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SAC, NEW YORK (117-192) April 23, 1953

DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268) ~~PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL~~

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC WEAPONS OR PARTS THEREOF
AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
INTO THE UNITED STATES

RECORDED - 15

Rebulet to New York dated March 20, 1953, and the replies from Washington Field, 3/26/53; Detroit, 3/27/53; New York, 4/3/53; and Chicago, 4/8/53.

In order to give you an indication of the effectiveness of the Coast Guard's Port Security Program on the matter of smuggling of atomic weapons or parts thereof, the following points are set forth from a report by the Secretary of the Navy and the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, which was furnished to the National Security Council, April 9, 1953.

1. The present port security program is not effective to prevent the introduction of atomic weapons into the United States.

2. The present program is effective to the extent that it offers partial protection against importation of a large yield atomic weapon into major port areas of the United States.

3. The present program is ineffective with respect to the importation of a major weapon into other ports of the United States.

4. With respect to the importation of small component parts of atomic weapons the present program is ineffective in and between all port areas.

5. The present program in major port areas offers sufficient risk of detection to the Soviets to make smuggling in these areas unattractive as a considered risk both to large yield weapons and smaller weapons or components thereof, in view of other available methods of such introduction in unprotected areas.

DECLASSIFIED BY sp4 bcm/bm ON 4-7-00
Changed to Secret 4-11-1954

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FBI

Tolson
Ladd
Nichols
Belmont
Clegg
Glavin
Harbo
Rosen
Tracy
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Mohr
Winterrowd
Tele. Rm.
Holloman
Gandy

cc: 2 - Chicago (117-110) - ~~Personal and Confidential~~
2 - Detroit (117-35) - ~~Personal and Confidential~~
2 - Washington Field (117-151) - ~~Personal and Confidential~~

56 APR 4 1953 LW:hmm

As pointed out heretofore, the most secure method of introducing an atomic weapon or its component parts is through the diplomatic pouch.

Problems relating to ports of entry, size of the pouch, handling of other diplomatic baggage, etc., are under consideration on an interdepartmental basis and any decisions reached by the interested agencies and approved by the National Security Council and the President will be brought to your attention.

In the meantime, surveillances should be maintained on diplomatic couriers whenever the facts warrant, and interested offices should in every instance be informed of the movement of couriers whose luggage is suspicious by the most expeditious means of communication which will enable them to afford such courier appropriate coverage upon his arrival.

The results of the check of the security indices regarding employees or operators of machine shops should be furnished to the Bureau promptly, together with a statement of the coverage proposed to be given such security index subjects.

This problem should be given your continuous study and the Bureau and other interested offices should be furnished promptly your observations on any investigative techniques or procedures which appear to you to have proven effective in coping with any aspect of this problem.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Mr. Sizoo
Miss Gandy

SECRET

TO : Director, FBI (117-268)

DATE: 4/3/53

FROM : SAC, New York (117-192)

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES

Rebulet 3/20/53 requesting that the New York Office advise the Bureau as to steps it is taking at the present time to detect the entrance of atomic bombs or component parts.

The New York Office recognizes, as does the Bureau, the immensity of this problem and the limitations that present conditions impose in any attempt to solve it. This office does not know any formula which it can recommend by which any reasonable assurance can be adduced of safety from the prospect of the entrance of bombs to this country. Because we do not know such an answer any more than does the Bureau at this time, it seems to be proper to pass on all suggestions for consideration by the Bureau even though some of these suggestions may not be worked out and offered as definitely useable plans.

It is recognized that it is possible that one or more bombs is already in the United States. It can only be hoped in this case that this fact can be uncovered by means of investigative effort, intensified effort to secure defections, and the like. However, the remainder of this two-fold problem is to prevent the entry of a bomb or additional bombs. This latter would seem to indicate increased activity at the ports of entry and might require drastic decisions of policy at the Seat of Government with regard to existing diplomatic practices and privileges. Decisions regarding some of New York's suggestions, it is recognized, cannot be made locally as they certainly involve matters of interest to the State Department, Treasury Department and the Department of Justice.

EXPEDITE PROCESSING

For example, unaccompanied shipments destined to foreign officials or establishments cannot be controlled by the FBI but only by Customs and shipping companies. As the Bureau was advised in a previous communication, a study of operations at Customs disclosed the fact that that agency was unable to give an accurate accounting of the volume and number of such shipments. A possible solution might be the establishment of a regulation that all unaccompanied shipments to officials or establishments of Iron Curtain countries must be destined to a specific bonded Customs warehouse in one or several designated ports. It would seem that only through establishing such jurisdiction by Customs by the channeling of these shipments can we be aware in some cases of the very existence of the shipment. Upon the entry to the

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warehouse of such a shipment Customs would notify the local FBI office, at which time the question arises what action this office should take. This

[redacted] b2 b7E

The New York Office has recently contacted [redacted] Inward Freight Department, Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. [redacted] has advised that Russian personnel in this country ship a great deal of merchandise through that company. [redacted] will be recontacted to ascertain whether or not incoming shipments arrive via the Moore-McCormack Lines and what coverage could be given in the event shipments are being sent through that company. However, it must be recognized that this is not the only line that can handle such shipments. b7C

The Bureau is well aware that the most secure medium for transmitting anything into the United States, subject to the limitations of size, is the diplomatic pouch or the accompanied hand luggage of diplomats. Once a foreign official or courier has entered the United States with such baggage, he is a virtually untouchable security problem for the FBI. This luggage and the pouches cannot be touched at any time as they are under diplomatic immunity. However, it is felt possibly advantageous that we have some more specific knowledge of the number of pieces and the amount of such accompanied baggage.

Because of the size of the Port of New York, the numerous piers, and the several airports, the problem is a difficult and widespread one, the solution of which would require considerable expenditure of manpower. It is felt that some consideration should be given toward the reinstituting of a travel control program of limited nature. This is particularly true of couriers because of the fact that many of them enter the United States without our having any knowledge of the fact until we receive a telephone call from Customs at the pier or airport. Due to the distance involved from the office and Customs' inability to detain the entering official or courier, it is impossible ever to have men at the point of entry in time either to observe the baggage or to institute a surveillance should such be considered desirable.

The suggestion that there be a general surveillance program directed toward couriers poses a further manpower problem with possible diplomatic repercussions. However, it is felt that it should be considered. To provide coverage at Idlewild Airport alone for a calendar week would require a minimum of nine additional agents on the surveillance squad. An additional nine agents would be needed to provide similar courier coverage for those arriving on ships at the Port of New York. However, this latter need could be obviated if the State Department would consider any arrangement

to treat the Russians in reciprocal fashion by forcing them to enter the United States via a specific ship line or pier. If this were done, for example at the Cunard Line pier, technical apparatus might be maintained in one spot. Under present conditions foreign officials enter at any of a dozen piers as well as Idlewild Airport. It is believed that it is necessary to secure more information as to the habits and personalities of the couriers involved before any plan could be developed toward the possible defection of one of them.

The following suggestion is based on the theory that, one, component parts of an atomic bomb must be limited in size and weight; two, detection apparatus such as a fluoroscope or metal detector can function better on smaller and less bulky packages. Observation on occasion of couriers in possession of mail pouches has indicated that some of them are of considerable size and bulk. The entire outside sack is under diplomatic seal. It is suggested that possibly diplomatic mail pouches entering the United States be limited to a specific maximum size, for example, 12" x 10" x 10". Such a specification would limit the size of any objects entering the country in the mail pouch. Such small pouches could be carried in a larger sack of any size provided that upon entry the larger sack must be emptied to permit the observation, counting and weighing of the smaller pouches. This would provide at least an estimate of the number, size and weight of possible metal pieces that might be contained.

UNDER DIPLOMATIC SEAL BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Reference is made to New York letter to the Bureau 3/16/53 captioned "ESPIONAGE AND FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS DEFECTION OF FOREIGN OFFICIALS IN THE UNITED STATES" (Bufile 66-6200-65) and New York letter to Bureau 3/25/53 captioned "TARGET" (Bufile 65-58501).

As has been pointed out in the above communications it has been suggested by agents in the New York Office that more approaches should be made to Russian and satellite officials at an early date.

The basic purpose in attempting to expand the defector plan is based on the belief that any enemy plan of importing an atomic bomb almost certainly involves a number of people who would have knowledge of it. More approaches to develop defectors might offer more opportunities to hit on a person who not only knows of the existence of a bomb or a plan for a bomb but who might be willing eventually to defect.

As suggested by the Bureau in reference letter, the Security Index records of the New York Office will be checked for persons employed in machine shops which might be utilized to fabricate "gun barrels". This study will

be commenced. However, the New York Office wishes to point out that with our present knowledge we can only make vague assumptions as to the extent of skill necessary to machine component parts of a bomb in the United States. Since we do not know the specific degree of skill needed, it is safe only to assume the greatest potential number of machinists are capable of doing such work. There are literally thousands of such in the New York area. By this assumption, every machinist or toolmaker is a potential manufacturer of a piece of an atomic bomb whether or not he is on the Security Index list. While the New York Office is not desirous of securing technical knowledge on such a subject, it is felt it might be necessary to have more precise knowledge in order to do a competent job in this field. For example, to narrow down the present tremendous field of machinists and machine shops, it might be necessary to know the size, the shape and the type of material to be used in making the part or parts which are most likely to be thus machined to order. It would be necessary to know the amount of equipment necessary, whether it would be a simple machine lathe or other more complicated equipment. Without such knowledge it is felt that all machinists or shops or even home shops may be suspect. The investigative ramifications of such a project appear to be too great to embark on without further study. Meantime, a preliminary survey of the Security Index will be begun as stated above.

With regard to actual procedures in operation at the present time, it is felt that the entire surveillance program specified under the caption "ESPIONAGE AND FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS" is applicable to this matter. To amplify the investigative coverage of Soviet and satellite personnel and individuals with whom they are in contact, the surveillance agents of the New York Office have been instructed immediately to report any movement of baggage, packages or freight. The agents have been instructed to determine the means of transport and its destination. The agents manning the stationary surveillance plants likewise have been instructed to watch specifically for the movement of baggage and packages. Files on the foreign organizations are being reviewed to identify drayage companies with whom these establishments have done business in the past.

Confidential Informant [redacted] technical(s) informants have been alerted for information as to movement of baggage and freight. [redacted] b1

[redacted] (S)

[redacted] b1

[redacted] (S)

[redacted] b1

[redacted] (S)

Confidential Informants [redacted] (S) b1

[redacted] (S)

[redacted]

It is to be noted, however, that in all instructions to agents and in all contacts with informants, no hint has been given that the purpose of this program is to secure information about the possible movement of atomic bombs or parts thereof or weapons of mass destruction into this country.

It is the opinion of the agents with whom this matter was discussed at New York that some reciprocal restrictions should be placed on the movements of Iron Curtain officials in the United States similar to those placed on our diplomats abroad. There is enclosed a clipping of an article which appeared in the "New York Herald Tribune" 3/31/53 relative to some of the conditions imposed on United States officials abroad. It has been suggested that when foreign officials are desirous of departing from the United States they should be required to appear personally at the Department of State and execute a travel form showing specifically when and from where they will depart the country. This procedure could be carried a further step and include travel within the United States. This declaration would show the specific train or plane on which the official is to travel and also the specific hotel or residence where he will stay in the other city as well as details concerning his return trip.

[redacted] b1

[redacted] (S)

The possibility of the smuggling of atomic bombs into this country has been given some coverage in the press. One such article appeared in the "New York Herald Tribune" 2/26/53 by JOSEPH J. RYAN. [redacted]

[redacted] b1

[redacted] (S)

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Letter to Director
NY 117-192

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

The New York Office wishes to assure the Bureau that this is a matter of immediate concern and considerable thought is being devoted to its possible solution. It is felt that there appears to be no clear-cut remedy that can be suggested at this time and the New York Office would welcome further thoughts from the Bureau concerning it as well as specific directions for action to be taken.

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Bohlen Is Sworn For Moscow Post

New Envoy Will Leave Here With Family Friday

WASHINGTON, March 30 (UP). —Charles E. Bohlen, whose nomination as Ambassador to Russia touched off President Eisenhower's first dispute with Sen. Joseph R. McCarthy, R., Wis., was sworn in today for the Moscow post. The oath was administered at a private ceremony in the office of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles.

A spokesman said Mr. Bohlen plans to fly from New York to Paris on Friday. He and his family will spend a few days there and in Germany before continuing to Moscow.

Douglas MacArthur 2d, career diplomat and nephew of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, was sworn in to succeed Mr. Bohlen as State Department counselor. Raymond D. Muir, assistant chief of protocol, administered the oath in Secretary Dulles' office to both Mr. Bohlen and Mr. MacArthur.

The spokesman said the Bohlen family will be in Moscow not later than April 10. He explained that they must await permission for an American plane to fly them there. The plane will carry American pilots, but while it is over Russian territory it will be flown by Russian airmen.

Mr. Bohlen was confirmed by the Senate Friday after a stormy debate. He succeeds George F. Kennan, author of the Truman administration's Communist "containment" policy. Mr. Kennan was barred from Russia last fall for remarks he made about life in the Soviet Union.

Jacob D. Beam, Charge d'Affaires in Moscow, has been in charge of the American Embassy.

NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE
March 31, 1953

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DATE 4-7-00 BY SP4 BJA/LBm

117-268-248
ENCLOSURE

SAC, DETROIT (117-35) May 15, 1953

RECORDED-45

DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268)

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS
THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES

Reurlet March 27, 1953.

Paragraph 2, Page 4 requested Bureau authority to institute physical surveillance on the activities of [redacted] when he returns from his vacation [redacted] Since the State Department has authorized an active investigation of [redacted] and since he is presently the subject of a pending case by your office, there is no reason for you not to conduct a physical surveillance on [redacted] should events make such surveillance necessary and feasible.

b7C

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Mohr
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Sizoo
Miss Gandy

MAY 20 1953

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI (117-268) DATE: March 27, 1953

FROM : SAC, Detroit (117-35) CONFIDENTIAL AMSD ~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES

Reference is made to Bureau Airtel, March 23, 1953 and Bureau letter to New York, March 20, 1953, captioned as above.

In compliance with instructions contained in referenced Bureau Airtel, previous reports of Confidential Informants [redacted](S) [redacted] were reviewed with a view toward determining whether any mention has been made in any of the reports of these informants which would refer to any methods of protecting undeveloped film within the Detroit Polish Consulate. b1 b2 b7D

No reference was made in any of the informants' reports which would indicate any protective measures which might have been taken by the Consulate in this regard. This office is not aware of any particular means having been exercised to protect film from fogging during forwarding by courier. The instructions of the Bureau will be followed as a continuing project in an attempt to ascertain whether any such precautions are being followed. This will be further developed in detail in the following paragraphs.

With specific reference to Bureau letter of March 20, 1953, definite attempts are being made to intelligently augment the informant coverage of the Detroit Division with respect to the Polish Consulate. The urgency of the subject matter under discussion is fully realized and in our attempts to develop informant coverage concerning the Consulate, particular attention will be paid to those persons who might have knowledge of the contents of the pouches and the incoming diplomatic shipments, as well as knowledge of the disposition of such contents.

In this respect the Bureau is already aware of the activities of this Division under the TOPLEV program, in attempting [redacted] b7C b7D

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Letter to Director Re: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE U.S.

Secondly, under the Bureau authorized interview program of security subjects, a request has already been submitted to the Bureau along with a report asking for authority to interview [redacted] and who is known to have been in contact with Consulate authorities frequently in the past. b7C

Thirdly, reference is made to Detroit letter to the Bureau of March 12, 1953 entitled ESPIONAGE AND FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS - DEFECTION OF FOREIGN OFFICIALS, which sets forth the result of our survey of [redacted] b7C b7D

The specific matter of development of Informants who can produce information of value in connection with the subject matter of this communication will continue to receive constant attention.

The Bureau's attention is called to the fact that through the present informant coverage at the Detroit Polish Consulate this office is aware of any express shipments which arrive destined for the consulate, before delivery is made, and it is anticipated that in the future when the consulate is notified of the arrival of express shipments, that this office can, if necessary, make arrangements to previously examine these shipments before delivery to the consulate.

The Bureau's attention is called to the fact that the postal and customs authorities in Detroit in the past have closely scrutinized and examined all postal deliveries to the Detroit Consulate and in the past these authorities have notified this division when any objects are delivered to the consulate through the mails in which those authorities thought this division might be interested. However, it is realized that shipments of materials as described in referenced letter could not logically be made through the mails.

SECRET

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Letter to Director Re: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE U.S.

While it is not possible at the present time to augment the coverage now being afforded by [redacted] it is believed that the coverage afforded by the above will permit this office to know in advance of the identity of any drayage and hauling establishments, as well as truck rental concerns, which might be hired by the consulate in advance concerning any shipments into or away from the consulate, so that appropriate coverage to the concern involved can be effected. b2 b7D

With respect specifically to what is being done to adequately cover the activities of the Polish personnel in Detroit, and with respect to what steps are being taken to augment that coverage, with particular reference to physical surveillances of personnel and shipments, the following is set forth.

Physical surveillances of the couriers coming into and leaving the city (which have only been covered infrequently in the past) are being instituted. To facilitate such coverage it is suggested that the Bureau issue instructions to all offices engaged in the problem under discussion that the movements of such couriers be the subject of telephonic and teletype communications (which-ever is necessary because of the time element) to the pertinent office. It has been noted that under the present system of using Airtels, the couriers may already be in the city before the various offices have knowledge of their presence.

It is noted that in the past, upon receipt of a pouch, the Consul General has been in the habit of opening same himself in the confines of his office, and apportioning out to any other employees of the consulate, those particular items which he wished them to handle. It is also noted that the relationship between the Consul General and the other employees of the Consulate, including [redacted] exists on a quite formal basis and it is the impression of this office that any activities coming within the subject matter under discussion would not at the present time logically be made the subject of discussion by the Consul General with any other employees. b7C

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Letter to Director, FBI Re: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE U.S.

The tempo of physical surveillances of visitors to the Consulate will be increased in an effort to effect full identification of anyone visiting the consulate.

Bureau authority is hereby being requested to institute physical surveillances of the activities of [redacted] b7C whenever, in the considered judgement of this office, it would appear advisable to conduct such surveillance in connection with any apparently suspicious circumstances which might exist at that time.

3-31-53 WHEN HE COMES BACK IS SOON ENOUGH LW

Information has been received from [redacted] that the [redacted] b2 b7C b7D

[redacted] b7C b7D

~~SECRET~~

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. Ladd	
Mr. Nichols	
Mr. Belmont	
Mr. Clegg	
Mr. Glavin	
Mr. Harbo	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Tracy	
Mr. Gearty	
Mr. Mohr	
Mr. Winterrowd	
Tele. Room	
Mr. Holloman	
Mr. Sizoo	
Miss Gandy	

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268)

DATE: March 26, 1953

FROM : SAC, WFO (117-151)

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES

Reference is made to Bureau letter dated March 20, 1953, in which the Bureau comments upon the letter submitted by the field in response to its letter of February 19, 1953.

Please be advised that immediate steps are being taken by this office to augment our informant coverage in Soviet and satellite establishments in this district as expeditiously as possible with due regard for the problem under consideration in this matter. The Bureau is well aware that this office has no informants who have exact knowledge of the contents of incoming diplomatic pouches. This office has, over a period of years, maintained close contact with officials of the Bureau of Customs, through whose assistance considerable information of value has been obtained regarding the contents of incoming diplomatic shipments. This excellent cooperation has continued up to the present date. However, in order to again insure that our interests in this matter are stressed to the appropriate officials of the Bureau of Customs, these officials will be contacted again in person in the immediate future, at which time a determination will be discreetly made as to whether our coverage in this respect can be improved. With respect to the knowledge of the disposition of such contents, such disposition appears to fall within the province of physical surveillance coverage.

The Bureau comments that consideration should be given to appropriate coverage of drayage and hauling establishments doing business with Soviet and satellite establishments. These firms have in the past been entirely cooperative with this office and in order to insure continued cooperation, they will be recontacted under this program to insure absolute coverage by this office.

The Bureau requests advice on steps being taken to adequately cover the activities of Soviet and satellite personnel in this division and what steps are being taken to augment that coverage with particular reference to physical surveillances of personnel and shipments.

At this time, Soviet and satellite establishments in this district are being afforded the maximum surveillance coverage possible with the number of Special Agent personnel assigned to this division. I will continue to afford the maximum coverage possible under these conditions. Requests for additional personnel have been previously directed to the Bureau so that more complete coverage can be attained.

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ON 4-7-00
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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Mr. Tolson

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI(117-268)

DATE: April 8,1953

FROM : SAC, Chicago(117-110)

SECRET

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF, AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES

CONFIDENTIAL

Rebulet to New York dated March 20, 1953, wherein the Bureau requested to be advised as to what coverage the Chicago Office is giving Soviet and satellite personnel located within the territory covered by the Chicago Office, and what steps will be taken to augment that coverage, with particular reference to physical surveillances of personnel and shipments.

The only official establishment of a Soviet or satellite government within the territory covered by the Chicago Office is the Chicago Polish Consulate. There are at the present time six individuals employed at the Chicago Polish Consulate.

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Current Coverage of Chicago Polish Consulate

Information concerning activities of the Consulate and its personnel is currently obtained through utilization of

cc 1 Washington Field(117-151)(Registered)
1 Detroit(66-2174)(Registered Mail)
1 New York(117-192)(Registered Mail)

LHMcG:SR
(AM)(REGISTERED)

RECORDED - 16 117-268-

56 APR 4 1953

4/23/53

SECRET

[redacted] The information furnished by these Tesurs is being reviewed on a daily basis in an effort to obtain the following information: b2 b7D

1. Identity of drayage and hauling establishments or truck rental concerns who receive a request from the Polish Consulate to transport any article or material.

Surveillance will be instituted on the particular truck or drayage conveyance. Surveilling agents will be alerted to observe any material or container such as described in rebulet. If the services of any particular trucking or hauling firm are utilized on more than one occasion, arrangements will be made for the Chicago Office to be advised should the Polish Consulate again request the services of the particular firm.

2. Information concerning the arrival and departure of visiting Polish officials.

Consideration will be given in each instance to instituting physical surveillance of visiting Polish officials.

3. Information concerning the arrival and departure of Polish couriers.

Their arrival and departure will be covered by physical surveillance. It is to be noted, however, that other than obtaining descriptive information concerning the luggage or baggage these couriers carry, it is doubtful if surveillance will result in the obtaining of any positive information.

4. Identity of contacts of the Polish Consulate.

The indices of the Chicago Office will be checked on such contacts and consideration will be given to the advisability of conducting active investigation where appropriate.

Individual case files are currently maintained in the Chicago Office on [redacted] b7C

[redacted] Bureau authority to actively inves-

tigate these individuals will be requested. In conducting such investigation, the Chicago Office will be alert for any information which might present the opportunity for obtaining additional informant coverage.

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[redacted] b1 (S)

[redacted] b1 (S)

[redacted] b1 (S)

The Chicago Office will review the records on Security Index Subjects in an effort to identify those SI Subjects employed in machine shops, as suggested in rebulet.

SECRET

SAC, New York

April 14, 1953

Director, FBI

Smuggling of Atomic Bomb or Parts Thereof and other Weapons of Mass Destruction into the United States

[redacted] b7C b7D

INTERNAL SECURITY - R
POTENTIAL SECURITY INFORMANT

ReNYairtel 3-27-53, captioned [redacted] Internal Security - R," and NYlet 4-1-53, captioned [redacted] b7C b7D

[redacted]

[redacted]

You have advised that all transactions with the Soviets by the Moore-McCormack Steamship Company are handled through [redacted] You should consider as to whether there is any necessity to endeavor to secure the cooperation of [redacted] as well as that of [redacted] You should submit to the Bureau your recommendation concerning the advisability of attempting to obtain [redacted] cooperation. b7C b7D

The Bureau has also noted that [redacted] is apprehensive of the possibility that [redacted]

105-new

cc - 2 - Washington Field (Attachment)

cc - 105-17097

- 117-268

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Moore-McCormack Steamship Company to cause [redacted] The Bureau desires that further information be secured if possible concerning the influence of [redacted] at the Moore-McCormack Steamship Company. It is possible that [redacted] comment may be intended to indicate that the loss of business from the Amtorg Trading Corporation would be frowned upon by the Moore-McCormack Steamship Company. On the other hand, [redacted] comment may indicate that some official or officials of the Moore-McCormack Steamship Company are ideologically sympathetic with Feinstein and/or the Russian viewpoint. In this connection, you should endeavor to determine whether the above comment by [redacted] has any connection with his statement that [redacted] has attended a reception at the Soviet Embassy with an unnamed official of the Moore-McCormack Steamship Company. Regardless of any connection between these two matters you should identify if possible the official of the Moore-McCormack Steamship Company who attended the above-mentioned reception. b7C b7D

WFO should endeavor to identify the Soviet employee named [redacted] mentioned on page five of attached NYlet of 4-1-53. If the identity of this individual can be determined, the Bureau should be advised in order that consideration may be given to notifying the CIA of this information. b7C b7D

[redacted]

Tolson
Ladd
Nichols
Belmont
Clegg
Glavin
Harbo
Rosen
Tracy
Laughlin
Mohr
Winterrowd
Tele. Rm.
Holloman
Gandy

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED S[illegible]ERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: April 20, 1953

FROM : D. M. LADD

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES REQUIRED TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION OF DEMOLITION ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

Tolson
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copy of

Attached for your approval (and signature) is a letter in the above matter directed to the Honorable James S. Lay, Jr., Executive Secretary, National Security Council, dated April 20, 1953.

This letter notifies Mr. Lay that a working group has been established in accordance with the letter to him from the Chairmen of the IIC and the ICIS dated March 23, 1953, and as confirmed by him in a letter to the Honorable Gordon Dean, Atomic Energy Commission dated April 1, 1953. This working group is making a study to determine what necessary information should be correlated and released to supervisory or administrative officers of the U. S. Government; the field representatives of the intelligence and enforcement agencies; and to public official representatives of duly constituted law enforcement agencies, who as members of the general public, must have some type of information in order to cooperate intelligently with the agencies actively engaged in detection and defense.

The working group is composed of representatives of the individual IIC agencies and the following agencies represented in the Subcommittees of the ICIS: Immigration and Naturalization Service, Bureau of Customs, Coast Guard, and Federal Civil Defense Administration. The working group is receiving technical assistance from a representative of the Atomic Energy Commission.

The letter is on the stationery of the ICIS because it was prepared by ICIS Secretary, Leonard Bienvenu, with ICIS clerical personnel.

RECOMMENDATION:

RECORDED - 117-268

APPROVE

It is respectfully recommended that you ~~sign~~ the attached letter as Chairman of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, after which it will be returned to the ICIS by the Domestic Intelligence Division, for signature by Mr. Thomas J. Donegan. Individual copies for members of the IIC and the ICIS will be distributed after approval.

Attachment

LW:hmm
117-268

LIAISON

MAY 6 1953

SECURITY INFORMATION

2212 xxx

April 20, 1953

Honorable James S. Lay, Jr.
Executive Secretary
National Security Council
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Lay:

Reference is made to our letter of March 23, 1953, indicating that the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security would establish a working Group composed of representatives of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, G-2 of the Army, Office of Special Investigations of the Air Force, Office of Naval Intelligence, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Bureau of Customs, the Coast Guard and the Atomic Energy Commission to make an immediate study to determine what necessary information should be collated and released to accomplish the objectives of the December 4, 1952 report to the President regarding countermeasures required to detect and defend against the clandestine introduction and detonation of atomic weapons.

The purpose of this letter is to advise you that this Working Group has been established and is at present engaged in preparing the educational and information program outlined in our letter of March 23, 1953. The membership consists of the agencies listed above as well as a representative of the Federal Civil Defense Administration. As previously indicated, when the educational program has been outlined and the proposed documentary material approved by the IIC and the ICIS, it will be presented to the National Security Council and to the Atomic Energy Commission for approval.

Copies of this letter are being transmitted to the heads of the agencies represented on the Working Group.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover
Chairman
Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference

4-7-60 SPH bja/PAM

Thomas J. Donegan
Chairman
Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security

FOR APPROVAL

SECURITY INFORMATION

ENCLOSURE

111 218-252

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: April 30, 1953

FROM : D. M. LADD

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES REQUIRED TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION OF DEMOLITION ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

Tolson
Ladd
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Tele. Room
Holloman
Sizoo
Miss Gandy

Attached for your approval and signature is a letter dated May 1, 1953, directed to the Honorable Charles E. Wilson, Secretary of Defense, requesting that Department to accept primary responsibility for sponsoring the study and preparation of a detailed plan regarding the disarming and disposal of unlawful atomic weapons. This communication, which has been prepared for the signatures of the Chairman, Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, and the Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security, is predicated upon a recommendation of the ICIS, which has been checked with Mr. J. P. Coyne, the Internal Security Representative on the National Security Council, by Mr. Leonard Bienvenu, Secretary of the ICIS. Military agencies of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference have concurred in the proposed letter.

This letter is on the stationery of the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security because it was prepared by the ICIS Secretary with ICIS clerical personnel.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is respectfully recommended that you sign the attached letter as Chairman of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, after which it will be returned to the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security by the Domestic Intelligence Division for the signature of Mr. Thomas J. Donegan. Individual copies for members of the IIC and the ICIS will be distributed after approval.

Attachment
LW:hmm

RECORDED-86

INDEXED-86

EX-112

MAY 4 1953

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4-7-00 BY SP4 BJA/LBM
948742/950935/997059

SECURITY [illegible]

April 24, 1953

Honorable Val Peterson
Administrator
Federal Civil Defense Administration
Washington 25, D. C.

Attention: Mr. Dario G. Barossi, Intelligence Division

Dear Mr. Peterson:

This is to confirm our understanding that the Federal Civil Defense Administration will participate in a Working Group created under the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security to develop an educational and information program designed to assist officials of the government having responsibilities for countermeasures required to detect and defend against the clandestine introduction into the United States of atomic weapons. This program will not be confined to government officials but will include study of what necessary information should be released to the public at large in order that they may render effective assistance to the government in connection with this problem.

We are especially mindful of the FCDA interest and competency in this latter area and take this opportunity to express our appreciation for your participation in this assignment.

Mr. Dario G. Barossi is attending the initial meetings of the Working Group as your representative and, as you know, he also represents the FCDA on the ICIS Subcommittee on Defense Against Unconventional Attack and the ICIS Subcommittee on Industrial Security. It is understood that another representative from your agency may be designated later depending upon the type of representation to be needed by the Group as it progresses in its work. We wish to advise you that it will be necessary that the individual designated have an Atomic Energy Commission "Q" clearance.

For your information, we are enclosing a copy of a letter dated April 20, 1953, to the Executive Secretary, National Security Council, by the Chairman, IIC and ICIS, relative to the status of this phase of the program.

Sincerely yours,

SIGNED

J. Edgar Hoover
Chairman
Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference

56 JUN 11 1953

SIGNED

Thomas J. Donegan
Chairman
Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security

SECURITY INFORMATION

SEC RIT' MATION

April 24, 1953

Honorable Herbert Brownell, Jr.
The Attorney General
Washington 25, D. C.

SMUGGLING Atom Bombs OR PARTS FOR Atom Bombs Into the United States

My dear Mr. Brownell:

For your information, there is enclosed herewith a copy of a letter dated April 20, 1953, to the Executive Secretary, National Security Council, from the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security advising that a Working Group has been established to make an immediate study to determine what necessary information should be collated and released to accomplish the objectives of the December 4, 1952 report to the President regarding counter-measures required to detect and defend against the clandestine introduction and detonation of atomic weapons.

The agencies of the Department of Justice represented on this Working Group are the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Mr. Charles W. Bates is the Bureau representative and Mr. Willard F. Kelly is serving as the representative of the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

Sincerely yours,

/S/
J. Edgar Hoover
Chairman
Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference

SIGNED
Thomas J. Donegan
Chairman
Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security

4-9-00 SP4 bja/PAM

117-268-

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56 JUN 11 1953

SECURITY MATION

SECURITY INFORMATION

April 20, 1953

SMUGGLING ATOM BOMBS OR PARTS FOR ATOM BOMBS INTO the United States

The Honorable
The Secretary of the Treasury
Washington 25, D. C.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

For your information, there is enclosed herewith a copy of a letter dated April 20, 1953, to the Executive Secretary, National Security Council, from the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security advising that a Working Group has been established to make an immediate study to determine what necessary information should be collated and released to accomplish the objectives of the December 4, 1952 report to the President regarding countermeasures required to detect and defend against the clandestine introduction and detonation of atomic weapons.

The Department of the Treasury is represented on this Working Group by Mr. Chester A. Emerick, Deputy Commissioner of Customs, Mr. Frank E. Russell, Bureau of Customs, and Captain Frederick G. Eastman, U. S. Coast Guard.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover
Chairman
Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference

Thomas J. Donegan
Chairman
Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security

117-268-V

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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April 24, 1953

SMUGGLING ATOM BOMBS OR PARTS FOR ATOM BOMBS INTO THE UNITED STATES

The Honorable
The Secretary of Defense
Washington 25, D. C.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

For your information, there is enclosed herewith a copy of a letter dated April 20, 1953, to the Executive Secretary, National Security Council, from the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security advising that a Working Group has been established to make an immediate study to determine what necessary information should be collated and released to accomplish the objectives of the December 4, 1952 report to the President regarding countermeasures required to detect and defend against the clandestine introduction and detonation of atomic weapons.

The Department of Defense is represented on this Working Group by Lt. Colonel Donald C. Landon, G-2, Department of the Army, Mr. Gilbert R. Levy, Office of Special Investigations, Department of the Air Force, and Captain D. C. Hamberger, Office of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy.

Sincerely,

J. Edgar Hoover
Chairman
Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference

SIGNED

Thomas J. Donegan
Chairman
Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security

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April 24, 1953

SMUGGLING ATOM B. MB OR PARTS FOR ATOM BOMBS INTO THE United States

Honorable Gordon E. Dean
Chairman
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Dean:

For your information, there is enclosed herewith a copy of a letter dated April 20, 1953, to the Executive Secretary, National Security Council, from the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security advising that a Working Group has been established to make an immediate study to determine what necessary information should be collated and released to accomplish the objectives of the December 4, 1952 report to the President regarding countermeasures required to detect and defend against the clandestine introduction and detonation of atomic weapons.

The Atomic Energy Commission is represented on this Working Group by Dr. Donald F. Mastick.

Sincerely yours,

SIGNED

J. Edgar Hoover
Chairman
Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference

SIGNED

Thomas J. Donegan
Chairman
Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security

4-7-00 SP4 6/2/PMA

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JUN 11 1953

SECURITY INFORMATION

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: April 24, 1953

FROM : D. M. LADD

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES REQUIRED TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION OF DEMOLITION ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

Tolson
Ladd
Clegg
Glavin
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Harbo
Belmont
Mohr
Tele. Room
Nease
Gandy

Attached for your approval and signature are letters dated April 24, 1953, directed to the Attorney General, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Federal Civil Defense Administrator. These letters confirm with the appropriate agency heads, the identities of individuals under their jurisdiction who are engaged in the study to determine what necessary information should be correlated and released in order to accomplish the objectives of the December 4, 1952, report to the President. These letters transmit a copy of the letter to the Honorable James S. Lay, Jr., dated April 20, 1953, from the Chairman of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference and the Chairman of the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security, as was stated in the letter of April 20.

These communications have been checked with Mr. J. P. Coyne, the Internal Security Representative on the National Security Council, by Mr. Leonard Bienvenu, Secretary of the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security. These letters are on the stationery of the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security because they were prepared by the ICIS Secretary with ICIS clerical personnel.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is respectfully recommended that you sign the attached letters as Chairman of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference after which they will be returned to the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security by the Domestic Intelligence Division for the signature of Mr. Thomas J. Donegan. Individual copies for members of the IIC and the ICIS will be distributed after approval.

DELIVERED TO BIENVENU FOR DONEGAN'S SIGNATURE 1PM 4-28-53 LW

Attachment
LW:hmm

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-7-00 BY SP4 BJA/LSM

MAY 8 1953

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56 MAY 13 1953

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI (117-268)

DATE: 4/2[illegible]

FROM: LVB SAC, New York (117-192)

SECURITY INFORMATION - [illegible]

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES

ReNYlet 4/7/53.

[redacted] Idlewild Airport, advised that he had determined from the auditing office [redacted] that [redacted] arrived with six bags, total weight 255 pounds. [redacted] was unable to develop any additional information. b7C

EXPEDITE PROCESSING

In view of his information, no further investigation will be conducted concerning [redacted]

RECORDED-38 APR 22 1953

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RVG:EG

63 MAY 19 1953

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DECLASSIFIED BY SP4 BJA/LBM
ON 4-7-00
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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PR
NATIONAL SECURITY COUN
WASHINGTON

April 1, 1953

Dear Mr. Dean:

The enclosed letter, dated March 23, 1953, from the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security and Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, requesting the collaboration of the Atomic Energy Commission in the preparation of material required to detect and defend against the clandestine introduction and detonation in place of demolition atomic weapons, is transmitted herewith.

I have confirmed from [redacted] that the preparation of this material, as outlined in the enclosed letter, is consistent with the procedure outlined in his letter to you on this subject dated March 12, 1953. b7C

It would therefore be appreciated if the Atomic Energy Commission would cooperate with the IIC and the ICIS as requested in the enclosed letter.

Sincerely yours,

JAMES S. LAY, JR.
Executive Secretary

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4-7-00 BY SP4 BJA/LBM

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Honorable Gordon Dean
Chairman,
Atomic Energy Commission
Washington

cc: Chairman, IIC (w/o encl)
Chairman, ICIS (w/o encl)

RECORDED - 123

MAY 8 1953

SECRET

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. D. M. LADD

DATE: April 9, 1953

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES REQUIRED TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION OF DEMOLITION ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

Tolson
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Rosen
Tracy
Harbo
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Mohr
Tele. Room
Nease
Gandy

SYNOPSIS:

Under date of March 23, 1953, a letter in the above-captioned matter was directed to the Honorable James S. Lay, Jr., Executive Secretary, National Security Council, jointly from the Director as Chairman of the IIC and Mr. William E. Foley, Acting Chairman of the ICIS. This letter requested the National Security Council to instruct the Atomic Energy Commission to collaborate with the representatives of the enforcement agencies charged with responsibilities for the detection and defense against clandestine atomic weapons in the preparation of informative material to be released to those persons who need it in connection with their work.

The Chairman of the IIC has now received a copy of a letter from Lay to the Honorable Gordon Dean, Atomic Energy Commission, dated April 1, 1953, confirming the procedures in the letter of March 23, and requesting the cooperation of the Atomic Energy Commission in the project.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. It is respectfully recommended that the Secretary of the IIC notify the IIC military agencies of the letter from Lay to Dean dated April 1, 1953, and (1) suggest to them that they furnish to him the name of a representative from each who is fully aware of the investigative needs of their personnel to work on this problem with representatives of the enforcement agencies and the Atomic Energy Commission; (2) as soon as all persons are selected, arrangements will be made for them to meet with the IIC-ICIS Joint Committee on Countermeasures in order to be briefed on approaches to the problem, and thereafter draw up recommendations regarding the information which should be provided.

4-14-53.

RECORDED - 123

INDEXED - 123

117-268

MAY 8 1953

117-268

LW:hmm

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-7-00 BY SP4 BJA/LBM

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2. It is respectfully recommended that Supervisor C. W. Bates, the Bureau liaison representative with the Atomic Energy Commission, be designated as the Bureau's representative on this project, and Supervisor L. Whitson as his alternate.

DETAILS:

The report to the President dated December 4, 1952, recommended that complete information in connection with the problem of detection and defense against clandestine atomic weapons be disseminated on a need-to-know basis in the various departments and agencies of the Government which have responsibilities in connection with the prevention of the introduction of such weapons and with the detection of such weapons once they are introduced.

The IIC-ICIS Joint Committee which was set up to follow the implementation of the recommendations obtained a briefing on aspects of the problem for selected IIC and ICIS personnel at the Atomic Energy Commission Headquarters, March 18, 1953.

Under date of March 23, 1953, a letter was directed to the Honorable James S. Lay, Jr., Executive Secretary, National Security Council, jointly from the Director as Chairman of the IIC and Mr. William E. Foley, Acting Chairman of the ICIS, pointing out that the FBI and military intelligence agencies, and the enforcement agencies represented in the ICIS; namely, Immigration, Customs, and Coast Guard, should, pursuant to the recommendation in the December 4, 1952, report, get together with the Atomic Energy Commission and make a study of the informative material which should be released to those persons who need it in connection with their work. This informative information would be recommended for release at three distinct levels as follows:

1. Those officers of the Government who are in supervisory or administrative positions.

2. *Officers of the Government who are actively engaged in detection of and defense against atomic weapons in the field.*

3. *Public officials, representatives of duly constituted law enforcement agencies, etc., who, as members of the general public must have some type of information in order to cooperate intelligently with the agencies actively engaged in detection and defense.*

The National Security Council was requested to instruct the Atomic Energy Commission to collaborate with the above-named agencies in the preparation of such material.

The Chairman of the IIC has now received a copy of a letter from Lay to the Honorable Gordon Dean, Atomic Energy Commission, dated April 1, 1953, confirming the procedures in the letter of March 23, and requesting the cooperation of the Atomic Energy Commission in the project.

The question of determining the data which would be most useful in the discovery of and defense against clandestine atomic weapons can best be handled by persons thoroughly familiar with the investigative needs of the respective intelligence and enforcement agencies. The Office of Naval Intelligence and the Office of Special Investigations of the Air Force are not represented individually on the Joint Committee. The Bureau of Customs and the Coast Guard are not represented individually on the Joint Committee, although there is a representative of the Treasury Department present. The Immigration and Naturalization Service is not represented on the Joint Committee although Leonard Bienvenu, the Secretary of the ICIS, who meets with the Joint Committee, is an employee of the Department of Justice.

It was the feeling of the Joint Committee, therefore, that a working group for this particular problem, consisting of persons acquainted with the needs of the specific intelligence and enforcement agencies could meet with the Joint Committee initially for the purpose of reviewing the specific problem and thereafter draw up, based upon the specific needs of their organizations, recommendations regarding the information which should be provided.

These recommendations, after approval by the IIC and ICIS, would be referred for final approval to the National Security Council and the Atomic Energy Commission.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. D. M. LADD

DATE: April 20, 1953

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES REQUIRED TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION OF DEMOLITION ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

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SYNOPSIS:

Representatives of IIC and ICIS met on April 15, 1953, to determine investigative needs of agents in the field in connection with the detection of atomic devices and to recommend information to be released at three distinct levels, i.e. (1) U. S. Government supervisory or administrative officers, (2) field representatives of enforcement agencies, (3) members of the general public.

Another meeting has been scheduled for 2:00 p.m. April 22, at which time Liaison Agent C. W. Bates, who has been designated as the Bureau's representative in this group, will propose a series of questions for discussion.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that the detailed questions set forth hereinafter be submitted for discussion at the April 22, meeting.

CWB/LW:hmm

RECORDED - 123

INDEXED - 123

117-262-

MAY 22 1953

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4-7-00 BY SP4 BJM/LBM
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DETAILS:

Reference is made to the memorandum to you dated April 9, 1953, recommending that Liaison Agent C. W. Bates be designated as the Bureau's representative to work with other representatives of the enforcement agencies charged with the responsibilities for detection and defense against clandestine atomic weapons in the preparation of informative material to be released to those persons who need it in connection with their work. You will recall that the information decided upon as necessary would be recommended for release at three distinct levels, i.e. (1) U. S. Government Supervisory or Administrative Officers, (2) representatives of enforcement and intelligence agencies in the field, and (3) public officials, representatives of duly constituted law enforcement agencies, etc, as members of the general public.

The first meeting of the above group, authorized by the National Security Council, was held April 15, 1953. The IIC representatives were Liaison Agent C. W. Bates, FBI; Lieutenant Colonel C. D. Landon, G-2, Army. The representative of OSI, who was unable to attend, is Mr. Gilbert Levy. ONI has made no designation.

The representatives from the ICIS who attended were Mr. C. A. Emerick, Deputy Commissioner of Customs; Mr. F. E. Russell, Customs, who is a member of the ICIS Subcommittees on Entry and Exit and Unconventional Attack; Captain F. G. Eastman, Coast Guard, who is a member of the ICIS Subcommittee on Entry and Exit; Mr. D. G. Barozzi, Federal Civil Defense Administration, who is a member of the ICIS Subcommittees on Industrial Security and Unconventional Attack; Mr. W. F. Kelley, Immigration and Naturalization Service. Dr. D. F. Mastick, Atomic Energy Commission, is Technical Advisor to the group.

It is proposed by the FBI representative that the following questions pertinent to investigation by the FBI in the field be submitted for discussion:

(1) Size, weight and shape of the various CLANDESTINE atomic weapons and their component parts.

(2) The shielding necessary so that an individual will not receive a lethal dose of radiation when smuggling fissionable material into the country on his person.

(3) *Medical aspects of smuggling of fissionable material with particular reference to visible symptoms of prolonged contact with such material.*

(4) *Shielding necessary so that fissionable material will not be detected by a passive device such as a Geiger Counter.*

(5) *How crude could an atomic weapon be and still produce an explosion.*

(6) *Physical description of the material involved in such a crude weapon.*

(7) *Time necessary to assemble atomic weapons of various types and yields.*

(8) *Equipment and security precautions necessary in assembling such weapons.*

(9) *Nature and description of other materials used in atomic weapons besides fissionable material.*

(10) *Storage facilities necessary in the event components are brought into this country for final assembly.*

(11) *Possibility of camouflage of component parts including fissionable material.*

(12) *Any unusual characteristics of component parts or fissionable materials which would be easily noticed.*

(13) *What are the precautions which must be taken in transporting assembled weapons?*

(14) *From the standpoint of safety and security, would an implosion-type weapon be likely transported around the country in assembled form or would it be assembled in the target area?*

SAC, SEATTLE

MAY 7, 1953

DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268)

PERSONAL AND ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
REGISTERED MAIL

RECORDED

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF
AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
INTO THE UNITED STATES

Reference is made to your memorandum dated April 22, 1953, re "Special Weapons Course, Navy Fleet Training Command, North Island, California," in which you indicated that the captioned course of four days' duration deals with the construction, development, capabilities, use, assembly, etc., of fission weapons and devices. You also indicated that data is furnished concerning new and unpublished detection devices.

Your attention is directed to No Number SAC Letter AM, Series 1952, dated December 10, 1952, which sets forth certain information regarding new developments in fission weapons and devices. The special committee referred to in No Number SAC Letter AM is studying the entire question of release of "restricted data" relating to the components and assemblies of fission weapons. When authorization has been obtained for release of such up-to-date data, such will be furnished to the Bureau's field offices. The special committee referred to is also studying the problem of disarming and disposal of fission weapons.

For your information, with regard to the "new and unpublished detection devices," the Atomic Energy Commission has stated positively that at the present time there is no detection device, of general application, which would detect shielded fissionable material, be portable, and be nonfatal to humans. The device described in your memorandum would appear to be [redacted] b2 b7E

[redacted]

enormous power supply.

As soon as release of up-to-date data relating to the detection of atomic devices, their disarming and disposal, is authorized by the National Security Council and the President, appropriate dissemination to the Bureau's field offices will be made. Under the circumstances, participation in the Special Weapons Course by Bureau personnel is not being considered. You should, nevertheless, be alert to supply the Bureau with any further data concerning this subject matter whenever it comes to your attention.

DECLASSIFIED BY sp4 BJA/UBM
ON 4-7-00

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LW: hmm

62 MAY 26 1953

COMM - FBI
MAY 11 1953
MAILED 28

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI ~~TOP SECRET~~ DATE: April 22, 1953

FROM : SAC, SEATTLE ATTENTION: ASS'T. DIRECTOR A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: SPECIAL WEAPONS COURSE
NAVY FLEET TRAINING COMMAND
NORTH ISLAND, CALIFORNIA

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Carroll
Mr. Gurnea
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Mr. Sizoo
Miss Gandy

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2 STP/mlw ON 4/9/93

I have been confidentially advised that the Navy is presently conducting a continuous ~~Top Secret~~ school at its Fleet Training Command Center, North Island, California, near San Diego. It is a Special Weapons Course with Serial #C427 and lasts for four days' duration.

This Special Weapons Course is mostly lecture with some movies and practical problems concerning all the phases of atomic energy and the hydrogen bomb by the Navy's experts and top scientists and physicists. It is focused for laymen of no particular scientific training. It handles construction and development, tactical problems, capabilities and use, assembly and dismounting, concealability, substitute construction, etc., of the bomb.

I feel that the Bureau might want to consider approaching the Navy for the assignment of several of our personnel to such a course because of its quite obvious interest for our Agents. It would appear to be of vital interest to our Agents to know for

EXPEDITE PROCESSING

b2
b7E

I am advised that the school is continuous with approximately 50 selected men in a class, with a charge of two dollars per day for board and room.

Should the Bureau decide to consider doing anything about this training, inasmuch as this whole course and data concerning it are ~~TOP SECRET~~ it is requested that the source of information concerning it be protected, since only one man from this entire district has taken the course, and it would not be too difficult for the Navy to trace down data concerning it.

RDA:LM

RECORDED - 101 117-268
INDEXED - 101
MAY 14 1953

SAC, New York (117-192)

May 22, 1953

Director, FBI (117-268)

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

RECORDED - 67

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC WEAPONS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES

G.I.R.-5

Reurlet 5-5-53 suggesting that an estimate of the size, weight, shape and metallic composition of the most likely pieces of an atomic weapon to be machined might be of assistance in seeking a solution to the problem of determining the possibility of the use of machine shops by subversives in the New York area.

The only machining which has been suggested as possible or practicable is that of the steel cylinders or "gun barrels" for one type of atomic weapon. The only available details have been pointed out in Bureau letters of March 20, 1953, and February 19, 1953. The last-mentioned letter referred you to no Number SAC Letter F, Series 1951, dated October 5, 1951, which furnished the minimum length of a "gun barrel." The maximum length has not yet been furnished to the Bureau by the Atomic Energy Commission. These data which are already available to you should supply a sufficient basis from which to study your problem.

As soon as additional physical specifications are obtained from the Atomic Energy Commission they will be furnished to you.

LW:brg

Tolson
Ladd
Nichols
Belmont
Clegg
Glavin
Harbo
Rosen
Tracy
Gearty
Mohr
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Sizoo
Miss Gandy

MAILED 4
MAY 22 1953
COMM-FBI

DECLASSIFIED BY SP4 BJA/lem
ON 4-7-00
CL#48742/950935/997059

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Gearty
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

TO : Director, FBI (117-268)

DATE: 5/5/53

FROM : SAC, New York (117-192)

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC WEAPONS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES

Rebulet 4/23/53 concerning a report of the Secretary of the Navy and Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, relative to Port Security.

The Security Index in the New York Office has been given a preliminary check. Only the cards have been reviewed to date and no reference has been had as of the date of this letter to the files represented.

From the limited information available from this preliminary perusal of the S.I. cards, it appears there are ninety-two persons who may either be employed in machine shops or in firms that have machine shops. It should be noted that until file review on these individuals is completed it will not be possible to state definitely that any of them is capable of or in position to machine parts for an atomic bomb. Therefore until the completion of this project the NYO is not in position to make a recommendation as to any special handling of these persons since the extent of the problem is still undetermined. This file review has been undertaken and the results will be furnished the Bureau at an early date.

As suggested in my previous letter, some estimate of the size, weight, shape and metallic composition of the most likely pieces to be machined might be of assistance in seeking a solution to this problem. As pointed out previously, with virtually no limitations to narrow the problem it is the opinion of the NYO that anyone--Security Index or not--with knowledge of machine shops might be in position to make the parts in question.

In connection with drayage and hauling, the plant covering 680 Park Avenue, New York City, has observed trucks from the Port Trucking Company, 775 Sixth Avenue, apparently doing business with the Russian Delegation.

A review of the files of the NYO reflects that [redacted] b7C b7D

RM

RECORDED - 67 117-269-

MAY 8 1953

RLS:HC

DECLASSIFIED BY SP4 BJA/LBM
ON 4-7-00
C# 948742/950935/999059

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Director

DATE: May 26, 1953

FROM : D. M. Ladd

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES REQUIRED TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION OF DEMOLITION ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

SMUGGLING ATOM BOMBS - PLANTS FOR ATOM BOMBS IN the United States

Attached for your approval and signature is a letter in the above matter directed to the Honorable Charles E. Wilson, Secretary of Defense, dated May 27, 1953, which was delivered to the Bureau today from the office of Mr. Leonard Bienvenu, Secretary of the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security.

This letter, which has been agreed to by the Joint IIC-ICIS Group which has been following the problem, requests the Department of Defense to sponsor a study by a group of technically-qualified personnel to determine means of defense of critical industrial facilities against clandestinely-placed atomic weapons.

This letter has been cleared with the members of the ICIS and with Mr. J. P. Coyne, the Internal Security representative for the NSC. The military members of the IIC have also concurred.

The letter is on the stationery of the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security because it was prepared by ICIS Secretary, Bienvenu, with ICIS clerical personnel. The individual copies for the members of the IIC and the ICIS will be distributed after approval.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is respectfully recommended that you sign the attached letter as Chairman of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, after which it will be returned to the ICIS by the Domestic Intelligence Division for signature by the Chairman of that body and for mailing.

DELIVERED TO BIENVENU, SECY ICIS 9:50 AM 6-2-53 LW

Attachment

LW:brg

RECORDED - 9 117-261-
INDEXED - 9
JUN 8 1953

- 108 -

5 C JUN 8 1953

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-7-00 BY SP4 BJM/BM C#948742/950935/997059

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Director

DATE: June 2, 1953

FROM : D. M. Ladd

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES REQUIRED TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION OF DEMOLITION ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

Tolson
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Clegg
Glavin
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Harbo
Belmont
Mohr
Tele. Room
Nease
Gandy

Attached for your approval and signature is a letter in the above matter directed to the Honorable Oveta Culp Hobby dated June 1, 1953, which was delivered to the Bureau from the office of Mr. Leonard Bienvenu, Secretary of the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security.

This letter is a follow-up to Mrs. Hobby predicated upon the recommendations contained in the December 4 report to the President in this matter requesting information as to any current developments regarding uniform legislation to make more difficult the fraudulent obtaining of birth certificates.

This letter has been cleared with Mr. J. P. Coyne, the internal security representative for the National Security Council. Further IIC concurrence is unnecessary because it is a follow-up.

The letter is on the stationery of the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security because it was prepared by ICIS Secretary Bienvenu with ICIS clerical personnel. The individual copies for the members of the IIC and the ICIS will be distributed after approval.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is respectfully recommended that you sign the attached letter as Chairman of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference after which it will be returned to the ICIS by the Domestic Intelligence Division for signature of the Chairman of that body and for mailing.

Attachment

DELIVERED TO BIENVENU, SEC'Y ICIS OFFICE, 9:15 AM 6-3-53 LWD

RECORDED - 114

INDEXED - 114

117-268-

EX-123

56 JUN 15 1953

LW: brg

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-7-00 BY SP4 AUC/bm

OSAMUSING ATOM BOMB INTO THE U.S. REPARTS FOR ATOM STATES

RECORDED - 44

SAC, New York (117-192) June 10, 1953

Director, FBI (117-268)

~~PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL~~
REGISTERED MAIL

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC WEAPONS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER ~~WEAPONS~~ OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES

ReBulets 3-20-53 and 4-23-53.

Additional material has been received from the Atomic Energy Commission regarding characteristics of atomic weapons and their component parts, which is set forth hereinafter. This material is "restricted data" as defined in the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 and further bears the security classification ~~top~~ secret.

[redacted] (S)

[redacted] (S)

Referral/Direct to OGA (b1)

[redacted] (S)

[redacted] (S)

Tolson
Ladd
Nichols
Belmont
Clegg
Glavin
Harbo
Rosen
Tracy
Gearty
Mohr
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Sizoo
Miss Gandy

MAILED 16
JUN 11 1953
FBI

56 JUN 19 1953

LW:brg

cc - 2 - Chicago (117-110) REGISTERED MAIL PERSONAL & ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
cc - 2 - Detroit (117-35) REGISTERED MAIL " "
cc - 2 - Washington Field (117-151) " "



The foregoing information is being furnished to you to assist you in considering possible solutions to your problems in this matter. These data may be discussed by you only with personnel of your office on a strictly "need-to-know" basis.

5-12

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
LIAISON SECTION

Date _____, 1953

___Director
___Mr. Tolson
___Mr. Ladd
___Mr. Belmont
___Mr. Laughlin

___Mr. Baumgardner
___Mr. Branigan
___Mr. Callan
___Mr. H.L. Edwards
___Mr. Hennrich
___Mr. Scatterday
___Mr. Stanley

___Miss_____
Room_____
___Miss Cuddy
___Miss Eggers
___Miss Henshaw
___Mrs. Schwab
___Mrs. Paytash
Room 6129 IB

___Ident Div.
___Miss Harrington
Room 6525
___Mail Room
Room 5533
___Reading Room
Room 5531

___Records Section
___Routing Unit
___Send File
Up-to-date
___Send Reference
___Place on record
and return

___See Me
___Phone Me
___Please Handle

___Mr. Keay
___Mr. Ammarell
___Mr. _____
Room _____

___Mr. Bartlett
___Mr. Bates
___Mr. J.W. Brown
___Mr. Byrnes
___Mr. Condon
___Mr. Conroy
Room 6130 IB
___Mr. Cotter
___Mr. Daunt
___Mr. Dougherty
___Mr. Ellis
___Mr. Ferris
___Mr. Fipp
___Mr. Foley
Room 6130 IB
___Mr. Kuhrtz
___Mr. Landis
___Mr. Mannion
___Mr. Martin
___Mr. Papich
___Mr. Philcox
___Mr. Quigley
___Mr. Roach
___Mr. Roderick
Room 6130 IB
___Mr. Sanders
___Mr. Smith
___Mr. D.J. Sullivan
___Mr. J.F. Sullivan
___Mr. W.C. Sullivan
___Mr. Woods
___Mr. Youtz

Russian Copy

62-117-285

b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4-7-00 BY SP4 BTA/LCM
Ch# 948742/950935/997059

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

~~SECRET~~

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268)

DATE: June 12, 1953

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (117-110)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC WEAPONS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES

Rebulet 4-23-53.

Coverage of Diplomatic Couriers

Physical surveillances were instituted on the Polish diplomatic couriers on the occasions of their visits to the Chicago Polish Consulate on April 26th and 27th and June 6th and 7th, 1953. The results of these surveillances were furnished the Bureau by letters in the case entitled, "MOVEMENT OF POLISH NATIONALS; IS-R and PO" (Bufile #100-354028). Interested offices likewise were informed of the arrival and departure of these couriers.

On each occasion the two couriers carried two leather briefcases, approximately 18" x 14" x 6", and both were locked and appeared to be filled to capacity. In addition, the couriers on June 6th and 7th carried one wrapped package upon their arrival and a smaller wrapped package on their departure, approximately 24" x 14" x 4" in size. On neither occasion did the couriers carry suitcases.

From the time the couriers arrived until the time they entered the doors of the Chicago Polish Consulate at 1301 North Ritche Court, where they remained for the night, neither courier relinquished possession of his respective briefcase. Upon their departure, each courier retained personal possession of the items in his custody, from the time they left the Consulate until their departure on an airlines flight. Based upon the appearance of the luggage and conduct of the couriers, there appeared to be no reason to suspect the couriers might be carrying suspicious luggage.

Identity of Drayage and Hauling Establishments

As suggested in CG let to the Bureau 4-8-53, the information supplied by [redacted] has been reviewed on a daily basis for information concerning the identity of any drayage or hauling establishment or truck rental concern who might receive a request from the Polish Consulate to transport any article or material. These informants have indicated that [redacted]

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b7D

4/10/00 CLASSIFIED BY Sgt Bialam DECLASSIFY ON: 25X1

ALL INFO... CONTAINED HERE IS ... EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

JRO:dlm

REGISTERED MAIL

RECORDED - 44

JUN 23 1953

Pol.

INDEXED - 44

JUN 16 1953

~~SECRET~~

DIRECTOR, FBI

RE: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC WEAPONS AND OTHER WEAPONS INTO THE UNITED STATES

[redacted] b2 b7C b7D

[redacted] b1

[redacted] (S)

Identity of Contacts of Polish Consulate

The indices of the Chicago Office have been checked on those who have been in contact with members of the staff of the Polish Consulate, and same is recorded in the file maintained on the Chicago Polish Consulate. No information from this procedure has been noted that is believed to be significant to instant matter.

[redacted] (S) b1

[redacted] b1

[redacted] (S)

[redacted] b1

[redacted] (S)

SECRET

DIRECTOR, FBI

RE: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC WEAPONS AND OTHER WEAPONS INTO THE UNITED STATES

Security Index Subjects employed in "Machine Shops"

The Security Index of the Chicago Office, consisting of nearly 1300 names, has been reviewed for information concerning the identity of Security Index subjects who are employed in, or are operators of "Machine Shops" which might be utilized to fabricate "gun barrels" for the gun-type Atomic weapon. Approximately 130 Security Index subjects in the Chicago area are employed by various steel manufacturing and other companies that would fit into the general category of "Machine Shops". The majority of these SI subjects are employed by the South Works of the U. S. Steel Corporation, the Electromotive Division of General Motors, Republic Steel Company, Inland Steel Company, and the various Works of the International Harvester Company in the Chicago area.

Because of the more or less assembly line method of production in these large manufacturing plants, it would appear rather doubtful that these SI subjects would have the opportunity to fabricate "gun barrels" during the course of their employment. The security measures in effect in these large plants, and the check made on each employee's production, would also lessen their opportunity to fabricate "gun barrels". A review of a number of the individual files on these SI subjects indicates that additional investigation at the place of employment would be necessary in nearly every case in order to determine the exact duties of the SI subject, as well as the exact type of material he has access to, in order to have a definite idea of the particular employee's opportunity to fabricate "gun barrels".

In view of the time and effort necessary to obtain this information, together with the small likelihood that these SI subjects would actually have opportunity to fabricate "gun barrels" during the course of their employment, it is not believed that further consideration should be given to checking out the SI subjects employed by these large companies. It is suggested that the matter of careful selection of SI subjects employed in "machine shops" and more concentrated coverage of those who are selected would be the most practical approach to this particular phase of the problem of detection and defense against clandestine Atomic weapons.

When a review of the files on the other SI subjects employed in smaller "machine shops" has been completed, it is anticipated that additional investigation, discreet if necessary, will be conducted at the places of employment, on those selected for coverage, for the purpose of obtaining information concerning the duties of the SI subject, and so forth. As outlined above, thereafter consideration will be given to, (1) securing the cooperation of the owner, manager, superintendent, or foreman to observe activities of the SI subject, or, (2) utilize present, or develop additional, informants within the "machine shops", depending on the particular situation where the SI subject is employed.

When the above project regarding SI subjects employed in "machine shops" has

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DIRECTOR, FBI

RE: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC WEAPONS AND OTHER WEAPONS INTO THE UNITED STATES

been completed, the Bureau will be informed of the coverage proposed to be given such SI subjects.

SECRET

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI (117-268)

DATE: June 8, 1953

FROM : SAC, Detroit (117-35)

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REGISTERED MAIL

Rebulets to New York, March 20 and April 23, 1953, and Detroit letter to Bureau, March 27, 1953, captioned as above.

In compliance with instructions contained in Bulets and in furtherance of suggestions contained in referenced Detroit letter, surveillances have been conducted on Polish couriers arriving in and departing from Detroit, as well as all arrivals and departures of all Polish Consular officials in an effort to establish a pattern of travel conducted by those individuals and to observe the types of baggage or parcels carried by those individuals.

In addition, all shipments by express destined for the Detroit Polish Consulate have been examined and contents determined prior to delivery at the Consulate.

In this connection a brief summary of the surveillances and the contents of the shipments to the Consulate is set forth as follows:

Two mail couriers were observed arriving at Willow Run Airport near Detroit on American Air Lines Flight 732 from Chicago at 11:25 A.M. on March 28, 1953. These individuals, who have reservations in the name of [redacted] were met at the terminal by [redacted] b7C

Each of the couriers was carrying a blue canvas bag, approximately two feet in length, one foot high, and having a zipper across the top. It was noted that these canvas bags were not heavy, weighing only ten to fifteen pounds. Neither of the couriers had additional luggage.

The couriers were driven directly to the Detroit Polish Consulate where they remained until 5:45 P.M. at which time they were driven back to Willow Run by [redacted] They arrived at the terminal at 6:25 P.M. and departed on American Air Lines Flight 124 at 6:45 P.M. for New York City. It was noted that the couriers were carrying the same blue canvas bags when departing. b7C

WLH:MMR

RECORDED - 44 117-268

56 JUN 23 1953

INDEXED - 44

JUN 17 1953

DECLASSIFIED BY SP4 bja/lbw ON 4-7-00

Letter to the Director, FBI

RE: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES

ALOJZY WALASZEK, Attache assigned to the Polish Embassy in Washington, D.C., was observed arriving at Willow Run Airport, near Detroit, at 9:30 A.M. on April 1, 1953. WALASZEK, who was visiting the Detroit Polish Consulate at ZYGMUNT KRAWCZYK's request, was carrying a brown leather brief case, which was light in weight and could not have contained anything but paper work.

WALASZEK was met by [redacted] and was driven directly to the Polish Consulate at 2603 West Grand Boulevard, Detroit, Michigan. b7C

WALASZEK remained at the Consulate Building until 3:45 P.M. at which time he, IRENA KRAWCZYK, and [redacted] drove to the Michigan Central Depot making one stop en route where WALASZEK purchased some ham and sausage, which was wrapped in brown paper.

WALASZEK arrived at Michigan Central Depot at 5:10 P.M. where he boarded the Baltimore and Ohio Ambassador and departed for Washington, D.C. It was noted at the time that WALASZEK boarded the train he was carrying the same brief case which he had brought to Detroit that morning and, in addition, was carrying a small paper wrapped parcel.

On April 25, 1953, [redacted] were observed arriving at Willow Run Airport from New York City on Northwest Air Lines Flight #1 at 10:50 A.M. The couriers each carried a brown leather brief case, each of which were identical, being approximately eighteen inches long, fourteen inches tall, and four inches thick. These brief cases did not appear to be heavy and it was noted that even when the couriers stopped to hold a conversation with [redacted] who met them at the Airport, they did not place the brief cases on the floor or out of their immediate control. They were driven immediately to the Detroit Polish Consulate at 2603 West Grand Boulevard, Detroit, Michigan. b7C

They were observed leaving the Consulate at 8:35 A.M., April 26, 1953, at which time they were driven to Willow Run Airport where they boarded American Air Lines Flight 731 which departed at 9:30 A.M. for Chicago. It was noted that when the couriers departed they were carrying the same brief cases as when they arrived in Detroit.

Letter to the Director, FBI

RE: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES

On April 25, 1953, ZYGMUNT KRAWCZYK, Detroit Polish Acting Consul General, and his wife, IRENA KRAWCZYK, were observed entering the Detroit Consulate automobile at 4:03 P.M. They were driven directly to the Michigan Central Depot [redacted] KRAWCZYK and his wife were observed boarding the Ambassador of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad at 5:15 P.M. having previously purchased tickets for New York. It is noted that this was the first portion of KRAWCZYK's trip to Poland on service leave. b7C

It was observed at this time that KRAWCZYK had in his possession two average size suit cases and two canvas bags which were approximately two feet long and ten inches tall. None of this luggage appeared excessively heavy.

On April 30, 1953 at 1:15 P.M., [redacted] arrived at the Michigan Central Depot where they met [redacted] who arrived by train from Chicago. [redacted] was carrying a brown leather suit case, approximately 24" x 10" x 5" which did not appear to be heavy. They entered the Consulate automobile and were driven directly to the Detroit Polish Consulate. b7C

At 4:45 P.M. on the same day, [redacted] to the east entrance of the Michigan Central Railroad. [redacted] alighted with their baggage and [redacted] returned to the Consulate. [redacted] was carrying a brown suit case, approximately 24" x 10" x 5" and a package about the size of a shoe box which appeared to be approximately 10" x 5" x 4". [redacted] was carrying a dark brown brief case, approximately 14" x 12". All of the baggage described appeared to be extremely light in weight. b7C

At 5:00 P.M., [redacted] boarded the Baltimore & Ohio Ambassador having previously purchased reservations to Washington, D.C. b7C

On May 9, 1953, [redacted] was observed departing from the Polish Consulate at 11:45 A.M. in the Consulate automobile which was driven by [redacted] arrived at the Michigan Central Depot at 12:00 P.M., alighted from the automobile, presented his ticket to the Station Master, and boarded the New York Central Train leaving at 12:15 P.M. for Chicago, Illinois. He was carrying no luggage except a small brief case which appeared light in weight.

Letter to the Director, FBI

RE: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES

On May 11, 1953 at 4:50 P.M., [redacted] arrived at the Michigan Central Railroad Station. He was carrying a brown leather brief case, approximately 4" at the bottom and coming to a point at the top and approximately 14" long and 10" in height. At 4:50 P.M., [redacted] the gates to enter the Baltimore & Ohio Ambassador having previously made reservations for Washington, D.C. b7C

On May 16, 1953 at 12:15 P.M., [redacted] observed alighting from the Detroit Consulate automobile at the entrance to the Michigan Central Depot and passing through the gates to board the New York Central train for Chicago, Illinois. At this time it was observed [redacted] carrying the same brief case that he had carried on previous occasions and, in addition, a box of flowers.

[redacted] previously purchased tickets to Chicago, Illinois. b7C

On April 21, 1953, [redacted] b2 b7D

Through the cooperation of the Detroit Customs Agent in Charge, the following described boxes were observed in the office of the Universal Carloading Corporation, Fort Street, Detroit, on April 23, 1953:

1. 12" x 20" x 24"
2. 2' x 2'6" x 3'
3. 1'6" x 1'6" x 2'
4. 2'6" x 2'6" x 3'.

It was determined that these boxes contained many different books of blank forms to be utilized in the Consulate, 24 bottles of cherry cordial, 24 bottles vodka, carbon paper, cigarettes, candy, blank paper, paper clips, pencils, air mail envelopes, large blank envelopes, ledger books, ink, scissors and stationery.

It is to be noted that during the period when these surveillances were conducted, that the Polish couriers arriving in Detroit have carried brief cases or small bags which would not appear to be large enough to carry any weapon or part thereof that could be utilized as a weapon of mass destruction.

It is also noted that the only shipment arriving at the Detroit Polish Consulate during this period contained no article or part thereof that could be construed as a portion of a weapon of mass destruction.

Inspection of all shipments to the Consulate and personal observation of the luggage of all Polish couriers and officials arriving at the Consulate is continuing.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : D. M. Ladd

DATE: June 17, 1953

FROM : A. H. Belmont

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Nichols
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Winterrowd
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Holloman
Sizoo
Miss Gandy

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES REQUIRED TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION IN PLACE OF DEMOLITION ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

Minutes

At a meeting of the Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures June 17, 1953, the members of the Committee discussed the format of the next report on this subject matter which will be prepared for the approval of the IIC and the ICIS for transmittal to the National Security Council. In line with the recommendations of Mr. J. P. Coyne to the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, the report will be a consolidation of the December 4, 1952, report to the President and all action taken pursuant to the recommendations therein to date.

The IIC representative on the Joint Committee informed the other members that the recommendations of various ICIS subcommittees which had been approved by the ICIS and referred to the IIC were under consideration by the IIC Working Committee.

The status of preparation by a working group of information relating to detection of clandestine atomic weapons was discussed. The only aspect of this study still pending is a proposed informational release for public consumption. The Joint Committee agreed to meet at 2:00 p.m., Friday, June 19, in Room 1310, Justice Building, with the members of the afore-mentioned working group to expedite completion of the necessary documents.

The Joint Committee set the date of its next regular meeting at 2:00 p.m., Wednesday, June 24, at which time it was proposed that the members of the working group studying the problem of disarming and disposal of clandestine atomic weapons would meet with them.

RECOMMENDATION:

None. This is for your information. It is expected that a draft report on the broad problem of countermeasures will be ready for submission to the IIC and ICIS about July 1.

117-268

RECORDED - 44
997059
C#948742/950935

117-268-
JUN 23 1953

LW:brg

56 JUL 10 1953

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-7-00 BY SP4 BJA/LBM

Osmanlings Atom Bombs OR PARTS FOR ATOM BOMB INTO THIS

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : D. M. Ladd

DATE: June 5, 1953

FROM : A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES REQUIRED TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION OF DEMOLITION ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES (SMUGGLING Atom Bombs OR PARTS FOR Atom Bombs INTO the United States)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-7-00 BY SP4 BJT/LBM C#948748/950935/997059

Under date of May 1, 1953, the Director as Chairman, IIC, and Mr. Donegan as Chairman, ICIS, on the recommendation of the joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures, transmitted to the Secretary of Defense a letter requesting the Department of Defense to sponsor the study and preparation of a plan to fix responsibility within the executive branch of Government for reporting, disarming and disposal of unlawful atomic weapons found in the United States. This was predicated upon the understanding that personnel of the various agencies of the Department of Defense had been trained in the disarming of atomic weapons and further that clandestine atomic weapons could well be used against important defense facilities which would not be profitable targets for air attack.

Under date of May 19, 1953, the Secretary of Defense replied declining to accept sponsorship of a study and preparation of such a plan since the problems and detection of unlawful atomic weapons are primarily civilian functions. He offered the closest association and assistance, however. Copies of the Secretary's letter, classified top secret, were furnished for the IIC by Mr. Leonard Bienvenu, Secretary, ICIS, on 6-2-53, consisting of copies 2, 3, 9, 10, and 11, Series A, and are attached.

At the present time the agencies of the IIC and the ICIS are represented on a working group, under the joint committee, studying dissemination of information of assistance in detecting clandestine atomic weapons. Liaison representative C. W. Bates is the Bureau's representative on this working group. Since the Defense Department has declined sponsorship of study and preparation of a plan for reporting, disarming and disposal, the joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures considers that the afore-mentioned working group should study these aspects of the problem and get the facts.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is respectfully recommended that this matter be brought to the attention of the military representatives on the working committee of the IIC. It is possible that for the purposes of this additional study they may desire to designate representatives from their agencies other than those now serving on the afore-mentioned working group.

ENCL

Attachment

LW:brg

RECORDED - 56 117-268-2

INDEXED - 56

AUG 3 1953

memo from Mr. Belmont to Mr. Ladd - 6/22/53 - NAP

117-268 56 AUG 6 1953

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : D. M. Ladd

DATE: June 12, 1953

FROM : A. H. Belmont

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Clegg
Glavin
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Rosen
Tracy
Gearty
Mohr
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Sizoo
Miss Gandy

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES REQUIRED TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION IN PLACE OF DEMOLITION ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

Smuggling Atom Bombs or parts for Atom Bombs into the United States

SYNOPSIS:

Under date of June 5, 1953, ICIS transmitted to IIC for comment certain recommendations tentatively agreed upon by ICIS as a result of a study by the ICIS Subcommittee on Entry and Exit Problems. ICIS proposes that these recommendations be included in the next report prepared by the Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures. Joint IIC-ICIS Committee discussed the study by the ICIS Subcommittee on Entry and Exit Problems with the State Department and INS representatives on that Subcommittee. Recommendations tentatively agreed upon by ICIS do not correspond in many respects with views of Joint IIC-ICIS Committee. Detailed analysis of recommendations set forth.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is respectfully recommended that this matter be placed on the agenda for the next meeting of the IIC Working Committee for consideration and appropriate action.

Discussed at IIC working committee 6-24-53 [illegible]

RECORDED - 67

117-268-

INDEXED - 67

JUN 30 1953

DETAILS:

The Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures for Detection and Defense Against Clandestine Introduction and Detonation in Place of Demolition Atomic Weapons in the United States has reviewed various studies conducted

117-268
LW:brg

JUL 14 1953

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DATE 4-7-00 BY SP4 BJA/LBM
C#948742/950935/999059

by the various subcommittees of the ICIS pertinent to the solution of the problem of clandestine atomic weapons. These studies and the tentative recommendations of the subcommittees predicated thereon have been discussed informally by the Joint IIC-ICIS Committee with representatives of the subcommittees and with Mr. Leonard Bienvenu, Secretary of the ICIS. The ICIS representatives on the Joint Committee are also members of the ICIS Standing Committee which passes on the subcommittees' recommendations. The general observations of the Joint Committee are thereby made known through these men and Mr. Bienvenu to Mr. Donegan, the Chairman of ICIS.

The informal discussions in the Joint Committee are in no way binding upon the IIC nor can they be considered expressions of IIC views since the recommendations predicated upon the ICIS Subcommittee's studies are not referred to the IIC for comment until the ICIS adopts phraseology in final form.

Under date of June 5, 1953, Mr. Donegan, Chairman of the ICIS, referred to the IIC certain recommendations predicated upon a study by the ICIS Subcommittee on Entry and Exit Problems. Prior to the formulation of ICIS recommendations based on the study there have been informal discussions between the members of the Joint IIC-ICIS Committee and the Department of State and Immigration Service representatives on the Subcommittee as well as with Mr. Leonard Bienvenu, Secretary of the ICIS. Mr. Bienvenu and the ICIS members of the Joint Committee had made known the substance of these discussions to Mr. Donegan, the Chairman of the ICIS.

The recommendations now tentatively agreed upon by the ICIS do not correspond in all respects to the observations of the Joint Committee.

There are set out hereinafter the ICIS recommendations, together with observations as to each:

ICIS Recommendation:

(1) That the Department of State be required to decline to accept into the United States any foreign diplomatic or other official

recommended for assignment to duty in the United States if there is reason to believe that such official may have been trained or engaged in espionage, sabotage, terrorism, or other subversive activity, or trained in the development, manufacture or use of nuclear devices. Exceptions should be made by the Secretary of State based on consultations with other agencies as appropriate with notification of the exception being made to the Attorney General.

Observations:

Under the terms of the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Department of State is required by law to deny visas to foreign diplomatic and official representatives in certain cases. Section 102 of the Act and Section 212 (a) 27, 28 and 29 set out specifically the subversive bases for refusal of visas to aliens in these categories. This recommendation in the language proposed is (1) contrary to the provisions of existing law by reason of its application to all such aliens regardless of diplomatic rank or official status; (2) contrary to sound procedures as well as contrary to the law because it places the power to make exceptions in the application of the law in the Secretary of State instead of with the Attorney General as the law now provides. Under the provisions of Section 212 (d) (3), the Attorney General can approve the issuance of a visa to a limited class of subversives who are members of or affiliated with subversive organizations and under the provisions of Section 212 (d) (5), the Attorney General can approve a temporary parole of an alien into the United States without a visa in an emergency or when such act would be in the public interest.

The various subversive factors noted in the recommendation should be taken into consideration by the visa issuing officer and applied according to the law as it is written. In every instance unless the alien clearly should be denied a visa, where some of those factors are present the visa issuing officer should require an advisory opinion from the Department of State prior to any action

toward granting or refusing a visa. This advisory opinion should be predicated on a check with the appropriate U. S. Government agencies. Any substantial implementation of a previsa screening program would require proper budgetary allotments.

ICIS Recommendation:

(2) That the interested departments and agencies be requested to resist any step on the part of public international organizations which could weaken the practices and procedures which have been established by the United States with a view to safeguarding its national security insofar as pertains to entry of aliens.

Observations:

This is not a good recommendation to send to the National Security Council because (1) it does not directly contribute to solution of the problem of smuggling atomic weapons and (2) the inference is implicit that certain unspecified departments and agencies are susceptible to pressures on the part of public international organizations which are contrary to U. S. security.

ICIS Recommendation:

(3) It should be brought to the attention of the NSC, or the various departments and agencies of the government, including the Bureau of the Budget, that funds have not been made available to acquire the requisite personnel and other facilities for carrying out the recommendations of the Subcommittee on Entry and Exit Problems and of the ICIS for the security screening of certain classes of aliens applying for visas, particularly in the light of the information contained in the report of December 4, 1952, to the President, regarding new developments in the field of atomic weapons.

Observations:

This recommendation contains no actual showing that any of the departments or agencies denied funds had specifically requested such funds on the basis of the December 4, 1952, report to the President on clandestine atomic weapons. This recommendation regarding the security screening of certain classes of aliens should stand on its own feet and state specifically what security screening was proposed. In this case the recommendation refers to a report by the ICIS Subcommittee on Entry and Exit Problems dated January 11, 1951. It cannot be expected that the present National Security Council would have any acquaintance with the 1951 recommendations and could properly associate them with the instant problem relating to countermeasures.

ICIS Recommendation:

(4) The program for individual screening and documentation of alien seamen and airmen should be fully implemented as soon as possible. It is noted in this connection that notwithstanding the fact that ICIS approved its recommendation for individual documentation of seamen and airmen over two years ago, and Congress enacted a similar requirement into law nearly one year ago, the necessary funds to provide the additional personnel and other facilities needed to implement fully the ICIS recommendation and the statutory provision of law have not been made available to the Department of State. In submitting this recommendation to the NSC it should be recommended that the appropriate agencies of the government be instructed that, notwithstanding the desire for reduction of the costs of government operations and the necessary economy to balance the budget, the security factors involved in this program outweigh the need for governmental economy and the Congress should be requested, as soon as practicable, to provide the necessary funds to implement the program.

Observations:

The substance of recommendation four is reasonable. Since the Congress has passed a law requiring individual documentation of seamen and airmen, it is logical that budgetary provisions for its administration should be made.

ICIS Recommendation:

(5) As a matter of information, the NSC should be advised that the ICIS has recommended to the Department of Justice that all resident aliens seeking to depart from and re-enter the United States as crewmen employed on foreign vessels or aircraft be security screened, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service issue to its field offices the necessary instructions and make whatever arrangements may be necessary with the FBI and other security agencies to make the procedure effective.

Observations:

This is a new procedure. It is satisfactory from a security standpoint. However, it should be pointed out that necessary funds will have to be made available in order to put it into operation.

ICIS Recommendation:

(6) As a matter of national security policy, for the purpose of preventing illegal entry of persons, the patrol inspectors stationed at all principal seaports and the force of border patrol inspectors should be increased so as to make thorough search of arriving vessels for stowaways and to maintain surveillance of vessels while in the United States ports to prevent the landing of stowaways who had escaped detention on arrival, to prevent the landing of crew members who had been denied shore leave, and to make possible a more effective patrol of our land borders and Gulf coast.

Observations:

This recommendation is repetitious of recommendations three and four relating to illegal arrivals in the United States as set out in the December 4, 1952, report to the President and as commented upon on page five of the status report of the IIC and the ICIS dated April 9, 1953. Because it is repetition of matter already under consideration, it should not be considered a new recommendation.

ICIS Recommendation:

(7) Necessary funds for implementation of the following recommendations previously made by ICIS should be provided as soon as possible in the interest of an adequate internal security program insofar as control of aliens is concerned:

a. That the Immigration and Naturalization Service, in cooperation with the Department of State, take appropriate steps so that there will be on file in the Central Office of the Immigration and Naturalization Service a copy of each application for a nonresident alien's border crossing card issued hereafter to nationals of Mexico.

b. That the Department of State and the Immigration and Naturalization Service work out appropriate methods for the reissuance of outstanding nonresident aliens' border crossing cards issued to Mexican nationals, over appropriate periods of time, so that there will not be any unnecessary impediment to traffic across the Mexican border.

c. That the Immigration and Naturalization Service undertake to maintain in the Central Office a record of the arrival and departure of each nonresident alien crewman.

Observations:

Item seven is a new recommendation as far as the problem of countermeasures is concerned although it has been made previously by ICIS in connection with the general tightening of security on our land borders. There is nothing objectionable to its inclusion here.

The ICIS has requested that the IIC comment on all the foregoing recommendations in order that those on which there is agreement between IIC and ICIS can be presented to the National Security Council as the joint recommendations of the two groups in connection with a search for satisfactory countermeasures.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED GOVERNMENT

TO : D. M. Ladd

DATE: June 23, 1953

FROM : A. H. Belmont

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4-7-00 BY SP4 BJA/LBM
cl#948742/950935/997059

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Miss Gandy

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES REQUIRED TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION OF DEMOLITION ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES
(CLANDESTINE ATOM BOMBS OR PARTS FOR ATOM BOMBS INTO THE UNITED STATES)

Reference is made to the memorandum Belmont to Ladd 6-17-53 regarding the preparation of information regarding clandestine atomic weapons to be released to those persons who will need it in connection with their duties. Representatives of the working group of the Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures met with the Joint Committee 6-23-53. Information material has been prepared for supervisory personnel and also data has been prepared for the use of field representatives of the Coast Guard, Customs and Immigration. The Federal Civil Defense representative, Mr. Guy Pearce Jones, has not yet prepared the proposed paper regarding information to be furnished to public officials. He stated that he would have such a paper by 6-30-53 and would like to have his proposed paper discussed before the Joint Committee on that date with Mr. Morse Salisbury, Director of Public Information of the Atomic Energy Commission.

Mr. Jones was advised that the information papers prepared in response to the request by the Joint Committee would have to be approved by the IIC and by the ICIS before being submitted to the National Security Council and the Atomic Energy Commission for final action, including any downgrading of information that might be necessary. Mr. Jones stated that he hoped the information that was being made available to the field representatives of the Coast Guard, Customs and Immigration could be downgraded so that it could be furnished to the appropriate officials of FCDA down to the level of regional director. Mr. Jones was told that he should not count on any such downgrading but should be prepared to request AEC for security clearance for any persons whom he proposed to furnish data which was not downgraded from the "restricted data" classification.

RECOMMENDATION:

None. This is for your information. This matter is being followed and you will be advised of further developments.

RECORDED-8
INDEXED-8

LW: brg

117-268-241

56 JUL 10 1953

JUN 30 1953

ORMATION - X

117-268

BY SPECIAL MESSENGER

Date: June 24, 1953

To: Commissioner
Bureau of Customs
Wilkins Building
1512 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D. C.

Attention: Mr. Chester A. Emerick
Deputy Commissioner

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES

DECLASSIFIED BY sp4 60324/uw ON 4-7-00

ORIGINAL FILED IN 100-258251-32

Reference is made to the letter from the Commissioner dated January 9, 1952, requesting information with regard to certain individuals, firms or organizations in order that they or shipments with which they are connected may be given more thorough Customs treatment upon arrival in the United States.

You may wish to consider [redacted] b7C

[redacted] b7C

International Workers Order which has been designated by the Attorney General as coming within the purview of Executive Order 10450.

100-258251

SECURITY INFORMATION - SECRET

[redacted]

In accordance with the referenced letter, it is understood that only the names and addresses above will be furnished to your field force to be included in its watch list. Any information which you receive regarding [redacted] would be of interest to this Bureau.

b7C

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

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TO : MR. D. M. LADD

DATE: June 17, 1953

FROM : A. H. Belmont

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-7-00 BY SP4 BJA/LBM C# 94874 2/950935/997059

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES REQUIRED TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION OF DEMOLITION ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

The Working Group of the IIC and the ICIS met on Wednesday, June 10, 1953, in further discussion regarding responsibility for detection and defense against clandestine atomic weapons. This group is concerned with the preparation of material to be released to those persons who will need it in connection with their duties. This has been considered on three levels: (1) the needs of U. S. Government supervisory or administrative officers, (2) the needs of representatives of enforcement and intelligence agencies in the field, and (3) the needs of public officials, representatives of duly constituted law enforcement agencies, etc., as members of the general public.

At the request of this Working Group, the Atomic Energy Commission representative, Dr. Don Mastick, submitted a paper furnishing detailed information regarding the two types of atomic weapons, (1) the implosion type weapon, and (2) the gun type weapon.

It was agreed that the first group, i.e., supervisory personnel, should have access to this complete report which bears the classification of ~~Top Secret~~. The Bureau Representative, Liaison Agent Bates, pointed out that in connection with the needs for enforcement and intelligence agencies in the field, Bureau Agents may have access to AEC restricted data and that no problem exists as to the information having to be declassified which would be furnished to Bureau Agents in the field. The representatives of the Coast Guard, Customs, and Immigration submitted a summary of the AEC document, stating they considered this a minimum for the use of their field people. The Federal Civil Defense representative was not present but is submitting a paper regarding information to be furnished to public officials.

This material is being placed in final form by the Working Group and it is expected that it will be submitted to the IIC-ICIS Group within the next few days.

ACTION: This is submitted for your information. Should any further developments occur in this matter, you will be advised.

CWB:lw
Attachment
1 - Mr. Whitson

RECORDED - 9 117-268-711
INDEXED - 9
29 JUN 22 1953

56 JUL 31 1953

Smuggling Atom Bombs or Parts for Atom Bombs into the United States

envelope only

THE INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
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#948742/950935/997059

[redacted]

DATE: _____

TO BE RETAINED BY ADDRESSEE

C#9487421950935/1997059

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4/4/03 BY SP4 [illegible]

ADDRESSEE: Mr. Charles Bates, FBI

SUBJECT: ICIS-P25/177 w/#5 of encl

RECEIVED BY: _____ TIME: _____

ICIS-P25/177

June 4, 1953

Mr. Charles Bates
Federal Bureau of Investigation

MEMORANDUM FOR: Lt. Col. Donald C. Loudon
Department of the Army

Mr. Gilbert R. Levy
Department of the Air Force

Mr. Dario G. Barossi
Federal Civil Defense Administration

FROM: Leonard P. Bienvenu
Secretary, ICIS

SUBJECT: Transmittal of Epoch 585.

Pursuant to yesterday's meeting of the Working Group of the IIC-ICIS Committee on Clandestine Introduction of Atomic Weapons, enclosed is Copy No. 5, Series A, of the report entitled "Report to the Working Group of the IIC and the ICIS" concerning basic technical information necessary to aid in accomplishing the objectives of the December 4, 1952 report to the President.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4-7-00 BY SP4 BJA/lan
#948742/950935/997059

117-208-2

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : D. M. Ladd

DATE: July 8, 1953

FROM : A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES REQUIRED TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION OF DEMOLITION ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

948742/950925/997059

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4/10/00 BY SP4 BJA/LBM

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Reference is made to the memorandum Belmont to Ladd 6-23-53 regarding the preparation of a proposed paper regarding information on clandestine weapons to be furnished to public officials. Mr. Guy Pearce Jones, the Federal Civil Defense representative on a working group of the Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures, had assured the Joint Committee on 6-30-53 that a proposed paper would be forthcoming July 7, 1953. On 6-30-53 Mr. Morse Salisbury, Director of Public Information of the Atomic Energy Commission, had informed the Joint Committee that a paper containing information to be furnished to public officials which had been drafted by [redacted] one of the AEC technical advisors to the Joint Committee, and a shorter paper drafted by [redacted] another AEC technical advisor, had been reviewed by him and both appeared to be the kind of material which might be declassified for public referral. These papers were brought to the attention of Jones. b7C

On 7-7-53 Jones again appeared before the Joint IIC-ICIS Committee without a paper. He explained that his superior in FCDA, Colonel Joseph Chambers, had indicated to him that the danger of clandestine introduction was less than had originally been felt, indicating that the Customs and Coast Guard had control over smuggling and the FBI had close coverage over subversives within the United States. Jones was told that the Committee did not know what he was talking about because the studies by the IIC and ICIS showed the existence of terrific loopholes for the introduction and detonation of clandestine weapons. He was told that the Joint Committee would proceed with its own recommendations as to information which could be released to the public and that his responsibilities and responsibilities of FCDA as far as this aspect of the study was concerned were terminated.

RECOMMENDATION:

None. This is for your information. The Joint IIC-ICIS Committee is meeting again on this matter 7-10-53.

LW: brg

RECORDED - 96 117-265

INDEXED - 96

56 JUL 22 1953

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : D. M. Ladd

DATE: June 25, 1953

FROM : A. H. Belmont

7417 J. J. Gallagher

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Sizoo
Miss Gandy

SUBJECT: ~~X~~ COUNTERMEASURES REQUIRED TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION OF DEMOLITION ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES
SMUGGLING ATOM BOMBS OR PARTS FOR ATOM BOMBS INTO THE UNITED STATES

Reference is made to memorandum Belmont to Ladd 6-5-53, pointing out that a working group operating under the Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures would study the problem of disarming and disposal of atomic weapons. On 6-24-53 this working group met with the members of the Joint IIC-ICIS Committee. The working group consists of Mr. C. W. Bates, FBI, representing the IIC agencies, and the following individuals representing the agencies interested from the ICIS standpoint: [redacted] b7c The members of the working group were told that their problem was to determine the facts and report back recommendations to the Joint Committee for ultimate referral to the NIC, ICIS and the NSC on disarming and disposal of atomic weapons and the protection of persons and installations during such disarming.

It was determined at this meeting that salvage squads operating under the jurisdiction of the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project as well as bomb disposal details of the Army Ordnance have received training in the disarming of atomic weapons. Colonel Judson was elected Chairman by the members of the working group. Judson reflected the Department of Defense position that this was a civilian and not a military function. It was pointed out to Judson that the only qualified personnel were military personnel and that the Joint Committee expected a realistic solution of the problem without regard to any preconceptions.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-7-00 BY SP4 BJR/LBM C#948742 1950935/990059

RECOMMENDATION:

Mr. Bates, the FBI-IIC representative, will meet with the working group on June 29 at 2:00 p.m., at which time the AEC and Defense representatives will present full information regarding available disarming and disposal personnel and the type of training which they have received. The FCDA and ODM representatives will present proposals for safeguarding personnel and installations.

117-268-

LW: brg

RECORDED - 56
117-268-37
INDEXED 56
EX-102

56 AUG 6 1953

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. V. P. KEAY

DATE: June 24, 1953

FROM : N. W. PHILCOX

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SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES REQUIRED TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION OF DEMOLITION ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

Reference is made to memorandum from Mr. Belmont to Mr. Ladd dated June 5, 1953, in which it was recommended that this matter be discussed at the IIC Working Committee meeting to determine if the IIC members wish to designate other representatives to represent them on the working group studying dissemination of information of assistance in detecting clandestine atomic weapons.

This matter was discussed at the IIC Working Committee meeting on June 17, 1953, at which time it was agreed that the military members did not desire to appoint other representatives to represent them on this working group but that C. W. Bates, who presently represents the IIC in this working group, can continue to represent the IIC in this study. Mr. Keay pointed out at the meeting, inasmuch as Mr. Bates is an FBI representative, the military members may wish to have their own representatives. They stated, however, that Colonel Halversen of the Department of Defense can be their point of contact with this group and that Mr. Bates can continue to represent the IIC.

ACTION:

This memorandum should be referred to Mr. Whitson for the information of the Joint Committee.

117-268

NWP:hke

RECORDED - 56
INDEXED 56

117-268-2914

EX-102

56 AUG 6 1953

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-7-00 BY SP4 BJA/LBM C#948742/950935/997059

Memo Belmont to Ladd 6-25-53 SMUGGLING ATOM BOMBS OR PARTS FOR ATOM BOMBS Into the United States

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
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TO : Director, FBI (117-268)

DATE: 6/24/53

FROM : SAC, New York (117-192)

SEC

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC WEAPONS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES.

Re Buairtel 3/23/53.

In regard to undeveloped film and the means used in forwarding photographic film, the Bureau's attention is called to the case entitled "EXPOSE, ESPIONAGE R&CZ" (Bufile 65-60545).

[redacted] (S)

b1

[redacted]

b2
b7D

[redacted]

b1

[redacted] (S)

It is suggested that the Bureau may desire to discuss the problem with the Atomic Energy Commission to determine what materials would be used for the purpose of [redacted]

b2
b7E

For example, it is possible that during the various atomic tests, [redacted] If it could be determined what type, size and shape of equipment would be required for the purpose, then during various investigations, information might be developed that the Soviet or satellite official establishments are purchasing material of such a nature.

4-7-00
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DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1,6
C#948742/950935/997059

117-268-

RECORDED-12

JUN 26

RVG:MPH

SEC

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

SAC, [redacted] York (117-192)

July 10, 1953

Director, FBI (117-268)

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

RECORDED-48

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC WEAPONS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES

ReBuair-tel 3-23-53 and New York let 6-24-53.

The New York Office suggested that the Bureau might desire to discuss the problem of [redacted] with the Atomic Energy Commission to determine what materials would be used for the purpose of [redacted]

This matter has been discussed with appropriate officials of the Atomic Energy Commission. They advised that the most effective way to [redacted]

b2
b7E

DECLASSIFIED BY SP3 STP/tap ON 4/4/03

There would be no [redacted] according to the Atomic Energy Commission, that would be used [redacted] Unfriendly governments could [redacted]

b2
b7E

Offices receiving copies of this letter should bear these facts in mind in the course of development of any information regarding [redacted] to and from the United States [redacted]

cc - 2 - Chicago (117-110) STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
cc - 2 - Detroit (117-35) " "
cc - 2 - Washington Field (117-151) " "

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JUL 28 1953

COMM - FBI
JUL 10
MAILED 30

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: July 8, 1953

FROM : V. P. Keay

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Sizoo
Miss Gandy

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC WEAPONS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES

Reference is made to letter from New York dated June 24, 1953, suggesting that the Bureau might discuss with the Atomic Energy Commission materials which could be used for the purpose of [redacted]

This matter was discussed by Liaison with [redacted] Atomic Energy Commission. They have advised that the most effective way to [redacted]

b2
b7C
b7E

They all concluded that it would be practically impossible to be able to tell in advance that [redacted] is all that is necessary.

b2
b7E

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that this memorandum be furnished to the Espionage Section.

CWB:lw

1 - Mr. Whitson

RECORDED-49 117-268-

14 1953

Let to NY
Cor - Chicago
Cor - Detroit
Cor - Newark
7-10-53
J.W.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4/7/00 BY SP4BJA/DBM
Ch#948742/950935/997059

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : D. M. Ladd

DATE: July 17, 1953

FROM : A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES REQUIRED TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION OF DEMOLITION ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

Tolson
Ladd
Clegg
Glavin
Harbo
Belmont
Mohr
Tele. Room
Nease
Gandy

The Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures met July 14 with [redacted]

b7C

Procedures were worked out for the requested briefing of IIC and ICIS by AEC and AFSWP 8-5-53 at the Pentagon. The type of presentation to be made in the briefing was discussed and the subject matter ultimately decided upon were estimated by [redacted] to require approximately two and one-half hours for presentation and another one-half hour was recommended for questions from those being briefed for a total of three hours.

ICIS representatives stated that they would supply IIC with a list of those individuals whom ICIS wished to have present at the briefing. Mr. Bienvenu, Secretary of ICIS, was to discuss with Mr. J. P. Coyne, internal security representative of the National Security Council, the advisability of recommending that Mr. Lay and General Cutler of NSC as well as a representative of the Bureau of the Budget be invited to the briefing by ICIS.

The ICIS representatives stated that ICIS is reviewing recommendations by its subcommittees on the basis of IIC comments regarding those recommendations and where there can be prompt agreement, those recommendations will be included in the proposed report to the National Security Council on Countermeasures by IIC and ICIS.

RECOMMENDATION:

The foregoing matters are being followed closely and you will be kept informed of developments.

LW:brg

RECORDED-97 117-268-

INDEXED-97

JUL 31 1953

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-7-00 BY SP4 BJA/LBM C# 948742/950935/997059

OSMUGGLING Atom Bombs OR PARTS FOR Atom Bombs INTO the United States

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Director

DATE: June 8, 1953

FROM : D. M. Ladd

Tolson
Ladd
Clegg
Glavin
Nichols
Rosen
Tracy
Harbo
Belmont
Mohr
Tele. Room
Nease
Gandy

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES REQUIRED TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

At the IIC meeting held in your office on June 3, 1953, it was agreed that Special Agent Edward S. Sanders, the IIC Secretary, should contact the IIC Representatives on the Joint IIC-ICIS-AEC Committee which is studying necessary countermeasures to detect and defend against the clandestine introduction and detonation of atomic weapons in the United States, and that they should be advised that the IIC members desire that the AEC prepare actual tests which will show the destructiveness of the small atomic bombs, about which they have been talking, on such things as industrial installations, air bases, etc. It was also agreed that in connection with these tests, demonstrations should be given of the practicability of the use of the various types of small atomic bombs in so far as clandestine transportation and assembly are concerned.

This matter has been brought to the attention of Mr. Lish Whitson, the Bureau's Representative on the Joint Committee, and he in turn is bringing this matter to the attention of Lieutenant Colonel Landon of G-2 who also serves on the Joint Committee. They will immediately initiate inquiries in this regard.

This matter has also been placed on the agenda of the IIC Working Committee meeting to be held on June 10, 1953, in order that the IIC agencies may be preparing specific questions they desire answered as a result of the tests. It is noted that the AEC will require additional information in connection with just what is desired, and it is felt that the military members of the IIC should be prepared to be specific in their desires.

RECOMMENDATION:

The foregoing is for your information. You will be kept advised of progress made in this connection.

ESS:hke

RECORDED-38 117-268-

INDEXED-38

56 AUG 10 1953

EX-110

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-10-00 BY SP4 BJA/LBM

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : D. M. Ladd

DATE: June 10, 1953

FROM : A. H. Belmont

Tolson
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Nichols
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Rosen
Tracy
Gearty
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Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Sizoo
Miss Gandy

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES REQUIRED TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

Pursuant to the instructions of the IIC, Supervisor Whitson of the Bureau and Lieutenant Colonel Landon of G-2, the IIC representatives on the Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures, informed ICIS representatives on the Joint Committee and the AEC Technical Advisor to the Committee, Colonel Marcus Cooper, that the IIC desired that the AEC prepare actual tests which would show the destructiveness of small atomic weapons on industrial installations, air bases, et cetera, and also demonstrations of practicability of transportation and assembly of clandestine weapons. At a meeting of the Joint IIC-ICIS Committee June 10, 1953, Colonel Cooper stated that to his knowledge actual tests had been made of small yield weapons and that he would determine from the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project people the circumstances and effects of such tests. After determining what test data were available IIC could then determine what additional information was necessary. Colonel Cooper stated that he could arrange a detailed briefing for the members of the IIC and the IIC Working Committee which would involve not only the effects of weapons but problems regarding assembly of weapons. He pointed out that the question of transportation, particularly of component parts, could be answered in connection with the assembly of a weapon from its component parts.

Colonel Cooper stated that such a briefing could be set up as soon as the IIC Working Committee had decided what specific information was desired within the general topical framework.

The ICIS representatives on the Joint Committee expressed the desire for the same or similar briefing for their superiors in the ICIS. Colonel Cooper stated that he was agreeable to the ICIS request but pointed out that anyone receiving such a briefing must have a "Q" clearance or its military equivalent. 117-268-

RECORDED-38
INDEXED-38
13 AUG 3 1953

RECOMMENDATION:

It is respectfully recommended that the foregoing be brought to the attention of the IIC Working Committee.

LW: br

6 AUG 10 1953

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C#948742 1950935/997059

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. D. M. LADD

DATE: June 22, 1953

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES REQUIRED TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

Tolson
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Reference is made to my memorandum dated June 10, 1953, in which it was pointed out that Supervisor Whitson of the Bureau and Lieutenant Colonel Landon of G-2, the IIC representatives on the Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures, informed ICIS representatives on the Joint Committee and the AEC Technical Advisor to the Committee, Colonel Marcus Cooper, that the IIC desired that the AEC prepare actual tests which would show the destructiveness of small atomic weapons on industrial installations, air bases, et cetera, and also demonstrations of practicability of transportation and assembly of clandestine weapons. It was recommended that this matter be brought to the attention of the IIC Working Committee in order that they can indicate the type of demonstration or briefing which they desire.

This matter was discussed at the IIC Working Committee meeting on June 17, 1953, at which time it was agreed by those present that further specific information should be obtained from Colonel Cooper, the AEC Technical Advisor to the Committee, as to what tests have been made and that the Working Committee can then give specific information on what they desire.

ACTION:

It is recommended that this memorandum be referred to Mr. Whitson so that he may contact Colonel Cooper for the desired information.

NWP:hke

Memo Ladd to Belmont 6-30-53 re: Smuggling Atom Bombs or Parts for Atom Bombs into U. S. by unfriendly states

memo from mr. Belmont to mr. Ladd 7/7/53 NWP

INDEXED-38

117-261-

3 1953

56 AUG 10 1953

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4/10/00 BY SP4 BJA/LBM c#948742/950935/997059

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. D. M. LADD

DATE: July 7, 1953

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: ~~COUNTERMEASURES~~ REQUIRED TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

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Tele. Room
Holloman
Sizoo
Miss Gandy

You will recall that at the IIC meeting on June 3, 1953, General Carroll noted that he feels that it is necessary to put pressure on the Atomic Energy Commission for specific data and demonstrations inasmuch as the AEC has stated that the production of small bombs is possible and the effects therefrom devastating. He suggested that the IIC representatives on the Joint Committee request the AEC to devote some time to the preparation of actual tests which could be observed by the IIC Representatives in order that the effects upon such things as industrial installations, air bases, etc., could be determined. This matter was discussed and it was agreed that the IIC Secretary should contact the IIC Representatives on the Joint Committee and convey to them the IIC observations concerning tests on the part of the Atomic Energy Commission.

This matter has been discussed with the IIC Representatives on the Joint Committee and with Colonel Marcus Cooper of AEC. Liaison Agent C. W. Bates determined that AEC can readily set up a detailed briefing as to the effects of small yield atomic weapons as well as their assembly and transportation. This briefing could be set up at the convenience of the IIC members for any time during the month of August. The AEC Representative pointed out that a briefing would be given at this time and that, if more specific information or demonstrations were desired, the IIC members could furnish specific requests as to the types of demonstrations desired. He stated that this briefing would take approximately two to three hours and that the charts and equipment necessary for the briefing are located at the Atomic Energy Commission, Main Building, and that it would be more logical to hold the briefing there.

RECORDED - 88 117-268
INDEXED - 88
13 AUG 13 1953

Information has been received that the ICIS is interested in having ICIS members attend this briefing as well as IIC members and it appears logical that they should attend. The Atomic Energy Commission has requested that they be furnished with the names of the individuals who will be present at this briefing. The other IIC members will be advised that the ICIS

cc - Mr. C. W. Bates
cc - Mr. Lish Whitson

56 AUG 13 1953

NWP:hke - 124

Memo from Ladd to Director with Secretary of Defense Stanley J. Stuart
7/20/53 - LW

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4/10/00 BY SP4 BJB/lsm

members will attend this briefing.

This matter has been discussed at an IIC Working Committee meeting and has been discussed informally with the other IIC members and it has been suggested that this briefing be held in connection with the next IIC meeting on August 5, 1953.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that this AEC briefing be held in connection with the IIC meeting scheduled for August 5, 1953. If you approve, the AEC Representative will be requested to arrange the briefing for this date. The IIC Secretary will then contact the ICIS Secretary to determine the identity of the individuals from ICIS who will attend this briefing and a complete list of those attending will be furnished to the AEC.

The AEC will be requested to furnish a printed outline of the proposed briefing to be distributed to IIC and ICIS members prior to the meeting.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: July 20, 1953

FROM : D. M. LADD

SUBJECT: ~~COUNTERMEASURES~~ REQUIRED TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

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Holloman
Sizoo
Miss Gandy

There is attached for your signature and approval a letter directed to the Secretary of Defense with copies for the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission formally requesting a briefing on clandestine atomic weapons by the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project and the Atomic Energy Commission on August 5, 1953, at 1:30 p.m., pursuant to the decision reached by the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference. This letter has been cleared with the military representatives of the IIC and has been discussed with Mr. J. Patrick Coyne, Internal Security Representative of the National Security Council, and with the members of the ICIS who requested to be included in the briefing because of their joint interest with IIC in the subject matter.

This briefing is for the purpose of supplying IIC and ICIS with available information regarding the use and effects of clandestine atomic weapons in order that the interested agency representatives will know the type of data presently available and can thereafter make such additional requests for information as they may deem necessary and desirable. In addition to the regular IIC and ICIS representatives, including their working committees and the representatives on the Joint Committee regarding Countermeasures, it has been suggested that the briefing also be afforded to General Cutler and Mr. Lay of NSC as well as Mr. J. Patrick Coyne. It is noted that Bernard Schmid of the Bureau of the Budget is also included. It is pointed out that Schmid in his work at the Bureau of the Budget is directly concerned with budgetary requirements of countermeasures in this particular problem.

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CA 948429 59035 9/2/59

RECOMMENDATION:

It is respectfully recommended that you approve and sign the attached letter, after which it will be delivered to Mr. T. J. Donegan, Chairman of ICIS, for his signature. After receiving Mr. Donegan's signature, it will be delivered by Bureau liaison.

Attachment

LW:hke

RECORDED-38 117-268-

INDEXED-38

56 AUG 11 1953

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Ladd
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Clegg
Mr. Glavin
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tracy
Mr. Gearty
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Mr. Sizoo
Miss Gandy

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268) DATE: 8/6/53

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (66-00 Sub A)

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES

CONFIDENTIAL

Re No Number SAC Letter A, Series 52, dated 1/28/52.

This is to advise that the files of the Salt Lake City Office do not reflect any information regarding captioned matter.

DLL:MEN

RECORDED-57 | 117-261-282

31 AUG 10 1953

INC 10 of 50

DECLASSIFIED BY SP4 BJA/LBM
ON 4/10/00

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124

AIR-TEL

AUGUST 11, 1953 - URGENT

SAC, BUFFALO
WASHINGTON FIELD (BSM)
NEW YORK

RECORDED - 56

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS AND PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION HAS ADVISED OF CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN OFFICE OF NAVAL RESEARCH, WASHINGTON, D. C., AND [redacted] b7C [redacted] REGARDING FOGGING OF "ILFORD PLATES" BY POSSIBLY BEING IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL IN TRANSIT FROM ENGLAND TO THE UNITED STATES VIA TWA. AEC POINTS OUT FOGGING OF PLATES MIGHT BE INDICATION THAT IMPROPERLY SHIELDED FISSIONABLE MATERIAL HAS BEEN BROUGHT INTO THE UNITED STATES IN SAME CARGO WITH PLATES. INCIDENT OCCURRED SOMETIME PRIOR TO MAY 19, 1953. WASHINGTON FIELD SHOULD IMMEDIATELY INTERVIEW EITHER [redacted] b7C ROOM 2502, BUILDING T 3, CONSTITUTION AVENUE BETWEEN 16TH AND 17TH STREETS, WASHINGTON, D. C., OR [redacted] ROOM 2506, SAME BUILDING, FOR ALL AVAILABLE BACKGROUND THIS MATTER IN OFFICE OF NAVAL RESEARCH. BUFFALO AT ROCHESTER SHOULD INTERVIEW [redacted] b7C [redacted] FOR AVAILABLE INFORMATION REGARDING THEIR DATE, PLACE AND TIME OF ARRIVAL IN THE UNITED STATES. COPIES THIS AIR-TEL BEING SENT NYC SINCE ANY CHECK WITH CUSTOMS REGARDING CARGO ACCOMPANYING PLATES WOULD BE MADE THERE. EXPEDITE INQUIRIES WASHINGTON AND ROCHESTER.

HOOVER

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-10-80 BY SP4 6STR/USR 9484/980935/9010559

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Tele. Room
Holloman
Sizoo
Miss Gandy

COMM — FBI
AUG 11 1953
MAILED 27

217-268

LL:prg (See note pg 2)

58 AUG 21 1953

NOTE: Original information received from [redacted] *AEC, August 7, 1953. On August 10, 1953,* [redacted] *informed Bureau Liaison that the correspondence between ONR and* [redacted] *was in line of official business and the matter was being handled by* [redacted]

b7C

COPY

Rec'd 8-7-53 of AEC LW

[redacted]

[redacted]

b7C

June 10, 1953

[redacted]
Office of Naval Research
Department of the Navy
Washington 25, D. C.

b7C

Dear [redacted]

I have your letter requesting information concerning the suspected x-ray irradiation of some Ilford plates which we received recently. Unfortunately I cannot give you very precise information concerning their handling on route to us.

As far as we know the plates were shipped via air, TWA carrier and passed through customs both in New York City and Rochester. The reason we suspected possible contamination is that the background on these plates in development showed an effect of occurring mainly in one position of the plate and implies to us the fact that the position of the shipped package may have come near an x-ray machine or possibly the edge of the package may have been close to some radioactive materials in transit. The important fact is that the nature of the background is such that it implies that it could not have been due to a purposeful x-ray exposure, but represents some random type of exposure and I would believe that this could be classified as due to careless handling since these packages are all plainly marked "do not x-ray -- keep away from radioactive materials."

I apologize for not being able to give definitive information but hope that the above may be of some use to you.

Sincerely yours,

RECORDED - 36

117-268-[illegible]

AUG [illegible]

[redacted]

b7C

[redacted]

4.10.00 STA bja/FAM

#948742/950935/997059

117-268

5-[illegible]

COPY

ONR:422:LJL:ar
Ser 12474
5 June 1953

[redacted]

b7C

Dear [redacted]

[redacted] has discussed with me your letter of 19 May 1953 concerning the background acquired by Ilford emulsions during transit from England to this country. As [redacted] was planning to be away from the office today, he suggested that I write you to determine whether you could provide further details concerning the suspected X-irradiation of the Ilford plates which you received recently. As you point out in your letter, circumstances connected with the quality of nuclear photographic emulsions, as received from abroad, can be of real interest to many of our contractors.

We would therefore very much appreciate hearing from you how certain you are that your recent shipment was exposed to X-radiation, as distinct from the alternate possibility that the plates may have received radiation from nearby radioactive materials in transit. It would also be of interest to learn the dates and route of shipment and any other related information which may be available to you.

With our thanks once again for your assistance,

Sincerely,

[redacted]

b7C

[redacted]

[redacted] COPY

ENCLOSURE

[redacted]RMATION - SEC[redacted]

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4/10/00 BY SP4 BSA/LBM

RECORDED - 43

esa

97-3

July 29, 1953

The Honorable
The Secretary of Defense
Washington, D. C.

VIA LIAISON

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Reference is made to my letter dated July 20, 1953, which requested a briefing for the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security. My letter of July 20, 1953, attached a list of individuals who would attend the briefing to be given by the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project and the Atomic Energy Commission.

It is requested that the name of Mr. Donald C. Parsons, Technical Chief, FBI Laboratory, be added to the list of individuals to receive this special briefing.

Sincerely yours,

Chairman
Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference

RECEIVED - DIRECTOR
FBI
JUL 29 2 22 PM '53
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE

To [redacted] CSD b7C
7-30-53 SDE.

1 - Honorable Lewis L. Strauss
Chairman
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
Washington, D. C.

VIA LIAISON

RECEIVED - DIRECTOR
FBI
JUL 29 2 03 PM '53
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE

ESS:bjl

to Col. Cooper
AEC
7-30-53

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Holloman
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Mrs. Gandy

SECURITY INFORMATION - SECRET

59 AUG 24 1953

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: July 22, 1953

FROM : D. M. LADD

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES REQUIRED TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION OF DEMOLITION ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

Tolson
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Sizoo
Miss Gandy

As you know, arrangements are being perfected for the IIC and the ICIS members and the IIC and ICIS Working Committee members to be briefed by the Atomic Energy Commission and the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project concerning matters relating to the small atomic bombs. The briefing is being set for August 5, 1953.

It is suggested that we have the name of Mr. Donald C. Parsons of the Bureau's Laboratory designated to attend this briefing inasmuch as the Bureau would greatly benefit from a technical standpoint by having him attend the briefing.

RECOMMENDATION:

If you approve the attendance of Mr. Parsons at this briefing, arrangements will be made for him to be included on the roster of those to attend.

ESS:hke

SMUGGLING ATOM BOMBS OR PARTS FOR ATOM BOMBS INTO the United States

117-268-

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HET to SEC. DEF 7-29-53 ESS

C#948742/950935/997059
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4/10/00 BY SP4 BJA/LBM

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. D. M. LADD

DATE: July 28, 1953

FROM : A. H. Belmont

Tolson
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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4/20/00 BY SP4 BJA/LBM C#940742/950935/997059

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES REQUIRED TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION OF DEMOLITION ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

Reference is made to memorandum to you dated June 25, 1953, recommending that Liaison Agent Bates would meet with the Working Group of the Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures. This Working Group was considering the problem of disarming and disposal of clandestinely introduced atomic weapons, as well as the protective measures to be taken.

This joint group is composed of Lt. Colonel Ralph Gahl, Atomic Energy Commission; Colonel Robert R. Judson, Department of Defense; Frank Russell, Customs; Wayne Althaus, Federal Civil Defense Administration; William Royce, Office of Defense Mobilization; and Charles W. Bates, FBI.

This group has now submitted a draft of a report to the Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures regarding the problem of disarming, disposal, and protective measures in connection with clandestine atomic weapons. The conclusion of this group is that the disarming of fissionable weapons can be handled by Department of Defense Explosive Ordnance Units which have received training along these lines and which are set up at strategic points throughout the country. It was further concluded that the disposal of these disarmed weapons is by law the responsibility of the Atomic Energy Commission and that the protective measures to be taken are the responsibility of the local police and civil defense agencies under the guidance of the FCDA. The responsibility of confirming or receiving the initial report that such a weapon has been found should rest with state, county, and municipal police departments in conjunction, of course, with the FBI.

You will recall that another subcommittee of the IIC-ICIS Joint Committee was considering the problem of reporting the finding of such weapons and it was felt that in view of the Bureau's internal security responsibilities, this matter would in all probability first come to the attention of local Bureau Agents. This report has been furnished to the Joint IIC-ICIS Committee for appropriate consideration and inclusion in the next report to be submitted by that committee on countermeasures. There are attached copies of this report.

CWB:lw
Attachments (3)
1 - Mr. Whitson

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56 AUG 21 1953

SMUGGLING ATOM BOMBS FOR ATOM BOMBS INTO THE UNITED STATES

ACTION:

None. This paper is not a commitment on the part of the members of the Working Group but has merely been submitted for the consideration of the Joint IIC-ICIS Committee. This Committee will then submit a report which will be circulated among the IIC agencies for appropriate comment and approval.

SECURITY INFORMATION - ~~S~~

D-R-A-F-T

SUBJECT: Report of Sub-committee on Clandestinely Placed Fissionable Devices

TO:

1. Committee was made up of the following persons, representing Federal Agencies shown:

Mr. Wayne Althaus - FCDA

Mr. William S. Royce - ODM

Mr. Charles Bates - FBI

Mr. Frank Russell - Treas.-Customs

Lt. Col. Ralph Gahl - USAF AEC

Col. Robert R. Judson - USA DOD

2. Problem: To determine the organization required to make safe or disarm and to dispose of clandestinely introduced fissionable weapons and to determine the protective measures to be taken to protect lives and property. To determine the agencies responsible for administration and supervision of the disarming and disposal of the weapons found and for the protective measures to be taken.

3. Assumption: Given to the committee was the assumption that the detection, discovery and reporting system was organized.

In addition, the following additional assumptions were made:

a. Clandestinely introduced fissionable weapons will be

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4-7-00 SPH by/ LBM

placed at or near potentially profitable targets.

b. More than one weapon may be in the vicinity of each potential target.

c. That since the discovery of these weapons will be very difficult, the probability of the discovery of more than one at a time is very unlikely.

d. That the weapons will be intended for use in conjunction with an overt attack and therefore if found, the time available to disarm them will be reasonable.

4. A. CONFIRMATION

Discussion: The general discussion of the sub-committee brought out that it would be necessary and advisable to have local agencies investigate all reports and determine as nearly as possible that the item reported was, in all probability, a fissionable weapon. This will be very difficult, at present, as the size and shape of the weapon will vary within a wide range. Until the actual explosive content is exposed, it will be hard to determine the nature of the weapon.

In all probability the weapon will be packed in any type outer container of indeterminate size and shape to contain the item and this container would have to be opened, using ordinary techniques to avoid booby traps which would detonate the weapon to destroy it or at least accomplish part of the mission.

In order to avoid premature calls on specialized teams, local persons could be trained, or presently organized local police bomb squads, would be capable, with little additional training, of uncovering enough of the weapon to establish the probability that the item was a fissionable weapon.

The general discussion brought out further that there was the probability that several weapons would be around each target and that several targets in the country would be selected, the discovery and confirmation would be slow; the weapons would probably be set up to detonate simultaneously around each target and would probably be set up to detonate at the time of, or after an overt attack; the time available to disarm the weapons would be relatively long.

B. DISARMING

Disarming techniques, for the present at least, are the same as for any other military explosive ordnance. Many of the present DOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal Units are qualified to disarm confirmed fissional weapons. The opening of outer containers to verify that the contents were explosives or fissionable weapons would involve the ordinary and usual techniques for looking for and neutralizing booby traps and other sabotage devices which most police bomb squads are capable of handling. The requirements are considerably different from those required

to disarm military explosive ordnance.

The techniques developed to disarm weapons are at present highly classified. These methods must be classified for the reason that if any potential enemy knew the methods used and how much is known of their own methods of arming, fuzing and connecting explosives weapons, the task of neutralizing enemy ammunition and weapons would be more difficult, take longer and be more dangerous than it is at present. For this reason, it is DOD policy to keep the information classified and disseminated on a need-to-know basis to people under direct Federal control. The task is of the type that must be practiced continuously for the people to remain proficient.

C. DISPOSAL

The disposal of fissionable materials and weapons is the responsibility of the AEC as now covered by law, therefore, the disposal of disarmed weapons found would be the responsibility of the AEC.

D. PROTECTIVE MEASURES

The only protective measures to be taken are for the removal of all persons, not actually engaged in the disarming work, to a considerable distance and the shutting off of all gas, water, electricity, and other utilities for a considerable distance around the weapon to reduce the possibility of secondary

damage from fire, etc. This is the same technique required for civil defense against bombing attacks.

5. Conclusions:

a. The responsibility to confirm that reported items are in all probability fissionable weapons should rest with state, county and municipal police departments, as appropriate, in conjunction with FBI.

b. Disarming of confirmed fissionable military type weapons is a military Explosive Ordnance technique and could be handled by existing DOD Explosive Ordnance Units in addition to presently assigned duties without increase in personnel or operating costs, and no change in present disposition. If it is determined that the Explosive Ordnance Units now established or programmed for, operating from present or planned distribution patterns, cannot meet anticipated requirements, then a new Federal organization may be necessary.

c. The disposal of disarmed fissionable weapons and the disposal of fissionable material is, by law, the responsibility of the Atomic Energy Commission.

d. The protective measures to be taken are the responsibility of local police and civil defense agencies. FCDA should provide guidance.

6. This report is submitted by this committee as the considered opinion of the members as to how and who should sponsor

and be responsible for the various aspects of the problem. None of the individual members are authorized to commit their respective departments to the conclusions stated.

Robert R. Judson, Col., USA Chairman

Wayne Althaus FCDA Member

William S. Royce ODM Member

Charles Bates FBI Member

Frank Russell Treasury Member

Ralph Gahl, Lt Col, USAF AEC Member

Incl
Copies of minutes of the meetings of the committee

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: July 31, 1953

FROM : D. M. LADD

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES REQUIRED TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

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Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Sizoo
Miss Gandy

SMUGGLING Atom Bombs IN PARTS FOR ATOM Bombs Into the United States

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4/10/00 BY SP4 BCM/LSM C#49874/96059

SYNOPSIS:

Attached is copy of draft of joint letter to NSC forwarding suggested report pertaining to status of countermeasures against clandestine introduction and detonation of atomic weapons which has been prepared and submitted to IIC and ICIS for concurrence or comments. Also attached is suggested letter to Admiral Strauss of AEC requesting official observations regarding Restricted Data content of informative documents prepared in connection with the joint report to NSC.

DETAILS:

Attached is a draft copy of a suggested letter to the National Security Council which, in accordance with agreement reached at the June 3, 1953, IIC meeting, reviews the recommendations made in December, and subsequently, concerning countermeasures against the clandestine introduction and possible detonation of atomic weapons in the United States. The draft report also comments upon the present status of actions taken in connection with these recommendations.

There is also attached a copy of a draft letter to Admiral Strauss of AEC requesting his official advice on the Restricted Data content of three informative documents, two of which are intended for dissemination - one to federal enforcement officers and the other to public officials, duly constituted law enforcement agencies, etc. AEC has informally and unofficially advised that these two items contain no Restricted Data. Admiral Strauss is being requested for an official statement.

The IIC on July 9, 1953, commented to the ICIS concerning additional recommendations which the ICIS has not included in this joint report due to the fact that the IIC did not agree. Those comments which are contained in this

Attachments (2)

LW; ESS: hke

ENCLS. BEHIND FILE

RECORDED - 43 117-268-

INDEXED - 43 AUG 12 1953

97 AUG 12 1953

Memorandum for The Director, 7/31/53

Re: Countermeasures Required To Detect and Defend Against the Clandestine Introduction and Detonation of Atomic Weapons in the United States

joint letter and report have been previously approved in the letter of July 9, 1953.

There are two points in the report which pertain directly to FBI functions. The first is on page four of the report and recommends that when information regarding clandestine atomic weapons is released to public officials and law enforcement agencies, the President point out that the FBI is charged with investigation of violations of the Atomic Energy Act and that any information regarding clandestine weapons or their parts should be reported to the FBI. The recommendation also appears that when the probability of a clandestine atomic weapon which has been found is determined by local authorities in conjunction with the FBI that disarming of such a weapon shall be performed by the appropriate groups within the Department of Defense and disposal of weapon after disarming will be made by AEC. The status of the recommendation that the IIC agency continue the infiltration of subversive groups within the United States is set forth on page five of the report.

Copies of the letter to NSC transmitting the report and other attachments have been furnished to the other IIC members for their approval or comments and to ICIS for the same purpose.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that if you, the other IIC members and the members of ICIS approve, the report be transmitted to the National Security Council and the informative documents go forward to Admiral Strauss for his official opinion. When approval has been obtained from the interested parties, the letters will be prepared for signature.

117- HQ-268 288



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

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

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August 3, 1953

PROPOSED INFORMATION FOR RELEASE TO PUBLIC OFFICIALS, REPRESENTATIVE OF DULY CONSTITUTED LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES, ETC.

DESCRIPTION OF ATOMIC DEVICES AND COMPONENT PARTS

In order that citizens of the United States may intelligently assist in the defense of our country, they should have sufficient information regarding atomic weapons to enable them to recognize bombs or parts of bombs which might be smuggled into the United States by enemy agents. It is impossible to describe exactly what a foreign atomic bomb will look like. On the other hand, it is possible to explain the basic ideas which will govern their design. For this explanation it is then possible to designate and describe those materials which must be essential to the construction of any atomic bomb.

Atomic explosions result when (1) certain amounts of fissionable material in two pieces or more are brought quickly together to form one piece of such material and when (2) a certain amount of fissionable material is quickly made more dense by squeezing it together. The important thing about each of these methods is that masses of fissionable material must be placed into rapid motion. We know that high explosives are capable of giving any material such necessary rapid motion.

In the first case we would look for some kind of a gun barrel device using high explosive to blow one piece of fissionable material from the breech end of the gun down through the barrel into another piece of fissionable material firmly anchored in the muzzle end of the gun.

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In the second case we would look for a device using high explosive to squeeze fissionable material. To explain how such a device will work we must understand what is meant by "implosion." The significance of the word explosion is familiar to most people. Implosion signifies a bursting inwards as contrasted with the bursting outwards of an explosion. In order to obtain an implosion, however strange it may seem, explosive material is necessary. The scientists who worked on the first atom bomb needed an implosion in order to compress nuclear material enough to get an atomic "explosion." They solved their problem by forming a large sphere of explosive material. In a hole in the center of this sphere they placed the fissionable material they wanted to squeeze. Then instead of using one detonator to ignite the explosive sphere, they placed many detonators around it. These detonators were connected electrically in such a way that they could be fired simultaneously. If only one detonator had been used, one can easily understand that the sphere, having been ignited at only one point, would have exploded in the ordinary way; that is, with the exploding wave, which is another way of saying a fast burning wave, burning through the sphere from one side to the other. However, with many detonators igniting the sphere from all sides, the fast burning wave is essentially spherical in shape and burns inward toward the center of the sphere. When this fast burning imploding wave reaches the sphere of fissionable material, this mass has no place to be pushed except in upon itself and is thus compressed.

We have now explained very simply the basic ideas which govern atomic bomb design. Looking back at these ideas, we note that two essential features of the gun type device are the gun barrel itself and fissionable material, and two essential features of the implosion type device are high explosive charges that could be used to build a sphere and again fissionable material. We see by this that we will be able to help protect ourselves and our country if we can recognize any one of three essential components; namely,

1. *Fissionable material*
2. *Gun barrel type device*
3. *High explosives for implosion.*

In order to help us in our recognition of these essential components, we must learn something about them. Fissionable material is uranium and/or plutonium which are EXTREMELY HEAVY metals weighing half again as much as lead of the same size. Fifty pounds of these heavy fissionable materials would be approximately five inches in diameter, if in the shape of a sphere - about the size of a softball. Since both of these metals can be coated with other metals or plastics and can be machined into all sorts of shapes, we should be especially alert regarding any article that is extremely heavy for its size. Pieces which might be smuggled would probably be of a size that could be carried on the person.

The gun barrel type device will probably be made of steel. The diameter of the bore of such a gun barrel would probably not be less than two inches or more than ten inches. With such a range of inner diameters for the bore, we may expect the outer diameter of the gun barrel to range from about five inches as a minimum to about twelve inches as a maximum. Both ends of the barrel may be closed by breech block type devices so that the bore of the gun will not be visible. It is possible, of course, that the gun tube and the two breech blocks may be carried as three separate pieces; in this case the inner bore may be visible. The fissionable material for this gun type weapon may be concealed within, and usually at the ends of, the gun barrel or it may be carried in separate packages for later assembly within the barrel. We may visualize the gun type device then as one in which a projectile of fissionable material is fired down a gun barrel into another plug of fissionable material in the muzzle of the gun barrel. The length of the entire device need not exceed about two and one-half feet.

The High explosives of implosion will probably be in specially fabricated shapes one side of which will be a part of a spherical surface. Most high explosives are light tan in color, have a soapy feel and are half again as heavy as an equal quantity of water.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : D. M. Ladd

DATE: August 13, 1953

FROM : A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: ~~X~~ COUNTERMEASURES REQUIRED TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION IN PLACE OF DEMOLITION ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

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On August 13, 1953, Mr. J. P. Coyne, National Security Council representative on internal security, phoned and stated that the Joint IIC-ICIS report dated August 3, 1953, on countermeasures was being prepared for submission by Mr. Lay to the National Security Council. Mr. Coyne stated as a matter of background that although President Truman had been briefed on the Director's December 4, 1952, report on subject of countermeasures and President Eisenhower had been briefed not only on the December 4, 1952, report but also on the status report of April 9, 1953, which was submitted jointly by IIC and ICIS, the National Security Council as such had not heretofore been presented officially and formally with the entire picture.

Accordingly, the report of August 3, 1953, was going to the Council. Mr. Coyne stated that the August, 1953, report contained certain current recommendations as well as statements regarding the status of implementation of the recommendations originally made in the December 4, 1952, report. He asked whether the April 9 report contained any new recommendations as of that time which had not appeared in the December 4 report.

Mr. Coyne was informed that the April 9 report concerned solely the degree of implementation at that time achieved with respect to the recommendations contained in the December 4, 1952, report. No new recommendations were made therein. It was pointed out that this was pointed out in the report itself on page one.

RECOMMENDATION:

None. This is for your information.

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LW:brg

56 AUG 21 1953

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ATOM BOMBS FOR ATTACK ON PARTS OF UNITED STATES

SMUGGLING INTO THE

AEC

UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
Washington 25, D. C.

No. 494 August 8, 1953
Tel. ST 3-8000, Ext. 307

SMUGGLING Atom Bombs OR PARTS For Atom Bombs INTO the United States

(Editors: The following statement was issued by Lewis L. Strauss, Chairman of the U. S. Atomic Energy Commission, in response to requests from news correspondents for comment on Malenkov's August 8, 1953 remarks that the "United States no longer has a monopoly of the hydrogen bomb.")

Mr. Strauss stated: "We have never assumed that it was beyond the capability of the Russians to produce such a weapon and that is the reason why, more than three years ago, it was decided to press forward with this development for ourselves."

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SAC, Seattle

August 13, 1953

Director, FBI (117-268)

RECORDED - 16

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES

Reurlet 7-31-53 re Espionage and Foreign Intelligence Investigations; Movement of Nationals of Soviet and Satellite Countries, which you directed to the Bureau in connection with Prodip, Bufile 66-17440, and Mosnat, Bufile 100-308748.

The program described to you by the U. S. Coast Guard representative at the port of Seattle is a part of the broad Coast Guard port security program. The specific program under which the prospective arrival of the "Nordic Star," a vessel of British registry, which had touched at a Chinese Communist port, is in line with steps being taken by Coast Guard and Customs to assure that all possible steps available to them are taken to prevent the introduction of atomic weapons into the United States in merchant vessels.

The actual search of such vessels is usually conducted by the U. S. Customs Service.

You will recall that No Number SAC Letter A, Series 1952, dated January 28, 1952, pointed out that the Bureau of Customs is charged with the responsibility of preventing the clandestine introduction into this country of atomic and other types of weapons of mass destruction. As pointed out in that letter the Bureau has been furnishing to Customs at the seat of Government names and addresses of individuals and organizations who might be involved in the smuggling into the United States of such weapons of mass destruction.

Other agencies of the U. S. Government also have the responsibility of pointing out to Customs possible means of introduction of such weapons of mass destruction. Any Soviet or satellite flag merchant vessel or a vessel

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controlled or chartered by nations of the Soviet bloc as well as merchant vessels which have touched the Soviet or satellite ports are suspect. You will note that the Coast Guard has been instructed to notify the Atomic Energy Commission as well as the FBI and other interested agencies of the arrival of merchant vessels in the foregoing categories. This notification to the various agencies by Customs is merely for the purpose of alerting those agencies to the arrival of a suspect vessel. The FBI has no responsibility for searching the vessel or supervising its movements into port or supervising the movements of its passengers, crew or cargo.

However, in the event a Customs search reveals the presence of atomic weapons or parts thereof or other weapons of mass destruction, such should be reported promptly to your office and appropriate investigative steps taken in line with the Bureau's investigative and intelligence responsibilities.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (66-17440 PRODIP)(100-308748 MOSNAT) REG. DATE: 7/31/53

FROM : SAC, SEATTLE (105-231 PRODIP)

SUBJECT: ESPIONAGE AND FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS; MOVEMENT OF NATIONALS OF SOVIET AND SATELLITE COUNTRIES

b7C

On June 22, 1953, [redacted] U. S. Coast Guard, Pier 70, Seattle, telephonically advised this office that a vessel in Category C was to arrive at Seattle, Washington. He advised the name of this vessel was the NORDIC STAR, a vessel of British registration which had reportedly touched at a Chinese Communist port within the past four months.

On June 25, 1953, [redacted] again telephonically advised that the NORDIC STAR had been diverted and was scheduled to be refueled at Vancouver, B. C., rather than at Seattle. b7C

EXPEDITE PROCESSING

A further inquiry was made with [redacted] who advised that U. S. Coast Guard Directive #2257 directs the Coast Guard to immediately notify various Government intelligence agencies regarding the arrival of vessels in Category A, B and C, which are defined as follows:

CATEGORY A. Soviet or satellite flag merchant vessels registered under the flag of any one of the following countries: U.S.S.R., Albania, Bulgaria, Communist China, Czechoslovakia, Eastern Austria, Eastern Germany, Hungary, North Korea, Outer Mongolia, Poland, and Romania.

CATEGORY B. Soviet or satellite controlled merchant vessels. This includes vessels not registered under the flag of the USSR or satellite countries but which are suspected of being owned or controlled by such country.

CATEGORY C. All merchant vessels which have touched at a Soviet or satellite port within a period of four months before entry into any U. S. port.

Coast Guard procedures in connection with the above three categories are as follows:

CATEGORY A. The vessel will be permitted to enter but her unloading shall be kept under continued surveillance by Customs guards or Coast Guard personnel and this vessel shall be boarded prior to its

RHC:BB

cc: Seattle files (100-16660 MOSNAT)
(100-19240 MOVEMENT OF SATELLITE NATIONALS)

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Ltr to Seattle 8-13-53

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arrival near the congested part of the port area. Vessel's papers shall be examined, a number of the crew members interrogated and a thorough a search as practicable shall be made.

In vessels under Categories B and C, the vessel will be permitted to enter but to the extent practicable her unloading should be under the surveillance of Coast Guard and Customs inspectors.

[redacted] advised that the above is a very brief summary of the Coast Guard instructions. He stated that the federal agencies to be notified upon the arrival of one of the above vessels are as follows: b7C

1. U. S. Public Health Service (Quarantine).
2. Bureau of Customs.
3. U. S. Immigration and Naturalization Service.
4. Navy (ONI).
5. Army (CIC).
6. Federal Bureau of Investigation.
7. Atomic Energy Commission.
8. Pilots' Association.
9. Bureau of Narcotics.

This matter was discussed informally with [redacted] of the Entry and Departure Section of the U. S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, Seattle, at which time [redacted] advised that in accordance with previous instructions, the Seattle Office will be advised only of movements of Soviet or satellite citizens coming into the United States. He stated that the I&NS does not maintain any records of visitors or people going aboard such ships as they do not maintain any kind of surveillance on such vessels. He noted that I&NS has the authority to refuse crew members of any foreign ship shore leave and recalled an instance some months ago when a ship with a Chinese crew entered a Washington harbor and the crew was denied shore leave. b7C

This matter is being called to the Bureau's attention since it is the first known instance of the Coast Guard reporting such a vessel at Seattle. It is believed this matter may be of interest to the Bureau from a liaison and intelligence standpoint with other interested Government agencies. The Bureau may desire to suggest procedures to be following in handling future reports from the Coast Guard in such cases.

AEC

UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
Washington 25, D. C.

No. 495 August 20, 1953
Tel. ST 3-8000, Ext. 307

Lewis L. Strauss, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, has issued the following statement:

"The Soviet Union conducted an atomic test on the morning of August 12. Certain information to this effect came into our hands that night. Subsequent information on the subject indicates that this test involved both fission and thermonuclear reactions.

"It will be recalled that more than three years ago the United States decided to accelerate work on all forms of atomic weapons. Both the 1951 and the 1952 Eniwetok test series included tests involving similar reactions."

- 30 -

SMUGGLING A-BOMBS OR PARTS FOR ATOM BOMBS Into the United States

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SAC, Buffalo (117-25)

RECORDED-42

Director, FBI (117-268)

August 25, 1953

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS AND PARTS
THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

Re Buffalo let August 21, 1953, on page 3 of which Buffalo indicates Washington Field as origin.

The Bureau has always been origin as far as correspondence relating to this problem is concerned. Any investigation reported by either New York or Baltimore should indicate the Bureau as origin.

cc - 2 - New York (117-192)

cc - 2 - Baltimore (117-46)

cc - 2 - Washington Field (117-151)

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: August 21, 1953

FROM : SAC, Buffalo

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS AND PARTS THEREOF
INTO THE UNTIED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

AIRMAIL SPECIAL DELIVERY

Re Bureau Airtel dated August 11, 1953.

[redacted] Physics Department, University of Rochester is on vacation and his definite whereabouts are not known, however, he is believed to be either at BROOKHAVEN LABORATORY, Long Island, New York, or at the home of his parents, first names unknown, at [redacted] He is not expected to return to the University of Rochester until September 10, next. b7C

The specific shipment of the Ilford plates involved cannot be identified by personnel of the Physics Department, University of Rochester, or by [redacted] either one of the two following shipments contained the plates in question. The first shipment was shipped February 20, 1953, from Ilford Limited, London, England, via Trans-World Airlines by plane 6023D. It arrived in New York, February 21, 1953, via Gander, Newfoundland and was shipped under Bill of Lading 449405. It was unloaded at New York and then transferred to American Airlines which brought it to Rochester, New York. It was picked up by the consignee, Physics Department, University of Rochester on February 26, 1953, at the Customs House, Rochester, New York. The plates are six by four inches, were treated with emulsion G2, and are referred to as Ilford Nuclear Research Plates.

The other shipment possibly containing the plates in question consisted of fifty-four plates identical with those described above. They were shipped by Ilford Limited, London, on December 19, 1952, by TWA plane 6024C, under Bill of Lading LON 444850. They arrived in New York on December 20, 1952, were transferred to American Airlines the same date and arrived in the Customs House, Rochester, New York, December 23, 1952. They were picked up [redacted] on December 24, 1952. The information concerning the plane number, date of arrival, etc., on this shipment was obtained from the office of the Collector of Customs, Rochester, New York. b7C

EXPEDITE PROCESSING

[redacted] advised that these plates have been obtained from Ilford for about two years and that the fogging of these plates has always been somewhat of a problem. He stated definitely that plates received prior to those in question were sometimes fogged to a slight extent. The plates are packed in cardboard containers and in shredded paper or some other form of packing material. The Professor is of the opinion that the fogging could have been caused by the plates being in proximity to any type of radio-active material such as thorium which is used in the manufacture of some watch dials. He stated definitely that

RGA:JRMC
117-25
cc:BALTIMORE (AMSD)
cc:NEW YORK (AMSD)
cc:WASHINGTON FIELD (AMSD)

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Lter to: Director
RE: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS AND PARTS THEREOF
INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

Buffalo, N.Y.
August 21, 1953

because of the type of packing material used if radio-active watch dials were part of the plane's cargo, the plates would become fogged. He also stated that he has noticed that the fogging is more severe immediately after an atomic bomb test explosion. Because of this factor, [redacted] that the heavy concentration of radio-active material in the air after an explosion may be the cause of the fogging. [redacted] that although exposure to X-ray may have caused the fogging, it is his opinion that a much more active and powerful type of ray must have come into contact with the plates. He does not believe that X-ray is causing the fogging. b7C

[redacted] he thought the fogging was caused by exposure to X-ray.

[redacted] that Brookhaven Laboratory also experienced the problem of fogged plates received from Ilford and are now having the plates shipped in lead containers. This procedure evidently has solved the problem for Brookhaven. The University of Rochester is now endeavoring to have these plates made in this country to overcome the difficulty experienced with the Ilford plates. b7C

New York is requested to interview [redacted] and ascertain which of the two above shipments contained the plates in question. He should also be interviewed for his opinion as to the cause of the fogging of the plates, whether the fogging is more pronounced after an atomic bomb test explosion, whether the presence of radio-active watch dials in the same plane could be the cause, and whether he is still of the opinion that exposure or close proximity to X-ray is the cause. It should also be ascertained from him whether fogging has always been a problem or whether it is of recent origin.

In the event that New York cannot locate [redacted] it is requested [redacted] advised and requested to interview him at [redacted] b7C

For the information [redacted] the Atomic Energy Commission has advised of correspondence between the Office of Naval Research [redacted] Physics Department, University of Rochester, regarding fogging of Ilford plates by possibly being in close proximity to radio-active material in transit from England to the United States via TWA. AEC pointed out that the fogging of the plates might be an indication that improperly shielded fissionable material has been brought into the United States in the same cargo with the plates. The incident occured prior to May 19, 1953.

Buffalo, New York
August 21, 1953

Lter to Director
Re: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS AND
PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

In the event that the interview is conducted [redacted] b7C copies of the results should be furnished to the Bureau, Buffalo, New York, and Washington Field which is origin.

Officials of the Office of Collector of Customs, Rochester, New York, advised that all plates received from England for the University of Rochester come directly into the Customs House at Rochester, New York, and are not examined by Customs' officials at New York. They also stated that they do not have any X-ray equipment at Rochester and that the plates are not exposed to X-ray inspection by them.

RUC.

SECURITY INFORMATION - SECRET

cc - Mr. Ladd
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Branigan
Mr. Keay

August 25, 1953

VIA LIAISON

SMUGGLING Atom Bombs OR PARTS FOR Atom Bombs INTO the United States

Honorable Lewis L. Strauss
Chairman
Atomic Energy Commission
19th and Constitution Avenue, N. W.
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Admiral:

As you are aware, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, together with other agencies of this Government which hold membership in the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security, has been studying with technical advisors from the Atomic Energy Commission countermeasures required to detect and defend against the clandestine introduction and detonation of atomic weapons in the United States.

Since it is now indicated that the U.S.S.R. has tested a thermonuclear device, I would appreciate your observations regarding the possibility of clandestine introduction of such a thermonuclear device or weapon into the United States, either in assembled form or in parts for later assembly.

If such clandestine introduction can be effected in the hold of a merchant vessel or by other means, the FBI and the other interested agencies will consider the problem of countermeasures in relation to these new aspects of clandestine introduction peculiar to thermonuclear weapons.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

LW:amb

117-268

117-268

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DECLASSIFIED BY SP-4 BJALKEN
ON 4/96 pkh 4/96 pkh 4948 CHRON/950935/19 2050

Tolson
Ladd
Nichols
Belmont
Clegg
Glavin
Harbo
Rosen
Tracy
Gearty
Mohr
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Sizoo
Miss Gandy

56 SEP 1 1953

SECURITY INFORMATION - SECRET

AIRTEL

FBI WASH FIELD 8-27-53

DIRECTOR AND SACS: BUFFALO (117-25) (RM)
NEW YORK (RM)
BALTIMORE (RM)

URGENT

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS AND PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES. RE WFO AIRTEL TO DIRECTOR DATED 8-12-53. [redacted] NUCLEAR PHYSICS BRANCH, OFFICE NAVAL RESEARCH, NAVY DEPT, WASHINGTON, D. C. ADVISED THIS DATE HIS OFFICE IN RECEIPT OF INFORMATION THIS DATE CONTAINED IN LETTER HEADED "AMERICAN EMBASSY OFFICE OF THE NAVAL ATTACHE, LONDON, ENGLAND ------ OFFICE NAVAL RESEARCH, BRANCH OFFICE, NAVY 100, FLEET POST OFFICE, N.Y.,N.Y.", DATED AUGUST 7 LAST PERTAINING TO "ILFORD PLATES". LETTER IN FORM OF TECHNICAL MEMO RE "VISIT TO ILFORD LIMITED , [redacted] PERTINENT PORTION OF LETTER CONTAINED COMMENT BY RICHARDSON THAT "IT HAD BEEN ASCERTAINED THAT ILFORD LIMITED HAS BEEN TROUBLED LATELY BY WHAT APPEARS TO BE RADIO-ACTIVE CONTAMINATION OF SOME CARDBOARD THEY USE. THE EMITTED RADIATION APPEARS NOT TO BE ALPHA PARTICLES BUT RATHER SLOW ELECTRONS. THE CARDBOARD COMES FROM HOLLAND BUT THE ULTIMATE SOURCE IS NOT KNOWN". INASMUCH AS [redacted] CONFERRED [redacted] CONCERNING INFORMATION SET FORTH IN AND BACKGROUND OF REAIRTEL TO DIRECTOR, [redacted] SUPPLIED THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS REGARDING THE FOGGED ILFORD PLATES ORIGINALLY RECEIVED BY [redacted] AT ROCHESTER, N.Y. (1) INASMUCH [redacted] STATED THE EFFECTS OF THE RADIATION OF THE PLATES OCCURRED MAINLY IN ONE POSITION ON THE PLATE, IT IS NOT ILLOGICAL TO CONCLUDE THAT THE RADIO-ACTIVE CARDBOARD

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117-268

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USED AT THE ILFORD PLANT, IN SHIPPING OR STORAGE, COULD HAVE CAUSED THE FOGGING ORIGINALLY REPORTED [redacted] (2) THERE EXISTS A GOOD LIKELIHOOD THAT WHEN PRESENTED WITH THIS INFORMATION, [redacted] BY TESTS, OR OTHER DEDUCTIONS, BE ABLE TO EXPLAIN WHAT CAUSED THE ORIGINAL FOGGING, OR AT LEAST ELIMINATE THE FACTOR OF THE PRESENCE OF RADIO ACTIVITY IN THE WRAPPINGS HE RECEIVED. b7C

(3) THERE IS A CASE HISTORY THAT THE EASTMAN KODAK COMPANY HAS EXPERIENCED SIMILAR RADIATION OF FILM CAUSED BY THIS SAME SOURCE. IN VIEW OF [redacted] COMMENTS, IT IS SUGGESTED [redacted] IMMEDIATELY APPRISED OF THE INFO CONTAINED HEREIN IN AN ATTEMPT TO POSSIBLY RESOLVE THE SOURCE OF THE RADIATION OF SUBJECT ILFORD PLATES. DISTRIBUTION LIST OF SUBJECT LETTER RECEIVED THIS DATE [redacted] BEING FURNISHED BY LETTER FOLLOWING, IT BEING NOTED [redacted] FURNISHED A COPY ADDRESSED TO THE UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER. [redacted] THE ONI DESIRES THAT THE SOURCE OF THIS INFORMATION BE CAREFULLY PROTECTED AND NOT DISCLOSED TO OTHER AGENCIES WITHOUT THE EXPRESS CONSENT OF ONI. COPIES OF THIS AIRTEL BEING FURNISHED TO BUFFALO, NEW YORK [redacted] INASMUCH AS THEY MAY BE REQUIRED TO INTERVIEW [redacted] BUREAU IS ORIGIN. b7C

FLETCHER, ACTING.

AIR-TEL

FBI WASH FIELD 8/12/53

DIRECTOR AND SAC, BUFFALO (~~REGULAR~~ REGISTERED MAIL) URGENT
NEW YORK " "

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS AND PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES. REBUAIRTEL DATED AUGUST 11 LAST. [redacted]

NUCLEAR PHYSICS BRANCH, OFFICE NAVAL RESEARCH, DEPT. OF NAVY, INTERVIEWED THIS DATE CONCERNING BACKGROUND OF CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN OFFICE NAVAL RESEARCH AND [redacted] b7C

[redacted] REGARDING FOGGED QUOTE ILFORD PLATES UNQUOTE. [redacted] OFFICE HAS COMMON INTEREST [redacted] OFFICE IN OBTAINING THE CLEANEST TYPE OF EMULSION ON PLATES USED IN THEIR RESEARCH AND PLATES IMPORTED FROM QUOTE ILFORD LIMITED UNQUOTE, ENGLAND HAVE PROVED BEST AVAILABLE ON MARKET. PLATES ARE SHIPPED BY AIR FREIGHT OR DIPLOMATIC POUCH TO INSURE FASTEST POSSIBLE DELIVERY TO THE U. S. IN ORDER TO MINIMIZE RADIATION ENCOUNTERED FROM COSMIC RAYS, WHICH METHOD OF TRANSPORTATION IS CONSIDERED TO BE THE BEST AVAILABLE AT THIS TIME. [redacted] CONFERENCE OF AMERICAN PHYSICAL SOCIETY AT WASHINGTON, D. C., APRIL 30 AND MAY 1 AND 2 LAST AT WHICH TIME DISCUSSION WAS HAD CONCERNING PROBLEMS b7C OCCASIONED IN THE IMPORTATION OF THE ILFORD PLATES. BY LETTER DATED 5/19/53 [redacted] HAVING RECENTLY RECEIVED PLATES WHICH WERE FOGGED. [redacted] PLATES HAD BEEN

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HEC:JC

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EX-124

cc Brennan

AIR-TEL

X-RAYED, OR EXPOSED TO X-RAY EQUIPMENT IN TRANSIT, WHICH MARKED THE FIRST OCCURRENCE OF THIS KIND [redacted] SOMEWHAT LENGTHY EXPERIENCE ON IMPORTING THE PLATES. [redacted] NOTIFICATION OF b7C THIS INCIDENT [redacted] WAS IN CORRESPONDENCE PERTAINING TO ANOTHER MATTER AND [redacted] IT WAS A NON DASH OFFICIAL, ACADEMIC MENTION OF A MATTER IN WHICH THEY BOTH HAD MUTUAL INTEREST. THE SUBJECT WAS MENTIONED IN CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN [redacted] OFFICE IN SUBSEQUENT LETTERS DATED MAY 26, 1953, JUNE 5, 10, 1953, ON A PERSONAL , RATHER THAN OFFICIAL b7C BASIS, [redacted] OFFICE CONDUCTED NO INQUIRIES OR STUDIES NOR RENDERED ANY OPINIONS IN THE MATTER. THE AEC WAS FURNISHED A COPY OF CERTAIN OF THIS CORRESPONDENCE BECAUSE OF THEIR INTEREST IN ANOTHER MATTER INCLUDED IN THE CORRESPONDENCE ACCORDING [redacted] SUGGESTED THAT ALL PERTINENT INFORMATION WOULD HAVE TO BE SECURED [redacted] SUGGESTED b7C THE FOLLOWING BE ASCERTAINED [redacted] INTERVIEWED: (1) ESTABLISH IF POSSIBLE FROM PLATE THE INTENSITY OF SOURCE OF RADIATION; (2) ESTABLISH FROM PLATE THE NATURE OF SOURCE, I.E. POINT OF RADIATION OR BROAD SOURCE OR MACHINE; (3) CONCLUSION RE POSSIBILITY OF CONTAMINATION OF PLATES IN PACKING AND HANDLING ON BOTH ENDS OF SHIPMENT, INCLUDING ITINERARY OF PACKAGE UPON ARRIVAL IN U. S.; (4) ESTABLISH PAST HISTORY OF SHIPMENTS; AND

(5) INQUIRE [redacted] BY EXAMINATION OF PLATES DETERMINE IF FOGGING IS DENSE ENOUGH TO ESTABLISH THAT THIS COULD NOT HAVE BEEN DUE TO CONTACT WITH FISSIONABLE MATERIAL FOR THE PERIOD OF TIME IT WAS KNOWN TO HAVE BEEN IN TRANSIT. [redacted] b7C ADVISED THAT THE USE OF AN X-RAY OR A FLUOROSCOPE BEING USED AT PORT OF ENTRY, MERELY IN VICINITY OF PLATES, WOULD CAUSE FOGGING AS DESCRIBED [redacted] RECOMMENDED THAT THE OFFICE OF ORIGIN GIVE CONSIDERATION TO INTERVIEWING [redacted] CONCERNING THE ABOVE STATED SUGGESTIONS IF THIS HAS NOT b7C ALREADY BEEN DONE, AS WELL AS ASCERTAINING WHAT DETECTION DEVICES ARE IN USE AT THE CUSTOMS OFFICE(S) THRU WHICH THE SHIPMENT PASSED. [redacted] HE AND HIS STAFF CONSIDERED IT POSSIBLE THAT FOGGING COULD HAVE BEEN CAUSED BY RADIATION FROM IMPROPERLY SHIELDED FISSIONABLE MATERIAL. RUC.

FLETCHER - ACTING

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 9/1/53

FROM : ACTING SAC, WFO (117-151)

G.I.R. -7

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS AND PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

ReWFO air-tel to Director dated 8/27/53, reflecting that the distribution list of letter received same date [redacted] Office of Naval Research, Washington, D. C., was being furnished to the Bureau by separate letter.

Attached herewith is a copy of same distribution list, as obtained [redacted] RUC

b7C

HEC:DL
Enclosure 1

RECORDED-38
INDEXED-38
EX-125

117-[illegible]

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

cc - Mr. Sanders

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : W. A. Branigan

DATE: May 20, 1954

FROM : L. Whitson

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Glavin
Harbo
Rosen
Tamm
Tracy
Mohr
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Miss Gandy

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION IN PLACE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

b2
b7E

In connection with the [redacted] a memo from Scott McLeod, Administrator, Bureau of Inspection, Security, and Consular Affairs, Department of State, to Mr. Thomas J. Donegan, Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security, dated April 21, 1954, was distributed to members of the Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures, May 19, 1954. This memo furnished statistical information regarding the number of Soviet Bloc officials and dependents in the United States and the number of United States officials and dependents in the Soviet Bloc capitals as of January 1, 1954. The information therein can be summarized as follows:

	Officials	Dependents	Total
Soviets in U. S.	191	272	463
Americans in Soviet Union	76	42	118
Poles in U. S.	77	94	171
Americans in Poland	31	39	70
Czechs in U. S.	48	57	105
Americans in Czechoslovakia	14	16	30
Hungarians in U. S.	26	3	29
Americans in Hungary	30	31	61
Rumanians in U. S.	11	19	30
Americans in Rumania	11	9	20

RECOMMENDATION:

A copy of the State Department tabulation is being placed in the file entitled, "Procedures for Handling Diplomatic and Official Representatives of Enemy Nations in the Event of an Emergency," Bureau file 66-17440.

117-268
cc - 66-17440
Attachment
LW:rmc

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INDEXED-1

51 JUN 9

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

In reply refer to
SCA

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

To: Mr. Thomas J. Donegan, Chairman,
Interdepartmental Committee on
Internal Security,
Room 1310, Department of Justice.

From: Scott McLeod, Administrator,
Bureau of Inspection, Security, and
Consular Affairs.

Subject: Soviet bloc official personnel and dependents in the United States and American official personnel and dependents in Soviet bloc countries.

Attached are four copies of a report on Soviet bloc official personnel and dependents in the United States, and American official personnel and dependents in Soviet bloc countries. This report has been prepared in response to a request made by Alternate Defense Member of the ICIS, Colonel Halversen, at the behest of the joint IIC-ICIS Subcommittee.

In the past, detailed records containing the information set forth in the attached report have not been maintained. The information has been gathered from a considerable number of sources and pieced together in an effort to form a coherent whole. Extrapolations and the occasional necessity for harmonizing conflicting information have introduced some error which we do not, however, consider to be significant. It has been difficult to obtain reliable information concerning dependents, especially with regard to their work status, as the practice of unofficially utilizing the services of "working wives" has frequently been followed by our missions in Soviet bloc countries and by Soviet bloc agencies here. Where known, the number of these "working dependents" has been carried separately in the attached report as well as included in officer, employee and staff totals as appropriate. All dates given are closely approximate.

With respect to the list of Czech nationals in the UN secretariat as of early April 1954, it appears that more than half of

twenty-four

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twenty-four are considered to have no connection, either officially or sentimentally, with the present regime of Czechoslovakia. It is supposed that a similar condition probably exists among the Poles in the UN secretariat.

Enclosures:

4 copies of Report

Enclosure No. 1

SOVIET PERSONNEL IN THE UNITED STATES

	1/1/52	7/1/52	1/1/53 - 3/1/53	7/1/53	1/1/54
Embassy					
Officers	39	37	40	28	40
Employees	48	42	37	41	49
Staff Total	87	79	77	69	89
Dependents	139	134	124	114	141
Embassy Total	226	213	201	183	230
U.N. Delegation					
Officers	29	27	28	20	25
Employees	39	40	49	39	43
Staff Total	68	67	77	59	68
Dependents	67	73	86	72	89
U.N. Secretariat					
Staff	30	28	5	21	23
Dependents	28	27	12	28	25
U.N. Total	193	195	184	180	205
Tass Staff	8	7	8	4	7
Dependents	14	11	12	6	9
Pravda Staff	2	1	3	2	1
Dependents	4	0	2	2	1
Amtorg Staff	5	5	3	4	3
Dependents	4	7	5	7	7
GRAND TOTALS					
Total Staff	200	187	177	159	191
Total Dependents	256	252	241	229	272
Total Soviet Personnel	456	439	418	388	463

Comments: The Department does not have sufficiently detailed information to permit the separate listing of Soviet "working dependents" who are therefore included as "dependents" rather than as "employees" or "staff" except where they are officially designated as staff members. It is possible that there may have been some duplication in those cases where a Soviet wife holds an official position in some Soviet agency other than the agency which employs her husband.

The column headed "1/1/53 - 3/1/53" represents a combination of figures available for those two dates and therefore must be considered to represent the approximate position early in 1953. For the purposes of this report, Soviet members of the U.N. Military Staff Committee and their dependents are included under U. N. Delegation listing.

ALL INFO
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AMERICAN PERSONNEL IN THE SOVIET UNION

	1/1/52	7/1/52	3/1/53	7/1/53	1/1/54
Embassy					
Officers	28	27	27	24	26
Employees	61	68	54	46	50
(Working Dependents)	(10)	(11)	(5)	(4)	(9)
Total Staff	89	95	81	70	76
Non-working Dependents	25	28	25	33	42
Embassy Total	114	123	106	103	118
Press Correspondents	6	7	6	5	2
Clergymen	1	1	1	1	1

Comments: Due to the difficulties faced in effecting an accurate breakdown, Foreign Service Staff Officers not possessing diplomatic status are included under the listing "Employees" in this and subsequent enclosures. American press correspondents, in contrast to their Soviet counterparts, are not official personnel and, consequently, are not included in any total. Working dependents are included as employees. The column headed "3/1/53" may be considered to represent a position closely approximate to that existing on 1/1/53.

Enclosure No. 2

POLISH PERSONNEL IN THE UNITED STATES

		1/1/52	7/1/52	1/1/53	7/1/53	1/1/54
	Embassy					
	Officers	5	5	6	4	4
	Employees	10	9	14	12	16
	(Working Dependents)	(1)	(1)	(3)	(3)	(4)
Embassy	Staff	15	14	20	16	20
	Non-working Dependents	20	22	23	19	21
	Embassy Total	35	36	43	35	41
	N.Y. Consulate General					
	Officers	4	5	4	3	4
	Employees	14	16	14	11	11
	(Working Dependents)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(3)	(2)
	Non-working Dependents	16	13	15	10	22
	Chicago Consulate General					
	Officers	2	2	2	2	2
	Employees	5	5	4	4	3
	(Working Dependents)	(0)	(1)	(2)	(2)	(1)
	Non-working Dependents	6	7	4	4	5
	Detroit Consulate General					
	Officers	1	1	1	1	1
	Employees	1	1	1	1	1
	Dependents	2	2	3	3	3
	Consulate General Total	51	52	48	39	52
	Embassy-Consulate General Total	86	88	91	74	93
	Polish Press Agency					
	Staff	2	2	2	1	1
	Dependents	3	3	3	2	0
	U.N. Delegation					
	Officers	2	3	5	3	3
	Employees	4	3	4	4	3
	Dependents	3	4	11	5	5
	U.N. Secretariat					
	Staff	31	31	30	28	28
	Dependents	33	33	33	38	38
	U.N. Total	73	74	83	76	77
	GRAND TOTALS					
	Staff Total	81	83	87	74	77
	Dependents	83	84	92	81	94
	Total Polish Personnel	164	167	179	155	171

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AMERICAN PERSONNEL IN POLAND

Embassy	1/1/52	/1/52	1/1/53	/1/53	1/1/54
Officers	16	16	16	1[illegible]	[illegible]
Employees	21	22	25	2[illegible]	[illegible]
Staff Total	3[illegible]	3[illegible]	41	3[illegible]	3[illegible]
Dependents	26	2[illegible]	3[illegible]	3[illegible]	3[illegible]
Grand Total	63	6[illegible]	75	[illegible]	[illegible]

Comments:

In a note to the Polish Embassy dated February 25, 1954, the United States Government requested the closure of the Polish Consulates General in New York, Chicago, and Detroit. The Polish Government has complied with this request. Except for a few individuals transferred to a newly-formed consular section of the Polish Embassy in Washington the personnel of the former Polish Consulates General have left or are leaving the United States.

EUR:EE:GLister/ROwen

ENCLOSURE NO. 3

CZECH PERSONNEL IN THE UNITED STATES

	1/1/52	7/1/52	1/1/53	7/1/53	1/1/54
Embassy					
Officers	4	4	3	3	4
Employees	7	5	5	6	5
Total Staff	11	9	8	9	9
Dependents	10	9	15	18	18
Embassy Total	21	18	23	27	27
United Nations Delegation					
Officers	3	2	4	3	3
Employees	1	1	2	3	3
Dependents	3	4	8	8	7
United Nations Secretariat					
Staff	27	28	29	34	33
Dependents	32	32	35	33	32
Total UN	66	67	78	81	78
GRAND TOTALS					
Total Staff	42	40	43	49	48
Total Dependents	45	45	58	59	57
Total Czech Personnel	87	85	101	108	105

AMERICAN PERSONNEL IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Embassy					
Officers	5	5	5	5	5
Employees	10	9	9	10	9
Total Staff	15	14	14	15	14
(Working Dependents)	(2)	(1)	(1)	(3)	(1)
Dependents (non-working)	15	13	12	11	16
Total American Personnel	30	27	26	26	30

Comments: Since 1950, the number of official personnel permitted in each country has remained constant at twelve, not interpreted as including the Chiefs of Mission and not including the "unofficial" assistance of working "dependents". The Department does not have information concerning the number of Czech working dependents. American working dependents, indicated separately above, are also included as "employees".

EUR:ES:MJerabek/ROwen

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ENCLOSURE NO. 4

HUNGARIAN PERSONNEL IN THE UNITED STATES

	1/1/52	7/1/52	1/1/53	7/1/53	1/1/54
Legation					
Officers	12	12	11	9	10
Employees	13	16	15	8	16
Working Dependents	(5)	(8)	(8)	(5)	(11)
Total Staff	25	28	27	17	26
Dependents (non-working)	7	11	10	5	3
Total Hungarian Personnel	32	39	37	22	29

AMERICAN PERSONNEL IN HUNGARY

Legation					
Officers	12	13	13	13	13
Employees	18	20	18	17	17
Working Dependents	(1)	(1)	(0)	(0)	(0)
Total Staff	30	33	31	30	30
Dependents (non-working)	21	24	25	31	31
Total American Personnel	51	57	56	61	61

Comments: Statistics were not, in every instance, available for the specific dates shown. Where this applied, statistics were used which correspond to the general period indicated. Dependents known to work full or part time at the respective legations are included as employees.

EUR:EE:RMcKisson/ROwen

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ENCLOSURE No. 5

RUMANIAN PERSONNEL IN THE UNITED STATES

Legation	1/1/52	7/1/52	1/1/53	7/1/53	1/1/54
Officers	7	6	6	6	8
Employees	2	2	2	1	3
Total Staff	9	8	8	7	11
Dependents	10	9	13	6	19
Total Rumanian Personnel	19	17	21	13	30

AMERICAN PERSONNEL IN RUMANIA

Legation					
Officers	6	6	6*	6	6
Employees	4	3*	4	4	5
Total Staff	10	9	10	10	11
Dependents	5	4	4	6	9
Total American Personnel	15	13	14	15	20

Comments: Statistics and dates are closely approximate. Asterisks above indicate variations from the report of January 20, 1954. It should be noted that since May 13, 1950 the staff of the American Legation in Bucharest has been limited by Rumanian Government action to eleven persons, with a reciprocal and identical limitation imposed by the United States Government on the size of the Rumanian Legation in Washington.

EUR:RE:AWShearer/RCVan

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dman
ont

June 2, 1954

FOR [redacted] (S)

b1

[redacted] (S)

You will recall that you were furnished with a release regarding the component parts of atomic weapons which was disseminated in January, 1954, to law enforcement agencies in the United States. Would it be possible to obtain a copy of any equivalent release made in Great Britain?

b1

cc - 2 - Legal Attache
London, England

~~SECRET~~ - AIR COURIER

cc - Foreign Service Desk

LW:rmc

RECORDED - 36

A - 107

Tolson
Boardman
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Belmont
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Miss Gandy

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[redacted]

May 27, 1954 b7C

Administrative Assistant Attorney General

117-966-

Director, FBI

CERTAIN TYPES OF CIVIL DEFENSE INFORMATION

Reference is made to your memorandum captioned as above, directed to this Bureau under date of May 20, 1954. There was attached a letter, and accompanying attachments, received in the Department from the Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA) regarding the coordination of certain types of information needed between the Army, Air Force, and the FBI.

This matter was immediately taken up by this Bureau with officials of FCDA in Washington. The question raised by the FCDA memorandum concerned the FBI's agreement with the Air Force in the setting up and continuing of police liaison for the 4602nd Air Intelligence Service Squadron (AISS). The FBI has assumed the responsibility for the handling of this police liaison and the Air Force has the responsibility of liaison with Civil Defense officials on all levels. The AISS has the wartime responsibility of interrogating foreign airmen and examining downed foreign hostile aircraft for tactical positive intelligence. Of course, if civilians are involved in these hostile airdraft, it would be the FBI's responsibility under our internal security jurisdiction.

FCDA officials were also advised of Presidential and National Security Council Directives concerning FBI responsibilities for the reporting and investigation of clandestinely introduced atomic weapons in the United States. In this program the FBI has instructed all local police officials to report such instances directly to the FBI in connection with our internal security responsibilities. FCDA in Washington is aware of this program.

In regard to the statement in the FCDA memorandum that inquiry was made regarding liaison with the FBI and "apparently such liaison has deteriorated" FCDA officials advised that the FCDA office formerly handling liaison with Government agencies on policy matters had been reorganized and at the present time the liaison function had not been assigned and that this criticism was directed at FCDA and not at the FBI. For your information, this Bureau maintains continual liaison contact with FCDA officials on all matters involving the FBI.

CWB:NWP:lw

JUN 11 1954

4/10/00 SP4 BJA/UBM
#948742/950935/999059

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FCDA has informed that they are notifying Mr. Eaton, the Regional Administrator who brought these matters to your attention, of the facts to set him straight." The FBI is also contacting Eaton and the Office of the Director of Civil Defense for the State of California to advise them of the FBI's responsibilities in connection with the programs mentioned. We are also advising the Air Intelligence Service Squadron headquarters at Colorado Springs of the apparent misunderstanding on the part of Civil Defense officials in California and suggesting that they advise Civil Defense officials elsewhere of this Bureau's part in this program.

This Bureau appreciates your having brought this matter to its attention and the above information is being furnished so that your records may contain the true facts.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TO : Mr. J. Edgar Hoover DATE: May 20,1954
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM : [redacted] b7C
Administrative Assistant Attorney General

SUBJECT: Certain Types of Civil Defense Information

Your attention is invited to the attached letter and accompanying attachments received in the Department from the Federal Civil Defense Administration regarding the coordination of certain types of information needed between the Army, Air Force and the FBI. The correspondence is referred to your office for such action and reply as may be deemed warranted. The letter has not been acknowledged.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1 ENCL.
file with original

1. I want to know about this.

2. Note P.2 of Eaton's memo re deterioration of liason. What about that.

H.

117-266-

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4-18-00 BY SP4 BJA/LBM
#948742/950935/997059

[redacted] b7C

[redacted] REFER TO SAC LETTER 53-F, NOVEMBER 3, 1953, AND SUBSEQUENT SAC LETTERS RE SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC WEAPONS. GIVE THIS MATTER IMMEDIATE AND PREFERRED ATTENTION. OMAHA EXPEDITE CHECK OF CORRESPONDENCE AT ALCO MANUFACTURING COMPANY.

HOOVER

NOTE: [redacted] b7C

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

cc - Mr. Sanders

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: May 24, 1954

FROM : W. A. Branigan

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Glavin
Harbo
Rosen
Tamm
Tracy
Mohr
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Miss Gandy

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION IN PLACE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

Re attached memo from J. Patrick Coyne, Internal Security Representative, National Security Council, to the Director as Chairman of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference and Mr. Thomas J. Donegan as Chairman of the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security, dated 5-7-54, and bearing the classification "Top Secret."

[redacted] (S)

b1

[redacted] (S)

Mr. Coyne's letter was discussed in the meetings of the Joint Committee May 19, and May 24, 1954.

RECORDED

117-268
Attachment
LW:rmc

#948742/950935/997059
NLS/BJA/LBM 60267 Derivative
(1)

RECOMMENDATION:

It is respectfully recommended that Coyne's letter be brought to the attention of the Working Committee of the IIC and that it be informed that a letter to Coyne is being prepared in the ICIS Secretariat for the signatures of the Chairmen of the IIC and ICIS, pointing out that appropriate research and study into the question of thermonuclear components, clandestine capabilities and weapons effects was instituted in August, 1953. A letter is also being prepared for joint signature to Admiral Strauss of AEC, furnishing him a copy of Coyne's letter and the Joint IIC-ICIS reply.

JUNE 15, 1954

[redacted] URGENT

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC WEAPONS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES, AEA. REBUAIRTEL JUNE THREE, LAST, AND NEW YORK TELETYPE OF JUNE SEVEN AND EIGHT, LAST. EXPEDITE REPLY.

HOOVER

117-268

OAE:rmc/mc

cc - [redacted]

b7C

[redacted]

RECORDED - 7 117-268

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4/18/00 BY SP4 BJA/LBm EX. - 107
#948742/950935/997059

JUN 15 1954

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JUN 15 1954

TELETYPE

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Glavin
Harbo
Rosen
Tamm
Tracy
Mohr
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Kiss Candy

JUN 29 1954

RECEIVED RECORDS ROOM

JUN 15 6 55 PM '54

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

FBI
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JUN 15 1954

TELETYPE

FBI WASH DC 6-15-54 759PM CCW

SAC, OMAHA URGENT

SMIGGLING OF ATOMIC WEAPONS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES, AEA. REBUAIRTEL JUNE THREE, LAST, AND NEW YORK TELETYPE OF JUNE SEVEN AND EIGHT, LAST. EXPEDITE REPLY.

HOOVER

END

OK FBI OM LCG

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4/28/00 SP4 BJA/LBM
#948742/950935/997059

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: June 18, 1954

FROM : L. V. BOARDMAN

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Glavin
Harbo
Rosen
Tamm
Tracy
Mohr
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Miss Gandy

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

By IIC-ICIS letter of March 12, 1954, more complete information was requested from the Atomic Energy Commission concerning the recognizable characteristics of the components of a thermonuclear device or weapon. By letter dated June 10, 1954, the Atomic Energy Commission advised that they will be better able to deal with our request in about thirty days when the pertinent data from recent tests has been evaluated.

The IIC-ICIS Committee dealing with the coordination of countermeasures against the clandestine introduction of atomic weapons has been considering a memorandum dated May 7, 1954, received from Pat Coyne which points up the fact that this threat constitutes one of the most serious internal security problems confronting the United States. Coyne's memorandum connects information concerning a recent Soviet nuclear explosion to this particular threat. (Smuggling bombs or parts thereof into U.S.)

With Pat Coyne's consent, a copy of his memorandum has been made for the information of the Atomic Energy Commission and attached hereto is a suggested joint letter transmitting a copy of that memorandum to the Atomic Energy Commission.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that you sign the attached letter as Chairman of the IIC. It has been signed by the Chairman of the ICIS.

Attachment sent 6-21-54

RECORDED - 97

ESS:hke

4/18/00 SP4 BJA/LBm

#948742/950935/997059

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

cc - Mr. Sanders

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: May 19, 1954

FROM : W. A. Branigan

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Glavin
Harbo
Rosen
Tracy
Mohr
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Miss Gandy

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION IN PLACE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures met 5-19-54 with the Survey Group, consisting of representatives of Customs, Coast Guard, Immigration and Atomic Energy Commission, which has completed a survey of Immigration and Customs facilities at ports of entry and the amount of travel and shipments entering the United States at those ports for the purpose of determining the number of detection devices which might be required at ports of entry. Survey Group report concludes that

[redacted]

Referral/Direct to OGA

The extended application of the use of detection devices in the 11 ports above indicated would not be recommended to the National Security Council until appropriate field testing of the six passive detection devices, which will be available in June, 1954, has been completed by Customs, Coast Guard and Immigration and until portable detectors are likewise available.

EX-129 RECORDED - 97

Lieutenant Colonel Gahl, Atomic Energy Commission Adviser to the Joint Committee, stated that AEC would retain title to the six passive detectors to be used in field testing and that after tests were completed, title could be transferred to the using agencies with appropriate reimbursement of funds. Captain Eastman of Coast Guard stated that Treasury would assume the responsibility of administering the field testing program for the six detection devices to be available in June and that Treasury would designate Customs as its agency for administration. It is contemplated that installation of the devices will be made in the middle of June, five at the port of New York and one at San Antonio, since the amount of traffic by Soviet diplomatic

LW:rmc

SPY BJA/LBM

#949142/950935/997059

personnel through the ports of St. Albans, Laredo and Syracuse, are too small to afford adequate field testing of the devices.

RECOMMENDATION:

(1) It is recommended that the above facts be brought to the attention of the Working Committee of Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference. Copies of the Survey Group report* are being prepared for dissemination to the IIC members. (PART 5 ONLY)

(2) The ICIS Secretariat is preparing a letter for the joint signatures of the Chairman of the IIC and the Chairman of the ICIS, advising the National Security Council of the pending field testing of the six passive detection devices.

ADDENDUM:

At 4:07 p.m., 5-19-54, Commander Benjamin P. Clark, Coast Guard, Chairman of the Survey Group, phoned the Bureau and informed Supervisor Whitson that a check through the Naval Research Laboratory with the manufacturer of the passive detection devices revealed that they probably would not be available before June 21, or 22, 1954. Commander Clark stated he would keep after them.

* HELD BY WHITSON.

117- HQ-268 524

EBF

117-268-

508

ONLY —— ON ENVELOPE

4-14-03 SPK

* 9487421950935/997059

Form G-21.1A (7-1-52)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: FEBRUARY 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1

I ENTRY AND DEPARTURE ACTIVITY	TOTAL	Bangor	Burlington	Calais	Fort Fairfield	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Rooseveltown	Rouses Point	St. Albans
PRIMARY INSPECTION																	
BORDER CROSSERS ADMITTED - ALIENS	439782	66	422	81957	16289	12547	19440	16542	84069	18868	30998	15936	22219	9494	22213	36174	2602
- CITIZENS	263985	-	690	60323	5571	13973	7111	5647	47559	11748	21770	5517	4774	8191	11800	20556	3406
CREWMEN ADMITTED - ALIENS	95	95	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
- CITIZENS	39	39	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
OTHERS ADMITTED - ALIENS	7753	-	69	132	4	116	37	597	184	[illegible]	185	284	160	11	50	2459	694
- CITIZENS	486	71	14	10	-	127	-	1	5	46	20	1	41	-	87	-	14
ALIENS NOT ADMITTED	356	4	-	20	-	13	4	17	7	7	37	7	7	2	8	58	-
PREEXAMINATIONS COMPLETED - IN U.S.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
- OUTSIDE U.S.	479	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
FINES	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TOTAL WORK UNITS	712975	275	1195	142442	21864	26776	26592	22804	131824	30742	53010	21745	27201	17698	34158	59247	6716
PRIMARY INSPECTION - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	35199	35	174	3278	1528	2542	2509	1565	1659	2364	3188	2349	1319	870	1382	4691	1283
- HOURS PER UNIT	.049	.127	.146	.023	.070	.095	.094	.069	.013	.077	.060	.108	.048	.049	.040	.079	.183
PRODUCTIVE HOURS - INS PERSONNEL	28755	35	174	2374	672	1722	1117	1303	1659	1964	2876	1901	1319	675	1382	4330	1233
VESSELS BOARDED - ARRIVAL	8	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
AIRPLANES BOARDED-ARRIVAL	79	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-
VESSELS & AIRPLANES BOARDED ON DEPARTURE	2	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
BSI HEARINGS																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	5	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
RECEIVED	80	-	-	11	-	-	4	1	3	-		-	2	1		9	5
TOTAL	85	-	-	12	-	-	4	1	4	-		-	2	1		9	5
COMPLETED	80	-	-	11	-	-	4	1	3	-		-	2	1		9	5
PENDING END OF PERIOD	5	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	-		-	-	-		-	-
BSI HEARINGS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	307	-	-	26	-	-	27	2	12	-		-	3	-		39	30
- HOURS PER UNIT	3.83	-	-	2.36	-	-	6.75	2.00	4.00	-		-	1.50	-		4.33	6.00
PRODUCTIVE HOURS - INS PERSONNEL	307	-	-	26	-	-	27	2	12	-		-	3	-		39	30
AUTHORIZATIONS																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	30	1	-	1	4	-	-	-		2	-	-	-	-	-	-	22
RECEIVED	2189	45	44	32	45	86	53	480	109	27	114	318	25	24	24	25	577
TOTAL	2219	46	44	33	49	86	53	480	109	29	114	318	25	24	24	25	599
COMPLETED	2143	45	43	32	45	86	53	479	109	27	114	318	25	24	24	21	537
BORDER CROSSING CARDS	486	42	38	4	36	55	41	41	9	15	76	16	19	16	20	9	4
REENTRY PERMITS ISSUED & EXTENDED	20		-	-	-												20
VISA PETITIONS	13		-	-	-												13
PREEXAMINATION AUTHORIZATIONS	-		-	-	-												-
EXTENSIONS OF STAY	49	2	3	-	1			4		7	3	1	1			10	17
REGISTRY	10	1	-	-	-												9
ALIEN LABORER'S CARDS	962		-	13	-	16		415	100	3	16	296		7		1	-
DUPLICATE ALIEN REGISTRATION CARDS	581		2	15	8	15	12	19		2	19	5	4	1	4		454
PERMISSION TO REAPPLY	14		-	-	-												14
CHANGE OF STATUS	-		-	-	-												-
APPLNS. TO IMPORT CONTRACT LABORERS	6		-	-	-											1	5
APPROVAL OF SCHOOLS	-		-	-	-												-
SECTION 4 D.P. APPLICATIONS	-		-	-	-												-
STUDENT EMPLOYMENT & TRANSFER	2		-	-	-								1				1

Miss Hart

Feb. 195 - Feb. 195

END #1

4-14-03 SPM by PRM

Form G-21.2$_A$ (7-1-52)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: FEBRUARY 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1

I ENTRY AND DEPARTURE ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	TOTAL	Bangor	Burlington	Calais	Fort Fairfield	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Rooseveltown	Rouses Point	St. Albans
AUTHORIZATIONS - (Cont'd)		⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗		
DENIED	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
BORDER CROSSING CARDS	-																
REENTRY PERMITS	-																
VISA PETITIONS	1																1
PREEXAMINATION AUTHORIZATIONS	-																
EXTENSIONS OF STAY	-																
REGISTRY	-																
ALIEN LABORER'S CARDS	-																
DUPLICATE ALIEN REGISTRATION CARDS	-																
PERMISSION TO REAPPLY	-																
CHANGE OF STATUS	-																
APPLNS. TO IMPORT CONTRACT LABORERS	-																
APPROVAL OF SCHOOLS	-																
SECTION 4 D.P. APPLICATIONS	-																
STUDENT EMPLOYMENT AND TRANSFER	-																
PENDING END OF PERIOD	76	1	1	1	4	-	-	1	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	4	62
BORDER CROSSING CARDS	-																
REENTRY PERMITS	1		1														
VISA PETITIONS	-																
PREEXAMINATION AUTHORIZATIONS	1	1															
EXTENSIONS OF STAY	9									1						4	4
REGISTRY	6			1	4			1									-
ALIEN LABORER'S CARDS	-																-
DUPLICATE ALIEN REGISTRATION CARDS	19																19
PERMISSION TO REAPPLY	-																-
CHANGE OF STATUS	-																-
APPLNS. TO IMPORT CONTRACT LABORERS	37																37
APPROVAL OF SCHOOLS	-																-
SECTION 4 D.P. APPLICATIONS	2									1							1
STUDENT EMPLOYMENT AND TRANSFER	1																1
AUTHORIZATIONS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	1117	31	18	12	32	74	8	89	52	17	69	65	9	4	19	83	443
- HOURS PER UNIT	.521	.689	.419	.375	.711	.860	.150	.185	.477	.630	.605	.204	.360	.166	.792	3.95	.824
TRAVEL TIME - ENTRY & DEPARTURE ACTIVITY	1087	8	-	3	-	-	6	76	4	63	214	144	-	-	-	135	264
LOST TIME - ENTRY & DEPARTURE ACTIVITY	1992	190	-	-	-	-	-	77	-	400	-	-	-	1063	-	-	-

Form G-21.1B (7-1-52)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: FEBRUARY 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1 (Continued)

I ENTRY AND DEPARTURE ACTIVITY	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vance-boro	Halifax	Montreal												
PRIMARY INSPECTION																	
BORDER CROSSERS ADMITTED - ALIENS	9023	30725	9267	236	695												
- CITIZENS	5419	22284	7536	-	110												
CREWMEN ADMITTED - ALIENS	-	-	-	-	-												
- CITIZENS	-	-	-	-	-												
OTHERS ADMITTED - ALIENS	267	95	236	183	1916												
- CITIZENS	-	1	3	3	42												
ALIENS NOT ADMITTED	8	4	23	70	60												
PREEXAMINATIONS COMPLETED - IN U.S.	-	-	-	-	-												
- OUTSIDE U.S.	6	1	472	-	-												
FINES		-	-	-	-												
TOTAL WORK UNITS	14723	53110	17537	492	2823												
PRIMARY INSPECTION - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	1120	1121	1572	250	450												
- HOURS PER UNIT	.070	.021	.089	.508	.159												
PRODUCTIVE HOURS - INS PERSONNEL	1114	1121	1084	250	450												
VESSELS BOARDED - ARRIVAL	-	-	-	6	-												
AIRPLANES BOARDED-ARRIVAL	10	-	-	-	63												
VESSELS & AIRPLANES BOARDED ON DEPARTURE	-	-	-	-	-												
BSI HEARINGS																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	2	-	-	-	1												
RECEIVED	-	3	6	-	35												
TOTAL	2	3	6	-	36												
COMPLETED	1	3	6	-	34												
PENDING END OF PERIOD	1	-	-	-	2												
BSI HEARINGS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	2	6	6	-	154												
- HOURS PER UNIT	2.00	2.00	1.00	-	4.53												
PRODUCTIVE HOURS - INS PERSONNEL	2	6	6	-	154												
AUTHORIZATIONS																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
RECEIVED	33	98	22		8												
TOTAL	33	98	22		8												
COMPLETED	33	98	22		8												
BORDER CROSSING CARDS	21	10	6		8												
REENTRY PERMITS ISSUED & EXTENDED																	
VISA PETITIONS																	
PREEXAMINATION AUTHORIZATIONS																	
EXTENSIONS OF STAY																	
REGISTRY																	
ALIEN LABORER'S CARDS	3	78	14														
DUPLICATE ALIEN REGISTRATION CARDS	9	10	2														
PERMISSION TO REAPPLY																	
CHANGE OF STATUS																	
APPLNS. TO IMPORT CONTRACT LABORERS																	
APPROVAL OF SCHOOLS																	
SECTION 4 D.P. APPLICATIONS																	
STUDENT EMPLOYMENT & TRANSFER																	

Form G-21.2B (7-1-52)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: FEBRUARY 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1 (Continued)

I ENTRY AND DEPARTURE ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vance-boro	Halifax	Montreal												
AUTHORIZATIONS - (Cont'd)	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗												
DENIED	-	-	-	-	-												
BORDER CROSSING CARDS																	
REENTRY PERMITS																	
VISA PETITIONS																	
PREEXAMINATION AUTHORIZATIONS																	
EXTENSIONS OF STAY																	
REGISTRY																	
ALIEN LABORER'S CARDS																	
DUPLICATE ALIEN REGISTRATION CARDS																	
PERMISSION TO REAPPLY																	
CHANGE OF STATUS																	
APPLNS. TO IMPORT CONTRACT LABORERS																	
APPROVAL OF SCHOOLS																	
SECTION 4 D.P. APPLICATIONS																	
STUDENT EMPLOYMENT AND TRANSFER																	
PENDING END OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
BORDER CROSSING CARDS																	
REENTRY PERMITS																	
VISA PETITIONS																	
PREEXAMINATION AUTHORIZATIONS																	
EXTENSIONS OF STAY																	
REGISTRY																	
ALIEN LABORER'S CARDS																	
DUPLICATE ALIEN REGISTRATION CARDS																	
PERMISSION TO REAPPLY																	
CHANGE OF STATUS																	
APPLNS. TO IMPORT CONTRACT LABORERS																	
APPROVAL OF SCHOOLS																	
SECTION 4 D.P. APPLICATIONS																	
STUDENT EMPLOYMENT AND TRANSFER																	
AUTHORIZATIONS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	33	49	8	-	2												
- HOURS PER UNIT	1.10	1.500	.363	-	.250												
TRAVEL TIME - ENTRY & DEPARTURE ACTIVITY	4	-	80	6	80												
LOST TIME - ENTRY & DEPARTURE ACTIVITY	144	-	96	8	16												

Form G-21.3A (7-1-52)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: FEBRUARY 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1

II DETENTION, DEPORTATION AND PAROLE ACTIVITY	TOTAL	Bangor	Burlington	Calais	Fort Fairfield	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Rooseveltown	Rouses Point	St. Albans
WARRANT OF ARREST PROCESSING			⊗		⊗		⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗			⊗	⊗	⊗		
COMPLETED	14	1		1	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	8	-
W/A PROCESSING - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	32	2		1		2					6					15	
- HOURS PER UNIT	2.28	2.00		1.00		2.00					6.00					1.87	
WARRANT OF ARREST SERVICE																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
RECEIVED	18	2		1		1					1	2				8	1
TOTAL	19	2		1		1					1	2				9	1
COMPLETED	18	2		1		1					1	2				9	-
PENDING END OF PERIOD	1	-		-		-					-	-				-	1
W/A SERVICE - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	22	1		1		1					11	2				2	-
- HOURS PER UNIT	1.22	.500		1.00		1.00					11.0	1.00				.222	-
WARRANT HEARINGS																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	37	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	37
RECEIVED	17																17
TOTAL	54																54
COMPLETED	13																13
SUBVERSIVE	-																-
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC	-																-
SUSPENSION	-																-
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS	-																-
OTHER	13																13
PENDING END OF PERIOD	41																41
WARRANT HEARINGS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	324																324
- HOURS PER UNIT	24.9																24.6
ON APPEAL - TOTAL	24																24
FINAL ORDERS ENTERED OR RECEIVED	13																13
TRAVEL TIME - WARRANT HEARING OPERATION	51																49
LOST TIME - WARRANT HEARING OPERATION	-																-
PAROLE AND SUPERVISION																	
CONDITIONAL PAROLE																	
ALIENS ON PAROLE BEGINNING OF PERIOD	31	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	31
PLACED ON PAROLE DURING PERIOD	1																1
TOTAL ON PAROLE DURING PERIOD	32																32
REMOVED FROM PAROLE DURING PERIOD	4																4
ALIENS ON PAROLE END OF PERIOD	28																28
SUBVERSIVE	-																-
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC	2																2
SUSPENSION	6																6
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS	2																2
OTHER	18																18
COND. PAROLE - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	13																13
- HOURS PER UNIT	.406																.406

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: FEBRUARY 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1

II DETENTION, DEPORTATION AND PAROLE ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	TOTAL	Bangor	Burlington	Calais	Fort Fairfield	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Roosevelt-town	Rouses Point	St. Albans
INTERNAL SECURITY ACT SUPERVISION			⊗		⊗	⊗		⊗	⊗					⊗	⊗		
ALIENS UNDER SUPER'N BEGINNING OF PERIOD	7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7
PLACED UNDER SUPER'N DURING PERIOD	-																-
TOTAL UNDER SUPER'N DURING PERIOD	7																7
REMOVED FROM SUPER'N DURING PERIOD	-																-
ALIENS UNDER SUPER'N END OF PERIOD	7																7
SUBVERSIVE	-																
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC	2																2
SUSPENSION	-																
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS	-																
OTHER	5																5
ISA SUPERVISION - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	3																3
- HOURS PER UNIT	.428																.428
OTHER TYPES OF PAROLE																	
ALIENS ON PAROLE BEGINNING OF PERIOD	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5
PLACED ON PAROLE DURING PERIOD	1																-
TOTAL ON PAROLE DURING PERIOD	6																5
REMOVED FROM PAROLE DURING PERIOD	1																1
ALIENS ON PAROLE END OF PERIOD	5																4
OTHER TYPES OF PAROLE-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	1																1
-HOURS PER UNIT	.200																.200
TRAVEL TIME - PAROLE & SUPER'N OPERATION	-																-
LOST TIME - PAROLE & SUPER'N OPERATION	-																-
SERVICE DETENTION FACILITIES																	
NUMBER DETAINED BEGINNING OF PERIOD	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
DETAINEES ADMITTED	67			2						1	20					30	5
NUMBER DETAINED DURING PERIOD	68			2						2	20					30	5
EXCLUSION	46			-						1	12					20	5
DETAINEES REMOVED DURING PERIOD	68			2						2	20					30	5
NUMBER DETAINED END OF PERIOD	-			-						-	-					-	-
MAN-DAYS DETENTION DURING PERIOD	102			2						3	21					54	9
EXCLUSION	63			-						2	12					28	9
EXPULSION	39			2						1	9					26	-
AVERAGE DAYS DET. PER DETAINEE	1.50			1.00						1.50	1.05					1.80	1.80
SERVICE DET. FAC. - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	408			-						19	136					138	3
- HOURS PER UNIT	6.00			-						6.33	6.47					2.55	.333
PRODUCTIVE HOURS - INS PERSONNEL	310			-						19	136					87	3
NON-SERVICE DETENTION FACILITIES																	
NUMBER DETAINED BEGINNING OF PERIOD	10	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	1	-	-	5	1
DETAINEES ADMITTED	14	1					4			-	4	2	-			1	1
NUMBER DETAINED DURING PERIOD	24	2					4			2	4	2	1			6	2
DETAINEES REMOVED DURING PERIOD	16	2					4			2	3	2	-			-	2
NUMBER DETAINED END OF PERIOD	8	-					-			-	1	-	1			6	-
MAN-DAYS DETENTION DURING PERIOD	234	4					4			6	16	6	28			155	12
AVERAGE DAYS DET. PER DETAINEE	9.75	2.00					1.00			3.00	4.00	3.00	28.0			25.8	6.00
NON-SERV. DET.FAC. - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	17	4					-			9	-	-				-	-
- HOURS PER UNIT	.708	2.00					-			4.50	-	-				-	-

Form G-21.3B (7-1-52)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: FEBRUARY 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1 (Continued)

II DETENTION, DEPORTATION AND PAROLE ACTIVITY	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vance-boro	Halifax	Montreal
WARRANT OF ARREST PROCESSING		⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗
COMPLETED	2	-	-	-	-
W/A PROCESSING - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	6				
- HOURS PER UNIT	3.00				
WARRANT OF ARREST SERVICE					
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-
RECEIVED	2				
TOTAL	2				
COMPLETED	2				
PENDING END OF PERIOD	-				
W/A SERVICE - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	4				
- HOURS PER UNIT	2.00				
WARRANT HEARINGS					
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-
RECEIVED					
TOTAL					
COMPLETED					
SUBVERSIVE					
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC					
SUSPENSION					
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS					
OTHER					
PENDING END OF PERIOD					
WARRANT HEARINGS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	3	-	-	-	-
- HOURS PER UNIT	-				
ON APPEAL - TOTAL	-				
FINAL ORDERS ENTERED OR RECEIVED	-				
TRAVEL TIME - WARRANT HEARING OPERATION	2				
LOST TIME - WARRANT HEARING OPERATION	-				
PAROLE AND SUPERVISION					
CONDITIONAL PAROLE					
ALIENS ON PAROLE BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-
PLACED ON PAROLE DURING PERIOD					
TOTAL ON PAROLE DURING PERIOD					
REMOVED FROM PAROLE DURING PERIOD					
ALIENS ON PAROLE END OF PERIOD					
SUBVERSIVE					
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC					
SUSPENSION					
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS					
OTHER					
COND. PAROLE - PRODUCTIVE HOURS					
- HOURS PER UNIT					

Form G-21.4B (7-1-52)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: FEBRUARY 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1 (Continued)

II DETENTION, DEPORTATION AND PAROLE ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vance-boro	Halifax	Montreal
INTERNAL SECURITY ACT SUPERVISION		⊗		⊗	⊗
ALIENS UNDER SUPER'N BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-
PLACED UNDER SUPER'N DURING PERIOD					
TOTAL UNDER SUPER'N DURING PERIOD					
REMOVED FROM SUPER'N DURING PERIOD					
ALIENS UNDER SUPER'N END OF PERIOD					
SUBVERSIVE					
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC					
SUSPENSION					
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS					
OTHER					
ISA SUPERVISION - PRODUCTIVE HOURS					
- HOURS PER UNIT					
OTHER TYPES OF PAROLE					
ALIENS ON PAROLE BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-
PLACED ON PAROLE DURING PERIOD			/		
TOTAL ON PAROLE DURING PERIOD			/		
REMOVED FROM PAROLE DURING PERIOD			-		
ALIENS ON PAROLE END OF PERIOD			/		
OTHER TYPES OF PAROLE-PRODUCTIVE HOURS			-		
-HOURS PER UNIT			-		
TRAVEL TIME - PAROLE & SUPER'N OPERATION			-		
LOST TIME - PAROLE & SUPER'N OPERATION			-		
SERVICE DETENTION FACILITIES					
NUMBER DETAINED BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-
DETAINEES ADMITTED			9		
NUMBER DETAINED DURING PERIOD			9		
EXCLUSION			8		
DETAINEES REMOVED DURING PERIOD			9		
NUMBER DETAINED END OF PERIOD			-		
MAN-DAYS DETENTION DURING PERIOD			13		
EXCLUSION			12		
EXPULSION			1		
AVERAGE DAYS DET. PER DETAINEE			1.44		
SERVICE DET. FAC. - PRODUCTIVE HOURS			112		
- HOURS PER UNIT			8.61		
PRODUCTIVE HOURS - INS PERSONNEL			65		
NON-SERVICE DETENTION FACILITIES					
NUMBER DETAINED BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-
DETAINEES ADMITTED	1				
NUMBER DETAINED DURING PERIOD	1				
DETAINEES REMOVED DURING PERIOD	1				
NUMBER DETAINED END OF PERIOD	-				
MAN-DAYS DETENTION DURING PERIOD	3				
AVERAGE DAYS DET. PER DETAINEE	3.00				
NON-SERV. DET.FAC. - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	4				
- HOURS PER UNIT	4.00				

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: FEBRUARY 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1

II DETENTION, DEPORTATION AND PAROLE ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	TOTAL	Bangor	Burlington	Calais	Fort Fairfield	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Roosevelt-town	Rouses Point	St. Albans
DEPORTATION																	
ALIENS PROCESSED FOR DEPORTATION	16	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	15
ALIENS PROCESSED FOR VOLUNTARY DEPARTURE	15	-		1	-				1	1	-		2		-	4	1
TOTAL	31	1		1	-				1	1	-		2		-	4	16
ALIENS DEPORTED	8			-	-				-	-	-		-		-	7	1
VOLUNTARY DEPARTURES	48			4	1		5		1	1	4		2		7	10	1
UNDER W/A	5			-	-		-		-	-	2		-		-	-	1
WITHOUT W/A	43			4	1		5		1	1	2		2		7	10	-
REMOVALS	-			-	-		-		-	-	-		-		-	-	-
DEPORTATION-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	207	1		1	-		-		1	-	4		1		-	6	189
-HOURS PER UNIT	6.67	1.00		1.00	-		-		1.00	-	-		.500		-	1.50	11.8
TRAVEL TIME - DEPORTATION OPERATION	2	-		-	-		-		-	-	-		-		-	2	-
LOST TIME - DEPORTATION OPERATION	-	-		-	-		-		-	-	-		-		-	-	-
III INVESTIGATIONS ACTIVITY																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	236	9	4	1	6	-	-	3	-	4	-	2	2	-	1	9	127
RECEIVED DURING PERIOD	856	67	26	10	12	10	52	23	7	23	35	26	54	12	14	56	344
TOTAL	1092	76	30	11	18	10	52	26	7	27	35	28	56	12	15	65	471
COMPLETED	875	69	29	10	8	10	52	23	7	19	35	25	54	12	13	59	349
NATURALIZATION & CITIZENSHIP	41			-					2						1	-	35
CANCELLATION - SUBVERSIVE	-																-
CANCELLATION - OTHER	-																-
NATURALIZATION	19																19
OTHER	22								2						1		16
DEPORTATION	467	16	28	1	1		9	1	1	5	25	16	53	1	1	22	225
SUBVERSIVE	6																3
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC	-																-
ADDRESS REPORT CARD (1-53)	372	13	28		1		6	1		1	23	14	51	1	1	10	215
SUSPENSION	4																-
NON-IMMIGRANTS	46									1						2	4
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS	16									1	2	2				8	-
DISPLACED PERSONS	-																-
OTHER	23	3		1			3		1	2			2			2	3
SMUGGLING	12															3	9
PRIVATE BILLS	1																1
PAROLE	-																
ALIEN REGISTRATION	32		1				5	4	4			7					7
ALIEN ADDRESS REPORT (SEC. 35)	230	53		9	7	10	38	12	-	14	10	-		11	10	24	13
MISCELLANEOUS	92						-	6	-	-		2	1	-	1	10	59
PENDING END OF PERIOD	217	7	1	1	10		-	3	-	8	-	3	2	-	2	6	122
NATURALIZATION & CITIZENSHIP	22																19
CANCELLATION - SUBVERSIVE	1																1
CANCELLATION - OTHER	-																
NATURALIZATION	8																8
OTHER	13																10

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: FEBRUARY 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1

III INVESTIGATIONS ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	TOTAL	Bangor	Burlington	Calais	Fort Fairfield	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Rooseveltown	Rouses Point	St. Albans
PENDING END OF PERIOD (CONT'D)																	
DEPORTATION	133	5	1	1	7	-	-	1	-	7	-	1	1	-	1	6	63
SUBVERSIVE	5																4
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC	2									1						1	
ADDRESS REPORT CARD (I-53)	74	4	1	1	3			1		5		1			1	5	50
SUSPENSION	4	1															1
NON-IMMIGRANTS	31									1							
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS	3																
DISPLACED PERSONS	5																5
OTHERS	9				4								1				3
SMUGGLING	11																11
PRIVATE BILLS	-																
PAROLE	-																
ALIEN REGISTRATION	5	1			2							1					
ALIEN ADDRESS REPORT (SEC. 35)	18	1			1					1			1				13
MISCELLANEOUS	28				-			2				1			1		16
INVESTIGATIONS RESULTING IN W/A OR V/D	19			1			1			1	2	2				10	2
ALIENS APPRH'D. (BY OTHER THAN B.P.)	4			2												2	
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS	-																
MEXICANS APPRH'D. (BY OTHER THAN B.P.)	-																
ILLEGALLY IN AGRICULTURE	-																
ILLEGALLY IN TRADE OR INDUSTRY	-																
OTHER	-																
W/A THRU ADDRESS REPORT CARD (I-53)	-																
INVESTIGATIONS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	1758	65	15	10	19	4	19	20	6	19	27	39	29	2	19	102	1259
- HOURS PER UNIT	2.00	.942	.517	1.00	2.37	.400	.365	.869	.857	1.00	.685	1.56	.537	.166	1.46	1.72	3.60
TRAVEL TIME - INVESTIGATIONS ACTIVITY	308	7	-	-	6	-	-	4	-	-	-	4	-	-	5	10	190
IV APPLICATIONS EXAMINATION ACTIVITY																	
NATIONALITY																	
N-300 PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-													-	-	-
RECEIVED	25																25
COMPLETED	25																25
PENDING END OF PERIOD	-																-
N-400 SERIES - PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	261	-															261
RECEIVED	287																287
COMPLETED	83																83
PENDING END OF PERIOD	465																465
N-600 PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	49	-															49
RECEIVED	17																17
COMPLETED	21																21
PENDING END OF PERIOD	45																45
N-500 SERIES - PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	6	-															6
RECEIVED	5																5
COMPLETED	4																4
PENDING END OF PERIOD	7																7

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: FEBRUARY 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1 (Continued)

II DETENTION, DEPORTATION AND PAROLE ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vanceboro	Halifax	Montreal
DEPORTATION					
ALIENS PROCESSED FOR DEPORTATION	-	-	-	-	-
ALIENS PROCESSED FOR VOLUNTARY DEPARTURE	5	-			
TOTAL	5	-			
ALIENS DEPORTED	-	-			
VOLUNTARY DEPARTURES	5	7			
UNDER W/A	2	-			
WITHOUT W/A	3	7			
REMOVALS	-	-			
DEPORTATION-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	4	-			
-HOURS PER UNIT	.800	-			
TRAVEL TIME - DEPORTATION OPERATION	-	-			
LOST TIME - DEPORTATION OPERATION	-	-			
III INVESTIGATIONS ACTIVITY					
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	1	2	-	5	60
RECEIVED DURING PERIOD	10	17	7	7	44
TOTAL	11	19	7	12	104
COMPLETED	8	19	7	6	61
NATURALIZATION & CITIZENSHIP	1	1			1
CANCELLATION - SUBVERSIVE					
CANCELLATION - OTHER					
NATURALIZATION					
OTHER	1	1			1
DEPORTATION	3	3		2	54
SUBVERSIVE					3
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC					-
ADDRESS REPORT CARD (1-53)	3	3			1
SUSPENSION					4
NON-IMMIGRANTS					39
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS				2	1
DISPLACED PERSONS					
OTHER					6
SMUGGLING					
PRIVATE BILLS					
PAROLE					
ALIEN REGISTRATION		4			
ALIEN ADDRESS REPORT (SEC. 35)	4	10	4		1
MISCELLANEOUS		1	3	4	5
PENDING END OF PERIOD	3	-		6	43
NATURALIZATION & CITIZENSHIP	2				1
CANCELLATION - SUBVERSIVE					
CANCELLATION - OTHER					
NATURALIZATION					
OTHER	2				1

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: FEBRUARY 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1 (Continued)

III INVESTIGATIONS ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vanceboro	Halifax	Montreal													
PENDING END OF PERIOD (CONT'D)																		
DEPORTATION	-	-	-	1	38													
SUBVERSIVE					1													
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC																		
ADDRESS REPORT CARD (I-53)					2													
SUSPENSION					2													
NON-IMMIGRANTS					30													
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS				1	2													
DISPLACED PERSONS																		
OTHERS					1													
SMUGGLING																		
PRIVATE BILLS																		
PAROLE																		
ALIEN REGISTRATION					1													
ALIEN ADDRESS REPORT (SEC. 35)					1													
MISCELLANEOUS	1	-		5	2													
INVESTIGATIONS RESULTING IN W/A OR V/D																		
ALIENS APPRH'D. (BY OTHER THAN B.P.)																		
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS																		
MEXICANS APPRH'D. (BY OTHER THAN B.P.)																		
ILLEGALLY IN AGRICULTURE																		
ILLEGALLY IN TRADE OR INDUSTRY																		
OTHER																		
W/A THRU ADDRESS REPORT CARD (I-53)																		
INVESTIGATIONS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	28	19	3	7	50													
- HOURS PER UNIT	3.50	1.00	.430	1.17	.820													
TRAVEL TIME - INVESTIGATIONS ACTIVITY	.6	1	-	4	71													
IV APPLICATIONS EXAMINATION ACTIVITY																		
NATIONALITY																		
N-300 PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-													
RECEIVED																		
COMPLETED																		
PENDING END OF PERIOD																		
N-400 SERIES - PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD																		
RECEIVED																		
COMPLETED																		
PENDING END OF PERIOD																		
N-600 PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD																		
RECEIVED																		
COMPLETED																		
PENDING END OF PERIOD																		
N-500 SERIES - PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD																		
RECEIVED																		
COMPLETED																		
PENDING END OF PERIOD																		

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: FEBRUARY 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1

IV APPLICATIONS EXAMINATION ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	TOTAL	Bangor	Burlington	Calais	Fort Fairfield	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Roosevelttown	Rouses Point	St. Albans
IMMIGRATION																	
REENTRY PERMITS-PENDING BEG. OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
RECEIVED	16																16
COMPLETED	16																16
PENDING END OF PERIOD	-																-
VISA PETITIONS-PENDING BEG. OF PERIOD	-	-															-
RECEIVED	17																17
COMPLETED	17																17
PENDING END OF PERIOD	-																-
OTHER-PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	14	-															14
RECEIVED	304																304
COMPLETED	301																301
PENDING END OF PERIOD	17																17
NATIONALITY APPLICATIONS-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	143																143
-HOURS PER UNIT	1.07																1.07
IMMIGRATION APPLICATIONS-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	87																87
-HOURS PER UNIT	.260																.260
DECLARATIONS FILED	2																2
V VERIFICATION OF ARRIVALS AND DEPARTURES ACTIVITY																	
VERIFICATION REQUESTS																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	389	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	389
RECEIVED DURING PERIOD	2729	19	1	11	5	6	24	17	342	14	58	14	5	1	7	42	1796
TOTAL	3118	19	1	11	5	6	24	17	342	14	58	14	5	1	7	42	2185
COMPLETED	2380	19	1	11	5	6	24	17	342	14	58	14	5	1	7	42	1447
NATURALIZATION	240	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	239
OTHER	2140	19	1	11	5	6	24	17	342	14	57	14	5	1	7	42	1208
PENDING END OF PERIOD	738	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	738
VERIFICATION-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	720	4	1	3	3	2	4	8	8	5	17	6	2	1	2	24	525
-HOURS PER UNIT	.302	.211	1.00	.273	.600	.333	.166	.470	.023	.357	.293	.429	.400	1.00	.286	.571	.362
VI NATURALIZATION AND CITIZENSHIP ACTIVITY																	
PRELIM. INVEST. CIT. & NAT. APPLN'S																	
PRELIM. INVESTIGATIONS (N-400 SERIES)																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	368	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	368
RECEIVED	49												2				47
COMPLETED	110												2				108
PENDING END OF PERIOD	307												-				307
CITIZENSHIP (N-600 APPLICATIONS)																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	12	-	4	1	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5
RECEIVED	20	5	-	1	1		-										13
COMPLETED	30	5	3	2	2		1										17
PENDING END OF PERIOD	2	-	1	-	-		-										1

Form G-21.8A (7-1-52)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: FEBRUARY 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1

VI NATURALIZATION AND CITIZENSHIP ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	TOTAL	Bangor	Burlington	Calais	Fort Fairfield	Highgate Springs ⊗	Houlton ⊗	Jackman ⊗	Madawaska ⊗	Malone ⊗	Newport ⊗	Norton ⊗	Ogdensburg	Richford ⊗	Roosevelttown ⊗	Rouses Point ⊗	St. Albans
NATIONALITY APPLN'S. (N-500 SERIES)																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	1	-	1		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
RECEIVED	5		4		1												-
COMPLETED	4		3		1												-
PENDING END OF PERIOD	2		2		-												-
PETITIONS FILED	103		-		-												103
N-600 HEARINGS COMPLETED	17	5	-	2	2												8
CERTIFICATES ISSUED (N-600 APPLN'S)	3		-		-												3
CERTIFICATES ISSUED (N-500 SERIES)	3		3		-												-
PRELIM. INVESTIGATIONS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	136	-	-	-	2								1				133
- HOURS PER UNIT	1.23	-	-	-	-								.500				1.23
CIT. (N-600 APPLN'S) - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	41	7	-	2	2												30
- HOURS PER UNIT	1.36	1.40	-	1.00	1.00												1.76
NAT. APPLN'S - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	3	-	2	-	1												-
- HOURS PER UNIT	.750	-	.667	-	100												-
NATURALIZATION HEARINGS																	
PETITIONS PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	270	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	270
PETITIONS PENDING DURING PERIOD	373																373
PETITIONS COMPLETED	70																70
GRANTED	69																69
DENIED	1																1
PETITIONS PENDING END OF PERIOD	303																303
PETITIONS READY FOR FINAL HEARING	303																303
PETITIONS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	129																129
- HOURS PER UNIT	1.84																1.84
TRAVEL TIME - NAT. & CIT. ACTIVITY	50																50
LOST TIME - NAT. & CIT. ACTIVITY	1																1
CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION 1/																	
CITIZENSHIP ASSISTANCE FURNISHED																	
ALIENS REFERRED TO PUBLIC SCHOOLS																	
ALIENS INFORMED OF HOME STUDY																	
NAME SLIPS TO PUBLIC SCHOOLS CORRES.CTRS.																	
ALIENS ADMITTED TO CITIZENSHIP																	
ATTENDED PUBLIC SCHOOL CLASSES																	
ENROLLED IN HOME STUDY COURSES																	
NUMBER SUBMITTING PUBLIC SCHOOL CERT.																	
VII EMPLOYMENT SUMMARY																	
NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES END OF PERIOD	296	3	2	20	5	12	8	11	12	16	22	16	9	9	8	34	62
OPERATIONS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	37616	355	210	2433	741	1805	1181	1579	1742	2496	3357	2161	1364	1745	1427	4835	5096
OPERATIONS - NON-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	3971	-	-	381	48	156	6	160	44	408	242	416	34	208	56	716	605
ADMINISTRATION - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	8845	89	150	525	75	167	9	184	274	280	178	167	130	24	264	311	3960
ADMINISTRATION - NON-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	466	-	-	60	-	-	-	13	48	-	-	-	-	-	40	-	175
TOTAL HOURS EMPLOYMENT	50898	444	360	3399	864	2128	1196	1936	2108	3184	3777	2744	1528	1977	1787	5862	9836
PERCENTAGE TOTAL HOURS ON OPERATIONS	81.7	79.9	58.3	82.7	91.3	92.1	99.2	89.8	84.7	91.2	95.2	93.9	91.5	98.9	83.0	94.6	57.9

1/ Source: Form N-38

Form G-21.7B (7-1-52)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: FEBRUARY 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1 (Continued)

IV APPLICATIONS EXAMINATION ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vanceboro	Halifax	Montreal												
IMMIGRATION																	
REENTRY PERMITS-PENDING BEG. OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-													
RECEIVED																	
COMPLETED																	
PENDING END OF PERIOD																	
VISA PETITIONS-PENDING BEG. OF PERIOD																	
RECEIVED																	
COMPLETED																	
PENDING END OF PERIOD																	
OTHER-PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD																	
RECEIVED																	
COMPLETED																	
PENDING END OF PERIOD																	
NATIONALITY APPLICATIONS-PRODUCTIVE HOURS																	
-HOURS PER UNIT																	
IMMIGRATION APPLICATIONS-PRODUCTIVE HOURS																	
-HOURS PER UNIT																	
DECLARATIONS FILED																	
V VERIFICATION OF ARRIVALS AND DEPARTURES ACTIVITY																	
VERIFICATION REQUESTS																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
RECEIVED DURING PERIOD	52	28	36	21	230												
TOTAL	52	28	36	21	230												
COMPLETED	52	28	36	21	230												
NATURALIZATION	-	-	-	-	-												
OTHER	52	28	36	21	230												
PENDING END OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
VERIFICATION-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	33	14	9	7	42												
-HOURS PER UNIT	.635	.500	.250	.333	.183												
VI NATURALIZATION AND CITIZENSHIP ACTIVITY																	
PRELIM. INVEST. CIT. & NAT. APPLN'S																	
PRELIM. INVESTIGATIONS (N-400 SERIES)																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
RECEIVED																	
COMPLETED																	
PENDING END OF PERIOD																	
CITIZENSHIP (N-600 APPLICATIONS)																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
RECEIVED																	
COMPLETED																	
PENDING END OF PERIOD																	

Form G-21.8B (7-1-52)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: FEBRUARY 1953

VI NATURALIZATION AND CITIZENSHIP ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vanceboro	Halifax	Montreal												
NATIONALITY APPLN'S. (N-500 SERIES)	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗												
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
RECEIVED																	
COMPLETED																	
PENDING END OF PERIOD																	
PETITIONS FILED																	
N-600 HEARINGS COMPLETED																	
CERTIFICATES ISSUED (N-600 APPLN'S)																	
CERTIFICATES ISSUED (N-500 SERIES)																	
PRELIM. INVESTIGATIONS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS																	
- HOURS PER UNIT																	
CIT. (N-600 APPLN'S) - PRODUCTIVE HOURS																	
- HOURS PER UNIT																	
NAT. APPLN'S - PRODUCTIVE HOURS																	
- HOURS PER UNIT																	
NATURALIZATION HEARINGS																	
PETITIONS PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
PETITIONS PENDING DURING PERIOD																	
PETITIONS COMPLETED																	
GRANTED																	
DENIED																	
PETITIONS PENDING END OF PERIOD																	
PETITIONS READY FOR FINAL HEARING																	
PETITIONS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS																	
- HOURS PER UNIT																	
TRAVEL TIME - NAT. & CIT. ACTIVITY																	
LOST TIME - NAT. & CIT. ACTIVITY																	
CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION 1/																	
CITIZENSHIP ASSISTANCE FURNISHED																	
ALIENS REFERRED TO PUBLIC SCHOOLS																	
ALIENS INFORMED OF HOME STUDY																	
NAME SLIPS TO PUBLIC SCHOOLS CORRES. CTRS.																	
ALIENS ADMITTED TO CITIZENSHIP																	
ATTENDED PUBLIC SCHOOL CLASSES																	
ENROLLED IN HOME STUDY COURSES																	
NUMBER SUBMITTING PUBLIC SCHOOL CERT.																	
VII EMPLOYMENT SUMMARY																	
NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES END OF PERIOD	10	9	10	3	15												
OPERATIONS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	1387	1210	1345	282	865												
OPERATIONS - NON-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	145	132	130	1	83												
ADMINISTRATION - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	119	227	258	188	1266												
ADMINISTRATION - NON-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	10	9	8	1	102												
TOTAL HOURS EMPLOYMENT	1661	1578	1741	472	2316												
PERCENTAGE TOTAL HOURS ON OPERATIONS	92.2	85.0	84.7	60.0	40.9												

1/ Source: Form N-38

Form G-21.1A (7-1-52)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: MARCH 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1

I ENTRY AND DEPARTURE ACTIVITY	TOTAL	Bangor	Burlington	Calais	Fort Fairfield	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Roosevelttown	Rouses Point	St.Albans
PRIMARY INSPECTION																	
BORDER CROSSERS ADMITTED - ALIENS	530752	68	398	94672	19712	15990	26819	13654	97854	24113	36638	18253	28819	10807	28870	50077	2761
- CITIZENS	276521	2	660	36771	7301	14538	10236	4303	59339	13256	29967	6519	54744	9131	14769	21069	25544
CREWMEN ADMITTED - ALIENS	40	40	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		-	-	-	-	-	-	-
- CITIZENS	4	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		-	-	-	-	-	-	-
OTHERS ADMITTED - ALIENS	6364	-	37	135	7	145	45	866	223	41	221	159	114	37	50	1553	408
- CITIZENS	568	6	3	7	-	199	-	13	8	72	10	-	38	-	97	5	16
ALIENS NOT ADMITTED	326	2	3	13	-	19	5	20	10	15	13	2	16	-	10	41	2
PREEXAMINATIONS COMPLETED - IN U.S.	-			-	-		-						-	-	-	-	-
- OUTSIDE U.S.	644			-	-		-						-	-	-	-	-
FINES	-			-	-		-						-	-	-	-	-
TOTAL WORK UNITS	815219	122	1101	131598	27020	30891	37105	18856	157434	37497	66849	24933	344461	19975	43796	72745	5741
PRIMARY INSPECTION - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	39166	17	168	3694	1719	2662	2872	1716	1830	2757	3506	2597	1453	889	1596	5486	1242
- HOURS PER UNIT	.048	.139	.153	.028	.064	.086	.077	.091	.012	.074	.052	.104	.042	.044	.036	.075	.216
PRODUCTIVE HOURS - INS PERSONNEL	31676	17	168	2670	876	1798	1368	1470	1830	2317	3138	2101	1453	644	1093	5050	1242
VESSELS BOARDED - ARRIVAL	8	1		-													
AIRPLANES BOARDED-ARRIVAL	104	3		-											9		
VESSELS & AIRPLANES BOARDED ON DEPARTURE	2	2		-													
BSI HEARINGS																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	5	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
RECEIVED	100			11			3	3	6				8			12	
TOTAL	105			12			3	3	7				8			12	
COMPLETED	96			10			3	1	7				8			8	
PENDING END OF PERIOD	9			2			-	2	-				-			4	
BSI HEARINGS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	371			23			26	2	29				23			15	
- HOURS PER UNIT	3.86			2.30			8.66	2.00	4.14				2.88			1.87	
PRODUCTIVE HOURS - INS PERSONNEL	371			23			26	2	29				23			15	
AUTHORIZATIONS																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	76	1	1	1	4	-	-	1	-	2	-	-	-		-	4	62
RECEIVED	1711	48	50	44	35	132	65	337	58	32	151	167	42	47	19	32	350
TOTAL	1787	49	51	45	39	132	65	338	58	34	151	167	42	47	19	36	412
COMPLETED	1726	48	49	44	34	132	65	337	58	32	151	167	42	47	19	36	363
BORDER CROSSING CARDS	589	42	37	27	29	87	50	32	8	20	81	31	35	20	16	17	13
REENTRY PERMITS ISSUED & EXTENDED	29		2							1			-				26
VISA PETITIONS	18												-				18
PREEXAMINATION AUTHORIZATIONS	-												-				-
EXTENSIONS OF STAY	45	2	9	3			1			1	5		4		1	6	12
REGISTRY	2	2											-				-
ALIEN LABORER'S CARDS	622			5		24		299	50	3	49	121	-	26	1	2	-
DUPLICATE ALIEN REGISTRATION CARDS	327		1	9	5	21	14	6		7	15	15	2	1	1	11	204
PERMISSION TO REAPPLY	9										1						8
CHANGE OF STATUS	1																1
APPLNS. TO IMPORT CONTRACT LABORERS	79																79
APPROVAL OF SCHOOLS	-																-
SECTION 4 D.P. APPLICATIONS	-																-
STUDENT EMPLOYMENT & TRANSFER	5	2											1				2

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: MARCH 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1 (Continued)

I ENTRY AND DEPARTURE ACTIVITY	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vance-boro	Halifax	Montreal
PRIMARY INSPECTION					
BORDER CROSSERS ADMITTED - ALIENS	13373	37388	9200	258	1028
- CITIZENS	6863	27396	6280		93
CREWMEN ADMITTED - ALIENS					
- CITIZENS					
OTHERS ADMITTED - ALIENS	130	46	217	219	1711
- CITIZENS	4	3	9	9	69
ALIENS NOT ADMITTED	12	3	24	75	41
PREEXAMINATIONS COMPLETED - IN U.S.					
- OUTSIDE U.S.	4	1	639		
FINES					
TOTAL WORK UNITS	20386	64837	16369	561	2942
PRIMARY INSPECTION - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	1103	1236	1724	284	615
- HOURS PER UNIT	.054	.019	.105	.506	.209
PRODUCTIVE HOURS - INS PERSONNEL	1090	1236	1276	284	615
VESSELS BOARDED - ARRIVAL				7	
AIRPLANES BOARDED-ARRIVAL	14				78
VESSELS & AIRPLANES BOARDED ON DEPARTURE					
BSI HEARINGS					
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	1	-	-	-	3
RECEIVED	5	2	3	1	46
TOTAL	6	2	3	1	48
COMPLETED	6	2	3	1	47
PENDING END OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	1
BSI HEARINGS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	12	4	6	5	226
- HOURS PER UNIT	2.00	2.00	2.00	5.00	4.81
PRODUCTIVE HOURS - INS PERSONNEL	12	4	6	5	226
AUTHORIZATIONS					
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-
RECEIVED	30	56	9		7
TOTAL	30	56	9		7
COMPLETED	30	56	9		7
BORDER CROSSING CARDS	21	7	9		7
REENTRY PERMITS ISSUED & EXTENDED					
VISA PETITIONS					
PREEXAMINATION AUTHORIZATIONS					
EXTENSIONS OF STAY	1				
REGISTRY					
ALIEN LABORER'S CARDS	1	41			
DUPLICATE ALIEN REGISTRATION CARDS	7	8			
PERMISSION TO REAPPLY					
CHANGE OF STATUS					
APPLNS. TO IMPORT CONTRACT LABORERS					
APPROVAL OF SCHOOLS					
SECTION 4 D.P. APPLICATIONS					
STUDENT EMPLOYMENT & TRANSFER					

Form G-21.2A (7-1-52)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: MARCH 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1

I ENTRY AND DEPARTURE ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	TOTAL	Bangor	Burlington	Calais	Fort Fairfield	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Roosevelttown	Rouses Point	St. Albans
AUTHORIZATIONS - (Cont'd)		⊗	⊗			⊗	⊗		⊗		⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	
DENIED	10	-	-	-	-	-	-	10	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
BORDER CROSSING CARDS	-																
REENTRY PERMITS	-																
VISA PETITIONS	-																
PREEXAMINATION AUTHORIZATIONS	-																
EXTENSIONS OF STAY	-																
REGISTRY	-																
ALIEN LABORER'S CARDS	10							10									
DUPLICATE ALIEN REGISTRATION CARDS	-																
PERMISSION TO REAPPLY	-																
CHANGE OF STATUS	-																
APPLNS. TO IMPORT CONTRACT LABORERS	-																
APPROVAL OF SCHOOLS	-																
SECTION 4 D.P. APPLICATIONS	-																
STUDENT EMPLOYMENT AND TRANSFER	-																
PENDING END OF PERIOD	61	1	2	1	5	-	-	1	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	49
BORDER CROSSING CARDS	-																
REENTRY PERMITS	2		2														
VISA PETITIONS	-																
PREEXAMINATION AUTHORIZATIONS	1	1															
EXTENSIONS OF STAY	4									1							3
REGISTRY	6			1	4			1									
ALIEN LABORER'S CARDS	-																
DUPLICATE ALIEN REGISTRATION CARDS	14				1												13
PERMISSION TO REAPPLY	-																
CHANGE OF STATUS	-																
APPLNS. TO IMPORT CONTRACT LABORERS	30																30
APPROVAL OF SCHOOLS	-																
SECTION 4 D.P. APPLICATIONS	2									1							1
STUDENT EMPLOYMENT AND TRANSFER	2																2
AUTHORIZATIONS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	955	46	24	9	30	76	9	64	23	19	135	50	12	10	14	121	257
- HOURS PER UNIT	.553	.958	.490	.204	.882	.575	.138	.189	.396	.594	.894	.299	.286	.213	.737	3.36	.707
TRAVEL TIME - ENTRY & DEPARTURE ACTIVITY	1099	10	-	2	-	-	7	80	19	83	217	145	-	-	3	105	297
LOST TIME - ENTRY & DEPARTURE ACTIVITY	2382	192	-	-	-	-	-	118	-	440	-	-	-	1386	-	-	-

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: MARCH 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1 (Continued)

I ENTRY AND DEPARTURE ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vanceboro	Halifax	Montreal												
AUTHORIZATIONS - (Cont'd)	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗												
DENIED	-	-	-	-	-												
BORDER CROSSING CARDS																	
REENTRY PERMITS																	
VISA PETITIONS																	
PREEXAMINATION AUTHORIZATIONS																	
EXTENSIONS OF STAY																	
REGISTRY																	
ALIEN LABORER'S CARDS																	
DUPLICATE ALIEN REGISTRATION CARDS																	
PERMISSION TO REAPPLY																	
CHANGE OF STATUS																	
APPLNS. TO IMPORT CONTRACT LABORERS																	
APPROVAL OF SCHOOLS																	
SECTION 4 D.P. APPLICATIONS																	
STUDENT EMPLOYMENT AND TRANSFER																	
PENDING END OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
BORDER CROSSING CARDS																	
REENTRY PERMITS																	
VISA PETITIONS																	
PREEXAMINATION AUTHORIZATIONS																	
EXTENSIONS OF STAY																	
REGISTRY																	
ALIEN LABORER'S CARDS																	
DUPLICATE ALIEN REGISTRATION CARDS																	
PERMISSION TO REAPPLY																	
CHANGE OF STATUS																	
APPLNS. TO IMPORT CONTRACT LABORERS																	
APPROVAL OF SCHOOLS																	
SECTION 4 D.P. APPLICATIONS																	
STUDENT EMPLOYMENT AND TRANSFER																	
AUTHORIZATIONS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	24	28	2	-	2												
- HOURS PER UNIT	.800	.500	.222	-	.286												
TRAVEL TIME - ENTRY & DEPARTURE ACTIVITY	9	-	79	-	43												
LOST TIME - ENTRY & DEPARTURE ACTIVITY	150	-	77	-	19												

Form G-21.3A (7-1-52)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: MARCH 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1

II DETENTION, DEPORTATION AND PAROLE ACTIVITY	TOTAL	Bangor	Burlington	Calais	Fort Fairfield	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Roosevelttown	Rouses Point	St. Albans
WARRANT OF ARREST PROCESSING			⊗	⊗	⊗			⊗		⊗	⊗	⊗		⊗	⊗		
COMPLETED	11	1	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	4	-
W/A PROCESSING - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	16	2				4	1						5			2	
- HOURS PER UNIT	1.45	2.00				4.00	1.00						1.67			.500	
WARRANT OF ARREST SERVICE																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
RECEIVED	14	1				1	1		1				3			4	-
TOTAL	15	1				1	1		1				3			4	1
COMPLETED	14	1				1	1		1				3			4	-
PENDING END OF PERIOD	1	-				-	-		-				-			-	1
W/A SERVICE - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	14	1.				1	1		1				1			2	-
- HOURS PER UNIT	1.00	1.00				1.00	1.00		1.00				.333			.500	-
WARRANT HEARINGS																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	41	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	41
RECEIVED	10																10
TOTAL	51																51
COMPLETED	8																8
SUBVERSIVE	-																
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC	-																
SUSPENSION	-																
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS	8																8
OTHER	-																
PENDING END OF PERIOD	43																43
WARRANT HEARINGS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	359																353
- HOURS PER UNIT	7.03																44.1
ON APPEAL - TOTAL	25																25
FINAL ORDERS ENTERED OR RECEIVED	-																-
TRAVEL TIME - WARRANT HEARING OPERATION	19																17
LOST TIME - WARRANT HEARING OPERATION	2																1
PAROLE AND SUPERVISION																	
CONDITIONAL PAROLE																	
ALIENS ON PAROLE BEGINNING OF PERIOD	28	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	28
PLACED ON PAROLE DURING PERIOD	2																1
TOTAL ON PAROLE DURING PERIOD	30																29
REMOVED FROM PAROLE DURING PERIOD	3																3
ALIENS ON PAROLE END OF PERIOD	27																26
SUBVERSIVE	-																
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC	3																3
SUSPENSION	6																6
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS	2																1
OTHER	16																16
COND. PAROLE - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	11																10
- HOURS PER UNIT	.366																.344

Form G-21.3B (7-1-52)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: MARCH 1953

II DETENTION, DEPORTATION AND PAROLE ACTIVITY	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vance-boro	Halifax	Montreal												
WARRANT OF ARREST PROCESSING		⊗		⊗	⊗												
COMPLETED	-	-	1	-	-												
W/A PROCESSING - PRODUCTIVE HOURS			2														
- HOURS PER UNIT			2.00														
WARRANT OF ARREST SERVICE																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
RECEIVED	2		1														
TOTAL	2		1														
COMPLETED	2		1														
PENDING END OF PERIOD	-		-														
W/A SERVICE - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	6		1														
- HOURS PER UNIT	3.00		1.00														
WARRANT HEARINGS																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
RECEIVED																	
TOTAL																	
COMPLETED																	
SUBVERSIVE																	
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC																	
SUSPENSION																	
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS																	
OTHER																	
PENDING END OF PERIOD																	
WARRANT HEARINGS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	6																
- HOURS PER UNIT	-																
ON APPEAL - TOTAL																	
FINAL ORDERS ENTERED OR RECEIVED																	
TRAVEL TIME - WARRANT HEARING OPERATION	2																
LOST TIME - WARRANT HEARING OPERATION	1																
PAROLE AND SUPERVISION																	
CONDITIONAL PAROLE																	
ALIENS ON PAROLE BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
PLACED ON PAROLE DURING PERIOD			1														
TOTAL ON PAROLE DURING PERIOD			1														
REMOVED FROM PAROLE DURING PERIOD			-														
ALIENS ON PAROLE END OF PERIOD			1														
SUBVERSIVE			-														
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC			-														
SUSPENSION			-														
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS			1														
OTHER			-														
COND. PAROLE - PRODUCTIVE HOURS			1														
- HOURS PER UNIT			1.00														

Form G-21.4A (7-1-52)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: MARCH 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1

II DETENTION, DEPORTATION AND PAROLE ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	TOTAL	Bangor	Burlington	Calais	Fort Fairfield	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Rooseveltown	Rouses Point	St. Albans
INTERNAL SECURITY ACT SUPERVISION		⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗			⊗	⊗	⊗		⊗		⊗	⊗		
ALIENS UNDER SUPER'N BEGINNING OF PERIOD	7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7
PLACED UNDER SUPER'N DURING PERIOD	-																-
TOTAL UNDER SUPER'N DURING PERIOD	7																7
REMOVED FROM SUPER'N DURING PERIOD	-																-
ALIENS UNDER SUPER'N END OF PERIOD	7																7
SUBVERSIVE	-																
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC	2																2
SUSPENSION	-																
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS	-																
OTHER	5																5
ISA SUPERVISION - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	4																4
- HOURS PER UNIT	.571																.571
OTHER TYPES OF PAROLE																	
ALIENS ON PAROLE BEGINNING OF PERIOD	5	-	-	-	-		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4
PLACED ON PAROLE DURING PERIOD	4																4
TOTAL ON PAROLE DURING PERIOD	9																8
REMOVED FROM PAROLE DURING PERIOD	5																4
ALIENS ON PAROLE END OF PERIOD	4																4
OTHER TYPES OF PAROLE-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	3																3
-HOURS PER UNIT	.333																.375
TRAVEL TIME - PAROLE & SUPER'N OPERATION	-																-
LOST TIME - PAROLE & SUPER'N OPERATION	-																-
SERVICE DETENTION FACILITIES																	
NUMBER DETAINED BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
DETAINEES ADMITTED	62					1					31					23	2
NUMBER DETAINED DURING PERIOD	62					1					31					23	2
EXCLUSION	50					-					31					13	1
DETAINEES REMOVED DURING PERIOD	58					1					31					19	2
NUMBER DETAINED END OF PERIOD	4					-					-					4	-
MAN-DAYS DETENTION DURING PERIOD	74					1					31					34	3
EXCLUSION	52					-					31					15	2
EXPULSION	22					1					-					19	1
AVERAGE DAYS DET. PER DETAINEE	1.19					1.00					1.00					1.47	1.50
SERVICE DET. FAC. - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	321					1					168					80	24
- HOURS PER UNIT	4.33					1.00					5.41					2.35	8.00
PRODUCTIVE HOURS - INS PERSONNEL	281					1					168					72	24
NON-SERVICE DETENTION FACILITIES																	
NUMBER DETAINED BEGINNING OF PERIOD	8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	6	-
DETAINEES ADMITTED	9						2				-		4			-	1
NUMBER DETAINED DURING PERIOD	17						2				1		5			6	1
DETAINEES REMOVED DURING PERIOD	6						2				-		2			-	-
NUMBER DETAINED END OF PERIOD	11						-				1		3			6	1
MAN-DAYS DETENTION DURING PERIOD	336						4				31		87			185	3
AVERAGE DAYS DET. PER DETAINEE	19.7						2.00				31.0		17.4			30.8	3.00
NON-SERV. DET.FAC. - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	12						-			9	-		-			-	-
- HOURS PER UNIT	.705						-			-	-		-			-	-

Form G-21.4B (7-1-52)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: MARCH 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1 (Continued)

II DETENTION, DEPORTATION AND PAROLE ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vance-boro	Halifax	Montreal												
INTERNAL SECURITY ACT SUPERVISION		⊗		⊗	⊗												
ALIENS UNDER SUPER'N BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
PLACED UNDER SUPER'N DURING PERIOD			-														
TOTAL UNDER SUPER'N DURING PERIOD																	
REMOVED FROM SUPER'N DURING PERIOD																	
ALIENS UNDER SUPER'N END OF PERIOD																	
SUBVERSIVE																	
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC																	
SUSPENSION																	
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS																	
OTHER																	
ISA SUPERVISION - PRODUCTIVE HOURS																	
- HOURS PER UNIT																	
OTHER TYPES OF PAROLE																	
ALIENS ON PAROLE BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	1	-	-												
PLACED ON PAROLE DURING PERIOD			-														
TOTAL ON PAROLE DURING PERIOD			1														
REMOVED FROM PAROLE DURING PERIOD			1														
ALIENS ON PAROLE END OF PERIOD			-														
OTHER TYPES OF PAROLE-PRODUCTIVE HOURS			-														
-HOURS PER UNIT			-														
TRAVEL TIME - PAROLE & SUPER'N OPERATION			-														
LOST TIME - PAROLE & SUPER'N OPERATION																	
SERVICE DETENTION FACILITIES																	
NUMBER DETAINED BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
DETAINEES ADMITTED			5														
NUMBER DETAINED DURING PERIOD			5														
EXCLUSION			5														
DETAINEES REMOVED DURING PERIOD			5														
NUMBER DETAINED END OF PERIOD			-														
MAN-DAYS DETENTION DURING PERIOD			5														
EXCLUSION			4														
EXPULSION			1														
AVERAGE DAYS DET. PER DETAINEE			1.00														
SERVICE DET. FAC. - PRODUCTIVE HOURS			48														
- HOURS PER UNIT			9.60														
PRODUCTIVE HOURS - INS PERSONNEL			16														
NON-SERVICE DETENTION FACILITIES																	
NUMBER DETAINED BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
DETAINEES ADMITTED	2																
NUMBER DETAINED DURING PERIOD	2																
DETAINEES REMOVED DURING PERIOD	2																
NUMBER DETAINED END OF PERIOD	-																
MAN-DAYS DETENTION DURING PERIOD	26																
AVERAGE DAYS DET. PER DETAINEE	13.0																
NON-SERV. DET.FAC. - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	3																
- HOURS PER UNIT	1.50																

Form G-21.5A (7-1-52)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: MARCH 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1

II DETENTION, DEPORTATION AND PAROLE ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	TOTAL	Bangor	Burlington	Calais	Fort Fairfield	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Roosevelttown	Rouses Point	St. Albans
DEPORTATION														⊗			
ALIENS PROCESSED FOR DEPORTATION	15	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	15
ALIENS PROCESSED FOR VOLUNTARY DEPARTURE	17					6							4		-	4	-
TOTAL	32					6							4		-	4	15
ALIENS DEPORTED	12					-					2		1		-	6	2
VOLUNTARY DEPARTURES	53					6	3				2		4		6	12	-
UNDER W/A	4					-	-						1		-	3	-
WITHOUT W/A	49					6	3				2		3		6	9	-
REMOVALS	-					-	-						-		-	-	-
DEPORTATION-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	164					2	-				4		6		-	[illegible]	139
-HOURS PER UNIT	5.12					.333	-				-		1.50		-	1.25	9.26
TRAVEL TIME - DEPORTATION OPERATION	28					-	-				-		23		-	[illegible]	2
LOST TIME - DEPORTATION OPERATION	59					-	-				-		-		-	-	-
III INVESTIGATIONS ACTIVITY																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	217	7	1	1	10	-	-	3	-	8	-	3	2	-	2	6	122
RECEIVED DURING PERIOD	547	28	21	11	4	9	18	10	11	23	21	27	11	1	6	46	184
TOTAL	764	35	22	12	14	9	18	13	11	31	21	30	13	1	8	52	306
COMPLETED	536	25	18	11	5	9	17	12	11	24	21	28	12	1	6	46	171
NATURALIZATION & CITIZENSHIP	33	3							2								20
CANCELLATION - SUBVERSIVE	-																
CANCELLATION - OTHER	-																
NATURALIZATION	20	1							2								15
OTHER	13	2															5
DEPORTATION	248	11	12	2	1	9	5			3	8	2	8			9	95
SUBVERSIVE	6																2
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC	10	4								1						1	1
ADDRESS REPORT CARD (1-53)	122	3	12	2	1	9				1	8	1	8			3	74
SUSPENSION	6	2															2
NON-IMMIGRANTS	72						3			1		1				3	1
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS	9															2	1
DISPLACED PERSONS	7	2															5
OTHER	16						2										9
SMUGGLING	7			1												2	3
PRIVATE BILLS	1								1								-
PAROLE	-																-
ALIEN REGISTRATION	18	1	6				3		1			3					3
ALIEN ADDRESS REPORT (SEC. 35)	145	10		7	4		6	6	6	19	9	20	2		4	27	13
MISCELLANEOUS	84	-		1			3	6	1	2	4	3	2	1	2	8	37
PENDING END OF PERIOD	228	10	4	1	9	-	1	1	-	7	-	2	1	-	2	6	135
NATURALIZATION & CITIZENSHIP	28																24
CANCELLATION - SUBVERSIVE	1																1
CANCELLATION - OTHER	-																-
NATURALIZATION	11																11
OTHER	16																12

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: MARCH 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1 (Continued)

II DETENTION, DEPORTATION AND PAROLE ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vance-boro	Halifax	Montreal												
DEPORTATION																	
ALIENS PROCESSED FOR DEPORTATION	-	-	-	-	-												
ALIENS PROCESSED FOR VOLUNTARY DEPARTURE	2	-	1														
TOTAL	2	-	1														
ALIENS DEPORTED	-	-	1														
VOLUNTARY DEPARTURES	2	17	1														
UNDER W/A	-	-	-														
WITHOUT W/A	2	17	1														
REMOVALS	-	-	-														
DEPORTATION-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	6	-	2														
-HOURS PER UNIT	3.00	-	2.00														
TRAVEL TIME - DEPORTATION OPERATION	3	-	-														
LOST TIME - DEPORTATION OPERATION	-	-	59														
III INVESTIGATIONS ACTIVITY																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	3	-	-	6	43												
RECEIVED DURING PERIOD	5	4	13	6	88												
TOTAL	8	4	13	12	131												
COMPLETED	7	4	13	6	89												
NATURALIZATION & CITIZENSHIP	3	3			2												
CANCELLATION - SUBVERSIVE																	
CANCELLATION - OTHER																	
NATURALIZATION		2															
OTHER	3	1			2												
DEPORTATION				2	81												
SUBVERSIVE					4												
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC					3												
ADDRESS REPORT CARD (I-53)					-												
SUSPENSION					2												
NON-IMMIGRANTS					63												
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS				1	5												
DISPLACED PERSONS																	
OTHER				1	4												
SMUGGLING	1																
PRIVATE BILLS																	
PAROLE																	
ALIEN REGISTRATION					1												
ALIEN ADDRESS REPORT (SEC. 35)	1	1	9		1												
MISCELLANEOUS	2		4	4	4												
PENDING END OF PERIOD	1	-	-	6	42												
NATURALIZATION & CITIZENSHIP				2	2												
CANCELLATION - SUBVERSIVE																	
CANCELLATION - OTHER																	
NATURALIZATION																	
OTHER				2	2												

Form G-21.6A (7-1-52)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: MARCH 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1

III INVESTIGATIONS ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	TOTAL	Bangor	Burlington	Calais	Fort Fairfield	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Roosevelttown	Rouses Point	St. Albans
PENDING END OF PERIOD (CONT'D)												⊗		⊗			
DEPORTATION	137	8	4	1	7	-	1	1	-	6	-	—	1		1	5	63
SUBVERSIVE	3																3
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC	-																
ADDRESS REPORT CARD (1-53)	82	6	4	1	2		1	1		4					1	5	55
SUSPENSION	-																
NON-IMMIGRANTS	32									1							1
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS	2																
DISPLACED PERSONS	-																
OTHERS	18	2			5					1			1				4
SMUGGLING	11															1	10
PRIVATE BILLS	-																
PAROLE	1																1
ALIEN REGISTRATION	4	1			2												1
ALIEN ADDRESS REPORT (SEC. 35)	14	1								1		1					11
MISCELLANEOUS	33											1			1		25
INVESTIGATIONS RESULTING IN W/A OR V/D	5						1									4	
ALIENS APPRH'D. (BY OTHER THAN B.P.)	3															3	
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS	-																
MEXICANS APPRH'D. (BY OTHER THAN B.P.)	-																
ILLEGALLY IN AGRICULTURE	-																
ILLEGALLY IN TRADE OR INDUSTRY	-																
OTHER	-																
W/A THRU ADDRESS REPORT CARD (1-53)	-																
INVESTIGATIONS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	1603	46	10	10	24	4	18	14	4	44	17	39	8	1	6	75	1163
- HOURS PER UNIT	2.99	1.84	.555	.909	4.80	.444	1.05	1.16	.363	1.83	.809	1.39	.667	1.00	1.00	1.63	6.80
TRAVEL TIME - INVESTIGATIONS ACTIVITY	294	14	-	-	6	-	21	4	1	5	-	-	-	-	3	27	107
IV APPLICATIONS EXAMINATION ACTIVITY																	
NATIONALITY																	
N-300 PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
RECEIVED	4																4
COMPLETED	1																1
PENDING END OF PERIOD	3																3
N-400 SERIES - PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	465	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	465
RECEIVED	300																300
COMPLETED	246																246
PENDING END OF PERIOD	519																519
N-600 PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	45	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	45
RECEIVED	11																11
COMPLETED	20																20
PENDING END OF PERIOD	36																36
N-500 SERIES - PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7
RECEIVED	6																6
COMPLETED	6																6
PENDING END OF PERIOD	7																7

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: MARCH 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1 (Continued)

III INVESTIGATIONS ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vance-boro	Halifax	Montreal													
PENDING END OF PERIOD (CONT'D)																		
DEPORTATION	1	-	-	1	37													
SUBVERSIVE																		
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC																		
ADDRESS REPORT CARD (I-53)					2													
SUSPENSION																		
NON-IMMIGRANTS					30													
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS					2													
DISPLACED PERSONS																		
OTHERS	1			1	3													
SMUGGLING																		
PRIVATE BILLS																		
PAROLE																		
ALIEN REGISTRATION																		
ALIEN ADDRESS REPORT (SEC. 35)																		
MISCELLANEOUS				3	3													
INVESTIGATIONS RESULTING IN W/A OR V/D																		
ALIENS APPRH'D. (BY OTHER THAN B.P.)																		
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS																		
MEXICANS APPRH'D. (BY OTHER THAN B.P.)																		
ILLEGALLY IN AGRICULTURE																		
ILLEGALLY IN TRADE OR INDUSTRY																		
OTHER																		
W/A THRU ADDRESS REPORT CARD (I-53)																		
INVESTIGATIONS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	38	4	8	6	64													
- HOURS PER UNIT	5.43	1.00	.615	1.00	.719													
TRAVEL TIME - INVESTIGATIONS ACTIVITY	13	1	-	6	86													
IV APPLICATIONS EXAMINATION ACTIVITY																		
NATIONALITY																		
N-300 PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-													
RECEIVED																		
COMPLETED																		
PENDING END OF PERIOD																		
N-400 SERIES - PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-													
RECEIVED																		
COMPLETED																		
PENDING END OF PERIOD																		
N-600 PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-													
RECEIVED																		
COMPLETED																		
PENDING END OF PERIOD																		
N-500 SERIES - PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-													
RECEIVED																		
COMPLETED																		
PENDING END OF PERIOD																		

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: MARCH 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1

IV APPLICATIONS EXAMINATION ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	TOTAL	Bangor	Burlington	Calais	Fort Fairfield	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Rooseveltown	Rouses point	St. Albans
IMMIGRATION																	
REENTRY PERMITS-PENDING BEG. OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
RECEIVED	29																29
COMPLETED	29																29
PENDING END OF PERIOD	-																-
VISA PETITIONS-PENDING BEG. OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
RECEIVED	30																30
COMPLETED	30																30
PENDING END OF PERIOD	-																-
OTHER-PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	17	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	17
RECEIVED	292																292
COMPLETED	296																296
PENDING END OF PERIOD	13																13
NATIONALITY APPLICATIONS-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	207																207
-HOURS PER UNIT	.758																.758
IMMIGRATION APPLICATIONS-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	87																87
-HOURS PER UNIT	.245																.245
DECLARATIONS FILED	3																3
V VERIFICATION OF ARRIVALS AND DEPARTURES ACTIVITY																	
VERIFICATION REQUESTS																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	738	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	738
RECEIVED DURING PERIOD	3654	19	4	7	2	8	12	18	573	16	61	26	14	3	7	45	2506
TOTAL	4392	19	4	7	2	8	12	18	573	16	61	26	14	3	7	45	3244
COMPLETED	3243	19	4	7	2	8	12	18	573	16	61	26	14	3	7	45	2095
NATURALIZATION	238	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8	-	-	-	-	-	230
OTHER	3005	19	4	7	2	8	12	18	573	16	53	26	14	3	7	45	1865
PENDING END OF PERIOD	1149	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1149
VERIFICATION-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	918	7	4	2	1	2	2	8	21	5	27	11	4	1	6	27	692
-HOURS PER UNIT	.283	.368	1.00	.286	.500	.250	.166	.1444	.037	.313	.442	.423	.286	.333	.857	.600	.330
VI NATURALIZATION AND CITIZENSHIP ACTIVITY																	
PRELIM. INVEST. CIT. & NAT. APPLN'S																	
PRELIM. INVESTIGATIONS (N-400 SERIES)																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	307	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	307
RECEIVED	217							2									215
COMPLETED	116							2									114
PENDING END OF PERIOD	408							-									408
CITIZENSHIP (N-600 APPLICATIONS)																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	2	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
RECEIVED	13	3	2	1													7
COMPLETED	10	3	1	1													5
PENDING END OF PERIOD	5	-	2	-													3

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: MARCH 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1 (Continued)

IV APPLICATIONS EXAMINATION ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vanceboro	Halifax	Montreal												
IMMIGRATION																	
REENTRY PERMITS-PENDING BEG. OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
RECEIVED																	
COMPLETED																	
PENDING END OF PERIOD																	
VISA PETITIONS-PENDING BEG. OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
RECEIVED																	
COMPLETED																	
PENDING END OF PERIOD																	
OTHER-PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
RECEIVED																	
COMPLETED																	
PENDING END OF PERIOD																	
NATIONALITY APPLICATIONS-PRODUCTIVE HOURS																	
-HOURS PER UNIT																	
IMMIGRATION APPLICATIONS-PRODUCTIVE HOURS																	
-HOURS PER UNIT																	
DECLARATIONS FILED																	
V VERIFICATION OF ARRIVALS AND DEPARTURES ACTIVITY																	
VERIFICATION REQUESTS																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
RECEIVED DURING PERIOD	52	34	35	20	192												
TOTAL	52	34	35	20	192												
COMPLETED	52	34	35	20	192												
NATURALIZATION	-	-	-	-	-												
OTHER	52	34	35	20	192												
PENDING END OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
VERIFICATION-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	31	17	10	7	33												
-HOURS PER UNIT	.596	.500	.285	.350	.172												
VI NATURALIZATION AND CITIZENSHIP ACTIVITY																	
PRELIM. INVEST. CIT. & NAT. APPLN'S																	
PRELIM. INVESTIGATIONS (N-400 SERIES)																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
RECEIVED																	
COMPLETED																	
PENDING END OF PERIOD																	
CITIZENSHIP (N-600 APPLICATIONS)																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
RECEIVED																	
COMPLETED																	
PENDING END OF PERIOD																	

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: MARCH 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1

VI NATURALIZATION AND CITIZENSHIP ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	TOTAL	Bangor	Burlington	Calais	Fort Fairfield ⊗	Highgate Springs ⊗	Houlton ⊗	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport ⊗	Norton ⊗	Ogdensburg ⊗	Richford ⊗	Roosevelt town ⊗	Rouses Point ⊗	St. Albans
NATIONALITY APPLN'S. (N-500 SERIES)																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	2	-	2	-		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
RECEIVED	5		5														
COMPLETED	3		3														
PENDING END OF PERIOD	4		4														
PETITIONS FILED	106		-														106
N-600 HEARINGS COMPLETED	7	2	1	1													3
CERTIFICATES ISSUED (N-600 APPLN'S)	3		-					-									3
CERTIFICATES ISSUED (N-500 SERIES)	3		3					-									-
PRELIM. INVESTIGATIONS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	216		-	-				2									214
- HOURS PER UNIT	1.86		-	-				1.00									1.87
CIT. (N-600 APPLN'S) - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	56	7	2	5													42
- HOURS PER UNIT	5.60	2.33	2.00	5.00													8.40
NAT. APPLN'S - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	3	-	3	-													-
- HOURS PER UNIT	1.00	-	1.00	-													-
NATURALIZATION HEARINGS																	
PETITIONS PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	303	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	303
PETITIONS PENDING DURING PERIOD	409																409
PETITIONS COMPLETED	86																86
GRANTED	84																84
DENIED	2																2
PETITIONS PENDING END OF PERIOD	323																323
PETITIONS READY FOR FINAL HEARING	323																323
PETITIONS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	40	-															40
- HOURS PER UNIT	4.65	-															.465
TRAVEL TIME - NAT. & CIT. ACTIVITY	79	1															78
LOST TIME - NAT. & CIT. ACTIVITY	-	-															-
CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION 1/																	
CITIZENSHIP ASSISTANCE FURNISHED																	
ALIENS REFERRED TO PUBLIC SCHOOLS																	
ALIENS INFORMED OF HOME STUDY																	
NAME SLIPS TO PUBLIC SCHOOLS CORRES.CTRS.																	
ALIENS ADMITTED TO CITIZENSHIP																	
ATTENDED PUBLIC SCHOOL CLASSES																	
ENROLLED IN HOME STUDY COURSES																	
NUMBER SUBMITTING PUBLIC SCHOOL CERT.																	
VII EMPLOYMENT SUMMARY																	
NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES END OF PERIOD	295	3	2	20	5	12	8	11	12	16	22	15	10	9	8	34	62
OPERATIONS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	40958	343	211	2721	844	1888	1453	1762	1928	2922	3706	2346	1535	2042	1125	5501	4979
OPERATIONS - NON-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	4287	35	72	408	24	305	28	194	75	269	288	380	96	216	40	737	651
ADMINISTRATION - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	9061	137	174	676	84	167	9	208	357	321	200	250	134	24	322	352	3450
ADMINISTRATION - NON-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	503	3	-	12	16	-	-	-	4	-	8	-	-	-	25	-	222
TOTAL HOURS EMPLOYMENT	54809	518	457	3817	968	2360	1490	2164	2364	3512	4202	2976	1765	2282	1512	6590	9302
PERCENTAGE TOTAL HOURS ON OPERATIONS	82.5	72.9	61.9	81.9	89.6	92.9	99.3	90.4	84.7	90.8	95.0	91.5	92.4	98.9	77.0	94.6	60.5

1/ Source: Form N-38

Form G-21.8B (7-1-52)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: MARCH 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1 (Continued)

VI NATURALIZATION AND CITIZENSHIP ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vanceboro	Halifax	Montreal													
NATIONALITY APPLN'S. (N-500 SERIES)	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗													
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-													
RECEIVED																		
COMPLETED																		
PENDING END OF PERIOD																		
PETITIONS FILED																		
N-600 HEARINGS COMPLETED																		
CERTIFICATES ISSUED (N-600 APPLN'S)																		
CERTIFICATES ISSUED (N-500 SERIES)																		
PRELIM. INVESTIGATIONS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS																		
- HOURS PER UNIT																		
CIT. (N-600 APPLN'S) - PRODUCTIVE HOURS																		
- HOURS PER UNIT																		
NAT. APPLN'S - PRODUCTIVE HOURS																		
- HOURS PER UNIT																		
NATURALIZATION HEARINGS																		
PETITIONS PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-													
PETITIONS PENDING DURING PERIOD																		
PETITIONS COMPLETED																		
GRANTED																		
DENIED																		
PETITIONS PENDING END OF PERIOD																		
PETITIONS READY FOR FINAL HEARING																		
PETITIONS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS																		
- HOURS PER UNIT																		
TRAVEL TIME - NAT. & CIT. ACTIVITY																		
LOST TIME - NAT. & CIT. ACTIVITY																		
CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION 1/																		
CITIZENSHIP ASSISTANCE FURNISHED																		
ALIENS REFERRED TO PUBLIC SCHOOLS																		
ALIENS INFORMED OF HOME STUDY																		
NAME SLIPS TO PUBLIC SCHOOLS CORRES.CTRS.																		
ALIENS ADMITTED TO CITIZENSHIP																		
ATTENDED PUBLIC SCHOOL CLASSES																		
ENROLLED IN HOME STUDY COURSES																		
NUMBER SUBMITTING PUBLIC SCHOOL CERT.																		
VII EMPLOYMENT SUMMARY																		
NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES END OF PERIOD	9	9	10	3	15													
OPERATIONS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	1394	1318	1539	313	1088													
OPERATIONS - NON-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	96	136	124	16	97													
ADMINISTRATION - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	138	226	314	203	1315													
ADMINISTRATION - NON-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	11	68	3	4	127													
TOTAL HOURS EMPLOYMENT	1639	1748	1980	536	2627													
PERCENTAGE TOTAL HOURS ON OPERATIONS	90.9	83.1	83.9	61.4	45.1													

1/ Source: Form N-38

Miss Manton

Form G-21.1A (7-1-52)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: APRIL 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1

I ENTRY AND DEPARTURE ACTIVITY	TOTAL	Bangor	Burlington	Calais	Fort Fairfield	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Rooseveltown	Rouses Point	St. Albans
PRIMARY INSPECTION																	
BORDER CROSSERS ADMITTED - ALIENS	660830	65	518	108863	22764	24449	30176	12263	111518	32614	51539	20024	36224	13749	34730	79348	3792
- CITIZENS	326419	1	664	42308	9628	19291	10890	4348	68222	17303	35320	8114	6963	9813	17889	26432	2314
CREWMEN ADMITTED - ALIENS	61	61	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
- CITIZENS	46	46	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
OTHERS ADMITTED - ALIENS	7390	-	163	163	6	342	36	1054	404	79	422	232	212	95	36	1251	241
- CITIZENS	646	-	-	5	-	256	2	-	11	56	18	-	50	-	125	5	11
ALIENS NOT ADMITTED	545	-	2	23	-	18	2	8	1	17	27	11	27	5	10	173	3
PREEXAMINATIONS COMPLETED - IN U.S.	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		-	-		-	-	-	1
- OUTSIDE U.S.	735	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		-	-		-	-	-	-
FINES	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		-	-		-	-	-	-
TOTAL WORK UNITS	996674	174	1347	151362	32398	44356	41106	17673	180156	50069	87326	28381	43476	23662	52790	107209	6362
PRIMARY INSPECTION - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	37931	23	192	3510	1667	2524	2792	1604	1721	2620	3225	2439	1388	1067	1487	5142	1449
- HOURS PER UNIT	.038	.132	.143	.023	.051	.057	.067	.091	.009	.052	.036	.086	.032	.045	.028	.047	.227
PRODUCTIVE HOURS - INS PERSONNEL	30501	23	192	2502	723	1676	1296	1324	1721	2200	2897	1963	1388	830	1002	4766	1449
VESSELS BOARDED - ARRIVAL	34	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-
AIRPLANES BOARDED-ARRIVAL	106	1	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-
VESSELS & AIRPLANES BOARDED ON DEPARTURE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
BSI HEARINGS																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	9	-	-	2	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	-
RECEIVED	101			9			2	-	1	-			7			8	4
TOTAL	110			11			2	2	1	-			7			12	4
COMPLETED	102			7			2	-	1	-			5			12	4
PENDING END OF PERIOD	8			4			-	2	-	-			2			-	-
BSI HEARINGS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	566			30			6	-	5	4			12			24	142
- HOURS PER UNIT	5.55			4.29			3.00	-	5.00	-			2.40			2.00	35.5
PRODUCTIVE HOURS - INS PERSONNEL	566			30			6	-	5	4			12			24	142
AUTHORIZATIONS																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	61	1	2	1	5	-	-	1	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	49
RECEIVED	2653	39	36	26	41	251	77	796	207	22	295	202	29	77	21	20	296
TOTAL	2714	40	38	27	46	251	77	797	207	24	295	202	29	77	21	20	345
COMPLETED	2658	38	33	27	41	251	77	796	207	23	295	202	29	77	21	20	303
BORDER CROSSING CARDS	623	34	27	15	31	97	65	36	16	4	120	20	26	15	18	15	19
REENTRY PERMITS ISSUED & EXTENDED	31		3	-	-								1				27
VISA PETITIONS	28		-	-	-												28
PREEXAMINATION AUTHORIZATIONS	1		-	-	-												1
EXTENSIONS OF STAY	28		3	1	-		2			1	1	5			1	1	12
REGISTRY	8	1	-	1	-												6
ALIEN LABORER'S CARDS	1627		-	-	-	127		753	191	17	165	168		60	2	4	-
DUPLICATE ALIEN REGISTRATION CARDS	250	1	-	10	10	27	10	7		1	9	9	2	2	-	-	150
PERMISSION TO REAPPLY	13		-	-	-												13
CHANGE OF STATUS	-		-	-	-												-
APPLNS. TO IMPORT CONTRACT LABORERS	44		-	-	-												44
APPROVAL OF SCHOOLS	-		-	-	-												-
SECTION 4 D.P. APPLICATIONS	-		-	-	-												-
STUDENT EMPLOYMENT & TRANSFER	5	2	-	-	-												3

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: APRIL 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1

I ENTRY AND DEPARTURE ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	TOTAL	Bangor	Burlington	Calais	Fort Fairfield	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Roosevelttown	Rouses Point	St. Albans
AUTHORIZATIONS - (Cont'd)				⊗		⊗	⊗		⊗		⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	
DENIED	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
BORDER CROSSING CARDS	-																
REENTRY PERMITS	-																
VISA PETITIONS	-														-		
PREEXAMINATION AUTHORIZATIONS	-																
EXTENSIONS OF STAY	-																
REGISTRY	-														-		
ALIEN LABORER'S CARDS	-																
DUPLICATE ALIEN REGISTRATION CARDS	-																
PERMISSION TO REAPPLY	-																
CHANGE OF STATUS	-																
APPLNS. TO IMPORT CONTRACT LABORERS	-																
APPROVAL OF SCHOOLS	-																
SECTION 4 D.P. APPLICATIONS	-																
STUDENT EMPLOYMENT AND TRANSFER	-																
PENDING END OF PERIOD	56	2	5	-	5	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	42
BORDER CROSSING CARDS	-		-														
REENTRY PERMITS	2		2														
VISA PETITIONS	-		-														
PREEXAMINATION AUTHORIZATIONS	2	2	-														
EXTENSIONS OF STAY	9		2					1									6
REGISTRY	4				4												
ALIEN LABORER'S CARDS	-																
DUPLICATE ALIEN REGISTRATION CARDS	29				1												28
PERMISSION TO REAPPLY	-																
CHANGE OF STATUS	-																
APPLNS. TO IMPORT CONTRACT LABORERS	7																7
APPROVAL OF SCHOOLS	-																
SECTION 4 D.P. APPLICATIONS	2									1							1
STUDENT EMPLOYMENT AND TRANSFER	1		1														
AUTHORIZATIONS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	1229	56	16	14	40	90	11	136	21	12	151	40	9	19	14	75	401
- HOURS PER UNIT	.462	1.47	.485	.519	.975	.358	.142	.170	.101	.522	.51	.198	.310	.247	.666	3.80	1.32
TRAVEL TIME - ENTRY & DEPARTURE ACTIVITY	1252	13	4	3	-	-	9	90	21	74	247	128	-	-	-	131	342
LOST TIME - ENTRY & DEPARTURE ACTIVITY	2080	184	-	-	-	-	-	108	-	420	-	-	-	1242	-	-	-

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: APRIL 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1 (Continued)

I ENTRY AND DEPARTURE ACTIVITY	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vance-boro	Halifax	Montreal
PRIMARY INSPECTION					
BORDER CROSSERS ADMITTED - ALIENS	23231	42177	11547	370	869
- CITIZENS	10587	28276	7973	-	83
CREWMEN ADMITTED - ALIENS		-	-	-	-
- CITIZENS		-	-	-	-
OTHERS ADMITTED - ALIENS	292	169	303	220	1670
- CITIZENS	11	4	5	6	81
ALIENS NOT ADMITTED	42	7	23	78	68
PREEXAMINATIONS COMPLETED - IN U.S.		-	-	-	-
- OUTSIDE U.S.		8	727	-	-
FINES		-	-	-	-
TOTAL WORK UNITS	34163	70641	20578	674	2771
PRIMARY INSPECTION - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	1314	1219	1740	265	543
- HOURS PER UNIT	.038	.017	.084	.394	.196
PRODUCTIVE HOURS - INS PERSONNEL	1256	1219	1266	265	543
VESSELS BOARDED - ARRIVAL	-	-	-	11	20
AIRPLANES BOARDED-ARRIVAL	14	-	-	-	87
VESSELS & AIRPLANES BOARDED ON DEPARTURE	-	-	-	-	-
BSI HEARINGS					
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	1
RECEIVED	2	6	5		57
TOTAL	2	6	5		58
COMPLETED	2	6	5		58
PENDING END OF PERIOD	-	-	-		-
BSI HEARINGS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	9	12	21		301
- HOURS PER UNIT	4.50	2.00	4.20		5.19
PRODUCTIVE HOURS - INS PERSONNEL	9	12	21		301
AUTHORIZATIONS					
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-
RECEIVED	53	152	8		5
TOTAL	53	152	8		5
COMPLETED	53	152	8		5
BORDER CROSSING CARDS	42	10	8		5
REENTRY PERMITS ISSUED & EXTENDED					
VISA PETITIONS					
PREEXAMINATION AUTHORIZATIONS					
EXTENSIONS OF STAY	1				
REGISTRY					
ALIEN LABORER'S CARDS	1	139			
DUPLICATE ALIEN REGISTRATION CARDS	9	3			
PERMISSION TO REAPPLY					
CHANGE OF STATUS					
APPLNS. TO IMPORT CONTRACT LABORERS					
APPROVAL OF SCHOOLS					
SECTION 4 D.P. APPLICATIONS					
STUDENT EMPLOYMENT & TRANSFER					

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: APRIL 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1 (Continued)

I ENTRY AND DEPARTURE ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vanceboro	Halifax	Montreal												
AUTHORIZATIONS - (Cont'd)	⊗ -	⊗ -	⊗ -	⊗ -	⊗ -												
DENIED																	
BORDER CROSSING CARDS																	
REENTRY PERMITS																	
VISA PETITIONS																	
PREEXAMINATION AUTHORIZATIONS																	
EXTENSIONS OF STAY																	
REGISTRY																	
ALIEN LABORER'S CARDS																	
DUPLICATE ALIEN REGISTRATION CARDS																	
PERMISSION TO REAPPLY																	
CHANGE OF STATUS																	
APPLNS. TO IMPORT CONTRACT LABORERS																	
APPROVAL OF SCHOOLS																	
SECTION 4 D.P. APPLICATIONS																	
STUDENT EMPLOYMENT AND TRANSFER																	
PENDING END OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
BORDER CROSSING CARDS																	
REENTRY PERMITS																	
VISA PETITIONS																	
PREEXAMINATION AUTHORIZATIONS																	
EXTENSIONS OF STAY																	
REGISTRY																	
ALIEN LABORER'S CARDS																	
DUPLICATE ALIEN REGISTRATION CARDS																	
PERMISSION TO REAPPLY																	
CHANGE OF STATUS																	
APPLNS. TO IMPORT CONTRACT LABORERS																	
APPROVAL OF SCHOOLS																	
SECTION 4 D.P. APPLICATIONS																	
STUDENT EMPLOYMENT AND TRANSFER																	
AUTHORIZATIONS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	44	76	2	-	1												
- HOURS PER UNIT	.830	.500	.250	-	.200												
TRAVEL TIME - ENTRY & DEPARTURE ACTIVITY	10	-	75	10	95												
LOST TIME - ENTRY & DEPARTURE ACTIVITY	22	-	71	-	33												

Form G-21.3A (7-1-52)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: APRIL 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1

II DETENTION, DEPORTATION AND PAROLE ACTIVITY	TOTAL	Bangor	Burlington	Calais	Fort Fairfield	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Roosevelttown	Rouses Point	St. Albans
WARRANT OF ARREST PROCESSING		⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗		⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗			
COMPLETED	9	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	2	3
W/A PROCESSING - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	20					3									1	2	12
- HOURS PER UNIT	2.22					1.50									1.00	1.00	4.00
WARRANT OF ARREST SERVICE																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
RECEIVED	9					2									1	2	3
TOTAL	10					2									1	2	4
COMPLETED	9					2									1	2	3
PENDING END OF PERIOD	1					-									-	-	1
W/A SERVICE - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	8					1									1	-	-
- HOURS PER UNIT	.888					.500									1.00	-	-
WARRANT HEARINGS																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	43	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	43
RECEIVED	10																10
TOTAL	53																53
COMPLETED	8																8
SUBVERSIVE	-																
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC	-																
SUSPENSION	-																
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS	4																4
OTHER	4																4
PENDING END OF PERIOD	45																45
WARRANT HEARINGS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	375														-		372
- HOURS PER UNIT	46.8														-		46.5
ON APPEAL - TOTAL	26																26
FINAL ORDERS ENTERED OR RECEIVED	8																8
TRAVEL TIME - WARRANT HEARING OPERATION	21														1		18
LOST TIME - WARRANT HEARING OPERATION	3														1		2
PAROLE AND SUPERVISION																	
CONDITIONAL PAROLE																	
ALIENS ON PAROLE BEGINNING OF PERIOD	27	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	26
PLACED ON PAROLE DURING PERIOD	6																6
TOTAL ON PAROLE DURING PERIOD	23																32
REMOVED FROM PAROLE DURING PERIOD	3																3
ALIENS ON PAROLE END OF PERIOD	30																29
SUBVERSIVE	-																-
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC	5																5
SUSPENSION	6																6
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS	3																2
OTHER	16																16
COND. PAROLE - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	17																17
- HOURS PER UNIT	.515																.531

Form G-21.4A (7-1-52)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: APRIL 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1

II DETENTION, DEPORTATION AND PAROLE ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	TOTAL	Bangor	Burlington	Calais	Fort Fairfield	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Rooseveltown	Rouses Point	St. Albans
INTERNAL SECURITY ACT SUPERVISION		⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗		⊗	⊗	⊗			⊗		⊗	⊗		
ALIENS UNDER SUPER'N BEGINNING OF PERIOD	7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7
PLACED UNDER SUPER'N DURING PERIOD	-																-
TOTAL UNDER SUPER'N DURING PERIOD	7																7
REMOVED FROM SUPER'N DURING PERIOD	1																1
ALIENS UNDER SUPER'N END OF PERIOD	6																6
SUBVERSIVE	-																-
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC	2																2
SUSPENSION	-																-
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS	-																-
OTHER	4																4
ISA SUPERVISION - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	6																6
- HOURS PER UNIT	.857																.857
OTHER TYPES OF PAROLE																	
ALIENS ON PAROLE BEGINNING OF PERIOD	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4
PLACED ON PAROLE DURING PERIOD	-																-
TOTAL ON PAROLE DURING PERIOD	4																4
REMOVED FROM PAROLE DURING PERIOD	-																-
ALIENS ON PAROLE END OF PERIOD	4																4
OTHER TYPES OF PAROLE-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	-																-
-HOURS PER UNIT	-																-
TRAVEL TIME - PAROLE & SUPER'N OPERATION	-																-
LOST TIME - PAROLE & SUPER'N OPERATION	-																-
SERVICE DETENTION FACILITIES																	
NUMBER DETAINED BEGINNING OF PERIOD	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	-
DETAINEES ADMITTED	64					2				4	15					31	7
NUMBER DETAINED DURING PERIOD	68					2				4	15					35	7
EXCLUSION	40					-				4	15					20	5
DETAINEES REMOVED DURING PERIOD	66					2				4	15					33	7
NUMBER DETAINED END OF PERIOD	2					-				-	-					2	-
MAN-DAYS DETENTION DURING PERIOD	96					2				7	16					51	14
EXCLUSION	71					-				6	16					33	10
EXPULSION	25					2				1	-					18	4
AVERAGE DAYS DET. PER DETAINEE	1.41					1.00				1.75	1.06					1.45	2.00
SERVICE DET. FAC. - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	328					-				27	160					61	16
- HOURS PER UNIT	3.42					-				3.86	10.0					1.19	1.14
PRODUCTIVE HOURS - INS PERSONNEL	262					-				27	160					27	16
NON-SERVICE DETENTION FACILITIES																	
NUMBER DETAINED BEGINNING OF PERIOD	11	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	3	-	-	6	1
DETAINEES ADMITTED	8									1	-		2			2	2
NUMBER DETAINED DURING PERIOD	19									1	1		5			8	3
DETAINEES REMOVED DURING PERIOD	13									1	1		4			3	3
NUMBER DETAINED END OF PERIOD	6									-	-		1			5	-
MAN-DAYS DETENTION DURING PERIOD	288									2	1		58			184	40
AVERAGE DAYS DET. PER DETAINEE	15.1									2.00	1.00		11.6			23.0	13.3
NON-SERV. DET.FAC. - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	11									10	-		-			-	-
- HOURS PER UNIT	.578									10.0	-		-			-	-

Form G-21.3B (7-1-52)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: APRIL 1953

II DETENTION, DEPORTATION AND PAROLE ACTIVITY	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vanceboro	Halifax	Montreal
WARRANT OF ARREST PROCESSING		⊗		⊗	⊗
COMPLETED	1	-	-	-	-
W/A PROCESSING - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	2				
- HOURS PER UNIT	2.00				
WARRANT OF ARREST SERVICE					
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-
RECEIVED	1				
TOTAL	1				
COMPLETED	1				
PENDING END OF PERIOD	-				
W/A SERVICE - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	6				
- HOURS PER UNIT	6.00				
WARRANT HEARINGS					
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-
RECEIVED					
TOTAL					
COMPLETED					
SUBVERSIVE					
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC					
SUSPENSION					
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS					
OTHER					
PENDING END OF PERIOD					
WARRANT HEARINGS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	3				
- HOURS PER UNIT	-				
ON APPEAL - TOTAL	-				
FINAL ORDERS ENTERED OR RECEIVED	-				
TRAVEL TIME - WARRANT HEARING OPERATION	2				
LOST TIME - WARRANT HEARING OPERATION	-				
PAROLE AND SUPERVISION					
CONDITIONAL PAROLE					
ALIENS ON PAROLE BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	1	-	-
PLACED ON PAROLE DURING PERIOD			-		
TOTAL ON PAROLE DURING PERIOD			1		
REMOVED FROM PAROLE DURING PERIOD			-		
ALIENS ON PAROLE END OF PERIOD			1		
SUBVERSIVE			-		
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC			-		
SUSPENSION			-		
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS			1		
OTHER			-		
COND. PAROLE - PRODUCTIVE HOURS			-		
- HOURS PER UNIT			-		

II DETENTION, DEPORTATION AND PAROLE ACTIVITY	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vanceboro	Halifax	Montreal
WARRANT OF ARREST PROCESSING		⊗		⊗	⊗
COMPLETED	1	-	-	-	-
W/A PROCESSING - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	2				
- HOURS PER UNIT	2.00				
WARRANT OF ARREST SERVICE					
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-
RECEIVED	1				
TOTAL	1				
COMPLETED	1				
PENDING END OF PERIOD	-				
W/A SERVICE - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	6				
- HOURS PER UNIT	6.00				
WARRANT HEARINGS					
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-
RECEIVED					
TOTAL					
COMPLETED					
SUBVERSIVE					
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC					
SUSPENSION					
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS					
OTHER					
PENDING END OF PERIOD					
WARRANT HEARINGS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	3				
- HOURS PER UNIT	-				
ON APPEAL - TOTAL	-				
FINAL ORDERS ENTERED OR RECEIVED	-				
TRAVEL TIME - WARRANT HEARING OPERATION	2				
LOST TIME - WARRANT HEARING OPERATION	-				
PAROLE AND SUPERVISION					
CONDITIONAL PAROLE					
ALIENS ON PAROLE BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	1	-	-
PLACED ON PAROLE DURING PERIOD			-		
TOTAL ON PAROLE DURING PERIOD			1		
REMOVED FROM PAROLE DURING PERIOD			-		
ALIENS ON PAROLE END OF PERIOD			1		
SUBVERSIVE			-		
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC			-		
SUSPENSION			-		
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS			1		
OTHER			-		
COND. PAROLE - PRODUCTIVE HOURS			-		
- HOURS PER UNIT			-		

Form G-21.48 (7-1-52)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: APRIL 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1 (Continued)

II DETENTION, DEPORTATION AND PAROLE ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vance-boro	Halifax	Montreal												
INTERNAL SECURITY ACT SUPERVISION		⊗		⊗	⊗												
ALIENS UNDER SUPER'N BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
PLACED UNDER SUPER'N DURING PERIOD																	
TOTAL UNDER SUPER'N DURING PERIOD																	
REMOVED FROM SUPER'N DURING PERIOD																	
ALIENS UNDER SUPER'N END OF PERIOD																	
SUBVERSIVE																	
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC																	
SUSPENSION																	
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS																	
OTHER																	
ISA SUPERVISION - PRODUCTIVE HOURS																	
- HOURS PER UNIT																	
OTHER TYPES OF PAROLE																	
ALIENS ON PAROLE BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
PLACED ON PAROLE DURING PERIOD																	
TOTAL ON PAROLE DURING PERIOD																	
REMOVED FROM PAROLE DURING PERIOD																	
ALIENS ON PAROLE END OF PERIOD																	
OTHER TYPES OF PAROLE-PRODUCTIVE HOURS																	
-HOURS PER UNIT																	
TRAVEL TIME - PAROLE & SUPER'N OPERATION																	
LOST TIME - PAROLE & SUPER'N OPERATION																	
SERVICE DETENTION FACILITIES																	
NUMBER DETAINED BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
DETAINEES ADMITTED			5														
NUMBER DETAINED DURING PERIOD			5														
EXCLUSION			5														
DETAINEES REMOVED DURING PERIOD			5														
NUMBER DETAINED END OF PERIOD			-														
MAN-DAYS DETENTION DURING PERIOD			6														
EXCLUSION			6														
EXPULSION			-														
AVERAGE DAYS DET. PER DETAINEE			1.20														
SERVICE DET. FAC. - PRODUCTIVE HOURS			64														
- HOURS PER UNIT			10.6														
PRODUCTIVE HOURS - INS PERSONNEL			32														
NON-SERVICE DETENTION FACILITIES																	
NUMBER DETAINED BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
DETAINEES ADMITTED	1																
NUMBER DETAINED DURING PERIOD	1																
DETAINEES REMOVED DURING PERIOD	1																
NUMBER DETAINED END OF PERIOD	-																
MAN-DAYS DETENTION DURING PERIOD	3																
AVERAGE DAYS DET. PER DETAINEE	3.00																
NON-SERV. DET.FAC. - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	1																
- HOURS PER UNIT	1.00																

Form G-21.5A (7-1-52)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: APRIL 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1

II DETENTION, DEPORTATION AND PAROLE ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	TOTAL	Bangor	Burlington	Calais	Fort Fairfield	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Roosevelttown	Rouses Point	St. Albans
DEPORTATION																	
ALIENS PROCESSED FOR DEPORTATION	19	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	2	14
ALIENS PROCESSED FOR VOLUNTARY DEPARTURE	27			-		2	1				-		12			7	2
TOTAL	46			-		2	1				-		14			9	16
ALIENS DEPORTED	8			-		-	-				1		2		-	4	-
VOLUNTARY DEPARTURES	40			5		2	1				5		12		1	9	2
UNDER W/A	5			-		-	-				1		-		-	2	2
WITHOUT W/A	35			5		2	1				4		12		1	7	-
REMOVALS	-			-		-	-				-		-		-	-	-
DEPORTATION-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	248			-		1	-				-		9		-	51	181
-HOURS PER UNIT	5.39			-		.500	-				-		.643		-	5.66	11.3
TRAVEL TIME - DEPORTATION OPERATION	76			-		-	-				-		4		-	56	16
LOST TIME - DEPORTATION OPERATION	58			-		-	-				-		-		-	-	-
III INVESTIGATIONS ACTIVITY																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	228	10	4	1	9	-	1	1	-	7	-	2	1	-	2	6	135
RECEIVED DURING PERIOD	459	16	7	7	14	16	11	12	7	7	20	24	4	1	3	59	145
TOTAL	687	26	11	8	23	16	12	13	7	14	20	26	5	1	5	65	280
COMPLETED	495	20	9	7	14	16	11	11	7	11	19	22	5	1	2	52	190
NATURALIZATION & CITIZENSHIP	50								5		2						35
CANCELLATION - SUBVERSIVE	-								-								
CANCELLATION - OTHER	1								-								
NATURALIZATION	29								2								25
OTHER	20								3		2						10
DEPORTATION	168	5	6		1	2	1		1	3	10	1	4	1	1	8	60
SUBVERSIVE	1																
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC	4								1							1	
ADDRESS REPORT CARD (1-53)	69	3	6		1		1			2	3	1	3	1			46
SUSPENSION	-																
NON-IMMIGRANTS	62					2										2	5
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS	17										5					4	6
DISPLACED PERSONS	1										1						
OTHER	14	2								1	1		1		1	1	3
SMUGGLING	4																4
PRIVATE BILLS	1																1
PAROLE	5						4										1
ALIEN REGISTRATION	27	5	3		11						3	3					2
ALIEN ADDRESS REPORT (SEC. 35)	130	9		3	2	14	5	6		7		17			1	39	20
MISCELLANEOUS	110	1		4			1	5	1	1	4	1	1			5	67
PENDING END OF PERIOD	192	6	2	1	9	-	1	2	-	3	1	4	-	-	3	13	90
NATURALIZATION & CITIZENSHIP	32															1	22
CANCELLATION - SUBVERSIVE	2																2
CANCELLATION - OTHER	-																
NATURALIZATION	14																14
OTHER	16															1	6

Form G-21.6A (7-1-52)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: APRIL 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1

III INVESTIGATIONS ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	TOTAL	Bangor	Burlington	Calais	Fort Fairfield	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Roosevelttown	Rouses Point	St. Albans
PENDING END OF PERIOD (CONT'D)																	
DEPORTATION	106	4	2	1	7	-	-	1	-	3	1	2	-	-	2	11	34
SUBVERSIVE	3																3
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC	5															3	
ADDRESS REPORT CARD (1-53)	41	3	2	1	1			1		2	1				2	6	22
SUSPENSION	-																
NON-IMMIGRANTS	26									1						2	1
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS	3																1
DISPLACED PERSONS	-																
OTHERS	28	1			6							2					7
SMUGGLING	10																10
PRIVATE BILLS	1															1	
PAROLE	-																
ALIEN REGISTRATION	3	1			2												
ALIEN ADDRESS REPORT (SEC. 35)	1	1															
MISCELLANEOUS	39						1	1				2			1		24
INVESTIGATIONS RESULTING IN W/A OR V/D	12					2					4					6	
ALIENS APPRH'D. (BY OTHER THAN B.P.)	4					2										2	
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS	-																
MEXICANS APPRH'D. (BY OTHER THAN B.P.)	-																
ILLEGALLY IN AGRICULTURE	-																
ILLEGALLY IN TRADE OR INDUSTRY	-																
OTHER	-																
W/A THRU ADDRESS REPORT CARD (1-53)	-																
INVESTIGATIONS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	1845	41	9	13	34	4	20	26	5	26	25	17	3	1	9	45	1453
- HOURS PER UNIT	3.73	2.05	1.00	1.86	2.42	.250	1.81	2.36	.714	2.36	1.31	.773	.600	1.00	4.50	.865	7.64
TRAVEL TIME - INVESTIGATIONS ACTIVITY	344	8	-	1	7	-	5	6	-	7	-	-	-	1	4	19	189
IV APPLICATIONS EXAMINATION ACTIVITY																	
NATIONALITY																	
N-300 PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3
RECEIVED	2																2
COMPLETED	3																3
PENDING END OF PERIOD	2																2
N-400 SERIES - PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	519	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	519
RECEIVED	175																175
COMPLETED	265																265
PENDING END OF PERIOD	429																429
N-600 PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	36	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	36
RECEIVED	10																10
COMPLETED	8																8
PENDING END OF PERIOD	38																38
N-500 SERIES - PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7
RECEIVED	3																3
COMPLETED	3																3
PENDING END OF PERIOD	7																7

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REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: APRIL 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1 (Continued)

II DETENTION, DEPORTATION AND PAROLE ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vance-boro	Halifax	Montreal
DEPORTATION					⊗
ALIENS PROCESSED FOR DEPORTATION	1	-	-	-	
ALIENS PROCESSED FOR VOLUNTARY DEPARTURE	2		1		
TOTAL	3		1		
ALIENS DEPORTED	1		-		
VOLUNTARY DEPARTURES	2		1		
UNDER W/A	-		-		
WITHOUT W/A	2		1		
REMOVALS	-		-		
DEPORTATION-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	5		1		
-HOURS PER UNIT	1.67		1.00		
TRAVEL TIME - DEPORTATION OPERATION	-		-		
LOST TIME - DEPORTATION OPERATION	-		58		
III INVESTIGATIONS ACTIVITY					
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	1	-	-	6	42
RECEIVED DURING PERIOD	4	4	10	7	81
TOTAL	5	4	10	13	123
COMPLETED	5	3	9	6	75
NATURALIZATION & CITIZENSHIP			1	1	6
CANCELLATION - SUBVERSIVE					
CANCELLATION - OTHER				1	
NATURALIZATION					2
OTHER			1		4
DEPORTATION	2	1	1		60
SUBVERSIVE					1
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC	1	1			
ADDRESS REPORT CARD (1-53)					2
SUSPENSION					
NON-IMMIGRANTS					53
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS			1		1
DISPLACED PERSONS					
OTHER	1				3
SMUGGLING					
PRIVATE BILLS					
PAROLE					
ALIEN REGISTRATION					
ALIEN ADDRESS REPORT (SEC. 35)		2	5		
MISCELLANEOUS	3		2	5	9
PENDING END OF PERIOD	-	1	1	7	48
NATURALIZATION & CITIZENSHIP				2	7
CANCELLATION - SUBVERSIVE					
CANCELLATION - OTHER					
NATURALIZATION					
OTHER				2	7

Form G-21.6B (7-1-52)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: APRIL 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1 (Continued)

III INVESTIGATIONS ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vance-boro	Halifax	Montreal												
PENDING END OF PERIOD (CONT'D)																	
DEPORTATION	-	1	1	1	35												
SUBVERSIVE			-														
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC			1		1												
ADDRESS REPORT CARD (1-53)																	
SUSPENSION																	
NON-IMMIGRANTS					22												
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS		1			1												
DISPLACED PERSONS																	
OTHERS				1	11												
SMUGGLING																	
PRIVATE BILLS																	
PAROLE																	
ALIEN REGISTRATION																	
ALIEN ADDRESS REPORT (SEC. 35)																	
MISCELLANEOUS				4	6												
INVESTIGATIONS RESULTING IN W/A OR V/D																	
ALIENS APPRH'D. (BY OTHER THAN B.P.)																	
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS																	
MEXICANS APPRH'D. (BY OTHER THAN B.P.)																	
ILLEGALLY IN AGRICULTURE																	
ILLEGALLY IN TRADE OR INDUSTRY																	
OTHER																	
W/A THRU ADDRESS REPORT CARD (1-53)																	
INVESTIGATIONS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	23	3	8	10	70												
- HOURS PER UNIT	4.60	1.00	.888	1.67	.933												
TRAVEL TIME - INVESTIGATIONS ACTIVITY	2	1	-	4	90												
IV APPLICATIONS EXAMINATION ACTIVITY																	
NATIONALITY																	
N-300 PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
RECEIVED																	
COMPLETED																	
PENDING END OF PERIOD																	
N-400 SERIES - PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
RECEIVED																	
COMPLETED																	
PENDING END OF PERIOD																	
N-600 PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
RECEIVED																	
COMPLETED																	
PENDING END OF PERIOD																	
N-500 SERIES - PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
RECEIVED																	
COMPLETED																	
PENDING END OF PERIOD																	

Form G-21.7A (7-1-52)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: APRIL 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1

IV APPLICATIONS EXAMINATION ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	TOTAL	Bangor	Burlington	Calais	Fort Fairfield	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Roosevelt-town	Rouses point	St. Albans
IMMIGRATION																	
REENTRY PERMITS-PENDING BEG. OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
RECEIVED	24																24
COMPLETED	24																24
PENDING END OF PERIOD	-																-
VISA PETITIONS-PENDING BEG. OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
RECEIVED	25																25
COMPLETED	22																22
PENDING END OF PERIOD	3																3
OTHER-PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	13	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	13
RECEIVED	215																215
COMPLETED	210																210
PENDING END OF PERIOD	18																18
NATIONALITY APPLICATIONS-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	83																83
-HOURS PER UNIT	.297																.297
IMMIGRATION APPLICATIONS-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	62																62
-HOURS PER UNIT	.242																.242
DECLARATIONS FILED	3																3
V VERIFICATION OF ARRIVALS AND DEPARTURES ACTIVITY																	
VERIFICATION REQUESTS																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	1149	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1149
RECEIVED DURING PERIOD	3582	22	2	23	5	9	11	21	447	14	91	21	7	2	5	57	2520
TOTAL	4731	22	2	23	5	9	11	21	447	14	91	21	7	2	5	57	3669
COMPLETED	3532	22	2	23	5	9	11	20	447	14	91	21	7	2	5	57	2471
NATURALIZATION	309	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	303
OTHER	3223	22	2	23	5	9	11	20	447	14	87	21	7	2	5	57	2168
PENDING END OF PERIOD	1199	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1198
VERIFICATION-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	859	4	3	5	3	1	2	8	14	7	33	7	2	1	4	24	634
-HOURS PER UNIT	.243	.182	1.50	.217	.600	.111	.181	.400	.031	.500	.362	.333	.286	.500	.800	.421	.256
VI NATURALIZATION AND CITIZENSHIP ACTIVITY																	
PRELIM. INVEST. CIT. & NAT. APPLN'S																	
PRELIM. INVESTIGATIONS (N-400 SERIES)																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	408	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	408
RECEIVED	257																257
COMPLETED	117																117
PENDING END OF PERIOD	548																548
CITIZENSHIP (N-600 APPLICATIONS)																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	5	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3
RECEIVED	10	1	2														7
COMPLETED	10	1	3														6
PENDING END OF PERIOD	5	-	1														4

Form G-21.8A (7-1-52)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: APRIL 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1

VI NATURALIZATION AND CITIZENSHIP ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	TOTAL	Bangor	Burlington	Calais	Fort Fairfield	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Roosevelttown	Rouses point	St. Albans
NATIONALITY APPLN'S. (N-500 SERIES)				⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	4	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
RECEIVED	2		2														
COMPLETED	2		2														
PENDING END OF PERIOD	4		4														
PETITIONS FILED	95	-	-														95
N-600 HEARINGS COMPLETED	10	1	3														6
CERTIFICATES ISSUED (N-600 APPLN'S)	6		-														6
CERTIFICATES ISSUED (N-500 SERIES)	2		2														-
PRELIM. INVESTIGATIONS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	228	2	-														226
- HOURS PER UNIT	1.95	-	-														1.93
CIT. (N-600 APPLN'S) - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	38	2	6														30
- HOURS PER UNIT	3.80	2.00	2.00														5.00
NAT. APPLN'S - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	2	-	2														-
- HOURS PER UNIT	1.00	-	1.00														-
NATURALIZATION HEARINGS																	
PETITIONS PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	323	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	323
PETITIONS PENDING DURING PERIOD	418																418
PETITIONS COMPLETED	215																215
GRANTED	214																214
DENIED	1																1
PETITIONS PENDING END OF PERIOD	203																203
PETITIONS READY FOR FINAL HEARING	203																203
PETITIONS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	31	-															31
- HOURS PER UNIT	.144	-															.144
TRAVEL TIME - NAT. & CIT. ACTIVITY	83	1															82
LOST TIME - NAT. & CIT. ACTIVITY	2	-															2
CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION 1/																	
CITIZENSHIP ASSISTANCE FURNISHED																	
ALIENS REFERRED TO PUBLIC SCHOOLS																	
ALIENS INFORMED OF HOME STUDY																	
NAME SLIPS TO PUBLIC SCHOOLS CORRES. CTRS.																	
ALIENS ADMITTED TO CITIZENSHIP																	
ATTENDED PUBLIC SCHOOL CLASSES																	
ENROLLED IN HOME STUDY COURSES																	
NUMBER SUBMITTING PUBLIC SCHOOL CERT.																	
VII EMPLOYMENT SUMMARY																	
NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES END OF PERIOD	294	3	2	20	5	12	8	11	12	16	22	15	10	9	8	33	62
OPERATIONS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	40310	334	232	2568	807	1776	1349	1698	1787	2787	3513	2155	1427	2094	1037	5221	5766
OPERATIONS - NON-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	5003	24	16	528	16	364	14	192	148	324	480	404	172	112	120	792	783
ADMINISTRATION - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	8668	120	170	631	81	140	8	221	295	403	176	229	110	24	196	342	3345
ADMINISTRATION - NON-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	1001	43	-	85	-	-	-	21	100	-	-	-	40	-	39	-	351
TOTAL HOURS EMPLOYMENT	54982	521	418	3812	904	2280	1371	2132	2330	3514	4169	2788	1749	2230	1392	6355	10245
PERCENTAGE TOTAL HOURS ON OPERATIONS	82.4	68.7	59.3	81.2	91.0	93.8	99.4	88.6	83.0	88.5	95.7	91.7	91.4	98.9	83.1	94.6	63.9

1/ Source: Form N-38

Form G-21.7B (7-1-52)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: APRIL 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1 (Continued)

IV APPLICATIONS EXAMINATION ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vance-boro	Halifax	Montreal												
IMMIGRATION																	
REENTRY PERMITS-PENDING BEG. OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
RECEIVED																	
COMPLETED																	
PENDING END OF PERIOD																	
VISA PETITIONS-PENDING BEG. OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
RECEIVED																	
COMPLETED																	
PENDING END OF PERIOD																	
OTHER-PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
RECEIVED																	
COMPLETED																	
PENDING END OF PERIOD																	
NATIONALITY APPLICATIONS-PRODUCTIVE HOURS																	
-HOURS PER UNIT																	
IMMIGRATION APPLICATIONS-PRODUCTIVE HOURS																	
-HOURS PER UNIT																	
DECLARATIONS FILED																	
V VERIFICATION OF ARRIVALS AND DEPARTURES ACTIVITY																	
VERIFICATION REQUESTS																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
RECEIVED DURING PERIOD	56	32	32	24	181												
TOTAL	56	32	32	24	181												
COMPLETED	56	32	32	24	181												
NATURALIZATION	-	-	2	-	-												
OTHER	56	32	30	24	181												
PENDING END OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
VERIFICATION-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	41	16	10	7	33												
-HOURS PER UNIT	.732	.500	.312	.292	.182												
VI NATURALIZATION AND CITIZENSHIP ACTIVITY																	
PRELIM. INVEST. CIT. & NAT. APPLN'S																	
PRELIM. INVESTIGATIONS (N-400 SERIES)																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
RECEIVED																	
COMPLETED																	
PENDING END OF PERIOD																	
CITIZENSHIP (N-600 APPLICATIONS)																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
RECEIVED																	
COMPLETED																	
PENDING END OF PERIOD																	

Form G-21.8B (7-1-52)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: APRIL 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1 (Continued)

VI NATURALIZATION AND CITIZENSHIP ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vanceboro	Halifax	Montreal
NATIONALITY APPLN'S. (N-500 SERIES)		⊗	⊗		⊗
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-
RECEIVED					
COMPLETED					
PENDING END OF PERIOD					
PETITIONS FILED					
N-600 HEARINGS COMPLETED					
CERTIFICATES ISSUED (N-600 APPLN'S)					
CERTIFICATES ISSUED (N-500 SERIES)					
PRELIM. INVESTIGATIONS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS					
- HOURS PER UNIT					
CIT. (N-600 APPLN'S) - PRODUCTIVE HOURS					
- HOURS PER UNIT					
NAT. APPLN'S - PRODUCTIVE HOURS					
- HOURS PER UNIT					
NATURALIZATION HEARINGS					
PETITIONS PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-
PETITIONS PENDING DURING PERIOD					
PETITIONS COMPLETED					
GRANTED					
DENIED					
PETITIONS PENDING END OF PERIOD					
PETITIONS READY FOR FINAL HEARING					
PETITIONS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS					
- HOURS PER UNIT					
TRAVEL TIME - NAT. & CIT. ACTIVITY					
LOST TIME - NAT. & CIT. ACTIVITY					
CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION 1/					
CITIZENSHIP ASSISTANCE FURNISHED					
ALIENS REFERRED TO PUBLIC SCHOOLS					
ALIENS INFORMED OF HOME STUDY					
NAME SLIPS TO PUBLIC SCHOOLS CORRES.CTRS.					
ALIENS ADMITTED TO CITIZENSHIP					
ATTENDED PUBLIC SCHOOL CLASSES					
ENROLLED IN HOME STUDY COURSES					
NUMBER SUBMITTING PUBLIC SCHOOL CERT.					
VII EMPLOYMENT SUMMARY					
NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES END OF PERIOD	9	9	10	3	15
OPERATIONS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	1426	1327	1544	296	1166
OPERATIONS - NON-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	88	128	133	-	165
ADMINISTRATION - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	185	266	310	208	1208
ADMINISTRATION - NON-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	58	55	8	27	174
TOTAL HOURS EMPLOYMENT	1757	1776	1995	531	2713
PERCENTAGE TOTAL HOURS ON OPERATIONS	86.1	81.9	84.0	55.7	49.0

1/ Source: Form N-~~38~~

Miss Mantor

Form G-21.1A (7-1-52)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: MAY 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1

I ENTRY AND DEPARTURE ACTIVITY	TOTAL	Bangor	Burlington	Calais	Fort Fairfield	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Roosevelttown	Rouses Point	St. Albans
PRIMARY INSPECTION																	
BORDER CROSSERS ADMITTED - ALIENS	825756	82	488	128227	27147	36782	39158	12657	123657	44269	73228	25450	48041	19554	42305	106297	3067
- CITIZENS	418542	38	744	49144	14586	26087	16218	9911	73573	23104	41790	12106	11230	13590	22155	32351	2448
CREWMEN ADMITTED - ALIENS	88	67													-		
- CITIZENS	37	37													-		
OTHERS ADMITTED - ALIENS	9599		35	143	1	212	31	1574	856	82	330	1261	153	42	50	1243	337
- CITIZENS	991		1	50		376	2	20	14	65	9	9	71		145	34	29
ALIENS NOT ADMITTED	716	6		58		22	2	15	7	16	23	10	20	7	17	236	
PREEXAMINATIONS COMPLETED - IN U.S.	-																
- OUTSIDE U.S.	926																
FINES	-																
TOTAL WORK UNITS	1256655	230	1268	177622	41734	63479	55411	24177	198107	67536	115380	38836	59515	33193	64672	140161	5881
PRIMARY INSPECTION - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	39290	30	218	3607	1675	2831	2946	1678	1771	2810	3141	2596	1827	1042	1413	5422	1343
- HOURS PER UNIT	.031	.130	.171	.020	.040	.045	.053	.069	.009	.042	.027	.067	.031	.031	.022	.038	.228
PRODUCTIVE HOURS - INS PERSONNEL	32161	30	218	2607	707	1895	1292	1400	1771	2442	3141	2068	1540	799	1413	5033	1343
VESSELS BOARDED - ARRIVAL	54	2											4		-	-	-
AIRPLANES BOARDED-ARRIVAL	177	3											9		12	-	-
VESSELS & AIRPLANES BOARDED ON DEPARTURE	1	1											-		-	-	-
BSI HEARINGS																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	8	-	-	4	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-
RECEIVED	94			17			1	-	2	1			5			6	2
TOTAL	102			21			1	2	2	1			7			6	2
COMPLETED	95			21			1	2	2	1			4			6	2
PENDING END OF PERIOD	7			-			-	-	-	-			3			-	-
BSI HEARINGS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	412			50			10	-	6	7			10			16	32
- HOURS PER UNIT	4.34			2.38			10.0	-	3.00	7.00			2.50			2.66	16.0
PRODUCTIVE HOURS - INS PERSONNEL	412			50			10	-	6	7			10			16	32
AUTHORIZATIONS																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	56	2	5	-	5	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	42
RECEIVED	4810	33	19	54	50	182	98	1561	624	37	207	1265	56	59	46	26	197
TOTAL	4866	35	24	54	55	182	98	1562	624	38	207	1265	56	59	46	26	239
COMPLETED	4816	33	24	54	50	182	98	1561	624	33	207	1265	56	59	46	26	202
BORDER CROSSING CARDS	749	32	17	12	36	140	86	39	15	7	97	54	53	36	42	23	6
REENTRY PERMITS ISSUED & EXTENDED	13		2														11
VISA PETITIONS	23																23
PREEXAMINATION AUTHORIZATIONS	-																
EXTENSIONS OF STAY	49	1	4	1				1		11	13	1					15
REGISTRY	6																6
ALIEN LABORER'S CARDS	3717			32		28		1519	608	9	84	1193		23	3		
DUPLICATE ALIEN REGISTRATION CARDS	231			9	14	14	12	2		6	13	17	3		1	3	116
PERMISSION TO REAPPLY	8																8
CHANGE OF STATUS	1																1
APPLNS. TO IMPORT CONTRACT LABORERS	18								1								16
APPROVAL OF SCHOOLS	-																
SECTION 4 D.P. APPLICATIONS	-																
STUDENT EMPLOYMENT & TRANSFER	1		1														

Form G-21.2A (7-1-52)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: MAY 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1

I ENTRY AND DEPARTURE ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	TOTAL	Bangor	Burlington	Calais	Fort Fairfield	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Roosevelttown	Rouses Point	St. Albans
AUTHORIZATIONS - (Cont'd)			⊗	⊗		⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗		⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	
DENIED	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
BORDER CROSSING CARDS																	
REENTRY PERMITS																	
VISA PETITIONS																	
PREEXAMINATION AUTHORIZATIONS																	
EXTENSIONS OF STAY	1																
REGISTRY																	
ALIEN LABORER'S CARDS	1																
DUPLICATE ALIEN REGISTRATION CARDS																	
PERMISSION TO REAPPLY																	
CHANGE OF STATUS																	
APPLNS. TO IMPORT CONTRACT LABORERS																	
APPROVAL OF SCHOOLS																	
SECTION 4 D.P. APPLICATIONS																	
STUDENT EMPLOYMENT AND TRANSFER																	
PENDING END OF PERIOD	50	2	-	-	5	-	-	1	-	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	37
BORDER CROSSING CARDS																	
REENTRY PERMITS																	
VISA PETITIONS																	
PREEXAMINATION AUTHORIZATIONS	2	2															
EXTENSIONS OF STAY	6									4							2
REGISTRY	5				4			1									
ALIEN LABORER'S CARDS																	
DUPLICATE ALIEN REGISTRATION CARDS	31				1												30
PERMISSION TO REAPPLY																	
CHANGE OF STATUS																	
APPLNS. TO IMPORT CONTRACT LABORERS	4																4
APPROVAL OF SCHOOLS																	
SECTION 4 D.P. APPLICATIONS	2									1							1
STUDENT EMPLOYMENT AND TRANSFER																	
AUTHORIZATIONS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	1424	46	16	15	41	97	13	258	52	13	127	173	16	14	30	67	281
- HOURS PER UNIT	.295	1.39	.666	.278	.820	.533	.132	.166	.083	.394	.613	.137	.286	.237	.652	2.57	1.39
TRAVEL TIME - ENTRY & DEPARTURE ACTIVITY	1249	15	23	3	-	-	10	16	4	53	256	162	2	-	3	133	284
LOST TIME - ENTRY & DEPARTURE ACTIVITY	1975	193	-	-	-	-	-	71	-	364	-	-	-	1215	4	-	2

Form G-21.1B (7-1-52)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: MAY 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. I (Continued)

I ENTRY AND DEPARTURE ACTIVITY	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vanceboro	Halifax	Montreal
PRIMARY INSPECTION					
BORDER CROSSERS ADMITTED - ALIENS	33568	46031	14496	371	881
- CITIZENS	24842	34724	9842	-	59
CREWMEN ADMITTED - ALIENS	21			-	-
- CITIZENS	-			-	-
OTHERS ADMITTED - ALIENS	246	236	332	224	2211
- CITIZENS	3	-	9	4	150
ALIENS NOT ADMITTED	103	4	25	78	67
PREEXAMINATIONS COMPLETED - IN U.S.	-	-	-	-	
- OUTSIDE U.S.	66	4	856	-	
FINES				-	
TOTAL WORK UNITS	58849	80999	25560	677	3368
PRIMARY INSPECTION - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	1254	1187	1781	231	587
- HOURS PER UNIT	.021	.015	.069	.341	.175
PRODUCTIVE HOURS - INS PERSONNEL	1190	1187	1267	231	587
VESSELS BOARDED - ARRIVAL	4	-	4	5	35
AIRPLANES BOARDED-ARRIVAL	36	-	-	-	117
VESSELS & AIRPLANES BOARDED ON DEPARTURE	-	-	-	-	-
BSI HEARINGS					
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-
RECEIVED	4	6	2		48
TOTAL	4	6	2		48
COMPLETED	4	5	2		45
PENDING END OF PERIOD	-	1	-		3
BSI HEARINGS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	12	10	7		252
- HOURS PER UNIT	3.00	2.00	3.50		5.60
PRODUCTIVE HOURS - INS PERSONNEL	12	10	7		252
AUTHORIZATIONS					
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-
RECEIVED	52	223	15		6
TOTAL	52	223	15		6
COMPLETED	52	223	15		6
BORDER CROSSING CARDS	34	2	12		6
REENTRY PERMITS ISSUED & EXTENDED					
VISA PETITIONS					
PREEXAMINATION AUTHORIZATIONS					
EXTENSIONS OF STAY	2				
REGISTRY					
ALIEN LABORER'S CARDS	1	217			
DUPLICATE ALIEN REGISTRATION CARDS	15	4	2		
PERMISSION TO REAPPLY					
CHANGE OF STATUS					
APPLNS. TO IMPORT CONTRACT LABORERS			1		
APPROVAL OF SCHOOLS					
SECTION 4 D.P. APPLICATIONS					
STUDENT EMPLOYMENT & TRANSFER					

Form G-21.2B (7-1-52)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: MAY 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1 (Continued)

I ENTRY AND DEPARTURE ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vanceboro	Halifax	Montreal												
AUTHORIZATIONS - (Cont'd)			⊗	⊗	⊗												
DENIED	/	/	-	-	-												
BORDER CROSSING CARDS																	
REENTRY PERMITS																	
VISA PETITIONS																	
PREEXAMINATION AUTHORIZATIONS																	
EXTENSIONS OF STAY	/																
REGISTRY																	
ALIEN LABORER'S CARDS		/															
DUPLICATE ALIEN REGISTRATION CARDS																	
PERMISSION TO REAPPLY																	
CHANGE OF STATUS																	
APPLNS. TO IMPORT CONTRACT LABORERS																	
APPROVAL OF SCHOOLS																	
SECTION 4 D.P. APPLICATIONS																	
STUDENT EMPLOYMENT AND TRANSFER		/															
PENDING END OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
BORDER CROSSING CARDS																	
REENTRY PERMITS																	
VISA PETITIONS																	
PREEXAMINATION AUTHORIZATIONS																	
EXTENSIONS OF STAY																	
REGISTRY																	
ALIEN LABORER'S CARDS																	
DUPLICATE ALIEN REGISTRATION CARDS																	
PERMISSION TO REAPPLY																	
CHANGE OF STATUS																	
APPLNS. TO IMPORT CONTRACT LABORERS																	
APPROVAL OF SCHOOLS																	
SECTION 4 D.P. APPLICATIONS																	
STUDENT EMPLOYMENT AND TRANSFER																	
AUTHORIZATIONS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	46	111	6	-	2												
- HOURS PER UNIT	.885	.497	.400	-	.333												
TRAVEL TIME - ENTRY & DEPARTURE ACTIVITY	5	-	82	-	198												
LOST TIME - ENTRY & DEPARTURE ACTIVITY	16	-	54	-	56												

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: MAY 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1

I. DETENTION, DEPORTATION AND PAROLE ACTIVITY	TOTAL	Bangor	Burlington	Calais	Fort Fairfield	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Roosevelttown	Rouses Point	St. Albans
WARRANT OF ARREST PROCESSING		⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗			⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗		
COMPLETED	20	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	2	-	-	-	-	8	1
W/A PROCESSING - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	53									5	13					14	14
- HOURS PER UNIT	2.65									-	6.50					1.75	14.0
WARRANT OF ARREST SERVICE																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
RECEIVED	14										2					8	1
TOTAL	15										2					8	2
COMPLETED	14										2					8	1
PENDING END OF PERIOD	1										-					-	1
W/A SERVICE - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	7										1					3	-
- HOURS PER UNIT	.500										.500					.375	-
WARRANT HEARINGS																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	45	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	45
RECEIVED	14																14
TOTAL	59																59
COMPLETED	10																10
SUBVERSIVE	-																
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC	-																
SUSPENSION	-																
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS	1																1
OTHER	9																9
PENDING END OF PERIOD	49																49
WARRANT HEARINGS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	289															7	279
- HOURS PER UNIT	28.9															-	279
ON APPEAL - TOTAL	25																25
FINAL ORDERS ENTERED OR RECEIVED	6																6
TRAVEL TIME - WARRANT HEARING OPERATION	33															-	32
LOST TIME - WARRANT HEARING OPERATION	-															-	-
PAROLE AND SUPERVISION																	
CONDITIONAL PAROLE																	
ALIENS ON PAROLE BEGINNING OF PERIOD	30	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	29
PLACED ON PAROLE DURING PERIOD	5																4
TOTAL ON PAROLE DURING PERIOD	35																33
REMOVED FROM PAROLE DURING PERIOD	3																3
ALIENS ON PAROLE END OF PERIOD	32																30
SUBVERSIVE	-																
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC	5																5
SUSPENSION	4																4
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS	3																2
OTHER	20																19
COND. PAROLE - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	20																20
- HOURS PER UNIT	.571																.606

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: MAY 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1

II DETENTION, DEPORTATION AND PAROLE ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	TOTAL	Bangor	Burlington	Calais	Fort Fairfield	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Roosevelt-town	Rouses Point	St. Albans
INTERNAL SECURITY ACT SUPERVISION		⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗			⊗		⊗	⊗		
ALIENS UNDER SUPER'N BEGINNING OF PERIOD	6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6
PLACED UNDER SUPER'N DURING PERIOD	2																2
TOTAL UNDER SUPER'N DURING PERIOD	8																8
REMOVED FROM SUPER'N DURING PERIOD	1																1
ALIENS UNDER SUPER'N END OF PERIOD	7																7
SUBVERSIVE	-																
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC	2																2
SUSPENSION	-																
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS	-																
OTHER	5																5
ISA SUPERVISION - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	11																10
- HOURS PER UNIT	1.37																1.25
OTHER TYPES OF PAROLE																	
ALIENS ON PAROLE BEGINNING OF PERIOD	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4
PLACED ON PAROLE DURING PERIOD	-																-
TOTAL ON PAROLE DURING PERIOD	4																4
REMOVED FROM PAROLE DURING PERIOD	-																-
ALIENS ON PAROLE END OF PERIOD	4																4
OTHER TYPES OF PAROLE-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	2																2
-HOURS PER UNIT	.500																.500
TRAVEL TIME - PAROLE & SUPER'N OPERATION	-																-
LOST TIME - PAROLE & SUPER'N OPERATION	-																-
SERVICE DETENTION FACILITIES																	
NUMBER DETAINED BEGINNING OF PERIOD	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
DETAINEES ADMITTED	37										12					21	2
NUMBER DETAINED DURING PERIOD	39										12					23	2
EXCLUSION	15										4					7	2
DETAINEES REMOVED DURING PERIOD	39										12					23	2
NUMBER DETAINED END OF PERIOD	-										-					-	-
MAN-DAYS DETENTION DURING PERIOD	61										13					44	2
EXCLUSION	21										5					12	2
EXPULSION	40										8					32	-
AVERAGE DAYS DET. PER DETAINEE	1.56										1.08					1.91	1.00
SERVICE DET. FAC. - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	281										160					105	-
- HOURS PER UNIT	4.61										12.3					2.39	-
PRODUCTIVE HOURS - INS PERSONNEL	247										160					71	-
NON-SERVICE DETENTION FACILITIES																	
NUMBER DETAINED BEGINNING OF PERIOD	6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	5	-
DETAINEES ADMITTED	6										3		2			-	
NUMBER DETAINED DURING PERIOD	12										3		3			5	
DETAINEES REMOVED DURING PERIOD	9										3		3			2	
NUMBER DETAINED END OF PERIOD	3										-		-			3	
MAN-DAYS DETENTION DURING PERIOD	173										28		18			122	
AVERAGE DAYS DET. PER DETAINEE	14.4										9.33		6.00			24.4	
NON-SERV. DET.FAC. - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	3									1	-		-			-	
- HOURS PER UNIT	.250									-	-		-			-	

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: MAY 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1 (Continued)

II DETENTION, DEPORTATION AND PAROLE ACTIVITY	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vance-boro	Halifax	Montreal
WARRANT OF ARREST PROCESSING		⊗		⊗	⊗
COMPLETED	3	-	-	-	-
W/A PROCESSING - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	7				
- HOURS PER UNIT	2.33				
WARRANT OF ARREST SERVICE					
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-
RECEIVED	3				
TOTAL	3				
COMPLETED	3				
PENDING END OF PERIOD	-				
W/A SERVICE - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	3				
- HOURS PER UNIT	1.00				
WARRANT HEARINGS					
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-
RECEIVED					
TOTAL					
COMPLETED	-				
SUBVERSIVE					
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC					
SUSPENSION					
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS					
OTHER					
PENDING END OF PERIOD	-				
WARRANT HEARINGS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	3	-	-		
- HOURS PER UNIT	-	-	-		
ON APPEAL - TOTAL	-	-			
FINAL ORDERS ENTERED OR RECEIVED	-		-		
TRAVEL TIME - WARRANT HEARING OPERATION	1	-	-		
LOST TIME - WARRANT HEARING OPERATION	-	-	-		
PAROLE AND SUPERVISION					
CONDITIONAL PAROLE					
ALIENS ON PAROLE BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	1	-	-
PLACED ON PAROLE DURING PERIOD			1		
TOTAL ON PAROLE DURING PERIOD			2		
REMOVED FROM PAROLE DURING PERIOD			-		
ALIENS ON PAROLE END OF PERIOD			2		
SUBVERSIVE					
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC					
SUSPENSION					
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS			1		
OTHER			1		
COND. PAROLE - PRODUCTIVE HOURS			-		
- HOURS PER UNIT			-		

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: MAY 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1 (Continued)

II DETENTION, DEPORTATION AND PAROLE ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vanceboro	Halifax	Montreal
INTERNAL SECURITY ACT SUPERVISION		⊗		⊗	⊗
ALIENS UNDER SUPER'N BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-
PLACED UNDER SUPER'N DURING PERIOD					
TOTAL UNDER SUPER'N DURING PERIOD					
REMOVED FROM SUPER'N DURING PERIOD					
ALIENS UNDER SUPER'N END OF PERIOD					
SUBVERSIVE					
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC					
SUSPENSION					
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS					
OTHER					
ISA SUPERVISION - PRODUCTIVE HOURS			/		
- HOURS PER UNIT			-		
OTHER TYPES OF PAROLE					
ALIENS ON PAROLE BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-
PLACED ON PAROLE DURING PERIOD					
TOTAL ON PAROLE DURING PERIOD					
REMOVED FROM PAROLE DURING PERIOD					
ALIENS ON PAROLE END OF PERIOD					
OTHER TYPES OF PAROLE-PRODUCTIVE HOURS					
-HOURS PER UNIT					
TRAVEL TIME - PAROLE & SUPER'N OPERATION					
LOST TIME - PAROLE & SUPER'N OPERATION					
SERVICE DETENTION FACILITIES					
NUMBER DETAINED BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-
DETAINEES ADMITTED			2		
NUMBER DETAINED DURING PERIOD			2		
EXCLUSION			2		
DETAINEES REMOVED DURING PERIOD			2		
NUMBER DETAINED END OF PERIOD			-		
MAN-DAYS DETENTION DURING PERIOD			2		
EXCLUSION			2		
EXPULSION			-		
AVERAGE DAYS DET. PER DETAINEE			1.00		
SERVICE DET. FAC. - PRODUCTIVE HOURS			16		
- HOURS PER UNIT			8.00		
PRODUCTIVE HOURS - INS PERSONNEL			16		
NON-SERVICE DETENTION FACILITIES					
NUMBER DETAINED BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-
DETAINEES ADMITTED	1				
NUMBER DETAINED DURING PERIOD	1				
DETAINEES REMOVED DURING PERIOD	1				
NUMBER DETAINED END OF PERIOD	-				
MAN-DAYS DETENTION DURING PERIOD	5				
AVERAGE DAYS DET. PER DETAINEE	5.00				
NON-SERV. DET.FAC. - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	2				
- HOURS PER UNIT	2.00				

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
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ST. ALBANS District No. 1

II DETENTION, DEPORTATION AND PAROLE ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	TOTAL	Bangor	Burlington	Calais	Fort Fairfield	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Roosevelttown	Rouses Point	St. Albans
DEPORTATION																	
ALIENS PROCESSED FOR DEPORTATION	11	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	7
ALIENS PROCESSED FOR VOLUNTARY DEPARTURE	18	2				2	2						4			4	-
TOTAL	29	2				2	3						4			6	7
ALIENS DEPORTED	11	-				-	1				4		-			5	
VOLUNTARY DEPARTURES	50	2			1	2	2		3		4	2	4	3	10	9	
UNDER W/A	-	-				-	-		-				-		-	-	
WITHOUT W/A	50	2			1	2	2		3		4	2	4	3	10	9	
REMOVALS	-	-			-	-	-		-							-	
DEPORTATION-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	235	2			-	1	1		1		-	-	2	-	-	43	180
-HOURS PER UNIT	8.10	1.00			-	.500	.333		-		-	-	.500	-	-	7.16	25.7
TRAVEL TIME - DEPORTATION OPERATION	41	-			-	-	1		-		-	-	16	-	-	24	-
LOST TIME - DEPORTATION OPERATION	34	-			-	-	-		-		-	-	-	-	-	-	-
III INVESTIGATIONS ACTIVITY																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	192	6	2	1	9	-	1	2	-	3	1	4	-	-	3	13	90
RECEIVED DURING PERIOD	294	6	-	4	5	2	8	5	5	-	8	14	6		3	32	116
TOTAL	486	12	2	5	14	2	9	7	5	3	9	18	6		6	45	206
COMPLETED	305	7	-	4	7	2	9	6	5	1	9	11	4		4	34	120
NATURALIZATION & CITIZENSHIP	29											1				1	18
CANCELLATION - SUBVERSIVE	1																1
CANCELLATION - OTHER	-																
NATURALIZATION	15											1					14
OTHER	13															1	3
DEPORTATION	122	3	-	1	1	-	3	1	1	1	3	2	4		1	15	36
SUBVERSIVE	-																
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC	5								1							1	
ADDRESS REPORT CARD (I-53)	14										1		3		1	2	7
SUSPENSION	-																
NON-IMMIGRANTS	42						3	1		1						6	1
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS	18	2									2					6	2
DISPLACED PERSONS	-	-															
OTHER	43	1		1	1							2	1				26
SMUGGLING	3																3
PRIVATE BILLS	2															1	1
PAROLE	5			1			1										2
ALIEN REGISTRATION	8				2							4					1
ALIEN ADDRESS REPORT (SEC. 35)	59	4		1	4	2	3	4	2		5				2	16	8
MISCELLANEOUS	77			1			2	1	2		1	4			1	1	51
PENDING END OF PERIOD	181	5	2	1	7		-	1	-	2	-	7	2		2	11	86
NATURALIZATION & CITIZENSHIP	35											2					24
CANCELLATION - SUBVERSIVE	1																1
CANCELLATION - OTHER	-																
NATURALIZATION	22											1					20
OTHER	12											1					3

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: MAY 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1

III INVESTIGATIONS ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	TOTAL	Bangor	Burlington	Calais	Fort Fairfield	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Roosevelttown	Rouses Point	St. Albans
PENDING END OF PERIOD (CONT'D)														⊗			
DEPORTATION	93	3	-	1	7	-	-	1	-	2	-	3	2		1	9	27
SUBVERSIVE	6																4
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC	6															4	
ADDRESS REPORT CARD (1-53)	33	3		1	1			1				1			1	5	20
SUSPENSION	1																
NON-IMMIGRANTS	22									2							
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS	4																
DISPLACED PERSONS	-																
OTHERS	21				6							2	2				3
SMUGGLING	13																13
PRIVATE BILLS	-																
PAROLE	4															2	2
ALIEN REGISTRATION	8	1	2														4
ALIEN ADDRESS REPORT (SEC. 35)	3	1										1					1
MISCELLANEOUS	25											1			1		15
INVESTIGATIONS RESULTING IN W/A OR V/D	19	2		1				1			2					12	1
ALIENS APPRH'D. (BY OTHER THAN B.P.)	1																1
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS	1																1
MEXICANS APPRH'D. (BY OTHER THAN B.P.)	-																
ILLEGALLY IN AGRICULTURE	-																
ILLEGALLY IN TRADE OR INDUSTRY	-																
OTHER	-																
W/A THRU ADDRESS REPORT CARD (1-53)	-																
INVESTIGATIONS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	1577	32	-	6	29	1	7	7	5	12	12	11	9	-	14	62	1284
- HOURS PER UNIT	5.17	4.57	-	1.50	4.14	.500	.777	1.17	1.00	12.0	1.33	1.00	2.25	-	3.50	1.82	10.7
TRAVEL TIME - INVESTIGATIONS ACTIVITY	294	8	-	-	7	-	7	2	-	2	-	-	1	-	9	12	167
IV APPLICATIONS EXAMINATION ACTIVITY																	
NATIONALITY																	
N-300 PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
RECEIVED	5																5
COMPLETED	7																7
PENDING END OF PERIOD	-																-
N-400 SERIES - PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	429	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	429
RECEIVED	131																131
COMPLETED	259																259
PENDING END OF PERIOD	301																301
N-600 PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	38	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	38
RECEIVED	12																12
COMPLETED	15																15
PENDING END OF PERIOD	35																35
N-500 SERIES - PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7
RECEIVED	10																10
COMPLETED	3																3
PENDING END OF PERIOD	14																14

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE ST. ALBANS District No. 1 (Continued)
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: MAY 1953

II DETENTION, DEPORTATION AND PAROLE ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vance-boro	Halifax	Montreal												
DEPORTATION																	
ALIENS PROCESSED FOR DEPORTATION	1	-	-	-	-												
ALIENS PROCESSED FOR VOLUNTARY DEPARTURE	4																
TOTAL	5																
ALIENS DEPORTED	1																
VOLUNTARY DEPARTURES	4	4															
UNDER W/A	-	-															
WITHOUT W/A	4	4															
REMOVALS	-	-															
DEPORTATION-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	5	-	-														
-HOURS PER UNIT	1.00	-	-														
TRAVEL TIME - DEPORTATION OPERATION	-	-	-														
LOST TIME - DEPORTATION OPERATION	-	-	.34														
III INVESTIGATIONS ACTIVITY																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	1	1	7	48												
RECEIVED DURING PERIOD	6	2	10	5	57												
TOTAL	6	3	11	12	105												
COMPLETED	6	3	9	7	57												
NATURALIZATION & CITIZENSHIP		1		2	6												
CANCELLATION - SUBVERSIVE																	
CANCELLATION - OTHER																	
NATURALIZATION																	
OTHER		1		2	6												
DEPORTATION	2	2		1	45												
SUBVERSIVE																	
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC					3												
ADDRESS REPORT CARD (1-53)																	
SUSPENSION																	
NON-IMMIGRANTS	1				29												
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS		2			4												
DISPLACED PERSONS																	
OTHER	1			1	9												
SMUGGLING																	
PRIVATE BILLS																	
PAROLE	1																
ALIEN REGISTRATION	1																
ALIEN ADDRESS REPORT (SEC. 35)	2		6														
MISCELLANEOUS			3	4	6												
PENDING END OF PERIOD	-	-	2	5	48												
NATURALIZATION & CITIZENSHIP				1	8												
CANCELLATION - SUBVERSIVE																	
CANCELLATION - OTHER																	
NATURALIZATION					1												
OTHER				1	7												

Form G-21.6B (7-1-52) UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE ST. ALBANS District No. 1 (Continued)
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: MAY 1953

III INVESTIGATIONS ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vance-boro	Halifax	Montreal												
PENDING END OF PERIOD (CONT'D)																	
DEPORTATION	-	-	2	2	33												
SUBVERSIVE					2												
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC				1	1												
ADDRESS REPORT CARD (1-53)																	
SUSPENSION					1												
NON-IMMIGRANTS					20												
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS			2		2												
DISPLACED PERSONS																	
OTHERS				1	7												
SMUGGLING																	
PRIVATE BILLS																	
PAROLE																	
ALIEN REGISTRATION					1												
ALIEN ADDRESS REPORT (SEC. 35)																	
MISCELLANEOUS				2	6												
INVESTIGATIONS RESULTING IN W/A OR V/D																	
ALIENS APPRH'D. (BY OTHER THAN B.P.)																	
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS																	
MEXICANS APPRH'D. (BY OTHER THAN B.P.)																	
ILLEGALLY IN AGRICULTURE																	
ILLEGALLY IN TRADE OR INDUSTRY																	
OTHER																	
W/A THRU ADDRESS REPORT CARD (1-53)																	
INVESTIGATIONS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	19	4	6	7	50												
- HOURS PER UNIT	3.17	1.33	.666	1.00	.877												
TRAVEL TIME - INVESTIGATIONS ACTIVITY	4	1	-	2	72												
IV APPLICATIONS EXAMINATION ACTIVITY																	
NATIONALITY																	
N-300 PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
RECEIVED																	
COMPLETED																	
PENDING END OF PERIOD																	
N-400 SERIES - PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
RECEIVED																	
COMPLETED																	
PENDING END OF PERIOD																	
N-600 PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
RECEIVED																	
COMPLETED																	
PENDING END OF PERIOD																	
N-500 SERIES - PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
RECEIVED																	
COMPLETED																	
PENDING END OF PERIOD																	

Form G-21.7A (7-1-52)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: MAY 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1

IV APPLICATIONS EXAMINATION ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	TOTAL	Bangor	Burlington	Calais	Fort Fairfield	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Roosevelttown	Rouses Point	St. Albans
IMMIGRATION																	
REENTRY PERMITS-PENDING BEG. OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
RECEIVED	16																16
COMPLETED	16																16
PENDING END OF PERIOD	-																-
VISA PETITIONS-PENDING BEG. OF PERIOD	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3
RECEIVED	10																10
COMPLETED	10																10
PENDING END OF PERIOD	3																3
OTHER-PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	18	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	18
RECEIVED	218																218
COMPLETED	222																222
PENDING END OF PERIOD	14																14
NATIONALITY APPLICATIONS-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	168	-	-														168
-HOURS PER UNIT	.591	-	-														.591
IMMIGRATION APPLICATIONS-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	131	-	-														131
-HOURS PER UNIT	.528	-	-														.528
DECLARATIONS FILED	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4
V VERIFICATION OF ARRIVALS AND DEPARTURES ACTIVITY																	
VERIFICATION REQUESTS																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	1199	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1198
RECEIVED DURING PERIOD	2318	19	3	8	6	8	14	24	15	10	65	13	7	1	3	45	1759
TOTAL	3517	19	3	8	6	8	14	25	15	10	65	13	7	1	3	45	2957
COMPLETED	2228	19	3	8	6	8	14	25	15	10	65	13	7	1	3	45	1668
NATURALIZATION	261	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	259
OTHER	1967	19	3	8	6	8	14	25	15	10	63	13	7	1	3	45	1409
PENDING END OF PERIOD	1289	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1289
VERIFICATION-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	828	6	2	2	3	2	2	8	5	3	17	4	3	1	2	22	648
-HOURS PER UNIT	.371	.316	.666	.250	.500	.250	.142	.320	.333	.300	.261	.308	.429	1.00	.667	.488	.382
VI NATURALIZATION AND CITIZENSHIP ACTIVITY																	
PRELIM. INVEST. CIT. & NAT. APPLN'S																	
PRELIM. INVESTIGATIONS (N-400 SERIES)																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	548	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	548
RECEIVED	242																242
COMPLETED	198																198
PENDING END OF PERIOD	592																592
CITIZENSHIP (N-600 APPLICATIONS)																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	5	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4
RECEIVED	13	6	-				1										6
COMPLETED	8	4	-				-										4
PENDING END OF PERIOD	10	2	1				1										6

Form G-21.8A (7-1-52)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: MAY 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1

VI NATURALIZATION AND CITIZENSHIP ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	TOTAL	Bangor	Burlington	Calais	Fort Fairfield ⊗	Highgate Springs ⊗	Houlton ⊗	Jackman ⊗	Madawaska ⊗	Malone ⊗	Newport ⊗	Norton ⊗	Ogdensburg ⊗	Richford ⊗	Roosevelt town ⊗	Rouses Point ⊗	St. Albans
NATIONALITY APPLN'S. (N-500 SERIES)																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	4	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
RECEIVED	3		3														
COMPLETED	3		3														
PENDING END OF PERIOD	4		4														
PETITIONS FILED	182	-	-														182
N-600 HEARINGS COMPLETED	5	4	-														1
CERTIFICATES ISSUED (N-600 APPLN'S)	6		-														6
CERTIFICATES ISSUED (N-500 SERIES)	3		3														
PRELIM. INVESTIGATIONS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	244	-	-	-													244
- HOURS PER UNIT	1.23	-	-	-													1.23
CIT. (N-600 APPLN'S) - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	40	5	-	1													34
- HOURS PER UNIT	5.00	1.25	-	-													8.50
NAT. APPLN'S - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	5	-	5	-													-
- HOURS PER UNIT	1.66	-	1.66	-													-
NATURALIZATION HEARINGS																	
PETITIONS PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	203	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	203
PETITIONS PENDING DURING PERIOD	385																385
PETITIONS COMPLETED	45																45
GRANTED	45																45
DENIED	-																-
PETITIONS PENDING END OF PERIOD	340																340
PETITIONS READY FOR FINAL HEARING	340																340
PETITIONS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	54	-															54
- HOURS PER UNIT	1.20	-															1.20
TRAVEL TIME - NAT. & CIT. ACTIVITY	52	2															50
LOST TIME - NAT. & CIT. ACTIVITY	3	1															2
CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION 1/																	
CITIZENSHIP ASSISTANCE FURNISHED																	
ALIENS REFERRED TO PUBLIC SCHOOLS																	
ALIENS INFORMED OF HOME STUDY																	
NAME SLIPS TO PUBLIC SCHOOLS CORRES. CTRS.																	
ALIENS ADMITTED TO CITIZENSHIP																	
ATTENDED PUBLIC SCHOOL CLASSES																	
ENROLLED IN HOME STUDY COURSES																	
NUMBER SUBMITTING PUBLIC-SCHOOL CERT.																	
VII EMPLOYMENT SUMMARY																	
NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES END OF PERIOD	295	3	2	20	5	12	8	11	12	16	22	15	10	9	7	34	62
OPERATIONS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	41592	340	264	2684	787	1996	1343	1762	1844	2906	3727	2418	1599	2029	1475	5507	5261
OPERATIONS - NON-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	5054	6	2	400	104	312	18	200	200	237	381	238	228	232	192	685	906
ADMINISTRATION - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	7900	137	123	576	77	132	9	196	295	239	168	232	130	24	163	282	2122
ADMINISTRATION - NON-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	996	14	80	96	-	-	-	-	8	-	40	-	-	8	4	-	419
TOTAL HOURS EMPLOYMENT	55542	497	469	3756	968	2440	1370	2158	2347	3382	4316	2888	1957	2293	1834	6474	9708
PERCENTAGE TOTAL HOURS ON OPERATIONS	83.9	69.6	56.7	82.1	92.0	94.5	99.3	90.9	87.0	92.9	95.0	91.9	93.3	98.6	90.8	95.6	63.5

1/ Source: Form N-38

Form G-21.7B (7-1-52) UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE ST. ALBANS District No. 1 (Continued)
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: MAY 1953

IV APPLICATIONS EXAMINATION ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van buren	Vanceboro	Halifax	Montreal												
IMMIGRATION																	
REENTRY PERMITS-PENDING BEG. OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
RECEIVED																	
COMPLETED																	
PENDING END OF PERIOD																	
VISA PETITIONS-PENDING BEG. OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
RECEIVED																	
COMPLETED																	
PENDING END OF PERIOD																	
OTHER-PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
RECEIVED																	
COMPLETED																	
PENDING END OF PERIOD																	
NATIONALITY APPLICATIONS-PRODUCTIVE HOURS																	
-HOURS PER UNIT																	
IMMIGRATION APPLICATIONS-PRODUCTIVE HOURS																	
-HOURS PER UNIT																	
DECLARATIONS FILED																	
V VERIFICATION OF ARRIVALS AND DEPARTURES ACTIVITY																	
VERIFICATION REQUESTS																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
RECEIVED DURING PERIOD	61	32	28	8	189												
TOTAL	61	32	28	8	189												
COMPLETED	61	32	28	8	189												
NATURALIZATION	-	-	-	-	-												
OTHER	61	32	28	8	189												
PENDING END OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
VERIFICATION-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	34	16	10	3	35												
-HOURS PER UNIT	.557	.500	.357	.375	.185												
VI NATURALIZATION AND CITIZENSHIP ACTIVITY																	
PRELIM. INVEST. CIT. & NAT. APPLN'S																	
PRELIM. INVESTIGATIONS (N-400 SERIES)																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
RECEIVED																	
COMPLETED																	
PENDING END OF PERIOD																	
CITIZENSHIP (N-600 APPLICATIONS)																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
RECEIVED																	
COMPLETED																	
PENDING END OF PERIOD																	

Form G-21.8B (7-1-52)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: MAY 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1 (Continued)

VI NATURALIZATION AND CITIZENSHIP ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vance-boro	Halifax	Montreal												
NATIONALITY APPLN'S. (N-500 SERIES)	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗												
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
RECEIVED																	
COMPLETED																	
PENDING END OF PERIOD																	
PETITIONS FILED																	
N-600 HEARINGS COMPLETED																	
CERTIFICATES ISSUED (N-600 APPLN'S)																	
CERTIFICATES ISSUED (N-500 SERIES)																	
PRELIM. INVESTIGATIONS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS																	
- HOURS PER UNIT																	
CIT. (N-600 APPLN'S) - PRODUCTIVE HOURS																	
- HOURS PER UNIT																	
NAT. APPLN'S - PRODUCTIVE HOURS																	
- HOURS PER UNIT																	
NATURALIZATION HEARINGS																	
PETITIONS PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
PETITIONS PENDING DURING PERIOD																	
PETITIONS COMPLETED																	
GRANTED																	
DENIED																	
PETITIONS PENDING END OF PERIOD																	
PETITIONS READY FOR FINAL HEARING																	
PETITIONS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS																	
- HOURS PER UNIT																	
TRAVEL TIME - NAT. & CIT. ACTIVITY																	
LOST TIME - NAT. & CIT. ACTIVITY																	
CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION 1/																	
CITIZENSHIP ASSISTANCE FURNISHED																	
ALIENS REFERRED TO PUBLIC SCHOOLS																	
ALIENS INFORMED OF HOME STUDY																	
NAME SLIPS TO PUBLIC SCHOOLS CORRES.CTRS.																	
ALIENS ADMITTED TO CITIZENSHIP																	
ATTENDED PUBLIC SCHOOL CLASSES																	
ENROLLED IN HOME STUDY COURSES																	
NUMBER SUBMITTING PUBLIC SCHOOL CERT.																	
VII EMPLOYMENT SUMMARY																	
NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES END OF PERIOD	10	9	10	3	15												
OPERATIONS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	1347	1329	1475	245	1254												
OPERATIONS - NON-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	251	128	115	120	99												
ADMINISTRATION - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	153	200	272	151	1219												
ADMINISTRATION - NON-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	17	105	116	-	89												
TOTAL HOURS EMPLOYMENT	1768	1762	1978	516	2661												
PERCENTAGE TOTAL HOURS ON OPERATIONS	90.3	82.6	80.3	70.7	50.8												

1/ Source: Form N-38

Form G-21.1A (7-1-52)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: JUNE 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1

I ENTRY AND DEPARTURE ACTIVITY	TOTAL	Bangor	Burlington	Calais	Fort Fairfield	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Roosevelttown	Rouses Point	St.Albans
PRIMARY INSPECTION																	
BORDER CROSSERS ADMITTED - ALIENS	893507	155	510	120559	23492	43838	40725	18195	126904	45621	82480	31382	43065	20235	45154	147913	3199
- CITIZENS	520844	19	1039	60134	17298	33975	19647	14967	75419	26226	55147	17677	13987	14389	26626	46428	29779
CREWMEN ADMITTED - ALIENS	36	36															
- CITIZENS	38	38															
OTHERS ADMITTED - ALIENS	12264		42	514	15	664	40	1379	677	82	1046	1442	193	48	103	1763	365
- CITIZENS	1044			63		406	1	57	5	86	8	-	71		157	46	38
ALIENS NOT ADMITTED	907		1	62		30	11	19	10	19	36	17	35	16	26	250	
PREEXAMINATIONS COMPLETED - IN U.S.	-					-											
- OUTSIDE U.S.	978																
FINES	-																
TOTAL WORK UNITS	1429618	248	1592	181332	40805	78913	60424	34617	203015	72034	138717	50518	57351	34688	72066	196400	6581
PRIMARY INSPECTION - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	40657	34	285	3846	1878	2918	2925	1615	1647	2672	3530	2744	1918	959	1475	5584	1102
- HOURS PER UNIT	.028	.137	.179	.021	.046	.036	.048	.047	.008	.037	.002	.054	.033	.028	.020	.029	.167
PRODUCTIVE HOURS - INS PERSONNEL	31537	34	285	2710	694	1868	1261	1329	1647	2212	3194	2024	1553	719	983	5078	1102
VESSELS BOARDED - ARRIVAL	17					-				-			9		-	-	
AIRPLANES BOARDED-ARRIVAL	95					1				2			3		17	-	
VESSELS & AIRPLANES BOARDED ON DEPARTURE	-					-				-			-		-	-	
BSI HEARINGS																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-
RECEIVED	136			21			4		6				3			7	3
TOTAL	143			21			4		6				6			7	3
COMPLETED	134			20			4		6				6			7	3
PENDING END OF PERIOD	9			1			-		-				-			-	-
BSI HEARINGS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	643			44			8		24				9			12	102
- HOURS PER UNIT	4.80			2.20			2.00		4.00				1.50			1.71	34.0
PRODUCTIVE HOURS - INS PERSONNEL	643			44			8		24				9			12	102
AUTHORIZATIONS																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	50	2	-	-	5	-	-	6	-	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	37
RECEIVED	4349	53	36	92	66	184	103	1386	410	47	192	1127	81	52	52	45	260
TOTAL	4399	55	36	92	71	184	103	1387	410	52	192	1127	81	52	52	45	297
COMPLETED	4351	53	36	92	66	184	103	1385	410	50	192	1127	81	52	51	45	262
BORDER CROSSING CARDS	901	46	32	24	52	120	89	42	25	27	140	55	76	27	42	44	5
REENTRY PERMITS ISSUED & EXTENDED	21		3														18
VISA PETITIONS	18																18
PREEXAMINATION AUTHORIZATIONS	-																
EXTENSIONS OF STAY	41	3	1	2						13	11	1		1		1	8
REGISTRY	5																5
ALIEN LABORER'S CARDS	3023			50		47		1343	382	7	28	1051		22	2		
DUPLICATE ALIEN REGISTRATION CARDS	315	4		16	14	17	14			2	13	20	5	2	7		185
PERMISSION TO REAPPLY	15								3								12
CHANGE OF STATUS	-																
APPLNS. TO IMPORT CONTRACT LABORERS	11																11
APPROVAL OF SCHOOLS	-																
SECTION 4 D.P. APPLICATIONS	1									1							
STUDENT EMPLOYMENT & TRANSFER	-																

Form G-21.2A (7-1-52)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: JUNE 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1

I ENTRY AND DEPARTURE ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	TOTAL	Bangor	Burlington	Calais	Fort Fairfield	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Roosevelttown	Rouses Point	St. Albans
AUTHORIZATIONS - (Cont'd)			⊗			⊗	⊗		⊗		⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗		⊗	
DENIED	-	-	-		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
BORDER CROSSING CARDS																	
REENTRY PERMITS																	
VISA PETITIONS																	
PREEXAMINATION AUTHORIZATIONS																	
EXTENSIONS OF STAY																	
REGISTRY																	
ALIEN LABORER'S CARDS																	
DUPLICATE ALIEN REGISTRATION CARDS																	
PERMISSION TO REAPPLY																	
CHANGE OF STATUS																	
APPLNS. TO IMPORT CONTRACT LABORERS																	
APPROVAL OF SCHOOLS																	
SECTION 4 D.P. APPLICATIONS																	
STUDENT EMPLOYMENT AND TRANSFER																	
PENDING END OF PERIOD	48	2	-		5	-	-	2	-	2	-	-	-	-	1	-	35
BORDER CROSSING CARDS	-																
REENTRY PERMITS	-																
VISA PETITIONS	-																
PREEXAMINATION AUTHORIZATIONS	2	2															
EXTENSIONS OF STAY	6							1		2							2
REGISTRY	6				4			1							1		
ALIEN LABORER'S CARDS	-																
DUPLICATE ALIEN REGISTRATION CARDS	30				1												29
PERMISSION TO REAPPLY	-																
CHANGE OF STATUS	-																
APPLNS. TO IMPORT CONTRACT LABORERS	3																3
APPROVAL OF SCHOOLS	-																
SECTION 4 D.P. APPLICATIONS	1																1
STUDENT EMPLOYMENT AND TRANSFER	-																
AUTHORIZATIONS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	1495	58	20	26	57	120	16	224	49	24	87	210	19	13	35	67	351
- HOURS PER UNIT	3.43	1.09	.555	.282	.864	.652	.155	.162	.119	.480	.453	.186	.235	.250	.673	1.48	1.33
TRAVEL TIME - ENTRY & DEPARTURE ACTIVITY	1353	19	25	28	-	-	9	62	4	52	258	204	3	-	1	123	292
LOST TIME - ENTRY & DEPARTURE ACTIVITY	1561	158	-	-	-	-	-	114	-	460	-	-	-	719	-	-	-

Form G-21.1B (7-1-52)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: JUNE 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1 (Continued)

I ENTRY AND DEPARTURE ACTIVITY	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vanceboro	Halifax	Montreal
PRIMARY INSPECTION					
BORDER CROSSERS ADMITTED - ALIENS	32888	50480	15124	427	1161
- CITIZENS	44195	38322	12326	2	42
CREWMEN ADMITTED - ALIENS					
- CITIZENS					
OTHERS ADMITTED - ALIENS	341	121	289	224	2916
- CITIZENS	15	2	5	7	77
ALIENS NOT ADMITTED	188	4	17	66	100
PREEXAMINATIONS COMPLETED - IN U.S.					
- OUTSIDE U.S.	59	1	918		
FINES					
TOTAL WORK UNITS	77686	88930	28679	726	4296
PRIMARY INSPECTION - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	1908	1136	1710	226	545
- HOURS PER UNIT	.024	.013	.059	.311	.127
PRODUCTIVE HOURS - INS PERSONNEL	1678	1136	1259	226	545
VESSELS BOARDED - ARRIVAL	6		2		
AIRPLANES BOARDED-ARRIVAL	72		-		
VESSELS & AIRPLANES BOARDED ON DEPARTURE	-		-		
BSI HEARINGS					
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	1	-	-	3
RECEIVED	7	2	7		76
TOTAL	7	3	7		79
COMPLETED	7	3	6		72
PENDING END OF PERIOD	-	-	1		7
BSI HEARINGS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	20	6	24		394
- HOURS PER UNIT	2.86	2.00	4.00		5.74
PRODUCTIVE HOURS - INS PERSONNEL	20	6	24		394
AUTHORIZATIONS					
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-
RECEIVED	33	104	20		6
TOTAL	33	104	20		6
COMPLETED	32	104	20		6
BORDER CROSSING CARDS	26	7	16		6
REENTRY PERMITS ISSUED & EXTENDED					
VISA PETITIONS					
PREEXAMINATION AUTHORIZATIONS					
EXTENSIONS OF STAY					
REGISTRY					
ALIEN LABORER'S CARDS		91			
DUPLICATE ALIEN REGISTRATION CARDS	6	6	4		
PERMISSION TO REAPPLY					
CHANGE OF STATUS					
APPLNS. TO IMPORT CONTRACT LABORERS					
APPROVAL OF SCHOOLS					
SECTION 4 D.P. APPLICATIONS					
STUDENT EMPLOYMENT & TRANSFER					

Form G-21.2B (7-1-52)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: JUNE 1953

I ENTRY AND DEPARTURE ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vance-boro	Halifax	Montreal												
AUTHORIZATIONS - (Cont'd)		⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗												
DENIED	-	-	-	-	-												
BORDER CROSSING CARDS																	
REENTRY PERMITS																	
VISA PETITIONS																	
PREEXAMINATION AUTHORIZATIONS																	
EXTENSIONS OF STAY																	
REGISTRY																	
ALIEN LABORER'S CARDS																	
DUPLICATE ALIEN REGISTRATION CARDS																	
PERMISSION TO REAPPLY																	
CHANGE OF STATUS																	
APPLNS. TO IMPORT CONTRACT LABORERS																	
APPROVAL OF SCHOOLS																	
SECTION 4 D.P. APPLICATIONS																	
STUDENT EMPLOYMENT AND TRANSFER																	
PENDING END OF PERIOD	/	-	-	-	-												
BORDER CROSSING CARDS																	
REENTRY PERMITS																	
VISA PETITIONS																	
PREEXAMINATION AUTHORIZATIONS																	
EXTENSIONS OF STAY	1																
REGISTRY																	
ALIEN LABORER'S CARDS																	
DUPLICATE ALIEN REGISTRATION CARDS																	
PERMISSION TO REAPPLY																	
CHANGE OF STATUS																	
APPLNS. TO IMPORT CONTRACT LABORERS																	
APPROVAL OF SCHOOLS																	
SECTION 4 D.P. APPLICATIONS																	
STUDENT EMPLOYMENT AND TRANSFER																	
AUTHORIZATIONS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	59	52	6	-	2												
- HOURS PER UNIT	1.84	.500	.300	-	.333												
TRAVEL TIME - ENTRY & DEPARTURE ACTIVITY	11	-	95	-	187												
LOST TIME - ENTRY & DEPARTURE ACTIVITY	15	-	48	-	47												

Form G-21.3A (7-1-52)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: JUNE 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1

II DETENTION, DEPORTATION AND PAROLE ACTIVITY	TOTAL	Bangor	Burlington	Calais	Fort Fairfield	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Roosevelttown	Rouses Point	St. Albans
WARRANT OF ARREST PROCESSING			⊗	⊗	⊗			⊗			⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗		
COMPLETED	19	1	-	-	-	1	5	-	2	1	-	-	-	-		5	-
W/A PROCESSING - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	43	2				2	4		5	9						4	
- HOURS PER UNIT	2.26	2.00				2.00	.800		2.50	9.00						.800	
WARRANT OF ARREST SERVICE																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
RECEIVED	24	1				1	5		2	4						5	2
TOTAL	25	1				1	5		2	4						5	3
COMPLETED	24	1				1	5		2	4						5	2
PENDING END OF PERIOD	1	-				-	-		-	-						-	1
W/A SERVICE - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	23	1				-	6		1	7						1	1
- HOURS PER UNIT	.958	1.00				-	1.20		.500	1.75						.200	.500
WARRANT HEARINGS																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	49	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	49
RECEIVED	15																15
TOTAL	64																64
COMPLETED	14																14
SUBVERSIVE	-																
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC	3																3
SUSPENSION	-																
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS	1																1
OTHER	10																10
PENDING END OF PERIOD	50																50
WARRANT HEARINGS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	435															5	419
- HOURS PER UNIT	31.1															-	29.9
ON APPEAL - TOTAL	27																27
FINAL ORDERS ENTERED OR RECEIVED	1																1
TRAVEL TIME - WARRANT HEARING OPERATION	43	1														-	38
LOST TIME - WARRANT HEARING OPERATION	4	2															1
PAROLE AND SUPERVISION																	
CONDITIONAL PAROLE																	
ALIENS ON PAROLE BEGINNING OF PERIOD	32	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	30
PLACED ON PAROLE DURING PERIOD	2																1
TOTAL ON PAROLE DURING PERIOD	34																31
REMOVED FROM PAROLE DURING PERIOD	4																3
ALIENS ON PAROLE END OF PERIOD	30																28
SUBVERSIVE	-																
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC	5																5
SUSPENSION	3																3
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS	3																2
OTHER	19																18
COND. PAROLE - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	33	1															20
- HOURS PER UNIT	1.676	-															.645

Form G-21.4A (7-1-52)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: JUNE 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1

II DETENTION, DEPORTATION AND PAROLE ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	TOTAL	Bangor	Burlington	Calais	Fort Fairfield	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Roosevelttown	Rouses Point	St. Albans
INTERNAL SECURITY ACT SUPERVISION			⊗	⊗	⊗				⊗			⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗		
ALIENS UNDER SUPER'N BEGINNING OF PERIOD	7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7
PLACED UNDER SUPER'N DURING PERIOD	1																1
TOTAL UNDER SUPER'N DURING PERIOD	8																8
REMOVED FROM SUPER'N DURING PERIOD	-																-
ALIENS UNDER SUPER'N END OF PERIOD	8																8
SUBVERSIVE	-																
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC	3																3
SUSPENSION	-																
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS	-																
OTHER	5																5
ISA SUPERVISION - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	8																8
- HOURS PER UNIT	1.00																1.00
OTHER TYPES OF PAROLE																	
ALIENS ON PAROLE BEGINNING OF PERIOD	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4
PLACED ON PAROLE DURING PERIOD	2										2						-
TOTAL ON PAROLE DURING PERIOD	6										2						4
REMOVED FROM PAROLE DURING PERIOD	1										1						-
ALIENS ON PAROLE END OF PERIOD	5										1						4
OTHER TYPES OF PAROLE-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	2										2						-
-HOURS PER UNIT	.333										1.00						-
TRAVEL TIME - PAROLE & SUPER'N OPERATION	-										-						-
LOST TIME - PAROLE & SUPER'N OPERATION	-										-						-
SERVICE DETENTION FACILITIES																	
NUMBER DETAINED BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
DETAINEES ADMITTED	52					2	2	1		1	22					17	1
NUMBER DETAINED DURING PERIOD	52					2	2	1		1	22					17	1
EXCLUSION	41					-	-	-			22					12	1
DETAINEES REMOVED DURING PERIOD	51					2	1	1		1	22					17	1
NUMBER DETAINED END OF PERIOD	1					-	1	-			-					-	-
MAN-DAYS DETENTION DURING PERIOD	83					2	6	1		2	27					35	1
EXCLUSION	49					-	-	-		-	27					21	1
EXPULSION	34					2	6	1		2	-					14	-
AVERAGE DAYS DET. PER DETAINEE	1.60					1.00	3.00	1.00		2.00	1.49					2.05	1.00
SERVICE DET. FAC. - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	279					-	5	8		-	104					81	1
- HOURS PER UNIT	3.36					-	.833	8.00		-	3.85					2.31	1.00
PRODUCTIVE HOURS - INS PERSONNEL	231					-	5	8		-	104					73	1
NON-SERVICE DETENTION FACILITIES																	
NUMBER DETAINED BEGINNING OF PERIOD	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	-
DETAINEES ADMITTED	13	2					3			4						-	2
NUMBER DETAINED DURING PERIOD	16	2					3			4						3	2
DETAINEES REMOVED DURING PERIOD	11	1					3			-						3	2
NUMBER DETAINED END OF PERIOD	5	1					-			4						-	-
MAN-DAYS DETENTION DURING PERIOD	60	4					4			28						13	7
AVERAGE DAYS DET. PER DETAINEE	3.75	2.00					1.33			7.00						4.33	3.50
NON-SERV. DET.FAC. - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	10	1					-			3						-	1
- HOURS PER UNIT	.625	.500					-			.750						-	.500

Form G-21.3B (7-1-52)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: JUNE 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1 (continued)

II DETENTION, DEPORTATION AND PAROLE ACTIVITY	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vance-boro	Halifax	Montreal													
WARRANT OF ARREST PROCESSING		⊗ -		⊗ -														
COMPLETED	4																	
W/A PROCESSING - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	17																	
- HOURS PER UNIT	4.25																	
WARRANT OF ARREST SERVICE																		
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-													
RECEIVED	4																	
TOTAL	4																	
COMPLETED	4																	
PENDING END OF PERIOD	-																	
W/A SERVICE - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	6																	
- HOURS PER UNIT	1.50																	
WARRANT HEARINGS																		
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-													
RECEIVED	-																	
TOTAL	-																	
COMPLETED	-																	
SUBVERSIVE	-																	
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC																		
SUSPENSION																		
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS																		
OTHER																		
PENDING END OF PERIOD																		
WARRANT HEARINGS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	11																	
- HOURS PER UNIT	-																	
ON APPEAL - TOTAL																		
FINAL ORDERS ENTERED OR RECEIVED																		
TRAVEL TIME - WARRANT HEARING OPERATION	4																	
LOST TIME - WARRANT HEARING OPERATION	1																	
PAROLE AND SUPERVISION																		
CONDITIONAL PAROLE																		
ALIENS ON PAROLE BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	2	-	-													
PLACED ON PAROLE DURING PERIOD			1															
TOTAL ON PAROLE DURING PERIOD			3															
REMOVED FROM PAROLE DURING PERIOD			1															
ALIENS ON PAROLE END OF PERIOD			2															
SUBVERSIVE																		
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC																		
SUSPENSION																		
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS			1															
OTHER			1															
COND. PAROLE - PRODUCTIVE HOURS			2															
- HOURS PER UNIT			.666															

...1.48 (7-1-52)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: JUNE 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1 (Continued)

...TION, DEPORTATION AND PAROLE ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vance-boro	Halifax	Montreal												
...ERNAL SECURITY ACT SUPERVISION		⊗	⊗	⊗													
...ENS UNDER SUPER'N BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
...CED UNDER SUPER'N DURING PERIOD																	
...AL UNDER SUPER'N DURING PERIOD																	
...MOVED FROM SUPER'N DURING PERIOD																	
...ENS UNDER SUPER'N END OF PERIOD																	
S...VERSIVE																	
C...INAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC																	
SUSPENSION																	
...LEGAL ENTRANTS																	
OTHER																	
...SUPERVISION - PRODUCTIVE HOURS																	
- HOURS PER UNIT																	
OTHER TYPES OF PAROLE																	
...ENS ON PAROLE BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
...CED ON PAROLE DURING PERIOD																	
...AL ON PAROLE DURING PERIOD																	
...MOVED FROM PAROLE DURING PERIOD																	
...ENS ON PAROLE END OF PERIOD																	
OTHER TYPES OF PAROLE-PRODUCTIVE HOURS																	
-HOURS PER UNIT																	
...TRAVEL TIME - PAROLE & SUPER'N OPERATION																	
LOST TIME - PAROLE & SUPER'N OPERATION																	
SERVICE DETENTION FACILITIES																	
...BER DETAINED BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
...ALIENS ADMITTED			6														
...BER DETAINED DURING PERIOD			6														
...SION			6														
...ES REMOVED DURING PERIOD			6														
...BER DETAINED END OF PERIOD			-														
...DAYS DETENTION DURING PERIOD			9														
...SION			-														
...SION			9														
...AGE DAYS DET. PER DETAINEE			1.50														
SERVICE DET. FAC. - PRODUCTIVE HOURS			80														
- HOURS PER UNIT			8.88														
...UCTIVE HOURS - INS PERSONNEL			40														
...-SERVICE DETENTION FACILITIES																	
...BER DETAINED BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
...ALIENS ADMITTED	2																
...BER DETAINED DURING PERIOD	2																
...ES REMOVED DURING PERIOD	2																
...DETAINED END OF PERIOD	-																
...ALIEN DAYS DETENTION DURING PERIOD	4																
...AGE DAYS DET. PER DETAINEE	2.00																
...SERV. DET.FAC. - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	5																
- HOURS PER UNIT	2.50																

Form G-21.5A (7-1-52)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: JUNE 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1

II DETENTION, DEPORTATION AND PAROLE ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	TOTAL	Bangor	Burlington	Calais	Fort Fairfield	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Rooseveltown	Rouses Point	St. Albans
DEPORTATION																	
ALIENS PROCESSED FOR DEPORTATION	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	3	1
ALIENS PROCESSED FOR VOLUNTARY DEPARTURE	21					2	1	5					4	-	-	4	3
TOTAL	26					2	1	5					5	-	-	7	4
ALIENS DEPORTED	8			-		-	-	-	2				1	1	-	3	1
VOLUNTARY DEPARTURES	40			3		2	1	5	2		3		4	-	6	7	3
UNDER W/A	9			-		-	-	-	-		2		-	-	-	6	-
WITHOUT W/A	31			3		2	1	5	2		1		4	-	6	1	3
REMOVALS	-			-		-	-	-			-		-	-	-	-	-
DEPORTATION-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	234			-		1	-	5	-		3		3	-	-	52	165
-HOURS PER UNIT	9.00			-		.500	-	1.00	-		-		.600	-	-	7.42	41.2
TRAVEL TIME - DEPORTATION OPERATION	18			-		-	-	-	-		-		1	-	-	16	-
LOST TIME - DEPORTATION OPERATION	46			-		-	-	-	-		-		-	-	-	-	-
III INVESTIGATIONS ACTIVITY																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	181	5	2	1	7	-	-	1	-	2	-	7	2	-	2	11	86
RECEIVED DURING PERIOD	323	14	1	5	2	3	15	7	7	12	26	6	8		5	20	106
TOTAL	504	19	3	6	9	3	15	8	7	14	26	13	10		7	31	192
COMPLETED	343	9	2	5	3	3	13	7	7	11	26	5	9		5	20	123
NATURALIZATION & CITIZENSHIP	51		-				1		1			3			3		28
CANCELLATION - SUBVERSIVE	-																
CANCELLATION - OTHER	-																
NATURALIZATION	30											1					28
OTHER	21						1		1			2			3		
DEPORTATION	121	5	-		2	-	5		2	4	10	2	7		1	8	22
SUBVERSIVE	1																
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC	6															2	
ADDRESS REPORT CARD (1-53)	29	2									10	1	3		1	1	11
SUSPENSION	1																
NON-IMMIGRANTS	37	1					1										
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS	21						3		2	4						4	3
DISPLACED PERSONS	-																
OTHER	26	2			2		1					1	4			1	8
SMUGGLING	3																3
PRIVATE BILLS	2																1
PAROLE	3															2	1
ALIEN REGISTRATION	16	2	2				3										6
ALIEN ADDRESS REPORT (SEC. 35)	52	2		3	1	3	4	3		7	13				1	9	2
MISCELLANEOUS	95			2		-	-	4	4		3		2			1	60
PENDING END OF PERIOD	161	10	1	1	6	-	2	1	-	3	-	8	1		2	11	69
NATURALIZATION & CITIZENSHIP	26	1					1					1					20
CANCELLATION - SUBVERSIVE	1																1
CANCELLATION - OTHER	-																
NATURALIZATION	18											1					16
OTHER	7	1					1										3

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: JUNE 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1

III INVESTIGATIONS ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	TOTAL	Bangor	Burlington	Calais	Fort Fairfield	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Roosevelttown	Rouses Point	St. Albans
PENDING END OF PERIOD (CONT'D)														⊗			
DEPORTATION	82	6	1	1	6	-	-	1	-	2		2	1	-	-	9	23
SUBVERSIVE	7																6
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC	6															5	
ADDRESS REPORT CARD (1-53)	29	5	1	1	1			1		2		1				4	13
SUSPENSION	-																
NON-IMMIGRANTS	20	1															
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS	2																
DISPLACED PERSONS	2																2
OTHERS	16				5							1	1				2
SMUGGLING	13																13
PRIVATE BILLS	-																
PAROLE	1																1
ALIEN REGISTRATION	6	2					1										3
ALIEN ADDRESS REPORT (SEC. 35)	2	1										1					
MISCELLANEOUS	31									1		4			2	2	9
INVESTIGATIONS RESULTING IN W/A OR V/D	23						4		4	4						8	
ALIENS APPRH'D. (BY OTHER THAN B.P.)	1															1	
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS	3						3										
MEXICANS APPRH'D. (BY OTHER THAN B.P.)	-																
ILLEGALLY IN AGRICULTURE	-																
ILLEGALLY IN TRADE OR INDUSTRY	-																
OTHER	-																-
W/A THRU ADDRESS REPORT CARD (1-53)	1															1	
INVESTIGATIONS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	1693	36	2	4	13	1	15	6	8	33	8	13	14		3	83	1344
- HOURS PER UNIT	4.94	4.00	1.00	.800	4.33	.333	1.15	.857	1.14	3.00	.307	2.60	1.56		.600	4.15	10.9
TRAVEL TIME - INVESTIGATIONS ACTIVITY	348	5	-	-	3	-	13	-	1	4		2	2		-	25	190
IV APPLICATIONS EXAMINATION ACTIVITY																	
NATIONALITY																	
N-300 PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
RECEIVED	2																2
COMPLETED	2																2
PENDING END OF PERIOD	-																-
N-400 SERIES - PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	301	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	301
RECEIVED	110																110
COMPLETED	190																190
PENDING END OF PERIOD	221																221
N-600 PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	35	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	35
RECEIVED	22																22
COMPLETED	17																17
PENDING END OF PERIOD	40																40
N-500 SERIES - PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	14	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	14
RECEIVED	8																8
COMPLETED	5																5
PENDING END OF PERIOD	17																17

Form G-21.5B (7-1-52)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: JUNE 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1 (Continued)

II DETENTION, DEPORTATION AND PAROLE ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vanceboro	Halifax	Montreal												
DEPORTATION																	
ALIENS PROCESSED FOR DEPORTATION	-	-	-	-	-												
ALIENS PROCESSED FOR VOLUNTARY DEPARTURE	2	-															
TOTAL	2	-															
ALIENS DEPORTED	-	-															
VOLUNTARY DEPARTURES	2	2															
UNDER W/A	1	-															
WITHOUT W/A	1	2	-														
REMOVALS	-	-	-														
DEPORTATION-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	5	-															
-HOURS PER UNIT	2.50	-	-														
TRAVEL TIME - DEPORTATION OPERATION	1	-	-														
LOST TIME - DEPORTATION OPERATION	-	-	46														
III INVESTIGATIONS ACTIVITY																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	2	5	48												
RECEIVED DURING PERIOD	9	3	5	7	62												
TOTAL	9	3	7	12	110												
COMPLETED	8	2	6	5	74												
NATURALIZATION & CITIZENSHIP	2	1	-	-	12												
CANCELLATION - SUBVERSIVE																	
CANCELLATION - OTHER																	
NATURALIZATION					1												
OTHER	2	1			11												
DEPORTATION	3	1	1	1	47												
SUBVERSIVE					1												
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC	1			1	2												
ADDRESS REPORT CARD (I-53)																	
SUSPENSION					1												
NON-IMMIGRANTS					35												
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS	1	1	1		2												
DISPLACED PERSONS																	
OTHER	1				6												
SMUGGLING																	
PRIVATE BILLS					1												
PAROLE																	
ALIEN REGISTRATION	2				1												
ALIEN ADDRESS REPORT (SEC. 35)			4														
MISCELLANEOUS	1		1	4	13												
PENDING END OF PERIOD	1	1	1	7	36												
NATURALIZATION & CITIZENSHIP		1		1	1												
CANCELLATION - SUBVERSIVE																	
CANCELLATION - OTHER																	
NATURALIZATION				1													
OTHER		1			1												

Form G-21.68 (7-1-52)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: JUNE 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1 (Continued)

III INVESTIGATIONS ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vance-boro	Halifax	Montreal												
PENDING END OF PERIOD (CONT'D)																	
DEPORTATION	1	-	1	3	25												
SUBVERSIVE					1												
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC					1												
ADDRESS REPORT CARD (1-53)					-												
SUSPENSION																	
NON-IMMIGRANTS	1				18												
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS			1		1												
DISPLACED PERSONS					-												
OTHERS				3	4												
SMUGGLING																	
PRIVATE BILLS																	
PAROLE																	
ALIEN REGISTRATION																	
ALIEN ADDRESS REPORT (SEC. 35)																	
MISCELLANEOUS				3	10												
INVESTIGATIONS RESULTING IN W/A OR V/D	3	-															
ALIENS APPRH'D. (BY OTHER THAN B.P.)																	
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS																	
MEXICANS APPRH'D. (BY OTHER THAN B.P.)																	
ILLEGALLY IN AGRICULTURE																	
ILLEGALLY IN TRADE OR INDUSTRY																	
OTHER																	
W/A THRU ADDRESS REPORT CARD (1-53)																	
INVESTIGATIONS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	18	2	12	4	74												
- HOURS PER UNIT	2.25	1.00	2.00	.800	1.00												
TRAVEL TIME - INVESTIGATIONS ACTIVITY	7	-	4	1	91												
IV APPLICATIONS EXAMINATION ACTIVITY																	
NATIONALITY																	
N-300 PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
RECEIVED																	
COMPLETED																	
PENDING END OF PERIOD																	
N-400 SERIES - PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
RECEIVED																	
COMPLETED																	
PENDING END OF PERIOD																	
N-600 PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
RECEIVED																	
COMPLETED																	
PENDING END OF PERIOD																	
N-500 SERIES - PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
RECEIVED																	
COMPLETED																	
PENDING END OF PERIOD																	

Form G-21.7A (7-1-52)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: JUNE 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1

IV APPLICATIONS EXAMINATION ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	TOTAL	Bangor	Burlington	Calais	Port Fairfield	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Nadawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Roosevelttown	Rouses Point	St. Albans
IMMIGRATION																	
REENTRY PERMITS-PENDING BEG. OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
RECEIVED	10																10
COMPLETED	10																10
PENDING END OF PERIOD	-																-
VISA PETITIONS-PENDING BEG. OF PERIOD	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3
RECEIVED	20																20
COMPLETED	22																22
PENDING END OF PERIOD	1																1
OTHER--PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	14	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	14
RECEIVED	255																255
COMPLETED	253																253
PENDING END OF PERIOD	16																16
NATIONALITY APPLICATIONS-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	117																117
-HOURS PER UNIT	.546																.546
IMMIGRATION APPLICATIONS-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	94																94
-HOURS PER UNIT	.329																.329
DECLARATIONS FILED	3																3
V VERIFICATION OF ARRIVALS AND DEPARTURES ACTIVITY																	
VERIFICATION REQUESTS																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	1289	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1289
RECEIVED DURING PERIOD	2442	21	1	8	3	3	7	32	4	11	31	10	10	1	4	54	1887
TOTAL	3731	21	1	8	3	3	7	32	4	11	31	10	10	1	4	54	3176
COMPLETED	2673	21	1	8	3	3	7	32	4	11	31	10	10	1	4	54	2118
NATURALIZATION	616	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	606
OTHER	2057	21	1	8	3	3	7	26	4	11	28	10	10	1	4	54	1512
PENDING END OF PERIOD	1058	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1058
VERIFICATION-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	904	7	1	2	2	1	1	8	1	6	16	6	4	1	4	23	716
-HOURS PER UNIT	.338	.333	1.00	.250	.666	.333	.142	.250	.250	.545	.516	.600	.400	1.00	1.00	.425	.338
VI NATURALIZATION AND CITIZENSHIP ACTIVITY																	
PRELIM. INVEST. CIT. & NAT. APPLN'S																	
PRELIM. INVESTIGATIONS (N-400 SERIES)																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	592	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	592
RECEIVED	193								1					1			191
COMPLETED	132								1					-			131
PENDING END OF PERIOD	653								-					1			652
CITIZENSHIP (N-600 APPLICATIONS)																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	10	2	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6
RECEIVED	9	-	-		1		1										7
COMPLETED	14	2	-		1		-										11
PENDING END OF PERIOD	5	-	1		-		2										2

Form G-21.8A (7-1-52)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: JUNE 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1

VI NATURALIZATION AND CITIZENSHIP ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	TOTAL	Bangor	Burlington	Calais	Fort Fairfield	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Roosevelt-town	Rouses Point	St. Albans
NATIONALITY APPLN'S. (N-500 SERIES)				⊗		⊗	⊗		⊗	⊗	⊗		⊗	⊗	⊗		
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	4	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
RECEIVED	4		4														
COMPLETED	7		7														
PENDING END OF PERIOD	1		1														
PETITIONS FILED	128	-	-		-			-									128
N-600 HEARINGS COMPLETED	3	2			1												-
CERTIFICATES ISSUED (N-600 APPLN'S)	10																10
CERTIFICATES ISSUED (N-500 SERIES)	7		7														-
PRELIM. INVESTIGATIONS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	248	-	-					2									246
- HOURS PER UNIT	1.88	-	-					2.00									1.87
CIT. (N-600 APPLN'S) - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	27	4	-		4			-									19
- HOURS PER UNIT	1.93	2.00	-		4.00			-									1.72
NAT. APPLN'S - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	5	-	5		-			-									-
- HOURS PER UNIT	.714	-	.714		-			-									-
NATURALIZATION HEARINGS																	
PETITIONS PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	340	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	340
PETITIONS PENDING DURING PERIOD	468																468
PETITIONS COMPLETED	119																119
GRANTED	119																119
DENIED	-																-
PETITIONS PENDING END OF PERIOD	349																349
PETITIONS READY FOR FINAL HEARING	349																349
PETITIONS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	37																37
- HOURS PER UNIT	.310																.310
TRAVEL TIME - NAT. & CIT. ACTIVITY	75																75
LOST TIME - NAT. & CIT. ACTIVITY	8																8
CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION 1/																	
CITIZENSHIP ASSISTANCE FURNISHED																	
ALIENS REFERRED TO PUBLIC SCHOOLS																	
ALIENS INFORMED OF HOME STUDY																	
NAME SLIPS TO PUBLIC SCHOOLS CORRES. CTRS.																	
ALIENS ADMITTED TO CITIZENSHIP																	
ATTENDED PUBLIC SCHOOL CLASSES																	
ENROLLED IN HOME STUDY COURSES																	
NUMBER SUBMITTING PUBLIC SCHOOL CERT.																	
VII EMPLOYMENT SUMMARY																	
NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES END OF PERIOD	294	3	2	20	4	12	8	11	12	15	22	15	9	9	7	34	62
OPERATIONS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	41265	329	338	2814	773	1993	1332	1758	1740	2810	3672	2459	1608	1452	1026	5562	5347
OPERATIONS - NON-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	5171	47	80	312	80	174	22	200	260	249	458	243	248	300	176	808	749
ADMINISTRATION - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	7772	105	153	616	35	161	10	192	229	259	100	252	110	8	135	294	3336
ADMINISTRATION - NON-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	876	44	-	48	-	-	-	-	82	-	76	-	-	-	6	-	360
TOTAL HOURS EMPLOYMENT	55084	525	571	3790	888	2328	1370	2150	2311	3318	4306	2954	1966	1760	1343	6664	9792
PERCENTAGE TOTAL HOURS ON OPERATIONS	84.3	71.6	73.2	82.4	96.0	93.0	99.2	91.0	86.5	92.1	95.9	91.44	94.4	99.5	89.5	95.5	62.2

1/ Source: Form N-38

Form G-21.78 (7-1-52)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: JUNE 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1 (Continued)

IV APPLICATIONS EXAMINATION ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vance-boro	Halifax	Montreal												
IMMIGRATION																	
REENTRY PERMITS-PENDING BEG. OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
RECEIVED																	
COMPLETED																	
PENDING END OF PERIOD																	
VISA PETITIONS-PENDING BEG. OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
RECEIVED																	
COMPLETED																	
PENDING END OF PERIOD																	
OTHER-PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
RECEIVED																	
COMPLETED																	
PENDING END OF PERIOD																	
NATIONALITY APPLICATIONS-PRODUCTIVE HOURS																	
-HOURS PER UNIT																	
IMMIGRATION APPLICATIONS-PRODUCTIVE HOURS																	
-HOURS PER UNIT																	
DECLARATIONS FILED																	
V VERIFICATION OF ARRIVALS AND DEPARTURES ACTIVITY																	
VERIFICATION REQUESTS																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
RECEIVED DURING PERIOD	63	36	35	21	200												
TOTAL	63	36	35	21	200												
COMPLETED	63	36	35	21	200												
NATURALIZATION	-	-	1	-	-												
OTHER	63	36	34	21	200												
PENDING END OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
VERIFICATION-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	36	18	9	6	36												
-HOURS PER UNIT	.571	.500	.256	.285	.180												
VI NATURALIZATION AND CITIZENSHIP ACTIVITY																	
PRELIM. INVEST. CIT. & NAT. APPLN'S																	
PRELIM. INVESTIGATIONS (N-400 SERIES)																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
RECEIVED																	
COMPLETED																	
PENDING END OF PERIOD																	
CITIZENSHIP (N-600 APPLICATIONS)																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
RECEIVED																	
COMPLETED																	
PENDING END OF PERIOD																	

Form G-21.8B (7-1-52)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: JUNE 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1 (Continued)

VI NATURALIZATION AND CITIZENSHIP ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vanceboro	Halifax	Montreal												
NATIONALITY APPLN'S. (N-500 SERIES)	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗													
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
RECEIVED																	
COMPLETED																	
PENDING END OF PERIOD																	
PETITIONS FILED																	
N-600 HEARINGS COMPLETED																	
CERTIFICATES ISSUED (N-600 APPLN'S)																	
CERTIFICATES ISSUED (N-500 SERIES)																	
PRELIM. INVESTIGATIONS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS																	
- HOURS PER UNIT																	
CIT. (N-600 APPLN'S) - PRODUCTIVE HOURS																	
- HOURS PER UNIT																	
NAT. APPLN'S - PRODUCTIVE HOURS																	
- HOURS PER UNIT																	
NATURALIZATION HEARINGS																	
PETITIONS PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
PETITIONS PENDING DURING PERIOD																	
PETITIONS COMPLETED																	
GRANTED																	
DENIED																	
PETITIONS PENDING END OF PERIOD																	
PETITIONS READY FOR FINAL HEARING																	
PETITIONS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS																	
- HOURS PER UNIT																	
TRAVEL TIME - NAT. & CIT. ACTIVITY																	
LOST TIME - NAT. & CIT. ACTIVITY																	
CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION 1/																	
CITIZENSHIP ASSISTANCE FURNISHED																	
ALIENS REFERRED TO PUBLIC SCHOOLS																	
ALIENS INFORMED OF HOME STUDY																	
NAME SLIPS TO PUBLIC SCHOOLS CORRES.CTRS.																	
ALIENS ADMITTED TO CITIZENSHIP																	
ATTENDED PUBLIC SCHOOL CLASSES																	
ENROLLED IN HOME STUDY COURSES																	
NUMBER SUBMITTING PUBLIC SCHOOL CERT.																	
VII EMPLOYMENT SUMMARY																	
NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES END OF PERIOD	11	10	10	3	13												
OPERATIONS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	1894	1214	1515	247	1376												
OPERATIONS - NON-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	48	246	192	136	145												
ADMINISTRATION - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	146	298	272	133	928												
ADMINISTRATION - NON-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	16	28	15	-	201												
TOTAL HOURS EMPLOYMENT	2104	1784	1994	516	2650												
PERCENTAGE TOTAL HOURS ON OPERATIONS	92.3	81.7	85.6	74.2	57.3												

1/ Source: Form N-38

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Form G-21.1A (7-1-52)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: JULY 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1

I ENTRY AND DEPARTURE ACTIVITY	TOTAL	Bangor	Burlington	Calais	Fort Fairfield	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Rooseveltown	Rouses Point	St. Albans
PRIMARY INSPECTION																	
BORDER CROSSERS ADMITTED - ALIENS	1181123	190	757	154533	27476	72160	46953	23725	136597	57154	114247	45597	54989	26076	59960	221096	6556
- CITIZENS	946687	46	1085	105049	21767	62865	33234	35664	89405	41154	102055	33550	26500	18458	37709	109570	53357
CREWMEN ADMITTED - ALIENS	58	48															
- CITIZENS	13	13															
OTHERS ADMITTED - ALIENS	12161		32	704	10	917	51	769	726	101	1089	1284	203	41	105	1987	323
- CITIZENS	2114			39		575	4	32	20	129	22	13	120		191	113	67
ALIENS NOT ADMITTED	1189	2	1	94		41	16	12	9	15	93	22	47	3	41	309	6
PREEXAMINATIONS COMPLETED - IN U.S.	1																
- OUTSIDE U.S.	944																
FINES	-																
TOTAL WORK UNITS	2144290	299	1875	260419	49253	136558	80258	60202	226757	98553	217506	80466	81859	44578	98006	333075	12309
PRIMARY INSPECTION - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	44592	44	273	4123	1870	3147	3127	1834	1800	2885	3770	3280	2018	1038	1569	6340	1294
- HOURS PER UNIT	.021	.147	.146	.016	.038	.023	.039	.030	.008	.029	.017	.041	.025	.023	.016	.019	.105
PRODUCTIVE HOURS - INS PERSONNEL	35047	44	273	3051	622	2019	1375	1520	1800	2425	3434	2536	1823	793	1057	5708	1294
VESSELS BOARDED - ARRIVAL	7	2											11				
AIRPLANES BOARDED-ARRIVAL	264	3								2			4				
VESSELS & AIRPLANES BOARDED ON DEPARTURE	1	1															
BSI HEARINGS																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	9	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
RECEIVED	139			39			9	3	4				8			13	
TOTAL	148			40			9	3	4				8			13	
COMPLETED	135			38			9	-	4				8			13	
PENDING END OF PERIOD	13			2			-	3	-				-			-	-
BSI HEARINGS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	756			90			23	-	23				7			26	228
- HOURS PER UNIT	5.10			2.36			2.55	-	5.75				.875			2.00	-
PRODUCTIVE HOURS - INS PERSONNEL	756			90			23	-	23				7			26	228
AUTHORIZATIONS																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	48	2	-	-	5	-	-	2	-	2	-	-	-	-	1	-	35
RECEIVED	3687	97	64	92	69	344	88	672	258	46	443	890	71	50	39	69	227
TOTAL	3735	99	64	92	74	344	88	674	258	48	443	890	71	50	40	69	262
COMPLETED	3685	96	62	92	72	344	88	674	258	47	443	890	71	50	36	69	231
BORDER CROSSING CARDS	1214	89	55	36	52	269	84	47	15	22	212	59	66	20	32	68	10
REENTRY PERMITS ISSUED & EXTENDED	20																20
VISA PETITIONS	17																17
PREEXAMINATION AUTHORIZATIONS	2																1
EXTENSIONS OF STAY	30	4	3					1		9	1					1	10
REGISTRY	10		2		4			1									3
ALIEN LABORER'S CARDS	2018			23		26	1	615	243	5	196	815		26			
DUPLICATE ALIEN REGISTRATION CARDS	340	2	1	33	16	49	3	10		11	34	16	5	4	1		141
PERMISSION TO REAPPLY	16														3		13
CHANGE OF STATUS	-																
APPLNS. TO IMPORT CONTRACT LABORERS	16	1															15
APPROVAL OF SCHOOLS	1																1
SECTION 4 D.P. APPLICATIONS	-																
STUDENT EMPLOYMENT & TRANSFER	1		1														

Form G-21.2 A (7-1-52)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: JULY 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1

I ENTRY AND DEPARTURE ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	TOTAL	Bangor	Burlington	Calais	Fort Fairfield	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Rooseveltown	Rouses Point	St. Albans
AUTHORIZATIONS - (Cont'd)				⊗		⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗		⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗			
DENIED	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
BORDER CROSSING CARDS	-																
REENTRY PERMITS	-																
VISA PETITIONS	1																1
PREEXAMINATION AUTHORIZATIONS	-																
EXTENSIONS OF STAY	-																
REGISTRY	-																
ALIEN LABORER'S CARDS	-																
DUPLICATE ALIEN REGISTRATION CARDS	2																
PERMISSION TO REAPPLY	-																
CHANGE OF STATUS	-																
APPLNS. TO IMPORT CONTRACT LABORERS	-																
APPROVAL OF SCHOOLS	-																
SECTION 4 D.P. APPLICATIONS	-																
STUDENT EMPLOYMENT AND TRANSFER	-																
PENDING END OF PERIOD	50	3	2	-	2	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	4	-	31
BORDER CROSSING CARDS	-																
REENTRY PERMITS	2		2														
VISA PETITIONS	-																
PREEXAMINATION AUTHORIZATIONS	2	2															
EXTENSIONS OF STAY	4									1							3
REGISTRY	3				1										2		
ALIEN LABORER'S CARDS	-																
DUPLICATE ALIEN REGISTRATION CARDS	30				1										2		20
PERMISSION TO REAPPLY	-																
CHANGE OF STATUS	1	1															
APPLNS. TO IMPORT CONTRACT LABORERS	7																7
APPROVAL OF SCHOOLS	-																
SECTION 4 D.P. APPLICATIONS	1																1
STUDENT EMPLOYMENT AND TRANSFER	-																
AUTHORIZATIONS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	1461	78	38	21	34	146	10	113	37	32	142	138	19	13	27	99	367
- HOURS PER UNIT	.396	.813	.613	.228	.472	.424	.114	.168	.143	.681	.321	.155	.268	.260	.750	1.443	1.58
TRAVEL TIME - ENTRY & DEPARTURE ACTIVITY	1532	33	10	35	-	-	9	62	20	53	243	233	-	-	-	143	376
LOST TIME - ENTRY & DEPARTURE ACTIVITY	2064	121	-	-	-	-	-	86	-	460	-		-	1263	-		5

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: JULY 1953

ST.ALBANS District No.1 (Continued)

I ENTRY AND DEPARTURE ACTIVITY	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vance-boro	Halifax	Montreal
PRIMARY INSPECTION					
BORDER CROSSERS ADMITTED - ALIENS	56338	54075	20775	605	1264
- CITIZENS	149431	54444	19292		52
CREWMEN ADMITTED - ALIENS	10				
- CITIZENS	-				
OTHERS ADMITTED - ALIENS	366	74	325	257	2797
- CITIZENS	6	3	8	11	761
ALIENS NOT ADMITTED	242	4	31	110	91
PREEXAMINATIONS COMPLETED - IN U.S.	-	1			
- OUTSIDE U.S.	85	5	854		
FINES	-				
TOTAL WORK UNITS	206478	108606	41285	983	4965
PRIMARY INSPECTION - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	2334	1262	1777	262	545
- HOURS PER UNIT	.011	.012	.043	.266	.109
PRODUCTIVE HOURS - INS PERSONNEL	1872	1262	1332	262	545
VESSELS BOARDED - ARRIVAL	4	-	2	9	43
AIRPLANES BOARDED-ARRIVAL	137	-			118
VESSELS & AIRPLANES BOARDED ON DEPARTURE	-	-			-
BSI HEARINGS					
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	1	-	7
RECEIVED	3	8	2		50
TOTAL	3	8	3		57
COMPLETED	2	8	3		50
PENDING END OF PERIOD	1	-	-		7
BSI HEARINGS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	8	16	12		323
- HOURS PER UNIT	4.00	2.00	4.00		6.46
PRODUCTIVE HOURS - INS PERSONNEL	8	16	12		323
AUTHORIZATIONS					
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	1	-	-	-	-
RECEIVED	65	76	18		9
TOTAL	66	76	18		9
COMPLETED	59	76	18		9
BORDER CROSSING CARDS	47	6	16		9
REENTRY PERMITS ISSUED & EXTENDED					
VISA PETITIONS					
PREEXAMINATION AUTHORIZATIONS		1			
EXTENSIONS OF STAY	1				
REGISTRY					
ALIEN LABORER'S CARDS	1	67			
DUPLICATE ALIEN REGISTRATION CARDS	10	2	2		
PERMISSION TO REAPPLY					
CHANGE OF STATUS					
APPLNS. TO IMPORT CONTRACT LABORERS					
APPROVAL OF SCHOOLS					
SECTION 4 D.P. APPLICATIONS					
STUDENT EMPLOYMENT & TRANSFER					

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: JULY 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1 (Continued)

I ENTRY AND DEPARTURE ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vance-boro	Halifax	Montreal												
AUTHORIZATIONS - (Cont'd)		(X)		(X)	(X)												
DENIED	-	-	2	-	-												
BORDER CROSSING CARDS																	
REENTRY PERMITS																	
VISA PETITIONS																	
PREEXAMINATION AUTHORIZATIONS																	
EXTENSIONS OF STAY																	
REGISTRY																	
ALIEN LABORER'S CARDS																	
DUPLICATE ALIEN REGISTRATION CARDS			2														
PERMISSION TO REAPPLY																	
CHANGE OF STATUS																	
APPLNS. TO IMPORT CONTRACT LABORERS																	
APPROVAL OF SCHOOLS																	
SECTION 4 D.P. APPLICATIONS																	
STUDENT EMPLOYMENT AND TRANSFER																	
PENDING END OF PERIOD	7	-	-	-	-												
BORDER CROSSING CARDS																	
REENTRY PERMITS																	
VISA PETITIONS																	
PREEXAMINATION AUTHORIZATIONS																	
EXTENSIONS OF STAY																	
REGISTRY																	
ALIEN LABORER'S CARDS																	
DUPLICATE ALIEN REGISTRATION CARDS	7																
PERMISSION TO REAPPLY																	
CHANGE OF STATUS																	
APPLNS. TO IMPORT CONTRACT LABORERS																	
APPROVAL OF SCHOOLS																	
SECTION 4 D.P. APPLICATIONS																	
STUDENT EMPLOYMENT AND TRANSFER																	
AUTHORIZATIONS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	101	38	5	-	3												
- HOURS PER UNIT	1.71	.500	.280	-	.333												
TRAVEL TIME - ENTRY & DEPARTURE ACTIVITY	6	-	84	8	217												
LOST TIME - ENTRY & DEPARTURE ACTIVITY	20	-	42	-	67												

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: JULY 1953

ST.ALBANS District No.1

II DETENTION, DEPORTATION AND PAROLE ACTIVITY	TOTAL	Bangor	Burlington	Calais	Fort Fairfield	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Rooseveltown	Rouses Point	St. Albans
WARRANT OF ARREST PROCESSING		⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗		⊗	⊗	⊗			⊗		⊗	⊗		
COMPLETED	19	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	5	2	-	1	-	-	6	1
W/A PROCESSING - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	75					3				30	12		3			10	12
- HOURS PER UNIT	3.94					1.50				6.00	6.00		3.00			1.67	12.0
WARRANT OF ARREST SERVICE																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
RECEIVED	17					2				4	2		1			6	-
TOTAL	18					2				4	2		1			6	1
COMPLETED	17					2				4	2		1			5	1
PENDING END OF PERIOD	1					-				-	-		-			1	-
W/A SERVICE - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	14					1				7	1		-			2	1
- HOURS PER UNIT	.824					.500				1.75	.500		-			.400	1.00
WARRANT HEARINGS																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	50	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	50
RECEIVED	19																19
TOTAL	69																69
COMPLETED	43																43
SUBVERSIVE	-																
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC	2																2
SUSPENSION	-																
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS	7																7
OTHER	34																34
PENDING END OF PERIOD	26																26
WARRANT HEARINGS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	162															3	152
- HOURS PER UNIT	3.76															-	16.8
ON APPEAL - TOTAL	6															-	6
FINAL ORDERS ENTERED OR RECEIVED	-															-	-
TRAVEL TIME - WARRANT HEARING OPERATION	33															-	29
LOST TIME - WARRANT HEARING OPERATION	-															-	-
PAROLE AND SUPERVISION																	
CONDITIONAL PAROLE																	
ALIENS ON PAROLE BEGINNING OF PERIOD	30	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	28
PLACED ON PAROLE DURING PERIOD	8																8
TOTAL ON PAROLE DURING PERIOD	38																36
REMOVED FROM PAROLE DURING PERIOD	5																5
ALIENS ON PAROLE END OF PERIOD	33																31
SUBVERSIVE	-																
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC	5																5
SUSPENSION	2																1
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS	1																1
OTHER	25																24
COND. PAROLE - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	15																15
- HOURS PER UNIT	.395																.416

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: JULY 1953

ST.-ALBANS District No.1

II DETENTION, DEPORTATION AND PAROLE ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	TOTAL	Bangor	Burlington ⊗	Calais ⊗	Fort Fairfield ⊗	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska ⊗	Malone	Newport	Norton ⊗	Ogdensburg	Richford ⊗	Rooseveltown ⊗	Rouses Point	St. Albans
INTERNAL SECURITY ACT SUPERVISION																	
ALIENS UNDER SUPER'N BEGINNING OF PERIOD	8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8
PLACED UNDER SUPER'N DURING PERIOD	1																1
TOTAL UNDER SUPER'N DURING PERIOD	9																9
REMOVED FROM SUPER'N DURING PERIOD	-																-
ALIENS UNDER SUPER'N END OF PERIOD	9																9
SUBVERSIVE	-																
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC	4																4
SUSPENSION	-																
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS	-																
OTHER	5																5
ISA SUPERVISION - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	3																3
- HOURS PER UNIT	.323																.323
OTHER TYPES OF PAROLE																	
ALIENS ON PAROLE BEGINNING OF PERIOD	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	4
PLACED ON PAROLE DURING PERIOD	6							2			4						-
TOTAL ON PAROLE DURING PERIOD	11							2			5						4
REMOVED FROM PAROLE DURING PERIOD	-							-			-						-
ALIENS ON PAROLE END OF PERIOD	11							2			5						4
OTHER TYPES OF PAROLE-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	8							3			4						1
-HOURS PER UNIT	.727							1.50			1.800						.250
TRAVEL TIME - PAROLE & SUPER'N OPERATION	-							-			-						-
LOST TIME - PAROLE & SUPER'N OPERATION	-							-			-						-
SERVICE DETENTION FACILITIES																	
NUMBER DETAINED BEGINNING OF PERIOD	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
DETAINEES ADMITTED	81					4	-			1	44					22	6
NUMBER DETAINED DURING PERIOD	82					4	1			1	44					22	6
EXCLUSION	56					-	-			-	37					9	6
DETAINEES REMOVED DURING PERIOD	80					4	1			1	44					20	6
NUMBER DETAINED END OF PERIOD	2					-	-			-	-					2	-
MAN-DAYS DETENTION DURING PERIOD	108					4	14			2	46					28	10
EXCLUSION	60					-	-			-	37					9	10
EXPULSION	48					4	14			2	9					19	-
AVERAGE DAYS DET. PER DETAINEE	1.31					1.00	14.0			2.00	1.046					1.27	1.67
SERVICE DET. FAC. - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	320					-	14			-	184					61	21
- HOURS PER UNIT	2.96					-	1.00			-	4.00					2.18	2.10
PRODUCTIVE HOURS - INS PERSONNEL	296					-	14			-	184					53	21
NON-SERVICE DETENTION FACILITIES																	
NUMBER DETAINED BEGINNING OF PERIOD	5	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
DETAINEES ADMITTED	14	1								4	2		1			2	3
NUMBER DETAINED DURING PERIOD	19	2								8	2		1			2	3
DETAINEES REMOVED DURING PERIOD	17	1								8	2		1			2	3
NUMBER DETAINED END OF PERIOD	2	1								-	-		-			-	-
MAN-DAYS DETENTION DURING PERIOD	90	18								34	9		3			6	15
AVERAGE DAYS DET. PER DETAINEE	4.73	9.00								4.25	4.50		3.00			3.00	5.00
NON-SERV. DET.FAC. - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	9	2								4	-		-			-	1
- HOURS PER UNIT	.474	1.00								.500	-		-			-	.333

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: JULY 1953

ST.ALBANS District No.1 (Continued)

II DETENTION, DEPORTATION AND PAROLE ACTIVITY	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vance-boro	Halifax	Montreal													
WARRANT OF ARREST PROCESSING		⊗		⊗	⊗													
COMPLETED	2	-	-	-	-													
W/A PROCESSING - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	5																	
- HOURS PER UNIT	2.50																	
WARRANT OF ARREST SERVICE																		
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-													
RECEIVED	2																	
TOTAL	2																	
COMPLETED	2																	
PENDING END OF PERIOD	-																	
W/A SERVICE - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	2																	
- HOURS PER UNIT	1.00																	
WARRANT HEARINGS																		
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-													
RECEIVED																		
TOTAL																		
COMPLETED																		
SUBVERSIVE																		
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC																		
SUSPENSION																		
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS																		
OTHER																		
PENDING END OF PERIOD																		
WARRANT HEARINGS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	7																	
- HOURS PER UNIT	-																	
ON APPEAL - TOTAL	-																	
FINAL ORDERS ENTERED OR RECEIVED	-																	
TRAVEL TIME - WARRANT HEARING OPERATION	4																	
LOST TIME - WARRANT HEARING OPERATION	-																	
PAROLE AND SUPERVISION																		
CONDITIONAL PAROLE																		
ALIENS ON PAROLE BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	2	-	-													
PLACED ON PAROLE DURING PERIOD			-															
TOTAL ON PAROLE DURING PERIOD			2															
REMOVED FROM PAROLE DURING PERIOD			-															
ALIENS ON PAROLE END OF PERIOD			2															
SUBVERSIVE																		
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC																		
SUSPENSION																		
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS			1															
OTHER			1															
COND. PAROLE - PRODUCTIVE HOURS			-															
- HOURS PER UNIT			-															

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: JULY 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1 (Continued)

II DETENTION, DEPORTATION AND PAROLE ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vance-boro	Halifax	Montreal												
INTERNAL SECURITY ACT SUPERVISION		(X)		(X)	(X)												
ALIENS UNDER SUPER'N BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
PLACED UNDER SUPER'N DURING PERIOD																	
TOTAL UNDER SUPER'N DURING PERIOD																	
REMOVED FROM SUPER'N DURING PERIOD																	
ALIENS UNDER SUPER'N END OF PERIOD																	
SUBVERSIVE																	
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC																	
SUSPENSION																	
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS																	
OTHER																	
ISA SUPERVISION - PRODUCTIVE HOURS																	
- HOURS PER UNIT																	
OTHER TYPES OF PAROLE																	
ALIENS ON PAROLE BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
PLACED ON PAROLE DURING PERIOD																	
TOTAL ON PAROLE DURING PERIOD																	
REMOVED FROM PAROLE DURING PERIOD																	
ALIENS ON PAROLE END OF PERIOD																	
OTHER TYPES OF PAROLE-PRODUCTIVE HOURS																	
-HOURS PER UNIT																	
TRAVEL TIME - PAROLE & SUPER'N OPERATION																	
LOST TIME - PAROLE & SUPER'N OPERATION																	
SERVICE DETENTION FACILITIES																	
NUMBER DETAINED BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
DETAINEES ADMITTED			4														
NUMBER DETAINED DURING PERIOD			4														
EXCLUSION			4														
DETAINEES REMOVED DURING PERIOD			4														
NUMBER DETAINED END OF PERIOD			-														
MAN-DAYS DETENTION DURING PERIOD			4														
EXCLUSION			4														
EXPULSION			-														
AVERAGE DAYS DET. PER DETAINEE			1.00														
SERVICE DET. FAC. - PRODUCTIVE HOURS			40														
- HOURS PER UNIT			10.0														
PRODUCTIVE HOURS - INS PERSONNEL			24														
NON-SERVICE DETENTION FACILITIES																	
NUMBER DETAINED BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
DETAINEES ADMITTED	1																
NUMBER DETAINED DURING PERIOD	1																
DETAINEES REMOVED DURING PERIOD	-																
NUMBER DETAINED END OF PERIOD	1																
MAN-DAYS DETENTION DURING PERIOD	5																
AVERAGE DAYS DET. PER DETAINEE	5.00																
NON-SERV. DET.FAC. - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	2																
- HOURS PER UNIT	2.00																

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: JULY 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1

II DETENTION, DEPORTATION AND PAROLE ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	TOTAL	Bangor	Burlington	Calais	Fort Fairfield	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford ⊗	Roosevelttown	Rouses Point	St. Albans
DEPORTATION																	
ALIENS PROCESSED FOR DEPORTATION	23	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-		-	-	22
ALIENS PROCESSED FOR VOLUNTARY DEPARTURE	39				1	3	3	-		1	-		8			18	-
TOTAL	62				1	3	3	1		1	-		8			18	22
ALIENS DEPORTED	7				-	-	-	1		-	-		-			4	1
VOLUNTARY DEPARTURES	72			7	1	3	3	-	5	1	5	1	8		12	18	-
UNDER W/A	2			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		-		-	1	
WITHOUT W/A	70			7	1	3	3	-	5	1	5	1	8		12	17	
REMOVALS	-			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		-		-	-	
DEPORTATION-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	29.5			-	1	2	-	1	-	-	-	-	2		-	25	260
-HOURS PER UNIT	4.76			-	1.00	.666	-	1.00	-	-	-	-	.250		-	1.39	11.8
TRAVEL TIME - DEPORTATION OPERATION	18			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		-	16	2
LOST TIME - DEPORTATION OPERATION	58			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		-	-	-
III INVESTIGATIONS ACTIVITY																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	161	10	1	1	6	-	2	1	-	3	-	8	1	-	2	11	69
RECEIVED DURING PERIOD	410	19	9	5	7	11	10	8	6	13	33	5	6		2	44	149
TOTAL	571	29	10	6	13	11	12	9	6	16	33	13	7		4	55	218
COMPLETED	408	17	8	5	7	11	12	9	6	13	33	3	7		2	46	151
NATURALIZATION & CITIZENSHIP	35	1	3	-	-	-	1				-	-			-		26
CANCELLATION - SUBVERSIVE	-																
CANCELLATION - OTHER	-																
NATURALIZATION	23		3														20
OTHER	12	1					1										6
DEPORTATION	134	1		-	3	-	3	1	6	7	16	-	6		-	24	21
SUBVERSIVE	2																
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC	2																
ADDRESS REPORT CARD (I-53)	17							1		2	1		3			1	9
SUSPENSION	-																
NON-IMMIGRANTS	48				1		1		2							20	3
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS	18						2		3	5			1			3	
DISPLACED PERSONS	1								-								1
OTHER	46	1			2				1		15		2				8
SMUGGLING	4								-								4
PRIVATE BILLS	1																
PAROLE	6		1				1										4
ALIEN REGISTRATION	13		4				2			1							5
ALIEN ADDRESS REPORT (SEC. 35)	82	14		3	4		4	4		4	17	1				20	3
MISCELLANEOUS	133	1		2		11	1	4		1		2	1		2	2	88
PENDING END OF PERIOD	163	12	2	1	6	-	-	-	-	3	-	10	-		2	9	67
NATURALIZATION & CITIZENSHIP	18	2	1	-								2					10
CANCELLATION - SUBVERSIVE	3																3
CANCELLATION - OTHER	-																
NATURALIZATION	6	1	1									2					2
OTHER	9	1															5

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: JULY 1953

ST.ALBANS District No.1

III INVESTIGATIONS ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	TOTAL	Bangor	Burlington	Calais	Fort Fairfield	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Maddawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Rooseveltown	Rouses Point	St. Albans
PENDING END OF PERIOD (CONT'D)									(X)					(X)			
DEPORTATION	85	7	1	1	6	-	-	-		1	-	4	-	-	1	8	20
SUBVERSIVE	10																9
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC	6											1				5	
ADDRESS REPORT CARD (1-53)	23	6	1	1	2					1		1				3	8
SUSPENSION	1																1
NON-IMMIGRANTS	32	1															
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS	1																
DISPLACED PERSONS	1																1
OTHERS	11				4							2			1		1
SMUGGLING	13																13
PRIVATE BILLS	1														1		
PAROLE	.																
ALIEN REGISTRATION	3	2															
ALIEN ADDRESS REPORT (SEC. 35)	2	1										1					
MISCELLANEOUS	41									2		3				1	24
INVESTIGATIONS RESULTING IN W/A OR V/D	27				1	-				5						21	
ALIENS APPRH'D. (BY OTHER THAN B.P.)	2															1	
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS	.																
MEXICANS APPRH'D. (BY OTHER THAN B.P.)	.																
ILLEGALLY IN AGRICULTURE	-																
ILLEGALLY IN TRADE OR INDUSTRY	-																
OTHER	-																
W/A THRU ADDRESS REPORT CARD (1-53)	1															1	
INVESTIGATIONS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	1355	22	7	4	6	7	10	10	4	23	12	8	13		4	35	1079
- HOURS PER UNIT	3.32	1.29	.875	.800	.857	.636	.833	1.11	.666	1.77	.364	2.66	1.86		2.00	.761	7.14
TRAVEL TIME - INVESTIGATIONS ACTIVITY	224	6	-	-	4	-	11	12	.	1	.	-	3		2	9	117
IV APPLICATIONS EXAMINATION ACTIVITY																	
NATIONALITY																	
N-300 PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
RECEIVED	2																2
COMPLETED	2																2
PENDING END OF PERIOD	-																-
N-400 SERIES - PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	221	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	221
RECEIVED	152																152
COMPLETED	102																102
PENDING END OF PERIOD	271																271
N-600 PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	40	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	40
RECEIVED	10																10
COMPLETED	15																15
PENDING END OF PERIOD	35																35
N-500 SERIES - PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	17	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	17
RECEIVED	8																8
COMPLETED	7																7
PENDING END OF PERIOD	18																18

Form G-21.5 B (7-1-52)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: JULY 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1 (Continued)

II DETENTION, DEPORTATION AND PAROLE ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vance-Boro	Halifax	Montreal
DEPORTATION					
ALIENS PROCESSED FOR DEPORTATION	-	-	-	-	-
ALIENS PROCESSED FOR VOLUNTARY DEPARTURE	3		2		
TOTAL	3		2		
ALIENS DEPORTED	-	1			
VOLUNTARY DEPARTURES	3	3	2		
UNDER W/A	1	-	-		
WITHOUT W/A	2	3	2		
REMOVALS	-	-	-		
DEPORTATION-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	2	.	2		
-HOURS PER UNIT	.667	-	1.00		
TRAVEL TIME - DEPORTATION OPERATION	-	-	-		
LOST TIME - DEPORTATION OPERATION	-		.58		
III INVESTIGATIONS ACTIVITY					
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	1	1	1	7	36
RECEIVED DURING PERIOD	8	3	8	7	57
TOTAL	9	4	9	14	93
COMPLETED	9	2	8	11	48
NATURALIZATION & CITIZENSHIP	2	-	-	1	1
CANCELLATION - SUBVERSIVE					
CANCELLATION - OTHER					
NATURALIZATION					
OTHER	2			1	1
DEPORTATION	4	-	-	8	34
SUBVERSIVE					2
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC					2
ADDRESS REPORT CARD (I-53)					
SUSPENSION					
NON-IMMIGRANTS	1				20
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS	3				1
DISPLACED PERSONS					
OTHER				8	9
SMUGGLING					1
PRIVATE BILLS					
PAROLE					
ALIEN REGISTRATION		1			
ALIEN ADDRESS REPORT (SEC. 35)	2	1	5		
MISCELLANEOUS	1	-	3	2	12
PENDING END OF PERIOD	-	2	1	3	45
NATURALIZATION & CITIZENSHIP		1			2
CANCELLATION - SUBVERSIVE					
CANCELLATION - OTHER					
NATURALIZATION					
OTHER		1			2

Form G-21.6 B(7-1-52)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: JULY 1953

ST.ALBANS District No.1 (Continued)

III INVESTIGATIONS ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vance-boro	Halifax	Montreal												
PENDING END OF PERIOD (CONT'D)																	
DEPORTATION	-	-	1	-	35												
SUBVERSIVE					1												
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC																	
ADDRESS REPORT CARD (1-53)																	
SUSPENSION																	
NON-IMMIGRANTS					31												
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS			1														
DISPLACED PERSONS																	
OTHERS					3												
SMUGGLING																	
PRIVATE BILLS																	
PAROLE																	
ALIEN REGISTRATION		1															
ALIEN ADDRESS REPORT (SEC. 35)																	
MISCELLANEOUS				3	8												
INVESTIGATIONS RESULTING IN W/A OR V/D																	
ALIENS APPRH'D. (BY OTHER THAN B.P.)																	
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS																	
MEXICANS APPRH'D. (BY OTHER THAN B.P.)																	
ILLEGALLY IN AGRICULTURE																	
ILLEGALLY IN TRADE OR INDUSTRY																	
OTHER																	
W/A THRU ADDRESS REPORT CARD (1-53)																	
INVESTIGATIONS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	24	2	6	9	70												
- HOURS PER UNIT	2.66	1.00	.750	.818	1.45												
TRAVEL TIME - INVESTIGATIONS ACTIVITY	3	-	-	5	51												
IV APPLICATIONS EXAMINATION ACTIVITY																	
NATIONALITY																	
N-300 PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
RECEIVED																	
COMPLETED																	
PENDING END OF PERIOD																	
N-400 SERIES - PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
RECEIVED																	
COMPLETED																	
PENDING END OF PERIOD																	
N-600 PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
RECEIVED																	
COMPLETED																	
PENDING END OF PERIOD																	
N-500 SERIES - PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
RECEIVED																	
COMPLETED																	
PENDING END OF PERIOD																	

Form G-21.7 A (7-1-52)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: JULY 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1

IV APPLICATIONS EXAMINATION ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	TOTAL	Bangor	Burlington	Calais	Fort Fairfield	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Rooseveltown	Rouses Point	St. Albans
IMMIGRATION																	
REENTRY PERMITS-PENDING BEG. OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
RECEIVED	17																17
COMPLETED	17																17
PENDING END OF PERIOD	-																-
VISA PETITIONS-PENDING BEG. OF PERIOD	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
RECEIVED	15																15
COMPLETED	16																16
PENDING END OF PERIOD	-																-
OTHER-PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	16	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	16
RECEIVED	290																290
COMPLETED	292																292
PENDING END OF PERIOD	14																14
NATIONALITY APPLICATIONS-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	165																165
-HOURS PER UNIT	1.30																1.30
IMMIGRATION APPLICATIONS-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	125																125
-HOURS PER UNIT	.384																.384
DECLARATIONS FILED	3																3
V VERIFICATION OF ARRIVALS AND DEPARTURES ACTIVITY																	
VERIFICATION REQUESTS																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	1058	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1058
RECEIVED DURING PERIOD	2343	22	2	13	2	6	7	18	9	12	215	18	11		2	53	1653
TOTAL	3401	22	2	13	2	6	7	18	9	12	215	18	11		2	53	2711
COMPLETED	2136	22	2	13	2	6	7	18	9	12	215	18	11		2	53	1446
NATURALIZATION	221	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		-	-	221
OTHER	1915	22	2	13	2	6	7	18	9	12	215	18	11		2	53	1225
PENDING END OF PERIOD	1265	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		-	-	1265
VERIFICATION-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	832	5	2	3	2	2	1	5	2	6	29	5	3		2	24	646
-HOURS PER UNIT	.389	.227	1.00	.231	1.00	.333	.143	.278	.222	.500	.135	.278	.273		1.00	.453	.446
VI NATURALIZATION AND CITIZENSHIP ACTIVITY																	
PRELIM. INVEST. CIT. & NAT. APPLN'S																	
PRELIM. INVESTIGATIONS (N-400 SERIES)																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	653	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	*652
RECEIVED	101													1			100
COMPLETED	838													1			237
PENDING END OF PERIOD	516													1			515
CITIZENSHIP (N-600 APPLICATIONS)																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	5	-	1	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
RECEIVED	15	3	2				-										10
COMPLETED	13	2	2				2										7
PENDING END OF PERIOD	7	1	1				-										5

Form G-21.8[A] (7-1-52)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: JULY 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1

VI NATURALIZATION AND CITIZENSHIP ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	TOTAL	Bangor	Burlington	Calais	Fort Fairfield	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Roosevelttown	Rouses Point	St. Albans
NATIONALITY APPLN'S. (N-500 SERIES)																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
RECEIVED	2		2														
COMPLETED	1		1														
PENDING END OF PERIOD	2		2														
PETITIONS FILED	219																
N-600 HEARINGS COMPLETED	3	1	2														
CERTIFICATES ISSUED (N-600 APPLN'S)	11																
CERTIFICATES ISSUED (N-500 SERIES)	-																
PRELIM. INVESTIGATIONS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	329	2		-			-							1			
- HOURS PER UNIT	1.38	-		-			-							1.00			
CIT. (N-600 APPLN'S) - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	77	3	5	1			2							-			
- HOURS PER UNIT	5.92	1.50	2.50	-			1.00							-			
NAT. APPLN'S - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	5	-	1	-			-							-			
- HOURS PER UNIT	5.00	-	1.00	-			-							-			
NATURALIZATION HEARINGS																	
PETITIONS PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	349	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	349
PETITIONS PENDING DURING PERIOD	568																568
PETITIONS COMPLETED	22																22
GRANTED	22																22
DENIED	-																-
PETITIONS PENDING END OF PERIOD	546																546
PETITIONS READY FOR FINAL HEARING	546																546
PETITIONS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	108																108
- HOURS PER UNIT	4.90																4.90
TRAVEL TIME - NAT. & CIT. ACTIVITY	43																43
LOST TIME - NAT. & CIT. ACTIVITY	4																4
CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION 1/																	
CITIZENSHIP ASSISTANCE FURNISHED																	
ALIENS REFERRED TO PUBLIC SCHOOLS																	
ALIENS INFORMED OF HOME STUDY																	
NAME SLIPS TO PUBLIC SCHOOLS CORRES. CTRS.																	
ALIENS ADMITTED TO CITIZENSHIP																	
ATTENDED PUBLIC SCHOOL CLASSES																	
ENROLLED IN HOME STUDY COURSES																	
NUMBER SUBMITTING PUBLIC SCHOOL CERT.																	
VII EMPLOYMENT SUMMARY																	
NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES END OF PERIOD	297	3	2	20	4	12	8	11	12	15	22	16	10	10	7	34	62
OPERATIONS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	45113	316	336	3205	669	2180	1455	1812	1886	3041	4061	2920	1873	2070	1092	6153	5450
OPERATIONS - NON-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	4797	128	-	208	112	112	20	212	200	253	243	224	140	260	232	685	1103
ADMINISTRATION - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	7849	86	172	625	27	156	21	184	295	190	184	228	100	8	114	366	3473
ADMINISTRATION - NON-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	1153	4	-	24	-	-	-	-	16	-	-	-	-	-	12	-	456
TOTAL HOURS EMPLOYMENT	58912	534	508	4062	808	2448	1496	2208	2397	3484	4488	3372	2113	2338	1450	7204	10482
PERCENTAGE TOTAL HOURS ON OPERATIONS	84.7	83.1	66.1	84.0	96.7	93.6	98.6	91.7	87.0	94.5	95.9	93.2	95.3	99.6	91.3	94.9	62.5

1/ Source: Form N-28

Form G-21.7B (7-1-52)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: JULY 1953

ST.ALBANS District No.1 (Continued)

IV APPLICATIONS EXAMINATION ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vance-Boro	Halifax	Montreal												
IMMIGRATION																	
REENTRY PERMITS-PENDING BEG. OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
RECEIVED																	
COMPLETED																	
PENDING END OF PERIOD																	
VISA PETITIONS-PENDING BEG. OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
RECEIVED																	
COMPLETED																	
PENDING END OF PERIOD																	
OTHER-PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
RECEIVED																	
COMPLETED																	
PENDING END OF PERIOD																	
NATIONALITY APPLICATIONS-PRODUCTIVE HOURS																	
-HOURS PER UNIT																	
IMMIGRATION APPLICATIONS-PRODUCTIVE HOURS																	
-HOURS PER UNIT																	
DECLARATIONS FILED																	
V VERIFICATION OF ARRIVALS AND DEPARTURES ACTIVITY																	
VERIFICATION REQUESTS																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
RECEIVED DURING PERIOD	59	32	38	27	144												
TOTAL	59	32	38	27	144												
COMPLETED	59	32	38	27	144												
NATURALIZATION	-	-	-	-	-												
OTHER	59	32	38	27	144												
PENDING END OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
VERIFICATION-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	32	16	14	7	26												
-HOURS PER UNIT	.542	.500	.370	.259	.181												
VI NATURALIZATION AND CITIZENSHIP ACTIVITY																	
PRELIM. INVEST. CIT. & NAT. APPLN'S																	
PRELIM. INVESTIGATIONS (N-400 SERIES)																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
RECEIVED																	
COMPLETED																	
PENDING END OF PERIOD																	
CITIZENSHIP (N-600 APPLICATIONS)																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
RECEIVED																	
COMPLETED																	
PENDING END OF PERIOD																	

Form G-21.8 B(7-1-52)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: JULY 1953

ST.ALBANS District No.1 (Continued)

VI NATURALIZATION AND CITIZENSHIP ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vanceboro	Halifax	Montreal												
NATIONALITY APPLN'S. (N-500 SERIES)	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗	⊗												
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
RECEIVED																	
COMPLETED																	
PENDING END OF PERIOD																	
PETITIONS FILED																	
N-600 HEARINGS COMPLETED																	
CERTIFICATES ISSUED (N-600 APPLN'S)																	
CERTIFICATES ISSUED (N-500 SERIES)																	
PRELIM. INVESTIGATIONS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS																	
- HOURS PER UNIT																	
CIT. (N-600 APPLN'S) - PRODUCTIVE HOURS																	
- HOURS PER UNIT																	
NAT. APPLN'S - PRODUCTIVE HOURS																	
- HOURS PER UNIT																	
NATURALIZATION HEARINGS																	
PETITIONS PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
PETITIONS PENDING DURING PERIOD																	
PETITIONS COMPLETED																	
GRANTED																	
DENIED																	
PETITIONS PENDING END OF PERIOD																	
PETITIONS READY FOR FINAL HEARING																	
PETITIONS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS																	
- HOURS PER UNIT																	
TRAVEL TIME - NAT. & CIT. ACTIVITY																	
LOST TIME - NAT. & CIT. ACTIVITY																	
CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION 1/																	
CITIZENSHIP ASSISTANCE FURNISHED																	
ALIENS REFERRED TO PUBLIC SCHOOLS																	
ALIENS INFORMED OF HOME STUDY																	
NAME SLIPS TO PUBLIC SCHOOLS CORRES.CTRS.																	
ALIENS ADMITTED TO CITIZENSHIP																	
ATTENDED PUBLIC SCHOOL CLASSES																	
ENROLLED IN HOME STUDY COURSES																	
NUMBER SUBMITTING PUBLIC SCHOOL CERT.																	
VII EMPLOYMENT SUMMARY																	
NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES END OF PERIOD	11	10	10	3	15												
OPERATIONS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	2088	1334	1579	291	1302												
OPERATIONS - NON-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	-	260	192	104	109												
ADMINISTRATION - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	109	212	302	143	854												
ADMINISTRATION - NON-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	83	106	4	-	448												
TOTAL HOURS EMPLOYMENT	2280	1912	2077	538	2713												
PERCENTAGE TOTAL HOURS ON OPERATIONS	91.6	83.4	85.2	73.4	52.0												

1/ Source: Form N-28

Form G-21.1 A (7-1-52)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: AUGUST 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1

I ENTRY AND DEPARTURE ACTIVITY	TOTAL	Bangor	Burlington	Calais	Fort Fairfield	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Rooseveltown	Rouses Point	St. Albans
PRIMARY INSPECTION																	
BORDER CROSSERS ADMITTED - ALIENS	1316012	-	705	178548	31386	60907	55725	22973	134289	62943	107660	47627	58734	29465	62030	303629	5816
- CITIZENS	941411	7	1158	117813	24390	57276	29823	33625	86092	38978	92286	31891	30645	18689	38377	118243	5040
CREWMEN ADMITTED - ALIENS	219	189															
- CITIZENS	20	20															
OTHERS ADMITTED - ALIENS	9186		39	573	10	186	75	1493	435	77	609	689	177	26	72	1310	291
- CITIZENS	4054		10	49		494	4	116	16	57	84	2	85	5	166	360	194
ALIENS NOT ADMITTED	1033		1	71	3	37	20	18	8	14	60	15	37	10	30	235	8
PREEXAMINATIONS COMPLETED - IN U.S.	1	1															
- OUTSIDE U.S.	735																
FINES	-																
TOTAL WORK UNITS	2272671	217	1913	297054	55789	118900	85647	58225	220840	102069	200699	80224	89678	48195	100675	423777	105549
PRIMARY INSPECTION - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	43564	47	272	3971	1854	3066	2986	1840	1816	2794	3708	3309	2048	1146	1742	5895	11441
- HOURS PER UNIT	.019	.217	.142	.013	.033	.026	.034	.032	.008	.027	.002	.041	.023	.025	.017	.013	.108
PRODUCTIVE HOURS - INS PERSONNEL	33715	47	272	2939	590	1953	1318	1570	1816	2326	3372	2541	1858	886	1227	5195	11441
VESSELS BOARDED - ARRIVAL	122	35											31				
AIRPLANES BOARDED-ARRIVAL	249	11								1	1		2		24		
VESSELS & AIRPLANES BOARDED ON DEPARTURE	-	-											-				
BSI HEARINGS																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	13	-	-	2	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
RECEIVED	166			29			8	4	11				7			14	7
TOTAL	179			31			8	7	11				7			14	7
COMPLETED	168			30			8	4	11				7			14	7
PENDING END OF PERIOD	11			1			-	3	-				-			-	-
BSI HEARINGS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	778			100			18	8	31				11			34	188
- HOURS PER UNIT	4.63			3.33			2.25	2.00	2.82				1.57			2.43	26.8
PRODUCTIVE HOURS - INS PERSONNEL	778			100			18	8	31				11			34	188
AUTHORIZATIONS																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	50	3	2	-	2	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	4	-	31
RECEIVED	3467	55	55	60	69	138	122	1159	154	29	287	623	68	27	59	50	352
TOTAL	3517	58	57	60	71	138	122	1159	154	30	287	623	68	27	63	50	383
COMPLETED	3395	57	54	60	69	138	122	1159	154	29	287	623	68	27	57	50	277
BORDER CROSSING CARDS	920	30	42	10	59	113	105	40	11	24	170	32	58	17	44	48	15
REENTRY PERMITS ISSUED & EXTENDED	30		7														23
VISA PETITIONS	13																13
PREEXAMINATION AUTHORIZATIONS	1	1															-
EXTENSIONS OF STAY	32	4	2	5		1				1		1	1			1	16
REGISTRY	3														1		2
ALIEN LABORER'S CARDS	2004			21		13	1	1111	143	4	110	559		8	1	1	-
DUPLICATE ALIEN REGISTRATION CARDS	365	21	3	24	10	11	16	8			7	31	9	2	11		182
PERMISSION TO REAPPLY	11	-															11
CHANGE OF STATUS	1	1															-
APPLNS. TO IMPORT CONTRACT LABORERS	8																8
APPROVAL OF SCHOOLS	6																6
SECTION 4 D.P. APPLICATIONS	-																-
STUDENT EMPLOYMENT & TRANSFER	1																1

Form G-21.2 A (7-1-52)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: AUGUST 1955

ST.ALBANS District No. 1

I ENTRY AND DEPARTURE ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	TOTAL	Bangor	Burlington	Calais	Fort Fairfield	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Roosevelttown	Rouses Point	St. Albans
AUTHORIZATIONS - (Cont'd)																	
DENIED	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
BORDER CROSSING CARDS																	
REENTRY PERMITS																	
VISA PETITIONS																	
PREEXAMINATION AUTHORIZATIONS																	
EXTENSIONS OF STAY																	
REGISTRY																	
ALIEN LABORER'S CARDS																	
DUPLICATE ALIEN REGISTRATION CARDS																	
PERMISSION TO REAPPLY																	
CHANGE OF STATUS																	
APPLNS. TO IMPORT CONTRACT LABORERS																	
APPROVAL OF SCHOOLS																	
SECTION 4 D.P. APPLICATIONS																	
STUDENT EMPLOYMENT AND TRANSFER																	
PENDING END OF PERIOD	122	1	3	-	2	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	6	-	106
BORDER CROSSING CARDS	-																
REENTRY PERMITS	3		3														
VISA PETITIONS	-																
PREEXAMINATION AUTHORIZATIONS	1	1															
EXTENSIONS OF STAY	2									1							1
REGISTRY	2				1										1		
ALIEN LABORER'S CARDS	-																
DUPLICATE ALIEN REGISTRATION CARDS	29				1										5		14
PERMISSION TO REAPPLY	-																
CHANGE OF STATUS	-																
APPLNS. TO IMPORT CONTRACT LABORERS	89																89
APPROVAL OF SCHOOLS	-																
SECTION 4 D.P. APPLICATIONS	1																1
STUDENT EMPLOYMENT AND TRANSFER	1																1
AUTHORIZATIONS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	1410	58	23	15	15	127	15	196	28	16	197	113	23	7	32	78	377
- HOURS PER UNIT	.415	1.02	.426	.250	.217	.920	.122	.169	.181	.552	.686	.181	.338	.260	.561	1.56	1.36
TRAVEL TIME - ENTRY & DEPARTURE ACTIVITY	1449	27	10	30	4	-	8	42	36	39	258	177	2	-	1	134	304
LOST TIME - ENTRY & DEPARTURE ACTIVITY	2058	121	-	-	-	-	-	61	-	468	-	-	-	1282	-	-	-

Form G-21.1 B (7-1-52)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: AUGUST 1953

ST. ALBANS District No.1 (Continued)

I ENTRY AND DEPARTURE ACTIVITY	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vance-boro	Halifax	Montreal											
PRIMARY INSPECTION																
BORDER CROSSERS ADMITTED - ALIENS	66642	61394	24627	608	11044											
- CITIZENS	142528	52421	22111		18											
CREWMEN ADMITTED - ALIENS	30															
- CITIZENS	-															
OTHERS ADMITTED - ALIENS	285	45	333	210	2251											
- CITIZENS	-	3	7	13	2389											
ALIENS NOT ADMITTED	225	31	27	89	94											
PREEXAMINATIONS COMPLETED - IN U.S.	-															
- OUTSIDE U.S.	71	1	663													
FINES	-															
TOTAL WORK UNITS	209781	113895	47768	920	5856											
PRIMARY INSPECTION - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	2208	1263	1607	260	588											
- HOURS PER UNIT	.011	.011	.033	.283	.100											
PRODUCTIVE HOURS - INS PERSONNEL	1842	1263	1155	260	141											
VESSELS BOARDED - ARRIVAL	4		-	7	45											
AIRPLANES BOARDED-ARRIVAL	92		-	-	118											
VESSELS & AIRPLANES BOARDED ON DEPARTURE	-		-	-	-											
BSI HEARINGS																
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	1	-	-	-	7											
RECEIVED	3	6	8		69											
TOTAL	4	6	8		76											
COMPLETED	4	6	8		69											
PENDING END OF PERIOD	-	-	-		7											
BSI HEARINGS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	4	12	26		346											
- HOURS PER UNIT	1.00	2.00	3.25		5.01											
PRODUCTIVE HOURS - INS PERSONNEL	4	12	26		346											
AUTHORIZATIONS																
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	7	-	-	-	-											
RECEIVED	85	46	21		8											
TOTAL	92	46	21		8											
COMPLETED	89	46	21		8											
BORDER CROSSING CARDS	75	5	14		8											
REENTRY PERMITS ISSUED & EXTENDED																
VISA PETITIONS																
PREEXAMINATION AUTHORIZATIONS																
EXTENSIONS OF STAY																
REGISTRY																
ALIEN LABORER'S CARDS	2	30														
DUPLICATE ALIEN REGISTRATION CARDS	12	11	7													
PERMISSION TO REAPPLY																
CHANGE OF STATUS																
APPLNS. TO IMPORT CONTRACT LABORERS																
APPROVAL OF SCHOOLS																
SECTION 4 D.P. APPLICATIONS																
STUDENT EMPLOYMENT & TRANSFER																

Form G-21.2 B (7-1-52)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: AUGUST 1953

ST.ALBANS District No.1 (Continued)

I ENTRY AND DEPARTURE ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vanceboro	Halifax	Montreal												
AUTHORIZATIONS - (Cont'd)																	
DENIED	-	-	-	-	-												
BORDER CROSSING CARDS																	
REENTRY PERMITS																	
VISA PETITIONS																	
PREEXAMINATION AUTHORIZATIONS																	
EXTENSIONS OF STAY																	
REGISTRY																	
ALIEN LABORER'S CARDS																	
DUPLICATE ALIEN REGISTRATION CARDS																	
PERMISSION TO REAPPLY																	
CHANGE OF STATUS																	
APPLNS. TO IMPORT CONTRACT LABORERS																	
APPROVAL OF SCHOOLS																	
SECTION 4 D.P. APPLICATIONS																	
STUDENT EMPLOYMENT AND TRANSFER																	
PENDING END OF PERIOD	3	-	-	-	-												
BORDER CROSSING CARDS																	
REENTRY PERMITS																	
VISA PETITIONS																	
PREEXAMINATION AUTHORIZATIONS																	
EXTENSIONS OF STAY																	
REGISTRY																	
ALIEN LABORER'S CARDS																	
DUPLICATE ALIEN REGISTRATION CARDS	3																
PERMISSION TO REAPPLY																	
CHANGE OF STATUS																	
APPLNS. TO IMPORT CONTRACT LABORERS																	
APPROVAL OF SCHOOLS																	
SECTION 4 D.P. APPLICATIONS																	
STUDENT EMPLOYMENT AND TRANSFER																	
AUTHORIZATIONS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	61	23	4	-	2												
- HOURS PER UNIT	.685	.500	.190	-	.250												
TRAVEL TIME - ENTRY & DEPARTURE ACTIVITY	3	-	88	4	282												
LOST TIME - ENTRY & DEPARTURE ACTIVITY	22	-	33	-	71												

Form G-21.3A (7-1-52)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: AUGUST 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1

II DETENTION, DEPORTATION AND PAROLE ACTIVITY	TOTAL	Bangor	Burlington	Calais	Fort Fairfield	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Roosevelttown	Rouses Point	St. Albans
WARRANT OF ARREST PROCESSING																	
COMPLETED	28	3		1	-	-	3	-		10	-	1	-	-		8	1
W/A PROCESSING - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	38	3		1			2			12		2				5	8
- HOURS PER UNIT	1.36	1.00		1.00			.666			1.20		2.00				.625	8.00
WARRANT OF ARREST SERVICE																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
RECEIVED	18	3		1			2		1			1				8	1
TOTAL	19	3		1			2		1			1				9	1
COMPLETED	19	3		1			2		1			1				9	1
PENDING END OF PERIOD	-	-		-			-		-			-				-	-
W/A SERVICE - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	11	2		1			2		3			1				-	-
- HOURS PER UNIT	.578	.667		1.00			1.00		3.00			1.00				-	-
WARRANT HEARINGS																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	26	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	26
RECEIVED	15																15
TOTAL	41																41
COMPLETED	7																7
SUBVERSIVE	-																
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC	-																
SUSPENSION	-																
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS	1																1
OTHER	6																6
PENDING END OF PERIOD	34																34
WARRANT HEARINGS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	351															8	333
- HOURS PER UNIT	50.1															-	47.5
ON APPEAL - TOTAL	5																5
FINAL ORDERS ENTERED OR RECEIVED	7																7
TRAVEL TIME - WARRANT HEARING OPERATION	82															3	73
LOST TIME - WARRANT HEARING OPERATION	7															4	3
PAROLE AND SUPERVISION																	
CONDITIONAL PAROLE																	
ALIENS ON PAROLE BEGINNING OF PERIOD	33	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	31
PLACED ON PAROLE DURING PERIOD	4												1				1
TOTAL ON PAROLE DURING PERIOD	37												1				32
REMOVED FROM PAROLE DURING PERIOD	1												-				1
ALIENS ON PAROLE END OF PERIOD	36												1				31
SUBVERSIVE	-																
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC	5																5
SUSPENSION	1																1
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS	2																1
OTHER	28												1				24
COND. PAROLE - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	10												-				7
- HOURS PER UNIT	.270												-				.218

Form G-21.4 A (7-1-52)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: AUGUST 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1

II DETENTION, DEPORTATION AND PAROLE ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	TOTAL	Bangor	Burlington	Calais	Fort Fairfield	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Roosevelttown	Rouses Point	St. Albans
INTERNAL SECURITY ACT SUPERVISION																	
ALIENS UNDER SUPER'N BEGINNING OF PERIOD	9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9
PLACED UNDER SUPER'N DURING PERIOD	1																1
TOTAL UNDER SUPER'N DURING PERIOD	10																10
REMOVED FROM SUPER'N DURING PERIOD	-																-
ALIENS UNDER SUPER'N END OF PERIOD	10																10
SUBVERSIVE	-																
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC	5																5
SUSPENSION	-																
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS	-																
OTHER	5																5
ISA SUPERVISION - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	2																2
- HOURS PER UNIT	.200																.200
OTHER TYPES OF PAROLE																	
ALIENS ON PAROLE BEGINNING OF PERIOD	11	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	5	-	-	-	-	-	4
PLACED ON PAROLE DURING PERIOD	6							-			6						-
TOTAL ON PAROLE DURING PERIOD	17							2			11						4
REMOVED FROM PAROLE DURING PERIOD	3							-			3						-
ALIENS ON PAROLE END OF PERIOD	14							2			8						4
OTHER TYPES OF PAROLE-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	11							-			11						-
-HOURS PER UNIT	.647							-			1.00						-
TRAVEL TIME - PAROLE & SUPER'N OPERATION	-							-			-						-
LOST TIME - PAROLE & SUPER'N OPERATION	-							-			-						-
SERVICE DETENTION FACILITIES																	
NUMBER DETAINED BEGINNING OF PERIOD	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
DETAINEES ADMITTED	66			1		1		1		1	23	2				23	7
NUMBER DETAINED DURING PERIOD	68			1		1		1		1	23	2				25	7
EXCLUSION	46			-						1	19	-				13	7
DETAINEES REMOVED DURING PERIOD	65			1		1		1		1	23	2				22	7
NUMBER DETAINED END OF PERIOD	3			-		-		-		-	-	-				3	-
MAN-DAYS DETENTION DURING PERIOD	110			1		1		1		2	25	4				57	9
EXCLUSION	55			-						2	20	-				17	7
EXPULSION	55			1		1		1		-	5	4				40	2
AVERAGE DAYS DET. PER DETAINEE	1.62			1.00		1.00		1.00		2.00	1.08	2.00				2.28	1.29
SERVICE DET. FAC. - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	374			-		1		4		8	160	-				105	8
- HOURS PER UNIT	3.40			-		1.00		4.00		4.00	6.40	-				1.84	.888
PRODUCTIVE HOURS - INS PERSONNEL	302			-		1		4		8	160	-				73	8
NON-SERVICE DETENTION FACILITIES																	
NUMBER DETAINED BEGINNING OF PERIOD	2	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
DETAINEES ADMITTED	15	4					1			3	1						4
NUMBER DETAINED DURING PERIOD	17	5					1			3	1						4
DETAINEES REMOVED DURING PERIOD	5	1					1			-	1						1
NUMBER DETAINED END OF PERIOD	12	4					-			3	-						3
MAN-DAYS DETENTION DURING PERIOD	292	115					2			71	5						40
AVERAGE DAYS DET. PER DETAINEE	17.2	23.0					2.00			23.6	5.00						10.0
NON-SERV. DET.FAC. - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	15	6					-			5	-						1
- HOURS PER UNIT	.882	1.20					-			1.67	-						.250

Form G-21.3 B (7-1-52)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: AUGUST 1953

ST.ALBANS District No.1 (Continued)

II DETENTION, DEPORTATION AND PAROLE ACTIVITY	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vance-boro	Halifax	Montreal												
WARRANT OF ARREST PROCESSING																	
COMPLETED	1	-	-	-	-												
W/A PROCESSING - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	5																
- HOURS PER UNIT	5.00																
WARRANT OF ARREST SERVICE																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
RECEIVED	1																
TOTAL	1																
COMPLETED	1																
PENDING END OF PERIOD	-																
W/A SERVICE - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	2																
- HOURS PER UNIT	2.00																
WARRANT HEARINGS																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
RECEIVED																	
TOTAL																	
COMPLETED																	
SUBVERSIVE																	
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC																	
SUSPENSION																	
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS																	
OTHER																	
PENDING END OF PERIOD																	
WARRANT HEARINGS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	10																
- HOURS PER UNIT	-																
ON APPEAL - TOTAL																	
FINAL ORDERS ENTERED OR RECEIVED																	
TRAVEL TIME - WARRANT HEARING OPERATION	6																
LOST TIME - WARRANT HEARING OPERATION	-																
PAROLE AND SUPERVISION																	
CONDITIONAL PAROLE																	
ALIENS ON PAROLE BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	2	-	-												
PLACED ON PAROLE DURING PERIOD			2														
TOTAL ON PAROLE DURING PERIOD			4														
REMOVED FROM PAROLE DURING PERIOD			-														
ALIENS ON PAROLE END OF PERIOD			4														
SUBVERSIVE																	
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC																	
SUSPENSION																	
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS			1														
OTHER			3														
COND. PAROLE - PRODUCTIVE HOURS			3														
- HOURS PER UNIT			.750														

Form G-21.4 B (7-1-52)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED:

ST.ALBANS District No. 1 (Continued)

II DETENTION, DEPORTATION AND PAROLE ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vanceboro	Halifax	Montreal												
INTERNAL SECURITY ACT SUPERVISION																	
ALIENS UNDER SUPER'N BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
PLACED UNDER SUPER'N DURING PERIOD																	
TOTAL UNDER SUPER'N DURING PERIOD																	
REMOVED FROM SUPER'N DURING PERIOD																	
ALIENS UNDER SUPER'N END OF PERIOD																	
SUBVERSIVE																	
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC																	
SUSPENSION																	
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS																	
OTHER																	
ISA SUPERVISION - PRODUCTIVE HOURS																	
- HOURS PER UNIT																	
OTHER TYPES OF PAROLE																	
ALIENS ON PAROLE BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
PLACED ON PAROLE DURING PERIOD																	
TOTAL ON PAROLE DURING PERIOD																	
REMOVED FROM PAROLE DURING PERIOD																	
ALIENS ON PAROLE END OF PERIOD																	
OTHER TYPES OF PAROLE-PRODUCTIVE HOURS																	
-HOURS PER UNIT																	
TRAVEL TIME - PAROLE & SUPER'N OPERATION																	
LOST TIME - PAROLE & SUPER'N OPERATION																	
SERVICE DETENTION FACILITIES																	
NUMBER DETAINED BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
DETAINEES ADMITTED			7														
NUMBER DETAINED DURING PERIOD			7														
EXCLUSION			6														
DETAINEES REMOVED DURING PERIOD			7														
NUMBER DETAINED END OF PERIOD			-														
MAN-DAYS DETENTION DURING PERIOD			10														
EXCLUSION			9														
EXPULSION			1														
AVERAGE DAYS DET. PER DETAINEE			1.43														
SERVICE DET. FAC. - PRODUCTIVE HOURS			88														
- HOURS PER UNIT			8.80														
PRODUCTIVE HOURS - INS PERSONNEL			48														
NON-SERVICE DETENTION FACILITIES																	
NUMBER DETAINED BEGINNING OF PERIOD	1	-	-	-	-												
DETAINEES ADMITTED	2																
NUMBER DETAINED DURING PERIOD	3																
DETAINEES REMOVED DURING PERIOD	1																
NUMBER DETAINED END OF PERIOD	2																
MAN-DAYS DETENTION DURING PERIOD	59																
AVERAGE DAYS DET. PER DETAINEE	20.0																
NON-SERV. DET.FAC. - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	3																
- HOURS PER UNIT	1.00																

Form G-21.5 A(7-1-52)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: AUGUST 195[illegible]

ST. ALBANS District No. 1

II DETENTION, DEPORTATION AND PAROLE ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	TOTAL	Bangor	Burlington	Calais	Fort Fairfield	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Roosevelt Town	Rouses Point	St. Albans
DEPORTATION																	
ALIENS PROCESSED FOR DEPORTATION	11	-		-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	6
ALIENS PROCESSED FOR VOLUNTARY DEPARTURE	34				2	5	2	1		2			6			3	1
TOTAL	45				2	5	3	1		2			6			4	7
ALIENS DEPORTED	11				-	-	1			-			-			6	1
VOLUNTARY DEPARTURES	51			3	2	5	2	1		2	1	1	8	4	4	5	1
UNDER W/A	3			-	-	-	1			-	-	-	1	-	-	1	-
WITHOUT W/A	48			3	2	5	1	1		2	1	1	7	4	4	4	1
REMOVALS	-			-	-	-	-			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
DEPORTATION-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	228			-	2	1	2	1		-	-	-	2	-	-	24	184
-HOURS PER UNIT	5.07			-	1.00	.200	.666	1.00		-	-	-	.333	-	-	6.00	26.3
TRAVEL TIME - DEPORTATION OPERATION	10			-	-	-	-	2		-	-	-	-	-	-	8	-
LOST TIME - DEPORTATION OPERATION	24			-	-	-	-	-		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
III INVESTIGATIONS ACTIVITY																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	163	12	2	1	6	-	-	-	-	3	-	10	-	-	2	9	67
RECEIVED DURING PERIOD	360	7	6	6	3	3	5	13	4	4	15	3	7		2	41	130
TOTAL	523	19	8	7	9	3	5	13	4	7	15	13	7		4	50	197
COMPLETED	307	6	6	6	3	3	5	12	4	4	15	7	6		3	38	101
NATURALIZATION & CITIZENSHIP	19	1					1		3			2	-		-	1	5
CANCELLATION - SUBVERSIVE	-																
CANCELLATION - OTHER	1															1	
NATURALIZATION	7	1							1			2					2
OTHER	11						1		2								3
DEPORTATION	122	4	1	1	1		3	1	1	3	4	2	2		1	13	28
SUBVERSIVE	4																3
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC	5	2					2					1					
ADDRESS REPORT CARD (I-53)	24		1							1	2	1					19
SUSPENSION	1																1
NON-IMMIGRANTS	59	1								1			1			8	
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS	15	1						1		1	1					5	2
DISPLACED PERSONS	-																
OTHER	14			1	1		1		1		1		1		1		3
SMUGGLING	5							1									4
PRIVATE BILLS	1																1
PAROLE	1						1										
ALIEN REGISTRATION	8		5														2
ALIEN ADDRESS REPORT (SEC. 35)	64	1		3	2	3		6		1	11		3			23	4
MISCELLANEOUS	87	-		2	-			4				3	1		2	1	57
PENDING END OF PERIOD	216	13	2	1	6	-	-	1	-	3	-	6	1		1	12	96
NATURALIZATION & CITIZENSHIP	55	3	1														42
CANCELLATION - SUBVERSIVE	3															-	3
CANCELLATION - OTHER	-																-
NATURALIZATION	33	2	1														30
OTHER	19	1	-														9

Form G-21.6 A (7-1-52)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: AUGUST 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1

III INVESTIGATIONS ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	TOTAL	Bangor	Burlington	Calais	Fort Fairfield	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Roosevelttown	Rouses Point	St. Albans
PENDING END OF PERIOD (CONT'D)																	
DEPORTATION	110	7	1	1	6	-	-	-	-	1	-	3	1	-	-	10	24
SUBVERSIVE	6																6
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC	7															7	
ADDRESS REPORT CARD (1-53)	25	6	1	1	2								1			3	11
SUSPENSION	2																2
NON-IMMIGRANTS	48	1															
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS	4																1
DISPLACED PERSONS	2									1							1
OTHERS	16				4							3					3
SMUGGLING	13																13
PRIVATE BILLS	1														1		
PAROLE	1																1
ALIEN REGISTRATION	3	2															
ALIEN ADDRESS REPORT (SEC. 35)	2	1										1					
MISCELLANEOUS	31							1		2		2				2	16
INVESTIGATIONS RESULTING IN W/A OR V/D	24	3		1			3	1	1	2						12	
ALIENS APPRH'D. (BY OTHER THAN B.P.)	6	2														4	
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS	-																
MEXICANS APPRH'D. (BY OTHER THAN B.P.)	-																
ILLEGALLY IN AGRICULTURE	-																
ILLEGALLY IN TRADE OR INDUSTRY	-																
OTHER	-																
W/A THRU ADDRESS REPORT CARD (1-53)	-																
INVESTIGATIONS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	1558	30	4	6	5	3	9	12	3	5	11	22	10	-	2	78	1259
- HOURS PER UNIT	5.07	5.00	.667	1.00	1.66	1.00	1.80	1.00	.750	1.25	.733	3.14	1.67	-	.667	2.05	12.4
TRAVEL TIME - INVESTIGATIONS ACTIVITY	322	9	-	-	4	-	14	4	1	-	-	4	3	-	1	2	197
IV APPLICATIONS EXAMINATION ACTIVITY																	
NATIONALITY																	
N-300 PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
RECEIVED	6																6
COMPLETED	6																6
PENDING END OF PERIOD	-																-
N-400 SERIES - PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	271	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	271
RECEIVED	175																175
COMPLETED	77																77
PENDING END OF PERIOD	369																369
N-600 PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	35	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	35
RECEIVED	14																14
COMPLETED	10																10
PENDING END OF PERIOD	39																39
N-500 SERIES - PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	18	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	18
RECEIVED	2																2
COMPLETED	15																15
PENDING END OF PERIOD	5																5

Form G-21.5a (7-1-52)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: AUGUST 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1 (Continued)

II DETENTION, DEPORTATION AND PAROLE ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vance-boro	Halifax	Montreal												
DEPORTATION																	
ALIENS PROCESSED FOR DEPORTATION	3	-	-	-	-												
ALIENS PROCESSED FOR VOLUNTARY DEPARTURE	9		3														
TOTAL	12		3														
ALIENS DEPORTED	3		-														
VOLUNTARY DEPARTURES	9		3														
UNDER W/A	-		-														
WITHOUT W/A	9		3														
REMOVALS	-		-														
DEPORTATION-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	9		3														
-HOURS PER UNIT	.750		1.00														
TRAVEL TIME - DEPORTATION OPERATION	-		-														
LOST TIME - DEPORTATION OPERATION	-		24														
III INVESTIGATIONS ACTIVITY																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	2	1	3	45												
RECEIVED DURING PERIOD	3	4	10	3	91												
TOTAL	3	6	11	6	136												
COMPLETED	3	5	11	6	63												
NATURALIZATION & CITIZENSHIP	2	2		-	2												
CANCELLATION - SUBVERSIVE																	
CANCELLATION - OTHER																	
NATURALIZATION					1												
OTHER	2	2			1												
DEPORTATION	1	2	1	-	53												
SUBVERSIVE					1												
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC																	
ADDRESS REPORT CARD (1-53)																	
SUSPENSION																	
NON-IMMIGRANTS					48												
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS	1	2	1														
DISPLACED PERSONS																	
OTHER					4												
SMUGGLING																	
PRIVATE BILLS																	
PAROLE																	
ALIEN REGISTRATION		1															
ALIEN ADDRESS REPORT (SEC. 35)			7														
MISCELLANEOUS			3	6	8												
PENDING END OF PERIOD	-	1	-	-	73												
NATURALIZATION & CITIZENSHIP					9												
CANCELLATION - SUBVERSIVE																	
CANCELLATION - OTHER																	
NATURALIZATION																	
OTHER					9												

Form G-21.6B (7-1-52)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: AUGUST 1953

ST.ALBANS District No.1 (Continued)

III INVESTIGATIONS ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vance-boro	Halifax	Montreal												
PENDING END OF PERIOD (CONT'D)																	
DEPORTATION	-	-		-	56												
SUBVERSIVE																	
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC																	
ADDRESS REPORT CARD (1-53)																	
SUSPENSION																	
NON-IMMIGRANTS					47												
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS					3												
DISPLACED PERSONS																	
OTHERS					6												
SMUGGLING																	
PRIVATE BILLS																	
PAROLE																	
ALIEN REGISTRATION		1															
ALIEN ADDRESS REPORT (SEC. 35)																	
MISCELLANEOUS					8												
INVESTIGATIONS RESULTING IN W/A OR V/D	1																
ALIENS APPRH'D. (BY OTHER THAN B.P.)																	
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS																	
MEXICANS APPRH'D. (BY OTHER THAN B.P.)																	
ILLEGALLY IN AGRICULTURE																	
ILLEGALLY IN TRADE OR INDUSTRY																	
OTHER																	
W/A THRU ADDRESS REPORT CARD (1-53)																	
INVESTIGATIONS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	19	5	5	3	67												
- HOURS PER UNIT	6.33	1.00	.455	.500	1.06												
TRAVEL TIME - INVESTIGATIONS ACTIVITY	3	3	-	1	76												
IV APPLICATIONS EXAMINATION ACTIVITY																	
NATIONALITY																	
N-300 PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
RECEIVED																	
COMPLETED																	
PENDING END OF PERIOD																	
N-400 SERIES - PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
RECEIVED																	
COMPLETED																	
PENDING END OF PERIOD																	
N-600 PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
RECEIVED																	
COMPLETED																	
PENDING END OF PERIOD																	
N-500 SERIES - PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
RECEIVED																	
COMPLETED																	
PENDING END OF PERIOD																	

Form G-21.7 A (7-1-52)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: AUGUST 1953

ST. ALBANS District NO. 1

IV APPLICATIONS EXAMINATION ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	TOTAL	Bangor	Burlington	Calais	Fort Fairfield	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Roosevelttown	Rouses Point	St. Albans
IMMIGRATION																	
REENTRY PERMITS-PENDING BEG. OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
RECEIVED	21																21
COMPLETED	21																21
PENDING END OF PERIOD	-																-
VISA PETITIONS-PENDING BEG. OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
RECEIVED	6																6
COMPLETED	6																6
PENDING END OF PERIOD	-																-
OTHER-PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	14	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	14
RECEIVED	299	-															299
COMPLETED	299																299
PENDING END OF PERIOD	14																14
NATIONALITY APPLICATIONS-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	98																98
-HOURS PER UNIT	.907																.907
IMMIGRATION APPLICATIONS-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	93																93
-HOURS PER UNIT	.285																.285
DECLARATIONS FILED	2																2
V VERIFICATION OF ARRIVALS AND DEPARTURES ACTIVITY																	
VERIFICATION REQUESTS																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	1265	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1265
RECEIVED DURING PERIOD	2598	14	3	8	2	5	12	24	4	16	121	10	6		3	51	1987
TOTAL	3863	14	3	8	2	5	12	24	4	16	121	10	6		3	51	3252
COMPLETED	2874	14	3	8	2	5	12	24	4	16	121	7	6		3	51	2266
NATURALIZATION	428	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-		-	-	426
OTHER	2446	14	3	8	2	5	12	24	4	16	120	7	6		3	51	1840
PENDING END OF PERIOD	989	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	-		-	-	986
VERIFICATION-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	774	4	1	2	1	2	2	6	1	6	21	2	2		2	19	595
-HOURS PER UNIT	.269	.286	.333	.250	.500	.400	.166	.250	.250	.375	.173	.286	.333		.667	.372	.262
VI NATURALIZATION AND CITIZENSHIP ACTIVITY																	
PRELIM. INVEST. CIT. & NAT. APPLN'S																	
PRELIM. INVESTIGATIONS (N-400 SERIES)																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	516	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	515
RECEIVED	73		2											-			71
COMPLETED	82		2											1			79
PENDING END OF PERIOD	507		-											-			507
CITIZENSHIP (N-600 APPLICATIONS)																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	7	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5
RECEIVED	6	3	1														2
COMPLETED	8	4	1														3
PENDING END OF PERIOD	5	-	1														4

Form G-21.8 A (7-1-52)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: AUGUST 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1

VI NATURALIZATION AND CITIZENSHIP ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	TOTAL	Bangor	Burlington	Calais	Fort Fairfield	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Roosevelttown	Rouses Point	St. Albans
NATIONALITY APPLN'S. (N-500 SERIES)																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	2	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
RECEIVED	3		3														
COMPLETED	5		5														
PENDING END OF PERIOD	-		-														
PETITIONS FILED	79	-	-														79
N-600 HEARINGS COMPLETED	6	4															2
CERTIFICATES ISSUED (N-600 APPLN'S)	3																3
CERTIFICATES ISSUED (N-500 SERIES)	-																
PRELIM. INVESTIGATIONS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	193	1	2	-													190
- HOURS PER UNIT	2.35	-	1.00	-													2.40
CIT. (N-600 APPLN'S) - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	49	6	-	2													41
- HOURS PER UNIT	6.13	1.50	-	-													13.6
NAT. APPLN'S - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	4	-	3	-													1
- HOURS PER UNIT	.800	-	.600	-													-
NATURALIZATION HEARINGS																	
PETITIONS PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	546	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	546
PETITIONS PENDING DURING PERIOD	625																625
PETITIONS COMPLETED	18																18
GRANTED	18																18
DENIED	-																-
PETITIONS PENDING END OF PERIOD	607																607
PETITIONS READY FOR FINAL HEARING	607																607
PETITIONS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	72	-															72
- HOURS PER UNIT	4.00	-															4.00
TRAVEL TIME - NAT. & CIT. ACTIVITY	2	2															-
LOST TIME - NAT. & CIT. ACTIVITY	-	-															-
CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION 1/																	
CITIZENSHIP ASSISTANCE FURNISHED																	
ALIENS REFERRED TO PUBLIC SCHOOLS																	
ALIENS INFORMED OF HOME STUDY																	
NAME SLIPS TO PUBLIC SCHOOLS CORRES. CTRS.																	
ALIENS ADMITTED TO CITIZENSHIP																	
ATTENDED PUBLIC SCHOOL CLASSES																	
ENROLLED IN HOME STUDY COURSES																	
NUMBER SUBMITTING PUBLIC SCHOOL CERT.																	
VII EMPLOYMENT SUMMARY																	
NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES END OF PERIOD	295	3	2	20	4	11	8	11	12	15	23	17	10	10	7	34	62
OPERATIONS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	43666	316	315	3097	621	2087	1390	1906	1919	2885	4030	2862	1911	2176	1265	5665	5178
OPERATIONS - NON-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	4507	16	-	214	160	63	22	251	152	395	276	480	60	228	32	671	1013
ADMINISTRATION - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	7122	104	199	549	19	146	7	168	260	142	128	228	110	32	127	300	2971
ADMINISTRATION - NON-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	1237	42	-	48	-	-	-	-	28	-	40	-	-	24	-	-	557
TOTAL HOURS EMPLOYMENT	56532	478	514	3908	800	2296	1419	2325	2359	3422	4474	3570	2081	2460	1424	6636	9719
PERCENTAGE TOTAL HOURS ON OPERATIONS	85.2	69.4	61.3	84.7	97.6	93.6	99.5	92.8	87.7	95.8	96.2	93.6	94.7	97.7	91.1	95.4	63.6

1/ Source: Form N-28

Form G-21.7 B (7-1-52)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: AUGUST 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1 (Continued)

IV APPLICATIONS EXAMINATION ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vance-boro	Halifax	Montreal												
IMMIGRATION																	
REENTRY PERMITS-PENDING BEG. OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
RECEIVED																	
COMPLETED																	
PENDING END OF PERIOD																	
VISA PETITIONS-PENDING BEG. OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
RECEIVED																	
COMPLETED																	
PENDING END OF PERIOD																	
OTHER-PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
RECEIVED																	
COMPLETED																	
PENDING END OF PERIOD																	
NATIONALITY APPLICATIONS-PRODUCTIVE HOURS																	
-HOURS PER UNIT																	
IMMIGRATION APPLICATIONS-PRODUCTIVE HOURS																	
-HOURS PER UNIT																	
DECLARATIONS FILED																	
V VERIFICATION OF ARRIVALS AND DEPARTURES ACTIVITY																	
VERIFICATION REQUESTS																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
RECEIVED DURING PERIOD	53	32	34	36	177												
TOTAL	53	32	34	36	177												
COMPLETED	53	32	34	36	177												
NATURALIZATION	-	-	1	-	-												
OTHER	53	32	33	36	177												
PENDING END OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
VERIFICATION-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	41	16	10	9	32												
-HOURS PER UNIT	.774	.500	.294	.250	.181												
VI NATURALIZATION AND CITIZENSHIP ACTIVITY																	
PRELIM. INVEST. CIT. & NAT. APPLN'S																	
PRELIM. INVESTIGATIONS (N-400 SERIES)																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
RECEIVED																	
COMPLETED																	
PENDING END OF PERIOD																	
CITIZENSHIP (N-600 APPLICATIONS)																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
RECEIVED																	
COMPLETED																	
PENDING END OF PERIOD																	

Form G-21.8 B(7-1-52)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: AUGUST 1953

ST.ALBANS District No.1 (Continued)

VI NATURALIZATION AND CITIZENSHIP ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vanceboro	Halifax	Montreal												
NATIONALITY APPLN'S. (N-500 SERIES)																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
RECEIVED																	
COMPLETED																	
PENDING END OF PERIOD																	
PETITIONS FILED																	
N-600 HEARINGS COMPLETED																	
CERTIFICATES ISSUED (N-600 APPLN'S)																	
CERTIFICATES ISSUED (N-500 SERIES)																	
PRELIM. INVESTIGATIONS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS																	
- HOURS PER UNIT																	
CIT. (N-600 APPLN'S) - PRODUCTIVE HOURS																	
- HOURS PER UNIT																	
NAT. APPLN'S - PRODUCTIVE HOURS																	
- HOURS PER UNIT																	
NATURALIZATION HEARINGS																	
PETITIONS PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
PETITIONS PENDING DURING PERIOD																	
PETITIONS COMPLETED																	
GRANTED																	
DENIED																	
PETITIONS PENDING END OF PERIOD																	
PETITIONS READY FOR FINAL HEARING																	
PETITIONS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS																	
- HOURS PER UNIT																	
TRAVEL TIME - NAT. & CIT. ACTIVITY																	
LOST TIME - NAT. & CIT. ACTIVITY																	
CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION 1/																	
CITIZENSHIP ASSISTANCE FURNISHED																	
ALIENS REFERRED TO PUBLIC SCHOOLS																	
ALIENS INFORMED OF HOME STUDY																	
NAME SLIPS TO PUBLIC SCHOOLS CORRES. CTRS.																	
ALIENS ADMITTED TO CITIZENSHIP																	
ATTENDED PUBLIC SCHOOL CLASSES																	
ENROLLED IN HOME STUDY COURSES																	
NUMBER SUBMITTING PUBLIC SCHOOL CERT.																	
VII EMPLOYMENT SUMMARY																	
NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES END OF PERIOD	11	9	9	2	15												
OPERATIONS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	2030	1322	1397	277	1017												
OPERATIONS - NON-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	24	144	104	24	178												
ADMINISTRATION - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	142	294	238	166	792												
ADMINISTRATION - NON-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	32	8	120	8	330												
TOTAL HOURS EMPLOYMENT	2228	1768	1859	475	2317												
PERCENTAGE TOTAL HOURS ON OPERATIONS	92.1	83.0	80.7	.634	51.5												

1/ Source: Form N-28

Form G-21.1 (9-1-53)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: SEPTEMBER 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1

I ENTRY AND DEPARTURE ACTIVITY	TOTAL	Bangor	Burlington	Calais	Fort Fairfield	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Roosevelt-town	Rouses point	St. Albans
PRIMARY INSPECTION																	
BORDER CROSSERS ADMITTED - ALIENS	892724	7	524	136980	—	36503	66868	18702	128572	89195	75054	36715	41457	32601	-	98169	40053
- CITIZENS	630936	13	623	79937		42577	38297	20453	72323	56732	60125	22693	16460	17150		72233	37244
CREWMEN ADMITTED - ALIENS	2822	200	13	2236									194			124	-
- CITIZENS	469	18	336	111									-			4	-
OTHERS ADMITTED - ALIENS	8136		43	340		151	38	916	34	204	343	805	87	18		1107	446
- CITIZENS	4388		13	11		340	1	67	7	206	126	-	12	-		392	268
ALIENS NOT ADMITTED - TOTAL	1107	2	2	62		41	54	36	35	30	58	9	34	1		138	3
BORDER-CROSSERS	499	-	2	-		30	54	2	24	28	-	7	34	1		58	3
CREWMEN	143	2		-								-				-	
OTHERS NOT ADMITTED	465			62		11		34	11	2	58	2	-			80	
PREEXAMINATIONS COMPLETED - IN U.S.	—																
OUTSIDE U.S.	308																
FINES	—																
TOTAL WORK UNITS	1540890	240	1554	219677	-	79612	105258	40174	200971	146367	135706	60222	58239	49770	-	172167	84944
PRIMARY INSPECTION - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	41343	64	271	3771		2923	4813	1656	1771	4151	3634	3021	1827	1002		5610	11923
- HOURS PER UNIT	.026	.267	.174	.017		.036	.045	.041	.008	.028	.026	.050	.031	.020		.032	.140
PRODUCTIVE HOURS - INS PERSONNEL	32746	64	271	2787		1891	1981	1297	1771	3451	3338	2301	1621	775		4977	1192
VESSELS BOARDED - ARRIVAL	1220	28	-	1087		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	25	-		17	-
AIRPLANE FLIGHTS - ARRIVAL	457	17	217	15		-	-	-	-	14	1	-	4	-		2	-
VESSELS & AIRPLANES BOARDED ON DEPART.	—	-	-	-		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		-	-
SPECIAL INQUIRY OFFICER HEARINGS																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	11	-	-	1	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
RECEIVED	151			33		1	4	-	6				7			6	3
TOTAL	162			34		1	4	3	6				7			6	3
COMPLETED	149			33		1	4	3	5				6			6	3
SUBVERSIVE	-																
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC	-																
WITHOUT PROPER DOCUMENTS	-																
OTHER	-																
PENDING END OF PERIOD	13			1		-	-	-	1	-	-		1			-	-
SIO HEARINGS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	656	-		68		2	8	19	20	4	-		14			19	126
- HOURS PER UNIT	4.40			2.06		2.00	2.00	6.38	4.00	-	-		2.33			3.16	42.0
PRODUCTIVE HOURS - INS PERSONNEL	653	-		68		2	8	16	20	4	-		14			19	126
AUTHORIZATIONS																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	122	1	3	-	—	-	2	-	-	7	-	-	-	-		-	106
RECEIVED	8319	59	15	162		67	354	878	5030	162	241	687	45	31		82	305
TOTAL	8441	60	18	162		67	356	878	5030	169	241	687	45	31		82	411
RETURNED OR TRANSFERRED	4	-	-	-		-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-		-	1
PROCESSED WITHOUT COMPLETION	—	-	-	-		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		-	-

Form G-21.2 (9-1-53) 1A

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: SEPTEMBER 1953 ST. ALBANS District No. 1

I ENTRY AND DEPARTURE ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	TOTAL	Bangor	Burlington	Calais	Fort Fairfield	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Roosevelttown	Rouses Point	St. Albans
AUTHORIZATIONS - (Cont'd)	8319	59	15	162	-	67	354	878	5030	162	241	687	45	31	-	82	305
RECEIVED																	
BORDER CROSSING CARDS	509	33	12	14			129	27	11	33	107	28	36	16		13	6
REENTRY PERMITS ISSUED & EXTENDED	12																12
VISA PETITIONS	27												1				26
Q - SPECIAL SKILLS																	
Q - PARENTS OF CITIZENS	2												1				1
Q - OTHER RELATIVES OF CITIZENS	5																5
NQ- SPOUSES, CHILDREN OF CITIZENS	14																14
Q - SPOUSES, CHILDREN OF RESID. ALIENS	2																2
NQ- MINISTERS	4																4
ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS.																	
NONIMMIGRANTS TO IMMIGRANTS	2																2
IMMIGRANTS TO NONIMMIGRANTS																	
PREEXAMINATION AUTHORIZATIONS																	
CREATION OF RECORD OF ADMISSION	2																2
EXTENSIONS OF TEMPORARY STAY	33		2	1							3		2				23
ALIEN LABORER CARDS	7308			129		38	210	840	5016	114	119	646		11		69	
DUPLICATE ALIEN REGISTRATION CARDS	317	25	1	14		29	15	11	2	14	12	13	3	4			159
PERMISSION TO REAPPLY	40			4					1				1				11
CHANGE OF NONIMMIGRANT STATUS	2									1							1
PETITIONS TO IMPORT:																	
TEMP. WORKERS OF EXCEPT. ABILITY	4																4
LABORERS AND OTHER TEMP. WORKERS	35																35
INDUSTRIAL TRAINEES	1																1
SCHOOL APPROVALS	9																9
SEC. 4 D.P. APPLICATIONS																	
APPL'S. FOR PERMISSION TO RETURN																	
APPL'S. FOR WAIVER OF INADMISSIBILITY	7																7
APPL'S. FOR STUDENT EMPLOYMENT	4	1											2				1
BREACH OR CANCELLATION OF BONDS	7																7
DENIED																	
BORDER CROSSING CARDS																	
REENTRY PERMITS ISSUED & EXTENDED																	
VISA PETITIONS																	
Q - SPECIAL SKILLS																	
Q - PARENTS OF CITIZENS																	
Q - OTHER RELATIVES OF CITIZENS																	
NQ- SPOUSES, CHILDREN OF CITIZENS																	
Q - SPOUSES, CHILDREN OF RESID. ALIENS																	
NQ- MINISTERS																	
ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS.																	
NONIMMIGRANTS TO IMMIGRANTS																	
IMMIGRANTS TO NONIMMIGRANTS																	
PREEXAMINATION AUTHORIZATIONS																	
CREATION OF RECORD OF ADMISSION																	

Form G-21.1 (9-1-53) B

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: SEPTEMBER 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1 (Continued)

I ENTRY AND DEPARTURE ACTIVITY	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vanceboro	Halifax	Montreal												
PRIMARY INSPECTION																	
BORDER CROSSERS ADMITTED - ALIENS	34823	70907	19891	432	1276												
- CITIZENS	71781	38555	17250	2	8												
CREWMEN ADMITTED - ALIENS	55	-															
- CITIZENS	-	-															
OTHERS ADMITTED - ALIENS	169	417	340	163	2515												
- CITIZENS	25	15	7	30	2868												
ALIENS NOT ADMITTED - TOTAL	218	177	23	76	108												
BORDER-CROSSERS	77	162	17														
CREWMEN	141																
OTHERS NOT ADMITTED		15	6	76	108												
PREEXAMINATIONS COMPLETED - IN U.S.		-															
OUTSIDE U.S.	85	-	229														
FINES		-															
TOTAL WORK UNITS	107156	110071	37734	703	6775												
PRIMARY INSPECTION-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	1824	1268	1602	196	747												
- HOURS PER UNIT	.017	.011	.042	.279	.110												
PRODUCTIVE HOURS- INS PERSONNEL	1641	1268	1177	196	747												
VESSELS BOARDED - ARRIVAL	9	-	-	9	45												
AIRPLANE FLIGHTS- ARRIVAL	73	-	-	-	114												
VESSELS & AIRPLANES BOARDED ON DEPART.	-	-	-	-	-												
SPECIAL INQUIRY OFFICER HEARINGS																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	7												
RECEIVED	2	15	4		70												
TOTAL	2	15	4		77												
COMPLETED	2	15	4		67												
SUBVERSIVE																	
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC																	
WITHOUT PROPER DOCUMENTS																	
OTHER																	
PENDING END OF PERIOD	-	-	-		10												
SIO HEARINGS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	6	30	13		327												
- HOURS PER UNIT	3.00	2.00	3.25		4.88												
PRODUCTIVE HOURS - INS PERSONNEL	6	30	13		327												
AUTHORIZATIONS																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	3	-	-	-	-												
RECEIVED	32	118	22	1	28												
TOTAL	35	118	22	1	28												
RETURNED OR TRANSFERRED	-	-	-	-	-												
PROCESSED WITHOUT COMPLETION	-	-	-	-	-												

Form G-21.2 (9-1-53) 8 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE

REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: SEPTEMBER 1953 ST. ALBANS District No. 1 (Continued)

I ENTRY AND DEPARTURE ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vanceboro	Halifax	Montreal												
AUTHORIZATIONS - (Cont'd)																	
COMPLETED	33	118	22	1	28												
BORDER CROSSING CARDS	20	-	17	1	6												
REENTRY PERMITS ISSUED & EXTENDED																	
VISA PETITIONS																	
Q - SPECIAL SKILLS																	
Q - PARENTS OF CITIZENS																	
Q - OTHER RELATIVES OF CITIZENS																	
NQ- SPOUSES, CHILDREN OF CITIZENS																	
Q - SPOUSES, CHILDREN OF RESID. ALIENS																	
NQ- MINISTERS																	
ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS.																	
NONIMMIGRANTS TO IMMIGRANTS																	
IMMIGRANTS TO NONIMMIGRANTS																	
PREEXAMINATION AUTHORIZATIONS																	
CREATION OF RECORD OF ADMISSION																	
EXTENSIONS OF TEMPORARY STAY	1																
ALIEN LABORER CARDS	2	114															
DUPLICATE ALIEN REGISTRATION CARDS	10	3	5														
PERMISSION TO REAPPLY		1			22												
CHANGE OF NONIMMIGRANT STATUS																	
PETITIONS TO IMPORT:																	
TEMP. WORKERS OF EXCEPT. ABILITY																	
LABORERS AND OTHER TEMP. WORKERS																	
INDUSTRIAL TRAINEES																	
SCHOOL APPROVALS																	
SEC. 4 D.P. APPLICATIONS																	
APPL'S. FOR PERMISSION TO RETURN																	
APPL'S. FOR WAIVER OF INADMISSIBILITY																	
APPL'S. FOR STUDENT EMPLOYMENT																	
BREACH OR CANCELLATION OF BONDS																	
DENIED	-	-	-	-	-												
BORDER CROSSING CARDS																	
REENTRY PERMITS ISSUED & EXTENDED																	
VISA PETITIONS																	
Q - SPECIAL SKILLS																	
Q - PARENTS OF CITIZENS																	
Q - OTHER RELATIVES OF CITIZENS																	
NQ- SPOUSES, CHILDREN OF CITIZENS																	
Q - SPOUSES, CHILDREN OF RESID. ALIENS																	
NQ- MINISTERS																	
ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS.																	
NONIMMIGRANTS TO IMMIGRANTS																	
IMMIGRANTS TO NONIMMIGRANTS																	
PREEXAMINATION AUTHORIZATIONS																	
CREATION OF RECORD OF ADMISSION																	

Form G-21.2 (9-1-53) A

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: SEPTEMBER 1953

St. ALBANS District No. 1

ENTRY AND DEPARTURE ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	TOTAL	Bangor	Burlington	Calais	Fort Fairfield	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Rooseveltown	Rouses Point	St. Albans
AUTHORIZATIONS. - (Cont'd)																	
COMPLETED	8401	59	18	162	—	67	355	878	5027	169	241	687	45	31	—	82	378
BORDER CROSSING CARDS	514	33	12	14			130	27	9	39	107	28	36	16		13	6
REENTRY PERMITS ISSUED & EXTENDED	15		3														12
VISA PETITIONS	15												1				14
Q - SPECIAL SKILLS	-																-
Q - PARENTS OF CITIZENS	1												1				-
Q - OTHER RELATIVES OF CITIZENS	1																1
NQ- SPOUSES, CHILDREN OF CITIZENS	8																8
Q - SPOUSES, CHILDREN OF RESID. ALIENS	1																1
NQ- MINISTERS	4																4
ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS.																	
NONIMMIGRANTS TO IMMIGRANTS	1																1
IMMIGRANTS TO NONIMMIGRANTS	-																
PREEXAMINATION AUTHORIZATIONS	-																
CREATION OF RECORD OF ADMISSION	2																2
EXTENSIONS OF TEMPORARY STAY	32		2	1							3		2				22
ALIEN LABORER CARDS	7308			129	-	38	210	840	5016	114	119	646		11	-	69	
DUPLICATE ALIEN REGISTRATION CARDS	326	25	1	14		29	15	11		14	12	13	3	4			167
PERMISSION TO REAPPLY	41			4					2				1				11
CHANGE OF NONIMMIGRANT STATUS	2									1							1
PETITIONS TO IMPORT:																	
TEMP. WORKERS OF EXCEPT. ABILITY	4																4
LABORERS AND OTHER TEMP. WORKERS	111																111
INDUSTRIAL TRAINEES	1																1
SCHOOL APPROVALS	9																9
SEC. 4 D.P. APPLICATIONS	1																1
APPL'S. FOR PERMISSION TO RETURN	-																
APPL'S. FOR WAIVER OF INADMISSIBILITY	7																7
APPL'S. FOR STUDENT EMPLOYMENT	5	1											2				2
BREACH OR CANCELLATION OF BONDS	7																7
DENIED	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
BORDER CROSSING CARDS	-																
REENTRY PERMITS ISSUED & EXTENDED	-																
VISA PETITIONS	-																
Q - SPECIAL SKILLS	-																
Q - PARENTS OF CITIZENS	-																
Q - OTHER RELATIVES OF CITIZENS	-																
NQ- SPOUSES, CHILDREN OF CITIZENS	-																
Q - SPOUSES, CHILDREN OF RESID. ALIENS	-																
NQ- MINISTERS	-																
ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS.																	
NONIMMIGRANTS TO IMMIGRANTS	-																
IMMIGRANTS TO NONIMMIGRANTS	-																
PREEXAMINATION AUTHORIZATIONS	-																
CREATION OF RECORD OF ADMISSION	-																

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: SEPTEMBER 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1 (Continued)

I ENTRY AND DEPARTURE ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vance-boro	Halifax	Montreal												
AUTHORIZATIONS - (Cont'd) RECEIVED	32	118	22	1	28												
BORDER CROSSING CARDS	20	-	17	1	6												
REENTRY PERMITS ISSUED & EXTENDED																	
VISA PETITIONS																	
Q - SPECIAL SKILLS																	
Q - PARENTS OF CITIZENS																	
Q - OTHER RELATIVES OF CITIZENS																	
NQ- SPOUSES, CHILDREN OF CITIZENS																	
Q - SPOUSES, CHILDREN OF RESID. ALIENS																	
NQ- MINISTERS																	
ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS.																	
NONIMMIGRANTS TO IMMIGRANTS																	
IMMIGRANTS TO NONIMMIGRANTS																	
PREEXAMINATION AUTHORIZATIONS																	
CREATION OF RECORD OF ADMISSION																	
EXTENSIONS OF TEMPORARY STAY	2																
ALIEN LABORER CARDS	2	114															
DUPLICATE ALIEN REGISTRATION CARDS	8	3	5														
PERMISSION TO REAPPLY		1			22												
CHANGE OF NONIMMIGRANT STATUS																	
PETITIONS TO IMPORT:																	
TEMP. WORKERS OF EXCEPT. ABILITY																	
LABORERS AND OTHER TEMP. WORKERS																	
INDUSTRIAL TRAINEES																	
SCHOOL APPROVALS																	
SEC. 4 D.P. APPLICATIONS																	
APPL'S. FOR PERMISSION TO RETURN																	
APPL'S. FOR WAIVER OF INADMISSIBILITY																	
APPL'S. FOR STUDENT EMPLOYMENT																	
BREACH OR CANCELLATION OF BONDS																	
ISSUED																	
BORDER CROSSING CARDS																	
REENTRY PERMITS ISSUED & EXTENDED																	
VISA PETITIONS																	
Q - SPECIAL SKILLS																	
Q - PARENTS OF CITIZENS																	
Q - OTHER RELATIVES OF CITIZENS																	
NQ- SPOUSES, CHILDREN OF CITIZENS																	
Q - SPOUSES, CHILDREN OF RESID. ALIENS																	
NQ- MINISTERS																	
ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS.																	
NONIMMIGRANTS TO IMMIGRANTS																	
IMMIGRANTS TO NONIMMIGRANTS																	
PREEXAMINATION AUTHORIZATIONS																	
CREATION OF RECORD OF ADMISSION																	

Form G-21.3 (9-1-53) A

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: SEPTEMBER 1953 ST. ALBANS District No. 1

I ENTRY AND DEPARTURE ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	TOTAL	Bangor	Burlington	Calais	Fort Fairfield	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Roosevelt town	Rouses Point	St. Albans
AUTHORIZATIONS - (Cont'd)																	
DENIED (CONT'D)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
EXTENSIONS OF TEMPORARY STAY	-																
ALIEN LABORER CARDS	-																
DUPLICATE ALIEN REGISTRATION CARDS	-																
PERMISSION TO REAPPLY	-																
CHANGE OF NONIMMIGRANT STATUS	-																
PETITIONS TO IMPORT:																	
TEMP. WORKERS OF EXCEPT. ABILITY	-																
LABORERS AND OTHER TEMP. WORKERS	-																
INDUSTRIAL TRAINEES	-																
SCHOOL APPROVALS	-																
SEC. 4 D.P. APPLICATIONS	-																
APPL'S FOR PERMISSION TO RETURN	-																
APPL'S. FOR WAIVER OF INADMISSIBILITY	-																
APPL'S. FOR STUDENT EMPLOYMENT	-																
BREACH OR CANCELLATION OF BONDS	-																
PENDING END OF PERIOD	36	1	-	-		-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	32
BORDER CROSSING CARDS	-																
REENTRY PERMITS ISSUED & EXTENDED	-																
VISA PETITIONS	12																12
Q - SPECIAL SKILLS	-																-
Q - PARENTS OF CITIZENS	1																1
Q - OTHER RELATIVES OF CITIZENS	4																4
NQ- SPOUSES, CHILDREN OF CITIZENS	6																6
Q - SPOUSES, CHILDREN OF RESID. ALIENS	1																1
NQ-MINISTERS	-																-
ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS																	
NONIMMIGRANTS TO IMMIGRANTS	1																1
IMMIGRANTS TO NONIMMIGRANTS	-																
PREEXAMINATION AUTHORIZATIONS	1	1															
CREATION OF RECORD OF ADMISSION	1						1										
EXTENSIONS OF TEMPORARY STAY	1																
ALIEN LABORER CARDS	-																
DUPLICATE ALIEN REGISTRATION CARDS	7																6
PERMISSION TO REAPPLY	-																
CHANGE OF NONIMMIGRANT STATUS	-																
PETITIONS TO IMPORT:	-																
TEMP. WORKERS OF EXCEPT. ABILITY																	
LABORERS AND OTHER TEMP. WORKERS	13																13
INDUSTRIAL TRAINEES	-																
SCHOOL APPROVALS	-																
SEC. 4 D.P. APPLICATIONS	-																
APPL'S. FOR PERMISSION TO RETURN	-																
APPL'S. FOR WAIVER OF INADMISSIBILITY	-																
APPL'S. FOR STUDENT EMPLOYMENT	-																
BREACH OR CANCELLATION OF BONDS	-																

Form G-21.4 (9-1-53) A

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: SEPTEMBER 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1

I ENTRY AND DEPARTURE ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	TOTAL	Bangor	Burlington	Calais	Fort Fairfield	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Roosevelttown	Rouses Point	St. Albans
AUTHORIZATIONS - (Cont'd)																	
AUTHORIZATIONS- PRODUCTIVE HOURS	1391	56	7	32	-	110	23	168	179	56	101	136	24	6	-	39	335
- HOURS PER UNIT	.165	.949	.389	.198	-	1.64	.064	.191	.035	.331	.419	.197	.533	.194	-	.475	.886
TRAVEL TIME - ENTRY & DEPARTURE ACTIV.	1392	29	14	12	-	-	8	92	19	39	235	143	-	-	-	113	323
LOST TIME - ENTRY & DEPARTURE ACTIV.	2691	108	-	-	-	-	-	62	-	700	-	-	-	1715	-	-	3
II DETENTION, DEPORTATION AND PAROLE ACTIVITY																	
WARRANT HEARINGS																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	34	-	-	-		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	34
RECEIVED	33													2			31
TOTAL	67													2			65
COMPLETED	34													2			22
SUBVERSIVE	-																-
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC	1																1
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS	10													2			8
WITHOUT PROPER DOCUMENTS	-																-
REMAINED LONGER	4																4
OTHER	9																9
PENDING END OF PERIOD	43													-		-	43
WARRANT HEARINGS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	410													4		21	385
- HOURS PER UNIT	17.1													2.00		-	17.5
CASES COMPLETED WITH 2-MAN HEARINGS	-													-			-
ON APPEAL - TOTAL	3													-			3
FINAL ORDERS ENTERED OR RECEIVED	19													-			19
TRAVEL TIME - WARRANT HEARINGS OPER.	72													-		4	68
LOST TIME - WARRANT HEARINGS OPER.	-													-		-	-
PAROLE AND SUPERVISION (Expulsion)																	
CONDITIONAL PAROLE																	
ALIENS ON PAROLE BEGINNING OF PERIOD	36	-	-	-	-	-		-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	31
PLACED ON PAROLE DURING PERIOD	5												-				4
TOTAL ON PAROLE DURING PERIOD	41												1				35
REMOVED FROM PAROLE DURING PERIOD	6												-				2
ALIENS ON PAROLE END OF PERIOD	35												1				33
SUBVERSIVE	-																-
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC	7																7
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS	2																1
WITHOUT PROPER DOCUMENTS	7																7
REMAINED LONGER	9																9
OTHER	10												1				9
COND. PAROLE - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	16												-				8
- HOURS PER UNIT	.390												-				.228

Form G-21.3 (9-1-53) B

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: SEPTEMBER 1953 ST. ALBANS District No. 1 (Continued)

I ENTRY AND DEPARTURE ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vanceboro	Halifax	Montreal												
AUTHORIZATIONS - (Cont'd)	-	-	-	-	-												
DENIED (CONT'D)																	
EXTENSIONS OF TEMPORARY STAY																	
ALIEN LABORER CARDS																	
DUPLICATE ALIEN REGISTRATION CARDS																	
PERMISSION TO REAPPLY																	
CHANGE OF NONIMMIGRANT STATUS																	
PETITIONS TO IMPORT:																	
TEMP. WORKERS OF EXCEPT. ABILITY																	
LABORERS AND OTHER TEMP. WORKERS																	
INDUSTRIAL TRAINEES																	
SCHOOL APPROVALS																	
SEC. 4 D.P. APPLICATIONS																	
APPL'S FOR PERMISSION TO RETURN																	
APPL'S. FOR WAIVER OF INADMISSIBILITY																	
APPL'S. FOR STUDENT EMPLOYMENT																	
BREACH OR CANCELLATION OF BONDS																	
PENDING END OF PERIOD	2	-	-	-	-												
BORDER CROSSING CARDS																	
REENTRY PERMITS ISSUED & EXTENDED																	
VISA PETITIONS																	
Q - SPECIAL SKILLS																	
Q - PARENTS OF CITIZENS																	
Q - OTHER RELATIVES OF CITIZENS																	
NQ- SPOUSES, CHILDREN OF CITIZENS																	
Q - SPOUSES, CHILDREN OF RESID. ALIENS																	
NQ-MINISTERS																	
ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS																	
NONIMMIGRANTS TO IMMIGRANTS																	
IMMIGRANTS TO NONIMMIGRANTS																	
PREEXAMINATION AUTHORIZATIONS																	
CREATION OF RECORD OF ADMISSION																	
EXTENSIONS OF TEMPORARY STAY	1																
ALIEN LABORER CARDS																	
DUPLICATE ALIEN REGISTRATION CARDS	1																
PERMISSION TO REAPPLY																	
CHANGE OF NONIMMIGRANT STATUS																	
PETITIONS TO IMPORT:																	
TEMP. WORKERS OF EXCEPT. ABILITY																	
LABORERS AND OTHER TEMP. WORKERS																	
INDUSTRIAL TRAINEES																	
SCHOOL APPROVALS																	
SEC. 4 D.P. APPLICATIONS																	
APPL'S. FOR PERMISSION TO RETURN																	
APPL'S. FOR WAIVER OF INADMISSIBILITY																	
APPL'S. FOR STUDENT EMPLOYMENT																	
BREACH OR CANCELLATION OF BONDS																	

Form G-21.4 (9-1-53) B

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: SEPTEMBER 1953 ST. ALBANS District No. 1 (Continued)

I ENTRY AND DEPARTURE ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vanceboro	Halifax	Montreal											
AUTHORIZATIONS - (Cont'd)																
AUTHORIZATIONS- PRODUCTIVE HOURS	39	59	6	1	14											
- HOURS PER UNIT	1.18	.500	.272	1.00	.500											
TRAVEL TIME- ENTRY & DEPARTURE ACTIV.	4	-	87	7	267											
LOST TIME - ENTRY & DEPARTURE ACTIV.	16	-	42	-	45											
II DETENTION, DEPORTATION AND PAROLE ACTIVITY																
WARRANT HEARINGS																
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-											
RECEIVED																
TOTAL																
COMPLETED																
SUBVERSIVE																
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC																
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS																
WITHOUT PROPER DOCUMENTS																
REMAINED LONGER																
OTHER																
PENDING END OF PERIOD																
WARRANT HEARINGS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS																
- HOURS PER UNIT																
CASES COMPLETED WITH 2-MAN HEARINGS																
ON APPEAL - TOTAL																
FINAL ORDERS ENTERED OR RECEIVED																
TRAVEL TIME - WARRANT HEARINGS OPER.																
LOST TIME - WARRANT HEARINGS OPER.																
PAROLE AND SUPERVISION (Expulsion)																
CONDITIONAL PAROLE																
ALIENS ON PAROLE BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	4	-	-											
PLACED ON PAROLE DURING PERIOD			1													
TOTAL ON PAROLE DURING PERIOD			5													
REMOVED FROM PAROLE DURING PERIOD			4													
ALIENS ON PAROLE END OF PERIOD			1													
SUBVERSIVE																
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC																
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS			1													
WITHOUT PROPER DOCUMENTS																
REMAINED LONGER																
OTHER																
COND. PAROLE - PRODUCTIVE HOURS			8													
- HOURS PER UNIT			1.60													

Form G-21.5 (9-1-53) A

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: SEPTEMBER 1953 ST. ALBANS District No. 1

II DETENTION, DEPORTATION AND PAROLE ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	TOTAL	Bangor	Burlington	Calais	Fort Fairfield	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Maine	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Roosevelt Town	Rouses point	St. Albans
PAROLE AND SUPERVISION (Cont'd)																	
SUPERVISION																	
ALIENS UNDER SUPER'N BEGIN. OF PERIOD	10	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10
PLACED UNDER SUPER'N DURING PERIOD	-																-
TOTAL UNDER SUPER'N DURING PERIOD	10																10
REMOVED FROM SUPER'N DURING PERIOD	-																-
ALIENS UNDER SUPER'N END OF PERIOD	10																10
SUBVERSIVE	-																-
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC	5																5
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS	-																-
WITHOUT PROPER DOCUMENTS	-																-
REMAINED LONGER	3																3
OTHER	2																2
SUPERVISION - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	-																-
- HOURS PER UNIT	-																-
TRAVEL TIME - PAROLE & SUPER'N OPER.	-																-
LOST TIME - PAROLE & SUPER'N OPER.	-																-
SERVICE DETENTION FACILITIES																	
NUMBER DETAINED BEGINNING OF PERIOD	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	-
EXCLUSION	-															-	-
EXPULSION	3															3	-
DETAINEES ADMITTED	83			3		6				1	45	1		1		17	3
NUMBER DETAINED DURING PERIOD	86			3		6				1	45	1		1		20	3
EXCLUSION	57			-		-				1	44	-		-		4	2
DETAINEES REMOVED DURING PERIOD	83			3		5				1	45	1		1		19	2
NUMBER DETAINED END OF PERIOD	3			-		1				-	-	-		-		1	1
MAN-DAYS DETENTION DURING PERIOD	134			2		11				2	48	2		1		54	4
EXCLUSION	66			-		-				2	47	-		-		4	3
EXPULSION	68			2		11				-	1	2		1		50	1
AVERAGE DAYS DET. PER DETAINEE	1.56			.666		1.83				2.00	1.06	2.00		1.00		2.70	1.33
SERVICE DET. FAC. - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	366			-		-				9	136	-		1		100	16
- HOURS PER UNIT	2.73			-		-				4.50	2.83	-		1.00		1.85	4.00
PRODUCTIVE HOURS - INS PERSONNEL	282			-		-				9	136	-		1		64	16
NON-SERVICE DETENTION FACILITIES																	
NUMBER DETAINED BEGINNING OF PERIOD	12	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	3
DETAINEES ADMITTED	41	13				18				5							3
NUMBER DETAINED DURING PERIOD	53	17				18				8							6
DETAINEES REMOVED DURING PERIOD	33	14				8				7							3
NUMBER DETAINED END OF PERIOD	20	3				10				1							3
MAN-DAYS DETENTION DURING PERIOD	460	159				83				84							88
AVERAGE DAYS DET. PER DETAINEE	8.68	9.35				4.60				10.5							14.7
NON-SERV. DET. FAC.-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	14	9				-				3							-
- HOURS PER UNIT	.264	.529				-				.375							-

Form G-21.5 (9-1-53) 8

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: SEPTEMBER 1953 ST. ALBANS District No. 1 (Continued)

II DETENTION, DEPORTATION AND PAROLE ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	yance-boro	Halifax	Montreal												
PAROLE AND SUPERVISION (Cont'd)																	
SUPERVISION																	
ALIENS UNDER SUPER'N BEGIN. OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
PLACED UNDER SUPER'N DURING PERIOD																	
TOTAL UNDER SUPER'N DURING PERIOD																	
REMOVED FROM SUPER'N DURING PERIOD																	
ALIENS UNDER SUPER'N END OF PERIOD																	
SUBVERSIVE																	
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC																	
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS																	
WITHOUT PROPER DOCUMENTS																	
REMAINED LONGER																	
OTHER																	
SUPERVISION - PRODUCTIVE HOURS																	
- HOURS PER UNIT																	
TRAVEL TIME - PAROLE & SUPER'N OPER.																	
LOST TIME - PAROLE & SUPER'N OPER.																	
SERVICE DETENTION FACILITIES																	
NUMBER DETAINED BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
EXCLUSION																	
EXPULSION																	
DETAINEES ADMITTED			6														
NUMBER DETAINED DURING PERIOD			6														
EXCLUSION			6														
DETAINEES REMOVED DURING PERIOD			6														
NUMBER DETAINED END OF PERIOD			-														
MAN-DAYS DETENTION DURING PERIOD			10														
EXCLUSION			10														
EXPULSION			-														
AVERAGE DAYS DET. PER DETAINEE			1.66														
SERVICE DET. FAC. - PRODUCTIVE HOURS			104														
- HOURS PER UNIT			10.4														
PRODUCTIVE HOURS - INS PERSONNEL			56														
NON-SERVICE DETENTION FACILITIES																	
NUMBER DETAINED BEGINNING OF PERIOD	2	-	-	-	-												
DETAINEES ADMITTED	2																
NUMBER DETAINED DURING PERIOD	4																
DETAINEES REMOVED DURING PERIOD	1																
NUMBER DETAINED END OF PERIOD	3																
MAN-DAYS DETENTION DURING PERIOD	46																
AVERAGE DAYS DET. PER DETAINEE	15.3																
NON-SERV. DET. FAC. - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	2																
- HOURS PER UNIT	.500																

Form G-21.6 (9-1-53)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: SEPTEMBER 1953 ST. ALBANS District No.1

II DETENTION, DEPORTATION AND PAROLE ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	TOTAL	Bangor	Burlington	Calais	Fort-Fairfield	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Roosevelttown	Rouses Point	St. Albans
DEPORTATION																	
Aliens processed for deportation	35	3	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	25
Aliens processed for voluntary departure	35	-					14	-	-	4	1					4	2
Aliens processed for removal	-	-					-	-	-	-	-					-	-
TOTAL	70	3					14	1	-	6	1					6	27
Aliens deported	17	-		1			-	1	1	2	-					7	1
Voluntary departures	46	-		3			14	-	-	4	1					2	2
Under W/A	3	-		2			-	-	-	-	-					1	-
Without W/A	43	-		1			14	-	-	4	1					1	2
Removals	-	-		-			-	-		-	-					-	-
Deportation-Productive hours	292	3		-			4	1	-	4	1					35	229
-Hours per unit		1.00		-			.285	1.00	-	.666	1.00					5.83	8.48
Travel time - Deportation operation	74	-		-			8	2	24	-	-					24	16
Lost time - Deportation operation	40	-		-			-	-	-	-	-					-	-
III CITIZENSHIP ACTIVITY																	
NATURALIZATION																	
N-400) Pending beginning of period	507	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	507
etc.,) Received	244																244
Appl's) Completed	166																166
" Rej., transf., or closed	11																11
" Petitions filed	155																155
" Pending end of period	585																585
" Ready for hear.,fil.,adj.	492																492
Peti-) Pending beginning of period	607																607
tions) Completed	356																356
" Granted	355																355
" Denied	-																-
" Transferred	1																1
" Pending end of period	406																406
" Ready for final hearing	406																406
N-300) Pending beginning of period	-																-
Appl's) Received	1																1
" Completed	1																1
" Pending end of period	-																-
Naturalization - Productive hours	613																613
- Hours per unit	1.17																1.17

Form G-21.7 (9-1-53) A

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: SEPTEMBER 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1

III CITIZENSHIP ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	TOTAL	Bangor	Burlington	Calais	Fort Fairfield	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Roosevelt town	Rouses Point	St. Albans
CITIZENSHIP APPLICATIONS																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	44	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	43
RECEIVED	6		2											1			3
TOTAL	50		3											1			46
COMPLETED - TOTAL	4		2											1			1
REJECTED, TRANSFERRED, OR CLOSED	-		-														-
PROCESSED FOR OTHER OFFICES	-		-														-
PENDING END OF PERIOD - TOTAL	46		1											-			45
READY FOR HEARING, FILING, ADJUDICATION, OR DELIVERY	14		1														13
CITIZENSHIP - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	115		3											1			111
- HOURS PER UNIT	28.8		1.50											1.00			111.
NATIONALITY APPLICATIONS																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5
RECEIVED	3	1	1														1
TOTAL	8	1	1														6
COMPLETED - TOTAL	2	1	-														1
REJECTED, TRANSFERRED, OR CLOSED	-	-	-														1
PROCESSED FOR OTHER OFFICES	-	-	-														
PENDING END OF PERIOD - TOTAL	6	-	1														5
READY FOR HEARING, FILING, ADJUDICATION OR DELIVERY	-	-	-														-
NATIONALITY - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	28	-	-														28
- HOURS PER UNIT	14.0	-	-														14.0
TRAVEL TIME - CITIZENSHIP ACTIVITY	106	-	-														106
LOST TIME - CITIZENSHIP ACTIVITY	-	-	-														-
CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION 1/																	
CITIZENSHIP ASSISTANCE FURNISHED	-																
ALIENS REFERRED TO PUBLIC SCHOOLS	-																
ALIENS INFORMED OF HOME STUDY	-																
NAME SLIPS TO PUBLIC SCHOOLS COR. CTRS.	-																
ALIENS ADMITTED TO CITIZENSHIP	-																
ATTENDED PUBLIC SCHOOL CLASSES	-																
ENROLLED IN HOME STUDY COURSES	-																
NUMBER SUBMITTING PUBLIC SCHOOL CERT.	-																
111a VERIFICATION OF ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE ACTIVITY																	
VERIFICATION REQUESTS																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	989	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	986
RECEIVED DURING PERIOD	2208	10	4	10		12	12	18		24	100	11	6	1		70	1428
TOTAL	3197	10	4	10		12	12	18		24	100	14	6	1		70	2414
COMPLETED	2381	10	4	10		12	12	18		24	100	14	6	1		70	1598
NATURALIZATION	484	-	-	-		-	-	-		-	4	-	-	-		-	479
OTHER	1897	10	4	10		12	12	18		24	96	14	6	1		70	1119
PENDING END OF PERIOD	816	-	-	-		-	-	-		-	-	-	-	-		-	816
VERIFICATION - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	759	3	1	2		2	2	6		8	21	8	3	1		11	572
- HOURS PER UNIT	.318	.300	.250	.200		.166	.166	.333		.333	.210	.573	.500	1.00		.157	.357

1/ Source: Form N-28

Form G-21.6 (9-1-53)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: SEPTEMBER 1953

ST. ALBANS District No.: (Continued)

II DETENTION, DEPORTATION AND PAROLE ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vance-boro	Halifax	Montreal												
DEPORTATION																	
Aliens processed for deportation	2	-	-	-	-												
Aliens processed for voluntary departure	5	-	5														
Aliens processed for removal	-	-	-														
TOTAL	7	-	5														
Aliens deported	2	-															
Voluntary departures	5	10	5														
Under W/A	-	-	-														
Without W/A	5	10	5														
Removals	-	-	-														
Deportation-Productive hours	13	-	2														
-Hours per unit	1.86	-	.400														
Travel time - Deportation operation	-	-	-														
Lost time - Deportation operation	-	-	1/2														
III CITIZENSHIP ACTIVITY																	
NATURALIZATION																	
N-400) Pending beginning of period	-	-	-	-	-												
etc.,) Received																	
Appl's) Completed																	
" Rej., transf., or closed																	
" Petitions filed																	
" Pending end of period																	
" Ready for hear.,fil.,adj.																	
Peti-) Pending beginning of period																	
tions) Completed																	
" Granted																	
" Denied																	
" Transferred																	
" Pending end of period																	
" Ready for final hearing																	
N-300) Pending beginning of period																	
Appl's) Received																	
" Completed																	
" Pending end of period																	
Naturalization - Productive hours																	
- Hours per unit																	

Form G-21.7 (9-1-53) B

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: SEPTEMBER 1953 ST. ALBANS District No. 1 (Continued)

III CITIZENSHIP ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vanceboro	Halifax	Montreal												
CITIZENSHIP APPLICATIONS																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
RECEIVED																	
TOTAL																	
COMPLETED - TOTAL																	
REJECTED, TRANSFERRED, OR CLOSED																	
PROCESSED FOR OTHER OFFICES																	
PENDING END OF PERIOD - TOTAL																	
READY FOR HEARING, FILING, ADJUDICATION, OR DELIVERY																	
CITIZENSHIP - PRODUCTIVE HOURS																	
- HOURS PER UNIT																	
NATIONALITY APPLICATIONS																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
RECEIVED																	
TOTAL																	
COMPLETED - TOTAL																	
REJECTED, TRANSFERRED, OR CLOSED																	
PROCESSED FOR OTHER OFFICES																	
PENDING END OF PERIOD - TOTAL																	
READY FOR HEARING, FILING, ADJUDICATION OR DELIVERY																	
NATIONALITY - PRODUCTIVE HOURS																	
- HOURS PER UNIT																	
TRAVEL TIME - CITIZENSHIP ACTIVITY																	
LOST TIME - CITIZENSHIP ACTIVITY																	
CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION 1/																	
CITIZENSHIP ASSISTANCE FURNISHED																	
ALIENS REFERRED TO PUBLIC SCHOOLS																	
ALIENS INFORMED OF HOME STUDY																	
NAME SLIPS TO PUBLIC SCHOOLS COR. CTRS.																	
ALIENS ADMITTED TO CITIZENSHIP																	
ATTENDED PUBLIC SCHOOL CLASSES																	
ENROLLED IN HOME STUDY COURSES																	
NUMBER SUBMITTING PUBLIC SCHOOL CERT.																	
111a VERIFICATION OF ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE ACTIVITY																	
VERIFICATION REQUESTS																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
RECEIVED DURING PERIOD	46	36	46	28	346												
TOTAL	46	36	46	28	346												
COMPLETED	46	36	46	28	346												
NATURALIZATION	-	-	1	-	-												
OTHER	46	36	45	28	346												
PENDING END OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
VERIFICATION - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	33	18	14	7	47												
- HOURS PER UNIT	.717	.500	.304	.250	.136												

1/ Source: Form N-28

Form G-21.10 (9-1-53) A

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: SEPTEMBER 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1

V INVESTIGATIONS ACTIVITY	TOTAL	Bangor	Burlington	Calais	Fort Fairfield	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Roosevelt Town	Rouses Point	St. Albans
INVESTIGATIONS																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	216	13	2	1	-	-	6	1	-	4	-	6	1	-	-	12	96
RECEIVED DURING PERIOD	292	10	5	7		4	22	7	3	11	8	8	2	-		23	79
TOTAL	508	23	7	8		4	28	8	3	15	8	14	3	-		35	175
COMPLETED	293	11	3	7		4	22	8	3	13	8	6	2			23	109
NATURALIZATION AND CITIZENSHIP	57	3	2							2		2					40
CANCELLATION - SUBVERSIVE	1																1
CANCELLATION - OTHER	3		1														1
NATURALIZATION	29	2	1							1		1					24
OTHER	24	1								1		1					14
DEPORTATION	99	1		3			16			1	7	2				18	24
SUBVERSIVE	1																1
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC	4															4	
ADDRESS REPORT CARD (I-53)	17						2				4						11
SUSPENSION	4																4
NON-IMMIGRANTS	35	1					9									9	3
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS	14			1			5				1	1				4	1
DISPLACED PERSONS	1									1							
OTHER	23			2							2	1				1	4
SMUGGLING	2						2										
PRIVATE BILLS	-																
PAROLE	3																1
ALIEN REGISTRATION	24	3	1				2										
ALIEN ADDRESS REPORT (SEC. 35)	30	3		4		4	2	2		4	1	1				3	
MISCELLANEOUS	78	1						6	3	6		1	2			2	44
PENDING END OF PERIOD	215	12	4	1			6			2		8	1		--	12	66
NATURALIZATION AND CITIZENSHIP	47		1														37
CANCELLATION - SUBVERSIVE	2																2
CANCELLATION - OTHER	-																
NATURALIZATION	32		1														30
OTHER	13																5
DEPORTATION	130	10	3	1			6					4	1			11	14
SUBVERSIVE	6																5
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC	11															8	
ADDRESS REPORT CARD (I-53)	14	6	1										1			3	3
SUSPENSION	-																
NON-IMMIGRANTS	74	1	2														
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS	6																2
DISPLACED PERSONS	1																1
OTHER	18	3		1			6					4					3
SMUGGLING	1																
PRIVATE BILLS	-																
PAROLE	-																
ALIEN REGISTRATION	2																1
ALIEN ADDRESS REPORT (SEC. 35)	2	1										1					
MISCELLANEOUS	33	1								2		3				1	14

Form G-21.11 (9-1-53) A

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: SEPTEMBER 1953 ST. ALBANS District No. 1

V INVESTIGATIONS ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	TOTAL	Bangor	Burlington	Calais	Fort Fairfield	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Roosevelttown	Rouses Point	St. Albans
INVESTIGATIONS RESULTING IN W/A OR V/D	37	-	-	3	-	-	16	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	16	-
ALIENS APPRH'D. (BY OTHER THAN B.P.)	9															9	
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS	-															-	
MEXICANS APPRH'D. (BY OTHER THAN B.P.)	1															1	
ILLEGALLY IN AGRICULTURE	-															-	
ILLEGALLY IN TRADE OR INDUSTRY	-															-	
OTHER	1															1	
W/A THRU ADDRESS REPORT CARD (I-88)	-															-	
INVESTIGATIONS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	1463	30	2	10	-	8	25	12	2	24	16	21	3	-	-	93	1112
- HOURS PER UNIT	4.99	2.72	.667	1.43	-	2.00	.961	1.50	.666	1.85	2.00	3.50	1.50	-	-	4.04	10.2
TRAVEL TIME - INVESTIGATIONS ACTIVITY	238	4	-	-	-	10	2	-	-	4	-	2	2	-	-	10	160
WARRANT OF ARREST PROCESSING																	
COMPLETED	38	-	-	3	-	-	17	-	-	2	-	1	-	-	-	13	-
W/A PROCESSING - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	31			1			9			2	-	2				11	
- HOURS PER UNIT	.815			.333			.529			1.00	-	2.00				.846	
WARRANT OF ARREST SERVICE																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
RECEIVED	35			3			17				1	1				13	
TOTAL	35			3			17				1	1				13	
COMPLETED	35			3			17				1	1				13	
PENDING END OF PERIOD	-			-			-				-	-				-	
W/A SERVICE - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	14			1			9				4	-				-	
- HOURS PER UNIT	.400			.333			.529				4.00	-				-	
VI EMPLOYMENT SUMMARY																	
NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES END OF PERIOD	232	2	2	20	-	11	12	11	13	21	23	17	10	10	-	34	61
OPERATIONS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	43440	306	299	2913	-	2023	2079	1656	2015	4309	3852	2613	1667	3504	-	5421	5403
OPERATIONS - NON-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	4611	-	32	208	-	170	176	267	176	336	358	622	138	208	-	799	525
ADMINISTRATION - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	6966	66	177	492	-	145	21	160	282	188	168	136	110	-	-	195	3278
ADMINISTRATION - NON-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	951	4	-	164	-	-	-	-	-	57	-	-	40	-	-	-	301
TOTAL HOURS EMPLOYMENT	55968	376	508	3777	-	2338	2276	2083	2473	4890	4378	3371	1955	2712	-	6415	9507
PERCENTAGE TOTAL HOURS ON OPERATIONS	85.8	81.3	65.1	82.6	-	93.7	99.0	92.3	88.5	94.9	96.1	95.9	92.3	100.	-	96.9	61.0

Form G-21.10 (9-1-53) 8

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: SEPTEMBER 1953 ST. ALBANS District No. 1 (continued)

V INVESTIGATIONS ACTIVITY	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vanceboro	Halifax	Montreal												
INVESTIGATIONS																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD		1	.	.	73												
RECEIVED DURING PERIOD	23	7	7	9	57												
TOTAL	23	8	7	9	130												
COMPLETED	22	7	6	8	31												
NATURALIZATION AND CITIZENSHIP	2	1			5												
CANCELLATION - SUBVERSIVE																	
CANCELLATION - OTHER					1												
NATURALIZATION																	
OTHER	2	1			4												
DEPORTATION		4		4	19												
SUBVERSIVE																	
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC																	
ADDRESS REPORT CARD (1-53)																	
SUSPENSION					13												
NON-IMMIGRANTS		1															
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS																	
DISPLACED PERSONS		3		4	6												
OTHER																	
SMUGGLING																	
PRIVATE BILLS	2																
PAROLE	16	2															
ALIEN REGISTRATION	1		5														
ALIEN ADDRESS REPORT (SEC. 35)	1		1	4	7												
MISCELLANEOUS	1	1	1	1	99												
PENDING END OF PERIOD	1		1		7												
NATURALIZATION AND CITIZENSHIP																	
CANCELLATION - SUBVERSIVE			1														
CANCELLATION - OTHER					7												
NATURALIZATION	1				80												
OTHER					1												
DEPORTATION					3												
SUBVERSIVE																	
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC					71												
ADDRESS REPORT CARD (1-53)					4												
SUSPENSION																	
NON-IMMIGRANTS					1												
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS					1												
DISPLACED PERSONS																	
OTHER																	
SMUGGLING																	
PRIVATE BILLS		1															
PAROLE																	
ALIEN REGISTRATION																	
ALIEN ADDRESS REPORT (SEC. 35)				1	11												
MISCELLANEOUS																	

Form G-21.11 (9-1-53) 8

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: SEPTEMBER 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1 (Continued)

V INVESTIGATIONS ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	vance-bore	Halifax	Montreal												
INVESTIGATIONS RESULTING IN W/A OR V/D		2	-	-	-												
ALIENS APPRH'D. (BY OTHER THAN B.P.)																	
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS																	
MEXICANS APPRH'D. (BY OTHER THAN B.P.)																	
ILLEGALLY IN AGRICULTURE																	
ILLEGALLY IN TRADE OR INDUSTRY																	
OTHER																	
W/A THRU ADDRESS REPORT CARD (I-53)																	
INVESTIGATIONS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	36	7	4	6	52												
- HOURS PER UNIT	1.64	1.00	.666	.750	1.68												
TRAVEL TIME - INVESTIGATIONS ACTIVITY	-	2	-	4	38												
WARRANT OF ARREST PROCESSING																	
COMPLETED	-	2	-	-	-												
W/A PROCESSING - PRODUCTIVE HOURS		6															
- HOURS PER UNIT		3.00															
WARRANT OF ARREST SERVICE																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-												
RECEIVED																	
TOTAL																	
COMPLETED																	
PENDING END OF PERIOD																	
W/A SERVICE - PRODUCTIVE HOURS																	
- HOURS PER UNIT																	
VI EMPLOYMENT SUMMARY																	
NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES END OF PERIOD	10	9	9	2	15												
OPERATIONS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	1790	1390	1442	221	1537												
OPERATIONS - NON-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	192	72	171	1	160												
ADMINISTRATION - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	138	252	224	119	815												
ADMINISTRATION - NON-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	35	15	40	-	295												
TOTAL HOURS EMPLOYMENT	2155	1729	1877	341	2807												
PERCENTAGE TOTAL HOURS ON OPERATIONS	92.0	84.5	85.9	65.1	60.4												

Form G-21.1 (9-1-53)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: OCTOBER 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1

I ENTRY AND DEPARTURE ACTIVITY	TOTAL	Bar- [illegible]	—	Calais	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jack-man	Made-waska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdens-burg	Richford	Rouses Point	St. Albans	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vance-boro	Hali-fax	Mont-real
PRIMARY INSPECTION																				
BORDER CROSSERS ADMITTED - ALIENS	794587	-		126647	31240	64644	17812	126488	82697	64779	29470	39464	19988	83627	5564	30790	54046	15683	297	1351
- CITIZENS	450358	4		52743	30369	31118	12376	71792	43303	47918	15775	10554	14697	42502	3815	24067	37494	11823		8
CREWMEN ADMITTED - ALIENS	1857	105		1506								134		108	4					
- CITIZENS	422	6		92										2	322					
OTHERS ADMITTED - ALIENS	8252	6		176	141	14	1159	22	136	239	630	23	47	1046	535	106	110	507	1075	2280
- CITIZENS	3754	58		15	375	1	47	7	171	20	2			168	5	12	1	342	1742	788
ALIENS NOT ADMITTED - TOTAL	832			38	26	18	69	5	37	63	23	30	5	155	4	143	46	21	58	91
BORDER-CROSSERS	395			31	20	18	15	2	27		22	30	5	155	4	23	40	3		
CREWMEN	105															105				
OTHERS NOT ADMITTED	332			7	6		54	3	10	63	1					15	6	18	58	91
PREEXAMINATIONS COMPLETED - IN U.S.	-																			
OUTSIDE U.S.	175															42		133		
FINES	2																			2
TOTAL WORK UNITS	1260239	179		181217	62151	95795	31463	198314	126344	113019	45900	50205	34737	127608	10249	55160	91697	28509	372	4520
PRIMARY INSPECTION-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	40426	38		3799	2675	4922	1910	1773	4204	3068	3125	1579	1107	5370	1346	1522	1318	1616	249	805
- HOURS PER UNIT	.032	.212		.020	.043	.057	.060	.008	.033	.027	.068	.031	.032	.042	.131	.028	.014	.056	.078	.178
PRODUCTIVE HOURS- INS PERSONNEL	32441	38		2791	1747	1946	1910	1773	3502	3068	2381	1398	847	4757	1346	1452	1318	1113	249	805
VESSELS BOARDED - ARRIVAL	879	12		784	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	11	-	15	-	5		1	11	40
AIRPLANE FLIGHTS- ARRIVAL	353	6		11	-	-	-	-	11	2	-	6	-	1	173	41	2			100
VESSELS & AIRPLANES BOARDED ON DEPART.	5	-		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		-		-	-				5
SPECIAL INQUIRY OFFICER HEARINGS																				
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	13	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10
RECEIVED	129			25		1		-				9			27					67
TOTAL	142			26		1		1				10			27					77
COMPLETED	134			26		1		1				9			27					70
SUBVERSIVE	-																			
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC	-																			
WITHOUT PROPER DOCUMENTS	-																			
OTHER	-																			
PENDING END OF PERIOD	8			-		-						1								7
SIO HEARINGS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	425	-		48		3		-				26		17	278	30		23		
- HOURS PER UNIT	3.17	-		1.85		3.00		-				2.89		-	10.3	-		-		
PRODUCTIVE HOURS - INS PERSONNEL	425	-		48		3		-				26		17	278	30		23		
AUTHORIZATIONS																				
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	36	1		-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	32	2	-	-	-	-
RECEIVED	2951	35		25	63	119	1082	326	71	192	561	42	32	5	287	45	38	11	1	16
TOTAL	2987	36		25	63	120	1082	326	71	192	561	42	32	5	319	47	38	11	1	16
RETURNED OR TRANSFERRED	10	-		-	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	-	-	-	-	-
PROCESSED WITHOUT COMPLETION	17	-		-	-	-	-	7	9	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Form G-21.2 (9-1-53) UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE ST. ALBANS District No. 1

REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: OCTOBER 1953

I ENTRY AND DEPARTURE ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	TOTAL	Bangor	Calais	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Rouses Point	St. Albans	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vanceboro	Halifax	Montreal
AUTHORIZATIONS. - (Cont'd) Received	2951	35	25	63	119	1082	326	71	192	561	42	32	5	287	45	38	11	1	16
BORDER CROSSING CARDS	463	22	9		106	35	7	43	79	17	36	21	3	37	31		8	1	8
REENTRY PERMITS ISSUED & EXTENDED	23						2							21				-	
VISA PETITIONS	25													25					
Q - SPECIAL SKILLS	3													3					
Q - PARENTS OF CITIZENS	1													1			-		
Q - OTHER RELATIVES OF CITIZENS	7													7					
NQ- SPOUSES, CHILDREN OF CITIZENS	13													13					
Q - SPOUSES, CHILDREN OF RESID. ALIENS	1													1					
NQ- MINISTERS	-													-					
ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS.																			
NONIMMIGRANTS TO IMMIGRANTS	4													4					
IMMIGRANTS TO NONIMMIGRANTS	-																		
PREEXAMINATION AUTHORIZATIONS	-																		
CREATION OF RECORD OF ADMISSION	21						1							19	1				
EXTENSIONS OF TEMPORARY STAY	47		3	4		1		3	8	4	1		1	20	2				
ALIEN LABORER CARDS	2044		3	23		1045	295	11	89	524		10	1	4	4	35			
DUPLICATE ALIEN REGISTRATION CARDS	237	13	4	35	13	1	20	10	16	16	2	1		93	7	3	3		
PERMISSION TO REAPPLY	28		5	1							1			13					8
CHANGE OF NONIMMIGRANT STATUS	2							1						1					
PETITIONS TO IMPORT:																			
TEMP. WORKERS OF EXCEPT. ABILITY	8													8					
LABORERS AND OTHER TEMP. WORKERS	35						1	1						33					
INDUSTRIAL TRAINEES	-													-					
SCHOOL APPROVALS	3													3					
SEC. 4 D.P. APPLICATIONS	-																		
APPL'S. FOR PERMISSION TO RETURN	-																		
APPL'S. FOR WAIVER OF INADMISSIBILITY	7		1											6					
APPL'S. FOR STUDENT EMPLOYMENT	4							2			2								
BREACH OR CANCELLATION OF BONDS	-													-					
DENIED																			
BORDER CROSSING CARDS																			
REENTRY PERMITS ISSUED & EXTENDED																			
VISA PETITIONS																			
Q - SPECIAL SKILLS																			
Q - PARENTS OF CITIZENS																			
Q - OTHER RELATIVES OF CITIZENS																			
NQ- SPOUSES, CHILDREN OF CITIZENS																			
Q - SPOUSES, CHILDREN OF RESID. ALIENS																			
NQ- MINISTERS																			
ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS.																			
NONIMMIGRANTS TO IMMIGRANTS																			
IMMIGRANTS TO NONIMMIGRANTS																			
PREEXAMINATION AUTHORIZATIONS																			
CREATION OF RECORD OF ADMISSION																			

Form G-21.2 (9-1-53)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: OCTOBER 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1

I ENTRY AND DEPARTURE ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	TOTAL	Bangor		Calais	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Rouses Point	St. Albans	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vanceboro	Mellifax	Montreal
AUTHORIZATIONS. - (Cont'd)	2893	35		25	63	119	1082	315	57	192	560	42	32	5	253	47	38	11	1	16
COMPLETED.																				
BORDER CROSSING CARDS	463	22		9		106	35	7	43	79	17	36	21	3	37	31		8	1	8
REENTRY PERMITS ISSUED & EXTENDED	21														21					
VISA PETITIONS	19														19					
Q - SPECIAL SKILLS	1														1					
Q - PARENTS OF CITIZENS	1														1					
Q - OTHER RELATIVES OF CITIZENS	-														-					
NQ- SPOUSES, CHILDREN OF CITIZENS	16														16					
Q - SPOUSES, CHILDREN OF RESID. ALIENS	1														1					
NQ- MINISTERS	-														-					
ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS.																				
NONIMMIGRANTS TO IMMIGRANTS	1														1					
IMMIGRANTS TO NONIMMIGRANTS	-																			
PREEXAMINATION AUTHORIZATIONS	-																			
CREATION OF RECORD OF ADMISSION	3														2	1				
EXTENSIONS OF TEMPORARY STAY	44			3	4		1		2	8	3	1		1	18	3				
ALIEN LABORER CARDS	2044			3	23		1045	295	11	89	524		10	1	4	4	35			
DUPLICATE ALIEN REGISTRATION CARDS	227	13		4	35	13	1	13		16	16	2	1		99	8	9	3		
PERMISSION TO REAPPLY	28			5	1							1			13					8
CHANGE OF NONIMMIGRANT STATUS	-														-					
PETITIONS TO IMPORT:																				
TEMP. WORKERS OF EXCEPT. ABILITY	7														7					
LABORERS AND OTHER TEMP. WORKERS	24														24					
INDUSTRIAL TRAINEES	-																			
SCHOOL APPROVALS	2														2					
SEC. 4 D.P. APPLICATIONS	-																			
APPL'S. FOR PERMISSION TO RETURN	-																			
APPL'S. FOR WAIVER OF INADMISSIBILITY	7			1											6					
APPL'S. FOR STUDENT EMPLOYMENT	3								1			2								
BREACH OR CANCELLATION OF BONDS	-																			
DENIED	-	-		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
BORDER CROSSING CARDS																				
REENTRY PERMITS ISSUED & EXTENDED																				
VISA PETITIONS				-		-				-										
Q - SPECIAL SKILLS																				
Q - PARENTS OF CITIZENS																				
Q - OTHER RELATIVES OF CITIZENS																				
NQ- SPOUSES, CHILDREN OF CITIZENS																				
Q - SPOUSES, CHILDREN OF RESID. ALIENS																				
NQ- MINISTERS																				
ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS.																				
NONIMMIGRANTS TO IMMIGRANTS																				
IMMIGRANTS TO NONIMMIGRANTS																				
PREEXAMINATION AUTHORIZATIONS																				
CREATION OF RECORD OF ADMISSION																				

Form G-21.3 (9-1-53)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: OCTOBER 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1

I ENTRY AND DEPARTURE ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	TOTAL	Bangor		Calais	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Rouses Point	St. Albans	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vanceboro	Halifax	Montreal
AUTHORIZATIONS - (Cont'd)																				
DENIED (CONT'D)																				
EXTENSIONS OF TEMPORARY STAY																				
ALIEN LABORER CARDS																				
DUPLICATE ALIEN REGISTRATION CARDS																				
PERMISSION TO REAPPLY																				
CHANGE OF NONIMMIGRANT STATUS																				
PETITIONS TO IMPORT:																				
TEMP. WORKERS OF EXCEPT. ABILITY																				
LABORERS AND OTHER TEMP. WORKERS																				
INDUSTRIAL TRAINEES																				
SCHOOL APPROVALS																				
SEC. 4 D.P. APPLICATIONS																				
APPL'S FOR PERMISSION TO RETURN																				
APPL'S. FOR WAIVER OF INADMISSIBILITY																				
APPL'S. FOR STUDENT EMPLOYMENT																				
BREACH OR CANCELLATION OF BONDS																				
PENDING END OF PERIOD	67	1		-	-	1	-	-	5	-	-	-	-	-	60	-	-	-	-	-
BORDER CROSSING CARDS	-																			
REENTRY PERMITS ISSUED & EXTENDED	-																			
VISA PETITIONS	17														17					
Q - SPECIAL SKILLS	1														1					
Q - PARENTS OF CITIZENS	1														1					
Q - OTHER RELATIVES OF CITIZENS	11														11					
NQ- SPOUSES, CHILDREN OF CITIZENS	3														3					
Q - SPOUSES, CHILDREN OF RESID. ALIENS	1														1					
NQ-MINISTERS	-														-					
ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS																				
NONIMMIGRANTS TO IMMIGRANTS	4														4					
IMMIGRANTS TO NONIMMIGRANTS	-																			
PREEXAMINATION AUTHORIZATIONS	1	1																		
CREATION OF RECORD OF ADMISSION	17					1									16					
EXTENSIONS OF TEMPORARY STAY	3								1						2					
ALIEN LABORER CARDS	-																			
DUPLICATE ALIEN REGISTRATION CARDS	3								3											
PERMISSION TO REAPPLY	-																			
CHANGE OF NONIMMIGRANT STATUS	1														1					
PETITIONS TO IMPORT:																				
TEMP. WORKERS OF EXCEPT. ABILITY	-																			
LABORERS AND OTHER TEMP. WORKERS	19														19					
INDUSTRIAL TRAINEES	-																			
SCHOOL APPROVALS	1														1					
SEC. 4 D.P. APPLICATIONS	-																			
APPL'S. FOR PERMISSION TO RETURN	-																			
APPL'S. FOR WAIVER OF INADMISSIBILITY	-																			
APPL'S. FOR STUDENT EMPLOYMENT	1								1											
BREACH OR CANCELLATION OF BONDS	-																			

Form G-21.4 (9-1-53) UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE

REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: OCTOBER 1953 ST. ALBANS District No. 1

I ENTRY AND DEPARTURE ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	TOTAL	Ban- gor		Calais	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jacke- man	Made- waska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdens- burg	Richford	Rouses Point	St. Albans	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vance- boro	Hali- fax	Mont- real
AUTHORIZATIONS - (Cont'd)																				
AUTHORIZATIONS- PRODUCTIVE HOURS	1310	28		8	68	14	218	32	48	103	113	20	8	64	496	58	19	3	1	10
- HOURS PER UNIT	.452	.800		.320	1.08	.117	.200	.101	.842	.536	.201	.476	.250	12.8	1.96	1.23	.500	.272	1.00	.625
TRAVEL TIME- ENTRY & DEPARTURE ACTIV.	1413	29		4	-	16	86	21	35	175	149	-	-	119	414	7	-	93	51	214
LOST TIME - ENTRY & DEPARTURE ACTIV.	1770	95		-	-	-	84	-	703	-	-	-	761	-	33	11	-	48	1	34
II DETENTION, DEPORTATION AND PAROLE ACTIVITY																				
WARRANT HEARINGS																				
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	43	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	43	-	-	-	-	-
RECEIVED	30														30					
TOTAL	73														73					
COMPLETED	36														36					
SUBVERSIVE	-																			
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC	2														2					
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS	25														25					
WITHOUT PROPER DOCUMENTS	3														3					
REMAINED LONGER	4														4					
OTHER	2														2					
PENDING END OF PERIOD	37														37					
WARRANT HEARINGS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	212													16	196					
- HOURS PER UNIT	5.89													-	5.44					
CASES COMPLETED WITH 2-MAN HEARINGS	-														-					
ON APPEAL - TOTAL	1														1					
FINAL ORDERS ENTERED OR RECEIVED	37														37					
TRAVEL TIME - WARRANT HEARINGS OPER.	28													6	22					
LOST TIME - WARRANT HEARINGS OPER.	-													-	-					
PAROLE AND SUPERVISION (Expulsion)																				
CONDITIONAL PAROLE																				
ALIENS ON PAROLE BEGINNING OF PERIOD	35	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	33	-	-	1	-	-
PLACED ON PAROLE DURING PERIOD	2											1			1					
TOTAL ON PAROLE DURING PERIOD	37											2			34			1		
REMOVED FROM PAROLE DURING PERIOD	-																			
ALIENS ON PAROLE END OF PERIOD	37											2			34			1		
SUBVERSIVE	-																			
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC	8														8					
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS	2														1			1		
WITHOUT PROPER DOCUMENTS	8											1			7					
REMAINED LONGER	9														9					
OTHER	10											1			9					
COND. PAROLE - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	1											-			1			-		
- HOURS PER UNIT	.027											-			.029			-		

Form G-21.5 (9-1-53)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: OCTOBER 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1

II DETENTION, DEPORTATION AND PAROLE ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	TOTAL	Ban- gor		Calais	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jack- man	Mada- waska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdens- burg	Richford	Rouses Point	St. Albans	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vance- boro	Hali- fax	Mont- real
PAROLE AND SUPERVISION (Cont'd)																				
SUPERVISION																				
ALIENS UNDER SUPER'N BEGIN. OF PERIOD	10	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10	-	-	-	-	-
PLACED UNDER SUPER'N DURING PERIOD	-																			
TOTAL UNDER SUPER'N DURING PERIOD	10														10					
REMOVED FROM SUPER'N DURING PERIOD	1														1					
ALIENS UNDER SUPER'N END OF PERIOD	9														9					
SUBVERSIVE	-																			
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC	4														4					
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS	-																			
WITHOUT PROPER DOCUMENTS	-																			
REMAINED LONGER	3														3					
OTHER	2														2					
SUPERVISION - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	-														-					
- HOURS PER UNIT	-														-					
TRAVEL TIME - PAROLE & SUPER'N OPER.	-														-					
LOST TIME - PAROLE & SUPER'N OPER.	-														-					
SERVICE DETENTION FACILITIES																				
NUMBER DETAINED BEGINNING OF PERIOD	3	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-
EXCLUSION	1					-									1					
EXPULSION	2					1								1						
DETAINEES ADMITTED	91			1	2	-				44				29	8			7		
NUMBER DETAINED DURING PERIOD	94			1	2	1				44				30	9			7		
EXCLUSION	77			-	-	-				44				21	5			7		
DETAINEES REMOVED DURING PERIOD	93			1	2	1				44				29	9			7		
NUMBER DETAINED END OF PERIOD	1			-		-				-				1	-			-		
MAN-DAYS DETENTION DURING PERIOD	132			1	4	1				44				57	12			13		
EXCLUSION	98			-	-	-				44				34	8			12		
EXPULSION	34			1	4	1				-				23	4			1		
AVERAGE DAYS DET. PER DETAINEE	1.40			1.00	2.00	1.00				1.00				1.90	1.33			1.71		
SERVICE DET. FAC. - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	407			-	2	-				160				118	-			127		
- HOURS PER UNIT	3.38			-	.500	-				3.63				2.07	-			9.77		
PRODUCTIVE HOURS - INS PERSONNEL	318			-	2	-				160				77	-			79		
NON-SERVICE DETENTION FACILITIES																				
NUMBER DETAINED BEGINNING OF PERIOD	20	3	-	-	-	10	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	3	3	-	-	-	-
DETAINEES ADMITTED	30	18				-			1	6					5					
NUMBER DETAINED DURING PERIOD	50	21				10			2	6					8	3				
DETAINEES REMOVED DURING PERIOD	43	17				10			1	6					7	2				
NUMBER DETAINED END OF PERIOD	7	4							1	-					1	1				
MAN-DAYS DETENTION DURING PERIOD	370	146				46			17	24					78	59				
AVERAGE DAYS DET. PER DETAINEE	7.40	6.90				4.60			8.50	4.00					9.75	19.7				
NON-SERV. DET. FAC.- PRODUCTIVE HOURS	21	10				-			2	-					-	9				
- HOURS PER UNIT	.420	476				-			1.00	-					-	3.00				
															-	-				

Form G-21.6 (9-1-53)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: OCTOBER 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1

II DETENTION, DEPORTATION AND PAROLE ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	TOTAL	Ban-gor		Calais	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jack-man	Made-waska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdens-burg	Richford	Rouses Point	St. Albans	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vance-boro	Hali-fax	Hous-ton
DEPORTATION																				
ALIENS PROCESSED FOR DEPORTATION	37	11		-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-			1	21	3	-	-	-	-
ALIENS PROCESSED FOR VOLUNTARY DEPAR	21	-			2	3			1					3	2	4		6		
ALIENS PROCESSED FOR REMOVAL	1	-			-	-			-						1			-		
TOTAL	59	11			2	4			1					4	24	7		6		
ALIENS DEPORTED	17				-	6		2	-					2	4	3		-		
VOLUNTARY DEPARTURES	36			5	2	3		2	1	7			1	4	-	4	1	6		
UNDER W/A	4			-	-	2		-	-					1	-	1	-	-		
WITHOUT W/A	32			5	2	1		2	1	7			1	3	-	3	1	6		
REMOVALS	-			-	-	-		-	-				-	-	-		-	-		
DEPORTATION - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	350	8		-	1	2		-	-	-			-	24	28.7	20	-	8		
- HOURS PER UNIT	5.93	.727		-	.500	.500		-	-	-			-	6.00	11.9	2.86	-	1.33		
TRAVEL TIME - DEPORTATION OPERATION	56	-		-	-	7		-	-	-			-	24	18	-	-	7		
LOST TIME - DEPORTATION OPERATION	36	-		-	-	-		-	-	-			-	-	-	-	-	36		
III CITIZENSHIP ACTIVITY																				
NATURALIZATION																				
N-400) PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	585	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	585	-	-	-	-	-
FOR) RECEIVED	2			2											-					
PROC-) COMPLETED	193			2											191					
ESSING) REJ., TRANSF., OR CLOSED	9			-											9					
" PROCESSED	1184			2											182					
" PENDING END OF PERIOD	394			-											394					
N-400) PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	406	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	406	-	-	-	-	-
FOR) RECEIVED	218						1								217					
FILING) COMPLETED	102							-							102					
PET.) TRANSFERRED OR CLOSED	6							-							6					
" PETITIONS FILED	96							-							96					
" PENDING END OF PERIOD	522						1	-							521					
" READY FOR filing petitions	521							-							521					
PETI-) PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	406	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	406	-	-	-	-	-
TIONS) COMPLETED	179														179					
" GRANTED	179														179					
" DENIED	-														-					
" TRANSFERRED	-														-					
" PENDING END OF PERIOD	323														323					
" READY FOR FINAL HEARING	323														323					
N-300) PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-														-					
" RECEIVED	4														4					
" COMPLETED	4														4					
" PENDING END OF PERIOD	-														-					
DECLARATIONS FILED	6														6					
NATURALIZATION - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	419			2				-							417					
- HOURS PER UNIT	.859			1.00				-							.865					

Form G-21.7 (9-1-53) UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: OCTOBER 1953 ST. ALBANS District No. 1

III CITIZENSHIP ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	TOTAL	Bangor	[illegible]	Calais	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Rouses Point	St. Albans	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vanceboro	Halifax	Montreal
CITIZENSHIP APPLICATIONS																				
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	46	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	45	-	-	-	-	-
RECEIVED	20					1									19					
TOTAL	66		1			1									64					
COMPLETED - TOTAL	5					1									4					
REJECTED, TRANSFERRED, OR CLOSED	4		1												4					
PROCESSED FOR OTHER OFFICES	2					1									1					
PENDING END OF PERIOD - TOTAL	55		-												55					
READY FOR HEARING	23		-												23					
CITIZENSHIP - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	201		-			-									201					
- HOURS PER UNIT	20.1		-			-									22.3					
NATIONALITY APPLICATIONS																				
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	6	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	-	-	-	-	-
RECEIVED	9														9					
TOTAL	15		1												14					
COMPLETED - TOTAL	5		1												4					
REJECTED, TRANSFERRED, OR CLOSED	-		-																	
PROCESSED FOR OTHER OFFICES	-																			
PENDING END OF PERIOD - TOTAL	10		-												10					
READY FOR HEARING, adjudication OR DELIVERY	1														1					
NATIONALITY - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	32		-												32					
- HOURS PER UNIT	8.00		-												8.00					
TRAVEL TIME - CITIZENSHIP ACTIVITY	50		-												50					
LOST TIME - CITIZENSHIP ACTIVITY	-		-												-					
CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION 1/																				
CITIZENSHIP ASSISTANCE FURNISHED																				
ALIENS REFERRED TO PUBLIC SCHOOLS																				
ALIENS INFORMED OF HOME STUDY																				
NAME SLIPS TO PUBLIC SCHOOLS COR. CTRS.																				
ALIENS ADMITTED TO CITIZENSHIP																				
ATTENDED PUBLIC SCHOOL CLASSES																				
ENROLLED IN HOME STUDY COURSES																				
NUMBER SUBMITTING PUBLIC SCHOOL CERT.																				
111a VERIFICATION OF ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE ACTIVITY																				
VERIFICATION REQUESTS																				
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	816	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	816	-	-	-	-	-
RECEIVED DURING PERIOD	1939	12		17	15	9	4	3	54	118	22	4		59	1258	48	28	42	27	219
TOTAL	2755	12		17	15	9	4	3	54	118	22	4		59	2074	48	28	42	27	219
COMPLETED	1879	12		17	15	9	4	3	54	118	22	4		59	1198	48	28	42	27	219
NATURALIZATION	248	-		-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-		1	245	-	-	-	-	-
OTHER	1631	12		17	15	9	4	3	54	116	22	4		58	953	48	28	42	27	219
PENDING END OF PERIOD	876	-		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		-	876	-	-	-	-	-
VERIFICATION - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	726	5		3	2	2	1	-	13	58	9	2		20	510	28	14	16	6	37
- HOURS PER UNIT	.493	.417		.176	.133	.222	.250	-	.240	.491	.409	.500		.338	.425	.583	.500	.380	.222	.169

1/ Source: Form N-28

Form G-21.10 (9-1-53)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: OCTOBER 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1

V INVESTIGATIONS ACTIVITY	TOTAL	Bangor		Calais	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Rouses Point	St. Albans	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vanceboro	Halifax	Montreal
INVESTIGATIONS																				
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	215	12	4	1	-	6	-	-	2	-	8	1	-	12	66	1	1	1	1	99
RECEIVED DURING PERIOD	311	10		5	5	6	5	3	12	9	3	6	1	18	124	7	3	4	3	87
TOTAL	526	22	4	6	5	12	5	3	14	9	11	7	1	30	190	8	4	5	4	186
COMPLETED	302	11	4	5	5	8	5	3	12	9	6	7	1	19	125	8	3	5	4	62
NATURALIZATION AND CITIZENSHIP	64		4			1		1	2						52	2	1	1	-	
CANCELLATION - SUBVERSIVE	-																			
CANCELLATION - OTHER	-																			
NATURALIZATION	42								1						40			1		
OTHER	22		4			1		1	1						12	2	1			
DEPORTATION	108	6		2	-	3	-	1	3	6	3	2		13	19		1		2	47
SUBVERSIVE	-																			
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC	10													5					1	4
ADDRESS REPORT CARD (I-53)	3											1			2					
SUSPENSION	1														1					
NON-IMMIGRANTS	51	3		1		1			1					1	5				1	38
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS	10								2					6			1			1
DISPLACED PERSONS	2											1			1					
OTHER	31	3		1		2		1		6	3			1	10					4
SMUGGLING	-																			
PRIVATE BILLS	2														2					
PAROLE	1															1				
ALIEN REGISTRATION	4														3		1			
ALIEN ADDRESS REPORT (SEC. 35)	40	3		1	5	2	1		4	3	1	4	1	5	7			3		
MISCELLANEOUS	83	2		2		2	4	1	3		2	1		1	42	5		1	2	15
PENDING END OF PERIOD	224	11	-	1	-	4	-	-	2	-	5	-	-	11	65	-	1	-	-	124
NATURALIZATION AND CITIZENSHIP	44										1				32					11
CANCELLATION - SUBVERSIVE	3														3					
CANCELLATION - OTHER	-																			
NATURALIZATION	24														23					1
OTHER	17										1				6					10
DEPORTATION	147	10		1		4					1			10	16					105
SUBVERSIVE	7														6					1
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC	8													7						1
ADDRESS REPORT CARD (I-53)	15	6		1		2								3	3					
SUSPENSION	1														1					
NON-IMMIGRANTS	99	1																		98
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS	5														2					3
DISPLACED PERSONS	-																			
OTHER	12	3				2					1				4					2
SMUGGLING	1																			1
PRIVATE BILLS	4								1						3					
PAROLE	-																			
ALIEN REGISTRATION	2														1		1			
ALIEN ADDRESS REPORT (SEC. 35)	2	1									1									
MISCELLANEOUS	24								1		2			1	13					7

Form G-21.11 (9-1-53)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: OCTOBER 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1

V INVESTIGATIONS ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	TOTAL	Bangor	Calais	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Rouses Point	St. Albans	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vanceboro	Halifax	Montreal
INVESTIGATIONS RESULTING IN W/A OR V/D	17	5	2	-	1		-	2	-		-	-	7	-			-	-	
ALIENS APPRH'D. (BY OTHER THAN B.P.)	5	2											2				1		
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS	2												1				1		
MEXICANS APPRH'D. (BY OTHER THAN B.P.)	-																		
ILLEGALLY IN AGRICULTURE	-																		
ILLEGALLY IN TRADE OR INDUSTRY	-																		
OTHER	-																		
W/A THRU ADDRESS REPORT CARD (I-88)	-																		
INVESTIGATIONS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	1441	41	7	4	9	14	2	33	7	28	8	1	46	1103	58	3	8	2	67
- HOURS PER UNIT	4.77	3.72	1.40	.800	1.13	2.80	.667	2.75	.777	4.67	1.14	1.00	2.42	8.82	3.50	1.00	1.60	.500	1.08
TRAVEL TIME - INVESTIGATIONS ACTIVITY	271	7	1	-	5	-	1	3	-	11	-	-	22	126	7	1	-	1	86
WARRANT OF ARREST PROCESSING																			
COMPLETED	15	2	2		-	-	-	3	-		-	-	5	3	-	-	-	-	-
W/A PROCESSING - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	14	4	4					3	-				-	3					
- HOURS PER UNIT	.933	2.00	.500					1.00	-				-	1.00					
WARRANT OF ARREST SERVICE																			
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
RECEIVED	13	2	2					1	2				5				1		
TOTAL	13	2	2					1	2				5				1		
COMPLETED	13	2	2					1	2				5				1		
PENDING END OF PERIOD	-	-	-					-	-				-				-		
W/A SERVICE - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	19	2	1					1	4				7				4		
- HOURS PER UNIT	1.46	1.00	.500					1.00	2.00				-				4.00		
VI EMPLOYMENT SUMMARY																			
NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES END OF PERIOD	288	2	20	11	12	11	13	21	23	17	10	10	33	60	11	9	9	2	14
OPERATIONS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	41556	267	2866	1824	2005	1993	1829	4341	3575	2691	1454	1617	5192	5503	1650	1355	1415	311	1668
OPERATIONS - NON-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	6438	-	380	424	330	184	344	380	600	465	357	183	1110	965	384	98	122	-	112
ADMINISTRATION - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	7050	76	510	144	16	190	312	172	193	172	115	40	262	3270	147	186	226	165	854
ADMINISTRATION - NON-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	1089	5	152	-	-	24	28	34	-	-	-	32	-	426	-	140	128	1	117
TOTAL HOURS EMPLOYMENT	56131	348	3908	2392	2351	2391	2513	4927	4368	3328	1926	1872	6564	10164	2181	1779	1891	497	2751
PERCENTAGE TOTAL HOURS ON OPERATIONS	74.0	76.7	83.0	93.9	99.3	91.0	86.4	95.8	95.5	94.8	94.0	96.1	96.0	63.6	93.3	81.6	81.2	65.1	64.7

Form G-21.1 (9-1-53) UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: NOVEMBER 1953 ST. ALBANS District No. 1

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I ENTRY AND DEPARTURE ACTIVITY	TOTAL	Bangor	Calais	Highgate Springs	Moulton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Rouses Point	St. Albans	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vanceboro	Halifax	Montreal
PRIMARY INSPECTION																			
BORDER CROSSERS ADMITTED - ALIENS	611331	2	103726	21198	55704	17757	105241	66215	48874	22724	30212	15090	49448	3511	15529	42999	11762	759	1180
- CITIZENS	351693	1	45828	23259	25266	9560	63203	35528	37213	12523	6791	12638	26860	2675	8578	33482	8277	-	11
CREWMEN ADMITTED - ALIENS	1343	189	953								72		100	21	8			-	
- CITIZENS	374	47	71											250	6				
OTHERS ADMITTED - ALIENS	5744	39	136	108	11	1387	26	138	192	443	12	17	821	263	73	59	281	116	1622
- CITIZENS	852	8	7	220			7	225	13	2			26	32	9	5	15	3	280
ALIENS NOT ADMITTED - TOTAL	578	2	37	33	8	34	9	24	59	5	19	9	126	6	59	23	17	55	53
BORDER-CROSSERS	403		28	24	8	4	3	19	59	5	18	9	77		17	16	8	55	53
CREWMEN	44	2	-												42				
OTHERS NOT ADMITTED	131		9	9		30	6	5			1		49	6		7	9		
PREEXAMINATIONS COMPLETED - IN U.S.	1														1		-		
OUTSIDE U.S.	170														34		136		
FINES	-																		
TOTAL WORK UNITS	972086	288	150758	44818	80989	28738	168486	102130	86351	35697	37106	27754	77381	6758	24297	76568	20488	333	3146
PRIMARY INSPECTION - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	37459	39	3505	2485	4335	1879	1638	3849	3322	2656	1341	1053	5223	1394	1312	1252	1434	107	6
- HOURS PER UNIT	.038	.135	.023	.055	.053	.065	.009	.037	.038	.074	.036	.038	.067	.206	.053	.016	.069	.321	.2
PRODUCTIVE HOURS - INS PERSONNEL	29404	39	2569	1669	1847	1240	1638	3152	2978	1968	1216	820	4679	1394	1270	1252	931	107	6
VESSELS BOARDED - ARRIVAL	555	27	473	-	-						3	-	14	-	3	-	-	4	
AIRPLANE FLIGHTS - ARRIVAL	227	8	19	-	-						1	-	-	106	15	3	-	-	
VESSELS & AIRPLANES BOARDED ON DEPART.	9	-	-	-	-						-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
SPECIAL INQUIRY OFFICER HEARINGS																			
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8	-	-	-	-	-
RECEIVED	118										-			118					
TOTAL	126													126					
COMPLETED	111													111					
SUBVERSIVE	-																		
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC	-																		
WITHOUT PROPER DOCUMENTS	-																		
OTHER	-																		
PENDING END OF PERIOD	15										-			15					
SIO HEARINGS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	217						-				-			217					
- HOURS PER UNIT	2.40						-				-			2.40			-		
PRODUCTIVE HOURS - INS PERSONNEL	255						12				-			217			26		
AUTHORIZATIONS																			
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	67	1	-	-	1	-	-	5	-	-	-	-	-	60	-	-	-	-	-
RECEIVED	2630	30	17	37	89	1362	130	69	111	409	28	25	3	237	21	40	11	1	10
TOTAL	2697	31	17	37	90	1362	130	74	111	409	28	25	3	297	21	40	11	1	10
RETURNED OR TRANSFERRED	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
PROCESSED WITHOUT COMPLETION	12	-	-	-	-	-	3	9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Form G-21.2 (9-1-53)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: NOVEMBER 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1

ENTRY AND DEPARTURE ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	TOTAL	Bangor	Calais	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Rouses Point	St. Albans	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vanceboro	Halifax	Montreal
AUTHORIZATIONS. - (Cont'd) Received	2630	30	17	37	89	1362	130	69	111	409	28	25	3	237	21	40	11	1	1
BORDER CROSSING CARDS	311	18	2		84	1		45	52	14	24	13	3	35	10		7	1	2
REENTRY PERMITS ISSUED & EXTENDED	12													12					
VISA PETITIONS	18													18					
Q - SPECIAL SKILLS	1													1					
Q - PARENTS OF CITIZENS	-																		
Q - OTHER RELATIVES OF CITIZENS	6													6					
NQ- SPOUSES, CHILDREN OF CITIZENS	10													10					
Q - SPOUSES, CHILDREN OF RESID. ALIENS	1													1					
NQ- MINISTERS																			
ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS.																			
NONIMMIGRANTS TO IMMIGRANTS	-																		
IMMIGRANTS TO NONIMMIGRANTS	-																		
PREEXAMINATION AUTHORIZATIONS	1														1				
CREATION OF RECORD OF ADMISSION	6						1							5					
EXTENSIONS OF TEMPORARY STAY	46				1			5	7	3				30					
ALIEN LABORER CARDS	1983		2	21		1359	126	11	42	373		11				38			
DUPLICATE ALIEN REGISTRATION CARDS	194	12	9	16	4	2	2	8	10	19	4	1		94	10	1	2		
PERMISSION TO REAPPLY	26		4				1							10		1	2		8
CHANGE OF NONIMMIGRANT STATUS	6													6					
PETITIONS TO IMPORT: Refugee Appl.	1													1					
TEMP. WORKERS OF EXCEPT. ABILITY	-																		
LABORERS AND OTHER TEMP. WORKERS	21													21					
INDUSTRIAL TRAINEES	-																		
SCHOOL APPROVALS	1													1					
SEC. 4 D.P. APPLICATIONS	-																		
APPL'S. FOR PERMISSION TO RETURN	-																		
APPL'S. FOR WAIVER OF INADMISSIBILITY	3													3					
APPL'S. FOR STUDENT EMPLOYMENT	1													1					
BREACH OR CANCELLATION OF BONDS	-																		
~~REVOKED~~																			
~~BORDER CROSSING CARDS~~																			
~~REENTRY PERMITS ISSUED & EXTENDED~~																			
~~VISA PETITIONS~~																			
~~Q - SPECIAL SKILLS~~																			
~~Q - PARENTS OF CITIZENS~~																			
~~Q - OTHER RELATIVES OF CITIZENS~~																			
~~NQ- SPOUSES, CHILDREN OF CITIZENS~~																			
~~Q - SPOUSES, CHILDREN OF RESID. ALIENS~~																			
~~NQ- MINISTERS~~																			
~~ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS.~~																			
~~NONIMMIGRANTS TO IMMIGRANTS~~																			
~~IMMIGRANTS TO NONIMMIGRANTS~~																			
~~PREEXAMINATION AUTHORIZATIONS~~																			
~~CREATION OF RECORD OF ADMISSION~~																			

Form G-21.2 (9-1-53)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: NOVEMBER 1953 ST. ALBANS District No. 1

I. ENTRY AND DEPARTURE ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	TOTAL	Bangor	Calais	Highgate-Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Rouses Point	St. Albans	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vanceboro	Halifax	Montreal
AUTHORIZATIONS - (Cont'd)	2605	30	17	37	89	1362	126	61	111	409	28	23	3	324	21	40	11	1	10
COMPLETED																			
BORDER CROSSING CARDS	311	18	2		84	1		45	52	14	24	13	3	35	10		7	1	2
REENTRY PERMITS ISSUED & EXTENDED	12													12					
VISA PETITIONS	22													22					
Q - SPECIAL SKILLS	2													2					
Q - PARENTS OF CITIZENS	1													1			-		
Q - OTHER RELATIVES OF CITIZENS	8													8					
NQ- SPOUSES, CHILDREN OF CITIZENS	10													10					
Q - SPOUSES, CHILDREN OF RESID. ALIENS	1													1					
NQ- MINISTERS	-													-					
ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS.																			
NONIMMIGRANTS TO IMMIGRANTS	-																		
IMMIGRANTS TO NONIMMIGRANTS	-																		
PREEXAMINATION AUTHORIZATIONS	1														1				
CREATION OF RECORD OF ADMISSION	-																		
EXTENSIONS OF TEMPORARY STAY	21				1			4	7	3				6					
ALIEN LABORER CARDS	2005		2	21		1359	126	11	42	373		11		22		38			
DUPLICATE ALIEN REGISTRATION CARDS	90	12	9	16	4	2			10	19	4	1			10	1	2		
PERMISSION TO REAPPLY	109		4											94		1	2		8
CHANGE OF NONIMMIGRANT STATUS	6													6					
PETITIONS TO IMPORT:																			
TEMP. WORKERS OF EXCEPT. ABILITY	4													4					
LABORERS AND OTHER TEMP. WORKERS	19													19					
INDUSTRIAL TRAINEES	-																		
SCHOOL APPROVALS	1													1					
SEC. 4 D.P. APPLICATIONS	-																		
APPL'S. FOR PERMISSION TO RETURN	-																		
APPL'S. FOR WAIVER OF INADMISSIBILITY	3													3					
APPL'S. FOR STUDENT EMPLOYMENT	1							1											
BREACH OR CANCELLATION OF BONDS	-																		
DENIED	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
BORDER CROSSING CARDS	-																		
REENTRY PERMITS ISSUED & EXTENDED	-																		
VISA PETITIONS	-																		
Q - SPECIAL SKILLS	-																		
Q - PARENTS OF CITIZENS	-																		
Q - OTHER RELATIVES OF CITIZENS	-																		
NQ- SPOUSES, CHILDREN OF CITIZENS	-																		
Q - SPOUSES, CHILDREN OF RESID. ALIENS	-																		
NQ- MINISTERS	-																		
ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS.																			
NONIMMIGRANTS TO IMMIGRANTS	-																		
IMMIGRANTS TO NONIMMIGRANTS	-																		
PREEXAMINATION AUTHORIZATIONS	-																		
CREATION OF RECORD OF ADMISSION	-																		

Form G-21.3 (9-1-53)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: NOVEMBER 1953 ST. ALBANS District No. 1

I ENTRY AND DEPARTURE ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	TOTAL	Bangor	Calais	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Rouses Point	St. Albans	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vanceboro	Halifax	Montreal
AUTHORIZATIONS - (Cont'd)																			
DENIED (CONT'D)																			
EXTENSIONS OF TEMPORARY STAY	1							1											
ALIEN LABORER CARDS																			
DUPLICATE ALIEN REGISTRATION CARDS																			
PERMISSION TO REAPPLY																			
CHANGE OF NONIMMIGRANT STATUS																			
PETITIONS TO IMPORT:																			
TEMP. WORKERS OF EXCEPT. ABILITY																			
LABORERS AND OTHER TEMP. WORKERS																			
INDUSTRIAL TRAINEES																			
SCHOOL APPROVALS																			
SEC. 4 D.P. APPLICATIONS																			
APPL'S FOR PERMISSION TO RETURN																			
APPL'S. FOR WAIVER OF INADMISSIBILITY																			
APPL'S. FOR STUDENT EMPLOYMENT																			
BREACH OR CANCELLATION OF BONDS																			
PENDING END OF PERIOD	80	1	-	-	1	-	1	4	-	-	-	-	-	73	-	-	-	-	-
BORDER CROSSING CARDS																			
REENTRY PERMITS ISSUED & EXTENDED																			
VISA PETITIONS	13													13					
Q - SPECIAL SKILLS																			
Q - PARENTS OF CITIZENS																			
Q - OTHER RELATIVES OF CITIZENS	9													9					
NQ- SPOUSES, CHILDREN OF CITIZENS	3													3					
Q - SPOUSES, CHILDREN OF RESID. ALIENS	1													1					
NQ-MINISTERS																			
ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS																			
NONIMMIGRANTS TO IMMIGRANTS	4													4					
IMMIGRANTS TO NONIMMIGRANTS																			
PREEXAMINATION AUTHORIZATIONS	1	1																	
CREATION OF RECORD OF ADMISSION	17				1		1							15					
EXTENSIONS OF TEMPORARY STAY	12							2						10					
ALIEN LABORER CARDS																			
DUPLICATE ALIEN REGISTRATION CARDS	2							2											
PERMISSION TO REAPPLY	4													4					
CHANGE OF NONIMMIGRANT STATUS	3													3					
PETITIONS TO IMPORT: Refugee app.	1													1					
TEMP. WORKERS OF EXCEPT. ABILITY	-																		
LABORERS AND OTHER TEMP. WORKERS	21													21					
INDUSTRIAL TRAINEES	-																		
SCHOOL APPROVALS	1													1					
SEC. 4 D.P. APPLICATIONS	-																		
APPL'S. FOR PERMISSION TO RETURN	-																		
APPL'S. FOR WAIVER OF INADMISSIBILITY	1													1					
APPL'S. FOR STUDENT EMPLOYMENT	-																		
BREACH OR CANCELLATION OF BONDS	-																		

Form G-21.4 (9-1-53)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: NOVEMBER 1953 ST. ALBANS District No. 1

I ENTRY AND DEPARTURE ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	TOTAL	Bangor	Calais	Highgate-Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Rouses Point	St. Albans	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vanceboro	Halifax	Montreal
AUTHORIZATIONS - (Cont'd)																			
AUTHORIZATIONS- PRODUCTIVE HOURS	1232	29	4	27	10	272	19	32	68	105	12	5	60	514	44	20	4	1	6
- HOURS PER UNIT	.472	.967	.235	.729	.112	.200	.150	.524	.612	.256	.429	2.00	2.00	2.29	2.10	.500	.364	1.00	.600
TRAVEL TIME - ENTRY & DEPARTURE ACTIV.	1266	21	4	-	11	112	11	34	230	116	-	-	100	385	8	-	75	4	155
LOST TIME - ENTRY & DEPARTURE ACTIV.	2235	70	-	-	-	107	3	696	-	-	-	1244	-	51	17	-	28	-	19
II DETENTION, DEPORTATION AND PAROLE ACTIVITY																			
WARRANT HEARINGS																			
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	37	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	37	-	-	-	-	-
RECEIVED	17													17					
TOTAL	54													54					
COMPLETED	22													22					
SUBVERSIVE	-																		
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC	3													3					
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS	14													14					
WITHOUT PROPER DOCUMENTS	3													3					
REMAINED LONGER	-																		
OTHER	2													2					
PENDING END OF PERIOD	32													32					
WARRANT HEARINGS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	234												12	219	2		1		
- HOURS PER UNIT	10.6												-	9.95	-				
CASES COMPLETED WITH 2-MAN HEARINGS	-													-					
ON APPEAL - TOTAL	2													2					
FINAL ORDERS ENTERED OR RECEIVED	21												-	21					
TRAVEL TIME - WARRANT HEARINGS OPER.	9												-	7	2		-		
LOST TIME - WARRANT HEARINGS OPER.	5												-	5	-				
PAROLE AND SUPERVISION (Expulsion)																			
CONDITIONAL PAROLE																			
ALIENS ON PAROLE BEGINNING OF PERIOD	37	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	34	-	-	1	-	-
PLACED ON PAROLE DURING PERIOD	5													4			1		
TOTAL ON PAROLE DURING PERIOD	42										2			38			2		
REMOVED FROM PAROLE DURING PERIOD	4										2			2			-		
ALIENS ON PAROLE END OF PERIOD	38										-			36			2		
SUBVERSIVE	-																		
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC	8													8					
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS	2													1			1		
WITHOUT PROPER DOCUMENTS	7													7					
REMAINED LONGER	11													11					
OTHER	10													9			1		
COND. PAROLE - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	4										-			4			-		
- HOURS PER UNIT	.095										-			.105			-		

Form G-21.5 (9-1-53)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: NOVEMBER 1953 ST. ALBANS District No. 1

II DETENTION, DEPORTATION AND PAROLE ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	TOTAL	Bangor	Calais	Highgate-Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Rouses Point	St. Albans	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vanceboro	Halifax	Montrea
PAROLE AND SUPERVISION (Cont'd)																			
SUPERVISION																			
ALIENS UNDER SUPER'N BEGIN. OF PERIOD	9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9	-	-	-	-	-
PLACED UNDER SUPER'N DURING PERIOD	-																		
TOTAL UNDER SUPER'N DURING PERIOD	9													9					
REMOVED FROM SUPER'N DURING PERIOD	-																		
ALIENS UNDER SUPER'N END OF PERIOD	9													9					
SUBVERSIVE	-																		
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC	4													4					
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS	-																		
WITHOUT PROPER DOCUMENTS	-																		
REMAINED LONGER	3													3					
OTHER	2													2					
SUPERVISION - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	-													-			-		
- HOURS PER UNIT	-													-			-		
TRAVEL TIME - PAROLE & SUPER'N OPER.	-													-			-		
LOST TIME - PAROLE & SUPER'N OPER.	29													-			29		
SERVICE DETENTION FACILITIES																			
NUMBER DETAINED BEGINNING OF PERIOD	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-
EXCLUSION	1												1						
EXPULSION	-												-						
DETAINEES ADMITTED	66		1	1				5	21				27	6			5		
NUMBER DETAINED DURING PERIOD	67		1	1				5	21				28	6			5		
EXCLUSION	48		-					1	20				16	6			5		
DETAINEES REMOVED DURING PERIOD	65		1	1				5	21				27	5			5		
NUMBER DETAINED END OF PERIOD	2		-					-	-				1	1			-		
MAN-DAYS DETENTION DURING PERIOD	93		1	2				10	24				42	7			7		
EXCLUSION	65		-					2	22				27	7			7		
EXPULSION	28		1	2				8	2				15	-			-		
AVERAGE DAYS DET. PER DETAINEE	1.39		1.00	2.00				2.00	1.14				1.50	1.16			1.40		
SERVICE DET. FAC. - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	312		-	1				10	104				101	8			88		
- HOURS PER UNIT	3.35		-	.500				1.00	4.33				2.40	1.14			12.6		
PRODUCTIVE HOURS - INS PERSONNEL	214		-	1				10	104				75	8			16		
NON-SERVICE DETENTION FACILITIES																			
NUMBER DETAINED BEGINNING OF PERIOD	7	4	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	-
DETAINEES ADMITTED	12	2						1	1		3			4	1				
NUMBER DETAINED DURING PERIOD	19	6						2	1		3			5	2				
DETAINEES REMOVED DURING PERIOD	13	3						1	1		3			4	1				
NUMBER DETAINED END OF PERIOD	6	3						1	-					1	1				
MAN-DAYS DETENTION DURING PERIOD	209	116						29	4		7			21	32				
AVERAGE DAYS DET. PER DETAINEE	11.0	19.3						14.5	4.00		2.33			4.20	16.0				
NON-SERV. DET. FAC.-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	17	8						6	-		-			-	3				
-HOURS PER UNIT	.894	1.33						3.00	-		-			-	1.50				

Form G-21.6 (9-1-53)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: NOVEMBER 1953 ST. ALBANS District No. 1

II DETENTION, DEPORTATION AND PAROLE ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	TOTAL	Bangor	Calais	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Rouses Point	St. Albans	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vanceboro	Halifax	Montreal
DEPORTATION																			
ALIENS PROCESSED FOR DEPORTATION	32	6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	22	2	-	-	-	-
ALIENS PROCESSED FOR VOLUNTARY DEPAR	14				3			4					4	1	2				
ALIENS PROCESSED FOR REMOVAL	-																		
TOTAL	46	6			3			4			1		5	23	4				
ALIENS DEPORTED	5								-		1		1	1	2				
VOLUNTARY DEPARTURES	39		1		3		1	4	6		1		14	-	2	1	6		
UNDER W/A	9		1				1		6						1				
WITHOUT W/A	30				3		-	4	-		1		14		1	1	6		
REMOVALS	-								-										
DEPORTATION - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	379	17	-	-	-		-	-	-		1		5	331	5	-	20	-	
- HOURS PER UNIT	8.24	2.83	-	-	-		-	-	-		1.00	-	1.00	14.4	1.25	-	-	-	
TRAVEL TIME - DEPORTATION OPERATION	33	-	-	-	-		-	-	-		1	-	-	16	-	-	16	-	
LOST TIME - DEPORTATION OPERATION	-	-	-	-	-		-	-	-		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
III CITIZENSHIP ACTIVITY																			
NATURALIZATION																			
N-400) PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	394	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	394	-	-	-	-	-
FOR) RECEIVED	127											1		126					
PROC-) COMPLETED	75											-		75					
ESSING) REJ., TRANSF., OR CLOSED	10											-		10					
" PROCESSED	65											-		65					
" PENDING END OF PERIOD	446											1		445					
N-400) PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	522	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	521	-	-	-	-	-
FOR) RECEIVED	65					-								65					
FILING) COMPLETED	41					1								40					
PET.) TRANSFERRED OR CLOSED	2					1								1					
" PETITIONS FILED	39					-								39					
" PENDING END OF PERIOD	546					-								546					
" READY FOR filing petitions	546													546					
PETI-) PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	323	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	323	-	-	-	-	-
TIONS) COMPLETED	160													160					
" GRANTED	159													159					
" DENIED	1													1					
" TRANSFERRED	-													-					
" PENDING END OF PERIOD	202													202					
" READY FOR FINAL HEARING	202													202					
N-300) PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
" RECEIVED	1													1					
" COMPLETED	1													1					
" PENDING END OF PERIOD	-													-					
DECLARATIONS FILED	3													3					
NATURALIZATION - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	336					1								335					
- HOURS PER UNIT	1.20					1.00								1.20					

Form G-21.7 (9-1-53)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: NOVEMBER 1953 ST. ALBANS District No. 1

III CITIZENSHIP ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	TOTAL	Bangor	Calais	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Rouses Point	St. Albans	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vanceboro	Halifax	Montreal
CITIZENSHIP APPLICATIONS																			
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	55	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	55	-	-	-	-	-
RECEIVED	30	1	1		2									26					
TOTAL	85	1	1		2									81					
COMPLETED - TOTAL	3	-	-		-									3					
REJECTED, TRANSFERRED, OR CLOSED	4	-	-		-									4					
PROCESSED FOR OTHER OFFICES	10	1	1		2									6					
PENDING END OF PERIOD - TOTAL	68	-	-		-									68					
READY FOR HEARING, adjudication	31	-	-		-									31					
CITIZENSHIP - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	107	1	1		2									103					
- HOURS PER UNIT	6.29	1.00	1.00		1.00									7.92					
NATIONALITY APPLICATIONS																			
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	10	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10	-	-	-	-	-
RECEIVED	4													4					
TOTAL	14													14					
COMPLETED - TOTAL	1													1					
REJECTED, TRANSFERRED, OR CLOSED	-																		
PROCESSED FOR OTHER OFFICES	-																		
PENDING END OF PERIOD - TOTAL	13													13					
READY FOR HEARING, adjudication OR DELIVERY	7													7					
NATIONALITY - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	34													34					
- HOURS PER UNIT	34.0													34.0					
TRAVEL TIME - CITIZENSHIP ACTIVITY	70													70					
LOST TIME - CITIZENSHIP ACTIVITY	-													-					
CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION 1/																			
CITIZENSHIP ASSISTANCE FURNISHED																			
ALIENS REFERRED TO PUBLIC SCHOOLS																			
ALIENS INFORMED OF HOME STUDY																			
NAME SLIPS TO PUBLIC SCHOOLS COR. CTRS.																			
ALIENS ADMITTED TO CITIZENSHIP																			
ATTENDED PUBLIC SCHOOL CLASSES																			
ENROLLED IN HOME STUDY COURSES																			
NUMBER SUBMITTING PUBLIC SCHOOL CERT.																			
111a VERIFICATION OF ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE ACTIVITY																			
VERIFICATION REQUESTS																			
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	876	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	876	-	-	-	-	-
RECEIVED DURING PERIOD	1614	9	13	6	10	24	2	19	77	11	7		52	1016	42	32	31	22	241
TOTAL	2490	9	13	6	10	24	2	19	77	11	7		52	1892	42	32	31	22	241
COMPLETED	1498	9	13	6	10	24	2	19	77	11	7		52	900	42	32	31	22	241
NATURALIZATION	151	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-		-	149	-	-	1	-	-
OTHER	1347	9	13	6	10	24	2	19	76	11	7		52	751	42	32	30	22	241
PENDING END OF PERIOD	992	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		-	992	-	-	-	-	-
VERIFICATION - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	798	4	2	2	2	6	-	8	18	8	3		21	364	290	16	8	5	41
- HOURS PER UNIT	.532	.444	.153	.333	.200	.250	-	.421	.233	.727	.429		.403	.404	.690	.500	.258	.227	.170

1/ Source: Form N-28

Form G-21.10 (9-1-53) UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: NOVEMBER 1953 ST. ALBANS District No. 1

V INVESTIGATIONS ACTIVITY	TOTAL	Bangor	Calais	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Rouses Point	St. Albans	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vanceboro	Hallifax	Non-Rep.
INVESTIGATIONS																			
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	224	11	1	-	4	-	-	2	-	5	-	-	11	65	-	1	-		124
RECEIVED DURING PERIOD	269	22	7	2	2	5	4	16	9	2	4		15	58	10	-	6	3	102
TOTAL	493	33	8	2	6	5	4	18	9	7	4		26	123	10	1	6	3	226
COMPLETED	253	13	7	2	3	5	4	16	9	4	4		15	73	10	-	6	4	78
NATURALIZATION AND CITIZENSHIP	37						2	1		1				28					5
CANCELLATION - SUBVERSIVE	2													2					
CANCELLATION - OTHER	-																		
NATURALIZATION	21													21					
OTHER	14						2	1		1				5					5
DEPORTATION	131	10	1	-	3	-	1	9	4		3		13	17	3			1	66
SUBVERSIVE	10	5												2					3
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC	5						1						2		1				1
ADDRESS REPORT CARD (I-53)	9	3			1				2				2	1					
SUSPENSION	1													1					
NON-IMMIGRANTS	72		1					2			3			5	2				59
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS	20				1			7	2				7	3					
DISPLACED PERSONS	-																		
OTHER	14	2			1								2	5				1	3
SMUGGLING	1												1						
PRIVATE BILLS	4							1						3					
PAROLE	-																		
ALIEN REGISTRATION	3		1					1						1					
ALIEN ADDRESS REPORT (SEC. 35)	12		2	2		1		3						2			2		
MISCELLANEOUS	65	3	3			4	1	1	5	3	1		1	22	7		4	3	7
PENDING END OF PERIOD	240	20	1	-	3	-	-	2	-	3	-	-	11	50	-	1	-	1	148
NATURALIZATION AND CITIZENSHIP	37	1												27					9
CANCELLATION - SUBVERSIVE	1													1					
CANCELLATION - OTHER	1	1																	
NATURALIZATION	22													20					2
OTHER	13													6					7
DEPORTATION	163	11	1		3					1			11	8				1	127
SUBVERSIVE	4													4					
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC	11												9					1	1
ADDRESS REPORT CARD (I-53)	9	3	1		1								2	2					
SUSPENSION	-																		
NON-IMMIGRANTS	120	1																	119
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS	7	2												1					4
DISPLACED PERSONS	1													1					
OTHER	11	5			2					1									3
SMUGGLING	1																		1
PRIVATE BILLS	-																		
PAROLE	-																		
ALIEN REGISTRATION	8	1						1						5		1			
ALIEN ADDRESS REPORT (SEC. 35)	2	1						-		1									
MISCELLANEOUS	29	6						1		1				10					11

Form G-21.11 (9-1-53)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: NOVEMBER 1953 — ST. ALBANS District No. 1

V INVESTIGATIONS ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	TOTAL	Bangor	Calais	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Rouses Point	St. Albans	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vanceboro	Halifax	Montreal
INVESTIGATIONS RESULTING IN W/A OR V/D	24	-	1	-	2	-	-	8	1	-	-	-	10		2	-	-	-	-
ALIENS APPRH'D. (BY OTHER THAN B.P.)	1												1						
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS	-																		
MEXICANS APPRH'D. (BY OTHER THAN B.P.)	-																		
ILLEGALLY IN AGRICULTURE	-																		
ILLEGALLY IN TRADE OR INDUSTRY	-																		
OTHER	-																		
W/A THRU ADDRESS REPORT CARD (I-53)	-																		
INVESTIGATIONS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	1180	36	18	2	3	12	4	25	10	27	8	-	77	867	23	-	5	4	59
- HOURS PER UNIT	4.66	2.76	2.57	1.00	1.00	2.40	1.00	1.56	1.11	6.75	2.00	-	5.13	4.19	2.30	-	.833	1.00	.756
TRAVEL TIME - INVESTIGATIONS ACTIVITY	203	6	-	-	2	4	-	2	-	-	3	-	5	113	3	-	-	2	63
WARRANT OF ARREST PROCESSING																			
COMPLETED	22	-	1	1	-	-	-	11	-	-	-	-	6	1	2	-	-	-	-
W/A PROCESSING - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	34		1	2				16					-	9	6				
- HOURS PER UNIT	1.55		1.00	2.00				1.45					-	9.00	3.00				
WARRANT OF ARREST SERVICE																			
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
RECEIVED	21		1	1				4	1		3		6	3	2				
TOTAL	21		1	1				4	1		3		6	3	2				
COMPLETED	21		1	1				4	1		3		6	3	2				
PENDING END OF PERIOD	-		-	-				-	-		-		-	-	-				
W/A SERVICE - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	9		1	1				4	2		1		-	-	-				
- HOURS PER UNIT	.428		1.00	1.00				1.00	2.00		.333		-	-	-				
VI EMPLOYMENT SUMMARY																			
NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES END OF PERIOD	287	3	20	11	12	11	12	21	23	16	10	10	33	60	11	9	9	2	14
OPERATIONS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	38087	231	2602	1704	1877	1754	1687	3985	3410	2224	1245	2069	5058	4975	1412	1288	1159	123	1284
OPERATIONS - NON-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	6225	115	455	248	279	200	216	467	593	616	327	251	683	871	254	96	291	50	2[illegible]
ADMINISTRATION - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	6216	68	333	112	14	187	287	125	155	104	100	40	298	2960	125	280	214	130	684
ADMINISTRATION - NON-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	671	12	236	-	-	-	32	-	8	-	76	16	-	170	4	8	18	-	91
TOTAL HOURS EMPLOYMENT	51199	426	3626	2064	2170	2141	2222	4577	4166	2944	1748	2376	6039	8976	1795	1672	1682	303	2272
PERCENTAGE TOTAL HOURS ON OPERATIONS	86.5	81.2	84.5	94.5	99.4	91.2	85.6	97.2	96.1	96.5	89.9	97.6	95.0	65.1	92.8	82.7	86.2	57.0	65.8

Form G-21.1 (9-1-53) UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE

REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: DECEMBER 1953

Canerypasi

ST. ALBANS District No. 1

I ENTRY AND DEPARTURE ACTIVITY	TOTAL	Bangor	Calais	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Rouses Point	St. Albans	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vanceboro	Halifax	Montreal
PRIMARY INSPECTION																			
BORDER CROSSERS ADMITTED - ALIENS	618784	2	115681	18226	58214	16279	114064	61009	52075	21827	29061	14128	45462	5126	12837	41419	11478	224	1672
- CITIZENS	310600		44022	15899	21432	3345	67027	31189	34907	8900	5035	11130	21576	3217	5604	30436	6876		5
CREWMEN ADMITTED - ALIENS	1189	247	931											11					
- CITIZENS	277	32	29											216					
OTHERS ADMITTED - ALIENS	5981		98	87	20	1133	53	59	228	363	3	31	1436	179	53	45	149	258	1786
- CITIZENS	602	94	2	262			12	167	5	3			14	4	2		9	11	17
ALIENS NOT ADMITTED - TOTAL	440		17	25	11	18	6	16	40	19	19	10	93	5	16	5	14	63	63
BORDER-CROSSERS	312		6	5	10		2	9		16	19		93	5	16	1	4	63	63
CREWMEN	-							-											
OTHERS NOT ADMITTED	128		11	20	1	18	4	7	40	3		10				4	10		
PREEXAMINATIONS COMPLETED - IN U.S.	-																		
OUTSIDE U.S.	132														17	2	113		
FINES	-																		
TOTAL WORK UNITS	938005	375	160780	34499	79677	20775	181162	92440	87255	31112	34118	25299	68581	8758	18529	71907	18639	556	3543
PRIMARY INSPECTION-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	39321	45	3649	2560	4903	1619	1779	4050	3656	2631	1380	1006	5520	1493	1415	1268	1596	162	589
-HOURS PER UNIT	.041	.120	.023	.074	.061	.077	.009	.043	.041	.084	.040	.039	.080	.170	.076	.017	.085	.291	.166
PRODUCTIVE HOURS- INS PERSONNEL	31137	45	2833	1712	2015	1321	1779	3328	3320	2135	1380	204	5054	1493	1403	1268	1096	162	589
VESSELS BOARDED - ARRIVAL	489	42	436					-						-			-	7	4
AIRPLANE FLIGHTS- ARRIVAL	189	10	5					3						93	4	3	-		71
VESSELS & AIRPLANES BOARDED ON DEPART.	-	-	-					-						-			-		-
SPECIAL INQUIRY OFFICER HEARINGS																			
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	15	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	15	-	-	-	-	-
RECEIVED	98												-	98					
TOTAL	113												-	113					
COMPLETED	104												-	104					
SUBVERSIVE	5												-	5					
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC	7												-	7					
WITHOUT PROPER DOCUMENTS	88												-	88					
OTHER	4													4					
PENDING END OF PERIOD	9													9					
SIO HEARINGS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	377												28	349	-				
- HOURS PER UNIT	3.62												-	3.35	-				
PRODUCTIVE HOURS - INS PERSONNEL	387												28	349	10				
AUTHORIZATIONS																			
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	80	1	-	-	1	-	1	4	-	-	-	-	-	73	-	-	-	-	-
RECEIVED	2098	26	18	32	86	1027	81	60	105	344	32	17	3	176	27	42	11		11
TOTAL	2178	27	18	32	87	1027	82	64	105	344	32	17	3	249	27	42	11		11
RETURNED OR TRANSFERRED	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-		-
PROCESSED WITHOUT COMPLETION	22	1	-	-	-	-	8	12	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-		-

Form G-21.2 (9-1-53) UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE

REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: DECEMBER 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1

I ENTRY AND DEPARTURE ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	TOTAL	Bangor	Calais	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Rouses Point	St. Albans	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vanceboro	Halifax	Montreal
AUTHORIZATIONS - (Cont'd) Received	2098	26	18	32	86	1027	81	60	105	344	32	17	3	176	27	42	11	-	11
BORDER CROSSING CARDS	328	16	8	1	74			38	79	24	29	5	3	21	17		8		5
REENTRY PERMITS ISSUED & EXTENDED	18							2						16					
VISA PETITIONS	21													21					
Q - SPECIAL SKILLS	-																		
Q - PARENTS OF CITIZENS	3													3			-		
Q - OTHER RELATIVES OF CITIZENS	-																		
NQ- SPOUSES, CHILDREN OF CITIZENS	4													4					
Q - SPOUSES, CHILDREN OF RESID. ALIENS	14													14					
NQ- MINISTERS	-																		
ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS.																			
NONIMMIGRANTS TO IMMIGRANTS																			
IMMIGRANTS TO NONIMMIGRANTS	-																		
PREEXAMINATION AUTHORIZATIONS	-																		
CREATION OF RECORD OF ADMISSION	8	1												7					
EXTENSIONS OF TEMPORARY STAY	15			1		2		1						9	2				
ALIEN LABORER CARDS	1413		2	20		1022	74	8	16	305		10				41			
DUPLICATE ALIEN REGISTRATION CARDS	114	9	6	10	12	3	7	9	10	15	3	2		68	6	1	3		
PERMISSION TO REAPPLY	34		2				-							14	2				6
CHANGE OF NONIMMIGRANT STATUS	4													4					
PETITIONS TO IMPORT: Refugee Appl.	-													-					
TEMP. WORKERS OF EXCEPT. ABILITY	-																		
LABORERS AND OTHER TEMP. WORKERS	11							2						9					
INDUSTRIAL TRAINEES	1													1					
SCHOOL APPROVALS	-																		
SEC. 6 D.P. APPLICATIONS	-																		
APPL'S. FOR PERMISSION TO RETURN	-																		
APPL'S. FOR WAIVER OF INADMISSIBILITY	6													6					
APPL'S. FOR STUDENT EMPLOYMENT	-																		
BREACH OR CANCELLATION OF BONDS	-																		
~~WAIVERS~~:																			
BORDER CROSSING CARDS																			
REENTRY PERMITS ISSUED & EXTENDED																			
VISA PETITIONS																			
Q - SPECIAL SKILLS																			
Q - PARENTS OF CITIZENS																			
Q - OTHER RELATIVES OF CITIZENS																			
NQ- SPOUSES, CHILDREN OF CITIZENS																			
Q - SPOUSES, CHILDREN OF RESID. ALIENS																			
NQ- MINISTERS																			
ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS.																			
NONIMMIGRANTS TO IMMIGRANTS																			
IMMIGRANTS TO NONIMMIGRANTS																			
PREEXAMINATION AUTHORIZATIONS																			
CREATION OF RECORD OF ADMISSION																			

Form G-21.2 (9-1-53)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: DECEMBER 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1

ENTRY AND DEPARTURE ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	TOTAL	Bangor	Calais	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Rouses Point	St. Albans	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vanceboro	[illegible]	[illegible]
AUTHORIZATIONS - (Cont'd)																			
COMPLETED	2082	25	18	32	86	1027	74	49	105	344	32	17	3	182	24	42	11	-	11
BORDER CROSSING CARDS	328	16	8	1	74			38	79	24	29	5	3	21	17		8		5
REENTRY PERMITS ISSUED & EXTENDED	16													16					
VISA PETITIONS	22													22					
Q - SPECIAL SKILLS	2													2					
Q - PARENTS OF CITIZENS	-																		
Q - OTHER RELATIVES OF CITIZENS	7													7					
NQ - SPOUSES, CHILDREN OF CITIZENS	13													13					
Q - SPOUSES, CHILDREN OF RESID. ALIENS	-																		
NQ - MINISTERS	-																		
ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS.																			
NONIMMIGRANTS TO IMMIGRANTS	-																		
IMMIGRANTS TO NONIMMIGRANTS	-																		
PREEXAMINATION AUTHORIZATIONS	-																		
CREATION OF RECORD OF ADMISSION	7													7					
EXTENSIONS OF TEMPORARY STAY	16			1		2		3						8	2				
ALIEN LABORER CARDS	1498		2	20		1022	74	8	16	305		10				41			
DUPLICATE ALIEN REGISTRATION CARDS	145	9	6	10	12	3			10	15	3	2		68	3	1	3		
PERMISSION TO REAPPLY	23		2											13	2				6
CHANGE OF NONIMMIGRANT STATUS	6													6					
PETITIONS TO IMPORT: Refugee Appl.	-																		
TEMP. WORKERS OF EXCEPT. ABILITY	-																		
LABORERS AND OTHER TEMP. WORKERS	17/1													17/1					
INDUSTRIAL TRAINEES																			
SCHOOL APPROVALS	-																		
SEC. 4 D.P. APPLICATIONS	-																		
APPL'S. FOR PERMISSION TO RETURN	-																		
APPL'S. FOR WAIVER OF INADMISSIBILITY	3													3					
APPL'S. FOR STUDENT EMPLOYMENT	-																		
BREACH OR CANCELLATION OF BONDS	-																		
DENIED	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
BORDER CROSSING CARDS																			
REENTRY PERMITS ISSUED & EXTENDED																			
VISA PETITIONS																			
Q - SPECIAL SKILLS																			
Q - PARENTS OF CITIZENS																			
Q - OTHER RELATIVES OF CITIZENS																			
NQ - SPOUSES, CHILDREN OF CITIZENS																			
Q - SPOUSES, CHILDREN OF RESID. ALIENS																			
NQ - MINISTERS																			
ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS.																			
NONIMMIGRANTS TO IMMIGRANTS																			
IMMIGRANTS TO NONIMMIGRANTS																			
PREEXAMINATION AUTHORIZATIONS																			
CREATION OF RECORD OF ADMISSION																			

Form G-21.3 (9-1-53)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: DECEMBER 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1

I ENTRY AND DEPARTURE ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	TOTAL	Bangor	Calais	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Rouses Point	St. Albans	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vanceboro	Halifax	Montreal
AUTHORIZATIONS - (Cont'd)																			
DENIED (CONT'D)																			
EXTENSIONS OF TEMPORARY STAY																			
ALIEN LABORER CARDS																			
DUPLICATE ALIEN REGISTRATION CARDS																			
PERMISSION TO REAPPLY																			
CHANGE OF NONIMMIGRANT STATUS																			
PETITIONS TO IMPORT:																			
TEMP. WORKERS OF EXCEPT. ABILITY																			
LABORERS AND OTHER TEMP. WORKERS																			
INDUSTRIAL TRAINEES																			
SCHOOL APPROVALS																			
SEC. 4 D.P. APPLICATIONS																			
APPL'S FOR PERMISSION TO RETURN																			
APPL'S. FOR WAIVER OF INADMISSIBILITY																			
APPL'S. FOR STUDENT EMPLOYMENT																			
BREACH OR CANCELLATION OF BONDS																			
PENDING END OF PERIOD	72	1	-	-	1	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	65	2	-	-	-	-
BORDER CROSSING CARDS	-													-					
REENTRY PERMITS ISSUED & EXTENDED	-																		
VISA PETITIONS	11													11					
Q - SPECIAL SKILLS	1													1					
Q - PARENTS OF CITIZENS	-																		
Q - OTHER RELATIVES OF CITIZENS	6													6					
NQ- SPOUSES, CHILDREN OF CITIZENS	3													3					
Q - SPOUSES, CHILDREN OF RESID. ALIENS	1													1					
NQ-MINISTERS	-																		
ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS																			
NONIMMIGRANTS TO IMMIGRANTS	4													4					
IMMIGRANTS TO NONIMMIGRANTS	-																		
PREEXAMINATION AUTHORIZATIONS	1	1																	
CREATION OF RECORD OF ADMISSION	16				1									15					
EXTENSIONS OF TEMPORARY STAY	11													11					
ALIEN LABORER CARDS	-																		
DUPLICATE ALIEN REGISTRATION CARDS	5							3							2				
PERMISSION TO REAPPLY	4													4					
CHANGE OF NONIMMIGRANT STATUS	1													1					
PETITIONS TO IMPORT: Refugee Appl.	1													1					
TEMP. WORKERS OF EXCEPT. ABILITY	-													-					
LABORERS AND OTHER TEMP. WORKERS	13													13					
INDUSTRIAL TRAINEES	-																		
SCHOOL APPROVALS	1													1					
SEC. 4 D.P. APPLICATIONS	-																		
APPL'S. FOR PERMISSION TO RETURN	-																		
APPL'S. FOR WAIVER OF INADMISSIBILITY	3													3					
APPL'S. FOR STUDENT EMPLOYMENT	1													1					
BREACH OR CANCELLATION OF BONDS	-																		

Form G-21.4 (9-1-53) UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: DECEMBER 1953 ST. ALBANS District No. 1

I ENTRY AND DEPARTURE ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	TOTAL	Bangor	Calais	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Rouses Point	St. Albans	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vanceboro	Halifax	Montreal
AUTHORIZATIONS - (Cont'd)																			
AUTHORIZATIONS- PRODUCTIVE HOURS	1098	30	5	19	12	208	16	40	34	84	10	4	69	511	24	21	4	-	7
- HOURS PER UNIT	.527	1.20	.277	.593	.139	.203	.216	.816	.323	.244	.313	.235	23.0	2.81	1.00	.500	.363	-	.636
TRAVEL TIME- ENTRY & DEPARTURE ACTIV.	1299	20	3	-	20	120	4	36	240	143	-	-	134	352	8	-	109	15	95
LOST TIME - ENTRY & DEPARTURE ACTIV.	2360	86	-	-	2	122	-	722	-	-	-	1342	-	-	21	-	42	2	21
II DETENTION, DEPORTATION AND PAROLE ACTIVITY																			
WARRANT HEARINGS																			
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	32	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	32	-	-	-	-	-
RECEIVED	7													7					
TOTAL	39													39					
COMPLETED	13													13					
SUBVERSIVE	-																		
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC	3													3					
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS	10													10					
WITHOUT PROPER DOCUMENTS	-																		
REMAINED LONGER	-																		
OTHER	-																		
PENDING END OF PERIOD	26													26					
WARRANT HEARINGS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	154												9	145					
- HOURS PER UNIT	11.8												-	11.1					
CASES COMPLETED WITH 2-MAN HEARINGS	-													-					
ON APPEAL - TOTAL	10													10					
FINAL ORDERS ENTERED OR RECEIVED	12													12					
TRAVEL TIME - WARRANT HEARINGS OPER.	24												3	21					
LOST TIME - WARRANT HEARINGS OPER.	-												-	-					
PAROLE AND SUPERVISION (Expulsion)																			
CONDITIONAL PAROLE																			
ALIENS ON PAROLE BEGINNING OF PERIOD	38	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	36	-	-	2	-	-
PLACED ON PAROLE DURING PERIOD	2													2					
TOTAL ON PAROLE DURING PERIOD	40													38			2		
REMOVED FROM PAROLE DURING PERIOD	8													7			1		
ALIENS ON PAROLE END OF PERIOD	32													31			1		
SUBVERSIVE	-																		
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC	7													7					
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS	2													1			1		
WITHOUT PROPER DOCUMENTS	7													7					
REMAINED LONGER	9													9					
OTHER	7													7					
COND. PAROLE - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	15													15			-		
- HOURS PER UNIT	.375													.394			-		

Form G-21.5 (9-1-53)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: DECEMBER 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1

II DETENTION, DEPORTATION AND PAROLE ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	TOTAL	Bangor	Calais	Highgate-Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Rouses Point	St. Albans	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vanceboro	Halifax	Montreal
PAROLE AND SUPERVISION (Cont'd)																			
SUPERVISION																			
ALIENS UNDER SUPER'N BEGIN. OF PERIOD	9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9	-	-	-	-	-
PLACED UNDER SUPER'N DURING PERIOD	1													1					
TOTAL UNDER SUPER'N DURING PERIOD	10													10					
REMOVED FROM SUPER'N DURING PERIOD	-																		
ALIENS UNDER SUPER'N END OF PERIOD	10													10					
SUBVERSIVE	-																		
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC	5													5					
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS	-																		
WITHOUT PROPER DOCUMENTS	-																		
REMAINED LONGER	3													3					
OTHER	2													2					
SUPERVISION - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	7							2						5					
- HOURS PER UNIT	.700							-						.500					
TRAVEL TIME - PAROLE & SUPER'N OPER.	-							-						-					
LOST TIME - PAROLE & SUPER'N OPER.	-							-						-					
SERVICE DETENTION FACILITIES																			
NUMBER DETAINED BEGINNING OF PERIOD	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-
EXCLUSION	2												1	1					
EXPULSION	-												-	-					
DETAINEES ADMITTED	81		4	3				3	28				31	10			3		
NUMBER DETAINED DURING PERIOD	83		4	3				3	28				32	11			3		
EXCLUSION	62							3	26				26	6			1		
DETAINEES REMOVED DURING PERIOD	83		4	3				3	28				32	11			2		
NUMBER DETAINED END OF PERIOD	-		-	-				-	-				-	-			-		
MAN-DAYS DETENTION DURING PERIOD	125		2	4				6	28				66	14			5		
EXCLUSION	84							6	26				42	9			1		
EXPULSION	41		2	4				-	2				24	5			4		
AVERAGE DAYS DET. PER DETAINEE	1.51		.500	1.33				2.00	1.00				2.06	1.27			2.50		
SERVICE DET. FAC. - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	361		-	-				10	168				111	32			40		
- HOURS PER UNIT	2.89		-	-				1.67	6.00				1.68	2.28			8.00		
PRODUCTIVE HOURS - INS PERSONNEL	312		-	-				10	168				70	32			32		
NON-SERVICE DETENTION FACILITIES																			
NUMBER DETAINED BEGINNING OF PERIOD	6	3	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	-
DETAINEES ADMITTED	27	6						2	3	2				11	3				
NUMBER DETAINED DURING PERIOD	33	9						3	3	2				12	4				
DETAINEES REMOVED DURING PERIOD	30	8						3	3	2				10	4				
NUMBER DETAINED END OF PERIOD	3	1						-	-					2	-				
MAN-DAYS DETENTION DURING PERIOD	136	30						22	11	10				40	23				
AVERAGE DAYS DET. PER DETAINEE	4.12	3.30						7.33	3.66	5.00				3.33	5.75				
NON-SERV. DET. FAC.-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	20	12						3	-	-				-	5				
- HOURS PER UNIT	.606	1.33						1.00	-	-				-	1.25				

Form G-21.6 (9-1-53)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: DECEMBER 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1

II DETENTION, DEPORTATION AND PAROLE ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	TOTAL	Bangor	Calais	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Rouses Point	St. Albans	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vancebora	Halifax	Montreal
DEPORTATION																			
ALIENS PROCESSED FOR DEPORTATION	27	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	16	5	-	1	-	-
ALIENS PROCESSED FOR VOLUNTARY DEPAR	17	-				8		2					6	1					
ALIENS PROCESSED FOR REMOVAL	-	-				-		-					-						
TOTAL	44	3				8		2			2		6	17	5		1		
ALIENS DEPORTED	16					-		-			2		7	-	5		2		
VOLUNTARY DEPARTURES	31					8		2			2	2	14	-		1	2		
UNDER W/A	3					-		-					1	-			2		
WITHOUT W/A	28					8		2			2	2	13			1	-		
REMOVALS	-					-		-			-	-	-			-	-		
DEPORTATION - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	384	4				2		-			3	-	8	335	20	-	12	-	
- HOURS PER UNIT	8.73	1.33				.250		-			1.50	-	1.33	19.7	4.00	-	12.0	-	
TRAVEL TIME - DEPORTATION OPERATION	38	-				-		-			3	-	-	19	-	-	16	-	
LOST TIME - DEPORTATION OPERATION	49	-				-		-			-	-	-	-	-	-	49	-	
III CITIZENSHIP ACTIVITY																			
NATURALIZATION																			
N-400) PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	446	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	445	-	-	-	-	-
FOR) RECEIVED	102		2									-		100					
PROC-) COMPLETED	65		2									1		62					
ESSING) REJ., TRANSF., OR CLOSED	5		-									-		5					
" PROCESSED	60		2									1		57					
" PENDING END OF PERIOD	483		-									-		483					
N-400) PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	546	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	546	-	-	-	-	-
FOR) RECEIVED	57													57					
FILING) COMPLETED	137													137					
PET.) TRANSFERRED OR CLOSED	11													11					
" PETITIONS FILED	126													126					
" PENDING END OF PERIOD	466													466					
" READY FOR filing petitions	466													466					
PETI-) PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	202	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	202	-	-	-	-	-
TIONS) COMPLETED	22													22					
" GRANTED	15													15					
" DENIED	1													1					
" TRANSFERRED	6													6					
" PENDING END OF PERIOD	306													306					
" READY FOR FINAL HEARING	306													306					
N-300) PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
" RECEIVED	4													4					
" COMPLETED	4													4					
" PENDING END OF PERIOD	-													-					
DECLARATIONS FILED	1													1					
NATURALIZATION - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	382		3									-		379					
- HOURS PER UNIT	1.67		1.50									-		1.68					

Form G-21.7 (9-1-53) UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: DECEMBER 1953 ST. ALBANS District No. 1

III CITIZENSHIP ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	TOTAL	Bangor	Calais	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Rouses Point	St. Albans	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vanceboro	Halifax	Montreal
CITIZENSHIP APPLICATIONS																			
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	68	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	68	-	-	-	-	-
RECEIVED	15													15					
TOTAL	83													83					
COMPLETED - TOTAL	16													16					
REJECTED, TRANSFERRED, OR CLOSED	2													2					
PROCESSED FOR OTHER OFFICES	-													-					
PENDING END OF PERIOD - TOTAL	65													65					
READY FOR HEARING	30													30					
CITIZENSHIP - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	93													93					
- HOURS PER UNIT	5.17													5.17					
NATIONALITY APPLICATIONS																			
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	13	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	13	-	-	-	-	-
RECEIVED	7													7					
TOTAL	20													20					
COMPLETED - TOTAL	2													2					
REJECTED, TRANSFERRED, OR CLOSED	-													-					
PROCESSED FOR OTHER OFFICES	-													-					
PENDING END OF PERIOD - TOTAL	18													18					
READY FOR [redacted] TION OR DELIVERY	12													12					
NATIONALITY - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	55													55					
- HOURS PER UNIT	27.5													27.5					
TRAVEL TIME - CITIZENSHIP ACTIVITY	213													213					
LOST TIME - CITIZENSHIP ACTIVITY	-													-					
CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION 1/																			
CITIZENSHIP ASSISTANCE FURNISHED																			
ALIENS REFERRED TO PUBLIC SCHOOLS																			
ALIENS INFORMED OF HOME STUDY																			
NAME SLIPS TO PUBLIC SCHOOLS COR. CTRS.																			
ALIENS ADMITTED TO CITIZENSHIP																			
ATTENDED PUBLIC SCHOOL CLASSES																			
ENROLLED IN HOME STUDY COURSES																			
NUMBER SUBMITTING PUBLIC SCHOOL CERT.																			
111a VERIFICATION OF ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE ACTIVITY																			
VERIFICATION REQUESTS																			
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	992	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	992	-	-	-	-	-
RECEIVED DURING PERIOD	1402	8	7	2	15	18	9	12	55	12	7	1	27	854	51	30	17	21	256
TOTAL	2394	8	7	2	15	18	9	12	55	12	7	1	27	1846	51	30	17	21	256
COMPLETED	1360	8	7	2	15	18	9	12	55	12	7	1	27	812	51	30	17	21	256
NATURALIZATION	180	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	177	-	-	-	-	-
OTHER	1180	8	7	2	15	18	9	12	52	12	7	1	27	635	51	30	17	21	256
PENDING END OF PERIOD	1034	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1034	-	-	-	-	-
VERIFICATION - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	518	6	2	2	2	4	1	5	12	3	4	1	13	353	37	15	5	5	48
- HOURS PER UNIT	.380	.750	.286	1.00	.133	.222	.111	.416	.218	.250	.571	1.00	.481	.434	.725	.500	.294	.238	.188

1/ Source: Form N-28

Form G-21.10 (9-1-53)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: DECEMBER 1953

ST. ALBANS District No. 1

V INVESTIGATIONS ACTIVITY	TOTAL	Bangor	Calais	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Rouses Point	St. Albans	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vanceboro	Halifax	Montreal
INVESTIGATIONS																			
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	240	20	1	-	3	-	-	2	-	3	-	-	11	50	-	1	-	1	148
RECEIVED DURING PERIOD	202	6	5	2	5	2		7	2	7	4	1	13	85	5			1	57
TOTAL	442	26	6	2	8	2		9	2	10	4	1	24	135	5	1		2	205
COMPLETED	192	10	5	2	6	2		8	2	6	4	1	9	79	5	1		2	50
NATURALIZATION AND CITIZENSHIP	36		1					1		1				28					5
CANCELLATION - SUBVERSIVE	2													2					
CANCELLATION - OTHER	-													-					
NATURALIZATION	25		1					1						22					1
OTHER	9									1				4					4
DEPORTATION	76	4	4		2			3		1	3	1	5	10	2			2	39
SUBVERSIVE	2													2					
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC	8				1							1	2	1	1			2	
ADDRESS REPORT CARD (1-53)	4				1								1	2					
SUSPENSION	2													1	1				
NON-IMMIGRANTS	37										3		1						33
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS	10							2		1			1	4					2
DISPLACED PERSONS	-																		
OTHER	13	4	4					1											4
SMUGGLING	3												2						1
PRIVATE BILLS	-																		
PAROLE	2				2														
ALIEN REGISTRATION	11	1		1	1			1						5	1	1			
ALIEN ADDRESS REPORT (SEC. 35)	4				1			1	2										
MISCELLANEOUS	60	5		1		2		2		4	1		2	36	2				5
PENDING END OF PERIOD	250	16	1	-	2	-	-	1	-	4	-	-	15	56	-	-	-	-	155
NATURALIZATION AND CITIZENSHIP	37	1												30					6
CANCELLATION - SUBVERSIVE	-																		
CANCELLATION - OTHER	1	1																	
NATURALIZATION	27													25					2
OTHER	9													5					4
DEPORTATION	178	12	1		2					1			15	9					138
SUBVERSIVE	4													3					1
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC	17												14	1					2
ADDRESS REPORT CARD (1-53)	5	3	1										1						
SUSPENSION	-																		
NON-IMMIGRANTS	129	1																	128
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS	7	2												3					2
DISPLACED PERSONS	1													1					
OTHER	15	6			2					1				1					5
SMUGGLING	-																		
PRIVATE BILLS	1													1					
PAROLE	1													1					
ALIEN REGISTRATION	2	1								1									
ALIEN ADDRESS REPORT (SEC. 35)	31	2						1		2				15					11
MISCELLANEOUS																			

Form G-21.11 (9-1-53)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: DECEMBER 1953 ST. ALBANS District No. 1

V INVESTIGATIONS ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	TOTAL	Bangor	Calais	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Rouses point	St. Albans	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vanceboro	Halifax	Montreal
INVESTIGATIONS RESULTING IN W/A OR V/D	11	-	4	-	-	-	-		-	1	3	-	3	-	-	-	-		
ALIENS APPRH'D. (BY OTHER THAN B.P.)	1												1						
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS	-																		
MEXICANS APPRH'D. (BY OTHER THAN B.P.)	-																		
ILLEGALLY IN AGRICULTURE	-																		
ILLEGALLY IN TRADE OR INDUSTRY	-																		
OTHER	-																		
W/A THRU ADDRESS REPORT CARD (I-53)	-																		
INVESTIGATIONS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	1241	26	16	9	7	3	-	20	2	31	9	1	93	940	16	1	1	-	69
- HOURS PER UNIT	6.46	2.60	3.20	4.50	.666	1.50	-	2.50	1.00	5.17	2.25	1.00	10.3	11.9	3.20	1.00	.500	-	1.38
TRAVEL TIME - INVESTIGATIONS ACTIVITY	241	5	-	-	9	1	-	2	-	-	1	-	29	165	-	-	-	-	29
WARRANT OF ARREST PROCESSING																			
COMPLETED	11	-	4	3	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-		-
W/A PROCESSING - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	13		2	6				2					3						
- HOURS PER UNIT	1.18		.500	2.00				2.00					1.00						
WARRANT OF ARREST SERVICE																			
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
RECEIVED	18		4	3				2		1	3		3	1			1		
TOTAL	18		4	3				2		1	3		3	1			1		
COMPLETED	18		4	3				2		1	3		3	1			1		
PENDING END OF PERIOD	-		-	-				-		-	-		-	-			-		
W/A SERVICE - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	8		2	2				2		1	1		-	-			-		
- HOURS PER UNIT	.444		.500	.666				1.00		1.00	.333		-	-			-		
VI EMPLOYMENT SUMMARY																			
NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES END OF PERIOD	286	3	20	11	12	11	12	21	23	16	10	10	33	60	11	9	9	2	13
OPERATIONS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	40048	234	2866	1750	2064	1781	1800	4172	3776	2397	1411	1552	5513	5475	1544	1305	1365	185	85
OPERATIONS - NON-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	5882	168	336	296	184	204	148	415	472	477	273	292	730	939	312	119	147	-	370
ADMINISTRATION - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	7069	87	612	134	15	168	313	170	168	162	120	40	302	3047	142	300	280	150	859
ADMINISTRATION - NON-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	1036	15	120	-	-	-	56	63	12	-	-	40	-	566	22	16	12	-	114
TOTAL HOURS EMPLOYMENT	54035	504	3934	2180	2263	2153	2317	4820	4428	3036	1804	1924	6545	10027	2020	1740	1804	335	2201
PERCENTAGE TOTAL HOURS ON OPERATIONS	85.0	79.7	81.3	93.8	99.3	92.2	84.0	95.1	95.9	94.7	93.3	95.8	95.3	63.9	91.8	81.8	83.8	55.2	55.7

Form G-21.1 (9-1-53)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: JANUARY 1954 ST. ALBANS District No. 1

Mr. Cavenzasi

ENTRY AND DEPARTURE ACTIVITY	TOTAL	Bangor	Calais	Highgate-springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Rouses Point	St. Albans	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vanceboro	Halifax	Montreal
PRIMARY INSPECTION																			
BORDER-CROSSERS ADMITTED - ALIENS	450018	-	82906	111141	31638	18553	90685	44136	33589	18961	20571	10063	32270	4459	7751	32817	9229	188	1061
- CITIZENS	248304	1	31860	13126	12364	6988	54118	23799	29430	7106	3644	8278	18427	3684	3640	24131	7699	-	9
CREWMEN ADMITTED - ALIENS	671	254	404	-	-	-					10			3					
- CITIZENS	287	47	22	-	-	-					-			218					
OTHERS ADMITTED - ALIENS	6294	10	126	76	9	1623	18	63	161	651	11	18	768	176	134	57	159	162	2072
- CITIZENS	308	53	2	60		2	9	137	7	1	1		12	5			5	3	11
ALIENS NOT ADMITTED - TOTAL	318	-	30	16	6	20	5	14	26	12	22	3	59	5	11	4	6	39	40
BORDER-CROSSERS	175	-	17	9	4	2	3	5	26	10	21		50	5	11			2	10
CREWMEN	-	-	-	-															
OTHERS NOT ADMITTED	143	-	13	7	2	18	2	9		2	1	3	9			4	6	37	30
PREEXAMINATIONS COMPLETED - IN U.S.	-	-	-	-															
OUTSIDE U.S.	111	-	-	-	-										37	1	73		
FINES	-	-	-	-	-														
TOTAL WORK UNITS	706311	365	115350	24419	44017	27186	147835	68149	63213	26731	24259	18362	51536	8550	11573	57010	17171	392	3193
PRIMARY INSPECTION-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	38530	55	3708	2768	4588	1582	1794	4191	2985	2509	1095	886	5555	1567	1474	1278	1626	177	692
- HOURS PER UNIT	.054	.151	.032	.113	.104	.058	.012	.061	.047	.093	.045	.048	.107	.183	.127	.022	.093	.452	.217
PRODUCTIVE HOURS - INS PERSONNEL	31116	55	2723	1936	2020	1284	1794	3500	2617	2013	1095	646	5147	1567	1470	1278	1102	177	692
VESSELS BOARDED - ARRIVAL	251	31	208	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	11	-
AIRPLANE FLIGHTS - ARRIVAL	178	9	5	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	92	-	3	-	-	68
VESSELS & AIRPLANES BOARDED ON DEPART.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
SPECIAL INQUIRY OFFICER HEARINGS																			
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9	-	-	-	-	-
RECEIVED	114													114					
TOTAL	123													123					
COMPLETED	109													109					
SUBVERSIVE	7													7					
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC	8													8					
WITHOUT PROPER DOCUMENTS	91													91					
OTHER	3													3					
PENDING END OF PERIOD	14													14					
SIO HEARINGS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	688												16	672					
- HOURS PER UNIT	6.31												-	6.16					
PRODUCTIVE HOURS - INS PERSONNEL	691					3							16	672					
AUTHORIZATIONS																			
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	72	1	-	-	1	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	65	2	-	-	-	-
RECEIVED	2932	24	43	22	70	1573	129	40	79	596	32	9	6	204	21	54	4		26
TOTAL	3004	25	43	22	71	1573	129	43	79	596	32	9	6	269	23	54	4		26
RETURNED OR TRANSFERRED	4	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-		-
PROCESSED WITHOUT COMPLETION	21	-	-	-	-	-	2	10	-	-	-	-	-	9	-	-	-		-

Form G-21.2 (9-1-53)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: JANUARY 1954 ST. ALBANS District No. 1

I ENTRY AND DEPARTURE ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	TOTAL	Bangor	Calais	Highgate-Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Rouses Point	St. Albans	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vanceboro	Halifax	Montreal
AUTHORIZATIONS. - (Cont'd) Received	2932	24	43	22	70	1573	129	40	79	596	32	9	6	204	21	54	4	-	26
BORDER CROSSING CARDS	269	13	4		62			24	30	32	25	4	1	30	17		2		25
REENTRY PERMITS ISSUED & EXTENDED	19	-					3	2						14					
VISA PETITIONS	25	-												25					
Q - SPECIAL SKILLS	-																		
Q - PARENTS OF CITIZENS	-																		
Q - OTHER RELATIVES OF CITIZENS	6													6					
NQ- SPOUSES, CHILDREN OF CITIZENS	18													18					
Q - SPOUSES, CHILDREN OF RESID. ALIENS	1													1					
NQ- MINISTERS	-																		
ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS.																			
NONIMMIGRANTS TO IMMIGRANTS	-																		
IMMIGRANTS TO NONIMMIGRANTS	-																		
PREEXAMINATION AUTHORIZATIONS	-																		
CREATION OF RECORD OF ADMISSION	5	1												4					
EXTENSIONS OF TEMPORARY STAY	40	2	1	17				4	1	2			3	10					
ALIEN LABORER CARDS	2362		28			1571	110	3	35	554		4	2		1	54			
DUPLICATE ALIEN REGISTRATION CARDS	170	8	6	5	8	2	15	5	13	8	6	1		88	3		2		
PERMISSION TO REAPPLY	20		4					1						14					1
CHANGE OF NONIMMIGRANT STATUS	1													1					
PETITIONS TO IMPORT: Refugee Appl.	1													1					
TEMP. WORKERS OF EXCEPT. ABILITY	-													-					
LABORERS AND OTHER TEMP. WORKERS	9													9					
INDUSTRIAL TRAINEES	2						1							1					
SCHOOL APPROVALS	1													1					
SEC. 4 D.P. APPLICATIONS	1							1											
APPL'S. FOR PERMISSION TO RETURN	-																		
APPL'S. FOR WAIVER OF INADMISSIBILITY	6													6					
APPL'S. FOR STUDENT EMPLOYMENT	1										1								
BREACH OR CANCELLATION OF BONDS	-																		
DENIED:	-																		
BORDER CROSSING CARDS																			
REENTRY PERMITS ISSUED & EXTENDED																			
VISA PETITIONS:																			
Q - SPECIAL SKILLS																			
Q - PARENTS OF CITIZENS																			
Q - OTHER RELATIVES OF CITIZENS																			
NQ- SPOUSES, CHILDREN OF CITIZENS																			
Q - SPOUSES, CHILDREN OF RESID. ALIENS																			
NQ- MINISTERS																			
ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS.																			
NONIMMIGRANTS TO IMMIGRANTS																			
IMMIGRANTS TO NONIMMIGRANTS																			
PREEXAMINATION AUTHORIZATIONS																			
CREATION OF RECORD OF ADMISSIO																			

Form G-21.2 (9-1-53) UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE

REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: JANUARY 1954 ST. ALBANS District No. 1

I. ENTRY AND DEPARTURE ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	TOTAL	Bangor	Calais	Highgate-Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Rouses Point	St. Albans	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vanceboro	Halifax	Portland
AUTHORIZATIONS. - (Cont'd)																			
COMPLETED	2898	24	43	22	70	1573	125	29	79	596	32	9	5	184	23	54	4	-	26
BORDER CROSSING CARDS	269	13	4		62			24	30	32	25	4	1	30	17		2		25
REENTRY PERMITS ISSUED & EXTENDED	14													14					
VISA PETITIONS	22													22					
Q - SPECIAL SKILLS	-																		
Q - PARENTS OF CITIZENS	-																		
Q - OTHER RELATIVES OF CITIZENS	5													5					
NQ- SPOUSES, CHILDREN OF CITIZENS	17													17					
Q - SPOUSES, CHILDREN OF RESID. ALIENS	-																		
NQ- MINISTERS	-																		
ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS.																			
NONIMMIGRANTS TO IMMIGRANTS	2													2					
IMMIGRANTS TO NONIMMIGRANTS	-																		
PREEXAMINATION AUTHORIZATIONS	-																		
CREATION OF RECORD OF ADMISSION	3	1												2					
EXTENSIONS OF TEMPORARY STAY	34	2	1	17				1	1	2			2	8					
ALIEN LABORER CARDS	2362		28			1571	110	3	35	554		4	2		1	54			
DUPLICATE ALIEN REGISTRATION CARDS	167	8	6	5	8	2	15		13	8	6	1		88	5		2		1
PERMISSION TO REAPPLY	14		4					1						8					
CHANGE OF NONIMMIGRANT STATUS	-																		
PETITIONS TO IMPORT: Refugee Appl.	-																		
TEMP. WORKERS OF EXCEPT. ABILITY	-																		
LABORERS AND OTHER TEMP. WORKERS	6													6					
INDUSTRIAL TRAINEES	-																		
SCHOOL APPROVALS	1													1					
SEC. 4 D.P. APPLICATIONS	-																		
APPL'S. FOR PERMISSION TO RETURN	-																		
APPL'S. FOR WAIVER OF INADMISSIBILITY	3													3					
APPL'S. FOR STUDENT EMPLOYMENT	2										1			1					
BREACH OR CANCELLATION OF BONDS	-																		
DENIED	6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	-	-	-	-	-
BORDER CROSSING CARDS	-													-					
REENTRY PERMITS ISSUED & EXTENDED	-																		
VISA PETITIONS	2													2					
Q - SPECIAL SKILLS	-																		
Q - PARENTS OF CITIZENS	-																		
Q - OTHER RELATIVES OF CITIZENS	-																		
NQ- SPOUSES, CHILDREN OF CITIZENS	2													2					
Q - SPOUSES, CHILDREN OF RESID. ALIENS	-																		
NQ- MINISTERS	-																		
ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS.																			
NONIMMIGRANTS TO IMMIGRANTS	-																		
IMMIGRANTS TO NONIMMIGRANTS	-																		
PREEXAMINATION AUTHORIZATIONS	-																		
CREATION OF RECORD OF ADMISSION	-																		

Form G-21.3 (9-1-53)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: JANUARY 1954 ST. ALBANS District No. 1

I ENTRY AND DEPARTURE ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	TOTAL	Bangor	Calais	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Reuses Point	St. Albans	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vanceboro	Halifax	Montreal
AUTHORIZATIONS - (Cont'd)																			
DENIED (CONT'D)	-																		
EXTENSIONS OF TEMPORARY STAY	-																		
ALIEN LABORER CARDS	-																		
DUPLICATE ALIEN REGISTRATION CARDS	-																		
PERMISSION TO REAPPLY	4													4					
CHANGE OF NONIMMIGRANT STATUS	-																		
PETITIONS TO IMPORT: Refugee Appl.	-																		
TEMP. WORKERS OF EXCEPT. ABILITY	-																		
LABORERS AND OTHER TEMP. WORKERS	-																		
INDUSTRIAL TRAINEES	-																		
SCHOOL APPROVALS	-																		
SEC. 4 D.P. APPLICATIONS	-																		
APPL'S FOR PERMISSION TO RETURN	-																		
APPL'S. FOR WAIVER OF INADMISSIBILITY	-																		
APPL'S. FOR STUDENT EMPLOYMENT	-																		
BREACH OR CANCELLATION OF BONDS	-																		
PENDING END OF PERIOD	81	1	-	-	1	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	1	74	-	-	-	-	-
BORDER CROSSING CARDS	-																		
REENTRY PERMITS ISSUED & EXTENDED	-																		
VISA PETITIONS	13													13					
Q - SPECIAL SKILLS	1													1					
Q - PARENTS OF CITIZENS	-																		
Q - OTHER RELATIVES OF CITIZENS	7													7					
NQ- SPOUSES, CHILDREN OF CITIZENS	4													4					
Q - SPOUSES, CHILDREN OF RESID. ALIENS	1													1					
NQ-MINISTERS	-																		
ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS																			
NONIMMIGRANTS TO IMMIGRANTS	2													2					
IMMIGRANTS TO NONIMMIGRANTS	-																		
PREEXAMINATION AUTHORIZATIONS	1	1																	
CREATION OF RECORD OF ADMISSION	18				1									17					
EXTENSIONS OF TEMPORARY STAY	17							3					1	13					
ALIEN LABORER CARDS	-																		
DUPLICATE ALIEN REGISTRATION CARDS	-																		
PERMISSION TO REAPPLY	9													9					
CHANGE OF NONIMMIGRANT STATUS	2													2					
PETITIONS TO IMPORT: Refugee Appl.	2													2					
TEMP. WORKERS OF EXCEPT. ABILITY	-																		
LABORERS AND OTHER TEMP. WORKERS	11													11					
INDUSTRIAL TRAINEES	1													1					
SCHOOL APPROVALS	1													1					
SEC. 4 D.P. APPLICATIONS	1							1											
APPL'S. FOR PERMISSION TO RETURN	-																		
APPL'S. FOR WAIVER OF INADMISSIBILITY	3													3					
APPL'S. FOR STUDENT EMPLOYMENT																			
BREACH OR CANCELLATION OF BONDS																			

Form G-21.4 (9-1-53) UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: JANUARY 1954 ST. ALBANS District No. 1

I ENTRY AND DEPARTURE ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	TOTAL	Bangor	Calais	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Reuses Point	St. Albans	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vanceboro	Halifax	Montreal
AUTHORIZATIONS - (Cont'd)																			
AUTHORIZATIONS- PRODUCTIVE HOURS	1400	37	12	15	10	352	32	35	73	116	15	2	67	573	17	27	2	-	15
- HOURS PER UNIT	.483	1.54	.279	.681	.142	.323	.256	1.21	.924	.194	.469	.222	13.4	3.11	.739	.500	.500	-	.577
TRAVEL TIME - ENTRY & DEPARTURE ACTIV.	1222	26	2	-	4	118	11	33	230	168	-	-	108	371	7	-	78	-	66
LOST TIME - ENTRY & DEPARTURE ACTIV.	2423	84	-	-	-	68	-	692	-	-	-	1384	-	59	28	-	81	2	25
II DETENTION, DEPORTATION AND PAROLE ACTIVITY																			
WARRANT HEARINGS																			
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	26	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	26	-	-	-	-	-
RECEIVED	9													9					
TOTAL	35													35					
COMPLETED	13													13					
SUBVERSIVE	-													-					
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC	2													2					
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS	5													5					
WITHOUT PROPER DOCUMENTS	5													5					
REMAINED LONGER	1													1					
OTHER	-													-					
PENDING END OF PERIOD	22													22					
WARRANT HEARINGS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	163													163					
- HOURS PER UNIT	12.5													12.5					
CASES COMPLETED WITH 2-MAN HEARINGS	-													-					
ON APPEAL - TOTAL	7													7					
FINAL ORDERS ENTERED OR RECEIVED	13													13					
TRAVEL TIME - WARRANT HEARINGS OPER.	23													23					
LOST TIME - WARRANT HEARINGS OPER.	11													11					
PAROLE AND SUPERVISION (Expulsion)																			
CONDITIONAL PAROLE																			
ALIENS ON PAROLE BEGINNING OF PERIOD	32	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	31	-	-	1	-	-
PLACED ON PAROLE DURING PERIOD	2													1			1		
TOTAL ON PAROLE DURING PERIOD	34													32			2		
REMOVED FROM PAROLE DURING PERIOD	4													3			1		
ALIENS ON PAROLE END OF PERIOD	30													29			1		
SUBVERSIVE	-													-					
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC	5													5					
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS	1													1					
WITHOUT PROPER DOCUMENTS	8													8					
REMAINED LONGER	9													9					
OTHER	7													6			1		
COND. PAROLE - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	12													12			-		
- HOURS PER UNIT	.352													.375			-		

Form G-21.5 (9-1-53)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: JANUARY 1954 ST. ALBANS District No. 1

II DETENTION, DEPORTATION AND PAROLE ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	TOTAL	Bangor	Calais	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Rouses Point	St. Albans	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vanceboro	Halifax	Montreal
PAROLE AND SUPERVISION (Cont'd)																			
SUPERVISION																			
ALIENS UNDER SUPER'N BEGIN. OF PERIOD	10	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10	-	-	-	-	-
PLACED UNDER SUPER'N DURING PERIOD	-													-					
TOTAL UNDER SUPER'N DURING PERIOD	10													10					
REMOVED FROM SUPER'N DURING PERIOD	-													-					
ALIENS UNDER SUPER'N END OF PERIOD	10													10					
SUBVERSIVE	-																		
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC	5													5					
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS	-																		
WITHOUT PROPER DOCUMENTS	-																		
REMAINED LONGER	3													3					
OTHER	2													2					
SUPERVISION - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	3													3					
- HOURS PER UNIT	.300													.300					
TRAVEL TIME - PAROLE & SUPER'N OPER.	-													-					
LOST TIME - PAROLE & SUPER'N OPER.	-													-					
SERVICE DETENTION FACILITIES																			
NUMBER DETAINED BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
EXCLUSION	-																		
EXPULSION	-																		
DETAINEES ADMITTED	62		1	1				2	29				22	5			2		
NUMBER DETAINED DURING PERIOD	62		1	1				2	29				22	5			2		
EXCLUSION	54		-	-				-	29				18	5			2		
DETAINEES REMOVED DURING PERIOD	62		1	1				2	29				22	5			2		
NUMBER DETAINED END OF PERIOD	-		-	-				-	-				-	-			-		
MAN-DAYS DETENTION DURING PERIOD	88		1	1				4	34				38	8			2		
EXCLUSION	72		-	-				4	34				24	8			2		
EXPULSION	16		1	1				-	-				14	-			-		
AVERAGE DAYS DET. PER DETAINEE	1.42		1.00	1.00				2.00	1.17				1.73	1.60			1.00		
SERVICE DET. FAC. - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	349		-	-				10	184				107	16			32		
- HOURS PER UNIT	3.97		-	-				2.50	5.41				2.81	2.00			16.0		
PRODUCTIVE HOURS - INS PERSONNEL	310		-	-				10	184				84	16			16		
NON-SERVICE DETENTION FACILITIES																			
NUMBER DETAINED BEGINNING OF PERIOD	3	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-
DETAINEES ADMITTED	5	2						1						2					
NUMBER DETAINED DURING PERIOD	8	3						1						4					
DETAINEES REMOVED DURING PERIOD	4	2						-						2					
NUMBER DETAINED END OF PERIOD	4	1						1						2					
MAN-DAYS DETENTION DURING PERIOD	103	41						14						48					
AVERAGE DAYS DET. PER DETAINEE	12.8	13.6						14.0						12.0					
NON-SERV. DET. FAC.-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	13	9						4						-					
-HOURS PER UNIT	1.63	3.00						4.00						-					

Form G-21.6 (9-1-53)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: JANUARY 1954 ST. ALBANS District No. 1

II DETENTION, DEPORTATION AND PAROLE ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	TOTAL	Bangor	Calais	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Rouses Point	St. Albans	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vanceboro	Halifax	Montreal
DEPORTATION																			
ALIENS PROCESSED FOR DEPORTATION	17	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	13	2	-	1	-	-
ALIENS PROCESSED FOR VOLUNTARY DEPAR	11			1		1	1	3	-				2	-	1		2		
ALIENS PROCESSED FOR REMOVAL	-			-		-	-	-	-				-	-	-		-		
TOTAL	28			1		1	1	3	-				3	13	3		3		
ALIENS DEPORTED	10			-		-	-	-	-				7	-	2	1	-		
VOLUNTARY DEPARTURES	24		4	1	1	1	1	3	1	2			5	-	1	2	2		
UNDER W/A	3		1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-			-	-	1	-	-		
WITHOUT W/A	21		3	1	-	1	1	3	1	2			5	-	-	2	2		
REMOVALS	-		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-				-	-	-	-		
DEPORTATION - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	337		-	1	-	1	1	-	-	-			1	325	6	-	2		
- HOURS PER UNIT	12.0		-	1.00	-	1.00	1.00	-	-	-			.333	25.0	2.00	-	.666		
TRAVEL TIME - DEPORTATION OPERATION	27		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-			-	25	-	-	2		
LOST TIME - DEPORTATION OPERATION	62		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-			-	-	-	-	62		
III CITIZENSHIP ACTIVITY																			
NATURALIZATION																			
N-400) PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	483	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	483	-	-	-	-	-
FOR) RECEIVED	139					2								137					
PROC-) COMPLETED	156					1								155					
ESSING) REJ., TRANSF., OR CLOSED	50					-								50					
" PROCESSED	106					1								105					
" PENDING END OF PERIOD	466					1								465					
N-400) PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	466	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	466	-	-	-	-	-
FOR) RECEIVED	105													105					
FILING) COMPLETED	122													122					
PET.) TRANSFERRED OR CLOSED	17													17					
" PETITIONS FILED	105													105					
" PENDING END OF PERIOD	449													449					
" READY FOR [redacted]	449													449					
PETI-) PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	306	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	306	-	-	-	-	-
TIONS) COMPLETED	62													62					
" GRANTED	62													62					
" DENIED	-													-					
" TRANSFERRED	-													-					
" PENDING END OF PERIOD	349													349					
" READY FOR FINAL HEARING	349													349					
N-300) PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
" RECEIVED	3													3					
" COMPLETED	3													3					
" PENDING END OF PERIOD	-													-					
DECLARATIONS FILED	5													5					
NATURALIZATION - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	394					1								393					
- HOURS PER UNIT	1.13					1.00								1.13					

Form G-21.7 (9-1-53)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: JANUARY 1954 ST. ALBANS District No. 1

III CITIZENSHIP ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	TOTAL	Bangor	Calais	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Rouses Point	St. Albans	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vanceboro	Halifax	Montreal
CITIZENSHIP APPLICATIONS																			
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	65	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	65	-	-	-	-	-
RECEIVED	38													37			1		
TOTAL	103													102			1		
COMPLETED - TOTAL	8													8			-		
REJECTED, TRANSFERRED, OR CLOSED	4													4			-		
PROCESSED FOR OTHER OFFICES	1													-			1		
PENDING END OF PERIOD - TOTAL	90													90			-		
READY FOR HEARING,	40													40			-		
CITIZENSHIP - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	125													121			4		
- HOURS PER UNIT	9.61													10.1			4.00		
NATIONALITY APPLICATIONS																			
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	18	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	18	-	-	-	-	-
RECEIVED	5													5					
TOTAL	23													23					
COMPLETED - TOTAL	4													4					
REJECTED, TRANSFERRED, OR CLOSED	-													-					
PROCESSED FOR OTHER OFFICES	-													-					
PENDING END OF PERIOD - TOTAL	19													19					
READY FOR HEARING, adjudication OR DELIVERY	4													4					
NATIONALITY - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	31													31					
- HOURS PER UNIT	7.75													7.75					
TRAVEL TIME - CITIZENSHIP ACTIVITY	221													221					
LOST TIME - CITIZENSHIP ACTIVITY	-													-					
CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION 1/																			
CITIZENSHIP ASSISTANCE FURNISHED																			
ALIENS REFERRED TO PUBLIC SCHOOLS																			
ALIENS INFORMED OF HOME STUDY																			
NAME SLIPS TO PUBLIC SCHOOLS COR. CTRS.																			
ALIENS ADMITTED TO CITIZENSHIP																			
ATTENDED PUBLIC SCHOOL CLASSES																			
ENROLLED IN HOME STUDY COURSES																			
NUMBER SUBMITTING PUBLIC SCHOOL CERT.																			
111a VERIFICATION OF ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE ACTIVITY																			
VERIFICATION REQUESTS																			
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	1034	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1034	-	-	-	-	-
RECEIVED DURING PERIOD	1637	12	8	2	5	12	3	22	60	13	9	3	36	1046	39	34	28	12	293
TOTAL	2671	12	8	2	5	12	3	22	60	13	9	3	36	2080	39	34	28	12	293
COMPLETED	1727	12	8	2	5	12	3	22	60	13	9	3	36	1136	39	34	28	12	293
NATURALIZATION	227	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	3	222	-	-	-	-	-
OTHER	1500	12	8	2	5	12	3	22	58	13	9	3	33	914	39	34	28	12	293
PENDING END OF PERIOD	944	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	944	-	-	-	-	-
VERIFICATION - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	599	8	2	1	1	3	-	9	11	5	5	1	16	435	20	17	10	2	53
- HOURS PER UNIT	.346	.666	.250	.500	.200	.250	-	.409	.183	.384	.556	.333	.444	.382	.512	.500	.357	.167	.181

1/ Source: Form N-28

Form G-21.10 (9-1-53)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: JANUARY 1954 ST. ALBANS District No. 1

V INVESTIGATIONS ACTIVITY	TOTAL	Bangor	Calais	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Rouses Point	St. Albans	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vanceboro	Halifax	Montreal
INVESTIGATIONS																			
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	250	16	1	-	2	-	-	1	-	4	-	-	15	56	-	-	-	-	155
RECEIVED DURING PERIOD	1001	3	5	2	44	9	26	27	7	13	4	1	48	711	27	11	2	2	59
TOTAL	1251	19	6	2	46	9	26	28	7	17	4	1	63	767	27	11	2	2	214
COMPLETED	752	4	6	-	12	9	21	18	4	7	-	-	24	507	11	9	2	2	116
NATURALIZATION AND CITIZENSHIP	40	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	2	24	-	1	-	-	11
CANCELLATION - SUBVERSIVE	-																		
CANCELLATION - OTHER	1																		1
NATURALIZATION	15													13					2
OTHER	24				1		1						2	11		1			8
DEPORTATION	359	1	5	-	6	-	8	5	-	2	-	-	16	216	-	5	-	-	95
SUBVERSIVE	3													1					2
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC	9												8						1
ADDRESS REPORT CARD (I-53)	238		4		6		8						4	211		5			
SUSPENSION	-																		
NON-IMMIGRANTS	82							1											81
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS	14	1						3					4	4					2
DISPLACED PERSONS	-																		
OTHER	13		1					1		2									9
SMUGGLING	-																		
PRIVATE BILLS	-																		
PAROLE	1												1						
ALIEN REGISTRATION	5	1			3									1					
ALIEN ADDRESS REPORT (SEC. 35)	240				1	5	11	10	4				4	191	10	3		1	
MISCELLANEOUS	107	2	1		1	4	1	3		5			1	75	1		2	1	10
PENDING END OF PERIOD	499	15	-	2	34	-	5	10	3	10	4	1	39	260	16	2	-	-	98
NATURALIZATION AND CITIZENSHIP	40	1						1						35					3
CANCELLATION - SUBVERSIVE	-																		
CANCELLATION - OTHER	1	1																	
NATURALIZATION	28													28					
OTHER	11							1						7					3
DEPORTATION	212	13			21		1	-		1			32	40	14				90
SUBVERSIVE	2													2					
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC	31												29	1					1
ADDRESS REPORT CARD (I-53)	59	3			18		1						3	30	4				
SUSPENSION	2													1	1				
NON-IMMIGRANTS	87	1			1														85
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS	12	2												2	8				
DISPLACED PERSONS	2													2					
OTHER	17	7			2					1				2	1				4
SMUGGLING	-																		
PRIVATE BILLS	-																		
PAROLE	1													1					
ALIEN REGISTRATION	2													2					
ALIEN ADDRESS REPORT (SEC. 35)	219	1		2	13		4	9	3	8	4	1	7	163	2	2			
MISCELLANEOUS	25						-	-		1				19					5

Form G-21.11 (9-1-53)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: JANUARY 1954 ST. ALBANS District No. 1

V INVESTIGATIONS ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	TOTAL	Bangor	Calais	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Rouses Point	St. Albans	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vanceboro	Halifax	Montreal
INVESTIGATIONS RESULTING IN W/A OR V/D	10		2							2			6						
ALIENS APPRH'D. (BY OTHER THAN B.P.)	1												1						
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS	-																		
MEXICANS APPRH'D. (BY OTHER THAN B.P.)	-																		
ILLEGALLY IN AGRICULTURE	-																		
ILLEGALLY IN TRADE OR INDUSTRY	-																		
OTHER	-																		
W/A THRU ADDRESS REPORT CARD (I-53)	1		1										-						
INVESTIGATIONS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	1190	20	11	1	10	14	7	25	6	52	-	-	106	806	21	9	2	1	99
- HOURS PER UNIT	1.58	5.00	1.83	-	.833	1.56	.333	1.39	1.50	7.43			4.42	1.59	1.91	1.00	1.00	.500	.853
TRAVEL TIME - INVESTIGATIONS ACTIVITY	143	7	-	-	6	-	1	3	-	-			11	55	2	-	-	-	5
WARRANT OF ARREST PROCESSING																			
COMPLETED	10	-	2	1	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	-
W/A PROCESSING - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	16		2	2				8					-		4				
- HOURS PER UNIT	1.60		1.00	2.00				2.67					-		-				
WARRANT OF ARREST SERVICE																			
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
RECEIVED	7		2	1									4						
TOTAL	7		2	1									4						
COMPLETED	7		2	1									4						
PENDING END OF PERIOD	-		-	-									-						
W/A SERVICE - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	2		2	-									-						
- HOURS PER UNIT	.285		1.00	-									-						

VI EMPLOYMENT SUMMARY																			
NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES END OF PERIOD	282	2	20	11	12	11	13	21	22	16	11	10	30	60	10	9	9	2	13
OPERATIONS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	40534	246	2754	1956	2051	1844	1846	4319	3121	2354	1115	2033	5556	5882	1575	1331	361	182	10
OPERATIONS - NON-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	4057	28	384	96	198	164	200	311	392	484	168	216	449	633	48	96	19	-	171
ADMINISTRATION - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	7566	93	689	108	13	120	354	168	195	194	118	40	282	3566	114	286	224	153	848
ADMINISTRATION - NON-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	593	3	-	-	-	-	8	-	8	-	80	-	-	347	51	9	8	•	79
TOTAL HOURS EMPLOYMENT	52749	370	3827	2160	2262	2128	2408	4798	3716	3032	1481	2289	6287	10428	1788	1722	1612	335	2106
PERCENTAGE TOTAL HOURS ON OPERATIONS	84.5	74.0	81.9	95.0	99.4	94.4	84.9	96.4	94.5	93.6	86.6	98.2	95.5	62.4	90.8	82.8	85.6	54.3	55.9

Form G-21.1 (9-1-53) UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE

REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: FEBRUARY 1954

ST. ALBANS District No. 1

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I ENTRY AND DEPARTURE ACTIVITY	TOTAL	Bangor	Calais	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Rouses Point	St. Albans	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vanceboro	Hollis Fax	Montreal
PRIMARY INSPECTION														*					
BORDER CROSSERS ADMITTED - ALIENS	434521	2	76834	15650	36885	16353	90299	38057	31678	17082	21623	9927	31853	-	9144	29291	8715	118	1010
- CITIZENS	229987	7	29667	18766	12455	4548	51120	18981	24641	5610	3496	7884	19195		4093	22477	7043		4
CREWMEN ADMITTED - ALIENS	839	169	593	5		-	-												72
- CITIZENS	315	34	46	226		-	-												9
OTHERS ADMITTED - ALIENS	3868	8	66	202	22	655	28	55	128	240	14	41	544		229	42	82	58	1454
- CITIZENS	478	18	5	128		1	6	135	5	1			24			137		8	10
ALIENS NOT ADMITTED - TOTAL	317	2	12	7		13	2	28	26	3	23	6	82		5	11	8	41	48
BORDER-CROSSERS	229		7	4		-	2	9		3	23		82		5	5		41	48
CREWMEN	-		-			-													
OTHERS NOT ADMITTED	88	2	5	3		13		19	26			6				6	8		
PREEXAMINATIONS COMPLETED - IN U.S.	-		-																
OUTSIDE U.S.	192		-												37	1	154		
FINES	-		-																
TOTAL WORK UNITS	670517	240	107223	34984	49362	21570	141455	57256	56478	22936	25156	17858	51698	-	13508	51959	16002	225	2607
PRIMARY INSPECTION - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	34952	42	3216	3021	4046	1630	1681	3774	3066	2503	1030	888	4616	583	1352	1227	1420	169	688
- HOURS PER UNIT	.052	.175	.030	.086	.082	.076	.011	.065	.054	.109	.041	.049	.089	-	.100	.023	.088	.751	.264
PRODUCTIVE HOURS - INS PERSONNEL	28354	42	2312	2253	1742	1446	1681	3158	2764	2055	1030	686	4230	583	1348	1227	940	169	1
VESSELS BOARDED - ARRIVAL	323	22	291	-		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10	
AIRPLANE FLIGHTS - ARRIVAL	125	9	6	95		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	15	-	-	-
VESSELS & AIRPLANES BOARDED ON DEPART.	-	-	-	-		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
SPECIAL INQUIRY OFFICER HEARINGS																			
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	14	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	14	-	-	-	-	-
RECEIVED	63													63					
TOTAL	77													77					
COMPLETED	64													64					
SUBVERSIVE	3													3					
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC	6													6					
WITHOUT PROPER DOCUMENTS	48													48					
OTHER	7													7					
PENDING END OF PERIOD	13													13					
SIO HEARINGS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	536													536					
- HOURS PER UNIT	8.37													8.37					
PRODUCTIVE HOURS - INS PERSONNEL	536													536					
AUTHORIZATIONS																			
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	81	1	-	-	1	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	1	74	-	-	-	-	-
RECEIVED	1550	23	16	70	81	634	23	29	68	214	20	32	19	237	22	30	6		26
TOTAL	1631	24	16	70	82	634	23	33	68	214	20	32	20	311	22	30	6		26
RETURNED OR TRANSFERRED	15	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	15	-	-	-		-
PROCESSED WITHOUT COMPLETION	11	1	-	-	-	-	1	5	-	-	-	-	-	4	-	-	-		-

* Entry and Departure reported under Highgate Springs

Form G-21.2 (9-1-53) UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE

REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: FEBRUARY 1954 ST. ALBANS District No. 1

I. ENTRY AND DEPARTURE ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	TOTAL	Bangor	Calais	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Rouses Point	St. Albans	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vanceboro	Halifax	Montreal
AUTHORIZATIONS. - (Cont'd) Received	1550	23	16	70	81	634	23	29	68	214	20	32	19	237	22	30	6	-	26
BORDER CROSSING CARDS	248	15	4	37	64			18	33	9	16	8	4	-	16		3		21
REENTRY PERMITS ISSUED & EXTENDED	9		-											9					
VISA PETITIONS	27		-											27					
Q - SPECIAL SKILLS	1													1					
Q - PARENTS OF CITIZENS	-																		
Q - OTHER RELATIVES OF CITIZENS	8													8					
NQ- SPOUSES, CHILDREN OF CITIZENS	17													17					
Q - SPOUSES, CHILDREN OF RESID. ALIENS	1													1					
NQ- MINISTERS	-													-					
ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS.																			
NONIMMIGRANTS TO IMMIGRANTS	-																		
IMMIGRANTS TO NONIMMIGRANTS	-																		
PREEXAMINATION AUTHORIZATIONS	-																		
CREATION OF RECORD OF ADMISSION	7													7					
EXTENSIONS OF TEMPORARY STAY	25	1	3	5				2		1			3	9		1			
ALIEN LABORER CARDS	955		6	14		632	22	3	31	197		21				29			
DUPLICATE ALIEN REGISTRATION CARDS	170	7	2	14	16	2	1	5	4	7	4	3	12	85	6		2		
PERMISSION TO REAPPLY	13		1		1									5			1		5
CHANGE OF NONIMMIGRANT STATUS	2							1						1					
PETITIONS TO IMPORT: Refugee Appl.																			
TEMP. WORKERS OF EXCEPT. ABILITY	88													88					
LABORERS AND OTHER TEMP. WORKERS	-																		
INDUSTRIAL TRAINEES	-																		
SCHOOL APPROVALS	-																		
SEC. 4 D.P. APPLICATIONS	-																		
APPL'S. FOR PERMISSION TO RETURN	-																		
APPL'S. FOR WAIVER OF INADMISSIBILITY	5													5					
APPL'S. FOR STUDENT EMPLOYMENT	1													1					
BREACH OR CANCELLATION OF BONDS	-																		
~~XXXXXX~~																			
BORDER CROSSING CARDS																			
REENTRY PERMITS ISSUED & EXTENDED																			
VISA PETITIONS																			
Q - SPECIAL SKILLS																			
Q - PARENTS OF CITIZENS																			
Q - OTHER RELATIVES OF CITIZENS																			
NQ- SPOUSES, CHILDREN OF CITIZENS																			
Q - SPOUSES, CHILDREN OF RESID. ALIENS																			
NQ- MINISTERS																			
ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS.																			
NONIMMIGRANTS TO IMMIGRANTS																			
IMMIGRANTS TO NONIMMIGRANTS																			
PREEXAMINATION AUTHORIZATIONS																			
CREATION OF RECORD OF ADMISSION																			

Form G-21.2 (9-1-53) UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE

REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: FEBRUARY 1954 ST. ALBANS District No. 1

I ENTRY AND DEPARTURE ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	TOTAL	Bangor	Calais	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Rouses Point	St. Albans	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vanceboro	Halifax	Montreal
AUTHORIZATIONS. - (Cont'd)																			
GRANTED	1481	23	16	70	82	634	22	27	68	214	20	32	17	174	20	30	6	-	26
BORDER CROSSING CARDS	248	15	4	37	64			18	33	9	16	8	4		16		3		21
REENTRY PERMITS ISSUED & EXTENDED	9		-											9					
VISA PETITIONS	24		-											24					
Q - SPECIAL SKILLS	1													1					
Q - PARENTS OF CITIZENS	-																		
Q - OTHER RELATIVES OF CITIZENS	7													7					
NQ- SPOUSES, CHILDREN OF CITIZENS	14													14					
Q - SPOUSES, CHILDREN OF RESID. ALIENS	2													2					
NQ- MINISTERS	-																		
ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS.																			
NONIMMIGRANTS TO IMMIGRANTS	-																		
IMMIGRANTS TO NONIMMIGRANTS	-																		
PREEXAMINATION AUTHORIZATIONS	-																		
CREATION OF RECORD OF ADMISSION	6				1									5					
EXTENSIONS OF TEMPORARY STAY	55	1	3	5			22	5		1			1	16		1			
ALIEN LABORER CARDS	933		6	14		632		3	31	197		21				29			
DUPLICATE ALIEN REGISTRATION CARDS	162	7	2	14	16	2			4	7	4	3	12	85	4		2		
PERMISSION TO REAPPLY	19		1		1			1						10			1		5
CHANGE OF NONIMMIGRANT STATUS	3													3					
PETITIONS TO IMPORT: Refugee Appl.	-																		
TEMP. WORKERS OF EXCEPT. ABILITY	16													16					
LABORERS AND OTHER TEMP. WORKERS	1													1					
INDUSTRIAL TRAINEES	1													1					
SCHOOL APPROVALS	-																		
SEC. 4 D.P. APPLICATIONS	-																		
APPL'S. FOR PERMISSION TO RETURN	3													3					
APPL'S. FOR WAIVER OF INADMISSIBILITY	1													1					
APPL'S. FOR STUDENT EMPLOYMENT	-																		
BREACH OR CANCELLATION OF BONDS	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	-	-	-	-	-
DENIED	-																		
BORDER CROSSING CARDS	-																		
REENTRY PERMITS ISSUED & EXTENDED	-																		
VISA PETITIONS	-																		
Q - SPECIAL SKILLS	-																		
Q - PARENTS OF CITIZENS	-																		
Q - OTHER RELATIVES OF CITIZENS	-																		
NQ- SPOUSES, CHILDREN OF CITIZENS	-																		
Q - SPOUSES, CHILDREN OF RESID. ALIENS	-																		
NQ- MINISTERS	-																		
ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS.																			
NONIMMIGRANTS TO IMMIGRANTS	-																		
IMMIGRANTS TO NONIMMIGRANTS	-																		
PREEXAMINATION AUTHORIZATIONS	-																		
CREATION OF RECORD OF ADMISSION	-																		

Form G-21.3 (9-1-53)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: FEBRUARY 1954

ST. ALBANS District No. 1

I ENTRY AND DEPARTURE ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	TOTAL	Bangor	Calais	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Rouses Point	St. Albans	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vanceboro	Halifax	Montreal
AUTHORIZATIONS - (Cont'd)																			
DENIED (CONT'D)																			
EXTENSIONS OF TEMPORARY STAY	-																		
ALIEN LABORER CARDS	-																		
DUPLICATE ALIEN REGISTRATION CARDS	-																		
PERMISSION TO REAPPLY	5													5					
CHANGE OF NONIMMIGRANT STATUS	-																		
PETITIONS TO IMPORT: Refugee Appl.																			
TEMP. WORKERS OF EXCEPT. ABILITY	-																		
LABORERS AND OTHER TEMP. WORKERS	-																		
INDUSTRIAL TRAINEES	-																		
SCHOOL APPROVALS	-																		
SEC. 4 D.P. APPLICATIONS	-																		
APPL'S FOR PERMISSION TO RETURN	-																		
APPL'S. FOR WAIVER OF INADMISSIBILITY	-																		
APPL'S. FOR STUDENT EMPLOYMENT	-																		
BREACH OR CANCELLATION OF BONDS	-																		
PENDING END OF PERIOD	124	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	3	118	2	-	-	-	-
BORDER CROSSING CARDS	-																		
REENTRY PERMITS ISSUED & EXTENDED	-																		
VISA PETITIONS	14													14					
Q - SPECIAL SKILLS	1													1					
Q - PARENTS OF CITIZENS	-																		
Q - OTHER RELATIVES OF CITIZENS	7													7					
NQ- SPOUSES, CHILDREN OF CITIZENS	6													6					
Q - SPOUSES, CHILDREN OF RESID. ALIENS	-																		
NQ-MINISTERS	-																		
ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS																			
NONIMMIGRANTS TO IMMIGRANTS	2													2					
IMMIGRANTS TO NONIMMIGRANTS	-																		
PREEXAMINATION AUTHORIZATIONS	-																		
CREATION OF RECORD OF ADMISSION	19													19					
EXTENSIONS OF TEMPORARY STAY	8												3	5					
ALIEN LABORER CARDS	-																		
DUPLICATE ALIEN REGISTRATION CARDS	2														2				
PERMISSION TO REAPPLY	4													4					
CHANGE OF NONIMMIGRANT STATUS	-																		
PETITIONS TO IMPORT: Refugee Appl.	2													2					
TEMP. WORKERS OF EXCEPT. ABILITY	-																		
LABORERS AND OTHER TEMP. WORKERS	71													71					
INDUSTRIAL TRAINEES	-																		
SCHOOL APPROVALS	-																		
SEC. 4 D.P. APPLICATIONS	1							1											
APPL'S. FOR PERMISSION TO RETURN	-																		
APPL'S. FOR WAIVER OF INADMISSIBILITY	1													1					
APPL'S. FOR STUDENT EMPLOYMENT	-																		
BREACH OR CANCELLATION OF BONDS	-																		

Form G-21.4 (9-1-53) UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE

REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: FEBRUARY 1954 ST. ALBANS District No. 1

I ENTRY AND DEPARTURE ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	TOTAL	Banger	Calais	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Rouses Point	St. Albans	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vanceboro	Halifax	Montreal
AUTHORIZATIONS - (Cont'd)																			
AUTHORIZATIONS- PRODUCTIVE HOURS	1227	18	6	177	15	142	10	29	108	60	8	7	61	539	15	15	2	-	15
- HOURS PER UNIT	.828	.783	.375	.253	.182	.223	.454	1.07	1.58	.280	.400	.219	3.59	3.09	.750	.500	.333	-	.577
TRAVEL TIME - ENTRY & DEPARTURE ACTIV.	1101	10	-	264	10	42	3	35	216	128	30	-	123	32	8	3	110	12	75
LOST TIME - ENTRY & DEPARTURE ACTIV.	1621	71	3	-	-	106	-	616	-	-	-	711	-	-	13	-	84	3	14
II DETENTION, DEPORTATION AND PAROLE ACTIVITY																			
WARRANT HEARINGS																			
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	22	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	22	-	-	-	-	-
RECEIVED	17													17					
TOTAL	39													39					
COMPLETED	13													13					
SUBVERSIVE	-																		
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC	1													1					
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS	10													10					
WITHOUT PROPER DOCUMENTS	1													1					
REMAINED LONGER	1													1					
OTHER	-																		
PENDING END OF PERIOD	26													26					
WARRANT HEARINGS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	78													78					
- HOURS PER UNIT	6.00													6.00					
CASES COMPLETED WITH 2-MAN HEARINGS	-													-					
ON APPEAL - TOTAL	7													7					
FINAL ORDERS ENTERED OR RECEIVED	13													13					
TRAVEL TIME - WARRANT HEARINGS OPER.	22													22					
LOST TIME - WARRANT HEARINGS OPER.	18													18					
PAROLE AND SUPERVISION (Expulsion)																			
CONDITIONAL PAROLE																			
ALIENS ON PAROLE BEGINNING OF PERIOD	30	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	29	-	-	1	-	-
PLACED ON PAROLE DURING PERIOD	1													1					
TOTAL ON PAROLE DURING PERIOD	31													30			1		
REMOVED FROM PAROLE DURING PERIOD	6													5			1		
ALIENS ON PAROLE END OF PERIOD	25													25			-		
SUBVERSIVE	-																		
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC	6													6					
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS	-																		
WITHOUT PROPER DOCUMENTS	6													6					
REMAINED LONGER	9													9					
OTHER	4													4					
COND. PAROLE - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	19							2						17			-		
- HOURS PER UNIT	.566							-						.566			-		

Form G-21.5 (9-1-53)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: FEBRUARY 1954

ST. ALBANS District No. 1

II DETENTION, DEPORTATION AND PAROLE ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	TOTAL	Bangor	Calais	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Reuses Point	St. Albans	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vanceboro	Halifax	Montreal
PAROLE AND SUPERVISION (Cont'd)																			
SUPERVISION																			
ALIENS UNDER SUPER'N BEGIN. OF PERIOD	10	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10	-	-	-	-	-
PLACED UNDER SUPER'N DURING PERIOD	3													3					
TOTAL UNDER SUPER'N DURING PERIOD	13													13					
REMOVED FROM SUPER'N DURING PERIOD	-																		
ALIENS UNDER SUPER'N END OF PERIOD	13													13					
SUBVERSIVE	-																		
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC	5													5					
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS	-																		
WITHOUT PROPER DOCUMENTS	2													2					
REMAINED LONGER	3													3					
OTHER	3													3					
SUPERVISION - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	3							-						3					
- HOURS PER UNIT	.230							-						.230					
TRAVEL TIME - PAROLE & SUPER'N OPER.	1							1						-					
LOST TIME - PAROLE & SUPER'N OPER.	-							-						-					
SERVICE DETENTION FACILITIES																			
NUMBER DETAINED BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
EXCLUSION	-																		
EXPULSION	-																		
DETAINEES ADMITTED	56								21				30	2			3		
NUMBER DETAINED DURING PERIOD	56								21				30	2			3		
EXCLUSION	36								13				20	-			3		
DETAINEES REMOVED DURING PERIOD	56								21				30	2			3		
NUMBER DETAINED END OF PERIOD	-								-				-	-			-		
MAN-DAYS DETENTION DURING PERIOD	85								26				50	6			3		
EXCLUSION	52								18				31	-			3		
EXPULSION	33								8				19	6			-		
AVERAGE DAYS DET. PER DETAINEE	1.52								1.23				1.66	3.00			1.00		
SERVICE DET. FAC. - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	283								160				81	2			40		
- HOURS PER UNIT	3.33								7.61				1.62	.333			13.3		
PRODUCTIVE HOURS - INS PERSONNEL	252								160				66	2			24		
NON-SERVICE DETENTION FACILITIES																			
NUMBER DETAINED BEGINNING OF PERIOD	4	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-
DETAINEES ADMITTED	12	3						2	4	2				1					
NUMBER DETAINED DURING PERIOD	16	4						3	4	2				3					
DETAINEES REMOVED DURING PERIOD	13	4						2	3	2				2					
NUMBER DETAINED END OF PERIOD	3	-						1	1	-				1					
MAN-DAYS DETENTION DURING PERIOD	126	33						23	42	3				25					
AVERAGE DAYS DET. PER DETAINEE	7.88	8.25						7.67	10.5	1.50				8.33					
NON-SERV. DET. FAC.-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	11	9						2	-	-				-					
-HOURS PER UNIT	.687	2.25						.666	-	-				-					

Form G-21.6 (9-1-53)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: FEBRUARY 1954

ST. ALBANS District No. 1

II DETENTION, DEPORTATION AND PAROLE ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	TOTAL	Bangor	Calais	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Rouses Point	St. Albans	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vanceboro	Halifax	Montreal
DEPORTATION																			
ALIENS PROCESSED FOR DEPORTATION	23	8	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	2	12	-	-	-	-	-
ALIENS PROCESSED FOR VOLUNTARY DEPAR	23	-				11	4	5					1	-	1		1		
ALIENS PROCESSED FOR REMOVAL	-	-				-	-	-					-	-	-		-		
TOTAL	46	8				11	4	6					3	12	1		1		
ALIENS DEPORTED	14	-	4			-	-	1	-				5	-	-		4		
VOLUNTARY DEPARTURES	40		2			11	4	5	1	2	4		5	-	1	5	1		
UNDER W/A	1		-			-	-	-	-	-	-		-	-	1	-	-		
WITHOUT W/A	39		2			11	4	5	1	2	4		5	-	-	5	1		
REMOVALS	-		-			-	-	-		-	-		-	-	-	-	-		
DEPORTATION - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	375	11	1			2	1	2	1	-	-	-	38	310	1	-	8	-	-
- HOURS PER UNIT	8.13	1.37	-			.181	.250	.333	-	-	-	-	12.6	25.8	1.00	-	8.00	-	-
TRAVEL TIME - DEPORTATION OPERATION	48	-	-			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8	32	-	-	8	-	-
LOST TIME - DEPORTATION OPERATION	66	-	-			-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	15	-	-	51	-	-
III CITIZENSHIP ACTIVITY																			
NATURALIZATION																			
N-400) PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	466	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	465	-	-	-	-	-
FOR) RECEIVED	191		[redacted]	20		1								170					
PROC-) COMPLETED	75		[redacted]	18		1								56					
ESSING) REJ., TRANSF., OR CLOSED	8			-		1								7					
" PROCESSED	67		[redacted]	18		-								49					
" PENDING END OF PERIOD	582		[redacted]	2		1								579					
N-400) PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	449	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	449	-	-	-	-	-
FOR) RECEIVED	49													49					
FILING) COMPLETED	188													188					
PET.) TRANSFERRED OR CLOSED	19													19					
" PETITIONS FILED	169													169					
" PENDING END OF PERIOD	310													310					
" READY FOR [redacted]	310													310					
PETI-) PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	349	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	349	-	-	-	-	-
TIONS) COMPLETED	119													119					
" GRANTED	115													115					
" DENIED	1													1					
" TRANSFERRED	3													3					
" PENDING END OF PERIOD	399													399					
" READY FOR FINAL HEARING	399													399					
N-300) PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
" RECEIVED	3													3					
" COMPLETED	3													3					
" PENDING END OF PERIOD	-													-					
DECLARATIONS FILED	1													1					
NATURALIZATION - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	435			13		1								421					
- HOURS PER UNIT	1.13			.722		1.00								1.15					

Form G-21.7 (9-1-53)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: FEBRUARY 1954

ST. ALBANS District No. 1

III CITIZENSHIP ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	TOTAL	Bangor	Calais	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Rouses Point	St. Albans	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vanceboro	Halifax	Montreal
CITIZENSHIP APPLICATIONS																			
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	90	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	90	-	-	-	-	-
RECEIVED	17	2		2										13					
TOTAL	107	2		2										103					
COMPLETED - TOTAL	8	-		1										7					
REJECTED, TRANSFERRED, OR CLOSED	6	-		-										6					
PROCESSED FOR OTHER OFFICES	5	2		-										3					
PENDING END OF PERIOD - TOTAL	88	2		1										87					
READY FOR HEARING	48	-		-										48					
CITIZENSHIP - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	119	1		2										116					
- HOURS PER UNIT	6.26	.500		2.00										7.25					
NATIONALITY APPLICATIONS																			
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	19	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	19	-	-	-	-	-
RECEIVED	4													4					
TOTAL	23													23					
COMPLETED - TOTAL	4													4					
REJECTED, TRANSFERRED, OR CLOSED	-													-					
PROCESSED FOR OTHER OFFICES	-													-					
PENDING END OF PERIOD - TOTAL	19													19					
READY FOR adjudication OR DELIVERY	6													6					
NATIONALITY - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	57													57					
- HOURS PER UNIT	14.3													14.3					
TRAVEL TIME - CITIZENSHIP ACTIVITY	178													178					
LOST TIME - CITIZENSHIP ACTIVITY	-													-					
CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION 1/																			
CITIZENSHIP ASSISTANCE FURNISHED																			
ALIENS REFERRED TO PUBLIC SCHOOLS																			
ALIENS INFORMED OF HOME STUDY																			
NAME SLIPS TO PUBLIC SCHOOLS COR. CTRS.																			
ALIENS ADMITTED TO CITIZENSHIP																			
ATTENDED PUBLIC SCHOOL CLASSES																			
ENROLLED IN HOME STUDY COURSES																			
NUMBER SUBMITTING PUBLIC SCHOOL CERT.																			
111a VERIFICATION OF ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE ACTIVITY																			
VERIFICATION REQUESTS																			
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	944	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	944	-	-	-	-	-
RECEIVED DURING PERIOD	1563	11	15	13	10	8	3	8	65	9	6	3	35	1128	37	30	31	12	139
TOTAL	2507	11	15	13	10	8	3	8	65	9	6	3	35	2072	37	30	31	12	139
COMPLETED	1495	11	15	13	10	8	3	8	65	9	6	3	35	1060	37	30	31	12	139
NATURALIZATION	173	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	171	-	-	2	-	-
OTHER	1322	11	15	13	10	8	3	8	65	9	6	3	35	889	37	30	29	12	139
PENDING END OF PERIOD	1012	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1012	-	-	-	-	-
VERIFICATION - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	613	7	3	41	2	2	-	4	21	4	3	1	21	431	17	15	11	2	16
- HOURS PER UNIT	.410	.636	.200	3.51	.200	.250	-	.500	3	.444	.500	.333	.600	.406	.459	.500	.355	.167	.201

1/ Source: Form N-38

Form G-21.10 (9-1-53)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: FEBRUARY 1954

ST. ALBANS District No. 1

INVESTIGATIONS ACTIVITY	TOTAL	Bangor	Calais	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Rouses Point	St. Albans	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vanceboro	Halifax	Montreal
INVESTIGATIONS																			
PENDING, BEGINNING OF PERIOD	499	15	-	2	34	-	5	10	3	19	4	1	39	260	16	2	-	-	98
RECEIVED DURING PERIOD	1044	59	27	69	61	11	16	70	43	26	25	4	78	435	24	20	5	3	68
TOTAL	1543	74	27	71	95	11	21	80	46	36	29	5	117	695	40	22	5	3	166
COMPLETED	1019	66	27	69	60	11	17	72	40	28	22	3	74	346	20	21	5	3	135
NATURALIZATION AND CITIZENSHIP	36	1					2	1		1				27	1	1			2
CANCELLATION - SUBVERSIVE	-																		
CANCELLATION - OTHER	2	1																	1
NATURALIZATION	15	-					1							12	1	1			
OTHER	19						1	1		1				15					1
DEPORTATION	232	10	15		5		1	7		2			22	31	3	11	6	6	123
SUBVERSIVE	5													5					
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC	20		1										15	1					3
ADDRESS REPORT CARD (I-53)	45		14		2									16	2	11			
SUSPENSION	1													1					
NON-IMMIGRANTS	111				1			1					1					1	107
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS	20	2					1	6					6	3			1		1
DISPLACED PERSONS	1													1					
OTHER	29	8			2					2				4	1				12
SMUGGLING	-																		
PRIVATE BILLS	-																		
PAROLE	2													1					1
ALIEN REGISTRATION	5				1									4					
ALIEN ADDRESS REPORT (SEC. 35)	533	54	11	64	54	7	14	62	40	22	22	3	49	104	14	9	2	2	
MISCELLANEOUS	211	1	1	5		4	-	2		3	-	-	3	179	2		2		9
PENDING END OF PERIOD	524	8	-	2	35	-	4	8	6	8	7	2	43	349	20	1	-	-	31
NATURALIZATION AND CITIZENSHIP	47						2							43					2
CANCELLATION - SUBVERSIVE	-																		
CANCELLATION - OTHER	-																		
NATURALIZATION	33						1							32					
OTHER	14						1							11					2
DEPORTATION	138	5			16		1	2		1			38	36	13				26
SUBVERSIVE	1													1					
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC	36												35	1					
ADDRESS REPORT CARD (I-53)	49	3			16		1						3	23	3				
SUSPENSION	1													-	1				
NON-IMMIGRANTS	38	1						2						4	8				23
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS	5	1													1				3
DISPLACED PERSONS	1													1					
OTHER	7									1				6					
SMUGGLING	-																		
PRIVATE BILLS	-																		
PAROLE	-																		
ALIEN REGISTRATION	29	1			19									9					
ALIEN ADDRESS REPORT (SEC. 35)	280	2		2			1	5	6	7	7	2	5	235	7		1		
MISCELLANEOUS	30	-						1		-				26					3

Form G-21.11 (9-1-53)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: FEBRUARY 1954

ST. ALBANS District No. 1

V INVESTIGATIONS ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	TOTAL	Bangor	Calais	Highgate Springs	Houlton	Jackman	Madawaska	Malone	Newport	Norton	Ogdensburg	Richford	Rouses Point	St. Albans	Thousand Islands Bridge	Van Buren	Vanceboro	Halifax	Montreal
INVESTIGATIONS RESULTING IN W/A OR V/D	30	1	1	-	-	-	-	7	4	2	-	-	14	1	-	-	-		
ALIENS APPRH'D. (BY OTHER THAN B.P.)	6	1											5						
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS	1	1																	
MEXICANS APPRH'D. (BY OTHER THAN B.P.)	-																		
ILLEGALLY IN AGRICULTURE	-																		
ILLEGALLY IN TRADE OR INDUSTRY	-																		
OTHER	-																		
W/A THRU ADDRESS REPORT CARD (I-83)	-																		
INVESTIGATIONS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	1477	71	21	54	45	18	8	106	35	46	12	1	111	727	51	21	4	10	15
- HOURS PER UNIT	1.45	1.07	.778	.782	.750	1.64	.470	1.47	.760	1.64	.545	.333	1.50	2.10	.255	1.00	.800	.33	
TRAVEL TIME - INVESTIGATIONS ACTIVITY	217	1	1	-	6	4	-	7	-	-	-	-	17	99	10	-	-	-	
WARRANT OF ARREST PROCESSING																			
COMPLETED	26		1	-	-	-	-	9	4	-	-	-	12	-		-	-	-	
W/A PROCESSING - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	41		1					25	11				4						
- HOURS PER UNIT	1.57		1.00					2.77	2.75				.333						
WARRANT OF ARREST SERVICE																			
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
RECEIVED	16	1	1					2	4				12						
TOTAL	16	1	1					2	4				12						
COMPLETED	11	1	1					2	4				7						
PENDING END OF PERIOD	5	-	-					-	-				5						
W/A SERVICE - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	4	2	1					1	1				-						
- HOURS PER UNIT	.363	2.00	1.00					.500	.250				-						

VI EMPLOYMENT SUMMARY																			
NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES END OF PERIOD	278	2	20	20	8	11	13	21	22	16	11	10	30	51	10	9	9	2	13
OPERATIONS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	36873	243	2349	2804	1820	1763	1703	3988	3317	2293	1053	1406	4708	4216	1463	1281	1242	187	1035
OPERATIONS - NON-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	3335	-	405	333	220	120	165	248	163	247	124	208	404	400	69	92	35	-	102
ADMINISTRATION - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	6864	56	603	371	7	96	349	101	181	212	80	-	265	2975	114	247	237	135	835
ADMINISTRATION - NON-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	530	3	-	-	-	-	50	4	8	-	100	-	-	259	34	20	-	-	52
TOTAL HOURS EMPLOYMENT	47602	302	3357	3508	2047	1979	2267	4341	3669	2752	1357	1614	5377	7850	1680	1640	1514	322	2026
PERCENTAGE TOTAL HOURS ON OPERATIONS	84.4	80.4	82.0	89.4	99.6	95.1	82.0	97.5	94.8	92.3	86.8	100.	95.0	58.8	91.1	84.0	84.3	58.1	56.2

ENCLOSURE 5

EXCLUSIVELY CARGO PLANE DISCHARGING.

IDLEWILD AIRPORT

4-1408 SP4 bja/ PAW



FOREIGN CARGO AREA
ADJACENT TO APRON

4-14-08 SDAT bja/PAW



ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4-14-03 BY SP1 bjk/PKM

ENTRANCE TO FOREIGN CARGO AREA
USED BY TRUCKS TRANSPORTING CARGO
FROM PASSENGER PLANES TO INSPECTION
AREA




ENCLOSURE 6
PASSENGER VESSE
4.14.03



4-14-53 SP4



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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
4-14-03 SP4 bja/PAW


NO SMOKING
FIRE ALARM

TAINED

4-14-03 SPA Ejalfalla

Form G-21.1 (9-1-53)

FNC #6

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: FEBRUARY 1954

I ENTRY AND DEPARTURE ACTIVITY	ALL DISTRICTS	St. Albans	Boston	New York	Philadelphia	Baltimore	Miami	Buffalo	Detroit	Chicago	Kansas City	Seattle	San Francisco	San Antonio	El Paso	Los Angeles	Honolulu
PRIMARY INSPECTION																	
BORDER CROSSERS ADMITTED - ALIENS	4,069,025	434521	818	4985	-	28	276	250951	290457	84777	-	128326	63	840352	1301714	731757	-
- CITIZENS	3749.915	229987	972	3711	-	11	693	288366	370468	42152	-	64381	11	655855	1241087	852221	-
CREWMEN ADMITTED - ALIENS	88920	839	4427	31277	4399	5825	22409	1163	13	26	-	6751	2205	3641	-	4241	1704
- CITIZENS	63757	315	2513	14788	1433	1558	17926	574	64	293	2	9670	4290	1735	12	3478	41106
OTHERS ADMITTED - ALIENS	61040	3868	580	19508	50	208	11917	1203	3255	344	-	2070	601	6793	2340	4720	2583
- CITIZENS	119059	478	1660	28571	111	1699	63565	27	55	1159	1	5627	2706	1010	82	1389	10919
ALIENS NOT ADMITTED - TOTAL	10939	317	39	438	71	177	958	1464	609	222	-	1548	58	1274	2542	1147	75
BORDER-CROSSERS	6084	229	3	3	-	-	1	1356	609	170	-	235	-	640	1903	935	-
CREWMEN	1270	-	36	129	71	160	296	-	-	-	-	306	57	105	-	98	12
OTHERS NOT ADMITTED	3585	88	-	306	-	17	661	108	-	52	-	1007	1	529	639	114	63
PREEXAMINATIONS COMPLETED - IN U.S.	369	-	8	149	6	10	3	14	22	15	3	117	6	-	-	6	-
OUTSIDE U.S.	5851	192	-	64	-	-	-	3767	-	921	-	907	-	-	-	-	-
FINES	51	-	13	-	-	6	21	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	3	5	2
TOTAL WORK UNITS	8.168.926	670517	11030	103491	6070	10522	117768	547529	664953	129909	6	219397	9940	1510661	2547780	1598964	20389
PRIMARY INSPECTION-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	149519	34952	2266	9989	804	1406	9314	9359	12229	12967	33	15143	3035	14231	11786	9608	2397
- HOURS PER UNIT	.018	.052	.205	.096	.132	.133	.079	.017	.018	.099	5.50	.069	.305	.009	.004	.006	.117
PRODUCTIVE HOURS - INS PERSONNEL	136455	33354	2266	9989	804	1406	9268	9357	12059	9790	33	13143	3035	14199	11426	8929	2397
VESSELS BOARDED - ARRIVAL	3249	323	183	396	144	186	1119	-	-	-	-	333	114	154	-	237	60
AIRPLANE FLIGHTS - ARRIVAL	7559	125	354	707	1	84	3286	534	84	152	1	636	8	363	164	296	764
VESSELS & AIRPLANES BOARDED ON DEPART.	894	-	25	92	2	32	496	-	-	-	-	150	23	25	-	42	7
SPECIAL INQUIRY OFFICER HEARINGS																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	446	14	2	29	-	3	1	7	35	13	1	25	19	110	108	77	2
RECEIVED	986	63	1	22	1	-	82	48	101	15	-	26	5	338	154	130	-
TOTAL	1432	77	3	51	1	3	83	55	136	28	1	51	24	448	262	207	2
COMPLETED	997	64	·	24	1	·	82	45	103	16	-	35	9	336	170	111	1
SUBVERSIVE	6	3	·	2	-	·	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC	107	6	·	1	·	·	3	6	5	6	-	1	-	32	28	19	
WITHOUT PROPER DOCUMENTS	488	48	·	11	1		56	35	47	2	-	1	3	184	59	41	-
OTHER	396	7	·	10	-	·	23	3	51	8	-	33	6	120	83	51	1
PENDING END OF PERIOD	435	13	3	27	-	3	1	10	33	12	1	16	15	112	92	96	1
SIO HEARINGS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	6214	536	37	684	12	·	363	175	590	92	-	351	23	1439	877	1006	29
- HOURS PER UNIT	6.23	8.37	·	28.5	12.0		4.43	3.89	5.73	5.75	-	10.0	2.55	4.28	5.16	9.06	29.0
PRODUCTIVE HOURS - INS PERSONNEL	6301	536	37	684	12	·	366	175	590	92	-	351	23	1439	961	1006	29
AUTHORIZATIONS																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	36745	81	1975	8550	725	579	512	1434	2288	1731	799	316	3426	2883	820	9685	941
RECEIVED	62903	1550	2463	10225	2457	1472	2368	1658	3362	3520	1228	1384	2194	5486	5033	17318	1185
TOTAL	99648	1631	4438	18775	3182	2051	2880	3092	5650	5251	2027	1700	5620	8369	5853	27003	2126
RETURNED OR TRANSFERRED	2545	15	42	791	822	61	194	80	62	116	65	15	52	51	3	176	-
PROCESSED WITHOUT COMPLETION	1517	11	14	446	4	28	46	100	15	26	123	36	69	583	6	10	-

Form G-21.2 (9-1-53)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: FEBRUARY 1954

I. ENTRY AND DEPARTURE ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	ALL DISTRICTS	St. Albans	Boston	New York	Philadelphia	Baltimore	Miami	Buffalo	Detroit	Chicago	Kansas City	Seattle	San Francisco	San Antonio	El Paso	Los Angeles	Honolulu
AUTHORIZATIONS. - (Cont'd) Received	62903	1550	2463	10225	2457	1472	2368	1658	3362	3520	1228	1384	2194	5486	5033	17318	1185
BORDER CROSSING CARDS	13543	248	267	89	4	8	10	290	992	1504	1	517	82	3221	3839	2471	-
REENTRY PERMITS ISSUED & EXTENDED	6024	9	324	2038	260	207	592	200	356	346	172	177	397	79	24	456	357
VISA PETITIONS	6890	27	565	1671	1489	265	314	445	407	516	235	109	278	77	26	191	275
Q - SPECIAL SKILLS	324	1	5	26	111	10	10	89	17	26	16	3	2	3	1	3	1
Q - PARENTS OF CITIZENS	406	-	39	97	84	25	22	15	28	23	7	10	22	6	-	24	4
Q - OTHER RELATIVES OF CITIZENS	2522	8	263	758	617	45	73	147	140	196	63	38	85	16	5	64	4
NQ- SPOUSES, CHILDREN OF CITIZENS	2887	17	221	552	508	173	190	136	183	129	121	44	133	47	20	83	260
Q - SPOUSES, CHILDREN OF RESID. ALIENS	728	1	36	235	163	11	16	58	37	78	16	14	36	5	-	16	6
NQ- MINISTERS	23	-	1	3	6	1	3	-	2	4	2	-	-	-	-	1	-
ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS.																	
NONIMMIGRANTS TO IMMIGRANTS	215		7	69	7	24	8	8	17	13	13	5	19	4	1	17	3
IMMIGRANTS TO NONIMMIGRANTS	943		6	596	3	285	4	-	-	4	1	-	44	-	-	-	-
PREEXAMINATION AUTHORIZATIONS	128		1	90	-	1	-	8	12	2	1	2	6	-	-	5	-
CREATION OF RECORD OF ADMISSION	1225	7	63	81	11	8	97	38	32	18	25	18	63	491	85	186	2
EXTENSIONS OF TEMPORARY STAY	15186	25	548	3043	246	399	664	172	532	594	317	113	389	188	89	7849	18
ALIEN LABORER CARDS	4458	955	-	-	-	47	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	10	3099	345
DUPLICATE ALIEN REGISTRATION CARDS	10481	170	527	1564	313	179	405	373	684	306	246	336	671	945	846	2787	129
PERMISSION TO REAPPLY	767	13	3	76	5	6	28	11	41	5	6	16	13	402	87	55	-
CHANGE OF NONIMMIGRANT STATUS	380	2	25	136	7	20	33	8	94	23	11	1	28	8	1	43	-
PETITIONS TO IMPORT: Refugee Appl.	707	-	31	286	5	20	16	18	23	84	66	16	111	9	1	21	-
TEMP. WORKERS OF EXCEPT. ABILITY	307	88	10	17	38	15	42	5	12	13	12	13	4	25	2	8	
LABORERS AND OTHER TEMP. WORKERS	103	-	5	20	-	1	6	8	1	2	3	2	3	-	3	6	43
INDUSTRIAL TRAINEES	110	-	4	38	5	4	1	8	15	15	4	1	5	1	2	7	-
SCHOOL APPROVALS	80	-	7	8	16	3	5	8	2	4	5	8	4	2	-	5	3
SEC. 4 D.P. APPLICATIONS	44	-	-	16	15	-	1	-	-	2	8	-	-	2	-	-	-
APPL'S. FOR PERMISSION TO RETURN	10	-	-	2	-	-	5	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	1	-	-
APPL'S. FOR WAIVER OF INADMISSIBILITY	27	5	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	2	-	2	9	7	-
APPL'S. FOR STUDENT EMPLOYMENT	802	1	58	172	19	24	56	27	154	44	87	28	61	21	2	44	11
BREACH OR CANCELLATION OF BONDS	473	-	12	213	14	2	34	30	46	25	12	20	14	9	5	31	6
DENIED																	
BORDER CROSSING CARDS																	
REENTRY PERMITS ISSUED & EXTENDED																	
VISA PETITIONS:																	
Q - SPECIAL SKILLS																	
Q - PARENTS OF CITIZENS																	
Q - OTHER RELATIVES OF CITIZENS																	
NQ- SPOUSES, CHILDREN OF CITIZENS																	
Q - SPOUSES, CHILDREN OF RESID. ALIENS																	
NQ- MINISTERS																	
ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS.																	
NONIMMIGRANTS TO IMMIGRANTS																	
IMMIGRANTS TO NONIMMIGRANTS																	
PREEXAMINATION AUTHORIZATIONS																	
CREATION OF RECORD OF ADMISSION																	

Form G-21.2 (9-1-53) UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE

REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: FEBRUARY 1954

I. ENTRY AND DEPARTURE ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	ALL DISTRICTS	St. Albans	Boston	New York	Philadelphia	Baltimore	Miami	Buffalo	Detroit	Chicago	Kansas City	Seattle	San Francisco	San Antonio	El Paso	Los Angeles	Honolulu
AUTHORIZATIONS. - (Cont'd)	57382	1481	2338	8945	1678	1364	2116	1604	3507	3377	920	1289	1996	4846	4880	15506	1535
COMPLETED																	
BORDER CROSSING CARDS	13470	248	267	89	4	8	10	290	992	1504	1	519	82	3221	3772	2463	-
REENTRY PERMITS ISSUED & EXTENDED	5759	9	317	2028	239	195	575	165	327	327	120	144	204	69	22	451	516
VISA PETITIONS	6593	24	600	2162	921	210	231	547	265	437	189	106	297	43	24	187	250
Q - SPECIAL SKILLS	247	1	12	25	82	12	4	55	8	20	20	1	3	1	1	1	1
Q - PARENTS OF CITIZENS	401	-	35	158	51	13	15	28	23	19	4	11	27	4	-	13	
Q - OTHER RELATIVES OF CITIZENS	2360	7	270	885	359	39	44	267	124	144	27	35	83	9	5	62	
NQ- SPOUSES, CHILDREN OF CITIZENS	2876	14	231	837	331	124	156	113	182	181	122	47	151	25	17	87	248
Q - SPOUSES, CHILDREN OF RESID. ALIENS	685	2	49	250	94	10	11	84	27	71	14	12	33	4	1	22	1
NQ- MINISTERS	24	-	3	7	4	2	1	-	1	2	2	-	-	-	-	2	-
ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS.																	
NONIMMIGRANTS TO IMMIGRANTS	345	-	14	89	8	26	8	8	9	19	11	2	27	5	-	119	-
IMMIGRANTS TO NONIMMIGRANTS	489	-	4	180	3	285	-	-	-	4	-	-	13	-	-	-	-
PREEXAMINATION AUTHORIZATIONS	53	-	1	12	-	1	-	9	8	6	-	2	6	-	-	8	
CREATION OF RECORD OF ADMISSION	394	6	44	28	12	19	85	9	27	2	8	9	10	37	25	68	5
EXTENSIONS OF TEMPORARY STAY	14427	55	513	2267	211	359	665	154	592	592	311	110	431	187	86	7861	33
ALIEN LABORER CARDS	4424	933	-	-	-	-	48	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	9	3089	345
DUPLICATE ALIEN REGISTRATION CARDS	8244	162	458	1154	181	179	314	313	910	335	141	310	784	1012	814	902	275
PERMISSION TO REAPPLY	645	19	3	159	7	6	22	11	20	4	5	16	3	219	100	40	
CHANGE OF NONIMMIGRANT STATUS	393	3	24	161	6	21	24	7	28	21	11	1	35	4	1	44	2
PETITIONS TO IMPORT: Refugee Appl.	166	-	1	45	1	5	3	-	1	5	-	1	1	-	-	97	
TEMP. WORKERS OF EXCEPT. ABILITY	231	-	13	45	34	16	33	5	13	14	13	12	7	15	2	8	1
LABORERS AND OTHER TEMP. WORKERS	145	16	2	38	-	3	7	8	5	2	3	-	3	-	3	6	49
INDUSTRIAL TRAINEES	107	1	4	36	4	4	1	8	19	14	2	-	4	1	2	7	
SCHOOL APPROVALS	79	1	6	15	2	4	5	11	5	3	6	8	3	2	-	8	
SEC. 4 D.P. APPLICATIONS	147	-	3	69	7	-	-	-	2	19	-	-	2	1	-	44	
APPL'S. FOR PERMISSION TO RETURN	8	-	-	3	-	-	3	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	-	
APPL'S. FOR WAIVER OF INADMISSIBILITY	17	3	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	11	1	
APPL'S. FOR STUDENT EMPLOYMENT	771	1	52	165	14	20	49	27	140	44	86	28	60	21	2	57	5
BREACH OR CANCELLATION OF BONDS	475	-	12	200	24	3	32	31	34	25	12	20	18	9	5	46	4
DENIED	2230	5	6	782	25	14	127	31	56	21	34	14	108	232	153	611	11
BORDER CROSSING CARDS	685	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	74	127	483	-
REENTRY PERMITS ISSUED & EXTENDED	95	-	-	86	1	-	7	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-
VISA PETITIONS	142	-	3	36	8	7	10	25	16	5	8	3	15	3	-	3	-
Q - SPECIAL SKILLS	24	-	-	4	7	-	-	2	1	-	8	-	1	-	-	1	-
Q - PARENTS OF CITIZENS	14	-	-	2	1	3	2	3	1	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	-
Q - OTHER RELATIVES OF CITIZENS	34	-	-	8	-	-	2	12	6	-	-	1	5	-	-	-	-
NQ- SPOUSES, CHILDREN OF CITIZENS	49	-	2	9	-	2	4	8	8	2		2	8	2	-	2	-
Q - SPOUSES, CHILDREN OF RESID. ALIENS	21	-	1	13	-	2	2	-	-	2	-	-	1	-	-	-	-
NQ- MINISTERS	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		-	-	-	-	-	-
ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS.																	
NONIMMIGRANTS TO IMMIGRANTS	19	-	-	5	-	-	-	-	2	4	3	-	2	1	-	2	
IMMIGRANTS TO NONIMMIGRANTS	180	-	-	180	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
PREEXAMINATION AUTHORIZATIONS	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	
CREATION OF RECORD OF ADMISSION	66	-	-	5	-	-	50	-	2	-	3	-	1	4	-	-	1

Form G-21.3 (9-1-53)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: FEBRUARY 1954

I ENTRY AND DEPARTURE ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	ALL DISTRICTS	St. Albans	Boston	New York	Philadelphia	Baltimore	Miami	Buffalo	Detroit	Chicago	Kansas City	Seattle	San Francisco	San Antonio	El Paso	Los Angeles	Honolulu
AUTHORIZATIONS - (Cont'd)																	
DENIED (CONT'D)																	
EXTENSIONS OF TEMPORARY STAY	254	-	3	112	4	-	34	5	18	8	8	4	18	1	1	38	-
ALIEN LABORER CARDS	-	-		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
DUPLICATE ALIEN REGISTRATION CARDS	177	-		32	4	-	-	-	2	-	8	4	53	19	-	55	
PERMISSION TO REAPPLY	363	5		138	4	-	21	-	13	-	-	2	4	130	22	24	
CHANGE OF NONIMMIGRANT STATUS	25	-		15	-	-	1	1	-	-	3	-	4	-	-	1	
PETITIONS TO IMPORT: Refugee Appl.	61	-		45	-	5	-	-	-	1		-	7	-	-	3	
TEMP. WORKERS OF EXCEPT. ABILITY	7	-		2	3	-	2		-	-		-	-	-	-	-	
LABORERS AND OTHER TEMP. WORKERS	20	-		9	-	1			-	-		-	-	-	-	-	10
INDUSTRIAL TRAINEES	2	-		1	-	1			-	-		-	-	-	-	-	
SCHOOL APPROVALS	3	-		-	-				2	-			1	-	-	-	
SEC. 4 D.P. APPLICATIONS	41	-		35	-				1	3	1		1	-	-	-	
APPL'S FOR PERMISSION TO RETURN	-	-		-	-				-	-			-	-	-	-	
APPL'S. FOR WAIVER OF INADMISSIBILITY	2	-		-	-				-	-			-	-	2	-	
APPL'S. FOR STUDENT EMPLOYMENT	9	-		3	1		2		-	-			-	-	1	2	
BREACH OR CANCELLATION OF BONDS	78	-		78	-				-	-			-	-	-	-	
PENDING END OF PERIOD	38204	124	2044	8593	678	598	524	1308	2066	1732	919	360	3503	2889	964	11311	591
BORDER CROSSING CARDS	405	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	11	-	-	323	71	-
REENTRY PERMITS ISSUED & EXTENDED	1203		58	283	37	46	8	59	39	50	40	15	240	19	2	84	223
VISA PETITIONS	4418	14	453	1057	27	259	20	537	555	118	72	39	547	19	33	477	191
Q - SPECIAL SKILLS	240	1	21	103	-	2		39	45	11	6	2	-	1	1	8	-
Q - PARENTS OF CITIZENS	319	-	15	51	2	27	4	43	63	3	4	2	53	1	2	25	24
Q - OTHER RELATIVES OF CITIZENS	1757	7	186	537	13	57	4	250	246	46	24	9	161	2	10	187	18
NQ- SPOUSES, CHILDREN OF CITIZENS	1459	6	211	153	12	153	10	19	144	35	36	20	289	14	16	217	124
Q - SPOUSES, CHILDREN OF RESID. ALIENS	607	-	20	197	-	18	1	186	56	20	2	6	44	1	1	30	25
NQ-MINISTERS	36	-	-	16	-	2	1	-	1	3	-	-	-	-	3	10	-
ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS																	
NONIMMIGRANTS TO IMMIGRANTS	1040	2	27	572	31	52	37	36	63	69	38	9	66	2	6	23	7
IMMIGRANTS TO NONIMMIGRANTS	476	-	11	448	-	-	6	-	-	-	-	-	11	-	-	-	-
PREEXAMINATION AUTHORIZATIONS	276	-	1	103	-	20	4	25	27	15	2	16	9	4	-	50	-
CREATION OF RECORD OF ADMISSION	5634	19	308	422	73	40	31	187	136	305	215	64	317	2212	434	861	10
EXTENSIONS OF TEMPORARY STAY	1292	8	93	524	-	10	20	30	201	-	25	1	324	3	-	48	5
ALIEN LABORER CARDS	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
DUPLICATE ALIEN REGISTRATION CARDS	17663	2	888	1983	425	-	275	334	803	886	317	157	1395	497	27	9558	116
PERMISSION TO REAPPLY	630	4	8	203	7	1	37	1	53	1	9	1	18	107	114	65	1
CHANGE OF NONIMMIGRANT STATUS	430	-	8	322	2	3	13	2	34	5	10	-	20	5	-	5	1
PETITIONS TO IMPORT: Refugee Appl.	2780	2	119	1366	35	141	40	79	105	218	169	43	411	17	12	-	23
TEMP. WORKERS OF EXCEPT. ABILITY	37	-	3	21	-	-	3	-	-	1	3	2	-	-	-	-	4
LABORERS AND OTHER TEMP. WORKERS	97	71	4	11	-	1	-	-	2	1	2	1	1	-	-	1	2
INDUSTRIAL TRAINEES	13	-	-	6	-	-	1	-	4	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-
SCHOOL APPROVALS	104	-	22	38	10	3	1	4	3	-	3	-	3	1	4	9	3
SEC. 4 D.P. APPLICATIONS	913	1	27	687	25	17	5	10	7	62	13	1	49	3	-	6	-
APPL'S. FOR PERMISSION TO RETURN	23	-	-	18	-	-	2	-	1	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	-
APPL'S. FOR WAIVER OF INADMISSIBILITY	11	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	8	-	-
APPL'S. FOR STUDENT EMPLOYMENT	171	-	7	29	-	5	-	3	14	-	-	-	87	-	1	22	3
BREACH OR CANCELLATION OF BONDS	587	-	7	500	6	-	20	-	18	-	-	-	3	-	-	31	2

Form G-21.4 (9-1-53)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: FEBRUARY 1954

I ENTRY AND DEPARTURE ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	ALL DISTRICTS	St. Albans	Boston	New York	Philadelphia	Baltimore	Miami	Buffalo	Detroit	Chicago	Kansas City	Seattle	San Francisco	San Antonio	El Paso	Los Angeles	Honolulu
AUTHORIZATIONS - (Cont'd)																	
AUTHORIZATIONS- PRODUCTIVE HOURS	57274	1227	3551	13002	2391	1687	22[illegible]8	2055	4112	3760	1661	1804	4156	4438	2575	6196	1401
- HOURS PER UNIT	.998	.828	1.52	1.45	1.42	1.24	1.07	1.90	1.17	1.11	1.81	1.40	2.08	.915	.527	.399	.912
TRAVEL TIME- ENTRY & DEPARTURE ACTIV.	5925	1101	283	1	204	274	1077	255	629	297	-	798	61	386	49	360	150
LOST TIME - ENTRY & DEPARTURE ACTIV.	6486	1621	86	-	114	216	2313	148	35	1325	-	343	15	82	3	48	127
II DETENTION, DEPORTATION AND PAROLE ACTIVITY																	
WARRANT HEARINGS																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	5289	22	148	1503	359	90	56	98	242	679	102	121	892	423	195	305	54
RECEIVED	2882	17	48	426	29	24	109	47	106	222	33	89	147	624	431	475	55
TOTAL	8171	39	196	1929	388	114	165	145	348	901	135	210	1039	1047	626	780	109
COMPLETED	2650	13	33	410	33	26	125	38	68	206	42	78	178	606	398	386	10
SUBVERSIVE	29	-	1	8	1	-	2	-	-	3	-	4	1	1	-	8	-
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC	153	1	10	17	8	3	15	3	9	3	6	5	10	16	32	15	-
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS	1321	10	-	23	1	9	26	6	13	126	16	56	75	476	314	169	1
WITHOUT PROPER DOCUMENTS	405	1	4	6	4	1	14	7	21	15	12	1	49	77	37	155	1
REMAINED LONGER	268	1	8	58	9	10	61	9	1	33	6	8	34	14	-	16	-
OTHER	474	-	10	298	10	3	7	13	24	26	2	4	9	22	15	23	8
PENDING END OF PERIOD	5521	26	163	1519	355	88	40	107	280	695	93	132	861	441	228	394	99
WARRANT HEARINGS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	25460	78	1643	6141	1266	370	745	551	1272	2028	612	966	2986	1731	1171	3693	127
- HOURS PER UNIT	9.61	6.00	49.8	14.9	38.4	14.2	5.96	14.5	18.7	9.89	14.6	12.4	16.8	2.86	2.94	9.57	12.7
CASES COMPLETED WITH 2-MAN HEARINGS	38	-	-	5	3	1	4	-	1	5	-	-	-	1	10	8	-
ON APPEAL - TOTAL	766	7	6	251	14	37	10	9	198	10	19	6	7	74	27	89	2
FINAL ORDERS ENTERED OR RECEIVED	2551	13	42	455	18	21	100	39	85	173	39	66	143	605	397	353	2
TRAVEL TIME - WARRANT HEARINGS OPER.	629	22	53	35	-	22	49	49	117	9	17	13	-	82	48	107	-
LOST TIME - WARRANT HEARINGS OPER.	149	18	-	2	-	5	84	21	6	-	-	-	-	-	10	1	2
PAROLE AND SUPERVISION (Expulsion)																	
CONDITIONAL PAROLE																	
ALIENS ON PAROLE BEGINNING OF PERIOD	14320	30	596	5466	406	398	379	390	620	924	203	263	2150	805	746	826	118
PLACED ON PAROLE DURING PERIOD	842	1	23	264	21	27	64	17	56	42	14	17	63	67	104	48	17
TOTAL ON PAROLE DURING PERIOD	15162	31	619	5730	427	425	443	407	676	966	217	280	2213	872	850	874	132
REMOVED FROM PAROLE DURING PERIOD	1000	6	47	267	11	20	52	20	41	63	28	25	113	85	168	38	16
ALIENS ON PAROLE END OF PERIOD	14162	25	572	5463	416	405	391	387	635	903	189	255	2100	787	682	836	116
SUBVERSIVE	319	-	2	67	24	-	8	23	42	11	2	19	11	-	1	107	2
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC	924	6	82	216	36	21	34	87	102	54	20	27	44	38	68	70	19
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS	2116	-	98	120	10	15	19	23	43	222	19	21	204	567	405	348	2
WITHOUT PROPER DOCUMENTS	3181	6	68	1273	42	25	124	112	197	172	28	75	810	74	107	39	29
REMAINED LONGER	5710	9	163	3187	65	203	151	88	196	313	66	50	911	18	12	254	24
OTHER	1912	4	159	600	239	141	55	54	55	131	54	63	120	90	89	18	40
COND. PAROLE - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	3388	19	131	922	90	142	205	109	268	449	27	164	359	127	150	201	25
- HOURS PER UNIT	.223	.566	.211	.160	.210	.334	.462	.267	.396	.464	.124	.585	.162	.145	.176	.229	.[illegible]

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE · IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: FEBRUARY 1954

II DETENTION, DEPORTATION AND PAROLE ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	ALL DISTRICTS	St. Albans	Boston	New York	Philadelphia	Baltimore	Miami	Buffalo	Detroit	Chicago	Kansas City	Seattle	San Francisco	San Antonio	El Paso	Los Angeles	Honolulu
PAROLE AND SUPERVISION (Cont'd)																	
SUPERVISION																	
ALIENS UNDER SUPER'N BEGIN. OF PERIOD	3439	10	212	1741	166	68	79	101	283	146	33	51	228	28	49	233	2
PLACED UNDER SUPER'N DURING PERIOD	246	3	6	158	4	1	13	8	13	8	2	4	11	-	-	13	2
TOTAL UNDER SUPER'N DURING PERIOD	3676	13	218	1899	170	69	92	109	296	154	35	55	239	28	49	246	4
REMOVED FROM SUPER'N DURING PERIOD	124	-	1	43	4	2	4	14	13	4	2	4	25	-	-	8	-
ALIENS UNDER SUPER'N END OF PERIOD	3552	13	217	1856	166	67	88	95	283	150	33	51	214	28	49	238	4
SUBVERSIVE	212	-	7	40	12	6	2	9	44	17	2	9	13	2	2	45	2
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC	898	5	71	254	48	11	30	59	150	88	23	27	47	10	3	72	-
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS	215	-	13	56	7	15	6	3	11	5	3	2	6	7	8	73	-
WITHOUT PROPER DOCUMENTS	907	2	27	692	12	12	18	16	31	24	-	6	61	3	-	3	-
REMAINED LONGER	1041	3	13	790	24	23	18	5	35	7	3	4	75	-	-	39	2
OTHER	279	3	86	24	63	-	14	3	12	9	2	3	12	6	36	6	-
SUPERVISION - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	1918	3	121	694	88	46	72	69	250	79	12	234	70	14	11	150	4
- HOURS PER UNIT	.521	.230	.555	.365	.517	.666	.793	.633	.844	.512	.342	4.25	.292	.500	.224	.609	1.00
TRAVEL TIME - PAROLE & SUPER'N OPER.	24	1	-	-	-	-	6	2	10	2	-	-	-	3	-	-	-
LOST TIME - PAROLE & SUPER'N OPER.	3	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
SERVICE DETENTION FACILITIES																	
NUMBER DETAINED BEGINNING OF PERIOD	1381	-	19	304	-	-	[illegible]	-	-	-	-	7	108	364	-	575	44
EXCLUSION	82	-	1	46			[illegible]			-		4	27	-		1	3
EXPULSION	1299	-	18	258			[illegible]			-		3	81	364		574	1
DETAINEES ADMITTED	30434	56	21	466			[illegible]			3		81	264	13556		15964	23
NUMBER DETAINED DURING PERIOD	31815	56	40	770			[illegible]			3		88	372	13920		16539	27
EXCLUSION	258	36	1	123			[illegible]			-		19	49	1		17	12
DETAINEES REMOVED DURING PERIOD	30231	56	24	430			[illegible]			3		80	299	13600		15713	26
NUMBER DETAINED END OF PERIOD	1584	-	16	340			[illegible]			-		8	73	320		826	1
MAN-DAYS DETENTION DURING PERIOD	81445	85	546	10360			[illegible]			9		301	3041	30783		36213	10.7
EXCLUSION	1930	52	28	1258			[illegible]			-		142	336	2		69	43
EXPULSION	79515	33	518	9102			[illegible]			9		159	2705	30781		36144	64
AVERAGE DAYS DET. PER DETAINEE	2.56	1.52	13.6	13.4			[illegible]			3.00		3.42	8.17	2.21		2.19	39.6
SERVICE DET. FAC. - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	62188	283	1470	18134			[illegible]			18		749	12534	4373		23711	916
- HOURS PER UNIT	.763	3.33	2.69	1.75			[illegible]			2.00		2.49	4.12	.142		.654	8.55
PRODUCTIVE HOURS - INS PERSONNEL	46413	252	1470	18134			[illegible]			18		749	5940	4373		14561	916
NON-SERVICE DETENTION FACILITIES																	
NUMBER DETAINED BEGINNING OF PERIOD	892	4	1	13	9	3	46	10	48	210	19	45	64	216	125	71	8
DETAINEES ADMITTED	5688	12	18	25	14	11	139	15	98	458	125	89	1281	1501	1021	777	4
NUMBER DETAINED DURING PERIOD	6580	16	19	38	23	14	185	25	146	668	144	134	1445	1717	1146	848	12
DETAINEES REMOVED DURING PERIOD	5632	13	16	23	12	10	146	16	88	428	91	84	1302	1553	1097	750	3
NUMBER DETAINED END OF PERIOD	948	3	3	15	11	4	39	9	58	240	53	50	143	164	49	98	9
MAN-DAYS DETENTION DURING PERIOD	29886	126	101	407	281	152	1735	170	1516	6163	1099	1119	4168	6980	2614	3018	237
AVERAGE DAYS DET. PER DETAINEE	4.54	7.88	5.31	10.7	12.2	10.8	9.38	6.80	10.4	9.23	7.63	8.35	2.88	4.06	2.28	3.56	19.7
NON-SERV. DET. FAC.-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	2382	11	15	174	195	39	327	81	35	860	21	35	90	222	145	116	16
- HOURS PER UNIT	.362	.687	.789	4.58	12.2	2.78	1.77	3.24	.239	1.29	.145	.261	.062	.129	.126	.136	1.33

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: FEBRUARY 1954

II DETENTION, DEPORTATION AND PAROLE ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	ALL DISTRICTS	St. Albans	Boston	New York	Phila-delphia	Balti-more	Miami	Buffalo	Detroit	Chicago	Kansas City	Seattle	San Fran-cisco	San Antonio	El Paso	Los Angeles	Honolulu
DEPORTATION																	
ALIENS PROCESSED FOR DEPORTATION	4787	23	23	163	10	11	102	40	59	133	23	84	100	954	536	2524	2
ALIENS PROCESSED FOR VOLUNTARY DEPAR	51010	23	38	445	63	16	327	60	62	237	58	8	2692	600	1657	44713	11
ALIENS PROCESSED FOR REMOVAL	2	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
TOTAL	55799	46	62	608	73	27	429	100	121	370	81	92	2792	1554	2193	47237	14
ALIENS DEPORTED	1857	14	11	128	1	1	78	30	33	3	-	21	16	860	367	291	3
VOLUNTARY DEPARTURES	68189	40	9	810	47	9	255	42	44	9	-	32	10	18357	3156	45358	11
UNDER W/A	2831	1	6	393	14	6	125	14	11	-	-	3	10	428	88	1725	7
WITHOUT W/A	65358	39	3	417	33	3	130	28	33	9	-	29	-	17929	3068	43633	4
REMOVALS	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
DEPORTATION - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	25022	375	459	10960	285	229	1390	1049	1465	1128	738	762	2094	1421	1002	1587	78
- HOURS PER UNIT	.448	8.13	7.40	18.0	3.90	8.48	3.24	10.5	12.1	3.05	9.11	8.28	.750	.914	.456	.033	26.0
TRAVEL TIME - DEPORTATION OPERATION	3490	48	306	441	37	55	502	103	311	99	72	120	526	138	172	560	-
LOST TIME - DEPORTATION OPERATION	299	66	-	122	-	7	64	10	13	3	-	5	5	-	-	4	-
III CITIZENSHIP ACTIVITY																	
NATURALIZATION																	
N-400) PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	44720	466	5377	10432	2411	833	153	2055	2205	3694	1105	622	5679	805	227	8105	551
FOR) RECEIVED	17509	191	1277	4022	941	1104	877	717	1518	1493	730	726	1324	326	223	1296	744
PROC-) COMPLETED	15509	75	1516	4342	850	702	833	469	1179	1228	445	689	1221	177	225	889	669
ESSING) REJ., TRANSF., OR CLOSED	2951	8	128	755	264	140	273	66	313	203	115	155	179	21	17	252	62
" PROCESSED	12558	67	1388	3587	586	562	560	403	866	1025	330	534	1042	156	208	637	607
" PENDING END OF PERIOD	46720	582	5138	10112	2502	1235	197	2303	2544	3959	1390	659	5782	954	225	8512	626
N-400) PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	37960	449	3926	11798	1759	857	1509	1271	1637	2875	1353	1210	4186	1123	521	2247	1239
FOR) RECEIVED	12827	49	1422	3587	578	517	656	333	876	920	564	498	1129	237	220	634	607
FILING) COMPLETED	11354	188	1119	2548	648	449	529	166	970	1300	487	493	999	344	199	338	577
PET.) TRANSFERRED OR CLOSED	1308	19	95	249	52	63	116	28	130	86	40	48	175	46	34	48	79
" PETITIONS FILED	10046	169	1024	2299	596	386	413	138	840	1214	447	445	824	298	165	290	498
" PENDING END OF PERIOD	39433	310	4229	12837	1689	925	1636	1438	1543	2495	1430	1215	4316	1016	542	2543	1269
" READY FOR filing petitions	36309	310	4180	12837	1312	573	1201	1048	1395	2457	1330	922	4186	911	245	2133	1269
PETI-) PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	34659	349	3400	8817	2532	1359	1287	1370	2495	2492	1495	1678	2877	666	287	2652	903
TIONS) COMPLETED	9333	119	851	2519	581	306	338	558	809	489	371	449	631	207	93	471	541
" GRANTED	8991	115	844	2481	570	293	324	530	788	487	267	391	621	201	87	453	539
" DENIED	144	1	6	36	9	8	6	24	15	2	2	3	7	5	3	17	-
" TRANSFERRED	198	3	1	2	2	5	8	4	6	-	102	55	3	1	3	1	2
" PENDING END OF PERIOD	35372	399	3573	8597	2547	1439	1362	950	2526	3217	1571	1674	3070	757	359	2471	860
" READY FOR FINAL HEARING	15535	399	1487	4043	1408	691	797	273	900	1538	1170	777	1068	349	191	161	283
N-600) PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	735	-	81	446	70	14	20	73	67	72	36	27	80	100	9	40	-
" RECEIVED	1124	3	42	367	56	20	54	110	82	121	30	31	53	16	24	111	4
" COMPLETED	1101	3	55	383	52	27	65	49	75	112	36	35	57	21	24	105	2
" PENDING END OF PERIOD	758	-	68	30	74	7	9	134	74	81	30	23	76	95	9	46	2
DECLARATIONS FILED	961	1	48	313	24	18	20	121	35	111	31	30	47	18	20	116	8
NATURALIZATION - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	46492	435	4634	11971	2714	1273	2444	1781	3299	3812	2374	2765	4105	1321	1011	1155	1398
- HOURS PER UNIT	1.21	1.13	1.29	1.18	1.26	.847	1.37	1.31	1.08	1.18	1.73	1.63	1.39	1.72	1.80	.601	.778

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REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: FEBRUARY 1954

III CITIZENSHIP ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	ALL DISTRICTS	St. Albans	Boston	New York	Philadelphia	Baltimore	Miami	Buffalo	Detroit	Chicago	Kansas City	Seattle	San Francisco	San Antonio	El Paso	Los Angeles	Honolulu
CITIZENSHIP APPLICATIONS																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	13022	90	1454	3427	653	174	175	1309	857	1787	300	495	804	485	141	714	157
RECEIVED	2702	17	217	549	177	76	104	232	273	200	97	136	147	140	42	252	43
TOTAL	15724	107	1671	3976	830	250	279	1541	1130	1987	397	631	951	625	183	966	200
COMPLETED - TOTAL	2252	8	98	837	132	43	66	102	277	91	56	121	157	63	30	153	18
REJECTED, TRANSFERRED, OR CLOSED	554	6	29	126	12	21	34	73	31	3	11	60	34	8	-	103	3
PROCESSED FOR OTHER OFFICES	297	5	14	27	8	2	15	87	20	22	5	5	14	49	1	23	-
PENDING END OF PERIOD - TOTAL	12621	88	1530	2986	678	184	164	1279	802	1871	325	445	746	505	152	687	179
READY FOR HEARING	4176	48	696	997	351	108	97	464	225	319	201	181	144	69	69	135	72
CITIZENSHIP - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	9823	119	1043	2458	754	212	382	897	793	799	169	537	692	119	166	521	162
- HOURS PER UNIT	3.16	6.26	7.40	2.48	4.96	3.21	3.32	3.42	2.42	6.89	2.35	2.89	3.38	.991	5.35	1.87	9.00
NATIONALITY APPLICATIONS																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	2293	19	244	462	193	8	46	240	150	315	56	53	98	18	12	353	26
RECEIVED	759	4	64	157	61	30	40	95	57	62	31	25	45	17	6	57	8
TOTAL	3052	23	308	619	254	38	86	335	207	377	87	78	143	35	18	410	34
COMPLETED - TOTAL	703	4	69	247	47	22	23	66	66	18	5	27	33	20	7	47	2
REJECTED, TRANSFERRED, OR CLOSED	91	-	1	5	1	-	6	57	2	4	5	1	7	-	-	2	-
PROCESSED FOR OTHER OFFICES	46	-	-	-	3	-	1	1	-	-	18	1	12	10	-	-	-
PENDING END OF PERIOD - TOTAL	2212	19	228	367	203	16	56	211	139	355	59	49	91	5	11	361	32
READY FOR adjudication OR DELIVERY	736	6	105	170	101	8	24	127	10	40	30	17	58	5	3	30	2
NATIONALITY - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	2568	57	355	661	51	66	121	195	274	201	94	220	145	42	31	49	6
- HOURS PER UNIT	3.06	14.3	5.07	2.62	1.00	3.00	4.03	1.57	4.03	9.14	3.36	7.59	2.79	1.40	4.43	1.00	3.00
TRAVEL TIME - CITIZENSHIP ACTIVITY	1448	178	230	175	89	27	121	96	140	80	103	127	53	18	11	-	-
LOST TIME - CITIZENSHIP ACTIVITY	134	-	17	-	12	22	28	12	21	-	4	1	14	3	-	-	-
CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION 1/																	
CITIZENSHIP ASSISTANCE FURNISHED																	
ALIENS REFERRED TO PUBLIC SCHOOLS	12949	-	140	6245	543	357	306	12	1178	1474	634	312	498	450	507	156	137
ALIENS INFORMED OF HOME STUDY	4993	27	55	32	198	173	657	308	1185	603	767	160	188	264	310	66	-
NAME SLIPS TO PUBLIC SCHOOLS COR. CTRS.	16176	133	885	2723	601	620	803	296	1823	1191	669	209	711	1384	534	3507	87
ALIENS ADMITTED TO CITIZENSHIP	8991	115	844	2481	570	293	324	530	788	487	267	391	621	201	87	453	539
ATTENDED PUBLIC SCHOOL CLASSES	2705	12	178	631	76	34	23	149	220	203	84	147	276	25	37	331	279
ENROLLED IN HOME STUDY COURSES	434	-	-	151	17	2	44	5	74	8	71	30	23	5	4	-	-
NUMBER SUBMITTING PUBLIC SCHOOL CERT.	702	-	48	-	11	31	-	11	118	42	-	-	191	-	13	186	51
111a VERIFICATION OF ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE ACTIVITY																	
VERIFICATION REQUESTS																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	11583	944	206	7231	-	24	2	45	-	56	2	251	213	16	246	2182	165
RECEIVED DURING PERIOD	28697	1563	682	9558	1978	354	1664	771	777	211	3	1998	1479	2828	2574	1412	845
TOTAL	40280	2507	888	16789	1978	378	1666	816	777	267	5	2249	1692	2844	2820	3594	1010
COMPLETED	27647	1495	590	9115	1978	337	1648	779	773	207	5	1827	1489	2832	2523	1166	883
NATURALIZATION	4966	173	189	1893	527	212	104	46	85	87	-	235	679	122	142	277	195
OTHER	22681	1322	401	7222	1451	125	1544	733	688	120	5	1592	810	2710	2381	889	688
PENDING END OF PERIOD	12633	1012	298	7674	-	41	18	37	4	60	-	422	203	12	297	2428	127
VERIFICATION - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	9495	613	207	4218	237	98	344	182	81	168	-	317	741	635	1007	237	410
- HOURS PER UNIT	.343	.410	.350	.462	.120	.290	.208	.233	.104	.811	-	.173	.497	.224	.399	.203	.464

1/ Source: Form N-38

• Form G-21.8 (9-1-53)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: FEBRUARY 1954

IV BORDER PATROL	ALL DISTRICTS	ST. ALBANS	MIAMI	BUFFALO	DETROIT	CHICAGO	SEATTLE	SAN FRAN-CISCO	SAN ANTONIO	EL PASO	LOS ANGELES					
PERSONS APPREHENDED BY BORDER PATROL - TOTAL	62857	59	461	47	118	377	63	2296	17771	3390	38275					
ALIENS APPREHENDED BY BORDER PATROL - TOTAL	62125	49	270	45	118	339	47	2292	17719	3354	37892					
(A) APPREHENSIONS OF MEXICAN ALIENS - TOTAL	61652	-	48	-	30	323	11	2289	17714	3345	37892					
(1) WORKING IN AGRICULTURE	19821	-	32	-	-	-	9	2063	5369	781	11567					
(2) WORKING IN TRADES, CRAFTS, AND INDUSTRY	2810	-	2	-	16	200	2	226	1510	201	653					
(3) OTHERS	39021	-	14	-	14	123	-	-	10835	2363	25672					
(B) APPREHENSIONS OF CANADIAN ALIENS - TOTAL	225	46	19	39	72	16	32	-	-	1	-					
(C) APPREHENSIONS OF ALIENS ENTERING, OR WHO ENTERED VIA THE MEXICAN BORDER (OTHER THAN MEXICAN OR CANADIAN)	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-					
(D) APPREHENSIONS OF ALIENS ENTERING, OR WHO ENTERED VIA THE CANADIAN BORDER (OTHER THAN CANADIAN OR MEXICAN)	24	2	1	3	11	-	4	-	1	2	-					
(E) APPREHENSIONS OF STOWAWAYS (OTHER THAN CANADIAN OR MEXICAN)	3	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-					
(F) APPREHENSIONS OF ALIEN CREWMEN (OTHER THAN CANADIAN OR MEXICAN)	170	-	162	1	1	-	-	2	3	1	-					
(G) APPREHENSIONS OF ALL ALIENS OTHER THAN ABOVE, ILLEGALLY ENTERING OR ILLEGALLY IN THE U.S.	50	1	37	2	4	-	-	1	-	5	-					
APPREHENSIONS OF SMUGGLERS OF ALIENS (Viol. of Sec. 274, 277, and 278) BY BORDER PATROL - TOTAL	128	-	1	-	-	-	-	4	26	13	84					
APPREHENSIONS OF OTHER VIOLATORS, Title 8, USC - TOTAL	502	-	188	-	-	38	1	-	15	3	257					
APPREHENSIONS OF VIOLATORS OF OTHER LAWS - TOTAL	102	10	2	2	-	-	15	-	11	20	42					
(A) STATE AND MUNICIPAL	61	1	-	2	-	-	-	-	6	13	39					
(B) ARMY AND NAVY	3	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-					
(C) NARCOTICS	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	-					
(D) CUSTOMS	34	9	-	-	-	-	15	-	-	7	3					
(E) F.B.I.	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-					
(F)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-					
PERSONS APPREHENDED																
PREVIOUSLY DEPORTED	4368	8	9	5	9	16	3	63	4164	53	38					
WITH CRIMINAL RECORD	127	14	13	8	20	1	2	36	4	11	18					

Form G-21.9 (9-1-53)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: FEBRUARY 1954

IV BORDER PATROL (CONT'D)	ALL DISTRICTS	ST. ALBANS	MIAMI	BUFFALO	DETROIT	CHICAGO	SEATTLE	SAN FRANCISCO	SAN ANTONIO	EL PASO	LOS ANGELES					
SMUGGLING INVESTIGATIONS BY BORDER PATROL																
(A) PENDING BEGINNING OF MONTH	83	13	23	3	6	-	3	-	29	3	3					
(B) RECEIVED DURING MONTH	180	1	12	3	1	-	6	13	31	29	84					
(C) TOTAL OF LINES (A) AND (B) ABOVE	263	14	35	6	7	-	9	13	60	32	87					
(D) COMPLETED DURING MONTH	186	1	16	1	2	-	7	13	31	30	85					
(E) PENDING END OF MONTH	77	13	19	5	5	-	2	-	29	2	2					
MILES PATROLLED - TOTAL	877128	65789	52019	11842	21776	19939	41977	16973	273429	177437	195947					
(A) MOTOR	813108	64144	47444	11028	21164	18937	40643	16620	246600	159642	186886					
(B) TRAIN	145	-	-	-	-	-	145	-	-	-	-					
(C) HORSE	271	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	271					
(D) BOAT	25	-	25	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-					
(E) PLANE	45273	-	2800	-	-	-	-	-	21495	14652	6326					
(F) AFOOT	18306	1645	1750	814	612	1002	1189	353	5334	3143	2464					
CONVEYANCES EXAMINED - TOTAL	198768	5146	1051	1383	944	392	1185	557	58747	4453	125760					
(A) FREIGHT TRAINS	3315	212	36	1148	23	34	245	32	212	606	767					
(B) PASSENGER TRAINS	1025	278	4	79	-	83	113	6	95	182	185					
(C) AUTOS	183111	3873	74	116	64	117	252	394	57010	2125	119086					
(D) BUSSES	7953	494	724	-	-	155	566	124	1339	1398	3153					
(E) BOATS	262	10	156	-	6	-	-	-	90	-	-					
(F) PLANES	10	5	-	-	-	3	-	-	1	-	1					
(G) OTHERS	3092	274	57	40	1	-	9	1	-	142	2568					
PERSONS QUESTIONED - TOTAL	625725	20360	11420	9214	2685	1772	2119	6752	213349	33698	324356					
(A) ON FREIGHT TRAINS	16604	17	49	5553	-	-	16	163	204	1734	8868					
(B) ON PASSENGER TRAINS	7037	878	4	522	-	25	27	832	1844	198	2707					
(C) IN AUTOMOBILES	386187	10513	252	259	156	290	656	742	154149	3577	215593					
(D) IN BUSSES	72581	3754	637	-	-	154	173	425	13043	4471	49924					
(E) ON BOATS	901	5	577	-	4	-	-	-	315	-	-					
(F) IN PLANES	36	14	-	-	-	16	-	-	2	-	4					
(G) PEDESTRIANS	99894	2837	3329	1274	873	1287	1166	3562	43732	21263	20571					
(H) OTHERS	42485	2342	6572	1606	1652	-	81	1028	60	2455	26689					
TOTAL MAN DAYS WORKED	18858.1	1179.1	1248.3	453.0	621.1	574.3	837.6	307.3	5784.1	3610.5	4242.2					
SEIZURES																
AUTOMOBILES AND TRUCKS	26	10	-	-	-	2	10	-	2	-	2					
OTHER CONVEYANCES	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-					
VALUE OF ALL SEIZURES	$ 49.686	11.670	-	-	-	1000.	29.904	-	2413.	2299.	2400.					

Form G-21.10 (9-1-53)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: FEBRUARY 1954

V INVESTIGATIONS ACTIVITY	ALL DISTRICTS	St. Albans	Boston	New York	Philadelphia	Baltimore	Miami	Buffalo	Detroit	Chicago	Kansas City	Seattle	San Francisco	San Antonio	El Paso	Los Angeles	Honolulu
INVESTIGATIONS																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	279158	499	6796	32949	3964	1622	6483	28178	6053	58990	4863	21837	8387	33835	9223	43098	12381
RECEIVED DURING PERIOD	58235	1044	5265	6217	3986	3606	2894	566	1675	4535	2794	1536	3356	6044	3812	10427	478
TOTAL	337393	1543	12061	39166	7950	5228	9377	28744	7728	63525	7657	23373	11743	39879	13035	53525	12859
COMPLETED	62455	1019	4372	6146	2618	3118	4741	2178	1215	4338	2349	4182	3831	7468	3728	10568	584
NATURALIZATION AND CITIZENSHIP	1779	36	62	220	56	99	186	46	93	44	30	99	128	92	164	230	194
CANCELLATION - SUBVERSIVE	282	-	26	96	18	27	12	24	17	12	13	6	3	2	6	20	-
CANCELLATION - OTHER	91	2	-	30	13	5	5	6	9	3	-	3	5	-	6	4	-
NATURALIZATION	735	15	18	79	16	41	66	6	28	20	7	36	32	45	87	45	194
OTHER	671	19	18	15	9	26	103	10	39	9	10	54	88	45	65	161	-
DEPORTATION	16641	232	566	2932	323	412	683	403	527	582	367	708	2415	1227	1382	3837	45
SUBVERSIVE	448	5	43	142	36	28	14	16	22	46	17	29	12	7	10	20	1
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC	662	20	29	63	21	15	33	26	37	15	4	46	141	46	46	119	1
ADDRESS REPORT CARD (I-53)	3993	45	203	1313	111	24	44	106	214	92	62	154	1048	53	479	29	16
SUSPENSION	151	1	16	8	11	10	6	10	11	6	5	6	31	14	2	14	-
NON-IMMIGRANTS	2848	111	49	1008	70	169	357	135	77	72	88	42	257	81	88	223	21
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS	6032	20	12	26	5	27	43	6	68	230	109	84	763	945	649	3044	1
DISPLACED PERSONS	67	1	4	7	8	4	1	13	-	-	1	-	22	3	-	3	-
OTHER	2440	29	210	365	61	135	185	91	98	121	81	347	141	78	108	385	5
SMUGGLING	100	-	-	41	5	2	7	-	4	3	1	-	18	3	-	16	-
PRIVATE BILLS	67	-	1	12	2	15	8	1	1	2	2	7	9	1	-	6	-
PAROLE	745	2	25	133	251	11	48	23	40	13	10	11	5	78	7	83	5
ALIEN REGISTRATION	973	5	212	67	34	27	68	31	88	78	36	62	24	35	17	99	90
ALIEN ADDRESS REPORT (SEC. 35)	35414	533	2832	2196	1714	1968	3421	1597	274	3413	1829	3112	231	5318	1504	5352	120
MISCELLANEOUS	6736	211	674	545	233	584	320	77	188	203	74	183	1001	714	654	945	130
PENDING END OF PERIOD	274938	524	7689	33020	5332	2110	4636	26566	6513	59187	5308	19191	7912	32411	9307	42957	12275
NATURALIZATION AND CITIZENSHIP	14304	47	1059	4614	1053	191	183	1300	551	1494	225	184	1035	112	159	1671	426
CANCELLATION - SUBVERSIVE	9614	-	786	3721	629	73	32	870	376	1091	89	82	672	8	23	1145	17
CANCELLATION - OTHER	429	-	8	196	59	13	17	41	19	20	10	7	13	4	5	16	1
NATURALIZATION	3141	33	194	587	295	77	44	170	96	362	70	59	169	52	84	445	404
OTHER	1120	14	71	110	70	28	90	219	60	21	56	36	181	48	47	65	4
DEPORTATION	67090	138	4342	21185	2085	842	689	3232	3060	3239	1293	1286	5470	15723	1244	2905	357
SUBVERSIVE	11346	1	764	5146	835	338	43	925	259	1409	219	106	581	48	98	513	61
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC	1483	36	66	306	52	60	58	94	97	102	62	62	192	47	61	176	12
ADDRESS REPORT CARD (I-53)	38212	49	2395	10563	967	60	71	1228	1638	968	634	826	3282	14505	480	317	229
SUSPENSION	933	1	32	371	24	10	11	20	47	27	28	7	55	213	20	64	3
NON-IMMIGRANTS	6455	38	548	3170	95	267	358	287	233	303	55	36	359	362	86	227	31
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS	3003	5	39	41	49	43	30	25	178	105	118	58	751	186	329	1036	10
DISPLACED PERSONS	522	1	37	77	27	20	8	174	40	97	8	9	11	-	3	10	-
OTHER	5136	7	461	1511	36	44	110	479	568	228	169	182	239	362	167	562	11
SMUGGLING	208	-	13	109	8	-	-	9	6	19	1	-	22	5	5	10	1
PRIVATE BILLS	231	-	6	81	8	22	2	11	14	21	14	6	8	7	2	29	-
PAROLE	1406	-	39	432	60	7	8	28	101	224	15	14	36	6	12	421	3
ALIEN REGISTRATION	2093	29	117	865	397	7	32	65	226	34	89	27	27	30	21	34	93
ALIEN ADDRESS REPORT (SEC. 35)	183445	280	1940	4707	1488	658	3551	21698	1442	53607	3474	17407	1095	16102	7359	37435	11202
MISCELLANEOUS	6161	30	173	1027	233	383	171	223	1113	549	197	267	219	426	505	452	193

Form G-21.11 (9-1-53)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: FEBRUARY 1954

V INVESTIGATIONS ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	ALL DISTRICTS	St. Albans	Boston	New York	Philadelphia	Baltimore	Miami	Buffalo	Detroit	Chicago	Kansas City	Seattle	San Francisco	San Antonio	El Paso	Los Angeles	Honolulu
INVESTIGATIONS RESULTING IN W/A OR V/D	6393	30	52	815	34	61	285	47	119	83	79	52	733	867	582	2526	28
ALIENS APPRH'D. (BY OTHER THAN B.P.)	4497	6	20	379	26	53	32	34	68	74	78	44	714	265	179	2521	4
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS	3744	1	1	25	4	5	13	15	9	65	65	28	667	254	139	2452	1
MEXICANS APPRH'D. (BY OTHER THAN B.P.)	3778	-	-	9	-	11	2	1	14	70	67	24	668	256	175	2481	-
ILLEGALLY IN AGRICULTURE	734	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	-	339	80	15	298	-
ILLEGALLY IN TRADE OR INDUSTRY	1011	-	-	5	-	-	1	-	10	49	20	6	257	59	12	592	-
OTHER	2033	-	-	4	-	11	-	1	4	21	46	18	72	117	148	1591	-
W/A THRU ADDRESS REPORT CARD (I-53)	40	-	2	3	4	3	-	-	2	3	-	1	16	-	6	-	-
INVESTIGATIONS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	131420	1477	7765	32015	6848	5670	5998	5687	8246	10034	3346	6224	12104	5948	5113	13077	1868
- HOURS PER UNIT	2.10	1.45	1.78	5.21	2.62	1.82	1.26	2.61	6.79	2.31	1.42	1.49	3.16	.796	1.37	1.24	2.20
TRAVEL TIME - INVESTIGATIONS ACTIVITY	18008	217	1068	3917	1254	1303	1243	2025	1179	580	375	572	871	546	655	2054	149
WARRANT OF ARREST PROCESSING																	
COMPLETED	4938	26	53	395	31	32	133	57	100	264	81	85	1715	733	563	647	23
W/A PROCESSING - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	4482	41	110	285	114	43	300	150	263	244	191	59	519	1047	285	794	37
- HOURS PER UNIT	.907	1.57	2.07	.721	3.68	1.34	2.26	2.63	2.63	.924	2.36	.694	.302	1.43	.506	1.23	1.61
WARRANT OF ARREST SERVICE																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	689	-	13	199	11	11	41	9	34	76	31	21	26	55	116	48	28
RECEIVED	4987	16	50	377	34	29	133	44	102	295	80	92	1800	734	551	627	23
TOTAL	5676	16	63	576	45	40	174	53	136	371	111	113	1826	789	667	675	51
COMPLETED	4953	11	51	376	31	32	169	39	110	309	82	94	1795	745	513	602	24
PENDING END OF PERIOD	723	5	12	200	14	8	5	14	26	62	29	19	31	44	154	73	27
W/A SERVICE - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	1249	4	113	169	26	24	101	60	136	83	60	31	166	101	77	85	13
- HOURS PER UNIT	.252	.363	2.21	.449	.838	.750	.726	1.54	1.24	.268	.731	.329	.092	.135	.150	.141	.541

VI EMPLOYMENT SUMMARY																	
NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES END OF PERIOD	4994	278	267	1320	167	123	267	232	331	292	91	261	339	289	184	469	84
OPERATIONS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	546731	36873	25963	117170	17585	13229	29812	26119	35604	35950	9917	30425	38770	38435	25993	55491	9395
OPERATIONS - NON-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	50135	3335	3023	10805	1456	1346	3566	2534	4738	3269	316	2513	3480	2550	2206	4096	902
ADMINISTRATION - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	176579	6864	10933	55596	6165	3941	10159	8186	12822	8633	3453	9827	8914	8286	3422	16147	3231
ADMINISTRATION - NON-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	17568	530	1128	6888	806	409	1284	544	774	811	257	698	963	634	352	1232	258
TOTAL HOURS EMPLOYMENT	791013	47602	41047	190459	26012	18925	44821	37383	53938	48663	13943	43463	52127	49905	31973	76966	13786
PERCENTAGE TOTAL HOURS ON OPERATIONS	75.4	84.4	70.6	67.1	73.2	77.0	74.4	76.6	74.7	80.5	73.3	75.7	81.0	82.1	88.1	77.4	74.6

Form G-21.1 (9-1-53)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: FEBRUARY 1954 SAN ANTONIO District No. 14

I ENTRY AND DEPARTURE ACTIVITY	TOTAL	Brownsville	Corpus Christi	Dallas	Del Rio	Eagle Pass	Galveston	Hidalgo	Houston	Laredo	McAllen	Port Arthur	Rio Grande	San Antonio			
PRIMARY INSPECTION																	
BORDER CROSSERS ADMITTED - ALIENS	840352	245876	-	-	30899	100131	-	133949	147	309341	-	-	19733	276			
- CITIZENS	655855	201013		10	46347	66755		95967	890	205946			34499	4428			
CREWMEN ADMITTED - ALIENS	3641	492	574	-			602		1664			309					
- CITIZENS	1735	251	62	28			312		613			469					
OTHERS ADMITTED - ALIENS	6793	465	28	-	260	3591	1	897	93	739		2	124	593			
- CITIZENS	1010	684	17	34		11	15	39	32	30		1	5	142			
ALIENS NOT ADMITTED - TOTAL	1274	72	17		36	508	10	180	114	233		4	82	18			
BORDER-CROSSERS	640	6	-			495		97	1				41				
CREWMEN	105	5	17			-	10		69			4					
OTHERS NOT ADMITTED	529	61			36	13		83	44	233			41	18			
PREEXAMINATIONS COMPLETED - IN U.S.	-																
OUTSIDE U.S.	-																
FINES	1								1								
TOTAL WORK UNITS	1510661	448853	698	72	77542	170996	940	231032	35554	516289	-	785	54443	54457			
PRIMARY INSPECTION-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	14231	2551	71	22	908	1799	194	2048	433	4644		48	1000	513			
- HOURS PER UNIT	.009	.005	.101	.305	.011	.010	.206	.008	.121	.008		.061	.018	.094			
PRODUCTIVE HOURS - INS PERSONNEL	14199	2551	71	22	908	1799	194	2016	433	4644		48	1000	513			
VESSELS BOARDED - ARRIVAL	154	29	17	-	-	-	26	-	62	-		20	-	-			
AIRPLANE FLIGHTS - ARRIVAL	363	180	-	4	-	11	-	2	30	5		-	-	131			
VESSELS & AIRPLANES BOARDED ON DEPART.	25	4	1	-	-	-	14	-	4	-		2	-	-			
SPECIAL INQUIRY OFFICER HEARINGS																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	110	19	-	-	1	11	-	50	-	25	-	-	3	1			
RECEIVED	338	32			5	16		120		146			9	10			
TOTAL	448	51			6	27		170		171			12	11			
COMPLETED	336	32			5	19		108		149			12	11			
SUBVERSIVE	-												-	-			
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC	32							6		26			-	-			
WITHOUT PROPER DOCUMENTS	184	20				13		35		103			8	5			
OTHER	120	12			5	6		67		20			4	6			
PENDING END OF PERIOD	112	19			1	8		62		22			-	-			
SIO HEARINGS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	1439	233			38	187		450	-	432			49	50			
- HOURS PER UNIT	4.28	7.28			7.60	9.84		4.17	-	2.90			4.08	4.55			
PRODUCTIVE HOURS - INS PERSONNEL	1439	233			38	187		450	-	432			49	50			
AUTHORIZATIONS																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	2883	314	223	410	-	-	18	727	100	75	-	28	25	963			
RECEIVED	5486	711	125	126	566	528	23	956	126	609		24	222	1470			
TOTAL	8369	1025	348	536	566	528	41	1683	226	684		52	247	2433			
RETURNED OR TRANSFERRED	51	-	-	2	-	-	-	8	-	-		-	-	41			
PROCESSED WITHOUT COMPLETION	583	83	30	42	2	-	6	-	11	20		2	13	374			

Form G-21.2 (9-1-53) UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE

REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: FEBRUARY 1954 SAN ANTONIO District No. 14

I. ENTRY AND DEPARTURE ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	TOTAL	Brownsville	Corpus Christi	Dallas	Del Rio	Eagle Pass	Galveston	Hidalgo	Houston	Laredo	McAllen	Port Arthur	Rio Grande	San Antonio			
AUTHORIZATIONS. - (Cont'd)	5486	711	125	126	566	528	23	956	126	609	-	24	222	1470			
BORDER CROSSING CARDS	3221	615	20		490	494	-	787	13	443			203	156			
REENTRY PERMITS ISSUED & EXTENDED	79	2	3				3	-				3		68			
VISA PETITIONS	77		1				2					1		73			
Q - SPECIAL SKILLS	3													3			
Q - PARENTS OF CITIZENS	6													6			
Q - OTHER RELATIVES OF CITIZENS	16		1				2					1		12			
NQ- SPOUSES, CHILDREN OF CITIZENS	47													47			
Q - SPOUSES, CHILDREN OF RESID. ALIENS	5													5			
NQ- MINISTERS	-																
ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS.																	
NONIMMIGRANTS TO IMMIGRANTS	4							1						3			
IMMIGRANTS TO NONIMMIGRANTS	-																
PREEXAMINATION AUTHORIZATIONS	-																
CREATION OF RECORD OF ADMISSION	491	4	43	24				58	19	27			3	313			
EXTENSIONS OF TEMPORARY STAY	188	3	9	27			4	5	26	5		4		105			
ALIEN LABORER CARDS	-																
DUPLICATE ALIEN REGISTRATION CARDS	945	63	49	67	74	34	13	105	57	134		16	13	320			
PERMISSION TO REAPPLY	402	24			2		1		4				3	368			
CHANGE OF NONIMMIGRANT STATUS	8			2										6			
PETITIONS TO IMPORT: Refugee Appl.	4			1					3					5			
TEMP. WORKERS OF EXCEPT. ABILITY	25			-										25			
LABORERS AND OTHER TEMP. WORKERS	-																
INDUSTRIAL TRAINEES	1													1			
SCHOOL APPROVALS	2													2			
SEC. 4 D.P. APPLICATIONS	2			2													
APPL'S. FOR PERMISSION TO RETURN	-																
APPL'S. FOR WAIVER OF INADMISSIBILITY	2													2			
APPL'S. FOR STUDENT EMPLOYMENT	21			3										18			
BREACH OR CANCELLATION OF BONDS	9								4					5			
XXXXXXX																	
BORDER CROSSING CARDS																	
REENTRY PERMITS ISSUED & EXTENDED																	
VISA PETITIONS																	
Q - SPECIAL SKILLS																	
Q - PARENTS OF CITIZENS																	
Q - OTHER RELATIVES OF CITIZENS																	
NQ- SPOUSES, CHILDREN OF CITIZENS																	
Q - SPOUSES, CHILDREN OF RESID. ALIENS																	
NQ- MINISTERS																	
ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS.																	
NONIMMIGRANTS TO IMMIGRANTS																	
IMMIGRANTS TO NONIMMIGRANTS																	
PREEXAMINATION AUTHORIZATIONS																	
CREATION OF RECORD OF ADMISSION																	

Form G-21.2 (9-1-53) UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE

REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: FEBRUARY 1954 SAN ANTONIO District No. 14

I ENTRY AND DEPARTURE ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	TOTAL	Brownsville	Corpus Christi	Dallas	Del Rio	Eagle pass	Galveston	Hidalgo	Houston	Laredo	McAllen	Port Arthur	Rio Grande	San Antonio			
AUTHORIZATIONS. - (Cont'd)	4846	681	78	126	564	528	24	923	117	582	-	14	207	1002			
COMPLETED,																	
BORDER CROSSING CARDS	3221	615	20		490	494		787	13	443			203	156			
REENTRY PERMITS ISSUED & EXTENDED	69							5						64			
VISA PETITIONS	43													43			
Q - SPECIAL SKILLS	1													1			
Q - PARENTS OF CITIZENS	4													4			
Q - OTHER RELATIVES OF CITIZENS	9													9			
NQ- SPOUSES, CHILDREN OF CITIZENS	25													25			
Q - SPOUSES, CHILDREN OF RESID. ALIENS	4													4			
NQ- MINISTERS	-													-			
ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS.																	
NONIMMIGRANTS TO IMMIGRANTS	5							1						4			
IMMIGRANTS TO NONIMMIGRANTS	-													-			
PREEXAMINATION AUTHORIZATIONS	-													-			
CREATION OF RECORD OF ADMISSION	37													37			
EXTENSIONS OF TEMPORARY STAY	187	3	9	25			4	5	26	5		5		105			
ALIEN LABORER CARDS	-																
DUPLICATE ALIEN REGISTRATION CARDS	1012	63	49	98	74	34	20	125	74	134		9	4	328			
PERMISSION TO REAPPLY	219													219			
CHANGE OF NONIMMIGRANT STATUS	4													4			
PETITIONS TO IMPORT: Refugee Appl.																	
TEMP. WORKERS OF EXCEPT. ABILITY	15													15			
LABORERS AND OTHER TEMP. WORKERS	-																
INDUSTRIAL TRAINEES	1													1			
SCHOOL APPROVALS	2													2			
SEC. 4 D.P. APPLICATIONS	1													1			
APPL'S. FOR PERMISSION TO RETURN	-																
APPL'S. FOR WAIVER OF INADMISSIBILITY	-																
APPL'S. FOR STUDENT EMPLOYMENT	21			3										18			
BREACH OR CANCELLATION OF BONDS	9								4					5			
DENIED	232	46	-	-	-	-	-	22	4	-	-	-	11	149			
BORDER CROSSING CARDS	74	46						17					11				
REENTRY PERMITS ISSUED & EXTENDED	-																
VISA PETITIONS	3													3			
Q - SPECIAL SKILLS	-																
Q - PARENTS OF CITIZENS	1													1			
Q - OTHER RELATIVES OF CITIZENS	-																
NQ- SPOUSES, CHILDREN OF CITIZENS	2													2			
Q - SPOUSES, CHILDREN OF RESID. ALIENS	-																
NQ- MINISTERS	-																
ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS.																	
NONIMMIGRANTS TO IMMIGRANTS	1													1			
IMMIGRANTS TO NONIMMIGRANTS	-																
PREEXAMINATION AUTHORIZATIONS	-																
CREATION OF RECORD OF ADMISSION	4													4			

Form G-21.3 (9-1-53)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: FEBRUARY 1954 SAN ANTONIO District No. 14

I ENTRY AND DEPARTURE ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	TOTAL	Brownsville	Corpus Christi	Dallas	Del Rio	Eagle Pass	Galveston	Hidalgo	Houston	Laredo	McAllen	Port Arthur	Rio Grande	San Antonio			
AUTHORIZATIONS - (Cont'd)																	
DENIED (CONT'D)																	
EXTENSIONS OF TEMPORARY STAY	1								1								
ALIEN LABORER CARDS	-																
DUPLICATE ALIEN REGISTRATION CARDS	19							5	3					11			
PERMISSION TO REAPPLY	130													130			
CHANGE OF NONIMMIGRANT STATUS	-																
PETITIONS TO IMPORT: Refugee Appl.																	
TEMP. WORKERS OF EXCEPT. ABILITY	-																
LABORERS AND OTHER TEMP. WORKERS	-																
INDUSTRIAL TRAINEES	-																
SCHOOL APPROVALS	-																
SEC. 4 D.P. APPLICATIONS	-																
APPL'S FOR PERMISSION TO RETURN	-																
APPL'S. FOR WAIVER OF INADMISSIBILITY	-																
APPL'S. FOR STUDENT EMPLOYMENT	-																
BREACH OR CANCELLATION OF BONDS	-																
PENDING END OF PERIOD	2889	261	240	366	-	-	11	752	98	82	-	36	27	1016			
BORDER CROSSING CARDS	-																
REENTRY PERMITS ISSUED & EXTENDED	19											1		18			
VISA PETITIONS	19											1		18			
Q - SPECIAL SKILLS	1													1			
Q - PARENTS OF CITIZENS	1													1			
Q - OTHER RELATIVES OF CITIZENS	2											1		1			
NQ- SPOUSES, CHILDREN OF CITIZENS	14													14			
Q - SPOUSES, CHILDREN OF RESID. ALIENS	1													1			
NQ-MINISTERS	-																
ADJUSTMENT OF STATUS																	
NONIMMIGRANTS TO IMMIGRANTS	2			1				1									
IMMIGRANTS TO NONIMMIGRANTS	-																
PREEXAMINATION AUTHORIZATIONS	4			2			1		1								
CREATION OF RECORD OF ADMISSION	2212	261	240	219			4	659	52	82		20		675			
EXTENSIONS OF TEMPORARY STAY	3			3													
ALIEN LABORER CARDS	-																
DUPLICATE ALIEN REGISTRATION CARDS	497			135			4	92	36			14	27	189			
PERMISSION TO REAPPLY	107													107			
CHANGE OF NONIMMIGRANT STATUS	5			2			2		1								
PETITIONS TO IMPORT: Refugee Appl.	17			2					7					8			
TEMP. WORKERS OF EXCEPT. ABILITY	-			-					-					-			
LABORERS AND OTHER TEMP. WORKERS	-																
INDUSTRIAL TRAINEES	-																
SCHOOL APPROVALS	1													1			
SEC. 4 D.P. APPLICATIONS	3			2					1								
APPL'S. FOR PERMISSION TO RETURN	-																
APPL'S. FOR WAIVER OF INADMISSIBILITY	-																
APPL'S. FOR STUDENT EMPLOYMENT	-																
BREACH OR CANCELLATION OF BONDS	-																

Form G-21.4 (9-1-53)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: FEBRUARY 1954 SAN ANTONIO District No. 14

I ENTRY AND DEPARTURE ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	TOTAL	Brownsville	Corpus Christi	Dallas	Del Rio	Eagle Pass	Galveston	Hidalgo	Houston	Laredo	McAllen	Port Arthur	Rio Grande	San Antonio			
AUTHORIZATIONS - (Cont'd)																	
AUTHORIZATIONS- PRODUCTIVE HOURS	4438	530	129	215	287	176	58	622	315	355	-	32	137	1582			
- HOURS PER UNIT	.915	.778	1.65	1.71	.508	.333	2.42	.679	2.69	.609	-	2.28	.661	1.58			
TRAVEL TIME- ENTRY & DEPARTURE ACTIV.	386	15	4	5	-	-	81	1	108	-	-	25	23	124			
LOST TIME - ENTRY & DEPARTURE ACTIV.	82	-	7	-	-	-	42	-	29	-	-	4	-	-			
II DETENTION, DEPORTATION AND PAROLE ACTIVITY																	
WARRANT HEARINGS																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	423	36	43	16	-	7	-	139	93	27	-	6	-	56			
RECEIVED	624	104	76	8	37	17	2	137	51	123			6	63			
TOTAL	1047	140	119	24	37	24	2	276	144	150		6	6	119			
COMPLETED	606	83	76	2	37	22	2	125	44	134		-	5	76			
SUBVERSIVE	1	-						-	-					1			
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC	16	3				1		2	4	4				2			
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS	476	80	72	2		21		108	36	99			5	53			
WITHOUT PROPER DOCUMENTS	77		3		37			7	3	14				13			
REMAINED LONGER	14		1				2	-	1	10				-			
OTHER	22							8	-	7				7			
PENDING END OF PERIOD	441	57	43	22	-	2	-	151	100	16		6	1	43			
WARRANT HEARINGS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	1731	299	167	1	82	42	4	218	135	263		1	6	513			
- HOURS PER UNIT	2.86	3.60	2.20	.500	2.22	1.91	2.00	1.74	3.07	1.96		-	1.20	6.75			
CASES COMPLETED WITH 2-MAN HEARINGS	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-			-	1			
ON APPEAL - TOTAL	74	29	-	3	-	-	-	1	34	1		-	-	6			
FINAL ORDERS ENTERED OR RECEIVED	605	92	76	-	37	22	2	118	44	134		-	3	77			
TRAVEL TIME - WARRANT HEARINGS OPER.	82	-	-	-	-	28	5	11	15	-		-	3	20			
LOST TIME - WARRANT HEARINGS OPER.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		-	-	-			
PAROLE AND SUPERVISION (Expulsion)																	
CONDITIONAL PAROLE																	
ALIENS ON PAROLE BEGINNING OF PERIOD	805	353	30	26	35	71	7	99	81	13	-	6	4	80			
PLACED ON PAROLE DURING PERIOD	67	4	1	7	7	26	1	11	1	2		1	1	5			
TOTAL ON PAROLE DURING PERIOD	872	357	31	33	42	97	8	110	82	15		7	5	85			
REMOVED FROM PAROLE DURING PERIOD	85	34	1	3	12	9	2	8	1	5		-	2	8			
ALIENS ON PAROLE END OF PERIOD	787	323	30	30	30	88	6	102	81	10		7	3	77			
SUBVERSIVE	-			-													
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC	38	1	1	9		3	1	1	1	1		2		18			
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS	567	322		11	30	64	1	101	8	7		3	1	19			
WITHOUT PROPER DOCUMENTS	74			-					38			1		35			
REMAINED LONGER	18			6					10			-		2			
OTHER	90		29	4		21	4		24	2		1	2	3			
COND. PAROLE - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	127	37	-	5	6	4	2	9	24	-		5	-	35			
- HOURS PER UNIT	.145	.103	-	.151	.142	.041	.250	.081	.292	-		.714	-	.411			

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: FEBRUARY 1954 SAN ANTONIO District No. 14

II DETENTION, DEPORTATION AND PAROLE ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	TOTAL	Brownsville	Corpus Christi	Dallas	Del Rio	Eagle Pass	Galveston	Hidalgo	Houston	Laredo	McAllen	Port Arthur	Rio Grande	San Antonio			
PAROLE AND SUPERVISION (Cont'd)																	
SUPERVISION																	
ALIENS UNDER SUPER'N BEGIN. OF PERIOD	28	-	1	10	-	--	2	1	5	3	-	-	-	6			
PLACED UNDER SUPER'N DURING PERIOD	-																
TOTAL UNDER SUPER'N DURING PERIOD	28		1	10			2	1	5	3				6			
REMOVED FROM SUPER'N DURING PERIOD	-																
ALIENS UNDER SUPER'N END OF PERIOD	28		1	10			2	1	5	3				6			
SUBVERSIVE	2						1							1			
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC	10		1	3			1	1	2	1				1			
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS	7			2						2				3			
WITHOUT PROPER DOCUMENTS	3								3								
REMAINED LONGER	-																
OTHER	6			5										1			
SUPERVISION - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	14		-	2			1	1	-	-	-			10			
- HOURS PER UNIT	.500		-	.200			.500	1.00	-	-	-			1.67			
TRAVEL TIME - PAROLE & SUPER'N OPER.	3		-	-			3	-	-	-	-			-			
LOST TIME - PAROLE & SUPER'N OPER.	-		-	-			-	-	-	-	-			-			
SERVICE DETENTION FACILITIES																	
NUMBER DETAINED BEGINNING OF PERIOD	364	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	-	-	358	-	-	-			
EXCLUSION	-										-						
EXPULSION	364							6			358						
DETAINEES ADMITTED	13556							16			13540						
NUMBER DETAINED DURING PERIOD	13920							22			13898						
EXCLUSION	1							1			-						
DETAINEES REMOVED DURING PERIOD	13600							10			13590						
NUMBER DETAINED END OF PERIOD	320							12			308						
MAN-DAYS DETENTION DURING PERIOD	30783							171			30612						
EXCLUSION	2							2			-						
EXPULSION	30781							169			30612						
AVERAGE DAYS DET. PER DETAINEE	2.21							7.75			2.20						
SERVICE DET. FAC. - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	4373							8			4365						
- HOURS PER UNIT	.142							.046			.142						
PRODUCTIVE HOURS - INS PERSONNEL	4373							8			4365						
NON-SERVICE DETENTION FACILITIES																	
NUMBER DETAINED BEGINNING OF PERIOD	216	18	51	35	3	6	-	2	18	26	-	-	-	57			
DETAINEES ADMITTED	1501	172	392	68	118	60	2	115	93	274		1	3	203			
NUMBER DETAINED DURING PERIOD	1717	190	443	103	121	66	2	117	111	300		1	3	260			
DETAINEES REMOVED DURING PERIOD	1553	177	399	96	115	52	2	112	95	272		1	3	229			
NUMBER DETAINED END OF PERIOD	164	13	44	7	6	14	-	5	16	28		-	-	31			
MAN-DAYS DETENTION DURING PERIOD	6980	579	2148	545	399	302	4	386	494	746		7	9	1361			
AVERAGE DAYS DET. PER DETAINEE	4.06	3.05	4.84	5.29	3.30	4.57	2.00	3.28	4.45	2.49		7.00	3.00	5.23			
NON-SERV. DET. FAC.-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	222	8	36	16	20	12	-	6	74	-		-	-	50			
-HOURS PER UNIT	.129	.042	.081	.155	.165	.181	-	.051	.666	-		-	-	.192			

• Form G-21.6 (9-1-53)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: FEBRUARY 1954 SAN ANTONIO District No. 14

II DETENTION, DEPORTATION AND PAROLE ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	TOTAL	Browns-ville	Corpus Christi	Dallas	Del Rio	Eagle Pass	Galveston	Hidalgo	Houston	Laredo	McAllen	Port Arthur	Rio Grande	San Antonio			
DEPORTATION																	
ALIENS PROCESSED FOR DEPORTATION	954	225	78	46	24	34	3	218	51	161	-	-	28	86			
ALIENS PROCESSED FOR VOLUNTARY DEPAR.	600	73	136	60	-	-	1	77	36	63		2	45	107			
ALIENS PROCESSED FOR REMOVAL	-	-	-		-	-	-	-	-	-		-	-	-			
TOTAL	1554	298	214	106	24	34	4	295	87	224		2	73	193			
ALIENS DEPORTED	860	225	-	-	24	4	2	75	1	521		-	8	-			
VOLUNTARY DEPARTURES	18357	212	-	-	190	381	-	1772	2	4765		-	11035	-			
UNDER W/A	428	21	-	-		13	-	11	2	381		-	-	-			
WITHOUT W/A	17929	191	-	-	190	368	-	1761	-	4384		-	11035	-			
REMOVALS	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		-	-	-			
DEPORTATION - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	1421	189	43	96	10	56	32	124	210	380	-	8	11	262			
- HOURS PER UNIT	.914	.634	.200	.905	.416	1.65	8.00	.420	2.41	1.70		4.00	.150	1.36			
TRAVEL TIME - DEPORTATION OPERATION	138	-	1	51	20	-	17	1	29	-	-	12	7	-			
LOST TIME - DEPORTATION OPERATION	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-			
III CITIZENSHIP ACTIVITY																	
NATURALIZATION																	
N-400) PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	805	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	805			
FOR) RECEIVED	326									13		9		304			
PROC-) COMPLETED	177									13		9		155			
ESSING) REJ., TRANSF., OR CLOSED	21									-		-		21			
" PROCESSED	156									13		9		134			
" PENDING END OF PERIOD	954									-		-		954			
N-400) PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	1123	162	18	163	25	-	20	-	270	38	-	40	-	387			
FOR) RECEIVED	237	8	93	20	1		4		24	8		9		70			
FILING) COMPLETED	344	22	87	34	22		9		80	3		17		70			
PET.) TRANSFERRED OR CLOSED	46	2	-	9	5		-		5	1		-		24			
" PETITIONS FILED	298	20	87	25	17		9		75	2		17		46			
" PENDING END OF PERIOD	1016	148	24	149	4		15		214	43		32		387			
" READY FOR filing petitions	911	148	4	125	-		2		170	43		32		387			
PETI-) PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	666	36	25	191	3	-	26	-	85	50	-	18	-	232			
TIONS) COMPLETED	207	-	1	111	-		2		-	50		-		43			
" GRANTED	201		1	107	-		2		-	49		-		42			
" DENIED	5		-	4	-		-		-	1		-		-			
" TRANSFERRED	1		-	-	-		-		-	-		-		1			
" PENDING END OF PERIOD	757	56	111	105	20		33		160	2		35		235			
" READY FOR FINAL HEARING	349	56	74	44	20		25		48	2		35		45			
N-300) PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	100	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	100			
" RECEIVED	16													16			
" COMPLETED	21													21			
" PENDING END OF PERIOD	95	-		-			-		-	-		-		95			
DECLARATIONS FILED	18	-	2	1	-		-		-	-		-		15			
NATURALIZATION - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	1321	89	144	190	34		22		182	72		61		527			
- HOURS PER UNIT	1.72	4.04	6.86	1.30	1.55		2.00		2.28	1.09		1.42		1.73			

Form G-21.7 (9-1-53)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: FEBRUARY 1954 SAN ANTONIO District No. 14

III CITIZENSHIP ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	TOTAL	Brownsville	Corpus Christi	Dallas	El Paso	Houston	Laredo	McAllen	Port Arthur	Rio Grande	San Antonio
CITIZENSHIP APPLICATIONS											
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	485	10	25	60	1 -	2	274	49	-	-	-	-	64
RECEIVED	140	2	20	9	-	-	17		4		2		86
TOTAL	625	12	45	69	1	2	291	49	4		2		150
COMPLETED - TOTAL	63	1	15	-	-	-	8	3	4		-		32
REJECTED, TRANSFERRED, OR CLOSED	8	-	-	8	-	-	-	-	-		-		-
PROCESSED FOR OTHER OFFICES	49	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		-		49
PENDING END OF PERIOD - TOTAL	505	11	30	61	1	2	283	46	-		2		69
READY FOR HEARING, [redacted]	69	11	15	20	-	-	-	23	-		-		-
CITIZENSHIP - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	119	1	13	22	-	2	6	5	-		1		69
- HOURS PER UNIT	.991	1.00	.866	2.75	-	-	.750	1.66	-		-		.851
NATIONALITY APPLICATIONS											
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	18	-	-	4	- -	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	13
RECEIVED	17		2	-				3			-		12
TOTAL	35		2	4				3			1		25
COMPLETED - TOTAL	20		2	-				3	-		-		15
REJECTED, TRANSFERRED, OR CLOSED	-		-	-				-			-		-
PROCESSED FOR OTHER OFFICES	10		-	-				-			-		10
PENDING END OF PERIOD - TOTAL	5		-	4				-			1		-
READY FOR adjudication OR DELIVERY	5		-	4				-			1		-
NATIONALITY - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	42	-	5	8				9			-		20
- HOURS PER UNIT	1.40		2.50	-				3.00			-		.800
TRAVEL TIME - CITIZENSHIP ACTIVITY	18	-	-	9				1			2		6
LOST TIME - CITIZENSHIP ACTIVITY	3	3	-	-				-			-		-
CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION 1/											
CITIZENSHIP ASSISTANCE FURNISHED											
ALIENS REFERRED TO PUBLIC SCHOOLS											
ALIENS INFORMED OF HOME STUDY											
NAME SLIPS TO PUBLIC SCHOOLS COR. CTRS.											
ALIENS ADMITTED TO CITIZENSHIP											
ATTENDED PUBLIC SCHOOL CLASSES											
ENROLLED IN HOME STUDY COURSES											
NUMBER SUBMITTING PUBLIC SCHOOL CERT.											
111a VERIFICATION OF ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE ACTIVITY											
VERIFICATION REQUESTS											
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	16	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	16
RECEIVED DURING PERIOD	2828	490		1	54	199	60	1058	16	809	12	89	40
TOTAL	2844	490		1	54	199	60	1058	16	809	12	89	56
COMPLETED	2832	490		1	54	199	60	1058	16	809	12	89	44
NATURALIZATION	122	1		-	5	22	17	5	-	67	-	5	-
OTHER	2710	489		1	49	177	43	1053	16	742	12	84	44
PENDING END OF PERIOD	12	-		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	12
VERIFICATION - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	635	82		-	12	82	10	76	3	302	2	28	8
- HOURS PER UNIT	224	167		-	222	.412	.166	.071	1.87	.373	.166	.314	.181

1/ Source: Form N-28

Form G-21.10 (9-1-53)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: FEBRUARY 1954 SAN ANTONIO District No. 14

V INVESTIGATIONS ACTIVITY	TOTAL	Brownsville	Corpus Christi	Dallas	Del Rio	Eagle Pass	Galveston	Hidalgo	Houston	Laredo	McAllen	Port Arthur	Rio Grande	San Antonio			
INVESTIGATIONS																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	33835	13652	2584	2642	495	1146	229	2204	1236	1321	-	156	248	7922			
RECEIVED DURING PERIOD	6044	3600	310	360	58	58	66	458	68	218		39	42	767			
TOTAL	39879	17252	2894	3002	553	1204	295	2662	1304	1539		195	290	8689			
COMPLETED	7468	463	352	352	289	227	114	704	474	383	-	84	42	3984			
NATURALIZATION AND CITIZENSHIP	92	2	33	16	11	4	4	1		1		1	13	6			
CANCELLATION - SUBVERSIVE	2			1						1							
CANCELLATION - OTHER	-			-													
NATURALIZATION	45	2	33	7			1	1						1			
OTHER	45	-		8	11	4	3					1	13	5			
DEPORTATION	1227	154	265	56	24	47	45	167	26	197	-	5	16	225			
SUBVERSIVE	7		1	2					4								
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC	46	22	6	5		2			2	5				4			
ADDRESS REPORT CARD (I-53)	53	11	4	4		6			16					12			
SUSPENSION	14	9						1	2			2					
NON-IMMIGRANTS	81			10	6	18		1	2	16		1		27			
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS	945	108	240	35	17	19	40	154		170		1	16	145			
DISPLACED PERSONS	3		3									-					
OTHER	78	4	11		1	2	5	11		6		1		37			
SMUGGLING	3								1	2		-					
PRIVATE BILLS	1								1			-					
PAROLE	78	72								5		1					
ALIEN REGISTRATION	35			11	1		6		5					12			
ALIEN ADDRESS REPORT (SEC. 35)	5318	44	50	18	251	168	53	413	390	169		74	1	3687			
MISCELLANEOUS	714	191	4	251	2	8	6	123	51	9		3	12	54			
PENDING END OF PERIOD	32411	16789	2542	2650	264	977	181	1958	830	1156	-	111	248	4705			
NATURALIZATION AND CITIZENSHIP	112	6	31	15	-	3		16	3			5		33			
CANCELLATION - SUBVERSIVE	8			1										7			
CANCELLATION - OTHER	4	1							1			2		-			
NATURALIZATION	52	1	31	6				3	2			1		8			
OTHER	48	4		8		3		13				2		18			
DEPORTATION	15723	13274	297	455	-	214	12	601	64	61		18	53	674			
SUBVERSIVE	48		4	5					12	1		1		25			
CRIMINAL, IMMORAL, NARCOTIC	47	1	4	18				5	9			1		9			
ADDRESS REPORT CARD (I-53)	14505	13067	255	271		101	6	225	22	47		1	53	457			
SUSPENSION	213	173	22	2				8	6			-		2			
NON-IMMIGRANTS	362	12	4	11		110		203	5	3		1		13			
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS	186	17		55			6	34	3	8		11		52			
DISPLACED PERSONS	-	-						-	-			-					
OTHER	362	4	8	93		3		126	7	2		3		116			
SMUGGLING	5							1	1			-		3			
PRIVATE BILLS	7		1	2				1	3			-					
PAROLE	6			5					1			-					
ALIEN REGISTRATION	30			10				1	-			1		18			
ALIEN ADDRESS REPORT (SEC. 35)	16102	3223	2209	2143	264	745	169	1293	748	1095		86	195	3932			
MISCELLANEOUS	426	286	4	20		15		45	10	-		1		45			

Form G-21.11 (9-1-53)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
REPORT OF FIELD OPERATIONS - PERIOD COVERED: FEBRUARY 1954 SAN ANTONIO District No. 14

V INVESTIGATIONS ACTIVITY (CONT'D)	TOTAL	Brownsville	Corpus Christi	Dallas	Del Rio	Eagle Pass	Galveston	Hidalgo	Houston	Laredo	McAllen	Port Arthur	Rio Grande	San Antonio			
INVESTIGATIONS RESULTING IN W/A OR V/D	867	173	214	37	17	-	1	42	19	164	-	2	2	196			
ALIENS APPRH'D. (BY OTHER THAN B.P.)	265	132		28	17		1	42	19	6		1	2	17			
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS	254	132		24	17			42	19	4		1	2	13			
MEXICANS APPRH'D. (BY OTHER THAN B.P.)	256	132		22	17			42	19	5		1	2	16			
ILLEGALLY IN AGRICULTURE	80	44		9	15			8	-	2		-		2			
ILLEGALLY IN TRADE OR INDUSTRY	59	39		5	2			-	-	3		1		9			
OTHER	117	49		8	-			34	19	-		-	2	5			
W/A THRU ADDRESS REPORT CARD (I-53)	-	-		-	-			-	-	-		-	-	-			
INVESTIGATIONS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	5948	527	558	491	153	203	263	868	371	483	-	153	162	1716			
- HOURS PER UNIT	1796	1.14	1.58	1.39	.529	.894	2.31	1.23	.782	1.26	-	1.82	3.86	.430			
TRAVEL TIME - INVESTIGATIONS ACTIVITY	546	129	18	42	9	13	41	62	38	-	-	11	49	134			
WARRANT OF ARREST PROCESSING																	
COMPLETED	733	105	80	24	30	22	1	137	51	123	-	-	4	156			
W/A PROCESSING - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	1047	345	116	34	62	179	4	86	30	130	-	3	2	56			
- HOURS PER UNIT	1.43	3.29	1.45	1.42	2.06	8.14	4.00	.627	.588	1.06	-	-	.500	.358			
WARRANT OF ARREST SERVICE																	
PENDING BEGINNING OF PERIOD	55	31	-	7	-	-	-	5	12	-	-	-	-	-			
RECEIVED	734	99	80	28	30	34	1	139	40	123		-	4	156			
TOTAL	789	130	80	35	30	34	1	144	52	123		-	4	156			
COMPLETED	745	100	80	29	30	34	1	137	51	123		-	4	156			
PENDING END OF PERIOD	44	30	-	6	-	-	-	7	1	-		-	-	-			
W/A SERVICE - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	101	18	11	10	3	4	2	12	21	10	-	1	2	7			
- HOURS PER UNIT	.135	.180	.137	.344	.100	.117	2.00	.087	.411	.081	-	-	.500	.044			

VI EMPLOYMENT SUMMARY																	
NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES END OF PERIOD	289	36	12	10	13	24	8	34	16	48	-	3	10	75			
OPERATIONS - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	38435	5056	1323	1219	1644	2785	813	4577	2032	7071	4365	369	1479	5702			
OPERATIONS - NON-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	2550	363	85	64	187	264	193	449	82	372	-	16	9	466			
ADMINISTRATION - PRODUCTIVE HOURS	8286	480	407	289	176	152	265	651	410	751	-	89	249	4367			
ADMINISTRATION - NON-PRODUCTIVE HOURS	634	76	-	4	32	8	-	8	-	9	-	2	-	495			
TOTAL HOURS EMPLOYMENT	49905	5975	1815	1576	2039	3209	1271	5685	2524	8203	4365	476	1737	11030			
PERCENTAGE TOTAL HOURS ON OPERATIONS	82.1	90.6	77.5	81.4	89.8	95.0	79.1	88.5	83.7	90.7	100.	80.8	85.6	55.9			

H-11-03 SD4 bja/PAM

ENC 15

UNITED STATES
BUREAU OF CUSTOMS

Laredo, Texas
April 13, 1954

Diplomatic immunity granted at Laredo, Texas, from July 1, 1953 to April 13th, 1954. No record is readily available for unaccompanied baggage:

Country	No. of Persons	Peg. Baggage
Argentina	19	64
Austria	2	8
Australia	4	8
Belgium	5	11
Bolivia	3	12
Brazil	6	25
Canada	1	8
Chile	3	5
Colombia	4	10
Cuba	9	26
Denmark	7	22
Dominican Republic	1	3
Ecuador	4	11
France	12	33
Germany	8	33
Great Britain	4	14
Haiti	2	3
Honduras	2	8
Italy	1	2
Japan	3	11
Mexico	150	423
Nicaragua	5	15
Peru	7	18
Russia	11	42
Spain	6	23
Sweden	5	20
Turkey	1	5
United States	72	169
Venezuela	8	13
Total	365	1,045

4-14-03 SPA bja/PAA

Enc 15

Bureau of Customs

STATEMENT OF TRANSACTIONS AT LAREDO, TEXAS, FOR THE MONTH OF MARCH AND IN ADDITION THERETO FOR THE FISCAL YEAR - July 1, 1953 to March 31, 1954

Entering United States	Number	Number of passengers from foreign countries	Accumulated Totals to and including end of present month: Number	Accumulated Totals to and including end of present month: Number of passengers from foreign countries
Vessels: Actually entering	0	0	0	0
Reporting only	0	0	0	0
Ferries	0	0	0	0
Aircraft	28	62	189	462
Armed forces Aircraft	0	0	3	3
Vehicles: Automobiles	88,069	219,496	795,359	1,591,798
Busses	1,218	5,024	11,641	54,684
Other vehicles	19,565	39,130	222,748	364,881
Passenger trains	28	3,183	267	16,416
Freight cars	1,632	0	15,004	0
Pedestrians	x x x x	266,895	x x x x	2,144,558
	110,540	533,790	1,045,211	4,172,802

DIPLOMATS - Report at Bridge Office
UNACCOMPANIED POUCHES - None
NUMBER OF CUSTOMS INSPECTORS - LAREDO - 45.

COMMODITIES: - Railway: Antimony ore, iron ore, lead, zinc concentrates, ixtle fiber, fresh & frozen fruits, baskets, brick, beer, eartenware, glycerine.

COMMODITIES: - Truck: Glass, pecans, meat, footwear, broom corn, rugs, fruits & vegetables, mica, charcoal, dowels, tile.

4-14-03 SPH bja/PAM

ENCLOSURE #7

Transactions at San Antonio, Texas for First Nine (9) Months of FY 1954

Number of planes arriving	964
Number of passengers arriving	37,236
Point of origin	Mexico
Average number of planes arriving daily	4
Number of inspectors stationed at San Antonio	7
Number of consumption entries	557

DIPLOMATIC ARRIVALS

Country	Number of Diplomats	Pieces of baggage
Canada	1	3
Great Britain	1	8
Honduras	1	3
Finland	1	4
Spain	2	7
France	5	16
Brazil	3	14
Philiopine Islands	2	6
Holland	1	3
Sweden	1	2
Poland	8	32
Norway	1	3
Italy	3	14
Venezuela	1	4
Colombia	2	5
Russia	24	72
Germany	2	3
Czechoslovakia	20	43
Nicaragua	1	5
Indonesia	5	16
Chile	2	4
Peru	1	6
Bolivia	1	3
Argentina	2	10
Kuwait	3	8
Ecuador	3	11
China	2	6
Mexico	71	274

COMMODITIES ARRIVING BY AIR

Commodity	Country of origin
Earthenware	Mexico
Lithographic prints	Mexico
Fresh cut flowers	Mexico
Beans, prepared	Mexico
Peas, prepared	Mexico
Cotton wearing apparel	Guatemala
Wool wearing apparel	Guatemala

4-14-03 SPH bja/PAA

Lace, embroidered & ornamented wearing apparel	Guatemala
Leather manufactures	Guatemala
Photographic film	Mexico

COMMODITIES ARRIVING OTHER THAN BY AIR

Commodity	Country of origin
Optical instruments	Germany
"	Japan
Timekeeping instruments	Switzerland
Musical instruments	Italy
"	France
"	Germany
Tobacco	Cuba
Toys	Germany
Diamonds	Belgium
Pearls	Japan
Marble & statuary	Italy
Liquor	Scotland
"	Italy
"	France
Leather manufactures	Denmark

ENCLOSURE No. 16

Customs Form 3063
Treasury Department
201, CAM 1948
(July 1947)

MONTHLY REPORT OF TRANSACTIONS

Bureau of Customs

DISTRICT NO. 7 PORT OR STATION OF Champlain, New York, June (Month) 1953

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following summary statement of the transactions of this PORT (District, port, or station) for the month indicated above.

Entering United States:	No.	Number of passengers fr foreign countries	ACCUMULATED TOTALS TO & INCLUDING END OF PRESENT MONTH No.	Number of passengers fr foreign countries
Vehicles:				
Automobiles	38745	132977	319484	1021922
Busses	167	4907	1537	41865
Other Vehicles	2049	2580	18721	25156
Pedestrians	x x x	4	x x x	593
		140468		1089536
Packages examined:		No.		No.
Merchandise:				
On wharves, at freight terminals, on highways, etc.		7343		100561
Baggage		148540		1111286

	NO.	No.
Protests filed with collector by importers		5
Protests denied by collector and forwarded to Customs Court		5
Appeals for reappraisement filed		17

	Number of invoices	No. entries	No. of invoices	No. of entries
Entries of merchandise:				
(a) Consumption---Free	342	276	4045	2749
(a) Consumption---Dutiable	1061	441	15246	4476
(d) Baggage entries and written declarations		427		5874
(e) Informal		117		1058
(g) Immediate transpn without appraisement		94		748
(h) Transportation and exportation		203		3289
All other entries		13		157
Drawback entries Total		81		280

4-14-03 SPA bja/PAM

ENCLOSURE NO. 6

T Total district personnel 122 made up as follows: 1 Collector of Customs, 1 Assistant Collector of Customs, 6 Customs Entry Officers (deputy collector), 1 Customs Liquidator (deputy collector), 1 Fiscal Accountant (deputy collector), 1 Cash Accounting Assistant (teller), 1 Fiscal Accounting Clerk, 1 Customs Liquidating Clerk, 1 Deputy Collector, 1 Personnel Assistant, 5 Clerks, 1 Time, Leave and Payroll Clerk, 1 Secretary(Stenography), 2 Cler-Stenographers, 8 Deputy Collectors in Charge (ports), 8 Deputy Collectors (stations), 3 Supervisory Customs Inspectors, 1 Customs Inspector (Deputy Collector), and 78 Customs Inspectors.

St. Albans
1 Collector of Customs
1 Assistant Collector
1 Customs Entry Officer
1 Customs Liquidator
1 Customs Liquidating Clerk
1 Fiscal Accountant
1 Cash Accounting Assistant (teller)
1 Fiscal Accounting Clerk
1 Personnel Assistant
5 Clerks
1 Time, Leave & Payroll Clerk
1 Secretary (Stenography)
1 Supervisory Customs Inspecto
1 Customs Inspector (deputy collector)
13 Customs Inspectors

MONTREAL, P.Q.
1 Deputy Collector
1 Supervisory Customs Inspector
9 Customs Inspectors

BURLINGTON
1 Deputy Collector in Charge
3 Customs Inspectors
1 Clerk-Stenographer

ALBURG
1 Deputy Collector in Charge
2 Customs Inspectors

ALBURG SPRINGS
1 Deputy Collector

HIGHGATE SPRINGS
1 Customs Entry Officer
*7 Customs Inspectors

RICHFORD
1 Deputy Collector in Charge
1 Customs Entry Officer
5 Customs Inspectors

MORSES LINE
1 Deputy Collector
1 Customs Inspector

*Deputy Collector in Charge position presently vacant -- one customs inspector actingas deputy collector in charge

WEST BERKSHIRE
1 Deputy Collector
2 Customs Inspectors

EAST RICHFORD
1 Deputy Collector
1 Customs Inspector

NORTH TROY
1 Deputy Collector in Charge
4 Customs Inspectors

NEWPORT
1 Deputy Collector in Charge
1 Deputy Collector
1 Customs Entry Officer
1 Supervisory Customs Inspector
10 Customs Inspectors
1 Clerk-Stenographer

DERBY LINE
1 Deputy Collector in Charge
1 Customs Entry Officer
6 Customs Inspectors

BEEBE PLAIN
1 Deputy Collector
1 Customs Inspector

ISLAND POND
1 Deputy Collector in Charge
1 Customs Entry Officer
6 Customs Inspectors

NORTON
1 Deputy Collector
4 Customs Inspectors

BEECHER FALLS
1 Deputy Collector in Charge
2 Customs Inspectors

CANAAN
1 Deputy Collector
1 Customs Inspector

CONNECTICUT LAKES
1 Customs Inspector

4-14-03 SPH:bja/Paul

BURLINGTON, VERMONT
ELEVATION 334
STOP
STOP



ENCLOSURE NO. 10

Customs Form 3063
Treasury Department
201, CAM 1948
(July 1947)

MONTHLY REPORT OF TRANSACTIONS

Bureau of Customs

DISTRICT NO. _____ PORT OR STATION OF Rouses Point, N.Y., Fiscal Year 1953

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following summary statement of the transactions of this _____ for the month indicated above.
(District, port, or station)

Entering United States:	No. Vessels:	No. of Passengers from foreign countries	ACCUMULATED TOTALS TO AND INCLUDING END OF PRESENT MONTH Number	Number of passengers from foreign countries
Actually entering			120	
Reporting only			286	986
Ferries				
Aircraft			12	26
Vehicles:				
Automobiles			112905	312252
Busses			1269	21795
Other vehicles			3344	1523
Passenger trains			1118	142783
Freight cars			84304	
Pedestrians			x x x x	1092
				480457
				NUMBER

Packages examined:
- Merchandise:
  - At appraiser's stores
  - At importers' places of business
  - On Wharves, at freight terminals, on highways, etc. — 197310
- Mail packages — 11293
- Baggage — 256027
- Other

4-14-53 SP4 Bjelman

Entries of merchandise:	? Number of invoices	Number of entries	No. of invoices	No. Entries
(a) Consumption Free			44697	7602
(b) Consumption Dutiable			26391	10606
(c) Mail				4429
(d) Baggage entries and written declarations				3784
(e) Informal				2457

Site #1

4-14-03 SDW bja/Atl

STOMS AND IMMIGRATION

Sanford Park

Woodpine Road Extension

ENCLOSURE NO. 5

The main commodities imported are;

Hay and straw
Lumber and other forest products
Pulpboard
Woodpulp
Feed wheat
Bran shorts
Feed flour and other feeds
Fish
Fiberboard
Leather
Metals
Whiskey
Beer and ale
Newsprint paper
Locomotive parts
Asbestos
Agricultural implements
Christmas trees
Maple sugar and syrup
Furniture
Bricks
Machines and machine parts
Ixtle fiber
Synthetic rubber
Hides
Fertilizer
Granite
Vinyl Acetate
Acids

AIR TRAFFIC

Period from July 1, 1953 through March 31, 1954

Port or Station	No. of Planes	No. of Passengers	Pieces of Baggage Examined
Burlington	1397	12,400	17,710
Newport	3	6	6
Highgate Springs	1	2	2

DIPLOMATS AND DIPLOMATIC BAGGAGE

Period from July 1, 1953 through March 31, 1954

COUNTRY	NUMBER OF DIPLOMATS	TYPE OF IMPORTATION		
		UNACC. BAGG.	ACC. BAGG.	POUCHES
Australia	2	-	7	-
Belgium	1	-	3	-
Canada	54	-	100	144
England	4	-	15	-
France	4	-	11	-
Germany Republic of	3	-	8	-
India	2	-	6	-
Italy	1	-	4	-
Japan	5	-	13	-
Netherlands	4	-	15	-
Sweden	3	-	9	-
United States	7	-	20	-
U.S.S.R.	15	-	41	4

For the port of St. Albans only

PASSENGER TRAINS AND FREIGHT CARS

Period from July 1, 1953 through March 31, 1954

Port or Station	Passenger Trains	Passengers	Freight Cars
St. Albans	559	69695	46873
Newport	549	41967	35556
Richford	0	0	2404
Island Pond	248	15129	13035
Norton	273	941	0
Alburg	0	0	7
Burlington	0		71
North Troy	0		5684
Derby Line	0		278
Highgate Springs	92	624	0

AUTOMOBILES, TRUCKS, AND OTHER VEHICLES ARRIVING BY HIGHWAY

Period from July 1, 1953 through March 31, 1954

Port or Station	Automobiles	Passengers	Trucks or Other Vehicles	Passengers	Busses
Newport	887	2632	1	1	0
Richford	63699	171807	944	3646	0
East Richford	22259	49454	241	427	0
West Berkshire	17661	46741	18	20	0
Morses Line	3401	9070	930	1138	0
Island Pond	0	0	0	0	0
Norton	69172	202785	276	437	1006
Alburg	27060	75065	92	170	56
Alburg Springs	9593	29993	461	855	0
Beecher Falls	29052	74496	263	258	0
Canaan	22484	60196	351	408	
Conn. Lakes	4428	13386			
North Troy	57052	163717	283	300	437
Derby Line	206270	558402	10688	16139	651
Beebe Plain	62729	173179	2454	2738	879
Highgate Springs	126792	431980	12592	25192	1339

Statistics on the amount of baggage carried is not readily available but a safe e
would be in the vicinity of one and one-half million.

5-7 (7-15-55)
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION--FBI

12-2, 1955

___Mr. Boardman
___Mr. Belmont
___Mr. Hennrich
___Mr. Keay
___Mr. Cleveland
___Mr. Baumgardner
___Mr. Branigan
___Mr. Roach
___Mr. W.C. Sullivan

___Mechanical Section
___Translation Sec. 6228 IB
___Ident Div.
___Technical Lab
___Mr. Ferris, 7627

[redacted]

___Mr. Scatterday Room 2544

SUPERVISORS

___Mr. Aull
___Mr. Baken
___Mr. Bird
___Mr. Broden
___Mr. Calame
___Mr. Callahan
___Mr. Chase
___Mr. Cotter
___Mr. Crowley
___Mr. Day
___Mr. de Bettencourt
___Mr. Donahoe
___Mr. Dunn
___Mr. Ezell
___Mr. Fitzgerald
___Mr. Garrett
___Mr. Gregg
___Mr. Hitt
___Mr. Jaquiss
___Mr. Jensen
___Mr. A.R. Jones
___Mr. F.L. Jones
___Mr. Kissiah
___Mr. Kitchel
___Mr. Kuno
___Mr. Kurtz
___Mr. Lake
___Mr. Lee
___Mr. Lewis
___Mr. Litrento
___Mr. Little
___Mr. McCaslin
___Mr. McDermott
___Mr. Meehan
___Mr. Mossburg
___Mr. Nasca
___Mr. Norstrom
___Mr. Payne
___Mr. Peasinger
___Mr. Sandweg
___Mr. Schweppe
___Mr. Shroder
___Mr. Stacey
___Mr. Stewart
___Mr. Todd
___Mr. Torrillo
___Mr. Tully
___Mr. Turner
___Mr. Turyn
___Mr. Wacks
___Mr. Wallace
___Mr. Wannall
___Mr. Welborn
___Mr. Welte
___Mr. Whaley
___Mr. Whitson

SPW bjaplan 4-14-03

___Mail Room, 5533
___Mrs. Dean
___Mr. Hammond
___Miss Taylor
___Miss Martis
___Correct
___Please call me
___Please see me

___RECORDS SECTION
___Send File
___Bring File up to date
___Place on record and return
___Indicate index ref.

Pls make enclosure behind file for 117-265 ser 524. No indexing necessary.

2780

ESPIONAGE SECTION

Total dollar value of imports Port of New York

for the year 1953 - $4,164,600,000.

this figure represents 38.3% of total U.S. imports

Document (s) too large to Scan

Description of Document (s)

Map


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





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U.S. CUSTOMS
IN CLASS
NGERS
PASSENGERS

4-1-03 Sd/- Bijapur



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4/1/93 Jan Bjerknes

4-14-03 SPH bja/PMA



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4:14:23 SPH Bijdorp


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


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NEW YORK CENTRAL
SCB-616


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NEW YORK CENTRAL
REFRIGERA R - HEATER
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ERIE



ANCHOR

NEW YORK
16
DOCK CO.
MOORE-McCORMACK
BRAZIL RIVER PLATE SERVICE


ALWAYS BE CAREFUL
NO SMOKING
FIRE ALARM
FIRE TANK
FIRE HOSE

Loading Area EX-44-4


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MONEY EXCHANGE

4-14-03 SP4 bja/PAAR

4.14.03 SP4 bja/FAA

Enclosure 4

Troop Disembarkation Area
Calcutta Airport



4-14-43 SP4 bja[illegible]

AIR LINES

4-14-09 SD4 bja/BM

EXIT

With regard to Customs procedures, it will be recalled that these have been the subject of inquiry by [redacted] b7C b7D In this regard your attention is directed to the memoranda from this Bureau dated May 13, and June 21, 1954, re "Technical Aids to Investigation." Matters which you have discussed with Inspector Guernsey can be discussed, of course, with Assistant Commissioner Harvison.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

~~SECRET~~

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AIR MAIL - REGISTERED

Date: June 17, 1954

To: Director, FBI

From: Liaison Representative
Ottawa, Canada

Subject: ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

[redacted] b1

(S)

At the time of the publicity relative to the Bureau's notices to police departments, [redacted] b1

[redacted] (S)

[redacted] b1

[redacted] (S)

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

4/8/00
CLASSIFIED BY NLS/BJA/LBM-60267-AAG
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 6

9480742/950935/997054

OM 105-237

ADMINISTRATIVE PAGE

The Omaha Office is not setting forth leads in this matter as current status is not known and New York City may have obtained the name of the present [redacted] b7C

It is requested that the New York Office return enclosed items to the Omaha Office as soon as they have served their purpose.

REFERENCE

New York letter to Director dated May 27, 1954.
Bureau airtel to New York dated June 3, 1954 entitled SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC WEAPONS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES; AEA.
New York teletype to Omaha dated June 9, 1954.
New York teletype to Director and Omaha dated June 8, 1954, entitled SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC WEAPONS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE US, AEA.

[redacted]

June 2, 1954

VIA LIAISON

Honorable True D. Morse
Acting Secretary
Department of Agriculture
Washington 25, D. C.

My dear Mr. Morse:

Reference is made to your letter of May 19, 1954, addressed to me as Chairman of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, which letter was delivered through the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security. Your letter requested clearance before furnishing to the Kentucky Department of Agriculture certain information concerning the description of clandestine atomic devices.

While the IIC is not in a position to give clearance for dissemination of this material, it may be of interest to you that the information to which you refer is unclassified and was released to the newspapers by a representative of the National Security Council Staff. The information is, therefore, now in the public domain.

Sincerely yours,

Chairman
Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference

(NOTE: The information referred to is atomic devices description information which was furnished to all law enforcement agencies and which was released to the press by [illegible] after consultation with the Bureau.)

[redacted]

Tolson
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Belmont
Clegg
Glavin
Harbo
Rosen
Tracy
Gearty
Mohr
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Miss Gandy

ORIGINAL FILED IN 66-7615

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C O P Y

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

May 19, 1954

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover
Chairman, Interdepartmental
Intelligence Conference
2212 Department of Justice
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Hoover:

This concerns the enclosed letter of May 13 received from Mr. George L. Johnson, Director, Division of Weights and Measures of the Kentucky Department of Agriculture, and our reply concerning his request for twenty copies of the material entitled "Proposed Information for Release to Public Officials, Representative of Duly Constituted Law Enforcement Agencies, Etc. - - - Description of Atomic Devices and Component Parts". We have copies on hand of this material which represents Enclosure 2 referred to in your letter of January 8.

We will appreciate receiving clearance from you before we send to Mr. Johnson the copies that he has requested.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ True D. Morse

True D. Morse
Acting Secretary

Enclosures-2

2 ENCL

NOT RECORDED
176 JUN 23 1954

ORIGINAL FILED IN

ALLISON

1997059

Office, Room 635
635 per [illegible]

SAC, Baltimore

July 9, 1954

Director, FBI (117-268)

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

Re SAC Letter No. 54-20 (L) dated 4-13-54, which listed addresses and phone numbers of Army agencies which could be contacted in the event of an atomic incident.

The New York office of the Bureau recently discussed the operations of Explosive Ordnance Disposal Units with Colonel Joseph A. Petrolino, First Army Ordnance officer. During the course of the discussion, Colonel Petrolino stated that at Aberdeen, Maryland, and at Indian Head, Maryland, there were atomic weapons which might be observed by Bureau Agents and suggested that viewing of such weapons might suggest new investigative techniques for their detection.

The Baltimore office, through its contacts at Aberdeen and Indian Head, Maryland, should determine what information is available regarding atomic weapons at these installations that would be helpful to the various field offices in detecting or recognizing atomic weapons or their component parts. It is not intended that any Agent of your office participate in any Explosive Ordnance Disposal course being given at these installations, but you should determine what information of possible assistance to the Bureau, including photographs or drawings of weapons and weapon components, might be available for Bureau use.

LW:rmq/mc

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Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Miss Gandy

MAILED 11
JUL 9 1954
COMM-FBI

68 JUL 14 1954

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4/10/00 BY SP4 BJA/LBM

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI (117-268)

DATE: 6/22/54

FROM SAC, New York (117-00)

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

Rebulet to NY, 4/21/54.

[redacted] Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), NYC, advised on 6/2/54 that the AEC has set up a Health and Safety Group which consists of technicians and personnel of the AEC. He stated this group is equipped to make a determination regarding suspected radioactive material. The equipment used, he stated, in making this determination consists chiefly of a Geiger counter or some variation thereof. b7C

[redacted] stated there are no monitoring teams as such and that AEC has passed this responsibility on to various Civil Defense units and have trained these units to recognize radioactive material. He further stated that the AEC has worked closely with the Coast Guard and United States Customs, has trained them in locating radioactive material aboard ships and has provided any technical assistance needed.

Regarding locating radioactive material aboard ships, [redacted] stated this is next to impossible without completely unloading the ship which of course, he stated, is impractical. b7C

[redacted] advised that the problem has never come up where any sizeable amount of radioactive material has been located. He stated at this point he would not be able to tell just exactly how AEC would handle the problem if a sizeable quantity of radioactive material were located. He stated, however, that this problem would be handled if and when it came up.

1 - NY 117-192

ARS:EMK

INDEXED RECORDED 8 JUN 24 1954

EX-SEC

DECLASSIFIED BY sp4 BJA/LBM
ON 4/8/00

As a point of information [redacted] stated uranium in its natural state is not fissionable, but through processes at various facilities such as Oak Ridge, Tennessee it is made fissionable.

If during the course of an investigation an agent discovered some material that appeared to be radioactive, [redacted] stated the procedure would be to call [redacted] and he would make the necessary arrangements to have a technician sent out from AEC who would make a determination as to the character of the alleged radioactive material. [redacted] stated he personally and his office would render every possible assistance in any case relating to an alleged atomic device. b7C

Colonel JOSEPH A. PETROLINO, First Army Ordnance Officer, Governors Island, New York, was interviewed on June 4, 1954. He advised he replaced Colonel G. W. VAUGHN, who retired on 4/30/54. Also present at this interview was [redacted] Explosive Ordnance Disposal Officer, who according to Colonel PETROLINO is the officer to be contacted regarding the location of any alleged atomic devise. [redacted] on call 24 hours daily and can be reached at WHitehall 4-7700, extension [redacted] or extension [redacted] b7C

Should this office receive a complaint regarding the location of an atomic device or part thereof and should the Army's assistance be required, Colonel PETROLINO stated a squad of eight men would be dispatched to the scene and they would proceed to disarm this device. He pointed out that in a matter of this nature time is of the essence, because if an actual atomic missile were located it would not be possible to immediately determine when it was set to explode. He stated that two men could disarm an average size implosion type atomic bomb in about 20 minutes. He further stated that there are several stages in disarming an atomic bomb and that as the disarming progresses the effectiveness of the bomb decreases.

Colonel PETROLINO related that detecting a concealed atomic device or part thereof, including radioactive matter when properly shielded, is almost an impossible job. He stated fissionable matter may be in all shapes and in all sizes and in all probability would be in a container which would shield the radioactive rays. He stated it is not always possible to detect fissionable material by weight in relation to size since it is quite possible to place a small amount in a large box.

Regarding the smuggling of an atomic bomb or parts thereof into this country, Colonel PETROLINO stated this could be accomplished [redacted]

b2
b7E

Colonel PETROLINO stated his unit is in the process of making a movie to be used in Civil Defense training which movie will be completed in about three months. He stated this movie will show the Army's method of operation from the time the atomic device is located until the bomb is rendered safe. This movie will run about 25 minutes.

Colonel PETROLINO stated that since the FBI has the overall responsibility for locating alleged atomic bombs or parts thereof he would suggest that the Bureau may desire to send some agents to either Aberdeen, Maryland or Indian Head, Maryland for a short period so

that they may observe atomic weapons and possibly develop some new investigative techniques which would aid in the detection of atomic weapons.

Colonel PETROLINO advised he would render every assistance requested and required by the FBI. He requested close liaison so that we may be informed of the latest atomic devices pointing out that this would aid in their detection.

No committments were made to Colonel PETROLINO. It is however suggested that if the Bureau does not have previous knowledge of these atomic weapons at Aberdeen, Maryland and Indian Head, Maryland, they may desire that Bureau representatives visit these installations to ascertain if they may afford any information that would aid in detecting or further recognizing atomic bombs or parts thereof or in any way be helpful in investigations of this nature. This information could then be disseminated throughout the field.

It is not suggested that liaison as such be arranged with Colonel PETROLINO at this time, but that he be periodically contacted so that we will be advised of new procedures with atomic weapons which might possibly help in the detection of these weapons.

~~SECRET~~

117-268

Date: June 21, 1954 REGISTERED AIR MAIL

To: Liaison Representative
Ottawa, Ontario, Canada

From: Director, FBI

Subject: TECHNICAL AIDS TO INVESTIGATION

4/18/00
CLASSIFIED BY SP4BIA/LBM
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X1 (6)
948742/950935/997059

Reference is made to the Bureau's memorandum of May 13, 1954, furnishing comments on the use of X-ray machines for the purpose of determining the presence of metallic substances in suspected baggage.

During a Censorship Refresher Course given by the Army and Air Force at Lowry Air Force Base, Colorado, a representative of the Department of State on June 14, 1954, indicated to the officers in attendance that it was his understanding that Soviet Bloc diplomatic pouches were being checked in the United States for the presence of atomic weapons. [redacted] (3)

b1

When there are further developments in this matter which can be related by you [redacted] you will be advised. (5)

b1

cc - Foreign Service Desk

LW:rmc

cc - 62-95702

Tolson
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Glavin
Harbo
Rosen
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Winterrowd
Tele. Room
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Miss Gandy

EX-123

RECORDED-16
INDEXED-16

COMM - FBI
JUN 22 1954
MAILED 2

~~SECRET~~

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COPY/pls

THE DIRECTOR June 17, 1954

L. V. BOARDMAN

COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

By memorandum of May 7, 1954, Pat Coyne suggested that the Joint IIC-ICIS Committee, dealing with countermeasures to detect and defend against the clandestine introduction and detonation of atomic weapons in the United States, consider the entire problem in view of recent information concerning Sovier thermonuclear (H- bomb) capabilities.

This memorandum was referred to the Joint Committee for consideration, and it was noted that the Joint Committee has been considering this matter since August, 1953, when it was first determined that the Soviets had succeeded in producing a thermonuclear explosion.

Attached hereto is an IIC-ICIS letter to Coyne briefing him on the activities of the Joint Committee in this connection and advising that these matters will be covered in future reports to the National Security Council.

A copy of the attached suggested letter has been furnished to each of the IIC members for his information.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that you sign the attached suggested letter as Chairman of the IIC and that it be forwarded to Coyne for his information.

Attachment

ASS:hke

ENCL

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

4/18/00 SP4 BJA/Bm

COPY/plb

June 17, 1954

Mr J. Patrick Coyne
IIC Representative on Internal Security
National Security Council
Washington 25, D. C.

Re: Calndestine Introduction of Atomic Weapons

Dear Mr. Coyne:

Reference is made to your memorandum of May 7, 1954, in which you suggest that the Joint Committee of the IIC and ICIS be directed to re-examine the above problem in its entirety in view of recent information concerning Soviet thermonuclear capabilities in the above-captioned field and that definitive recommendations be made to the internal security committees and, where necessary, to the National Security Council, in all areas requiring measures to defend against the clandestine introduction of atomic weapons.

The Joint Committee of the IIC and ICIS, since the first indication of a thermonuclear explosion by the Soviets in August 1953 has been proceeding on the assumption that the Soviets had the capability of producing thermonuclear weapons, suitable for clandestine introduction and detonation in place. The AEC has advised that the development of a technical device to detect thermonuclear materials, other than fissionable material, is highly improbable. On the other hand, they stated that fissionable material is necessary to the design of a thermonuclear weapon and those counter-measures already designed to prevent its introduction would be equally effective against clandestine thermonuclear weapons. The IIC and ICIS directed a letter to the Atomic Energy Commission on March 12, 1954, after the commencement of the Pacific tests, requesting more complete information concerning the recognizable characteristics of the thermonuclear components. This was predicated on comments made by representatives of the Atomic Energy Commission on December 7, 1953, when a thermonuclear briefing was given to representatives of the IIC, ICIS, NCS and to the Attorney General, that after the Pacific tests more complete data would be furnished the IIC and ICIS.

4/1800 SPY BJA/LBM

ENCLOSURE

COPY/plb

In addition, a Department of Defense report on the effects of thermonuclear weapons, requested by the IIC and ICIS, is currently being studied in the Joint Committee.

In your memorandum you point up the need for considering the thermonuclear capabilities of the Soviets in consideration of certain serious internal security problems, particularly, as regards such matters as border and coastal patrols, control of non-military air traffic, theexamination of express, freight and other shipments entering the U. S., etc.; pointing out that several of these matters have not as yet been the subject of detailed and definitive recommendations to the IIC, the ICIS or the NSC. These matters are currently under active consideration by the interested ICIS subcommittees, and when the requested information is received from the Atomic Energy Commission, it will be studied with a view to making definitive recommendations on those matter.

The foregoing is for your information. The substance thereof will be included in future reports to the Council.

Sincerely,

J. Edgar Hoover
Chairman, Interdepartmental
Intelligence Conference

Thomas J. Donegan
Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee
on Internal Security

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: June 24, 1954

FROM : R. R. ROACH

~~SECRET~~

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
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Mohr
Parsons
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Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFENSE AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

At an IIC Working Committee meeting on April 7, 1954, it was noted [redacted] (S)

This inquiry was motivated as a result of newspaper articles which carried the text of the document supplied by the FBI to all law enforcement agencies with the January issue of the Law Enforcement Bulletin. The document was released to the press, with Bureau knowledge, by a representative of the National Security Council Staff. [redacted] (S)

b1

At the IIC Working Committee meeting, it was noted that the military services in some foreign countries must depend upon the local friendly governments for protection of U.S. bases and installations. The military members of the committee desired to know if it would be permissible for them to furnish to these friendly governments the document prepared by the IIC-ICIS Joint Committee for federal law enforcement agencies, which contains a slight amount of information in addition to that contained in the document disseminated to all law enforcement agencies. Inasmuch as the dissemination of this document to federal law enforcement agencies was approved by the NSC, it was agreed that a letter should be directed to the Executive Secretary of the NSC to determine if any objection would be made to the dissemination of this document to [redacted] those countries referred to by the military members of the committee. An IIC letter was sent to the Executive Secretary of the NSC on May 24, 1954. (S)

b1

Due to the lapse of time, this matter was discussed with Pat Coyne by Special Agent Edward S. Sanders on June 9, 1954, at which time Coyne stated there is definitely no objection

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RECORDED - 97

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~

to this unclassified document being furnished [redacted] official use only. He noted that there is some hesitancy (S) b1
to give open authority for the military people to disseminate this information to any foreign government as they see fit. He advised that dissemination [redacted] could proceed, however, (S) without awaiting a formal reply from the NSC Staff which would be forthcoming within a few days. Coyne was recontacted by Philcox on 6/23/54, at which time he advised that the formal reply may not be forthcoming for some time due to other pressing matters.

Two copies of this unclassified document were furnished [redacted] by Special Agent Edward S. Sanders on (S) June 10, 1954, and it was pointed out [redacted] that, (S) b1
although this is an unclassified document, it had been disseminated to U.S. law enforcement agencies for their official use only and that it was being furnished [redacted] with the explicit under- (S) standing that it would be restricted to official use only [redacted] (S)

RECOMMENDATION:

The foregoing is for your information.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: June 17, 1954

FROM : L. V. BOARDMAN

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES REQUIRED TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Glavin
Harbo
Rosen
Tamm
Tracy
Mohr
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Miss Gandy

By memorandum dated December 29, 1952, the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council advised the IIC and the ICIS that the President had on that date authorized implementation, as a broad guide, of the recommendations which had been made for countermeasures to detect and defend against the clandestine introduction and detonation of atomic weapons in the United States. The memorandum of December 29, 1952, advised that the implementation of the recommendations should be under the coordination of the IIC and the ICIS in conjunction with the Atomic Energy Commission.

As you know, one of the major objectives in this countermeasure program has been the development of technical devices which would detect fissionable material. The Atomic Energy Commission has developed a passive (nonlethal) type of detection device which can be used by the Customs Service, Immigration and Naturalization Service and certain other departments of the Government. The devices are too large for logical use in investigative work, and the IIC agencies have followed the development of this device with the understanding that it, as well as others being worked upon, may be brought down to a size which would make them useful in investigative work.

EX-104 RECORDED - 94

An advisory group was established by the IIC-ICIS Committee dealing with these matters, and this group was composed of representatives from the Atomic Energy Commission, Treasury Department and the Immigration and Naturalization Service. This group has made recommendations for the location and use of the six detection devices which are being made available for field testing. The Joint Committee feels that in at least the initial phases of the field testing, it would be highly desirable if the well-qualified people from Treasury, AEC and INS who have worked on this project are made available for full-time duty.

Attached hereto are suggested IIC-ICIS letters addressed to the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Attorney General, suggesting that these individuals be made available on a full-time basis during the

Attachments (4)

ESS:hke

initial phases of the field testing for these devices. Also attached is a joint letter to Pat Coyne advising him of the status of this matter. Copies of the suggested letters have been made available to the other members of the IIC for approval or comment.

These developments in connection with technical detection devices are being closely followed by the IIC representatives in the Joint Committee in order to insure that every effort is made to develop devices which will be suitable for investigative work and to insure that all pertinent information is made available to the IIC agencies.

RECOMMENDATION:

If approved by you and the other members of the IIC, it is suggested that you sign the four attached suggested letters as Chairman of the IIC. It is noted that the letters have been prepared by the ICIS Secretary and they have been signed by the Chairman of the ICIS.

If approved and signed by you, the letters will be forwarded after approval has been obtained from the other IIC members.

June 18, 1954

Honorable Lewis L. Strauss
Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
Washington 25, D. C.

My dear Mr. Chairman:

Reference is made to Mr. Donegan's letter of March 11, 1954, advising you of the ICIS decision to create an advisory group consisting of representatives from the Coast Guard, the Bureau of Customs and the Immigration and Naturalization Service, with a technical advisor from the Atomic Energy Commission, for the purpose of making a study as to the most practicable means of adapting experimental devices for the detection of fissionable material being developed by the AEC for possible use at selected points of entry into the United States. In this letter you were requested to designate a technical advisor from the AEC to serve with this group and you complied with this request by designating Mr. Don Gale.

The Advisory Group has been functioning since March 22, and has submitted reports to the IIC and ICIS in which recommendations were made as to the utilization of the six prototype passive detection devices which the AEC has advised will be available by approximately June 21. Representatives of AEC have further advised that it will make these devices available without cost to the operating agencies until such time as the agencies are in a position to take title to the devices. In addition, the AEC has instructed the Naval Research Laboratory (its contractor) to package the six devices for transshipment and utilization by the operating agencies, and it is proposed that the using agencies will accept delivery at NRL.

The services of Mr. Gale and the other members of the Advisory Group will be required on a full-time basis when necessary to supervise the installation of these devices (two at Idlewild Airport, three at passenger piers at New York harbor, and one at the International Airport at San Antonio, Texas) and to monitor the field testing of these devices and make recommendations to the IIC and the ICIS on the basis of the facts developed concerning procurement and installation of additional devices. The Committees believe that the field testing of the six devices can best be accomplished at the indicated locations.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4/18/94 BY SP4 BJA/LCM

RECORDED - 94

Sent over to ICIS for delivery to AEC 6/21/54 ESS per phone

JUN 28 1954 FBI file copy

The Advisory Group has recommended, and the Committees concur in the recommendation, that because of the delicate problems which may arise in connection with the utilization of these devices on an experimental basis, especially in relation to the surreptitious examination of diplomatic baggage with these devices, the operating agencies should designate officers of high caliber to participate in the operation of this program, at least during its preliminary stages.

Representatives of the Treasury Department have informally advised that it will accept responsibility for the administration of this detection device program and that the Bureau of Customs will have the administrative responsibility therefor within that department. In addition, the Committees have also been informally advised that the Coast Guard and Bureau of Customs will absorb the cost of this program in their normal operating expenses for Fiscal Year 1955 with the clear understanding that Customs and Coast Guard cannot pay for the six devices being furnished by AEC nor can they purchase devices which would be utilized in any expansion of this program without the appropriation of additional funds.

At a later date when recommendations are made to the National Security Council concerning the number of devices needed for fuller coverage of the legal points of entry into the United States, the report will cover the cost of the six devices on loan from the AEC as well as budget estimates on the whole detection device program. After operating experience has been gained with the six devices it should be possible for the agencies concerned to list their actual requirements for an expansion of this program.

The participation of the Immigration and Naturalization Service in the present program is limited but it is anticipated that INS will take a much more active part in this program when a device, suitable for use at highway check points, is developed.

The substance of the foregoing will be included in future reports to the National Security Council, and it is requested that you take whatever action is necessary within your agency to effect immediate implementation of the foregoing program.

The Committees appreciate the excellent cooperation being given by the Atomic Energy Commission in this important internal security program.

Sincerely,

J. Edgar Hoover
Chairman, Interdepartmental
Intelligence Conference

Thomas J. Donegan
Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee
on Internal Security

June 18, 1954

Mr. J. Patrick Coyne
NSC Representative on Internal Security
National Security Council
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Coyne:

The Joint IIC-ICIS Committee which is concerned with the coordination of countermeasures against the clandestine introduction of atomic weapons recommended that a study be made of the most practicable means of adapting experimental devices (passive and radiographic models for the detection of fissionable material) being developed by the Atomic Energy Commission for possible use at selected points utilized for the entry of persons and/or materials into the United States. Pursuant to that recommendation, the ICIS approved the creation of an Advisory Group consisting of representatives from the Coast Guard, the Bureau of Customs, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service, with a Technical Advisor from the Atomic Energy Commission for the purpose of planning and supervising the installation of these devices at certain of the ports of entry through which Soviet and satellite diplomatic personnel are channeled pursuant to Paragraph 20 b (6) of NSC 5408. (Since use of these devices by the IIC agencies depends upon portability and in view of the experimental nature of this immediate program, installation at this time is being limited to ICIS agencies.) In addition, the AEC was requested to make available six of the prototype passive devices for this field testing.

By letter of March 11, 1954, the indicated agencies were requested to designate representatives to serve on the Advisory Group. The Advisory Group has been functioning since March 22, and has submitted reports to the Joint IIC-ICIS Committee in which recommendations were made as to the utilization of the six prototype passive detection devices which the AEC has advised will be available by approximately June 21. AEC has further advised that it would make the devices available without cost to the operating agencies until such time as the agencies are in a position to take title to the devices. In addition, the AEC has instructed the Naval Research Laboratory (its contractor) to package the six devices for transshipment and utilization by the operating agencies, and it is proposed that the using agencies will accept delivery at NRL. ENCLOSURE

FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-28-00 BY SP4 BJM/LBW

RECORDED - 94

EX. - 104

18 JUN 25 1954 FBI

Original sent over to ICIS for delivery - 6/28/54 ESS per hand

This is FBI file copy

The services of the present Advisory Group will be required on a full-time basis, when necessary to supervise the installation of these devices (two at Idlewild Airport, three at passenger piers in New York harbor, and one at the International Airport at San Antonio, Texas) and to monitor the field testing of these devices and make recommendations to theIIC and the ICIS, on the basis of the facts developed, concerning procurement and installation of additional devices. The Committees believe that the field testing of the six devices can best be accomplished at the indicated locations. The operation of the devices is not intended to afford full or complete protection at the above ports of entry, but is to serve as a basis for additional recommendations at a later date for coverage not only at the visa designated ports but at other ports of entry as well.

The Advisory Group has recommended, and the Committees concur in the recommendation, that because of the delicate problems which may arise in connection with the utilization of these devices on an experimental basis, especially in relation to the surreptitious examination of diplomatic baggage with these devices, the operating agencies should designate officers of high caliber to participate in the operation of this program, at least during its preliminary stages.

The Department of the Treasury has informally advised that it will accept responsibility for the administration of this detection device program and that the Bureau of Customs will have the responsibility therefor within that Department. It is estimated that for the Fiscal Year 1955, implementation of the program involving the six devices will cost approximately $79,000. In addition, it is estimated that the cost of operating these six devices in Fiscal Years 1956, 1957 and 1958 will be approximately $57,000 per year. In this connection the Bureau of Customs and the Coast Guard, upon whom the principal expenditures would fall, have advised that they would absorb the cost of this program for the Fiscal Year 1955 in their normal operating expenses. It is understood that Customs and Coast Guard can not pay for the six devices being supplied by AEC, nor can they purchase devices which would be utilized in any expansion of this program without the appropriation of additional funds.

At a later date when the Committees report on the number of devices recommended for fuller coverage of the legal points of entry, the report will cover the cost of the six devices on loan from the Atomic Energy Commission as well as budget estimates on the whole detection device program. After operating experience has been gained with the six devices, it will be possible for the agencies concerned to list their actual requirements for an expansion of this program.

The participation of the Immigration and Naturalization Service in the present program is a limited one but it is anticipated that INS will take a much more active part in the program when a device suitable for use at highway check points is developed.

The Departments of Justice and Treasury and the Atomic Energy Commission are being requested to take whatever action is necessary in their respective agencies to effect immediate implementation of the program outlined above.

The foregoing is for your information. The substance thereof will be included in future reports to the Council.

Sincerely,

J. Edgar Hoover
Chairman, Interdepartmental
Intelligence Conference

Thomas J. Donegan
Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee
on Internal Security

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RECORDED-27

117-268-C 32

Date: June 24, 1954 BY COURIER SERVICE

To: Mr. Chester A. Emerick
Deputy Commissioner, Investigations
Bureau of Customs
Room 7048
Internal Revenue Service Building
Washington 25, D. C.

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC WEAPONS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES

Reference is made to the letter from the Commissioner of Customs, dated January 9, 1952, requesting information concerning certain individuals, firms or organizations, in order that they or shipments with which they are connected may be given more thorough Customs treatment upon arrival in the United States.

You may wish to consider [redacted]

b7C

In accordance with the referenced letter, it is understood that only the names and addresses above will be furnished to your field office to be included in its Watch List. Any information which you receive regarding [redacted] would be of interest to this Bureau.

b7C

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Glavin
Harbo
Rosen
Tamm
Tracy
Mohr
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Miss Gandy

cc - 2 - Newark (117-72) (For Info)

APL:rmc

cc - 100-319058

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

JUN 1954

COMM - FBI

DECLASSIFIED BY SP4 BJA/LBM ON 4/18/00

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268) DATE: 6/21/54

FROM : SAC, NEWARK (117-72)

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

Re No Number SAC letter A, Series 1952, dated 1/28/52,
No Number SAC letter U, Series 1951, dated 12/13/51,
No Number SAC letter F, Series 1951, dated 10/5/51.

It is believed the following individual should be placed on the Customs Watch List in accordance with referenced Bulets:

Newark File

Bureau File [redacted] b7C

Name [redacted]

Address

Business

Reason [redacted] b7C

REGISTERED MAIL

JRL:AM

RECORDED-27

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

117-268

RECORDED 86

Date: June 28, 1954 BY COURIER SERVICE

To: Mr. Chester A. Emerick
Deputy Commissioner, Investigations
Bureau of Customs
Room 7048
Internal Revenue Service Building
Washington 25, D. C.

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES

b7C

Reference is made to the letter from the Commissioner of Customs dated January 9, 1952, requesting information with regard to certain individuals, firms or organizations, in order that they, or shipments with which they are connected, may be given more thorough customs treatment upon arrival in the United States.

By letter dated April 19, 1952, [redacted] was offered for your consideration in connection with this matter. Since the date of my referenced letter, [redacted] b7C moved. His new residence address is [redacted]

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

In accordance with the referenced letter it is understood that only the names and addresses above will be furnished to your field force to be included in its Watch List. Any information which you receive regarding [redacted] would be of interest to the Bureau. b7C

NOTE: [redacted] b1

[redacted] should remain on the Bureau of Customs Watch List.

cc - [redacted] b7C

RGJ:ejf:ph:mrh

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Nichols
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Tele. Room
Holloman
Miss Gandy

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268)

DATE: June 16, 1954

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (117-110)

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES

Re Pittsburgh letter to Director dated April 8, 1954, requesting Chicago to submit recommendations to Bureau with regard to [redacted] as to whether this individual should remain on the Bureau of Customs Watch list.

b7C

Attached hereto are an original and four copies of a blank memorandum concerning reasons for retention of [redacted] on Bureau of Customs Watch list.

REGISTERED

Encl. (1)

[redacted]

b7C

CS:PEH

RECORDED - 86

EX-123

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4/18/00 BY SP4 BJA/LBm

"X"

S/4789

29 June 1954.

Please refer to your 10616 dated June 2, 1954 in which reference was made to radio reports to the effect that the British Government had alerted port authorities and customs officials to watch for attempts to smuggle into Great Britain atomic materials.

We have been informed by our Head Office that the radio reports referred to were possibly based on an article which appeared in the London Daily Express of 22 May 1954. This press report was almost wholly inaccurate, and no instructions have been issued to port authorities and customs officials on this subject.

(5) b1

4/18/00 NLS/BJA/RNP 60267 AAG
9487482/950935/997059

RECORDED - 86
INDEXED - 86

(5) b1

~~SECRET~~

62-95702

Date: June 21, 1954 VIA LIAISON

To: Mr. Dennis A. Flinn
Director
Office of Security
Department of State
515 22nd Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

DECLASSIFIED BY SP4BTA/LBM
ON 4/18/00
#948742/950935/997059

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: CENSORSHIP PLANNING

Mr. James H. Ennis, of the Executive Staff of the Special Assistant - Intelligence, Department of State, spoke before a Censorship Refresher Course for Army and Air Force reserve officers at Lowry Air Force Base, Colorado, June 14, 1954. During the course of his remarks, he stated, without specifying the date or country involved, that a Soviet Bloc diplomatic pouch had been opened by U. S. authorities, and a document intended for publication in the "Daily Worker" had been found therein. Mr. Ennis also stated that it was his understanding that Soviet Bloc diplomatic pouches were being checked for atomic weapons.

Could you furnish details regarding the incident of the opening of the Soviet Bloc diplomatic pouch mentioned by Mr. Ennis?

The most recent Bureau of Customs circular available to this Bureau, dated June 1, 1954, regarding reciprocal treatment of incoming and outgoing baggage and effects of diplomatic personnel from Soviet Bloc countries, contains no instructions regarding checking Soviet Bloc diplomatic pouches for atomic weapons. Could you furnish the facts with regard to this matter as they existed on June 14, 1954?

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Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Miss Gandy

LW:rmc
cc - 117-268

NOT RECORDED
106 JUL 28 1954

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FD-36

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Nich[illegible]
Mr. Belm[illegible]
Mr. H[illegible]
Mr. M[illegible]
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. Tamm
Mr. S[illegible]
M[illegible]
Tele. R[illegible]
Mr. H[illegible]
Miss G[illegible]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

AIRTEL

Transmit the following ~~TELETYPE~~ message to: VIA AIR MAIL

FBI, OMAHA (105-287) 6/16/54

DIRECTOR, FBI

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC WEAPONS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE U. S.; AEA.

REBUTEL FIFTEENTH LAST. RUC REPORT SA [redacted] MAILED AMSD TO [redacted] b7C

BUREAU AND NEW YORK FIFTEENTH LAST. RUC.

WILLIAMS

END

REM:EOD

Mr. Belmont

RECORDED-96

EX-103

DATE 4/18/00 SP4 BJM/bm

BRANIGAN

Approved:_____ Sent_____M Per_____

Special Agent in Charge

FBI files

COPY

E OFFICE OF THE
...TIONAL SECURITY C...NCIL
WASHINGTON

June 25, 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. J. Edgar Hoover
Chairman, Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference

Mr. Thomas J. Donegan
Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security

SUBJECT: Clandestine Introduction of Atomic Weapons.

I wish to acknowledge for Mr. Lay your request of May 24 for views regarding the three recommendations contained therein.

The data referred to in your letter involves two separate but related items, both of which are contained in the joint IIC-ICIS report on the subject dated August 7, 1953. (The first item is "Enclosure C" of that report; the second is "Enclosure B.")

Because "Enclosure C" is an unclassified report which has been released to the public with appropriate authorization, there can, of course, be no objection to any further public release deemed necessary.

"Enclsure B" was originated by IIC and ICIS with the recommendation that it be distributed only to officers and employees of the Federal Government who are actively engaged in detection of and defense against atomic weapons introduced clandestinely. While this office must defer to the originators of this document as regards any additional distribution they consider appropriate, our views thereon follow for such purpose as they may serve:

(1) We agree with your recommendation that "Enclosure B" not be considered in the public domain (even though it was given limited public distribution due to its unauthorized release to the press by the Department of Defense).

(2) We agree with your recommendation that "Enclosure B" [redacted] b7D

(3) We do not agree fully with the recommendation that the military services be granted what would in effect be a carte blanche approval of its release to various (but unidentified) friendly foreign governments. While the reasons underlying release to certain foreign governments are unquestionably sound, it is suggested that the Internal Security Committees, as originators of "Enclosure B," consider release in each case on its individual merits, as requests therefor are made by the military services.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4/18/80 SP/SM/LEY

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RECORDED - 10 117-268

/s/ J. Patrick Coyne

COPY

J. Patrick Coyne

EX-129

13 JUL 9 195...

Original filing retained in official FBI files in the Security Office

117-268 This is FBI File copy

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

117-268

Date: July 9, 1954 BY COURIER SERVICE

To: Mr. Chester A. Emerick
Deputy Commissioner, Investigations
Bureau of Customs
Room 7048
Internal Revenue Service Building
Washington 25, D. C.

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC WEAPONS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES

Reference is made to the memorandum from this Bureau dated April 19, 1952, furnishing for your consideration the name of [redacted] b7C

[redacted]

For the completion of your records, [redacted]

[redacted]

LW:rmc

EX-123

cc - [redacted] b7C

RECORDED - 69
BY COURIER SVC.
2 - JUL 12
COMM - FBI

117-268-
JUL 13 1954
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Tolson
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Miss Gandy

21 JUL 21 1954

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED BY SP4 BJA/LBM
ON 4/18/00

INDEXED COPY FILED IN

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

cc - Mr. Philcox

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: July 7, 1954

FROM : W. A. Branigan

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Glavin
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Tamm
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Mohr
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Miss Gandy

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC WEAPONS AND PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES

At 11:35 a.m., July 6, 1954, Commander Clark, U.S. Coast Guard, who heads the Advisory Group of representatives from Coast Guard, Customs, Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the Atomic Energy Commission, who will supervise the field testing of passive detection devices for the discovery of fissionable material, phoned the Bureau.

Commander Clark stated that he had received word from the Naval Research Laboratory that it would not have the detection devices packaged and ready for delivery to the Treasury Department before August 1, 1954, since the Naval Research Laboratory had not yet received the six promised devices from the manufacturer.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is respectfully recommended that these facts be brought to the attention of the Working Committee of the IIC.

4/18/cc SP4 BJA/lbm

RECORDED 117-

117-268
LW:rmc

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

July 6, 1954

Mr. John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
United States Department of Justice
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Hoover:

It was indeed thoughtful and gracious of you to write me your letter of July 1, commending my recent talk at the Self-Protection Conference at the University of Pennsylvania.

It certainly was no effort on my part to give the FBI "a plug," for, having been a former agent, I am keenly aware of the problems that arise as the result either of late reporting or ill-channeled reporting. Also, in a sense, I suppose I was being selfish, in that it makes my work a great deal easier if cases are properly handled at the outset, and I am sure that the SAC's in the various offices where we have plant locations will testify that I have tried to be diligent in seeing to it that anything that comes under FBI jurisdiction is promptly and accurately reported to the nearest Field Office.

Again, thanks for your recognition.

Sincerely yours,

[redacted]

b7C

11/18/00 SP4BJA/LSM

RCA Pioneered and Developed Compatible Color Television

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: July 1, 1954

FROM : L. V. BOARDMAN

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

Tolson
Boardman
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Gandy

By letter dated May 19, 1954, the Federal Civil Defense Administration forwarded for IIC comment and coordination an FCDA policy paper which that Administration proposed to issue to state and local civil defense directors concerning recommended civil defense action in relation to clandestinely introduced nuclear devices. The policy paper would be accompanied by the same information as that furnished by the FBI to all law enforcement agencies on January 1, 1954. That information was designed to assist local police in recognizing a clandestine nuclear weapon. On the same date, an identical letter was addressed by FCDA to the ICIS for the same purpose. The FCDA had been instructed by the National Security Council to submit any information they proposed to release to the two committees for comment inasmuch as the two committees are charged with coordinating the implementation of countermeasures designed to prevent the clandestine introduction of atomic weapons.

There is, of course, no objection to the FCDA furnishing the information to state and local civil defense directors that was furnished to law enforcement agencies by the Bureau. The Bureau dissemination was made in accordance with NSC approval. The FCDA policy paper designed to accompany that information when it is disseminated to local FCDA Directors contains a statement, however, that the FBI is charged with determining whether a suspected object is probably a nuclear device and with immediately transmitting the warning to local governing officials. The FCDA letter indicates that civil defense plans will be activated by local decision upon receipt of warning from the FBI that a suspected object is probably a nuclear weapon.

The policy matters which have been raised by the FCDA letter have received considerable discussion within the Joint Committee and within the ICIS inasmuch as the interests of various departments were directly affected. The IIC members and the ICIS members are of the opinion that plans must be made for the coordination of the action to be taken by local civil defense officials with action to be taken by the military

Attachment

RECORDED - 93

ESS; NWP: hke

LIAISON

agencies and certain nonmilitary agencies in the event a clandestine atomic weapon is found.

Attached hereto is a suggested IIC-ICIS letter to the Federal Civil Defense Administration which advises that normally local authorities should be notified only after the Explosive Ordnance Disposal Unit called in by the Bureau either identifies the object as a nuclear weapon or has reason to believe that it may be a nuclear weapon. The letter notes that it is outside the purview of the committees to determine when evacuation measures should be put into effect but notes that the committees recognize that plans for such action should be coordinated with the plans of the military agencies who are responsible for the defense of the country and with the plans of the Office of Defense Mobilization which has the responsibility for the planning for the continuity of Government. The letter suggests that FCDA coordinate this matter with the military and with ODM. The letter further notes that the two committees are not coordinating the FCDA paper with all departments and agencies who might have an interest therein inasmuch as the paper raises policy questions which are outside the purview of the two committees.

The FCDA states that the local civil defense authorities should be notified by the FBI of the existence of a possible fissionable weapon when such is located. Although the Bureau assumes responsibility for the investigation surrounding the existence of the weapon in a particular location and calls in the Explosive Ordnance Disposal Unit to identify the object as a fissionable weapon, it is not the responsibility of the FBI to advise local civil defense authorities as to the existence of the weapon. The question as to which agency will advise civil defense authorities in the event such a weapon is found has been discussed by the IIC and the ICIS, but an agreement has not yet been reached on this point. FCDA is being advised in the attached letter that this question is still under consideration and that they will be advised accordingly when an agreement is reached. This matter will be followed closely and, when FCDA plans are finally coordinated with the military and the Office of Defense Mobilization, our Agents in Charge can then be given appropriate instructions.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is suggested that you sign the attached IIC-ICIS letter as Chairman of the IIC. It has been apprcved by the

other members of the IIC and the ICIS. Final coordination was received from the IIC agencies and ICIS on June 30, 1954, after repeated contacts and after considerable pressure had been applied to expedite this matter. After the letter has been signed by you, the signature of the Chairman of the ICIS will be obtained and the letter will be forwarded to FCDA.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

cc - Mr. Philcox

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: July 8, 1954

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Glavin
Harbo
Rosen
Tamm
Tracy
Mohr
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Miss Gandy

FROM : W. A. Branigan

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION IN PLACE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

At 2:48 p.m., July 7, 1954, Lieutenant Colonel Ralph Gahl, Atomic Energy Commission technical adviser to the Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures, phoned and informed Supervisor Whitson, the Bureau's representative on the Joint Committee, that AEC and the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project would be ready at the end of another week to furnish a briefing to IIC and ICIS on thermonuclear components of fusion weapons. He requested information regarding suitable dates and persons to receive the briefing.

Colonel Gahl stated that there had been some discussion in ICIS about abolishing the Joint Committee because it duplicated to some extent the work of one of the subcommittees of ICIS. Colonel Gahl was informed that Mr. Barrett McDonnell, of the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice, had on July 6, indicated that AEC had raised the question of duplication of functions. Colonel Gahl was told that the IIC would not comment on the subcommittee structure of ICIS, but that the Joint Committee was operating under the express instructions of the National Security Council, and any change in those instructions should, of course, come from the National Security Council.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that the Working Committee of IIC be advised of the possibility of the above briefing and that it furnish, as soon as possible, dates acceptable to IIC, as well as names of persons in IIC agencies who should receive a thermonuclear briefing.

RECORDED

LW: rmc

DIRECTOR, FBI [redacted] 7/1/54

SAC, WFO [redacted] b7C

[redacted]

INTERNAL SECURITY - R

Re Pittsburgh letter to Director dated 4/8/54 captioned, "SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES."

Based upon a review of the subject's file in this office, including a review of a recent interview with the subject, as set forth in re WFOlet dated 6/24/54, it is the recommendation of the WFO that the subject should not be included on the Bureau of Customs Watch List at this time.

In the event that any information comes to the attention of this office in the future, indicating [redacted] should be reconsidered for inclusion on the Bureau of Customs Watch List, the Bureau will be promptly advised. b7C

HEC:dgt

1 - Bufile 117-268
1 - WFO 117-151

[redacted] FILED
193 JUL 12 1954

[redacted]

4/18/00 [redacted]

[redacted]

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: July 7, 1954

FROM : MR. A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC WEAPONS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE U. S.

Tolson
Boardman
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Glavin
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Miss Gandy

The Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS) assigned to its Subcommittee on Foreign Diplomatic and Official Personnel the study of procedures to be taken in the event Customs detected fissionable material in a diplomatic shipment. By memorandum, 5-24-54, Branigan to Belmont, comment was made regarding a draft which had been submitted by the ICIS Subcommittee. It was pointed out that the Subcommittee had made no provision for action to be taken except where positive identification of fissionable material had been made.

On July 2, 1954, Mr. Barrett McDonnell of the Criminal Division furnished to Bureau liaison a memorandum dated June 11, 1954, from the Chairman of the ICIS Standing Committee to the ICIS recommending that where positive identification of fissionable material in diplomatic baggage is not possible the local office of the FBI should be notified immediately by Customs and neither the Soviet bloc official nor the baggage should be detained. The ICIS Standing Committee recommended further that the FBI should not take action beyond surveillance except with consultation and approval of the State Department and other appropriate agencies.

RECOMMENDATION:

When this matter is formally presented to the Bureau for comment our position should be that the ICIS has no jurisdiction to regulate in any way the handling of our investigations and the ICIS recommendation should terminate with the above-mentioned instructions to the Bureau of Customs.

JUL 16 1954

117-268
LW:plv

LIAISON

June 11, 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security

FROM: Chairman, ICIS Standing Committee

SUBJECT: Procedures to be taken in the event of detection of fissionable material in diplomatic shipments.

SMUGGLING Atom Bombs

Enclosed is a report dated June 1, 1954, which has been prepared by the Subcommittee on Foreign Diplomatic and Official Personnel on the above subject. The report was considered by the Standing Committee on 10 June 1954.

It is the view of the Standing Committee that procedures predicated upon an assumption that positive identification of the presence of fissionable material is possible, short of manual examination, are not capable of implementation in the present stage of development of detection devices. It was noted, however, that experience in the use of detection devices may make possible a degree of skill on the part of the operators of devices which will approach a capability for positive identification. While this experience is being accumulated the present report (except paragraphs 6 and 7), it was agreed, should be noted and held in abeyance. Paragraphs 6 and 7 should be combined as follows and put into effect:

> "If the detection device indicates the possible presence of fissionable material on the person or in the baggage of a Soviet bloc official, but positive identification is not possible, the local office of the FBI should be notified immediately by a representative of the Bureau of Customs. Neither the Soviet bloc official nor his baggage should be detained in these circumstances. The FBI shall not take action beyond what it may consider advisable in the surveillance of the official concerned except with consultation and approval of the Department of State and other appropriate agencies."

Accordingly the Standing Committee recommends that the ICIS:

1. Note the report of June 1, 1954 (except paragraphs 6 and 7) without approval or disapproval, and hold it in abeyance until further practical experience in the use of detection devices has been gained.

RECORDED - 8

FILE

2. Recommend that the NSC approve as policy the revision of paragraphs 6 and 7 set forth above.

Proposed FCDA Policy Paper.

THIS DOCUMENT WILL BE DE-CLASSIFIED PRIOR TO RELEASE. THE PRESENT CLASSIFICATION IS NECESSARY UNTIL SUCH TIME AS IT IS CLEARED WITH THE INTERDE-PARTMENTAL COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL SECURITY.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

January 1, 1954

TO ALL LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS

On December 15, 1953, the White House released a statement by the President requesting that all enforcement officers, both Federal and state, report all information relating to violations of the Atomic Energy Act to the nearest field representative of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. A copy of the statement by the President is attached. There is also attached for your information a description of atomic devices and component parts, the release of which has been approved by the Atomic Energy Commission, the National Security Council, and the President in order that you may be better able to recognize atomic devices or parts of atomic devices which might come to your attention.

The President and the National Security Council have designated certain Explosive Ordnance Disposal Units operating under the jurisdiction of the Department of the Army as having the responsibility for disarming any atomic weapon. The disposal of disarmed fissionable weapons and the disposal of fissionable material are by law the responsibility of the Atomic Energy Commission. Therefore, it is suggested that information regarding fissionable material or atomic weapons be reported promptly to the nearest representative of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and that no attempt be made on the part of an individual law enforcement officer to dismantle an apparent atomic device.

Very truly yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

Attachment

DATE 4/19/00 BY SP4 BJA/LBM

December 15, 1953

THE WHITE HOUSE

Statement by the President

On September 6, 1939, January 8, 1943, and July 24, 1950, Presidential Directives were issued requesting all enforcement officers, both Federal and state, to report promptly all information relating to espionage, sabotage, subversive activities and related matters to the nearest field representative of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation is charged with investigating all violations of the Atomic Energy Act, including the illegal export or import of fissionable material, the illegal possession or transportation of fissionable material and the illegal production, transfer, or possession of any equipment or device utilizing fissionable material or atomic energy as a military weapon. "Fissionable material" means plutonium, uranium-235 or other material which the Atomic Energy Commission has determined to be capable of releasing substantial quantities of energy through nuclear chain reaction. I am requesting that all enforcement officers, both Federal and state, report all information relating to violations of the Atomic Energy Act to the nearest field representative of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

I suggest that all patriotic organizations and individuals likewise report all such information to the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the same manner.

4/18/00 SP4 BJA/LBM

December 21, 1953

INFORMATION FOR RELEASE TO REPRESENTATIVES
OF DULY CONSTITUTED LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES

DESCRIPTION OF ATOMIC DEVICES AND COMPONENT PARTS

In order that citizens of the United States may intelligently assist in the defense of our country, they should have sufficient information regarding atomic weapons to enable them to recognize bombs or parts of bombs which might be smuggled into the United States by enemy agents. It is impossible to describe exactly what a foreign atomic bomb will look like. On the other hand, it is possible to explain the basic ideas which will govern their design. For this explanation it is then possible to designate and describe those materials which must be essential to the construction of any atomic bomb.

Atomic explosions result when (1) certain amounts of fissionable material in two pieces or more are brought quickly together to form one piece of such material and when (2) a certain amount of fissionable material is quickly made more dense by squeezing it together. The important thing about each of these methods is that masses of fissionable material must be placed into rapid motion. We know that high explosives are capable of giving any material such necessary rapid motion.

In the first case we would look for some kind of a gun barrel device using high explosive to blow one piece of fissionable material from the breech end of the gun down through the barrel into another piece of fissionable material firmly anchored in the muzzle end of the gun.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4-14-00 BY SP4 BJA/LBM

In the second case we would look for a device using high explosive to squeeze fissionable material. To explain how such a device will work we must understand what is meant by "implosion." The significance of the word explosion is familiar to most people. Implosion signifies a bursting inwards as contrasted with the bursting outwards of an explosion. In order to obtain an implosion, however strange it may seem, explosive material is necessary. The scientists who worked on the first atom bomb needed an implosion in order to compress nuclear material enough to get an atomic "explosion." They solved their problem by forming a large sphere of explosive material. In a hole in the center of this sphere they placed the fissionable material they wanted to squeeze. Then instead of using one detonator to ignite the explosive sphere, they placed many detonators around it. These detonators were connected electrically in such a way that they could be fired simultaneously. If only one detonator had been used, one can easily understand that the sphere, having been ignited at only one point, would have exploded in the ordinary way; that is, with the exploding wave, which is another way of saying a fast burning wave, burning through the sphere from one side to the other. However, with many detonators igniting the sphere from all sides, the fast burning wave is essentially spherical in shape and burns inward toward the center of the sphere. When this fast burning imploding wave reaches the sphere of fissionable material, this mass has no place to be pushed except in upon itself and is thus compressed.

We have now explained very simply the basic ideas which govern atomic bomb design. Looking back at these ideas, we note that two essential features of the gun-type device are the gun barrel itself and fissionable material, and two essential features of the implosion type device are high explosive charges that could be used to build a sphere and again fissionable material. We see by this that we will be able to help protect ourselves and our country if we can recognize any one of three essential components; namely,

1. *Fissionable material*
2. *Gun barrel type device*
3. *High explosives for implosion.*

In order to help us in our recognition of these essential components, we must learn something about them. *Fissionable material* *is uranium and/or plutonium which are EXTREMELY HEAVY metals weighing half again as much as lead of the same size. Fifty pounds of these heavy fissionable materials would be approximately five inches in diameter, if in the shape of a sphere - about the size of a softball. Since both of these metals can be coated with other metals or plastics and can be machined into all sorts of shapes, we should be especially alert regarding any article that is extremely heavy for its size. Pieces which might be smuggled would probably be of a size that could be carried on the person.*

The gun barrel type device will probably be made of steel. The diameter of the bore of such a gun barrel would probably not be less than two inches or more than ten inches. With such a range of inner diameters for the bore, we may expect the outer diameter of the gun barrel to range from about five inches as a minimum to about twelve inches as a maximum. Both ends of the barrel may be closed by breech block-type devices so that the bore of the gun will not be visible. It is possible, of course, that the gun tube and the two breech blocks may be carried as three separate pieces; in this case the inner bore may be visible. The fissionable material for this gun-type weapon may be concealed within, and usually at the ends of, the gun barrel or it may be carried in separate packages for later assembly within the barrel. We may visualize the gun-type device then as one in which a projectile of fissionable material is fired down a gun barrel into another plug of fissionable material in the muzzle of the gun barrel. The length of the entire device need not exceed about two and one-half feet.

The High explosives of implosion will probably be in specially fabricated shapes one side of which will be a part of a spherical surface. Most high explosives are light tan in color, have a soapy feel and are half again as heavy as an equal quantity of water.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: July 21, 1954

FROM : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

Tolson
Boardman
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Tele. Room
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SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION IN PLACE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

By letter dated June 30, 1954, the Assistant Attorney General requested IIC and ICIS comments pertaining to proposed legislation which would provide for the payment to informers of rewards for information leading to the recovery or acquisition of atomic weapons or fissionable material which had been illegally introduced into the United States.

This matter was considered at the IIC Working Committee meeting on July 14, 1954. Attached hereto is a proposed IIC letter to Mr. Olney, with a copy designated for Assistant Attorney General Tompkins. The IIC letter suggests that provisions be made for payment for such information if furnished to the Treasury Department [redacted](S) b1 The letter suggests that the fine to be imposed against any United States officer for collusion should not be limited to $10,000 but should be in an amount at least equal to the amount received by such officer as a result of his collusion. These two suggestions were proposed in a memorandum from Mr. Belmont to me dated July 8, 1954, and were approved by you. The attached IIC letter further suggests that provisions be made for the payment for information leading to the recovery of any atomic weapon or fissionable material illegally manufactured or acquired in the United States, as well as information pertaining to any introduced into the United States. As now written, the proposed legislation covers only that which is introduced into the United States.

The letter has been approved by the military members of the IIC. The ICIS Executive Secretary has advised that a separate letter is being prepared by the ICIS.

EX-123 RECORDED-80 INDEXED-80

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that the attached letter be signed by you as IIC Chairman and forwarded to Mr. Olney. A copy will be made available to Tom Donegan, Chairman, ICIS, for his information.

Attachment Recd 7-26-54

ESS:bas

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4/18/00 NLS/BJA/LBM 60267 Derivative (1)

Per letter dtd 10/6/03 60267 tue/NLS/BJA/RNP 11/20/03

~~SECRET~~

July 1, 1954

RECORDED - 162 [illegible]

EX. - 113

VIA LIAISON

Honorable Val Peterson
Administrator
Federal Civil Defense Administration
Washington 25, D. C.

My dear Mr. Peterson:

Reference is made to your letters of May 19, 1954, furnishing for coordination by the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security a proposed Federal Civil Defense Administration Advisory Bulletin outlining protective measures proposed to be taken in the event of the discovery of clandestinely introduced nuclear weapons.

You suggest that local authorities should be able to look to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for immediate authoritative warning that a suspected object is probably a nuclear weapon. You further indicate the need for the activation of civil defense plans by local decision, including evacuation of the affected community, upon receipt of warning rather than for deferring such action until a national assessment of the situation has been made.

It is believed that the predication of local civil defense action upon a notification by the FBI that it was requesting the services of an Explosive Ordnance Disposal Unit would be premature. A request by the FBI for the services of an Explosive Ordnance Disposal Unit would be made where a likelihood exists that an object is a nuclear weapon. It appears that normally local authorities should be notified only after the Explosive Ordnance Disposal Unit either identifies the object as a nuclear weapon or has reason to believe that it may be a nuclear weapon. The question as to which agency will notify the local civil defense authorities after the determination has been made by the Explosive Ordnance Disposal Unit is still under consideration and you will be advised accordingly.

It is outside the responsibilities of the IIC and the ICIS to determine when evacuation measures should be put into

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4/14/00 BY SP2 BJA/LAM

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7/2/54 NWP

effect. It is recognized, however, that measures designed for the military protection of the United States as well as certain nonmilitary emergency programs, particularly those affecting continuity of Government operations, would be directly affected by the discovery of a clandestine nuclear weapon. You may desire, therefore, to provide for the coordination of the action to be taken by local civil defense officials with action of the military services and the Office of Defense Mobilization in the event they are notified that a nuclear weapon has been found or that an Ordnance Disposal Unit has reason to believe that an object which has been found is a nuclear weapon.

Pending the coordination suggested in the preceding paragraph, it is strongly recommended that an interim plan be adopted to alert the local civil defense authorities of the danger from clandestine nuclear weapons.

The IIC and the ICIS have reviewed the material submitted with your letters of May 19, 1954, and it is noted that the information furnished by the FBI to all law enforcement officials under date of January 1, 1954, is ~~that which was~~ approved by the National Security Council for such dissemination. There is no objection on the part of the IIC and the ICIS to that information being furnished to local civil defense officials.

The FCDA policy paper which was also submitted with your letters of May 19, 1954, has been reviewed by the IIC and the ICIS. Except for the comments above pertaining to notification of officials and agencies and the comments regarding the institution of evacuation measures, the committees have no comments to make concerning this paper. The question as to which agency will notify the local civil defense authorities of the existence of the weapon after the determination has been made by the Explosive Ordnance Disposal Unit is still under consideration and you will be advised accordingly. The FCDA policy paper has not been coordinated by the IIC and the ICIS with all departments and agencies who might have an interest therein inasmuch as it raises policy questions which are outside the duties and functions of the two committees.

In the event your coordination of civil defense aspects of this matter with the military aspects of this matter indicates

the necessity for changing the plan for notification outlined herein, it is requested that the two committees and the FBI be promptly advised.

Sincerely yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Chairman, Interdepartmental
Intelligence Conference

Thomas J. Donegan
Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee on
Internal Security

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

cc - Mr. Branigan
Mr. Sanders

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : L. V. Boardman

DATE: May 21, 1954

FROM : A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION IN PLACE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

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Miss Gandy

By memo Branigan to Belmont, 4-8-54, it was pointed out that on 4-8-54, Mr. Dario G. Barozzi of the Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA) had indicated that FCDA, in implementing recommendations contained in NSC 159/4 and NSC 5408, was supposed to afford guidance to local Civil Defense authorities in order to minimize danger to property and life in the event a clandestine atomic weapon was located. Barozzi indicated that the FCDA paper would recommend that the FBI would give immediate warning to the local government in the event a probable atomic weapon was discovered so that evacuation of the threatened community could take place.

It was pointed out to Mr. Barozzi on 4-8-54 that the FBI could not agree in every situation to afford immediate notification to local governmental officials since the question of national survival might outweigh the question of local survival and the international implications of finding a clandestine atomic weapon was so serious that the FBI would have to notify top officials of the Government in Washington and be bound by high policy decisions as to the timing of notification on a local level.

On 5-20-54, Bureau received a letter dated 5-19-54, from Val Peterson, Administrator of Federal Civil Defense, to the Director as Chairman of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, submitting a proposed FCDA bulletin to all state and local Civil Defense Directors placing upon the FBI the responsibility in each instance of immediately notifying the local authorities that a suspected object is probably a nuclear weapon in order that evacuation of the community concerned could be instituted promptly. This is contrary to the FBI position of Federal Government responsibility for timing of such notification.

RECOMMENDATION:

(1) Since this is a matter for IIC action, it is respectfully recommended that Peterson's letter be referred promptly to the Working Committee of the IIC and that the Bureau's position continue to be that the FBI will not be bound to immediately notify local governmental officials

LW:rmc

EX.-113

of the probability that a suspected item is an atomic weapon since the timing of such notification is a matter for high Government policy coordination, in other words, a weighing of national security against local damage. This matter should be of serious concern to the military members of the IIC since the timing of any Air Force or Naval air staging operations for defense or retaliation might be jeopardized by premature local disclosure.

5-24-54

ADDENDUM: (2) It is further recommended that the FBI position should be that, since the need for evacuation of a community under conditions of prospective enemy air attack is predicated upon notification by agencies of the Department of Defense, evacuation of a community by reason of a clandestine atomic weapon should be predicated upon notification from the appropriate agency of the Department of Defense. In other words, the notification to the local government should be made by the appropriate agency of the Department of Defense after the ordnance experts have seen the clandestine weapon or device and after national interests have been weighed on the highest executive levels in Washington.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

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PER LTR DTD 10/6/03
60207 UC/NLS/BJA/RMP 10/6/03

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. TOLSON

DATE: July 22, 1954

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FROM : L. B. MOHR

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

SUBJECT: INTENSIFIED COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM OF SOVIET AND SATELLITE OFFICIALS (S) (W)

Under date of July 21, 1954, we sent a Top Secret letter to Mr. Edwin L. Fisher, General Counsel, General Accounting Office (GAO), confirming the substance of a conference which Inspector Callahan had with Mr. Fisher on July 15, 1954, concerning the legality of the Bureau purchasing 100 additional automobiles from the [redacted] b1 b2 (S)

You will recall that there was some question as to whether we could utilize this fund for the purpose of buying the 100 additional cars and thereby increase our fleet of automobiles by the 100 cars.

Our letter to Mr. Fisher dated July 21, 1954, was to obtain confirmation of Mr. Fisher's previous opinion that we could purchase the cars and thereby increase our fleet. [redacted] b1 (S)

Mr. Fisher called me this morning and stated that he had received the letter from the Director and that he was perfectly happy to confirm the information he had furnished to Inspector Callahan. He said the only question he had in mind was whether their letter should [redacted] b1 (S)

I told Mr. Fisher that he had nothing to worry about on that score; that we definitely intended to include in our 1956 appropriation the fact that we had increased our authorized fleet by these 100 cars; and that if any question came up the Director would be able to answer, off the record, as to the manner in which these additional cars were obtained.

Mr. Fisher stated that under the circumstances the GAO would promptly submit a letter to us authorizing us to purchase the 100 additional cars [redacted] b1 (S)

JPM:mfs

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INDEXED - 93
EX. - 113

JUL 26 1954

~~SECRET~~

21 JUL 30 1954

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62-89452-
62-89434-

ENCLOSURE FILED IN

Memorandum to Mr. Tolson ~~SECRET~~ July 22, 1954

Re: Intensified Counterintelligence Program of Soviet and Satellite Officials (S) (W)

Mr. Fisher was very affable and said he was very glad to do this for the Director.

I expressed the Director's appreciation to him.

As soon as the letter is received from the GAO confirming Mr. Fisher's opinion we will go ahead and order the 100 additional cars and we will include in our 1956 appropriation material the fact that we have increased our fleet by 100 cars.

The foregoing is submitted for your information.

~~SECRET~~

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: July 23, 1954

FROM : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
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SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

SMUGGLING Atom Bombs

On December 7, 1953, representatives of the IIC and the ICIS were briefed by the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project in connection with developments in the atomic field having a bearing on the possibility of clandestine atomic weapons. At that time the AEC representatives advised that the IIC and ICIS representatives would be briefed again after the conclusion of the 1954 Spring tests being made in the Pacific concerning hydrogen weapons. The AEC has advised that the possibility exists that hydrogen weapons could be clandestinely introduced.

A briefing of IIC and ICIS representatives has now been scheduled for 10 a.m., July 27, 1954, in the Atomic Energy Building. AEC is being advised as to the identities of IIC representatives who will be present.

I suggest that Mr. Lish Whitson attend this briefing as a member of the IIC-ICIS Committee on countermeasures; that Special Agent Edward S. Sanders attend as the Executive Secretary of the IIC; that Mr. [redacted] Parsons attend as the FBI Technical Representative; and that I attend as a member of the IIC Working Committee. An invitation has been extended for you to attend this briefing if you so desire.

RECOMMENDATION:

If you approve, the AEC will be advised that Mr. Whitson, Mr. Sanders, Mr. Parsons, and I will attend the briefing on July 27, 1954. If your schedule will permit your attendance and you so desire, the AEC will be advised that you will attend this briefing.

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62-101138-

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EX-113

7-26-54 Cancel for GRE Cancel for Parsons

ESS:bas

51 AUG 4 1954

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4/18/00 BY SP4 BJA/LBM

cc - Mr. Belmont
Mr. Braniga
. Sanders
r. Conrad

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Tolson
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Holloman
Miss Gandy

TO : The Director

DATE: July 27, 1954

FROM : L. V. Boardman

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION IN PLACE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4/18/00 BY SP4 BJA/LCB

SYNOPSIS:

Thermonuclear weapons briefing given to representatives of Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference and Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security at Atomic Energy Commission building, 10 A.M., 7-27-54. Mr. J. P. Coyne, internal security representative, National Security Council, and Assistant Attorney General William F. Tompkins, Internal Security Division of Department, also present.

Study of Soviet nuclear tests in Fall of 1953 and U. S. tests in Pacific in Spring of 1954 indicate construction of thermonuclear weapon from component parts would require no more skill although more time than construction of implosion-type atomic weapon. [redacted]

[redacted]

Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) representative announced six passive detection devices would be available for installation at ports of entry by Customs, Immigration and Coast Guard, August 1. Sometime during September, a portable passive detection device would be ready for demonstration, and before end of October, X-ray type [redacted] radiographic detection device would be ready for demonstration. AEC will study preparation of document on thermonuclear components which may be disseminated to Federal enforcement personnel.

b2
b7E

RECOMMENDATION:

None. For your information. This will be followed with AEC through IIC representation on Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures.

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FY 130 117-388-5[illegible]

LW:rmg

67 AUG 10 19[illegible]

LIAISON

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DETAILS:

At the insistence of the Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures, AEC presented a briefing on thermonuclear weapon components to representatives of the IIC and the ICIS. Each of the agencies in those organizations was represented. In addition, Mr. J. P. Coyne, internal security representative, National Security Council, and Assistant Attorney General William F. Tompkins, Internal Security Division of the Department, were present. The briefing, which was given at 10 A.M., 7-27-54, was attended for the Bureau by Assistant to the Director Boardman and Supervisors E. S. Sanders, I. W. Conrad and L. Whitson.

The briefing was in two parts. First was a recapitulation of information already known to the Bureau regarding the estimated force of the last four Russian "shots." [redacted]

It was also pointed out that, in addition to the seismographic and sound measurements for spotting the time and place of Soviet tests, [redacted] b2 b7E more accurate locating of a nuclear explosion.

The U. S. thermonuclear tests in the Pacific during the Spring of 1954 were discussed. Data regarding yields had already been made available to the Bureau. It was pointed out that the [redacted]

Questions propounded brought out the fact that a thermonuclear weapon could be assembled by a person having the knowledge and skill required to assemble an atomic implosion weapon and that such assembly would take more time than the assembly of an atomic weapon because of the need for "tying in" the thermonuclear components. [redacted] b2 b7E In the use of a clandestine

[redacted]

Mr. Mackay Donkin, of Admiral Strauss' office, AEC, announced that the AEC would have available, by August 1, for delivery to Customs, Coast Guard and Immigration, six nonportable passive detection devices [redacted] b2 b7E

[redacted] *In September, AEC hoped to demonstrate a portable passive detection device. By the end of October, AEC hopes to have demonstrated radiographic detection devices utilizing not only the X-ray type of element but also* [redacted]

Mr. Donkin was asked when the AEC could prepare a paper on thermonuclear components that could be given to the working personnel of the Federal enforcement agencies on the assumption that the Soviets had already introduced fissionable material and would now seek to introduce into the United States the thermonuclear components.

Mr. Donkin stated that the AEC would study the matter over and would consult with the Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures.

~~SECRET~~

4/18/00
CLASSIFIED BY SP4 BJA/LCM
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (1)
PER LTR DTD 10/6/03
60267 uc/NLSI BJA/RNP 10/6/03

July 21, 1954

FBRS. FILES

Mr. Edwin L. Fisher
General Counsel
General Accounting Office
Room 7033
441 G Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Re: ~~Intensified~~ Counterintelligence Program ~~of~~ Soviet and Satellite Officials (S) (u) 1-13-98 ~~Declassify~~ Declassified 330,299 6

Dear Mr. Fisher:

This will confirm the substance of a conference with you under date of July 15, 1954, by Inspector W. P. Callahan of this Bureau, involving an issue concerning the authority, and legality thereof, on the part of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to purchase 100 additional automobiles to implement its investigative responsibilities under the above-captioned program.

In order that you may be aware of the facts in this matter, you are informed that during the Fall of 1953, as a result of a study made by the Planning Board of the National Security Council relative to the clandestine introduction of atomic weapons into the United States, the President, on November 24, 1953, instructed the FBI to expand its coverage of Communist bloc nationals in this country.

No funds had previously been made available for this activity. Accordingly, it was estimated by the Bureau that $4,095,000 would be necessary during the fiscal year 1955 to afford the coverage contenplated within the scope of the National Security Council Directive. Included in this over-all figure was an amount of $140,000 to provide for the purchase of 100 automobiles. Since the need for this equipment had been predicated wholly upon our specific commitments under this program, the failure to provide for the acquisition thereof would have seriously impaired, and otherwise precluded, the FBI from adequately and successfully discharging its highly confidential security responsibilities incident to this directive.

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[redacted] b1

(S)

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EX-113

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Special Mess.
18 JUL 22

COMM - FBI

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~~TOP SECRET~~

Mr. Edwin L. Fisher

July 21, 1954

[redacted] b1

[redacted] (S)

Since this program involves vital counter-intelligence measures designed to strengthen the Nation's security, its development at the earliest opportunity is extremely urgent. Consequently, I would greatly appreciate your written confirmation regarding our interpretation and analysis of the legal views orally submitted by your office, in order that the Bureau may promptly proceed with the purchase of the automotive equipment under consideration herein. I do want to take this opportunity of expressing my appreciation for your cooperation and assistance in this matter.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

[redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (1)
PER LTR DTD 10/6/03 60267 uc/NLS/BJA/RNP 10/6/03

TO : MR. MOHR

DATE: July 16, 1954

FROM : N. P. CALLAHAN

SUBJECT: ADDITIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF SOVIET AND SATELLITE OFFICIALS (S)

Tolson
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Tele. Room
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Gandy

Reference is made to my memorandum to you under date of July 14, 1954, (which is attached) which approved the making of a contact with the appropriate official of the General Accounting Office (GAO) in order to ascertain whether or not the Bureau could legally purchase cars under [redacted] (S) in the amount of [redacted] to implement the Bureau's activities under (S) the above-captioned program. b1

You are advised that the writer contacted Mr. Edward L. Fisher, General Counsel for the GAO, on the afternoon of July 15, 1954, and briefly outlined to him the fact that the Bureau, with the approval of the Bureau of the Budget and the Chairmen of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees, [redacted] b1 I pointed out that the amount of (S) $140,000 was included [redacted] for the purpose (S) of purchasing 100 additional automobiles and inquired of Mr. Fisher as to whether or not under the above transfer of funds the Bureau would have authority to purchase the 100 cars needed in carrying out the President's directive in undertaking this increased responsibility.

Mr. Fisher stated that he would check into this matter and advise the writer of his decision in this respect.

On the morning of July 16, 1954, Mr. Fisher telephonically contacted the writer and stated that he had reviewed various Statutes in connection with the purchase of automotive equipment and felt that the Bureau could purchase the automobiles desired [redacted] b1 (S)

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INDEXED - 6

NPC:mfs
jmr
Attachment

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Memorandum to Mr. Mohr

Re: Additional Counterintelligence Coverage of Soviet and Satellite Officials (S) (W)

[redacted] (S) b1

[redacted] (S)

Mr. Fisher stated that Volume 63, United States Statutes at Large, page 211, Section 6 (a) and page 212, Section 10 (a) and (b), were the basis for his conclusion and opinion in this respect.

I inquired of Mr. Fisher if we proceed to purchase the cars and a question should be raised by the Auditing Division of GAO concerning our purchasing 100 cars over and above the authorization carried in our direct appropriation, i.e. 300, would it be satisfactory to refer the inquirer to him for substantiation of our action in acquiring these 100 additional cars.

Mr. Fisher stated that by all means should any question be raised by anyone in the GAO in connection with this matter not to hesitate to refer them to him for confirmation of this decision.

Mr. Fisher pointed out that he felt that at hearings before Appropriations Committees in connection with Fiscal Year 1956 Appropriation an explanatory statement should be made in connection with this matter inasmuch as it would preclude the possibility of our having to return these cars [redacted] (S) b1

In this connection it is pointed out that the annual budget contains an inventory of our automotive equipment together with a statement showing the number authorized to be operated and upon the acquisition of this 100 additional cars our authorization in the future would be shown as 3,104 rather than 3,004, which is our current authorization.

Memorandum to Mr. Mohr

Re: Additional Counterintelligence Coverage
of Soviet and Satellite Officials (S) (W)

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That the Bureau secure written confirmation from GAO regarding the legality of this proposed purchase of automotive equipment. If approved, a suggested communication is attached.

(2) Upon receipt of the foregoing written confirmation, if favorable: That the Bureau promptly proceed with the purchase of 100 cars [redacted] (S) b7C

(3) That an explanatory background statement concerning pertinent phases of this matter be included in future justification material prepared in connection with the Bureau's budget request for the fiscal year 1956.

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

5/27/04 #948742/850935/997059
CLASSIFIED BY 60267 uc/NCS/BJA/CB
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X(1) 5/27/2029
PER LTR DTD 4/8/04 60267 uc/NCS/BJA/CB

TO : MR. MOHR

DATE: July 14, 1954

FROM : N. P. CALLAHAN

CLASSIFIED BY Spralm/pte
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339,299

SUBJECT: ADDITIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF SOVIET AND SATELLITE OFFICIALS (S)(U)

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

NPC Callahan

Reference is made to my memorandum to you under date of July 8, 1954, advising that the writer was delivering to [redacted] (S) [redacted] available to that agency to this Bureau. My memorandum further advised that [redacted] was going to endeavor to find out specifically if (S) [redacted] (S)

I followed with [redacted] this morning, July 14th, concerning (S) this matter and [redacted] who had had discussions with Congressman Tabor and Senator (S) Bridges concerning this matter and he advised that the [redacted] was discussed with Congressman Tabor on two occasions and with Senator Bridges on one occasion and during none of these discussions was any mention made of the fact [redacted] (S) Bridges had indicated their autographic approval on the letter which [redacted] (S) [redacted] in his office today and stated he would inform (S) the writer when it was available so that arrangements could be made to have the [redacted]

Insofar as the acquisition of the [redacted] it appears that our only recourse at this time (S) is to consult with the General Counsellors Office of the General Accounting Office to ascertain whether or not this Bureau has the legal authority [redacted] In discussing this matter with (S) (S) (U) the General Accounting Office which can be done on a very confidential

NPC:gt

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JUL 30 1954

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EX - 113

memo to file NPC 1-16-54

JUL 4 1954

Atom Bomb

Espionage - R

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Memo to Mr. Mohr (continued)

basis, I recommend that there be exhibited the correspondence between [redacted] (S) You will recall that the letter from the Director of the Bureau of the Budget to Mr. Dulles of CIA under date of April 8th [redacted] (S) b1 b3

RECOMMENDATION

It is recommended that approval be granted for appropriate contact to be made with the General Counsellors Office of the General Accounting Office in order to ascertain the Bureau's [redacted] (S) b1 b3

OK. 7/14

Yes 7-14

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

5/27/04 #948742/950935/997059
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DECLASSIFY ON: 25X(1) 5/27/2029
PER LTR DTD 6/8/04 60267 uc/NLS/BJA/CB

TO : MR. MOHR

DATE: July 8, 1954

FROM : N. P. Callahan

~~SECRET~~
12-29-97
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DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 6
330,299

SUBJECT: ADDITIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF SOVIET AND SATELLITE OFFICIALS (S)(U)

Tolson
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Miss Gandy

BY GUNSSER

You will recall that Allen W. Dulles, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), directed a letter to the Bureau dated June 16 advising [redacted] (S)

b1
b3

This afternoon I followed with [redacted] of CIA again to ascertain whether or not [redacted] stated that the final documents had not been processed in Treasury yet [redacted] He requested that the writer deliver to him the appropriate Form 1080 [redacted] (S)

I also took occasion to inquire as to what, if any, discussions specifically were had between Mr. Dulles and the Chairmen of the Appropriations Committees and [redacted] stated he did not know. He indicated, however, that it was his understanding that the Chairmen of the Appropriations Committees signed their approval [redacted] (S)

b1
b3

INDEXED - 6 RECORDED - 6 117-268-

I will endeavor to secure from [redacted] tomorrow morning when I see him what information he has been able to obtain as to the approval by the Chairmen of the Appropriations Committees for this Bureau to [redacted] (S)

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b3

EX. - 113

135

NPC:jmr

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PERS. FILES

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CONFIDENTIAL

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INDEXED-88

July 21, 1954

Honorable Warren Olney III
Assistant Attorney General
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

123

My dear Mr. Olney:

Reference is made to your letter of June 30, 1954, requesting the views of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security with respect to proposed legislation to provide for the payment to informers of rewards for information which would be an inducement to supply information leading to the recovery or acquisition of atomic weapons or fissionable material which has been illegally introduced into the United States.

The proposed legislation has been reviewed by the IIC and it is suggested that provision be made for payment for such information if furnished to Treasury Department representatives (such as Customs, Bureau of Narcotics, and Secret Service) or Central Intelligence Agency representatives abroad. It is noted that the proposed legislation now provides for payment if the information is furnished to the Atomic Energy Commission, the Defense Department, or Justice Department representatives, most of whom would naturally be within the United States.

It is also suggested that the proposed amendment to the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 provide for the payment of the reward for information leading to the finding or other acquisition by the United States of fission devices, fusion devices, or fissionable material manufactured or acquired or introduced into the United States, its territories or possessions, contrary to the laws of the United States. As written, the proposed amendment would not provide for the reward for information concerning the material unless illegally introduced into the United States. The possibility of illegal manufacture of such weapons in the United States at this particular time is, of course, rather remote due to the unavailability of fissionable material but this situation could possibly change in the future.

67 AUG 10 1954

CONFIDENTIAL

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FBI - COMM. - JUL 23 1954 MAILED 7

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It is noted that the proposed legislation provides a maximum monetary penalty of not more than $10,000 against any officer of the United States who receives, accepts, or contracts for any portion of the money which may accrue to any person furnishing such information. It is recommended that this be changed to provide that such monetary penalty should be at least as great as the amount actually received by such officer or not more than $10,000 if no money was actually received by him. To provide otherwise might allow such an officer of the United States to make a profit even though fined $10,000.

I have been advised that the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security is making a separate reply in connection with this matter.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

Chairman
Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference

cc - Honorable William F. Tompkins
Assistant Attorney General
Internal Security Division

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

cc - Mr. Branigan
Mr. Philcox

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Tolson
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TO : L. V. Boardman

DATE: July 8, 1954

FROM : A. H. Belmont

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/22/04 BY 60267 tac/NLS/BJA/CB
Per LTR DTD 6/8/04 60267 tac/NLS/BJA/CB

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION IN PLACE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

Attached is the Bureau file copy of a letter from Warren Olney III dated June 30, 1954, addressed jointly to the Director, as Chairman, Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, and Mr. Thomas J. Donegan, as Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security, which letter forwarded a draft bill to provide rewards for information concerning the illegal introduction of fission devices, fusion devices and fissionable material into the United States.

The National Security Council and the President had approved in NSC 159/4 and subsequent NSC papers on continental defense the preparation of such legislation.

The proposed bill authorizes the payment of rewards in amounts not to exceed $500,000 to any person not an officer of the U. S. who furnishes original information regarding fission devices, fusion devices or fissionable material introduced into or to be introduced into the United States, its territories or possessions, in violation of U. S. law. Original information must be furnished by such person to the Atomic Energy Commission, the Department of Justice or the Department of Defense or to officers of the foregoing.

The bill further provides that, if the informant is an alien, the Attorney General and Commissioner of Immigration may permit such alien to enter the United States for permanent residence with his immediate family without regard to their inadmissibility under any other laws or regulations.

Amounts of rewards shall be determined by a board consisting of the members of the Atomic Energy Commission, the Attorney General and the Secretary of Defense, and such rewards shall be paid out of funds appropriated for the administration of the Atomic Energy Act.

1 - ENCL

The bill also provides that any officer of the United States who directly or indirectly receives, accepts, or contracts for any portion of the money which might accrue to any informant shall be guilty of a

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EX-123 INDEXED-88

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Attachment

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felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by a fine of not more than $10,000 or by imprisonment for not more than five years or both and shall, thereafter, be ineligible to hold any office of honor, trust or emolument.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

It is recommended that this matter be placed on the agenda for the next meeting of the Working Committee of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference and that the Bureau's position should be as follows:

(1) Since the Treasury Department agencies (Customs, Bureau of Narcotics, Secret Service) and the Central Intelligence Agency have representatives abroad and receive information abroad, consideration should be given to authorization of payment of rewards to aliens furnishing valuable information of the type covered in the statute to those agencies abroad.

(2) The penalty of a $10,000 fine for an officer of the United States who receives, accepts, or contracts for a portion of the reward money is not realistic, and the fine provided for should be equal to the amount received or contracted for.

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DATE 5/27/04 BY 60267 uc/jks/BJA

Assistant Attorney General
J. Lee Rankin

July 20, 1954

Director, FBI

PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO H. R. 9757 AND S. 3690

-26-

Reference is made to your memorandum dated July 20, 1954, your reference JLR:MS:aab, requesting comments no later than July 21, 1954, on a proposed amendment to H. R. 9757 and S. 3690, drafted by the Atomic Energy Commission to implement a decision of the National Security Council.

The proposed legislation provides for a reward in an amount not to exceed $500,000 for original information leading to the finding or other acquisition by the United States of any special nuclear material or atomic weapon which has been introduced into the United States, its territories or possessions, contrary to the laws of the United States, or for original credible information with respect to an attempted introduction of such.

You may wish to consider also the desirability of the payment of such a reward for information leading to the finding or other acquisition by the United States of any special nuclear material or atomic weapon manufactured or acquired in the United States by persons, contrary to the laws of the United States. As written, the proposed amendment is directed only toward material illegally introduced.

It is noted the proposed legislation provides for the payment of such a reward to a person not an officer of the United States. You may wish to consider the advisability of including the words "or employee" of the United States, not only with reference to payment of the reward but also in the penal provision.

It is noted that the proposed legislation provides a maximum monetary penalty in the form of a fine of not more than $10,000 against any officer of the United States who receives, accepts, or contracts for any portion of the money which may accrue to any person furnishing

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99 DEC - 117-268

YELLOW DUPLICATE
JUL 20 1954
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information on which a reward would be predicated. You may wish to consider changing this provision so that the fine could be at least as great as the amount actually received by such officer or employee of the United States Government or not more than $10,000, if no money was actually received by him. To provide otherwise might allow such an officer or employee of the United States to make a profit on the deal even though fined $10,000.

The penalty mentioned above, as drafted by the Atomic Energy Commission, provides that the guilty party "shall thereafter be ineligible to hold any office of honor, trust, or emolument." You may wish to consider bringing the language of this penalty into uniformity with a similar penalty in the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, with particular reference to Title 50, U. S. Code, Section 783 (d), i.e.: "and shall, moreover, be thereafter ineligible to hold any office, or place of honor, profit, or trust created by the Constitution or laws of the United States."

66-18949

cc - 1 - Assistant Attorney General
William F. Tompkins

J. Edgar Hoover, Director,
Federal Bureau of Investigation

JLR:NS:dab

J. Lee Rankin, Assistant Attorney General,
Office of Legal Counsel

Proposed amendment to H. R. 9757 and S. 3690

The attached proposal has been drafted by the Atomic Energy Commission as an amendment to H. R. 9757 and S. 3690. It is intended to implement a decision of the National Security Council. Urgent action is requested.

Your comments on it, if possible no later than July 21, 1954, would be appreciated.

Attachment

[redacted]

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27 JUL 26 1954

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DATE 5/27/04 BY 60324 UC/NLS/BJA/CJB

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

cc - Mr. Branigan
Mr. Sanders

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : L. V. Boardman

DATE: July 30, 1954

FROM : A. H. Belmont

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Nichols
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Miss Gandy

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/17/04 BY 60267 uc/NLS/BJA/CB

SUBJECT: PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO H.R. 9757 AND S. 3690 (REWARD ACT OF 1954)
SMUGGLING Atom Bombs

Under date of 7-29-54, the Attorney General transmitted to the Speaker of the House of Representatives a proposed bill implement a National Security Council recommendation to set up a system of rewards for original information leading to the acquisition by the United States of atomic weapons or their components illegally introduced into this country or illegally manufactured herein.

This proposed legislation was previously referred to the Bureau by Assistant Attorney General J. Lee Rankin by memo 7-16-54. The Bureau analyzed the legislation and made certain suggestions for consideration by the Department by memo of 7-20-54 to Assistant Attorney General Rankin.

The Bureau pointed out in its memo of 7-20-54 that the payment of a reward might be considered for information leading to the finding or other acquisition by the United States of atomic weapons or components manufactured in the United States contrary to law. This suggestion was included in the draft sent to Congress.

The Bureau also suggested consideration of including employees of the United States in the categories which would not receive rewards. This suggestion was included in the draft sent to Congress.

The Bureau also suggested consideration of invoking a fine for violation of the reward provisions equal to the amount of money received by the culprit. This was likewise included in the draft sent to Congress.

The Bureau recommended consideration of bringing the language of the penalty in this bill into uniformity with similar penalties in the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, where, in addition to fine or imprisonment or both, the person convicted "shall, moreover, be thereafter ineligible to hold any office, or place of honor, profit, or trust created by the Constitution or laws of the United States." This suggestion was likewise included in the bill sent to Congress.

RECOMMENDATION: None. This is for your information.

117-268-
NOT RECORDED
176 AUG 6 1954

INITIALS OF ORIGINAL

ORIGINAL FILED IN 66-18949-1

66-18949
LWarmd

135

67 AUG 10 1954

HDS:WPR:rl CHER:gws
(Identical Letter Sent to the Vice President)

July 29, 1954

The Speaker
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5/27/04 BY 60267 UC/NLS/B; A/CB

Dear Mr. Speaker:

There is attached for your consideration and appropriate action a legislative proposal "To provide rewards for information concerning the illegal introduction into the United States, or the illegal manufacture or acquisition in the United States, of special nuclear material and atomic weapons."

SMUGGLING

The Department of Justice has for some time been studying with other departments and agencies primarily concerned, the problem of the possible illegal introduction into the United States, and the illegal manufacture and acquisition in the United States, of various atomic materials or weapons, the presence of which would constitute a threat to the security of the nation and the welfare of its people.

The attached bill is designed to set up a system of rewards for original information leading to the acquisition by the United States of special nuclear material or atomic weapons which have been illegally brought into the United States, its territories or possessions, or the District of Columbia, or which have been illegally manufactured or acquired therein. It is also designed to set up a system of rewards for original information with respect to attempts illegally to introduce, manufacture, or acquire such materials or weapons.

1 ENCL.

It is the view of the Department of Justice and the other agencies concerned that this proposal will materially strengthen the internal security of the United States by alerting the people to the need for vigilance, and by providing a monetary reward for informants. It will likewise, by reason of its provisions for reward and for immigration to the United States for permanent residence, encourage aliens to furnish information about the unauthorized introduction, manufacture, or acquisition of special nuclear material or atomic weapons.

This legislation implements a National Security Council recommendation, and the Bureau of the Budget has advised that its enactment would be in accord with the program of the President.

67 AUG 10 1954

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ORIGINAL FILED IN 66-18949-

117-268
NOT RECORDED
176 AUG 6 1954
INITIALS OF ORIGINATOR

Sincerely,

(Signed) Herbert Brownell, Jr.
Attorney General

COPY/plb

TO provide rewards for information concerning the illegal introduction into the United States, or the illegal manufacture or acquisition in the United States, of special nuclear material and atomic weapons.

Be it exacted by the Senate and House of Repesenatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as the "Rewards Act of 1954."

SEC.2 Any person not an officer or an employee of the United States (1) who furnishes original information leading to the finding or other acquisition by the United States of any special nuclear material or atomic weapon which has been introduced into the United States, its territories or possessions, or the District of Columbia, or which has been manufactured or acquired therein, contrary to the laws of the United States, or (2) who furnishes original information to the United States with respect to an attempted introduction into the United States, its territories or possessions, or the District of Columbia, or an attempted manufacture or acquisition therein, of any special nuclear material or atomic weapon, contrary to the laws of the United States, shall be rewarded by the payment of an amount not to exceed $500,000. If such information has been furnished by an alien, the Attorney General and the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization may determine that the entry of the particular alien into the United States for permanent residence is in the best interests

117-268-
ENCLOSURE

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of the United States and that such alien and his immediate family shall be permitted to enter the United States for permanent residence without regard to their inadvissibility under any other laws and regulations, or tbetheir failure to comply with such laws and regulations pertaining to advissibility.

SEC 3 A Board consisting of the members of the Atomic Energy Commission, the Attorney General, and the Secretary of Defense shall determine the amount of reward to be paid in each case pursuant to section 2 of this Act. Any such rewards shall be paid out of funds appropriated for the Administration of the Atomic Energy Actoof 1946.

SEC 4 Any officer or employee of the United States who directly or indirectly receives, accepts, or contracts for any portion of the reward money which may accrue to any person pursuant to this Act, shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine of not more than $10,000 or by imprisonment for not more tham five years, or both, and shall, moreover, be thereafter ineligible to hold any office, or place of honor, profit, or trust created by the Constitution or laws of the United States. If such officer or employee has received any portion of money paid as a reward he shall, in addition to the foregoing, be fined the amount of money he has received.

SEC5 As used in this Act, the term "special nuclear material" means plutonium or uranium enriched in the isotope 233 or in the isotope 235, or any other material which the Atomic Energy Commission determines to be special nuclear material for the purpose of this Act.

August 4, 1954

RECORDED-48
INDEXED-48
EX-130

117-368-560

[redacted] b7C

Dear [redacted]

Your letter postmarked August 1, 1954, has been received, and the thought prompting your sending me your suggestion and comments is very much appreciated.

In the event you have further data which you believe to be of interest to the FBI, please feel free to contact the representatives of our office located at 3915 Biscayne Boulevard, Miami 52, Florida.

I want to take this occasion to thank you for your kind words concerning the work being done by the FBI. It is my hope that our efforts will continue to merit your esteem.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover
John Edgar Hoover
Director

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5/27/04 BY 60267 uc/NLS/BJA/CB

cc - Miami, with copy of incoming

DCL:wa:lmc

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Glavin
Harbo
Rosen
Tamm
Tracy
Mohr
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Miss Gandy

53 AUG 17 1954

MAILED 16
AUG 5 - 1954
COMM-FBI

FBI

RECEIVED ROOM
AUG 4 7 32 PM '54

[redacted]

b7C

July 29th, 1954.

(41)

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Chief,
FBI.,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Hoover,

SMUGGLING

I just heard a news broadcaster say that as of this date, an atomic weapons has been devised which can be carried on one's person. If that statement is true, then it is easy to visualize the terrific danger that threatens our Country.

Altho I am not at all familiar with the behavior of an atomic weapon insofar as clues to it's existence are concerned, I assume that there probably is an aura of radio-active emanations around it. If that premise is true, then would it not be possible to equip spotters with a Geiger type apparatus which would be concealed on one's person and which would have a phone arrangement similar to our present day hearing aids (the little battery type aids) and they could probably pick up the radio impulses of the hidden weapon?

Undoubtedly your organization has equipment to take care of any new development that may be an added danger to our Country, but, this thought came to my mind and I am passing it on to you for whatever value you may get from it. You see, Mr. Hoover, I love this Country of ours and certainly want to protect it!

Your organization is a great one and I hope that it will grow greater!

Sin[redacted]

b7C

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DATE 5/27/04 BY 60242 uc/lws/bja/cb

mnl
Ack. 8-4-54
DCL

RECORDED-48 117-268-560

EX-130 13 AUG 9 1954

Pardon

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

cc - Mr. Sanders

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: August 4, 1954

FROM : W. A. Branigan

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Glavin
Harbo
Rosen
Tamm
Tracy
Mohr
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Miss Gandy

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC WEAPONS AND PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES

At 4:30 p.m., August 3, 1954, Mr. Jack Keeney, of the ICIS Secretariat, phoned and stated that a meeting of the Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures had been set up for Friday, August 6, at 10 a.m. in Room 2515, Justice Building. Mr. Keeney stated that this had been set up to accommodate the members of the Advisory Group on detection devices who wanted to confer with the representatives of the Joint Committee and bring it up to date on the question of the field testing and attendant problems.

Among the problems which Commander Clark, U. S. Coast Guard, the Chairman of the Advisory Group, wishes to discuss is the question of security of the field testing program and the question of classification of the field testing. Clark stated that the members of the Advisory Group would present their views and recommendations on Friday, August 6.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

None. This matter will be followed by Supervisor Whitson.

66-8603-
62-90938-

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DATE 5/27/04 BY 60267 uc/nls/bja/cb

RECORDED - 30

EX - 107

117-268-561

13 AUG 10 1954

5 AUG 13 1954

LW:rmc

5-

RECORDED-29

EX. - 117

August 9, 1954

VIA LIAISON

Honorable Val Peterson
Administrator
Federal Civil Defense Administration
Washington 25, D. C.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFED
DATE 5/27/04 BY 60226 UC/NLS/BJA/CB

My dear Mr. Peterson:

Reference is made to your letters of May 19, 1954, furnishing for coordination by the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security a proposed Federal Civil Defense Administration Advisory Bulletin outlining protective measures proposed to be taken in the event of the discovery of clandestinely introduced nuclear weapons.

Reference is also made to our letter of July 1, 1954, which advised that it is outside the responsibilities of the IIC and the ICIS to determine when evacuation measures should be put into effect. Our letter also advised that the question as to which agency will notify the local civil defense authorities as to the discovery of a clandestine weapon was still under consideration.

The IIC and the ICIS have further considered the matter of actions to be taken in the event a clandestine atomic weapon is discovered, and it has been determined that this matter is outside the charter responsibilities of the internal security committees and is not included within the coordinating responsibilities which have been assigned to the two committees in connection with countermeasures to detect and defend against the clandestine introduction and detonation of atomic weapons in the United States.

It is believed that a plan should be developed at this time in connection with coordinated action to be taken in the event such a weapon is discovered. It is recognized that premature or uncoordinated action on the part of any one department or agency would seriously affect the plans

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Miss Gandy

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FOR APPROVAL
SENT DIRECTOR
8-4-54

66 AUG

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~~SECRET~~

or missions of other departments and agencies. The IIC agencies would have a direct interest in the finding of such a weapon from a counterintelligence standpoint, but such a finding would also be of direct interest to the National Security Council, the military departments, the Office of Defense Mobilization, your own organization, and possibly other departments or agencies.

It is suggested that the Federal Civil Defense Administration coordinate this matter with other interested departments and agencies and that a plan be developed for actions to be taken in the event a clandestine atomic weapon is discovered. It is further suggested that when such a plan is developed it be referred to the National Security Council for approval. This would insure that the interests of all agencies and departments are considered and appropriately coordinated.

In view of the direct interest of the IIC and the ICIS in this matter, it will be appreciated if you will keep these committees advised of progress being made in the development of this plan. A copy of this letter is being furnished to the National Security Council Staff in order that the Staff may be aware of the suggestions which have been made in connection with this matter.

Sincerely yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Chairman, Interdepartmental
Intelligence Conference

Thomas J. Donegan
Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee on
Internal Security

~~SECRET~~

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Tolson
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Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: August 3, 1954

FROM : L. V. BOARDMAN

(4)

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

(4)

By identical letters dated May 19, 1954, the Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA) forwarded for IIC and ICIS comment and coordination an FCDA policy paper which that Administration proposed to issue to state and local civil defense directors concerning recommended civil defense action in relation to clandestinely introduced nuclear devices. This paper was submitted for IIC and ICIS comment inasmuch as the two committees are charged with coordination and implementation of countermeasures designed to prevent the clandestine introduction and detonation of atomic weapons in the United States.

IIC-ICIS letter of July 1, 1954, to FCDA made certain suggestions for coordination by FCDA with the Defense Department and the Office of Defense Mobilization inasmuch as those agencies would naturally be interested in any actions to be taken by FCDA in the event a clandestine nuclear weapon is discovered. The letter further advised that the two committees would discuss further the question as to notifications of agencies to be made in the event such a weapon is discovered.

The matter of who should notify civil defense authorities, and other departments and agencies, in the event a clandestine weapon is discovered has been further discussed within the IIC Working Committee and in the ICIS. It has been determined that the military departments, FCDA, Office of Defense Mobilization, the National Security Council (NSC), and other agencies would have certain responsibilities in the event such a weapon is found. It is the opinion of the IIC Working Committee and the ICIS that the development of actions to be taken in the event a clandestine nuclear weapon is found is outside the charter responsibilities of the two internal security committees and not included within the coordinating responsibilities which have been assigned to the two committees in connection with countermeasures to detect and defend against the clandestine introduction and detonation of atomic weapons within the United States.

RECORDED 29
EX. - 117 117-268-562

Attached hereto is a suggested IIC-ICIS letter to the FCDA which recognizes that a plan should be developed at this time in connection with coordinated action to be taken

Attachment
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FOR APPROVAL
SENT DIRECTOR
8-4-54

13 AUG 10 1954

LIAISON

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62-85805

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in the event such a weapon is discovered. The letter notes that this matter is outside IIC-ICIS jurisdiction. The letter suggests that FCDA coordinate this matter with other interested departments and agencies and that a plan be developed which can then be referred to the National Security Council for approval. This would insure that the interests of all agencies and departments are considered and appropriately coordinated. The letter notes that a copy is being furnished to the NSC Staff in order that the Staff may be aware of the suggestions which have been made by the two committees in this connection. This method of handling the matter was suggested by Pat Coyne of the NSC Staff. The letter requests that the IIC and the ICIS be advised of progress being made in the development of this plan.

The attached letter has been approved by the other members of the IIC, by the members of the ICIS, and by Pat Coyne.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that you sign the attached letter as Chairman of the IIC and that it be forwarded, after which the signature of the ICIS Chairman will be obtained and the letter delivered. A copy of the letter will be furnished to the NSC Staff.

AUG 5 1954

Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

William F. Tompkins
Assistant Attorney General, Internal Security Division
PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO H. R. 9757 AND S. 3690

WFT:HDK:vb

OSMUGGLING Atom Bombs

Reference is made to your memorandum dated July 20, 1954, to Assistant Attorney General J. Lee Rankin. Your memorandum was concerned with the proposal to enact legislation to provide for a system of rewards for original information leading to the finding or other acquisition by the United States of special nuclear material or atomic weapons which have been illegally introduced into the United States.

The suggestions contained in your memorandum have been considered and have been incorporated in a revised proposal. I am attaching herewith a copy of a press release issued by the Attorney General, together with a copy of the proposed legislation.

Enc. No. 105406

1/ ENCL.

117-268-
NOT RECORDED
176 AUG 12 1954

INITIALS ON ORIGINAL

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53 AUG 17 1954

ORIGINAL FILED IN 66-1870-69

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Sizoo
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
FRIDAY, JULY 30, 1954

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Attorney General Herbert Brownell, Jr., today made public the text of identical letters he sent to the Vice President and the Speaker of the House and a proposed bill which follow:

"There is attached for your consideration and appropriate action a legislative proposal "To provide rewards for information concerning the illegal introduction into the United States, or the illegal manufacture or acquisition in the United States, of special nuclear material and atomic weapons."

"The Department of Justice has for some time been studying with other departments and agencies primarily concerned, the problem of the possible illegal introduction into the United States, and the illegal manufacture and acquisition in the United States, of various atomic materials or weapons, the presence of which would constitute a threat to the security of the nation and the welfare of its people.

"The attached bill is designed to set up a system of rewards for original information leading to the acquisition by the United States of special nuclear material or atomic weapons which have been illegally brought into the United States, its territories or possessions, or the District of Columbia, or which have been illegally manufactured or acquired therein. It is also designed to set up a system of rewards for original information with respect to attempts illegally to introduce, manufacture, or acquire such materials or weapons.

"It is the view of the Department of Justice and the other agencies concerned that this proposal will materially strengthen the internal security of the United States by alerting the people to the need for vigilance, and by providing a monetary reward for informants. It will likewise, by reason of its provisions for reward and for immigration to the United States for permanent residence, encourage aliens to furnish information about the unauthorized introduction, manufacture, or acquisition of special nuclear material or atomic weapons.

"This legislation implements a National Security Council recommendation, and the Bureau of the Budget has advised that its enactment would be in accord with the program of the President."

commented on in memo Belmont to Boardman 7-30-54 EMW

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NOT RECORDED
13 AUG 10 1954

117-268

117-268-

ENCLOSURE

5-AW

To provide rewards for information concerning the illegal introduction into the United States, or the illegal manufacture or acquisition in the United States, of special nuclear material and atomic weapons.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled. That this Act may be cited as the "Rewards Act of 1954."

SEC. 2 Any person not an officer or an employee of the United States (1) who furnishes original information leading to the finding or other acquisition by the United States of any special nuclear material or atomic weapon which has been introduced into the United States, its territories or possessions, or the District of Columbia, or which has been manufactured or acquired therein, contrary to the laws of the United States, or (2) who furnishes original information to the United States with respect to an attempted introduction into the United States, its territories or possessions, or the District of Columbia, or an attempted manufacture or acquisition therein, of any special nuclear material or atomic weapon, contrary to the laws of the United States, shall be rewarded by the payment of an amount not to exceed $500,000. If such information has been furnished by an alien, the Attorney General and the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization may determine that the entry of the particular alien into the United States for permanent residence is in the best interests of the United States and that such alien and his immediate family shall be permitted to enter the United States for permanent residence without regard to their inadmissibility under any other laws and regulations, or to their failure to comply with such laws and regulations pertaining to admissibility.

SEC. 3 A Board consisting of the members of the Atomic Energy Commission, the Attorney General, and the Secretary of Defense shall determine the amount of reward to be paid in each case pursuant to section 2 of this Act. Any such rewards shall be paid out of funds appropriated for the administration of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946.

SEC. 4 Any officer or employee of the United States who directly or indirectly receives, accepts, or contracts for any portion of the reward money which may accrue to any person prusuant to this Act, shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine of not more than $10,000 or by imprisonment for not more than five years, or both, and shall, moreover, be thereafter ineligible to hold any office, or place of honor, profit, or trust created by the Constitution or laws of the United States. If such officer or employee has received any portion of money paid as a reward he shall, in addition to the foregoing, be fined the amount of money he has received.

SEC. 5 As used in this Act, the term "special nuclear material" means plutonium, or uranium enriched in the isotope 233 or in the isotope 235, or any other material which the Atomic Energy Commission determines to be special nuclear material for the purposes of this Act.

SAC, New York (100-20409D)

August 4, 1954

Director, FBI (66-17440)

PERSONAL ATTENTION
~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~

PRODIP

117-268

FOR INSTRUCTIONS AS TO DISSEMINATION SEE FILE 66-12440-✓ (8-1-54)

ReBulet June 3, 1954.

Pursuant to reflet, New York and Washington Field are considering possible recommendations for certain telephone lines to remain in operation in enemy establishments for the benefit of the FBI at such time as all other telecommunication facilities for such enemy establishments would be cut off in the event of hostilities.

In connection with your consideration of this problem, your attention is directed to the letters from New York to the Bureau dated 6-22-54 and 7-22-54, re "Smuggling of Atomic Bombs or Parts Thereof and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction into the United States, Atomic Energy Act," New York file 117-192, Bureau file 117-268. In both of these communications, responsible individuals have pointed out to representatives of the New York office

[redacted]

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b7E

While the referenced letters do not specifically so indicate, it may be presumed that the telephone would probably be on unlisted one. Accordingly, the Washington Field and New York offices should not include in their recommendations for continued service any unlisted telephone at any Soviet Bloc establishment. Washington Field and New York should also make certain through appropriate contacts with the telephone company that all telecommunications lines listed or unlisted, serving any Soviet Bloc establishment in their areas, are known to them.

Washington Field and New York should furnish the Bureau with their observations and comments on this matter promptly.

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Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

cc - 2 - Washington Field (66-2395)

PERSONAL ATTENTION
~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~

Lee - 117-268

LW:rmc

YELLOW DUPLICATE
AUG - 4 1954
MAILED

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267 uc/NLS/BjA/CAB
ON 5/27/04

ORIGINAL FILED IN 66-17440-

Director, FBI

7/22/54

SAC, New York (117-192)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

ReNYlet to Bureau, 6/22/54.

[redacted] who is a personal friend of many years standing of SA [redacted] recently related the following matter about which he stated he felt very concerned: b7C

[redacted] engaged in many types of contracts for the armed forces, and by so being, they and their personnel have become somewhat alerted as to the hazards that could exist in this country in connection with atomic warfare.

[redacted] in a recent conversation with another [redacted] struck upon the b7C possibility of the Russians bringing atomic bombs into the U.S. broken down into component parts that could be easily smuggled into the country, and that later these bombs could be reassembled in offices in principal cities throughout the country, which office space had been rented under the guise of ordinary business operations.

[redacted] b2 b7C b7E

[redacted] have discussed this with no one else and they were particularly concerned inasmuch as they were unable to conceive any means of counteracting such an operation should the Russians conceive the idea. b7C

[redacted]

It will be noted that the press had reported in March 1954 stories relating to possible attempts by foreign agents to smuggle atomic weapons or parts thereof into the U. S. These stories followed up a public

FJG:EG

117-365-

NOT RECORDED

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267 uc/NUS/BJA/CB
ON 5/27/04

ORIGINAL FILED IN 65-7440-

proclamation by President EISENHOWER requesting citizens to report to the FBI suspected subversive activities involving atomic weapons.

Relet, on page 3, sets forth comments of [redacted] First Army Ordnance Officer. He pointed out various ways of detonating an atomic bomb [redacted] b2 b7C b7E

The above information is being forwarded to the Bureau for whatever action the Bureau deems advisable.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

FROM : W. A. Branigan

DATE: August 2, 1954

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Glavin
Harbo
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Tamm
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Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Miss Gandy

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC WEAPONS AND PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES

At 4:15 p.m., August 2, Commander Clark, U. S. Coast Guard, who heads the Advisory Group of representatives from Coast Guard, Customs, Immigration and the Atomic Energy Commission, who will supervise the field testing of passive detection devices for the discovery of fissionable material, phoned the Bureau.

Commander Clark stated that he had received word from the Naval Research Laboratory that the passive detection devices had been received today by the Laboratory from the manufacturer. They would be tested in the Laboratory and "packaged" to suit the requirements of the using agencies and will be ready for delivery to Customs for transportation to New York and San Antonio, Texas, August 12. Commander Clark stated that five of the devices could be in operation in New York on the 16th but that the device scheduled for San Antonio probably would not be put in the San Antonio airport until after the devices had been put in operating order in New York.

Commander Clark stated that he would keep in touch with both IIC and ICIS during the period preceding the installation of the devices as well as during the actual test period.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is respectfully recommended that these facts be brought to the attention of the working committee of the IIC.

8-11-54

RECORDED-52 117-268-563

LW:elc

13 AUG 12 1954

58 AUG 17 1954

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RECORDED - 150

EX-129

AUGUST 11, 1954 AIR-TEL

SAC, NEW YORK URGENT

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC WEAPONS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES. WITH APPROVAL OF NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION AND NAVAL RESEARCH LABORATORY, WASHINGTON, HAVE DEVELOPED A DETECTION DEVICE WHICH WILL DISCLOSE PRESENCE OF CERTAIN FISSIONABLE MATERIALS. SEVERAL MODELS OF THIS DEVICE APPROPRIATELY DISGUISED ARE BEING INSTALLED BY CUSTOMS AT INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AND AT PIERS ALONG NEW YORK WATERFRONT WHERE SOVIET BLOC OFFICIAL PERSONNEL ENTER U.S. DEVICES WILL BE FIELD TESTED IN NEW YORK BY CUSTOMS, COAST GUARD AND IMMIGRATION SERVICE. IN EVENT FISSIONABLE MATERIAL IS DISCOVERED BY MEANS OF DEVICE, FBI, NEW YORK, WILL BE NOTIFIED. YOU ARE INSTRUCTED TO HAVE REPRESENTATION PRESENT AT A BRIEFING REGARDING THESE DETECTION DEVICES TO BE HELD AT 1:30 P.M., AUGUST 16, IN ROOM 134, CUSTOMS HOUSE, NEW YORK CITY. YOU SHOULD CONTACT [redacted] CUSTOMS TO VERIFY TIME AND PLACE. YOU SHOULD MAKE NO COMMITMENTS REGARDING ANY FBI ACTION IN CONNECTION WITH FIELD TESTING OF THESE DEVICES, BUT YOU SHOULD REPORT PROMPTLY AND IN DETAIL ALL MATTERS AFFECTING THE FBI WHICH DEVELOP DURING COURSE OF BRIEFING DISCUSSIONS.

HOOVER

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Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

LW:rmc

MAILED 6
AUG 11 1954
COMM - FBI

AUG 13 1954

132

cc - Mr. Sanders

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: August 9, 1954

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Glavin
Harbo
Rosen
Tamm
Tracy
Mohr
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Miss Gandy

FROM : W. A. Branigan

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC WEAPONS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES

At 3 p.m., August 9, 1954, Commander Clark, U. S. Coast Guard; Mr. Almanza Tripp, Immigration and Naturalization Service; and Mr. Gale, Atomic Energy Commission representative on the Advisory Group in charge of field testing passive detection devices for fissionable material, called at the Bureau and spoke with Supervisor Whitson in his capacity as Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference representative on the Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures.

The Advisory Group representatives stated that they had discussed the question of possible publicity regarding the detection devices with the ICIS. The ICIS had told them that, should there be any press inquiries regarding the detection devices, their response should be, "No comment." The Advisory Group members stated that the detection devices [redacted] the New York waterfront and at the International Airport, New York, as was possible.

b2 b7E

The Advisory Group stated that they desired guidance with regard to classifying results of the field testing. They were told that, although the continental defense program of the National Security Council was classified Top Secret, this classification did not necessarily apply to all segments of the program when considered separately. It was suggested that the Advisory Group consider assigning such classification to the results of their field testing as would be reasonable from the standpoint of national security and in accord with Executive Order 10501. It was further suggested that, if the Advisory Group had any doubts as to the proper classification of data relating to fissionable material, it should check with the classification officers of the Atomic Energy Commission.

The Advisory Group stated that Customs, Coast Guard and Immigration officials at the port of New York would be briefed at 1:30 p.m., August 16, 1954, in Room 134, Customs House. The Advisory Group requested that a representative or representatives of the New York office of the FBI be present at the briefing which would explain the operation of the detection devices.

SMUGGLING ATOM BOMBS

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 62-82555-96 62-82555-

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RECORDED - 150 117-248-564

LW:rmc

EX-129

13 AUG 17 1954

RECOMMENDATIONS:

It is respectfully recommended that:

(1) The foregoing information be referred to the Working Committee of the IIC.

OK HR

Noted at meeting IIC m/c 8-11-54 RBS.

(2) The New York office of the Bureau be instructed to have representation present at the briefing regarding the detection devices at Room 134, Customs House, 1:30 p.m., August 16. This is desirable because the Customs Service at the Port of New York where the detection devices will be located will notify the New York office of the Bureau in the event positive reactions to fissionable material are registered on the devices. It is necessary for New York to know what the devices are, where they are located, and how they operate in order to intelligently handle situations which might arise.

OK AB

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

5/27/04
CLASSIFIED BY 60267 uc/NLS/B;A/CB
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X(1) 5/27/04
PER LTR DTD 6/8/04 60267 uc/NLS/B;A/CB

TO : MR. MOHR

DATE: August 4, 1954

FROM : N. P. CALLAHAN

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SECRET

b1
b3

SUBJECT: METHOD OF HANDLING [redacted] FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF (S) INTENSIFIED COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM CONCERNING SOVIET AND SATELLITE OFFICIALS (X)(U)

Callahan
Dawson
Egan
Gurnea

12/29/70
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DECLASSIFY ON: 25X6
330,299

You will recall that on the afternoon of July 28, 1954, [redacted] Budget Officer of the Department of Justice, [redacted] and [redacted] Budget Examiners of the Bureau of the Budget handling the Department of Justice budget request, conferred with you as to the manner in which the [redacted] would be treated on the (S) 1956 "green sheets" which are submitted to the Bureau of the Budget annually with our formal budget request and which further appear in the House Appropriations Committee hearings.

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b3
b7C

It was the contention of the Bureau of the Budget examiners and [redacted]

b2
b7C

Upon the writer's recall, he has had several conferences with [redacted] the Bureau of the Budget [redacted] Group handling our budget request [redacted] after numerous meetings with other representatives of the Bureau of the Budget has advised that [redacted]

b2
b7C

UNRECORDED COPY

FX-129 RECORDED - 150 - 117-268-565

ENCL. 2 [redacted]

b1
b2
b3
b7C

as the Bureau of the Budget is aware and has documented in its records [redacted]

(S)

NPC:gt

SECRET

SENT DIRECTOR 8-4-54

cc - Mr. Sanders

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

FROM : W. A. Branigan

DATE: August 6, 1954

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Glavin
Harbo
Rosen
Tamm
Tracy
Mohr
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Miss Gandy

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC WEAPONS AND PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES

At 2 p.m., August 6, 1954, the Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures met with representatives of the Advisory Group, consisting of Customs, Coast Guard, Immigration and AEC, who will supervise the field testing of passive detection devices which will be made available to Customs by the Naval Research Laboratory on or about August 12.

The Advisory Group had four problems:

1. The problem of liaison in New York with AEC and FBI. They were told that any necessary liaison, particularly in connection with the reporting of suspicious shipments, could be arranged.

2. Classification of the passive detection device as "Confidential." The Advisory Group recommended this classification for the device, which had not heretofore been classified while being manufactured. Classification would be desirable in order to prevent its construction and performance from becoming public knowledge. The Advisory Group was told their recommendation would be brought to the attention of the IIC and ICIS.

3. The Advisory Group wanted guidance as to what Customs could do in the event the detection device indicated possession of fissionable material by a diplomat. The Advisory Group was told this matter was presently under consideration by the ICIS Subcommittee on Diplomatic Personnel.

4. The Advisory Group wanted to know what should be told the press if inquiries were received regarding the detection device, since it was recognized that although its outward appearance could be disguised and its use would be as unobtrusive as possible, it could not be expected that it could be employed surreptitiously for any length of time on the New York waterfront without suspicions and curiosity on the part of workmen and representatives of the press being aroused.

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EX-127

47-268-566

LW:rmc

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13 AUG 16 1954

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With regard to the fourth question, the Joint Committee referred the Advisory Group directly to the ICIS, which happened to be in session on the afternoon of August 6. It was felt that, since Customs was responsible for the use of the device, Customs should be responsible for any comments to the press which might be necessary. The Advisory Group did not believe that any advance press release was desirable but that some suitable release should be made if inquiries were directed to Customs. Since all of the agencies involved in the field testing of these devices were ICIS agencies, the Joint Committee felt ICIS could give them proper guidance on this point.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is respectfully recommended that this matter be placed on the agenda of the next meeting of the Working Committee of the IIC and that the Bureau's position and the IIC position should be, with regard to Point 2, that a classification of "Confidential" for the detection device is not objectionable; that the ICIS and Department of State should expedite a decision as to Customs action should a diplomat be suspected of having fissionable material in his possession. With regard to Item 4, that Customs should be responsible for making any statement to the press if such becomes necessary with regard to the use of these devices, at ports of entry, but that IIC will make no recommendation as to the content of such a release other than that the release should not indicate the precise nature of the device nor its capabilities; the release should contain no information regarding the broad program, as little information as practical regarding the use of the device, and nothing which would aid the "enemy."

Discussed at working committee 8-11-54 H.G.S.

cc - Mr. Branigan
Mr. Sanders

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : L. V. Boardman

DATE: August 12, 1954

FROM : A. H. Belmont

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Glavin
Harbo
Rosen
Tamm
Tracy
Mohr
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Miss Gandy

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC WEAPONS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES

SYNOPSIS:

Bureau of Customs requested guidance from ICIS as to what action it should take in event a detection device indicated presence of fissionable material in possession of foreign diplomat. Detection devices currently available and to be field tested by Customs in New York are sensitive to radium dial watches and cannot positively identify contents of diplomatic pouch as fissionable material. State Department draft of policy and program to be followed in event of positive reaction by detection device ignores Attorney General's position in enforcement of Atomic Energy Act and Immigration and Nationality Act, attempts to place Department of State in dominant position, attempts to prescribe notification procedure to be followed by FBI and attempts to limit FBI investigation of possible smuggling of fissionable material by diplomatic personnel to surveillance.

RECOMMENDATION:

There is attached a memorandum to Assistant Attorney General William F. Tompkins pointing out foregoing and suggesting for his consideration that proposal be amended to conform with Bureau observations.

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DETAILS:

At the present time the Bureau of Customs has been assigned by the Treasury Department the administrative responsibility for the field testing of certain detection devices which will reveal the presence of fissionable material in baggage or shipments or carried on the person. These passive detection devices are sensitive enough to detect the presence of shielded plutonium. Because of this great sensitivity, they will also pick up radiation from such exposed source as radium dial watches. For this reason they

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117-268-567

117-268
Attachment
5 AUG 23 1954

8-13-54 Hqs

EX-107

13 AUG 17 1954

cannot be considered precisely selective. In other words, a positive reaction from the device (indicating the presence of alpha, beta or gamma rays or a stream of neutrons) would not in every instance positively identify fissionable material as being the source of the radiation disturbance.

Customs requested guidance from the Inter-departmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS), of which the Treasury Department is a member, as to what action Customs should take in the event the detection device gave a positive reaction to the person or baggage of a diplomat, including the diplomatic pouch.

Under date of August 10, 1954, Assistant Attorney General William F. Tompkins transmitted to the Bureau a copy of a report by the ICIS Subcommittee on foreign diplomatic and official personnel to the ICIS Standing Committee and a memorandum from the ICIS Standing Committee to the Inter-departmental Committee on Internal Security. It is noted that Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., who prepared the Subcommittee report, is a representative of the Department of State.

The report contemplates certain action in the event of one of two possible situations. Under the first set of facts, Customs positively identifies fissionable material in the possession of a diplomat. Under these circumstances, Customs would seize the diplomat and search his person and his baggage, including the pouch. Customs would notify the FBI and request that the diplomat be taken into custody. The FBI would notify the National Security Council and hold the diplomat in custody pending advice from the Department of State.

Under the second possible set of facts, the detection device merely indicates the possible presence of fissionable material. Under these circumstances, the ICIS Subcommittee recommendation is that the FBI should be notified but the diplomat and his baggage would not be detained, and the FBI would do no more than conduct a surveillance. With regard to this last item, the Standing Committee of the ICIS recommended that the FBI should not take action beyond what it might consider advisable in surveillance except with consultation and approval of the Department of State and other appropriate agencies.

There are several objectional features to the procedures proposed with particular reference to the concept that the Department of State would determine action which should be taken by the FBI and also with regard to the programming of notification which should be made by the FBI.

When Customs determines that a Soviet bloc diplomat has fissionable material in his diplomatic pouch, the matter in that point comes within the purview of the Attorney General. Under the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, it is unlawful for any person to import into the United States any fissionable material or to possess any fissionable material except as authorized by the Atomic Energy Commission (Title 42, USC, Section 1805 (a) (3) (A) (B)). It is also a violation of the Atomic Energy Act to produce, transfer or acquire any equipment or device utilizing fissionable material as a military weapon except as authorized by the Commission (Title 42, Section 1807 (b)).

If the person is taken into custody by the FBI, which has exclusive jurisdiction over investigation of violations of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, it should be with the express approval of the Attorney General rather than at the mere request of the Bureau of Customs or the Department of State. Title 42, USC, Section 1810 (b) (5) (A) provides that no person should be prosecuted for any violations under this Section unless and until the Attorney General of the United States has advised the Atomic Energy Commission with respect to such prosecution, and no such prosecution shall be commenced except upon the express direction of the Attorney General of the United States.

When the FBI takes a person into custody as a violator of the Atomic Energy Act, that is an initial step in prosecution.

If the foreign diplomat is being detained not for violation of the Atomic Energy Act (in which case there might be some question as to the seizure of his baggage), he could be legally detained at the order of the Attorney General by the Immigration and Naturalization Service. The detention in this instance would be for the purpose of determining his excludability as one of a class of subversive aliens under the Immigration and Nationality Act. Under that Act, the Attorney General can exclude an alien whom he knows or has reasonable ground to believe probably would engage in activities prohibited by the laws of the United States and subversive to the national security (Title 8, US Code, Section 1182 (a) (27) and (29)). The exclusion or deportation of ambassadors and career diplomatic and consular officers can only be undertaken under such rules and regulations as the President may deem to be necessary (Title 8, US Code, Section 1102 (1)). If this recommendation was adopted by the National Security Council and the President, the Attorney General could exclude foreign diplomats under the circumstances contemplated, i.e. being found in possession of fissionable material. Normally the detaining of inadmissible aliens is a function of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Under the circumstances, however, the Attorney General could by law designate any agency of the Department to perform the custodial function.

It should be noted that the Department of State would not have the final determination under either of the situations described above under the laws of the United States, although the State Department could, as it has in the past, make representations to the Attorney General, looking toward the release of the foreign diplomat or his exchange for American personnel held by the authorities of the offending diplomat's country.

On the basis of the existing laws, the Bureau, upon receiving word that a diplomat had been caught with fissionable material by Customs, would notify the Attorney General and obtain clearance from him to take the subject into custody, unless the Attorney General's approval of this program could be construed as blanket approval for this preliminary step. The FBI would notify the White House, General Cutler, Mr. Lay of the National Security Council, the Atomic Energy Commission, State, the Department of Defense, G-2, ONI, OSI, CIA, and the Chairman of the Watch Committee of the Intelligence Advisory Committee, and also confirm with Treasury (Customs) the Attorney General's confirmation that the FBI should take the diplomat into custody from Customs.

The foregoing notifications should be made telephonically as nearly simultaneously as possible and subsequently confirmed in writing. The most important notifications from the standpoint of national action are those to the White House, Cutler, State, and the Department of Defense. AEC will have to take possession of the fissionable material.

With regard to the procedures suggested in the event a positive identification of fissionable material cannot be made, the ICIS has no jurisdiction to regulate in any way the handling of FBI investigations. While its reasonable and regular operating procedure to obtain Department of State authorization for investigation of foreign personnel or to employ special investigative techniques, such as technical surveillance, the FBI does not propose to consult with other agencies regarding other investigative techniques unless such agencies are definite parties in interest and it is illogical to confine investigation regarding the smuggling of nuclear weapons into the United States to the conduct of surveillance.

Quite properly, no action would be taken toward arrest of a diplomat after his admission into the United States without appropriate consultation and authorization from the Attorney General and the Secretary of State.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

AUG 17 1954

TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. Boardman	
Mr. Nichols	
Mr. Belmont	
Mr. Harbo	
Mr. Mohr	
Mr. Parsons	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Tamm	
Mr. Sizoo	
Mr. Winterrowd	
Tele. Room	
Mr. Holloman	
Miss Gandy	

BRANIGAN

WASH 3 FROM NEW YORK 17 12-02 P

DIRECTOR URGENT

ATT. INSPECTOR CARL HENNRICH

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS AND/OR PARTS THEROF INTO US. ISR. REBUAIRTEL AUGUST TWELVE, FIFTYFOUR. SAC JAMES J. KELLY AND SA THOMAS J. MC ANDREWS ATTENDED CONFERENCE HELD IN OFFICE OF COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, ONE THIRTY PM, AUGUST SIXTEEN, FIFTYFOUR. REPRESENTATIVES OF INS, CUSTOMS, AEC, COAST GUARD PRESENT. CONFERENCE CONSISTED OF DESCRIPTION OF DEVICE DEVELOPED TO DATE TO DETECT FISSIONABLE MATERIAL. MACHINE NOT PRESENT AT CUSTOM HOUSE. INSTRUMENT TO GO INTO OPERATION AT INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUGUST SEVENTEEN, FIFTYFOUR. FIRST PASSENGERS TO BE SCREENED BY INSTRUMENT, AUGUST EIGHTEEN, FIFTYFOUR. LETTER FOLLOWS.

KELLY

END

NY R 3 WA FCH

EX-115

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RECORDED-29 117-268-568

Mr. Belmont

CC: Mr. Hennrich

67 AUG 25 1954

117-268

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COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

AUG 10 1954

TELETYPE

WASH 4 FROM NEW YORK 10 5-55 P

DIRECTOR URGENT

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Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Sizoo
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

SMUGGLING Atom Bombs

ATT... INSPECTOR HENNRICH..

PROPOSED COAST GUARD DOCUMENTARY FILM ON PROCESSING OF "SPECIAL CATEGORY" VESSELS ARRIVING FROM BEHIND IRON CURTAIN, ESPIONAGE - X.

[redacted] THE OFFICE OF CAPTAIN OF PORT, U.S. COAST GUARD, NYC, ADVISED THIS DATE THAT COAST GUARD IS PLANNING TO MAKE A DOCUMENTARY FILM ON AUGUST FOURTEEN NEXT SHOWING PROCEDURE FOLLOWED BY CAPTAIN OF PORT IN PROCESSING "SPECIAL CATEGORY" VESSELS. FILM PLANNED IN COOPERATION WITH TELENEWS, WHICH, ACCORDING TO [redacted] IS OWNED BY HEARST, METROTONE AND NEWS OF THE DAY, ALL AT FOUR FIVE FAUCHT WEST FIFTY SIXTH ST., NYC. A VESSEL OF THE COSMOPOLITAN LINES WILL BE USED IN FILMING THE DOCUMENTARY. [redacted] POINTED OUT THE OFFICE ENCOUNTERED DIFFICULTY IN GETTING A STEAMSHIP COMPANY TO COOPERATE ON THIS PROJECT INASMUCH AS OTHER COMPANIES HAVE CONSIDERED SUCH A PROCEDURE TO BE UNFAVORABLE PUBLICITY FOR THEIR VESSELS.

[redacted] STATED THE DOCUMENTARY FILM WILL BE SHOWN OVER SEVERAL TELEVISION CHANNELS IN NYC AREA IN NEAR FUTURE. HE IS CALLING THIS TO BUREAU'S ATTENTION INASMUCH AS IT WILL BE REVEALED IN FILM THAT THE CAPTAIN OF THE PORT NOTIFIES FBI, CUSTOMS, INS, QUARANTINE, PILOTS, ONI AND G TWO, WHEN "SPECIAL CATEGORY" VESSELS ARE SCHEDULED TO ARRIVE IN PORT OF NY. COMMANDER [redacted] PURPOSE IN CALLING THIS OFFICE WAS MERELY TO CALL OUR ATTENTION TO THE DOCUMENTARY IN VIEW OF THE PROBABILITY THAT THE FILM WOULD BE SHOWN THROUGH TELEVISION MEDIA.

ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-29163-

117-268-

NOT RECORDED
176 AUG 19 1954

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Nichols
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

KELLY [Mr. Nichols]

b7C

E. P. DO 8/6/54 8/5/54

AAG Wm. F Tompkins

Re Bureau letter 7/21/54, attaches copy of AG's press release concerning proposed legislation to provide for payment of rewards for information re illegal introduction of nuclear material and atomic weapons.

FILES MAINTAINED IN MR. SANDERS' OFFICE

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/27/04 BY 60267uclpw/sbj/ahb

18-10

COPY:emf

TO : MR. BOARDMAN August 10, 1954

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO HR 9757 and S-3690
(REWARD ACT OF 1954)
OSMUGGLING Atom Bombs

You will recall that as part of its study of the clandestine entry of nuclear weapons into the United States and controls to be applied thereto, the ICIS came up with a suggestion on possible legislation paralleling the informer statutes now applicable, to Treasury and Customs cases, whereby and informer is paid handsomely by the Government to report violations resulting in recoveries. the ICIS recommended such legislation and the IIC went along with the recommendation. The proposal was referred to the National Security Council and subsequently adopted by the Administration, as a result of which the Justice Department drafted the proposed legislation and it is now being considered by Congress. The proposed legislation would authorize payment to an informant furnishing information on the clandestine entry of nuclear weapons into the United States up to $500,000 and also contains a provision whereby an alien furnisheing such information could be granted asylum in this Country.

Shortly after 4:00 pm on August 10, 1954, Barrett McDonnell of the Department called me to advise that Corbin Allardice of the Joint Congressional Atomic Energy Committee had contacted the Department to advise that this bill is in jeopardy. A hearing is to be held before the Joint Congressional Atomic Energy Committee tomorrow. McDonnell said that Allardice had suggested that pressure and prestige be put back of the bill. The suggestion was made that a representative of I&NS appear before the committee ro testify as to the value of the asylum portion of the bill and that Tom Donegan of ICIS appear and the Director or other representative of the Bureau appear to throw their weight behind the legislation. McDonnell said that Senator Pat McCarran had blasted the bill in connection with the asylum factor.

I advised Mr. Mc Donnell that it was out of the question for the Director to appear and that it would not be possible for any other representative of the Bureau to appeal/ I pointed out

CC- Mr. Nichols
AHB:tlr

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117-268-
NOT RECORDED
176 AUG 23 1954

INITIALS OF ORIGINAL

ORIGINAL FILED IN 64-18648-19

Memorandum to MR. BOARDMAN

that traditionally the Bureau does not enter the legislative field andthe Department carries the ball before Congressional Committees concerning legislation. Mr.McDonnell said that he thinks the representative of I&NS and possibly Admiral Strauss of the Atomic Energy Commissinwill appear.

This is for your information. MMcDonnell understands why the Bureau cannot appear.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Sizoo
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

TO : Director, FBI (117-268) DATE: 8/11/54

FROM : SAC, Salt Lake City (66-00 Sub A) CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES.

Re no number SAC Letter A, Series 1952, dated 1/28/52.

This is to advise that the files of the Salt Lake City Office do not reflect any information regarding captioned matter.

No information has been received in this regard in the past two and one-half years and during this period negative letters have been submitted to the Bureau by this office on a six month basis. In view of the fact that there has been no information to report, letters will not be submitted in the future unless some positive information is received UACB.

DLL:jt
REGISTERED MAIL

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267 uc/NCS/BJA/cb
ON 5/27/04

RECORDED - 23 117-268-59
EX. - 109

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DO-6

OFFICE OF DIRECTOR
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Jones
Mr. Sizoo
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

Hennrich
Brannigan
White House
Secretary

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DATE 5/27/04 BY 60267 uc/mcs/bja/cb

EXP. PROC.

AUG 6 1954

5

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Tolson

FROM : L. B. Nichols

DATE: August 18, 1954

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Clavin
Harbo
Rosen
Tamm
Tracy
Mohr
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Miss Gandy

SUBJECT: Smuggling of Atomic Weapons Across the Canadian Border into the United States

While talking to SAC Banister of Chicago on other matters, Mr. McGuire was advised that [redacted] had asked Banister for advice. [redacted] concerned over the possible danger to the United States of someone crossing the Canadian border carrying a small concealed atom bomb. He has in mind sending someone up to Canada with a small suitcase and having him bring over a thirty pound infernal device to show how easily it could be done; but before going into any such venture he asked Banister if he wouldn't inquire of me if I could not obtain the Director's views if this would not be in the best interest to do such a thing. [redacted] the Bureau's opinions would be confidential with him and would not be used for publication or attribution. He further explained that if it was in the public interest for some agency to have more border patrol personnel, then [redacted] would get behind such a proposal so that Congress and the public would see the need and urge the necessary appropriations for whatever agency needed the personnel to do the job. On the other hand, if it was felt by the Director undesirable to get into a situation like this, he would abide by the Bureau's views.

b7C

Banister was informed that a check would be made and we would call him back in the next day or two.

Our relationships [redacted] over the years have been friendly. It might be well for us to have Banister call [redacted] tell him his message has been passed on to the Director and it was the Director's thoughts that this was not the time for him to be playing war games.

b7C

JJM:arm

Banister advised.

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RECORDED-91
INDEXED-91

AUG 20 1954

71 AUG 27 1954

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: August 20, 1954

FROM : W. A. BRANIGAN

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING ATOMIC WEAPONS AND PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES

Commander Clark, U. S. Coast Guard, phoned from New York City at 2:10 p.m., August 20, 1954, and stated that they had set up a detection device at the International Airport and they were pleased with the prospects. Clark stated that the other devices were expected to go into operation on the water front on Monday, August 23. Clark stated he had some problems. He was asked if they were such that they could be discussed over the phone. He said they were not. Field Supervisor McAndrews of the New York Office then came on the line and said he was with Commander Clark and would send in a teletype on the installations. He also stated Clark would return to Washington from New York this week-end.

RECOMMENDATION:

This will be followed.

LW:hke

cc - Mr. E.S. Sanders

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RECORDED-29 117-268-573

EX. - 109

13 AUG 23 1954

6 0 AUG 27 1954

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

AUG 23 1954

TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Sizoo
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

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WASH 10 FROM NEW YORK 23 11-24 P

DIRECTOR URGENT

ATT... ASSISTANT DIRECTOR A. H. BELMONT...

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO UNITED STATES, IS DASH R. SAAG DONEGAN AND REPRESENTATIVE OF NYO WITNESSED INSTALATION OF DEVICE TO DETECT FISSIONABLE MATERIAL AT CUNARD LINE, PIER NINETY, NORTH RIVER, AUGUST TWENTY THIRD, NINETEEN FIFTYFOUR. DEVICE TO BE IN OPERATION ON PIER NINETY, COVERING ARRIVAL OF "SS QUEEN MARY" TWO THIRTY PM, AUGUST TWENTYFOUR, NINETEEN FIFTYFOUR. THIS VESSEL TO BRING IN ANDREI VISHINSKY AND PERSONAL STAFF. TWO MACHINES SET UP. ONE WILL COVER REGULAR PASSENGERS AND ONE WILL COVER DIPLOMATS. MACHINE IN OPERATION AT NEW YORK INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT REACTED STRONGLY ON ARRIVAL OF DR. LOUIS BOROW ON AUGUST TWENTY THIRD, NINETEEN FIFTYFOUR. CUSTOMS SEARCH REVEALED THAT DR. BOROW HAD IN HIS POSSESSION "WALKIE RECORD ALL" NUMBER A FIVE ZERO SIX THREE, MANUFACTURED BY MILES REPRODUCER CO., NEW YORK. THIS INSTRUMENT IS PORTABLE RECORDING MACHINE WITH RADIUM DIAL. DR. BOROW BORN FARGO, NORTH DAKOTA, FEBRUARY SEVENTEEN, NINETEEN HUNDRED. PASSPORT NUMBER FOUR ZERO ONE FOUR THREE FIVE, ISSUED JUNE SEVEN, NINETEEN FIFTYFOUR, AND HAD TRAVELED IN SOUTH PACIFIC AND PAKISTAN,

END PAGE ONE ..

RECORDED-91 117-268-

EX-122

cc: Mr. Belmont

AUG 31 1954

PAGE TWO..

RETURNING TO US VIA EUROPE. ARRIVED ABOARD PAN AMERICAN AIRWAYS, PLANE N SIX FIVE THREE THREE C, FROM PARIS AND FILED DECLARATION NUMBER SEVEN SIX SEVEN SIX ZERO TWO FOUR. RESIDES NINE THREE FOUR PARK AVENUE, PLAINFIELD, NEW JERSEY AND OPERATES BOUNDBROOK HOSPITAL WITH TWO BROTHERS AT BOUNDBROOK, NEW JERSEY. STATED TO CUSTOMS HE WAS RADIOLOGIST WHO HAD BEEN IN URANIUM AREAS IN UNSPECIFIED COUNTRY. CUSTOMS RETAINED INSTRUMENT WITH PERMISSION OF BOROW TO BE RETURNED AT LATER DATE. SEPARATE COMMUNICATIONS BEING FORWARDED RE BOROW, REQUESTING DISCREET INVESTIGATION OF BOROW BY WFO AT PASSPORT DIVISION, STATE DEPARTMENT AND NY NEWARK OFFICE.

KELLY

HOLD PLS

~~SECRET~~ Belmont

Assistant Attorney General
William F. Tompkins

August 23, 1954

Director, FBI

RECORDED-57
INDEXED-57

PROCEDURES TO BE TAKEN IN THE EVENT OF DETECTION OF FISSIONABLE MATERIAL IN DIPLOMATIC SHIPMENTS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/27/04 BY 60267 UC/NLS/BJA/CB

Reference is made to your memorandum of August 10, 1954, your reference WFT:JFD:el, and to this Bureau's memorandum of August 13, 1954. Both memoranda were concerned with recommendations of the Subcommittee on Foreign Diplomatic and Official Personnel of the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security.

Passive detection devices have now been installed and are undergoing field testing at the International Airport, Idlewild, New York, and on certain selected pier locations at the Port of New York.

At the present time United States Customs personnel at the Port of New York do not have authorization from the National Security Council, the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security or the Department of State to take any action other than to notify the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the event the detection devices are activated by something on the person or in the baggage of a diplomat which might be fissionable material.

A representative of this Bureau discussed the situation on the morning of August 23, 1954, with Messrs. John F. Doherty and Barrett McDonnell of the Department. It was pointed out by Mr. McDonnell that the National Security Council Planning Board, in considering the problem of the introduction of fissionable material through diplomatic channels, had expressed itself against interference with the diplomatic pouch and against manual search of the baggage accompanying diplomats entering the United States.

The report of the ICIS Subcommittee on Foreign Diplomatic and Official Personnel which reflects the Department of State's position would permit manual inspection of the accompanying baggage of a diplomat only when the operators of a detection device have made positive identification of the presence of fissionable material.

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COMM-FBI

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If such a positive determination could be made by the operator of a device, it would be unnecessary to examine the contents of the baggage.

Inasmuch as the detection devices began their field testing August 20, 1954, the skill of the operators, the accuracy of the calibration of the instruments under varying physical and atmospheric conditions, and even the manner of use of the instruments may not reach their highest efficiency for some while to come. As soon as practicable during the course of the field testing, representatives of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Naval Research Laboratory, who were responsible for the development of the detection device, should be able to make a statement indicating with some degree of accuracy the likelihood of the presence of fissionable material at a certain level of reaction by the device. As soon as this can be done the matter can be placed squarely before the Department of State and the National Security Council in order that a manual search of the suspected article can be predicated upon something less than a positive identification of fissionable material, if such positive identification cannot be made with the detection devices now available.

As indicated in this Bureau's memorandum of August 13, 1954, the Federal Bureau of Investigation will notify the Attorney General of information brought to its attention by the Bureau of Customs indicating that the detection devices have reacted to something in the possession of a diplomat. Obviously the Attorney General could not authorize action under the Atomic Energy Act unless fissionable material in the diplomat's possession had caused the reaction of the detection device. A determination that the questionable material was fissionable could only be made by an inspection of the material by Customs. Such an inspection they are now prohibited from making.

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~~SECRET~~

Assistant Attorney General
William F. Tompkins

August 13, 1954

Director, FBI

RECORDED - 9 [illegible]

PROCEDURES TO BE TAKEN IN THE EVENT OF DETECTION OF FISSIONABLE MATERIAL IN DIPLOMATIC SHIPMENTS

Reference is made to your memorandum of August 10, 1954, your reference WFT:JFD:el, which forwarded a copy of a report from Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., ICIS Subcommittee on Foreign Diplomatic and Official Personnel, to Mr. W. Barrett McDonnell, Chairman, ICIS Standing Committee, dated June 1, 1954, and a memorandum from the Chairman, ICIS Standing Committee, to the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security, dated June 11, 1954, relative to Mr. Stoessel's report.

You requested comments on those documents.

The Subcommittee recommendations, when there is positive determination of fissionable material on the person or in the possession of a Soviet Bloc official, are that the official be held and searched by representatives of Customs and that the FBI should be notified and requested to take the Soviet Bloc official into custody. He would then be held by the FBI pending advice from the State Department.

The recommendations do not appear to take into consideration the responsibilities of the Attorney General under the criminal provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 and under the Immigration and Nationality Act. Under both of those statutes, the Attorney General makes the determination as to the action to be taken against an individual falling within the purview of those statutes. While the Attorney General might desire to confer with the Department of State concerning ultimate disposition of a foreign representative seeking to smuggle fissionable material into the United States in violation of the Atomic Energy Act, you may wish to consider that the FBI would be holding such a person pending instructions from the Attorney General rather than from the Department of State.

The proposed plan of the ICIS Subcommittee sets out the procedures for the FBI to notify interested agencies. The proposed notification procedures affecting

LW:rmc

SEE NOTE ON PAGE 2.

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5-12-76 BY [illegible]

MAILED 11 AUG 13 1954 COMM-FBI

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the FBI are undesirable and unnecessary in an expression of policy for the guidance of the Bureau of Customs. You may rely upon the FBI's giving appropriate notification to the proper agencies of the United States Government. He would naturally notify the Attorney General to obtain his authorization to hold the offending diplomat. You may wish to insure that the document will show that the Attorney General will determine, in each instance, whether or not the FBI should take the offending diplomat into custody.

The Subcommittee report and the proposed language of the ICIS Standing Committee relating to action which could be taken in the event Customs representatives were unable to effect positive identification of fissionable material on the person or in the baggage of a Soviet Bloc official limit independent FBI investigation to surveillance.

This is highly undesirable as restricting the FBI in an investigation of a violation of the Atomic Energy Act to a greater degree than in any other type of investigation involving foreign official personnel. Since the ICIS Subcommittee study was intended to furnish guidance to the Bureau of Customs, you may wish to consider recommending that the ICIS recommendations should terminate with the instructions to the Bureau of Customs, and references to FBI procedures should be deleted.

117-268

NOTE: These matters initially discussed in memoranda Branigan to Belmont, 5-24-54, and Belmont to Boardman, 7-7-54. (117-268-545, 510)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

AUG 24 1954

WASH 10 FROM NEW YORK 24 7-50 P

DIRECTOR U R G E N T

TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. W. C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Miss Holloman
Miss Gandy

DATE 5/27/04 BY 60267 uc/jw/ls/sb/jat

ATT... ASST. DIR. A. H. BELMONT...

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS AND PARTS THEREOF INTO US, ISR. SAAG DONEGAN AND AGENTS NYO OBSERVED ARRIVAL OF EUROPEAN TRAVELLERS AT NY INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUG TWO FOUR INST. DEVICE TO DETECT FISSIONABLE MATERIAL IN OPERATION. [redacted]

b2
b7C
b7E

[redacted]

KELLY

HOLD PLS

RECORDED - 162
INDEXED - 162

EX-128

SEP 1 1954

Mr. Belmont

cc: S. A. [illegible]

URGENT

AUGUST 23, 1954

SAC, NEW YORK

RECORDED 117-268-5

EX-129

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO U. S., INTERNAL SECURITY - R. REMYTEL AUGUST TWENTY-ONE, NINETEEN FIFTY-FOUR. NEITHER DEPARTMENT OF STATE NOR NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL HAVE AUTHORIZED DETENTION OF DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL OR SEARCH OF THEIR BAGGAGE. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE REPRESENTATIVES ON INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL SECURITY ADVISE THAT CUSTOMS HEADQUARTERS, WASHINGTON, IS INFORMING CUSTOMS, NEW YORK, THAT DIPLOMATS SHOULD NOT BE DELAYED BY CUSTOMS PENDING INSTRUCTIONS FROM FBI AS TO DISPOSITION. CUSTOMS, NEW YORK, BEING INSTRUCTED TO NOTIFY FBI OF POSITIVE REACTION ON MACHINE INVOLVING DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL. NEW YORK OFFICE SHOULD NOTIFY BUREAU AND CONDUCT APPROPRIATE INVESTIGATION OF ACTIVITIES OF SUSPECTED DIPLOMAT. AS SOON AS POSITIVE REACTION NORMS FOR FISSIONABLE MATERIAL CAN BE DETERMINED BY REPRESENTATIVES OF AEC OR NAVAL RESEARCH LABORATORY QUESTION OF DETENTION AND SEARCH OF DIPLOMATS AND BAGGAGE CAN BE PRESENTED TO NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL.

HOOVER

117-268

LW:jla:mpp

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Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

INITIALED
DIRECTOR'S OFFICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
AUG 23 1954

TELETYPE

Initialed for Director by hgh 8/23/54

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Nease
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. W. C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Miss Holloman
Miss Gandy

AUG 21 [illegible]
TYPE

WASH 4 FROM NEW YORK 21 1-33 AM

DIRECTOR URGENT

ATTN ASST. DIR. A. H. BELMONT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/27/04 BY 60267 UC/MKS/BJA/CB

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO U. S., IS-R. BUFILE ONE ONE SEVEN DASH TWO SIX EIGHT. ON AUG TWENTY, FIFTYFOUR, AGENTS OF THIS OFFICE WITNESSED DEMONSTRATION OF DEVICE TO DETECT FISS-IONABLE MATERIAL AT NEW YORK INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT. PRESENT WERE ALMANZA TRIPPE, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, COMMANDER B. F. CLARK, COAST GUARD, BURTON, CUSTOMS AGENT IN CHARGE, NY INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT. [redacted]

[redacted] IN DEMONSTRATION COMMANDER CLARK CARRYING TWO SMALL PIECES OF SHIELDED RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL IN SUIT COAT POCKET, PASSED IN FRONT OF MACHINE. POSITIVE REACTION SET UP IN MACHINE. [redacted]

b2
b7E

RECORDED-29 117-263
EX-129

END PAGE ONE

Mr. Belmont

RECORDING. IN TEST OF MACHINE ON INCOMING PASSENGERS MACHINE RECORDED MILD REACTION WHEN ONE PASSENGER HAD LUMINOUS DIAL CLOCK IN BAGGAGE. MACHINE ALSO RECORDED MILD REACTION WHEN ANOTHER PASSENGER WITH A SHIP SEXTANT PASSED MACHINE. FOLLOWING THESE REACTIONS, CUSTOMS MADE APPARENTLY ROUTINE BAGGAGE SEARCH AND DISCOVERED ABOVE SOURCES OF REACTION. PASSENGERS UNAWARE OF EXPERIMENT. MACHINE WILL BE IN OPERATION AT NY INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT CONTINUOUSLY FROM THIS POINT ON. ON MONDAY, AUG TWENTYTHREE, FIFTYFOUR, INSTALLATION OF SIMILAR MACHINES WILL BE MADE AT PIER NINETY, HUDSON RIVER, WHICH COVERS ARRIVAL OF CUNARD LINE LUXURY VESSELS. THESE VESSELS IN PAST HAVE BEEN USED BY SOVIET OFFICIALS AND DIPLOMATS. EXPERIMENTS ON PIER NINETY ON AUG TWENTYTHREE, FIFTYFOUR, TO BE COVERED BY AGENTS OF THIS OFFICE. FOLLOWING INSTALLATION OF MACHINES ON PIER NINETY, ALL INCOMING PASSENGERS WILL BE SCREENED BY THIS MACHINE. NON-DIPLOMATIC PASSENGERS WHOSE PERSONAL BAGGAGE GIVE POSITIVE REACTION ON MACHINE WILL BE SEARCHED AND FBI AND AEC IMMEDIATELY NOTIFIED BY CUSTOMS. CUSTOMS WILL ALSO NOTIFY FBI, NY, OF SIMILAR REACTION ON MACHINE CAUSED

BY PERSON OR BAGGAGE OF DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL. CUSTOMS HAS INDICATED THEY WILL DELAY DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL AS LONG AS POSSIBLE PENDING INSTRUCTIONS AS TO DISPOSITION TO BE MADE OF PERSONNEL AND BAGGAGE. CUSTOMS WILL NOTIFY CUSTOMS HEADQUARTERS, WASH., AND FBI NY TELEPHONICALLY OF ANY POSITIVE REACTION SET UP BY DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL, AND WILL AWAIT INSTRUCTIONS FROM FBI. IN VIEW OF FACT THAT MACHINES WILL BE IN OPERATION CONTINUOUSLY AT NY INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AND PIER NINETY, HUDSON RIVER, BUREAU REQUESTED TO HAVE QUESTION OF DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY TO SEARCH AND DETENTION RESOLVED IN IMMEDIATE FUTURE AND NY ADVISED.

KELLY

HLD

CC: MR. BELMONT
ASST. SUPERVISOR
DOM. INTEL. DIVISION

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: August 25, 1954

FROM : W. A. Branigan

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/27/04 BY 60267 uc/NKS/bja/KB

Tolson
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Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES

64-29165-
64-28038-69
64-29076-29

At 3:55 P.M., August 25, Supervisor Whitson received a call from Commander B. P. Clark, United States Coast Guard, a member of the advisory group which is supervising the field testing of a device for a fissionable matter in New York. Clark said that because of the increase in newspaper inquiries regarding the activities connected with the device the Collector of Customs in New York had told the press that the authorities in Washington would make an announcement in due course. Clark wanted advice. He was told that the IIC could not give him advice in his particular circumstances, and it was suggested that he get in touch with Deputy Commissioner of Customs Emerick in Washington and with Mr. Thomas Donegan, Chairman of ICIS who had observed the testing of the device in New York. Clark was told that the IIC's position had been that Customs was responsible for answering the press that IIC was not suggesting any language for Customs comments but no comment should be made revealing the background of the project or furnishing any information of aid and comfort to the Russians.

Clark stated he was in favor of discontinuing the testing for the time being, but he had been outvoted 3 to 1 by the other members of the advisory group and the passengers and baggage from the Stockholm would be processed Thursday. He indicated Mr. Tripp, the INS representative on the advisory group, was proposing the assignment of a well-qualified Customs representative in New York to continue the monitoring of the detection devices after the advisory group left New York. It was suggested by Whitson that they take this up with Customs.

RECORDED - 58 117-268-57

13 AUG 30 1954

Thereafter, Whitson received a call from Deputy Commissioner of Customs Emerick who stated he had been receiving inquiries from the press. Emerick was referred to Mr. Donegan or to Mr. Ranta, the Treasury representative from the ICIS, and he was likewise informed of the IIC's position above indicated. At 5:15 P.M. Mr. Thomas Donegan phoned and stated that he was opposed to any release being made at Washington but that Customs could tell the press any story they wanted to provided it did not reveal the purpose of the device. Mr. Donegan was informed of the IIC's opinion above cited. He stated that the matter would be discussed at ICIS on August 26. Immediately thereafter Mr. Jack Keeney, ICIS Secretariate, phoned and was informed of the afore-mentioned conversations. Apparently Mr. Emerick had contacted Mr. Ranta, Treasury representative from ICIS, who had contacted Keeney.

LW:bmm:bjg

5-W Whitson

Memo for A. H. Belmont
from W. A. Branigan

RECOMMENDATION:

None. This is for your information.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: August 26, 1954

FROM : MR. C. E. HENNRICH

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC WEAPONS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES; INTERNAL SECURITY - R

Mr. Tom McAndrews of the New York Office called on the morning of August 26, 1954. He advised that in accordance with my instructions on August 25, he had interviewed Commander B. P. Clark, of the U. S. Coast Guard, regarding Clark's action in calling over New York Office Agents on the morning of August 25 and introducing them to representatives of the press as FBI Agents. The press had been making inquiries as to a device being used by Customs and the Coast Guard in examining baggage of incoming passengers. Clark said that the reason he had called FBI Agents over at the time the press was making inquiries was to have a witness that he was making no comment to the press regarding their inquiries. He said he realized he should not have done this, but that since the operation of the device in question was a most delicate matter, he was somewhat concerned at the inquiries being made by the press. Clark was vigorously admonished by Mr. McAndrews for having taken this action, and Clark expressed his regrets that he had done so and assured that such an occurrence would not happen again.

ACTION:

For your information.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/27/04 BY 60267 UC/NLS/BJA/CB

62-29163-4

CEH:LL

cc--MRL NICHOLS

INDEXED - 58

117-262-57

RECORDED - 58

EX-109

51 SEP 2 1954

OFFICE OF DIRECTOR
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

August 11, 1954

From [redacted] b7c

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Jones
Mr. Sizoo
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

SMUGGLING ATOM BOMBS

FOR THE ATTENTION OF
Messrs.
☐ .....
☐ J. E. Hoover
☐ .....
☐ .....
☐ .....
☐ .....
☐ .....
☐ .....

117-261
NOT RECORDED
176 OCT 6 1954

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

Ltr to 8-13-54 MLL

Bond-Spr... b7c

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DATE 5/27/04 BY 60267 UC/NLS/BJA/dh

SEP 24 1954

...enhower Speeds ...sk Case Reporting

Special to The New York Times.

WASHINGTON, Aug. 5—President Eisenhower ordered today tighter and faster reporting on the results of security risk investigations.

In the recent Army-McCarthy hearings, Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, Republican of Wisconsin, asserted that Federal agencies had failed to act in several cases of employes against whom the Federal Bureau of Investigation had filed adverse reports.

James C. Hagerty, White House press secretary, commented in answer to questions today:

"The President has said he hoped full field investigations would be cleared up as soon as possible. This is one way to be sure that is done."

Before today's action an Executive Order required the Civil Service Commission to make a continuing check on the speed with which security cases are

Continued on Page 7, Column 6

handled and to report to the National Security Council at least semi-annually. Two amendments were made today.

One requires the Civil Service Commission to inform the National Security Council immediately, without waiting for the semi-annual report of any deficiency in the system.

The other creates a new subsection in the order. This requires departments and agencies to inform the Civil Service Commission of action taken with respect to each case not later than ninety days after receipt of a final investigation report involving any official or employe who is subject to a full field investigation under the order.

Whenever an employe's file indicates derogatory information, a full field investigation is ordered.

Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Sizoo
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

IN THE ...

N.Y. TIMES

IN THE ...

AUG 6 1954

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5/27/04 BY 60267 uc/lws/bj/a/cb

7-24-3

BILL URGES CASH FOR ATOMIC TIPS

Rewards Up to Half a Million Asked by Brownell for Data on Traffic in Weapons

By The Associated Press

WASHINGTON, July 30—Rewards up to half a million dollars were recommended by the Eisenhower Administration today for tips on any enemy agents or other persons seeking to smuggle atomic weapons into the United States or to manufacture them here.

In addition to big cash payments, lifetime asylum in this country would be offered to aliens and their families who provided such information.

These aliens would be admitted into the United States regardless of any laws barring them on the usual grounds, such as Communist membership, moral turpitude, etc.

Attorney General Herbert Brownell Jr. submitted the proposal today to Vice President Richard M. Nixon, who presides over the Senate, and Speaker Joseph W. Martin Jr. of the House of Representatives, in the form of a bill for introduction in Congress.

He said the plan had the backing of the National Security Council, which is composed of President Eisenhower, Vice President Nixon, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson and other high officials.

Panel Would Fix Amount

The amount of reward in each case would be determined by a board made up of the Atomic Energy Commission, the Attorney General and the Secretary of Defense. Payments would be made out of A.E.C. appropriations.

The information needed deals with smuggling or the secret manufacture of atomic weapons or materials within the United States.

In identical letters to Mr. [illegible] and Mr. Martin, Mr. Brownell said:

"The Department of Justice has for some time been studying, with other departments, matters primarily concerning the problem of possible illegal introduction into the United States, or the illegal manufacture and acquisition in the United States, of various atomic materials or weapons, the presence of which would constitute a threat to the security of the nation and the welfare of its people."

Employes of the United States would be specifically barred from participating in the rewards, and they would be liable to five years' imprisonment and a $10,000 fine if caught conniving with others to share in any payments. They also would be barred from further Federal employment.

The Brownell proposal followed recent disclosures that J. Edgar Hoover had privately circulated an alert to law enforcement officials in all parts of the country. The Federal Bureau of Investigation chief had cautioned that developments in the nuclear field now made possible the manufacture of atomic weapons in a size that could be concealed on a person.

1954
N. Y. TIMES

31

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5/27/04 BY 60282 uc/ns/sbj/alc

117-266-X

ENCLOSURE

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI
Attention: INSPECTOR CARL HENNRICH
FROM : SAC, New York (117-192)

DATE: 8/17/54
CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS AND/OR PARTS THEREOF INTO U. S.
ISR

DECLASSIFIED BY 60867 uc/nls/bj/1/06
ON 5/27/04

Pursuant to instructions set out in Buairtel 8/11/54 in captioned-matter, SAC James J. Kelly and SA Thomas J. McAndrews attended a conference at the United States Custom House, Room 134, at 1:30 P.M., 8/16/54. The following individuals were present at the conference:-- ROBERT W. DILL, Collector of Customs; HARRY EDWARDS, Supervisor of Customs; F. W. LAUGHLIN, Assistant Collector of Customs; W. G. CALLAHAN, Solicitor of Customs; J. H. PAGE, Supervising Customs Agent; R. B. BIRDSALL, ONI; Admiral L. B. OLSON, U. S. Coast Guard; Captain F. K. JOHNSON, U. S. Coast Guard; Captain E. HOLTZ, U. S. Coast Guard; Lt. Commander E. O"HARA, U. S. Coast Guard; Lt. Commander D. M. MORRELL, U. S. Coast Guard; SOL MARKS, INS; PAUL G. WERNER, INS; THOMAS C. GIBNEY, INS; HANSON BLATZ, AEC; Commander B. P. CLARK, U. S. Coast Guard; DONALD GALE, Naval Research Laboratory; ALMANZA TRIPPE, ~~Naval Research Laboratory~~, J. J. FLYNN, Customs. The last three-named individuals are also a committee designated by the National Security Council and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security to develop the device necessary to put this program into operation.

EXPEDITE PROC.

Commander CLARK opened the conference by stating that the instrument which had been developed in an effort to detect fissionable material was the result of study and experiment conducted by the Naval Research Laboratory, Stanford University and the Atomic Energy Commission. This instrument is in an experimental stage and is the forerunner of other types of instruments which are under development. Depending upon the results of experiments conducted in the field with these instruments, the Federal Government will either order sufficient quantities for equipping all ports of entry or will go on with other experiments to find more desirable models. Commander CLARK stated that the experiments have been going on for a considerable period of time. The committee has coordinated information and submitted six reports. The efforts of the committee have resulted in development of an instrument which is believed to be able to detect fissionable material brought in on the person or handbaggage of passengers arriving in this country. The instrument's limitations are such that it probably will be of no use insofar as cargo material is concerned. Five instruments are in New York. One of these instruments will be located at NY International Airport. The remaining four will be located on selected luxury liner piers on the Hudson River.

RECORDED - 86 117-268-579

TJM:MFB

AUG 26 1954

SEP 3 1954

DESCRIPTION OF MACHINE

DONALD GALE of the Naval Research Laboratory then addressed the conference and advised he had been working with representatives of AEC in the development of this machine. The instrument registers radiation from fissionable material, i.e., Gamma Rays and Neutron Particles which are given off by plutonium and uranium. Mr. GALE stated [redacted]

b2
b7E

Mr. GALE then stated that Customs has the responsibility for developing this instrument. The Coast Guard will maintain and operate the equipment.

OPERATING PROCEDURE

ALMANZA TRIPPE then described that one instrument will be located at the International Airport in a small area situated between the space operated by INS and Customs. Incoming passengers [redacted] He stressed the fact that it had been decided by the National Security Council that the operation of the instrument must be as inconspicuous as possible. He indicated that three other devices were under development, one of which was expected to be a portable type.

b2
b7E

Mr. J. J. FLYNN then discussed the instructions he had received concerning the use of this machine. The National Security Council had indicated that there must be no publicity concerning this instrument. If the fact that the instrument is in use should leak out, all governmental agencies questioned about the instrument should, in effect, reply with, "no comment". Mr. FLYNN stated all diplomats and couriers will be screened together with their handbaggage. The instrument has been given a "confidential" classification. The operators of the instrument will have confidential clearance and it is expected that the instrument will be in full operation by 8/18/54.

A question was asked as to what procedure would be followed in the event a Soviet or Satellite diplomat was detected by the instrument as having in his possession fissionable material. Mr. FLYNN indicated that Customs' instructions were to refer the matter to the FBI.

Mr. FLYNN also indicated that the matter was under consideration by the National Security Council and one proposal had been made that, if fissionable material were discovered in the possession of a diplomat, it could possibly be arranged for him to be declared persona non grata on the spot and returned immediately to his country, the material to be held pending a decision by appropriate representatives of the Federal Government. He stressed, however, that this matter had not been decided and was under consideration.

AL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

TELE



BRANIGAN

WASH 4 FROM NEW YORK 25 12-02 P

DIRECTOR URGENT

INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED 5/27/04 60267 uc/mls/sja/cdb

ATTENTION INSP. HENNRICH

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC WEAPONS OR PARTS THEROF INTO THE US, ISR. AT ELEVEN FIFTEEN AM, AUG TWENTYFIVE, FIFTYFOUR, COMMANDER B.P. CLARK, US COAST GUARD, TELEPHONICALLY CONTACTED NYO AND ADVISED HE AND HARRY EDWARDS, SUPERVISING AGENT OF CUSTOMS, HAD BEEN APPROACHED AT PIER EIGHTY EIGHT BY ONE DUFFY OF THE WORLD TELEGRAM AND AN UNIDENTIFIED REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UP, WHO INQUIRED AS TO THE NATURE OF THE ACTIVITY OF CUSTOMS ON THAT PIER. THE BUREAU IS AWARE THAT CUSTOMS AND A FIELD GROUP OF THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL SECURITY ARE OPERATING A DEVICE IN THE HOPE OF DETECTING FISSIONABLE MATERIAL IN THE POSSESSION OF INCOMING PASSENGERS. THIS DEVICE IN OPERATION ON PIER EIGHTY EIGHT, AUGUST TWENTYFIVE, COVERING ARRIVAL OF PASSENGERS ON SS LIBERTE AND SS OLYMPIA. CLARK ADVISED REPRESENTATIVES OF PRESS THAT HE HAD NO COMMENT TO MAKE. CLARK THEN CALLED OVER AGENTS NYO ON PIER AND INTRODUCED THESE AGENTS TO REPRESENTATIVES OF PRESS AS FBI AGENTS. AGENTS NOT AWARE OF IDENTITY OF PRESS. NY AGENTS MADE NO COMMENT TO PRESS AND WERE NOT ASKED FOR ANY STATEMENTS. NO INFO FURNISHED TO PRESS BY ANYONE CONCERNING THIS DEVICE. EXPERIMENTS BEING DISCONTINUED TEMPORARILY. ABOVE FOR INFO.

RECORDED - 86 117-265-
INDEXED - 86
27 AUG 31 1954

KELLY

END

Mr. Belmont

CC: MR. BELMONT
AND SUPERVISOR
DOM. INTEL. DIVISION

,6XXX NY R 4 WA NOS

117-263-581

CHANGED TO

117-1263-43

5/27/04 60267 UC/NLS/BJA/CB

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: August 26, 1954

FROM : W. A. Branigan

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC WEAPONS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES

Tolson
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Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

At 2:50 P.M., August 26, Mr. Jack Keeney of the ICIS Secretariat phoned Supervisor Whitson and stated that at a regular meeting of the ICIS August 26 it was decided that if the Treasury Department felt that it was necessary to comment on the detection devices for fissionable material now in operation in New York, they could comment as follows in substance, "The Bureau of Customs is continually experimenting with devices and gadgets that may assist it in its duties of preventing smuggling."

Mr. Keeney commented that this statement was apparently innocuous and seemed to ICIS to fit the IIC requirements that any statement must contain nothing regarding the background of the project nor any information that would be of assistance to the "enemy."

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that this be brought to the attention of the working committee of the IIC for its information since the ICIS action appears to conform to the IIC position, which was: replies to the press are Customs' responsibility and must contain no information of assistance to the enemy.

EW:aas:bjg

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 5/27/04 BY 60267 uc/nks/bja/ckb

117-268-

RECORDED - 116

SEP 1 1954

EX. - 113

51 SEP 8 1954

117-268-583

CHANGED TO

117-1963-14

JAN 12 1955

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

cc Mr. Boardman
Mr. Sanders
Room 7635

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

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Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: August 23, 1954

FROM : W. A. Branigan

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO U. S.
INTERNAL SECURITY - R

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/27/04 BY 60267UC/ALS/MJA/CB

ReNYtel 8/21/54 advising that detection devices were installed at International Airport, New York, 8/20/54 and will be installed on Pier 90, Hudson River, 8/23/54. Soviet diplomatic personnel expected to arrive, Port of New York, 8/24/54. New York advised if machines give positive reaction on nondiplomatic travelers Customs will search travelers and baggage and notify FBI and AEC. If machine gives positive reaction on diplomatic personnel or baggage Customs will also notify FBI in New York City but will delay diplomatic personnel as long as possible pending instructions as to disposition to be made.

New York requested clarification of policy regarding diplomatic immunity to search and detention.

Commander B. P. Clark, U. S. Coast Guard, member of advisory group supervising installation and field testing of devices in New York, stated 8/21/54 that it was necessary to [redacted] b2 b7E

[redacted] Clark expressed belief that even though operators of devices are inexperienced and field testing only started that devices can be set to make identification of fissionable material almost certain.

Bureau position as set out in letter to AAG Tompkins dated 8/13/54 was that we would take no action to arrest or hold a diplomat without specific authorization from the Attorney General and that the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security which has been studying the question has no jurisdiction to limit FBI investigative procedures after Customs notifies FBI of suspected smuggling of fissionable material by a diplomat.

Attachments - 2 Sent tels.

117-268
LW:jla

RECORDED - 162
SEP 1 1954

8-23-54

EX-130
SENT DIRECTOR
8-24-54

ESP REC'D

51 SEP 8 1954

On 8/23/54 Supervisor Whitson discussed this matter with Leonard Bienvenu, Executive Secretary of ICIS, and Jack Keeney of the ICIS Secretariat. The ICIS representatives stated that during the field testing of the devices in New York Customs was not to detain or search any diplomat and that Customs' action was limited to notification to the FBI of a positive reading on the detection device. Messrs. Bienvenu and Keeney stated that no instructions of any kind had gone to Customs in New York from Customs headquarters, Washington, but that Customs, New York, should be predicating field testing procedures on oral advice from ICIS. Keeney stated he would immediately contact ICIS Treasury representative and Customs headquarters so that Customs, New York, would be instructed to not detain or search a diplomat where machine gave positive reading but to notify FBI, New York, and State Department representative, New York, of the circumstances. Keeney stated that the policy to be followed by Customs including the right of Customs to detain and search was still under study in ICIS.

RECOMMENDATION:

This matter is being followed closely and as soon as confirmation is received regarding specific instructions issued by Customs headquarters, Washington, to Customs, New York City, an appropriate teletype will be prepared for New York.

ADDENDUM: August 23, 1954 LW

Matter discussed with John P. Doherty and Barrett McDonnell of Department. Customs, New York, being instructed by Customs, Washington, not to delay or detain diplomats pending notification or instructions from FBI. Department attorneys indicated Attorney General cannot take action under Atomic Energy Act unless proof of fissionable material. NSC and State have refused to allow interference with pouch or search of accompanied baggage. Reaction norm for machine indicating likelihood of fissionable material could be used to represent problem to NSC.

Teletype attached to New York - Sent 8/23/54 LW

Also memo to AAG Tompkins

~~SECRET~~

RECORDED - 162

August 25, 1954

VIA LIAISON

EX-130

Mr. Thomas J. Donegan
Chairman
Interdepartmental Committee on
Internal Security
Room 1318, Department of Justice Building
Washington, D. C.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/27/04 BY 60242 auc/sw/sbs/KCB

Dear Mr. Donegan:

Reference is made to recommendations made to the ICIS by its Subcommittee in a report dated June 1, 1954, pertaining to procedures to be taken in the event of detection of fissionable material in diplomatic shipments. Reference is also made to the recommendations which have been made by the ICIS Standing Committee to the ICIS in a memorandum dated June 11, 1954, in connection with the report of the Subcommittee. The report of the Subcommittee and the memorandum of the ICIS Standing Committee were furnished to the IIC for comment on August 10, 1954.

The Subcommittee recommendations, when there is positive determination of fissionable material on the person or in the possession of a Soviet bloc official, are that the official be held and searched by representatives of Customs and that the FBI should be notified and requested to take the Soviet bloc official into custody. He would then be held by the FBI pending advice from the State Department.

There would appear to be a conflict in this recommendation with the responsibilities of the Attorney General under the criminal provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 and under the Immigration and Nationality Act. It appears desirable that this point be further discussed within the ICIS or between the Departments of Justice and State.

It is noted that the Subcommittee report and the proposed language of the ICIS Standing Committee relating to action which could be taken in the event Customs representatives

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62-85205-

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ESS:hke

~~SECRET~~

FOR APPROVAL
SENT DIRECTOR
8-25-54

SENT FROM D. O.
TIME PM
DATE 8-27-54
BY MWS

AUG 26 1954

were unable to effect positive identification of fissionable material on the person or in the baggage of a Soviet bloc official limit independent FBI investigation to surveillance. It is suggested that the ICIS recommendations terminate with the instructions to the Bureau of Customs. It is not believed desirable that the FBI be restricted in such an event to a surveillance inasmuch as there may be other actions or procedures which can be followed in connection with the investigation of an Atomic Energy Act violation which would still take into account the diplomatic status of the persons involved.

It is noted that the report provides that the FBI will notify the National Security Council when any diplomatic personnel are detained due to the fact that they had been found to be carrying fissionable material. While it is not believed desirable that provision be made in the report for the military services to be advised by the FBI, it is deemed appropriate and necessary that the military services be advised, and such notification will be made by the FBI through its established liaison channels with the military services.

Sincerely yours,

Chairman
Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

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TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: August 24, 1954

FROM : L. V. BOARDMAN

(7)

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING ATOMIC WEAPONS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES

INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL SECURITY

On August 10, 1954, the ICIS Executive Secretary furnished for IIC comment an ICIS draft report dated June 1, 1954, pertaining to procedures to be taken in the event of detection of fissionable material in diplomatic shipments. Also furnished for comment was a memorandum from the Chairman of the ICIS Standing Committee to the ICIS which comments on the draft report. On August 10, 1954, the Assistant Attorney General asked for Bureau comments on the same papers to assist the Justice Department representative in taking a position in the ICIS.

INTERDEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE CONF.

By memorandum of August 13, 1954, the Department was advised of Bureau views in connection with these papers. Attached hereto is a suggested IIC letter to the ICIS which follows the recommendations made by the Bureau to the Department of Justice. The IIC letter notes that the ICIS papers provide for the Bureau to hold diplomatic personnel who have been found to be carrying fissionable material until advice is received from the State Department. The IIC letter notes that the Attorney General has certain responsibilities under the Atomic Energy Act and the Immigration and Nationality Act in connection with such matters, and it appears desirable that this point be further discussed within the ICIS or between the Departments of Justice and State. The letter further notes that, where positive identification of fissionable material cannot be made, the FBI should be notified but not limited in its investigation of the case to a surveillance as provided in the ICIS report. In addition, the IIC letter notes the desirability of the military services, in addition to the NSC, being advised when a foreign diplomat is found to be carrying fissionable material. The letter states that the provision for this notification should not be in the ICIS paper and that such notification will be made through the normal liaison channels between the FBI and the military services.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

The letter has been approved by the other members of the IIC.

Attachment

ESS:hke

RECORDED - 102 117-3

EX-130

ROB. KEPPEL
ASST. DIRECTOR
8-25-54

SEP

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/27/94 BY 60322 uc/lus/sjr/cb

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that you sign the attached letter as Chairman of the IIC and that it be forwarded to the ICIS.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Tolson

DATE: August 25, 1954

FROM : L. B. Nichols

SUBJECT: [illegible]

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You will recall that earlier this week the New York Office advised by teletype that the Customs officials at New York had begun screening incoming passengers arriving in the United States having them pass by an X-ray machine to determine whether they had any hidden metal objects on their persons or in their baggage.

ASAC Marchessault of New York advised my office that the SS Olympia and the SS Liberte arrived today and Customs utilized this device. During the course of the screening a reporter named Duffy of the New York World Telegram and a reporter of United Press, identity unknown, apparently noted the Customs officials activity and asked what was going on. One of our Agents was in the vicinity and was introduced to the newspapermen as an FBI Agent. He made no comment and was asked for none. In view of the newspaper interest our Agent immediately got out of the area and notified the New York Office. Marchessault was advised if any inquiries were received in the New York Office, we should have no comment to make.

Shortly thereafter Frank Holeman of the New York Daily News Washington office stopped by and advised Mr. McGuire that he understood a number of Federal agents apparently were going over the SS Liberte today with a geiger counter and that he understood the same type of activity was engaged on the arrival of the Queen Mary yesterday. Holeman stated he did not know what government agency was doing this but he immediately thought of the Director's warning in the January Law Enforcement Bulletin on how to detect atomic devices which might be sneaked into the country and he thought possibly a mysterious activity on the New York piers in the last two days might tie in. Holeman was advised there was nothing we could help him on whatsoever. Holeman observed that he had tackled the Customs people but nobody was saying anything.

cc - Mr. Boardman
cc - Mr. Belmont

JJM:rcw

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9 SEP 2 1954

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/27/04 BY 60267 uc/plm/sbs/cb

SENT DIRECTOR 8/25/54

117-268

117-268-587

CHANGED TO

117-1263-1X

JAN 12 1955

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5/27/04 BY W2247 uc/ALS/BJAB

cc: Mr. Hennrich

SEPTEMBER 3, 1954 URGENT

SAC, NEW YORK

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO US, AEA.

REURTEL SEPTEMBER THREE ON RED LIGHT REACTION TO UNKNOWN BAGGAGE ARRIVING INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT VIA PAN AMERICAN FLIGHT FOUR FIVE TWO, EIGHT THIRTY A.M. SEPTEMBER THREE. IN ORDER TO EXPLORE ADDITIONAL LINES OF INQUIRY WHICH MAY BE PERTINENT TO POSSIBLE INVESTIGATIVE STEPS, YOU SHOULD DETERMINE FROM CUSTOMS THE FOLLOWING: ONE - WERE THERE ANY PASSENGERS ABOARD FROM SAN JUAN, PUERTO RICO, WHOSE BAGGAGE WAS NOT INSPECTED BY CUSTOMS. TWO - HOW MANY OF THE PASSENGERS WERE EN ROUTE TO EUROPE AND OF THESE HOW MANY WERE EN ROUTE TO AREAS BEHIND THE IRON CURTAIN. THREE - IN CHECKING BAGGAGE IN SAN JUAN DID CUSTOMS DISCOVER ANY EXTREMELY HEAVY ARTICLES OF SMALL DIMENSIONS. FOUR - WHICH PASSENGERS PAID EXCESS BAGGAGE FEES. IN THE EVENT SHIELDED FISSIONABLE MATERIAL WAS INVOLVED, INDIVIDUAL ITEM MIGHT HAVE WEIGHED IN BETWEEN THIRTY AND SIXTY POUNDS. EXPEDITE REPLY.

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DATE 5/27/04 BY 60267 uc/klS/Bja/cb

HOOVER

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

SEP 3 1954

TELETYPE

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SEP 10 1954

LW:nbs

EX. 111

SEP 3 1954

U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE
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117-1763-X2

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Mr. Sanders (Rm. 7635)

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

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Holloman
Gandy

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: September 7, 1954

FROM : W. A. Branigan

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION IN PLACE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

At 3:50 P.M. September 7, 1954, Commander B. P. Clark, U. S. Coast Guard, a member of the advisory group of Coast Guard, Customs, Immigration and AEC representatives, which is supervising the field testing of detection devices, phoned the Bureau. Clark stated that the detection device for San Antonio would be shipped in care of Customs, San Antonio, by the Naval Research Laboratory on September 13, 1954, and that the actual field testing would begin at the International Airport, San Antonio on September 20, 1954.

RECOMMENDATION:

None. This is for your information.
SAN ANTONIO WILL BE ALERTED PRIOR TO 9/20/54

LW:bjg

117-268-5911

RECORDED-68

EX-124

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5/27/04 BY 60267 uc/NLS/BJA/CB

Assistant Attorney General
William P. Tompkins

September 3, 1954

Director, FBI

RECORDED - 82 [redacted] b7C

EX-112

MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION

Reference is made to your memorandum of August 27, 1954, your reference WPT:JFR:mcf, 146-7-0, which enclosed a Photostat of a letter dated July 31, 1954, addressed to the Attorney General by the above subject.

It is noted that the letter was written [redacted] This address [redacted] b7C was crossed out. Did the envelope bear an appropriate return other than [redacted] return? In order to definitely identify the writer, it would be helpful to have a more definite return if such appears on the envelope of this communication.

LW:bjg

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DATE 5/27/04 BY 60267 uc/pls/bj; A/cb

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Miss Gandy

MAILED 6
SEP 3 1954
COMM-FBI

50 SEP 15 1954

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. W. C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

TO : Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation DATE: August 27, 1954

FROM : William F. Tompkins, Assistant Attorney General
Internal Security Division WFT:JFR:mcf

SUBJECT: [redacted] b7C 146-7-0
MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION

For your information I am enclosing a photostatic copy of a self-explanatory letter dated July 31, 1954, addressed to the Attorney General by the above subject. I am also enclosing a photostatic copy of the newspaper article referred to therein.

Enclosure No. 170902

INDEXED 82
RECORDED 82
117-368-591
9-7
AUG 30 1954
EX-112

EXPEDITE
AUG 30 1954

ENCL.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/27/04 BY 60267 uc/NLS/bjm 04-cv-1639

Smuggling Atom Bombs

cc BRANIGAN


INCLOSURE
No. 170902
FROM
Department of Justice
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
7—849

Neue Erklärung Johns

(Fortsetzung von Seite 1)

nach Beendigung der Untersuchungen zu erwarten.

Maulkorb für die Presse?

Im Wettlauf der Berliner Presse mit der Kriminalpolizei um die Aufklärung des Falles John kann die Presse einen neuen Pluspunkt für sich buchen: Der West-Berliner „Abend" veröffentlichte am Freitag im Wortlaut einen Brief Otto Johns an Frau X, deren Namen aus Sicherheitsgründen nicht genannt wird. Aus diesem Brief geht einwandfrei hervor, daß John keineswegs die Absicht hatte, in die Ost-Berliner Charité zu fahren, um wichtige Unterlagen für ein ärztliches Gutachten über Herrn X zu beschaffen.

Damit ist eines der wichtigsten Argumente des Bundesinnenministers in sich zusammengefallen. Dr. Schröder hatte es als möglich bezeichnet, daß John in den Ostsektor gefahren sei, um Frau X bei der Beschaffung von Unterlagen zur Durchsetzung ihres Rentenanspruches behilflich zu sein. Wie Frau X erklärte, ist ihr Mann niemals in der Charité behandelt worden. Dr. Wohlgemuth habe ihr gegenüber auch niemals behauptet, daß die Unterlagen für sein ärztliches Gutachten in der Ost-Berliner Charité lägen. Der Berliner Polizei wurde inzwischen bedeutet, daß nach der Eröffnung eines Strafverfahrens gegen Wohlgemuth Auskünfte im Fall John nur noch von der Oberbundesanwaltschaft gegeben werden könnten. In Berliner Journalistenkreisen hat diese Verfügung stärkstes Befremden erregt, da man sie als „Maulkorb" für die Berliner Presse empfindet.

Polizei untersucht Bericht aus der Sowjetunion zum Fall John

(UP) Die politische Sonderabteilung der West-Berliner Kriminalpolizei untersucht gegenwärtig einen aus der Sowjetunion stammenden Bericht, aus dem hervorgeht, daß John möglicherweise bereits seit Jahren für den sowjetischen Geheimdienst tätig war. Wie ein Sprecher des Polizeipräsidiums bestätigte, soll ein im vergangenen Jahr aus einem politischen Straflager der Sowjetunion entlassener Heimkehrer diesen Bericht mit nach Deutschland gebracht haben.

»Rote Hilde« schreibt nach Bonn

Will mit Neumayer Familienrecht erörtern

BERLIN, 30. Juli (dpa). Zu einem „unmittelbaren Gedankenaustausch über die Frage der Neugestaltung des Familienrechts" hat der Sowjetzonen-Justizminister Hilde Benjamin (SED) den Bundesjustizminister Fritz Neumayer (FDP) aufgefordert. Wie die Sowjetzonenagentur ADN mitteilt, vertritt Hilde Benjamin in einem Schreiben nach Bonn die Auffassung, der neue sowjetzonale Entwurf eines Familiengesetzbuches könne für die Gesetzgebung der Bundesregierung „Anregung geben und von Nutzen sein".

Zwei Millionen DM Belohnung

Für Aufklärung von Atombombenschmuggel in die USA

WASHINGTON, 30. Juli (AP). Belohnungen in Höhe von bis zu einer halben Million Dollar (2,1 Millionen DM) hat am Freitag der amerikanische Justizminister Brownell allen denjenigen in Aussicht gestellt, die den amerikanischen Behörden Angaben machen, die zur Verhinderung des Einschmuggelns von Atomwaffen in die Vereinigten Staaten führen. Auch für Mitteilungen über eine illegale Herstellung von Atomwaffen in den Vereinigten Staaten selbst soll eine gleich hohe Belohnung ausgeworfen werden. Die Belohnung soll nicht nur Amerikanern, sondern auch Ausländern zugute kommen, die darüber hinaus auch noch für sich und ihre Familien das ständige Aufenthaltsrecht in den Vereinigten Staaten erhalten sollen.

Der amerikanische Bundesfahndungsdienst hat in diesem Jahr an die Justizbeamten Beschreibungen von zwei Arten Atombomben verteilt, die in die Vereinigten Staaten eingeschmuggelt werden könnten.

Seite 6.
Rundschau Frankfurt M.
Samstag, 31. Juli 1954

BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIC
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
MUNICATIONS SECTION

SEP 3 1954

TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Sizoo
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy
BRANIGAN

WA 5 FROM NEW YORK 3 420 P

DIRECTOR URGENT

ATTN. INSP. CARL HENNRICH

INTERNAL SECURITY - RUSSIAN.

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS AND/OR PARTS THEREOF INTO US, ISR.

[redacted] US COAST GUARD, TELEPHONICALLY CONTACTED THIS OFFICE b7C INST. DATE TO ADVISE THAT A STRONG RED LIGHT REACTION HAD BEEN RECD ON THE DEVICE TO DETECT FISSIONABLE MATERIAL AT NY INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT WHEN THE BAGGAGE FROM PAN AMERICAN AIRWAYS FLIGHT FOUR FIVE TWO WAS PASSED IN FRONT OF THE MACHINE. THIS FLIGHT CARRIED FORTY TWO PASSENGERS, DESTINED FOR US AND FOREIGN COUNTRIES, AND ARRIVED EIGHT THIRTY AM, SEPT THIRD, FROM SAN JUAN, PR. THE PASSENGERS REMOVED THE BAGGAGE PRIOR TO DETERMINATION AS TO WHAT CAUSED THE REACTION.

[redacted] CUSTOMS, WAS CONTACTED AND ADVISED THE b7C FOLLOWING EVENTS TOOK PLACE. UPON ARRIVAL OF THE REFERENCED FLIGHT, BAGGAGE WAS BROUGHT PAST THE DEVICE ON A HAND TRUCK. A STRONG RED LIGHT REACTION OCCURRED. THE CUSTOMS OFFICIAL OPERATING THE MACHINE BEGAN TO REMOVE THE BAGGAGE PIECE BY PIECE AND PLACED IT A SHORT DISTANCE AWAY FROM THE MACHINE. UPON COMPLETION OF THE UNLOADING, THE RED LIGHT ON THE MACHINE CONTINUED TO GLOW. THIS WAS PROBABLY BECAUSE THE BAGGAGE WAS NEAR THE MACHINE. THE BAGGAGE WAS IN SUCH A

RECORDED - 71 - 2688 - 12
9 SEP 10 1954

END PAGE ONE

50 SEP 21 1954

Mr. Belmont

Tel NYC 9-3 54 LW

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POSITION THAT INCOMING PASSENGERS WHO HAD ALREADY BEEN CLEARED BY CUSTOMS IN SAN JUAN ASSUMED THAT THEIR BAGGAGE HAD ALREADY BEEN COMPLETELY CLEARED AND TOOK THEIR LUGGAGE AND DEPARTED BEFORE THE CUSTOMS COULD MAKE A DETERMINATION AS TO WHICH SUITCASE GAVE OFF THE REACTION. THIS FLIGHT HAD FORTYTWO PASSENGERS, WHOSE NAMES AND ADDRESSES HAVE BEEN OBTAINED BY THIS OFFICE. IN VIEW OF DESTINATION OF SOME OF THESE PASSENGERS OUTSIDE US, IT IS DEEMED IMPRACTICAL TO CONDUCT INVESTIGATION TO LOCATE THE LUGGAGE WHICH ACTIVATED THE MACHINE. UACB NY CONDUCTING NO INVESTIGATION.

KELLY

END

HOLD AFTER ACK

NY R 5 WA MS

CC: MR. BELMONT
AND SUPERVISOR
DOM. INTEL. DIVISION

Mr. Hennrich

BEST COPY
AVAILABLE

OFFICE OF DIRECTOR
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Jones
Mr. Sizoo
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

September 3, 1954

For record purposes, this afternoon Lt. Price Duty Officer of the US Coast Guard, called at the Director's Office and delivered the attached letter from Vice Admiral A. C Richmond, US Coast Guard Commandant, dated September 3, 1954, concerning the SS Silverstar and classified 'Secret.' Lt. Price stated that he did have a receipt and if one was not in the sealed envelope, he would appreciate our giving him a receipt, acknowledging receipt of this letter.

On opening the envelopes, there was no receipt inside and Lt. Price was advised it would not be possible to give him a receipt as there was no way to identify to him in the receipt the communication as it was classified secret and, of course, we could not give him a receipt merely for a letter dated today. I told him that if he wanted to have a receipt prepared and bring it back this afternoon that I would be glad to sign it for him. He did not desire to do so and stated he thoroughly understood our position in this matter and that the matter was completely bungled by the Coast Guard.

The above is set forth in order to record the instances pertaining to the delivery of this letter to the Bureau.

Attachment
FCH:eff

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176 SEP 14 1954

INITIALS ON ORIGINAL

13 SEP 14 1954

58 SEP 23 1954

SEP 4

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Sizoo
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy
Brantigan

FBI NYC 9-4 12-46 PM TM

DIRECTOR URGENT

ATTENTION INSPECTOR HENNRICH.

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THERE OF INTO US, ATOMIC ENERGY ACT. REBUTEL SEPTEMBER THREE LAST. [redacted] CUSTOMS PROVIDED PASSENGER LIST OF INDIVIDUALS ARRIVING IN US ABOARD FLIGHT FOUR FIVE TWO, PAN AMERICAN PLANE NC SIX FIVE TWO FIVE C. THIS INFO RECEIVED ON EVENING OF SEPTEMBER THREE LAST. [redacted] CUSTOMS AT NY INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT ON SEPTEMBER FOUR INSTANT FURNISHED FOLLOWING INFO. ONE. NO PASSENGERS BOARDED THIS PLANE AT SAN JUAN, PUERTO RICO. ALL PASSENGERS WERE SUBJECTED TO BAGGAGE SEARCH AT NY INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT UPON ARRIVAL SEPTEMBER THREE LAST. THIS CONFLICTS WITH INFO FURNISHED ON SEPTEMBER THREE LAST BY CUSTOMS THAT BAGGAGE SEARCH HAD BEEN MADE AT SAN JUAN. BAGGAGE DECLARATIONS NOW IN POSSESSION OF CUSTOMS AT NY INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT. TWO. FORTY-TWO PASSENGERS ARRIVED ON FLIGHT FOUR FIVE TWO. OF THE FORTY-TWO SEVEN PASSENGERS WERE DESTINED TO POINTS OUTSIDE OF US. OF THE SEVEN ONE DESTENED TO ITALY, THREE DESTINATION UNKNOWN, AND THREE DESTINED TO

END PAGE ONE

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Mr. Belmont

F/A3

SEP 21 1954

b7C

CANADA. THE NAMES OF THESE SEVEN PASSENGERS ARE [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] THE REMAINING PASSENGERS WERE DESTINED TO VARIOUS PARTS OF US. NONE OF ABOVE KNOWN TO BE DESTINED TO IRON CURTIIN COURTRIES. THREE NO EXTREMELY HEAVY BAGGAGE NOTED BY CUSTOMS. FOUR. A CHECK OF THE RECORDS OF PAN AMERICAN AIRLINES BY CUSTOMS REVEALED NO INFO AVAILABLE ON WHICH PASSENGERS PAID EXCESS BAGGAGE FEES. A TELETYPE HAS BEEN SENT BY PAN AMERICAN AIRWAYS TO THEIR OFFICES IN CARACAS, CURACAO AND SAN JUAN REQUESTING THE NAMES AND DESTINATIONS OF PASSENGERS ON THIS FLIGHT WHO PAID EXCESS BAGGAGE FEES. NO REPLY WILL BE RECEIVED FROM THIS UNTIL SEPTEMBER SEVEN NEXT. INFO WILL BE

END PAGE TWO

PAGE THREE

OBTAINED BY THIS OFFICE AT THAT TIME RE THIS ITEM.

KELLY

END

12-55 PM OK FBI WA SH

M

CC Mr. Hennrich

SEPTEMBER 9, 1954

RECORDED 71-117-268-C1-1 SAC, NEW YORK DEFERRED

125

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE US; ATOMIC ENERGY ACT. RE NY TEL SEPTEMBER EIGHT. NO IDENTIFIABLE DATA BUFILES RE [redacted] WHO HAD EXCESS LUGGAGE ON PAN AMERICAN FLIGHT FROM VENEZUELA TO IDLEWILD SEPTEMBER THREE. ADVISE NATURE OF CUSTOMS DECLARATIONS FILED BY THESE TWO PASSENGERS WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO ANY ITEMS WHICH MIGHT HAVE CAUSED REACTION ON DETECTION DEVICE. CHECK IMMIGRATION RECORDS FOR BIOGRAPHICAL DATA INCLUDING OCCUPATION FOR [redacted]

HOOVER

LW:bjg

b7C

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

SEP 9 1954

TELETYPE

71 SEP 21 1954

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

SEP 8 1954

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Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
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Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Sizoo
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

NASH 27 FROM NEW YORK 8 11-OXXX 11-10 P

DIRECTOR U R G E N T

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/27/04 BY 60247 uc/NLS/Bj A/cb

ATT... INSPECTOR HENNRICH.

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE US, ATOMIC ENERGY ACT. RENYO TEL OF SEPTEMBER FOUR LAST. CUSTOMS [redacted] b7C IDLEWILD AIRPORT, NY, ADVISED THAT PAN AMERICAN AIRLINES HAS DETERMINED THAT TWO PASSENGERS ON THEIR FLIGHT FOUR FIVE TWO MENTIONED IN REFERENCED TEL PAID EXCESS BAGGAGE FEES IN CONNECTION WITH FLIGHT FROM VENEZUELA VIA SAN JUAN TO IDLEWILD. ONE PASSENGER, [redacted] b7C

[redacted]

[redacted] THE SECOND PASSENGER,

[redacted] b7C

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[redacted]

END PAGE ONE.

Mr. Belmont

cc BRANIGAN

Tel to NY 9-9-54 LW:bjg

PAGE TWO..

HAVING REGISTERED THERE. ACCORDING TO [redacted] b7C

[redacted] HAD ONE EACH OF THEIR PIECES OF LUGGAGE EXAMINED.

KELLY

HOLD PLS

Mr. Belmont
Mr. Sanders

SEPTEMBER 16, 1954 AIR-TEL

SAC, SAN ANTONIO URGENT

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC WEAPONS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE US.

BUFILE 117-268. WITH APPROVAL OF NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, ATOMIC ENERGY COMMITTEE AND NAVAL RESEARCH LABORATORY, WASHINGTON, D. C., HAVE DEVELOPED A DETECTION DEVICE WHICH WILL DISCLOSE PRESENCE OF CERTAIN FISSIONABLE MATERIALS. [redacted]

[redacted] b2 b7E

[redacted] A MODEL OF THIS DEVICE

[redacted] WILL BE INSTALLED BY CUSTOMS AT INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, SAN ANTONIO, WHERE SOVIET BLOC OFFICIAL PERSONNEL ARE PERMITTED TO ENTER THE US. SEVERAL SUCH DEVICES CURRENTLY BEING FIELD TESTED AT INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, NY, AND ALONG NY WATERFRONT. DEVICE AT SAN ANTONIO WILL BE FIELD TESTED BY CUSTOMS, COAST GUARD AND IMMIGRATION SERVICE. IN EVENT FISSIONABLE MATERIAL IS DISCOVERED BY MEANS OF DETECTION DEVICE, FBI, SAN ANTONIO WILL BE NOTIFIED. YOU ARE INSTRUCTED TO HAVE REPRESENTATION PRESENT AT A BRIEFING REGARDING THIS DETECTION DEVICE TO BE HELD AT 3:00 P.M., TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 21, IN THE CUSTOMS OFFICE AT SAN ANTONIO AIRPORT. YOU SHOULD MAKE CONTACT WITH MR. JOHN HOLLAND, DISTRICT DIRECTOR, IMMIGRATION SERVICE, SAN ANTONIO, TO VERIFY TIME AND PLACE. COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS COMING TO SAN ANTONIO FROM LAREDO TO ATTEND THIS BRIEFING. YOU SHOULD MAKE NO COMMITMENTS RE ANY PUBLICATION IN CONNECTION WITH THE FIELD TESTING OF THIS DEVICE, BUT YOU SHOULD REPORT PROMPTLY AND IN DETAIL ALL MATTERS AFFECTING THE FBI WHICH DEVELOP DURING COURSE OF BRIEFING DISCUSSIONS OR WHICH ARE BROUGHT TO

SEE PAGE 2 FOR MORE ON YELLOW

INITIALED DIRECTOR'S OFFICE

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
SEP 16 1954

SEP 20 10 AM

AIR-TEL

SAC, SAN ANTONIO

PAGE 2

YOUR ATTENTION DURING ACTUAL FIELD TESTING.

HOOVER

(NOTE: Information re setting up of briefing received 10:30 A.M. 9-16-54 from Commander B. P. Clark, U. S. Coast Guard.) Same procedure followed and same instructions issued to NY 8-11-54.)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

SEP 16 1954

TELETYPE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

FBI WASH DC 9-16-54 7-25 PM FCH
SAC SAN ANTONIO U R G E N T

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC WEAPONS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE US.

BUFILE ONE ONE SEVEN DASH TWO SIX EIGHT. WITH APPROVAL OF NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, ATOMIC ENERGY COMMITTEE AND NAVAL RESEARCH LABORATORY, WASHINGTON, D. C., HAVE DEVELOPED A DETECTION DEVICE WHICH WILL DISCLOSE PRESENCE OF CERTAIN FISSIONABLE MATERIALS. [redacted] b2 b7E A MODEL OF THIS DEVICE [redacted] WILL BE INSTALLED BY CUSTOMS AT INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, SAN ANTONIO, WHERE SOVIET BLOC OFFICIAL PERSONNEL ARE PERMITTED TO ENTER THE US. SEVERAL SUCH DEVICES CURRENTLY BEING FIELD TESTED AT INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, NY, AND ALONG NY WATERFRONT. DEVICE AT SAN ANTONIO WILL BE FIELD TESTED BY CUSTOMS, COAST GUARD AND IMMIGRATION SERVICE. IN EVEENT FISSIONABLE MATERIAL IS DISCOVERED BY MEANS OF DETECTION DEVICE, FBI, SAN ANTONIO WILL BE NOTIFIED. YOU ARE INSTRUCTED TO HAVE REPRESENTATION PRESENT AT A BRIEFING REGARDING THIS

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CORR-- THIRD LINE FROM BOTTOM FIRST WD SHD BE "EVENT"

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DETECTION DEVICE TO BE HELD AT THREE P.M., TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER TWENTY-ONE, IN THE CUSTOMS OFFICE AT SAN ANTONIO AIRPORT. YOU SHOULD MAKE CONTACT WITH MR. JOHN HOLLAND, DISTRICT DIRECTOR, IMMIGRATION SERVICE, SAN ANTONIO, TO VERIFY TIME AND PLACE. COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS COMING TO SAN ANTONIO FROM LAREDO TO ATTEND THIS BRIEFING. YOU SHOULD MAKE NO COMMITMENTS RE ANY FBI ACTION IN CONNECTION WITH THE FIELD TESTING OF THIS DEVICE, BUT YOU SHOULD REPORT PROMPTLY AND IN DETAIL ALL MATTERS AFFECTING THE FBI WHICH DEVELOP DURING COURSE OF BRIEFING DISCUSSIONS OR WHICH ARE BROUGHT TO YOUR ATTENTION DURING ACTUAL FIELD TESTING.

HOOVER

END ACK PLS

OK FBI SA EFY

SAC, NEW YORK (117-192)

September 17, 1954

DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268)

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC WEAPONS AND PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES

On September 16, 1954, Commander B. P. Clark, U. S. Coast Guard, who is a member of the Advisory Group consisting of representatives of Customs, Coast Guard, Immigration and Atomic Energy Commission, engaged in the field testing of detection devices, phoned the Bureau.

Commander Clark stated that he has received a report from Coast Guard in New York that on September 6, 1954, two Czech officials arrived in New York at LaGuardia Airport via Trans-Canada Airlines from Montreal. Since available detection equipment is at the International Airport at Idlewild, rather than at the LaGuardia Airport, the two Czechs and their baggage escaped processing.

The New York Office should determine the frequency with which Soviet bloc officials arrive at LaGuardia Airport from Canada or other foreign countries and make recommendations regarding the plugging of this particular loophole.

LW:bjg

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EX-124

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COMM - FBI
SEP 17 1954
MAILED 30

SEP 29 1954

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

1 - Mr. Sanders (Rm. 7635)

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: September 7, 1954

FROM : W. A. Branigan

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/27/04 BY L0267 uc/NLS/BJA/dlb

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SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION IN PLACE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

At 1:30 P.M. September 3, 1954, the advisory group, consisting of representatives of Customs, Coast Guard, Immigration and AEC, reported to the Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures on the field testing of devices in New York.

Two devices have been installed at the International Airport at Idlewild, one of which is being used for passengers, the other for baggage.

3 devices are being used on the piers at the New York Waterfront. One additional device is ready at the Naval Research Laboratory for shipment to San Antonio, Texas, where it is to be tested at the International Airport.

It was pointed out to the advisory group that the field testing of the passive detection devices should be expedited and completed as soon as possible, because additional detection devices were going to be demonstrated by AEC and the Naval Research Laboratory in the near future. The advisory group stated that they would make the installation in San Antonio during the week of September 13, 1954.

The advisory group is preparing a written report on the New York testing. Mr. Jack Keeney of the ICIS Secretariat is preparing letters to the Commissioner of Immigration and to the Secretary of the Treasury for the signature of Mr. Donegan as Chairman of ICIS, pointing out the previous acceptance of responsibility by Customs, Coast Guard and Immigration for field testing of the devices mentioned above and requesting continued cooperation in connection with this project. It is noted that Customs, Coast Guard and Immigration are all under ICIS purview rather than IIC.

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INDEXED - 23

RECOMMENDATION:

None. This is for your information.

LW:bjg

SEP 23 1954

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: September 17, 1954

FROM : W. A. Branigan

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SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION IN PLACE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

At 3:10 P.M. Commander B. P. Clark, U. S. Coast Guard, phoned the Bureau. Mr. Clark said that since neither he nor Mr. Tripp of INS could travel to San Antonio the week of September 20, 1954, to supervise the field testing of the detection device at the San Antonio Airport, the Advisory Group would be represented by Mr. Flynn of the New York Customs Office and Mr. Don Gale of AEC. Commander Clark stated that Flynn and Gale would arrive in San Antonio the morning of September 21 and would hold a briefing at the San Antonio Airport that afternoon in the Customs Office. (San Antonio Office of the FBI was advised of the background of this situation by Air-tel dated 9-16-54.)

RECOMMENDATION:

None. This is for your information.

LW:bjg

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117-861-

EX-124

AIRTEL

NY, 9/7/54

BUREAU

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC WEAPONS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES. REBUAIRTEL 8/30/54. [redacted]

[redacted] ADVISED THIS DATE THAT HE HAD READ AN ARTICLE IN THE JULY ISSUE OF THE MONTHLY PERIODICAL "SHIPS ON THE SEA." HE STATED THE ARTICLE SET FORTH THAT THE "SS SILVER STAR" REGULARLY GOES IN AND OUT OF WASHINGTON, D.C., IS PRIMARILY A PASSENGER SHIP AND MAY BE OPERATING AS A CRUISE SHIP. HE STATED HE RECALLS FROM THE ARTICLE THAT THE SHIP IS OF MIXED OWNERSHIP. REGARDING HIS CONCERN WITH THE ATOMIC BOMB OR BOMBS MAY BE DELIVERED TO THE UNITED STATES IN THIS MANNER, [redacted] HE HAS NO SUSPICION REGARDING THE "SS SILVER STAR", BUT HE STATED THE POSSIBILITY EXISTS THAT A FOREIGN POWER COULD GET A BOMBS INTO THIS COUNTRY IN THIS MANNER. [redacted] THE "SS SILVER STAR" IS OWNED BY PANAMANIAN CO. AND OPERATED BY A. BERNSTEIN SHIPPING CO., INC., NYC. [redacted] THE INFORMATION HE HAD

b7C

b7C

3-BUREAU (117-268) (REGULAR)

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SEP 14 1954

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ORIG. BELMONT

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PAGE TWO

REGARDING THE "SS SILVER STAR" " MAY HAVE GOTTEN A LITTLE OUT OF CONTEXT BY THE TIME IT REACHED US." [redacted] b7C FURNISH NO INFORMATION RE "SS SILVER STAR", ITS OWNERS, OR ITS OPERATIONS, BUT SUGGESTED THAT PROCEDURES SHOULD BE SET UP TO PREVENT DELIVERY OF AN A BOMB IN THIS MANNER. NO FURTHER ACTIONS WILL BE TAKEN IN THIS MANNER.

KELLY

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. W. A. BRANIGAN

DATE: September 17, 1954

FROM : L. Whitson

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION IN PLACE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

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At 1:35 P.M. 9-17-54 Mr. Almanza Tripp, Immigration and Naturalization Service, phoned the Bureau. Mr. Tripp is a member of the Advisory Group engaged in field testing detection devices. He had been scheduled to go to San Antonio with the other members of the Group on Tuesday, September 21, but due to an emergency situation in the Immigration and Naturalization Service he wanted to advise that he would not be able to make the trip.

Mr. Tripp asked if it would be necessary to obtain approval from the Joint IIC-ICIS Committee under the circumstances. He was informed that the Joint Committee had left the question of field testing and the degree of participation by the individual members of the Advisory Group pretty much up to the group. It was suggested that Mr. Tripp might wish to inform Colonel Joseph Halvorsen, Office of the Secretary of Defense, the regular ICIS member on the Joint Committee. Mr. Tripp stated he would do so.

RECOMMENDATION: Osmulgation Atom Bombs

None. This is for your information.

LW:bjg

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VIA LIAISON

Date: September 17, 1954

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 5/27/04 BY uc2w7 mc/ws/bja/cb

To: Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy
The Pentagon
Washington 25, D. C.

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION IN PLACE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

This will confirm and enlarge upon the oral request of a liaison representative of the FBI to Captain Jones September 2, 1954.

It is the understanding of this Bureau that the Navy is responsible for the Explosives Ordnance Disposal School and Special Weapons Disposal, Naval Powder Factory, Indian Head, Maryland.

As you know the FBI is responsible by statute for investigating violations of the Atomic Energy Act. By instruction of the National Security Council the FBI under certain circumstances will request the services of an Explosive Ordnance Disposal Unit to disarm a clandestine atomic weapon or what appears to be a clandestine atomic weapon.

In order to better acquaint the field personnel of the FBI with the possible appearance of clandestine atomic weapons it was suggested to Captain Jones that if the school at Indian Head had appropriate charts or diagrams which might be helpful to agents of this Bureau, we would like to have the opportunity of looking at them and if deemed desirable of reproducing them in suitable form for dissemination to selected FBI personnel.

LW:bjg

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Accordingly, it is requested that permission be granted representatives of the FBI from our Baltimore Office to examine any charts or diagrams of the type discussed above at Indian Head, Maryland, in order that appropriate recommendations can be made regarding their possible use by this Bureau in the discharge of its responsibilities.

~~SECRET~~

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268) DATE: 8/20/54

D.K.B.

FROM : SAC, BALTIMORE (117-46)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/27/04 BY 60267 uc/ms/sg/clb

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

(4)

(RS)

Re Bureau letter to Baltimore 7/9/54.

Commander WEIL R. BILL, Commanding Officer, Explosives Ordnance Disposal School and Special Weapons Disposal, Naval Powder Factory, Indian Head, Maryland, advised that he does not have the authority to allow anyone to observe the facilities or material at the Special Weapons Disposal School at Indian Head, Maryland, He explained that Commander SMALLWOOD, Room 4D546, Pentagon Building, Washington, D. C., is the individual having the responsibility of arranging for civilians to witness the facilities and materials at Indian Head, Maryland.

Commander BILL also suggested that Colonel D. M. PERKINS, Security Officer, Room 1B665, Pentagon Building, Washington, D. C., might be helpful to the Bureau in procuring photographs, diagrams and films.

HARRY H. MENCKE, Assistant Chief of Staff Intelligence, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, advised that there is some atomic energy work going on at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. Mr. MENCKE stated that arrangements could be made for Bureau agents to observe any material of this type which is at the Proving Ground; however, he suggested that such a viewing would not be particularly beneficial to Bureau agents inasmuch as they would be unable to make a comprehensive picture from the limited amount of AEC work actually going on at Aberdeen Proving Ground. Mr. MENCKE advised that the Bureau should contact members of the AEC and/or members of the Defense Department on a policy making level and ascertain the appropriate place to make an inquiry of the type contained in referenced letter looking toward procuring a comprehensive picture of atomic energy weapons of all types.

No further investigation or inquiry will be made along these lines by the Baltimore Office, UACB.

REW:AFS

RECORDED-11 117-268-600

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17 AUG 23 1954

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: September 16, 1954

FROM : W. A. Branigan

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
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Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION IN PLACE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

We should avail ourselves of every opportunity to obtain information for the use of our agents in the field in connection with the identification of clandestine nuclear weapons.

We do not know precisely the appearance of a Soviet nuclear weapon. Neither do the military who are charged with disarming them.

By statute and under National Security Council instructions our agents in the field receive complaints regarding clandestine nuclear weapons; they investigate these complaints and where necessary call for the services of explosive ordnance disposal units of the Department of Defense to disarm suspected atoms.

The field actually has very little to go on in attempting to identify clandestine nuclear weapons. They have been furnished available discriptive data on the principles involved in construction of nuclear weapons which are general in nature. They have been supplied schematic drawings of implosion and gun-type weapons of the Nagasaki and Hiroshima series.

Our field personnel need all of the assistance we can get for them to enable them to (a) recognize nuclear weapons (b) recognize possible means whereby such weapons would be set off (c) conduct investigations regarding the illegal possession, transportation, etc., of such weapons.

Colonel Joseph A. Petrolino, Ordnance Officer, First Army, New York, who has been contacted by the New York Office in connection with this program, has recommended the Explosives Ordnance Disposal School at Indian Head, Maryland, as a place from which the Bureau could obtain new data regarding nuclear weapons and perhaps get new ideas regarding investigation.

LW: bjg
Attachment

RECORDED-57
INDEXED-57

EX - 107

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/27/04 BY 60267 uc/kk/sbj/dlc

OCT 14 1954

Memo for Mr. Belmont
from Mr. Branigan

Under date of July 9, 1954, the Baltimore Office was instructed through its contacts at Indian Head, Maryland, to determine what information is available and regarding nuclear weapons that would be helpful to the various field offices in detecting or recognizing nuclear weapons or their component parts. Baltimore was instructed to determine what information of possible assistance to the Bureau including photographs or drawings of weapons and weapon components might be available for Bureau use.

Under date of August 20, 1954, the Baltimore Office advised that the Commanding Officer at the Explosives Ordnance Disposal School at Indian Head did not have the authority to allow anyone to observe the facilities or material at the School and that clearance for civilians to witness the facilities and materials at Indian Head would have to come from the Pentagon.

It was determined through Liaison that the Office of Naval Intelligence had charge of such clearance and ONI requested a letter of request, September 2, 1954.

RECOMMENDATION:

There is attached a letter to ONI, telling them that the Bureau wants its Baltimore Office representatives to find out whether the School at Indian Head, Maryland, has appropriate charts or diagrams which would be helpful to the agents of this Bureau in the discharge of their responsibilities and if any such material appears desirable for use we want to be able to reproduce them in suitable form for dissemination to select FBI personnel.

ONI decided 9-30-54 Bureau can request [illegible] Liaison [illegible] and Bureau personnel

SECRET

RECORDED - 116

117-368

EX-128

BY COURIER SERVICE

Date: September 22, 1954

To: Mr. Chester A. Emerick
Deputy Commissioner, Investigations
Bureau of Customs
Room 7048
Internal Revenue Service Building
Washington 25, D. C.

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF
AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO
THE UNITED STATES

Reference is made to my memorandum dated April 6, 1953, directing your attention to [redacted] b7C

[redacted]

Any information which you receive regarding [redacted] would be of interest to this Bureau. b7C

LW: bjg

1 - [redacted]

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267uc/nls/bja/cb
ON 5/27/04

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Nolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Sandy

6 - SEP 2 3
COMM - FBI

SECRET

9 OCT 1 1954

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI (117-268) ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DATE: 9-15-54

FROM : SAC, San Diego (66-998)

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES.

Re No Number SAC Letter January 28, 1952, and mylet March 17, 1953.

The San Diego Office has no additional names to suggest, at this time, for inclusion on the Customs Watch List.

Blind memoranda enclosed to the Bureau with mylet of March 17, 1953, suggested the inclusion of [redacted] As reflected in Form FD-128, submitted March 26, 1954, [redacted] was submitted by the Bureau to the Customs Agency, the Bureau may now wish to inform that agency of the changes.

On September 14, 1954 Confidential Informants [redacted]

[redacted]

In view of [redacted] the Los Angeles Office may deem it advisable to recommend his name for inclusion on the Watch List.

This matter is being closely followed and the Bureau will be advised whenever it appears that a security subject is engaged in activities which should place him on the Watch List.

REGISTERED

JEP:HB

RECORDED - 116

cc - Los Angeles (Reg.)

INDEXED - 116

117-268-9-24

21 SEP 21 1954

EX-128

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5/27/04 BY 60267 uc pls/bj a/cb

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Sizoo
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

FBI WASH FIELD 9/27/54 URGENT 12:30 PM

DIRECTOR AND SACS NEW YORK AND BOSTON

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE U.S.; ATOMIC ENERGY ACT. RE NEW YORK AIRTEL DATED SEPTEMBER TWENTYONE, FIFTYFOUR, REQUESTING WFO DEVELOP IDENTIFYING DATA RE [redacted] FROM PASSPORT RECORDS. FILES PASSPORT OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DISCLOSED [redacted]

b7C

[redacted]

b7C

KJH:RGW

117-151

RECORDED - 6 117-2688-

EX-107 29 SEP 29 1954

Belmont

BEST COPY
AVAILABLE

Director, FBI (64-200-221 Sub 13) 9-2-54

SAC, San Diego (100-7468)

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DATE 5/27/04 BY 60267 uc/NLS/BJA/CB

COMMUNIST PARTY OF MEXICO
STATE OF LOWER CALIFORNIA
INTERNAL SECURITY - C & M

There are being forwarded herewith newspaper articles dated August 29, 30, and 31, 1954, which appeared in the San Diego Union, a daily newspaper in San Diego, California.

The article dated August 31, 1954, reflects that Senator WELKER from Idaho, and Senator McCARRAN from Nevada, of the Senate Internal Security subcommittee, are to hold hearings in San Diego, in October, to investigate the Communist penetration of the United States through the border from Mexico. Inasmuch as this article bears a Washington, D. C. dateline, it is believed that the Bureau probably already has information regarding the contents of this article.

The articles referring to the smuggling of an atom bomb into the United States were written by GENE FUSON, San Diego Union staff writer. In connection with these articles written by GENE FUSON, the attention of the Bureau is brought to a series of articles written by GENE FUSON for the San Diego Union in 1952, concerning the smuggling of aliens into the United States, which were transmitted to the Bureau in August of 1952 by letter captioned "SERIES OF ARTICLES CURRENTLY BEING PUBLISHED IN THE SAN DIEGO UNION CONCERNING THE SMUGGLING OF ALIENS INTO THE UNITED STATES; COMFUGS - INTERNAL SECURITY - C." As the Bureau was advised at that time, GENE FUSON, the author of these articles, was interviewed. At that time FUSON was a

[redacted] He was also the author of a series of articles which appeared in the San Diego Union previously in regard to the traffic of narcotics into the United States from Mexico.

b7C

The attention of the Bureau is also brought to the fact that

[redacted]

When interviewed regarding the series of articles which FUSON wrote concerning the smuggling of aliens into the United States, FUSON stated he obtained a great deal of his information from the United States Immigration authorities and the Border Patrol, both in San Ysidro and Calexico, California. It is also interesting to know that an employee

Enclosures (3)
REGISTERED

100-265604

NOT RECORDED
145 SEP 10 1954

3 ENCLS

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of the U. S. Border Patrol advised an Agent of this office that the articles written by FUSON were cleared by both the local office in San Diego and the regional office of the U. S. Immigration and Naturalization Service in Los Angeles, for publication. This employee also stated it was hoped these articles would do some good in alleviating the manpower shortage which presently exists in the Border Patrol along the Mexican Border.

The articles referring to the smuggling of a mock atom bomb into the United States, which are enclosed herewith, and written by FUSON, are believed to have been written much along the same line as the series of articles written by FUSON in August of 1952.

This office, is, of course, quite concerned with respect to the publicity which has been given this particular subject. Every effort is being made by this office to obtain any information indicating that Red Agents are being slipped into the United States disguised as Mexican laborers. All Security Informants and other sources of information have been alerted for some time regarding this matter and this office is constantly on the alert to explore any possibility of such activities. The Bureau's attention is also brought to the fact that at [redacted] b2 b7D The possibility that such activities are existent in the border area is not being underestimated by this office and the responsibilities of the Bureau with respect to that phase of our work are being constantly borne in mind. Should any further information come to the attention of this office regarding the hearings to be held by the Senate Internal Security subcommittee in San Diego in October, the Bureau will be immediately advised.

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(12)

ENCLOSURE

117-268-604

Mock Atom Bombs

—Photo by Mike Hazelip, San Diego Union Chief Photographer.

Some of the mock atomic bombs and devices that were brought into United States in security tests. Legends in Russian on the devices say "Simulated Atomic Bomb—This Mock Device Is Not Dangerous."

~~Smuggled into U.S.~~

San Diego Union 8-30-54
San Diego Evening Tribune
Peoples Daily World
La Mesa Pictorial
Oceanside Daily Blade Tribune
Santa Ana Register
Imperial Valley Weekley
Calexico Chronical
Corona Daily Independent
Perris Progress
Riverside Daily Press
Riverside Enterprise
Indio Date Palm
Escondido Daily Times Advocate

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DATE 5/27/04 BY 60267 uc/nls/bja/cb

SEARCHED _____ INDEXED _____
SERIALIZED _____ FILED _____
AUG 30 1954
FBI - SAN DIEGO

WRITER TESTS SECURITY

Mock Atom Bombs Smuggled Into S.D.

By GENE FUSON
San Diego Union Staff Writer
Copyright, 1954, The San Diego Union

I had been in Mexicali many times but never before on this kind of business. My assignment was to see what a Communist agent, intending to smuggle atomic weapons into the United States, would find at that part of the border.

I had learned enough already in Nogales and Hermosillo to know that Mexicali has the reputation in the main part of Mexico as a mecca for Communists.

At the same time, Mexicali is known to be the gathering place for the biggest number of Mexican laborers who hope to cross the border and get jobs in the United States. We call them wetbacks when they get into California.

I knew that hundreds of thousands of Mexican workers had crossed the border at Mexicali. I knew also that hundreds of thousands had been caught by the border patrol in the United States and sent back to Mexico and that the border is better guarded now than at any time in history.

A little more than a month ago, Atty. Gen. Brownell ordered the border sealed to illegal entrants and more than 100 extra men with equipment had been stationed in Imperial Valley to carry out the order.

This was part of what a real foreign agent would be expected to know. I wanted to see how things actually were set up at Mexicali.

Imperial Valley is at its widest at Mexicali. There are 15 or 20 miles of irrigated fields each side of town, on both the Mexican and American sides of the border. Mexicali and Calexico are one town, or would be except for the fence that marks the border.

I had the help of a friend with an automobile in Mexicali, posing as an American Communist agent, and I drove up and down the border.

Driving through Mexicali he pointed out the place in the railroad yards where four months ago Latin America's No. 1 Communist, Vincente Lombardo Toledano, spoke three hours to an estimated 8,000 Mexican workers standing in the hot sun. Toledano spoke largely on Yankee Imperialism.

My friend pointed out the book store where they sell Russian publications reprinted in Spanish and the official Communist newspaper, Voz de Mexico.

The border fence used to be a joke. A year ago it was a twisted wreck, full of holes.

I found that it has been entirely rebuilt. It extends

(Continued on Page a-3, Col. 1)

(Continued from Page 1)

four miles each side of town and it is in excellent repair.

On the United States side of the line jeeps patrolled every few minutes on a dirt road next to the fence. On a paved road 50 feet north of the fence, patrol cars cruised up and down every few minutes.

DECIDES ON FENCE

An enemy agent, bent on smuggling in an atomic weapon or device, would not be pleased by what he saw here.

In telling this story, I am at a point now where I think that I ought to explain why I decided to climb that fence. I was trying to think out what our country could do that would make an atom smuggling plot fail I felt that I had to go through some of the motions that an enemy agent would have to make. He would have to get across the border into the United States.

I picked fence climbing as the most direct way of going about it.

PATROLS ARE HEAVY

It was not easy to decide on the place for the climbing attempt. The section on the Mexican side opposite Calexico's residential area was the most convenient, but patrols were too heavy. I finally decided on a location east of town.

I started out the next midnight. My friend was waiting at a motel in Calexico. I was a mile and a half east of the center of Mexicali in a poor section of town.

I was to walk back toward the center of town on a street next to the fence, until I came to a place near a tall radio tower where a street light was missing. I had with me an object that I thought of as a mock atomic bomb. It was about 20 inches long. I carried it in a canvas bag.

PLODS DOWN STREET

I plodded down the street until I reached the place where the light was missing and the fence was dark. It was 1:15 a.m. I sat under a tree next to a little shack and waited.

I watched the United States border patrol jeep grind slowly down the dirt road, easing over the bumps, on the other side of the border. It came almost to a full stop opposite me, 20 yards away and someone played a spotlight over the fence and the brush.

The border patrol evidently had noticed that the Mexicali street light was out. The man with the flashlight did not see me, though, and the jeep ground on down the dirt road.

LIGHT GOES ON

At 2 a.m. someone stirred inside the shack. A light went on in the doorway. I could hear splashing water and someone talking. A man came out with a bundle under his arm and turned up the street toward town.

At exactly 2:30 a.m. I walked to the fence where it was darkest, took the canvas sack in my teeth and started up the wire mesh fence. I hoisted myself to the barbed wire, rolled over it, and eased down on the other side.

As I crossed the paved street 50 feet inside the United States from the border, I could see a pair of headlights coming far down the pavement. I ran across the road into a field and lay down next to an irrigation ditch. In a few minutes another patrol car cruised slowly by.

WAITS AT BUSH

The plan was for me to walk a mile northward across the fields until I reached a canal, then west until I got to the place where a paved road crossed the canal. I struck out across the fields, swatting at hordes of mosquitoes that buzzed in the hot night.

I reached the rendezvous point a few minutes early. I had no way of knowing what would happen. I had no way of knowing what the reaction of the United States border patrol would be to my attempt to climb the fence. I had no way of knowing what kind of reception I would get from the men who were to meet me.

MEET SMALL BOAT

Actually, to make the test as realistic as I thought it would attract, three friends and I met a small boat west of the Coronado Islands at daybreak. From that boat, we picked up seven tanks of various sizes and brought them into San Diego Harbor.

They were of various sizes, painted silver and each was labeled in Russian letters as a mock atomic bomb. We landed them 100 yards from the Civic Center a few minutes after the practice air raid alarm sounded on Monday.

Only top officials of the Coast Guard, Harbor Department and United States Customs previously had been informed.

We landed the fake bombs, put them in a car and drove away. The few persons eating lunch on the embarcadero and passersby paid not the slightest attention to what we were doing. The drive into town gave me a chance to think out some of the implications of the things I had found out and had done.

Here is what they added up to:

I had started out to see what an enemy agent would discover if he were trying to smuggle atomic weapons into the United States. How could he be thwarted?

1,800-MILE BORDER

I had tried to understand how an enemy's operations would be carried out. I had crossed the border at Nogales and at Mexicali. These were the most strongly guarded points. They are much better watched than they ever were before.

But the border is 1,800 miles long, and the United States border patrol, even with its reinforcements, numbers only 1,500. The border stretches 695 miles from the Pacific south of Imperial Beach, to El Paso, Tex., and it runs another 1,100 miles along the Rio Grande to Brownsville, Tex.

There are 11 sizable ports of entry, three in California, three in Arizona, one in New Mexico, and four in Texas. These must be manned, most of them, 24 hours a day. There are wire mesh fences at most of these ports, but the total length of all these strips of fence is less than 50 miles.

The situation then is that there are 1,500 men to guard 1,800 miles of border, of which only 3 per cent is fenced.

ANOTHER ANGLE

To guard such a border like the Russians guard the Iron Curtain might take 100,000 men.

But there is another angle. A Communist agent, to smuggle atomic bombs into the United States, would require an organization behind him.

He and his bomb would have to have a spy network in operation to bring them from some Iron Curtain country to the United States border.

This organization also would have to have somebody on the United States side of the border to meet him and take him and his bomb to their destination.

Such an organization would be made up of a number of persons. It would be the vulnerable part of the Communist setup.

TWO POSSIBLE WAYS

If anybody in that organization could be caught — if anybody in the outfit would inform the United States that a smuggling operation was under way — the United States would be able to defeat the smuggling attempt.

There are two ways, it seemed to me, of going about that. One is to alert the American public to the fact that atomic bombs and de-

—San Diego Union Staff Photo

International boundary at Mexicali and Calexico where border fence (shown by broken line) was scaled in smuggling simulated atomic device into the United States. Arrow indicates point where crossing was made. Initial A marks United States port of entry in Calexico. Initial B marks Mexican port of entry in Mexicali. "Bomb" smuggler proceeded north after scaling fence.

vices are of such a size that they can be smuggled into the country.

The San Diego Union is trying to alert the public by printing these articles.

The other approach is to offer powerful incentives to members of the enemy's camp to inform us of smuggling operations.

Atty. Gen. Brownell on July 30 asked Congress to authorize awards up to $500,000 for informants giving tips about atomic materials and weapons illegally produced or smuggled into the United States. In addition to cash payments, lifetime asylum in this country would be offered to aliens and their families who provide such information.

This plan would offer the powerful incentives needed by aliens.

I have the idea that the reason an enemy would try to smuggle atomic weapons into the United States would be to meet some secret deadline, a new Communist - set Pearl Harbor Day.

But such a scheme would be exposed if even one smuggling plot were discovered, by an alert United States public or through a tip by a member of the smuggling ring who wanted to get a reward and get his family safely into the United States.

The Communist enemy would hardly dare to expose his Pearl Harbor Day plot by a smuggling operation if he thought that the smuggling might be detected.

We never can have armed guards standing every 20 feet along the border from San Diego to Brownsville.

But even with an imperfect network, we may be able to have 100 per cent success in preventing smuggling if the enemy thinks his operation might be discovered by an alert country and give away a greater plot.

(This is the last of a two-part series.)

HELP NEEDED--FROM ALERT CIVILIAN PUBLIC

What Atom-Bomb Smuggler Would Find At Mexican Border

By GENE FUSON
San Diego Union Staff Writer
Copyright, 1954, The San Diego Union

The United States government needs the help of an alert civilian public to guard against Communist agents trying to smuggle atomic weapons into this country and transport them to a target area.

I became convinced of this during the last six weeks, which I spent along the border and south of the border.

It is true in spite of the fact that the Mexican border is better protected, more carefully watched, than at any time in its history.

I learned some other things, too, during those six weeks of border investigations. One fact seems to me to be of more than ordinary interest to people of San Diego and Imperial Valley.

This is that northern Baja California, especially Mexicali, is getting to be known throughout Mexico as a kind of mecca for Communists.

The assignment was to see what an enemy agent, bent on atomic smuggling, would find at the border.

I had read the repeated and what to me were startling warnings by the United States government of the possibility of atomic weapons being smuggled into this country. One warning went so far as to describe, in some detail, what kind of objects to look for.

After I started to work on the border inquiry, something else came along to point up even more the importance which the United States government attaches to atomic smuggling.

This was a request by the Eisenhower administration to Congress to authorize rewards up to $500,000 for information on enemy agents seeking to smuggle atomic weapons into the United States. More than that, lifetime residence in this country would be offered to aliens and their families who give us such information.

I knew, at the same time, that two congressional committees had announced plans to hold hearings here in September or October on the extent to which Communists are crossing the border in the guise of Mexican alien laborers.

One other thing should be mentioned. Starting June 17, the border patrol division of the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service has been picking up illegal Mexican aliens in the biggest roundup in the history of the Southwest.

More than 100,000 persons, mostly wetbacks—Mexicans who crossed illegally into the United States—have been apprehended and shipped back to Mexico. Another 100,000 have gone back to escape deportation.

Atty. Gen. Brownell has called it the largest migration of people witnessed on this continent in modern times.

For the job, the 1,000-man Border Patrol that operates between San Diego and Brownsville, Tex., has been increased to 1,500 and given extra radio cars, jeeps and seven airplanes.

It should be pointed out that the border patrol is to remain permanently strengthened. Congress has approved an extra 3 million dollars to provide more men and equipment to guard the Mexican border. The immediate result was to order the recruitmen of 200 more men in Southern California for the Border Patrol.

This is the background, then, of my assignment and the investigation that I made.

I started in Tijuana. I traveled from there to Hermosillo, the capital of the Mexican state of Sonora, south of Arizona. I rode a bus through Sonora. Half of the people aboard were labor-

(Continued on Page a-6, Col. 1)

San Diego Union 6 - 57
San Diego Evening Tribune
Peoples Daily World
La Mesa Pictorial
Oceanside Daily Blade Tribune
Santa Ana Register
Imperial Valley Weekley
Calexico Chronical
Corona Daily Independent
Perris Progress
Riverside Daily Press
Riverside Enterprise
Indio Date Palm
Escondido Daily Times Advocate

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Test Finds 'A Nest Of Wasps'

(Continued from Page a-1)

ers headed for Mexicali with the intention of crossing into the United States.

I talked to Mexican people in all kinds of jobs and places. There were street sweepers, policemen, businessmen waiters, taxidrivers, farmers and laborers.

I spent considerable time in Nogales, Sonora, and I went to Mexicali.

At both Nogales and Mexicali I crossed the border by climbing over the fence at night. In each case I did so because I wanted to make the operation real to myself.

Hundreds of thousands of wetbacks have got across the border in one way or another. I was not trying to prove anything by crossing. It was no achievement.

I felt that I had to do some part of the operation that a real foreign agent would carry out if I was going to understand just what such an agent would face and how our country could plan best to make him fail.

CARRIES MOCK DEVICE

In my bag I carried an 8-inch tubular device made of junk electrical parts to simulate an atomic bomb triggering device. I intended to smuggle it into the United States.

Let me start the story at Hermosillo. It is a town of 60,000, 165 miles below the border at Nogales—it is 215 miles due south of Tucson, Ariz. It is in cattle country, and there are orange groves. It was sweltering in 100-degree heat and high humidity the day I got there.

'BUSINESS?' HE ASKS

The driver of the single taxi at Hermosillo airport tended his yanqui tourista trade in khaki pants, a white shirt, soggy from the heat, and a slightly battered straw hat. His grin was missing two teeth.

Enroute to town he told me of his two years schooling at Wichita, Kans., and of his travels to United States cities on the Pacific Coast. He toured Hermosillo while we made tourist talk.

"You here for business?" he asked.

"In part," I told him. "I'm going to meet a friend. We deal in machinery for wrecking buildings."

"When do you meet your friend?" he asked.

"In a few days. I will take the train to Nogales."

He shook his head. "It is better you take the bus. On the train perhaps you get there and perhaps you don't."

He pointed out several new buildings in the city, which he said had been built by Abelardo Rodriquez, former governor of Sonora.

WORD ON REDS

"How is the government now?" I asked him.

He shrugged. "It is like all governments, some like it, others do not."

"Are there any Communists here?" I asked.

"All the Communists go to Baja California," he said.

"Why?"

He shrugged again. "Who knows? It is said that it is better for them there."

"Are there Communists in Hermosillo," I asked.

"Only a few, like everywhere, to make agitations," he replied.

Another time at midnight I wandered in front of the hotel to see if it might be cooler in the street. I joined a little knot of late strollers chatting on the corner. There was a policeman, a businessman of some sort and two others who may have been cab drivers. Another man sweeping up hundreds of crickets and moths that swarmed on the sidewalk under the hotel sign, gave up in disgust and joined the discussion.

'A NEST OF WASPS'

The talk meandered from baseball to agriculture and when it got to politics I broached the subject of Communism.

"Mexicali," one said, "Like a nest of wasps."

The group nodded agreement.

The Nogales bus was a new United States made model, but the air conditioning didn't work. It was packed and overflow passengers filled the aisles.

About half the passengers were field workers in khaki and blue jeans moving north with their cardboard boxes and bundles. The others

seemed to be ranchers, a few women and a child or two.

My seat was in the middle, behind a fat woman who carried her lunch of meat and chilis wrapped in two huge Sonora tortillas. The man beside me wore long sideburns and a Texas hat. He said he made his living as a slaughterhouse worker.

The field workers left the bus with their bundles and boxes at Benjamin Hill, 91 miles south of Nogales.

Benjamin Hill is a dusty little clutter of mud houses dozing around a few railroad switches where the track splits with one line to Mexicali and one to Nagales. Once it was a tourist stop, but a new highway left it stranded a mile out on the prairie.

From their chatter, I learned that the field workers would take the train for Mexicali, where they would seek work in the United States.

CLEAR VIEW OF FENCE

Late that afternoon, I checked into the Hotel Fray Marcos de Niza on the Mexican side of Nogales.

From my hotel room I had a clear view of the border fence that divides the city. The first step was to take a taxi tour of the city.

Nogales sits astride the border where the southbound railroad tracks pass through a narrow valley leaving the United States. Narrow canyons enter the valley east and west, which is only a few hundred yards wide. The Mexican population of 40,000 lives in small houses clustered on the hillsides and in the canyons.

TOUR IN TAXI

The taxi driver, a young, amiable sort, took me to the high hills and back streets that bordered the high fence. He seemed to take it for granted I was with a Hollywood motion picture unit that was shooting in the desert on the United States side.

Like most taxi drivers along the border, he wasn't very nosey.

I found the fence was about 13 feet high, with seven strands of barbed wire strung on an inverted "V" at the top. It was heavy steel mesh and in excellent repair. All the brush had been cleared away from it. I judged it ran three miles out on either side of the city.

BORDER PATROL CITED

The driver told me few Mexicans attempt to cross the border illegally at Nogales because there is only one highway to the north.

"Besides," he said, "there are many border patrol and they are vivo (alert). To cross here is difficult. Those who cross the fence all go first to Mexicali, I will show you."

He drove me to the railroad yards in the bottom of the valley. He pointed out a pair of railroad cars on a siding. They were full of field workers. They were part of the 15 or 20 busloads of Mexican aliens the border patrol was delivering to Nogales every day from their drive on wetbacks.

TAXIS LINED UP

The train was supposed to take them 1,500 miles to the interior under soldier guards, where they would be dispersed.

There was a line of 30 taxis parked bumper-to-bumper next to the train.

"Before the train leaves," the driver told me, "many of them will jump out of the train and take the taxis to Santa Ana, 66-miles south of Nogales) and they will ride the bus back to the border at Mexicali."

For the crossing, I picked a place 400 yards east of the entry port, where the fence dropped into a small canyon, leaving a hill between the spot and the port of entry, on the main street.

The route would bring me out on the United States side of the line at the edge of the residential section and near a television antenna on a hill that would serve as a guidepost.

Shortly before midnight I started up a dark little street in Buenos Aires Canyon, which parallels the border fence east of Mexican Nogales and 200 yards south of the fence.

I followed the bumpy, winding canyon road, climbing past two small, naked street lights toward the black head of the canyon. It took me between rows of darkened mud and stone houses roofed with castoff pieces of tin and cardboard cartons.

GROUPS IN DOORWAYS

Groups of people gathered in twos and threes in dark doorways talked quietly in the hot night. Stray mongrels sleeping in the dirt street raised curious noses as I passed. A few ventured a half-hearted growl or a weak bark. With the last street light behind me, I turned north into the darkness, picking my way quietly between mud and cardboard walls.

A summer storm was starting in the south and the lightning flashes followed a few warm raindrops as I topped the hill and picked my way through the brush toward the television antenna.

By 1 a.m., I was in position. I sat down under a thorn bush and listened. An hour later I had located all the barking dogs across the fence and the route the patrol car followed twice on a street 100 yards from the fence. The lights had gone out in the two houses across the fence from me.

FENCE MAKES RATTLE

I gripped the mesh and shook it gently to check it for noise. It made a loud rattle. I slipped the simulated trigger device through the mesh and returned to the brush to wait.

At 2:20 a.m., the wire atop the fence squeaked. Someone else was going over it. Dogs barked in the blackness to my left.

A few minutes later I stepped to the fence and and started climbing. At the top, I grabbed the uppermost barbed wire strand, lay on it, rolled over and dropped to the other side.

BACK TOWARD TOWN

I lay still under a bush away from the fence until the dogs stopped barking. When it was quiet, I returned, took the fake trigger device and moved through someone's backyard. I passed under a window, past a chicken coop, opened and closed the front gate and strolled down the street toward town.

A few minutes later I walked down the main street of Nogales, and back into Mexico carrying the device in my hand. At the hotel I packed the fake trigger in my bag. At 6 a.m. a Mexican taxi took me and my bag across the line to the bus station .

At 1 a.m., July 30, the fake trigger was delivered in San Diego.

The information that "everyone who wants to cross the border goes to Mexicali," seemed particularly interesting. I decided I would try to bring a small simulated atomic bomb into the United States in the same manner.

U.S. Needs Help From Civilians



AB5WX

(270) ATOMIC SABOTEURS

WASHINGTON, AUG. 18 (AP)-CONGRESSIONAL ATOMIC SPECIALISTS SAY IT IS POSSIBLE RUSSIA MAY HAVE DEVISED SMALL ATOMIC WEAPONS WHICH MIGHT BE SLIPPED INTO THIS COUNTRY WITHOUT DETECTION BY CUSTOMS AGENTS.

THE SENATE-HOUSE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMITTEE MADE THIS COMMENT YESTERDAY IN A REPORT ON A BILL TO AUTHORIZE UP TO $500,000 IN REWARDS FOR DETECTION OF ATTEMPTS TO SMUGGLE A-WEAPONS INTO THIS COUNTRY.

LATER IN THE DAY, THE HOUSE PASSED THE BILL BY VOICE VOTE AND IT TO THESENATE.

—San Diego Union Photo

Reproduction of an Associated Press news story describing possibility that Russia has atomic weapons that could be smuggled into United States. News story and other developments affecting security led to San Diego Union tests.

BOMB DETECTION ISN'T EASY

Atom Smuggler Could Hide Small Weapons On Person

What does an atomic bomb look like? How would you know it if you saw one?

The answer is that detection is not easy, but there are some inevitable clues. A smuggled bomb might come in various sizes or shapes, and it might be made of various materials.

One fixed characteristic, though, is the extreme heaviness of the fissionable material which is the basic component of every A-bomb.

Uranium, the original atomic explosive, weighs one and three-fourths times as much as lead. A piece of uranium one inch thick, one inch high and two inches long would weigh 1.34398 pounds.

Although atomic bombs come in various sizes and shapes, there are two main types that enemy agents might try to smuggle into the United States. These are the gun type and the implosion type.

The gun type essentially is made of a gun barrel with a 6 or 8-inch bore, plugged at the muzzle with atomic explosives. A metal shield or blanket, made of heavy material such as tungsten carbide or uranium, or a light material such as beryllium, surrounds the barrel.

The atomic explosive may be in special shapes, such as five-side or six-side blocks. These blocks might be anywhere from 2 inches across and 1 inch thick to 20 inches across and 10 inches thick.

The implosion type consists of a ball of atomic explosive wrapped inside a metal blanket or shield, and around that a high explosive. This high explosive causes the core to cave in (implode). This compresses the atomic explosive, in a fraction of a second, to its exploding point.

It is possible to make atomic weapons so small they can be concealed on the person. An assembled atomic bomb can be fitted into the luggage compartment of an automobile.

Small parts of a bomb can be smuggled into the country and assembled in any reasonably dry place.

The parts of a bomb as heavy as five tons can be put together in an average room of the average house, or in a truck, or aboard a small vessel.



—San Diego Union Staff Map

Arrows locate Mexicali and Nogales, where border crossings were made in security tests, and San Diego. Broken line marks U.S.-Mexican boundary.

SENATE TO 'PROBE' S.D. BORDER 'REDS'

San Diego Union
San Diego Evening
Peoples Daily World
La Mesa Pictorial
Oceanside Daily Blade Tribune
Santa Ana Register
Imperial Valley Weekley
Calexico Chronical
Corona Daily Independent
Perris Progress
Riverside Daily Press
Riverside Enterprise
Indio Date Palm
Escondido Daily Times Advocate

MATION CONTAINED
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DATE 5/27/04 BY 60267 uc/mls/bja/kb

SEARCHED ____ INDEXED ____
SERIALIZED ____ FILED ____
AUG 31 19--
FBI - SAN DIEGO

Check Ordered On Crossings From Mexico

Internal Security Group Sets Hearings Here On Spies, Agitators

The San Diego Union's Washington Bureau
Copley Press Leased Wire

WASHINGTON, Aug. 30—The Senate Internal Security subcommittee today announced it will send two senators to San Diego in October to investigate Communist penetration of the United States through the border from Mexico. Sen. Welker (R-Idaho) and Sen. McCarran (D-Nev) will hold hearings there, on dates still to be fixed, to determine the number of Red agents that have slipped into the United States disguised as Mexican laborers.

The objective of the San Diego investigation will be to close the gaps through which reported Communist spies and agitators are entering the United States.

Welker and McCarran are members of the subcommittee, which has been authorized by the parent Senate Judiciary Committee to investigate Communist activity.

MEMBERS OF GROUP

Staff investigators have been investigating since last spring reports received from California that Communists have been using the illegal Mexican labor device as a means of sneaking their agents into this country to foment agitation for Red causes.

A subcommittee spokesman said sufficient evidence has been turned up to justify hearings in southern California and to other points along the Mexican border.

The extent of Communist infiltration at the border was accurately described by a series of stories appearing in The San Diego Union, the spokesman added.

The first of the series of 13 articles by Gene Fuson appeared Aug. 17, 1952.

The spokesman would not divulge additional evidence available to the subcommittee except to say that field investigations have determined the veracity of the reports.

In May, Sen. Knowland (R-Calif) and Sen. Kuchel (R-Calif) addressed a letter to Sen. Jenner (R-Ind), chairman of the Internal Security subcommittee, urging a full-scale Senate investigation of the Communist menace at the border.

The investigation, headed by Welker, is not expected to confine its southern California inquiry to Communist penetration alone.

NARCOTICS INCLUDED

The amount of narcotics smuggled across the boundary, the extent to which the legal Mexican farm labor recruiting program is being skirted by the importation of wetbacks and the teen-age problem created in the United States by the availability of illegal narcotics across the border are scheduled to receive a full investigation.

The subcommittee spokesman indicated that Senate field investigators would precede the senators to San Diego to set up

(Continued on Page a-2, Col. 7.)

Senators To Probe Reds' Penetration

(Continued from Page 1)

he hearings and gather evi-ence for presentation to Welk-r and McCarran when they rrive.

'anama New Target)f Reds, Reports Say

The San Diego Union's Washington Bureau

Copley Press Leased Wire

WASHINGTON, Aug. 30 — A pecial House subcommittee oday moved to open an in-estigation of reports that the overnment of Panama is the ext target of the Communists n the Western Hemisphere.

Rep. Hillings (R-Calif), sub-ommittee chairman, said the eports definitely will be studied nd, if true, exposed.

Hillings announced the ap-ointment of Rep. Bentley (R-Mich) and Rep. Dodd (D-Conn) to the subcommittee. The appointments were made by Rep. Kersten (R-Wis), chairman of the House Select Committee on Communist Aggression, which has turned its attention to Red inroads in the Western Hemisphere.

The first phase of the subcommittee's hearings will be held in Latin America, with Hillings scheduled to leave for South and Central America late next week to carry on investigation of Communist activities.

Hillings outlined a tentative schedule of hearings, the outgrowth of the near Communist coup in Guatemala, that will take the subcommittee from Washington to southern California.

VITAL TO OBJECTIVE

When he returns Hillings plans to hold public hearings in Washington and then, sometime in October, move to Los Angeles and San Diego for additional inquiry.

The detailed itinerary of the subcommittee has not been established.

Hillings suggested that southern California hearings are extremely vital to the over all objective of turning up Communist activity in the hemisphere because of the numerous witnesses located there who can shed light on Communist push to gain control of certain key countries in Latin America.

Hillings said southern California has a traditional Latin American background and has become the haven of many of the Latin American figures who have had to flee their own countries because of Communist political aggression.

[redacted] b7C

NO RECORD AVAILABLE TO DETERMINE WHICH PIECE BAGGAGE CAUSED REACTION ON DETECTION DEVICE BECAUSE OF CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH PREVENTED REINSPECTION OF ALL BAGGAGE AS OUTLINED IN MYTEL SEPTEMBER THREE LAST. BOSTON REQUESTED TO ASCERTAIN IDENTITY OF PERSON RESIDING [redacted] CHECK INDICES ON THIS PERSON AND ALSO [redacted] AND, IF POSSIBLE, ASCERTAIN b7C OCCUPATION AND BIOGRAPHICAL DATA CONCERNING [redacted] WFO REQUESTED TO CHECK PASSPORT RECORDS FOR POSSIBLE IDENTIFYING DATA ON [redacted] SET OUT ABOVE. BOTH OFFICES SUTEL BUREAU.

KELLY

BOSTON AND WASHINGTON FIELD ADVISED BY MAIL.

END

NY R 12 AND 13 WA JFL

Mr. William P. Rogers
Deputy Attorney General

September 14, 1954

Director, FBI

DEPARTMENTAL LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM
84TH CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION

Reference is made to your memorandum of August 19, 1954, requesting that this Bureau submit any legislative proposals which this Bureau desired to be included in the preliminary legislative program of the Department for the First Session of the 84th Congress.

I desire to submit for your consideration the following items, all of which except one were included in the Department's legislative program as of November 30, 1953. The one item not previously included in the Department's legislative program pertains to legislation providing for the payment of substantial rewards for information leading to the acquisition or recovery of fissionable weapons or material illegally introduced or attempted to be introduced into the United States.

1. Legislation to Penalize Spies for Obtaining or Transmitting to their Principals Information Received from Legitimate Sources - page 5, item 15.

2. Legislation to Prohibit Disclosure of Information by Former Government Employees - page 6, item 17.

3. Legislation to Resolve Evidence Problem in Security Matters - page 6, item 18.

4. Legislation to Revise the Foreign Agents Registration Act - page 6, item 19.

5. Legislation Regarding Wire Tapping - page 3, item 19.

WPJ:eck

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OCT 4 1954

6. Legislation to Provide Rewards for Information Regarding the Smuggling of Atomic Weapons or Fissionable Material.

This legislation was presented to the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference by letter from the chairman of the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security dated May 8, 1953. The proposal is predicated upon the fact that the Bureau of Customs in the detection of smuggling relies to a considerable degree upon information furnished as a result of rewards provided for by statutes. The statutory rewards paid by the Bureau of Customs are predicated largely on the value of recovery; but cash value of an atomic weapon or the amount which might be paid for the recovery of a smuggled atomic weapon is considerably greater than the amount authorized under the present Customs laws.

The Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference concurred in this proposal and recommended enactment of such legislation to the National Security Council. The recommendation was approved by the National Security Council, and by the President in National Security Council Document 159/4 dated September 25, 1953. It is our understanding that legislation to this same effect was recommended by the Attorney General to the National Security Council and that the Department drafted a proposed bill providing for payment of rewards in amounts not to exceed $500,000 which was then transmitted to the 83rd Congress under date of July 29, 1954, but which failed of enactment in that Congress.

It is recommended that similar legislation be placed before the 84th Congress. No estimate can be made of the costs of administration of such legislation. It was previously proposed that the rewards be paid out of funds appropriated for the administration of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946.

7. Legislation to Amend Title 18, United States Code, Section 2314, the National Stolen Property Act - page 3, item 20.

8. Legislation to Amend Title 18, United States Code, Section 1462, to Prohibit the Interstate Transportation of Obscene Matter by Private Conveyances - page 2, item 12.

9. *Legislation to Amend Title 18, United States Code, Sections 2311, 2312, and 2313, the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act - page 2, item 16.*

10. *Legislation to Amend the Dependents Assistance Act of 1950 - page 2, item 13.*

By memorandum from Mr. James S. Lay, Jr., Executive Secretary, National Security Council, to the National Security Council dated December 28, 1953, a 25 point security legislative program was presented for the consideration of the National Security Council. Several of the preceding legislative proposals were included in this 25 point security legislative program, to which you may wish to refer.

The Director

9-13-54

Mr. Boardman

DEPARTMENTAL LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM
84th CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION

By memorandum of August 19, 1954, Mr. William P. Rogers, Deputy Attorney General, requested that he be furnished not later than September 15, 1954, any legislative proposals which the Bureau desired to be included in the preliminary legislative program of the Department for the First Session of the 84th Congress.

Pursuant to this request of Deputy Attorney General Rogers, a survey was made of all the Divisions of the Bureau and a memorandum, which is attached hereto, was prepared setting forth information concerning the various recommended legislative proposals which the Bureau desires to present for the Department's consideration. This information is divided into two categories, (a) Security or Espionage Legislation and (b) General Criminal Legislation. There is set forth briefly below a summary of the legislative proposals which it is recommended be forwarded to the Department. These items are numbered to correspond with the numbers in the memorandum to Deputy Attorney General Rogers.

SECURITY OR ESPIONAGE LEGISLATION

1. RECOMMENDED LEGISLATION TO PENALIZE ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES CONCERNING INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM LEGITIMATE SOURCES - Prosecution for espionage should lie against a spy who gathers information from legitimate sources for transmittal to his principal. This problem was first sharply drawn by the decision of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in the case of U. S. versus Heine, 151 F2d 813. The effect of this decision was to remove from the operations of the Espionage Statutes those espionage agents who gathered information from public sources for transmittal to their principals. The Department has been urged on prior occasions, by memoranda of February 16, 1953, and August 19, 1953, to draft suitable legislation to amend this deficiency in the Espionage Statutes. By memorandum of November 19,1953, Deputy Attorney General Rogers indicated the Criminal Division opposed such a bill as not being capable of practical administration and by Departmental memorandum of November 30, 1953, this proposal was listed as one of a group of proposals not approved for inclusion in the Department's legislative program before the 83rd Congress, Second Session.

Attachment
WPJ:eck

NOT RECORDED
76 SEP 27 1954

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2. PROPOSED LEGISLATION TO PROHIBIT DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION BY FORMER GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES - Existing statutes do not adequately cover the disclosure of information to unauthorized individuals by former employees of the United States Government, which information was obtained during the period of their employment. By memorandum dated July 30, 1953, the Criminal Division advised that the Department was considering amending Title 18, United States Code, Section 1905, to prohibit such disclosure. However, no legislation submitted to the 83rd Congress which would have had the effect of so amending the law was ever brought to the attention of this Bureau.

3. RECOMMENDED LEGISLATION TO RESOLVE EVIDENCE PROBLEM IN SECURITY MATTERS - A problem of evidence arises out of a refusal of Government agencies to allow the introduction in evidence of certain items which are the "fruits of the crime" on the grounds of security considerations. The United States Government at the present time has highly classified information for the protection of which it is expending considerable time, effort and funds. If an espionage agent was found in the possession of detailed plans or a speciman or prototype of the classified items, his offense could be worthy of the death penalty. His "fruits of the crime" like the photographs of the atomic bomb in the Comer case would not be declassified. This problem was brought to the attention of Deputy Attorney General Rogers by memoranda of February 16, 1953, and August 19, 1953, but as was reflected in Departmental memorandum of November 30, 1953, it was not approved for inclusion in the Department's legislative program before the 83rd Congress, Second Session.

4. PROPOSED REVISION OF FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT - The Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (IIC) recommended in 1946 to the Attorney General that persons having knowledge of, instruction in or assignment in the espionage or sabotage service of foreign countries be required to register so that failure to register could be prosecuted even though no overt acts of espionage or sabotage were committed. The Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938 was amended by Section 20 (a) of the Internal Security Act of 1950 with intent to accomplish this. The Criminal Division has indicated it intended to amend Section 20(a), Internal Security Act of 1950, by removing it from the predicating provisions of the Foreign Agents Registration Act. The Bureau by memorandum to Deputy Attorney General Rogers dated August 19, 1953, pointed out that if this section was amended the remaining loophole in Section 20 (a), Foreign Agents Registration Act, which would make prosecution of violators impossible, should likewise be corrected by making more difficult the claim of privilege under the Fifth Amendment on the part of persons refusing to register. Legislation which might have had this effect was embodied in the Foreign Agents Registration Act provisions of H.R. 9580, 83rd Congress. This bill was passed by the 83rd Congress, but as passed the registration provisions of the bill were deleted.

5. WIRE TAPPING BILLS - In the 83rd Congress, three wire tapping bills (H.R. 408, H.R. 5149, and H.R. 8649 (as introduced in the House of Representatives)) were endorsed by the Bureau and sponsored by the Department. These measures would have permitted the use of wire tapping in security type cases upon the express approval of the Attorney General and further would have provided that information so obtained could be used in evidence. H.R. 408 and H.R. 8649 applied to all member agencies of the IIC. In addition, H.R. 408 applied to cases involving the safety of human life. H.R. 8649 was desirable legislation as originally introduced, but after two days of debate, it was passed by the House on April 8, 1954, in an entirely different form. This bill as passed in the House was a substitute in the nature of an amendment and would have applied to the IIC agencies and information obtained by those agencies prior to the effective date of the act could have been used in evidence in cases involving the national defense if written permission had been obtained from the Attorney General to make the wire tap interceptions. However, information obtained after the effective date of that act through interceptions upon the express written approval of the Attorney General could have only been used in evidence provided a court order was obtained from a Federal Judge prior to the interception. The Bureau and the Department had previously gone on record as opposing any wire tap legislation which would require a court order. In addition, nine other bills pertaining to wire tapping were introduced in the 83rd Congress, all of which contained certain objectionable or undesirable features and various memoranda were forwarded to the Department in which these undesirable features were pointed out and at the same time, the Department was made aware of the desirability of legislation similar to H.R. 408, H.R. 5149 or H.R. 8649 as originally introduced.

6. RECOMMENDED LEGISLATION TO PROVIDE REWARDS FOR INFORMATION REGARDING THE SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC WEAPONS OR FISSIONABLE MATERIAL - A joint IIC - Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS) recommendation that legislation be sought authorizing rewards for information regarding smuggling of atomic weapons or fissionable material was approved by the National Security Council and the President in National Security Council Document 159/4, September 25, 1953. Legislation to this effect was recommended by the Attorney General to the National Security Council and the Department drafted a bill providing for payment of rewards in amounts not to exceed $500,000. This bill was transmitted to the 83rd Congress under date of July 29, 1954, and although it passed the House, it failed to pass the Senate.

GENERAL CRIMINAL LEGISLATION

7. RECOMMENDED LEGISLATION TO AMEND THE INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF STOLEN PROPERTY STATUTE - Legislation to bring within the Bureau's jurisdiction the transportation of the victim in interstate commerce for the purpose of defrauding that victim of $5,000 or more and/or to conceal the fraudulent scheme was recommended to the Department by memorandum dated May 6, 1953. Supporting evidence showing the need for such legislation was furnished the Department by memorandum of August 11, 1953. A bill providing for such an amendment of the Interstate Transportation of Stolen Property Statute, S. 3341, was introduced in the 83rd Congress, Second Session, where it passed the Senate but failed to be enacted by the House prior to the adjournment of Congress.

8. RECOMMENDED LEGISLATION TO AMEND THE INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF OBSCENE MATTER STATUTE - The interstate transportation of obscene matter via express companies or other common carries is prohibited by Section 1462, Title 18, United States Code. This statute is deficient since transportation of such material by other means, such as privately owned conveyance is not within its purview. Since 1938, this Bureau has called to the attention of the Department the desirability of amending this statute to prohibit transportation of obscene matter by means other than common carrier or express and various bills have been introduced into Congress since that date, but all have failed of enactment.

9. RECOMMENDED LEGISLATION TO AMEND THE INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF STOLEN MOTOR VEHICLE STATUTES - At the present time, Sections 2312 and 2313, Title 18, United States Code, make it a violation to transport in interstate or foreign commerce a stolen motor vehicle, etc. however, the word "stolen" is not defined in this statute and there has been a diversity of opinion among the courts as to the interpretation to be given to this term. Some courts have given it a narrow construction restricting it to the common law definition of a larceny while others have held it should be interpreted as including embezzlement and similar offenses. The Bureau on several occasions has recommended to the Department that the statutes be amended to include not only stolen vehicles but those which were embezzled, fraudulently obtained, or feloniously converted. This type of legislation is desirable in order to permit prosecution of individuals who rent cars from rental agencies or purchase cars from dealers with bad checks and then transport these cars interstate to sell them. A bill, S. 675, which would have amended the Interstate Transportation of Stolen Motor Vehicle Statutes in this fashion, was introducted before the 83rd Congress, but failed to be enacted into law.

10. RECOMMENDED LEGISLATION TO AMEND THE DEPENDENT'S ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1950 - The Dependent's Assistance Act of 1950 provides allowances for dependents of enlisted members of the uniformed services, but does not provide specific criminal provisions as did other Acts of the same nature which preceded it. Prosecution of irregularities in connection with servicemen's allowances have been had under the Fraud Against the Government Statutes in some cases; however, at the present time, no penalty is provided for fraudulent receipt of such allowances. Legislation which would have remedied these deficiencies was introduced in the 83rd Congress, but failed of enactment.

ACTION RECOMMENDED:

By memorandum of August 19, 1954, Deputy Attorney General Rogers requested that the Bureau advise the Department of any legislative proposals which the Bureau desires to have included in the preliminary legislative program of the Department for the 84th Congress, First Session. Mr. Rogers furnished a mimeographed copy of the Department of Justice Legislative Program as of November 30, 1953, indicating that with respect to the resubmission of any proposals appearing therein, if the Bureau's recommendation was that they be submitted to the 84th Congress in identical form, it would be sufficient merely to refer to such proposals by page and number.

Attached hereto for approval is a memorandum to Deputy Attorney General Rogers advising him of the items we desire to be considered for inclusion in the Department's legislative program for the 84th Congress, First Session. All items except one were previously included in the Department's legislative program as of November 30, 1953, and are accordingly referred to by page and number. With respect to the remaining item, Mr. Rogers is being advised of the subject matter of the proposed legislation, its objectives and other data concerning it.

FD-36

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

AIRTEL

Transmit the following ~~XXXXXX~~ message to:

FBI, BOSTON (117-77) 9/27/54 3 PM DAL:mtl

DIRECTOR, FBI

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE US; ATOMIC ENERGY ACT. RENYAIRTEL 9/21/54. INV REVEALS THAT SEVEN HARRIS AVE., JAMAICA PLAIN, MASS., IS A NURSING HOME KNOWN AS THE HARRIS AVENUE CONVALESCENT HOME. THIS HOME CAN ACCOMMODATE TWENTYTWO PEOPLE. IT IS OWNED AND OPERATED BY JOSEPH E. ESSEX OF BEVERLY, MASS. [redacted]

[redacted]

NO FURTHER INV BEING CONDUCTED BY BOSTON IN THE ABSENCE OF FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS.

RUC.

Mr. Belmont

FOSTER

CC: NEW YORK(117-192)

Approved: _____ Sent 12 SEP 29 1954 M Per _____

Special Agent in Charge

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b7C

RECORDED
EX-103

OCTOBER 1, 1954 AIR-TEL

SAC, NEW YORK (117-192) URGENT

SMUGGLING OF ATOM BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE US; AEA.

REBAIR-TEL 9-28-54 FORWARDING PHOTOGRAPHS WHICH YOU STATE ARE THOSE OF AN INSTRUMENT DESIGNED TO DETECT FISSIONABLE MATERIALS WHICH IS PRESENTLY IN USE AT NY INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AND VARIOUS PIERS IN NYC. THE PHOTOGRAPHS WHICH YOU ENCLOSED [redacted] IDENTICAL PHOTOGRAPHS FURNISHED TO THE BUREAU BY CUSTOMS WERE DESCRIBED BY CUSTOMS AS [redacted] [redacted] THE DETECTION DEVICE. NY TEL AUGUST 23 ADVISED THAT DETECTION DEVICE IN OPERATION AT NY INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT REACTED STRONGLY ON ARRIVAL OF [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] NEW YORK SHOULD CORRECT ITS RECORDS WITH REGARD TO THE PHOTOGRAPHS. (117-268-573)

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HOOVER

117-268

LW:bjg

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Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

COMM – FBI
OCT 1 1954
MAILED 31

OCT 11 1954

1-24

AIR-TEL

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

- - 9/20/54, NY

Transmit the following Teletype message to: BUREAU: ATT. INSP. CARL HENNRICH

FD-36

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Harbo
Mr. M
Mr. P
Mr. S
Mr. T
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. V [illegible] wd.
Tele. Room
Miss Gandy

SMUGGLING OF ATOM BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE US. AEC. RENYLET TO BUREAU, 8/17/54, WHEREIN INFORMATION IS SET OUT REGARDING AN INSTRUMENT WHICH IS DESIGNED TO DETECT FISSIONABLE MATERIALS. ENCLOSED HEREWITH IS ONE COPY OF FOUR PHOTOGRAPHS OF SAID INSTRUMENT. THIS INSTRUMENT IS PRESENTLY IN USE AT NY INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AND VARIOUS PIERS AT NYC. ONE COPY OF EACH OF THE FOUR PHOTOGRAPHS MENTIONED ABOVE WILL BE DELIVERED TO THE AEC AT NYC AND ONE COPY AND NEGATIVES RETAINED AT THE NYO.

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DATE 5/27/04 BY 60207 UC/ALS/BJA/CB

KELLY

Air-tel to NY 10-1-54

Mr. Belmont

117-268-

EX-103

11 SEP 29 1954

(3) - BUREAU (ENCS. - 4) (REGULAR)

JEM:PMF (#6)
117-192

c.c. Mr. Hennrich

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____

Special Agent in Charge

BRANIGAN

QUALITY PARK
9 x 12

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268) DATE: 9/24/54

FROM: SAC, WFO (117-151)

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC WEAPONS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/27/04 BY 60267 uc/mls/bja/cb

On September 23, 1954, [redacted] made available to an agent of this office the contents of a memorandum recently prepared by him for transmission to the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security, with which [redacted] stated he is connected.

[redacted] memorandum was prompted by his recent travel in Europe, which travel was entirely unofficial in nature. He and his wife travelled on regular U. S. passports and their border crossing was not facilitated in any manner until their arrival at the Port of New York. b7C

[redacted] it was his observation that the allied occupation zones in Austria and Germany provided no effective barrier to the ordinary means of transportation of fissionable material from the Soviet occupied territory to the ports of Western Europe. With reference to baggage which was carried in the hand or carried in the same commercial vehicle with the traveler, [redacted] impression that it received little, if any, attention as regards inspection of its contents by Customs officials. He observed that this was particularly true of persons travelling on American passports and applied to Customs inspections by American, German, Austrian, Belgian, Dutch, Italian and French authorities.

With reference to inspection of passports, [redacted] observation that they were frequently and quite thoroughly inspected in contrast to the baggage which appeared to be disregarded. He also noted that the baggage of foreign nationals he observed travelling appeared to receive more attention from the Customs officials; however, he considered the inspection of their baggage to be merely cursory in nature. b7C

[redacted] he felt a person possessing an American passport who was working in cooperation with the Soviets could easily pick up fissionable material in Vienna for instance, and subsequently transport same through Austria and Germany to one of

REFERENCE TO THIS SITUATION MADE IN MEMO FOR NATO SPECIAL COMMITTEE MEETING IN PARIS OCTOBER 1954 (W)

HEC:af
1 - New York (117-192)(Info)(RM)

RECORDED - 23
EX. 107

117-
10/5

OCT 8 1954

several principal Western ports of Europe.

It is noted [redacted] offered no specific suggestions, stating he felt that no effective Customs inspection procedure could be inaugurated without the development of apparatus which detect fissionable material from a distance of several miles. b7C

This information is being furnished the Bureau and the New York Office in view of previous investigations under this caption.

FANTASTIC! A RADIUM DIAL WATCH AT 5' GIVES MORE Γ RAYS THAN SHIELDED FISSIONABLE MATERIAL. LW

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI (117-268)

DATE: 9/24/54

FROM : SAC, New York (117-192)

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC WEAPONS AND PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES

Re bulet to New York 9/17/54 in which New York was requested to determine the frequency with which Soviet bloc officials arrive at La Guardia Airport from Canada or other foreign countries.

The following is a list of flights arriving at or departing from Canada at La Guardia Airport, New York City:

COLONIAL AIRLINES

Arrival Time - DST	Port of Origin	Remarks
9:15 AM	Montreal - nonstop to NY	Except Sunday
1:45 PM	Montreal - nonstop to NY	Daily
5:00 PM	Ottawa and Montreal - nonstop NY	Daily
7:15 PM	Montreal - nonstop to NY	Daily
10:05 PM	Montreal - nonstop to NY	Except Saturday
11:15 PM	Montreal - nonstop to NY	Daily
2:20 PM	Montreal to Burlington Vt., nonstop then local stops to NY	
2:25 AM	Montreal to Burlington Vt., nonstop then local stops to NY	Except Saturday
6:25 PM	Bermuda	

Departure Time - NY	Destination and Routing
7:50 AM	Local stops to Burlington, then nonstop to Montreal
8:30 AM	Montreal, nonstop
11:30 AM	Montreal, nonstop, continues to Ottawa
2:50 PM	Montreal, nonstop, continues to Ottawa
5:50 PM	Montreal, nonstop, continues to Ottawa
6:55 PM	Montreal, nonstop, continues to Ottawa
9:05 PM	Montreal, nonstop, continues to Ottawa
11:59 PM	Local stops to Burlington, Vt., then nonstop to Montreal
11:00 PM	Bermuda

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JEM:ABB

EX. - 109

63 OCT 12 1954

AMERICAN AIRLINES

Departure Time - NY	Routing	Remarks
12:40 PM	Via Buffalo to Toronto	
2:20 PM,	Via Buffalo to Toronto	Except Saturday

Arrivals at NY	Routing
11:30 AM	Via Buffalo to NY
1:30 PM	Via Buffalo to NY

It is to be noted that all of the above times will change on September 25, 1954, due to the change of time from Eastern Daylight time to Eastern Standard Time, and that the Trans-Canada Airlines has various flights in and out of New York from Canada, however, these flights use International Airport, New York City.

A review of the files of the New York Office indicate that [redacted] b7C

It should be noted that the files of the New York Office indicate that numerous Soviet bloc officials have arrived by Airlines in New York City, however, no indication is noted as to the Airport. The files of the New York Office do, in most instances, indicate the Airlines by which the official travelled and from this it has been ascertained that these officials, entered or departed at New York International Airport.

The present system in use by INS is to have all arrival and departure forms reviewed at International Airport, New York City, therefore all arrivals and departures at La Guardia Airport are picked up by INS, on a daily basis, and taken to International Airport. In the past no indication was made on the aforementioned forms that the arrival or departure had taken place at La Guardia Airport. The New York Office has asked INS to make an appropriate

notation, in those cases where the arrival or departure took place at La Guardia Airport.

It is the opinion of the New York Office that detection equipment should be placed in operation at La Guardia Airport, in order that Soviet bloc officials and their baggage may be processed.

DISCUSSED AT IIC-ICIS
JOINT COMMITTEE 10-4-54.
ADVISORY GROUP RECOMMENDS
PORTABLE DETECTOR FOR LAGUARDIA,
TO BE INCLUDED IN FIRST ORDER TO BE
PLACED FOR PORTABLES.

LW

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5/27/04 BY 60247 uc baw/sbj/a/cb
#94877/21/950935/997059

FBI NYC 9-25-54 9-59 PM FJM

DIRECTOR URGENT

SMUGGLING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE US. RENY TELEPHONE CALL SEPTEMBER TWENTYFIVE FIFTYFOUR TO [redacted] OF THE BUREAU. US CUSTOMS, NYC, TELEPHONICALLY ADVISED NYO, SEPTEMBER TWENTYFIVE FIFTYFOUR, THAT [redacted] b7C

[redacted] WHEN THIS INDIVIDUAL-S LUGGAGE PASSED BY MACHINE USED TO DETECT FISSIONABLE MATERIAL MACHINE REGISTERED STRONGLY TO PRESENCE OF FISSIONABLE MATERIAL. UPON SEARCH OF LUGGAGE [redacted] LUGGAGE AND FOUND b7C TO BE THE SOURCE REGISTERING ON MACHINE. REVIEW [redacted] CUSTOMS DECLARATION REFLECTED FOREGOING OBJECT LISTED AND DECLARED [redacted] DESCRIBED BY HIM AS BEING BROUGHT INTO THE US QUOTE FOR USE BY THE [redacted] INTERVIEWED BY CUSTOMS RE THIS STATEMENT AND HIS HAVING OF THIS FISSIONABLE MATERIAL. RESULTED IN HIS [redacted] b7C [redacted] [redacted] CUSTOMS STATED

END OF PAGE ONE

Mr. Belmont

b1

[redacted] ABOUT INFO TELEPHONICALLY FURNISHED TO BUREAU BY REFERENCED PHONE CALL AND BUREAU REQUESTED TO CONTACT [redacted] NO FURTHER ACTION BEING TAKEN IN THIS MATTER AT THIS TIME BY NYO AND

b1

BALTIMORE OFFICE BEING FURNISHED BY MAIL A COPY OF THIS COMMUNICATION IN VIEW OF [redacted] NO ACTION BEING REQUESTED OF BALTIMORE OFFICE.

KELLY

CORR. PAGE ONE LINE TWELVE WOD SEVEN SHOULD BE "~~DECLARED~~"

END AND ACK PLS

1006 PM OK FBI WA FCH

DISC

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOIPA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET

Serial Description ~ COVER SHEET 07/14/1954

Total Deleted Page(s) ~ 30

Page 9 ~ Referral/Direct to OGA
Page 10 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 11 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 38 ~ b2 , b7C
Page 39 ~ b2
Page 53 ~ Referral/Direct to OGA
Page 54 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 55 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 66 ~ Referral/Direct to OGA
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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

. Sanders

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: September 15, 1954

FROM : W. A. Branigan

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION IN PLACE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

On September 10, 1954, the Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures met in Room 2515, Justice Building. Colonel Beckedorff, AEC Advisor to the Joint Committee, stated that he had prepared informative documents on nuclear components of clandestine weapons which he hoped would be approved for submission to the Joint Committee by the time of its next meeting.

The ICIS representatives requested the opinion of the IIC representatives on the informal proposal of the ICIS Standing Committee that the Joint Committee on Countermeasures be abolished and its work handled in the future by a subcommittee of the ICIS. The ICIS representatives were informed that the matter had been discussed by the Working Committee of the IIC and that body had indicated it would be impossible to properly carry out coordination of countermeasures programs by turning the responsibility over to a subcommittee of ICIS and that the IIC could not be expected to attach itself to such an ICIS subcommittee. The ICIS representatives in the Joint Committee decided to recommend to the ICIS Standing Committee that the proposal to abolish the Joint Committee be dropped at this time and not be considered until the detection device program and the dissemination of information program relating to clandestine weapons had been carried through.

Colonel Beckedorff stated that the Joint Committee could have a preview of the portable detection device and the x-ray type radiographic detection device during the week of September 27. He suggested that the Joint Committee look at these items prior to a demonstration to a large number of representatives of the IIC and ICIS so that when the larger group was afforded a demonstration it could be a demonstration which would reflect problems which the using agencies in IIC and ICIS would have.

A written report by the Advisory Group on field-testing of the mobile passive detection devices in New York was disseminated to the Joint Committee. This report has been reproduced for the members of IIC.

LW:bjg

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DATE 4/19/00 BY SP1BTA/LBM
9487421950925/992059

Memo for Mr. Belmont
from Mr. Branigan

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that the foregoing be brought to the attention of the Working Committee of the IIC, with the suggestion that any specific tests which they would like to have made with the passive portable detection device and the x-ray type radiographic device be brought to the attention of Supervisor Whitson in order that appropriate demonstrations can be set up.

SECRET

September 21, 1954

RECORDED-20
INDEXED-20
EX-131

Honorable Lewis L. Strauss
Chairman
Atomic Energy Commission
Washington 25, D. C.

— to Strauss 9-22-54 cmb.

Dear Mr. Strauss:

Reference is made to your letter of August 13, 1954, with which you transmitted a "Status Report on [redacted] as of August 3, 1954," and requested the judgment of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security as to the utility of the device described in "Item 5" of the report. b2

In considering the utility of the above device, the Committees noted that it is an [redacted] b2 b7E [redacted] The Committees further noted that there is sufficient data at hand to construct in about 18 months a prototype, consisting of [redacted] Also, the Committees noted that your letter refers to the device's lethality to exposed people and its non-surreptitious characteristics.

In view of its lack of mobility due to its size and necessary background structures and the fact that it would have to be used on a selective basis in order to avoid a serious disruption of international trade, the Committees are of the opinion that the cost of the device would not be commensurate with its utility and therefore recommended that further development of this type of device should not be undertaken at this time. Nevertheless, the Atomic Energy Commission is requested to continue to study the problem of detection of objects of high density and fissionable material in bulky commercial shipments.

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SEP 23 1954

FBI YELLOW COPY

Your cooperation in this matter is appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover
Chairman, Interdepartmental Intelligence
Conference

J. Walter Yeagley
Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee on
Internal Security

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: September 20, 1954

FROM : L. V. BOARDMAN

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

On August 13, 1954, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission supplied to the IIC and the ICIS a status report on the development of devices which would [redacted] One of the devices reported on is the [redacted] and would require a [redacted] In addition, it would [redacted]

b2
b7E

This matter has been considered by the IIC and the ICIS, and it has been agreed that, due to the size, weight, cost, and utility, it would not be practicable for the use intended.

Attached hereto is a suggested IIC-ICIS letter to the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission advising him that the committees recommend that further development of this type of device should not be undertaken at this time although the study of detection of objects of high density and fissionable material in bulky commercial shipments should continue. The letter has been signed by the Chairman of the ICIS. It has been approved by the other members of the IIC.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is suggested that you sign the attached letter as Chairman of the IIC and that it be forwarded through Liaison to the Atomic Energy Commission.

RECORDED-20
INDEXED - 20
EX-130

Attachment

ESS:hke

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DATE 1/19/00 BY SP4BSA/LBM

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Mr. Belmont

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : W. A. Branigan

DATE: October 1, 1954

FROM : L. Whitson

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMB, OR PARTS THEREOF, INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

At 3:30 p.m. 10-1-54 Mr. John Doherty, Justice Representative on the Standing Committee of the ICIS, called at the Bureau and discussed with Supervisor Whitson the so-called Stoessel Report on the question of what should be done by Customs in the event detection devices indicate the presence of fissionable material in the possession of a diplomat. Mr. Doherty stated that the Standing Committee was again about to consider the problem. It was pointed out to him that the Bureau had written to Assistant Attorney General William F. Tompkins on August 13, and August 23, 1954, setting out the Bureau's position; namely, that any arrests the Bureau would make of diplomats in possession of fissionable material would be on the authority of the Attorney General according to statute; that a document of instructions to the Bureau of Customs should not contain gratuitous statements as to the manner in which the FBI should disseminate information, nor should it place any investigative limitations on the FBI.

It was also pointed out to Mr. Doherty that the IIC had written on August 25, 1954, to Mr. Thomas J. Donegan, who was then chairman of ICIS, reiterating the Bureau's position as the position of the IIC agencies.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

None, for your information. This will be followed with Mr. Doherty.

LW: ewk

RECORDED - 14

4/19-00 SP4 BJA/LBM

SAC, SAN ANTONIO (117-new) October 6, 1954

DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268)

RECORDED-61

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC WEAPONS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

Reurlet 9-24-54.

You requested the Bureau's observations and suggestions regarding the administration of the program now being undertaken by Customs and Immigration at the San Antonio International Airport, whereby a passive detection device for fissionable material is being utilized for the coverage of incoming passengers and baggage.

In the event a traveler has no diplomatic status he can be thoroughly searched, as can his baggage, by Customs. Should the detection device indicate the presence of a radioactive substance emitting neutrons or gamma rays or both, it would be the responsibility of Customs to determine the source of such emissions. If the source of the emissions was uranium or plutonium or some other special nuclear material Customs should notify you and you should notify the Bureau immediately in order that appropriate action might be taken under the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act.

It is not necessary for the Customs representatives to notify you in the event the material activating the detection device is determined to be a watch dial, a lamp mantle or some other such innocuous material.

COMM - FBI
OCT 6 - 1954
MAILED 28

In the event a person having diplomatic status the accompanied baggage of a person having diplomatic status activates the device and it is not possible for Customs to identify the specific source of radiation, Customs should notify you and you should notify the Bureau promptly so that appropriate action may be taken to afford such individual proper investigative attention. It might be necessary to place such a person under physical surveillance but the specific type of investigative attention afforded him would depend upon the circumstances in the particular case.

Prompt notification to the Bureau is essential under any circumstances in which action by the FBI is necessary.

2 - New York (117-192)

LW: bjg

Tolson
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Holloman
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OCT 14 1954

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Sizoo
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

TO : Director, FBI (117-268) **DATE:** Sept. 21, 1954

FROM : SAC, San Antonio (117-

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC WEAPONS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE U. S. ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

Rebutel 9/16/54.

On September 21, 1954, ASAC VERNON H. BAILEY and I participated in the briefing conference in the office of U. S. Customs at San Antonio International Airport, San Antonio, Texas, relative to the installation and operation of a detection device for gamma rays and neutrons. The following persons were present at that conference:

J. J. FLYNN, U. S. Customs, New York City;
D. I. GALE, Atomic Energy Commission, Washington, D.C.
E. J. THORNTON, U. S. Coast Guard, New York City;
GUY A. BELZONS, Acting Collector of Customs, San Antonio;
H. H. MEINERS, Deputy Collector of Customs, San Antonio;
WILLIAM F. OAKES, Customs Inspector, San Antonio;
WILLIAM T. BIVINS, Customs Inspector, San Antonio;
FRANK H. CAREY, Customs Inspector, San Antonio;
WALLACE D. SHONLEY, Customs Inspector, San Antonio;
W. L. MUEHLHAUSE, Chief, Entry, Departure and Investigations Section, I&NS, San Antonio;
WILLIAM S. WHITE, Border Patrol, I&NS, San Antonio.

Mr. FLYNN and Mr. GALE explained the operation of the detection device and discussed problems and experiences encountered in the operation of a similar project in New York.

It was pointed out that the arrangement of airport facilities in San Antonio presented some difficulties in utilizing the equipment to cover both passengers and baggage simultaneously and it was decided that on an experimental basis it would be used to cover passengers at certain times and baggage at others. The project will be administered primarily by U. S. Customs at the Airport but maintenance will be supplied by Immigration and Naturalization Service. This office will be notified by telephone immediately upon the receipt of a positive signal from the machine which cannot be satisfactorily explained by functioning of the machine or by articles in the possession of [redacted] subjects. At the same time this office will be furnished the name and description of the traveler, his baggage and his travel arrangements.

RECORDED - 61 117-268-64

cc to SA [redacted] NY

VHB:JMW

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EX-124

In accordance with Bureau instructions, no comments were made concerning any action to be taken by the FBI on the receipt of such notification. The Bureau, however, will be informed promptly of any reports received.

Based upon previous experience in the New York City Office, it will be appreciated if the Bureau will furnish its observations and suggestions concerning the administration of the program with specific reference to whether it may be contemplated that the Bureau would request surveillance operations by San Antonio or the office covering destination of the passengers in certain instances. It is realized that some such persons might have diplomatic status and could not be covered without State Department clearance.

The Bureau will be kept fully cognizant of all pertinent developments.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

1 - Mr. Sanders

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

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Holloman
Gandy

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: October 5, 1954

FROM : W. A. Branigan

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION IN PLACE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

On 10-4-54 the Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures met with the advisory group of representatives from Coast Guard, Customs and Immigration. The advisory group reported the commencement of field testing of the [redacted] in the Customs Office of the International Airport, San Antonio, Texas. During the first 3 days of operation nothing in passengers' baggage activated the device. The only conclusion drawn from this was that [redacted]

b2
b7E

With regard to the [redacted] which was demonstrated on Monday September 27, at the Naval Research Laboratory, the advisory group recommended acquisition of 16 units for field testing as follows:

6 at the piers in New York
3 for Coast Guard vessel searches, New York quarantine
2 at Idlewild, New York, Airport
1 at LaGuardia Airport, New York
1 at the International Airport, San Antonio
1 at the Port of Entry, Laredo, Texas
1 at the Port of Entry, St. Albans, Vermont
1 at the Georgetown, D. C., Customs Office

The Customs representative suggested that AEC might order these items and loan them to the Treasury Department while they were being field tested. Colonel Beckedorff, the AEC Technical Advisor, stated that he doubted AEC would agree to such a procedure since 16 units would be construed as production models, not experimental models. It was pointed out to the AEC representative by the Coast Guard representative that AEC had loaned to Coast Guard for the past [redacted] which were used by the Coast Guard in checking suspect vessels. He pointed out that the [redacted] The point was raised that if AEC could loan [redacted] for [redacted] they should be able to loan these [redacted] Colonel Beckedorff stated he would check.

LMobjg

4119100 SPUSJA LBM

Memo for Belmont
from Branigan

It was pointed out that [redacted]

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b7E

The advisory group was of the opinion that [redacted] should continue but that the equipment now under development is not particularly adaptable to the needs of Customs or Coast Guard. The advisory group also requested that AEC consider the possible use of [redacted]

The advisory group pointed out that when portable devices are available they can be used on military and civilian U. S. Government personnel and their dependents returning to the United States from abroad. At the present time these people come in without Customs search because no duty is charged them.

Customs and Coast Guard representatives raised a question regarding budgeting for repairs and replacements on detection devices now being operated. It was suggested that if they had any budgetary problems they could (a) discuss it with the appropriate Treasury budgeting officer or (b) discuss it with the Bureau of the Budget representative in liaison with the ICIS to which committee Treasury belongs.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is respectfully recommended that the foregoing be brought to the attention of the working committee of the IIC for their information. No Bureau or IIC position is necessary at this time on the matters discussed.

OK

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: September 28, 1954

FROM : W. A. Branigan

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION IN PLACE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

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Gandy

COUNTERMEASURES - ATOM BOMBS

The Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures was given briefings and demonstrations on 9-27-54 at the Naval Research Laboratory and at the Naval Ordnance Laboratory.

At the Naval Research Laboratory, [redacted]

b2
b7E

[redacted]

[redacted]

At the Naval Ordnance Laboratory the briefing and [redacted]

The same comment [redacted]

[redacted]

LW: bjg

Attachments (5)

2 NOV 1 1954

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Memo for Belmont

RECOMMENDATION:

There are attached copies of an unclassified dissertation on the X-ray device for the IIC files and the IIC Agency files.

It is respectfully recommended that the foregoing be brought to the attention of the IIC agencies and that they be requested by the Executive Secretary of the IIC to indicate a preferred date and alternative date for demonstrations of the detection devices. The FBI position should be that a demonstration of the portable passive detector is not only desirable but necessary. However, the X-ray radiographic detector would be of only limited use, if any, to t he IIC agencies.

117- HQ-268 616

EBF

18-616

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9487N2/950925/997059

ENCLOSURE

117-267-616

[redacted] b2

6th INTERIM REPORT

27 September 1954

Prepared by:

D. T. O'CONNOR
U. S. NAVAL ORDNANCE LABORATORY
White Oak, Silver Spring, Md.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4-7-00 BY SDM bjf/PAM
948742/950935/997059

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Roach

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Tolson
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Rosen
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Gandy

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: October 8, 1954

FROM : Mr. L. V. Boardman

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION IN PLACE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

b2
b7E

In connection with its research, looking toward development of a detection device to detect smuggled fissionable material, the Atomic Energy Commission, with the assistance and facilities of the Naval Research Laboratory, has developed

[redacted]

A practical demonstration of this device is being held at the Naval Research Laboratory at 9:30 A.M. October 14, 1954, for the representatives of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security. Those individuals from the IIC agencies who have indicated their intention of attending the demonstration are, for G-2, ~~General Trudeau~~ CAPT. ROBERT H. RICE, Colonel Perry, Colonel Nichols; for ONI, ~~Admiral Pope~~, Captain Steve Jones, ~~Mr.~~ B. Willard; for OSI, ~~General Carroll~~, MAJ. WILLIAM MANN, Colonel McCartney, Mr. Gil Levy.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4/19/00 BY SP4 SEALBM

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that the following individuals from the Bureau attend:

Mr. Boardman as the Bureau's representative on the Working Committee of IIC.

EX-110 RECORDED-57 INDEXED-57

Mr. D. J. Parsons as representative of the Bureau Laboratory.

Supervisor C. W. Bates, Bureau liaison with AEC.

Supervisor L. Whitson, the IIC representative on the Joint IIC - ICIS Committee on Countermeasures.

If you approve, Liaison will notify AEC of the identities the individuals to attend the briefing.

LW:bjg
1 - D. J. Parsons (Rm. 7621)

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Roach

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
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Winterrowd
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Gandy

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: October 14, 1954

FROM : Mr. L. V. Boardman

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION IN PLACE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

At 9:30 A.M. 10-14-54 a practical demonstration of a portable detection device for fissionable material was held at the Naval Research Laboratory for representatives of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security.

The following Bureau personnel attended:

D. J. Parsons, Assistant Director
Inspector V. P. Keay
Supervisor C. W. Bates
Supervisor L. Whitson

b2
b7E

[redacted]

In its [redacted]

[redacted]

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RECOMMENDATION:

It is respectfully recommended that the Bureau through Liaison arrange with the Atomic Energy Commission for [redacted] in the area of Bureau responsibility under the Atomic Energy Act. The Laboratory could also consider [redacted] The Atomic Energy Commission has previously advised that these [redacted]

Request made of Strauss 10-20-54 will follow up

10-15

INDEXED - 23 -268-

EX-128

1954

LW:bjg
1 - D. J. Parsons (Rm. 7621)

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

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TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: October 18, 1954

FROM : W. A. Branigan

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION IN PLACE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

117-200

At 10:00 A.M., October 18, 1954, Supervisor Whitson met with the other members of the Joint IIC - ICIS Committee on Countermeasures in Room 2515, Justice Building. Colonel Beckedorff, AEC Technical Advisor, stated that he hoped by the end of another week to obtain AEC approval of two proposed documents relating to thermonuclear reactions to which disposition will be given similar to that given the clandestine atomic weapons papers that were approved in the Fall of 1953.

With regard to the 16 portable devices recommended by the Advisory Group for field testing by Customs and Coast Guard, Mr. Leonard Bienvenu, Executive Secretary of the ICIS, stated that he would draft a letter from the ICIS to AEC requesting the 16 instruments in language similar to that used in the March, 1954, request from ICIS to AEC for the 6 large passive detectors. Colonel Beckedorff stated that AEC would like to have an indication that the using agencies would include funds to pay for these instruments in their 1956 budget. It was pointed out to Colonel Beckedorff that in a joint IIC - ICIS letter to AEC under date of June 18, 1954, it was stated that budgeting would be considered by the operating agencies when the National Security Council was given recommendations by IIC - ICIS for a national coverage of our ports and borders with the various types of detection devices. Mr. Bienvenu stated that he would use the same language as the joint IIC - ICIS letter in requesting 16 portable devices but would comment that the portable devices will each cost $750 or less, and that the 6 heavy passive devices now in use in New York City and San Antonio, Texas, would cost $5,500 each.

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At 1:45 P.M. October 18, 1954, Captain B. P. Clark, U. S. Coast Guard, member of the Advisory Group, phoned Supervisor Whitson and stated that the Advisory Group planned to go to New York with one or more portable detection devices on October 25 and would report back to the Joint Committee during the first week of November. He commented that the Advisory Group intended to explore the possibility [redacted]

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[redacted]

LW:bjg

RECORDED - 23

INDEXED - 23

EX-128

To Belmont 10-20-54 LW

Memo for Belmont
from Mr. Branigan

RECOMMENDATION:

None. This is for your information.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

1 - Mr. Sanders

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: October 26, 1954

FROM : W. A. Branigan

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SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION IN PLACE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

117-268

Reference is made to my memorandum of October 18, 1954, indicating that the Advisory Group consisting of representatives of Customs, Coast Guard, Immigration and Atomic Energy Commission plan to go to New York on October 25 to field test one or more portable detection devices. At 10:30 A.M. October 20, Captain B. P. Clark, U.S. Coast Guard member of the Advisory Group, phoned Supervisor Whitson and stated that the trip was indefinitely postponed because the Naval Research Laboratory had informed the Advisory Group that [redacted]

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[redacted]

[redacted]

Commander Clark stated that the [redacted] which were demonstrated to representatives of IIC and ICIS [redacted] The Naval Research Laboratory now states, according to Clark, that it will take a month for NRL to [redacted]

RECOMMENDATION:

None. For your information this matter will be closely followed and you will be informed of all developments.

LW:bjg

2 PM 10-26
BRANIGAN PHONED AND STATED
WOULD BE ABOUT A MONTH
BEFORE DEVICES READY.
LW

RECORDED - 14
INDEXED - 14

117-268-620

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: August 30, 1954

FROM : W. A. Branigan

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION IN PLACE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

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Meeting of Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures met 1:30 P.M. August 27, 1954, in ICIS Conference Room, Room 2515, Justice Building. Meeting considered question of informative documents regarding thermonuclear components, one to be released to highly qualified administrative and supervisory personnel of Federal enforcement agencies which would consist of secret or top secret restricted data; the other document would be unclassified and intended for the use of the lower echelons of Customs, Coast Guard and Immigration. Colonel Beckedorff of the Atomic Energy Commission stated that he would attempt to draft both items. He indicated that it might not be too difficult to prepare an unclassified document on the thermonuclear components provided it was general enough and touched on physical characteristics of such components which could be recognized by nonscientists.

The next item on the agenda was a discussion of the letter from Lewis L. Strauss, Chairman of AEC, to the Chairmen of IIC and ICIS dated August 13, 1954, regarding the progress of the detection device program. Beckedorff elaborated on certain of the matters discussed therein as follows:

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b7E

By the end of September the Naval Research Laboratory

[redacted]

RECORDED

Memo for Belmont
from Branigan

Beckedorff stated that the [redacted] would be ready for demonstration possibly by the end of October rather than November.

With regard to item 5, an [redacted] which would [redacted] Beckedorff stated that a demonstration could probably be set up in the Argonne Lab at Chicago, Illinois, in about 6 months at the cost of $25,000 to $30,000. The consensus of opinion in the Joint Committee was that such a demonstration would not be worth the cost; that the device contemplated was of limited application and would take from [redacted] The Joint Committee members agreed that for commercial shipments, the money could better be spent by having Customs inspectors open and inspect suspicious cargo.

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Arrangements were made for another meeting of the Joint Committee at 1:30 A.M., Friday, September 3, at which time a written report will be received from the advisory group that installed the detection devices in New York City.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is respectfully recommended that these matters be brought to the attention of the Working Committee of the IIC for their information and that the Bureau's position and the IIC position should be that [redacted] is too costly; i. e., $500,000.00 to $1,000,000 each, and of too limited application for further consideration, it being noted [redacted]

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Therefore, in order to [redacted]

A-695 (5-1-56)

U. S. Department of Justice

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

117- HQ-268
SERIALS 611-660
SECTION 10

FEDERAL BUREAU

of

INVESTIGATION

SECTION 10
SERIALS 611-660

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117-262

12 OCT 22 1954

EX. - 107

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

. Sanders

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TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: September 15, 1954

FROM : W. A. Branigan

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION IN PLACE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

On September 10, 1954, the Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures met in Room 2515, Justice Building. Colonel Beckedorff, AEC Advisor to the Joint Committee, stated that he had prepared informative documents on nuclear components of clandestine weapons which he hoped would be approved for submission to the Joint Committee by the time of its next meeting.

The ICIS representatives requested the opinion of the IIC representatives on the informal proposal of the ICIS Standing Committee that the Joint Committee on Countermeasures be abolished and its work handled in the future by a subcommittee of the ICIS. The ICIS representatives were informed that the matter had been discussed by the Working Committee of the IIC and that body had indicated it would be impossible to properly carry out coordination of countermeasures programs by turning the responsibility over to a subcommittee of ICIS and that the IIC could not be expected to attach itself to such an ICIS subcommittee. The ICIS representatives in the Joint Committee decided to recommend to the ICIS Standing Committee that the proposal to abolish the Joint Committee be dropped at this time and not be considered until the detection device program and the dissemination of information program relating to clandestine weapons had been carried through.

Colonel Beckedorff stated that the Joint Committee could have a preview of the portable detection device and the x-ray type radiographic detection device during the week of September 27. He suggested that the Joint Committee look at these items prior to a demonstration to a large number of representatives of the IIC and ICIS so that when the larger group was afforded a demonstration it could be a demonstration which would reflect problems which the using agencies in IIC and ICIS would have.

A written report by the Advisory Group on field-testing of the mobile passive detection devices in New York was disseminated to the Joint Committee. This report has been reproduced for the members of IIC.

LW:bjg

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II. (d) DESIGNATION OF AGENCIES

Prior reports of this advisory group recommended that one agency be designated as that responsible for any detection program, and that such agency would be assisted when deemed advisable by other Government units. Subsequent to this recommendation it was understood that the Bureau of Customs, Treasury Department, was designated to administer and operate the devices used during the experimental period and that the Coast Guard would be responsible for maintenance, custody and placement of the devices at designated locations. Representatives of the Bureau of Customs and the Coast Guard at a conference agreed to absorb the cost of the experimental operation, estimated to be about $75,000. Unfortunately this designation of the above two Government agencies has not been official and instructions should be issued to them outlining their responsibilities in the experimental operation. The classification of the detection devices has not been accomplished by the operating and maintenance agencies and will not be done until official delegation of responsibility has been made.

For the purpose of clarity, the group strongly recommends that official notice of designation of the Bureau of Customs as the agency responsible for the operation be made and that other agencies who will be associated with the operation be supplied with sufficient information to permit them to discharge their responsibilities. This communication should also indicate the extent of the need of the services of the Advisory Group.

II. (e) REACTION OF PERSONS ASSOCIATED WITH THE PROGRAM

The Advisory Group was very much pleased with the cooperation of Customs officers and Coast Guard personnel selected to maintain and operate the devices. These officers all indicated a keen interest in their assignment and gave every reason to believe that efficient operational procedures will be accomplished. It is suggested that a letter of appreciation be forwarded to the Treasury Department expressing thanks for their assistance in these tests.

Some minor difficulties were encountered in connection with the installation of devices on piers. It was indicated to the group that in certain areas of activity the desires of labor unions must be considered. As one illustration of this, it was pointed out that an electrician having the approval of the union organization must be engaged to run necessary power lines on piers for the operation of the devices. The necessity for considering the desires of the unions can very well impede the operation in some areas. This is not intended to mean that the unions or other organizations have hampered the operational tests in any way (to date management and labor have been most cooperative), it is only mentioned to point out the difficulties which might be encountered in a large scale detection program.

Particular gratitude is expressed for the fine cooperation of Mr. John Franke, Baggage Supervisor of the U. S. Lines. Mr. Franke offered to cooperate in any way possible and directed his assistants to install barriers or change barrier installations at the direction of operators of the detection devices. Such complete cooperation will make possible operation experiments on the U. S. Lines piers which can be adapted to piers used by other transportation lines. Representatives of the Cunard, French, and Swedish Lines were very cooperative and did not evidence any inordinate curiosity.

II. (h) OPERATIONAL STUDIES

As indicated elsewhere, actual tests of the detector devices in operation have been conducted and it has been found that the device will indicate the presence of articles other than fissionable material. Special reference is made to radium faced watches and instruments.

Study of this problem resulted in the conclusion that a compilation of statistics which relates the type and degree of reaction caused by certain non-contraband articles could be of aid in arriving at a sensitivity setting which might eliminate a large number of false signals and still not result in a large reduction in detector sensitivity.

To conduct these operational studies will require a considerable amount of time. The members of the Advisory Group are not free to devote that much of their time to the project and to carry on their ordinary duties.

Because it was thought that these studies must be made and statistics compiled, after consultation with a representative of the B Committee, it was decided to designate two employees of interested agencies in the New York area to conduct the studies. Those selected were Mr. Thomas Fleming, Supervisory Inspector, New York City Bureau of Customs and Mr. James Thornton, Electronics Technician Chief, Chief Petty Officer, U. S. Coast Guard. These two individuals were selected because of their knowledge of the technical aspects of Customs examination procedures and of the detection equipment and general ability to accept and discharge their responsibilities. They have been directed to compile the statistics desired and deliver them to the Advisory Group for consideration with such recommendation as they may deem appropriate.

The Advisory Group will be prepared to submit general and detailed recommendations after more data is gathered from the present experimental program.

cc: Original - File
1st copy - Mr. Whitson
2nd copy - Col. Halvorsen
3rd copy - Capt. Stewart
4th copy - Col. Beckedorff
5th copy - ONI Representative
6th copy - File

Newspaper Clipping
Appearing in

THE DAILY TELEGRAPH AND MORNING POST

LONDON, THURSDAY, AUGUST 26, 1954

CUSTOMS DESKS AS ATOMIC MATTER CHECK

New York Report
From Our Own Correspondent
NEW YORK, Wednesday.

Passengers landing from the liners Liberte, 51,834 tons and Olympia, 22,979 tons, at New York to-day were mystified by the appearance on the pier of two small, grey desks, each about 4ft high.

They were at the exit through which they passed with baggage after normal Customs inspection. As each passenger paused there for the final Customs stamp on luggage, officials looked hard into the desks, which seemed to hold some kind of electronic equipment.

The officials, who first set up their desks yesterday when the Queen Mary docked here, are described simply as "men from Washington." Customs and Immigration officials to-day professed to have no knowledge of their identity.

Mr. R. Dill, Collector of Customs for New York, declared: "I am as much in the dark as you are. I'm sure Washington will make an announcement at the proper time."

"GREAT MYSTERY"

A French line official stated: "It is all a great mystery to us."

A report persisted to-day that the officials activities mark a new United States policy of checking all passengers' baggage for atomic materials. It was said that the instruments hidden in the desks were geiger counters.

It was pointed out that if the officials were looking only for ordinary contraband they would use some kind of X-ray machine such as the inspectoscope. This has already been employed successfully at the Idlewild airfield.

An X-ray machine would need some kind of lens for focusing on the baggage. But the instruments used by the officials are hidden.

For some time now searches for atomic materials are known to have been made on cargo boats arriving at New York. But passenger vessels have previously been exempt.

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

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4-7-00 SOLUBILOAD

Memo for Mr. Belmont
from Mr. Branigan

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that the foregoing be brought to the attention of the Working Committee of the IIC, with the suggestion that any specific tests which they would like to have made with the passive portable detection device and the x-ray type radiographic device be brought to the attention of Supervisor Whitson in order that appropriate demonstrations can be set up.



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4-7-00 SPA bja/PAU

4.7.00 SPH bja/PAM

September 21, 1954

RECORDED-20
INDEXED-20
EX-131

Honorable Lewis L. Strauss
Chairman
Atomic Energy Commission
Washington 25, D. C.

— to Strauss 9-22-54 cmb.

Dear Mr. Strauss:

Reference is made to your letter of August 13, 1954, with which you transmitted a [redacted] and requested the judgment of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security as to the utility of the device described in "Item 5" of the report.

In considering the [redacted] the Committees [redacted] b2 b7E [redacted] The Committees further noted that there is sufficient data at hand to [redacted] Also, the Committees noted that your letter refers to the device's lethality to exposed people and its non-surreptitious characteristics.

In view of its lack of mobility due to its size and necessary background structures and the fact that it would have to be used on a selective basis in order to avoid a serious disruption of international trade, the Committees are of the opinion that the cost of the device would not be commensurate with its utility and therefore recommended that further development of this type of device should not be undertaken at this time. Nevertheless, the Atomic Energy Commission is requested to continue to study the [redacted]

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SEP 23 1954

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SAC, NEW YORK (65-14825) October 21, 1954

DIRECTOR, FBI (100-354839)

Smuggling of Atomic Bomb or Parts Thereof, Into the United States
SOVIET PERSONNEL AND INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
IS - R

Reurlet 10-15-54 requesting information regarding the content of Collector of Customs circular number X-54 dated 6-1-54 which deals with reciprocal treatment of incoming and outgoing baggage and effects of diplomatic personnel from Soviet bloc countries.

Bureau of Customs Collector's circular number X-54 dated 6-1-54 states "The handling of incoming and outgoing baggage and effects of diplomatic personnel from designated Soviet bloc countries is to be based on the rendering of reciprocal treatment insofar as is feasible."

The Soviet bloc countries are named as the Union of Soviet Socialists Republics, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Poland and Hungary. There shall be inspection and manual search of all incoming unaccompanied baggage, effects and other importations other than diplomatic pouches of personnel from the Soviet bloc. Incoming and outgoing diplomatic pouches, whether or not accompanied, shall be immune from search. Incoming accompanied baggage and effects of diplomatic couriers of the U.S.S.R. arriving at the ports of New York City, San Antonio and Laredo, Texas; Syracuse, New York and St. Albans, Vermont, shall not be inspected but the accompanied baggage and effects of all other Soviet bloc couriers shall be inspected upon arrival. The handling of the baggage and effects of the diplomats of the various Soviet bloc countries will apparently vary as Soviet bloc treatment of our diplomats varies.

The circular also provides that representatives of the Soviet bloc countries to the United Nations or United Nations specialized agencies and other international [illegible]

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TO : MR. MOHR

DATE: October 26, 1954

FROM : N. P. CALLAHAN

b1

SUBJECT: METHOD OF HANDLING [redacted] RECEIVED (S) FROM CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF INTENSIFIED COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM CONCERNING SOVIET AND SATELLITE OFFICIALS

Reference is made to prior memoranda concerning the above-captioned subject, specifically, Mr. Roach's memorandum to Mr. Belmont dated October 20, 1954, in which it was recommended that Mr. Eigenmann and Mr. Broadbent of the Bureau of the Budget be contacted in connection with this matter in order that they could be apprized of the Bureau's position in connection therewith. As you know as a result of the conference between the Bureau's liaison representative, S. J. Papich, [redacted] (S)

b1

I contacted Messrs. Eigenmann and Broadbent on October 20, 1954, and advised them of the Bureau's position in connection with this matter, pointing out I was doing so in the event the Bureau of the Budget [redacted] (S)

Both Messrs. Eigenmann and Broadbent indicated that they would continue to support the Bureau's position as to the method of reflecting these funds on the "green sheet."

NPC:gt

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10/07/03

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

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TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: October 15, 1954

FROM : R.R. Roach

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SUBJECT: METHOD OF HANDLING [redacted] RECEIVED FROM CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF INTENSIFIED COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM CONCERNING SOVIET AND SATELLITE OFFICIALS

You will recall that in connection with the instant matter arrangements were effected whereby [redacted] were to be transferred from a CIA [redacted] to the Bureau. Discussions were held with representatives of the Department of Justice and of the Bureau of the Budget with regard to the manner in which the [redacted] would be treated on the 1956 "green sheets." As you know, the "green sheets" are submitted to the Bureau of the Budget annually with our formal Budget request and also appear in the House Appropriations Committee hearings. As described in memorandum dated August 4, 1954, from Mr. N. P. Callahan to Mr. Mohr, the above-described discussions led to the Bureau of the Budget's advising that in the 1956 "green sheets" the Bureau could tabulate the item as "Comparative transfer in form of reimbursement from other accounts." Such tabulation was preferable to listing the item as a straight reimbursement because for the 1956 fiscal year the Bureau could request an increase in appropriations of $2,266,000 over the fiscal year 1955. If the [redacted] were incorporated with "reimbursements from other accounts" the Bureau's request for the fiscal year 1956 would make it appear that the Bureau would be getting an increase of [redacted] over the fiscal year 1955. By letter dated August 10, 1954, the Bureau of the Budget advised the Department of Justice that the itemization, "Comparative transfer in form of reimbursement from other accounts" was approved by the Bureau of the Budget and that such itemization should be reflected in the 1956 budget submission.

On October 14, 1954, [redacted]

RECORDED - 30

INDEXED - 30

CLASSIFIED BY 60267 uc/NLS/BJA/Amm 10/25/03
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SJP:lw
1 - Mr. Mohr

[redacted] (S)

[redacted] (S)

b1

[redacted] (S)

The Administrative Division advises that at the time this question first came under consideration in August, 1954, as to the treatment of this item on the "green sheet", it was pointed out to the Bureau of the Budget that in view of the delicate nature of the program for which these funds were to be utilized and the instructions issued by the President in a meeting at which the Attorney General and the Director of the Bureau of

the Budget (at that time it was Joseph Dodge) and the Director were present, the Bureau of the Budget was instructed to work with the FBI in arranging for the obtaining of the necessary funds to carry out the program desired by the President.

During the initial negotiations for the necessary funds, representatives of the Bureau, CIA, and the Bureau of the Budget met at the Budget Bureau and did agree that the [redacted] would be processed (S) from CIA to FBI by a reimbursement procedure since this was the only method under which CIA would agree to make the funds forthcoming. However, nothing was said or agreed upon at that time as to the method in which the item would be reflected on the "green sheet". Further, at that time [redacted] then with the Bureau of the Budget, agreed that the funds forthcoming in this manner would be considered by the Bureau of the Budget as a part of our regular 1955 appropriation, so that it would not be necessary that this Bureau show any sizeable increase between our base appropriation for 1955 and our 1956 fiscal year estimate. b1 b7C

The Bureau of the Budget was advised that in handling this item as proposed by the FBI all aspects of security angles insofar as the receipt of funds from CIA were taken into consideration as well as the method of reimbursement under which the funds were actually obtained. It was pointed out that it was the considered opinion of this Bureau that the method finally resolved would best serve the interest of security desired in connection with these funds. The verbage that is used on the "green sheet" finally agreed on indicates that [redacted] (S) was "...form of reimbursement from other accounts." b1

[redacted]

[redacted] (S)

~~SECRET~~

RECOMMENDATIONS

b3

1. In view of the above, it is recommended that [redacted] be advised by the Bureau's liaison representative that the Bureau having taken full cognizance of the security considerations which enter into this problem are of the strong opinion that the manner in which the item is being handled affords the maximum security desired in connection with this matter and does not violate any alleged agreement in this regard.

b7C

2. It is further recommended that the Administrative Division inform Mr. Eigenmann, the Budget Bureau Examiner handling our material, and his superior, [redacted] of the Bureau's determination in connection with this matter in order that they will be aware of our position in the event they receive any contact from Hughes in connection with this item.

OK.

~~SECRET~~

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TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: October 20, 1954

FROM : MR. R. R. ROACH

SUBJECT: METHOD OF HANDLING [redacted] RECEIVED (S) FROM CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF INTENSIFIED COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM CONCERNING SOVIET AND SATELLITE OFFICIALS

b1

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 11-21-98 BY 3301 [illegible]

Park

Smuggling Atom Bomb

Callahan

Reference is made to my memorandum dated October 15, 1954. You [redacted] Bureau's intention of tabulating the [redacted] (S) as a separate item on the Bureau's "green sheet." As you know, the "green sheets" are submitted to the Bureau of the Budget annually with our formal budget request. As reflected in the referenced memorandum, [redacted] (S)

b1

In accordance with the recommendation set forth in the referenced memorandum, [redacted] was advised that the Bureau had taken full cognizance of the security considerations in the instant matter, and that the Bureau was of the strong opinion that the manner in which the item was being handled afforded it the maximum security desired and, furthermore, that there was no violation of any alleged agreement. You will recall that [redacted] It was emphasized [redacted] (S) that it was difficult to understand that there was any violation, particularly since the Bureau of the Budget had officially advised the Bureau that the procedure being followed had been approved and could be followed by the Bureau in connection with the submission of the 1956 budget request. [redacted] and that he felt there was no sense to raising any issue. (S) He stated that, as far as he was concerned, he did not plan to take any strong stand, and he definitely did not desire to get involved in any further controversy in

SJP:mpm

1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. N. P. Callahan

RECORDED - 30

117-268-685

55 NOV 5 1954

EX-124

CLASSIFIED BY 60267 uc lmls/bjm/hm
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X1 20071025
DERIVED FROM: multiple sources

COPY FILED IN

b1

connection with this matter. [redacted]

[redacted]

ACTION:

The above information is being referred to the attention of the Administrative Division.

Your cooperation in this matter is appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover
Chairman, Interdepartmental Intelligence
Conference

J. Walter Yeagley
Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee on
Internal Security

SAC, WASHINGTON FIELD (117-161) November 1, 1954

b2
b7E

DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268)

PERSONAL ATTENTION
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC WEAPONS OR
PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES

A recent top secret study of Soviet capabilities

[redacted]

[redacted]

From time to time Bureau agents or informants have obtained access to Soviet establishments and have made certain observations regarding space utilization. Both the Washington Field and New York offices should give immediate and continuous consideration to the institution of a program whereby those areas of Soviet establishments [redacted]

[redacted]

Let me have your comments and observations on this matter no later than November 5, 1954.

The foregoing [redacted] are restricted data under the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Miss Gandy

New York

RECORDED - 5
COMM — FBI
NOV
MAILED 28

PERSONAL ATTENTION
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
REGISTERED RETURN RECEIPT

LW:bjg

4/19/00 SP4BSA/LBM

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

[redacted] 1 - Mr. Sanders

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: October 19, 1954

FROM : W. A. Branigan

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION IN PLACE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

b1

[redacted] (S)

[redacted] (S)

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that the attached draft be noted by the Working Committee representatives of IIC, inasmuch as the letter indicates that the Joint IIC-ICIS Committee, as a result of consultation with the Advisory Group, [redacted] is solely an ICIS matter since no IIC requirements are set forth in the attached draft letter. No IIC position or concurrence is necessary. (S)

LW:bjg
Attachment

4/19/00
CLASSIFIED BY NLS/BJA/PAM 60267 Derivative
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1

5 NOV 12 1954

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. V. A. BRANIGAN

DATE: November 1, 1954

FROM : L. Whitson

SUBJECT: NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
NET CAPABILITIES EVALUATION SUBCOMMITTEE

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

Attached for possible future reference are the following drafts and work papers:

Draft 21 September 1954, "Soviet Plan of Clandestine Attack," 2 copies.

Undated memorandum (prepared by ICIS "An Approach To Requirement 2."

Undated memorandum "Clandestine Use of 10 Megaton Weapon (prepared in Bureau).

Memorandum 23September 1954 "Probability of Success and Resultant Damage of Clandestine Attack with Nuclear Weapons Against Grand Coulee Dam."

Draft memorandum 23 September 1954 "Carswell Air Force Base, Texas - MacDill Air Force Base, Florida."

Draft dated 23 September 1954 "Estimate of the Net Weight of Clandestine Attack Against MacDeill Air Force Base (Tampa, Florida)."

Memorandum without caption dated 23 September 1954 relating to sabotage of tetraethyl lead plants.

All of the foregoing are classified top secret. The Grand Coulee memorandum has attached to it a receipt for a classified document indicating that it was loaned on October 6, 1954, to Leonard P. Bienvenu, Executive Secretary, ICIS, and returned.

RECOMMENDATION: These should be filed.

LW:bjg
Attachments (7)

7 ENCLS (Filed sub Dog 124 BS)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4/19/00 BY SP4BJA/LSM

NOT RECORDED
145 NOV 16 1954

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

NOV 5 1954

TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Miss Gandy

WASH 2 FROM NEW YORK 5 1128 A

DIRECTOR URGENT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-19-00 BY SP4 bja/mal

ATTN. ASST. DIR. A. H. BELMONT.

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC WEAPONS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE US. BUREAU FILE ONE ONE SEVEN DASH TWO SIX EIGHT. REBULET NOV FIRST LAST.

b2
b7E

[redacted]

SAME SITUATION EXISTS AT [redacted]

THOUGH NY AGENTS [redacted]

NY HAS BEEN [redacted]

END PAGE ONE

117-268-628

RECORDED - 9

INDEXED - 9

30

Mr. Belmont

cc Branigan

71 NOV 15

b2
b7E

WA 2, PAGE TWO

[redacted] NY KNOWS OF NO MEANS AT PRESENT WHEREBY [redacted] WE WILL CONTINUE TO [redacted] EFFORTS WILL BE MADE [redacted] CONTINUOUS INVESTIGATION AT [redacted]

END PAGE TWO

FIRST WD FOURTH LINE FROM END - STATIONERY

b2
b7E

WA 2, PAGE THREE

[redacted] ALL AGENT PERSONNEL ENGAGED IN HANDLING CASES RE [redacted] THIS OFFICE WILL ATTEMPT TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF EVERY REASONABLE OPPORTUNITY THAT PRESENTS ITSELF AND EACH AGENT WILL BE REPEATEDLY REMINDED OF OUR OBLIGATIONS IN THIS RESPECT. [redacted]

KELLY

FIRST WD LINE 5 PAGE THREE - REPORT

END

NY R 2 WA CAF

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: September 20, 1954

FROM : L. V. BOARDMAN

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

On August 13, 1954, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission supplied to the IIC and the ICIS a status report on the [redacted]

b2
b7E

This matter has been considered by the IIC and the ICIS, and it has been agreed that, due to the size, weight, cost, and utility, it would not be practicable for the use intended.

Attached hereto is a suggested IIC-ICIS letter to the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission advising him that the committees recommend that further development of this type of device should not be undertaken at this time although the study of detection of objects of high density and fissionable material in bulky commercial shipments should continue. The letter has been signed by the Chairman of the ICIS. It has been approved by the other members of the IIC.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is suggested that you sign the attached letter as Chairman of the IIC and that it be forwarded through Liaison to the Atomic Energy Commission.

RECORDED-20
INDEXED - 20
EX-130

Attachment

ESS:hke

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

DECLASSIFIED BY SP4BSTA/LBM ON 01/19/00

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office M.....m • UNITE /ERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268)

DATE: 11/5/54

FROM : SAC, WFO (117-161)

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC WEAPONS OR
PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES

Rebulet dated November 1, 1954, instructing WFO and New York to give immediate and continuous consideration to the institution of a program whereby those [redacted]

The Bureau requested our comments and observations on this matter.

This office is in full agreement with the Bureau as to the desirability of instituting such a program. However, it is felt that certain comments should be made concerning [redacted]

b2
b7E

On the other hand, it is felt that it will be possible to comply with Bureau's desires insofar [redacted]

In this respect, the Bureau is aware that, on such occasions and in all other instances, [redacted]

LWRO:af

2 - New York (RM)

[redacted] Furthermore, it has been the experience of this office that [redacted] WFO will remain alert to those [redacted] and it is noted that to date we have invariably [redacted] b2 b7E [redacted] It will, of course, be [redacted] In addition, it should be possible (and is being done in connection with certain confidential sources at this time) [redacted]

In this regard, it is to be noted that on [redacted] a Special Agent in this office [redacted] and had an opportunity to make pertinent [redacted]

This matter will receive the continuing attention of this office and every opportunity will be utilized in order to conform with the Bureau's desires in connection with this program. The Bureau will, of course, be notified appropriately in each instance when a situation arises which appears to permit exploitation through the utilization of Special Agent personnel in cover assignments. Due care will have to be taken, of course, to insure that these agents are not known to the Soviets.

SAC, BALTIMORE

November 9, 1954

DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268)

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR
PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES

RECORDED - 94

Reurlet 8-20-54,

Bureau has made inquiry through the Office of Naval Intelligence regarding a possible visit to the U. S. Naval School, Explosive Ordnance Disposal, Naval Powder Factory, Indian Head, Maryland, for the purpose of determining what additional materials, including visual aids, the Ordnance Disposal School might have which would be of assistance to the Bureau.

The Navy, in the interests of having proper arrangements made in advance, would like to have the names of those personnel who will visit the school and the dates most satisfactory for doing so.

Accordingly, you should advise the Bureau of the names of the agents you intend to send to Indian Head for the above purpose. Arrangements will be made by the Bureau. It is contemplated that the representatives of the Bureau's Laboratory will also visit Indian Head in this connection.

(5)

MAILED 3
NOV - 9 1954
COMM-FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4/19/00 BY SP4 BJA/lbm

LW: bjg

1 - Mr. D. J. Parsons (Rm. 7621)

NOTE: In view of Bureau responsibility in the field of detection of clandestine atomic weapons it has been thought desirable to obtain as much information as possible concerning the appearance of a nuclear weapon and other means of identification. The Ordnance Officer from 1st Army, NY, recommended the Explosives Ordnance Disposal School at Indian Head, Md., as a place where Bureau can obtain data re nuclear weapons and new ideas re investigation. Inquiry by Baltimore reflected the Commanding Officer did not have authority to allow anyone to observe the facilities and clearance for civilians to witness the facilities and materials would have to come from the Pentagon. Contact with ONI in this regard has disclosed they desire the names of personnel and the approximate dates such personnel would visit the school. ONI is in charge of clearances this installation.

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

135

58 NOV 17 1954

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI (117-268) DATE: 11-15-54

FROM : SAC, San Diego (66-998)

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Re no number SAC letter dated January 28, 1952 and mylet dated September 15, 1954.

This office has no additional names to recommend inclusion on the Bureau of Customs Watch List at this time. This matter is being closely followed and the Bureau will be kept advised of any further developments.

JEP:jam
(3)
REGISTERED MAIL

RECORDED - 21

EX-130

117-268-631

6 NOV 22 1954

NOV 26 1954

DECLASSIFIED BY SP4 bja/lcb
ON 4-2-00

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

ccs: Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Hennrich
Mr. Sanders
Mr. Whitson

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: November 19, 1954

FROM : A. H. Belmont

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION IN PLACE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES
SMUGGLING Atom Bombs

SYNOPSIS:

Allen Dulles, Director of Central Intelligence, November 8, 1954, informed Bureau Liaison that he would like to support the Bureau in the promotion of any measures which could restrict the Soviets in efforts to clandestinely introduce atomic weapons. [redacted] (S) b1 b3

Proposal to limit weight of diplomatic pouch to 500 pounds proposed in Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security Subcommittee April 2, 1951. Bureau pointed out to ICIS April 9, 1951, 500 pounds limitation fallacious since atomic weapons could be broken down into lighter weight components. Weight limitation on pouch periodically considered in ICIS. Ad Hoc Committee of National Security Council Planning Board studying restriction of use of diplomatic pouch to transmittal of documents concluded it would not be to advantage of U. S. to restrict use of pouch to documents and restrictions on pouch as to size, weight or contents would not guarantee against clandestine introduction. Conclusions of Ad Hoc Committee adopted by NSC February 11, 1954. Ad Hoc Committee consisted of representatives of State, Defense, Treasury, Justice (but not FBI), CIA and NSC representative on internal security.

FBI and IIC position has been that any restrictions on size or use of diplomatic pouch which are realistic and limit smuggling potential should be given consideration. [redacted] periodic re-appraisal of pouch problem by NSC desirable. (S) b1 b3

RECOMMENDATION:

Attached for approval is a letter to Allen Dulles suggesting that the problem of diplomatic pouch should be subject to re-appraisal [redacted] (S)

LW: bjg
(6)
Attachment

RECORDED - 32 117-268-632

11-22-54
EXED 132

EX. - 109

SECRET

51 NOV 26 1954

4-17-80 NSC/Ltr. dtd. 10-20-83 re/ms/bjg/Pam Exam derivative 10/8/03

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Memo for Boardman
from Belmont

b1
b3 [redacted] (S) The letter also advises him that his observations were being brought to the attention of the National Security Council representative on internal security and the Chairman of the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security.

11-19

DETAILS:

On November 8, 1954, Allen Dulles, Director of Central Intelligence, stated to Bureau Liaison Representative S. J. Papich that he was particularly interested in the comments made by Assistant Director Belmont before the National Security Council November 4, 1954, concerning the clandestine introduction by the Soviets of parts of nuclear weapons through the diplomatic pouch. Dulles stated he would like to support the Bureau in the promotion of any measures which could restrict the Soviets in their efforts to clandestinely bring in an atomic weapon. [redacted] He stated the matter was so serious it was (S) to the U. S. Government's advantage to impose a severe restriction.

b1
b3

[redacted] (S)

The question placing weight limitations on the Soviet diplomatic pouch is not new. Under date of April 2, 1951, the ICIS Subcommittee on Foreign Diplomatic and Official Personnel prepared certain recommendations to the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security predicated upon an assumption that the smallest component into which an atomic weapon could be broken weighed more than 500 pounds and that the most practical measure to prevent the introduction into the United States of unconventional weapons would be to institute the examination of diplomatic baggage weighing over 500 pounds.

When the foregoing recommendation was brought to the attention of the FBI the matter was discussed orally on April 9, 1951, with the Chairman of the ICIS pointing out that the proposal to limit diplomatic baggage, including the pouch, to 500 pounds was fallacious since the component parts of atomic weapons would individually weigh much less. (Current IIC and ICIS studies are predicated upon advice from the Atomic Energy Commission that the component parts of a nuclear weapon need not weigh over 25 pounds each, including the fissionable material.)

The question of placing restrictions on the weight and contents of the diplomatic pouch has been studied periodically in the ICIS. By letter of July 9, 1953, the IIC in commenting to the Chairman of the ICIS on an ICIS tentative recommendation, that nothing of a nondocumentary nature be brought into the U. S. in a diplomatic pouch of any Soviet bloc nation (which would definitely limit the weight of the individual pouch), stated, "The IIC members agree that all feasible steps should be taken to prevent the clandestine introduction into this country of fissionable material and that all steps possible should be taken toward that end. While it is recognized that the limiting of the pouches to documentary material in the strict technical sense would be desirable from an internal security standpoint, it is recognized that there are many considerations, such as reciprocity, it must be considered by those making this decision ..."

NSC 159/4 on "Continental Defense" and NSC 5408 on "Continental Defense," have recognized the Soviet capability of introducing into the U. S. component parts of nuclear weapons clandestinely. The NSC Planning Board set up an Ad Hoc group on December 2, 1953, which reported to the Planning Board January 26, 1954, on the comparative advantage of restricting the diplomatic pouch to documents. The members of the working group, or Ad Hoc Committee, were representatives of the Departments of State, Defense, Treasury and Justice, the CIA and the NSC Representative on Internal Security. The FBI was not a member of this Ad Hoc Committee. The conclusions drawn by the Ad Hoc Committee, which were approved by the NSC February 11, 1954, were as follows:

"19. In view of (a) the importance to the U. S. of the unrestricted use of the pouch for both documentary and nondocumentary shipments, (b) the retaliatory measures which might be taken by the countries affected, and (c) the practical difficulties of enforcement, it would not be to the advantage of the U. S. to seek an agreement restricting the use of the pouch solely to the transmittal of documents.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Mr. Belmont

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : W. A. Branigan

DATE: October 1, 1954

FROM : L. Whitson

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMB, OR PARTS THEREOF, INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

At 3:30 p.m. 10-1-54 Mr. John Doherty, Justice Representative on the Standing Committee of the ICIS, called at the Bureau and discussed with Supervisor Whitson the so-called Stoessel Report on the question of what should be done by Customs in the event detection devices indicate the presence of fissionable material in the possession of a diplomat. Mr. Doherty stated that the Standing Committee was again about to consider the problem. It was pointed out to him that the Bureau had written to Assistant Attorney General William F. Tompkins on August 13, and August 23, 1954, setting out the Bureau's position; namely, that any arrests the Bureau would make of diplomats in possession of fissionable material would be on the authority of the Attorney General according to statute; that a document of instructions to the Bureau of Customs should not contain gratuitous statements as to the manner in which the FBI should disseminate information, nor should it place any investigative limitations on the FBI.

It was also pointed out to Mr. Doherty that the IIC had written on August 25, 1954, to Mr. Thomas J. Donegan, who was then chairman of ICIS, reiterating the Bureau's position as the position of the IIC agencies.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

None, for your information. This will be followed with Mr. Doherty.

LW: ewk

RECORDED - 14

4/19-00 SP4 BJA/LBM

Memo for Boardman
from Belmont

~~SECRET~~

"20. Further, [redacted] b2 b7E it can be introduced through many non-diplomatic channels; and [redacted] would not guarantee security against clandestine introduction."

[redacted] (S)

b1 b3

[redacted] (S)

The FBI and IIC position has been that any restrictions on the size or use of the pouch which are realistic and limit the Soviet smuggling potential should be given consideration. The problem of the pouch should be subject to periodic re-appraisal. The individuals primarily interested in such re-appraisal are the National Security Council Representative on Internal Security and the Chairman of the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security.

~~SECRET~~

NOVEMBER 22, 1954 AIR-TEL

SAC, CLEVELAND URGENT
SAN ANTONIO

RECORDED - 15 117-268-633

EX-125

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC WEAPONS INTO THE US; ABA (BUFILE 117-268).

ON 11-19-54 US COAST GUARD HEADQUARTERS, WASHINGTON, INFORMED THE BUREAU THAT DETECTION DEVICE FOR FISSIONABLE MATERIAL BEING FIELD TESTED AT [redacted] REACTED ON [redacted] TO THE PRESENCE OF GAMMA RAYS WHEN THE DEVICE WAS APPROACHED BY [redacted]

[redacted] b7C

NO RADIOACTIVE SOURCE WAS DISCOVERED IN HER LUGGAGE BUT NO PERSONAL SEARCH WAS MADE. REACTION OF DETECTION DEVICE SIMILAR TO THAT NOTED PREVIOUSLY IN PORT OF NY WHEN DEVICE WAS APPROACHED BY PERSON WHO HAD TAKEN RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS IN MEDICAL TREATMENT. NO RECORD [redacted] BUREAU INDICES. CLEVELAND DETERMINE HER IDENTITY AND IF POSSIBLE WITHOUT DISCLOSING BUREAU INTEREST IN HER OR KNOWLEDGE OF RADIOACTIVITY, ATTEMPT TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER SHE HAS BEEN TAKING MEDICAL TREATMENTS WHICH MIGHT ACCOUNT FOR REACTION.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4/19/00 BY SP4 BJA/LCM

HOOVER

LW:bjg
(6)

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

MAILED 3
NOV 22 1954
FBI

WAB

124

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

ccs: Mr. Belmont
Mr. Branigan
Mr. Whitson

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: November 19, 1954

FROM : W. A. Branigan

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC WEAPONS INTO THE UNITED STATES

Customs responsibility for operating detection devices for fissionable material at Idlewild International Airport, New York, New York Docks, and International Airport, San Antonio, Texas.

Commander B. P. Clark, United States Coast Guard, Chairman of Advisory Group supervising field testing of these devices, phoned Bureau November 18 and informed Supervisor Whitson that detection device in San Antonio had been activated by a traveler October 3, 1954, but information had not been furnished until November 18. On November 19 Clark delivered a memorandum which stated that [redacted] b2 b7C b7E device; i. e., the device registered presence of gamma rays. No radioactive source was discovered by Customs in her baggage and no search of her was made. The matter was not reported to the San Antonio Office of the Bureau because the device had been triggered apparently in a manner similar to that experienced in the Port of New York when an employee of the Customs Service, who had been taking radioactive materials in connection with medical treatment, set off a device there.

In order to keep the records straight, it would be desirable to determine the identity of [redacted] and determine, if possible, whether she is undergoing medical treatment. It was pointed out to Clark that the FBI should be informed re any unexplained reactions promptly. He stated appropriate instructions were being issued. b7C

RECOMMENDATION:

There is attached an Air-tel for Cleveland with copies to San Antonio informing them of the circumstances and requesting that [redacted] be identified with particular reference to possible medical treatment.

LW:bjg
(4)
Attachment

INDEXED - 15

EX-125

4/19/00 SP4 BJA/LBM

Read 10:15 am
11-19-54
from Cmdr BF.
JSC RS.
LW

~~SECRET~~

19 November 1954

NR in Indices
LW

[redacted]

b2
b7C
b7E

This person triggered [redacted]

[redacted] No source was discovered by Customs and no personal search was made. The subject appeared to trigger the device in similar manner to that experienced in New York when a person was discovered to be taking medical treatment.

RECORDED - 15
INDEXED - 15
EX-125

[redacted]

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4/19/00 BY SP4 BJA/LBm

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Mr. Branigan
Mr. Whitson

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

TO : MR. W. A. BRANIGAN

DATE: November 18, 1954

FROM : L. WHITSON

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION IN PLACE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

On 8-13-54 the Bureau transmitted to AAG Tompkins a memorandum criticizing a proposal for procedures to be followed in the event fissionable material was identified or was suspected in the possession of a foreign diplomat. The proposal was under consideration by the ICIS Standing Committee. The ICIS document appeared to place the Department of State in a dominant position, attempted to prescribe notification procedure to be followed by FBI and attempted to limit FBI investigation.

At 5:15 P.M. 11-18-54 Mr. John Doherty, Justice Representative on ICIS Standing Committee, advised ICIS was forwarding to Bureau for comments 11-19-54 a revised plan which he indicated omitted material offensive to the Bureau.

RECOMMENDATION:

When the document is received it will be analyzed.

LW:bjg
(3)

RECORDED - 24

INDEXED - 24

EX. - 107

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

4.19.00 SP4bje/PKM

5 DEC 1954

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: November 9, 1954

FROM : A. H. Belmont

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
NET CAPABILITIES EVALUATION SUBCOMMITTEE

Reference is made to my memorandum of November 5, 1954, attached hereto, wherein I advised that Allen Dulles had contacted me following the presentation and discussion of the report of the Net Capabilities Evaluation Subcommittee before the National Security Council on November 4, 1954. You will recall that Dulles stated that my remarks before the Council had been of interest and that he would like to get together with me to discuss the matter. Dulles apparently was referring to dissenting opinions expressed by the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference and to my comments relative to securing access to Soviet establishments in this country. I did not make any commitments to Dulles and I suggested that Agent Papich ascertain from Dulles exactly what he had in mind when he suggested that I get together with him.

ENCL

On November 8, 1954, Agent Papich had occasion to contact Dulles, at which time Dulles stated that he had been most impressed by the presentation which was given by the Bureau before the National Security Council. He stated that he was particularly interested in the comments which were made concerning liberties afforded to the Soviets in clandestinely bringing in parts of atomic bombs. Dulles stated that the Bureau's observation to the effect that the Soviets could bring in various parts and then later assemble a bomb certainly made sense and warranted more serious attention. He stated that he did not wish to get involved in anything which was out of his jurisdiction but he would like to support the Bureau in the promotion of any measures which could restrict the Soviets in their efforts to clandestinely bring an atomic weapon into the country.

[redacted] Dulles stated that the Soviets undoubtedly would not like such a restriction but he felt that this matter was so serious that it was to the Government's advantage to impose a severe restriction.

b1
b3

NOT RECORDED

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

SJP:lw
(5)
Attachment
1 - Mr. Sanders

Give Dulles' suggestions careful consideration.

NW 60267 Date 11-19-00

NW 60267 derivative
Per Htr. dtd. 10-7-03 60267 NE/NLS/B:A/PAM 10/8/03

[redacted] (S)

b1
b3

[redacted] (S)

Dulles reiterated that my comments before the National Security Council left quite an impression upon him and he was desirous of exchanging ideas, hence, his interest in getting together with me. He advised Agent Papich that at the present time he only had the above thought concerning restriction of Soviet pouches to pass on for what it was worth. He further stated that inasmuch as he had talked to Agent Papich concerning this matter, he saw no reason to confer with me for the time being. He stated that if he gained knowledge of anything else which would be of assistance to the Bureau in connection with restrictions which might be imposed upon the Soviets, he would contact the Liaison Agent.

ACTION:

The above is being submitted for your information.

11-10

Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. K. BOARDMAN DATE: 11-6-54

FROM : MR. A. H. BELMONT cc Mr. Papich
Mr. Brennan

SUBJECT: NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
NET CAPABILITIES EVALUATION SUBCOMMITTEE

Tolson
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Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

Immediately following the presentation and discussion of the report of the Net Capabilities Evaluation Subcommittee before the National Security Council on November 4, 1954, CIA Director Allen Dulles contacted me to state that my remarks to the Council had been of interest and that he would like to get together with me to discuss the matter. He was apparently referring to the dissenting opinions expressed by the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference and my comments relative to securing access to Soviet establishments in this country. I merely stated that the subject was interesting and deserving of study. He repeated that he would like to get together with me. However, I made no commitment whatsoever.

It is suggested that Liaison Supervisor Papich casually mention to Mr. Dulles that he understood Dulles was interested in the comments made before the Council and Papich ascertain what Dulles has in mind. I would prefer to handle this through Liaison rather than set up any conference personally with Mr. Dulles. By handling it through liaison, we will be able to study what he has in mind and handle the matter accordingly.

If you agree, Supervisor Papich will be so instructed.

AHB:TD

ENCLOSURE

NOT RECORDED
117 NOV 26 1954

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 62-95075-756

4.19.00 SPA bjallbaw
Per ltr. dtd. 10-9-03

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memoranaum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

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TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: November 26, 1954

FROM : W. A. BRANIGAN

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION IN PLACE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

On 11-26-54 the Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures met with members of the Advisory Group which has been supervising the field testing of detection devices for fissionable material in New York and San Antonio.

The ICIS representative pointed out that the Commissioner of Immigration had written to ICIS advising that an INS electronics technician could not be made available on a regular basis for the field testing of devices in San Antonio and suggested that an Air Force electronics technician be obtained for the purpose of servicing the San Antonio machine.

After discussion the ICIS representative indicated that ICIS would inform INS that it would be desirable for the INS electronics technician to continue to be available at San Antonio until a regular program was established and that ICIS did not desire to bring in to the operation any additional agencies besides those which now have and would in the future have responsibility to defend against smuggling; namely, INS, Customs and Coast Guard.

The members of the Advisory Group stated that they have not been able to obtain as much in the way of statistical performance data on the passive devices as they might have obtained had Customs been a little more aggressive with regard to checks of baggage and persons to discover radioactive sources indicated by the device. The Advisory Group is going to New York during the week of November 29 and will discuss the matter with Customs representatives and while making tests of portable detection devices. The Advisory Group stated that they would be as unobtrusive as possible in testing the portable devices, including the use of such devices in ship searches by Coast Guard. They stated they would make no comment whatsoever to newspaper inquiries if such were made.

RECOMMENDATION:

INDEXED - EX. - 109

It is suggested these data be brought to the attention of the Working Committee of the IIC. It should be noted that Mr. B. Willard, ONI Representative, attended the Joint Committee meeting.

LW:bjg
(4) cc: Mr. Belmont; Mr. Branigan; Mr. Whitson

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: November 24, 1954

FROM : A. H. Belmont

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

SUBJECT: NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
NET CAPABILITIES EVALUATION SUBCOMMITTEE
ANF Smuggling Atom Bombs

[redacted] (3)

b1
b3

[redacted] (3)

b1
b3

[redacted]

SJP:lw
(7)
1 - Mr. Boardman
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Papich
1 - Mr. Sanders
1 - Mr. Whitson
1 - Section Tickler

INITIALS OF ORIGINAL

117-268-

NOT RECORDED
117 DEC 1 1954

Per Mr. Hd. 10-2-08
b6 b7C NICB/NLS/BAP 12/03

4-19-00 CLASSIFIED BY

DEC 8 1954

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

SAC, SAN ANTONIO (117-new) October 6, 1954

DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268)

RECORDED-61

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC WEAPONS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

Reurlet 9-24-54.

You requested the Bureau's observations and suggestions regarding the administration of the program now being undertaken by Customs and Immigration at the San Antonio International Airport, whereby a passive detection device for fissionable material is being utilized for the coverage of incoming passengers and baggage.

In the event a traveler has no diplomatic status he can be thoroughly searched, as can his baggage, by Customs. Should the detection device indicate the presence of a radioactive substance emitting neutrons or gamma rays or both, it would be the responsibility of Customs to determine the source of such emissions. If the source of the emissions was uranium or plutonium or some other special nuclear material Customs should notify you and you should notify the Bureau immediately in order that appropriate action might be taken under the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act.

It is not necessary for the Customs representatives to notify you in the event the material activating the detection device is determined to be a watch dial, a lamp mantle or some other such innocuous material.

COMM - FBI
OCT 6 - 1954
MAILED 28

In the event a person having diplomatic status the accompanied baggage of a person having diplomatic status activates the device and it is not possible for Customs to identify the specific source of radiation, Customs should notify you and you should notify the Bureau promptly so that appropriate action may be taken to afford such individual proper investigative attention. It might be necessary to place such a person under physical surveillance but the specific type of investigative attention afforded him would depend upon the circumstances in the particular case.

Prompt notification to the Bureau is essential under any circumstances in which action by the FBI is necessary.

2 - New York (117-192)

LW: bjg

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OCT 14 1954

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4/19/00 BY SP3 AlM/mlr

[redacted] to Beardman

[redacted] b1 b3

ACTION:

None. The above is being reported in order to inform you concerning Dulles' current thinking on this matter.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Belmont

DATE: November 24, 1954

FROM : R. R. Roach

[redacted] HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-7-00 BY SP4 BCA/LEN

SUBJECT: UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE IN SOVIET BLOC AREAS

Smuggling Atom Bombs.

An Executive Meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) was held late yesterday afternoon, November 23, 1954, with Mr. Allen Dulles, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, serving as Chairman. All representatives of the IAC were present. Dulles introduced a proposed agreed statement to be signed by all IAC members present, which had to do with the lack of United States intelligence coverage in Soviet bloc areas (Soviet and Satellite territories outside the continental United States and its possessions). All members present, with the exception of myself representing the FBI, signed the agreed statement in their capacities as head or representative of their intelligence agency, the agreement having been reduced from the status of an IAC paper to an informal agreement among the "intelligence community" (State, Army, Navy, Air Force, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Atomic Energy Commission, Central Intelligence Agency, and FBI). Dulles commented he needed such an agreed statement for presentation this morning, November 24, 1954, to "high-level" policymakers, whom he did not identify.

By way of background, Dulles advised that he realized as a result of briefings before the National Security Council on clandestine introduction into the United States of nuclear weapons by the Soviets that perhaps his and other U. S. agencies operating abroad could effect better coverage in Soviet and Satellite countries if further means of obtaining intelligence data were at their command. He stated that particularly he and the Air Force had in mind the matter of using more extensively air reconnaissance and photography over Soviet bloc areas. He commented that the Air Force had stated it is reasonable to assume that the Air Force can conduct some reconnaissance and photography with a minimum possibility of being detected, and that through highly developed technical means it would be possible for the Air Force to come up with very "solid" information regarding Soviet intentions to introduce atomic war against the United States. He stated that, aside from any political implications that such an operation may have, he desired the backing of the "intelligence community" before officially presenting the matter for top level discussion. With this in mind, he desired that all of the IAC representatives sign the statement which he had prepared in advance for signatures. Dulles would not make a copy of the agreed statement

RRR:mls
(6)
1 - Mr. Boardman
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Kuhrt
1 - Mr. Roach
1 - Lia. Sect. Tick.

INITIALS ON ORIGINAL

117-268

NOT RECORDED

117 DEC 9 1954

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51 DEC 9 1954

available and only permitted members to read and discuss the text, after which they were asked to sign it. In substance, the statement indicated we (the intelligence agencies) admit that there are serious gaps in the intelligence coverage in the Soviet bloc areas relating to Soviet intentions to launch a surprise nuclear attack against the United States, and we believe that we would have substantially improved capabilities of filling these gaps through the use of air reconnaissance and photography.

Upon discussion of the text of the note, I pointed out to Mr. Dulles that he should define exactly the area or activities of the Soviet bloc intended as if he were referring to Soviet bloc activities in the United States then, of course, it would be a matter that would come within our jurisdiction. Dulles admitted that the note was ambiguous in this regard and, therefore, inserted language to the effect that it pertained to coverage of Soviet bloc areas outside the continental United States. Other changes which Dulles made in the prepared note made it clear that the matter under discussion pertained to foreign collection and acquisition of intelligence and not to any matters pertaining to internal security.

After the note had been put into final form with no copies made available to members present, Dulles asked that the members sign it as IAC representatives. Upon receipt of this request, I told Mr. Dulles and those present that I had no authority to sign such a document; that it appeared to be a matter outside the Bureau's investigative jurisdiction; and even if it were within our jurisdiction, we would of necessity have to have a reasonable amount of time to study it to make certain it was a correct statement insofar as the Bureau was concerned. Following my statements to Mr. Dulles, Admiral Espe of ONI, General Trudeau of G-2, and Mr. Armstrong of the State Department also advised that they could not sign the document as an IAC paper, but could only sign it in an individual capacity but that it must be understood their signatures would not bind their respective departments other than the intelligence agencies they represented. After these comments, Mr. Dulles stated he would withdraw the paper as an IAC document and accept it as an informal note to him from members of the intelligence community. All of the members, with the exception of myself, signed the document in this capacity. Since it was a matter outside the Bureau's jurisdiction and for the other reasons given, I told Mr. Dulles that I could not sign it and that if he desired me to present the matter to the Director I would be glad to do so, although it appeared to be something in which the Bureau normally would abstain from taking a position in, either for or against.

It was noted by representatives of the IAC present, with the exception of the Air Force who apparently had had previous information concerning the matter, that Dulles was attempting to pressure through -

an agreed statement without giving the representatives of the intelligence agencies time to consider it. Dulles stated that the matter was highly secret and asked Mr. Roach and other members present that they hold the information very closely within their respective agencies.

Under the circumstances, there appears to be no further action the Bureau need take in this matter as it is one that does not directly touch upon our jurisdiction or operations. The manner, however, in which Dulles presented this and attempted to pressure it through was the subject matter of a discussion by the Director at a recent Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference meeting; further, it would appear that an operation of this nature, if put into effect, would have dangerous political implications which, up until now, Dulles admitted had not been taken into consideration.

ACTION:

None. For your information.

V

This was certainly high handed procedure upon Dulles' part. Roach handled it excellently.

December 2, 1954

RECORDED-42

INDEXED-42

[redacted] b7C

[redacted] North Dakota

Dear [redacted]

Your letter dated November 27, 1954, has been received.

In this connection, I am instructing one of my representatives from our office at 419 North American Life and Casualty Building, Minneapolis 3, Minnesota, to contact you in the immediate future.

Sincerely yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

2 cc's - Minneapolis, with 2 copies of the incoming.
ATTENTION SAC: Correspondent is not identifiable in Bufiles. You are instructed to have a representative of your office interview the correspondent for any information of interest to the Bureau. If he has information of interest to another agency, he should be referred to the proper authorities, and the jurisdiction of the FBI should be explained to him. Sulet results of interview under the caption [redacted] North Dakota, RESEARCH (Crime Records)" no later than December 13, 1954. b7C

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Follow-up made ~~for December 14, 1954~~. Pulled per memo 12-13-54

HEW:djg

~~DEC 10 1954~~

COMM - FBI
MAILED 30

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4-7-00 BY SP4 BJA LBM

TRUE COPY

[redacted] N. Dak
November 27, 1954

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover,
F.B.I. Washington, D. C.

Dear Sir,

I have heard about possible importations of atomic devices for use against us in our country. I should like to know how serious this threat is considered to be. If my curiosity seems unwarranted, I hasten to add that it is prompted by what I have seen on the Canadian border lately.

b7C

If you choose to notice this letter after referring to the Civil Service Commission, I believe I can make your interest worth while.

Yours truly

/S/ [redacted]

4-7-00 SP4 BJA/LBM

[redacted]

N. Dak

November 27, 1954

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover,
F.B.I. Washington D.C.

Dear Sir,

I have heard about possible importations of atomic devices for use against us in our country. I should like to know how serious this threat is considered to be. If my curiosity seems unwarranted, I hasten to add that it is prompted by what I have seen on the Canadian border lately.

If you choose to notice this letter, I believe I can make your interest worth while.

Yours truly

[redacted]

b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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3 Copies made

RECORDED-47 111-265-631

17 NOV 29 1954

EX-102 ROC

NOV 29 1954

CONFIDENTIAL

cc Mr. Callahan
Mr. Whitson

117-268

BY COURIER SERVICE

Date: December 2, 1954

To: Mr. Chester A. Emerick (ORIGINAL AND ONE)
Deputy Commissioner, Investigations
Bureau of Customs
Room 7048
Internal Revenue Service Building
Washington 25, D. C.

DECLASSIFIED BY SP4 bjg/WBM
ON 4-7-00

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC WEAPONS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES

Reference is made to the letter from the Commissioner of Customs dated January 9, 1952, requesting information concerning individuals, firms or organizations in order that they or shipments with which they are connected may be given more thorough Customs treatment upon arrival in the United States.

You may wish to consider [redacted] who resides at [redacted] New Jersey, and operates his own business as a [redacted] New Jersey. [redacted] is married to [redacted] who reportedly assists him in his business. b7C

[redacted]

In accordance with the referenced letter it is understood that only the names and addresses above will be furnished to your field office to be included in its watch list. Any information which may receive regarding shipments to [redacted] or to his [redacted] sometimes referred to as the [redacted] would be of interest to this Bureau. b7C

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Winterrowd
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Holloman
Gandy

1 - [redacted]
2 - Newark (Info)(117-72)(Sta 0-25)

RECORDED 28 117-268-638
DEC 3 1954

LW:bjg bjg
(8)

CONFIDENTIAL

145

DEC

INDEXED COPY FILED IN

CONFIDENTIAL

. D. Harrington
Mr. Whitson

117-268

BY COURIER SERVICE

Date: December 3, 1954

To: Mr. Chester A. Emerick (ORIGINAL AND ONE)
Deputy Commissioner, Investigations
Bureau of Customs
Room 7048
Internal Revenue Service Building
Washington 25, D. C.

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC WEAPONS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES

Reference is made to the letter from the Commissioner of Customs dated January 9, 1952, requesting information concerning individuals, firms or organizations in order that they or shipments with which they are connected may be given more thorough Customs treatment upon arrival in the United States.

b7C

You may wish to consider [redacted] and his wife [redacted] who reside at [redacted] New Jersey. [redacted] is an [redacted] for [redacted] New Jersey.

[redacted]

b7C

In accordance with the referenced letter it is understood that only the names and addresses above will be furnished to your field office to be included in its watch list. Any information which you receive regarding shipments to [redacted] and his wife would be of interest to this Bureau.

1 - [redacted]
2 - Newark (Info)(117-72)(8-25)

LW:bjg
(8)

RECORDED - 6

117-268

DEC 6 1954
145

BY COURIER SVC

DEC 6 CONFIDENTIAL

COMM - FBI

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DEC 3 1954

4.19.00 NSC Withdrawal

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

STANDARD

Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: December 2, 1954

FROM : A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION IN PLACE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

Tolson
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At 1:40 P.M. November 2, 1954, Commander B. P. Clark, U. S. Coast Guard, phoned Supervisor Whitson and reported that he had just returned from New York where the Advisory Group supervising the field testing of portable detection devices had just completed a three-day test. There will be additional work conducted by the Advisory Group during the coming week and a report will be prepared by them for the Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures during the week of December 20.

Clark stated that the portable device was not foolproof but that it was so much of an improvement over the Geiger counters the Coast Guard is now using on ship searches that there was no comparison.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is suggested that these facts be brought to the attention of the Working Committee of the IIC. As soon as the Advisory Group's report is received it will be disseminated to the other IIC members.

LW:bjg
(4)

ccs: Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Sanders
Mr. Whitson

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-7-00 BY SP4 BJA/LBM

NOT RECORDED
145 DEC 9 1954

9 DEC 7 1954

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

5

ccs: Mr. V. D. Harrington
Mr. Whitson

CONFIDENTIAL

117-268

BY COURIER SERVICE

Date: December 2, 1954

To: Mr. Chester A. Emerick
Deputy Commissioner, Investigations
Bureau of Customs
Room 7048
Internal Revenue Service Building
Washington 25, D. C.

DECLASSIFIED ON 4-19-00 SP4 bja/PAU

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC WEAPONS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES

Reference is made to the letter from the Commissioner of Customs dated January 9, 1952, requesting information concerning individuals, firms or organizations in order that they or shipments with which they are connected may be given more thorough Customs treatment upon arrival in the United States.

b7C

You may wish to consider [redacted] who resides at [redacted] New Jersey, and is employed as [redacted] New Jersey. [redacted] is a [redacted]

[redacted]

b7C

1 - [redacted]
2 - Newark (Info)(117-72)(0-25)

LW:bjg
(8)

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CONFIDENTIAL

BY COURIER SVC.
6 DEC - 6
COMM - FBI

RECORDED - 6

117-262

DEC. 6 1954
145

51 DEC 9 1954

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

CONFIDENTIAL

The Philadelphia School of Social Science and Art has been designated by the Attorney General of the United States pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

In accordance with the referenced letter it is understood that only the names and addresses above will be furnished to your field office to be included in its watch list. Any information which you receive regarding shipments to [redacted] would be of interest to this Bureau. [redacted] b7C

- 2 -

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

cc Mr. V. D. Harrington
Mr. Whitson

117-268

BY COURIER SERVICE

Date: December 3, 1954

To: Mr. Chester A. Emerick (ORIGINAL AND ONE)
Deputy Commissioner, Investigations
Bureau of Customs
Room 7048
Internal Revenue Service Building
Washington 25, D. C.

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

4-1900 SP4 bjg/PAAC

Subject: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC WEAPONS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES

Reference is made to the letter from the Commissioner of Customs dated January 9, 1952, requesting information concerning individuals, firms or organizations in order that they or shipments with which they are connected may be given more thorough Customs treatment upon arrival in the United States.

b7C

You may wish to consider [redacted] and his wife, [redacted] who reside in [redacted] New Jersey. [redacted] is an [redacted] at the [redacted] Both [redacted] and his wife have been associated for many years with the Communist Party and various front groups. [redacted] has traveled extensively in Europe and has many foreign contacts.

In accordance with the referenced letter it is understood that only the names and addresses above will be furnished to your field office to be included in its watch list. Any information which you receive regarding shipments to [redacted] and his wife [redacted] would be of interest to this Bureau.

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LW: bjg
(8)
1 - [redacted]
2 - Newark (Info)(117-72)(0-25)

RECORDED - 6 117-268
6 DEC 6
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b7C

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CONFIDENTIAL

DEC 6 1954

CONFIDENTIAL

. D. Harrington
/hitson

117-268

BY COURIER SERVICE

Date: December 3, 1954

To: Mr. Chester A. Emerick (ORIGINAL AND ONE)
Deputy Commissioner, Investigations
Bureau of Customs
Room 7048
Internal Revenue Service Building
Washington 25, D. C.

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SP4 bja/UBac
4-19-00

Subject: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC WEAPONS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES

Reference is made to the letter from the Commissioner of Customs dated January 9, 1952, requesting information concerning individuals, firms or organizations in order that they or shipments with which they are connected may be given more thorough Customs treatment upon arrival in the United States.

b7C

You may wish to consider [redacted] also known as [redacted] who resides at [redacted] New Jersey, and is self-employed at the same address doing business as [redacted] is a [redacted] he is reportedly a former member of the Communist Party and is also reported to be active in the International Workers Order and the Slovak Workers Society. The International Workers Order and the Slovak Workers Society have been cited by the Attorney General of the United States pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

[redacted]

[redacted] has made several purchases of electronic equipment for the Czechoslovakian government. These purchases have included large quantities of electronic tubes. It is assumed they reached Czechoslovakia through diplomatic channels.

b7C

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LW:bjg (8)

1 - [redacted]
2 - Newark (Info)(117-72)(by 0-25)

RECORDED - 6 117-268

DEC 6 1954

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CONFIDENTIAL

In accordance with the referenced letter it is understood that only the names and addresses above will be furnished to your field office to be included in its watch list. Any information which you receive regarding shipments to [redacted] b7C [redacted] would be of interest to this Bureau.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268) DATE: 11/29/54

FROM : SAC, NEWARK (117-72)

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

Re No Number SAC Letter A, Series 1952, dated 1/28/52; No Number SAC Letter U, Series 1951, dated 12/13/51; and No Number SAC Letter F, Series 1951, dated 10/5/51.

It is believed the following individuals should be placed on the Customs Watch List in accordance with referenced Bulets:

(1) Newark file
Bureau file
Name
Residence
Employment
Reason

[redacted] N.J.,
[redacted] N. J.
Subject was born in [redacted] and has a [redacted] Subject's [redacted] Subject has traveled extensively in Europe and has many foreign contacts.

b7C

(2) Newark file
Bureau file
Name
Residence
Employment
Reason

[redacted] N. J.
[redacted] N. J.
Subject and wife closely associated with U. S. and Canadian CP officials and espionage suspects. Wife [redacted]

b7C

(3) Newark file
Bureau file
Name
Residence
Employment
Reason

[redacted] N. J.
Self-employed as a [redacted] at residence
Subject former CP and IWO member and has made several purchases of electronic equipment for Czechoslovakian Government

RGC:AM
Registered Mail

4-7-00 SP4 BJA/LBM

NK 117-72

(4) Newark file
Bureau file
Name
Residence
Employment

[redacted] N. J.
[redacted] N. J.
(operated by father)

Reason
Subject has recently visited Mexico City and has associated with an agent of the Red Chinese Government.

(5) Newark file
Bureau file
Name
Residence
Employment

b7C

[redacted] N. J.
[redacted] N. J.

Reason
Subject believed to be associated with CP members and to be a CP sympathizer. He has traveled extensively between the U. S. and Mexico and may possibly be a courier for the CP.

(6) Newark file
Bureau file
Name
Residence

Employment
Reason

[redacted]
Care of [redacted]
Student
Subject is a member of the Libertarian Socialist Committee, which urges its members to evade the draft, disobey all laws and abolish the family system. The LSC further does not believe in national boundaries, is against Stalinism and imperialism, and has as its objective a society free of individuals. Newark is interested in learning if subject returns to the U. S.

b7C

(7) Newark file
Bureau file
Name
Residence
Employment

[redacted] N. J.
N. J. (own business)

Reason
Subject is very close to the Hungarian Embassy and has had telephone contacts from Baltimore [redacted]

NK 117-72

(8) Newark file
Bureau file
Name

Residence
Employment

Reason

[redacted] N. J.

[redacted] N. J. [redacted] b7C

he favored the former Communist government in that country. He was also reportedly a friend of Communist officials in Guatemala and he has made many recent trips to that country. [redacted] has also traveled in [redacted]

FD-86

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Transmit the following Teletype message to: BUREAU, SAN ANTONIO AND CHICAGO

FBI CLEVELAND (117-58) 11-30-54

DIRECTOR FBI (117-268) AND SACS SAN ANTONIO (INFO) (RM) AND CHICAGO (RM)

URGENT

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC WEAPONS INTO THE U.S.; AEA. RE BU AIRTEL 11-22-54.

FOR INFO OF CG, BUAIRTEL ADVISED AS FOLLOWS: ON 11-19-54 US COAST GUARD HEADQUARTERS, WASHINGTON, INFORMED THE BUREAU THAT DETECTION DEVICE FOR FISSIONABLE MATERIAL BEING FIELD TESTED [redacted] [redacted] REACTED [redacted] THE PRESENCE OF GAMMA RAYS WHEN THE DEVICE WAS APPROACHED BY [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] NO RADIOACTIVE SOURCE WAS DISCOVERED IN HER LUGGAGE, BUT NO PERSONAL SEARCH WAS MADE. REACTION OF DETECTION DEVICE SIMILAR TO THAT NOTED PREVIOUSLY IN PORT OF NY WHEN DEVICE WAS APPROACHED BY PERSON WHO HAD TAKEN RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS IN MEDICAL TREATMENT. NO RECORD [redacted] BUREAU INDICES. BUREAU REQUESTED CLEVELAND TO DETERMINE IDENTITY [redacted] IF POSSIBLE WITHOUT DISCLOSING BUREAU INTEREST IN HER OR KNOWLEDGE OF RADIOACTIVITY, ATTEMPT TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER SHE HAS BEEN TAKING MEDICAL TREATMENTS WHICH MIGHT ACCOUNT FOR REACTION. [redacted] [redacted]

b7C

b7C

INDEXED - 86 RECORDED - 86

FILE: jma
117-58

REGISTERED MAIL

Sent ____ M Per ____

Approved: _____
Special Agent in Charge

FD-36

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Transmit the following Teletype message to:

PAGE TWO

[redacted] NOTE DIFFERENCE IN SPELLING OF LAST NAME. [redacted]

[redacted] WAS DISCREETLY INTERVIEWED ON

11-29-54. SHE STATED [redacted] HAS NOT BEEN IN CV FOR SEVERAL YEARS BUT

IS NOW RESIDING IN CG. [redacted] COMMONLY CALLED [redacted] WENT TO CG IN b7C

SEPTEMBER TO MEET [redacted] AND BOTH TRAVELLED TO MEXICO ON VACATION. SHE

ADVISED THAT [redacted] IS A NERVOUS TYPE INDIVIDUAL AND BELIEVED SHE WAS

GOING TO A DOCTOR ABOUT HER CONDITION, HOWEVER, [redacted] DID NOT

KNOW ANY FURTHER DETAILS NOR THE NAME OF PHYSICIAN. SHE DID NOT KNOW

OF ANY ILLNESSES UPON PART OF [redacted] DESCRIBED THE [redacted]

FAMILY AS CONSERVATIVE AND VERY LOYAL INDIVIDUALS. RECORDS [redacted] b7C

HIGH SCHOOL AS PRODUCED BY [redacted] ON 11-29-54

REVEALED [redacted] BORN [redacted] GRADUATED [redacted]

AND TRANSCRIPT SENT TO [redacted] HEALTH RECORD AT SCHOOL

GOOD. [redacted] DIRECTORY INDICATES [redacted] EMPLOYED AS [redacted]

[redacted] AND [redacted] CV. RECORDS [redacted]

[redacted] PRODUCED BY [redacted] ON

11-29-54 INDICATED THAT [redacted] BORN [redacted] b7C

ATTENDED ABOVE COLLEGE FROM [redacted]

[redacted] HER FATHER AND MOTHER BIRTHPLACES LISTED AS [redacted]

FATHER'S OCCUPATION, [redacted]

END PAGE TWO

Approved:_____ **Sent**_____**M** **Per**_____

Special Agent in Charge

FD-36

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Transmit the following Teletype message to:

PAGE THREE

[redacted] CHECKED HER RECORDS ON 11-29-54 AND ADVISED AS OF JUNE 1953 [redacted] RESIDED [redacted] ILL., APT [redacted] AS OF 7-9-49 SHE WAS EMPLOYED AS A [redacted] ILL. [redacted] ADVISED [redacted] WAS PHI BETA KAPPA MEMBER AND HAD PREVIOUS ADDRESS OF [redacted] IN 4-45. PRETEXT CALL TO [redacted] RESIDENCE ON 11-30-54 ELICITED INFO THAT [redacted] DURING LAST THREE MOS. BUT NO [redacted] KNOWN TO HAVE BEEN PRESCRIBED NOR SPECIALIST ENGAGED. FAMILY PHYSICIAN [redacted] TREATED [redacted] CV INDICES CONTAIN NO IDENTIFIABLE INFO RE ENTIRE [redacted] FAMILY [redacted] UACB NO DIRECT CONTACT BEING MADE WITH [redacted] CONCERNING [redacted] IN VIEW INSTRUCTIONS SET FORTH IN REBUAIRTEL. CG REQUESTED TO DETERMINE IF POSSIBLE WITHOUT DISCLOSING BUREAU INTEREST IN HER OR KNOWLEDGE OF [redacted] ATTEMPT TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER [redacted] HAS BEEN TAKING [redacted] IN EVENT CG INVESTIGATION NEGATIVE BUREAU REQUESTED TO CONSIDER RECONTACT USCG TO DETERMINE POSSIBILITY THAT [redacted] INASMUCH AS BOTH WENT TO MEXICO AND PROBABLY BOTH WALKING TOGETHER AT AIRPORT. PERHAPS INTERVIEW OF [redacted]

END PAGE THREE

b2
b7C
b7E

Approved:_____ **Sent**_____**M** **Per**_____

Special Agent in Charge

FD-36

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Transmit the following Teletype message to:

PAGE FOUR

ADVISABLE. NO FURTHER INVESTIGATION BEING CONDUCTED AT CV UACB.

HAWKINS

END

Approved:_____ **Sent**_____**M** **Per**_____

Special Agent in Charge

CONFIDENTIAL

Sanders
Whitson

RECORDED - 4
INDEXED - 4

Date: December 1, 1954

To: Mr. J. Walter Yeagley (ORIGINAL AND ONE)
Chairman
Interdepartmental Committee on
Internal Security
Room 3527
Department of Justice
Washington 25, D. C.

CR 4-7-00 SAM bja LBM

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Per ltr. dtd. 10-7-03
CORR/mc/NCS/bja/DIAL 10-27-03

Subject: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION IN PLACE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

b7C

Attached for your information and consideration is a copy of a communication dated November 11, 1954, directed jointly to the Central Intelligence Agency and to the FBI from Herbert Levine, USNS Pvt. [redacted] (T-AP 184), c/o Fleet Post Office, New York, New York.

Because of the specific interest of the Coast Guard and the Bureau of Customs copies have been designated for those agencies.

Attachment

cc - 1 - Vice Admiral Alfred C. Richmond VIA COURIER SERVICE
The Commandant (Attachment)
U. S. Coast Guard
1300 E Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Attention: Captain John Huppert Stewart
Chief, Intelligence Unit

COMM - FBI
DEC 1 1954
MAILED 20

cc - 1 - Mr. Chester A. Emerick VIA COURIER SERVICE
Deputy Commissioner, Investigations (Attachment)
Bureau of Customs
Room 7048
Internal Revenue Service Building
Washington 25, D. C.

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

LW:bjg
(7)

CONFIDENTIAL

CCs ONLY

November 22, 1954

RECORDED - 4

117

Mr. Herbert Levine
USNS [redacted] (T-AP 184)
c/o Fleet Post Office
New York, New York

b7C

Dear Mr. Levine:

Your letter postmarked November 15, 1954, a copy of which was also directed to the Central Intelligence Agency, has been received. It was most thoughtful of you to bring your observations and suggestions to my attention, and I want to thank you.

Sincerely yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

HEW:lt
(3)

COMM - FBI
NOV 24 1954
MAILED 20

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4-7-00 BY SP4 BJA/lam
Per ltr. dtd. 10-7-03 60267 uc/NLS/B;A/Amm 10/28/03

11 Nov 1954

Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C.

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C.

Gentlemen:

A few months ago, I read an article in a nationally distributed magazine which presented one of your main problems: To prevent suitcase sized atomic bombs from entering the United States.

It seems to me that such an attempt on the part of the Russians would be done on a mass scale as they are accustomed to planning in large, collective terms rather than individual isolated deeds.

Such a plan would have to solve to main challenges:
(1) Getting the bombs into the United States
(2) Placing them most effectively (where they would do the most damage).

I believe Oxygen tanks with false bottoms would solve the two problems, thereby meeting the requirements of a general plan. They are used on foreign and United States Ships, in all military establishments in and of the United States, in hospitals and factories.....

*****

This is an imaginative construction relating to your problem: To prevent suitcase sized atomic bombs from entering the United States. As a citizen and Federal employee, it is also my concern. In the back of my mind, I recall reading that the man who has a monopoly on oxygen making either is a Communist or has contributed heavily to the movement.

My thoughts on this matter may or may not mean anything when put to your tests of the "actual situation". Nevertheless, I feel I should bring this possibility to your attention.

Sincerely yours,

Herbert Levine

b7C

Herbert Levine
USMS PVT [redacted] T-AP 184)
c/o Fleet Post Office
New York, New York

SP4 BTA LBM
4-7-00
Per Htr. dtd. 10-7-03 Lo 267 uc/NLS/bja/pam 10/27/03

RECORDED

ccs: D. J. Parsons
W. F. Woods
L. Whitson

RECORDED-38
EX-130

DECEMBER 3, 1954 AIR-TEL

SAC, BALTIMORE URGENT
(ORIGINAL AND ONE)

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE US. BALTIMORE FILE 117-46. REURLET 11-19-54. ARRANGEMENTS MADE WITH NAVY DEPARTMENT FOR VISIT BY BALTIMORE AGENTS NAMED IN REFLET TOGETHER WITH [redacted] AND [redacted] OF BUREAU LABORATORY TO EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL SCHOOL, INDIAN HEAD, MARYLAND, 10:00 A.M. 12-9-54. b7C

HOOVER

117-268

LW:bjg
(6)

NOTE: Purpose of visit is to ascertain whether Explosive Ordnance Disposal School has educational aids such as photos, charts, etc., which would be of value to Bureau field personnel in assisting in identification of clandestine atomic weapons and to determine whether any new ideas regarding investigation of reports of clandestine atomic weapons can be developed.

Tolson
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Holloman
Gandy

COMM - FBI
DEC 3 1954
MAILED 20

INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4-7-00 BY SP4 BJA/LBM

1 DEC 1 0 1954

RECORDED-38 62-26[illegible]

EX-130

VIA LIAISON

Date: December 1, 1954

To: Chief of Naval Personnel
Bureau of Naval Personnel
Department of the Navy
Arlington Annex
Arlington, Virginia

Attention: Pers C-123

Hand carried to Navy Bureau 12-2-54 [illegible]

From: John Edgar Hoover - Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Confirming the oral request of Special Agent [redacted] of this Bureau, it is requested that arrangements be made for the following Special Agent personnel of the FBI to visit the U. S. Naval Explosive Ordnance Disposal School at the Naval Powder Factory, Indian Head, Maryland, for the purpose indicated by [redacted]

[redacted]

b7C

All of the above men are citizens of the United States and all have been cleared on a need-to-know basis for top secret and atomic energy information.

If convenient, approximately 10:00 A.M., December 9, 1954, is suggested as a tentative time and date with 10:00 A.M., December 8, 1954, as a suggested alternate. If neither of these is convenient to you, I shall be happy to meet your desires in this regard.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-7-00 BY SP4 BJR/LBM

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

IWC:edm
(7)

(See note next page)

Ltr tel to BA
12-3-54 Lwick

5 Copies auth 12-10-54 (62)

NOTE:

As a result of a Bureau request that FBI personnel be permitted to visit U. S. Naval Explosive Ordnance Disposal School, ONI requested that the Chief of Naval Personnel be furnished the names of the FBI personnel involved in order that clearance arrangements might be made. Above letter based on arrangements and information orally furnished by Liaison Agent [redacted] b7C

3-54

WOLFE, LIAISON, SAYS 10 AM [illegible] 54 GOOD FOR [illegible]

LH

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268)

DATE: November 19, 1954

FROM : SAC, BALTIMORE (117-46)

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES

Re Bureau letter November 9, 1954.

The following agents have been chosen to visit the U.S. Naval School, Explosive Ordnance Disposal, Naval Powder Factory, Indian Head, Md., regarding the above captioned matter: SAs [redacted] and [redacted]

b7C

It appears that the most satisfactory time for this visit would be the first or second week of December. Bureau is requested to advise Baltimore when arrangements are complete.

JFF:afp

cc: Personnel files

[redacted] of Laboratory,

b7C

Include [redacted] and

11/26/54 JWC

Ltr. Chief of Naval Personnel 12/1/54 JWC.

RECORDED-38 117-46

INDEXED-38 10 NOV 23 1954

EX-130

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-7-00 BY SP4 BJM/LBM

3 Copies Auto 12-10-54 (62)

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
BUREAU OF NAVAL PERSONNEL
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

IN REPLY REFER TO
Pers-C1235-mbt
Ser: U-153[illegible]4

13 DEC 1954

From: Chief of Naval Personnel
To: Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
U.S. Department of Justice
Washington 25, D.C.

Subj: Authorization for FBI personnel to visit U.S. Naval School, Explosive Ordnance Disposal, Indian Head, Maryland

Ref: (a) Dir, Fed. Bureau of Investigation ltr of 1 Dec 1954

1. In accordance with reference (a), the following Special Agent personnel of the FBI are authorized to visit the U.S. Naval School, Explosive Ordnance Disposal, Indian Head, Maryland for purposes already made known to such school:

[redacted] b7C

2. The above personnel will be expected at the U.S. Naval School, Explosive Ordnance Disposal at approximately 1000, 9 Dec 1954.

Indian Head, Md.

G. M. HAGERMAN
By direction

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-7-00 BY SP4 BJA/LBM

RECORDED-38
INDEXED-38
EX-130

117-268-647

13 DEC 8 1954

SEE AIRTEL BALTIMORE 12-3-54 LW:bjs

53 DEC 14 1954
124
117-268

CONFIDENTIAL

D. Harrington
Tolson

117-268

BY COURIER SERVICE

Date: December 6, 1954

To: Mr. Chester A. Emerick (ORIGINAL AND ONE)
Deputy Commissioner, Investigations
Bureau of Customs
Room 7048
Internal Revenue Service Building
Washington 25, D. C.

DECLASSIFIED BY SP4 BJA/LBm
ON 4-7-00

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC WEAPONS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES

Reference is made to the letter from the Commissioner of Customs dated January 9, 1952, requesting information concerning individuals, firms or organizations in order that they or shipments with which they are connected may be given more thorough Customs treatment upon arrival in the United States.

You may wish to consider [redacted] whose permanent address is [redacted] West Virginia. [redacted] holds United States Passport Number [redacted] issued at Washington, D. C., December 16, 1953, for travel in France, India and Israel. During the Summer of 1954 [redacted] was reported to be living in a [redacted]

[redacted] is a member of the "Libertarian Socialist Committee" which urges its members to evade the draft, disobey all laws and to work for the abolition of the wage system and the family. The "Libertarian Socialist Committee" does not believe in national boundaries and allegedly has its own flag [redacted]

In accordance with the referenced letter it is understood that only the names and addresses above will be furnished to your field office to be included in its watch list. Any information which you receive regarding shipments to [redacted] would be of interest to this Bureau.

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

2 - Newark (117-72)(info)
1 - [redacted]
LW:bjg
(8)

RECORDED - 33 117-268-1
EX-109
DEC 7 1954

CONFIDENTIAL

145

BY COURIER SVC.

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

cc: Mr. V. D. Harrington
Mr. Whitson

CONFIDENTIAL

117-268

BY COURIER SERVICE

G.I.R.-8

Date: December 6, 1954

To: Mr. Chester A. Emerick (ORIGINAL AND ONE)
Deputy Commissioner, Investigations
Bureau of Customs
Room 7048
Internal Revenue Service Building
Washington 25, D. C.

b7C

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

DECLASSIFIED BY SP4 BJA/LBM
ON 4-7-00

Subject: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC WEAPONS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES

Reference is made to the letter from the Commissioner of Customs dated January 9, 1952, requesting information concerning individuals, firms or organizations in order that they or [redacted] shipments with which they are connected may be given more thorough Customs treatment upon arrival in the United States.

You may wish to consider [redacted] also known as [redacted] who resides at [redacted] New Jersey. [redacted] currently operates a cleaning establishment known as [redacted] New Jersey. He has operated other businesses in the past and reportedly has [redacted] was reportedly pro-Nazi during the 1939 - 1941 period, which coincided with the life of the Nazi-Soviet pact.

b7C

[redacted] and his wife [redacted] He reportedly favored the former Communist government of Guatemala and made many trips to that country between the end of World War II and the most recent revolution in Guatemala.

b7C

In accordance with the referenced letter it is understood that only the names and addresses above will be furnished to your field office to be included in its watch list. Any information which you receive regarding shipments to [redacted] or his wife would be of interest to this Bureau.

CONFIDENTIAL

RECORDED - 77

EX-128

DEC 7 1954

145

71 DEC 13 1954

2 - Newark (117-72)(info)
1 - [redacted]

Tolson
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Holloman
Gandy

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

8 DEC 1954 BY COURIER SERVICE

. D. Harrington
Whitson

CONFIDENTIAL

117-268

BY COURIER SERVICE

Date: December 6, 1954

To: Mr. Chester A. Emerick (ORIGINAL AND ONE)
Deputy Commissioner, Investigations
Bureau of Customs
Room 7048
Internal Revenue Service Building
Washington 25, D. C.

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC WEAPONS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES

DECLASSIFIED BY SP4 BSM/LSM
ON 4-7-00

Reference is made to the letter from the Commissioner of Customs dated January 9, 1952, requesting information concerning individuals, firms or organizations in order that they or shipments with which they are connected may be given more thorough Customs treatment upon arrival in the United States.

b7C

You may wish to consider [redacted] also known as [redacted] who resides at [redacted] New Jersey, and who is employed by her father as the [redacted] of the [redacted] New Jersey.

BY COURIER SVC.
DEC - 6

Reliable informants have stated that [redacted] was a member of the Communist Party as early as 1945. The Communist Party has been designated by the Attorney General of the United States pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

A reliable source has stated that during May, 1954, [redacted]

b7C

In accordance with the referenced letter it is understood that only the names and addresses above will be furnished to your field office to be included in its watch list. Any information which you receive regarding shipments to [redacted] would be of interest to this Bureau.

Tolson
Boardman
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Gandy

2 - Newark (117-72)(Info)
LW:bjg

RECORDED-27 117-268
CONFIDENTIAL
DEC 7 1954
145

6 DEC 16 1954

[redacted]

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

In accordance with Bureau instructions, no comments were made concerning any action to be taken by the FBI on the receipt of such notification. The Bureau, however, will be informed promptly of any reports received.

Based upon previous experience in the New York City Office, it will be appreciated if the Bureau will furnish its observations and suggestions concerning the administration of the program with specific reference to whether it may be contemplated that the Bureau would request surveillance operations by San Antonio or the office covering destination of the passengers in certain instances. It is realized that some such persons might have diplomatic status and could not be covered without State Department clearance.

The Bureau will be kept fully cognizant of all pertinent developments.

ccs: Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Sanders
Mr. Roach
Mr. Whitson

SECRET

RECORDED-38
INDEXED-38

December 7, 1954

VIA LIAISON

Mr. J. R. Killian, Jr.
Director
Technological Capabilities Panel
Science Advisory Committee
Office of Defense Mobilization
Washington 25, D. C.

CLASSIFIED BY SPH bjg/lbm
ON 4-19-00

My dear Mr. Killian:

Reference is made to your letter of December 1, 1954, advising that the Technological Capabilities Panel of the Science Advisory Committee had been assembled at the request of the President to study certain problems, including the covert introduction of nuclear or other weapons into the United States and to suggest technical measures which might minimize such a threat. You stated you would welcome any information from the FBI which this Bureau might think important to the work of your panel.

The FBI, separately and as a member of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, has supplied considerable information to the National Security Council on the threat of clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons into the United States and on countermeasures to detect and defend against such introduction. The Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference submits to the National Security Council every six months a status report on the handling of these matters jointly with the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security. It is my understanding that the Office of Defense Mobilization has access to these reports at the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security level as well as at the National Security Council level.

LW:bjg
(7)

117-268

Tolson
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Gandy

SECRET

124
51 DEC 16 1954

You may wish to review the material which has been furnished to the National Security Council to date and thereafter you may desire to specifically request of the FBI additional data. [redacted] the FBI Liaison Representative to the Office of Defense Mobilization, will be available for discussion of such matters with you. b7C

Sincerely yours,

FD-36

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

AIR-TEL

Transmit the following ~~Teletype~~ message to:

FBI, CHICAGO (117-110) 12/10/54

DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268) (AM) (RM)

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS WEAPONS INTO THE U.S.; AEA. RE CLEVELAND AIRTEL 11/30 LAST. ON 12/9 LAST [redacted] b7C [redacted] CHICAGO, WAS TELEPHONICALLY CONTACTED BY SA [redacted] THROUGH UTILIZATION OF A DISCREET PRETEXT AND THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED: [redacted] HER SISTER, [redacted] FROM [redacted] OHIO, AND TWO OTHER GIRLS FROM CHICAGO, NAMELY [redacted] WERE VACATIONING IN MEXICO IN LATE SEPTEMBER AND EARLY OCTOBER LAST. THEY RETURNED TO THE U.S. FROM MEXICO [redacted] NONE HAD BEEN IN MEXICO FOR ANY RADIOACTIVE OR OTHER TYPE HEALTH b7C TREATMENTS. [redacted] REMARKED THAT SHE AND THE OTHER GIRLS WERE IN THE BEST OF HEALTH AND HAD A WONDERFUL TIME TRAVELING RATHER EXTENSIVELY ALL OVER MEXICO. NO INFORMATION CONCERNING ABOVE MENTIONED GIRLS LOCATED IN CHICAGO OFFICE FILES. RUC.

HOSTETTER

JRO:mks

1 - Cleveland (117-58)(Info.)(RM)
1 - San Antonio (Info.)(RM)

RECORDED 13 117-268-

INDEXED - 13

6 DEC 1954

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-7-00 BY SP4 837/LBM

Mr. Belmont

Approved: DSH/w Sent M Per

Special Agent in Charge

51 DEC 16 1954

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE
10/31/03 CLASSIFIED BY 60267 uc/NLS/B;A/PAM DECLASSIFY ON: 25X1 10/31/2028
PER LTR DTD 10/7/03 60267/uc/NLS/B;A/PAM 10/28/03

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

330,299 Review
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 2-17-98 BY SP2 auto/rte

TO : Mr. Belmont

DATE: November 30, 1954

FROM : R. R. Roach

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: METHOD OF HANDLING [redacted] b2
FOR INTENSIFICATION PROGRAM
[redacted] (S) b1

General Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President, advised when interviewed on November 30, 1954, that:

(1) He is not an expert in the field of budget matters and, therefore, can give no advice on the matter of handling the above-mentioned fund.

(2) He believes the fund's identity should be securely concealed.

(3) He feels that any submissions to Appropriations Committees should be true pictures of existing conditions.

(4) He feels the Director's position in the matter is more logical [redacted] (S)

(5) He advocates that the Bureau of the Budget make the final decision in the matter.

(6) He will contact Budget Director Rowland R. Hughes soon to give Hughes his views on the matter.

With reference to the above comments, it is noted that the attached memorandum from Mr. Mohr to Mr. Tolson dated November 26, 1954, b1 b2 set forth the present status in the matter of how the [redacted] should be reported on the "green sheets" by the Bureau to Congress. As you know, there are two views on the subject; [redacted] (S) Mr. Tolson suggested that Liaison contact General Cutler and remind him of the origin of this exchange of funds, particularly that it was on the President's instructions that the funds were made available to the Bureau [redacted] (S) that the Bureau did not request the work; and that it is unfair to the Bureau to show the exchange of funds in such a manner on our 1956 budget estimates as to cause a misrepresentation of the facts and possible security leaks as it relates to the Bureau's intensification program (coverage of Soviets and Satellites in the U.S.).

This morning, accompanied by Special Agent [redacted] of the Liaison Section, I contacted General Cutler and as requested went over with him in detail the background of the funds involved, procedures for transferring, and related matters so that he would have a complete

Attachment
(8)
RRR:mls

1 - Mr. Boardman
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Mohr (sent direct)
1 - Mr. M. P. Callahan (sent direct)
1 - Mr. Sanders
1 - Mr. Roach
1 - Lia. Sect. Tick.

4 add'l cys Budget Unit

RECORDED-42
INDEXED-42

ENCLOSURE

ENCLOSED COPY FILED IN

picture of subject under discussion. I also displayed to General Cutler for his enlightenment sample copies of the green sheets as prepared under the two procedures, [redacted] It (S) was pointed out to General Cutler that notwithstanding the procedure used in reporting the Bureau's 1956 budget estimates, it would be necessary for the Director to explain to the satisfaction of the members of the Appropriations Committees off the record the matter of the funds in question, the reason therefor, and the manner in which these funds were transferred to the Bureau. General Cutler was told that in view of the President's deep interest in the Intensification Program, the Director wanted him to know it would be necessary to give the Appropriations Committees this information. [redacted] (S) b1

General Cutler was further told that it was the Director's belief that the reporting method proposed by the FBI gave more security to the transaction insofar as curious outsiders are concerned [redacted] It was mentioned to him that it is felt (S) [redacted] (S) that now it was not deemed advisable to give less than maximum security to the President's Program while at the same time, [redacted] I pointed out to General Cutler that the procedure (S) requested [redacted] did not present a true comparison picture of our 1955-(S) 1956 budget estimates; that it left the impression, even to curious outsiders, that the Bureau was launching into a new four million dollar program for the fiscal year 1956, which is not true; that such a comparison of figures would immediately give rise to comments by newspaper columnists that new positions (jobs) were in the offing because of such a large program; and that this was an entirely inaccurate picture, it being explained that the program was actually one for the 1955 fiscal year and not a new one intended for the 1956 fiscal year. b1

In reply to General Cutler's inquiry, he was told that the Bureau of the Budget had approved the Bureau's suggested procedure of reporting on the green sheets by letter dated August 10, 1954, but that the Budget Bureau saw fit to reverse itself by subsequent letter dated November 23, 1954.

Upon receipt of the facts in the matter and after carefully reviewing the implications involved in [redacted] (S) General Cutler stated, "I am inclined to agree with Edgar." He further commented that it would appear [redacted] false picture of fiscal (S) year 1956 programs. He stated he was of the firm belief that everything

possible should be done to factually report figures, and comparison of figures, to the Appropriations Committees; that the reporting should be handled in such a manner as to give an accurate picture of the programs in existence, as well as those contemplated, but still not disclose the identity of the transferred funds. Cutler stated he felt it was a matter that should be finally decided by the Bureau of the Budget without favoritism being shown to either side. He concluded by saying he intended to discuss the matter with Budget Director Rowland R. Hughes, at an early date, but he did not indicate that he intended to take a demanding stand one way or the other. General Cutler was of the opinion that this matter should be rediscussed [redacted] FBI, and Budget Bureau. (5) b1

Cutler commented that as a result of his banking experience, it was his understanding that when moneys are moved from one account to another, [redacted] this is considered by those in the business as a "transfer of funds" and should not be misconstrued by any interpretation as a "reimbursement." (5)

ACTION:

The Administrative Division has been orally advised of the results of the interview with General Cutler. In view of the fact that Cutler plans to discuss this matter with the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, the Administrative Division may desire to follow future developments through their contacts at the Budget Bureau.

Done mec 12/2

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

FROM : R. R. Roach

DATE: November 16, 1954

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Papich
1 - Section Tickler

SUBJECT: METHOD OF HANDLING [redacted] FOR INTENSIFICATION PROGRAM [redacted] (S)

b1 ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
b2 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2-17-98 BY [redacted]
330,299 Rev

Reference is made to memorandum from Mr. Callahan to Mr. Mohr concerning the status of the instant matter dated November 10, 1954. It was recommended that the Bureau's Liaison representative advise (S) [redacted] that the Bureau was maintaining the same position, namely, that it was the Bureau's opinion that [redacted] b2 should be itemized as a "Comparative transfer in form of reimbursement from other accounts" in the Bureau's "green sheets." It was recommended that [redacted] the Bureau felt (S) that its method of handling the afore-mentioned itemization was by far the most practical approach from the standpoint of security and furthermore, would minimize the possibility of questions which might be raised concerning the matter. With regard to the security surrounding the handling of this matter, the Liaison Agent was instructed to also point out [redacted] that it would be necessary to comment (S) before appropriate Congressional representatives concerning the additional responsibilities placed upon this Bureau as a result of the Intensification Program and that any comments concerning the subject matter would naturally be in a strictly confidential, off-the-record manner.

On November 15, 1954, [redacted] (S) the Bureau's position as set forth in the preceding paragraph.

(S) A lengthy discussion then ensued [redacted] that the itemization of the [redacted] as a "Comparative transfer in form of reimbursement from other accounts" placed the item in a separate b1 category on the "green sheet", thereby presenting an excellent target b2 for individuals who might be curious concerning the Bureau's budget. [redacted] were of the firm opinion that by spotlighting (S) the item in a separate category the curiosity of outsiders, particularly newspaper columnists, would eventually lead to publicity regarding the transfer of funds [redacted] to the Bureau. [redacted] (S) [redacted] (S)

SJP:lw

1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. Callahan, 5517

EX-125 RECORDED 42

16 DEC 16 1954

13 DEC 14

THREE

CLASSIFIED BY 60267 uc/nls/sja/mm 10/07/03
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Per LTR DTD 10/7/03 60267 uc/nls/sja/mm

ENCLOSURE FILED IN 62-19934-1953

62-90750-

MEMO to Belmont

[redacted] that Bernie Shmid, now with the Department of (S)
Justice and formerly with the Bureau of the Budget, [redacted]
[redacted] and had advised [redacted] concerning the Bureau's (S)
intention to report the item as a comparative transfer. [redacted]
[redacted] (S)

[redacted] stressed the (S)
fact that the Bureau was listing [redacted] item in a separate cate- b1
gory primarily because the Bureau of the Budget had approved of the b2
method and had instructed the Bureau to handle it in this manner by
letter dated August 10, 1954. [redacted] the Bureau (S)
certainly was thinking of security in following the procedure desired.
It was pointed out that it appeared [redacted] was making a mountain out (S)
of a molehill and [redacted] seemed to be exaggerating the (S)
potential exposure of the transfer to the public. [redacted] (S)
if any publicity resulted from the transfer, it would come from a leak
of the information and if there were going to be leaks, they would
develop regardless of how the item was set forth in the "green sheet."
[redacted]

[redacted] that he was stretching his argument to an extreme which did not (S)
make sense and it was again pointed out that if the Soviets did obtain
any information, it was not going to come from "green sheets" but from
leaks in agencies who possessed the classified information. [redacted]
[redacted]

[redacted] This particular remark was directed [redacted] who (S)
apparently had been responsible for following the matter since the
beginning. [redacted] b1
b2
[redacted] (S)

[redacted] left the meeting and [redacted] made some (S)
comments which might shed some light on his reason for concern in
connection with the instant matter. [redacted] (S)
[redacted]
[redacted] (S)

troubles in the future and he fears that if any publicity resulted from the transfer of the funds to the Bureau, [redacted] It was his opinion that if (S) the Bureau combined [redacted] together with items listed under "Reimbursements from other accounts" no questions would be raised [redacted] (S)

During the course of the discussion [redacted] did not make any mention regarding the advantage to (S) be gained by the Bureau if the item [redacted] listed as a comparative transfer rather than being combined with "Reimbursements from other accounts." As you know, under the procedure desired by the Bureau, when the totals of the appropriations for the fiscal years 1955 and 1956 were compared, there would be a two million dollar difference rather than a six million dollar difference. It was felt by the Liaison Agent that if any such line were followed, [redacted] might receive the impression that the Bureau was seeking (S) some special favor.

b1
b2

ACTION:

The above information is being referred to the attention of the Administrative Division. [redacted] It is, therefore, (S) not necessary for the Bureau to take any action at this time until word is received from the Bureau of the Budget.

ERB/kaw

~~SECRET~~

November 23, 1954

Received from Mr. S. A. Andretta copy No. 2 of 6 copies of letter dated November 23, 1954 addressed to Mr. Andretta, signed by Mr. Samuel Broadbent, Chief, Commerce and Finance Division, Bureau of the Budget, [redacted] b1 [redacted] (S)

[redacted] Bright [redacted] (Initial) [redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 10-27-2003 BY SP2 ALM/LP

4/7/00 NLS bja/LBM 60267 Derivative (1)
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X[redacted]
Per ltr. dtd. 10-7-03
60267 uc/NOBja/PKM 10/27/03

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

TO : MR. TOLSON

DATE: November 26, 1954

FROM : MR. MOHR

10/07/03
CLASSIFIED BY 60267 uc/NLS/BJA/PAM
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (1) 10/07/2028
Per LTR DTD 10/7/03 60267 uc/NLS/BJA/PAM 10/28/03

SUBJECT: METHOD OF HANDLING [redacted] FOR INTENSIFICATION PROGRAM [redacted] (S)

b1
b2

PURPOSE:

The purpose of this memorandum is to report the receipt of a letter from Sam Broadbent, Bureau of the Budget, dated November 23, 1954, reversing the Budget Bureau's decision of August 10, 1954, to the Bureau approving the method by which this Bureau desired to treat this item. [redacted] The effect of this is to increase our requested funds for direct appropriation for the fiscal year 1956 [redacted] (S)

330,299 Rec'd
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 2-17-98 BY

b1
b2

BACKGROUND:

In February, 1954, upon the instructions of the President and the Director, a conference was held at the Bureau of the Budget between representatives of this Bureau (former Assistant Director W. R. Glavin and N. P. Callahan), [redacted] and Mr. Bernie Schmid, then of the Bureau of the Budget, at which time funds in the amount of [redacted] to implement our Intensification Program were discussed. [redacted] (S) was agreeable to making funds available to the FBI but the only method by which they could accomplish the exchange of funds would be on a reimbursable basis [redacted] Accordingly, this procedure of exchanging the funds was agreed to since it will be recalled that in view of the delicate nature of the program involved and the fact that the House had already acted upon this Bureau's 1955 appropriation, any supplemental appropriation was out of the question. However, it is pointed out that at that time no mention was made by any of the parties concerned as to the manner in which this item would be reflected in the "green sheets" in connection with the preparation of our 1956 budget request. (S)

b1
b2

4 Attachments
NPC:gt
9

Memo to Belmont 11/30/54

RECORDED-42
INDEXED-42

DEC 16 1954

FBI

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

In July and August, 1954, as a result of discussions with Budget Bureau representatives by the Bureau as to the method of handling this item in connection with the Bureau's 1956 budget request and particularly as to the manner in which it would be set forth on the "green sheet" schedules incident thereto, this Bureau after presenting convincing arguments in connection with handling the matter in the manner suggested, received a letter dated August 10, 1954, from Sam Broadbent of the Bureau of the Budget approving the method desired by this Bureau.

You will recall that in handling the matter in the manner desired by the Bureau when comparing our adjusted funds available for the fiscal year 1955 with our request for the fiscal year 1956, there would be reflected an increase of $2,000,000 as compared to an increase of $6,000,000 which would have otherwise been reflected had we been required to submit the "green sheets" in the manner prescribed by the Budget Bureau regulations in connection with the preparation of annual budget estimates. It was our contention that the method suggested by the Bureau [redacted] (S) maximum security of the program from the curious would be insured by not having the FBI on record for a major increase in its appropriation request for the fiscal year 1956. The Budget Bureau people agreed with b1 this reasoning.

Upon the submission of our formal budget estimates in the manner reflecting only the $2,000,000 increase, an objection was raised [redacted] (S) as to our method of handling this matter and as reported in my memorandum of November 10th, the Bureau of the Budget representatives had advised [redacted] the Bureau of the Budget, if it had to decide (S) the problem, would instruct this Bureau to prepare its "green sheets" in accordance with the method prescribed in a budget circular concerning the preparation of annual budget estimates. The Budget Bureau pointed out they would be forced to reverse their decision of August 10, 1954. [redacted] it was mutually agreed by all that the exchange of funds (S) would have to be handled as a reimbursable item and [redacted] (S)

Pursuant to the recommendations contained in my attached memorandum of November 10th, the Bureau of the Budget was advised that this Bureau would continue to maintain the position which resulted in their letter to us under date of August 10th agreeing to our method of handling the matter. [redacted] that the Bureau felt its position was sound (S) as to the method in which this matter was to be handled and sought b1

(S) agreement as to this method of handling the matter. (S)

CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS:

The above-reference communication from Broadbent of November 23rd reverses his decision in his letter of August 10th. It is still felt the met od desired to be used by this Bureau would precipitate less inquiries than the method prescribed by the Budget Bureau regulations, and although it is indicated by the Bureau of the Budget b1 (S) to the submission of our final budget schedules, the same will be acceptable to the Budget Bureau. (S)

It is pointed out that irrespective of which method of handling this matter on the "green sheets" is concerned, it would be necessary that specific comment on this Intensification Program and the additional funds in connection therewith be pointed out by the Director at Appropriations Hearings incident to our 1956 appropriation request. There are attached for your information the "green sheet" schedules, the first of which reflects the effect of t is action, and thesecond which reflects the manner in which we wanted it handled.

RECOMMENDATION

(S) This I do not recommend. Therefore, I recommend we go ahead and prepare the "green sheets" in accordance with the instructions of the Budget Bureau in their letter of November 23, 1954. b1 b2

Addendum:

I agree with Mr. Mohr that we ought not to be put in the position of (S) However, I suggest that Liaison contact General Cutler, remind him of the origin of this exchange of funds, namely the specific instructions of the President that funds, be secured for the Bureau to intensify its coverage of Soviet and Satellite officials, and point out to General Cutler that, as he knows, the Bureau did not request this work and that it is obviously unfair for the Bureau to be required to show the exchange of funds in such a manner as to give the impression that the 1956 budget estimates of the Bureau are being increased in the amount which the Bureau feels will cause considerable comment and questions which may lead to the disclosure of this intensified activity upon the part of the Bureau, and which, of course the President does not want disclosed.

CT:DSS

Standard Form 3a
(Approved by President June 15, 1923 Revised October 28, 1947)

Type size: 6 point, 22 picas

Use in preparing schedules of obligations accompanying estimates for lump-sum appropriations

Appropriation title: **Salaries and Expenses, Federal Bureau of Investigation**
(O. 130 C. & I. c. flush)

FIRST

SECRET

AMOUNTS AVAILABLE FOR OBLIGATION

	1954 actual	1955 estimate	1956 estimate
Appropriation or estimate	$77,000,000	$78,282,000	$84,874,000
Reimbursements from other accounts	5,774,704	8,161,000	3,470,760
Reimbursements from non-Federal sources	72,057	84,000	60,000
Total available for obligation	82,846,761	86,527,000	88,404,760
Unobligated balance, estimated savings	(-) 8,458	.....	.....
Obligations incurred	82,838,303	86,527,000	88,404,760

Note: Reimbursements from non-Federal sources above are from the proceeds of sale of personal property (40 U.S.C. 481 e).

SECRET

SAMPLE GREEN SHEET REFLECTING CHANGE

REQUESTED BY BUDGET BUREAU

b1

(5)

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10/27/03
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PER LTR DTD 10/7/03 60267 uc/NLS/BJA/AHM 10/28/03

(Mono cast: 21.4) (Mono cast: 7.9) (Mono cast: 7.9) (Mono cast: 7)

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—35804-4

62-116395-2268

Standard Form 3a
(Approved by President June 15, 1923 Revised October 28, 1947)

Type size: 6 point, 22 picas

Use in preparing schedules of obligations accompanying estimates for lump-sum appropriations

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—25804-3

Appropriation title: Salaries and Expenses, Federal Bureau of Investigation
(O. 130 O. & I. c. flush)

SECOND

AMOUNTS AVAILABLE FOR OBLIGATION

	Actual, 1954	Estimate, 1955	Estimate, 1956
Appropriation or estimate	$77,000,000	$78,282,000	$84,874,000
Comparative transfer (in form of reimbursement) from other accounts	.....	4,095,000	.....
Appropriation or estimate adjusted for comparative purposes	77,000,000	82,377,000	84,874,000
Reimbursements from other accounts	5,774,704	4,066,000	3,470,760
Reimbursements from non-Federal sources	72,057	84,000	60,000
Total available for obligation	82,846,761	86,527,000	88,404,760
Unobligated balance, estimated savings	(-) 8,458	.....	.....
Obligations incurred	82,838,303	86,527,000	88,404,760

Note: Reimbursements from non-Federal sources above are from the proceeds of sale of personal property (40 U. S. C. 481 e).

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED BY [redacted] DATE 12-22-98 BY [redacted]

SAMPLE GREEN SHEET REFLECTING FIGURES DESIRED BY FBI

(Mono cast: 21.4) (Mono cast: 7.9) (Mono cast: 7.9) (Mono cast: 7)

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. MOHR

DATE: November 10, 1954

4/7/00 NLS/bja/LAM 60267 derivative

FROM : N. P. CALLAHAN

Per ltr. dtd. 10-7-03 60267 uc/NLS/bja/LAM 10/29/03

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: METHOD OF HANDLING [redacted] FOR [redacted] b1 b2

[redacted] (S)

The purpose of this memorandum is to advise of current developments in connection with the method of reflecting the above amount on our formal budget "green sheets" [redacted] (S)

b1
b2

BACKGROUND

You will recall that during the latter part of July and the first of August after considerable contacts with the Bureau of the Budget, it was determined, based on a letter from the Bureau of the Budget dated August 10, 1954, that the Bureau would be permitted to reflect the sum [redacted] in its formal "green sheets" as a comparative transfer in form of reimbursement from other accounts in the 1955 column. Thus, when the totals of the appropriations for the fiscal years 1955 and 1956 were compared there would be a $2,000,000 difference rather than a $6,000,000 difference. A copy of the "green sheet" reflecting proposed method of handling attached.

[redacted]

b1

[redacted] (S)

After talking to Eigenmann the writer received a call from [redacted]

[redacted] (S)

Attachment

RECORDED-42

NPC:gt

61 DEC 16 1954

[redacted] (S)

b1

[redacted] (S)

[redacted]

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. It is recommended that the Bureau continue to maintain the position it assumed in the Summer [redacted] i.e. to continue to reflect the item in the "green sheets" in the manner originally proposed and which the Bureau of the Budget gave approval to in its letter of August 10, 1954. (S)

b1

2. If the above is approved it is recommended that the Bureau's liaison representative contact Mr. Dulles, Director of CIA, directly and apprise him of the Bureau's position in connection with this item, pointing out that it is the Bureau's opinion that the manner in which it is proposed to handle this matter is by far the most practical approach both from the standpoint of security [redacted] (S) and further, it minimizes the possibility of questions being raised in connection therewith. He should also point out to Mr. Dulles that of necessity it would be necessary to comment concerning the additional

responsibilities placed upon this Bureau as a result of the Intensification Program and make particular point of the fact that any comments concerning this subject matter would naturally be in a strictly confidential, off-the-record manner.

3. It is also recommended that representatives of the Administrative Division reiterate its position to the Budget Examiners at the Bureau of the Budget.

Memo for Belmont
from Branigan

b2
b7E

[redacted]

The advisory group was of the opinion that research in radiographic devices should continue but that the equipment now under development is not particularly adaptable to the needs of Customs or Coast Guard. The advisory group also requested that AEC consider the possible use of the heavy passive detection device on a fork lift or a "cherry picker" so that it could examine stacked cargo.

The advisory group pointed out that when portable devices are available they can be used on military and civilian U. S. Government personnel and their dependents returning to the United States from abroad. At the present time these people come in without Customs search because no duty is charged them.

Customs and Coast Guard representatives raised a question regarding budgeting for repairs and replacements on detection devices now being operated. It was suggested that if they had any budgetary problems they could (a) discuss it with the appropriate Treasury budgeting officer or (b) discuss it with the Bureau of the Budget representative in liaison with the ICIS to which committee Treasury belongs.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is respectfully recommended that the foregoing be brought to the attention of the working committee of the IIC for their information. No Bureau or IIC position is necessary at this time on the matters discussed.

OK

Standard Form 2a
(Approved by President June 16, 1943
Revised October 28, 1947)

Type size: 6 point, 22 picas

Use in preparing schedules of obligations accompanying estimates for lump-sum appropriations

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—36804-3

Appropriation title: Salaries and Expenses, Federal Bureau of Investigation
(O. 130 O. & L. c. flush)

AMOUNTS AVAILABLE FOR OBLIGATION

	Actual, 1954	Estimate, 1955	Estimate, 1956
Appropriation or estimate	$77,000,000	$78,282,000	$84,874,000
Comparative transfer in form of reimbursement from other accounts	.....	4,095,000	.....
Appropriation or estimate adjusted for comparative purposes	77,000,000	82,377,000	84,874,000
Reimbursements from other accounts	5,774,704	4,066,000	3,470,760
Reimbursements from non-Federal sources	72,057	84,000	60,000
Total available for obligation	82,846,761	86,527,000	88,404,760
Unobligated balance, estimated savings	(-) 8,458	.....	.....
Obligations incurred	82,838,303	86,527,000	88,404,760

Note: Reimbursements from non-Federal sources above are from the proceeds of sale of personal property (40 U. S. C. 481 e).

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 3-11-80 BY SP2 STP

(Memo cost: 21.4) (Memo cost: 7.9) (Memo cost: 7.9) (Memo cost: 7)

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: December 13, 1954

FROM : SAC, Minneapolis (117-0-21)

SUBJECT: [redacted] b7C
[redacted] North Dakota
RESEARCH (Crime Records)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-7-80 BY SP4 Gtm/Gm

EX-24 ROC.

ReBu correspondence concerning this matter dated 12/2/54.

On December 10, 1954, Chief of Police HAROLD STENSCHOL, Valley City, North Dakota Police Department, advised that [redacted] had been, for many years, [redacted] with [redacted] and had been dismissed under mysterious circumstances by that service several years ago. Chief STENSCHOL further related that he has personally been b7C acquainted with [redacted] all of his life and the whole family is known to be somewhat [redacted] and of [redacted] Chief STENSCHOL stated that one of [redacted]

Chief STENSCHOL further related that his observation has been that members of [redacted] seem to be mentaly stable while young but on growing older, their mental facilities seem to deteriorate. Chief STENSCHOL stated further that [redacted] is, at the present, [redacted] and that it is quite possible that he [redacted]

Chief STENSCHOL concluded by advising that [redacted] has, on b7C numerous occasions in the past, made complaints to him regarding the city administration and petty violations of traffic laws by others and attempted to advise him as to how the police department should conduct its investigations.

[redacted] North Dakota, was interviewed on December 10, 1954, at which time he advised he [redacted]

RECORDED-42 117-268 657

INDEXED-42

DEC 16 1954

GGP:pwg
(3)

Follow-up killed in Crime Records

immediate superiors, and the [redacted] in general.

In concluding, [redacted] requested the interviewing agent to accompany him on a tour of the various ports of entry on the Canadian border, which was declined and at which time, the Bureau's jurisdiction in matters regarding internal security were explained and that personal grievances against various agencies of the United States Government should be called to the attention of the department heads of those agencies. [redacted] related that he understood the Bureau's responsibility regarding the internal security of the United States but that he was going to make his proposed trip to the Canadian border by himself and that if he observed anything further, he would advise the SAC at Minneapolis, Minnesota. b7C

At this point, it was firmly impressed upon [redacted] that any action he took was his own personal affair but that he was not to consider himself associated in any degree with the FBI and that the interviewing agent and the Bureau wanted it thoroughly understood that any action he did take was in his own behalf and not at the request, suggestion or interest of the FBI. [redacted] advised that he thoroughly understood that the Bureau was not to be implicated in any way by him in whatever he did in the future but that should he find anything that he thought would be of interest to the Bureau, he would make that knowledge available. b7C

RECORDED-92
117-268

VIA LIAISON

Date: December 16, 1954

To: Chief of Naval Personnel
Bureau of Naval Personnel
Department of the Navy
Arlington Annex
Arlington, Virginia

Attention: Pers C-123

From: John Edgar Hoover - Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

On December 9, 1954, five Special Agents of this Bureau visited the U. S. Naval School, Explosive Ordnance Disposal, Indian Head, Maryland.

The purpose of this visit was to obtain material, including visual aids, which would be of assistance to this Bureau in investigations relating to the surreptitious entry of atomic bombs or components into the United States.

Preliminary arrangements at the U. S. Naval School were handled at Indian Head, Maryland, by Commander [redacted] and then our Agents were instructed by Lieutenant [redacted] Lieutenant [redacted] USMC [redacted] and AO1 [redacted] b7C

The fine spirit of cooperation and the efforts of these men in presenting a well-planned lecture and demonstration program are appreciated by this Bureau.

While at the Naval School at Indian Head, Maryland, our representatives took notes which we would appreciate having so that the information from this trip could be promulgated on a need-to-know basis to other Special Agents of the FBI. It is pointed out that these notes relating to the lectures were classified top secret and were left at the U. S. Naval School, Indian Head, Maryland, in compliance with the existing security regulations.

It would be further appreciated if copies of the visual aids charts employed at the Naval School, Indian Head, Maryland, could be obtained to supplement the notes.

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ON 4-7-00

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1 DEC 30 1954

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Parsons

DATE: 12/16/54

FROM : Mr. Beach

Tolson
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Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
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Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES

On December 9, 1954, the following Special Agents visited the U. S. Naval School, Explosive Ordnance Disposal, Indian Head, Maryland:

[redacted] Number One Man, FBI Laboratory
[redacted] FBI Laboratory
b7C [redacted] Baltimore Office
[redacted] Baltimore Office
[redacted] Baltimore Office

The purpose of this visit was to determine what additional materials, including visual aids, this school might have which would be of assistance to the Bureau in connection with the above-entitled matter.

b7C

Arrangements at the school were made by Commander [redacted] and instructions on the theory of atomic and thermo-nuclear weapons were presented in lecture form by Lt. [redacted] Lt. [redacted] discussed the theory by the implosion and gun type weapon and specifically explained the use of the initiator, nuclear material, tamper and detonator. Lt. [redacted] also discussed the primary and secondary components of the thermo-nuclear weapons. GMC [redacted] discussed the electronic components of the bomb and further demonstrated the operation of an electronic detonator. AOl [redacted] discussed the smaller type bomb of the gun type which possibly could be surreptitiously brought into the United States for the purpose of clandestine attack. Lt. [redacted] took the Agents on a tour of the school to view the atomic weapons of the type manufactured during the last five years in the United States. Both the gun and implosion type weapon were viewed by the Agents.

Inasmuch as the material discussed at the Naval School was classified top secret, the notes made by the Agents during the lectures were collected to be filed at the school. Lt. [redacted] advised that it would be possible to obtain these notes if appropriate clearance could be obtained from the Department of the Navy.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that the attached letter be forwarded to the Chief of Naval Personnel. Same letter thanks the Navy Department for their cooperation with the Bureau and requests that the notes of the Special Agents and copies of the visual aids used at Indian Head, Maryland, be forwarded to the Bureau.

RECORDED 92
INDEXED 92

Attachment
117-268
(6 copies)
JMC:mcl

117- HQ-268 658

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: September 28, 1954

FROM : W. A. Branigan

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION IN PLACE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

The Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures was given briefings and demonstrations on 9-27-54 at the Naval Research Laboratory and at the Naval Ordnance Laboratory.

At the Naval Research Laboratory, [redacted] b2 b7E

[redacted]

At the Naval Ordnance Laboratory the briefing and demonstration was of [redacted] This might be useful in processing luggage or small items of cargo [redacted]

RECORDED-140

The same comment applies to the [redacted] by the Naval Reserach Laboratory.

LW:bjg

Attachments (5)

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Memo for Belmont

RECOMMENDATION:

There are attached copies of an unclassified dissertation on the X-ray device for the IIC files and the IIC Agency files.

It is respectfully recommended that the foregoing be brought to the attention of the IIC agencies and that they be requested by the Executive Secretary of the IIC to indicate a preferred date and alternative date for demonstrations of the detection devices. The FBI position should be that a demonstration of the portable passive detector is not only desirable but necessary. However, the X-ray radiographic detector would be of only limited use, if any, to t he IIC agencies.

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117-267-616

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF ORDNANCE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

FPBadin/mja/71652

IN REPLY REFER TO: JB/AUG 50208

9 DEC 1954

ORDHO

SUBJECT: Explosive Ordnance Disposal

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington 25, D. C.

Attached for your information and retention are two copies of a recent Department of Army letter outlining the Explosive Ordnance Disposal responsibilities of Continental Army Commanders.

FOR THE CHIEF OF ORDNANCE:

ELI E. WHITE
Col, Ord Corps
Assistant

1 Incl
DA ltr, 10 Nov 54,
AGAC-C (M) 471
(5 Oct 54) ORDHO
(in dupe)

NO FBI ACTION NECESSARY. ENCL ON PAGE 4 ITEM 6a POINTS OUT INVESTIGATIVE JURISDICTION OF FBI.
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51 DEC 30 1954

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

AGAC-C (M) 471 (5 Oct 54) ORDHO 10 November 1954

SUBJECT: Clarification and Delineation of Explosive Ordnance Disposal Responsibilities of Continental United States Armies

TO: Commanding Generals
Continental Armies

1. References.

a. AR 755-145, Definition of Responsibilities for Explosive Ordnance Disposal, as changed.

b. AR 75-15, Responsibilities for Explosive Ordnance Disposal, as changed.

c. FM 9-40, Explosive Ordnance Reconnaissance and Disposal, March 1953.

d. DA Circular 83, 18 September 1953, Explosive Ordnance Disposal Personnel.

e. SR 380-150-30, Foreign Atomic Devices and Component Parts.

2. General.

a. Reference 1a outlines explosive ordnance disposal responsibilities within the Department of Defense.

b. Reference 1b outlines explosive ordnance disposal responsibilities within the Department of the Army.

c. Reference 1c outlines present Department of the Army policies and procedures relative to explosive ordnance disposal organization, administration, and operations.

d. Reference 1d outlines requirements for training certain explosive ordnance disposal officers and supervisory noncommissioned officers in special weapons disposal techniques.

e. Reference 1e outlines information about atomic weapons which may be disclosed to military and civilian personnel of the Army establishment for explosive ordnance reconnaissance purposes.

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[redacted] b2

6th INTERIM REPORT

27 September 1954

Prepared by:

[redacted] b7C

U. S. NAVAL ORDNANCE LABORATORY
White Oak, Silver Spring, Md.

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DATE 4-7-00 BY SDM bjp/PAM
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3. Purpose.

a. Pending revision of references 1a and 1b, the information contained herein is published for the purpose of clarifying and delineating explosive ordnance disposal responsibilities of Continental United States Armies, and outlining standardized procedures for achieving uniformly efficient explosive ordnance disposal service under existing directives.

4. Responsibilities of Continental United States Army commanders:

a. Conduct the explosive ordnance disposal field operations delegated to the Department of the Army by AR 755-145.

b. Develop a complete explosive ordnance disposal program within assigned areas and coordinate this program with Civil Defense and other local municipal, state, and Federal Government agencies. Such program will include:

(1) Establishment and maintenance of a unified explosive ordnance disposal organization under centralized operational control.

(2) Establishment and operation of an incident reporting system, and coordination of this system with Civil Defense and other local municipal, state, and Federal Government agencies.

(3) Provision for continuous explosive ordnance reconnaissance training of all active and reserve components of the Army located within assigned areas.

(4) Provision of planning, training, and technical assistance to civil agencies in explosive ordnance reconnaissance programs to assure timely transmission to the military of reports of explosive ordnance incidents.

(5) Insuring that personnel assigned to explosive ordnance disposal operations are technically qualified in their MOS by successful completion of basic, advance (including atomic weapons), periodic refresher, and specialized disposal courses approved by the Department of the Army; and by field experience in actual disposal operations.

(6) Acting as principal local Department of Defense representative to deal with other government agencies in the disarming of atomic weapons introduced into the CONUS by stealth or clandestine means, within assigned areas.

(7) Provision of assistance to other departments at the lowest possible echelon, when requested, and assistance to local civil authorities in the event of civil disaster involving explosive ordnance. Coordination with appropriate Navy and Air Force commanders for:

(a) Participation by the Navy and Air Force in explosive ordnance disposal programs.

(b) Emergency employment of Navy and Air Force explosive ordnance disposal units and personnel.

(8) Assistance in developing standard procedures and uniform agreements on explosive ordnance disposal matters of joint interest to more than one CONUS Army or civilian agency.

(9) Coordination of explosive ordnance disposal activities with commanders of adjoining CONUS Armies to facilitate emergency use of explosive ordnance disposal units, personnel, and incident reporting facilities within the means available.

(10) The explosive ordnance disposal responsibilities outlined herein do not include the responsibility for disposal of nonatomic (conventional) sabotage devices for which local civil authorities are responsible.

5. To assure rapid dissemination of render-safe procedures and exploitation of new or unknown items of foreign explosive ordnance encountered by CONUS Army EOD units in the field the following procedure will be utilized:

a. Prepare a written on-the-spot memorandum which includes a description of the item, photographs and drawings, the location where encountered, and the circumstances surrounding the incident. This written memorandum will be placed in the custody of a reliable person, who is at a safe distance from the item, with forwarding instructions in case of an explosion, prior to attempting to render the item safe or destroying it in place.

b. Attempt to render the item safe.

c. If the item cannot be rendered safe or removed, destroy it in such a manner as to minimize the resultant damage.

d. Add to the written memorandum outlined in subparagraph a above, the recommended tentative render-safe procedure or disposal instructions. This information must be added step-by-step, as the render-safe operation proceeds.

e. Prepare a teletype or radio report which includes a description of the item, location where encountered, circumstances surrounding the incident, and the recommended tentative render-safe procedure or disposal instructions.

f. Forward this report through CONUS Army headquarters, ATTN: Ordnance Officer, to:

(1) Chief, Bureau of Ordnance (Re2e)
Department of the Navy
Washington 25, D. C.

(2) Commanding General
Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md.
ATTN: EOD

(3) Commander, Air Materiel Command
Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio
ATTN: MCSQM

(4) Information copies of this report will be furnished the command G2 and the local ordnance technical intelligence staff officer.

g. An advance copy of complete official reports on new and unknown foreign explosive ordnance will be air mailed to the addresses shown in subparagraph f above.

h. An unknown item, which has not had technical evaluation, when recovered by an Army explosive ordnance disposal organization in the field, will be turned over to the Army ordnance technical intelligence unit in the field for disposition in accordance with technical intelligence regulations.

6. Upon determination that an atomic explosive ordnance incident exists the following government agencies will be notified:

a. The nearest office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which will make investigation into the circumstances surrounding the incident, under provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and the National Security Council Program. The telephone number of the Federal Bureau of Investigation is listed in the front of all commercial telephone directories.

b. The Atomic Energy Commission, so that Commission representatives may be dispatched to take custody of the components of the inerted or recovered atomic device under provision of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. One of the following offices will be notified:

Atomic Energy Commission
Director of Military Application (or Duty Officer)
Washington 25, D. C.
Telephone: Sterling 3-8000

or

Atomic Energy Commission
Santa Fe Operations Office
Albuquerque, New Mexico
Telephone: Albuquerque 5-8781

c. The name and clearance of the Commission representative will be furnished through security channels. Prior to release of information or material, positive identification of the representative is required. Identification cards alone will not be the sole basis of checking identity.

d. Items turned over to Commission representatives will be recorded on DA Form 447 (Turn-In Slip), giving the best possible description of the item. The identification card number and full name of the representative will be plainly recorded on all copies of the form.

7. In order that commanders of CONUS Armies can fully carry out their explosive ordnance disposal responsibilities, as outlined herein, it is essential that the following responsibilities be vested in the ordnance officer within each CONUS Army area:

a. Planning, training, and operational control of all explosive ordnance disposal activities within respective areas of responsibility.

b. Procurement, employment, utilization, and control of Army explosive ordnance disposal units and personnel.

c. Vigorous and continuous inspection of explosive ordnance disposal activities within respective areas of responsibility to insure:

(1) Over-all proficiency of entire CONUS Army explosive disposal ordnance organization.

(2) Proficiency of individual explosive disposal ordnance units.

(3) Technical proficiency of individuals.

(4) Adequacy and condition of equipment, to include special explosive ordnance disposal tools and equipment.

(5) Maintenance of up-to-date technical files.

d. Establishment of Standing Operating Procedures for liaison and coordination with:

(1) Local explosive ordnance disposal facilities of the Departments of the Navy and Air Force.

(2) Local Civil Defense and other governmental agencies.

(3) Adjoining CONUS Armies.

e. Establishment of a Standing Operating Procedure for using all available communication facilities to expedite the flow of explosive ordnance reconnaissance and disposal information within the Army area.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

JOHN A. KLEIN
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

Copies furnished:
Deputy Chief of Staff for
Logistics
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3
Chief of Ordnance
Chief of Army Field Forces
Commanding Generals
Aberdeen Proving Ground
Ordnance Training Command
President, Ordnance Board
Commanding General
Army Antiaircraft Command
Superintendent
US Military Academy
Chief
Armed Forces Special Weapons
Project

[redacted] b2

6th INTERIM REPORT

Demonstration - Screening Manually Handled Packages

27 September 1954

1. It is the purpose of this demonstration to illustrate the merits and the limitations of an X-ray television inspection system. Such a system comprises an X-ray generator, a fluorescent screen which converts X-ray energy to light energy, and a television camera which converts this light energy back into electrical energy and presents it as information on the television monitor.

2. The subjects of today's demonstration, the packages which are presented X-ray-wise on the television monitor, are all capable of being manually transferred or handled. By this is meant that very large crates and heavy objects are excluded. In order to penetrate and obtain satisfactory X-ray images of very large objects, such as tank cars or shipments that must be handled by fork lift trucks or a hoisting equipment, very high X-ray energies are required. The higher the X-ray energy required the more bulky and expensive becomes the X-ray generator. The X-ray generator has therefore been chosen on the basis of a compromise involving the following considerations: penetrability, cost, dependability, size or bulk, and field coverage.

FBI

INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL SECURITY ICIS-P25/244

2515 Department of Justice, Washington 25, D. C.

November 19, 1954

(y)

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover
Chairman, Interdepartmental
Intelligence Conference

Smuggling Atom Bombs

Dear Mr. Hoover:

For some time the ICIS has discussed the problem of Procedures to be Followed in the Event of Detection of Fissionable Material in Diplomatic Shipments. At its meeting yesterday, the ICIS approved the policy statement set out in the attached proposed letter to the Secretaries of State, Defense, Treasury, the Attorney General, and the Atomic Energy Commission.

We would appreciate advice as to whether there is anything in the proposed letter which is objectionable to the IIC.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ J. Walter Yeagley

J. Walter Yeagley
Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee
on Internal Security

Enclosure

[redacted] 4-7-00 SP4 bjs/sbw

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DRAFT
ICIS-P25/

November 18, 1954

DRAFT LETTER TO STATE, JUSTICE, TREASURY, DEFENSE AND AEC

The subject of procedures to be followed in the event of detection of fissionable material in diplomatic shipments has been under consideration in the ICIS.

In connection with the use of detection devices to disclose fissionable material on the person or in the baggage of a Soviet bloc official, the ICIS has approved the following policy:

> "If the detection device indicates the possible presence of fissionable material on the person or in the baggage of a Soviet bloc official, the local office of the FBI should be notified immediately by a representative of the Bureau of Customs. Neither the Soviet bloc official nor his baggage should be detained in these circumstances. Further action should not be taken, except as the FBI may consider advisable in connection with its responsibilities under the Atomic Energy Act, as amended."

The ICIS requests that this policy be made known to the appropriate persons within your Department (Agency) so that, should an occasion arise to which the policy is pertinent, it will be followed.

The ICIS is continuing its consideration of other aspects of this problem.

Your cooperation in this matter is appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

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4-7-00 SP/bjaffbes

J. Walter Yeagley
Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee
on Internal Security

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1-Orig t
3-IIC m(-s, ONI, OSI)
1-Mr. Boardman
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Section Tickler
1-Mr. Sanders
1-IIC files
1-Pat Coyne

December 17, 1954

VIA LIAISON

Mr. J. Walter Yeagley
Chairman
Interdepartmental Committee on
Internal Security
Department of Justice Building
Washington, D. C.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4/7/00 BY SP4 BJA/LBM
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Dear Mr. Yeagley:

Reference is made to your letter of November 19, 1954, which requested IIC comments on the proposed policy statement concerning procedures to be followed in the event of detection of fissionable material on the person or in the baggage of an official of a Soviet bloc country. Your letter notes that the ICIS has approved the following policy:

> "If the detection device indicates the possible presence of fissionable material on the person or in the baggage of a Soviet bloc official, the local office of the FBI should be notified immediately by a representative of the Bureau of Customs. Neither the Soviet bloc official nor his baggage should be detained in these circumstances. Further action should not be taken, except as the FBI may consider advisable in connection with its responsibilities under the Atomic Energy Act, as amended."

While it is realized that diplomatic problems may be encountered and while it is realized that the detection devices presently being used cannot be completely accurate, the IIC members feel that such a policy would facilitate rather than hinder the introduction of fissionable material into the United States and that it would be a serious threat to the internal security of the United States to allow Soviet bloc officials to enter the United States without

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challenge when the detection devices indicate the possible presence of fissionable material on their person or in their baggage. To adopt such a rigid policy of non-interference would not only provide such officials with a safe method of introducing component parts of an atomic bomb but would in addition allow them to depart from the port of entry before a surveillance, or other measures, could be instituted by the FBI. While a surveillance would provide information regarding subsequent travel and contacts, it would not clarify the question of the possibility of fissionable material being carried on the person or in the baggage of these officials.

The IIC members feel that, if searches were made in those instances where the detection devices indicate the possible presence of fissionable material, the resulting risk of detection would force the Soviet bloc countries to use less secure means of introducing fissionable material or force them to use the diplomatic pouch which presently also offers a secure means of such introduction.

The IIC cannot agree, therefore, that the suggested policy, quoted above, would aid the efforts being made by the responsible departments and agencies in their efforts to prevent the clandestine introduction of fissionable materials or atomic weapons into the United States.

Sincerely yours,

Chairman
Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: December 17, 1954

FROM : L. V. BOARDMAN

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Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF ATOMIC WEAPONS INTO THE UNITED STATES

By letter dated November 19, 1954, the ICIS submitted for IIC comment a proposed policy statement of procedures to be followed in the event the detection devices indicate the possible presence of fissionable material on the person or in the baggage of a Soviet bloc official arriving in the United States. The policy provides merely that Customs should notify the local FBI office and that neither the Soviet bloc official nor his baggage should be detained in these circumstances. This proposal is based on the fact that the detection devices cannot at the present time positively identify fissionable material inasmuch as radium or one or two other substances will also activate the detection devices.

This matter was presented to the IIC Working Committee on November 24, 1954, for study. All factors were considered by the military members of the IIC, and it has now been recommended that the attached letter be forwarded to the ICIS advising that, while it is realized that the detection devices presently being used cannot be completely accurate, it is felt that the policy recommended would facilitate rather than hinder the introduction of fissionable material inasmuch as Soviet bloc officials would not be challenged or a search made when the detection devices indicate the possible presence of such material on their person or in their baggage. The letter notes that such a rigid policy of noninterference would allow these officials to depart from the port of entry before a surveillance or other measures could be instituted by the FBI. It is also noted that, while a surveillance would provide information regarding subsequent travel and contacts, it would not clarify the question of the possibility of fissionable material being carried on the person or in the baggage of these officials.

Attachment

ESS:hke
(5 copies)
1-Mr. Boardman
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Section Tickler
1-Mr. Sanders

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-7-00 BY SP4 BJA/LBM C# 948742/950935/997059

RECORDED - 55
INDEXED - 55

117-268-661

EX-130

FOR APPROVAL SENT DIRECTOR 12-13-54

13 DEC 27 1954

53 JAN 11 1955

117-268

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62-99238-

The letter notes that the IIC members feel that, if searches were made in those instances where the detection devices indicate the possible presence of fissionable material, the resulting risk of detection would force the Soviet bloc countries to use less secure means of introducing fissionable material or force them to use the diplomatic pouch which presently also offers a secure means of such transportation. The letter concludes that the IIC does not agree that the suggested policy would aid the efforts being made to prevent the clandestine introduction of fissionable materials or atomic weapons into the United States. It is believed that the IIC policy should be, as indicated in the letter, that searches should be made where the devices indicate the possible presence of the fissionable material on the person or in the baggage of these Soviet bloc officials and that, if any decision is made to the contrary, that decision should be made by the National Security Council over our stated objection.

RECOMMENDATION:

The attached letter has been approved by the other members of the IIC and Pat Coyne has been advised. If you approve, it is recommended that you sign the letter as IIC Chairman in order that it may be transmitted to the ICIS.



cc Mr. Belmont
Mr. Whitson

DECEMBER 23, 1954 AIR-TEL

SAC, CLEVELAND URGENT
SAN ANTONIO

Bombs or parts, Tube and other weapons of
SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC WEAPONS INTO U.S. AREA. CLEVELAND FILE 117-58.
Destruction into the U.S.

RE SAN ANTONIO TELETYPE TO BUREAU AND CLEVELAND 12/22/54 ADVISING THAT RED SIGNAL ON DETECTION DEVICE FOR FISSIONABLE MATERIAL REACTED IN PRESENCE OF DONALD B. GILLIES, 2460 EDGEHILL ROAD, CLEVELAND, OHIO, WHO WAS ACCOMPANIED BY MORGAN OSCAR EVANS OF CLEVELAND, OSCAR LEE OF SHAKER HEIGHTS AND EDMUND B. WINNING OF SHAKER HEIGHTS, OHIO. RED SIGNAL ON DEVICES OPERATED BY PLASTIC HEAD SENSITIVE TO STREAM OF NEUTRONS ON DEVICES USED IN PORT OF NEW YORK. UNLESS WIRING OF SAN ANTONIO DEVICE DIFFERENT RED SIGNAL WOULD INDICATE STREAM OF NEUTRONS. LAST UNEXPLAINED REACTION BY DEVICE BROUGHT TO BUREAU'S ATTENTION WAS REACTION TO GAMMA RAYS 10/3/54 WHEN THREE GIRLS FROM CHICAGO AND ONE FROM SHAKER HEIGHTS, OHIO, ARRIVED SAN ANTONIO INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT VIA AMERICAN AIRLINES FROM MEXICO. BUREAU HAS NO RECORD OF OSCAR LEE OR EDMUND B. WINNING FROM OHIO. NO REFERENCES IDENTIFIABLE WITH MORGAN OSCAR EVANS OR MORGAN EVANS FROM CLEVELAND AREA. DONALD B. GILLIES SHOWN VARIOUSLY IN COMMUNICATIONS FROM CLEVELAND TO BUREAU AS BEING VICE PRESIDENT OF REPUBLIC STEEL CORPORATION AND MINING CONSULTANT FOR THE REPUBLIC STEEL CORPORATION. REPORT SA [redacted] CLEVELAND, DATED 4/18/42 AT [redacted] IS-M, CLEVELAND FILE 100-6562, HUFILE

b7C

RECORDED 22 117-267-1
EX. - 109
DEC 27 1954

65-27498, SHOWS DONALD B. GILLIES, 2460 EDGEHILL ROAD, CLEVELAND, OHIO, TO BE SUBSCRIBER TO "THE PAMPHLETEER," A MAGAZINE PUBLISHED BY NEDERHOED. NEDERHOED AS WILLEM LOUIS NEDERHOED WITH ALIASES WAS SUBJECT OF REGISTRATION ACT INVESTIGATION, NEW YORK ORIGIN. THIS

(File references: 65-27498-47 (Nederhoed &
100-347907-68 (Marcello)

MAILED
COMM.-FBI

LW: bjg(7)

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
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Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4/26/83 BY SP2 AUG/MLW

REPORT OF SA [redacted] DATED AT CLEVELAND 6/30/50 RE [redacted] b7C [redacted] IS-R, SHOWS THAT [redacted] CONTACTED GILLIES IN HIS OFFICE IN THE REPUBLIC BUILDING ON 6/14/50, CLEVELAND FILE 105-236, BUFILE 100-347907. [redacted] IS A SECURITY INDEX SUBJECT, A [redacted] AND A CONTACT OF SOVIET AND SATELLITE OFFICIALS IN WASHINGTON AND NEW YORK. THE CLEVELAND OFFICE SHOULD COMPLETELY IDENTIFY THE FOUR MEN ARRIVING FROM MEXICO. IN THE LIGHT OF THE PRIOR ACTIVATION OF DEVICE AT SAN ANTONIO BY TRAVELER FROM MEXICO FROM SHAKER HEIGHTS, OHIO, CLEVELAND SHOULD DETERMINE WHETHER THE FATHER OF [redacted] TWO OF THE GIRLS INVOLVED IN THE OCTOBER INCIDENT, HAS ANY CLOSE BUSINESS RELATIONSHIP WITH GILLIES, EVANS, [redacted] OR WINNING. IT MAY BE SIGNIFICANT THAT THE CLEVELAND - SHAKER HEIGHTS AREA HAS BEEN INVOLVED IN BOTH INCIDENTS.

HOOVER

4-22

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
RECORDS SECTION

_____, 1954

☐ Name Check Unit-Room 6523
☐ Attention _____
☐ Service Unit-Room 6524
☐ Forward to [redacted] Ext. [redacted]
☐ Return to
Room 1742

☑ All References
☐ Subversive References
☐ Main References Only
☐ Main_____References Only
☐ Restrict to Locality of Ohio
☐ Breakdown ☐ Buildup ☐ Variations
☐ Exact Name Only
☐ Exact Spelling
☐ Check for Alphabetical Loyalty Form

b7C

SUBJECT [redacted]
Address _____

Localities _____
Birthdate & Place _____

R# _____ Date 12/22 Searcher Initial Jab

FILE NUMBER SERIAL
MR

Files called to Whitson 1730. Delivered 11:30 pen to [redacted] 1742

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4/20 BY SP4 BOA/LBM

4-22

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
RECORDS SECTION

_____, 1954

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☐ Attention _____
☐ Service Unit Room 6524
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☐ Return t

Supervisor _____ Ext. _____

b7C Room 1742

☑ All References
☐ Subversive References
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☐ Main _____ References Only
☑ Restrict to Locality of Ohio
☐ Breakdown ☐ Buildup ☐ Variations
☐ Exact Name Only
☐ Exact Spelling
☐ Check for Alphabetical Loyalty Form

Donald B. Gillies

SUBJECT _____
Address _____

Localities _____
Birthdate & Place _____

R# _____ Date 12/22 Searcher Initial JAL

FILE NUMBER	SERIAL
~~61-3019~~	
~~94-592-32~~	~~30~~, 28
	31, 32
~~61-21880-7~~	
~~65-29698-41~~	
~~100-347907~~	~~76~~, 68

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4-22

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
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☐ Exact Name Only
☐ Exact Spelling
☐ Check for Alphabetical Loyalty Form

SUBJECT Morgan Oscar Evans
Address _____

Localities _____
Birthdate & Place _____

R# _____ Date 12/22 Searcher Initial Job

FILE NUMBER SERIAL

Mr
Morgan
~~100-35[illegible]-10-13~~
~~45-50400-1~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 4/7/00 BY SP4 GJA/LBM

4-22

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
RECORDS SECTION

_____, 1954

☐ Name Check Unit-Room 6523
☐ Attent[redacted] _____
☐ Servic[redacted]
☐ Forwar[redacted]
☐ Return [redacted] Ext. [redacted]

b7C Room 1242

☑ All References
☐ Subversive References
☐ Main References Only
☐ Main _____ References Only
☐ Restrict to Locality of Ohio
☐ Breakdown ☐ Buildup ☐ Variations
☐ Exact Name Only
☐ Exact Spelling
☐ Check for Alphabetical Loyalty Form

SUBJECT Edmund B. Hinning
Address _____
Localities _____
Birthdate & Place _____

R# _____ Date 12:22 Searcher Initial DJ

FILE NUMBER SERIAL

NR

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4/7/00 BY SP4 RJM/LBM

Whitson

December 8, 1954

SAC, NEW YORK

Director, FBI

[redacted] b7C

[redacted]

SM - C

ReNYlet 11-19-54 requesting Bureau authority to interview the subject in accordance with existing instructions and to the Bureau's approval thereof.

In the event subject, who is a general partner in an importing firm in New York City, is uncooperative, you should consider the advisability of requesting the Bureau to refer his name to the Bureau of Customs for inclusion on the Special Customs Watch List in connection with the case entitled, "Smuggling of Atomic Weapons or Parts Thereof into the United States."

[redacted] b7C

LW:bjg
(5)

1 - 117-268

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

121

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INSTALLATION AND PRELIMINARY TEST OF [redacted]
AT THE INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS

I. INTRODUCTORY MEETING

Mr. Flynn and Mr. Gale of the Advisory Group met with representatives of the U. S. Customs, Immigration Service and FBI at the airport, Sept. 21, 1954 to discuss the proposed installation of a [redacted] at the airport. Many subjects involved in the operation were covered including classification of the project, responsibilities of the agencies concerned, a brief description of detector characteristics, publicity, and statistical reports of the operation.. Those present at the meeting are listed on Table I.

II. TRAFFIC

Incoming foreign traffic consists of three American Airlines planes arriving daily from Mexico, 3:55 AM, 11:40 AM and 1:35 PM. An average of about forty passengers and seventy pieces of baggage are carried per plane. In addition, some cargo and mail arrive on these flights, however, at present the search has not extended to this type of traffic.

It was learned that arrivals of diplomats have been less frequent in recent months because of a non-stop flight from Mexico City to New York, N. Y. operated by Air-France.

III. LOCATION OF EQUIPMENT

The equipment was placed within the customs examination area adjacent to the entrance end of the conveyor belt which transports passenger and crew baggage to the examination room. (See attached photographs). The conveyor runs at floor level

Smuggling Atom Bombs.

117-268-

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underneath a long counter, 35 inches wide and 30 inches high, used in customs examinations and runs within a few inches of the detector housing. The speed of the conveyor is such that baggage is within 3 feet of the detector for a period of 3 seconds or within 5 feet for 5 seconds.

By introducing a slight change in the normal examination procedures, so that passengers and crew present their identification papers to the inspector assigned to the device, passengers, crew and their hand carried baggage are channelled by the equipment. This traffic is separated from the detector by the customs examination counter but is within 4 1/2 feet of the device for a minimum of 10 seconds. Further, almost invariably the hand carried luggage is placed on the counter within 3 feet of the detector for this period of time. The above arrangement is believed to be reasonably suitable from a search viewpoint and does not in any way delay the customs examination. For this experimental period 1 detector appears to be adequate for the San Antonio airport.

IV. INDOCTRINATION OF EQUIPMENT OPERATORS

All seven Custom Inspectors assigned to the airport received basic instructions in the use of the equipment as a search device. Three of the inspectors were given training by James Thornton E.T.C., U. S. C. G. in calibrating and adjusting the equipment. These 3 men will transmit reports of the tests to the Advisory Group.

V. OPERATION AND CUSTODY

Equipment commenced operation with the 11:40 Sept. 22 arrival. No alarm signals were obtained during operation through

Sept. 24. A faulty capacitor in the detector head caused interruption of ~~interruptions~~ operations over the first weekend of operation.

The customs examination area in which the detector is placed is open at all times to airline and airport personnel. To furnish security custom seals are used to prevent admittance to critical parts of the desk housing. b7C

VI. COOPERATION

The placement of the detector at the selected location was achieved mainly because of the excellent cooperation of [redacted] American Air Lines, San Antonio, Mr. Walter C. Gunstream, Director, and Mr. J. R. Saunders, Asst. Director of the Airport.

Mr. Guy A. Belzons, Acting Collector of Customs for the district, Mr. H. H. Meiners, Deputy Collector of Customs, San Antonio and the custom inspectors were most cooperative and showed sincere interest in the program.

Mr. William White, Immigrative Service Radio Technician, showed keen interest in the program and is expected to be of great assistance in future equipment maintenance at San Antonio.

VII. ADVISORY GROUP

Two members of the Advisory Group were sufficient to initiate the installation of the equipment and to outline various procedures to be used in the operation. However, these two members believe that a better evaluation of the overall project can be attained if all members of the Advisory Group are assigned to any future installations because of the broader range of interests represented.

TABLE I

Attendees at Detector Installation Briefing Meeting

Guy A. Belzons, Asst. Collector of Customs

H. H. Meiners, Dep. Coll. Customs

Wm. F. Oakes, Inspector of Customs

Wm. T. Bivins, Inspector of Customs

Frank H. Corey, Inspector of Customs

Wallace D. Shorley, Inspector of Customs

W. L. Meuhlhaus, Immigration

William S. White, Immigration (Border Patrol)

S. J. Werner, FBI

Vernon H. Bailey, FBI

S. S. Flynn, Customs, NYC

D. I. Gale, AEC, Wash., DC

E. J. Thornton, ETC, U. S. C. G.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED on envelope
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DATE 4-7-00 BY SP4 BJA/LBM
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
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C# 948742/950935

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DATE 4-7-00 BY SP4 BOM/LBM



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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4-7-00 BY SP4 BJA/LBM

FD-36

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. Boardman	
Mr. Nichols	
Mr. Belmont	
Mr. Harbo	
Mr. Mohr	
Mr. Parsons	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Tamm	
Mr. Sizoo	
Mr. Winterrowd	
Tele. Room	
Mr. Holloman	
Miss Gandy	

Transmit the following Teletype message to: BU

FBI, CLEVELAND (117-58) 12-23-54

DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268)(RM) AND SAC, SAN ANTONIO (INFO)(RM)

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC WEAPONS INTO U.S. AEA. RE SA TEL 12-22-54.

FILES CV REFLECT ONE REF., TO DONALD B. GILLIES IN REPT. OF

SA [redacted] DATED 6-30-50 AT CV ENTITLED, [redacted]

[redacted] IS - R". FISUR OF [redacted] REFLECTED SHE IN CONTACT WITH

DONALD B. GILLIES, MINING CONSULTANT REPUGLIC S TEEL CORP., ROOM

1521, REPUBLIC BLDG., CV, FROM APPROX., 4:30 PM TO 4:45 PM

6-14-50. PURPOSE OF THIS CONTACT UNKNOWN. FOR INFO SA, BS

WAS OO IN [redacted] CASE AND BU REQUESTED INVESTIGATION TO DETERMINE

WHETHER [redacted] ENGAGED IN ANY ESPIONAGE BECAUSE OF HER CONTINUED

CONTACT WITH RUSSIANS OFFICIALS AND OFFICIALS OF SATELLITE NATIONS.

NOTED THAT SHE WROTE SERIES OF ARTICLES IN '49 AND '50 RE

ECONOMIC LIFE IN POLAND, CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND HUNGARY. CV INDICES

CONTAIN NO IDENTIFIABLE INFO RE OTHER NAMES OF GILLIES PARTY

AS SET FORTH IN RETEL. NO INVEST. BEING CONSIDERED CV. UACB.

RECORDED-92 117-268-663

INDEXED-92

RUC.

Mr. Belmont

HAWKINS

CV INSTR TO CONDUCT INVESTIGATION BY AIRTEL 12-23-54 LW

END.

FLE:EKN

(6)

AIRTEL

5-

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-7-00 BY SP4 BSM/LBM

cc Branigan

53 JAN 4 1955

117

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____

Special Agent in Charge

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

DEC 26 1954

TELETYPE

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(2081)

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Sizoo
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

FBI, SAN ANTONIO 12-22-54 5-30 CST EFY

DIRECTOR, FBI, AND SAC, CLEVELAND URGENT

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC WEAPONS INTO U. S., AEA. US CUSTOMS, S. A., INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, ADVISED THAT RED SIGNAL ON DETECTION DEVICE FOR FISSIONABLE MATERIAL REACTED VIOLENTLY APPROXIMATELY TWO P.M. TODAY WHILE CHECKING PASSENGERS ON FLIGHT ONE FIVE EIGHT, AMERICAN AIRLINES FROM MEXICO CITY TO S.A., DL, AND CHICAGO. PASSENGER NEAREST TO DEVICE WAS DONALD B. GILLIES, TWO FOUR SIX NAUGHT EDGEHILL ROAD, CLEVELAND, OHIO, BORN NOV. FOUR, SEVENTY TWO. INSPECTOR W.P. VIVINS, US CUSTOMS, ADVISES GILLIES IS GEOLOGIST WHO FREQUENTLY TRAVELS TO MEXICO, LAST ENTRY DECEMBER SEVEN LAST. GILLIES TOLD VIVINS HE IS MINING ENGINEER AND HAS MADE TITANIUM DISCOVERY IN MEXICO. VIVINS STATES INVOLUNTARY REACTION OF GILLIES INDICATES POSSIBLE AWARENESS OF AUDIBLE SIGNAL ON DETECTION DEVICE. GILLIES ACCOMPANIED BY MORGAN OSCAR EVANS, THREE THREE TWO EIGHT EUCLID AVE., CLEVELAND, OSCAR LEE, THREE THREE ONE SIX CHADBOURNE RD, SHAKER HEIGHTS, OHIO, BORN EIGHTEEN NINETY TWO, AND EDMUND B. WINNING, FWO FOUR ONE NAUGHT FIVE DUFFIELD RD, SHAKER HEIGHTS, BORN EIGHTEEN EIGHTY NINE. VIVINS STATES EVANS, LEE AND WINNINGS WENT TO MEXICO DEC. THIRTEEN AT REQUEST OF GILLIES. ALL FOUR INDIVIDUALS NEVER IN FRONT

END PAGE ONE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-22-75 BY Sgt. Lynn

RECORDED - 18 7-268-66 7:45 PM 12/27/54

50 JAN 10 1955

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AIRTEL CLV 12-23-54 LW

cc Whitson

EX-107 13 DEC 29 1954

Mr. Belmont

Whitson advised erase

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PAGE TWO

OF DETECTION DEVICE AT SAME TIME, AND VIVINS CONJECTURES THEY MAY HAVE MADE ORE DISCOVERY AND CARRYING SAMPLE WHICH WAS PASSED AMONG THEM DURING BAGGAGE AND PERSONAL EXAMINATION. THOROUGH SEARCH OF PERSON AND BAGGAGE REVEALED NOTHING WHICH WOULD CAUSE REACTION. ALL BAGGAGE COMING IN ON PLANE SUBJECTED TO REEXAMINATION BUT FAILED TO CAUSE ADDITIONAL REACTION. SA INDICES NEGATIVE. NO FURTHER ACTION SA UACB. CLEVELAND INFO.

WERNER

EN CORR PAGE ONE THIRD LINE FROM BOTTOM LAST TWO WORDS SHUD BE " EIGHTEEN EIGHTY"

END ACL PLS

WA 6-35 PM OK FBI WA DAF
V
CV OK FBI CV JWM

TU DISC

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Mr. Branigan
Mr. Todd
Mr. Whitson

RECORDED - 15

117-268 - Cable 5

VIA LIAISON

Date: January 6, 1955

To: Captain John A. Waters (ORIGINAL AND ONE)
Director of Security
Atomic Energy Commission
Room 2314, T-3 Building
16th and Constitution Avenue, N. W.
Washington 25, D. C.

~ to Capt. Waters 1-7-55 cmb.

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC WEAPONS INTO THE U. S.
(FIELD TESTING OF PASSIVE DETECTION DEVICE
INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4/18/03 BY SP2 auw/jsp

As part of the field testing program of detection devices for fissionable material being conducted in the ports of New York and San Antonio, Texas, under the supervision of the Coast Guard and Customs, a passive detection device has been set up at the International Airport, San Antonio, Texas. Detection devices of this type are equipped with a plastic head which causes a red light to flash when affected by a stream of neutrons and a sodium iodide head which causes a green light to flash when affected by gamma radiation.

At 2:00 P.M., December 22, 1954, the red signal on the detection device at the International Airport, San Antonio, Texas, flashed in the presence of Donald B. Gillies, 3460 Edgehill Road, Cleveland, Ohio, a passenger on American Airlines Flight 158 from Mexico City. Gillies was accompanied by Morgan Oscar Evans of Cleveland, Ohio; [redacted] Ohio; and Edmund B. Dinning of Shaker Heights, Ohio. The Customs representatives at the International Airport were unable to determine the cause for the reaction of the detection device.

b7C

According to news items in "The Engineering and Mining Journal," and in the "Cleveland Press," of Cleveland, Ohio, the Republic Steel Corporation has acquired what is believed to be the largest deposit of titanium-bearing rutile

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ore in the Western Hemisphere. This deposit, which allegedly contains several million tons of crude ore, is located in the province of Oaxaca in Southern Mexico. Donald B. Gillies is an eighty-two year old steel and mining man, an executive of Republic Steel Company, who is credited with finding the titanium-bearing deposit in Mexico. The persons traveling with Gillies may be identified as follows: The chief engineer for operating mines of the Republic Steel Corporation is M. O. Evans; B. B. Tinning is an Assistant Vice President of Republic Steel Corporation; Oscar Lee is a metallurgist employed by Republic Steel Corporation.

The only other unexplained signal from the detection device at International Airport reported to the FBI occurred on October 3, 1954, when the sodium iodide head reacted as the device was approached by [redacted] whose address was given as [redacted] Ohio, who arrived at the airport on American Airlines Flight 690 from Mexico at 4:00 A.M. that date. No radioactive source was discovered in [redacted] luggage by Customs but no personal search was made. [redacted] was determined to reside at [redacted] Illinois. The [redacted] address is that of [redacted] and [redacted] Inquiries developed no information regarding any medical treatment undergone by [redacted] which would account for the behavior of the device. There is no known connection between [redacted] and the four men from the Cleveland area who arrived at the airport on December 22, 1954. b7C

No further inquiry is being made by the FBI in connection with foregoing reactions of the detection device. Could the Atomic Energy Commission furnish its observations regarding the possible effects of titanium or rutile ore specimens on the detection device? Has any information come to the attention of the Atomic Energy Commission indicating the discovery by Republic Steel interests of radioactive material in Mexico?

cc - 1 - Mr. Chester A. Emerick BY COURIER SERVICE
Deputy Commissioner, Investigations
Bureau of Customs
Room 7048
Internal Revenue Service Building
Washington 25, D. C.

To Emerick 1-7-55 DBS

cc - 1 - Chief, Intelligence Division BY COURIER SERVICE
Coast Guard Headquarters
1300 E Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

T. Capt Stewart USCG 1-6-55 WFW

SECRET

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Transmit the following Teletype message to: BUREAU

FBI, CLEVELAND (117-58) 12-30-54

DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268)

URGENT

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC WEAPONS INTO THE UNITED STATES; AEA. REMY AIRTEL 12-23-54, AND REBUREAU AIRTEL TO CLEVELAND 12-23-54. IN THE COLUMN OF MILT WIDDER (LOCAL NEWSPAPER COLUMNIST), "CLEVELAND PRESS" (LOCAL DAILY NEWSPAPER), DATED 12-24-54, IT WAS NOTED THAT WIDDER GAVE THE "HALO OF THE WEEK" TO DONALD R. GILLIES, WHOM HE DESCRIBED AS THE 82 YEAR OLD STEEL AND MINING MAN WHO BROUGHT HONOR TO HIS COMMUNITY, HIS COMPANY AND HIMSELF BY MAKING A RICH TITANIUM FIND IN MEXICO. WIDDER FURTHER DESCRIBED GILLIES AS CANADIAN-BORN CLEVELANDER WHO HAS BEEN A LEADER IN THIS COMMUNITY, FIRST AS PRESIDENT OF THE CORRIGAN-MC KINNEY STEEL CO., WHICH 20 YEARS AGO BECAME PART OF THE PRESENT REPUBLIC STEEL CO. AND IN WHICH GILLIES HAS SERVED AS AN EXECUTIVE. THE JUNE, 1954 EDITION OF THE ENGINEERING AND MINING JOURNAL CONTAINED A NEWS BRIEF ON PAGE 125, WHICH REVEALED THAT THE REPUBLIC STEEL CORP. ANNOUNCED ACQUISITION OF WHAT WAS BELIEVED TO BE THE LARGEST DEPOSIT OF TITANIUM BEARING RUTILE IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE. THIS ARTICLE POINTED OUT THAT THE DEPOSIT WAS LOCATED IN THE PROVINCE OF OAXACA IN SOUTHERN MEXICO ABOUT 30 MILES FROM PORT ANGELO, AND WAS SAID TO CONTAIN SEVERAL

RECORDED - 15 117-268-665

INDEXED - 15 13 JAN 10 1955

FLE:sib (6) REGISTERED MAIL

cc: 2 - San Antonio (RM)

EX-104

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____

Special Agent in Charge

AIR TEL

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Sizoo
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

BRANIGAN

Mr. Belmont

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-7-80 BY SP4 BTM/lcn

FD-36

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Transmit the following Teletype message to:

PAGE TWO

MILLION TONS OF CRUDE ORE IN VARIOUS GRADES. THE MAY, 1954 ISSUE OF "CLEVELANDER," PUBLISHED BY CLEVELAND CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, CONTAINED COMPLETE ROSTER OF MEMBERS OF CV CHAMBER OF COMMERCE. IT WAS NOTED THAT M. O. EVANS WAS LISTED AS A MEMBER AND HIS OCCUPATION, AS CHIEF ENGINEER, MINES OPERATING, REPUBLIC STEEL CORP. THE ABOVE ROSTER ALSO LISTED E. B. WINNING AS A MEMBER AND AS ASST. VICE-PRES., REPUBLIC STEEL CORP. THE 1954 SHAKER HTS. DIRECTORY LISTS [redacted] AS A METALURGIST AND EMPLOYED REPUBLIC STEEL CORP. AS NOTED IN MYAIRTEL DATED 12-23-54, THE CLEVELAND OFFICE INDICES CONTAIN NO IDENTIFIABLE INFO RE EVANS, WINNING OR [redacted] WHEN PREVIOUSLY INTERVIEWED RE THE HUDGEON INCIDENT, HAD ADVISED THAT [redacted] FATHER OF [redacted] WAS A RETIRED BUILDING CONTRACTOR. IN VIEW OF THIS LATTER INFO, THERE IS NO REASON TO BELIEVE OR SUSPECT THAT [redacted] HAS ANY CLOSE BUSINESS RELATIONSHIP WITH GILLIES, EVANS, [redacted] OR WINNING, INASMUCH AS ALL OF THESE LATTER INDIVIDUALS ARE ASSOCIATED WITH REPUBLIC STEEL CORP. NO FURTHER INVES. IS BEING CONSIDERED BY CLEVELAND, UACB. RUC.

b7C

HAWKINS

Approved:_____ Sent_____M Per_____

Special Agent in Charge

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: January 17, 1955

FROM : W. A. Branigan

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION IN PLACE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

(SMUGGLING)

At 10:45 A.M. 1-17-55 Commander B. P. Clark, U. S. Coast Guard, Chairman of the advisory group in charge of field testing detection devices for fissionable material, phoned the Bureau. Commander Clark stated that the advisory group's report on detection devices is finished. The recommendations which have been included in the report regarding national coverage at ports of entry by means of various kinds of detection devices were unanimous within the advisory group. Clark stated that the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security is reproducing the report for dissemination to the Joint IIC - ICIS Committee as well as to the parent committees.

Clark said the advisory group would be available to discuss with the Joint IIC - ICIS Committee the details of the report, but that both Flynn of Customs and Tripp of Immigration were now assigned to New York City and the ICIS would probably have to make a request of their respective agencies to get them down to Washington for a half-day consultation.

Supervisor Whitson told Commander Clark that the Joint IIC - ICIS Committee would take that matter up with ICIS through the ICIS representative on the Joint Committee when the report had been read through.

RECOMMENDATION:

None. For your information. When the report is received it will be analyzed.

LW:bjg
(5)

ccs: Mr. Belmont
Mr. Branigan
Mr. Sanders
Mr. Whitson

EX-110

RECORDED - 43 77-268-667

18 JAN 20 1955

58 JAN 25 1955

5 - White

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-7-00 BY SP4 EJM/LBM

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
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Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: January 12, 1955

FROM : A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: ~~SMUGGLING~~ Atom Bombs OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES

In connection with the Joint Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference - Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security project regarding countermeasures, the Atomic Energy Commission was requested July 27, 1954, on the occasion of a fusion weapon (H-bomb briefing) to furnish written descriptions of fusion weapon components for appropriate dissemination.

Similar descriptions of atomic weapons on a restricted data basis were furnished to the field offices of the Bureau by SAC Letter 53-F November 3, 1953. An unclassified version of the atomic component information was furnished to all duly-constituted law enforcement agencies of the U. S. in an enclosure to the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin for January 1, 1954.

Under date of January 6, 1955, the Honorable Lewis L. Strauss, Chairman of AEC, furnished to the Director as Chairman of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, a classified memorandum containing secret, restricted data on fusion weapon components as well as a tentatively unclassified description. When the National Security Council approves the issuance of the unclassified description, appropriate dissemination to law enforcement agencies will be arranged. There is no reason, however, why both memoranda should not be given to our field offices immediately.

The descriptive memoranda have been placed on the agenda of the Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures in order that a letter of recommendation for dissemination can be prepared for transmittal to the National Security Council.

RECOMMENDATION: EX-125 RECORDED - 86 117-268-668

There is attached for approval a No Number SAC Letter transmitting the contents of the memoranda to the field with the caution that they should not be discussed outside the FBI at this time.

JAN 19 1955

LW:bjg
(5)
64 JAN 28 1955
Attachment Letr 1-18-55
ccs: Mr. Boardman Mr. Branigan
Mr. Belmont Mr. Whitson

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-7-00 BY SP4 BCM/bcm

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 66-8603-- 62-85205-- 62-85205-

Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: January 21, 1955

FROM : W. A. Branigan

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: PROPOSED SECURITY LEGISLATION
OSMUGGLING ATOM Bombs

Reference is made to the attached copies of correspondence between the Attorney General and the Vice-President and Speaker of the House of Representatives, transmitting a proposed bill to provide for rewards for information concerning the illegal introduction into the United States, or the illegal manufacture or acquisition in the United States, of special nuclear material and atomic weapons.

This bill is the bill which was passed by the House of Representatives, H.R. 10203, 83rd Congress, 2nd Session, but which failed to pass the Senate. This bill is not objectionable to the Bureau since it does provide a means for obtaining information regarding clandestine atomic weapons.

The bill differs in some respects from H.R. 78, 84th Congress, 1st Session, which was introduced by Representative Cole, January 5, 1955, and which was similar in phraseology in the one originally introduced in the 83rd Congress. The Bureau would have no objection to either bill, since both seek to put into effect the recommendations of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security as approved by the National Security Council and the President.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-7-00 BY SP4 [illegible]

RECOMMENDATION:

None. For your information.

RECORDED - 43 117-268-669

JAN 28 1955

ORIGINAL FILED IN 66-18949-1

1 ENCL

Attachment

LW:adh
(4)

cc - Mr. Belmont
cc - Mr. Branigan
cc - Mr. Whitson

EX-115

FBI
RECEIVED - MICHOTS

JAN 27 1955

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51 FEB 2 1955

9BI

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. Boardman	
Mr. Nichols	
Mr. Belmont	
Mr. Harbo	
Mr. Mohr	
Mr. Parsons	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Tamm	
Mr. Sizoo	
Mr. Winterrowd	
Tele. Room	
Mr. Holloman	
Miss Gandy	

JAN 18 1955

The Speaker
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Speaker:

There is attached for your consideration and appropriate action a legislative proposal "To provide rewards for information concerning the illegal introduction into the United States, or the illegal manufacture or acquisition in the United States, of special nuclear material and atomic weapons."

The National Security Council has made a study of the problem of the possible illegal introduction into the United States, and the illegal manufacture and acquisition in the United States, of various atomic materials or weapons, the presence of which would constitute a threat to the security of the nation and the welfare of its people.

The attached bill which implements the Council's recommendation, is designed to set up a system of rewards for original information leading to the acquisition by the United States of special nuclear material or atomic weapons which have been illegally brought into the United States, its territories or possessions, or the District of Columbia or which have been illegally manufactured or acquired therein. It is also designed to set up a system of rewards for original information with respect to attempts illegally to introduce, manufacture or acquire such material or weapons.

It is believed that this proposal will materially strengthen the internal security of the United States by alerting the people thereof to the need for vigilance, and by providing a monetary reward for informants. It will likewise, by reason of its provisions for reward and for immigration to the United States for permanent residence, encourage aliens to furnish information about the unauthorized introduction, manufacture, or acquisition of special nuclear material or atomic weapons.

ENCL

EXP. PROC.
JAN 19 1955

RECORDED - 43 117-268-

18 JAN 27 1955

EX-115

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-7-00 BY SP4 BTA/LBM

This legislation in the form in which it is transmitted herewith was passed by the House of Representatives (H.R. 10203, 83rd Congress), and reported favorably in the Senate by the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (S. 3851, 83rd Congress), toward the close of the 83rd Congress. The Bureau of the Budget has advised that its enactment would be in accord with the program of the President.

Sincerely,

HERBERT BROWNELL, JR.

Attorney General

84th

1st.

A BILL

To provide rewards for information concerning the illegal introduction into the United States, or the illegal manufacture or acquisition in the United States, of special nuclear material and atomic weapons.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as the "Atomic Weapons Rewards Act of 1955".

SEC. 2. Any person who furnishes original information to the United States-

(a) leading to the finding or other acquisition by the United States of any special nuclear material or atomic weapon which has been introduced into the United States, or which has been manufactured or acquired therein contrary to the laws of the United States, or

(b) with respect to an attempted introduction into the United States or an attempted manufacture or acquisition therein of any special nuclear material or atomic weapon, contrary to the laws of the United States, shall be rewarded by the payment of an amount not to exceed $500,000.

SEC. 3. An Awards Board consisting of the Secretary of the Treasury (who shall be the Chairman), the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the Director of Central Intelligence, and of one member of the Atomic Energy Commission designated by that Commission, shall determine whether any person furnishing information to the United States is entitled to any award and the amount thereof to be paid pursuant to section 2. In determining whether any person furnishing information to the United States is entitled to an award and the amount of such award, the Board shall take into consideration-

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ENCLOSURE 117-268-669

(a) whether or not the information is of the type specified in section 2, and

(b) whether the person furnishing the information was an officer or employee of the United States and, if so, whether the furnishing of such information was in the line of duty of that person. Any reward of $50,000 or more shall be approved by the President.

SEC. 4. If the information leading to an award under section 3 is furnished by an alien, the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, and the Director of Central Intelligence, acting jointly, may determine that the entry of such alien into the United States is in the public interest and, in that event, such alien and the members of his immediate family may receive immigrant visas and may be admitted to the United States for permanent residence, notwithstanding the requirements of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

SEC. 5. The Board established under section 3 is authorized to hold such hearings and make, promulgate, issue, rescind, and amend such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act.

SEC. 6. Any awards granted under section 3 of this Act shall be certified by the Awards Board and, together with the approval of the President in those cases where such approval is required, transmitted to the Director of Central Intelligence for payment out of funds appropriated or available for the administration of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended.

SEC. 7. As used in this Act—

(a) The term "atomic energy" means all forms of energy released in the course of nuclear fission or nuclear transformation.

(b) The term "atomic weapon" means any device utilizing atomic energy, exclusive of the means for transporting or propelling the device (where such means is a separable and divisible part of the device), the principal purpose of which is for use as, or for development of, a weapon, a weapon prototype, or a weapon test device.

(c) The term "special nuclear material" means plutonium, or uranium enriched in the isotope 233 or in the isotope 235, or any other material which is found to be special nuclear material pursuant to the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.

(d) The term "United States", when used in a geographical sense, includes all Territories and possessions of the United States and the Canal Zone; except that in section 4, the term "United States" when so used shall have the meaning given to it in the Immigration and Nationality Act.

CONFIDENTIAL

tic - Mr. Belmont
Mr. Whitson

Assistant Attorney General
William F. Tompkins (Original and 1)

January 26, 1955

Director, FBI

RECORDED - 25

ESA

EX-125

COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION IN PLACE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

This will confirm the telephone conversation between Inspector Hennrich of the F.B.I. and Mr. J. Walter Yeagley, Chairman of the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security, on January 25, 1955.

Inspector Hennrich informed Mr. Yeagley that on January 24, 1955, Commander B. P. Clark, United States Coast Guard, Chairman of the Advisory Group supervising the field testing of detection devices for fissionable material, phoned the F. B. I. and stated he had received word from the Customs Office in New York that the United States Attorney there wanted all details regarding the manner in which certain radium-dial watches were discovered in a smuggling case which is to go to trial in the near future. Clark stated that during the course of the field testing of a detection device at the Port of New York, the device reacted violently when it was approached by a female traveler from Germany. Subsequent search of this female by Customs revealed radium-dial watches hidden in false compartments of her suitcases and handbag, and in a foundation garment she was wearing.

It was suggested to Commander Clark that if Customs or the United States Attorney in New York had any questions regarding possible disclosures of the effectiveness of the detection devices that they should refer their inquiry to Assistant Attorney General Tompkins and to Mr. Yeagley. The performance data for the detection devices has been classified secret. The operation of the devices at the Port of New York and the security of those devices have been the responsibility of Customs. While any decision

DECLASSIFIED BY 3428/tkp/ap ON 4/803

RECEIVED READING ROOM JAN 27 9:28 AM '55

Tolson
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Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

LW:fjm
(6)

CONFIDENTIAL

MAILED 5
JAN 27 1955
COMM-FBI

51 FEB 7 1955

regarding publicity concerning the field testing and performance of these devices is that of Customs and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security, we do wish to point out that disclosure of performance data to the public at this time might well jeopardize the effectiveness of any program involving the use of these detection devices.

117-268

cc - 1 - Mr. J. Walter Yeagley
Chairman
Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security
Department of Justice Building
Washington, D. C.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: January 24, 1955

FROM : W. A. Branigan

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC WEAPONS INTO THE U. S.

At 11:30 a.m., 1/24/55, Commander B. P. Clark, U. S. Coast Guard, Chairman of the Advisory Group supervising the field testing of detection devices for fissionable material, phoned the Bureau. Clark told Supervisor Whitson that during the course of field testing of a device at the Port of New York, the device reacted violently when it was approached by a female traveller from Germany. A subsequent search of this woman revealed radium dial watches hidden in false compartments in her suitcases, handbag and a foundation garment she was wearing. Clark stated that he had just received word from the Customs Office in New York that this woman's case on a smuggling charge was to go to trial in the near future and the U. S. Attorney wanted to have all the details regarding the manner in which the radium dial watches were discovered. Commander Clark was reminded that the agencies conducting the field testing were doing so as agencies of the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS), the Chairman of which is Mr. J. Walter Yeagley of the Internal Security Division of the Department of Justice. Mr. Clark was also reminded that Mr. Yeagley's superior was Assistant Attorney General William F. Tompkins. It was suggested to him that if Customs or the U. S. Attorney in New York had any questions regarding possible disclosure of the effectiveness of the detection devices that they should request the observations of Assistant Attorney General Tompkins and Mr. Yeagley.

RECOMMENDATION:

None, this is for your information.

RECORDED - 25
117-268-
18 JAN 31 1955

LW:plv:pcp
Ticklers: Mr. Belmont
(4) Mr. Branigan
Mr. Whitson

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4/8/03 BY SP4 STP/RHP

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
NO NUMBER SAC LETTER 55-B

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

January 21, 1955 WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

RE: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES

Reference is made to No Number SAC Letter 53-F dated November 3, 1953, furnishing "Restricted Data" on the components of atomic devices.

The Atomic Energy Commission has prepared descriptions of fusion weapons (H-Bombs) for use in the program of defending against clandestine introduction of weapons of mass destruction. There are attached a classified and a tentatively unclassified description. The classified version contains secret restricted data. Its distribution is limited to those employees of the Bureau who require the information on a "need-to-know" basis and to those other officers and employees of the Federal Government who have been "Q-cleared" for such information because of their responsibilities in connection with defense against clandestine atomic attack.

The description which is tentatively unclassified will not be released outside of the Government until such release is authorized by the National Security Council.

Accordingly, you should not discuss the details contained in the attachments with persons outside the Bureau.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

Attachments (2)

2 ENCL. Unclassified description destroyed per 66-04-2329 Cons/rea 1/6/56

117-268-

NOT RECORDED
176 FEB 8 1955

DECLASSIFIED BY SP4 RDK/RNP
ON 11-10-03

7-189
51 FEB 14 1955

ORIGINAL FILED IN 66-04-2329

Ticklers - Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Roach
Mr. Branigan
Mr. Whitson

TELETYPE

CODE

URGENT

JANUARY 28, 1955

SECRET

SAC, ALBANY
ALBUQUERQUE
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CHICAGO
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DETROIT
NEW ORLEANS
NORFOLK
PHOENIX
PORTLAND
SAN ANTONIO
SAN FRANCISCO
WASHINGTON FIELD
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HOUSTON
INDIANAPOLIS
LOS ANGELES
MIAMI
MILWAUKEE
MINNEAPOLIS
MOBILE
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NEW YORK
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DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (1)
PER LTR DTD 10/14/03

(cc - 2) (BCS)

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF OR OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES. ATOMIC ENERGY ACT.

RE SAC LETTER FIFTY FOUR DASH ONE PARENTHESIS H PARENTHESIS DATED JANUARY FIVE, NINETEEN FIFTY FOUR, AND NO NUMBER SAC LETTER FIVE FIVE DASH B DATED JANUARY TWENTY ONE, NINETEEN FIFTY FIVE.

Referral/Direct to OGA

(5)

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

LW:JAA/jaa (10)

TELETYPE

JAN 29 1955

RECORDED - 25

117-2[illegible]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

6:00 PM BW

JAN 31 1955

SECRET

[redacted]

[redacted] ALL FIELD OFFICES HAVING SEABOARD OR (S)
LAKE PORTS OR LAND BORDER PORTS OF ENTRY SHOULD BE PARTICULARLY
ALERT TO RECOGNIZE AND REPORT PROMPTLY ANY INFORMATION BEARING
ON THIS SITUATION. THE MENTION OF POLAND AS A POSSIBLE POINT
OF SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIALS IS IN LINE WITH INFORMATION
REPORTED IN THE SPRING OF NINETEEN FIFTY FOUR BY INFORMANT
OF SAN ANTONIO OFFICE WHO INDICATED THAT POLISH OFFICIAL
ESTABLISHMENT IN MEXICO CITY WAS CHARGED WITH SMUGGLING

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

OF ATOMIC WEAPONS INTO US. BECAUSE OF TENSE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND RELIANCE WHICH OTHER AGENCIES OF GOVERNMENT PLACE IN THIS BUREAU, YOU SHOULD GIVE MATTERS OF THIS TYPE PROMPT, THOROUGH, AND INTELLIGENT HANDLING.

HOOVER

~~SECRET~~

Ticklers - Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Branigan
Mr. Philcox
Mr. Whitson

~~SECRET~~

RADIOGRAM

CODE

JANUARY 28, 1955

DEFERRED

SAC, ANCHORAGE
HONOLULU
SAN JUAN

DNL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

esa/ O

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF OR OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES. ATOMIC ENERGY ACT.

RE SAC LETTER FIFTY - FOUR DASH ONE PARENTHESIS H PARENTHESIS DATED JANUARY FIVE, NINETEEN FIFTY FOUR, AND NO NUMBER SAC LETTER FIVE FIVE DASH B DATED JANUARY TWENTY ONE, NINETEEN FIFTY FIVE.

Referral/Direct to OGA

[redacted]

(5)

[redacted]

REASON FOR DTD 10/14/03 60267 UC/NSISTG A/LAND 10/29/03 CLASSIFIED BY: NSI B/A/LAM COAUT Derivative DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (1) 4/7/00 [illegible] 9603035/6970538

Wilson
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Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

LW:JAA (8)

RADIO

JAN 29 1955

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

RECORDED - 25

117-268-

18 JAN 31 1955

5:15 AM Per ECA

~~SECRET~~

Referral/Direct to OGA

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] ALL (5)

FIELD OFFICES HAVING SEABOARD OR LAKE PORTS OR LAND BORDER PORTS OF ENTRY SHOULD BE PARTICULARLY ALERT TO RECOGNIZE AND REPORT PROMPTLY ANY INFORMATION BEARING ON THIS SITUATION. THE MENTION OF POLAND AS A POSSIBLE POINT OF SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC MATERIALS IS IN LINE WITH INFORMATION REPORTED IN THE SPRING OF NINETEEN FIFTY FOUR BY INFORMANT OF SAN ANTONIO OFFICE WHO INDICATED THAT POLISH OFFICIAL ESTABLISHMENT IN MEXICO CITY WAS CHARGED WITH SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC WEAPONS INTO US. BECAUSE OF TENSE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND RELIANCE WHICH OTHER AGENCIES OF GOVERNMENT PLACE IN THIS BUREAU YOU SHOULD GIVE MATTERS OF THIS TYPE PROMPT, THOROUGH, AND INTELLIGENT HANDLING.

HOOVER

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Tickler: Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Whitson

The Attorney General (original and one) February 1, 1955

Director, FBI

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS AND PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES

Referral/Direct to OGA

[redacted]

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

MAILED 2
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COMM-FBI

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
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Holloman
Gandy

ENCLOSURE 117-268

LW:plv
(9)

(Memo from L. V. Boardman to The Director prepared by LW:plv on 2-1-55 re Reported Shipment of Atom Bombs to the U.S.)

~~SECRET~~

The Attorney General February 1, 1955

Referral/Direct to OGA

[redacted] (S)

[redacted] (S)

The files of this Bureau contain no identifiable references to this woman.

The continental and territorial offices of the Federal Bureau of Investigation covering all ports of entry have been notified of the foregoing. Referral/Direct to OGA

[redacted] (S)

The Federal Bureau of Investigation has requested the Department of State [redacted] bi [redacted] make every effort to trace the information in these reports to the original source and to resolve the allegations. (S)

117-268

cc - 1 - Mr. William P. Rogers
Deputy Attorney General

cc - 1 - The Commissioner
Immigration and Naturalization Service

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JAN 29 1955

TELETYPE

FBI, NEWARK 29 11-36 JIB

DIRECTOR, FBI b7C URGENT

[redacted] ET AL. CHS-STOWAWAY. REMYTEL AND TEL CALL JAN. TWENTY NINE LAST. EXAMINATION OF MANIFEST OF SS VILLO DO PORTO REFLECTS GENERAL CARGO AS CORK, ROPE, BASKETS AND WINE. NO INDICATION FROM REVIEW OF MANIFEST OR SEARCH OF VESSEL THAT ANY FISSONABLE MATERILA ON BACRD. INTERVIEWS OF NINE STOWAWAYS THROUGH INTERPERTER CONTINUING. END

SMUGGLING ATOMIC BOMBS

FOSTER

ACK PLS

11-38 PM OK FBI WA BW

TU DISC

INITIALED ON ORIGINAL

RECORDED

117-268-B

b7C

NOT RECORDED

176 FEB 7 1955

CC Rosen, Belmont, Hennrich

Mr. Rosen

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-7-00 BY SP4 COM/LSM

ORIGINAL FILED IN

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

TELETYPE

FBI NEWARK 30 7-10 JIB

DIRECTOR, FBI b7C URGENT

[redacted] ET AL. CHS-STOWAWAY. REMYTEL JAN. TWENTYNINE LAST. INTENSIVE INTERVIEWS OF SUBJECTS THRU INTERPERTER THIS DATE FAILED TO INDICATE ANY CONNECTION WITH FISSIONABLE MATERIAL. INTERVIEWS REFLECT SUBJECTS TO BE PERSONS OF AGRARIAN BACKGROUND AND NO FORMAL EDUCATION. OBJECT OF TRIP TO USA APPEARS TO BE TO SEEK EMPLOYMENT AND TO RETURN TO FAMILIES IN PORTUGAL AFTER TWO OR THREE YEARS WITH SUFFICIENT SAVINGS TO BUY ADDITIONAL LAND. INVESTIGATION CONTINUING. b7C

END OSMUGGLING Atomic Bombs

FOSTER 117-268-

ACK PLS NOT RECORDED
176 FEB 17 1955

7-11 PM OK F T WA D R FBI WA RD

INITIALS ON ORIGINAL

Mr. Rosen

cc Rosen, Supervisor

ORIGINAL FILED

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4/24/03 BY SP4COR/RMP

~~SECRET~~

cc - Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Hennrich
Mr. Branigan
Mr. Philcox

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

Date: January 31, 1955

To: Mr. Dennis A. Flinn
Director
Office of Security
Department of State
515 22nd Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

BY COURIER SERVICE

(original & 1)

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: REPORTED SHIPMENT OF ATOM BOMBS TO
THE UNITED STATES
(Smuggling Atom Bombs)

[redacted]

Reference is also made to a telegram from the [redacted]

As Mr. Philcox of this Bureau orally pointed out on January 28, 1955, it is imperative that every effort be made to trace these reports to their original sources and to resolve the allegations.

NWP:et
(9)

A cover memo from Belmont to Boardman was prepared by NWP:et on 1/28/55 in connection with this outgoing mail.

~~SECRET~~

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman

RECORDED-35
29 FEB 1 1955

BY COURIER SVC.
84 JAN 31
COMM - FBI

INDEXED-35
EX-128

FEB 7 1955

7-189

4/7/03 CLASSIFIED BY NSICG/LBM/60291 DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (1) CIA 2003352 per LTR dtd 10/29/03 4/RNP 10/29/03 Derivative

7-268-67

b1

A copy of this memorandum is being furnished to the Central Intelligence Agency so [redacted] (5)

In view of the extremely serious nature of the allegations, this Bureau should be kept immediately advised of any developments.

cc - 1 - Director
Central Intelligence Agency
2430 E Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

BY COURIER SERVICE

Attention: Deputy Director, Plans

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: January 31, 1955

FROM : I. D. Haack

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF OR OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

SAC, Harvey Foster of Newark, telephoned at 7:30 p.m. January 29, 1955, concerning teletype from Newark dated January 29, 1955, entitled [redacted] et al, Crime on Seas - Stowaway."

b7C

[redacted] and eight other Portuguese were apprehended Newark, New Jersey, January 28, 1955, by New Jersey State Police. All subjects were stowaways on board S.S. Ville Do Porto which docked Newark night of January 28, 1955. USA, Newark authorized prosecution. All subjects arraigned before USC, Jersey City and remanded to Hudson County Jail, Jersey City, in lieu of $2,500 bond each. Possibility exists that two additional Portuguese stowaways managed to get ashore undetected. Investigation continuing with respect to these two.

SAC, Foster said he had just furnished the above information to the Investigative Division by phone as he had answered press inquiries concerning the Portuguese. However, in view of Butel January 28, 1954, titled "Smuggling of Atomic Bombs or Parts thereof or other Weapons of Mass Destruction into the United States; Atomic Energy Act," your tickler copy of which is attached, which states [redacted] Foster felt that the coincidence of the same number of stowaways should be furnished to the Domestic Intelligence Division. Foster noted that the Portuguese could speak no English while the smugglers were reported to speak good English.

Referral/Direct to OGA

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4/7/00 BY SP4/BAW/LBM

ACTION:

None. For your information.

IDH:dlf
(3)

RECORDED - 6

117-268-67

cc - Mr. Belmont
Mr. Haack

13 FEB 8 1955

5

Auto 2-7-55 UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

FEB 10 1955

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Rosen

FROM : Mr. Price

DATE: January 29, 1955

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-7-00 BY SP4 BSA/LBM

SUBJECT: [redacted]
ET AL
CRIME ON HIGH SEAS - STOWAWAY

Purpose is to record a call from SAC, Harvey Foster, Newark, at 6:18 P. M. regarding above-captioned case.

DETAILS:

SAC, Foster called and advised that this case involves nine Portuguese stowaways, apprehended by New Jersey State Police the night of January 28, 1955. He advised that a teletype had been sent regarding their apprehension and prosecutive action taken but that he wanted to call the Bureau's attention to coded teletype received from Bureau today regarding smuggling of Atomic bombs into the United States. He said that this teletype had stated that nine "international smugglers" were allegedly supposed to handle the smuggled bombs. He wanted to call attention to the similarity in numbers of individuals involved, however, he said that he didn't believe there was any connection as the stowaways appeared to be ignorant laborers who can not speak English and that the "smugglers" allegedly spoke very good English. This information was furnished to the supervisor on duty in Division Five. (Domestic Intelligence Division)

The above-mentioned teletype was received at 6:46 P. M. and indicates that the stowaways were apprehended and have been interviewed by Immigration and by Bureau Agents and admitted hiding under a cork cargo in Lisbon, Portugal. U. S. Attorney has authorized prosecution of all subjects for violation Title 18, Section 2119, and Title 8, Section 1325, U. S. C. Subjects were arraigned in Jersey City today before U. S. Commissioner and remanded to Hudson County Jail, Jersey City, New Jersey in leiu of $2500 bond each.

The possibility exists that there are two additional Portuguese stowaways who managed to get ashore undetected. Investigation is continuing regarding those two. It is also indicated the press inquiries have been answered by Mr. Foster concerning this matter.

b7C

ORIGINAL FILED IN

117-268-2

NOT RECORDED
176 FEB 7 1955

INITIALS ON ORIGINAL

RECOMMENDATION:

That this be routed to the Domestic Intelligence Division for their information.

cc: 1 - Mr. Belmont
DHY:mal 7-18?
(5)

15 FEB 1955

15 FEB

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

~~SECRET~~

TO : W. A. Branigan

DATE: January 31, 1955

FROM : L. Whi[illegible]

b7C
b7D

4/7/00
CLASSIFIED BY NLS/BAW/LDM 62217 DERIVATIVE
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (U)
CH 948742/950935/997059

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: [redacted] aka [redacted]
UNKNOWN SUBJECTS; [redacted]
[redacted] - INFORMANT
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

o Smuggling Atom Bombs or parts for atom Bombs into the United States

[redacted] (S)

Referral/Direct to OGA

[redacted]

A check of the Bureau's indices regarding the [redacted] woman and [redacted] has been made with negative results.

b7C
b7D

RECOMMENDATION:

None. This is for your information. When additional data are received from any source regarding the above situation, appropriate action will be taken.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

ENCL.

ENCL. 7

ORIGINAL FILED IN

SEE TELETYPE TO ALBANY AND OTHER OFFICES 1-29-55 AND RADIOGRAM TO ANCHORAGE AND OTHER OFFICES 1-29-55 RE: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS

LW:ss (3)

Attachment

RECORDED SE 15

117-268

NOT RECORDED
45 FEB 4 1955

117-1[illegible]

19 FEB 1[illegible]

~~SECRET~~

117-

cc: Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Roach
Mr. Whitson

CABLE
URGENT NIACT
CIPHER PAD CODE

FEBRUARY 4, 1955

RECORDED-27
117-268-696

LEGAL ATTACHE
PARIS, FRANCE

EX-128

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS AND PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES. REBUCAB FEBRUARY ONE AND YOUR CABLES FEBRUARY TWO AND THREE REGARDING ALLEGATIONS FROM NICE. TAKE IMMEDIATE STEPS TO SEE THAT ALLEGATIONS RECEIVED BY UNITED STATES LEGATION COMMA LUXEMBOURG COMMA ARE RESOLVED. YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO TRAVEL TO LUXEMBOURG AND BELGIUM TO FOLLOW BUT NOT INVESTIGATE THIS MATTER. MAKE IMMEDIATE RECOMMENDATIONS TO BUREAU REGARDING ANY INVESTIGATIVE STEPS BY BUREAU YOU CONSIDER NECESSARY. KEEP BUREAU ADVISED OF ALL DEVELOPMENTS.

HOOVER

117-268

NOTE:

Cover memo Belmont to Boardman 2/4/55, LW;plv

cc: Foreign Service Desk

FBI
RECEIVED READING ROOM
FEB 4 2 56 PM
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

NR. 222
ENC. 0056 0146 BY
CK. 2 22 0222 BY
APPROVED BY
TYPED BY
FILED BY

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

LW:fjm/plv

(7)

Cable 2-4-55
9:50 PM

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4-7-00 BY SP4 BJA/LBM

4-3
(12-2-54)

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

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4/7/00
CLASSIFIED BY: NSICG/AllBM 60267 DERIVATIVE
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (1)
Per LHR DTD 10/14/03 60267 uc/NLS/CIA/RNP 10/29/03
#948742/950935/997059

SECRET

DECODE OF CODED CABLE NUMBER 631 DATED FEBRUARY 2, 1955 AT PARIS, FRANCE. RECEIVED VIA THE STATE DEPARTMENT.

URGENT

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS AND PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES. REBUCABLE FEBRUARY 1. [redacted] WHOSE IDENTITY SHOULD BE PROTECTED, ADVISED TODAY THAT U.S. VICE-CONSUL CHARLES BEYLARD SECURED HIS INFORMATION CONCERNING CAPTIONED MATTER FROM INFORMANT [redacted] WHO IS A [redacted] RESIDING [redacted] INTERVIEWED INFORMANT [redacted] AND COMPLETE REPORT OF INTERROGATION HAS BEEN TRANSMITTED TO STATE DEPARTMENT. IN SUBSTANCE, INFORMANT ALLEGED THAT [redacted] SAME INFORMANT IN 1951 REPORTED THAT [redacted] WARNED THAT CHURCHILL WAS TO BE ASSASSINATED. SINCE INFORMANT ALREADY REINTERVIEWED AND BOTH STATE DEPARTMENT AND CIA NOW ENDEAVORING TO ESTABLISH AUTHENTICITY OF INSTANT REPORT, THIS OFFICE ONLY FOLLOWING MATTER CLOSELY WITH EMBASSY. BUREAU WILL BE IMMEDIATELY INFORMED OF ANY PERTINENT DEVELOPMENTS.

b1
b7C
b7D

(5)

117-268-676

memo Boardman 2/4/55 cable Legat Paris 2/4/55 LW

RECORDED-27 ROLAND O. ALLIER FEB 8 1955

RECEIVED: 2-2-55 EX-128 2:01 PM MEH

cc: Mr. Belmont
cc: Mr. Mohr

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

SECRET

(X)(u)

CONFIDENTIAL

(M) SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES -- Reference is made to SAC Letter 54-1 (H) dated January 5, 1954, and to No Number SAC Letter 55-B dated January 21, 1955. (X)(u)

Referral/Direct to OGA

[redacted]

[redacted] (X) (u)

[redacted]

[redacted] (X) (u)

[redacted]

2/1/55
SAC LETTER NO. 55-7

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.
Classified by SP4/BJA/LBM
Declassify on: OADR 5/17/83

117-268-
NOT RECORDED
176 FEB 8 1955

(X)(u)

ORIGINAL FILED

DECLASSIFIED BY SP4/BJA/LBM
ON 4/7/00

7-189

CONFIDENTIAL

Referral/Direct to OGA

All field offices should be alert to recognize and report promptly any information bearing on this situation. The field offices should carefully check their confidential informants and sources of information regarding individuals having contact with or knowledge of the type of international "operator" indicated in the story from Luxembourg. In the event you have such informants or sources, you should advise the Bureau and furnish your observation as to how they can best be utilized in a situation of this kind.

The Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency have been requested by this Bureau to make every effort to trace the above reports to their original sources and to resolve the allegations.

Because of the tense international situation and the reliance which other Agencies of the United States Government place in the Federal Bureau of Investigation, you should give matters of this type, which come to your attention, prompt, thorough, and intelligent handling. The Bureau should be immediately advised of any developments.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

~~SECRET~~

DATE: February 1, 1955

FROM : MR. R. R. ROACH

SUBJECT: ~~REPORTED SHIPMENT OF ATOM BOMBS TO THE UNITED STATES~~
Smuggling of Atomic Bomb or Parts Thereof and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction into the United States
117-265

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

Referral/Direct to OGA

Reference is made to the report received on January 28, 1955 [redacted] we directed a letter to the Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) on January 31, 1955, pointing out that it is imperative that this matter be followed vigorously to its original source so that it can be resolved.

The State Department advised on February 1, 1955, that a dispatch was received from the American Embassy at Paris dated January 31, 1955, stating that contact had been made with the original informant but that no further details were available on the reported shipment. They stated that a report of the interview will follow. [redacted] (S)

b1

ACTION:

Liaison is following this matter closely with the State Department and CIA.

NWP:fjb
(6)

RECORDED - 5
EX-117-265-67

7 FEB 9 1955

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Papich
1 - Liaison Section tickler
1 - Mr. Branigan
1 - Mr. Philcox

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

7-189
58 FEB 11 1955

~~SECRET~~

47/100 per LTR NFD 10/14/03 60267 uc/ncs/bja/rnp 10/29/03
CLASSIFIED BY NSIC/bja/LCM 60267
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X1 (1)
DE-CLASSIFIED BY 6116744/ucbaw/35/1220059

tic - Mr. Wh

TEL

URGENT

FEBRUARY 8, 1955

SACS, ALBANY (original &1) ALBUQUERQUE (2ccs) ANCHORAGE (2ccs) BALTIMORE (2ccs) BUFFALO (2ccs) BUTTE (2ccs) CHARLOTTE (2ccs) CHICAGO (2ccs) CLEVELAND (2ccs) DETROIT 2 ccs) EL PASO (2ccs) BOSTON (2ccs) HONOLULU (2ccs) HOUSTON (2ccs) INDIANAPOLIS (2ccs) LOS ANGELES (2ccs) MIAMI (2ccs) MILWAUKEE (2ccs) MINNEAPOLIS (2ccs) MOBILE (2ccs) NEWARK (2ccs) NEW HAVEN (2ccs) NEW ORLEANS (2ccs) NEW YORK (2ccs) NORFOLK (2ccs) PHILADELPHIA (9ccs PHOENIX (2ccs) PITTSBURGH (2ccs) PORTLAND (2ccs) RICHMOND (2ccs) SAN ANTONIO (2ccs) SAN DIEGO (2ccs) SAN FRANCISCO (2cc SAN JUAN (2ccs) SAVANNAH (2ccs) SEATTLE (2ccs) WASHINGTON FIELD (2ccs) (BCS)

#948242/1950935 ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4/9/03 BY SP4 CAM/KNP Re ltr MD 10/14/03 60217 uc/nls/9:4/KNP (10/21/03

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF OR WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES, ATOMIC ENERGY ACT. REFER SAC LETTER NO. 55-7(M) AND PARTICULARLY INFORMATION FURNISHED BY

[redacted]

[redacted] SOURCE DETERMINED TO BE [redacted]

[redacted] b7C b7D

[redacted] BOTH DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY HAVE QUESTIONED RELIABILITY OF [redacted] SOURCE. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY PLACES NO CREDENCE IN INFORMATION BEING FURNISHED BY INFORMANT WHO REFUSES TO DIVULGE NAMES OF PERSONS THROUGH WHOM HE ALLEGEDLY RECEIVES INFORMATION. [redacted]

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

[redacted]

RECORDED - 6 11-26

[redacted]

THESE DATA HAVE BEEN DISSEMINATED BY DEPARTMENT OF STATE. NO PRIOR REFERENCES [redacted] IN BUFILES.

FEB 14 1955

FEB 8 1955

COMM-FBI

HOOVER

LW:fjm (76)

(above prepared as duplimat)

RA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Smuggling of Atomic Bombs or Parts Thereof, and Other Weapons) Mass Destruction into the United States

(B) SOVIET WAR PLANS (INDICATIONS OF SOVIET INTENT TO INITIATE GENERAL WAR) -- Reference is made to no number SAC Letter B, Series 1951, dated September 18, 1951 (X) (w)

One indication of Soviet intent to attack the United States would be the smuggling into this country of atomic or nuclear weapons. On January 27, 1955, an anonymous caller phoned the New York Office of the Bureau that he had placed atomic weapons in various locations in New York City, and that other atomic weapons had been placed in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and Washington, D. C. Because of the widespread publicity which resulted after garbled and distorted versions of this anonymous message had reached state and local levels in various parts of the country, it is possible that "cranks" and others may make the same type of call to Bureau field offices. Unless sufficient data are obtained from each caller, the agencies of the United States Government may not be able to take appropriate action in the event of a bona fide call. (X) (w)

It is highly important for the office receiving such a report initially to obtain every possible bit of information from the caller so that appropriate investigative steps can be taken. Since the Bureau has certain responsibilities for giving dissemination of matters affecting the local police to those agencies, and matters affecting the national security to appropriate agencies of the Federal Government, it is extremely important that all possible details be obtained from the caller and disseminated. (X) (w)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

Classified by SP8 BJA/lcd
Declassify on: OADR 8/11/83

117-268-V
NOT RECORDED
128 FEB 7 1955

INITIAL

58 FEB -8 1959

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED BY SP4 BJA/lbm
ON 4-7-00

ORIGINAL FILED IN 66-04

CONFIDENTIAL

Prompt evaluation of any report by the responsible agencies of the Federal Government is largely dependent upon the details obtained by the office receiving the call. (X) (W)

Your attention is directed to SAC Letter No. 54-1 (H), dated January 5, 1954, "Smuggling of Atomic Bombs, or Parts Thereof, and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction into the United States." You were told in that letter that each report coming to your attention should be carefully evaluated and appropriately checked. Accordingly, you should be alert to the desirability of attempting to trace all anonymous calls of this type. (X) (W)

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

CONFIDENTIAL

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. L. V. Boardman

~~SECRET~~

DATE: February 4, 1955

FROM : A. H. Belmont

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS AND PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES
Other Weapons of Mass Destruction

4/7/100 CLASSIFIED BY NSISCG/LSM 60267 DERIVATIVE
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X1
Per LTR DTD 10/24/03 #948743/FOIPA #1509355/1223
NSISCG/LSM 60267 uc/nns/BJA/FOIPA 10/24/03

On February 1, 1955, Legal Attache, Paris, was furnished information regarding allegations received by the Bureau from Department of State concerning Soviet plans to smuggle atomic materials into the United States. Legal Attache was informed that State and Central Intelligence Agency had been asked by the Bureau to [redacted] resolve allegations. Legal Attache instructed to follow closely with State [redacted] to make such recommendations promptly to Bureau. By cable of February 3, 1955, Legal Attache, Paris, instructed to inform Bureau of liaison arrangements with Embassy [redacted]

b1

By cable, February 2, 1955, Legal Attache, Paris, informed Bureau that informant in allegations emanating from Nice, France, had been identified and interviewed by security officer of U. S. Embassy. This informant, [redacted] was characterized [redacted] in 1949, as "of no intelligence value." Legal Attache states [redacted] No information received regarding second set of allegations received by Department of State from informant in Luxembourg. By cable February 3, 1955, Legal Attache furnished additional [redacted] No information regarding Luxembourg angle has been received.

b1
b7C
b7D

117-268

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HERE IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

117-268
Attachment
LW:plv
(6)

~~SECRET~~

RECORDED - 58

7 FEB 9 1955

INDEXED - 58

cc - Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Roach
Mr. Whitson
Foreign Service Desk

FEB 17 1955

~~SECRET~~

RECOMMENDATION:

Sent 2-4-55

There is attached a cable to the Legal Attache, Paris, instructing him to take immediate steps to have Luxembourg allegations resolved, authorizing him to travel to Luxembourg and Belgium to follow this matter.

~~SECRET~~

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: February 2, 1955

FROM : MR. A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: REPORTED SHIPMENT OF ATOM BOMBS TO THE UNITED STATES

SECRET

Reference is made to Mr. Boardman's memorandum to the Director dated February 1, 1955, relative to information received by the American Vice-Consul in Nice, France, that the Soviet Government has decided to ship eight atomic bombs to the United States. That memorandum recommended that the information be given to the Department and to the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and that a cablegram be sent to the Legal Attache in Paris furnishing him the information and instructing him to follow the investigation closely with the Department of State [redacted] and to submit recommendations concerning Bureau participation as well as keeping the Bureau informed of developments. That memorandum bears the Director's notation:

b1
(S)

> "While I am going along with recommendations I must say I think you stand on protocol and ceremony while the world is burning. We (FBI) are charged with Internal Security not the State Department and CIA and here is vital information which must be substantiated and done so at the earliest moment. Also there must be some lack of liaison between our man and the Embassy at Paris that we were not even told of it upon receipt. H."

Through liaison State Department has been requested to advise the Bureau why the information in question was not furnished to the Legal Attache by the American Embassy in Paris. State was also requested to instruct the Embassy in Paris that steps should be taken so that in the future there will be no recurrence of failure to advise Bureau's representatives of pertinent, vital information. Mr. Dennis A. Flinn advised that he will send a wire on February 2, 1955, to the Embassy in Paris covering above points.

Attachment

117-268-681

JJM:pyp/sqw
(7)

RECORDED - 58

FEB 10 1955

1 - Mr. Boardman
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Philcox
1 - Mr. Whitson
1 - Mr. Mannion
1 - Sect. Tick. File

SECRET

60 FEB 15 1955

CLASSIFIED BY 41760 NSI/BJT/LBM 60267 Declassify on: 25X1
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X1
Per LTR DTD 10/14/83 60267 uc/NLS/BJT/RND 10/29/83
#94873/93935 43057

Legal Attache is being instructed to advise why information concerning this matter was not immediately reported to his office. He is also being instructed to advise of the nature and extent of his liaison arrangements with Embassy, particularly with the section which handled instant matter, and concerning what steps he has taken to prevent a recurrence of a similar situation. The Legal Attache is also being advised concerning liaison discussions with the Department of State, [redacted] (S) b1

RECOMMENDATION:

Approval recommended for the attached cable to Legal Attache in Paris advising him of the Bureau's contact with the Department of State and incorporating the above instructions.

4-3
(12-2-54)

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

DECODE OF CODED CABLE NUMBER 638 DATED FEBRUARY 9, 1955 AT PARIS, FRANCE. RECEIVED VIA THE STATE DEPARTMENT.

URGENT

O

ATOM SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS AND PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES. REMYCABLE FEBRUARY 4. EMBASSY RECEIVED REPORT TODAY FROM NICE INFORMANT [redacted] THAT SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC BOMBS POSSIBLY LEAVING (DATE UNKNOWN) FROM PORT ARTHUR, MANCHURIA. INFORMANT UNABLE TO PROVIDE FURTHER DETAILS. BUREAU WILL BE IMMEDIATELY INFORMED OF ANY PERTINENT DEVELOPMENTS. b7C b7D

ROLLAND O. L-ALLIER

RECEIVED: 2-9-55 12:22 PM MAP

HANDLED ON CARBON COPY BY MEMO BOARDMAN AND AIRTEL TO ALBANY ETC 2-10-55. LW

RECORDED - 79

117-268-682

EX-128

18 FEB 11 1955

5-Wash

cc-Mr. Belmont
cc. Mr. Ferris

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4/10/03 BY SP2 [illegible]

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

7-189

51 FEB 15 1955

4-3
(12-2-54)

~~SECRET~~

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Gandy

4/7/00 #648744/950935/997059
CLASSIFIED BY NSG/BJA/LBM 60267 DERIVATIVE
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X1
PER LTR DTD 10/14/03 60267 UC/NSG/BJA/RNP 10/29/03

DECODE OF CODED CABLE NUMBER 635 DATED FEBRUARY 5, 1955 AT PARIS, FRANCE. RECEIVED VIA THE STATE DEPARTMENT.

URGENT

b1

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS AND PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES.

[redacted]

(S)

ROLLAND O. L'ALLIER

RECEIVED: 2-5-55 10:51 AM MEH

INTELL. 117-1688-1

NOT RECORDED
176 FEB 15 1955

NOT RECORDED
176 FEB 15 1955

Orig Director
cc: Mr. Tolson

7-189 If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

DAT

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117-1688-1

CC - L. Whitson

SAC, New York (117-192) (original and 1) February 10, 1955

Director, FBI (117-268)

RECORDED - 10

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PART THEREOF
OR OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

FY-125

Reurlet 2-2-55 setting forth results of discussions with representatives of Customs and Coast Guard.

Similar observations have been made by representatives of Customs and the Coast Guard at the Seat of Government. It is gratifying to know that considerable thought is being given to the problem of prevention of smuggling in the major ports of the U.S.

Your suggestions for requesting information of CIA are being considered in connection with other aspects of the problem of advance intelligence.

Your suggestion that all field offices of the FBI develop information regarding suspect companies or individuals of Communist background who might act as consignees for questioned shipments and for the recognition of Communist cover companies in the import-export field is covered in no number SAC Letter A dated 1-28-52. The various field offices are submitting to the Bureau recommendations regarding names to be placed on the Customs' special watch list.

You also recommended a possible contact with Commodore Robert C. Lee, Vice Chairman of the Board of Directors of Moore McCormack, which line has acted as sole shipping agent in the U.S. for the USSR. You indicate that Commodore Lee is a reserve officer in Naval Intelligence. For this reason, you should request from your contacts in the Office of Naval Intelligence their observations regarding pertinent Russian shipping information which Lee might have furnished to the Office of Naval Intelligence in New York. When you have furnished such data to the Bureau, you should then make a recommendation as to whether Commodore Lee should be interviewed by you.

LW:ckw
(4)

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7-189

WABS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4-7-06 BY Sp4 BCA/LCM
PER LTR DTD 10/14/05 60247 MC/NLS/SJH/ANP, 4/29/03

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

~~SECRET~~

DATE: 2/2/55

FROM : SAC, New York (117-192)

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PART THEREOF
OR OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

Rebutel 1/29/55.

The following action has been taken by the NYO in instant matter:

On 1/31/55, Honorable ROBERT W. DILL, Collector of the Port of New York, FRANK B. LOUGHLIN, Assistant Collector, and JOSEPH FLYNN, Assistant Surveyor, were interviewed by SAs [redacted] b7C The contents of rebutel as to the allegations received by the State Department were made known to these Customs officials since they had not as yet received this information from the Bureau of Customs.

With reference to their present procedure as to searches of cargo and passenger ships entering the Port of New York, Mr. LOUGHLIN advised that all ships, regardless of nationality, which had touched in Russian or Satellite ports within a period of four months were boarded and searched in the outer harbor by a joint party of U. S. Customs and Coast Guard personnel. Mr. LOUGHLIN advised that occasionally representatives of AEC, NY accompany these searching parties, but that the instruments used for conducting the search for radioactive materials, which are primarily in the nature of geiger counters, are handled by Coast Guard personnel trained for this purpose. He advised that the AEC had not participated in any recent searches.

Mr. LOUGHLIN and Mr. FLYNN advised that the efficiency of the search was admittedly limited because of the very nature of the stowage of cargo. They pointed out that in the majority

1 - Albany
1 - Buffalo
1 - New Haven
1 - Boston
1 - Newark
1 - Philadelphia

JJD:EG

1-D RECORDED - 10 117-262-14

EX-125

FEB 3 1956

~~SECRET~~

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CLASSIFIED & DECLASSIFY ON: 25X1 per LTR DTD 10/NLS 60267 uc/NLS/BJA/ANP 10/29/03

NSIB/BJA/ANP 10/29/03 60267 Declassified

of instances, where west-bound ships have touched at Russian or Satellite ports, the most eastern port of call is generally the Russian or Satellite port. As a result thereof, the Russian or Satellite cargo is generally the first loaded on the ship and cargo subsequently received at more western ports of the Baltic or Western Europe is stowed on top of the Russian or Satellite cargo. The obvious result thereof is that the search conducted in the outer harbor is limited by the inaccessibility of the Russian or Satellite cargo. In addition, the possibility of radioactive material being shielded and not accessible limits the possibility of detection.

They pointed out that instances have arisen wherein cargo has been indicated by the instrument search to be radioactive and they have ascertained, for example, that certain types of fertilizer procured primarily in Baltic countries have a limited amount of radioactivity and react positively to the search. They stated that where such positive test is indicated, the ship is not permitted to enter the inner harbor and dock until the actual source of radioactivity is determined and verified.

Concerning cargo inspection on piers during unloading and following completion of unloading of these ships, they advised that approximately only fifteen percent of ships entering the Port of New York are subject to any cargo inspection due to limited personnel available to Customs at NYC. In addition, where cargo searches are made, approximately only ten percent of the cargo of a specific ship is inspected. In most instances this inspection is limited to dutiable items. They pointed out, in addition, that certain types of material, for example, baled material, is not readily susceptible to search other than piercing by a rod. The reason for this is that if baled material is opened, since it has been baled under extreme pressure, it expands into a great mass and extreme difficulty would be encountered rebaling same without appropriate equipment, which is generally not available on the New York piers. Among such items, they pointed out, are rags, hides, and unfinished furs, all of which are duty free and many of which originate in Russia or Satellite countries.

In connection with this, they pointed out that equipment presently being utilized at New York International Airport and passenger piers in New York for the inspection of personal baggage is not yet available for inspection of such cargo.

Concerning package goods, for example, Polish or Czechoslovak hams, the importation of which is increasing considerably, they pointed out that the inspection of same is extremely limited; that as a general rule only one crate of same is spot checked to verify number and actual content, and in most instances, of this one crate only one can is actually opened for physical inspection, and this primarily to satisfy U. S. Public Health requirements.

Concerning dock security, they advised that there is of necessity limited patrol for dock security by U. S. Customs at New York due to a shortage of port patrolmen, brought about by budgetary considerations.

Concerning numbers of ships and cargo handled, Mr. DILL advised that in 1954, 11,932 ships entered the Port of New York, as compared with 6,208 for Philadelphia, 5,108 for Norfolk, 5,009 for Los Angeles, 4,998 for Baltimore, 4,478 for San Francisco, 4,241 for New Orleans, 3,584 for Houston, 2,309 for Boston, 2,218 for Seattle, and 1,459 for Portland. Mr. DILL and his assistants estimated, although they admittedly had no available figures prepared, that approximately 1,500 lots of cargo as identified by individual consignees entered the Port of New York daily.

Concerning Custom procedure for clearance of such cargo, they advised that upon docking of the ship, U. S. Customs receives a ship manifest which purportedly lists by lot all cargo contained in the ship. The consignee or his custom broker, generally the latter, who is licensed by the U. S. Customs, prepares and files an invoice which identifies the item and its consignee. The duty due and the amount of inspection given to the article is determined by a Customs appraiser who is a specialist in the particular commodity declared on the invoice. As a general rule, the appraiser makes his determination of the amount of inspection and the duty due on the basis of the information contained in the invoice. If actual or real value is deemed necessary to be determined, a sample inspection is made of the goods.

Following determination and payment of duty, the cargo is cleared for removal on instructions of the consignee or his broker by a drayage service. It is removed either for warehousing or trans-shipment to other parts of the United States. An alternative to this procedure exists where the Customs broker

arranges for the shipment to proceed in Customs bond to an inland port. In such case, there is no inspection in New York but the cargo is appropriately marked as being under bond with instructions to public carriers to deliver only to a bonded Custom warehouse at the inland port. They pointed out with regard to this that the inland ports of the United States have very limited Customs personnel for inspection purposes and, in addition, the opportunities for substitution of a similarly marked and sized article to the bonded shipment are multiple in the course of its shipment to the bonded Customs warehouse.

Mr. DILL pointed out that it was manifestly impossible for U. S. Customs to do anything but a spot inspection of incoming ships' cargoes. He said any attempt to handle an inspection on a full scale covering all shipments would tie up the port immediately by requiring the use of all available Customs men even for one ship.

Representatives of Customs were questioned as to any intelligence service which they maintain abroad which might assist in the instant problem, and they advised that such intelligence service was practically non-existent. They stated that to their knowledge there were approximately ten Customs representatives in Western Europe, most of whom were engaged in administrative duties and were neither equipped nor trained for intelligence activities. They stated that Customs does receive some intelligence information concerning smuggling activities, but that such information is normally provided by disgruntled competitors of the smugglers in the trade handling the smuggled commodity. For example, they pointed out that Swiss watch dealers will on occasions inform of smuggling activities of competitors solely because of business losses which they are suffering through the unfair competition.

They were asked whether or not they had in their possession a list of known or suspected international smugglers which might be checked against Bureau files for purposes of developing logical suspects who might be ideologically adapted to carry out the plan furnished to State Department representatives. They advised that they did not have any list of known or suspected international smugglers. They advised that they did maintain a stop list of approximately 2,000 passengers and 533 crew members,

~~SECRET~~

who, for one reason or another, are given close attention if their arrival is detected by U. S. Customs. This list was reviewed by the interviewing agents and it consists of a typed list of names with a corresponding number assigned arbitrarily by Customs. These numbers in turn direct Customs in their files to whatever original letter or document warranted the placing of the name on their list. These letters come from such agencies as the FBI, Narcotics, Bureau of Customs, and law enforcement agencies generally who desire information or specific search of an individual on his entry into the United States.

Concerning possible means of smuggling the atom bombs or other weapons of mass destruction into the United States, the Customs officials expressed a unanimous opinion that if such were actually accomplished it would be conducted in the following manner.

The necessary parts of the bombs would be shipped from an Iron Curtain country to either a free port of Western Europe or, for that matter, into the hands of sympathizers or agents in Western Europe. Here it would be repacked to indicate origin in Western Europe and to indicate that it consisted of a commodity other than its true nature. Here, Customs pointed out, that they have no means of determining except by actual inspection of an article, with knowledge of its obvious origin, what the true and actual origin of a shipment is.

They believe that rather than making an attempt to smuggle the item into the United States, it would be openly entered in a lot of articles consisting primarily of the described article. For example, a part of a bomb would be encased in a lot of actual sewing machine parts. A good possibility also exists that if the Soviets are aware of our Custom procedures, they would attempt to enter the article in the guise of a duty-free article, being aware that such are subject to a minimum of Customs inspection. They believe that such an attempt would be made at one of the largest ports such as New York, where the volume for Customs would guarantee minimum coverage.

In conclusion, the Customs officials' statements and information furnished by them may be summarized as follows:

1. There is only spot coverage of cargo.

2. There is no possible coverage by Customs concerning trans-shipped items and mislabeled and misdeclared cargo except as revealed by spot inspection.

3. The volume of import at NYC defeats effective coverage.

4. Precious metals such as platinum, which might be used to shield fissionable material, are subject only to a scratch test for assay purposes.

5. Customs possesses no workable master list of all importers. However, should suspected importers be developed, a stop can be placed against same.

6. Customs conducts no investigation of new importers.

On 2/1/55, Captain [redacted] USCG, Captain of the Port of New York, was interviewed by the agents. Captain [redacted] was likewise unaware of the contents of rebutel and was advised of same. Captain [redacted] advised that ships subject to search on entry to American ports are, in general, in three categories as follows: b7C

Category A: Russian flag ships which are not permitted to enter any eastern ports except New Haven. To Captain [redacted] knowledge, none have entered there since this restriction was imposed. He indicated that this information was of a confidential nature.

Category B: Satellite flag vessels, none of which have entered the Port of New York in recent times. If such do arrive, they likewise will be forced to unload at New Haven.

Category C: Vessels of any flag which have touched at a Russian or Satellite port in the previous four months.

Concerning Yugoslav flag ships, Captain [redacted] stated that same have not been classed as Satellites and are considered under Category C only if they have touched at a Russian or Satellite port as required. He advised that all ships of Category C b7C

are stopped at Ambrose Light and brought under escort to Gravesend Bay. On occasions of extremely bad weather, the ships are permitted to proceed as far as the Narrows, the entrance to the inner harbor.

Captain [redacted] outlined the joint search conducted by Customs and the Coast Guard as described above and agreed with Customs officials as to the limitations thereof. If cleared after search, the ship is maintained under waterside and pier surveillance while in port. Captain [redacted] pointed out that as a practical matter the shortcoming of the present system exists in the fact that ships rather than cargo are categorized as to origin. This, of course, is of necessity because of the difficulty of determining actual origin of cargo. b7C

Concerning the number of ships boarded, searched and placed under surveillance in the past eight months, Captain [redacted] furnished the following figures:

May, 1954	10
June, 1954	5
July, 1954	5
August, 1954	6
September, 1954	9
October, 1954	8
November, 1954	11
December, 1954	15

It would appear that approximately eight to nine Category C ships on an average enter the Port of New York monthly. However, it is noted that the past four months reflect a marked increase in such traffic.

Captain [redacted] pointed out in addition that in all probability a person intent on bringing an atomic bomb or other weapon into the United States on behalf of Russia or a Satellite country would not utilize any ships of the above categories but would utilize a neutral or friendly flag ship which innocently would carry trans-shipped and mislabled material.

Captain [redacted] advised that the Coast Guard has collected some information as to searches conducted by Russia and Satellite countries of ships other than their own flag entering their ports. He exhibited reports of interviews with b7C

ship masters who had called at Russian or Satellite ports. In general, these reports reflected: (1) No apparent use of instrument devices to search the ships; (2) Apparent concentration in the search for stowaways both incoming and outgoing.

A cursory review of these reports oddly enough indicated that the searches conducted by the Russians were the less thorough. On one occasion a search conducted of an Esso Standard Oil tanker, the MV Nayade, of Panamanian nationality and registry, while at Novorossisk, Russia on 10/22/54, consisted solely of a boarding by a doctor, two Customs officers, two Police officers, and a welfare officer, who merely changed money and collected passports.

In conclusion, the interview with Captain [redacted] might be summarized as follows:

b7C

1. A Coast Guard and Customs search prior to docking is dictated solely by the registry of the vessel or its whereabouts in the previous four months.

2. The search is admittedly limited in efficiency.

3. Search is not determined by actual origin of cargo even if known.

SUGGESTIONS OF THE NEW YORK OFFICE

In view of the foregoing information, the following suggestions are made by the NYO with a view to attempting to develop information which might be of assistance in forestalling the plot outlined in rebutel or similar plot:

b1

1. A request be made of the State Department [redacted] (S) through further interrogation of the Nice and Luxembourg informants to endeavor to ascertain the following:

A. The actual name of any participant or the pseudonym intended to be used for entry or consignment of the shipment.

B. The cover commodity to be used to disguise the part or parts of the bomb.

C. The particular port or area from which the shipment will be made.

D. The port to which the shipment will be made in the United States.

E. The registry or identity of the ship or ships being utilized.

If any part of the above information can be obtained, steps can be taken with Coast Guard and Customs at New York to insure closer or, if necessary, full inspection of suspected articles or ships. Stops can be placed against entry or importation by any known participants. While still a major operation, this would help to pinpoint what is now only spot coverage on a huge and unworkable volume.

2. [redacted] (S) b1

3. [redacted] (S)

4. Development by all field offices of the FBI in the United States of any suspect companies or individuals of Communist or Communist sympathy background who might act as consignees for the questioned shipments. If such names are furnished to U. S. Customs, they can be placed on a nation-wide stop list. Particular emphasis in this regard should be placed on importing companies newly organized by Communist Party members or sympathizers or contacts of these who might be utilized wittingly or unwittingly as the consignee.

THIS PROCEDURE BEING FOLLOWED BY FIELD RE: CUSTOMS SPECIAL WATCHLIST SAC LETTER NO NUMBER "A" 1-23-52. LW

5. Alerting of informants within the Communist Party in the United States and informants having knowledge of Russian or Satellite activities within the United States as to establishment of any suspect companies as outlined above, particularly in the import field, so that same may be placed on a stop list.

In conclusion, the following additional recommendation is being brought to the attention of the Bureau:

Customs officials have advised that the Moore McCormack Steamship Lines are practically the sole American vessels touching on western, Russian and Satellite ports. It is known by the Bureau that the Moore McCormack Lines, for the past twenty-five years, have acted as the sole shipping agent for the USSR government. Custom officials have advised that it is their understanding that this agency is continued by Moore McCormack at the behest of the United States Government partially for intelligence purposes.

They advised that Commodore ROBERT C. LEE, Vice Chairman of the Board of Directors of Moore McCormack, is a Naval Intelligence reserve officer and would have considerable information concerning the experiences of his ships in Russian and Satellite ports. Permission is requested by the NYO to interview Commodore LEE to ascertain what knowledge he has of activities in Russian Satellite ports and what knowledge he might possibly be able to ascertain through his employees who enter these ports with a particular view in mind of having noted any suspicious shipments being made to the United States or shipped to other European ports, where in turn same might be trans-shipped by another line to the United States.

Until advised by the Bureau, no interview will be conducted with Commodore LEE.

F.B.I. TELETYPE

4-41a

DECODED COPY

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Sizoo
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

FBI, SEATTLE 2-9-55 NR 092310 7:46 PM PST

DIRECTOR AND SACS PORTLAND, SAN FRANCISCO AND LOS ANGELES

DEFERRED

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF OR OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION IN TO THE U.S., AEA. RE CODED BUTEL JANUARY 29, LAST. [redacted] U.S. CUSTOMS, SEATTLE, ADVISES INFORMATION ORIGINATING FROM MOSCOW JANUARY 20, LAST, RECEIVED BY STATE DEPARTMENT FROM INFORMANT [redacted] AT NICE REFLECTS QUOTE THE GOODS IN QUESTION(ATOM BOMBS) HAVE BEEN SENT TO A PACIFIC PORT FOR SHIPMENT UNQUOTE-NO FURTHER DETAILS. [redacted] INTERPRETES THIS TO MEAN THAT BOMBS SENT TO A PACIFIC PORT IN U.S. FOR SHIPMENT INLAND. ANOTHER INTERPRETATION COULD BE THAT BOMBS SENT TO PACIFIC PORT IN RUSSIA OR ASIA FOR SHIPMENT TO U.S. [redacted] BELIEVES SS MARINE ARROW, WHICH APPEARS TO BE OWNED BY JOSHUA HENDY CORPORATION, LOS ANGELES, BUT IN FACT OWNED BY AN QUOTE UNKNOWN GREEK OUTFIT UNQUOTE AND WHICH HE STATES HAS A CREW LARGELY COMMUNIST AND HAS CARRIED NARCOTICS IN THE PAST, IS GOOD SUSPECT CARRIER OF BOMBS. THIS SHIP HAS RECENTLY CLEARED RAYMOND AND ABERDEEN, WASHINGTON, GOOS BAY, OREGON, AND IS PRESENTLY EITHER IN SAN FRANCISCO OR EN ROUTE TO FAR EAST. [redacted] HAS ARRANGED TO BE ADVISED WHEN SHIP NEXT CLEARS FAR EAST FOR U.S. PORT. [redacted] SPECIFICALLY REQUESTS OWNERS OR AGENTS OF SHIP NOT BE CONTACTED.

b7C
b7D

THIS POINT CLEARED UP IN BUR AIRTEL 2-10-55 LW

AUERBACH

PORTLAND, SAN FRANCISCO AND LOS ANGELES ADVISED

WA 10:55 PM OK FBI WA JG
SF OK FBI SF LDS
LA OK FBI LA JBA

RECEIVED 2-9-55 11:02 PM REH

RECORDED - 117-

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's coding systems.

Mr. Belmont

7-182

4-7-00 SP4 BJA/LBm

FD-36
Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tr m
Mr. Sizoo
Mr. Wintorrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Transmit the following Teletype message to:

AIRTEL

FBI PITTSBURGH (117-38) 2/9/55

DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268)

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES. RE SAC LETTERS 55-7 DATED 2/1/55. ON 2/8/55 SAMUEL KLINVEX, COLLECTOR, U.S. CUSTOMS OFFICE, ROOM 539, NEW FEDERAL BUILDING, PITTSBURGH, PA., ADVISED SA [redacted] THAT HE HAD BEEN ALERTED BY HIS SUPERIORS CONCERNING THE SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMB PARTS INTO THE U.S. KLINVEX ADVISED THAT IT HAD COME TO HIS ATTENTION UPON INSPECTION AT EAST PITTSBURGH, PA., THAT A CRATE SHIPPED FROM BREMEN, WEST GERMANY, TO WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION EAST PITTSBURGH, PA., CONTAINING A ROUGH-MACHINED RETAINING RING WEIGHING 3124 POUNDS, HAD BEEN BROKEN OPEN, LEAVING A HOLE ABOUT 8 INCHES IN DIAMETER. KLINVEX WAS OF THE OPINION THAT A SMALL OBJECT COULD HAVE BEEN REMOVED OR INSERTED THROUGH THIS HOLE. KLINVEX STATED THAT NORMALLY THIS BROKEN CARTON WOULD NOT HAVE CUASED HIM ANY ALARM AS THIS TYPE OF THING IS A

DWE:flh
(4)
(117-38)

3 - Bureau (117-268)(RM)

RECORDED - 88

EX-107

FEB 11 1955

Mr. Belmont

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____

Special Agent in Charge

60 FEB 16 1955

TRANIGAN

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-7-80 BY SP4 BJM/bm

FD-36

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Transmit the following Teletype message to:

PAGE TWO

COMMON OCCURRENCE. HE SAID, HOWEVER, THAT IN VIEW OF THE INSTRUCTIONS HE HAD JUST RECEIVED HE FELT THAT SOMEONE SHOULD BE NOTIFIED. ON 2/9/55, CAPTAIN [redacted] PLANT PROTECTION OFFICER, WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION, EAST PITTSBURGH, ADVISED SA [redacted] THAT THE SHIPMENT MENTIONED ABOVE ARRIVED AT THAT PLANT WEIGHING THE SAME AS INDICATED ON THE INVOICE AND IT APPEARED THAT NOTHING WAS MISSING FROM THE SHIPMENT AND THAT IT HAD NOT BEEN DISTURBED. NO FURTHER INVESTIGATION IS BEING CONDUCTED REGARDING THIS MATTER BY THIS OFFICE.

b7C

HALLFORD

END

Approved:_____ Sent_____M Per_____

Special Agent in Charge




Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Sizoo
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

FBI, INDIANAPOLIS 2/7/55

AIRTEL

DIRECTOR, FBI

RUDOLPH WECKERING, ATOMIC ENERGY ACT. RE IP LET FEBRUARY 4, 1955. IN CONNECTION WITH SAC LETTER 55-7, SECTION (M), ENTITLED "SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF," ETC., THE BUREAU'S ATTENTION IS CALLED TO THE FACT THAT [redacted] ALLEGEDLY OBTAINED BOOK AND BROCHURES IN LUXEMBOURG. IT IS SUGGESTED THE BUREAU MAY DESIRE TO CHECK THIS MATERIAL EITHER AT ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION, OR IF NOT YET RECEIVED HAVE THE PHOENIX OFFICE CHECK WITH [redacted] REPORTER OF THE PHOENIX GAZETTE.

b7C

BLAYLOCK

HAK:BH
117-0
cc: 2 - Phoenix
(7)

NOT RECORDED
126 FEB. 16 1955

AIRTEL

SAC, BELMONT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-7-00 BY SP4 BJA LBm

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. BELMONT

DATE: February 1, 1955

FROM : W. A. BRANIGAN

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: COUNTER-MEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION IN PLACE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES.

Smuggling Atom Bombs

Joint IIC/ICIS Committee on counter-measures met Room 2515, Justice Building, 10:30 A.M., 2/1/55. Present were Leonard Bienvenu and Carl Pfuntner of the ICIS Secretariat; Captain Stewart of Coast Guard, Colonel Beckedorff of AEC, Mr. B. Willard, ONI, and Supervisor L. Whitson, FBI, The latter two represented IIC.

Items considered were:

1.

1. An announcement by Colonel Beckedorff that bids for 16 portable detection devices had been opened by AEC 10 days ago. Contracts would be signed in two weeks and delivery of the devices would be made 60 days thereafter. These portable devices are for field testing and experimentation at the various ports of entry with particular attention to their use in searching railroad trains and automobile border traffic. b2 b7E

2. Colonel Beckedorff stated that the [redacted]

3. Pfuntner stated that he was following Customs for statistics on the number of unaccompanied pieces of baggage and shipments which were received in the United States en route to some Soviet or satellite official establishment.

4. Pfuntner will prepare for the signatures of the Chairman of IIC and the Chairman of ICIS a memorandum to Mr. Lay of NSC transmitting classified and unclassified descriptions of thermonuclear weapon components for NSC approval as to dissemination.

5. The ICIS is requesting Customs to maintain statistics on number, size and estimated weight of all Soviet and satellite diplomatic accompanied baggage and pouches.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4/9/03 BY SP4 BSP/MJS

Tickler: Mr. Belmont
Mr. Branigan
Mr. Whitson

LW:baw
(4)

RECORDED-35

INDEXED-35

117-268-687

13 FEB 11 195

6. The committee discussed the report on the experimental detection program submitted by the Advisory Group consisting of representatives of Coast Guard, Customs, Immigration and AEC. There were numerous questions which would have to be answered by the Advisory Group prior to any submission to the IIC and to ICIS. Accordingly, arrangements were made by the Joint Committee to meet with the Advisory Group at 10:00 A.M., Monday, February 7, 1955, in connection with the report. The most encouraging information was that supplied by Colonel Beckedorff that research is under way toward the actual development of an active detection device which would activate fissionable material by means of a stream of neutrons. This active device could be as small as a cubic yard and weigh less than 200 pounds. This is a big development over the 70 foot, 6 ton monster previously thought necessary for this purpose.

RECOMMENDATION:

None. For your information. You will be kept informed of the developments.

tic - [redacted]

tic [redacted] Mr. Whitson -

AIR-TEL
URGENT

FEBRUARY 10, 1955

RECORDED - 45

117-3608-1 58

Ex-117

SACS, ALBANY (orig & 1) HONOLULU (2ccs) NORFOLK (2ccs)
ALBUQUERQUE (2ccs) HOUSTON " PHILADELPHIA "
ANCHORAGE " INDIANAPOLIS " PHOENIX "
BALTIMORE " LOS ANGELES " PITTSBURGH "
BOSTON " MIAMI " PORTLAND "
BUFFALO " MILWAUKEE " RICHMOND "
BUTTE " MINNEAPOLIS " SAN ANTONIO "
CHARLOTTE " MOBILE " SAN DIEGO "
CHICAGO " NEWARK " SAN FRANCISCO "
CLEVELAND " NEW HAVEN " SAN JUAN "
DETROIT " NEW ORLEANS " SAVANNAH "
EL PASO " NEW YORK " SEATTLE "
WASHINGTON FIELD (BCS (2ccs)

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF OR WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES, ATOMIC ENERGY ACT. REBUAIRTEL FEBRUARY 8, 1955. [redacted] INFORMANT OF U. S. VICE CONSUL, AT NICE, FRANCE, REPORTED FEBRUARY 9, 1955, THAT SHIPMENT OF ATOMIC BOMBS POSSIBLY LEAVING FROM PORT ARTHUR, MANCHURIA, ON UNKNOWN DATE. [redacted] WAS UNABLE TO PROVIDE FURTHER DETAILS.

[redacted] RELIABILITY STILL UNDETERMINED.

b7C
b7D

HOOVER

LW:fjm
(78)

(A cover memo from A. H. Belmont to L. V. Boardman was prepared by LW:fjm on February 10, 1955, in connection with this outgoing mail.)

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

COMM - FBI
FEB 10 1955
MAILED 20

FEB 10 1955

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4-7-00 BY SP4 BJA/LBM

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. L. V. Boardman

DATE: February 10, 1955

FROM : A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF OR WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

Tolson
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By air-tel, February 8, 1955, Bureau furnished to border, seaport and Great Lakes offices information from State Department informant, Nice, France, that atomic materials were supposed to have been sent to a "Pacific port for shipment."

On February 9, 1955, the Legal Attache, Paris, reported that Embassy had received word that the informant in Nice had reported that the materials might be shipped from Port Arthur, Manchuria. These data were received by the State Department in Washington, D. C., February 10, 1955, and are being disseminated by State to all agencies receiving the original information.

RECOMMENDATION:

There is attached an air-tel to the offices which received the February 8, 1955, air-tel informing them of the latest report.

Attachment

LW:fjm
(4)

cc - Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Whitson

RECORDED - 65
117-268-688
EX-117
18 FEB 15 1955

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4-7-00 BY SP4 BJA/LBM

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: February 14, 1955

FROM : W. A. Branigan

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
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Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
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SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION IN PLACE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

The Joint Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference-Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security Committee on Countermeasures met at 10:00 a.m., February 14, 1955, in Room 3524, Justice Building.

The Advisory Group's report of field testing was carefully reviewed and thoroughly discussed. The Committee directed Carl Pfuntner of the IIC Secretariat to prepare a draft document on the basis of the discussions for submission to the IIC and ICIS. This document may be completed by Friday, February 18, 1955.

SMUGGLING Atom Bombs

RECOMMENDATION:

None. This is for your information. You will be kept informed of developments.

LW:fjm
(5)

cc - Mr. Belmont
Mr. Branigan
Mr. E. S. Sanders, Room 7635
Mr. Whitson

RECORDED - 45

117-268-

10 FEB 15 1955

7-189

EX-117

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-7-00 BY SP4 BJA/LBM

cc - Mr. Whiteon

AIR-TEL

URGENT

EX-110

RECORDED-16

FEBRUARY 15, 1955

~~SECRET~~

SAC, NEW HAVEN

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES. REURAIRTEL 2/11/55, REGARDING IDENTIFICATION OF INFORMER OF US LEGATION, LUXEMBOURG, AS [redacted] AND ONE OF THE SMUGGLERS AS [redacted] AKA [redacted] BUREAU INDICES NEGATIVE AS TO INFORMER AS WELL AS ALLEGED SMUGGLER. [redacted] (S)

b1
b7C
b7D

HOOVER

117-268

cc - 117-1833 [redacted] aka)

LW:fjm

(5)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

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FEB 1955 COMM-FBI

38 FEB

4-9-03
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Per ltr. dtd. 10-14-03
60267 uc/NSI/bja/RNP 10-29-03

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 117-1833

FD-36

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. Boardman	
Mr. Nichols	
Mr. Belmont	
Mr. Harbo	
Mr. Mohr	
Mr. Parsons	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Tamm	
Mr. Sizoo	
Mr. Winterrowd	
Tele. Room	
Mr. Holloman	
Miss Gandy	

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Transmit the following Teletype message to:

FBI, NEW HAVEN 2/11/55 CES:nbm

DIRECTOR, FBI . . . . . AIRTEL

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF OR WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES. ATOMIC ENERGY ACT. REBUTEL 2/8/55 AND SAC LET NO. 55-7 (M). CHARLES ARKELL, DEPUTY COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, NEW HAVEN, CONN., ADVISED THIS OFFICE HE HAD RECEIVED A CIRCULAR NO. X 110 DATED 2/10/55 WITH ENCLOSURES CIRCULAR NO. X 109 DATED 2/9/55 AND A TELEGRAM FROM U. S. LEGATION, LUXEMBURG TO SECRETARY OF STATE DATED 1/28/55 SIGNED "BUCHANAN" RELATING TO SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS INTO THE U. S. THESE DOCUMENTS IDENTIFIED THE LEGATION'S INFORMER AS [redacted] AND ONE [redacted] AKA [redacted] RESIDING [redacted]

ABOVE DATA BEING FORWARDED TO YOU FOR INFORMATION AS THIS OFFICE DOES NOT KNOW WHETHER BUREAU HAS RECEIVED SAME.

CASPER

END

117-20

Mr. Belmont

EX-[illegible] 2-11-55 Letter to Mr. Belmont (Y)

RECORDED-16

117-268

6 FEB 14 1955

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-9-03 BY SP4CM/ksw

Approved:_____ Sent_____M Per_____

Special Agent in Charge

cc - BRANIGAN

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b7C
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CIPHER PAD CODE

FEBRUARY 15, 1955

cc - Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Whitson

LEGAL ATTACHE
PARIS, FRANCE

~~SECRET~~

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO UNITED STATES.

REURCAB FEBRUARY NINE THAT EMBASSY HAD RECEIVED WORD IMFORMANT [redacted] REPORTED MATERIALS MIGHT BE SHIPPED FROM PORT ARTHUR. YOU SHOULD RESOLVE THIS SERIES OF ALLEGATIONS IMMEDIATELY. ADVISE WHETHER FRENCH AUTHORITIES HAVE BEEN BROUGHT IN. ADVISE IMMEDIATELY STATUS INVESTIGATION ALLEGATIONS BY [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] b1 b7C b7D

ADVISE HOW THESE FACTS RECONCILE WITH COMPLETE UNRELIABILITY OF [redacted] REPORTED BY OSI. IS OSI'S DETERMINATION OF UNRELIABILITY PREDICATED CURRENT ALLEGATIONS OR SOME PRIOR STATEMENT BY [redacted] ADVISE WHAT EXTENT HAVE BELGIAN AUTHORITIES BEEN BROUGHT INTO THIS MATTER. IF [redacted] IDENTIFIED AND LOCATED SUBMIT YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS FOR INTERVIEW.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

117-268
LW:fjm
(7)

cc - 117-1833 [redacted] aka)

cc - Foreign Service Desk

HOOVER

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EX 103
117-368

NR. 226
ENC. [illegible] BY
CK. 6000-0038 BY
APPROVED BY
TYPED BY
FILED BY

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FEB 16 1955

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Winterrowd
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Holloman
Gandy

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Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. S. B. Donahoe
Mr. Whitson

SAC, Seattle (original and one) February 14, 1955

PERSONAL ATTENTION

Director, FBI

RECORDED-11

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

Ex-124

Reurlet 2/4/55, setting out results of discussions which you have had with the heads of unspecified organizations for the State of Washington regarding the problem of smuggling of atomic bombs. You indicated you have discovered that there is no effective plan of prevention of smuggling in the Pacific northwest area, either from the sea or across the Canadian border.

[redacted]

[redacted] Bids are now being let by the Atomic Energy Commission for a restricted number of these devices

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 11/6/03 BY SP4 CONTINUED

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LW:fjm
(7)

MAILED 8
FEB 15 1955
COMM-FBI

(A cover memo from A.H.Belmont to L.V.Boardman was prepared by LW:fjm on 2/11/55, in connection with this outgoing mail.)

FEB 21 1955

98

which can be utilized by the Coast Guard in ship searches and by Customs checking rail passengers' and motor vehicle passengers' baggage.

It has been recommended by Customs and Coast Guard personnel that a number of [redacted] be considered for the use of Coast Guard and Customs in the Seattle area. The decision will ultimately be made by the National Security Council. b2 b7E

In the meantime, Customs and Coast Guard in the Seattle area will have to do their best with what they now have. The point has been made by those two agencies that advance intelligence is extremely beneficial in the discharge of their responsibilities.

Your attention is directed to No Number SAC Letter A, Series 1952, dated January 28, 1952, in which you were advised that the Bureau of Customs is charged with the responsibility of preventing the clandestine introduction into this country of atomic, biological, chemical, radiological or other types of weapons of mass destruction. You were told that Customs was compiling a watch list of individuals, firms and other organizations which, because of their sympathy with, or association with, the Soviet bloc of countries, might be utilized for the clandestine introduction into this country of such items. You were given instructions regarding notification to the Bureau concerning the identity of individuals and firms which are recommended by you for inclusion in the Customs watch list. You still have the responsibility for bringing to the attention of the Bureau any such persons as may come within the purview of that watch list.

In your contacts with Customs or Coast Guard you should avoid any suggestion that we are attempting to tell them how to discharge their responsibilities. You should, of course, keep the Bureau informed of any Coast Guard or Customs operations which would affect FBI operations either beneficially or detrimentally.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 2-4-55

FROM : SAC, SEATTLE

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES
AEA

Reference is made to Bureau coded teletype 1/29/55 concerning the above-captioned matter.

Inasmuch as instant communication and SAC Letter 54-1 (H) of 1/5/54, as well as No Number SAC Letters 55-B of 1/21/55 and G of 11/13/53, advised that the substance of this data had been disseminated to particular other agencies concerned therewith, I have conferred with the heads of those organizations for the State of Washington in a very general way concerning the matter with the following results, which I felt should be brought to the attention of the Bureau:

In considering the problem at hand, we of course are continually alert to the possibility that Soviets may attempt to smuggle a bomb into this country. There does not appear to be much the FBI can do to prevent a bomb from being brought into the country, but the primary responsibility in this regard lies with Customs, Coast Guard, etc.; however, were a Soviet bomb discovered in the United States, our jurisdiction and responsibility would then be clear. Everyone recognizes that the public generally and particularly all Government agencies charged with security must work together and make every effort to prevent any such attempt. Accordingly, I felt that so far as reasonably and conceivably possible I wanted to find out what control such agencies had and what steps they were taking to protect the country from such imports. I was interested in what specific direction they had received and what cooperatively could be undertaken as a practical matter to augment their present plans in order that we not be charged with negligence in any form, even in the strictest interpretation of our own responsibility.

I learned at the conference that other agencies have received the general content of information furnished in reftel as well as their alerting, but this has resulted in practically no change from their routine. The heads of the agencies certainly are ignorant, almost to the point of being unable to ask an intelligent question, concerning even the most fundamental facts pertaining to fissionable material. Naturally, the result of this

RDA:LM
(3)

REGISTERED MAIL

RECORDED-11 117-268-692

16 FEB

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DECLASSIFIED BY SP1CTM/CAW ON 11/10/03

is that their subordinates who are doing the everyday screening know even less, and it all winds up to the conclusion that actually nothing specific is being done toward preventing such import into the United States.

Probably the reason for no effective plan of prevention lies in the nature of the bomb itself. When you consider the bomb can be made in almost any shape or size, that it can be hidden or disguised in almost any conceivable manner, that given the fissionable material a bomb can be constructed from material available on the open market, that it can be handled with bare hands, that a high school student with a little instruction can assemble a bomb with a screwdriver, pliers, etc. in his basement or any small room, it could be practically impossible to detect without mechanical equipment highly sensitive to radioactivity within a large area such as a ship, warehouse, truck, etc. I understand that Geiger counters are not practical nor sensitive enough to be effective, but I learned that most agencies do not even have these. In considering the reason for a lack of plan, it should also be recognized that we have between five hundred and one thousand miles of coastline with 23 official legitimate ports of entry in this State, as well as a main north and south road out of Western Canada, that is Route 99, which is an avenue for cargo from all ships of the world which put in at Vancouver and Victoria, British Columbia. The agencies involved just don't have sufficient personnel to cover these avenues of entry effectively, let alone make a thorough physical inspection of all freight, cargo or baggage necessary to detect a bomb.

The result of the above means that as a practical proposition physical sight examination by the inspectors of the above Services of what does go through here, and which is only on a spot check basis without any real thorough examination, is the only screening there is. This being so, it is of no value, since the personnel doing such screening have no idea as to potentiality of form nor of content of an imported atomic weapon.

While all of the people who sat in on this conference of "ways and means" have been cleared for Top Secret material, and although they individually in the past have had access to and knowledge concerning a lot of the devices themselves, they are so proscribed by their regulations that they can't even talk about it among our little group alone, much less disseminate the necessary background data to their personnel to have them do any good screening.

DIRECTOR, FBI
RE: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF OR OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES; AEA

SAC, SEATTLE
2-4-55

In the absence of effective mechanical detectors necessary to handle the situation efficiently and having to depend upon physical sight examination alone, it was decided by the group that they would canvass the possibilities of their individual coverage and endeavor to institute a program of closer inspection. We agreed to meet again to decide what could be done, practically, to correlate efforts in a cooperative, joint, over-all plan of action which will better cover the possible avenues and opportunities for smuggling. Although this office cannot participate in that which is the work and responsibility of other agencies, we are taking the initiative in getting these agencies to pool their efforts and effect some direction to the problem at hand. We are compelled to take this initiative if we are going to be in any position at all to discharge our own responsibility.

Reftel indicates that eight disassembled units for eventual assembly in the United States, and according to another report sixteen cases weighing nine tons, are to be smuggled into the United States. Our only alternative is to assume that the bombs will not be completely disguised and therefore will be readily detectable. We must also assume that "disassembled" merely means that the bomb proper and the core or fissionable material are in separate packages. It is felt due to the weight, number of packages and size, this is probably the only assumption under which any kind of physical screening without detectors could be intelligently carried on.

The intelligence contained in reftel has made it clear to me that no semblance of safety from smuggled bombs can be effected unless responsible agencies are supplied with whatever mechanical detecting equipment is available.

I understand that the Naval Research Laboratory at Washington, in cooperation with AEA, has developed on an experimental basis a very sensitive detector of radioactivity. I refer to the [redacted] I think the Bureau should take the lead in demanding that these detectors be made in sufficient numbers to supply these security agencies. As this problem stands now, this country is wide open to this type of attack, and there is almost nothing but stopgap measures that can prevent it. b2 b7E

The foregoing is being furnished the Bureau for its suggestions, recommendations or instructions in connection with our desire to formulate a feasible, workable plan within this State.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. L. V. Boardman

DATE: February 11, 1955

FROM : A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES

Tolson
Boardman
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By letter of 2/4/55, SAC Auerbach, Seattle, transmitted to Bureau his ideas and observations regarding the lack of effective means of preventing smuggling of atomic weapons into the Pacific northwest. It is inferred that Mr. Auerbach participated in a conference of organizations responsible for the prevention of smuggling, presumably Customs and Coast Guard.

The activity of the SAC, Seattle, was predicated upon Bureau teletype, 1/29/55, in captioned matter, advising seaport, border and Great Lakes offices that informants of Department of State in France and Luxembourg had reported alleged Soviet plans to smuggle parts of atomic weapons into the United States. The problem of detection of and defense against atomic weapons has been discussed in the following SAC letters since the Fall of 1951:

1. No Number SAC Letter F, Series 1951, 10/5/51, re "National Intelligence Estimates (Soviet capabilities for a surprise attack on the continental United States before July, 1952)" in which dimensions of possible Soviet clandestine weapons were furnished and factual material furnished to Customs and Coast Guard by the Atomic Energy Commission was set out.

2. No Number SAC Letter U, Series 1951, 12/13/51, re "National Intelligence Estimates (Soviet capabilities for a surprise attack on the continental United States before July, 1952)" which describes the ease of assembling of clandestine atomic weapons and points out that a Geiger counter is of no value in detection of clandestine atomic weapons. (SAC Auerbach apparently discussed the ineffectiveness of the Geiger counter at the mentioned conference).

3. No Number SAC Letter A, Series 1952, 1/28/52, re "Smuggling of Atomic Bombs or Parts Thereof and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction into the United States," which points out the Bureau of Customs is charged with the responsibility of preventing clandestine introduction into the United States of atomic, biological, chemical, radiological or other types of weapons of mass destruction.

Attachment
LW:fjm
(4)
cc - Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Whitson

RECORDED-27 117-260-693

EX-109

5-WHITSON

51 FEB 23

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4/10/83 BY Sp/am/kmw

The field was told that Customs was compiling a watch list of individuals, firms and other organizations which, because of their sympathy with, or association with, the Soviet bloc of countries, might be utilized for the clandestine introduction into the United States of such items. The field was given instructions regarding notification to the Bureau concerning identity of individuals and firms which are recommended by the field offices for inclusion in the Customs watch list. The field was instructed to keep the Bureau advised of proper individuals and firms for the Customs watch list on a continuing basis.

4. No Number SAC Letter Z, Series 1952, 8/7/52, re "Smuggling of Atomic Bombs or Parts Thereof and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction into the United States," which points out the developments in weapons research makes it necessary to completely revised downward the size of atomic weapons and their component parts and that fissionable material can be smuggled in on the person. Reference is again made to the special Customs watch list.

5. No Number SAC Letter AM, Series 1952, 12/10/52, re "Smuggling of Atomic Bombs or Parts Thereof and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction into the United States," which furnished additional information regarding clandestine atomic weapons and advised the field that possible measures to counter the clandestine introduction of atomic bombs or fissionable material are being studied by a special committee on which the FBI is represented.

6. No Number SAC Letter 53-F, 11/3/53, re "Smuggling of Atomic Bombs or Parts Thereof and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction into the United States," furnished to the field "restricted data" and information on atomic weapons.

7. No Number SAC Letter 53-G, Series 1953, 11/13/53, re "Smuggling of Atomic Bombs or Parts Thereof and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction into the United States," furnishing additional information regarding the components of atomic weapons which have been authorized by the National Security Council and the President for release to the field enforcement personnel of the Coast Guard, Customs and Immigration Service.

8. SAC Letter No. 54-1 (H) re "Smuggling of Atomic Bombs or Parts Thereof and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction into the United States," furnished a statement by the President released at the White House, 12/15/53, pointing out the investigative

jurisdiction of the FBI in violations of the Atomic Energy Act and also attaching an unclassified description of atomic devices and component parts which was disseminated as an insert in the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin for January, 1954.

9. No Number SAC Letter 55-B, 1/21/55, re "Smuggling of Atomic Bombs or parts Thereof and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction into the United States," which discussed descriptions and components of thermonuclear weapons (also known as the fusion weapons or H-Bombs).

10. SAC Letter 55--7 (M), re "Smuggling of Atomic Bombs or Parts Thereof and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction into the United States," furnished to all the field offices the information received from the Department of State regarding allegations made by informants in France and Luxembourg that the Soviets were planning to ship atomic material into the United States.

SAC, Seattle, has determined that there has been very little understanding of the problem on the part of the agencies charged with preventing smuggling and that because of shortage of personnel, the agencies involved cannot cover the avenues of entry effectively let alone make a thorough physical inspection of freight, cargo or baggage necessary to detect atomic materials.

This situation is not confined to Customs and Coast Guard in the Seattle area. The Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security have been pointing out the vulnerability of our land and sea borders to smuggling of atomic weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, in reports to the National Security Council since December, 1952. The reported lack of knowledge regarding atomic weapons on the part of the personnel of the agencies with whom the SAC, Seattle, discussed this problem is one which exists by reason of the personal capabilities of the individuals involved. Detailed information on need-to-know basis has been made available to the administrative heads and to the field personnel of Customs and Coast Guard as indicated in the SAC Letters listed above.

SAC, Seattle, recommends the use of detection devices. The development of the practical detection device for fissionable material has been a top priority research item for the Atomic Energy Commission since the submission of the Director's report to the President on the subject of clandestine atomic weapons 12/4/52.

Experimental models of a fixed or mobile passive detection device, [redacted] have been used in the international airports in New York and San Antonio, Texas, and on the piers in the Port of New York. Small portable detectors, [redacted] have been used experimentally in ship searches on the east coast by Coast Guard. The IIC and ICIS are now studying results of the experiments and field testing of these devices. Representatives of Customs and Coast Guard who supervised the field testing have recommended the procurement of a sufficient number of the [redacted] devices to supply the major ports, including Seattle. The National Security Council will have to make the final decision on any such procurement. These passive detectors will react to unshielded uranium - 235 and to shielded plutonium in amounts of one pound or more carried on the person or in hand baggage.

b2
b7E

The SAC, Seattle, made no reference to the supplying of any names for the special Customs watch list.

RECOMMENDATION:

There is attached a letter to SAC, Seattle, pointing out the status of development of detection devices, the need for the field to furnish to the Bureau data regarding individuals and firms for inclusion on the Customs watch list and pointing out that SAC, Seattle, should avoid any suggestion that we are attempting to tell Customs or Coast Guard how to discharge their responsibilities but that he should keep the Bureau informed of any Coast Guard or Customs operations which would affect FBI operations either beneficially or detrimentally.

These matters will be discussed with SAC Auerbach by Assistant Director Belmont when Mr. Auerbach visits the Bureau.

4-3
(12-2-54)

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DECODE OF CODED CABLE NUMBER 637 DATED FEBRUARY 8, 1955 AT PARIS, FRANCE. RECEIVED VIA THE STATE DEPARTMENT.

URGENT

O

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS AND PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES. REMYCABLE FEBRUARY 7. OSI, BITBURGH, GERMANY, HAS ADVISED OSI, PARIS, THAT ORIGINAL INFORMANT [redacted] IS WELL KNOWN AND A LIAR, SWINDLER, NOT TO BE TRUSTED AND HAS ADMITTED TO OSI, BITBURGH, HE IS FABRICATOR AND SWINDLER. DETAILS WILL BE FURNISHED TO BUREAU WHEN RECEIVED PARIS OFFICE. NO FURTHER ACTION CONTEMPLATED PARIS OFFICE RE ALLEGATION ORIGINATING [redacted]

ROLLAND O. L-ALLIER

RECEIVED: 2-8-55 11:59 AM MAP

117-1233-

b7C
b7D

cc: Mr. Belmont
cc: Mr. Ferris

EX-117

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4/10/03 BY SP4 BSR/ENP

RECORDED-27

117-268-
21 FEB 17 1955

If the intelligence contained in the above message is ~~to be~~ disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

51 FEB 24 1955

4-3
(12-2-54)

~~SECRET~~

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

DECODE OF CODED CABLE NUMBER 636 DATED FEBRUARY 7, 1955 AT PARIS, FRANCE. RECEIVED VIA THE STATE DEPARTMENT.

URGENT

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS AND PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES. REMYCABLE FEBRUARY 5. [redacted]

[redacted] BELGIUM RECORDS (S) REFLECTED PREVIOUS INFORMATION ORIGINATING WITH [redacted] IN 1954 REGARDING [redacted] BY [redacted] WIFE, AND [redacted] ALIAS [redacted] AND [redacted] ALIAS [redacted] ACCORDING TO [redacted] INFORMATION [redacted] AND [redacted] ARRESTED [redacted] BY LUXEMBURG AUTHORITIES FOR [redacted] AND [redacted] ALSO ACCORDING TO [redacted] HAD [redacted] ALLEGEDLY KNOWN TO BITBURGH AIR BASE OSI. BELGIUM SOURCE UNABLE TO IDENTIFY [redacted] AS NAME COMMON. OTHERS IDENTIFIED BUT

RECORDED-27 117-267-1695

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

21 FEB 4 1955

~~SECRET~~

c-c: Mr. Belmont
c-c: Mr. Peterson

117-1883

51 FEB 24 1955

124 7-187

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 117-1883-

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HERE IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

4/7/00 #048743/850935/5970S9
CLASSIFIED BY NSI/BJA/LSM M26 7 Derivative
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X1
Per LTR DTD 10/14/03 6026 Tue/NSI/BJA/RNP 10/29/03

4-3
(12-2-54)

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Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

~~SECRE~~

PAGE 2

NO RECORD ALTHOUGH HAAGDOREN A FORMER BELGIUM CUSTOMS OFFICIAL DISCHARGED FOR INDISCRETION. [redacted]

[redacted] b1 b7C b7D

[redacted] PARIS (S)

OFFICE HAVING OSI, PARIS CHECK OSI, BITBURGH FOR ALL AVAILABLE INFORMATION [redacted] AND OTHERS. PARIS RECOMMENDS [redacted] BE REINTERVIEWED EITHER BY AGENTS AT PARIS OFFICE OR EMBASSY OFFICE WHEN IDENTIFIED. BUREAU ADVICE REQUESTED ON INTERVIEW. NO APPARENT RELATION BETWEEN NICE AND LUXEMBURG ALLEGATIONS. BUREAU WILL BE IMMEDIATELY INFORMED OF ANY FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS PARIS.

ROLLAND O. L-ALLIER

RECEIVED: 2-7-55 12:35 PM RLG

~~SECRET~~

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

4-3
(12-2-54)

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Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

DECODE OF CODED CABLE NUMBER 632 DATED FEBRUARY 3, 1955 AT PARIS, FRANCE. RECEIVED VIA THE STATE DEPARTMENT.

URGENT

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS AND PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES. [redacted] BUREAU WILL BE IMMEDIATELY INFORMED OF ANY PERTINENT DEVELOPMENTS.

117-268-

ROLLAND O. L-ALLIER

RECEIVED: 2-3-55 3:15 PM HL

RECORDED-27 117-268-696

2 FEB 16 1955

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Ex-117

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4/7/00
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DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (1)
PER LTR DTD 10/14/03 60267 UC/NSI/BJA/RND
#948742/950935 997059

~~SECRET~~

10/29/03 cc: Mr. Belmont cc: Mr. Ferris

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

51 FEB 24 1955

CONFIDENTIAL

Tickler: Mr. Whitson

BY COURIER SERVICE

Date: February 16, 1955

To: Chief, Intelligence Division (Orig & 1)
Coast Guard Headquarters
1300 E Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES

An official of United States Customs has expressed his personal suspicions that the SS "Marine Arrow" which recently arrived in the Seattle, Washington, area from the Far East could be utilized for the clandestine introduction into the United States of nuclear weapons or component parts thereof.

While there is nothing of a positive nature to single out the SS "Marine Arrow" from other ships which may have touched at Communist ports in the Far East, this matter is being brought to your attention for such action as you may wish to take when the vessel is next within the jurisdiction of the United States.

cc - 1 - Mr. Chester A. Emerick (By Courier Service)
Deputy Commissioner, Investigation
Bureau of Customs
Room 7048
Internal Revenue Service Building
Washington 25, D. C.

cc - 1 - Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Department of the Army
The Pentagon
Washington 25, D. C.

LW:baw
(8)

(A cover memo from A. H. Belmont to L. V. Boardman was prepared by LW:fjm on 2/15/55, in connection with this outgoing mail.)

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED BY SP4 BTA/LBM
ON 4-7-00

BY COURIER SVC.
10 FEB 17
COMM - FBI

RECEIVED HEADQUARTERS

117-268-

RECORDED-27

21 FEB 18 1955

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

5 FEB 23 1955

cc - 1 - Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy
The Pentagon
Washington 25, D. C.

cc - 1 - Director of Special Investigations
The Inspector General
Department of the Air Force
The Pentagon
Washington 25, D. C.

4-3
(12-2-54)

~~SECRET~~

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
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Parsons
Rosen
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Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HERE IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

DECODE OF CODED CABLE NUMBER 633 DATED FEBRUARY 4, 1955 AT PARIS, FRANCE. RECEIVED VIA THE STATE DEPARTMENT.

URGENT

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS AND PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES. REBUCABLE FEBRUARY 4. IN CABLE NUMBER 3252 DATED FEBRUARY 3 EMBASSY HERE ADVISED DEPARTMENT OF STATE IN DETAIL HOW THIS MATTER HANDLED AND WHY INFORMATION NOT DISSEMINATED LOCALLY TO LEGAL ATTACHE PRIOR TO FEBRUARY 2. IN SUBSTANCE, EMBASSY STATES ORIGINAL REPORT ARRIVED EMBASSY JANUARY 19 LAST. BECAUSE OF NON SPECIFIC NATURE OF REPORT AND SINCE DEPARTMENT OF STATE WASHINGTON WAS ALREADY AWARE, EMBASSY HERE CONSIDERED IT NECESSARY HAVE ORIGINAL SOURCE INTERVIEWED TO ESTABLISH RELIABILITY AND GET FURTHER DETAILS PRIOR TO LOCAL DISSEMINATION. ACCORDINGLY, [redacted] WENT TO [redacted] AND INTERVIEWED INFORMANT [redacted] ON [redacted] AS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED. INFORMANT FURNISHED ADDITIONAL INFORMATION, THE GIST OF WHICH ALREADY REPORTED IN REMYCABLE FEBRUARY 2, BUT UNABLE TO GIVE ANYTHING PRESICELY SUSCEPTIBLE TO VERIFICATION. INFORMANT REQUESTED THAT HIS INFORMATION NOT BE GIVEN TO FRENCH OR THAT THEY BE QUESTIONED CONCERNING HIM. HE DID NOT SPECIFICALLY REQUEST SALARY JOB WITH US INTELLIGENCE BUT HINTED AT ONE. [redacted] FURTHER LEARNED THAT [redacted] WAS IN CONTACT WITH [redacted]

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CONSEQUENTLY, SINCE QUESTION OF RELIABILITY OF INFORMATION WAS PRINCIPAL CONCERN, NO DISSEMINATION TO LEGAL ATTACHE LOCALLY MADE BY EMBASSY. IN THIS CONNECTION, EMBASSYS OFFICIAL COMMENT AS FOLLOWS ~~QUOTE~~ "IT HAS ALWAYS BEEN THE POLICY OF EMBASSY TO FURNISH THE LEGAL ATTACHE IN FINAL REPORT FORM ANY

EX-117 RECORDED-27 117-268-1099

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

13 FEB 17 1955

~~SECRET~~

1 FEB 23 1955

cc: Mr. Belmont
cc: Mr. Tamm

CLASSIFIED BY: NIS/10 jat/LBM 60247 Derivative
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X1
Per LTR DTD 10/31/03 60247 uc/nus/10jat/KNP 10/29/03
#1,7,10 # 944742-1/985925-1/997457

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

4-3
(12-2-54)

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
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Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

~~SECRET~~

PAGE TWO

INFORMATION WHICH COULD BE USEFUL OR OF INTEREST TO HIM IN THE CARRYING OUT HIS RESPONSIBILITY "~~UNQUOTE~~. EMBASSY COMMENT ON ABOVE SUBJECT MISINTERPRETAION: WHEREAS OFFICIAL EMBASSY POLICY IS TO DISSEMINATE ONLY ~~QUOTE~~"IN FINAL REPORT FORM" ~~UNQUOTE~~, UNOFFICIAL PRACTICE IS FOR EMBASSY TO FURNISH THIS OFFICE VERBALLY AND IMMEDIATELY ALL INFORMATION WHICH COULD BE USEFUL TO BUREAU. FOR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION BUREAU, [redacted] USUALLY FRIENDLY AND CO-OPERATIVE. PARIS OFFICE HAS ALMOST DAILY LIAISON RELATIONS WITH HIM AND THIS VERY PRODUCTIVE SO NO INDICATION HERE EMBASSY DELIBERATELY WITHHELD INFORMATION FROM BUREAU. [redacted] [redacted] HAS ADVISED IN CONFIDENCE THAT HIS HEADQUARTERS AWARE INSTANT REPORT SINCE JANUARY 19 LAST SO ASSUMED THAT STATE DEPARTMENT HAD PASSED INFORMATION AT SOG. THIS MATTER DISCUSSED AT LENGTH WITH [redacted] EMBASSY FEBRUARY 3 TO INSURE THAT FUTURE (S) MATTERS OF VITAL INTEREST TO BUREAU ORIGINATING WITH THE EMBASSY WILL BE KNOWN TO LEGAL ATTACHE. [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] INFORMATION JUST RECEIVED THAT INFORMANT RECEIVED (S) ANOTHER REPORT THIS MATTER ALLEGEDLY ORIGINATING IN MOSCOW JANUARY 20 LAST AND RECEIVED BY INFORMANT FEBRUARY 1 THAT ~~QUOTE~~ "THE GOODS IN QUESTION HAVE BEEN SENT TO A PACIFIC PORT FOR SHIPMENT" ~~UNQUOTE~~. INFORMANT UNABLE TO PROVIDE FURTHER DETAILS NOW BUT STATES HE WILL KEEP EMBASSY ADVISED. EMBASSY [redacted] (S) FULLY AWARE THAT INFORMATION OF VITAL INTEREST TO FBI SHOULD BE IMMEDIATELY BROUGHT TO ATTENTION THIS OFFICE FOR EXPEDITIOUS TRANSMITTAL TO TO BUREAU. THIS AGAIN FORCEFULLY BROUGHT TO THEIR ATTENTION TODAY AND EVERY EFFORT BEING MADE TO INSURE NO REPETITION OF LACKADAISICAL ATTITUDE HERE REGARDING HANDLING INFORMATION OF POSSIBLE INTEREST AND IMPORTANCE TO BUREAU. BUREAU WILL BE IMMEDIATELY INFORMED OF ANY PERTINENT DEVELOPMENTS.

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RECEIVED: 2-4-55 3:53 PM HL ROLLAND O. L-ALLIER

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

~~SECRET~~

4-22

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
RECORDS SECTION

2-9, 1955

☐ Name Check Unit-Room 6523
☐ Attention
☐ Service Unit-Room 6524
☐ Forward to File Review
☑ Return to Whitson Ext. 2001
Supervisor
Room 1730

☑ All References
☐ Subversive References
☐ Main References Only
☐ Main ____ References Only
☑ Restrict to Locality of Belgium, Luxembourg
☑ Breakdown ☐ Buildup ☐ Variations
☑ Exact Name Only
☐ Exact Spelling
☐ Check for Alphabetical Loyalty Form

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Ref Hereabouts Date 2-9 Searcher Initial

	FILE NUMBER	SERIAL
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NI	~~65-37193-231~~	~~2, 3, 5, 298~~
NI	~~65-37193-264~~	~~1~~
NI	~~100-342508~~	~~1~~
NI	~~64-176-253~~	~~170~~
NI	~~100-342079~~	~~6~~
NI	~~100-384723~~	~~39~~
NI	~~64-330-277~~	~~1506~~
NI	~~105-1854~~	~~25, 78~~
NI	~~64-204-54~~	~~37~~

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DATE 4-7-00 BY SP4 BJA/LBM

4-22

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
RECORDS SECTION

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☑ Return to Whitson Ext 2081
Supervisor
Room 1230

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
RECORDS SECTION

2-9, 1955

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Birthdate & Place Luxembourg

R# alias [redacted] Date 2-9 Searcher Initial

FILE NUMBER SERIAL

100-386397

~~64-206-231~~ 996

~~101-33478~~ alias [redacted]

no buildups

L. (Bd)

~~65-58331~~ - Lench #7

Cell Chief in Chence, Belgium C Force
per CIA, 1948

French Jewish CP front functionary
1952 per G2

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 4/7/00 BY SP4 [redacted]
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4-22

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
RECORDS SECTION

2-9, 1955

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
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2-9, 1955

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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2-9, 1955

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 4-7-00 BY SP4 BOA/LBM

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
RECORDS SECTION

2-9, 1955

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Supervisor
Room 1730

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☑ Exact Spelling
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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 4-7-00 BY SP4 BSA/
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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
RECORDS SECTION

2-9, 1955

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Room 1730

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FILE NUMBER SERIAL

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4-7-00 BY SP4 BSM/LBM

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
RECORDS SECTION

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☑ Return to Solution Ext 2081
Supervisor
Room 1730

☑ All References
☐ Subversive References
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☐ Exact Name Only
☑ Exact Spelling
☐ Check for Alphabetical Loyalty Form

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SUBJECT
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Birthdate & Place

R# Date 2-9 Searcher Initial

FILE NUMBER SERIAL

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no breakdowns

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4-7-80 BY SP4 BSM/lbm

4-22

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
RECORDS SECTION

2-9, 1955

- ☐ Name Check Unit-Room 6523
- ☐ Attention _____
- ☐ Service Unit-Room 6524
- ☐ Forward to File Review
- ☑ Return to Whitson Ext 2081
  Supervisor
  Room 1730

- ☑ All References
- ☐ Subversive References
- ☐ Main References Only
- ☐ Main _____ References Only
- ☑ Restrict to Locality of Allegheny, Lawrence, Beaver, Butler
- ☑ Breakdown ☑ Buildup ☐ Variations
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- ☑ Exact Spelling
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see Breakdowns

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4/10/03 BY SP1 STP/ksp

2/9
3/10

cc - Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. W. F. Woods
Mr. Whitson

SAC, Seattle (original and one)

February 16, 1955

PERSONAL ATTENTION

Director, FBI

RECORDED-35 117-268-701

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF
AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO
THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

Reurtel 2/11/55, containing suggestion that Bureau may desire to consider requesting Army or other appropriate agency to check cargo of SS. "Marine Arrow" before it leaves the Far East on its next voyage and/or advise Customs and FBI of first port in U. S. in sufficient time in order that thorough search can be effected at that port.

The suggestion for a check of cargo on the SS. "Marine Arrow" before it leaves the Far East is impractical for several reasons:

1. Discussions with Coast Guard and Customs representatives at the Seat of Government in connection with problem of smuggling of A-bombs have established that the only way cargo can be examined in the absence of an accurate detection device for fissionable material is to unload the cargo and open it up. Opening of cargo is still necessary when detection devices react to radioactive material since various items of commerce can cause reaction of detection device;

2. There is no legal basis known for forcing a ship, in the absence of wartime blockade, to proceed to an Asiatic or Pacific island port under U. S. control;

3. The recommended action against the SS. "Marine Arrow" has no factual basis and is predicated solely on the personal suspicions of Mr. Frank Hull, a Customs representative in Seattle, who, not only will not advise his Headquarters of his

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4/24/02 BY SP2 AUK/MW

RECEIVED FBI FEB 16 9 PM '55 SEATTLE RADIO ROOM

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons

LW:fjm (7)

MAILED 8
COMM-FBI

(A cover memo from A. H. Belmont to L. V. Boardman was prepared by LW:fjm on 2/15/55, in connection with this outgoing mail.)

23 1955

Retype of pages 2 & 3

To: SAC, Seattle
From: Director, FBI
Subject: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE US AEC

LW:fjm:mbr

Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. W. F. Woods
Mr. Whitson

Date changed from 2/15/55 to 2/16/55

suspicions but does not want the FBI to contact Customs anywhere concerning the shtp. You have previously indicated in urtel 2/9 last, that Hull wants no check made with the ship's owners or agents in order that its itinerary could be determined. It will be necessary to bring information of this type to the attention of the other interested agencies and particularly to Coast Guard and Customs since they are responsible for the ship searching procedure.

You recommend that Customs and the FBI be notified in sufficient time of the first port of call in the U. S. in order that a thorough search can be effected at that point.

You have made no showing that the proper agency has not been notified in advance of the arrival of this vessel in the U. S. port. Under the Port Security Program, the arrival of this vessel would be known in advance to the U. S. Coast Guard. Under date of July 31, 1953, you advised under the caption, "Espionage and Foreign Intelligence; Movement of Nationals of Soviet and Satellite Countries," that the Coast Guard had informed you of the impending arrival at the Port of Seattle of the "Nordic Star," a vessel of British registry, which had reportedly touched at a Chinese Communist port within the preceding four months. In reply to your letter, the Bureau, under date of August 13, 1953, advised you that the Atomic Energy Commission as well as the FBI and other interested agencies were notified of the arrival of merchant vessels coming within the purview of the Port Security Program. You were advised as follows:

"This notification to the various agencies by Customs is merely for the purpose of alerting those agencies to the arrival of a suspect vessel. The FBI has no responsibility for searching the vessel or supervising its movements into port or supervising the movements of its passengers, crew or cargo.

"However, in the event a Customs search reveals the presence of atomic weapons or parts thereof or other weapons of mass destruction, such should be reported promptly to your office and appropriate investigative steps taken in line with the Bureau's investigative and intelligence responsibilities."

As you were advised at Seat of Government in connection with this matter, informants and sources furnishing information to you regarding the smuggling of atomic weapons must clearly understand that you will have to make appropriate dissemination of such data.

4-41a

F.B.I. TELETYPE

fed

DECODED COPY

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Sizoo
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

FBI, SEATTLE 2-11-55 8:46 P.M.

DIRECTOR DEFERRED

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF OR OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE U.S., AEA. REMYTEL FEBRUARY 9 LAST, WHEREIN FRANK HULL, U.S. CUSTOMS, SEATTLE, IS REPORTED CONSIDERING SS MARINE ARROW A POSSIBLE SUSPECT CARRIER OF BOMBS. SINCE EVERY EFFORT BEING MADE TO PREVENT BOMB BEING CARRIED INTO A U.S. PORT, IT IS SUGGESTED BUREAU MAY DESIRE TO CONSIDER REQUESTING ARMY OR OTHER APPROPRIATE AGENCY TO CHECK CARGO OF MARINE ARROW BEFORE IT LEAVES FAR EAST ON NEXT VOYAGE, AND/OR ADVISE IN SUFFICIENT TIME CUSTOMS AND FBI OF SHIP'S FIRST PORT OF CALL IN U.S. IN ORDER THAT THOROUGH SEARCH CAN BE EFFECTED AT THAT PORT. ALTHOUGH SHIP ARRIVED AT RAYMOND, WASHINGTON, APPROXIMATELY TEN DAYS AGO AND CUSTOMS SEARCHED SHIP TWELVE HOURS AFTER IT WAS IN PORT FOR NARCOTICS, NO SPECIFIC SEARCH WAS MADE FOR BOMBS. BUREAU MAY DESIRE CHECK BE MADE OF BILL OF LADING AGAINST ACTUAL CARGO UNLOADED. HULL STATES NAMING OF SS MARINE ARROW ONLY HIS PERSONAL SUSPICION, THAT HE HAS NOT ADVISED HIS HEADQUARTERS, WASHINGTON, D.C., AND DOES NOT INTEND TO, AND THAT ANY ACTION THE FBI DESIRES TO TAKE BE STRICTLY BETWEEN FBI AND ARMY, ETC., WITH NO CONTACT OF CUSTOMS AT WASHINGTON OR ANYWHERE ELSE CONCERNING HIS SUSPICION OF THIS SHIP. HULL EXTREMELY COOPERATIVE WITH THIS OFFICE INSTANT MATTER.

AUERBACH

11:54 PM OK FBI WA JCD

RECORDED-35 117-268-

RECEIVED: 2-12-55 12:00 A.M. FEB 18 1955 RPF

cc: MR. BELMONT
[redacted]
DOM. INTEL. DIVISION

Mr. Belmont

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's coding systems.

1-D

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-7-00 BY SP4 6371/bm

LW - 2/15/55
Memo to Boardman (5) 2/15/55
Ltr to Seattle (7) 2/16/55

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : L. V. Boardman

DATE: February 15, 1955

FROM : A. H. Belmont

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES

Seattle teletype, 2/11/55, states that Frank Hull, U. S. Customs, Seattle, considers the SS. "Marine Arrow" a possible carrier of bombs but has not advised his Headquarters, Washington, D. C., of his personal suspicions and does not intend to. Seattle teletype suggests Bureau may desire to request Army or other appropriate agency to check cargo of "Marine Arrow" before it leaves the Far East on its next voyage and/or advise in sufficient time Customs and FBI of ship's first port of call in U. S. in order that thorough search can be effected at that port.

Discussions with Coast Guard and Customs representatives at SOG in connection with problem of smuggling of A-bombs established that only way cargo can be examined in absence of accurate detection device for fissionable material, is to unload the cargo and open it up. No legal basis known for forcing ship, in absence of wartime blockade, to proceed to Pacific island port and unload cargo. Recommended action against SS. "Marine Arrow" has no factual basis and Customs representative holding suspicion of "Marine Arrow" will not advise his Headquarters of his suspicions and does not want FBI to contact Customs regarding that ship. U. S. Coast Guard, Seattle, has been receiving notice in advance of arrivals of ships which have touched Chinese Communist ports.

I spoke to SAC Auerbach and explained to him that we cannot sit on information of this type and that we were going to have to make dissemination to Customs, Coast Guard and the three military intelligence agencies. Mr. Auerbach stated that he was getting in touch with the Seattle office for the purpose of informing his informant, Frank Hull of Customs, that the matter was to be given dissemination by the Bureau and so that Hull could notify his agency if he desired. Mr. Auerbach understands that information of this type will have to be disseminated and that his informants and sources of information should be so informed.

Attachment
LW:fjm:mbr
(5)

RECORDED-35 117-268-702

24 FEB 18 1955

cc - Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. W. F. Woods, Room 7645
Mr. Whitson

51 FEB 23 1955

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-7-00 BY SP4 BJA/LBM

RECOMMENDATION:

There is attached a letter to SAC Seattle pointing out substance of foregoing. Seattle is cautioned that Bureau should not participate in examination of cargo which is Coast Guard and Customs responsibility.

There is attached a letter pointing out suspicion of SS "Marine Arrow" held by Customs representative to Customs, Coast Guard, G-2, ONI and OSI.

SECRET

AU OF INVESTIGATI
DEPARTMENT OF JU

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Philcox
1 - Boardman
LEGRAM
1 - Mr. Whitson
ENCODE
1 - Section tickler
URGENT

To: COMMUNICATIONS SECTION. FEBRUARY 2, 1955

Transmit the following message to: LEGAL ATTACHE
PARIS, FRANCE

Per call - Mr. Mohrman

ea 117-2168-70

RECORDED - 6

SMUGGLING OF ATOM BOMBS AND PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES. REBUCABLE FEBRUARY ONE LAST. ADVISE BY RETURN CABLEGRAM WHY ORIGINAL INFORMATION THIS CASE NOT REPORTED TO YOUR OFFICE BY EMBASSY SOURCES. ALSO ADVISE CONCERNING THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF YOUR LIAISON WITH EMBASSY PARTICULARLY WITH THAT SECTION OR OFFICE HANDLING INSTANT MATTER AND WHAT STEPS YOU HAVE TAKEN TO INSURE THAT INFORMATION OF VITAL INTEREST TO THE BUREAU WHICH THE EMBASSY HAS A KNOWLEDGE OF WILL BE IMMEDIATELY BROUGHT TO YOUR ATTENTION. BY LIAISON STATE HAS BEEN REQUESTED TO ADVISE BUREAU WHY INFORMATION IN THIS CASE WAS NOT FURNISHED TO YOUR OFFICE DIRECTLY BY EMBASSY AND WHAT STEPS TAKEN TO INSURE THAT FUTURE MATTERS OF VITAL INTEREST TO THE BUREAU ORIGINATING WITH THE EMBASSY WILL BE MADE KNOWN TO YOU. FOLLOW [redacted] STATE TO RESOLVE MATTER EXPEDITIOUSLY. (5)

b1

JJM:pup
(8)
1 - Foreign Liaison Unit (detached)

Cover memo Belmont to Boardman
2-2-55 "Reported Shipment of Atom Bombs to the U.S."
JJM:pup/saw

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

RECEIVED FBI FEB 3 4 20 PM

NR. 221
ENC. 2330-0021 BY Ea
CK 0020-0055 BY Ea
APPROVED BY
TYPED BY HC
FILED BY

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

4/7/00
CLASSIFIED BY: NSIS/BJA/LBM 60267 Declassify
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X
Per LTR DTD 10/14/03 60267 uc/NSIS/BJA/RNP 10/29/03

SECRET

51 FEB 25 1955

SENT VIA Cable 2-3-55 8 PM Per NH

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

~~SECRET~~

TO : The Director

DATE: February 1, 1955

FROM : L. V. Boardman

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING
REPORTED SHIPMENT OF ATOM BOMBS TO THE U. S.

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

Reference is made to the memorandum from R. R. Roach to A. H. Belmont dated 1/28/55 and to the memorandum from A. H. Belmont to L. V. Boardman dated 1/28/55, captioned as above, with the Director's instructions to send a memorandum to the Attorney General (AG) and Rogers furnishing the data regarding the smuggling plots reported from Nice, France, and Luxembourg and pointing out the delay in transmittal by the Department of State of the information from Nice.

The Director asked: "Couldn't our Legal Attache tackle the running down of this"? We have protested to the Department of State on the delay involved in the Nice report and have pointed out to the Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) that every effort must be made to trace the information [redacted] and to resolve the allegations. The responsibility for running down these stories has been rightfully placed on State and CIA. However, although we do not wish to inject our Legal Attache into the situation in France and Luxembourg [redacted] our Legal Attache must and should follow the matter closely and make recommendations to the Bureau for participation where he sees that a matter could best be handled by the Bureau. b1 (S) (S)

RECOMMENDATION:

1. There is attached for approval a memorandum to the AG with copies for Deputy AG Rogers and the Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. The Commissioner is included in this memorandum since the nine alleged smugglers are in the possession of fraudulent U. S. passports and according to the story will seek to enter the U. S.

RECORDED - 117-268-703

24 FEB 18 1955

117-268
Attachment
LW:plv
Ticklers: Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Branigan
Mr. Whitson

(6)

~~SECRET~~

DEPT. OF JUSTICE
FBI

4/17/80 CLASSIFIED BY NUS/BJA/LSM 60207 Derivative
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X1
Per LTR DTD 10/24/03 60207 uc/NUS/BJA/LSM 10/29/03

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HERE IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

~~SECRET~~

b1

2. *There is attached a cablegram for the Legal Attache, Paris, giving him briefly the picture and instructing him to follow the investigation closely* [redacted] *and to submit promptly recommendations regarding Bureau participation and to keep the Bureau informed of developments.* (S)

While I am going along in the recommendations I must say I think you stand on protocol a good deal while the world is burning. We (FBI) are charged with internal security and the State Dept is charged with external security. Here is vital information which must be authenticated & done as at the earliest moment. Also this must become a matter between our man & the Embassy at Paris that we have not even told Dr Jackson

~~SECRET~~

Tickler

Mr. Belmont
Mr. Whitson
CABLEGRAM ok per call Ferris meh
URGENT
CIPHER PAD CODE

FEBRUARY 1, 1955

LEGAL ATTACHE (orig)
PARIS, FRANCE

Referral/Direct to OGA

SECRET

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS AND PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES. DEPARTMENT OF STATE REPORTS INFORMATION FROM [redacted] DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY HAVE BEEN ASKED BY FBI TO TRACE THESE REPORTS [redacted] (S) AND RESOLVE ALLEGATIONS. YOU SHOULD FOLLOW CLOSELY WITH DEPARTMENT OF STATE [redacted] TO MAKE CERTAIN THAT THEY (S) b1 HANDLE THIS MATTER PROMPTLY AND THOROUGHLY. IN THE EVENT YOU DETERMINE THAT CERTAIN INVESTIGATIVE STEPS OR INTERVIEWS COULD BETTER BE HANDLED BY THE BUREAU THAN BY STATE [redacted] YOU SHOULD MAKE SUCH (S) RECOMMENDATIONS PROMPTLY TO THE BUREAU. KEEP BUREAU ADVISED OF ALL DEVELOPMENTS.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

CLASSIFIED BY NSI/BJA/LBM 60267 Derivative
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X1
4/7/00
Per LTR DTD 10/18/23 60267 uc/NSI/BJA/kmp 10/29/03

NR. 220 FEB
RECEIVED
ENC. 191-2055 BY 7114
CK. 213-7N BY
APPROVED BY
TYPED BY
FILED BY

LW:ss:bjb light
(5)

RECORDED - 6 117-268-
HOOVER
FEB 18 1955

cc - Foreign Service Desk Attached

(Cover memo prepared from L. V. Boardman to The Director by LW:plv on 2-1-55) re Reported Shipment of Atom Bombs to the U.S.)

SECRET

7-18

18 FEB 24 1955

Sent via Cable 2/1/55 5:25 PM per mar

FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

FROM : MR. R. R. ROACH

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HERE IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

DATE: January 28, 1955

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: REPORTED SHIPMENT OF ATOM BOMBS TO THE UNITED STATES

Referral/Direct to OGA

There is attached a copy of a memorandum from the American Consulate in Nice, France, to the American Embassy in Paris dated

[redacted]

[redacted]

Mr. Philcox of Liaison contacted Dennis Flinn, Director of Security, Department of State, on January 28, 1955, and pointed out to him that this report had apparently been in the possession of the State Department since January 18 and had never been furnished to the Bureau until January 28, 1955. It was pointed out to him that this type of information is of vital interest to the Bureau and should have been furnished immediately upon receipt by telephone if it could not have been delivered the same day. Mr. Flinn apologized for the delay and stated that he had instructed the person responsible in his office to furnish the information to the Bureau immediately but that apparently there had been a misunderstanding and the person handling this matter had been holding the information pending the receipt of clarification from Paris. Mr. Flinn stated that he can assure us that such a delay

Attachment

NWP:fjb
(5)

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Section tickler
1 - Mr. Branigan
1 - Mr. Philcox

RECORDED - 6 117-268-24 FEB 18 1955

51 FEB 24 1955

ENCLOSURE

DECLASSIFIED BY 1/1100 #4 ON 10/29/03 LOGAN NC/NLS/BJA/OGA
PER LTR DTD 10/14/03

will not recur and that he has taken specific steps to see that such information will be furnished to the Bureau immediately in the future.

Mr. Flinn was advised that the State Department should vigorously pursue this report to the source and, if necessary, beyond the source to its origin. He was advised that every attempt should be made to completely resolve this information. Mr. Flinn stated that they have already sent a follow-up to Paris and that they will follow this matter closely in order to attempt to obtain all information available as soon as possible.

Mr. Flinn advised that this information has been furnished to the following agencies in addition to the FBI: National Indications Center, Central Intelligence Agency, Customs, Office of Naval Intelligence, G-2, Office of Special Investigations (OSI), and Atomic Energy Commission.

Mr. Papich of Liaison contacted [redacted] of CIA who advised that CIA has no information which would substantiate this report. (5)

b3

ACTION:

This is being followed closely by Liaison with the Department of State to insure that State Department pursues this report vigorously to its original source to make every attempt to resolve the information.

1. Send memo to A.G. & Rogers pointing out delay
2. Confer w/ our Legal Attache to tackle the running down of this.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED on envelope
~~NEITHER~~ CLASSIFIED
DATE 4-7-00 BY SP4 BJA/LBm

ENCLOSURE

117-AA-005

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : L. V. Boardman

FROM : A. H. Belmont

~~SECRET~~

DATE: January 28, 1955

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HERE IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Tolson ✓
Boardman ✓
Nichols
Belmont ✓
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room

SUBJECT: REPORTED SHIPMENT OF ATOM BOMBS TO THE UNITED STATES SMUGGLING

Referral/Direct to OGA

Reference is made to Mr. Roach's memorandum to me of January 28, 1955, captioned as above, indicating that a report had been received from

[redacted]

Referenced memorandum reflected that State Department was orally requested to pursue this information as vigorously and as soon as possible in order to attempt to resolve it.

Referral/Direct to OGA

There is attached another State Department dispatch dated

[redacted]

[redacted]

Attachment Secret - 1 - 31-55

cc - Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Hennrich

cc - Mr. Branigan
Mr. Philcox

NWP:et
(6)

RECORDED - 6

24 FEB 18 1955

51 FEB 24 1955

~~SECRET~~

4/7/00 #948742/850935/997059
CLASSIFIED BY NLS/BJA/LBM 60267 Derivative
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X1
PER LTR DTD 10/14/03 60267 uc/NLS/BJA/CB 10/29/03

117-268-106

117-1833-Autostat UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

~~SECRET~~

[redacted]

Mr. Dennis Flinn of the State Department advised that they are also furnishing this information to the following agencies: National Indications Center, Central Intelligence Agency, Customs, Office of Naval Intelligence, G-2, Office of Special Investigations (OSI), and Atomic Energy Commission. Mr. Flinn was advised that both reports should also be furnished to Coast Guard.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. There is attached a letter to the State Department with a copy for CIA pointing out that every effort must be made to trace the information in these reports [redacted] and to resolve the information reported. (5) b1

2. We are immediately alerting our key port offices by teletype regarding the information contained in these two complaints so that these offices may be doubly alert as to the possibility of the introduction of atomic weapons and material into the U. S.

teletype to Sec. State Pers. W.A.B. 24

3. An SAC Letter is being prepared to alert the field as a whole regarding these complaints.

→ attached

4. Bureau files are being checked regarding [redacted] and [redacted] first name [redacted] b7C b7D

Also and minus C.G. & Rogers.

LET TO AG
cc ROGERS
cc COMM-INS
2-1-55
LEW:pjw

~~SECRET~~

4-3
(12-2-54)

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SECRET

DECODE OF CODED CABLE NUMBER 646 DATED FEBRUARY 16, 1955 AT PARIS, FRANCE. RECEIVED VIA STATE DEPARTMENT.

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO UNITED STATES. REBUCABLE FEBRUARY 15. NO NEW INFORMATION CONCERNING NICE ALLEGATIONS. MATTER BEING FOLLOWED CLOSELY WITH EMBASSY [redacted] FRENCH AUTHORITIES HAVE (S) NOT BEEN BROUGHT IN PER INFORMANT'S REQUEST. [redacted]

[redacted] (S)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

b1

ROLLAND O. L-ALLIER

RECEIVED: 2-16-55 2:35 PM MAX

4/9/00
CLASSIFIED BY NLS/BJA/LBM 60267 Derivative
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X
PER LTR DTD 10/14/00 60267 uc/NLS/BJA/CAB 10/29/03
#948742/950935/997059

5 - Mr. Tolson
cc: Mr. Harris
cc: Mr. Belmont

RECORDED - 17

62-268-707

FEB 24 1955

51 MAR 2 1955

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

SECRET

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 117-1833-

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Tolson

DATE: Feb. 15, 1955

FROM : L. B. Nichols

SUBJECT:

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

Assistant Attorney General Tompkins, in his address in New Jersey on the night of February 15, 1955, made the following statement:

SMUGGLING

"When I tell you that atomic weapons can be made in such size and weight that they can be brought into this country or carried around in a suitcase, you will understand why protection against espionage and sabotage is as vital as winning battles. The Government is engaged. . . in some of the most secret, scientific and technological developments the world has ever known."

Mullen had sent copies of the address around earlier in the afternoon, and when this one item was noted, I checked with Mr. Belmont since I had not recalled any similar statement being made. Mr. Belmont, likewise, could not recall such a statement; and the possibility of the question of security arising was such that I called Mullen and advised him that I had seen this statement and assumed there was a proper basis for making it or that it had been cleared with the Atomic Energy Commission. Mullen told me that the Attorney General had made a similar statement and that this was perfectly okay and would not be objectionable.

cc: Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
LBN:arm
(4)

ORIGINAL FILED IN 94-1-17

1117-268

NOT RECORDED
176 MAR 2 1955

FEB 18

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-7-00 BY SP4 BJA/LBm

58 MAR -4 1955

DO-6

OFFICE OF DIRECTOR
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Jones
Mr. Sizoo
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4-7-00 BY SP4 BJM/LSM

JAN 7 1955

tic - Mr. Belmont
Mr. Papich
Mr. Whitson

CABLE DEFERRED
CIPHER PAD CODE

FEBRUARY 24, 1955

LEGAL ATTACHE (original only)
PARIS, FRANCE

117-268-710

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES, ATOMIC ENERGY ACT. REURLET FEBRUARY FOURTEEN AND URCABLE FEBRUARY EIGHTEEN. [redacted]

[redacted] YOU (S) MUST PRESS [redacted] STATE FOR PROMPT (S) FINDING UP OF LOOSE ENDS THIS MATTER. YOU HAVE INDICATED THEY [redacted] BUT FAILURE TO PIN (S) IT DOWN RAISES QUESTION OF HOW THEY WOULD GO ABOUT OBTAINING FACTS UNDER AUTHENTIC CIRCUMSTANCES. EXPEDITE.

NR. 2 52
ENC. [redacted] BY
HOOVER
CK. 0645 6800 BY
APPROVED
TYPED BY L.R.

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Jerrowd
Room

117-268
(7)
LW:fjm
cc - Foreign Service Desk
cc - 117-1833 (Vincent)

b1

[redacted] (S)

Sent via Cable 2-25-55 4:21AM (LCD)

RECEIVED - 3

117-268-710

4/7/00 #9457473/9509235/9972659
NUS 1B/A/LBM 0267 Derivative
Declassified/Sanitized/Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note) by NSA/CSS 10/29/03

RECEIVED FBI 7:49 PM '55

FBI 6:29 PM '55

117-1833-7

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

4-3
(12-2-54)

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

~~SECRET~~

DECODE OF CODED CABLE NUMBER 650 DATED FEBRUARY 18, 1955 AT PARIS, FRANCE. RECEIVED VIA STATE DEPARTMENT.

O

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO UNITED STATES. b1
REMYCABLE FEBRUARY 16.

[redacted]

(S)

ROLLAND O. L-ALLIER

RECEIVED: 2-18-55 4:53 PM BK

RECORDED - 49 117-868-710

1955

EX-117

cc: Mr. Tamm
cc: Mr. Belmont

Author to

117-1833-7

4/7/00 #948742/950935/997059
CLASSIFIED BY NLS/BJA/LBM 60267 Derivative
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X1
Per LTR DTD 10/14/00 60267 uc/NLS/BJA/CB 10/29/03

2-2-2/24/55 Legal (7)
Cable Paris

~~SECRET~~

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

HW

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Candy

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: February 15, 1955

FROM : C. E. HENNRICH

SUBJECT: PROPOSED DEVICE FOR DETECTION OF ALPHA, BETA, AND GAMMA RAYS SUBMITTED BY SIDNEY WEISER

By reference from the Director's Office, I took a call on February 15 from Mr. Burton R. Thorman, attorney. Thorman is a former Bureau employee in the Identification Division. He wanted to come in and talk with me which he did on the afternoon of February 15. Thorman had a proposal submitted by Sidney Weiser, consulting engineer, [redacted] b7C Weiser is Director of Research at the Federal Manufacturing and Engineering Corporation.

The proposal which Weiser had was for the development of an electronic device based upon Geiger counters which would amplify the impulses caused by alpha, beta, and gamma rays. He proposed that such a device be developed and utilized on ramps to aircraft, ships, etc., in order to detect fissionable material being carried in small amounts on the person of passengers and other individuals utilizing such ramps. His proposal was that if anyone was interested in the development of such a device, he felt that he had the experience and qualifications to engage in the necessary research in order to arrive at a successful development.

Thorman's inquiry of the Bureau was whether the Bureau would be interested in such a device and, if not, what organization in the United States Government would be interested. He said he understands that Weiser came through with his idea after reading newspaper stories regarding the problems of possible attempts to introduce atomic weapons into the United States.

117-268-711

I checked with Mr. Conrad of the Laboratory as to any possible Laboratory interest in this proposal.

~~117-268-24~~

RECORDED - 43

ACTION:

117

INDEXED - 43

21 FEB 25 1955

I pointed out to Thorman that, of course, the basic responsibility for detecting atomic devices being brought into the United States rests with Customs and the Coast Guard. I also pointed

cc - Mr. Belmont
Mr. I. W. Conrad
Mr. Hennrich

CEH:jmr

(5)

66 MAR 15 1955

Mr. Winterrowd

58 MAR

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4/14/03 BY SP4 BJA/RNP

PERS. FILES

SMUGGLING Atom Bombs

Attached UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 80-7317

out that the Atomic Energy Commission has, of course, been interested in such devices for their own security problems for sometime and suggested that he might desire to discuss the matter with someone at the Atomic Energy Commission.

One of the interesting factors suggested by Weiser in his proposal was the use of a photographic device which would be automatically triggered by the presence of fissionable material and which would record photographically the person or object which caused the triggering

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. W. A. Branigan

DATE: February 28, 1955

FROM : L. Whitson

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION IN PLACE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

esa

O SMUGGLING

At 2:35 p.m., February 25, 1955, Commander B. P. Clark, U. S. Coast Guard, Chairman of the Advisory Group in charge of field testing of detection devices, phoned and stated that he would appreciate the opportunity of reviewing any report on field testing which the joint IIC-ICIS Committee intended to send to the National Security Council.

Commander Clark was informed that a draft report was now under consideration by the members of the joint committee and would probably be acted upon during the coming week by the joint committee and that essentially the recommendations having limited national coverage were those in the advisory group.

RECOMMENDATION:

None. This is for your information.

ADDENDUM:

At 11:45 a.m., February 28, 1955, Mr. Carl Pfuntner, ICIS Secretariat, phoned and stated a meeting of the joint committee had been set for 10:00 a.m., March 3, 1955.

RECORDED - 28

117-268-712

LW:fjm
(3)

EX-112

24 MAR 2 1955

cc - Mr. Branigan
Mr. Whitson

55 MAR 7 1955

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-7-00 BY SP4 BJA/LBM

SECRET

THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
American Embassy
Paris 8, France

4.9.03
CLASSIFIED BY NLS/bja/RNP 60267 derivative
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1
Per Hr. dtd 10.14.03
60267 uc/NLS/bja/RNP 10.29.03

Date: February 14, 1955

To: Director, FBI

From: Legat, Paris (117-8)

Subject: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS ~~AND~~ OR PARTS
THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

ReBucables 2/1,4/55 and re Paris cables 2/5,7,8/55.

[redacted] (S) b1

[redacted] (S)

[redacted] (S)

[redacted] (S)

[redacted] (S)

WTB:CM

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RECORDED - 25
FEB 21 1955

SECRET

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: February 23, 1955

FROM : SAC, Cleveland (66-5084)

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES
INTERNAL SECURITY-C

EXP PROC

Re SAC Letter No. 55-7 dated February 1, 1955.

Particular reference is made to Paragraph (M) of referenced SAC Letter and for the information of the Bureau, it has been determined from a review of the Confidential Informants and Sources of Information available to this office that we have no informants or sources who are in a position to have knowledge regarding the type of international operators referred to.

AWP:bn
(4)
cc: (Cleveland 117-43)

RECORDED-27
117-268-
1 FEB 25 1955
EX-117

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-7-00 BY SP4 BTM/LPM

THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

American Embassy
Paris 8, France

Date: February 24, 1955

To: Director, FBI (117-265)

From: Legal Attache, Paris (117-8)

Subject: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS AND PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

Re Paris let February 14, 1955, and Paris cable February 18, 1955.

[redacted] (S)

Enclosure (1)

WTB:AM

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Per Hr. dtd. 10-14-03
60267 uc/NUS/bja/PAAA 10-29-03

117-265-

MAR 1 1955

SECRET

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OTHERWISE

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI (117-268) DATE: 3/2/55

FROM : SAC, San Diego (66-998)

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE U.S. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Re No Number SAC Let A, 1/28/52.

This office has no additional names to recommend for inclusion on the Bureau of Customs Watch List at this time. This matter is being closely followed and the Bureau will be kept advised of any pertinent developments.

AIR MAIL - REGISTERED

JEP:SH

EX-110

117-268-718

1-D

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-7-00 BY SP4 BJA/LBM

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

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Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: March 4, 1955

FROM : W. A. Branigan

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION IN PLACE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

A meeting of the Joint Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference-Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security Committee on Countermeasures was held March 3, 1955, in Room 2515, Justice Building.

The Committee reviewed a draft report on the status of the development and experimental use of detection devices for fissionable materials predicated upon a report by the Advisory Group consisting of representatives of Customs, Coast Guard, Immigration and Atomic Energy Commission. Revisions in the draft were made and Mr. Carl Pfuntner of the ICIS Secretariat was instructed by the Joint Committee to prepare a revised draft for consideration the first part of the coming week.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

None. This is for your information. You will be informed of developments.

117-268

LW:fjm
(4)

cc - Mr. Belmont
Mr. Branigan
Mr. Whitson

RECORDED - 25
INDEXED - 25
MAR 3 1955

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4-7-00 BY SP4 BSA/LBM

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. L. V. Boardman

DATE: March 2, 1955

FROM : A. H. Belmont

SECRET

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES

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On February 1, 1955, the Bureau furnished to the field by SAC Letter the gist of reports received from Department of State concerning alleged smuggling operations by the Soviets. These data were also furnished February 1, 1955, by memorandum to the Attorney General, with copies to Deputy Attorney General Rogers and the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization Service.

By cable, February 28, 1955, Legal Attache, Paris, informed that State [redacted] considered European informants discredited. The informant of the U. S. Vice Consul, Nice, has changed his story and the Soviets are not going to smuggle any weapons. [redacted] (S) b1

[redacted] (S)

RECOMMENDATION:

There is attached for approval an SAC Letter bringing the field up to date on this matter and a letter to the Attorney General with copies to Deputy Attorney General Rogers and the Commissioner, INS, bringing them up to date.

Attachment 3-7-55
LW:fjm
(6)

RECORDED - 17
EX-107
MAR 8 1955

cc - Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Branigan
Mr. Papich, Rm 7651A
Mr. Whitson

5 - White

SECRET

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HERE IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

4/7/00 NLS/BJA/LAM 60247 Derivative per LTR DTD 10/14/03 60247 ac/NLS/BJA/cab 10/29/03 #946742/990985/997057

~~SECRET~~

cc - Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Whitson

The Attorney General (original and 1) March 4, 1955

Director, FBI

RECORDED-85

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES

Referral/Direct to OGA

Reference is made to my memorandum dated February 1, 1955, [redacted] (S)

This related to the alleged plan by the Soviets to smuggle atomic materials into the United States.

As you were advised, the Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency were requested to make every effort to trace the information [redacted] and to resolve the allegations. (S)

b1

On February 28, 1955, representatives of the United States Embassy, Paris, France, [redacted] informed this Bureau's representative in Paris that they believed the informant of the United States Vice Consul at Nice, France, [redacted] (S)

Referral/Direct to OGA

[redacted]

LW:fjm
(8)

~~SECRET~~

(A cover memo from A. H. Belmont to L. V. Boardman was prepared by LW:fjm on 3/2/55, in connection with this outgoing mail.)

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V.

SECRET

The Attorney General March 4, 1955

[redacted]

With regard to the informant of the United States Legation in Luxembourg, the Central Intelligence Agency considers him unreliable and the Office of Special Investigations of the United States Air Force, which has had dealings with him in the past, states that he has admitted lying on other matters.

Referral/Direct to OGA

[redacted] b1

117-268

cc - 1 - Mr. William P. Rogers
Deputy Attorney General

cc - 1 - The Commissioner
Immigration and Naturalization Service

SECRET

4-3
(12-2-54)

4/7/00 #948742/950935/997059
CLASSIFIED BY: NLS/BJA/LBM 60267 Derivative ~~SECRET~~
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X1
PER LTR DTD 10/14/03 60267 uc/NLS/BJA/CAB 10/29/03

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DECODE OF CODED CABLE NUMBER 659 DATED FEBRUARY 28, 1955 AT PARIS, FRANCE. RECEIVED VIA STATE DEPARTMENT.

URGENT

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO UNITED STATES, AEA. REBUCABLE FEBRUARY 25. INSTANT CASE AGAIN DISCUSSED

[redacted]

b1

[redacted]

b7C
b7D

INVESTIGATION BY BELGIUM AUTHORITIES REFLECT THAT [redacted] IDENTICAL WITH [redacted]

Paris legat cable 2-28-55 carrying NET addressed [illegible] cc: to OSI on ancillary matter, LCW

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HERE IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

4-3
(12-2-54)

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~~SECRET~~

PAGE TWO .....

b1

[redacted] UNLESS YOU ADVISE TO (S)
THE CONTRARY THIS OFFICE WILL NEITHER INTERVIEW ORIGINAL SOURCE, CONDUCT INVESTIGATION TO RESOLVE ALLEGATION, NOR APPROACH FRENCH THIS MATTER. BUREAU WILL BE IMMEDIATELY INFORMED OF ANY FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS.

ROLLAND O. L-ALLIER

RECEIVED: 2-28-55 1:17 PM CCA

~~SECRET~~

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

c - Mr. Whitson

SAC, Philadelphia (117-75) (original and one) March 9, 1955

RECORDED - 70 117-268

Director, FBI (117-268)

EX-107

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF
AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO
THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

Reurlet 2/23/55, describing the procedures followed by the Coast Guard in the Port of Philadelphia and in the Delaware River with regard to the so-called "Category Vessels" which might be utilized by the Soviets to smuggle weapons of mass destruction into the United States.

It is noted that Commander Roderick Y. Edwards, U. S. Coast Guard, Captain of the Port of Philadelphia, has invited an agent of your office to accompany the Coast Guard search party as an observer the next time a "Category Vessel" enters the harbor. It is not believed that a Bureau observer should accompany the Coast Guard search party. Ship searches at the present time in the absence of sound knowledge of the presence of fissionable material are largely futile exercises. The stowage of cargo makes a thorough search impossible. The Geiger counters utilized by the Coast Guard are not sensitive enough to pick up radiation from shielded fissionable material and certain types of fertilizer or radium-dial watches might activate the Geiger counters used.

At such time as Coast Guard search procedures are improved by reason of improved detection devices, you might renew your request for authority to observe a Coast Guard search.

LW:fjm
(4)

RECEIVED - INDEXED - FILED

COMM - FBI
MAR 10 1955

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4/21/03 BY SP4 COS/LNP

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI (117-268) DATE: 2/23/55

FROM : SAC, Philadelphia (117-75)

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

Re Philadelphia letter, 5/8/52, captioned "LIAISON WITH UNITED STATES COAST GUARD, IS - C."

Re SAC Letter 55-7 (M).

Re New York letter, 2/2/55.

b7C

On 2/4/55, SA [redacted] discussed the contents of referenced SAC Letter with Commander RODERICK Y. EDWARDS, U.S.C.G., Captain of the Port of Philadelphia. Commander EDWARDS had received communications from his headquarters advising him of the possible attempt to smuggle eight disassembled atomic bombs into the United States.

Commander EDWARDS advised that since May 1952, the Coast Guard had been searching certain vessels coming into this port. The Bureau was advised by referenced Philadelphia letter when this program was initiated. He advised that this search would now be intensified but expressed doubt as to the effectiveness of the search due to the limitations of time, manpower, equipment, and the limited number of ships that were searched. These limitations are obvious and were covered in detail in referenced New York letter.

Commander EDWARDS advised that the vessels to be searched fell into three categories:

Category A. A vessel owned by and operated under the flags of the U.S.S.R. or one of the satellite countries.

Category B. Vessels flying the flag of a friendly nation and apparently owned and operated by a friendly nation but who Intelligence indicates are possibly owned or controlled by the U.S.S.R. or a satellite country.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-7-80 BY SP4 BTM/LBM

MBD:MMK
(2BU, 1BA, 1NK, 1NY, 1PH)

REGISTERED MAIL

RECORDED - 70

CC: Baltimore (Registered Mail)
Newark (Registered Mail)
New York (Registered Mail)

EX-107 12 FEB 28 1955

EX-107

Category C. Any vessel of American or friendly nation ownership which has touched an Iron Curtain port in the last four months.

Commander EDWARDS said that the ships to be searched, "Category Vessels," were brought under escort from the breakwater at the mouth of the Delaware River to the explosive loading anchorage in the middle of the River opposite Artificial Island. Artificial Island is located on the New Jersey side of the Delaware River below Wilmington, Del., and is used only as a geographic point to describe the location of the explosive loading anchorage. The ships are then boarded by the search party made up solely of Coast Guard officials. These search parties are made up of specially trained Coast Guard personnel who search for radioactive material. Due to the distance of the explosive loading anchorage from Philadelphia, officials representing the U. S. Customs, Public Health Service, and Immigration and Naturalization Service do not board the vessel until the search is over and the ship has proceeded to Marcus Hook, Pa. After the search, the ship is kept under physical surveillance by the Coast Guard from both the pier and the waterside while it is in the port. When it leaves the port, it is escorted to the breakwater. No "Category Vessel" can enter the Delaware River except during daylight hours.

Commander EDWARDS stated that arrangements were made to notify a number of Government agencies including the Military Intelligence Services, U. S. Customs, Immigration and Naturalization Service, AEC, and the FBI, when a "Category Vessel" entered the harbor.

He further advised that a "Category Vessel" has entered the Port of Philadelphia only about once every two months since the search program started. All of these have been Category C., except for one Category B. Vessel. No Category A. Vessels have entered. Yugoslav vessels visit the port frequently but are only considered for search if they fall within Category C., as they are not considered satellite vessels.

The above information about "Category Vessels" is classified SECRET by the U. S. Coast Guard and should be handled appropriately.

PH 117-75
Director, FBI

2/23/55

On 2/18/55, this matter was discussed with Lieutenant IVAN C. MC LEAN, U.S.C.G., Executive Officer, Captain of the Port Office in the absence of Commander EDWARDS. Lieutenant MC LEAN advised that because of the original information received mentioning a Panamanian ship, special attention was being paid to Panamanian vessels, and they are being searched by the Coast Guard but only after they dock at a pier. Lieutenant MC LEAN also advised that his headquarters had furnished him the information contained in Bureau Airtels, dated 2/8/55, and 2/10/55, mentioning that the bombs had been sent to a Pacific port for shipment, and that they might possibly leave from Port Arthur, Manchuria.

b7C

On 2/17/55, and 2/18/55, SA [redacted] discussed the contents of referenced SAC Letter with ANDREW C. MC QUEEN, Assistant Collector of Customs, and KENNETH A. MARR, Special Agent in Charge, Customs Agency Service. These Customs officials were in possession of the information contained in referenced SAC Letter and in Bureau Airtels, dated 2/8/55, and 2/10/55, referred to above. They advised that the Customs searchers had been apprised of this information in a general fashion. Instructions had been given that if any mechanisms of an unusual appearance are found by the searchers Mr. MARR should be notified immediately.

Mr. MC QUEEN and Mr. MARR pointed out the same facts set forth in detail in referenced New York letter, to the effect that there is only spot coverage of cargo, and that only a very limited force is available for smuggling searches. Mr. MARR advised that a special duty squad composed of 15 port patrol officers was being trained to operate in civilian dress on the waterfront. Also special attention was being paid to any new importer bringing cargo into the port or any unusual cargo being brought in by a regular importer.

The jurisdiction of the FBI in the Internal Security Field was explained to the Coast Guard and Customs officials interviewed above, and they promised that any information which come to their attention indicating the smuggling of atomic devices would be furnished immediately to the FBI.

Commander EDWARDS invited an Agent of this Office to accompany the Coast Guard search party as an observer the next time a "Category Vessel" enters the harbor, and UACB, this invitation will be accepted. It is believed that because of the Bureau's interest in this matter, it will be of value to have an Agent of this Office observe the mechanics of the search so that he will have firsthand knowledge of the search procedure.

A copy of this letter is being forwarded to Newark and Baltimore because of their interest in the Port of Philadelphia.

0-20

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Sizoo
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

BRANIGAN

(SHIPS)

BEGINNING TODAY, ALL SHIPS MUST GIVE 24-HOUR ADVANCE NOTICE BEFORE ENTERING U.S. SEAPORTS, THE COAST GUARD ANNOUNCED.

A COAST GUARD SPOKESMAN SAID THE NEW ORDER, PART OF THE PORT SECURITY PROGRAM, WAS NOT PROMPTED BY ANY EMERGENCY SITUATION.

HE SAID MOST SHIPS ALREADY GIVE THE 24-HOUR NOTICE VOLUNTARILY AND THAT THE NEW ORDER IS DESIGNED TO IMPROVE THE SECURITY PROGRAM'S OPERATION.

SHIPS ALREADY MUST CLEAR WITH THE COAST GUARD WHEN ENTERING THE U.S. UNDER THE FOUR-YEAR-OLD SECURITY PROGRAM. THE ADVANCE NOTICE, THE SPOKESMAN SAID, WILL HELP AVOID DELAY IN CLEARING SHIPS WHEN THEY APPEAR AT THE HARBOR ENTRANCE.

3/12--JR909A

NOT RECORDED
126 MAR 16 1955

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4-7-00 BY SP4 BJA/LBm

117-268

66 MAR 16 1955

WASHINGTON CITY NEWS SERVICE

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268) DATE: 3/9/55

FROM : SAC, PHILADELPHIA (117-75)

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS
THEREOF OR WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

b7C

Re Philadelphia letter dated 2/23/55.

On 3/2/55, SA [redacted] of the Philadelphia Office accompanied Lieutenant IVAN C. MC LEAN, U. S. Coast Guard, on a search of the "SS Antonios A. Kyrtatas," a ship under Greek registry. Lieutenant MC LEAN is Executive Officer to the Captain of the Port of Philadelphia, U. S. Coast Guard.

This ship was en route to Philadelphia from Victoria, Brazil, but had been in Gdynia, Poland, within the last four months, thus placing it in Category C, as explained in relet.

A search of the ship was made by six Coast Guard enlisted men equipped with two Geiger counters. This is the size of the usual search party. The ship was escorted by a Coast Guard cutter from the breakwater at the mouth of the Delaware River to the Federal Anchorage (Anchorage #1) near Reedy Island. Another Coast Guard boat took over the surveillance there. This surveilling Coast Guard vessel comes down the Delaware River from Gloucester, N. J., and picks up the search party at Port Penn or Augustine Beach, Del., to which the search party has driven by automobile.

After the search, the Coast Guard boat keeps the Category vessel under surveillance until it berths and maintains a waterside surveillance while the ship is in port. The Category vessel upon leaving port is kept under surveillance by a Coast Guard cutter until it passes the breakwater.

While the vessel was being searched, Lieutenant MC LEAN interviewed the Captain of the ship concerning his cargo, crew, and previous ports of call. He also questioned him about the type of search conducted by officials in Iron Curtain ports and what restrictions were placed on the ship while it was in these ports.

REGISTERED MAIL

RECORDED - 77
INDEXED - 77

MBD:cb
(2BU, 1NY, 1NK, 1BA, 1PH)

EX-125

cc: New York (117-192) REGISTERED MAIL
Newark REGISTERED MAIL
Baltimore REGISTERED MAIL

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-7-00 BY SP4 BSTA/LBM

PH 117-75
DIRECTOR, FBI

3/9/55

The Philadelphia Office will continue to maintain close liaison with the Coast Guard, Customs, and other waterfront agencies and sources. Above for information.

c - Mr. Belmont
Mr. Branigan
Mr. C.W.Bates
Mr. Whitson

SAC, Seattle (98-1137) (original and one)

March 14, 1955

PERSONAL ATTENTION

Director, FBI (117-268)

RECORDED

EX-117

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF
AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO
THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

Reurlet 2/28/55, furnishing additional information and observations regarding action being taken by the interested agencies in your area concerning the captioned problem.

You state that the Atomic Energy Commission has promised to fly in, or otherwise make immediately available, their [redacted] or similar detectors at the request of any agency. The Atomic Energy Commission was also reported to have offered the services at any time of its consultants and monitoring teams at various colleges and universities throughout the state.

You should furnish the identity of the representative of the Atomic Energy Commission who promised to fly in a [redacted] or similar detector at the request of any agency. This information must be furnished in detail to the Atomic Energy Commission. There are no unused and available [redacted] devices at the present time. [redacted] as you were advised by Bulet of 2/14/55, in this matter. As you were further advised in the same communication, the decision regarding the supplying of [redacted] and other devices to specific ports of entry will ultimately be made by the National Security Council.

b2
b7E

Even when additional [redacted] devices are approved the determination as to where a specific device will be sent as it becomes available must be determined on the basis of national necessity at Washington. The factor

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LW:fjm
(7)

APR 14 1955

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-16-03 BY Sealtrain

of cost and transportation for any additional [redacted] devices must be borne by the using agency; consequently, some question might exist as to whether any agency representative in the Seattle area could, without prior approval and planning by his headquarters, commit his parent organization to a substantial expenditure of funds.

b2
b7E

You recommended that the Bureau consider the advisibility of positive action toward educating the public on the subject of clandestine nuclear weapons and that SACs should be authorized to discuss the problem on a general basis in the course of Bureau speeches. You further stated that the Bureau should prepare an outline of those phases in detail of the subject that could be included in their speeches to public groups.

Over a year ago the Bureau took the lead in positive action toward educating the public in the above manner. The White House press release regarding the Bureau's jurisdiction in atomic energy matters dated December 15, 1953, was part of this program. The letter from the Director of the FBI to all law enforcement officials dated January 1, 1954, with its attachments, which was distributed as an enclosure to the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, January, 1954, was another part of the same educational program. Subsequently, in March, 1954, there was a vast amount of publicity in the nation's press with comments by public leaders throughout the country. Since that time, it is my understanding that civil defense organizations in many parts of the country at Federal, state and local levels have given consideration to the question of clandestine atomic weapons. As you were informed by No Number SAC Letter 55-B dated January 21, 1955, an unclassified description of fusion weapons (H-bombs) is being considered for public release.

When such release is effected, if you then feel you should use such material in your speeches, you should make specific suggestions in the matter. The fusion weapon information may not be released under Bureau auspices at this time.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI DATE: 2-28-55

FROM : SAC, SEATTLE (98-1137) CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS ~~AND~~ OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

Remylet 2/4/55 and Bulet 2/14/55.

I have just conferred a second time with heads of local security agencies relative to instant matter. At the outset of this conference, I again emphasized, in order that our position be clear, that it is not our intention nor are we attempting to direct the activities of other agencies with respect to this problem, but that we are taking the initiative in bringing the various groups together in order that whatever cooperative effort is feasible and possible might be effected. All local agency heads understand this relationship, and their attitude has always been cooperative. I know the seriousness of instant problem is well recognized by all and that they welcomed the opportunity we provided to consider it jointly.

It was agreed that the Coast Guard at the focal point together with Customs and INS have the primary responsibility for detecting and preventing the smuggling of bombs into the country. These agencies also agreed that toward this end they would undertake through their respective headquarters to acquire, as soon as possible, the best available detectors of radioactive material in as great a quantity as possible commensurate with their needs. The Navy announced they have approximately 150 Geiger counters, and Army announced possession of a number of Geiger counters which both Services offered for general use by any other agency requiring their use. AEC promised to fly in or otherwise make immediately available [redacted] or similar detectors at the request of any agency. AEC also offered the services at any time of its consultants and monitoring teams at various colleges and universities throughout the State. All agencies agreed that receipt of important information by any of them would be immediately reported to the FBI, and we in turn would undertake to advise all others. This places this office in the position of being advised of any developments, of having the opportunity, if warranted, of coordinating any action which might be necessary, and of course insures that we be in a position to discharge our own responsibilities.

b2
b7E

RDA:LM
(3)

EX-117

DECLASSIFIED BY SP4BSM/RNP ON 4/16/03

DIRECTOR, FBI
RE: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS AND PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES; AEA

SAC, SEATTLE
2-28-55

All agencies will immediately alert all employees to the potential danger and direct that insofar as is practical search or scrutiny of any vessel, plane or other vehicle be performed with the additional purpose of detecting attempts to smuggle bombs or fissionable material into the country.

Representatives of the various agencies were unanimous in their observation that without previous intelligence and without sensitive detectors which, for example, could be placed near a ship and efficiently monitor the entire cargo, etc., any alternate measures would be only stop-gap in measure. The enormity of the task of visual inspection is reflected in such comments and observations as the following made by representatives at our conference:

The Coast Guard has no instruction to date as to the details of handling a suspect ship. Would it be taken to a port accessible to newspapermen or would search be attempted at sea where cargo would be unloaded on barges? Who would do the unloading? What disposition would be made of the crew?

[redacted] b2 b7E

Coast Guard feels there is such a vast quantity of material and crates which could conceal a bomb or parts in various warious warehouses and docks that examination by visual inspection is almost impossible.

Even though alerting employees generally to watch for possible import of fissionable material would be better than not doing so, there are practically none of these employees who know what they should be looking for.

The United States has thousands of personnel abroad whose effects are being shipped in and out of the country on a completely informal basis.

Diplomatic pouch could conceivably be used for importing fissionable material.

Shipments from Japan are currently being unloaded in Vancouver, B. C. The ships then proceed to local ports empty or in ballast.

DIRECTOR, FBI
RE: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS AND PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES; AEA

SAC, SEATTLE
2-28-55

Generally, it was the recommendation of representatives at this conference that active steps be taken immediately to inform the public generally, perhaps without going into great detail, of the nature, appearance and various characteristics of a bomb and fissionable material to acquaint them with the possibility of fissionable material being smuggled into the country and thereby secure cooperation of the public to act as sentinels against such a possibility. The job is too great for security agencies to insure against such smuggling because they just don't have sufficient personnel.

I alluded to the necessity of having public cooperation in my reflet, and I am in agreement that information to the public on this subject and their assistance is the most formidable and effective counter we can employ against a bomb delivered by this means. I believe it is the responsibility of the Government to adequately inform the public in order that they will be qualified to help protect themselves and the country. Such a program of education would also have the advantage of minimizing any panic that might otherwise occur by sudden knowledge that a bomb had been discovered within our boundaries.

I recommend insofar as the Bureau is concerned that the Bureau consider the advisability of positive action toward educating the public in this respect. I believe SAC's should be authorized to discuss the problem on a general basis in the course of Bureau speeches. In order that policy be uniform in this respect, the Bureau should prepare an outline of those phases and detail of the subject that could be included in our speeches to public groups.

The foregoing is being furnished the Bureau to report the efforts we are making to cope with this problem and also to advise of the recommendations of security agency heads in this area.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: March 12, 1955

FROM : J. H. Kleinkauf

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC WEAPONS
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

Tolson
Boardman
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At 10:10 a.m., 3/12/55, Major Joseph E. O'Leary, Security Division, G-2, telephonically advised he had just received a "Top Secret" message regarding the docking of the "Marine Arrow" in San Francisco on 3/13/55. He further advised that in view of the nature of this message, he was not able to give the writer too much information but that it appeared Customs and the Coast Guard have first responsibility regarding this matter and that the San Francisco FBI office has not been advised regarding this matter.

I then called SA Lish Whitson who stated that this matter undoubtedly pertained to information received approximately one month ago from the Bureau's Seattle office wherein SAC Auerbach advised he had received information that the "Marine Arrow" was a suspect vessel and was suspected of bringing narcotics into the United States; that this vessel may have touched Red Chinese ports during its trip and that this information has been disseminated to the interested agencies. Whitson advised that Liaison Agent J.F. Sullivan should contact G-2 in an effort to get more information regarding this matter, if possible.

Sullivan advised after contacting G-2 that this message was received by G-2 from its Seattle office which was advising Headquarters, 6th Army, San Francisco, of the arrival of this vessel and that the Pentagon merely received a copy for its information. Sullivan also advised that this vessel is due to arrive in Seattle (instead of San Francisco as mentioned by O'Leary) at 10:00 a.m. on 3/13/55; that the information is apparently a "feed-back" of our own information previously disseminated and that G-2, Seattle, received their information

Ticklers: Mr. Belmont
Mr. Branigan
Mr. Whitson
Mr. J.F. Sullivan
Mr. Kleinkauf

JHK:rmp/em
(6)

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51 MAR 22 1955

ENCLOSURE

from the Coast Guard at Seattle. Accordingly, I called SA Whitson on the matter, advising him of the additional information Sullivan received from G-2. Whitson stated that no further action need be taken in this matter inasmuch as the Seattle office was already aware of it; that Seattle was maintaining close liaison with the Coast Guard and Customs regarding this matter and that in the event any information pertinent to the Bureau was received, the Seattle office would appropriately advise the Bureau.

At 12:10 p.m., 3/12/55, Major O'Leary called back and said that he had ascertained the afore-mentioned was a "test run"; to forget the message and advise SA Sullivan, which was done. Sullivan later advised that Col. Perry has stated the afore-mentioned was a "test maneuver"; that the message should have contained the word "maneuver" in it, but apparently did not.

RECOMMENDATION: C. E. Hennrich:LL - March 14, 1955

It is recommended that Liaison discuss this matter with Major General Arthur G. Trudeau, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. Playing games and maneuvers, as was done in this instance, can result only in confusion and duplication of effort on the part of the agencies involved, particularly when in the original instance we had no notification that this was a "maneuver."

Done
J.F.S.

Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: March 7, 1955

FROM : L. V. BOARDMAN

SUBJECT: RESTRICTIONS ON THE DIPLOMATIC POUCH

SECRET IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Dulles
Jackson
Bedell Smith
Dillon
Larbo
Mohr
Parsons
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Tamm
Sizoo
Wintrow
Mrs. Boom
Holloman
Gandy

#GU874/950935/99705S
4/7/00
NLS/BJA/LAM Cont Derivative
Per LTR DTD 10/14/03 602417 HQ/NLS/BJA/pmp 10/24/03

SYNOPSIS:

Your memorandum of March 3, 1955, indicated the concern of Admiral Radford and the Attorney General concerning misuse of the Diplomatic Pouch and noted that the "Killian" report might deal with this matter. The "Killian" report deals with the technological and scientific aspects of improving U. S. offensive and defensive measures, and apparently notes atomic weapons could be introduced in the Pouch. No dissemination of "Killian" report to be made prior to March 17, 1955, when President is to be briefed at NSC meeting. Subcommittee of NSC Planning Board studied this matter and reported to NSC in January, 1954. Defense and CIA at that time opposed limiting the Pouch. NSC approved Subcommittee report on February 11, 1954, and no limitations placed on the Pouch. Director of CIA expressed concern this matter in November, 1954. IIC-ICIS Subcommittee requested to consider this matter as a result of concern on part of Director of CIA. This request to Joint Committee by ICIS on March 3, 1955. IIC has consistently pointed out danger of atom bombs being introduced via Diplomatic Pouch.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

It is recommended:

1. That through liaison it be pointed out to Mr. Allen Dulles that this subject was considered by a special group under the NSC and a report made in January, 1954, which reflected CIA opposed limiting the Pouch. If Dulles desires to reverse that position, then continued IIC-ICIS consideration would be logical.

2. That it be suggested to the Attorney General he may wish to point out to Admiral Radford that this matter was

Attachment

ESS:hko
(8)

1-Mr. Boardman
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mrs. Sanders
1-Mrs. Whitson
1-Section Tickler

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145 MAR 17 1955

MAR 10 1955

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LIAISON

considered by a special group under the NSC and a report made to the NSC in January, 1954, which reflected that the defense agencies opposed limiting the use of the Pouch to documentary materials. In the event Admiral Radford desires to reverse the position of the defense agencies in this connection, then it would be logical to have this matter given further consideration in the IIC-ICIS Joint Committee.

3. That the attached suggested memorandum in this connection be forwarded to the Attorney General.

OK

DETAILS:

Reference is made to your memorandum, March 9, 1955, which advised that Admiral Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had spoken to the Attorney General about the misuse of the Diplomatic Pouch. Admiral Radford and the Attorney General felt that some additional thought should be given to limiting the Pouch to letters only. It was noted that the "Killian" report might deal directly with this matter. You advised you would like to have Mr. E. S. Sanders determine just what the "Killian" report is. The Attorney General requested that you send him a memorandum with any suggestions we might be able to make concerning this matter and an indication of what is being done by the IIC or the ICIS in this connection.

Special Agent Sanders has determined that the "Killian" report is one which is to be presented to the President on March 17, 1955, at an NSC meeting. No distribution is to be made of this report until that time and only four copies have been made. The study was made upon the instructions of the President and deals with the technological and scientific matters relating to possible improvement of U.S. offensive and defensive measures. It, reportedly, deals only with technological and scientific improvements. Sanders was advised by a representative of the Office of Defense Mobilization that the report

refers in two places to the Diplomatic Pouch, undoubtedly taking cognizance of our efforts to develop technological devices to detect fissionable materials. To date, the exact references in the report to the Pouch are not known, but efforts are being made to obtain additional information concerning the "Killian" report, including inquiry at the Atomic Energy Commission.

In November, 1954, Mr. Allen W. Dulles, Director of CIA, expressed concern to Mr. Belmont and Liaison Agent Papich concerning the fact that the Pouch could be used for transporting atomic weapons. This concern was called to the attention of the ICIS and Pat Coyne.

On January 26, 1954, a Special NSC Planning Board Subcommittee submitted a report to the Planning Board on the "Comparative Advantages to the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Which Would Result from an International Agreement Restricting the Use of the Diplomatic Pouch Solely to the Transmittal of Documents." It is interesting to note that this report points out that

[redacted] b2 b7E

[redacted] b1

[redacted] (S)

The report concluded that this use of the Pouch on the part of the U.S., the retaliatory measures which might be taken, and the practical difficulties of enforcement on the part of the United States would indicate that the advantage is to the United States not to limit the Diplomatic Pouches solely to the transmittal of documents. It was further noted that atomic weapons could be introduced into the United States through many nondiplomatic channels and that restricting the Pouch would not guarantee security. The recommendations of the

countries, not to restrict the Diplomatic Pouch to documents were approved by the National Security Council on February 11, 1954.

It is interesting to note that Defense and CIA Representatives took a position opposed to the concern now being expressed by Admiral Radford and Mr. Allen Dulles. On March 3, 1955, the ICIS requested the IIC-ICIS Joint Committee Concerning Countermeasures to Detect and Defend Against the Clandestine Introduction of Atomic Weapons to study this matter as a result of the concern expressed by Mr. Dulles.

The IIC has since December 4, 1952, when the first survey report of the danger from the small atomic weapons was made to the President, consistently pointed out the danger of atomic bombs or component parts thereof being introduced into the United States via the Diplomatic Pouch.

Orig & 1 - A
1 - Mr. Boardman
1- Mr. Belmont
1- Mr. Sanders
1- Mr. Whitson
1- Section Tickler

~~SECRET~~

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

March 8, 1955

DIRECTOR, FBI

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RESTRICTIONS ON THE DIPLOMATIC POUCH

Reference is made to our conversation on March 3, 1955, at which time you indicated that Admiral Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is concerned with the misuse of the Diplomatic Pouch and that some thought might be in order with a view to limiting the use of the Pouch to letters only rather than large crates and cartons which might contain parts of an atom bomb.

The IIC has consistently taken the position that an atom bomb or the component parts thereof could be introduced into the United States through the use of the "Diplomatic Pouch."

On January 26, 1954, a temporary subcommittee of the National Security Council Planning Board reported on the comparative advantage of restricting the use of the Diplomatic Pouch to documents. The report noted that it was not considered advisable to attempt to restrict the use of the Diplomatic Pouch to documents inasmuch as the State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Department of Defense had advised that such restrictions on the Pouch would result in the same restrictions being made by Russia and the satellite countries

[redacted] b1

[redacted] (S)

The recommendations of the subcommittee, not to limit the Diplomatic Pouch to documents, were approved by the National Security Council on February 11, 1954.

During November of 1954, Mr. Allen W. Dulles, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, expressed concern that the Diplomatic Pouch could be utilized for introducing atomic weapons or component parts thereof, and his concern was called to the attention of the ICIS by me in an IIC letter dated November 23, 1954. It is understood that this letter has been referred for consideration to the IIC-ICIS Joint Committee considering counter-measures to detect and defend against the clandestine introduction of atomic weapons.

You mentioned that Admiral Radford had stated that there would shortly be considered the "Killian" report which

(Attached to cover memo from Mr. Boardman to

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Per LTR DTD 10/24/03 #0248742/95035/991059 4/7/00 62uc/NLS/BJA/CG 10/29/03

might deal with this matter. The Killian Committee is a group under the Office of Defense Mobilization, which, at Presidential direction, is considering the technological and scientific aspects of improving U. S. offensive and defensive measures, and it is understood a report of this group is to be considered by the National Security Council on March 17, 1955. It is further understood that the report at this time is restricted to the members of the committee and that no dissemination is to be made prior to a briefing of the President on March 17. It is understood, however, that the problem of the misuse of Diplomatic Pouches is mentioned in connection with the clandestine introduction of atomic weapons. The exact contents of the report are not known to me at this time.

Through liaison, I am determining whether Mr. Allen Dulles desires to take a position at this time in connection with this matter opposite to that taken in January of last year, [redacted] b1 (S)

You may desire to discuss this matter further with Admiral Radford and inquire whether the military departments now feel that they could effectively operate if such limitations were placed on U. S. Government Diplomatic Pouches.

As indicated above, this matter is presently being considered by the Joint IIC-ICIS Committee, but it is not believed any effective restrictions can be placed upon the Soviet Bloc Diplomatic Pouches unless the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Department positions are different from what they were in January of 1954.

I will advise you of any additional information which I may obtain concerning the "Killian" report and the position which Mr. Dulles may now desire to take in connection with this matter.

tic - Mr. Whitson

SAC, New Haven (117-29) (original and one) March 16, 1955

Director, FBI (117-268) - 124

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EX-117

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

Re New Haven letter, 3/8/55, advising that there is no Coast Guard station in New Haven for vessel searches and in view of the limited facilities available in New Haven, it would appear that it will be incumbent upon appropriate New York authorities in Customs and Coast Guard to notify Customs in New Haven and the nearest Coast Guard unit available for inspection of the arrival of one of the categories of ships falling within the provisions of the Port Security Program.

The attention of New York and New Haven is directed to the press releases by the Bureau of Customs, March 11 and 12, 1955, publicizing the fact that vessels falling within the purview of the Port Security Program must now give Coast Guard 24 hours notice of their arrivals in a specific port.

Both New York and New Haven should check with the appropriate authorities to determine how these new regulations may affect Port Security procedures in small ports such as New Haven.

cc - 2 - New York (117-192)

LW:fjm
(6)

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MAR 18 1955

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MAR 16 1955
COMM-FBI

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: March 8, 1955

FROM : SAC, NEW HAVEN (117-29)

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND/OR OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES.
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

Re Butel dated 1-29-55 and letter to the Bureau from New York dated 2-2-55 captioned as above.

Steps have been taken by the New Haven Division to alert appropriate officials of the U. S. Bureau of Customs and the U. S. Coast Guard to the information set forth in referenced teletype concerning the smuggling of Atomic bombs into the United States. A survey of the port facilities in Connecticut was made along the lines of that which was described in referenced letter from New York and the following situation was determined.

The State of Connecticut has on its coast line four principal seaports, located at New Haven, New London, Bridgeport and Stamford. Appropriate inquiry of Coast Guard and Customs officials located at these ports indicates that for the most part shipping in this State consists principally of coast-wise trade in oil and lumber, the oil boats shipping out of Central and South American ports and the lumber boats originating in Canada. Twice a month ships of the Isbrantsen Line dock in New Haven from the Orient. The first port of call in the United States visited by these ships is San Francisco and the cargoes are subject to customs inspection in that port. The Isbrantsen cargo consists of food articles, such as canned fish from Japan and canned fruits and vegetables from the West Coast of the United States. These articles are subject to spot inspection by authorities from the Food and Drug Administration out of Boston, Massachusetts and the Customs Bureau in New Haven, Connecticut.

Officials of the U. S. Customs Bureau in New Haven, New London, Bridgeport and Stamford, Connecticut, as well as the Coast Guard Station in New London, have advised that they were alerted to

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2 cc New York (117-192)
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Ex. - 117 Butel to New Haven 3-4-55

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information from the State Department by their Washington, D. C. Headquarters. There is no Coast Guard unit assigned to board vessels docking in New Haven, Bridgeport and Stamford. Coast Guard authorities in New London, Connecticut, which is also an United States Naval Station, have advised that any ships arriving in that port which have touched at any Iron Curtain port will be given an armed guard and thorough inspection.

In referenced letter from the New York Office to the Bureau, on page 6, there was set forth the results of an interview with Captain FRANK K. JOHNSON, USCG, Caption of the Port of New York, to the effect that ships in three catergories coming to the United States, that is, Russian flag ships, Satellite flag ships and other vessels having touched at a Russian or Satellite port within a four month period, will be required to unload in New Haven, Connecticut. The attention of the New York Office is directed to the fact that the U. S. Customs Bureau in New Haven, which is the only boarding and searching agency in that port, is a relatively small office and able, therefore, to give only a relatively sketchy search and is not aware of the plan outlined by Captain JOHNSON calling for the sending of certain ships to New Haven. Furthermore, there is no Coast Guard Station in New Haven which could be called upon, if necessary, to assist in searching a vessel. The local Customs Bureau provides only a spot search of ships unloading in New Haven. From time to time, a searching party will be sent from New York City under the jurisdiction of Deputy Collector of Customs HERMAN LIPSKY, NYC. This searching party is not required to, and does not usually, give any advance notice to the New Haven Customs Office that a search is going to be conducted. In view of the limited facilities available in New Haven, Connecticut as outlined above, it would appear that it will be incumbent upon appropriate New York authorities, presumably the U. S. Coast Guard and U. S. Customs Bureau, to notify the Customs Bureau in New Haven and the nearest Coast Guard unit available for guard services and inspection that one of the specific catergories of ships to be unloaded in New Haven is to arrive in that port. In addition, these agencies in New York City should advise the New York Office of the FBI in order that it can in turn alert the New Haven Office of the FBI to the arrival of one of these vessels.

NH 117-29
las

Individuals responsible for the checking of vessels arriving in the four ports in Connecticut have been alerted to be on the watch for any suspicious cargo which could possibly contain an Atomic Bomb or a component part thereof.

-RUC-

CONFIDENTIAL

The Attorney General (orig & 1)

March 15, 1955

RECORDED

Director, FBI

RESTRICTIONS ON THE DIPLOMATIC POUCH

Reference is made to my memoranda dated March 8 and March 11, 1955, regarding the proposed reappraisal of the United States policy regarding restrictions on the diplomatic pouch to prevent its use in the smuggling into the United States of components of nuclear weapons.

As you were advised in the memorandum from this Bureau dated March 11, 1955, the question of reappraisal of United States policy in this regard was raised on March 10, 1955, by a representative of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference to the Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on countermeasures to detect and defend against the clandestine introduction and detonation of atomic weapons in the United States. At the meeting of the Joint Committee, Colonel Joseph Halversen, Defense Representative from ICIS, stated that it was his opinion that a reappraisal should not be undertaken at this time because the question had been "settled" by an Ad Hoc Committee of the National Security Council Planning Board in January of 1954. Colonel Halversen stated that he wanted personally to confer with Admiral Radford of the Joint Chiefs of Staff before taking any position in either the ICIS or the Joint Committee.

Since you have been in contact with Admiral Radford on this matter, I thought you would want to have the foregoing information.

LW:ewk
(7)

MAILED 2
MAR 15 1955
COMM-FBI

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CONFIDENTIAL

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: March 10, 1955

FROM : W. A. Branigan

Tolson
Boardman
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Holloman
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SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION IN PLACE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

The Joint Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference-Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security Committee on Countermeasures met at 10:00 a.m., March 10, 1955, in the Justice Building. Supervisor Whitson and B. L. Willard of the Office of Naval Intelligence represented the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference.

A draft report of detection devices was discussed and Mr. Carl Pfuntner of the ICIS Secretariat was instructed to prepare the final draft on the basis of discussion for presentation to the IIC and to the ICIS.

The Joint Committee then took up consideration of a memorandum to the Joint Committee by Mr. Leonard P. Bienvenu, Executive Secretary, ICIS, requesting the Joint Committee to undertake a re-appraisal of U. S. policy regarding the size of Soviet diplomatic pouches. The ICIS members of the Joint Committee Colonel Halversen of Defense and Captain Stewart of Coast Guard stated that they knew nothing of the referral of the matter to the Joint Committee for re-appraisal. Captain Stewart pointed out that the Treasury representative was not present at the last meeting of the ICIS where such a request might have originated. Colonel Halversen stated that he was present and that it was his understanding that the matter would be referred to the Joint Committee for the Joint Committee's recommendation as to whether a re-appraisal should be undertaken. Colonel Halversen, on that basis, stated he would vote against such a re-appraisal because the matter had already been settled in January of 1954. Supervisor Whitson pointed out that IIC position had been that if a practical weight limitation could be imposed on the Soviet diplomatic pouches, it would be beneficial to the internal security and for that reason IIC felt that a re-appraisal of U. S. policy might be advantageous.

LW:fjm
(5)
cc - Mr. A. H. Belmont
Mr. Branigan
Mr. Sanders
Mr. Whitson

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EX-128

MAR 17 1955

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Colonel Halversen was vigorously insistent that the Joint Committee had no jurisdiction in the matter; that the problem was "res adjudicata"; and that ICIS had not intended to refer the matter to the Joint Committee for re-appraisal. In order to settle the matter as far as ICIS was concerned, the Joint Committee requested the presence of Mr. Bienvenu, Executive Secretary of ICIS; Mr. Doherty, the Standing Committee representative from Justice on ICIS; and finally Mr. Yeagley, the Chairman of ICIS. In the interim, Colonel Halversen phoned Mr. Warren Chase, State Department representative on ICIS standing Committee, who had been present at the ICIS meeting, and confirmed from Chase that Chase understood that the Joint Committee was only going to consider whether or not a re-appraisal should be made.

Bienvenu and Doherty admitted that they had not coordinated the memorandum to the Joint Committee with the ICIS Defense and State representatives before requesting the re-appraisal. Mr. Yeagley pointed out that the Attorney General was in correspondence with Admiral Radford regarding the latter idea concerning the Soviet pouch and that Radford had expressed concern. Yeagley also stated that the Treasury Department had been requested by ICIS to furnish statistics on the amount of pouch traffic entering the U. S. He also advised that he, as Chairman of ICIS, had told Mr. Lay of National Security Council in November of 1954 that ICIS would continue to look into the question of restrictions on the Soviet pouch. Colonel Halversen pointed out that this had not been coordinated with the other ICIS members and stated that he wanted personally to confer with Admiral Radford before taking any position in either the ICIS or Joint Committee.

Supervisor Whitson requested the ICIS representatives to get themselves "squared away" as quickly as possible so that some constructive thinking could be done on the problem.

RECOMMENDATION:

None. You will be kept informed of developments. This matter is being followed closely by Supervisor Whitson with Mr. Bienvenu.

Suggest memo to A. re attitude of Col. Halversen. K.

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268) DATE: 3-15-55

FROM : SAC, BALTIMORE (117-46)

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF OR WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

Reference SAC Letter 55-7 dated 2/1/55 and Bureau airtels dated 2/8/55 and 2/10/55.

A survey has been made of the confidential sources and informants in the Baltimore Division for individuals who may have knowledge or might obtain information concerning the type of international "operator" indicated in the story from Luxembourg concerning the threatened smuggling of atomic bombs. The Baltimore Office has no sources in such a position.

At various Agents squad conferences, all agents were advised of the information contained in referenced letter and airtels and have been alerted to the possibility of receipt of information bearing on this matter in the course of their regular contacts with the sources, informants or in connection with other investigations. All agents were cautioned concerning the extreme confidential nature of this information and the seriousness of the situation which might be created in the event any of this information became known to the general public or to the press.

GWM:pom

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DATE 4-7-00 BY SP4 BJA/LBM
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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: February 8, 1955

FROM : W. A. Branigan

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 3/15/2004 BY 60267 uc/mls/BJA/tdw

Tolson
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Rosen
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Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION IN PLACE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

The Joint Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference-Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security Subcommittee on Countermeasures met at 10:00 a.m., February 7, 1955, in Room 2515, Justice Building. Meeting with the Subcommittee was the Advisory Group, composed of representatives of Coast Guard, Customs, Immigration and Atomic Energy Commission, which has been supervising the field testing of passive detection devices and which group has submitted recommendations regarding limited national procurement for the use of detection devices by Customs, Coast Guard and Immigration.

The program suggested by the Advisory Group would involve the utilization of 48 of the so-called [redacted] detection devices (nonportable) at a production cost of $240,000 and 300 portable detection devices at a production cost of $225,000. The annual operating cost for such a program would be approximately $2,016,500. The Advisory Group pointed out that there had been no unfavorable public reaction in connection with field testing to date. For a day or so there had been a flurry of speculation in the press at the time the first devices appeared on the New York waterfront. It was pointed out that the portable detection device had not received the most thorough field testing on automobile traffic and passenger baggage on railroad trains but that its performance was of such caliber that the Advisory Group felt justified in recommending the purchase of 300 for the use of the Coast Guard on ship searches, by the Immigration border patrol on checks of autos and railroad coaches crossing the Mexican and Canadian borders and for supplemental use by Customs in identifying specific pieces of baggage when the big [redacted] device has been activated by a truck load of baggage. b2 b7E

The Advisory Group also discussed the need for full-time supervision of such a nation-wide program by personnel from the responsible agencies who could be relieved from other duties. They pointed out that if a program was put into operation at 16 major ports of entry and along the Mexican and Canadian borders that there would have to be careful coordination in order that all agencies could have a prompt exchange of information regarding performance of the devices and to insure that any suspicious behavior

LW:fjm
(6)

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cc - Mr. Belmont
Mr. Boardman

cc - Mr. Branigan
Mr. Sanders
Mr. Whitson

66 MAR 23 1955

of the devices was acted upon promptly where possible by the operating agency and reported promptly to the FBI when such was necessary.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is respectfully recommended that these data be brought to the attention of the member agencies of the IIC. The next meeting of the joint committee will be at 10:00 a.m., Friday, February 11, 1955, at which time proposed recommendations to the National Security Council for the approval of IIC-ICIS will be drafted.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Director

DATE: March 14, 1955

FROM : L. V. Boardman

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SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES REQUIRED TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION-IN-PLACE OF DEMOLITION ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

Reference is made to the attached letter from J. Patrick Coyne, Internal Security Representative, National Security Council, to the Chairmen of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security dated March 10, 1955. Coyne states that at its meeting of February 18, 1955, the ICIS agreed that a reappraisal of United States policy regarding the diplomatic pouch should be studied by the Joint IIC-ICIS group which has been studying countermeasures.

You noted "Try to get prompt action on this."

At 1:40 p.m. March 14, 1955, Mr. Leonard Bienvenu, Executive Secretary of the ICIS, informed Supervisor Whitson that he had talked with Mr. Stohl, Defense Representative of ICIS, who was apparently favorably disposed toward a reappraisal, but that Mr. Warren Chase, the State Department Representative, was not willing to commit the Department of State to any such reappraisal. Mr. Bienvenue stated that consequently the ICIS position was still undetermined because he and Mr. Yeagley, the Chairman, had not coordinated with Treasury, Defense and State the request for the Joint IIC-ICIS Committee to reappraise the problem.

Mr. Bienvenu stated that he was trying to get complete ICIS concurrence and would notify the Bureau as soon as possible upon obtaining a majority concurrence in the ICIS so that a meeting of the Joint Committee could be called to take action on the problem.

Mr. Coyne's memorandum does not require acknowledgment since it would appear to have been written solely for the purpose of showing Coyne's impression that the ICIS agreed that the problem of the pouch should be studied by the Joint IIC-ICIS Committee. In this position, Doherty of Justice has previously stood alone, the State and Defense members being of a contrary opinion and the Treasury ICIS member having been absent when the matter was raised.

LW:ewk
(7)

32

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Ticklers: Mr. Boardman, Mr. Belmont, Mr. Branigan, Mr. Sanders, Mr. Whitson

MAR 22 1955

Attachment

RECOMMENDATION:

None. You will be kept informed of developments.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: March 9, 1955

4-7-00
CLASSIFIED BY Nsn/61A/(AM 60267)(Denoted)
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1
Per letter dated 3/23/04 60267 uc/NLS/15341/tlw 3/29/04

FROM : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

SUBJECT: RESTRICTIONS ON THE DIPLOMATIC POUCH

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Reference is made to my memorandum dated March 7, 1955, describing the concern of Admiral Radford and the Attorney General relative to the misuse of the diplomatic pouch. They felt that some additional thought should be given to limiting the pouch to letters only. This matter is of particular interest to us inasmuch as we have consistently pointed out the danger of atomic weapons being introduced into the United States via the diplomatic pouch. In January, 1954, a subcommittee of the National Security Council Planning Board studied this matter and prepared a report.

[redacted] b1 b3

(C)

Agent Papich contacted [redacted]

[redacted]

(C)

NOT RECORDED
145 MAR 17 1955

SPP:fjb (7)

1 - Mr. Boardman
1 - Mr. Whitson
1 - Liaison Section
1 - Mr. Sanders
1 - Mr. Papich

INITIALS OF PERSON HANDLING MATTER

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 66-8603

Memo to the Director
from Mr. Boardman

RE: RESTRICTIONS ON THE DIPLOMATIC POUCH

A memorandum dated March 8, 1955, was sent to the Attorney General suggesting that he point out to Admiral Radford that Defense agencies in January, 1954, had opposed limiting the use of the pouch to documentary materials. It was pointed out to the Attorney General that if Admiral Radford desired to reverse the position of Defense agencies then this could be directed to the attention of the IIC-ICIS Joint Committee.

ACTION:

b1
b3

[redacted] (C)

Have D give prompt attention.

2. When we receive word from the Attorney General, we will advise the same Joint Committee concerning Admiral Radford's position.

3. The IIC will press for action the Joint Committee through its representatives on that Committee. The attitude of Admiral Radford will be immediately furnished to the Joint Committee when received from the Attorney General. There is no further action which the IIC can take at this time but this matter will be closely followed and IIC views maintained that the pouch should be limited.

Orig & 1 AG
1 - Mr. Boardman
1 - Mr. Belment
1 - Mr. Sanders

1-Mr. Whitso
1-Mr. Papich
1-Section
Tickler

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

March 17, 1955

4.1-00

DIRECTOR, FBI

SPWBJP/LBM
1

RESTRICTIONS ON THE DIPLOMATIC POUCH

Per letter dated 3/23/04 62267 UC/AKS/DSA/Hdw 3/30/04

Reference is made to my memorandum of March 8, 1955, which advised that through liaison I was determining whether

[redacted] (C)

[redacted] (C)

[redacted] (C)

[redacted] (C)

b1
b3

I will be interested in receiving from you any further expressions of opinion which you may receive from Admiral Arthur W. Radford in connection with this matter.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(X) SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES -- Reference is made to SAC Letter 55-7 (M) dated February 1, 1955, which furnished information supplied to the [redacted] (X) (u) Referral/Direct to OGA [redacted] and the Central Intelligence Agency have informed the Legal Attache, Paris, that both the [redacted] (X) (u) [redacted] (X) (u)

3/8/55
SAC LETTER NO. 55-20 - 23 -

Classified by SP5a/jac
Declassify on: OADR 9/14/87

pages 23 and 24, item (X) only is being marked for classification per SP5ci/jac, 9/14/87.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ DECLASSIFIED BY SP4 BJA/LSM ON 4-7-00 Pm/letter dated 3/23/04 LW2/7 uc/NLS/BJA/FBI 3/30/04

Both the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of State are attempting to further resolve the allegations in this matter. Apparent unreliability of sources regarding instant allegations should not lessen your alertness to recognize and report promptly to the Bureau any information bearing on possible Soviet smuggling of nuclear weapons. (X) -24-

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NOT RECORDED
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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Tolson ✓
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TO : Mr. L. V. Boardman

DATE: March 18, 1955

FROM : A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES REQUIRED TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION-IN-PLACE OF DEMOLITION ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

Reference is made to the memorandum from L. V. Boardman to the Director, dated March 14, 1955, indicating that Mr. Leonard Bienvenu, Executive Secretary of the ICIS, was attempting to get complete ICIS concurrence in the referral of the question of reappraisal of U. S. policy regarding the diplomatic pouches to the Joint Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference-Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security Committee on Countermeasures.

At 9:40 a.m., March 18, 1955, Mr. Carl Pfuntner, of the ICIS Secretariat, phoned the Bureau and informed Supervisor Whitson that the ICIS agencies had concurred and the Department of State had designated Mr. Jacob Beam to represent it in connection with the study by the Joint Committee and that because of the interest of Mr. Allen Dulles, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, he had been requested by ICIS to provide a representative. Mr. Dulles had designated Colonel Sheffield Edwards.

Mr. Pfuntner stated that the earliest he could get the ICIS group together, including the State and CIA representatives, to meet with the IIC representatives in the Joint Committee was 10:00 a.m., Thursday, March 24, 1955. Supervisor Whitson told Mr. Pfuntner that if it was at all possible the meeting should be set up sooner. Mr. Pfunter stated that he would see what could be done in this regard.

RECOMMENDATION:

None. You will be kept advised of developments.

LW:fjm
(6)

cc - Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Branigan
Mr. E. S. Sanders
Mr. Whitson

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INDEXED - 32

The Director

March 17, 1955

Mr. L. V. Boardman

DEPARTMENTAL LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM
84TH CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION

By memorandun of March 11, 1955, Mr. Frank Chambers, in Deputy Attorney General William P. Rogers' Office, notified you that the Attorney General was to hold a meeting at 2:00 p.m., Friday, March 18, 1955, at which time the Department's legislative program for the 84th Congress would be discussed.

For your information, the Department has furnished the Bureau with a mimeographed list of legislative matters included in the Department's legislative program, which is attached, reflecting the status of the program as of March 16, 1955. Matters included in the Department's legislative program are in two categories: (1) Matters of Primary Importance; (2) Matters of Secondary Importance. The Department also furnished a memorandum dated March 15, 1955, re "ICIS Recommendations for Internal Security Legislation." Also discussed in this memorandum is a third classification, namely, those items which the Bureau recommended but which are not included in the present Departmental legislative program.

Hereinafter are brief summarizations concerning the proposals in the program which have been recommended by the Bureau or which directly affect the Bureau's work. There is also being attached a brief which sets forth in more detail information pertaining to these several items.
(See indicated tabs)

I. MATTERS OF PRIMARY IMPORTANCE

Of these items listed in the first category of the Department's legislative program, those of primary importance, the following are of interest to the Bureau:

Atomic Weapons Rewards:

A joint Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (IIC) - Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS) recommendation that legislation be sought authorizing rewards for information regarding smuggling of atomic weapons or fissionable material was approved by the National Security Council and the President in the National Security Council Document 159/4, September 25, 1953. Bills to this effect were introduced in the 83rd Congress and 84th Congress; S. 609 and H. R. 78[illegible] in the 84th Congress are intended to effect this end.

(See Tab 1)
Attachment
cc: Mr. Belmont, Mr. Branigan, Mr. Baumgardner
WPJ:HOB:LW:rec:ate:mjp
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DATE 4-7-00 BY SP4 BJA LBM

Registration of Persons Trained in Espionage, etc.:

In the 83rd Congress, legislation was drawn by the Department intending to amend Section 20 (A) of the Internal Security Act of 1950 by removing it from the predicating provisions of the Foreign Agents Registration Act. This section of the Act provides for the registration of persons who have received instruction or assignment in the espionage service of a foreign country. The Department feels by making this a separate act it will be removed from the restraining agency provisions of the Foreigh Agents Registration Act. We, of course, would favor legislation which would make this law more effective. Three bills intended to have this result are now being pending in the 84th Congress, S. 750, H.R. 3882 and H. R. 4102. (See Tab 2)

Gambling Information:

The Criminal Division of the Department has sponsored legislation to prohibit the transmission in interstate and foreign commerce of certain gambling information. At the present time, three measures, S.J.R. 33, S. 950, and H. R. 3461 are pending in committee. These measures, which are similar, prohibit the transmission of gambling information which is defined to include, among other things, "bets or wagers and related information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers on any horse or dog racing event or contest; entries, scratches, jockeys, weights, track conditions odds, results, and prices paid." The bills carry no penal provisions but authorize the Federal Communication to suspend the service of interstate communication facilities to individuals who violate this statute. (See Tab 3)

Seditious Conspiracy and Smith Act--Increase Penalties:

There are at the present time the following bills pending in Congress, namely S. 547, H. R. 2854, and H. R. 3883, all similar and each seeking to amend Title 18 of the United States Code so as to increase the penalties applicable to seditious conspiracy, advocating overthrow of Government, and conspiracy to advocate overthrow of Government. This increase of penalties might work as a deterrent and the Bureau should not offer any objection thereto. (See Tab 4)

Defense Facilities Protection Act:

This proposed legislative has been recommended by the Office of Legal Counsel and the Internal Security Division of the Department. Similar bills have been introduced in the Congress, namely S. 681 and H. R. 3788. This proposed legislation provides that when security of the United States is threatened by war, insurrection, or serious disturbances of international relations, the President may institute administrative proceedings to bar certain individuals from defense facilities if there exist reasonable grounds to believe they would commit espionage or sabotage, or other subversive activity. Facilities to be listed by the Secretary of Defense. No individual or agency has been named to administer the Act. Proceedings are to be adminsitrative, no cross-examination of witness and no informant to be divulged. The

individual will receive a statement of charges against him. Penalty for violation is $10,000 fine and/or 5 years imprisonment. This proposed legislation was brought to the attention of the Bureau on April 1, 1954, by assistant Attorney General J. Lee Rankin. We commented in our memorandum on April 7, 1954, that we could not discuss the possible effect on our work since the Act is only a framework and actual operation depended on measures to be adopted by the President. We suggested to the Department that we believed it to be the responsibility of agencies having security responsibility at the various plants to evaluate information which we furnished them in security reports and to determine who should be excluded, and prepare charges to avoid possibility of revealing our informants. The Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS) has recommended legislation on this matter.

(See Tab 5)

Perjury-Contradictory Statements

The department's legislative program includes a proposed addition to the Perjury Statute (Section 1623, Title 18, United States Code) which would provide that a conviction can be sustained solely by proof of a wilfull contradictory statements on material matters under oath within a three-year period. This would not affect the Bureau's investigative jurisdiction but would materially reduce the scope of investigation required in perjury cases since it would no longer be necessary to prove which of the two statements was false.

(See Tab 18)

II. MATTERS OF SECONDARY IMPORTANCE

Included in this category are the following items which have been proposed by the Bureau or which would affect the Bureau's work:

Slot Machine Act Amendments:

The criminal Division of the Department has sponsored legislation to amend the Slot Machine Act so as to broaden the definition section, clarify the registration provisions and augment the administrative requirements. Under the old Statute, the Federal courts, including the Supreme Court, held that the Government could not force intrastate dealers to comply with the provisions of the statute requiring registration and the filing of reports of inventories, sales and shipments.

The Supreme Court decision stated it was not the Congressional intent that intrastate dealers be covered. The legislation sponsored by the Criminal Division is for the purpose of clarifying the Congressional intent and will specifically include intrastate dealers.

(See Tab 6)

Foreign Agents Registration Act - Amend Sections 1, 3, 4, so as to Strengthen and Clarify:

This proposed legislation was sponsored by the Department to strengthen the Foreign Agents Registration Act by amending definitions under the Act in order to better cover persons and organizations deemed within the purview of the law. We have previously taken the position that we favor any legislation which will strengthen this Act and thereby made it more effective, from the standpoint of our internal security. H. R. 4105 purporting to accomplish these matters is pending in the 84th Congress.

(See Tab 7)

Dependents Assistant Act - Ammend so as to Incorporate Criminal Sanctions:

The Bureau in its menorandum of September 14, 1954, to Deputy Attorney General Rogers, indicated the desirability of amending the Dependents Assistance Act of 1950. Under existing statute, no

penalty is provided for the fraudulent receipt of servicemen's allowance, although prosecution has sometimes been had under the Fraud Against the Government Statutes. The proposed amendment would provide specific criminal provisions. (See Tab 8)

Obscene Material--Prohibit Carriage by Private Carrier:

The Bureau has for many years recommended that the statutes pertaining to the interstate transportation of obscene matter be amended to prohibit transportation by means of other than common carrier or express. The Bureau recommended such legislation in its memorandum to Deputy Attorney General Rogers of September 14, 1954. At the present time, several measures are pending in Congress which would accomplish this purpose and Deputy Attorney General Rogers, by letter of February 8, 1955, to Congressman Celler urged the enactment of H. F. 321 which would broaden the scope of the statuets pertaining to the interstate transportation of obscene matter to include transportation by any means. (See Tab 9)

Disclosure of Information by Former Employees--Amend 18, United States Code, 1905:

An amendment to existing statutes to cover the sidclosure of information to unauthorized individuals by former employees of the United States Government which information was obtained during the period of their employment was suggested to the Department of Justice by the Bureau. No legislation was submitted to the 83rd Congress on this matter and a draft for possible submission to the 84th Congress is now under consideration in the Department. The Bureau commented on the Department's draft by memorandum to Deputy Attorney General Rogers, February 4, 1955. (See Tab 10)

Confidence Game Swindles:

The Bureau recommended to the Department, in the memorandum to Deputy Attorney General Rogers on September 14, 1954, that legislation he enacted to amend the Irterstate Transportation of Stolen Property Statute in order to bring within the Bureau's jurisdiction the defrauding that victim of $5,00 or more, and/or to conceal a fraudulent scheme. The Bureau has pointed out to the Department that such legislation would facilitate prosecution of persons engaged in confidence game swindles. Three measures are pending in Congress, S. 997, H. R. 3441 and H. R. 3660, which would accomplish this purpose.

(See Tab 11)

III. PROPOSALS NOT INCLUDED IN PRESENT DEPARTMENTAL LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM

Memorandum to the Director

Wire Tap Legislation:

By memorandum of September 14 1954, the Bureau pointed out to the Department that certain measures pertaining to wire tapping had been introduced in the 83rd Congress which the Bureau considered desirable. These measures (H. R. 408, H. R. 5149 and H. R. 8649 as introduced) permitted the use of wire tapping upon the express approval of the Attorney General; H. R. 408 would have permitted information obtained to be used in evidence in both security-type and criminal-type cases, and H. R. 5149 and H. R. 8649, as introduced, would have permitted information so obtained to be used in security cases. Inasmuch as the last session of Congress did not enact a bill acceptable to the Bureau, the Department has indicated that it would not push any particular wire tap legislation, but if an acceptable bill was introduced by a member of Congress, the Department would go along. (See Tab 12)

Interstate Transportation of Stolen Motor Vehicle:

The Bureau has on several occasions recommended to the Department that Sections 2312 and 2313, Title 18, United States Code, be amended. At the present time, these sections make it a violation to transport in interstate or foreign commerce a stolen motor vehicle, etc. However, the word "stolen" is not defined in the statute and there has been a diversity of opinion among the courts as to the interpretation to be given to this term. Some courts have restricted it to the common law definition of larceny, while others have held it should be interpreted as including embezzlement and similar offenses. The Bureau has recommended that the statute be amended to include not only stolen vehicles, but those which were embezzled, fraudulently obtained or feloniously converted. The Department by memorandum December 10, 1954, indicated that this proposal of the Bureau was not being included in the Department's legislative program. Nevertheless, the Bureau still feels this type of legislation is most desirable. (See Tab 13)

Also missing from the Department's legislative program are legislative proposals to cover the following items which have previously been brought to the Department's attention by the Bureau:

Foreign Agents Registration Act (Section 20a):

No legislation has been proposed by the Department which would make it more difficult for persons to register under the registration provisions of Section 20 (A) of the Internal Security Act on the basis of their privilege under the Fifth Amendment. The Department, by memorandum dated October 19, 1954, in connection with the Immunity Bill indicated they did not know how that legislation might affect the claim of privilege against Section 20 (A) of the Internal Security Act. (See Tab 14)

Penalizing Espionage Activities Where Information Received from Legitimate Sources:

As the result of the decision of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in the case of the United States versus Heine, the Bureau has suggested to the Department that prosecution for espionage should lie against a spy who gathers information from legitimate sources for transmittal to his principal. The Department has listed this as a proposal not approved for inclusion in the legislative program. (See Tab 15)

Evidence Problem in Security Matters:

The Bureau has recommended legislation to resolve the problem of evidence in security matters where under existing rules highly classified items could not be introduced as evidence against an accused spy. This item was listed by the Department as one to be held in abeyance in connection with the current legislative program. (See Tab 16)

With respect to the last three items, the Bureau still feels these proposals have merit and should be resolved.

Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS)

The ICIS has made certain recommendations to the Attorney General. Where they have related to FBI items the ICIS interest has been commented upon above. The memorandum of March 15, 1955, supplied to the Bureau by the Deputy Attorney General's Office, entitled "ICIS Recommendations for Internal Security Legislation" lists these as items 1 and 2 (Defense Facilities and Atomic Weapons Rewards.) The balance of the ICIS recommendations are not yet a part of the legislative program. None are of immediate interest to the FBI except item 8 regarding subversives in the communications industry. By memorandum of November 13, 1953, to Warren Olney III and by memorandum of March 1, 1955, to the Attorney General concerning the legislative program, the Director as Chairman of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (IIC) recognized the danger of subversives in the communications industry. This is first of all a problem for ICIS and an administrative matter for the Federal Communications Commission. (See Tab 17)

3/19/2004 60267 UC/NLS/ASD/HLW

FROM : L. V. BOARDMAN Per letter dated 3/23/04 60267 UC/NLS/ASD HLW 3/30/04

Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING, MARCH 17, 1955

Re my memorandum to you dated March 15, 1955, which furnished a brief for your use at the NSC meeting on March 17, 1955. The NSC will be briefed concerning the Report to the President by the Technological Capabilities Panel of the Science Advisory Committee.

On page 5, under the heading of comments regarding the report, it is noted that the portions of the report which have been referred to support the positions that the FBI and the IIC have taken previously concerning the loophole of the Diplomatic Pouch, clandestine delivery of atomic weapons, and clandestine operations generally.

By letter dated December 22, 1952, a special committee, which included all the IIC members, forwarded to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council a study requested by the President concerning countermeasures required to detect and defend against the clandestine introduction into the United States of atomic weapons. That report pointed out that the small atomic weapons or component parts thereof could be introduced into the United States in Diplomatic Pouches. It recommended that Diplomatic Pouches be subjected to examination with the technical detection equipment which the Atomic Energy Commission was endeavoring to develop. Completely satisfactory detection equipment still has not been developed in spite of efforts on the part of the Atomic Energy Commission, and it is still possible that atomic weapons could be introduced through the Diplomatic Pouch.

At the IIC meeting on March 3, 1954, the IIC noted that on February 11, 1954, the NSC had approved the recommendation from a special subcommittee of the NSC that Diplomatic Pouches not be restricted to documents inasmuch as the State Department, CIA, and the Department of Defense had advised that such restrictions on the Pouch would result in the same restrictions

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1-Mr. Tolson
1-Mr. Boardman
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Sanders
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Section Tickler

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being made by Russia and Satellite countries and that these three departments could not effectively operate if such limitations were placed on U.S. Government Diplomatic Pouches. It was agreed that the minutes of that IIC meeting should reflect that the IIC, as a group and as individual agencies, have pointed out that the Diplomatic Pouch is a safe method by which the Soviets or the Satellite countries could clandestinely introduce atomic weapons into the United States. It was further agreed that the minutes of the IIC meeting should reflect that it is the position of the IIC that, if other than internal security considerations prevent restrictions being placed on the Diplomatic Pouches, all logical steps should be taken to channel Soviet and Satellite diplomats through designated U.S. ports of entry in order that as much coverage as possible can be placed upon these diplomats and in order that fissionable material detection devices can be utilized when they become available without arousing suspicion by channeling such representatives at that time.

Representatives from Rumania, Bulgaria, and Albania receive visas for entry at New York only. Those from the U.S.S.R., Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary may enter by air at New York, San Antonio, and Syracuse; by sea only at New York; and by rail at the ports of Laredo, Texas, and Saint Albans, Vermont.

The military members of the IIC from an internal security standpoint are solidly in line with the IIC views that a loophole exists in connection with the Diplomatic Pouches through which atomic weapons could be introduced into the United States. They are on the other hand somewhat saddled with the views of their departments through the Office of the Secretary of Defense that, if our Pouches are limited, it would affect operations of the Army, Navy, and Air Force in the Soviet bloc countries. As you know, Admiral Radford, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has recently expressed his concern to the Attorney General concerning this loophole, and it may be that the Department of Defense is now coming around to the point of view that it is necessary to close this Diplomatic Pouch loophole, even if it does mean inconvenience the military services in their operations overseas. Mr. Dulles of CIA is also now concerned about this loophole and this concern has been called to the attention of the IIC-ICIS Committee considering countermeasures against the introduction of clandestine atomic weapons.

Memorandum for The Director

ACTION:

The foregoing is for your information inasmuch as this point may receive some consideration at the NSC meeting on March 17, 1965.

THE FOREIGN SER
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF /
American Embassy
Paris 8, France

Date: March 3, 1955

To: Director, FBI

From: Legat, Paris (117-8)

Subject: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

Reourcable 2/28/55.

On 3/1/55 the following communication was received from CIA, Paris:

"1. In reference to our note of 24 February, we have received the following additional data concerning [redacted] Case:

"2. [redacted] the source of the story in question, stated that the wife of [redacted] later identified as [redacted] was of [redacted] origin. The [redacted] have now added that [redacted] is the daughter of [redacted] born in [redacted] on [redacted] and [redacted] nee [redacted] The father is of [redacted] nationality and has been in [redacted] He is known for his [redacted] but he is not active politically. It seems probable that the mother of [redacted] is of [redacted] origin, if not nationality, as well but [redacted] fails to make that point clear. The net result, however, is that confirmation has been obtained of only one of [redacted] claims thus far, i.e. [redacted] is of [redacted] origin.

"3. Clarification of [redacted] actual participation in her husband's business has been requested. If she is merely a housewife, even though her husband's business was at least at one time in her name, she might be considered less well-qualified to act as an intermediary for a shipment of atomic materials, as reported [redacted] states that she does not have an active role in [redacted] business but she is perfectly aware of the activities of her husband. Both are considered [redacted] to be completely unscrupulous.

"4. As further information on this case is received, it will be transmitted.

As additional information is received concerning subject matter, the Bureau will be immediately advised.

ROL:CM

b7C
b7D

b7C
b7D

1 R. 3

117-1823-1

RECORDED 21

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-7-80 BY SP4 BJP/LBM

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 24 1955

TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Sizoo
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

FBI, SAN ANTONIO 3-24-55 XXZXX XXMIXXXR 4-25. CST

DIRECTOR, FBI AND SAC, WASHINGTON FIELD ..... URGENT

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC WEAPONS INTO U.S., AEA. [redacted] CUSTOMS INSPECTOR, SA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, ADVISES US DIPLOMATIC SACK FIVE DASH TWO NINE NAUGHT, AIR WAYBILL MEXA ONE TWO TWO NAUGHT FROM AMERICAN EMBASSY, MEXICO, D. F. TO STATE DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, ARRIVED SAN ANTONIO AMERICAN AIRLINES FLIGHT ONE FIVE EIGHT, ONE THIRTYFIVE P.M. TODAY AND DEPARTED TWO FORTY P.M. FOR WASHINGTON ON SAME FLIGHT. POUCH MANIFESTED AS DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE, TWENTYFIVE POUNDS. SHOWED STRONG REACTION ON SODIUM OR GREEN LIGHT SIDE OF DETECTION DEVICE FOR FISSIONABLE MATERIAL. [redacted] STATES TYPE OF REACTION INDICATES POSSIBLE RADIUM DIAL MECHANISM SUCH AS CLOCK OR WATCH IN POUCH. SUGGEST BU HAVE WFO DETERMINE CONTENTS OF POUCH WHICH MIGHT CAUSE REACTION.

WERNER

END

CORRECT TIME TO 4-25

ACK PLS

5-27 PM OK FBI WA CA

TU DISCVV

3-25
LIAISON HANDLING THRU WARREN CHASE STATE DEPARTMENT WHO IS COGNIZANT OF DEVICE

TWO COPIES RIO

Mr. Belmont

RECORDED - 43

60 APR 6 1955

117-268-

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

TO : Mr. L. V. Boardman

DATE: March 24, 1955

FROM : A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION-IN-PLACE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

At 10:00 a.m., March 24, 1955, the Joint Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference-Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security Committee on Countermeasures met with Colonel Lawrence Beckedorff, technical advisor from the Atomic Energy Commission and ad hoc representatives, Colonel Sheffield Edwards from Central Intelligence Agency and Mr. Jacob Beam from the Department of State. Mr. E. S. Sanders, Executive Secretary of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, and Mr. Carl Pfuntner, of the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security Secretariat, also participated in the discussion.

Supervisor Whitson as Chairman of the Joint Committee outlined the history of the problem under consideration, namely, what practical measures should be taken to prevent effective use of the diplomatic pouch by Soviet bloc countries in smuggling fissionable materials or complete nuclear weapons.

Colonel Sheffield Edwards indicated that the Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. Allen Dulles, was intensely interested in a reconsideration of present U. S. policy regarding the pouch. [redacted] b1 b3 [redacted] Mr. Jacob Beam of State advised that the U. S. Embassy in Moscow was dependent on food supplies, literally tons of food, which are brought in by pouch. He was asked to supply specifics on this point (S)

117-268
LW:fjm
(6)
cc - Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Branigan
Mr. E. S. Sanders
Mr. Whitson

117-[illegible]

21 MAR 30 1955

(Derivative) NLS/BTA/LBm-60267 4-7-00 Per letter dated 2/23/04 (Coxen w/NSA/Hqs) 3/30/04

and to obtain from the Department of State figures on the relative cost of procuring the calorie or vitamin equivalent of such food behind the Iron Curtain. Mr. Beam stated that he would do this and pointed out that importation of food in the diplomatic pouch was a violation of Soviet law which the Soviets had to date "winked at." He did admit that the Soviets could stop the use of the pouch for food whenever they so desire.

Mr. Pfuntner stated that the ICIS had requested Customs to supply statistics on a six-month basis of the number, dimensions and weight of Soviet pouches entering the U. S. over a six-month period but that the earliest date for the receipt of the statistics from Customs would probably be about the end of April.

Due to an appointment with the Secretary of State, Mr. Beam had to leave the meeting early. In his absence, Colonel Beckedorff advised the group of the following top secret restricted data, namely, that a

b2
b7E

Colonel Beckedorff also stated that

RECOMMENDATION:

None. This matter will be closely followed. The next meeting of the Joint Committee for the purpose of studying the pouch problem has been set for 10:00 a.m., Thursday, March 31, 1955, in Room 2515, Justice Building, the ICIS conference room.

THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
American Embassy
Paris 8, France

Date: March 16, 1955

To: Director, FBI

From: Legat, Paris (117-8)

Subject: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE
DATE 3/19/2004 BY 60240 uc/NLS/BSA/klw
Per letter dated 3/23/04 60240 uc/NLS/BSA/klw 4/30/04

Reourlet 3/11/55.

Referral/Direct to OGA

On 3/15/55 [redacted] U. S. Embassy, Paris, furnished the following information which was obtained from informant [redacted]

"1. [redacted]

"2. [redacted]

"3. [redacted]

"4. [redacted]

Referral/Direct to OGA

"1. [redacted]

"2. [redacted]

No Dissemination ... see P...

RECORDED - 15 117-268-[illegible]

INDEXED - 15

DECLASSIFIED BY 60240 uc/NLS/BSA/klw ON 4/30/04

FILED # 100-343044

JUSTICE

ROL:CM
59 APR 1 1955

"3. [redacted]

[redacted]

It is noted that both CIA and the [redacted] believe [redacted] is of known unreliability.

Neither CIA nor the [redacted] has any intention of entering into direct contact [redacted] and, as the Bureau was advised in Paris cable dated 2/28/55, the Paris office, UACB, will conduct no investigations to resolve allegations received from [redacted]

If additional information is received, the Bureau will be promptly advised.

March 30, 1955

RECORDED-57
INDEXED-57

EX-110

[redacted] b7c
[redacted] California

Dear [redacted]

Your letter dated January 20, 1955, addressed to Attorney General Brownell, has been referred to my attention, and I appreciate the interest which prompted you to write.

If you should learn of any specific information concerning the smuggling of atomic weapons either in or out of the country please notify my representatives at 1340 West Sixth Street, Los Angeles 17, California.

Sincerely yours,

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4-7-00 BY SP4 BJA/LBM

John Edgar Hoover
Director

cc - Los Angeles, with a copy of the incoming

NOTE: Bufiles contain no record identifiable with correspondent.

59 APR 7 1955

BAUMGARDNER

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
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Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

LBT

HEH:jsm

COMM — FBI
MAR 30 1955
MAILED 30

#1

TRUE COPY

Los Angeles - Cal - 1/20-55.

Attorney Gen Brownell-
Washington D.C.-, Dear Sir-, For your information, I noted with much interest your request to Congress, to provide rewards of up to $500,000 for "tips" on the smuggling of atomic weapons & materials" into this country."
How about the smuggling of these weapons and materials "out of this country"?
As to an Alien abroad, given special consideration admitting the Alien and his family to this country for permanent residence, for supplying information along this line, I think "the Alien and his information" should be "screened and investigated" thoughly before he is admitted to this country. --- There is at the present time an individual and his family now residing in Canada in "secrecey" that "broke away" from the Iron curtain and soviett government, Just at the "beggining of the exploring of the great iron and uraimum and other meatal fields" discovered in Canada - Labrador - Alaska; but up to this date he has never been known to request an audiance with government officials of the United States Government.
So some of those "tips" we may receive from Aliens from abroad, may not be valubale enough. After being run down and investigated, to warrant their aplication for residence in the U.S.A. As you, Mr. Brownell and all concerned know that the United States, have in Washington D.C. an office, known as the F.B.I., headed by a man named "J. Edgar Hoover" that is world known and if given a free hand, and no sticks throwed in his path, that "he and his staff" can handle and bring to an end successfully any attempt to smuggle, in or out of this country - weapons or Atomic Material.
Also Attorney Gen Brownell, I am sorry that this $500,000 will be used for "tips" from Aliens. or some of it awarded to good suggestions from all concerned; - As I could use a "small reward-for amature suggestions"-, As I hit sweet 65 11/3-54;- and was awarded a small pension from the state of California; Also as an ex rail road man, I have an application for a small amount from the Rail Road Retirement board, so you see I would like to cut in on some of that $500,000 if I can do any good with "suggestions."
And as we go along, and you receive any visitors from behind the "Iron Curtain," see King asylum in the U.S.A. - please escort them up Pennsylvania Ave - to the office of a man named - J. Edgar Hoover whom will decide as to what kind of a home or asylum they need here in America, given a "safe place" behind the Iron, or sent back to the protection of the "Iron curtain."
A reply will be apreciated.

Yours Truly.

b7C

/s/ [redacted]

[redacted] Cal.

4-7-00 SP4 BSA/LBM

#1

Los Angeles - Cal - 1/20-55.

Attorney Gen Brownell -
Washington D.C. -, Dear Sir -, For your information, I noted with much interest your request to Congress, to provide rewards of up to $500,000 for "tips" on the ~~smuggling~~ of atomic weapons + materials "into this country".
How about the smuggling of these weapons and materials "out of this country".? M.G.B
As to an alien abroad, given special consideration admitting the alien and his family to this country for permanent residence, for supplying information along this line, I think "the alien and his information" should be "screened and investigated" thoughly before he is admitted to this country. --- There is at the present time an individual and his family now residing in Canada in "secrecy" that "broke away" from the Iron curtain and soviett government, just at the "beggining of the exploring of the great iron and uraimum and other meatal fields" discovered in Canada - Labrador - Alaska; but up to this date he has never been known to request an audiance with government officials of the United States Government.
So some of those "tips" we may receive from

RECORDED-57
EX-110
MAR 23 1955
CRIME REC.
EX-110
MAR 23 1955

Aliens from abroad, may not be valuable enough after being run down and investigated, to warrant their application for residence in the U.S.A.

As you, Mr Brownell and all concerned know that the United States, have in Washington D.C. an Office, known as the F.B.I. headed by a man named "J. Edgar Hoover" that is world known and if given a free hand, and no sticks thrown in his path, that "he and his staff" can handle and bring to an end successfully any attempt to smuggle, in or out of this country - Weapons or atomic Materials.

Also Attorney Gen Brownell, I am sorry that this $500,000 will be used for "tips" from Aliens. or some of it awarded to good suggestions from all concerned; - As I could use a "small reward for amature suggestions" -, As I hit sweet 65 11/3-54; - and was awarded a small pension from the state of California; Also as an ex rail road man, I have an application for a small amount from the Rail Road Retirement Board, so you see I would like to cut in on some of that $500,000 if I can do any good with "suggestions."

And as we go along, and you receive any visitors from behind the "Iron Curtain", seeking asylum in the U.S.A. - please escort them up Pennsylvania Ave - to the Office of a man named J. Edgar Hoover

#3

portion will decide as to what kind of a home or asylum they need here in America, given a "safe place" behind the Iron, or sent back to the protection of the "Iron curtain".

A reply will be appreciated.

[redacted]

b7C

[redacted] Cal.

tic - Mr. Whitson

SAC, New York [redacted] March 21, 1955

(original and one)

Director, FBI

[redacted] was
SECURITY MATTER - C

Re New York Form FD-122, dated 2/24/55, indicating for Security Index purposes that the subject is now employed by [redacted] New York, New York.

Your attention is directed to No Number SAC Letter A, Series 1952, dated 1/28/52, instructing you to furnish the Bureau with names, addresses and brief statement of facts with regard to individuals or firms for inclusion on the special Customs watch list. The special Customs watch list is maintained for the purpose of giving thorough Customs treatment to individuals who might be utilized by the Soviets for smuggling into the United States weapons of mass destruction.

You should furnish the Bureau promptly background identifying data concerning the subject's company together with your recommendations as to inclusion of [redacted] and the company on the special Customs watch list.

ec - 117-268 (Smuggling of Atomic Weapons or Parts Thereof and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction into the US.)

LW:fjm
(5)

117-268-
NOT RECORDED
123 JUN 2 1955

Tolson
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Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

JUN 2 1955

YELLOW DUPLICATE
MAR 2 1
MAILED

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4-7-00 BY SP4 BJA/LBm

b7C

ORIGINAL FILED IN

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Tolson
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Nichols
Belmont ✓
Harbo
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Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: March 28, 1955

FROM : MR. R. R. ROACH

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC WEAPONS
INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

3/12/2004 uc/sl/ucfms/b3A/HW

Reference is made to the teletype from San Antonio dated March 24, 1955, which stated that [redacted] Customs Inspector, San Antonio International Airport, advised that a diplomatic sack from the American Embassy, Mexico City, to the State Department, Washington, D.C., showed strong reaction on the sodium or green light side of the detection device for fissionable material. [redacted] stated that the type of reaction indicated a possible radium dial mechanism such as a clock or watch in the pouch. This was a twenty-five pound diplomatic pouch and the contents were listed as diplomatic correspondence.

b7C

This was immediately brought to the attention of Mr. Warren Chase of the Department of State on March 25, 1955. He later advised that this particular pouch had been opened in his presence and that of two other witnesses in the State Department. The pouch contained for the most part normal diplomatic documents. It also contained one package of photographic negatives for Vice President Nixon as a result of his recent Caribbean tour. This was destined to Mr. Shelby Smith, U.S. Information Agency (USIA), Washington, D.C., from USIA, Mexico City. The pouch also contained a box of recording tape wound on a metal spindle destined to Mr. Eugene Karst of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare from USIA in Mexico City. Mr. Chase stated that there were approximately 50 to 60 pieces of normal diplomatic mail. He stated that so far as he can determine there was nothing in the pouch to cause a reaction on the detection device for fissionable material unless there was something in the recording tape or metal spindle which may have caused this reaction. Mr. Chase stated that the contents of the pouch were carefully examined.

This was brought to the attention of the Espionage Section and it was noted that since recording machines have caused the detection device to react positively on previous occasions in New York City, it is believed that the reaction in this instance probably resulted from the presence of the recording tape and, therefore, it is not believed that any further action is necessary by the Bureau.

ACTION: None. This is for information.

RECORDED

MJP:fjb
(5)
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Branigan
1 - Liaison Section
1 - Mr. Philcox

60 APR 6 1955

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI (117-268) DATE: 3/30/55

FROM : SAC, New York (117-192)

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF
OR OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO
THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

ReNYlet 2/2/55, New Haven let 3/8/55 and Bulet 3/16/55.

Capt. FRANK K. JOHNSON, USCG, advised on 3/29/55 that the plans outlined for "category ships" on p.6 of NYlet have now been changed. He stated that under present plans ships in category "C" might be permitted in New Haven but there is little if any likelihood that category "A" or "B" ships will be permitted at ports such as New London, Bridgeport, New Haven or Stamford.

Capt. JOHNSON advised that commencing in the summer of 1955 the USCG hopes to have a patrol operating throughout and at the north end of Long Island Sound, to act as a security measure on ships entering the Sound. The New York office of the USCG operates the "Ship Movement Center" for the USCG for the entire east coast and with information received from various shipping sources, here and abroad, notifies other east coast USCG offices of ship movements. The new regulations, referred to in Bulet 3/16/55, requiring twenty-four hour notice from category ships will be strictly enforced according to Capt. JOHNSON and should any category ships be directed to Conn. ports this office will be promptly advised by Capt. JOHNSON's office and the New Haven office notified by expeditious means.

Capt. JOHNSON advised that in addition the USCG at NY will provide search and security patrols for such ships directed to Bridgeport, New Haven or Stamford.

Capt. JOHNSON stated that the USCG is presently engaged in attempting to procure and assign more personnel for search and security patrols and as personnel is obtained and assigned plans and procedures are modified. Capt. JOHNSON stated he would keep the NYO abreast of pertinent changes or modifications in USCG procedures.

RECORDED - 43 117-268

1-New Haven (117-29)

12 MAR 31 1955

INDEXED - 43

EX-125

EX-100

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4-7-00 BY SP1 RJA/LBm

JJD:EH

Mr. Whitson

~~SECRET~~

RECORDED - 77

~~SECRET - AIR COURIER~~

Date: March 31, 1955

To: Legal Attache (117-8) (orig and 1)
Paris, France

From: Director, FBI

Subject: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT
(Bufile 117-268)

[redacted] aka
Mme. [redacted]
Unknown Subjects;
[redacted] Informant
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT
(Bufile 117-1833)

b7C
b7D

Reurlet 3/11/55, furnishing information received from OSI, Paris, re [redacted] You indicated that [redacted] OSI, Paris, had advised that since OSI is well acquainted with [redacted] they would be willing to interview him if the Bureau so desired.

[redacted] (S)

b1
b3

[redacted] (S)

Accordingly, you should request OSI to

Attachment (1)
LW:fjm
(8)

~~SECRET~~

cc - Foreign Service Desk
(A cover memo from A. H. Belmont to L. V. Boardman was prepared by LW:fjm on 3/30/55, in connection with this outgoing mail.)

NOTE: Legal Attache maintains file on Smuggling caption only, therefore, only original and 1cc being furnished him.

CLASSIFIED BY NLS/BJA/lbm - 50267 (Derivative)
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1
Per letter dated 3/23/04
NSZ/NLS/BJA/lbm 3/30/04

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 117-1833

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

b1

interrogate [redacted] *in that matter and you should notify the interested Department of State* [redacted] b7C b7D *that the request to OSI is being made. The CIA and Department of State, Washington, are being so informed.* (S)

THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
American Embassy
Paris 8, France

~~SECRET~~

Date: March 11, 1955

4-7-30
CLASSIFIED BY NLS/BJA/LBM 41267 (Derivative)
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1
Per letter dated 3/23/04 60267 uc/pac/sco/hdw 3/30/04

To: Director, FBI

From: Legat, Paris (117-8)

Subject: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS
THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

O
SMUGGLING ATOM BOMBS

b1

Reourlet 3/3/55.

[redacted] (S)

On 3/9/5[redacted] and [redacted] OSI, Paris, furnished the following information as reflected in OSI files:

On 3/26/54 [redacted] He claimed that [redacted] and who used the name [redacted] stated that [redacted] offered [redacted] b7C b7D [redacted] he determined that these [redacted]. The shipments were to be re-routed through Switzerland to Iron Curtain countries. [redacted] Later, on [redacted] according to [redacted] contacted [redacted] asked him to go to Bettemburg, Luxemburg, and check on an impounded shipment to determine the type of [redacted] being held by Luxemburg Customs. [redacted] stated that he refused.

[redacted] further claimed that [redacted] by Luxemburg

ROL:CM

~~SECRET~~

3/31/55 Ltr to CDA, Paris (8) RECORDED - 71 117-2685
Ltr to Legat, Paris (1)
Memo to Boardman (1) 1 1955
Ltr to OSI (1) INDEXED - 71

EX-206

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 117-1833-1

at Bettemburg. The shipment, which had originated at Viveunies, Belgium, was shipped by rail from Mecanica, S.A., 175 Rue de la Loi, Brussels, a cover firm.

Following this interview with [redacted] OSI learned at the Luxemburg Surete that (1) [redacted] had been impounded at Bettemburg on 4/20/54; (2) 2 previous shipments of [redacted] had passed through Luxemburg; (3) [redacted] was identified as [redacted] born [redacted] at [redacted] Belgium, former address [redacted] Belgium, a former [redacted] at [redacted] who now maintains residence in [redacted] (4) [redacted] was found to have registered in a hotel in Luxemburg City on four separate occasions in past months; (5) the actual shipper of the [redacted] Belgium. [redacted] and his wife were apprehended [redacted] in Luxemburg City. [redacted] samples in the possession of OSI were found to be the same as the impounded shipment. (6) [redacted] contact with [redacted] on [redacted] (7) information received on 5/3/54 reflected that [redacted] had been arrested in Luxemburg.

b7C
b7D

An OSI report dated 12/14/54 stated as follows: "On 28 September 1954 voluntary informant [redacted] residing in [redacted] alleged he knew of a German national engaged in espionage activities for the Soviets. [redacted] residing in [redacted] allegedly bought parts of new Belgian rifle from Secretary of Liege Communist Party for a Soviet Intelligence Agency. [redacted] advised he was instructed by [redacted] Luxemburg authorities given aforementioned information. During meeting between [redacted] Luxemburg Second Bureau representatives and OSI, arrangements made to monitor telephonic conversation between [redacted] agreed to have German speaking person listening in to conversation; however, [redacted] failed to appear at time and place designated for the operation. [redacted] is [redacted] well known by Luxemburg authorities. Luxemburg officials said they believe [redacted] espionage allegation is scheme to obtain police protection to facilitate his smuggling operations and are no longer interested in the alleged espionage activities of [redacted] and [redacted]

Another OSI report, dated 7/31/54, stated as follows: "An unidentified man, later identified by Luxemburg and Belgian authorities as [redacted] allegedly approached [redacted] and offered [redacted]

"and export license for transporting iron balls from Belgium through Luxemburg across France, through Switzerland into Italy. later learned from that the shipments were not iron balls but shipments of which were routed from Belgium through Luxemburg across France into Switzerland, where they would be re-routed through a free port to a recipient on the eastern side of the Iron Curtain. One shipment of confiscated by Luxemburg Customs authorities at Bettemburg, Luxemburg, identified as of the same nature as samples given to OSI by received above samples from Shipments of were sent by Belgium, which was determined by the Belgian authorities to be a fictitious name and address. The actual sender was identified as Belgium. were apprehended by the Luxemburg Surete but would not talk regarding smuggling activities." b7C b7D

advised further that, inasmuch as OSI is well acquainted with they would be willing to interview him if the Bureau so desires.

SECRET

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

DATE: March 22 1955

FROM : William F. Tompkins, Assistant Attorney General
Internal Security Division

SUBJECT: Official Statements Regarding Nuclear Weapons

At its meeting on March 3, 1955, the National Security Council noted the President's directive that oral or written statements to be made public by government officials regarding nuclear weapons, which contain information not previously made public officially, must be checked in advance with the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission who will coordinate the intelligence and foreign climate of opinion aspects with the Operations Coordinating Board.

This Council action as approved by the President on March 5, 1955, has been transmitted to the Attorney General for implementation by all appropriate departments and agencies.

RECORDED - 15

27 MAR 23 1955

BAUMGARDNER

ESPIONAGE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-10-80 BY SP4 BJA/LBm

59 APR 12 1955

117-268

cc - Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. [redacted]igan
Mr. Roach
Mr. Whitson

AIR-TEL
URGENT

APRIL 6, 1955

SAC, PHILADELPHIA (117-75) (orig & 1)

RECORDED - 15

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES, ATOMIC ENERGY ACT. REURAIRTEL 3/29/55. YOU SHOULD ADVISE COAST GUARD TO MAKE NAME CHECK REQUESTS OF CONSIGNEES OF CARGO THROUGH COAST GUARD HEADQUARTERS, WASHINGTON, SINCE LOCAL FIELD OFFICE FILES DO NOT NECESSARILY REFLECT INFORMATION AVAILABLE AT SEAT OF GOVERNMENT AND ULTIMATE CONSIGNEE MAY BE LOCATED OUTSIDE PHILADELPHIA. BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, WHICH MAINTAINS SPECIAL SEARCH LIST, HAS INFORMED FBI THAT BACKGROUND INFORMATION SUPPLIED BY SOG REGARDING SUSPECTED CONSIGNEES OF ATOMIC COMPONENTS IS NOT FURNISHED TO FIELD PERSONNEL. SOURCES OF INFORMATION IN EUROPE RE ALLEGED SOVIET SMUGGLING PLOT ARE INFORMANTS OF DEPARTMENT OF STATE. ALL DISSEMINATION TO OTHER AGENCIES WAS MADE BY STATE AND IT IS RESPONSIBILITY OF DEPARTMENT OF STATE TO FURNISH EVALUATION OF ITS INFORMANTS TO COAST GUARD HEADQUARTERS WHICH THEN HAS RESPONSIBILITY TO FURNISH EVALUATION TO COAST GUARD PORT OFFICES IF IT SO DESIRES. RELIABILITY OF STATE'S INFORMANTS IN EUROPE IS NOT PERTINENT TO NEW COAST GUARD POLICY OF CHECKING CARGO ORIGINATING WITHIN SOVIET BLOC. SHOULD YOU RECEIVE INQUIRY FROM COAST GUARD REGARDING EVALUATION OF ORIGINAL SOURCES OF SMUGGLING INFORMATION FURNISHED BY DEPARTMENT OF STATE, YOU SHOULD REFER COAST GUARD TO ITS HEADQUARTERS IN WASHINGTON.

HOOVER

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-7-00 BY SP4 BGA/LBM

COMM — FBI
APR 6 - 1955
MAILED 28

FBI WASH. D. C. APR 6 6 PM '55

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Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

59 APR 12 1955

117-268

LW:fjm (8)

(A cover memo from A.H. Belmont to L. V. Boardman was prepared by LW:fjm on 4/5/55, in connection with this outgoing mail.)

FD-36

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

AIRTEL

Transmit the following Teletype message to: BUREAU (117-268) (REGISTERED MAIL)

FBI, PH 3/29/55

DIRECTOR

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES, ATOMIC ENERGY ACT. RE BUAIRTELS, 2/8/55, AND 2/10/55, AND SAC LETTERS, 55-7 (M) AND 55-20 (X). COMMANDER RODERICK Y. EDWARDS, U. S. COAST GUARD, CAPTAIN OF THE PORT OF PHILADELPHIA, HAS ADVISED THAT THE COAST GUARD PROGRAM OF SEARCHING CERTAIN VESSELS FOR SMUGGLED WEAPONS HAD BEEN ENLARGED TO INCLUDE A DESIGNATION OF "UNCLEARED VESSELS." ANY SHIP CARRYING CARGO WHICH ORIGINATED IN THE U.S.S.R. OR A SATELLITE COUNTRY EVEN THOUGH THE CARGO WAS LOADED AT A PORT NOT BEHIND THE IRON CURTAIN COULD BE DECLARED AN "UNCLEARED VESSEL" BY THE CAPTAIN OF THE PORT AND TREATED AS A "CATEGORY VESSEL" UNTIL CLEARED BY THE CAPTAIN OF THE PORT. WITHIN THE PAST WEEK THREE SUCH VESSELS HAVE ENTERED THE PORT AND WERE SEARCHED. ONE OF THESE, THE SS HEINA, A NORWEGIAN SHIP, CARRIED ~~BALS~~ BALES OF RAW GOAT HAIR FROM OUTER MONGOLIA. BECAUSE OF THE INFORMATION PREVIOUSLY FURNISHED THE COAST GUARD THAT THE SHIPMENT OF EIGHT ATOMIC BOMBS MIGHT POSSIBLY LEAVE PORT ARTHUR, MANCHURIA, THIS SHIP WAS GIVEN AN INTENSIVE SEARCH. COMMANDER EDWARDS REQUESTED THIS OFFICE TO FURNISH ANY AVAILABLE INFORMATION REGARDING THE

Mr. Belmont

RECORDED - 15

117-75

MBD:MMK
(3BU, 1PH)

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

cc Birmingham

4-7-00 SP4 BSA/LBm

FD-36

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

AIRTEL

Transmit the following Teletype message to:

PAGE TWO

HEMPHILL COMPANY, WHO IS THE CONSIGNEE OF THIS CARGO. AN INDICES CHECK REFLECTED NO INFORMATION REGARDING THIS COMPANY OR ITS OFFICERS, AND THAT INFORMATION WAS FURNISHED TO THE COAST GUARD EMPHASIZING THAT THE FBI HAD MADE NO INVESTIGATION OF THE COMPANY OR ANY OF ITS OFFICERS. IT IS BELIEVED THAT SIMILAR REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION ON CONSIGNEES OF SUSPECTED CARGO WILL BE MADE IN THE FUTURE, AND UACB THE PHILADELPHIA OFFICE WILL FURNISH INDICES CHECK INFORMATION TO THE COAST GUARD. COMMANDER EDWARDS HAS INDICATED THAT HE HAS RECEIVED NO FURTHER INFORMATION FROM HIS HEADQUARTERS ABOUT THE ATTEMPT TO SMUGGLE EIGHT ATOMIC BOMBS INTO THE UNITED STATES, AND NO EVALUATION OF THE INFORMATION PREVIOUSLY FURNISHED. IF NOT ALREADY DONE, IT IS SUGGESTED THAT CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO FURNISHING THE COAST GUARD THE INFORMATION EVALUATING THE ORIGINAL SOURCE OF THE SMUGGLING INFORMATION AS UNRELIABLE WHICH APPEARED IN BUAIRTELS, 2/8/55, AND 2/10/55, AND SAC LETTER 55-20 (X). RELATIONS WITH THE LOCAL COAST GUARD OFFICE ARE EXCELLENT, AND CLOSE LIAISON WILL BE MAINTAINED WITH THEM IN THIS MATTER.

MC CABE

Approved:_____ Sent_____M Per_____

Special Agent in Charge

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: April 5, 1955

FROM : MR. A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
NET CAPABILITIES EVALUATION SUBCOMMITTEE

Tolson
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Gandy

Lieutenant General Harold Lee George, U. S. Air Force (Retired), called at the Bureau on the morning of April 5, 1955, and conferred with Inspector Hennrich, Supervisor Whitson and myself.

Arrangements were made for liaison between General George's staff and the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference through Inspector Hennrich. General George stated he wanted to work closely with the IIC and the Bureau and would confer with the IIC representative on all matters of IIC interest. General George indicated his grave concern over the problem of clandestine attack and particularly the clandestine use of nuclear weapons.

General George stated he was organizing his staff outside the framework of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, since the Subcommittee was a National Security Council Subcommittee. He is planning on having an Army General as his assistant and having on staff members an Army Colonel, a Marine Corps Colonel, two Navy Captains, and two Air Force Colonels, one of the latter representing the Strategic Air Command and the other the Continental Air Defense Command.

RECOMMENDATION:

None. This is for your information.

LW:LL
(5)
cc--Mr. Boardman
cc--Mr. Belmont
cc--Mr. Hennrich
cc--Mr. Whitson

NOT RECORDED
14 APR 13 1955

24 APR 12 1955

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4-7-00 BY SP4 BJA/LBM

SECRET

tic - Mr. Boardman
Mr. Roach
Mr. Whitson

RECORDED

Date: March 31, 1955

To: Director of Special Investigations
The Inspector General
Department of the Air Force (orig and one)
The Pentagon
Washington 25, D. C.

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT
(Bufile 117-268)

[redacted] also known as
[redacted]
Unknown Subjects;
[redacted] Informant
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT
(Bufile 117-1833)

[redacted]

b7C
b7D

Office of Special Investigations, Paris, have furnished to our Legal Attache, Paris, considerable information regarding [redacted] have indicated OSI's willingness to interview him if the Bureau so desires, since OSI is well acquainted [redacted]

Since it is desirable [redacted] allegations be resolved as promptly as possible, our Legal Attache is being requested to ask OSI, Paris, to [redacted] interrogated in this matter.

DECLASSIFIED BY SP4 BJA/LBM
ON 4-7-00

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LW:fjm
(7)

APR 12 1955

(A cover memo from A. H. Belmont to L. V. Boardman was prepared by LW:fjm on 3/30/55 in connection with this outgoing mail.)

SECRET

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

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TO : Mr. L. V. Boardman

DATE: March 30, 1955

FROM : A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT
(Bufile 117-268)

[redacted] aka
[redacted]
Unknown Subjects;
[redacted] Informant
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT
(Bufile 117-1833)

b7C
b7D

[redacted] informant of the U. S. Legation, Luxembourg, is known to the Office of Special Investigations, U. S. Air Force, Luxembourg and Paris, as a liar. [redacted]

[redacted]

CIA and State have not resolved this matter. OSI, Paris, has offered to interrogate [redacted]

RECOMMENDATION:

Attached is a letter to the Legal Attache, Paris, telling him to request OSI to interview [redacted] who is well known to them. Attached is a letter to CIA and cc for State Department, advising them of the above. There is also attached a separate letter to OSI advising them.

Attachment

LW:fjm
(7)

cc - Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Branigan
Mr. Roach
Mr. Whitson

RECORDED - 15 1-7-262

1955

5 - M

Date 4-7-00 SP4 BJA/LBM
#442963 Per letter dated 3/23/04 by NSC/NSS/BJA/Hdqtrs 3/30/04

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: April 1, 1955

FROM : L. V. BOARDMAN

SUBJECT: ATTACK WARNING CHANNELS AND PROCEDURES FOR CIVILIANS

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Special Agent Edward S. Sanders attended a meeting on April 1, 1955, in the office of Commander Edward L. Beach, Naval Aide to the President. This meeting was of the NSC Subcommittee designated to coordinate the implementation of the actions approved by the NSC in connection with the attack warning channels and procedures for civilians. Others in attendance were: Mr. Ralph Stohl, [redacted] for the Director of CIA; Mr. Ralph Spears, for the Director of the Federal Civil Defense Administration; and Mr. Jack Hurley, for the Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization. b3

Commander Beach noted that there are presently three items to be considered by this Subcommittee as follows:

1. Methods by which realistic drills and tests of procedures for civilians under conditions of emergency may be conducted in order that the American people may be better prepared for such procedures in the event of an emergency.

2. Recommendation No. 5 of the "Killian Report" which recommended that a mechanism be established within the Executive Office of the President for promoting and monitoring the planning and execution of readiness tests. A report in this regard is due in the National Security Council by May 15, 1955.

3. Federal Civil Defense Advisory Bulletins No. 182 and No. 183 concerning alerts; it was noted that, according to these bulletins, the population would take shelter upon an alert but no "All Clear" would be sounded.

Commander Beach noted that, in coordinating the implementation of the attack warning channels and procedures for civilians, it probably would be necessary to at least review these attack warning channels. He pointed out that

Attachment

ESS:hke (5)
1-Mr. Boardman
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Sanders
1-Section Tickler

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-7-00 BY SP4 BTA/lbm
Per Lt. dated 3/23/04 re 67 HQ/HS/ASA/JHS 3/20/04
ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

it is not intended to interfere with or change the military portion of these matters, but that it would be necessary to be well-acquainted with the procedures.

Special Agent Sanders pointed out the concern of the Bureau and of the Department of Justice concerning the present vagueness as to who is to instruct evacuation of the appropriate people in the Department of Justice and under what conditions. Sanders further noted that the Bureau has a very acute "need to know" concerning information relating to possible attacks inasmuch as the Bureau has the responsibility for the apprehension of individuals under such conditions who might possibly commit sabotage to the extent of utilizing nuclear and thermonuclear weapons reaching into the megaton range. It was agreed that the two points made by Sanders will receive very early consideration in order that no doubt will be left in connection with these two items.

It was further agreed that the recommendation made in the "Killian Report," and referred to above, will also receive immediate consideration inasmuch as a report is due by May 15, 1955, concerning a mechanism to be established within the Executive Office of the President for promoting and monitoring the planning and execution of readiness tests. This contemplates the establishment of a mechanism which would insure that the President receives the information regarding possible attacks and that provision is made, day or night, for him to have the assistance he will need in determining the action to be taken. Commander Beach indicated that this might mean the quiet re-establishment of a "War Room" at the White House. Beach confidentially advised he is personally concerned at this time as to the adequacy of arrangements presently in effect at the White House in the event of an alert or emergency at odd times, such as during the night or when the President is away from the White House.

ACTION:

The foregoing is the outline of the work facing the NSC Subcommittee concerned with attack warning channels

and procedures for civilians. The committee agreed that these matters must be diligently pursued to a logical conclusion at an early date. Attached is a suggested memorandum to the Attorney General in this connection.

~~SECRET~~

Mr. Boardman
- P - Mr. Roach
Mr. Whitson

117-1833

VIA LIAISON

Date: March 31, 1955

To: Director
Central Intelligence Agency (original and one)
2430 E Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Attention: Deputy Director, Plans

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: [redacted] also known as [redacted] b7C b7D
Unknown Subjects;
[redacted] Informant
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

[redacted] b1 b3 (5)

Inasmuch as [redacted] Office of Special Investigations, Department of the Air Force, Paris, France, has indicated that the Office of Special Investigations (OSI) has had some experience in interrogating [redacted] b7C b7D the Legal Attache, Paris, is being requested to ask the Office of Special Investigations to interrogate [redacted] regarding the allegations in the instant matter.

cc - 117-268 (Smuggling of Atomic Bombs or Parts thereof into the United States)

YELLOW DUPLICATE
APR 1 1955
MAILED

~~SECRET~~

LW:fjm
(8)

4-7-00
CLASSIFIED BY SP4 BJA/LBM
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (1)
Pub Letter dated 3/23/04 60267 UC/NLS/BJA/TDW 9/30/04

A cover memo from A. H. Belmont to L.V. Boardman was prepared by LW:fjm on 3/30/55, in connection with this outgoing mail.)

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APR 8 1955 97

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ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 117-1833

~~SECRET~~ ~~SECRET~~

The Legal Attache, Paris, is being instructed to notify the [redacted] Department of State representatives (S) b1 b3
[redacted] who are interested in this case that (S)
OSI is being asked to do so.

BY COURIER SERVICE

cc - 1 - Mr. Dennis A. Flinn
Director
Office of Security
Department of State
515 22nd Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

~~SECRET~~ ~~SECRET~~

c - Mr. Whitson

SAC, Detroit (117-35) (orig and 1) April 6, 1955

Director, FBI (117-268)

RECORDED - 25

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF
AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

Reurlet 3/24/55, in which you made certain suggestions.

You suggested that Detroit be authorized to have the Resident Agents, covering the Ports of Bay City, Muskegon, Sault Ste. Marie and Port Huron, establish liaison with Bureau of Customs authorities in those areas to facilitate complete cooperation and mutual knowledge in the problem of clandestine atomic weapons.

You are authorized to have your Resident Agents establish liaison with the responsible officials of Customs covering the above-mentioned ports which you indicate could be visited by vessels from European ports.

You suggested that the Bureau might desire to suggest that a more complete distribution of descriptive information be made throughout the various Federal agencies possibly by reclassification of descriptive material regarding hydrogen bombs (fusion weapons). The Bureau is not in a position to recommend reclassification of "Restricted Data" for the purpose indicated. The Atomic Energy Commission is assigned the responsibility by law to make determinations as to classification or declassification of "Restricted Data." Agencies of the Federal Government whose employees must handle "Restricted Data" in the discharge of their responsibilities are required to obtain appropriate clearances for such employees. If an agency of the U. S. Government has not seen fit to obtain such clearances for its employees, we cannot discuss "Restricted Data" with them.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-7-00 SP

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LW:fjm
(4)

COMM - FBI
APR 6 1955
MAILED 31

60 APR 15 1955

You are able to discuss with your contacts any of the material relating to fission weapons which was released to the public as indicated in SAC Letter 54-1 (H). These data pertain specifically to clandestine atomic weapons of which the demolition weapons referred to as [redacted] in the next-to-the-last paragraph of your letter are examples. You commented that newspaper reports of a test explosion on March 23, 1955, in Nevada, would appear to indicate that revised descriptions of weapons would be forthcoming. We have received no information that any weapon description of the demolition weapon is intended for public release. b2

You will be kept informed of developments in this field but you must bear in mind that unless the Bureau of Customs has seen fit to obtain clearances for certain of its personnel to receive "Restricted Data," you will be unable to discuss weapon aspects of this problem to any extent beyond that already authorized.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI (117-68) DATE: March 24, 1955

FROM : SAC, Detroit (117-35)

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEROF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES

Re SAC Letter No. 55-7.

Referenced letter instructed field offices to check informants and sources of information regarding individuals having contact with or knowledge of the type of international "operator" indicated in the story from Luxembourg.

All informants and sources of the Detroit Division were evaluated with these instructions in mind, and it is believed that the following might be in a position to be of value in this matter:

1. [redacted] a Confidential Source of the Detroit Division, is approximately [redacted] of age. He came to [redacted] as a [redacted] He is now [redacted] located near [redacted] and in this capacity frequently calls on Confidential Source [redacted] and is thus available for interview in Detroit by Special Agents of the Detroit Office.

Every ship that enters the Port of Detroit that has a crew or passengers from behind the Iron Curtain is visited by [redacted] By this manner he has built up acquaintances on the various ships. b7C b7D

EXP. PROC.

It is to be noted, however, that the shipping season in Detroit is quite short and takes place only during the season when the Detroit River is free of ice.

[redacted] has furnished reliable information in the past that has been verified through other sources.

1-4 2. [redacted] a Confidential Source of the [redacted] is about [redacted] years of age. [redacted] the United States from [redacted] He presently is employed

AMSD
REGISTERED MAIL
WLH:AMW
(3)

RECORDED - 25

MAR 28 1955

DATE 4-7-00 SP4 BJA/LBm

Letter to Director, FBI

Re: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR
PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS
OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE
UNITED STATES

at the [redacted] as a [redacted] b7C
in the [redacted] division, and part time as a [redacted] b7D
[redacted] He has several [redacted]
[redacted] that frequently docks at Detroit.
Through these [redacted]
[redacted] that arrives in Detroit.

In the past he has furnished reliable information to the Detroit Division.

3. [redacted] who is an [redacted] who [redacted]
with the [redacted] in Spain [redacted] Spain
for that purpose. He is acquainted with many of the other
[redacted] and, inasmuch as several
of the "international smugglers" reportedly were Spanish war b2
veterans, he could possibly be in a position to be of value. b7C
b7D

This individual speaks [redacted] and has
acquaintances in [redacted]
[redacted] in the future.

There has been no reason in the past to question this individual's reliability.

The above are the only informants or sources in the Detroit Division who have the background or contacts that could be considered in this matter.

In the furtherance of this program, to prevent the clandestine introduction of such a weapon into this country, the Bureau's attention is called to the fact that ports of entry by water into Michigan are located at Port Huron, Sault Ste. Marie, Muskegon, Saginaw and Bay City, Michigan.

All of these ports are covered by Resident Agencies out of the Detroit Division.

Letter to Director, FBI

Re: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR
PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS
OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE
UNITED STATES

It is suggested that Detroit be authorized to have the Resident Agents that cover these ports establish liaison with the Bureau of Customs authorities in those areas to facilitate complete cooperation and mutual knowledge in this matter.

However, it is noted that in No Number SAC Letter 55-B dated January 21, 1955 that a classified description of the weapon contains secret restricted data and is only being furnished to employees of the Federal Government who have been "Q-cleared". The above communication states, "You should not discuss the details contained in the communication with persons outside the Bureau."

This presents a problem inasmuch as it is not believed that Customs Inspectors are "Q-cleared".

However, it is believed that liaison could be established on the basis of discussing information that is not restricted to such a degree and which probably has been furnished to Customs Inspectors.

It is suggested that the Bureau might desire to suggest that a more complete distribution of descriptive information be made throughout the various federal agencies possibly by reclassification of the descriptive material.

The Detroit Free Press, a daily Detroit newspaper, carried an article on March 24, 1955, page 6, columns 3 and 4, which was entitled "Satchel-Type A-Bomb Set Off By GI Squad". This article, which was datelined Las Vegas, Nevada, stated that the Army exploded a newly developed nuclear "satchel" charge on March 23, 1955. Article stated, "'Satchel' charges, one of the latest additions to America's atomic arsenal, are highly portable and capable of being transported and planted by a small combat team." This article stated that the weapon, which is believed portable enough to be handled by one man in a "sneak" raid, was equivalent to 1,000 tons of TNT.

This article would indicate that revised descriptions of the weapons will be forthcoming. It is recommended that the information be furnished in a form suitable for open discussion between this Bureau and the Bureau of Customs.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: April 6, 1955

FROM : W. A. Branigan

Tolson
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Nichols
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Gandy

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES

At 12:55 p.m., 4/6/55, Colonel Joe Halversen, Office of the Secretary of Defense, phoned Supervisor Whitson in the latter's capacity as IIC representative on the Joint Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference-Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security Committee on Countermeasures. Colonel Halversen stated that he was meeting on the afternoon of Thursday, April 7, with representatives of the Explosive Ordnance Disposal Units and wanted to know if liaison had been effected between the Bureau field offices and various Explosive Ordnance Disposal Units in the field. Colonel Halversen was informed that such liaison had been effected and that in the areas in which the situation was potentially the most serious, namely New York and Washington, this liaison was a continuing matter.

RECOMMENDATION:

None. This is for your information.

117-268

LW:fjm
(4)
cc - Mr. Belmont
Mr. Branigan
Mr. Whitson

RECORDED - 43 117-268

INDEXED - 43

EX-116

7 APR 7 1955

4-7-00 SP4 BJA/LBM

5-Whitson

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

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TO : The Director

DATE: April 6, 1955

FROM : L. V. Boardman

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

SYNOPSIS:

3/15/2004 [illegible]

Re Seattle letter of March 30, 1955, regarding an offer by an Atomic Energy Commission representative in the Seattle area to make available a detection device.

You noted "Just why we are making such an issue about this?"

The facts are: By letter of February 4, 1955, SAC, Seattle, informed the Bureau he understood that the Naval Research Laboratory at Washington, in cooperation with the Atomic Energy Commission, had developed on an experimental basis a very sensitive detector of radioactivity. SAC, Seattle, stated, "I think the Bureau should take the lead in demanding that these detectors be made in sufficient numbers to supply these security agencies." By security agencies he was referring to Customs and Coast Guard.

By letter of February 14, 1955, SAC, Seattle was furnished specific information regarding the so-called [redacted] passive detector. He was told about its capabilities and size. He was informed that Customs and Coast Guard personnel have recommended that a number of these devices be considered for the use of Coast Guard and Customs, including those in the Seattle area. It was pointed out, however, that the decision would ultimately be made by the National Security Council as to where such devices would be used.

b2
b7E

117-268
Enclosure
LW:fjm
(7)
cc - Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Branigan
Mr. Roach
Mr. Whitson

117-268

RECORDED-16

24 APR 11 1955

INDEXED-16

EX-116

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

By letter dated February 28, 1955, SAC, Seattle, informed the Bureau that he had conferred with the heads of local security agencies relative to the question of smuggling atomic bombs, and that the Atomic Energy Commission had promised to fly in or otherwise make immediately available their [redacted] or similar detectors at the request of any agency.

By Bureau letter of March 14, 1955, SAC, Seattle, was informed that there were no unused or available [redacted] devices at the present time and that as he had previously been informed the decision regarding the supplying of [redacted] or other devices at specific ports of entry would ultimately be made by the National Security Council. It was further pointed out that when additional [redacted] devices are approved and available, the places where they will be sent would have to be determined on the basis of national necessity at Washington. Accordingly, SAC, Seattle, was asked to furnish the identity of the representative of the Atomic Energy Commission who promised to fly the [redacted] or similar detectors into the Seattle area at the request of any agency. SAC, Seattle, was informed that we would have to furnish this information in detail to the Atomic Energy Commission.

b2
b7E

The reasons for this were not explained in detail in the letter of 3/14/55. The Bureau as a member of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference has been charged with following closely all developments in the field of countermeasures against the smuggling of atomic weapons. One of the basic and important countermeasures has been the development of detection devices. At the present time, there are no [redacted] devices which are not in use. There are no contracts for the production of additional [redacted] devices until the National Security Council approves a limited nation-wide program which is being referred to them by the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security. If the Atomic Energy Commission representative in Seattle does have available an additional [redacted] device, which he could fly to Seattle, this device might be put to better use on one of the piers in New York through which port the bulk of Soviet bloc passenger and hand-luggage traffic passes. If on the other hand the Atomic Energy

Commission representative had no such device available, he should not have raised the hopes of the other agencies in a meeting brought up on the initiative of the SAC, Seattle.

ACTION April 7, 1955

In the absence of SAC Auerbach, I called ASAC Estep at Seattle on April 7, 1955, with reference to Seattle's letter of March 30, 1955. I advised Mr. Estep that it was satisfactory for Seattle to talk to Mr. Frank McHale, Atomic Energy Commission representative in Seattle, as suggested by Seattle. I explained that the Bureau's interest in this matter arises because of our membership in a committee which is considering the clandestine entry of nuclear weapons and the purchase and control of detection devices and their location in the country are necessarily a part of the overall planning in this program. Consequently, if Mr. McHale does have one or more of these devices available to the Seattle area, we would like to know it, otherwise it will not be necessary for Seattle to advise us of the results of its contact with McHale. I pointed out further that the Bureau does not desire to spearhead further publicity on the size, weight and description of atomic weapons for public consumption; that publicity was afforded this matter in January, 1954, with the approval of the Atomic Energy Commission and high government officials in Washington, and that essentially, publicity in this field is under the control of the AEC. I pointed out that unless such publicity was most carefully controlled, hysteria could result.

In the event I visit the Seattle Office next week for the purpose of discussing the general security situation with Agents in that office, I will take the opportunity to further discuss this with Mr. Auerbach and be sure that he has a full understanding as to this matter.

AHB:td A. H. Belmont

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Sizoo
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268)

DATE: 3-30-55

FROM : SAC, SEATTLE (98-1137)

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF
AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

ReBulet 3/14/55 requesting to be advised as to the identity of the AEC representative who promised to fly in a detector at the request of any agency and stating that the information must be furnished in detail to AEC.

I am very much disturbed at this situation for the following reasons:

In mylet of 2/28/55, I attempted to advise the Bureau of action being taken by interested agencies in this area to counter what appeared at that time to be a real possibility that local security agencies might be confronted with the job of detecting and intercepting smuggled atom bombs. Because of its possible imminence, the problem was seriously considered and what amounted to emergency plans were made in order that the situation could be dealt with as effectively as possible. It was with the recognition that positive action might have to be taken within the immediate future that these agency representatives took inventory of means and equipment at their disposal which they could individually contribute toward a cooperative effort. No one could conceive under exactly what conditions a maximum use of all available men and equipment would be needed, but it appeared necessary to consider such a need. In this spirit of mutual assistance and cooperation, all representatives offered what equipment they had, and at the same time the AEC representative offered certain resources and equipment at his disposal.

Of course, the AEC representative, who is the Security Section Chief, FRANK McHALE, when offering the use of counters, etc., thought . . as did we all . . that it must be in a situation where the sensible thing would be to check the matter based upon a serious situation and not just furnishing such materials as a "fishing expedition". Certainly, Mr. McHALE, as the representative of AEC, is in a position to know what his own commitments may be, and I think it would seriously endanger our relations with AEC if we were to stick our nose into the authority of such an individual to utilize equipment owned and operated by his own agency.

ENCLOSURE

I assume each of the various agency heads who were here is a responsible man and that each knows the extent to which he can commit

RDA:LM
(3)

RECORDED-16
INDEXED-16
24 APR 11 1955

EX-116

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 66-5233

APR 4 1955

DIRECTOR, FBI
RE: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

SAC, SEATTLE
3-30-55

his organization. It is my observation each man present was very much aware of his responsibility to take every precaution possible to prevent an atom bomb from being smuggled into the country. I doubt very much whether the expense of whatever effective action might be necessary in such an emergency was of prime consideration in these plans.

The planning and pooling of equipment by these agencies was done entirely between their respective representatives without suggestion or direction by this office. We were in the picture only for the purpose of being certain all agencies were advised of informants' reports, for the purpose of ascertaining what plans existed for an emergency and, of course, for the purpose of being certain ourselves that we were in a position to discharge our responsibilities. We understand that we have no direct responsibility in the detection and interception of smuggled bombs, and we did not participate in this phase of the planning. By the same token, I don't think it is our business to intervene in any understanding between other agencies relative to equipment or facilities they may decide to use in an emergency, especially where we have no direct responsibility. My personal opinion also is that I doubt if we should be concerned with the possible expense to another agency of shipping an eight hundred pound detector if such, in the judgment of responsible officials of the other agency, is needed on an emergency basis to prevent an atom bomb's being brought into the country.

The Bureau can be assured this office has no intention of requesting the use of detectors or of committing the Bureau to expenditure of funds for such purpose without prior approval and planning by headquarters.

I assume from Bureau letter that the representative of AEC went beyond his authority in offering AEC detection devices and facilities to other security agencies for use in case of an emergency. It seems to me that since we were not a party to the understanding and in fact were little more than onlookers, the furnishing of information to AEC on a headquarters level concerning this matter would adversely affect the liaison and cooperation we presently enjoy with AEC as well as with other security agencies in this State; however, if the Bureau is firm in its opinion that it is the Bureau's responsibility to see that this matter is cleared with AEC headquarters, I respectfully suggest, as an alternative to the Bureau's intention to report the local official to AEC headquarters,

Just why we are speaking such a [illegible] about this?

K.

DIRECTOR, FBI
RE: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

SAC, SEATTLE
3-30-55

that I be directed to contact this man, explain the function of the National Security Council in this connection and ask him to check with his headquarters as to whether or not he is permitted to commit his agency to the emergency assistance he has offered.

Regarding public education on the subject of clandestine nuclear weapons, I would like to state that I am aware of the action the Bureau has been taking as outlined in reflet, but my idea was that the public could be of substantial assistance in instant matter if it had some idea of a bomb's characteristics, appearance and size and consequently a conception of what it should be alert for. Information in No Number SAC Letter 55-B dated 1/21/55 is generally the information the public could use in this respect. I appreciate that this material is being considered for public release, but in the meantime attempted smuggling of an atom bomb into this country appears to be a present and continuing possibility, and yet the public, whose assistance could be formidable, is not informed in the detail that would enable it to be of effective help. In a nutshell, while some data has been made public, it would appear that a sustaining campaign should be put on, if any lasting results are to be obtained.

tic - Mr. Whitson

SAC, New York (117-192) (orig and 1) April 7, 1955

RECORDED-12
EX-116

Director, FBI (117-268)

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF
AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

Reurlet 3/30/55, recommending preliminary discussion with Commodore Robert C. Lee, vice chairman of the board of directors of Moore McCormack Steamship Lines, to determine the feasibility of establishing a program whereby Moore McCormack Masters and other responsible ship personnel visiting Iron Curtain ports can be watchful of suspicious shipments, particularly of those being transshipped to Western European countries for ultimate delivery to the United States.

It is noted that your original information concerning Commodore Lee came from Customs officials in New York who advised that he was a Naval Intelligence Reserve officer and would have considerable information concerning the experiences of his ships in Soviet and satellite ports.

You have since determined through Captain Arthur Graubart, District Intelligence Officer, Third Naval District, New York City, that there is nothing in ONI records, Third Naval District, to indicate that Lee has furnished Soviet shipping information to the Office of Naval Intelligence. Inquiries by Bureau Liaison at the headquarters of the Office of Naval Intelligence, Washington, D. C., reveal that Commodore Lee is neither an active nor inactive Reserve officer.

COMM — FBI
APR — 1955
MAILED 25

LW:fjm
(4)

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

APR 14 1955

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4-7-00 SP4 BJA/LBM

Commodore Lee would appear to be identical with Robert Corwin Lee subject of "Special Inquiry - National Security Resources Board - Employee" investigation, New York file 126-136, Bufile 126-280, which was conducted in 1949.

Although the initial basis for your contact with Lee, namely the fact that he was a Naval Intelligence Reserve officer, has been shown to be erroneous, you are nevertheless authorized to contact Lee to determine from him the identity of the proper persons in the Moore McCormack organization to talk to regarding your problem.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI (117-268) DATE: 3/30/55

SECRET

FROM : SAC, New York (117-192)

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF OR OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

Rebulet dated 2/10/55.

Captain ARTHUR H. GRAUBART, District Intelligence Officer, Third Naval District, 90 Church Street, New York City, advised that Commodore ROBERT C. LEE Vice Chairman of the Board of Directors of Moore McCormack Steamship Lines is known to him but there is nothing in ONI, 3ND records to indicate that he has furnished pertinent Russian shipping information to the Office of Naval Intelligence.

Lieutenant (j.g.) JAMES E. WELCH, who processes all of the "Special Category" ships for ONI, 3ND in the Port of New York, advised that Moore McCormack has always been most cooperative with him but his dealings have been with other individuals in this company who are in a position to furnish specific details concerning the arrival and departure of ships, ports visited, etc. He stated this kind of information is the only information he receives from the company and that he depends upon the Masters of the various ships to furnish anything of value from an intelligence standpoint.

The Office of Naval Intelligence has set up in each port city of the United States a collection of information program involving all "Category C" ships usually referred to as "NERM" (Naval Intelligence Requirement Manual). "NERM" consists of about thirty five very detailed outlines covering the types of information desired in various fields of Intelligence. For instance, NERM 4 deals with fuel and lubricants; NERM 11 deals with Volunteer Observer Program (usually Naval Officers traveling abroad), NERM 18 (in which ONI is particularly interested) deals with Selected Foreign Ports and Activities. Most of the information solicited under these various NERMS pertain to port facilities and matters in which the Navy would be primarily interested.

RECORDED-12 INDEXED-12

The Coast Guard cooperates with ONI insofar as it is able but the Coast Guard's interest is primarily security and not intelligence. ONI does receive some information from the Coast Guard noted on Coast Guard report form captioned "Other Pertinent Data Gathered from Casual Conversation," but ONI endeavors to solicit intelligence data from the Master of the vessel and relies upon the Coast Guard only to keep it advised of the arrival and departure of vessels. The ONI representative boards the vessel after the Coast Guard for the reasons stated in the Naval Intelligence Requirement Manual, "There is no

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JCM:MPH

4-7-00
CLASSIFIED BY NLS/BJA/lbm-60267- (Derivative)
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1
Per letter dated 3/23/04 60267/DC/NLS/BJA tdw 3/30/04

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basis in law, at this time, to require or authorize a boarding of such vessels for Naval Intelligence Development. It might be construed as an unfriendly act on the part of the United States if representatives of Naval Intelligence were included, either overtly or covertly, as members of the Coast Guard boarding parties. Coast Guard Headquarters will promulgate instructions to District Commanders which will coordinate their boarding procedures for 'Special Category' merchant vessels."

Lieut. WELCH advised that thus far his contacts have been solely with the Masters of the vessels and the degree of cooperation he has received from Masters of foreign vessels is usually in proportion to the proximity of Russia and its satellite countries to the country of the vessel. Masters of Scandinavian ships are usually reticent as are Masters of vessels that call frequently at Russian or satellite ports.

Lieut. WELCH advised he receives sailing schedules from the Moore McCormack Steamship Lines several days prior to departure together with a list of ports at which the vessel is scheduled to stop. When this list includes ports within Russia or its satellites, he endeavors to thoroughly brief the Master on the items of interest to the Navy from an intelligence standpoint as set forth in NERM, although sometimes the Director of Naval Operations requests specific information regarding a particular port not contained in the Manual.

Lieut. WELCH stated that the degree of cooperation received from Masters of American vessels varies. Some are enthusiastic and take prodigious notes; others are disinterested and passive and it is evident not much in the way of intelligence will be forthcoming from them upon the return of the vessel. Lieut. WELCH stated that the Navy depends upon Masters of vessels who are members of the Naval Reserve for most of its information. He stated a large percentage of the Masters of American ships are Reserve officers and are therefore most cooperative.

Lieut. WELCH stated that [redacted] (S)

b1
b3

Discussion of this matter at NYO intelligence conferences reflects that the Navy's NERM program "briefing and debriefing" inquiries are not concerned directly with endeavoring to develop information concerning the captioned topic. DIO officers indicate that their sources do not have direct dock contacts abroad but are more concerned with ship and ship activity information.

NY Letter to Director
NY 117-192

The Bureau may desire to discuss with representatives of ONI the possibilities of setting up a NERM program to deal with the captioned matter.

Lieut. WELCH stated he had never heard of Commodore ROBERT C. LEE being contacted in connection with the Navy's NERM program or furnishing information in connection therewith and he doubted very much that Commodore LEE was ever aware of the existence of this program. However, in view of the Bureau's responsibilities in this matter, the NYO recommends a preliminary discussion with Commodore LEE to determine the feasibility of establishing a program whereby Moore-McCormick Masters and other responsible ship personnel visiting iron curtain ports can be watchful of suspicious shipments, particularly those being trans-shipped to western European countries for ultimate delivery to the United States.

SECRET

cc: Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Sanders
Mr. Whitson

Assistant Attorney General (orig and 1)
William F. Tompkins

April 8, 1955

Director, FBI

RECORDED-12

EX-116

DETECTION DEVICES FOR FISSIONABLE MATERIAL
(ICIS PROBLEM 25)

Referral/Direct to OGA

[redacted] (S)

Mr. Yeagley requested the comments of this Bureau in connection with the report as soon as possible.

This report has been reviewed and the F. B. I. has found no objectionable material therein. The recommendation, however, requires the insertion of the proper page number in Tab D in order to conform with the intent of the Joint Committee. The recommendation should read: "That the limited national program described on page 5 of Tab D be initiated as soon as practicable."

117-268

LW:fjm
(7)

(A cover memo from L. V. Boardman to The Director was prepared by LW:fjm on 4/7/55, in connection with this outgoing mail.)

4-7-00
CLASSIFIED BY SP4 BJA/LBM
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1

COMM — FBI
APR - 8 1955
MAILED 25

RECEIVED FBI
APR 8 3 14 PM '55

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

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59 APR 14 1955

SECRET

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation DATE: April 6 1955

FROM : J. Walter Yeagley, Justice Representative
Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security

SUBJECT: Detection Devices for Fissionable Material
(ICIS Problem 25)

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Sizoo
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

There is attached a draft dated March 10, 1955 of a joint IIC-ICIS report on detection devices for fissionable material.

We would appreciate your comments in connection with this report as soon as possible.

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Enclosure
No. 56497

3 ENCL.

EX-116

16)

EXP. PROC.
APR 6 1955

RECORDED-12
INDEXED-12 CONTROL NO. SRD-483
EX-116

APR 12 1955

removed.
defined
prohibited.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. L. V. Boardman

DATE: April 5, 1955

FROM : A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

Limited Classification
Review Conducted
See Top Serial
Form 4-774

62-39749-1
62-93542-1

SYNOPSIS:

Philadelphia airtel, 3/29/55, advised that Coast Guard Ship Search Program now provides for searching of any ship carrying cargo originating in Soviet bloc country even though cargo was loaded at a port not behind the Iron Curtain. Such search would apparently be optional by Captain of Port.

Philadelphia makes 2 recommendations:

(1) That Philadelphia Office at request of Coast Guard will furnish indices check information regarding consignees of cargo;

(2) Consideration be given to furnishing Coast Guard information regarding unreliability of sources of information of Department of State, one of whom in Nice, France, and the other in Luxembourg, furnished information in January regarding alleged Soviet plans to smuggle weapons into the United States.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

Attached is an airtel to Philadelphia instructing that office:

(1) That they should advise Coast Guard to make name check requests on consignees of cargo through Coast Guard Headquarters, Washington, since local field office files do not necessarily reflect information available at Seat of Government, and ultimate consignees may be located outside Philadelphia area. Philadelphia is informed that Customs (which maintains special search list of suspected consignees of atomic components) does not furnish FBI information to field personnel in this matter.

RECORDED-45

117-268
Enclosure sent 4-6-55
LW:fjm
(6)

59 APR 15 1955

117-268-748

EX-107

24 APR 12 1955

cc - Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Branigan
Mr. Roach
Mr. Whitson

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(2) That since sources of information in Europe regarding alleged Soviet smuggling plot were informants of Department of State and all dissemination to other agencies was made by Department of State, it is the responsibility of the Department of State to furnish its evaluation of its informants to the Headquarters of the Coast Guard which then has responsibility to furnish evaluations of reliability to Coast Guard port offices. Reliability of State's informants in Europe is not pertinent to Coast Guard policy of checking cargo originating behind Iron Curtain.

5-12 (2-7-55)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
LIAISON SECTION

4-11-, 1955

___Director	___Mr. Bates
___Mr. Tolson	___Mr. J.W. Brown
___Mr. Boardman	___Mr. Daunt
___Mr. Belmont	___Mr. Dougherty
___Mr. Keay	___Mr. Ellis
	___Mr. Ferris
___Mr. Baumgardner	___Mr. Fipp
___Mr. Branigan	___Mr. Kuhrtz
___Mr. Callan	___Mr. Landis
___Mr. Cleveland	___Mr. Mannion
___Mr. H.L. Edwards	___Mr. Martin
___Mr. Hennrich	___Mr. Papich
___Mr. Scatterday	___Mr. Philcox
___Mr. Stanley	___Mr. Robb
___Mr. W.C. Sullivan	___Mr. Sanders
	___Mr. Stevenson
___Mr. Roach	___Mr. D.J. Sullivan
___Mr. Bartlett	___Mr. J.F. Sullivan
___Mr. W Mohr	___Mr. Wells
Room 1730	___Mr. Woods
	___Mr. Young
___Miss_____	
Room_____	
	___Ident Div.
___Miss Cuddy	___Mail Room, 5533
___Miss Goggins	___Reading Room, 5531
___Mrs. Schwab	___Records Section
___Miss White	___Routing Unit
___Miss Wielkiewicz	___Send File UTD
	___Place on record and return
___Miss Cole	___See Me Please
___Miss Rogers	___Call Me Please
___Mr. Smith	___Please handle
___Miss El. Toby	___Please return
___Miss Ev. Toby	

Beckedoff advised.

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4-7-00 SP4 BM/tbm
#442963

G. W. BATES

5-MW

5-7 (12-31-54)
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION -- FBI

7-1, 1955

___Mr. Boardman	___Mechanical Section
___Mr. Belmont	___Translation Sec. 6228 IB
___Mr. Hennrich	
___Mr. Keay	___Ident Div.
___Mr. Cleveland	___Technical Lab
___Mr. Baumgardner	___Mr. Ferris, 7627
___Mr. Branigan	
___Mr. Roach	
___Mr. Scatterday	Room 7627

SUPERVISORS

___Mr. Aull	___Mr. Lewis
___Mr. Baken	___Mr. Litrento
___Mr. Bird	___Mr. Little
___Mr. Brennan	___Mr. McCaslin
___Mr. Broden	___Mr. McMahon
___Mr. Calame	___Mr. Meehan
___Mr. Callahan	___Mr. Mossburg
___Mr. Cotter	___Mr. Nasca
___Mr. Crowley	___Mr. Norstrom
___Mr. Day	___Mr. Peasinger
___Mr. De Bettencourt	___Mr. Sandweg
___Mr. Donahoe	___Mr. Schweppe
___Mr. Dunn	___Mr. Shroder
___Mr. Ezell	___Mr. Stacey
___Mr. Fitsgerald	___Mr. Stewart
___Mr. Gregg	___Mr. Teague
___Mr. Hitt	___Mr. Todd
___Mr. Jaquiss	___Mr. Torrillo
___Mr. Jensen	___Mr. Tully
___Mr. A.R. Jones	___Mr. Turner
___Mr. F.L. Jones	___Mr. Wacks
___Mr. Kissiah	___Mr. H.H. Wallace
___Mr. Kitchell	___Mr. Wannall
___Mr. Kuno	___Mr. Welborn
___Mr. Kurtz	___Mr. Welte
___Mr. Lake	___Mr. Whaley
___Mr. Lamphere	___Mr. Whitson
___Mr. Lee	
___Mail Room, 5533	___RECORDS SECTION
___Mrs. Dean	___Send File
___Mr. Hammond	___Bring File up to date
___Miss Taylor	
___Miss Martis	___Place on record and return
___Correct	
___Please call me	___Indicate index ref.
___Please see me	

The last Ref. Enclosure that should be charged to Evan Kahl

ESPIONAGE SECTION

Health, welfare + welfare.

#4H2963 SP4 BSM USM

5-7 (12-31-54)

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION -- FBI

[illegible], 1955

___Mr. Boardman	___Mechanical Section
___Mr. Belmont	___Translation Sec.
___Mr. Hennrich	6228 IB
___Mr. Keay	___Ident Div.
___Mr. Cleveland	___Technical Lab
___Mr. Baumgardner	___Mr. Ferris, 7627
___Mr. Branigan	
___Mr. Roach	
___Mr. Scatterday	Room [illegible]

SUPERVISORS

___Mr. Aull	___Mr. Lewis
___Mr. Baken	___Mr. Litrento
___Mr. Bird	___Mr. Little
___Mr. Brennan	___Mr. McCaslin
___Mr. Broden	___Mr. McMahon
___Mr. Calame	___Mr. Meehan
___Mr. Callahan	___Mr. Mossburg
___Mr. Cotter	___Mr. Nasca
___Mr. Crowley	___Mr. Norstrom
___Mr. Day	___Mr. Peasinger
___Mr. De Bettencourt	___Mr. Sandweg
___Mr. Donahoe	___Mr. Schweppe
___Mr. Dunn	___Mr. Shroder
___Mr. Ezell	___Mr. Stacey
___Mr. Fitsgerald	___Mr. Stewart
___Mr. Gregg	___Mr. Teague
___Mr. Hitt	___Mr. Todd
___Mr. Jaquiss	___Mr. Torrillo
___Mr. Jensen	___Mr. Tully
___Mr. A.R. Jones	___Mr. Turner
___Mr. F.L. Jones	___Mr. Wacks
___Mr. Kissiah	___Mr. H.H. Wallace
___Mr. Kitchell	___Mr. Wannall
___Mr. Kuno	___Mr. Welborn
___Mr. Kurtz	___Mr. Welte
___Mr. Lake	___Mr. Whaley
___Mr. Lamphere	___Mr. Whitson
___Mr. Lee	
___Mail Room, 5533	___RECORDS SECTION
___Mrs. Dean	___Send File
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___Miss Taylor	___Place on record and return
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ESPIONAGE SECTION

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4-7-00 #4h2b63 SP4 Galen

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

APR 6 1956

TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. Boardman	
Mr. Nichols	
Mr. Belmont	
Mr. Harbo	
Mr. Mohr	
Mr. Parsons	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Tamm	
Mr. Sizoo	
Mr. Winterrowd	
Tele. Room	
Mr. Holloman	
Miss Gandy	

WASH 16 FROM NEW YORK 6 9-57 P

DIRECTOR URGENT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4-7-00 BY SP4 BJA/LBM

ATTENTION INSPECTOR HENNRICH.

SMUGGLING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE US. AEA. US CUSTOMS, NYC, TELEPHONICALLY ADVISED NYO APRIL SIX INSTANT THAT FRIEDRICH RINGER, WHO GAVE HIS ADDRESS AS ONE FIFTEEN EDGEMONT, UPPER MONTCLAIR, NJ, ARRIVED IDLEWILD AIRPORT, NYC, APRIL SIX INSTANT VIA SWISSAIR FLIGHT HBIBZ FROM ZURICH, SWITZERLAND. WHEN THIS INDIVIDUAL-S LUGGAGE PASSED BY MACHINE USED TO DETECT FISSIONABLE MATERIAL, MACHINE REGISTERED STRONGLY TO PRESENCE OF FISSIONABLE MATERIAL. UPON SEARCH OF LUGGAGE THREE SMALL PIECES OF ROUGH ORE WEIGHING A TOTAL OF APPROXIMATELY SEVEN OUNCES WERE FOUND IN RINGER-S LUGGAGE AND FOUND TO BE THE SOURCE REGISTERING ON MACHINE. ACCORDING TO CUSTOMS THREE PIECES OF ROUGH ORE STRONGLY REGISTERED URANIUM TRACES. RINGER, UPON BEING QUESTIONED, ADVISED CUSTOMS THAT HE HAD SECURED THIS MATERIAL FROM A PORTUGUESE MINE AND WAS TURNING IT OVER TO MR. F. B. O-CONNOR, DRESSER INDUSTRIES, DALLAS, TEXAS. CUSTOMS DETERMINED FROM RINGER THAT HE WAS A CHEMICAL ENGINEER, A GERMAN CITIZEN BUT A RESIDENT OF THE US, AND THAT HE HAD BEEN BUILDING OIL REFINERIES ABROAD FOR AMERICAN CORPORATIONS. ACCORDING TO CUSTOMS, RINGER WAS MORE THAN WILLING THAT THE THREE ROUGH ORE SAMPLES BE LEFT WITH CUSTOMS, WHICH HE DID. ACCORDING TO CUSTOMS, RINGER HAD FILED BAGGAGE DECLARATION

117-268
NOT RECORDED
145 APR 18 1955

END PAGE ONE

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 117-8211-1

NINE ONE FOUR NINE EIGHT NAUGHT FIVE, AND, INASMUCH AS THERE IS NO NOTATION MADE ON THIS DECLARATION BY THE INSPECTOR REGARDING THREE SMALL PIECES OF ROUGH ORE, RINGER MUST HAVE VERBALLY DECLARED THIS MATERIAL AT THE TIME OF HIS ARRIVAL. CUSTOMS DID NOT DETERMINE ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON RINGER OTHER THAN AS HERETOFORE SET FORTH AND, AS FAR AS THEY KNOW, RINGER WAS PROCEEDING TO THE ABOVE MENTIONED NJ ADDRESS. CUSTOMS ADVISED THAT AEC, NYC, WAS BEING CONTACTED AND THE THREE ROUGH PIECES OF ORE WERE BEING TURNED OVER TO THEM INASMUCH AS IT WAS FELT THAT IF THESE PIECES OR ORE WERE RICH ENOUGH IN URANIUM AEC MIGHT DESIRE OR BE INTERESTED IN LEARNING THE MINE FROM WHICH THEY CAME. INDICES OF NYO CONTAIN NO REFERENCE TO FRIEDRICH RINGER. NO FURTHER ACTION BEING TAKEN IN THIS MATTER AT THIS TIME BY NYO AND NEWARK AND DALLAS OFFICES BEING FURNISHED BY MAIL COPIES OF THIS COMMUNICATION FOR THEIR INFO. SUCH OFFICES ARE NOT BEING REQUESTED TO TAKE ANY ACTION IN THIS MATTER UACB. BUREAU TELEPHONICALLY ADVISED OF ABOVE APRIL SIX INSTANT.

KELLY

HOLD

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Director

DATE: April 7, 1955

FROM : L. V. Boardman

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION-IN-PLACE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

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Holloman
Gandy

SYNOPSIS:

By memorandum of April 6, 1955, Mr. J. Walter Yeagley, Justice representative, Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security, forwarded a draft dated March 10, 1955, of a joint IIC-ICIS report on detection devices for fissionable material. Mr. Yeagley requested the Bureau's comments in connection with the report as soon as possible.

Yeagley's request as Justice representative on ICIS is for the purpose of obtaining a Justice position. The attached report has been studied by the military representatives of the IIC and they have indicated their concurrence.

The report, consisting of five pages, was prepared on the basis of a study of detection devices for fissionable material which study was made by representatives of Customs, Coast Guard, Immigration and the Atomic Energy Commission. The study included the actual field testing of two different types of passive detection devices,* one weighing eight hundred pounds and intended for stationary operation and the other weighing approximately seven pounds and completely portable.

ANALYSIS OF REPORT:

In March, 1954, the Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures assigned to the specially constituted advisory group, consisting of representatives of Coast Guard, Customs, Immigration and Naturalization Service, and Atomic Energy Commission,

117-268
Enclosure sent 4-8-55
LW:fjm
(6)
cc - Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Sanders
Mr. Whitson

RECORDED-16

24 APR 13 1955

INDEXED-16

* See Addendum on page 4.

59 APR 15 1955

59 OCT 6 1955

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the task of field testing detection devices developed by the Atomic Energy Commission in ports of entry through which Soviet bloc diplomats were permitted to enter the United States. Passive detection devices were the only ones immediately available for field testing and the problem of active devices is the continuing subject of research and development by the Atomic Energy Commission.

The two types of passive detectors field tested were: (a) [redacted]

As a result of a national statistical survey of ports of entry and physical survey of the Ports of New York, St. Albans, Vermont, Rochester, New York, San Antonio, Texas, and Laredo, Texas, by the advisory group, six [redacted] *were installed for checking travelers and their baggage at the following locations: New York International Airport, New York piers, and the San Antonio International Airport. Mark II portable detectors were given limited field testing particularly on ship searches in the Port of New York. Additional* [redacted] *portable devices are on order and when received will be distributed to appropriate locations for testing on motor vehicle and railroad traffic.*

b2
b7E

The passive detection devices can detect unshielded uranium and shielded plutonium in amounts that can be hand carried but they do not discriminate between fissionable material and noncontraband radioactive sources such as clocks and watches with luminous dials, compasses, radioactive bath salts, sound recording tape and film and certain other substances, including some types of fertilizer.

The effectiveness of the detection equipment, therefore, depends on both the technical capabilities of the equipment and on search procedures used to isolate the item which has activated the device. The report points out that the only sure method of detection involves manual search.

The conclusions are: (1) A program which would assure the detection of fissionable material that might be clandestinely introduced into the United States is not possible

either now or in the foreseeable future; (2) Any detection program adopted should be one which would balance maximum effectiveness with minimum interference with the normal flow of commerce; (3) Any practicable program would have very little effectiveness in the detection of fissionable material brought in ship cargo, highway truck or as rail freight; (4) [redacted] *passive detection devices can be utilized now without awaiting further development of active devices.*

The report contains the recommendation that

[redacted]

b2
b7E

The Tabs are informative material prepared by the above-mentioned advisory group: [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

RECOMMENDATION:

There is attached a letter to the Assistant Attorney General, Internal Security Division, William F. Tompkins, advising him that the FBI has no objection to the report but that the limited national program recommended should be indicated as the one set forth on page 5 of Tab D, as discussed above.

This matter is being followed for IIC by Bureau Liaison and as soon as the Chairman of ICIS has signed the letter of transmittal to the National Security Council of the proposed report, such letter will be presented to you for signature. As noted above the military agencies of IIC will concur in the report. The transmittal letter may not be forthcoming from ICIS until May 1, 1955, since the Department of Defense representative on ICIS has reportedly informed ICIS that he will be unable to obtain agency concurrence on the Departmental level until that time.

ADDENDUM: *LW:fjm* *April 8, 1955*

A passive detection device reacts to radiation received from an item in its vicinity, for example, a Geiger counter. An active detection device sends radiation into or through the item being inspected, for example, a fluoroscope.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

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TO : L. V. Boardman

DATE: April 11, 1955

FROM : A. H. Belmont

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 3/19/2004 60267 uc/MLS/RJA/tdw
Per letter dated 3/23/04 60267 uc/MLS/RJA (tdw) 3/30/04

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION-IN-PLACE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

SYNOPSIS: Small-type U.S. Atom Bombs

On April 7, 1955, the Joint Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference-Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security Committee on Countermeasures met with its Atomic Energy Commission technical advisor and ad hoc representatives from CIA and the Department of State to consider further the question of U. S. policy regarding the Soviet diplomatic pouch. Supervisor Whitson represented the IIC with Mr. B. Willard of ONI. Mr. E. S. Sanders, Executive Secretary of the IIC, also was present. Referral/Direct OGA

[redacted]

A draft was discussed of a letter to the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, requesting a tabulation of the dimensions and total weight, including shielding material, of a critical mass of uranium and plutonium and convenient fractions thereof, down to a minimum practical size which might be hand-carried by one or two persons. This information is necessary for a determination as to the practical size and weight limitations for the diplomatic pouch. A copy of this draft is attached.

Attachments
Ticklers - Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Branigan
Mr. Sanders
Mr. Whitson

59 APR 25 1955

LW:bsb
(6)

Colonel Joseph Halverson, Office of the Secretary of Defense, who is the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security representative on the Joint Committee, has been adamant in insisting that the IIC and ICIS request the Intelligence Advisory Committee to make an estimate on the "probability" that the Soviets would use the diplomatic pouch to introduce nuclear components before a military attack. The Central Intelligence Agency representative and the Department of State representative, who are participating in the discussions on an ad hoc basis, have been sympathetic to the Colonel's position. A draft letter was prepared for the consideration of the IIC and the ICIS.

The IIC representatives pointed out that the "probability" of the use of the pouch was not material to this problem. The capability and lack of U. S. defenses against such clandestine introduction were the pertinent factors. A copy of the draft letter to the Chairman of IAC is attached.

The proceedings of the Joint Committee with regard to the study of the pouch have been placed on the agenda of the Working Committee of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference for Wednesday, April 13, 1955.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

It is respectfully recommended (1) that the draft letter to the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission be approved by the Working Committee of the IIC since the weight and dimension data are necessary for an intelligent determination regarding the size of the pouch.

(2) With regard to the proposed letter to the Chairman of the Intelligence Advisory Committee, it is respectfully recommended that the FBI position and the IIC position should be that no request will be made by the IIC for an estimate of "probability" since "probability" is not pertinent to the problem. The reappraisal of U. S. policy regarding the Soviet pouch should be predicated upon Soviet capabilities and our lack of defenses against them.

SECRET

DRAFT

April 8, 1955

Letter to Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission

Recd from ICIS Secretariat 4-8-55 LW

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DATE 3/15/2004 BY 60267 uc/MLS/ASF/tdw
Per letter dated 3/23/04 60267 uc/MLS/ASF/tdw
3/30/04

The IIC and the ICIS, with a technical advisor from the Atomic Energy Commission and with ad hoc representatives from the Department of State and the CIA, are studying the advisability of placing limitations on the diplomatic pouch, specifically the size and weight of separate packages, in order to lower its effectiveness as a possible means for clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons.

We request that you furnish for the purpose of this study a tabulation of the dimensions and total weight, including effective shielding material, of a critical mass of nuclear material, including both uranium and plutonium, and convenient fractions thereof, down to a minimum practical size which might be hand-carried by one or two persons.

SECRET

ENCLOSURE

DRAFT

~~SECRET~~

April 8, 1955

Intelligence

Letter to Chairman, ~~Interdepartmental~~ Advisory Committee

Read from ICIS Secretariat 4-8-55 LW

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 3/30/2004 BY 60324uc/baw/sdr/ksr
Pub Letter dated 3/23/04 60267 uc/baw/sdr/ksr 3/30/04

The IIC and the ICIS, with a technical advisor from the Atomic Energy Commission and with ad hoc representatives from the Department of State and the CIA, are studying the advisability of placing limitations on the diplomatic pouch, specifically the size and weight of separate packages, in order to lower its effectiveness as a possible means for clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons.

Based on estimated capabilities of the USSR in production of nuclear weapons and considering estimated USSR strategic policy, including advantages and disadvantages of this course of action to the Russians, what do our intelligence agencies consider as the probability that an attempt will be made by the USSR to effect the clandestine introduction into the U. S. of nuclear weapons or their nuclear components by means of entries and shipments covered by diplomatic immunity before an all-out attack on this country by nuclear weapons delivered either by aircraft or missiles?

In preparing the above estimates it is suggested that you take into account the fact that existing procedures and use of existing detection devices afford a low probability of detection, and none of identification, of nuclear weapons or their components which might be introduced through entries and shipments covered by diplomatic immunity. Should further details be desired in this connection, and IIC and ICIS will be glad to arrange appropriate briefings.

There should be an estimate of current probabilities as well as an estimate of probabilities based upon anticipated changes in USSR capabilities over the next several years.

~~SECRET~~

ENCLOS 117-261 152

Comments on any varying opinions between agencies on this matter and the assumptions on which they are based are also desired.

It is requested that the above estimates be made available to the IIC and the ICIS within one month.

Hoover, Chairman of IIC

Yeagley, Chairman of ICIS

DIRECTOR, FBI (66-17440) 4/15/55

SAC, WFO (66-2395)

PRODIP SMUGGLING Atom Bombs

Remylet 2/3/55 in which the Bureau was advised that the Department of the Army was moving two Explosive Ordnance Detachments into the Washington, D. C., area in the immediate future and that each of these detachments would be made available to the Bureau during the course of any of its investigations or in the event of a national emergency.

For the information of the Bureau, the above-described Explosive Ordnance Detachments are now stationed in the Washington, D. C., area. The 57th EOD is currently stationed in building T-401, South Fort Myer, Virginia. The Commanding Officer is Lieutenant EUGENE R. BELCHER, who resides on the post in the Bachelor Officers Quarters. Lieutenant BELCHER was contacted by this office 4/12/55 and indicated his detachment would be available to assist the Bureau at any time desired. He stated a Duty Office would be maintained on a 24-hour basis and could be immediately contacted by the Bureau when desired. The Duty Officer can be reached on telephone number JAckson 7-9400 (Code 1213), Extension 1176 or 1066. According to Lieutenant BELCHER, three members of the 57th EOD, including himself, have received Special Weapons Disposal Training, and as such are capable of disarming atomic or nuclear weapons. There are also six enlisted men in this detachment, five of whom are capable of handling ordinary demolition problems, such as bombs, booby traps, etc.

The 67th EOD is currently located at Fort McNair, District of Columbia. The Commanding Officer of this detachment is Captain WILLIAM R. BOWIE, JR., who resides in the Bachelor Officers Quarters at Fort McNair. Captain BOWIE's office number is EXecutive 3-7700 (Code 150), Extension 76. Captain BOWIE also has an assistant Lieutenant MARTIN MARSH. Lieutenant MARSH can be reached on Captain BOWIE's office extension during working hours. Lieutenant MARSH resides at 113 Wayne Place, S.E., and his home telephone number is JOhnson 1-1461.

Captain BOWIE was interviewed by this office 4/12/55 at which time he stated his detachment was ready to assist the Bureau at any time it desired. At the present time two officers and one enlisted man in the 67th EOD have Special Weapons Disposal training. There are also five enlisted men in this detachment who have ordinary disposal training.

REL:dgh
(3)

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1 117-268-
NOT RECORDED
176 APR 21 1955

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ORIGINAL FILED IN 66-17440-4-2

WFO 66-2395

For the information of the Bureau, both the 57th and 67th EODs have civil defense duties and responsibilities in the Washington, D. C., area. Both organizations, according to their Commanding Officers, are constantly training their personnel in all phases of explosive work and are one hundred per cent ready at all times to act in an emergency.

This office is of the opinion that in the event of a national emergency both of these EODs will be available to assist the Bureau in captioned matter in one hour or less.

tic Mr. Whitson

SAC, Seattle (orig and 2) April 21, 1955

Director, FBI

esa

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES
(Bufile 117-268)
(Seattle file 66-1974-39)

[redacted] was
INTERNAL SECURITY - C
(Bufile [redacted]
(Seattle file [redacted]

Reurlet 4/1/52, recommending that [redacted] was, be placed on the Special Customs Watchlist in connection with this matter. [redacted] was recommended by you because of her position with the [redacted] Seattle. 117-268- serial 104 b7C

The report of SA [redacted] re [redacted] was, Internal Security - C," dated at Seattle, Washington, 2/10/55, shows that she is no longer employed by the [redacted] You should inform the Bureau as to your recommendation at this time regarding the continuing of [redacted] on the Special Customs Watchlist. [redacted] serial 80

LW:fjm
(6)

RECORDED-45
117-268-754

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COMM — FBI
APR 21 1955
MAILED 28

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59 APR 26 1955

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-7-00 BY SP4 BJA/LBM

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: April 21, 1955

FROM : W. A. Branigan

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES

Tolson
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Branigan

The Annual Report of the Immigration and Naturalization Service for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1954, contains the following comment pertinent to the captioned matter under the heading "Border Patrol" on page 34:

> The most disturbing enforcement problem confronting the Border Patrol in the Gulf area results from the existence of more than 100 excellent, hard surface, unattended airfields within less than two hours flying time from Havana, Cuba. A number of these fields have been used by alien smugglers, but any one of them could be used to convey war material, as well as illegal aliens, into the United States.

The underlining is supplied. This refers to the potentiality for smuggling atomic weapons into the United States.

RECOMMENDATION:

RECORDED-35
INDEXED-35

117-268-159

None. This is for your information.

X-124

117-268

LW:fjm
(5)
cc - Mr. Belmont
Mr. Branigan
Mr. Sanders
Mr. Whitson

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I would rather that Irving had not read that portion of this report.

Tolson

59 APR 27 1955

CONFIDENTIAL

tic - Mr. Whiteen

117-268

BY COURIER SERVICE

Date: April 22, 1955

To: Mr. Chester A. Emerick
Deputy Commissioner, Investigations
Bureau of Customs
Room 7048 (orig and 1)
Internal Revenue Service Building
Washington 25, D. C.

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF
AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

Reference is made to our memorandum to the Commissioner, for the attention of Mr. Emerick, dated April 19, 1952, and to our memorandum to you dated July 9, 1954, furnishing for your consideration the name of [redacted] for special watch purposes.

b7C

On March 29, 1955, [redacted] Collector, U. S. Customs Office, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, advised the Pittsburgh Office of this Bureau that Customs at Pittsburgh had been in possession of a package shipped to [redacted] in Pittsburgh from a company in Bremen, Germany, since August 12, 1952. The contents of this package were described on the invoice as "iron rods." [redacted] has refused to accept delivery because of the duty charge.

DECLASSIFIED BY SP4 BSA/LBM
ON 4-7-80

UNRECORDED

RECORDED 117-268-756
139 APR 26 1955

CONFIDENTIAL

cc - [redacted]

LW:fjm
(5)

BY COURIER SVC.
APR 25
COMM - FBI

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APR 27 1955

b7C

[redacted] indicated that Customs anticipated having the rods examined and would advise our Pittsburgh Office if they were anything other than molding rods. You may wish to consider checking these rods for evidence of radioactivity if you have not already done so.

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TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: April 19, 1955

FROM : W. A. Branigan

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES REQUIRED TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION-IN-PLACE OF DEMOLITION ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

On April 18, 1955, Mr. Carl Pfuntner of the Secretariat of the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security phoned and stated that the ICIS was meeting on Thursday, April 21, 1955, and it would, therefore, be necessary to postpone the scheduled meeting of the Joint IIC-ICIS on Countermeasures until Friday, April 22. Supervisor Whitson pointed out to Pfuntner that there had been no meeting of the Joint Committee subsequent to Wednesday, April 13, 1955, when the working committee of the IIC voted down a proposal originally sponsored by Colonel Halversen, the ICIS Defense representative on the Joint Committee, that the Intelligence Advisory Committee be requested to prepare a National Intelligence Estimate on the "probability" that the Soviets would use their diplomatic pouch for smuggling fissionable material into the United States.

Pfuntner stated that he realized this but that April 22, appeared to be the first date on which ICIS representatives on the Joint Committee could be present.

RECOMMENDATION:

None. This is for your information.

117-268

LW:fjm
(5)
cc - Mr. Belmont
Mr. Branigan
Mr. Sanders
Mr. Whitson

117-268-757

59 MAY 2 1955

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: April 26, 1955

FROM : W. A. Branigan

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Nichols
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Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION-IN-PLACE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

SYNOPSIS:

A meeting of the Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures was held in Room 2515, Justice Building, 10 a.m., 4/22/55. Present were: Captain Stewart, Coast Guard, for ICIS; Leonard P. Bienvenu and Carl Pfuntner, of the ICIS Secretariat; Colonel Beckedorff, Atomic Energy Commission; Colonel Sheffield Edwards, ad hoc representative of Central Intelligence Agency; Walter J. Stoessel, ad hoc representative of State; Special Agent Whitson, FBI, and B. L. Willard, Office of Naval Intelligence, regular IIC representatives; and E. S. Sanders, Executive Secretary, IIC.

Pfuntner, ICIS Secretariat, was instructed to prepare replies to incoming correspondence for approval of the IIC-ICIS as follows:

Memorandum from James S. Lay, Jr., 3/24/55, re Killian report, reply to assure Lay that IIC and ICIS had taken into consideration technical feasibility of clandestine nuclear weapons having yields in the megaton range ever since Soviet thermonuclear tests in the Fall of 1953;

AEC memorandum, 4/7/55, re AEC withdrawal from responsibility regarding further development of detection devices, reply in line with IIC Working Committee position adopted 4/13/55, that AEC should not be permitted to withdraw at this time.

Proposed Joint IIC-ICIS letter to AEC regarding thermonuclear information to be released by AEC has been prepared and was awaiting signature of Chairman, ICIS, before being forwarded to Chairman of IIC for signature.

117-268
LW:fjm
(5) cc - Mr. Belmont
Mr. Branigan
Mr. Sanders
Mr. Whitson

117-208-758

EX-113

5 WHITSON

Joint IIC-ICIS report to National Security Council recommending limited national program of detection devices which has been approved by IIC agencies is still awaiting ICIS agency approval.

Committee resumed discussions of problem of pouch and IIC Executive Secretary Sanders explained in detail adverse IIC position on recommendation proposed by Colonel Halversen, ICIS, that Intelligence Advisory Committee make estimate on "probability" that Soviets would use diplomatic pouch to introduce nuclear weapons into U. S.

It was agreed that the group would meet again 4/29/55, at which time, the Department of State representative would attempt to have detailed statistical data regarding the size and weight of individual U. S. shipments under diplomatic seal to Moscow. Heretofore, statistics furnished by State have related to entire shipments over periods of time.

4-27-55 MEETING POSTPONED AT REQUEST OF STATE TO 5-5-55 FOR PURPOSE OF GETTING MORE DATA. LW

RECOMMENDATION:

None. This is for your information. You will be kept informed of developments.

BEST COPY
AVAILABLE

~~SECRET~~

April 28, 1955

esa

Honorable Lewis L. Strauss
Chairman
Atomic Energy Commission
Washington 25, D. C.

My dear Mr. Chairman:

A joint committee of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security, with a technical adviser from the Atomic Energy Commission and with ad hoc representatives from the Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency, is studying the advisability of placing limitations on the diplomatic pouch, specifically the size and weight of separate packages, in order to lower its effectiveness as a possible means for clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons.

We request that you furnish as soon as possible for the purpose of this study a tabulation of the dimensions and total weight, including effective shielding material, of a critical mass of nuclear material, including both uranium and plutonium, and convenient fractions thereof, down to a minimum practical size which might be hand-carried by one or two persons.

Sincerely yours,

To Col Dahl
4-29-55
CWB

RECORDED - 24 117-268-159

J. Edgar Hoover
Chairman, Interdepartmental
Intelligence Conference

24 MAY 4 1955

J. Walter Yeagley
Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee
on Internal Security

(Attached to cover memorandum from Mr. Boardman to The Director, 4/27/55, re "Restricting the Size of Diplomatic Pouches")

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Per letter dated 3/23/04
60267 uc/NLS/ESA/tdw
3/30/04

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(This is FBI file copy as the letter was prepared in ICIS)

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62-90938-1
62-82221-1
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Gandy

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: April 27, 1955

FROM : L. V. BOARDMAN

SUBJECT: RESTRICTING THE SIZE OF DIPLOMATIC POUCHES

The IIC-ICIS Committee considering restricting the sizes and weights of Soviet bloc diplomatic pouches in order to prevent their use as a means of introducing clandestine atomic weapons has recommended that the Atomic Energy Commission be requested for specific information concerning the smallest sizes to which nuclear materials can be, from a practical standpoint, reduced in order that they may be clandestinely introduced.

Attached is a suggested letter to the Atomic Energy Commission containing a request for the desired information. The letter has been approved by the ICIS and signed by the ICIS Chairman. The letter has been approved by the military members of the IIC.

ACTION: SMUGGLING Atom Bombs

It is recommended that you sign the attached suggested IIC-ICIS letter to the Atomic Energy Commission.

Attachment

ESS:hke (5)

1-Mr. Boardman
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Sanders
1-Section Tickler

typed UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 66-8603-1
typed UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 62-90938-1
typed UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 62-82421-1

RECORDED - 24

INDEXED - 24

117-268-751

24 MAY 4 1955

LIAISON

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-7-00 BY SP4 BJA/LBM

cc - Mr. Whitson

~~SECRET~~ - AIR COURIER

Date: May 4, 1955

To: Legal Attache (117-8) (orig and 1)
Paris, France

From: Director, FBI

Subject: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT
(Bufile 117-268)

[redacted] aka
[redacted]
Unknown Subjects;
[redacted] Informant
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT
(Bufile 117-1833)

b7C
b7D

ReBulet 3/31/55, requesting you to ask OSI to interrogate [redacted]

You should inform the Bureau promptly regarding the status of this matter with particular reference to any difficulty OSI may be experiencing in locating [redacted] for interview.

RECORDED-61 117-268-760

cc - Foreign Service Desk

LW:fjm
(6)

NOTE: Legal Attache maintains file on Smuggling caption only, therefore, only original and 1 cc being furnished him.

Tolson
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DECLASSIFIED BY SP4 BSA/LBM
ON 4-7-00

LEGAT
4 - MAY - 6
COMM - FBI

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~~SECRET~~

cc - Belmont
Roach
Whitson

Assistant Attorney General (orig & 1)
William F. Tompkins

May 11, 1955

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Director, FBI

INTRODUCTION OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
BY ISRAELI COURIER, IDLEWILD AIRPORT,
NEW YORK, MAY 10, 1955

At 2:30 p.m., May 10, 1955, [redacted] an Israeli diplomatic courier, bearing Israeli Passport [redacted] and a courier letter from the Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs, arrived at Idlewild Airport, New York, via El Al Airline, Flight 4 XAKA. He was carrying the following items under diplomatic seal: one sealed bag, one sealed pouch, one sealed box, one sealed parcel. According to Customs at Idlewild Airport, the bag weighing seventy pounds caused a reaction of both the head sensitive to neutrons and the head sensitive to gamma radiation of the detection device for fissionable material.

[redacted] who resides at [redacted] was destined to the Consul General of Israel, 11 East 70th Street, New York City.

Customs at the Idlewild Airport took no action to detain [redacted] but notified the Atomic Energy Commission and the F. B. I. in New York. The contents of the bag which caused the reaction of the detection device are not known.

These data are being furnished to the Central Intelligence Agency, for the attention of the Deputy Director of Plans; Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army; Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy; Director of Special Investigations, The Inspector General, Department of the Air Force; and to the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, Department of State.

RECORDED-57
INDEXED-57

9 MAY [illegible] 1955

117-268

cc - [redacted] (5)

LW:fjm
(7)

MAILED 11
MAY 11 1955
COMM-FBI

MAY 1 [illegible] 1955

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~SECRET~~ 12-19-57

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

b7C

b1

4-7-00 CLASSIFIED BY SP4 BTA/LBM DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1,6

Per Litt. dated 3/22/04 60267 uc/MLS/RDA 3/30/04

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

May 5, 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TOLSON
MR. BOARDMAN
MR. BELMONT
MR. NICHOLS

This morning I attended a meeting of the National Security Council at the White House, which was presided over by the President. Mr. J. Patrick Coyne, of the National Security Council, gave a forty-five minute briefing to the members of the Council upon the problems of internal security and the operations of the IIC and the ICIS. Mr. Coyne's briefing was very excellently presented. There were a number of questions asked by the President, the Vice President, and other members of the Council, which were answered satisfactorily by Mr. Coyne or myself.

One particular matter which seemed to get the President's attention was the possibility of there being smuggled into the United States component parts of the atom bomb. There was a general discussion about this problem and Mr. Allen Dulles, Director of CIA; Admiral Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Secretary of Defense Wilson all indicated concern about the matter and whether the diplomatic pouch could be reduced in size and weight so as to reduce the hazards now prevalent in the possibility of bringing into this country surreptitiously component parts of the atom bomb.

The President was advised that the two internal security committees had been studying this matter and that certain recommendations will, no doubt, be made shortly. Admiral Radford commented that he certainly was concerned about the matter but had been unsuccessful in making any headway with the military branches in going along with the idea that the size and weight of the diplomatic pouch should be reduced.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

JEH:eff (7)

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
W. C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-7-00 BY SP4 BJA/LBM

NOT RECORDED
146 MAY 10 1955

SENT
TIME

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI (117-268) DATE: 5/13/55

FROM: SAC, New York (117-192)

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES
AEA

INDEXED-17

Remylets 2/2/55 and 3/30/55 and Bulets 2/10/55 and 4/7/55.

On 5/10/55, Commodore ROBERT C. LEE, Vice Chairman of the Board of Directors of Moore McCormack Steamship Line, was interviewed by SA [redacted] It will be noted that Commodore LEE, graduate of the United States Naval Academy, has been associated with the Moore McCormack Lines since 1920 with the exception of a period during World War II when he returned to active duty in the U. S. Navy. b7C

Commodore LEE advised that he has travelled extensively in Europe and has made frequent visits to ports called upon by vessels of his line. He stated that the principal ports in northern Europe serviced by Moore McCormack are Goteberg or Guthenberg and Stockholm, Sweden, Oslo and Narvik, Norway, Copenhagen, Denmark, Helsinki or Helsingfors, Finland, and Gdynia, Poland.

Commodore LEE explained that in each of these ports the pier or dock utilized by Moore McCormack is operated by the local customs service, and it has been the experience of Moore McCormack that these piers are closely guarded by the local customs and police officials. Commodore LEE stated that from the nature of the guard, particularly at Gdynia, Poland, it would appear that the authorities are primarily concerned with preventing stowaways from fleeing this country.

The general nature of the captioned topic was discussed with Commodore LEE and he stated he was well aware of the problem since he had been a member of the Coast Guard Security Board which enacted the current regulations pertaining to category ships. He stated that he felt that the possibility of an unfriendly power attempting to smuggle a destructive weapon into the United States

1 - New Haven (117-29)
1 - Philadelphia (117-75)
1 - Newark

RECORDED - 17 117-268-762
INDEXED-17
17
16 MAY 16 1955

JJD:EG

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4-7-00 BY SP4 BJA/LBM

via shipping was a rather remote one, although he conceded that the possibility existed and the opportunities wide. He stated that in the event an unfriendly power was intent upon doing it, in all probability the material would be trans-shipped from the unfriendly power to a western country of Europe and thereafter carried unsuspectingly by a friendly or American ship to the shores of the United States.

Concerning the possible assistance which Moore McCormack masters might give to the Bureau, Commodore LEE stated that he did not feel they could offer much assistance in this matter. He pointed out that as a matter of policy his line does not carry trans-shipments from one European country to another but will only accept cargo for the United States. In addition, he pointed out that the piers utilized by Moore McCormack, to his knowledge, seldom have any cargo contained thereon other than that intended for the Moore McCormack ship. The cargo in the most part is produce of the country such as foodstuffs and furs and little, if any, manufactured products, (particularly of a type such as a destructive weapon, would be disguised, for example, machine tools) are exported from Gdynia.

In connection with the principal shipments from Poland, Commodore LEE pointed out that one of the principal products carried by his line was Polish hams, primarily canned, and all of which are imported by the one company, the Atalanta Trading Co., 77 Hudson St., NYC. Commodore LEE advised that to his knowledge there are two partners of this firm, Mr. RUBIN and Mr. MUELLER, who do business with Moore McCormack. He stated that during last year they imported approximately 2,760 tons of canned hams.

In connection with this, the files of the NYO will be reviewed concerning this company, its officers identified, and a recommendation made to the Bureau as to possible inquiry or investigation along these lines.

Commodore LEE advised that he was departing on 5/12/55 on a European tour and would give serious consideration to this matter and be alert to observe general conditions which may be adaptible to the needs of this Bureau. Commodore LEE advised that he would contact SA [redacted] should he develop anything of interest along these lines. b7C

In view of the above information, it is felt that because of the sensitive nature of this topic no recommendation should be made at this time of the establishment of a program of interviews of Moore McCormack Masters and other responsible ship personnel visiting the Satellite port of Gdynia and its neighboring Baltic ports.

tic - Mr. Whitson

SAC, New York (orig and 1)

April 14, 1955

Director, FBI (117-New)

FRIEDRICH RINGER
MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING
(ATOMIC ENERGY ACT)

Re New York teletype April 6, 1955, "Smuggling Weapons of Mass Destruction into the U. S. AEA," copies of which were mailed to Newark and Dallas. Reftel indicated Friedrich Ringer, 115 Edgemont, Upper Montclair, New Jersey, arrived at the Idlewild Airport, 4/6/55, via Swissair from Zurich, Switzerland, with three small pieces of radioactive ore weighing about seven ounces. Ringer claimed he had secured this material from a Portuguese mine and was turning it over to Mr. F. B. O'Connor, Dresser Industries, Dallas, Texas. Customs took possession of the ore samples from Ringer who was identified as a chemical engineer, a German citizen but a resident of the United States.

Friedrich Ringer may be identical with Friedrich Karl Franz Ringer, also known as Fritz Ringer, who was a leading oil engineer for and a director of I. G. Farben. [redacted] was (S) b1 about 48 years of age in 1949, was married and had two sons and two daughters. At one time he was procurement officer for I. G. Farben in Berlin. Prior to World War II, he was head of the process and contract divisions of I. G. Farben. During World War II he was in charge of Rumanian oil refineries for the Germans. Ringer reportedly conducted most of the negotiations with the Japanese for synthetic oils. [redacted] Ringer (S) b1 had come to the U. S. subsequent to World War II as an immigrant and in 1949, was working for the Hydrocarbon Research Corporation, a Dresser Industries affiliate. In that capacity, he traveled in the Middle East and Europe.

105-8090, ser. 282

cc - 2 - Newark

cc - 2 - Dallas

cc - 117-268 (Smuggling of Atomic Bombs or Parts Thereof and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction into the US.)

59 APR 20 1955

LW:fjm
(9)

YELLOW DUPLICATE
APR 14 1955
MAILED

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Nichols
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Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

4-7-00 CLASSIFIED BY NSIC/BSA/LBM. 60267- (Derivative)
DECLASSIFY ON: 1
Per Ltr. dated 3/23/04 60267 uc/nsi/BSA/HJS 3/30/04

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 117-

~~SECRET~~

By memorandum dated 1/5/51, Peyton Ford, then Deputy Attorney General, advised that information had been received from an unspecified agency of the Government that Ringer was one of a group of persons transferred to Nurnberg for a war crimes trial, that he was wanted by the Department of Justice and taken into custody by the Army Headquarters in Europe. Ford stated that Ringer was reported to have been born December 13, 1900, in Neumunster, Germany. By memorandum of 1/16/51, Ford was informed that there was no information in Bufiles regarding Ringer being wanted as a war criminal.

62-76878, ser. 214

There was information in Bufiles, however, that one Dr. Friedrich Ringer was carried on Detention List No. 1 of the U. S. Army dated August, 1945, as a security suspect at G-2 Plat, Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF).

62-76878, ser. 84

There are no identifiable references regarding one F. B. O'Connor of Dresser Industries. Bufiles indicate, however, that [redacted]

b7C
b1

(S) 105-17572, ser. 1

[redacted] (S)

105-17572, ser. 1

The report of SA [redacted] dated at New York City, 8/2/41, in the case entitled [redacted] was, et al, Espionage - R," contains background information regarding the [redacted]

b7C

~~SECRET~~

The circumstances under which the seven ounces of ore were brought into this country were suspicious in that Ringer had not declared them on his Customs declaration and after the detection device indicated their presence, he was "more than willing" that the samples be left with Customs.

A thorough investigation should be undertaken for the purpose of determining whether Ringer was being used by the Soviets or others to determine the sensitivity and effectiveness of the detection device.

Complete background information should be obtained regarding Ringer through Immigration records in New York or in his residence area and careful examination should be made of Customs declarations filed by him on his return to the United States from the various trips which he has made abroad for any indications that he has been in Soviet bloc territory on his trips. This would include the Eastern Zone of Germany.

4-41a

F.B.I. TELETYPE

DECODED COPY

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Sizoo
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

WASHINGTON 1 FROM NEW YORK 5-11-55 NR 110320 12:39 AM

DIRECTOR JUNE URGENT

ATTENTION INSPECTOR CARL E. HENNRICH

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS, FISSIONABLE MATERIAL, AND PARTS THEREOF INTO U.S., IS - R. RE NY TEL MAY 10, 1955. INSPECTOR ROBINSON, U.S. CUSTOMS, IDLEWILD AIRPORT, TELEPHONICALLY ADVISED THAT [redacted] WAS CARRYING A LETTER FROM ISRAELI MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS TOGGA WHICH LETTER IS DESCRIBED AS QUOTE NY 4-1955 UNQUOTE AND LISTS THE MATERIAL HE CARRIES AS A DIPLOMATIC COURIER WITH A DIPLOMATIC PASSPORT, NAMELY, 1 SEALED BAG, 1 SEALED POUCH, 1 SEALED BOX, AND 1 SEALED PARCEL. ROBINSON ADVISED [redacted] WAS ALSO CARRYING A LETTER WRITTEN IN FRENCH WHICH IS DESCRIBED AS QUOTE P NY 6 UNQUOTE SIGNED IN PARIS MAY 9, 1955 WITH THE ISRAELI EMBASSY SEAL ATTACHED. APPARENTLY THIS LETTER IS SIMILAR TO LETTER QUOTE NY 4-1955 UNQUOTE EXCEPT THAT IT IS IN FRENCH AND THE CONTENTS ARE NOT KNOWN. ROBINSON STATED [redacted] IS AN ISRAELI CITIZEN BUT A RESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES. RETEL REFLECTS ADDRESS [redacted] NYC TELEPHONE LISTS 11 SUBSCRIBERS AT THIS ADDRESS INCLUDING ONE [redacted] INSPECTOR [redacted] INS, IDLEWILD AIRPORT, TELEPHONICALLY ADVISED THAT [redacted] WAS ADMITTED UNDER A TEMPORARY VISITORS VISA INS FORM NUMBER [redacted] AS A GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL. [redacted] ADVISED [redacted] WAS ADMITTED UNDER QUOTE SECTION A-1 UNQUOTE WHICH HE DESCRIBED AS QUOTE FOR TOP GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS UNQUOTE. [redacted] MAY REMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES QUOTE FOR THE DURATION OF HIS STATUS UNQUOTE. [redacted] STATED [redacted] WAS DESTINED TO THE CONSUL GENERAL OF ISRAEL, NYC, WHICH IS LISTED IN THE NY TELEPHONE DIRECTORY AS 11 EAST 70TH STREET. HE DESCRIBED [redacted] AS AN ISRAELI CITIZEN, BORN IN [redacted] IN [redacted] AND ALSO LISTED HIS ADDRESS AS [redacted] NYC.

INDEXED - 28

RECORDED - 28 KELLY

9 MAY 13 1955

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's coding systems.

Mr. Belmont

LW - 5/11/55, Let to ONI & Treasury (7)
Let to State (7) Let to CIA (7)
Let to A-2, cc and rec'd (9)

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 105-382278-

b7C

4-41a

F.B.I. TELETYPE

DECODED COPY

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Sizoo
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

PAGE TWO

NY R 1 WA JCD

RECEIVED 5-11-55 12:49 AM ECD

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's coding systems.

~~SECRET~~

CC - Mr. Belmont
CC _ Mr. Roach
Mr. Whitson

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

117-268

RECORDED - 28

VIA LIAISON

Date: May 11, 1955

To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 (orig and 1)
Department of the Army
The Pentagon
Washington 25, D. C.

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: INTRODUCTION OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
BY ISRAELI COURIER, IDLEWILD AIRPORT,
NEW YORK, MAY 10, 1955

At 2:30 p.m., May 10, 1955, [redacted] an Israeli diplomatic courier, bearing Israeli Passport No. [redacted] and a courier letter from the Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs, arrived at Idlewild Airport, New York, via El Al Airline, Flight 4 XAKA. He was carrying the following items under diplomatic seal: one sealed bag, one sealed pouch, one sealed box, one sealed parcel. According to Customs at Idlewild Airport, the bag weighing seventy pounds caused a reaction of both the head sensitive to neutrons and the head sensitive to gamma radiation of the detection device for fissionable material. b7C

[redacted] who resides at [redacted] was destined to the Consul General of Israel, 11 East 70th Street, New York City.

Customs at the Idlewild Airport took no action to detain [redacted] but notified the Atomic Energy Commission and the F. B. I. in New York. The contents

cc - [redacted] (5) b1

LW:fjm
(9)

~~SECRET~~ 12-19-57

MAY 28 1955

Tolson
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Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

CLASSIFIED BY SP4 BJA/LBM
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR 1,2,6

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

REALTR DTD 3/23/03 60247 uc/ns/jsa/kmw 3/20/03

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 117-268

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~SECRET~~

of the bag which caused the reaction of the detection device are not known.

These data are being furnished to the Central Intelligence Agency, for the attention of the Deputy Director of Plans; to the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, Department of State; and to Assistant Attorney General William F. Tompkins.

cc - 1 - Director of Naval Intelligence VIA LIAISON
Department of the Navy
The Pentagon
Washington 25, D. C.

To Capt Nash 5-12-55 WFW

cc - 1 - Director of Special Investigations VIA LIAISON
The Inspector General
Department of the Air Force
The Pentagon
Washington 25, D. C.

To Frank Walsh OSI-5 13-55 DJS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

cc - Mr. Belmont
Mr. Roach
Mr. Whitson

117-268

VIA LIAISON

RECORDED - 28 117-268-1163

Date: May 11, 1955

(orig and 1)

To: Mr. Scott McLeod
Administrator
Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs
Department of State
Washington 25, D. C.

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: INTRODUCTION OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL BY ISRAELI COURIER, IDLEWILD AIRPORT, NEW YORK, MAY 10, 1955

This will confirm information furnished telephonically to your office by F. B. I. liaison on May 10, 1955.

At 2:30 p.m., May 10, 1955, [redacted] an Israeli diplomatic courier, bearing Israeli Passport No. [redacted] and a courier letter from the Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs, arrived at Idlewild Airport, New York, via El Al Airline, Flight 4 XAKA. He was carrying the following items under diplomatic seal: one sealed bag, one sealed pouch, one sealed box, one sealed parcel. According to Customs at Idlewild Airport, the bag weighing seventy pounds caused a reaction of both the head sensitive to neutrons and the head sensitive to gamma radiation of the detection device for fissionable material. b7C

[redacted] who resides at [redacted] was destined to the Consul General of Israel, 11 East 70th Street, New York City.

cc - [redacted] (5) b1

~~SECRET~~

LW:fjm
(7)

59 MAY 23 1955

Tolson
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Gandy

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Per letter dated 3/23/04 (62-116395) 3/30/04

CLASSIFIED BY SP4 BSG/LBM
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1,6

1-7-00

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Customs at the Idlewild Airport took no action to detain [redacted] but notified the Atomic Energy Commission and the F. B. I. in New York. The contents of the bag which caused the reaction of the detection device are not known. b7C

These data are being furnished to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army; Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy; Director of Special Investigations, The Inspector General, Department of the Air Force; Central Intelligence Agency, for the attention of the Deputy Director of Plans; and to the Assistant Attorney General William F. Tompkins.

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

cc - Mr. Belmont
Mr. Roach
Mr. Whitson

117-268

VIA LIAISON

INDEXED - 28 117-268-163

RECORDED - 28

Date: May 11, 1955

To: Director
Central Intelligence Agency (orig and 1)
2430 E Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Attention: Deputy Director, Plans

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: INTRODUCTION OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
BY ISRAELI COURIER, IDLEWILD AIRPORT,
NEW YORK, MAY 10, 1955

This will confirm information furnished telephonically by F. B. I. liaison May 10, 1955.

At 2:30 p.m., May 10, 1955, [redacted] an Israeli diplomatic courier, bearing Israeli Passport No. [redacted] and a courier letter from the Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs, arrived at Idlewild Airport, New York, via El Al Airline, Flight 4 XAKA. b7C He was carrying the following items under diplomatic seal: one sealed bag, one sealed pouch, one sealed box, one sealed parcel. According to Customs at Idlewild Airport, the bag weighing seventy pounds caused a reaction of both the head sensitive to neutrons and the head sensitive to gamma radiation of the detection device for fissionable material.

[redacted] who resides at [redacted] was destined to the Consul General of Israel, 11 East 70th Street, New York City.

b1

cc - [redacted] (5)

LW:fjm
(7)

~~SECRET~~

12-19-87

Tolson
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DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1,6

4-7-00

Per letter dated 3/23/04 (0228) wc/jusdoc/hcw 3/30/04

EX-117

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 105-38279

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Customs at the Idlewild Airport took no action to detain [redacted] but notified the Atomic Energy Commission and the F. B. I. in New York. The contents of the bag which caused the reaction of the detection device are not known. b7C

These data are being furnished to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army; Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy; Director of Special Investigations, The Inspector General, Department of the Air Force; Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, Department of State; and to the Assistant Attorney General William F. Tompkins.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~SECRET~~

4-41a

TELETYPE

DECODED COPY

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Sizoo
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

WASHINGTON 11 FROM NEW YORK 5-10-55 102330 7:50 PM

DIRECTOR URGENT [redacted]

ATTENTION INSPECTOR CARL E. HENNRICH.

[redacted]. SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS, FISSIONABLE MATERIAL, AND PARTS THEREOF INTO US, IS - R. RENYTEL CALL TO BUREAU MAY 10, 1955. [redacted] CUSTOMS, NY, ON MAY 10, 1955, ADVISED THAT A PACKAGE WEIGHING ONE AND FOUR TENTHS POUNDS ARRIVED AT IDLEWILD AIRPORT, NY, MAY 8, 1955, FROM RADIO CHEMICAL CENTER, AMERSHEM, BUCKINGHAMSHIRE, ENGLAND, AND DESTINED TO CARBIDE AND CARBON CHEMICAL CO., 9 EAST 41ST STREET, NYC. PACKAGE IS LABELLED, RADIO ACTIVE, AND SET OFF REACTION IN SPECIAL DEVICE AT IDLEWILD AIRPORT. CONTENTS DESCRIBED AS ONE BOX RADIO PHORIUM GAMMA SOURCE. AEC ADVISED AND NOT INTERESTED IN FURTHER ACTION. NO ACTION BEING TAKEN BY NY.

b7C

KELLY

WA NY R 11 WA KW

RECEIVED: 5-10-55 7:59 PM MAP

cc: Mr Belmont
Mr Rosen
Mr Nichols
Mr Rosenau

RECORDED-35
INDEXED-35
EX-125

117-268-1164

20 MAY 18 1955

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's coding systems.

59 MAY 23 1955

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-7-00 BY SP4 BJA/LBM

cc-Whitson

SAC, New York (117-New) (orig & 1) May 12, 1955

Director, FBI (117-New)

b7C

[redacted]

MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING
(ATOMIC ENERGY ACT)

Re New York tels 5/6/55, advising that [redacted] a representative of Cubral Mill Products Corporation, 150 Nassau Street, New York City, arrived at Idlewild Airport, New York, from Rio de Janeiro, via Pan American Flight 202, 5/5/55.

b7C

[redacted] was reported to have had in his possession sixteen vials containing various substances weighing a total of approximately two pounds. One group of seven glass vials contained radioactive substance which activated both of the heads on the detection device at Idlewild Airport.

Washington Field was instructed by the Bureau, 5/6/55, to check the passport records at the Department of State regarding [redacted] who had advised Customs at Idlewild that he was a citizen of the United States and had resided in this country since 1948.

New York subsequently advised on 5/6/55, that Customs, New York, had been advised by the Atomic Energy Commission it had no further interest in the matter and AEC was taking no action.

The New York Office should determine from Customs and AEC what were the contents of the sixteen vials and which of these substances caused the reactions noted on the detection device. It should be noted that

NOT RECORDED
194 MAY 17 1955

cc - 2 - Washington Field (117-New)

cc - 117-268 (Smuggling of Atomic Bombs or Parts Thereof, etc.)

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LW:fjm/rc (7)

MAY 23 1955

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-7-00 BY SP4 BJA/BM

ORIGINAL FILED IN 117-1900-3

the detection device indicated the presence of a stream of neutrons as well as gamma radiation.

Bureau indices contain no information regarding the Cubral Mill Products Corporation. There are certain references, however, which might pertain to [redacted] These are set out for the information of the New York and Washington Field Offices. b7C

One [redacted] is mentioned in the report of SA [redacted] dated at Washington, D. C., 5/12/50, in the case entitled [redacted] aka, Internal Security - YU," Detroit origin.

The result of an interview with [redacted] is set out in the report of SA [redacted] dated at New York, 8/2/50, in the same case. (New York file [redacted] WFO file [redacted] Bufile [redacted]

One [redacted] is indicated to be the party making a transfer of funds through the Chase National Bank, Rockefeller Center, New York, in the amount of $50 to Waggon Lits Company, Zagreb, Yugoslavia, (passage money of [redacted] on page 7 of the report of SA (A) [redacted] dated at New York, 8/28/51, in the case entitled "Yugoslav Funds, Internal Security - R & YU." [redacted] had been mentioned previously in report by SA [redacted] b7C dated at New York, 7/19/50, in the same case. On page 14 of the latter report is shown a deposit in the amount of $700 representing payment by Riggs National Bank, Washington, D. C., to [redacted] in Yugoslavia. This case is WFO origin. (New York file [redacted] WFO file [redacted] Bufile [redacted]

According to the report of SA [redacted] dated at Salzburg, Austria, 10/11/54, in the case entitled [redacted] Security Matter - C," CIC in Austria had records indicating that [redacted] who had worked for the [redacted] claimed to have

been imprisoned in 1944 by the Gestapo because of anti-Nazi activities. The specific charges reportedly included delivery from prison in Zagreb of "many important men," who had been arrested by the Germans. One of those named by [redacted] was [redacted]

The report of SA [redacted] dated at New York, 5/17/52, in the case entitled [redacted] aka, Internal Security - YU," indicates that [redacted] and his wife were reported to be friends of [redacted] and the latter's wife, [redacted] This case is New York origin. (New York file [redacted] Bufile [redacted] [redacted]

b7C

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: May 13, 1955

FROM : L. V. BOARDMAN

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

By memorandum dated March 24, 1955, the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council referred to the IIC and ICIS for consideration one of the recommendations contained in the "Killian Report," which recommendation reads as follows:

> "For U. S. defense planning purposes, it should be considered technically feasible for the USSR to construct, for clandestine introduction into the United States, nuclear bombs having yields as high as megatons."

Inasmuch as various agencies are making reports to the National Security Council on or about May 16, 1955, in connection with those portions of the "Killian Report" of interest to the agencies, there is attached a suggested IIC-ICIS letter to the National Security Council advising that the two committees have been proceeding on the assumption that nuclear bombs in the megaton range can be clandestinely introduced into the United States. The two committees made an inquiry of the Atomic Energy Commission after the Soviets exploded their first hydrogen bomb (megaton range), and the Atomic Energy Commission advised that such bombs could be clandestinely introduced into the United States in the same manner as the smaller atomic weapons. The attached suggested letter to the NSC notes that the two committees will keep this fact in mind as they continue their efforts to establish countermeasures to detect and defend against the clandestine introduction of such weapons into the United States.

ACTION:

It is recommended that the attached suggested

Attachment

ESS:hke
(5)
1-Mr. Boardman
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Sanders
1-Section Tickler

INDEXED - 28
RECORDED - 28

59 MAY 23 1955

4-700

SP4 BJA/LBM

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 66-8603-1

Memorandum for The Director, 5/13/55

IIC-ICIS letter to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council be signed by you as Chairman of the IIC and that it be forwarded. The letter has been approved by the military members of the IIC and has already been signed by the Chairman of the ICIS.

4-41a

TELETYPE

DECODED COPY

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Sizoo
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

WASH 8 FROM NEW YORK 5-10-55 102300 6:39 PM

DIRECTOR URGENT [redacted]

ATTENTION INSPECTOR CARL E. HENNRICH.

[redacted]. SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS, FISSIONABLE MATERIAL, AND PARTS THEREOF INTO US, IS - R. AT 3:15 PM, MAY 10, 1955, MR. BURTON, CUSTOMS, IDLEWILD AIRPORT, TELEPHONICALLY ADVISED THAT A REACTION HAD BEEN OBTAINED ON THE DEVICE LOCATED AT IDLEWILD AIRPORT. A READING OF 70 AND 65 WAS RECORDED WHEN THE DIPLOMATIC BAG WEIGHING 70 POUNDS OF AN ISRAELI DIPLOMATIC COURIER PASSED IN FRONT OF THE DEVICE. COURIER IS [redacted] DESTINED FOR [redacted] 21,NY. [redacted] CARRIES ISRAELI DIPLOMATIC PASSPORT [redacted] A DATED JANUARY 9, 1955, AND IDENTIFYING HIM AS COURIER-DIPLOMATIC, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, ISRAEL. [redacted] ARRIVED AT 2:30 PM, IDLEWILD AIRPORT VIA EL AL AIRLINE, FLIGHT 4 XAKA, MAY 10, 1955. CUSTOMS ADVISING AEC. COURIER NOT DETAINED BY CUSTOMS. NO ACTION CONTEMPLATED BY NY.

b7C

KELLY

are we to do nothing about this?

WA NY R 8 WA NG

RECEIVED: 5-10-55 6:47 PM MAX

5-11

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 3/15/2004 BY 60322 UCBAW/MLS/BSR/kbw

cc Mr. Belmont
Mr. Hennrich
Mr. Burton
Mr. Donahue

fw - 5/11/55 Boardman (S)

117-268-766

RECORDED - 15

29 MAY 20 1955

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's coding systems.

5

6 JUN 2 1955

5 MAY

38279

RECORDED COPY FILED IN [redacted]

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

TO : Mr. L. V. Boardman

DATE: May 11, 1955

FROM : A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: INTRODUCTION OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL BY ISRAELI COURIER, IDLEWILD AIRPORT, NEW YORK, MAY 10, 1955

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE
DATE 3/19/2004 60267 uc/NLS/BJA/tdw
Per letter dated 3/23/04 60267 uc/NLS/BJA/tdw 3/30/04

SYNOPSIS:

New York teletype, 5/10/55, advising that Israeli diplomatic baggage caused reaction of detection device at Idlewild Airport, 5/10/55, indicated no action contemplated by New York Office. Mr. Tolson noted "Are we to do nothing about this?"

At 7 p.m., 5/10/55, Mr. Scott McLeod's office in the Department of State was telephonically advised of the incident. Mr. James Angleton of CIA was also informed telephonically by Bureau Liaison.

On 5/11/55, memoranda of confirmation were prepared for CIA and McLeod of State. Memoranda on the incident were also prepared for Assistant Attorney General Tompkins, G-2, ONI and OSI. No notification was necessary to AEC because it was notified by Customs on 5/10/55.

The procedure followed by Customs in leaving baggage under diplomatic seal strictly alone and not interfering with the courier is in keeping with existing National Security Council policy. This incident, however, is an excellent example of the lack of program on the part of the U. S. Government when radioactive materials are introduced under diplomatic seal. It is known, of course, that the detection device for fissionable material installed at Idlewild Airport will react to many other radioactive items. There is no way in an incident of this kind to determine the nature of the radioactive material.

117-268
LW:fjm
(5)
cc - Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Roach
Mr. Whitson

RECORDED - 15
INDEXED - 15

MAY 30 1955

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

RECOMMENDATION:

This incident is being called to the attention of the IIC and ICIS representatives who are considering jointly with ad hoc representatives from CIA and State the question of reappraisal of U. S. policy regarding the diplomatic pouch. This will be brought to their attention at the next meeting of this group, 10 a.m., May 12, 1955, in Room 2515, Justice Building.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

BEST COPY
AVAILABLE

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268)

DATE: May 18, 1955

FROM SAC, DETROIT (117-35)

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS
OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER
MATERIALS OF WAR DESTRUCTION
INTO THE UNITED STATES

Rebulet dated, 4/6/55.

In accordance with authority granted in referenced letter, Liaison has been established with the following customs officials in the area of the Port of Detroit.

Mr. [illegible]
Collector of Customs
38th District
201 Customs House Building
Detroit 1, Michigan

Mr. EDWARD A. GLEASON
Agent in Charge
U.S. Customs
303 Customs House Building
Detroit, Michigan

Establishment of liaison in outlying ports of entry within Michigan is progressing and after completion this matter will be placed in a closed status until further investigation is warranted.

[illegible]
JM:CLF
(3)

RECORDED-42

INDEXED-42 117-268-768

16 MAY 1955

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4-7-00 BY SP4 BJA/Lam

57 MAY 31 1955

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: May 17, 1955

FROM : MR. A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: ATTACK WARNING CHANNELS AND PROCEDURES FOR CIVILIANS

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

On your memorandum to the Director of May 13, 1955, the Director noted "I would like a concise up to the minute brief which I may use at A.G's. Staff Conference at Quantico May 20 & 21. H."

The report which the NSC Special Committee is making to the NSC was received at 2:15 PM today. The brief is being prepared. A memorandum to the Attorney General transmitting a copy of the Special Committee report is also being prepared.

It is contemplated that this material will be completed and available at approximately 8:30 PM today.

ACTION:

The foregoing is for your information. It is noted that this matter is on the "Special List."

ESS:saw
(5)

1 - Mr. Boardman
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Lia. Sect. Tick.
1 - Mr. Sanders

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

4-7-00 SP4 BDA LBM

AIR-TEL

MAY 23, 1955

SAC, New York (117-192)
(orig and 1)

cc - Boardman
Belmont
Sanders
Whitson

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF
INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

RECORDED - 10 117-268-770

Bureau and other interested Government agencies making reappraisal of U. S. policy regarding diplomatic pouch and other shipments under diplomatic seal for National Security Council. Problem involves question of size, weight and quantity of Soviet shipments under diplomatic seal entering U. S. at port of New York. You should furnish to Bureau by 5-27-55 statistical survey of Soviet items under diplomatic seal entering U. S. at port of New York between 3-1-54 and 3-1-55. Show total number of pouches, total number of crates and boxes, total number of other items under diplomatic seal for period involved. Show estimated total weight of same. Show estimated maximum weight and dimensions of largest item and estimated weight and dimensions of smallest item. Show average number of pouches, boxes and other items under diplomatic seal brought into U. S. by air courier; same information regarding items brought in by ship courier; same information regarding items under diplomatic seal arriving unaccompanied. Show estimated average weight and dimensions of average item in each of three foregoing categories.

Hoover

Bufile 117-268

LW:blb
(7)

COVER MEMO PREPARED 5-23-55 BELMONT TO BOARDMAN BY LW:blb RE THIS OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE.

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

MAILED 11
MAY 23 1955
COMM-FBI

1955

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4-7-00 BY SP4 BJA/LBM

Autoshark UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 62-85205-1

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : L. V. Boardman

DATE: May 23, 1955

FROM : A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE U. S.

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

The FBI is participating as a member of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference in a reappraisal of U. S. policy regarding the diplomatic pouch. Other agencies involved in this reappraisal are the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security with "ad hoc" representation for the purposes of this study from the Central Intelligence Agency and State and a technical advisor from the Atomic Energy Commission. The National Security Council representative for internal security has designated Mr. A. R. Ash to sit in on the discussions. It is intended that recommendations will be ready to go forward to the National Security Council during the second week of June.

The studies to date have indicated that statistical data in the possession of Customs regarding size, weight and quantity of Soviet shipments under diplomatic seal are nowhere near as complete as they should be for this study. Representatives of State have indicated that they believe U. S. shipments into Russia under diplomatic seal are considerably larger and heavier than Soviet shipments into the U. S.

RECOMMENDATION:

There is attached an air-tel for New York, which has been maintaining statistics on Soviet shipments during the past year which entered U. S. through the port of New York, requesting them to supply statistical information to combat the Department of State assumption.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4-7-00 BY SP4 BJA/LBM

Per letter dated 3/23/04
60207 UC/NLS/BJA Hdw
3/30/04

117-268
cc - Boardman
Belmont
Sanders
Whitson
LW:blb
(5)

RECORDED - 10
INDEXED - 10
2 MAY 25 1955

117-268-1140

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: May 5, 1955

FROM : W. A. Branigan

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION-IN-PLACE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

SYNOPSIS:

The Joint Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security Committee on Countermeasures met at 10 a.m., 5/5/55, Room 2515, Justice Building. Present were: Colonel Joseph Halversen, Air Force, Department of Defense representative for ICIS, Captain John R. Stewart, Coast Guard, Treasury Department representative for ICIS, Colonel Lawrence Beckedorff, Atomic Energy Commission, Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Department of State ad hoc representative, Colonel Sheffield Edwards, Central Intelligence Agency ad hoc representative, Messrs. Leonard P. Bienvenu and Carl Pfuntner of the ICIS Secretariat, Special Agents L. Whitson and E. S. Sanders, FBI representatives for IIC.

Mr. Stoessel of State distributed two "Confidential" memoranda and one "Top Secret" memorandum regarding shipments of goods into the Soviet Union. These memoranda were not complete in that they did not show a breakdown of military items being shipped in as to content of the shipment, outside dimensions of the shipment and the weight of the shipment. They also failed to take into account the shipments into each of the Soviet bloc countries. These memoranda are attached. Mr. Stoessel was requested to have the missing data for the next meeting.

[redacted] b1 (S)

117-268
Enclosure
LW:fjm
cc - Mr. Belmont
Mr. Branigan
Mr. Sanders
Mr. Whitson
(5)

117-268-171

INDEXED

5 ENCL.

JUN 1 1955

Memorandum to A. H. Belmont May 5, 1955

The discussions which followed found general agreement on the proviso that no restrictions would be suggested upon the size of the outbound shipments under diplomatic seal since we would be perfectly willing for the Soviets to take TV machines and refrigerators back to Moscow [redacted] b2 b7E

At the suggestion of Mr. Sanders, it was decided that Mr. Stoessel, Colonel Edwards and Colonel Halversen would bring to the next meeting an estimate of the smallest size shipment their agencies can "live with." The basic problem was recognized as being what is the reasonable size below which the agencies operating cannot discharge their responsibilities to the United States.

Colonel Halversen was brought up to date on the position of the IIC agencies in opposition to requesting the Intelligence Advisory Committee to prepare an estimate on the "probability" of the Soviets using the diplomatic pouch to smuggle fissionable material into the United States. It was noted that such a request to the Intelligence Advisory Committee was on the ICIS agenda for consideration even though it had been voted down by the IIC.

The ICIS Secretariat advised digests had been made for the use of the Joint Committee of matters in the so-called "Killian" report on Soviet technical capabilities. It was suggested to the ICIS that appropriate digests be made of pertinent items in the various intelligence estimates heretofore published and that all the pertinent material should be commented upon in connection with any report submitted by the Joint Committee on the problem of reappraisal of U. S. policy regarding the diplomatic pouch.

The next meeting was set for Thursday, May 12, 1955, at 10 a.m. in the ICIS Conference Room, Justice Building.

Memorandum to A. H. Belmont May 5, 1955

RECOMMENDATION:

None. This is for your information. You will be kept informed of developments.

~~SECRET~~

L. V. Boardman

May 24, 1955

A. H. Belmont

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

[redacted](S)

[redacted](S) classified Top Secret - Restricted Data, was published by the Intelligence Advisory Committee April 26, 1955. The FBI obtained, the subject being outside of its jurisdiction.

[redacted](S)

[redacted]

[redacted](S)

b1
b3

The report may be summarized as follows:

[redacted]

[redacted](S)

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted](S)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

62-93351
cc - 117-268
Enclosures (2)
cc - Boardman
Belmont
Brantley
Roach
Whitson
JM:blb (7)

1 117-268-✓
NOT RECORDED
176 JUN 17 1955

5 JUN 23 1955

INITIALS ON ORIGINAL per letter dated 3/23/04 (NLS/BJM/LBM-60267-(Derivative) 3/30/04
4-9-04
CLASSIFIED BY NLS/BJM/LBM-60267-
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1

~~SECRET~~

Memo B[redacted] Boardmen

Re: M[redacted] Intelligence Estimates [redacted] (S)

SECRET

[redacted]

b1
b3

RECOMMENDATION:

None. For your information, Bureau's copies No. 21 and No. 28 of this Top Secret - Restricted Data report are attached.

[redacted]

SECRET

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: May 25, 1955

FROM : MR. A. H. BELMONT

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL SECURITY (ICIS) REQUEST FOR AN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE (IAC) ESTIMATE ON THE PROBABILITY OF A USSR ATTEMPT TO INTRODUCE CLANDESTINELY NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTO THE U.S.

During the course of an IAC meeting on May 24, 1955, attended by Supervisor M.W. Kuhrtz of the Liaison Section, Mr. Allen Dulles, Chairman, read from a letter directed to the IAC from Mr. J. Walter Yeagley, Chairman of ICIS, dated May 17, 1955. This letter refers to a joint IIC-ICIS study on the advisability of placing limitations on the diplomatic pouches; and in connection with this study, the ICIS would appreciate receiving an estimate on the probability of a USSR attempt to effect clandestine introduction into the U.S. of nuclear weapons by means of entry covered by diplomatic immunity before an all-out attack by nuclear weapons delivered by aircraft. The ICIS requested that in preparing the estimate, the IAC take into account the fact that existing procedures and detection devices afford a low probability of detection. The ICIS requests this information by June 17, 1955.

It is pointed out that this matter was considered by the IIC Working Committee on April 13, 1955, and the approved IIC position in the Subcommittee has been that the IIC will not join the ICIS in requesting the IAC to estimate the probability of the Soviets using the diplomatic pouch inasmuch as it is a well-known and accepted fact that the Soviets have the capability of clandestinely introducing nuclear weapons by this method. The IIC representatives have pointed out that there is no possible way for the IAC to make such an estimate of probability and even if such an estimate could be made, the answer would not change the fact that the Soviets have this capability and that a danger exists. The ICIS has decided to request this estimate from the IAC in spite of the fact that it has been pointed out that three of the IAC agencies are members of the IIC and have voted against requesting such an estimate.

The above-mentioned letter is, therefore, the ICIS request to the IAC. Mr. Dulles, in discussing the request, stated that the

Enclosure
MWK:fjb
(7)
1 - Mr. Boardman
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Sanders
1 - Mr. Whitson
1 - Liaison Section
1 - Mr. Kuhrtz

ORIGINAL FILED IN

NOT RECORDED
126 JUN 3 1955

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-7-00 BY SP4 BJA/LBM

On/after dated 3/27/04 correction/NSD/BJA/Hdw 3/30/04

IAC would be obligated to prepare an estimate in view of this official request. He added that the recent IAC approved National Intelligence Estimate 11/7 re "Soviet Capabilities to Attack the U.S." deals with clandestine delivery of nuclear weapons and, therefore, any information assembled for the ICIS will be only an elaboration of that portion of this IAC estimate. (It is pointed out that this latter estimate reflects the Soviets are capable of using diplomatic pouch to clandestinely introduce nuclear weapons; however, no attempt was made to determine the probability of this particular means as compared with all other possible means of delivery by the Soviets.)

Supervisor Kuhrtz of the Liaison Section will attend the IAC Working Group meeting on this matter on May 27, 1955, as an observer only at which time it will be pointed out that any statements relative to Soviet probability of using one means of delivery over another will need to be based on fact and not mere "guesswork."

ACTION:

Liaison will follow this matter closely and report developments.

~~SECRET~~

INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL SECURITY

3527 DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

ICIS-P25/290

May 17, 1955

Honorable Allen W. Dulles
Chairman
Intelligence Advisory Committee
Washington 25, D. C.

4.7.00 sp4 BJA/LBM
Per letter dated 3/22/04
60267 ltd/NRS/BJA/ltd
3/20/04

Dear Mr. Dulles:

A joint committee of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security, with a technical advisor from the Atomic Energy Commission and with ad hoc representatives from the Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency, is studying the advisability of placing limitations on the diplomatic pouch, specifically the size and weight of separate packages, in order to lower its effectiveness as a possible means for clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons.

In connection with this study the ICIS would appreciate receiving the following information:

Based on estimated capabilities of the USSR in production of nuclear weapons and considering estimated USSR strategic policy, including advantages and disadvantages of this course of action to the Russians, what do our intelligence agencies consider as the probability that an attempt will be made by the USSR to effect the clandestine introduction into the U.S. of nuclear weapons or their nuclear components by means of entries and shipments covered by diplomatic immunity before an all out attack on this country by nuclear weapons delivered either by aircraft or missiles?

~~SECRET~~

ENCLOSURE

~~ENCLOSURE~~

In preparing the above estimates it is suggested that you take into account the fact that existing procedures and use of existing detection devices afford a low probability of detection, and none of identification, of nuclear weapons or their components which might be introduced through entries and shipments covered by diplomatic immunity. Should further details be desired in this connection, ICIS will be glad to arrange appropriate briefings.

There should be an estimate of current probabilities as well as an estimate of probabilities based upon anticipated changes in USSR capabilities over the next several years.

Comments on any varying opinions between agencies on this matter and the assumptions on which they are based are also desired.

It is requested that the above estimates be made available to the ICIS within one month.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ J. Walter Yeagley

J. Walter Yeagley
Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee
on Internal Security

4-3
(12-2-54)

Tolson
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Belmont
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Tele. Room
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Gandy

DECODE OF CODED CABLE NUMBER 695 DATED MAY 27, 1955 AT PARIS, FRANCE. RECEIVED VIA THE STATE DEPARTMENT.

b1

NATO SPECIAL COMMITTEE. FIFTH CONFERENCE CONVENED ON SCHEDULE AND ADJOURNED ON COMPLETION BUSINESS TODAY. [redacted] JEAN MAIREY, (S) DIRECTOR GENERAL SURETE NATIONALE, CHAIRMAN FOR CALENDAR YEAR, PRESIDED. ALL NATO COUNTRIES EXCEPT GERMANY AND ICELAND REPRESENTED. [redacted]

[redacted] BRUNET, CANADIAN, SECRETARY FOR THIS MEETING. REVISED (S) PERMANENT AGENDA PROPOSED BY US ADOPTED BY COMMITTEE AS GUIDE FOR FUTURE MEETINGS WITH MINOR CHANGES SUGGESTED BY OTHER DELEGATES. BUREAU MATERIAL PRESENTED TO SECRETARIAT AND DISCUSSION BY BUREAUS REPRESENTATIVE LIMITED TO MATERIAL PREPARED AND APPROVED BY BUREAU. NO COMMITMENT MADE FOR BUREAU OR US GOVERNMENT FOR FUTURE. [redacted]

b1

[redacted] PHILCOX RETURNING BY FIRST AVAILABLE RESERVATION (S) VIA PAWA FLIGHT 115 LEAVING PARIS 8 P.M. MAY 29 AND EASTERN AIRLINES FLIGHT 557 LEAVING NEW YORK CITY FOR WASHINGTON 10 AM MAY 30. FULL REPORT ON ALL MATTERS WILL BE SUBMITTED UPON HIS RETURN.

RECEIVED 5-27-55 5:10 PM JM

CORRECTED 4/7/00 5-28-55 1:00 AM JM

Sp4 Bjf/LBm

(1)(6)

Per letter dated 3/23/04 from NSC/RAC/ISCAP/Hdw 3/30/04

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

5 JUN 14 1955

SECRET

Branigan
Sanders
Whitson

May 27, 1955

Assistant Attorney General
William P. Tompkins

(orig and 1)

Director, FBI

COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION-IN-PLACE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

The Joint Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference-Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security Committee on Countermeasures is engaged in a reappraisal of United States policy regarding the diplomatic pouch. At the request of the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security, the Bureau of Customs submitted on May 16, 1955, certain statistics on items under Soviet Bloc diplomatic seal which were introduced into the United States during the month of April, 1955, through the ports of New York, Baltimore and Laredo.

These figures indicated that the largest item introduced under Soviet Bloc diplomatic seal during the month of April was five cubic feet in size and the heaviest Soviet Bloc pouches for the same period averaged ninety pounds. Even though these statistics are for only one month, there might be a tendency to consider them as typical since they are the only data supplied by Customs to date in response to the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security request.

You may be interested to know that on May 17, 1955, two Czechoslovakian couriers, [redacted] and [redacted] arrived at the port of New York aboard the "Queen Elizabeth." [redacted] baggage declaration showed thirteen pieces of baggage, including the following items under diplomatic seal: b7C

Four cases, each five feet by three feet with a total weight of 3,000 pounds.

Seven pouches, each weighing 250 pounds for a total of 1,750 pounds.

One case, three feet by two feet, weight not shown.

Tolson
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Winterrowd
Tele. Room
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Gandy

LW:blb
(8)

RECORDED - 17

MAILED 11
MAY 27 1955
COMM-FBI

SECRET MAY 31 1955

DECLASSIFIED BY SP4 BTA/LBM ON 4-7-00

Memorandum for Assistant Attorney General William F. Tompkins

RE: Countermeasures to Detect and Defend Against Clandestine Introduction and Detonation-in-Place of Atomic Weapons in the United States

With regard to the first four cases, freight handlers who picked them up claimed that one was six feet by five feet by two feet, bound with metal straps and so heavy that four men could barely lift one end of it. Another case was four feet by two and one-half feet by two feet, also bound with metal straps and extremely heavy. According to the freight handlers, the other two cases were about a foot and one half in each dimension and were light in weight.

According to Customs, no detection devices for fissionable material had been set up on the pier used by the "Queen Elizabeth" May 17, 1955, so there was no opportunity to check these items under diplomatic seal for the presence of fissionable material.

(NY air-tel 5-18-55 re: "Czechoslovakian Diplomatic Activities in NY, IS-R and CZ.")

117-268

cc - Whitson

SAC, New York (orig and 2)

May 24, 1955

Director, FBI

[redacted] with aliases
SECURITY MATTER - C
(Bufile [redacted]
(NY file [redacted]

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS
THEREOF INTO THE U. S.
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT
(Bufile 117-268)
(NY file 117-192)

b7C

ReBulet March 21, 1955, instructing that you submit identifying data concerning the company by which subject [redacted] is employed, together with your recommendations as to inclusion of [redacted] and the [redacted] on the Special Customs Watch List.

You should furnish these data promptly and use a dual caption in your letter as above.

LW:blb
(6)

YELLOW DUPLICATE
MAY 24 1955
MAILED

117-[illegible]
NOT [illegible] ED
MAY 25 1955

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

MAY 27 195[illegible]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4-7-06 sp4 BJA/LBM

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: May 25, 1955

FROM : L. V. BOARDMAN

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF ATOMIC WEAPONS INTO THE UNITED STATES

Inspection of

National Security Council Document 5408 provides that all incoming unaccompanied baggage, effects, and shipments of Soviet bloc personnel, exclusive of the diplomatic pouch, should be subject to overt inspection and manual search. The Bureau of Customs is endeavoring to implement this recommendation.

This matter has been discussed in the Joint IIC-ICIS Committee Concerning Countermeasures to Detect and Defend Against the Clandestine Introduction of Atomic Weapons into the United States, and it has been agreed by all concerned that it is desirable to channel this unaccompanied baggage, effects, and shipments of Soviet bloc personnel through the ports of New York, New York, and Georgetown, District of Columbia. The Departments of State and Treasury have advised that this can be done through administrative methods without the exchange of diplomatic notes. This would enable the Treasury Department to more effectively utilize the detection devices in an effort to detect any fissionable material that might be contained in such shipments.

Attached is a suggested IIC-ICIS letter to the Secretary of the Treasury requesting that this channeling through New York and Georgetown be effected. Also attached is a suggested IIC-ICIS letter to the Secretary of State requesting that the State Department render any assistance possible to the Department of the Treasury in connection with this channeling procedure.

ACTION:

It is recommended that you sign, as Chairman of the

Enclosures (2) dated 5-26-55

ESS:hke
(5)
1-Mr. Boardman
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Sanders
1-Section Tickler

RECORDED
INDEXED-99

4-7-00

SPY BJM/LBm

Memorandum for The Director, 5/25/55

IIC, the attached letters to the Secretaries of Treasury and State. The letters have been signed by the Chairman of the ICIS and copies have been furnished to the other members of the IIC for their information.

BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAY 24 1955

TELETYPE

3/15/2004 60267UC/ams/BJE/Hdw

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

WASH 5 FROM NEW YORK 24 7-15 P

DIRECTOR URGENT

ATTENTION INSPECTOR HENNRICH.

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF OR OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES, AEA. US CUSTOMS, NYC, ADVISED THAT [redacted] ARRIVED IN US AT IDLEWILD AIRPORT FROM CARACAS, VENEZUELA, AT EIGHT FIFTEEN AM ON MAY TWENTYFOUR, FIFTYFIVE, ON PAN AMERICAN FLIGHT PLANE NC ONE NAUGHT EIGHT C. AT THE TIME THIS INDIVIDUAL-S PACKAGE WAS TAKEN BY THE DEVICE FOR DETECTING FISSIONABLE MATERIALS AT IDLEWILD AIRPORT, THE MACHINE REGISTERED IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD OF ONE HUNDRED ON THE GREEN SIDE OF THE DEVICE. A SUBSEQUENT SEARCH OF THIS INDIVIDUAL-S PACKAGE REFLECTED THREE SAMPLES OF MINERAL ORE, ONE OF WHICH CONTAINED FISSIONABLE MATERIAL AND REGISTERED AS HERETOFORE STATED. THIS PIECE OF ROUGH ORE WEIGHED ABOUT TWO POUNDS. [redacted] WHO IS A CONSULTANT ENGINEER AND GEOLOGIST, STATED THAT HE HAD BROUGHT THE SAMPLES OF ORE, INASMUCH AS HE THOUGHT THEY CONTAINED THORIUM AND THAT THIS ORE HAD BEEN OBTAINED FROM A MINE IN CARACAS, WHICH IS NOT PRESENTLY BEING WORKED. RECORDED 41 [redacted] SURRENDERED THE PIECE OF RADIO

END PAGE ONE....

Mr. Belmont

5- white

PAGE TWO.....

ACTIVE ORE TO CUSTOMS AND, ACCORDING TO THE FOREGOING AGENCY, THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION IN NYC WAS IMMEDIATELY CONTACTED, AND AFTER LEARNING THE FACTS, EXPRESSED NO FURTHER INTEREST IN THE MATTER. CUSTOMS LEARNED [redacted] THAT HE WAS TRAVELLING ON US PASSPORT [redacted] ISSUED IN CARACAS, VENEZUELA ON AUGUST FOURTEENTH, FIFTYTHREE, WAS PLANNING TO REMAIN IN THE US THREE TO FOUR DAYS, AND DURING THIS TIME WOULD BE STAYING AT [redacted] NYC. [redacted] ADVISED CUSTOMS THAT HE HAS BEEN IN CARACAS, VENEZUELA, FOR TEN YEARS, HAS NO ADDRESS

b7C

IN THE US OTHER THAN THE ONE HERETOFORE GIVEN, AND THAT THE ADDRESS AND THE FIRM HE IS ASSOCIATED WITH IN CARACAS IS [redacted] CARACAS, VENEZUELA. THIS INDIVIDUAL-S CUSTOMS DECLARATION WAS NUMBER [redacted] INDICES NYO CONTAIN NO INFORMATION IDENTIFIABLE WITH [redacted] IN VIEW OF FOREGOING, NO FURTHER ACTION IS BEING TAKEN BY THIS OFFICE.

KELLY

PLS HOLD

NO IDENTIFIABLE REFS BUR INDICES 5-27-55 LW

AEC was advised by their NY office also received info from Customs NY cmb.

A.E.C.

FD-36

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Sizoo
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

AIRTEL

5/26/55
NY, NY

Transmit the following Teletype message to: Bureau

Smuggling of Atomic Bombs or Parts Thereof into the United States; Atomic Energy Act.

ReBuairtel, 5/23/55. Mr. JOSEPH J. FLYNN, Assistant Surveyor of US Customs, Port of NY., furnished following information to SA [redacted] on 5/24-26/55. b7C

Prior to 4/1/55, Customs maintained no record as to type of parcel brought in under diplomatic seal, i.e. leather pouch, briefcase, crate, box or envelope etc., but classified all items under seal as "pouches."

Exception to this were items arriving under seal unaccompanied which for over a year have been subject to US Customs examination.

Nor did customs prior to 4/1/55, maintain records as to weights or dimensions of items arriving under diplomatic seal.

Available figures reflect 193 pouches, crates, boxes, and other items arrived under diplomatic seal for Soviets from 3/1/54, to 3/1/55, of which 24 were crates arriving unaccompanied in five shipments and were examined. Details of these as follows:

Date	# of Crates	Contents
5/14/54	1	Oil Painting
6/9/54	17	Wine (7), Caviar (1), Vodka (7), Cigarettes (1), Oil Painting (1)
6/9/54	2	3 Oil Paintings
12/31/54	3	3 " "
1/24/54	1	Mixture of rye and wheat

Mr. Belmont

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-7-00 BY SP4 BJALKEN

6 ENCL.,

RECORDED - 24

INDEXED - 24

3 - Bureau (117-268)(att. 8)(Reg. Mail)

1 - MAY 30 1955

JJD:RCM (#1-G)
117-192

59 JUN 10 1955

cc Flannigan

Approved _____ Sent _____ M. Per _____

Special Agent in Charge

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

AIRTEL

Transmit the following Teletype message to:

All of the above were designated for Representatives of USSR at UN.

Figures re estimated total weight, maximum weight and dimension of largest item and estimated weight and dimension of smallest item unavailable during period desired.

During period 131 pouches etc. arrived in 16 shipments with air courier for average of 8.2 items per shipment. During period 38 pouches etc. arrived in three shipments with ship couriers for average of 12.7 items per shipment. Unaccompanied items set forth in detail above, 24 items in five shipments reflect average 4.8 items per shipment.

Estimates of average weight and dimensions of average items in three foregoing categories unavailable.

For information and analysis by Bureau copies of memos prepared by Customs showing dates, carriers, and number of pouches are attached. Also copy of order effective 4/1/55, and blank copy of report being prepared by Customs inspectors since 4/1/55, on items under diplomatic seal. Also memorandum of analysis made by Customs of items examined by Customs under this order from 4/1/55, to 5/25/55.

Customs advises information furnished above relates to items arriving under diplomatic seal; that numerous Soviet diplomats arrive in US and are accorded free entry although personal baggage and effects are not under diplomatic seal.

KELLY

Approved _____ Sent _____ M. Per _____

Special Agent in Charge

M E M O R A N D U M:

Report of pouches under seal brought in by diplomats and couriers of the U.S.S.R. from March 1, 1954 to March 31, 1955.

DATE	CARRIER	NO. OF POUCHES
3/ 3/54	PLANE - SEBDR	15
3/31/54	" - LNLMS	6
		5
6/ 4/54	" - SEBDS	5
6/18/54	" - SEBOR	5
7/ 2/54	" - SEBDT	15
7/13/54	" - 93267	9
8/13/54	" - OYKMI	5
12/17/54	" - LMS	11
12/24/54	" - SEBDU	7
12/31/54	" - LNLMO	12
1/ 5/55	" - FBGNB	6
1/10/55	" - 21758	4
1/19/55	" - FBGNB	5
2/ 2/55	" - LNLML	11
2/11/55	" - FBGNC	4
2/16/55	" - OYKME	2
		4
3/12/55	" - LNLML	14
	TOTAL	145

ENCLOSURE

4-7-00 SP4 BJA/IBM

M E M O R A N D U M:

Report of pouches under seal brought in by diplomats and couriers of the U. S. S. R. from March 1, 1954 to March 31, 1955.

DATE	CARRIER	NO. OF POUCHES
10/19/54	S/S - QUEEN MARY	12
1/24/55	S/S - QUEEN MARY	18
5/ 4/54	S/S - QUEEN ELIZABETH	4
		4
3/10/55	S/S - LIBERTE	17
	TOTAL	55

4-7-00 SA: BJA/LBm

SENT/COURIER

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: June 2, 1955

FROM : W. A. Branigan

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC WEAPONS

At 10:50 A. M., 6-2-55, Commander B. P. Clark, U. S. Coast Guard, phoned and stated that he had been informed by a representative of the Atomic Energy Commission that the 16 portable detection devices for fissionable material have been received at the Naval Research Laboratory and are undergoing testing. They would be available for Coast Guard use on 6-17-55.

Commander Clark requested that the Joint Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference-Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security Committee on Countermeasures meet with the Advisory Group on Detection Devices sometime on or after 6-10-55 and, preferably, during the week of 6-13-17-55. Commander Clark was told that such arrangements would be made at the next meeting of the Joint Committee, which is scheduled for 9:30 A. M., 6-3-55.

RECOMMENDATION:

None. For your information, you will be kept informed of developments.

5-M

RECORDED - 24

INDEXED - 24

117-268

cc - Belmont
Branigan
Roach
Sanders
Whitson

WAB:blb (6)

JUN 10 1955

4-7-00 SP4 BJA/LBM

DATE OF MAIL 5-31-63

b7C

HAS BEEN REMOVED FOR [redacted] TO BE KEPT PERMANENTLY IN HIS OFFICE, ROOM 1036

SEE FILE 66-2554-7530 FOR AUTHORITY.

SUBJECT JUNE MAIL

REMOVED BY

FILE NUMBER

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGEOUT

4-7-00 SP4 BJA/LBM

cc - Whitson

SECRET

RECORDED-92

Date: June 3, 1955 SECRET - AIR COURIER

To: Legal Attache
Paris, France (117-6) (Orig and 2) 4-1-00

From: Director, FBI

NLS BSM LBM 60216 (Derivative)
Per letter dated 3/22/04 60267uc/ms/RSH Hdqtrs 3/30/04

Subject: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS
THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT
(Bufile 117-268)

[redacted] aka
[redacted]
UNKNOWN SUBJECTS;
[redacted] Informant
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT
(Bufile [redacted])

[redacted] b7C b7D

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

Reurlet 5-16-55 advising that Colonel Frank Dunnington, OSI, Paris, reported that he had requested [redacted] interviewed through his headquarters because Luxembourg was outside his territory. OSI headquarters, according to Dunnington, has taken the position that [redacted] has already been interviewed concerning this matter and it is believed inadvisable to reinterview him. You suggested that this matter might be discussed through liaison with OSI at the Seat of Government.

OSI headquarters, Washington, D. C., has informed Bureau liaison that it advised OSI headquarters, Europe, at Wiesbaden, Germany, that it was okay to interview New [redacted] (5) OSI headquarters, Washington, D. C., cannot order OSI headquarters, Europe, to conduct the interview and OSI headquarters, Washington, has never taken the position either that [redacted] has already been interviewed or that it is believed inadvisable to reinterview him. b1 b7C b7D

Tolson
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Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

According, you should ascertain from OSI when and under what circumstances during the course of

FBAT COMM-FBI

cc - 1 - Foreign Service Desk
LM:blb (8)

PER D. J. SULLIVAN, LIAISON SECTION

this investigation [redacted] was interviewed by it. If, as a matter of fact, it has interviewed [redacted] regarding this situation, it should be requested to supply you with the complete details of the interview. It is the Bureau's understanding that no one has interviewed [redacted] regarding this subject matter during the course of this investigation since the first allegation by [redacted] was passed to the U. S. Legation, Luxembourg. b7C b7D

This matter must be resolved without further delay.

THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
American Embassy
Paris 8, France

Date: May 16, 1955

To: Director, FBI

From: Legat, Paris (117-8)

Subject: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS
THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT
(Bufile 117-268)

[redacted] aka
[redacted]
UNKNOWN SUBJECTS;
[redacted] Informant
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT
(Bufile [redacted])

b7C
b7D

ReBulet 5/4/55.

As the Bureau was advised on 3/11/55, [redacted] OSI, Paris, stated on 3/9/55 that, inasmuch as OSI was well acquainted with [redacted] they would be willing to interview him if the Bureau so desired.

b1 By memorandum dated 4/7/55 OSI, Paris, was formally requested to interview [redacted] and the Security Office of the Embassy were (S) advised accordingly.

On 5/11/55 Colonel FRANK DUNNINGTON, OSI, Paris, reported that he had requested [redacted] interviewed through his headquarters, because Luxembourg is outside his territory. OSI headquarters, according to DUNNINGTON, have taken the position that [redacted] has already been interviewed concerning this matter, and it is believed inadvisable to reinterview him. b7C b7D

The Bureau may wish to discuss this matter through liaison with OSI at the seat of government if it is desired that [redacted] be reinterviewed by OSI.

This office will withhold further action pending Bureau advice.

EXP. PROC.

ROL:CM RECORDED-92 117-268-117

12 MAY 20 1955

4-7-00
CLASSIFIED BY: NSIC/BTA/LDM 60267 [Derivative]
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1

Per letter dated 3/23/04 60267 uc/NSIC/BTA/LDM 3/30/04

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. Boardman	
Mr. Nichols	
Mr. Belmont	
Mr. Harbo	
Mr. Mohr	
Mr. Parsons	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Tamm	
Mr. Clegg	
Mr. Winterrowd	
Tele. Room	
Mr. Holloman	
Miss Gandy	

TO : Director, FBI (117-268)

DATE: 6-6-55

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM : SAC, San Diego (66-998)

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES

Re No Number SAC Letter A, dated 1-28-52 and San Diego letter dated 3-2-55.

This office has no additional names to recommend for inclusion on the Bureau of Customs Watch List at this time. This matter is being closely followed and the Bureau will be kept advised of any pertinent developments.

WED:HB
(3)

AIR MAIL - REGISTERED

RECORDED - 8

10 JUN 8 1955

JUN 20 1955

4-7-00 SP4 BJA/LBm

ESP SEC

AIRTEL

FD-36

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Miss Gandy

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

6/6/55, NY

4-7-00 SP4 DOJA/CBM

Transmit the following Teletype message to: BUREAU

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF OR OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES - AEA.

DANIEL CROMACK, Deputy Collector, U. S. Department of Customs, Idlewild Airport, NYC, advised this date that a small package weighing less than two pounds was received at Idlewild Airport. Said package was addressed to [redacted] NYC, and contained the return address of British Atomic Energy Research Establishment, Harwell Didcot, Berks, England.

INDEXED - 83

A contents slip attached to the package described enclosure as radio active chromium.

b7C

CROMACK stated said package caused a reaction on the instrument used to detect fissionable materials located at Idlewild, however, exact reading on instrument was not known.

[redacted] (S)

b1

CROMACK also advised that he contacted [redacted] and latter advised that the radio active chromium was to be used in medical treatments and if successful will be needed on a monthly basis.

All information received from Idlewild operation has been classified by Customs as secret.

No further action being taken by NYO.

KELLY

3 - Bureau (Registered)

RECORDED - 83

Mr. Belmont

JEN:JGR (#6)
117-192

INDEXED - 83

10 JUN 7 1955

Approved _____ Sent _____ M Per _____

Special Agent in Charge

4-41a

F.B.I. TELETY

DECODED COPY

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Sizoo
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

WASH 12 FROM NEW YORK 10 7:24 PM 102100

DIRECTOR [redacted] URGENT

ATTN. INSP. HENNRICH

~~JUNE~~. SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF OR OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES, AEA. US CUSTOMS, NYC, ADVISED THAT [redacted] ARRIVED AT NYC ON JUNE 10TH, 1955, ON AIR FRANCE FLIGHT FVGNE. [redacted] NATIVE BORN AND AN AMERICAN CITIZEN, HAD ORIGINALLY LEFT THE US ON MAY 28, 1955, BY PLANE FROM NYC AND VISITED AUSTRIA, SWITZERLAND, ITALY, FRANCE AND CASABLANCA, ARRIVING BACK IN THE US BY THE MEANS AND ON THE DATE HERETOFORE INDICATED. [redacted] WAS TRAVELLING ON US PASSPORT NUMBER [redacted] AND WAS DESCRIBED AS [redacted] AT THE TIME OF ARRIVING AT NYC AT IDLEWILD AIRPORT ON JUNE 10, 1955, [redacted] FILED CUSTOMS DECLARATION 201883 AND ORALLY DECLARED AN ORE SPECIMEN THAT WILL BE HEREINAFTER MENTIONED. AT THE TIME THIS ROUGH ORE SPECIMEN, WHICH WEIGHS APPROXIMATELY 12 POUNDS, WAS PASSED BY THE DEVICE USED TO DETECT FISSIONABLE MATERIALS, THIS DEVICE REGISTERED ONE HUNDRED PLUS ON BOTH SIDES. [redacted] IN ADDITION TO ORALLY DECLARING THIS MATERIAL, EXPLAINED TO CUSTOMS AT IDLEWILD AIRPORT THAT THE PURPOSE OF HIS TRIP ABROAD HAD BEEN BUSINESS IN NATURE IN THAT HE WANTED TO LOOK AT MINING PROPERTIES AT BUSTERWOLD, AUSTRIA, AND THAT THE MINERAL SPECIMEN IN QUESTION WAS OBTAINED DURING HIS MINING SURVEY IN AUSTRIA. HE ADVISED CUSTOMS THAT HE WAS BRINGING THIS MINERAL SPECIMEN INTO THE US FOR ASSAY IN USE IN CONNECTION WITH HIS INCOMPLETED PLANS TO POSSIBLY FORM A MINING COMPANY. US CUSTOMS

b7C

b7C

1-D Mr. Belmont

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's coding systems.

RECORDED-78
INDEXED-78

12 JUN 15 1955

5

F.B.I. TELETYPE

4-41a

DECODED COPY

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Sizoo
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

PAGE TWO

ADVISED THE FOREGOING FACTS WERE DISCUSSED WITH THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION, NYC, AND THAT THE AEC HAD INSTRUCTED [redacted] TO FURNISH THEM WITH AN ASSAY OF THE MINERAL SPECIMEN IN QUESTION, AND THAT THE SPECIMEN COULD BE RELEASED TO [redacted] WHICH US CUSTOMS DID. INDICES NYO REFLECT NO INFO IDENTIFIABLE WITH [redacted] FOREGOING DATA FOR INFO OF BUREAU AND SAN FRANCISCO. NO FURTHER INVESTIGATION BEING CONDUCTED NYC.

b7C

KELLY

SAN FRANCISCO ADVISED VIA MAIL

RECEIVED: 6-10-55 7:47 PM HL

NO IDENTIFIABLE REFS IN BUR. FILES LW

OO: BELMONT
[redacted] VISION
[redacted] DIVISION

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's coding systems.

4-22

b7C
Subj: [redacted]

Address:

Birthdate: _____ SUPV: [illegible]

Misc:

Searcher
R# 1730 Date 6/13/55 Initial

FILE NUMBER	SERIAL
NI 71-4493	
NI 140-190927	18
NI 91-6210-	2, 14
NK 26-193496 (age 15)	

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3/15/2004 BY 60242 uc/mlb/bca/tdw

5-RW

CONFIDENTIAL cc Whitson

117-268

6026/UC/NLS/BSA/tdw

3/15/2004

RECORDED - 83

264-1

BY COURIER SERVICE

Date: June 8, 1955

To: Mr. Chester A. Emerick (orig and 1)
Deputy Commissioner, Investigations
Bureau of Customs
Room 7048
Internal Revenue Service Building
Washington 25, D. C.

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

From time to time this Bureau has presented, for your consideration, names of individuals or firms in connection with the special Customs watch list in order that the shipments with which they are connected will be given most thorough Customs treatment upon arrival in the United States.

You may wish to consider [redacted] who resides at [redacted] Washington, and is employed as a [redacted] for the [redacted]. Reliable informants have advised that the [redacted] is a propaganda outlet, not only for Communist Party literature originating in the United States, but also for books, magazines, pamphlets and other material originating in the USSR, Communist China and the various European satellite countries. [redacted] has been associated with the Communist Party for a number of years.

Any information that you may develop regarding shipments from abroad to [redacted] at her residence or place of business would be of interest to this Bureau.

cc - 1 - SAC, Seattle (for info) (98-1137)
cc: [redacted]
LW:blb
(6)

CONFIDENTIAL

JUN 20 1955

BAUMGARDNER

BY COURIER SVC
6 7 JUN - 9
COMM - FBI

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
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Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

b7C

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 91-0121-33

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI (117-268) DATE: May 25, 1955

FROM : SAC, Seattle (98-1137)

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES

[redacted] was.
SECURITY MATTER -C
(Bufile [redacted]
(Sefile [redacted]

3/15/2004 40267UC/NLS/BJA/Hcb

Re: No number SAC letter A Series 1952 dated 1/28/52 concerning the smuggling of atomic bombs or parts thereof and other weapons of mass destruction into the United States. b7C

It is suggested that [redacted] be recommended to the Bureau of Customs for inclusion on the watch list which is being maintained for detection for possible attempts to smuggle atomic bombs or parts thereof into the United States.

[redacted] a [redacted] female, born [redacted] at [redacted] resides at [redacted] and is employed as [redacted] for the [redacted] Reliable informants have advised that the [redacted] is the local propaganda outlet for C.P. literature for the 12th District C.P.; and, in addition to handling regular C.P. literature, the Book Store is still able under current postal restrictions to receive and sell books, magazines, pamphlets and other material obtained from China, Russia, and the various satellite countries.

RECORDED - 83

[redacted] has been associated with the C.P. since 1943 and as of January, 1955 was [redacted] of the 12th District C.P. In 1948 [redacted] and her husband, [redacted] were C.P. Organizers for th[redacted] of the 12th District C.P. [redacted] b7C [redacted] the 12th District C.P., had told her that [redacted] and her husband, [redacted] "had been sent and had gone underground". [redacted] had known [redacted] as a member of the C.P." and as "a person involved in C.P. cultural activities - entertainment activities". [redacted] has also attended leadership classes held by the C.P. and has been in attendance at 12th District C.P. conventions. From 1945 to date [redacted] has participated in numerous activities of C.P. front groups in Seattle.

GK:lg
(6)
REGISTERED

MAY 31 1955

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EXPEDITE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JUN 3 1955

TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Tamm

WASH 4 FROM NEW YORK 3 4-46 P

DIRECTOR URGENT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-7-00 SP4 BJM/LBM

ATTENTION INSPECTOR HENNRICH.

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF OR OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES, AEA. ON JUNE THIRD, FIFTYFIVE, MR. JOSEPH FLYNN, US CUSTOMS, NYC, TELEPHONICALLY ADVISED THIS OFFICE THAT [redacted] ARRIVED AT APPROXIMATELY SEVEN FORTY FIVE AM ON THE FOREGOING DATE ON THE MS "STOCKHOLM" AT NYC. AT THE TIME HIS BAGGAGE WAS PROCESSED BY CUSTOMS, THE DEVICE USED TO DETECT FISSIONABLE MATERIALS REGISTERED FORTY EIGHT COUNTS ON THE GREEN SIDE. A SUBSEQUENT INSPECTION OF THE BAGGAGE OF [redacted] REFLECTED THAT IT CONTAINED ONE TWO ONCE PIECE OF URANIT ORE. MR. FLYNN DESCRIBED THE FOREGOING RECORDING OF THE DETECTION DEVICE AS BEING LOW. [redacted] ADVISED CUSTOMS THAT HE WAS A PROSPECTOR AND THAT HE HAD OBTAINED, IN THE CAPACITY OF A PROSPECTOR FROM THE BUREAU OF MINES, VANCOUVER, CANADA, THE FOREGOING PIECE OF URANIT ORE WHICH HE USED FOR COMPARISON PURPOSES WHILE PROSPECTING. CUSTOMS ADVISED ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION, NYC, AND PURSUANT TO THEIR INSTRUCTIONS, THE PIECE OF ORE HAD BEEN GIVEN BACK [redacted] FROM INQUIRY CONDUCTED BY CUSTOMS OF [redacted] US CUSTOMS LEARNED THAT HE WAS TRAVELLING ON CANADIAN PASSPORT [redacted] WHICH HAD BEEN ISSUED DEC. SIXTEEN, FIFTYTWO, AT OTTAWA, CANADA. [redacted] FORMERLY A SWEDISH CITIZEN, HAD BEEN GRANTED CANADIAN CERTIFICATE OF NATURALIZATION NUMBER [redacted]

RECORDED - 40 117-2622-
INDEXED - 40
12 JUN 15 1955

Mr. Belmont

EX-112

END PAGE ONE

b7C

[redacted] ON OCT. SEVENTEEN, NINETEEN TWENTY FOUR, OTTAWA, CANADA. HE LEFT THE US FEB. TWELFTH, FIFTYTHREE FROM PIER NINETY SEVEN, NORTH RIVER, NYC, ON THE MS "GRIPSHOLM" FOR A PLEASURE TRIP TO SWEDEN AS WELL AS TO VISIT HIS MOTHER AT SUNNANHED FURNDAL, SWEDEN, AND AS OF JUNE THIRD, FIFTYFIVE WAS RETURNING FROM THE FOREGOING TRIP EN ROUTE TO HIS RESIDENCE, [redacted] VANCOUVER, CANADA. MR. FLYNN ADVISED [redacted] WAS NOT BEING DETAINED BY CUSTOMS AND AS HERETOFORE INDICATED, HIS SAMPLE OF URANIT ORE WAS BEING RETURNED TO HIM. INDICES OF THIS OFFICE CONTAIN NO RECORD b7C IDENTIFIABLE WITH [redacted] FOREGOING FOR YOUR INFO.

KELLY

END

WA NY R 4 WA BJH

TU DISC

No identifiable
Reference in Bur. files
LW

Assistant Attorney General (orig & 1)
William P. Tompkins

June 15, 1955

Director, FBI

RECORDED - 8

EX-116

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF
INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

b7C

A Burmese student, [redacted] arrived at International Airport, New York, via Pan American Airways, Flight 1031, at 5:30 A. M., June 5, 1955, from Rangoon. [redacted] was travelling on Burmese passport [redacted] and was en route to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

On the afternoon of June 6, 1955, Customs at New York informed the New York Office of this Bureau that [redacted] had in his possession, upon arrival, a box, weighing 15 pounds and containing sand which gave a top reading on the dial of the detection device sensitive to gamma rays. Customs notified the Atomic Energy Commission office in New York.

Examination of the box and its contents by an Atomic Energy Commission employee revealed that the gray sand in the box was slightly radioactive. The box was partially packed with graph paper labelled "Radioactivity Level of Air in the Vicinity of Rangoon," which apparently originated from the Union of Burma Atomic Energy Center, Applied Research Institute.

[redacted] baggage declaration to Customs revealed that he was destined to Graduate House, Foreign Student Summer Project, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Customs informed the New York Office of this Bureau that the box had been declared as baggage. Mr. Ransom Blatz, Chief of the Radiation Branch, Health and Safety Laboratory, Atomic Energy Commission, New York, has advised that no violation of the Atomic Energy Act exists. The Atomic Energy Commission office retained samples of the radioactive sand and the remainder was returned to Customs by the Atomic Energy Commission for release to [redacted]

b7C

There are no identifiable references to [redacted] in the files of this Bureau.

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

117-268
53 JUN 23 1955

cc - 1 - Mr. J. Walter Yeagley
Chairman
Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security

LW:blb
(6)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JUN 6 1955

TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Sizoo
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy
BRANIGAN

WASH 2 FROM NEW YORK 6 4-13 P

DIRECTOR URGENT

ATTENTION INSPECTOR CARL E. HENNRICH.

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES, AEA. RENYTEL CALL TO BUREAU. CUSTOMS, AT TWO FORTY FIVE PM, SIX SIX FIFTY FIVE, ADVISED THAT [redacted] A STUDENT, ARRIVED VIA PAN AMERICAN AIRWAYS, FLIGHT ONE ZERO THREE ONE, AT NY INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, FIVE THIRTY AM, JUNE FIVE, FIFTY FIVE, FROM RANGOON. [redacted] WAS TRAVELING ON BURMESE PASSPORT [redacted] AND FILED DECLARATION NO. TWO FIVE ZERO TWO FIVE ONE. [redacted] FURNISHED ADDRESS AS BUILDING [redacted] AND DESTINATION AS MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY. UPON ARRIVAL, BOX IN POSSESSION OF [redacted] ACTIVATED SPECIAL DEVICE AT NY INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT WHICH GAVE A GREEN LIGHT TOP READING. RED LIGHT WAS NOT ACTIVATED. [redacted] ADVISED CUSTOMS THIS BOX CONTAINED SAND. BOX WEIGHED FIFTEEN POUNDS. AEC NOTIFIED. NY CONTACTING AEC TO DETERMINE WHETHER VIOLATION EXISTS AND BUREAU WILL BE NOTIFIED. PROTEST MADE TO CUSTOMS FOR DELAY IN NOTIFICATION THIS OFFICE OF ACTIVATION OF DEVICE AT AIRPORT. BUREAU TO BE ADVISED.

b7C

b7C

Mr. Belmont

RECORDED - 8 117-268-1-4
INDEXED - 8 KELLY

6 JUN 16 1955

CORRECTION THIRD LAST LINE FIFTH WOD SH READ "EXISTS AND"

4/7/00 SP4 BJA/LBM

END

WA NY R 2 WZ EJN

...AL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
...S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JUN 6 1955

TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. Boardman	
Mr. Nichols	
Mr. Belmont	
Mr. Harbo	
Mr. Mohr	
Mr. Parsons	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Tamm	
Mr. Sizoo	
Mr. Winterrowd	
Tele. Room	
Mr. Holloman	
Miss Gandy	

WASH 13 FROM NEW YORK 6 10-50 P

DIRECTOR

... U R G E N T ....

ATT.... INSPECTOR CARL E. HENNRICH

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO US, AEA. RE NY TEL TO BUREAU THIS DATE. INVESTIGATION NY INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, REVEALED FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REGARDING BOX IN POSSESSION OF [redacted] AEC EMPLOYEE, ADVISED BOX CONTAINED GRAY SAND, SLIGHLY RADIO ACTIVE. BOX MADE OF TIN AND MEASURES TEN INCHES BY SIX INCHES BY THREE INCHES AND WAS PARTIALLY PACKED WITH GRAPH PAPER LABLED QUOTE RADIO ACTIVITY LEVEL OF AIR IN THE VICINITY OF RANGOON ENQUOTE, WHICH APPARENTLY ORIGINATED FROM UNION OF BURMA ATOMIC ENERGY CENTER, APPLIED RESEARCH INSTITUTE. CUSTOMS BAGGAGE DECLARATION FORM REVEALED [redacted] RESIDED BURMA SINCE DECEMBER TEN NINETEEN FOURTEEN, A CITIZEN OF BURMA, AND DESTINED TO GRADUATE HOUSE, FOREIGN STUDENT SUMMER PROJECT, MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, BOSTON, MASS. CUSTOMS ADVISED INSTANT BOX DECLARED AS BAGGAGE AND WAS CONTAINED IN ONE OF THREE PIECES OF BAGGAGE DECLARED BY [redacted] HANSOM BLATZ, CHIEF OF RADIATION BRANCH, HEALTH AND SAFETY LABORATORY, AEC, NYC, ADVISED NO VIOLATION EXISTS. AEC IN POSSESSION OF SAMPLE AND CONDUCTING ANALYSIS AND WILL FURNISH NYO RESULTS. BUREAU TO BE ADVISED OF FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS.

RECORDED - 8

KELLY 116

END

NY R 13 WA WS

Mr. Belmont

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Serial Description ~ COVER SHEET XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

FOIPA

Total Deleted Page(s) ~ 37

Page 33 ~ Referral/Direct OGA
Page 78 ~ Referral/Direct OGA
Page 79 ~ Referral/Direct OGA
Page 80 ~ Referral/Direct OGA
Page 81 ~ Referral/Direct OGA
Page 82 ~ Referral/Direct OGA
Page 83 ~ Referral/Direct OGA
Page 84 ~ Referral/Direct OGA
Page 85 ~ Referral/Direct OGA
Page 199 ~ Referral/Direct OGAOGA

Page 181 ~ b1 , b3

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JUN 7 1955

TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. Boardman	
Mr. Nichols	
Mr. Belmont	
Mr. Harbo	
Mr. Mohr	
Mr. Parsons	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Tamm	
Mr. Sizoo	
Mr. Winterrowd	
Tele. Room	
Miss Holloman	
Miss Gandy	

BRANIGAN

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II 948742/950935/997059

WASH AND WASH FLD 9XXX 8 FROM NEW YORK 7 8-10 P

DIRECTOR AND SAC, URGENT

ATTENTION INSPECTOR HENNRICH.

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO US, AEA. RENYTELS TO BUREAU JUNE SIX LAST, IN CAPTIONED MATTER. FOR INFO WFO CUSTOMS HAS ADVISED [redacted] ARRIVED VIA PAN AMERICAN AIRWAYS, [redacted] AT NY INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, [redacted] [redacted] FURNISHED ADDRESS AS [redacted] [redacted] UPON ARRIVAL NY INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, IT WAS DISCOVERED [redacted] [redacted] BUREAU DESIRES INS RECORDS [redacted] BE CHECKED. INS, NY, ADVISED ITS FORM TWO FIVE SEVEN ALREADY FORWARDED INS, WASHINGTON, DC. WASHINGTON REVIEW INS RECORDS [redacted] FURNISH BUREAU AND NY RESULTS THEREOF.

b7C

KELLY

RECORDED - 8 117-

HOLD

cc: MR. BELMONT
AND SUPERVISOR
DOM. INTEL. DIVISION

59 JUN 23 1955

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JUN 7 1954

TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Sizoo
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

WASH 7 FROM NEW YORK 7 8-08 P

DIRECTOR URGENT

ATTENTION INSPECTOR HENNRICH.

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO US, AEA. REMY PREVIOUS TELS THIS MATTER JUNE SIX, LAST, IN CAPTIONED MATTER. FOR ADDITIONAL INFO OF BUREAU, [redacted] AEC, NY, TELEPHONICALLY ADVISED NYO THAT AEC HEALTH AND SAFETY SECTION SAYS THAT EXAMINATION OF MATERIAL BROUGHT INTO THIS COUNTRY BY [redacted] b7C [redacted] ADVISED THERE IS NO INDICATION OF A VIOLATION AND ADVISED THAT AT THIS POINT IT APPEARS TO BE MERELY OF INTEREST TO AEC INTELLIGENCE. [redacted] HE IS REFERRING THE MATTER TO AEC, WASHINGTON, DC. THIS OFFICE TAKING NO FURTHER ACTION THIS MATTER.

KELLY

HOLD

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JUN 9 1955

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

TELETYPE

WASH 26 FROM NEW YORK 8 837 PM

DIRECTOR ... U R G E N T ...

ATTN... INSPECTOR HENNRICH

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO US, AEA.

REMYTEL JUNE SEVEN, FIFTYFIVE IN CAPTIONED MATTER. [redacted]

US CUSTOMS, THIS DATE ADVISED THAT AEC HAS RETAINED SAMPLES OF [redacted] b7C

ADVISED THAT THE MATTER IS OF NO FURTHER INTEREST TO THEM AND CUSTOMS IS GOING TO RELEASE REMAINDER OF [redacted] ABOVE FOR INFO.

KELLY

END

WA NY R 2 WA ELR

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-9-03 BY SP4BJA/DFW
#948742/950935/997059

RECORDED - 8

117-268-7

JUN

Mr. Belmont

Branigan

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

cc - Whitson

117-268

4.9.83 SPH bja DFW

RECORDED - 83 117-268-7121

Date: June 15, 1955 BY COURIER SERVICE

To: Mr. Chester A. Emerick (orig and 1)
Deputy Commissioner, Investigations
Bureau of Customs
Room 7048
Internal Revenue Service Building
Washington 25, D. C.

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

b7C

From time to time this Bureau has presented, for your consideration, names of individuals or firms in connection with the special Customs watch list in order that the shipments with which they are connected will be given most thorough Customs treatment upon arrival in the United States.

You may wish to consider

Informants who have furnished reliable information in the past have identified

b7C

The Civil Rights Congress has been designated by the Attorney General pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

Any information that you may develop regarding

would be of interest to this Bureau.

b7C

cc - 1 - New York (For Info)

cc -

LW:blb
(6)

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

59 JUN 24 1955

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BY COURIER SVC.

77 JUN 16

COMM-FBI

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI [redacted]

DATE: JUN 3 1955

FROM : SAC, New York [redacted]

b7C

SUBJECT: [redacted]
SM-C

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS
THEREOF INTO THE U.S.
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

ReBulet 3/21/55.

[redacted]

She is included on the Security Index of the NYO.

b7C

An attempt to interview herwas made on 11/10/53 by SAS [redacted] however, she refused to talk to the agents.

b7C

She has been identified by informants, who have furnished reliable information in the past, as [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

b7C

[redacted]

RM

2 - Bufile (117-268)
1 - NY 117-192
1 - NY 65-2899

NPD:JJF

RECORDED - 83 117-268-118

INDEXED - 83 10 JUN 7 1955

INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-9-03 SP4bjaltFW

INDEXED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

cc - Whitson

117-268

Date: June 15, 1955

To: Mr. Chester A. Emerick BY COURIER SERVICE
Deputy Commissioner, Investigations
Bureau of Customs (orig and 1)
Room 7048
Internal Revenue Service Building
Washington 25, D. C.

b7C

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

From time to time this Bureau has presented, for your consideration, names of individuals or firms in connection with the special Customs watch list in order that the shipments with which they are connected will be given most thorough Customs treatment upon arrival in the United States.

You may wish to consider [redacted] b7C [redacted] the subject of a separate communication.

RECORDED-74 117-268-110

Any information that you may develop regarding [redacted] would be of interest to this Bureau.

b7C

16 JUN 16 1955

cc - 1 - New York (for info) [redacted]
cc - [redacted]
LW:blb
(6)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BY COURIER SVC.
77 JUN 16
COMM - FBI

49-03

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Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

cc - Whitson

117-268

DECLASSIFIED BY SP4 BJA/DFW
ON 4-9-03
#94874 2/950935/997059

RECORDED-92 117-268-791

EX-100

Date: June 15, 1955

To: Mr. Chester A. Emerick — BY COURIER SERVICE
Deputy Commissioner, Investigations
Bureau of Customs
Room 7048 (orig and 1)
Internal Revenue Service Building
Washington 25, D. C.

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

b7C

Subject: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

From time to time this Bureau has presented, for your consideration, names of individuals or firms in connection with the special Customs watch list in order that the shipments with which they are connected will be given most thorough Customs treatment upon arrival in the United States.

You may wish to delete the name of [redacted] from your watch list. She was originally referred to you for inclusion when she was [redacted]

b7C

She has been [redacted] was brought to your attention by our memorandum of June 6, 1955.

cc - 1 - Seattle [redacted] (for info)

b7C

cc - [redacted]

LW:blb
(6)

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BY COURIER SVC.
77 JUN 16
COMM - FBI

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI (117-268)

DATE: May 25, 1955

FROM : SAC, Seattle (98-1137)

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES

Delete Key Figure 5-31-55 RH

[redacted]

INTERNAL SECURITY - C

(Bufile [redacted]
(Sefile

b7C

Card U.T.D. 6-8-55

ReBulet to Se 4/21/55.

[redacted] was originally recommended for inclusion on the U.S. Customs' watch list in 1952 in view of [redacted]

It is recommended that [redacted] removed from the watch list since [redacted]

It is also recommended that she be deleted as a key figure of the Seattle Division since she does not [redacted]

GK:lg
(6)

REGISTERED

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RECORDED-92

117-268-711

6/16

29 MAY 31 1955

EX-100

31 10 39 AM

All Copies Whited

ESP

EX-100

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b7C

33564-1

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: June 15, 1955

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: CONTINENTAL DEFENSE PLANNING

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

The Director inquired today (June 15) concerning certain points in the brief prepared for the National Security Council meeting on June 16, 1955, as follows:

1. What is the basis for the Joint IIC-ICIS Committee to favor not [redacted]

b2
b7E

I talked to Supervisor Sanders tonight. He said that representatives of Air Force Intelligence, A-2 (not OSI) told the Committee that the United States has been [redacted]

b2
b7E

[redacted]

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

AHB:LL
(4)
cc—Mr. Belmont
cc—Mr. Sanders
cc—Mr. Roach

59 JUL 8

Memo to Director from Belmont June 15, 1955

Re: CONTINENTAL DEFENSE PLANNING

2. The Director inquired when we asked the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) to make a public release. (See page 5 of brief.)

Mr. Sanders says that the Joint Committee sent a letter to the AEC about 2 weeks ago suggesting certain changes on the proposed release by AEC.

Try & get action.

3. At the bottom of page 5 of the brief, the Director noted that the wording would seem to indicate that the Justice Department is processing our Security Index cases.

Sanders said that this is the wording in the report to the National Security Council. These are semiannual reports; therefore, in the next report we will raise a question to clarify the fact that Justice is not processing these cases.

certainly bad phraseology & we should have caught it (JS)

4. On page 6, the Director asks concerning the wording to the effect that shielded uranium alone could be used as a fission weapon.

Sanders states that by this he meant to convey that [redacted] shielded uranium, which can be used for fission weapons. [redacted] unshielded uranium and plutonium which also can be used for fission weapons.

b2
b7E

Can rewritten it was very sloppy.

L.

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. [illegible]
Tele. Room
Mr. Holl[illegible]
Miss Gandy

AIRTEL

FBI/WASH FIELD 6/22/55

DIRECTOR AND SAC NEW YORK URGENT

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF IN US, AEA

ReNYtel to Bu and WFO, 6/7/55. Retel requested WFO review INS Records [redacted] and furnish results thereof.

b7C

Only info appearing identifiable located in check at Central INS, is [redacted] RUC here.

LAUGHLIN

JRC:BRH
(6)

117-15[illegible]

AIRTEL

[redacted]
DATE 4-9-03 BY SP4 BJA/DFW
II 948742/950935/997059

Mr. Belmont

EX-122

RECORDED-95
INDEXED-95

117-263-[illegible]

21 JUN 24 1955

[illegible] JUN 29 1955

The Director June 20, 1955

L. V. Boardman

CONTINENTAL DEFENSE PLANNING

Reference is made to the memorandum from Belmont to the Director dated June 15, 1955, on which the Director noted two instructions.

The Director noted: "Get final action" on a joint Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference-Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security study of U. S. policy regarding the diplomatic pouch.

We now have for analysis and review a proposed draft document on the reappraisal of U. S. policy. Copies have been furnished to the other Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (IIC) agencies and we will complete our analysis of it and submit a memorandum June 21, 1955.

The Director also noted in connection with the proposed Atomic Energy Commission public release on thermonuclear weapon components: "Try and get action." This matter has been and is being followed, both with the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS) and with the Atomic Energy Commission, by Bureau liaison. As soon as there is a definite indication of impending release, you will be notified. We will continue to press for action by the Atomic Energy Commission.

RECOMMENDATION:

None. This is for your information. These matters are being followed continuously.

cc - Boardman
Belmont
Sanders
Whitson

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Hollóman
Gandy

LVB:blb
(6)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4-9-03 BY SP4BJA/DFW
II 948742/950935/997059

[redacted] on

117-268 49.03 SAH bja/DFW

BY COURIER SERVICE

Date: June 22, 1955

To: Mr. Chester A. Emerick (orig and 1)
Deputy Commissioner, Investigations
Bureau of Customs
Room 7048
Internal Revenue Service Building
Washington 25, D. C.

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES

Reference is made to the letter from this Bureau in the captioned matter dated November 27, 1953, referring to you the name of [redacted] with aliases.

For your information, [redacted]

Any information which you receive or develop regarding [redacted] would be of interest to this Bureau.

RECORDED - 15

JUN 28 1955

67

cc - 1 - Los Angeles [redacted] (for info)

cc - [redacted]
LW:blb
(6)

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

BAUMGARDNER

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BY COURIER SVC.

b7C

b7C

b7C

UNRECORDED COPY FILED

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: June 20, 1955

FROM : L. V. BOARDMAN

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: PROPOSED FEDERAL CIVIL DEFENSE ADMINISTRATION ADVISORY BULLETIN

SYNOPSIS:

The Federal Civil Defense Administration has requested IIC comments concerning a proposed FCDA Bulletin designed to acquaint state and local Civil Defense Directors with the threat of clandestine atomic weapons. The Bulletin notes that civil defense measures to be activated in connection with a suspected device are the responsibility of the head of the local government. The Bulletin notes the Bureau's investigative responsibilities and advises that the Bureau will request the services of a Defense Department Explosive Ordnance Disposal Unit if a suspected device is found, will alert appropriate Federal Government officials, will alert the Army Area Commander and local police officials, and will accept no responsibility for subsequent civil defense or local government action. IIC Working Committee considered the Bulletin and agreed nothing objectionable to IIC agencies therein but suggested that the wording be changed to indicate FBI would alert "appropriate local military authorities" instead of "Army Area Commander." The Bulletin notes FCDA responsibility for providing guidance to local civil defense, notes Department of Defense responsibility for disarming clandestine atomic weapons, and notes Atomic Energy Commission responsibility for disposing of fissionable material. FCDA recommends state and local authorities consider civil defense measures to be taken in such instances and suggest careful weighing of decision to activate these defenses prior to definite identification that object is a clandestine atomic weapon. Pat Coyne suggests not necessary FCDA submit this Bulletin to NSC if all interested agencies indicate they have no objection to the Bulletin.

ACTION:

Enclosed is a suggested IIC letter to the Administrator of the FCDA suggesting that the wording relating to the FBI

Enclosure

ESS:hke
(5)

1-Mr. Boardman
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Sanders
1-Section Tickler

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notifying local Army Commanders be changed to reflect that the Bureau will notify the appropriate local military authorities. The suggested letter agrees that there would appear to be no reason to submit the Bulletin to the National Security Council if all interested agencies indicate they have no objections to the Bulletin.

DETAILS:

By letter dated June 9, 1955, the Federal Civil Defense Administration requested IIC observations concerning an Advisory Bulletin which the Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA) proposes to issue to state and local Civil Defense Directors. The proposed Bulletin suggests procedures for the state and local Civil Defense Directors to follow when an object suspected of being a clandestine atomic weapon is discovered. The IIC and the ICIS commented upon, by letter of August 9, 1954, a previous draft of this Bulletin in which it was provided that the FBI would report such instances to local FCDA officials who might in turn start evacuating a city. The IIC and the ICIS did not agree with the previous draft for various reasons, and it was recommended that changes be made, that it be coordinated with all interested agencies, and that a draft of the proposed plan be submitted to the National Security Council.

The enclosed draft Bulletin would furnish to state and local FCDA Directors certain unclassified background information concerning the possibility or danger of an enemy utilizing clandestine atomic weapons. It notes that expert judgment will necessarily form the principal basis upon which to determine whether a suspected device constitutes a threat sufficient to

justify the invoking of civil defense measures. The FCDA Bulletin advises the local Civil Defense Directors that the decision to activate civil defense plans, such as those for evacuation, upon the discovery of a suspected weapon will involve the acceptance of a risk.

The proposed Bulletin furnishes for the information of the state and local Civil Defense Directors the various responsibilities of other agencies having an interest but, of course, cannot impose responsibilities upon the other agencies, such as the Bureau, which they do not already have.

The Bulletin notes that the head of the local government has the responsibility for making the final decision with respect to whether or not civil defense measures should be activated to protect the public if a suspected device is discovered. It is noted that local law enforcement officials have been requested to report to the FBI all information regarding fissionable material or atomic weapons, including suspected devices, without attempting to dismantle or disarm such a device.

In advising the local Civil Defense Officials of the FBI's responsibilities, the Bureau's investigative responsibilities under the Atomic Energy Act are briefed. It is noted that, if a suspected object might be a nuclear device, the FBI will request the services of the nearest Explosive Ordnance Disposal Unit, will alert appropriate officials of the Federal Government, will alert the Army Area Commander, will alert appropriate local police officials, and will accept no responsibility for subsequent civil defense or local government action. It is believed that the observation that the Bureau will alert the Army Area Commander should be changed to reflect that the Bureau will alert the appropriate local military authorities.

The Bulletin advises the state and local Civil Defense Directors that the FCDA is responsible for providing guidance to them and for alerting them in the event there is positive evidence that clandestine weapons have been introduced into the country. It is further noted that the Department of Defense, through its Explosive Ordnance Disposal Units, has the responsibility for disarming atomic weapons and that the Atomic Energy Commission has the responsibility for disposing of fissionable material.

The proposed FCDA policy is outlined on page 7, and this recommends that state and local authorities prepare appropriate plans for meeting the threat of clandestine nuclear attack which would in effect be a modification of existing plans in connection with air attack. The policy recommends to the state and local authorities that they accept no responsibility for identification, disarming, or disposal of devices suspected of being nuclear weapons and that they should assist in this only at the request and under the direction of Defense, the Atomic Energy Commission, or the FBI. The Bulletin stresses that the local Civil Defense officials should weigh very carefully the decision to activate civil defense plans against the possibility that the suspected object may not, in fact, be an enemy weapon, noting that it would seem preferable to defer a decision until there is an authoritative identification of the device by an Explosive Ordnance Disposal Unit.

This matter was discussed by the IIC Working Committee on June 8, 1955, and it was agreed that there appears to be nothing now contained in the proposed Advisory Bulletin which would be objectionable to the IIC agencies except the suggested change relating to advising "the appropriate local military authorities" instead of the Army Area Commander. The Area Commander would be on notice in any event inasmuch as the Bureau would have requested the services of a Disposal Unit to study the suspected device.

The Bulletin, as now written, does not provide that the Bureau would give any notification to local Civil Defense authorities if a suspected object were found. It does note that the Bureau would alert the appropriate local police officials, which is in line with Bureau policy, and it is noted that in many cases the local police officials are also Civil Defense authorities.

Pat Coyne has suggested that there is no need for FCDA to submit this Bulletin to the National Security Council for approval if all interested agencies in the IIC and the ICIS indicate they have no objection to the Bulletin. This matter is presently being considered in the ICIS but there will apparently be no objections in the ICIS which would in anyway affect the IIC agencies.

cc - Whitson

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117-268

DECLASSIFIED BY SP4 BJA/DFW
ON 4-9-03
II948742/950935/997059

RECORDED-96

Date: June 24, 1955

To: Mr. Dennis A. Flinn — BY COURIER SERVICE
Director
Office of Security (orig and 1)
Department of State
515 22nd Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF
OR OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO
THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

This will confirm oral advice furnished by F.B.I. liaison June 22, 1955.

On June 21, 1955, Chang Watanarat, Minister of Finance for Thailand, arrived at the port of New York aboard the SS. "United States." As his baggage was taken past the detection device for fissionable material on Pier 86, New York City, it caused a reaction on that part of the device sensitive to gamma rays, according to U. S. Customs authorities.

In view of Watanarat's diplomatic position, neither he nor his baggage was searched, according to Customs. No investigation is being conducted by the F.B.I. No prior reference to Chang Watanarat appears in the files of this Bureau.

cc - 1 - Captain John A. Waters — BY COURIER SERVICE
Director of Security
Atomic Energy Commission
Room 2314, T-5 Building
16th and Constitution Avenue, N. W.
Washington 25, D. C.

cc - 2 - AAG Tompkins by r.s. 0-6 same date.

LW:blb
(7)

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

59 JUL 5 1955

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12-30-99

91 JUN 27
COMM-FBI

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JUN 21 1955

TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. Boardman	
Mr. Nichols	
Mr. Belmont	
Mr. Harbo	
Mr. Mohr	
Mr. Parsons	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Tamm	
Mr. Sizoo	
Mr. Winterrowd	
Tele. Room	
Mr. Holloman	
Miss Gandy	

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DATE 4-9-03 BY SP4 BJA/DFW
II 948742/950935/997059

WASH 10 FROM NEW YORK 21 6-01 P

DIRECTOR URGENT

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF OR OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES, AEA. US CUSTOMS ADVISED JUNE TWENTY ONE, FIFTY FIVE THAT ON THIS DATE THE SS "UNITED STATES" ARRIVED AND DOCKED AT NYC, PIER EIGHTY SIX. AT THE TIME THE MINISTER OF FINANCE FOR THAILAND, CHANG RATANARAT, DISEMBARKDED AND HIS BAGGAGE WAS TAKEN BY THE DEVICE USED FOR DETECTING FISSIONABLE MATERIAL, A LIGHT READING OF FIFTY ON THE GREEN LIGHT WAS RECORDED. ACCORDING TO US CUSTOMS, NEITHER RATANARAT NOR HIS BAGGAGE WERE SEARCHED, IN VIEW OF HIS DIPLOMATIC POSITION. RATANARAT WAS EN ROUTE TO WASHINGTON, DC. THE FOREGOING INFO TELEPHONICALLY FURNISHED THE BUREAU. NO FURTHER INVESTIGATION BEING CONDUCTED THIS OFFICE.

KELLY

HOLD

Whitson states reading of 50 on green dial is very low - comparable to radium on wrist watch dial. State + AEC orally advised 6-22-55.

CC: MR. BELMONT
AND SUPERVISOR
DOM. INTEL. DIVISION

Mr. Belmont

RECORDED-96
INDEXED-96

117-268-

12 JUN 27 1955

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: June 27, 1955

FROM : W. A. Branigan

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: ~~C~~OUNTERMEASURES REQUIRED TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION-IN-PLACE OF DEMOLITION ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

At 9:37 A. M., 6-24-55, Commander B. P. Clark, U. S. Coast Guard, phoned and stated that the field testing of the portable ~~de~~tection devices for fissionable material was proceeding satisfactorily. The portable devices had been utilized during the past two weeks in the port of New York by Coast Guard and they were intending to expand the utilization of them on a test basis. Clark asked that he and Mr. Gale, the Atomic Energy Commission representative on the field testing group, be notified of the next regular meeting of the joint committee of IIC and ICIS so that they could make an oral report of developments.

Commander Clark was told that the joint committee would like to hear such a report and that he should get in touch with Mr. Carl Pfuntner of the ICIS Secretariat, who gives notifications of meetings of the joint committee.

RECOMMENDATION:

None. For your information. This matter will be followed.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-9-03 BY SP4BJA/DFW
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12 JUN 28 1955

cc - Belmont
Branigan
Whitson
LW:blb
(4)

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: June 22, 1955

FROM : W. A. Branigan

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES REQUIRED TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION-IN-PLACE OF DEMOLITION ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

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Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-9-03 BY SP4 BJA/DKW
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At 9:20 A. M., Mr. John Doherty, Department of Justice representative on the Standing Committee of the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security, phoned SA Whitson and stated that he was going to have to take a Justice position in the ICIS Standing Committee on Thursday, 6-23-55 regarding the draft report on the reappraisal of U. S. policy concerning the diplomatic pouch. Doherty asked for a Bureau position so that the Justice position could be coordinated.

Doherty was informed that the Bureau position had not yet been established and that the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (IIC) position had not yet been established. It was suggested that if he wanted a Bureau position he could request it in writing as had been done in the past. He stated that he did not have time and could only proceed on the assumption that SA Whitson, who is the FBI and IIC representative on the joint committee which prepared the draft reappraisal, had no objection to the draft report. Doherty was told that SA Whitson's personal feelings had nothing to do with the matter; that the responsibility of the joint committee was to prepare a draft which could be studied by the IIC and the ICIS.

Mr. Doherty stated that he would "play it by ear" in the ICIS.

RECOMMENDATION:

117-261-

RECORDED - 40
INDEXED - 40

None. This is for your information. A draft of the subcommittee report has been received and a memorandum is being submitted on June 23rd.

cc - Belmont
Branigan
Whitson

LW:blb
(4)

1955

Where is IIC going to take position? Just what did Whitson agree to?

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: June 29, 1955

FROM : W. A. Branigan

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Boardman
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Mohr
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Rosen
Tamm
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Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC WEAPONS
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT
Bufile 117-268

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DATE 4-9-03 BY SP4BJA/DFW
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At 2:15 p.m., 6/29/55, Commander B. P. Clark, United States Coast Guard, phoned and stated that he had received word from Coast Guard in New York that while checking the cargo of the Norwegian ship, "Black Condor," with portable detection devices, they received positive readings indicating radioactive material in some of 300 drums of carborundum sand. FBI and AEC in New York were advised, and AEC stated that carborundum sand should not give any reaction. Clark stated the vessel was due to leave New York for Philadelphia at 5:00 p.m. (1700) and did we want the vessel held.

Clark was informed that the movement of vessels, and particularly questions regarding their cargo, were matters for Customs and Coast Guard to decide since the FBI had no jurisdiction over vessels' movements. Clark was told we were interested in further developments in the matter, however.

RECOMMENDATION:

For your information. When details are received from New York, appropriate dissemination of the information will be made.

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LW:bmm (4)

cc - Mr. Belmont
Mr. Branigan
Mr. Whitson

59 JUL 7 1955

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dman Brantigan
Belmont Hudson
Roach
Bates
June 30, 1955

The Attorney General (orig and 1)

Director, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

cc To Murray DOJ
Encls to G-2, Army
ONI, Coyne Asst,
per instructions
of Director at IC
meeting 7-6-55
E.S.S.

CLANDESTINE MEASURES REQUIRED TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION-IN-PLACE OF DEMOLITION ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

In line with our conversation during Operation Alert, we have endeavored to secure a simplified picture of nuclear weapons insofar as size, weight and assembly of clandestine weapons are concerned. I thought you would like to have this during any conversation you might have with members of the Cabinet in regard to clandestine entry of such weapons into the United States.

In the field of clandestine weapons, we can consider two major groups: Fission weapons, commonly referred to as atomic weapons, and fusion weapons, popularly known as H-bombs.

[redacted] (S) b1

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[redacted]

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The "explosive" force of nuclear weapons is measured by the effect of the equivalent tonnage of TNT.

A simple gun-type atomic weapon giving a yield of five thousand tons of TNT and weighing approximately 160 pounds might have a cylindrical form with a maximum

LW:CWB:blb
(10)

SEE NOTE ON PAGE 8.

59 JUL 7 1955

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Letter to the Attorney General

[redacted] b1

[redacted] (S)

[redacted] b1

[redacted] (S)

[redacted] b2 b7E

cc - 1 - Mr. William P. Rogers
Deputy Attorney General

NOTE: Info contained herein re the H-bomb components as well as demolition weapon received from [redacted] b7C b1 *AEC 6-29-55 by Liaison Agent Bates. Info re* [redacted] *was from a letter dated 5-31-55 from Chairman of AEC to Chairmen of IIC and ICIS. All other data taken from No Number SAC Letter 53-F 11-3-53 and No Number 55-B 1-21-55.* (S)

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Director

DATE: June 24, 1955

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Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
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Rosen
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Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

FROM : L. V. Boardman

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES REQUIRED TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION-IN-PLACE OF DEMOLITION ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-9-03 BY SP4 BJA/DFW
II 948742/950935/997059

Re memorandum Branigan to Belmont 6-22-55 on which you noted: "When is IIC going to take a position? Just what did Whitson agree to"?

Special Agent Whitson, as FBI and IIC representative on the joint committee which prepared the draft reappraisal, agreed to nothing except to present the draft report to the IIC for its study and consideration.

Under date of 6-23-55 memorandum Boardman to the Director analyzed the draft report and recommended FBI position. If the recommended position is approved, it will be conveyed to the other IIC members, all of whom are now studying their copies of the draft report. An IIC position will then be presented to the joint committee of IIC and ICIS preparing a final draft in this matter and, if necessary, the IIC position will be set out separately in the report.

RECOMMENDATION:

None. For your information. This matter is receiving continuous attention.

cc - Boardman
Belmont
Philcox
Whitson
LW:blb
(6)

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11 JUL 1 1955

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

AR LTR DTD 10/29/03 62617 ua/NRS/6jn/DFW
10/30/03

JUN 30 1955

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4-9-03 SP4 BJA/DFW
948742/950935/997059

TELETYPE

WASHINGTON 2 PHILADELPHIA 1 FROM NEW YORK 30 130 AM

DIRECTOR AND SAC U R G E N T

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF OR OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES, AEA. (ATOMIC ENERGY ACT) USCG ADVISED ON JUNE TWENTY-NINE INSTANT THAT THE M. V. BLACK CONDOR OF NORWEGIAN REGISTRY CHARTERED TO BLACK DIAMOND SS LINE, ARRIVED NYC JUNE TWENTYEIGHT FROM ROTTERDAM. PREVIOUS PORTS OF CALL HAMBURG, BREMERHAVEN, BREMEN AND ANTWERP. EXAMINATION OF CARGO BY USCG (U.S. COAST GUARD) AND CUSTOMS REFLECTED TWO HUNDRED NINETY EIGHT BARRELS OF MINERAL SUBSTANCE SIMILAR TO CARBORUNDUM WHICH REGISTERED POSITIVE ON RADIO-ACTIVE TEST. LEONARD R. SOLON, ASSISTANT CHIEF, RADIATION BRANCH, HEALTH AND SERVICE LABORATORY, US AEC, NYC, ADVISED EXAMINATION OF TEST SAMPLE REFLECTED SUBSTANCE IS LOW LEVEL SAND BEARING EITHER THORIUM OR URANIUM. EXAMINATION OF SHIP MANIFEST BY AGENTS REFLECTS CONSIGNOR TO BE MSO MASCHINEN UND SCHLEIFMITTEL WERKE /MSO MACHINE AND TOOL GRINDING PLANT/, OFFENBACH AM MAIN, GERMANY. CONSIGNEE PRECISION GRINDING WHEEL CO., INC., EIGHT THREE NAUGHT TORRESDALE AVENUE, PHILADELPHIA THIRTYSIX, PA. SHIPMENT LOADED AT ROTTERDAM JUNE EIGHTEEN LAST. SHIPMENT APPEARS ON PAGE FORTYFOUR OF CARGO MANIFEST, BILL OF LADING ITEM NO. FOUR. BARRELS CONTAIN MARKINGS "PRECISION PHILADELPHIA, NR ONE SIX NINE TWO DIAGONAL ONE THROUGH TWO SIX SIX", AND "PRECISION PHILADELPHIA, NR

RECORDED-45

16 JUL 1 1955

Mr. Belmont

END PAGE ONE

AEC being orally advised 6-30-55 mlw

TWO NAUGHT NAUGHT TWO DIAGONAL ONE THROUGH THIRTYTWO". GROSS WEIGHT EACH BARREL FOUR HUNDRED ONE POUNDS, NET THREE HUNDRED SEVENTY FIVE POUNDS. SHIP UNDER PIER GUARD BY USCG AT BROOKLYN, NY. WILL DEPART NYC FIVE PM, JUNE TWENTYNINE FOR PHILADELPHIA. USCG ADVISES SHIP WILL BE ESCORTED OUT OF NY HARBOR TO THREE MILE LIMIT, AND ON ARRIVAL AT PHILADELPHIA WILL BE ESCORTED BY USCG THERE TO DOCKING AREA. EXAMINATION OF INDIVIDUAL BARRELS AND CONTENTS THEREOF WILL BE MADE BY USCG AND CUSTOMS AT PHILADELPHIA. PENDING FINAL CHEMICAL ANALYSIS AEC BELIEVES NO VIOLATION. FINAL RESULTS OF AEC EXAMINATION WILL BE MADE KNOWN TO BUREAU AND PHILA.

KELLY

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PH NY R 1 PH JLS

WASHING

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. BELMONT

DATE: June 23, 1955

FROM : W. A. BRANIGAN

Per HQ. DTD 10-29-03 60267 uc/NLS/BJA/DFN 10/30/03

4-903 SP4BJA/DFN 9487421/950935/997059

SUBJECT: COUNTER MEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION-IN-PLACE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

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Holloman
Gandy

At 9:15 a.m. [redacted] of Central Intelligence Agency phoned Special Agent Whitson and stated that the Central Intelligence Agency had received an invitation from the Standing Committee of the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security to attend a meeting June 23 of the Standing Committee to discuss the draft report on reappraisal of United States policy regarding the diplomatic pouch.

[redacted] stated he had been designated by Colonel Sheffield Edwards of CIA to attend. He wondered if FBI would attend. It was explained to [redacted] that the FBI was a member of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference and was not a member of ICIS. The FBI and the other IIC members are considering the draft report separately from ICIS.

[redacted] stated he wanted to pass along word that he was going to propose a CIA suggestion which had not been pressed by CIA during the preparation of the draft report. Namely, that if the United States wanted security, the pouch would have to be reduced to letter size. [redacted] was thanked for the information.

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b3

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RECOMMENDATION:

None. For your information. The proposed Bureau and IIC position is that if the United States wishes maximum security from introduction of bomb components in the pouch, that the pouch would have to be reduced to letter size.

LW:blo
(5)
cc - AHBelmont
WABranigan
ESSanders
LWhitson

11 JUL 5 1955

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Boardman
Belmont
Roach
Whitson

SPH bja|DFW

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H.9.03
Per Ltr. dtd. 10.29.03
60267 MC|NLS|BJA|DFW 10/30/03

Date: July 1, 1955

To: Captain John A. Waters
Director of Security
Atomic Energy Commission
Room 2314, T-5 Building
16th and Constitution Avenue, N. W.
Washington 25, D. C.

VIA LIAISON
(orig and 1)

J A Waters
7-5-55
emb

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: SMUGGLING OF AT MIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

During a Coast Guard examination of the cargo of the Norwegian motor vessel "Black Condor," June 29, 1955, at New York Harbor, barrels of mineral substance similar to carborundum registered presence of radioactive substance on the portable detection device.

Mr. Leonard R. Solon, Assistant Chief, Radiation Branch, Health and Service Laboratory, Atomic Energy Commission, New York City, advised that examination of a test sample reflected that the substance is a sand-bearing either thorium or uranium. The shipment of 298 barrels is consigned to Precision Grinding Wheel Company, Incorporated, 830 Torresdale Avenue, Philadelphia 36, Pennsylvania. The shipment was loaded at Rotterdam, Netherlands, June 18, 1955. The consignor was MSO Maschinen Und Schleifmittel Werke (MSO Machine and Tool Grinding Plant), Offenbach am Main, Germany. The gross weight of each barrel is 401 pounds and the net weight is 375 pounds. The "Black Condor" was under pier guard by the U. S. Coast Guard at Brooklyn, New York. It was scheduled to depart for Philadelphia on the evening of June 29, 1955. The Coast Guard has advised that the ship

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Letter to Captain John A. Waters
Director of Security
Atomic Energy Commission

was to be escorted out of New York Harbor to the three-mile limit and escorted into Philadelphia docking area by Coast Guard on arrival at the latter port. An examination of individual barrels and the contents thereof will be made by Coast Guard and Customs at Philadelphia.

Pending final chemical analysis, the Atomic Energy Commission office in New York believes that there is no violation of the Atomic Energy Act.

The foregoing will confirm data orally furnished to the Atomic Energy Commission and to the Central Intelligence Agency by F.B.I. liaison, June 30, 1955.

cc - 1 - Director
Central Intelligence Agency
2430 E Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Attention: Deputy Director, Plans

VIA LIAISON

to Jane Roman C.I.A. 7-5-55 CMB

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : C. E. Hennrich

DATE: July 1, 1955

FROM : W. A. Branigan

SUBJECT: NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
NLT EVALUATION SUBCOMMITTEE

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4/9/03 Spd BJA/DFW

On 6-30-55 Mr. Leonard Bienvenu, Executive Secretary, Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS) discussed with SA Whitson the steps ICIS was taking in connection with the request from Lt. Gen. George for certain information regarding clandestine attacks coordinated with a hypothetical Soviet surprise attack in mid-1958.

Bienvenu stated that in connection with the inquiry regarding possible sabotage to electric power and communications systems serving the Continental Air Defense Command and the Strategic Air Command and the power and communications facilities serving key Governmental control centers, the Office of Defense Mobilization will check on the identities and locations, vulnerability, etc. of power and communications systems for key Government control centers, including relocation sites. Bienvenu stated that he presumed that the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (IIC) agencies, particularly OSI, would handle the question of sabotage to the military installations in the Continental U. S.

With regard to the problem of small nuclear weapons held at sea in submarines and then smuggled into the U. S. for clandestine delivery against Grand Coulee Dam, Hoover Dam, Carswell Air Force Base and McDill Air Force Base, Bienvenu stated that the Coast Guard representative with ICIS would state the locations of the best places to bring such weapons ashore from submarines on the Pacific Coast and the Gulf of Mexico. It was suggested to Bienvenu that the Gulf of Lower California also be considered. Bienvenu further stated that since all of the targets for small nuclear weapons named above had been studied during last year's exercise, with the exception of Hoover Dam, he was going to request the Department of the Interior to supply a vulnerability study on Hoover Dam similar to that which was made last year on Grand Coulee.

Bienvenu raised the question of conventional sabotage on residual targets. It was pointed out to him that George and his staff should indicate to the ICIS and the IIC which of the important targets would not be destroyed in the air attack. It was pointed out

cc - Belmont
Hennrich
Branigan
Whitson

LW:blb (6)
62-101958

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that this policy had been followed in all of the previous surveys so that the IIC and ICIS would not be "spreading themselves thin" over too many targets unnecessarily. Bienvenu stated that he was personally going to ask George's staff what targets are to be left for sabotage and of these targets which are the most important to the Soviets.

Bienvenu stated that he would keep us advised of developments.

RECOMMENDATION:

None. This is for your information in connection with any planning by the IIC working group.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Orig & [redacted] - Peterson
3 - G-2, OSI, ONI
1 - IIC files
1 - Mr. Boardm[redacted]
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Sanders
1 - Section Tickler
1 - Yellow

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4-4-83 BY SP4BJA/DFW
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RECORDED-92

117-268

June 21, 1955

VIA LIAISON

Honorable Val Peterson
Administrator
Federal Civil Defense Administration
Washington 25, D. C.

to Peterson's secretary
6-23-55
cmb.

My dear Mr. Peterson:

Reference is made to your letter dated June 9, 1955, which requested the comments of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference concerning an advisory Bulletin which you propose to furnish to the state and local Civil Defense Directors regarding actions to be taken in connection with the discovery of a suspected clandestine nuclear device.

The proposed Bulletin has been reviewed by the members of the IIC, and there are no IIC objections to the Bulletin with the exception that on page six it is noted that the FBI would alert the Army Area Commander in the event a suspected device is discovered. It is suggested that this be changed to indicate that the FBI would alert the appropriate local military officials inasmuch as there are military officials other than those in the Army who should be notified. The Army Area Commander would be on notice in any event inasmuch as, as is noted in the Bulletin, the FBI would request the services of the nearest Explosive Ordnance Disposal Unit and this would be accomplished through the office of the Army Area Commander.

The IIC has no objection to this Bulletin being furnished by you to the state and local Civil Defense Directors without first submitting the Bulletin to the National Security Council for consideration if all agencies who have a direct interest in this matter indicate they have no objection to the Bulletin. It is understood that the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security is presently considering the proposed Bulletin and will furnish comments to you within the near future.

Sincerely yours,

Chairman
Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference

ESS:hke

(Attached to cover memorandum from Mr. Boardman to The Director, 6/20/55, re "Proposed Federal Civil Defense Administration Advisory Bulletin," ESS:hke)

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DO-6

OFFICE OF DIRECTOR
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Jones
Mr. Sizoo
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

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EXP. PROC.
JUN 10 1955

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: June 15, 1955

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-9-03 BY SP4BJA/DFW
II 948742/ 950935/ 997059

SUBJECT: FEDERAL CIVIL DEFENSE ADVISORY BULLETIN CONCERNING MEASURES TO BE TAKEN IN THE EVENT OF DISCOVERY OF CLANDESTINE NUCLEAR WEAPONS

On August 9, 1954, the IIC and the ICIS made certain objections to an Advisory Bulletin which the Federal Civil Defense Administration proposed to furnish to local FCDA officials. As written, the Bulletin would have required the FBI to notify local Civil Defense officials if a suspected clandestine atomic weapon were found, and this could have, under the proposed Bulletin, caused evacuation of a city. The IIC and the ICIS suggested that this matter be further studied by FCDA.

By letter dated June 9, 1955, FCDA has furnished for IIC comment a revised Advisory Bulletin which they propose to issue to local Civil Defense officials. FCDA has advised that a similar letter and request has been directed to the ICIS. Advance copies of this proposed Bulletin were obtained by SA Edward S. Sanders and IIC consideration thereof is virtually complete. As the Bulletin is now written, there appears to be only one minor suggestion the IIC will desire to make to FCDA. An IIC reply to the FCDA letter will be prepared at the earliest possible time. A check is being made with ICIS to determine if they have any particular objection or observations to make in connection with this Bulletin inasmuch as the IIC and the ICIS have presented a united front on this matter for the past year.

INDEXED - 75 117-268-814

ACTION:

RECORDED - 75 EX-118 11 JUL 8 1955

The foregoing is for your information. The IIC reply will be expedited. It is not deemed necessary to ~~give~~ FCDA an interim reply inasmuch as they have been working on this matter since last August and they could hardly expect the IIC to complete its action in one or two days.

ESS: saw; hke

59 JUL 18 1955

1-Mr. Boardman
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Sanders
1-Section Tickler

memo from Mr. Boardman to Director re Proposed FCDA Advisory Bulletin - 6/20/55

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SMUGGLING ATOM BOMBS

July 7, 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TOLSON
MR. BOARDMAN
MR. BELMONT
MR. NICHOLS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-9-03 BY SP4 bjalm/rw

This morning I attended a conference in the Attorney General's office and present, in addition to the Attorney General, were the Deputy Attorney General, Mr. Rogers, Mr. Yeagley, of the Internal Security Division of the Department, and Mr. Bienvenu, also of the Internal Security Division of the Department.

The question had been raised by Mr. Yeagley as to what position he, as representative of the Department of Justice, should take in connection with the limiting of the diplomatic pouch being considered by the I. C. I. S. Mr. Yeagley outlined what he had in mind doing, as reflected on page 3 of the memorandum addressed to me under date of July 6, 1955, by Mr. Boardman.

The Attorney General inquired of me as to what my position was in the matter, and I told the Attorney General that the FBI had already resolved the question and had taken the position that if maximum security was desired, the diplomatic pouch should be reduced to letter size. I said I could see no other position that an agency charged with the responsibility for internal security could take. Either there had to be maximum security, or there would be little or no security, and I thought that it would be most undesirable to be on record for any compromise of maximum security. I stated that at the meeting of the I. I. C. yesterday, I had stated the position which the FBI was taking and that this position was informally concurred in by Admiral Espe, head of ONI, and General Trudeau, head of G-2, and that General Carroll, of the Air Force, stated that the position taken was his personal view, but he did not know whether he could coordinate the views of the Air Force to be able to take it officially. I advised the Attorney General that there would be a meeting of the Working Committee within the next day or two, and the position of the IIC would then be formalized and we would advise the Attorney General and also advise Mr. Yeagley, Chairman of the I. C. I. S.

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Holloman
Miss Gandy

JUL 18

SENT FROM D. O.
TIME 2:20 PM
DATE 7-7-55
BY

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SM-MAIL ROOM BOMBS

CODE FILED IN

Messrs. Tolson, Boardman, Belmont, Nichols July 7, 1958

Mr. Yeagley and Mr. Bienvenu discussed some possible alternatives, such as the use of sacks of certain size for diplomatic purposes and Mr. Bienvenu reverted to the original recommendation sometime ago of limiting the pouch not to exceed 300 pounds, as he believed that this would meet the insistent demands of the Defense and State Departments and at the same time would give some degree of protection to this country.

I stated that so far as the FBI was concerned, it did not intend to make any alternative suggestion, as I thought that this would then make our first position purely academic. I stated that if the decision should be made at higher level that the diplomatic pouch should not be reduced to letter size because of outweighing factors in the foreign intelligence field, and the National Security Council desired that the I. I. C. then give some consideration to steps short of reducing the pouch to letter size, the question could be evaluated from that point of view. I again stressed the point that as security agency responsible for the internal security, I did not intend that the FBI should be on record for anything less than maximum security unless some higher authority reached the decision that maximum security was not desirable nor practical.

The Attorney General shared my views upon the matter and Mr. Yeagley was instructed to take the same position in the I. C. I. S. as the FBI has taken in I. I. C.

It is imperative that the Working Committee of I. I. C. meet at the earliest possible moment and resolve this problem so that we may then forward to the Attorney General and to Mr. Yeagley the official position of I. I. C. in this matter.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

JEH:tlc
(7)

Copy/dpg

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. BELMONT

DATE: July 7, 1955

FROM : C. E. HENNRICH

SUBJECT: NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
NET EVALUATION SUBCOMMITTEE

INITIALS OF ORIGINAL

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 12-9-08 BY SP4 bjp/dew

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Holloman
Gandy

On the afternoon of July 7, 1955, Mr. Leonard Bienvenu, Executive Secretary, Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS) called at the Bureau and discussed the problem of the surprise attack with Special Agent Whitson. He advised that he had written to General George, the Director of the Subcommittee Staff, and pointed out to him that the ICIS could not guarantee to meet the July 15, 1955, deadline set by General George for answers from IIC and ICIS. He was informed that IIC had already expressed such ideas to General George through liaison channels.

Mr. Bienvenu stated that the following information was being obtained for ICIS by a Mr. Hjortsberg, a civilian in the Department of Defense:

(1) Damage estimate for a 10 megaton weapon with ground zero at 680 Park Avenue, New York City, as well as the effects of fall-out from such a weapon.

(2) The size of nuclear weapon falling within the 20 to 500 kiloton range sufficient to destroy Gatun Dam in Panama and the residual damage, including fall-out, which would occur from such a weapon.

The Department of Interior is gathering information regarding vulnerabilty of Hoover Dam.

The Armed Forces Special Weapons Project is being requested to furnish estimates of the effects of the smallest weapon of 5 kiloton yield or less which would effectively knock out Grand Coulee or Hoover Dams. The same type of information is being requested of Armed Forces Special Weapons Project by ICIS regarding Carswell and McDill Air Force Bases.

62-101958
cc - Belmont
Hennrich
Sanders
LW:blb
(5)

59 JUL 22 1955 146

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SMUGGLING Rptr. 13 Jan 1955

Memo for Belmont

The Coast Guard is completing a study of the best spots to get a weapon ashore from submarine in Panama; in the Hoquiam, Washington, area (for Grand Coulee); Santa Barbara, California, area, (for Hoover Dam); Port Lavaca, Texas, area (for Carswell Air Force Base); and Tampa Bay area (for McDill Air Force Base).

The Office of Defense Mobilization, according to Bienvenu, is studying the question of telecommunications of key centers of Goverment including relocation sites and will do the smae regarding power supplies.

By July 8 or 11, 1955, Geroge's staff, which is "war gaming" the surprise air attack on the United States, will furnish to the IIC and ICIS a list of the places hit in the air attack, the ground zeros in the attack and the remaining vital facilities. Mr. Hjortsberg will then look over the key facilities list for the most important installations for furtheranalysis and discussion with George's staff.

RECOMMENDATION:

This matter is beingfollowed and you will be kept informed of developments.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

cc - Whitson

SAC, Philadelphia (orig and 1) July 11, 1955

RECORDED 75 117-261-2

Director, FBI (117-288)

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF OR OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

ReNYtel 6-28-55 and NYair-tel 7-6-55 concerning radioactivity of the cargo of Norwegian M.V. "Black Condor" destined for Philadelphia.

Philadelphia should check with Customs and Coast Guard concerning results of scheduled search of cargo at port of Philadelphia and advise Bureau and New York Office promptly.

cc - 8 - New York (117-192)

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LW:blb (6)

COMM - FBI
JUL 11 1955
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63 JUL 15 1955

FD-36

AIRTEL

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

7/6/55

NY, NY

Mr. Boardman
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Sizoo
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

Transmit the following Teletype message to: BUREAU

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF OR OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE U. S. AEA.

Remytel, 6/29/55 re shipment aboard M. V. BLACK CONDOR destined for Philadelphia. LEONARD R. SOLON, Assistant Chief, Radiation Branch, Health and Safety Laboratory, NYOO, AEC, advised this date that preliminary tests of sample of questioned material indicated such low grade radioactivity that no further chemical tests made at NYC to determine whether source was uranium or thorium. Stated no violation apparent as AEC sole interest in material is as source of radioactive raw material. Accordingly, material forwarded by NYOO of AEC to Division of Raw Materials, AEC, Wash., D. C. for info of any any action deemed necessary by that Division. In view of above no further action by NYO.

KELLY

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DATE 4-9-03 BY SP4 BJA/DFW
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3 - Bureau (RM)
1 - Philadelphia (Info) (RM)

Mr. Belmont

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7-11-55

EX-109 8 JUL 7 1955

ESP SEC

JJD:MXH (1-G)
NY 117-192-178

Approved _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

cc Mr. Langan

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

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Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: July 7, 1955

FROM : L. V. Boardman 7/8/55

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-9-03 BY SP4BJA/DFW

SUBJECT: PROBABILITY OF CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS UNDER DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY, INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE (IAC)

Pat Coyne telephoned this morning to call to my attention the National Intelligence Estimate of 6/28/55, captioned "Clandestine Introduction of Nuclear Weapons under Diplomatic Immunity," a copy of which is attached to Belmont's memorandum to me of 7/1/55, also attached hereto.

As you will recall, the Bureau dissented to the concluding paragraph of the estimate, which reflected that "chances are slightly better than even that the USSR would not undertake even this more restricted operation" of introducing nuclear weapons clandestinely by means of the diplomatic pouch.

Coyne commented that, in view of General Trudeau's "table-hammering" comments at the IIC Meeting yesterday, reflecting amazement at the positions being taken by persons in high places, it was interesting to him (Coyne) to note that in the National Intelligence Estimate the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, concurred in the National Intelligence Estimate report. He stated that he feels G-2 has not been consistent in some of the positions it has taken. For example, he said it was his observation that G-2 will concur with the IIC in a particular point, but take a different position in the IAC. On the other hand, he noted that Admiral Espe of ONI has been consistent right down the line and joined the FBI in its dissent to this estimate.

Pat Coyne said that he would like for you to be specifically aware of this point, and I told him that it would be brought to your attention.

1 ENCL.

Enclosure

LVB:CSH
(4)

Filed with copy in 62-93351

RECORDED - 87 117-268-806

INDEXED - 87

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EX-121

LIAISON

59 JUL 25 1955

SMUGGLING Atom Bomb Bs.

62-93351-363

62-93351-1 thru 6

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DATE OF MAIL 6-14-55

HAS BEEN REMOVED FOR [redacted] TO BE KEPT PERMANENTLY IN HIS OFFICE, [redacted] b7C

SEE FILE 66-2554-7530 FOR AUTHORITY.

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-9-03 BY SP4 bja/DFW

SUBJECT JUNE MAIL

REMOVED BY 59 JUL 27 1955

FILE NUMBER 117-268-807

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGEOUT

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JUL 1 1955

TELETYPE

WASHINGTON FROM NEW YORK 12 1

DIRECTOR ....U R G E N T....

Tr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Sizoo
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

9-Office

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF OR OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES, AEA. U.S. CUSTOMS ADVISED JULY ONE, FIFTY FIVE THAT STANLEY AIREY, CUSTOMS DECLARATION EIGHT FIVE SEVEN SIX ZERO ZERO TWO, WHO WAS LISTED AS BRITISH CONSUL WHO IS REPORTING BRITISH EMBASSY, WASHINGTON, D.C. AND WHO IS TRAVELLING BETWEEN THE CANAL ZONE AND THE U.S., ARRIVED JULY ONE, FIFTY FIVE AT NYC VIA SS CRISTOBAL. AS HIS BAGGAGE WENT BY THE DEVICE USED FOR DETECTION OF FISSIONABLE MATERIAL, A READING OF ONE FIVE ZERO WAS RECORDED WHICH U.S. CUSTOMS DESCRIBED AS BEING VERY SLIGHT. HIS BAGGAGE WAS NOT SEARCHED OR HELD IN VIEW OF DIPLOMATIC POSITION. INDICES OF NYO NEGATIVE AS TO AIREY. FOR INFO OF BUREAU, THE DETECTION DEVICE USED WAS DIFFERENT FROM DETECTION DEVICE HITHERTO USED ON THE PIERS AND AT IDLEWILD AIRPORT. FOREGOING FOR INFO OF BUREAU. NO FURTHER INVESTIGATION CONTEMPLATED BY NYO.

END

NY R 12 WA PC

KELLY

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EX-118

JUL 14 1955

Handled via Bureau phone call 7-1-55 Lwt

Mr. Belmont

64 JUL 18 1955

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 11-9-83 BY SP4 bja/DFW

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

~~SECRET~~

TO : The Director

DATE: June 23, 1955

FROM : L. V. Boardman

4/9/03
CLASSIFIED BY NSC/bja/DFW 60267 derivative
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (1)
Per ltr. dtd. 10-29-03 60267tuc/NSC/BJA/DFW 10/30/03

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES REQUIRED TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION-IN-PLACE OF DEMOLITION ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

Tolson
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SYNOPSIS:

As a result of exchange of views between Mr. Allen Dulles of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Director, as Chairman of Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (IIC), regarding possibility of restricting the size of Soviet diplomatic pouches in order to reduce the chances of USSR introducing components of nuclear weapons by means of the pouch, reappraisal of U. S. policy regarding pouch undertaken by joint group from IIC and Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS) with ad hoc representation from CIA and State and technical advisor from Atomic Energy Commission.

Joint group has now presented for IIC and ICIS consideration a draft report which, at this point, is not binding on any committee or agency. Report indicates:

[redacted] (S)

[redacted]

Enclosure (1) DETACHED FOR MEMO ON AG MEETING LW.
cc - Boardman
Belmont
Roach
Sanders
Whitson
LW:blb
(7)

RECORDED - 40
INDEXED - 40

117-268-809

11 JUL 13 1955

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[redacted] (S)

(3) While reduction on size and weight of the diplomatic pouch might prevent introduction of assembled nuclear weapons, pouch would have to be reduced to letter size if security against introduction of fractions of fissionable components is to be approached.

(4) Department of Defense, Department of State and CIA point [redacted] (S) [redacted]

(5) Any restrictions on the Soviet pouch would result in retaliation and probably even heavier restrictions on our pouch. b1 b3

(6) [redacted] (S)

The draft report recommends:

(1) No size or weight restrictions at this time on diplomatic shipments.

(2) Increased use of detection devices at ports of entry through which Soviet Bloc diplomatic traffic is permitted.

(3) Reporting system on results of use of detection devices.

(4) Continuous review of those results as they affect each nation involved. In event of recurrent efforts on the part of any nation to introduce radioactive material in the pouch or diplomatic shipments, further attention should be given to possible additional steps.

(5) With regard to the Soviet Bloc, when, in the opinion of the President, the international situation is such that the U. S. must first look to its own internal security rather than the need for maintaining status quo on channelling of intelligence information

and the supply of our missions in Soviet Bloc countries, pouches or diplomatic shipments from Soviet Bloc causing devices to register presence of radioactive material would be stopped until cause of disturbance is established or shipment will be refused entrance. Same would apply to individual foreign official having radioactive material on person.

(6) If invoked by President, such procedures could apply to pouches, diplomatic shipments or official personnel of any country.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) Is is respectfully recommended that the FBI position and the IIC position should be that if the U. S. wants the maximum possible security against clandestine introduction of nuclear weapon components in the pouch, the pouch should be reduced to letter size.

(2) If the U. S. does not want maximum security, Soviet introduction of an assembled thermonuclear weapon (H bomb) could be prevented by limiting the diplomatic pouch or shipments under diplomatic seal to a size and weight less than the dimensions of a weapon having a yield of a million tons of TNT. These dimensions would be determined by the Atomic Energy Commission and Armed Forces Special Weapons Project.

(3) At the present time, there is no uniform procedure for channelling diplomats and their diplomatic shipments past detection devices. The draft report recommends this be done. We agree. However, draft report does not provide for immediate follow-through to determine nature of radioactive substance causing reaction by detection device. FBI position should be that diplomatic personnel be required to account for substance causing reaction of detection device at the time reaction occurs.

(4) On page 4 of the draft report, reference is made to National Intelligence Estimate 11-7-55 as recognizing Soviet capability to introduce nuclear components under diplomatic immunity. This Intelligence Estimate is still under consideration by the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) because of certain changes in the military picture, although there are no changes in the portions of the Estimate dealing with clandestine operations. Unless this Estimate has been published by the time the draft report is approved, reference to it should be deleted. This will be brought to attention of ICIS and Joint Committee.

~~SECRET~~

Memo to the Director

(5) Item 8 on page 5 of the draft report points out that the ICIS has requested the Intelligence Advisory Committee to submit an estimate on probability of the use of the diplomatic pouch for smuggling. The IIC position has been and should continue to be that the question of probability is not the controlling factor but the Soviet capability coupled with lack of defense against the use of the pouch. Furthermore, the IAC does not have the facts upon which an estimate of probable Kremlin planning in this regard can be made. This will be brought to attention of Joint Committee and ICIS.

(6) It is respectfully recommended that, with the above exceptions, the FBI and the IIC can accept the draft report and forward it.

DETAILS:

As the result of the discussions by Assistant Director Belmont of the report of the Net Capabilities Evaluation Subcommittee before the National Security Council 11-4-54, Mr. Allen Dulles mentioned to Bureau liaison representative Papich the possibility of restricting the size of Soviet diplomatic pouches in order to reduce the chances of the USSR clandestinely introducing components of nuclear weapons by means of the diplomatic pouch. Under date of 11-22-54 the Director, as Chairman of the IIC, wrote to Dulles that in view of Dulles' observations a reappraisal

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of U. S. policy regarding the diplomatic pouch might be advantageous and, accordingly, was transmitting to the National Security Council Representative on Internal Security and to the Chairman of ICIS copies of the communication to Dulles.

Under date of 8-10-55 Mr. J. Patrick Coyne, Internal Security Representative, National Security Council, suggested to the Chairman of IIC and the Chairman of ICIS that a re-appraisal of U. S. policy regarding the diplomatic pouch be given preferred attention in the joint IIC-ICIS group, which examines various related aspects of the subject.

Accordingly, commencing with its 3-24-55 meeting, the Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures met with ad hoc representatives from the Central Intelligence Agency and from the Department of State with a technical advisor from AEC to study the problem. Detailed statistics regarding shipments into and out of the Iron Curtain countries were obtained from the U. S. missions abroad and limited statistics on Soviet Bloc diplomatic shipments into the U. S. were collected by Customs.

A draft report was drawn up by the Joint Committee and disseminated for study under date of 6-14-55 to the member agencies of IIC and ICIS.

Analysis of Draft Report:

Recurrent consideration has been given to the feasibility of imposing restrictions on the sizes, weights and contents of incoming diplomatic pouches from Soviet Bloc countries. Studies have concluded that any restrictions which might be placed on incoming pouches would result in net disadvantage to the U. S. since Soviet Bloc retaliation would be inevitable and since it could not be assumed that such retaliation would be strictly reciprocal; therefore, it might be in greater degree than the U. S. could afford to accept.

SECRET

At the present time, there are no limitations on size and weight of diplomatic shipments. Diplomatic pouches and accompanied shipments under diplomatic seal are not subject to inspection.

[redacted] b1 b2 b7E

(S)

The U. S. has developed for use at ports of entry detection devices which will give a signal when influenced by a stream of neutrons or gamma rays from radioactive material.

[redacted] b1

(S)

The devices will also react to any radioactive but nonfissionable items such as a certain fertilizer, radium dial wrist watches and compasses and certain types of sound recording tape and film. All other components of a nuclear weapon could be introduced under diplomatic seal without any possibility of detection.

The U. S. is relatively more dependent upon pouches and shipments under diplomatic seal for the transmission to U. S. missions in the Soviet Bloc of foodstuffs, office supplies

[redacted] b1 b3

(S)

Memo to the Director

[redacted] (S)

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b3

The conclusions in the report are as follows:

(1) Although restrictions on size and weight of incoming diplomatic pouches and shipments could prevent the introduction of assembled nuclear weapons, Soviet capability to introduce fissionable material and other components of weapons in very small sizes makes impractical the imposition of restrictions on size and weight of incoming Soviet Bloc pouches and shipments, since we would have to expect severe retaliation.

(2) The maintenance of the status quo of our capability for using diplomatic channels [redacted] (S)

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b3

(3) There should be an increased use of the detection devices to insure the fullest realization of their potential benefits.

The recommendations in the draft report are as follows:

(1) No size or weight restrictions be imposed at this time on diplomatic pouches and shipments under diplomatic seal from Soviet Bloc countries.

(2) In the five ports of entry through which Soviet diplomatic traffic is permitted (New York City; St. Albans, Vermont; Syracuse, New York; San Antonio, Texas; and Laredo, Texas) all incoming shipments under diplomatic seal, including diplomatic

pouches, regardless of nationality should be channelled past detection devices to determine whether they contain radioactive materials. Likewise, diplomatic officials and personnel insofar as practical should be channelled past the detection devices.

(3) A reporting system should be established among the responsible agencies regarding the results of the examinations recommended in 2 and monthly summaries should be supplied to the IIC and the ICIS.

(4) The situation with regard to the possibility of clandestine introduction of fissionable material through diplomatic shipments should be the subject of continuous review based on recommendation 3. In the event of recurrent efforts on the part of one nation to introduce radioactive material in the pouch or diplomatic shipments, further attention should be given to what additional steps should be taken.

(5) With regard to the Soviet Bloc, when, in the opinion of the President, the international situation is such that the U. S. must first look to its own internal security rather than to the need for maintaining the status quo on the channelling of essential intelligence information and the supply of our missions in Soviet Bloc countries, any Soviet Bloc pouch or shipment, which causes the detection device to indicate the presence of radioactive material, shall be detained and not released by Customs authorities until the responsible mission demonstrates that the radioactive contents are not fissionable material. If the mission refuses to so demonstrate, the mission will be requested to remove the shipment from the U. S. immediately. If nuclear material is identified, the shipment will be seized. Likewise, if radioactive material is determined by the detection device to be on the person of an official, he will be required to show the source of radioactivity or be detained. If a satisfactory demonstration is provided, i.e. no fissionable material, the official will be permitted to proceed. If the official or his mission refuses to provide a satisfactory demonstration, the official will be requested to leave the country immediately.

(6) The foregoing procedures could apply, if invoked by the President, not only to the Soviet Bloc but to any other pouches, diplomatic shipments or diplomatic and official personnel regardless of country.

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cc - Boardman
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Whitson

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REAPPRAISAL OF U. S. POLICY REGARDING SHIPMENTS UNDER DIPLOMATIC SEAL

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Sizoo
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

COVER MEMO BOARDMAN TO DIRECTOR re WH 22 July 6, 1955
7-~~6~~-55 ~~LHM/blb~~ RE THIS MATTER.

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4-9-03 AHB:LL

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REAPPRAISAL OF U. S. POLICY REGARDING SHIPMENTS UNDER DIPLOMATIC SEAL

By memorandum of July 5, 1955, from Herbert Brownell, Jr. to "Messrs. Tompkins and Hoover," the Attorney General advised that Mr. J. Walter Yeagley, Chairman of the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS) had requested instructions by memorandum of June 29, 1955, as to the attitude the Department of Justice should take in connection with the captioned study at the forthcoming meeting of the ICIS.

The Attorney General indicated that he felt that a memorandum to him from the Director of the FBI dated June 30, 1955, on the subject "Countermeasures Required to Detect and Defend Against the Clandestine Introduction and Detonation-in-Place of Demolition Atomic Weapons in the United States" has a direct bearing on the attitude which the Department of Justice should take on the subject of reappraisal of U. S. policy regarding shipments under diplomatic seal. (Tab 6)

Accordingly, the Attorney General proposed a conference between the Director of the FBI, the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Internal Security Division, the Chairman of the ICIS and himself, together with such others as the named principals deem desirable to have attend the meeting.

The proposed conference is now scheduled for 10:30 A. M., Thursday, July 7, 1955.

BACKGROUND OF THE PROBLEM

Original Considerations:

The problem of the smuggling of atomic weapons and parts thereof in incoming diplomatic baggage and shipments was initially raised by the Director of the FBI by memoranda of November 1, 1947, to the Attorney General, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the

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Atomic Energy Commission and the Executive Director of the President's Air Policy Commission.

After the establishment of the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security, the problem was considered by it during 1951 and 1952 but no positive steps were taken by either State or Treasury, both of which were members of ICIS, to plug this "loophole."

In October, 1952, a special committee, chaired by the Director and consisting of the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission; Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 of the Army; the Director of the Office of Naval Intelligence; the Director of the Office of Special Investigations of the Air Force and special representatives of the Secretaries of State and Treasury, studied the question of clandestine introduction of atomic weapons at the direction of the President. The problem as it applied to the diplomatic pouch was considered as a part of the broad study of countermeasures. By memorandum of December 22, 1952, this special committee transmitted to the Honorable James S. Lay, Executive Secretary, National Security Council, a report to the President on "Countermeasures Required to Detect and Defend Against the Clandestine Introduction and Detonation-in-Place of Demolition Atomic Weapons in the United States."

In this report it was noted that the baggage and effects of foreign diplomatic representatives, as well as the foreign diplomatic pouches, were passed through U. S. Customs without examination. The report recommended:

(1) That the baggage and effects of foreign diplomatic representatives be subjected to examination with technical detection equipment then being devised by the Atomic Energy Commission to determine whether fissionable material was contained in such shipments.

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(2) That diplomatic pouches be subjected to similar examination.

(3) That the diplomatic couriers of the Soviet Bloc nations be required to enter the U. S. at designated ports in order that they and the pouches they carry might be subjected to examination by the technical detection devices.

(4) That such examination be accomplished at least initially on a surreptitious basis.

Degree of Implementation:

Under date of December 29, 1952, the President authorized implementation of the recommendations in the above report "as a broad guide to the departments and agencies concerned in establishing necessary detection and countermeasures with respect to this subject, under the coordination of the IIC and the ICIS in conjunction with the AEC."

With regard to the specific recommendations above, passive-type detection devices, which react to a stream of neutrons or gamma rays from fissionable material, have been developed and field tested on the docks in New York Harbor, at Idlewild Airport and at the International Airport in San Antonio. These

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At the present time, a proposal is under consideration by the Treasury Department to extend the use of these detection devices to other ports of entry.

As of May 25, 1955, the Department of State and the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the Department of Justice had limited the entry of Soviet Bloc diplomatic personnel to five ports of entry as follows: New York, by air or sea; Laredo, Texas, by highway or rail; San Antonio, Texas, by air; St. Albans, Vermont, by rail; and Syracuse, New York, by air.

There is no uniform procedure for channelling diplomats and diplomatic shipments past the detection devices even in those ports where a limited number of devices are available.

THE CURRENT REAPPRAISAL

Recurrent consideration has been given by the subcommittees of ICIS as well as by the National Security Security Council's Planning Board to the feasibility of imposing restrictions on the sizes, weights and contents of incoming diplomatic pouches from Soviet Bloc countries. For example, a subcommittee of the ICIS once suggested limiting the diplomatic pouch to 500 pounds in weight. The Bureau pointed out that this was futile since atomic weapon components could be broken down into much smaller sizes and weights. A special committee of the National Security Council Planning Board considered limiting the diplomatic pouch to documentary material but the Departments of State and Defense protested that they used the pouch for necessary items other than documentary material.

Such studies as have been made regarding the placing of limitations on the diplomatic pouch have concluded that any restrictions which might be placed on incoming pouches would result in net disadvantage to the U. S. since Soviet Bloc retaliation would be inevitable and since it could not be assumed that such retaliation would be strictly reciprocal and, therefore, it might be in a greater degree than the U. S. could afford to accept.

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The matter again came to a head on November 4, 1954, when the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (IIC) took a vigorous dissent before the National Security Council on a Net Capabilities Evaluation report. The Net Capabilities Evaluation Subcommittee of the National Security Council presented a report on the threat of Soviet attack upon the United States and belittled the risk of introduction of clandestine weapons. The IIC position was that the risk should not be underestimated and that the diplomatic pouch was a relatively secure means of introducing atomic weapon components.

As a result of the IIC position before the National Security Council, Mr. Allen Dulles mentioned to Bureau liaison representative Papich the possibility of restricting the size of Soviet diplomatic pouches in order to reduce the chances of the USSR clandestinely introducing components of nuclear weapons by means of the pouch. Under date of November 22, 1954, the Director, as Chairman of IIC, wrote to Dulles that in view of Dulles' observations a reappraisal of U. S. policy regarding the diplomatic pouch might be advantageous and, accordingly, he was transmitting to the National Security Council Representative on Internal Security and to the Chairman of ICIS copies of the communication to Dulles. (Tab 1)

Under date of March 10, 1955, Mr. J. Patrick Coyne, Internal Security Representative, National Security Council, suggested to the Chairman of IIC and the Chairman of ICIS that a reappraisal regarding the pouch be given preferred attention in a joint IIC-ICIS group which examines various related aspects of the subject. Accordingly, commencing with its March 24, 1955, meeting, the joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures met with ad hoc representatives from the Central Intelligence Agency and from the Department of State with a technical advisor from Atomic Energy Commission to study the problem. A draft report was drawn up by the joint committee and disseminated for study under date of June 14, 1955, to the member agencies of IIC and ICIS. (Tab 4)

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Draft Report of June 14, 1955:

The report indicates:

(1) The U. S. now has detection devices which will indicate the presence of radioactive material. [redacted] Identity of radioactive (S) substance must be determined by examination. b1

[redacted] (S) (Tab 3)

(3) While reduction in size and weight of the diplomatic pouch might prevent introduction of assembled nuclear weapons, pouch would have to be reduced to letter size if security against introduction of fractions of fissionable components is to be approached.

(4) Department of Defense, Department of State and CIA point out [redacted] b1

[redacted] (S)

(5) Any restrictions on the Soviet pouch would result in retaliation and probably even heavier restrictions on our pouch.

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(6) These restrictions would mean we would be unable [redacted] necessary foodstuffs and, likewise, would be unable to [redacted] b2 b7E

Recommendations in June 14, 1955, Draft Report:

The Draft report recommends:

(1) No size or weight restrictions at this time on diplomatic shipments.

(2) Increased use of detection devices at ports of entry through which Soviet Bloc diplomatic traffic is permitted, including all diplomatic shipments and, insofar as practical, all diplomatic personnel.

(3) Reporting system on results of use of detection devices.

(4) Continuous review of those results as they affect each nation involved. In event of recurrent efforts on the part of any nation to introduce radioactive material in the pouch or diplomatic shipments, further attention should be given to possible additional steps.

(5) With regard to the Soviet Bloc, when, in the opinion of the President, the international situation is such that the U. S. must first look to its own internal security rather than the need for maintaining status quo on channelling of intelligence information and the supply of our missions in Soviet Bloc countries, pouches or diplomatic shipments from Soviet Bloc causing devices to register presence of radioactive material would be stopped until cause of disturbance is established or shipment will be refused entrance. Same would apply to individual foreign official having radioactive material on person.

(6) If invoked by President, such procedures could apply to pouches, diplomatic shipments or official personnel of any country.

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IIC and FBI Position on June 14, 1955, Draft Report:

The IIC position on the June 14, 1955, draft is not yet "set." We have acquainted the other members of the IIC with the FBI views which are as follows:

(1) The following items should be listed as conclusions in the report:

(A) If the U. S. wants the maximum possible security against clandestine introduction of nuclear weapon components in the diplomatic pouch, the pouch should be reduced to letter size.

(B) If the U. S. does not want maximum security, Soviet introduction of an assembled thermo-nuclear weapon could be prevented by limiting the diplomatic pouch or shipments under diplomatic seal to a size and weight less than the dimensions of a weapon having a yield of a million tons of TNT. These dimensions would be determined by the Atomic Energy Commission and Armed Forces Special Weapons Project. (We can eliminate this conclusion and stand on A.)

(2) The recommendations should include the following sentence: "Diplomatic personnel should be required to account for the substance causing a reaction of the detection device at the same time the reaction occurs." (This should be added to recommendation #2 of the June 14 draft.)

(3) On page 4 of the draft report, reference is made to National Intelligence Estimate 11-7-55 as recognizing Soviet capability to introduce nuclear weapon components under diplomatic immunity. At this time this Intelligence Estimate is still under consideration by the Intelligence Advisory Committee because of certain changes in the military picture, although there are no changes in the portions of the Estimate dealing with clandestine operations. Unless this Estimate has been published by the time the draft report is approved, reference to it should be deleted.

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(4) Item 8 on page 5 of the draft report points out that the ICIS has requested the Intelligence Advisory Committee to submit an estimate on the probability of the use of the diplomatic pouch for smuggling. The IIC position is that the question of probability is not the controlling factor but the Soviet capability, coupled with lack of defense against the use of the pouch, is. Furthermore, the Intelligence Advisory Committee does not have the facts upon which an estimate of probable Kremlin planning in this regard can be made. The IIC will not associate itself with the ICIS request. The FBI and the Office of Naval Intelligence representatives on the Intelligence Advisory Committee took an exception to the estimate when it was submitted. (Tab 7)

We feel that the Director should take the position that, as a security agency, the FBI must take the position that security can only be achieved by reducing the diplomatic pouch to letter size. Any other measures cannot produce security. Further, that all diplomatic personnel and/or shipments must pass before the detection devices and, if a reaction occurs, appropriate explanations be secured prior to the passage of such persons or shipments into this country.

It is recommended, therefore, that

(1) FBI advise ICIS that if the United States wants security against clandestine introduction of nuclear weapon components in the diplomatic pouch, the pouch should be reduced to letter size; that this is a decision to be made at high policy level as to whether the value to the United States of security by such a proposed reduction is outweighed by the value accruing to the United States through its present use of the unrestricted size of the diplomatic pouch.

(2) Regardless of whether the diplomatic pouch is reduced in size, immediate steps should be taken to channel all diplomatic personnel and diplomatic shipments in those ports to which the Soviet bloc is now restricted through the technical detection devices now in use.

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ICIS Position:

This report was considered by the ICIS Standing Committee with Central Intelligence Agency and Atomic Energy Commission representatives in attendance and revisions were proposed by the Standing Committee to the June 14, 1955, draft report. These revisions appear in the Standing Committee's draft dated June 24, 1955. The proposed June 24 draft contains numerous changes of phraseology which can be appropriately considered from the standpoint of accuracy in the Joint Committee of IIC and ICIS; however, there is a major change in the recommendations in that a new recommendation has been added to the effect that if the detection devices indicate the possible presence of fissionable material in the baggage of a Soviet Bloc official or on his person, all that would be done would be that the Bureau of Customs would notify the FBI.

The Chairman of ICIS transmitted the Standing Committee draft of June 24 to the Chairman of the IIC by memorandum of June 28, 1955, for IIC comments.

(Tab 5)

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According to the memorandum of transmittal, the positions of the Standing Committee members of the ICIS on the June 24 draft are as follows:

State and Defense in favor of the report. Treasury in favor of only one recommendation, i.e. that no restrictions be imposed on diplomatic pouches and shipments under diplomatic seal. Department of Justice dissents to the report but no dissenting position is shown. CIA has no objection to the report.

The June 24 ICIS Standing Committee draft has been furnished to the military agencies of IIC.

The FBI position and the IIC position with regard to the basic revision, i.e. the new recommendation, should be that the proposed procedure whereby nothing will be done by Customs authorities other than to notify the FBI, is unsatisfactory to the IIC.

An identical proposal had been made by ICIS to IIC in November, 1954. By letter of December 17, 1954, the Chairman of IIC notified the Chairman of ICIS that the IIC members felt that such a policy would facilitate rather than hinder the introduction of fissionable material into the United States and that it would be a serious threat to the internal security to allow Soviet Bloc officials to enter the U. S. without challenge when the detection devices indicated the possible presence of fissionable material on their person or in their baggage. (Tab 2)

Justice Position Proposed by Yeagley:

By memorandum to the Attorney General dated June 29, 1955, J. Walter Yeagley, Justice representative on and Chairman of ICIS, proposed that one of the following positions be adopted as the Justice position: (Tab 8)

(1) That detention of diplomatic shipments or officials from Soviet Bloc countries when detection devices indicate presence of radioactive materials be

made effective immediately rather than on the action of the President on the basis of the needs of the international situation or;

(2) That the pouch be restricted immediately to documentary material contained in sacks or canvas bags no larger than one cubic foot in size and 25 pounds in weight.

As to Yeagley's proposal number 1, we are proposing a challenge of any diplomat or diplomatic shipment which causes a reaction. We think this is more sound than Yeagley's proposal of detention of Soviet bloc only.

As to Yeagley's proposal number 2, this is neither fish nor fowl. It does not give the protection which reduction to a letter size pouch would give, nor would it permit the USA to reap the advantages it now does from the pouch.

Yeagley also suggests that if inspection of the radioactive material reveals that the reaction was caused "by other than nuclear or thermonuclear materials," the shipment should be released, otherwise it must be removed from this country. This is not as "strong" a recommendation as appeared in the June 14 draft. In that draft, nuclear materials would be seized by U.S. authorities.

Present Status:

The reappraisal draft is due to be considered again in the joint committee of IIC and ICIS as soon as the positions of the parent organizations, IIC and ICIS,

are made known. We believe that the IIC position will follow that of the FBI and that it will be resolved during the present week.

The ICIS position has not yet been determined and it is apparently in connection with this that Mr. Yeagley, Chairman of ICIS, wants guidance with regard to a Department of Justice position within ICIS.

Recommendation:

It is respectfully recommended that the Director stick to the FBI position as indicated herein on pages 8, 9 and 10.

LETTER TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL DATED JUNE 30, 1955

The letter to the Attorney General dated June 30, 1955, regarding countermeasures endeavored to present to him a simplified picture of nuclear weapons insofar as size, weight and assembly of clandestine weapons are concerned. This letter pointed out that both atomic and hydrogen bombs can be smuggled in in small component parts and can be assembled by persons having relatively little skill. For example, a small atomic bomb having the explosive power of 5,000 tons of TNT could be put together by one man with relatively little skill in an hour or two and a hydrogen bomb having the explosive power of a million tons of TNT could be assembled by a couple of men in a few hours. [redacted] (S) All other component parts could escape detection in the immunity of a diplomatic pouch. (Tab 6)

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December 17, 1954

VIA LIAISON

Mr. J. Walter Yeagley
Chairman
Interdepartmental Committee on
Internal Security
Department of Justice Building
Washington, D. C.

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Dear Mr. Yeagley:

Reference is made to your letter of November 19, 1954, which requested IIC comments on the proposed policy statement concerning procedures to be followed in the event of detection of fissionable material on the person or in the baggage of an official of a Soviet bloc country. Your letter notes that the ICIS has approved the following policy:

> "If the detection device indicates the possible presence of fissionable material on the person or in the baggage of a Soviet bloc official, the local office of the FBI should be notified immediately by a representative of the Bureau of Customs. Neither the Soviet bloc official nor his baggage should be detained in these circumstances. Further action should not be taken, except as the FBI may consider advisable in connection with its responsibilities under the Atomic Energy Act, as amended."

While it is realized that diplomatic problems may be encountered and while it is realized that the detection devices presently being used cannot be completely accurate, the IIC members feel that such a policy would facilitate rather than hinder the introduction of fissionable material into the United States and that it would be a serious threat to the internal security of the United States to allow Soviet bloc officials to enter the United States without

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challenge when the detection devices indicate the possible presence of fissionable material on their person or in their baggage. To adopt such a rigid policy of noninterference would not only provide such officials with a safe method of introducing component parts of an atomic bomb but would in addition allow them to depart from the port of entry before a surveillance, or other measures, could be instituted by the FBI. While a surveillance would provide information regarding subsequent travel and contacts, it would not clarify the question of the possibility of fissionable material being carried on the person or in the baggage of these officials.

The IIC members feel that, if searches were made in those instances where the detection devices indicate the possible presence of fissionable material, the resulting risk of detection would force the Soviet bloc countries to use less secure means of introducing fissionable material or force them to use the diplomatic pouch which presently also offers a secure means of such introduction.

The IIC cannot agree, therefore, that the suggested policy, quoted above, would aid the efforts being made by the responsible departments and agencies in their efforts to prevent the clandestine introduction of fissionable materials or atomic weapons into the United States.

Sincerely yours,

Chairman
Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference

Draft reports June 14 and 24 omitted from tickler copies.

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The Attorney General

June 30, 1955

Director, FBI

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COUNTERMEASURES REQUIRED TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION-IN-PLACE OF DEMOLITION ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

In line with our conversation during Operation Alert, we have endeavored to secure a simplified picture of nuclear weapons insofar as size, weight and assembly of clandestine weapons are concerned. I thought you would like to have this during any conversation you might have with members of the Cabinet in regard to clandestine entry of such weapons into the United States.

In the field of clandestine weapons, we can consider two major groups: Fission weapons, commonly referred to as atomic weapons, and fusion weapons, popularly known as H-bombs.

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The "explosive" force of nuclear weapons is measured by the force of the equivalent tonnage of TNT.

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EXCERPTS FROM SPECIAL NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE #11-9-55: "CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS UNDER DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY"

Majority View of Intelligence Advisory Committee:

"7. Although the possibility of limited Soviet use of this method of clandestine attack can by no means be excluded, we believe that, since the adverse consequences of premature disclosure would remain and since the chances of detection could not be entirely eliminated, the chances are now slightly better than even that the USSR would not undertake even this more restricted operation."

FBI Dissent:

"It is impossible to predict whether the USSR would or would not attempt to utilize the diplomatic pouch to clandestinely introduce nuclear weapons into the U.S. However, since the USSR is capable of producing nuclear weapons for introduction by this method, a risk will continue to exist as long as present U.S. entry and examination procedures provide limited chance of detection of radioactive material and no chance of identification of such radioactive material as fissionable material in Soviet diplomatic shipments."

An ONI (Navy) dissent also reflects that it concurs in the above FBI dissent and also "would stress that the danger would rise in direct proportion to the ease with which nuclear weapons could be introduced into the U.S. without risk of detection."

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: July 6, 1955

FROM : L. V. BOARDMAN

SUBJECT: REAPPRAISAL OF UNITED STATES POLICY REGARDING SHIPMENTS UNDER DIPLOMATIC SEAL

4-26-04 CLASSIFIED BY uc/nls/BJA/DFW 60267- Derivative
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per ltr dated 4-26-04 60267 uc/nls/BJA/DFW 4-27-04

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The attached memorandum gives in some detail the background of and consideration which has been given to the question of reducing the diplomatic pouch for the purpose of minimizing the risk of clandestine entry of nuclear weapons through the diplomatic pouch.

In 1952, a Special Committee, of which the Bureau was a member, studied this problem, and in December, 1952, recommended to the National Security Council that baggage and effects, including diplomatic pouches, of foreign diplomatic representatives be subjected to examination with detection equipment being devised by AEC, and that diplomatic couriers of the Soviet bloc nations be required to enter the United States through designated ports in order that they might be examined by the technical detection devices.

These recommendations have been met, in part, inasmuch as Soviet bloc representatives are required to enter certain ports, and technical devices have been established at those ports. However, while unaccompanied Soviet bloc shipments are examined physically, and some diplomatic representatives are channeled past detection devices, there is no uniformity of coverage at present.

On a number of occasions, ICIS committees and the National Security Council Planning Board have considered limiting the diplomatic pouch as to size and content, but each time they have concluded that retaliatory measures which would be applied by the Soviet bloc would work to the disadvantage of this country.

In November, 1954, the Bureau dissented before the National Security Council from Admiral Radford's report, which tended to belittle the possibility of clandestine entry of atomic weapons into this country. Subsequently, Allen Dulles

Attachment ← YELLOW ATTACHED. ORIGINAL DETACHED RM 1730
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cc--Mr. Boardman
cc--Mr. Belmont
cc--Mr. Whitson
cc--Mr. Sanders

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raised the question as to whether diplomatic pouches should not be reduced, in view of the threat of clandestine entry of atomic weapons. As a result, we went to Dulles, Coyne and Yeagley with the suggestion that this problem be reexamined. A Joint Committee of ICIS and IIC was set up under the auspices of the National Security Council to study this problem, and is still studying it. On June 14, this Joint Committee rendered a draft report which takes cognizance of the fact the United States now has detection devices which will indicate the presence of radio active material, although the device will not indicate the presence of properly [redacted] b1 [redacted] and will react to radio active substances of (S) commercial nature as well as to fissionable material; that fissionable material can be brought in in very small portions, no larger than a disc 5½ inches in diameter, 3/4 inch thick, and weighing 4 pounds; that the diplomatic pouch would have to be reduced to letter size in order to guard against introduction of such small pieces of fissionable material; [redacted] b2 b7E [redacted] foodstuffs; and that any restriction of the Soviet pouch would result in drastic retaliation.

The draft report recommended no size or weight restrictions at this time on diplomatic shipments; increased use of detection devices against all diplomatic traffic at the five ports through which Soviet bloc shipments pass; a recording system on the results of the use of detection devices; a continuous review of those results, looking toward further restrictive steps if any nation recurrently attempts to introduce radio active material; a detention of Soviet bloc pouches or diplomatic shipments if the President determines that the international situation requires the United States to look first to its security; a like procedure to be applied to diplomatic shipments or personnel of any country if the President so invokes.

In our memorandum of June 23, 1955, to the Director, we took the position that (1) if the United States wants the maximum possible security against clandestine introduction

~~SECRET~~

of nuclear weapon components in the pouch, the pouch should be reduced to letter size; (2) if the United States does not want maximum security, the pouch could be limited in size to prevent the introduction of an assembled H-bomb; (3) that diplomatic personnel should be required to account for any substance causing reaction of detection devices, at the time the reaction occurs--(This is not done now); (4) that with the above additions, the FBI and the IIC could accept the Committee draft report.

We have called our position to the attention of other members of the IIC. However, they have not as yet committed themselves to a position.

Walter Yeagley, by memorandum to the Attorney General dated June 29, 1955, proposed that Justice take one of two positions before the ICIS on this matter: (1) that when a diplomatic shipment or personnel from Soviet bloc causes reaction on the device, such be detained immediately rather than waiting for action by the President; or (2) that the pouch be restricted immediately to documentary material contained in sacks or canvas bags no larger than one cubic foot in size and 25 pounds in weight.

Yeagley's first recommendation is not sound in that it requires detention and is restricted to the Soviet bloc. Our proposal requires challenge for explanation and applies to all countries. Yeagley's recommendation No. 2 is not sound unless the pouch could be opened to visibly examine whether the contents were solely documentary. This would pose a very real problem from the diplomatic standpoint.

BUREAU'S POSITION AT ATTORNEY GENERAL'S CONFERENCE

We feel that the Director should take the position that, as a security agency, the FBI must take the position security can only be achieved by reducing the diplomatic pouch to letter size. Any other measures cannot produce security. Further, that all diplomatic personnel and/or shipments must pass before the detection devices and, if a reaction occurs, appropriate explanations be secured prior to the passage of such persons or shipments into this country.

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Memorandum to Director from Boardman July 6, 1955

It is recommended, therefore, that:

(1) FBI advise ICIS that if the United States wants security against clandestine introduction of nuclear weapon components in the diplomatic pouch, the pouch should be reduced to letter size; that this is a decision to be made at high policy level as to whether the value to the United States of security by such a proposed reduction is outweighed by the value accruing to the United States through its present use of the unrestricted size of the diplomatic pouch.

(2) That regardless of whether the diplomatic pouch is reduced in size, immediate steps should be taken to channel all diplomatic personnel and diplomatic shipments in those ports to which the Soviet bloc is now restricted through the technical detection devices now in use.

1/

This doesn't make sense. certainly you are not going to confine all diplomatic personnel & shipments of all countries to entry thru the 5 Soviet bloc ports.

H.

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ONLY HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
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Exhibit 5 filed separately.

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DATE 5-18-04 BY 60267 ue/nls/BJA/DFW

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Director

DATE: July 8, 1955

FROM : L. V. Boardman

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-9-03 BY SP4 BJA/DFW

D 948742/950935/997059

SUBJECT: REAPPRAISAL OF UNITED STATES POLICY REGARDING SHIPMENTS UNDER DIPLOMATIC SEAL

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Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

Re memorandum Boardman to the Director July 6, 1955, in which appeared the following statement: "That regardless of whether the diplomatic pouch is reduced in size, immediate steps should be taken to channel all diplomatic personnel and diplomatic shipments in those ports to which the Soviet Bloc is now restricted through the technical detection devices now in use."

You indicated: "This doesn't make sense. Certainly you are not going to compel all diplomatic personnel and shipments of all countries to enter through the 5 Soviet bloc ports."

This will confirm the oral explanation furnished to you on July 7, 1955, by Assistant Director Belmont. Diplomatic personnel of countries other than the Soviet Bloc may enter the United States through whatever ports they choose. Soviet Bloc diplomatic personnel are limited to five ports of entry.

The language used was intended to express the idea that all diplomatic personnel and all diplomatic shipments which entered through those five ports should be channelled past the detection devices. This is not only desirable as a security measure but it will provide for uniformity of operation and will give the Soviet Bloc no basis for a claim that they are being discriminated against.

It is regretted this was not clear.

RECOMMENDATION:

None. For your information.

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117-268-812

JUL 14 1955

certainly the language used should not state that all diplomatic personnel and all diplomatic shipments which entered through those five ports should be channelled past the detection devices. This is not only desirable as a security measure but it will provide for uniformity of operation and will give the Soviet Bloc no basis for a claim that they are being discriminated against. It is regretted this was not clear.

cc - Boardman
Belmont
Sanders
Whitson

LW:blb
(6)

117-268

SENT DIRECTOR 7-9-55

60 JUL 20 1955

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: July 12, 1955

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

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Winterrowd
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Holloman
Gandy

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-9-03 BY SP4 BJA/DFW

I 948742/950936/997059

SUBJECT: REAPPRAISAL OF U.S. POLICY REGARDING SHIPMENTS UNDER DIPLOMATIC SEAL

At 12:45 p.m., 7/12/55, Supervisor Whitson, while discussing another matter with Mr. Leonard Bienvenu, Executive Secretary of the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS), asked Bienvenu what the ICIS had done about the captioned matter. Bienvenu was reminded that ICIS had received a letter on July 11 from the IIC setting out the IIC position as discussed by the Director of the FBI with the Attorney General and Mr. Yeagley of ICIS on July 7, 1955.

Mr. Bienvenu stated that the departments represented in the ICIS had not yet made their positions known to the ICIS Secretariat regarding the IIC position. He stated that Justice, pursuant to the Attorney General's instructions, would adopt the IIC position but he did not know what the other departments would do. He stated he would attempt to have expressions from the other departments of ICIS besides Justice by the close of business July 12 and that he would keep the IIC informed of developments. As soon as the positions of the various ICIS members are known, the Joint IIC-ICIS Committee can draft a fresh report.

RECOMMENDATION:

None. For your information. This matter is being followed.

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LW:blow
(5)
cc - LVBoardman
AHBelmont
ESSanders
LWhitson

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59 JUL 20 1955

LIAISON

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR

DATE: 6/14/55

FROM : CLYDE TOLSON

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-1083 BY SP2 bjalkford

SUBJECT: CONTINENTAL DEFENSE PROGRESS REPORT (NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING, JUNE 16, 1955)

Summary of attached brief.

On June 16, 1955 the National Security Council will consider at Fort Ritchie the Continental Defense Progress Report.

There are no known questions or problems which will arise in connection with this report pertaining to IIC.

The document to be considered is the NSC Progress Report on the Continental Defense Program. The Continental Defense Program encompasses the various programs of the several agencies of government dealing with our defense in meeting possible Soviet aggression against the United States.

The elements within this program of interest to IIC are the FBI programs of coverage of Soviet Bloc Representatives in the United States and investigations leading to the detention of known subversives in the event of an emergency.

The Bureau has materially intensified its coverage of Soviet Bloc Representatives as a result of additional funds made available to the Bureau for Fiscal Year 1955. While this coverage increases our counter-intelligence coverage it cannot assure that atomic weapons or their component parts can be kept out of the United States, nor does it give assurance that they will be discovered if brought to the United States.

With respect to the detention of known subversives in the event of an emergency, while the number of such subversive individuals is not set out in the report, for your information as of June 10, 1955 there were approximately 22,434 such individuals on the detention list and the FBI is in a high state of readiness for implementing this program if necessary.

ENCL. Collateral to the subjects of primary interest to IIC, IIC has a collateral interest in other phases of the program to be discussed.

The ICIS sponsored a field testing of six passive (non-lethal) type detection devices at the docks in New York, at Idlewild Airport and at the International Airport at San Antonio, Texas. Portable

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detectors have been given limited field tests, particularly on ship searches, and 16 are on order for more extensive tests with motor vehicles and railroad traffic. IIC and ICIS are preparing to submit to the National Security Council a limited national program for the utilization of these detection devices.

A Joint IIC-ICIS Committee is currently studying the problem pertaining to diplomatic pouches to prevent clandestine introduction of atomic weapons through that medium. This report will be submitted to IIC and ICIS for consideration within a few days prior to being submitted to the NSC.

The FBI favors limiting the sizes of the pouches but the Joint IIC-ICIS Committee probably will not go along with this view.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

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TO : L. V. Boardman

DATE: June 27, 1955

FROM : A. H. Belmont

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 11-04-03 BY SP4 bjd/DFW Per letr. dtd 11-04-03 60267 uc/NSS/BJA/DFW 11/6/03

SUBJECT: PROBABILITY OF CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS UNDER DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE (IAC)

Reference is made to my memorandum of May 25, 1955, which reflected that a formal request by the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS) was directed to the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) requesting an estimate on the captioned matter. The ICIS made this request in spite of objection by three of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (IIC) members, including the Bureau, which are also members of IAC.

As was pointed out in the memorandum from Boardman to the Director, June 23, 1955, captioned "Countermeasures Required to Detect and Defend Against the Clandestine Introduction and Detonation-in-Place of Demolition Atomic Weapons in the United States," the IIC position has been that the question of probability is not the controlling factor but that the controlling factor is the Soviet capability coupled with lack of defense against the use of the diplomatic pouch. Furthermore, the IIC position has been that the IAC does not have the facts upon which an estimate of probable Kremlin planning in this regard can be made. (This position has been and will again be brought to the attention of the ICIS and the joint committee of IIC and ICIS studying the reappraisal of U. S. policy regarding the diplomatic pouch.)

The ICIS request to IAC was assigned to an IAC working group and Supervisor M. W. Kuhrtz of the Liaison Section has been following this group's consideration of the matter. Enclosed is a draft of a proposed estimate for IAC consideration.

The estimate is very brief, containing only 7 paragraphs. After making the assumption that the USSR had decided to launch an all-out attack on the U. S., the estimate reviews in 4 paragraphs the general concepts of clandestine attack and open military attack. The substance of the estimate with regard to the diplomatic pouch appears in paragraph 7, which states:

ENCL

Enclosure (1)

cc - Boardman
Belmont
Roach
Kuhrtz
Sandefur
Whitson

LW:blb (7)

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"Although the possibility of limited Soviet use by this method of clandestine attack cannot be excluded, we believe that, since the adverse consequences of premature disclosure would not have been reduced and since the chances of detection would not have been entirely eliminated, the chances are slightly better than even that the USSR would not undertake even this more restricted operation."

The Bureau usually abstains from any position in the IAC estimates; however, since paragraph 7 takes a position contrary to that which has been taken by the IIC and, in fact, is not based on the accepted views elsewhere in the draft, it is suggested that the FBI take an exception to paragraph 7 through the insertion of an alternate paragraph in the final document, incorporating our views.

It is proposed that the following ideas be included in such an exception:

"It is impossible to predict whether the USSR would or would not attempt to utilize the diplomatic pouch to clandestinely introduce nuclear weapons into the U.S. In addition, since the USSR is capable of producing nuclear weapons for introduction by this method, a risk will continue to exist as long as present U. S. entry and examination procedures provide limited chance of detection of radioactive material and no chance of identification of such radioactive material as fissionable material in Soviet diplomatic shipments."

It is pointed out that State, Central Intelligence Agency, Air Force and Joint Chiefs of Staff representatives have remained firm in their agreement with the wording that "chances are slightly better than even that the USSR would not undertake even this more restricted operation." It is pointed out that no evidence exists to conclude that the Soviets either would or would not use the diplomatic pouch for this purpose. The Bureau representative at the IAC working group meetings has continually pointed out the above position as maintained by the Bureau in the joint IIC-ICIS study on this matter.

Memo for Boardman

G-2 (Army) and ONI (Navy) have also taken exceptions to the IAC estimate and it is indicated that they will possibly join with the Bureau in an alternate paragraph expressing the above views.

ACTION:

If you approve, the Bureau representative will take a footnote exception to the IAC estimate with the request that an additional concluding paragraph, expressing our views along the lines set forth above, be reflected in the final IAC document. This estimate is scheduled for consideration at the IAC meeting at 10:45 A. M. on June 28, 1955.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. L. V. Boardman

DATE: July 1, 1955

FROM : Mr. A. H. Belmont

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-9-03 BY SP4bja/dcw

SUBJECT: PROBABILITY OF CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS UNDER DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE (IAC)

Reference is made to my memorandum of June 27 last on the captioned matter in which the Director approved Bureau dissent to an IAC estimate on the captioned matter, which estimate was requested by the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS). As was pointed out, Bureau dissent is to the concluding paragraph of the estimate which reflected that "chances are slightly better than even, that the USSR would not undertake even this more restricted operation" of introducing nuclear weapons clandestinely by means of the diplomatic pouch.

Liaison Agent M. W. Kuhrtz attended the IAC meeting on June 28 last when this matter was considered. It was pointed out by the Bureau representative that the conclusion is not based on any fact or intelligence, but is merely an attempt to "read the Kremlin's mind" and, therefore, guess that the chances are slightly better than even, that the USSR would not undertake an operation of this kind. It was further pointed out that the question of probability of the Soviets using the diplomatic pouch for nuclear weapons is not the controlling factor but that the controlling factor is the Soviet capability coupled with the lack of defense against the use of the diplomatic pouch.

Mr. Allen Dulles, Chairman, IAC, agreed that the conclusion is a "guess" adding that he has been concerned about the Soviet use of the diplomatic pouch for some time and referred to his conversation with the Director on this matter in the past.

The attached advance copy reflects the Bureau dissent as approved in referenced memorandum. The footnote dissent reads as follows:

"It is impossible to predict whether the USSR would or would not attempt to utilize the diplomatic pouch to clandestinely introduce nuclear weapons into the U.S. However, since the USSR is capable

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Enclosure
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1 - Mr. Boardman
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Whitson
1 - Mr. Sanders
1 - Liaison Section
1- Mr. Kuhrtz

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of producing nuclear weapons for introduction by this method, a risk will continue to exist as long as present U. S. entry and examination procedures provide limited chance of detection of radioactive material and no chance of identification of such radioactive material as fissionable material in Soviet diplomatic shipments."

An ONI (Navy) dissent also reflects that it concurs in the above FBI dissent and also "would stress that the danger would rise in direct proportion to the ease with which nuclear weapons could be introduced into the U. S. without risk of detection."

ACTION:

None. The above is submitted for information.

~~SECRET~~ Whitson

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

116-80120

117-268-

BY COURIER SERVICE

Date: July 18, 1955

To: Captain John A. Waters (original & 1)
Director of Security
Atomic Energy Commission
Room 2314, T-5 Building
16th and Constitution Avenue, N.W.
Washington 25, D. C.

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: [redacted] b7C
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

This will confirm the advice furnished to you orally by FBI Liaison July 1, 1955. [redacted]

[redacted] b7C

[redacted] baggage was checked it caused a reaction on the detection device for fissionable material.

Mr. Harry Walsh, Assistant Director of Security, Atomic Energy Commission, New York City, informed the New York office of this Bureau that the Health and Safety Laboratories, Radiation Branch, Atomic Energy Commission, New York City, was cognizant of the arrival of these ore samples and indicated that their introduction was not in violation of AEC regulations. Mr. Walsh stated that as long as the amounts of ore imported are extremely small and are declared as ore samples in the manifest the Atomic Energy Commission raises no objection.

cc - 117-268
cc - 1 - Assistant Attorney General (By O-6 routing slip
William F. Tompkins (on same date)

LW:Blo
(6)

50 JUL 22 1955

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Air-Tel

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. Boardman	
Mr. Nichols	
Mr. Belmont	
Mr. Harbo	
Mr. Mohr	
Mr. Parsons	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Tamm	
Mr. Sizoo	
Mr. Winterrowd	
Tele. Room	
Mr. Holloman	
Miss Gandy	

6/29/55, New York

Bureau

[redacted]

b7C

Smuggling of Atomic Bombs

HARRY WALSH, Assistant Director of Security, AEC, NYC, was advised by the NYO of the above. WALSH subsequently related that the Health and Safety Laboratories, Radiation Branch of the Radiation Branch of the AEC, NYC, was cognizant of the arrival of these small amounts of these ore samples and indicated that same was not in violation of AEC regulations. As a practical matter, WALSH stated that as long as the amounts of ore imported are extremely small and are declared as ore samples on the manifest, the AEC raises no objection to this practice. No further investigation contemplated.

b7C

KELLY

3-Bureau (Registered Mail)

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FBI - INJUSTICE
RECORD SECTION

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

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Per ltr. dtd. 10-29-03
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Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Sizoo
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy
BRANIGAN

WASH 6 FROM NEW YORK 28 4-32 PM

DIRECTOR URGENT

SMUGGLING ATOM BOMBS

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF OR OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES, AEA. US CUSTOMS, NYC, ADVISED THAT ON JUNE TWENTY-EIGHT, FIFTY-FIVE, EXPERIMENTATION WAS BEING CONDUCTED WITH A DEVICE USED TO DETECT FISSIONABLE MATERIAL AT US POST OFFICE "MORGAN ANNEX, THREE FOUR ONE NINTH AVENUE, NYC." ACCORDING TO CUSTOMS, THE DETECTION DEVICE USED AT THIS POST OFFICE IS DIFFERENT THAN THE ONE HITHERTO USED EITHER AT IDLEWILD AIRPORT OR AT THE PIERS IN NYC. THE DEVICE WAS BEING UTILIZED ON PACKAGES IN ORDER TO DETERMINE ITS EFFICIENCY. A PACKAGE WEIGHING ABOUT THREE POUNDS, ADDRESSED TO PHILLIP BROS., INC., SEVENTY PINE STREET, NY, city FIVE, NY, WAS PASSED BY THIS MACHINE. THE MACHINE BEING UTILIZED REGISTERED A COUNT OF TWO THOUSAND, WHICH IS DESCRIBED BY CUSTOMS AS BEING VERY HIGH. SAID PACKAGE BORE THE RETURN NAME AND ADDRESS OF [redacted] b7C [redacted] WHILE IT WAS NOT SO DESIGNATED, CUSTOMS ADVISED THAT THE PACKAGE HAD BEEN MAILED FROM ITALY. IN ADDITION, THIS PACKAGE BORE THE WORD "SAMPLES" ON IT. UPON THE

INDEXED - 77
INDEXED - 77
JUL 14 1955

Waters, AEC was initially advised by Bates, Dept. on 6 pm 6-27-55 mkc

END PAGE ONE

Mr. Belmont

cc Branigan

PACKAGE BEING OPENED, IT WAS FOUND TO CONTAIN ABOUT THREE POUNDS OF RAW ORE, THE EXACT MAKE-UP OF WHICH WAS NOT KNOWN, BUT WHICH CONTAINED FISSUIONABLE MATERIALS IN VIEW OF THE REACTION OF THE MACHINE. CUSTOMS THEN IMMEDIATELY CONTACTED AEC, NYC, AND WERE ADVISED THAT AEC WOULD MAKE A RECORD OF THIS MATTER, BUT THAT THE ORE SHOULD BE RELEASED TO THE CONSIGNEE. INDICES NYO REVIEWED ON CONSIGNOR AND CONSIGNEE, ND NO IDENTIFIABLE RECORD LOCATED. US CUSTOMS ADVISED MATERIAL WOULD BE RELEASED TO CONSIGNEE. NYO CONDUCTING CHECK THROUGH USUSAL SOURCES TO FURTHER IDENTIFY CONSIGNEE AND BUREAU WILL BE IMMEDIATELY ADVISED OF RESULTS OF THIS CHECK. FOREGOING FOR INFO.

KELLY

HOLD

JUSTICE

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cc - Boardman
Belmont
Whitson

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ON 4-9-03
Per Ltr. d+d. 10-29-03 60267 uc/mcs/bs 10/30/03

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Date: July 1, 1955

To: Captain John A. Waters BY COURIER SERVICE
Director of Security
Atomic Energy Commission (orig and 1)
Room 2314, T-5 Building
16th and Constitution Avenue, N. W.
Washington 25, D. C.

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

This will confirm the oral information supplied to Captain John A. Waters, Director of Security, by F.B.I. Liaison, June 28, 1955.

The F.B.I. was advised by U. S. Customs, New York City, on June 28, 1955, that experimentation was being conducted with a detection device for fissionable material at the Morgan Annex Station, 341 Ninth Avenue, New York City. A package, weighing about three pounds, addressed to Phillip Brothers, Inc., 70 Pine Street, New York 5, New York, was passed by the device which registered the presence of radioactive material. Customs advises that the package had been mailed from Italy and bore the return [redacted] b7C

According to Customs, the package was opened and was found to contain about three pounds of raw ore. Customs thereupon contacted the Atomic Energy Commission office in New York City. The Atomic Energy Commission representative informed Customs that the Atomic Energy Commission would make a record of the

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cc - 1 - AAG Tompkins by r.s. 0-6 same date.

BY COURIER SVC.
1 JUL 1
COMM-FBI

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Gandy

59 JUL 25 1955

~~SECRET~~

Letter to Captain John A. Waters
Director of Security
Atomic Energy Commission

matter but that the ore should be released to the consignee.

Phillip Brothers, Incorporated, 70 Pine Street, New York City, has never been the subject of investigation by the F.B.I. It reputedly has nine domestic subsidiary companies and one Canadian company and wholesales, imports and exports ores, metals and minerals.

Since the Atomic Energy Commission representative in New York has advised Customs to release the package to the consignee, no investigation will be conducted by the F.B.I.

cc - 1 - Director BY COURIER SERVICE
Central Intelligence Agency
2430 E Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Attention: Deputy Director, Plans

cc - 1 - Chief, Intelligence Division BY COURIER SERVICE
Coast Guard Headquarters
1300 A Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

cc - 1 - Mr. Chester A. Emerick BY COURIER SERVICE
Deputy Commissioner, Investigations
Bureau of Customs
Room 7048
Internal Revenue Service Building
Washington 25, D. C.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JUN 29 1955

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Mr. Tolson
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Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Sizoo
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy
BRANIGAN

WASHINGTON FROM NEW YORK 13 29 9-27P

DIRECTOR ....U R G E N T....

SMUGGLING ATOM BOMBS

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF OR OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE US, AEC. RENYTEL TO BUREAU JUNE TWENTY EIGHT, LAST. [redacted] ADVISES PHILIPP BROTHERS INC., SEVEN ZERO PINE STREET, NYC, HAS NINE DOMESTIC SUBSIDIARY COMPANIES AND ONE CANADIAN COMPANY, WHICH WHOLESALES, IMPORTS AND EXPORTS ORES, METALS, MINERALS AND TO A LESSER EXTENT CHEMICALS. [redacted] DESCRIBES PHILIPP BROTHERS AS AN OLD AND ESTABLISHED CONCERN MAINTAINING A RECORD OF PROGRESSIVE AND PROFITABLE OPERATIONS. STARTED NINETEEN SIXTEEN, IN SOUND FINANCIAL CONDITION, NET WORTH EIGHT MILLION DOLLARS. [redacted] ADVISES THE FOLLOWING ARE OFFICERS OF PHILIPP BROTHERS INC.-- PRESIDENT, SIEGFRIED ULLMANN. VICE PRESIDENT, LEO FORCHHEIMER. ASSISTANT TREASURER, MAX LONNER. ASSISTANT SECRETARY, RUDOLPH FORCHHEIMER. VICE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY, ARTURO GRUENEBAUM. TREASURER, LUDWIG JESSELSON. ASSISTANT TREASURER, ERNST L. FRANK. FILES OF NYO CONTAINED NO PERTINENT INFORMATION RELATIVE TO ANY OFFICERS OF THE COMPANY

b2
b7D

END PAGE ONE

Mr. Belmont

RECORDED - 77
INDEXED - 77

117-268-11

EX-125

21 JUL 14 1955

cc Branigan

~~SECRET~~

NY FILE ONE ZERO ZERO DASH SEVEN FIVE ONE EIGHT DASH EIGHT SIX NINE, PAGE FIVE ZERO, ENTITLED, ~~QUOTE~~ "NATIONAL COUNCIL OF AMERICAN SOVIET FRIENDSHIP INC." ~~UNQUOTE~~, REFLECTS THAT PHILIPP BROTHERS INC., IN NINETEEN FORTY SIX CONTRIBUTED FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS TO THE NATIONAL COUNCILS BOOK, ENTITLED, ~~QUOTE~~ "AMERICAN INDUSTRY COMMEMORATES THE TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF SOVIET DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS" ~~UNQUOTE~~. CASE ENTITLED ~~QUOTE~~ "YUGOSLAV FUNDS, IS DASH YU ~~UNQUOTE~~", BUFILE ONE ZERO FIVE DASH TWO ZERO FIVE ZERO, REFLECTS THAT INFORMATION FURNISHED NYO [redacted] IN NINETEEN FIFTY AND FIFTY ONE THAT b7D PHILIPP BROTHERS INC. MADE REMITTANCES OF NEARLY ONE MILLION DOLLARS PER MONTH TO YUGOMETAL, BELGRADE, YUGOSLAVIA. IN VIEW OF THE NATURE OF THE BUSINESS OF THE CONSIGNEE OF PACKAGE MENTIONED IN REFERENCED TELETYPE, AND SINCE AEC HAS BEEN ADVISED OF THE NATURE OF THE CONTENTS OF THE PACKAGE, BY CUSTOMS, NYC, AND SINCE AEC ADVISED THE PACKAGE SHOULD BE RELEASED TO THE CONSIGNEE, THE NYO CONTEMPLATES NO FURTHER INVESTIGATION IN THIS CASE, UACB.

KELLY

END

NY R 13 WA MLR

~~SECRET~~

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: July 12, 1955

FROM : L. V. BOARDMAN

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-10-03 BY SP4BJA/DFD
#948742/950935/997059

SUBJECT: LIMITING DIPLOMATIC POUCHES

Reference is made to memorandum of July 7, 1955, from Mr. Belmont to me which advised that Special Agent Sanders had obtained the concurrence of Admiral Espe, General Carroll, and General Trudeau with the Bureau's position in connection with limiting diplomatic pouches to prevent the clandestine introduction of atomic weapons. Their concurrence established the Bureau's position as the IIC position, and an appropriate letter was forwarded to the ICIS under date of July 11, 1955. A copy was furnished to the Attorney General for his information.

On the July 7, 1955, memorandum from Mr. Belmont to me you noted, "I can't understand why this couldn't have been resolved sooner. It wasn't till I mentioned it at last IIC meeting that I learned there was no real objection to FBI position. Up till then I had been led to believe there was a badly split IIC. Here again Sanders should have been more diligent."

The definite split among the IIC agencies had occurred at the Working Committee level consideration of this problem. OSI was having trouble arriving at a position due to a position being taken by Air Intelligence. The Navy Representatives on the working level were objecting strenuously to requiring a foreign diplomat to identify material causing a reaction on a detection device at the time the reaction occurred and, as indicated in the July 7, 1955, memorandum, G-2 was recommending that a statement be included to the effect that partial security could be obtained by keeping the pouches down to a size within the 39-inch range of the detection devices. Every effort was being made to obtain an IIC position in this matter, but the conflicting views had prevented a solidified IIC position prior to July 7. Sanders has advised that your very firm statement of the Bureau's position at the meeting on

ESS:hke
(5)
1-Mr. Boardman
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Sanders
1-Section Tickler

RECORDED-52 117-268-816
INDEXED-52
21 JUL 15 1955

LIAISON

58 JUL 22 1955

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 66-3800-1

July 6 aided greatly in resolving this matter. After this matter was discussed by the IIC members in your office, Sanders personally contacted General Carroll, Admiral Espe, and General Trudeau and discussed the Bureau's position with them, which they then approved. This brought the matter to a quick, logical conclusion, in which the Bureau's position was adopted as the IIC position.

ACTION:

I thought the foregoing would be of interest to you inasmuch as it indicates the manner in which the IIC was split and how this matter was brought to a conclusion.

7/13/55 - It shouldn't be necessary for you to have to crystallize the "thinking" of the other IIC members. I will follow these matters with Sanders more emphatically in the future in an effort to resolve these problems as promptly as possible.

LVB

I certainly agree. Certainly our representative on the working committee should be able to act with the authority of his principal.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: July 7, 1955

FROM : MR. A. H. BELMONT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-10-03 BY SP4 BJA/DTW II 948742/950935/997059

SUBJECT: LIMITING DIPLOMATIC POUCHES

Tolson
Boardman
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Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

Liaison Supervisor Sanders has contacted members of the Working Committee of the IIC to insist on action today (July 7), if at all possible, on the IIC position as to whether limitations should be placed on diplomatic pouches. The Working Committee members advised Sanders that they would attempt to have the heads of their agencies crystallize their positions today, as the Working Committee has to refer this to the heads of the agencies for a decision.

Attached is a draft of a proposed letter to Yeagley, Chairman of the ICIS, expressing the IIC position on this matter in line with the Bureau's position. Sanders is carrying this to the other members of IIC and is attempting to have either concurrence or dissent today. If there is concurrence, the letter can go through as written. If there is dissent, the dissenting views will be reflected in the letter. However, we are making every attempt to present a united front.

RECORDED - 40 117-268-811

This attached draft of a letter to Yeagley conforms with the Bureau's position, in that it does not concur with the Joint IIC-ICIS Committee recommendations in its June 14, 1955, draft report, insofar as those recommendations call for no size or weight restrictions to be placed on Soviet bloc diplomatic pouches and call for action to be taken concerning diplomatic personnel or shipments only if the President determines that the international situation so warrants at a particular time.

INDEXED - 40

27 JUL 18 1955

The draft letter states the Bureau's position that if the United States wants security, the pouch should be reduced to letter size, including a reduction of size in shipments under diplomatic seal or a physical examination of such shipments. The letter points out that whether this action should be taken is a decision to be made at a high-policy level, based on a weighing of the values of security as opposed to the value accruing to this country through its present use of the unrestricted size of the diplomatic pouch.

Attachment ENCL 1
AHB:LLee
(5)
cc--Mr. Boardman
cc--Mr. Belmont
cc--Mr. Whitson
cc--Mr. Sanders

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 62-91083-1 62-91083-1 62-91083-1

SMUGGLING ATOM BOMBS

This certainly is not my view. The word "pouch" has become a misnomer - it can be a pound or a ton. At the latter [illegible] tomorrow [illegible] call it a "shipment." Hoover

memo from Mr. Belmont to Mr. Boardman 7-7-55 with suggested letter

Memo to Boardman from Belmont July 7, 1955

Re: LIMITING DIPLOMATIC POUCHES

The meat of our position is set forth in paragraph 3 of page 1 and the next 2 paragraphs on page 2. The remaining items in the proposed draft are matters on which we feel we should go on record in connection with the June 14 draft of the Joint Committee and a proposal of the Standing Committee of the ICIS.

ACTION:

As stated above, Sanders is carrying this letter around to the other IIC members and insisting that an immediate decision be made by those members.

Let me know what decision is reached by other IIC members

K.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JUL 12 1955

TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Sizoo
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

GRANTGAN

WASH 5 FROM NEW YORK 12 2-45 PM #217,484

DIRECTOR URGENT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8/27/85 BY SP2 [illegible]

ATOM BOMBS

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF OR OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES, AEA. U. S. CUSTOMS ADVISED AT NINE THIRTY AM, JULY TWELVE, FIFTY FIVE, THE FOLLOWING....

[redacted]

b7C

SEVERAL MINERAL AND ORE SPECIMENS. THESE SPECIMENS, WHEN PASSING SPECIAL DEVICE AT AIRPORT, ACTIVATED DEVICE TO TOP READING ON BOTH SIDES. ORE SPECIMENS DETERMINED BY CUSTOMS TO BE URANANITE ORE IN ROCK, WEIGHING TEN OUNCES, UNREFINED. AEC ADVISED BY CUSTOMS, DECLARED NO INTEREST BY AEC IN ORE. [redacted]

[redacted]

b7C

[redacted]

[redacted]

27 JUL 20 1955

END PAGE ONE

Mr. Belmont

5 White

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

[redacted] b7C

NO FURTHER ACTION CONTEMPLATED NY. LA AND SF ADVISED.

KELLY

JEND

NY R 5 WA BLW

TU DISC

NO DISSEMINATION BECAUSE (1) SPECIMENS WERE DECLARED IN CUSTOMS DECLARATION; (2) AEC, NY DECLARED NOT INTERESTED; (3) TO FBI

[redacted] b7C

LW

THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
American Embassy
Paris 8, France

Date: June 14, 1955

To: Director, FBI

WTB From: Legat, Paris (117-8)

Subject: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT
(Bufile 117-268)

[redacted]
UNKNOWN SUBJECTS;
[redacted] b7C b7D
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT
(Bufile [redacted])

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-10-03 BY SP4 BJA/DFW
II 948742/ 950935/997059

ReBulet 6/3/55.

[redacted] OSI, Paris, was recontacted regarding [redacted] had not been interviewed concerning the information furnished about the smuggling of atomic bombs into the United States, [redacted] previously been interviewed by OSI on other matters. [redacted] indicated that his headquarters had declined to interview [redacted] the smuggling of atomic material into the United States because the previous interviews [redacted] unreliable. b7C b7D

[redacted] advised that in view of the position of his headquarters on this matter, [redacted] not be interviewed by OSI, although he would [redacted] address for this office.

Pending Bureau instructions, no action is being taken by this office to interview [redacted]

WTB:CM
(5)

OSI Ltg - requesting [illegible]
OSI Enclosure [illegible]
interviewed - [illegible]
cpd 6/15/55 PSS

117-268-
RECORDED - 83

Ltr to Legat, Paris
LW
7-15-55

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

Tolson

RECORDED - 83

~~SECRET~~ - AIR COURIER

DECLASSIFIED BY SP4BJA/DFW
ON 4-10-03
D 948742/ 950935/997059

Date: July 15, 1955

To: Legal Attache (117-8 (orig & 1)
Paris, France

From: Director, FBI

Subject: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT
(Bufile 117-268)

[redacted]

UNKNOWN SUBJECTS;

[redacted]

b7C
b7D

ATOMIC ENERGY ACT
(Bufile [redacted]

Reurlet 6/14/55. OSI, Washington, D. C., has requested OSI, Europe, to reconsider and interview [redacted] this case.

cc - 1 - Foreign Liaison Unit

LW:blo
(6)

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

2 JUL 19 1955

LEGAT
24 JUL 19
COMM - FBI

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: July 6, 1955

FROM : MR. A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: LIMITING DIPLOMATIC POUCHES

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-10-03 BY SP4 BJA/DFW
1944742/950935/997059

Item 8 on the IIC Agenda for today concerns limitations on the diplomatic pouch. This matter is still in the stage of consideration by the Joint ICIS - IIC Committee. This Committee's draft of June 14th was analyzed by us as reflected by the attached memorandum of June 23, 1955, wherein we took a position contrary to the Committee conclusions and recommendations and we recommended that the IIC agencies consider the Committee draft likewise and take a position. As of now, OSI has advised that they are still trying to coordinate with Air Intelligence (A-2) to arrive at an Air Force position. ONI has advised that Admiral Espe has considered the matter and is not yet ready to take a position. Espe may bring the matter up at the IIC conference this afternoon. G-2 has advised that General Trudeau agrees with the Bureau's suggestions and the suggested IIC position.

ICIS has not yet taken a position and the Attorney General has called a conference for tomorrow morning to determine the Justice Department position to be taken in ICIS. An ICIS standing committee considered the June 14th draft of the Joint Committee and suggested a recommendation be added to the draft report to the effect that if Customs detects radio active material in the baggage or on the person of a diplomat, Customs should notify FBI and take no further action. ICIS had previously suggested this step in November 1954 and IIC took a position at that time that such a step would merely facilitate the introduction of fissionable material through diplomatic shipments and IIC was opposed to it. The 3 other IIC members have been notified of this recent ICIS suggestion and of the position we previously took concerning it.

The FBI position on the pending Joint Committee report still stands as set forth on pages 3, 4, and 5 of the attached memorandum of June 23rd. The material for the Director's use at the Attorney General's conference tomorrow morning will contain the entire background on this matter.

Enclosure
AHB:mn
(5) cc - Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Whitson
Mr. Sanders

ENCL. RECORDED - 40
EX-108
27 JUL 19 1955

LIAISON

117-268-829
Memo from Mr. Belmont to Mr. Boardman - 7-7-55 with suggested letter to ICIS and A.G. - 7-11-55 - ESS

OSMED 1 INC ATTN ROOM 5

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 62-90038-

62-86003

Memorandum for Mr. Boardman

Attached for your information is a draft of a proposed letter to ICIS setting forth the IIC position on this matter. This draft has been circulated to the other 3 IIC agencies but, as stated above, those agencies, with the exception of G-2, have not as yet completed their action in connection therewith.

1. I don't like No 2 in the draft. It weakens our own all position.
2. I want this problem promptly disposed of by the Working Com.

K.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: July 7, 1955

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: LIMITING DIPLOMATIC POUCHES

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-10-03 BY SP4BJA/DFW
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Liaison Supervisor Sanders today contacted Colonel Murray and General Carroll of OSI and discussed with them the Bureau's suggested IIC position relating to limitations on the diplomatic pouches. General Carroll approved the IIC position suggested by the Bureau.

Sanders discussed this matter with Captain Jones, the ONI member of the IIC Working Committee, and Jones advised he would endeavor to obtain an ONI position regarding this matter. At 5:25 p.m., Jones advised Sanders he had been unable to discuss this matter with Admiral Espe, that Admiral Espe had left for the day, would be out of the city on Friday, July 8, and, therefore, the ONI position could not be furnished until Monday, July 11, 1955. Sanders thereupon personally telephonically contacted Admiral Espe at his home, discussed this matter with him discreetly, and Admiral Espe approved the IIC position as suggested by the Bureau. He stated he would leave the wording of the letter covering these points to the other members of the IIC inasmuch as he would be out of the city on July 8.

Sanders discussed this matter with Colonel Quinto, the G-2 member of the Working Committee, who advised at 6:20 p.m. that General Trudeau approved the IIC position suggested by the Bureau, but that General Trudeau had suggested a statement to the effect that partial security could be obtained by keeping the pouches down to a size within the 39-inch range of the detection devices. Sanders immediately contacted General Trudeau personally and noted that such a statement might

[redacted] b2 b7E

General Trudeau agreed and withdrew his suggestion that such a statement be included.

RECORDED - 40 117-268-821
27 JUL 28 1955
INDEXED - 40

ESS:hke (6)

1-Mr. Boardman
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Sanders
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Section Tickler

Enclosures (2)

memo from Mr. Boardman to Director - 7-12-55 ESS

FOR APPROVAL SENT DIRECTOR 7-8-55

PERS. FILE

66-86023-1
62-90938-1

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0 JUL 1955 9 AM 1955

Memorandum for Mr. Boardman

The ONI representatives, as well as the G-2 representatives and General Trudeau, suggested that the wording in the suggested letter:

> *"If the United States wants security against the clandestine introduction.....the pouch should be reduced to letter size"*

be changed to read:

> *"If the United States is to achieve maximum security against the clandestine introduction.....the pouch should be reduced to letter size."*

Their basis was that everyone probably wants security, but it is the achieving of the security that is involved. It is not believed that this change would weaken our position.

The suggested IIC letter to the ICIS has been prepared in final form, and the original is attached for the Director's signature. Copies of the final letter are being furnished to the other IIC members today by Sanders with the information that it is planned to deliver the letter to the ICIS on July 11, 1955. This will place the final version of this letter in their hands prior to the time it is delivered to the ICIS.

ACTION:

It is recommended that the attached IIC letter be submitted to the Director for his signature and, if he approves, that it be delivered to the ICIS on Monday, July 11, 1955.

You will note that the letter as now written requires that any shipment under diplomatic seal would have to be reduced to letter size, or be subjected to physical examination.

Pursuant to the Director's instructions, there is attached a memorandum to the Attorney General furnishing a copy of the IIC letter to him for his information.

[redacted]

1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Sanders
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Section Tickler

orig & 1 - A.G.
1 - Yellow
1 - Mr. Boardman

July 11, 1955

The Attorney General

Director, FBI

LIMITING DIPLOMATIC POUCHES OF THE SOVIET BLOC COUNTRIES

Enclosed for your information is a copy of a letter from the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference to the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security which sets forth the IIC views pertaining to the problem of Soviet bloc diplomatic pouches.

Enclosure

ESS:hke
(8)

(Attached to cover memorandum from Mr. Belmont to Mr. Boardman re "Limiting Diplomatic Pouches" dated 7/7/55. ESS:hke)

FOR APPROVAL
SENT DIRECTOR
7-9-55

DECLASSIFIED BY SP4 bja/DFM
ON 4-10-03

7-7-55

RECORDED - 40 117-268-

EX-108

JUL 20 1955

Tolson
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Gandy

~~RESTRICTED DATA~~
~~This document contains restricted data as defined in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. Its transmittal or the disclosure of its contents to any unauthorized person is prohibited.~~

[redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~

JUL 20 1955

SMUGGLING ATTEMPTS BY DIPLOMATS

62-90938-

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4-572 (3-29-55)
STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Director

DATE: 7/8/55

FROM : J. P. Mohr

SUBJECT: The Congressional Record Smuggling of Atomic Bombs or Parts Thereof and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction Into the United States

Page 8845 The Senate concurred in the House amendment to S. 609, Atomic Weapons Reward Act of 1955, clearing the bill for action of the President.

Original filed in: 66-1781-1132

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-10-85 BY SP4 bjd/DFW

INDEXED - 6 117-268-825
NOT RECORDED
76 JUL 22 1955

126

In the original of a memorandum captioned and dated as above, the Congressional Record for THURS 7/7/55 was reviewed and pertinent items were marked for the Director's attention. This form has been prepared in order that portions of a copy of the original memorandum may be clipped, mounted, and placed in appropriate Bureau case or subject matter files.

JUL 20 1955 7/52

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: July 12, 1955

FROM : L. V. BOARDMAN

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
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Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4-10-03 BY SP4 BJA/DFW
#948742/950935/997059

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

Reference is made to my memorandum of July 7, 1955, which advised that Special Agent Sanders had subsequent to the IIC meeting on July 6 contacted the Executive Secretary of the ICIS and determined that the Treasury Department and State Department Representatives are presently working out the details of channeling incoming unaccompanied baggage, effects, and shipments of Soviet bloc personnel through the ports of New York and Georgetown. My memorandum furnished a suggested IIC letter to the ICIS inquiring as to the status of the implementation of the recommendation for this channeling which was contained in an IIC-ICIS letter dated May 25, 1955. You noted, "I am not satisfied at all with lethargic handling of IIC matters by Sanders. This is another instance. Nothing was done re following up letter of May 25 until I personally raised the issue and now all that is done is to write letter to Yeagley which will accomplish nothing. Furthermore what prevents Sanders from calling Yeagley by phone and also calling Treasury. There is altogether too much folderol and too little results. H."

Since December 29, 1952, the IIC and the ICIS, at the instruction of the President, have been coordinating countermeasures designed to protect against the clandestine introduction and detonation of atomic weapons in the United States. A joint committee has functioned since that time, and the two committees have jointly made numerous recommendations for action designed to defend against such clandestine introduction. As a matter of policy, the ICIS has followed and endeavored to obtain implementation of those recommendations which fall within the ICIS field, and the IIC has implemented those recommendations in the IIC field. These matters have been coordinated through liaison between the Executive Secretaries of the two committees.

Representatives of the Departments of Treasury and State serve on the joint committee which recommended that the

ESS:hke (5)

1-Mr. Boardman
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Sanders
1-Section Tickler

RECORDED-45 117-268-826

27 JUL 20 1955

JUL 27 1955

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channeling of unaccompanied baggage, effects, and shipments of Soviet bloc personnel through New York and Georgetown, and through those committee representatives the Departments of State and Treasury agreed to this channeling. Sanders has advised that he had not endeavored to press either Treasury or State Departments for action in this matter inasmuch as it is a matter falling within the purview of the ICIS, and Sanders understood through the ICIS Executive Secretary that those two departments were working out the details of the implementation. This was again confirmed telephonically after the IIC meeting on July 6 but a formal letter was forwarded to the ICIS in order that the IIC may be on record inquiring as to the status of this implementation six weeks after the recommendations were made. Sanders personally discussed this matter with Yeagley on July 11, 1955, and pointed out that no formal answer has been received from the State and Treasury Departments and that implementation of this recommendation appears to be dragging. Yeagley stated that he would follow this matter immediately and take steps to insure that the two ICIS agencies involved bring this matter to a quick, logical conclusion. In addition, Sanders contacted Mr. Hugo Ranta, of the Treasury Department, who advised that the Customs Service, assisted by the State Department, is presently working out the details for implementation of this recommendation and are hoping to have the recommendation implemented within the near future.

ACTION:

The foregoing is for your information. It is suggested that we follow these ICIS matters vigorously through the Chairman of the ICIS and in that manner force these ICIS agencies to bring matters within their field to a quick, logical conclusion in the future. I have instructed that Sanders maintain a very close liaison with the ICIS Chairman and Executive Secretary in order that we will know at all times the exact status of these various recommendations which have been approved jointly by the IIC and the ICIS.

I do not understand why we have to wait so long because of ICIS inaction. Think we should press Treasury & State directly. H.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
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Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

TO : MR. TOLSON

DATE: 7/8/55

FROM : J. P. Mohr

SUBJECT: ATOMIC WEAPONS REWARDS ACT OF 1955
H. R. 6901

Enclosed is a copy of bill H. R. 6901 that passed the House on 7/5/55, to provide rewards for information concerning the illegal introduction into the United States, or the illegal manufacture or acquisition in the United States, of special nuclear material and atomic weapons. A similar bill S. 609 was introduced in the Senate and passed the Senate on June 28, 1955, contained a slight difference from the House passed bill H. R. 6901. On 7/6/55, the House considered this measure and offered it amended on page 4, line 20, striking out "the Commonwealth of."

This bill provides that any person who furnishes original information to the United States of any special nuclear material or atomic weapon which has been introduced into the United States, or which has been manufactured or acquired therein contrary to the laws of the United States, or attempts to introduce or manufacture such material contrary to the laws of the United States, shall be rewarded by the payment of an amount not to exceed $500,000.

This measure provides for an Awards Board consisting of the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the Director of Central Intelligence, and one member of the Atomic Energy Commission. Any award of $50,000 or more shall be approved by the President. If such information is furnished by an alien under the provisions of this legislation, the alien may be granted permanent residence in the United States if it is in the best interests of this country.

The term "atomic energy" means all forms of energy released in the course of nuclear fission or nuclear transformation. The term "atomic weapon" means any device utilizing atomic energy. The term "special nuclear material" means plutonium, or uranium enriched in the isotope 233 or in the isotope 235, or any other material which is found to be special nuclear material pursuant to the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.

RECORDED - 50

There is also enclosed a copy of bill S. 609.

117-260-827

Enclosures - 2 ENCL.

INDEXED-50

PGT:vlg
(6)
CC: Mr. Belmont
Mr. Todd - Room 4732
Mr. Whitson - Room 1730

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-10-03 BY SP4 BAW/DFW

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 62-104512-

[redacted] in this envelope
[redacted]
DATE 4-10-03 BY SP4 BJA/DFW
II 948742/950935/997059

Union Calendar No. 263

84TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 6901

[Report No. 901]

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JUNE 20, 1955

Mr. COLE introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy

JUNE 23, 1955

Reported with amendments, committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, and ordered to be printed

[Omit the part struck through and insert the part printed in italic]

A BILL

To provide rewards for information concerning the illegal introduction into the United States, or the illegal manufacture or acquisition in the United States, of special nuclear material and atomic weapons.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as the "Atomic Weapons Rewards Act of 1955".

SEC. 2. Any person who furnishes original information to the United States—

(a) leading to the finding or other acquisition by the United States of any special nuclear material or atomic weapon which has been introduced into the

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United States, or which has been manufactured or acquired therein contrary to the laws of the United ~~States;~~ *States*, or

(b) with respect to an attempted introduction into the United States or an attempted manufacture or acquisition therein of any special nuclear material or atomic weapon, contrary to the laws of the United States,

shall be rewarded by the payment of an amount not to exceed $500,000.

SEC. 3. An Awards Board consisting of the Secretary of the Treasury (who shall be the chairman), the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the Director of Central Intelligence, and of one member of the Atomic Energy Commission designated by that Commission, shall determine whether any person furnishing information to the United States is entitled to any award and the amount thereof to be paid pursuant to section 2. In determining whether any person furnishing information to the United States is entitled to an award and the amount of such award, the Board shall take into consideration—

(a) whether or not the information is of the type specified in section ~~2;~~ *2*, and

(b) whether the person furnishing the information

was an officer or employee of the United States and, if so, whether the furnishing of such information was in line of duty of that person.

Any reward of $50,000 or more shall be approved by the President.

SEC. 4. If the information leading to an award under section 3 is furnished by an alien, the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, and the Director of Central Intelligence, acting jointly, may determine that the entry of such alien into the United States is in the public interest and, in that event, such alien and the members of his immediate family may receive immigrant visas and may be admitted to the United States for permanent residence, notwithstanding the requirements of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

SEC. 5. The Board established under section 3 is authorized to hold such hearings and make, promulgate, issue, rescind, and amend such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act.

SEC. 6. Any awards granted under section 3 of this Act shall be certified by the Awards Board and, together with the approval of the President in those cases where such approval is required, transmitted to the Director of Central

Intelligence for payment out of funds appropriated or available for the administration of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended.

SEC. 7. As used in this Act—

(a) The term "atomic energy" means all forms of energy released in the course of nuclear fission or nuclear transformation.

(b) The term "atomic weapon" means any device utilizing atomic energy, exclusive of the means for transporting or propelling the device (where such means is a separable and divisible part of the device), the principal purpose of which is for use as, or for development of, a weapon, a weapon prototype, or a weapon test device.

(c) The term "special nuclear material" means plutonium, or uranium enriched in the isotope 233 or in the isotope 235, or any other material which is found to be special nuclear material pursuant to the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.

(d) The term "United States" when used in a geographical sense, includes ~~the Commonwealth of~~ Puerto Rico, all Territories and possessions of the United States and the Canal Zone; except that in section 4, the term "United States" when so used shall have the meaning given to it in the Immigration and Nationality Act.

Union Calendar No. 263

84TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 6901

[Report No. 901]

A BILL

To provide rewards for information concerning the illegal introduction into the United States, or the illegal manufacture or acquisition in the United States, of special nuclear material and atomic weapons.

By Mr. COLE

JUNE 20, 1955

Referred to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy

JUNE 23, 1955

Reported with amendments, committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, and ordered to be printed

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II 948742/ 950935

84TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

S. 609

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

JANUARY 21, 1955

Mr. HICKENLOOPER (for himself and Mr. ANDERSON) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy

A BILL

To provide rewards for information concerning the illegal introduction into the United States, or the illegal manufacture or acquisition in the United States, of special nuclear material and atomic weapons.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as the "Atomic Weapons Rewards Act of 1955".

SEC. 2. Any person who furnishes original information to the United States—

(a) leading to the finding or other acquisition by the United States of any special nuclear material or

atomic weapon which has been introduced into the United States, or which has been manufactured or acquired therein contrary to the laws of the United States, or

(b) with respect to an attempted introduction into the United States or an attempted manufacture or acquisition therein of any special nuclear material or atomic weapon, contrary to the laws of the United States,

shall be rewarded by the payment of an amount not to exceed $500,000.

SEC. 3. An Awards Board consisting of the Secretary of the Treasury (who shall be the Chairman), the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the Director of Central Intelligence, and of one member of the Atomic Energy Commission designated by that Commission, shall determine whether any person furnishing information to the United States is entitled to any award and the amount thereof to be paid pursuant to section 2. In determining whether any person furnishing information to the United States is entitled to an award and the amount of such award, the Board shall take into consideration—

(a) whether or not the information is of the type specified in section 2, and

(b) whether the person furnishing the information was an officer or employee of the United States and, if

so, whether the furnishing of such information was in the line of duty of that person.

Any reward of $50,000 or more shall be approved by the President.

SEC. 4. If the information leading to an award under section 3 is furnished by an alien, the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, and the Director of Central Intelligence, acting jointly, may determine that the entry of such alien into the United States is in the public interest and, in that event, such alien and the members of his immediate family may receive immigrant visas and may be admitted to the United States for permanent residence, notwithstanding the requirements of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

SEC. 5. The Board established under section 3 is authorized to hold such hearings and make, promulgate, issue, rescind, and amend such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act.

SEC. 6. Any awards granted under section 3 of this Act shall be certified by the Awards Board and, together with the approval of the President in those cases where such approval is required, transmitted to the Director of Central Intelligence for payment out of funds appropriated or available for the administration of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended.

SEC. 7. As used in this Act—

(a) The term "atomic energy" means all forms of energy released in the course of nuclear fission or nuclear transformation.

(b) The term "atomic weapon" means any device utilizing atomic energy, exclusive of the means for transporting or propelling the device (where such means is a separable and divisible part of the device), the principal purpose of which is for use as, or for development of, a weapon, a weapon prototype, or a weapon test device.

(c) The term "special nuclear material" means plutonium, or uranium enriched in the isotope 233 or in the isotope 235, or any other material which is found to be special nuclear material pursuant to the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.

(d) The term "United States," when used in a geographical sense, includes all Territories and possssions of the United States and the Canal Zone; except that in section 4, the term "United States" when so used shall have the meaning given to it in the Immigration and Nationality Act.

84TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

S. 609

A BILL

To provide rewards for information concerning the illegal introduction into the United States, or the illegal manufacture or acquisition in the United States, of special nuclear material and atomic weapons.

By Mr. HICKENLOOPER and Mr. ANDERSON

JANUARY 21, 1955

Read twice and referred to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. BELMONT

FROM : W. A. BRANIGAN

DATE: July 21, 1955

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 4-10-03 BY SP4 BJA/DFW
II 948742/950935/997059

SUBJECT: COUNTER MEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION-IN-PLACE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE US ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

On March 10, 1955, the Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Counter Measures (B) concluded studies on a program whereby detection devices for fissionable material would be used by Immigration, Customs and the Coast Guard at various ports of entry in the US. The detection device program is essentially an ICIS program because Coast Guard, Customs and Immigration are all responsible to the ICIS.

A limited national program calling for the use of 48 mobile detection devices and 300 portable devices at various ports of entry at an approximate cost of $2,616,500 was drawn up and submitted to ICIS. Justice on 4-6-55 requested FBI comments in order to take a Justice position in ICIS. The Bureau under date of 4-8-55 advised AAG Tompkins the proposals on detection devices had been reviewed and the FBI had found no objectionable material.

Nothing more was heard from ICIS until 5-18-55 when Mr. Yeagley, Chairman of ICIS, sent a memorandum dated 5-17-55 to Committe B requesting that the report be reconsidered in the light of State and Treasury objections. The Treasury objections appeared to be merely that they didn't want to spend money. No details were furnished.

ICIS was followed regularly through its representatives on Committee B for a Treasury Department position. The State Department merely wanted some additional phraseology added which would not materially change the recommendation for a limited national program utilizing detection devices. On July 19, 1955, Mr. Bienvenu, Executive Secretary, ICIS, asked if a Treasury representative could meet with Committee B July 20 on this matter. Arrangements were made for such a meeting and arrangements were also made for representatives of the advisory group now field testing the portable detection device to also be present.

ENCL. (3)

Enclosure
117-268
cc - Mr. Belmont
Mr. Branigan
Mr. Sanders
Mr. Whitson

LW:et
(5)

117-268-828

RECORDED - 30
JUL 26 1955
INDEXED-30
EX-108

59 AUG 2 1955

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

Memorandum for Mr. Belmont

On 7-20-55 Mr. Hugo ARanta of Treasury proposed as an alternative program that 74 portable devices and 14 mobile devices be employed by Customs at a cost of approximately $500,000. ARanta had no concrete Treasury proposal for Coast Guard and did not take the Immigration requirements into consideration. Committee B unanimously declined to consider the Treasury proposal and requested the chairman to refer the matter back to ICIS since it involved a departmental position of a member of ICIS. The State Department language was considered with modifications and no objection was raised by the members of Committee B to its further consideration by ICIS. State had also suggested dropping certain pages of the report containing cost figures for detection devices. Committee B recommended against elimination of these pages.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

None. For your information. There is attached a copy of a memorandum from the chairman of Committee B to the ICIS referring the matter back to ICIS along the lines indicated above.

~~SECRET~~

July 21, 1955

DRAFT

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. J. Walter Yeagley, Chairman
Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security

FROM: Mr. Lish Whitson, Chairman
Committee B

SUBJECT: Interim Report of the IIC and the ICIS on Detection Devices for Fissionable Material

Reference is made to your memorandum of May 17, 1955, requesting reconsideration of the above-entitled March 10 draft report, in the light of the views of the State and Treasury ICIS representatives as summarized in your memorandum.

On July 20, 1955, at a meeting of Committee B, the Treasury representative on ICIS, Mr. Hugo Ranta, made known for the first time the Treasury position and presented facts and figures on the increase in the detection device program which the Treasury Department would favor. His statement is enclosed. As shown therein, the Treasury program would involve the use of [redacted] devices by Customs at a cost of approximately $500,000. The proposal made by this Committee, as shown in the draft report of March 10, 1955, calls for the use of [redacted] devices at an approximate cost of $2,616,500, by Customs, Coast Guard and INS.

b2
b7E

In the course of discussion in Committee B of the Treasury position, with Mr. Ranta participating, no concrete Treasury counterproposals were made for Coast Guard and no reasons were adduced to cause the Committee to reconsider the proposal as contained in the draft report of March 10, 1955, or to recommend that the Treasury proposal be substituted therefore. Committee B therefore refers the matter back to the ICIS since it apparently involves a Departmental position of a member of ICIS.

117-26-83X

~~SECRET~~

ENCLOSURE

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-10-03 BY 60324 UCBAW/MJ

~~SECRET~~

With regard to the proposal by the Department of State representative on ICIS regarding implementation of the program in stages, Committee B has no objection to changing the Recommendation on page 5 of the report to read as follows:

"That the limited national program described in page 5 in TAB D be initiated as soon as practicable. If the availability of devices makes necessary the phasing of implementation, the following order should be followed:

1. The five ports through which Soviet bloc diplomats enter the country.

2. Ports in which security measures are taken for the search and surveillance of shipping. ~~which has recently visited Iron Country countries.~~

3. Such other sensitive points as may seem desirable, in the light of expert opinion and in the light of experience gained from operation of the two foregoing stages.

The cost figures appended in TAB D are approximate and do not reflect local conditions, which may exist within a port or an agency, which might add or detract from the sum determined to be adequate to initiate a limited national program."

With regard to dropping pages 6 and 7 of TAB D, as referred to in the penultimate paragraph of your memorandum of May 17, Committee B prefers that these pages be retained.

~~SECRET~~

cc - Belmont
Ba[illegible]
Wh[illegible]son

TELETYPE URGENT

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9487421 950935 997059

JULY 22, 1955

SAC, NEW YORK (orig)
WASHINGTON FIELD (INFO) (BCS)

RECORDED - 39 117-268-829
INDEXED-39

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF OR OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES, AEA. REURTEL

[redacted] b7C

[redacted] WHOSE BAGGAGE

ACTIVATED DETECTION DEVICE PORT OF NEW YORK. [redacted]

[redacted] PERSONNEL SECURITY AND INTEGRITY,

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ADMINISTRATION, FORMERLY FOREIGN OPERATIONS ADMINISTRATION STATES [redacted]

[redacted] b7C

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

JUL 22 1955

59 AUG 2 1955

cc - 1 - WASHINGTON FIELD (FOR INFO) (BY COURIER SERVICE)

LW:blb (6)

TELETYPE

SEE NOTE PG. 2.

TELETYPE TO SAC, NEW YORK

[redacted]

SHOULD CHECK WITH ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION OFFICE, NY, AS TO POSSIBILITY [redacted] ORE SAMPLES WITH ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION. NY IS CAUTIONED THAT HIGH READING ON DIAL OF DETECTION DEVICE SENSITIVE TO GAMMA RAYS DOES NOT MEAN A URANIUM SOURCE IS PRESENT. GAMMA RADIATION IS RELEASED FROM OTHER ITEMS IN ADDITION TO URANIUM. [redacted] LOCATED OR HIS ITINERARY IS DETERMINED, NOTIFY BUREAU IMMEDIATELY. BEFORE ATTEMPTING TO INTERVIEW OBTAIN BUREAU AUTHORIZATION.

HOOVER

b7C

NOTE:
Per info received from [redacted] by Bureau liaison agent 7-20, 21, 22, 55.

b7C

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JUL 22 1955

TELETYPE

- 2 -

5-50 BJ

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JUL 18 1955

TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Sizoo
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

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D 948742/950935/992059

WASHINGTON FROM NEW YORK 5 18

DIRECTOR ....U R G E N T....

ATTENTION -- INSPECTOR HENNRICH.

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF OR OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES, AEA. Atomic Energy Act

[redacted] U.S. CUSTOMS, NYC, ADVISED THAT [redacted] b7C

[redacted] BAGGAGE WAS

PASSED BY THE DEVICE USED TO DETECT FISSIONABLE MATERIAL, THIS b2 b7E

MACHINE REGISTERED [redacted]

CUSTOMS ADVISED [redacted]

[redacted] INDICES OF THE NYO CONTAIN NO INFO b7C
RECORDED 111-268-829

IDENTIFIABLE WITH [redacted] FOR INFO OF BUREAU, THE

ABOVE MENTIONED GREEN SIGNAL REFLECTS THE PRESENCE OF URANIUM

MATERIAL. THE MACHINE TO WHICH THE SIGNAL IS ATTACHED WILL

END PAGE ONE

LINE 10 WORD 8 SHD BE "PAPERS"

Mr. Belmont

801-13 27 JUL 27 1955

this certainly is a good gap in security. K.

REGISTER A MAXIMUM OF ONE HUNDRED COUNTS. U.S. CUSTOMS ADVISES THAT WHILE THE EIGHTY EIGHT COUNT READING HERETOFORE MENTIONED IN THIS TELETYPE IS HIGH, IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO TELL BY THIS COUNT ALONE THE EXACT OBJECT THAT REGISTERED ON THE MACHINE OTHER THAN TO STATE THAT THE OBJECT IN QUESTION CONTAINED URANIUM MATERIALS. THE BUREAU ADVISED OF FOREGOING TELEPHONICALLY AND THIS FOR INFO.

KELLY

END

b7C

NY R 5 WA NG

66 MR. BELMONT
AND SUPERVISOR
DOM. INTEL. DIVISION

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JUL 25 1955

TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Sizoo
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

WASHINGTON FROM NEW YORK 11 25

DIRECTOR ....U R G E N T....

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF, OR OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES, AEA. REBUTEL JULY TWENTY TWO LAST. [redacted] U.S. DISPATCH AGENT, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, NYC, ADVISED THAT RECORDS REFLECT [redacted] INDEXED-39

[redacted]

b7C

LOCATED.

SEE MEMO BATES TO ROACH

INDEXED-39

27 JUL 27 1955

EX.-108

RJS:WAS NBJH

Mr. Belmont

cc S. Morgan

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JUL 30 1955

TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Sizoo
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

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DATE 4-10-03 BY SP4 BJA/DFW
II 948742/950935/997059

Brannigan

WASHINGTON FROM NEW YORK 8 20 8-20 P

DIRECTOR ....U R G E N T....

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PART THEREOF OR OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE U.S., AEA. [redacted] U.S. [redacted] b7C

NUMBER EIGHT NINE FIVE THREE SEVEN ONE FIVE. MATERIAL CARRIED IN [redacted] BAGGAGE REGISTERED [redacted] b2 b7E

[redacted] MACHINE LOCATED AT AIRPORT [redacted] USED TO DETECT FISSIONABLE MATERIALS. [redacted] b7C

[redacted] MATERIAL REGISTERING READING DETERMINED TO BE FIFTEEN SPECIMEN SAMPLES OF URANIUM CRUDE ORE, WEIGHT ONE HALF POUND, ORE OBTAINED FROM [redacted]

END PAGE ONE

RECORDED - 64 117-268

EX-121

Mr. Belmont

cc Brannigan

5- whittaker

60 AUG 2 1955

BE SUBMITTED TO [redacted] AEC, GRAND JUNCTION, COLORADO. [redacted] ORE SHIPMENTS WILL BE DELIVERED IN NEAR FUTURE [redacted] b7C

[redacted]

AEC, NYC, ADVISED CUSTOMS TO RELEASE AFOREMENTIONED MATERIAL. NO FURTHER ACTION BEING TAKEN BY NYO. INFO RECEIVED THROUGH USE OF DETECTION MACHINE AT AIRPORT CLASSIFIED SECRET BY U.S. CUSTOMS. NYO INDICES REFLECT [redacted] b7C

[redacted] NO DEROGATORY INFORMATION CONTAINED IN FILE. ABOVE FURNISHED TO BUREAU AND SALT LAKE CITY FOR INFORMATION.

KELLY

SALT LAKE CITY ADVISED BY MAIL

END

,6,

NY R g WA JFP

[redacted] b7C

[redacted] AEC COGNIZANT. LW

NO DISSEMINATION -

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JUL 20 1955

TELETYPE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-10-03 BY SP4 bjp/sew

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Sizoo
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

WASHINGTON FROM NEW YORK 7 20 8-15P

DIRECTOR ....U R G E N T....

Brantigan

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF OR WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE U.S., AEA. [redacted] U.S. CUSTOMS, NYC b7C ADVISED THIS DATE THAT A PACKAGE INCLUDED IN CARGO OF SABENA AIRLINES, PLANE OO SDQ, FLIGHT FIVE FOUR THREE, ARRIVING IDLEWILD AIRPORT, NYC, JULY TWENTY, FIFTY FIVE, WEIGHING TWO POUNDS, FROM FRIESEKE AND HOEPFNER, STUTGART, GERMANY, TO MESSRS. CURTIS WRIGHT CORPORATION, EXPORT DIVISION, THIRTY ROCKEFELLER PLAZA, NY TWENTY, NY, REGISTERED [redacted] MACHINE LOCATED AT AIRPORT USED TO DETECT FISSIONABLE MATERIALS. [redacted] b2 b7E b7C INDICATES PRESENCE OF URANIUM MATERIAL. [redacted] INVOICE ATTACHED TO PACKAGE BORE AUTHORIZATION NUMBER THREE ONE FOUR EIGHT TWO, DATED FEBRUARY SEVENTEEN, FIFTY FIVE, ISSUED BY AEC FOR RADIO ISETOPS PROCUREMENT BY CURTIS WRIGHT CORP. [redacted] ADVISES HE MADE INQUIRY OF AEC WHO CONFIRMED AUTHORIZATION FOR THIS PACKAGE, AFTER WHICH HE RELEASED THE PACKAGE TO CONSIGNEE. NO FURTHER ACTION BEING TAKEN BY NYO. INDICES NEGATIVE ON CONSIGNOR.

AEC AUTHORIZATION FOR RADIOISOTOPES. NO DISSEMINATION - LW

END 2:03

60 AUG 2 1955

NY R 7 WA BLW

Mr. Belmont

cc Brantigan

RECORDED - 64

JUL 27 1955

KELLY

EX-121

5 Mitchell

cc - Mr. Conrad
Mr. Whitson

SAC, Washington Field (orig and 2) July 19, 1955

Director, FBI

RECORDED - 83 117-268-834

PERSONAL ATTENTION
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC WEAPONS OR
PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT
(WFO file 117-151)
(Bufile 117-268)

[redacted] b2 b7C b7D

Re WFO let 7-5-55 suggesting certain procedures for the use of a suitable radiation detection device [redacted]

The FBI Laboratory has available a suitable [redacted]

The attention of WFO is directed to Bulet 7-8-55 re [redacted] instructing that your investigation [redacted] b2 b7C b7D b7E

No further arrangements can be made regarding the proposals contained in your letter of 7-5-55 until the investigation instructed in Bulet 7-8-55 has been completed.

DECLASSIFIED BY SP4 bja/SFW
ON 4-10-03

LW:blb
(7)

YELLOW DUPLICATE
JUL 19 1955
MAILED

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. PARSONS

FROM : I. W. CONRAD

DATE: July 14, 1955

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols ✓
Belmont ✓
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC WEAPONS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE U. S.
SMUGGLING ATOM BOMBS

Reference is made to the attached letter from WFO dated 7/5/55, recommending that [redacted]

b2
b7D
b7E

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

The above information is set forth for the attention of the Domestic Intelligence Division in considering the recommendation of the WFO.

RECOMMENDATION: For review and consideration by Domestic Intelligence Division.

IWC/mek
(5)

1- Mr. Belmont (Attention Mr. Whitson)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-10-03 BY SP2 bja/DMW

RECORDED - 83 117-268-835

10 JUL 27 1955

59 AUG 2

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

4-572 (3-29-55)
STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Director

DATE: 7-6-55

FROM : J. P. Mohr

SUBJECT: The Congressional Record

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4-10-03 BY SP4 bja/DFW

SMUGGLING OF ATOM BOMBS

Pages 8490-8491

The House passed with amendments H. R. 6901, to provide rewards for information concerning the illegal introduction into the United States, or the illegal manufacture or acquisition in the United States of special nuclear material and atomic weapons.

INDEXED - 40

117-268-8536
NOT RECORDED
138 JUL 22 1955

In the original of a memorandum captioned and dated as above, the Congressional Record for TUESDAY 7-5-55 was reviewed and pertinent items were marked for the Director's attention. This form has been prepared in order that portions of a copy of the original memorandum may be clipped, mounted, and placed in appropriate Bureau case or subject matter files.

AUG 3 1955

Original filed in: 62-117331

3-288 (6-27-55)
STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. TOLSON

DATE: July 22, 1955

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-10-03 BY SP4 bjs/DCW 10/30/03
Per Lt. dtd. 10-29-03 62617 uc/MLS/BJA/DFW

FROM : J. P. Mohr

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: ATOMIC WEAPONS REWARDS ACT OF 1955
Public Law 165
84th Congress

Enclosed is a copy of Public Law 165, approved on July 15, 1955, which provides rewards for information concerning the illegal introduction into the United States, or the illegal manufacture or acquisition in the United States, of special nuclear material and atomic weapons.

This law allows the U. S. Government to grant a reward not to exceed $500,000 to any person who furnishes original information to the U. S. leading to the finding or other acquisition of atomic devices which are illegally in the country or any information regarding an attempt to introduce, manufacture, or acquire the same.

The law provides for the establishment of an Awards Board to determine the merits of a claim for this reward to consist of the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the Director of Central Intelligence, and of one member of the Atomic Energy Commission to be designated by the Commission. Presidential approval is required for any award over $50,000.

If the information leading to any award is furnished by an alien, authority is provided for offering the sanctuary of a permanent residence in the U. S. contingent upon the joint determination of the Board that such entry would be in the public interest of the U. S.

Provision is made for the granting of administrative powers to the Awards Board, and for the appropriations for the rewards to be payable out of the funds for the administration of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended.

Definitions of the terms used in this law are set forth, and the terms "atomic energy", "atomic weapon", "special nuclear material", and "United States" are also defined.

Enclosure
PGT:jh
(5)
cc: Mr. Belmont
Mr. Rosen

RECORDED - 73
INDEXED - 73

117-2-62-

DO NOT FILE
SEP 18 1956
Return to Room 5132

EX 104

61 SEP 20 1956

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4-12-03 BY SP4 bjp/DFW

Public Law 165 - 84th Congress
Chapter 372 - 1st Session
S. 609

AN ACT

To provide rewards for information concerning the illegal introduction into the United States, or the illegal manufacture or acquisition in the United States, of special nuclear material and atomic weapons.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as the "Atomic Weapons Rewards Act of 1955". Atomic Weapons Rewards Act of 1955.

SEC. 2. Any person who furnishes original information to the United States—

(a) leading to the finding or other acquisition by the United States of any special nuclear material or atomic weapon which has been introduced into the United States, or which has been manufactured or acquired therein contrary to the laws of the United States, or

(b) with respect to an attempted introduction into the United States or an attempted manufacture or acquisition therein of any special nuclear material or atomic weapon, contrary to the laws of the United States,

shall be rewarded by the payment of an amount not to exceed $500,000.

SEC. 3. An Awards Board consisting of the Secretary of the Treasury (who shall be the Chairman), the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the Director of Central Intelligence, and of one member of the Atomic Energy Commission designated by that Commission, shall determine whether any person furnishing information to the United States is entitled to any award and the amount thereof to be paid pursuant to section 2. In determining whether any person furnishing information to the United States is entitled to an award and the amount of such award, the Board shall take into consideration— Awards Board. Establishment. 69 Stat. 365. 69 Stat. 366.

(a) whether or not the information is of the type specified in section 2, and

(b) whether the person furnishing the information was an officer or employee of the United States and, if so, whether the furnishing of such information was in the line of duty of that person.

Any reward of $50,000 or more shall be approved by the President.

SEC. 4. If the information leading to an award under section 3 is furnished by an alien, the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, and the Director of Central Intelligence, acting jointly, may determine that the entry of such alien into the United States is in the public interest and, in that event, such alien and the members of his immediate family may receive immigrant visas and may be admitted to the United States for permanent residence, notwithstanding the requirements of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

SEC. 5. The Board established under section 3 is authorized to hold such hearings and make, promulgate, issue, rescind, and amend such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act.

SEC. 6. Any awards granted under section 3 of this Act shall be certified by the Awards Board and, together with the approval of the President in those cases where such approval is required, transmitted to the Director of Central Intelligence for payment out of funds appropriated or available for the administration of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended. 61 Stat. 495. 5 USC 171 note.

SEC. 7. As used in this Act—

(a) The term "atomic energy" means all forms of energy released in the course of nuclear fission or nuclear transformation.

ENCLOSURE

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

cc - Boardman
Belmont
Roach
Whitson

117-268

DECLASSIFIED BY SP4 bja/DAW
ON 4-9-03

Per ltr. dtd. 11-4-03 60267 uc/NLS/BJA/DFW 11/6/03

RECORDED-37
117-268-837

EX-104

Date: July 27, 1955 VIA LIAISON

To: Captain John A. Waters
Director of Security
Atomic Energy Commission
Room 2314, T-3 Building
19th and Constitution Avenue, N. W.
Washington 25, D. C.

(orig and 1)

7 to Waters 7-28-55 cwb

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

Reference is made to the memorandum from this Bureau dated July 1, 1955, concerning Coast Guard examination at New York Harbor of the cargo of the Norwegian motor vessel "Black Condor."

Lieutenant Ivan C. McLean, U. S. Coast Guard Executive Officer, Captain of the Port Office, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, has stated that the "Black Condor" left the port of Philadelphia July 2, 1955, and had been cleared by the Coast Guard before departure. Coast Guard and Customs searching parties did not find anything of a suspicious nature in the vessel's cargo.

cc - 1 ~~Director~~ VIA LIAISON
Central Intelligence Agency
2430 E Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

cc to Mrs. Roach 7-28-55 cwb

Attention: Deputy Director, Plans

MAILED 5
JUL 27 1955
COMM-FBI

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cc - 1 AAG Tompkins by r.s. 0-6 same date.
LW:blb (9)

NOTE: Certain barrels of a mineral substance similar to carborundum registered presence of radioactivity on the portable detection device during Coast Guard examination of cargo at NY Harbor 6-29-55. AEC Office, NYC, advised that substance giving radiation was sand bearing either thorium or uranium. AEC, NY, was notified in cargo which was en route Philadelphia.

59 AUG 2 1955

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268) DATE: 7/18/55

FROM : SAC, PHILADELPHIA (117-75)

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF OR OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES
AEA

Re NY tel 6/29/55, NY airtel 7/6/55, and Bulet 7/11/55 concerning the radio activity of the cargo of Norwegian M. V. "Black Condor."

b7C

On 6/30/55 and 7/5/55, SA [redacted] discussed this matter with Lt. IVAN C. McLEAN, U. S. Coast Guard Executive Officer, Captain of the Port Office, 803 Customs House, Philadelphia. Lt. McLEAN advised that the M. V. "Black Condor" arrived in Philadelphia on 6/30/55 and was treated as an "uncleared vessel." The ship was kept under surveillance while in the Port of Philadelphia and was searched by searching parties from both Coast Guard and Customs. The search failed to reveal anything of a suspicious nature and no evidence of radio activity was found.

On 7/5/55 Lt. McLEAN advised that the M. V. "Black Condor" had left port on 7/2/55 and had been cleared by the U. S. Coast Guard before departure.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-10-03 BY SP4 bjp/AFM

MBD:DLI
(2-BU, 1-NY, 1-PH)

CC: New York (117-192)

RECORDED-37
INDEXED-37

117-[illegible]-237

29 1955

THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
American Embassy
Paris 8, France

Date: July 28, 1955

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-10-03 BY SP4 bja/DFW

To: Director, FBI

From: Legat, Paris (117-8)

Subject: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT
(Bufile 117-268)

[redacted]

UNKNOWN SUBJECTS;
[redacted]
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT
(Bufile [redacted]

b7C

ReBulet 7/15/55.

On 7/26/55 [redacted] OSI, Paris, stated that OSI, Paris, had received no request to reconsider an interview with [redacted] in this case. He indicated that his headquarters in Weisbaden, Germany, had undoubtedly received instructions to interview [redacted] possible, he indicated, that the interview [redacted] will not be conducted by the Paris OSI office but by the OSI office in Luxemburg.

b7C

[redacted] promised to forward to this office any information secured as a result of this interview.

ROL:CM

117-268-838

RECORDED - 87

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Copy/dpg

ORIGINAL

TO: THE DIRECTOR

Date: July 7, 1955

FROM: L. V. BOARDMAN

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-10-03 BY SP4bja/pkw

At the IIC meeting on July 6, 1955, it was noted that by joint IIC-ICIS letter the Treasury Department and the State Department were requested to channel incoming unaccompanied baggage, effects, and shipments of Soviet bloc personnel, exclusive of the diplomatic pouch, through the ports of New York, New York, and Georgetown, Washington, D. C. Under National Security Council Document 5408, these items, exclusive of the pouch, are physically inspected when they arrive in the United States. This inspection would be facilitated by having these items channeled through New York and Georgetown. If they arrive in other ports, they will be forwarded to New York or Georgetown under bond. At the IIC meeting it was agreed that this matter should be followed to determine the present status. Special Agent Sanders determined telephonically and informally from the Executive Secretary of the ICIS that Treasury Department and State Department representatives are presently working out the details of this channeling process.

Enclosed is a suggested IIC letter to the ICIS noting that State and Treasury were requested by letter dated May 25, 1955, to channel these items, and the IIC letter inquires as to the present status of this matter. The implementation of this matter is, of course, an ICIS matter, but the IIC has an interest and joined in requesting that the channeling be accomplished.

Enclosure
ESS:hke
(5)
1- Mr. Boardman
1- Mr. Belmont
1- Mr. Sanders
1- Section Tickler

"OK, H"

"I am not satisfied at all with Lethargic handling of IIC matters by Sanders. This is another instance. Nothing was done Re following up letter of May 25 until I personally raised the issue, and now all that is done is to write letters to Yeagley which will accomplish nothing. Furthermore what prevent Sanders from calling Yeagley by phone, and also calling Treasury. There is altogether too much falderal and too little results. H"

INITIALS ON ORIGINAL

117-2[illegible]-1

NOT RECORDED
145 JUL 22 1955

56 AUG 2 1955

176

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 66-[illegible]

SURVEILLANCE ATOM BOMBS

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ADMINISTRATION

Washington 25, D. C.

July 28, 1955

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4-10-83 BY SP4 bja/DFW

Honorable J. Edgar Hoover
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington 25, D. C.

Attention: Special Agent Charles Bates

Re: [redacted] b7C

Dear Mr. Hoover:

Enclosed herewith is a summary report relative to an incident involving the subject which occurred during Customs clearance on July 18, 1955 in New York City.

If further inquiry is deemed necessary, please advise me.

Sincerely yours,

T. E. Naughten
Director
Personnel Security and Integrity

NO ACKN. NECESSARY.
SEE MEMO TO EMERICK, CUSTOMS, CC NAUGHTEN AND COAST GUARD 7-28-55 RE SMUGGLING ATOMIC LW WEAPONS.

2 ENCL.

Enclosures: [redacted] b7C

RECORDED-99
INDEXED-99
EX-121
3 1955
59 AUG 5 1955
EX. PROC. AUG 1 1955
LIAISON

113-268

Page 228 ~ Duplicate of Public Law 165 - 84th C XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

Page 140 ~ Duplicate of document referred to OGA 1955

FOIPA

Total Deleted Page(s) ~ 40

Page 161 ~ b1 , b2 , b3 , b7C , b7D
Page 10 ~ b7C , b7D
Page 11 ~ b7C , b7D
Page 13 ~ b7C
Page 14 ~ b7C
Page 27 ~ b7C
Page 34 ~ b2 , b7E
Page 35 ~ b1 , b2 , b7E
Page 49 ~ Referral/Direct to OGA
Page 50 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 213 ~ b2 , b7C , b7D , b7E A

Page 68 ~ b1 , b2
Page 136 ~ Duplicate b7E

Page 224 ~ b7C

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July 25, 1955

cc - Boardman
Belmont
Branigan
Whitson

PROPOSED CHANGE IN MANUAL OF INSTRUCTIONS

(orig and 1 typed)

SECTION 20. ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1954 - CRIMINAL VIOLATION 20F-G

(page 7)

Manual of Instructions, Section 20F-11 should be changed to read as follows:

"11. Atomic weapons

Public Law 165, 84th Congress, First Session, approved July 15, 1955, provides: (A) Reward not to exceed $500,000 for original information (1) leading to acquisition by United States of special nuclear material [redacted] or (S) atomic weapon introduced into U. S. or manufactured or acquired in U. S. contrary to law, or (2) with respect to attempted introduction, manufacture or acquisition contrary to law. (B) Rewards will be authorized by Awards Board, consisting of Secretary of Treasury (Chairman), Secretary of Defense, Attorney General, Director of Central Intelligence and one Atomic Energy commissioner; any over $50,000 must be approved by the President. (C) Rewards will be paid by Director of Central Intelligence from funds appropriated under National Security Act of 1947, as amended. (D) If information is furnished by alien, Secretary of State, Attorney General and Director of Central Intelligence may authorize permanent residence visa for alien and his immediate family.

Information regarding smuggling of atomic weapons or their components or illegal manufacture or acquisition of same should be reported promptly and in detail to the Bureau.

Cases concerning unlawful possession, manufacturing, or importation (smuggling) of atomic weapons must receive top priority and be given thorough, continuous attention.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

b1

*94MP2 950935/997059 4-25-03 CLASSIFIED BY Allsig/IPAM 60267 derivative DECLASSIFY ON: 25X1 per LHR 5/5/03 Declassify MS/BJM/ANP 10/15/03

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LW:blb (7)

COVER MEMO BOARDMAN TO DIRECTOR PREPARED 7-28-55 LW:blb RE THIS MATTER.

SECRET

ENCLOSURE

Proposed change in Manual of Instructions:

SECRET

Liaison should be effected with U. S. Customs Service to insure any instances of smuggling of weapons or component parts thereof are reported to the Bureau.

The Atomic Energy Commission has the responsibility for disposal of disarmed atomic weapons and illegal special nuclear material.

The Explosive Ordnance Disposal Units of the Department of Defense have the responsibility for disarming illegal atomic weapons."

SECRET

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Director

DATE: July 25, 1955

FROM : L. V. Boardman

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Tele. Room
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Gandy

SUBJECT: ATOMIC WEAPONS REWARDS ACT OF 1955

Public Law 165, 84th Congress, First Session, provides rewards for information regarding smuggling of atomic weapons or nuclear components and other illegal manufacture or acquisition of such.

RECOMMENDATION:

There is attached an SAC Letter giving the Field the provisions of this Law. There are also attached proposed manual and handbook revisions.

RECORDED-16 117-368-

INDEXED-16

Enclosures (3)
cc - Boardman
Belmont
Branigan
Whitson
LW:blb
(6)

59 AUG 10 1955

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4-25-03 SPK bja/PAM
9407442/950935/997059

July 26, 1955

cc -Boardman
Belmont
Branigan
Whitson

PROPOSED CHANGE IN FBI HANDBOOK

(orig and 1 typed)

PART 3, CHAPTER 8, ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1954 - SECURITY MATTERS AND CRIMINAL VIOLATIONS 3 F, PAGE 18

FBI Handbook, Part 3, Chapter 8, Atomic Energy Act of 1954 - Security Matters and Criminal Violations, should be amended on page 18 under item 3 F as follows:

"F. Atomic weapons 84th Congress, Public Law 165 authorizes payment of rewards up to $500,000 and permanent residence visa for alien in return for original information leading to acquisition by U. S. of illegal atomic weapon or nuclear components or information regarding attempted illegal introduction, manufacture or acquisition.

Furnish weapon information promptly and in detail to Bureau.

Give high priority to violation involving atomic weapons. Effect liaison with Customs to insure that any allegations of smuggling of atomic weapons or component parts are reported promptly."

LW:blb (7)

COVER MEMO BOARDMAN TO DIRECTOR PREPARED 7-25-55 LW:BLB RE THIS MATTER.

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DATE 4-25-03 BY SP4bja/tpm

RECEIVED ROOM 4:29 PM FBI

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ENCLOSURE

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

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TO : A. H. Belmont **DATE:** August 2, 1955

FROM : W. A. Branigan

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC WEAPONS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE U. S. ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

At 9:40 a.m., 8-2-55, Commander B. P. Clark, U. S. Coast Guard, the head of the advisory group consisting of representatives of Customs, Coast Guard, Immigration and AEC, who are field testing the portable detection devices, phoned the Bureau. He told Supervisor Whitson that the advisory group was attempting to get authority from Customs to test the portable devices at the Georgetown Customs House and on international mail at the Washington Post Office. Clark stated that Mr. Emerick of Customs had raised the question as to whether such activity was permissible since the meeting at "The Summit."

Commander Clark asked whether the joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures had been in receipt of any instructions to that effect as a result of the Summit meeting. He was told that no such instructions had been received by the joint committee.

Clark stated that he thought it would be possible to continue with the field testing of the portable detection device without embarking on an exchange of correspondence with Customs but he did want us aware of the question raised by Mr. Emerick.

Whitson phoned Leonard Bienvenu, Executive Secretary, ICIS, pointing out what Clark had said about Emerick's inquiry, and pointed out to Bienvenu that Treasury was an ICIS agency. Bienvenu advised that he would check into the matter and find out what Customs was basing its attitude upon.

RECOMMENDATION:

None. For your information. This matter will be followed with Bienvenu.

RECORDED-37 117-268-84
INDEXED-37
16 AUG 8 1955

117-268
cc - Belmont
Branigan
Sanders
Whitson
LW:blb
(5)

AUG 9 1955

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-25-03 BY SP4bja/pm

5-Hw

DIRECTOR, FBI [redacted] 7/14/55

SAC, SAN FRANCISCO [redacted] b7C

[redacted]

SM - C
OO: New York

Re Los Angeles Air-Tel to Director, 6/9/55, entitled

[redacted]

On 7/7/55 [redacted] who has furnished reliable information in the past [redacted] who requests that his identity be protected) advised that he had

[redacted] 1 b2 b7C b7D

[redacted]

recently learned [redacted] may have, or may have had, some connections with the CP and that he did not want to do business with him if this were true. He pointed out to [redacted]

[redacted]

be a member of the CP, in about [redacted]

[redacted] b7C b7D

[redacted] of the opinion [redacted] is a dangerous Communist and that [redacted] would be possible for him, if he cared to, to engage in various clandestine operations.

The above is furnished for the information of New York and Los Angeles.

GAH:hko
(5)
REGISTERED MAIL
cc: New York [redacted] (REG.)
cc: Los Angeles (100-New) (REG.)
cc: [redacted]

b2 b7C b7D

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145 AUG 16 1955

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DECLASSIFIED BY SP4 bja/PAM
ON 4.25.03

117-268

RECORDED - 77

Date: July 28, 1955 VIA LIAISON

EX-121

To: Mr. Chester A. Emerick (orig and 1)
Deputy Commissioner, Investigations
Bureau of Customs
Room 7048
Internal Revenue Service Building
Washington 25, D. C.

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS
THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

On July 18, 1955, U. S. Customs, New York City, informed the New York office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation that [redacted] disembarked from the SS "Constitution" at the port of New York. At the time [redacted] passed by a device used to detect fissionable material, there was a reaction from the device. b7C

U. S. Customs, New York City, advised that [redacted] not detained nor was his baggage searched in view of the fact that he was an employee of the [redacted]

Mr. Thomas E. Naughten, Director, Personnel Security and Integrity, International Cooperation Administration, which Administration has taken over functions of the Foreign Operations Administration, was informed of these circumstances by the Federal Bureau of Investigation on July 19, 1955. According to Mr. Naughten, [redacted] b7C

CC-AR MAILED 2 JUL 29 1955 COMM-FBI

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LW:blb
(8) cc - 1 - New York (for info)

SECRET

59 AUG 10 1955

Letter to Mr. Chester A. Emerick
Deputy Commissioner, Investigations
Bureau of Customs

[redacted] He was interviewed by a representative of Mr. Naughten's office. According to Mr. Naughten, [redacted] was cooperative and recalled that when his luggage was being checked by Customs, the Customs people had been excited but had passed him through without detaining him. He could not recall the specific piece of luggage involved but stated he had no ore, soil samples or other such material in his luggage. He stated that he did have a radium-dial travelling alarm clock manufactured in Switzerland. b7C

According to Mr. Naughten, [redacted] staying at [redacted] during the current week and can be reached through [redacted]

Because of the time which has elapsed and the fact that a radium dial travelling alarm clock could have caused a reaction of the device at the port of New York, the Federal Bureau of Investigation is making no further inquiry in this matter.

It is suggested that similar situations might be avoided in the future if prompt inquiry were made by the Customs officials regarding the cause of the reaction of the detection device at the time the reaction occurs.

cc - 1 - Mr. Thomas E. Naughten VIA LIAISON
Director
Personnel Security and Integrity
International Cooperation Administration
Room 410, Maiatico Building
806 Connecticut Avenue, N. W.
Washington 25, D. C.

[redacted] b7C

To [redacted] 7-29-55 (NFW)

cc - 1 - Chief, Intelligence Division VIA LIAISON
Coast Guard Headquarters
1300 E Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. R. R. Roach

DATE: July 25, 1955

FROM : Mr. C. W. Bates CWB

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC WEAPONS
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT
SMUGGLING ATOM BOMBS

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Reference is made to information received from the Espionage Section that [redacted] His luggage caused a reaction on the detective devices. He was not detained by Customs. This information was immediately furnished to Tom Naughten of ICA.

Naughten advised on 7-25-55 [redacted] arrived in Washington [redacted] and was interviewed by a representative of Naughten's office. According to Naughten, [redacted] very cooperative and recalled that when his luggage was being checked by Customs the Customs people became excited and after conversing, b7C passed him through without detaining him. He could not recall the specific piece of luggage involved, but stated he had no ore, dirt samples or other material in his luggage with the exception of a radium-dial traveling alarm clock which was made in Switzerland. According to Naughten, [redacted] and can be reached through [redacted] which is the office of [redacted] will be here for one week and would be happy to talk with Bureau Agents if desired. Some of his luggage has been shipped to the [redacted] He has with him [redacted] pieces of luggage.

ACTION:

This is for the information of Supervisor Whitson of the Espionage Section.

RECORDED - 77 117-262-1X3

EX-121

21 AUG 4 1955

CWB:saw (4)
1 - Mr. Roach (Lia. Sect. tick)
1 - Mr. L. Whitson
1 - Mr. Bates

5 - Whitson

ASAC SIMON, NYC
ADVISED TO DISCONTINUE
INVESTIGATION TO LOCATE
[redacted] 5 PM 7-25-55 b7C
PER W.V. CLEVELAND. LW

Left Cartwright & Bennett ICA, Cable Room 7:30 PM 7/28/55 LW

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-25-03 BY SP4 bja/PAM

Auth: L.T. UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 121-15554

4-312

DATE OF MAIL 7-15-55

HAS BEEN REMOVED FOR [redacted] TO BE KEPT PERMANENTLY IN HIS OFFICE, ROOM [redacted] b7C

SEE FILE 66-2554-7530 FOR AUTHORITY.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4-25-03 BY SP4bja/PAM

SUBJECT JUNE MAIL

REMOVED BY [redacted]

FILE NUMBER 117-268-4

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGEOUT

1-4

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: July 25, 1955

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-25-03 BY SP4 bja/PAM

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SUBJECT: LIMITING DIPLOMATIC POUCHES

Walt Yeagley, Chairman of ICIS, advised Special Agent Edward S. Sanders today that the ICIS on the afternoon of July 22, 1955, considered the situation in connection with the IIC-ICIS report to the NSC regarding the diplomatic pouch problem.

Yeagley advised that the Departments of State and Treasury in the ICIS desired that the report recommend that no limitations be placed on the pouch and that the Defense Department representative was set to agree to this position but withheld his position when he determined that the IIC is flatly opposed to making any recommendation that no limitation be placed on the pouches. The Defense Department Representative advised he would recheck with the military departments. Yeagley advised that he is doing everything possible to convince the other members of the ICIS that the internal security committees should not be in a position of attempting to weigh what is necessary for internal security against what is required for foreign intelligence operations and international relations and that this decision should be made by the National Security Council. Yeagley stated he fully understands the IIC position and that the IIC does not intend to be a party to weighing internal security matters against foreign intelligence collection and international relations or to making a recommendation to the NSC that no restrictions should be placed on the pouch.

Special Agent Sanders has advised the military members of the IIC of the split within the ICIS and of the fact that the Defense Department Representative in the ICIS is probably going to recheck to determine what his position can be in the ICIS. Colonel Murray of OSI, Captain Jones of ONI, and Mr. Smith of G-2 advised they will attempt to have the Defense Representative in ICIS take the position that the proper place for arguing the relative desirability between internal security and foreign relations is in the National Security Council and not in the internal security committees.

RECORDED - 77 117-268-844

Yeagley advised that he expects to have an ICIS position, split or otherwise, within the next two or three days, after which it can be determined whether the IIC-ICIS report to the NSC will be an approved report by all concerned or a

EX-107

INDEXED - 77

18 AUG 11 1955

ESS:hke 1-Mr. Boardman 1-Mr. Sanders
1-Mr. Belmont 1-Section Tickler

58 AUG 22 1955

66-8603-1 UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 62-90445-1

split report. Sanders advised Yeagley that the IIC desires to settle this matter immediately and that it is imperative that the ICIS agencies determine their individual positions so this matter can be settled without any further delay.

ACTION:

The foregoing will indicate the status of this matter at this time. Every effort is being made to have ICIS take a position in order that this matter may be settled. The IIC position was set forth in a letter to the ICIS on July 11, 1955.

for

follow and advise position ICIS on 7-29-55 & submit memo -

LD

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: July 29, 1955

FROM MR. A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: LIMITING DIPLOMATIC POUCHES

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

Remymemo of July 25, 1955, which advised that Walt Yeagley, the Chairman of the ICIS, had advised on July 25, 1955, that he expected to have an ICIS position concerning the limiting of diplomatic pouches within the next two or three days.

This matter was discussed again today by Special Agent Edward S. Sanders with Yeagley at which time Yeagley stated that the ICIS does not yet have a position and that it may be several days before a position can be arrived at in view of the fact that the State Department and Treasury Department representatives on the ICIS are on leave. Yeagley stated Defense still does not have a position.

Sanders urged Yeagley to use every means possible to bring this matter to a quick conclusion which Yeagley stated he would do.

ACTION:

The foregoing is for your information. This matter will be very closely followed and every effort made to have ICIS handle this matter without further delay.

RECORDED - 117-268-814

INDEXED - 1

16 AUG 11 1955

cc - Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Sanders
Section tickler

EX-107

ESS:jdd
(5)

59 AUG 19 1955

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-25-03 BY SP4 bja/PAM

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TRANSLATION FROM POLISH

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-25-03 BY SP4 bja/BAM

(Envelope) From: [redacted]

To: Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C.

b7C

(Letter)

Polish language. Very urgent and important. [redacted]

[redacted]

7-30-55

Esteemed Sir, Director of Intelligence, Federal Bureau of Investigation.

I read in a paper that Congress of the United States has voted a half-million-dollar reward for anyone who will detect smuggling of atomic bombs into the U. S. A.

Please, advise and explain how I could notify the main Bureau of Investigation, in order to get immediate help in catching the aggressor who might want to smuggle atomic bombs in to the United States.

Undoubtedly you will be interested, sir, how I could detect such a thing. Let me therefore, explain this to you.

When there was to be a war with HITLER, I knew about it two years before it started; when the war with Japan was to end, I knew about it three weeks before the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima. I can produce witnesses to this.

I take liberty of writing this letter to you, sir, on the basis of clairvoyance. Should you desire additional explanation in this matter, then perhaps it should be done personally.

Respectfully,

[redacted]

TRANSLATED BY:

[redacted]

b7C

August 4, 1955

EFL

117-267-1

NOT RECORDED
128 AUG 11 1955

EX AUG 15 1955

ORIGINAL FILED IN 117-1

(On Reverse Side of the Letter)

I write this letter to you in Polish, because I am still unable to write well in English; please forgive me. I do speak and read English.

(Newspaper Clipping)

SUMMARY FROM POLISH

Washington, D. C. - The House of Representatives voted without opposition a half-million-dollar reward for anyone who would detect and inform authorities of any conspiracy, or attempt to smuggle atomic bombs, or atomic materials into the United States.

This legislation was recommended by Joint Congressional Atomic Committee which saw a possibility of smuggling parts for atomic bombs in suitcases, to be reassembled later, and exploded in strategic places in this country.

RA

Smuggling of Atomic Bomb or Parts Thereof & Other Weapons of Mass Destruction Into the U.S.

(O) ATOMIC WEAPONS REWARDS ACT OF 1955 -- Public Law 165, 84th Congress, First Session, approved July 15, 1955, provides:

(1) Reward not to exceed $500,000 for original information (a) leading to acquisition by United States of special nuclear material (plutonium, uranium-235, et cetera) or atomic weapon introduced into U. S. or manufactured or acquired in U. S. contrary to law, or (b) with respect to attempted introduction, manufacture or acquisition contrary to law.

(2) Rewards will be authorized by Awards Board, consisting of Secretary of Treasury (Chairman), Secretary of Defense, Attorney General, Director of Central Intelligence and one Atomic Energy commissioner; any over $50,000 must be approved by the President.

(3) Rewards will be paid by Director of Central Intelligence from funds appropriated under National Security Act of 1947, as amended.

(4) If information is furnished by alien, Secretary of State, Attorney General and Director of Central Intelligence may authorize permanent residence visa for alien and his immediate family.

Information regarding smuggling of atomic weapons or their components or illegal manufacture or acquisition of same should be reported promptly and in detail to the Bureau. Investigations must receive top priority and must be given thorough, continuous attention.

SAC LETTER NO. 55-51
8/2/55

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8/11/83 BY SP8Rtj/bca

117-268
NOT RECORDED
128 AUG 11 1955

61 AUG 16 1955

ORIGINAL FILED IN 66-04-

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: August 10, 1955

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-25-03 BY SP4 bja/RAM

SUBJECT: RESTRICTING THE DIPLOMATIC POUCH

A Joint Committee of the IIC and the ICIS considered the placing of restrictions on diplomatic pouches and a joint report was submitted for IIC and ICIS consideration on June 14, 1955. IIC views in connection with this joint report were made known to the ICIS by IIC letter dated July 11, 1955. Since that time, every effort has been made to make ICIS take a position in connection with this matter in order that a report can be made to the National Security Council by the two committees.

Special Agent Edward S. Sanders, today, again contacted the ICIS and talked to Mr. John Dougherty, in the absence of Mr. Yeagley who is on leave. Dougherty stated that the ICIS is attempting to rewrite the report on restricting diplomatic pouches, but that to date no agreement has been reached within the ICIS concerning this matter. He could give no indication as to when this matter will be resolved.

ACTION:

It is recommended that the Bureau suggest to the other IIC members that the IIC views in connection with this matter be furnished now by letter to the National Security Council without any further waiting on the ICIS. If this Bureau position is approved, we will immediately take the matter up with the military members of the IIC and get this matter settled. The submission of a joint report is preferable to the National Security Council, but it is not believed that the IIC should any longer be associated with the procrastination which the ICIS is exhibiting in connection with this matter. Mr. Coyne of NSC is aware of this situation.

ESS:hke
(5)
1-Mr. Boardman
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Sanders
1-Section Tickler

RECORDED-57 117-368-1

INDEXED-57

16 AUG 15 1955

Memo Belmont to Boardman 8-11-55, Re: Letter attached

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

cc - Mr. Thau

Assistant Attorney General
William F. Tompkins

August 9, 1955

Director, FBI

ALLEGED IMPORTATION OF ARMS AND ATOMIC MATERIAL INFORMATION CONCERNING

X Two Naught Thousand Small arms Smuggled into U.S.A. For Puerto Ricans

Reclassified 10/15/03 62267 uc/NSISBJA/RNP 10/15/03
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 10/15/03 BY 62267 uc/NSISBJA/RNP

The Department of State advised on August 8, 1955, that the following anonymous undated letter was received by the American Embassy, Dublin, Ireland. This letter was mailed at Port Arlington, County Leix, Ireland.

"TO ALL WHOM IT MAY CONSERN

"I am connected wit a group of Irishmen who faught in the Spanish Civil War on the Reds Side, of corse we have many frinds in Spain. I the past year 20,000 small arms have left Spain to be smuggled into U.S.A. for Purto-Riceans. At this moment in the Spanish Zone of Morocco 'the Boys' have some sort of atom ore for the 'Riceans.' Mind Spanish Ship at N.Y. Agust 15th."

The Department of State has advised that the foregoing information has been furnished to the United States Coast Guard, United States Customs, Central Intelligence Agency, Atomic Energy Commission, National Indication Center and intelligence agencies of the Armed Forces.

We instructed our New York and San Juan Offices to furnish pertinent information contained in the anonymous letter to the New York City Police Department and the Puerto Rico Police Department, respectively.

1 ENCL

RET:ojk
(4) ojk

RECORDED 40 117-12445-3911

INDEXED - 40 16 AUG 10 1955

COMM - FBI
AUG 9 1955
MAILED 30

Tolson
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Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

59 AUG 23 1955

WHITON-1130

AUG 9 12 17 PM '55
RECEIVED READING ROOM
U.S. ATTY
F B I

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED ON envelope only HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4-25-03 BY SP4bjalm

117-268-841

ENCLOSURE

AU OF INVESTIGATION
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Per Call Mr. Thau
8-9-55 RLS
cc - Mr. Thau

To: COMMUNICATIONS SECTION. AUGUST 9, 1955 RADIOGRAM URGENT

Transmit the following message to: SACS, SAN JUAN RADIO
NEW YORK TELETYPE

ALLEGED IMPORTATION OF ARMS AND ATOMIC MATERIAL, INFO CONCERNING. FOLLOWING ANONYMOUS UNDATED LETTER RECEIVED BY AMERICAN EMBASSY, DUBLIN, IRELAND. QUOTE TO ALL WHOM IT MAY CONSERN. I AM CONNECTED WIT A GROUP OF IRISHMEN WHO FAUGHT IN THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR ON THE REDS SIDE, OF CORSE WE HAVE MANY FRINDS IN SPAIN. I THE PAST YEAR TWENTY THOUSAND SMALL ARMS HAVE LEFT SPAIN TO BE SMUGGLED INTO U.S.A. FOR PURTO DASH RICEANS. AT THIS MOMENT IN THE SPANISH ZONE OF MOROCCO SINGLE QUOTE THE BOYS END SINGLE QUOTE HAVE SOME SORT OF ATOM ORE FOR THE SINGLE QUOTE RICEANS END SINGLE QUOTE. MIND SPANISH SHIP AT N.Y. AGUST FIFTEENTH UNQUOTE. STATE DEPARTMENT HAS ADVISED PERTINENT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES. SAN JUAN AND NEW YORK ARE INSTRUCTED TO ADVISE NEW YORK CITY PD AND PUERTO RICO PD ON CONFIDENTIAL BASIS.

Per letter dtd 10/14/03 60267 uc/NLS/BSA/RNP HOOVER 10/15/03
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/14/03 BY 60267 uc/NLS/BSA/RNP

RET:ojk
(3) ojk

RECORDED - 40
INDEXED - 40
EX-107

NOTE ON YELLOW:

Walter Jessop, Chief of Liaison Section, State Department, advised SA [redacted] 8/9/55 that State Department disseminated above quoted letter to Coast Guard, U.S. Customs, G-2, ONI, OSI, CIA, AEC, and National Indication Center. b7C

TELETYPE

AUG 9 1955
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

3:46 PM Jer Jp

RADIO

AUG 9 1955
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

Tolson
Boardman
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Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SENT VIA 3:16 PM Per mar

NR. 071752
ENC. 1752 - 1805 BY
CM 188 - 1652 BY
APPROVED BY
TYPED BY
CODED BY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

cc - Norstrom
Roach
Whitson

117-268

DECLASSIFIED BY SP4 bja/PAM
ON 4.25.03

RECORDED - 76 117-268-817

Date: August 9, 1955

To: Captain John A. Waters VIA LIAISON
Director of Security
Atomic Energy Commission
Room 2314, T-3 Building (orig and 1)
16th and Constitution Avenue, N. W.
Washington 25, D. C.

T. C. A. Rolander, AEC, 8/9/55. PAM

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS
THEREOF INTO THE U. S.
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

This will confirm information furnished to you orally by F.B.I. liaison August 2, 1955, to the effect that one [redacted]

His customs declaration indicated samples of uranium ore. The detection device for fissionable material at Idlewild Airport showed a reaction on both the plastic head and the sodium iodide head. U. S. customs representatives determined that [redacted] was carrying ten ounces of crude unrefined uranium ore which he stated was destined to the Wah Chang Corporation, Woolworth Building, New York City. [redacted] the ore was obtained from the northern territory of Australia. b7C

[redacted] a letter from the Director of the Atomic Energy Commission of Australia to the Atomic Energy Commission, Washington, D. C., explaining [redacted] interest in mining and processing uranium ore. [redacted] of the New York office of the Atomic Energy Commission has advised that he told the U. S. Customs authorities in New York to release the ten ounces of uranium ore [redacted] b7C b7D

cc - 2 - New York
Reopen investigation entitled [redacted]
IS - CH, New York file [redacted] Bureau file [redacted]

LW:blb (8)

Tolson
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AUG 23 1955

NORSTROM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

12-23-57

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~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Letter to Captain John A. Waters
Director of Security
Atomic Energy Commission

The files of this Bureau indicate that the

[redacted]

b7C
b7D

Because of [redacted] possible interest in Australian uranium, this Bureau is making inquiries regarding possible [redacted] with Communist China.

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

AUG 2 1955

TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Sizoo
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

WASHINGTON FROM NEW YORK 20 2 10-58 PM

DIRECTOR ....U R G E N T....

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF OR OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE US, AEA. [redacted] STAFF OFFICER, U.S. CUSTOMS, IDLEWILD AIRPORT, NYC, ADVISED THIS DATE b7C

[redacted]

[redacted] POSSESSED SAMPLES OF URANIUM ORE. MACHINE USED TO DETECT FISSIONABLE MATERIALS, LOCATED AT IDLEWILD AIRPORT, REGISTERED A THIRTY POINT /MAXIMUM/ READING ON GREEN LIGHT AND TWENTY POINT READING ON RED LIGHT. CUSTOMS [redacted] CARRIED TEN OUNCES OF CRUDE, UNREFINED URANIUM ORE. [redacted] SAID ORE WAS DESTINED TO [redacted] NYC, AND ORE WAS OBTAINED FROM NORTHERN TERRITORY OF AUSTRALIA. RECORDED - 76 b7C

WHILE IN NYC, [redacted] CARRIED INDEXED - 76

LETTER FROM DIRECTOR OF AEC OF AUSTRALIA TO AEC, WASHINGTON, D.C., EXPLAINING [redacted] INTEREST IN MINING AND PROCESSING URANIUM ORE. [redacted] AEC, NYC, ADVISED THAT HE HAS INFORMED

END PAGE ONE Mr. Belmont

cc: Brannigan

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-25-03 BY

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 66-1709-

CUSTOMS TO RELEASE URANIUM [redacted] NYO INDICES REFLECT CASE FILE ON [redacted] FILE INDICATES THAT INFORMANIS ADVISED THAT [redacted] BEEN FOR MANY YEARS CLOSELY ASSOCIATED WITH [redacted] b7C b7D GOVERNMENT. INFORMANT ADVISED [redacted] IS ENGAGED IN IMPORT DASH EXPORT BUSINESS, DEALING PRIMARILY WITH TUNGSTEN ORES [redacted] FILE REFLECTS THAT IN JANUARY, FIFTYTHREE, [redacted] AN EMPLOYEE [redacted] CORPORATION , WENT TO ENGLAND TO ESTABLISH BRANCH OFFICE OF SAID CORPORATION. CORPORATION WAS SEEKING TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF LESS RIGID BRITISH EXPORT RESTRICTIONS, AND TO OBTAIN FROM EUROPE AND ENGLAND, METALS AND PHARMACEUTICAL PRODUCTS FOR EXPORT [redacted] WITH SUBSEQUENT TRANSSHIPMENT TO [redacted] BOSTON REPORT NOVEMBER TEN, FIFTYFOUR, REFLECTS THAT INFORMANT ADVISED THAT [redacted] b7C b7D AND WORK FOR HIM IN DISTRIBUTING GOODS WHICH HE WAS GETTING INTO THAT COUNTRY. [redacted] WOULD OUT OF NECESSITY, HAVE TO BECOME COMMUNISTS, FOR COMMUNISM WAS HERE TO STAY INASMUCH URANIUM IN QUESTION WAS RELEASED BY AEC, NO FURTHER ACTION IS BEING TAKEN AT NYO. ABOVE FURNISHED FOR INFORMATION OF BUREAU.

KELLY

HOLD PLS

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: August 3, 1955

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-25-03 BY SP4 bja/PAM

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

By IIC-ICIS letter dated May 5, 1955, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission was requested to make a public release of the unclassified description of fusion (hydrogen) weapons in order that public officials of duly constituted law enforcement agencies may cooperate intelligently with the agencies actively engaged in detection and defense against such weapons. The unclassified description had been furnished to the IIC and the ICIS by the Atomic Energy Commission. The Atomic Energy Commission was advised that the two committees have proceeded with the dissemination of the classified description of these weapons to those officers and employees of the Federal Government who have been cleared for such information in view of their responsibilities in connection with defense against clandestine nuclear weapon attack.

No reply was received from the Atomic Energy Commission until July 7, 1955, in spite of repeated inquiries. In its letter of July 7, 1955, the Atomic Energy Commission suggested that the release be made by the FBI to all law enforcement agencies as was done in January of 1954 in connection with fission (atomic) weapons.

With the January, 1954, Law Enforcement Bulletin, the Bureau furnished to law enforcement agencies and officials an unclassified description of atomic weapons. A few weeks later this unclassified description appeared in the newspapers and considerable Congressional and private comment appeared in the newspapers as to why such an unclassified release had been given to law enforcement agencies and not the general public and as to why the FBI rather than the Atomic Energy Commission was making a release concerning Atomic Energy Commission matters.

The Atomic Energy Commission suggestion that the FBI make the present unclassified release was considered by the

Enclosure (ENC.) 1

RECORDED - 77
INDEXED - 77

67-268-

16 AUG 16 1955

ESS:hke (5)

1-Mr. Boardman
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Sanders
1-Section Tickler

SENT DIRECTOR 8-6-55

59 AUG 19 1955

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IIC-ICIS Joint Committee on Countermeasures Against Clandestine Introduction of Atomic Weapons, and it has been suggested that a joint letter be sent to the Atomic Energy Commission pointing out the difficulties encountered with this manner of release of information in the past and requesting that the Atomic Energy Commission reconsider and make the release in question.

This matter was closely followed by Special Agent Edward S. Sanders, and the ICIS was advised through liaison on August 1, 1955, that this matter must be brought to an immediate conclusion inasmuch as the IIC does not desire to let this matter drag. On August 2, 1955, the ICIS approved the attached suggested letter to the Atomic Energy Commission in this regard.

ACTION:

If you approve, it is recommended that the attached suggested IIC-ICIS letter be forwarded to the AEC requesting that the Commission reconsider this matter with a view towards the Commission making the public release of the unclassified description of fusion weapons as suggested by the IIC-ICIS letter of May 5, 1955. The attached suggested letter has been approved by the other members of the IIC.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

August 4, 1955

Honorable Lewis L. Strauss
Chairman
Atomic Energy Commission
19th and Constitution Avenue, N.W.
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Admiral Strauss:

In your letter of July 7, 1955, you suggested that the unclassified release describing fusion weapons should be made by the FBI to all law enforcement officers in order that they might cooperate with the FBI in efforts to detect and defend against the clandestine introduction into the United States of alien fusion weapons. You noted that this procedure was followed in connection with fission weapons and that subsequently the text of the release furnished to the law enforcement officials was published in the press. Your letter notes that this procedure for public release appeared satisfactory.

While it is true that any unclassified statement or description of fusion weapons released to all law enforcement agencies would probably ultimately appear in the press, it does not appear to us that this method would be the most desirable or satisfactory. When the statement concerning the fission weapons, which was furnished to law enforcement agencies in January of 1954, appeared in the newspapers, considerable Congressional and private comment appeared in the newspapers as to why such an unclassified release had been given to law enforcement agencies and not the general public and as to why the FBI rather than the Atomic Energy Commission was making a release concerning Atomic Energy Commission matters.

It is felt that should the Atomic Energy Commission make a release containing an unclassified description of fusion weapons it would be received as merely an extension of information presently available to the general public, would be a release by the Atomic Energy Commission concerning matters within its jurisdiction, and would avoid the prior criticism that the release was not made to the general public by the agency most directly concerned.

SEE FBI CLASSIFICATION CONTAINED IN THIS FILE
DATE 4/15/03 BY SP4 BJA/AMN

FBI
8-6-55
10M

(Attached to cover memorandum from Mr. Belmont to Mr. Boardman, 8/3/55, re "Countermeasures to Detect and Defend Against the Clandestine Introduction and Detonation of Atomic Weapons in the U.S."
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ENCLOSURE)

This is F.B.I. file copy as letter was prepared in ICIS

It would be appreciated if you would reconsider this matter with a view towards your Commission making the public release of the unclassified description of fusion weapons as suggested in the IIC-ICIS letter of May 5, 1955.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover
Chairman
Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference

SIGNED
J. Walter Yeagley
Chairman
Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

AUG 10 1955

TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Sizoo
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

WASH 20 FROM NEW YORK 10 91XXX 9-19P

DIRECTOR DEFERRED

ALLEGED IMPORTATION OF ARMS AND ATOMIC MATERIAL, INFO CONCERNING.

REURTEL, EIGHT NINE FITYFIVE. [redacted]

CONFIDENTIALLY ADVISED OF CONTENTS THEREIN. [redacted] b7C

[redacted]

SHIP MENTIONED THERE IN MAY BE SS LA RIOJA OF SPANISH REGISTRY, DUE PORT NEWARK NEW JERSEY, EIGHT TEN FIFTYFIVE, WHICH TOUCHED AT SPANISH MOROCCO, SEVEN TWENTYFOUR FIFTYFIVE. UNITED STATES COAST GUARD AND CUSTOMS PLAN DETAILED SEARCH AND DOCKSIDE SURVEILLANCE OF LATTER WHILE AT NEW YORK CITY. NEWARK OFFICE TELEPHONICALLY ADVISED. BUREAU WILL BE ADVISED OF ANY PERTINENT DEVELOPMENTS FROM SEARCH.

KELLY

END AND CK PLS

WA NY R 20 WA MLT

DISC

RECORDED-99
INDEXED-99

AUG 15 1955

EX-125

Mr. Belmont

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-25-03 BY SP4 bja/PAM

59 AUG 23 1955

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: August 12, 1955

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: RESTRICTING THE DIPLOMATIC POUCH

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-25-03 BY SP4 bjs/pan

At the IIC Working Committee meeting on August 10, 1955, the question of the IIC-ICIS study relating to restricting diplomatic pouches was discussed. It was noted that it has not been possible to make a report to the NSC in this matter as it has been stalled in the ICIS since June 14, 1955; that the IIC position was made known to the ICIS by letter of July 11, 1955; that ICIS cannot agree upon a position; and it could not be determined when this matter will be settled within the ICIS.

It was agreed that it is most desirable that an IIC letter be forwarded to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council at this time in order that the IIC can be on record as to its position and not be associated with the procrastination being indulged in within the ICIS. It was agreed that the Executive Secretary should prepare a letter to Mr. Lay setting forth the IIC's position as reflected in the letter dated July 11, 1955, to the ICIS. The military members of the Working Committee advised that it is not necessary to obtain clearance on this letter to Mr. Lay inasmuch as it will merely reflect a previously agreed IIC position. It was suggested that the letter be forwarded immediately and that copies be furnished to the military members for the completion of their files.

ACTION:

Attached is a suggested IIC letter to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council advising him of the position which has been taken by the IIC in connection with consideration given to the restricting of diplomatic pouches. It is suggested that the letter be signed by the Director as Chairman of the IIC and that it be forwarded. Copies will be made available to the military members of the IIC.

Enclosure

ESS:hke
(5)
1-Mr. Boardman
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Sanders
1-Section Tickler

RECORDED 117-248
INDEXED 145 AUG 17 1955

16 AUG 16 1955

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : L. V. Boardman

DATE: August 15, 1955

FROM : A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: IIC - ICIS JOINT COMMITTEE STUDY ON DIPLOMATIC POUCH

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

Pat Coyne of the National Security Council (NSC) called this afternoon and referred to the IIC letter reflecting our position on the size of the diplomatic pouch to avoid clandestine entry of atomic weapons into this country. Coyne wanted to know whether the IIC expected this letter to be considered now by the NSC.

I told him the letter had been sent because the IIC had reached a position well over a month ago and had submitted its findings to the ICIS but the ICIS had not reached a decision and we wanted the NSC to know that we had given this matter prompt attention. Coyne said if it were agreeable he would hold up NSC action until the Joint Committee report had been received with the understanding that the report would reflect the IIC position as set forth in this letter. I reiterated that we had sent the letter to let the Council know we had acted on this problem and whatever the Council wanted to do with the letter was O.K. with us.

For your information.

AHB:hpf
(4)

Tics - Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Whitson

NOT RECORDED
165 AUG 17 1955

16 AUG 17 1955

LIAISON

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

cc - Whitson

117-268

DECLASSIFIED BY Sp4 BJA/Pam
ON 4/25/03

Date: August 8, 1955

To: Mr. Chester A. Emerick BY COURIER SERVICE
Deputy Commissioner, Investigations
Bureau of Customs (orig and 1)
Room 7048
Internal Revenue Service Building
Washington 25, D. C.

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES

b7C

Reference is made to the letter from this Bureau dated June 22, 1955, referring to you the name [redacted]

A confidential source who has furnished reliable information in the past has stated that [redacted]

b7C

[redacted] source believes the name of the [redacted] The source is of the opinion that [redacted] a dangerous Communist and as the [redacted] it would be possible for him to engage in various clandestine operations. [redacted]

Any information which you receive or develop regarding shipments [redacted] would be of interest to this Bureau.

RECORDED - 50 117-268

cc - 1 - Chief, Intelligence Division BY COURIER SERVICE
Coast Guard Headquarters
1300 E Street, N.W. 16 AUG 15 1955
Washington, D. C. EX-125

cc - 1 - Los Angeles (For Info) - [redacted]

cc - [redacted]

b7C

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BY COURIER SVC
52 AUG - 9

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

BAUMGARDNER

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

~~SECRET~~

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: August 1, 1955

FROM : W. A. Branigan

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC WEAPONS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

Enc. The Washington "News" for July 20, 1955, contained an item with a London date line regarding a suggestion made by Dr. G. O. Jones, professor of physics at the University of London, that H-bombs could be triggered by using shock waves to produce the necessary high temperatures which now require an A-bomb.

The article states that H-bombs without accompanying A-bomb would not be detected by radiation detection devices since they would not release radiation until exploded.

[redacted] (5)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE b1

RECOMMENDATION:

It is respectfully recommended that Bureau liaison determine from the appropriate source at the Atomic Energy Commission whether any AEC observations have been made on the suggestion of Dr. Jones and, if so, obtain a copy of any such comment.

ENCL.

117-268
cc - Belmont
Branigan
Roach
Bates
Whitson
LW:blb
(6)

117-[redacted]-853

RECORDED - 75 2 AUG 18 1955

INDEXED - 75

4.2503
CLASSIFIED BY NW/bja/PAN 60267 derivative
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1

AUG 26 19[redacted]

~~SECRET~~

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Sizoo
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

No Atom Trigger

Could Science Shock H-Bomb Into Action?

By Science Service

LONDON, July 20—Baby H-bombs exploded without a triggering A-bomb are foreseen from the report here of a possible new method, using shock waves, for setting off H-bombs.

Dr. G. O. Jones, professor of physics at the University of London, made the suggestion.

For years there has been speculation on the possibility of using a method other than an A-bomb for detonating the H-bomb.

Originally it was thought only an A-bomb could produce the extremely high heat required to trigger the H-bomb. But shock waves may produce the heat needed, Prof. Jones said.

WAVES

Shock waves are increasing in importance as the era of intercontinental ballistic missiles approaches. The sharp sound heard when a jet passes thru the sound barrier is due to the shock wave.

Explosions as well as extremely rapid motion of airplanes or guided missiles can cause shock waves.

Using shock waves to set off H-bombs might allow building of a baby H-bomb. It could be exploded without using up precious fissionable uranium 235 or plutonium.

With the wave method, the H-bomb explosion could be made very little or very big, as desired. The A-bomb must have a minimum mass, probably about 50 pounds, to be set off in an uncontrolled chain reaction.

H-bombs without an accompanying A-bomb would not be detected by Geiger counters or other radiation detecting devices, since they would not release tell-tale radiation until exploded.

The H-bomb's light elements—generally thought to be deuterium, tritium or lithium—are widely available. Any nation, big or small, could make baby H-bombs after solving the detonation problem.

Shock waves may generate "such high temperatures," Prof. Jones says, they could be used to set off H-bombs.

America's favorite woman columnist, Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt, writes every day, Monday thru Saturday, exclusively in The Washington Daily News.

Wash. Post and Times Herald
Wash. News
Wash. Star
N. Y. Herald Tribune
N. Y. Mirror

Date: 7-20-1955

ENCLOSURE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-25-03 BY SP4 bja/PAM

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: August 17, 1955

FROM : MR. R. R. ROACH

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC WEAPONS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

Mr. Branigan's memorandum to you dated August 1, 1955, reported that the Washington "Daily News" of July 20, 1955, had contained an article to the effect that H-bombs could be triggered by using shock waves to produce the necessary high temperatures which now require an A-bomb.

William A. Burke, Division of Security, Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), advised on August 16, 1955, that AEC does not consider this method of triggering H-bombs feasible. He added that the article contained no classified information.

ACTION:

None. For your information.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-25-03 BY SP4 bjp/PAM

BAW:fjb
(5)

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Whitson
1 - Liaison Section
1 - Mr. Wells

RECORDED - 75

119-90-854

2 AUG 18 1955

5-Mr. Wilson

1-M

9 AUG 23 1955

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

AUG 5 1955

TELETYPE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Sizoo
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

WASH 5 FROM NEW YORK 5 1-45 PM

DIRECTOR URGENT

10-14-03
CLASSIFIED BY uc/lnc/ka/RNP 60267 derivative
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (1)(2) 10/14/2028
Per letter dtd 10/14/03 60267 uc/nls/BJA/RNP 10/15/03

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF OR OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE US., AEA. US CUSTOMS, NYC, ADVISED ON AUG FIFTH, FIFTYFIVE,

b1

59 AUG 23 1955

INDEXED - 84

2 AUG 19 1955

END PAGE ONE

Mrs. Holloman

cc Branigan

AEC and

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

~~SECRET~~

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: August 11, 1955

FROM : MR. R. R. ROACH

10-14-03
CLASSIFIED BY: UC/NW/bja/RNP 60267 derivative
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X(1) 10-14-2028
per letter dtd 10/14/03 60267 uc/NW/bja/RNP 10/15/03

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF OR OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT (AEA)

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

[redacted] (5) b1

[redacted] (5) b1

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

SJP:fjb
(5)

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Whitson
1 - Liaison Section
1 - Mr. Papich

RECORDED - 84
INDEXED - 84

117-268-4

2 AUG 19 1955

59 AUG 23 1955

Memo to Mr. Belmont
from Mr. Roach

~~SECRET~~

[redacted] (S)

ACTION:

b1

The above information is being directed to the attention of the Espionage Section. The Liaison Agent will follow this matter [redacted] for the purpose of obtaining any significant information which might require action on the part of the Bureau. (S)

[redacted] (S)

b1

~~SECRET~~

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : L. V. Boardman

DATE: August 17, 1955

FROM : A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: IIC-ICIS JOINT STUDY ON DIPLOMATIC POUCH

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
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Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

At 5:35 p.m., 8-17-55, Mr. John Doherty, Justice Department representative on the ICIS Standing Committee, called and stated that he was puzzled as to what the IIC and CIA meant by the term "letter size" when they suggested that in order to have maximum security, the diplomatic pouch would have to be reduced to letter size. He was asked by Agent Whitson what prompted the inquiry and he stated that the information obtained from AEC which he had discussed this morning with Bureau representatives to the effect that fissionable material might be sliced paper thin. He asked whether he should put his request in writing and he was told that it would probably be best for him to do so and include in his request for dimensions of a letter-size pouch the data from AEC on which the request was actually predicated.

RECOMMENDATION:

None. When the request from Doherty is received, it will be analyzed and an appropriate reply coordinated with the other IIC agencies.

Per LTR DTD 10/4/03 60267 uc/NLS/BJA/RNP 11/26/03
SEE INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/4/03 BY 60267 uc/NLS/BJA/RNP

NOT RECORDED
145 AUG 22 1955

16 AUG 19 1955

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

cc - Boardman
Belmont
Roach
S. D. Ellis
Whitson

LW:blb
(6)

INITIALS ON ORIGINAL

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. KEAY

DATE: August 16, 1955

FROM : MR. BELMONT

SUBJECT: SEMIANNUAL IIC-ICIS REPORT FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

Mr. Pat Coyne of the National Security Council called me on the afternoon of August 16, 1955, to advise that he had attended an ICIS meeting today at which the pending semiannual interim report of the IIC-ICIS for the National Security Council, due August 26, was discussed. He said there are some conflicting views as to the wording of the report and that he had suggested to Mr. Yeagley that Yeagley contact us so we could go over these points in the report to iron them out before submission to the NSC. I told Coyne we would do this as soon as Yeagley contacted us.

Coyne also referred to the IIC letter to Mr. Lay of NSC, expressing IIC views on the restriction of the diplomatic pouch. He said he had suggested to the ICIS that the divergent views of the various members of ICIS and IIC be contained in the joint report itself rather than in a cover memorandum. He suggested that in the "recommendations" part of the report, the views of the various agencies be set forth, including those of the IIC. He said that Yeagley will be contacting us in order that we, as IIC members, can assist in ironing out this report. I told Coyne that as soon as Yeagley called us on these things, we would give such assistance as we could.

We should look these reports over carefully to see that our views are properly presented.

Yeagley called 8/16. I told him Tolson & Sanders would be available

AHB:LL
(6)
cc--Mr. Keay
cc--Mr. Belmont
cc--Mr. Mohr
cc--Mr. Sanders
cc--Mr. Tolson

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-25-03 BY SP4 bja/mlw

NOT RECORDED 145 AUG 23 1955

TO : A. H. Belmont

FROM : V. A. Branigan

SUBJECT: SEMIANNUAL IIC-ICIS REPORT FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL; RESTRICTING THE DIPLOMATIC POUCH

Re memo Belmont to Keay August 16, 1955, indicating Mr. Pat Coyne of the National Security Council (NSC) had suggested to Yeagley of ICIS that Yeagley should contact the Bureau and go over points of conflict in the draft semiannual IIC-ICIS report so as to iron them out before submission to the NSC.

On the morning of August 17, 1955, Mr. S. D. Ellis followed Mr. Yeagley on this matter and was informed that the ICIS was not yet ready to discuss the semiannual IIC-ICIS report but hoped to be on August 18. Mr. Yeagley, however, sent over to the Bureau Mr. John Doherty, Justice Department representative on the ICIS Standing Committee. Mr. Doherty stated he wished to discuss the IIC-ICIS Joint Committee study on limiting the diplomatic pouch, which is one of the items mentioned in the semiannual report.

This matter was discussed with Mr. Doherty by Messrs. Ellis and Whitson. Doherty pointed out that although the Justice position had followed that of the IIC the Attorney General had expressed the feeling that Justice as a member of ICIS must attempt to weigh the alleged advantages and disadvantages of the possible reduction in size of the pouch against the reported intelligence acquisition made possible by the use of the pouch in Soviet Bloc countries.

Doherty also stated that on August 16, a representative of the Atomic Energy Commission had told him that fissionable material could be sliced extremely thin so that it would actually fit with its shielding in an envelope-size container. Doherty thought that this warranted reconsideration by IIC of its position to the effect that if maximum security was to be obtained the pouch would have to be reduced to letter size.

cc - Belmont
Branigan
Roach
Ellis
Whitson

SDE:LV:blb
(6)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-25-03 BY SP4 bja/PAM

NOT RECORDED
145 AUG 23 1955

AUG 22 1955

INITIALS ON ORIGINAL

Memo to A. H. Belmont

Doherty was told that the IIC position was unchanged; that even though uranium could be sliced paper thin, there was no showing that this was a practical means of handling a bomb core and, further, that there was no showing that the other components of atomic or thermonuclear weapons could be practicably reduced to letter size.

It was pointed out to Doherty that months had gone by since the problem of the pouch had been put before the two committees; that the IIC position was known, not only to ICIS, but to Mr. Coyne and Mr. Lay, and that any further delay in submitting the facts to the NSC would be unjustifiable. Doherty said he was seeking to get some kind of unanimous paper. It was pointed out to him that unanimity was apparently out of question and that a "split" set of recommendations reflecting the views of IIC and ICIS should go forward without further delay.

RECOMMENDATION:

None. For your information. When any documents on this subject are received from the Department or ICIS, they will be analyzed promptly.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

cc - Baken
Whitson

4-25-03 SP4 by a/PAW
CLASSIFIED BY
DECLASSIFY ON:

105-38279

Date: August 18, 1955

To: Captain John A. Sutera BY COURIER SERVICE
Director of Security
Atomic Energy Commission (orig and 1)
Room 2314, T-3 Building
16th and Constitution Avenue, N. W.
Washington 25, D. C.

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: INTRODUCTION OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
BY ISRAELI COURIER, IDLEWILD AIRPORT,
NEW YORK, MAY 10, 1955

Smuggling of Atomic Weapons

Reference is made to the information furnished May 10, 1955, to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and to the Atomic Energy Commission by the Bureau of Customs to the effect that an Israeli diplomatic courier, [redacted] entered the United States at Idlewild International Airport May 10, 1955. [redacted] taking his baggage, under diplomatic seal, past the detection device for fissionable material, a reaction was noted on both the head sensitive to neutrons and the head sensitive to gamma radiation. b7C

No action was taken by Customs to detain [redacted] or to determine the cause of the reaction of the detection device because [redacted] diplomatic status. [redacted] destined to the Consul General of Israel in New York City.

[redacted] b1

Tolson
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Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

cc - 1 - Assistant Attorney General (r.s. 0-6 same date)
William F. Tompkins 117-26-

cc - 117-268 (Smuggling...) NOT RECORDED
SEE NOTE PG. 2. 198 AUG 22 1955
LW:bhb

64 AUG (8) 1955

YELLOW DUPLICATE
AUG 19 1955
MAILED

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

SECRET

Letter to Captain John A. Peters
Director of Security
Atomic Energy Commission

[redacted] b1

[redacted] (S)

The comments of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Bureau of Customs regarding the existence and practical use of such a device are solicited.

cc - 1 - Mr. Chester A. Emerick
Deputy Commissioner, Investigations
Bureau of Customs
Room 7048
Internal Revenue Service Building
Washington 25, D. C.

BY COURIER SERVICE

NOTE: [redacted] Office of Naval Intelligence, authorized dissemination of these data to the AEC and Customs 8-16-55, per [redacted] Bureau liaison. b7C

SECRET

cc - Bane
Whitson

SAC, New York (117-192) (orig & 1) August 18, 1955

Director, FBI (117-268)

4-25-03 CLASSIFIED NSC/bja/PAW 60260 derivative

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE U.S.
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

O
SMUGGLING ATOM BOMBS

b7C

[redacted] b1

[redacted] (S)

[redacted] b1

[redacted] (S)

The New York Office should check with the appropriate officials of U. S. Customs in New York in an attempt to determine the significance of the introduction of such a device.

CC - [redacted] b7C

LW:blb
(6)

ENCL.

EX-104

RECORDED-37
INDEXED-37

MAILED 4
AUG 10 1955
COMM-FBI

AUG 22 1955

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
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Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

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FD-36

AIRTEL

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
NEW YORK, NY

8/18/55

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Sizoo
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

Transmit the following Teletype message to: BUREAU

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF OR OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES; AEA.

Re NY teletype 8/17/55.

Line six of retel should end with "President and Director, Detroit Edison Company, Detroit, Michigan". Bureau and Detroit requested to correct their copies. NY copies corrected.

KELLY

3 - Bureau (RM)
1 - Detroit (RM)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4-25-03 BY SP4 bja/PAM

Mr. Belmont

9-1

RECORDED - 73

117-2144

JEM:JJS(#17)
117-192

SEP 1 1955

Approved _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

TO : W. A. Branigan

DATE: August 19, 1955

FROM : L. Whitson

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION-IN-PLACE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE U.S.

At 3:25 and at 3:35 writer received calls from Colonel Joseph Halverson, Department of Defense representative on ICIS, and from Mr. Leonard Bienvenu, Executive Secretary of ICIS. Both made inquiry regarding whether the Treasury Department had been notified that the Atomic Energy Commission expected reimbursement for the cost of the detection devices which are now being used by Customs and Coast Guard.

The writer stated that it was his recollection that the IIC and the ICIS had written in the Fall of 1954 to the Atomic Energy Commission, making note of the Atomic Energy Commission's request in this regard, and that Treasury should, of course, have a copy as a member of ICIS.

Both individuals calling indicated that the Treasury representative on the ICIS Standing Committee had requested that the ICIS write a letter to the Secretary of the Treasury now confirming the foregoing. Bienvenu stated that the ICIS files indicated correspondence with AEC, copies of which went to Treasury.

RECOMMENDATION:

None. This is for your information.

cc - Branigan
Whitson
LW:blb
(3)

RECORDED - 87
INDEXED - 87
117-368-859

EX-104

AUG 24 1955

AUG 26 1955

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-25-03 BY SP4 bjf/mm

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

DATE OF MAIL 9-1-55

HAS BEEN REMOVED FOR [redacted] TO BE KEPT PERMANENTLY IN HIS OFFICE, ROOM [redacted]

b7C

SEE FILE 66-2554-7530 FOR AUTHORITY.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-25-03 BY SP4bja/PAM

SUBJECT JUNE MAIL Smuggling Atomic Bombs

REMOVED BY 59 OCT 11 1955

FILE NUMBER 117-268-C

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGEOUT

DATE OF MAIL 8-29-55

HAS BEEN REMOVED FOR [redacted] TO BE KEPT PERMANENTLY IN HIS OFFICE, ROOM [redacted] b7C

SEE FILE 66-2554-7530 FOR AUTHORITY.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-25-03 BY SP4 bja/PAM

SUBJECT JUNE MAIL Smuggling Atom Bombs

REMOVED BY 59 SEP 20 1955

FILE NUMBER 117-268-V

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGEOUT

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI (117-268) DATE: August 25, 1955

FROM : SAC, Buffalo (117-25)

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS
AND PARTS THEREOF INTO THE
UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT
(Bureau - Origin)

4-25-03 SP4 bja/PAM

Reference is made to Bulet, 1/20/54, and subsequent communications concerning the above-captioned matter.

On 8/20/55, Dr. MORTON E. KAPLON, Assistant Professor of Physics, University of Rochester, Rochester, New York, furnished the following information to SA MARK H. TUOHEY of this office:

> The University of Rochester Department of Physics is currently under contract to the United States Air Force, Air Research and Development Command, 6590th Headquarters Support Group, P. O. Box 1395, Baltimore, Maryland, Contract Number AF 18(600)380, to study the aspects of cosmic radiation.
>
> Sometime during the last week in June or the first week in July 1955, exact date unknown, Ilford Ltd., Ilford, London, England, shipped to the University of Rochester in a lead container sixty (60) 400 micron G5 stripped emulsions (plates) made up at Ilford Ltd. for use in a University of Rochester experiment. These sixty emulsions were part of a large shipment also containing six (6) additional emulsions of the same type as the sixty but packed separately in the lead container. The six were

REGISTERED
MHT:jak
(9)
cc: 2 - Baltimore (RM)
2 - Minneapolis (RM)
2 - Albuquerque (RM)

RECORDED - 76
INDEXED - 76

30

AUG 25 1955

SEP 16 1955

also from the same emulsion batch as the sixty. The shipment was via Trans-World Airlines Waybill No. 54-99-10, and arrived at the University of Rochester July 6, 1955. Regarding shipping procedure, the sixty emulsions were packed one on top of the other in the lead container, with No. 1 on the bottom, and No. 60 at the top.

Upon their arrival at the University of Rochester, the sixty emulsions were removed from the lead container together with the other part of the shipment, and the sixty emulsions were then repacked in an aluminum container and shipped to Winzer Research, Inc., 8401 Lyndale Avenue, Minneapolis, Minnesota. The date of the shipment from the University of Rochester was July 11, 1955, via Air Express Waybill No. 82-85-18.

It is to be noted that the emulsions were stored at the University of Rochester under secure conditions prior to shipment.

The emulsions were test flown at Winzer Research, Inc., Flight No. AMFL-61, during the latter part of July 1955, exact date unknown. The purpose of the test was to study the effects of cosmic radiation on the emulsions. This test was conducted under the supervision of Major DAVID G. SIMONS, Assistant Director, Aerometical Field Laboratory, Holloman Air Force Base, Alamogordo, New Mexico. The emulsions, which remained in the aluminum container throughout the entire flight, were then returned to the University of Rochester via Air Express for processing. The emulsions arrived at the University prior to August 2, 1955, exact date unknown.

On August 6, 1955, scientists at the University of Rochester knew that something was wrong with the emulsions. Further study reflected that they had been subjected to some intense gamma

radiation exposure which was incident in all directions on the block of emulsions with the highest intensity from one given direction, thereby causing intense fogging on the emulsion. The entire experiment was thereby declared worthless and, of course, the results negative.

Dr. KAPLON theorized that the emulsions were fogged or contaminated in transit between Rochester and Minneapolis and/or return because of their proximity to materials throwing off gamma radiation. He said there existed the possibility that careless handling of the emulsions at Ilford Ltd., such as prolonged exposure to X-ray treatment, may have caused the fogging. In this regard, Dr. KAPLON said it might be well to mention that the emulsions were subjected to limited X-ray treatment at Ilford in order to place small black lines on the emulsions themselves for testing purposes. He said, however, a study of these small black lines under a microscopic examination indicated they were sharp and not in any way diffused. He advised that this seems to indicate that this X-ray application was not the cause of the fogging.

Continuing, Dr. KAPLON said that he plans to contact Ilford, Ltd. in an effort to determine whether the responsibility for the fogging rests with that company.

He said that Dr. HERMAN YAGODA, National Institute of Health, Bethesda, Maryland, also had emulsions on the same test flight at Minneapolis which was referred to above. Dr. KAPLON has written to Dr. YAGODA and learned that none of Dr. YAGODA's emulsions were fogged. Dr. KAPLON, therefore, rules out the possibility that the emulsions were damaged in the test balloon flight.

Dr. KAPLON said he has contacted the office of Major SIMONS at Holloman Air Force Base regarding the possibility that there was an unusual amount of radiation at the time of the balloon flight. He said he received a reply from Holloman Air Force Base indicating there was not any unusual amount of radiation at the time of the flight.

Dr. KAPLON said he has contacted officials of the Atomic Energy Commission in an effort to determine if there was any radioactive cloud in the area at the time of the test flight and has been advised there was not.

The above set of circumstances appears to be almost identical to the situation existing in early 1954, at which time Ilford emulsions were fogged by some type of radiation. Buffalo is unaware of the final results of that investigation.

Buffalo will hold any further investigation in abeyance pending receipt of authorization from the Bureau. Offices receiving copies of this letter are requested to withhold investigation pending receipt of a specific request for investigation by the Bureau or Buffalo.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CC: LWhitson
EHMossburg

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BY COURIER SERVICE

RECORDED - 39

Date: August 25, 1955

To: Captain John A. Waters (Original & 1)
Director of Security
Atomic Energy Commission
Room 2314, T-5 Building
16th and Constitution Avenue, N. W.
Washington 25, D. C.

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF OR OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

DECLASSIFIED BY SP4 bjp/pam
ON 4-25-03

On August 23, 1955, United States Bureau of Customs, New York City, advised equipment utilized by it to detect fissionable material at the Morgan Postal Annex, 30th Street and 9th Avenue, New York City, had registered a positive reaction on a package consigned to one [redacted] United States Bureau of Customs further advised the name of the consignor of the package was not completely legible but the package appeared to have been sent from Switzerland. The machine used by Customs in this instance recorded a 20 by 200 reading which Customs officials described as only an average reaction.

b7C

BY COURIER SVC.
18 AUG 26
COMM - FBI

Your local office at New York City examined the contents of the package and described the material contained therein as pseudo medical apparatus in which it has no interest. A piece of the material contained in the package was obtained by your local office for examination and the package will be released by your local office. The material contained in the package appeared to be a "sleeping pad type which had been dipped into radioactive material," according to your local office.

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Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

66 SEP 1 1955

2 - Records Administration Branch (O-6a, same date)
ATTN: Internal Security Division

EHM:ss
(6)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Letter to Captain John A. Waters
Director of Security
Atomic Energy Commission

The files of this Bureau fail to reflect any information that can be identified with the consignee of the package referred to above. In view of the facts reported in this matter, no investigation is contemplated by this Bureau.

F.B.I. TELETYPE

4-41a

DECODED COPY

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Sizoo
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

4-25-03 SP4bja/PAM

WASHINGTON 15 FROM NEW YORK 8-23-55 232345 8:53 PM

DIRECTOR URGENT

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF OR OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO U.S. AEA. US CUSTOMS, NYC, ADVISED ON INSTANT DATE THAT A MACHINE USED TO DETECT FISSIONABLE MATERIAL BEING UTILIZED BY US CUSTOMS AT MORGAN POSTAL ANNEX, 30 STREET AND 9TH AVENUE NYC, ON INSTANT DATE, REGISTERED A POSITIVE REACTION ON A PACKAGE CONSIGNED TO [redacted] CUSTOMS ADVISED NAME OF CONSIGNOR IS NOT COMPLETELY LEGIBLE BUT APPEARS TO BE FROM SWITZERLAND. MACHINE RECORDED A TWENTY BY TWO HUNDRED READING ON THE TYPE OF MACHINE BEING USED, WHICH CUSTOMS OFFICIALS DESCRIBED AS ONLY AN AVERAGE REACTION. AEC, UPON EXAMINATION OF CONTENTS OF THE PACKAGE, DESCRIBED THE MATERIAL AS PSEUDO MEDICAL APPARATUS, WHICH THEY HAD NO INTEREST IN. A PIECE OF THE MATERIAL WAS TAKEN BY AEC FOR EXAMINATION BUT PACKAGE WILL BE RELEASED BY AEC. ACCORDING TO AEC, MATERIAL APPEARED TO BE QUOTE SLEEPING PAD TYPE WHICH HAD BEEN DIPPED INTO RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL. UNQUOTE NY TELEPHONE DIRECTORY REFLECTS NO LISTING FOR [redacted] AND NY CROSS REFERENCE DIRECTORY LISTED NO PHONE LISTING AT [redacted] NYO INDICES NEGATIVE [redacted] IN VIEW OF TYPE OF MATERIAL WHICH CREATED REACTION ON THE CUSTOMS MACHINE, AND LACK OF INTEREST BY AEC, NO FURTHER ACTION BEING TAKEN BY NYO.

b7C

RECORDED - 39
INDEXED-39
KELLY
2 AUG 30 1955

WA NY R 15 WA NG

RECEIVED: 8-23-55 9:02 PM MAP

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's coding systems.

Mr. Belmont

~~SECRET~~

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

cc - Roach
Whitson

117-268

4-25-03 SP4 bja/PAM

RECORDED-92

Date: August 26, 1955 VIA LIAISON

To: Captain John A. Waters (orig and 1)
Director of Security
Atomic Energy Commission
Room 2214, T-5 Building
16th and Constitution Avenue, N. W.
Washington 25, D. C.

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE U. S.
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

This is to confirm information orally furnished you through this Bureau's liaison representative on August 18, 1955, concerning [redacted] As you have been previously advised, [redacted] a United States citizen residing at [redacted] b7C

[redacted] that time [redacted] and was returning to the United States from a United States Government-sponsored trip to Geneva, Switzerland, where the International Conference on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy was recently held.

When the machine used to detect fissionable materials located at Idlewild Airport registered a maximum reading on the red and green lights with respect [redacted] baggage, his suitcases were searched and found therein were three and one-fourth pounds of natural uranium. [redacted] declared this merchandise and advised that the ore was obtained from the Detroit Edison Company and was taken to Geneva, Switzerland, for utilization in the afore-mentioned atomic energy conference. It was b7C

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Gandy

JFW:blb
(5)

63 SEP 13 1955

~~SECRET~~

12-29-57

Letter to Captain John A. Waters
Director of Security
Atomic Energy Commission

ascertained [redacted] was carrying export license number [redacted] issued by the Atomic Energy Commission. The Atomic Energy Commission, New York City, advised the U. S. Customs officials at Idlewild Airport to release instant uranium [redacted] b7C

No further action in this matter is contemplated by this Bureau.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

AUG 17 1955

TELETYPE

7

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-25-03 SP4bjf/mm

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Sizoo
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

WASH 16 FROM NEW YORK 17 11-00 P

DIRECTOR .... U R G E N T ....

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF OR OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE US, AEA. [redacted] US CUSTOMS, IDLEWILD AIRPORT, NY, ADVISED THIS DATE THAT [redacted] ARRIVED IDLEWILD AIRPORT, NY VIA [redacted] THIS AM. [redacted] b7C

[redacted] SPECIAL PASSPORT NUMBER [redacted] AND WAS RETURNING TO US FROM US GOVERNMENT SPONSORED TRIP TO GENEVA, SWITZERLAND WHERE ATOMIC CONFERENCE RECENTLY HELD. MACHINE USED TO DETECT FISSIONABLE MATERIALS LOCATED AT IDLEWILD AIRPORT REGISTERED A MAXIMUM READING ON RED AND GREEN LIGHT. A SEARCH [redacted] BAGGAGE DISCLOSED THREE AND ONE QUARTER POUNDS OF NATURAL URANIUM. [redacted] DECLARED SAME AND ADVISED THAT ORE WAS OBTAINED FROM DETROIT EDISON COMPANY AND WAS TAKEN TO GENEVA, SWITZERLAND FOR US GOVERNMENT SPONSORED ATOMIC CONFERENCE. [redacted] EXPORT LICENSE b7C

RECORDED-92
INDEXED-92

Capt. Waters, A&C
Orally advised
8-18-55
cmb

END PAGE ONE....

2 AUG 31 1955

65 SEP 13 1955

ESP/mjo INNES

PAGE TWO.....

[redacted] ISSUED BY AEC. AEC, NYC ADVISED CUSTOMS TO RELEASE URANIUM [redacted] NYO INDICES REFLECT CLOSED EUROPEAN RECOVERY PROGRAM CASE [redacted] BU FILE [redacted] WITH LEADS AT [redacted] INDICES ALSO REFLECT PENDING SPI INVESTIGATION PREDICATED UPON BUREAU TELETYPE TO NY AUGUST SIXTEEN, FIFTYFIVE [redacted] NO DEROGATORY INFORMATION NOTED IN SAID FILES. US CUSTOMS HAS CLASSIFIED MACHINE TO DETECT FISSIONABLE MATERIALS AS SECRET. NO FURTHER ACTION BEING TAKEN BY NYO. ABOVE INFO FURNISHED TO BUREAU AND DETROIT FOR INFORMATION.

b7C

KELLY

DETROIT ADVISED

END

WA NY R 16 WA KW

TU DISC

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

AUG 24 1955

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. Boardman	
Mr. Nichols	
Mr. Belmont	
Mr. Harbo	
Mr. Mohr	
Mr. Parsons	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Tamm	
Mr. Sizoo	
Mr. Winterrowd	
Tele. Room	
Mr. Holloman	
Miss Gandy	

WASH 12 FROM NEW YORK 24 TELETYPE 8-28P

DIRECTOR .....D E F E R R E D.....

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-25-03 BY SP4 bjd/pm

ATTENTION INSPECTOR HENNRICH.....

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF OR OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE US. AEA. MR. JOSEPH J. BURTON, DEPUTY COLLECTOR IN CHARGE, US CUSTOMS, IDLEWILD AIRPORT, NYC, ADVISED THIS DATE [redacted] b7C

[redacted] ARRIVED AT IDLEWILD AIRPORT [redacted] AUGUST [redacted] INSTANT, VIA PAN AMERICAN AIRLINES FLIGHT NUMBER [redacted]

[redacted] MACHINE USED TO DETECT FISSIONABLE MATERIALS LOCATED AT IDLEWILD AIRPORT REGISTERED A MAXIMUM READING ON RED AND GREEN LIGHT. SEARCH [redacted] BAGGAGE DISCLOSED ONE MEDICAL GLASS FIVE INCHES HIGH, WHICH WAS MANUFACTURED BY RADIUM INSTITUTE, DR. FRITZ BAHR AND CO., BERLIN, GERMANY. [redacted] DECLARATION FORM NUMBER [redacted] DECLARED SAME AS A MEDICAL GLASS, WEIGHT ONE DASH HALF TO ONE POUND. [redacted] DECLARED ORALLY THAT SAID MEDICAL GLASS WAS FOR PERSONAL MEDICAL USE. BURTON ADVISED THAT THIS GLASS PROBABLY CONTAINED RADIUM, WHICH REACTED ON MACHINE USED TO DETECT FISSIONABLE MATERIALS. LEONARD SOLON, AEC, NYC, ADVISED CUSTOMS TO RELEASE SAID MEDICAL GLASS [redacted] NYO INDICES CONTAIN NO INFORMATION IDENTIFIABLE WITH [redacted] FOREGOING INFORMATION FURNISHED FOR INFORMATION OF BUREAU. NO FURTHER ACTION BEING TAKEN BY THE NYO. b7C

58 SEP 9 1955

RECORDED - 73 117-268-

INDEXED - 73

KELLY

AUG 31 1955

No Dissemination necessary. Item on declaration and clearly radium glass

EX-107

Mr. Belmont

NY R 12 WA JS

58 SEP 9 1955

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI (117-268) DATE: 8/30/55

FROM : SAC, New York (117-192)

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES
AEA

Rebulet 8/18/55.

On 8/29/55, the information contained in rebulet was furnished to Mr. LEROY MACKERODT, acting in the absence of Assistant Surveyor JOSEPH FLYNN, U. S. Customs, NYC.

Mr. MACKERODT stated he could see no significance, from the point of view of U. S. Customs, if the device mentioned in rebulet was introduced to this country via diplomatic courier. However, if the device were smuggled in by other than a person with diplomatic immunity, a Custom violation would be involved under the general rule of the introduction of any device to be utilized in furthering the commission of crime.

Mr. MACKERODT had no information concerning this so-called device but stated he would call it to the attention of Mr. FLYNN on the latter's return and would make inquiries among the appropriate officials of U. S. Customs and would advise this office if any information were developed.

RECORDED - 54 117-268-

9-1

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-25-03 BY SP4 bg/sm

JJD:EG

126

59 SEP 8 1955

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Tolson
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Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: August 24, 1955

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-25-83 BY SP4 bja/pkm

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

On May 25, 1955, the IIC and the ICIS suggested to the Treasury Department that unaccompanied diplomatic baggage, effects, and shipments from the Soviet bloc countries be channeled through the ports of New York City and Georgetown, Washington, D. C., in order that they could be more thoroughly searched in an effort to prevent the clandestine introduction of atomic weapons. The Departments of State and Treasury had previously advised that this could be accomplished through the administrative methods without the exchange of diplomatic notes.

Since May 25, 1955, the Departments of Treasury and State have attempted to implement this procedure. This matter has been closely followed through liaison, and it was officially followed by IIC letter to ICIS dated July 8, 1955, to which a reply dated July 19, 1955, was received.

By letter dated August 8, 1955, the Treasury Department directed a letter to the IIC and the ICIS advising that all details for this channeling of unaccompanied shipments have been completed but that there appears to be the necessity for the State Department to advise the Soviet bloc representatives that these shipments are, upon arrival in the U. S., to be channeled to and released only at the ports of New York City and Georgetown. Treasury states that it appears to be necessary that this notification be made inasmuch as this channeling will constitute a change in procedures and the Soviet bloc representatives should be put on notice in order that they will be aware of the fact that in the future they may take delivery of these shipments in New York City and Georgetown only.

RECORDED - 65 117-268-

Inasmuch as this matter is a portion of the implementation of this procedure and must be handled by ICIS agencies, this matter was discussed with the ICIS Secretariat. Supervisor Sanders was advised this matter would be discussed thoroughly

INDEXED - 65

Enclosure

FOR APPROVAL SENT DIRECTOR 8-29-55

SEP 1955

ESS:hke (5)
1-Mr. Boardman
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Sanders
1-Section Tickler

SEP 13 1955

OK, but original was not sent to Mr. H.

Liaison

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 62-94888-77-E6003

Aug 24 2 33 PM

on August 16 or 18 by the ICIS. Inquiries were made on August 22 and 23, and it was determined that the matter was scheduled for ICIS consideration on August 25. Sanders advised Mr. Yeagley on August 23 that this matter must receive immediate attention inasmuch as the Treasury had addressed its letter to both committees and the IIC does not intend to have weeks go by without an answer to the Treasury Department in this connection. Yeagley agreed that, since this matter is strictly a matter of implementation by ICIS agencies, the IIC should direct a letter to Treasury advising that the matter is being handled in the ICIS, where Treasury and State are represented, and that the matter will be settled at the earliest possible moment.

Attached is a suggested IIC letter to the Treasury Department advising that the question of advising the Soviet bloc representatives in this country that their unaccompanied shipments are to be channeled through New York and Georgetown is a matter of implementation by the ICIS agencies, that the matter is being considered by the ICIS, and that a decision will be forthcoming from the ICIS in the near future. This will relieve the IIC of this question of implementation. This matter will, however, receive vigorous follow-up action to insure that the matter is settled within the ICIS without undue delay.

ACTION:

It is suggested that the Director sign the attached IIC letter and that it be forwarded to the Treasury Department. It has been approved by the other members of the IIC.

DATE OF MAIL 7-25-55

HAS BEEN REMOVED FOR [redacted] TO BE KEPT PERMANENTLY IN HIS OFFICE, ROOM [redacted]

b7c

SEE FILE 66-2554-7530 FOR AUTHORITY.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-25-03 BY SP4 bja/PAM

SUBJECT JUNE MAIL Smuggling Atomic Weapons

SEP 20 1955

REMOVED BY _____

FILE NUMBER 117-268-867

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGEOUT

189

cc - Whitson

SAC, Buffalo (117-25) (orig and 1)

September 12 1955

Director, FBI (117-268)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 7-25-83 BY SP4 bja/mm

RECORDED - 70

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

801.X3

Re Buffalo letter 8-25-55 advising that 60 Ilford plates utilized by the University of Rochester in cosmic radiation experiments were found to have been fogged. Reference is also made to Buffalo letter 9-7-55 in this matter.

It is noted that other plates from the National Institute of Health, Bethesda, Maryland, which were utilized in the cosmic radiation experiment did not suffer such fogging as did the University of Rochester's plates. It is noted that Dr. Morton F. Kaplon, University of Rochester, has eliminated the possibility of a radioactive cloud in the area of the test and suspects there might be a possibility that Ilford, Ltd., the producers of the plates, was responsible for the fogging.

It is noted there were 6 additional plates which were received by the University of Rochester from England in the same lead container that contained the 60 fogged plates.

The Buffalo Office should advise the Bureau whether Dr. Kaplon has noted the same fogging on the 6 plates as was noted on the 60. In the absence of facts which would place responsibility for the fogging on Ilford, Ltd., there is a possibility that the fogging took place as the result of close proximity of a radioactive source in the air express shipment from Rochester to Minneapolis, Minnesota, where the cosmic ray experiments were undertaken.

cc - 1 - Baltimore (for info)
cc - 1 - Minneapolis (for info)
cc - 1 - Albuquerque (for info)
cc - 1 - Washington Field (for info)
cc - 1 - New York (for info)

LW:blb
(9)

FEB 3 3M LW.22

Tolson
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Winterrowd
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Holloman
Gandy

18 SEP 15 1955

MAILED 8
SEP 12 1955
COMM-FBI

FBI - BUFFALO
DEC 6 1955

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI (117-268)

DATE: September 7, 1955

FROM : SAC, Buffalo (117-25)

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS
AND PARTS THEREOF INTO THE
UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT
(Bureau - Origin)

4-25-03 SP4 bjc/Pzw

Re: Buffalo letter to Bureau dated 8/25/55.

On September 1, 1955, MORTON F. KAPLON, Assistant Professor of Physics, University of Rochester, Rochester, New York, advised that the following letter was received by him from Ilford Limited, England, in reply to Dr. KAPLON's inquiry concerning the fogged emulsions described in reLet. The letter is under date of August 24, 1955, and signed "C. Waller". The letter is as follows:

"Dear Dr. Kaplon,

"Thank you for your letter of 19th August concerning the fogging you have found on the stack of G5 Batch NO. Z9323.

"I had hoped and expected to be able to assure you that it would be impossible for such fogging to occur here, but I find that on this occasion your stack was in the room whilst a stack for Bristol was marked. This, of course, was against instructions, and owing to the non-availability at the time of the man who would have normally supervised the work.

"We have now carried out some tests of G5 emulsion placed in the position where your stack was, and we find in fact that there is some background of very slow electrons due to scattered radiation.

"We used 70kv X-rays, and most of the radiation reaching the plate was softer than this. Furthermore, the intensity is not such as would give almost complete blackening, we would not expect it to be isotrapic, and we would expect a very rapid fall of intensity into the interior of the stack.

MHT:amw
(6)
Registered Mail
cc: 1 - Albuquerque (RM)
1 - Baltimore (RM)
1 - Minneapolis (RM)

117-268-Xbm

RECORDED - 70
INDEXED - 70
108 - X3
16 SEP 8 1955

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

"To sum up, I think that we have contributed to the fogging of this particular stack (but not other stacks), but I am doubtful whether we have produced the whole effect.

"I am, of course, very sorry about this, and for the trouble you have been caused, and we are prepared to replace this stack. Perhaps you will let me know if you wish us to do so.

"I have decide that the X-ray marking of emulsion is not an operation we should in the fubure undertake. The tests I have referred to show a distinct possibility that the actual exposure of the stack during marking may cause some general fogging, and I do not feel that the people who are accustomed to handling the emulsion, including myself, have sufficient knowledge of the behavior of X-rays to make the risk of such mishaps as yours worth taking.

"We have just received your cable asking for three stacks of 483 X 3" X 400u G5 emulsion films plus four separate test emulsions and treated glasses, and we can undertake this without the X-ray marking.

"Yours sincerely,"

Dr. KAPLON advised that while the above offers an explanation as to what caused at least partial fogging in the emulsions, he is not entirely satisfied at this time that the whole cause lies with Ilford Limited. He said that there still exists the possibility, however remote, that gamma radiation effected the emulsions somewhere other than at Ilford. He said that of course his findings are not near as strong as they were prior to the Ilford letter. He said that he plans to send to Ilford one of the fogged emulsions received at the University of Rochester asking Ilford to compare the intensity of the fogging on this particular emulsion with the intensity of fogging on the emulsions referred to in the Ilford letter. He said that he would advise this office of the results.

Dr. KAPLON also furnished a copy of a letter directed to the Commanding General, Air Research and Development Command, Office of Scientific Research (RDRN), P. O. Box 1395, Baltimore 3, Maryland, dated August 22, 1955. This letter sets out in detail the results of the initial findings of Dr. KAPLON concerning the fogged emulsions which results were set forth for the Bureau in Buffalo letter August 25, 1955. The copy of the letter to the Air Research and Development Command is being maintained in the files of the Buffalo Office.

In view of the results of the Ilford inquiry, Buffalo will conduct no further investigation UACB. The Bureau will be advised of any contact by Dr. KAPLON with this office. RUC.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. Boardman	
Mr. Nichols	
Mr. Belmont	
Mr. Harbo	
Mr. Mohr	
Mr. Parsons	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Tamm	
Mr. Winterrowd	
Tele. Room	
Mr. Holloman	
Miss Gandy	

TO : Director, FBI (117-268)

DATE: 9-7-55

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

FROM : SAC, San Diego (66-998)

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES

Re No Number SAC Letter A, dated 1-28-52 and San Diego letter dated 6-6-55.

This office has no additional names to recommend for inclusion on the Bureau of Customs Watch List at this time. This matter is being closely followed and the Bureau will be kept advised of any pertinent developments.

WED:HB
(3)

DECLASSIFIED BY SP4 bja/pam
ON 4.25.03

REGISTERED - AIR MAIL

EXP. PROC.

RECORDED - 97 117-266-869

EX-118

14 SEP 8 1955

~~SECRET~~ cc -

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RECORDED - 73
117-268
62 - 97161

DECLASSIFIED BY SP4 bja/PAW
ON 4-25-03

Date: September 7, 1955 BY COURIER SERVICE

To: Captain John A. Waters (orig and 1)
Director of Security
Atomic Energy Commission
Room 2314, T-5 Building
16th and Constitution Avenue, N. W.
Washington 25, D. C.

EX-122

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF OR OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

On September 1, 1955, [redacted] who is employed in the Surveyor's Office, United States Customs House, New York City, advised that a package was received at the Morgan Annex which registered a [redacted] reading on the machine used to detect fissionable material located at the Morgan Annex. Miss Bowe stated that upon inspection by U. S. Customs, this package was found to contain a foam rubber mat approximately 5 feet by 2½ feet by ½ inch. The package was addressed to [redacted] and was sent from [redacted] Mr. Leonard Solon of the Atomic Energy Commission, New York City, advised that this mat contains radium and he described the mat as a pseudomedical apparatus which, in his opinion, is potentially dangerous to health. Mr. Solon advised U.S. Customs to release the package to [redacted]

b2
b7E
b7C

JFW:blb
(7)

cc - 1 - AAG Tompkins by r.s. 0-6 same date.

~~SECRET~~ 12-26-57

Tolson
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Harbo
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Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

BY COURIER SVC.
04 SEP - 8
COMM - FBI

57 SEP 20 1955

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Letter to Captain John A. Waters
Director of Security
Atomic Energy Commission

The foregoing is being submitted for your information. This Bureau contemplates taking no further action in this matter.

cc - 1 - Mr. Chester A. Emerick BY COURIER SERVICE
Deputy Commissioner, Investigations
Bureau of Customs
Room 7048
Internal Revenue Service Building
Washington 25, D. C.

cc - 1 - Mr. Frederick H. Schmidt BY COURIER SERVICE
Director of Security
Department of Health, Education and Welfare
Fourth Street and Independence Avenue, S. W.
Washington, D. C.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~SECRET~~

4-22 (6-15-55)

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Records Section

9-2, 1955

- ☐ Name Check Unit - Room 6523
- ☐ Attention _____
- ☐ Service Unit - Room 6524
- ☐ Forward to File Review
- ☐ Return to [redacted] Ext. _____
  Supervisor
  Room 1730

- ☐ All References
- ☐ Subversive References
- ☐ Main _____ References Only
- ☐ Restrict to Locality of _____
- ☐ Breakdown ☐ Buildup ☐ Variations
- ☐ Exact Name Only
- ☐ Exact Spelling
- ☐ Check for Alphabetical Loyalty Form

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SUBJECT [redacted]
Address _____

Localities _____
Birthdate & Place _____

R# _____ Date 9-2 Searcher Initial des

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4-22 (6-15-55)

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Records Section

9-2, 1955

- ☐ Name Check Unit - Room 6523
- ☐ Attention _____
- ☐ Service Unit - Room 6524
- ☐ Forward to File Review
- ☐ Return to [redacted] Ext. _____
  Supervisor
  Room 1730

- ☐ All References
- ☐ Subversive References
- ☐ Main _____ References Only
- ☐ Restrict to Locality of _____
- ☐ Breakdown ☐ Buildup ☐ Variations
- ☐ Exact Name Only
- ☐ Exact Spelling
- ☐ Check for Alphabetical Loyalty Form

b7C

SUBJECT
Address

Localities _____
Birthdate & Place _____

R# _____ Date 9-2 Searcher Initial das

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DATE 4-25-03 BY SP4bjaltm

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

SEP 1 1955

TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Sizoo
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

WASH 10 FROM NEW YORK 1 7-48 P

DIRECTOR .... D E F E R R E D ....

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF OR OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE USA, AEA. [redacted] SURVEYOR-S OFFICE, US CUSTOMS HOUSE, NYC, ADVISED THIS DATE THAT A PACKAGE WAS RECEIVED AT THE MORGAN ANNEX, MAIL DIVISION. SAID PACKAGE REGISTERED A [redacted] READING ON THE MACHINE USED TO DETECT FISSIONABLE MATERIALS, LOCATED AT MORGAN ANNEX. UPON INSPECTION BY CUSTOMS, SAID PACKAGE WAS FOUND TO CONTAIN A FOAM RUBBER MAT, APPROXIMATELY FIVE FEET BY TWO AND ONE DASH HALF FEET BY ONE DASH HALF INCH. PACKAGE WAS ADDRESSED TO [redacted] AND WAS SENT FROM [redacted] LEONARD SOLON, AEC, NYC, ADVISED THAT AFOREMENTIONED MAT CONTAINS RADIUM, WHICH CAUSED RE DASH ACTION ON MACHINE. SOLON DESCRIBED MAT AS A PSEUDO MEDICAL APPARATUS WHICH, IN HIS OPINION, IS POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS TO HEALTH. SOLON HAS ADVISED CUSTOMS TO RELEASE PACKAGE TO ADDRESSEE. NYO INDICES CONTAINED NO INFORMATION IDENTIFIABLE WITH [redacted] ABOVE FURNISHED FOR INFORMATION OF BUREAU. NO FURTHER ACTION BEING TAKEN BY NYO.

b7C b2 b7E

b7C

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RECORDED - 73

KELLY

21 SEP 15 1955

END SEP 20 1955

WA NY R 10 WA NG

Mr. Belmont

5 - WSJFKW

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: August 19, 1955

FROM : W. A. Branigan

SUBJECT: NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
NET EVALUATION SUBCOMMITTEE

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

At 2 p.m., 8-17-55, SA Whitson met with the representatives of the military agencies of IIC working on the evaluation problem Plan "C." This concerns the Soviet attack after sufficient strategic warning to place U. S. military and nonmilitary defenses in a condition of full alert.

[redacted]

b2
b7E

[redacted]

[redacted]

The conferees noted that it would reasonably take [redacted]

[redacted]

b2
b7E

Further discussion individually with representatives of OSI, Major Mann, [redacted] Boyd and Captain Martin, and with Captain Schmidling of ONI on August 19, 1955, brought about the following understanding regarding the [redacted]

[redacted]

cc - Belmont
Hennrich
Branigan
Roach
Day
Whitson

LW:blb
(7)

NOT RECORDED
SEP 19 1955

21 SEP 15 1955

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[redacted]

b2
b7E

[redacted] The military members of the group have stated they would attempt to submit papers on their target studies on Wednesday, August 24, 1955. Captain Schmidling will submit a paper on the probabilities of getting bombs smuggled in from the sea.

Mr. Leonard Bienvenu, Executive Secretary, ICIS, has stated that Commander Clark of the Coast Guard was also preparing a study on how to smuggle the small bombs in from the sea.

RECOMMENDATION:

This is for your information. The next meeting of the group working on this problem will be at 2 p.m., Wednesday, August 24, 1955, in Room 2C468, the Pentagon.

DATE OF MAIL 9-13-55

HAS BEEN REMOVED FOR [redacted] TO BE KEPT PERMANENTLY IN HIS OFFICE, ROOM [redacted] b7C

SEE FILE 66-2554-7530 FOR AUTHORITY.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-25-03 BY SP4 bja/PAM

SUBJECT JUNE MAIL Smuggling of Atomic Bombs

REMOVED BY [redacted] SEP 21 1955

FILE NUMBER 117-268-871

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGEOUT

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~~SECRET~~

cc - Whitson

117-268

RECORDED - 43

10/14/2003
CLASSIFIED BY 60267 uc/NLS/BJA/RNP
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (1) 10/14/2028
Per LTR DTD 10/14/03 60267 uc/NLS/BJA/RNP
10/15/2003

Date: August 29, 1955

To: Captain John A. Waters — BY COURIER SERVICE
Director of Security (orig and 1)
Atomic Energy Commission
Room 2314, T-5 Building
18th and Constitution Avenue, N. W.
Washington 25, D. C.

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Subject: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

[redacted]

[redacted]

MAILED 5
AUG 31 1955
COMM-FBI

BY COURIER SVC.
34 AUG 31
COMM-FBI

(S) FBI

RECEIVED READING ROOM
AUG 30 1 58 PM '55

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Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

cc - 1 - Assistant Attorney General (by r.s. 0-6 same date)
William F. Tompkins

IFW:blh (5)

SEP 23 1955

~~SECRET~~

Memo Roach to Belmont 8-29-55
SJP:FJB, same subject

Letter to Captain John A. Waters
Director of Security
Atomic Energy Commission

[redacted] b1

[redacted] (S)

The foregoing is being furnished for your information. This Bureau will take no further action in this matter.

ST[redacted]M NO. 64

Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

~~SECRET~~

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: August 23, 1955

FROM : MR. R. R. ROACH

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF OR OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY ACT (AEA)

10-14-03
CLASSIFIED BY: uc/aus/bja/ RNP 60267 derivative
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (1) 10-14-2028
[illegible] 10-14-03

SMUGGLING ATOMIC BOMBS

[redacted] (5)

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[redacted] (5)

b1

SJP:fjb
(5)

RECORDED - 43
INDEXED - 43

117-268-

SEE ADDENDUM PAGE 2.

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Whitson
1 - Liaison Section
1 - Mr. Papich

memo to all (various) re Communist Espionage 8-24-55 JFW

~~SECRET~~

6 SEP 16 1955

1 -

Memo to Mr. Belmont
from Mr. Roach

~~SECRET~~

[redacted] (S)

b1

[redacted] (S)

[redacted] (S)

ACTION:

The above information is being directed to the attention of the Espionage Section.

ADDENDUM 8-29-55 JFW:blb

[redacted] (S)

b1

~~SECRET~~

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN ~~SECRET~~ DATE: September 2, 1955

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: LIMITING DIPLOMATIC POUCHES

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

By letter dated August 26, 1955, the ICIS furnished for IIC information copies of correspondence between the ICIS and the Atomic Energy Commission in which the ICIS requested information regarding the smallest amounts or sizes to which fissionable material could be reduced, introduced clandestinely, and later reassembled for use in an atomic weapon.

Referral/Direct to OGA

[redacted] (S)

ENCL

On September 1, 1955, Pat Coyne indicated concern that AEC has indicated that fissionable material could be [redacted] the pouch even though the pouch would be reduced to "letter size." Coyne attempted on September 1, 1955, to contact Admiral Strauss of AEC to discuss this matter and determined that Strauss will

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b7E

Enclosures (2)

GAD:nlc

NOT RECORDED
117 SEP 02 1955

4-25-2003
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OTHERWISE

not return to Washington until September 12. Coyne then arranged for Mr. Ash of his office and for Mr. Yeagley of ICIS to contact AEC Officials to determine the feasibility and practicability [redacted] for clandestine introduction. He invited the IIC to have a representative present.

Copies of the ICIS-AEC correspondence have been furnished to the other members of the IIC, and this has been the subject of discussion. The other members agree that the information supplied by the AEC would in no way affect the IIC position that maximum security could only be obtained by reducing the pouch to letter size. They also agree that, even if minute amounts of fissionable material could still be introduced in the "letter-size" pouches, this procedure would force an enemy into an extremely difficult task, particularly in view of the fact that all other components of such a nuclear weapon could not be introduced through a pouch of this size and would have to be obtained in this country, thus greatly increasing the possibilities of detection.

b2
b7E

In order that we can ascertain just what AEC has to say about the feasibility or practicability of reducing the fissionable material to extremely small sizes [redacted] we have advised Coyne that Supervisor Whitson, who has represented the IIC in the study of this matter, will accompany the ICIS representative and Ash in their discussion with officials of the Atomic Energy Commission.

Coyne advised that Yeagley stated on September 1, 1955, that the ICIS would be ready to sit down and write up the joint report on this matter subsequent to the inquiries at AEC referred to above although it appears that there will be a divergence of opinion among the ICIS members as well as with the IIC position. You will recall that, when we sent the IIC position to the National Security Council by letter of August 12, 1955, as a result of ICIS delays, Coyne called me and advised that, before this goes to the NSC for consideration, it should be in the form of a joint report. He was told that the IIC has been ready to prepare the joint report for a number of weeks and that the IIC position was sent to the NSC only because we could not get ICIS to get down to business in the preparation of the joint

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum for Mr. Boardman

report even though we were ready. Coyne and Mr. Doherty of the ICIS were advised on September 2 that the IIC is ready to sit down and write the joint report.

ACTION:

The foregoing is for your information, and you will be kept advised of all developments in this matter. We will maintain the IIC position and will continue to insist that the ICIS get down to business with the IIC representatives and prepare the joint report even though it will present split views.

~~SECRET~~

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : L. V. Boardman SECRET DATE: 9-7-55

FROM : A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: LIMITING DIPLOMATIC POUCHES

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
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Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

Re memo Belmont to Boardman 9-2-55 indicating that the IIC was ready to sit down and meet with the ICIS and write a joint report on the question of limiting diplomatic pouches. Pursuant to advice given Mr. J. P. Coyne, Internal Security Representative, National Security Council, Supervisor Whitson, representing IIC, met with Mr. Ash, Coyne's assistant, Messrs. John Doherty and Carl Pfuntner for ICIS, and Lt. Col. Vance Hudgins and Mr. Don Gale of the Atomic Energy Commission, 10 a.m., 9-6-55.

Inquiries were directed at the AEC representatives by Doherty and Ash regarding the clandestine introduction of [redacted] The AEC people pointed out (S) that a [redacted]

b1
b2
b7E

The ICIS representatives agreed to write a letter to AEC requesting clarification of certain of the statistical items supplied in the AEC letter to Mr. Yeagley of ICIS dated 8-23-55. Nothing which developed during the course of the discussion served to alter in any respect the IIC position that maximum security against the use of the diplomatic pouch as a means of introducing clandestine atomic weapons could only be obtained by reducing the pouch to letter size.

The AEC representatives, in response to inquiry by the IIC representative, stated that they would not attempt to introduce an atomic weapon [redacted] nor would they attempt to use the diplomatic pouch if it was reduced to letter size. b2 b7E

*the fissionable material for

cc - Boardman
Belmont
Day
Whitson

LW:blb
(5)

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SEP 14 1955

117-248
NOT RECORDED
145 SEP 16 1955

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62-104076-60247 Den

NW 65184 Docld: 32989627 Page 1

DECLASSIFIED BY NSISAC/Am 60247 Den ON: 25X 4-25-03

AEC will supply additional data regarding the practicability of attempting to shield any weight of uranium in order to [redacted] b2 b7E

After the meeting, Supervisor Whitson suggested to Mr. Doherty of ICIS that the IIC and ICIS could now get together and prepare a joint report since nothing had developed to change the known facts even though the Atomic Energy Commission was going to supply additional examples. Mr. Doherty stated that he would phone Mr. Whitson, Wednesday, 9-7-55, to set a definite hour for preparation of the joint report.

RECOMMENDATION:

None. For your information. These developments may be of interest to the Director inasmuch as the status of this matter is to be noted at the IIC meeting which will be held in the Director's office, 9-7-55.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : L. V. Boardman

DATE: 9-9-55

FROM : A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: LIMITING DIPLOMATIC POUCHES

Re memo Belmont to Boardman 9-7-55.

A meeting of the Working Committee representatives of the IIC and the Standing Committee representatives of the ICIS met with Mr. J. P. Coyne, Internal Security Representative, National Security Council, and Coyne's assistant, Mr. Ash, at 10 a.m., 9-9-55, in Room 2515, Justice Building. The Bureau representatives present were Messrs. Belmont, Day, and Whitson.

The contents and format of a proposed joint IIC-ICIS report on the question of the diplomatic pouch were discussed and arrangements were made for a draft to be reviewed and discussed by the same group at 2:30 p.m., Tuesday, 9-13-55.

RECOMMENDATION:

None. For your information. This matter is being followed closely.

cc - Boardman
Belmont
Day
Whitson

NOT RECORDED
145 SEP 16 1955

SEP 14 1955

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Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security

2212 Department of Justice, Washington 25, D. C.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4-25-03 SP4 bja/PAM

Honorable J. Edgar Hoover
Chairman
Interdepartmental Intelligence
Conference
Washington, D. C.

Attention: Mr. Lish Whitson

Re: DIPLOMATIC POUCH

Dear Mr. Hoover:

Attached is a photostat copy of a self-explanatory letter I received today from Acting Commissioner of Customs Lawton M. King, dated September 14, 1955.

Sincerely,

J. Walter Yeagley

J. Walter Yeagley
Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee
on Internal Security

ENCL.

RECORDED - 65

117-268

INDEXED - 65

117-268

57 SEP 22 1955

5-AW

DATE OF MAIL 9-6-55

HAS BEEN REMOVED FOR [redacted] TO BE KEPT PERMANENTLY IN HIS OFFICE, ROOM [redacted] b7C

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SEE FILE 66-2554-7530 FOR AUTHORITY.

SUBJECT JUNE MAIL Smuggling of Atomic Bombs

REMOVED BY 57 SEP 23 1955

FILE NUMBER 117-268-874

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGEOUT

104

copy/dpg

September 14, 1955

TO: MR. A. H. BELMONT

FROM: R. R. ROACH

SUBJECT: CHANNELING OF UNACCOPANIED DIPLOMATIC BAGGAGE, EFFECTS, AND SHIPMENTS
SMUGGLING ATOM BOMBS

At the IIC meeting 9/7/55, the action previously taken in this matter was reviewed. It was noted that Treasury had been instructed by IIC-ICIS letter 5/25/55 to arrange for channeling of unaccompanied Soviet bloc shipments, not under diplomatic seal, through ports of New York City and Georgetown to permit more thorough search to prevent clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons.

By letter 8/8/55 Treasury advised IIC and ICIS jointly that details completed, but notification of Soviet bloc representatives should be made. After consultation with ICIS Chairman Yeagley, IIC letter 8/25/55 was prepared notifying Treasury that the matter of having State inform Soviet bloc being considered in ICIS and that ICIS consideration of this matter.

As noted in IIC minutes, 9/7/55, ICIS is requesting Treasury to survey amount of unaccompanied shipments in belief they are very few and additional detection devices are becoming available. John Doherty, ICIS, informed Graham Day, 9/14/55, that ICIS would by letter request IIC comments on this procedure.

ACTION:

This is to inform you of current status of this matter, and Doherty will be followed closely in order that matter may be considered by IIC Working Committee when letter received.

GAD:hke
(4)

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1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Day
1-Section Tickler

117-268
NOT RECORDED
145 SEP 22 1955

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September 15, 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TOLSON
MR. BOARDMAN
MR. BELMONT

Confirming the oral instructions which I have previously given, I desire that the two matters which have been considered by the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference be carefully reevaluated to be certain that our position is sound.

The first matter deals with the size of the diplomatic pouch, which the IIC has recommended be reduced to letter-size, and the second matter deals with the channeling of private baggage of Soviet and satellite diplomats through New York and Georgetown, D. C. While positions have been taken upon both of these matters by the IIC, it might be well to have them again reevaluated in view of present world conditions and then a decision made.

Very truly yours,

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John Edgar Hoover
Director

JEH:eff (6)

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145 SEP 21 1955

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
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SENT FROM D. O.
TIME [illegible]
DATE 9-15-55
BY [illegible]

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20 SEP 21 1955

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DATE OF MAIL 9-1-55

HAS BEEN REMOVED FOR [redacted] TO BE KEPT PERMANENTLY IN HIS OFFICE, ROOM [redacted] b7C

SEE FILE 66-2554-7530 FOR AUTHORITY.

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SUBJECT JUNE MAIL Smuggling Atomic Weapons

REMOVED BY [redacted]

FILE NUMBER 117-268-875

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGEOUT

176

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: September 13, 1955

FROM : R. R. ROACH

SUBJECT: PREVENTION AND DETECTION OF THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY SEA

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-25-83 BY SP4 bjs/PAM

By letter, August 29, 1955, the Chairman, ICIS, forwarded to the Director as Chairman, IIC, copies of an ICIS report on the captioned subject dated August 22, 1955. IIC comments were requested, and the matter has been placed on the IIC Working Committee agenda for its next meeting, September 19, 1955.

The report states the problem to be whether a seacoast patrol system, including patrol by men, ships, and aircraft; increased development and use of intelligence; and prior notice of arrival at U. S. ports by merchant vessels, is required to prevent or detect clandestine introduction by sea of nuclear weapons. The acknowledged capability of the Soviets for such introduction is noted as is the existence of a gap in the detection system which would permit this. It is concluded that a seacoast patrol system would be a countermeasure, but that no one Federal agency has clear-cut responsibility for coordinating such a system.

The report notes Coast Guard security forces not employed in other than 16 ports of entry and other Coast Guard facilities primarily designed for search and rescue. However, war mobilization plan for Coast Guard envisions beach patrol of about 22,000 men in addition to present programs. Air Force and Naval operations provide some "bonus effect" for protection against smuggling, while INS and Customs rely on Coast Guard to cover vessels in coastal waters. Report states, "The FBI has personnel which, under certain circumstances, could be deployed along the coast. Personnel of other Federal agencies could be made available for deployment along the coast in their special fields of responsibility." No further comment is made concerning this statement, the implications of which will be strongly objected to in connection with IIC comment.

The report briefly reviews intelligence responsibilities of Armed Forces, FBI, Customs, INS, and Coast Guard. It states

GAD:hke (4)
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Day
1-Section Tickler

NOT RECORDED
145 OCT 13 1955

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that local police and citizens living along coast are one of greatest unexploited sources of intelligence. "At present no single agency is responsible for coordinating action against the threat considered herein based on the information which might be derived from this source"; further: "There are many regions of the coast where a citizen could report suspicious activities, but because of the present lack of coordinated effort by a single agency or groups of agencies, the enemy could disappear into the hinterland without investigation or apprehension." This unwarranted conclusion will be considered in IIC comment.

Report recommends:

1. That a mechanism be established for:

   (a) Correlating and evaluating available intelligence information and stimulating the acquisition of needed additional intelligence relating to these matters.

   (b) Using present forces, initiating and coordinating action concerning (1) surveillance and search of suspicious vessels, (2) investigation of suspicious incidents on the coast, and (3) requests for additional preventive action as necessary by any appropriate forces.

2. That the Coast Guard be assigned responsibility for the establishment and operation of the mechanism recommended above, and that all appropriate executive departments and agencies of the Government be notified of the establishment of this mechanism and be directed to lend it their support.

As attachments to the report are Plans A, B, and C for extension of Coast Guard facilities to include active seacoast patrols. These are alternative plans based on varying costs. Plan C provides for supervisory details to "solicit information from residents in isolated areas" among other duties. This apparently envisions establishment of coastal informant system by Coast Guard.

The apparent encroachments upon our investigative jurisdiction will be firmly opposed. It is suggested our position should be that situation requires clarification of jurisdiction of the several interested Federal agencies and that [redacted] delimitation of fields of responsibility should be established. This matter is included in agenda for IIC Working Committee meeting, September 19, 1955.

ACTION:

If you approve, FBI position concerning ICIS proposal will be that, while Bureau will, of course, cooperate with Coast Guard or any other agency in captioned problem, we will not be "coordinated" in the discharge of our responsibilities, whether statutory or by Executive Directive. We will suggest that IIC inform ICIS that the plan to establish Coast Guard as a coordinating agency in intelligence field appears to have been based on premise confusion presently exists, which is not accurate. We will suggest clarification and delimitation of responsibilities of the various departments and agencies interested in this problem.

DATE OF MAIL 9-15-55

HAS BEEN REMOVED FOR [redacted] TO BE KEPT PERMANENTLY IN HIS OFFICE, ROOM [redacted] b7C

SEE FILE 66-2554-7530 FOR AUTHORITY.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-25-03 BY SP4 bja/fnm

SUBJECT JUNE MAIL Smuggling Atomic Bombs

REMOVED BY [redacted] OCT 11 1955

FILE NUMBER 117-268-V

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGEOUT

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: September 15, 1955

FROM : R. R. ROACH

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: REAPPRAISAL OF U. S. POLICY REGARDING SHIPMENTS AFFORDED DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY

The Working Committees of the IIC and ICIS, which met jointly on September 9 and 13, 1955, to discuss drafts of a report in the captioned matter, met again 9/15/55 from 9:30 a.m. to 1:40 p.m. The draft currently under discussion was considered through Conclusion No. 1. Supervisors Whitson and Day represented the FBI.

The joint meeting will reconvene at 9:30 a.m., Friday, 9/16/55, for further discussion. It is expected by that time AEC representatives will have furnished further data regarding the sizes and weights of pieces of fissionable material of varying thicknesses.

ACTION:

None. This is for your information.

GAD:hke
(5)

1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Mr. Day
1-Section Tickler

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Smuggling Atom Bombs

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SEP 21 1955

59 SEP 29 1955

DATE OF MAIL 9-16-55

HAS BEEN REMOVED FOR [redacted] TO BE KEPT PERMANENTLY IN HIS OFFICE, ROOM [redacted] b7C

SEE FILE 66-2554-7530 FOR AUTHORITY.

SUBJECT JUNE MAIL Investigating Atomic Weapons

REMOVED BY 59 SEP 30 1955

FILE NUMBER 117-268-877

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGEOUT

126

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-25-03 BY SP4 bjf/mal

Director, FBI (105-11768) 9/16/55

SAC, New York (100-93422)

CZECHOSLOVAKIAN DIPLOMATIC
ACTIVITIES IN NEW YORK;
IS - R & CZ

Re telcall of Inspector C. E. HENNRICH to Supervisor T. J. McANDREWS on 9/16/55.

Transmitted herewith is a typed copy of baggage declaration [redacted] relative to the arrival in the United States of [redacted] Also enclosed is a typed copy of confidential record of accompanied baggage and/or diplomatic pouches from Soviet Bloc Countries, relative to the arrival of [redacted] These copies were furnished by [redacted] US Customs, NYC, from the originals which are in the possession of the Customs Service. These need not be returned. No copies have been retained by the NYO.

b7C

Encs. (2)

JSMcC:AMV

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4-25-03 BY SP4 bjf/ROM

2 ENCL

NOT RECORDED
1 OCT 4 1955

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60 OCT 6 1955

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

SECRET

DATE: September 16, 1955

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

SUBJECT: LIMITING DIPLOMATIC POUCHES

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

Pursuant to the Director's instructions at the IIC meeting, September 7, 1955, joint meetings of the Working Committees of the IIC and ICIS, called by Pat Coyne of the National Security Council, were held on September 9, 13, 15, and 16 for a total of more than 17 hours. Most of the discussion has been on the part of ICIS representatives in the nature of changes in phraseology of positions previously adopted by ICIS members and essentially unchanged by such new phraseology. Mr. Coyne personally and also through Mr. Ash, his assistant, has made various suggestions regarding inclusion of explanatory data which might be of interest to the National Security Council. In each instance the Committees have sought to supply and have supplied such data.

The IIC position pursuant to the Director's instructions has been carefully reviewed by the FBI representatives.

You will recall that our basic position has been, if the United States is to achieve maximum security against the clandestine introduction of nuclear weapon components in the diplomatic pouch, the pouch should be reduced to letter size. This would include a reduction to the same size of any items under diplomatic immunity or a provision that such items be physically examined.

Predicated upon technical data supplied by AEC, we have selected [redacted] b1

[redacted] Such a procedure would, of course, be highly impractical for the Soviets to undertake. These figures were predicated upon the performance of the currently available detection devices under conditions where the above-mentioned packet would be exposed to the device for a period of 15 seconds at a distance of not less than 20 inches. The Atomic Energy

(S)

LW:GAD:hke
(6)

1-Mr. Boardman
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Mr. Day
1-Section Tickler

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145 OCT 12 1955

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Commission pointed out that, if the packet was brought closer to the device, even smaller quantities of [redacted] could be detected. (S) b1

The IIC has maintained that such a radical step as reduction of the pouch to letter size, is a decision to be made at a high-policy level based upon whether the value to the United States of the security provided by such action is outweighed by the value accruing to the United States through its present unrestricted use of shipments enjoying diplomatic immunity.

The ICIS has come out "flat-footedly" for the status quo, i.e., no change of policy regarding the pouch. The ICIS, however, has agreed with the IIC that maximum security could be obtained against the use of the pouch by the means described above.

OBSERVATIONS:

The IIC position has been sound from an internal security standpoint and remains sound. The danger is that because of changing international conditions since we made this recommendation, the IIC might be charged with failure to recognize important aspects outside the confines of internal security; namely, it may be undesirable at this time to place heavy restrictions on the Soviets and/or satellites because of the impact on the delicate balance of relations between the East and the West.

ACTION:

It is recommended that we do not make a flat recommendation that these restrictions be placed upon the diplomatic pouch at this time but rather that these are the restrictions necessary for maximum security and should be applied at such time as the President or other high authority considers the international situation will permit. This recommendation would likewise apply to requiring that Soviet bloc diplomats be stopped and made to account for radioactive material in their possession, which has been the IIC position to date.

DATE OF MAIL 9-15-55

HAS BEEN REMOVED FOR [redacted] TO BE KEPT PERMANENTLY IN HIS OFFICE, ROOM [redacted] b7C

SEE FILE 66-2554-7530 FOR AUTHORITY.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-25-03 BY SP4 bja/PAM

SUBJECT JUNE MAIL Smuggling Atomic Bombs

REMOVED BY [redacted] 57 SEP 23 1955

FILE NUMBER 117-268-4

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGEOUT

121

4-312

DATE OF MAIL 9-19-53

HAS BEEN REMOVED FOR [redacted] TO BE KEPT PERMANENTLY IN HIS OFFICE, ROOM [redacted] b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-25-03 BY SP4 bja/pam

SEE FILE 66-2554-7530 FOR AUTHORITY.

SUBJECT JUNE MAIL Smuggling Atomic Bombs

REMOVED BY

FILE NUMBER 117-268-878

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGEOUT

126

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. BELMONT

DATE: August 29, 1955

FROM : W. A. BRANIGAN

SUBJECT: RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT BY THE TECHNOLOGICAL CAPABILITIES PANEL OF THE SCIENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE, ODM (KILLIAN REPORT)

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
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Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

By the attached communication to the Bureau dated August 23, 1955, Assistant Attorney General Tompkins transmits, as of possible interest to the Bureau, portions of the National Security Council's actions in connection with the Killian Report. These actions were previously received by the Bureau on August 12, 1955, and were reviewed. There is no Bureau action to be taken.

The portions of the National Security Council Action forwarded by Mr. Tompkins refer to the Translation of Early Warning into Action, which has been studied by a committee under the chairmanship of the President's Naval Aide and on which the IIC is represented. The Department's memorandum further notes that US defense planning should assume the feasibility of clandestine introduction of megaton weapons. This recognition was made by the IIC and the ICIS by their studies during the past two or three years.

Mr. McDonnell in Mr. Tompkins' office has advised that this memorandum was forwarded merely for the Bureau's information and that he realizes there is no Bureau or IIC action to be taken.

ACTION:

The foregoing is for your information.

Enclosure
Ticklers - Mr. Belmont
Mr. Branigan
Mr. Sanders

WAB:ccs:jpa
(4)

SEP 1 1955

NOT RECORDED
165 SEP 6 1955

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE
DATE 4-25-03 BY SP4 bjs/pm

SPRINGLINE ARMY BRANCH

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: 9-23-55

FROM : W. A. Branigan

SUBJECT: ~~LIMITATIONS ON DIPLOMATIC SHIPMENTS~~ SMUGGLING ATOM BOMBS

Tolson
Boardman
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Gandy

On 9-23-55 J. Walter Yeagley, Chairman of the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS), phoned SA Whitson and stated that he was going over some of the problems on the pouch which had been the subject of discussion by the working groups of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (IIC) and the ICIS 9-22-55 and in which Agent Whitson had participated. Yeagley stated there was a question in his mind as to the "crit" for a megaton item (the critical mass of fissionable material required for a hydrogen bomb). Whitson reminded him that there might be some variation, but that the megaton item needed fission and the fission "crit" was the only "crit" needed. These data had been discussed by the Atomic Energy Commission representatives in the joint IIC-ICIS discussions and have also been supplied by AEC in an unclassified description of hydrogen bombs.

Yeagley stated that he understood.

RECOMMENDATION:

None. For your information. It would appear that Yeagley was going over the problem of nuclear weapons sizes, which is discussed in the draft "Reappraisal of U.S. Policy Regarding Soviet Bloc Shipments Afforded Diplomatic Immunity."

cc - Belmont
Branigan
Day
Whitson

LW:blb
(5)

RECORDED - 54 117-268-917

INDEXED - 54

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59 SEP 26 1955

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117-268

62-80828-77
62-90938

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: Sept. 15, 1955

FROM : MR. W. V. CLEVELAND

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-25-03 BY SP4bjg/PAM

SUBJECT: ~~LIMITATIONS~~ ON SOVIET BLOC DIPLOMATIC POUCHES
INTERNAL SECURITY (R)

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
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Tele. Room
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Gandy

On September 15, 1955, Supervisor [redacted] b7C of the Washington Field Office advised that a railway express shipment was delivered to the Czechoslovakian Embassy on May 18, 1955. The weight of the packages was 1300 pounds and it was valued at $10,000.00. It was shipped on collect way bill #647136.

ACTION:

The above information has been furnished to Supervisor Whitson for inclusion in material he is preparing under the above caption.

WVC:mn
(5) cc - Mr. Belmont
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Branigan
Mr. Whitson

RECORDED - 43

INDEXED - 43

117-268-880

2 SEP 27 1955

117-268

DATE OF MAIL 9-20-55

HAS BEEN REMOVED FOR [redacted] TO BE KEPT PERMANENTLY IN HIS OFFICE, ROOM [redacted] b7C

SEE FILE 66-2554-7530 FOR AUTHORITY.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4.25.03 BY SP4 bjp/PAM

SUBJECT JUNE MAIL Smuggling Atomic Bombs

REMOVED BY 59 OCT 11 1955

FILE NUMBER 117-268-2

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGEOUT

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: September 21, 1955

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-25-03 BY SP4 bjallm

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Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: CHANNELING OF UNACCOMPANIED DIPLOMATIC BAGGAGE, EFFECTS, AND SHIPMENTS

In accordance with the Director's instructions at the IIC meeting September 7, 1955, the IIC position in this problem was carefully reviewed by the members of the IIC Working Committee at their meeting on September 20, 1955.

You will recall that Treasury was instructed by joint IIC-ICIS letter May 25, 1955, to arrange for the channeling of unaccompanied Soviet bloc shipments, not under diplomatic seal, through the ports of New York City and Georgetown to permit more thorough search to prevent clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons or components thereof. By letter August 8, 1955, Treasury advised IIC and ICIS jointly that details completed but notification of Soviet bloc representatives should be made. IIC letter August 25, 1955, notified Treasury that the matter of having State Department so inform Soviet bloc being considered in ICIS and that ICIS would advise Treasury concerning this.

As noted in IIC minutes of meeting September 7, 1955, ICIS has decided to ask Treasury to conduct survey to determine volume of these unaccompanied shipments in belief that very few arrive at ports other than New York and Georgetown and additional detection devices are becoming available.

IIC Working Committee believes its position in this matter is sound at this time since we have made recommendation designed to afford maximum security from threat of clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons through these unaccompanied shipments. ICIS concurred in this recommendation with the resultant instructions by joint IIC-ICIS letter to Treasury on May 25, 1955. ICIS is now holding up implementation of these instructions pending a Treasury survey of shipments. If this survey reflects information warranting a change in the joint IIC-ICIS instructions, IIC must again be consulted, at which time our position will again be studied, taking into account international conditions as of that time. Meanwhile, ICIS

GAD:hke (6)
1-Mr. Boardman
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Day
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Section Tickler

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117-268

SEP 23 1955

117-268

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bears the responsibility for the delay in action.

ACTION:

We do not believe we should press ICIS or Treasury for immediate action. In view of present international conditions, if question arises concerning desirability of serving notice on Soviet bloc to restrict their diplomatic shipments, we will recommend that this program is sound, but should be implemented at such time as the President or other high authority considers the international situation will permit.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: September 27, 1955

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION-IN-PLACE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

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Nichols
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Tele. Room
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Gandy

As a result of a study by a Joint IIC-ICIS Subcommittee of the desirability of expanding the use of devices which will detect fissionable material, a Subcommittee report dated March 10, 1955, was issued recommending that a limited national program for the use of these devices be put into effect to protect against the clandestine introduction into the U.S. of fissionable material.

Two types of device were considered: [redacted]

[redacted] The recommended program considered use of devices by Customs, Coast Guard, and INS, and all three agencies were represented on advisory group which concurred that the program is a minimum program not deemed commensurate with the threat. b2 b7E

Report recommended Customs procure [redacted]

By memorandum April 6, 1955, ICIS forwarded report for IIC comment. Report analyzed in memorandum of April 7, 1955, attached, and approved by IIC, and ICIS so advised. In ICIS, Defense stalled until May, 1955, then approved report. Treasury continued to stall, and in effort to force action, Treasury Representative was called before Joint Committee with result

Enclosures (2)

GAD:hkc
(6)
1-Mr. Boardman
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Day
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Section Tickler

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145 OCT 7 1955

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SEP 30 1955

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4-25-03 SP4bg/MW

Memorandum for Mr. Boardman

that Treasury submitted counterproposal calling for procurement by Customs of [redacted] No recommendation was made for Coast Guard participation. In so far as can be determined only reason for Treasury objection to full program is cost. b2 b7E

ICIS has now forwarded for IIC comment draft letters to the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission. Letter to Treasury acknowledges Treasury counterproposal, notes it is limited in scope and application, but states it is "at least a start toward a desirable program in this field." Letter requests that Treasury counterproposal, therefore, be implemented. Letter to Attorney General requests that original recommendation for INS program be implemented, and letter to Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, indicates that agencies are being assigned operational responsibility for procurement and operation of devices but requests that AEC remain responsible for additional research and technical advice.

Nothing appears objectionable in requests contained in letters to the Attorney General and Chairman, AEC. Letter to Treasury, however, would have effect of making IIC approve of program far below that recommended by Joint Committee as a bare minimum. Treasury counterproposal does not do the job considered necessary for Customs, and apparently considers no action necessary by Coast Guard.

Matter considered at IIC Working Committee meeting September 19, 1955, and draft letter thereafter prepared and approved by IIC military members.

ACTION:

There is attached, for the Director's approval and signature as IIC Chairman, a letter informing ICIS that IIC agrees that AEC continue to be responsible for research and development of detection devices and that program for INS be implemented without delay, but IIC considers Treasury counterproposal unsatisfactory as it is a temporizing measure which would not accomplish objective of program. Letter urges that implementation of the limited national program recommended by the Joint Subcommittee be expedited.

Orig.-Mr. Yeagley
3-ONI, OSI, G-2
1-IIC files
1-Yellow
1-Mr. Boardman
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Day
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Section Tickler

~~SECRET~~

4-25-03 SDH by jaf/RAM

September 28, 1955

VIA LIAISON

Mr. J. Walter Yeagley
Chairman
Interdepartmental Committee on
Internal Security
Department of Justice Building
Washington, D. C.

DEPT TO TELETYPE 9/28/55 SPECIAL MESSENGER 3:15 PM

Dear Mr. Yeagley:

The three draft letters concerning a limited national program for the use of detection devices which were addressed respectively to the Attorney General, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, copies of which were furnished to the IIC with the memorandum dated September 7, 1955, of Mr. Leonard P. Bienvenu, Executive Secretary, ICIS, have been carefully considered by the members of the IIC.

With respect to the letter to the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, the IIC agrees that the Atomic Energy Commission, in view of its responsibilities and special knowledge in the field of development and research concerning devices for the detection of clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons or components into the United States, should continue this research and development for the indefinite future and furnish technical advice, information, and guidance to the agencies which are or may be assigned operational responsibilities.

With respect to the draft letter to the Secretary of the Treasury, the IIC considers that the counterproposal of the Treasury Department, to which the draft letter accedes, is not satisfactory as it is a temporizing measure which fails to accomplish the objective of the program. The IIC has noted that the draft report, dated March 10, 1955, on this problem, which was submitted to and approved by the IIC, states that the program is considered to be a minimum program and is not deemed to be commensurate with the threat. This report was prepared with

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GAD:hke
(11)

117-268-

(Attached to copy of memorandum from Mr. Belmont to Mr. Boardman, 9/27/55, re "Countermeasures to Detect and Defend Against the Clandestine Introduction and Detonation-in-Place of Atomic Weapons in the United States" GAD:hke)

NOT RECORDED
145 OCT 5 1955

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~~SECRET~~

Letter to Mr. J. Walter Yeagley
Chairman
Interdepartmental Committee on
Internal Security

the advice and guidance of a group which included representation from Coast Guard, Customs, Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the Atomic Energy Commission, and the IIC feels that the recommendation which was considered by this group to be a minimum program should not be reduced. The IIC further notes that the counterproposal of Treasury fails to make mention of the program recommended for implementation by the Coast Guard and that the draft letter to Treasury merely urges that consideration of the problem be expedited and that specific proposals for the use of devices by the Coast Guard be made in the near future. In the absence of any technical developments which may alter the basis on which the original recommendations were made, the IIC does not agree that further consideration or further proposals are warranted inasmuch as a minimum program has already been considered and recommended by the Joint Subcommittee.

The IIC agrees that the program recommended for implementation by the Immigration and Naturalization Service should be implemented without further delay. Comments contained in the letters to the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, and to the Attorney General concerning acceptance of the Treasury counterproposal should, however, be omitted from those letters.

The IIC urges that implementation of the limited national program which was recommended by the Joint Subcommittee be expedited in order that the United States may be afforded the benefit of this defense against the clandestine introduction of fissionable material.

Sincerely yours,

Chairman
Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference

~~SECRET~~

cc - W

RECORDED-37
INDEXED-37

DECLASSIFIED
CIA 1425.03 Stat by/PAW

Date: September 29, 1955

To: Legal Attache
London, England
SECRET - AIR COURIER
(orig and 1)

LX-108

From: Director, FBI (117-268)

Subject: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR
PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

There is enclosed for your information a Photostat of a report prepared by V. D. Hopper and Jean E. Laby of the Physics Department, University of Melbourne, Australia, on the subject "Electron Background in Imported G5 Emulsions." This report deals with the high contamination noted in emulsions received from Ilford, Ltd., London, England.

This report was furnished to the Bureau by a representative of the University of Rochester during the course of an inquiry by the Bureau as to the possibility that improperly shielded fissionable material was being transported by air in commercial shipments within the United States. The inquiry was predicated upon receipt of information that the emulsions on certain plates supplied to educational and research institutions in the United States by Ilford, Ltd., were badly fogged.

Apparently the Ilford emulsions have been found to be fogged by other universities and research laboratories outside the United States. There is apparently no basis for assuming that improperly shielded fissionable material had been placed in close proximity with the plates on commercial aircraft within the United States. There apparently has been no allegation of deliberate fogging of the plates in London to impede research elsewhere.

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Gandy

Enclosure (1)
cc 1 - Foreign Liaison Unit
LW:blb
(5)

59 OCT 6 1955

LEGAT
19 OCT 3
COMM-FBI

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. Boardman	
Mr. Nichols	
Mr. Belmont	
Mr. Harbo	
Mr. Mohr	
Mr. Parsons	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Tamm	
Mr. Sizoo	
Mr. Winterrowd	
Tele. Room	
Mr. Holloman	
Miss Gandy	

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268) DATE: 9/21/55

FROM : SAC, BUFFALO (117-25)

"CONFIDENTIAL"

SUBJECT: O Atom Bombs
SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

DECLASSIFIED BY SP4 bja/PKW
ON 4-25-03

Rebulet 9/12/55.

On 9/19/55, Dr. MORTON F. KAPLON, Physics Department, University of Rochester, advised that the six additional plates referred to in relet were not in any way fogged. According to Dr. KAPLON, the six additional plates were examined carefully at the University of Rochester upon their arrival from England, but showed no signs of being exposed to any type of radiation. Rochester, N.Y.

On 9/20/55, Dr. KAPLON furnished SA MARK H. TUOHEY with the enclosed publication prepared by the CERN organization, Geneva, Switzerland, which is entitled "Electron Background In Imported G5 Emulsions". According to Dr. KAPLON, this publication was received by him in early September, 1955, but he inadvertently failed to furnish it to the writer at an earlier date. He said that a number of large Universities are on the mailing list of CERN, in addition to the AEC, Air Force, and ONR.

Dr. KAPLON said he wished to point out in particular the publication's reference to the high contamination noted in emulsions received from Ilford, Ltd., London, England, by the University of Melbourne in Australia. He said that apparently the University of Melbourne is experiencing the same problem as the University of Rochester.

The enclosed publication is furnished to the Bureau as a matter of interest, and as a possible aid to

EX. PROC.

REGISTERED MAIL
MHT:mh
(3)

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117-268-10-4

2 SEP 23 1955

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EX-108

EX-108

ESP. SEC.

the Bureau in any future inquiry concerning captioned matter. Dr. KAPLON is not desirous of having the publication returned to him.

Buffalo letter 9/7/55, invited the Bureau's attention to the fact that the plates in question, referred to in bulet of 9/12/55, were definitely exposed to an unusual amount of radiation at Ilford prior to shipment to the University of Rochester. This, of course, does account for at least some of the contamination in the sixty plates. Dr. KAPLON has asked Ilford to conduct further inquiry, and will advise this office of any pertinent developments. In the absence of a contact with this office by Dr. KAPLON, no further action will be taken, UACB.

RUC.

ENCLOSURE TO THE BUREAU - REGISTERED MAIL
CONFIDENTIAL

RE: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS
THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

Encl: 1 publication published by CERN
received from Dr. KAPLON, University
of Rochester.

BUFFALO FILE 117-25
BUREAU FILE 117-268

4.25.03 SP4 bja/PAM

ENCLOSURE

Received from Dr. Morton F. Kaplan, University of Rochester, Rochester N.Y. on 9/20/1955. MFK.

EUROPEAN ORGANISATION FOR NUCLEAR RESEARCH

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-25-03 BY SPH by FAM

CERN

Scientific and Technical Services
Villa de Cointrin
Genève - Aéroport

Documents circulated by CERN Secretariat for the Standardisation of Measurements in Emulsions.
BS 22 - 30. 8.55

ELECTRON BACKGROUND IN IMPORTED G5 EMULSIONS

V.D. Hopper and Jean E. Laby : Physics Dept. University of Melbourne

Abstract. Ilford G. 5 nuclear emulsions have been regularly imported by plane to this laboratory but during the last six months four batches were obtained which had very heavy electron backgrounds. Possible causes of these variations have been investigated.

Ilford G. 5 nuclear emulsions have been received by this department at regular fornightly intervals during the last six months. They are sent by air mail and reach this laboratory approximately two weeks after the date of manufacture in England and are developed soon after arrival. Heavy electron backgrounds were observed in four batches of plates out of twelve successive fortnightly shipments.

To compare the background in the plates two methods were used which gave closely similar results. In one method the number of sharply defined black grains in a $(50\mu)^2$ field using a 95 x objective was counted and an average obtained for a number of fields of view. Results are shown in fig. 1a. In the second method the number of electron tracks ending in the emulsion in the $(100\mu)^2$ field using a 45 x objective was counted and averaged for a number of fields of view (Fig. 1b). Neither method is very accurate but the results were quite consistent up to exposures of about 150 milliroentgens. The second method could not be used for exposures above 150 mr as the electron tracks could not be resolved. A comparison was made of these results with plates exposed to a 4.6 c Iridium source specified as giving 3 mr/hr at 1 metre so as to obtain a measure in mr of the various backgrounds. The radiation 1 metre from the source was checked using a radiation monitor and found to agree with the specified 3 mr/hr. Two Ilford G5 600μ plates (manufactured May 3rd) of low background were placed on the surface of the container (i.e. about 1/3 metre from the source) and given exposures of 64 and 113 hours respectively and two similar plates were placed 2 metres from the source and given the same exposure times. The estimated dosages received by various batches are given in Table I and plotted in fig. 1a and 1b and photographs showing relative electron backgrounds of the plates manufactured on January 21 and February 7 are shown in Plate 1.

TABLE I

Dosage measurements on plates obtained by comparing their background with that produced by γ - radiation from I_r^{192}.

Date of manufacture (1955)	Departure from London	Estimated Dose on arrival mr.
Jan. 21	Jan. 23	70
Feb. 7		15
Apr. 1	Apr. 6 (BOAC)	140
Apr. 20	Apr. 22 (KLM)	35
May. 3		10
May 16		10
May 31, June 2	June 4 (KLM)	120
June 13		15
June 28		10

Considering only the cosmic ray background and general radiation from the earth a rough estimate can be made of the radiation that one would expect in a plate imported to Australia by aircraft and developed one week after arrival i. e. about a fortnight after manufacture. A typical time of flight in the height region 10,000 to 20,000 ft. would be about 38 hours and the plates would be airborne for 46 hours. Assuming 1 mrep/day * at 20,000 ft, the exposure due to cosmic radiation during flight would be of the order of 1.5 mrep. Radiation received at ground level mainly due to γ - rays is of the order of 0.5 mrep/day. Plates are normally stored under 2" - 3" of lead at this laboratory so the rate would be much less than this during storage. Thus the total radiation received by the plates at development would be expected to be about 10 mrep and it will be seen from Table I that some of the batches of plates show slow electron backgrounds corresponding to this. Possible causes of the extra radiation background on some of the plates are :

1. Irradiation at time of manufacture or during storage in this laboratory.
2. Exposure to radiation from instrument panels and radioactive isotopes carried on the aircraft.
3. X - ray examination by customs officials.
4. Radiation from products of atomic explosion tests.

1. Irradiation at manufacture or storage.

Dr. C. Waller of Ilford states that there was no possibility of the emulsion being exposed before dispatch and that occasional complaints that had been received from America were attributed to customs activities or to emulsion travelling in close proximity to radioactive material. Regarding storage at this laboratory, the plates with high background had been stored alongside other plates and these showed no extra background.

---

* Roentgen equivalent physical (r.e.p.) is the amount of radiation which produces in water an energy dissipation equal to 93 erg/g or 5.9 x 107 Mev/g and this unit is used when radiation other than γ - or X - radiation is included. When one roentgen (r) of X or γ - rays is absorbed by water the energy dissipation is also 93 erg/g.

2. Contamination in aircraft.

(a) Instrument panels.

A source of contamination in aircraft is the radioactive paint on instrument panels. Measurements were made by Morrison (1) in 1951 on the gamma radiation from instruments in a " Constellation " aircraft and the results of his measurements are given in Table II

TABLE II

Radiation in "Constellation" aircraft.

Position	Seat level mr/hr	Head level mr/hr
Pilot	0.07	0.08
Co-pilot	0.11	0.11
Engineer	0.11	0.19
Entrance Walkway maximum		0.12
Cosmic ray background		0.02 (included

From these figures it appears that radiation in the luggage compartments presumably well away from the instrument panels would be less than 2 mr per day. As the plates would be stored in the aircraft for the complete flight the plates might conceivably receive a radiation dosage of 10 mr during the flight due to this cause alone.

(Tests were recently made by the Commonwealth X - ray and Radium Laboratory of the radiation at different places in a " Viscount " aircraft. These measurements are given in Table III :

TABLE III

Radiation in " Viscount " aircraft

Position	Dose mr / hr
Pilot	0.1
Co - pilot	0.1 to 0.35
Near instrument panel	1.5
At electrical switchboard	3.8 - 5.0
Closest luggage compartment (near co-pilot)	0.6 to 0.1
1 ft. from exit notices	0.15
Passage in passenger cabin	0.02
Background away from aircraft	0.02

Thus the radiation from the instrument panels could reach 60 mr in four days for this type of aircraft if the plates had been stored against the wall of the luggage compartment which was nearest the switchboard. Clearly this would not be a suitable compartment for transportation of nuclear emulsions. Other compartments were well away from the instrument panel.)

The type of plane used on the England - Australian air route is the " Constellation " and it thus seems unlikely that radiation from instrument panels could be as high as the background observed in three of the batches received.

(b) Imported Isotopes.

The background observed on the two most heavily exposed plates could have been produced if the plates had been stored 4 to 5 ft. from a 4.6 c Ir ^{192} source for four days (see Fig. 1). The Commonwealth X - ray and Radium Laboratory keeps a complete record of all isotopes entering Australia and γ - ray sources of highest activity arriving during the period in which the twelve batches of plates were received were in fact Ir ^{192} sources of 4.5 to 5.1 curies. The nuclear emulsion plates that had excessive exposures were manufactured on Jan 21, Apr. 20 and May 31 and the dates of departure of these batches are given in Table I. From the records it was found that not one of these batches travelled to Australia on the same plane as an imported γ - ray active isotope. There is however the possibility that the plates travelled in planes carrying isotopes dispatched to other countries en route but if so, the plates would need to be stored even closer to the isotopes than 4.5 ft.

Boxes of emulsions are labelled specifying that packets should be stored at least 10' from any radioactive material and parcels of radioactive isotopes are also labelled advising that photographic material be stored at least 10' from the container. Assurances have been received that these instructions are carried out.

(Ilford G.5 emulsions having about 25 mr are usable for cosmic ray experiments but it is of course preferable to have a much lower background. To obtain a dosage less than 25 mr plates imported to Australia should, in fact, be stored at least 15' from an Iridium source of 4.6 c.).

3. X - ray examination at customs inspection.

All packets of plates are labelled as containing photographic material and one of the most heavily exposed was clearly marked advising that the plates should not be exposed to X - rays. Also all plates in packets are equally affected and unless an exceptionally high energy X - ray or γ - ray source was used for custom examination, the background of high energy electron tracks would not be obtained.

4. Radioactive products from atomic explosions.

The last possibility is that the contamination is due to by-products of atomic explosions. There is apparently no significant overall increase in the activity in the air due to the recent series of explosions as most packets of plates received during the period of analyses show low electron background. However there may be isolated patches or clouds of radioactive contamination which could account for the intermittent appearance of the heavy background.

In a private communication Professor Vassy, University of Paris, has supplied details of the radioactivity found in rain or snow at Val-Joyeux, near Paris, this year and results which are to be published in comptes rendus, Academie des Sciences, are shown in Table IV :

TABLE IV

Radioactivity observed at Val-Joyeux by Mlle. Olga Tanaevsky and M. Etienne Vassy.

Type of Precipitation	Date	Initial activity (counts minute $^{-1}$ litre $^{-1}$)
Rain	11/1	61
Snow	13/1	25
Snow	15/2	50
Rain	21/2	8
Rain	night 23 to 24/2	14
Snow	7/3	13
Rain	night 20 to 21/3	88
Rain	22/3	35
Rain	28/3	90
Rain	night 6 to 7/4	1596
Rain	10/4	189
Rain	5/5	112
Rain	6/5	47
Rain	night 13 to 14/5	47
Rain	15/5	87
Rain	night 16 to 17/5	15
Rain	18/5	53
Rain	19/5	20

.....

It will be observed from Table 1 that the most heavily exposed batch of plates left England on April 6 and the radiation which produced the exposure may have been due to the radioactive cloud which produced the radioactive rain in Paris on the same evening.

(A recent press report states that Japanese scientists under Dr. Miyake also found that ash and sand which fell in Japan in mid April was highly radioactive and attribute radioactivity of the ash as due to an atomic explosion. Details are not yet available).

CONCLUSIONS

Using the present method for importing plates by air to Australia there is a chance of 1 in 3 batches having too high a background. The reason for the high background has not been determined with any certainty but they could have been produced by storing the plates too close to imported γ - ray isotopes. The films did not arrive with isotopes entering Australia and would need to be placed well within 4.5 ft of a box containing a 5.0 c Ir^{192} source to obtain the highest backgrounds observed. In order for plates to have sufficiently low background so as to be suitable for cosmic ray studies the plate should be stored at least 15' from such a source. Radiation from instrument panels is too low to produce the results obtained for the most heavily exposed plates.

Ruling out the effect due to isotopes there must be some other very highly active source encountered by the plates on route. The date of departure from London of the most heavily affected packet agrees with the date of a highly radioactive downpour in France.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Beneficial discussions were had with Dr. C. E. Eddy and Mr. D.J. Stevens of the Commonwealth X - ray and Radium Laboratory. Our thanks are also due to Mr. F.J. Richardson who made the measurements on the ' Viscount ' aircraft.

REFERENCES

Morrison A., Aviation Med. 22, 350, 1951.

FIGURE 1

ELECTRON BACKGROUND IN PLATES

Fig. 1a. Number of focussed grains in 95 x objective field as a function of time of exposure of plates.

A Ilford G5 emulsion exposed 1/3 metre from Ir ^{192} source

B Ilford G5 emulsion exposed 2 metre from Ir ^{192} source

For comparison the level of the background in Ilford G.5 plates manufactured :

i) Apr. 1 1955

ii) Jan. 21 1955

iii) Apr. 20 1955

iv) Feb. 7 1955

v) May 3 1955

vi) May 31 1955 are shown.

Fig. 1b. Number of slow electrons ending in 45 x field as a fonction of time of exposure.

Plate 1. Photographs showing electron background in plates manufactured

a) Jan. 21

b) Feb. 7


40
30
No. elec.
20
10
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
Hours
(i)
(iii)
(v)
B

FIG. 1b


300
250
200
grains
95x field
150
100
50
0
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
Hours
A
B
(i)
(vi)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
(v)

FIG. 1a

REAU OF INVESTIGATION
ARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

SEP 2 8 1955

TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. Boardman	
Mr. Nichols	
Mr. Belmont	
Mr. Harbo	
Mr. Mohr	
Mr. Parsons	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Tamm	
Mr. Sizoo	
Mr. Winterrowd	
Tele. Room	
Mr. Holloman	
Miss Gandy	

WASH 13 FROM NY 28 11-55 PM

DIRECTOR ... DEFERRED ...

O SMUGGLING ATOM BOMBS OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF OR OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE US, AEA. RENYTEL, AUGUST SEVENTEEN, LAST. JOSEPH J. BURTON, DEPUTY IN CHARGE, US CUSTOMS, IDLEWILD AIRPORT, NYC, ADVISED THIS DATE THAT [redacted] ARRIVED IDLEWILD AIRPORT VIA [redacted] THIS DATE. [redacted] b7C

[redacted]

WHICH DECLARED ONE BAR OF URANIUM ORE. SAID ORE REGISTERED A MAXIMUM READING ON RED LIGHT OF MACHINE USED TO DETECT FISSIONABLE MATERIALS LOCATED AT IDLEWILD AIRPORT. WEIGHT OF SAID BAR WAS THREE AND ONE QUARTER POUNDS, AND IS PROPERTY OF ATOMIC POWER DEVELOPMENTS ASSOCIATES, INC. [redacted] CARRIED US GOVERNMENT LICENSE FROM ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION TO TAKE SAID BAR ON BUSINESS TRIP TO WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. LEONARD SOLON, AEC, NYC, ADVISED b7C CUSTOMS TO RELEASED URANIUM [redacted] RETEL SETS OUT RESULTS OF NYO CHECK [redacted] ABOVE FURNISHED FOR INFO OF BUREAU AND DETROIT. NO FURTHER ACTION BEING TAKEN BY NYO.

NO DISSEMINATION NECESSARY. SEE NYTEL 8-17-55 LW KELLY

DETROIT ADVISED LW

RECORDED - 54 117-268-

END

INDEXED - 54

WA NY R 13 WA JCD

Mr. B

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 116-9-610

Tolson
-FBI

October

SAC, New York (117-192) (orig and 1)

RECORDED - 39

117-268-87

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-25-03 BY SP4bja/PAM

ReNYtel October 4, 1955, captioned "Smuggling of Atomic Bombs and/or Parts Thereof Into the U.S., IS-E," regarding advice received from Customs concerning shipment of radioactive Burmese wolfram which AEC ordered released by Customs to Derby and Co., Metals and Minerals, New York.

In all future reporting of information regarding reaction of detection devices to shipments consigned to persons or firms in the United States, you should obtain from Customs the full name and address of the consignor, the full name and address of the consignee, a statement as to whether the contents of the shipment were properly declared to Customs and a clear statement regarding the reaction of the detection head sensitive to neutrons and the reaction of the detection head sensitive to gamma radiation. In the event the detection device was a portable model which has only one dial for registering reactions, you should specifically so state.

Hoover

Bufile 117-268

LW:blb
(4)

Tolson
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Parsons
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

COMM - FBI
OCT 6 1955
MAILED 20

OCT 6 11 AM '55

FBI - JUSTICE
RECORDS SECTION

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

OCT 4 - 1955

TELETYPE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-25-03 BY SP4bja/FAM

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Sizoo
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy
BRANIGAN

WASH 2 FROM NEW YORK 4 11-11 AM

DIRECTOR URGENT

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS AND/OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE US, IS-R.

AT EIGHT FORTY FIVE AM, OCT FOUR, FIFTYFIVE, CUSTOMS ADVISED THAT A PACKAGE SHIPPED BY DERBY AND CO., LTD. TO DERBY AND CO. METALS AND MINERALS, NY, RECORDED A RATING OF TWENTY X TWO FIVE ZERO ON DEVICE TO DETECT FISSIONABLE MATERIALS. THIS RATING IS RATED VERY HIGH AND EXAMINATION OF CENTENTS OF PACKAGE REFLECTS THAT MATERIALS ENCLOSED WAS BURMESE WOLFRAM. AEC, NY, ORDERED RELEASE OF PACKAGE TO CONSIGNEE. NO FURTHER ACTION CONTEMPLATED BY NY.

cc Branigan RECORDED - 30 117-268- KELLY

~~CORR TIME SHLD BE 11-11 AM~~ 7 OCT 12 1955

END

NY R 2 WA EW Mr. Belmont

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

FROM : W. A. Branigan

DATE: 10-6-55

Rec'd DTD 10/14/03 60267 uc/NIS/BJA/RNP 11/26/03
INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/14/03 BY 60267 uc/NIS/BJA/RNP

Tolson
Boardman
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Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: REAPPRAISAL OF U. S. POLICY REGARDING SOVIET BLOC SHIPMENTS AFFORDED DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY

Pursuant to your authorization 10-6-55 SA Whitson attended briefly a meeting of the Standing Committee of the ICIS which was considering with Mr. Russell Ash of Pat Coyne's office, further revisions of the draft IIC-ICIS report on the captioned reappraisal.

Various minor editorial changes were under discussion which will be referred to the IIC no later than 10-7-55. One related to an IIC proposed rewording regarding re-evaluation of procedures to be followed in the event radioactive materials were determined to be in a shipment afforded diplomatic immunity or on the person or in possession of diplomatic personnel. The language proposed did not change the basic meaning of the item and is being referred to the IIC working group representatives by Mr. Day.

The ICIS revealed that in July the CIA, which had participated in the discussions during May and June on pouch policy, had furnished its observations to ICIS favoring reduction of the pouch to letter size at such time as the President directed. ICIS proposed that CIA's present position be obtained in toto since a CIA position is purportedly cited in the discussion portion of the draft report. ICIS stated it would do this without requesting IIC concurrence since CIA was definitely a party in interest. The ICIS Standing Committee members offerked their apologies to IIC for failing to inform IIC of the CIA comments on the earlier draft.

RECOMMENDATION:

None. For your information.

NOT RECORDED
105 OCT 13 1955

OCT 11 1955

cc - Boardman
Belmont
Branigan
Day
Whitson

LW:blb
(6)

LIAISON

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

c... Whitson
AIR-TEL

OCTOBER 13, 1955

SAC, NEW YORK (117-182) (orig and 1)

RECORDED-48
EX-107

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF OR OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

Re NYairtel 10-12-55 concerning arrival of [redacted] had in his possession a pad, allegedly containing 50 micrograms of radium, which caused a reaction on detection device at Idlewild Airport.

b7C

New York should ascertain from Customs whether pad was of U.S. or foreign manufacture; whether obtained in U.S. or abroad; if obtained abroad, whether declared to Customs [redacted] Also determine from Customs whether reaction on detection device was normal under circumstances for 50 micrograms of radium.

Hoover

Bufile 117-268

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-25-03 BY SP4 bja/rac

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(4)

MAILED 6
OCT 13 1955
COMM-FBI

OCT 13 11 45 AM '55

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
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Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

OCT 18 1955

FD-36

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

AIRTEL

NY, 10/11/55

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Sizoo
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

Transmit the following Teletype message to: BUREAU

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF OR OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE U.S.; AEA.

Inspector [redacted] U.S. Customs Service, advised on 10/11/55 that [redacted] arrived Idlewild Airport [redacted] He held U.S. passport [redacted] and his baggage declaration [redacted] When baggage exposed to detection head sensitive to neutrons and gamma radiation both dials registered one hundred. Examination of luggage reflected a pad described as being approximate dimensions of electric heating pad that bore inscription 50 micrograms of radium element. Customs advised [redacted] explained this pad used to alleviate pain.

b7C

Above for info of Bureau. No further action being taken by NYO.

KELLY

3 - Bureau

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4.25.03 BY SP4 bja/PAM

Belmont

airtel to NY 10-13-55 LW

RECORDED-48
INDEXED-48

117-268-815

EX-107

OCT 12 1955

TGS:EG
117-192

Approved _____ Sent _____ M. Per _____

Special Agent in Charge

cc - Baken
Whitson

RECORDED - 75

SAC, New York (117-192) (orig and 1) October 7, 1955

Director, FBI (117-260)

4.25.03
CLASSIFIED BY NSC/bja/PAW 60267 Derivative
DECLASSIFY ON: 1

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE U. S.
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

b1

(S) Referral/Direct to OGA

(S) Referral/Direct to OGA

(S)

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Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

The foregoing data have been furnished by the Atomic Energy Commission to the Bureau of Customs at the Seat of Government.

OCT 12 1955

cc - 105-38279 (Introduction of Radioactive Material by Israeli Courier)

LW:blb
(6)

MAILED 18
OCT 7 1955
COMM-FBI

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN ~~SECRET~~

DATE: October 7, 1955

FROM : MR. A. H. BELMONT

4-25-03 CLASSIFIED BY NSIC/BSW/DFW60267 Derivative DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1 948742/950935

Tolson, Boardman, Nichols, Belmont, Harbo, Mohr, Parsons, Rosen, Tamm, Sizoo, Winterrowd, Tele. Room, Holloman, Gandy

SUBJECT: REAPPRAISAL OF U. S. POLICY REGARDING SOVIET BLOC SHIPMENTS AFFORDED DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY

SYNOPSIS: Smuggling Atom Bombs

Attached for approval, as drafted during seven joint meetings of IIC-ICIS Working Committees, is report recommending countermeasures against possible clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons, or components thereof, through Soviet bloc shipments afforded diplomatic immunity. Our position has been and is sound, and has been changed only to recognize international situation in our recommendation that such diplomatic shipments be limited, and to aim restrictions only at Soviet bloc diplomats and shipments, to conform to title of report. We have noted this may result in Soviet bloc charges of discrimination.

Report notes that large nuclear weapons may be introduced into U. S. now, fully assembled and shielded to avoid detection by devices currently used to detect radioactivity, through shipments now being granted diplomatic immunity; that due to such immunity identification of fissionable material cannot be made even when devices do register radioactivity; that restrictions on size and weight of such shipments could prevent introduction of assembled A-bomb, but [redacted] that fractional portions of nuclear material could be brought in on practical basis unless pouch very drastically restricted; and that, even so, material could be hidden on body of diplomat immune from search.

ICIS recommends no size or weight restrictions now. IIC, joined by Defense, Treasury, and Justice, recommends that to approach maximum security against threat, pouch and shipments now immune should be restricted to letter size at such time as President considers international situation will permit. State makes same basic statement, effective when international situation warrants. IIC defines "letter size" as size sufficiently small to render impractical introduction of critical amount of fissionable material in fractional pieces. An example would be packet not exceeding one-half inch in thickness, less than 15 x 15 inches in other dimensions, weighing not over 9 ounces. This size would require over 200 trips.

Enclosure

GAD:hke (6)

1-Mr. Boardman
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Mr. Day
1-Section Tickler

RECORDED - 64 117-268-

INDEXED - 64

OCT 17 1955

59 OCT 20 1955

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62-85205-

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Memorandum for Mr. Boardman

ACTION:

If report is approved, joint IIC-ICIS letter will be prepared for signature of Director as IIC Chairman, forwarding report to National Security Council. Report has been approved by other IIC members, is pending approval within ICIS.

DETAILS:

Joint meetings of the Working Committees of IIC-ICIS were held September 9, 13, 15, 16, 22, 26, and 30, 1955, for a total of more than 41 hours resulting in attached report which is submitted for approval. Report is outgrowth of our consideration of necessity for limiting the diplomatic pouch. A number of changes and additions have been made by the various ICIS members altering phraseology to express their positions more properly, and Pat Coyne, National Security Council Representative, has requested many changes and additions in effort to anticipate NSC questions.

Based on data furnished by AEC regarding sizes and weights of various atomic weapons and data furnished by State and Customs regarding current shipments to and from Soviet bloc countries under diplomatic immunity, IIC-ICIS reached following conclusions:

(1) Very powerful nuclear weapons or components thereof, fully assembled and shielded to avoid detection by devices now being used to detect radioactivity, may now be introduced into U.S. through shipments currently being granted diplomatic immunity.

(2) Nuclear weapons or parts thereof, even if detected by existing devices upon introduction, cannot be identified by those devices and identification by other means is not possible because of the immunity being granted.

(3) Restrictions on the size and weight of shipments afforded immunity could prevent the introduction of an assembled weapon, [redacted]

b2
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[redacted] b2 b7E

(4) Fractional portions of nuclear material could be brought in on practical basis unless pouches subjected to restrictions on the order of one-half inch for one dimension, less than 15 x 15 inches for other dimensions, and maximum weight of 9 ounces.

(5) To render impractical the entire channel of introduction now protected by immunity would require procedures calling for body and clothing searches of Soviet bloc diplomatic officials.

ICIS concludes that size and weight restrictions on Soviet bloc diplomatic shipments would be to the net disadvantage of the U.S. because of operational difficulties and retaliatory action expected. IIC concludes that the present ease with which the Soviet bloc could introduce into the U.S., in shipments afforded immunity, undetected nuclear weapons or their components, constitutes a threat of such potentially disastrous proportions as to make restrictions upon such shipments mandatory if any substantial degree of security is to be achieved against introduction through such shipments. The extent and effect of retaliatory action are not within knowledge or purview of IIC and, therefore, the time of imposition of such restrictions should be fixed by higher authority.

ICIS recommends no size or weight restrictions at this time. IIC, joined by Defense, Treasury, and Justice, make following recommendation:

"To approach maximum security against clandestine entry of nuclear weapons or their components through diplomatic shipments, at such time as the President or such authority as he may designate considers the international situation will permit, the diplomatic pouch and shipments afforded diplomatic immunity should be restricted to letter size, as defined in paragraph V, 4, page 7, and any shipment in excess of those dimensions should be denied entry into the United States unless surrendered for direct examination of its contents in accordance with procedures applying to non-diplomatic shipments."

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State makes same basic recommendation but changes wording to place restrictions in effect at such time as the international situation warrants. Both IIC and ICIS recommend that at such time as the President considers the international situation warrants, Soviet bloc diplomatic personnel should be required to produce for examination any radioactive materials registered by devices under procedures set forth in detail. Both IIC-ICIS recommend that regardless of whether restrictions are imposed on Soviet bloc diplomatic officials, pouches, baggage, effects, and other shipments afforded immunity from inspection and search be subjected to covert examination by present detection devices as they become available and that efforts be intensified to improve such devices.

IIC defines letter size:

> "By letter size is meant a size sufficiently small as to render impractical the introduction by this means of sufficient fissionable material to form a critical mass. An example would be a packet not exceeding 1/2 inch in thickness, and less than 15 inches by 15 inches in other dimensions, with a weight not to exceed 9 ounces. This is determined by figures supplied by AEC which indicate that over 200 trips would be required to introduce sufficient [redacted] to form a critical mass in pouches thus restricted." (S) b1

Our position has been sound and remains sound. We have altered our recommendation that Soviet bloc diplomatic shipments be limited to recognize the current tense international situation and that restrictions should be effected when President or designated authority considers international situation will permit. While we formerly recommended that restrictions be placed on all diplomatic shipments, we have altered our recommendation to include only Soviet bloc shipments to conform to caption of report. We have noted, however, that this action would probably result in lodging of protests on grounds of discriminatory treatment. Throughout our discussions State and Defense Representatives have adamantly opposed any restrictions on diplomatic shipments. Treasury Representative has firmly opposed any change in current procedures, apparently in anticipation of added burden on Customs. We have, however, succeeded in securing concurrence of ICIS in many points we desired included in report. It is believed the

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report, as presently drafted, offers a fair exposition of problem and will permit National Security Council to consider the many factors involved.

Minor drafting changes are still being suggested by ICIS and Coyne. Any changes affecting our position, or sufficiently material to require consideration, will be brought to your attention immediately.

~~SECRET~~

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: September 16, 1955

FROM : MR. A. H. BELMONT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-25-03 BY SP4bjp/Dau

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: PUBLIC RELEASE OF AN UNCLASSIFIED DESCRIPTION OF FUSION WEAPONS

Reference is made to my memorandum dated September 15, 1955, regarding efforts by the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (IIC) - Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS) to have the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) make a public release of an unclassified description of fusion (hydrogen) weapons in order that public officials and law enforcement agencies might cooperate intelligently with the agencies engaged in detection and defense against such weapons. You were informed that the AEC was still considering the matter and you were advised that Chairman Strauss would be contacted on September 15, 1955.

Chairman Strauss advised Liaison Agent Bates on September 15, 1955, that he intended to hold a press conference in about two weeks and at that time would release to the press the unclassified description of hydrogen weapons. He stated he had a request from Governor Val Peterson of the Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA) for this information and intended to tell the press of Peterson's request and then make the release. He said, of course, the Bureau would be furnished a copy of the release beforehand. On the morning of September 16, 1955, Admiral Paul Foster, Assistant General Manager, AEC, called Bates and stated that the AEC intended to make this release at a press conference to be held the first week of October, 1955. He stated the AEC would like to have a letter from the Director pointing out the need for this information and making reference to the public release of descriptive information concerning atomic weapons which was made by the Bureau in January, 1954. He stated that the AEC release would then be made based on the Bureau's letter as well as the request from Governor Peterson.

By letter dated May 5, 1955, to Strauss from the Chairman of the IIC and Chairman of the ICIS, it was pointed out that the unclassified description (of hydrogen weapons) should be distributed to public officials and representatives of duly constituted law enforcement agencies who must have this type of information in order

CWB:fjb
(6)

1 - Mr. Boardman
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Day
1 - Liaison Section
1 - Mr. Bates

RECORDED - 111
INDEXED - 111

117-268

OCT 18 1955

OCT 28 1955

Day

Smuggling Atom Bombs

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 66-8603 66-90938 66-95521

to cooperate with the agencies actively engaged in detection and defense. It was pointed out that the IIC and the ICIS recommend that the AEC make public release of this data. It was also suggested that the release contain a preface along the following lines:

> "Technical developments indicate that assembled fusion weapons or their components could be clandestinely introduced into this country. In order that the public, public officials, and duly constituted law enforcement agencies may have such information as can be made available for the purpose of cooperating in defending against clandestine introduction of alien fusion weapons, or component parts thereof, the following information is made available."

It was also suggested that the release contain the following as a concluding paragraph:

> "Inasmuch as the Federal Bureau of Investigation has the responsibility under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 to investigate all violations of the Act, any information indicating such violations should be reported immediately to the nearest office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation."

In reply to the IIC-ICIS letter of May 5, 1955, the AEC in letter dated July 7, 1955, stated that it was not believed that the AEC should make the release and suggested that it be made by the Bureau. In reply to Strauss, signed by the Chairmen of IIC and ICIS dated August 4, 1955, he was asked to reconsider and it was pointed out it was felt the AEC should make this release since it concerned matters within their jurisdiction and would avoid prior criticism that the release was not made to the general public by the agency most directly concerned. If a letter was directed now to the AEC in reply to Admiral Foster's request, it could, of course, be used by the AEC as a basis for reply to any future criticism as to why the release was made. It would also relieve the AEC of any responsibility in the long delay in replying to the IIC-ICIS request of May 5, 1955.

It is believed that the above-quoted information from the May 5, 1955, letter is certainly sufficient to be the basis for the AEC release.

Memo to Mr. Boardman
from Mr. Belmont

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that Liaison advise Admiral Strauss that in view of the information contained in the May 5, 1955, letter (that quoted above), it is felt that no additional letter is necessary and that this information could certainly be used by the AEC in connection with the release of the desired information.

Strauss was advised 9-20-55 and asked that it be discussed with Adm. Hooper. F. and Tell 9-22.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

FROM : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: September 30, 1955

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-25-03 BY SP4 bja/pam

SUBJECT: PUBLIC RELEASE OF AN UNCLASSIFIED DESCRIPTION OF FUSION WEAPONS

Reference memoranda September 16, 23 and 29, 1955, regarding Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference - Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (IIC-ICIS) request to AEC to make public release of unclassified description of hydrogen weapons. Memoranda indicated efforts by Liaison to expedite matter. Memorandum 9-29-55 indicated statement to be released by AEC not similar to one previously approved by IIC-ICIS. It was recommended and the Director approved (1) that Liaison advise Strauss unclassified statement is change from that previously approved and should be coordinated again with IIC-ICIS, (2) that if statement desired by AEC for basis for release, Strauss should refer to National Security Council Directive (NSC 159/4) and (3) that Strauss be advised if AEC feels release not appropriate at this time matter should be taken up with NSC not FBI.

On 9-29-55 Liaison Agent Bates pointed out above-approved recommendations to Strauss and Paul Foster, AEC. Strauss stated entire matter had now been changed as result of following. Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA) had requested AEC for unclassified descriptive statement regarding both hydrogen and atomic weapons for release to local civil defense people. Matter discussed at Operations Coordinating Board (OCB) meeting 9-28-55. Dillon Anderson of NSC stated he had talked with President and Herbert Hoover, Jr., and any statement released should be done in "blandest" possible way. Release should not be made by AEC. Anderson advised statement as prepared did not meet President's views. OCB concurred reversing previous decision. OCB recommended AEC furnish FCDA unclassified statement on atomic and hydrogen weapons to be given to local civil defense people by FCDA. In this manner, information would be in public domain.

Release of this information in this manner does not meet request of IIC-ICIS in letter to AEC 5-5-55. AEC will send letter to Chairmen IIC-ICIS and set forth present status. Also, copy of AEC release to FCDA will be furnished IIC-ICIS.

RECORDED - 77 INDEXED - 77 117-268-417 OCT 18 1955

ACTION: For information. We will follow this matter closely. However, it appears that the release of the information now contemplated does meet the basic request of IIC-ICIS that this type of information be made available to the public.

CWB:fjb
(7)

1 - Mr. Nichols
1 - Mr. Boardman
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Day
1 - Liaison Section
1 - Mr. Bates

59 OCT 28 1955

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 65-56613 62-90338 62-90338-21 62-83221

OSMUGGLING ATOM SECRETS

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268)

DATE: 10/10/55

FROM : SAC, BUFFALO (117-25)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES
AEA
00: Bureau

4.25.03 SP4 bja/PAM
940742/950935/997059

Remylet 9/21/55.

On 10/5/55 Dr. MORTON ~~F.~~ KAPLON, Physics, University of Rochester, stated that he was recently advised by Ilford, Ltd., London, England, of the results of an experiment conducted at Ilford concerning the fogged emulsions referred to in previous communications. According to Dr. KAPLON, test emulsions subjected to 70kv X-rays at Ilford reflected only a 1/10" penetration, whereas the emulsions of G5 Batch #Z9323, showed a penetration of 1". Dr. KAPLON concluded from this that the fogging found on the stack of G5 Batch #Z9323 emulsions was due to exposure to a much more intense source than X-rays.

The Bureau's attention is invited to Buffalo letter 9/7/55, wherein Ilford Ltd., had advised that exposure of the G5 Batch #29323 emulsions to the 70kv X-rays contributed to partial fogging, but probably did not account for the intense fogging as noted by KAPLON. Dr. KAPLON said he is now convinced that Ilford was only partially responsible for the contamination found on the original emulsions.

According to Dr. KAPLON, the emulsions apparently were subjected to some very intense radiation from nuclear disintegration. It is his theory that the emulsions were in the vicinity of some intense radio active source between Rochester and Minnesota or on the return trip. He eliminates the possibility that the fogging occurred between England and the United States because six emulsions packed in the same shipment arrived in the United States without any trace of contamination. He also eliminates the possibility of the fogging having occurred during the actual test in Minnesota, inasmuch as Dr. YAGODA also had emulsions in this experiment and subsequently found no evidence of fogging.

EXCERPTED

RECORDED - 77
INDEXED - 77

117-268-

21 OCT 11 1955

REGISTERED
MHT:RMM
(6)
cc: Albuquerque (RM)
Baltimore (RM)
Minneapolis (RM)

59 OCT 24 1955

BU 117-25

The Bureau's attention is invited to a suggestion of Dr. KAPLON's viz, that appropriate officials of the Atomic Energy Commission be contacted to determine whether there was any unusual radiation from nuclear disintegration present in the Minnesota to Rochester area during the pertinent period. Dr. KAPLON previously advised that he personally checked with AEC officials in Rochester when the contamination was discovered, and found no unusual disturbances in the Rochester area.

Dr. KAPLON said he would furnish this office any pertinent information subsequently uncovered by him in this matter. . .RUC.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOIPA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET

Serial Description ~ COVER SHEET 07/25/1955

Total Deleted Page(s) ~ 16

Page 21 ~ Referral/Direct to OGA
Page 40 ~ b1
Page 52 ~ Referral/Direct to OGA
Page 53 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 75 ~ Referral/Direct to OGA
Page 76 ~ Referral/Direct to OGA
Page 95 ~ b7C
Page 103 ~ Referral/Direct to OGA
Page 115 ~ Referral/Direct to OGA
Page 116 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 117 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 144 ~ Duplicate of document dated 9/21/55
Page 145 ~ Duplicate
Page 153 ~ Referral/Direct to OGA
Page 155 ~ Referral/Direct to OGA
Page 156 ~ Referral/Direct

X Deleted Page(s) X

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: September 15, 1955

FROM : MR. A. H. BELMONT

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
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Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-9-84 BY 60267 uc/nk/BJA/DFW

E 948742/950935/997059

SUBJECT: PUBLIC RELEASE OF AN UNCLASSIFIED DESCRIPTION OF FUSION WEAPONS

By Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (IIC) - Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS) letter dated May 5, 1955, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) was requested to make public release of an unclassified description of fusion (hydrogen) weapons in order that public officials and law enforcement agencies might cooperate intelligently with the agencies engaged in detection and defense against such weapons. After repeated inquiries, the AEC replied by letter of July 7, 1955, suggesting that the release be made by the FBI. By IIC-ICIS letter of August 4, 1955, the AEC was requested to reconsider this matter and for the AEC to make the release. The AEC replied by letter of August 19, 1955, stating the letter would be brought to the attention of Chairman Strauss upon his return to Washington. On August 30, 1955, the matter was followed with AEC and information was received that the matter was pending and would be considered by Strauss upon his return from leave on or about September 8, 1955.

At the IIC meeting on September 7, 1955, the Director instructed the Executive Secretary to follow this matter with AEC.

On September 14, 1955, Liaison Agent Bates contacted Mr. McKay Donkin and Colonel Hudgins of the AEC, who are working on this matter. They advised that the release was being rewritten to provide more descriptive data. They presumed that the AEC would then make the release after the Commission itself approved the matter. Mr. Donkin was informed that this particular matter had been pending for quite some time and that it should be handled without any further delay. He commented that he expected the Commission to consider this matter for approval within the next few days. Chairman Strauss was out of his office on September 14, 1955, at a meeting.

CWB:fjb
(6)

RECORDED-45 INDEXED-45 117-268-211

1 - Mr. Boardman
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Day
1 - Liaison Section
1 - Mr. Bates

59 OCT 24 1955

Memo to Mr. Boardman
from Mr. Belmont

ACTION:

This matter will be discussed with Chairman Strauss on September 15, 1955, and he will be advised that this matter should be approved without further delay. You will be kept advised.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: September 23, 1955

FROM : MR. A. H. BELMONT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-9-04 BY 60262 uc/nls/BJA/DFW

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: PUBLIC RELEASE OF AN UNCLASSIFIED DESCRIPTION OF FUSION WEAPONS

Reference is made to my memoranda dated September 15 and 16, 1955, regarding efforts by the Interdepartment Intelligence Conference (IIC) - Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS) to have the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) make a public release of an unclassified description of fusion (hydrogen) weapons. By IIC-ICIS letter dated May 5, 1955, the Chairman of the AEC was requested to make this public release in order that public officials and law enforcement agencies might cooperate intelligently with the agencies engaged in detection and defense against such weapons. My memorandum of September 16, 1955, pointed out that Paul Foster of the AEC who was handling the matter for Strauss had advised that the AEC intended to make this release at a press conference the first week of October, 1955, but that the AEC would like to have a letter from the Director pointing out a need for this information to serve as a basis for the AEC release. This memorandum recommended that Strauss be informed that it was felt no additional letter was necessary and that the information contained in the May 5, 1955, letter was certainly sufficient. The Director agreed.

Strauss was so advised on September 20, 1955. He asked that this information be furnished to Foster. Efforts were made to contact Foster on September 20 and 21 but he was unavailable. On September 22, 1955, this information was relayed to Foster by Liaison Agent Bates and he indicated he still felt the letter was necessary. Foster was informed that the National Security Council had instructed IIC-ICIS to do this job and that it was not the prime responsibility of the FBI but of all IIC-ICIS agencies. The matter was again discussed with Strauss and Foster on the morning of September 23, 1955, and after the same comments were made by Foster and after he was told that the Director was not going to write such a letter, he stated that AEC would go ahead and make the release.

Foster furnished a proposed statement to be made by the AEC at the time of the release. This statement is enclosed. It

CWB:fjb (7)

RECORDED-40 INDEXED-45 117-248-

1 - Mr. Nichols
1 - Mr. Boardman
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Day
1 - Liaison Section
1 - Mr. Bates

Enclosure

RECORDED COPY FILED IN

Memo to Mr. Boardman
from Mr. Belmont

refers to the December 15, 1953, White House release by the President requesting all enforcement agencies to report to the FBI information relating to violations of the Atomic Energy Act. It also refers to the FBI bulletin to law enforcement officers dated January 1, 1954, which gave an unclassified description of atomic devices. The statement then refers to a request from Val Peterson of the Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA) and "officials of Federal law enforcement agencies" to the AEC asking the AEC to provide an additional statement including information on components of fusion (hydrogen) weapons. Foster asked if the Bureau had any comments to make regarding this statement. It is felt that the above quote is not necessary to this release and that information contained in the May 5, 1955, letter is sufficient. This letter suggested that the release be made "in order that the public, public officials, and duly constituted law enforcement agencies may have such information for the purpose of cooperating in defending against clandestine introduction of alien fusion weapons or component parts thereof." It would appear that such a statement stating that these public officials are being furnished this for the purpose of cooperating "with Federal agencies" would be sufficient.

The original title on the unclassified release of the AEC was "unclassified description of fusion weapons provided by the AEC to the FBI and the FCDA." Foster was informed that this unclassified release was not to be provided to the FBI; that the FBI had a classified description and that this information was for the assistance of local officials and that, therefore, this title was incorrect. Foster then suggested the following title "unclassified statement provided by AEC to assist enforcement agencies in guarding against the possibility of clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons and also to aid FCDA in identifying such weapons if successfully smuggled into this country." The Bureau does not know what specific request Val Peterson of FCDA made to the AEC. However, the above title indicating that FCDA wanted the information to identify such weapons if smuggled into the country is not correct. FCDA does not have the responsibility of identifying such weapons.

AEC has certainly been derelict in delaying this release since the request was originally made on May 5, 1955. It is evident that AEC is trying to use the Director's name in the event they are questioned as to why they made the release.

Memo to Mr. Boardman
from Mr. Belmont

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. It is recommended that Strauss and Foster be advised that the Bureau suggests the reference in the AEC statement to the press that "officials of Federal law enforcement agencies" have asked AEC to release the information be deleted and read "in order that the public, public officials, and duly constituted law enforcement agencies may have such information for the purpose of cooperating with Federal agencies in defending against clandestine introduction of such weapons." This is suggested in order to avoid the implication that this request is from Federal law enforcement agencies when in fact it was from the IIC-ICIS agencies.

Foster advised as above 9-25. cmb.

V

OK. H.

2. It is also recommended that AEC be queried as to the title of the release which states that it is also being furnished to FCDA to aid FCDA in identifying such weapons if successfully smuggled into this country. FCDA has no responsibility for identifying such weapons.

Done 9-28 cmb.

V

OK. H.

ADDENDUM: The above recommendations have been correlated with Mr. Nichols' office.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: October 5, 1955

FROM : MR. A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: PUBLIC RELEASE OF AN UNCLASSIFIED DESCRIPTION OF FUSION WEAPONS

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

Reference my memoranda September 16, 23, 29 and 30, 1955, regarding Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference - Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (IIC-ICIS) request to AEC to make public release of unclassified description of hydrogen weapons. Memorandum 9-30-55 indicated AEC would furnish Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA) unclassified description of hydrogen and atomic weapons for release to local civil defense. AEC indicated concern about any release on hydrogen weapons. Director noted "Since there seems to have developed opposition at high level I suggest we gracefully withdraw & not press the issue. H."

On 10-4-55 Paul Foster, AEC, advised Liaison Agent Bates the Commission had that date reconsidered matter and now felt it unwise to put out any description of hydrogen weapons. Therefore, AEC statement to FCDA will only include description of atomic weapons. Foster stated AEC will reply by letter to IIC-ICIS request and set forth AEC's present position.

ACTION:

1. This matter will not be followed further with AEC.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-9-04 BY 60267 uc/nls/BJA/DFW

2. Upon receipt of AEC letter to IIC-ICIS, information will be brought to attention of IIC-ICIS agencies.

CWB:fjb
(6)

1 - Mr. Boardman
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Day
1 - Liaison Section
1 - Mr. Bates

117-368-

RECORDED-45

INDEXED - 45

12

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: September 29, 1955

FROM : MR. A. H. BELMONT

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-9-04 BY 60267 uc/nls/BJA/DFW 948742/950935/997059

SUBJECT: PUBLIC RELEASE OF AN UNCLASSIFIED DESCRIPTION OF FUSION WEAPONS

Reference memoranda September 16 and 23, 1955, regarding efforts by Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference - Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (IIC-ICIS) to have Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) make public release of unclassified description of hydrogen weapons. Memoranda indicated efforts by Liaison to expedite matter with AEC. Daily contact has been maintained in effort to resolve this matter. Letter dated May 5, 1955, to Strauss, Chairman, AEC, from IIC-ICIS asked that unclassified release be made by AEC and enclosed release previously submitted by AEC and approved by IIC-ICIS.

On 9-28-55 Paul Foster, AEC, furnished Liaison copy of statement to be made at time of release together with copy of unclassified description of hydrogen weapons. May 5 letter suggested preface and concluding paragraph to be used at time statement released. Review of material furnished indicates unclassified statement not similar to that previously approved by IIC-ICIS and statement contains superfluous details regarding FBI's jurisdiction, Presidential directives and release made by Bureau in January, 1954, concerning unclassified description of atomic weapons.

Liaison Agent Bates indicated to Strauss on 9-28-55 statement and release appeared different from that originally approved. Strauss asked Bates to discuss matter with him at 4:00 P.M., 9-29-55.

Unclassified statement as now proposed by AEC does not contain as much descriptive information as in the original statement approved by IIC-ICIS. Therefore, it is not adequate for purpose for which intended. AEC officials indicated concern about making release re hydrogen weapons in view of international conditions. If AEC objects to release, they should so indicate to the National Security Council (NSC) and not try to use the FBI as basis for the release.

OWB:fjb
(7)

RECORDED-45
INDEXED-45

1 - Mr. Nichols
1 - Mr. Boardman
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Day
1 - Liaison Section
1 - Mr. Bates

OCT 24 1955

Liaison

Memo to Mr. Boardman
from Mr. Belmont

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. It is recommended that Bates advise Strauss unclassified statement is [redacted] change from that previously approved; that if such statement to be released, it should be coordinated with IIC-ICIS agencies beforehand.

2. That release not being made for FBI alone; that if statement desired as to basis for release, Strauss should refer to National Security Council Directive (NSC 159/4) which was basis for request to AEC to release information.

3. Strauss should be advised if AEC feels release not appropriate at this time or changes should be made, matter should be taken up with NSC and not the FBI.

9/29 Bates advised 3:10 pm

FD-36

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Sizoo
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

BUREAU OF INVEST

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

AIRTEL

NY, 10/17/55

Transmit the following Teletype message to: **BUREAU**

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF OR OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES, AEA.

Rebuairtel 10/13/55.

On 10/17/55, Inspector [redacted] U. S. Customs, advised that when he questioned [redacted] about instant pad, latter explained that while in Switzerland he complained to some friends of a pain in his back. Friends suggested he buy this pad which he did.

[redacted] recalled that the inscription on pad was in German language but was able to understand that portion of inscription indicating "50 micrograms of radium element". [redacted] orally declared pad. [redacted] does not know if readings were normal under circumstances since both dials registered maximum reading, viz. 100.

[redacted] stated he has instructions to contact a [redacted] the Atomic Energy Commission, NYC when the material causing the device to record a reaction to neutrons or gamma radiation is located in a passenger's baggage. He stated he also calls the FBI in these instances. On this occasion [redacted] told him these pads are sold commercially in Europe and are supposed to alleviate pain in the same fashion as an electric heating pad.

[redacted] stated that in view [redacted] statement there did not appear to be any need for formal declaration.

Mr. Belmont
CC: Mr. Whitson

KELLY

RECORDED-45

117-268-895

(3) - Bureau (117-268) (RM)

TGS:EG
117-192

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-9-04 BY 60267 uc/nls/BTA/DFW

50 OCT 26 1955

Approved _____ Sent _____ M. Per _____

Special Agent in Charge

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

117-C66-V

Supl - 10
1 - Mr. Rogers
1 - Mr. Tompkins
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. Boardman
1 - Mr. Belmont

October 11, 1955

1 - Mr. Watson
1 - Liaison Section
1 - Mr. Kuhrts

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

DIRECTOR, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-9-04 BY 60267 uc/sms/bjd DFW

PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL TO THE USSR FOR AN EXCHANGE OF MILITARY INFORMATION

Reference is made to Mr. Tompkins' memorandum of October 5, 1955, (regarding "NSC Action No. 1410") transmitting Mr. Harold E. Stassen's letter to you on the captioned matter. Mr. Stassen's letter, in addition to informing you of the schedule for the drafting of an inspection plan for disarmament, solicits observations on areas of specific concern to the Department and the FBI. Pursuant to Mr. Stassen's request, I am setting forth hereafter my observations on a matter in this area.

In connection with the design of an inspection system to insure compliance on the part of the USSR with an arms limitation agreement, it appears also that inherent in this planning is the formulation of an inspection system to provide the U.S. with security against a surprise attack. It also appears that there are many uncertainties concerning the form which the plan will ultimately take, including the demands and the conditions that will be made by the Soviets.

Although it would appear that an inspection system of this type will be aimed primarily at military security and military targets, the FBI has a vital concern relative to the possible use by Soviet agents of their official establishments in the U.S. for clandestine introduction, storage, and eventual detonation of atomic and nuclear military weapons.

As you know, the Soviets own or lease outright such space and buildings in the U.S. as they desire, giving the Soviets complete control over this real estate. Also, Soviet shipments enjoying diplomatic immunities and which are not restricted as to size, weight or contents are received into the U.S. All diplomatic personnel also enjoying immunity from any search or seizure. Because of these facts, it is not possible to determine whether the means of a clandestine attack are housed in such Soviet establishments.

On the other hand, the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, located at 19-21 Tchaikovsky Building, Tchaikovsky Street, and the residence of the U.S. Ambassador, located at 10 Spaso-Peskovsky

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Gandy

MMK:fjb (10)

Cover memo Belmont to Boardman 10-11-55
MMK:fjb captioned as above

SECRET

124

62-102185-

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RECORDED - 22
INDEXED - 22

COMM — FBI
OCT 12 1955
MAILED 26

Memorandum for the Attorney General

Street, Moscow, are owned and rented to the U.S. by the official Soviet housing agency. Because of Soviet Government ownership, these premises are dependent upon various Soviet official bodies for repair, redecoration, painting, et cetera. Therefore, it appears that the U.S. has nothing to lose and considerable to gain by a thorough inspection of each other's official establishments.

Also, it is recommended that an inspection of the Soviet establishments in the U.S. under an agreed disarmament inspection system could probably not be set up so thoroughly as to guarantee against storage of nuclear or atomic weapons, it will be known with a relatively high degree of confidence after consideration of their establishments for this purpose.

The official Soviet establishments, including the Soviet United Nations delegation facilities in the U.S., are identified as follows:

Soviet Embassy
1115-85 16th Street, N.W.
Washington, D. C.
owned by the Russian
Government

Press Department
Soviet Embassy
2619 Wyoming Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D. C.
leased by the Russian
Government

Soviet Embassy School
1304-06 21st Street, N.W.
Washington, D. C.
owned by the Russian
Government

Office of the Soviet Military,
Naval, and Air Attaches
2538 Belmont Road, N.W.
Washington, D. C.
owned by the Russian Government

Soviet United Nations Delegation
Headquarters
680 Park Avenue and
67 East 68th Street,
both New York City
owned by the "U.S.S.R. Delegation to
United Nations."

Tass News Agency
30 Rockefeller Plaza
New York City
leased by Tass News Agency from
Rockefeller Center, Inc.

Amtorg Trading Corporation
United Nations Plaza
33 East 67th Street
New York City
leased by Amtorg Trading Corp.
from 33 East 67th Street Corp.

Memorandum for the Attorney General

Texas Texas Agency
Room [illegible]
National Press Building
Washington, D. C.
Leased by the Texas Texas Agency

Soviet Estate (former Miller Estate) Upper Brookville, Long Island, New York
owned by "U.S.S.R Delegation to the United Nations."

Soviet Estate (former [illegible] Estate) Glen Cove, Long Island New York
owned by "U.S.S.R Delegation to the United Nations."

In addition to the above, Mr. Stassen's letter referred to the possibility that Mr. Benjamin Fairless or Mr. Walker Cisler, Chairmen, respectively, of the Stassen task forces on "Steel" and "Power and Industry," may wish to contact the FBI for information pertinent to their studies. I will be pleased to consider requests for information pertinent to the studies conducted by Mr. Stassen's staff in this regard.

The above observations are submitted for your consideration in the event you desire to include them in replying to Mr. Stassen's letter.

I am returning Mr. Stassen's letter of September 21, 1956, addressed to you. In addition, I am enclosing the letter from Mr. Stassen's secretary addressed to your office dated October 4, 1956. The latter two letters were forwarded to the Bureau with Mr. Tompkins' memorandum of reference.

Enclosures (2)

1 - Mr. William P. Rogers
Deputy Attorney General

1 - Assistant Attorney General
William F. Tompkins

- 2 -

SECRET

Office Memorandum

TO : Mr. L. V. Boardman

FROM : Mr. A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL TO THE USSR FOR AN EXCHANGE OF MILITARY INFORMATION

SYNOPSIS: SMUGGLING Atom Bombs

Attached hereto is a memorandum from Assistant Attorney General William F. Tompkins, dated 10-5-55, transmitting a letter addressed to the Attorney General from Mr. Harold E. Stassen, Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament. A copy of Mr. Stassen's letter was obtained by Liaison from Mr. Stassen's staff and analysed in Mr. Belmont's memorandum of September 27 last. Mr. Stassen's letter refers to the Presidential Directive of 6-30-55 which calls for an inspection system for a disarmament plan. The letter suggests to the Attorney General that he advise the Bureau of the inspection system to be drafted under Mr. Stassen's supervision, suggesting that the FBI will probably have a contribution to make in an over-all inspection system. In addition to an exchange of military information to insure compliance by the USSR of an arms limitation agreement, the President's directive aims at the formulation of an inspection system to provide security against a surprise attack. Although military security and targets are primary in this proposal, Mr. Belmont's memorandum approved that we request consideration by the Stassen staff of the possible Soviet use of their official establishments for clandestine introduction, storage and detonation of nuclear weapons in the U. S. It further pointed out that a USSR agreement to U. S. inspection of USSR establishments in the U. S. in exchange for USSR inspection of U. S. establishments in the USSR, would be a decided advantage to the U. S. since we have no access at the present to the USSR establishments in the U. S. while the USSR has complete access to our facilities in Moscow. Therefore, it appears desirable to identify to Mr. Stassen the establishments in the U. S. which the Soviets are presently capable of utilizing for clandestine introduction and storage of nuclear weapons along with the above observations. In addition to the above, Mr. Stassen's letter referred to the possibility of future contacts with the Bureau by Mr. Benjamin Fairless and Mr. Walter Cisler, consultants on this matter, for further information pertinent to their studies.

(5)

Enclosure

1 - Mr. Boardman

1 - Mr. Belmont

1 - Mr. Whitson

1 - Liaison Section

1 - Mr. Kuhrtz

62-109165

ORIGINAL FILED IN

Memorandum for Mr. Boardman

RECOMMENDATION:

1. Since Mr. Stassen's letter to the Attorney General specifically welcomes the Director to call to his (Mr. Stassen's) attention areas of concern to the FBI relative to an inspection plan, it is recommended that the attached letter over the Director's signature to Mr. Stassen be approved, setting forth the above observations.

2. Also, there is attached a memorandum to the Attorney General returning Mr. Stassen's letter of September 21 last addressed to the Attorney General, also a copy of the Bureau's letter to Mr. Stassen in compliance with Mr. Stassen's request.

Not sent
see 10/11/55 memo
mmk

DETAILS:

Assistant Attorney General William F. Tompkins, by memorandum dated October 5, transmitted a letter from Mr. Harold E. Stassen, Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament, to the Attorney General dated September 21 last. In this connection, reference is made to Mr. Belmont's memorandum of September 27 last on the captioned matter, which analyzed a copy of Mr. Stassen's letter which was then obtained from a Stassen staff member by Liaison. Mr. Stassen's letter refers to a directive from the President and the National Security Council of June 30, 1955, which calls for an effective, reciprocally acceptable inspection system for a disarmament plan. In addition, Mr. Stassen's letter suggests to the Attorney General that he advise the Director of the scheduling of various task forces to aid in the designing of an inspection system, suggesting that the FBI will probably have a contribution to make in an over-all inspection system. In addition, Mr. Stassen's letter specifically welcomes the Director to call to his attention any specific areas of concern to the Bureau. For the development of the inspection plan, Mr. Stassen has appointed eight task forces to consider the following aspects of the broad program: Nuclear Matters, Dr. Ernest O. Lawrence, Chairman; Steel, Mr. Benjamin Fairless, Chairman; Power and Industry, Mr. Walker Cisler, Chairman; Air, General James H. Doolittle, Chairman; Navy, Admiral Oswald S. Colclough, Chairman; Army, General Walter B. Smith, Chairman; Budget and Finance, Dr. Harold Moulton, Chairman; Communications, Dr. James B. Fisk, Chairman.

Memorandum for Mr. Boardman

It is pointed out that in addition to an inspection system to insure compliance on the part of the USSR of an arms limitation agreement, the President's [illegible] aims at the formulation of an inspection system to provide the U. S. with security against a surprise attack. As pointed out by a Stassen staff member to the Intelligence Advisory Committee, there are many uncertainties concerning the form which the plan will ultimately take, including the demands and the conditions that will be made by the Soviets.

Although an inspection system of this type is aimed primarily at military security and military targets, the Bureau has a vital concern relative to the possible Soviet use of their official establishments for clandestine introduction, storage and detonation of component and complete assembly of atomic and nuclear military weapons. As you know, the Soviets own or lease outright such space and buildings in the U. S. as it desires, giving them complete control over such real estate. Because of this, it is not possible to determine whether the [illegible] of a clandestine attack is housed in the Soviet buildings. While on the other hand, the U. S. Embassy in Moscow, located at 19-21 Tschaikovsky Building, on Tschaikovsky Street, and the residence of the U. S. Ambassador, located at 10 Spasopeskovski Street, Moscow, are owned and rented to the U. S. by the official Soviet housing agency, otherwise known as "Burocom." Because of Soviet Government ownership, these premises are dependent upon various Soviet official bodies for repair, redecoration, painting, etc. Therefore, it appears that the U. S. has nothing to lose and everything to gain by a mutual inspection of each others' official establishments.

Although it is recognized that an inspection of the Soviet U. S. establishments under an agreed disarmament inspection system can probably not be set up as thorough as to guarantee against storage of nuclear or atomic weapons, it will at least have a deterring effect on Soviet consideration of their establishments for this purpose.

Since Mr. Stassen's letter to the Attorney General welcomes any information from the Bureau on this matter, it is suggested that we incorporate the above observations, along with the identity of the Soviet establishments in the U. S. in a letter to Mr. Stassen. In addition to the above, Mr. Stassen's letter mentions that Mr. Benjamin Fairless and Mr. Walker Cisler, Chairmen respectively of the "Steel" and the "Power and Industry" task forces, may wish to contact the Bureau for information pertinent to their studies. (Mr. Benjamin Fairless is President of the U. S. Steel Company, while "Who's Who" lists a Mr. Walker Lee Cisler, age 58, as President of the Detroit Edison Company. Cisler, in the

Memorandum for [redacted]

past has been a consultant with the Mutual Security Agency, National Security Resources Board, and the Economic Cooperation Administration. Although it does not appear desirable to become involved in any industrial security matters which may be of concern to these latter groups, we cannot object to any contact by these task forces at which time we will consider their request for Bureau information pertinent to their studies.

There follows the Soviet establishments both in Washington, D. C., and New York, listing the type of Soviet control over each as to direct ownership or lease:

1. Soviet Embassy
1115-25 16th Street, N. W.,
Washington, D. C.
owned by the Russian
Government

2. Press Department
Soviet Embassy
2016 Wyoming Avenue, N. W
Washington, D. C.
leased by the Russian
Government

3. Soviet Embassy School
1304-06 21st Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.
owned by the Russian
Government

4. Office of the Soviet Military,
Naval, and Air Attaches,
2552 Belmont Road, N. W.
Washington, D. C.
owned by the Russian
Government

5. Tass News Agency
Room 307
National Press Building
Washington, D. C.
leased by the Tass News Agency

6. Soviet United Nations Delegation
Headquarters
680 Park Avenue and
48 East 68th Street,
both New York City
owned by the "USSR Delegation
to United Nations"

7. Tass News Agency
50 Rockefeller Plaza
New York City
leased by Tass News Agency from
Rockefeller Center, Inc.

8. Amtorg Trading Corporation
entire 12th floor
49 West 37th Street
New York City
leased by Amtorg Trading Corp.
from 49 West 37th Street Corp.

9. Soviet Estate (former Pratt Estate)
Glen Cove, Long Island, New York
owned by "USSR Delegation to the
United Nations"

10. Soviet Estate (former Miller Estate)
Upper Brookville, Long Island
New York
owned by "USSR Delegation to the
United Nations"

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO: The Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

DATE: October 5, 1955

FROM: William F. Tompkins, Assistant Attorney General, Internal Security Division

SUBJECT: NSC ACTION NO. 1418.

Attached for your information is a self-explanatory letter from Mr. Harold S. Stassen, dated September 21, 1955, which was received in this Division October 4. Also attached is a communication of that date representing the information referred to in the letter as contained in an enclosure which was not actually attached to the September 21 letter as received in the Department. Our acknowledgment of receipt of the letter and of the fact that it is being transmitted to you has been made.

Enclosure No. 26633

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-9-04 BY [illegible]

ENCLOSURES

INITIALS ON ORIGINAL

ENCLOSURE

OCT 19 1955

RECEIVED - RICHMOND

FBI

RECEIVED - DIRECTOR

SECRET

RECEIVED - WASHINGTON

F PROC

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: October 14, 1955

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-9-84 BY 6026 uc/nls/BJA/DFW

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: REAPPRAISAL OF U. S. POLICY REGARDING SOVIET BLOC SHIPMENTS AFFORDED DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY

My memorandum of October 7, 1955, analyzed the report drafted by the Joint IIC-ICIS Working Committees concerning limitation of the diplomatic pouch. In order that we may be aware of the current status of this matter, Liaison has closely followed the ICIS Secretariat, and the following are the positions of the interested parties as of this date:

IIC . . . . . Has approved the report as drafted.

State . . . . . Has approved the report with three minor editorial changes which have been considered and approved by the IIC Working Committee members.

Justice . . . . Apparently approves. Carl Pfuntner of the ICIS Secretariat states he understands the Attorney General "has taken a position." It is known that ICIS Chairman Yeagley is in agreement with IIC views, for the most part.

Treasury . . . Dragging its feet as usual; has not completed "staffing" within own organization.

Defense . . . . Referred entire matter for comment to Army, Navy, and Air Force. Colonel Halversen, Defense Representative on ICIS, is reported by Smith, G-2, to have phoned the offices of the three Secretaries and asked that special consideration be given by their Intelligence Collection Branches.

ACTION:

This is to inform you of the current status of this matter.

GAD:hke
(6)
1-Mr. Boardman
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Mr. Day
1-Section Tickler

RECORDED INDEXED-92

117-268-

OCT 26 1955

12 OCT 20 1955

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

copy/bjb

Date: October 17, 1955

To: Legal Attache [redacted]
Paris, France

~~SECRET~~ - AIR COURIER

(orig and 1)

From: Director, FBI [redacted]

b7C

Subject: [redacted]

UNKNOWN SUBJECTS:

[redacted]

SMUGGLING Atom Bombs

ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

Reurlet September 22, 1955.

There are attached for your information Photostats of reports dated September 8, 18, and 22, 1955, regarding "Unknown Subject (s) Possible Import Into the US of Atomic Materials."

You should maintain close liaison with OSI, Paris.

Enclosures (3)

cc - 1 - Foreign Liaison Unit
LW:blb
(5)

Enclosures
Filed with original
10/24/55
eca

117-268-
NOT RECORDED
176 OCT 24 1955

b7C

Yellow

ORIGINAL FILED IN

EX-124

50 OCT 28 1955

FD-36

BUREAU OF INVESTIG

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

AIRTEL

NY, 10/14/55

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Sizoo
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

Transmit the following Teletype message to: BUREAU

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF OR OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES, AEA.

Inspector [redacted] U.S. Customs, advised this date that [redacted] Magnesium Electron, Ltd., Clifton Junction, Manchester, England, arrived Idlewild Airport [redacted] 10-1 b7C in which he declared two samples of magnesium castings to be utilized in tour of U. S. in demonstration of new protective treatment for magnesium alloys. [redacted]

Samples on passing detection device registered readings of 100 on both neutron and gamma dials. AEC, NY, notified by Customs, stated they would pick up samples merely to examine same and thereafter would return them [redacted] Any significant observations noted by AEC will be furnished to Bureau.

Above for information.

Not necessary to advise AEC, Wash. per Rolander's advise. 10-19-55 OMB

KELLY

(3) - Bureau (RM)

Mr. Belmont

RECORDED-107 117-[illegible]-878

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-9-04 BY 60267 uc/nls/BJA/DFW

JJD:EG
117-192

71 OCT 26 1955

Approved _____ Sent _____ M Per _____

Special Agent in Charge

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : W. A. Branigan

DATE: 10-18-55

FROM : L. Whitson

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC WEAPONS

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

At 1:50 P. M., October 18, 1955, Commander B. P. Clark, U. S. Coast Guard, phoned and stated he and Don Gale, Naval Research Laboratory, were going today to see Mr. Emerick of Customs. They were going to give Emerick informal memorandum as members of the "advisory group" regarding the location of existing detection devices; the purposes of the program; and other basic data regarding the use of detection devices.

Clark stated that Emerick had previously wanted a formal statement of some sort from the IIC and ICIS, but apparently would be satisfied now with an informal memorandum from Clark and Gale.

RECOMMENDATION:

None. For your information. Customs has the responsibility for operating the devices at ports of entry.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-9-04 BY 60267 uc/nls/ BJA/DFW

117-268

2 OCT 21 1955

cc - Branigan
Whitson
Day

117-268
LW:blb
(4)

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: October 24, 1955

FROM : L. V. BOARDMAN

SUBJECT: PUBLIC RELEASE OF AN UNCLASSIFIED DESCRIPTION OF FUSION WEAPONS

Your memorandum of October 21, 1955, instructed that ICIS Chairman Yeagley and the IIC members be advised of your discussion with Atomic Energy Commission Chairman Strauss on October 20, 1955.

ACTION:

Attached for your approval and signature as IIC Chairman is a letter informing ICIS Chairman Yeagley that the Atomic Energy Commission is of the opinion that no release of information concerning fusion weapons should be made at the present time. Copies of this communication have been designated for the other IIC members.

Enclosure sent 10-24-55 AMW

GAD:hke (6)

1-Mr. Boardman
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Day
1-Mr. Bates
1-Section Tickler

RECORDED - 72

INDEXED - 72

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-9-04 BY 60267 uc/nls/BJA/DFW

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

OCT 21 1955

TELETYPE

WASH 10 FROM NEW YORK 21 9-00 P

DIRECTOR ..... U R G E N T ....

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Miss Holloman
Miss Gandy

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS AND/OR PARTS THEREOF OR OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO U. S., AEA. [redacted] CUSTOMS BUREAU, AT TWO THIRTY PM, OCTOBER TWENTYONE, FIFTYFIVE, TELEPHONICALLY ADVISED THE FOLLOWING, CUSTOMS, OPERATING [redacted] DEVICE TO DETECT FISSIONABLE MATERIAL, EXAMINED INCOMING MAIL, OCTOBER TWENTYONE, FIFTYFIVE, AND OBTAINED A REACTION ON THE FOLLOWING TWO ITEMS. ITEM ONE. A PACKAGE WEIGHING TWENTYFOUR AND THREE QUARTERS POUNDS, DIRECTED TO AMERICAN MUSEUM OF NATURAL HISTORY, COLUMBUS AVENUE, AND SEVENTY NINTH STREET, NYC, FROM [redacted]

b7C b2 b7E

[redacted]

INDEXED - 13

EXAMINATION OF THE CONTENTS BY CUSTOMS REFLECTED THIRTYFIVE ROUGH STONES. AEC WAS ADVISED AND ORDERED RELEASE OF PACKAGE. ITEM TWO. PACKAGE TO CURTIS-WRIGHT EXPORT DIVISION FROM [redacted] [redacted] PACKAGE CONTAINED THREE AND ONE QUARTER POUNDS STRONTIUM IN A SEALED CONTAINER. MACHINE, AT [redacted] [redacted] THIS PACKAGE HAD A NOTATION, REFER TO U. S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION LICENSE THREE ONE FOUR EIGHT THREE, ISSUED FEBRUARY SEVENTEEN, FIFTYFIVE. CUSTOMS ADVISED AEC WHO ORDERED RELEASE OF PACKAGE. NO FURTHER ACTION CONTEMPLATED THIS DIVISION.

b7C b2 b7E

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-20-84 BY 4004 #40262 sp/als/BJA/DFW

RECORDED 13 117-268-7

INDEXED - 13

PACKAGES RELEASED. NO DISSEMINATION NECESSARY

PLS HOLD

KELLY

Mr. Belmont

EX-107

71 OCT 31 1955

2 OCT 25 1955

ESPIONAGE

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: 10-11-55

FROM : W. A. Branigan

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE U.S. (Bufile 117-268)

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols ✓
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-9-04 BY 60262 uc/nls/ BJA/DFW

On the morning of October 11, 1955, Special Agent Whitson received a call from the Office of the Secretariat of the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS). He was advised that the Atomic Energy Commission had requested the ICIS to furnish AEC with a listing of all individuals who had access to an unclassified description of fusion weapons (H-bombs) which had been furnished by the Chairman of AEC to the Chairman of IIC and the Chairman of ICIS under date of January 6, 1955.

The records of the ICIS Secretariat show that Agent Whitson had received a copy of this unclassified document in connection with the deliberations of the Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures during January and February of 1955. Agent Whitson informed the Secretariat office that no one other than himself had access to the item in question inasmuch as all necessary dissemination within the Bureau had been accomplished on the basis of the copies furnished to IIC by AEC. (No Number SAC letter 55-B, 1-21-55).

RECOMMENDATION:

None. For your information. This may relate to the discussions during recent weeks with AEC regarding a proposed public release of the unclassified information regarding fusion weapons.

ADDENDUM:

As of 10-14-55, AEC had not asked for IIC dissemination. If FBI asked, can say all field offices were advised.

cc - Belmont
Branigan
Bates
Day
Whitson

LW:blb
(6)

RECORDED - 77
INDEXED - 77

117-268-

UNRECORDED COPY FILED

L BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
MUNICATIONS SECTION

OCT 20 1955

WP
TELETYPE

WASH g FROM NEW YORK 20 9-13 PM

DIRECTOR ... D E F E R R E D ...

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-9-04 BY 60267 uc/nls/BSTAHOM

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Sizoo
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC WEAPONS BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF OR OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES, AEA. JOSEPH J. BURTON DEPUTY COLLECTOR, ~~DIRECTOR~~ IN CHARGE, UNITED STATES CUSTOMS, IDLEWILD AIRPORT, NEW YORK CITY, ADVISED [redacted] ARRIVED IDLEWILD AIRPORT [redacted]

INDEXED-33

b7C

[redacted] THE MACHINE USED TO INDICATE FISSIONABLE MATERIALS LOCATED AT IDLEWILD AIRPORT REGISTERED MAXIMUM READING ON RED LIGHT, AND A NINTYTWO POINT READING ON GREEN LIGHT, ON PASSAGE OF FISCHER-S PERSONAL BAGGAGE. BURTON ADVISED THAT A FOUR POUND ROCK DESCRIBED AS QUOTE MOLIKITE UNQUOTE WAS LOCATED IN THE BAGGAGE. [redacted] DECLARED THAT SAID ROCK WAS OBTAINED IN KATANGUA, BELGIAN CONGO, AND ADVISED THAT IT WAS BROUGHT INTO THIS COUNTRY FOR HIS CHILDREN, AND NOT FOR ANY COMMERCIAL USE. [redacted]

b7C

[redacted]

MC LAUGHLIN AEC, NYC, ADVISED CUSTOMS TO RELEASE ROCK [redacted]

NO INFORMATION IDENTIFIABLE [redacted] LOCATED IN NYO INDICES. ABOVE FURNISHED FOR INFORMATION OF BUREAU.

RECORDED-33 117-268-
INDEXED-33

NO ACTION BEING TAKEN BY NYO.

NO VIOLATION. NO DISSEMINATION. KELLY

5-WFO

Routing
FD-4 (54)

Date 10-21-55

To

☑ Director, FBI

N.Y.

FILE # 117-192

Att. .....

☐ SAC .....

☐ ASAC .....

☐ Supv. .....

☐ Agent .....

☐ SE .....

☐ CC .....

☐ Steno .....

☐ Clerk .....

Title SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF OR OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE U.S.- AEA

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-9-04 BY 60267 uc/mls/BTM 06-0

ACTION DESIRED

☐ Reassign to	☐ Initial & return	☐ Open Case
.....	☐ Search & return	☐ Expedite
☐ Send Serials	☐ Recharge serials	☐ Correct
.....	☐ Prepare tickler	☐ Call me
☐ Submit report by	☐ Return serials	☐ See me
.....	☐ Acknowledge	☐ Type
☐ Submit new charge-out	☐ Bring file	☐ File
☐ Leads need attention	☐ Delinquent	

☐ Return with explanation or notation as to action taken.

RE N.Y. TELETYPE 10-20-55

L.3 SHOULD READ

DEPUTY COLLECTOR IN CHARGE, ...

LAST WORD L.12 S/B BURTON

N.Y.O. HAS CORRECTED ITS COPY - BUREAU IS REQUESTED TO DO THE SAME

DONE 10-24-55 EW

SAC James J. Kelly

Office New York N.Y.

RESP SEC

CONFIRMATION 10-25-55

RECD FROM ICIS SECRETARIAT 5PM 10-27-55. LW.

ICIS-PES/55X

October 28, 1955

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-9-04 BY 60267 uc/nls/BJH/DFW

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Lish Whitson
Chairman, Committee B

FROM: J. Walter Yeagley, Chairman SIGNED
Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security

SUBJECT: Countermeasures Against Fissionable Material

In connection with consideration by the ICIS of its report on Plan "A" to the Net Evaluation Subcommittee, the Defense Representative on the ICIS suggested at an ICIS meeting on August 8, 1955, that if the threat to New York and Washington is as serious as was indicated in the report, the AEC should perhaps be requested to develop countermeasures.

The ICIS Standing Committee discussed the problem with an AEC representative on October 13, 1955, and was informed that so far as that representative knew no equipment exists at this time which would disclose, from outside a building, fissionable material stored inside a building. It was agreed that further consideration should be given to the matter by Committee B.

Accordingly, the ICIS requests that Committee B explore, with the assistance of its AEC advisor, possible recommendations that might be directed to the AEC for the development of countermeasures, and report to the IIC and ICIS as soon as possible.

IF SUCH DEVICE WAS CONSTRUCTED IT WOULD BE GIGANTIC AND LETHALLY IRRADIATE THE WHOLE SECTION OF TOWN. LW

cc: Mr. Whitson
Col. Malversen
Lt. Col. Hudgins
Captain Jones
Captain Stewart

SEE MEMO BELMONT TO BOARDMAN 12-2-55. LW

RECORDED-45

INDEXED - 45 117-248

16 OCT 28 1955

EX-118

WILL BE CONSIDERED AT NEXT JOINT MEETING. LW

12

OCT 28 1955

ENCLOSURE

Orig & [redacted] by
1 - Mr. Lee
1 - Mr. Boardman
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Bates
1 - Mr. Day
1 - Section Tickler

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-9-04 BY 60262 uc/lnls/BJA/DFW

October 24, 1955

VIA LIAISON

Mr. J. Walter Yeagley
Chairman
Interdepartmental Committee on
Internal Security
Department of Justice Building
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Yeagley:

Pursuant to National Security Council Document 5408 dated February 11, 1954, IIC-ICIS letters dated May 5 and August 4, 1955, asked the Atomic Energy Commission to release an unclassified description of fusion weapons.

On October 20, 1955, Admiral Strauss, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, called to see me. He referred to the IIC-ICIS correspondence and stated that this matter had been very carefully considered by the Atomic Energy Commission and it was the opinion of the Commission that no such release could be made at the present time. He stated that one of the compelling reasons was that any description of fusion weapons made available to the public might enable the Russians to obtain some valuable intelligence information.

I advised Admiral Strauss that I was perfectly satisfied with the judgment of the Atomic Energy Commission and that so far as the IIC was concerned, the request might be considered closed. I knew that you would be interested in this decision of the Atomic Energy Commission.

Sincerely yours,

[redacted]

Chairman
Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

GAD:hke
(12)

(Attached to cover memorandum from Mr. Boardman to The Director, 10/24/55, re "Public Release of an Unclassified Description of Fusion Weapons" GAD:hke)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1 - Major General Ridgely Gaither
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Department of the Army
The Pentagon
Washington 25, D. C.

VIA LIAISON
to major Olsen 10/27/55

1 - Rear Admiral Carl F. Espe
Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy
Washington 25, D. C.

VIA LIAISON
[illegible] 10/27/55

1 - Brigadier General John E. Murray
Director
Special Investigations
The Inspector General
Department of the Air Force
Building Tempo E
4th and Adams Drive, S. W.
Washington 25, D. C.

VIA LIAISON
to Lt Col Fuller 10/27/55

DATE OF MAIL 10-25-55

HAS BEEN REMOVED FOR [redacted] TO BE KEPT PERMANENTLY IN HIS OFFICE, ROOM [redacted] b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-9-04 BY 60267 ucdnls/BJA/DFW

SEE FILE 66-2554-7530 FOR AUTHORITY.

SUBJECT JUNE MAIL Smuggling Atomic Bombs

REMOVED BY [redacted]

FILE NUMBER 117-268-4

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGEOUT

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: October 25, 1955

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: REAPPRAISAL OF U. S. POLICY REGARDING SOVIET BLOC SHIPMENTS AFFORDED DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

The report, drafted by the Joint IIC-ICIS Working Committees concerning limitation of the diplomatic pouch, was approved by the IIC on October 7, 1955, three days after receipt of the final draft copy. Liaison has been, ever since, attempting to expedite approval of the report within ICIS.

The State and Justice Departments have approved, but neither Treasury nor Defense have yet taken a position. Both departments were represented throughout the discussions which resulted in the final draft report so no reason exists for any unsuspected major objections from them.

Pat Coyne, National Security Council, called the ICIS Secretariat on October 19, 1955, urged that every effort be made to speed up consideration of the report, and asked that he be informed of any change in its status. Liaison Agent Day has checked with ICIS on a daily basis since October 7 and several minor editorial changes suggested by ICIS members have been cleared with the IIC Working Committee and approved on the same date they were received. We will continue our endeavors to secure final ICIS consideration of this report.

ACTION:

This is to inform you of the current status of this matter.

GAD:hke
(6)

1-Mr. Boardman
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Mr. Day
1-Section Tickler

RECORDED - 43

INDEXED - 43

117-265-

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

LIAISON

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-9-04 BY 60267 uc/nls/BJA/DFW

Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security

3527 Department of Justice, Washington 25, D. C.

ICIS-P25/335

October 26, 1955

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Sizoo
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-9-04 BY 60267 uc/nls/BJA/DFW

Honorable J. Edgar Hoover
Chairman, Interdepartmental
Intelligence Conference
Department of Justice Building
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Hoover:

I appreciate very much your advising me by your letter of October 24th of the visit of Admiral Strauss and the results of your conversation with him regarding the possible release of a description of a fusion weapon.

Admiral Foster of the Atomic Energy Commission contacted me about this problem and I agree entirely with the position you indicated to Admiral Strauss. I am sure that none of the other members of ICIS will take a different position.

Sincerely yours,

J. Walter Yeagley

J. Walter Yeagley
Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee
on Internal Security

RECORDED-45
INDEXED - 45

EX-10[illegible]

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

~~SECRET~~

Boardman
Belmont
Brantigan
Roach
Kurtz-Rm. 1728
October 25, 1955

Whitson

The Attorney General (orig and 1)

Director, FBI

[redacted]

INTERNAL SECURITY - CZECHOSLOVAKIA

b7C

[redacted] Czech couriers, arrived from Mexico City at Idlewild Airport, New York, via Air France, Flight 070, at 8:35 P. M., October 20, 1955. Customs representatives at the Airport advised that when [redacted] passed the detection device for radioactive material, carrying a briefcase four inches by fourteen inches by sixteen inches, reaction was noted on the detection device with respect to the head sensitive to neutrons as well as to the head sensitive to gamma radiation.

b7C

[redacted] had in their possession, in addition to their briefcases, pieces of diplomatic luggage described as a paper-covered carton weighing sixty pounds, a canvas-covered pouch weighing sixty-five pounds, and a suitcase weighing twenty-five pounds. [redacted] was in possession of Czech diplomatic passport No. [redacted] held Czech diplomatic passport No. [redacted] Both [redacted] went from the Airport to the Czech United Nations Delegation offices, 6 East 67th Street, New York City.

This Bureau will furnish you with any information developed regarding significant activity on the part of these individuals.

These data have also been furnished to the Office of Security, Department of State; Director of Security, Atomic Energy Commission; Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army; Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy; Director of Special Investigations, The Inspector General, Department of the Air Force; and Assistant Attorney General William F. Tompkins.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 7-9-84 BY 60260 uc/sns/bja/bfw

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Rosen
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Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

117-268-
NOT RECORDED
44 OCT 28 1955

cc - 1 - Mr. William P. Rogers
Deputy Attorney General

cc - 117-268
LW:blb (11)

Cover memo Belmont to Boardman, 10-25-55, CEH:bmm, same subj.

YELLOW DUPLICATE
OCT 26 1955
MAILED

57 NOV 2 1955

~~SECRET~~

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

October 28, 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TOLSON
MR. BOARDMAN
MR. BELMONT
MR. NICHOLS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE
FBI/DOJ 6-9-04 BY 60262 ucdn ls (BJH/DFW)

Yesterday, following the meeting of the National Security Council at the White House, a short discussion ensued among the Vice President, the Attorney General, Admiral Radford, the Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Thomas, and myself.

I took occasion to point out to these officials the recent activities of the two Czechoslovakian couriers and the helplessness faced by ourselves in doing anything about the bringing into this country under diplomatic immunity of packages and shipments which might contain fissionable material. I also pointed out the continued intense activities upon the part of Soviet representatives in this country to procure top secret information and observed that there had been no diminution in these efforts since the "Summit" Conference at Geneva. It was indicated by the Attorney General that it might be well to give some further thought to this matter in order that the President could be briefed upon the same.

The Vice President during this conversation stated there was a strong likelihood of [redacted] matter being investigated by a Senatorial Committee in order to determine the extent of British security and also how it was that these two individuals were able to have such full access to top secret information in this country and thereby ultimately do irreparable harm to our security. The Vice President stated he had been advised by Admiral Strauss that Maclean had had a so-called free access pass at the Atomic Energy Headquarters. I confirmed this to the Vice President. b7C

In view of the observation made by the Vice President, I believe it would be well to immediately prepare a complete, carefully-indexed brief upon the [redacted] matter so that we may carefully review the same and it may be desirable to furnish copies of this memorandum to a limited group of officials

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Gandy

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145 NOV 2 1955

SENT FROM D. O.
TIME 3:49 PM
DATE 10-28-55
BY

in the Administration. It will also enable us to be thoroughly prepared in advance should any Congressional inquiry be conducted into it.

Following the conversation referred to above, the Attorney General observed to me that he was concerned as to what to do about some of the very delicate and confidential information which we had recently furnished to him concerning Soviet espionage activities. He inquired as to whether it wouldn't be desirable to submit a memorandum covering at least some of these matters to the National Security Council. He stated that as it was now we were in possession of information regarding some rather shocking activities upon the part of Soviet agents engaged in espionage against the United States but were not advising top level officials of the Administration about the same, which he thought probably should be done.

I observed to the Attorney General that I recognized the situation as now existing, but it must be kept in mind that the information to which he referred had been procured from highly delicate operations still in current activity, and I did not wish to see any leak occur concerning these, as it would obviously cut off our sources of information and possibly imperil some of our informants.

The Attorney General suggested that we give thought to preparing two memorandums, one which might be so phrased that he could at least make it available to the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of State, Admiral Radford, and then maybe one or two others of high-level rank. He stated that the second memorandum might be a more complete one for his own personal information, as he anticipated he would be asked many questions, both at Cabinet meetings and the National Security Council meetings in the future following the briefing of yesterday morning.

I would like to have Mr. Boardman and Mr. Belmont give this matter immediate attention and it may be possible that we can prepare only one memorandum covering our sources adequately which will serve both purposes. Otherwise, it will be necessary to prepare two.

The Attorney General also commented in this discussion about the fact that he thought efforts should be made upon the part

of the United States to insist upon the employment of United States nationals in our embassies abroad, just as the foreign embassies employ their own nationals in their embassies here, particularly those of the Russian Government and the Satellite nations. I do not know what consideration has been given to this matter by the Bureau or the IIC and ICIS, but I do think it is one which should be carefully considered so that there may be equal reciprocal operations in this field between the Soviet Government and the United States.

Very truly yours,

/s/ J. E. H.

John Edgar Hoover
Director

JEH:tlc (7)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

OCT 21 1955

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-7-04 BY 60267 uc/nls/BJA/dfw

TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

WASH AND WFO 2 FROM NEW YORK 21 2-00 PM

DIRECTOR AND SAC URGENT

ATTENTION.... INSPECTOR HENNRICK. O.K.R.

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE U.S., AEA. BUFILE ONE SEVENTEEN DASH TWO SIX EIGHT. ON OCTOBER TWENTYONE INSTANT, U.S. CUSTOMS, IDLEWILD AIRPORT, ADVISED THAT TWO CZECH COURIERS, [redacted] BAGGAGE DECLARATION NO. [redacted] HAVING CZECH DIPLOMATIC PASSPORT NO. [redacted] b7C [redacted] BAGGAGE DECLARATION NO. [redacted] [redacted] HAVING CZECH DIPLOMATIC PASSPORT NO. [redacted] [redacted] ARRIVED AT IDLEWILD AIRPORT AT FIVE THIRTYFIVE P.M., OCTOBER TWENTY LAST. BOTH WERE CARRYING BRIEFCASE FOUR BY FOURTEEN BY SIXTEEN INCHES, AND DIPLOMATIC PIECES OF LUGGAGE WERE IN THEIR POSSESSION DESCRIBED AS ONE PAPER COVERED CARTON, EIGHT BY TWELVE BY TWENTY INCHES WEIGHING SIXTY POUNDS, A CANVASS COVERED POUCH, SIXTEEN BY TWENTY BY THIRTYSIX INCHES WEIGHING SIXTYFIVE POUNDS, AND A SUITCASE WEIGHING TWENTYFIVE POUNDS. CUSTOMS ADVISED THAT BOTH WERE CARRYING THEIR BRIEFCASES AND THAT WHEN [redacted] PASSED

RECORDED-29 117-265-70 NOV 22 1955

b7C

END PAGE ONE

TWO COPIES WFO

Mr. Belmont

cc - Rec, 6-2, one, occ, Complete 10-25-55

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BY THE APPARATUS IT REGISTERED SEVENTY ON THE LEFT OR GREEN INDICATOR AND THIRTYSIX ON THE RIGHT OR RED INDICATOR. CUSTOMS WAS UNABLE TO STATE THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS READING IN CONNECTION WITH [redacted] PRESENCE IN FRONT OF THE APPARATUS. CUSTOMS HAS NOTIFIED AEC OF ABOVE. COURIERS INDICATED THEY WOULD REMAIN IN U.S. UNTIL OCTOBER TWENTYEIGHT NEXT WHEN THEY WOULD RETURN TO PRAGUE. FOR INFORMATION OF BUREAU, SPOT CHECK FISUR AT IDLEWILD PHYSICAL SURVEILLANCE b7C UNDER CURRENT INSTRUCTIONS AND ARRIVAL AS DESCRIBED ABOVE VERIFIED. AT TIME OF CUSTOMS INSPECTION OF ABOVE LUGGAGE ON OCTOBER TWENTY FIFTYFIVE CUSTOMS OFFICER INDICATED THE APPARATUS SHOWED VERY SLIGHT REACTION UPON PASSAGE OF [redacted] SIGNIFICANCE OF WHICH WAS UNKNOWN. PHYSICAL SURVEILLANCE FISUR REFLECTED IMMEDIATE DEPARTURE FROM AIRPORT AND ARRIVAL AT CZECH UN DELEGATION, SIX EAST SIXTY SEVENTH ST., NYC. NO ACTIVITY NOTED SINCE ARRIVAL. HOWEVER, IN VIEW OF ABOVE, FULL TIME PHYSICAL SURVEILLANCE FISUR WILL BE CONDUCTED THESE SUBJECT.

WARREN CHASE, STATE ADVISED ORALLY BY PHILCOX, LIAISON 10-21-55 LW

KELLY

A. ROLANDER, AEC ADVISED ORALLY BY BATES, LIAISON 10-21-55 LW

END

1

4

MY NY R 2 WA RD

TWG

cc: Mr. Hennrich

AIRTEL

10/25/55

FBI WASH FIELD

URGENT

DIRECTOR (117-268) and SAC NEW YORK (RM)

ATTENTION INSPECTOR HENNRICH

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE U. S., AEA.

Re NY teletype dated 10/21/last.

ATTACHE

Two Czech couriers, [redacted] arrived D. C., 10/21 last. Were met at station by BOHUSLAV JUZA and [redacted] Had in their possession one large duffle bag and two brown leather briefcases. Proceeded directly to Czech Embassy. On 10/22 they shopped briefly in the morning with [redacted] On 10/23, with JUZA and [redacted] and other members of the Czech Embassy staff, attended a Soviet-Satellite volleyball contest at Carter Barron Theater. On evening of 10/23 dined at the home of JUZA. b7C

Couriers departed Washington, D. C., aboard Pennsylvania Railroad Train 156 at 5:01 PM, 10/24/55. On arrival in NYC at 9:45 PM were met by an unknown white man, age 37-40, 170 pounds, 5' 9", black hair, dressed in gray suit and topcoat, who assisted them in carrying two briefcases and two large dark brown canvas bags from the train. These two canvas bags were described as approximately three feet long and 26 inches in diameter. The bags were apparently filled and appeared to be quite heavy.

New York should advise Bureau of identity of individual who met couriers at Pennsylvania Station, believed to be member of the Czech UN Delegation, New York City.

117-268
ERH:teb
(8)
CC: 1 - [redacted] b7C

RECORDED - 15 117-268 LAUGHLIN

NOV 1 1955

[redacted] CONTAINED
[redacted] IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-9-04 BY 60267 ucdnls/BJA/DRW

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: October 31, 1955

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE BY 60267 uc/nls/BJA/DPW 64-04

SUBJECT: PUBLIC RELEASE OF AN UNCLASSIFIED DESCRIPTION OF FUSION WEAPONS

By letter January 6, 1955, Atomic Energy Commission furnished IIC and ICIS both classified and unclassified descriptions of fusion (hydrogen) weapons "for your information and use." These descriptions had been requested for use in program of defending against clandestine introduction of alien nuclear weapons.

ONI disseminated both descriptions to major commands throughout Navy, authorizing further internal distribution. FBI, by attachments to No Number SAC Letter 55-B, furnished both descriptions to SACs and advised that the unclassified description would not be released outside Government until authorized by the National Security Council.

AEC letter, October 21, 1955, copy attached, referred to conversation between Director and Admiral Strauss, October 20, and requests return of the unclassified description, together with all copies that have been made. Willard, ONI, discussed this request with Paul Foster of AEC, October 28, and Foster indicated destruction of the description would be as acceptable as return. Return of SAC Letter attachments and of all copies of description prepared within various Naval Commands would impose unwarranted administrative burden and would result in bringing description to attention of additional personnel.

ACTION:

There is attached for approval and signature of the Director as IIC Chairman a letter to AEC asking whether destruction of the unclassified description may be effected, rather than return. This letter has been approved by the other IIC members.

RECORDED-45
INDEXED-45

Enclosures (2)

GAD:hke
(6)
1-Mr. Boardman
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Mr. Day
1-Section Tickler

FBI

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

COPY

INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL SECURITY ICIS-P25/334

3527 Department of Justice, Washington 25, D. C.

October 27, 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Graham Dey
Executive Secretary, IIC

FROM : Leonard P. Bienvenu
Executive Secretary, ICIS

SUBJECT : Press Release Regarding an Unclassified Description of Fusion Weapons

On October 25, 1955, the ICIS received a letter dated October 21, 1955, from the Chairman, AEC, addressed jointly to the chairmen of the IIC and the ICIS, regarding the above subject. I inquired of your office today as to whether IIC had also received the communication and was advised that you had not. I am, therefore, attaching the carbon of the aforementioned letter and a copy of the attachment entitled "Description of Atomic Weapons and Component Parts," one copy of which was included with the original.

I would have sent you the original of the letter containing Mr. Strauss' signature, but did not do so because my office had already placed an ICIS stamp thereon and Mr. Yeagley had also written some notes on the first page.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-9-04 BY 60267uclnls/BJA/DFW

Enclosures:

1. Carbon copy of letter
2. Copy of enclosure

Memo from Mr. Belmont to Mr. Boardman with IIC letter to Strauss. 10/31/55 GAD

COPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

this copy has been made for FBI files. The original is being placed in the IIC files. GAD per Mike

ENCLOSURE

COPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

October 21, 1955

Gentlemen:

This is in reference to the letter of August 19, 1955, from our General Manager acknowledging receipt of your letter of August 4, 1955, which requested the Commission to issue a press release containing an unclassified description of fusion weapons.

Your letter of August 4, 1955, reached the Commission at a time when Governor Val Peterson, Administrator, Federal Civil Defense Administration, had requested our approval for the inclusion in a FCDA Advisory Bulletin of an unclassified "Description of Atomic Devices and Component Parts." We submitted Governor Peterson's request to the Operations Coordinating Board in order to get the Board's judgment as to the possible impact on public opinion abroad of publication in this country of the requested description of atomic weapons. At the same time, we brought to the Board's attention the pending request from ICIS-IIC for issuance by the Commission of a news release giving an unclassified description of fusion weapons and we suggested that if your request were approved, it would be appropriate to include a similar description of fusion weapons in the FCDA Advisory Bulletin.

Pursuant to my conversation yesterday with Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, this will confirm the decision of the Atomic Energy Commission not to issue at this time an unclassified description of fusion weapons. We have, however, approved the use in a Federal Civil Defense Advisory Bulletin of the enclosed unclassified "Description of Atomic Devices and Component Parts," which, you will note, is similar to the material circulated to Law Enforcement Officers by the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation on January 1, 1954.

COPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ENCLOSURE

COPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

With further reference to my discussion with Mr. Hoover yesterday afternoon, I request that you return to me the enclosure entitled, "Unclassified Description of Fusion Weapons," referred to in my letter to you of January 6, 1955, together with all copies of that enclosure that may have been made.

Sincerely,

Chairman

Honorable J. Edgar Hoover
Chairman, Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference
Department of Justice

Honorable J. Walter Yeagley
Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee on
Internal Security

Enclosure:
Description of Atomic Devices and
Component Parts

COPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-9-04 BY 60267 ucnls/BJA/DFW

Orig-Strauss
1-Yellow
3-ONI, OSI, G-2
1-IIC files
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Mr. Coyne, NSC
1-Mr. Boardman
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Sec. Tickler
1-Mr. Day

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

October 31, 1955

VIA LIAISON

Honorable Lewis L. Strauss
Chairman
Atomic Energy Commission
19th and Constitution Avenue, N. W.
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Admiral:

Reference is made to your letter of October 21, 1955, requesting return to you of the "unclassified description of fusion weapons" which had been furnished by your letter of January 6, 1955.

Some of the IIC members have made distribution to their field activities of this unclassified description in connection with their program of defending against the clandestine introduction of alien nuclear weapons. This distribution involved, in some cases, the inclusion of the description in military communications which it would be impractical to request be returned.

It would seem that destruction of all copies of the unclassified description would serve the same purpose, and it is, therefore, requested that you advise whether it would be equally acceptable to you to have destruction of the material ordered rather than its return.

RECORDED - 84 [illegible] 7- 2168-

EX-118

7 OCT 2 1955

Sincerely yours,

Chairman
Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference

GAD:hke
(13)

(Attached to cover memorandum from Mr. Belmont to Mr. Boardman, 10/31/55, re "Public Release of an Unclassified Description of Fusion Weapons" GAD:hke)

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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[redacted] ucdnls|BJA|DFW

153303

October 21, 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TOLSON
MR. BOARDMAN
MR. BELMONT
MR. NICHOLS

Yesterday, Admiral Strauss, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, called to see me. He referred to the recent correspondence which the IIC and the ICIS have had with the Commission, recommending that the Commission consider releasing certain information regarding an unclassified description of fusion weapons.

Admiral Strauss stated that this matter had been very carefully considered by the Atomic Energy Commission and it was the opinion of that Commission that no such release could be made at the present time. He stated that one of the compelling reasons was that any description made available to the public of fusion weapons might enable the Russians to obtain some valuable intelligence information.

I advised Admiral Strauss that I was perfectly satisfied with the judgment of the Atomic Energy Commission and that so far as the IIC was concerned, the request might be considered closed. I think it would be well to advise Mr. Yeagley of this conversation, as well as the members of the IIC.

Admiral Strauss commented generally upon some problems which have arisen within the Commission between himself and Commissioner Thomas E. Murray. He said that the contact was civil but that there were wide differences of opinion existing between the two of them. Admiral Strauss said he was making mention of this matter in view of the fact that he knew that I knew Commissioner Murray personally. I told Admiral Strauss that I was cognizant of some of these differences and I had cautioned our Liaison representative with AEC to refrain from discussing or in any way becoming involved in this matter, as it was one which was of no concern to the FBI.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

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JEH:tlc (7)

INDEXED - 87
RECORDED - 87
1 NOV 4 1955

SENT FROM D. O.
TIME 3:18 PM
DATE 10-21-55
BY

RECORDED COPY FILED IN 66-5602

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

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Boardman ✓
Nichols ✓
Belmont ✓
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Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: October 19, 1955

FROM : MR. A. H. BELMONT

1 - Mr. Holloman
1 - Mr. Boardman
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Liaison Section
1 - Mr. Bates

SUBJECT: LEWIS L. STRAUSS, CHAIRMAN
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC)

Reference my memorandum 10-18-55 re Strauss' request to see the Director on 10-20-55. Memorandum pointed out that Liaison had been advised Strauss desired to see the Director regarding the AEC's reasons for not publishing information concerning an unclassified description of fusion (hydrogen) weapons. There are listed below other items which Strauss might possibly bring up during his meeting with the Director.

1. At request of AEC, Bureau conducted investigation [redacted]

[redacted]

2. July 29, 1955, letter from Senator Clinton P. Anderson, Chairman, Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, requested Bureau to make background investigation on [redacted] August 8 letter to Anderson enclosed summary of check of Bureau files. Anderson was advised in the event further action desired after reading summary to inform Bureau. AEC has been discussing the granting of their clearance [redacted] Information received 10-18-55 from AEC that Strauss intends to ask Joint Committee to request FBI for full background investigation. In the event committee refuses, AEC will then ask Bureau for investigation.

b7C

3. British atomic security representatives will be in U.S. for two weeks beginning October 24 for discussions with U.S. AEC security representatives. Director has approved Bureau representative attending these meetings. British security reviewed in London in January, 1955, and found not comparable to U.S. personnel security standards.

4. For the Director's further information, there is a great deal of antagonism between Admiral Strauss and Commissioner Thomas E. Murray. They have violently disagreed on many important issues. Both, however, have been friendly toward Bureau. It is felt this might be pertinent in the event Strauss brings up any matter involving Commissioner Murray.

ACTION:

For information.

59 NOV 9 1955

CWB:fjb
(6)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-9-04 BY 60267 uc/n/s/ BJA/DFW

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Tolson
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Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: October 18, 1955

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-9-04 BY 60267 uc/nls/BJA/DFW

SUBJECT: LEWIS L. STRAUSS, CHAIRMAN, ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

Reference is made to Admiral Strauss' request to see the Director on Thursday, October 20. Liaison Agent Bates was advised on October 18 [redacted] that Strauss had left town and would not return until Thursday, October 20. Before leaving he had asked [redacted] remind him to see the Director regarding the AEC reasons for not publishing information regarding an unclassified description of fusion (hydrogen) weapons.

b7C

National Security Council Action 5408, February 11, 1954, included instruction that information be released on selected basis to law enforcement agencies to assist in defense against clandestine atomic weapons. Fission (A-bomb) weapons had been described in FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, January, 1954. IIC-ICIS letter May 5, 1955, requested AEC to make release of unclassified description of fusion (hydrogen) weapons.

AEC letter July 7, 1955, suggested FBI make release. IIC-ICIS letter August 4, 1955, asked AEC to reconsider. This request was followed by Liaison after return of Strauss from Geneva, and on September 29, 1955, Strauss advised Liaison he had been informed by Dillon Anderson, Special Assistant to the President, that the President and Herbert Hoover, Jr., recommended any statement released be done in "blandest" possible way. The Director noted, "Since there seems to have developed opposition at high level, I suggest we gracefully withdraw and not press the issue."

On October 4, 1955, Paul Foster, AEC, advised Liaison the Commission had that date reconsidered matter and now felt it unwise to release any description of hydrogen weapons.

ACTION:

For your information. If the Director feels it is not necessary for him to see Strauss, Liaison can inform Strauss on his return to the city that this matter has been considered by the IIC and that no further action is being taken.

CWB:GAD:hke:jdd
(8)
1-Mr. Holloman
1-Mr. Nichols
1-Mr. Boardman
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Bates
1-Mr. Day
1-Section Tickler

RECORDED - 31

Director scheduled to see Strauss, 2 pm Oct. 20 - + +

Remember Lewis Strauss Tolson Boardman Belmont Holloman Nichols Gandy

Emil Jacobson.

L 12/18/17

FILED IN

SECRET

- Boardman
Belmont
Branigan
Beach
Kuntz-Rm. 1728
Whitson

DEC
CG 6-10-04 6026W ue/mus/hjp/DECW

5324

Date: October 28, 1955

To: Mr. Dennis A. Flinn
Director
Office of Security
Department of State
515 22nd Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

BY COURIER SERVICE

(orig and 1)

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: [redacted] b7C

INTERNAL SECURITY - CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Smuggling of Atomic Bombs or Parts thereof and other weapons of Mass Destruction into the U.S.

This will confirm information furnished by FBI liaison to Mr. Warren Chase on October 21, 1955.

[redacted] Czech couriers, arrived from Mexico City at Idlewild Airport, New York, via Air France, Flight 070, at 5:35 P. M., October 20, 1955. Customs representatives at the Airport advised that when [redacted] passed the detection device for radioactive material, carrying a briefcase four inches by fourteen inches by sixteen inches, reaction was noted on the detection device with respect to the head sensitive to neutrons as well as to the head sensitive to gamma radiation.

b7C

[redacted] had in their possession, in addition to their briefcases, pieces of diplomatic luggage described as a paper-covered carton weighing sixty pounds, a canvas-covered pouch weighing sixty-five pounds, and a suitcase weighing twenty-five pounds. [redacted] was in possession of Czech diplomatic passport No. [redacted] held Czech diplomatic passport No. [redacted] Both [redacted] went from the Airport to the Czech United Nations Delegation offices, 6 East 67th Street, New York City.

This Bureau will furnish you with any information developed regarding significant activity on the part of these individuals.

cc - 1 - AAG Tompkins by r.s. 0-6 same date.
cc - 117-268

LW:blb
(15)

SECRET

Cover memo Belmont to Boardman, 10-26-55, CEH:bmm, same subject.

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

117-268
NOT RECORDED
133 NOV 1 1955

68 NOV 7 1955

CLASSIFIED BY

~~SECRET~~

Letter to Mr. Dennis A. Flinn
Director
Office of Security
Department of State

cc - 1 - Captain John A. Waters
Director of Security
Atomic Energy Commission
Room 2314, T-5 Building
16th and Constitution Avenue, N. W.
Washington 25, D. C.

BY COURIER SERVICE

cc - 1 - Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
Department of the Army
The Pentagon
Washington 25, D. C.

cc - 1 - Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy
The Pentagon
Washington 25, D. C.

cc - 1 - Director of Special Investigations
The Inspector General
Department of the Air Force
Building Tempo E
4th and Adams Drive, S. W.
Washington, D. C.

BY COURIER SERVICE

~~SECRET~~

117-268

RR- 10/26/55

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

THE DIRECTOR

October 26
1955

MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

Osmuggling Atom Bombs

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
NET EVALUATION SUBCOMMITTEE

You requested certain additional information for possible use at the National Security Council meeting on October 27, 1955.

1. At a previous National Security Council meeting a doubt was expressed by one person present that the Soviets would detonate a clandestine atomic weapon in their Embassy because it would endanger their people.

The answer to this is that the Soviets would have some advanced knowledge and could clear Embassy if they chose. However, it is more likely that the Soviets would consider their personnel expendable in view of the catastrophic damage to the U. S. resulting from such a clandestine attack. The same reasoning would apply to a Soviet air attack upon the U. S. It is reasonable to believe that the Soviets would seek to destroy American industrial centers and major ports even though it would mean destroying some members of the Communist Party.

2. You raised the question of the size and components of clandestine nuclear weapons. (We do not know how Soviet weapons le We must guess on basis of our weapons.)

[redacted]

[redacted]

b2
b7E

To
Bo
Mic
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

cc - Mr. Beardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Branigan
Mr. Day
Mr. Whitson
Yellow file copy

LW:jmm/dd
(7)

117-268-

NOT RECORDED
176 OCT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 6-10-04 BY 60267 uc/mlc/bjl/DFW

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Glavo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: November 1, 1955

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

DATE: 6-10-04
CLASSIFIED BY uc/nsw/bja/PAW 60267 dem/ptw
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3,3( ) 6-10-2029
Per ltr. dtd. 6-28-04
60267 uc/nsw/bja/PAW

SUBJECT: REAPPRAISAL OF U. S. POLICY REGARDING SOVIET BLOC SHIPMENTS AFFORDED DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY

The report concerning limitation of the diplomatic pouch, drafted by the Joint IIC-ICIS Working Committees, was submitted by ICIS to the Central Intelligence Agency for comment.

[redacted] (S)

b1

[redacted]

[redacted] (S)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Treasury and Defense have not yet approved the draft report. Pfuntner, ICIS, states Defense has indicated its position will be taken this week. No commitment has yet been made by Treasury.

ACTION:

This is to inform you of the current status of this matter.

Enclosure (1)

GAD:hke
(6)

1-Mr. Boardman
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Mr. Day
1-Section Tickler

RECORDED - 70
INDEXED - 70

We will all be long dead before Dulles reaches any conclusion!!!

59 NOV 14 1955

Airtel

FD-36

BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

New York, N.Y.; 10/28/55

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. Boardman	
Mr. Nichols	
Mr. Belmont	
Mr. Harbo	
Mr. Mohr	
Mr. Parsons	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Tamm	
Mr. Sizoo	
Mr. Winterrowd	
Tele. Room	
Miss Holloman	
Miss Gandy	

Transmit the following Teletype message to: Bureau

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF OR OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE US, AEA

On 10/28/55 Inspector [redacted] US Customs, advised [redacted] arrived Idlewild Airport [redacted] possession small sample uranium ore weighing approximately 3/4 of an ounce, which he did not declare in writing but which he orally declared and was acceptable to customs. He stated ore was souvenir of visit to Belgian Congo. Custom device registered 100 on both readings. [redacted] carried US passport [redacted] filed baggage declaration number [redacted] Questioned item cleared by J. E. MC LAUGHLIN, AEC, NYC, and neither subject nor item detained.

Chicago advise Bureau of any derogatory information regarding [redacted]

KELLY

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/10/04 BY 166267 uc/nls/BSA/DFW

3 - Bureau (117-268)(Regular)
2 - Chicago (AM)

JJD:MAK(#1)
117-192

RECORDED - 84 117-268-114
INDEXED - 84

EX-125

Approved _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

cc BRANIGAN

Copy - Mhg
- yellow file copy

TO: The Director

Date: October 26, 1955

INITIALS ON ORIGINAL

FROM: L. V. BOARDMAN

Per ltr. dtd. 6-28-2004
60267 uc/nls/bja/DFW 7-27-2004

SUBJECT: NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
NET EVALUATION SUBCOMMITTEE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-28-04 BY 60267 uc/nls/BJA/DFW

In connection with the Director's attendance at the National Security Council on the morning of October 27, 1955, the following two items are being provided for his possible assistance:

Two Czech Couriers Arrived New York on 10-20-55 Carrying Radioactive Material:

In the event the question of inspection of Soviet Bloc establishments in U.S. comes up the following is a recent occurrence where radioactive material was brought in. We do not know what it was and there is no way to check and take further action: b7C

[redacted] Czech couriers, arrived from Mexico City at Idlewild Airport, New York, 5:35 P. M., 10-20-55, carrying a briefcase four inches by fourteen inches by sixteen inches, reaction was noted. Fortunately, in connection with FBI coverage of the Czechs, we had these two men covered and determined that they went to the Czech United Nations Delegation offices in New York City. The FBI was not notified by Customs of the reaction on the detection device until the morning of 10-21-55. These Czech couriers were in Washington, D. C., associating with personnel of the Czech Embassy from 10-21-55 until 10-24-55, when they returned to New York City.

Soviet Requests to Double Agent for Information Regarding Commitments and Shipments to India and NATO Countires:

If there is discussion of Soviet activities in intelligence field, following is current example of such activities. b7C

On 10-25-55 [redacted] asked our double agent to acquire information on United States shipments to India and NATO countries of heavy water (Heavy water is the popular name for deuterium oxide, a man-made liquid which is used as a control factor in atomic reactors for production of power and fission materials. Heavy water also has general research use in fields of biology and chemistry. U.S. has general research use in fields of biology and chemistry. U. S. has

cc - Boardman
Belmont
Branigan
Lake
Whitson

GHL:LW:blb

INITIALS ON ORIGINAL

117-268-
NOT RECORDED
145 NOV 18 1955

59 NOV 21 1955

cobl - WNR

SMUGGLING ATOM BOMBS

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 62-101952-1

Memorandum for the Director

publicly announded agreements by Atomic Energy Commission to sell heavy water for use in research reactors to Italy, India, France and Australia.) [redacted] told our double agent that the Soviets knew United States agreed to sell ten tons of heavy water to India. b7C They want to know whether the United States had actually shipped to India this ten tons, or any part thereof. The double agent was requested to get this information urgently and advise [redacted] by 10-26-55. (The U.S. Government Printing Office publication "Major Activities in the Atomic Energy Programs, January-June, 1955" shows that as of 5-31-55 the U.S. had not shipped any heavy water to India at terms either equal to or better than the terms offered India by the United States. The double agent gained the impression that the Soviet motive is to gain a propaganda victory over the United States. It may be significatn that an international two-day conference on peaceful uses of atomic energy is being held in New York beginning 10-26-55, and is to be attended by Soviet representatives.

[redacted] also asked the double agent to ascertain whether b7C the United States has shipped any heavy water to any of the NATO countries under the Mutual Security Program. This assignment was not given on an urgent basis.

When this information came to FBI, Department of State and Atomic Energy Commission were immediately informed. With their concurrence, the double agent is furnishing to his Soviet principal public source information regarding the U.S. heavy water commitments to India and NATO countries. FBI has also furnished information regarding this situation to the Central Intelligence Agency and the Attorney General.

RECOMMENDATION:

None. For your information.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Branigan cc-Tully
Turner
Whitson

TO : L. V. Boardman

DATE: 10-29-55

FROM : A. H. Belmont

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-10-04 BY 60226 tuc/nls/BJA/DAD

SUBJECT: NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
NET EVALUATION SUBCOMMITTEE

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

On 10-28-55 Mr. Yeagley of the Department called and advised that subsequent to the National Security Council meeting on 10-27-55 the Attorney General indicated to Yeagley that he should prepare a memorandum furnishing to the Attorney General recommendations as to what recommendations the Attorney General might, in the future, make to the National Security Council as a result of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee report on 10-27-55. Yeagley said the Attorney General pointed out the report of the Subcommittee carried no recommendations and the question arose as to what, if any, security-type action should flow from the Subcommittee report. Yeagley said he was under the impression that the Attorney General may have asked the Director to offer suggestions likewise. Yeagley said he was having Leonard Bienvenu and Carl Pfuntner of ICIS to prepare a memorandum on this.

I pointed out to Mr. Yeagley that one obvious question arising from the Subcommittee report was the question of reducing the size of the diplomatic pouch. I pointed out that the study on this question by the IIC-ICIS had been completed for several weeks and is awaiting clearance by Defense Department and Treasury Department. I suggested to Yeagley that he build a fire under this and get it out. He said he had already called Treasury to spur them into clearing the paper.

We are going ahead and preparing the papers suggested in the Director's memorandum of 10-28-55, namely, the brief on the [redacted] matter; the memorandum reflecting the delicate and confidential information on current Soviet espionage activities; and a memorandum considering reciprocal arrangements insofar as employment of U.S. nationals in our embassies in the Soviet Bloc. In connection with the latter paper, we are also comparing the degree of control exercised by the Soviet Bloc on the buildings occupied by their official establishments in this country with the degree of control the U.S. has on buildings occupied by us in Soviet Bloc countries. The purpose, of course, being to see whether it is feasible to insist on reciprocity in this respect also. If it is possible to lessen the control of the Soviet-occupied buildings in this country, we will have a much better opportunity to insure that there are no clandestine weapons secreted in those buildings.

b7C

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

NOT REC'D 16 NOV 16 1955

We are giving priority attention to these three projects and will have them as soon as possible. I did not advise Yeagley, of course, that we were working on these.

cc - Boardman
Belmont
AHB:blb (7)

cony/bjb

October 28, 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TOLSON
MR. BOARDMAN
MR. BELMONT
MR. NICHOLS

I attended the meeting of the National Security Council at the White House yesterday morning. The Vice President presided over the same at which there was a detailed briefing of the Council on the Annual Report of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee headed by Admiral Radford.

This briefing was quite detailed in form and was accompanied by the presentation of a large number of interesting charts and maps. I seemed to make a deep impression upon the persons in attendance.

A number of questions were asked at the conclusion of the meeting, one in particular by the Vice President as to what recommendations were being submitted by the Net Evaluation Subcommittee. Admiral Radford indicated that there had been prepared a list of recommendations but this had not been included in the briefing, as the entire report and studies incident to the report were available to the interested agencies and, of course, the matter would be most thoroughly reviewed by the National Security Council in the near future. The Vice President inquired as to what action had been taken along the lines previously suggested by me toward limiting the size of the diplomatic shipments. Admiral Radford responded by saying that he had been in full accord with the views expressed by me, as well as by the Attorney General, but that strong opposition had been met in the Defense Department from the Armed Services and in the Stat Department. It was indicated, however, that this matter would shortly be brought before the National Security Council for final decision.

Very truly yours,

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DATE 6-10-04 BY 60262 uc/n/s/BJA/DAW

John Edgar Hoover
Director

JEH:tlc (7)

117-268

NOT RECORDED
145 NOV 16 1955

59 NOV 21 1955

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 62-101955

FD-36

BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

AIRTEL

NY, 10/28/55

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont ✓
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Sizoo
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

Transmit the following Teletype message to: **BUREAU**

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE U.S., AEA.

Re WFO airtel 10/25/55.

Czech couriers [redacted] met at Penn Station, NYC by [redacted] Czech UN Delegation, NYC. b7C

All Czech + NY

KELLY

3 - Bureau (117-268) (RM)
2 - Washington Field (RM)
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted] b7C

Mr. Belmont

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-10-04 BY 60276 uc/n/s/BJA/JDW

INDEXED - 84
RECORDED - 84

117-268-

EX-125

5-Wilson

JJD:EG
117-192

cc Brannigan

Approved _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

FD-36

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Sizoo
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Miss Gandy

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

AIRTEL

NY, NY, 11/2/55

Transmit the following Teletype message to: BUREAU

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF OR OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE U.S., AEA.

Inspector [redacted] U.S. Customs, NYC, advised today that one [redacted] arrived NYC NY aboard "SS Olympia" of Greek registry this date. Had in possession an orally declared two to four pounds of thorium and uranium ore obtained from the Museum of the Belgian Congo at Brussels, Belgium, to be used for display at New York Museum of Natural History. Filed declaration [redacted]

b7C

Detection device registered green 50 after 64 background and red 14 after 24 background at five feet. Material released by Customs and AEC, NYC.

Subject naturalized U.S. citizen born [redacted]

Files of NYO reflect individual probably identical with subject, same name, arrived NYC [redacted]

b7C

For info.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-10-04 BY 60262 uchls/BJA/DFW

NO DEROG INFO IN INDICES RE MASON. LW

KELLY

3 - Bureau (117-268) (RM)

RECORDED - 84

117-268-

INDEXED - 84

JJD:EG
117-192

Mr. Belmont

125

Approved _____ Sent _____ M. Per _____

Special Agent in Charge

FD-36

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Sizoo
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Airtel

Transmit the following ~~Teletype~~ message to:

FBI, CHICAGO (117-110) November 7, 1955

DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268) (Air Mail - Registered Mail)

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF OR OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE US, AEA

ReNYairtel 10/28/55.

No record CG files for [redacted] b7c

HOSTETTER

END

AK:MMS
(5)

cc: (1) New York (117-192) (Air Mail - Registered Mail)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-10-04 BY 60262 ucl/nls/BJA/DFW

Mr. Belmont

RECORDED-90
INDEXED-90
EX-118

117-268-

NOV 9 1955

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

NOV 11 1955

TELETYPE

INDEXED-11

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Harbo
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Sizoo
Mr. Whitemowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

FBI NYC 11-11-55 6-01 AM EDM

DIRECTOR URGENT

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS AND OR PARTS THEREOF OR OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO US., AEA. AT SEVEN FORTH FIVE PM., NOV TEN, FIFTY FIVE, [redacted] US CUSTOMS, IDLEWILD AIRPORT, ADVISED THAT [redacted] HAD ARRIVED ON FLIGHT NUMBER [redacted] BOAC, PLANE [redacted] POSSESSED TWO QUOTE ~~GAMMA~~ CAMERAS UNQUOTE, THAT IS LEAD CARRIERS, WHICH REGISTERED AS RADIO ACTIVE MATERIAL MAXIMUM ON RED AND GREEN. [redacted] EXPLAINED HE WAS CARRYING IRIDIUM. [redacted] CARRIED LETTER DESCRIBING HIM AS EMPLOYEE OF [redacted] AND DECLARED ITEM ON WRITTEN MANIFEST AS EQUIPMENT. [redacted] TO SPEND NIGHT AT UNDETERMINED NY HOTEL. SCHEDULED TO DEPART US ABOUT [redacted] VIA AMERICAN AIRLINES FLIGHT NUMBER [redacted] REILLY ADVISED THAT L. R. SOLAN OF AEC QUOTE RELEASED [redacted] PHONE UNQUOTE. MATERIALS RELEASED BY CUSTOMS. NO IDENTIFIABLE REFERENCES NYO [redacted]

b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-10-04 BY 60267 uc/nb/sbj/mdfw

KELLY

HOLD PLS

Mr. Belmont

FD-11

INDEXED-11

117-[illegible]

NOV 22 1955

EX-125

5

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Tolson
~~Boardman~~
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: November 8, 1955

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: REAPPRAISAL OF U. S. POLICY REGARDING SOVIET BLOC SHIPMENTS AFFORDED DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY

My previous memoranda have informed you of the status of ICIS consideration of the joint IIC-ICIS report concerning limitation of the diplomatic pouch.

ICIS Executive Secretary Bienvenu advised on November 8, 1955, that the Treasury Department has finally completed "staffing" the report and has made no recommendations for change. Defense is now the only agency which has not completed its study of this report.

This matter is included in the agenda for the IIC meeting November 9, 1955, for notation as to its present status.

ACTION:

This is for your information as a development subsequent to the preparation of the IIC agenda.

GAD:hke
(6)

1-Mr. Boardman
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Mr. Day
1-Section Tickler

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-10-04 BY 60262 uc/nls/BJA/DFW

RECORDED - 54 117-
INDEXED - 54

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: November 10, 1955

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-10-09 BY 60262 uc dal s/BTM

SUBJECT: REAPPRAISAL OF U. S. POLICY REGARDING SOVIET BLOC SHIPMENTS AFFORDED DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY

During the IIC meeting November 9, 1955, the Director instructed that informal inquiry be made of Admiral Radford to determine the present status of Defense consideration of the joint IIC-ICIS draft report on limiting the diplomatic pouch.

Admiral Radford's Executive Officer, Colonel LeRoy H. Watson, today informed Liaison Agent D. J. Sullivan that Defense had referred the report to the three military services and to the Joint Intelligence Group for opinions and that all these had already replied indicating concurrence. Colonel Watson said that the Defense position will probably be finalized next week and will be favorable.

Colonel Watson advised in confidence that the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be asked for an opinion by the National Security Council after the latter receives the report and that the JCS comments will be favorable.

ACTION:

This is to inform you of the present status of this matter. There appears to be a good possibility that we will finally get favorable action next week.

GAD:hke
(7)

1- Mr. Boardman
1- Mr. Belmont
1- Mr. D. J. Sullivan
1- Mr. Whitson
1- Mr. Day
1- Section Tickler

RECORDED - 54 117-268-
INDEXED - 54
2 NOV 15 1955

5 Whitson

NOV 17 1955

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

DATE OF MAIL 11-10-55

HAS BEEN REMOVED FOR [redacted] TO BE KEPT PERMANENTLY IN HIS OFFICE, ROOM [redacted] b7c

SEE FILE 66-2554-7530 FOR AUTHORITY.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-10-04 BY 60262 ucl/nls/BJA/DFW

SUBJECT JUNE MAIL Smuggling Atomic Bombs

REMOVED BY [redacted]

FILE NUMBER 111-268-C

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGEOUT

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: October 28, 1955

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-16-04 BY 60267 uc/nls/BJA/DKW

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION-IN-PLACE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

In December, 1952, the IIC and ICIS were directed by the President to coordinate, with the Atomic Energy Commission, the establishment of necessary countermeasures against the clandestine introduction of atomic weapons. A Joint Committee, established to discharge this responsibility, has considered the wider use of devices which will detect radioactive material and which are presently being operated on an experimental basis in limited numbers.

These devices are now being used for the examination of baggage arriving on overseas flights at Idlewild Airport, NYC, and for examination of baggage arriving on board ships carrying Soviet bloc diplomatic representatives. Successful operation of the devices is dependent upon various factors including exposure time and distance between the device and the object being tested and is, therefore, dependent upon the procedures followed by the Customs and Coast Guard Representatives entrusted with their operation. The IIC, in order to consider questions concerning the continued or expanded use of these devices, should have firsthand knowledge of their present operation. An IIC Representative should observe the devices in action.

By sending an IIC Representative to observe these devices in operation, it would place the IIC in a position to speak with some degree of accuracy as to the present operations of these devices. This may be important in consideration of the problem jointly with ICIS and Pat Coyne of the National Security Council. All of the using agencies, i.e., Customs, Coast Guard, and INS, are represented in the ICIS rather than in the IIC.

ACTION:

Subject to your approval, it is recommended that Supervisor Lish Whitson, FBI and IIC Representative on the

GAD;LW:hke
(6)
1-Mr. Boardman
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Mr. Day
1-Tickler

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5- Whitson

Memorandum for Mr. Boardman

Joint IIC-ICIS Committee, on a day when Soviet bloc representatives are arriving on board ship, personally observe the operation of the detection devices both at New York Harbor and at Idlewild Airport. ICIS Chairman Yeagley has indicated that if IIC sends an observer, he will recommend that someone from ICIS accompany him.

TO NYC 11-15-55
2 cc

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

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TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: November 14, 1955

FROM : Mr. W. A. Branigan

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST CLANDESTINE ATOMIC WEAPONS

Pursuant to authorization contained in memorandum Belmont to Boardman 10-28-55 Special Agent Whitson will observe the operation of detection devices at Idlewild International Airport and at the Cunard Pier when the "Queen" arrives on 11-15-55. As indicated in referenced memorandum Whitson will represent IIC.

He will be accompanied by Mr. Warren Chase, Department of State representing ICIS. Whitson leaves Washington 1:00 A.M., 11-15-55 via Pennsylvania Railroad, Car 1026, lower ten..

RECOMMENDATION:

None. For your information. Whitson will return evening of 11-15-55.

cc - Mr. Belmont
Mr. Branigan
Mr. Whitson

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NOV 16 1955

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November 15, 1955

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-10-04 BY 60226 uc/als/BJA/DFW

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover
Chairman,
Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference
Department of Justice Building
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Hoover:

Attached for the information of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference are five copies of a letter, dated November 7, 1955, from the Commissioner of Customs to the Chairman of ICIF, reporting statistics for the month of September 1955 on the importations of pouches and accompanied baggage by Soviet Bloc personnel (re IICIB Problem 25). Copies of similar statistics for four months preceding September were made available to Mr. Lish Whitson, as Chairman of Committee B.

Sincerely yours,

SIGNED

J. Walter Yeagley
Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee
on Internal Security

Enclosures

1 ENCL

ENCL.

memo from Mr. Roach to Mr. Belmont re "Reappraisement of U.S. Policy Concerning Soviet Bloc Diplomatic Community" 11/18/55 GAD

This is FBI file copy. The original is being filed in official IIC files in Mr. Day's Office 11/18/55 GAD per the

Rec'd in Division 3 3:33 PM 11/17/55 M. A. Day per bbm

LIAISON

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Gandy

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: November 16, 1955

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION-IN-PLACE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

My memorandum of November 14, 1955, reviewed the current status of ICIS consideration of a limited national program for the use of devices which will detect radioactivity. The Director suggested that a memorandum be furnished to the Attorney General concerning this matter.

ACTION:

Attached for approval is a memorandum informing the Attorney General and Mr. Rogers of the background and current status of this matter.

Enclosure

GAD:hke
(6)

1-Mr. Boardman
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Mr. Day
1-Section Tickler

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TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: November 14, 1955

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION-IN-PLACE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

At the IIC meeting November 9, 1955, the Director instructed Supervisor Day to follow and report ICIS action concerning the limited national program for the use of devices which will detect radioactivity. The IIC, by letter dated September 28, 1955, had informed the ICIS that a Treasury Department counterproposal for use of less than half the number of detection devices originally recommended was not satisfactory as it was a temporizing measure which failed to accomplish the objective of the program.

No action whatever has been taken by ICIS since their receipt of the IIC letter and consideration of the matter has been postponed several times. The ICIS Secretariat advised today that the item is included in the agenda for the ICIS meeting to be held Friday, November 18.

ACTION:

This matter will be followed with ICIS immediately after their meeting November 18.

GAD:hke
(6)

1-Mr. Boardman
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Mr. Day
1-Section Tickler

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TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: 11-16-55

FROM : W. A. Branigan

SUBJECT: LIMITATIONS ON DIPLOMATIC POUCH

On 11-16-55 Mr. J. Walter Yeagley, Chairman of ICIS, phoned Special Agent Whitson and stated that he had been advised by phone from the Department of Defense that the Department of Defense had been unable to take a position as yet with regard to the proposed joint IIC-ICIS report to the National Security Council on the question of limitations on the diplomatic pouch. Yeagley stated that Defense proposed that the "personal position" of the Defense representative in ICIS be placed in the report rather than a Departmental position.

It was observed to Yeagley that such an action was unreasonable and unnecessary and that a Defense position in writing should be obtained by ICIS without further delay. It was pointed out to Yeagley that in the recent net evaluation study, the Net Evaluation Subcommittee, and specifically Admiral Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who was Chairman of the Subcommittee, made some very pertinent observations with regard to the problem under consideration. Yeagley stated that he would seek an immediate Defense position in writing and would likewise seek to obtain from Admiral Radford written confirmation, for the purpose of the pouch paper, of the pertinent conclusions contained in the net evaluation report.

RECOMMENDATION:

None. For your information. This is being followed by Bureau liaison.

cc - Belmont
Branigan
Day
Whitson

LW:blb
(5)

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6/10/04 60267uc/NLS/BJM/DFW

November 14, 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TOLSON
MR. BOARDMAN
MR. BELMONT
MR. NICHOLS

On November 9, 1955, at 11:30 AM, I attended a conference in the Attorney General's office at which were present the Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General Rogers, Assistant Attorney General Tompkins, Mr. Yeagley, of Mr. Tompkins' Division, and myself.

I am attaching hereto a copy of a memorandum addressed by Mr. Yeagley to the Attorney General dated November 7, 1955, which Mr. Yeagley handed to me just before I went into this conference with the Attorney General.

The Attorney General was advised that the memorandum referred to above had been sent to him from Mr. Tompkins' Division and I also advised the Attorney General that a memorandum had been sent to him from the Bureau dealing with some of the questions which he had raised to be discussed at this particular meeting. The Attorney General indicated that he had not yet had an opportunity to read either of the two memorandums and for that reason felt that he would have to familiarize himself with them and would call a meeting on November 21, to discuss in detail some of these problems.

The Attorney General then stated that as regards the forthcoming tests for relocation headquarters, it was his plan to hold this test on December 8, and that it was proposed that the test be on December 8, and that the personnel going to the relocation headquarters would remain over that night and into December 9. The Department will be relocated at Martinsburg, as it was on the last test and the FBI will be relocated at Quantico, as it was on the last test.

The Attorney General stressed the fact that this was to be a surprise test and that the date of it should be known only to the limited number of persons necessary to direct the operation of the same.

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SENT FROM D. O.

Messrs. Tolson, Boardman, Belmont, Nichols
November 14, 1955

The Attorney General indicated that at Martinsburg it was his intention to brief all key personnel of the Department as to the contents of the Portfolio. I advised the Attorney General that as regards the FBI's operations at Quantico, we had a number of problems already worked out and our program was pretty well certain as to the tests we would make.

The Attorney General inquired of me as to the desirability of having some ranking official of the Bureau at Martinsburg on this next test in view of the discussion to be held concerning the Portfolio. I told the Attorney General I thought it would be desirable to have someone able to speak for the Bureau upon this matter, as the Liaison Agent would not be so qualified. I desire that Mr. Belmont arrange to be at Martinsburg during the relocation test on December 8, to represent the Bureau in all matters that may be necessary for discussion with Departmental representatives at that time. Mr. Belmont will arrange to have someone designated to take his place at Quantico so that our operations there will move smoothly and without any difficulty.

There was some general discussion about the [redacted] case and I outlined briefly for the Attorney General's information exactly what had taken place chronologically in these cases. b7C

There was then a discussion as to the standards of British security measures and the Attorney General asked whether these standards were adequate. I informed the Attorney General generally what our experience had been growing out of our membership on the Tripartite Conference on Atomic Energy Security Standards but suggested that it might be desirable for the ICIS to make a study of these British security measures to make certain that they were adequate. Mr. Yeagley observed that he thought probably it was a matter to be handled by the IIC, but I pointed out to him that the IIC had a rather limited membership whereas his Committee had a rather broad membership of representatives from practically all Government agencies and that his Committee was the one which should make the study. The Attorney General agreed to this.

There was then a discussion on the matter of examination of diplomatic baggage and I pointed out to the Attorney General the status

of this study insofar as the FBI was concerned and the difficulties which we experienced technically at the ports of entry in that even though the devices indicate radioactive materials, there is no basis for examination of such baggage in view of the diplomatic immunity prevailing.

I also brought up the matter of the employment in our embassies abroad of nationals of those countries in which the embassies are located and cited to the Attorney General the table of comparison between the number of nationals and aliens employed by the United States in its missions abroad and the number employed by the embassies of foreign governments here.

I also called attention to the matter of examination of property occupied by the United States abroad which almost universally prevails in the Soviet bloc countries because of our inability to buy property there and the necessity for us to lease it, either from the Soviet bloc government or private individuals. I pointed out to the Attorney General that these problems, however, were all matters involving high policy within the State Department and that he might wish to take up such matters with the Secretary of State.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

Attachment (with original)

JEM:tlc (7)

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

November 8, 1955

RE: ITEMS TO DISCUSS WITH ATTORNEY GENERAL NOVEMBER 9, 1955

By memorandum 11-1-55 to "Messrs. Hoover, Tompkins, Veagley," the Attorney General proposed a discussion in his office, Wednesday, November 9, at 11:30 a.m., to discuss "what steps the FBI, the ICIS or the Department of Justice can and should take to study or implement the internal security questions raised by the so-called 'Net Evaluations' Committee in its report to the National Security Council on Thursday, October 27, 1955."

Three items were raised in the Attorney General's memorandum; we raise the fourth problem - see page 6.

Problem 1:

Each operating agency is responsible for initiating any studies or actions deemed advisable as the result of the information collected and presented by the Net Evaluation Subcommittee.

Answer:

Report going forward to National Security Council contains no recommendations; Subcommittee recognizes that problems raised were receiving individual attention by appropriate agencies and committees. Draft recommendations not used were (1) U.S. improve collection of intelligence from Soviet Bloc by better communications intelligence and electronic intelligence coverage including prosecution of a "Military Reconnaissance Satellite Program." (2) U.S. develop programs to strengthen port security, frontier and seacoast patrol, control of low-flying light aircraft and local security of vital installations. (3) action be taken providing for continuity of Federal executive and legislative activity in event of nuclear attack.

The IIC is not responsible for carrying out item 1. Individual IIC agencies have plans for continuity of operations in event of attack in item 3. Regarding problems raised in

ENCLOSURE

item 2, the introduction of clandestine nuclear weapons in diplomatic shipments has been the subject of joint study by IIC and ICIS and will be discussed in detail below. The smuggling of small atomic weapons across our seacoasts is a problem within the jurisdiction of the Coast Guard and Customs and has been the subject of study in the ICIS. Defense of industrial targets against nuclear ground attack has been the subject of study by the Office of Defense Mobilization. The use of light civilian aircraft for clandestine attack has been studied by the ICIS and the control of civilian aircraft is a responsibility of the Civil Aeronautics Board and the Civil Aeronautics Administration of the Department of Commerce. The defense of industrial installations is the responsibility of their management, although the military agencies of the IIC having security responsibilities in certain such establishments do furnish advice and guidance to management. Defense of military installations is, of course, the responsibility of the Military. There were no new problems raised by this study, although the vulnerability of certain targets was verified. The military agencies of the IIC have taken cognizance of such vulerabilities where they existed and have brought them to the attention of the appropriate commands.

Problem 2:

Has all of the information given in the Net Evaluation Subcommittee's report been considered in the forthcoming report of the ICIS and the IIC on examination of diplomatic baggage?

Answer:

The IIC did not consider the Subcommittee report in adopting its position on diplomatic shipments, and nothing in the report would cause any change in its position. We do not know what consideration has been given by ICIS.

The IIC position concurred in by the Department of Justice in the ICIS and still under consideration by Defense and Treasury is as follows:

To approach maximum security against clandestine entry of nuclear weapons or their components through diplomatic shipments, at such time as the President or such authority as he may designate considers the international situation will permit, the diplomatic pouch and shipments from Soviet Bloc countries afforded diplomatic immunity should be restricted to letter size and any shipment in excess of those dimensions should be denied entry into the United States unless surrendered for direct examination of its contents in accordance with procedures applying to nondiplomatic shipments. By letter size is meant a size sufficiently small as to render impractical the introduction by this means of sufficient fissionable material to form a critical mass. An example would be a packet not exceeding one-half inch in thickness and less than 15 inches by 15 inches in other dimensions, with a weight not to exceed nine ounces. This is determined by figures supplied by AEC which indicate that over 200 trips would be required to introduce sufficient uranium-235 to form a critical mass in pouches thus restricted.

During IIC-ICIS study, recommendation proposed that if detection devices show radioactive material and indicate presence of material on the person of Soviet Bloc diplomat, he should be challenged and if material not surrendered by him or if surrendered material proves fissionable, official will not be permitted to enter U.S. Fissionable material discovered would be seized by U.S.

The net evaluation report pointed out that no

[redacted]

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[redacted]

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b7E

Problem 5:

Should the U.S. Government insist on employment abroad in U.S. Embassies and Legations of U.S. nationals in the manner in which foreign governments, particularly that of the USSR, do in this country? As the Attorney General put it, does there exist reciprocity between the United States and the Iron Curtain countries as to the restrictions placed upon service personnel who are employed in embassies such as waiters, housemen, cooks, charwomen, etc?

Answer:

In summary, as reflected by the tabulation on the next page, the Soviet Bloc, with the exception of the Czech (two U.S. citizens) and Polish (five U.S. citizens) Embassies in Washington, does not employ any U.S. nationals whereas the majority of service personnel in U.S. missions within the Soviet bloc are aliens. Nevertheless, except in the case of the Soviet Embassy in Washington, U.S. missions abroad employ U.S. nationals equal to or greater than the number of Soviet Bloc nationals employed in Soviet Bloc missions in Washington. This situation arises because U.S. missions employ a far greater number of service personnel than do the Soviet Bloc missions. It would not appear, therefore, that the United States has any basis for protest. However, there appears to be no legal reason why the United States could not replace the aliens now employed in our missions abroad with U.S. citizens. Practical reasons may apply, such as difficulty of obtaining qualified personnel, shortage of housing and expense. We have not raised this specific question with the State Department pending further consideration.

It is suggested in answer to the Attorney General's question, that we advise him of the above facts and point out that undoubtedly the replacement of Soviet Bloc nationals by U.S. citizens would increase the security of our missions abroad; that we suggest he might want to point this out to the State Department; however, in the final analysis, this is a State Department problem and not an internal security problem.

Details:

The Immigration and Nationality Act, Title 8, U.S. Code, Section 1101 (a) (15) (A) (ii) and (iii) provide that persons below the rank of career diplomatic or consular officer, i.e., other officials and employees and attendants, servants, etc., attached to an embassy or legation may be granted visas "upon a basis of reciprocity."

On the basis of figures available as of 10-31-55 for U.S. missions in the Soviet Bloc and as of 11-1-55 for Bloc missions in Washington, D. C., the following comparative table regarding employees below diplomatic rank has been drawn showing nationals employed by their own mission and aliens employed by such mission and totals.

	Nationals	Aliens	Total
Czech Embassy, Washington, D. C.	7	2	9
U.S. Embassy, Prague	13	28	41
Hungarian Legation, Washington, D. C.	2	0	2
U.S. Legation, Budapest	21	33	54
Polish Embassy, Washington, D. C.	20	5	25
U.S. Embassy, Warsaw	20	36	56
Rumanian Legation, Washington, D. C.	4	0	4
U.S. Legation, Bucharest	11	14	25
Soviet Embassy, Washington, D. C.	55	0	55
U.S. Embassy, Moscow	41	48	89

In the Soviet Bloc missions in the United States, clerical and service personnel are, with few exceptions, nationals of the particular Iron Curtain country. There are two American women with Communist backgrounds who are employed as clerk-stenographers by the Czech Embassy; four women with Communist backgrounds who are employed in clerical capacities (one a telephone switchboard operator) by the Polish Embassy; one American man employed as chauffeur by Polish Embassy. Regarding this man, clearance obtained by FBI from State 9-22-52 for contacts, but because of apparent mental instability and unreliability, contacts were discontinued per WFO letter 10-8-52. Only one of the women at the Czech Embassy and one at the Polish Embassy have had sufficient Communist Party or front activities in recent years to permit their inclusion in the Security Index.

The question of U.N. delegations of Soviet Bloc does not enter into the question of reciprocity since there is no equivalent of United Nations to which U.S. is member within Bloc.

Following considerations may have prompted the Department of State in the past to hire local personnel for its establishments in Soviet Bloc:

(1) Difficulty in obtaining service and maintenance personnel with proper language and other foreign service qualifications.

(2) Ability of local personnel to handle problems involving detailed knowledge of local customs.

(3) Shortage of housing for U.S. personnel.

(4) Lack of full diplomatic immunities for persons not on the Foreign Service List.

(5) Hiring of Americans would mean additional expense for transportation, salaries, allowances, and other benefits, including food imports.

Another point has been raised by State in connection with possibilities of war. Increase in U.S. personnel in missions to Bloc countries would mean more hostages in event of war.

Under the provisions of the Foreign Service Act of 1946, "alien clerks and employees" are a statutory category of personnel in the Foreign Service of the U.S. (Title 22, U.S. Code, Section 861) They are appointed by the Secretary of State at posts abroad under such regulations as he may prescribe. (Title 22, U.S. Code, Section 946) Whether one of our missions behind Iron Curtain should employ no one but U.S. citizens is not an internal security matter but one for State to decide on basis of what would be in best interests of U.S.

Problem 4:

Is reciprocity possible in control of buildings occupied by diplomatic missions, since the degree of access by government of country in which building is located affects degree of security of building?

Answer:

In summary - we added this point for discussion because if the Soviet Bloc is able to have ready access to buildings used by U.S. missions in the Soviet Bloc, it is harder for us to maintain proper security in those buildings. For example, you will recall the resonant cavity microphone found in the Great Seal at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. Our research on this reflects that with the exception of two properties in Washington (one an annex to the Soviet Embassy and the other an annex to the Polish Embassy, both of which are leased) the Soviet Bloc missions own the properties occupied by them. On the other hand, the U.S. missions in the Soviet Bloc lease property occupied by them with the exception of U.S. missions in Czechoslovakia and Hungary. This means that in general our leased missions abroad are subject to entry for inspection and repair under the lease provisions whereas in the U.S. the Soviet Bloc missions generally own their property and are not subject to such inspection.

It may be possible to change this situation in the interest of security to a certain extent. For example, it may be possible to purchase property housing our missions in the other satellite countries. In Moscow, the State Department advises that to its knowledge no foreign mission owns its own property and, therefore, it is presumed that such property cannot be purchased. Again we have not specifically raised this point with the State Department pending consideration of this matter.

In the event the Russians refuse permission to purchase property in Moscow, would it be possible to refuse Russians permission to purchase property in the United States? It appears any effort to divest Soviet Bloc missions of property purchased by them would involve fundamental laws regarding the right to purchase property and that, at the very least, would involve complicated legal procedures. It may be desirable to have the Department explore this possibility.

In discussing this matter with the Attorney General, it is suggested we advise the Attorney General of the above facts, pointing out there is not reciprocity at this time and suggesting that the Department may wish to check the legal possibility of restricting Soviet Bloc purchases of property in this country and the possibility of divesting them of their present holdings. Further, the Department may wish to point out to the State Department the lack of reciprocity at the present time and suggest that the State Department attempt to acquire properties in the Soviet Bloc to bring about the desired reciprocity.

Details:

This is not a simple problem. Properties within a certain country which are owned by another government and used by its diplomatic establishments are considered as extraterritorial in nature and therefore not subject to inspections incident to the enforcement of local police powers covering health and safety.

Properties within a country which are leased by another government are subject to the terms of the lease, the laws of the country in which they are located, as well as International Law.

In the United States the Bloc countries own most of their establishments outright. The only embassy property which is leased in Washington, D. C., by the Soviets is a building at 2016 Wyoming Avenue, N.W., used as office space and living quarters. This is a lease by the month from a private owner and contains no provisions relating to right of entry by owner or his agent, or for entry with respect to handling of repairs or improvements. Polish Embassy leases from a private owner property at 2132 Wyoming Avenue to be utilized as a residence and chancellery. Lease provides that Polish Embassy will allow landlord or its agent to have access to property upon appointment any reasonable time for purpose of inspection or making necessary or desirable repairs.

All of UN Delegation buildings in New York of USSR, Poland and Czechoslovakia are owned by those governments respectively. Only other leased premises in either Washington, D. C., or New York are those leased by organizations such as Amtorg and Tass. Whereas Tass in Washington has a standard lease with the Press Building, owners of Rockefeller Center in New York do not have right of access to floor on which Tass offices are located in that Center. Tass in New York subleases from the Associated Press.

U.S. missions in Czechoslovakia and Hungary own their offices as well as residences of chiefs of mission. They do not have any officially leased space except garage space in Budapest. U.S.-owned premises in Czechoslovakia and Hungary are considered as extraterritorial in nature and, therefore, are not subject to inspections incident to enforcement of local police powers covering health and safety.

U.S. Government leases its Embassy in Moscow as well as Ambassador's residence from a Soviet Government agency known as the Administration for Services to the Diplomatic Corps. In Moscow the lessor has the right to enter premises to inspect and make structural repairs. Lessor also has the right to carry out technical and fire prevention inspection, the time of such inspection to be established by arrangements of the parties. As far as the Department of State knows, no foreign missions in Moscow own their buildings. State has tried in the past to definitely verify this but has been unable to obtain pertinent information.

In Warsaw, the U.S. owns no buildings but leases five premises for offices and residence quarters. Two of these are rented from the Municipal Buildings Administration. On two other leases the lessor is shown to be a woman and no official title is shown. On the remaining property the lessor is the Ambassador of the Bulgarian People's Republic in Poland. (Note: The U.S. does not have diplomatic relations with Bulgaria.) In Warsaw, the lessors are responsible for maintenance and repair and have the right to enter the premises at reasonable times to inspect and make necessary repairs.

The U.S. Legation in Bucharest, Rumania, leases office and residence premises from the Rumanian Office for Services to the Diplomatic Corps. The lessor has the right of entry to inspect the premises periodically to insure compliance with local regulations pertaining to health, safety and fire prevention. The lessor also has the right of entry to inspect and repair structural defects but must give notice to the lessee beforehand.

According to security inspection reports of Department of State for U.S. missions in Soviet Bloc, alien employees are segregated from all classified operations in Prague, Czechoslovakia, and Bucharest, Rumania. In Budapest, Hungary, and Warsaw, Poland, alien employees are not permitted above the first floor of the mission building unless accompanied by an American employee. In Moscow, no alien employees are permitted on the ninth or tenth floors of the Embassy building unless directly supervised by American personnel and no aliens are assigned to offices on those floors.

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TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: November 18, 1955

FROM : R. R. ROACH

SUBJECT: REAPPRAISAL OF U.S. POLICY REGARDING SOVIET BLOC SHIPMENTS AFFORDED DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY

IIC received November 17 by ICIS cover letter November 15, 1955, copies of a Treasury letter to ICIS November 7, 1955, attached. The Treasury letter contains a report for the month of September, 1955, on importations of pouches and accompanied baggage by Soviet Bloc personnel as compiled from reports submitted by all collectors of customs.

These reports were requested in connection with the joint IIC-ICIS consideration of the captioned problem and Enclosure A of the joint report makes specific reference to this six-month check and sets out figures for the first four of the six months. Liaison Agent Day, therefore, telephoned Carl Pfuntner of the ICIS Secretariat, November 18, and recommended that these figures be added to Enclosure A.

Pfuntner stated he had already made this recommendation to ICIS Chairman Yeagley and that he would advise of Yeagley's decision. He said he knew of no reason Yeagley would disapprove.

ACTION:

No action is necessary provided these statistics are included in the enclosure to the IIC-ICIS pouch report. If, for any reason, Yeagley fails to approve this, we should vigorously insist that it be done.

Enclosure

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1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Mr. Day
1-Section Tickler

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8 NOV 22 1955

LIAISON

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: 11-17-55

FROM : W. A. Branigan

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION-IN-PLACE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

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At 4:15 P. M. 11-17-55 Mr. J. P. Coyne, Internal Security Representative, National Security Council, phoned the Bureau and spoke to SA Whitson who had observed the operation of detection devices in New York on 11-15-55. Coyne stated that he was going to see Mr. Warren Chase of State, who also had gone to New York, at the ICIS meeting on Friday, 11-18-55. He was going to suggest to Chase that the latter's observations be made available to the other Standing Committee personnel in ICIS. Coyne stated that he hoped that Whitson's observations would be made available to the Working Committee members of the IIC.

RECOMMENDATION:

None. For your information. Coyne was advised that you had been informed of the results of the trip.

SMUGGLING A-BOMBS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-10-04 BY 60267 uc/nls/BJA/DFW

cc - Belmont
Branigan
Roach
Day
Whitson

LW:blb (6)

RECORDED - 84 117-261-

EX-126

126

64-25205
66-1603
64-90938

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: November 18, 1955

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: CHANNELING OF UNACCOMPANIED DIPLOMATIC BAGGAGE, EFFECTS, AND SHIPMENTS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-10-04 BY 60267 uc/nls/BJA/DFW

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

ICIS has furnished for IIC information copies of its letter to Treasury November 7, 1955, copy attached, requesting that the Bureau of Customs conduct a survey of incoming unaccompanied baggage, effects, and shipments of Soviet Bloc personnel during the next six months and submit reports each thirty days.

Treasury was instructed by joint IIC-ICIS letter May 25, 1955, to arrange for the channeling of unaccompanied Soviet Bloc shipments, not under diplomatic seal, through the ports of New York City and Georgetown to permit more thorough search to prevent clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons or components thereof. By letter August 8, 1955, Treasury advised IIC and ICIS jointly that details completed but notification of Soviet Bloc representatives should be made. IIC letter August 25, 1955, notified Treasury that the matter of having State Department so inform Soviet Bloc being considered in ICIS and that ICIS would advise Treasury concerning this.

It was noted in IIC minutes of meeting September 7, 1955, that ICIS had decided to ask Treasury to conduct survey.

The Director instructed that the IIC Working Committee review the IIC position in this problem, and my memorandum September 21, 1955, recommended: (1) we should not press ICIS or Treasury for immediate action, and (2) if, in view of present international conditions, question arises concerning desirability of notifying Soviet Bloc to restrict their diplomatic shipments, we will recommend that this program is sound, but should be implemented at such time as the President or other high authority considers the international situation will permit. The Director agreed.

ACTION:

Copies of the ICIS letter have been furnished to the IIC Working Committee. Since the letter has already been dispatched by ICIS and since it was furnished for our information, no action is necessary.

RECORDED 99 117-268-
INDEXED-99

Enclosure

GAD:hke
(6)

1-Mr. Boardman
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Mr. Day
1-Section Tickler

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ICIS-P25/346

November 15, 1955

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover
Chairman
Interdepartmental Intelligence
Conference
Washington 25, D. C.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-10-04 BY 60267 uc/nls/BJA/DFW

Dear Mr. Hoover:

Enclosed for the information of the IIC are five copies of a letter to the Secretary of Treasury dated November 7, 1955, which I have dispatched requesting that the Bureau of Customs conduct a survey which will afford information on the amounts of incoming unaccompanied baggage, effects, and shipments of Soviet bloc personnel, including any unaccompanied diplomatic pouches, which enter the country during the next six months, and submit reports thereon every thirty days.

Sincerely yours,

J. Walter Yeagley
Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee
on Internal Security

Enclosure:

Five copies of letter

memo from [illegible] to [illegible] re [illegible] Unaccompanied [illegible] Baggage [illegible] 11/18/55

This is FBI copy for file. The original is being placed in IIC files in Mr. Day's office. GAD

COPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ICIS-P25/339

November 7, 1955

Hon. George M. Humphrey
Secretary of the Treasury
Washington 25, D. C.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-10-04 BY 60267 ucdnls/BJA/DFW

Dear Mr. Humphrey:

Reference is made to the letter dated August 8, 1955, from the Under Secretary of the Treasury to the IIC and ICIS, regarding the request of May 25, 1955, that all Soviet bloc unaccompanied baggage, effects, and shipments, including any unaccompanied diplomatic pouches, be channeled through the ports of New York City and Georgetown. This request was made in connection with the responsibility of the two committees, under Presidential assignment since December 1952, to coordinate in conjunction with the AEC, the establishment of necessary detection and countermeasures with respect to the clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons into the United States.

The two committees are now re-examining the proposal for channeling, in view of further developments which have occurred since that time. In connection with this re-examination consideration has been given to the suggestion made in the letter of August 8 that, before any instructions are issued to the Customs field officers, the Department of State should be requested to inform the countries concerned of just what will be required of them in order that they may have time to make such changes in their present arrangements as may be necessary.

In view of the lack of information as to the amount of unaccompanied baggage, effects, and shipments of Soviet bloc personnel that may be entering the country and in view of the consequent difficulty of reaching conclusions in our own re-examination, especially with regard to deciding whether the benefits of instituting the proposal would outweigh the disadvantages which might result from the notification by State to the Soviet bloc countries, it is requested that you have the Bureau of Customs conduct a survey which will afford information on the amounts of incoming unaccompanied baggage, effects, and shipments of Soviet bloc personnel, including any unaccompanied diplomatic pouches, which enter the country during the next six months.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ENCLOSURE

and submit reports thereon every 30 days. This survey should include statistics on the size and weights of the shipments and the results of inspections which are conducted.

On the basis of our review of the results of this survey, we will advise you further of any steps we consider should be taken to implement the channeling program.

Sincerely yours,

/S/ J. Walter Yeagley

J. Walter Yeagley
Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee
on Internal Security

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: November 21, 1955

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-10-04 BY 60267 uc/nls/BJA/DFW

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION-IN-PLACE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

The Director has instructed that we closely follow ICIS action concerning the limited national program for the use of devices which will detect radioactivity. The IIC by letter September 28, 1955, had informed ICIS that a Treasury Department counterproposal for use of less than half the number of detection devices originally recommended was unsatisfactory as it failed to accomplish the objective of the program.

Carl Pfuntner of the ICIS Secretariat has advised this problem was considered by ICIS at its meeting November 18. ICIS has decided that Treasury should be requested to purchase and put into use the number of devices indicated in their counterproposal since this will afford more protection than we are now receiving and will take some time, thus permitting continued consideration of the problem. At the same time the Immigration and Naturalization Service will be requested to implement that part of the program involving INS. ICIS will draft a joint IIC-ICIS letter for our consideration.

Treasury insists that a press release be made concerning the devices. Pat Coyne, NSC, agrees. Treasury is now drafting a proposed release for consideration at a future ICIS meeting.

ACTION:

Liaison will continue to follow ICIS action in this matter. Any joint letter proposed by ICIS will be carefully analyzed and recommendations made for your consideration.

GAD:hke
(6)

ADDENDUM: Treasury claims publicity will add to the psychological value of the devices by informing Soviet bloc of their use, but not their capability. This will be analyzed when IIC concurrence requested.
GAD:hke - 11/22/55

1-Mr. Boardman
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Mr. Day
1-Section Tickler

RECORDED - 8 117-268

INDEXED - 8

EX-126

21 NOV 28 1955

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

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TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: 11-21-55

FROM : W. A. Branigan

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-10-04 BY 60267 uc/nls/BJA/DPW

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST CLANDESTINE ATOMIC WEAPONS

At 4:15 P. M., 11-21-55, SA Whitson discussed the detection device program with Mr. Leonard Bienvenu, Executive Secretary, ICIS. Bienvenu stated that on Friday, 11-18-55, Mr. Warren Chase, who had gone to New York with Agent Whitson on 11-15-55 to observe the detection devices, reported to the ICIS. Bienvenu stated Chase was impressed by the manner in which the operation was conducted both at the airfield and at the pier. He had certain suggestions whereby the operation could be improved. These related primarily, according to Bienvenu, to the prohibition of large numbers of visitors from the pier and to the question of doing something about the loud buzzers which signal the presence of radioactive material. (As you know, these two items were commented upon by the IIC representative.) Bienvenu was asked whether Chase's report changed the ICIS position in any way and he replied that the ICIS position was confusing at best and he had been told to prepare a letter for IIC concurrence which would request Treasury to institute its $500,000 program and which made no recommendation regarding the Coast Guard. It was suggested to him that the Coast Guard matter should have been handled. He said that he would look into the question.

SMUGGLING Atom Bombs

RECOMMENDATION:

None. For your information.

cc - Belmont
Branigan
Day
Whitson

LW:blb
(5)

RECORDED - 14

INDEXED - 14

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

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Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

TO : L. V. Boardman

DATE: 11-17-55

FROM : A. H. Belmont

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-10-04 BY 60267 uc/als/BJA/dfw

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION-IN-PLACE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

Smuggling Atom Bombs

WHITSON

SYNOPSIS:

Memo Belmont to Boardman 10-28-55 obtained authorization for travel to NYC by SA Whitson as IIC observer, accompanied by ICIS observer, regarding use of detection devices for radioactive material on passengers and baggage arriving Idlewild Airport and by ship from abroad. SA Whitson and Warren Chase, Department of State and ICIS representative, observed use of devices New York 11-15-55. Mr. J. P. Coyne, Internal Security Representative, National Security Council, indicated certain questions should be considered by IIC and ICIS. These now answered as follows:

1. Do devices do the job they were intended to do? Answer: Yes, they can detect presence of radioactive materials in extremely small amounts concealed in luggage and on persons of travellers and would indicate presence of fissionable material emitting similar radiation.

2. Is operation of the devices covert? Answer: Use of the portable detection devices which are similar in shape to meters now used by uranium prospectors and which are openly used by Coast Guard for ship searches is open. Their performance is secret. The precise nature of the mobile detection devices [redacted] is not known to public and their performance patterns are secret. Mobile devices have been in use experimentally at the port of New York and at Idlewild Airport since the Fall of 1954.

3. Is limited national program for detection devices which has been approved by the IIC and most of the ICIS, with the exception of Treasury, realistic? Answer: It is a realistic start for a detection program which would cover as nearly as practicable all persons and hand-carried baggage traffic originating in foreign countries other than Canada and Mexico with special provision for coverage of traffic at ports designated as ports of entry for Soviet Bloc officials and their dependents.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. No change in IIC position is necessary.

117-268-

cc - Boardman
Belmont
Roach
Day
Branigan
Whitson

LW:blb (7)

126

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62-90934-
62-85815-

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b7E

5) Auto stat

Memorandum for L. V. Boardman

2. Operational problems, such as large numbers of visitors on piers and question of need for audible alarms on mobile devices known to ICIS. Will be followed with ICIS through liaison.

DETAILS:

Memorandum Belmont to Boardman 10-28-55 contained authorization for travel to NYC by SA Whitson as IIC observer, accompanied by ICIS observer, regarding use of detection devices for radioactive material on passengers and baggage arriving Idlewild Airport and by ship from abroad. SA Whitson and Warren Chase, Department of State and ICIS representative, observed use devices New York 11-15-55.

Special Agents [redacted] of the New York Office of the Bureau accompanied Special Agent Whitson and Mr. Chase. Customs Inspector [redacted] was in charge of the detection device operation at Idlewild Airport. Customs Inspector [redacted] was in charge of the operation on Pier 90, Manhattan, where the "Queen Mary" docked. It was observed that SA's [redacted] appeared to have very good contacts at the airport and pier. b7C

Mr. J. P. Coyne, Internal Security Representative, National Security Council, discussed with SA Whitson the detection devices now being used experimentally in New York 11-14-55. Coyne had spent a weekend in New York recently and had observed the operation of the devices at Idlewild and also at Pier 90, the Cunard Line pier, in Manhattan. Coyne raised three questions which were predicated upon his observations. He stated that he was not attempting to answer them himself but was anxious for the IIC and ICIS to take them into consideration in connection with their studies of countermeasures.

Memorandum for L. V. Boardman

Hereinafter, Mr. Coyne's three questions will be set forth together with material relating to them which was obtained as the result of observations in New York.

Mr. Coyne's first hypothetical question was: "Do the devices do the job they were intended to do"? The answer is yes. The devices can detect the presence of radioactive materials in extremely small amounts concealed in luggage and on the persons of travellers. They would indicate the presence of fissionable material emitting similar radiation. At the airport, travellers enter the Customs area through a doorway at which is

[redacted] b2 b7E

At Pier 90, VIP's (very important persons), including diplomats and their luggage, are brought within the effective range of a device [redacted] *Baggage on hand trucks is brought within the effective range of the device* [redacted] *Not all VIP's are brought within the effective range of the device* [redacted] b2 b7E

[redacted] *they were getting all of their luggage and the members of the party together to board the elevator. No Soviet Bloc diplomats were present during the observations 11-15-55.*

The ordinary ship passengers and their baggage pass within the effective range of [redacted] b2 b7E

piece of luggage. During the course of processing the passengers and crew of a ship like the "Queen Mary," which normally carries between 1700 and 2300 passengers and a crew of between 1000 and 1300 persons, the mobile detection devices are activated between

45 and 50 times. The source of the reaction is hunted out except when the device is activated by a diplomat or baggage enjoying diplomatic immunity. The radioactive object is located by means of [redacted] On 11-15-55 small wrist watches and other timepieces with luminous numerals and hands were located in luggage ranging from duffle bags through regular hand luggage of varying qualities to heavy wooden crates of chinaware three feet by three feet by four feet. b2 b7E

The second question raised was whether the operation of the devices was covert. The answer to this is that the use of the portable detection devices [redacted] which are similar in shape to meters now used by uranium prospectors and which are openly used by the Coast Guard for ship searches, is open. Their performance, however, is secret. The nature of [redacted] the airport and on the pier is not known to the public and their performance patterns are secret. These mobile devices have been in use experimentally at the port of New York and at Idlewild Airport since the Fall of 1954. The portable devices were not in use in New York until the past summer.

At the present time the signal indicating reaction of the mobile device to gamma rays or neutrons is a colored light - green for gamma - red for neutron. These lights are visible to the operator but not to persons [redacted] the device. Customs has them rigged, [redacted] so that a buzzer sounds regardless of the type of activation. [redacted] b2 b7E This buzzer attracts the attention of persons within earshot. The noise and confusion, on the pier particularly, tend to minimize the significance of the buzzer except to the operators of the device. It is reasonable to expect, however, that longshoremen and freight handlers regularly employed on the pier are aware that the buzzer is a signal for a person or baggage to be taken aside for a systematic search.

No visitors were allowed at the airport within the Customs enclosure. This was not true on Pier 90. Hundreds of visitors swarm all over the place. Theoretically there are as many visitors as there are passengers. The Customs representatives advised that people obtained pier passes more or less on a political basis through the collector of Customs who was a political appointee. This situation is well known and was commented upon by Coyne.

Mr. Coyne's third question was whether the limited national program for detection devices which has been approved by the IIC and most of the ICIS with the exception of the Treasury is realistic. This limited national program contemplated the use of 48 mobile devices and 159 portable devices by the Bureau of Customs; 31 portable devices by Immigration; and 110 portable devices by the Coast Guard in the principal ports of entry of the United States. The answer is that this is a realistic start for a detection program which would cover as nearly as practicable all persons and hand-carried baggage traffic originating in foreign countries other than Canada and Mexico, with special provision for the coverage of traffic at designated ports of entry for Soviet Bloc officials and their dependents. The limited national program is recognized to be only a beginning. It does not attempt to provide for real coverage of cargo entering the United States by ship, plane, train or motor vehicle. The scientific examination of heavy cargo for radioactive material depends upon the development of new devices. A limited coverage of cargo is possible through use of the portable [redacted] What may be adequate today at Idlewild International Airport, New York, will no longer be adequate two years from now when new airport facilities will have been completed. Additional devices will then be necessary. b2 b7E

During the visits to Idlewild Airport and Pier 90, the movement and storage of cargo were watched and discussed and it was determined that a check [redacted] is being made on a selective basis of cargo known to have originated within or on the fringe of the Iron Curtain. This is not an answer to the handling of cargo everywhere, since each building or port facility has its own traffic patterns and stowage problems.

copy/bj

TO: MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: November 21, 1955

FROM: A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: REAPPRAISAL OF U. S. POLICY REGARDING SOVIET BLOC SHIPMENTS AFFORDED DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY

With respect to the joint IIC-ICIS report regarding limiting the diplomatic pouch, final approval of which has been delayed by the inability of Defense to arrive at a position, Carl Pfuntner of the ICIS Secretariat advised Liaison, November 21, that a joint letter is being drafted by ICIS to serve as a cover letter for transmittal of the pouch report to the National Security Council.

Pfuntner stated that the letter will inform NSC of the Defense inability to take a position and will transmit the report in its present form. In this regard, Pfuntner stated that a compilation of all changes and corrections which have been agreed upon since distribution of the October 3 draft of the pouch report will be forwarded for the information of the IIC and ICIS members.

ACTION:

None. This is for your information. Liaison will continue to follow this matter closely in order that the pouch report may be brought to the attention of the National Security Council at the earliest possible date.

GAD:hke
(6)

1-Mr. Boardman
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Mr. Day
1-Section Tickler

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-10-04 BY 60267 uc/n/s/BJA/DFW

117-268
NOT RECORDED
145 NOV 23 1955

INITIALS ON ORIGINAL

SMUGGLING ATOM PARTS

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 62-90138

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: November 30, 1955

FROM : MR. A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: REAPPRAISAL OF U.S. POLICY REGARDING SOVIET BLOC SHIPMENTS AFFORDED DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
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Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

My memorandum of 10/7/55 analyzed for the Director's approval the joint IIC-ICIS report regarding limitation of the diplomatic pouch. The report was approved, and subsequent to October 7, various minor drafting changes have been made and approved by the IIC Working Committee members.

[redacted] (S) and a statement by Justice that it concurs with the IIC conclusion that restrictions on shipments under diplomatic immunity are mandatory if any substantial degree of security is to be achieved against introduction of nuclear weapons or components through such shipments.

b1
b3

Defense has been unable to take a position due, according to information informally received by G-2, to the refusal of Air Force Intelligence (not OSI) to agree to any limitation on the pouch because [redacted] A cover letter signed by ICIS Chairman Yeagley and approved by the other IIC members notes that continued efforts are being made to obtain a coordinated defense position.

b2
b7E

ACTION:

There is attached for the approval and signature of the Director as IIC Chairman a cover letter addressed to the National Security Council forwarding the joint report. The FBI copy of the report is also attached. Other copies are being maintained by Liaison for delivery after approval.

Enclosures (5)

GAD:lmm

1 - Mr. Boardman
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Section Tickler
1 - Mr. Day

RECORDED-92
INDEXED-92
EX-126

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

DATE: 6-10-04
CLASSIFIED BY uc/nus/bja/dfw 60267 derivative
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3,5(1) 6-10-2029

Per Ltr. dtd. 6-28-04 60267 uc/nus/bja/DFW 7-27-04

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. L. V. Boardman

DATE: November 29, 1955

FROM : Mr. A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: PUBLIC RELEASE OF AN UNCLASSIFIED DESCRIPTION OF FUSION WEAPONS

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
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Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-13-82 BY SP4 Clifford

Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) letter, October 21, 1955, requested return of the unclassified description of fusion (hydrogen) weapons which had been furnished to the IIC and ICIS on January 6, 1955. This unclassified description was disseminated to all SACs by attachment to No Number SAC Letter 55-B and was disseminated by Navy to its major commands together with authorization for further internal distribution.

Since return of SAC Letter attachments and of Naval communications was believed undesirable, IIC letter, October 31, 1955, asked AEC if destruction would be equally satisfactory.

AEC letter, November 23, 1955, attached, states "we shall be entirely satisfied with your statement that you have ordered the destruction of the material in question."

ACTION:

1. Attached for approval is a No Number SAC Letter instructing that the unclassified description furnished as an attachment to No Number SAC Letter 55-B be destroyed.

2. Also attached for approval is a letter for the Director's signature as IIC chairman informing AEC that the IIC members ordered the destruction of the material in question. Copies of AEC letter, November 23, 1955, are being furnished to the IIC members, who have advised that they have ordered destruction of the unclassified description within their own Departments.

Enclosures (2)

RECORDED - 72 117-268-

INDEXED - 72

cc - Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Whitson
Mr. Bates
Liaison Section
Mr. Day

GAD:gmk
(7)

67 DEC 14 1955

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. PARSONS

DATE: 11/22/55

FROM : T. D. Beach

Nelson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-10-94 BY 60262 uc/nls/BJA/DPA

SUBJECT: PURCHASE OF [redacted] AND ACCESSORIES

It is requested that the Administrative Division arrange for the purchase of [redacted]

b2
b7E

[redacted]

The sole supplier of this unit is:

Litton Industries
Nuclear Electronics Division
336 North Foothill Road
Beverly Hills, California

The approximate cost of the complete unit is $1,545. At the time arrangements are made for purchase, Litton Industries should be advised that AEC Forms [redacted] purchase are being forwarded directly to the AEC.

The following equipment and supplies should be ordered as necessary accessories for the above:

b2
b7E

1. From Picker X-Ray Corporation, 2025 I Street, N. W., Washington 6, D. C.

a. [redacted]

Total Cost --------- $216

DEC 7 1955

b. [redacted]

Total Cost ---------- $340

c. [redacted] b7C

Total Cost ---------- $ 17

2. From Eastman Kodak Company, Government Sales, Shoreham Building, Washington, D. C.

a. [redacted]

Total Cost ---------- $ 76.66

RECOMMENDATION:

That arrangements be made for purchase of above items. Total cost will be approximately $2,195.

JFG:edm
(4)

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: November 23, 1955

FROM : R. R. Roach

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
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Trotter
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-10-04 BY 60267 uc/nls/BJA/DFW

SUBJECT: CONTROLS TO PREVENT PRE D-DAY CLANDESTINE INFILTRATION OF ATOMIC WEAPONS INTO NATO COUNTRIES

While Mr. Philcox was attending the conference of the NATO Special Committee, Paris, France, November 17-18, 1955, William Trueheart of the Department of State advised him that SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters of Allied Powers in Europe) is considering attempting to establish uniform countermeasures in the NATO countries to prevent the pre D-Day clandestine infiltration of atomic weapons. The commander of SHAPE has asked for advice as to the best channels through which to proceed to bring this to the attention of the various NATO countries. Mr. Trueheart stated that it is possible that the commander of SHAPE may suggest that this be considered by the NATO Special Committee since this appears to be definitely something which would fall within the purview of the committee and appears to be of definite interest to civilian security services of the various NATO countries.

It is possible that this may be raised at the next conference of the NATO Special Committee. The United States is the only NATO country which has taken cognizance of this problem and which has instituted whatever countermeasures are available to attempt to prevent the clandestine introduction of atomic weapons. In past conferences of the Special Committee the Canadian and United Kingdom representatives have indicated that they do not feel that there is a serious threat in this regard. The United Kingdom representative pointed out that should the USSR attempt to clandestinely introduce an atomic weapon, this would practically be an act of war and the UK does not feel that the USSR is ready for war at this time. Therefore, they do not feel that the threat warrants extensive countermeasures at this time. The Canadians have expressed the same view. The Belgian representative in the past has indicated that he feels that there is a greater threat from the clandestine introduction of atomic weapons by Soviet bloc ships entering Belgian harbors than through the clandestine introduction of small weapons in diplomatic baggage or suitcases.

If this is to be raised at the ~~next~~ Special Committee conference, we will be advised in advance so that we can prepare our discussions.

ACTION: None. For information.

NWP:lw (7) 1-Mr. Belmont
1-Hennrich 1-Branigan
1-Whitson 1-Philcox
1-Liaison Section Tickler

NOV 1 1955

NOT RECORDED
145 DEC 2 1955

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

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Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN 11/30/55

DATE: November 29, 1955

FROM : MR. A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: REAPPRAISAL OF U.S. POLICY REGARDING SOVIET BLOC SHIPMENTS AFFORDED DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY

Carl Pfuntner, of the ICIS Secretariat, today advised Liaison that the joint IIC-ICIS report regarding limiting the diplomatic pouch is being mimeographed in its final form and will be ready for distribution either November 30, or December 1, 1955. A joint IIC-ICIS letter, forwarding the report to the National Security Council (NSC), will be signed by ICIS Chairman Yeagley and will accompany the report for the signature of the Director as IIC Chairman.

ACTION:

It appears that this report, long delayed by ICIS differences of opinion, is finally ready for submission to the NSC. As soon as it is received, it will be forwarded for the approval of the Director and for his signature on the joint cover letter.

GAD:lmm
(6)

1 - Mr. Boardman
1 - Mr. Whitson
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Section Tickler
1 - Mr. Day

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-10-04 BY 60267 uc/nls/BSA/DFW

RECORDED - 72 117-

INDEXED - 72

59 DEC 6 1955

Liaison

November 30, 1955

Per ltr. dtd. 7-26-2004
60267 uc/mus/bja/DFW 7-27-2004

Mr. James S. Lay, Jr.
Executive Secretary
National Security Council
Washington 25, D. C.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-10-04 BY 60267 uc/als/ BJA/DFW

Dear Mr. Lay:

Enclosed is a report dated November 28, 1955, on Reappraisal of United States Policy Regarding Soviet Bloc Shipments Afforded Diplomatic Immunity. This report is the result of consideration by the two internal security committees, with the ad hoc participation of representatives of the Central Intelligence Agency, and with the assistance of advisers from the Atomic Energy Commission and the Naval Research Laboratory.

It has not been possible to obtain a formal position from the Department of Defense. The view of the Defense Representative on the ICIS is as indicated in the report. Continued efforts are being made to obtain a coordinated Department of Defense position. When it is obtained it will be reported directly to the Council by the Department of Defense.

It is suggested that distribution of the enclosed report be closely restricted, in view of the highly sensitive data contained in it.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover
Chairman
Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference

J. Walter Yeagley
Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee
on Internal Security

1 ENCL (Enclosure)

DELIVERED TO
PAT COYNE, NSC,
11/30/55 4:45PM
BAM

1 ENCL

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

Enclosure

(This is FBI file copy of letter prepared by ICIS)

117-268

NOT RECORDED
145 DEC 5 1955

10 DEC 1 1955

INITIALS ON ORIGINAL

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 62-90938

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Orig - 1 - Boardman
1 - 1 - Belmont
3 - 2,3-2 1 - Bates
1 - IIC files 1 - Sec. Tickler
1 - Mr. Whitson 1 - Mr. Day
1 - Mr. Coyne, NSC

EX-118

RECORDED - 86

November 30, 1955

VIA LIAISON

Honorable Lewis L. Strauss
Chairman
Atomic Energy Commission
19th and Constitution Avenue, N. W.
Washington 25, D. C.

To Strauss 12-1-55 cmb

Dear Admiral:

Your letter of November 23, 1955, advised that destruction of the "unclassified description of fusion weapons" would satisfy the request contained in your letter of October 21, 1955.

This information has been furnished to the IIC members and each has, accordingly, ordered destruction within his own Department of all copies of the material in question.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8-13-82 BY SP4 clw/dcg

Sincerely yours,

Chairman
Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference

Attachment to memo from Belmont to Boardman 11-29-55 re: Public Release of an Unclassified Description of Fusion Weapons; GAD:amk.

GAD:amk
(13)

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Tamm
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Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

57 DEC 12 1955

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols ✓
Belmont ✓
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: November 29, 1955

FROM : C. E. HENNRICH

SUBJECT: REAPPRAISAL OF U.S. POLICY REGARDING SOVIET BLOC SHIPMENTS AFFORDED DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-10-04 BY 60267 uc/nls/bja/dkd

While discussing another matter today with Walter Yeagley, ICIS Chairman, he informed me that the completed IIC-ICIS report on limiting the diplomatic pouch is being forwarded for final IIC approval within the next two days. Yeagley stated that he is footnoting recommendation number 1 (that no size or weight restrictions should be imposed at this time on Soviet bloc shipments under diplomatic seal) with a statement that Justice concurrence in this recommendation is based on statements by the Air Force and Defense indicating that such restrictions

[redacted] b2 b7E

As you know, IIC abstained from this recommendation and recommended, together with Defense, Treasury, and Justice, the limitation of the pouch to letter size at such time as the President considers the international situation will permit.

Yeagley's footnote will have no bearing on the IIC position.

ACTION:

None, for information.

GAD:dje
(6)

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Hennrich
1 - Mr. Whitson
1 - Liaison Section
1 - Mr. Day

RECORDED - 36 117-268-

INDEXED - 36

DEC 8 1955

DEC 8 1955

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268)

DATE: 12-7-55

FROM : SAC, SAN DIEGO (66-998)

PERSONAL AND ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES

Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Tele. Room
Mr.
Miss Gandy

Re No Number SAC Letter A dated 1-28-52 and San Diego let dated 9-7-55.

This office has no additional names to recommend for inclusion on the Bureau of Customs Watch List at this time. This matter is being closely followed, and the Bureau will be kept advised of any pertinent developments.

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267 uc/nls/BJA/DFW
ON 6-10-09

2 - Bureau (117-268)
1 - San Diego (66-998)
WED:jec
(3)

REGISTERED - AIR MAIL

RECORDED-92 117-268-932

EX-126

DEC 1955

57 DEC 15 1955

PERSONAL ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
NO NUMBER SAC LETTER 55-V

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

December 5, 1955 WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

RE: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES

No Number SAC Letter 55-B furnished, in two attachments, descriptions of fusion weapons which had been prepared by the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). One of these was classified "Secret" and the other was unclassified.

The AEC has requested the return of all copies of the unclassified description. AEC has advised, however, that destruction of this unclassified description will be equally satisfactory. You are, therefore, instructed to destroy the "Unclassified Description of Fusion Weapons" dated January 6, 1955, which was furnished to you as an attachment with No Number SAC Letter 55-B.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267 uc/NLW/bja/PKM
ON 6-10-04

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

SAC, New York (117-192)

Director, FBI (117-268)

~~SECRET~~

December 9, 1955

RECORDED - 25

EX-107

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS
THEREOF OR OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO
THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

[redacted]

[redacted] (S)

b1

In the event additional inquiries are received from this source, it is suggested that you advise [redacted] (S) that, of course, actual visual examination of the contents of the luggage would be the most certain means of such detection. For examination of the luggage without opening the container, the use of X-ray equipment in conjunction with a visual fluoroscopic screen is considered the best method for detecting concealed weapons. X-ray examinations would not be considered 100 per cent effective, however, and it would have the minor disadvantage that any undeveloped picture film contained within the luggage possibly would be ruined by such an examination. It is also noted that mine detecting devices, such as used by the military, might possibly be of some assistance, although it is pointed out that any metallic object, including a metallic frame of the luggage case, would give a positive indication.

DATE: 6-17-04
CLASSIFIED BY: uc|n|s|BJA|DFW 60267-AAC
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3 ( ) 6-17-2029

1 - Mr. L. Whitson, Room 1730 (sent direct)

IWC:ctw
(5)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

COMM - FBI
DEC 8 - 1955
MAILED 31

57 DEC 19 1955

Whitson - 1730 h

~~SECRET~~

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268) ~~SECRET~~ DATE: 11/29/55

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (117-192)

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF OR OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

DATE: 6-17-84 BJA/DFW
CLASSIFIED
DECLASSIFIED

[redacted] (S)

[redacted] (S)

b1

The Bureau is aware of the methods employed by Customs at the Port of New York.

[redacted] advised by the interviewing agent that to his knowledge no such machine is in use by Customs officials in the Port of New York. No further information was advanced to him. (S)

b2
b7D

The above is being forwarded to the Bureau for its information. In the event additional inquiries are received from this source, research will be made in an effort to determine what instruments are employed by various penal institutions, and when this has been obtained the Bureau will be notified so that they may advise what information can be furnished to this source.

1 - [redacted] (S)

b1
b2
b7D

RM

LHB:EG

117-368-

24 DEC 18 1955

EX-107

~~SECRET~~

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

c - Day
Whitson

TO : L. V. Boardman

DATE: 12-2-55

FROM : A. H. Belmont

Tolson
Boardman
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Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-10-04 BY 60267 uc/nls/ BJA/DFW

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION-IN-PLACE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES
(117-268)

On 12-1-55 the joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures met in Room 2515, Justice Building. Present were Captain Stewart, Coast Guard, for ICIS; SA Whitson, FBI, for IIC; Lt. Col. Hudgins, U.S. Marine Corps, representing Military Application Division of AEC; Commander Clark, U.S. Coast Guard; and Don Gale, Naval Research Laboratory, representing the advisory group which has supervised the field testing of detection devices.

The joint committee considered two matters which had been referred to it by ICIS. Mr. Carl Pfuntner of the ICIS Secretariat was requested to prepare memoranda for ICIS in response to the inquiries as follows:

(1) There is no practical device which if set up outside the Soviet Embassy could "scan" the building from roof to subbasement, and locate and properly identify shielded fissionable material. It was pointed out that ICIS should have known this. Such a device would be lethal to all persons within the building "scanned."

(2) In response to a letter from AEC complaining to ICIS in substance regarding the number of requests made by Customs in NY for AEC opinions on radioactive materials, ICIS could advise AEC that Customs in NY would be informed that AEC desired to be called only when radioactive material was identified as or reasonably suspected of being fissionable material. In the discussion of this point between Captain Stewart, the ICIS representative, and Lt. Col. Hudgins, the AEC advisor, it was brought out that when detection devices were installed under a national program in many ports of entry, the operating agency (in most instances, Customs) would have to have available trained personnel who could make appropriate identifications of radioactive material.

117-268-

Commander Clark of Coast Guard indicated that the Coast Guard was considering ordering 125 [redacted] detection devices. Lt. Col. Hudgins stated that the detection devices now under development [redacted] would not be ready for a practical demonstration for perhaps a year. He pointed out that legal problems may arise from its use on human beings. He was advised by the group that this problem had been recognized previously

b2
b7E

cc - Boardman
Belmont

DEC 9 1955

5-Mr. Whitson

62-82221
62-86055
62-90833

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

and would have to be studied thoroughly in the light of the precise use to which [redacted] could be put when its development on a laboratory scale warranted. Col. Hudgins also stated that the Department of State and AEC were looking into the possible use of portable detection devices by Customs on trains entering U.S. from Canada, on the Canadian side of the line. Hudgins and Gale expressed disappointment in Treasury's refusal to adopt limited national detection device program which had been approved by IIC and other ICIS agencies. They pointed out that AEC was spending in research on detection devices each year considerably more than Treasury was willing to spend in actual operation of a detection program.

b2
b7E

RECOMMENDATION:

None. For your information. The next meeting of the joint committee tentatively set for 12-14-55 to hear problems relating to AEC aspects of health and security which might arise under proposed limited national detection program.

LW:blb
(5)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ cc [redacted] Liaison

RECORDED - 33

EX-101 117-268 (Smuggling of Atomic Weapons)

Date: December 8, 1955 BY COURIER SERVICE

To: Captain John A. Waters (orig and 1)
Director of Security
Atomic Energy Commission
Room 926
1717 H Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267uc/als/BJA/DFW
ON 6-10-04

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: [redacted]
MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING
(Atomic Energy Act)

U. S. Customs, New York City, advised on December 1, 1955, that one [redacted] arrived at International Airport, New York, via [redacted] Airlines, bearing [redacted] passport No. [redacted] an exporter of minerals to the U. S., listed on his Customs declaration ten pounds of various ores which were to be shown as samples to various U. S. companies. [redacted] ores were radioactive. They were, nevertheless, released [redacted] by Customs and the Atomic Energy Commission representative in New York. b7C

[redacted] may be possibly identical with a person of the same name who was the subject of an investigation [redacted] The subject of that investigation was then [redacted] He resided at [redacted] and was employed as a [redacted] The subject of the [redacted] investigation [redacted] The Assistant U. S. Attorney, [redacted] declined prosecution. No investigation of the [redacted] who arrived at International Airport is contemplated by the FBI in the absence of any showing that he was unlawfully in possession of materials within the purview of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. [redacted] b7C

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Holloman
Gandy

LW:blb (5)

BY COURIER SVC
23 DEC 8
COMM - FBI

9 DEC 19 1955

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FD-36

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mason
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Nease
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

AIR TEL

NY, NY

12/1/55

Transmit the following Teletype message to: BUREAU

O ATOM BOMBS

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF OR OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE US; AEC.

US Customs, NYC, advised this date one [redacted] arrived International Airport, NYC, [redacted] Airlines, bearing [redacted] passport number [redacted] Described self as exporter of minerals to US. b7C

On customs declaration number [redacted] declared ten pounds various ores which upon examination registered a .575 on red and 1.0 on green. Advised US Customs ores were to be shown as samples to various US companies, for example Union Carbon and Carbide. Material released by Customs and AEC.

Subject possibly identical with individual, same name, subject of closed [redacted] case in NYO. See report SA [redacted] at NYC, title [redacted] wherein subject [redacted] planned departure from US. Prosecution declined by USA. No action by NYO. b7C

KELLY

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-10-04 BY 60267 uc/nls/BJA/DFW

(3) - Bureau (117-268) (Regular)

RECORDED - 33

INDEXED-33

117-268

2 DEC 8 1955

JJD:mfw (#1)
117-192

1-D

Mr. Belmont

cc. Mr. Tolson

EX-107

Approved _____ Sent _____ M Per _____

Special Agent in Charge

R-TEL

December 7, 1955

cc - Boardman
Belmont
Day
Whitson

SAC, Washington Field (BCS)
(orig and 1)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-10-04 BY 60267 uc/n1s/BJA/DFW

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC WEAPONS OR PARTS THEREOF
INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

The Georgetown Custom House now has two portable detection devices for radioactive material known [redacted] passive devices. One of these will be used to check incoming international mail at the Washington Post Office. The second device will alternate in use between the Georgetown Custom House and the National Airport where it will be used on a selective basis on incoming baggage and shipments from abroad.

b7C

The use of these devices is a part of a field testing program which is being supervised by representatives of Coast Guard, Customs and Immigration. Detection devices have been in use during past year at International Airport, San Antonio, Texas; Idlewild International Airport, New York; and at the port of New York. [redacted] detection devices have also been used by Coast Guard on limited basis for ship searches under Port Protection Program.

Customs has been instructed to notify local offices of FBI and AEC immediately if detection devices indicate presence of radioactive material and physical examination of radioactive item indicates that it may be special nuclear material within purview of Atomic Energy Act. No physical examination of items having diplomatic immunity will be made by Customs, but WFO and AEC will be informed by Customs should item possessing diplomatic immunity cause reaction on detection device. WFO, when notified by Customs as indicated above, should obtain all details and notify Bureau promptly.

62-X-125

Hoover

RECORDED-91 117-268

COMM — FBI
DEC 7 - 1955
MAILED 28

DEC 1955

Bufile 117-268

LW:blb (7)

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Gandy

PARSONS

NOTE: Per info received from Commander B. P. Clark, U.S. Coast Guard, Chairman of advisory group supervising field testing of detection devices 10:30 A. M., 12-7-55.

DEC 14 1955

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tolson
Whitson

RECORDED - 64

117-268 (Smuggling of Atomic Weapons)

EX-107

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267 uc/nls/BJA/DFW
ON 6-10-04

Date: December 8, 1955

To: Captain John A. Waters
Director of Security
Atomic Energy Commission
Room 926
1717 H Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

BY COURIER SERVICE
(orig and 1)

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: [redacted]
MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING
(ATOMIC ENERGY ACT)

According to advice received from U. S. Customs December 1, 1955, a package was received from overseas by mail at the Morgan Annex, U. S. Post Office, New York City, consigned to [redacted] Titanium Manufacturing Division, Box C, Bridge Station, Niagara Falls, New York. The package was from [redacted] The weight of the package was 41 pounds and, according to the postal declaration, it contained mineral sand.

b7C

Because of the presence of radioactive materials, Customs notified the Atomic Energy Commission office, New York City. Samples of the contents of the package were furnished by Customs to the Atomic Energy Commission's representatives at their request.

Could you furnish this Bureau with the conclusions of the Atomic Energy Commission as to the identity of the substance which was radioactive?

LW:blb
(5)

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Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DEC 15 1955

BY COURIER SVC.
12 4 DEC 9
COMM - FBI

FD-36

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mason
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Nease
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

AIR TEL
NY, NY
12/1/55

Transmit the following Teletype message to: BUREAU

O ATOM BOMBS
SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF OR OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE US; AEC.

US Customs advised this date package arrived from overseas by mail at Morgan Annex, USPO, NYC, consigned to [redacted] Titanium Manufacturing Division, Box C, Bridge Station, Niagara Falls, NY, from [redacted] weight 41 pounds, postal declaration, mineral sand.

b7C
b2
b7E

Customs advised examination reflected [redacted] AEC notified and requested samples. Customs opened and examined package which appeared to contain mineral sand. Samples being examined by AEC. Remainder of item released by Customs.

NYO will be notified if any unusual results in AEC examination. No further action.

KELLY

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-10-04 BY 60267 uc/nls/BJA/DFW

117-268

INDEXED - 64
RECORDED - 64

DEC 9 1955

3 - Bureau (117-268) (Regular)

JJD:mfw (#1)
117192

Mr. Belmont
cc Mr. Whitson

EX-107

Approved _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: 12-6-55

FROM : W. A. Branigan

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-10-04 BY 60267 uc/nls/BJA/DFW

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Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
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Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION-IN-PLACE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

At 9:45 A. M., 12-6-55, Commander B. P. Clark, U. S. Coast Guard, head of the advisory group which has supervised the field testing of detection devices for radioactive material, phoned the Bureau and advised SA Whitson as follows:

During the next month or so there is a likelihood that three Soviet vessels will transit the Panama Canal from the Atlantic to the Pacific en route Vladivostok or some other Siberian port. These vessels will include a fish factory and a floating dry-dock.

Clark stated that he would prepare a memorandum on the situation for the joint information of IIC and ICIS but he was anxious to have the IIC agencies and particularly G-2 aware of the situation in order that G-2, if it desired, could arrange for the use of detection devices [redacted] on these Soviet vessels before they transit the Canal.

b2
b7E

RECOMMENDATION:

It is respectfully recommended that the foregoing be brought to the attention of the working committee of the IIC.

This was called to attn of G2 today. It is G2 responsibility & not IIC.

cc - Belmont
Branigan
Day
Whitson

LW:blb
(5)

RECORDED-75 117-268-

EX-126

DEC 12 1955

DEC 13 1955

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268)

DATE: 12-9-55

FROM : SAC, SAN DIEGO (66-998)

PERSONAL AND ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES

Re No Number SAC Letter 55-V dated 12-5-55.

The unclassified descriptions of fusion weapons furnished with No Number SAC Letter 55-B have been destroyed in accordance with Bureau instructions.

2 - Bureau (117-268)
1 - San Diego (66-998)
HGM:jec
(3)

REGISTERED

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267 uc/nls/BJA/DFW
ON 6-10-09

RECORDED - 36 117-268-14

EX-121

18 DEC 1955

STA... FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI DATE: 12/7/55

FROM : SAC, Mobile (117-00)

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES

Re No Number SAC Letter 55-V.

All copies (total of three) of the unclassified description furnished with No Number SAC Letter 55-B were this date destroyed by me personally.

FH:lo
(3)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-10-04 BY 60267 uc/nls/BJA/DFW

DEC 9 1955

117-502

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25 DEC 9 1955

FD-36

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

AIRTEL

NY, NY, 12/8/55

Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mason
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Nease
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

Transmit the following Teletype message to: BUREAU

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF OR OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE U.S.
AEA

On 12/8/55, U. S. Customs advised that [redacted] and children, [redacted] travelling on [redacted] arrived at International Airport 12/8/55 enroute 7:00 p.m. this date for [redacted]

b7C

Detection device on baggage registered 100 on both red and green. Search of baggage disclosed radium element pad which was on baggage declaration. According to Customs, German printing on radium pad indicated "Radium element 50 micrograms". On interview by Customs, [redacted] stated she suffered broken arm [redacted] and her doctor recommended radium pad to alleviate pain during healing after bone was set.

Customs advise AEC notified of above, who requested material be released.

KELLY

(3) - Bureau (117-268) (RM)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-10-04 BY 60267 uc/nls/BJA/DFW

Mr. Belmont

RECORDED - 33

117-268-

INDEXED-33

DEC 19 1955

TGS:EG
117-192

DEC 21 1955

Approved _____ Sent _____ M. Per _____

Special Agent in Charge

DATE OF MAIL 12-12-55

HAS BEEN REMOVED FOR [redacted] TO BE KEPT PERMANENTLY IN HIS OFFICE, ROOM [redacted] b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-10-04 BY 60267 uc/nls/BJA/DFW

SEE FILE 66-2554-7530 FOR AUTHORITY.

SUBJECT JUNE MAIL Smuggling Atom Bombs

REMOVED BY [redacted]

FILE NUMBER 117-268-✓

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGEOUT

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
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Rosen
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Holloman
Gandy

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: 12-16-55

FROM : W. A. Branigan

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-10-04 BY 60267 uc/nls/BJA/DFW

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES

Attached air-tel from New York dated 12-8-55 pertains to the discovery of a radioactive "radium pad" in the possession of a [redacted] woman en route [redacted] which caused a reaction on the detection device at Idlewild International Airport 12-8-55. b7C

On 12-14-55 the Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures met with representatives of the New York Operations Office of the Atomic Energy Commission and representatives of AEC's Divisions of Biology and Medicine, Security and Inspections. The attached case relating to the radium pad was cited as the type of item in which AEC had no interest and regarding which Customs should never have phoned the AEC New York Operations Office. The AEC representatives were insistent that AEC was interested only in radioactive materials which were being introduced in violation of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, i.e., those which should have been licensed as required by statute and those fissionable materials which could be used for the construction of nuclear weapons. The AEC representatives pointed out that radium dial watches, radium pads, luminous dog leashes, radioactive sand and other such commercial articles, were of no interest to AEC.

RECOMMENDATION:

None. For your information. ICIS representatives from Treasury advised AEC that Customs would be notified that radioactive items should not be referred to the AEC New York Operations Office unless they were fissionable material or there was reasonable ground for belief that they were items that should have been licensed as required by statute.

Enclosure

cc - Belmont
Branigan
Bates
Day
Whitson

LW:blb
(6)

117-268

RECORDED - 33

EX-[illegible] DEC 21 1955

DIRECTOR'S COPY FILED IN

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

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Belmont
Harbo
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Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: 12-15-55

FROM : W. A. Branigan

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-10-04 BY 60267 ucdnls/BJA/DFW

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST CLANDESTINE ATOMIC WEAPONS

Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures met 12-14-55 in Room 2515, Justice Building. Present were Captain Stewart, U.S. Coast Guard, and Colonel Graham, Office of the Secretary of Defense, for the ICIS; Special Agent Whitson, F.B.I., for IIC; Carl Pfuntner of ICIS Secretariat; Lt. Col. Hudgins, U.S. Marine Corps, representing Military Applications Division, AEC; Don Gale, National Research Laboratory, and Commander B. P. Clark, U.S. Coast Guard, representing the advisory group in charge of field testing detection devices. The purpose of the meeting was to hear from representatives of the AEC regarding problems which might be presented from an AEC standpoint under a national program involving detection devices. The AEC representatives were [redacted] of AEC's New York Operations Office; [redacted] representing respectively, AEC's Division of Biology and Medicine, Security Division, and Inspection Division.

The men from AEC's Operations Office stated that during the past 16 months an AEC representative had made a total of 35 visits to ships or to Customs points in New York at the request of Customs or Coast Guard to identify radioactive material. Twelve laboratory analyses were necessary as a result of these 35 visits. AEC representatives stated cost of analyses undetermined, but absorbed in regular AEC operation expenses. If such were necessitated on nation-wide scale, problem would be multiplied by each major port where detection device is located. AEC representatives had no figures regarding cost of analyses if conducted by AEC or cost if conducted by private contract laboratory. They were requested to obtain such figures and furnish to Joint Committee through Lt. Col. Hudgins.

AEC representatives expressed view that the Soviets now knew the capabilities of the system. They were unable to support this view by specific situations and admitted that capabilities of U.S. detection devices could not have been accurately calibrated by Soviets on basis of items determined to be radioactive in

117-268
cc - Belmont
Branigan
Whitson
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LW:blb
(5)

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5-MN

travellers' baggage to date since no Soviet Bloc official has been challenged on basis of detection device reaction.

AEC representatives expressed fear that AEC would be held responsible for clearance of vessels containing radioactive potash which occasionally came in and was brought to AEC's attention by Coast Guard under Port Protection Program. AEC representatives were told that this was problem for AEC to work out with Coast Guard since the Port Protection Program was not the same thing as the Detection Device Program even though improved detection devices were being used by the Coast Guard in place of geiger counters in the Port Protection Program.

RECOMMENDATION:

None. For your information. AEC is preparing data regarding license and compliance procedures under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and data regarding extent of AEC participation possible under any national detection procedure for purpose of identifying questioned radioactive materials. When these data are received, they will be appropriately analyzed.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: December 6, 1955

~~SECRET~~ - AIR COURIER

FROM : Legat, Tokyo, Japan (98-0)

DATE: 6-10-04
CLASSIFIED BY uc/NWE/bja/DFW 60267 derivative
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3.3(1) 6-10-2029
Per ltr. dtd. 6-28-04
60267 uc/NWE/bja/DFW 7-27-04

SUBJECT: DEFENSE AGAINST SURREPTITIOUS INTRODUCTION OF ATOMIC WEAPONS INTO UNITED STATES

On December 5, 1955 Lieutenant Commander KENNETH WILSON, United States Coast Guard intelligence officer and captain of the port at Honolulu, T.H., called at this office with his assistant, [redacted] b7C

WILSON explained that the Coast Guard is responsible for preventing surreptitious entry into the United States of hostile agents and weapons. For the past 7 or 8 years ships have been divided into three categories and examined accordingly. These were (1) Soviet or satellite vessels; (2) vessels of any registry under temporary Soviet or satellite control; and (3) any vessels which on the voyage in question had visited Soviet or satellite areas.

WILSON said he had recently received a directive to the effect that it may by now be presumed that a hostile country is aware of the standard methods of screening ships, and would therefore use some different form of entry. The directive ordered that all possible alternate means that might be employed be explored and covered.

To this end, WILSON obtained permission for himself and [redacted] b7C b1 to make a survey of Far Eastern areas in the effort to determine how best to cope with this problem. He has visited Guam, Hong Kong, Manila and Tokyo. [redacted] (S)

He pointed out that because of the staggering volume of freight pouring into United States ports each month, under precautions now in force it would be very easy for a hostile nation to smuggle atomic devices into this country, and [redacted] 39 b2 b7E

WILSON said existing personnel and detecting devices cannot cope with this problem. [redacted]

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12-16-55

[redacted] few of these have yet been manufactured.

b2
b7E

GRANGER said he was convinced that in a test run he could successfully [redacted] devices to perhaps 36 critical areas in the United States. He stated he was going to ask permission to run this test in order to shock defense authorities into adequately enlarging coverage of this flagrant vulnerability.

HLC:jar

[illegible] Tickler Orig & [illegible] IS
[illegible] Follow

1 - Mr. Boardman
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Whitson
1 - Pat Coyne
3 - ONI, OSI, G-2
1 - IIC files
1 - Mr. Day

~~SECRET~~

December 22, 1955

VIA LIAISON

Mr. J. Walter Yeagley
Chairman
Interdepartmental Committee on
Internal Security
Department of Justice Building
Washington, D. C.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-10-04 BY 60267 uc/mls/BJA/DFW

Dear Mr. Yeagley:

Your letter of November 25, 1955, forwarded, for IIC comment, copies of a memorandum dated October 19, 1955, prepared by the ICIS Subcommittee on Entry and Exit Problems on the subject "Clandestine Attack." The IIC has carefully considered the material contained in this memorandum and has noted that the subject matter has been limited to consideration of more effective prevention of illegal arrivals of persons by increased patrol of land borders and the Gulf Coast. The areas with which the memorandum is concerned are stated to be between ports of entry.

Your letter indicates that ICIS has concluded that it would be more appropriate for the report to issue from IIC and ICIS jointly. Inasmuch as the material has been presented in the form of a memorandum from your subcommittee and inasmuch as the memorandum contains administrative material pertaining to the activities of your subcommittee, the IIC cannot join in its endorsement. It is further noted that the IIC has not participated in any studies or deliberations which may have resulted in the conclusions contained in the memorandum.

The IIC cannot join in the conclusion that there has been a lessening of the possibility of the introduction of fissionable material across our land borders between ports of entry. This conclusion is apparently based upon the statistics which are cited relative to apprehension of Mexican aliens in the United States. The IIC does not believe that a decrease

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GAD:hke
(13)

(Attached to cover memorandum from Mr. Belmont to Mr. Boardman, 12/21/55, re "Border Patrol to Prevent Clandestine Attack" GAD:hke)

FOR APPROVAL SENT DIRECTOR

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Letter to Mr. J. Walter Yeagley
Chairman
Interdepartmental Committee on
Internal Security

in the number of illegal entries by Mexican agricultural workers is indicative of a decrease in the possibility of the introduction of fissionable material, it being noted that Border Patrol apprehensions of Mexican aliens in the United States averaged three hundred per day during the first six months of 1955.

The IIC concurs with the recommendation that all agencies engaged in the intelligence field should be reminded of this continuing problem and encouraged to cooperate with the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the Customs Service by promptly furnishing these agencies with any information received which indicates that a smuggling operation is contemplated. The IIC agencies have in the past and will continue to follow this practice.

The IIC further concurs with the recommendation that all possible emphasis be placed on the practice of Customs and INS of paying informers for information concerning smuggling of persons and material. With reference to the recommendation that wide publicity be afforded the recently approved statute concerning the payment of rewards for information concerning the attempted introduction into the United States of atomic weapons or materials, the IIC agrees. In this regard, the Federal Bureau of Investigation has already notified law enforcement officers of this new legislation by means of an article concerning it in the November, 1955, issue of the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin.

Recommendation No. 4, as contained in the subcommittee memorandum, indicates that INS should be requested to reassess the effectiveness of control of the border and to report to ICIS not later than January 1, 1957. This extension of time is apparently predicated upon the statement in the memorandum that the Border Patrol was last increased by two hundred officers, of which one hundred and fifty are still in the Border Patrol Training School. Since the memorandum is dated October 19, 1955, it appears probable that this training should have been substantially completed prior to the end of 1955. The IIC, therefore, considers a lapse of one year an excessive delay.

Sincerely yours,

Chairman
Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference

~~SECRET~~

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: December 21, 1955

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: BORDER PATROL TO PREVENT CLANDESTINE ATTACK

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ICIS memorandum November 25, 1955, furnished for IIC comment copies of an ICIS Subcommittee study, attached, concerning the more effective prevention of illegal arrivals of persons by increased patrol of land borders and the Gulf Coast. The study recommends that: (1) All agencies in the intelligence field be reminded of the problem and encouraged to cooperate with INS and Customs; (2) Emphasis be placed on the practice of Customs and INS of paying informers for information concerning smuggling; (3) The new statute concerning payment of rewards for information concerning introduction into the U.S. of atomic weapons or materials be widely publicized both here and abroad; and (4) INS be requested to reassess the effectiveness of its border patrol and to report to ICIS not later than January 1, 1957.

ICIS concluded that the study should issue from IIC and ICIS jointly, but IIC did not participate in the study. ICIS concludes that there has been a lessening of the possibility of the introduction of fissionable material across our land borders between ports of entry, apparently basing this on statistics which are cited indicating that fewer Mexican aliens are being apprehended in 1955 than in previous years.

Copies of the study were furnished to the IIC military members and a draft letter of reply was distributed December 5, 1955, and has been approved by the military members.

1 ENCL

ACTION:

Attached for the signature of the Director as IIC Chairman is a letter informing ICIS that the IIC cannot join

ENCL.

Enclosures (2)

GAD:hke
(6)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-10-84 BY 60267 uc/als/BJA/DFW

NOT RECORDED 145 JAN 5 1956

17 JAN 4 1956

1-Mr. Boardman
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Mr. Day
1-Section Tickler

5-Board

SENT DIRECTOR 12-22-55

in sponsorship of the ICIS study since IIC did not participate in the deliberations resulting in the ICIS conclusions. The letter informs ICIS that IIC cannot join in the conclusion that there has been a lessening of the possibility of introduction of fissionable material across our land borders and notes that the study indicates that border patrol apprehensions of Mexican aliens in the United States have averaged 300 per day during the first six months of 1955. IIC concurs with the recommendation that intelligence agencies cooperate with INS and Customs and points out that the IIC agencies have in the past and will continue to follow this practice. The letter notes that the FBI has already notified law enforcement officers of the new legislation concerning payment of rewards for information concerning atomic weapons or materials by means of an article in the November, 1955, issue of the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin. The letter concludes by pointing out that IIC believes a lapse of one year in the requested report by INS to be an excessive delay.

~~SECRET~~

ICIB-#25/342

November 25, 1955

Honorable J. Edgar Hoover
Chairman, Interdepartmental
Intelligence Conference
Department of Justice Building
Washington 25, D. C.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-10-04 BY [illegible]

Dear Mr. Hoover:

Enclosed are five copies of a memorandum report by the ICIB Subcommittee on Entry and Exit Problems, dated October 19, 1955, directed toward more effective prevention of illegal arrivals of persons via areas between ports of entry by increased patrol of land borders and the Gulf Coast.

In its consideration of this report on October 6, 1955, the ICIB concluded that it would be more appropriate for the report to issue from IIC and ICIB jointly, in view of the responsibilities of the two internal security committees for coordinating the implementation of countermeasures against the clandestine introduction of fissionable materials.

It will be noted that Recommendation 3, on page 8 of the report, calls for the publicising, both in this country and abroad, of the recently approved statute providing for the payment of rewards to informers for information concerning the attempted introduction into the United States of atomic weapons or materials. The ICIB suggests that the IIC would be the appropriate agency to implement this recommendation through the channels of its member agencies so far as publicising in this country is concerned, and believes that the Department of State is the proper agency for publicising abroad, by means of circularisation throughout U. S. official establishments abroad. It is also possible that U. S. I. A. might find some effective means of giving publicity to this information abroad. The aforementioned Recommendation 3 in the attached report does not in any way affect or modify the responsibility assigned to the Secretary of the Treasury in the statute as Chairman of the Board established to pass upon payments of rewards to informers.

ENCLOSURE

With regard to Recommendation 1, it is contemplated that upon approval by IIC and ICIB, a joint report would be sent to the agencies concerned, with a request that they cooperate with the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the Bureau of Customs in the manner indicated in that Recommendation.

ENCLOSURE

NOT RECORDED
145 JAN 5 1956

LIAISON

This is FBI copy
The original is in
IIC files in
Mr. Delgado's office

[illegible]

Memo from Mr. Belmont to Mr. Boardman re: Border Patrol. To Report re: Border Patrol to be attached with IIC letter to ICIB 12/[illegible]/55

~~SECRET~~

The ICIS would appreciate any views and comments which the IIC may have on the enclosed report.

Sincerely yours,

SIGNED

J. Walter Yeagley
Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee
on Internal Security

Enclosure

~~SECRET~~

Legal Attache (98-0) (orig and 1)
Tokyo, Japan

December 16, 1955

Director, FBI (117-268)

RECORDED-27

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-10-04 BY 60226 uc/nls/BJA/DFW

Ex-10

Reurlet December 6, 1955, captioned "Defense Against Surreptitious Introduction of Atomic Weapons Into United States," your file 98-0.

You reported that Lieutenant Commander Kenneth Wilson, United States Coast Guard intelligence officer and Captain of the Port at Honolulu, T.H., had recently visited Tokyo. You quoted Wilson as stating that a radiation detector had been developed capable of identifying one cubic inch of radioactive material in a six-foot square solid lead container at a distance of 50 feet.

For your confidential information, no such device has been manufactured. Any device capable of identifying radioactive material as fissionable material under the conditions indicated would be a massive instrument weighing several thousand pounds which would emit radiation lethal to humans. Detection devices are in use on a limited scale in the United States which will react to the presence of radioactive material in containers that can be hand carried or concealed on the person. These devices are not lethal.

LW:blb
(6)

NOTE: Liaison contacting Coast Guard at SOG re what CG knows about matters in last 2 paragraphs of incoming letter.

cc - 1 - Foreign Liaison Unit

FBI

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Boardman
Belmont
Liaison
Whitson

117-1777

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267 uc/nls/BJA/DFW
ON 6-16-09

Date: December 27, 1955

To: Captain John A. Waters (orig and1)VIA LIAISON
Director of Security
Atomic Energy Commission
Room 926
1717 H Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: [redacted]
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

Reference is made to the memorandum from this Bureau dated October 14, 1954, and to the investigative reports submitted subsequently thereto in which it is shown that subject [redacted] was interested in ore obtained from a mine [redacted] one of the owners of which was [redacted] a citizen of the U.S. b7C

According to U.S. Customs, one [redacted] who may be identical with the individual mentioned in the [redacted] case arrived at International Airport, New York, via [redacted] Flight [redacted] December 20, 1955. [redacted] a U.S. citizen, filed Customs declaration [redacted] and declared three ounces of torbernite crystals containing 60 per cent uranium oxide. [redacted] he was bringing this from a mine [redacted] in which he claims 20 per cent ownership. This material was released by Customs to [redacted] according to Customs, on the authority of the Atomic Energy Commission representatives in New York City. b7C

[redacted] claimed to be self-employed in an import-export business [redacted]

No investigation is being made [redacted] in the absence of a showing of violation of the Atomic Energy Act.

cc - 1 - AAG Tompkins by r.s. 0-6 same date.
cc - 117-268
LW:blb
(9)

59 JAN 9 1956

YELLOW DUPLICATE
DEC 27 1955
CC MAILED

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Gandy

ORIGINAL FILED IN 117-1777-

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mason
Mr. Mohr
Mr.
Tele. Room
Miss Gandy

AIRTEL
NEW YORK 12-28065

BUREAU URGENT

Dear Mr. Whitson
1738

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF OR OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE U.S.; AEA.

U.S. Customs advised this date one [redacted] self-employed in import-export business, [redacted] arrived International Airport, NYC, [redacted] b7C

[redacted] R U.S. citizen, filed customs declaration [redacted] and declared 5 ounces of TOBERNITE crystals which he was bringing from mine [redacted] which he claims 20% ownership. States crystals contain 60% uranium oxide. Customs device registered tan on red, seventy on green. Material released on authority of USAEC, NYC. NYO indices negative.

KELLY

Orig Mr Belmont

INDEXED - 64 ! 117-268-95
NOT RECORDED
176 DEC 29 1955

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-10-04 BY 60267 uc/mls/BSA/DFW

JJD:SGR (#1)
NY 117-192

(5)-BUREAU (117-268)

DEC 31 2 55 PM '55

FBI

...RAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

AIRTEL

NY, NY, 12/29/55

Transmit the following Teletype message to: BUREAU

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mason
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Nease
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF OR OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO U.S., AEA

ReNYairtel 12/22/55 captioned as above.

LEONARD R. SOLAN, AEC, Assistant Chief, Radiation Branch, Health and Service Laboratory, NYC, advised SA [redacted] on 12/28/55 that AEC examination of material declared by [redacted] had been completed and material was essentially as represented and is being released and returned [redacted]

b7C

No further investigation contemplated.

KELLY

3 - Bureau (117-268) (RM)
1 - New York (117-192)

117-268-

RECORDED - 14

7 DEC 30 1955

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INDEXED - 14

EX-126

Mr. Belmont

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-10-04 BY 60267 uc/nls/BJA/DFW

cpm

TGS:EG
(5)

59 JAN 9 1956

Approved _____ Sent _____ M. Per _____

Special Agent in Charge

SMUGGLING ATOM BOMBS

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

cc - B
Belmont
Re
Whitson

117-268 - SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE U.S.

RECORDED-91

Date: December 29, 1955 VIA LIAISON

EX-121

To: Captain John A. Waters
Director of Security (orig and 1)
Atomic Energy Commission
Room 926
1717 H Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

— to Waters 12-30-55 cmb

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: [redacted]
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267 uc/nls/BJR/DFW ON 6-10-04

On December 29, 1955, [redacted] geologist and mining engineer, [redacted] bearing [redacted] passport [redacted] arrived at Idlewild Airport, New York. He was destined to [redacted] declaration to Customs of certain pieces of mineral that he was bringing into this country for examination. b7C

The mineral material consisted of two pounds of radioactive ore. According to Inspector [redacted] U.S. Customs, Idlewild Airport, the Atomic Energy Commission office in New York requested [redacted] be allowed to proceed but that [redacted] hold the mineral for examination by the Atomic Energy Commission.

The Atomic Energy Commission in New York informed the office of the FBI in New York City that it was holding the material as a precautionary measure and was giving it additional examination in view of its unusual physical appearance and the fact that it emitted a considerable amount of neutrons. b7C

There are no data identifiable [redacted] in the indices of the FBI. No investigation [redacted] is being made in the absence of any showing of violation of the Atomic Energy Act.

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LW:blb
(7)

59 JAN 9 1956

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 3-26-58

WAB

FD-36

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

AIRTEL

NY, NY, 12/22/55

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mason
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. Winterrowd
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

Transmit the following Teletype message to: BUREAU

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF OR OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE U.S., AEA.

Inspector [redacted] U. S. Customs, Idlewild Airport, advised 12/22/55 that [redacted] passport [redacted] arrived on the [redacted] Airlines flight at Idlewild Airport. He was destined in care of [redacted] He is a geologist and mining engineer [redacted] and his business address is [redacted] He made a declaration of certain pieces of mineral that he was taking into the country for examination.

b7C

Examination by Customs of his baggage showed a reaction of the detection head 100 neutrons (red) and 40 gamma (green).

Inspector [redacted] telephonically communicated with AEC, NYC and was requested to allow the passenger to proceed but to hold the material for further examination by AEC. This material consisted of two pounds of ore. In view of the small amount of material declared, AEC was contacted and they advised they were merely holding material as a precautionary measure in view of the fact that the material, although not refined, registered a high degree of neutrons, and further, because the material was in the form of pebbles and not in the usual form of sand or rock, they decided to give it an additional examination.

NYO indices negative.

KELLY

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SMUGGLING ATOM BOMBS

(3) - Bureau (117-268) RM

Mr. Belmont

cc Mr. Trotter

TGS:EG

117-192

117-268-

RECORDED-9

INDEXED-9

1955

Approved _____ Sent _____ M. Per _____

Special Agent in Charge

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

cc - Liaison
Whitson

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267 uc/nls/BJA/DFW
ON 6-10-04

117-268

Date: January 5, 1956 BY COURIER SERVICE

To: Mr. Chester A. Emerick
Deputy Commissioner, Investigations
Bureau of Customs (orig and 1)
Room 7048
Internal Revenue Service Building
Washington 25, D. C.

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

Reference is made to the letter from the Commissioner dated January 9, 1952, requesting information with regard to certain individuals, firms or organizations in order that they or shipments with which they are connected may be given more thorough Customs treatment upon arrival in the United States.

You may wish to consider [redacted] who resides at [redacted] and is employed by [redacted] (Import and Export) A confidential source of another agency of the Government which conducts intelligence investigations abroad has advised that [redacted] a United States citizen [redacted] is a member of the Communist Party. [redacted]

b7C

b7C

[redacted]

BY COURIER SVC.
60 JAN 6
COMM - FBI

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RECORDED-27 INDEXED-117-268-
JAN 13 1956

cc - 2 - SAC, New York [redacted]

SEE NOTE PAGE 2.

JAN 12 1956

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LW:blb (8)
cc - [redacted]

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN [redacted]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Letter for Mr. Chester A. Emerick
Deputy Commissioner, Investigations
Bureau of Customs

[redacted] The Soviet Youth Anti-Fascist Committee is a USSR youth organization with headquarters in Moscow, USSR. b7C

In accordance with the referenced letter, it is understood that only the names and addresses above will be furnished to your field force to be included in its watch-list. Any information which you receive regarding shipments to or from [redacted] would be of interest to this Bureau.

SAC, New York: Determine promptly the position held by [redacted] b7C and submit recommendations as to referring Company to Customs.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: January 4, 1956

FROM : R. R. Roach

SUBJECT: CONTROLS TO PREVENT PRE D-DAY CLANDESTINE INFILTRATION OF ATOMIC WEAPONS INTO NATO COUNTRIES

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Gandy

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-10-81 BY 6026 TUC/MW/JJA/DFW

Reference is made to my memoranda of 11/25/55 and 12/23/55 indicating that SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters of Allied Powers in Europe) is considering attempting to establish uniform countermeasures in the NATO countries to prevent the pre D-Day clandestine infiltration of atomic weapons. The commander of SHAPE has asked the American Embassy at Paris for advice as to the best channels through which to proceed to bring this to the attention of the various NATO countries. Philcox was advised while in Paris attending the last conference of the NATO Special Committee that the commander of SHAPE may suggest that this be considered by the NATO Special Committee since it appears to fall within the purview of the committee and appears to be of definite interest to the civilian security services of the various NATO countries. My memorandum of 12/23/55 indicated that W. C. Haraldson of the Department of State advised that at the request of SHAPE he had taken this up with the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to determine if they agree that some attempt should be made to bring this to the attention of the NATO countries so that uniform countermeasures could be adopted.

Mr. Haraldson contacted Philcox on 1/4/56. He advised that this has now been returned to the Department of State by the JCS with an indication that the JCS have no responsibility in this matter and are not in a position to make a recommendation. Mr. Haraldson is still attempting to determine through what channels this should be considered in the United States. He was advised that this appears to be mainly a civilian, and not a military, problem since the countermeasures instituted in the United States are mainly the responsibility of Customs, Coast Guard, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service. He was advised that the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS) and the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (IIC) have formed a joint subcommittee which has studied this problem in the U. S. for some time. He was advised that the Department of State representative on the ICIS is Mr. Warren Chase. He stated that he intends to discuss this with Mr. Chase and that this problem may eventually be referred to the joint

SEE ADDENDUM PAGE 2

NWP:lw (7)
1-Mr. Belmont 1-Mr. Hennrich
1-Mr. Branigan 1-Mr. Whitson
1-Mr. Philcox 1-Sec. Tickler

EX-125

RECORDED - 77
INDEXED - 77

JAN 11 1956

Memorandum Roach to Belmont

ICIS-IIC subcommittee for consideration. Mr. Haraldson stated that he would keep us advised as to the progress of this matter.

ACTION:

None. This is for information.

ADDENDUM: (lw) 1/6/56 Mr. W. C. Haraldson of State called back to correct his previous statement that JCS was no longer considering this. He said it is still in the hands of JCS to determine if any action should be taken and if so, through what channels. It was again pointed out to Mr. Haraldson that this is primarily a civilian problem and is of concern to civilian agencies of the various NATO Governments. He stated that he intends to talk with Warren Chase of State within the next few days and will keep us advised. NWP

DATE: January 5, 1956

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-10-04 BY 60267uc/nls/BCA/DFW

SUBJECT: BORDER PATROL TO PREVENT CLANDESTINE ATTACK

My memorandum of December 21, 1955, attached, analyzed an ICIS Subcommittee study, attached, concerning the more effective prevention of illegal entry into the U. S. by increased patrol of land borders and the Gulf Coast. It was noted that ICIS asked that IIC join in issuance of the report. IIC declined, pointing out we did not participate in any studies or deliberations and could not join in one of the conclusions and one of the recommendations.

On January 6, 1956, Leonard Bienvenu and Goodwin Shapiro of ICIS informed Liaison Agent Day, IIC Secretary, that they wished to iron out any matters in the report to which the IIC objected in order that the report might be issued over the signatures of the Director as IIC Chairman and Walter Yeagley as ICIS Chairman.

The report is largely concerned with INS activities and makes several statements regarding increased INS activities and efficiency. Some of the statements could probably be so altered as to to merit IIC concurrence. However, others, such as the following, could not: "The INS, through more effective use of the manpower, equipment and materials available, much of which has been obtained during the last few years, has brought under better control the former flow of illegal entries across the southern border. Thus, the likelihood of the introduction of such (nuclear) weapons across the southern border has been materially reduced."

OBSERVATION:

Bienvenu intimated, but did not state, that Pat Coyne of NSC is urging ICIS to issue more reports jointly with IIC. IIC certainly should not join in issuance of reports containing statements such as noted above or which are based on ICIS member agencies' estimates of their own efficiency. We must not permit

Enclosures (2)

GAD:hke
(6)

1-Mr. Boardman
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Mr. Day
1-Section Tickler

NOT RECORDED
145 JAN 13 1956

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

Memorandum for Mr. L. V. Boardman

ICIS to utilize the Director's prestige to promote their own[illegible] interests.

TOLD BIENVENU 1/10/56

ACTION:

If you approve, Liaison will orally inform the ICIS Secretary that, as we indicated in our letter of December 22, 1955, IIC cannot join with ICIS in issuing this report. It will also be pointed out that the report is primarily concerned with INS operations, which are matters not within the knowledge of the IIC. Liaison will further inform ICIS that, in general, IIC will be unable to join in issuance of a report unless IIC has actually participated in the studies and discussions lying behind the statements included in the report.

I am in absolute accord.

K.

Office Memorandum

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: January 12, 1956

FROM : R. R. ROACH

SUBJECT: REAPPRAISAL OF U. S. POLICY REGARDING SOVIET BLOC SHIPMENTS AFFORDED DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY

Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

The joint IIC-ICIS report in this matter (Limiting the Diplomatic Pouch) which was forwarded to the National Security Council on November 30, 1955, is scheduled for consideration by the NSC Planning Board on January 23, 1956, according to information received by Liaison today.

William Foley, Justice Representative on the Planning Board, stated that, in all probability, you will be invited to attend this meeting.

Belmont

ACTION:

None. This is for your information. Liaison will follow and you will be kept advised.

GAD:hke
(4)

1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Day
1-Section Tickler

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-10-04 BY 60267 uc/nls/BJA/DFW

17 JAN 12 1956

AIR-TEL

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

NEW YORK, 1/7/56

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mason
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Nease
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

FD-36

Transmit the following Teletype message to: BUREAU

SMUGGLING OF ATOM BOMBS OR OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES; AEA

Customs Officer, [redacted] Idlewild Airport, NYC, advised this date one [redacted] of Nuclear Metals, Inc., 155 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, Massachusetts, arrived Idlewild Airport 8:55 a.m. from Canada in possession of two pieces of uranium metal ore totaling twenty pounds. [redacted] declared ore and produced letter from Atomic Energy Commission, Washington, D.C., dated 12/29/53, bearing License Number C1-3438, which letter allowed him to import from Canada up to twenty lbs. of uranium metal.

[redacted] contacted Atomic Energy Commission, New York City, and latter agency advised [redacted] known to them and cleared shipment of uranium ore.

Indices NY negative re [redacted]

For information.

NO ACTION. LICENSED SHIPMENT.
Mr. Belmont
LW.

KELLY

EX-125

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-10-04 BY 60267 uc/nls/ BJA/DFW
D948742/ 950935/ 997059

(3) BUREAU (RM)

WGM:jmg (#1)
117-192
(5)

RECORDED - 77
INDEXED - 77

117-268-9

2 JAN 9 1956

Approved _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

5 JAN 18 1956

SMUGGLING ATOM BOMBS

Serial Description ~ COVER SHEET XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

FOIPA

Total Deleted Page(s) ~ 20

Page 3 ~ Referral/Direct to OGA
Page 4 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 5 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 6 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 13 ~ Referral/Direct to OGA
Page 14 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 15 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 16 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 17 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 86 ~ Referral/Direct to OGA[A]

Page 65 ~ b2 , b7E
Page 67 ~ b1 , b3
Page 69 ~ b7C

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: January 10, 1956

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES REQUIRED TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

During the December 1, 1955, meeting of the Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures, Atomic Energy Commission representatives reported, in response to an ICIS inquiry, that there is no practical technical device which could be used from outside a building to detect and identify fissionable material within. AEC has developed devices which will locate and identify radioactive material within the relatively smaller area of incoming diplomatic shipments and baggage. These devices will not, however, operate satisfactorily at the distance which would be required if an entire building were to be examined from a point outside.

ICIS has now, by attached memorandum from J. Walter Yeagley, received January 4, 1956, furnished a formal report containing this information and has requested IIC comments concerning it. There is no comment to be made by IIC since this information was already known to the members.

ACTION:

Attached for approval and signature of the Director as IIC Chairman is a brief letter to Yeagley informing him that IIC has no comment to make. This memorandum has been approved, through liaison, by the other IIC members.

Enclosures (2) sent 1-10-56

GAD:hke
(6)

1-Mr. Boardman
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Mr. Day
1-Section Tickler

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4/28/03 BY SP4 BJA/RNP

RECORDED-87 117-0682

INDEXED-87

17 JAN 11 1956

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SECRET

ICIS-P25/

December 8, 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. J. Walter Yeagley, Chairman
Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security

Mr. J. Patrick Coyne
NSC Representative on Internal Security

FROM: Mr. Lish Whitson
Chairman, Committee B

SUBJECT: Countermeasures Against Fissionable Material

Reference is made to your memorandum dated October 18, 1955, on the above subject. In accordance with your request, Committee B has consulted with its AEC adviser on the question of equipment which would disclose, from outside a building, fissionable material stored inside the building. The AEC adviser in turn has consulted the HYDRA group and informs us that no device with the required capabilities exists. Further, any that might be built would not reliably detect fissionable material in the conditions envisaged, and would have deleterious and even lethal effects on the inhabitants of the building, and of the surrounding area.

cc: Mr. Yeagley
Mr. Stohl
Mr. Ranta
Mr. Chase
Mr. Doherty
Col. Halversen
Mr. Flinn
Mr. Canavan

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4/28/03 BY SP4BSTA/RNP

SECRET

ENCLOSURE

FBI

~~SECRET~~

IOIR-P25/353

December 30, 1955

Honorable J. Edgar Hoover
Chairman, Interdepartmental
Intelligence Conference
Department of Justice Building
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Hoover:

Enclosed are [redacted] copies of a memorandum dated December 8, 1955, containing [redacted] by Committee B on the possibility of detecting from outside a building [redacted] material stored inside the building. The problem of [redacted] for such detection was referred to Committee B for consideration and report as the result of questions raised by the Department of Defense Representative on the IEIB, who felt that, in view of the threat to New York and Washington which is described in the recent submission by the IIC and the IEIB to the Net Evaluation Subcommittee, no possibilities of developing safeguards should be left unexamined.

The IEIB would appreciate any views or comments that the IIC may have on the enclosed memorandum.

Sincerely yours,

[redacted]

J. Walter Yeagley
Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee
on Internal Security

Enclosure

ENCL.

INDEXED
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ENCLOSURE

17 JAN 11 1956

This is FBI file copy
Original is being
placed in official
IIC file in new
Dept. Office 9/18 per Mike

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 66-8603 62-90238

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : L. V. Boardman

FROM : A. H. Belmont

DATE: January 6, 1956

4/28/03 CLASSIFIED BY NSI/bja/85/60247 derivative DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (1)

Ticklers - Boardman
Belmont
Branigan
Bates
Day
Whitson

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST CLANDESTINE ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

SECRET

Pursuant to National Security Council, Document 5408 (Continental Defense) dated 2/11/54, AEC prepared unclassified description of thermonuclear weapons (H-Bombs) for release to law enforcement officials so that they could intelligently cooperate with Federal agencies charged with detection and defense against clandestine nuclear weapons. AEC wanted FBI to make release. FBI declined on ground that prior dissemination of fission weapon information to law enforcement officials by FBI had caused congressional and private comment as to why FBI and not AEC had made release of information within AEC jurisdiction. IIC-ICIS letters dated 5/5/55 and 8/4/55 asked AEC to make the release. AEC continued reluctant and on 10/20/55 Admiral Strauss, Chairman of AEC called on Director and stated in opinion of AEC no release of thermonuclear data could be made at that time. One of compelling reasons was that any description of fusion weapons made available to the public might enable the Russians to obtain valuable intelligence. (At this time also the Foreign Ministers Conference with the USSR at Geneva was pending.) Director advised Strauss he was satisfied with judgment of AEC and so far as IIC was concerned, the request might be considered closed. ICIS concurred.

Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on countermeasures has responsibility to review programs on countermeasures and prepare for approval of IIC and ICIS, appropriate "follow-ups" to agencies having responsibilities and programs when programs have not been completed. Review of program calling for preparations and release of unclassified data to law enforcement agencies due for consideration by Joint Committee during coming month. Since 10/20/55 following developments have changed international picture:

(1) Foreign Ministers Conference at Geneva resulted unsatisfactorily.

(2) [redacted]

(4) Life magazine for 12/5/55 published on pages 54 and 55 diagrams of H-Bomb construction and reactions based on already published information. Photostat attached.

Enclosure

b1

LW:mgh
(7)

INDEXED - 64
RECORDED - 64 11-2-68

SECRET

25

Memorandum Belmont to Boardman

~~SECRET~~

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that this matter be placed on the agenda for the next meeting of the IIC Working Committee so that an IIC position can be taken in the Joint IIC-ICIS Committee regarding asking AEC to reconsider the question of preparation and dissemination of an unclassified document on thermonuclear weapons for law enforcement officials.

ADDENDUM: 1/7/56 AHB:mab

Inasmuch as we are on record with the Atomic Energy Commission and this article does not appear sufficient to reopen the question, I don't think the IIC Working Committee should again consider this at this time. I have no objection to the Joint IIC-ICIS Committee considering it in the ~~light~~ time of their discussions.

~~SECRET~~

envelope only

ALL INFORMATION ~~CONTAINED~~
~~HEREIN~~ IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4/28/03 BY SP4 GTA/RNP

ENCLOSURE

117-2[illegible]-157

WHY THE H-BOMB IS NOW CALLED THE 3-F



HYPOTHETICAL 3-F BOMB, shown in cutaway, is based on published information and gives only theoretical construction without indicating actual size or arrangement. Bomb has Uranium 238 casing enclosing lithium hydride, a compound containing hydrogen for fusion. Evenly spaced around lithium hydride are spheres of plutonium powder. Each is plastered with many electrically triggered implosion charges to set off bomb. Each has core of beryllium and polonium which produce neutrons to help start fission. Since polonium soon loses its radioactivity, fresh cores are inserted through casing at end of rods shortly before bomb drop. How explosion proceeds is shown in the three drawings at the right.



EXPLOSION SEQUENCE begins when plutonium is imploded into masses of proper size for fission.



FISSION HEAT BLAST, held in by the red-hot casing, focuses on lithium hydride to cause fusion.



NEUTRON BLAST from fusion, fissions the U-238. Three-stage sequence lasts millionths of a second.

INFORMATION CONTAINED
4/28/03 SP4BJA/RNP

U.S., Russians appear to use fission-fusion-fission principle

Last week the U.S. learned that Russia had set off its biggest H-bomb to date and that the U.S. might test some of its own next spring. The reports gave added import to a new theory which scientific observers have evolved concerning the way the H-bomb works. Their deductions were getting a lot of attention last week because of a speech by AEC Commissioner Thomas E. Murray which gave a clue as to the materials used in building them.

Until recently the H-bomb was thought to be powered mainly by fusion of heavy hydrogen atoms. The intense heat needed to bring about fusion was thought to come from an A-bomb trigger which by splitting Uranium 235 or plutonium atoms in nuclear fission released enormous amounts of energy.

But when a Japanese fishing boat, the *Fortunate Dragon*, was showered with radioactive dust near 1954's first test H-blast, scientists knew that such a heavy fallout could not have come from fusion or from a small fission trigger. A fission trigger would produce relatively little radioactive debris, and fusion produces none. The fallout could only have come from a mass of uranium so huge that it must account for most of the bomb's explosive power. From these calculations emerged a new concept of the bomb which is shown in the drawings on the opposite page.

This superweapon is a fission-fusion-fission bomb—a 3-F bomb. It has a fission trigger which causes fusion. The fusion in turn acts as a booster to give the bomb its big punch which comes from the final fissioning of Uranium 238. This is the plentiful form of the metal which yields minute quantities of its dangerous isotope U-235 whose fissioning powers ordinary atom bombs. Ordinarily U-238 resists fissioning. But when it is struck by the intense hail of fast neutrons released by the fusion (*diagram at right*), even Uranium 238's tough atoms give way and fission with a force equivalent to 10 to 20 million tons of TNT.



FISSION-FUSION-FISSION sequence, shown in diagram, illustrates how reaction's explosive force increases at each stage. Neutron splits a plutonium nucleus (*top, left*) to start fission. Heat from fission causes fusion of many hydrogen nuclei into helium. Each fusion releases one neutron which causes a final fission, splitting Uranium 238 nucleus. Each fission yields 10 times as much energy as a fusion.

NUCLEAR BLASTS illustrate increased power of atomic weapons. The Hiroshima A-bomb (*smallest hemisphere*), had force of 20,000 tons of TNT. Modern A-bomb (*center*) has force of 500,000 tons of TNT. Fission-fusion-fission blast (*outer hemisphere*) may equal 20 million tons of TNT (20 megatons).

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: January 17, 1956

FROM : R. R. Roach

SUBJECT: CONTROLS TO PREVENT PRE D-DAY CLANDESTINE INFILTRATION OF ATOMIC WEAPONS INTO NATO COUNTRIES

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 1/22/93 BY SP2 ALM/MW

My memoranda of 11/25/55, 12/23/55, and 1/4/56 pointed out that the Commander of SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters of Allied Powers in Europe) had suggested that consideration be given to the possibility of entering into discussions with all of the NATO nations in an attempt to establish uniform countermeasures to prevent pre D-Day clandestine infiltration of atomic weapons into NATO countries. It was indicated that the NATO Special Committee may be the channel for these discussions since this matter is primarily of interest to the civilian security services of the NATO countries. Mr. W. C. Haraldson of the Department of State had advised that this matter had been referred by SHAPE to the NATO Standing Group (United States-United Kingdom-Canada) for consideration and that each country had in turn referred it to their respective military agencies for consideration. The Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Pentagon are presently considering the question as to whether the United States should enter into such discussions with the other NATO nations. It was previously pointed out to Mr. Haraldson that this appears to be primarily a civilian matter since all countermeasures against the clandestine introduction of atomic weapons into the United States are handled by civilian agencies such as Coast Guard, Customs, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service. It was also pointed out to him that the joint IIC-ICIS committee on countermeasures has considered this problem for several years and is responsible for seeing that various recommendations are implemented.

Mr. Haraldson advised on 1/16/56 that he has talked to Warren Chase, the Department of State representative on ICIS. Mr. Haraldson expects to visit Paris in the near future and intends to discuss this matter with members of the U. S. Delegation to NATO. He stated that he will point out to them that the matter is apparently in the wrong channels at the present time and should be in civilian channels. He stated that it will then be up to the U. S. NATO Delegation and SHAPE to take whatever further action they feel is warranted in this matter.

ACTION: None. For information.

NWP:lw (7)
1-Mr. Belmont 1-Mr. Hennrich
1-Mr. Brannigan 1-Mr. Whitson
1-Mr. Philcox 1-Mrs. Tickler

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145 JAN 19 1956

17 JAN 18 1956

62 JAN 24 1956

Orig & 1 - Yeagley
3 - ONI, OSI, G-2
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Mr. Day
1-Section Tickler
1 - IIC files
1 - Yellow
1- Mr. Coyne
1 - Mr. Boardman
1 - Mr. Belmont

January 10, 1956

VIA LIAISON

Mr. J. Walter Yeagley
Chairman
Interdepartmental Committee on
Internal Security
Department of Justice Building
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Yeagley:

Your memorandum of December 30, 1955, enclosing a report of Committee B concerning the unsuitability of a technical device, has been considered by the IIC members.

The IIC has no comment to make concerning this report.

Sincerely yours,

Chairman
Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference

GAD:hke
(13)

(Attached to cover memorandum from Mr. Belmont to Mr. Boardman, 1/10/56, re "Countermeasures required to detect and defend against the clandestine introduction and detonation of atomic weapons in the United States" GAD:hke)

Tolson
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Tamm
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Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

RECORDED - 37

17 JAN 18 1956

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: January 19, 1956

FROM : R. R. ROACH

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: REAPPRAISAL OF U. S. POLICY REGARDING SOVIET BLOC SHIPMENTS AFFORDED DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY

The joint IIC-ICIS report in this matter (Limiting the Diplomatic Pouch) was scheduled for consideration by the NSC Planning Board on January 23, 1956. Pat Coyne advised today that this meeting has been cancelled entirely and that the Pouch matter is now scheduled for 2:00 p.m, Monday, January 30, 1956. Coyne stated that these matters are frequently postponed, or entire meetings cancelled, because of more urgent matters which arise. He said that there had been no change with respect to his feeling that you should be present at the Planning Board meeting.

ACTION:

This is for your information. Liaison will follow, and you will be kept advised.

GAD:hke
((5)

1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Day
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Section Tickler

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4/28/03 BY SP4 6TAP/RNP

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39 JAN 27 1956

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ti[redacted] Liaison
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[redacted]itson

N

117-268

RECORDED - 69
INDEXED - 69

BY COURIER SERVICE

Date: January 18, 1956

(original & 1)

To: Mr. Chester A. Emerick
Deputy Commissioner, Investigations
Bureau of Customs
Room 7048
Internal Revenue Service Building
Washington 25, D. C.

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

DECLASSIFIED BY SP6 STP/jcw ON 5/1/03

This will confirm information furnished to you by telephone from this Bureau, January 15, 1956.

The New York office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation was informed by U.S. Customs at Idlewild International Airport, New York, that two cases of air cargo weighing a total of seventy pounds arrived at Idlewild, January 15, 1956, aboard Lufthansa flight no. 420. The two cases were determined by Customs to be highly radioactive.

The manifest indicated the items were shipped by [redacted] Germany, to Banco Popular, Barranquilla, Colombia, South America. They were described on the manifest in Spanish as "2 pcls aparates preparadores de radium bebible."

b6
b7C

Customs at Idlewild notified Mr. Hanson Blatz, Chief, Radiation Branch, Atomic Energy Commission, New York City. Mr. Blatz indicated that the items would seem to be a medical shipment, of which there have been a number recently. He was of the opinion that the shipment

Tolson
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Winterrowd
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Holloman
Gandy

LW:jdb
(10)
cc - 1 - AAG Tompkins (by form 0-6)

64 JAN 30 1956

BY COURIER SVC.
18 JAN 19
CONFIDENTIAL

Letter to Mr. Chester A. Emerick
Deputy Commissioner, Investigations
Bureau of Customs

should be opened but did not feel that the Atomic Energy Commission could authorize Customs to open it because it was a transhipment. The New York office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation informed both Customs and Atomic Energy Commission that the FBI could not authorize the opening of the shipment and that such a decision was the responsibility of the Atomic Energy Commission and Customs. Customs and Atomic Energy Commission at New York City were requested to contact the New York office of the FBI in the event further investigation on their part was productive of pertinent results.

cc - 1 - Captain John A. Waters
Director of Security
Atomic Energy Commission
Room 926
1717 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D. C.

BY COURIER SERVICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JAN 1 5 1956

TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mason
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Nease
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/1/03 BY SP4CCA/KNP

FBI NEW YORK 1-15-55 8-47 PM EDM

DIRECTOR URGENT

ATTN INSP HENNRICH

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF OR OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO US., AEA. BUFILE ONE SEVENTEEN DASH TWO SIX EIGHT. REOUR PHONE CALL TO MR. B.G. PETTIT FIVE PM THIS DATE. MR. JOHN DI BENEDETTO, DEPUTY COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS AT NY INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT ADVISED THIS DATE AS FOLLOWS- TWO CASES OF CARGO WEIGHING A TOTAL OF SEVENTY POUNDS ARRIVE NYC AT ONE TWENTY EIGHT PM THIS DATE ON BOARD LUFTHANSA FLIGHT NO. FOUR TWO ZERO. THE TWO PIECES WHEN CHECKED BY CUSTOMS REGISTERED AS HIGHLY RADIOACTIVE. [redacted] b2 b7E

[redacted] CUSTOMS HAS ISOLATED THESE PIECES FROM THE REST OF THE CARGO. THE MANIFEST INDICATES THAT THESE ITEMS ARE BEING SHIPPED BY [redacted] HAMBURG THIRTY SIX, GERMANY TO BANCO POPULAR, BARRANQUILLA, COLUMBIA, SOUTH AMERICA. THE ITEMS ARE DESCRIBED AS QUOTE TWO PCLS APARATOS PREPARADORES DE RADIUM BEBIBLE / SPANISH/ UNQUOTE. THE PIECES ARE NOT MARKED WITH ANY WARNING. CUSTOMS HAS NOTIFIED HANSON BLATZ, CHIEF OF RADIATION BRANCH, AEC, NYC. BLATZ ADVISED THE NYO THAT THE SHIPMENT WOULD SEEM TO BE A MEDICAL SHIPMENT. THE HIGH COUNT b6 b7C

RECORDED - 69

END OF PAGE ONE

JAN 24 1956

Mr. Belmont

CC - Mr. Tolson

Memo Belmont to Pettit 1-16-56 B/S2 P/M

5 - Mr. Belmont

OF RADIOACTIVITY IN HIS OPINION IS NOT ALARMING DUE TO SENSITIVE NATURE OF INSTRUMENTS USED BY CUSTOMS. THE NAME OF THE SHIPPER AND CONSIGNEE MEAN NOTHING TO HIM. HE SAID THERE HAVE BEEN A NUMBER OF THESE MEDICAL SHIPMENTS RECENTLY. HE WAS OF THE OPINION THAT THE SHIPMENT SHOULD BE OPENED BUT DID NOT FEEL THAT AEC COULD AUTHORIZE CUSTOMS TO OPEN IT, BECAUSE IT WAS A TRAN-SHIPMENT. HE IS WILLING TO SEND AN AEC OFFICIAL AS AN OBSERVER TO THE OPENING. DI BENEDETTO HAS STATED THAT THE ITEMS HAVE BEEN SET ASIDE UNTIL TOMMORROW JAN SIXTEEN NEXT. HE WILL NOT OPEN THEM WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION FROM EITHER AEC OR FBI. HE WILL NOT ALLOW THE CARGO TO BE RE-SHIPPED. [redacted] STATION STAFF OFFICER, US CUSTOMS, INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, NYC ADVISED THAT HE BELIEVES CUSTOMS CAN OPEN THE CARTONS. [redacted] ADVISED THAT THE CARTONS HAVE BEEN EXAMINED BY THE QUOTE INSPECTASCOPE UNQUOTE WITH THE RESULT THAT QUOTE THERE WERE NO CONCEALED COMPARTMENTS UNQUOTE. UPON THE TELEPHONIC INSTRUCTIONS OF THE BUREAU, CUSTOMS AND AEC, NYC HAVE BEEN ADVISED THAT THE FBI CANNOT AUTHORIZE THE OPENING OF THE CARTONS AND AT THIS TIME THAT DECISION IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF AEC AND CUSTOMS. THEY HAVE BEEN EN-

END OF PAGE TWO

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b7C

COURAGED TO CONTACT THE NYO AS TO THE RESULTS OF THEIR INVESTIGATION.

NO FURTHER ACTION IS CONTEMPLATED BY THIS OFFICE AT THIS TIME.

KELLY

END ACK PLS

8-58 PM OKFBI WA LO

TU DISC

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: January 16, 1956

FROM : B.G.L. Pettit

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMB OR PARTS THEREOF OR OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION TO THE U. S.

SA [redacted] called from New York office 5:05 P.M. 1/15/56 and advised: Customs at NY International Airport called NYO at 3:40 P.M. advising that radioactive shipment received 1:28 P.M. 1/15/56 from [redacted] Hamburg, Germany, consigned to Branco Popular, Barranquilla, Colombia, S.A. Shipment consisted of two boxes with total weight 70 lbs. Manifest in Spanish "Aparatos Preparadores de Radium Bebible." Weigh bill also in Spanish "50 pretiezas." Parcels to be transshipped to South America via air. Cargo under bond.

Customs ~~explained~~ examined boxes with Inspectascope and report showed "no concealed compartments." Customs reluctant to open for inspection unless requested to do so by FBI or AEC.

[redacted] talked with Hanson Blatz, Chief Radiation Branch, AEC, NYC, who indicated AEC would not examine unless requested by FBI and expressed opinion that boxes contained medical shipment consisting of radium.

Bureau Supervisor [redacted] was advised and following action taken:

1. Notified Mr. Chester Emerick of Customs Bureau.
2. Notified AEC - Edward J. Brosnan.
3. Called SA [redacted] in NYO and instructed him to advise both Customs & AEC in NY that FBI would not request that packages be held or opened but that we would be interested in any information developed which would indicate a violation over which we have jurisdiction.

Ticklers: Mr. Belmont
Mr. Pettit
Mr. L. Whitson

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13 JAN 24 1956

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BGLP: mpp (4)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/11/03 BY SP4 BOUTENP

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Orig & 1-A.G. 1-Section Tick-
1-[redacted]low ler
1-Mr. Boardman
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Mr. Day

The Attorney General

January 20, 1956

Director, FBI

COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION-IN-PLACE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

My memorandum of November 17, 1955, informed you of the current status of consideration by the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference - Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (IIC-ICIS) of the desirability of expanding our use of technical devices which will detect radioactive materials. These devices have been utilized on an experimental basis and are designed for use in assisting our defense against the clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons or their components into this country.

I pointed out that a joint IIC-ICIS Subcommittee study had resulted in a report, dated March 10, 1955, recommending adoption of a limited national program for use of these devices. This report was approved by all IIC and ICIS members with the exception of the Department of the Treasury. It had been recommended that the Bureau of Customs, the Coast Guard, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service secure additional devices, in accordance with a detailed program, agreed upon by the joint Subcommittee with the assistance of an advisory group on which all three of the operational agencies were represented. This recommended program was termed a minimum program not deemed commensurate with the threat.

A counterproposal was made by Treasury calling for procurement of less than half the recommended number of devices and for participation by Customs but not by Coast Guard. The IIC, by letter September 29, 1955, informed ICIS that it considered the Treasury counterproposal to be a temporizing measure which failed to accomplish the objective of the program and was, therefore, unsatisfactory.

The ICIS has now referred for IIC comment a draft letter accepting the Treasury counterproposal "on the understanding that it should not preclude development into a larger program subsequently as a result of agreements which may become feasible in the light of experience gained through the development and operation of the starting program." In addition, ICIS has

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Winterrowd
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Gandy

GAD:hke (9)

(Attached to cover memorandum from Mr. Belmont to Mr. Boardman, 1/19/56 GAD:hke)
(same re)

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17 JAN 24 1956

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EX-137

advised that Treasury will approve even this reduced program only on condition that publicity be given regarding the device. A proposed press release was forwarded for IIC comment.

With respect to the Treasury counterproposal, it is my feeling that I would be derelict in my duty if I were to approve a halfway measure such as proposed by Treasury. The Joint Subcommittee study resulted in general agreement that the measures recommended were minimum in nature. Treasury proposes to reduce this minimum by more than half. If this refusal is based on the expenditures involved, as appears probable, I can state only that in my position as a member of the IIC, I cannot agree to a program which fails to be responsive to a threat to our internal security. The decision as to whether our economy can or cannot afford these measures, which are deemed necessary, is one to be made by higher authority.

With reference to the press release which Treasury proposes to make, it is noted that the devices are identified as designed to detect the presence of radioactive materials. It is probable that the Soviets are aware, through our experimental use of these devices, that <u>something</u> is being used but it is not probable that they are aware of the capabilities of the devices. The proposed release informs the Soviets that the devices will only detect radioactive materials whereas the Soviets may be under the impression that they will detect the more critical fissionable materials. The release further states, unnecessarily, that use of the devices has no ill effect on health. This matter has not previously arisen, to my knowledge, and can only have the effect of raising a question as to why it is included. I believe an additional harmful result of the issuance of a press release would be the inevitable effort on the part of some member or members of the press to secure more information to serve as the basis for subsequent press stories. Such publicity could only have the effect of furnishing the Soviets with further information concerning our devices.

This matter is scheduled for consideration within the IIC in the very near future, and an IIC position with respect to this matter will be promptly furnished to ICIS. I felt that you would be interested in learning of this latest development.

1 - Mr. William P. Rogers
Deputy Attorney General

~~SECRET~~

18 January 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR: Lish Whitson, Chairman
Committee B

FROM: Chairman, Advisory Group
Committee B

SUBJECT: [redacted]

1. Mr. J. J. Flynn and Mr. D. I. Gale of the Advisory Group recently made a visit to San Antonio and Laredo, Texas, for the purpose of [redacted]

A. San Antonio

Customs Officers at the San Antonio International Airport (three incoming flights daily from Mexico)

[redacted]

[redacted]

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SMUGGLING Attn

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/1/03 BY SP4 [illegible]

B. Laredo

One train arrives daily from Mexico carrying some 50-150 passengers depending on the time of year, holidays, etc.; about one-third of the passengers travel by pullman, the remainder in coach cars. Two Custom Inspectors board the train as it enters the United States and commence inspections of the coach car passengers and their baggage while the train is enroute to the station, a distance of about one mile. The coach passengers carry their baggage to a baggage car where a table is provided for placing bags during inspection. Upon the train's arrival at the station a

INDEXED - 65 [illegible]
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17 JAN 25 1956
59 FEB 10 1956

a third inspector boards the train and inspects pullman car passengers and baggage.

Observation of the procedure [redacted]

[redacted]

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The purpose of the visit [redacted] were discussed with the Collector of Customs in charge of the Laredo District and the FBI representative in Laredo.

B. B. Clark

CC: Col. J. Halverson
Mr. B. Willard
Capt. J. Stewart
Col. V. Hudgins
Mr. J. J. Flynn
Mr. D. I. Gale

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 1/18/56

FROM : SAC, SAN ANTONIO (117-66)

SUBJECT: DEVICE FOR DETECTION OF FISSIONABLE MATERIALS
USED BY U. S. CUSTOMS, LAREDO, TEXAS
INFORMATION CONCERNING

On January 11, 1956, HENRY P. BARNES, Officer in Charge, U. S. Customs, Laredo, Texas, telephonically contacted SA [redacted] Resident Agent, Laredo, Texas, requesting immediate conference at the office of the U. S. Customs, International Bridge, Laredo, concerning a "confidential matter".

Arriving at Mr. BARNES' office, SA [redacted] was introduced to DONALD I. GALE, who identified himself as a representative of the Naval Research Laboratory, Washington 25, D. C., and to Mr. JOSEPH J. FLYNN, who identified himself as the Assistant Customs Surveyor, of the U. S. Customs New York City Office. Both of these men further identified themselves as being members of a subcommittee of the Inter-departmental Committee on Internal Security.

Mr. DONALD I. GALE stated that he and Mr. FLYNN were in Laredo, Texas, [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

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EXP

2 - Bureau (REGISTERED)
1 - SA 100-7483
1 - San Antonio (117-66)
CPG:ljs
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2 JAN 26 1956
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DATE 5/1/03 BY SP4 SBA/ENP

1958

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

cc: Belmont
Branigan
Whitson

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. BELMONT

DATE: January 18, 1956

FROM : W. A. BRANIGAN

Folson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST ATOMIC WEAPONS

Mr. John Doherty, Justice Representative on the Standing Committee of the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS), called on the afternoon of January 17. He referred to National Security Council document 5408 re continental defense and specifically to that portion which provides that there would be only 5 ports of entry for Soviet bloc personnel entering the U.S., namely, New York City; Laredo, Texas; San Antonio, Texas; St. Albans, Vermont; and Syracuse, New York. Mr. Doherty advised that the State Department has requested that Highgate Springs, Vermont, also be listed as a port of entry. Doherty explained that State was taking the position that St. Albans, Vermont, is primarily a port of entry by railroad and that Highgate Springs, which is six miles from St. Albans, is the port of entry by motor vehicle. According to Doherty, Highgate Springs is covered by the Customs personnel stationed at St. Albans. State Department is taking the position that the National Security Council document should list Highgate Springs and St. Albans as one port of entry.

Doherty stated that Immigration and Naturalization Service has indicated that they would have no objection to such a proposal. Doherty stated he was calling to inquire as to what the Bureau's position would be so that the Justice Department could be guided in taking a formal position with the ICIS. Mr. Doherty was advised that he should submit this request in writing and that the Bureau would give it proper consideration.

OBSERVATIONS:

1. St. Albans has been the sole port of entry for land travel on the Canadian border for Soviet bloc personnel since mid-1954. No question of Highgate Springs has been raised before.

2. Unless State can show USSR has opened up a new port of entry for our people abroad, Highgate Springs proposal cannot be justified on grounds of reciprocity.

3. Bureau's position regarding 5 ports of entry has been an IIC position, so other IIC members should be consulted regarding this proposal prior to reply to Doherty.

RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended that as soon as Doherty's written request is received that it be brought to attention of other IIC members and that Bureau and IIC position should be, in absence of new port of entry provided by USSR, no change in present arrangements should be made.

WAB:LW:hmm
(4)

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12 JAN 25

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

D-36

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mason
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Nease
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holleman
Miss Gandy

BUREAU OF INVESTIGATI

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

AIRTEL

THIS IS CONFIDENTIAL

NY, NY, 1/19/56

Transmit the following Teletype message to: BUREAU

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF OR OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE U.S., AEA.

Remyairtel 12/20/55.

HERMAN LIPSKI, Chief of Enforcement, U. S. Customs, NYC, advised this date shipment of one pound of tobernite consigned to [redacted] arrived NYC aboard "SS Extavio" from Madrid, Spain via American Express. Customs advised previously of shipment by RIVERO. Material released by U.S. Customs, on authority AEC, NYC.

For info.

KELLY

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3 Bureau (117-268) RM

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/4/03 BY SP4 DSA/ENP

RECORDED - 34 117-268-

INDEXED - 34

JJD:EG
NY 117-192

EX. - 107

69 JAN 31 1956

Approved _____ Sent _____ M. Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: January 24, 1956

FROM : MR. C. E. HENNRICH

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: SHIPMENT OF PHOTOSTATS CONTAINING TECHNICAL DATA REGARDING ATOMIC ENERGY
FROM [redacted]
TO DIRECTOR, U. N. INFORMATION CENTER, MOSCOW
January 24, 1956
ESPIONAGE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/1/03 BY SP4BTA/RNP

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Supervisor [redacted] called from New York at 3:50 PM, January 24, 1956. He advised that Customs at New York had just advised of a shipment of publications which they had examined today, January 24th, going to the Soviet Union. The shipment was sent by [redacted] to the Director, U. N. Information Center, Hohlovski Pereulok, Moscow. Customs opened this package and inside found a sealed envelope addressed to Professor [redacted] USSR, Academy of Science, Moscow, from Atomic Energy, U. N., Room 3468, U. N. Building. This envelope contained 32 pounds of Photostats which appeared to relate to the technical data concerning atomic energy. Customs has notified AEC who are sending a representative to examine these documents.

ACTION:

(New York is maintaining contact with Customs and will advise the Bureau of developments in this matter.)

CEH:mn

cc - Mr. Belmont
Mr. Hennrich
Mr. Branigan
Mr. Whitson
Liaison Section
(6)

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INDEXED - 4
6 JAN 30 1956
EX-107

Let me know outcome.

FEB 6 1956

117-265

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director

DATE: January 26, 1956

FROM : L. V. Boardman

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: SHIPMENT OF PHOTOSTATS CONTAINING TECHNICAL DATA REGARDING ATOMIC ENERGY FROM [redacted] TO DIRECTOR, U. N. INFORMATION CENTER, MOSCOW, 1-24-56
ESPIONAGE

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Re memo Hennrich to Belmont, 1-24-56, advising Customs had discovered 32 lbs. of Photostats appearing to relate to atomic energy in a shipment addressed to the U.N. Information Center, Moscow. You requested to be informed of the outcome of AEC's examination of these items.

At 12:08 p.m., 1-26-56, AEC headquarters, Washington, D.C., informed Liaison Representative Bates that AEC's man in New York had phoned and had informed AEC headquarters that the Photostats, mentioned above, were not classified information and that AEC was releasing the material to Customs for shipment.

RECOMMENDATION:

None. For your information.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/1/03 BY SP4BTH/RNP

LV:jdb
(6)

cc - Boardman
Belmont
Hennrich
Roach
Whitson

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INDEXED - 4

59 FEB 6

117-265

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

TO : W. A. Branigan

DATE: January 20, 1956

FROM : L. Whitson

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF ATOMIC WEAPONS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/1/03 BY SP4CTM/ENP

At 5 p.m., 1-18-56, Mr. Leonard Bienvenu, Executive Secretary of ICIS, and Carl Pfuntner of the ICIS Secretariat discussed with SA [redacted] a proposal which ICIS was making to the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of State.

[redacted] of Naval Research Laboratory and Lt. Col. Hudgins, Military Applications Division, AEC, gave a briefing to the Standing Committee of ICIS on the use of dosimeters (devices for measuring amount of radiation). ICIS on basis of this briefing suggested to AEC and to State Department that [redacted]

AEC has informally agreed to make dosimeters available to State on a loan basis and State has informally agreed [redacted] Although agencies are agreeable, letter from ICIS to AEC and State implementing project has not gone forward because Mr. J. P. Coyne, Internal Security Representative, National Security Council, wishes first to have explained to him the internal security connection of such a program.

Discussion with Bienvenu and Pfuntner brought out that State probably willing to engage in project because use of dosimeters would be for personal welfare of State employees. Intelligence results would be of internal security benefit. [redacted] Bienvenu stated he would talk further with Coyne.

RECOMMENDATION:

None. For your information. No IIC action necessary.

117-268
LW:blb:jdb
(4)
cc - Branigan
Day
Whitson

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AU OF INVESTIGATION
RTMENT OF JUSTICE
CATIONS SECTION

JAN 24 1956

TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mason
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Nease
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

WASHINGTON 10 FROM NEW YORK 24 5-32P

DIRECTOR URGENT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5/1/03 BY SP4BAR/PAP

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS, OR PARTS THEREOF, OR OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES, AEA. US CUSTOMS, NYC, ADVISED THIS DATE THAT THIRTY TWO POUND PACKAGE BEING EXPORTED VIA AIR FREIGHT ON SCANDINAVIAN AIRLINES, UNDER EXPORT DECLARATION JJ DASH ONE DASH ZERO SIX ONE ZERO EIGHT FOUR, EXAMINED BY CUSTOMS THIS DATE IN ROUTINE EXPORT EXAMINATION AND ASCERTAINED TO CONTAIN NUMEROUS PACKAGES OF DOCUMENTS APPARENTLY PERTAINING TO ATOMIC ENERGY AND MATHEMATICAL FORMULAE. DECLARATION AND LABEL ON OUTSIDE OF PACKAGE LISED CONSIGNOR AS [redacted] MAIL OPERATIONS, THE REGISTRY, UNITED NATIONS, NYC, CONSIGNEE AS DIRECTOR, UNITED NATIONS INFORMATION CENTER, HOHLOVSKI PEREULOK, FIFTEEN, MOSCOW, USSR. PACKAGE WHEN OPENED, CONTAINED CARDBOARD CARTON AND LETTERS ADDRESSED TO PROFESSOR [redacted] USSR ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, MOSCOW AND RETURN ADDRESS ATOMIC ENERGY, ROOM THREE FIVE SIX EIGHT, UN, NYC. DOCUMENTS, ACCORDING TO CUSTOMS, APPEARED TO BE PHOTOSTATS AND DITTO-MASTER COPIES OF ORIGINAL DOCUMENTS AFTER PEN OR PENCILED CORRECTIONS MADE THEREON. DECLARATION STATED ARTICLES HAD NO COMMERICAL VALUE, EXCEPT ONE DOLLAR, AND DESCRIBED SAME AS PRINTED MATERIAL. SOME MATERIAL,

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END PAGE ONE

END

WITHIN CARTON CONTAINED IN BROWN MANILA UN ENVELOPES. SOME TITLED QUOTE AUTHOR/S CORRECTION, VOLUME FIVE UNQUOTE. EACH SET OF PAPERS IS BANDED WITH PAPER AND BROWN MANILA TAPE. EACH SET APROXIMATELY ONE AND ONE HALF INCHES THICK. PAPERS ARE ALL CAPTIONED. CUSTOMS FURNISHED SEVERAL SAMPLES OF CAPTIONS, SUCH AS FOLLOWING, ONE. ZERO ENERGY EXPONENTIAL EXPERIMENTS, TWO. ZERO ENERGY EXPERIMENTS ON FAST REACTORS AND REACTOR KINETICS, THREE. A SURVEY OF NEUTRON THERMALIZATION THEORY, FOUR. A STUDY OF NEUTRON DIFFUSION IN BARILLIUM, GRAPHITE AND WATER BY THE IMPULSE METHOD. CUSTOMS HAS ALSO NOTIFIED LEONARD R. SOLON, ASSISTANT CHIEF, RADIATION BRANCH, HEALTH AND SERVICE LABORATORY, AEC, NYC, WHO REQUESTED CUSTOMS TO HOLD UP SHIPMENT AND DISPATCHED REPRESENTATIVE TO OBTAIN SAME FROM CUSTOMS AND BRING TO AEC FOR EXAMINATION. SOLON ADVISED CUSTOMS POSSIBILITY EXISTS MATERIAL IS RESULT OF RECENT ATOMIC ENERGY CONFERENCE AT GENEVA AND MAY CONTAIN CORRECTED DRAFTS OF SUBJECTS DISCUSSED THERE. RESULTS OF EXAMINATION BY AEC WILL BE FOLLOWED BY NYO AND BUREAU ADVISED.

KELLY

END AND ACK

NY R 10 WA SH

TU

5-12 (1-1-56)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
LIAISON SECTION

JAN 25 1956, 1956

___Director	___Mr. Bartlett
___Mr. Tolson	___Mr. Bates
___Mr. Boardman	___Mr. J.W. Brown
___Mr. Belmont	___Mr. Daunt
___Mr. Hennrich	___Mr. Day
___Mr. Sizoo	___Mr. Dougherty
___Mr. Cleveland	___Mr. Estill
	___Mr. Ferris
___Mr. Roach	___Mr. Fipp
___Mr. Philcox	___Mr. Kuhrtz
	___Mr. Martin
___Mr. Baumgardner	___Mr. McArdle
___Mr. Bland	___Mr. Moynihan
___Mr. Branigan	___Mr. Papich
___Mr. W.C. Sullivan	___Mr. Short
	___Mr. Stevenson
___Mr. Callan	___Mr. D.J. Sullivan
___Mr. H.L. Edwards	___Mr. Wells
___Mr. Scatterday	___Mr. Whaley
___Mr. Stanley	___Mr. Woods
	___Mr. Young
___Mrs. Schwab	
___Miss Wielkiewicz	___Miss Cole
___Miss Goggins	___Miss Gronquist
___Mrs. Cuozzo	___Miss Rogers
___Mrs. Henley	___Miss El. Toby
___Miss Lewis	___Mi
___Miss_____	✓Mr
Room_____	Room 1730
___See Me Please	___Records Section
___Call Me Please	___Routing Unit
___Please Handle	___Send File UTD
___Please note and return	___Place on record and return
___Mail Room,5533	___Ident. Div.
___Reading Room,5531	___Expedite Processing

AEC + State Advised

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DATE 5/1/03 BY SP4 BSTK/RSP

N.W. PHILCOX
7637 X-505

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5-7 (7-15-55)

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIV[redacted]--FBI

1-25, 1955

___Mr. Boardman	___Mechanical Section
___Mr. Belmont	___Translation Sec.
___Mr. Hennrich	6228 IB
___Mr. Keay	___Ident Div.
___Mr. Cleveland	___Technical Lab
___Mr. Baumgardner	___Mr. Ferris, 7627
___Mr. Branigan	
___Mr. Roach	
___Mr. W.C. Sullivan	
___Mr. Scatterday	Room

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SUPERVISORS

___Mr. Aull	___Mr. Lewis
___Mr. Baken	___Mr. Litrento
___Mr. Bird	___Mr. Little
___Mr. Broden	___Mr. McCaslin
___Mr. Calame	___Mr. McDermott
___Mr. Callahan	___Mr. Meehan
___Mr. Chase	___Mr. Mossburg
___Mr. Cotter	___Mr. Nasca
___Mr. Crowley	___Mr. Norstrom
___Mr. Day	___Mr. Payne
___Mr. de Bettencourt	___Mr. Peasinger
___Mr. Donahoe	___Mr. Sandweg
___Mr. Dunn	___Mr. Schweppe
___Mr. Ezell	___Mr. Shroder
___Mr. Fitzgerald	___Mr. Stacey
___Mr. Garrett	___Mr. Stewart
___Mr. Gregg	___Mr. Todd
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___Mr. Jaquiss	___Mr. Tully
___Mr. Jensen	___Mr. Turner
___Mr. A.R. Jones	___Mr. Turyn
___Mr. F.L. Jones	___Mr. Wacks
___Mr. Kissiah	___Mr. Wallace
___Mr. Kitchel	___Mr. Wannall
___Mr. Kuno	___Mr. Welborn
___Mr. Kurtz	___Mr. Welte
___Mr. Lake	___Mr. Whaley
___Mr. Lee	___Mr. Whitson

___Mail Room, 5533	___RECORDS SECTION
___Mrs. Dean	___Send File
___Mr. Hammond	___Bring File up to date
___Miss Taylor	___Place on record and return
___Miss Martis	___Indicate index ref.
___Correct	
___Please call me	
___Please see me	

Atomic Energy Act

for civil section

L. Whitson
1730

ESPIONAGE SECTION

4-22 (6-15-55)

Federal Bureau of Inves[redacted]on
Records Section

_____, 1955

- ☐ Name Check Unit - Room 6523
- ☐ Attention _____
- ☐ Service Unit - Room 6524
- ☐ Forward t[redacted]
- ☑ Return to [redacted] xt. ____

Supervisor
Room 1730

- ☑ All References
- ☐ Subversive References
- ☐ Main _____ References Only
- ☐ Restrict to Locality of _____
- ☑ Breakdown ☐ Buildup ☐ Variations
- ☐ Exact Name Only
- ☐ Exact Spelling
- ☐ Check for Alphabetical Loyalty Form

SUBJECT [redacted]
Address

Localities _____
Birthdate & Place _____

R# _____ Date 2-26 Searcher Initial JCW

FILE NUMBER SERIAL

[redacted]

b6
b7C

THIS INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 5/1/03 BY SP4 CTA/DVP

4-22 (6-15-55)

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Records Section

_____, 1955

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- ☐ Service Unit - Room 6524
- ☐ Forward to File Review
- ☑ Return to [redacted] xt. ____
  Supervisor
  Room 1730

- ☑ All References
- ☐ Subversive References
- ☐ Main _____ References Only
- ☐ Restrict to Locality of _____
- ☑ Breakdown ☑ Buildup ☐ Variations
- ☐ Exact Name Only
- ☐ Exact Spelling
- ☐ Check for Alphabetical Loyalty Form

SUBJECT [redacted]
Address

Localities _____
Birthdate & Place _____

R# _____ Date 1-26 Searcher Initial MCO
FILE NUMBER SERIAL

100

[redacted]

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b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5/1/03 BY SP4 GSA/RVP

CONFIDENTIAL

man
Belmont
Roach
Whitson

BY COURIER SERVICE

Date: January 30, 1956

To: Mr. Dennis A. Flinn (original & 1)
Director
Office of Security
Department of State
515 22nd Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.

DECLASSIFIED BY SP4OTA/ENP
ON 8/11/03

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: SHIPMENT OF PHOTOSTATS CONTAINING TECHNICAL DATA REGARDING ATOMIC ENERGY FROM [redacted] TO DIRECTOR, U. N. INFORMATION CENTER, MOSCOW, JANUARY 24, 1956
ESPIONAGE

This will confirm information furnished orally to your office by FBI liaison on January 25 and 26, 1956.

On January 24, 1956, U.S. Customs, New York City, gave a routine export examination to a thirty-two-pound package being shipped via Scandinavian Airlines by one [redacted] Mail Operations, The Registry, United Nations, New York, to Director, United Nations Information Center, Hohlovski Pereulok 15, Moscow, USSR. The package when opened was found to contain a cardboard carton of documents, Photostats and Ditto-masters on technical subjects relating to atomic energy, and letters addressed to Professor [redacted] USSR Academy of Sciences, Moscow.

BY COURIER SVC.
93 JAN 30
COMM - FBI

The export declaration JJ-1-061084, attached to the package, described the contents as printed material of no commercial value except $1. Customs notified the Atomic Energy Commission representatives in New York and was requested by the Atomic Energy Commission to hold up the shipment until it could be examined by a representative of the Atomic Energy Commission. This was done. On January 26, 1956, an Atomic Energy Commission representative determined

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

LW:jdb
(9)

CONFIDENTIAL

cc - 1 - AAG Tompkins (by form 0-6)

b6
b7C

Letter to Mr. Dennis A. Flinn
Director
Office of Security
Department of State

that the documents did not contain classified information and released the package to Customs for shipment.

The files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation contain no identifiable references to either [redacted] (117-268)

b6
b7C

cc - 1 - Captain John A. Waters
Director of Security
Atomic Energy Commission
Room 926
1717 H Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

BY COURIER SERVICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JAN 25 1956

TELETYPE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/10/03 NYSP/BOSTON/ENP

Mr. Belmont
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Nease
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

WASH 16 FROM NEW YORK 25 10-55 PM

DIRECTOR

..... U R G E N T .....

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS, OR PARTS THEREOF, OR OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES, AEA. RE NY TEL JANUARY TWENTYFOUR, FIFTYSIX CONCERNING THIRTYTWO POUND PACKAGE BEING EXPORTED VIA AIR FREIGHT ON SCANDINAVIAN AIRLINES JANUARY TWENTYFOUR, FIFTYSIX UNDER EXPORT DECLARATION J J - ONE - ZERO SIX ONE ZERO EIGHT FOUR, FOUND ON CUSTOM EXAMINATION TO CONTAIN NUMEROUS PACKAGES OF DOCUMENTS APPARENTLY PERTAINING TO ATOMIC ENERGY AND MATHEMATICAL FORMULAE. CONSIGNOR [redacted] MAIL OPERATIONS, THE REGISTRY, UNITED NATIONS, NYC, CONSIGNEE, DIRECTOR, UNITED NATIONS INFORMATION CENTER, HOHLOVSKI PEREULOK FIFTEEN, MOSCOW, USSR. ROBERT M. KIRKMAN, DIRECTOR OF SECURITY AEC, NYC ADVISED JANUARY TWENTYFIVE, FIFTYSIX THAT EXAMINATION BY AEC HAS NOT BEEN COMPLETED. HE STATED UNIDENTIFIED OFFICIAL WAS EXPECTED TO COME TO NYC ON JANUARY TWENTYSIX, FIFTYSIX, FROM WASHINGTON, DC, TO EXAMINE MATERIAL. NYO WILL FOLLOW UP WITH AEC RE RESULTS OF EXAMINATION.

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KELLY

END

WA NY R 16 WA SH

TU DISC PLS

Mr. Belmont

cc to Director (b6-6)
cc AEC, Washington
LW 1-30-56

5-W

4-22 (6-15-55)

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Records Section

1/26/56, ~~1955~~

- [ ] Name Check Unit - Room 6523
- [x] Attention [redacted]
- [ ] Service Unit - Room 6524
- [ ] Forward to File Review
- [x] Return to [redacted]
  Supervisor
  Room 1230

- [x] All References
- [ ] Subversive References
- [ ] Main _____ References Only
- [ ] Restrict to Locality of _____
- [ ] Breakdown [x] Buildup [ ] Variations
- [ ] Exact Name Only
- [x] Exact Spelling
- [ ] Check for Alphabetical Loyalty Form

SUBJECT [redacted]
Address ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, USSR

Localities _____
Birthdate & Place _____

R# _____ Date 1/26 Searcher Initial RS.M

FILE NUMBER	SERIAL
NR	
[redacted]	
100-21318-16	
61-7523-240	
100-412271-1	
[redacted]	
61-3489-24 Encl 62	
[redacted]	
65-30092-1296	
100-365088-1844	
61-7559-2-2964	
100-267791-121	
100-302546538-2	
65-30092-4031 R	
[redacted]	
NR	

NOT LISTED IN ACTIVE OR CORRESPONDING MEMBERS OF SOV. ACAD. OF SCIENCES (1954)
64-35693-240-22 (ENCL)

5-RW

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b6
b7C

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: January 17, 1956

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/2/03 BY SP4 CLM/ENP

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SYNOPSIS: SMUGGLING ATOM BOMBS

As a result of a joint IIC-ICIS study, a national program was recommended for use of devices which will detect radioactive material. This program, in which all IIC and ICIS members agreed with exception of Treasury, contemplated use of devices by Customs, Coast Guard, and Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). These agencies were represented on an advisory group which agreed that the recommended program was minimum and not actually commensurate with the threat of clandestine introduction of fissionable material.

That portion of the program recommended for Treasury implementation would cost an estimated two and one-half million dollars the first year and involved procurement and use of the devices by Customs at specified ports of entry and by Coast Guard in examining ship cargoes. INS was to use a small number of devices in Border Patrol examination of aliens. Treasury objected and submitted counterproposal calling for program by Customs costing estimated $500,000 and no recommendation for Coast Guard participation. ICIS in September, 1955, proposed to accept the Treasury counterproposal. IIC letter September 28, 1955, referred to the Treasury counterproposal as unsatisfactory and a temporizing measure which would not accomplish the objective of the program. Implementation of the original program was urged.

ICIS has now revised and resubmitted draft letters for IIC comment. These letters request INS to implement its portion of original program and ask AEC to remain responsible for research and advice. ICIS letter to Treasury accepts Treasury counterproposal with stipulation that subsequent expansion of program not precluded. Treasury has now indicated it will approve its own counterproposal only on condition that press release be made and draft of recommended release also furnished for comment. We believe acceptance of Treasury counterproposal would be acceptance of less than minimum security since Subcommittee termed its recommended program as not commensurate with threat. Press release would result in additional inquiries and stories concerning devices, thereby furnishing Soviets information by which their capabilities may be assessed.

Enclosure
GAD:hkeh
(6)

RECORDED - 64
INDEXED - 64

1-Mr. Boardman
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Mr. Day
1-Section Tickler

EX. - 107

117-268-

(3) Auths to ✓ DECLASSIFIED COPY ATTACHED

Memorandum for Mr. L. V. Boardman

ACTION:

This matter is scheduled for discussion at the IIC Working Committee meeting to be held on January 20. If you agree, we will propose that ICIS be advised that the IIC strongly oppose issuance of any statement to the press concerning use of the detection devices and that we believe ~~that~~ the limited national program developed by our Joint Subcommittee to be a minimum security program which should not be reduced. We will further urge that a report be prepared showing the divergent views and that this report be promptly forwarded to the National Security Council.

DETAILS:

A Joint IIC-ICIS Subcommittee studied the desirability of expanding the use of technical devices which will detect radioactive material and issued a report dated March 10, 1955, recommending that a limited national program for use of these devices be put into effect to protect against the clandestine introduction into the United States of fissionable material.

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Two types of devices were considered: [redacted]

[redacted] *The recommended program contemplated use of the devices by Customs, Coast Guard, and Immigration and Naturalization Service, and all three agencies were represented on an advisory group which concurred with the Subcommittee report and with the statement in the report that the recommended program was a minimum program not deemed commensurate with the threat.*

The report recommended that Customs procure [redacted] devices for use at specified ports of entry; Coast Guard was to procure [redacted] devices for use in examining ship cargoes; and INS was to procure [redacted] devices for use by the Border Patrol in examining aliens. The report was approved by the IIC and by all ICIS agencies with the exception of Treasury which submitted a counterproposal calling for procurement by Customs of [redacted] devices. No recommendation was made for Coast Guard participation. The program recommended by the Subcommittee for implementation by Treasury would cost an estimated $2,500,000 the first year. The Treasury counterproposal would cost an estimated $500,000.

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By memorandum dated September 7, 1955, ICIS forwarded for IIC comment draft letters to Treasury, the Attorney General, and to the Atomic Energy Commission. The letter to the Attorney General requested implementation of that portion of the program recommended for INS participation. The letter to the Atomic Energy Commission indicated that agencies were being assigned operational responsibility for the procurement, operation, and maintenance of the detection devices but requested AEC remain responsible for additional research and technical advice. The letter to Treasury acknowledged the Treasury counterproposal, noted that it was limited in scope and application but requested implementation on the basis that it was at least a start toward a desirable program. IIC letter dated September 28, 1955, informed ICIS that IIC agreed with the letters to AEC and the Attorney General but that the IIC considered the Treasury counterproposal unsatisfactory and a temporizing measure which would not accomplish the objective of the program. The letter urged that implementation of the program recommended by the Joint Subcommittee be expedited.

This matter has been followed closely with ICIS since that time and Liaison has learned that Treasury is adamant in its refusal to exceed the scope of the program contained in its counterproposal. In addition, Treasury now insists that a press release be made concerning use of the devices before even the counterproposal is implemented. ICIS letter January 11, 1956, attached, forwarded for IIC comment three revised draft letters together with a suggested press release for issuance by Treasury. The letter of transmittal states that ICIS has decided that it would be more practicable to authorize the Treasury $500,000 program immediately in view of the delay that would be involved in processing a split report through the Planning Board to the National Security Council. In addition, it is noted that it would require from 8 to 10 months to complete even this part of the program. The letter of transmittal states that it is thought that the IIC may

wish to reconsider in view of: (1) The difficulty of getting started on a more extensive program; (2) The time that will be required to put even the most limited program into effect; and (3) The clear understanding that the contemplated program is to be regarded only as a beginning, and development into a more extensive program is not to be considered precluded and is indeed to remain as a subject for continued consideration by the internal security committees.

The draft letters to the Attorney General and to AEC remain essentially unchanged. The letter to Treasury requests implementation of the Treasury counterproposal on the basis cited in (3) above. The letter informs Treasury that it must assume budgetary responsibility for maintenance, procurement, and operation of the devices. It further notes that [redacted] b2 b7E

[redacted] *devices, and that this consideration be expedited. Periodic reports by Treasury are requested. The proposed press release quotes Treasury as announcing expanded use in connection with Customs inspections of devices designed to detect the presence of radioactive materials. It is stated that these have been used experimentally since late 1954 at various ports of entry and it is emphasized that use of the devices has no ill effect on health. Liaison has learned that Treasury alleges that such a release will increase the psychological value of the devices.*

OBSERVATION:

The joint IIC-ICIS consideration of this problem has apparently reached an impasse due to the stubborn refusal by Treasury to spend the money necessary to secure a supply of devices which even its operational agencies agree would be a bare minimum. The question to be decided is whether IIC should compromise since during our consideration of the counterproposal no expanded use whatever is being made of the devices.

We do not believe the IIC should join in any compromise which would be tantamount to agreement in a program of smaller proportions than actually required by the interests of our national security. Through our participation in the Subcommittee, we have arrived at a program which we consider a bare minimum. The Treasury proposal would cut this program more than in half.

Memorandum for Mr. L. V. Boardman

With reference to the press release, we believe that the psychological value of the devices is enhanced by the lack of public statement concerning them. It is probable that the Soviet bloc is aware that devices are in use, but it is not probable that they have accurate information concerning their scope or capabilities. Any statement to the press offers avenues for further questioning and further news stories concerning the devices. These would inevitably have the result of assisting the Soviets in assessing their value.

FBI

ICIS-P25/353

January 11, 1956

Honorable J. Edgar Hoover
Chairman, Interdepartmental
Intelligence Conference
Department of Justice Building
Washington 25, D. C.

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5/1/03 BY SP4BJA/cmp

Dear Mr. Hoover:

Reference is made to your letter dated September 28, 1955, containing the comments of the IIC on the three draft letters dated September 7, 1955, concerning a limited national program for the use of technical devices, addressed respectively to the Attorney General, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission.

Since the IIC comments have been received, the ICIS has discussed the whole program extensively, including the question of possible publicity on the program, as a means of gaining psychological benefits which might be at least as important as the concrete benefits accruing from the use of the devices. The ICIS has also heard briefings from its State and Justice members and the NSC Representative on Internal Security on the actual operations of the devices [redacted] The Treasury Department is strongly of the opinion that the $500,000 program is more advisable until we gain further experience and is unwilling to authorize the expenditure of additional funds at the present time. In view of the delay that would be involved in processing a split report through the Planning Board to the Council, the general consensus has developed in discussions in the ICIS that it would be more practical to immediately authorize the Treasury $500,000 program and the INS program on the understanding that these initial programs would not preclude development of larger programs later on the basis of agreements which might eventually be worked out in the light of experience gained in developing and operating these initial programs. We are informed that it would require from eight to ten months to complete the $500,000 program. It should be noted, however, that the Treasury representative has indicated that his Department will approve this program only on condition that publicity be given regarding the device in the form of a general statement which would not disclose technical details, specific capabilities, or the weaknesses of the device, but which would put the public on notice that examination of persons and baggage was being carried on by means of

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a device capable of detecting the presence of radioactive material. The text of such a release has been prepared and submitted by the Treasury Representative on the ICIS (copies enclosed). Treasury would release this publicity upon the inception of the implementing program. The text is acceptable to the ICIS.

In view of the above it is thought that the IIC may wish to reconsider and to comment further on the Treasury proposal of a $500,000 program in view of (1) the difficulty of getting started on a more extensive program, (2) the time that will be required to put even the most limited program into effect, and (3) the clear understanding that the contemplated program is to be regarded only as a beginning, and that development into a more extensive program is not to be considered precluded and is indeed to remain as a subject for continued consideration by the Internal Security committees.

The draft letters to the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General and the Chairman, AEC, have been appropriately revised and five copies of each, dated January 5, 1956, are enclosed. Also enclosed are five copies of the above-mentioned text of a press release, bearing date of December 15, 1955.

Sincerely yours,

J. Walter Yeagley
Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee
on Internal Security

Enclosure

~~SECRET~~

DRAFT

ICIS-P25/

January 5, 1956

Honorable Herbert Brownell, Jr.
The Attorney General
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Brownell:

Under Presidential authorization of December 29, 1952, the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (IIC) and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS), in conjunction with the Atomic Energy Commission, have been coordinating the development of countermeasures required to detect and defend against the clandestine introduction and detonation of nuclear weapons in the United States. As one phase of this program, the IIC and the ICIS have been considering proposals for the use of devices which have been developed for the detection of fissionable material. A program was developed (contained in the enclosed report, dated March 10, 1955) which was generally favored by the IIC and by the Departments of State, Defense, and Justice of the ICIS. The Treasury Department, however, offered an alternative proposal (copy enclosed). As a start toward a program in this field, and on the understanding that subsequent development of an expanded program on the basis of experience gained from the starting program is not precluded, we are requesting the Department of the Treasury to implement the program called for under its alternative proposal with the request that consideration be given to use of devices by the Coast Guard and that a report be made by Treasury in the near future to IIC and ICIS (letter dated January 5, 1956, to Treasury enclosed). We are also advising the Secretary of the Treasury that the internal security committees have no objection to the issuance of a press release proposed by the Treasury Department along the lines of the copy enclosed, dated December 15, 1955.

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~~SECRET~~

We request that implementation of that portion of the program assigned to the Immigration and Naturalization Service (page 5 of TAB D of the enclosed report dated March 10, 1955) be undertaken as soon as possible. Since this is an operational program, as distinguished from the experimental and field-testing program which has hitherto been in effect, utilizing devices supplied by the Atomic Energy Commission, the requested implementation requires: (a) the assumption of budgetary responsibility for the expenses connected with operational aspects of the program as distinguished from research, (b) assumption of responsibility for procurement of devices through the Atomic Energy Commission, and (c) assumption of responsibility for maintenance and operation of the devices. As you will note from the enclosed letter dated January 5, 1956, to the Atomic Energy Commission, that agency is being requested to assist your department in the procurement of the devices.

In the opinion of the IIC-ICIS the limited program outlined in this communication will, when implemented, aid in carrying into effect certain aspects of previously approved NSC policy which calls for the development of countermeasures for the detection of nuclear weapons whose introduction into the U. S. may be attempted by clandestine means (NSC 5408).

In view of the continuing responsibility of the internal security committees to report periodically on this and related aspects of the clandestine entry problem, we would appreciate periodic reports from the Immigration and Naturalization Service relative to the implementation of the limited program referred to in this communication.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover, Chairman, IIC
J. Walter Yeagley, Chairman, ICIS

Enclosures:
1. Report dated 3/10/55
2. Treasury proposal
3. Letter dated 1/5/56 to Treasury
4. Letter dated 1/5/56 to AEC
5. Proposed press release on use of devices dated 12/15/55

~~SECRET~~ DRAFT

January 5, 1956

Honorable George M. Humphrey
Secretary of the Treasury
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Under Presidential authorization of December 29, 1952, the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (IIC) and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS), in conjunction with the Atomic Energy Commission, have been coordinating the development of countermeasures required to detect and defend against the clandestine introduction and detonation of nuclear weapons in the United States. As one phase of this program, the IIC and the ICIS have been considering proposals for the use of devices which have been developed for the detection of fissionable material. A program was developed (contained in the enclosed report, dated March 10, 1955) which was generally favored by the IIC and by the Departments of State, Defense, and Justice in the ICIS. The Treasury Department, however, through your representative, Mr. Hugo Ranta, offered, on July 20, 1955, an alternative proposal.

The alternative proposal of your Department has been very carefully considered. It is the feeling of the internal security committees that some program, even though limited in scope should be started in this field, on the understanding that it should not preclude development into a larger program subsequently as a result of agreements which may become feasible in the light of experience gained through the development and operation of the starting program. On this basis, we therefore request that implementation of the program outlined in the

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~~SECRET~~

ENCLOSURE

paper (copy enclosed) supplied by Mr. Ramsey at the meeting of the joint IIC-ICIS Committee on July 20, 1955, be undertaken as soon as possible.

As to the release of publicity referred to in the Treasury proposal, the internal security committees have no objection to the issuance of a press release such as the one enclosed, dated December 15, 1955, which was prepared by your Department.

We are also requesting implementation of the Immigration and Naturalization Service part of the program as shown on page 5 of TAB D of the enclosed report (letter dated January 5, 1956, to the Attorney General enclosed).

Since this is an operational program, as distinguished from the experimental and field-testing program which has hitherto been in effect, utilizing devices supplied by the Atomic Energy Commission, the requested implementation requires: (a) the assumption of budgetary responsibility for the expense connected with operational aspects of the program as distinguished from research, (b) assumption of responsibility for procurement of devices through the Atomic Energy Commission, and (c) assumption of responsibility for maintenance and operation of the devices. As you will note from the enclosed letter dated January 5, 1956, to the Atomic Energy Commission, that agency is being requested to advise and assist your Department in the procurement of the devices.

Syracuse, New York, which is one of the ports of entry for Soviet Bloc diplomats, was not listed for coverage in the Treasury proposal. We request that the Bureau of Customs allocate the devices in such a manner as to cover Syracuse.

~~SECRET~~

The Treasury proposal made [illegible] use of the devices by the Coast Guard, but it was noted in the document referred to above that "consideration will be given by the Coast Guard to replacing [redacted] b2 b7E

It is requested that this consideration be expedited and that a report be made in the near future to IIC and ICIS.

In the opinion of the IIC-ICIS the limited program outlined in this communication will, when implemented, aid in carrying into effect certain aspects of previously approved NSC policy which calls for the development of countermeasures for the detection of nuclear weapons whose introduction into the U. S. may be attempted by clandestine means (NSC 5408).

In view of the continuing responsibility of the internal security committees to report periodically on this and related aspects of the clandestine entry problem, we would appreciate periodic reports relative to the Treasury Department's implementation of the limited program referred to in this communication.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover
Chairman, IIC

J. Walter Yeagley
Chairman, ICIS

Enclosures:

1. Report dated March 30, 1955
2. Undated Treasury proposal for Customs part of program
3. Letter dated January 5, 1956 to AEC
4. Letter dated January 5, 1956 to the Attorney General
5. Proposed Press Release on Use of Devices, dated December 15, 1955.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

DRAFT

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January 5, 1955

Honorable Lewis Strauss
Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
Washington, D. C.

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DATE 5/1/03 BY SP4 CTK/ENP

Dear Mr. Strauss:

The IIC and the ICIS have been giving consideration to the manner of continuing the program regarding the development and use of technical devices for the detection of clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons or components into the United States. In conjunction therewith your letter of April 7, 1955, has been considered.

Your letter summarizes the results of research efforts to date and suggests that for the future, responsibility for the production and further engineering development of detection devices based on the known principles be assumed by the agency or department of the government charged with the principal operational responsibility for use of detection devices. This proposal would mean, since the Bureau of Customs and the Coast Guard are the chief users, that Treasury would have to assume such responsibility. It does not seem to us that Treasury is equipped to accept this responsibility.

As you know, this whole program, including the responsibility assumed by the AEC, resulted from the adoption of a recommendation in the report to the President dated December 4, 1952 on the subject of counter-measures required to detect and defend against the clandestine introduction and detonation-in-place of demolition atomic weapons in the United States. The President, on December 29, 1952, authorized implementation of the recommendations in the report as a broad guide to the departments and agencies concerned in establishing necessary detection and counter-

~~SECRET~~ WNINTEL

measures with respect to the subject, under the coordination of the IIC and the ICIS in conjunction with the AEC.

It is of course true that much of the research and development work in this connection has been accomplished. Nevertheless, it is the view of the two internal security committees that the AEC, in view of its responsibilities and in viewof its being the agency best qualified in this field on the basis of special knowledge, should continue this important coordination for the indefinite future.

As you are aware, the two committees are recommending a limited national program for the increased use of detection devices, and we are at this time requesting implementing action by the Departments of Treasury and Justice (see enclosed letters dated January 5, 1956, to those departments, the report dated March 10, 1955, and the Treasury alternative proposal on the Customs portion of the program).

In connection with your suggestion that the operational agencies undertake responsibility for the production and further engineering development of detection devices, it is the feeling of the Internal Security Committees that the responsibilities now being assigned to those agencies are properly confined to the areas of procurement through the AEC and the operation, with technical advice, information and guidance supplied by the AEC in the furtherance of its continuing responsibility for the research aspects of the problem. It is accordingly requested that the Commission procure the additional devices as requested by the agencies under the limited program outlined in the enclosures. Futhermore, as experience in the use of the devices under this program is gained, further engineering and development of the devices in use might become possible, and we feel

that the AEC should be available to assist-where necessary in this type of improvement. The security committees urge, however, that whatever further work of a research and development nature is to be carried on be, as in the past, by or under the direction of the AEC, with a view to obtaining the most effective device possible for the detection of the clandestine introduction of fissionable material.

You will note from the enclosure that the IIC-ICIS will review periodic reports received from the operational agencies relative to their implementation of the approved program, and it is anticipated that the assistance of the AEC will continue to be required by the Committees in evaluating such reports.

Sincerely,

J. Edgar Hoover
Chairman, IIC

J. Walter Yeagley
Chairman, ICIS

Enclosures

Letters dated January 5, 1956 to Treasury and Justice
Report dated March 10, 1955
Treasury alternative proposal on Customs portion
of program

~~SECRET~~

December 15, 1955

Treasury Proposed Release on Devices

The Treasury Department today announced that it is expanding its use in connection with customs inspections of devices designed to detect the presence of radioactive materials. These devices have been used on an experimental basis since the fall of 1954 at various ports of entry in the examination of persons, baggage, and cargo entering the United States. The Department emphasized that the use of the devices has no ill effect whatsoever on the health of individuals regardless of the number of times persons clear customs.

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5/1/03 BY SP4 STR/RNP

~~SECRET~~

ENCLOSURE

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: January 18, 1956

FROM : MR. A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

My memorandum of January 17, 1956, recommended that the Bureau oppose the ICIS recommendation concerning the limited national program for use of devices which will detect radioactive material. ICIS had recommended that we accept a Treasury counterproposal whereby Treasury would spend only $500,000 instead of the $2,500,000 program urged by a Joint IIC-ICIS Subcommittee for implementation by Customs and Coast Guard.

Leonard Bienvenu, Executive Secretary, ICIS, today informed Liaison that ICIS Chairman J. Walter Yeagley had presented the entire matter to the Attorney General for his opinion. Yeagley is said to have explained to the Attorney General that inasmuch as Treasury refused to spend more than the $500,000 and since no action was being taken to expand the use of the devices during our discussions, he would recommend that the Treasury's proposal be accepted. Bienvenu stated that the Attorney General considered the matter and informed Yeagley that he agreed with Yeagley's position including approval of the press release recommended by Treasury.

ACTION:

This is for your information. The Director today approved the action recommended in my memorandum of January 17, 1956, for the adoption of a position contrary to that which the Attorney General has reportedly adopted.

GAD:lmm
(6)
1 - Mr. Boardman
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Whitson
1 - Section Tickler
1 - Mr. Day

ATTACHED

I think a memo should go to AG re this

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/2/03 BY SP4 BJA/ENP

62-117-262

RECORDED - 8 JAN 31 1956

INDEXED

memo from Mr. Belmont A. H. to Mr. Boardman 1/19/56 with memo to A.G. re Hoover 1/20/56 - GAD

59 FEB 10 1956

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

DATE: January 19, 1956

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
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Rosen
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Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION-IN-PLACE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES
SMUGGLING Atom Bombs

My memoranda of January 17 and 18, attached, analyzed an ICIS proposal to accept Treasury's own program for use of devices to detect radioactive material rather than the program recommended by a joint IIC-ICIS Subcommittee. It was recommended, and the Director agreed, that we believe the program developed by the joint Subcommittee would be a minimum security program which should not be reduced; further, that we oppose issuance of any statement to the press concerning use of the detection devices. (Treasury insists on such a release.) It was further noted that ICIS Chairman Walter Yeagley had discussed the matter with the Attorney General and that the Attorney General had agreed with Yeagley's position approving the press release and approving the Treasury counterproposal.

Mr. Tolson indicated that a memorandum should be sent to the Attorney General concerning the matter, to which the Director agreed.

ACTION:

Attached for approval is a memorandum informing the Attorney General and Mr. Rogers of the current status of this matter. The memorandum makes reference to our earlier communication which furnished complete background and notes the ICIS proposal that Treasury's terms be accepted. It is pointed out that we cannot accept a measure which offers less than minimum security and that if Treasury's refusal to participate fully in the program is based on its cost, this is a decision for higher authority as to whether or not the national economy can afford it.

Enclosures (3)
GAD:hke
(6)
1-Mr. Boardman
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Mr. Day
1-Section Tickler

RECORDED - 64 117-268-
6 JAN 31 1956

(3) Attached

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4-312

DATE OF MAIL 1-20-56

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5/2/03 BY SP4 BJA/RWP

b6
b7C

HAS BEEN REMOVED FOR [redacted] TO BE KEPT PERMANENTLY IN HIS OFFICE, ROOM [redacted] 1734

SEE FILE 66-2554-7530 FOR AUTHORITY.

SUBJECT JUNE MAIL Smuggling Atomic Bombs

REMOVED BY [redacted]

FILE NUMBER 117-268-V

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGEOUT

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: January 24, 1956

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION-IN-PLACE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

SMUGGLING Atom Bombs

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

My memoranda of January 17, 18, and 19, attached, analyzed an ICIS proposal to accept Treasury's own program for use of devices to detect radioactive material rather than the program recommended by a joint IIC-ICIS Subcommittee. The Attorney General was informed by letter dated January 20, 1956, of the Director's belief that the Subcommittee program was a minimum security program which should not be reduced and of the Director's opposition to the issuance of any press release concerning use of the detection devices.

This matter was considered by the IIC Working Committee at its meeting on January 20, 1956, and the members concurred with the Director's comments and with the position which IIC previously furnished to ICIS by letter dated September 28, 1955.

ACTION:

Attached for approval and signature of the Director as IIC Chairman is a letter informing ICIS that the IIC cannot concur with the reduced program proposed by Treasury. The letter reiterates the previous IIC position and states that the decision as to whether our economy can or cannot afford these measures must be made by higher authority in the light of the serious threat to our internal security. The letter points out the harmful results which would be expected following issuance of a press release concerning the devices and notes that more than ten months have now passed with no action having been taken to implement this important program. The letter states that the IIC feels that positive action should be taken without further delay. The other members of the IIC have concurred in this letter.

Enclosures (4)

GAD:hke
(6)
1-Mr. Boardman
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Day
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Section Tickler

RECORDED 64 27 JAN 31 1956

117-268-

59 FEB 6 1956

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: January 24, 1956

FROM : R. R. ROACH

SUBJECT: REAPPRAISAL OF U. S. POLICY REGARDING SOVIET BLOC SHIPMENTS AFFORDED DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY

William Foley, Justice Representative on the National Security Council Planning Board, today advised Liaison that NSC Planning Board consideration of the joint IIC-ICIS report on limiting the diplomatic pouch had again been postponed. The matter is now scheduled to appear on the Planning Board agenda for February 6 and 13, it being felt that discussion will occupy two meetings.

Foley said that no formal invitation would be issued, but he expected that you would attend to represent the IIC. He said that the attendance of Lish Whitson would also be of assistance to the Board's consideration of this problem.

ACTION:

This is for your information. Liaison will keep you advised of developments.

GAD:hke
(5)

1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Mr. Day
1-Section Tickler

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/2/03 BY SP4 BJA/KAP

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

EX-107

17 FEB 6 1956

AIR-TEL
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

NEW YORK, NY, 1/26/56

FD-36
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mason
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Nease
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

Transmit the following Teletype message to: BUREAU

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF OR OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DISTRUCTION INTO THE US - AEA

US Customs, NYC, advised [redacted] arrived NY International Airport 7:25 a.m. [redacted] Vanadium Corporation of America, 420 Lexington Ave., NYC, residence [redacted] NYC, carries US Passport Number [redacted] issued Washington, D.C. [redacted] declared six pounds of ore as part of personal baggage. Examination of luggage with secret device showed indication of radioactivity [redacted]

In declaration [redacted] stated ore acquired in Spain. [redacted] known to AEC, NYC, who released material as did US Customs. For information.

116-77616 (ND)
KELLY

ORE DECLARED.
NO ACTION NECESSARY.
LW

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/2/03 BY SP4CTA/RNP

Mr. Nichols

3-Bureau (117-268) (RM)
1-New York (117-192)

JJD:ECF (#1)
(5)

117-215-1
2-7

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

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b7C
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[redacted] AIRTEL [redacted]

[redacted] EAU OF INVESTIGATI[redacted]

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FD-36

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mason
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Nease
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. [redacted]
Miss [redacted]

- - - - - - -

1/31/56
New York, New York

Transmit the following Teletype message to: Bureau

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF OR OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES, AEA.

Customs Officer, [redacted] Idlewild Airport, NYC, advised at 1:40 PM this date, one [redacted] a chemist and entomologist, Bogota, Colombia, arrived Idlewild Airport, 11:45 AM, via KLM Airlines, in transit, Peru. [redacted] in possession of suspended solution of phosphorous which registered maximum reading [redacted] arrived from Germany where phosphorous solution obtained.

Solution to be utilized in treatment of cotton crop in Peru to combat damage caused by boll weevil. [redacted] not in possession of U.S. visa, therefore, passport surrendered to INS to be held by latter agency until [redacted] departure 5:00 PM this date, via Panagra Airlines.

LEONARD R. SOLON, Chief, Radiation Branch, AEC, authorized clearance.

NYO indices negative re [redacted] For information.

KELLY

RADIOACTIVE PHOSPHOROUS SOLUTION NOT SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL OR SOURCE MATERIAL UNDER AE.ACT. NO ACTION NECESSARY. LW

3 - Bureau (RM)

WJMcD:pam (#1)
(117-192)
(5)

RECORDED - 26 11-2626
FEB 1 1956

EX - 107

ESP[redacted]

Mr. Belmont

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/2/03 BY SP4 [redacted]

59 FEB 10 1956

Approved _____ Sent _____ M. Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

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b6
b7C
b7E

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: February 1, 1956

FROM : R. R. ROACH

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

MISS LEWIS

SUBJECT: REAPPRAISAL OF U. S. POLICY REGARDING SOVIET BLOC SHIPMENTS AFFORDED DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY

William Foley, Justice Observer on the National Security Council Planning Board, advised Liaison at 3:15 p.m., February 1, 1956, that the consideration of the IIC-ICIS report on limiting the diplomatic pouch had been postponed until February 13, next.

You will recall that this matter had been postponed on several previous occasions. The present scheduling is for consideration at the meeting to be held at 2:00 p.m., February 13, 1956, in Room 384, Executive Office Building (Old State).

ACTION:

Liaison will continue to inform you of developments in this matter.

GAD:hke
(5)

1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Mr. Day
1-Section Tickler

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/2/03 BY SP4 BOATENP

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117-264-1

59 FEB 10

EX-107

LIAISON

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: February 1, 1956

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

Tolson
Boardman
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Mohr
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Rosen
Tamm
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Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION-IN-PLACE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

IIC letter January 25, 1956, informed ICIS that the IIC could not concur in the reduced program proposed by Treasury for its use of devices which will detect the presence of radioactive materials. The IIC letter pointed out that more than ten months had passed since a national program for use of these devices was recommended by a joint subcommittee and that no action had yet been taken to implement the program although the threat of clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons continued to exist and the need for an effective defense remained unsatisfied.

ICIS Secretary Bienvenu on January 30, 1956, telephoned Liaison Agent Day, the IIC Secretary, and asked, with respect to the delay noted in the IIC letter, whether some agreement might be reached whereby Treasury could be asked to start on at least a partial program. Bienvenu was informed that there was nothing whatever preventing Treasury from starting on the program and that, in view of the threat and the Treasury participation in the studies made concerning the use of these devices, the IIC felt there was no reason why Treasury, of its own initiative, should not commence this program. Bienvenu said that he agreed with this and suggested the possibility of an IIC-ICIS letter asking Treasury to start the program even though the full extent of its participation had not yet been decided.

Bienvenu was informed that IIC could not concur in any measure less than the program indicated by the joint subcommittee to be a bare minimum "not commensurate with the threat." It was further pointed out to Bienvenu that the INS participation on which both IIC and ICIS agreed was also being delayed during discussion of Treasury's counterproposal. Bienvenu said he would discuss this matter with ICIS Chairman Yeagley and if Yeagley approved, would meet with the IIC Secretary in an effort to draft letters which would be acceptable to both committees and which would have the effect of getting the program under way.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/2/03 BY SP4 STP/jmp

GAD:hke:jdd
(6)

RECORDED-87
INDEXED-87

117-268-1

1 - Mr. Boardman
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Whitson
1 - Mr. Day
1 - Section Tickler

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

LIAISON

Memorandum for Mr. Boardman

OBSERVATION:

IIC letter January 25, last, took a strong position in favor of the program in which all IIC-ICIS agencies except Treasury had concurred. The Director also emphasized this position in his letter to the Attorney General of January 20, 1956. We have made it clear that we will not compromise and approve a program which affords less than minimum security. We have also made it clear that this matter is being unduly delayed and that the responsibility for this delay rests in ICIS.

ACTION:

If you approve, Liaison will, with the ICIS Secretary, draft letters which will initiate INS participation in the program and will request Treasury to make an immediate start at implementation of the program recommended for its use. The letter will acknowledge that the full extent of Treasury's participation is still under discussion; will point out that the IIC position has not changed; and will state that the nature of the threat makes it imperative that Treasury commence action on its own initiative without further delay.

What is meant by this?

cc - Lie
Whi

AIR-TEL

FEBRUARY 6, 1956

SAC, NEW YORK (117-192)

(orig and 1)

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF
OR OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE U.S.
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

RECORDED - 81

Reurtel 1-26-56 quoting AEC, NYC, to effect that Professor [redacted] was one of Soviet participants in Geneva Conference on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy. AEC headquarters, Washington, D. C., has no record of [redacted] being at Geneva Conference.

Determine promptly basis for statement made by AEC, NYC.

Hoover

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LW:blb
(5)

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DATE 5/2/03 BY SP4BJA/ENP

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Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

MAILED 27

59 FEB 10 1956

5-12 (1-1-56)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
LIAISON SECTION

_____, 1956

___Director	___Mr. Bartlett
___Mr. Tolson	___Mr. Bates
___Mr. Boardman	___Mr. J.W. Brown
___Mr. Belmont	___Mr. Daunt
___Mr. Hennrich	___Mr. Day
___Mr. Sizoo	___Mr. Dougherty
___Mr. Cleveland	___Mr. Estill
	___Mr. Ferris
___Mr. Roach	___Mr. Fipp
___Mr. Philcox	___Mr. Kuhrtz
	___Mr. Martin
___Mr. Baumgardner	___Mr. McArdle
___Mr. Bland	___Mr. Moynihan
___Mr. Branigan	___Mr. Papich
___Mr. W.C. Sullivan	___Mr. Short
	___Mr. Stevenson
___Mr. Callan	___Mr. D.J. Sullivan
___Mr. H.L. Edwards	___Mr. Wells
___Mr. Scatterday	___Mr. Whaley
___Mr. Stanley	___Mr. Woods
	___Mr. Young
___Mrs. Schwab	
___Miss Wielkiewicz	___Miss Cole
___Miss Goggins	___Miss Gronquist
___Mrs. Cuozzo	___Miss Rogers
___Mrs. Henley	___Miss El. Toby
___Miss Lewis	___M[redacted]
	✓ M[redacted]
___Miss_____	
Room_____	Room 1730

___See Me Please	___Records Section
___Call Me Please	___Routing Unit
___Please Handle	___Send File UTD
___Please note and return	___Place on record and return
___Mail Room,5533	___Ident. Div.
___Reading Room,5531	___Expedite Processing

AEC has no record of [redacted] being at Geneva Conference. AEC NY must have been assuming role

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5/2/03 BY SP4 BSP/PNP

C. W. BATES

b6
b7C

5-7 (7-15-55)
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVI[redacted]N--FBI

1-27, 1956

___Mr. Boardman
___Mr. Belmont
___Mr. Hennrich
___Mr. Keay
___Mr. Cleveland
___Mr. Baumgardner
___Mr. Branigan
___Mr. Roach
___Mr. W.C. Sullivan

___Mechanical Section
___Translation Sec.
6228 IB
___Ident Div.
___Technical Lab
Mr. Fennis 7627

[redacted]

b6
b7C

___Mr. Scatterday Room 7649

SUPERVISORS

___Mr. Aull
___Mr. Baken
___Mr. Bird
___Mr. Broden
___Mr. Calame
___Mr. Callahan
___Mr. Chase
___Mr. Cotter
___Mr. Crowley
___Mr. Day
___Mr. de Bettencourt
___Mr. Donahoe
___Mr. Dunn
___Mr. Ezell
___Mr. Fitzgerald
___Mr. Garrett
___Mr. Gregg
___Mr. Hitt
___Mr. Jaquiss
___Mr. Jensen
___Mr. A.R. Jones
___Mr. F.L. Jones
___Mr. Kissiah
___Mr. Kitchel
___Mr. Kuno
___Mr. Kurtz
___Mr. Lake
___Mr. Lee

___Mr. Lewis
___Mr. Litrento
___Mr. Little
___Mr. McCaslin
___Mr. McDermott
___Mr. Meehan
___Mr. Mossburg
___Mr. Nasca
___Mr. Norstrom
___Mr. Payne
___Mr. Peasinger
___Mr. Sandweg
___Mr. Schweppe
___Mr. Shroder
___Mr. Stacey
___Mr. Stewart
___Mr. Todd
___Mr. Torrillo
___Mr. Tully
___Mr. Turner
___Mr. Turyn
___Mr. Wacks
___Mr. Wallace
___Mr. Wannall
___Mr. Welborn
___Mr. Welte
___Mr. Whaley
___Mr. Whitson

___Mail Room, 5533
___Mrs. Dean
___Mr. Hammond
___Miss Taylor
___Miss Martis
___Correct
___Please call me
___Please see me

___RECORDS SECTION
___Send File
___Bring File up to date
___Place on record and return
___Indicate index ref.

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Note p 2 re Nemkov.

L. Whitson

1730

ESPIONAGE SECTION

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JAN 26 1956

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/2/03 BY SP6CBA/KNP

TELETYPE

WASHINGTON FROM NEW YORK 15 26

DIRECTOR ....U R G E N T....

SMUGGLING ATOM BOMBS OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF OR OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE U.S., AEA. REMYTELS JANUARY TWENTY FOUR AND TWENTY FIVE LAST RE SHIPMENT OF THIRTY TWO POUNDS OF DOCUMENTS RE ATOMIC ENERGY TO PROFESSOR [redacted] MOSCOW, USSR, VIA UN INFO CENTER. [redacted] OF AEC, WASHINGTON, D.C., EXAMINED DOCUMENTS PAGE BY PAGE AT AEC, NYC THIS DATE AND ADVISED DOCUMENTS ARE COMPLETELY UNCLASSIFIED AND RELATE TO INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PEACEFUL USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY HELD RECENTLY AT GENEVA. ONE ENVELOPE IN PACKAGE CONTAINED FORM RECEIPT TO BE ENDORSED BY UN INFO CENTER AT MOSCOW ACKNOWLEDGING RECEIPT OF MATERIAL AND FOR RETURN TO ATOMIC ENERGY CONTROL, ROOM THREE FIVE SIX EIGHT UN, NYC. RECEIPT IS CAPTIONED "INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PEACEFUL USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY" AND INDICATES PACKAGE CONTENTS TO BE TWO COPIES OF PHOTOCOPY OF BOOKS A-E OF VOLUME FIVE IN ENGLISH AND TWO COPIES OF CORRECTIONS ALREADY INCLUDED IN ORDER TO FACILITATE THEIR INDENTIFICATION. ANOTHER ENVELOPE ADDRESSED TO [redacted] ON STATIONERY OF UN FROM D. G. SULLIVAN, EXECUTIVE OFFICER, INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PEACEFUL USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY, CONTAINED

END PAGE ONE

RECORDED - 81 117-368-

INDEXED - 81

7 FEB 7 1956

Mr. Belmont

EX-112

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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL INDICATING PACKAGE CONTAINED TWO SETS OF PHOTOCOPIES OF FINAL ENGLISH MANUSCRIPTS OF VOLUME FIVE ENTITLED "PHYSICS OF REACTOR DESIGN" AND TWO SETS OF AUTHORS CORRECTIONS. AEC, NYC ADVISES PROFESSOR [redacted] WAS ONE OF SOVIET PARTICIPANTS IN GENEVA CONFERENCE. AEC ADVISES MATERIAL WILL BE RETURNED TO U.S. CUSTOMS ON JANUARY TWENTY SEVEN NEXT FOR RESUMPTION OF SHIPMENT TO MOSCOW VIA SCANDINAVIAN AND A USSR AIRLINE. IN VIEW OF ABOVE, NO FURTHER ACTION BY NYO.

b6
b7C

KELLY

END

HOLD PLS

NY R 15 WA SH

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: February 3, 1956

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION-IN-PLACE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
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Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/2/03 BY SP4 DOA/CMP

My memorandum of February 1, 1956, referred to the delay in commencing a national program for use of devices which will detect radioactive materials which is being caused by Treasury's refusal to participate to the extent recommended by a Joint IIC-ICIS Subcommittee.

The Subcommittee recommended use of the devices by Customs, Coast Guard, and Immigration (INS). Both IIC and ICIS have agreed in the program recommended for INS, yet the program has not been started because ICIS has considered it jointly with the program for Customs, to which program Treasury does not agree. INS was represented on an advisory group which concurred in the recommendation that INS procure 31 portable devices for use by Border Patrol in examining aliens. My memorandum of February 1 suggested, subject to approval, that Liaison attempt, with the ICIS Secretary, to draft letters "which will initiate INS participation in the program." The Director asked what was meant by this.

This recommendation was made in response to a request from the ICIS Secretary, who recognized that ICIS was responsible for delay in this matter and hoped that letters, acceptable to both IIC and ICIS, could be drafted which would ask INS to implement that portion of the program which had been recommended for its use and which would ask Treasury to make an immediate start on its share of the program. The ICIS Secretary has subsequently advised, however, that Treasury remains adamant in its refusal to participate unless a press release is made concerning use of the devices and that Treasury will not approve a letter asking INS to participate without such a press release. As you know, the IIC has opposed issuance of publicity on the grounds it would arouse press interest in the devices and result in stories furnishing the Soviets with information concerning their capabilities.

GAD:hke
(6)
1-Mr. Boardman
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Mr. Day
1-Section Tickler

FEB 10 1956

RECORDED-91
INDEXED-9

111-368

6 FEB 7 1956

LIAISON

Analysis of UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

Memorandum for Mr. L. V. Boardman

ACTION:

Since it is now apparent that mutually satisfactory letters cannot be drafted, no further action need be taken at this time. We have made it clear that this matter is being unduly delayed and the responsibility for this delay rests in ICIS. No further action need be taken by IIC at this time as by our letter to ICIS dated January 25, 1956, we reiterated our position, called attention to the delay, and urged that positive action be taken promptly. A copy of our January 25, 1956, letter to ICIS was made available through Liaison to Pat Coyne of the National Security Council for his information.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: February 2, 1956

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION-IN-PLACE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

IIC letter January 25, 1956, discussed the program recommended by a Joint IIC-ICIS Subcommittee for use of devices which will detect radioactive materials and informed ICIS that the IIC could not concur in the Treasury proposal to reduce substantially that portion of the program recommended for implementation by Treasury. Treasury had reduced, by more than half, the number of devices which the subcommittee recommended be utilized by the Customs Bureau, and the Treasury counterproposal made no commitment for use of the devices by Coast Guard although the subcommittee had recommended that Coast Guard procure [redacted] devices for use in examining ship cargoes.

ICIS Secretary Bienvenu orally informed Liaison today that Coast Guard, of their own volition, has now ordered [redacted] these devices for the use described above. Bienvenu was informed by the IIC Secretary that this information would be made available to the IIC members. He was also informed that this would have no effect upon the IIC position that the full program recommended by the subcommittee for implementation by the Bureau of Customs should be adopted and promptly commenced.

ACTION:

This is for your information. The IIC Working Committee members are being informed of Bienvenu's report.

GAD:hke
(6)
1-Mr. Boardman
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Mr. Day
1-Section Tickler

RECORDED - 97

117-968

2 FEB 8 1956

Liaison

FEB 14 1956

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/2/03 BY SP4 BSM/MP

b2
b7E

DATE OF MAIL 2-2-56

HAS BEEN REMOVED FOR MR [redacted] TO BE KEPT PERMANENTLY IN HIS OFFICE, ROOM ~~1526~~ 5/1734

b6
b7C

SEE FILE 66-2554-7530 FOR AUTHORITY.

SUBJECT JUNE MAIL Smuggling Atomic Bombs

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/2/03 BY SP4 BJA/RNP

59 FEB 14 1956

REMOVED BY

FILE NUMBER 117-268 -V

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGEOUT

AIRTEL

1 - orig. and 3
1 - yellow
1 - Mr. Boardman
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Whitson
1 - Section tic
1 - Mr. Day

February 9, 1956

MAIL, NEW YORK
SAN ANTONIO

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5/2/03 BY SP4 [illegible]

NATIONAL PROGRAM FOR USE OF DETECTION DEVICES; INFORMATION CONCERNING - LIAISON

The Internal Security committee of the National Security Council have been considering recommendations for the establishment of a national program for the use of devices which will detect radioactivity such as are now being used on an experimental basis [redacted]

[redacted] the Inter-Departmental Intelligence Conference, of which I am Chairman, has opposed the issuance of a press release concerning the use of these devices. It has been claimed by those favoring the issuance of such a release that numerous questions have been asked by the general public concerning whether the devices have an injurious effect upon the health of persons exposed to them.

The Bureau has not received information indicating that any volume of such inquiries has been received. It is possible, however, that these questions have been limited to the individuals operating the devices, or that the inquiries have been received by Customs officials through the mail. In order to determine whether use of the devices is occasioning concern over their possible effects upon health, you should make inquiry both of the individuals actually operating the devices and of the supervisory officials to whose attention written or oral complaints would come. You should tactfully determine whether any substantial volume of such complaints has been received and if such exists, the general nature of the inquiries which have been made. No reference should be made to the possibility of a press release or to IIC interest in such a release. Inquiries should be made by New York of, among other sources, Commissioner of Customs Dill, Deputy Commissioner Flynn, and the Deputy Commissioner at Idlewild.

RECORDED-35 117-368

Your replies, designated for the attention of the Liaison Section, should be forwarded to reach the Bureau not later than February 17, 1956.

INDEXED-35

17 FEB 10 1956

GAD:mlp/dje
(10)

59 FEB 16 1956

COver memo Belmont to Boardman, 2-9-56, Re: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF ATOMIC WEAPONS INTO THE UNITED STATES; GAD:mlp/dje

b2
b7E

cc - Roach
Whitson

SAC, New York (117-192) (orig and 1) February 10, 1956

Director, FBI (117-268)- [illegible]

RECORDED-20

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF OR OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

Reurtel 1-28-56 concerning carton weighing 71 pounds shipped from Sweden to Professor [redacted] Lamont Laboratories, Palisades, New York. You advised carton bore notation "Atomic Energy Contract" and contained mild uranium ore pitch in rock ore form.

The Atomic Energy Commission headquarters, Washington, D. C., has advised that [redacted] has an active Atomic Energy Commission clearance as the Lamont Laboratories, Columbia University. [redacted] contract is a Class B contract with the Atomic Energy Commission New York Operations Office. For the completion of your records and the Bureau's records, you should obtain the name and address of the shipper of the carton.

b6
b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5/2/03 BY SP4 [illegible]

LW:blb
(5)

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

COMM - FBI
FEB 10 1956
MAILED 20

FEB 17 1956

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JAN 23 1956

TELETYPE

Mr. [illegible]
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Nease
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy
8-30P

WASHINGTON FROM NEW YORK 16 23

DIRECTOR ....D E F E R R E D....

SMUGGLING OF ATMOIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF OR OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE U.S. - AEA. [redacted] APPRAISER OF MERCHANDISE, TWO ZERO ONE VARICK STREET, NYC ADVISED THIS DATE THAT ONE CARTON WEIGHING SEVENTY ONE POUNDS ARRIVED AT PIER FIFTEEN, BROOKLYN, NY. ON DECEMBER TWENTY ONE, FIFTY FIVE AND WAS DELIVERED TO APPRAISER-S OFFICE ON JANUARY ELEVEN, FIFTY SIX. CARTON ADDRESSED TO PROFESSOR [redacted] LAMONT LABORATORIES, PALISADES, NY WITH NOTATION QUOTE ATOMIC ENERGY CONTRACT UNQUOTE. CARTON ARRIVED FROM SWEDEN VIA SS MORMAC SAGA. SAMPLE OFFICE PACKAGE NUMBER ONE TWO ZERO DESCRIBED CONTENTS AS ONE CASE MILD URANIUM ORE PITCH IN ROCK ORE FORM. MACHINE USED TO DETECT FISSIONABLE MATERIALS LOCATED AT APPRAISER-S OFFICE, DESIGNATED

[redacted]

END PAGE ONE

Mr. Belmont

RECORDED-20

FEB 13 1956

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/2/03 BY SP4 BJK/KNP

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AEC, NYC ADVISED THE APPRAISER-S OFFICE TO RELEASE SAID CARTON TO ADDRESSEE. INDICES, NYO REFLECT CLOSED AEAA CASE ON [redacted] KULP, DOB FEBRUARY ELEVEN, TWENTY ONE, TRENTON, N.J. NO DEROGATORY INFORMATION DEVELOPED. NY FILE SIXTY TWO DASH NINE SIX FOUR NINE DASH ONE SIX EIGHT REFLECTS ONE [redacted] LAMONT OBSERVATORIES, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, PALISADES, NY, AS PLANT INFORMANT AT NY OPERATIONS OFFICE, B CONTRACT RESEARCH. INDICES CONTAIN NO FURTHER IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION. ABOVE FURNISHED FOR INFORMATION OF THE BUREAU. NO FURTHER ACTION BEING TAKEN BY THE NYO.

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KELLY

END

NY R 16 WA WS

TU

[redacted] has active AEC clearance. as Lamont Lab, Columbia U. Contract is with AEC NY operations office. (Class B Contract.)

Security inspection made of this facility and AEC rated it unsatisfactory - [redacted] had 60 secret reports but didn't have the required guard or alarm system.

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5/2/03 BY SP4 COTA/RNP

[redacted] SECRET [redacted]

Boardman
Belmont
Roach
Whitson

5-2-03
CLASSIFIED BY 60267 NCS/BJA/RNP
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 6

117-268

RECORDED - 77

Date: February 8, 1956

To: Captain John A. Waters
Director of Security
Atomic Energy Commission
Room 926
1717 H Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

VIA LIAISON

(orig and 1)

To Waters 2-9-56 emb

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

BY COURIER SVC.
10 FEB 9
COMM - FBI

U.S. Customs at Idlewild International Airport, New York, has informed the FBI that one [redacted] arrived February 1, 1956, at Idlewild in transit to Canada.

[redacted] was in possession of British passport [redacted] and was identified as a metallurgist and liaison officer, United Kingdom Atomic Energy Administration, Didcot, Berkshire, England. [redacted] had in his possession a package weighing 400 grams labelled "RA-100 radioactive," which contained nine vials approximating the size and shape of cigarettes. Four vials contained uranium and the remainder contained uranium oxide. [redacted]

The package was consigned to [redacted] Atomic Energy of Canada, Ltd., Chalk River, Ontario. [redacted] advised that the shipment was to be utilized in experimental fuel tests.

Customs informed the FBI that the Atomic Energy Commission in New York had been advised of the foregoing and clearance had been authorized by Mr. Henson Blatz of the Atomic Energy Commission office.

cc - 1 - AAG Tompkins by r.s. 0-6 same date.
LW:blb
(9)

13 1956

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Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

[redacted] SECRET [redacted]

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~~SECRET~~

Letter to Captain John A. Waters
Director of Security
Atomic Energy Commission

The FBI has no information identifiable with Plail.

[redacted] (S)

b1

cc - 1 - Mr. Dennis A. Flinn
Director
Office of Security
Department of State
515 22nd Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

BY COURIER SERVICE

~~SECRET~~

FD-36

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

AIRTEL

NY, NY, 2/1/56

Transmit the following Teletype message to: BUREAU

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF OR OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES, AEA.

N/R per Miss Walker, Intelligence, 2-6-56 LM

Customs Officer [redacted] Idlewild Airport, NYC advised at 3:45 p.m. this date of the arrival of one [redacted] via BOAC flight #521 at 2:34 p.m. in transit Canada. [redacted] will depart from Idlewild for Canada via Colonial Airlines 5:20 p.m. this date.

[redacted] gave his address as [redacted] England and employment as metallurgist and liaison officer, United Kingdon AEA, Didcot,Berks, England. He was in possession of British passport [redacted] and accompanying a package weighing 400 grams which contained nine vials approximating the size and shape of a cigarette. Four vials contained uranium and five vials uranium oxide. This shipment [redacted] package labeled "RA-100 radioactive". Consigned to [redacted] Atomic Energy of Canada, Ltd., Chalk River, Ontario, from Director, United Kingdom AEA, Aere Harwell, Didcot Berks, England. [redacted] advised the shipment was to be utilized in experimental fuel tests.

Customs stated AEC, NYC advised and clearance authorized by HANSON BLATZ, AEC.

Indices NYO negative re [redacted]

For information.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/2/03 BY SP4 BSK/JP

RECORDED - 77

INDEXED - 77

KELLY

117-368-

Mr. Belmont

(3) Bureau (RM)

WJM:EG
117-192
(5)

Approved _____ Sent _____ M. Per _____

Special Agent in Charge

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CONFIDENTIAL

...lers - Mr. Kitchel
Liaison

RECORDED-38
INDEXED-38

Date: February 9, 1956

BY COURIER SERVICE

To: Captain John A. Waters (Orig & 1)
Director of Security
Atomic Energy Commission
Room 926
1717 H Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

EX-107

DECLASSIFIED BY SP4 STA/ENP
ON 5/2/03

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: BARBU NICULESCU
MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING
(Espionage)

Born 10-14-1911 Bucharest, Rum.

United States Customs advised that [redacted] of the League of Free Rumanians, reportedly an anti-Communist organization, arrived at Idlewild Airport, New York City, from Paris, France, and London, England, on January 29, 1956. At time of entry, he declared a radio-active container and phosphorus plastic samples. The container was reported to have been acquired from "Cirei," 34 Rue du Faubourg, St. Honore, Paris 8, France. [redacted] advised that the container is used medicinally by leaving it overnight in a glass of water and thereafter drinking the water.

[redacted] stated he intends to submit the phosphorus plastic to the U. S. Army in Washington, D. C., for possible use and if the Army is not interested he will explore its commercial use.

Mr. Leonard R. Solon, Health and Service Laboratory, Atomic Energy Commission, New York City, advised that the items carried by [redacted] were of no interest to the Atomic Energy Commission. These items were accordingly released to [redacted]

[redacted] is stateless and has no passport. He traveled on a temporary travel document. He left the United States on January 11, 1956, to travel to Paris and London on business and to visit Rumanian refugees. He presently resides at [redacted] New York City.

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Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

cc - 1 - Assistant Attorney General
William F. Tompkins (by O-6 routing slip same date)

GWK:orm
(8)

FEB 20 1956

BY COURIER SVC.
10 FEB 9
COMM - FBI

CONFIDENTIAL

Letter to Captain John A. Waters
Director of Security
Atomic Energy Commission

This Bureau does not contemplate taking further action in this matter. The above is for your information and is not intended for further dissemination.

cc - 1 - Mr. Dennis A. Flinn
Director
Office of Security
Department of State
515 22nd Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

BY COURIER SERVICE

cc - 1 - Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
Department of the Army
The Pentagon
Washington 25, D. C.

Attention: Chief, Security Division

WASH 9 FROM NY 30 6-20 PM

DIRECTOR DEFERRED

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE US DASH AEA. RE MY TEL, JAN TWENTYNINE LAST RE [redacted] LEONARD R. SOLON, HEALTH AND SERVICE LAB AEC, NYC, ADVISED THIS DATE MATERIALS CARRIED BY [redacted] OF NO INTEREST TO AEC. ACCORDINGLY HAVE BEEN RELEASED TO [redacted]

KELLY

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/2/03 BY SP4BJA/RNP

END AND ACK

NY R 9 WA SH

TU DIS

Mr. Bullock

RECORDED

17 FEB 18 1954

Miss Gandy

b6
b7C

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JAN 29 1956

TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. Nichols	
Mr. Boardman	
Mr. Belmont	✓
Mr. Mason	
Mr. Mohr	
Mr. Parsons	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Tamm	
Mr. Nease	
Mr. Winterrowd	
Tele. Room	
Mr. Holloman	
Miss Gandy	

FBI NEW YORK 1-29-56 4-52 PM JLM

DIRECTOR URGENT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/2/03 BY SP4 BDK/KMP

O SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE US DASH AEA.

US CUSTOMS, NYC, ADVISED THIS DATE [redacted] NYC, EMPLOYED [redacted] LEAGUE OF FREE ROUMANIANS ARRIVED IDLEWILD AIRPORT VIA PAA FLIGHT ONE NAUGHT ONE FROM PARIS AND LONDON AT EIGHT FIFTY FOUR AM THIS DATE. [redacted] STATELESS, HAD NO PASSPORT, BUT TEMPORARY TRAVEL DOCUMENT [redacted] IN LIEU THEREOF AND US RE DASH ENTRY PERMIT A [redacted] BORN RUMANIA. LEFT NYC JANUARY ELEVEN LAST VIA PAA FOR TRAVEL TO PARIS AND LONDON, PRIMARILY FOR BUSINES AND TO VISIT RUMANIAN REFUGEES. ON CUSTOMS DECLARATION TWO SEVEN TWO SEVEN EIGHT THREE NAUGHT, [redacted] DECLARED ONE RADIO DASH ACTIVE CONTAINER AND PHOSPHORUS PLASTIC SAMPLES. CONTAINER ACQUIRED FROM CIREI, THIRTY FOUR RUE DU FAUBOURG, ST. HONORE, PARIS EIGHT, FRANCE. [redacted] STATES CONTAINER USED MEDICINALLY BY LEAVING OVERNIGHT IN GLASS OF WATER, THEREAFTER DRINKING WATER. [redacted]

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RECORDED-38 117-268-

INDEXED-38

Mr. Belmont

END OF PAGE ONE

[redacted] PLASTIC SAMPLES APPEARED TO BE LUMINOUS PLEXI DASH GLASS. [redacted] STATES INTENT TO SUBMIT PLASTIC TO US ARMY IN WASHINGTON FOR POSSIBLE USE AND IF LATTER NOT INTERESTED WILL EXPLORE COMMERCIAL USE THEREOF. [redacted] [redacted] AEC, NYC, NOTIFIED AND WILL EXAMINE PLASTIC SAMPLES. RADIO DASH ACTIVE CONTINER RELEASED ON AUTHORITY AEC.

FILES OF NYO REFLECT THAT [redacted] HAS ADVISED THAT [redacted] AND HAD BEEN A MEMBER OF A FIRM WHICH TOOK OVER THE OPERATION OF A WATCH IMPORTING COMPANY. INSTANT WATCH COMPANY REPORTEDLY OPERATED FOR A NATIONAL MINORITY GROUP DURING THE PERIOD WHEN NONE BUT CHRISTIAN RUMANIANS COULD CONDUCT BUSINESS. HIS PARTNER WAS ONE [redacted] A SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATIVE IN THE COMMUNIST DOMINATED COALITION GOVERNMENT. IN THE COURSE OF CONDUCTING BUSINESS, [redacted] ALLEGEDLY WAS ABLE TO BUILD UP A SUM OF MONEY IN SWISS BANKS WHICH HE DREW UPON AFTER HIS ESCAPE FROM RUMANIA. [redacted] HAS ASCERTAINED FROM [redacted] IN PARIS THAT [redacted] WAS UNKNOWN TO HER PRIOR TO HIS ARRIVAL IN THE

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US. ACCORDING TO [redacted] THE ONLY CONNECTION THAT CAN BE DRAWN IS THAT [redacted] IN THE RUMANIAN ARMY AND MAY HAVE BECOME ACQUAINTED WITH [redacted] AT THAT TIME. [redacted] HAS ADVISED THAT [redacted] WOULD BE OF THE SAME MIND AS [redacted]

BY LETTER DATED MAY NINETEEN, NINETEEN FIFTYFOUR, INS, NYC, ADVISED THEY PROPOSED TO USE [redacted] AS A POSSIBLE WITNESS OR INFORMANT. AT THAT TIME, [redacted] IN BUCHAREST, ROUMANIA, WAS ASSIGNED INS FILE NUMBER [redacted] NYC, AND WAS EMPLOYED AS [redacted] LEAGUE OF FREE ROUMANIANS. FOR INFO.

KELLY

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b7D

END ACK PLS

5-02 PM OK FBI WA SH

O

FD-36

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mason
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Nease
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

AIR - TEL

2/8/56, New York

Transmit the following Teletype message to: Bureau

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF OR OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE US; ATOMIC ENERTY ACT

ReBuairtel 2/6/56.

HARRY R. WALSH, Chief, Personnel Clearance Branch, Security Division, USAEC, NYC, advised that AEC representatives at New York Operations Office unable to recall if they had specific information that Professor [redacted] was one of Soviet participants at Geneva Conference, however, nature of material and clearance therein indicated that drafts of material discussed were being sent to participants and possibility exists that New York Operations Office officials merely presuming that [redacted] was one of Soviet participants.

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/2/03 BY SP4CBTA/RNP

KELLY

Mr. Belmont

RECORDED-38

INDEXED-38

FEB 9 1956

3 - Bureau (117-268) (RM)
1 - NY 117-192

JJD:cb (#1)
(5)

FEB 20 1956

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

1-Yeagley
1-ITC file
2-CNI, C
1-Mr. C
1-Yellow
1-Mr. Boardman
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Day
1-Section Tickler
1-Mr. Whitson

January 25, 1956

VIA LIAISON

Mr. J. Walter Yeagley
Chairman
Interdepartmental Committee on
Internal Security
Department of Justice Building
Washington, D. C.

SOURCE FOR INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5/6/03 BY SP4BSR/RNP

Dear Mr. Yeagley:

Your letter of January 11, 1956, requested IIC reconsideration and comment concerning draft letters addressed to the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission. Comment was also requested on a proposed press release. These draft letters concerned a limited national program for the use of technical devices designed to detect the presence of radioactive material and were revisions of letters concerning which the IIC had furnished comments by letter dated September 28, 1955. The proposed press release was designed to publicize the utilization of these devices.

It is noted that there has been no change in the Treasury counterproposal other than an indication that it will approve its own recommendation only on condition that publicity be given regarding the device. It is further noted that this counterproposal by Treasury calls for procurement and use of less than half the number of devices recommended by the joint IIC-ICIS Subcommittee which studied this matter and that there is still no definite provision for participation by the Coast Guard.

The IIC cannot concur with the reduced program proposed by Treasury. The joint Subcommittee study resulted in general agreement that the measures recommended were minimum in nature. Treasury proposes to reduce this minimum by more than half. The IIC can only reiterate its previously

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Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

GAD:hke
(13)

(Attached to ~~Belmont memorandum~~ from Mr. Belmont to Mr. Boardman 1/24/56, re "Countermeasures to Detect and Defend Against the Clandestine Introduction and Detonation-in-Place of Atomic Weapons in the United States" GAD:hke)

NOT RECORDED
JAN 30 1956

Letter to Mr. J. Walter Yeagley
Chairman
Interdepartmental Committee on
Internal Security

expressed position that the Treasury proposal fails to accomplish the objective of the program and fails to be responsive to a serious threat to our internal security. The decision as to whether our economy can or cannot afford these measures must be made by higher authority in the light of this threat.

With reference to the press release which Treasury proposes to make, the IIC notes that the devices are identified as designed to detect the presence of radioactive materials. It is probable that the Soviets are aware, through our experimental use of these devices, that something is being used but it is not probable that they are aware of the capability of the devices. The proposed release informs the Soviets that the devices will only detect radioactive materials whereas the Soviets may be under the impression that they will detect the more critical fissionable materials. The release further states, unnecessarily, that use of the devices has no ill effect on health. This matter has not previously arisen, within the knowledge of the IIC, and can only have the effect of raising a question as to why it is included. It is believed an additional harmful result of the issuance of a press release would be the inevitable effort on the part of some member or members of the press to secure more information to serve as a basis for subsequent press stories. Such publicity could only have the effect of furnishing the Soviets with more information concerning our devices.

The IIC further desires to point out that the joint Subcommittee report which recommended adoption of the limited national program was issued on March 10, 1955. More than ten months have now passed and no action has yet been taken to implement this important program. The threat of clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons or their components continues to exist and the need for an effective defense remains unsatisfied.

The IIC feels that some positive action should be taken to implement the Subcommittee's recommendations without further delay.

Sincerely yours,

Chairman
Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: January 26, 1956

FROM : R. R. ROACH

SUBJECT: REAPPRAISAL OF U. S. POLICY REGARDING SOVIET BLOC SHIPMENTS AFFORDED DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
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Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

My memorandum of January 24, 1956, informed you that the pouch report had been tentatively scheduled for National Security Council Planning Board consideration at its meetings on February 6 and 13, next.

Miss Lewis

Pat Coyne, today, advised that the meetings will be held at 2:00 p.m. and that entrance to the Planning Board room can be made through the office of Marion Boggs, Room 384, Executive Office Building (Old State). Coyne pointed out that either or both of these meetings might be postponed or the pouch item might be removed from the agenda with very little notice.

ACTION:

None. This is for your information. You will be promptly informed of any further developments.

GAD:hke
(5)

1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Day
1-Section Tickler
1-Mr. Whitson

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/5/03 BY SP4GTA/ENP

117-368-

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26 JAN 30 1956

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: February 8, 1956

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/5/03 BY SP4 BOA/ENP

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION-IN-PLACE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

In connection with the captioned program, IIC and ICIS have made recommendations for the use of technical devices which will detect radioactivity. The only devices available to this country are sensitive to emanations from a radioactive object and cannot determine whether the object is fissionable material or merely material such as used in painting luminous dial watches and clocks. AEC has for some time been attempting to perfect an active device which will send rays into an object and determine from the return of these rays whether the object contains fissionable material. AEC has available dosimeters (devices for measuring amount of radiation) which would react if exposed to an active device.

[redacted]

b2
b7E

ENCLOSURE

It is recommended that IIC not participate in making this request since [redacted]

FBI-IIC request. If you approve, a unified IIC position will be determined through Liaison, and ICIS will subsequently be informed that while IIC has no objection to the proposed procedure, it will not join in formally requesting it.

Enclosure
GAD:hke
(6)

1-Mr. Boardman
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Day
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Section Tickler

EX. - 108 RECORDED - 4 117-268-9

FEB 14 1956

Memo from Belmont to Mr. Boardman 2/13/56

62 MAR 7 1956

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FBI

ICIS-P25/359

February 7, 1956

Honorable John Foster Dulles
The Secretary of State
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Dulles:

Under Presidential authorization of December 29, 1952, the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (IIC) and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS), in conjunction with the Atomic Energy Commission, have been coordinating the development of countermeasures required to detect and defend against the clandestine introduction and detonation of nuclear weapons in the United States. As one phase of this program, the IIC and the ICIS have been considering proposals for the use of devices which have been developed for the detection of fissionable material.

In connection with discussions of the use of these devices, the desirability and importance have been noted of ascertaining if possible whether Soviet bloc countries are searching incoming persons and baggage by means of detection devices which would register on dosimeters.

[redacted]

b2
b7E

Sincerely,

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/6/03 BY SP4GBA/ENP

J. Edgar Hoover
Chairman, Interdepartmental
Intelligence Conference

J. Walter Yeagley
Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee
on Internal Security

THIS IS THE FBI FILE COPY AS THIS LETTER WAS TYPED IN ICIS.

ENCLOSURE

(Attached to cover memorandum from Mr. Belmont to Mr. Boardman 2/8/56, re "Countermeasures to Detect & Defend Against the clandestine Introduction & Detonation-In-Place of Atomic Weapons in the U.S." GAD:hke)

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

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Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: February 13, 1956

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION-IN-PLACE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

My memorandum February 8, 1956, attached recommended that IIC decline to join in an ICIS proposal that [redacted] The Director approved. b2 b7E

A unified IIC position has been determined through Liaison and on February 10, 1956, ICIS Secretary Bienvenu was informed that IIC would not join in making the request. The proposed letter which ICIS had made available for the signature of the Director as IIC Chairman was returned to Bienvenu. He advised that he would make this information available to the ICIS for its consideration at its meeting during the coming week.

ACTION:

None. The request for IIC action was made orally and was, therefore, answered orally.

Enclosure

GAD:hke
(6)

1-Mr. Boardman
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Mr. Day
1-Section Tickler

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EX. - 108

8 FEB 14 1956

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/5/03 BY SP4PSTA/ENP

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: February 10, 1956

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

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Holloman
Gandy

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/5/03 BY SP4/BTA/RNP

SUBJECT: RECOMMENDED CIVIL DEFENSE ACTION CONCERNING CLANDESTINELY INTRODUCED NUCLEAR DEVICES

Paragraph 20-b-(6) of National Security Council Document 5408, dated February 11, 1954, calls for the "furnishing of guidance by the Federal Civil Defense Administration to local civil defense and other local governmental agencies having responsibility for protective measures to preserve life, to minimize damage from fire, etc." as a part of the program of countermeasures for the detection and prevention of clandestine introduction of atomic weapons.

A proposed Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA) Advisory Bulletin was reviewed by the IIC, and IIC letter June 21, 1955, noted no objections to the Bulletin with the exception of a suggestion that would clarify the procedure whereby FBI would alert appropriate local military officials upon discovery of a suspected clandestine nuclear device. We have now received FCDA Advisory Bulletin No. 195 dated January 27, 1956, on the captioned subject. The Bulletin is essentially the same, with the exception of minor editorial changes, as that approved by IIC. The FBI suggestion has been adopted. The Bulletin notes the general FBI responsibility for investigations under the Atomic Energy Act and FBI specific responsibility, upon discovery of a clandestine nuclear weapon, for requesting the services of the nearest Explosive Ordnance Disposal Unit and alerting appropriate military, police, Federal, and FCDA officials. It is clearly stated that FBI has no responsibility for subsequent civil defense or local government action.

Attached to the Bulletin, for the information of state and local Civil Defense Directors, is the unclassified "Description of Atomic Devices and Component Parts" which we issued to Law Enforcement Officers in January, 1954.

ACTION: None. A review of the Bulletin reflects no material

ENCLOSURE

GAD:hke
(6)

1-Mr. Boardman
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Day
1-Mr. McArdle
1-Section Tickler

117-268-

RECORDED - 34
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FEB 14 1956

59 MAR 2 1956

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objectionable to the Bureau or contrary to FBI or IIC interests. The Bulletin was furnished for FBI information by Ben Willis of the Department who expects no comment or reply.

Attachments

Read from Mr. Willis 1 P.M. 2/8/56 JA

Federal Civil Defense Administration

BATTLE CREEK, MICHIGAN

ADVISORY BULLETIN

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/5/03 BY SP4BTA/RNP

No. 195
January 27, 1956

TO: STATE AND LOCAL CIVIL DEFENSE DIRECTORS

SUBJECT: RECOMMENDED CIVIL DEFENSE ACTION CONCERNING CLANDESTINELY INTRODUCED NUCLEAR DEVICES

I. Purpose

The purpose of this Advisory Bulletin is to provide States and their political subdivisions guidance currently available concerning actions intended to meet the possibility of the clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons into the United States, and to bring to the attention of the State and local civil defense directors the unclassified descriptive material on atomic devices which was issued to law enforcement officers by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in January 1954.

II. The Problem

A. In the event of attack on the country, it would be possible for an enemy to introduce nuclear weapons by clandestine means, before or during the attack, and to arrange for their detonation by timing devices or other control mechanisms despite all precautions which may be taken by appropriate agencies charged with the internal security of the Nation.

B. While recognizing that, in the event of hostilities, air attack continues to be the major threat, civil defense planning needs to deal realistically with such a contingency.

C. Although the circumstances surrounding the discovery of a nuclear weapon may be extremely varied, the civil defense protection problem is essentially the same as in the case of air attack. Thus, basically, the same protective measures and warning system heretofore recommended for air attack are readily adaptable to this situation.

117-... Memo from ... to Belmont to Mr. Boardman 2/10/56 - GAD

ENCLOSURE

III. Analysis

A. The size and shape of the suspected object may be such that its identification as a nuclear weapon is difficult. (See Attachment, "Description of Atomic Weapons and Component Parts," based upon information furnished to all law enforcement officials by the FBI.)

B. Such weapons might range up to several thousand tons of TNT equivalent. In addition, thermonuclear weapons might be discovered ranging up to millions of tons of TNT equivalent. It is more probable that the yield of a clandestine weapon will be at the lower end of the above ranges.

C. Not only target cities, but also individual industrial and other key facilities of critical importance to our defense capability might be subjected to this form of attack. Harbor cities need to consider the possibility of a clandestine device being prepared for detonation on board a ship or underwater within the harbor area.

D. Since a clandestine weapon will be at or near ground level, or underwater, an additional hazard can be created by residual radioactivity.

E. Expert judgment will necessarily form the principal basis upon which to determine whether a suspected device constitutes a threat sufficient to justify the invoking of civil defense measures. The possibility of the introduction of dummy devices to create panic cannot be overlooked.

F. Since the time available for civil defense protective measures probably will not be reasonably predictable, the decision to activate civil defense plans such as those for evacuation will involve the acceptance of a risk.

G. Even though the time available is not reasonably predictable, the probabilities are that evacuation would involve less risk and provide better protection than shelter alone for the following reasons:

1. Unlike the case of air attack, the ground zero is known.

2. The area of damage of a ground burst is smaller than that of an air burst of a comparable weapon, and

3. In the area of major damage, shelter would probably be inadequate.

H. Public disclosure of the threat prior to official decision to act could well result in serious panic or other disorganized behavior.

I. The possibility of panic in a population at the time the threat is made known publicly will be minimized if the people:

1. Are well-informed on what to expect;

2. Have confidence in their leaders and in the civil defense plans that have been developed; and

3. Know what to do and have had an opportunity to rehearse their part in the civil defense plan.

J. Normal radio and television facilities will be available for informational purposes unless discovery of a clandestine atomic weapon is coincidental with receipt of warning of air attack, in which case CONELRAD would probably be invoked. These facilities could be used, in conjunction with the appropriate public warning signal, to broadcast information and instructions to the public.

IV. Responsibilities of Local Authorities and Federal Agencies

The importance to the Nation of assuring that authorities at all levels play their proper roles in meeting this possibility cannot be overemphasized. The following outline of the roles of the various officials and agencies who may be involved is therefore presented:

A. Local Officials

1. The head of local government is responsible, consistent with local laws, for making the final decision with respect to whether civil defense measures to protect the public will be activated.

2. Local civil defense officials are responsible for preparing necessary plans for protection of the public and for putting them into effect as directed by local governing officials.

3. Local law enforcement officials have been requested to report promptly all information regarding fissionable material or atomic weapons, including suspected devices, to the nearest field representative of the FBI, without attempting to dismantle or disarm an apparent atomic device.

B. The Federal Bureau of Investigation is responsible for:

1. Generally

Investigating under existing law all violations of the Atomic Energy Act, including the illegal export or import of fissionable material, the illegal possession or transportation of fissionable material, and the illegal transfer or possession of any equipment or device utilizing fissionable material or atomic energy as a military weapon.

2. Specifically

If a suspected object might be a nuclear device:

a. Immediately requesting the services of the nearest Explosive Ordnance Disposal Unit, Department of Defense.

b. Alerting appropriate officials of the Federal Government, including the Federal Civil Defense Administrator, through official channels, concerning the existence and location of the suspected object.

c. Alerting appropriate local military officials.

d. Alerting appropriate local police officials.

(The FBI has no responsibility for subsequent civil defense or local government action.)

C. The Federal Civil Defense Administration is responsible for providing guidance on protective measures to State and local officials responsible for planning and executing such measures, and for taking

necessary action to alert these officials in the event there is positive evidence that clandestine weapons have been introduced into the country.

D. The Department of Defense, through its Explosive Ordnance Disposal Units, has the responsibility for disarming atomic weapons. An EOD unit could be on the scene in most Eastern cities within an hour after notification. In some parts of the country as much as two or three hours might be required.

E. The Atomic Energy Commission has the responsibility for disposing of fissionable material.

V. FCDA Policy

FCDA recommends that State and local authorities:

A. Prepare appropriate plans for meeting the possibility of clandestine nuclear attack. These should include, but not be limited to, evacuation plans whether or not evacuation is deemed feasible in the event of air attack under the conditions outlined in Advisory Bulletin No. 158. It is probable that, in most clandestine atomic weapon situations, evacuation would be necessary for fewer people and for shorter distances than in the case of threatened attack from the air.

B. Make any evacuation plans which have been developed for defense against air attack flexible enough so that traffic control measures can be instituted to divert traffic away from or around the estimated danger area. Whether information would be broadcast defining such danger area would be a matter for local decision.

C. Prepare plans to meet the problems created by the hazard of residual radioactivity along the lines of Advisory Bulletin No. 179.

D. Accept no responsibility for identification, disarming, or disposal of devices suspected of being nuclear weapons. If civil defense personnel assist in identification, disarming, or disposal, they should do so only at the request and under the direction of the FBI, Department of Defense, or AEC personnel.

E. Hold information concerning a suspected nuclear weapon within official channels, primarily FBI and police, until a definite decision has been made regarding any civil defense action to be taken.

F. Weigh very carefully the decision to activate civil defense plans against the possibility that the suspected object may not, in fact, be an enemy weapon. It would seem preferable to defer decision until there is an authoritative identification of the device by an Explosive Ordnance Disposal Unit.

G. Prepare emergency information operations plans to prevent disorganized behavior in situations where initial discovery may be widely known before identity of the suspected device can be established.

VI. Amendment

Advisory Bulletin No. 34, on the subject of "Explosive Ordnance Disposal," outlined a system for the reporting of unexploded conventional ordnance. The present Advisory Bulletin (No. 195) alters this procedure only in that the FBI should be notified rather than the United States Army when an object is suspected to be an atomic device.

Val Peterson
Administrator

Attachment

Distribution B

DESCRIPTION OF ATOMIC DEVICES AND COMPONENT PARTS

It is impossible to describe exactly what a foreign atomic bomb will look like. On the other hand, it is possible to explain the basic ideas which will govern their design. For this explanation it is then possible to designate and describe those materials which must be essential to the construction of any atomic bomb.

Atomic explosions result when (1) certain amounts of fissionable material in two pieces or more are brought quickly together to form one piece of such material, or when (2) a certain amount of fissionable material is quickly made more dense by squeezing it together. The important thing about each of these methods is that masses of fissionable material must be placed into rapid motion. We know that high explosives are capable of giving any material such necessary rapid motion.

A clandestine atomic bomb may be in the form of a gun barrel device using high explosive to blow one piece of fissionable material from the breech end of the gun down through the barrel into another piece of fissionable material firmly anchored in the muzzle end of the gun.

Another type might be a device using high explosive to squeeze fissionable material. To explain how such a device will work we must understand what is meant by "implosion." The significance of the word explosion is familiar to most people. Implosion signifies a bursting inwards as contrasted with the bursting outwards of an explosion. In order to obtain an implosion, however strange it may seem, explosive material is necessary.

The scientists who worked on the first atom bomb needed an implosion in order to compress nuclear material enough to get an atomic "explosion." They solved their problem by forming a large sphere of explosive material. In a hole in the center of this sphere they placed the fissionable material they wanted to squeeze. Then, instead of using one detonator to ignite the explosive sphere, they placed many detonators around it. These detonators were connected electrically in such a way that they could be fired simultaneously. If only one detonator had been used, one can easily understand that the sphere, having been ignited at only one point, would have exploded in the ordinary way; that is, with the exploding wave, which is another

way of saying a fast burning wave, burning through the sphere from one side to the other. However, with many detonators igniting the sphere from all sides, the fast burning wave is essentially spherical in shape and burns inward toward the center of the sphere. When this fast burning imploding wave reaches the sphere of fissionable material, this mass has no place to be pushed except in upon itself, and is thus compressed.

We have now explained very simply the basic ideas which govern atomic bomb design. Looking back at these ideas, we note that two essential features of the gun type device are the gun barrel itself and fissionable material, and two essential features of the implosion type device are high explosive charges that could be used to build a sphere and again fissionable material.

The most commonly used fissionable materials are uranium and plutonium, which are EXTREMELY HEAVY metals weighing half again as much as lead of the same size. Fifty pounds of these heavy fissionable materials would be approximately five inches in diameter (if in the shape of a sphere) about the size of a softball. Both of these metals can be coated with other metals or plastics and can be machined into all sorts of shapes; thus, the fact that a suspicious object is extremely heavy for its size may be significant. Pieces which might be smuggled would probably be of a size that could be carried on the person.

The gun barrel type device will probably be made of steel. The diameter of the bore of such a gun barrel would probably not be less than two inches or more than ten inches. With such a range of inner diameters for the bore, we may expect the outer diameter of the gun barrel to range from about five inches as a minimum to about twelve inches as a maximum. Both ends of the barrel may be closed by breech block type devices so that the bore of the gun will not be visible. It is possible, of course, that the gun tube and the two breech blocks may be carried as three separate pieces; in this case the inner bore may be visible. The fissionable material for this gun type weapon may be concealed within, and usually at the ends of the gun barrel, or it may be carried in separate packages for later assembly within the barrel. The length of the entire device need not exceed about two and one-half feet.

The high explosives of implosion will probably be in specially fabricated shapes, one side of which will be a part of a spherical surface. Most high explosives are light tan in color, have a soapy feel, and are half again as heavy as an equal quantity of water.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. L. V. Boardman

DATE: February 13, 1956

FROM : Mr. A. H. Belmont

per letter dtd 10/29/03 60267 UC NLS/BJA/RNP 10/29/03

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SUBJECT: REAPPRAISAL OF U. S. POLICY REGARDING SOVIET BLOC SHIPMENTS AFFORDED DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY

SOME INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/5/03 BY SP4CTA/RNP

Supervisor [redacted] and I represented the IIC at the Planning Board of the National Security Council (NSC) from 2:30 to 5:30 p.m., February 13, while the Board took up the joint IIC-ICIS Working Committee report recommending countermeasures against possible clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons or components thereof through Soviet bloc shipments afforded diplomatic immunity.

There was a three-hour discussion with no decisions reached. Mr. Elliott of the Office of Defense Mobilization, General Smith of Operations Coordinating Board and General Farrell of Joint Chiefs of Staff came out strongly in favor of action at once to restrict the diplomatic pouch as recommended in the subcommittee report. Mr. Amory of CIA stuck to the position taken by CIA in the report, namely, that CIA could get along if it was found necessary to reduce the size of the pouch. The remaining members of the Board, State, Office of Secretary of Defense, Treasury, Governor Stassen's representative, and the Chairman, Dillon Anderson, were of the opinion that a great many ramifications would flow from the suggested restrictions and nothing should be done at the present time although this was a matter of high policy for the NSC to decide. All of the members of the Planning Board recognized the threat posed by possible clandestine introduction of a nuclear weapon; however, some had doubts as to whether restrictive action would be advantageous on a net basis to this country considering such factors as loss of U. S. intelligence capabilities abroad, retaliation by the Soviet bloc, impact upon our allies, etc.

Mr. Anderson appointed a group (identities not clear but believed to be State, CIA and Defense) to work with Mr. Coyne to draw up the Planning Board's views on this problem for presentation to the NSC. It was indicated there would not be unanimous views. Mr. Anderson asked whether I desired to work with the group representing IIC. I told him the IIC had presented its views fully in the report to the Planning Board and there was nothing further I could add for the IIC; if there was any question as to our report I would be glad to have Mr. Coyne contact me. Yeagley likewise declined for ICIS.

117-268

cc - Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Whitson
Mr. Day

AHB:jdd
(5)

RECORDED - 34
INDEXED - 34

117-268-4

FEB 15 1956

LIAISON

MAR 14 1956

Memorandum for Mr. Boardman

Numerous questions were asked concerning the report which we answered frankly. Our basic position maintained throughout was that the Soviet bloc is cabable of introducing clandestinely a nuclear weapon through the diplomatic pouch under present policy; that the potential risk of disaster to us through such introduction resulted in our recommendation that steps be taken to reduce the pouch to letter size as soon as international conditions will permit. I stated that the IIC recognizes that the President and the NSC might have additional factors of national or international policy which they would take into account in making their decision and, consequently, we had placed in our recommendation the phraseology "...at such time as the President or such authority as he may designate considers the international situation will permit."

ACTION:

No further action need be taken by the IIC or the Bureau at this time. Liaison will keep in touch with Pat Coyne to ascertain the recommendation of the Planning Board to the NSC.

V.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: February 13, 1956

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF ATOMIC WEAPONS INTO THE UNITED STATES

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Gandy

WHITSON

ICIS letter February 8, 1956, attached, forwarded for IIC information a copy of a letter addressed to ICIS Chairman Yeagley by the Atomic Energy Commission on January 27, 1956.

The AEC letter referred to the Presidential direction under which AEC has conducted research in an effort to develop technical devices for use in detection of clandestine introduction of fissionable material. AEC notes the urgency with which it was instructed to embark upon this research and reviews the extensive expenditure of research manpower on devices "which do not seem destined for early extensive use." AEC reiterates its previously stated position that some agency or department of the Government, actively using the devices, should be responsible for operation, training of personnel, budgeting and procuring of additional devices. Guidance is requested on future plans for this program.

AEC has reference to the limited national program for the use of detection devices which was initiated by an advisory group on which AEC was represented. As you are aware, this program was approved by IIC and all ICIS agencies, except Treasury which submitted a counterproposal which would have reduced, by more than half, the program recommended for its use. The joint efforts of IIC and ICIS to establish even a minimum defense against the threat of clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons have reached an impasse due to Treasury's adamant refusal to procure and use an adequate number of devices. ICIS has planned, and IIC has agreed, that the agencies actually using the devices should be responsible for their construction and purchase while AEC should remain responsible for additional research and continuing advice.

GAD:hke
(6)
1-Mr. Boardman
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Day
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Section Tickler

Enclosure

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/5/03 BY SP4 COX/ENP

117-268-

FEB 13 1956

L V Boardman

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62-90398-1

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SANITIZED ATOMIC ENERGY

Memorandum for Mr. L. V. Boardman

ACTION:

No IIC reply or comment is required. This question will be resolved as soon as agreement is reached concerning the extent to which Treasury will participate in the limited national program for the use of detection devices and as soon as the question of limiting the diplomatic pouch has been resolved. The IIC-ICIS report concerning limiting the pouch contains a recommendation that AEC continue and expedite its research to develop and improve various types of detection devices.

February 20, 1956

cc - Bates
Whitson

SAC, New York (117-192) (orig and 1)

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS
THEREOF OR OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

RECORDED-61 117-268-727

Reurairtel 2-14-56 regarding arrival of 2,240 pounds columbite ore consigned to Union Carbide and Carbon Company under "free permit" No. 48539. AEC, Washington, D. C., has no information regarding this shipment. AEC advises permit number does not apply to its operations. Advise promptly whether AIC, NYC, decides material requires AEC license.

Hoover

Bufile 117-268

LW:blb
(5)

NOTE: Per info received from AEC by Liaison Representative C. W. Bates 2-17-56.

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Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

2 FEB 23 1956

COMM - FBI
FEB 20 1956
MAILED 20

FD-36

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

AIRTEL

NY, NY, 2/14/56

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mason
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Sizoo
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

Transmit the following Teletype message to: BUREAU

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF OR OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE U.S., AEA.

THOMAS FLEMING, Assistant Deputy Collector, U.S. Customs, advised this date that examination of SS AFRICAN PLANET, which arrived Pier 33, Brooklyn, NY on 2/7/56, revealed 20 bags of columbite ore, total weight 2240 pounds. Material on exam [redacted] Ore shipped by Empressa Mineira de Alto Ligonha, Portuguese East Africa, consigned to Union Carbide and Carbon Co., 30 E. 42nd St., NYC, under free permit #348539. LEONARD SOLON, Assistant Chief, Radiation Branch, Health and Service Laboratory, AEC, NYC, notified by Customs and will advise Customs whether material requires permit. b2 b7E

Bureau will be advised of any pertinent developments.

Mr. Belmont

KELLY

3-Bureau (117-268) RM

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/5/03 BY SP4BJA/RMD

airtel to NY 2-20-56

RECORDED-61

117-268

16 FEB 15 1956

JJD:EG
117-192
(5)

[redacted] b6 b7C

Approved _____ Sent _____ M. Per _____

Special Agent in Charge

FD-36

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mason
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Nease
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

AIRTEL

NY, NY, 2/9/56

Transmit the following Teletype message to: BUREAU

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF OR OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE U.S., AEA.

Customs Officer [redacted] Idlewild Airport, NYC, at 6:45 p.m., 2/8/56, advised of the arrival of one [redacted] NYC, via LAV (Venezuelan) Airlines Flight #252 at 5:22 p.m. [redacted] declared orally six pieces uranium quartz totalling two ounces in weight. [redacted] Ore obtained by [redacted] at Bogota, Colombia and to be utilized for assay purposes. [redacted] a citizen of Colombia, S.A., travelling on Colombia passport [redacted] and U.S. reentry permit [redacted] NYC. [redacted] Colestad Corp., 1 East 57th St., NYC, departed U.S. 1/25/56 via Avianca Airlines on business trip to Colombia and Venezuela.

b2
b6
b7C
b7D

Mr. FRANKLIN ZILA, AEC, NYC, advised by Customs and authorized release.

Files NYO contain no reference to Colestad Corp. [redacted] may be identical with [redacted] mentioned in report of SA [redacted] at Los Angeles, 8/11/43, captioned [redacted] was., ESPIONAGE-G". [redacted] was a contact of the subjects of this investigation but no derogatory information was developed concerning him.

For information.

Mr. Belmont

KELLY

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/5/03 BY SP4 BDP/RNP

cc Mr. Belmont

3-Bureau (RM)

NO ACTION.
NO DERIVATORY INFO RE [redacted]
2-13-56. LW

WPC:EG
117-192
(5)

RECORDED-35
INDEXED-35

117-268-23

25 FEB 10 1956

59 FEB 27 1956

Approved _____ Sent _____ M Per _____

Special Agent in Charge

, BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

2/14/56, NY, NY

air-tel

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. Nichols	FD-36
Mr. Boardman	
Mr. Belmont	✓
Mr. Mason	
Mr. Mohr	
Mr. Parsons	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Tamm	
Mr. Trotter	
Mr. Nease	
Tele. Room	
Mr. Holloman	
Miss Gandy	

Transmit the following Teletype message to: BUREAU

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS
THERE OF OR OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES
AEA

OSMUGGLING ATOM BOMBS

US Customs, NYC, furnished following information re arrivals this date.

At Idlewild International Airport.

[redacted] N.Y.

[redacted]nford, Connecticut, bearing US passport [redacted] arrived PA flight 861 at 7:10 AM, engaged investment business in Connecticut. Carried and declared on Customs Declaration a one pound package of monazite ore, [redacted] AEC, NYC advised by Custom and permitted clearance of ore by Customs. b2 b6 b7C b7E

EXAMINED INDEX CARDS. NONE ON [redacted] IN NY OR CONN. LW

At pier 90, NYC, [redacted] 116-204822? NY (BLACKFOOT, IDAHO) Goshen, Idaho, arrived "SS Queen Elizabeth" 8:00 AM this date bearing US passport [redacted] is missionary and orally declared one and one half pounds gold bearing ore which he obtained as souvenir from President Sten Mine at Belcome. Orrange Free State, South Africa. [redacted]

AEC advised by Customs and authorized release of ore. For information.

Mr. Belmont

KELLY

3-Bureau (117-268) (RM)
1-NY 117-192
JJD:MTD
(5)

117-268-

NO ACTION NECESSARY LW

FEB 15 1956

Approved _____ Sent _____ M Per _____

Special Agent in Charge

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/5/03 BY SP4 AUTH/SWP

RECORDED COPY FILED IN

4233613

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: February 13, 1956

FROM : MR. A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF ATOMIC WEAPONS INTO THE UNITED STATES

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

Following the discussion of Assistant Secretary Kendall of Treasury Department with the Director on February 10, 1956, I called Mr. Yeagley of the Justice Department and advised him Mr. Kendall would probably contact him in the near future for the purpose of setting up an informal discussion group between the Treasury, Yeagley representing ICIS, and a member of the IIC. The purpose of this meeting would be to further discuss Treasury's position relative to the limited national program utilizing devices to detect the introduction of radio-active material at our ports.

I told Mr. Yeagley I would be ready at any time to sit down with him and Treasury to see what could be worked out on this.

Mr. Yeagley called me back on the morning of February 13 to advise that Kendall had called and had appointed Hugo Ranta to represent the Treasury. Ranta is the ICIS representative of Treasury. Yeagley said that Ranta is sick and will call him within the next few days when he recovers.

I will meet with Yeagley and Ranta, when they desire, for the purpose of ironing this out. We will take into account the fact that Treasury has its problem of staying within its budget and we will try to work this out so that there will be no unsettled issue going to a higher level.

AHB:LL
(5)
cc--Mr. Boardman
cc--Mr. Belmont
cc--Mr. Day
cc--Mr. Whitson

117-268-1

RECORDED-20

FEB 21 1956

59 FEB 23 1956

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/5/03 BY SP1 DMH/MP

SMUGGLING ATOM BOMBS

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 62-90980

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: February 21, ~~1954~~ 1956

FROM : R. R. ROACH

SUBJECT: REAPPRAISAL OF U. S. POLICY REGARDING SOVIET BLOC SHIPMENTS AFFORDED DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

William Foley, Justice Representative on the National Security Council Planning Board, telephoned February 21 to advise that the Planning Board would again consider the problem of limiting the diplomatic pouch on Thursday, February 23, at 4:00 p.m.

The meeting will be held in the Planning Board Room, Room 384, Executive Office Building (Old State). Foley said Pat Coyne would try to furnish us a copy of the new Planning Board paper prior to the meeting. He further indicated that you and Whitson, who represented IIC at the Planning Board meeting on February 13, were invited to be present.

ACTION:

This is for your information. Liaison will secure the Planning Board paper from Coyne as soon as it is available.

GAD:hke
(5)

1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Mr. Day
1-Liaison Section Tickler

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/5/03 BY SP4 COR/RWP

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 66-5803

117-268

52 MAR 2 1956

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: February 21, 1956

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/5/03 BY SP4 [illegible]/ENP

Pat Coyne of the National Security Council Staff, during the IIC meeting February 8, 1956, indicated that a number of persons had inquired concerning the possible effect upon health of our technical devices used to detect radioactive material. Coyne indicated a number of inquiries had been received by the persons operating these devices.

The Director instructed that inquiry be made at once to determine the extent to which such concern has been voiced and to learn whether a public relations problem exists which would support Treasury's claim that a press release concerning the devices should be issued. b2 b7E [redacted] state that no complaints of any kind, either oral or written, have been received concerning the use of the device. SAC, New York reports no complaints or objections have been received at [redacted] and the only complaint received at [redacted] based on effect on health was made by an individual who claimed violation of his Constitutional rights and that he believed excessive fluoroscoping and X raying was the underlying cause of cancer.

Coyne also suggested that two Washington Treasury officials be interviewed. Of these, one was ill and unavailable until February 20, and the other has been out of town ever since the IIC meeting. A separate memorandum has been submitted.

Treasury Under Secretary Kendall informed the Director on February 10, last, that the health aspect was by no means the

GAD:hke (6)
1-Mr. Boardman
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Mr. Day
1-Liaison Section Tickler

117-268-

INDEXED - 25

FEB 24 1956

LIAISON

5 MAR 1956

SMUGGLING ATOM BOMB 135

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 66-8603

major problem, and the proposed press release was suggested largely for psychological effect.

At the Director's instruction, I am meeting with Yeagley of ICIS and Ranta of Treasury on the morning of February 27, next, to settle the whole problem of the technical device program. However, the Director, at the IIC meeting February 8, instructed that the results of our inquiry be made available to the IIC Working Committee for its consideration. A Working Committee meeting is scheduled for 2:00 p.m., February 27, next.

ACTION:

The results of our survey are being furnished to the other IIC members and to Coyne. It will be considered during the Working Committee meeting February 27. This will have no bearing on whatever may result from my meeting with Yeagley and Ranta.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268)(100-384974) DATE: 2/13/56

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (117-192)(100-100141)

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

[redacted]

SM - C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-15-80 BY SP5 RSG

ReBulet to Deputy Commissioner, Investigations, Bureau of Customs, Washington, D. C., dated 1/5/56, with addendum to the NYO requesting that the position held by [redacted] with the PAUL WALLHEIMER Company be determined. It was further requested that recommendations be submitted as to referring the WALLHEIMER Company to Customs.

b6
b7C

On 12/15/55, [redacted] the PAUL WALLHEIMER Company, 303 Fourth Ave., NYC, advised SA [redacted] that [redacted] is presently employed by that company as a secretary and has been with the company since [redacted]

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

(4) - Bureau (RM)
(2) - Bufile 117-268)
(2 - Bufile 100-384974)
2 - New York
(1 - NY 117-192)
(1 - NY 100-100141)

RECORDED - 19 117-268-26
8 FEB 20 1956

INDEXED - 19

EX - 108

OBL:cb
(6)

ESP SEC

29 MAR 2 1956

SUBV. CONTROL

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

It is noted that the telephone directory for the Borough of Manhattan, NYC, for 1955-1956, lists both the PAUL WALLHEIMER Company, Exports-Imports, and Wallport Products at 303 Fourth Avenue, NYC.

On 1/30/56 [redacted] Clerk, Credit Bureau of Greater NY, NYC, advised SE [redacted] that the records of the Credit Bureau reflect a report pertaining to [redacted] dated 3/30/44. His residence at that time was listed as [redacted] Long Island, NY, and his former address was listed as [redacted] Flushing, NY. The report reflected that he had been [redacted]

It was further reported that [redacted] is in

business for himself as an exporter and importer of general merchandise with his business located at 425 Fifth Ave., NYC, for the past number of years. Previously for 30 years, he had his own business in Europe. [redacted] had one employee and there were no suits or judgments against him at the time of the report.

It is noted that the telephone directory for the Borough of Manhattan, NYC, for 1955-1956, reflects the residence of [redacted] Flushing, New York.

A check of the records of the Bureau of Special Services, NYCPD, was caused to be made on 2/7/56, by SA [redacted] and no subversive record was found for [redacted] b6 b7C

[redacted] Supervisor, Records Unit, INS, NYC, advised SE [redacted] on 2/7/56, that there is no record of [redacted] having petitioned for naturalization in the US.

A check of the records of the USDC, SDNY, was caused to be made by SE [redacted] on 2/7/56, for the years 1942 to the present, and there is no record of naturalization for [redacted]

In view of the information set out above, no recommendation is made to refer the PAUL WALLHEIMER Company to Customs.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 2/23/56

FROM: SAC, WFO (117-151)

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC WEAPONS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES (ATOM BOMBS)

b2
b6
b7C
b7E

Rebuairtel to WFO 12/7/55.

FRANK E. RUSSELL, Assistant Deputy Commissioner, U. S. Bureau of Customs, advised SA [redacted] on 2/16/56 that [redacted] to detect radio-active material in incoming shipments. He said foreign shipments are examined [redacted]

Mr. RUSSELL, in the presence of the agent, phoned Mr. BURNS and asked him if he clearly understood that the FBI is to be notified in the event that fissionable material is detected in any shipment. Mr. BURNS said that he was and both agreed that he, Mr. BURNS, should notify the SAC of WFO directly and immediately by telephone if fissionable material be detected. Mr. RUSSELL assured the agent that Mr. BURNS would give this notice immediately.

2 - Bureau
1 - WFO
AJH:af
(3)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/5/03 BY SP4 BSM/RNP

RECORDED - 19 117-268-28

INDEXED - 19 2 FEB 24 1956

EX - 108

28 MAR 1 1956

NSR SEC

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: February 9, 1956

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF ATOMIC WEAPONS INTO THE UNITED STATES

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/5/03 BY SP4BTA/RNP

Mr. Nichols' memorandum, February 8, reflects the desire of Under Secretary of the Treasury David Kendall to visit with the Director regarding an IIC letter "involving detection." This is undoubtedly the question of the national program for the use of detection devices which was discussed at the IIC meeting, February 8. The Director asked for a short memorandum concerning this.

The Proposed National Program

A joint IIC-ICIS subcommittee, by report dated March 10, 1955, recommended adoption of a national program for the use of devices which will detect radioactive material. The report recommended that Customs procure [redacted] use at specified ports of entry; Coast Guard was to procure [redacted] for use in examining ship cargoes; and Immigration and Naturalization Service Border Patrol was to [redacted] devices in examining aliens. All three of these agencies were represented on an advisory group which initiated these recommendations and agreed that the recommended program was a minimum program not deemed commensurate with the threat.

b2
b7E

IIC and all ICIS agencies, with the exception of Treasury, approved the subcommittee report. Treasury submitted a counterproposal calling for procurement by Customs of [redacted] No commitment was made for Coast Guard participation. Coast Guard has recently, however, ordered [redacted]

INDEXED - 12
RECORDED - 12

IIC Position

ICIS has twice endeavored to secure IIC agreement in letters which would ask Treasury to commence the program contained in the Treasury counterproposal. The second request

Enclosures (2)

GAD:hke (6)

1-Mr. Boardman
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Mr. Holloman
1-Mr. Nichols
1-Mr. Day
1-Section Tickler

FEB 28 1956

MAR 2 1956

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

was accompanied by a proposed press release which Treasury had indicated must be issued before it would implement even its own counterproposal.

By letters dated September 28, 1955, and January 25, 1956, copies attached, the IIC pointed out that the program recommended by the subcommittee was minimum in nature and should not be decreased. We have made it clear that Treasury proposal to reduce this minimum program by more than half fails toaccomplish the objective of the program and fails to be responsive to a serious threat to our internal security. We have noted that the decision as to whether our economy can or cannot afford these measures must be made by higher authority in the light of this threat. In each letter we have urged that implementation of the recommended program be undertaken without further delay.

The Press Release

Treasury now desires issuance of a press release concerning use of the devices. The proposed release would state that the devices are designed to detect the presence of radioactive materials; that they have been used experimentally since the Fall of 1954; and that they have no ill effect on health. According to Pat Coyne, Treasury desires the release in order to permit Customs men to answer questions concerning whether the devices are injurious to health. We have initiated inquiries to determine whether a substantial volume of inquiries are being received and whether this question is a public relations matter necessitating a press release.

IIC believes the Soviets are aware that we are using something to examine incoming persons and baggage. We do not believe the Soviets know the capabilities of the devices. The proposed release would inform the Soviets that the devices are sensitive to radioactive materials, whereas the Soviets may be under the impression or fear that the devices will detect and identify the more critical fissionable materials. IIC further believes that issuance of a press release would result in additional press inquiries and further stories which could only have the effect of furnishing the Soviets with more information.

Treasury Department Position

According to Pat Coyne, Treasury Secretary Humphrey, whose opinion had not been secured previously, was to be consulted concerning the Treasury position "this week." Kendall's request

to see the Director was initiated by Humphrey, and it appears probable that the Treasury representatives have finally discussed the problem with Humphrey.

With respect to the national program for the use of detection devices, it is our belief that our position continues to be sound. With respect to the issuance of a press release concerning the devices, this appears undesirable for the reasons noted above, in the absence of some compelling reason of which we are not cognizant. We have asked New York and San Antonio by airtel February 9 to report by February 17 concerning the volume of inquiries aroused by use of the devices, as alleged by Coyne to be the case. When we have the facts, we will re-evaluate our position.

It seems to me we could get this today rather than to wait until Friday 17

ACTION:

This memorandum has been prepared for the use of the Director in the event he agrees to see Treasury Under Secretary David Kendall.

February 16, 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TOLSON
MR. BOARDMAN
MR. BELMONT
MR. NICHOLS

On Friday, February 10, I saw Under Secretary of the Treasury David Kendall, who called to see me at the suggestion of the Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Humphrey, to discuss informally the position which the IIC committee has taken in connection with a recommended program for the use of detection devices by the United States Coast Guard at ports of entry. I told Mr. Kendall that this matter had been very carefully considered by the IIC and that it was really in two parts, namely, that the IIC had recommended what it considered to be a minimum program to be put into force and effect by the Treasury Department, but that the Treasury Department had indicated it could not spend more than $500,000 instead of the little over $2,000,000 which the minimum program recommended would cost.

I said that the second part of the problem was the insistence upon the part of the Treasury Department on the issuance of a press statement should the program be implemented.

I told Mr. Kendall that at the last meeting of the IIC I had inquired of Mr. Coyne, the National Security Council representative on the IIC, as to the reasons behind the desire for a press release. I stated that I gained the impression from Mr. Coyne that the principal reason was to dispell the idea that any physical harm would be done to persons entering the country who had to pass through examination by machines. I told Mr. Kendall that there seemed to be some vagueness about this and I had asked that further details be procured by representatives of this Bureau as to the extent of complaints made by passengers coming into this country as to this aspect.

Mr. Kendall assured me that the health aspect was by no means the major problem. He stated that as a matter of fact

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
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Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

JEH:TLC

INDEXED - 12
RECORDED - 12

62-26[illegible]

EX-121

FEB 28 1956

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/5/03 BY SP4 mjs/jsp

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the press release idea had been suggested by former Under Secretary of Treasury Rose and had been suggested largely for psychological effect and that the proposed release which has been shown to the IIC was not necessarily the final form of the same, but that the Treasury Department would be perfectly willing to discuss the matter further and try to come to a common ground of understanding as to this aspect. Mr. Kendall further informed me with regard to the original statement that the most that could be spent was $500,000 that upon reexamination it was determined that approximately a million and a half could be spent which, while less than the recommendation of the IIC for the program, was believed to be a start in the right direction. He said it was impossible to allocate a larger sum than that now indicated.

I told Mr. Kendall that, of course, if the Treasury Department felt that the budget would not stand the expenditure of the little over two million dollars needed for the recommended program, that was a matter that the Secretary of the Treasury had to determine, as it was one of higher policy.

I told him that since there had not been a complete understanding as to this problem, as I judged from his statements to me at this interview, I would suggest that Mr. Yeagley, of the ICIS, and Mr. Belmont, of the IIC, should meet with a representative of the Treasury Department, to be designated by Mr. Kendall, to see whether this matter couldn't be settled at the present level, rather than having to be taken up in the National Security Council and finally decided at the Presidential level. Mr. Kendall was thoroughly agreeable to this.

Following my conference with Mr. Kendall, I called Mr. Belmont and orally advised him of the substance of this conference and asked that prompt steps be taken to implement the meeting which Mr. Kendall and I had agreed upon would be desirable for possible settlement of this problem.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

SENT FROM D. O.
TIME 4:38 P.M.
DATE 2-16-56
BY

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. TOLSON

DATE: Feb. 8, 1956

FROM : L. B. NICHOLS

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT:

With reference to the call which David Kendall, Under Secretary of the Treasury, made to the Director, I desire to advise I returned the call.

Kendall stated that he wanted to visit with the Director briefly in the next day or two regarding a letter which the Director as Chairman of IIC had sent to Yeagley on a matter "involving detection." He stated that he had talked to Secretary Humphrey about the matter and the Secretary had asked him to discuss the matter briefly with the Director.

Mr. Belmont thinks this pertains to the Port Control Detection Devices which was discussed at the IIC meeting this afternoon.

I told Mr. Kendall I didn't know what the Director's schedule would be but that I would pass the information on at the earliest opportunity.

LBN:FML
(5)

CC - Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Holloman

INDEXED - 12
RECORDED - 12
EX-121

117-268-1008

FEB 28 1956

Let me have a memorandum on this.

LIAISON

Memo from Mr. Belmont to Mr. Boardman - 2/9/56 re: "Countermeasures to Detect and Defend Against the Clandestine Introduction of Atomic Weapons into the U.S."

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/5/03 BY SP4CTA/RNP

59 MAR 8 1956

Autostat UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 66-8603

05MAG LING ATOM 130 MAR 1956

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: February 9, 1956

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF ATOMIC WEAPONS INTO THE UNITED STATES

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

During the IIC meeting February 8, 1956, Pat Coyne, NSC, in defending Treasury's insistence on the issuance of a press release concerning the use of devices designed to detect radioactive material, indicated that a number of persons who have passed the devices have inquired concerning whether the devices had an injurious effect upon health. Coyne indicated he had been told by the New York Commissioner of Customs and the Deputy Commissioner at the waterfront concerning these inquiries and said Washington Treasury officials Emerick and Ranta also had information in this regard.

The Director instructed that inquiry be made at once to determine the extent to which concern has been voiced regarding the effect the devices may have upon health and whether a public relations problem exists which would support Treasury's contention that a press release should be made.

ACTION: (1) Attached for approval is an airtel instructing SAC's, New York and San Antonio, to make inquiry of Customs officials and of Customs men actually operating the technical devices in order to determine whether there has been any volume of complaints or inquiries from the general public concerning their use.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/5/03 BY SP1BTA/RNP

RECORDED - 4 117-268-1029

(2) In order to explore thoroughly the leads offered by Coyne, Liaison should interview Chester A. Emerick, Deputy Commissioner of Investigations, Bureau of Customs, and Hugo Ranta, Assistant to the General Counsel, Treasury Department. These individuals should be informed that they are being interviewed at the suggestion of Pat Coyne and no comment should be made concerning the issuance of a press release or an FBI or IIC position concerning such a release.

Enclosure sent 2-9-56
GAD:mlp/djeff (6)
1 - Mr. Boardman
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Whitson
1 - Section tickler
1 - Mr. Day

FEB 29 1956

59 MAR 5 1956

memo Belmont to Boardman dtd 2-21-56

Liaison

b2
b7E

UNRECORDED COPY FILED

SMUGGLING A TON BOMBS

FD-36 (6-21-55)

F B I

Date: 2/23/56

Transmit the following message via AIRTEL

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

From SAC, NEW YORK (117-192)

To: BUREAU (117-268)

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF OR OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES
AEA

[redacted] US Customs, NYC, advised, this date, that [redacted] arrived International Airport, NYC, 3:00 pm, this date, via Varig Airlines, flight PPVDC, bearing Brazilian passport [redacted] issued 3/31/55, at San Paula, Brazil, indicating [redacted] resides [redacted] San Paula, Brazil, employed as an engineer.

[redacted] filed customs declaration [redacted] indicating destined for Corning Glass Works, Corning, NY, and declared thereon one pound package of zironita ore. Examination of luggage containing this ore [redacted] was met at airport by a [redacted] of Corning Glass, who indicated ore was being brought for analysis thereof.

AEC, NYC, advised by customs and authorized release of ore. Material released by customs.

For info.

KELLY

NO RECORD. NO ACTION NECESSARY. ORE DECLARED ON CUSTOMS DECLARATION. LW

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/5/03 BY SP4BJA/ROP

(3) - Bureau (117-268)(RM)
1 - New York (117-192)

JJD:ckg (#1)
(5)

RECORDED - 30 117-268-1011

INDEXED-30

16 FEB 24 1956

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mason
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Nease
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

b2
b6
b7C
b7E

4-22 (6-15-55)

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Records Section

2/27, 1955

- [ ] Name Check Unit - Room 6523
- [ ] Attention
- [ ] Service Unit
- [ ] Forward to
- [ ] Return to [redacted] Unit.

Supervisor
Room 1230

- [x] All References
- [ ] Subversive References
- [ ] Main ____ References Only
- [ ] Restrict to Locality of
- [x] Breakdown [ ] Buildup [ ] Variations
- [ ] Exact Name Only
- [ ] Exact Spelling
- [ ] Check for Alphabetical Loyalty Form

SUBJ [redacted]
Addr

b6
b7C

Localities
Birthdate & Place

R# ____ Date 2-27 Searcher Initial

FILE NUMBER SERIAL

MM
[redacted]
MM
One Renaudesse (war.)
NR 65-47926-231 15 1.0
[redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5/5/03 BY SP4 BOTA/PNP

5-RW

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: 2/24/56

FROM : W. A. Branigan

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST CLANDESTINE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE U.S. (Bufile 117-268)

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

A meeting of the Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures met at 10 a.m., 2/23/56, in the ICIS conference room to consider two items referred to the Committee by ICIS. Present were Captain Stewart, Coast Guard, representing ICIS; B. Willard, ONI, and SA Whitson, FBI, representing IIC; Colonel Hudgins, AEC technical advisor; Commander B. P. Clark, Coast Guard, and Don Gale, Naval Research Laboratory, representing the advisory group on detection devices.

The first item was a problem raised by the advisory group regarding the necessity of making a check with [redacted] Clark and Gale pointed out it was impractical to attempt a Customs check after the port of entry [redacted] The ICIS had been assured by AEC that the portable detection device as such was not classified but that its performance in the presence of fissionable material was classified. Since Customs had indicated that it could not very well use the devices on U.S.-bound trains inside Canada without the concurrence of the Canadian Government, the Joint Committee instructed Mr. Carl Pfuntner of the ICIS Secretariat to prepare a draft letter for consideration by the two committees, requesting State to negotiate with the Canadian authorities to permit the use by Customs of portable detectors on U.S.-bound trains [redacted] without disclosure of the classified aspect of the precise reaction of the device to fissionable material. b2 b7E

The second item on the agenda was a letter from Admiral Strauss to Mr. Yeagley dated 1-27-56 complaining about a lack of program for the use of detection devices. (A copy of this has been seen by the IIC.) The Joint Committee expressed to Colonel Hudgins its appreciation of AEC's research and recognized the legitimacy of its inquiry to ICIS. It was pointed out to Colonel Hudgins that as he well knew the delay in getting a program underway stemmed from the

117-268-1010

cc - Belmont
Branigan
Day
Whitson

LW:blb
(5)

RECORDED - 12 2 FEB 29 1956

EX-121

59 MAR 5 1956

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/5/03 BY SP4CBA/RWP

fact that the pouch policy problem was now before the NSC Planning Board and the question of a detection device program had been stalled by Treasury since the Summer of 1955. It was further pointed out, however, to Colonel Hudgins that negotiations were presently underway between IIC, ICIS and the Treasury Department to get a program underway.

The Joint Committee suggested to Mr. Pfuntner that Mr. Yeagley could reply to Admiral Strauss, pointing out that no program could be gotten underway until the pouch policy matter and the limited national detection program matter, which were now in the process of being settled, were settled.

RECOMMENDATION:

None. For your information. When Pfuntner prepares the drafts indicated, they will be brought to your attention.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: February 27, 1956

FROM : R. R. Roach

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/7/03 BY SP4BCH/ENP

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: CONTROLS TO PREVENT PRE D-DAY CLANDESTINE INFILTRATION OF ATOMIC WEAPONS INTO NATO COUNTRIES

My previous memoranda indicated that the captioned subject had been referred by the Commander of the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Powers of Europe (SHAPE) to the NATO Standing Group for consideration. The members of the Standing Group (United States-United Kingdom-France) referred the matter to their respective military authorities for consideration. Enclosed is a copy of a memorandum from W. C. Haraldson to Edwin M. Martin, Deputy Chief of Mission, U. S. Nato Delegation, Paris, indicating that the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff has now completed its review and has reported back to the U. S. element of the Standing Group to the effect that they recognize the problem to be one of great importance but one which does not properly fall in the domain of the military. The Standing Group probably has not yet heard from the French and British elements. If they agree with the U. S. comment, then the Standing Group will probably refer the matter back to the NATO organization for referral to a civilian group, probably the NATO Special Committee.

There is no action to be taken by the Bureau at this time. If this is referred to the NATO Special Committee, on which the Bureau represents the U. S., then it will be necessary for the Bureau to coordinate this within the U. S. Government to determine how far we should go in our discussions of controls to prevent the clandestine introduction of atomic weapons.

ACTION:

None. For information.

ENCLOSURE (filed with orig.)

8 MAR 1 1956

NWP:lw
(6)
Enclosure

117-367
NOT RECORDED
146 MAR 1 1956

1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Branigan
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Mr. Philcox
1-Section Tickler

62-98719

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
FEB 19 1956

TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mason
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Nease
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

FBI NEW YORK 2-19-56 11-45PM

DIRECTOR DEFERRED

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE U.S. AEA. STAFF OFFICER [redacted] U.S. CUSTOMS, IDLEWILD AIRPORT, NY, ADVISED PROFESSOR [redacted] PARIS, FRANCE, ARRIVED IDLEWILD AIRPORT VIA AIR FRANCE FLIGHT AT SEVEN FORTY AM, FEB. NINETEEN - FIFTYSIX, AND ORALLY DECLARED, DECLARATION NUMBER [redacted] THREE PIECES OF METAL, REFINED, WEIGHT TWO HUNDRED GRAMS, [redacted] THIS METAL IS DESTINED FOR [redacted] ARGONNE NATIONAL LABORATORY, CHICAGO, ILL. TO BE USED FOR METALLURGICAL COMPARISON. [redacted] WILL STAY AT HOTEL NEW YORKER FOR ONE WEEK, AND HAS FRENCH PASSPORT [redacted] ISSUED IN PARIS, FRANCE JULY FIVE, FIFTYFOUR. [redacted] IS A CITIZEN OF FRANCE, AND A PROFESSOR ATH UNIVERSITY OF PARIS. [redacted] STATED MR. [redacted] OF AEC REQUESTED CUSTOMS TO HOLD METAL AND [redacted] WOULD PICK IT UP THE AFTERNOON OF FEB. NINETEEN FIFTYSIX, AND LATER RETURN IT TO [redacted] AT THE HOTEL NEW YORKER. A SEARCH OF INDICES OF NYO REFLECTED NO PERTINENT IDENTIFIALBE INFO PERTAINING TO [redacted] WILL FOLLOW DEVELOPMENTS WITH AEC. RECORDED - 34 117-268-

KELLY

CORR SEVENTH LINE EIGHTH WORD SHOULD BE REFINED

END AND ACK

59 MAR 8 1956

Mr. Belmont

1-53 OK FBI WA MET

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/10/03 BY SP2 MLP/KSP

b2
b6
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b7E

cc Whitaker 5:30 PM

February 29, 1956 Whitson

Air-Tel

RECORDED - 34

EX - 108

SAC, New York (117-192) (orig and 1)

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF
OR OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO U.S.
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

ReNYairtel 2/24/56 reflecting entry of 2,240 pounds columbite ore under license No. R-105.

AEC, Washington, D. C., states this license issued to U.S. Vanadium, a division of Union Carbide, New York, to receive raw materials without limitation on quantity.

Hoover

Bufile 117-268

LW:blb
(5)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5/8/03 BY SP4 BSA/RNP

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Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

MAILED 11
FEB 29 1956
COMM-FBI

59 MAR 9 1956

5-12 (1-1-56)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
LIAISON SECTION

2-29, 1956

___Director	___Mr. Bartlett
___Mr. Tolson	___Mr. Bates
___Mr. Boardman	___Mr. J.W. Brown
___Mr. Belmont	___Mr. Daunt
___Mr. Hennrich	___Mr. Day
___Mr. Sizoo	___Mr. Dougherty
___Mr. Cleveland	___Mr. Estill
	___Mr. Ferris
___Mr. Roach	___Mr. Fipp
___Mr. Philcox	___Mr. Kuhrtz
	___Mr. Martin
___Mr. Baumgardner	___Mr. McArdle
___Mr. Bland	___Mr. Moynihan
___Mr. Branigan	___Mr. Papich
___Mr. W.C. Sullivan	___Mr. Short
	___Mr. Stevenson
___Mr. Callan	___Mr. D.J. Sullivan
___Mr. H.L. Edwards	___Mr. Wells
___Mr. Scatterday	___Mr. Whaley
___Mr. Stanley	___Mr. Woods
	___Mr. Young
___Mrs. Schwab	
___Miss Wielkiewicz	___Miss Cole
___Miss Goggins	___Miss Gronquist
___Mrs. Cuozzo	___Miss Rogers
___Mrs. Henley	___Miss El. Toby
___Miss Lewis	___Miss Ev. Toby
___Miss_____	V Mr. Wellington
Room_____	Room 1736

___See Me Please	___Records Section
___Call Me Please	___Routing Unit
___Please Handle	___Send File UTD
___Please note and return	___Place on record and return
___Mail Room,5533	___Ident. Div.
___Reading Room,5531	___Expedite Processing

This license issued to U.S. Vanadium a Div. of Union Carbide to raw material without limitation on quantity.

C. W. BATES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/8/03 BY SP4 BTM/RNP

5-7
(11-19-54)

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION-FBI

2-27, 1956

___Mr. Boardman	___Mechanical Section
___Mr. Belmont	___Translation Sec.
___Mr. Hennrich	6228 IB
___Mr. Keay	___Ident Div.
___Mr. Cleveland	___Technical Lab
___Mr. Baumgardner	___Mr. Ferris, 7627
___Mr. Branigan	
___Mr. Roach	
___Mr. Scatterday	Room 6649

SUPERVISORS

___Mr. Aull	___Mr. Lewis
___Mr. Baken	___Mr. Litrento
___Mr. Bird	___Mr. Little
___Mr. Brennan	___Mr. McCaslin
___Mr. Broden	___Mr. McMahon
___Mr. Calame	___Mr. Meehan
___Mr. Callahan	___Mr. Mossburg
___Mr. Cotter	___Mr. Nasca
___Mr. Crowley	___Mr. Norstrom
___Mr. Day	___Mr. O'Donnell
___Mr. De Bettencourt	___Mr. Peasinger
___Mr. Donahoe	___Mr. Sandweg
___Mr. Dunn	___Mr. Schweppe
___Mr. Ezell	___Mr. Shroder
___Mr. Fitzgerald	___Mr. Stacey
___Mr. Gregg	___Mr. Stewart
___Mr. Hitt	___Mr. Teague
___Mr. Jaquiss	___Mr. Todd
___Mr. Jensen	___Mr. Torrillo
___Mr. A. R. Jones	___Mr. Tully
___Mr. F. L. Jones	___Mr. Turner
___Mr. Kissiah	___Mr. Wacks
___Mr. Kitchell	___Mr. H. H. Wallace
___Mr. Kuno	___Mr. Wannall
___Mr. Kurtz	___Mr. Welborn
___Mr. Lake	___Mr. Welte
___Mr. Lamphere	___Mr. Whaley
___Mr. Lee	___Mr. Whitson
___Mail Room, 5533	___RECORDS SECTION
___Mrs. Dean	___Send File
___Mr. Hammond	___Bring File
___Miss Taylor	up to date
___Miss Martis	___Place on record
___Correct	and return
___Please call me	___Indicate index ref.
___Please see me	

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/8/03 BY SP1 CDA/lcw

What kind of license is Legal Trainee Whitson 378
Referring to?
Espionage Section

Tom Thomson
Geo Land Pebble
1962 –
TN 27654

LIAISON SECTION
FBI
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE
FEB 27 11 12 AM '56

Lic. issued to VS
Vanadium, a div. of
Union Carbide N.Y.
to receive raw
materials with limitation
of quantity.

FD-36

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

AIRTEL

NY, NY, 2/24/56

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mason
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Nease
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

Transmit the following Teletype message to: BUREAU

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF OR OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE U.S., AEA.

ReBuairtel 2/20/56 and myairtel 2/14/56 re 2240 pounds columbite ore. Free permit #348539, under which item admitted, is U.S. Custom permit issued on duty-free items under Free Tariff Act. [redacted] Health and Service Laboratory, AEC, NYC, advises his records reflect his office was notified on 2/15/56 by LYALL JOHNSON, Chief of License Branch of Division of Civilian Application, AEC, Washington, D. C., that material was admitted under license #R-105.

Remytel 2/19/56 re Professor [redacted] advises material carried by [redacted] examined by him, found to be of no interest to AEC and returned to Customs for return to [redacted]

KELLY

3-Bureau (117-268) RM

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/8/03 BY SP4BTA/ENP

Mr. Belmont

INDEXED - 34

117-268-

1956

JJD:EG
117-192
(5)

Approved _____ Sent _____ M. Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

9:33 AM

February 29, 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TOLSON
MR. BOARDMAN
MR. BELMONT
MR. NICHOLS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/8/03 BY SP4BSTA/ENP

Honorable David Kendall, Undersecretary of the Treasury, called regarding the internal security program and stated there apparently was a little misunderstanding in this matter on the part of Mr. Belmont. Mr. Kendall stated when he visited with me we discussed [redacted] Mr. Kendall indicated he understood Mr. Belmont felt they should go to one and one-half million dollars. I stated that this was not entirely correct; that Mr. Belmont had advised me he had a conference with the ICIS representative and with Mr. Yeagley and had gone over the matter and indicated his position was that while we felt the full sum should be spent, nevertheless, if Treasury could not spend that amount then the amount available should be spent and the program should be implemented on that basis. Mr. Kendall stated they wanted to spend what they could which amounted [redacted] which the Coast Guard had purchased. I told him that whatever they wanted to spend was entirely satisfactory; that we should at least do what we can and that was the position IIC was taking; that perhaps in a year or two more money would be available for the program.

b2
b7E

I stated also that as far as the press release was concerned the suggestion had been made that Treasury prepare whatever press release they had in mind and it should be submitted to ICIS, which committee would have the responsibility for this matter.

RECORDED - 34 117-268-101

Mr. Kendall asked that Mr. Belmont be advised of our accord in the above matters.

27 MAR 1 1956

Very truly yours,

/S/ J. E. H.

John Edgar Hoover
Director

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mason
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

59 MAR 8 1956

cc-Mr. Holloman
JEH:EH (7)

SENT FROM D. O.
TIME 1:49 PM
DATE 2-29-56
BY TMC

66-86033
62-10033
UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

12:15 PM

February 29, 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TOLSON
MR. BOARDMAN
MR. BELMONT
MR. NICHOLS

I returned the telephone call of Undersecretary of Treasury David Kendall with regard to the matter earlier discussed concerning an internal security program under consideration. I told Mr. Kendall that I had checked with Mr. Belmont and could understand where some little misunderstanding may have developed. I advised him that what Mr. Belmont stated he did was to suggest that the Treasury representative submit immediately, or as soon as he could, in writing exactly what the Treasury would propose to do, that is, what amount they could spend, rather than the $500,000 previously mentioned; that as soon as this memorandum was submitted, we would then clear it with the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, which is all that would be necessary. I explained to Mr. Kendall that as Chairman of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference obviously I have to consult the other members, namely, the ONI, G-2 and Air Force Intelligence representatives, but that with regard to this, it is merely a formality and they will go along with our views on it. I told Mr. Kendall that if Mr. Ranta can get his memorandum over to Mr. Yeagley, then it will be out of our hands and all clear.

Mr. Kendall commented on the red tape one encounters in Washington and thanked me for clearing this matter up.

RECORDED - 34 117-268-

Very truly yours,

1S/J. E. H.

John Edgar Hoover
Director

27 MAR 1 1956

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/8/03 BY SP4 LOTA/RNP

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Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

JEH:TLC
(7)

59 MAR 8 1956

SENT FROM D. O.
TIME 1:45 PM
DATE 2-29-56
BY

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 66-8605, 66-10032

Autostaff

SMUGGLING Form 18 OMB 85

FD-36 (6-21-55)

FBI

Date: 2/14/56

Transmit the following message via AIRTEL

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/8/03 BY SP4 [illegible]

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mason
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Nease
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

From SAC, NEW YORK (TIME: 2:10 PM)

To: BUREAU
ATTENTION: LIAISON SECTION

NATIONAL PROGRAM FOR USE OF DETECTION DEVICES
INFORMATION CONCERNING - LIAISON

117-268

[redacted] Assistant Surveyor, US Customs, NYC, interviewed and advises to his knowledge only one complaint made by individual re examination by any customs device. Searched his files and exhibited memorandum indicating that on 5/24/55, one [redacted] N.J., arrived via SS LIBERTE at Pier 88, NYC, and told Deputy Collector [redacted] that he did not desire to pass in front of desk enroute to Pier barrier because he had read newspaper reports that Customs utilized Xray machinery and it was violation of his constitutional rights to Xray his body without his expressed permission, that he believed excessive fluoroscoping and Xraying was underlying cause of human cancer. Was assured by [redacted] that Customs utilized Xraying machinery in nature of inspectroscope only on cargo, but adamantly refused to pass in front of desk to barrier. Was advised his luggage would have to be passed through barrier exit to have inspection stamps cancelled and agreed to do this providing he could pass behind the desk. [redacted]

[redacted] Assistant Deputy Collector, advises this is sole incident relating to objections on basis of personal health and furnished added information he believes [redacted]

[redacted] Deputy Collector, who with [redacted] and US Customs staff personnel [redacted] knew of no additional complaints. All state that fairly regular requests are made of Customs by passengers not to utilize Xray equipment on luggage which passengers state contain unexposed photographic film. Frequenty of latter, they all generally agree, occurs approximately one passenger every two ship arrivals.

b2 b6 b7C b7E

b2 b6 b7C b7E

ENCLOSURE 117-268-1017

RECORDED-87 117-268 March 2 1956

3 - BUREAU (RM)
1 - NEW YORK (62-11658)
JJD:jjs (#1)
(5)

Mr. Belmont

Approved: Special Agent in Charge

Sent M Per

LIAISON

FD-36 (6-21-55)

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following message via _____

_____
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

From SAC,

To:

PAGE TWO

[redacted] Deputy Collectors, Idlewild Airport, and staff personnel supervised by them have received no objections nor complaints of examinations at Idlewild. As Bureau aware, [redacted]

[redacted] b2 b6 b7C b7E

Collector of Customs [redacted] was unavailable at time of interview of [redacted] who advised that he was certain that any complaints of this nature throughout Port of New York would be channeled through his office to Mr. [redacted] and was certain latter would have no additional instances. UACB, no further action by NYO.

KELLY

cc Mr. Roach

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268) DATE: 2/14/56

FROM : SAC, SAN ANTONIO (117-77)

SUBJECT: NATIONAL PROGRAM FOR USE OF DETECTION DEVICES
INFORMATION CONCERNING - LIAISON

ATTENTION: LIAISON SECTION

ReBulet to New York and San Antonio dated February 9, 1956.

On February 14, 1956, HERBERT H. MEINERS, Deputy Collector in Charge, U.S. Customs, and two Customs Inspectors [redacted] at the San Antonio International Airport, advised that no complaints of any kind, either oral or written have been received [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Of possible interest to the Bureau [redacted]

[redacted]

b2
b6
b7C
b7E

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/8/03 BY SP2 [illegible]

- R U G -

2 - Bureau (AIR MAIL)(REGISTERED MAIL)
1 - San Antonio (117-77)
JEJ:mkd (3)

59 MAR 9 1956

LIAISON

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: February 27, 1956

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: FOREIGN FLAG SHIPPING IN THE GREAT LAKES

Tolson
Boardman
Belmont
Harbo
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Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

Following discussion concerning this topic during the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (IIC) on February 8, 1956, the Director, with the concurrence of the other IIC members, instructed the Secretary to request, not later than March 1, 1956, information from ICIS in order that the Working Committee may consider it and make such recommendations as appear necessary.

Accordingly, a letter has been prepared noting the continued concern of the IIC regarding the threat posed by foreign flag shipping in the Great Lakes, which concern was expressed in the IIC letter September 8, 1954, and resulted in the Treasury Department's comments of August 4, 1955. The letter requests information concerning measures which have been taken or are scheduled for implementation, in connection with port security activities in the Great Lakes area, which were not outlined in the Treasury letter of August 4, 1955, and which would serve to strengthen our defense against the threat of clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons.

As indicated by Pat Coyne at the IIC meeting on February 8, ICIS and IIC should be, according to arrangements made by the NSC Staff with the Treasury ICIS representative, kept fully informed of all port security activities of the Coast Guard which relate to the clandestine introduction problem.

ACTION:

Attached for approval and signature of the Director as IIC Chairman is the proposed letter. The other IIC Members have concurred with this letter.

Enclosure 2-28-56

GAD:hke (5)

1-Mr. Boardman
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Day
1-Section Tickler

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/8/03 BY SP2 STP/JP

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 62-93542

62-86603-1579

NOT RECORDED
145 MAR 7 1956

RECORDED - 9
INDEXED - 9

17 MAR 1 1956

X-118

1-Section

Orig & 1 [illegible]
1 - [illegible]
3 - Ch[illegible]I
1 - Pat Coyne
1 - Yellow
1 - Mr. Boardman
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Day

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

February 28, 1956

VIA LIAISON

Mr. J. Walter Yeagley
Chairman
Interdepartmental Committee on
Internal Security
Department of Justice Building
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Yeagley:

Mr. Coyne's memorandum to you on April 19, 1955, captioned "Port Security," suggested that arrangements be made through the Secretary of the Treasury's representative on ICIS to keep the ICIS and IIC fully informed of all port security activities of the Coast Guard which relate to the clandestine introduction problem.

As you are aware, the IIC has been, for some time, concerned regarding the threat posed by foreign flag shipping in the Great Lakes. This concern was expressed in our letter of September 8, 1954, which resulted in the Treasury Department's comments of August 4, 1955.

The IIC would appreciate being informed of any measures which have been taken or are scheduled for implementation, in connection with port security activities in the Great Lakes area, which were not outlined in the Treasury letter of August 4, 1955, and which would serve to strengthen our defense against the threat of clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons.

INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/8/03 BY SP4STR/RNP

Sincerely yours,

[illegible]

Chairman
Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

GAD:hke
(12)

(Attached to cover memorandum from Mr. Belmont to Mr. Boardman, 2/27/56, re "Foreign Flag Shipping in the Great Lakes" GAD:hke)

MAR 16 1956

59 MAR 6 1956

117-268

NOT RECORDED
145 MAR 15 1956

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 66-8603-15

cc - Li[redacted]ords Sec.
cc - C[redacted] Rm. 4642)
cc - [redacted]

SAC, New York (117-192) (orig and 1) March 5, 1956

Director, FBI (117-268)

RECORDED - 30 268-1077

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF
OR OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE U.S.
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

EX-125

ReNYlet 2/15/56 requesting designation of code title SMAB for correspondence and communications other than reports in this case.

This code title may be used by you.

cc - 1 - Washington Field (for info)

NOTE: Code title SMAB has been checked and cleared with the Code Room and the Records Section.

LW:blb
(7)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5/8/03 BY SP4 SDA/RMP

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Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

MAILED 8
MAR 5 1956
COMM-FBI

59 MAR 9 1956

5-7
(11-19-54)

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION-FBI

2-21, 1954

___Mr. Boardman
___Mr. Belmont
___Mr. Hennrich
___Mr. Keay
___Mr. Cleveland
___Mr. Baumgardner
___Mr. Branigan
___Mr. Roach

___Mr. Scatterday

___Mechanical Section
___Translation Sec.
6228 IB
___Ident Div.
___Technical Lab
___Mr. Ferrie 7627

Room ____

SUPERVISORS

___Mr. Aull
___Mr. Baken
___Mr. Bird
___Mr. Brennan
___Mr. Broden
___Mr. Calame
___Mr. Callahan
___Mr. Cotter
___Mr. Crowley
___Mr. Day
___Mr. De Bettencourt
___Mr. Donahoe
___Mr. Dunn
___Mr. Ezell
___Mr. Fitzgerald
___Mr. Gregg
___Mr. Hitt
___Mr. Jaquiss
___Mr. Jensen
___Mr. A. R. Jones
___Mr. F. L. Jones
___Mr. Kissiah
___Mr. Kitchell
___Mr. Kuno
___Mr. Kurtz
___Mr. Lake
___Mr. Lamphere
___Mr. Lee
___Mail Room, 5533
___Mrs. Dean
___Mr. Hammond
___Miss Taylor
___Miss Martis
___Correct
___Please call me
___Please see me

___Mr. Lewis
___Mr. Litrento
___Mr. Little
___Mr. McCaslin
___Mr. McMahon
___Mr. Meehan
___Mr. Mossburg
___Mr. Nasca
___Mr. Norstrom
___Mr. O'Donnell
___Mr. Peasinger
___Mr. Sandweg
___Mr. Schweppe
___Mr. Shroder
___Mr. Stacey
___Mr. Stewart
___Mr. Teague
___Mr. Todd
___Mr. Torrillo
___Mr. Tully
___Mr. Turner
___Mr. Wacks
___Mr. H. H. Wallace
___Mr. Wannall
___Mr. Welborn
___Mr. Welte
___Mr. Whaley
___Mr. Whitson
___RECORDS SECTION
___Send File
___Bring File
up to date
___Place on record
and return
___Indicate index ref.

No OK to use here for it

Has code word been used before?

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/10/03 BY SP4 MLR/LMS

___Espionage Section

4-72 (12-29-55)

DIVISION FOUR
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

Feb 20, 1956

___Director	___Mr. Wherry, 5537
___Mr. Tolson	___Mrs. Shirata, 5537
___Mr. Nichols	___Mrs. Foster, 5545
___Mr. Boardman	___Mr. Frank, 5537
___Mr. Belmont	___Mrs. Liddon, 4642
___Mr. Mason	___Miss Mooney, 5644
___Mr. Mohr	___Mr. O'Keefe, 5533
___Mr. Parsons	___Miss Thomas, 4642
___Mr. Rosen	___Miss Wassink, 4642
___Mr. Tamm	___Mr. Joule, 5537
___Mr. Holloman	___Mr. Smyth, 5537
___Mr. McGuire	
✓ Mr. Sullivan	
___Mr. Dalbey	___Room 1730
___Mr. Downing	___Fugitive Desk, 5728
___Mr. Ferris	___Leave Clerk, 7110
___Miss Gandy	___Movement Section
___Mr. M.A. Jones	___Payroll
___Mr. McArdle	___Reading Room
___Mr. McMichael	___Records Section
___Mr. Millen	___Routing Unit
___Mr. Runaldue	___Service Unit
	___Statistical Section
___For the Director	___Voucher Unit
___Please Handle	
___Per Call	___WFO, OPO 537
___Note and Return	

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Code word OK as is. Nothing in our records to indicate that this Code word has been used. However before making it official you should check with Records Section to see if it has ever been used in the Bureau

b6
b7C

Rm 4642.

5-7
(11-19-54)

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION-FBI

1-20, 1954

___Mr. Boardman	___Mechanical Section
___Mr. Belmont	___Translation Sec.
___Mr. Hennrich	6228 IB
___Mr. Keay	___Ident Div.
___Mr. Cleveland	___Technical Lab
___Mr. Baumgardner	MW Mr. Ferris, 7627
___Mr. Branigan	Code Room
___Mr. Roach	

___Mr. Scatterday Room_____

SUPERVISORS

___Mr. Aull	___Mr. Lewis
___Mr. Baken	___Mr. Litrento
___Mr. Bird	___Mr. Little
___Mr. Brennan	___Mr. McCaslin
___Mr. Broden	___Mr. McMahon
___Mr. Calame	___Mr. Meehan
___Mr. Callahan	___Mr. Mossburg
___Mr. Cotter	___Mr. Nasca
___Mr. Crowley	___Mr. Norstrom
___Mr. Day	___Mr. O'Donnell
___Mr. De Bettencourt	___Mr. Peasinger
___Mr. Donahoe	___Mr. Sandweg
___Mr. Dunn	___Mr. Schweppe
___Mr. Ezell	___Mr. Shroder
___Mr. Fitzgerald	___Mr. Stacey
___Mr. Gregg	___Mr. Stewart
___Mr. Hitt	___Mr. Teague
___Mr. Jaquiss	___Mr. Todd
___Mr. Jensen	___Mr. Torrillo
___Mr. A. R. Jones	___Mr. Tully
___Mr. F. L. Jones	___Mr. Turner
___Mr. Kissiah	___Mr. Wacks
___Mr. Kitchell	___Mr. H. H. Wallace
___Mr. Kuno	___Mr. Wannall
___Mr. Kurtz	___Mr. Welborn
___Mr. Lake	___Mr. Welte
___Mr. Lamphere	___Mr. Whaley
___Mr. Lee	___Mr. Whitson
___Mail Room, 5533	___RECORDS SECTION
___Mrs. Dean	___Send File
___Mr. Hammond	___Bring File up to date
___Miss Taylor	___Place on record and return
___Miss Martis	___Indicate index ref.
___Correct	
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___Please see me	

Any suggestions?

L. Whitson | 1784

Espionage Section

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5/9/03 BY SP4 JTA/RNP

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268) DATE: 2/15/56

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (117-192)

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF OR OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE U.S.
AEA

Rebulet 2/10/56.

[redacted] Deputy Appraiser, U. S. Customs, NYC, after a search of his records, advised that same did not reveal the identity of the shipper in instant matter but that AEC, NYC might have knowledge thereof.

LEONARD R. SOLON, AEC, NYC, advised that his records did not reflect specifically the identity of the shipper but it was his recollection and belief that Professor [redacted] was on a field trip to Scandinavian countries in the summer of 1955 and had shipped samples or caused same to be shipped to himself.

In connection with instant case, in view of the amount of correspondence and communications being utilized therein, and because of the length of the title thereof, it is recommended that the Bureau designate the code title "SMAB".

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/8/03 BY SP4 BJA/ENP

2-Bureau (117-268) RM
1-New York (117-192)

EX-125

RECORDED

117-268-1617

1356

JJD:EG
(3)

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. Nichols	
Mr. Boardman	
Mr. Belmont	
Mr. Mason	
Mr. Mohr	
Mr. Parsons	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Tamm	
Mr. Nease	
Mr. Winterrowd	
Tele. Room	
Mr. Holloman	
Miss Gandy	

TO : Director, FBI (117-268)

DATE: 3-6-56

FROM : SAC, San Diego (66-998)

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES

Re No Number SAC Letter A dated 1-28-52 and San Diego letter dated 12-7-55.

This office has no additional names to recommend for inclusion on the Bureau of Customs Watch List at this time. This matter is being closely followed, and the Bureau will be kept advised of any pertinent developments.

2 - Bureau (REGISTERED - AIR MAIL)
1 - San Diego

WED:HB
(3)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/10/83 BY SP4 COM/RNP

RECORDED 15 117-268-1630

7 MAR 7 1956

EX-103

(3) MAR 7 1956

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: February 29, 1956

FROM : MR. A. H. BELMONT

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF ATOMIC WEAPONS INTO THE UNITED STATES

With reference to the Director's conversation with Undersecretary Kendall of Treasury Department today (2/29), it would appear that Treasury Department is not playing a straightforward role. For sake of clarity, the following is a succinct resume of this situation.

The Joint IIC-ICIS Subcommittee in March 1955 recommended an estimated outlay by Customs of $2,073,500 (for procurement of devices, plus annual operating costs) and an estimated cost to the Coast Guard of $492,000 (for devices and operating costs). Treasury Department countered with the proposal for a maximum outlay by Customs of $500,000 and a press release to publicize the use of the devices, and stated that consideration will be given by the Coast Guard to replacing the Geiger counters now used in the search of suspect vessels with portable detection devices.

The IIC opposed the Treasury proposal on the grounds that it did not meet the minimum requirement as recommended by the Joint IIC-ICIS Subcommittee.

On February 10, 1956, Mr. Kendall of Treasury called to see the Director. The Director pointed out the IIC position to Mr. Kendall (memorandum attached). Mr. Kendall stated that upon reexamination it was determined that approximately a million and a half dollars could be spent, which, while less than the recommendation of the IIC for the program, was believed to be a start in the right direction. The Director arranged for a conference between Yeagley, Belmont and a Treasury representative to iron this out.

This conference was held on February 27, at which time we pointed out that Mr. Kendall had stated the Treasury could spend up to a million and a half dollars and this would appear to apply to the Customs' outlay, separate and apart from the Coast Guard

Enclosure
AHB:LL
(6)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/12/03 BY SP4 [illegible]

RECORDED - 19

MAR 6 1956

cc--Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Whitson
Mr. Day
Mr. Daunt

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 62-10023 66-8603

expenditure. It was pointed out that the Coast Guard has gone ahead [redacted] thus carrying out its portion of the recommendation. Mr. Ranta of Treasury was not clear as to just what Treasury was going to do. Therefore, Mr. Yeagley requested him to submit a paper this week showing just what Treasury is proposing to do, and I stated we would clear Treasury's proposal with IIC. At this meeting, with reference to the proposed press release, Ranta stated any mention of health would be eliminated, but a press release was still believed necessary by Treasury. He was told if he would submit a copy of the proposed release, we would present it to IIC. b2 b7E

From Mr. Kendall's discussion with the Director today, it appears that Kendall has now gone back to Treasury's original position of spending $500,000 by Customs, plus the funds already earmarked by Coast Guard.

ACTION:

In my memorandum of February 27, I stated that as we are not going to insist on the full implementation of the program as recommended by the Subcommittee, it makes little difference whether Treasury is going to put out a million dollars or a million and a half dollars; that when Treasury's proposal is received, we will present it to IIC, get clearance, and send a letter to Yeagley advising that as Treasury cannot implement the recommended program, at least the action proposed by Treasury should be undertaken as soon as possible; that if Treasury insists on a press release, we will leave this up to them, as our views concerning a press release are already on record.

It appears that Kendall is reneging further on the funds Treasury will spend. However, we will follow the action as set forth in the paragraph above, unless advised to the contrary.

✓

RB

I see no reason for continuing the controversy. We can't compel Treasury to spend money it won't spend. Let them spend what they are willing to. The press release is of no consequence.
M. K.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: February 27, 1956

FROM : MR. A. H. BELMONT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/9/03 BY SP4STP/RNP

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Gurnea
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF ATOMIC WEAPONS INTO THE UNITED STATES

In accordance with arrangements, Supervisor Whitson and I met with Mr. Walter Yeagley, of ICIS, and Mr. Hugo Ranta, of Treasury Department, at 10:30 a.m. today (February 27) to settle the problem of the use of technical devices at our ports, as countermeasures to detect possible clandestine entry of atomic weapons.

The original recommendation of the Joint IIC-ICIS Subcommittee concerning this program called for an estimated outlay by Customs of $2,073,500 (for procurement of devices, plus annual operating costs) and an estimated cost to the Coast Guard of $492,000 (for devices and operating costs). The Treasury Department had countered with a proposal for a maximum outlay by Customs of $500,000 and a press release to publicize the use of the devices, and particularly to counteract complaints that the program was injurious to health. The Treasury counter-proposal stated that consideration would be given by the Coast Guard to replacing the Geiger counters now used in the search of suspect vessels with portable detection devices.

At the meeting today, Mr. Hugo Ranta, of Treasury, advised it was his understanding that Treasury position now is the expenditure of the same $500,000 previously proposed by Treasury.

b2
b7E

Mr. Ranta and Mr. Yeagley were advised that our purpose in holding the meeting was to attempt to iron this matter out so it would not have to be ironed out at National Security Council level; that Mr. Kendall had been to see Director Hoover, stating that Treasury could not spend the money for the entire program as recommended, but had indicated that instead of the proposed $500,000 expenditure by Treasury, Treasury could spend up to a million and a half dollars. I pointed out that Mr. Kendall's

ENCLOSURE

Enclosure
AHB:LLO
(6)

1 ENCLOSURE

RECORDED - 19 117-268-7021

EX-125

cc--Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Whitson
Mr. Day
Mr. Daunt

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proposal appeared to be to increase the Customs' outlay from $500,000 to $1,500,000 and that this was separate and apart from the Coast Guard expenditure, which has already been arranged by Coast Guard. Mr. Ranta advised that he would have to get together with Mr. Kendall to find out just what Treasury is proposing.

I told Mr. Yeagley that as Treasury has stated it is not able to spend the money as recommended by the Committee, we would present to the IIC whatever proposal Treasury is now going to make, but we would like to have it as soon as possible to get this matter settled.

Relative to the press release, Mr. Ranta said that Treasury is withdrawing any reference to health in its press release, as such reference is unnecessary. Mr. Ranta said, however, that Treasury still feels a press release is necessary. We pointed out that the Coast Guard had put out a press release last week, as reflected in the New York Times of February 16 (copy attached). Mr. Ranta read this release, but said he felt a press release would still be necessary. We told him if he had a copy of the proposed release, we would present it to the IIC.

ACTION:

Mr. Yeagley requested Mr. Ranta to submit, in writing, the Treasury proposal to implement this program now, together with the proposed press release. I told Yeagley and Ranta we would go over it immediately upon receipt, but I did think the matter should be settled within the next few days.

As we are not going to insist on the full implementation of the program as recommended by the Subcommittee, it makes little difference whether Treasury is going to put out a million dollars or a million and a half dollars. When its proposal is received, we will present it to IIC, get clearance, and send a letter to Yeagley advising that as Treasury cannot implement the recommended program, at least the action proposed by Treasury should be undertaken as soon as possible. If Treasury insists on a press release, we will leave this up to them, as our views concerning a press release are already on record.

ROUTING SLIP
FD-4
(8-17-54)

To

Date 2/24/56

[X] Director, FBI
Attention Asst. Director A. H. Belmont

[ ] SAC _____ Title _____
[ ] ASAC _____ _____
[ ] Supervisor _____ _____
[ ] Agent _____ _____
[ ] Steno _____ _____
[ ] Clerk _____ _____
[ ] Chief Clerk _____ _____
[ ] SE _____ File # _____

ACTION DESIRED

[ ] Assign to _____
[ ] Acknowledge
[ ] Bring file
[ ] Call me
[ ] See me
[ ] Correct
[ ] Delinquent
[ ] Expedite
[ ] File
[ ] Leads need attention
[ ] Read, initial and return
[ ] Undeveloped leads in your district awaiting attention
[ ] Open case
[ ] Prepare tickler
[ ] Reassign to _____
[ ] Recharge serials
[ ] Search and return
[ ] Send serials _____ to _____
[ ] Submit new charge-out
[ ] Type
[ ] Return serials
[ ] Submit report by _____

Attached hereto is "New York Times" article in issue of Thursday, 2/16/56, re Coast Guard patrol boat on security patrol, New York Harbor.

Attention: Bureau mail room:- Deliver immediately to Assistant Director Belmont.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/8/03 BY SP4 CDB/LNP

SAC JAMES J. KELLY
Office New York



READY FOR THE SEARCH: A Coast Guard port security patrol boat pulls alongside of freighter in Gravesend Bay. Here Coast Guardsmen carrying Geiger counters and port patrolmen of Customs searching squad go over ship from bridge to keel, bow to stern.

Boat Patrol Reports All Clear In Atomic Smuggling Search

Port Guardians Have Found No Hidden Explosives in 5 Years on Job—Old Brush Made Geiger Counters Chirp

By JOSEPH J. RYAN

The Coast Guard's port security boat patrol has been operating off the entrance to New York Harbor for more than five years without once encountering a ship carrying unli-

Geiger counters on periodic examinations of ships.

As the Queen Mary entered her berth at West Fiftieth Street, counters carried by two Guardsmen began to click. The

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DATE 5/8/03 BY

ENCLOSURE

4-312 (1-23-56)

DATE OF MAIL 2-29-56

HAS BEEN REMOVED FOR THE CONFIDENTIAL FILE ROOM OF THE DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION.

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5-12-03 BY SP4 BJA/DFW

SEE FILE 66-2554-7530 FOR AUTHORITY.

SUBJECT JUNE MAIL L.M.A.B.

REMOVED BY 57 APR 2 1956

FILE NUMBER 117-268-V

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGEOUT

4-312 (1-23-56)

DATE OF MAIL 3-2-56

HAS BEEN REMOVED FOR THE CONFIDENTIAL FILE ROOM OF THE DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5-12-03 BY SP4 BJA/DFW

SEE FILE 66-2554-7530 FOR AUTHORITY.

SUBJECT JUNE MAIL Smuggling Atomic Bombs

REMOVED BY 57 APR 2 1956

FILE NUMBER 117-268-V

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGEOUT




~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ March 8, 1956

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CLASS. & EXT. BY 1-2 4.2 2 3
REASON-FCIM II, 1/21/83
DATE OF REVIEW

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TOLSON
MR. NICHOLS
MR. BOARDMAN
MR. BELMONT

This morning I attended a meeting of the National Security Council held in the Cabinet Room at the White House presided over by the President. In addition to the President and the Vice President, there were also in attendance the Undersecretary of State, Mr. Herbert Hoover, Jr.; Arthur S. Flemming, Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization; William H. Jackson, Special Assistant to the President; the Secretary of Defense, Mr. Charles E. Wilson; the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Thomas White; the Attorney General; Mr. Allen Dulles, Director of CIA; Admiral Lewis L. Strauss, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission; Mr. Rowland R. Hughes, Director of the Budget Bureau; Mr. Harold Stassen, Special Assistant to the President; Mr. George M. Humphrey, Secretary of the Treasury; Mr. Dillon Anderson, Special Assistant to the President; Governor Sherman Adams; General Wilton B. Persons, Deputy Assistant to the President; Mr. J. Patrick Coyne, of the National Security Council; Mr. J. Walter Yeagley, of the Department of Justice; and several others.

Upon the convening of the meeting, Mr. Dillon Anderson stated that the first order of business was a briefing of the President and the Council upon the present menace of Communist espionage and subversion.

I then presented our report upon this subject. Each member of the Council had been furnished with a copy of the exhibits and attention was directed to these exhibits by me as I came to the appropriate subject in the briefing.

Upon conclusion of the report, the President commented upon the fact that he did not believe the Council had ever had such a

9/8/02 CH#937918
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DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (1)
no deletions see orig. because remains classified for other reasons.

2 ENCLOSURES (1 filed with one)
2 ENCLOSURES

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mason
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

JEM:TLC
(7)

63 MAR 16 1956

~~TOP SECRET~~

NOT RECORDED
145 MAR 13 1956

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

TOP SECRET

complete and thorough briefing upon this subject and be believed that it should be done at least once a year in view of the fact that persons too often lose sight of the seriousness of the subversive and espionage activities within our country. U

The President inquired as to whether I thought it would be possible to make a public address, based upon some of the contents of the report which I had presented. He said he realized the report, as presented, covered many highly sensitive and top secret matters which could not be disclosed, but he did feel there was an educational need of the public as to exactly what is going on. U

I advised the President that no doubt such a speech could be prepared, but that it would necessarily have to be very carefully evaluated and cleared with the various Government agencies that have an interest in this over-all problem. U

[redacted] b1

[redacted] S

[redacted]

[redacted] S

The President asked a number of other questions and then asked whether there were any questions from other members of the Council. U

Mr. Stassen, referring to one of the charts used, stated he noticed there was no indication of penetration into the press and

TOP SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~

[redacted] S

[redacted] b1

[redacted] S

I took occasion to state that the State Department had been most cooperative in this matter. U

[redacted] S

Upon the conclusion of the interrogation, the President again commended the report which had been submitted. U

[redacted] b1

~~TOP SECRET~~

Mosers. Tolson, Nichols, Boardman, Belmont March 8, 1954

[redacted]

b1

Upon the conclusion of this portion of the National Security Council meeting, the Attorney General, Mr. Yeagley and myself then withdrew.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

SENT FROM D. O.
TIME
DATE
BY

cc- Whitson

SAC, New York (117-192) (orig and 1) March 9, 1956

Director, FBI (117-268)

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF
OR OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE U.S.
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

RECORDED-35

ReNYtel 3/1/56 informing that [redacted] N.J., arrived on National Airlines, Flight 550, 3/1/56, New York International Airport. [redacted] customs declaration listed rock specimens containing copper, cadium and zinc. [redacted] AEC authorized release of material.

Bureau's indices negative of subversive derogatory information identifiable with [redacted] of [redacted] N.J.

b6
b2
b7C
b7E

[redacted]

(61-7558-218X1)

cc - 1 - Newark (for info)

LW:blb (5)

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DATE 5/12/03 BY SP4BTH/ENP

MAILED 8
MAR 9 1956
COMM-FBI

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

WWR 8 11 51 AM '56

MAR 14 1956

4-22 (6-15-55)

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Records Section

3-7, 1955

- [ ] Name Check Unit - Room 6523
- [ ] Attention _____
- [ ] Service Unit - Room 6524
- [ ] Forward to File Review
- [x] Return to Whitson / Ext. ____
  Supervisor
  Room 1730

- [x] All References
- [ ] Subversive References
- [ ] Main _____ References Only
- [ ] Restrict to Locality of _____
- [ ] Breakdown [x] Buildup [ ] Variations
- [ ] Exact Name Only
- [x] Exact Spelling
- [ ]

SUBJECT _____
Address _____

Localities _____
Birthdate & Place _____

R# _____ Date _____ Searcher Initial dcb

FILE NUMBER	SERIAL
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61-7558-318x	
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DATE 5/12/03 BY SP4 BSTEM/MP

5-11

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 1 1956

TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mason
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Nease
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

WASH 16 FROM NEW YORK 1 10-47 PM

DIRECTOR ..... U R G E N T ....

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF OR OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE US, AEA. INSPECTOR [redacted] US CUSTOMS ADVISED [redacted] NJ, EMPLOYED C. TENNANT SONS AND CO. IMPORTERS, ONE HUNDRED PARK AVE, NYC BEARING US PASSPORT NUMBER [redacted] ARRIVED NATIONAL AIRLINES FLIGHT NUMBER FIVE FIFTY AT FOUR FORTYTWO PM, NY INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT. FILED US CUSTOMS DECLARATION NUMBER [redacted] DECLARING ROCK SPECIMENS CONTAINING COPPER, CADIUM AND ZINC [redacted] STATED SPECIMENS BEING BROUGHT IN ON BEHALF OF HIS COMPANY FOR ANALYSIS. AEC NYC ADVISED BY CUSTOMS AND AUTHORIZED RELEASE OF MATERIAL. RELEASED BY CUSTOMS. FOR INFO

b6
b7C
b2
b7E

MAR 12 1956

KELLY

PLS HOLD

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/12/03 BY SP1 CTM/RNP

RECORDED-35
INDEXED-35

Mr. Belmont

ENCLOSURE

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. L. V. Boardman

DATE: March 7, 1956

FROM : Mr. A. H. Belmont

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Teleo Roon
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: REAPPRAISAL OF U. S. POLICY REGARDING SOVIET BLOC SHIPMENTS AFFORDED DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY

Reference is made to the attached memorandum dated March 7, 1956, from Mr. James S. Lay, Jr., Executive Secretary, National Security Council, with which he forwarded memoranda reflecting the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and of Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson with respect to captioned subject matter. The attachments merely reflect that Mr. Wilson and the Joint Chiefs of Staff agree with the recommendations of the National Security Council Planning Board on the matter of U. S. policy regarding Soviet bloc shipments afforded diplomatic immunity. The recommendations of the Planning Board are set forth on pages three and four of the Brief which has been furnished to the Director under the above caption for his assistance in attending the National Security Council meeting tomorrow morning during which U.S. policy on this matter will be discussed.

The views of Secretary Wilson and the Joint Chiefs of Staff have been set forth on a page to be inserted in the Director's Brief as page number 6 in order that this information may be available during his attendance at the National Security Council meeting.

ACTION:

It is recommended that the new page, which is attached, be inserted in the Director's Brief.

Enclosure

Tickler: Mr. Boardman
Mr. Holloman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Branigan
Mr. Wannall

WRW:mpp
(6)

117-268-
NOT RECORDED
188 MAR 19 1956

27 MAR 12 1956

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/13/93 BY SP2 AM/sjr

ORIGINAL FILED IN

4-312 (1-23-56)

DATE OF MAIL 3-14-56

HAS BEEN REMOVED FOR THE CONFIDENTIAL FILE ROOM OF THE DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5-12-03 BY SP4BJA/DFW

SEE FILE 66-2554-7530 FOR AUTHORITY.

SUBJECT JUNE MAIL S.M.A.B.

REMOVED BY FBI APR 2 1956

FILE NUMBER 77-268-1

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGEOUT

4-312 (1-23-56)

DATE OF MAIL 3-13-56

HAS BEEN REMOVED FOR THE CONFIDENTIAL FILE ROOM OF THE DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5-12-03 BY SP4 BJA/DFW

SEE FILE 66-2554-7530 FOR AUTHORITY.

SUBJECT JUNE MAIL Smuggling Atomic Bombs

REMOVED BY 67 APR 2 1956

FILE NUMBER 77-268-4

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGEOUT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ cc - [illegible]n

b- Whitson

117-268

RECORDED - 19

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/12/03 BY SP4 CTA/ENP

Date: March 14, 1956 VIA LIAISON

To: Captain John A. Waters
Director of Security
Atomic Energy Commission
Room 926
1717 H Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

(orig and 1) to Rolander, aec 3-15-56 cmb

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF
OR OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

This will confirm data furnished you orally by FBI liaison March 6, 1956.

b6
b7C

[redacted] arrived at Idlewild International Airport, New York, on March 6, 1956, bearing Swedish citizen passport No. [redacted] was identified as a chemical engineer [redacted] the Atomic Energy Commission, Sweden. His Customs declaration No. [redacted] covered a sample of cut and polished uranium ore weighing approximately 200 grams. [redacted] indicated he intended to take the ore first to Columbia University, New York City, and then to Mr. Johnson, Division of Raw Materials, Atomic Energy Commission, Washington, D. C., for purposes of discussion. U.S. Customs at Idlewild notified the Atomic Energy Commission office in New York. The Atomic Energy Commission, New York, authorized Customs to release the ore to [redacted] This was done.

There are no prior references to [redacted] in the files of the FBI. No investigation will be conducted by the FBI in the absence of a specific request.

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

cc - 1 - AAG Tompkins by r.s. 0-6 same date.
LW:blb (9)

COMM - FBI
MAR 15 1956
MAILED 20

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4-22 (6-15-55)

Federal Bureau of Inves[redacted]tion
Records Section

3/2/56, 1955

- [ ] Name Check Unit - Room 6523
- [ ] Attention _____
- [ ] Service Unit - Room 6524
- [ ] Forward to File Review
- [x] Return to [redacted] Ext. 2081
  Supervisor
  Room 1730

- [x] All References
- [ ] Subversive References
- [ ] Main _____ References Only
- [ ] Restrict to Locality of _____
- [x] Breakdown [x] Buildup [ ] Variations
- [ ] Exact Name Only
- [ ] Exact Spelling
- [ ] Check for Alphabetical Loyalty Form

SUBJECT [redacted]
Address
Locality
Birthdate & Place

R# _____ Date 3/6 Searcher Initial [redacted]

FILE NUMBER	SERIAL

b6
b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5/12/03 BY SP4 [redacted]/ENP

4-22 (6-15-55)

Federal Bureau of Inves[redacted]tion
Records Section

3/7/56, 1955

- [ ] Name Check Unit - Room 6523
- [ ] Attention _____
- [ ] Service Unit - Room 6524
- [ ] Forward to File Review
- [x] Return to W[illegible] Ext. 2081
  Supervisor
  Room 1730

- [x] All References
- [ ] Subversive References
- [ ] Main _____ References Only
- [ ] Restrict to Locality of _____
- [x] Breakdown [x] Buildup [ ] Variations
- [ ] Exact Name Only
- [ ] Exact Spelling
- [ ] Check for Alphabetical Loyalty Form

SUBJECT
Address

b6
b7C

Localities _____
Birthdate & Place _____

R# _____ Date 3/7 Searcher Initial [illegible]
FILE NUMBER SERIAL

Ny

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5/12/03 BY SP/STAFF

FD-36 (6-21-55)

FBI

Date: 3/6/56

Transmit the following message via AIRTEL

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mason
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Nease
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

From SAC, NEW YORK (117-192)

To: BUREAU (117-268)

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF, OR OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE US; AEA.

[redacted] Staff Officer, US Customs, Idlewild Airport, NY, advised [redacted] Citizen Passport Number [redacted] arrived at Idlewild this date, at 9:40 A.M., aboard SAS Plane Oykmi, from Bermouth, Sweden.

[redacted] a chemical engineer [redacted] Atomic Energy Commission, Sweden, carried sample of cut and polished uranium ore, weighing approximately 200 grams, which had been obtained in Sweden. Ore was orally declared and covered by Declaration Number [redacted] indicated he intended to take ore first to Columbia University in NYC, and then to Mr. JOHNSON, Division of Raw Materials, AEC, Washington, D.C., for discussion purposes.

b2
b6
b7C
b7E

[redacted]

AEC, NYC advised by customs and authorized release of ore. Material released by customs. For information.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/12/03 BY SP1 BAW/RNP

KELLY

Mr. Belmont

(3) - Bureau (117-268)(RM)
1 - New York 117-192

JHK:ABC #1
(5)

RECORDED - 19
INDEXED - 19

117-268-

10 MAR 7 1956

ESPIONAGE

Approved: J. J. Kelly Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: February 28, 1956

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: REAPPRAISAL OF U. S. POLICY REGARDING SOVIET BLOC SHIPMENTS AFFORDED DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

My memorandum of February 24, attached, advised concerning the National Security Council Planning Board consideration of the joint IIC-ICIS report reappraising U.S. policy regarding Soviet Bloc shipments afforded diplomatic immunity.

The Planning Board has prepared a memorandum, attached, furnishing its recommendations in this matter to the NSC. These recommendations, found in paragraph eight of the Planning Board paper, are as follows:

a. Adopt the ICIS recommendation that no size or weight restrictions should be imposed at this time on diplomatic pouches and shipments.

b. Note the IIC-ICIS plans for action in the event the President decides such shipments should be reduced, and direct IIC and ICIS to keep these plans under continuing review, with reports to NSC at appropriate intervals.

c. Direct the U.S. Communications Security Board to report on the feasibility of maintaining adequate and secure communications if the pouch were reduced to letter size.

d. Continue covert examination by present detection devices of all Soviet Bloc diplomatic officials, pouches, baggage, effects and other shipments afforded immunity and continue intensive efforts to develop improved active and passive detection devices.

ENCLOSURE

ACTION:

The Planning Board is recommending no action at this time. However, consideration of this problem is tentatively scheduled by the National Security Council for March 8, next.

Enclosures (2)

GAD:hke
(6)
1-Mr. Boardman
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Mr. Day
1-Section Tickler

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/12/03 BY SP4 BR/LMP

NOT RECORDED 110-248 1956

DETAILS ON ORIGINAL

Memorandum for Mr. L. V. Boardman

at 10:00 a.m. You will recall that the Director is to brief the Council concerning developments in the internal security field at 9:00 a.m. on the same date. The brief prepared for the Director contains a section under III-F dealing with this question, which is being brought up to date.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: February 24, 1956

FROM : MR. A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: REAPPRAISAL OF U. S. POLICY REGARDING SOVIET BLOC SHIPMENTS AFFORDED DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

I attended an additional session of the Planning Board of the National Security Council (NSC) from 3:00 to 6:00 p.m., February 23, 1956, relative to its consideration of the Joint IIC-ICIS Report recommending countermeasures against possible clandestine introduction of atomic weapons into the United States.

Representatives of State, CIA and Defense had met on the morning of February 23 and drafted proposed comments and recommendations by the Planning Board. Copy No. 41 is attached.

The Planning Board agrees with the IIC and ICIS as to the gravity of the threat and that the report of the Joint Committee is sound, but believes that there are certain wider considerations, not directly connected with internal security, which need emphasis, namely: (a) impact from loss of secure U. S. communications with its missions inside the Soviet bloc, (b) the risk factor in relation to other means of delivery, and (c) international repercussions. The proposed draft then goes on to amplify these points.

The Planning Board is redrafting its comments and recommendations. Liaison will secure a copy. However, it was clear that the Planning Board is going to recommend to the National Security Council that no action be taken at this time to reduce the diplomatic pouch in size.

ACTION:

ENCLOSURE

When the final draft of the Planning Board's comments and recommendations is secured, you will be advised.

ENCLOSURE

Enclosure
AHB:LL
(5)

ENCLOSURE

cc - Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belment
Mr. Whitson
Mr. Day

ENCLOSURE

62-117-268

NOT RECORDED
146 MAR 15 1956

per letter dtd 10/29/03 62267 UC/MLS/BTA/emp 10/29/03

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/12/03 BY SP4 CTM/MP

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: March 9, 1956

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF ATOMIC WEAPONS INTO THE UNITED STATES

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

My memorandum of February 27, last, reported the conference between Yeagley of ICIS, Hugo Ranta of Treasury, and Belmont representing FBI-IIC. Ranta was to submit a Treasury proposal for action in connection with purchase and use by Customs of devices which will detect radioactive materials.

Liaison today followed this matter with Yeagley and was informed that Hugo Ranta had been ill all this week and had, therefore, been unable to submit the Treasury proposal. Yeagley said he would follow this closely with Ranta in order that the matter might not be further delayed.

ACTION:

This is for your information.

GAD:hke
(7)

1-Mr. Boardman
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Mr. Daunt
1-Mr. Day
1-Liaison Section

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/12/03 BY SP4 BTA/RNP

RECORDED-38

117-268-

11 MAR 16 1956

Liaison

57 MAR 23 1956

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 62-90838-

Samuel Lines Atom Bombs

CONFIDENTIAL

117-268 (Smuggling of Atomic Bombs)

RECORDED-61

Date: March 20, 1956

To: Captain John A. Waters
Director of Security
Atomic Energy Commission
Room 928
1717 H Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

BY COURIER SERVICE

(orig and 1)

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: MRS. ISABEL MACLEOD
MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING
(Atomic Energy Act)

On March 12, 1956, U.S. Customs, New York City, in the New York Office of this Bureau that [redacted] Washington, D. C., arrived at the port New York aboard the "Queen Mary." [redacted] held Australi passport [redacted] issued at Sydney, Australia, October 22, 19 She orally declared to Customs a piece of crude ore approxima one-fourth pound in weight which she stated she had obtained a souvenir at Cape Town, South Africa. Customs determined th the ore was radioactive.

The Atomic Energy Commission office in New York was advised by Customs and a representative of the Atomic Energy Commission upon examining the item declared it to be crude pitchblende and authorized its release by Customs to Mrs. Mac

b6
b7C

In the State Department's "List of Employees of Diplomatic Missions Not Printed in the Diplomatic List" for January, 1956, is shown, among the employees of the Embassy New Zealand, [redacted] Typist, Commercial Counselor's Office, [redacted]

According to the records of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, one [redacted] held a diplom or official 3 (1) visa when she arrived at the port of New Yo in December, 1951, en route to the New Zealand Trade Commissioner in Washington, D. C. Her occupation was shown as "Housewife."

(105-16424-241 ser 1546)

[redacted] ins same date by r.s.o-6

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED BY 60324/uc/baw/lmp ON 5/12/03 #94742/60935/1970SS

MAR 20 1956
BY COURIER SVC.

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

CONFIDENTIAL

15326

Letter to Captain John A. Waters
Director of Security
Atomic Energy Commission

No investigation is being conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the absence of a specific request.

cc - 1 - Mr. Dennis A. Flinn
Director
Office of Security
Department of State
515 22nd Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

BY COURIER SERVICE

- 2 -

CONFIDENTIAL

HQ 268-1025

4-[redacted]-15-55)
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Records Section

3/15, 1955

- [ ] Name Check Unit - Room 6523
- [ ] Attention
- [ ] Service Unit - Room 6524
- [ ] Forward to File Review
- [x] Return to C. Whitford Ext.
Supervisor
Room 1730

- [x] All References
- [ ] Subversive References
- [ ] Main References Only
- [ ] Restrict to Locality of Foreign + D.C.
- [ ] Breakdown [ ] Buildup [ ] Variations
- [ ] Exact Name Only
- [x] Exact Spelling
- [ ] Check for Alphabetical Loyalty Form

b6
b7C

SUBJECT
Address [redacted]

Localities
Birthdate & Place

[redacted] Date Searcher Initial Jay
FILE NUMBER SERIAL
= 16424-241-1546,

only ref in 2d

Girl at same address same last name, empl New Zealand Consul 1956

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5/12/03 BY SP1 AT/CNP

5 Ltr

(6-21-55)

FBI

Date: 3/13/56

Transmit the following message via AIRTEL

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mason
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Nease
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

From SAC, NEW YORK (117-192)

To: BUREAU (117-268)

SMAB.

On 3/12/56 U.S. Customs, NYC advised that [redacted] Washington, D.C., bearing Australian passport [redacted] issued Sidney, Australia 10/22/55, arrived NYC Pier 90 via "SS QUEEN MARY". Orally declared piece of crude ore approximately ½ lb. obtained as souvenir at Capetown, South Africa. [redacted]

b2
b6
b7C
b7E

AEC, NYC advised by Customs, examined sample, declared it to be crude pitchblende, and authorized release of same by Customs.

For information.

KELLY

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/12/03 BY SP4 BDA/ENP

3-Bureau (117-268) RM
1-New York (117-192)

Mr. Belmont

JJD:EG
(5)

RECORDED-61 117-268

8 MAR 14 1956

INDEXED-61

EX-125

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____

Special Agent in Charge

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: March 13, 1956

FROM : A. H. BE[illegible]

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: REAPPRAISAL OF U. S. POLICY REGARDING SOVIET BLOC SHIPMENTS AFFORDED DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY
117-284

By memorandum March 9, 1956, attached, the National Security Council Executive Secretary reported the action taken by the National Security Council on March 8, 1956, concerning the problem of limiting the diplomatic pouch. The Director, who was present at this NSC meeting, has already reported the decision of the Council. The attached memorandum formalizes the action as NSC Action No. 1524.

The following was decided:

a. The joint IIC-ICIS report on the subject and the Planning Board recommendations were considered and discussed.

b. It was decided that no limitation would be placed upon the diplomatic pouch at this time.

c. The detailed operational plans prepared by IIC-ICIS for use if the President decided the pouch should be limited are to be kept under continuing review by IIC-ICIS with reports to NSC at appropriate intervals.

d. The U.S. Communications Security Board is to study and report on the feasibility of maintaining adequate and secure U.S. communications in the event limitations were to be placed on our use of the pouch.

e. Intensive efforts should be continued to develop improved active and passive detection devices.

f. Directed the Department of State to study the feasibility of obtaining international agreement prohibiting the shipment under diplomatic immunity of radioactive materials which would authorize adequate inspection, through detection devices, of such shipments; such study to be forwarded to the Council through the NSC Planning Board.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 9/24/93 BY SP2 [illegible]

ENCLOSURE

1 ENCLOSURE

ORIGINAL FILED IN

Enclosure
[illegible]:hkg
(6)

1-Mr. Boardman
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Mr. Day
1-Liaison Section

117-284-[illegible]
NOT RECORDED
188 MAR 27 1956
27 MAR 23 1956

Memorandum for Mr. Boardman

Walter Yeagley, the Department of Justice Representative on the ICIS, called the Director at 5:36 p.m., March 12, 1956, to advise that he had just received a record of the action of the NSC meeting. He indicated the portion we are interested in came under paragraph f. He said that the meat of our contemplated plans for our operation had been taken out and the President had approved this action, and it was not his impression that this was what the President wanted. Mr. Yeagley indicated that it was by accident that he had received a draft of the above which was supposed to go to the Attorney General before it was approved, and he sent the Attorney General a memorandum suggesting that he might want to contact Mr. Anderson or Mr. Coyne concerning this matter. The Director advised Yeagley that he had not yet received a copy of the NSC report, but he would check into it and get in touch with the Attorney General and Mr. Coyne.

Mr. Yeagley further advised on March 13, 1956, that he was concerned that the report of the NSC meeting did not exactly express what the President had in mind. He stated that for one thing, paragraph f of the NSC memorandum directs the Department of State to study the feasibility of obtaining international agreement prohibiting the shipment under diplomatic immunity of radioactive materials, which would authorize adequate inspection through detection devices of such shipments. Yeagley said that he thought that the President had not mentioned "devices" but had used the term "limited inspection." He also states that he thought it was the President's intention that the Planning Board should attempt to separate the two problems pertaining to the size of the pouch - (1) The problem of clandestine introduction of nuclear materials, and (2) The use of the pouch by friendly foreign nations to avoid the payment of customs on certain articles.

Yeagley stated he had talked with James S. Lay, Jr., Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, and had pointed out the above. Mr. Lay told Yeagley that he feels that the NSC memorandum correctly reflects the decision of the NSC and should not be reconsidered or rewritten. He pointed out that the Planning Board knows what was discussed at the NSC and what is wanted by the President.

Yeagley stated that the IIC-ICIS Joint Subcommittee on Countermeasures Against the Clandestine Introduction of Nuclear Weapons will continue to review this matter and will see that the NSC instructions are implemented, and this will serve as a check on the action taken by the State Department.

Memorandum for Mr. Beardman

ACTION:

1. This is for your information. The continuing review and periodic reports requested in c above will be conducted and prepared by the Joint IIC-ICIS Subcommittee on Countermeasures Against the Clandestine Introduction of Nuclear Weapons.

2. There appears to be no reason for the Director to confer with the Attorney General or Coyne regarding this matter at this time.



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOIPA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET

Serial Description ~ COVER SHEET 01/10/1956

Total Deleted Page(s) ~ 26

Page 9 ~ Referral/Direct
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Page 29 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 30 ~ Referral/Direct
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Page 130 ~ Referral/Direct
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Page 160 ~ Duplicate
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Page 163 ~ Duplicate
Page 164 ~ Duplicate
Page 206 ~ b1

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

5-7 (7-15-55)

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION--FBI

3-16, 1956

___Mr. Boardman	___Mechanical Section
___Mr. Belmont	___Translation Sec. 6228 IB
___Mr. Hennrich	
___Mr. Keay	___Ident Div.
___Mr. Cleveland	___Technical Lab
___Mr. Baumgardner	___Mr. Ferris, 7627
___Mr. Branigan	
___Mr. Roach	
___Mr. W.C. Sullivan	
___Mr. Scatterday	Room 7649

SUPERVISORS

___Mr. Aull	___Mr. Lewis
___Mr. Baken	___Mr. Litrento
___Mr. Bird	___Mr. Little
___Mr. Broden	___Mr. McCaslin
___Mr. Calame	___Mr. McDermott
___Mr. Callahan	___Mr. Meehan
___Mr. Chase	___Mr. Mossburg
___Mr. Cotter	___Mr. Nasca
___Mr. Crowley	___Mr. Norstrom
___Mr. Day	___Mr. Payne
___Mr. de Bettencourt	___Mr. Peasinger
___Mr. Donahoe	___Mr. Sandweg
___Mr. Dunn	___Mr. Schweppe
___Mr. Ezell	___Mr. Shroder
___Mr. Fitzgerald	___Mr. Stacey
___Mr. Garrett	___Mr. Stewart
___Mr. Gregg	___Mr. Todd
___Mr. Hitt	___Mr. Torrillo
___Mr. Jaquiss	___Mr. Tully
___Mr. Jensen	___Mr. Turner
___Mr. A.R. Jones	___Mr. Turyn
___Mr. F.L. Jones	___Mr. Wacks
___Mr. Kissiah	___Mr. Wallace
___Mr. Kitchel	___Mr. Wannall
___Mr. Kuno	___Mr. Welborn
___Mr. Kurtz	___Mr. Welte
___Mr. Lake	___Mr. Whaley
___Mr. Lee	___Mr. Whitson

___Mail Room, 5533	___RECORDS SECTION
___Mrs. Dean	___Send File
___Mr. Hammond	___Bring File up to date
___Miss Taylor	
___Miss Martis	___Place on record and return
___Correct	
___Please call me	___Indicate index ref.
___Please see me	

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4/8/93 BY SP4BJA/DKJ 950935

Phil AEC. Has picked a lot of neutrons.

L. Whitson
1720

ESPIONAGE SECTION

FD-36 (6-21-55)

F B I

Date: 3/12/56

Transmit the following message via AIRTEL

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

From SAC, NEW YORK

To: BUREAU

SMAB.

On 3/12/56, Inspector [redacted] U.S. Customs, Pier 90, North River, advised that [redacted] arrived at Pier 90, North River, NYC aboard the "QUEEN MARY". [redacted] gave his home address as [redacted] Quebec, Canada and was travelling under Canadian passport [redacted] issued at Ottawa 11/23/55.

[redacted] stated he was a prospector by profession and that while visiting France he picked up five pounds of uranium ore at a mine in France named the Gernne Sur Scorf. He further related that he intended to turn over this uranium ore to the Department of Mines in Quebec.

[redacted] This ore was declared orally by [redacted]

AEC, NY advised by Customs who authorized release of ore to [redacted] For information.

KELLY

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4/9/03 BY SP4BJA/DFW
IL 948742/950935/997059

3-Bureau (117-268) RM

RECORDED-3
INDEXED-3

EX-125

Above info. to Rolander, AEC 3-15-56 emb.

Mr. Belmont

TGS:EG
117-192
(5)

117-21[illegible]

2 MAR 13 1956

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. Mason
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Nease
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

CONFIDENTIAL

cc - Bates
Whitson

RECORDED-3

117-268 (Smuggling of Atomic Bombs)

Date: March 19, 1956

To: Captain John A. Waters
Director of Security
Atomic Energy Commission
Room 926
1717 H Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

BY COURIER SERVICE

(orig and 1)

EX-125

DECLASSIFIED BY SP4 BJA/DFW
ON 4-8-03
D44874 2/950936

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: MARTIAL DUMULON
MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING
(Atomic Energy Act)

This will confirm information furnished to the Atomic Energy Commission by FBI liaison March 15, 1956.

According to U.S. Customs, New York City, one [redacted] carrying Canadian passport No. [redacted] arrived at Pier 90, North River, New York City, aboard the "Queen Mary" on March 12, 1956.

[redacted] whose home address was given as [redacted] Quebec, Canada, stated he was a prospector by profession and that while visiting France he picked up five pounds of uranium ore at a mine in France named the Gernne Sur Scorf. He stated he intended to turn this uranium ore over to the Department of Mines in Quebec. The ore was declared orally by [redacted]

b6
b7C

According to word received by us from Customs, the Atomic Energy Commission office in New York, upon notification by Customs, authorized release of the ore to [redacted] No investigation is being conducted by this Bureau. We have no record identifiable with [redacted]

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Boom

LW:blb
(5)

BY COURIER SVC.
MAR 19
COMM-FBI

CONFIDENTIAL

MAR 23 1956

FD-36 (6-21-55)

FBI

Date: 3/13/56

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mason
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Nease
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

Transmit the following message via AIRTEL

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

From SAC, NEW YORK (117-192)

To: BUREAU (117-268)

SMAB Smuggling - Atom Bombs

On 3/13/56, U.S. Customs, Idlewild Airport, NYC, reported that a ship of the Flying Tiger Line #30058, a freight carrier, arrived with passengers from Frankfurt, Germany at Idlewild Airport at 7:47 a.m., 3/13/56. [redacted] the pilot of this plane, is in possession of U.S. passport [redacted]

[redacted] was found to be in possession of five ounces of uranium ore which he claimed he obtained in Salt Lake City about one and a half years ago and has been carrying this piece of uranium as a pocket piece since that time. [redacted] also stated this is first time that he has ever landed at Idlewild Airport.

[redacted]

b2
b6
b7C
b7E

AEC, NYC advised by Customs who authorized release of ore to [redacted] which was returned to him by Customs.

For information.

NO ACTION NECESSARY.
INDICES NEGATIVE OF
IDENTIFIABLE INFO. LW

KELLY

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4-8-03 BY SP4BJA/DFW
II 948 742/950935

3 Bureau (117-268) RM
1-New York (117-192)

Mr. Belmont

RECORDED-3
INDEXED-3

117-268-

8 MAR 14 1956

TGS:EG
(5)

ESM EC

MAR 23 1956

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

NUMEROUS REFERENCE 4-22a

SEARCH SLIP

Subj: [redacted]

Supervisor Whelan Room 1730

Searcher

R# Date 3/15/56 Initial

FILE NUMBER SERIAL

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/12/03 BY SP4 SM/cap

ND	94-5	39785
NR	100-128809	1
NR	100-149946	2
NI	100-423477-307	
	[redacted]	
NR	[redacted]	126
	[redacted]	
ND	26-85913	19
NI	46-66483	
	[redacted]	
NI	26-150239	
	[redacted]	
NR	[redacted]	373
	[redacted]	
NI	[redacted]	
	[redacted]	
NR	137-4	452090

b6
b7C

NUMEROUS REFERENCE 4-22a

SEARCH SLIP

Sub [redacted]

Supervisor Whitsons Room 1730

Searcher

R# Date 7/15/56 Initial

FILE NUMBER SERIAL

[redacted]

NI 44-32997

[redacted]

ND 44-[illegible]

[redacted]

NK 44-[illegible]

[redacted]

NP [illegible]

[redacted]

b6
b7C

(2)

4-312 (1-23-56)

DATE OF MAIL 3-15-56

HAS BEEN REMOVED FOR THE CONFIDENTIAL FILE ROOM OF THE DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION.

SEE FILE 66-2554-7530 FOR AUTHORITY.

SUBJECT JUNE MAIL S. M. A. B.

REMOVED BY 57 APR 2 1956

FILE NUMBER 117-268-C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 9/2/03 BY SP1CAB/ENP

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGEOUT

Interdepartmental Committee on International Security
3527 Department of Justice, Washington 25, D. C.

ICIS-P25/378

March 16, 1956

SECRET

Honorable J. Edgar Hoover
Chairman
Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference
Washington, D. C.

Re: Detection Device Program

S. M. A. B.

Dear Mr. Hoover:

The Treasury Department's counter proposal which I believe resulted from a conference or conferences between you and Mr. David Kendall of the Department of Treasury was forwarded to me by Hugo A. Ranta, Treasury Representative, ICIS, by cover letter of March 15, 1956. The proposal is dated March 14, 1956 and five copies of each are enclosed herewith.

The meeting between Mr. Belmont, Mr. Ranta and myself after your first discussion with Mr. Kendall did not result in anything definitive since Mr. Ranta stated that he was not clear as to just what the Treasury Department could or would do. The only thing we agreed on was that he would get more definite information. I believe subsequent to that Mr. Kendall talked to you. Although I am not familiar with the details of Mr. Kendall's conversations with you I note that the new proposal apparently

ENCLOSURE
b2
b7E

[redacted]

If you have any questions about this proposal I assume you will deal directly with the Department of Treasury. I will, of course, be interested in the final position of IIC on this matter.

1 117-218

NOT RECORDED
188 MAR 28 1956

1 ENCLOSURE

Sincerely,

J. Walter Yeagley

J. Walter Yeagley
Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee
on Internal Security

THE INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/2/03 BY SP4 SJM/ENP

Enclosures (5)

SECRET

27 MAR 27 1956

LIAISON

ORIGINAL FILED IN

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: March 20, 1956

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES REQUIRED TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

On February 10 and 29, 1956, Treasury Under Secretary Kendall discussed with the Director the national program recommended by a joint IIC-ICIS subcommittee for the use of devices which will detect radioactive materials. In accordance with the Director's instructions, Belmont met with Yeagley, of ICIS, and Hugo Ranta, of Treasury, on February 27, last, in an effort to reach agreement on the extent of Treasury's participation in this program.

b2
b7E

The Treasury Department has now furnished ICIS its latest proposal, dated March 14, 1956, copy attached. This proposal calls for purchase and use by Customs of [redacted] to replace Geiger counters now in use. Treasury still feels a press release should be made when its program is inaugurated.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/2/03 BY SP3 STP/mlp

1 ENCLOSURE

The original Treasury proposal, to which IIC objected, was practically the same as instant proposal. The current proposal adds one device of each kind and notes the Coast Guard use of devices, which the previous proposal said would be considered.

OBSERVATION:

IIC has pointed out by letters dated September 28, 1955, and January 25, 1956, that the program originally recommended by the subcommittee was a minimum program and should not be decreased. The current Treasury proposal does not meet the subcommittee recommendation, and in fact, amounts to less than half. If, as it appears, this is all Treasury will do in

ORIGINAL FILED IN

Enclosures (2)

GAD:hke (6)

1 ENCLOSURE

MAR 27 1956

1-Mr. Boardman
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Mr. Day
1-Liaison Section

NOT RECORDED
188 MAR 28 1956

LIAISON

implementing the recommended program, Treasury should go ahead with this much. The IIC position has been made quite clear, and Treasury is solely responsible for the inadequate program in this field. The issuance of a press release is likewise the responsibility of Treasury. We consider any press release undesirable and have so indicated in our letter of January 25, 1956, to ICIS. However, if Treasury insists, it is their responsibility.

ACTION:

Attached for approval is a proposed IIC letter to ICIS acknowledging the Treasury Department counterproposal, noting that the IIC has previously furnished its views concerning the minimum program recommended by the joint IIC-ICIS subcommittee as well as concerning the proposed press release, and suggesting that the program be implemented to the extent possible. We state, with reference to the press release, that this is left to the discretion of the Treasury Department.

We are not commenting on the proposed location of the devices, the extent of the implementation considered in the new counterproposal, or the wording of the proposed press release. All we are saying is that Treasury should implement the program to the extent possible.

If approved, this proposed letter will be circulated for the approval of the IIC military members.

3/29/56

DIRECTOR, FBI (100-330411)

SAC, NEW YORK (100-65536)

[redacted]

SM-C

Re NYlet to Director dated 1/27/56;
Bulet to New York, 2/9/56;
Summary Report of SA [redacted]
dated 3/2/56 at New York

b6
b7C

New York, in a letter to Director 1/27/56, requested that the subject be removed from Special Customs Watch List, since it had been determined that she was no longer employed at The Den-Ro Import Co., 580 Fifth Ave., N. Y., on 1/12/56. By letter dated 2/9/56, the Bureau instructed that New York must positively determine the subject's present employment before she could be removed from the Watch List.

It was determined by means of a surveillance on 3/2/56 and a pretext telephone call on 3/2/56 that the subject was employed at the Jewish Sanatarium and Hospital for Chronic Diseases, 86 East 49th St., Brooklyn, N. Y. FD-122 is being submitted to reflect this change.

In view of the above information, it is again recommended that the subject be removed from the Special Customs Watch List.

Since no leads are outstanding, this case is being placed in a closed status, summary report having been submitted on 3/2/56.

2-Bureau (100-330411)(RM)
1-New York (117-192)(Smuggling of Atomic Bombs or Parts Thereof into the U.S.)
1-New York (100-65536)

ROD:jen
(4)

INITIALS ON ORIGINAL

117-268
NOT RECORDED
145 APR 4 1956

59 APR 5 1956

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/2/03 BY SP4 [illegible]

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 100-330411-

SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL

cc on
on

117-1513

DECLASSIFIED BY SP4BJA/RNP
ON 4/2/03

Date: March 22, 1956

To: Captain John A. Waters
Director of Security
Atomic Energy Commission
Room 926
1717 H Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

BY COURIER SERVICE

(orig and 1)

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: [redacted]
MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING
(Espionage)

U. S. Customs, Idlewild Airport, New York City, advised on March 15, 1956, that [redacted] San Francisco, California, had arrived that date on TWA, Flight 829. On his Customs declaration [redacted] declared a mineral sample of torbernite of approximately one ounce, which he stated he had obtained from a professor of mineralogy in Portugal.

Examination of the mineral sample by Customs showed it to be radioactive. Customs informed the Atomic Energy Commission office in New York and Mr. Zila of the Atomic Energy Commission office authorized Customs to release the mineral sample to [redacted]

[redacted] was described by Customs as bearing U.S. passport [redacted] place of birth [redacted] occupation - lawyer, [redacted] was returning to the United States from a business and pleasure trip during which he had visited Portugal, Spain, Morocco, France, Germany, Yugoslavia, Turkey, Lebanon, Syria, and the Scandinavian countries. [redacted] reportedly has a hobby of mineral collecting.

[redacted] may be identical with the person of the same name who was the subject of memoranda to you from this Bureau dated July 29 and August 18, 1955.

Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

LW:blb (7)
cc - 117-268 (Smuggling of Atomic Bombs)

117-268-1
NOT RECORDED
1956

5 MAR 27 1956

CONFIDENTIAL

DUPLICATE
MAR 1956
MAILED

3-26-58

[redacted]

b6
b7C

ORIGINAL FILED IN 117-1513-1

Ltr 1/16/56 from Adam Bonds

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

Letter to Captain John A. Waters
Director of Security
Atomic Energy Commission

entitled [redacted] Atomic Energy Act. These memoranda, copies of which were furnished to the Office of Security, Department of State, related to one [redacted] who had gone to the Surete Nationale in Paris, France, and demanded protection from unnamed persons who wished to murder him. While in protective custody of the Surete, he attempted suicide and was placed in a public infirmary for mental cases. The subject of the 1953 memoranda revealed to French authorities that he was travelling in France and in the French colony of Madagascar in an effort to obtain scandium for the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission.

b6
b7C

The foregoing is for your information. No investigation of [redacted] is being conducted by the FBI.

cc - 1 - Mr. Dennis A. Flinn
Director
Office of Security
Department of State
515 22nd Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

BY COURIER SERVICE

CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET

2 [illegible] dupl
1 [illegible] tickler
1 [illegible] rdle
2-yellows

SAC, Charlotte (80-157) March 22, 1956

Director, FBI (117-268)

FEDERAL CIVIL DEFENSE ADMINISTRATION

RECORDED-3

Reurmemo 3/15/56, captioned as above seeking Bureau advice as to whether any special arrangement has been worked out between the Bureau and Federal Civil Defense Administration relative to the handling of an atomic device.

The instructions set forth in Section H of SAC letter 54-1 (not 55-1) and Section L of SAC letter 54-20 continue to be the Bureau instructions on the handling of an atomic device.

The amendment on page 6 of Federal Civil Defense Administration Advisory Bulletin No. 195 dated 1/27/56, merely places Civil Defense in the same position as all other agencies by reminding them that the FBI does have primary investigative jurisdiction in matters involving the violation of the Atomic Energy Act. The responsibility for dismantling any bomb device is still the responsibility of the Explosive Ordnance Disposal Units and the Atomic Energy Commission still has the responsibility for disposing of fissionable material. These responsibilities are clearly set forth in Federal Civil Defense Advisory Bulletin No. 195.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4-8-03 BY SP4 BJA/DFW
II 948742/950935

JEM:vec
(6)

66-17380sub8

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

MAILED 11
MAR 22 1956
COMM-FBI

APR 2 1956

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 66-17380-[illegible]

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: 3-15-56

FROM : SAC, Charlotte (80-157)

SUBJECT: FEDERAL CIVIL DEFENSE ADMINISTRATION
"Smuggling" Atom Bombs

Enclosed is a copy of Advisory Bulletin No. 195 dated 1-27-56, and published by the Federal Civil Defense Administration, Battle Creek, Mich.

This Bulletin was received in the Charlotte Office on 3-14-56, and the Bureau's attention is invited to page 6, Item No. VI. Amendment which states as follows:

> "Advisory Bulletin No. 34, on the subject of 'Explosive Ordnance Disposal,' outlined a system for the reporting of unexploded conventional ordnance. The present Advisory Bulletin (No. 195) alters this procedure only in that the FBI should be notified rather than the United States Army when an object is suspected to be an atomic device."

Instructions contained in Section H of SAC Let 55-1 and Section L of SAC Let 54-20 are to the effect that the disarming of atomic devices is the responsibility of Explosive Ordnance Disposal Units of the Department of Defense and that the disposal of disarmed atomic weapons or fissionable material is the responsibility of the Atomic Energy Commission.

This office is unable to locate any subsequent instructions from the Bureau either countermanding or superseding those in above SAC Lets.

The Bureau is requested to advise whether any special arrangement as described in the enclosed Advisory Bulletin has been made between the Bureau and the FCDA.

Enclosure - 1 ENCLOSURE
2 - Bureau
1 - Charlotte (80-157)
PDW:hks
(3)

1 - [illegible]
dictated 3/21/56
let Sac Charlotte 3/21/56 JEM

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4-8-03 BY SP4BJA/DFW
ID#48742/950935

RECORDED-3 119-268-10
INDEXED-31
23
25 MAR 16 1956

FD-36

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mason
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Nease
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

AIRTEL

NEW YORK, N.Y.
3/16/56

Transmit the following Teletype message to: BUREAU

Re: SMAB

U. S. Customs, NYC, advised on 3/14/56, that [redacted] Utah, U. S. born, holding U.S.Passport [redacted] issued 5/5/55, Glasgow, Scotland, arrived NY International Airport, 9:00 AM, via PAA Flight 101 from England. Employed as mining engineer by UTEX Exploration Co., Moab, Utah.

Filed Customs Declaration [redacted] declaring in writing 8 lbs. mineral and ore samples obtained at Cornwall, England, and Uganda, Africa, for personal collection and some for contribution to National Museum, Washington, D. C. Samples crude and pitchblend from Cornwall [redacted] AEC notified by Customs and authorized release. For info.

b2
b6
b7C
b7E

JJD:MFB

3-Bureau
1-NY

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/2/03 BY SP1BJA/LMP

Mr. Belmont

Re: Mr. Nichols

POSSIBLY IDENT WITH [redacted] MINING ENGINEER AND GEOLOGIST (124-1267) NO DEROG. NO ACTION NECESSARY.

EX-122

LW

RECORDED-66

INDEXED-66

ESH SEC

59 APR 2 1956

Approved _____ Sent _____ M. Per _____

Special Agent in Charge

~~SECRET~~

March 14, 1956

ICIS-225/568

Honorable J. Edgar Hoover
Chairman, Interdepartmental
Intelligence Conference
Department of Justice Building
Washington 25, D. C.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/2/03 BY SP4 [illegible]

Dear Mr. Hoover:

Enclosed are letters to the appropriate agencies which request implementation of recommendations contained in a report dated February 3, 1956, on the subject of clandestine introduction of fissionable material between ports of entry along the land borders and along the Gulf Coast. This report was prepared in the ICIS, as an aspect of the assignment made by the President to the IIC and ICIS jointly, for coordinating, in conjunction with AEC, the establishment of necessary countermeasures to detect and defend against the clandestine introduction and detonation of nuclear weapons in the United States.

By letter dated December 22, 1955, you furnished IIC comments on the report as then drafted, and indicated reasons why the IIC could not join in endorsement of the report. Since that time, all the substantive points mentioned in your letter have been taken care of in a way which we feel may be satisfactory to the IIC. We understand, further, that the IIC has not wished to join with the ICIS in the report primarily because it did not participate in the studies and discussions which went into its development, and, secondly, because the report is largely concerned with operations of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, which are not within the knowledge of the IIC.

ENCLOSURE

We have, accordingly, prepared letters requesting agencies to implement the recommendations contained in the report in such a manner that the joint requests do not imply IIC endorsement of the body of the report. We note from your letter of December 22, 1955, that IIC agencies are already implementing recommendations 1 and 3. Five copies of the report, dated February 3, 1956, are enclosed for the information of the IIC.

ENCLOSURE

NOT RECORDED
188 MAR 28 1956
27 MAR 28 1956

~~SECRET~~

MAIL ROOM

ORIGINAL FILED IN

to Mr. Boardman 3/21/56 RAD

The original has been placed in IIC files in Mr. Dayo's office. This is FBI's file copy.

I hope that you will find it possible to join me in signing the enclosed letters, so that implementation by the agencies will be requested in accordance with the joint responsibility assigned by the President to the two internal security committees.

Sincerely yours,

J. Walter Yeagley
Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee
on Internal Security

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: March 21, 1956

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

S.M.A.B.

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: PREVENTION AND DETECTION OF THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF FISSIONABLE WEAPONS BETWEEN PORTS OF ENTRY ALONG THE LAND BORDERS AND THE GULF COAST

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/12/03 BY SP1 AGT/RMS

ICIS memorandum November 25, 1955, furnished for IIC comment copies of a report in the captioned matter and asked that IIC join in issuing the report. IIC letter December 22, 1955, informed ICIS that IIC could not join in endorsing the report since it had not participated in its preparation. We also took issue with the conclusion in the report that there had been a lessening of the possibility of the introduction of fissionable material across our land borders between ports of entry. IIC concurred in the recommendations in the report, except for Recommendation No. 4 which gave INS more than a year within which to reassess the effectiveness of control of the border.

ICIS memorandum March 14, 1956, attached, notes the IIC comments and furnishes copies of a report revised in accordance with those comments. The report recommends: (1) All intelligence agencies should be reminded of the captioned problem and should furnish INS and Customs any information obtained concerning any type of smuggling operation. Conversely, INS and Customs should furnish all interested investigative agencies with any information developed regarding contemplated smuggling of fissionable material; (2) Emphasis should be placed on Customs and INS practice of paying informants for data concerning smuggling of persons and material; (3) The statute concerning payment of rewards for information concerning attempted smuggling of atomic weapons or materials should be widely publicized here and abroad through media such as post offices, Customs offices, consular offices, and law enforcement bulletins (this was done in November, 1955, issue of the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin); and (4) INS should reassess effectiveness of border control and report to ICIS within six months after the completion of training of its newest patrol officers.

ENCLOSURE

ORIGINAL FILED IN

Enclosures (8)
GAD:hke (5)
1-Mr. Boardman
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Day
1-Liaison Section

ENCLOSURE

119-268-87 MAR 27 1956

NOT RECORDED
188 MAR 28 1956

LIAISON

Memorandum for Mr. Boardman

ICIS has forwarded seven letters (copies attached) which it proposes to forward to the appropriate agencies requesting that they implement Recommendations 1, 2, and 3 where appropriate. Walter Yeagley, ICIS Chairman, requests that the Director sign these letters with him so that these are joint requests from the two committees.

OBSERVATION:

Yeagley makes the point that this is a study of prevention and detection of the clandestine introduction of fissionable materials, which, he points out, has been assigned to IIC and ICIS by the President as a joint responsibility. This is true. Undoubtedly, Yeagley feels the requests would have more weight if signed with him by the Director. This is also true. Our only objections to this procedure are: (1) IIC did not join in the study (Yeagley attempts to take care of this by stating in the requests that IIC merely agrees with the recommendations), (2) the report which will accompany the letters indicates on page three that INS has done a good job along the border by reducing the flow of aliens. We do not know whether this is true or whether INS has jockeyed the figures to present a favorable impression; further, the report has an attachment which, in effect, indicates INS has not been given sufficient funds by Congress in the past to implement border coverage properly.

While the proposed letters for the Director's signature state that the IIC did not participate in preparation of the report, it can be inferred that we do not object to it.

RECOMMENDATION:

Despite the fact that ICIS and possibly Pat Coyne (who favors joint action by IIC and ICIS in matters affecting clandestine introduction of nuclear materials) may feel that IIC is being stuffy in not joining in the letters to the various agencies, we feel we should tell Yeagley again that this report is the result of a study by ICIS and should be forwarded to the interested agencies by Yeagley alone.

FD-36 (6-21-55)

FBI

Date: 3-21-56

Transmit the following message via AIR-TEL

REGISTERED

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

From SAC, New York

To: Director

OSMAB

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mason
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Nease
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

NO-378973-1
97-268-44,43
116-xxx8

On 3/21/56 U. S. Customs Inspector [redacted] Idlewild Airport, NYC advised that [redacted] Riverdale, NY bearing U. S. Special Passport [redacted] arrived PAA plane 5024K, 6:15 PM, 3/21/56 from Bermuda. [redacted] is physicist and orally declared 25 micrograms of radium.

b2
b6
b7C
b7E

[redacted]

[redacted]

AEC advised by Customs and MR. BLATZ authorized release of radium to [redacted]

For information.

Kelly

NO DEROG. INFO. ON [redacted] RADIUM NOT SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL UNDER AEA. NO FURTHER ACTION LW.

Mr. Belmont

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-8-03 BY SP4 BJA/DFW
D948742/950935

3-BUREAU (117-268) RM
1-NY 117-192

FJG:FJM (#1)

EX-122

117-268-

RECORDED-66

INDEXED-66

59 APR 2 1956

Approved: _____ Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 22 1956

TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. Nichols	
Mr. Boardman	
Mr. Belmont	
Mr. Mason	
Mr. Mohr	
Mr. Parsons	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Tamm	
Mr. Nease	
Mr. Winterrowd	
Tele. Room	
Mr. Holloman	
Miss Gandy	

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-8-03 BY SP4BJA/DFW
II 948742/950935

WASH 13 FROM NY 22 6-59 PM

DIRECTOR DEFERRED

b2
b6
b7C
b7E

SMAB. BUFILE ONE ONE SEVEN DASH TWO SIX EIGHT [redacted] MUSIC TEACHER US CUSTOMS, MAIL DIVISION, NYC, ADVISED ON MARCH TWENTY TWO, FIFTY SIX, THAT HE EXAMINED A FIVE POUND MAIL SHIPMENT ADDRESSED TO [redacted] CARE OF NEWMONT MINING CORPORATION, THREE HUNDRED PARK AVENUE, NYC. THIS SHIPMENT BORE RETURN ADDRESS OF [redacted] GENERAL COMMISSION MERCHANTS, P.O. BOX ONE NINE EIGHT, TEHERAN, IRAN. WHEN SHIPMENT EXAMINED [redacted] IN VIEW OF THIS, SHIPMENT WAS OPENED AND EXAMINED AND FOUND TO CONTAIN RUBBER SHOES AND A SMALL QUANTITY OF ORE. CUSTOMS ADVISED LOCAL AEC OF INSTANT MATTER WHO IN TURN INFORMED CUSTOMS THAT SHIPMENT IN ITS ORIGINAL STATE COULD BE FORWARDED TO ADDRESSEE. NO DECLARATION MADE OF CONTENTS. NY INDICES NEGATIVE FOR INFO.

KELLY

END AND HOLD

APR 4 1956
Mr. Belmont

RECORDED - 30 117-268-

INDEXED-30

16 MAR 29 1956

NO SHOWING ORE WAS SOURCEMATERIAL UNDER AEA. NO IDENTIFIABLE INFO RE SHIPPER OR RECEIVER. NO FURTHER ACTION. LW

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: March 27, 1956

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES REQUIRED TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

My memorandum of March 14, 1956, attached, analyzed and secured approval for a joint IIC-ICIS letter to the Secretary of State requesting that arrangements be made with Canadian authorities which will permit use by Customs of portable detection devices during their regular inspections on U.S.-bound trains between Saint Johns, Quebec, and Saint Albans, Vermont.

ICIS has forwarded the original of the letter which was considered and the signature of ICIS Chairman Yeagley has been affixed. This letter is identical with the letter considered in my attached memorandum, with the exception that it contains one additional sentence: "The Canadians, of course, should be requested not to make public statements on the use of the devices." This is consistent with the IIC's belief that no publicity should be given.

ACTION:

Attached for the signature of the Director as IIC Chairman is the letter forwarded by ICIS.

Enclosures (2) ENCLOSURES

GAD:hke/lhe
(6)
1-Mr. Boardman
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Mr. Day
1-Section Tickler

RECORDED - 30 117-268-1092

20 MAR 30 1956

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-8-03 BY SP4BJA/DFW II 948742/950935

57 APR 4 1956

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: March 14, 1956

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-8-03 BY SP4BJA/DFW ID#948742/950935

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES REQUIRED TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

Soviet bloc diplomatic personnel enter the United States by rail at Laredo, Texas, and Saint Albans, Vermont. Trains arriving at Laredo halt for a sufficient period to permit thorough inspection and interrogation by Customs and INS. Trains entering through Saint Albans are not thus delayed and Customs inspectors normally board these trains at Saint Johns, Quebec (about 40 miles from Saint Albans), and are able to complete their inspections by the time of arrival at Saint Albans.

The President has instructed that IIC-ICIS coordinate the captioned problem. IIC-ICIS have recommended use of detection devices in examining incoming luggage and baggage of Soviet bloc personnel. Customs has pointed out these devices should be used between Saint Johns and Saint Albans in order to prevent delay of trains or necessity for additional personnel. Treasury has indicated willingness to secure and use portable devices at this point but asks that arrangements be made with Canadian authorities. We feel that requesting such arrangements is properly within the function of IIC-ICIS as coordinators of the program.

IIC military members have approved attached draft joint IIC-ICIS letter to Secretary of State requesting that arrangements be made with Canadian authorities which will permit use by Customs of the portable detection devices during their regular inspections on U.S.-bound trains between Saint Johns, Quebec, and Saint Albans, Vermont.

ADVISED 3/16/56 9:15 AM

ACTION:

If you approve, ICIS will be informed and the signature of ICIS Chairman Yeagley will be secured on an original of the attached draft letter prior to presenting the letter for the Director's signature.

ENCLOSURE

117-268-10

RECORDED - 30

20 MAR 30 1956

Enclosure
GAD:hke
(6)

1-Mr. Boardman
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Mr. Day
1-Liaison Section

FBI

~~SECRET~~ DRAFT

ICIS-P25

February 24, 1956

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/2/03 BY SP4 BTA/RMP

Honorable John Foster Dulles
Secretary of State
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Dulles:

Consideration by the joint IIC-ICIS Committee of the problem of possible introduction of fissionable material by persons entering the United States by rail from Canada indicates that there is no practical substitute [redacted] in connection with the search of certain U.S.-bound trains while they are still traveling in Canada. Customs inspectors normally board U.S.-bound trains at St. Johns, Quebec (about 40 miles from St. Albans, Vermont), and occasionally at Montreal, Quebec, and are thereby able to carry out their inspections by the time such trains arrive at the port of entry at St. Albans. If use of the [redacted] is not to be integrated with this established procedure, and is to be undertaken only after the trains have entered the United States, the operation would become more costly, since more inspectors would be required, and would be less efficient, since it could not be completed between the Canadian border and St. Albans, and would have to be continued south of that point, with the risk of debarkation of some passengers. b2 b7E

In view of the above considerations, it is requested that the Department of State undertake to make the necessary arrangements with the Canadian authorities [redacted] on certain U.S.-bound trains traveling in Canada. As indicated in the enclosed letter dated

ENCLOSURE

1 Copy of this ltr has been made for IIC files - 3-20-56 HAD

December 22, 1955, from the Atomic Energy Commission, the existence of the [redacted] is not classified and no Atomic Energy "Restricted Data" is involved. b2 b7E However, details as to the performance of the device regarding its capabilities in detecting special nuclear material are classified, and such details should not therefore be divulged to the Canadians in connection with these arrangements. It is considered appropriate and sufficient to inform the Canadians that the purpose of the use of the device is the detection of radioactive material. The Canadians should also be informed that use of the device entails no harmful effects to persons or things examined by means of it. It is contemplated that the devices would be handled only by U.S. personnel. Should the Canadians request operational details or should they request that their personnel be allowed to use the devices, the problem of the release of classified information would then arise and would have to be considered as a separate issue.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover
Chairman, Interdepartmental
Intelligence Conference

J. Walter Yeagley
Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee
on Internal Security

Enclosure

~~SECRET~~

ICIS-P25/379

March 27, 1956

Honorable John Foster Dulles
The Secretary of State
Washington 25, D. C.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/2/03 BY SP4BTP/RNP

Dear Mr. Dulles:

Consideration by the Joint IKG-ICIS Committee of the problem of possible introduction of fissionable material by persons entering the United States by rail from Canada indicates that there is no practical substitute [redacted] in connection with the search of certain U.S.-bound trains while they are still traveling in Canada. Customs inspectors normally board U.S.-bound trains at St. Johns, Quebec (about 40 miles from St. Albans, Vermont), and occasionally at Montreal, Quebec, and are thereby able to carry out their inspections by the time such trains arrive at the port of entry at St. Albans. [redacted] is not to be integrated with this established procedure, and is to be undertaken only after the trains have entered the United States, the operation would become more costly, since more inspectors would be required, and would be less efficient, since it could not be completed between the Canadian border and St. Albans, and would have to be continued south of that point, with the risk of debarkation of some passengers. b2 b7E

In view of the above considerations, it is requested that the Department of State undertake to make the necessary arrangements with the Canadian authorities [redacted] on certain U.S.-bound trains traveling in Canada. As indicated in the enclosed letter dated December 22, 1955, from the Atomic Energy Commission, the existence of [redacted] is not classified and no Atomic Energy "Restricted Data" is involved. However, details as to the performance of the device regarding its capabilities in detecting special nuclear material are classified, and such details should not therefore be divulged to the Canadians in connection with these arrangements. It is considered appropriate and sufficient to inform the Canadians that the purpose of the use of the device is the detection of radioactive material. The Canadians should also be informed that use of the device entails no harmful effects to

3/28/56 Delivered O/H

RECORDED - 30 117-268-125

ENCLOSURE

(Attached to cover memorandum from Mr. Belmont to Mr. Boardman, 3/27/56, re "Countermeasures Required to Detect & Defend Against the Clandestine Introduction and Detonation of Atomic Weapons in the United States" GAD:hke)

20 MAR 30 1956

APR 4 1956

FBI files. The letter was prepared in ICIS so there is no yellow copy.)

~~SECRET~~

persons or things examined by means of it. The Canadians of course should be requested not to make public statements on the use of the devices. It is contemplated that the devices would be handled only by U.S. personnel. Should the Canadians request operational details or should they request that their personnel be allowed to use the devices, the problem of the release of classified information would then arise and would have to be considered as a separate issue.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover
Chairman, Interdepartmental
Intelligence Conference

J. Walter Yeagley
Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee
on Internal Security

Enclosure

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

FBI

P
Y

UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

Washington 25, D. C.

December 22, 1955

Dear Mr. Yeagley

Your letter of November 10, 1955 requested advice on the security classification of [redacted] b2 b7E

This is to advise you that the existence of this device and the device itself as designed and built by the Naval Research Laboratory are unclassified. In addition, the technical characteristics of the device, per se, would not require any classification. Restricted Data classifications may become involved, however, if the characteristics of the device are related specifically to the kind or quantity of special nuclear material which the device is capable of detecting, or the circumstances under which such special nuclear material would be detectable by these devices. If further guidance would be helpful in this area, please feel free to work with our Director of Classification, Charles L. Marshall.

In our opinion the functioning of the device to detect possible clandestine introduction of special nuclear material into the United States should properly be classified Secret, Defense Information. Restricted Data is not involved.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ Lewis L. Strauss

Chairman

Mr. J. Walter Yeagley
Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee
on Internal Security
Department of Justice

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4-8-03 BY SP4 BJA/DFW
1948742/950935

~~SECRET~~

117-26-1033

ENCLOSURE

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : L. V. Boardman

DATE: 3-27-56

FROM : A. H. Belmont

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: REAPPRAISAL OF U. S. POLICY REGARDING SOVIET BLOC SHIPMENTS AFFORDED DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY

S. M. A. B.

Re memorandum Belmont to Boardman 3-13-56 showing that National Security Council on 3-8-56 decided regarding captioned matter, among other points, that the detailed operational plans, prepared by IIC-ICIS for use as the President decided the diplomatic pouch should be limited, are to be kept under continuing review by IIC-ICIS with reports to NSC at appropriate intervals.

It was noted in the action paragraph of that memorandum that continuing review and periodic reports would be handled by the joint IIC-ICIS Subcommittee on Countermeasures Against the Clandestine Introduction of Nuclear Weapons.

RECOMMENDATION:

The IIC and ICIS will submit a report to the NSC on internal security matters which will cover the period ending June 30, 1956. It is respectfully recommended that a report on the detailed operational plans, mentioned above, will be included in the joint IIC-ICIS report on internal security matters.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-8-03 BY SP4BJA/DFW II 948742/950935

cc - Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Day
Mr. Whitson

LW:et
(5)

RECORDED - 78
EX - 121

117-268-10

20 MAR 30 1956

7 APR 4 1956

5-

2 auth letts 62-90938-1 62-90603-1

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

Date of Removal 5/27/52

Report
Letter Inc
Enclosure ✓ - 12/22/55 submitted by

Dated 3/27/56 has been removed for Mr. Day

~~to be sent~~ to further review

Subject SMAB

Synopsis

This is to be removed from file upon the return of the item and forwarded to the Coordinator of Mail and Files

Removed by
BJO

Date Request Received

File Number 117-268-10337 end

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/12/03 BY SP6 DOE/RENT

Orig & 1 - IC
1 - Y
3 - A ONI
1 - N
1 - Mr. Boardman
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Day
1 - Liaison Section
1- IIC files

1-Mr. Whitson

SECRET

March 29, 1956

Mr. J. Walter Yeagley
Chairman
Interdepartmental Committee on
Internal Security
Department of Justice Building
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Yeagley:

S.M.A.B

The Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference is in receipt of your letter of March 14, 1956, transmitting the Treasury Department counterproposal of March 14, 1956, outlining the extent of the program it favors for use of devices which will detect radioactive materials.

The IIC has previously furnished its views concerning the minimum program recommended by the joint IIC-USCIB subcommittee and concerning a proposed press release.

Inasmuch as the Treasury Department has indicated that it is not in a position to implement this program as recommended, it is suggested that it be implemented to the extent possible.

Sincerely yours,

NOT RECORDED
188 APR 3 1956

Chairman
Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference

RECEIVED FBI
1956 MAR 29 2 50 PM

ORIGINAL FILED IN

GAD:hke
(13)

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman

(Attached to cover memorandum from Mr. Belmont to Mr. Boardman, 3/29/56, re "Countermeasures Required to Detect and Defend Against the Clandestine Introduction and Detonation of Atomic Weapons in the United States" GAD:hke)

SECRET

20 MAR 30 1956

FD-36 (6-21-55)

F B I

Date: 3/29/56

Transmit the following message via AIRTEL

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

From SAC, NEW YORK (117-192)

To: DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268)

SMAB; AEA.

US Customs advised this date that [redacted] Mich., employed [redacted] Atomic Power Development Associates (APDA), 2000 2nd Ave., Detroit, Mich., and Consultant for Internat'l Cooperation Administration, arrived Internat'l Airport, NYC, 6:50 a.m., 3/29/56, via AIR FRANCE Flight 071 from Paris, France; US citizen, carried ICA travel orders [redacted]

On Custom Declaration [redacted] declared 3¼ lb. bar uranium, property of APDA, brought out of USA and returned for business purposes. Displayed AEClet dated 3/13/56, signed by [redacted] describing uranium bar as APDA property and authorizing [redacted] to carry same to Paris, France on or about 3/13/56, and return to US. AEC license to expire 5/31/56. [redacted] AEC, NYC notified and authorized release by Customs. Released to [redacted]

b2
b6
b7C
b7E

For Info.

KELLY

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-8-03 BY SP4BJA/DFW II 948742/950935

3 - BUREAU (117-268)(~~REGULAR MAIL~~) RM
1 - NY 117-192

JJD:JLK (#1)
(5)

RECORDED-3

INDEXED-3

AUTHORIZED TRANSPORTATION
NO ACTION NECESSARY.
LW

117-268-
4-2

16 MAR 30 1956

EX-124

Mr. Belmont
cc Mr. Winterrowd

APR 4 1956

Approved: _____ Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mason
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Nease
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

FD-36 (6-21-55)

FBI

Date: 3/28/56

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mason
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Nease
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

Transmit the following message via AIRTEL

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

From SAC, NEW YORK (117-192)

To: DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268)

SMAB; AEA

Staff Officer [redacted] U.S. Customs, advised this date that 7 pound package containing two cans of slate colored powder, believed to be cobalt, arrived U.S. Post Office, Morgan Annex, NYC, consigned to Continental Ore Corp., 500 Fifth Ave., NYC, from Societe Minere et Metall, Le Havre, France. No invoice. [redacted] AEC, NYC, notified and authorized release but requested samples of powder. Bureau attention directed to Bufile 105-28473, NY 105-7947, indicating Continental Ore in business dealings with Amtorg Trading Corp. from approximately 1940-41 to 1955. For info.

b2
b6
b7C
b7E

KELLY

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4-8-03 BY SP4BSA/DFW
II 948742/950935

117-268

RECORDED - 6 117-268-[illegible]

cc to 105-28473

Mr. Belmont

RECORDED
[illegible] 1956

3 - Bureau (117-268)
2 - New York (117-192)
(1 - 105-7947)
JJD:mmr (#1)
(6)

Approved: _____ Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memoranaum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: March 29, 1956

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES REQUIRED TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

My memorandum of March 20, 1956, reported the Treasury Department counterproposal for use of devices which will detect radioactive materials and secured approval for the circulation of a proposed letter to ICIS suggesting that Treasury implement the program to the extent possible.

The military members of the IIC approved this proposed letter with the exception of OSI which desires that the last sentence in the proposed letter be eliminated. This sentence read, "With reference to the press release, this is left to the discretion of the Treasury Department." OSI points out that this sentence has the effect of indicating IIC approval of a press release, whereas IIC has previously indicated it believes a release undesirable. The letter states that the IIC has previously furnished its views concerning a press release, and OSI feels that no further comment is necessary. The other military members have been consulted and concur in this.

ACTION:

Attached for approval and the Director's signature as IIC Chairman is a letter to ICIS acknowledging the Treasury Department counterproposal, noting that the IIC has previously furnished its views concerning the minimum program recommended by a Joint IIC-ICIS Subcommittee as well as concerning the proposed press release, and suggesting that the program be implemented to the extent possible.

Enclosure

GAD:hke
(6)
1-Mr. Boardman
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Day
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Liaison Section

RECORDED - 6 117-268-1097

20 APR 2 1956

EX-103

59 APR 6 1956

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-8-03 BY SP4 BJA/DFW

II 948742/950935

80-737-
66-8603-
62-90938-

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

CONFIDENTIAL

cc - Liaison
Whitson

117-268

DECLASSIFIED BY SP4BJA/DFW
ON 4-8-03
#948742/950935

Date: March 30, 1956

To: Mr. Chester A. Emerick
Deputy Commissioner, Investigations
Bureau of Customs
Room 7048
Internal Revenue Service Building
Washington 25, D. C.

BY COURIER SERVICE
(orig and 1)

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF
AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE U.S.
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

Reference is made to the memorandum from this Bureau dated June 15, 1955, presenting for your consideration [redacted] who was employed by the Den-Ro Import Company, 560 Fifth Avenue, New York City.

b6
b7C

It has been determined that [redacted] is now employed at the Jewish Sanitorium and Hospital for Chronic Diseases, 86 East 49th Street, Brooklyn, New York. Since she is no longer connected with the import business, you might no longer wish to consider her in connection with the special Customs watch list.

RECORDED - 78

117-268

APR 3 1956

cc - 1 - New York (100-65536) (for info)
cc - 100-330411 (Pearl Maze)

LW:blb (7)

BY COURIER SVC.
81 APR 2
COMM-FBI

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
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Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

CONFIDENTIAL

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 100-330411

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: March 29, 1956

FROM : A. H. BELMONT
S.M.A.B.

SUBJECT: REAPPRAISAL OF U.S. POLICY REGARDING SOVIET BLOC SHIPMENTS AFFORDED DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

The National Security Council, in connection with its consideration of the problem of limiting the diplomatic pouch, on March 8, 1956, instructed the Department of State to study the feasibility of obtaining international agreements prohibiting the shipment under diplomatic immunity of radioactive materials and which would authorize adequate inspection of such shipments by means of detection devices. State was instructed to forward the results of its study to NSC through the NSC Planning Board.

Liaison has determined through the ICIS Secretary that State has not mentioned this study within ICIS and apparently does not intend to have ICIS participate in it. Pat Coyne has advised that he has received no information regarding the progress of State's inquiries and, in fact, does not expect that the Planning Board will hear from State for some time, perhaps several months. Coyne promised to forward a copy of State's study for IIC consideration immediately upon its receipt by the NSC Staff.

ACTION:

If you approve, Liaison will make no further effort to follow this matter at this time. However, as a matter of interest to the Bureau, if no action is taken within 60 days, we will check and determine the status of the matter.

GAD:hke
(6)
1-Mr. Boardman
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Mr. Day
1-Liaison Section

RECORDED - 83
62-95265-
62-94936-
80-737-
3 auto-stats
UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

MT-268-1037

20 APR 4 1956

EX-108

59 APR 5 1956

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-8-03 BY SP4 BJA/DFW

D948742/950935

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: March 29, 1956

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

S.M.A.B.

Tolson
Boardman
Belmont
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Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: PREVENTION AND DETECTION OF THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF FISSIONABLE WEAPONS BETWEEN PORTS OF ENTRY ALONG THE LAND BORDERS AND THE GULF COAST

My memorandum of March 21, 1956, discussed an ICIS report in the captioned matter and various letters which ICIS had proposed that the Director sign jointly with the ICIS Chairman. We recommended, and the Director approved, that we should again tell Yeagley that this report is the result of a study by ICIS and that we should not join in forwarding it to interested agencies for implementation.

A draft letter has been circulated and approved by the military members of the IIC.

ACTION:

Attached for approval and signature of the Director as IIC Chairman is a letter to ICIS acknowledging receipt of the ICIS report, noting that comments and suggestions previously made by IIC have been considered and included in the report, and stating that inasmuch as the report resulted from a study by ICIS in which IIC did not participate, the IIC considers that it should not join in forwarding the report to the interested agencies for implementation, since IIC is not in a position to approve or disapprove of the material contained in the report.

Enclosure

GAD:hke
(5)

1-Mr. Boardman
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Day
1-Liaison Section

RECORDED - 12

117-268-104

20 APR 4 1956

FILED IN 62-90938-2 enclosures 66-8603-

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-8-03 BY SP4BJA/DFW
D 948742/950935

ENCLOSURE 59 APR 6 1956

184

1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Day
1-Liaison Section

Orig & 1 - ICIS
1 - Yellow
3 - ACSI, ONI, OSI
1 - NSC
1 - IIC files
1 - Mr. Boardman

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 30, 1956

VIA LIAISON

Mr. J. Walter Yeagley
Chairman
Interdepartmental Committee on
Internal Security
Department of Justice Building
Washington, D. C.

Sent by Special Messenger 3-30-56
H.A. Day

RECEIVED FBI
MAR 30 2 55 PM '56
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE

Dear Mr. Yeagley:

Your memorandum of March 14, 1956, furnished, for the signature of the IIC Chairman, letters addressed to appropriate agencies requesting implementation of recommendations contained in the ICIS report of February 3, 1956, concerning the prevention and detection of the clandestine introduction of fissionable weapons between ports of entry along the land borders and the Gulf Coast.

It is noted that the comments and suggestions contained in the IIC letter of December 22, 1955, have been considered and included in the ICIS report of February 3, 1956. The IIC has no further suggestions to make concerning this matter.

Inasmuch as this report resulted from a study by ICIS in which IIC did not participate, the IIC considers that it should not join in forwarding the report to the interested agencies for implementation, since the IIC is not in a position to approve or disapprove of the material contained in the report.

Sincerely yours,

Chairman
Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4/8/83 BY SP4 Bit/Rmp

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
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Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

GAD:hke
(12)

(Attached to cover memorandum from Mr. Belmont to Mr. Boardman, 3/29/56, re "Prevention and Detection of the Clandestine Introduction of Fissionable Weapons Between Ports of Entry Along the Land Borders and the Gulf Coast" GAD:hke)

RECORDED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FD-36

UREAU OF INVESTIGA

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

- AIRTEL - -

NEW YORK, N.Y.
3/21/56

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mason
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Nease
Mr. Wint...
Tele. Roo...
Mr. Holl...
Miss Gand...

Transmit the following Teletype message to: BUREAU

Re: SMAB (Bufile 117-268)

U. S. Customs, NYC, advised on 3/21/56 of arrival of following cargo on 3/20/56 at NY International Airport via Trans-Canada Airlines plane CFTFM, Flight #204 under Bill of Lading #256; Manifest describes cargo as one package of ore samples; shipper, Eldorado Aviation, Ltd., Hangar #8, Municipal Airport, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada. According to Customs, package contains 2 inner packages. One of same bears label "Beaver Load", weighs 6 Lbs. [redacted] Other item, a single rock, weight 12 Lbs., labeled, "Port Radium" [redacted] Consigned to [redacted] Mining Engineer, Division of Raw Material, U.S.A.E.C., Wash. 25, D.C. A.E.C.,NYC, advised by Customs and authorized release this date. b2 b6 b7C b7E

KELLY

~~46-20944~~ (Corrected)
116-31624 (Revised)

(3) Bureau RM
1-NY (117-192)

JJD:MFB

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4-8-03 BY SP4 BSA/DFW
II 948742/950935

Mr. Belmont

cc Mr. Nichols

EX-122

RECORDED-48 111-268-1
INDEXED-48 4-10
1956

1-D memo [illegible] 4-2-56

59 APR 12 1956

Approved _____ Sent _____ M. Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: April 2, 1956

FROM : W. A. Branigan

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-8-03 BY SP4BJA/DFW II948742/950935

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS AND PARTS THEREOF INTO THE U.S.
S.M.A.B.

NY airtel 3-21-56 pointed out that a shipment of ore from Eldorado Aviation, Ltd., Edmonton, Alberta, Canada, to [redacted] a mining engineer in the Division of Raw Material, Atomic Energy Commission, Washington, D. C.,

[redacted]

b2
b6
b7C
b7E

RECOMMENDATION:

It is respectfully recommended that Liaison check with the appropriate officials of the Atomic Energy Commission to determine whether such highly radioactive materials would have any damaging effects on other items of air cargo such as photographic film or Ilford plates. Liaison should also determine whether such improperly shielded radioactive materials would have any ill effects on the travelling public if in the confined space of an aircraft cabin.

117-268

cc - Belmont
Branigan
Bates
Whitson

LW:nlh
(5)

RECORDED-48 117-268-1941

INDEXED-48 20 APR 10 1956

59 APR 16 1956

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: April 6, 1956

FROM : MR. R. R. ROACH

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS AND PARTS THEREOF INTO THE U. S.

S.M.A.B.

Reference is made to the memorandum from Mr. Branigan to you dated 4-2-56 concerning a shipment of ore from Eldorado Aviation, Ltd., of Canada to [redacted] of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), Washington, D.C. This shipment [redacted] The memorandum recommended that Liaison check with AEC to determine whether such radioactive materials would have any damaging effect on items of air cargo or effects on the people traveling in the same plane containing the materials.

b2
b6
b7C
b7E

On 4-4-56 Dr. George Manov of the AEC advised Liaison Agent [redacted] that while he was not aware of [redacted] he felt certain from his experience [redacted] that the radiation given off from the material in question would have been well within the permissible limit. On 4-5-56 [redacted] of the Naval Research Laboratory was contacted and he stated, after being advised of the details in this matter, that the radiation from the shipment in question would not have any adverse effect on photographic film or on individuals riding in the same aircraft.

ACTION:

For your information.

RECORDED-48 117-268-107

20 APR 10 1956

CWB:fjb
(5)

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Whitson
1 - Liaison Section
1 - Mr. Bates

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-8-03 BY SP4 BSA/DFW
D948742/950935

59 APR 12 1956

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: April 6, 1956

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES REQUIRED TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION OF DEMOLITION ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

Tolson
Boardman
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

ICIS letter April 4, 1956, attached, forwards for IIC information a copy of a letter addressed to ICIS Chairman Yeagley by the Atomic Energy Commission on March 30, 1956. The AEC letter reiterates the position expressed by AEC in a previous letter to Yeagley on February 8, 1956, and notes, with reference to devices which will detect radioactive materials, that while AEC is willing to provide technical advice and assistance, the actual procurement of additional devices must be the responsibility of the agencies using them. AEC makes reference to a letter dated February 21, 1956, from Yeagley, in which it is stated that the Treasury Department is not considered equipped to assume operational responsibility for the detection device program. The context in which this statement was made is not known since IIC did not receive copies of Yeagley's letter. However, as you know, IIC by letter March 29, 1956, suggested to ICIS that Treasury implement the program to the extent possible. The ICIS Secretary has advised the IIC Secretary that letters are being drafted for the joint signatures of the IIC and ICIS Chairmen which will put the program in operation and will ask AEC to remain responsible for technical advice and assistance.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4803 BY SP4 BJA/DFW

D 948742/950935

ACTION:

Copies of the attached are being furnished to the other IIC members. No reply is necessary, and this matter will be settled as soon as ICIS agrees upon the wording of letters to the agencies which will use the technical devices.

Enclosure

GAD:hke (6)
1-Mr. Boardman
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Mr. Day
1-Liaison Section

2 ENCLOSURES APR 16 1956

117-268

RECORDED - 98

117-268-1044

20 APR 10 1956

LIAISON

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: April 12, 1956

FROM : R. R. ROACH

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES REQUIRED TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF ATOMIC WEAPONS INTO THE UNITED STATES (SNAB)

At 5:20 p.m., April 11, 1956, ICIS Secretary Bienvenu telephoned IIC Secretary Day and asked whether the IIC letter of March 29, 1956, relative to the limited national program for use of detection devices should be interpreted as IIC endorsement of the Treasury counterproposal. You will recall that Treasury indicated that it was willing to procure and utilize a substantially smaller number of detection devices than had been agreed upon by a Joint IIC-ICIS Subcommittee.

Bienvenu was informed that the IIC letter should not be interpreted as IIC endorsement of the Treasury counter-proposal; that the IIC had twice clearly expressed its opinion that the subcommittee program was a minimum program which should not be reduced and that any lessening of the program would result in a lessening of our security. Bienvenu was informed that the IIC position, as expressed in its letter of March 29, 1956, was that inasmuch as the Treasury Department has indicated that it is not in a position to implement the recommended program, it is suggested that it be implemented to the extent possible.

Bienvenu asked whether the letter should be interpreted as indicating IIC approval of the press release suggested by Treasury. He was informed that the IIC position concerning the press release was unchanged and that we believed a press release inadvisable. It was explained to Bienvenu that if Treasury insists that it make a release before it implements any portion of the program, that is Treasury's responsibility.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/2/03 BY SP4BJA/ENP

ACTION:

None. This is for your information.

GAD:hke
(5)
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Mr. Day
1-Liaison Section

RECORDED - 76 117-268-

11 APR 17 1956

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 66-8603-

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

APR 12 1956

TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mason
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Nease
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

WASH 2 FROM NEW YORK 12 10-24 AM

DIRECTOR URGENT

Smuggling Of Atomic Bombs

116-18969

SMAB, AEA. [redacted] U. S. CUSTOMS, IDLEWILD AIRPORT, ADVISED APR. ELEVEN FIFTYSIX THAT [redacted] [redacted] CONN., ARRIVED NY VIA SABENA AIRLINES, EIGHT TWO ZERO A.M., FOUR ELEVEN FIFTYSIX. HE FILED CUSTOMS DECLARATION [redacted] [redacted] AND DECLARED MINERAL SPECIMENS. THESE SPECIMENS OF ORE IN NATURAL STATE WERE, ONE PIECE TORBENITE WEIGHING ONE GRAM AND ONE PIECE SAMARSKITE WEIGHING TEN OUNCES. [redacted] STATED HIS HOBBY WAS COLLECTION OF ORE SAMPLES. [redacted] MR. SOLON, AEC, STATED AEC HAS NO INTEREST IN ORE OR [redacted] ADVISED CUSTOMS HE OBTAINED ORE SAMPLES FROM GREGORY BOTTLEY AND CO., THREE ZERO OLD CHURCH STREET, LONDON SW E, THAT THIS COMPANY HANDLES ORE SAMPLES, THAT HE HAD LEFT U.S., THREE SIXTEEN FIFTYSIX, AND TRAVELED THROUGH GERMANY, SWITZERLAND, ITALY, BELGIUM, FRANCE, AND ENGLAND. [redacted] TRAVELING ON U.S. PASSPORT [redacted] IS NATIVE BORN, U.S. CITIZEN. NY INDICES NEGATIVE ON PACE. NO FURTHER ACTION NY. FOR INFO.

b2
b6
b7C
b7E

117-268

1-D NO ACTION NECESSARY ITEMS WERE DECLARED. LW

END

Mr. Belmont

NYBR 1 2

NY R 12 AWA JP 1956

RECORDED - 40

20 APR 23 1956

KELLY

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-8-03 BY SP4 BJA/DFW

9487421 950935

cc [redacted]hau
[redacted]hitson

April 20, 1956

Air-Tel

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4-8-03 BY SP4BJA/DFW
II 948742/950935

SAC, ALBANY (original and 1)

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS
THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

OSMAB

Feurlet 4/10/56, "Alleged Communist Activity in New Orleans, Louisiana, and Mobile, Alabama, area. [redacted] Informants. Security Matter - C." [redacted] told Special Agent of your office there might be an atomic weapon stored in Louisiana, possibly in Mobile area. [redacted] stated parts of weapon were smuggled in through the port of Mobile and were assembled in that area. [redacted] explained parts were smuggled into Mobile wrapped in waterproof packages which were thrown overboard and moored by anchors and later picked up by small boats. [redacted] source of his information indicated to be [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

Arrange prompt interview with [redacted] regarding atomic weapon smuggling story, obtaining complete details including source of [redacted] information. You indicate hospital records show [redacted]

Hoover

Buffile 117-268

cc - 1 - Mobile (for info)

cc - 1 - New Orleans (for info)

MAILED 2
APR 20 1956
COMM-FBI

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

cc - 100-sub A-ser.31043 (Alleged Communist Activity in New Orleans, etc.)

LW:RET:blb
(8)

RECORDED 117-268-[illegible]

SEE NOTE ON PAGE TWO

EX.-100

20 APR 23 1956

71 MAY 11 1956

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 422855

NOTE:

[redacted]

He furnished considerable information to an agent of the Albany Office regarding individuals alleged to be communists in the New Orleans and Mobile areas. He claimed to have received these data from [redacted] Because of the fact that [redacted] Albany deferred interview of [redacted] pending Bureau advice. Because of seriousness of allegation, [redacted] should be interrogated. Allegations regarding individuals are being handled separately by Subversive Control Section and Employees Security Section.

b6
b7C
b7D

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN 4/25/56

DATE: April 18, 1956

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES REQUIRED TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF ATOMIC WEAPONS INTO THE UNITED STATES

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SMAB

My memorandum of February 8, 1956, reported the ICIS request that IIC join in asking the Department of State to [redacted] The objective of ICIS was to determine whether the Iron Curtain countries were surreptitiously subjecting visitors to inspection by devices which subject persons or objects to active radiation in order to determine the presence of fissionable material.

b2
b7E

We declined to participate in this request since the [redacted] and outside IIC purview. ICIS by letter April 18, 1956, copy attached, enclosed for IIC information a copy of its request made to State as outlined above on March 14, 1956, together with State's reply of April 2, 1956. State declined to [redacted]

ACTION:

None. The attached material was furnished for our information. Copies are being furnished to the other IIC members.

Enclosure

GAD:hke
(6)
1-Mr. Boardman
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Mr. Day
1-Liaison Section

INDEXED-41
RECORDED-41
117-218-1049

20 APR 1956

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 62-94846-6, 66-4618-6

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-8-03 BY SP4 BJA/DPW
D 948742/950935

FBI

ICIS-M25/338

April 18, 1956

Honorable J. Edgar Hoover
Chairman
Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference
Washington 25, D. C.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/12/03 BY SP4BTA/ENP

Dear Mr. Hoover:

Enclosed for the information of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference are five copies each of the following correspondence regarding [redacted] b2 b7E official personnel:

1. Letter dated March 14, 1956 to the Secretary of State from the Chairman, ICIS

2. Letter dated April 2, 1956 from the Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, Department of State.

Sincerely yours,

J. Walter Yeagley
Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee
on Internal Security

Enclosures

memo from Mr Belmont to Mr Boardman re Communications Received to Internal Security Against the Communist Party, U.S.A.

4-18-56

Encl

This memo is being referred to the Internal Security Section

When

Confidential

ENCLOSURE 117-368 1041

FBI

C O P Y

~~SECRET~~

C O P Y

March 14, 1956

ICIS-P25/359

Honorable John Foster Dulles
The Secretary of State
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Dulles:

Under Presidential authorization of December 29, 1952, the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (IIC) and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS), in conjunction with the Atomic Energy Commission, have been coordinating the development of countermeasures required to detect and defend against the clandestine introduction and detonation of nuclear weapons in the United States. As one phase of this program, the IIC and the ICIS have been considering proposals for the use of devices which have been developed for the detection of fissionable material.

In connection with discussions of the use of these devices, the desirability and importance have been noted of ascertaining if possible whether Soviet bloc countries are searching incoming persons and baggage by means of detection devices which would register on dosimeters.

It is therefore requested that appropriate procedures be instituted by the Department of State after consultation with the Atomic Energy Commission [redacted] and that the Department of State report regularly to the two Committees [redacted]

b2
b7E

Sincerely yours,

/s/ J. Walter Yeagley

J. Walter Yeagley
Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee
on Internal Security

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/2/03 BY SP4 BTA/RNP

~~SECRET~~

ENCLOSURE

117-268-1047

FD-36 (6-21-55)

F B I

Date: 4/24/56

Transmit the following message via AIRTEL

AIRMAIL

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

From SAC, MOBILE (100-1351)

To: DIRECTOR, FBI AND SAC, ALBANY

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mason
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Nease
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/12/03 BY SP4BTA/RNP

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS
OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE U.S.
AEA

ReBuAirtel to Albany dated 4/20/56, with cc to Mobile and New Orleans.

Reference is also made to Albany memo to Bureau 4/10/56, cc to Mobile and New Orleans entitled ALLEGED COMMUNIST ACTIVITY IN NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA AND MOBILE, ALABAMA AREA, [redacted]-INFORMANTS.

On 4/17/56, OSI Agent [redacted] Brookley AFB, Mobile, Ala., advised his headquarters requested him to conduct a preliminary investigation concerning the 3 persons named on pages 11 and 12 of Albany memo as being civilian employees of Brookley AFB, Mobile. He had checked employment records at the base and determined there is no [redacted] employed there, although there are persons named [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted] was orally advised and OSI, 8th District has been advised by letter dated 4/24/56, that this office has no objection to preliminary investigation conducted by OSI concerning the [redacted] but that if any pertinent info is developed, bringing their activity within provisions of EO 10450, this office should be advised.

It is pointed out that the Mobile Office has no info which would corroborate in any way the info furnished by [redacted]

The person referred to by [redacted]

RECORDED - 71 117-[redacted]-1050 RASR

(3) - Bureau (REGISTERED)
2 - Albany (100-0)(REGISTERED)
1 - New Orleans (Info)(REGISTERED)
2 - Mobile (100-1351)
JTB:Amd
(8)

EX-107

18 APR 27 1956

Mr. Belmont

Approved: _____ Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

58 MAY 3 1956

FD-36 (6-21-55)

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following message via _____

_____
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

From SAC,

PAGE TWO

To:

in Mobile for many years. [redacted] as pointed out in Albany memo. [redacted] has been a source of info for the Mobile Office for a number of years and his reliability is unquestioned.

On 4/23/56, [redacted] advised SA [redacted] that [redacted] Mobile, from 12/17/53, until about 8/54, when he moved into a free room [redacted] as referred to on page 4 of Albany memo). [redacted] explained that [redacted] had lived there [redacted] merely to help him out. [redacted] stated that [redacted] claimed to be from Schenectady, N.Y.; to be an Army veteran and was employed around Mobile doing odd jobs [redacted] advised that [redacted] was an odd person, seemed to have something troubling him and left Mobile in early 1955 for New Orleans, La. He recalled that [redacted] had disappeared from Mobile in 1954, for about 1 month and came back saying he had been away "running down Communists for the government".

b6
b7C
b7D

No investigation is being conducted by this office pending a determination by the Bureau after Albany interviews [redacted]

HALLFORD

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: April 20, 1956

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-8-03 BY SP4 BJA/DFW II 94874 2/ 95093S

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES REQUIRED TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF ATOMIC WEAPONS INTO THE UNITED STATES

SNAB

A joint IIC-ICIS Subcommittee in March, 1955, recommended a limited national program for the use of devices which will detect radioactive material. Customs, Coast Guard, and Immigration were to participate in this program, and the Atomic Energy Commission was to provide continuing research and technical assistance. As you know, implementation of this program was delayed due to Treasury's reluctance to make the necessary financial investment in the detection devices and a Treasury counterproposal, calling for a smaller number of devices, resulted in IIC letter March 29, 1956, which informed ICIS that since Treasury had indicated it was not in a position to implement the recommended program, we suggested that it be implemented to the extent possible.

Inasmuch as the coordination of countermeasures against the clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons was assigned by the President jointly to IIC and ICIS, ICIS has prepared letters, attached, to the Attorney General, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Secretary of the Treasury. The letter to the Attorney General requests implementation of that portion of the program assigned to the Immigration and Naturalization Service. ICIS has advised that the Attorney General has already approved this program and that INS representatives assisted in drawing it up. The letter to the AEC Chairman asks that AEC continue to be responsible for research concerning detection devices and to furnish technical advice and guidance to the agencies which will be using the devices. The letter notes that the devices will be procured by the using agencies and that procurement and operational costs will be borne by those agencies. The letter to the Secretary of the Treasury asks that Treasury implement its counterproposal on the understanding that a larger program may be later developed if feasible. The question of a press release is left to Treasury's discretion with the suggestion that any release be coordinated with the Atomic Energy Commission. IIC has previously stated its reasons for believing a press release undesirable.

117-268-

RECORDED - 81

Enclosures (3)

20 MAY 1 1956

GAD:hke (6)

1-Liaison Section
1-Mr. Boardman
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Day

COPY FILED IN

The other IIC members concur in these letters.

ACTION:

Attached for the signature of the Director, as IIC Chairman, are the three letters discussed above, each of which has already been signed by Walter Yeagley as ICIS Chairman.

[redacted] CONFIDENTIAL cc [redacted] on

RECORDED - 71

117-268

Date: April 27, 1956

To: Captain John A. Waters
Director of Security
Atomic Energy Commission
Room 926
1717 H Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

VIA LIAISON

(orig and 1) to Waters 4-30-56 cmb

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

DECLASSIFIED BY SP4AM/lcw/jp ON 6/12/03

On April 14, 1956, [redacted] an employee of the Mercurium Corporation, 303 Fifth Avenue, New York City, arrived at Idlewild Airport on an Air France flight from Mexico City. U. S. Customs advised that a check of [redacted] baggage disclosed eight pieces of radioactive ore, five of which were about one inch square and the remaining pieces being about two inches square. The total weight was approximately two pounds. [redacted] claimed to Customs that the ore pieces were souvenirs. According to Customs, Mr. A. V. Zila of the Atomic Energy Commission's office in New York was notified. Mr. Zila informed Customs he did not want the ore and cleared the pieces through Customs.

b6
b7C

This Bureau was not informed as to the precise kind of ore involved. Records of the FBI do not contain any record of investigation of [redacted] The records of U. S. Censorship in 1943 showed that a [redacted] New York, New York, was receiving mail from one [redacted] who was in a work camp in Switzerland. (62-62736 sub 2 ser. 15460, pg. 36)

An investigation was conducted of one [redacted] also known as [redacted] as an applicant for employment with the United Nations under a Loyalty of Employees of United Nations and Other Public International Organizations character. The investigation showed that [redacted] The name [redacted] appeared as a signer

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

LW:blb (5)

59 MAY 4 1956

CONFIDENTIAL

Letter to Captain John A. Waters
Director of Security
Atomic Energy Commission

of a Communist Party nominating petition in Queens County, New York, in 1939. (138-2458-8)

The only other possible reference to [redacted] appears on a visa application of one [redacted] a Turkish national. This application, dated in September, 1941, showed [redacted] to be the brother and sponsor of [redacted] who had entered the United States as a student in March, 1940. At that time [redacted] was the export manager at Speed Products Company, New York. (40-13480)

b6
b7C

No investigation is being conducted in the absence of a specific request. This is the result of an FBI name check and should not be considered as a clearance or non-clearance.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

AIRTEL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

4/15/56, NY, NY

FD-36
Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mason
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Nease
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

Transmit the following Teletype message to: BUREAU

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS AND/OR PARTS THEREOF OR OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO US; AEA

SMib

At 8:00 pm on 4/14/56, Staff Officer [redacted] US Customs, Idlewild Airport, NYC, telephonically contacted the NYO and advised that an Air France Flight, plane number FBHBI, arrived at Idlewild Airport at 5:00 pm on 4/14/56, from Mexico City.

[redacted] stated that on checking the baggage of [redacted] employed by the Mercurium Corporation, 303 Fifth Avenue, NYC, a passenger on this flight, that [redacted]

b2
b6
b7C
b7E

[redacted] stated that a check of [redacted] baggage disclosed eight pieces of ore, five of which were about one inch square, with the three remaining pieces being about two inch square. [redacted] stated that the total weight was approximately two pounds. He stated that [redacted] claimed the pieces were souvenirs.

[redacted] stated that he had contacted Mr. A. V. ZILA of the Atomic Energy Commission, who did not want the pieces of ore and who cleared them through customs.

ABOVE FOR INFORMATION OF BUREAU.

KELLY

RECORDED - 71

INDEXED - 71

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-8-03 BY SP4 BJA/DFW ID#48742/950935

Mr. Belmont

3 - Bureau (RM) 117-268

1 - New York 117-192

117-268 -

RJ Smith
(4)

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____

Special Agent in Charge

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

APR 27 1956

TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mason
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Nease
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

INDEXED 12

WASH AND WFO 9 FROM NEW YORK 27 3-40 PM

DIRECTOR AND SAC URGENT

SMAB, AEA. US CUSTOMS IDLEWILD AIRPORT, NYC, ADVISED THAT TWO RUSSIAN COURIERS, [redacted] DIPLOMATIC PASSPORT NUMBER [redacted] AND [redacted] PLOMATIC PASSPORT NUMBER [redacted] ARRIVED IDLEWILD AIRPORT TEN TWENTY AM, APRIL TWENTY SEVEN, FIFTYSIX, ABOARD SCANDINAVIAN AIRLINES FLIGHT LNLMD. ENROUTE TO WASHINGTON DC. COURIERS WERE CARRYING THREE DIPLOMATIC POUCHES. [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] CUSTOMS ADVISED COURIERS WERE NOT STOPPED, QUESTIONED OR SEARCHED. ~~FISUR~~ PHYSICAL SURVEILLANCE REFLECTED COURIERS ARRIVED AT [redacted] ~~ELEVEN TWENTY AM~~ NEW YORK AFFORDING COURIERS CONTINUOUS ~~FISUR~~ PHYSICAL SURVEILLANCE COVERAGE WHILE THEY ARE IN NY. NYO WILL ALSO ACCOMPANY COURIERS TO WASHINGTON DC AND WFO SHOULD ALSO AFFORD CONTINUOUS ~~FISUR~~ PHYSICAL SURVEILLANCE COVERAGE WHILE COURIERS ARE IN WASH. WFO WILL BE TELEPHONICALLY ADVISED OF COURIERS DEPARTURE FOR WASH, DC. COURIERS ON ARRIVAL NEW YORK INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT CARRYING TWO GREEN CANVAS COVERED POUCHES, TWO INCHES, TEN INCHES BY TEN INCHES, SEALED AND ONE BROWN CANVAS COVERED PUCH TWELVE INCHES BY EIGHT INCHES BY EIGHT INCHES, SEALED AND EACH COURIER ALSO CARRYING A BROWN LEATHER BRIEFCASE. CUSTOMS HAS NO KNOWLEDGE RE [redacted] BUREAU WILL BE ADVISED OF DEVELOPMENTS.

INDEXED 12 RECORDED 12 117-268

MAY 2 1956

b2
b6
b7C
b7E

KELLY

MAY 7 1956

TWO COPIES WFO

END HOLD

Mr. Belmont

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-2-03 BY SP4 BOP/ENP

See 105-23832-10 5-1-56

This with diam AG, Dep AG, AEC, FBI

FD-36 (6-21-55)

F B I

Date: 5/1/56

Transmit the following message via AIRTEL

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

From SAC, NEW YORK (117-192)

To: BUREAU (117-268)

SPIAB
AEA

US Customs, Assistant Deputy Collector [redacted] NYC, advised this date of arrival of [redacted] residence Uranium City, Saskatchewan, Canada, aboard SS QUEEN ELIZABETH bearing Canadian Passport [redacted]. Departed US 2/1/56, aboard same ship. On arrival today filed custom declaration [redacted] and orally declared two pound piece of pitchblende which he obtained in Canada as souvenir and had brought to Great Britain to exhibit to his nephews. Pitchblende [redacted] AEC, NYC notified by Customs and authorized release. For info.

b2
b6
b7C
b7E

NO ACTION NECESSARY.
ORE WAS DECLARED IN TRANSIT. KELLY
NO IDENTIFIABLE REFERENCES
TO [redacted] IN BUREAU INDICES.
LW

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-8-03 BY SP4 BJA/DFW
II 948742/950935

Mr. Belmont

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mason
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Nease
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman

Wake

INDEXED - 12

117 268-1

RECORDED - 12

25 MAY 2 1956

EX-109

2-Bureau (117-268)
1-New York (117-192)

JJD:amb (#1)
(4)

57 MAY 15 1956

Approved: J. J. Kelly Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268) DATE: 5/2/56

FROM : SAC, ALBANY (117-70)

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-8-03 BY SP4BJA/DFW
ID 948742/950935

Re Bureau Airtel dated 4/20/56.

On April 25, 1956, [redacted] was interviewed [redacted] New York. [redacted] could not furnish any specific information indicating that parts of atom bombs had been smuggled into the United States. He stated he believed it possible that this could be done and stated he believed it possible that foreign agents could be obtaining materials from U.S. Atom Bomb plants and assembling atom bombs in remote areas.

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted] was interviewed at length regarding the allegations reported in Albany letter to Director dated April 10, 1956. He stated that since 1937, he has been very much interested in what he termed "The Brotherhood." He stated that this organization functions through the Communist Party throughout the world, but that it is a very efficient organization of persons who possess unusual powers of observation and activity. He stated that he recently traveled through the United States with three other men known to him only as M1, M2, and M3, and that he was known to them under his internationally known code name, [redacted] He stated that although the other three were working on behalf of the Brotherhood and the CP and he had become disillusioned with the CP and was attempting to determine weaknesses in the CP and the Brotherhood so that he might lead an attack upon the Brotherhood and the CP which would result in their complete destruction.

He indicated that it was during that trip that he learned the information reported in Albany letter to Director dated April 10, 1956. He stated that he has attained a great deal of prestiege in the Brotherhood and could well be used to destroy it and the CP. He stated that the means by which this

CC: 2-Bureau (117-268)
1-Mobile (Info)
1-New Orleans (Info)
1-Albany (117-70)

RECORDED - 72 117-268-8
INDEXED - 72
23 MAY 1956

EAM:VAE
(5)

EX. - 120

1-D

RE Tydings

could be accomplished would be to have the Federal Bureau of Investigation assist him [redacted] He stated that he would like to have an agent of the FBI assigned to travel with him throughout the world, their ultimate goal being to locate in West Germany the actual leader of the Brotherhood who in turn actually controls the CP. He stated that this person is known to members of the Brotherhood as Christ, and that he is very old. He stated that many members of the Brotherhood now called him [redacted] Christ, and believes that he will ultimately lead this world-wide organization.

[redacted] is a person of great intelligence, his intelligence quotient being approximately 130. In view of the nature of his information and his stated anxiety to lead in the destruction of the Brotherhood and the CP, it was suggested to him that if he could furnish any specific information of value to the FBI which would indicate the validity of all his information, that the FBI would be much more interested. He stated that he would attempt to locate such information and would notify the FBI when he felt that he had specific information of value. b6 b7C b7D

No further action in this matter is contemplated UACB.

C.

[redacted] NOT ONLY IS MENTALLY UNBALANCED BUT DOES NOT TELL SAME STORY JAS [redacted] SAYS [redacted] TOLD HIM. NO FURTHER ACTION NECESSARY.

LW

[redacted] cc - Boardman
Belmont
Brannigan
Bates
Whitson

RECORDED - 51
117-208 - 1060

DECLASSIFIED BY SP4BJA/DFW
ON 4-14-03
II948742/950935

EX-108

Date: May 4, 1956 VIA LIAISON

To: Mr. E. W. Cook
Acting General Manager
Atomic Energy Commission
19th and Constitution Avenue, N. W.
Washington 25, D. C.

(Orig and 1)

Ltr to Cook 5-7-56 emb

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

MAILED 12
MAY 7 1956
COMM.FBI

Reference is made to your letter of April 27, 1956, regarding a question of policy involved in the reluctance of U.S. Customs at Idlewild International Airport to search two cases of highly radioactive air cargo being transshipped from Hamburg, Germany, through Idlewild to Barranquilla, Colombia, South America.

You indicated that the opening of shipments was an element of investigation and detection and, therefore, it was felt that the Atomic Energy Commission had neither authority nor responsibility to effect or authorize the opening of a highly radioactive shipment.

With regard to the incident of January 15, 1956, the Deputy Collector of Customs on duty at Idlewild International Airport reportedly felt that without the "know how" to handle radium, which he felt reasonably certain the shipment contained, it might be injurious to the examining inspector and those concerned with opening it to be exposed to the radioactive source.

We have been informed by Mr. C. A. Emerick, Deputy Commissioner of Customs, that the Bureau of Customs at New York has informed him that in the future all such shipments will be examined or detained by Customs.

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

cc - 1 AAG Tompkins by r.s. 0-6 same date.
LW:blb (9)

MAY 14 1956

SECRET

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: May 7, 1956

FROM : R. R. ROACH

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-14-03 BY SP4 BJA/DFW
II 948742/950935

SUBJECT: PREVENTION AND DETECTION OF THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF FISSIONABLE WEAPONS BETWEEN PORTS OF ENTRY ALONG THE LAND BORDERS AND THE GULF COAST

SMAB

By letter May 2, 1956, attached, ICIS Chairman Yeagley has furnished, for IIC information, copies of letters addressed to seven departments and agencies requesting implementation of the ICIS report in the captioned matter.

As you know, IIC declined to join in issuing this report although we made suggestions concerning it to ICIS, which suggestions were incorporated in the final draft of the report. The report asks that all intelligence agencies furnish Immigration and Customs any information obtained concerning smuggling operations; that emphasis be placed on Customs and INS practice of paying informants for smuggling data; that the statute permitting rewards for data concerning the smuggling of atomic materials be publicized here and abroad; and that Immigration furnish ICIS with a report concerning the effectiveness of its border patrol operations.

The letters note the joint IIC-ICIS responsibility for coordination of countermeasures with respect to the clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons and states that the report was prepared by ICIS and that the views of the IIC have been considered and are included. Copies of the letters have been furnished to the other IIC members.

ACTION:

None. This is for your information.

Enclosure

GAD:hke
(4)

1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Day
1-Liaison Section

RECORDED - 51 117-268-1111

INDEXED - 51

MAY 9 1956

EX-108

59 MAY 23 1956

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

~~SECRET~~

FBI

ICIS-P25/383

May 2, 1956

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 9-14-83 BY SP4BJA/DFW
#948742/950935

Honorable J. Edgar Hoover
Chairman
Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Hoover:

Reference is made to your letter of March 30, 1956, concerning the ICIS report of February 3, 1956, regarding the prevention and detection of the clandestine introduction of fissionable weapons between ports of entry along the land borders and the Gulf Coast.

For your information, there are enclosed copies of letters dated April 19, 1956, to the following agencies requesting implementation of the recommendations of the February 3 report, copies of which have been furnished you previously: Department of Defense, U. S. Information Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, the Post Office Department, The Department of the Treasury, Department of State, and the Attorney General.

Sincerely yours,

SIGNED

J. Walter Yeagley
Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security

Enclosures

ENCLOSURE

RECORDED - 51 11-26[illegible]

EX-103

MAY [illegible]

This is FBI file copy. The original is in the ICIS files.

~~SECRET~~

C
O
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Y

~~SECRET~~

ICIS-P25/375

April 19, 1956

Honorable Charles E. Wilson
The Secretary of Defense
Washington 25, D. C.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4-14-03 BY SP4BJA/DFW
948742/950935

Dear Mr. Wilson:

Enclosed is a report dated February 3, 1956, on the prevention and detection of the clandestine introduction of fissionable weapons between ports of entry along the land borders and the Gulf Coast. In December 1952, the IIC and the ICIS were directed by the President to coordinate, in conjunction with the AEC, the establishment of necessary countermeasures with respect to the detection and defense against the clandestine introduction and detonation of nuclear weapons in the United States. The enclosed report was prepared by the ICIS as one phase of discharging that responsibility, and the views of the IIC have been considered and are included in the report.

You will note that Recommendation 1 contained in this report calls for action by your Department. We request that you direct appropriate implementation of the recommendation.

We will be grateful if you will advise us of the results of your consideration of the above request.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed)

J. Walter Yeagley
Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee
on Internal Security

Enclosure:

Report

~~SECRET~~

C
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~~SECRET~~

ICIS-P25/374

April 19, 1956

Honorable Theodore C. Streibert
Director
U. S. Information Agency
Washington 25, D. C.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9-14-23 BY SP4BJA/DFW
E 948742/950935

Dear Mr. Streibert:

Enclosed is a report dated February 3, 1956, on the prevention and detection of the clandestine introduction of fissionable weapons between ports of entry along the land borders and the Gulf Coast. In December 1952, the IIC and the ICIS were directed by the President to coordinate, in conjunction with the AEC, the establishment of necessary countermeasures with respect to the detection and defense against the clandestine introduction and detonation of nuclear weapons in the United States. The enclosed report was prepared by the ICIS as one phase of discharging that responsibility, and the views of the IIC have been considered and are included in the report.

You will note that Recommendation 3 contained in this report calls for action by the U.S.I.A. We request that you direct appropriate implementation of the publicizing of information abroad concerning the reward legislation.

We will be grateful if you will advise us of the results of your consideration of the above request.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed)

J. Walter Yeagley
Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee
on Internal Security

Enclosure:

Report

~~SECRET~~

ENCLOSURE

SECRET

ICIS-P25/373

C
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April 19, 1956

Honorable Allen W. Dulles
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington 25, D. C.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4-1403 BY SP4BJA/DFW
1948742/950935

Dear Mr. Dulles:

Enclosed is a report dated February 3, 1956, on the prevention and detection of the clandestine introduction of fissionable weapons between ports of entry along the land borders and the Gulf Coast. In December 1952, the IIC and the ICIS were directed by the President to coordinate, in conjunction with the AEC, the establishment of necessary countermeasures with respect to the detection and defense against the clandestine introduction and detonation of nuclear weapons in the United States. The enclosed report was prepared by the ICIS as one phase of discharging that responsibility, and the views of the IIC have been considered and are included in the report.

You will note that Recommendation 1 contained in the report calls for action by your agency. We request that you direct appropriate implementation of that recommendation.

We will be grateful if you will advise us of the results of your consideration of the above request.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed)

J. Walter Yeagley
Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee
on Internal Security

Enclosure

SECRET

SECRET

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April 19, 1956 ICIS-P25/372

Honorable Arthur E. Summerfield
The Postmaster General
Washington 25, D. C.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4-14-03 BY SP4BJA/DFW
948742/950935

Dear Mr. Summerfield:

Enclosed is a report dated February 3, 1956, on the prevention and detection of the clandestine introduction of fissionable weapons between ports of entry along the land borders and the Gulf Coast. In December 1952, the IIC and the ICIS were directed by the President to coordinate, in conjunction with the AEC, the establishment of necessary countermeasures with respect to the detection and defense against the clandestine introduction and detonation of nuclear weapons in the United States. The enclosed report was prepared by the ICIS as one phase of discharging that responsibility, and the views of the IIC have been considered and are included in the report.

You will note that the Recommendation 3 contained in this report calls for action by the Post Office Department. We request that you direct appropriate implementation of the publicizing through post offices of the law signed by the President on July 15, 1955, concerning the payment of rewards to informants for information pertaining to clandestine introduction of atomic weapons or materials.

We will be grateful if you will advise us of the results of your consideration of the above request.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed)

J. Walter Yeagley
Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee
on Internal Security

Enclosure

SECRET

ENCLOSURE

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ICIS-P25/370

April 19, 1956

Honorable George M. Humphrey
The Secretary of the Treasury
Washington 25, D. C.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4-14-03 BY SP4BJA/DFW
I948742/950935

Dear Mr. Humphrey:

Enclosed is a report dated February 3, 1956, on the prevention and detection of the clandestine introduction of fissionable weapons between ports of entry along the land borders and the Gulf Coast. In December 1952, the IIC and the ICIS were directed by the President to coordinate, in conjunction with the AEC, the establishment of necessary countermeasures with respect to the detection and defense against the clandestine introduction and detonation of nuclear weapons in the United States. The enclosed report was prepared by the ICIS as one phase of discharging that responsibility, and the views of the IIC have been considered and are included in the report.

You will note that Recommendations 1, 2, and 3 contained in this report call for actions by the Bureau of Customs. We request that you direct appropriate implementation by that agency of Recommendations 1, 2, and 3 of the enclosed report.

We will be grateful if you will advise us of the results of your consideration of the above request.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed)

J. Walter Yeagley
Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee
on Internal Security

Enclosure:

Report

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~~SECRET~~

ICIS-P25/369

April 19, 1956

Honorable John Foster Dulles
The Secretary of State
Washington 25, D. C.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4-14-03 BY SP4 BJA/DFW
#948742/950935

Dear Mr. Dulles:

Enclosed is a report dated February 3, 1956, on the prevention and detection of the clandestine introduction of fissionable weapons between ports of entry along the land borders and the Gulf Coast. In December 1952, the IIC and the ICIS were directed by the President to coordinate, in conjunction with the AEC, the establishment of necessary countermeasures with respect to the detection and defense against the clandestine introduction and detonation of nuclear weapons in the United States. The enclosed report was prepared by the ICIS as one phase of discharging that responsibility, and the views of the IIC have been considered and are included in the report.

You will note that Recommendations 1 and 3 contained in this report call for actions by your Department. We request that you direct appropriate implementation of Recommendation 1 and also of Recommendation 3, as it pertains to publicizing, by means of circularization through U. S. official establishments abroad, of information concerning the reward legislation.

We will be grateful if you will advise us of the results of your consideration of the above request.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed)

J. Walter Yeagley
Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee
on Internal Security

COPY

~~SECRET~~

ICIS-P25/371

April 19, 1956

Honorable Herbert Brownell, Jr.
The Attorney General
Washington 25, D. C.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4-14-03 BY 3004 BTA/DEW
948972/950935

Dear Mr. Brownell:

Enclosed is a report dated February 3, 1956, on the prevention and detection of the clandestine introduction of fissionable weapons between ports of entry along the land borders and the Gulf Coast. In December 1952, the IIC and the ICIS were directed by the President to coordinate, in conjunction with the AEC, the establishment of necessary countermeasures with respect to the detection and defense against the clandestine introduction and detonation of nuclear weapons in the United States. The enclosed report was prepared by the ICIS as one phase of discharging that responsibility, and the views of the IIC have been considered and are included in the report.

You will note that all the recommendations contained in this report call for actions by the Immigration and Naturalization Service. We request that you direct appropriate implementation by that agency of the recommendations of the enclosed report.

We will be grateful if you will advise us of the results of your consideration of the above request.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed)

J. Walter Yeagley
Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee
on Internal Security

Enclosure

cc: Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization with enclosure

~~SECRET~~

ENCLOSURE

CONFIDENTIAL

cc - [illegible]
Belmont
Roach
Hitt
Day
Whitson

117-999

DECLASSIFIED BY SP4BJA/DFW
ON 4-14-03
II948742/950935

Date: May 7, 1956

To: Mr. J. Walter Yeagley (orig and 1)
Chairman
Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security
Department of Justice Building
Washington, D. C.

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

SAAB

This will confirm information furnished orally on May 3, 1956, by the FBI representative at a meeting of the Joint Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference-Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security Committee on Counter-measures (Committee B).

BY COURIER SERVICE
34 MAY 8
COMM-FBI

[redacted] Soviet diplomatic couriers, arrived in the United States via Scandinavian Airlines at Idlewild Airport, April 27, 1956, en route to the Soviet Embassy, Washington, D. C. As they passed through Customs at the Airport, carrying three diplomatic pouches and two brief cases, [redacted]

COMM-FBI MAY - 7 1956 MAILED 31

RECORDED - 89

[redacted] were furnished to the Department of State, the Atomic Energy Commission, the Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General William P. Rogers, and Assistant Attorney General William F. Tompkins.

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We have no record of [redacted] entering the United States within recent years. A Soviet courier bearing papers identifying him as [redacted] was last in the United States in 1953.

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

cc - 1 Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
Department of the Army
The Pentagon
Washington 25, D. C.

SEE NOTE PAGE 2.

LW:blb (12)

Attention: Chief, Security Division

Letter to Mr. J. Walter Yeagley
Chairman
Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security

cc - 1 - Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy
The Pentagon
Washington 25, D. C.

cc - 1 - Director of Special Investigations BY COURIER SERVICE
The Inspector General
Department of the Air Force
Building Tempo E
4th and Adams Drive, S. W.
Washington, D. C.

NOTE: Prior dissemination to Dept. 4/27/56; State and AEC, 5/1/56; confirming oral advice of 4/27/56.

~~SECRET~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

cc - Belmont
Branigan
Bates
Whitson

RECORDED - 40

117-268

DECLASSIFIED BY SP4BJA/DFW
ON 4-14-03
II948742/950935

Date: May 10, 1956 VIA LIAISON

To: Captain John A. Waters
Director of Security
Atomic Energy Commission
Room 926
1717 H Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

(orig and 1)
to Waters
5-11-56
cmb

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

U. S. Customs, New York City, has advised that on May 1, 1956, [redacted] attorney and businessman of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, arrived at Idlewild Airport via Pan American Airways. [redacted] filed a Customs declaration and orally declared, prior to examination, ten pounds of radioactive rare earth and two pounds of zirconia obtained from his own property in Brazil which he was bringing to the United States for analysis. Part of the material was destined for the Union Carbon and Carbide Company, New York.

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According to U.S. Customs, [redacted] Customs notified the Atomic Energy Commission office in New York, which requested the material be held for its examination. After completing the examination the Atomic Energy Commission office, New York, authorized release of the material by Customs to [redacted] on May 2, 1956.

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

LW:blb
(7)

5.9 MAY 21 1956

~~SECRET~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3-26-58

Letter to Captain John A. Waters
Director of Security
Atomic Energy Commission

[redacted] may be identical with the person of the same name who in 1954 owned property in the Brazilian state of Minas Gerais [redacted] In 1954 negotiations were reportedly under way between the Union Carbon and Carbide Company and the Brazilian National Research Council (Conselho Nacional De Pesquisas) concerning operations on [redacted] property with regard to uranium-bearing ores. The Brazilian National Research Council reportedly controls under Brazilian law all activities in Brazil having to do with nuclear research. (source- [redacted] Economic Counsellor of U.S. Embassy, Rio de Janeiro 117-880-8)

[redacted]

b6
b7C
OTHER

No investigation of [redacted] is being made in the absence of any allegation of a violation of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.

Congressional Information Not Subject to FOIPA

FD-36 (6-21-55)

F B I

Date: 5/2/56

Transmit the following message via AIRTEL

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

From SAC, NEW YORK (117-192)

To: DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268)

SMAB; AEA.

US Customs, NYC, advised on 5/1/56, of arrival via PAA Flight 6108 at 5:38 P.M., 5/1/56, at Idlewild Airport, NYC, of [redacted] Rio de Janiero, Brazil, attorney and businessman, Brazilian Passport Number [redacted] This individual filed Customs Declaration Number [redacted] and orally declared prior to exam 10 lbs. radioactive rare earth and 2 lbs. zirconia obtained from his own property in Brazil, being brought to the United States for analysis, part destined for Union Carbon and Carbide Company, NYC. [redacted] AEC notified and requested material be held for exam by AEC. AEC examined same and authorized release of material to [redacted] on 5/2/56.

b2
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b7C
b7E

Submitted for info.

KELLY

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-14-03 BY SP4BJA/DFW
D1948742/950935

3 - Bureau (117-268) (REGISTERED)
1 - New York (117-192)

JJD:mkc (#1)
(5)

Mr. Belmont

RECORDED - 40
INDEXED - 40

117-268-1

MAY 3 1956

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mason
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Nease
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

OFFICE OF DIRECTO
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVES
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUS



Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mason
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Jones
Mr. Nease
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/2/03 BY SP4 SDT/PAN

33

EXP. PROC.

APR 16 1956

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: May 7, 1956

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES REQUIRED TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF ATOMIC WEAPONS INTO THE UNITED STATES

Tolson
Boardman
Belmont
Harbo
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Sizoo
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-14-03 BY SP4BJA/DFW #948742/950935

S.M.A.B

At the IIC meeting on May 2, 1956, the Director instructed that Liaison determine the present status of the limited national program for the use of devices which will detect radioactivity. This is the program which was delayed for more than a year by the refusal of Treasury to spend the money necessary to procure these devices for Customs and Coast Guard.

Joint IIC-ICIS letters were sent on April 23, 1956, to the Attorney General, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission. The Attorney General was requested to have the Immigration and Naturalization Service secure and use portable detection devices in the examination of persons crossing the border. By letter dated May 2, 1956, General Swing informed the Attorney General that he was securing the necessary devices and would implement the program promptly.

The letter to AEC requested that AEC remain responsible for research and technical advice. The ICIS Secretariat has advised that an AEC representative has informally stated that AEC will accept this responsibility.

The letter to Treasury requested implementation of Treasury's own counterproposal calling for use of the devices by Customs and Coast Guard. The ICIS Secretary reported on May 7 that the devices for Coast Guard have already been ordered and Treasury has agreed to go ahead with its part of the program.

ACTION: None. This is to inform you of the present status of the program. The members of the IIC Working Committee are being informed of this.

ATTACHMENT 1.

GAD:hke
(5)
1-Mr. Boardman
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Day
1-Liaison Section

RECORDED - 52

117-268-15

MAY 1956

59 MAY 21 1956

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 62-8603-8923

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mason
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Nease
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

56354/786

MAY 2 1956

Attorney General

Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization

Implementation of the Program for Detection of Fissionable Material

Reference is made to your letter of April 23, 1956, addressed to J. Walter Yeagley, Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security, a copy of which was forwarded to this Service, requesting implementation of the program for detection of fissionable material.

The Naval Research Laboratory is presently in the process of redesigning the machine which will be used by the Border Patrol. A sample machine should be completed on approximately May 8, 1956. The Service will proceed with the procurement of the necessary number of machines. Funds for their maintenance and operation will be included in future budget requests.

Training of technicians in the maintenance of the machines will be effected by the Naval Research.

J. M. Swing

cc: J. Edgar Hoover, Chairman
Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference and

J. Walter Yeagley, Chairman
Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4-14-03 BY SP4 BJA/DFW
1948742/950935

RECORDED - 52

ENCLOSURE
117-268-15

EXP. PROC.

MAY 3 1956

34

cc [illegible]gan
[illegible]e
Whitson

Legal Attache, Mexico (orig and 1) May 18, 1956

Director, FBI (117-268)

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

PERSONAL ATTENTION

Prepare summary-type report regarding potentialities for smuggling atomic bombs or their components or other weapons of mass destruction, such as biological warfare (BW) or chemical warfare (CW) agents into the United States from Mexico by Soviet agents or professional smugglers. Report should be prepared on basis of material already in your possession and such additional contacts with selected reliable sources as you may deem necessary.

You should consider the possibility of assembled weapons or components coming into Mexico in diplomatic shipments, as mislabelled commercial shipments or smuggled ashore from submarines. Consider possibilities of bringing same across border in light civilian-type aircraft, in motor vehicles or, in the case of weapon components or BW materials, in hand-carried luggage. Consider the operational radii of light civilian-type aircraft in computing locations of airfields below the border which could be used.

RECORDED - 40 117-268

For the purposes of this report, consider that BW and CW materials could be introduced in aerosol dispensers which could be hand carried. Consider that CW materials, including deadly Soviet nerve gases, could be carried in 50-gallon oil drums. Small-yield atomic weapons weighing 160 pounds when assembled can be disassembled into four 40-pound parcels. Atomic weapon dimensions should be considered Top Secret - Restricted Data in connection with this report. This report should be classified Top Secret. For this reason, do not indicate Bureau interest or your interest in introduction into the U.S. of weapons of mass destruction in connection with any contacts which you make.

MAY 23 1956

You should submit this report within 30 days and arrange to have the Bureau promptly informed of any developments pertinent to this matter coming to your attention in the future.

cc - 1 - Foreign Liaison Unit (route thru for review)
LW:blb
(8)

Tolson
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Boardman
Belmont
Mason
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

LEGAT
[illegible]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/28/83 BY SP2 AMP/lem

FD-36 (6-21-55)

FBI

Date: 5/24/56

AIRTEL

Transmit the following message via _____

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mason
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Nease
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

From SAC, NEW YORK (117-192)

To: DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268)

SMAB
AEA

Smuggling Atomic Bombs

ReNYairtel 5/16/56.

AEC, NY, advises that shipment of seashells contained two radio active samples, but were of no interest to AEC. AEC has advised US Customs that they have no interest in seashells and authorized releasing same to consignee.

KELLY

WARD'S NATURAL SCIENCE ESTABLISHMENT, INC.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-14-03 BY SP4BJA/DFW 1948742/950935

Mr. Belmont

(3) Bureau (117-268) (RM)
1- New York (117-192)

RECORDED - 36

117-26

TGS:ehr (#1)
(5)

MAY 25 1956

EX. - 120

ESTABLISHMENT

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

[redacted] SECRET

cc - [redacted] Whitson

RECORDED - 40
117-268

DECLASSIFIED BY SP4 BJA/DFW
ON 4-14-03
I9487421950935

Date: May 25, 1956 VIA LIAISON

To: Captain John A. Waters (orig and 1)
Director of Security
Atomic Energy Commission
Room 926
1717 H Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

A Waters 5-28-56 cwb

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE U.S.
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

U.S. Customs, International Airport, Idlewild, New York, has advised that on May 16, 1956, one [redacted] of Stuttgart, Germany, arrived aboard Trans World Airlines, Flight 861. [redacted] filed U.S. Customs Declaration No. [redacted] in which he declared a massage oil and a heating pad. Both the massage oil and the heating pad [redacted] Customs stated that [redacted] was bringing the massage oil and heating pad into the United States for demonstration purposes and not for sale. Customs notified the Atomic Energy Commission office in New York, which ordered the release of the material to [redacted]

b2
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b7E

[redacted] may be identical with the [redacted] of Stuttgart, Germany, in the memorandum regarding [redacted] Illegal Sale of Uranium in Germany, Miscellaneous - Information Concerning, which was transmitted to Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army, for the attention of the Chief, Intelligence Division, under date of May 31, 1951. A copy of that communication was designated for the Atomic Energy Commission for the attention of [redacted] has been variously identified as [redacted] in Stuttgart and, according to information obtained

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Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

LW:blb
(6) NOTE: ~~CLASSIFIED SECRET~~ BECAUSE IT DISCUSSES REACTION OF DETECTION DEVICE. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ Entire

JUN 4 1956

3-26-58

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Letter to Captain John A. Waters
Director of Security
Atomic Energy Commission

abroad by another agency of the U.S. Government engaged in collection of intelligence abroad, the [redacted] who was connected with [redacted] was reported to be an anti-Nazi who was of such importance in the electrical industry of Germany that the Nazis did not bother him. (G-2 intelligence report info furnished by [redacted] (64-175232-118) No investigation of [redacted] is being made by this Bureau in the absence of a specific request.

b6
b7C

cc - 1 - Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
Department of the Army
The Pentagon
Washington 25, D. C.

To Col. Mg. Service AC31-5/38/55 DJS

Attention: Chief, Security Division

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

New York, N.Y.

AIRTEL

May 16, 1956

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mason
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Nease
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

Transmit the following Teletype message to: BUREAU

SMAB, AEA

Customs, New York International Airport, advised 9:30 A.M. 5/16/56, that one [redacted] Stuttgart, Germany, arrived New York International Airport 7:21 A.M., 5/16/56, aboard TWA Flight 861, Plane 7109. [redacted] destined to M. Dubco, 250 Fifth Avenue, New York. Filed U.S. Customs Declaration [redacted] in which he declared massage oil and heating pad.

[redacted] travelling on German passport [redacted] issued Stuttgart, Germany, 12/21/55. German by birth, occupation consulting engineer [redacted] import-export business. [redacted] last in U.S. 9/22/55, when he returned to Germany via KLM.

b2
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b7E

Massage oil [redacted] Heating pad described as 38 x 29 x 1 centimeters, [redacted] bringing massage oil and heating pad into U.S. for demonstration purposes and not for sale.

Ziller, AEC, notified by Customs and ordered release. No action by NYO. For information.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-4-03 BY SP4 BJA/DFW II 948742/950935 KELLY

Mr. Belmont

117-268-

RECORDED - 40
INDEXED - 40

3 - Bureau (117-268)(RM)
1 - NY (117-192)
(5)
TJM:IM

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

SECRET

cc - Li
Whitson

ORDED -

117-268

DECLASSIFIED BY SP4 BJA/DFW
ON 4-14-03
II948742/950935

VIA LIAISON

Date: May 25, 1956

To: Captain John A. Waters (orig and 1)
Director of Security
Atomic Energy Commission
Room 926
1717 H Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

J. Waters
5-28-56
cwb -

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

U. S. Customs has advised that on May 15, 1956, a mail package consigned from [redacted] in New South Wales, Australia, to Ward's National Science Establishment, Inc., Rochester, New York, [redacted] The invoice on the package described the contents as "seashells and under-sea stones."

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Customs notified the Atomic Energy Commission office in New York, which requested that the item be held pending examination of samples.

Ward's National Seience Establishment, Inc., is operated as the Frank A. Ward Foundation of Natural Science of the University of Rochester, New York. It is widely known as a supplier of natural science specimens and microscopic slides.

Could you inform this Bureau as to whether there were any significant results of the examination of the material by your New York office?

cc - 62-40361 (Ward's National Science Establishment, Inc.)
LW:blb
(6)

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Holloman
Gandy

NOTE: ~~CLASSIFIED SECRET~~ BECAUSE IT DISCUSSES REACTION OF DETECTION DEVICE.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECRET 3-27-58

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 62-40361-1

(6-21-55)

F B I

Date: 5/16/56

Transmit the following message via AIRTEL

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

From SAC, NEW YORK (117-192)

To: BUREAU (117-268)

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mason
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Nease
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

SMAB; AEA

U.S. Customs advised 5/15/56 that 8 lb. 12 oz. package arrived NYC via mail consigned from [redacted] New South Wales, Australia, to Wards National Science Inc., 300 Ridge Road, East, Rochester, NY. Invoice described contents as "seashells and under-sea stones". Package [redacted]

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AEC notified by Customs and AEC requested item be held pending examination of samples. AEC on 5/16/56 advised samples not yet received or examined but NYO will be advised of result of examination. Bureau will be advised of any significant results of this examination.

For info.

KELLY

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-4-03 BY SP4 BSA/DFW
II 948742/950935

3-Bureau (117-268) (RM)
1-New York (117-192)

RECORDED - 67 117-268-
MAY 17 1956

Mr. Belmont

JJD:EG
(5)

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

ED-36 (6-21-55)

F B I

Date: 5/28/56

Transmit the following message via AIRTEL

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

From SAC, NEW YORK

To: BUREAU

SMAB: AEA

Remyairtel 5/23/56 re [redacted]

LEONARD R. SOLON, Assistant Chief, Radiation Branch, AEC, NYC, advises material carried by [redacted] was as declared, but not of sufficient quality [redacted] SOLON advises that he notified US Coast Guard [redacted] so that same could be corrected. Material released to [redacted] following examination by AEC. No further interest.

b2
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b7C
b7E

KELLY

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4-14-03 BY SP4BJA/DFW
II 948742/950935

3 - Bureau (117-268)(RM)
1 - New York (117-192)

JJD:ams #1
(5)

Mr. Belmont

RECORDED-11 117-268

28 MAY 29 1956

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

~~SECRET~~ CONFIDENTIAL

cc - Be
Br
Rosen
Whitson

DECLASSIFIED BY SP4 BJA/DFW
ON 4-14-03
II 948742/950935

117-268 — 1072 —

Date: June 4, 1956 VIA LIAISON

To: Captain John A. Waters (orig and 1)
Director of Security
Atomic Energy Commission
Room 926
1717 H Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

to Waters 6-5-56 A.P.M.

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

U. S. Customs, New York, advised on May 29, 1956, that a mail package had arrived at Morgan Annex Post Office, New York City, consigned from [redacted] Finland, to [redacted] Princeton, New Jersey. The contents were described as a 16-pound mineral sample.

[redacted]

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According to Customs, the sample was examined by a representative of the Atomic Energy Commission but was found to be of no interest to the Atomic Energy Commission and its release was authorized to the consignee.

There are no identifiable references in this Bureau's files to either [redacted] No investigation of [redacted] is being made in the absence of a specific request. It would be of some assistance to know what [redacted] Could you furnish this information?

LW:blb
(7)

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Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

~~SECRET~~ CONFIDENTIAL

3-27-58

b2

JUN 12 1956

FD-36

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

NEW YORK -- 5/29/56

AirTel

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mason
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Nease
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

Transmit the following Teletype message to: BUREAU

SMAB, AEA NR

NR

US Customs advised mail package arrived Morgan Annex Post Office, NYC, consigned from [redacted] Finland, to [redacted] Princeton, N.J. described as 16 lb. mineral sample. [redacted]

MR. HANIGAN

b2
b6
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Sample examined by AEC but found no interest and authorized release to consignee.

For info.

KELLY

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-14-03 BY SP4 BJS A/DFW
D 948742/950935

Registered Mail

3 - Bureau (117-268)(Regular)
1 - New York (117-192)

JJD:plk (#1)
(5)

RECORDED - 94
INDEXED - 94

117-268-1022

11 MAY 30 1956

Approved: J J Kelly
Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

~~SECRET~~

CONFIDENTIAL

cc - B
Branigan
Roach
Whitson

RECORDED - 72

117-268 - 1074

10/28/03
CLASSIFIED BY 60267 uc/NLS/BJA/RNP
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (1) 10/28/2028
Per letter dtd 10/27/03 60267 uc/NLS/BJA/RNP 10/28/03

VIA LIAISON

Date: June 4, 1956

To: Captain John A. Waters
Director of Security
Atomic Energy Commission
Room 926
1717 H Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

(orig and 1) to Waters 6-5-56 APM 6-5-56 cmb

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

U. S. Customs, New York, advised that on May 23, 1956, [redacted] Long Island, New York, [redacted] Mercantile Metal and Ore Corporation, 595 Madison Avenue, New York City, arrived via Pan American Airways from Johannesburg, South Africa. [redacted] was identified as a collector of minerals and declared five ounces of pitchblende and samarskite. The [redacted]

The Atomic Energy Commission office in New York is reported to have undertaken an examination of the above-mentioned material.

A review of the files of the FBI reflects that one [redacted] served as a lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Army during World War II and was assigned to the Foreign Liaison Section of the Washington branch of the Military Intelligence Service. [redacted]

(S)

cc - 105-10349 [redacted]
LW:blb
(8)

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b7C
b7E

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

Tolson
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Boardman
Belmont
Mason
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

JUN 12 1956

CONFIDENTIAL 3-27-58

SECRET

Letter to Captain John A. Waters
Director of Security
Atomic Energy Commission

(S) [redacted]

[redacted] b1

(S) [redacted]

(S) [redacted]

No investigation is being conducted of W. F. Brazeau in the absence of any specific request.

FD-36 (6-21-55)

F B I

Date: 5/23/56

Transmit the following message via AIRTEL

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

From SAC, NEW YORK (117-192)

To: BUREAU (117-268)

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mason
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Nease
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

SMAB
AEA

105-[illegible]
66-160[illegible]-651x21

U.S. Customs advised 5/23/56 that [redacted] Long Island, NY, arrived via PAA flight 115 at 9:00 a.m. from the Carlton Hotel, Johannesburg, South Africa; baggage declaration [redacted] identified as collector of minerals and declared 5 oz. of pitch blende and samarskite. [redacted]

AEC cognizant and undertaking examination of material. Bureau will be advised of any significant results of this examination.

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b7C
b7E

[redacted] Mercantile Metal and Ore Corp., 595 Madison Ave., NYC. He holds U.S. passport [redacted]

NY records contain no derogatory information re [redacted]

For information.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-14-03 BY SP4 BJA/DFW
D948742/950935

KELLY

3-Bureau (117-268) RM
1-New York (117-192)

RECORDED - 72 117-268-1074

16 MAY 24 1956

Mr. Belmont

FJG:EG
(5)

ESTIMATED

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 117-268-1074

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268) DATE: June 11, 1956

FROM SAC, SAN DIEGO (66-998) ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR
PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS
OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES

Re No Number ~~SAC Letter~~ A dated 1/28/52 and mylet dated 3/6/56.

This office has no additional names to recommend for inclusion on the Bureau of Customs Watch List at this time. This matter is being closely followed, and the Bureau will be kept advised of any pertinent developments.

2-Bureau (REGISTERED-AIRMAIL)
1-San Diego

JEP
(3)

~~DECLASSIFIED BY~~ SP4 BJA/DFW
4-14-03
D948742/950935

RECORDED-11

JUN 12 1955

EX-125

JUN 19 1956

FD-36 (Rev. 3-13-56)

F B I

Date: 6/6/56

Transmit the following message via AIR-TEL

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. Nichols	
Mr. Boardman	
Mr. Belmont	✓
Mr. Mason	
Mr. Mohr	
Mr. Parsons	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Tamm	
Mr. Nease	
Mr. Winterrowd	
Tele. Room	
Mr. Holloman	
Miss Gandy	

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268)

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (117-192)

TITLE: SMAB; AEA

U.S. Customs advised two mail packages arrived Morgan Annex Post Office, NYC. One package consigned to [redacted] Paterson, New Jersey, from [redacted] Johannesburg, South Africa. Package contained mineralogical specimens, (crude stones) weighing approximately 4 lbs. Material declared [redacted] Forest Hills, from [redacted] This package contained radium and registered on Mark 2 device 250 by 4 and same rating at five feet. b2 b6 b7C b7E

AEC was advised and material released.

For information.

NO SUBVERSIVE IDENT. MATERIALS NOT SHOWN TO BE WITHIN ATOMIC ENERGY ACT. NO ACTION NECESSARY. Mr. Belmont

KELLY

LW

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-14-03 BY 3P4BJA/DFW # 948742/950935

3-Bureau (117-268) (RM)
1-New York (117-192)

FCG:jmg (#1)

(5)

RECORDED-11 117-268-1015

INDEXED-11

25 JUN 7 1956

EX-120

ENCLOSURE

JUN 19 1956

Approved: J J Kelly Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

FD-36 (Rev. 3-13-56)

FBI

Date: 6/6/56

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mason
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Nease
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

Transmit the following message via AIR - TEL

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268)

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (117-192)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-14-03 BY SP4 BJA/DFW
D 948742 950935

SMAB
AEA

U. S. Customs Officer [redacted] Idlewild Airport, NYC, advised [redacted] alien resident, Scrips Institute of Oceanography, San Diego, California, arrived via TWA Flight No. 817, 8:30 a.m., 6/6/56, Plane No. 7107. [redacted] had French Passport No. [redacted] issued 5/13/55, occupation research chemist.

[redacted] declared orally "rare earth." He exhibited Baggage Declaration No. [redacted] There were six small pieces of rare earth of approximately four ounces in weight each. These were sent to [redacted] by U.S. Mail from California in order that analysis could be made and thereafter use same as samples for future business. b2 b6 b7C b7E

[redacted] a French citizen, left U.S. 6/22/55, and has been on vacation and handling business. He visited France, England, Switzerland, Austria, and West Germany. Material [redacted] AEC advised no further interest.

For information.

Mr. Belmont

KELLY

(3) - Bureau (117-268) (RM)
1 - New York (117-192)

NO IDENTIFIABLE DATA. SAMPLES ORIGINALLY SENT FROM CALIFORNIA. NO ACTION NECESSARY.
FJG:blw #1) (5)

RECORDED-11
INDEXED-11

EX-120

25 JUN 7 1956

Approved: _____ Special Agent In Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

SECRET

cc - Liaison (Mr. Wells)
Whitson

RECORDED - 93

117-268 - 1027

DECLASSIFIED BY SP4BJA/DFW
ON 4-14-03
II948742/950935

VIA LIAISON

Date: June 7, 1956

To: Captain Allyn Cole, Jr., USN
Executive Secretary, USCSB
2054 Q Building (orig and 1)
2430 E Street, N. W.
Washington 25, D. C.

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: REAPPRAISAL OF U.S. POLICY REGARDING SOVIET BLOC SHIPMENTS AFFORDED DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY

This will confirm information furnished orally to you by Mr. Wells of this Bureau on June 7, 1956, that the FBI would be represented on the ad hoc committee of the U.S. Communications Security Board considering the captioned matter by Special Agent Lish Whitson.

LW:blb
(5)

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mason
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

INC

57 JUN 20 1956

SECRET

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: May 29, 1956

FROM : Mr. R. R. Roach

SUBJECT: REAPPRAISAL OF U. S. POLICY REGARDING SOVIET BLOC SHIPMENTS AFFORDED DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
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Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

Captain Allyn Cole, Jr., U. S. Navy, Executive Secretary, U. S. Communications Security Board (USCSB), has advised that the National Security Council has directed the USCSB to study and report to NSC on the feasibility of maintaining an adequate and secure U. S. communications system in the event of the imposition on limitations on diplomatic shipments set forth in recommendation number 2 of NSC 5527. That recommendation would limit the size of diplomatic pouches and shipments from Soviet bloc countries to letter size.

The Chairman, USCSB, has requested that an ad hoc committee of USCSB be formed, with representation from each member agency, under Department of State chairmanship, to prepare a study for consideration of USCSB. Captain Cole has requested that each member designate a representative and advise him of the representative's telephone number. That representative has been requested to obtain from his organization information as to the effect limitation of U. S. diplomatic pouch size to letter size would have on his organization's ability to maintain adequate and secure communications. No meeting dates have been set.

The problem of limiting the size of the diplomatic pouch has been previously discussed by the Joint IIC-ICIS Subcommittee.

RECOMMENDATION:

That Supervisor L. Whitson of the Espionage Section, who represents the Bureau on the Joint IIC-ICIS Subcommittee, represent the Bureau on the above ad hoc committee.

BAW:jlf (7)
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Whitson
1 - Mr. Day
1 - Mr. Hennrich
1 - Liaison Section
1 - Mr. Wells

RECORDED - 93
INDEXED - 93
23 JUN 15 1956

Capt. Allyn Cole, Jr., advised USCSB, advised on 6/4/56 that Bureau would be represented by L. Whitson, Esq., Espionage Section. Board conferred 6/4/56

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-14-03 BY SP4BJA/DFW
6948742/950935

GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Office Memorandum

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: June 8, 1956

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: AIR FORCE REQUESTS FOR DOWNGRADING OF IIC TOP SECRET DOCUMENTS

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Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

By letters 6-5-56, copies attached, OSI asks to be advised whether certain listed top secret documents may be downgraded. These include agenda and minutes of IIC meetings in 1952, together with IIC correspondence and an IIC study regarding countermeasures required to detect and defend against clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons. Some of the correspondence consists of joint IIC-ICIS letters and cannot be downgraded without ICIS concurrence.

These requests are occasioned by the unusually strict control which OSI maintains over top secret material. OSI requires periodic inventories of such material with the result that the employees charged with such duties are very anxious to eliminate as much top secret material as possible. Since all the material listed was originated by IIC, it will be necessary that the IIC Working Committee meet and consider these requests. In some instances material has been classified top secret because it quotes or uses data secured from similarly classified documents of the National Security Council. In these cases we obviously cannot agree to downgrade without NSC approval.

ACTION:

Attached for approval is a letter acknowledging receipt of the OSI requests and informing OSI that these requests will be scheduled for early consideration by IIC Working Committee. Copies of this letter are addressed to the other IIC members, furnishing them with copies of the OSI requests.

GAD:djeJ
(6)
2 ENCLOSURE

1 - Mr. Boardman
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Whitson
1 - Section tickler
1 - Mr. Day

117-268-1
NOT RECORDED
180 JUN 14 1956

Enclosures sent 6-11-56

JUN 12 1956

ENCLOSURE

ORIGINAL FILED IN

CONFIDENTIAL cc - Lid
Whi...on

RECORDED - 93

117-268 - 1080

DECLASSIFIED BY SP4BJA/DFW
ON 4-14-03
#948742/950935

Date: June 15, 1956 BY COURIER SERVICE

To: Captain John A. Waters
Director of Security (orig and 1)
Atomic Energy Commission
Room 926
1717 H Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR
PARTS THEREOF INTO THE U.S.
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

U.S. Customs at Idlewild Airport, New York, has reported that on May 27, 1956, a package containing radioactive material identified as uranium ore arrived from Melbourne, Australia, via Los Angeles. The package was shipped to this country via Pan American Airlines, and was placed in bond at Los Angeles. It was brought to New York by American Airlines.

U.S. Customs advised that the shipper was Consolidated Zinc Pty., Ltd., of Melbourne and the addressee was C. Tennant and Sons and Company, 100 Park Avenue, New York City. The package was held by Customs for examination by an official of the Atomic Energy Commission.

The files of this Bureau indicate that C. Tennant and Sons and Company of New York has been a shipper and receiver of various minerals for many years. (54-1413-1; 100-34396-52; 40-171506)

The records of another agency of the U.S. Government which has conducted some investigations regarding foreign holdings in the United States indicate that in 1941 C. Tennant Sons and Company, Ltd., 9 Rockefeller Plaza, New York, New York, was reportedly controlled by the British Metal Corporation, Ltd., Rugby, England. The American

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Gandy

LW:blb
(5)

JUN 29 1956

BY COURIER SVC.
89 JUN 19

CONFIDENTIAL

FD-36 (6-21-55)

FBI

Date: 6/4/56

Transmit the following message via AIRTEL

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

From SAC, NEW YORK (117-192)

To: BUREAU (117-268)

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mason
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Nease
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-14-03 BY SP4BJA/DFW II 948742/950935

SMAB; AEA

U.S. Customs Duty Officer [redacted] advised 6/4/56 of the arrival of a package at Idlewild Airport, NYC, containing uranium ore. This package was declared as approximately 56 lbs. and was shipped from the Consolidated Zinc Pty. Ltd., 95 Collins St., Melbourne, Australia, to C. Tennant & Sons & Co., 100 Park Ave., NYC. This package was declared as containing radioactive material and entered the U.S. via Pan American Airlines into Los Angeles, where the package was placed in bond and shipped from Los Angeles to New York by American Airlines. The package arrived on 5/27/56. Customs Officer unable to state if this date is date of entry into U.S. Package in transit bond #1867 from LA to NYC.

b2
b6
b7C
b7E

[redacted] Package upon examination found to contain a paper cylinder identified as lot 47A, No. 3 dated 12/13/55; also, one jar approximately one gallon marked No. 2, dated 8/11/55, and one jar approximately one gallon marked No. 4, dated 1/27/56.

AEC, NYC was advised and package being held for examination by AEC official on 6/5/56.

Above furnished for information. Bureau will be advised of any pertinent results of examination.

KELLY

INDEXED - 93
RECORDED - 93

3-Bureau (117-268) RM
1-New York (117-192)

Mr. Belmont

FJG:EG
(5)

111-[illegible]-1080

11 JUN 5 1956

Approved: J. F. Kelly
Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

Letter to Captain John A. Waters
Director of Security
Atomic Energy Commission

53824

company was interested in chemicals, minerals and non-ferrous metals.

Could you furnish any pertinent results of any examination performed by your representatives?

117-368-1080 p2

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: June 25, 1956

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

SECRET

S. M. A. B.

SUBJECT: PREVENTION AND DETECTION OF CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF FISSIONABLE WEAPONS BETWEEN PORTS OF ENTRY ALONG THE LAND BORDERS AND THE GULF COAST

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Gandy

By memorandum June 21, 1956, attached, ICIS has furnished a communication dated May 3, 1956, also attached, which ICIS had received from CIA. The CIA letter was written in response to the receipt by CIA of an ICIS report in the captioned matter, which contains a recommendation that all agencies engaged in the intelligence field be reminded of the captioned problem and encouraged to cooperate with INS and Customs by furnishing them any information received concerning smuggling operations.

[redacted] (5)

ACTION:

No reply to the ICIS communication is necessary.

[redacted] (5)

Enclosures (2)
GAD:hke
(6)

1-Mr. Boardman
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Mr. Day
1-Liaison Section

RECORDED - 83

117-262-1

EX-109

14 JUN 27 1956

57 JUL 2 1956

10/28/03
CLASSIFIED BY uc/nls/BJA/RNP 60267 Derivative
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (1) 10/28/2028
Per letter dtd 10/27/03 60267 uc/NLS/BJA/RNP 10/28/03

SECRET

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

b1

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

FBI

ICIS-P25/398

June 21, 1956

Honorable J. Edgar Hoover
Chairman, Interdepartmental
Intelligence Conference
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C.

Per LHR DTD 10/27/03 60267 uc/NLS/BJA/RNP 10/28/03
ALL THE INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9-14-03 BY SP1 BJA/DCW
948742/950935

Dear Mr. Hoover:

Enclosed are five copies of a letter dated May 3, 1956 from the Director, CIA. It is a response to my letter of April 19, 1956, requesting implementation of appropriate recommendations in an ICIS report dated February 3, 1956, on Prevention and Detection of Clandestine Introduction of Fissionable Weapons between Ports of Entry and Along the Gulf Coast. [redacted] b1 (S)

Sincerely yours,

J. Walter Yeagley
Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee
on Internal Security

Enclosure

Memo from Mr. Belmont to Mr. Boardman 6-25-56

ENCLOSURE

RECORDED - 88

112-268-

ENCLOSURE

This is FBI file copy. The original is being placed in official IIC files in Mr. Day's office.

When the attachments are removed this transmittal letter becomes Confidential

14 JUN 27 1956

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

~~SECRET~~

C
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Y

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

3 May 1956

Mr. J. Walter Yeagley
Chairman
Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security
Department of Justice
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Yeagley:

Reference is made to your letter of 19 April 1956 and its enclosure. Recommendation (1) on page 4 of the report by the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security is of definite interest to this Agency. Steps are now being taken to instruct the responsible officers in Headquarters and abroad on this subject.

In my opinion an important phase of this problem requires continuous observation and investigation of hostile individuals and organizations which normally would be utilized in any conspiracy of a foreign power to introduce atomic weapons or fissionable materials into the United States. [redacted] (S)

b1 I would appreciate being informed of other determinations of the ICIS on this vital subject. [redacted] (S)

Sincerely,

/s/ Allen W. Dulles

Allen W. Dulles
Director

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/1/03 BY 60267 UC/NLS/BJA/RNP
PER LTR DTD 10/27/03 60267 UC/NLS/BJA/RNP
10/28/03

~~SECRET~~

ENCLOSURE

FD-36 (6-21-55)

FBI

Date: 6/25/56

Transmit the following message via AIRTEL

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

From SAC, NEW YORK (117-192)

To: BUREAU (117-268)

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mason
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Nease
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

SMAB,
AEA

N/R

U.S. Customs advised this date of arrival aboard SS VULCANIA at Pier 84, North River, on 6/25/56, of one 60 beam cobalt therapy source weighing 4500 pounds, [redacted] Shipper is Atomic Energy of Canada, Ltd.; consignee, Professor [redacted] c/o Societa Lombarda di Treievisione, via Arrigo Roito #1, Milano, Italy. Package was manifested as cargo and placed aboard VULCANIA at Halifax, Canada destined for Milano, Italy. VULCANIA to depart NYC 6/27/56 at noon.

b2
b6
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b7E

NR

US AEC, NYC notified by Customs and authorized release.

For information.

NO ACTION NECESSARY. SHIPMENT MANIFESTED IN TRANSIT FROM CANADA TO ITALY. COBALT ISOTOPE.

KELLY

RECORDED - 88

LW

INDEXED-88

117-268-
7-3
JUN 26 1956

3-Bureau (117-268) RM
1-New York (117-192)

Mr. Belmont

EX-107

JJD:EG
(5)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-14-03 BY SP4 BJA/DFW
II 948742/950935

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

cc: [redacted]ont
[redacted]tgan
[redacted]uson
[redacted]son

SAC, New York (Orig & 2) June 29, 1956

PERSONAL ATTENTION

Director, FBI

SOVIET DIPLOMATIC COURIERS
IS - R
(New York file 100-81783)
(Bufile 61-771)

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT
(New York file 117-192)
(Bufile 117-268)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-12-03 BY SP4CJA/RNP

S.W.S.R.

ReNYlet 6-20-56 re "Soviet Diplomatic Couriers, IS - R," pointing out that surveillance coverage of couriers affords excellent coverage of arrivals and departures in NYC area, and as long as Bureau desires to have an exact account of the amount and size of courier baggage entering and leaving NYC, this coverage should be maintained. An exact account is desired, and the Bureau agrees that this coverage should be maintained.

You also pointed out [redacted] at port of New York and at Idlewild a confidential technique is maintained by Customs to determine whether radioactive materials are being brought into this country through those areas. You recommended that the Department be consulted to ascertain whether or not the baggage of couriers may be inspected if there is a possibility that fissionable material might be in their possession. You also recommended that the Department should be asked whether or not they would recommend the couriers be declared "persona non grata" on the spot and not be permitted to enter the U.S.

For your information in connection with your recommendations, a study was made during the past year looking toward a reappraisal of U.S. policy regarding Soviet bloc shipments afforded diplomatic immunity. A report on the subject, in the preparation of which the FBI participated, was transmitted to the National Security Council under date of November 30, 1955. After further study by the National Security Council's Planning Board, the Council acted on the matter March 8, 1956, and decided: (1) That no size or weight restrictions should be imposed on diplomatic pouches and shipments under diplomatic seal from Soviet bloc

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117-268-1

NOT RECORDED
188 JUL 2 1956

55 JUL 6 1956

YELLOW DUPLICATE
JUN 29 1956
MAILED

ORIGINAL FILED IN

countries; (2) At such time as the President considers the international situation will permit, diplomatic immunity will be restricted to pouches and shipments of letter sizes; and (3) At such time as the President or such authority as he may designate considers the international situation warrants, Soviet bloc diplomatic personnel can be required to produce for examination and identification any radioactive materials detected by means of the detection devices.

The National Security Council also directed the Department of State to study the feasibility of obtaining an international agreement prohibiting the shipment under diplomatic immunity of radioactive materials, which would authorize adequate inspection through detection devices of such shipments. The Department of State has not completed its study. The actions to be taken by the President under certain international conditions are under continuing study by the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security and the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference. As you can see from the foregoing National Security Council action, which is Top Secret, the problems discussed by you have been and are receiving attention on the highest policy level.

Until the international situation permits, however, we will have to proceed as heretofore. You should continue to obtain complete details regarding the diplomatic pouches, baggage and other shipments enjoying diplomatic immunity for which the Soviet couriers are responsible, and notify the Bureau immediately of any indications that radioactive material is present in any containers in the possession of or on the person of any such Soviet couriers.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: July 2, 1956

FROM : MR. R. R. ROACH

SUBJECT: CLANDESTINE ATTACK ON U.S.;
ILLEGAL ENTRY OF ENEMY AGENTS;
SMUGGLING OF FISSIONABLE MATERIAL

S.M.A.B.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/20/03 BY SP4 BTA/ENP

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Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

By airtel dated June 26, 1956, the Richmond Office advised that the Regional Commander of the Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC), Department of the Army, Richmond, Virginia, had informed that office that in connection with the plans of CIC Headquarters, Second Army Area, Fort Meade, Maryland, to effectively combat and counteract enemy efforts to attack the U.S. in a clandestine manner, effect illegal entry into the U.S. or smuggle into this country fissionable materials, CIC had devised certain code words for use in communication of information relating to possible enemy action of this nature. Re airtel further stated that the code words devised by CIC were as follows: "FISH BAIT," referring to a clandestine attack on U.S.; "ROAD RUNNER," referring to illegal entry into the U.S.; and "DOG FOOD," referring to the smuggling of fissionable material into the U.S. CIC requested that if information came to the Bureau's attention along the lines set out above that CIC be advised immediately by the use of the code words. By airtel dated June 25, 1956, the Louisville Office advised the Bureau of substantially the same information.

This matter was taken up by SA [redacted] Liaison Section, with Colonel Minor Wilson, Assistant Chief, Security Division, and Lieutenant Colonel Jack Downing, Special Operations Branch, Security Division, Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence (ACSI). Both advised that the code word system referred to was not known to ACSI. Colonel Wilson and Downing stated, however, that under date of June 4, 1956, the Department of the Army had issued a directive concerning clandestine attack upon the U.S. The directive by the Army was issued upon instructions of the Department of Defense (DOD), DOD having directed the implementation of a recommendation made by the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS), which related to increased countermeasures required to prevent and detect the clandestine introduction into the U.S. of fissionable weapons between ports of entry along the land borders and the Gulf Coast. The Army directive, two copies of which are enclosed, quoted a portion of the ICIS recommendation.

b6
b7C

2 ENCLOSURES

Enclosures

DJS:jlf (7)

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Branigan
1 - Mr. Day
1 - Mr. Whitson
1 - Liaison Section
1 - Mr. Sullivan

RECORDED - 52 117-268-10

EX-109

JUL 10 1956

Memorandum for Mr. Belmont

This June 4, 1956, Army directive also instructed the respective addressees to see that appropriate action be taken to implement the quoted ICIS recommendation. Colonels Wilson and Downing stated that while they were not sure, they presumed that the action taken by the Second Army in contacting the Bureau offices and furnishing same with code words to be used in reporting clandestine attack to CIC was an implementation by Second Army of the above-referred-to Army directive. It is noted that both our Richmond and Louisville Offices are located within the Second Army Area.

ACTION:

Enclosed for your approval is a letter addressed to the Baltimore Office, with copies for other Bureau offices within Second Army Area, instructing Baltimore to contact Headquarters, CIC, Second Army, to ascertain full facts concerning the request for the use of code words in instant matter. Baltimore is being instructed to advise Second Army that Bureau will keep Army fully informed on matters of interest, but that Bureau cannot be bound by Army administrative procedures.

2 - Orig. [redacted] ow
7- offices
1 - Yellow
1 - Mr. Be
1 - Mr. Branigan
1 - Mr. Day
1 - Mr. Whitson
1 - Liaison Sec.
1 - Mr. Sullivan

SAC, BALTIMORE

July 5, 1956

DIRECTOR, FBI

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY DIRECTIVE
CONCERNING CLANDESTINE ATTACK ON U.S.;
ENTRY OF ENEMY AGENTS;
SMUGGLING OF FISSIONABLE MATERIAL

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/2/03 BY SP4BOTA/RMP

S.M. 4 B

For your information and the information of other offices receiving a copy of this communication, under date of June 4, 1956, the Department of the Army issued a directive which implements a Department of Defense directive relative to captioned subject matter. The Department of Defense directive was concerned with a recommendation made by the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS) relating to increased countermeasures required to prevent and detect the clandestine introduction into the U.S. of fissionable weapons between ports of entry along the land borders and the Gulf Coast of the U.S. The pertinent portion of the ICIS recommendation is as follows:

"All agencies engaged in the intelligence field should be reminded of the continuing problem of the illegal entry of persons, and possible smuggling of fissionable material, and encouraged to cooperate with the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the Customs Service by providing these agencies by the quickest means possible any information they may obtain indicating that any type of smuggling operation is contemplated between ports of entry along land borders and the Gulf Coast. Conversely, it is felt that the Immigration and Naturalization Service and Customs Service should be requested to provide all interested investigative agencies with any information which may be developed with respect to contemplated smuggling of fissionable material between ports of entry along land borders and the Gulf Coast."

MAILED 12 JUL 5 1956 COMM-FBI

JUL 5 3 57 PM '56 FBI RECEIVED RECORDING ROOM

Recently representatives of the Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC), Department of the Army, have contacted Bureau offices at Richmond, Virginia, and Louisville, Kentucky, and informed in substance that the CIC, in connection with the plans of CIC Headquarters, Second Army Area, Fort Meade, Maryland, to effectively combat and counteract enemy efforts to attack the U.S. in a clandestine manner, effect illegal entry into the U.S., or smuggle

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Boardman 1 - Cincinnati
Belmont 1 - Cleveland
Mason 1 - Louisville
Mohr 1 - Norfolk
Parsons 1 - Philadelphia
Rosen 1 - Pittsburgh
Tamm 1 - Richmond
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Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

DJS:jlf (16)

Cover memo Roach to Belmont dated 7-2-56, captioned "Clandestine Attack on U.S.; Illegal Entry of Enemy Agents; Smuggling of Fissionable Material," DJS:jlf

RECORDED 52 117-264

JUL 10 1956

JUL 6 1956

into this country fissionable materials, had devised certain code words for use in communication of information relating to possible enemy action of this nature. The code words devised by CIC are as follows: "FISH BAIT," referring to a clandestine attack on U.S.; "ROAD RUNNER," referring to illegal entry into the U.S.; and "DOG FOOD," referring to the smuggling of fissionable material into the U.S. According to Richmond and Louisville, the CIC representatives requested if information came to the Bureau's attention along the lines set out above, that CIC be advised immediately by the use of the code words.

This matter was taken up by the Bureau with the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence (ACSI), Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. While ACSI was cognizant of the June 4, 1958, Department of the Army directive implementing the Department of Defense directive concerning clandestine attack, ACSI was not cognizant of any instructions for the use of code words in this connection. It was the opinion of ACSI that Second Army in implementing the Department of Army directive had devised this system to be used within Second Army Area.

The Baltimore Office is requested to contact Headquarters, CIC, Second Army Area, and obtain full background and details concerning the use of the code words furnished by CIC representatives to the Richmond and Louisville Offices for use in reporting clandestine attack. Baltimore should diplomatically point out to CIC, Second Army, that the Bureau will expeditiously furnish to Second Army Headquarters all information coming to the Bureau's attention concerning a clandestine attack, but that the use of code words designated by the Army is an additional administrative burden upon the Bureau and that the Bureau does not, because of obvious reasons, desire to be bound by the use of such code words. It should be pointed out to Second Army officials that any information furnished to Second Army will be furnished in the most expeditious means possible and properly classified so as to insure complete safety in transmission.

Baltimore should handle this matter immediately and advise the Bureau of the results of its contact with Second Army officials.

FD-36 (6-21-55)

FBI

Date: 6-26-56

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mason
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

Transmit the following message via AIRTEL

REGISTERED MAIL
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

From SAC, RICHMOND (117-00)

To: DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268)

**CLANDESTINE ATTACK ON U. S.;
ILLEGAL ENTRY OF ENEMY AGENTS;
SMUGGLING OF FISSIONABLE MATERIAL**

For the Bureau's information, on the afternoon of 6-25-56 Lt. Col. CHARLES E. HICKS, Regional Commander, CIC, Richmond, Va., appeared at the Richmond Office and advised that in connection with the plans of CIC Headquarters, 2nd Army Area, Ft. Meade, Md., to effectively combat and counteract enemy efforts to attack the U. S. in a clandestine manner, effect illegal entry into the U. S. or smuggle into this country fissionable materials, CIC had devised certain code words for use in communication of information relating to possible enemy action of this nature.

The code word "FISH BAIT" refers to a clandestine attack on the U. S. The code word "ROAD RUNNER" refers to an illegal entry into the U. S., and the code word "DOG FOOD" refers to the matter of smuggling fissionable materials into the U. S. or the transportation of these materials along the coastline of this country.

According to Col. HICKS, it is his assumption that any information relating to similar operations as affects the possessions of the U. S. would be handled in a like manner. He said his instructions were to contact all intelligente agencies including FBI, ONI, INS, and Customs Service with a view to acquainting these agencies with the above code words and requesting their cooperation in communicating with his office at Richmond, Va., by the most rapid means any information obtained which might come within the three types of operations mentioned in order that he in turn can telephonically communicate with 2nd Army Area Headquarters in the interest of appropriate action to defend the U. S. Any telephone communication should, instead of using the terminology clandestine attack on U. S., etc., utilize code words referred to.

According to Col. HICKS, his original communication dealing with the above matter was dated 6-4-56 from 2nd Army Area Headquarters, CIC. He said he felt this matter had been taken up with the FBI Headquarters, possibly on the Pentagon level, but he had nothing in his possession indicating this actually had been done.

3 - Bureau (Registered Mail)
1 - Baltimore (Registered Mail)
1 - RH 98-00
1 - RH 117-00
WHC:SHW
(6)

RECORDED-82

JUL 16 1956

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-4-03 BY SP4 AUTSTEIN

FD-36 (6-21-55)

F B I

Date: 6-26-56

Transmit the following message via _____

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

From SAC, RICHMOND (117-00

To: DIRECTOR, FBI

CLANDESTINE ATTACK ON U. S.;
ILLEGAL ENTRY OF ENEMY AGENTS;
SMUGGLING OF FISSIONABLE MATERIAL

The above is being furnished the Bureau for whatever action and instructions it may deem appropriate under the circumstances. One copy is furnished Baltimore for information should the Bureau desire Baltimore to obtain further information regarding this matter from 2nd Army Area Headquarters, CIC.

GRAPP

END

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

FD-36 (6

F B I

Date: June 25 1956

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. Nichols	
Mr. Boardman	
Mr. Belmont	✓
Mr. Mason	
Mr. Mohr	
Mr. Parsons	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Tamm	
Mr. Nease	
Mr. Winterrowd	
Tele. Room	
Mr. Holloman	
Miss Gandy	

Transmit the following message via _____

AIRTEL

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

From SAC, LOUISVILLE 6-25-56 JEK

To: DIRECTOR, FBI

PROJECT "FISHBAIT", AEA (LIAISON WITH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE)

On June 25, 1956, Major TOM HOWARD, Regional Intelligence Office, Department of the Army, Louisville, Kentucky, exhibited communications classified "secret" setting out three code words to be used in communications between his agency, I. and N. S., the U. S. Customs Service, and the FBI concerning possible attempts to smuggle fissionable material into this country.

Communications exhibited by Major HOWARD indicated that the code words had been designated as a result of a Department of the Army directive based upon recommendations of the National Security Council that investigative agencies be "reminded of the continuing problems of illegal entry of persons and the possible smuggling of fissionable material into this country." The recommendation specifically mentions cooperation involving investigating agencies and I. and N. S. and U. S. Customs Service, and refers to the reported numbers of Communists on both sides of the U. S. borders in various areas. The code words as furnished by Major HOWARD were "fishbait" referring to the over-all project; "road runner" meaning an illegal entrant; and "dog food" meaning fissionable material. Major HOWARD advised that he had been instructed to contact this office, I. and N. S. and U. S. Customs to request the Regional Intelligence Office be advised of any information pertaining to attempts to smuggle fissionable material and to assure the other agencies his agency would advise the other interested agencies in the event it receives such information.

The Bureau is being advised as a matter of information.

END

117-268

GEARTY

INDEXED - 18 JUL 13 1956

Mr. Belmont

GWH/JEK
(4)

EX-109

cc Mr Roach

1 - 117-0

REGISTERED MAIL

ESP/ Hilton

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/12/03 BY SP4BSTA/RNP

MR. BRANIGAN

59 JUL 18 1956

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____

Special Agent in Charge

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: 7/12/56

FROM : SAC, Baltimore

SUBJECT: DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY DIRECTIVE CONCERNING CLANDESTINE ATTACK ON U. S.; ENTRY OF ENEMY AGENTS; SMUGGLING OF FISSIONABLE MATERIAL

S.M.A.B.

ReBulet 7/5/56.

On 7/11/56 Major E. H. MEISER, Chief, SMI Branch, G-2, Second Army Headquarters, and Major SHIRLEY R. TRUMPS, Operations Officer, 109th CIC, Second Army Headquarters, Fort Meade, Md., were informed that the Bureau will furnish to Second Army Headquarters by the most expeditious means available all information coming to its attention concerning a clandestine attack. These men were also advised that the Bureau does not desire to be bound by the use of code words such as those set forth in relet.

Major TRUMPS stated that code words had been devised for use in communicating with interested agencies, including the FBI, so that accuracy could be insured. Major TRUMPS agreed to furnish information of interest to the Bureau to its representatives in an open manner and without the use of code words.

On the same date Colonel T. R. MALONE, JR., Executive Officer, G-2, Second Army Headquarters, was informed that the Bureau does not desire to be bound by the use of code words in captioned matter. Col. MALONE agreed to furnish information of interest to Bureau representatives without the use of such code words.

2 - Bureau (R.M.)
1 - Cincinnati
1 - Cleveland
1 - Louisville
1 - Norfolk
1 - Philadelphia
1 - Pittsburgh
1 - Richmond
1 - Baltimore

RTH:lw
(10)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-14-03 BY SP4BJA/DFW ID#48742/950935

RECORDED-16

117-268-1[illegible]

18

EX-134

29 JUL 13 1956

EX-134 JUL 13 1956

LIAISON

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: July 12, 1956

FROM : W. A. Branigan

SUBJECT: REAPPRAISAL OF U.S. POLICY REGARDING THE DIPLOMATIC POUCH

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mason
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

At 3:15 p.m., 7/12/56, Mr. Bernard J. Humes, Diplomatic Mail Branch, Department of State, phoned SA Whitson and advised that he, Humes, was Chairman of an ad hoc committee which had been set up to study the effect of possible pouch limitation on the communications of the various intelligence agencies. Humes' office is in Department of State Annex No. 9, Room 2204, which is located on the Washington Monument side of 16th and Constitution. Humes' phone is Code 191, Ext. 5187. He stated that he hoped to have a meeting of the ad hoc committee the first of the week following Operation Alert, which would be the 30th or 31st of July. He stated that he had one copy of a highly classified document which the members of the ad hoc committee were free to examine at their convenience.

RECOMMENDATION:

For your information. Prior to Operation Alert, SA Whitson will arrange to review the document in question.

EX-122

RECORDED-82
INDEXED-82

117-268-107

117-268
cc - Belmont
Roach
Branigan
Day
Whitson
LW:blb
(6)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4-14-03 BY SP4 BCA/DFW

II 948742/950935

cc -

SAC, New York (117-192) (orig and 1) July 20, 1956

Director, FBI (117-268)

SMAB

Reference is made to WFO letter 6/28/56 re [redacted] IS - CZ, copies of which were furnished to New York. [redacted] subject of your file 100-51785, was deleted from the Security Index at your recommendation of 10/7/55.

WFO letter reflected [redacted] passport was renewed 5/27/56 for the purpose of taking a 6 weeks' trip to France, Italy, Spain, England, Switzerland, Germany and Czechoslovakia. The passport was revalidated to read not valid for travel to Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary and those portions of China, Korea and Viet-Nam under communist control.

b6
b7C

You should furnish promptly your recommendations regarding the referral to [redacted] name to the U.S. Customs Bureau for inclusion on the Special Customs Watch List.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/2/03 BY SP4 CTA/ENP

LW:blb
(5)

cc - 100-168940 [redacted]

RECORDED-82 117-268-

COMM - FBI
JUL 30 1956
MAILED 19

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mason
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

JUL 30 1956

UNRECORDED COPY FILED

cc - [redacted]

July 20, 1956

SAC, New York (117-192) (orig and 1)

Director, FBI (117-268)

RECORDED - 72

SMAB

EX-19

Reurairtel 7/14/56 concerning an eight-pound package of molybdenite samples received at Morgan Annex, New York Post Office, 7/13/56, from Turkmaadin, Istanbul, Turkey, addressed to Metallurg, Inc., 99 Park Avenue, New York City. You indicated that AEC had been advised and authorized release of the package which caused a reaction on a Geiger counter.

For your information, the Bureau has no index references to Turkmaadin. Metallurg, Inc., 99 Park Avenue, New York, was to be the ultimate receiver of approximately 8,000 pounds of 50 per cent tungsten concentrates which had been shipped from Mexico on or immediately prior to 4/13/54 to [redacted] customs broker, Douglas, Arizona. This information was received from the General Services Administration, Compliance Division, under date of 5/13/54 in connection with a General Services Administration investigation of alleged substitution of Mexican tungsten for domestic tungsten in sales to the U.S. Government. The FBI conducted no investigation in the matter. (46-20153-5 encl. pg. #84)

While it is recognized that molybdenite would not be considered a source material or special nuclear material under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, it is suggested that you ascertain from the New York office of AEC in each instance hereafter and advise the Bureau in the air-tel submitted whether the substance [redacted] is special nuclear material or source material under the terms of the Atomic Energy Act. If the substance [redacted] is special nuclear material or source material, you should determine from AEC and advise the Bureau whether the provisions of the Act have been followed by the importer.

b2
b6
b7C
b7E

LW:blb
(4)

Tolson
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Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/12/03 BY SP4BJM/RNP

MAILED 2
JUL 20 1956
COMM-FBI

FD-36 (6-21-55)

FBI

Date: 7/14/56

Transmit the following message via AIRTEL

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

From SAC, NEW YORK

To: BUREAU

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mason
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Nease
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holl
Miss Gan

SMAB.

U.S. Custom examiner [redacted] Morgan Annex advised 7/13/56 that an eight pound package containing MOLYBDENITE samples received Morgan Annex this date. [redacted] Package sent from TURKMAADIN, ISTANBUL, TURKEY to METALLURG INC., 99 PARK AVE., NYC. AEC advised and released package. For info.

b2
b6
b7C
b7E

Mr. Belmont

KELLY

3-BUREAU

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/2/03 BY SP4 STP/RMP

EX-122

RECORDED - 72

INDEXED - 72

7 JUL 23 1956

1-D

FJSjfm #1

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____

Special Agent in Charge

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director of Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington 25, D.C.
ATTN: Mr. Lish Whitson

DATE: July 24, 1956

FROM : Bernard J. Humes, Chairman, ad hoc Committee, DC/P, Department of State

SUBJECT: Meeting of Inter-Agency ad hoc Committee

Confirming telephone conversations, a meeting of the inter-agency ad-hoc Committee to which you have been designated will be held in Room 2204, State Department Annex #9 (US Tempo 3) corner Constitution Ave. and 16th Sts., at 10:30 AM, July 31, 1956.

Should you require additional information, please call Mr. Humes on Code 191, Extension 5187.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/2/03 BY SP4BDA/RNP

RECORDED - 72

10 JUL 26 1956

EX. - 109

57 AUG 1 1956

FD-36 (6-21-55)

FBI

Date: 7/26/56

Transmit the following message via AIRTEL

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mason
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Nease
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

From SAC, NEW YORK (117-192)

To: BUREAU (117-268)

SMAB; AEA

U. S. Customs Officer [redacted] Idlewild Airport, NYC, advised 7/26/56 of the arrival at Idlewild Airport of [redacted] U. S. citizen, [redacted] Denver, Colorado. [redacted] arrived via Pan American Airlines flight #155 at 6:58 a.m., 7/26/56, in possession of 3 ounces of torbenite, declaration #2690354.

[redacted] gave occupation as geologist employed by AEC 116-18683 and stated that torbenite was obtained in Spain for AEC.

[redacted] U.S. passport [redacted] issued Washington, D.C. 2/3/54.

b2
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b7C
b7E

[redacted]

[redacted] advised instant shipment cleared by Mr. [redacted] AEC.

For information.

NO ACTION. AEC EMPLOYEE BRINGING IN SPECIMEN FOR AEC. LW

KELLY

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/2/03 BY SP4 COM/LEMP

3-Bureau (117-268) RM
1-New York (117-192)

RECORDED - 22 117-268-

INDEXED - 22

EX 104

WJM:EG
(5)

Mr. Belmont

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

CONFIDENTIAL

CC:

100-409289

BY COURIER SERVICE

Date: July 26, 1956

To: Mr. Chester A. Emerick (Orig & 1)
Deputy Commissioner, Investigations
Bureau of Customs
Room 7048
Internal Revenue Service Building
Washington 25, D. C.

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC WEAPONS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES

Reference is made to a letter dated July 16, 1956, from Mr. F. E. Russell, Acting Deputy Commissioner, Bureau of Customs, requesting further information, if possible, relating to [redacted] a Swiss national who has previously traveled in the United States as a representative of the Maag Gear-Wheel Company, Limited, Zurich, Switzerland. Ruegg was the subject of this Bureau's letter of May 20, 1954.

The letter dated July 16, 1956, indicates there may be another individual by the same name and also from Switzerland visiting this country.

b6
b7C

Our files indicate that [redacted] referred to in our letter of May 20, 1954, was born [redacted] Switzerland. Our files further reflect that [redacted] on one trip, departed from the United States at New York International Airport on December 1, 1954, at which time he was in possession of Visa Number [redacted] Further, our files indicate that on

Tolson
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Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

ESS:ss
(5)

BY COURIER SVC.
17 JUL 27
COMM - FBI

CONFIDENTIAL

ORIGINAL FILED IN

Letter to Mr. Chester A. Emerick
Deputy Commissioner, Investigations
Bureau of Customs

November 3, 1954, [redacted] executed a sworn affidavit at Hamilton, Ohio, to an Immigration and Naturalization Service investigator, in which he admitted his membership in the Partie der Arbeit (Swiss Communist Party) from 1944 to about 1947. He stated he was expelled from that organization because of a disagreement with leaders concerning a proposed strike in the Mag Gear-Wheel Company where he was working. He also admitted having subscribed to the communist-dominated newspaper "Vorwarts," and that he continued to receive this newspaper for approximately one year after he left the Partie der Arbeit.

On February 24, 1955, a representative of the Immigration and Naturalization Service advised that by letter dated November 22, 1954, to [redacted] he was informed that his application for extension of temporary stay was denied and that he should plan to leave this country on or before December 1, 1954. The Immigration and Naturalization Service representative also advised that by letter of November 24, 1954, the Washington Immigration and Naturalization Service representative was requested to prepare an "Exclusion Lookout" notice directed to all ports of entry which would, in effect, exclude the subject from further entry into the United States. b6 b7C

Other than the foregoing, there is no further pertinent information in the files of this Bureau relating to [redacted]

CONFIDENTIAL

cc - [redacted]
Liaison

RECORDED-90 117-268

EX-120

VIA LIAISON

Date: July 27, 1956

(orig and 1)

To: Captain John A. Waters
Director of Security
Atomic Energy Commission
Room 926
1717 H Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

to Waters 8-2-56 emb.

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS AND PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

On July 18, 1956, U.S. Customs advised the New York Office of the FBI that a quantity of gold ore brought into the United States by [redacted] New York City, an engineer for the Anaconda Company, was radioactive.

b6
b7C

According to Customs, the Atomic Energy Commission office in New York City requested that it be permitted to examine the ore.

Could you furnish your observations regarding the possible significance of this ore?

LW:blb
(5)

DECLASSIFIED BY SP4BJA/RNP
ON 6/2/03

CONFIDENTIAL

Tolson
Nichols
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Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

AUG 8 1956

FD-36 (Rev. 3-13-56)

FBI

Date: 7-18-56

Transmit the following message via AIRTEL

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. Nichols	
Mr. Boardman	
Mr. Belmont	✓
Mr. Mason	
Mr. Mohr	
Mr. Parsons	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Tamm	
Mr. Nease	
Mr. Winterrowd	
Tele. Room	
Mr. Holloman	
Miss Gandy	

FROM: SAC NEW YORK

TO: BUREAU

SMAB
AEA

U.S. Customs advised this date of the arrival aboard the "Queen Mary" at Pier 90, North River, of a ¼ lb. piece of gold ore which contains about 2 oz. of pure gold. [redacted] Ore was brought into U.S. by [redacted] N.Y.C. [redacted] is employed by the ANACONDA CO., 25 Broadway, N.Y.C. as an engineer and ore is to be part of his personal collection of metals.

b2
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b7C
b7E

U.S.A.E.C., N.Y.C. notified by Customs and has requested that they be permitted to examine the ore.

Any pertinent results of A.E.C. examination will be forwarded to Bureau.

For info.

KELLY

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/2/03 BY SP4 BTM/RMP

Mr. Belmont

RECORDED-90 117-268-1077
INDEXED - 90
JUL 19 1956

(3) Bureau (RM) (117-268)
1-NY 117-192

TFM :sgr
(5)

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: July 26, 1956

FROM : W. A. Branigan

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mason
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: REAPPRAISAL OF U.S. POLICY REGARDING SOVIET BLOC SHIPMENTS AFFORDED DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY

b6
b7C

(Smab)

At 10:30 a.m., 7/26/56, SA [redacted] conferred with Mr. Bernard J. Humes, Diplomatic Mail Branch, Department of State, State Annex No. 9, Room 2204. Mr. Humes stated that prior to a meeting of the ad hoc committee on communications security connected with the captioned problem, he wanted us to know that the CIA representative on the ad hoc committee was definitely of the opinion that the committee's concern was solely with electrical communications and did not relate to courier operations.

Humes referred during the course of his comments to the NSC Document No. 5527 captioned as above which was a joint report of the IIC and the ICIS. Agent Whitson determined that Humes had neither seen nor heard of NSC Action No. 1524 which was the National Security Council paper which directed the study of the adequacy and security of U.S. communications in event limitations on diplomatic shipments were imposed. Humes stated that there were really only two basic problems: (1) Whether the United States wanted to "stockpile" repair parts for coding machines in the various embassies behind the Iron Curtain prior to imposing limitations on the pouch or (2) whether the United States wanted to assign additional code clerks to the embassies to perform manually the operations now done by the machines. Humes stated that he could see no great difficulty in either stockpiling or in hiring additional personnel although limitations which had been placed on the sizes of our missions in Hungary, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia might make the hiring of additional code clerks contingent upon the recall of a "substantive" diplomat in order to leave the total personnel in the establishment the same. It was pointed out to Humes that this might cut down on the number of coded communications which had to be

cc - Belmont
Branigan
Whitson
LW:blb
(4)

RECORDED-16 117-268

INDEXED-16

AUG 3 1956

57 AUG 8 1956

Per LTR DTD 10/27/03 62267 uc/NLS/BSA/RHP
INFORMATION CONTAINED 10/28/03
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/2/03 BY 62267 uc/NLS/BSA/RHP

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 62-85205

MEMORANDUM FOR A.H. BELMONT:

sent. He said that of course it would be possible in an emergency for the diplomatic staff to engage in coding operations.

It was pointed out to Mr. Humes that the placing of limitations on the pouch was recommended for such time as the President or such authority as he may designate considers the international situation will permit. It was not intended by the National Security Council that this particular ad hoc committee would study anything but the question of adequacy and security of the communications system since there were separate directives to the AEC to improve detection devices and to the Department of State to study the feasibility of obtaining an international agreement prohibiting the shipment under diplomatic immunity of radioactive materials which would authorize adequate inspection through detection devices of such shipments. Mr. Humes stated that he felt that some of the people in the Department of State wanted to raise the question of Soviet bloc retaliation in this ad hoc committee on communications. It was pointed out to him that the question of Soviet bloc retaliatory action had been belabored thoroughly in the original study and that the possibilities of an international agreement were the subject of a separate study by the Department of State. It was suggested to Humes that this ad hoc committee should by its terms of reference confine itself to the problem of communications and security and their adequancy.

ACTION:

None. For your information. A meeting of the ad hoc committee will be held in the Conference Room adjoining Mr. Humes' office at 10:30 a.m. 7/31/56.

FD-36 (6-21-55)

FBI

Date: 8/1/56

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mason
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Nease
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

Transmit the following message via AIR-TEL

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

From SAC, NEW YORK (117-192)

To: DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268)

SMAB
AEA

On 8/1/56 Inspector [redacted] U.S. Customs, advised that [redacted] Swedish Passport Number [redacted] arrived 7:15 a.m., Idlewild Airport, aboard SAS Airlines. He is destined to the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Raw Materials Division, Washington, D.C., and is stopping temporarily at the Latham Hotel, New York City. He is a consulting geologist of the Ministry of Mines, Ragoon, Burma.

He had declared two ounces of pulverized uranium ore, one ounce of which was obtained in Burma and one in the United States, the latter being used for comparitive purposes.

U.S. Customs advised Atomic Energy Commission, NYC. and latter related that they were cognizant of [redacted] arrival with this ore.

b2
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b7C
b7E

KELLY

3-Bureau (117-268) (RM)
1-NY 117-192

TGS: jmg
(5)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/2/03 BY SP4BSTR/ENP

8-3-56
NO RECORD ON [redacted] NO ACTION NECESSARY.
LW

RECORDED-16
INDEXED-16

57 AUG 8 1956

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

cc - Liaison
Day
Whitson

117-268

RECORDED - 22

VIA LIAISON

Date: August 3, 1956

To: Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
Department of the Army
The Pentagon (orig and 1)
Washington 25, D. C.

Attention: Chief, Security Division

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

DECLASSIFIED BY 60247uc/NLS/BJA/RMP ON 6/15/93

Each year in connection with the studies of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee of the National Security Council, the agencies of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference prepare analyses of clandestine attacks with nuclear weapons on certain selected targets in the Continental United States. In order to assist you in your evaluation of hypothetical clandestine attacks in which nuclear weapons or their components are smuggled into the United States across the Mexican border, there is enclosed a memorandum dated July 9, 1956, presenting the facts as known regarding Mexican border security. The data contained therein were obtained principally from representatives of various agencies of the United States Government in a position to know.

Enclosure

To B. Wilson & Gant, 8/6/56

cc - 1 - Director of Naval Intelligence (Enclosure)
Department of the Navy
The Pentagon
Washington 25, D. C. VIA LIAISON

NOTE: Classified TS because Net Evaluation Subcommittee studies are so classified.

LWS:blb
(10)
cc - 62-101958 (NSC NES)

Tolson
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Boardman
Belmont
Mason
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Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 62-101958

Letter to Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
Department of the Army

cc - 1 - Director of Special Investigations (Enclosure)
The Inspector General
Department of the Air Force
Building Tempo E VIA LIAISON
4th and Adams Drive, S. W.
Washington, D. C.

To Air OSI 9/6/56

Date: July 9, 1956

To: Director, FBI

From: Legat, Mexico (100-1493)

Subject: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

Rerep. of SA [redacted] dated 7-9-56 at Mexico, D. F.

b6
b7C

It is to be noted that individuals interviewed in referenced report were not alerted as to the Bureau's interest in the smuggling of atomic weapons into the United States. The pretext was used that this Bureau was interested in the smuggling of Communist propaganda from the United States to Mexico and from Mexico to the United States. At no time during the interviews with these individuals was the question of atomic weapons brought up nor could it have been inferred from the questions asked that this Bureau was interested in such subject matter.

JTH:ij
(3)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/2/03 BY SP4/STA/RNP

RECORDED - 22 117-

EX-122

CONFIDENTIAL

RECORDED-53
117-268

BY COURIER SERVICE

Date: August 6, 1956

To: Captain John A. Waters (orig and 1)
Director of Security
Atomic Energy Commission
Room 926
1717 H Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

U. S. Customs, Idlewild Airport, New York, advised that on July 26, 1956, [redacted] Colorado, had arrived via Pan American Airlines. [redacted] gave his occupation as geologist and declared one cubic inch of nicolite ore and one cubic inch of cobolite ore. These ore samples were radioactive. [redacted] told the Customs representative at Idlewild the ore samples were obtained in Iran and were to be delivered to Dartmouth College, Hanover, New Hampshire, and to the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan. According to Customs, the ore was cleared by the New York office of the Atomic Energy Commission.

b6
b7C

The FBI conducted an Atomic Energy Act - Applicant investigation of one [redacted] FBI file number 116-365154. Copies of reports in that investigation were furnished to the Atomic Energy Commission on January 22, 1953.

LW:blb (5)

DECLASSIFIED BY SP2 STAFF/ENP ON 6/2/03

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mason
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

AUG 8 1956

BY COURIER SERVICE

60 AUG - 6

COMM - FBI

CONFIDENTIAL

Letter to Captain John A. Waters
Director of Security
Atomic Energy Commission

Is the traveller who arrived with radioactive ore samples from Iran identical with the individual concerning whom the applicant investigation was conducted?

FD-36 (6-21-55)

FBI

Date: 7/26/56

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mason
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Nease
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

Transmit the following message via AIRTEL

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

From SAC, NEW YORK (117-192)

To: BUREAU (117-268)

SMAB; AEA

U. S. Customs Officer [redacted] Idlewild Airport, NYC, advised 7/26/56 that [redacted] Colorado, arrived via Pan American Airlines flight 65 at Idlewild Airport, 6:40 a.m., 7/26/56.

[redacted] gave his occupation as geologist and declared one cubic inch of nicolite ore and one cubic inch cobolite ore, baggage declaration [redacted] in possession U.S. passport [redacted] issued 6/12/56 Washington, D.C.

b6
b7C

[redacted] departed U.S. 7/4/56 and stated above-described ore samples obtained in Iran and to be delivered to Dartmouth College, Hanover, N.H., and University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

Reaction maximum on the green and negative on the red.

[redacted] advised instant shipment cleared by Mr. ZILA, AEC.

For information.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/2/03 BY SP4 CTA/RMP

KELLY

3-Bureau (117-268) RM
1-New York (117-192)

117-268-

RECORDED-53

INDEXED-53

31 JUL 27 1956

Mr. Belmont

WJM:EG
(5)

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

CONFIDENTIAL

Tolson

RECORDED-21 117-268

122

BY COURIER SERVICE

Date: August 6, 1956

To: Captain John A. Waters (orig adn 1)
Director of Security
Atomic Energy Commission
Room 926
1717 H Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

BY COURIER SVC.
61 AUG 7
COMM - FBI

DECLASSIFIED BY SP4BAW/lcw ON 6/2/03

U.S. Customs Officer Holmgren, Morgan Annex Post Office, New York City, advised the New York Office of the FBI on July 26, 1956, that a package had been received from [redacted] Australia, addressed to [redacted] New York. The package contained a quantity of radioactive stone weighing approximately nine ounces. According to Customs, the Atomic Energy Office in New York was advised and the material was released since it was indicated to be rock mineral samples.

The addressee might be identical with one [redacted] whose address since about 1940 has been [redacted] New York. In 1955 [redacted] was an applicant for an appointment with the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) at Paris, France. He was the subject of investigation by this Bureau on loyalty of employees of the United Nations and other public international organizations.

b6
b7C

cc - 138-3346 [redacted]
LW:blb (6)

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mason
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

AUG 9 1956

CONFIDENTIAL

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 138-3346

Letter to Captain John A. Waters
Director of Security
Atomic Energy Commission

Under date of February 7, 1956, the FBI was informed by the International Organizations Employees Loyalty Board of the United States Civil Service Commission that a favorable advisory loyalty determination had been forwarded to the head of UNESCO.

No investigation is being conducted by the FBI of this shipment.

FD-36 (Rev- 3-13-56)

FBI

Date: 7-26-56

Transmit the following message via AIRTEL

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mason
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Neace
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

SMAB;AEA

USC Officer [redacted] MORGAN, Annex P.O., NYC advised that a package had been received consigned to [redacted] from [redacted] Australia. Package [redacted] Package contained old shoes and clothing as declared also a quantity of radioactive stone approx. 9 ounces. AEC advised. Released material since indicated to be rock mineral samplings. NYO files reflect a [redacted] Bufile 138-3346. Attention also directed to Bufile 65-58776-4 Clandestine Radio Communications Potential Operators ESP-R. NY let. 6-27-55 re one [redacted] formerly of [redacted] NY. Records also reflect NY file 123-8364 VOA-Applicant on [redacted] On basis of info available unable to determine if [redacted] is identical with subject of NYO files. For info.

b2
b6
b7C
b7E

KELLY

THE INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/2/03 BY SP4RSJA/RNP

Mr. Belmont

RECORDED-20

117-268

AUG 7 1956

3-Bureau (117-268)(RM)
1-NY 117-192

FJG:sgr (#1)
(5)

EX-122

Approved: _____ Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

5-

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 138-3346

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Form No. 1
THIS CASE ORIGINATED AT BUREAU

REPORT MADE AT	DATE WHEN MADE	PERIOD FOR WHICH MADE	REPORT MADE BY
MEXICO, D. F.	7/9/56	6/18,25/56	b6 lg b7C

TITLE	CHARACTER OF CASE
SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES	ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

SYNOPSIS OF FACTS:

Contraband articles may be imported into Mexico by diplomatic shipment, mislabeled commercial shipment, or by being smuggled ashore anywhere along 6,000-mile coastline. Because of millions of Mexico-U.S. border crossings it is virtually impossible to prevent smuggling of small articles into U. S. No adequate control exists of smuggling of such articles by airplane, automobile, rail, or boat.

- RUC -

DECLASSIFIED BY: SP4BJA/RNP
ON 6/12/03

117-268-1103

APPROVED AND FORWARDED:	SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE	DO NOT WRITE IN THESE SPACES
		114-31-2 RECORDED-16

COPIES OF THIS REPORT
8 - Bureau
1 - Mexico City (100-1493)

JUL 26 1956
AUG 8 1956

PROPERTY OF FBI—THIS REPORT IS LOANED TO YOU BY THE FBI, AND NEITHER IT NOR ITS CONTENTS ARE TO BE DISTRIBUTED OUTSIDE THE AG TO WHICH LOANED.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—59255-3

United States Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington 25, D. C.

July 9, 1956

RE: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES

BACKGROUND OF THE PROBLEM

The Mexican-United States border stretches some 2,000 miles from the Gulf of Mexico to the Pacific Ocean. The Rio Grande River, which is often nothing more than a trickling stream, forms a dividing line along the border from the Gulf to El Paso, Texas, a distance of about 1,000 miles. On the western end of the border there is no natural boundary line.

The northern part of Mexico is mostly flat, arid land which is very sparsely populated. From Brownsville, Texas, to the west the following are the principal settlements along the border:

MEXICO	UNITED STATES
Matamoros, Tamaulipas	Brownsville, Texas
Reynosa "	San Benito "
Camargo "	Rio Grande "
Ciudad Guerrero, Tamaulipas	
Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas	Laredo "
Piedras Negras, Coahuila	Eagle Pass "
Villa Acuna "	Del Rio "
Juarez, Chihuahua	El Paso "
Zaragoza, Chihuahua	Ysleta "
Guadalupe, "	Fabens "
Porvenir, "	Fort Hancock "
Ojinaga, "	Presidio "
Las Palomas, Chihuahua	Columbus, New Mexico
El Berrendo, "	Antelope Wells, New Mexico

DECLASSIFIED BY SP4BJA/ENP
ON 6/2/03

MEXICO	UNITED STATES
Agua Prieta, Sonora	Douglas, Arizona
Naco, "	Naco, "
Nogales, "	Nogales, "
Sasabe, "	Sasabe, "
Sonoyta, "	Lukeville, "
San Luis, "	San Luis, "
Algodones, Baja California	Andrade, California
Mexicali, " "	Calexico, "
Tecate, " "	Tecate, "
Tijuana, " "	San Ysidro, "

[redacted] U. S. Treasury Representative at the U. S. Embassy, Mexico, D. F., advised that at most of the U. S. border towns listed there is a U. S. Customs representative. He further pointed out that the Immigration and Naturalization Service has roving patrols which cover the border area and that agents of this Service have the power of search and seizure. b6 b7C

WARREN C. STEWART, Consul, U. S. Embassy, Mexico, D. F., advised that it is estimated that there are twenty million crossings of the border yearly. Studies made by JAMES P. PILCHER, Supervising Consul General, and CHARLES G. SOMMER, Consul, both of the U. S. Embassy, Mexico, D. F., reflect the following statistics on border crossings.

At the city of Brownsville, Texas, there are approximately 10,000 crossings of the border daily or 3,650,000 yearly. There are estimated to be 100,000 dual nationals residing just south of the border who must be documented for frequent border crossings. Approximately 400,000 braceros (farm laborers) will be contracted legally this year for temporary work north of the border. In 1956, 65,000 quota immigrants are expected to leave Mexico to reside permanently in the U. S., and it is estimated that 77,000 non-immigrant visas will be issued to Mexican nationals for visits to the U. S. Added to this number, crossing the border are the 600,000 U. S. tourists who are expected to visit Mexico in 1956.

Supervising Consul PILCHER points out in his report that "the use of fraudulent documents in the procuring of almost any type of United States permission to cross the border, and particularly in immigration cases, is widespread on both sides of the border."

ENTRANCE OF CONTRABAND ARTICLES INTO MEXICO

Contraband articles may be introduced into Mexico with comparative ease either by:

1. Diplomatic Shipment - Diplomatic shipments of any size may be introduced into Mexico without being inspected by the Mexican authorities.

2. Mislabeled Commercial Shipments - Shipments which have been mislabeled can be introduced into Mexico with great chance of success. Although such shipments are nominally inspected by Mexican Customs agents, [redacted] who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that these agents are notoriously underpaid and their susceptibility to bribery would insure these shipments easy access to the country. b2 b7D

3. By Being Smuggled Ashore into Mexico - The Mexican coast line including that of the Gulf of California stretches for some 6,000 miles. There is no Mexican Government agency which has the facilities to patrol such an area. According to Colonel JEROME J. McCABE, U. S. Air Attache at the American Embassy, Mexico, D. F., the Mexican Air Force makes no pretense of attempting to cover smuggling activities. BENJAMIN WHITE, U. S. Treasury Representative, has advised that the Mexican Customs authorities have no facilities for adequately handling such a matter. The Mexican Navy, according to [redacted] has neither the manpower nor the boats necessary for vigilant surveillance of Mexico's coast line.

It is to be pointed out that the 6,000 miles of Mexican coast line is very sparsely settled. Although there are few roads to most of the shore line of the country, contraband articles could be taken inland by mule or airplane.

ENTRANCE OF CONTRABAND ARTICLES FROM MEXICO TO THE UNITED STATES

Contraband articles may be imported into the United States from Mexico in any conceivable way devised by man whether on foot, pack mule, or horse, auto, truck, train, plane, or boat. The vast extension of the border and the large crossing population make detection of the smuggling of contraband articles a decidedly difficult operation.

A. On foot - The "wetbacks", those Mexicans who illegally enter the United States by fording the Rio Grande River, have long been a vexing problem in the United States - Mexican relations. The vast expanse of the border and the fact that on the whole it is a sparsely settled area contribute to the ease with which persons can illegally enter the United States. The problem of controlling the introduction of contraband is further complicated by the fact that there are millions of crossings yearly by Mexican residents of border towns who have been properly documented. The complete searching of these individuals on each crossing would be a monumental task. Needless to say, such individuals could carry on their persons various articles the size of an aerosol bomb.

B. AUTO, TRUCK, AND BUS - The majority of the American tourists, of which there are expected to be 600,000 in 1956, come to Mexico by car. Although there is reportedly a search made by Mexican Customs officials of the effects of tourists leaving Mexico, such searches often are very cursory. As for the search for contraband articles made by United States Customs Agents, BENJAMIN WHITE has advised that articles the size of aerosol bombs and larger could easily be hidden in the car's upholstery, gas tank, etc. He pointed out that generally without a specific complaint there is no thorough examination made of cars entering the United States.

This same source advised that there are Mexican bus lines which operate into U. S. border towns. Although the baggage carried by the passengers traveling on these busses is searched by United States Customs Agents, the general principle adhered to is not to conduct a search of the bus itself in the absence of a specific complaint.

There is also a mutual agreement between United States and Mexican authorities to permit free access to border towns of privately owned cars and commercial vehicles. Mr. WHITE pointed out that the complete search of such vehicles on each crossing would be a major task.

C. BY TRAIN - Exportation of petroleum, minerals, and agricultural products are made from Mexico to the United States by train. There are also passenger trains which travel from Mexico into the United States. According to BENJAMIN WHITE, Customs regulations call for a spot check search of 10 per cent of the bulk shipments such as minerals. He pointed out, however, freight trains lend themselves readily to concealed hiding places as do passenger trains. This, he advised, was particularly true of the concealment of small articles. Such places as water tanks and upper berths have been known to have been used for smuggling purposes.

D. BY PLANE - Colonel McCABE advised that there is no effective control by either the Mexican or U. S. authorities of smuggling by plane from Mexico into the U. S. He pointed out that unlike along the Canadian-United States border there is no radar network along the Mexican-U. S. border. He explained that a light plane, capable of landing on a hard dirt runway, could land in the United States after making a trip of 400 to 900 miles from inside Mexico.

[redacted] another Government agency, advised that the following are non-listed airstrips in the northern part of Mexico: b2 b7D

STATE OF COAHUILA

Strip 15 miles N-E of Agua Salada; Marco Villa Canyon, large field, some buildings, a house for maintenance personnel, will accommodate a DC-3 type aircraft with ease.

STATE OF CHIHUAHUA

Villa Ahumada, dirt strip.
Wide spot desert road south of Malpais, 17 miles from Las Palomas.
Tito Herrera Ranch.
Morris, Gratten, and Wallace Ranches; the three strips are within ½ mile of each other.
Ramos, dirt strip.
Janos, dirt strip.
Villa Real Ranch.
Rancho Cerro en Medio (Benton Ranch).
Gabilondo Ranch.

(STATE OF CHIHUAHUA, CONTINUED)

Jeffers Ranch.
Boyd Ranch.
Ranch of one of the ex-Presidents of Mexico.
Los Moscos.
Jeffers Ranch.
Jeffers Ranch.
Strip near the small town of Juarez.
Strip near La Ascension.
Simpson Mine.
Strip near Las Palomas.
Dr. Soto's Ranch.
San Pedro Ranch.
Strip near La Noria.
Jeffers Ranch.
Strip near Ojinaga (port of entry across from Presidio, Texas).

STATE OF SONORA

J. G. Boyd Ranch

Colonel McCABE stated that there are approximately 50 macadam unregistered airstrips in the northern part of Mexico. These are mostly on the property of rich ranchers who have their own planes. He pointed out, however, that anyone desiring to land a light plane surreptitiously could easily make an adequate airstrip in a day.

With respect to smuggling material by plane from Mexico to the United States, Colonel McCABE stated that this could be done with ease because of the lack of inspection on the part of Mexican and U. S. authorities. According to Colonel McCABE, aside from the central airport at Mexico City, there is little or no inspection of air traffic by the Mexican Government authorities. As an example, he advised that one could take off from Monterrey, Nuevo Leon, Mexico, after having filed flight plans stating he was going to Tampico. Instead of landing at Tampico, he could land either at a commercial field in the United States or could land surreptitiously at some out of the way place.

BENJAMIN WHITE advised in like manner and pointed out that the U. S. Customs Agents had arrested an individual who used to land at the Mexico City airport and load his plane with parrots, which he smuggled into the U. S. At Mexico City he would file flight plans for Tampico but instead of going to Tampico would land at Del Rio, Texas.

BENJAMIN WHITE and Colonel McCABE pointed out that the Immigration and Naturalization Service does have some air patrol facilities at the border but that these facilities are mainly used for the detection of foot travelers crossing from Mexico into the United States.

E. BY BOAT - Perhaps the use of boats has the greatest potential for the smuggling of contraband from Mexico or its environs into the United States. [redacted] advised that it is estimated that approximately 2,000 fishing craft with home ports in the United States fish in waters adjacent to the Mexican shore line. These include commercial fishing craft which fish for shrimp off the east coast of Mexico and for tuna and other species off the west coast of Baja California, as well as personally owned craft which mostly fish off the west coast of Mexico. According to [redacted] the Mexican Navy has no effective control over the activities of these boats. BENJAMIN WHITE advised that such craft on return to their home ports in the United States are not minutely searched except on the receipt of a specific complaint. b2 b7D

There are also ocean going steamers which call at Mexican ports, particularly at Mazatlan and Acapulco on the west coast and Tampico and Veracruz on the east coast which make stops at United States ports and which could be used in smuggling activities.

ADMINISTRATIVE PAGE

No dissemination is being made of the memorandum portion of this report.

This report is being marked "~~TOP SECRET~~" in accordance with reference Bulet.

Careful consideration has been given to each source concealed and T symbols were utilized in this report only in those instances where the identities of the sources must be concealed.

IDENTITY OF SOURCE	DATE OF ACTIVITY AND/ OR DESCRIPTION OF INFORMATION	DATE RECEIVED	AGENT TO WHOM FURNISHED	FILE NUMBER WHERE LOCATED
[redacted]	Coverage of Mexican Navy	6/25/56	[redacted] orally	Instant file
[redacted] Hdqtrs III Region 112th CIC Detachment, El Paso, Texas, Report dated 3/27/56	Airfields in Mexico	4/6/56		100-743F-91

b2
b6
b7C
b7D

REFERENCE

Bureau letter to Legat, Mexico dated May 18, 1956.

- RUC -

ADMINISTRATIVE PAGE

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: July 31, 1956

FROM : W. A. Branigan

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mason
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: REAPPRAISAL OF U.S. POLICY REGARDING SOVIET BLOC SHIPMENTS AFFORDED DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY

At 10:30 a.m., 7/31/56, SA Whitson met with the other members of the ad hoc committee on communications security connected with the captioned problem. Present were: Mr. Bernard J. Humes, Diplomatic Mail Branch, Department of State; Lt. Col. John Hayes, Army; Lt. Commander Carl G. Reeves, Navy; Col. Alfred Bilotti, Air Force; Mr. Robert G. Gramann, CIA; Mr. Dayl Coskery, National Security Agency; Mr. William T. Riley, AEC. A Mr. Drake of Defense and Mr. Goodwin of State for telecommunications were also present.

SA Whitson pointed out that the FBI was in the position of an interested observer since we had no personnel behind the Iron Curtain with whom we had to maintain communication through diplomatic channels. Points brought out under discussion were:

1. Security of communications would not be affected by placing restrictions on the pouch.

2. Adequacy of communications could not be maintained since encoding machinery could not be used indefinitely without repair and replacement which would be impossible.

3. Manual encryption would be approximately half as efficient as machine operation.

4. Restrictions on number of personnel assigned to Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Rumania would prevent assigning additional code clerks to those countries.

ENCLOSURE

5. The U.S. could partially make up communications deficiencies by increasing the number of courier trips if the Iron Curtain countries would permit such increases.

cc - Parsons
Belmont
Roach
Branigan
Whitson

LW:blb
(6)

RECORDED - 50
INDEXED-50

memo to Belmont 8/3/56 LW

112-268-

AUG 9 1956

5

EX-103

Per letter dtd 10/7/03 by 60267 uc/NLS/BJA/RNP 10/28/03
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 10/2/03 BY 60267 uc/NLS/BJA/RNP

Memorandum for A. H. Belmont

RECOMMENDATION:

None. For your information. A draft report will be ready in Mr. Humes' office on the afternoon of Thursday, August 2. It will be analyzed prior to the next meeting of the ad hoc committee now scheduled for Tuesday, August 7.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: August 3, 1956

FROM : W. A. Branigan

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mason
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: REAPPRAISAL OF U.S. POLICY REGARDING SOVIET BLOC SHIPMENTS AFFORDED DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY

Re memo Branigan to Belmont 7/31/56 noting that ad hoc committee on communications security relating to captioned problem had developed point that security of U.S. communications with our establishments behind the Iron Curtain would not be affected by placing restrictions on the pouch but that adequacy of communications could not be maintained because encoding machinery could not be used indefinitely without repair and replacement which would be impossible; restrictions on number of personnel assigned to Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Rumania would prevent assigning additional code clerks to those countries.

On basis of ad hoc committee discussions 7/31/56, a draft memo dated 8/2/56 prepared by Mr. B. J. Humes, State Department, Chairman of ad hoc committee, noted above points and made following recommendations:

1. That the limitations on diplomatic pouches not be imposed since adequate communications cannot be maintained.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/2/03 BY SP4STA/RNP

OBSERVATION:

This is not for the ad hoc group to recommend. The ad hoc group was supposed to merely study and report to the U.S. Communications Security Board on the feasibility of maintaining an adequate and secure U.S. communications system "in the event of the imposition of limitations on diplomatic shipments set forth in Recommendation 2 of NSC 5527." (Recommendation No. 2 of NSC 5527 called for reduction of the pouch to "letter size" when in the opinion of the President the international situation would permit.)

ENCLOSURE

Enclosure

cc - Boardman
Parsons
Belmont
Roach
Branigan
Whitson

LW:blb
(7)

RECORDED - 50 117-268-1104

EX-103

AUG 9 1956

2. That the appropriate agencies be requested to intensify the development of accurate detection devices, thus eliminating the necessity to impose limitations on the pouch.

OBSERVATION:

The recommendation to intensify development of accurate detection devices is already national policy. The ad hoc group should consider making a recommendation that the appropriate agencies engage in appropriate research and development to reduce the size of "one-time pads" and the components of machine encoding devices to a size which would permit their transmittal in "letter size" pouches.

3. That should it become necessary to impose limitations on diplomatic pouches, an advance warning of at least _____ months be given to the agencies to build up maximum supplies in the areas and make personnel adjustments.

OBSERVATION:

This recommendation appears to be impractical since the imposition of pouch restrictions would come as the result of unforeseen circumstances. It would be more realistic to recommend stockpiling now in our establishments behind the Iron Curtain replacement parts for coding machines and making any necessary personnel adjustments on a gradual basis commencing as soon as practical.

RECOMMENDATION:

If you have no objection, SA Whitson will present the above observations to the ad hoc group at its next meeting 10:30 a.m., Tuesday, 8/7/56, in Mr. Humes' office at the Department of State. Draft to be discussed 8/7/56 attached.

DONE
8-7-56
LW

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

8/7/56

Air-Tel

Transmit the following Teletype message to: Bureau

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268)

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (117-192)

SMAB-AEA

On 8/7/56 [redacted] U. S. Customs, Morgan Annex, Post Office Dept., NYC, advised that several small packages of mineral specimens "of scientific interest" had been mailed by the British Ministry of Natural History, London to [redacted] NY. Two of the samples containing Torbernite [redacted] related that he conferred with ALBERT ZILA of the Atomic Energy Commission, NYC, who advised that AEC not interested in this shipment and requested same be forwarded to addressee, for info.

b2
b6
b7C
b7E

KELLY

NOT "SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL". NO ACTION NECESSARY. LW

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/2/03 BY SP4BJA/RNP

3 - Bureau (117-268) (RM)
1 - New York (117-192)

Mr. Belmont

RECORDED - 72 117-268-

INDEXED - 72

TGS:cpn
5

Approved: J. Kelly
Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: August 21, 1956

FROM : W. A. Branigan

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mason
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST CLANDESTINE ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

At 4:35 p.m., 8/17/56 SA Whitson received a call from the office of Leonard Bienvenu, Executive Secretary, ICIS, and was informed that ICIS was receiving a briefing on explosive ordnance disposal at 9 a.m., Tuesday, August 21. SA Whitson was unable to obtain details at the time and discussed the matter further with Bienvenu on the morning of 8/20/56. Bienvenu stated that the ICIS representative from the office of the Secretary of Defense had determined that a Defense Department briefing on explosive ordnance disposal was going to be held at the Pentagon from 9 to 12 a.m., 8/21/56 and that additional briefing would be given at the naval ammunition factory at Indian Head on August 22. Bienvenu stated that he had asked his office to call in the event the IIC representatives on the joint committee would be interested. When it was determined that the invitation was not being extended to the IIC and that the briefing was not intended primarily for ICIS membership, SA Whitson told Bienvenu that under the circumstances, it would not be possible for arrangements to be made.

The IIC representatives on the joint committee are from FBI and Navy. Navy obviously would have the opportunity whenever it desired to receive such a briefing. Laboratory representatives from the FBI have already received practical demonstrations at the Indian Head base.

RECOMMENDATION:

Under the circumstances, no further action on this is necessary. The WFO of the FBI is in close liaison with the explosive ordnance disposal units assigned to Fort McNair and Fort Myer.

RECORDED - 78

INDEXED - 78

EX-104

cc - Belmont
Branigan
Day
Whitson

LW:blb
(5)

59 AUG 27 1956

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UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

DO-6

OFFICE OF DIRECTOR
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mason
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Jones
Mr. Nease
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/2/63 BY SP4 JSH/RNP

Belmont
8/20/56
L W

EXP. PROC.

AUG 13 1956

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: August 20, 1956

FROM : W. A. Branigan

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mason
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: REAPPRAISAL OF U.S. POLICY CONCERNING DIPLOMATIC SHIPMENTS

(Smab)

On the morning of August 20, 1956, Mr. Boggs, Secretary of the National Security Council (NSC) Planning Board, phoned Bureau liaison to advise that the Planning Board would consider at 2 p.m., August 20, a study prepared by the Department of State regarding international agreements to prevent entry into the U.S. of radioactive materials through diplomatic shipments.

As a result of a joint IIC-ICIS study regarding countermeasures which might be taken to prevent the introduction of fissionable material for clandestine nuclear weapons in diplomatic shipments, the Department of State was instructed by the NSC to study the feasibility of obtaining international agreement to prohibit shipment of radioactive materials under diplomatic immunity and to authorize adequate inspection of diplomatic shipments by means of detection devices. The Department of State study, which was submitted to Mr. James Lay, Jr., under date of 8/9/56, concluded that the negotiation of international agreements is probably not feasible because bilateral agreements would have to be negotiated with every nation and uniformity would be almost impossible. Before any negotiations could be started, State should consult with our important allies and even consider a forthright approach to the USSR. If negotiations should be attempted, it might be possible to include a specific provision on the subject in a broad convention, preferably one on disarmament. Any other method would probably lay the U.S. open to Soviet propaganda attacks and diplomatic reprisal.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/2/03 BY SP4BCJ/RNP

ACTION:

There is nothing for the IIC or the Bureau to do in connection with this study since it was result of a recommendation which originated in the NSC and not with IIC. SA [redacted] will attend the Planning Board meeting as an observer as we have done in the past.

b6
b7C

117-268

RECORDED - 78 117-268-

EX-128

18 AUG 22 1956

117-268
cc - Belmont
Branigan
Roach
M. W. Kuhrtz
Whitson
LW:blb
(6)

19a 8/20

TOLSON

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: 8/14/56

FROM : W. A. Branigan

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mason
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST CLANDESTINE ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE U.S.

At meeting of joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures 5/31/56, ICIS Secretariat was requested to draft letter to Secretary of Treasury for Customs and Coast Guard and to Attorney General for Immigration Service, embodying certain AEC suggestions regarding calls upon AEC for assistance in identifying certain radioactive material discovered by the operators of detection devices.

Such letters were prepared by ICIS Secretariat and circularized through ICIS membership. Treasury representative indicated he had objected but did not specify objections. ICIS has been unable to determine precisely what Treasury's objections are and has now placed draft letter on agenda for standing committee meeting of ICIS 4 p.m., Thursday, 8/16/56. Invitation has been issued to IIC and AEC to have observers present at ICIS standing committee meeting to hear Treasury position.

ACTION:

SA Whitson, the FBI-IIC representative on the joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures, will attend the standing committee meeting as an observer for IIC.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/2/03 BY SP4BTA/RNP

cc - Belmont
Branigan
Day
Whitson

LW:blb
(4)

RECORDED - 79
EX-126

117-268-1

18 AUG 22 1956

memo to Belmont 8/21/56

66-8603-
62-90938-

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

ICIS-P25/413

August 14, 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR: ALL HOLDERS OF LETTER DATED MAY 19, 1953, RELATIVE TO DEFENSE DEPARTMENT SPONSORSHIP OF A STUDY AND PREPARATION OF A PLAN TO FIX RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE REPORTING, DISARMING AND DISPOSAL OF CERTAIN WEAPONS.

FROM: Leonard P. Bienvenu
Executive Secretary, ICIS

SUBJECT: Downgrading of Correspondence

By memorandum dated June 14, 1956, to the Chairmen, IIC and ICIS, First Lieutenant [redacted] Top Secret Control Officer, Office of the Secretary of Defense, advised that upon review by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, it has been determined that reference correspondence may be downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL. Lieutenan[redacted] requested that necessary action be taken to downgrade this correspondence as indicated above, quoting his memorandum as authority therefor. b6 b7C

Records of this office indicate that this correspondence was forwarded to you and it is therefore requested that you comply with Lieutenant [redacted] request.

See 117-268-269X

cc: Mr. Yeagley
Mr. Chase
Col. Graham
Mr. Ranta
Mr. Doherty
Mr. Canavan
Mr. Coyne
Mr. Kieffer
Mr. Whitson
Col. Hudgins
Mr. Babbitt

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/2/03 BY SP4BSA/RNP

117-268-
NOT RECORDED
16 AUG 28 1956

59 AUG 31 1956

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: 8/13/56

FROM : W. A. Branigan

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mason
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: REAPPRAISAL OF U.S. POLICY REGARDING SOVIET BLOC SHIPMENTS AFFORDED DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY

Smeb

Brantigan

Wells

SYNOPSIS:

At meeting of ad hoc committee 8/7/56 considering adequacy and security of U.S. diplomatic communications should limitations on the pouch be imposed, FBI representative objected to recommendations included in August 2 draft on basis of memo Branigan to Belmont 8/3/56 and they were deleted. These were that no limitations be placed on the pouch; that detection devices be developed further; that six months' advance notice was necessary. Need of six months' period to replace machine encryption by materials for manual operations, i.e. one-time pads, etc., expressed by Department of State and included in conclusions with fact that communications security could be maintained although adequacy of communications as measured by present volume could not be maintained if reductions in size and weight of pouch made which would make replacement and repair of code machines impossible.

Final draft will be circularized to agencies by Executive Secretary, U.S. Communications Security Board.

RECOMMENDATION:

When final draft circularized by U.S. Communications Security Board is received, it will be analyzed and recommendations will be made.

cc - Belmont
Branigan
B.A. Wells
Day
Whitson

LW:blb
(6)

RECORDED - 27

117-268-11

17 AUG 27 1956

EX-101

AUG 31 1956

Per letter dtd 10/27/03 60267 uc/NLS/BJA/RNP 10/28/03
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 10/2/03 BY 60267 uc/NLS/BJA/RNP

Memorandum for A. H. Belmont

DETAILS:

The ad hoc committee set up by the U.S. Communications Security Board to study the security and adequacy of U.S. diplomatic communications in the event limitations were imposed on size and weight of diplomatic pouches met 8/7/56 at the Department of State. It was decided that the draft would be rewritten to exclude the recommendations which the FBI representative objected to on basis of memo Branigan to Belmont 8/3/56. These were that no limitations be placed on the pouch; that detection devices be developed further; that six months' advance notice was necessary. The draft would also be rewritten to include, at the suggestion of the CIA representative, a brief digest of the terms of reference on which the study by the ad hoc committee was conducted. The final draft, which will be disseminated to the members of the U.S. Communications Security Board by the Executive Secretary of that group, should contain substantially the following assumptions, facts and conclusions:

Assumptions:

1. The verbal information furnished to the Chairman by the Executive Secretariat, USCSB, to the effect that the words "communications system" as used in reference (1) referred to electrical communications systems only.

2. The assumption that no more restrictive limitation on the size, weight, or number of diplomatic pouches exchanged than those specified in paragraph V-17 of reference (3) would be imposed by the countries affected on U.S. diplomatic pouches.

3. Since only minimum essential telegraph traffic is being sent to and from the posts affected, it is assumed that an "adequate communications system" is one capable of handling the present volume.

Memorandum for A. H. Belmont

Discussion:

1. *The committee agreed that the conditions to be imposed upon the exchange of diplomatic pouches would eliminate the supplying of bulky cryptographic materials and make imperative a change over from machine cryptographic operation to manual operation. Under these circumstances, communications would remain secure but only a substantially reduced volume could be maintained, even with the providing of additional personnel where conditions permitted.*

2. *There is a limit placed by the host countries at certain of the posts affected upon the number of U.S. personnel in the Embassy. Additional code personnel required for manual operation could be provided only at the sacrifice of substantive officers, thereby adversely affecting the degree of effectiveness of the mission.*

3. *The speed of telegraphic communications would be greatly reduced under manual cryptographic operation to a point where its effectiveness would be seriously impaired.*

4. *Under the tense circumstances that would exist, it is probable that the volume of telegraph traffic would increase when the system would be least capable of handling it.*

5. *There is a strong possibility that the countries affected by the proposed limitations may retaliate by imposing even more severe limitations on size, weight, frequency of delivery or number of diplomatic pouches which may be permitted to enter their respective countries.*

6. *At the present time in isolated instances one country transmits material in its diplomatic pouches for another country. The limitations*

envisioned in paragraph V-17 of NSC-5527, December 1, 1955, may be circumvented by the Iron Curtain countries through the use of the diplomatic pouch facilities of other countries.

7. This circumventing ruse could not effectively be used by the United States to send over-size or over-weight classified material to Iron Curtain countries, since United States security regulations do not permit classified material to pass out of U.S. custody.

8. Under the limitations to be imposed upon the exchange of diplomatic pouches, it would not be possible for the United States to maintain indefinitely the radio equipment which in the countries affected is essential for emergency use.

Conclusions:

1. Secure communications can be maintained under the limitations imposed upon diplomatic pouches.

2. Adequate communications cannot be maintained.

3. Should it become necessary to impose limitations on diplomatic pouches, an advance warning of at least six months should be given to the agencies to build up maximum supplies of cryptographic materials for manual operations and to make personnel adjustments.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: August 20, 1956

FROM : MR. R. R. ROACH

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mason
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: REAPPRAISAL OF U.S. POLICY CONCERNING DIPLOMATIC SHIPMENTS

(Smab)

Reference is made to Mr. Branigan's memorandum on this matter dated August 20 instant, which reflected that the National Security Council (NSC) Planning Board was considering on August 20 instant a study prepared by State regarding international agreements to prevent entry into the U.S. of radioactive materials through diplomatic shipments. A copy of State's report was attached to the referenced memorandum which concluded that the negotiation of international agreements relative to the inspection of diplomatic shipments for taking radioactive materials under diplomatic immunity was probably not feasible since it would be almost impossible to negotiate with every nation and thus avoid uniformity in such an effort.

Liaison Supervisor M. W. Kuhrtz attended the Planning Board meeting on this matter as an observer only. The matter was discussed again at some length and as stated by Mr. Dillon Anderson, Chairman, although State's report is "very shy" in its approach to this matter, he did not believe that the USSR could be approached on this matter at this time to the benefit of the U.S. The joint staff representative questioned the recommendation in State's report that international agreements were not feasible, by stating that he did not believe that this matter was a closed issue, and that it might be very possible that at some future date and even in the immediate future, that an approach to the Soviets or an attempt at international agreements may definitely be feasible. The Planning Board finally agreed to present the State Department report to the National Security Council with the statement that it had reviewed the report and agreed that it was not feasible at this time to approach the Soviets on an inspection system of their diplomatic shipments. The Planning Board also agreed to note in its memorandum to the NSC that the IIC-ICIS have this matter under continuous review and as a result, will report to the National Security Council in the event problems occur or information is developed which will require the NSC to reconsider this matter.

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18 AUG 28 1956

MWK:bal ad
(6)
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Branigan
1 - Liaison Section
1 - Mr. Day
1 - Mr. Kuhrtz

LIAISON

ACTION:

There is nothing for the IIC or the Bureau to do in connection with this study since it was a recommendation which originated in the National Security Council on March 8 last that State prepare this report. The Bureau will, of course, continue to inform Mr. James S. Lay of any information developed by the Bureau relative to the detection of radioactive material in diplomatic shipments.

DO-6

OFFICE OF DIRECTOR
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mason
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Jones
Mr. Nease
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

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DATE 6/2/03 BY SP4BSR/RNP

Burbage
Rosen Rothman

EXP. PROC. Dalbey

AUG 23 1956 31

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: August 24, 1956

FROM : R. R. ROACH

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mason
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: REAPPRAISAL OF U.S. POLICY CONCERNING DIPLOMATIC SHIPMENTS

Reference is made to my memorandum of August 20, last, on the captioned matter which reflected that the NSC Planning Board agreed on that date to refer to the NSC for consideration a study prepared by State regarding the feasibility of international agreements or unilateral action within individual countries to prevent entry of radioactive material through diplomatic shipments. In this connection, NSC Action 1524 (March 8, 1956) directed State to make this feasibility study and forward same to the NSC through the Planning Board.

Attached is a copy of a memorandum from Mr. James Lay, Executive Secretary, NSC, to the NSC dated August 21, 1956, enclosing the above-mentioned State study along with the Planning Board's agreed action. It reflects that the Planning Board concurred in the State conclusion that neither international agreements or unilateral U.S. action in this regard is feasible at this time. Also, the Planning Board action requests IIC and ICIS to keep the problem of entry of radioactive material through diplomatic shipments under continuing review and report to the NSC if developments occur which would warrant reconsideration of the feasibility of international agreements. This latter statement involving the IIC and ICIS is the same wording which appears in the NSC Action 1524 on March 8, last, dealing with the over-all U.S. policy regarding Soviet bloc shipments afforded diplomatic immunity. In this connection the IIC agencies will continue to furnish ICIS with information developed in this area. However, ICIS is the proper committee to make reappraisal and recommendations to the NSC rather than the IIC since State, the controlling department, is a member of ICIS and not IIC.

Also, the attached memorandum to Mr. Lay reflects that the Planning Board considered State's report with the assistance of representatives of IIC and ICIS. In this connection, Liaison Supervisor M. W. Kuhrtz was present at

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ENCLOSURE

Enclosure

MWK:hke (7)

1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Branigan
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Mr. Kuhrtz
1-Mr. Day
1-Liaison Section

RECORDED - 91

EX-126

62-268-

18 AUG 28 1956

59 SEP 11 1956

LIAISON

the Planning Board meeting as an observer only. As a result of a request for comments by the chairman, Kuhrtz advised that the IIC was in no position to comment upon State's report. Furthermore, the FBI and the IIC have promptly passed information which has been developed concerning detection of radioactive material in diplomatic shipments. However, it was pointed out by Kuhrtz that in the absence of more rigid controls of diplomatic shipments, the detection devices and the present restrictions on their use limit the possibilities of radioactive material being detected.

ACTION:

Although the matter of reviewing and recommending to the NSC on this matter is actually an ICIS responsibility, we have set up this item on a six-months' tickler schedule in the IIC in order to be assured that ICIS is givingappropriate review and consideration to evidence developed by the IIC concerning the possible entry of radioactive material into the U.S. in diplomatic shipments.

Page 230 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 231 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 237 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 238 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 239 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 240 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 247 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 248 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 257 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 320 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 340 ~ Referral/Direct

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Page 230 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 231 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 237 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 238 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 239 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 240 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 247 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 248 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 257 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 320 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 340 ~ Referral/Direct

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Page 230 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 231 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 237 ~ Referral/Direct
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Page 240 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 247 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 248 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 257 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 320 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 340 ~ Referral/Direct

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : W. A. Branigan

DATE: August 27, 1956

FROM : L. Whitson

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mason
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

"Stag" magazine for October, 1956, carries story on page 18 by newspaper photographer Gene Hackley, "We Smuggled in 10 A-Bombs." This is a rehash of a newspaper story which appeared in the Los Angeles, California, "Daily Mirror" of April 7, 1954.

The background is as follows:

"FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin" for January, 1954, contained unclassified description of atomic devices, copy of White House statement dated December 15, 1953, regarding FBI jurisdiction under Atomic Energy Act and memorandum from Director to all law enforcement officials regarding FBI responsibility and cautioning law enforcement officers to avoid tampering with suspected atomic devices. The press got hold of this information March 22, 1954, and gave it a "big play" for a while. Story by newspaper reporter Sid Hughes of Los Angeles, California, broke in the California papers April 7, 1954. He had loaded 10 sections of pipe, simulating his conception of small gun-type A-Bombs, in the back end of his car and had driven across the international boundaries from Mexico into the U.S. He and a news photographer had planted the sections of pipe in various strategic spots. (Actually, had these sections of pipe been atomic weapons, each would have weighed close to 160 pounds and it would have been difficult if not impossible for them to have been carried around and placed as were the sections of pipe.)

We knew about Hughes' story from friendly newsmen and the Director instructed that we stick to "no comment." We notified the Attorney General and Deputy Attorney General Rogers April 8, 1954, and assured them that the FBI had nothing to do with Sid Hughes' publicity stunt. (117-268-470)

RECOMMENDATION:

None. For your information.

RECORDED-53

117-268

117-268-1

117-268
cc - Branigan
Whitson
LW:blb

AUG 31 1956

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: August 21, 1956

FROM : W. A. Branigan

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mason
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST CLANDESTINE ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

SM-3

SA Whitson, FBI-IIC representative on the joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures, attended as an observer a meeting of the Standing Committee of ICIS 8/16/56. On agenda was a draft letter prepared by ICIS Secretariat embodying certain AEC suggestions regarding calls upon AEC by Customs and Coast Guard for assistance in identifying radioactive material discovered by the operators of the detection devices.

Mr. Hugo Ranta, Treasury Department representative, stated that the matters raised by AEC were operational problems and that a letter was not needed. Ranta said that Coast Guard had no objection to receiving training from AEC but that Treasury felt Customs did not have enough work in this line as yet and that any training program for Customs was premature. In the ensuing discussion, it was pointed out by various ICIS representatives that this problem had been "hanging fire" while Treasury sat on it since the end of May, 1956. It was pointed out that AEC was offering to give instruction to Treasury employees operating the detection devices so that they would be able to screen out radioactive material of no consequence and would only have to refer to AEC those items which require laboratory testing. SA Whitson was asked what the IIC position was and he stated that he was not aware of any IIC position as yet since no communication had been referred to IIC. He pointed out, however, that the AEC could, of course, write directly to the Treasury Department if no satisfactory communication from the Committee could be drafted.

The ICIS Standing Committee thereupon instructed the ICIS Secretariat to redraft the letter in such a form as would be acceptable to Treasury and word it so that it would be a logical follow-up to the letters directed to the Treasury Department and to the Attorney General under

66-8603-
62-90938-

117-358-1116

RECORDED-93

18 AUG 29 1956

EX-126

cc - Belmont
Branigan
Day
Whitson

LW:blb
(5)

29 AUG 31 1956

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date of 4/23/56 when the limited national detection device program was instituted. The 4/23/56 letters were signed jointly by the Chairman, IIC, and the Chairman, ICIS.

RECOMMENDATION:

When the ICIS draft is received by the IIC, it will be analyzed and appropriate recommendations made.

If this is a joint letter, examine this when received to determine whether joint letter is warranted

DIRECTOR FBI ([redacted] 8/27/56

SAC, NEW YORK [redacted]

b7C

[redacted] WA

SM-C; IS-CZ

Re WFO Letter to Bureau dated 6/28/56 on captioned subject and BuLet to NY dated 7/20/56 captioned, "SMAB" (BUFILE: 117-268).

Prior background information had been developed on [redacted] who was a former SI subject of the NYO and had been deleted from the SI under the new criteria in SAC Letter 55-12 dated 2/10/55.

The subject operates the [redacted], NYC, which engages in the sale of gifts and glassware. Referenced WFO letter indicated the purpose of the subject's foreign travel was for the purchase of giftwares and commodities to sell through his own wholesale organization.

In reply to referenced Bulet captioned "SMAB", the NYO does not recommend the referral of [redacted] name to the U.S. Customs Bureau for inclusion on the Special Customs Watch List.

The subject is not employed in a sensitive capacity. Prior investigation established that [redacted] maintains irregular business hours and an excessive amount of investigative time would be expended in order to interview him.

In view of the foregoing, and in accordance with instructions Section 105(K) M. of I., this case is being closed.

(4) - BUREAU [redacted] (RM)
(2- 117-268)
1 - NEW YORK [redacted]
1 - NEW YORK (117-192)

EPM:epm
(6)

117-268-✓

NOT RECORDED
136 AUG 29 1956

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[redacted]

71 AUG 31 1956

FD-36 (6-21-55)

FBI

Date: 9/7/56

Transmit the following message via AIRTEL

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

From SAC, NEW YORK (117-192)

To: BUREAU (117-268)

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mason
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Nease
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

SMAB; AEA

M/R per INDEX RES. 2:30 pg 10-56 LW

TOM SHEAN, U.S. Customs, Idlewild Airport, NY, advised on 9/7/56 that [redacted] U.S. passport [redacted] issued in Washington, D. C. on 5/31/56, arrived at Idlewild on 9/7/56 aboard TWA flight 963 at 10:15 a.m. He was destined to his residence, [redacted] N. C., and listed himself as a student. He declared some pieces of rock and ore as collectors' items which he had obtained from the University of Madrid at Madrid, Spain. Two of the pieces had a registration of 50 red, 100 green and were labeled by [redacted] as containing tarbonite.

b7C

ALBERT ZILA, Radiation Branch, Health and Service Laboratory, AEC, NYC, stated that an examination of this material by AEC indicated that same could not be classified as source or nuclear material.

NO SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL
NO ACTION NECESSARY.

KELLY

LW

3-Bureau (117-268) RM
1-New York (117-192)

RECORDED-53 117-268-1130

Mr. Belmont INDEXED-53

1-D

TGS:EG
(5)

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SEP 14 1956

Approved: J. A. Kelly Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

FD-36 (6-21-55)



F B I



Date: 9/7/56

Transmit the following message via AIRTEL

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

From SAC, NEW YORK (117-192)

To: BUREAU (117-268)



SMAB: AEA

On 9/7/56, THOMAS D. SHEAN, U.S. Customs Service, Idlewild Airport, NY, advised that [redacted] who has passport [redacted] issued at Porto Alegre, Brazil, arrived at Idlewild on 9/7/56 aboard TWA flight 850. [redacted] is the [redacted] at Idlewild for Derig Airlines. He declared a bottle of sand which he listed as a curio, and an examination with the [redacted] device reflected a reading of 250 x 10. [redacted] stated he obtained this sand on a beach at Comuxativa, which is near Caradelas, Brazil. b2 b7C b7E

ALBERT ZILA, Radiation Branch, Health and Service Laboratory, AEC, NYC, stated that the contents consisted of monazite sand and was not source material or nuclear, and that the AEC had no further interest in this matter.

NO SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL.
NO ACTION NECESSARY.
LW

KELLY

3-Bureau (117-268) RM
1-New York (117-192)

RECORDED-53

INDEXED-53

TGS:EG
(5)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-14-2007 BY 60267 UC/NW5/bja/DMA

Approved: _____ Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

FD-36 (6-21-55)

F B I

Date: 9/7/56

Transmit the following message via AIRTEL

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

From SAC, NEW YORK (117-192)

To: BUREAU (117-268)

SMAB; AEA

On 9/7/56, THOMAS FLEMING, U.S. Customs Service, NYC, advised that the "SS Horda" arrived at Pier 34, Brooklyn, NY on 9/3/56. In an examination of cargo they found a lead container which reacted the [redacted] device to the point of 250 x 20. He stated instant material was destined to [redacted] Ithaca, NY, and the sender was Rolland Pernit Company, Paris, and that it was cleared under permit [redacted]

b2
b7C
b7E

ALBERT ZILA of the Radiation Branch, Health and Service Laboratory, AEC, NYC, advised that the contents of the lead container was meso thorium and that this material was used for laboratory experiments and was not designated as nuclear material, and, therefore, the AEC had no interest in further holding this material.

NOT SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL.
NO ACTION NECESSARY.

LW KELLY

RECORDED - 76

3-Bureau (117-268) RM
1-New York (117-192)

INDEXED - 76

EX-116

Mr. Belmont

1-D

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-14-2004 BY 60267 uc/NLS/bja/PKM

TGS:EG
(5)

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

FD-36 (6-21-55)

FBI

Date: 9/6/56

Transmit the following message via AIRTEL

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

From SAC, NEW YORK (117-192)

To: BUREAU (117-268)

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mason
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Nease
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

SMAB; AEA

b7C

On 9/6/56, Inspector PRATT, U.S. Customs Service, NYC, advised that the "SS Liberte", which docked this morning at Pier 88 in NYC, had a small shipment of uranium ore consigned to [redacted] Hotel St. George, Brooklyn, NY, as representative of the Arizona Uranium Ore Co. of Globe, Arizona. According to Inspector PRATT, this shipment was originally shipped by the Arizona Uranium Co. from this country to Europe and represents a reshipment. Inspector PRATT stated he has submitted the facts in this matter to the Atomic Energy Commission which advised they are not interested in this shipment.

Inquiries made by NYO at NY office of AEC reflected shipment in question consists of rock ore samples which are not special nuclear material nor source material under the terms of the AEC. Mr. SIELER of AEC advised that provisions of the AEA have not been violated by the importer and that AEC is not interested in this shipment.

For information.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-14-2004 BY 60267 uc/nw/bja/pmw

NOT SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL. NO ACTION NECESSARY.
LW

KELLY

3-Bureau (117-268) RM
1-New York (117-192)

RECORDED-90 117-268-1
INDEXED - 90 2 SEP 7 1956

1-D

Mr. Belmont

HVE:EG (5)

SEP 14 1956

Approved: J J Kelly Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

FD-36 (6-21-55)

[redacted] [redacted]

FBI

Date: 9/7/56

Transmit the following message via AIRTEL

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

From SAC, NEW YORK (117-192)

To: BUREAU (117-268)

SMAB; AEA

FRANK RENNER, U.S. Customs, Idlewild Airport, NY, advised on 9/6/56 that [redacted] having Canadian passport [redacted] issued 7/16/56 at Ottawa, Canada, arrived Idlewild Airport at 7:55 p.m., 9/6/56. The equipment at Idlewild registered red 21, green 86 in connection with 150 pounds of crude ore which [redacted] had declared and identified as pyrochlore, which carries the trade name Columbian Ore, to be used in the hardening of steel, and which ore had been obtained from Barreiro, Brazil. b7C

[redacted] is a mining engineer by profession and advised that this ore would be used for analysis purposes at the Quebec Columbium Ltd. Laboratory at Oka in the Province of Quebec.

ALBERT ZILA, Radiation Branch, Health and Service Laboratory, AEC, NYC, stated that this Columbian ore has some traces of radioactivity but is not considered by them as nuclear or source material.

NOT NUCLEAR OR SOURCE MATERIAL. KELLY
NO ACTION NECESSARY.
LW.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-14-2004 BY 60267 uc/auw/bjg/pam

3-Bureau (117-268) RM
1-New York (117-192)

Mr. Belmont

117-268-11

RECORDED - 27
INDEXED-27

18 SEP 12 1956

ENCLOSURE

TGS:EG
(5)

59 SEP 17 1956

Approved: J J Kelly Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mason
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Nease
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

~~SECRET~~

CONFIDENTIAL

CC [redacted]t
Roach
Branigan
Whitson

117-268

Date: September 12, 1956 BY COURIER SERVICE

To: Captain John A. Waters
Director of Security
Atomic Energy Commission (orig and 1)
Room 926
1717 H Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

b2
b7C

EX-116

U.S. Customs, Idlewild International Airport, New York, has advised that on September 7, 1956, one [redacted] bearing Canadian Passport No. [redacted] arrived from Iceland aboard Icelandic Airlines, Flight L-301. [redacted] was in transit to Montreal and ultimately to Manitoba via Trans Canada Air Lines.

An examination of his baggage by the [redacted] detection device reflected that [redacted] was in possession of an undeclared ounce of uranite which caused a full-scale reaction on the head sensitive to neutrons and a reading of 40 on the dial for the head sensitive to gamma radiation at a distance of two feet.

[redacted] described himself as a prospector and stated that the uranite was to be used for comparison with any ore he might discover. Customs advised the Atomic Energy Commission office in New York, which office expressed no interest in the uranite. The indices of this Bureau are negative as to [redacted] whose mailing address is [redacted] Manitoba. The FBI is conducting no investigation in this matter.

LW:blb
(7)

NOTE: Classified Secret because reaction of detection device is classified Secret.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 32658

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267 ucl/sml/bjs/pmw
ON 6-14-2007

BY COURIER SVC.
13 SEP 17
COMM - FBI

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mason
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

SEP 7 1956

TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mason
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Nease
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

WASH 7 FROM NEW YORK 7 5-38 P

DIRECTOR URGENT

SMAB. T.D. SHEEHAN, CUSTOMS, NY INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, TELEPHONICALLY ADVISED AT THREE PM, SEPTEMBER SEVEN, FIFTYSIX, THAT [redacted] CANADA, ARRIVED NY INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT FROM ICELAND, EN ROUTE MANITOBA, CANADA, AT TWO THIRTY PM, SEPBEMBER SEVEN, FIFTYSIX, ABOARD ICELANDIC AIRLINES FLIGHT L DASH THREE ZERO ONE. [redacted] DID NOT DECLARE ANY FISSIONABLE MATERIAL. EXAMINATION OF BAGGAGE BY SPECIAL DEVICE REFLECTED PRESUNKA IN POSSESSION OF ONE OUNCE URANITE, WHICH CAUSED FULL-SCALE REACTION ON RED AND FORTY ON GREEN AT TWO FEET. [redacted] DESCRIBED HIMSELF AS PROSPECTOR IN POSSESSION OF URANITE TO BE USED FOR COMPARISON WITH ANY ORE HE MIGHT DISCOVER. [redacted] IN POSSESSION CANADIAN PASSPORT [redacted] ISSUED JUNE NINETEEN, NINETEEN FIFTY SIX AT ~~IDLEWILD~~ OTTAWA. [redacted] IN TRANSIT TO MONTREAL AND ULTIMATELY TO MANITOBA ON SEPT SEVEN, FIFTYSIX, VIA TRANSCANADA AIRLINES. AEC ADVISED BY CUSTOMS AND EXPRESSED NO INTEREST IN URANITE. NYO INDICES NEGATIVE. NO FURTHER ACTION.

KELLY

END

NY R 7 WA JG

TU DIS

11:58A NO be INDEX RESEARCH 9-10-56 LW

b7C

117-268-11

RECORDED-53
INDEXED-53

SEP 13 1956

Mr. Belmont

EX-116

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-14-2004 BY 60267 DC/mw/bja/PAM

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: 9/12/56

FROM : W. A. Branigan

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

(Smab)

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mason
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

At 11:25 a.m., 9/12/56, Mr. Don Gale, Naval Research Laboratory, a member of the "advisory group" which was responsible initially for placing the detection devices for radioactive material at the ports of entry through which Soviet bloc diplomats enter the United States, phoned and spoke to SA Whitson. Gale pointed out that no report had been made by the advisory group on the operation of the detection devices since early Spring of 1956 before the "limited national program" for detection devices had been assumed, with limitations, by Treasury. Gale wondered if a summary on detection device operations at the ports of entry was again due.

SA Whitson pointed out to Gale that Treasury was now responsible for the detection device programs administration. Actual operational responsibility rested on Customs, Coast Guard and Immigration, each of which had supplied representatives to the "advisory group" to which Gale belonged. It was suggested to Gale that he might wish to get in touch with the official in the Treasury Department responsible for the administration of the program and that in order to obtain the name of that official he might contact Leonard Bienvenu, Executive Secretary of ICIS, to which committee Treasury belongs.

It was suggested to Gale that when a summary was prepared by his group the agencies of the IIC would be interested in receiving copies.

RECOMMENDATION:

None. For your information.

RECORDED-53

117-268-1

18 SEP 13 1956

cc - Belmont
Branigan
Day
Whitson

LW:blb
(5)

EX-116

59 SEP 19 1956

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-14-2004 BY 60242 uc/alm/bja/PAM

FD-36 (6-21-55)

FBI

Date: 9/11/56

Transmit the following message via AIRTEL

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

From SAC, NEW YORK (117-192)

To: BUREAU (117-268)

SMAB; AEA

On 9/11/56, [redacted] U.S. Post Office Department, Morgan Annex, NYC, advised that the Post Office was in receipt of an air mail package directed to [redacted] Bi-Physics Department, Hartford Foundation, Yale University, Grasslands Road, Valhalla, NY, which contained ten mcs. of radioactive phosphorus 32. This package was mailed from the Radio Chemical Center of the United Kingdom, Atomic Energy Authority, Amersham, Buckinghamshire, England. The [redacted] device registered a reading of 50. This package was mailed under AEC authority #38007.

b2
b7C
b7E

LEONARD SOLON, Radiation Branch, Health and Service Laboratory, AEC, NYC, advised on 9/11/56 that instant phosphorus was a by-product material sent under proper AEC license and was not considered as either nuclear or source material.

PROPERLY LICENSED.
NO ACTION NECESSARY.
LW

KELLY

3-Bureau (117-268) RM
1-New York (117-192)

INDEXED-53
RECORDED-53

117-268-1

16 SEP 12 1956

1-D

Mr. Belmont

EX-116

5 Lee Pettigrew

TGS:EG
(5)

59 SEP 19 1956

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-14-2004 BY 60267 dcd/NUS/bja/Plm

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

98K

9/11/56

AIRTEL

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mason
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Nease
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

NEW YORK (117-192)

BUREAU (117-268)

SMAB; AEA

On 9/11/56, Inspector WEINER, U.S. Customs, Idlewild Airport, NYC, advised that [redacted] who resided at [redacted] arrived via National Airlines at Idlewild Airport. He has passport [redacted] issued 8/22/56 in Antofogasta, Chile. He stated he was a student, had never been in the U. S., and was enroute to the University of Colorado at Boulder, Colorado. On arrival he declared 4 oz. of radioactive ore which did not have any appreciable reading on the device at Idlewild Airport. He indicated he was bringing this unrefined ore to Boulder, Colorado for analysis. b7C

LEONARD SOLON, Radiation Branch, Health and Service Laboratory, AEC, NYC, stated that this material, which was in rock form, was not considered by the AEC as being nuclear or source material and, because of the small amount involved, they had no further interest in this matter.

KELLY

3-Bureau (117-268) RM
1-New York (117-192)

S:EG
5)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-14-2004 BY 60267 uc/nws/bja/pmc

FD-36 (6-21-55)

FBI

Date: 9/11/56

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mason
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Nease
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

Transmit the following message via AIRTEL

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

From SAC, NEW YORK (117-192)

To: BUREAU (117-268)

SMAB; AEA

On 9/9/56, Inspector CASTRO, U.S. Customs, NYC, advised that [redacted] British passport [redacted] issued 9/5/56, London, England, arrived Idlewild Airport on BOAC flight 509 at 9:48 a.m. His destination was Hotel Hawthorn, Salem, Mass. On arrival he declared a sample of thorium phosphate which he was going to deliver to Sylvania Electric Products Co., NYC for research purposes. b7C

LEONARD SOLON, Radiation Branch, Health and Service Laboratory, AEC, NYC, advised on 9/11/56 that instant material was technically source material but that since the quantity was so small that it did not require a license, the AEC had no particular interest in this material.

ITEM DECLARED -
LICENSE NOT REQUIRED.
NO ACTION NECESSARY.

LW

KELLY

3-Bureau (117-268) RM
1-New York (117-192)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-14-2004 BY 60267 uc/lmw/bja/pam

Mr. Boloney

RECORDED-53

117-268-1

13

11 SEP 1956

INDEXED-83

TGS:EG
(5)

11 SEP 13 1956

EX-116

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____

Special Agent in Charge

FD-36 (6-21-55)

FBI

Date: 9/14/56

Transmit the following message via AIRTEL

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

From SAC, NEW YORK (117-192)

To: BUREAU (117-268)

SMAB; AEA

New York, N.Y.

On 9/14/56, [redacted] U.S. Post Office Department, Morgan Annex, NYC, advised that the Post Office was in receipt of a shipment of three envelopes containing Columbite which was destined to Metallurg, Inc., 99 Park Ave., NYC, attention [redacted] The material was mailed by the London and Scandinavian Metallurgy Co., Wimbleton S.W. 19, London, England. b7C

On the device, envelope #1 registered 185 x 1 on surface, envelope #2 registered 215 x 1 on surface, and envelope #3 registered 225 x 1 on surface.

According to [redacted] these samples appeared to be advance samples from a shipment of eight tons of Columbite which was being shipped to Metallurg, Inc. aboard the "SS Anneal".

ALBERT ZILA, Radiation Branch, AEC, NYC, advised that this was not source or nuclear material and was not the type of ore that would be processed for uranium.

NOT SOURCE NOR NUCLEAR MATERIAL
NO ACTION NECESSARY.
LW

KELLY

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-14-2007 BY 60267 uc/lmw/bja/Rsa

3-Bureau (117-268) RM
1-New York (117-192)

RECORDED-89 117-268

INDEXED-89 11 SEP 17 1956

TGS:EG
(5)

Approved: _____ Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

FD-36 (Rev. 3-13-56)

F B I

Date: 9/8/56

Transmit the following message via AIRTEL

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268)

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (117-

SUBJECT: SMAB
AEA

Staff Sergeant [redacted] Station Staff Officer, of US Customs, Idlewild Airport, NYC, advised 9/8/56, radioactive material detected in possession of [redacted] b7C [redacted] California. [redacted] arrived this date NYC by PAA Flight 202, Plane #6520C, from Brazil. DAILY, a mining engineer, is American by birth. He was issued Passport [redacted] bearing renewal [redacted] 12/21/55, at San Francisco, California. He departed 5/8/56, from Miami, Fla., via Baniff Airlines for purpose of business and visited Brazil only.

Radioactive material consisted of the following:

1. Braddeleyite
2. Caldasite
3. Rare earth

Radioactive material was obtained near Pocos De Caldas, State of MG, Brazil. Material weighed approximately 10 lbs. and was not refined. Sergeant [redacted] advised material is for testing and study by Union Carbide Ore Co., NYC. Reading was 90 on red, 31 on green, on machine #5 at two feet. AEC is requesting samples of each.

Bureau will be advised of results of AEC examination.

SEE AIRTEL 9-11-56

KELLY

3 - Bureau (117-268)(RM)
1 - New York (117-

NJP:PAF
(5)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-14-2004 BY 60267 uc/sw/bja/PAM

RECORDED - 56 117-268-

INDEXED-50

Mr. Belmont

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

FD-36 (6-21-55)

F B I

Date: 9/17/56

Transmit the following message via AIRTEL

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

From SAC, NEW YORK (117-192)

To: BUREAU (117-268)

SMAB; AEA

b7C

On 9/17/56 [redacted] U.S. Post Office Department, Morgan Annex, NYC, advised that a shipment of two tubes containing 0.5 grams of Tris-acetylacetone-co (III) was sent by the Chemical Division, Atomic Energy Establishment, Government of India, 414A Cadell Road, Bombay. This shipment was destined to [redacted] Gamma Irradiation Service, Brookhaven National Laboratories, Associated Universities, Inc., Upton, Long Island. It had a reading of 250 x 20 at two inches.

ALBERT ZILA, Radiation Branch, AEC, NYC, advised that this material was not source or special nuclear material.

SHIPMENT TO AEC INSTALLATION.
NOT SOURCE OR SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL.
NO ACTION NECESSARY.
LW

KELLY

3-Bureau (117-268) RM
1-New York (117-192)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-14-2004 BY 60267 UC/NLW/bja/PAM

Mr. Belmont

RECORDED - 50
INDEXED-50

117-268-11

20 SEP 19 1956

TGS:EG

5 (5) SEP 24 1956

Approved: _____ Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: September 17, 1956

FROM : MR. A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: LIMITING THE DIPLOMATIC POUCH

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mason
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

The Director has been invited to attend the September 20, 1956, meeting of the National Security Council (NSC), to be held at 9:00 a.m. in the Cabinet Room of the White House. This meeting is called to consider a State Department report on the feasibility of international agreements concerning the captioned matter.

A brief is being prepared for the Director's use at this meeting.

ACTION:

If the Director plans to attend this meeting, Liaison will telephonically inform the NSC staff. JAMES LAY'S SECY ADVISED 9/18/56

GAD:jlf
(6)
1 - Mr. Holloman
1 - Mr. Boardman
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Liaison Section
1 - Mr. Day

20 SEP 20 1956

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-14-2004 BY 60267 DOE/NSC/bja/PAOW

117-26R-1
NOT RECORDED
133 SEP 24 1956

ORIGINAL FILED IN

FD-36 (6-21-55)

FBI

Date: 9/14/56

Transmit the following message via AIRTEL

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mason
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

From SAC, NEW YORK (117-192)

To: BUREAU (117-268)

116-422960

SMAB; AEA

On 9/14/56, [redacted] U.S. Post Office Department, Morgan Annex, NYC, advised that a shipment of four pounds containing two rock samples was mailed to [redacted] International General Electric Co., 570 Lexington Ave., NYC and was from [redacted] Helsinki, Finland. b7C

The samples on surface gave a reading of 245 x 2, and when opened one rock registered 250 x 2 and the other 190 x 4.

ALBERT ZILA, Radiation Branch, AEC, NYC, advised that this was not considered nuclear or source material.

NO NUCLEAR OR SOURCE MTL.
NO ACTION NECESSARY

KELLY

3-Bureau (117-268) RM
1-New York (117-192)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-14-2004 BY 60267 UC/NWS/bja/PAM

RECORDED - 55
INDEXED - 55

SEP 20 1956

TGS:EC
(5)

Approved: J J Kelly
Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

Orig & 1 - SA
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Branigan
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Mr. Day
1-Liaison Section
1-Yellow

SAC, NEW YORK 117-268

September 13, 1956

DIRECTOR, FBI 117-

RECORDED-89

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES
AEA

EX-116

Customs has been instructed by the National Security Council Representative on Internal Security to disseminate information to agencies at the Seat of Government regarding positive reactions on detection devices caused by diplomatic personnel of any country.

This does not alter our responsibilities. Make certain that Customs locally notifies you promptly of such reactions.

1 - Albany
1 - San Antonio
1 - Washington Field

GAD:hke (11)

(Attached to cover memorandum from Mr. Roach to Mr. Belmont, 9/10/56, re "Countermeasures to Detect and Defend Against Clandestine Atomic Weapons" GAD:hke)

MAILED 6
SEP 13 1956
FBI

62-85285
62-94580
62-90718

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mason
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SEP 26 1956

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-14-2004 BY 60267 uc/mws/bja/Pmw

3 Copies Typed

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

DO-6

OFFICE OF DIRECTOR
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mason
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Jones
Mr. Nease
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-14-2004 BY 60267 uc/NMS/bja/PAM

30

EXP. PROC.
AUG 17 1956

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: September 10, 1956

FROM : R. R. ROACH

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mason
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST CLANDESTINE ATOMIC WEAPONS

Mr. Branigan's memorandum of August 24, attached, asked that Liaison determine from Pat Coyne the purpose of his letter, addressed August 16 to the Commissioner of Customs, asking that Customs arrange to notify the Intelligence Advisory Committee of any instances in which our detection devices are activated by foreign diplomatic or other official personnel. These detection devices are being operated at certain ports of entry by Customs and are activated by any radioactive material.

Liaison Agent Day talked with Coyne on September 7 and pointed out that FBI had been affording prompt dissemination to the interested agencies of pertinent information furnished by Customs. Coyne said he considered the activation of a device by a Soviet bloc official to be an incident requiring consideration by the Watch Committee of the Intelligence Advisory Committee, and that he believed that the Bureau of Customs was itself responsible for prompt notification to the IAC agencies and that Customs should not rely on FBI or any other agency to make this dissemination for it. Day pointed out that the Office of Special Investigations (OSI) of Air Force was not a member of IAC, yet had a definite interest in these incidents. Coyne stated that OSI should arrange with Air Force Intelligence to receive this information. Coyne said that regardless whether the devices were being activated by luminous-dial clocks or any other radioactive substance, the Watch Committee agencies should have the information at once. He added that especial significance might be placed upon the repeated activation of the devices by representatives of a single country.

ACTION:

This is for your information. If Coyne chooses to regard activation of the device by a Soviet bloc official as a possible indication of hostile intention on the part of the Soviet bloc, then he is right in his contention that the Watch Committee agencies should be immediately notified.

Enclosures (2)
GAD:hke (6)
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Branigan
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Mr. Day
1-Liaison Section

ENCLOSURE

RECORDED-89
117-268-
SEP 19 1956
EX-116

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-14-2004 BY 60267 uc/sw/bja/mm

62-82205-
62-91506-

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

Memorandum for Mr. Belmont

ADDENDUM: 9/12/56 GAD:hke

Attached for approval is a letter to SAC, New York, with copies for SAC's Albany, San Antonio, and Washington Field, advising them of the instructions Customs has received and directing them to make certain that they continue to be notified locally by Customs since our responsibilities have not been altered.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: August 24, 1956

FROM : W. A. Branigan

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST CLANDESTINE ATOMIC WEAPONS

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mason
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

Pat Coyne, NSC representative on internal security, designated for Chairman, IIC, and Chairman, ICIS, carbon copies of letter dated 8/16/56 to Commissioner of Customs, Mr. Ralph Kelly. Letter stated Coyne was "recently apprised" of fact that two Soviet couriers carrying pouches and brief cases activated the detection device for radioactive material when they entered the U.S. at Idlewild, 4/27/56. Coyne requested Kelly to provide him with size and weight of the pouches and brief cases involved in the 4/27/56 incident, and requested him to insure "timely notification" to Coyne and to the agencies of the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) of any instances involving activation of the detection device by foreign diplomatic or official personnel. Coyne further requested the Commissioner of Customs to advise him of any other instances which have occured involving any diplomatic or official personnel of any foreign country.

b7C

The purpose of Coyne's letter is obscure. When [redacted] entered the U.S. at Idlewild, 4/27/56, they caused a mild reaction on the detection device which was described as similar to that caused by a radium-dial wrist watch. Complete information regarding the incident (except for the weight of the pouches) was furnished to the Bureau promptly by the NYO and dissemination of the information was made to the Department of State, the AEC, the Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General, Assistant Attorney General Tompkins, ACSI, ONI, OSI, and the Chairman of the ICIS. No dissemination was made to other members of IAC since this was not the type of information in which IAC is interested. Since Coyne attends ICIS meetings, he should have been cognizant of the correspondence regarding this situation in May, 1956.

Coyne's instructions to Kelly to provide information to him and to agencies of the IAC is contrary to existing policy in which Customs at port of entry furnishes data to AEC and FBI and any necessary dissemination is handled by FBI.

cc - Belmont
Branigan
Roach
Day
Whitson

LW:blb
(6)

RECORDED-89

117-2628-1

EX-116

11 SEP 19 1956

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-14-2004 BY 60267 uc/mwb/baw

1 cy to Tyler

62-[illegible]

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

Memorandum for A. H. Belmont

RECOMMENDATION:

It is respectfully suggested that liaison determine from Coyne the purpose of the letter and, particularly, why he feels that the IAC should be notified by the Commissioner of Customs of all instances in which foreign officials cause any reaction on the detection devices.

~~SECRET~~ CONFIDENTIAL

cc - Belmont
Branigan
Bates
Day
Whitson

RECORDED-89 117-268

EX-116

Date: September 19, 1956 BY COURIER SERVICE

To: Captain John A. Waters
Director of Security (original and 1)
Atomic Energy Commission
Room 926
1717 H Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

BY COURIER SVC.
56 SEP 19
COMM - FBI

U. S. Customs, Idlewild Airport, New York, advised on September 8, 1956, that radioactive material had been detected in the possession of [redacted] who had arrived that date via Pan American Airlines from Brazil. Daily, an American mining engineer, had departed from the U.S. at the port of Miami, May 8, 1956, via Braniff Airlines for Brazil. b7C

[redacted] stated that the radioactive material was obtained near Pocos De Caldas, Brazil, and was for testing and study by Union Carbide Ore Company, New York City.

The matter was referred to the Radiation Branch, Health and Service Laboratory, Atomic Energy Commission, New York City. After examination, the New York Office of the FBI was informed by a representative of the Atomic Energy Commission that the radioactive material

LW:blb
(8)

NOTE: Classified ~~Secret~~ because performance of detection devices is classified Secret.

~~SECRET~~ CONFIDENTIAL

SEP 21 1956

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mason
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

FBI MAIL ROOM

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267 uc/NLS/bja/[illegible]
ON 6-14-2007

Letter to Captain John A. Waters
Director of Security
Atomic Energy Commission

consisted of thorium-bearing ore which was characterized as unrefined source material of insufficient quantity to require any licensing.

[redacted] No identifiable references could be found to [redacted] in this Bureau's indices. No investigation of this incident is being conducted by the FBI. b7C

FD-36 (6-21-55)

FBI

Date: 9/11/56

Transmit the following message via AIRTEL

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

From SAC, NEW YORK (117-192)

To: BUREAU (117-268)

SMAB; AEA

Re NY airtel 9/8/56.

On 9/11/56, LEONARD SOLON, Radiation Branch, Health and Service Laboratory, AEC, NYC, advised material mentioned in reairtel consisted of thorium bearing ore and is characterized as unrefined source material of insufficient quantity as to require any licensing.

KELLY

3-Bureau (117-268) RM
1-New York (117-192)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-14-2004 BY 60262 UC/NWD/bga/RM

RECORDED-89

117-268-

2 SEP 21 1956

EX-116

TGS:EG
(5)

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

RECORDED - 52

- Bates
Whitson

September 21, 1956

Air-Tel

~~SECRET~~

SAC, New York (117-192) (original and 1)
2 - Richmond

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

ReNYairtel 9/18/56 concerning arrival of package via Pan American Airways at Idlewild Airport, New York, containing [redacted] This material was destined for Mollins Machine Company, 1710 Summit Avenue, Richmond, Virginia. b2 b7E

[redacted]

U.S. Customs, New York, quoted as advising that Albert Zila, AEC, New York, was familiar with this type of import which [redacted] Zila was quoted as saying AEC had been advised by telegraph of the incoming shipment and that import of this material was licensed by AEC.

New York obtain promptly from New York office of AEC complete details regarding [redacted] Determine facts regarding licensing of this particular shipment from England. Determine if possible whether other shipments of [redacted] have been introduced under licenses through port of New York and whether [redacted] has been sent in each instance to firm in Richmond or whether shipments have gone to other locations in the U.S. New York determine whether this and other shipments allegedly of [redacted] actually examined and contents identified or whether [redacted] were unexamined.

Richmond furnish background on Mollins Machine Company.

*(U.S. AEC publication "Major Activities in the Atomic Energy Programs, January-June, 1956, published Hoover 7/56, pgs. 104-106 and pgs. 259 and 260.)

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Buffile 117-268

LW:blb
(7)

MAILED
SEP 21 1956
FBI

SEE NOTE ON PAGE TWO

~~SECRET~~

DATE: 6-14-2004
CLASSIFIED BY UC/NLS/bjd/PAW 60260 derivative
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3,3(1) 6-14-2029

Referral/Direct OGA

NOTE:

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

(S)

If this is a violation of the licensing regulations, it is within our investigative jurisdiction.

Besides the possible licensing violation, this illustrates a possible loophole in the defenses against clandestine introduction of weapons of mass destruction, i.e., radiological weapons.

[redacted]

b2
b7E

FD-36 (6-21-55)

F B I

Date: 9/18/56

Transmit the following message via AIRTEL

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

From SAC, NEW YORK (117-192)

To: BUREAU (117-268)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-14-2004 BY 60267 uc/sws/bja/rsm

SMAB; AEA

On 9/18/56, Inspector BURTON, U.S. Customs, Idlewild Airport, NY, advised that the Mollins Machinery Co. of London, England had shipped via Pan American Airways flight 88888, on 9/15/56, [redacted] This was declared an informal entry #64490 made by the Air Clearance Company, a customs broker at Idlewild Airport, for J. M. Rogers Company, a customs broker at 44 Whitehall Street, NYC.

The importer was listed as the Mollins Machine Company, 1716 Summit Avenue, Richmond, Va. The package weighed 4.39 kilos gross. There was a notation on the package, "Don't come within 15 feet". b2 b7E

BURTON stated he had been in contact with ALBERT ZILA of the AEC, who stated that he was familiar with this type of import and that this was a [redacted] ZILA also stated that the [redacted] device would register a maximum reading if applied to the machine and would be of no great significance. ZILA also informed Customs that the AEC has been advised by telegraph of the incoming shipment.

ALBERT ZILA, Radiation Branch, AEC, NYC, advised this office that the importation of this material was licensed by the AEC and that although it might be considered a source material, it was not source material in which the AEC had any particular interest.

KELLY

EX-110

RECORDED - 52

INDEXED - 52

117-268-11

1-D

3-Bureau (117-268) RM
1-New York (117-192)

TGS:EG
(5)

Mr. Belmont

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____

Special Agent in Charge

September 21, 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TOLSON
MR. BOARDMAN
MR. BELMONT

Yesterday morning, I attended a meeting of the National Security Council held in the White House and presided over by the President. The first item on the agenda dealt with "Preventing Entry Into the United States of Radioactive Materials Through Diplomatic Shipments.

Mr. William H. Jackson, Special Assistant to the President and adviser on intelligence matters, briefly outlined the recommendations of the Planning Board in this matter and then stated to the President that he, the President, might desire to have my comment upon the same. The President asked me for my views upon the same, and I advised the President that while it, of course, was desirable, in order to attain maximum security, to have adopted the various measures recommended originally by the intelligence committees, in view of the recommendation of the State Department that neither international agreements nor unilateral United States action is feasible at this time, that I believed the matter had to be approached realistically and that the recommendation of the Planning Board was, therefore, sound.

I advised the President that the two committees on intelligence, namely, the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security, would be particularly alert to note any activities which might indicate the introduction into this country of radioactive materials through diplomatic shipments and that we would promptly report to the National Security Council and interested agencies any such developments in order that reconsideration of the conclusion reached by the State Department could be given prompt attention.

I pointed out to the President that, as he was aware, there were instruments at the various ports of entry through which Soviet diplomatic personnel passed which would react to radioactive material

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Gandy

JEB:TLC
(6)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-14-2004 60267 uc/pmw/bja/PKM

ORIGINAL FILED IN

but did not identify fissionable material such as is used in nuclear weapons. I advised the President that since the establishment of these devices, there had been but two instances in which there had been such a reaction, namely, one in 1955 and one in 1956.

The Under Secretary of State, Mr. Herbert Hoover, Jr., who was present at the meeting of the National Security Council in the absence of the Secretary of State, stated he desired also to point out that if there were a limitation placed upon the size of the diplomatic pouches and shipments, it would prevent the shipment of necessary equipment into the Soviet and Soviet bloc countries which would be to the detriment of some of the intelligence agencies of this country.

The President stated that in view of the presentation of the matter, he concurred in the recommendation of the Planning Board and that that recommendation should now be followed.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. L. V. Boardman 9/24/56 DATE: September 18, 1956

FROM : Mr. A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: LIMITING THE DIPLOMATIC POUCH

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
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Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

By letter dated September 14, attached, the Acting Executive Secretary of the National Security Council has, at the direction of the President, invited the Director, as IIC Chairman, to attend a meeting of NSC to be held on Thursday, September 20, at 9:00 a.m., in the Cabinet Room of the White House. The Director is invited to participate in the first item on the NSC agenda for that day, which item is the consideration of a proposed NSC action which the Planning Board has prepared following a review of a State Department study entitled "Preventing Entry Into The United States of Radioactive Materials Through Diplomatic Shipments."

A brief has been prepared for the Director's use at this meeting. The brief reviews the joint IIC-ICIS recommendations concerning limitation of the diplomatic pouch which were considered by NSC on March 8, 1956, during a meeting which the Director attended. We also summarize the instructions which NSC issued following that consideration. (One of these instructions led to the State report now scheduled for consideration.)

This report was considered by the Planning Board on August 20, and instructions were drafted for NSC action. These instructions are analyzed, including the proposal that IIC and ICIS make a continuing review of the situation and report to NSC if developments occur which would warrant reconsideration of State's conclusion that neither international agreements nor unilateral U. S. action to prevent entry of radioactive materials through diplomatic shipments is feasible at this time. The brief points out that this proposal has the effect of requiring IIC and ICIS to evaluate and report on foreign diplomatic, political, and intelligence developments.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-14-2004 BY 60322 UC/mw/kjp/pw

ACTION: 2 ENCLOSURE

NOT RECORDED
133 SEP 27 1956

The brief, described above, is attached for the Director's use at the NSC meeting.

GAD:clr (7)
Enclosures (2)
cc: 1 - Mr. Boardman
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Holloman
1 - Mr. Whitson
1 - Section
1 - Mr. Day

2 ENCLOSURE

11 SEP 26 1956

ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: September 24, 1956

FROM : R. R. ROACH

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mason
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: REAPPRAISAL OF U.S. POLICY REGARDING SOVIET BLOC SHIPMENTS AFFORDED DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY

On March 8, 1956, when the National Security Council considered the IIC-ICIS report on limiting the diplomatic pouch, the Council instructed that several aspects of the matter be looked into further. One of these instructions required the U.S. Communications Security Board (USCSB) to study and report to the Council on the feasibility of maintaining an adequate and secure U.S. communications system in the event diplomatic shipments were to be limited to letter size.

The report of the USCSB has been forwarded to the Council and circulated to the Council members and others, including the IIC Chairman. [redacted]

b2
b7E

[redacted] Since the number of U.S. personnel in certain countries is limited, we would be unable to maintain our present volume of communications. It is, therefore, concluded that while secure communications can be maintained, adequate communications cannot in the event diplomatic shipments are restricted.

The report, attached, has been forwarded by NSC Secretary Lay who indicates it will be discussed by the Planning Board prior to submission to the Council.

ACTION:

If, as in the past, IIC is invited to join in the Planning Board consideration of the USCSB report, the IIC Secretary will attend, and if asked to comment, will state that FBI, Army, Navy, and Air Force as USCSB members were all represented on the ad hoc group which prepared the report and IIC, therefore, has no comment to make concerning it.

Enclosure

GAD:hkd
(5)
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Liaison Section
1-Mr. Day

ENCLOSURE

RECORDED - 78

62-85205-

11 SEP 26 1956

57 OCT 3 1956

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-14-2004 BY 60267 TLC/Nw/bja/Plm

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

DO-6

OFFICE OF DIRECTOR
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. Jones
Mr. Nease
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

Rosen

35 EXP PROC 25

SEP 20 1956

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-14-2004 BY 60267 uc/Nus/bja/PAN

cc - Whitson

SAC, New York [redacted] (orig and 1) September 5, 1956

Director, FBI [redacted]

b7C

[redacted] 13372

[redacted] aa.

SECURITY MATTER - C
INTERNAL SECURITY - CZ

ReNYlet 8/27/56 stating that New York does not recommend the referral of subject's name to the U.S. Customs Bureau for inclusion on the Special Customs Watch List.

In this case, it is suggested that you furnish the Bureau your reasons for concluding that the subject does not come within the purview of No Number SAC Letter A, Series 1952, dated 1/28/52 re Smuggling of Atomic Bombs or Parts Thereof and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction Into the United States.

NOT RECORDED
16 SEP 7 1956

cc 117-268 (Smuggling of Atomic Bombs)

LW:blb
(5)

b7C

NOTE: Subject [redacted] identified as member of CP as early as [redacted] Party meetings reportedly held in [redacted] He was member of [redacted] and registered in NYC for the [redacted] in the [redacted] Subject was removed from Security Index 10/14/55 because of change of standards. Subject is now in the [redacted] In May of this year, his passport was revalidated to permit travel to Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rumania and the USSR. The Special Customs Watch List is for the purpose of enabling Customs to give special searches to shipments destined to persons suspected of being communists or otherwise subversive who receive imports from Soviet bloc countries.

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Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

16 SEP 12 1956

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE [redacted]

YELLOW DUPLICATE
SEP 5 1956
MAILED

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

cc - Roach - Branigan
Belmont Whitson

October 1, 1956

Air-Tel

SAC, New York (117-192) (orig and 1)
2 - Washington Field (117-151) (BCB)

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR
PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT (SMAB)

EX-120

Treasury Department reported to Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security re channeling of Soviet bloc unaccompanied diplomatic shipments through ports of entry at New York and Georgetown. Instructions under which inspection of shipments by Customs has been carried out, according to Treasury, provide that if any suspicious objects are found, FBI is to be notified. Further, when such shipments are examined at New York, arrangements are made to have FBI representative present.

New York and WFO advise promptly facts re Customs' policy indicated above. Advise number of times since July 1, 1956, notification received from Customs re finding of suspicious objects and number of times unaccompanied diplomatic shipments have been examined in presence of FBI representative.

Hoover

117-268

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-14-2004 BY 60267 uc/nlw/bja/pmw

LW:scc:blb
(9)

NOTE:
ICIS has requested joint IIC-ICIS Committee on countermeasures to review question of channeling of unaccompanied diplomatic shipments. Accordingly we want to know extent to which unaccompanied diplomatic shipments have been brought to the attention of FBI in Washington and New York.

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Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

OCT 15 1956

MAILED 3
OCT 1 1956
COMM-FBI

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: October 1, 1956

FROM : R. R. ROACH

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mason
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: REAPPRAISAL OF U.S. POLICY REGARDING SOVIET BLOC SHIPMENTS AFFORDED DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY

My memorandum of September 24 reported the conclusions reached by the U.S. Communications Security Board (USCSB) following their study of the feasibility of maintaining an adequate and secure U.S. communications system in the event diplomatic shipments were to be limited to letter size. This study was requested by the National Security Council on March 8, 1956, following consideration of the IIC-ICIS report on limiting the diplomatic pouch at an NSC meeting attended by the Director.

USCSB concluded that while secure communications could be maintained under such a restriction, adequate communications (equal to the present volume) could not be maintained since machine cryptographic operations would have to be eliminated. The USCSB report was considered by the NSC Planning Board on October 1 and, there being no objection or comment concerning the report, it was agreed that the report might be circulated to the NSC members and other interested persons and need not be considered at an NSC meeting.

ACTION:

This is for your information. You will be informed of any further developments concerning this matter.

GAD:hke
(5)

1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Mr. Day
1-Liaison Section

RECORDED-11

62-268-1136

EX-118

11 OCT 3 1956

LIAISON

62 OCT 8 1956

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-14-2004 BY 60267 UC/NSG/ga/ROA

FD-36 (6-21-55)

FBI

Date: 9/28/56

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. Nease
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Miss Gandy

Transmit the following message via AIRTEL

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

From SAC, NEW YORK (117-192)

To: BUREAU (117-268)

SMAB; AEA

ReBuairtel 9/21/56.

ALBERT ZILA, AEC, NYC, advised that the AEC is aware of the fact that [redacted] He stated that the Mollins Machine Company has a subsidiary known as Mollins Machine Company, Ltd., London, S.E. 8, Eng. He further related that the Mollins Company shipped the [redacted] under permit to the Reynolds Tobacco Co. at Winston-Salem, N.C., AEC license [redacted] which is to expire 9/30/56 unless renewed. ZILA stated that this AEC permit allows the Reynolds Tobacco Co. to obtain from Mollins Machine Co., Ltd. shipments of [redacted] until such time as [redacted] have been shipped. This, in effect, will b[redacted]

b2
b7E

In shipping this material, ZILA stated that this is a so-called [redacted] ZILA stated that in this manner the [redacted] ZILA stated it is his opinion [redacted] that have recently been advertised as "accuray".

ZILA stated that normally this material is shipped via Cunard Lines, but in some instances, when the material is needed in a hurry, it is shipped by air. He also advised that Mollins, Ltd. consigns this material to J.M. Rogers, a broker in New York, who in turn trans-ships it to the consignee which, insofar as the AEC knows, is the Reynolds Tobacco Co. in Winston-Salem.

3-Bureau (117-268) RM
1-Richmond (Info) RM
1-New York (117-192)

TGS:EG
(6)

OCT 5 1956

Mr. Belmont

EX-110

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-14-2004 BY 60267 uc/sml/bja/rba

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____

Special Agent in Charge

cc Bruyea

FD-36 (6-21-55)

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following message via _____

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

From SAC,

To:

ZILA also advised that it has come to the AEC's attention that the Brown Williamson Tobacco Co. in Louisville, Kentucky has received shipments of this [redacted] and the AEC is presently attempting to determine whether Brown Williamson has the necessary license in the event they have actually received some of this material. b2

ZILA also stated that, according to AEC regulations, it is incumbent upon the receiver, such as Brown Williamson and Reynolds Tobacco Co., to obtain the necessary AEC license for receiving and utilizing this material.

He stated that insofar as he can recall, AEC has been notified in advance of any shipments of [redacted] coming into the U. S. He also stated that the manner in which the material is shipped by Mollins, insofar as he knows, does not constitute a hazard in handling same.

ZILA is causing a check to be made of his records to determine the number and nature of other shipments of [redacted] that have been introduced under license through the Port of New York, and as to whether there has been a physical examination of any of this material. When this check has been completed, the Bureau will be advised by airtel.

KELLY

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____

Special Agent in Charge

~~Secret~~

CONFIDENTIAL

...iaison (Bates)
...hitson

117-268

ENCLOSURE - 55

DECLASSIFIED BY 62267 ucl/sw/tbp/mw
ON 6-14-2007

BY COURIER SERVICE

Date: October 4, 1956

To: Captain John A. Waters
Director of Security (orig and 1)
Atomic Energy Commission
Room 926
1717 H Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR
PARTS THEREOF INTO THE U.S.
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

U. S. Customs, New York City, has advised that on September 26, 1956, the contents of a wooden box, three inches by three inches by six inches, consigned to [redacted] from [redacted] were examined by Customs. Contained in the box was a small stone described as dark gray in color with a yellow sulphurous coating, weighing about three ounces. The [redacted] detection device showed a reading of 50 X 20. This item had been shipped by parcel post but no manifest number had been assigned.

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b7C
b7E

Customs, New York, furnished information regarding the shipment to Mr. Albert Zila, Radiation Branch, Atomic Energy Commission, New York City, who advised Customs that the Atomic Energy Commission was not interested in the material and authorized its release. Mr. Leonard Solon, Radiation Branch, Atomic Energy Commission, New York City, indicated that the stone was probably scouble material but of such insignificant quantity that the Atomic Energy Commission was not interested other than to maintain a record of its arrival.

b7C

cc [redacted]
LW:blb
(6)

NOTE: Classified Secret because reaction of detection devices classified ~~SECRET~~ Secret.

3-2658

BY COURIER SVC.
46 SEP 5
COMM - FBI

Tolson
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Boardman
Belmont
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Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

Letter to Captain John A. Waters
Director of Security
Atomic Energy Commission

The consignee may be identical with [redacted] - NY - 8317, the subject of an Atomic Energy Act - Applicant investigation by the FBI in 1949. The subject of that investigation was then employed in the [redacted] and had been so employed since 1929. b7C

No investigation of this matter is being conducted by the FBI.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

9/27/56

AIRTEL

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. Nease
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

Transmit the following Teletype message to: DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268)

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (117-192)

SUBJECT: SMAB
AEA

On 9/27/56, [redacted] Mail Division, US Customs, NYC, advised radioactive material in wooden box 3" by 3" by 6", consigned to [redacted] NYC, from [redacted] Russia, was examined by Customs on 9/26/56. Material described as small stone weighing about 3 ounces, dark grey in color, with a yellow sulphurous coating. Reading on [redacted] on surface. Shipped by parcel post; date of arrival not known; no manifest number.

b7C
b2
b7E

[redacted] relayed this information to ALBERT ZILA, Radiation Branch AEC, NYC, who advised AEC not interested in material and authorized release.

LEONARD SOLON, Radiation Branch AEC, NYC, advised material is probably source material but of such insignificant quantity that AEC is not interested other than to maintain record.

[redacted] is possibly identical with [redacted] subject of AEAA investigation, 1949.

KELLY

RECORDED - 53
INDEXED -

117-36[illegible]

7 SEP 28 1956

3 - Bureau (117-268)(RM)
1 - New York (117-192)

EJD:amn
(5)

Approved: J J Kelly
Special Agent in Charge

ESP. SEC.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-14-2004 BY 60267 uchuus/baptiste

Sent _____ M Per _____

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 117-36[illegible]

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT DATE: September 28, 1956

FROM : R. R. ROACH

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mason
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: REAPPRAISAL OF U.S. POLICY REGARDING SOVIET BLOC SHIPMENTS AFFORDED DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY

By memorandum dated September 25, 1956, attached, National Security Council Executive Secretary Lay has forwarded Council Action No. 1603. This is the formal action taken by the Council with respect to the study submitted by the Department of State of the feasibility of obtaining international agreements prohibiting the shipment under diplomatic immunity of radioactive materials. The Council considered this matter at its meeting on September 20, 1956, which the Director attended.

The Council concurred in State's conclusion that neither international agreements nor unilateral U.S. action is feasible at this time and requested IIC and ICIS "to keep the problem of entry of radioactive materials into the United States through diplomatic shipments under continuing review and report to the Council if developments occur which warrant reconsideration" of the Council's concurrence in State's conclusion.

Diplomatic shipments from the Soviet bloc now pass before detection devices operated by Customs in the ports of entry used by the bloc. Customs reports any activation of the devices by bloc personnel or shipments to the nearest FBI field office which reports the information at once to Bureau Headquarters. We promptly furnish this information to the other IIC members and to the ICIS Chairman, among others. In addition, Pat Coyne has instructed Customs to notify the members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee of these incidents.

In addition, a joint subcommittee of IIC and ICIS has under continuing review the entire problem of the clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons or material into this country.

ACTION:

This is for your information. Each incident of activation of the detection devices by Soviet bloc personnel or shipments will be considered with the Council's request in mind.

Enclosure

GAD:hke (5)

1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Mr. Day
1-Liaison Section

RECORDED - 76

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-14-2007 BY 60324 uc/sdp/sbm

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-1

62-116395-138

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268) DATE: 10/1/56

FROM : SAC, SAN DIEGO (66-998) CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMB OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES (Smab)

Re No Number SAC Letter A dated 1/28/52 and mylet 6/11/56.

This office has no additional names to recommend for inclusion on the Bureau of Customs Watch List at this time. This matter is being closely followed and the Bureau will be kept advised of any pertinent developments.

2 - Director, FBI (REG)
1 - San Diego

DNG:svd
(3)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-14-2004 BY 60267UC/NWS/bja/ptw

EX 104

RECORDED - 76

117-268

NOT RECORDED
25 OCT 5 10 1956

62 OCT 16 1956

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: October 5, 1956

FROM : R. R. ROACH

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mason
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: REAPPRAISAL OF U.S. POLICY REGARDING SOVIET BLOC SHIPMENTS AFFORDED DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY

My memorandum of October 1 reported the National Security Council Planning Board consideration of the U.S. Communications Security Board (USCSB) [redacted] The USCSB study concluded that [redacted] The Planning Board concurred in this conclusion (since there was no discussion or comment concerning it) and agreed that it need not be scheduled for consideration during an NSC meeting.

b2
b7E

By memorandum dated October 3, 1956, attached, NSC Secretary Lay has forwarded copies of the USCSB report to members of the Council and others, including the Director as IIC Chairman. He notes that the study will not be scheduled on the NSC agenda unless otherwise requested. FBI, Army, Navy, and Air Force were represented on the USCSB ad hoc group which prepared this report.

ACTION:

None. This is for your information.

Enclosure

GAD:hke
(5)

1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Mr. Day
1-Liaison Section

RECORDED-41
INDEXED-41
14 OCT 10 1956

EX-108

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-14-2004 BY 60267 UC/NUC/bjp/PAM

FD-36 (6-21-55)

F B I

Date: 10/1/56

Transmit the following message via AIRTEL

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

From SAC, NEW YORK (117-192)

To: BUREAU (117-268)

SMAB; AEA

Re NY airtel 9/28/56.

On 10/1/56, ALBERT ZILA, AEC, NYC, advised that after checking his records he determined that [redacted] had entered the Port of New York during the period 10/17/55 to 10/1/56. All of this material had been shipped by Mollens Machine Company, Ltd., England, and had arrived in this country via steamship, with the exception of [redacted] which had been destined for the Brown Williamson Tobacco Company. He stated that his records also reflected that [redacted] have been destined to the American Car and Foundry Company.

b2
b7E

ZILA stated his records also reflected that all of this material was used for the same purpose, that is, [redacted] ZILA advised that as far as his records were concerned, none of this material had ever been hand inspected.

KELLY

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-14-2004 BY 60262 uc/nus/lja/dmm

3-Bureau (117-268) RM
1-New York (117-192)

Mr. Belmont

RECORDED-59
INDEXED-59

11 OCT 10 1956

TGS:EG
(5)

OCT 16 1956

Approved: J. J. Kelly Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. Nease
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

CONFIDENTIAL

Belmont
Branigan
Day
Bates
Wacks
Whitson

117-268

RECORDED-59
INDEXED-59

Date: October 8, 1956 VIA LIAISON

To: Captain John A. Waters (original and 1)
Director of Security
Atomic Energy Commission
Room 926
1717 H Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR
PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

U. S. Customs, Idlewild Airport, New York, has advised that the Mollins Machine Company, Ltd., London, England, shipped via Pan American Airways on September 15, 1956, a package which contained [redacted] This material, according to Customs, was declared on an informal entry made by the Air Clearance Company, a customs broker at Idlewild Airport, for J. M. Rogers Company, a customs broker at 44 Whitehall Street, New York City. The actual importer was listed as the Mollins Machine Company, 1716 Summit Avenue, Richmond, Virginia. The package was shown to weigh 4.39 kilos (9.678 pounds). There was a notation on the package, "Don't come within 15 feet."

This will confirm the discussion between Special Agent [redacted] of the FBI and Dr. Paul McDaniel, Deputy Director, Research Division, Atomic Energy Commission, on October 2, 1956. Dr. McDaniel advised Special Agent [redacted] that there are a number of licenses issued to [redacted] in the United States for [redacted] If the density

b2
b7C
b7E

DECLASSIFIED BY 60324 auc/plm/sbm ON 12-14-09

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mason
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

LW:blb
(9)

SEE NOTE ON LAST PAGE OF YELLOW.

CONFIDENTIAL

Letter to Captain John A. Waters
Director of Security
Atomic Energy Commission

does not measure up to a certain standard, according to Dr. McDaniel, the cigarettes are rejected. Under the Atomic Energy Commission general licensing provisions, importation of a [redacted] would be permitted but, according to Dr. McDaniel, for amounts such as were involved in the instant shipment, a specific special license is required. According to Dr. McDaniel, Atomic Energy Commission License Number [redacted] under which this particular shipment was made, is filed at Oak Ridge, Tennessee. b2 b7E

According to the New York office of the Atomic Energy Commission, Atomic Energy Commission License Number [redacted] permits the Reynolds Tobacco Company at Winston-Salem, North Carolina, to obtain from the Mollins Machine Company, Ltd., London, England, shipments of [redacted] The Atomic Energy Commission office in New York has advised the New York Office of this Bureau that during the period from October 12, 1955, to October 1, 1956, [redacted] had entered the port of New York. All of this material had been shipped by the Mollins Machine Company, Ltd., London. Of this amount, 80 millicuries had been destined for the Brown Williamson Tobacco Company and [redacted] had been destined to the American Car and Foundry Company.

Mr. Albert Zila, Atomic Energy Commission, New York City, has advised that as far as his records are concerned, none of this material has ever been hand inspected to make certain that the incoming item was actually [redacted]

Letter to Captain John A. Waters
Director of Security
Atomic Energy Commission

These circumstances raise several questions.

1. Why is it necessary for these companies to import [redacted] instead of obtaining it from the Atomic Energy Commission domestically?

b2
b7E

2. Since the shipper is in England, is there any understanding between the United States Atomic Energy Commission and the British atomic energy authorities whereby you are informed of the contemplated shipment of [redacted] from England?

3. Is this [redacted] or of some other (i.e., Soviet) origin?

4. What was the significance of the [redacted] which entered the Idlewild Airport, "Don't come within 15 feet!"?

5. In the Atomic Energy Commission regulations as published on page 211 of the Commission publication, "Major Activities in the Atomic Energy Programs, January - June, 1956." Schedule B lists as licensed [redacted]

Could you supply the answers to the foregoing?

Letter to Captain John A. Waters
Director of Security
Atomic Energy Commission

b2
b7E

NOTE:

[redacted]

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. R. R. ROACH

DATE: October 4, 1956

FROM : MR. C. W. BATES

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mason
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

Reference is made to New York airtel 9-18-56 and Buairtel to New York 9-21-56 concerning the arrival at Idlewild Airport of a package containing [redacted] This material was destined for Mollins Machine Company, Richmond, Virginia. New York Atomic Energy Commission advised that this material is licensed under AEC License [redacted] which allows the Mollins Company to import [redacted] for the Reynolds Tobacco Company. b2 b7E

On October 2, 1956, Dr. Paul McDaniel, Deputy Director, Research Division, AEC, advised that there are a number of licenses issued to the U. S. Tobacco Companies for the use of [redacted]

McDaniel pointed out that under the AEC general license provisions, anyone may import a [redacted] but for any amounts over this, there must be a specific license. AEC License Number [redacted] is filed at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, and is not available in Washington. However, Dr. McDaniel pointed out that the license indicates the type of container as well as the amount to be imported. If any further details are required regarding the license, it could be obtained from Oak Ridge, Tennessee.

ACTION:

For information.

RECORDED-59 10 OCT 10 1956

CWB:bal
(4)

1 - Mr. Whitson
1 - Liaison Section
1 - Mr. Bates

EX-108

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-14-2004 BY 60267 UC/MLS/bja/PLA

Belmont
Bates
Branigan
Whitson
Liaison

RECORDED - 77 117-268

BY COURIER SERVICE

Date: October 12, 1956

To: Captain John A. Waters (Orig. and 1)
Director of Security
Atomic Energy Commission
Room 926
1717 H Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267 ucdmw/bja/pm
ON 6-14-2004

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE U. S.
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

b7C

Inspector Wallace Pratt, U. S. Customs, Pier 86, North River, New York City, advised on October 4, 1956, that one [redacted] traveling on German passport Number [redacted] had arrived that date on the SS. "General Langfora" from Berlin, Germany, en route to Tokeland, Washington. [redacted] who is to be employed at the [redacted] had ten pounds of mineral specimens in his possession contained in twenty boxes.

According to Inspector Pratt, six of the boxes caused a reading of sixty on the head of the detection device sensitive to gamma rays, and thirty on the head of the device sensitive to neutrons. [redacted] told Inspector Pra he had purchased the mineral specimens in Berlin, and has them as a collector of minerals. The matter was brought to the attention of Hanson Blatz, Atomic Energy Commission Office in New York City, who stated that the minerals were not source or special nuclear material, and were of no interest to Atomic Energy Commission. No identifiable references of [redacted] could be found in the FBI indices, and no investigation of this matter is being made.

NOTE: Classified ~~Secret~~ because reaction of detection device is so classified.

LW:scc
(8)

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mason
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

FBI - NEW YORK CITY
OCT 10 1956

COURIER SVC.

~~SECRET~~

32658

FD-36 (6-21-55)

FBI

Date: 10/4/56

Transmit the following message via AIRTEL

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

From SAC, NEW YORK (117-192)

To: BUREAU (117-268)

SMAB; AEA

On 10/4/56, Inspector WALLACE PRATT, U.S. Customs, Pier 86, North River, advised that one [redacted] travelling on German passport [redacted] arrived this date on the "SS General Langford" from Berlin, Germany. He is enroute to Tokeland, Washington where he is to be employed at the Tokeland Hotel. [redacted] had ten pounds of mineral specimens in his possession contained in twenty boxes, which he declared orally to the Inspector. PRATT advised that six of the boxes showed a reading of 60 on the green and 30 on the red. [redacted] advised he had purchased the specimen in Berlin and has them as a collector of minerals.

b7C

HANSON BLATZ, AEC, NYC, advised this date that this was not source or nuclear material and was of no interest to them.

KELLY

3-Bureau (117-268) RM
1-New York (117-192)

RECORDED - 77

INDEXED - 77

Mr. Belmont

WAJ:EG
(5)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-14-2004 BY 60267 uc/nws/bp/pma

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

AIR-TEL

NEW YORK, NY, 10/8/56

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. Nease
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

FD-36

Transmit the following Teletype message to:

DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268)

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (117-192)

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE US
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT (SMAB)

Rebuair-tel, 10/1/56.

US Customs, NYC, advised that unaccompanied diplomatic shipments are individual shipments sent out or arriving on a ship other than that on which the owner is traveling and the owner is such that he has diplomatic status.

The policy of US Customs, NYC, is to notify the FBI of any unaccompanied diplomatic shipments of Soviet Bloc countries through the Port of NY which appeared to be unusual or suspicious in nature and Bureau agents may then be present when the shipments are examined.

On occasions, US Customs will notify the FBI of a Soviet Bloc shipment for information purposes only, even though such shipment is not of an unusual or suspicious nature. The latter practice is occasionally followed inasmuch as Customs feels that while such shipment bears no taint, the knowledge of such shipment may be pertinent to an FBI investigation.

Since 7/1/56, US Customs has advised the NYO of four Soviet Bloc shipments through the Port of NY, none of which, however, were of an unusual or suspecious nature. They were furnished for information purposes only.

RECORDED - 77

117-268-1

20 OCT 9 1956

EX-122

3-Bureau (117-268) (RM)
1-Washington Field (117-151) (Info) (RM)
1-NY 117-192

LMW:PEH (#17-0)
(6)

Mr. Belmont

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____

Special Agent in Charge

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-14-2007 BY 60267 DIS/sdp/ksr

FD-36

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Transmit the following Teletype message to:

AIR-TEL TO BUREAU

RE: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE US
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT (SMAB)

In one of the four mentioned instances, on 9/20/56, two representatives of the FBI were present at an examination held by US Customs officials. This examination consisted of a search of the unaccompanied diplomatic shipment of the personal effects of a departing Soviet national employed at the UN Secretariat, NY. No other instance has occurred since 7/1/56, wherein FBI representatives were present at a Customs search.

Customs policy is to also notify the NYO whenever a search of a Soviet Bloc shipment uncovers an unusual amount of material written in a foreign language. Due to their lack of trained foreign language agents, top evaluation of such shipment cannot be made. Their policy is therefore to notify the FBI inasmuch as top evaluation of shipment may be of pertinency to an FBI investigation.

KELLY

Approved:_____ Sent_____M Per_____
Special Agent in Charge

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268) DATE: 10/9/56

FROM : SAC, RICHMOND (117-28)

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

Re Bureau airtel to New York dated 9/21/56 and New York airtel to Bureau dated 9/28/56.

The following investigation was conducted by SA [redacted] on 9/27/56:

[redacted] Virginia State Corporation Commission, Richmond, Virginia, furnished their files which reflected a record for the Molins Machine Company, Inc., not Mollins. The record, under number 4081, reflects that the company applied for a foreign license to conduct business in the State of Virginia. The application reflects that the company was incorporated in the State of New York on February 24, 1931, to manufacture, buy, sell, import, export, deal and trade in machinery, appliances, equipment, tools, parts, accessories, foundries, fittings, implements, supplies, motors, and engines of every kind, nature, and description. It reflected the company had a capital stock of $50,000 composed of 500 shares, one class, with a par value of $100. The directors were EDWIN J. MELLET, 120 Broadway, New York; GEORGE GASKILL, 120 Broadway, New York, and A. M. BURNS, 120 Broadway, New York. The application was filed by HERMAN GOLDMAN, 120 Broadway, New York, on June 15, 1931, the local office to be located at 1716 Summit Avenue, Richmond, Virginia.

Under Virginia State Corporation Commission #5404 the records indicated that on February 7, 1938, the company's charter was amended to increase the capital stock from $50,000 to $250,000. The amendment was filed with the Virginia State Corporation Commission on December 8, 1938.

117-268-11

2 - Bureau (117-268) (RM)
2 - New York (117-192)(RM)
1 - Richmond
CAB:SHW
(5)

RECORDED - 91
INDEXED - 91

15 OCT 1956

EX-110

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-14-2004 BY 60242 uc/sas/bja/pmw

RH 117-28

Under #8812, State Corporation Commission, the records reflect that an amendment was filed to the charter to increase the capital stock of the company from $250,000 to $500,000. The amendment was filed with the Virginia State Corporation Commission on July 5, 1950.

The records reflect under #11542 a certificate to amend the charter to increase capital stock from $500,000 to $1,000,000 composed of 10,000 shares with a par value of $100 was filed by HERMAN GOLDMAN, President; ELKAN TURK, Secretary, and was addressed to the Virginia State Corporation Commission by letter of Mr. THOMAS B. WARD, The Corporation Trust Company, 120 Broadway, New York City, dated August 10, 1955.

The records reflect that Mr. T. J. CHEWNING was the last registered agent in the State of Virginia for the Molins Machine Company and was so designated by power of attorney signed by Mr. H. GOLDMAN August 15, 1951. b7C b7D

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268) DATE: 10/10/56

FROM: SAC, WFO (117-151)

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY ACT (SMAB)

ReBuairtel dated 10/1/56 requesting advice regarding the facts concerning the policy of the United States Customs Service of notifying the FBI if suspicious objects are found in unaccompanied diplomatic shipments.

There have been no instances since July 1, 1956, in which notification has been received from the Customs Office at Georgetown, D.C., concerning the finding of suspicious objects. As a matter of fact, no instances of the finding of suspicious objects by Customs have ever been reported to this office. Although it is not possible to state with entire accuracy the number of times that unaccompanied diplomatic shipments have been examined in the presence of an FBI representative in Washington, D. C., since July 1, 1956, the following comments are offered:

For a number of years WFO has been advised on a regular basis by U. S. Customs at Georgetown, as well as by the offices of that agency at the National Airport, Washington, D. C., and at the Main Post Office, of the receipt of unaccompanied diplomatic shipments to Soviet and satellite establishments. This is accomplished by telephone call from the Customs offices to the Espionage and Foreign Intelligence desk at WFO. In some instances the Customs officer making the call has already conducted an examination of the shipment and is aware of its contents. He then advises the WFO representative as to the nature of the contents. In instances in which it is felt that these contents will be of possible intelligence interest to this Bureau in fulfilling its responsibilities, a Special Agent is dispatched to the Customs office in order to obtain whatever information of pertinence may be available. In other instances when it is apparent that the contents are of no intelligence value, the calling Customs officer is thanked courteously for bringing

DATE: 6-14-2004 CLASSIFIED BY ucfmus/baltzan bozar2 derivative DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3,1) 6-14-2029 Per ltr. dtd. 6-28-04 ucfmus/baltzan 6-30-2004

2 - Bureau
1 - New York (117-192)(Info)(RM)
1 - WFO

RECORDED-95 117-268-11

EX-110

20 OCT 16 1956

LWRO/pcn

(4)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

~~SECRET~~

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 62-29592-

~~SECRET~~

WFO 117-151

the shipment to the attention of this office and is advised that there is no interest on our part in that specific shipment.

Until approximately one and one-half years ago Customs also advised WFO of the receipt of motion picture film shipments to the various diplomatic establishments. b1 b3

[redacted]

It has been the impression of WFO that Customs officials locally have made every effort to bring all shipments to the attention of this office and have at all times exhibited a completely cooperative attitude.

~~SECRET~~

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: October 5, 1956

FROM : R. R. ROACH

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mason
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF ATOMIC WEAPONS INTO THE UNITED STATES

A joint IIC-ICIS subcommittee, known as "Committee B," has been studying the captioned problem. A Coast Guard officer and a representative of the Bureau of Customs together with representatives from AEC and INS have served as an advisory group to this committee. By letter dated October 3, attached, ICIS Chairman Yeagley has furnished the NSC with copies of his letter of September 24, 1956, to the Secretary of the Treasury noting the transfer to other duties of the Coast Guard representative and asking that a successor be designated.

This information has been furnished to IIC solely for its information, and no action or reply is necessary or expected. Copies of Yeagley's letter and its enclosure are being furnished to the other IIC members.

ACTION:

None. This is for your information.

Enclosure
GAD:hke
(5)

1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Mr. Day
1-Liaison Section

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-14-2004 BY 60267 uc/nsl/bja/pam

RECORDED-38

117-268-1147

EX-117

OCT 15 1956

59 OCT 19 1956

1 Copy - Auto 3-16-56

66-9073-1
62-90738-1

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

DO-6

OFFICE OF DIRECTOR
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. Jones
Mr. Nease
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-14-2004 BY 60267 uc/nlw/bja/pkm

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

October 3, 1956

IC-325/425

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. Nease
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

Honorable J. Edgar Hoover
Chairman
Interdepartmental Intelligence
Conference
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Hoover:

In view of the joint IIC-ICIS responsibilities for coordination of countermeasures against the clandestine introduction of atomic weapons, there is enclosed for the information of IIC five copies of my letter dated September 24, 1956, to the Secretary of the Treasury.

Sincerely yours,

J. Walter Yeagley
Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee
on Internal Security

Enclosures

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-14-2004 BY 60267 uc/pwd/jap/rw

Memo from Mr. Roach
to Mr. Belmont
10/5/56

ORIG. IN IIC FILES

Rec'd 10/3/56
in Liaison

This document may be
declassified upon permanent
separation of enclosure

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

C
O
P
Y

ICIS-P25/429

September 24, 1956

Honorable George M. Humphrey
Secretary of the Treasury
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Humphrey:

As you know, Commander Benjamin P. Clark, United States Coast Guard, has been detached from his present duty in Washington for assignment as Director of Coast Guard Reserve, Twelfth Coast Guard District.

You will recall that a joint IIC-ICIS Committee is responsible for coordination of countermeasures against the clandestine introduction of atomic weapons, and that in early 1954 the ICIS approved the creation of an Advisory Group consisting of representatives from the Coast Guard, Bureau of Customs, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service, with a technical advisor from the Atomic Energy Commission, for the purpose of planning and supervising the installation of devices to protect against the introduction of fissionable material. At the request of the ICIS (letter dated March 11, 1954), you designated Commander Clark and Mr. Joseph J. Flynn as representatives from the Coast Guard and the Bureau of Customs, respectively, to serve on this group. In the capacity of Coast Guard representative, Commander Clark has made invaluable contributions to the detection device program and performed his duties in connection with the Advisory Group with great devotion, energy, and enthusiasm.

As the ICIS indicated to you in a letter dated February 9, 1954, developments made it apparent that the services of the members of the Advisory Group might be required for an indeterminate period. This is still the case, and, even though agreement was recently reached on a program for the use of detection devices, research is continuing with a view to the development of new devices and improvements in existing devices. Also, it is to be expected that as the agreed program is implemented, experience will accumulate which will lead to the consideration of changes and improvements of various kinds. Accordingly, it is considered desirable that the Advisory Group continue in existence, and I wish therefore to request that you designate a successor to Commander Clark as the Coast Guard representative. It will of course also be appreciated if the services of Mr. Joseph J. Flynn as Customs representative will continue to be made available.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed)

J. Walter Yeagley
Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee
on Internal Security

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-14-2004 BY 60267 uc/pw/bja/rac

C
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P
Y

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ENCLOSURE

ARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: October 12, 1956

FROM : MR. R. R. ROACH

SECRET

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mason
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: ~~PREVENTION~~ AND DETECTION OF CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF FISSIONABLE WEAPONS BETWEEN PORTS OF ENTRY ALONG THE LAND BORDERS AND THE GULF COAST

Smab

ICIS issued a report dated February 3, 1956, in the captioned matter, which included a recommendation that all agencies engaged in the intelligence field be reminded of the problem and encouraged to cooperate with INS and Customs by furnishing them any information received concerning smuggling operations.

(LETTER ATTACHED)

After reviewing the report, CIA wrote to ICIS on May 3, 1956, [redacted] (S)

b1
b3

By memorandum June 21, 1956, ICIS furnished IIC with copies of the CIA letter "for information." Your memorandum of June 25, 1956, noted that no reply to the ICIS communication was necessary. [redacted]

ICIS has now replied to the CIA memorandum and has forwarded a copy (attached) of its reply, dated October 3, 1956, to the IIC Chairman. ICIS reviews some of its related programs, such as its recent report on a program for control of low-flying, light aircraft, its recommended program for security screening of U.S. airmen engaged in international flights, the IIC-ICIS program for use of detection devices at selected ports and the like. ICIS informs CIA that a copy of the CIA communication has been furnished IIC, "for any consideration that committee deems appropriate." (U)

Enclosures - 2
GAD:bjt (5)
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Whitson
1 - Section Tickler
1 - Mr. Rose

INDEXED - 76
RECORDED - 76
117-268-1150
EX-125

58 NOV 1 1956

SECRET

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3,5
DATE: 6.14.2004 CLASSIFIED BY UC/mlf/bjs/pmc 60267 derivative 6.14.2029 Declassified per htt 6.30.04 60267 UC/mlf/bjs/pmc 6.30.04

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UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 66-8163

SECRET

ACTION:

We have received no request from either ICIS or CIA for information, and no reply or comment is required. A copy of the letter from CIA to ICIS is also attached for information. Copies of the ICIS letter are being furnished to the other IIC members.

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

October 3, 1956

ICIS-P-27-423

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. Nease
Mr. Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

Honorable Allen W. Dulles
Director,
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Dulles:

Reference is made to your letter of May 3, 1956, regarding steps being taken by CIA to implement the ICIS report dated February 3, 1956, on the prevention and detection of clandestine introduction of fissionable weapons between ports of entry along the land borders and the Gulf Coast. The ICIS is pleased to learn that your agency has undertaken [redacted] (S) b1 b3

The ICIS is also appreciative of the observations set forth in the second paragraph of your letter of May 3, 1956, and has noted your expression of interest in being informed of any details of technique and methods of investigation which are being used or developed by other agencies of the Government. In view of the questions raised in your letter and the fact that IIC is jointly responsible with the ICIS pursuant to Presidential directive for development of adequate countermeasures against clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons, I referred your letter to the IIC on June 21, 1956, for any consideration that Committee deems appropriate.

It is indicated in the third paragraph of your letter that you would like to be informed of other determinations of the ICIS regarding programs directed toward increasing safeguards against the clandestine introduction of fissionable weapons. Accordingly, there follows a brief resume of other programs directly related to this problem.

By letters dated August 2, 1956, the ICIS requested the appropriate agencies, including CIA, to implement a program for the control of low-flying light aircraft, either entering the United States from without the borders or emanating from within the United States. The controls are directed against the risks of such aircraft being used as vehicles in the transportation of fissionable weapons directed against vital facilities. Responsibility for coordinating the activities of all Government agencies in this field is placed in the Department of Commerce, in consultation with the Department of Defense. This program is based on a study carried out in the ICIS Subcommittee on Defense Against Unconventional Attack, on which your agency is represented.

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Per ltr. dtd. 6.28.04
60267 uc/lnw/bja/PAM

~~SECRET~~

In May 1954, the ICIS recommended a program for security screening of U. S. airmen engaged in international flights. Implementation of the program still awaits the processing of an appropriate executive order although the program was approved by the President over two years ago.

The IIC and the ICIS, in consultation with the Atomic Energy Commission, have developed a national program for the use, at selected points of entry on our seacoasts and land borders, and in the searching of ships, of devices developed by the AEC which will detect radioactive materials. This program is being implemented by Coast Guard, Customs, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service. The program remains under review, and it is hoped that, on the basis of experience gained in its operation and on the basis of continuing research which is being carried on by the AEC for the development of improved technical devices, the program will be improved from time to time.

The IIC and the ICIS carried out a reappraisal of United States policy regarding shipments into the United States under diplomatic seal, taking into account the concern which had been expressed by you and other Government officials regarding the availability of the diplomatic pouch as a channel for the clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons. Representatives of your agency joined with the Internal Security Committees in their consideration of this reappraisal which resulted in the submission to the National Security Council of a report dated November 28, 1955. You will recall the decision by the National Security Council that no size or weight restrictions should be imposed at this time. Steps recommended by the Committeeswere adopted as "standby" plans to be implemented at such time as the President or his designated authority directs.

Based on recommendations made by ICIS, legislation was passed by the Congress in July 1955, under which rewards can be paid for information leading to the recovery or acquisition of atomic weapons or fissionable material illegally introduced or attempted to be introduced into the United States. In response to a recent request by ICIS, the Departments of State, Treasury, and Post Office are giving further publicity to this legislation.

The ICIS and the NSC Planning Board have given consideration to the problem of providing safeguards against clandestine introduction by submarine, small craft, or merchant vessels at isolated inlets, beaches, or other areas along the coasts between ports of entry and through ports not having an adequate port security program. However, as you know, no effective actions have flowed from these considerations, with the result that nuclear weapons and component parts can be introduced with relative ease through these several avenues of entry.

~~SECRET~~

With respect to physical security of vital U. S. industrial and governmental facilities, the ICIS has expressed its concern to ODM regarding shortcomings in implementation of E. O. 10421. This concern relates primarily to the opinion that there are many such vital facilities not under the security cognizance of the Department of Defense or AEC which remain unprotected, or which have no plans for proper protection in case of an emergency, especially from clandestine attack with nuclear weapons.

As I have indicated previously to the National Security Council, one of the objectives of the internal security program is directed towards achieving within practicable limits a reasonable level of security which will create substantial risks to the Soviet bloc in effecting clandestine introduction or employment of nuclear weapons. I do not believe that success has yet been achieved in accomplishing the desired over-all objective. I wish to assure you that we will continue to strive within the limits of our authority and capabilities towards accomplishment of adequate internal security in this and other related fields. Of course, as you recognize, some aspects of the problem are beyond the purview of ICIS responsibility.

Sincerely yours,

SIGNED

J. Walter Yeagley
Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee
on Internal Security

cc: Mr. J. Edgar Hoover
Chairman, Interdepartmental
Intelligence Conference

FD-36 (6-21-55)

F B I

Date: 10/18/56

Transmit the following message via AIRTEL

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

From SAC, NEW YORK (117-192)

To: BUREAU (117-268)

b7C

SMAB; AEA

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. Nease
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

NR

Inspector CHARLES FETTINGER, U.S. Customs, Idlewild Airport, NYC, advised on 10/18/56 that one [redacted] an [redacted] who has passport [redacted] issued at [redacted] arrived at Idlewild Airport at 10:26 a.m., 10/18/56, aboard Flight 965, TWA. He was destined to Louisiana State University at Baton Rouge, La.

He declared the following one ounce bottles of chemicals: (1) Uratyl acetate; (2) Thorium nitrate; (3) Berylium carbonate; (4) Zirconium oxycloride; (5) Lanthanum nitrate. He indicated that he was taking this material to the Coates Laboratory at LSU where he was going to continue his studies.

FETTINGER stated that there was no reading on red and a reading of 60 on green. He also stated that the AEC had no interest in the above-mentioned chemicals.

ALBERT ZILA, AEC, NYC, advised that the above-mentioned chemicals would not be considered as either source or fissionable material by the AEC.

NR ON SEN.
CHEMICALS ARE NOT SOURCE MATERIAL NOR FISSIONABLE (SPECIAL NUCLEAR) MATERIAL. NONE ON AEC LIST OF BY-PRODUCTS. KELLY
Mr. Belmont
NO ACTION NECESSARY. LW

3-Bureau (117-268) RM
1-New York (117-192)

RECORDED - 77
117-268
OCT 19 1956
INDEXED - 77

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EX-116
OCT 31 1956

TGS:EG
(5)

Approved: _____ Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M _____ er _____

FD-36 (6-21-55)

F B I

Date: 10/19/56

Transmit the following message via AIRTEL

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

From SAC, NEW YORK (117-192)

To: BUREAU (117-268)

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. Nease
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

SMAB; AEA

NR

Inspector LEONARD SIMON, U.S. Customs, Idlewild Airport, NYC, advised on 10/18/56 that [redacted] travelling on Brazilian diplomatic passport [redacted] arrived at Idlewild aboard Varig flight 850 at 4:00 p.m., 10/18/56. He was destined to Fordham University, NYC. [redacted] He had a letter indicating that this instrument was loaned to him by the AEC for experiments in Brazil and that he was returning same in connection with his research program that would be discussed at the next meeting of the UN. It registered zero on red and 84 on green.

b2
b7C
b7E

ALBERT ZILA, AEC, NYC, advised that instant instrument [redacted] and that they were aware of the fact that [redacted] was returning this instrument to the U.S.

NR ON FR. ROSER
AEC EQUIPMENT BEING RETURNED - NO ACTION NECESSARY - LW

KELLY

3-Bureau (117-268) RM
1-New York (117-192)

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Mr. Belmont

RECORDED - 77

117-268-1155

INDEXED - 77

OCT 20 1956

TGS:EG
(5)

EX-116

Approved: J J Kelly Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

[redacted] cc - Liai
Whit

117-268

RECORDED-45

BY COURIER SERVICE

Date: October 26, 1956

To: Captain John A. Waters (original and 1)
Director of Security
Atomic Energy Commission
Room 926
1717 H Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267 cic/NSL/bja/PMW
ON 6-14-2004

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

On October 15, 1956, U. S. Customs, Idlewild Airport, New York, advised that [redacted] carrying U. S. Passport No. [redacted] arrived that date from Spain via Iberica Airlines.

[redacted] was described as a [redacted] and was destined to the company's plant at Durango, Colorado. He declared four sacks of crude uranium ore, weighing approximately ten pounds. This ore registered maximum on the head of the detection device for radioactive materials sensitive to gamma radiation and 25 on the head of the device sensitive to neutrons. [redacted] stated he had made the trip from the United States to Madrid, Spain, for the sole purpose of contacting one [redacted] to obtain the above-mentioned ore, which is to be analyzed at the [redacted]

b7C

NOTE: Classified ~~Secret~~ because operation of detection device is so classified.

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mason
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

LW:blb
(5)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 3-26-58

BY COURIER SVC.
78 OCT 29
COMM - FBI

~~SECRET~~

Letter to Captain John A. Waters
Director of Security
Atomic Energy Commission

U. S. Customs informed the New York office of the Atomic Energy Commission. Mr. Leonard Solon, Atomic Energy Commission, New York City, informed the New York Office of the FBI that [redacted] uranium ore was source material but it was in such quantities as to be of no interest to the Atomic Energy Commission. b7C

The traveller may be identical with [redacted] in Charge of Mining and Milling, [redacted] concerning whom Atomic Energy Act - Employee investigations were conducted by this Bureau in 1947 and again at the request of the Atomic Energy Commission in 1954. No investigation is being conducted by the FBI of this incident.

~~SECRET~~

FD-36 (6-21-55)

F B I

Date: 10/15/56

Transmit the following message via AIRTEL

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

From SAC, NEW YORK (117-192)

To: BUREAU (117-268)

SMAB; AEA

On 10/15/56, Inspector CHARLES FETTINGER, U.S. Customs, Idlewild Airport, NYC, advised that [redacted] a U.S. citizen, carrying passport [redacted] arrived at 11:32 a.m., 10/15/56, at Idlewild Airport, via Iberica Airlines flight 951.

[redacted] NYC, and was destined to the b7C company's plant and his residence at [redacted] He declared four sacks, weighing approximately ten pounds, of crude uranium ore. This ore registered maximum on green and 25 on red. [redacted] indicated that he had gone from the U.S. to Madrid, Spain for the sole purpose of contacting one [redacted] of the [redacted] to obtain the above-mentioned ore. He is taking this ore to the [redacted] to have it analyzed.

FETTINGER stated the AEC had no interest in this matter.

LEONARD SOLON, AEC, NYC, advised that instant material is source material but in such quantities as to be of no interest to the AEC.

KELLY

RECORDED-45
INDEXED-45
117-268

28 OCT 16 1956

3-Bureau (117-268) RM
1-New York (117-192)

TGS:ec (5)

Mr. Belmont

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-14-2004 BY 60267 UC/NUC/bja/PKM

Approved: J. Kelly Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. [redacted]
Mr. [redacted]
Mr. [redacted]
Mr. [redacted]
Mr. [redacted]
Tele. [redacted]
Mr. [redacted]
Miss Gandy

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: 10/16/56

FROM : W. A. Branigan

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mason
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF ATOMIC WEAPONS INTO THE U.S.

(Small)

Joint IIC-ICIS subcommittee met 10 a.m., 10/11/56, with Mr. Don Gale, Naval Research Laboratory, representing advisory group for supervision of detection device program. After discussion, committee suggested advisory group obtain detailed reports from all ports of entry where devices are used and submit summarized reports to the IIC and ICIS every six months. The first report will be submitted by the advisory group before the first of 1957 and the next report will be submitted in time for its use in the preparation of the annual IIC-ICIS report to the National Security Council.

Gale stated that by May or June, 1957, [redacted] By October or November, 1957, the [redacted] The Atomic Energy Commission's [redacted] Technical Panel will meet the week of October 15 and thereafter reports on its proceedings will be furnished to the joint committee.

b2
b7E

Further discussion revealed that the Treasury Department has not budgeted for the so-called limited national program of detection devices for fiscal 1957 and it is not definite that they have budgeted for fiscal 1958.

Carl Pfuntner, ICIS, advised that the standing committee of ICIS had decided against asking the Attorney General for an opinion on whether or not the use of radiological detection devices would be prevented because of possible damage to humans since they could see no legal question involved.

cc - Belmont
Branigan
Roach
Day
Whitson

LW:blb
(6)

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RECORDED-62

117-26[illegible]

EX-108

16 OCT 23 1956

ENCLOSURE

OCT 26 1956

Memorandum for A. H. Belmont

The joint committee suggested to the AEC representative that he personally raise the question with the standing committee of ICIS since research on radiological devices could certainly be affected if there would actually be a legal inhibition against their use.

At the request of the ICIS, the joint committee considered the question of channelling unaccompanied diplomatic baggage of the Soviet bloc to the ports of Washington, D. C., and New York. It was noted that Customs records indicate most shipments are now routed in bond to those two ports. The committee requested Mr. Pfuntner to prepare a draft for ICIS, pointing out that it appeared as a practical matter that unaccompanied shipments were presently being channelled but that Customs should continue to provide figures which would be scrutinized by the joint committee and if further recommendations were warranted, they would be made on the basis of the figures submitted.

It was decided that unless other pressing matters arose, the joint committee would next meet when the advisory group submitted its semiannual report.

RECOMMENDATION:

For your information, when the draft on channelling is received, it will be analyzed and recommendations made.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

COMMITTEE B

MINUTES OF MEETING

OCTOBER 11, 1956

The joint IIC-ICIS Committee (Committee B) met on Thursday, October 11, 1956, at 10:00 a.m., in Room 2515, Department of Justice. The following members were present:

IIC:	Mr. Lish Whitson, Chairman - FBI Mr. Bevelyn L. Willard - Defense
ICIS:	Col. Alexander Graham - Defense Capt. John R. Stewart - Treasury
AEC Advisor:	Mr. John Kelly
ICIS Secretariat:	Mr. Carl H. Pfuntner

Advisory Group

Naval Research Laboratory:	Mr. Donald Gale

SEE MEMO ON THIS MEETING, BRANIGAN TO BELMONT, 10-16-56. LW

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DATE 6-14-2004 BY 60267 uc/nmf/jga/ROM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

117-268

5-fw

ENCLOSURE

117-268-1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1. Minutes

The Committee approved the minutes of its meeting of May 31, 1956, without change.

2. Reports by Advisory Group

Mr. Gale of the Advisory Group was present for discussion of this subject.

Mr. Gale said that in reviewing some reports on the operation of detection devices in the field he had been struck by their inadequacy. He felt that the Advisory Group should assume responsibility for periodic reports based on field trips and observations of the operation of devices. He suggested that the first such report be submitted about January 1, 1957.

Following discussion it was agreed that the Advisory Group should report semi-annually on the operation of detection devices. The first report is to be submitted about January 1, 1957, and the second report is to be submitted by a date (to be coordinated with the ICIS Secretariat) which will make its contents available for use in the preparation of the annual report to the Council on the status of internal security programs. It was agreed that the Advisory Group, in connection with the preparation of these reports, should obtain from the Bureau of Customs the information which that Bureau furnishes the Watch Committee. The reports are to cover such points as summaries of accomplishments; descriptions of methods of operation, based on field trips and observations; enumeration of articles of commerce which set off the devices, distances at which diplomatic baggage or diplomats themselves activate the devices.

3. Status of Research and Experimental Programs

Mr. Gale said that the Naval Ordnance Laboratory was proceeding with an experimental production model of the X-ray device intended for tests in the field. It was estimated that the device would be available in eight or nine months. The Naval Research Laboratory was making preliminary tests and arrangements for [redacted] capable of being moved into the field for tests. This device would be available in approximately one year. b2 b7E

Mr. Kelly observed that [redacted] Group was meeting next week; thereafter he would supply a report to Committee B on the status of [redacted]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4. Operation of Limited National Program for the Use of Detection Devices

It was noted in the course of a brief discussion that the detection device program was still operating in about the same way that the experimental program had operated. It was understood that the Bureau of Customs had not yet budgeted for additional detection devices. The press statement on the program had been cleared by Treasury with the Atomic Energy Commission but had not yet been issued. The Committee noted that letters which it had proposed on May 31, 1956, be sent to the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, and the Atomic Energy Commission, were still under discussion in ICIS, due to differences between Treasury and AEC over the ultimate responsibility for identification of material in incoming shipments.

5. Legality of Use of Devices

Mr. Pfuntner referred to the draft letter dated May 31, 1956, to the Attorney General which had been prepared by Committee B at its meeting on May 31, 1956, requesting a legal opinion on the question of involuntary search of persons entering the country by means of active detection devices. He reported that ICIS had decided at a meeting on August 29, 1956, that the letter should not be dispatched. This decision was based mainly on the view of the Justice Representative that no outstanding legal question was propounded by the letter. The question of whether or not active devices that might be developed would be harmful was a technical question, which the AEC could best answer. As to the right of the country to search incoming persons, it was felt that anyone presenting himself for entry was thereby submitting to search by practically any means, and that there was no need to show causes for such search.

Mr. Kelly said that the decision of the ICIS did not help the AEC. AEC wanted some assurances, before making extensive outlays of money and scientists' man-hours on the development of future devices, that such devices would be used.

Following further discussion it was agreed that Mr. Kelly, who was to be present at a Standing Committee meeting scheduled for Tuesday, October 16, 1956, would raise this problem with the Standing Committee at that time.

6. Restrictions on Diplomatic Shipments

Mr. Whitson said that the IIC and ICIS were charged with the responsibility for continuing review of the "standby plans" in the pouch report of November 28, 1955. He requested all members of Committee B to review the recommendations

of this report, so that, at the next meeting there could be discussion as to whether any revision might be called for.

7. Channeling of Soviet Bloc Unaccompanied Shipments

The Committee considered the memorandum dated September 26, 1956, from the Chairman, ICIS, on the above subject. It was noted that the six-month survey which Customs had carried out indicated that the objectives of the channeling proposal were, in the main, being accomplished. It was also noted that the ICIS was requesting that the surveys be resumed and that monthly reports on them be continued indefinitely, with the inclusion of general descriptions of the contents of shipments.

Following discussion, it was agreed to report to the ICIS that since the objectives of the channeling proposal were being accomplished, and since the reports on the surveys of unaccompanied shipments would be resumed, the Committee recommended that no further steps be taken at this time to implement the proposal. It was agreed that Committee B should review the monthly reports on the Customs survey and, should it seem appropriate or necessary in the future, make further recommendations on the channeling proposal. A letter to the ICIS along the above lines will be prepared, and cleared with Mr. Whitson, and placed on the agenda of the ICIS Standing Committee.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont Tic: Belmont
Branigan
Roach
Day (ENCL)
Whitson (ENCL)

DATE: October 22, 1956

FROM : W. A. Branigan

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mason
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF ATOMIC WEAPONS INTO THE U.S.

Rememo Branigan to Belmont 10-16-56, showing that joint IIC-ICIS subcommittee (Committee B), on 10-11-56, considered request by ICIS to study question of channeling unaccompanied diplomatic baggage of the Soviet bloc to the ports of Washington, D. C. and New York.

After considering the problem and taking into consideration the administrative difficulties experienced by State and Treasury in attempting such channeling without prior specific notification to the Soviet bloc, the joint subcommittee instructed Mr. Carl Pfuntner to prepare a draft memorandum for ICIS. This memorandum was to point out that practically all of the shipments in question now come in bond to New York or to the Georgetown (Washington, D. C.) Customs House. The draft would also point out that since ICIS was requesting a monthly report from Customs of all unaccompanied Soviet bloc diplomatic shipments entering the U.S. by any port, the joint subcommittee was not recommending further steps at this time to channel such shipments. The subcommittee desired copies of the monthly Customs surveys. Unaccompanied diplomatic shipments are now customarily searched by Customs. Coast Guard has ordered sufficient portable detection devices so that suspicious items entering the U.S. at ports other than New York and Washington could be checked with portable devices, if necessary.

RECOMMENDATION:

On October 22, 1955, Mr. Pfuntner, of the ICIS Secretariat, furnished to Special Agent Whitson six copies of a memorandum from Committee B to the ICIS for initialing by Special Agent Whitson. Five copies are for the IIC and IIC Agency files. While the subject is of interest to IIC, it does not affect any IIC agency. If you have no objection, Special Agent Whitson will initial the 6th copy and return it to the ICIS in order that it can be considered by the ICIS Standing Committee 10-23-56.

DONE 10-23-56 LW

LW:kg
(6)
(ENCL)

RECORDED-62
INDEXED-62

117-268

ENCLOSURE

56 JAN 28 1957

EX-108

14 OCT 29 1956

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FBI COPY.

October 22, 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. Walter Yeagley, Chairman,
Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security

FROM: Lish Whitson, Chairman,
Committee B

SUBJECT: Channeling of Soviet bloc unaccompanied shipments - re ICIS Problem 25.

Reference is made to your memorandum dated September 26, 1956, on the subject of channeling of Soviet bloc unaccompanied shipments. Committee B has reviewed the proposal for channeling of incoming unaccompanied diplomatic packages and shipments of Soviet bloc personnel through the two ports of entry of New York and Georgetown. In carrying out this review it has taken into consideration the administrative difficulties regarding channeling without prior specific notification to the Soviet bloc previously encountered by the Departments of State and Treasury in undertaking to implement the program. It has also taken into consideration the results of the survey of the shipments in question for the six-month period December 1955-May 1956, inclusive, which was carried out by the Bureau of Customs.

It appears to this committee that the survey indicates that practically all of the shipments in question come to New York or Georgetown, and therefore that the objectives of the channeling proposal are, in the main, being accomplished. This Committee understands that the ICIS is requesting that the survey by the Bureau of Customs be resumed and that monthly reports thereon be continued indefinitely. In view of this, and in view of the administrative difficulties attendant on the effort by the Departments of State and Treasury to implement the program, this Committee recommends that no further steps be taken at this time to implement the proposal. Committee B further recommends that copies of the monthly reports on the survey to be resumed by the Bureau of Customs be made available to it for review so that it may submit further recommendations on channeling should they seem appropriate at any time.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-14-2004 BY 60267 uc/MW/lp/PRM

cc: Mr. Fanning
Mr. Doherty
Mr. Canavan
Col. Graham
Mr. Ranta
Mr. Chase
Mr. Bailey
Mr. Coyne

117-21[illegible]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ENCLOSURE

cc - Whitson

October 29, 1956

Air-Tel

RECORDED-6

SAC, New York (117-192) (orig and 1)

SMAB

ReNYtel 10/19/56 and NYairtel 10/25/56 concerning shipment of device containing [redacted] used for measuring the level of molten glass in vats. Inform Bureau promptly as to whether shipment was licensed and indicate location of Nouville, N. J.

b2
b7E

Hoover

Buffle 117-268

LW:blb
(4)

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mason
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

FBI
OCT 29 1956

NOV 9 1956

FD-36 (6-21-55)

F B I

Date: 10/25/56

Transmit the following message via AIRTEL

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. Nichols	
Mr. Boardman	
Mr. Belmont	✓
Mr. Mohr	
Mr. Parsons	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Tamm	
Mr. Trotter	
Mr. Nease	
Tele. Room	
Mr. Holloman	
Miss Gandy	

From SAC, NEW YORK (117-192)

To: BUREAU (117-268)

SMAB; AEA

ReNYtel dated 10/19/56, concerning shipment on bill of lading #262, identified as "Contents: Liquid Level Gauge and Accessories", shipped by Isotope Division, Ltd., Benham Grange, and consigned to Lep Transportation Co., 47 Water St., NYC for the account of Wheaton Glass of Nouville, N.J.

On 10/25/56, ALFRED ZILA, Radiation Branch, AEC, NYC, advised that he had personally examined this equipment and it appears to him to be a legitimate shipment and conforms to the description of same. He advised that this instrument is used for measuring the level of molten glass in vats. He stated that previous to the development of this device the level of molten glass was determined by utilizing a platinum float on top of the molten glass but it was found that occasionally this platinum float melted or broke causing the entire mass of molten glass to be contaminated. Instant device is placed on the outside of the tank and measures the level of the molten glass on the inside. He also stated that this device was described as

[redacted] b2 b7E

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-14-2004 BY 60267 uc/nmf/bja/rma

KELLY

28

RECORDED-91

3-Bureau (117-268) RM
1-New York (117-192)

INDEXED - 9

17 OCT 26 1956

TGS:EG
(5)

Approved: J. J. Kelly Sent ____ M Per ____
Special Agent in Charge

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

OCT 19 1956

TELETYPE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-14-2004 BY 60324 uc/pms/bja/PAM

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. Nease
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

WASH 9 FROM NEW YORK 19 6-00 P.

DIRECTOR URGENT

SMAB. INSPECTOR PRATT, US CUSTOMS, FURNISHED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION AT ONE THIRTY PM, OCT NINETEEN, FIFTYSIX. PRATT ADVISED HE COULD BE REACHED AT WHITE HALL FOUR DASH FOUR THREE ZERO ZERO, EXTENSION FIVE TWO SIX. PRATT STATED THAT THE SS AMERICAN HARVESTER ARRIVE IN NY, OCT TWELVE, FIFTYSIX, AND DISCHARGED CARGO AT PIER FIVE NINE, NORTH RIVER. CUSTOMS SUBJECTED CARGO TO EXAMINATION BY SPECIAL DEVICE AND DETERMINED FOLLOWING REACTION FROM CASE NUMBER FOUR EIGHT THREE, WHICH WAS DESCRIBED AS FOUR SIX INCHES WIDE, FIVE THREE INCHES HIGH, FOUR SIX INCHES DEEP. THIS CASE WAS SHIPPED ON BILL OF LADING NO. TWO SIX TWO, AND IDENTIFIED AS, "CONTENTS, LIQUID LEVEL GAUGE AND ACCESSORIES". THE SHIPPER IS ISOTOPE DIVISION, LTD., BENHAM GRANGE, AND SHIPMENT ORIGINATED AT ALDERMASTON WHARF, READING, BERKS, ENGLAND. SHIPMENT CONSIGNED TO LEP TRANSPORTATION CO.J FOUR SEVEN WATER ST., NYC, FOR THE ACCOUNT OF WHEATON GLASS OF NOUVILLE, NJ. READING BY SPECIAL DEVICE REVEALED TWO FIVE ZERO BY TWENTY AT TWO FEET, TWO HUNDRED BY TWENTY AT SEVEN FEET, TWO FIFTY BY TEN AT NINE FEET, TWO FIFTY BY FOUR AT EIGHTEEN FT. PRATT STATED MR. A. ZELLER /PROBABLY ZILA/ OF AEC WAS NOTIFIED AND REPORTED THAT ABOVE READING VERY "HOT". SHIPMENT STILL ON PIER AWAITING RECEIPT OF PERMIT TO TRANSMIT SHIPMENT TO CONSIGNEE. NYO CONTACTED AL ZILA, RADIATION DEPT., AEC, NYC., WHO ADVISED, OCT NINETEEN, FIFTYSIX, THAT NO CONCLUSIONS HAVE BEEN REACHED TO DATE AS

END APAGE ONE

117-268-1157

b2
b7E

REGARDS THE CONTENTS OF INSTANT SHIPMENT. HE STATED THAT FROM AN INCOMPLETE STUDY OF THE RADIATION REGISTER ON THE DEVICE, IT MIGHT POSSIBLY [redacted] HE EXPLAINED AEC IS WAITING FOR INFORMATION FROM AEC, WASHINGTON, DC, AS TO WHETHER OR NOT THE CONSIGNEE HAS A PERMIT FOR INSTANT SHIPMENT. THIS PERMIT, TOGETHER WITH THE BILL OF LADING, AS YET TO BE PRESENTED BY THE CONSIGNEE, SHOULD, IN ZILA-S OPINION, PROVIDE FURTHER INFORMATION AS TO THE EXACT CONTENTS OF SHIPMENT. FOLLOWING A COMPLETE STUDY OF THE RADIATION, TOGETHER WITH THE ABOVE-DESCRIBED PERMIT AND BILL OF LADING, ZILA WILL ADVISE NYO OF AEC-S CONCLUSIONS. BUREAU WILL BE ADVISED.

KELLY

END

NY R 9 WA JHM

ORIGINAL—DIRECTOR

son

October 25, 1956

Air-Tel

SAC, New York (117-192) (original and 1)

SMAB

RECORDED - 74

EX-11

Reurtel 10/19/56. No references Bufiles to Wheaton Glass of Nouville, New Jersey. Wheaton Glass Company, Millville, New Jersey, was known as manufacturer of glass bottles and glass containers in 1954. (60-4561)

Inform Bureau promptly whether radioactive shipment to Wheaton Glass is licensed and, if not licensed, what action being taken by Customs and AEC.

Hoover

Bufile 117-268

LW:blb
(4)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-14-2004 BY 60260 uc/NWS/bja/PAM

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mason
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

4-22 (Rev. 8-13-56)

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Records Branch

11/13, 1956

- [ ] Name Check Unit - Room 6523
- [ ] Service Unit - Room 6524
- [ ] Forward to File Review
- [x] Attention Bowie
- [ ] Return to [redacted] 1519
  Supervisor Room Ext.

Type of References Requested:

- [ ] Regular Request (Analytical Search)
- [x] All References (Subversive & Nonsubversive)
- [ ] Subversive References Only
- [ ] Nonsubversive References Only
- [ ] Main _____ References Only

Type of Search Requested:

- [ ] Restricted to Locality of _____
- [ ] Exact Name Only (On the Nose)
- [ ] Buildup [ ] Variations
- [ ] Check for Alphabetical Loyalty Form

b7C

Subject [redacted]
Birthdate & Place _____
Address _____

Localities _____

R# _____ Date 11/13 Searcher Initials RM

FILE NUMBER	SERIAL
NR	

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-14-2007 BY 60322 uc/nrs/baw

FD-36 (6-21-55)

FBI

Date: 10/30/56

Transmit the following message via AIRTEL

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. Nichols	
Mr. Boardman	✓
Mr. Belmont	
Mr. Mohr	
Mr. Parsons	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Tamm	
Mr. Trotter	
Mr. Nease	
Tele. Room	
Mr. Holloman	
Miss Gandy	

From SAC, NEW YORK (117-192)

To: BUREAU (117-268)

SMAB; AEA

Remyairtel 10/25/56 and Buairtels 10/25, 29/56.

LEONARD SOLON, Radiation Branch, AEC, NYC, advises shipment of liquid level gauge and accessories from Isotope Division, Ltd. to Lep Transportation Co., was for account of Wheaton Glass Co. of Millville, N.J. rather than Nouville, N.J. as U.S. Customs had previously advised. Further, shipment was licensed by AEC license #29-968-1 and expectation of shipment by Wheaton Glass was telephonically verified by AEC, NYC.

LICENSED SHIPMENT.
NO ACTION NECESSARY.
LW

KELLY

3-Bureau (117-268) RM
1-New York (117-192)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-14-2004 BY 60267 TC/NWS/bja/PAM

RECORDED - 76

Mr. Belmont

INDEXED - 76

117-268-1

11-2

JJD:EG
(5)

57 NOV 7 1956

Approved: J. J. Kelly Sent _____ M Per _____

Special Agent in Charge

FD-36 (6-21-55)

FBI

Date: 11/7/56

Mr. T[illegible]
Mr. N[illegible]
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. Nease
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

Transmit the following message via AIRTEL

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

From SAC, NEW YORK (117-192)

To: BUREAU (117-268)

SMAB; AEA

US Customs, NYC advised 11/6/56 of arrival at 6:53 AM, 11/6/56, on Scandinavian Airline Flight SK 901, of [redacted] California. [redacted] is a Danish citizen traveling on Danish Passport [redacted] issued 6/27/52 at Copenhagen. [redacted] is a [redacted] and [redacted] who departed U.S. 10/9/56 via Scandinavian Airlines for pleasure, to visit medical institutes at England, Denmark, Germany and Norway.

On written declaration, [redacted] advised he was bringing into country a gamma meter to be utilized for medical purposes in measuring gamma rays in rectal and bladder research. He stated he purchased this machine at Hamburg, Germany for $175.00. The machine bears following markings: "Gamma meter, #10123. Sonde B-17-UI-56," machine weighs 3 pounds. Examination on mark one device at 25 feet of this machine indicated red reading 20 to 100'; green reading 56 to 100 '." U.S. Customs advised that ALBERT ZILA, Radiation Laboratory, AEC, was notified that he took machine from U.S. Customs for examination and eventual return to Customs or to [redacted] who is staying temporarily at Hotel Times Square, NYC. b7C

ZILA advised this date that examination reflected meter contains radium source material of type not under terms of AEA and did not contain special nuclear material. Accordingly, it is being returned to [redacted] this date.

NO INDEX REFERENCES.
NO SOURCE OR S.N.M UNDER AEA
NO ACTION NECESSARY.
3-Bureau (117-268) RM
1-New York (117-192)

KELLY

117-268-

RECORDED-56
INDEXED-56

JJD:EG
(5)

Mr. Belmont

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-14-2004 BY 60267 uc/pms/BTA/PAM

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____

Special Agent in Charge

DIRECTOR, FBI

November 5, 1956

Legat, Bonn (65-156)

~~SECRET~~

b7C

[redacted]

Espionage - X

DATE: 6-14-2004
CLASSIFIED BY uc/NLS/bja/PAM 60267 derivative
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3,3(1) 6-14-2029
Per ltr. dtd. 6-28-04
60267 uc/NLS/bja/PAM 6.30.04

OSMAB

Remyradiograms 10/12 and 10/26/56.

Referral/Direct OGA

Enclosed for the Bureau's information are [redacted]

b1

As pointed out in my radiogram of 10/12/56, subsequent to the original contacts explained in the enclosed memorandum, G-2 turned the information over to Department of Army Detachment [redacted] with the request that DAD assume the responsibility for further contact with the subjects and development of this matter. (S)

[redacted]

Referral/Direct OGA

[redacted]

4 - Bureau (Enc. 5)
1 - Paris (Enc. 1) (Sent direct)
1 - Bonn
GAV-mal
(6)

INDEXED - 67

117-268-1160

NOT RECORDED
176 NOV 14 1956

125

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

58 NOV 23 1956

65-[illegible]

ORIGINAL FILED IN



The Bureau will be furnished any pertinent information which may be developed in this matter.

~~SECRET~~

cc

SECRET

SAC, New York (117-192) (orig and 1) November 16, 1956

Director, FBI (117-268)

6/14/04
CLASSIFIED BY UC/NCS/BJA/PAM 60267 Derivative
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (1) 6/14/2029

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS
THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

ALL INFO...
HEREIN IS...
WHERE SHOWN...

RECORDED - 72

ReNYairtels 9/28/56 and 10/1/56.

[redacted] b1 (S)

Questions:

1. Why is it necessary for these companies to [redacted] instead of obtaining it from the Atomic Energy Commission domestically? b2 b7E

Answer:

[redacted] b1

[redacted] (S)

cc - Richmond (for info)

LW:blb
(7)

MAILED 4
NOV 16 1956
COMM-FBI

7 NOV 28 1956

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mason
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

~~SECRET~~

SAC, New York
Re: Smuggling of Atomic Bombs or Parts
Thereof Into the United States
Bufile: 117-268

Question:

2. Since the shipper is in England, is there any understanding between the United States Atomic Energy Commission and the British atomic energy authorities whereby you are informed of the contemplated shipment of [redacted] from England?

Answer:

[redacted] (S)

b2
b7E
b1

Question:

3. Is this [redacted] or of some other (i.e., Soviet) origin?

Answer:

[redacted] (S)

~~SECRET~~

SAC, New York
Re: Smuggling of Atomic Bombs or Parts Thereof Into the United States
Bufile: 117-268

[redacted]

Question:

4. What was the significance of the [redacted] which entered the Idlewild Airport, "Don't come within 15 feet"?

Answer:

[redacted] b1 b2 b7E

Question:

5. In the Atomic Energy Commission regulations as published on page 211 of the Commission publication, "Major Activities in the Atomic Energy Programs, January - June, 1956." Schedule B lists as licensed by-

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~

SAC, New York
Re: Smuggling of Atomic Bombs or Parts Thereof Into the United States
Bufile: 117-268

Answer:

[redacted] b1

(S)

Under the circumstances, no further inquiry need be made regarding the shipment to the Mollins Machine Company, Richmond, Virginia.

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED ON envelope
only ~~HEREIN~~ IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6.14.2004 BY 60267 UCLAS/bja/Pyan

117-268-1161

Date: November 15, 1956

To: Mr. E. Tomlin Bailey (orig. & 1)
Director
Office of Security
Department of State
515 22nd Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: UNITED NATIONS PERSONNEL - USSR
INTERNAL SECURITY - R

Reference is made to our memorandum dated November 1, 1956, in captioned matter which advised of the transportation into the Soviet United Nations Delegation of six small bags of the approximate size of a handie-talkie carrying case, and which appeared to be extremely heavy.

For your further information, we have now been advised that the six bags referred to above were oval-shaped and of tan canvas with leather straps sewed to the backs of the bags. Each of the Soviets referred to in our previous memorandum carried one bag and appeared to be straining under the weight. Agents who observed this activity recall that one of the Soviets, [redacted] took two of these bags from the trunk of the car and placed them on the street; however, he carried only one into the Soviet Delegation on each trip. [redacted] The other Soviet, [redacted] is approximately [redacted] The bags have not been observed since they were carried into the Soviet Delegation on October 29, 19[redacted]

cc - 1 - AAG William F. Tompkins (R/S [redacted], same date).
cc - 1 - [redacted]
cc - 1 [redacted]

JJT:ms
(14)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

b7C

b7C

DECLASSIFIED BY 6.14.2004 ufw/sbj/pam
ON 60267 ufw/sbj/pam 6.28.04
Per Mr. dtd. 6.28.04 60267 ufw/sbj/pam 6.30.04

ORIGINAL FILED IN [redacted]

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

Mr. E. Tomlin Batley

The foregoing is furnished with the request no further dissemination be made.

cc - 1 - Director BY COURIER SERVICE
Central Intelligence Agency
2430 E Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Attention: Deputy Director, Plans

cc - 1 - Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
Department of the Army
The Pentagon
Washington 25, D. C.

Attention: Chief, Security Division

cc - 1 - Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy
The Pentagon
Washington 25, D. C.

cc - 1 - Director of Special Investigations
The Inspector General BY COURIER SERVICE
Department of the Air Force
Building Tempo E
4th and Adams Drive, S. W.
Washington, D. C.

cc - 1 - Mr. J. Patrick Coyne BY COURIER SERVICE
National Security Council
Executive Office Building
Washington 25, D. C.

11/9/56

AIRTEL

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. Nease
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-77787-240)

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (100-92701)

RE: UN PERSONNEL - USSR
IS - R

OSMAB

Re NY teletype, 10/29/56, advising of six heavy bags carried into Soviet Delegation by [redacted]

The following information is furnished to the Bureau as it may aid in evaluation of the information furnished in referenced teletype:

The agent operating the lookout has advised that the six bags in question measure approximately 16" long by 18" high and 4" wide. The top of the bags were oval shaped and were designed very similar to a handy talky case. They were tan canvass with leather straps which were sewed to the backs of the bags.

Each Russian carried one bag and appeared to be straining under the weight. The agents remembered that [redacted] took two of these bags from the trunk of the car and placed them on the street; however, he only carried one into the Delegation on each ~~truck~~ trip.

[redacted] is approximately [redacted] and is of [redacted] is [redacted] and is a [redacted] individual.

The agents operating lookouts in the vicinity of the Delegation have not seen the bags since they were carried in on 10/29/56.

3 - Bureau (62-77787-240) (RM)
1 - New York (100-92701)

EM:cmr (#17)
(5)

117-268-
NOT RECORDED
176 NOV 28 1956
INITIALS ON ORIGINAL

ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-77787-240-2116-

b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-14-2004 BY 60267 uc/mc/bja/Rm

11/9/56

PAGE TWO

Plants presently have advised [redacted] regularly has been seen to handle such items as vacuum cleaners, chairs, floor lamps, lumber, and various other items [redacted] b7C

On 11/9/56 [redacted] was seen to carry several items of luggage within the Delegation although none were similar or as heavy as the bags mentioned in referenced teletype.

The possibility exists that these bags could have contained some type of tools or perhaps some office equipment but this is just the mere supposition on the part of the NYO.

NY will remain alert and advise the Bureau of any information obtained from sources concerning this baggage.

KELLY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ICIS-P25/438

November 16, 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR: Lish Whitson, Chairman,
Committee B

FROM: J. Walter Yeagley, Chairman,
Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security

SUBJECT: Preventing entry into the United States of Radioactive materials through diplomatic shipments.

Pursuant to NSC Action 1524-f, the Department of State made a study relative to the matter of achieving international agreements relating to the above subject. The study was transmitted to the Council by memorandum dated August 21, 1956, from the Executive Secretary, NSC.

The ICIS, at its meeting on November 14, 1956, noted a memorandum dated September 25, 1956, which contained NSC Action No. 1603. ICIS noted that the Council (1603-b) concurred in the conclusion of the study and that the Council (1603-c) requested the Internal Security Committees to keep the problem under continuing review and report to the Council if developments occur which would warrant reconsideration of the Council's concurrence in the State Department's study.

In view of Action 1603-c, Committee B is requested to review the present situation in relation to this problem and to submit a report at an early date.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-14-2004 BY 60267 uc/NLS/bja/PAM

will be considered at next meeting of Subcommittee. ivw

cc: Col. Graham
Col. Hudgins
Capt. Jones
Capt. Stewart

EX 104

RECORDED - 83

20 NOV 23 1956

57 NOV 28 1956

117-268

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5-Encl

Mitson

November 26, 1956

Air-Tel

esa

SAC, New York (117-192) (orig and 1)

RECORDED-35 117-268-1163

SMAB

ReNYairtel 11/23/56. No identifiable references to [redacted] b7C In reporting arrivals of persons carrying materials which activate detection devices, you should furnish full name, or at least the name appearing on passport, even though, as in this case, AEC advises that material brought in does not constitute nuclear or source material.

Hoover

Bufile 117-268

LW:blb-klb
(4)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-14-2007 BY 60267 UC/NWS/bja/PAA

NOV 28 1956

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mason
Mohr
Parsons
[illegible]
Neas
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

FD-36 (6-21-55)

F B I

Date: 11/23/56

Transmit the following message via AIRTEL

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

From SAC, NEW YORK (117-192)

To: BUREAU (117-268)

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. [illegible]
Tele. Room
Mr. [illegible]
Miss [illegible]

SMAB; AEA

THOMAS P. SHEEHAN, U.S. Customs Service, advised on 11/23/56 that [redacted] NY, b7C U.S. citizen by birth, passport [redacted] issued 9/29/54 at Washington, D.C., a purser on Pan American flight #71, plane #737, arrived at 9:18 a.m., 11/22/56 at Idlewild Airport, NYC, carrying two pounds of assorted stone which included some uranium. Stones were collected as curios and were properly declared on crew declaration #1328936. Reading on #1 machine was red 20 and green 86, and on portable machine 175 at 5 feet. SHEEHAN advised that the AEC released the material.

On 11/23/56, ALBERT ZILA, AEC, NYC, advised that above material did not constitute nuclear or source material.

KELLY

Mr. Belmont

3-Bureau (117-268) RM
1-New York (117-192)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-14-2004 BY 60267 uc/mus/bja/sbm

RECORDED-35 117-268-1163

INDEXED-35

EX-125

airtel to NY 11/26/56 enl

JHK:EG
(5)

Approved: J. J. Kelly Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: November 21, 1956

FROM : R. R. ROACH

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

SECRET

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mason
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: PREVENTION AND DETECTION OF CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF FISSIONABLE WEAPONS BETWEEN PORTS OF ENTRY ALONG THE LAND BORDERS AND THE GULF COAST

On February 3, 1956, a report in the captioned matter was issued by ICIS after IIC had twice declined to join in its issuance due to certain comments in the report concerning Immigration activities. The report recommended that all intelligence agencies be reminded of the problem and encouraged to cooperate with INS and Customs by furnishing them any data received regarding smuggling operations.

CIA wrote to ICIS on May 3, 1956, [redacted] (S)

ICIS furnished IIC a copy of the CIA letter and on October 3, 1956, ICIS wrote to CIA reviewing some of its related programs, such as its recommendations for control of low-flying light aircraft, the security screening of U.S. airmen engaged in international flights, and the IIC-ICIS program for use of detection devices at ports of entry utilized by Soviet bloc official personnel. ICIS told CIA that a copy of the CIA letter had been furnished to IIC "for any consideration that committee deems appropriate." (U)

b1
b3

By letter dated November 18, 1956, a copy attached, the CIA Director has thanked ICIS for its letter of October 3 and for "letting the chairman of the IIC know of our interest in being kept informed [redacted] No request has been made of FBI or IIC other than the implications in the CIA-ICIS correspondence. (S) (U)

117-268-1164

RECORDED - 70
INDEXED - 70
3 NOV 27 1956

EX-125

ACTION:

ENCLOSURE When the earlier correspondence was received, we recommended that no reply be made and that we not attempt to

Per ltr. dtd. 6-28-04 60267 uc/nmw/bja/PAW 6-30-04

Enclosure
GAD:hke (6)
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Mr. Papich
1-Mr. Day
1-Liaison Section

117-268

DATE: 6-14-2004
CLASSIFIED BY uc/nmw/bja/PAW 60267 derivative
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3.3( ) 6-14-2029

SECRET

(3) Attached UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 62-80750-

62-80750-90

62-80750-

Memorandum from Mr. Roach to Mr. Belmont
RE: PREVENTION AND DETECTION OF CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF FISSIONABLE WEAPONS BETWEEN PORTS OF ENTRY ALONG THE LAND BORDERS AND THE GULF COAST

~~SECRET~~

[redacted] (S) b1 b3

We believe this recommendation is sound and that we should not become involved with either CIA or ICIS in this matter. (S)U

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

January 25, 1957

4374

Honorable George M. Humphrey
The Secretary of the Treasury
Washington 25, D. C.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6-14-2007 BY 60322 uc/mst/jw/ram

Dear Mr. Humphrey:

By letter dated May 25, 1955, we requested that all Soviet bloc unaccompanied diplomatic baggage, effects and shipments, including any unaccompanied diplomatic pouches, be channeled through the ports of New York City and Georgetown.

By letter dated November 7, 1955, the Chairman, ICIS, requested that you have the Bureau of Customs conduct a survey which would afford information on the amounts of incoming baggage, effects and shipments of Soviet bloc personnel, including any unaccompanied diplomatic pouches which might enter the country during the ensuing six months and submit reports thereon every thirty days. That survey was conducted, and reports were submitted for the six-month period, December 1955 - May 1956, inclusive.

OSMAB

We have now re-examined the proposal for channeling with a view to deciding whether the benefits of instituting the program would outweigh the disadvantages which might result from the notification by State to the Soviet bloc countries. We have noted the administrative difficulties regarding channeling without prior specific notifications, and consider, since the survey indicates that practically all of the shipments in question come to New York or Georgetown, that the objectives of the channeling proposal are, in the main, being accomplished. We accordingly are not requesting that further steps be taken at this time.

62-90938-1
62-9663-7

RECORDED - 36 117-268-1197
INDEXED - 36

This is the FBI file copy as the letter was prepared in ICIS.

(Attached to cover memo from Mr. Belmont to Mr. Boardman, 1/24/57, re "Countermeasures Against the Clandestine Introduction of Atomic Weapons into the U.S." GAD:hke)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HAND COURIER SVC.
96 JAN 25
COMM-FBI

61 FEB 7 1957

(4) Auth 3-27 UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

As you know, the ICIS, by letter dated December 4, 1956, has requested that the survey by the Bureau of Customs be resumed and that monthly reports thereon be continued indefinitely. We shall carefully review these monthly reports and, should it seem appropriate at a later date, will submit further recommendations on channeling.

Sincerely yours,

14375

J. Edgar Hoover
Chairman, Interdepartmental
Intelligence Conference

J. Walter Yeagley
Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee
on Internal Security

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

Mr. J. Patrick Coyne

These data have also been furnished to the Department of State; the Atomic Energy Commission; Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army; Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy; Director of Special Investigations, The Inspector General, Department of the Air Force; and Mr. J. Walter Yeagley, Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security.

Sincerely yours,

NOTE:

Classified ~~Secret~~ because reaction of detection devices bears ~~Secret~~ classification. Under date 9/13/43 MID furnished memo on the [redacted] was a suspected person. No further info was shown. [redacted]

b7C
b7D

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ cc -

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267 uc/nws/bja/PAM
ON 6-14-2004

117-268

Date: February 1, 1957 BY COURIER SERVICE

To: Captain John A. Waters (orig and 1)
Director of Security
Atomic Energy Commission
Room 926
1717 H Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

RECORDED - 31
117-268-1134

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

EX-125

On January 26, 1957, U. S. Customs, Idlewild Airport, New York, advised that one [redacted] bearing Spanish Passport No. [redacted] had arrived on that date on Aviance Airlines, Flight 670, from Bogota, Colombia. [redacted] had in his possession ten pounds of uranium ore which he declared in writing on Customs Form No. 6230. b7C

Customs advised that this ore caused a reaction of 100 on the head of the detection device sensitive to gamma radiation and also a reaction of 25 on the head sensitive to neutrons. Customs stated that the Atomic Energy Commission office in New York had been advised and had said it was not interested in this material. The Atomic Energy Commission office, New York, informed the New York Office of the FBI on January 28, 1957, that the shipment of uranium ore was of such a small quantity as to be of no special interest to the Atomic Energy Commission.

LW:blb
(5)

NOTE: Classified ~~Secret~~ because reaction of detection device so classified. ~~SECRET~~

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mason
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
[redacted]
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

BY COURIER SVC.

60 FEB 11 1957

Captain John A. Waters

The FBI has no prior data identifiable with [redacted] b7C listed his New York address for Customs as [redacted] New York City. He stated that part of the ore was to go to the Golden Cycle Corporation, Colorado Springs, Colorado, and that part was to go to the Atomic Energy Corporation, Washington, D. C., or Winchester, Massachusetts.

In the absence of a specific request, no investigation of this matter will be conducted by the FBI.

FD-36 (6-13-56)

FBI

NY, NY Date: 1/28/57

Transmit the following message via AIRTEL

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. Nease
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-14-2004 BY 60267 uc/nw/bja/pmw

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK

J. PASCUAL ALVAREZ-SMAB
AEA

On 1/26/57, Inspector AUGUST MAIER, US Customs, Idlewild Airport, advised that [redacted] arrived Idlewild Airport, on 1/26/57, via Aviance Airlines, Flight 670, from Bogota, Columbia. [redacted] had a Spanish Passport No. [redacted] issued 4/19/55, at NYC. He listed his NY address as [redacted] had in his possession ten pounds of uranium ore, known as Clarkeite which he declared in writing on customs form number 6230. Customs advised that it registered a reading of red 25, and green 100. Customs notified the Atomic Energy Commission who stated they were not interested in this material. According to [redacted] part of this material was to go to the Golden Cycle Corp., Colorado Springs, Colorado, and part to the Atomic Energy Corp., Washington, D.C., or Winchester, Massachusetts.

b7C

Atomic Energy Commission advised on 1/28/57, that instant shipment of uranium ore was a source material but of such a quantity as to not be of any special interest to the Atomic Energy Commission.

KELLY

3- Bureau
1- New York

TGS:mea
(5)

Mr. Belmont

RECORDED - 31

INDEXED-31

EX-125

117-268-1172

31 JAN. 28 1957

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: January 30, 1957

FROM : MR. D. E. MOORE

SUBJECT: SMAB

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

Supervisor O'Brien, NYO, telephonically advised on 1-30-57, that a [redacted] traveling on Italian diplomatic passport, arrived in New York City aboard the SS Guilio Cesare 1-30-57. The boat docked at Pier 80, New York City, [redacted] carrying a beige colored bag approximately 3 feet by 2 feet by 10 inches in size. This bag weighed 6 pounds but the detection device used by Customs registered radio active material. The device registered an increase of 16 over a 50 background on [redacted] and an increase of 130 at 6 inches on [redacted] is destined to Italian Embassy, Ottawa, Canada, as First Secretary.

b7C
b2
b7E

Albert Zila, Radiation Section, AEC, New York City, advised that while no definite conclusion could be reached without an examination, he believed the bag did not contain anything of great significance because the weight (6 pounds) is not excessive.

ACTION:

The above is being disseminated to AEC and other interested agencies by letter.

DEM:mn
cc - Mr. Belmont
Mr. Branigan
Mr. Whitson
(4)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-14-2004 BY 60267 uc/baw/bja/rmd

Enclosures

Encls handled seperately for Mr. Bapp

RECORDED - 67

INDEXED - 67

FEB 25

111-269-1206

17 FEB 1957

60 FEB 11 1957

~~SECRET~~ cc - Liai... Whitso...

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267 uc/sac/bja/Pan
ON 6-14-2007

February 4, 1957

Mr. J. Patrick Coyne
National Security Council
Executive Office Building
Washington 25, D. C.

PERSONAL AND ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
BY COURIER SERVICE

(original) Summ

Dear Pat:

On January 30, 1957, U. S. Customs, New York City, informed the New York Office of the FBI of the arrival on that date of [redacted] holder of Italian Diplomatic Passport Number [redacted] on the SS. "Giulio Cesare," Italian Line, at Pier 84, North River, New York City. [redacted] was on his way to the Italian Embassy, Ottawa, Canada, as First Secretary.

As a diplomat, he was exempt from Customs search of his hand luggage. A six-pound handbag, approximately three feet by two feet by ten inches in size, supposed to contain overnight clothing, caused a reaction on the [redacted] detection device of 16 over a background of 50 on the head sensitive to gamma radiation. At a distance of six inches, the bag caused an increase of 130 over the background on a portable [redacted] device.

b2
b7C
b7E

Mr. Albert Zila, Chief, Radiation Branch, Atomic Energy Commission, New York, stated that while no definite conclusion could be reached without actual examination of the contents of the bag, he did not believe that the bag contained anything of great significance because the weight, six pounds, is not excessive when considered with the reading.

There are no identifiable references to [redacted] in the files of the FBI.

RECORDED - 28 117-268-
INDEXED - 28

LW:blb
(4)
SEE NOTE ON PAGE 2.

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mason
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

60 FEB 11 1957

~~SECRET~~

cc - L
W

DECLASSIFIED BY 60267 uc/sms/bja/PHM
ON 6-14-2004
9487482/950285/997059

117-266

BY COURIER SERVICE

Date: February 4, 1957

To: Mr. E. Tomlin Bailey
Director
Office of Security (orig and 1)
Department of State
515 22nd Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

RECORDED - 67

117-

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS
THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

On January 30, 1957, U. S. Customs, New York City, informed the New York Office of the FBI of the arrival on that date of [redacted] holder of Italian Diplomatic Passport No. [redacted] on the SS. "Giulio Cesare," Italian Line, at Pier 84, North River, New York City. [redacted] on his way to the Italian Embassy, Ottawa, Canada, as First Secretary.

b2
b7C
b7E

As a diplomat, he was exempt from Customs search of his hand luggage. A six-pound handbag, approximately three feet by two feet by ten inches in size, supposed to contain overnight clothing, caused a reaction on the [redacted] detection device of 16 over a background of 50 on the head sensitive to gamma radiation. At a distance of six inches, the bag caused an increase of 130 over the background on a portable [redacted] device.

Mr. Albert Bila, Chief, Radiation Branch, Atomic Energy Commission, New York, stated that while no definite conclusion could be reached without actual examination of the contents of the bag, he did not believe that the bag

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
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Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Ro
Hollo
Gandy

LW:blb
(10)
SEE NOTE ON LAST PAGE.

FEB 11 1957

FBI - DOUGLAS

10 FEB 5

COMM - FBI

~~SECRET~~

Mr. E. Tomlin Bailey

contained anything of great significance because the weight, six pounds, is not excessive when considered with the reading.

There are no identifiable references to [redacted] b7C in the files of the FBI.

These data have been furnished to Mr. J. Patrick Coyne, National Security Council.

cc - 1 - Captain John A. Waters BY COURIER SERVICE
Director of Security
Atomic Energy Commission
Room 926
1717 H Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

cc - 1 - Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
Department of the Army
The Pentagon
Washington 25, D. C.

Attention: Chief, Security Division

cc - 1 - Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy
The Pentagon
Washington 25, D. C.

cc - 1 - Director of Special Investigations BY COURIER SERVICE
The Inspector General
Department of the Air Force
Building Tempo E
4th and Adams Drive, S. W.
Washington, D. C.

cc - 1 - Mr. J. Walter Yeagley
Chairman
Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security
Department of Justice Building
Washington, D. C.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Mr. E. Tomlin Bailey

NOTE:

Classified ~~Secret~~ because reaction of detection devices bears Secret classification. Under date 9/13/43 MID furnished memo on the [redacted] b7C b7D which indicated that one [redacted] was a suspected person. No further info was shown. [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JAN 30 1957

TELETYPE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-14-2004 BY 60267 uc/sdb/sbr

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. Nease
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy
Brannigan

WASH 1 FROM NEW YORK 30 11-36 PM

DIRECTOR URGENT

SMAB, AEA. BUFILE ONE SEVENTEEN DASH TWO SIX EIGHT. US CUSTOMS NYC ADVISED THIS DATE OF ARRIVAL OF [redacted] ON SS GIULIO CESARE, ITALIAN LINE, AT PIER EIGHTYFOUR, NORTH RIVER, MORNING OF JAN THIRTY INSTANT. [redacted] ITALIAN DIPLOMATIC PASSPORT NO SEVEN ONE THREE ISSUED JAN SECOND LAST AT ROME, ITALY. GIVES RESIDENCE AS MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, ROME, ITALY. DESTINED TO ITALIAN EMBASSY, OTTAWA, b7C CANADA AS FIRST SECRETARY. DEPARTING NYC FOR CANADA EVENING OF JAN THIRTY. AS DIPLOMAT, [redacted] LUGGAGE NOT SUBJECT TO CUSTOMS SEARCH. A SIX POUND BEIGE COLORED HANDBAG, DIMENSIONS THREE FEET BY TWO FEET BY TEN INCHES, SUPPOSED TO CONTAIN OVERNIGHT CLOTHES, ON EXAMINATION BY [redacted] GAVE READING OF INCREASE OF SIXTEEN OVER FIFTY BACKGROUND ON GREEN, [redacted] GAVE INCREASE OF ONE THIRTY AT SIX INCHES. ALBERT ZILA, CHIEF, RADIATION BRANCH, AEC, NYC, STATES THAT WHILE NO DEFINITE CONCLUSION COULD BE REACHED WITHOUT ACTUAL EXAMINATION OF CONTENTS, HE DOES NOT BELIEVE BAG CONTAINED ANYTHING OF GREAT SIGNIFICANCE BECAUSE THE WEIGHT, NAMELY, SIX POUNDS, IS NOT EXCESSIVE WHEN CONSIDERED WITH THE READING. FOR INFO.

RECORDED - 117-268- KELLY 1201

~~CORR PLS CHANGE TIME TO "AM"~~

END cc Brannigan

EX-125

Mr. Belmont

FEB 6 1957

NY R 1 WA AW

Page 234 ~ Referral/Direct OGA
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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: August 21, 1956

FROM : W. A. Branigan

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mason
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: REAPPRAISAL OF U.S. POLICY REGARDING SOVIET BLOC SHIPMENTS AFFORDED DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY

Report of ad hoc committee on adequacy and security of U.S. diplomatic communications should limitations on the pouch be imposed has been placed on agenda of meeting of U.S. Communications Security Board (USCSB) to be held on 8/22/56.

Report of ad hoc committee in which FBI participated drew following conclusions: that secure communications can be maintained under the limitations imposed on diplomatic pouches; that adequate communications in the volume presently handled with our diplomatic posts behind the Iron Curtain cannot be maintained; should it become necessary to impose limitations on pouches, an advance warning of at least six months should be given to the agencies concerned to enable them to build up maximum supplies of cryptographic materials for manual operations and to make personnel adjustments.

Six months advance warning was need expressed by Department of State.

In proposed USCSB report to the Executive Secretary, NSC, following conclusions drawn:

(A) Imposition of limitations on diplomatic shipments would eliminate the supply of bulky cryptographic materials and would make a changeover from machine cryptographic operations to manual operations imperative.

(B) Secure communications can be maintained using manual systems.

(C) Use of manual systems would substantially reduce volume which could be maintained and, therefore, adequate communications could not be maintained. (These conclusions are not at variance with the conclusions of the ad hoc group.)

RECORDED - 12

cc - Belmont
Hennrich
B. A. Wells
Day
Branigan
Whitson

LW:blb (7)

INDEXED - 12

EX-117

117-262-

16 DEC 4 1956

948742/950935/997059

5/14/03 SAUSTR/ENP

Memorandum for A. H. Belmont

The draft recommendation in the USCSB paper is that at least six months advance warning be given to the departments and agencies affected in order to permit them to build up maximum supplies of cryptographic materials for manual operations and to make personnel adjustments.

OBSERVATION:

Since it is contemplated that at some future time should the international situation permit, the President would order certain limitations on the pouch, and since we cannot be certain that in an emergency we would have six months notice, it would be more realistic for the USCSB to recommend stockpiling of materials for manual encryption (for example - one-time pads) at the present time with a suggestion that it would probably take six months to adequately stockpile such materials and to make necessary personnel adjustments.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is respectfully recommended that the Bureau representative on the USCSB make the afore-mentioned observation. This is a matter which does not directly affect the Bureau since we have no personnel behind the Iron Curtain with whom we must communicate over Department of State facilities.

INVESTIGATION
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

NOV 26 1956

~~SECRET~~

5/14/03 CLASSIFIED BY SP4/BJA/RNP 60267 Derivative CLASSIFY ON: 25X (1)

TELETYPE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. Nease
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

WASH 10 FROM NEW YORK 26 3-44 PM

DIRECTOR URGENT

b7C ADRIANUS PELT (SMAB), AEA. ON NOV TWENTYSIX INSTANT INSPECTOR FLEMING, US CUSTOMS, ADVISED THAT [redacted] OF [redacted] CARRYING DIPLOMATIC PASSPORT NO [redacted] ISSUED [redacted] AT THE HAGUE, ARRIVED IN NYC ABOARD THE SS LIBERTE AT PIER EIGHTY EIGHT, NORTH RIVER AT SEVEN THIRTY AM. IT WAS INDICATED THAT HE WAS A [redacted] AND WAS ENROUTE FOR A VISIT TO THE UN AT NYC AND WILL MAINTAIN TEMPORARY RESIDENCE IN CARE OF [redacted] NYC. A SMALL HANDBAG WEIGHING FOURTEEN LBS., AND MEASURING TWO AND A HALF FEET IN LENGTH, ONE FOOT WIDE AND SIX INCHES THICK SET OFF EQUIPMENT AT PIER EIGHT EIGHT WITH A READING OF FOURTEEN ON GREEN AND NO READING ON RED. INSPECTOR FLEMING STATED THAT BECAUSE OF HIS DIPLOMATIC STATUS THIS BAG WAS NOT SEARCHED BUT THAT INQUIRY WAS MDE AS TO WHAT IT CONTAINED AND [redacted] RELATED THAT IT CONTAINED HIS OVERNIGHT CLOTHING. ALBERT ZILA, RADIATION BRANCH, AEC, NYC, ADVISED THAT HE HAD LEARNED OF THIS INCIDENT AND THAT IN HIS OPINION IT WAS A ~~QUOTE~~ "VERY LIGHT" ~~UNQUOTE~~ READING BUT THAT HE COULD NOT MAKE ANY DEFINITE STATEMENT AS TO WHAT WAS IN THE SUITCASE THAT GAVE

END PAGE ONE

RECORDED - 95 117-26[illegible]

EX-127 INDEXED-95

6 DEC 11 1956

Mr. Belmont

5-RW

~~SECRET~~

THIS INDICATED READING. FILES OF THE NYO REFLECT IN CASE CAPTIONED b1 b7C b7D
~~QUOTE~~ " IAN [redacted] ESP DASH R ~~UNQUOTE~~ " /BUFILE SIXTYFIVE
DASH FIVE EIGHT THREE FOUR NAUGHT /, IN NY REPORT DATED OCT [redacted]
[redacted] A CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT ADVISED THAT [redacted]
[redacted] WAS NOT LINKED WITH PERSONS GENERALLY CONSIDERED TO BE THE COMMUNIST ELEMENT OF [redacted] THIS
REPORT INDICATES [redacted] WAS FORMERLY EMPLOYED IN [redacted]
[redacted] IN THE SAME CASE, NY REPORT DATED [redacted]
[redacted] INDICATES A CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT FURNISHED A LIST OF
[redacted] AMONG THOSE LISTED WAS
A CALL ON [redacted]
[redacted]
CONCERNING [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted] b1
[redacted] IN (S)
NY REPORT OF [redacted] IN THE [redacted]
[redacted] INVESTIGATION, ESP - R, INFO APPEARS TO EFFECT THAT [redacted]
[redacted]

KELLY

END

NY R 10 WA MJM

DIS

~~SECRET~~

November 28, 1956

[redacted] BJA/RNP

TELETYPE

URGENT

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI AND PHILADELPHIA

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (ONE TWENTY PM)

RUMANIAN DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES IN US. IS DASH RU. BARNEY COSTELLO, DEPUTY COLLECTOR, US CUSTOMS, NY TELEPHONICALLY ADVISED SA [redacted] ON NOVEMBER TWENTY EIGHT INSTANT THAT A SHIPMENT OF TWENTY SIX UNACCOMPANIED DIPLOMATIC CASES, WHICH, ACCORDING TO SHIPPING PAPERS CONTAIN PRINTED MATTER ARRIVED IN NY ABOARD FRENCH LINE SHIP QUOTE INDO CHINOIS UNQUOTE. LONGSHOREMAN NY REFUSED TO UNLOAD SHIPMENT. SHIPMENT THEREFORE DEPARTED FOR PHILADELPHIA NOVEMBER TWENTY SEVEN LAST AND WILL ATTEMPT TO UNLOAD THIS CARGO IN THAT PORT. SAID SHIPMENT IS DESTINED TO THE RUMANIAN LEGATION, WASHINGTON D.C., CARE OF [redacted] AS SET FORTH IN NY AIRTEL TO BUREAU OCTOBER EIGHT LAST CAPTIONED SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE US DASH ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1946 PAREN BUFILE ONE ONE SEVEN DASH TWO SIX EIGHT [redacted], CUSTOMS POLICY IS TO NOTIFY THE NYO WHEN EVER A SHIPMENT OF A [redacted] DUE TO THEIR LACK OF TRAINED FOREIGN LANGUAGE AGENTS TOP EVALUATION OF SUCH SHIPMENT COULD NOT BE MADE. THEIR POLICY

b2
b7E
b7C

NY 105-6832

1 - Bufile (117-268)
1 - Washington Field (105-5527)(INFO)
1 - New York (117-192)

JM:pak (#17)
(5)

Supervisor D.P.WHITE

NOT RECORDED
28 NOV 30 1956

IS TO THEREFORE NOTIFY THE FBI INASMUCH AS EVALUATION OF SHIPMENT MAY BE OF PERTINENCY TO AN FBI INVESTIGATION. IN SUCH CASES THE NYO ARRANGES TO HAVE AN AGENT FAMILIAR WITH THE LANGUAGE PRESENT WHEN THE SHIPMENTS ARE OPENED AND EXAMINED BY CUSTOMS. INASMUCH AS SUCH A LARGE SHIPMENT OF TWENTY SIX CASES IS UNUSUAL NYO BELIEVES INSTANT SHIPMENT MAY BE OF A PROPAGANDA NATURE. MR. COSTELLO, US CUSTOMS, ADVISED THAT DEPUTY COLLECTOR HARRY FAY, US CUSTOMS, PHILADELPHIA, IF CONTACTED, COULD ARRANGE SIMILAR INSPECTION AND OBSERVATION. IN CONTACT WITH FAY, REFERENCE CAN BE MADE TO TREASURY DEPARTMENT LETTER X DASH FIVE FOUR ATED JUNE ONE, NINETEEN FIFTY FOUR, WHEREIN POLICY OF INSPECTION OF SUCH SHIPMENTS IS SET FORTH. NYO, AWARE THAT PHILADELPHIA HAS NO AGENTS FAMILIAR WITH THE RUMANIAN TONGUE, OFFERS THE THOUGHT THAT AGENTS COULD PHOTOGRAPH PART OF CONTENTS IF PHILADELPHIA CUSTOMS INSPECTS THIS SHIPMENT. NO FURTHER ACTION BEING CONTEMPLATED BY NYO.

KELLY

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: 12/7/56

FROM : W. A. Branigan

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mason
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST CLANDESTINE ATOMIC WEAPONS

(ISMAB)

The joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures (Committee B) met in the ICIS conference room, Justice Building, 10 a.m., 12/7/56. The AEC reported progress toward the engineering of semiportable radiographic detection devices. It stated that the Naval Ordnance Laboratory would probably have a semiportable device with a commercial X-ray source ready for demonstration purposes by May or June of 1957. The Naval Research Lab expected to have a similar semiportable detection device using a cobalt-60 source ready for demonstration and experimental field use by December, 1957.

The AEC representatives also reported that the Oak Ridge laboratory was working out a spectrum analyzer type of device in which a cathode tube would show a picture of the energy spectrum of a radioactive substance. This would be of assistance in analyzing contents of shipments which could not be manually examined. The only difficulty being that the energy spectrum of some radium paints appears very similar to the energy spectrum of certain fissionable weapons material.

AEC also is looking into the possible development of an active detection device which could be used against cargo. Experimentation to date has shown that <u>everything</u> within the effective range of an active device becomes activated, including the lead shielding around the suspected article. With everything in front of the device emitting radiation, there will be needed an extremely sensitive means of measuring gamma radiation and distinguishing its various sources.

Mr. Don Gale of the advisory group, composed of representatives of Customs, Coast Guard, INS, and Naval Research Lab, raised the question of tests of the operation of devices now in use by the Treasury. The Committee indicated that tests of devices and inspection of their operation were operational

117-268
cc - Belmont
D. E. Moore
Branigan
Day
Whitson
LW:blb
(6)

INDEXED-95

117-268

RECORDED - 95

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matters to be worked out by the advisory group and the Treasury Department, which has the administrative responsibility for the so-called "limited national program" for detection devices. Pursuant to a request of the ICIS, members of the Committee reviewed the various recommendations which had been made by the IIC and ICIS concerning methods of countering the threat of introduction of nuclear weapons through diplomatic shipments. The various Committee members knew of no facts which at this time were basically any different from the facts known to the committees at the time the various recommendations were first made and the consensus was that the Committee was aware of nothing which would warrant at this time reconsideration or revision of any part of the program or would warrant recommending to the President that limitation on the pouch should be made at this time.

RECOMMENDATION:

For your information. Before any reply goes from the joint committee to the ICIS, it will be presented for Bureau and IIC approval.

cc -

SECRET

Day
Whitson

117-268

December 7, 1956

Mr. J. Patrick Coyne
National Security Council
Executive Office Building
Washington 25, D. C.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
BY COURIER SERVICE

(original typed)

Dear Pat:

SMAB

b7C

On November 26, 1956, U. S. Customs in New York City advised that [redacted] carrying Diplomatic Passport Number [redacted] issued [redacted] at [redacted] had arrived at the port of New York on that date. According to Customs, [redacted] is a [redacted] was carrying a small handbag, weighing fourteen pounds and measuring two and one-half feet by one foot by six inches. This handbag caused a reaction of fourteen on the head sensitive to gamma rays. According to U. S. Customs, the bag was not searched because of [redacted] diplomatic status and [redacted] advised Customs that the bag contained his overnight clothing.

A representative of the Atomic Energy Commission office in New York stated that, in his opinion, the reaction was "very light" but that he could not make any definite statement as to what might have caused the reaction. In this regard, it is known that small "travelers' clocks" with luminous dials, which are sometimes carried by travelers, cause reaction on a detection device.

RECORDED - 95 117-268-1164

The Federal Bureau of Investigation has no information indicating a subversive background for [redacted] who was employed by the [redacted] prior to his

14 DEC 11

LW:pvp:blb
(7)

NOTE: Classified Secret because performance and reaction of detection device mentioned herein classified Secret.

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED BY Sp4 Mallamp
ON 5/14/03

DEC 7 1 2

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Holloman
Gandy

Mr. J. Patrick Coyne

b7C

United Nations employment. No investigation of [redacted] is being conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

This matter has been brought to the attention of Mr. E. Tomlin Bailey, Director, Office of Security, Department of State, and Captain John A. Waters, Director of Security, Atomic Energy Commission.

Sincerely yours,

M. Edgar Hoover

Read from 1415 12-12-56 LW

SECRET

COMMITTEE B

MINUTES OF MEETING

DECEMBER 7, 1956

OCMBC

The joint IIC-ICIS Committee (Committee B) met on Friday, December 7, 1956, at 10:00 a.m., in Room 2515, Department of Justice. The following members were present:

IIC:	Mr. Lish Whitson, Chairman - FBI Mr. Bevelyn L. Willard - Defense
ICIS:	Col. Alexander Graham - Defense Captain John R. Stewart - Treasury

****

AEC Advisor:	Mr. John S. Kelly
ICIS Secretariat:	Mr. Carl H. Pfuntner

****

Naval Research Laboratory:	Mr. Donald Gale

Covered in memo to Belmont 12-7-56. LW

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/14/03 BY SP4 [illegible]

INDEXED - 14

117-268

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117-268

1. Minutes

The Committee approved the minutes of its meeting of October 11, 1956, without change.

2. Change in IIC Membership

Mr. Willard said that Captain Jones, formerly one of the IIC members of the Committee, had been succeeded by Captain John R. Bromley.

3. Report on Meeting of [redacted] Group

Col. Hudgins and Mr. Kelly reported on a recent meeting of the [redacted] and covered the following points:

With regard to future research and detection devices [redacted] had decided

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[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

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

The [redacted] group had again recommended that there be a panel to oversee the operation of the device program and to consist of representatives of the operating agencies and the AEC. However, it was the feeling of the AEC representatives that the Advisory Group could adequately serve this purpose and that another group was not needed. It would be desirable if all members of the advisory group could obtain authorization from their respective agencies to make all of the field trips for observing the operation of devices.

The [redacted] Group had again recommended practical tests to measure the effectiveness of the program. They considered it desirable that simulated entry be undertaken, not to check against the alertness of operating personnel, but simply to check the effectiveness of the device. The Advisory Group is going to arrange for such a test.

4. AEC Training Program.

Col. Hudgins reported that his agency had approved plans for carrying out training in detection and identifying fissionable materials. This training would be accomplished during the coming summer. It was understood that the Coast Guard would make request to train 20 people and that INS was arranging for the training of about five. He emphasized that firm arrangements must be completed if this program was to be carried out. He also emphasized that the training did not cover the identification of material requiring laboratory analysis, but was only intended to enable personnel to eliminate everything but such material.

5. Preventing Entry into the United States of Radio-Active Material Through Diplomatic Shipments

The Committee considered the memorandum dated November 16, 1956, from the Chairman of ICIS on the above subject. Following discussion, it was the consensus that no developments had occurred which would warrant reconsideration of the Council's concurrence in the State Department's study of achieving international agreements relating to the above subject. (The State Department study was transmitted to the Council by memorandum dated August 21, 1956, from the Executive Secretary, NSC, and the Council concurrence in the conclusion of the study was recorded in Council Action No. 1603-b, contained in a memorandum dated September 25, 1956). The Committee also agreed that no developments had occurred which would justify any further recommendation at this time regarding the reconsideration or activation of the "standby plans" contained in Recommendations 2 and 3 of NSC 5527, dated December 1, 1955. The Secretariat was directed to prepare an appropriate reply to the ICIS memorandum along these lines.

cc- File Copy
Whitson cc-Sanders

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~~SECRET~~

The Director

12/12/56

5-14-04 CLASSIFIED BY sp/nls/BSA/DFW 60267-AAG
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (6) 5-14-2029

L. V. Boardman

SMUGGLING INTO U.S. BY RUSSIANS OF SMALL ATOMIC BOMBS;

[redacted] INFORMANT
IS - R

b1

~~RECORDED - 71~~

9 MAR

[redacted] (5)

The ASAC at Seattle was telephonically advised of this information on 12/11/56 and Seattle was instructed to make immediate arrangements [redacted] Seattle was advised it is imperative we resolve this matter one way or another at once and that the Bureau should be advised by teletype of the results.

[redacted] (2)

Bufiles fail to reveal any information identifiable with [redacted] or a [redacted]

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b7D

In attempting to evaluate this information, it is noted that in October, 1949, a reliable Chicago informant advised the Bureau he had received information from Czechoslovakia to the effect that the Minister of Information for Czechoslovakia, who had attended a Cominform conference in Rumania in September, 1949, had on his return to Prague stated that Russia "now has the atomic bomb but is unable to control it." Further, the Minister of Information had stated that Russia did not possess the "know how" at that time on how to detonate the bomb at a specific time. This was at approximately the same time as the alleged contact with

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[redacted]

cc - Boardman
Belmont
Brantigan
RRB:blb (7)

117-268
NOT RECORDED
145 JAN 7 1957
INITIALS ON ORIGINAL

~~SECRET~~

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

Memorandum for the Director
Re: Smuggling into U.S. by Russians of
Small Atomic Bombs;
[redacted] Informant
Bufile: [redacted]

1865

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[redacted] It is also noted that small atomic bombs took several years of development after the secret of the atomic bomb was worked out. In September of 1949, duplicate copies of a letter were forwarded from Czechoslovakia by an unknown individual to two firms in the United States and one firm in England to the effect that Russians planned to send atomic bombs into the U.S. and England. Inquiries made in connection with these copies of the letter did not reveal further information.

ACTION:

The foregoing is for your information. This matter is being followed closely and pressed to a logical conclusion. You will be kept advised of developments.

cc -

SAC, Seattle (orig and 1) December 17, 1

~~SECRET~~

Director, FBI

5-14-04
CLASSIFIED BY DC/NLS/BIA/DFW 60267-AAG
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (6) 5-14-2029

SMUGGLING INTO U.S. BY RUSSIANS OF SMALL ATOMIC BOMBS;

INFORMANT

b7C CANADA
b7D b1

INTERNAL SECURITY - R

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(S)

(S)

RECORDED - 24

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Enclosures (3) EX-12

117-26[illegible]

NOT RECORDED

cc - 1 - Ottawa (for info) 176 DEC 20 1956
cc - 1 - Foreign Liaison Unit
ESS:blb
(9)

COMM - FBI
DEC 12 1956
MAILED 20

~~SECRET~~

Letter for SAC, Seattle
Re: Smuggling Into U.S. by Russians of
Small Atomic Bombs; [redacted] Informant
Bufile: [redacted]

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period after the development of the atomic bomb. Your inquiries, however, should exhaust all possibilities.

As instructed telephonically on 12/11/56, the results of your contacts [redacted] the results of further interrogation(s) of [redacted] should be forwarded to the Bureau by teletype.

Bureau files contain no information identifiable with [redacted]

FD-36 (6-21-55)

FBI

Date: 12/11/56

Transmit the following message via AIRTEL

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr.

From SAC, NEW YORK (117-new)

To: DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268)

DE HOPE GOLDSCHMIDT CORP. SMAB
AEA

U.S. Customs advised "SS Steel Navigator" arrived 12/3/56, berthed Shed #1, Breakwater, Isthmanian Line Pier, foot of Columbia St., Brooklyn, NY. Examination of cargo disclosed 48 cases of tea, weight 3700 lbs., labeled "TALOON". Imported under free entry Custom Permit #333837 by importers De Hope Goldschmidt Corp., 129 Front St., NYC, shipped from Tangchong, Priok, Indonesia. Examination with secret [redacted] device of 4 cases gave reading of 120 with background of 40 for 80 count increase. Examination of single case by same device gave count of 80 with background of 40 for 40 count increase. b2 b7E

US AEC, NYC and Pure Food and Drug Administration notified by U.S. Customs. Action taken by these bureaus will be followed and Bureau advised.

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DATE 5/14/03 BY SP4 STP/ENP

KELLY

RECORDED-16
INDEXED-16

3-Bureau (117-268) RM
1-New York (117-192)
1-New York (117-new)

Mr. Belmont

117-268-1171

DEC 12 1956

JJD:EG
(6)

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. B. BOARDMAN

DATE: December 13, 1956

FROM : MR. A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING INTO U.S. BY RUSSIANS OF SMALL ATOMIC BOMBS; [redacted] INFORMANT
IS - R

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OSMAC

[redacted] (S)

At 6:20 PM, 12-12-56, SAC Auerbach, Seattle Office, telephonically advised arrangements had been made [redacted] (S)

The interview is scheduled for 12-17-56 which is the first possible date. Seattle will advise immediately of the results.

ACTION:

For your information. This will be closely followed.

DEM

cc - Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Whiteon
Mr. Branigan

(S)

NOT RECORDED
176 DEC 20 1956

16 DEC 17 1956

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4/2/04
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DECLASSIFY ON: 25X(b) 4/2/2029

SECRET

ORIGINAL FILED IN

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268) DATE: 12/14/56

FROM : SAC, SAN DIEGO (66-998)

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMB OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES

Re no number SAC Letter A dated 1/28/52 and mylet 10/1/56.

This office has no additional names to recommend for inclusion on the Bureau of Customs Watch List at this time. This matter is being closely followed and the Bureau will be kept advised of any pertinent developments.

2 - Bureau
1 - San Diego

DNG:amg
(3)

RECORDED-37

7 DEC 19 1956

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1-D

FD-36 (Rev- 3-13-56)

FBI

Date: 12/14/56

Transmit the following message via AIR-TEL

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. Nease
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268)

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (117-New)

[redacted] NY - SMAB

AEA

US Customs advised on 12/14/56 that the "SS Andria" arrived Pier 26, Brooklyn, NY on 12/11/56. Examination of cargo disclosed four cases of metal scraps consigned to [redacted] NYC, shipper British Transit. Examination by [redacted] device reflects that reading is 150 times 10. A sample weighing 2 ounces, 5 and one sixteenth of an inch in length with a diameter of three sixteenths of an inch on exam by the [redacted] device gave a 110 count increase.

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AEC notified by US Customs and Customs is sending a sample to AEC.

ALBERT ZILA, AEC, advised on 12/14/56 that he does not know if this is source or ore nuclear material at the present time but will notify the NYO upon determining this. Bureau will be advised of results.

KELLY

3-Bureau (117-268)
1-NY 117-192
1-NY 117-New

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/14/03 BY SP4BJP/KNP

Mr. Belmont

RECORDED - 15

EX-117

18 DEC 16 1956

ESP

JEH:PEH (#1)
(6)

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____

Special Agent in Charge

58 DEC 19 1956

cc - Watson

December 14, 1956

Air-Tel

RECORDED-16

SAC, New York (117-192) (orig and 1)

SMAB 117-214-1171

Reairtel 12/11/56 captioned De Hope Goldschmidt Corporation - SMAB, AEA. Check again with Customs to determine name of shipper. "Tangohong, Priok," may merely be a garble of Tandjungpriok, which is the port for Djakarta, the capital of Indonesia.

Hoover

Buffile 117-268

LW:blb
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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5/14/03 BY SP4 STA/ENP

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Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

DEC

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

SECRET

TO : MR. BOARDMAN

DATE: December 18, 1956

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

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Boardman
Belmont
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING INTO U.S. BY RUSSIANS OF SMALL ATOMIC BOMBS; [redacted] INFORMANT
INTERNAL SECURITY - R

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[redacted] b1

[redacted] (S)

[redacted] (S)

On 12/12/56 Seattle Office telephonically advised arrangements had been effected for interview [redacted] Interview was set for 12/17/56, which was the first possible date. (S)

Inspector J. A. Sizoo of this Division telephonically contacted SAC Auerbach at Seattle today to ascertain the status of this matter. Auerbach advised the Agents went to Vancouver yesterday and reviewed the [redacted] in preparation for the interview. The interview was set for this morning and the interviewing Agents are to telephonically advise Auerbach of the results. A teletype will then be sent to the Bureau. It is pointed out there is a 3-hour time difference between Seattle and here and this teletype will probably arrive tonight.

5-14-04
CLASSIFIED BY tdcn/ls/BJA/DFW 60267-AAG
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (6) 5-14-2029

ACTION:

This matter is being closely followed. It is noted [redacted] does not place much faith in information furnished by Neuhauser. (S)

[redacted]

cc: Boardman
Belmont
Brannigan
Sanders
Whitson

NOT RECORDED
176 DEC 20 1956

16 DEC 20 1956

SECRET

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L BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

DEC 18 1956

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10/28/03
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DECLASSIFY ON: (c) 10-28-2028
Per LTL DTD 10/28/03 60267 uc/NLS/B/A/RNP 10/28/03

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. Casper
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

FBI, SEATTLE 12-18-56 5-52 PM PST AFL

DIRECTOR, FBI URGENT SMAC MR. BRANIGAN

SMUGGLING INTO U. S. BY RUSSIANS OF SMALL ATOMIC BOMBS, [redacted]

[redacted] - INFORMANT, IS-R. BUFILE [redacted]

[redacted] RE CALL INSPECTOR JOSEPH SIZOO TODAY. [redacted]

[redacted]

12-19-56 Letter Jackson to SC

ORIGINAL FILED IN

END PAGE ONE

Mr. Belmont

NOT RECORDED
176 DEC 21 1956

b1

[redacted]

DETAILED REPORT (S)

BEING SUBMITTED.

AUERBACH

END

cc: MR. BELMONT
AND SUPERVISOR [redacted]
DOM. INTEL. DIVISION

9-02 PM OK FBI WA RG

~~SECRET~~

12-7-56

AIRTEL

AIRMAIL - REGISTERED - SPECIAL DELIVERY

5-14-04
CLASSIFIED BY uc/nls/BSA/DFW 60267-AAG
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (6) 5-14-2029

XXX LEGAT, OTTAWA

DIRECTOR, FBI

SMUGGLING INTO U.S. BY RUSSIANS OF SMALL ATOMIC BOMBS;
[redacted] - Informant
INTERNAL SECURITY - R

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b7D

[redacted] (S)

[redacted] (S)

b1

It would be helpful if this office could be advised should the Bureau refer this matter to Seattle. Two copies of this airtel are being enclosed for the information of the Seattle Office.

Enclosures (6)

BETHEL

GHB:njg

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~~SECRET~~

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: December 18, 1956

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST CLANDESTINE ATOMIC WEAPONS

Tolson
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Mohr
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Tele. Room
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The Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures (Committee B) at its meeting on December 7, 1956, reviewed the various recommendations which had been made by the committees concerning methods of countering the threat of introduction of nuclear weapons or components through diplomatic shipments. It was noted that the National Security Council had requested the internal security committees to keep the problem under continuing review and to report promptly if developments occurred which would warrant NSC reconsideration of the State Department's conclusion that it was not feasible at this time to enter into international agreements concerning this matter.

The various committee members knew of no facts which were basically any different from the facts known to IIC and ICIS at the time the various recommendations were first made, and the consensus of Committee B was that it was aware of nothing at this time which would warrant reconsideration or revision of any part of the program or would warrant recommending to the President that limitations should be placed at this time upon the diplomatic pouch.

The ICIS Secretariat drafted a memorandum from Committee B to the ICIS Chairman setting forth this consensus. The military members of the IIC have been consulted and agree. A copy of the proposed memorandum is attached.

ACTION:

If you approve, Liaison will inform the ICIS Secretariat that the draft memorandum may be forwarded.

Enclosure

GAD:hke
(7)

1-Mr. Boardman
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. D. E. Moore
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Mr. Day
1-Liaison Section

RECORDED - 54
INDEXED - 54

64 JAN 10 1957

CARL FFUNTNER ADVISED 1/9/57

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/14/03 BY SP4 AIT/lcp

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

DRAFT

December 11, 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. Walter Yeagley, Chairman
Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security

FROM: Lish Whitson, Chairman
Committee B

SUBJECT: Preventing Entry into the United States of Radioactive Materials Through Diplomatic Shipments (Re ICIS Problem 25).

Reference is made to your memorandum dated November 16, 1956, on the above subject.

Committee B has noted that the National Security Council (Action No. 1603-b) concurred in the conclusion of the study made by the Department of State relative to the matter of achieving international agreements relating to the above subject. We have also noted that the Council (Action No. 1603-c) requested the internal security committees to keep the problem under continuing review and report to the Council if developments occur which would warrant reconsideration of the Council's concurrence in the State Department study.

The consensus of Committee B at this time is that no developments have occurred which would warrant reconsideration of the Council's concurrence in the State Department study. The Committee is aware of no developments which would justify any further recommendation at this time regarding reconsideration or activation of the "standby plans" contained in Recommendations 2 and 3 of NSC 5527, dated December 1, 1955.

cc: Mr. Fanning
Mr. Chase
Mr. Weitzel
Mr. Doherty
Col. Graham
Mr. Canavan
Mr. Bailey
Mr. Coyne

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/14/03 BY SP4 STP/JW

memo from Mr. Belmont to Mr. Boardman 12/18/56 Lad

117-944-1174

ENCLOSURE

FD-36 (6-21-55)

FBI

Date: 12/19/56

Transmit the following message via AIRTEL

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

From SAC, NEW YORK (117-192)

To: DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268)

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. Nease
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

SMAB

ReBuairtel 12/14/56.

Re NY airtel 12/11/56 captioned "De Hope Goldschmidt Corporation - SMAB, AEA". U.S. Customs advise shipper was John Peet Company, Indonesia.

KELLY

3-Bureau (117-268) RM
1-New York (117-192)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/15/03 BY SP4 BTR/RNP

Mr. Belmont

117-268-1

RECORDED - 51

12 DEC 20

TGS:EG
(5)

INDEXED - 51

Approved: _____ Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

5-12 (Rev. 4-1-57)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
LIAISON SECTION

_____, 1957

___Director	___Mr. Bartlett
___Mr. Tolson	___Mr. Bates
___Mr. Boardman	___Mr. J.W. Brown
___Mr. Belmont	___Mr. Daunt
___Mr. Holloman	___Mr. Day
___Mr. Sizoo	___Mr. Estill
___Mr. Moore	___Mr. Ferris
___Mr. Cleveland	___Mr. Fitzgerald
	___Mr. Gaffney
___Mr. Roach	___Mr. Huelskamp
___Mr. Philcox	___Mr. Kuhrtz
	___Mr. Martin
___Mr. Baumgardner	___Mr. McArdle
___Mr. Bland	___Mr. Moynihan
___Mr. Branigan	___Mr. Onsgard
___Mr. W.C. Sullivan	___Mr. Papich
	___Mr. Short
___Mr. Callan	___Mr. Shubatt
___Mr. H.L. Edwards	___Mr. D.J. Sullivan
___Mr. Scatterday	___Mr. Wells
___Mr. Stanley	___Mr. Whaley
	___Mr. Woods b7D
___Mrs. Schwab	___Mr. Young
___Miss Dale	
___Mrs. Henley	___Mr. Stevenson
___Miss Lewis	✓ [redacted]
___Mrs. McDavid	___Mr. Whalen
	Room 1519
___Miss_____	
Room_____	___Records Branch
	___Routing Unit
___See Me Please	___Send File UTD
___Call Me Please	___Place on record
___Please Handle	and return
___Note status	___Ident Div.
and return	___Expedite
___Mail Room, 5533	Processing
___Reading Room	___Please note
5531	and return

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5/16/03 BY SP4 BAP/LMP

O.H. BARTLETT
7649 X-515

FD-36 (Rev- 3-13-56)

FBI

Date: 12/15/56

Transmit the following message via AIRTEL

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. Walters
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

TO: Director, FBI (117-268)

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (117-192)

SUBJECT: [redacted]
SMAB - AEA

On 12/14/56, US Customs, Idlewild Airport, advised that [redacted] b7C Chattanooga, Tennessee, US Passport [redacted] issued 10/27/56, at Chattanooga, arrived Idlewild Airport via Air France Flight 071, at 2:00 pm, 12/14/56. [redacted] is foreman of the Heavey Mineral Co. Chattanooga, and left US 11/14/56, via Air France and visited France for purpose of obtaining rare earth samples for comparative purposes with US samples of similiar material used in polishing glass lenses.

Customs stated samples weighed two pounds and activated apparatus to 100 red, 24 green. Customs advised AEC had no interest in material.

ALBERT ZEILER, AEC, advised that in their opinion material would not be classified as source material.

KELLY

Mr. Belmont

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/15/03 BY SP4 STA/ENP

(3) - Bureau (117-268)
1 - New York (117-192)

117-265-1176

RECORDED - 36

TGS:phw
(1-1) (5)

EX-127

1956

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

NY, NY, 12/27/56

AIRTEL

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. Nease
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

Transmit the following Teletype message to: BUREAU (117-268)

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (117-new)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268)

SUBJECT: [redacted] b7C

NY, NY - SMAB - AEC

Re NY airtel, 12/14/56.

ALBERT ZILA, Atomic Energy Commission, NYC, advised on 12/27/56, that the examination of samples of scrap from the boxes did not indicate this material was either source or nuclear.

KELLY

3 - Bureau (117-268)
1 - New York (117-new)

Mr. Belmont

TGS:mjw
(5)

117-211-1177

RECORDED - 2

DEC 28 1956

EX-103

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/15/03 BY SP4 STP/RNP

Approved: J. J. Kelly
Special Agent in Charge

Sent_____M Per_____

67 JAN 4 1957

FD-36 (Rev. 3-13-56)

FBI

Date: 12/28/56

Transmit the following message via AIRTEL

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. Nichols	
Mr. Boardman	✓
Mr. Belmont	
Mr. Mohr	
Mr. Parsons	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Tamm	
Mr. Trotter	
Mr. Nease	
Tele. Room	
Mr. Holloman	
Miss Gandy	

TO BUREAU

FROM SAC, NEW YORK

DeHOPE GOLDSCHMIDT CORPORATION-SMAB-AEA

ReNYairtel, 12/11/56.

On 12/27/56, ALBERT ZILA, AEC, NYC, advised that examination of samples of tea in instant shipment reflected this material was not considered source for nuclear.

KELLY

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5/15/03 BY SP4 BSTA/ENP

3 - Bureau (117-268) Rm
1 - NY 117-285

TJS:RCM (#1)
5

Mr. Belmont

117-268-1178

16 DEC 29 1956

RECORDED - 81

EX - 108

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

58 JAN 4 1957

117- HQ-268 1180

EBF

68-

envelope only
ALL INFORMATION ~~CONTAINED~~
~~HEREIN~~ IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5/13/03 BY SP4BTA/RNP
9448742/950935 | 997859

Belmont
Roach
Branigan
Whitson

January 7, 1957

AIRTEL

(Orig. & 1)

SAC, Baltimore

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR
PARTS THEREOF INTO THE U.S.

Anonymous hand printed letter received at Bureau, postmarked Easton, Maryland, 1-4-57, 7:30 p.m. Message reads "Mr. Hoover - There is being unloaded at P.R.R. Pier at Oxford, Maryland, some sort of contraband maybe atoms. Work on stormy nights. Flash light code signal on pier. Boat comes in without lights. Bad - careful. Work night of 12-25-56." Thereafter follows a sketch of the shore of the Chaptank River showing to the right the P.R.R. Pier and to the left a point of land with the notation watch here. The letter is signed "An American."

Inasmuch as the anonymous writer may have in mind the provisions of the atomic weapons rewards under Public Law 165, 84th Congress, you should make immediate inquiries through established sources regarding activity indicated. Make inquiry of appropriate Customs and Coast Guard officials re any prior allegations of smuggling at Oxford, Maryland. Expedite.

HOOVER

LW:ssp
(7)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5/15/03 BY SP4 BJA/RNP

RECORDED - 97

117-2[illegible]-1101

MAILED 3
JAN - 7 1957
COMM-FBI

7 JAN [illegible]

62-108

Tolson
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Boardman
Belmont
Mason
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

JAN 1 5 25 PM '57

67 JAN 10 1957 24

Whitson

January 8, 1957

AIRTEL

(Orig. & 1)

SAC, New York

SMAB
AEA

117-[illegible] 1142

RECORDED - 71

b7c

Reurairtel 1-7-57.

No record Andriamiha Bureau indices. Furnish identifying data on [redacted]

HOOVER

[illegible]-12 117-268

LW:ssp
(4)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5/15/03 BY SP4 ROSA/KMP

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mason
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

FD-36 (6-21-55)

F B I

Date: 1/7/57

Transmit the following message via AIRTEL

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. [illegible]
Tele. Room
[illegible]
Miss Gandy

From SAC, NEW YORK (117-new)

To: BUREAU (117-268)

[redacted]

SMAB
AEA

b2
b7C
b7E

Inspector PRATT, Cargo Division, U.S. Customs, advised that on 1/1/57 a five ounce sample of mineral ore arrived Idlewild Airport aboard Seaboard and Western Airlines flight 6501C. This material destined to [redacted] and was shipped by [redacted] or [redacted] On examination of material by [redacted] on 1/4/57, it registered 120 by 20 on [redacted] device when sealed and 250 by 20 when opened.

HANSON BLATZ, AEC, NYC, advised 1/7/57 material consisted of exempt amount of source material.

KELLY

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5/15/03 BY SP4BDA/ENP

3-Bureau (117-268) RM
1-New York (117-192)
1-New York (117-new)

RECORDED - 71

INDEXED - 71

[redacted]
24 JAN 8 1957

Mr. Belmont

TGS:EG
(6)

Approved: J. J. Kelly Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

[redacted] Tic[redacted]tson

January 8, 1957

AIRTEL

(Orig. & 1)

SAC, Baltimore

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS
OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE U.S.
AEA

ReBuairtel 1-7-57.

Attached are two Photostats of anonymous letter and envelope postmarked at Easton, Md., 1-4-57.

HOOVER

Enclosures - 2
117-268

LW:ssp
(4)

RECORDED - 71 117-268-1[illegible]

[redacted]

JAN - 8 1957

[redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5/15/03 BY SP4/STA/ENP

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mason
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

57 JAN 17 1957

[redacted]

SECRET

Mr. Bates
Mr. Branigan
Mr. Wacks
Liaison
Mr. Whitson

117-268

BY COURIER SERVICE

(Orig. & 1)

Date: January 8, 1957

To: Captain John A. Waters
Director of Security
Atomic Energy Commission
Room 926
1717 H Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

DECLASSIFIED BY SP4BJA/RNP
ON 5/15/03

RECORDED - 23

117-268-[illegible]

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR
PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES

b7C

On January 4, 1957, United States Customs, International Airport, New York City, advised that one [redacted] had arrived that date via Pan American Airlines. The traveler was carrying samples of radioactive ore described as samarskite, monazite, felspar and lepidolite, which he declared upon arrival. The traveler advised Customs he was affiliated with the Department of Atomic Energy of India and was destined to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He exhibited a letter from [redacted] Columbia University, dated December 6, 1956, requesting him to bring samples of Pre-Cambrian rocks for experimental purposes.

Customs advised that at one and one-half feet from the detection device these ore samples gave a reading of ninety-nine on the head sensitive to gamma radiation.

The Atomic Energy Commission Office in New York advised Customs it had no interest in these ore samples. There is no record in the indices of the FBI identifiable with U. Aswathanarayana. In the absence of any specific request, no investigation of this incident is being made.

LW:ssp (8)

NOTE: Classified Secret because degree of reaction of detection device to radioactive material classified Secret.

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mason
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

124

SECRET

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JAN 4 1957

TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. Nease
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

WA 4 BS 2 FROM NEW YORK 4 2-10 P

DIRECTOR AND SAC BOSTON ..... U R G E N T .....

SMAB. MR. POTTS, U.S. CUSTOMS, FURNISHED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION AT ELEVEN FIFTEEN A., JANUARY FOUR, NINETEEN FIFTY SEVEN. MR. POTTS ADVISED THAT ONE [redacted] b7C [redacted] ARRIVED U.S. NEW YORK INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT ABOARD FLIGHT THIRTY, PLANE SEVEN SEVEN ONE, PAN AMERICAN AIRLINES ON MORNING JANUARY FOUR, NINETEEN FIFTYSEVEN. THIS INDIVIDUAL WAS CARRYING FOUR SAMPLES OF RADIO ACTIVE ORE WHICH HE DECLARED UPON ARRIVAL. THESE SAMPLES ARE SAMARSKITE, MONAZITE, FELSPAR, AND LEPIDOLITE. PASSENGER ADVISED CUSTOMS HE WAS AFFILIATED WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF ATOMIC ENERGY, INDIA, AND DESTINED TO MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY. PASSENGER EXHIBITED LETTER FROM [redacted] COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY TO PASSENGER DATED DECEMBER SIX, NINETEEN FIFTY SIX, REQUESTING PASSENGER TO BRING IN SAMPLES OF PRECAMBRIAN ROCKS FOR EXPERIMENTAL PURPOSES. SAMPLES AT ONE AND ONE HALF FEET GAVE READING OF NINETY NINE ON SPECIAL DEVICE AT NEW YORK INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, AND NO REACTION ON RED. CUSTOMS ADVISED ZILA OF ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION WHO ADVISED NO INTEREST OF ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION IN ABOVE. NO INVESTIGATION BY NEW YORK. NEW YORK INDICES NEGATIVE ON PASSENGER.

K E L L Y

END AND ACK IN O

WA B NY R4 WA NM

BS NY R2 BS BPK

117-268

Mr. Belmont

RECORDED - 25

cc - Branigan

CONFIDENTIAL

Whitson

117-268

BY COURIER SERVICE

Date: January 9, 1957

To: Mr. Chester A. Amerlok (orig and 1)
Deputy Commissioner, Investigations
Bureau of Customs
Room 7040
Internal Revenue Service Building
Washington 25, D. C.

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

Enclosed are a Photostat of an envelope postmarked at Easton, Maryland, January 4, 1957, and a Photostat of an anonymous letter contained therein, signed "An American," alleging unloading of "some sort of contraband maybe atoms" at the "P.R.R. pier" at Oxford, Maryland.

This allegation has been brought to the attention of the Baltimore Office of this Bureau.

117-264

Would it be possible for you to give us your observations on this matter?

Enclosures (2)

RECORDED - 23 2 JAN 11 1957

BY COURIER SVC. 15 JAN 10

cc - 1 - Chief, Intelligence Division BY COURIER SERVICE
Coast Guard Headquarters
1300 E Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. (Enclosures - 2)

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mason
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

LW:blb
(12)

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED BY SP4BSTA/ENP
ON 5/15/03

Mr. Chester A. Emerick

cc - 1 - Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
Department of the Army
The Pentagon (Enclosures - 2)
Washington 25, D. C.

Attention: Chief, Security Division

cc - 1 - Director of Naval Intelligence (Enclosures - 2)
Department of the Navy
The Pentagon
Washington 25, D. C.

cc - 1 - Director of Special Investigations BY COURIER SERVICE
The Inspector General
Department of the Air Force (Enclosures - 2)
Building Tempo E
4th and Adams Drive, S. W.
Washington, D. C.

cc - 1 - Captain John A. Waters BY COURIER SERVICE
Director of Security
Atomic Energy Commission (Enclosures - 2)
Room 926
1717 H Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

cc - 1 - Mr. J. Walter Yeagley (Enclosures - 2)
Chairman
Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security
Department of Justice
Washington 25, D. C.

FD-36 (Rev. 3-13-56)

FBI

Date: 1/9/57

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

Transmit the following message via AIRTEL

REGULAR MAIL
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO: Director, FBI

FROM: SAC, Norfolk

ALLEGED RADIO ACTIVE MATERIAL ABOARD
YUGOSLAVIAN STEAMSHIP BEOGRAD,
NORFOLK, VA.
AEA

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5/15/03 BY SP4 CJA/RMP

INDEXED - 10

On 1/8/57, Capt. E. J. SUYDAN, USCG, Captain of the Port, Norfolk, Va., advised that the Yugoslav Steamship BEOGRAD recently arrived in Norfolk empty for coal bunkers. Its destination is Boston, Mass., where it will load with beans. The ship's last port of call had been Rejeika, Yugoslavia. Previous to this trip, it had taken 8,000 tons of phosphate ore from an unknown Russian port to Yugoslavia, having discharged this load on 11/29/56.

According to Capt. SUYDAN, the USCG boarded the ship at Quarantine Station, Hampton Roads, on 1/8/57 and found that the 4 booms of the aftermasts gave radio active readings of .2 milli-rontgens.

Capt. SUYDAN advised that the possibility existed that radio active material could be stored in the boom which is hollow.

A recheck of the ship was made by the USCG later on 1/8/57, using another instrument, and it was determined that the first instrument was not functioning properly, which resulted in inaccurate readings. USCG concluded there was no radiation emanating from the ship's booms as result of recheck.

Above furnished for information of Bureau and no further action being taken by Norfolk.

HOSTENY

3 - Bureau (REGISTERED MAIL)
1 - Norfolk

WMB:ajd
(4)

RECORDED - 10
INDEXED - 10
Mr. Belmont

117-268-4-1

5 JAN 10 1957

NO ACTION NECESSARY 1/9/57 LW

117-268

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: 1/10/57

FROM : W. A. Branigan

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST INTRODUCTION OF ATOMIC WEAPONS INTO THE U. S.

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mason
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SYNOPSIS:

Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures met with advisory group, 1/10/57, to discuss report of advisory group on status of present operations, capabilities and limitations of detection device program, as well as research developments and matters of operational responsibility involving Coast Guard, Customs and INS, the agencies charged with carrying out the program. Three conclusions drawn by advisory group not supported in text of report and matter referred back for revision by advisory group. ICIS Secretariat to determine from State status of negotiations with Canadian Government to permit use of portable detection devices on trains entering St. Albans, Vermont, from Canada. AEC has conducted tests of effectiveness of [redacted] portable detection device on U.S. stockpile atomic weapons and weapon components and will furnish results to Joint Committee. b2 b7E

RECOMMENDATION:

When the advisory group has revised its report, it will be discussed again in the Joint Committee and appropriate recommendations made for the IIC and ICIS. You will be kept advised of developments.

ENCLOSURE

cc - Belmont
Branigan
Day
Bates
Wannall
Harbold
(6) cbit

NOT RECORDED
146 JAN 28 1957

JAN 24 1957

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

5/15/03 SP 4B3TM/ERP

Memorandum for A. H. Belmont
Re: Countermeasures to Detect and Defend Against
Introduction of Atomic Weapons Into the U. S.

DETAILS:

Advisory group, consisting of representatives of Coast Guard, Customs and INS (agencies using detection devices for radioactive material), and Naval Research Laboratory (conducting research on devices) met with the Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures, 10 a.m., 1/10/57, in the ICIS conference room, Justice Building. A report by the advisory group on the status of present operations, capabilities and limitations of the program, including research and matters of operational responsibility among the using agencies, dated 12/21/56 was discussed. It was noted that the advisory group drew 11 conclusions as the result of their survey of the operations of the detection device program in the ports of New York; San Antonio, Texas; Laredo, Texas; and St. Albans, Vermont. These were:

(1) The present detection program is ineffective in the case of diplomats and accompanied diplomatic shipments. The only steps taken in case of a signal in such cases is notification of the FBI.

(2) Any scrutiny of diplomatic personnel or accompanied diplomatic shipments by detection devices may be considered a violation of diplomatic privileges.

(3) Research and development of additional detection devices including fluoroscopic and active methods can be justified only if they are to be used on diplomats and diplomatic shipments. Both of these methods would in all probability be interpreted as a physical search.

(4) Passive detection devices can be reasonably effective against shielded plutonium but are ineffective against shielded uranium

b2
b7E

(5) Many cargo packages could conceal significant amounts of either plutonium or uranium and avoid detection by passive devices.

(6) The normal search procedures used by Customs in the case of passengers, their effects, mail, and packaged cargo is believed a sufficient deterrent to generally preclude smuggling of atomic weapons or components by these means.

(7) The search for concealed bombs or components aboard vessels is technically ineffective.

(8) Use of the [redacted] portable detectors for vessel searches can be justified only on a deterrent basis.

(9) Definite responsibility within the agencies concerned with the operation of the program and better search techniques would result in an improved program even within the limitations of present equipment.

(10) A lead shielding wall used in conjunction with the [redacted] detector could appreciably increase the effectiveness of the sodium iodide channel. b2 b7E

(11) [redacted] installations for subsequent use can be made more effective if custom-built for the particular installation.

The members of the Joint IIC-ICIS Committee noted that there was no material in the text of the report to support conclusions 2, 3, and 6. The advisory group will supply material to insert in the body of the report in support of these conclusions or will reconsider them.

It was noted by the Joint Committee that no portable detection devices were being used on baggage entering U. S. by train from Canada through St. Albans, Vermont, although Department of State had entered negotiations with the Canadian Government to permit their use on trains between Canada and the U. S.

Memorandum for A. H. Belmont
Re: Countermeasures to Detect and Defend Against Introduction of Atomic Weapons Into the U. S.

Mr. Carl Pfuntner, ICIS Secretariat, is obtaining a status report on this matter from Mr. Warren Chase, State Department representative on ICIS Standing Committee. If no progress has been made, consideration will be given to a joint IIC-ICIS letter to State.

The advisory group report indicated that measurements had recently been made at Los Alamos on 4 nuclear weapons stockpiled by the U. S., as well as on a variety of weapon components to test the effectiveness of the portable detection device [redacted] The AEC advisor to the Joint Committee was requested to supply data to the Joint Committee regarding reaction of the portable detection device on each of the items used for the experiment. Data will be supplied. b2 b7E

SECRET cc -

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE
100-343044

5-14-04
CLASSIFIED BY 60267 uc/nb/ BJA/RNP
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X(1),(6) 5-14-2029

BY COURIER SERVICE

Date: January 10, 1957

To: Mr. R. Tomlin Bailey
Director
Office of Security
Department of State
515 22nd Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. (orig and 1)

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: SMUGGLING INTO THE UNITED STATES BY RUSSIANS
OF SMALL ATOMIC BOMBS
INTERNAL SECURITY - R

b7C
b7D

Reference is made to the memorandum from this Bureau dated December 19, 1956, in this matter. Enclosed is a copy of the report of Special Agent [redacted] dated at Seattle, December 24, 1956, regarding "Smuggling Into the United States by Russians of Small Atomic Bombs, [redacted] - Informant, Internal Security - R," which supplies additional details regarding the interview with the informant.

Copies of this report are also being furnished to Honorable Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President and to the Attorney General.

Enclosure

cc - 1 - Director BY COURIER SERVICE
Central Intelligence Agency
2430 E Street, N. W. (Enclosure)
Washington 25, D. C.

Attention: Deputy Director, Plans

LW:blp (12)
cc - 117-268 (Smuggling of Atomic Bombs, etc.)
SEE NOTE ON PAGE 2.

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mason
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

ORIGINAL FILED IN

Mr. E. Tomlin Bailey

cc - 1 - Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence (Enclosure)
Department of the Army
The Pentagon
Washington 25, D. C.

Attention: Chief, Security Division

cc - 1 - Director of Naval Intelligence (Enclosure)
Department of the Navy
The Pentagon
Washington 25, D. C.

cc - 1 - Director of Special Investigations BY COURIER SERVICE
The Inspector General
Department of the Air Force (Enclosure)
Building Tempo E
4th and Adams Drive, S. W.
Washington, D. C.

cc - 1 - Captain John A. Waters BY COURIER SERVICE
Director of Security
Atomic Energy Commission (Enclosure)
Room 926
1717 H Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

cc - 1 - Mr. J. Walter Yeagley
Chairman
Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security
Department of Justice
Washington 25, D. C. (Enclosure)

NOTE: Classified Secret because [redacted] (S) classifies Secret certain material contained in report. Of possible significance see 65-38136-1307; 100-367571; 100-367572. [redacted] (S) b1

FD-36 (6-21-55)

F B I

Date: 1/9/57

Transmit the following message via AIRTEL

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

From SAC, NEW YORK (117-285)

To: DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268)

Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

DE HOPE GOLDSCHMIDT CORP. - SMAB
AEA

Remyairtel 12/11/56.

ALBERT ZILA, US AEC, NYC, advised this date that examination of samples of 48 cases of tea reflects no indication of special nuclear or source material under terms of AEC. Cargo released by AEC, Customs and Pure Food and Drug Administration.

No further action by NYO.

KELLY

3-Bureau (117-268) RM
1-New York (117-192)
1-New York (117-285)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5/15/03 BY SP4 STP/RNP

RECORDED - 88

8 JAN 10 1957

Mr. Belmont

EX - 120

JJD:EG
(6)

JAN 25 1957

Approved: J. J. Kelly Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

FD-36 (~~5-21-55~~)

F B I

Date: 1/9/57

Transmit the following message via **AIRTEL**

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

From SAC, **NEW YORK (117-286)**

To: **DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268)**

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

PHILLIPS BROS., 70 Pine St., NY, NY - SMAB
AEA

Remyairtel 12/14/56.

ALBERT ZILA, US AEC, NYC, advised this date that total shipment to captioned company actually consisted of 17 wooden cases of 120 lbs. each and one steel drum of 960 lbs. Further, that AEC examination of samples reflected contents to be tungsten scrap and no special nuclear or nuclear source material under terms of AEA. Cargo released by AEC and Customs. No further action by NYO.

KELLY

Mr. Belmont

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5/15/03 BY SP4 CMK/RW

3-Bureau (117-268) RM
1-New York (117-192)
1-New York (117-286)

RECORDED - 40
117-268-1187

EX-SEC

JJD:EG
(6)

JAN 23 1957

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

January 17, 1957

Air-Tel

Tics: Mr. Wacks
Mr. Bates
Mr. Torrillo
Mr. Whitson

SAC, New York (117-192) (Orig. and 1)

SMAB
AEA

Per letter dtd 10/28/03
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5/15/03 BY 60267 uc/mcs/BJA/RNP
60267 uc/mcs/BJA/RNP 10/29/03

Re incident of October 29, 1956, when [redacted] and [redacted] Soviet U.N. Delegation employees, carried six small, heavy bags from Soviet-owned automobile into Soviet U.N. Delegation headquarters. Joseph J. Flynn, Bureau of Customs, New York, on 1-16-57, told Joint Committee of Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (IIC) and Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS) studying defense against smuggling of atomic weapons through diplomatic channels, that at that time Customs was maintaining no record of accompanied diplomatic shipments, but there might be record of unaccompanied shipments which would assist in identifying bags. Ask Flynn to check any available arrival data on all diplomats for October 29 and previous week, since some other nation's representative might have brought bags in for Soviets.

b7C

Hoover

117-268

MAILED 6
JAN 17 1957
FBI

RECORDED - 22

EX-17

117-268-1169

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
JAN 17 1957
COMM-FBI

LW:tw
(7)

NOTE: Joint IIC, ICIS Subcommittee on countermeasures against smuggling of atomic weapons was asked by ICIS to review incident of 10-29-56. FBI had disseminated information by memoranda of 11-1 and 11-15-56, to State, CIA, ACSI, ONI and OSI. These data also furnished to Mr. J. Walter Yeagley, Chairman ICIS and Mr. J. P. Coyne, Internal Security representative, National Security Council. AEC advisor for Joint Committee, and National Research Laboratory representative on advisory group following operation of detection devices, were unable to account for apparent weight of bags, each of which, according to Agents who observed incident, caused obvious strain on part of husky 6-foot Russian carrying it. Bags were approximately 14 inches by 14 inches by 5 inches.

Tolson
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Rosen
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Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

JAN 22 1957

January 17, 1957

Air-Tel

Tics: Mr. Wacks
Mr. Bates
Mr. Whitson

RECORDED-48

SAC, New York (117-192) (Orig. and 1)

SMAB 117-268-1196
AEA

Reurairtel 1-15-57. Check INS for arrival data and citizenship status [redacted] Since [redacted] refused to name employer, you should attempt to ascertain employment promptly, since it is possible that shipment of radioactive ore was actually for benefit of employer and [redacted] was merely dummy importer.

b7C

Hoover

117-268
LW:tw
(6)

NOTE: NY air-tel 1-7-57, advised detection device for radioactive material at port of New York reacted to small ore shipment to [redacted] Neither [redacted] nor shipper, one [redacted] could be identified in Bufiles. NY air-tel 1-15-57, states [redacted] formerly an importer in Czechoslovakia, but declined to name his present employer. [redacted] says he now is having sample of ore analyzed by AEC, the ore did not enter under an import license.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/15/03 SP/BCR/pmf

Mason
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
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Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

FD-36 (Rev. 3-13-56)

FBI

Date: 1/15/57

Transmit the following message via AIRTEL

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Rosen
Tele. Room
Miss Gandy

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (117-192)

SMAB.
AEA

Bradley b7C

ReNYairtel, 1/7/57, and Buairtel, 1/8/57.

NY indices negative on [redacted] however. NY Telephone Directory lists one [redacted] NY, HA. 6-7842. [redacted] contacted 1/14/57 and advised he was importer of textiles in pre-war days in Prague, Czechoslovakia, and had many contacts in Madagascar at that time. Stated [redacted] Madagascar, was one of these contacts who requested him recently to accept samples of ore to have it analyzed and determine from AEC if latter interested. States he communicated with AEC on this matter and is having sample of ore, mentioned NY airtel 1/7/57, analyzed to determine if AEC interested. [redacted] advised he is not actively engaged in importing any material from Europe, but merely handled this particular matter with possibility of making a little extra money. Stated he is now regularly employed, but declined to name employer as he felt if instant transaction became known he would lose his present position.

KELLY

(3) - Bureau
1 - New York (117-192)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/15/03 BY SP4 RJR/RNP

RECORDED-48 117-265-1170

Mr. Belmont

RECORDED
JAN 16 1957

TGS:imcl (#1)
(5)

1-D

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: January 9, 1957

FROM : R. R. ROACH

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF ATOMIC WEAPONS INTO THE U.S.

Tolson
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Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SMAB

Mr. Branigan's memorandum of October 22, 1956, attached, discussed the consideration by a joint IIC-ICIS sub-committee (Committee B) of the question of channeling Soviet bloc unaccompanied diplomatic baggage through the ports of New York and Georgetown (Washington, D.C.). IIC and ICIS had jointly requested Treasury to effect such channeling to facilitate search of these unaccompanied shipments. ICIS asked Treasury (Customs) to furnish monthly reports concerning all of these shipments to determine whether it would be necessary for the Department of State to restrict Soviet bloc unaccompanied diplomatic shipments to these two ports. Following review of the monthly reports, Committee B decided that "practically all of the shipments in question come to New York or Georgetown" and "the objectives of the channeling proposal are, in the main, being accomplished." The attached memorandum secured the Director's approval for the furnishing of the subcommittee's findings to ICIS.

ICIS has now prepared and approved a joint IIC-ICIS letter to Treasury which reviews the action previously taken in this matter and states that the committees have re-examined the channeling proposal and consider, since the survey indicates that practically all of the shipments in question are now being so channeled, that the objectives of the proposal are being accomplished (as noted in the attached memorandum, these shipments are now customarily searched by Customs). The letter requests, accordingly, that no further steps be taken with respect to the channeling proposal.

Copies of the proposed IIC-ICIS letter are being furnished to the other IIC members, and this will be discussed at the IIC Working Committee meeting scheduled for January 16.

ACTION:

If you approve, our position during the Working Committee consideration of the proposed letter will be

Enclosure
GAD:hke
(5)
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Mr. Day
1-Liaison Section

RECORDED - 33
INDEXED - 33

JAN 22 1957

LIAISON

Memorandum for Mr. Belmont
RE: COUNTERMEASURES AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF ATOMIC WEAPONS INTO THE U.S.

in accordance with the position approved by the Director in the attached memorandum, i.e., that since practically all the shipments in question are now entering through New York or Georgetown and since Customs is continuing its survey of such shipments, that further action need not be taken at this time.

INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL SECURITY
3527 Department of Justice, Washington 25, D. C.

DRAFT

January , 1957

Honorable George M. Humphrey
The Secretary of the Treasury
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Humphrey:

By letter dated May 25, 1955, we requested that all Soviet bloc unaccompanied diplomatic baggage, effects and shipments, including any unaccompanied pouches, be channeled through the ports of New York City and Georgetown.

By letter dated November 7, 1955, the Chairman, ICIS, requested that you have the Bureau of Customs conduct a survey which would afford information on the amounts of incoming baggage, effects and shipments of Soviet bloc personnel including any unaccompanied diplomatic pouches which might enter the country during the ensuing six months and submit reports thereon every 30 days. That survey was conducted, and reports were submitted for the six-month period, December 1955 - May 1956, inclusive.

We have now re-examined the proposal for channeling with a view to deciding whether the benefits of instituting the program would outweigh the disadvantages which might result from the notification by State to the Soviet bloc countries. We have noted the administrative difficulties regarding channeling without prior specific notifications, and consider, since the survey indicates that practically all of the shipments in question come to New York or Georgetown, that the objectives of the channeling proposal are, in the main, being accomplished. We accordingly request that no further steps be taken at this time to implement the proposal.

As you know, the ICIS by letter dated December 4, 1956, has requested that the survey by the Bureau of Customs be resumed and that monthly reports thereon be continued indefinitely. We shall carefully review these monthly reports and, should it seem appropriate at a later date, will submit further recommendations on channeling.

Sincerely yours,

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5/15/03 BY SP4 BJP/CLP

J. Edgar Hoover
Chairman, Interdepartmental
Intelligence Conference

/s/ J. Walter Yeagley

J. Walter Yeagley
Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee
on Internal Security

ENCLOSURE

62-364-1141

DRAFT

A. H. Belmont

1-15-57

W. A. Branigan

cc - Mr. Belmont
Mr. Branigan
Mr. Bartlett
Mr. Day
Mr. Roach
Mr. Shroder
Mr. Whitson

INTENSIFICATION PROGRAM

SYNOPSIS: OSNAB

State Department has referred to Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS) proposition that Los Angeles, California, terminal for Scandinavian Airlines transpolar flights, be designated as port of entry for Soviet officials traveling via Scandinavian Airlines. No "quid pro quo" by Soviets discussed. Use of West Coast port of entry by Soviets en route Washington, D. C., and New York raises security problems. Treasury Department does not have sufficient detection devices for radioactive material to establish detection program in Los Angeles without reducing coverage elsewhere.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. Respectfully recommended that matter be brought to attention of Working Committee of Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (IIC).

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/19/03 BY SP4BSA/RNP

2. When Justice, as is customary, refers question to FBI in order to obtain unified Justice Department position, FBI position should be that designation of Los Angeles as port of entry will raise serious security problems since Soviets arriving there must transit United States to reach their only destinations in New York City and Washington, D. C.; further, that if such designation necessary in order to get our representatives into U.S.S.R. through additional ports of entry, that Los Angeles should not be designated until Treasury Department able to establish suitable detection device program at airport for Scandinavian Airlines to check Soviet official personnel and Soviet diplomatic baggage or shipments.

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Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

65-63478
cc - 1 - 117-268 (Smuggling of Atomic Bombs)
LWism
(9)

117-268-1
NOT RECORDED
176 JAN 24 1957

INITIALS ON ORIGINAL

65 JAN FILED IN

Memorandum from Mr. Branigan to Mr. Belmont
Re: INTENSIFICATION PROGRAM
65-63478

DETAILS:

Mr. Ashley J. Nicholas, Passport Office, State Department, informed WFO 1-9-57, that State was considering opening Los Angeles, California, as port of entry for Soviet officials. Nicholas furnished information because he thought Bureau would experience additional security problems in covering major West Coast port entries.

Currently, Soviet personnel are permitted to enter the following ports on a reciprocal arrangement for entry of United States representatives to the U.S.S.R: by ship and plane New York; by train Laredo, Texas, and Saint Albans, Vermont; by plane only San Antonio, Texas, and Syracuse, New York, the latter port of entry to be changed in the near future to Massena, New York, because of change in airline routing. Mr. James P. McDonnell, in Mr. McLeod Office, State Department, advised Liaison Representative Bartlett that the Soviets have permitted U.S. diplomats, couriers and milita attaches to enter by more than five ports of entry in the U.S.S.R., but that permission to enter in each instance is handled by the Soviets on an individual basis.

McDonnell stated that the question was raised by State with the ICIS because the Scandinavian Airlines terminate their transpolar flights at Los Angeles and Soviet diplomats might want to travel that route. State would like to have this additional port to negotiate with if necessary. There has not been any Soviet "quid pro quo" discussed.

The matter is now being considered by the "Entry and Exit" subcommittee of ICIS. It is not known at this time whether the subcommittee will approve the proposition for referral to the Standing Committee of ICIS. When an item is reported out favorably by the subcommittee to the Standing Committee, the Justice representative on Standing Committee of ICIS requests FBI views on such item so that a Justice position can be established. Before ICIS acts finally on an item of IIC interest, ICIS should and does refer the matter to IIC for its opinion.

This is a matter of IIC interest since the opening of the West Coast at Los Angeles to Soviet diplomats en route to their only possible United States destinations in Washington, D. C., and New York raises serious security problems. Furthermore, Los Angeles could be used as a transfer point for Soviet personnel traveling to

Latin America. These factors point up the necessity for establishment in Los Angeles of a detection device program similar to that currently in effect at the International Airport, Idlewild, New York. Currently detection devices are available to Customs for use at the ports of entry indicated above. The [redacted] detection device, which is the heavy but movable device used to check personnel and baggage, has been installed at Idlewild Airport and at the San Antonio Airport. A limited number of [redacted] detectors are in use on the piers at the Port of New York. Any removal of devices now in use to fill a need at Los Angeles would reduce the effectivness of the detection device operation where it is now in effect. Customs intends to obtain ultimately 15 of these [redacted] devices, a bare minimun for use in the program as it was contemplated without any consideration of Los Angeles being designated a port of entry for Soviets.

b2
b7E

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: January 17, 1957

FROM : W. A. Branigan

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST INTRODUCTION OF ATOMIC WEAPONS INTO THE US

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
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Parsons
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Tamm
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Holloman
Gandy

Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures met with advisory group 1-16-57 to discuss further the report of advisory group on status of present operations, capabilities and limitations of detection device program, as well as research developments and matters of operational responsibility involving Coast Guard, Customs and INS. Text of report and conclusions of advisory group revised and final draft will be furnished Joint Committee within a few days. Mr. Joseph Flynn, Customs representative on advisory group, states that when a diplomat or diplomatic shipment causes reaction on detection devices, FBI and AEC in New York and Customs headquarters, Washington, are notified. Flynn has no instructions to notify Mr. Coyne, Internal Security representative, National Security Council, or the agencies which are members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee. Flynn presumes Customs headquarters, Washington, furnished such notification.

At request of ICIS, Joint Committee discussed FBI memoranda of November 1 and 15, 1956, wherein dissemination was made to interested agencies of information regarding two Soviets from Soviet U.N. Delegation who unloaded six small but extremely heavy bags from Soviet automobile and carried them one at a time into Soviet U.N. Delegation headquarters, New York. AEC representative John S. Kelly and Donald Gale, National Research Laboratory, unable to account for apparent weight of bags described 14 inches by 14 inches by 5 inches. Joseph Flynn will check Customs records, New York in attempt to determine whether entry of such bags noted during pertinent period, although Customs was not keeping record of accompanied Soviet diplomatic shipments at that time.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/19/03 SP4C0STP/RNP

RECOMMENDATION:

For your information. You will be advised of pertinent developments. When final draft of advisory report received, it will be analyzed.

Ticklers: Mr. Belmont
Mr. Branigan
Mr. Day
Mr. Bates
Mr. Whitson

RECORDED-79
INDEXED - 79
117-268-
JAN 23 1957

LW:tw
(6)

5-

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVE

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (65-63478) DATE: 1

FROM : SAC, WFO (66-2479)

SUBJECT: INPRO SMAB

Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. Nease
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

b7C

On January 9, 1957, Mr. ASHLEY J. NICHOLAS, Pass port Office, U. S. Department of State, informed SE [redacted] that a discussion arose at a recent inter-Departmental conference concerning the opening of Los Angeles, California, as a port of entry to representatives of the Soviet Union. He said the Passport Office was asked if it had any objection to Los Angeles being a port of entry. No decision was reached at this conference and the question was held over for the next inter-Departmental conference, which will be held in approximately one week from the date of this letter.

The Bureau is aware of the extended cooperation of Mr. NICHOLAS with WFO. He advised SE [redacted] he was of the opinion that the FBI might desire to express its views concerning the opening of Los Angeles as a port to the Russians. He pointed out that certain problems might be encountered in surveillances cross country, it being observed he has access to FBI reports and is aware of the fact that the Bureau uses such investigative aids. He also commented that certain problems might arise in connection with the current program of examining the passports of Soviet nationals for secret markings. He said if Los Angeles were opened as a port it might not be always possible for the passports to be examined.

Certain innate problems are obvious in the opening of a port on the West Coast to the Russians and WFO recommends the Bureau consider expressing its views to Mr. NICHOLAS through liaison channels. A port of entry on the West Coast would give the Russians an opportunity to visit that area on frequent occasions and the Bureau is aware of certain intelligence operations which have been directed in that area. WFO recommends the Bureau express opposition to the opening of Los Angeles as a port of entry for Russians.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 9/19/03 BY SP2 CAM/SAW

ORIGINAL FILED IN 65-63478-

117-268-
NOT RECORDED
176 JAN 24 1957

2 - Bureau
1 - WFO

JJJ/pcn

JAN 23 1957

51 JAN 30 1957

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: January 24, 1957

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mason
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF ATOMIC WEAPONS INTO THE U.S.

As indicated in Mr. Roach's memorandum of January 9, attached, the proposed joint IIC-ICIS letter to Treasury concerning the channeling of Soviet bloc unaccompanied diplomatic baggage through the ports of New York and Washington was discussed at the meeting of the IIC Working Committee on January 16.

There was general agreement with the position approved by the Director in the attached memorandum, i.e., that since practically all the shipments in question are now entering through New York or Georgetown and since Customs is continuing its survey of these shipments, further action need not be taken at this time.

The Working Committee agreed that a slight change in the wording of the proposed letter would be desirable. As drafted, the letter stated that the two committees were requesting that no further steps be taken at this time. The Working Committee agreed that the letter should instead indicate that the two committees are not requesting that further steps be taken at this time. The military members indicated that they would approve the letter if thus changed.

The letter has now been revised by ICIS in accordance with our suggestion and has been signed by ICIS Chairman Yeagley.

ACTION:

Attached for the approval and signature of the Director as IIC Chairman is the letter discussed above.

RECORDED-37 117-268-1193

17 JAN 29 1957

Enclosures (2)

GAD:hke
(6)
1-Mr. Boardman
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Mr. Day
1-Liaison Section

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 62-93181-4

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/19/03 BY SP4CTA/ENB

FD-36 (Rev. 3-13-56)

F B I

Date: 1/22/57

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. Nease
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

Transmit the following message via Airtel

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268)

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (117-192)

SMAB
AEA

Rebuairtel 1/17/57.

JOSEPH J. FLYNN, Assistant Surveyor of Customs, NYC, advised SA [redacted] on 1/21/57, that a review of his records for the months of September and October, 1956, reflects that the following unaccompanied diplomatic shipments were received in the U.S. consigned as indicated: b7C

1) On 9/28/56, an examination was made of a shipment which arrived on 8/3/56, consigned to [redacted] Bulgarian Delegation to U.N. Shipment consisted of three cases of clothing and household items.

2) On 10/1/56, an examination was made of a shipment which arrived on 9/13/56, consigned to a [redacted] was not further identified in Customs records although possibly identical with [redacted] Rumanian Delegation to U.N. Shipment was found to consist of one handpiece containing personal effects only.

3) On 10/2/56 an examination was made of a shipment which arrived on 9/13/56, consigned to the Polish Embassy, Washington, D.C. Shipment was found to consist of four cases consisting of books, publicity material and gifts.

(3) - Bureau (117-268)(RM)
1 - New York (117-192)

FSP:mal (#17)
(5)

RECORDED 117-268-
16 JAN 31 1957

66 FEB 5 1957

Mr. Belmont

EXAMINED

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/19/03 BY SP2 [illegible]

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

Transmit the following message via _____

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

4) On 10/16/56 an examination was made of a shipment which arrived on 9/21/56, consigned to the Soviet Delegation to the U.N., which shipment consisted of two cases containing bottles of Vodka and jars of caviar.

5) On 10/18/56 an examination was made of a shipment which arrived on 9/12/56, consigned to the Polish Delegation to the U.N. Shipment consisted of two bales containing carpets.

6) On 10/18/56 an examination was made of a shipment which arrived on 9/13/56, consigned to [redacted] the Polish Ambassador. Shipment was found to contain numerous cases consisting of household effects. b7C

7) On 10/18/56, an examination was made of a shipment which arrived on 9/12/56, consigned to the U.N. Cooperative, U.N. Headquarters. Shipment was found to contain two cases consisting of toys and dolls made of wood.

8) On 10/29/56 an examination was made of a shipment which arrived on 9/17/56, consigned to the Polish Delegation to the U.N. Shipment was found to consist of three cases of spirits and cigarettes.

9) On 10/29/56 an examination was made of a shipment which arrived 9/17/56, consigned to the Polish Embassy, Washington, D.C. Shipment was found to contain 42 cases consisting of office and food supplies. Shipment was mostly furniture and contained a safe, chairs and five small plywood drums.

FLYNN advised that inquiry with customs officials at N.Y. International Airport disclosed that only a limited amount of unaccompanied diplomatic baggage passes through

FD-36 (Rev. 3-13-56)

F B I

Date:

Page Three

Transmit the following message via _____

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

International Airport. FLYNN advised that these shipments generally consist of film and that there is no record which would indicate that the six small bags which were carried into the Soviet Delegation on 10/29/56, arrived at N.Y. International Airport.

FLYNN advised that there were no further records which might reflect any information on the bags mentioned in the incident of 10/29/56.

KELLY

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____

Special Agent in Charge

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : W. A. Branigan

DATE: 1/23/57

FROM : L. Wh

Belmont

Tolson
Nichols
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Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST INTRODUCTION OF ATOMIC WEAPONS INTO THE UNITED STATES

Smith

Memo Branigan to Belmont 1/17/57 advised that on 1/16/57 Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures discussed at request of ICIS, FBI memoranda of 11/1 and 12/5/56 wherein dissemination was made to interested agencies of information regarding two Soviets from Soviet UN Delegation who unloaded six small, but extremely heavy, bags from Soviet automobile and carried them one at a time into the Soviet UN Delegation headquarters, NY. Mr. Joseph Flynn, Assistant Surveyor, U. S. Bureau of Customs, NY, informed Joint Committee he would check Customs records in attempt to determine whether entry of such bags had been noted during pertinent period.

By letter 1/21/57 to Committee B (Joint IIC-ICIS Committee), Flynn advised he had examined records of unaccompanied baggage of Soviet bloc personnel arriving by ship and plane and found no items answering the description of the baggage in question. Flynn stated he had given details regarding these consignments to FBI, NY. (By air-tel 1/17/57 NY was instructed to check with Flynn on this matter.)

RECOMMENDATION:

As soon as details are received from our NYO, recommendations will be made regarding any action which might be taken further by the Joint Committee.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/19/03 BY SP4 STK/ENP

117-268-

NOT RECORDED
145 JAN 28 1957

cc - Branigan
Bay
Mitson

LW:blb
(4)

NY JAN 24 '57

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 62-90938-755

cc - Whitson

SAC, Los Angeles (orig & 1)

February 7, 1957

117-269

Director, FBI (105-29419)

SECRET

ALLEGED SOVIET ATOM BOMB DEPOSIT
IN MEXICO
IS - R - MEXICO

ReLAlet 1/29/57 captioned "Allegation That in Month of March 1954 Three Atomic or Hydrogen Bombs and Other War Material Delivered by Russian Submarine to General Lazaro Cardenas, (Ex-) President of Mexico, For Ultimate Use Against United States; Isadore M. Nobel, Los Angeles - Informant, Internal Security - Mexico."

A similar story originally came to the attention of the Bureau in May, 1954, through the American Ambassador to Mexico, Honorable Francis White. The allegation at that time was that a Russian submarine had landed on October 11, 1953, at Playa Azul, Michoacan, Mexico. The incident was related to Ambassador White by one [redacted] during the week of April 18, 1954. Following the visit of [redacted] b7C to the Embassy, an American in Mexico named [redacted] likewise visited Ambassador White and produced charts and drawings of a landing area on the coast of the State of Michoacan. The information was supposed to have leaked from an associate of General Cardenas whose hacienda is near Playa Azul in Michoacan. The submarine bore the letters "URS." The lettering was supposed to have been noted by several Indians (whose knowledge of the Russian alphabet was not determined). Five large objects, reported to be bombs, were described as about five feet tall and equal in diameter to a 50-gallon oil drum. In addition to these five large objects brought ashore from the submarine, a relatively large number of boxes of the proper size for carrying rifles and other heavy boxes, possibly containing ammunition, were carried ashore. There were also similar boxes containing grenades that looked like small pineapples.

10/29/03 uc/nls/BSR/RMP 60267 (Declassified)
UJ 10-28-2038
PER LTR DTD 10/29/03 60267 uc/nls/BSR/RMP 10/29/03

YELLOW DUPLICATE

Enclosure
LW:blb
(5)
cc - 117-268 (Smuggling of Atomic Bombs and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction Into The United States)

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mason
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

Letter to Los Angeles
Re: Alleged Soviet Atom Bomb Deposit in Mexico
Bufile: 105-29419

[redacted] b1

For your information, there is enclosed (S) a copy of a memorandum dated May 21, 1954, from the Legal Attache, Mexico, regarding the alleged landing of the Russian submarine at Playa Azul. The Legal Attache conducted no further investigation in the matter.

~~SECRET~~

DIRECTOR, FBI 1/29/57

SAC, LOS ANGELES (105-New - Dead)

ALLEGATION THAT IN MONTH OF MARCH 1954 THREE ATOMIC OR HYDROGEN BOMBS AND OTHER WAR MATERIAL DELIVERED BY RUSSIAN SUBMARINE TO GENERAL LAZARO CARDENAS, EX-PRESIDENT OF MEXICO, FOR ULTIMATE USE AGAINST UNITED STATES;
[redacted] LOS ANGELES - INFORMANT
INTERNAL SECURITY - MEXICO

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

[redacted] Calif., telephone [redacted] called at the Los Angeles Office and was interviewed for three hours by Security Coordinator [redacted] b7D

[redacted] stated that he has no new information and that the only reason for coming to the FBI to repeat the story, already repeated to high government officials, is that he does not feel that the serious allegations he has made of happenings in Mexico have been checked out.

[redacted] dated [redacted] in New York City [redacted] President DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER entitled [redacted] A photostatic copy is attached.

[redacted] stated that [redacted] is particularly interested [redacted] and his wife, as well as [redacted] President of an anti-Communist popular front movement in Mexico, told him in June 1954 that during the month of March 1954 three

2 - Bureau (REGISTERED)(AIR MAIL)(Enc. 11)
1 - Los Angeles

EFL:DRU
(3)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

atomic or hydrogen bombs and an unknown number of "G.Bs" were delivered by a Russian submarine to General LAZARO CARDENAS, former President of Mexico. The delivery was secretly made at CARDENAS' privately-owned harbor on the west coast of the state of Michoacan, thence transported to his retreat-estate some 100 miles eastward. b1

[redacted] b7D

[redacted] further alleged that [redacted]

[redacted] exhibited various [redacted]

[redacted] stated that the current address for [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[redacted] b1

(S)

[redacted] related the following information voluntarily concerning himself, predicating his remarks by stating that many people regarded [redacted]

[redacted] He stated that [redacted] b7D

He said this [redacted] He stated that [redacted] however [redacted]

He described himself as being [redacted] related that he has been [redacted] accompanied [redacted] where he along with [redacted] in most of the capitals of Europe. He stated that this gave him the occasion to talk with heads of governments and ambassadors of most countries. He described himself as being [redacted] He attributed his [redacted]

DESCRIPTION:

Name
Address

Age
Born
Race
Height
Weight
Hair

[redacted]

L.A. 105-New - Dead

~~SECRET~~

Eyes
Complexion
Peculiarities
Education

Occupation

[redacted]

A search of the Los Angeles indices failed to reflect any pertinent information concerning [redacted]

b7C
b7D

In view of the seriousness of [redacted] charges, the above facts are being brought to the attention of the Bureau notwithstanding the fact that he has previously presented these same facts during 1954 to the President, Vice-President, CIA, and other Government officials having direct responsibility for activities in Mexico.

There is also attached for the Bureau's information a photostat of a four-page document dated 10/10/55 from the anti-Communist organization operated by [redacted] as well as a photostat of an eighteen-page document from the same source.

[redacted] stated that [redacted]

[redacted] stated that he had been most patient in trying to get action on his allegations and that he is not unmindful that if he wanted to capitalize on his allegations he could have a long time ago given them to gossip columnists such as WALTER WINCHELL. He stated that he did not intend to do this.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

recorded 1/11/57
ebk

Laboratory Work Sheet

NO LAB FILE

Re: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES
AEA

File # 117-214
Lab. # D-244246 DJ

Examination requested by: Bureau

Date of reference communication: ~~Letter~~ 1/9/57 **Date received:** 1/10/57

Examination requested: Document

Result of Examination: **Examination by:** [redacted] b7C

Specimens submitted for examination

Q1 White envelope bearing the hand printed address "J EDGAR HOOVER FBI HEAD WASHINGTON D C ~~-D.-C.-~~," postmarked "EASTON, MD. JAN 4 1957 7:30 PM."

Q2 Accompanying one-page hand printed letter beginning "MR. HOOVER - THERE IS....," ending "....AN AMERICAN."

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5/19/03 BY 60324UCBAW/RNP

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: 1-9-57

FROM : W. A. Branigan

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES
AEA
SMAB

Hand printed envelope postmarked Easton, Maryland, 1-4-57, addressed to "J. Edgar Hoover, FBI Head, Washington, D. C.," contained hand printed letter signed "An American," complaining of "contraband maybe atoms" being unloaded at night at the "P. R. R. pier" at Oxford, Maryland.

Baltimore instructed to check established sources and appropriate Customs and Coast Guard officials 1-7-57.

A review of Bureau index cards reveals that "An American" is a frequently used signature on anonymous letters in security cases.

RECOMMENDATION:

Respectfully recommended attached anonymous letter be referred to FBI Laboratory for comparison with material in the anonymous letter file, in order to either identify the writer or identify other writings of the same person, and such other examination as the Laboratory may deem appropriate.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/19/03 BY SP4 BAM/RMP

Enclosure
117-268
LW:sm
(6)

RECORDED - 36 117-268

cc - Mr. Belmont
Mr. Branigan
Mr. Parsons
Liaison
Mr. Whitson

7-2

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

recorded 1/11/57
ebk

Laboratory Work Sheet

NO LAB FILE

Re: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES
AEA

File # 117-248-[illegible]5
Lab. # D-244246 DJ

Examination requested by: Bureau

Date of reference communication: Letter 1/9/57 **Date received:** 1/10/57

b7C

Examination requested: Document

Result of Examination:

Examination by: [redacted]

360 1-15
573-75

Specimens submitted for examination

Q1 White envelope bearing the hand printed address "J EDGAR HOOVER FBI HEAD WASHINGTON D C ~~D.C.~~," postmarked "EASTON, MD. JAN 4 1957 7:30 PM."

Q2 Accompanying one-page hand printed letter beginning "MR. HOOVER - THERE IS....," ending "....AN AMERICAN."

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/19/03 BY SP4 [illegible]

1 ENC

ENCL

79

envelope only

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5/19/03 BY SP4GOTA/ENP

ENCLOSURE 11

117-268-1175

J EDGAR HOOVER
FBI HEAD
WASHINGTON
D C ~~D.C.~~

envelope only

ALL INFORMATION ~~CONTAINED~~
~~HEREIN~~ IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5/19/03 BY SP4 GJA/RNP

Q1 D-244246 DJ
FBI
LABORATORY

ANONYMOUS COMMUNICATIONS
KEEP ENVELOPE ATTACHED

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5/19/83 BY SP1 STP/JAW

Q2 D-244246 DJ
FBI
LABORATORY

MR. HOOVER-

THERE IS BEING
UNLOADED AT P.R.R. PIER
AT OXFORD, MARYLAND
SOME SORT OF CONTRABAND
MAYBE ATOMS, WORK ON
STORMY NIGHTS. FLASH
LIGHT CODE SIGNAL ON
PIER. BOAT COMES IN
WITHOUT LIGHTS, BE-
CAREFUL. WORKED NIGHT OF
12-25-56

CHOPTANK RIVER.

POINT OF
LAND

UNLOADING

12 JAN 7 1957

117-268-1195

AN AMERICAN

son

January 23, 1957

Air-Tel

SAC, Baltimore (orig and 1)

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS
THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES

RECORDED - 36 117-264-114

ReBuairtels 1/7/57 and 1/8/57. Laboratory has compared anonymous letter with appropriate sections of anonymous letter file and national security file. Anonymous letter and envelope contain no watermarks or other identifying data which would assist in determining sources of envelope and paper. Submit results your inquiries promptly.

Hoover

Bufile 117-268

LW:blb
(4)

MAILED 10
JAN 23 1957
COMM-FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5/19/03 BY SP4 COA/ENP

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mason
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Room

64 FEB 13 1957

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. D. J. Parsons

DATE: January 15, 1957

FROM : A. K. Bowles

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mason
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES
AEA

The evidence described below was transmitted to the FBI Laboratory for examination with a memorandum from Mr. W. A. Branigan to Mr. A. H. Belmont dated January 9, 1957.

Q1 White envelope bearing the hand printed address "J EDGAR HOOVER FBI HEAD WASHINGTON D C," postmarked "EASTON, MD. JAN 4 1957 7:30 PM."
Q2 Accompanying one-page hand printed letter beginning "MR. HOOVER - THERE IS....," ending ".....AN AMERICAN."

Q1 and Q2 were compared with the appropriate sections of the Anonymous Letter File and National Security File without effecting an identification.

Q1 and Q2 do not contain any watermarks or other identifying data which would assist in determining the sources of the envelope and paper.

Q1 and Q2 are attached hereto. Photographs of Q1 and Q2 have been made.

RECOMMENDATION: Recommendation that this memorandum and attached evidence be referred to the attention of the Espionage Section of the Domestic Intelligence Division.

Enclosures (2)
117-268
D-244246 DJ
GFM:BL
(5)

RECORDED - 36

cc - Mr. Branigan

EX-125

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/19/03 BY SP4 AUTAU

cc - Whitson

February 18, 1957

Air-Tel

SAC, New York (117-192) (orig and 1)

1269

SMAE
AEA

FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/19/03 BY SP2 STP/ENP

Referral/Direct OGA

ReNYairtel 1/22/57.

Mr. J. J. Flynn, Assistant Surveyor, Bureau of Customs, New York, has furnished [redacted]

[redacted]

The Agents who made the original observations should be shown these photographs and their opinions solicited regarding the possibility that the containers noted might have been some of these. Sutel promptly. Return photos to Bureau when they are no longer needed for official purpose.

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mason
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

RECORDED-82
Buf (Rev) 117-268 + 1202
Enclosure(s) (4)
DW: blb 8
(4)

Hoover

52 FEB 21 1957

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

FEB 9 1957

TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. Nease
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy
PW

FBI NEW YORK 2-9-57 12-45 PM

DIRECTOR, FBI DEFERRED

SUBJECT, SMAB. A. HOPE, CUSTOMS OFFICE, IDLEWILD AIRPORT, NEW YORK CITY, ADVISED TODAY, [redacted] THE HAGUE, NETHERLANDS, ARRIVED IDLEWILD THIS DATE VIA KLM FLIGHT SIX TWO ONE, CARRYING RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS CONSISTING EIGHT SAMPLES ONE HUNDRED TWENTY FIVE GRAMS EACH AND FOUR SAMPLES, ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY-FIVE GRAMS EACH OF PYROCLENE NIOBIUM ORE CONCENTRATE, DESTINY DUPONT TESTING LABS, WILMINGTON, DELAWARE. SAMPLES DECLARED BY [redacted] ON MANIFEST. GREEN READING ONE HUNDRED COMPLETE. NO RED READING. A.V.ZILA, AEC, NEW YORK CITY, RELEASED MATERIALS. [redacted] CAN BE REACHED [redacted] RKO BUILDING, ROCKEFELLER CENTRE, NEW YORK CITY. NEW YORK OFFICE INDICES NEGATIVE RE EBBINGE. NO INVESTIGATION AT NYO.

b7C

RECORDED - 80
INDEXED - 80

KELLY

Mr. Belmont 1957

CORR WORD THREE ON LINE NINE SHD BE "EBBINGE"

END AND ACK 12-50 PM OK FBI WA NM

50 FEB 20 1957

cc Bridges

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/19/03 BY SP4 BOA/CNP

cc - Liaison
Whitson

RECORDED - 30

117-360 - 1205

BY COURIER SERVICE

Date: February 26, 1957

To: Mr. Chester A. [redacted] (orig and 1)
Deputy Commissioner, Investigations
Bureau of Customs
Room 7048
Internal Revenue Service Building
Washington 25, D. C.

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF
INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

Reference is made to the memorandum from this Bureau dated January 9, 1957, which furnished a Photostat of an anonymous communication, alleging unloading of "some sort of contraband maybe atoms" at Oxford, Maryland.

Enclosed is a memorandum furnishing the results of investigation by the Baltimore Office of this Bureau.

Copies of the memorandum have been furnished by our Baltimore Office locally to the Office of Naval Intelligence, the Coast Guard and the Bureau of Customs.

Enclosure

FEB 27 1957

cc - 1 - Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
Department of the Army
The Pentagon
Washington 25, D. C.

Enclosure

Attention: Chief, Security Division

BY COURIER SVC.
FEB 26
COMM - FBI

LW:blb
(11)

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mason
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

50 MAR 4 1957

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5/20/03 BY SP4 SJR/RNP

Mr. Chester A. Emerick

cc - 1 - Chief, Intelligence Division
Coast Guard Headquarters
1300 E Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.
BY COURIER SERVICE
Enclosure

cc - 1 - Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy
The Pentagon
Washington 25, D. C.
Enclosure

cc - 1 - Director of Special Investigations
The Inspector General
Department of the Air Force
Building Temps E
4th and Adams Drive, S. W.
Washington, D. C.
BY COURIER SERVICE
Enclosure

cc - 1 - Captain John A. Waters
Director of Security
Atomic Energy Commission
Room 926
1717 H Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.
BY COURIER SERVICE
Enclosure

cc - 1 - Mr. J. Walter Yeagley
Chairman
Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security
Department of Justice Building
Washington, D. C.
Enclosure

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: February 13,1957

FROM : SAC, BALTIMORE (117-46)

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS
OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE U.S.
AEA

Re Bureau Airtels to Baltimore dated 1/7/57;1/8/57; and 1/23/57.

Enclosed are five copies of blank memorandum suitable for dissemination. Copies are being designated locally by the Baltimore Office to Office of Naval Intelligence, U. S. Coast Guard, and U. S. Customs.

2 Bureau (ENCLS.-5)(REGISTERED MAIL)
1 Baltimore

DLS:gob
(3)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5/19/03 BY SP4BTA/ENP

RECORDED - 21

INDEXED - 21

FEB 15 1957

United States Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Baltimore, Maryland

February13, 1957

RE: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS
OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE U.S.

An anonymous, hand-printed letter was received by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Washington, D. C., postmarked Easton, Maryland, January 4, 1957, 7:30 P. M., which reads as follows:

> "Mr. HOOVER - There is being unloaded at P.R.R. Pier at Oxford, Maryland, some sort of contraband maybe atoms. Work on stormy nights. Flash light code signal on pier. Boat comes in without lights. Bad - careful. Work night of 12/25/56." (Thereafter follows a sketch of the shore of the Choptank Rivershowing to the right the P.R.R. Pier and to the left a point of land with the notation "watch here.") The letter is signed "An American."

On January 10, 1957, Sgt. [redacted] Maryland State Police, Barrack I, Easton, Md., who resides at Oxford, Md., and who is well acquainted in that area, advised that [redacted] doing business as the Maryland Clam Company, who resides in Oxford has a small frame building located by the pier designated in the anonymous letter previously described.

[redacted] stated [redacted] is engaged in the soft shell clam fishery and sub-leases this building from a [redacted] of Oxford b7C who leases the building and grounds from the Pennsylvania Railroad. [redacted] stated [redacted] has the clams shucked at this building and then hauls them to nearby cities in his own trucks. He said [redacted] has been so engaged for approximately the past

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5/19/03 BY SP4BSA/ENP

three years. With reference to this, [redacted] stated there has been rivalry and friction between the soft shell clam fishery and the oystermen of that area, as the oystermen feel the soft shell clam fishery ruins the oyster beds.

[redacted] has on occasion worked late in the evenings, but never on stormy nights. He would occasionally use a small skiff to row out approximately 50 feet where he would have soft shell clams submerged in water waiting his disposal. [redacted] stated if the night were stormy, neither [redacted] nor any of his employees would venture out on the water. In addition, if the night were stormy, it would be almost impossible to dock at the pier designated in the anonymous letter, inasmuch as there is only a little piling and in good weather only a small craft can dock there inasmuch as the depth of the water is six to nine feet at the pier.

b7C

[redacted] stated [redacted] is a veteran and a reputable businessman. He said it is his opinion that the anonymous letter is an attempt on the part of someone in the oyster business to possibly cause trouble for [redacted] He said it would be possible that someone might attempt to come into the pier late at night with oversized oysters or overweight rock fish, but not on a stormy night. He pointed out, however, that to leave the pier anyone hauling away such illegal oysters or fish would have to go through a portion of the town and would be very conspicuous due to the lack of traffic emanating from the Pennsylvania Railroad Pier and vicinity. With respect to the possible landing of illegal oysters or fish [redacted] reiterated that he did not believe it would be possible to dock at the pier on a stormy night, and, therefore, did not feel such a thing would have occurred. In addition, he said that due to the nature of the town and the people, he felt certain such activity would have been reported to himself or to Captain [redacted] of the Maryland Tidewater Fisheries. [redacted] said he has never received any type of complaint whatsoever concerning anyone docking at the Penna. RR Pier under suspicious circumstances.

On January 10, 1957, Capt. [redacted] District Supervisor for Department of Tidewater Fisheries, State of

Maryland, who resides at Oxford, Md., and who is Captain of the "Dorchester" advised he patrols that entire area, and has never received any complaints regarding illegal activity at the Penna. RR. Pier. Capt. [redacted] also stated it would be his opinion that friction between the oystermen and [redacted] would very possibly have caused such an anonymous letter to have been written. He also pointed out it is the contention of many oystermen that the soft shell clam fishery causes damage to result to oyster beds, and in the opinion of the oystermen, this causes a hardship upon their earning power.

b7C

Capt. [redacted] said if any illegal oysters or oversized fish or other traffic of such nature had landed at the Penna RR. Pier, he felt the matter would probably have been reported to him. He also pointed out that a ship could not draw more than nine feet of water and dock at the Penna. RR. Pier on a clear day due to the water depth being only six to nine feet. He stated he is certain that a ship would encounter tremendous difficulty in trying to dock there during stormy weather and felt it would be an almost impossibility.

On January 10, 1957, [redacted] BM3, U. S. Coast Guard, who is stationed at Tilghman, Md., where the Coast Guard 40407 vessel is assigned advised his detachment is assigned to that area and patrols Oxford, Md., and vicinity. He stated no complaints have been received there concerning any type of illegal activity possibly having occurred at the Penna. RR. Pier in Oxford. [redacted] agreed with Capt. [redacted] that it would be almost impossible to dock at the Penna. RR. Pier in stormy weather due to there being no piles to moor to where the cement wall of the pier is located.

[redacted] Md. State Police, Barracks I, Easton, Md., and Cpl. [redacted] of that Barracks, who is well acquainted in Oxford, Md., and Chief of Police, WILLIAM H. WILKINSON, of the Easton Police Department all of Easton, Md., advised on January 10, 1957, that they have not received any anonymous letters similar to instant letter. In addition, all said they have not received any complaints of any type concerning any illegal activity at the Penna. RR. Pier at Oxford.

b7C

On January 10, 1957, [redacted] Assistant Postmaster, U. S. Post Office, Easton, Md., was unable to furnish any information concerning instant letter which was postmarked from Easton, Md., January 4, 1957.

On January 10, 1957, Postmaster [redacted] and Town Officer [redacted] Oxford, Md., who are very well acquainted in that area advised [redacted] is regarded as a reputable businessman of good character, loyalty, and associates. They were unable to suggest anyone in Oxford or vicinity who might possibly have originated instant letter. They also pointed out that they did not believe it possible for a boat to dock at the Penna. RR. Pier on a stormy night and felt instant letter might have originated due to friction between the oystermen and [redacted]

On January 15, 1957, photostate copy of instant letter was exhibited to Postmaster [redacted] of Oxford and Chief of Police WILLIAM H. WILKINSON of the Easton Police Department without effecting an identification.

On January 28, 1957, [redacted] Md., advised he operates the U. S. Weather Bureau Station 1826955 at Easton which is only approximately ten miles from Oxford. [redacted] stated that due to the geography of that area, the weather conditions in Oxford and Easton are almost identical. He determined from his records that on December 25, 1956, stormy conditions definitely did not exist as reported in instant letter. He also checked his records for December 24 and December 26 of 1956, and determined the stormy conditions did not prevail on either of those dates. On December 25, 1956, the wind would not have been greater than five to ten miles per hour, inasmuch as he did not make any notation on his log. With respect to this, he said that if the wind had been greater than this velocity, he would have indicated on his log, and, therefore, he is positive that no strong wind existed. In addition, he advised the weather on December 25th was cloudy, but then cleared away after 9:00 A.M. in the morning. The barometric pressure also reflects the weather on December 25, 1956, would have been good and definitely not stormy.

Instant matter was also discussed on January 25, 1957, with the following Coast Guard and U. S. Customs officials in Baltimore, all of whom advised they had received no information or complaints which might tie in with or reflect on the matter. They also

agreed to contact the Baltimore Office immediately if any such information should be received.

U. S. Coast Guard - Baltimore Group Office.

[redacted] Operations Officer

[redacted] Intelligence Officer

Chief J. E. SANDERS, Aides to Navigation b7C

U. S. Customs

[redacted] Deputy Collector

[redacted] Deputy Collector, Outside Division

The Federal Bureau of Investigation Laboratory has compared the anonymous letter in question with appropriate section of the anonymous letter file and National Security file, and determined that the anonymous letter and envelope contained no water mark or other identifying data which would assist in determining the sources of the envelope and letter.

This memorandum and its contents are loaned to you by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and are not to be distributed outside of the agency to which loaned.

United States Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Baltimore, Maryland

February13, 1957

RE: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS
OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE U.S.

An anonymous, hand-printed letter was received by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Washington, D. C., postmarked Easton, Maryland, January 4, 1957, 7:30 P. M., which reads as follows:

b7C

"Mr. HOOVER - There is being unloaded at P.R.R. Pier at Oxford, Maryland, some sort of contraband maybe atoms. Work on stormy nights. Flash light code signal on pier. Boat comes in without lights. Bad - careful. Work night of 12/25/56." (Thereafter follows a sketch of the shore of the Choptank Rivershowing to the right the P.R.R. Pier and to the left a point of land with the notation "watch here.") The letter is signed "An American."

On January 10, 1957, Sgt. [redacted] Maryland State Police, Barrack I, Easton, Md., who resides at Oxford. Md.. and who is well acquainted in that area, advised that [redacted] doing business as the Maryland Clam Company, who resides in Oxford has a small frame building located by the pier designated in the anonymous letter previously described.

[redacted] stated [redacted] is engaged in the soft shell clam fishery and sub-leases this building from a [redacted] of Oxford who leases the building and grounds from the Pennsylvania Railroad. [redacted] stated [redacted] has the clams shucked at this building and then hauls them to nearby cities in his own trucks. He said [redacted] has been so engaged for approximately the past

three years. With reference to this, [redacted] stated there has been rivalry and friction between the soft shell clam fishery and the oystermen of that area, as the oystermen feel the soft shell clam fishery ruins the oyster beds.

[redacted] has on occasion worked late in the evenings, but never on stormy nights. He would occasionally use a small skiff to row out approximately 50 feet where he would have soft shell clams submerged in water waiting his disposal. [redacted] stated if the night were stormy, neither [redacted] nor any of his employees would venture out on the water. In addition, if the night were stormy, it would be almost impossible to dock at the pier designated in the anonymous letter, inasmuch as there is only a little piling and in good weather only a small craft can dock there inasmuch as the depth of the water is six to nine feet at the pier.

[redacted] is a veteran and a reputable businessman. He said it is his opinion that the anonymous letter is an attempt on the part of someone in the oyster business to possibly cause trouble for [redacted] He said it would be possible that someone might attempt to come into the pier late at night with oversized oysters or overweight rock fish, but not on a stormy night. He pointed out, however, that to leave the pier anyone hauling away such illegal oysters or fish would have to go through a portion of the town and would be very conspicuous due to the lack of traffic emanating from the Pennsylvania Railroad Pier and vicinity. With respect to the possible landing of illegal oysters or fish [redacted] reiterated that he did not believe it would be possible to dock at the pier on a stormy night, and, therefore, did not feel such a thing would have occurred. In addition, he said that due to the nature of the town and the people, he felt certain such activity would have been reported to himself or to Captain [redacted] of the Maryland Tidewater Fisheries. [redacted] said he has never received any type of complaint whatsoever concerning anyone docking at the Penna. RR Pier under suspicious circumstances. b7C

On January 10, 1957, Capt. WILLIAM H. COULBURN, District Supervisor for Department of Tidewater Fisheries, State of

Maryland, who resides at Oxford, Md., and who is Captain of the "Dorchester" advised he patrols that entire area, and has never received any complaints regarding illegal activity at the Penna. RR. Pier. Capt. [redacted] also stated it would be his opinion that friction between the oystermen and [redacted] would very possibly have caused such an anonymous letter to have been written. He also pointed out it is the contention of many oystermen that the soft shell clam fishery causes damage to result to oyster beds, and in the opinion of the oystermen, this causes a hardship upon their earning power.

Capt. [redacted] said if any illegal oysters or oversized fish or other traffic of such nature had landed at the Penna RR. Pier, he felt the matter would probably have been reported to him. He also pointed out that a ship could not draw more than nine feet of water and dock at the Penna. RR. Pier on a clear day due to the water depth being only six to nine feet. He stated he is certain that a ship would encounter tremendous difficulty in trying to dock there during stormy weather and felt it would be an almost impossibility. b7C

On January 10, 1957, [redacted] BM3, U. S. Coast Guard, who is stationed at Tilghman, Md., where the Coast Guard 40407 vessel is assigned advised his detachment is assigned to that area and patrols Oxford, Md., and vicinity. He stated no complaints have been received there concerning any type of illegal activity possibly having occurred at the Penna. RR. Pier in Oxford. [redacted] agreed with Capt. COULBURN that it would be almost impossible to dock at the Penna. RR. Pier in stormy weather due to there being no piles to moor to where the cement wall of the pier is located.

Lt. [redacted] Md. State Police, Barracks I, Easton, Md., and Cpl. [redacted] of that Barracks, who is well acquainted in Oxford, Md., and Chief of Police, WILLIAM H. WILKINSON, of the Easton Police Department all of Easton, Md., advised on January 10, 1957, that they have not received any anonymous letters similar to instant letter. In addition, all said they have not received any complaints of any type concerning any illegal activity at the Penna. RR. Pier at Oxford.

On January 10, 1957, [redacted] Assistant Postmaster, U. S. Post Office, Easton, Md., was unable to furnish any information concerning instant letter which was postmarked from Easton, Md., January 4, 1957. b7C

On January 10, 1957, Postmaster [redacted] and Town Officer [redacted] Oxford, Md., who are very well acquainted in that area advised [redacted] is regarded as a reputable businessman of good character, loyalty, and associates. They were unable to suggest anyone in Oxford or vicinity who might possibly have originated instant letter. They also pointed out that they did not believe it possible for a boat to dock at the Penna. RR. Pier on a stormy night and felt instant letter might have originated due to friction between the oystermen and [redacted]

On January 15, 1957, photostate copy of instant letter was exhibited to Postmaster [redacted] of Oxford and Chief of Police WILLIAM H. WILKINSON of the Easton Police Department without effecting an identification.

On January 28, 1957 [redacted] Easton, Md., advised he operates the U. S. Weather Bureau Station 1826955 at Easton which is only approximately ten miles from Oxford. [redacted] stated that due to the geography of that area, the weather conditions in Oxford and Easton are almost identical. He determined from his records that on December 25, 1956, stormy conditions definitely did not exist as reported in instant letter. He also checked his records for December 24 and December 26 of 1956, and determined the stormy conditions did not prevail on either of those dates. On December 25, 1956, the wind would not have been greater than five to ten miles per hour, inasmuch as he did not make any notation on his log. With respect to this, he said that if the wind had been greater than this velocity, he would have indicated on his log, and, therefore, he is positive that no strong wind existed. In addition, he advised the weather on December 25th was cloudy, but then cleared away after 9:00 A.M. in the morning. The barometric pressure also reflects the weather on December 25, 1956, would have been good and definitely not stormy.

Instant matter was also discussed on January 25, 1957, with the following Coast Guard and U. S. Customs officials in Baltimore, all of whom advised they had received no information or complaints which might tie in with or reflect on the matter. They also

agreed to contact the Baltimore Office immediately if any such information should be received.

U. S. Coast Guard - Baltimore Group Office.

Lt. [redacted] Operations Officer b7C

Ensign [redacted] Intelligence Officer

Chief J. E. SANDERS, Aides to Navigation

U. S. Customs

JAMES E. KENNEDY, Deputy Collector

H. P. TYSON, Deputy Collector, Outside Division

The Federal Bureau of Investigation Laboratory has compared the anonymous letter in question with appropriate section of the anonymous letter file and National Security file, and determined that the anonymous letter and envelope contained no water mark or other identifying data which would assist in determining the sources of the envelope and letter.

This memorandum and its contents are loaned to you by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and are not to be distributed outside of the agency to which loaned.

FD-36 (6-21-55)

FBI

Date: 2/12/57

AIRTEL

Transmit the following message via _____

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. Nease
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

From SAC, NEW YORK (117-192)

To: DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268)

SMAB;
AEA

Inspector HOLMGREN, US Customs, advised of arrival by ship mail of a package containing numerous mineral specimens. Package destined to [redacted] Rochester, NY. Consignor listed as [redacted] Germany. Examination of parcel at Morgan Annex Post Office, NYC, reflects one of specimens is gadolmite, which gave reading on [redacted] device of 145 by 10 at contact. ALBERT ZILA, Radiation Branch, NYOO, AEC, has advised AEC has no interest in this material and that it is not special nuclear material or source material under the terms of the AEA.

b2
b7C
b7E

For info.

KELLY

NO IDENTIFIABLE INFO. BUFILES. NO ACTION NECESSARY. LW

Mr. Belmont

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/20/03 BY SP1BDR/ENP

3 - Bureau (117-268)
1 - NY (117-192)

JJD:rjm
(5)

RECORDED - 39

INDEXED - 39

64 FEB 21 1957

10 FEB 13 1957

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____

Special Agent in Charge

4-22 (Rev. 12-17-56)

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Records Branch

2/14, 1957

- [ ] Name Check Unit - Room 6523
- [ ] Service Unit - Room 6524
- [ ] Forward to File Review
- [x] Attention Bowen
- [x] Return to Wilson 1519
  Supervisor Room Ext.

Type of References Requested:
- [ ] Regular Request (Analytical Search)
- [x] All References (Subversive & Nonsubversive)
- [ ] Subversive References Only
- [ ] Nonsubversive References Only
- [ ] Main _____ References Only

Type of Search Requested:
- [ ] Restricted to Locality of _____
- [ ] Exact Name Only (On the Nose)
- [x] Buildup [ ] Variations
- [ ] Check for Alphabetical Loyalty Form
- [x] Photo Desired

Subject [redacted]
Birthdate & Place
Address

Localities

R# _____ Date 2/14/57 Searcher Initials DRP

FILE NUMBER	SERIAL
?	65-15742-18
	W.
NI	100-18019

b7C

OIA [redacted] WWI
OFFICER IN GERMAN ARMY
RESIDED KREFELD BOCKUN
IN 1942.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5/20/03 BY SP1 [illegible] NP

5-FW

4-22 (Rev. 12-17-56)

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Records Branch

3/21, 1957

- [ ] Name Check Unit - Room 6523
- [ ] Service Unit - Room 6524
- [ ] Forward to File Review
- [x] Attention Carol
- [x] Return to Whitson 1511
  Supervisor Room Ext.

Type of References Requested:
- [ ] Regular Request (Analytical Search)
- [x] All References (Subversive & Nonsubversive)
- [ ] Subversive References Only
- [ ] Nonsubversive References Only
- [ ] Main _____ References Only

Type of Search Requested:
- [ ] Restricted to Locality of _____
- [ ] Exact Name Only (On the Nose)
- [x] Buildup [ ] Variations
- [ ] Check for Alphabetical Loyalty Form
- [x] Blind search

Subject [redacted]
Birthdate & Place _____
Address _____
b7C
Localities _____

R# _____ Date 3/21/57 Searcher Initials DPC

FILE NUMBER	SERIAL
NR!	
William	
47-4191 ← spelled	[redacted]
100-287332-2, 3 ↖ RETIRED. SARDINIA, OHIO IN 1944.	

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5/20/03 BY SP4 JTM/CNP

FD-36 (6-21-55)

F B I

Date: 2/13/57

Transmit the following message via AIRTEL

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

From SAC, NEW YORK (117-192)

To: DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268)

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. Nease
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

SMAB; BMT COMMODITY CORP.
AEA

Inspector HOLMBREN, U.S. Customs, advised of receipt at Morgan Annex Post Office, NYC, of an air parcel post package, destined to BMT Commodity Corp., importers, 233 Broadway, NYC, from [redacted] c/o Noskrelspat Co., Kristiansand, Norway. Package was declared to contain a small bottle holding 304 grams of thortveitit. Examination of package on [redacted] Device gave reading of 200 by 1 at contact. ALBERT ZILA, Radiation Branch, NYOO, AEC, has advised this office that material is of no interest to him, and is not a special nuclear material or a source material under the terms of the AEA. b7C

For information.

2-15-57
NO RECORD ON SHIPPER OR ADDRESSEE.
NO ACTION NECESSARY. LW

KELLY

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/20/03 BY SP4 [redacted] ENP

3-Bureau (117-268) RM
1-New York (117-192)

117-213-1206

18 FEB 14 1957

RECORDED - 39

INDEXED - 39

Mr. Belmont

1-D

JJD:EG
(5)

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

51 FEB 21 1957

DO-6

OFFICE OF DIRECTOR
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Mr. Tolson ✓
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman ✓
Mr. Belmont ✓
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. Jones
Mr. Nease
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5/20/03 BY SP1 BTK/ENP

EXP. PROC.

FEB 5 1957

4-22 (Rev. 12-27-56)

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Records Branch

Feb. 6, 1957

- ☐ Name Check Unit - Room 6523
- ☐ Service Unit - Room 6524
- ☐ Forward to File Review
- ☑ Attention Ewing
- ☑ Return to [illegible] 7635 2320
  Supervisor Room Ext.

Type of References Requested:
- ☐ Regular Request (Analytical Search)
- ☑ All References (Subversive & Nonsubversive)
- ☐ Subversive References Only
- ☐ Nonsubversive References Only
- ☐ Main _____ References Only

Type of Search Requested:
- ☑ Restricted to Locality of S.F. - Mt. - Jr.
- ☐ Exact Name Only (On the Nose)
- ☐ Buildup ☐ Variations b7C
- ☐ Check for Alphabetical Loyalty Form

Subject

Birthdate & Place

Address

Localities

R# _____ Date 2-6 Searcher Initials [illegible]

	FILE NUMBER	SERIAL
I	116-[illegible]	MF
I	[illegible]-9[illegible]35	9 NT
	[illegible] E. Russell	
NR	119-42	
I	116-[illegible] MF (Jr.)	
NI	65-59060	68
NI	94-[illegible]	632 I
I	100-[illegible]748 ND	975; 171 I
I	[illegible]-60154	8
Headquarters	62-60527	1598
NR	4[illegible]-[illegible]43	3

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5/20/03 BY SP4 BSR/RNP

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: February 21, 1957

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST INTRODUCTION OF ATOMIC WEAPONS INTO THE UNITED STATES

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mason
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

At the suggestion of the Joint IIC-ICIS Subcommittee (Committee B) in the captioned matter, an IIC-ICIS letter, dated March 27, 1956, was forwarded to the Secretary of State asking that arrangements be made with Canadian authorities which would permit use by Customs of portable detection devices during their regular inspections on U.S.-bound trains between Saint Johns, Quebec, and Saint Albans, Vermont. Saint Albans is one of the ports of entry utilized by Soviet bloc personnel, and the detection devices, which are sensitive to radioactive material, are used in an effort to prevent the clandestine introduction of fissionable material into the U.S. Use of the devices on board the trains would make it possible for completion of the Customs inspection between time of arrival at Saint Albans and would prevent delay of the train or the necessity of additional personnel.

The ICIS Secretariat reports that State has advised that negotiations were commenced promptly, but that the matter is still being considered within various departments of the Canadian Government. Committee B has recommended that State be requested formally to report the progress of its negotiations.

A joint IIC-ICIS letter asking State for advice regarding the status and probable outcome of the negotiations has been prepared and signed by the ICIS Chairman. The military members of IIC concur in this letter.

ACTION:

Attached for approval and signature of the Director as IIC Chairman is the joint letter described above.

Enclosure

GAD:hke
(6)
1-Mr. Boardman
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Mr. Day
1-Liaison Section

RECORDED-18 117-268-
INDEXED-18
14 FEB 26 1957

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/20/03 BY SP4 STP/RAP

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: February 21, 1957

FROM : MR. D. E. MOORE

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
Nease
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

On 2-21-57 Supervisor McAndrews, NYO, was advised that with regard to the information previously furnished concerning the arrival of Italian diplomat [redacted] on January 30, 1957, the Air Force had requested additional information concerning the bag he was carrying. Concerning the comment that it was not believed the bag contained anything of great significance because the weight, 6 pounds, is not excessive when considered with the reading on the [redacted] and [redacted] devices, the Air Force stated that it would be appreciated if additional information could be furnished in explanation and clarification of this statement. The Air Force requested this particularly in the light of prior information received that a critical mass lends itself to segmented introduction with several trips being involved, and also in view of the significant potentials involved.

b7C

McAndrews was requested to contact Albert Zila, Chief, Radiation Branch, AEC, for any additional details he could furnish.

ASAC Simon on 2-21-57, advised that Zila had been recontacted and Zila advised that his original statement was made as a result of consideration of all factors involved, particularly the size and weight of the bag. He said he could not definitely eliminate the possibility of piecemeal introduction of atomic bombs. He said the only way this could be done would be by actual examination of the contents of the bag.

Lt Col Neville OSI 2/25/57

ACTION:

This information will be furnished to OSI in accordance with their request.

DEM:mn
cc - Mr. Belmont
Mr. Branigan
Mr. Whitson
Mr. Day
(5)

ENCLOSURE

RECORDED - 17
INDEXED - 17

18 FEB 26 1957

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5/20/03 BY SP4 [illegible]

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: February 25, 1957

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mason
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF ATOMIC WEAPONS INTO THE U.S.

The National Security Council, following consideration of the IIC-ICIS report concerning limitation of the diplomatic pouch, on March 9, 1956, instructed IIC and ICIS to keep the "stand-by plans" (to be used at such time as diplomats may be required to identify material in their luggage or on their person which has activated our detection devices) under continuing review. On September 25, 1956, NSC concurred in the conclusion of a study submitted by the Department of State that neither international agreements nor unilateral U.S. action to prevent entry into the United States of radioactive materials through diplomatic shipments is feasible at this time. NSC asked IIC and ICIS to keep this problem under continuing review and to report to the Council if developments occur which would warrant reconsideration of this conclusion. On September 14, 1956, the U.S. Communications Security Board (USCSB) submitted a report to NSC which concluded that if limitations were placed upon U.S. use of the diplomatic pouch, we could maintain secure communications but could not maintain adequate communications.

The Joint IIC-ICIS Subcommittee (Committee B) in the captioned matter has reported that it is aware of no developments which would justify further recommendation at this time regarding reconsideration or activation of the "stand-by plans" or which would warrant reconsideration of NSC's concurrence in the State study above noted. An IIC-ICIS letter has been prepared addressed to NSC informing the Council of the above and noting that the two committees are maintaining a continuing review of the problem. The letter notes that should developments occur which would warrant a report to the Council by IIC and ICIS appropriate attention will be given to the USCSB report in connection with the continuing review and with any additional recommendation which might be made.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/20/03 BY SP4 CDA/ENP

ACTION:

Attached for approval and signature of the Director as

ENCLOSURE

Enclosure

RECORDED - 21

INDEXED - 21

6 FEB 27 1957

GAD:hke (6)
1-Mr. Boardman
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Mr. Day
1-Liaison Section

WHITSON

LIAISON

Memorandum from Mr. Belmont to Mr. Boardman

RE: COUNTERMEASURES AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF ATOMIC WEAPONS INTO THE U.S.

IIC Chairman is the joint IIC-ICIS letter discussed above. This letter has been concurred in by ICIS and bears the signature of the ICIS Chairman. The three military members of IIC have also concurred in this letter.

OK

SECRET

cc - Liaison (Bates)
Wacks
Whitson

Date: February 26, 1957

To: Captain John A. Waters
Director of Security
Atomic Energy Commission
Room 926
1717 H Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

BY COURIER SERVICE
(orig and 1)

RECORDED - 39

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: [redacted]
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

DECLASSIFIED BY SP4BJA/RNP
ON 8/20/03

U.S. Customs, New York City, has advised that [redacted] arrived at International Airport, New York, on Pan American Airlines, Flight No. 65, February 18, 1957. [redacted] who holds U. S. Passport No. [redacted] is the chief geologist for Yemen Development Corporation, care of Empire Trust Company, 2 West 51st Street, New York City.

[redacted] who stated he had been on a prospecting trip through Lebanon, Egypt, Arabia and Yemen, orally declared 42 small samples of ore in his personal baggage, which he was bringing into this country for laboratory analysis and assay. Six of the samples caused reactions on the [redacted] detection device as follows: green, background of 45-50, increasing to over 100; red, background of 15-20, increasing to 25. The other samples caused no reaction.

b2
b7C
b7E

Mr. Albert Zilz of the Atomic Energy Commission's New York office has stated that the six samples which caused reactions on the [redacted] device were source materials, but in view of the small amount, the material was of no interest to the Atomic Energy Commission.

cc - 1 - Detroit (for info)
NOTE: Copy furnished because [redacted] resides [redacted] Michigan.
cc - 1 - AAG Tompkins by courier same date.
LW:blb
(8)

NOTE: Classified Secret because reaction of detection device is so classified.

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mason
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

MAR 4 1957

Captain John A. Waters

There are no references identifiable with [redacted] in the indices of the FBI. There are no pertinent references to the Yemen Development Corporation. No investigation of this incident is being conducted by the FBI in the absence of a specific request.

b7C

FD-36 (Rev- 3-13-56)

FBI

Date: 2/18/57

Transmit the following message via AIRTEL

SECRET

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. Nease
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (~~117-286~~)

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (117-192) b7C

SMAB; [redacted]
AEA

On 2/18/57, Inspector H. M. SINGER, US Customs, NYC, telephonically notified NYO that [redacted] arrived International Airport, NY, on PAA flight #65 on 2/18/57 and orally declared 42 small samples of ore in personal baggage. Ore being brought into US for laboratory analysis and assay. Name on passport appears as above except that middle name on passport is misspelled as [redacted] Passport number [redacted]. Residence [redacted] Michigan. Employed as Chief Geologist for Yemen Development Corp., which has NY address c/o Empire Trust Co., 7 W. 51st St., NYC. Born [redacted] US citizen. Had been on prospecting trip in Lebanon, Egypt, Arabia, and Yemen. Now returning from Yemen. Examination by Secret [redacted] device for samples number one through number six of the samples reflected: red, average 15-20 background reading increasing to 25; green, average 45-50 increasing to over 100. Samples number 7 through number 42 were inert ores. ALBERT ZILA, Physicist, Radiation Branch, AEC, NYOO, advised that samples number one through number six were source materials, but in view of small amount, this material of no interest to AEC. Passenger and material released by AEC and customs. No further action being taken by NYO.

b2
b7C
b7E

KELLY

DECLASSIFIED BY SP4RSA/RNP
ON 5/21/03

RECORDED - 39

INDEXED - 39

3 - Bureau (117-286)
1- NY (117-192)

Mr. Belmont

EWC:rjm
(5)

1-D

27 FEB 19 1957

SECRET

Approved: J. J. Kelly Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

SECRET

cc - Liaison
Whitson

DECLASSIFIED BY SP4BJA/RNP
ON 5/20/03
Per letter dtd 10/28/03 62267 uc/NMS/BJA/RNP
10/29/03

117-265

BY COURIER SERVICE

Date: February 21, 1957

To: Mr. E. Tomlin Bailey (orig and 1)
Director
Office of Security
Department of State
515 22nd Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

RECORDED - 33

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS
THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

U.S. Customs, International Airport, New York, had advised that since February 9, 1957, Customs has been in possession of two packages consigned to the Permanent Delegation of Czechoslovakia to the United Nations. The manifest describes the contents of these packages as books and phonograph records. The shipper is shown as Artia Fso, Praha II Smecky 30. The packages were placed on a Sabena Airlines plane destined for the United States at Brussels, Belgium.

One package weighs 22 pounds and measures 17 inches by 14 inches by 7 inches. The other package weighs 40 pounds and measures 16½ inches by 12½ inches by 9 inches. X-ray machines available for inspection of cargo are not able to penetrate the packages. According to Customs, the [redacted] detection device shows no reaction but the [redacted] device shows a reading of 70+.

b2
b7E

LW:blb
(13)

NOTE: This letter classified Secret because the reaction of detection devices is so classified.

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mason
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SECRET

Mr. E. Tomlin Bailey

Customs advised that when consignees call for the packages with "free entry" papers from the U.S. Mission to the United Nations, the packages will be opened for examination to insure that the contents are as described in the manifest.

You will be informed of any pertinent developments.

cc - 1 - Captain John A. Waters — BY COURIER SERVICE
Director of Security
Atomic Energy Commission
Room 926
1717 H Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

cc - 1 - Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
Department of the Army
The Pentagon
Washington 25, D. C.

Attention: Chief, Security Division

cc - 1 - Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy
The Pentagon
Washington 25, D. C.

cc - 1 - Director of Special Investigations — BY COURIER SERVICE
The Inspector General
Department of the Air Force
Building Tempo E
4th and Adams Drive, S. W.
Washington, D. C.

cc - 1 - Director — BY COURIER SERVICE
Central Intelligence Agency
2430 E Street, N. W.
Washington 25, D. C.

Attention: Deputy Director, Plans

Mr. E. Tomlin Bailey

cc - 1 - Mr. J. Patrick Coyne
National Security Council
Executive Office Building
Washington 25, D. C.

BY COURIER SERVICE

cc - 1 - Mr. J. Walter Yeagley
Chairman
Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security
Department of Justice Building
Washington, D. C.

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

FEB 15 1957

TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Nease
Mr. Sizoo
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

WASH 13 FROM NY

15 6-41PM

DIRECTOR URGENT

Per letter dtd 10/28/03 62C67 uc/NLS/6j8/RNP 10/29/03

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/20/03 BY SP4 BJM/RNP

SMAB- SMETANA QUARTET, AEA. BUFILE ONE SEVENTEEN-TWO SIX EIGHT. DEPUTY INSPECTOR J. BURTON, US CUSTOMS, NY INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, ADVISED THAT CUSTOMS IS IN POSSESSION OF TWO PACKAGES CONSIGNED TO PERMANENT DELEGATION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA TO UN, SIX EAST SIXTY SEVENTH ST., NYC. MANIFEST DESCRIBES PACKAGE CONTENTS AS BOOKS AND PHONOGRAPH RECORDS. PACKAGES ARRIVED VIA SABENA AIRLINES FLIGHT EIGHT FIVE ONE, FEB NINE LAST. SHIPPER IS ARTIA PZO, PRAHA II SMECKY THIRTY. PACKAGES WERE PLACED ON PLANE AT BRUSSELS. MARKINGS ON PACKAGES AS FOLLOWS- "SUPRAHON OR SUPRATON SMETANA QUARTET, RECORDS SUPRAHON OR SUPRATON". PACKAGE ONE WEIGHS TWENTYTWO POUNDS, MEASURES SEVENTEEN BY FOURTEEN BY SEVEN INCHES. PACKAGE TWO WEIGHS FORTY POUNDS, MEASURES SIXTEEN AND A HALF BY TWELVE AND A HALF BY NINE INCHES. X-RAY MACHINES UNABLE TO PENETRATE PACKAGES. [redacted] SECRET DEVICE GIVES NO READING. [redacted] DEVICE READS SEVENTY TIMES FOUR. UNIDENTIFIED CZECH OFFICIALS VISITED AIRPORT FEB ELEVEN LAST TO CLEAR MATERIAL BUT WERE ADVISED TO APPLY TO US MISSION TO UN TO GET FREE ENTRY. CUSTOMS ADVISES THIS WILL TAKE ANYWHERE FROM FEW DAYS TO FEW WEEKS. [redacted] RADIATION BRANCH, AEC, NYC, ADVISES THAT AFOREMENTIONED [redacted] READING INDICATES STRONGLY THAT THERE IS MATERIAL OTHER THANF AS INDICATED ON MANIFEST IN PACKAGES. SPECULATES POSSIBILITY OF AN ITEM SUCH AS A WATCH BEING CONTAINED THEREIN. CUSTOMS ADVISES THAT WHEN CONSIGNEES RETURN WITH PROPOSED FREE ENTRY PAPERS, CUSTOMS WILL REQUIRE CONSIGNEE TO OPEN PACKAGE FOR EXAMINATION TO INSURE CONTENTS ARE AS DESCRIBED. RESULTS OF THIS EXAMINATION WILL BE FOLLOWED AND BUREAU ADVISED.

b2
b7C
b7E

RECORDED - 33

FEB 27 1957

COPY

~~SECRET~~

Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security
3527 Department of Justice, Washington 25, D. C.

February 25, 1957

Honorable John Foster Dulles
The Secretary of State
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Dulles:

Reference is made to our letter dated March 27, 1956, requesting that arrangements be worked out with the Canadian Government for the use, on U. S.-bound trains traveling in Canada, of devices which have been developed for the detection of radioactive materials.

We understand that these negotiations have been undertaken and we would like to be advised of their status and probable outcome.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5/20/03 BY SP4 STA/ENP

J. Edgar Hoover
Chairman, Interdepartmental
Intelligence Conference

SIGNED

J. Walter Yeagley
Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee
on Internal Security

RECORDED-18
18 FEB 28 1957

This is the FBI file copy. The letter was prepared in ICIS.

~~SECRET~~

(Attached to cover memorandum from Mr. Belmont to Mr. Boardman, 2/21/57, re "Countermeasures to Detect and Defend Against Introduction of Atomic Weapons Into the United States" GAD:hke)

71 MAR 5
BY COURIER SVC.
FEB 26
COMM - FBI

FD-36 (Rev- 3-13-56)

F B I

Date: 2/21/57

Transmit the following message via AIRTEL

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (117-192)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268)

RE : SHAD

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. Nease
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

ReBuairtel, 2/18/57, with which the NYO was furnished six photographs of various size film containers (13 photographs in all).

Returned herewith are the photographs furnished to NY with reBuairtel.

KELLY

3- Bureau (117-268)(Encls.13)(RM)
1- NY 117-192

EM:ras
(5)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/21/03 BY SP4LBR/RNP

RECORDED - 21

20 MAR 1 1957

Mr. Belmont

ENCLOSURE
#21

71 MAR 5 1957

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____

Special Agent in Charge

envelope only
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5/20/03 BY SP4 [illegible]

ENCLOSURE

117-20L-1215

#4 - THREE PICTURES

ONE OCTAGONAL CAN 15 1/2" ACROSS 6" WIDE -
EACH OF 8 SIDES 6" - WEIGHS 21 LBS 8 OZS
WITH 3 EMPTY REELS FOR 35 MM FILM
EMPTY REEL WEIGHS 2 LBS 3 OZS


5/21/03 SP4BJA/RNP

#4 - THREE PICTURES

ONE OCTAGONAL CAN 15 1/2" ACROSS 6" WIDE -
EACH OF 8 SIDES 6" - WEIGHS 21 LBS 8 OZS
WITH 3 EMPTY REELS FOR 35 MM FILM
EMPTY REEL WEIGHS 2 LBS 3 OZS

- - - - - - - - - - -

#4 - THREE PICTURES

ONE OCTAGONAL CAN 15 1/2" ACROSS 6" WIDE -
EACH OF 8 SIDES 6" - WEIGHS 21 LBS 8 OZS
WITH 3 EMPTY REELS FOR 35 MM FILM
EMPTY REEL WEIGHS 2 LBS 3 OZS

- - - - - - - - - -


#5

#5 - TWO PICTURES

ONE TIN 15 1/4" DIAMETER 2" WIDE,
49" CIRCUMFERENCE - WEIGHT OF TIN
AND ONE FULL REEL 35 MM FILM 12 LBS 4 OZS
FULL REEL WEIGHS 7 LBS 13 OZS
REEL DIAMETER 14 1/2"

#5 - TWO P

ONE T
49" C
AND C
FULL
REEL


ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5/21/03 BY SP4 ROTA/RNT

#6 - TWO PICTURES

ONE CAN 12" DIAMETER 4 3/4" WIDE 37 3/4" CIRCUMFERENCE CONTAINS 2 FULL REELS IN INDIVIDUAL TINS. TOTAL WEIGHT OF CAN AND CONTENTS 12 LBS 12 OZS.

WEIGHT OF ONE TIN AND FULL REEL 4 LBS 5 OZS
WEIGHT OF ONE EMPTY TIN 1 LB 2 OZS
DIAMETER OF TIN 10 1/2" - CIRCUMFERENCE 33 1/2"


5/21/03 SP4BTA/ENP

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ONE CAN 12" DIAMETER 4 3/4" WIDE 37 3/4" CIRCUMFERENCE
CONTAINS 2 FULL REELS IN INDIVIDUAL TINS. TOTAL WEIGHT
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WEIGHT OF ONE TIN AND FULL REEL 4 LBS
WEIGHT OF ONE EMPTY TIN 1 LB 2 OZS OF
DIAMETER OF TIN 10 1/2" - CIRCUM


#1
5/21/03 SPURGIN/KNP

#1 - ONE PICTURE
ONE CAN 12" SQUARE BY 23" HIGH
WEIGHS 15 LBS 15 OZS EMPTY
HOLDS 15 TINS OF 35 MM FILM
EACH TIN 11" SQUARE BY 2" HIGH
WEIGHS 7 LBS 5 OZS FULL - 3 LBS EMPTY


5/21/03 SP4000/EMP
PREPAID
LOT

#2 - TWO PICTURES

ONE ROUND CAN 12" DIAMETER, 6 3/4" HIGH, 37 1/4" CIRCUMFERENCE
18 LBS 3 OZS FULL
HOLDS 4 TINS OF 35 MM FIIM
EACH TIN 10 1/2" DIAMETER, 1 3/4" HIGH
33 1/8" CIRCUMFERENCE - 3 LBS 9 OZS FULL

5/21/03 SKHOSTA/RNP

#2 - TWO PICTURES

ONE ROUND CAN 12" DIAMETER, 6 3/4" HIGH, 37 1/4" CIRCUMFERENCE
18 LBS 3 OZS FULL
HOLDS 4 TINS OF 35 MM FILM
EACH TIN 10 1/2" DIAMETER, 1 3/4" HIGH
33 1/8" CIRCUMFERENCE - 3 LBS 9 OZS FULL

#3

#3 - THREE PICTURES

ONE OCTAGONAL CAN 15 1/2" ACROSS, 2 3/4" WIDE - EACH OF
8 SIDES 6" - WEIGHS 13 LBS 10 OZS WITH ONE EMPTY REEL FOR
35 MM FILM
EMPTY REEL WEIGHS 2 LBS 3 OZS.


RESTRICTED
ROOM 405

#3 - THREE PICTURES

ONE OCTAGONAL CAN 15 1/2" ACROSS, 2 3/4" WIDE - EACH OF
8 SIDES 6" - WEIGHS 13 LBS 10 OZS WITH ONE EMPTY REEL FOR
35 MM FILM
EMPTY REEL WEIGHS 2 LBS 3 OZS.


#3

#3 - THREE PICTURES

ONE OCTAGONAL CAN 15 1/2" ACROSS, 2 3/4" WIDE - EACH OF
8 SIDES 6" - WEIGHS 13 LBS 10 OZS WITH ONE EMPTY REEL FOR
35 MM FILM
EMPTY REEL WEIGHS 2 LBS 3 OZS.

February 28, 1957

Air-Tel

SAC, New York (117-192) (original and 1)

RECORDED - 21

SEAS

Re NYairtel 2/21/57 and NYtel same date.

Since you indicate that a large can for film designated as Item No. 4 more closely approximates the dimensions of the bags carried by Soviet personnel into the Soviet Delegation building 10/29/56 than the other items photographed, you should make inquiry of Mr. Joseph J. Flynn, Bureau of Customs, NYC, regarding dates on which such containers were shipped or brought into the United States by any Soviet bloc representatives in the quantity indicated. Expedite.

Hoover

Bufile 117-268

LT:blb
(4)

5/21/03 SP4BSJA/RNP

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mason
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

February 28, 1957

Air-Tel

4

SAC, New York (117-192) (original and 1)

RECORDED - 21

SMAB

ReNYairtel 2/21/57 and NYtel same date.

Since you indicate that a large can for film designated as Item No. 4 more closely approximates the dimensions of the bags carried by Soviet personnel into the Soviet Delegation building 10/29/56 than the other items photographed, you should make inquiry of Mr. Joseph J. Flynn, Bureau of Customs, NYC, regarding dates on which such containers were shipped or brought into the United States by any Soviet bloc representatives in the quantity indicated. Expedite.

Hoover

Bufile 117-268

LW:blb
(4)

THIS INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/21/03 BY SP4BJA/RNP

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
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Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

MAILED 2
1957
COMM-FBI

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

FEB 21 1957

TELETYPE

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Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. Nease
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

WASH 17 FROM NEW YORK 21 6-20 PM

DIRECTOR .... U R G E N T ....

SMAB. REBUAIRTEL, FEB EIGHTEEN FIFTYSEVEN, FORWARDING THIRTEEN PHOTOGRAPHS OF FILM CONTAINERS FOR VIEWING AND COMMENT BY AGENT WHO OBSERVED SOVIETS CARRYING HEAVY BAGS INTO SOVDEL ON TEN TWENTYNINE FIFTYSIX. FOR PURPOSE OF BREVITY, THE SIX EXHIBITS WILL BE REFERRED TO BY NUMBER AS DESCRIBED IN REAIRTEL. SA RICHARD W. HILL, WHO MADE THE OBSERVATION ON TEN TWENTYNINE FIFTYSIX, OFFERS FOLLOWING COMMENT. ITEM NO. ONE DASH APPEARS TO BE TOO HIGH, WIDE AND HEAVY. ITEM NO. TWO DASH APPEARS TO BE TOO LIGHT AND SOMEWHAT SMALLER THAN THE BAGS OBSERVED. ITEM NO. THREE DASH SIZE APPROXIMATES THE BAGS OBSERVED, ALTHOUGH THE WEIGHT OF TWENTYONE POUNDS SHOULD NOT CAUSE PERSON CARRYING ONE OF THESE IN A LEATHER HANDLE BAG TO STRAIN UNDER THE WEIGHT. ITEM NO. FOUR DASH CLOSELY APPROXIMATES SIZE OF BAGS OBSERVED. IT IS FURTHER NOTED WEIGHT OF THIS ITEM IS FORTYFIVE POUNDS AND WOULD CAUSE CONSIDERABLE STRAIN WHEN CARRIED IN A BAG AS THOSE USED BY SOVIETS ON TEN TWENTYNINE FIFTYSIX. ITEM NO. FIVE DASH APPEARS TO BE TOO NARROW AND LIGHT. ITEM NO. SIX DASH HEIGHT AND WEIGHT DO NOT CONFORM WITH BAGS CARRIED INTO SOVDEL. SA HILL STATED THAT ITEM NO. FOUR COULD VERY WELL BE THE OBJECT CARRIED IN THE BAGS THE SOVIETS BROUGHT INTO THE SOVDEL ON TEN TWENTYNINE FIFTYSIX. ENCLOSURES FURNISHED WITH REAIRTEL WILL BE RETURNED UNDER SEPARATE COVER.

RECORDED - 21

20 MAR 1 1957

KELLY

Mr. Belmont

PLS HOLD

5-Wash

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

~~SECRET~~

TO : W. A. Branigan

DATE: 2/27/57

FROM : L. Whitson

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mason
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF ATOMIC BOMBS INTO THE U.S.

Joint IIC-ICIS Subcommittee on Countermeasures met 2/20/57 in conference room of Tax Division, Department of Justice. Present were Mr. B. Willard, ONI and IIC representative; Mr. John Kelly, AEC advisor; Captain John R. Stewart, Coast Guard and ICIS representative; Carl Pfuntner, ICIS Secretariat; Mr. Donald Gale, Naval Research Laboratory representative of the advisory group. SA Whitson represented the FBI and IIC. Subcommittee approved minutes of its meeting of 1/16/57 (copy attached). Subcommittee noted communication from ICIS to the effect that Customs was recommencing its survey of incoming unaccompanied diplomatic shipments of the Soviet bloc (copy attached).

Subcommittee noted a memorandum from ICIS dated 2/6/57 advising that [redacted] (S) b1

ICIS requested Subcommittee to consider and comment. Mr. Pfuntner was instructed to prepare a brief reply.

Subcommittee considered memorandum from ICIS dated 2/11/57 requesting comment on ICIS proposed position that Los Angeles should not be opened as a port of entry by air to Soviet bloc personnel (copy attached). Subcommittee instructed Mr. Pfuntner to prepare a reply pointing out that Customs did not have available detection device equipment to give appropriate coverage to Los Angeles without jeopardizing what little coverage it has elsewhere.

ENCLOSURE

Subcommittee discussed 1/24/57 report of the advisory group on status of detection device program (copy attached). Pfuntner was instructed to prepare a letter of transmittal of this report to the parent committees but it was decided that pertinent comments by the Subcommittee would be held in abeyance until Colonel Alexander Graham, Defense representative from ICIS, could participate in further discussions.

RECORDED - 21 117-268-217

RECOMMENDATION: None. For your information. When drafts have been prepared by Pfuntner, they will be analyzed and recommendations made.

61 MAR 5 1957

EX-106 INDEXED - 21

cc - Branigan
Whitson
LW:blb (3)

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY: [illegible] DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (1) 10-28-2028 per letter dtd 10/28/03 [illegible] 10/28/03 10/28/03

TOP SECRET

ICIS-P25/454

February 11, 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Lish Whitson, Chairman
Committee B

FROM: J. Walter Yeagley, Chairman
Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security

SUBJECT: Opening of Los Angeles as a Port of Entry by Air for Soviet Bloc Diplomatic Personnel (Re ICIS Problem 25)

Enclosed is copy of a memorandum dated February 6, 1957, from the Chairman, ICIS Subcommittee on Entry and Exit Problems, to the Chairman, ICIS Standing Committee, on the above subject. This memorandum constitutes a reply by the ICIS Subcommittee to a memorandum dated December 21, 1956, (copy enclosed) which requested that the State Department proposal outlined in the December 21 memorandum be considered and that a recommendation be submitted from the internal security standpoint.

The memorandum from Subcommittee II is referred to your Committee for comment in view of the joint IIC-ICIS responsibility in this field. It will not be forwarded to the ICIS Standing Committee until comment by Committee B is available.

Enclosures

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DATE 5/21/03 BY S14BTA/ENP

cc: Col. Graham
Col. Hudgins
Capt. Stewart
Capt. Bromley

When the attachments are removed, this transmittal letter becomes Confidential.

TOP SECRET

ENCLOSURE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

February 6, 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: John F. Doherty, Chairman
ICIS Standing Committee

J. Patrick Coyne
NSC Representative on Internal Security

FROM: (Signed) Joseph M. Kelly, Chairman
ICIS Subcommittee on Entry and Exit Problems

SUBJECT: Opening of Los Angeles as a Port of Entry by Air for Soviet Bloc Diplomatic Personnel (Re ICIS Problem 25)

Reference is made to the Standing Committee memorandum dated December 21, 1956, instant caption.

This Subcommittee has considered the problem presented in your memorandum and recommends that the port of Los Angeles not be opened as a medium of entry by air for Soviet bloc diplomatic personnel. The Subcommittee feels that there is not sufficient justification to make a favorable recommendation. In this connection, the Subcommittee noted that there was no evidence of requests from the Government of U.S.S.R or any other Soviet Bloc Governments for use by Soviet bloc diplomatic personnel of Los Angeles air facilities. Furthermore, the Subcommittee noted that the Bureau of Customs would have difficulty, under present limitation of detection devices and personnel, in carrying out its responsibilities for screening arrivals at Los Angeles.

It is also the opinion of the Subcommittee that to open Los Angeles as a port of entry by air to Soviet bloc personnel would result in requests for the opening of additional ports, and thereby vitiate the original purpose of the policy.

cc: Mr. Canavan
Mr. Gafford (Sent to Mr. Ranta)
Mr. Chase
Col. Graham
Mr. Bailey

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5/21/03 BY SP4BJA/RNP

112-219-1217

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ENCLOSURE 11

TOP SECRET

ICIS-P25/442

December 21, 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR: William J. King, Chairman
ICIS Subcommittee on Entry and Exit Problems

FROM: John F. Doherty, Chairman
ICIS Standing Committee

SUBJECT: Opening Los Angeles as a Port of Entry by Air for Soviet Bloc Diplomatic Personnel (Re ICIS Problem 25)

At the Standing Committee meeting of December 4, 1956, the State Department member raised the above question and requested that it be referred to your Subcommittee for consideration and recommendation. He pointed out that the reason for the proposal was the introduction of Scandinavian airlines flights to Los Angeles via the Pole and the indications that there would be recurring cases of utilization of these flights by Soviet bloc personnel, partly because of the unavailability of bookings through New York. For the information of your Subcommittee, he made available a State Department internal memorandum dated October 22, 1956, containing as an attachment a memorandum of conversation dated September 11, 1956. Copies are enclosed.

The Standing Committee agreed that the proposal should be referred to your Subcommittee for consideration and recommendation, and agreed further that your attention should be drawn to the fact that the basic NSC policy on [redacted] provides, among the elements in the program of countermeasures for the detection and prevention of clandestine introduction and detonation of atomic weapons, the channeling of entry of Soviet bloc diplomatic personnel through a limited number of U. S. ports by means of individual visa designation (Paragraph 20-b (8)). As you know, the number of U. S. ports through which these entries have been channeled has been limited to five. Accordingly, your Subcommittee is requested to consider the State Department proposal and submit a recommendation as to the advisability from the internal security standpoint, of increasing the number of ports of entry by adding Los Angeles as a port of entry by air. b2

Enclosure

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5/21/63 BY SP4BDA/RNP

cc: Capt. Stewart
Mr. Kelly
Cmdr. Joyce
Mr. Valenza
Mr. Nicholas
Mr. Emerick

T2857-10

TOP SECRET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

COPY

TO: SCA - Mr. Warren Chase DATE: October 22, 1956

FROM: EE - Edward L. Freers /s/

SUBJECT: Opening Los Angeles Port of Entry by Air

In view of the introduction of the SAS Polar Flight from Scandinavia to Los Angeles and heavy booking of Europe-New York air line schedules, it is my impression that there will be recurring cases of Soviet bloc nationals wishing to utilize the Polar flight to the United States, in some cases because bookings through New York are unavailable.

The situation on reciprocity is that the Soviet authorities permit entry by Americans into the Soviet Union by air, sea, and rail from a number of points in Europe and Asia. The situation as we know it is described in the attached memorandum. So far as rail, air and sea entry points are concerned, Soviet practices are somewhat more liberal than those of the United States.

In view of the foregoing, EE recommends that you consult with ICIS members and arrange for the adding of Los Angeles as a point of entry --by air only-- to the others authorized.

Attachment:

Memorandum of Conversation concerning Ports of Entry to Mr. Freers.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5/21/03 BY SP4 BDA/ENP

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

117-319-1317

ENCLOSURE - 2

C
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P
Y

EE - Mr. Edward L. Freers

September 11, 1956

EE - Robert O. Blake /s/

Ports of Entry

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5/21/03 BY SP4RTA/RNP

U.S.S.R. Practices:

(1) Entry by air: The USSR appears to permit entry by air over any international air route flying into the Soviet Union. So far as US Government personnel are concerned, however, entry into the Soviet Union from China is excluded and air routes between the Soviet Union and Japan are not in operation. Therefore, the only known Asian air route American diplomats have used has been from Kabul to Tashkent.

On the European side, air routes are open from Helsinki direct to Moscow, the Scandinavian countries via Riga, Berlin and Warsaw via Vilnius, Vienna via Lvov, and the Balkan countries via Kiev, Odessa and perhaps other cities. American diplomats are not permitted to leave the airport in closed cities such as Riga, Vilnius or Lvov.

The situation for unofficial Americans appears to be the same as for diplomats.

(2) Sea travel: American diplomats have entered or departed from the Soviet Union via Leningrad and Nakhodka on the Pacific Coast. I do not know of any Americans who have entered through the Black Sea, although presumably the Soviets would permit such travel on ships calling at Odessa or some other Black Sea port which was open (on the same basis as Nakhodka). The American Naval Attache was denied permission to travel by sea from Pekhlevi in Iran to Baku some eighteen months ago, although Justice Douglas was permitted to enter the Soviet Union by this route, and other diplomats, including the British Ambassador, have also been permitted to take it.

(3) Train: American diplomats have been permitted to enter the Soviet Union by train from Helsinki, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania, and presumably are permitted to cross the border on any of the regularly scheduled international trains across these borders. An American diplomat has also been permitted to travel from Ankara to Soviet Armenia across the Turkish border by train.

(4) Auto: So far as I know, no American diplomats have been permitted to cross the border of the Soviet Union by car and have been obliged to load their automobiles on freight cars and have them transported by rail across the closed border zones.

Non-diplomatic personnel have on occasion been permitted to cross the border by car. The first such occasion appears to have been a dentist from Chicago, who crossed the Finnish-Soviet border a year or so ago. A recent case, I believe, was [redacted] who obtained permission to drive from Poland to the Soviet Union two or three months ago. b7C

ENCLOSURE 21

117-[illegible]-1217

~~SECRET~~

ICIS-P25/453

February 6, 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Lish Whitson,
Chairman, Committee B

FROM: J. Walter Yeagley, Chairman
Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security

SUBJECT: Smuggling into the United States by Russians of Small Atomic Bombs (Re ICIS Problem 25)

Enclosed is copy of a memorandum dated December 19, 1956, from the Director, FBI, to the Director, Office of Security, Department of State, regarding information on the above subject which was furnished by a native of Czechoslovakia, now residing in Canada.

A further memorandum dated January 10, 1957, from the Director, FBI, to the Director, Office of Security, Department of State, enclosed a copy of an investigative report on the individual mentioned above. Copy of this report will be available for the use of your Committee in considering this matter.

The memorandum dated December 19, 1956, was placed on the agenda for the ICIS meeting which took place on February 5, 1957. In preparation for that meeting the CIA was requested to supply information on (1) the earliest date at which it is estimated that the Russians had developed an atomic bomb, and (2) the general status in 1949 of the Russian atomic weapons development and research program. A reply to that request was not received from CIA until after the meeting of February 5. Copy of the reply, dated February 4, 1957, is also enclosed.

The ICIS, at its meeting on February 5, 1957, noted the memorandum of December 19, 1956, and agreed that it should be referred to your Committee for consideration and comment.

Enclosures

cc: Col. Graham
Col. Hudgins
Capt. Bromley
Capt. Stewart

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5/21/03 BY SP4/STP/ENP

~~SECRET~~

117-969-1017

ENCLOSURE

CONFIDENTIAL

C O P Y

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington 25, D. C.
BY COURIER SERVICE

Date: December 19, 1956

TO: Mr. E. Tomlin Bailey
Director
Office of Security
Department of State
515 22nd Street, N.W.
Washington, D. C.

FROM: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING INTO UNITED STATES BY RUSSIANS OF SMALL ATOMIC BOMBS
INTERNAL SECURITY - R

On December 17, 1956, a source, whose reliability is unknown, advised representatives of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and of the [redacted]

b7D
b7C

[redacted]

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5/21/03 BY SP4BCA/RNP

CONFIDENTIAL

NW-214-1111

ENCLOSURE

b7D

This information has been furnished to Honorable William H. Jackson, Special Assistant to the President, in addition to those agencies listed below.

cc - 1 - Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy, the Pentagon

Captain John A. Waters
Director of Security
Atomic Energy Commission

Director of Special Investigations
The Inspector General
Department of the Air Force

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
Department of the Army, the Pentagon

Director
Central Intelligence Agency

Mr. J. Walter Yeagley
Chairman, ICIS

CONFIDENTIAL

ICIS-P25/455

February 12, 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Lish Whitson, Chairman
Committee B

FROM: J. Walter Yeagley, Chairman
Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security

SUBJECT: Survey of Incoming Unaccompanied Diplomatic Packages and Shipments of Soviet Bloc Personnel (Re ICIS Problem 25)

Enclosed for information and completion of files is copy of a letter dated January 16, 1957, from the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, and enclosures thereto on the above subject. This letter is a response to the ICIS letter of December 4, 1956, which contained a request to Treasury that the survey in question be resumed and continued indefinitely. It will be noted that the monthly reports thereon will be commenced as soon as possible after February 1, 1957. These reports will be referred to Committee B as received.

Enclosures

Noted 2-20-57

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5/21/03 BY SP4BSTA/RNP

cc: Col. Graham
Col. Hudgins
Capt. Bromley
Capt. Stewart

117-964-1217

CONFIDENTIAL

5-ltr

ENCLOSURE

20

January 22, 1957

E R R A T U M

Bureau of Customs Collectors Circular Letter No. X-205 dated December 19, 1956, should be corrected to read Special Circular No. X-205.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5/21/03 BY SP4 BSA/ENP

112-261-1217

ENCLOSURE

Recd 2-1-57 from FCIS LW

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

COMMITTEE B

MINUTES OF MEETING

JANUARY 16, 1957

Committee B met at 10:00 a.m., in Room 2515, Department of Justice. The following members were present:

IIC: Mr. Lish Whitson, Chairman - FBI
Mr. Dwight L. Willard - Defense
Mr. Graham Day - FBI

ICIS: Capt. John B. Stewart - Treasury
Col. Alexander Graham - Defense

* * *

Advisory Group: Mr. Donald E. Gale
Naval Research Laboratory

Mr. Allen W. Cortbell
Immigration & Naturalization Service

Lt. Cdr. Garth D. Clizbe
Coast Guard

Mr. Joseph J. Flynn
Bureau of Customs

* * *

AEC Advisor: Mr. John Kelly

ICIS Secretariat: Mr. Carl H. Pfuntner

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5/21/03 BY SP4STAF/ENP

Approved 2-20-57

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

62-964-1917

5-FBI

1. Minutes

The Committee approved the minutes of its meeting of January 10, 1957, without change.

2. Progress Report from Advisory Group on the Detection Device Program

In accordance with the agreement at the last meeting (see Item 2, minutes of January 10, 1957) the Advisory Group had re-examined the conclusions of its report dated December 21, 1956, and had prepared revisions intended to afford the conclusions more adequate support. The Advisory Group had also prepared amendments of a clarifying nature. Copies of the additional wording and amendments of the December 21 report were distributed.

Following discussion, final amendments to the report of the Advisory Group were agreed on, and it was agreed that the report as revised would be prepared for consideration by Committee B. (Copy of revised report, dated January 24, 1957, was distributed on January 30, 1957.)

3. United Nations Personnel - USSR

The Committee considered the memoranda dated November 1 and November 15 from the Director, FBI, to the Director, Office of Security, Department of State. Copies of these memoranda had been referred to Committee B by a memorandum dated January 7, 1957, from the Chairman, ICIS.

It was agreed that the Bureau of Customs should ascertain whether its records on unaccompanied shipments would afford any further information pertinent to the matter discussed in the memoranda of November 1 and November 15, 1956. Mr. Flynn agreed to handle this inquiry and to notify Committee B of his findings. Further consideration was postponed pending the results of the Customs inquiry. (NOTE: Results of the Customs inquiry were embodied in a letter dated January 21, 1957, from Mr. Flynn to Mr. Whitson, copy of which is enclosed.)

Next Meeting

The Committee will meet next at the call of the Chairman to consider the following:

1. Approval of the minutes of January 16, 1957.

2. Progress Report by Advisory Group on the Detection Device Program (See Item 2 above.) Amended report dated January 24, 1957, distributed on January 30, 1957.

3. United Nations Personnel - USSR - Further consideration of the memoranda dated November 1 and 15, 1956, is pending the result of inquiry within the Bureau of Customs. (See Item 3 above.)

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

FROM : W. A. Branigan

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS

DATE: 3/1/57

Pee letter dtd 10/28/03 62-117468 Sec 95A/RNP 10/29/03
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5/21/03 BY SP2 BSK/RNP

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mason
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

By memo 2/21/57 Bureau disseminated to State, AEC, CIA, IIC agencies, Coyne and Yeagley information concerning two packages manifested as containing phonograph records consigned to Permanent Delegation of Czechoslovakia to the United Nations which caused a reaction on the [redacted] detection device although the [redacted] detection device, which is more sensitive, showed no reaction. Customs intends to open these packages and examine them when Czech consignees call for them. Consignees have not yet called.

On 2/27/57 Mr. Gilbert Levy, OSI, inquired of SA Day of Bureau liaison as to the significance of the reading on the [redacted] device and also expressed wonder that the [redacted] showed no reaction.

Mr. D. E. Moore inquired of the New York Office regarding these questions.

b2
b7E

At 5:50 p.m., 2/28/57, Field Supervisor McDonald of the NYO phoned and informed Mr. Cleveland that Leonard Solon, AEC, NY, stated that the reaction on the [redacted] could possibly be from a static eliminator brush packed with the phonograph records. Solon stated this was only an assumption. The lack of reaction on the [redacted] could have been possibly because of the position of the device and the packages and other packages which could have shielded the ones in question.

At 1:25 p.m., 3/1/57, Field Supervisor McDonald again called from NY and stated that Mr. Joseph Flynn, Assistant Surveyor, U.S. Customs, NY, had advised that the packages had been rechecked with both the [redacted] devices and no reaction was forthcoming on either device. Mr. Flynn, who was formerly the Customs representative on an advisory group which supervised the operation of the detection devices at various ports of entry, expressed the opinion that since there was no reading at the present time on either device that the radioactivity which had initially caused a reaction on the [redacted] must have come from something in the area of the packages rather than from within the packages at the time the reading on the [redacted] device was obtained.

LW:blb (6)
117-268
cc - Belmont
D. E. Moore
Branigan
Day
Whitson

RECORDED - 54 117-268-1316
18 MAR 5 1957

57 MAR 13 1957

EX 105

Memorandum for A. H. Belmont:
Re: Smuggling of Atomic Bombs
Bufile: 117-268

RECOMMENDATION:

These data have been relayed to Mr. Levy's office by SA Day. A memo is being prepared confirming this to OSI and furnishing similar information to other interested agencies.

CONFIDENTIAL

cc - Watson
Whitson

4

117-268

DECLASSIFIED BY SP4BJA/RNP
ON 5/21/03
Per letter dtd 10/28/03 602671uc/nlg/BJA/RNP 10/29/03

Date: March 4, 1957 BY COURIER SERVICE

To: Mr. E. Tomlin Bailey (orig and 1)
Director
Office of Security
Department of State
515 22nd Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS
THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

Reference is made to the memorandum from this Bureau dated February 21, 1957, advising that two packages consigned to the Permanent Delegation of Czechoslovakia to the United Nations, manifested as books and phonograph records, had caused a reaction on the [redacted] detection device. b7C

According to Mr. Leonard Solon, Atomic Energy Commission, New York, the reaction could possibly have been caused by a static eliminator brush and the lack of reaction on the [redacted] might have been due to shielding of the packages by reason of their position with respect to the [redacted] device.

On March 1, 1957, Mr. Joseph Flynn, Assistant Surveyor, U. S. Customs, New York, advised the New York Office of the FBI that the packages had been rechecked with both the [redacted] and [redacted] devices and no reaction was forthcoming on either device. Mr. Flynn expressed the opinion that the radioactivity which had initially caused a reaction on the [redacted] device might have come from something in the area of the packages rather than within the packages.

RECORDED - 33

You will be informed of any further pertinent developments.

20 MAR 5 1957

LW:blb ~~SENT TO BRANIGAN TO BELMONT, SAME SUBJECT~~
(13)

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mason
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. E. Tomlin Bailey

cc - 1 - Captain John A. Waters
Director of Security
Atomic Energy Commission
Room 926
1717 H Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

BY COURIER SERVICE

cc - 1 - Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
Department of the Army
The Pentagon
Washington 25, D. C.

Attention: Chief, Security Division

cc - 1 - Director of Naval Intelligence
Department of the Navy
The Pentagon
Washington 25, D. C.

cc - 1 - Director of Special Investigations
The Inspector General
Department of the Air Force
Building Tempo E
4th and Adams Drive, S. W.
Washington, D. C.

BY COURIER SERVICE

cc - 1 - Director
Central Intelligence Agency
2430 E Street, N. W.
Washington 25, D. C.

BY COURIER SERVICE

Attention: Deputy Director, Plans

Mr. E. Tomlin Bailey

cc - 1 - Mr. J. Patrick Coyne
National Security Council
Executive Office Building
Washington 25, D. C.

BY COURIER SERVICE

cc - 1 - Mr. J. Walter Yeagley
Chairman
Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security
Department of Justice Building
Washington, D. C.

FD-36 (6-21-55)

F B I

Date: 3/4/57

Transmit the following message via AIRTEL

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. [illegible]
Tele. Room
[illegible]

From SAC, NEW YORK (117-290)

To: DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268)

SMAB;
AEA

b7C

Remytel 2/15/57.

Deputy Inspector J. BURTON, U.S. Customs, advised this date that two packages still in possession of U.S. Customs and NYO will be notified of any effort to obtain same and results of inspection. Bureau will be kept advised.

KELLY

3-Bureau (117-268) RM
1-New York (117-192)
1-New York (105-18346)
1-New York (117-290)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5/21/03 BY SP4CSR/RNP

Mr. Belmont

RECORDED - 81

JJD:EG
(7)

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

FD-36 (Rev. 3-13-56)

F B I

Date: 3/1/57

Transmit the following message via AIRTEL

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/21/03 BY SP4 KSR/RNP
Per letter dtd 10/28/03 6026? ac/NRS/ajm/RNP 10/29/03

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

SNAB-AEA [redacted] b7C

Re NY airtel to Bureau, 2/15/57.

On 2/28/57, JOSEPH FLYNN, Assistant Surveyor of Customs, NYC, advised that on 2/15/57, he was notified by Customs at Idlewild Airport that material registered reaction on [redacted] Device but showed no reaction when exposed [redacted] device. FLYNN, at that time, ordered material to again be exposed to [redacted] device which, according to FLYNN, was negative on second exposure. b2 b7E

On 3/1/57, FLYNN had material again exposed to [redacted] devices and reported that on this date, material failed to register reading on either instrument.

[redacted] b7D confidentially advised [redacted]

KELLY

3 - Bureau (RM)
1 - New York (117-192)

TGS:DMO (#1)
(5)

Mr. Belmont

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

cc [redacted]on

March 8, 1957

EX-122

Air-Tel

SAC, New York (117-192) (orig and 1)

SMAB [redacted]

ReNYairtel 3/5/57 and Buairtel 2/28/57.

RECORDED-48

Check Customs for any records to show date or dates shipments of film arriving in U.S. consigned to Soviet Delegation to United Nations during September, 1956, were actually released to representatives of that Delegation.

Hoover

Bufile 117-268

L.W:blb
(4)

[redacted] CONTAINED
[redacted] UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5/21/03 BY SP4BOA/ENP

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mason
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

MAILED 6
MAR 8 1957
COMM-FBI

FD-36. (Rev. 3-13-56)

F B I

Date: 3/5/57

Transmit the following message via AIRTEL

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268)

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (117-192)

SMAB

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/21/03 BY SP4BAM/RMP

Re Bureau airtel, 2/28/57, and NY teletype, 2/21/57.

NY teletype reflects that a large can for film, designated as item number 4, more closely approximates dimensions of the bags carried by Soviet personnel into the Soviet Delegation building, 10/29/56, than the other items photographed.

At request of JOSEPH J. FLYNN, Mr. IRVING FISHMAN, Deputy Collector, Restricted Materials, US Customs, was contacted on 3/4/57 regarding dates on which such containers were shipped or brought into the US by any Soviet bloc representative and the quantity indicated.

Mr. FISHMAN advised that a review of his records reflected no record of material of this type arriving in the US during October, 1956. However, FISHMAN advised that during the early part of September, 1956, 35,000 ft. of film arrived in the US and during the latter part of September, 1956, 2,800 ft. of film arrived in the US. Both shipments were destined to the Soviet Delegation to the UN, 680 Park Ave., NYC, although the exact dates that this film arrived in the US was not known to FISHMAN.

FISHMAN advised that the large can of film designated as item number 4 holds approximately 6,000 ft. of film. It should be noted that the 37,800 ft. of film which arrived in September would therefore fill approximately six of the large cans mentioned above.

3 - Bureau (117-268) (RM)
1 - NY 117-192

RECORDED-48

FSP:mld (#17-0)
(5)

Mr. Belmont

Approved: _____ Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

FD-36. (Rev. 3-13-56)

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following message via _____

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

NY 117-192

FISHMAN further advised that although this shipment arrived in September it did not follow that the film was actually "picked up" by the Soviets in September as there may have been some delay in the Soviets' claiming of the film.

Further, it should be noted that [redacted] is the [redacted] of the Soviet Delegation and his duties include procuring of supplies and bringing in materials to the Soviet Delegation, while [redacted] is a [redacted]. It would therefore appear that it would be the responsibility of [redacted] for seeing that film designated for the Soviet Delegation was properly picked up and delivered. b7C

Further, it should be noted that if this film arrived in September that it was possibly taken to the Glen Cove Estate first and later brought to the Soviet Delegation in NYC if it was actually received by the Soviets in September.

Although FISHMAN could not be certain, he advised that it is possible that the film which arrived in September composed the six bags which were taken into the Soviet Delegation on 10/29/56. FISHMAN advised that no other shipments arriving for either the Soviet or Soviet bloc countries would resemble the six bags which were carried into the Soviet Delegation on 10/29/56.

KELLY

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____

Special Agent in Charge

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: 3/7/57

FROM : W. A. Branigan

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mason
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

5/21/03 SP/EC/TA/ENP
948742/950935/997059

b7C

Liaison Representative Bates phoned from AEC 3/7/57 that the AEC representatives in NY had advised their headquarters that the actual originator of the suspect shipment at the Java Street Pier, Greenpoint, Brooklyn, was [redacted] described as the [redacted] Bates advised that AEC records indicated [redacted] had been born [redacted] in [redacted] and that his name was originally [redacted] has been at Brookhaven National Laboratory, an AEC facility on Long Island, as a guest [redacted] since mid-1956.

Bufiles indicate [redacted] entered U.S. 2/13/56 at port of New York, destined to the Israeli Embassy. His visa indicated a visit of two months at the invitation of the AEC. (105-16424 sub 345 ser. 1115)

Bufiles also show report SA Malcolm P. Carr dated at WFO 8/21/56 re Israeli Embassy, Washington, D. C., IS - Israel, reflecting that [redacted] had been the scientific advisor to the Government of Israel since 2/13/56. He was reportedly in the U.S. to advise Israel regarding purchase of research reactors under bilateral agreement and intended to do research work in reactor physics at an AEC establishment. His address was shown to be care of [redacted] NYC. (105-10828-402 p. 22)

RECOMMENDATION:

None. For your information. This matter is being followed.

RECORDED - 49
INDEXED - 49

117-268
cc - Belmont
Branigan
Bates
Liaison
Day
Mossburg
F. L. Jones
Whitson
LW:blb (9)

4-2 (Rev. 12-17-56)

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Records Branch

3-7, 1957

- ☐ Name Check Unit - Room 6523
- ☐ Service Unit - Room 6524
- ☐ Forward to File Review
- ☐ Attention _____
- ☑ Return to Whitson 1519 2081
  Supervisor Room Ext.

Type of References Requested:

- ☐ Regular Request (Analytical Search)
- ☑ All References (Subversive & Nonsubversive)
- ☐ Subversive References Only
- ☐ Nonsubversive References Only
- ☐ Main _____ References Only

Type of Search Requested:

- ☐ Restricted to Locality of _____
- ☑ Exact Name Only (On the Nose)
- ☐ Buildup ☐ Variations
- ☐ Check for Alphabetical Loyalty Form

Subject [redacted]
Birthdate & Place _____
Address _____ b7C

Localities _____

R# _____ Date 3-7 Searcher Initials SWB

FILE NUMBER SERIAL

NY

[redacted] (Wa)

100-149134

WRONG FIRST NAME.
LW

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/21/03 BY SP4BSTP/RNP

5-MW

4-22 (Rev. 12-17-56)

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Records Branch

3-7-, 1957

- ☐ Name Check Unit - Room 6523
- ☐ Service Unit - Room 6524
- ☐ Forward to File Review
- ☐ Attention _____
- ☐ Return to [redacted] 2710 394
  Supervisor Room Ext.

Type of References Requested:

- ☐ Regular Request (Analytical Search)
- ☐ All References (Subversive & Nonsubversive)
- ☐ Subversive References Only
- ☐ Nonsubversive References Only
- ☐ Main _____ References Only

Type of Search Requested:

- ☐ Restricted to Locality of _____
- ☐ Exact Name Only (On the Nose)
- ☐ Buildup ☐ Variations b7C
- ☐ Check for Alphabetical Loyalty Form

Subject [redacted]
Birthdate & Place _____
Address _____

Localities _____

R# _____ Date 3/7 Searcher Initials W.D.M.

FILE NUMBER	SERIAL
N.R. [redacted]	
105-16424-345	-1115,
105-10828-402, Encl. P-22,	

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5/21/03 BY SP4 BCA/ENP

5 RN

Page 208 ~ Referral/Direct OGA
Page 209 ~ Referral/Direct OGA
Page 210 ~ Referral/Direct OGA
Page 219 ~ Referral/Direct OGA
Page 221 ~ Referral/Direct OGA
Page 222 ~ Referral/Direct OGA
Page 223 ~ Referral/Direct OGA
Page 224 ~ Referral/Direct OGA
Page 225 ~ Referral/Direct OGA
Page 227 ~ Referral/Direct OGA
Page 230 ~ Referral/Direct OGA
Page 241 ~ Duplicate
Page 242 ~ Duplicate

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Page 208 ~ Referral/Direct OGA
Page 209 ~ Referral/Direct OGA
Page 210 ~ Referral/Direct OGA
Page 219 ~ Referral/Direct OGA
Page 221 ~ Referral/Direct OGA
Page 222 ~ Referral/Direct OGA
Page 223 ~ Referral/Direct OGA
Page 224 ~ Referral/Direct OGA
Page 225 ~ Referral/Direct OGA
Page 227 ~ Referral/Direct OGA
Page 230 ~ Referral/Direct OGA
Page 241 ~ Duplicate
Page 242 ~ Duplicate

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

FD-36 (Rev. 3-13-56)

F B I

Date: 8/22/57

Transmit the following message via AIRTEL

RM
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. Nease
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (117-new)

BUREAU VERITAS - SMAB
AEA

On 8/21/57, Inspector [redacted] U.S. Customs, Idlewild Airport, New York, advised that Air France flight FEHML of 8/21/57, carried the following described material as cargo on airway bill number 5464497.

Two packages number BV 15 and BV 16 and described as "nitrate dethorium - activity environ 1 - number of radiation units - surface millirongten per hour."

This material was shipped by Bureau Veritas, 31 Rue Henri Rochefort to United States Atomic Energy Commission, Washington, D. C.

JAMES McLAUGHLIN, AEC, NYC, advised that instant material was source material and that it was being shipped to AEC, Washington, D.C. for assay and evaluation.

KELLY

SHIPMENT TO AEC
NO ACTION NECESSARY.
LW

#948742/950935/997059

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/12/03 BY SAUBTA/RNP

3 - Bureau (RM)
1 - New York (117-192)
1 - New York (117-new)

TGS: gsm

RECORDED - 6
INDEXED - 6

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

FBI

Date: 8/20/57

Transmit the following in _____ (Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL _____ (Priority or Method of Mailing)

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. Nease
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268)

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (117-New)

SUBJECT: [redacted] SMAB

b6
b7C

ReNYairtel, 8/16/57.

On 8/20/57 [redacted] Radiation Branch, AEC, NYC, advised SA [redacted] that parcel of 256 Mgs. of radium brought in by subject on 8/16/57, is still being held by Customs. AEC has requested Customs to investigate package further by opening the wooden outer container, to scratch the inner lining to be sure it is lead, and to furnish exact dimensions of inner lead lining to AEC. Upon receipt of this information, AEC will be in better position to determine whether this shipment is of further interest.

Bureau will be informed of further developments.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/12/03 BY SP4 CSA/RNP

KELLY

INDEXED - 37
RECORDED - 78
INDEXED - 78

117-24-1391

20 AUG 22 1957

3-Bureau (117-268) (RM)
1-New York (117-192) (SMAB) (#1)
1-New York (117-New)

EWC:ume
(6)

55 SEP 4 1957

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

D-36 (Rev. 3-13-56)

FBI

Date: 8/24/57

Transmit the following message via AIRTEL

RM
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. Nease
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (117-new)

[redacted]/R

SMAB; AEA

Inspector [redacted] U.S. Customs, Idlewild Airport, New York, advised that on 8/16/57 [redacted] who is attached to the Paulist Society to combat cancer, arrived via Venezuelan Airlines flight YBCAMU. He declared a box containing radium in a lead container weighing 180 pounds which was held for entry. This package [redacted] This package was called for on 8/23/57 by the Woodside Chemical Company, 60-06 27th Avenue, Woodside, New York who had the package entered under free entry number 310469.

b2
b6
b7C
b7E

ALBERT ZILA, AEC, NYC, advised that material was not source, nuclear or special interest material.

Indices negative on [redacted]

KELLY

NO ACTION NECESSARY
LW

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/12/03 BY SP1 BAW/KNP

3 - Bureau (RM)
1 - New York (117-new)
1 - New York (117-192)

TGS:gsm

RECORDED 76
INDEXED - 76

117-208-1899

20 AUG 26 1957

EX-

F68

ESP. SEC.

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

CONFIDENTIAL

ICIS-P25/502

August 16, 1957

MEMORANDUM TO: Lish Whitson, Chairman
Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures

FROM: Leonard P. Bienvenu
Executive Secretary, ICIS

SUBJECT: Survey of Unaccompanied Soviet Bloc Shipments

Reference is made to the memorandum dated May 6, 1957 (ICIS-P25/465), from the Chairman, ICIS, concerning the above subject. Enclosed for information and any comment you deem desirable are copies of letters dated July 10, 1957 and August 13, 1957, from the Commissioner of Customs, with attached survey of shipments for the months of May and June, 1957.

Enclosure

cc: Col. Graham
Mr. Kelly
Capt. Bromley
Capt. Stewart

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4/12/03 BY SP4BSK/RNP

CONFIDENTIAL

117-268-1393

RECORDED - 94

INDEXED - 94

SEP 18 1957

117-265

FBI/DOJ

envelope only

ALL INFORMATION ~~CONTAINED~~
~~HEREIN~~ IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/12/03 BY SP4 BJA/ENP

11-368-1393

Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security

Room [illegible] Department of Justice Building, Washington 25, D. C.

August 7, 1957 ICIS-225/499

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. Nease
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

MEMORANDUM TO: J. Edgar Hoover, Chairman
Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference

FROM: John P. Doherty, Acting Chairman
Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security

SUBJECT: Defense Against the Employment of Civil Aircraft in Unconventional Attack

In connection with the joint IIC-ICIS responsibility for safeguarding against the clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons, there are enclosed for information five copies of a progress report dated June 12, 1957, on implementing the recommendations contained in the ICIS report dated July 23, 1956, on the above subject. The progress report was submitted by letter dated June 21, 1957, from the Secretary of Commerce; five copies of that letter are also enclosed.

The Commerce status report has been referred to the ICIS Subcommittee on Unconventional Attack for review and comment. We will undoubtedly request IIC comments after the Subcommittee views have been obtained.

Enclosures

ENCLOSURE

Remove Enclosure
Enclosure
8-13-57

INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/12/03 BY SP4 BTP/ENP

11-7-268
NOT RECORDED
145 AUG 19 1957

AUG 16 1957

LIAISON

FROM : A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: DEFENSE AGAINST THE EMPLOYMENT OF CIVIL AIRCRAFT IN UNCONVENTIONAL ATTACK

Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

By letter dated 8/7/57 the Acting Chairman, ICIS, furnished to the Director, as IIC Chairman, a progress report by the Department of Commerce relative to the above program. This progress report is in response to an ICIS report of July 23, 1956, to which the IIC contributed, setting forth 11 recommendations to meet the threat of an unconventional attack upon the U.S. by civil aircraft.

The Commerce Department report reflects that they have fulfilled several of these recommendations; namely, (1) they have coordinated the over-all program through the Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA); (2) they have required civil aircraft entering the U.S. to land at designated airports, and this is being enforced by the Bureau of Customs, Immigration and Naturalization Service and the CAA; (3) INS has initiated legislation through the Department of Justice which would authorize their seizure of aircraft used in smuggling persons; (4) through CIA and State have made efforts to obtain increased U.S. intelligence efforts to obtain information concerning clandestine aircraft activities, and IIC agencies have alerted their field representatives to this problem within the U.S.; (5) through the State Department have sought increased cooperation in interchange of intelligence between foreign and American counterpart investigative agencies.

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 62-107

Progress report reflects that Ground Observer Corps and Air Defense Identification Zone coverage, although nearly complete around the perimeter and borders of the U.S., will not be fulfilled until radar equipment is installed, scheduled for the end of fiscal year 1959. Commerce advises that the Civil Aeronautics Board has prepared a draft Executive Order which it is presently considering which would authorize the denial or revocation of airman's certificates. ICIS originally recommended that INS purchase 6 aircraft to carry out its responsibilities under this program. The present progress report reflects that INS anticipates the use of seized aircraft if and when legislation is enacted.

Enclosure
DJD:mjf (6)
1 - Boardman
1 - Belmont
1 - Mohr
1 - Mr. Tolson
1 - Mr. Nease

NOT RECORDED
145 AUG 19 1957

AUG 19 1957

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 10/29/03 BY SP1BSTA/RNP
PER LETTER DTD 10/29/03 FOIPA# 1202167 NCLASS/DECL
10/29/03

Belmont to Boardman
DEFENSE AGAINST THE EMPLOYMENT OF CIVIL AIRCRAFT IN UNCONVENTIONAL ATTACK

ACTION:

Copies of the Commerce progress report and transmittal letter have been furnished to the IIC members for review. When ICIS requests IIC comments an appropriate reply will be prepared for the Director's signature as IIC Chairman.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: August 6, 1957

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTO THE UNITED STATES

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mason
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

On August 2, at the request of Pat Coyne, Supervisors Day and Whitson, together with Messrs Bienvenu and Pfuntner of ICIS and Ash of NSC, met in Coyne's office to discuss a draft which Coyne had prepared containing recommendations to be transmitted by IIC and ICIS to interested agencies with regard to the detection device program. This draft, revised following discussion by the group, is attached. It briefly reviews the assignment by the President to IIC and ICIS of joint responsibility for the countermeasures program and makes nine recommendations which would have the following effect:

1. Acceleration of development of all types of detection devices, and status reports to IIC-ICIS by AEC concerning progress.

2. More careful installation of [redacted] devices to insure maximum efficiency.

b2
b7E

3. Use of improved operational and search techniques (to overcome routine or careless handling of the devices).

4. Establishment of responsibility within each agency using devices for supervision, operation and training and full participation by these agencies in the advisory group which is in operation to follow and examine the use of the devices.

5. Treasury should be responsible for supervising the operation of the devices (which are used only by Coast Guard, Customs, and Immigration Inspectors serving in a Customs capacity).

6. The advisory group will continue to study the program and will make semiannual reports to IIC and ICIS.

7. Where the devices reflect the presence of radioactive materials and there is sufficient reason to believe

Enclosure

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/19/13 BY SP4 AM/sm

ENCLOSURE

INDEXED - 14 RECORDED - 14 117-268-1386

AUG 21 1957

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 117-268-1386

GAD:hke (7)

1-Mr. Boardman 1-Mr. Belmont 1-Mr. Branigan 1-Mr. Whitson 1-Mr. Day 1-Liaison Section

SENT DIRECTOR 8/6/57

that the material may be fissionable, AEC will be responsible for determining what the material is which activated the device.

8. Responsible agencies will take all practicable measures to expedite the acquisition and installation of the total number of devices called for by the currently agreed program. (This is not asking Treasury or Immigration to secure any more devices than they have actually agreed to acquire.)

9. Where possible, spot-check manual examinations of incoming express, freight and mail will be intensified and include inspection by detection devices. These examinations will include shipments in bond, warehouse shipments, bulk shipments, and shipments not ordinarily examined in appraisers' stores. (This is recommended for use "where possible" and emphasizes the IIC-ICIS belief that the detection device program is essential without requiring acquisition of additional devices.)

ACTION:

It is recommended that Coyne's draft be approved. It is being circulated to the other IIC members for their opinion. If approved by IIC and ICIS, ICIS will prepare a joint cover letter of transmittal addressed to Treasury (Customs and Coast Guard), Justice (Immigration), and AEC. After this has been signed by the ICIS Chairman, it will be forwarded for signature of the Director as IIC Chairman.

The recommendations follow, in general, the views of IIC as expressed in IIC letter April 30, 1957, to ICIS concerning this program.

~~SECRET~~

RECORDED - 36

August 26, 1957

Honorable Herbert L. Brownell, Jr.
The Attorney General
Washington 25, D. C.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/12/03 BY SP4BJA/RNP

Dear Mr. Brownell:

Enclosed is a statement dated August 20, 1957, of recommendations approved by the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security, based on review of the current detection device program for the prevention of the clandestine introduction into the United States of nuclear weapons or components thereof. It is requested that your department take steps to implement those recommendations which pertain to its responsibility, as indicated parenthetically at the end of each recommendation.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover
Chairman,
Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference

SIGNED

J. Walter Yeagley
Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee
on Internal Security

Enclosure

This is the FBI file copy as the letter was prepared by ICIS.

(Cover memorandum Belmont to Boardman, 8/23/57, re "Countermeasures to Detect and Defend Against the Clandestine Introduction of Nuclear Weapons into the United States" JJD:hke)

~~SECRET~~

SEP 12 1957

~~SECRET~~

August 26, 1957

RECORDED - 36

Honorable Lewis L. Strauss
Chairman,
Atomic Energy Commission
Washington 25, D. C.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/12/03 BY SP4BTA/ENP

Dear Mr. Strauss:

Enclosed is a statement dated August 20, 1957 of recommendations approved by the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security, based on review of the current detection device program for the prevention of the clandestine introduction into the United States of nuclear weapons or components thereof. It is requested that your agency take steps to implement those recommendations which pertain to its responsibility, as indicated parenthetically at the end of each recommendation.

With regard to Recommendation No. 7, we recognize that in discussions of responsibility for determining the nuclear or non-nuclear character of material detected by search, your representatives took a position in opposition to assignment of this responsibility to the AEC. Nevertheless, after full consideration, the two internal security committees are of the view that such responsibility should be assumed by AEC, and we trust that you will cause this recommendation to be implemented.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover
Chairman,
Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference

Ret'd to ICIS for delivery by courier service 8/26/57 JJD:hke

SIGNED

J. Walter Yeagley
Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee
on Internal Security

Enclosure

(Cover memorandum from Mr. Belmont to Mr. Boardman, re "Countermeasures to Detect and Defend Against the Clandestine Introduction of Nuclear Weapons Into the United States," 8/23/57, JJD:hke)

This is the FBI file copy as the letter was prepared by ICIS.

~~SECRET~~

66-8603-
62-107384-

INDEXED

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: August 23, 1957

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTO THE UNITED STATES

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
Nease
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

Reference is made to my memorandum of August 5, 1957, which enclosed a draft report containing nine recommendations which Pat Coyne desired to be transmitted by IIC and ICIS to the interested agencies with regard to the detection device program. The Director approved the recommendations.

The IIC military members have now approved the proposed joint report. ICIS on August 22, 1957, advised that they had approved the report and furnished three letters of transmittal to the Attorney General, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission enclosing one copy of the report. The report briefly reviews the assignment by the President to IIC and ICIS of joint responsibility for the countermeasures program and makes nine recommendations which would have the effect of improving the operational and administrative aspects of the program within the responsible departments - Justice, Treasury, and Atomic Energy Commission.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/12/83 BY SP4AMP/sap

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 66-8603-1 62-90938-1

ACTION:

There are enclosures for the Attorney General, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission for the Director's signature as IIC Chairman.

Enclosures (7) sent 8-24-57

JMD:hke

1-Mr. Boardman
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Branigan
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Mr. Daunt
1-Liaison Section

RECORDED - 14

117-268-1397

EX-110

21 AUG 27 1957

ENCLOSURE

EX-110 Memo Belmont to Boardman 11/22/57 GAD:mjs

68 DEC 11 1957

LIAISON

FBI

~~SECRET~~

August 20, 1957

RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE IIC AND ICIS, BASED ON REVIEW OF THE CURRENT DETECTION DEVICE PROGRAM FOR THE PREVENTION OF THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR COMPONENTS THEREOF

In accordance with the provisions of Presidential directives on the subject, the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (IIC) and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS) are jointly responsible (in conjunction with the AEC) for coordinating the implementation of a broad program of countermeasures designed to detect and defend against the clandestine introduction into the United States of nuclear weapons or component parts thereof. The over-all program, which was approved as a broad guide to the departments and agencies concerned, included a number of suggested courses of action designed to aid in the prevention of such introduction through various channels and avenues of entry capable of utilization by hostile forces.

Based upon the assignment given jointly to the IIC and the ICIS by the President, recommendations on various aspects of the problem have been made over the past several years to the NSC and to other departments and agencies concerned. At this time, in the light of a recent review of elements of the countermeasures program which deal specifically with the development and use of detection devices for the examination of persons and shipments, the IIC and ICIS recommend that the responsible agencies place emphasis upon completion of the following actions in order to facilitate implementation of those elements of the program which are treated below.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/12/03 BY SP4BDA/ENP

Recommendations:

1. In the light of improved Soviet capabilities, research and development activity should be accelerated in the fields of passive, active, and fluoroscopic devices, and status reports furnished thereon to the IIC and ICIS on a quarterly basis. (AEC)

2. [redacted] detection device installations should, insofar as practicable, be custom-built to insure maximum efficiency of the device. (For example, lead shielding should be utilized where practicable to permit the [redacted] devices to operate with improved efficiency and effectiveness.) (Treasury, Justice) b2 b7E

3. Improved operational and search techniques developed on the basis of experience gained in the use of detection devices should be utilized by all operating agencies, and full advantage taken of training courses offered by the AEC. (Treasury, Justice)

4. Definite lines of responsibility should be established within each agency involved in the operation of the detection device program, including responsibility for supervision of personnel training, and operation of equipment in use at various locations; and there should be full participation by such agencies in the interdepartmental Advisory Group established to assist in achieving coordinated implementation of the program. (Treasury, Justice)

~~SECRET~~ 117-964-1377

ENCLOSURE

5. The Department of the Treasury, exclusive of the functions described in Paragraph 7, should be responsible for supervising the operational aspects of the detection device program to insure maximum effectiveness in the utilization of such devices and should report thereon to IIC and ICIS on a quarterly basis. (Treasury)

6. The IIC-ICIS Advisory Group (composed of representatives of Customs, Coast Guard, INS, AEC) should be responsible for making continuing studies and analyses of all aspects of the detection device program (including operational, research, development, procurement, training, etc.) and should report such analyses, together with appropriate recommendations, to the IIC and ICIS on a semiannual basis. (The Advisory Group)

7. In instances where examinations by the detection devices indicate the presence of radioactive materials and there is sufficient reason to believe that same may contain special nuclear material, the AEC should be responsible for taking action to determine the nuclear or non-nuclear character thereof, when such material is available for examination. (AEC)

8. Agencies having operational responsibilities should take all practicable measures to expedite the acquisition and installation of the total number of devices called for within the limits of the currently agreed detection device program. (Treasury, Justice)

9. Where possible spot-check manual examinations of incoming express, freight and mail shipments should be intensified and extended to include use of detection devices, and these examinations should include shipments in bond, warehouse shipments, bulk shipments, and shipments not ordinarily examined in appraisers' stores. (Treasury)

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

FBI

Date: 8/21/57

Transmit the following in PLAIN TEXT
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. Nease
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268)

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (117-324)

SUBJECT: COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY
RADIATION LABORATORY NYC
OSMAB

ReNYairtel 8/15/57.

On 8/21/57 JAMES MC LAUGHLIN, Radiation Branch, AEC, NYC, advised SA [redacted] that matter of shipment from Weizmann Institute of Science, Israel, to Columbia University Radiation Laboratory labeled H2017 which arrived Idlewild Airport on 8/10/57 was still unresolved by AEC. Material is still being held. b6 b7C

Bureau will be advised of any further developments.

KELLY

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/12/03 BY SP4 OTA/RNP

(3) - Bureau (117-268) (RM)
1 - New York (117-192) (SMAB) (#1)
1 - New York (117-324)

EWC:psh
(6)

117-269-1394
24

RECORDED-85
INDEXED-85

20 AUG 22 1957

55 SEP 4 1957

ASP. & SEC.

Approved: J. J. Kelly
Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

FD-36 (Rev. 3-13-56)

FBI

Date: 8/23/57

Transmit the following message via AIRTEL

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. Nease
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (117-new)

SUBJECT: [redacted] KINGSWOOD SCHOOL, WEST HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT; SMAB AEA

POSSIBLY IDENT. 128-4673, ROY ELLIS NORCROSS OR ROY ERICKSSON NORCROSS NO DEROG.

On 8/22/57, Inspector [redacted] U.S. Customs, advised that [redacted] Kingswood School, West Hartford, Conn arrived on 8/22/57 aboard the SS KUNGSHOLM at Pier 97, North River, NYC, and orally declared to Customs that he had in his possession a two ounce piece of uranium ore, which [redacted] advised he had obtained from a fellow passenger, name not known to [redacted]

b6
b7C

[redacted] a school teacher and a U.S. citizen, holds U.S. passport [redacted] which was issued on 4/8/57 at Washington, D.C. [redacted] left the U.S. on 6/4/57 on the SS STOCKHOLM to spend a vacation in Sweden.

b6
b7C
b7E

According to Inspector [redacted] The material was released by the Atomic Energy Commission.

On 8/22/57, ALBERT ZILA, Radiation Branch, Atomic Energy Commission, advised that the two ounce piece of uranium ore probably contained a small quantity of source material but inasmuch as this was a small piece of uranium ore it was classified as material not of special interest to AEC and was released.

The files of the NYO contain no information identical to ROY NORCROSS.

NO NEUTRON COUNT.
NO ACTION NECESSARY.
LW

KELLY

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/12/03 BY SP4 BTA/RNP

3-Bureau (RM)
1-New York (117-192)
1-New York (117-new)

RECORDED-85
INDEXED-85

117-248-1399

29

17 AUG 28 1957

JEH:EG
(6)

55 SEP 5 1957

Approved: J. L. Kelly
Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

FD-36 (Rev. 3-13-56)

F B I

Date: 8/27/57

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. Nease
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

Transmit the following message via AIRTEL

PLAIN TEXT
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268)

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (117-324)

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY RADIATION LABORATORY,
NYC
SMAB

ReNYairtel, 8/21/57.

On 8/27/57, ALBERT ZILA, Radiation Branch, AEC, NYC, advised SA [redacted] that he inspected shipment reported as H2017 chemicals to Columbia University Radiation Laboratory, NYC, and found that shipment was not radioactive and was of no interest. Previously reported readings were an error in manipulation of detection device. Marking H2017 was actually an order number H2017. Material released.

b6
b7C

Matter regarded as closed by NY.

NO ACTION NECESSARY
LW

KELLY

3 - Bureau (117-268) (RM)
1 - New York (117-192) (SMAB) (#1)
1 - New York (117-324)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/12/03 BY SP4 BOA/ENP

117-268-1400

EWC:imcl (#1)
(6)

RECORDED - 12
INDEXED - 12

17 AUG 28 1957

SEP 5 1957

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

FD-36 (Rev. 3-13-56)

F B I

Date: 8/30/57

Transmit the following message via AIRTEL

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (117-314)

SUBJECT: DOMINION MAGNESIUM LTD.,
CANADA - SMAB
AEA

ReNYairtel 7/12/57.

ALBERT ZILA, AEC, NYC, was contacted on 8/30/57 and advised that final determination has not been made as yet in the captioned matter. NYO will continue to follow this matter and Bureau will be advised.

KELLY

3-Bureau (RM)
1-New York (117-192)
1-New York (117-314)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/12/03 BY SP4BSJA/RNP

RECORDED - 6 117-268-1401
INDEXED - 6
17 AUG 31 1957
EX-126

JHK:EG
(6)

F68
55 SEP 5 1957

Approved: J. J. Kelly Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: August 30, 1957

FROM : SAC, LOS ANGELES (117-108)

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES

Re SAC letter 57-47 Section (K).

Second Lieutenant [redacted] 58th Ordnance Detachment, b6 b7C EOD, Ft. Mac Arthur, San Pedro, California, advised on 8/27/57, that the area served by his detachment consists of the following counties in California: San Luis Obispo, Santa Barbara, Kern, Ventura, San Bernardino, Los Angeles, Orange and Riverside, and these in Arizona: Mojave, Coconino, Apache, Yavapai, and Navajo.

The detachment maintains a 24 hour service and can be reached through TExas 2-4571 or NEvada 6-1071, the extension for either number being 5241.

First Lieutenant [redacted] will resume as commanding officer of the detachment upon return from temporary duty.

Lieutenant [redacted] advised that the 70th Ordnance Detachment EOD listed as being at Ft. Mac Arthur is situated at Fort Rosecrans, Point Loma, San Diego, California. It is under the command of First Lieutenant [redacted] b6 b7C and may be reached through telephone number ACademy 3-8449, San Diego.

Its jurisdiction comprises San Diego and Imperial Counties in California and those counties in Arizona not listed as within the area covered by the 58th Ordnance Detachment.

The name of the commanding officer and the telephone number of the 58th Ordnance Detachment will be verified at six-month intervals.

2 - Bureau (Reg.)
2 - Phoenix (Reg.)
2 - San Diego (Reg.)
1 - Los Angeles (117-108)
FGT:HMS
(7)

RECORDED-20 117-268-1402

21 SEP 4 1957

EX-[illegible]

FBI/DOJ INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/12/03 BY SP4 BJA/RNP

F69
SEP 3 1957

CONFIDENTIAL

(K) SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES - Re SAC Letters 54-1 (H) and 54-20 (L) on responsibilities of Explosive Ordnance Disposal units in handling the disarming of atomic weapons (C)(U)

The Office of the Chief of Ordnance, Department of the Army, has furnished the enclosed list of Explosive Ordnance Disposal Detachments, showing their locations and commanding officers. The field offices covering the individual Army headquarters should contact the Ordnance officers listed at those headquarters for the purpose of obtaining the precise address of each Detachment within his specific jurisdiction and the area served by each. These data should then be furnished to the other field offices covering the locations of those Detachments within the Army area. Each field office should then arrange to make certain that the location of the Detachment, the name of the commanding officer and the telephone number and extension for the Detachment are up to date and correct at all times. (C)(U)

Each field office should advise the Bureau when it has accomplished the foregoing and supply the Bureau with the information concerning the telephone numbers and the area served by each Detachment within its field office territory. (C)(U)

ORIGINAL FILED IN 66-0

DECLASSIFIED BY SP4 BTM/RNP
ON 6/12/03

117-268-
NOT RECORDED
126 AUG 28 1957

Classified by Sp8 BTM/bce
Declassify on: OADR
3/9/83

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

FBI
63 SEP 9 1957

8/20/57
SAC LETTER NO. 57-47

CONFIDENTIAL

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: August 30, 1957

FROM : SAC, CHARLOTTE (65-1489)

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES

ReSAClet 57-47 dated 8/20/57.

Prior to receipt of reSAClet, Charlotte Office had initiated inquiries to establish availability of bomb disposal personnel in cases involving desctruction of aircraft or motor vehicles.

Re: 864th Explosive Ordnance Disposal Detachment,
Fort Bragg, North Carolina
First Lt. George H. Burnett, Jr.,
Commanding Officer
Telephone HYatt 7-2311, ext. 5-4219

On 8/26/57, First Lieutenant [redacted] Commanding Officer, 864th Ordnance Detachment, EOD, Fort Bragg, N. C., was interviewed and Lt. [redacted] advised the services of his Detachment are available to any agency at any time. He advised his Unit is on a 24-hour standby basis and will respond to any request from any civilian agency for assistance in the handling of explosive devices.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/6/03 BY SP2 [illegible]

b6
b7C

Lt. [redacted] stated his Detachment and the other Detachments at other Army installations in the Third Army area work through the Control Detachment 547th Ord. Det., EODC, Ft. McPherson, Ga., of which Captain [redacted] is the Commanding Officer and normally requests for assistance in routine matters should be made to the 547th Ord. Det. Ft. McPherson, Ga., telephone number 5204, since there are occasions when his Detachment is away from Ft. Bragg on assignment. However, he stated in time of peace and when there is an emergency for the service of his Detachment, his Detachment should be contacted directly at Ft. Bragg, N. C., telephone number HYatt 7-2311, extension 5-4219. He stated in this regard, emergency requests should be made to his Unit at Ft. Bragg only when his services are needed in North Carolina. In all other areas where the services of the Army is needed in the handling of explosive devices, the request should be made directly to the Control Detachment at Ft. McPherson.

Lt. [redacted] pointed out that there is an Ordnance Detachment at Fort Jackson, S. C., and at the other Army Installations in the Third Army area

2 - Bureau (RM)
2 - Atlanta (RM)
2 - Norfolk (RM)
2 - Knoxville (RM)
2 - Richmond (RM)
2 - Savannah (RM)
3 - Charlotte (65-1489) (lcc: 149-00; lcc: 149-9)
RET:jac
(15)

RECORDED - 6 112-268-1403

EX - 131

9 SEP 3 1957

55 SEP 10 1957

INDEXED

FBI - CHARLOTTE

and the Control Detachment at Ft. McPherson, Ga., may direct the Ft. Bragg Det. to an area outside of North Carolina and during the time his Detachment is on this assignment, the Fort Jackson, S. C., Detachment may be directed by the Control Det. to handle a matter in North Carolina. He further pointed out that his Detachment at Ft. Bragg has no specific geographic area of responsibility within the Third Army area, but for practical purposes his Detachment will respond to any EMERGENCY request in North Carolina. He stated if the services of his Detachment are not needed within the hour and the matter could be handled within 12 to 24 hours, this type of request should be directed to Ft. McPherson, Ga.

Lt. [redacted] was explained in detail the Bureau's interest in his Detachment and the Bureau's need for the services rendered by his Unit in such matters of explosive devices aboard aircraft and motor vehicles and the smuggling of atomic bombs or parts thereof and other weapons of mass destruction into the United States. It was explained to Lt. [redacted] that liaison is being established with his Detachment by the Charlotte Office due to the Bureau's jurisdictional interest. b6 b7C

As a matter of interest, Lt. [redacted] pointed out that he understands a representative of the Control Board at Ft. McPherson, Ga., has instructions that he should contact the FBI Field Offices in the Third Army area to establish liaison and a definite understanding of the functions and availability of this Unit in the Army.

The above data is being made available to our Agents.

The Atlanta Office at Ft. McPherson, Ga., following contact with the Control Detachment at Ft. McPherson will advise interested offices of information developed which may be of interest to these offices.

The Charlotte Office will insure that the Bureau is currently advised of the location of the Detachment, the name of the Commanding Officer and the telephone number and extension on a current basis at all times.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

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2 - Bureau (RM)
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2 - Norfolk (RM)
2 - Knoxville (RM)
2 - Richmond (RM)
2 - Savannah (RM)
3 - Charlotte (65-1489) (1cc: 149-00; 1cc: 149-9)
RET:jac
(15)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/10/03 BY SP4STAKMF

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Tolson

SAC, New York (117-192) September 4, 1957

Director, FBI (117-268)

117-368-1404

SMAB

RECORDED - 12

ReNYairtels 8/20/57 and 8/27/57, concerning shipment labelled "radium" brought into the U.S. by Dr. Jorge F. Barosa.

Determine from Customs results of examination of shipment at Woodside, Long Island, by representative of Appraiser's office.

LW:blb
(4)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/12/03 BY SP1 JJA/RNP

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mason
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trase
Clerrowd
Room
Holloman

MAILED 6
SEP 4 1957
COMM-FBI

SEP 9 1957

1 Rm.

FD-36 (Rev. 3-13-56)

F B I

Date: 8/27/57

Transmit the following message via AIRTEL

PLAIN TEXT

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. Nichols	
Mr. Boardman	
Mr. Belmont	
Mr. Mohr	
Mr. Parsons	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Tamm	
Mr. Trotter	
Mr. Nease	
Tele. Room	
Mr. Holloman	
Miss Gandy	

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (117-286)

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (117-326)

[redacted]

SMAB.

ReNYairtel, 8/20/57.

On 8/27/57, A.B. ZILA, Radiation Branch, AEC, NYC, advised SA [redacted] that AEC had received no further information from Customs, and AEC felt no further interest. ZILA stated that the material would not be source material or of interest if it is radium, as labeled.

On 8/27/57, [redacted] Deputy Collector of Customs, Idlewild Airport, NY, advised that Formal Entry No. 310469 was filed for the radium by A.W. Senton Co., Brokers, 25 Broadway, NYC. The shipment was sealed and ordered for examination at Radium Chemical Co., Inc., 60-06 27th Ave., Woodside, L.I., NY. Material was released on 8/23/57. b6 b7C

On 8/27/57, Mr. KAUFMAN, Office of Appraiser of Merchandise, U.S. Customs, 201 Varick St., NYC, advised that this material would be opened at the Woodside address in presence of an examiner from the Appraiser's office.

On 8/27/57, SA [redacted] advised ZILA, AEC, of this information. ZILA stated that AEC did not regard the material as of further interest and AEC would take no further action.

NY regards this matter as closed.

KELLY

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/12/03 BY SP1BJA/RMP

3 - Bureau (117-286) (RM)
1 - New York (117-192) (SMAB) (#1)
1 - New York (117-326)

117-268-1404

RECORDED 91 X2
INDEXED 91

17 AUG 28 1957

EWC:imcl (#1)
(6)

Approved: J. J. Kelly Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

FBI SEC.

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

FBI

Date: 9/3/57

Transmit the following in AIR-TEL
(Type in plain text or code)

Via _____
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. Nease
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (117-new)

TITLE: COMBINED DEVELOPMENT AGENCIES
c/o AMERICAN CONSUL GENERAL
SMAB - AEA

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/12/03 BY SP4BTK/RMP

On 9/3/57 Inspector [redacted] U.S. Customs, Idlewild Airport, New York, advised that a shipment of uranium samples consisting of seven parcels, total weight 59 pounds, arrived aboard Pan American Airways, 8/31/57 on air way bill 026-15-237968. Four of these packages were marked SSD 145 and three packages SSD 146. All packages bore red and white cross bones number 1 or 2 and a notation - principal contents radium, activity of content 2MC; number of radiation units per package less than one.

b6
b7C
b7E

These packages were shipped by Combined Development Agencies, c/o American Consul General, Johannesburg, South Africa, to United States Atomic Energy Commission, Washington, D.C. [redacted] advised that on

[redacted]

ALBERT ZILA, AEC, NYC, advised contents of packages consisted of source material in a small amount that was being sent to AEC, Washington, D.C., possibly for assay purposes and he had instructed Customs to forward same to AEC, Washington, D.C.

Mr. Belmont
CONSIGNED TO AEC
NO ACTION NECESSARY
LW

KELLY 117-268-1405

3-Bureau
1-NY (117-new)
1-NY 117-192

INDEXED - 12
117 RECORDED - 12
117-268

6 SEP 4 1957

TGS:jmg (#1)
(6)

55 SEP 9

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: 9/4/57

FROM : SAC, San Juan

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES

Re SAC Letter 57-47 (K).

Enclosed is a memorandum executed by SA [redacted] which reflects the result of his contact with Major OSWALD W. WEBB, Ordnance Officer, U. S. Army Forces Antilles and Military District of Puerto Rico. The Bureau will note that personnel currently assigned to Fort Buchanan, Puerto Rico, do not have the background or knowledge concerning the disarming of atomic weapons.

b6
b7C

Contact was had in the recent past with Major MICHAEL NAVARRO, Special Agent in Charge of the OSI Office at Ramey Air Force Base, concerning the disarming of atomic weapons. Major NAVARRO advised that ordnance personnel are available at Ramey Air Force Base for the disarming of atomic weapons and upon the request of a state or government agency, the Base Commander would consider making the ordnance crews available if their services are needed.

The foregoing is being submitted to the Bureau as a matter of information.

(2) - Bureau (Enclosure)
1 - San Juan (117-0)

CD:MLS
(3)

ENCLOSURE 27

EX-131

58 SEP 10 1957

INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/12/03 BY SP4 STA/RNP

RECORDED - 27 117-268-1406

EX-131

6 SEP 6 1957

ESP. SEC.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : SAC (117-0) DATE: 8/30/57

FROM : SA [redacted] b6 b7C

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES

Re SAC Letter 57-47, Contacts with Explosive Ordnance Disposal Detachments.

The following information was obtained by the writer in an interview with Major OSWALD W. WEBB, Ordnance Officer, Fort Buchanan, Puerto Rico, on August 29, 1957:

Major WEBB has an EOD Detachment consisting of two men assigned to his command. They are [redacted] SP-2, RA 17227921, Army Technical Services, Fort Buchanan, Puerto Rico; and [redacted] SP-2, RA 1744465, Army Technical Services, Fort Buchanan. These men have attended all the EOD schools and are experts on recognition and disarming of conventional type explosives and weapons. They have had "rudimentary instruction" on nuclear weapons including recognition of parts and how to handle them, but cannot be assumed to know how to disarm such weapons as this is very complex and there are continuous developments in the methods of detonating nuclear weapons. Current instructions in handling nuclear weapons which might be smuggled in are to get them away as fast as possible, preferably out to sea. b6 b7C

Major WEBB stated that these EOD men must clear with him before going out on a job and the quickest way to get action is to call him at Fort Buchanan, Ext. 5211 or 8282, Home Ext. 4158; or in Major WEBB's absence call Lt. KENNETH MARTIN, Executive Officer, Home Ext. 7152. Major WEBB said he will have to get instructions from his Commanding officer before handling a job not related to military explosives, such as homemade devices, airplane bomb scares, post office calls and the like, and he seemed uncertain as to whether or not full cooperation could be given. He further explained that he has an informal agreement with the Navy to divide the work of inspecting warehouses and piers for explosives when called upon.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 10/12/03 BY SP4BTA/ENP

JHD:MLS
(2)

117-268-1406

ENCLOSURE

The above-described EOD detachment is instructed by Army Regulations to answer calls to pick up duds or other dangerous military devices in Puerto Rico above the high water mark except on Naval and Air Force Bases. They have not had any calls from the Virgin Islands and it was explained that the Navy or Marine Corps probably handles these as they have a base there.

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

FBI

Date: 8/31/57

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. Nease
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268)

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (117-new)

SUBJECT: SMAB
[redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 1/15/03 BY SP4 BTA/RNP

At 3:15 p.m., 8/31/57, Inspector [redacted] US Customs, Idlewild Airport, NYC, telephonically advised the following concerning [redacted] age 18, a student who arrived at Idlewild Airport at approximately 12:38 p.m. 8/30/57, from Germany accompanied by hisparents, [redacted] b6 b7C

1. Name of Passengers

[redacted] 9-9-57 NO IDENTIFIABLE REFS. LHM

2. Nationality

[redacted] and his parents are naturalized American citizens, having been born in Germany. [redacted] was issued passport [redacted] on 2/18/57 at Paterson, New Jersey.

b6 b7C

3. Passenger's Address

[redacted] resides with his parents at [redacted] New Jersey.

3 - Bureau (117-268) (RM)
1 - Newark (Info) (RM)
1 - New York (117-new)

RECORDED - 96
INDEXED - 96

117-268-1467

4 SEP 9 1957

JTM:mm
(6)

Mr. Belmont

117-268

ENCLOSURE

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL _____
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

NY 117-new

4. Occupation

[redacted] is a student at [redacted] His father is employed as an instrument maker by the [redacted] New Jersey.

5. Citizenship

Naturalized

b6
b7C

6. Date and Means of Arrival of Passengers

The [redacted] arrived at Idlewild Airport, NYC, via flight 901, SAS Airlines, from Germany.

7. Description of Suspect Item

Rock ore 3/4's of a pound

8. [redacted]

9. Purpose of Importation

[redacted] a student, claims he is a rock collector.

b6
b7C
b7E

10. Place Where Obtained

[redacted] obtained the item in Germany from one [redacted] Germany.

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL _____
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

NY 117-new

11. Custom Declaration

Suspect material was declared orally.

12. Notification of AEC

Inspector [redacted] advised that he had attempted to contact the AEC but had been unsuccessful but would continue his efforts to contact them.

13. Action Taken by Customs

Material to be held for further examination by AEC. b6 b7C

The AEC will be notified and the Bureau will be advised of the results of the AEC examination.

NYO indices failed to reflect any references which could be identified with the [redacted].

KELLY

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

FD-36 (Rev. 3-13-56)

F B I

Date: 9/3/57

Transmit the following message via AIRTEL

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. Nease
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268)

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (117-192)

SUBJECT: SNAB, AEC

NR

On 9/3/57, Inspector [redacted] INS, Idlewild Airport, telephonically advised this office that on 8/31/57, one [redacted] NJ, arrived on Scandinavian Airlines flight 901 from Germany. In his baggage was found 3/4 of a pound of mineral pitch blend uranium which he said he had obtained in Germany for his private collection. [redacted] INS advised that the material was released on instructions of AEC.

On 9/3/57, [redacted] AEC, NYC, advised that the amount was released by his organization because it was covered by General License and that it was of such small quantity that it was insignificant.

KELLY

NO ACTION NECESSARY
LW

b6
b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/12/03 BY SP4 BJA/KMP

3 - Bureau (117-268) RM
1 - New York (117-192)

LHB: jad
(5)

RECORDED - 96
INDEXED - 96

117-268-1406

EX-127

55 SEP 11 1957

Approved: J. Kelly
Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: September 6, 1957

FROM : SAC, CLEVELAND (117-00)

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS AND PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION IN UNITED STATES

Re Section K. SAC letter 57-47.

On August 27, 1957 SA [redacted] contacted First Lieutenant [redacted] 44th Ord. Det. EOD, Erie Ordnance Depot, Port Clinton, (Lacarne) Ohio, the only bomb disposal unit located within the Cleveland Division.

Lieutenant [redacted] advised that his office phone number is Port Clinton 22051, Extension 372; his home phone number Port Clinton 22051 (this is the same number as he lives on the Post) Extension 507; his residence, Quarters 26 B, Erie Ordnance Depot, Port Clinton, Ohio.

He advised that in his absence contact should be made with Master Sergeant [redacted] Erie Ordnance Depot, Telephone Port Clinton 22051, Extension 372, or at his home, 819 Delaware Lane, Port Clinton, Ohio, telephone Port Clinton 25825.

Lieutenant [redacted] advised that the area covered by his unit comprises the Northern half of Ohio, which is all of the area North of United States Route number 40, an East-West Route running through Springfield, Columbus and Zanesville, Ohio.

He advised that the Southern half of Ohio is covered by Fort Hayes, Columbus, Ohio.

Inasmuch as all of the area of the Cleveland Division and the Northern counties of the Cincinnati Division

(2) - Bureau
2 - Cincinnati
1 - Cleveland

RWS:jem
(5)

RECORDED - 83 117-268-1409

18 SEP 10 1957

EX 105

ESP. SEC.

58 SEP 12 1957

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/2/83 BY [redacted]

Exp. proc

31

b6
b7C

are covered by Lieutenant [redacted] and as all of the Southern half of Ohio falls within the Cincinnati Division a copy of this letter is being sent to Cincinnati for their information. b6 b7C

DIRECTOR, FBI September 6, 1957

SAC, CLEVELAND (117-00)

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS AND PARTS
THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
IN UNITED STATES

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(2) - Bureau
2 - Cincinnati
1 - Cleveland

RWS:jem
(5)

THE INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/12/03 BY SP4 BSP/ENP

b6
b7C

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268) DATE: 9/5/57

FROM : SAC, SAN DIEGO (66-998)

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES

Re No Number SAC Letter A dated 1/28/52, and my letter, 6/12/57.

This Office has no additional names to recommend for enclosure on the Bureau of Customs Watch List at this time.

The Bureau will be kept advised of any and all pertinent developments.

2 - Bureau
1 - San Diego

WED: mf
(3)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/12/03 BY SP4 CSSP/ENP

EXP. PROC. SEP 9 1957

RECORDED-18 117-268-1410
EX.-137 18 SEP 9 1957

F6F

58 SEP 12 1957

EXP. PROC.

DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268) 9/5/57

SAC, SAN DIEGO (66-998)

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR
PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS
OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO
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2 - Bureau
1 - San Diego

WED: mf
(3)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/12/03 BY SP4 SSA/ENP

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: 9/6/57

FROM : SAC, Honolulu (100-5470-30)

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES

Re SAC Letter 57-47 (K), dated 8/20/57.

b6
b7C

The Explosive Ordnance Disposal Section and Headquarters Company, U.S. Army Garrison, Fort Shafter, Oahu, T.H., is presently headed by Lieutenant [redacted]. The detachment has an office in Building 164 at the Aliamanu Crater. The detachment can be reached by telephone through the Army exchange, Honolulu, 8-1011, extension 220284. This detachment covers only the Hawaiian Islands.

2 Bureau
1 Honolulu
LSB:KH
(3)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 10/2/03 BY SP4 BSP/ENP

RECORDED-18 117-268-1444

18 SEP 20 1957

EX. - 137

EXP. PROC.

3

58 SEP 12 1957

Director, FBI 9/6/57

SAC, Honolulu (100-5470-30)

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF
AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
INTO THE UNITED STATES

Re SAC Letter 57-47 (K), dated 8/20/57.

The Explosive Ordnance Disposal Section and Headquarters Company, U.S. Army Garrison, Fort Shafter, Oahu, T.H., is presently headed by Lieutenant [redacted] The detachment has an office in Building 164 at the Aliamanu Crater. The detachment can be reached by telephone through the Army exchange, Honolulu, 8-1011, extension 220284. This detachment covers only the Hawaiian Islands. b6 b7C

2 Bureau
1 Honolulu
LSB:KH
(3)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/2/03 BY SP4 [illegible]

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

FBI

Date: 9/9/57

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. Nease
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (117-192)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268)

NOT IDENTIFIABLE IN INDICES LW

SMAB - [redacted]
BOX 6, SALISBURY, SOUTH RHODESIA,
AFRICA
AEA

US Customs, NYC, advised this date of arrival via PAA flight 101 at NY International Airport 6:35 A.M. from South Rhodesia, one [redacted] South Rhodesia. b6 b7C b7E

[redacted] carried British passport [redacted] and is employee of Vanadium Corp. of America, 420 Lexington Ave., NYC. [redacted] declared one-quarter pound of thorium ore [redacted]

Material being brought by [redacted] from South Rhodesia for anaylsis by his employer. Material being released by US Customs on advise of AEC, NYC. [redacted] Radiation Branch, AEC, NYC, advised that material is source material of such quantity as not to be of interest to AEC. b6 b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/12/03 BY SP4 RTK/ENP

For info.

NOT OF SUFFICIENT QUANTITY TO WARRANT ACTION. LW

KELLY

3 - Bureau (117-268) RM
1 - New York (117-192)

RECORDED - 4

INDEXED - 4

11 SEP 10 1957

JJD:mtt (4)

30 SEP 12 1957

EX-150

Mr. Belmont

Approved: James J. Kelly
Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M _____ Per _____

ESPIONAGE

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: 9/12/57

FROM : SAC, Philadelphia (117-75)

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES

Re SAC Letter 57-47 dated 8/20/57, and more particularly Paragraph K thereof.

The following information is quoted from a communication received from CIC, Philadelphia:

"The 544th Ordnance Detachment (EODC) is located at the Indiantown Gap Military Reservation (IGMR), Annville, Pennsylvania. The 544th Ordnance Detachment (EODC) also has under its control the 56th Ordnance Detachment (EOD), located at IGMR; 69th Ordnance Detachment (EOD), located at Swarthmore, Pennsylvania; and the 145th Ordnance Detachment (EOD), located in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. The 145th Ordnance Detachment (EOD), is not located within this Region's area of jurisdiction.

"The 544th and 56th Ordnance Detachments have no specific boundaries or areas of responsibility. Assignments to these units are given on the basis of availability and distance. The 69th Ordance Detachment (EOD), serves seventeen (17) counties in Eastern Pennsylvania and the entire state of Delaware. Those counties served in Eastern Pennsylvania are:

Berks	Lehigh	Pike
Bucks	Luzerne	Schuylkill
Carbon	Monroe	Susquehanna
Chester	Montgomery	Wayne
Delaware	Northhampton	Wyoming
Lackawanna	Philadelphia	

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4/13/03 BY SP4AMP/kmp

2 - Bureau
1 - Baltimore (Info.)
1 - Pittsburgh (Info.)
1 - Philadelphia (117-75)

RECORDED - 7

117-268-1713

EX-137

SEP 13 1957

JWG:msm
(5)

SEP 19 1957

SEP 19 1957

ESP SEC.

"Whereas there is no specific overlap within the jurisdiction of these organizations they may be utilized in other areas of the Second United States Army or the adjacent First United States Army.

"There are no units of this type within this area other than those mentioned. Personnel of the organizations are on duty at all times and have air transportation, both fixed wing and rotary wing type aircraft, available to them.

"The 544th Ordnance Detachment (EODC), presently located at IGMR, is scheduled to move to the Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Maryland, effective 4 October 1957.

"The following pertinent information is furnished relative to the three Ordance Detachments situated within this Region:

"56th Ordnance Detachment (EOD)
Indiantown Gap Military Reservation
Annville, Pennsylvania

"Commanding Officer: Second Lieutenant [redacted]

"Telephone Number: [redacted]

"69th Ordnance Detachment (EOD)
Yale and Harvard Streets
Swarthmore, Pennsylvania

"Commanding Officer: Captain [redacted] b6 b7C
Telephone Number: [redacted]

"544th Ordnance Detachment (EODC)
Indiantown Gap Military Reservation
Annville, Pennsylvania

"Commanding Officer: Captain [redacted]
Telephone Number: [redacted]

"Ordnance Detachments of this type, have the capability of detecting, identifying, rendering safe, recovering, disposing of, and the field evaluation of all unexploded United States and foreign explosive items, such as bombs, shells, mines, rockets, pyrotechnics, demolition charges, guided missiles, and special weapons; which have been launched, dropped, placed, or armed in such a manner as to constitute a hazard to personnel and/or material and may include the safe disposal of explosive items rendered unsafe through damage or deterioration.

"These units have been requested to notify this organization, who will in turn contact your office, of any changes in their address, telephone number, areas of jurisdiction, or responsibility, or commanding officer."

The Bureau will be notified of any changes as they occur.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: August 23, 1957

FROM : Mr. R. R. Roach

SUBJECT: SOVIET REQUEST TO FLY PLANE INTO NEW YORK CITY

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
Nease
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

My memorandum dated August 21, 1957, advised that on that date the Soviet Embassy had requested permission to fly a TU-104 plane from Moscow to Idlewild Airport, New York City, between September 3 and 5, 1957, and again between September 13 and 15, 1957. My memorandum also reflected that Mr. Robert Murphy, Deputy Under Secretary of State, said he did not know why the Soviets wanted to make the flights but expressed the opinion they might want to make them in connection with transporting their U. N. personnel.

At 3:10 p.m. on August 23, 1957, the Liaison Representative learned from [redacted] of the State Russian Desk and from [redacted] Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, State, that Mr. Murphy had just made the decision to allow the Soviets to make the two flights requested, subject to the safeguards recommended by the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS) in its communication of August 23, 1957, a copy of which is enclosed.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/19/03 BY SP2 CUT/PAC

The State representatives said that the Canadian Government is going to be contacted by State as soon as possible, prior to advising the Soviets of the decision. State will probably advise the Canadians today and will probably advise the Soviets early on Monday, August 26, 1957. The Soviets will be informed that it has been decided to allow the two flights but that details will have to be worked out.

b6
b7C

State representatives said that there probably will be a meeting of the members of the ICIS next week, in particular, a meeting of representatives of Customs, Immigration and Naturalization Service, State and Air Force. It is planned to discuss the details of handling the Soviet flights at this meeting.

ENCLOSURE

According to [redacted] the Soviets have said that the purpose of the flights is to transport their United Nations Delegation.

ACTION:

For information. Liaison will continue to follow this matter with State.

Enclosure
JMF:hjt (7)
1 - Mr. Nichols
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Branigan
1 - Mr. Whitson
1 - Liaison Section
1 - Mr. Fitzgerald

62-116395-67

NOT RECORDED
112-268
29 AUG 1957

21 AUG 29 1957

LIAISON

DIRECTOR

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

F B I

Date: 9/13/57

Transmit the following in PLAIN
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. Nease
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (117-New)

SUBJECT: BALDWIN INSTRUMENT COMPANY
SMAB; AEA

On 9/13/57, Inspector [redacted] U.S. Customs, Idlewild Airport, NY, advised that Pan American Airways flight 88888 arrived Idlewild 9/11/57, and the following material was listed on airway bill number 052272: one radio active source holder without collimators; one radio active source number 873 comprising 6MCs strontium 90; 10.002 aluminum protective foils; two wire wound bobbins.

b6
b7C
b7E

This material was shipped by the Baldwin Instrument Company, Dratford, Kent, England to the Nuclear Corporation of America, 3361 Cresent Street, NYC. [redacted] stated that this material [redacted]

ALBERT ZILA, A.E.C., NYC, advised instant material was not source, ~~nocular~~ nuclear or special interest material.

NO ACTION NECESSARY. KELLY

LW

3 - Bureau (RM)
1 - New York (117-192)
1 - New York (117-New)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/13/03 BY SP4BJA/RNP

TGS:pak
(6)

RECORDED - 78

INDEXED - 78

117-368-1

56 SEP 17 1957

Approved: JJ Kelly
Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

Mr.	Tolson
Mr.	Nichols
Mr.	Boardman
Mr.	Belmont
Mr.	Mohr
Mr.	Parsons
Mr.	Rosen
Mr.	Tamm
Mr.	Trotter
Mr.	Nease
Tele.	Room
Mr.	Holloman
Miss	Gandy

FBI

Date: 9/11/57

Transmit the following in PLAIN
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (117-)

SUBJECT: [redacted]
SMAB; AEA

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/13/03 BY SP4BJP/RNP

b6
b7C

On 9/10/57, Inspector [redacted] US Customs, Idlewild Airport, NY, advised that 9/10/57, BOAC flight number GAKGH carried one package weighing one pound gross and measuring 4" x 4" x 5½" on air way bill number 527-346.

Package had label reading "radio active material group one or two - P32 activity, 10MC - Radio active units this package 0-1."

Package was shipped by Radio Chemical Center Amersham, Buckinghamshire, England, to [redacted] Biophysics Department, Hartford Foundation, Yale University, Valhalla, NY.

b6
b7C

[redacted]

b7E

ALBERT ZILA, A.E.C., NYC, advised that instant package contained 10 milicuries phosphorus 32 and was not source nucelar or special interest material.

NO ACTION NECESSARY.

KELLY

3 - Bureau (RM)
1 - New York (117-192)
1 - New York (117-)

JHK:hd
(6)

RECORDED - 65
INDEXED - 65
EX-126

117-268-1415

11 SEP 12 1957

117-268

EX-SEC

Approved: J. J. Kelly
Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268) DATE: 9/13/57

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (117-316)

SUBJECT: UNSUB; Possibly [redacted]
[redacted]
Durham, Connecticut
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

b6
b7C

Re Bureau letter July 31, 1957.

It will be recalled that on 7/25/57, a leather suitcase containing 15 brown paper sacks of ore weighing 50 pounds, arrived at Idlewild Airport, NYC. At this time, US Customs advised that inasmuch as suitcase's owner and airline it came on were unkown, it would be sent to Idlewild's General Order Department until it was claimed. Samples of the ore were sent to AEC for sampling.

On 9/11/57, Inspector [redacted] US Customs, advised that on 9/10/57, the suitcase had been turned over to one [redacted] Passenger Traffic Manager for US Steel Export Corporation, 30 Church Street, NYC. [redacted] explained that a sample of the ore, which had been forwarded to the Atomic Energy Commission, had been returned on 9/10/57, and on that same date, the bag and its contents, which had previously been claimed by [redacted] were turned over to him.

b6
b7C

On 9/11/57, Mr. ALBERT ZILA, UASEC, advised that he had authorized the release of the bag and its contents to [redacted] since it had been determined that the ore, although possible source material was in such an insignificant amount and inasmuch as it was covered by a general license, it could be returned to its owner.

In view of the above, no further action is contemplated and this case is being placed in a closed status.

2 - Bureau (117-268)
1 - New York (117-316)

LHB:el
(3)

RECORDED - 27
INDEXED - 32
117-268-1416
12 SEP 17 1957

ESP

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/13/03 BY SP4 STM/ENP

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: 9/12/57

FROM : W. A. Branigan

SUBJECT: JOINT IIC-ICIS COMMITTEE ON COUNTERMEASURES

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mason
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

Re memo Roach to Belmont 8/16/57 advising that pursuant to decision of IIC working committee, the ONI representative on the Joint Committee would withdraw in favor of a representative from OSI and, further, that the chairmanship of the Joint Committee would be rotated from the FBI representative on the Joint Committee to the new OSI representative. OSI designated Mr. Frank Welch as the person to handle the committee assignment for OSI.

At the meeting of the Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures 9/12/57 the foregoing changes were accomplished.

RECOMMENDATION:

None. For your information.

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

117-268-1417

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/13/03 BY SP4BTR/ENP

RECORDED - 7

INDEXED - 7

6 SEP 16 1957

cc - Belmont
Branigan
Day
Whitson

LW:blb
(5)

SEP 18 1957

117-268

5

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268) RM

DATE: 9/10/57

FROM : SAC, SAN ANTONIO (117-66)

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES

Re SAC Letter 57-47 (K) dated 8/20/57, with which was enclosed a list of explosive ordnance disposal units having responsibility for handling the disarming of atomic weapons.

On 8/29/57, Colonel J. D. SAMS, Ordnance Officer, Fourth U. S. Army, was contacted by SA [redacted] He advised that the list is current, except for a change in Commanding Officer of the 61st Ordnance Detachment, Ft. Sill, Oklahoma, which change is set out below. He furnished telephone extensions of the various detachments and a map showing the area of responsibility of each.

b6
b7C

The following is an up-to-date list of all the detachments with the area of responsibility of each:

Detachment	Location	Telephone	C.O.
45th Ordnance Detachment, Explosive Ordnance Disposal	Ft. Polk. La.	Ft. Polk Extension 5828	1st Lt. [redacted]

Area covered: All of the State of Louisiana

2 - Bureau (RM)
1 - AQ (RM)
1 - Dallas (RM)
1 - EP (RM)
1 - HO (RM)
1 - LR (RM)
1 - N.O. (RM)
1 - O.C. (RM)
1 - SA
JEJ/lmj
(10)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/13/03 BY SP4 DSTA/RNP

RECORDED - 36 117-268-1414

INDEXED - 36 18 SEP 18 1957

EX 105

FCP

55 SEP 20 1957

EXP. PROC.

ESP. SEC.

SA 117-66

Detachment	Location	Telephone	C.O.
47th Ordnance Detachment, Explosive Ordnance Disposal	Ft. Hood, Texas	Ft. Hood Extension 32209	1st Lt. [redacted]

b6
b7C

Area Covered: The following counties in Texas comprising parts of the Dallas, El Paso, Houston and San Antonio Divisions:

Anderson
Angelina
Bell
Borden
Bosque
Bowie
Brazos
Brown
Burleson
Burnet
Callahan
Camp
Cass
Cherokee
Coke
Coleman
Comanche
Concho
Coryell
Dallas
Dawson
Delta
Eastland
Ellis
Erath
Falls
Fisher
Franklin
Freestone
Glasscock
Gregg

SA 117-66
(Area covered by Ft. Hood, continued)

Grimes	Harrison
Henderson	Hill
Hood	Hopkins
Houston	Howard
Irion	Jasper
Johnson	Jones
Kaufman	Lamar
Lampasas	Lee
Leon	Limestone
Llano	McCulloch
McLennan	Madison
Martin	Mason
Milam	Mills
Mitchell	Montgomery
Nacogdoches	Navarro
Newton	Nolan
Palo Pinto	Panola
Parker	Polk
Rains	Regan
Red River	Robertson
Rockwall	Runnels
Rusk	Sabine
San Augustine	San Jacinto
San Saba	Scurry
Shackelford	Shelby
Smith	Somervell
Stephens	Sterling
Tarrant	Taylor
Titus	Tom Green
Trinity	Tyler
Upshur	Vanzandtne
Walker	Washington
Williamson	Wood

Detachment	Location	Telephone	C.O.
52nd Ordnance Detachment, Explosive Ordnance Disposal	Ft. Chaffee, Arkansas	TU 22081 Extension 558	1st Lt. [redacted]

Area Covered: All of the State of Arkansas and the following counties in Oklahoma:

Adair
Atoka
Cherokee
Choctaw
Coal
Craig
Creek
Delaware
Haskell
Hughes
Latimer
Le Flore
Mayes
McCurtain
McIntosh
Muskogee
Nowata
Okfuskee
Okmulgee
Ottawa
Pittsburg
Pushmataha
Rogers
Sequoyah
Wagoner

b6
b7C

61st Ordnance Detachment, Explosive Ordnance Disposal	Ft. Sill, Oklahoma	Ft. Sill Extension 26116	1st Lt. [redacted]

Area Covered: All of Oklahoma, except counties in Eastern Oklahoma assigned to Ft. Chaffee, and, in addition, the following counties in North Texas:

Detachment	Location	Telephone	C. O.

(Ft. Sill, Oklahoma, continued)

Archer	Armstrong
Bailey	Baylor
Briscoe	Carson
Castro	Childress
Clay	Cochran
Collin	Collingsworth
Cooke	Cottle
Crosby	Dallam
Deaf Smith	Dickens
Donley	Fannin
Floyd	Foard
Garza	Gray
Grayson	Hale
Hall	Hansford
Hardeman	Hartley
Haskell	Hemphill
Hockley	Hunt
Hutchinson	Jack
Kent	King
Knox	Lamb
Lipscomb	Lubbock
Lynn	Montague
Moore	Motley
Ochiltree	Oldham
Parmer	Potter
Randall	Roberts
Sherman	Stonewall
Swisher	Terry
Throckmorton	Wheeler
Wichita	Wilbarger
Wise	Yoakum
Young	

SA 117-66

Detachment	Location	Telephone	C.O.
133rd Ordnance Detachment, Explosive Ordnance Disposal	Ft. Bliss, Texas	Ft. Bliss Extension 28287	1st Lt. [redacted]

Area Covered: All of New Mexico and the following counties in Texas, comprising parts of the Dallas, El Paso and San Antonio Divisions:

Andrews	Brewster
Crane	Culberson
Ector	El Paso
Gaines	Hudspeth
Jeff Davis	Loving
Midland	Pecos
Presidio	Reeves
Terrell	Upton
Ward	Winkler

b6
b7C

546th Ordnance Detachment, Explosive Ordnance Disposal Control	Ft. Sam Houston, Texas	Capital 2-8411, Extensions 4646 and 5308	Major [redacted]

Area Covered: The following counties in Texas, comprising parts of the Dallas, San Antonio and Houston Divisions:

Aransas	Atascosa
Austin	Bandera
Bastrop	Bee
Bexar	Blanco
Brazoria	Brazos
Brooks	Caldwell
Calhoun	Cameron
Chambers	Colorado
Comal	Crockett
De Witt	Dimmit
Duval	Edwards
Fayette	Ft. Bend
Frio	Galveston
Gillespie	Goliad
Gonzales	Guadalupe

Detachment	Location	Telephone	C. O.
(Ft. Sam Houston continued)			
Hardin			Harris
Hays			Hidalgo
Jackson			Jefferson
Jim Hogg			Jim Wells
Karnes			Kendall
Kenedy			Kerr
Kimble			Kinney
Kleberg			La Salle
Lavaca			Liberty
Live Oak			Matagorda
Maverick			McMullen
Medina			Menard
Nueces			Orange
Real			Refugio
San Patricio			Schleicher
Starr			Sutton
Travis			Uvalde
Val Verde			Victoria
Waller			Webb
Wharton			Willacy
Wilson			Zapata
Zavala			

Colonel SAMS reminded that outside of business hours, the Officer of the Day at each post is always kept informed of the location of an officer in the respective Ordnance Detachments, and such officer can be contacted through the post Officer of the Day.

OFFICE MEMORANDUM . UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI DATE: 9/11/57

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (98-0)

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF, AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES

Re SAC Letter 57-47, dated 8/20/57, paragraph K, page 11, captioned as above.

Colonel J. A. PETROLINO, First United States Army, Governors Island, New York 4, New York, was contacted on 8/29 and 30/57. He advised that the 542nd Ordnance Detachment, Governors Island, New York, is the Explosive Disposal Control Unit for the entire First Army area, and is charged with the responsibility of assigning detachments when and where needed in this area. This control unit is under the command of Major JAMES S. LiCALZI, and the Operations Officer is Captain [redacted] The telephone number is WHitehall 4-7700, Extension 7266 or 7268. Since the 542nd Ordnance Detachment is the control center for directing operations in connection with the dispoal of all explosives in the First Army area, this is the only unit to be contacted in case of an incident occuring anywhere in this area. First Army area covers New England, New York and New Jersey, comprising the following states:

Maine, Vermont, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York and New Jersey.

Captain [redacted] personally appeared at the NYO on 9/3/57, and made available a roster of Explosive Detachment (ED) Units, commanding officers, telephone numbers and extensions. Captain [redacted] explained, however, that, although the telephone numbers

EXECUTIVE

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b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/13/03 BY SP3 [illegible]

2-Bureau (RM)
2-Albany (RM)
2-Boston (RM)
2-Buffalo (RM)
2-Newark (RM)
2-New Haven (RM)
1-New York (98-0)

RECORDED - 6 117-268-1419

INDEXED - 6

14 SEP 16 1957

EX-131

TEO:amd
(13)

55 SEP 19 1957

ESP/MEC

of the individual units located in the First Army area are being made available, these units will go into operation only on orders from the Central Control Unit, the 542nd Ordnance Detachment, Governors Island, New York. Captain [redacted] explained that this system has been to allow for greater flexibility in covering critical points with a mimimum of travel. He said that the movement of a particular unit to another section for temporary duty can be covered by the Control Unit which could assign another unit to handle any explosive problem. For example, Captain [redacted] pointed out that the 66th Ordnance Detachment, regularly located at Fort Slocum, New York, is presently on temporary assignment in upper NY State.

b6
b7C

Following is a list of the ED Units within the First Army area broken down according to the field divisions covering the units:

NEW YORK FIELD DIVISION

Unit	Commanding Officer
542nd Ordnance Detachment (Explosive Disposal Control) Governors Island, New York 4, NY Tel: WHitehall 4-7700 Ext. 7266 or 7268	Major JAMES S. LiCALZI, Commanding Capt. [redacted] Operations Officer
54th Ordnance Detachment (Explosive Disposal) Fort Totten 59, New York BAyside 9-1900, Ext. 3249	1st Lt. WALTER G. GREINER
66th Ordnance Detachment (Explosive Disposal) Fort Slocum, New York Tel: NEw Rochelle 6-0900 Ext. 68	1st Lt. ROBERT A. DONAHUE

Unit	Commanding Officer
132nd Ordnance Detachment (Explosive Disposal) Fort Tilden 95, New York Tel: NEptune 4-2900, Ext. 48	1st Lt. CLIFTON D. PRUETT, Jr.

BUFFALO FIELD DIVISION

40th Ordnance Detachment (Explosive Disposal) Fort Niagara, Youngstown, NY Tel: Youngstown 7-7381 Ext. 360	1st Lt. WALTER KORSGAARD
143rd Ordnance Detachment (Explosive Disposal) Seneca Ordnance Depot (NSA) Romulus, New York Tel: Justice 5-4481 Ext. 7258 or 7560	Capt. WILLIAM C. KISSINGER

NEWARK FIELD DIVISION

42nd Ordnance Detachment (Explosive Disposal) Delaware Storage Activity Pedricktown, New Jersey Tel: PEnnsgrove 800, Ext. 77	1st Lt. JAMES H. ROBERTS
60th Ordnance Detachment (Explosive Disposal) Fort Dix, New Jersey Tel: Raymond 4-2000 Ext. 25210	1st Lt. KENNETH V. BARNWELL
72nd Ordnance Detachment (Explosive Disposal) Raritan Arsenal, Metuchen, New Jersey Tel: WH 3-4233, Ext. 823	1st Lt. MORGAN E. TACKETT

BOSTON FIELD DIVISION

Unit	Commanding Officer
55th Ordnance Detachment (Explosive Disposal) Fort Devens, Mass. Tel: Ayer, Mass SPruce 2-3311 Ext. 3313 or 3012	2nd Lt. EARL F. THOMPSON
65th Ordnance Detachment (Explosive Disposal) USA Garrison, Ft. Williams, Maine Tel: Portland, SPruce 2-4072	1st Lt. LAWRENCE W. WHITNEY
144th Ordnance Detachment (Explosive Disposal) USA Garrison, Ft. Devens, Mass. Tel: Ayer Mass. SPruce 2-3311 Ext. 2132 or 3012	Capt. NICHOLAS MIKU
146th Ordnance Detachment (Explosive Disposal) Fort Banks, Mass. Tel: Boston LIberty 2-6000 Ext. 279	1st Lt. CHARLES R. BAILEY

The Bureau is requested to advise, in following the procedure set up by the First Army, whether the field divisions in the First Army area in reporting an explosive incident, should communicate directly with the Control Unit on Governors Island, the 542nd Ordnance Detachment, or whether the field divisions should report the matter to the NYO, and the NYO report it to the 542nd Ordnance Detachment.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 9/12/57

FROM : SAC, SAN DIEGO (66-998)

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES

Re SAC let 57-47.

The Explosive Ordnance Disposal Detachment in San Diego is the 70th Ordnance Detachment, Fort Rosecrans, San Diego 6, California, telephone ACademy 3-8449. First Lt. WILLIAM DELONG is the Commanding Officer. His home telephone number is ACademy 3-3840.

DELONG advised on September 6, 1957 that his detachment covers San Diego and Imperial Counties in California, all of Arizona, all of Nevada effective December 1, 1957 and western New Mexico if called.

2 - Director, FBI (REGISTERED)
1 - San Diego

DNG:rk
(3)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/13/03 BY SP4 BJA/LNP

EXP PROC

RECORDED - 6 117-268-1406

13 SEP 16 1957

EX-131

ESP REC.

0-17 SAN DIEGO 9-16-57
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NOTIFIED. LW

58 SEP 20 1957

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI DATE: 9/13/57

FROM SAC, Kansas City (98-00)

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES

Re SAC Letter 57-47 (K), 8/20/57.

On 9/3/57 First Lieutenant RALPH O. EKONEN, Commanding Officer, 88th Ordnance Detachment, EOD, Building 919, Main Post, Fort Riley, Kansas, furnished the following information to SA [redacted] b6 b7C

Lieutenant EKONEN advised that the following five Explosive Ordnance Disposal Detachments have joint responsibility in the states of Colorado, Kansas, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota and Wyoming. He stated that no EOD had jurisdiction that was confined in an area within the six state radius, but that any unit had jurisdiction and responsibility anywhere in the six state area where a complaint or their responsibilities would take them. Lieutenant EKNOEN advised that the jurisdiction and responsibility is fixed according to which detachment receives a complaint or request.

41st Ordnance Detachment, EOD, Rocky Mountain Arsenal, Colorado (near Denver). Commanding Officer, Captain HARLEY K. POUJOL. Telephone number ATlas 8-0711, Extension 6202.

74th Ordnance Detachment, EOD, Building 919, Main Post, Fort Riley, Kansas. Commanding Officer, First Lieutenant C. F. GARDNER. Telephone number Fort Riley 6-1133. Main telephone number and extension the same.

74th Ordnance Detachment is presently on summer training at Camp McCoy, Wisconsin, and will return to their permanent station at Fort Riley, Kansas, during the last week of September 1957. The telephone number at Camp McCoy is not known.

2-Bureau (RM)
2-Denver (RM)
1-Minneapolis (RM)
1-Omaha (RM)
1-Kansas City
RGD:B

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/13/03 BY SP2 AT/cew

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11-7-268-1421

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21 SEP 18 1957

55 SEP 20 1957

KC 98-00

88th Ordnance Detachment, EOD, and the 550th Ordnance Detachment, EOD, are both under Commanding Officer, First Lieutenant RALPH O. EKONEN. Both are located in Building 919, Main Post, Fort Riley, Kansas, and both have the same phones and extension, Fort Riley 6-1133. The foregoing phone number is also the extension phone.

Lieutenant EKONEN advised that the 550th Ordnance Detachment would be deactivated on 10/1/57.

171st Ordnance Detachment, EOD, Fort Carson, Colorado, Commanding Officer, Lieutenant MELROSE (first name not known). Telephone number MElrose 3-6644, Extension 2643.

The Denver office is requested to contact the 171st Ordnance Detachment, EOD, and ascertain the full name of the Commanding Officer, specific location, address and telephone number, and so advise the Bureau.

FD-36 (Rev. 3-13-56)

FBI

Date: 9/17/57

Transmit the following message via AIRTEL

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. Tease
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268)

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (117-192)

SUBJECT: SMAB - COMBINED DEVELOPMENT AGENCY, C/O AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL, JOHANNESBURG, SOUTH AFRICA
AEA

On 9/15/57, [redacted] Deputy Collector of Customs, Idlewild Airport, NYC, advised that three parcels of uranium samples came in as cargo at Idlewild Airport on 9/14/57 via Pan American Airlines. The three parcels were shipped by the Combined Development Agency, in care of the American Consulate General, Johannesburg, South Africa and were going to the U.S. Atomic Energy Comm., Washington, D.C. [redacted] advised that Mr. ZILA of the AEC, NYC, had released the uranium ore and allowed it to be shipped in bond to the Collector of Customs, Washington, D.C. where it will be delivered to the AEC in Washington.

b6
b7C

Above for info.

ORE IN BOND TO AEC, WASHINGTON, D.C. NO ACTION NECESSARY. KELLY
LW

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/13/63 BY SP4 BTB/RNP

3-Bureau (117-268) RM
1-New York (117-192)

RECORDED - 7
INDEXED - 7

117-268-1439

15 SEP 18 1957

LHB:EG
(5)

Mr. Belmont

55 SEP 20 1957

Approved: J. J. Kelly Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

FD-36 (Rev. 3-13-56)

FBI

Date: 9/18/57

Transmit the following message via AIRTEL

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. Nease
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (117-new)

SUBJECT: AEC CANADA % CHIEF RADIO ACTIVE SECTION, NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS, WASHINGTON, D.C., ATT: [redacted] SMAB - AEA

b6
b7C

On 9/17/57, [redacted] Deputy Collector of Customs, Idlewild Airport, NYC, advised that one carton, 8½" x 8½" x 8½" in size, labelled Class D poison, radio active; ANTHRACENE - 9 - C14, arrived 9/16/57 as cargo via Trans-Canada Airlines flight "CFTHK #200" (Manifest #2).

This carton was shipped by Atomic Energy of Canada and destined for Chief Radio Active Section of the National Bureau of Standards, Washington, D.C., Attention Dr. W.B. MANN.

[redacted] advised that [redacted] and that Mr. SOLON, AEC, NYC, had released said carton to be sent in bond to US Customs, Washington, D.C.

b6
b7C
b7E

Mr. ALBERT ZILA, AEC, NYC, advised on 9/18/57 that above-mentioned carton contained Carbon 14, probably in a liquid state, and was not a special nuclear or source material under terms of AEA.

For information.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/13/03 BY SP4/BTA/ENP

NO ACTION NECESSARY
LW

POWERS

(3) - Bureau (RM)
1 - New York (117-192)
1 - New York (117-new)

RECORDED - 78
INDEXED - 78

117-263-1403

11 SEP 19 1957

EX - 137

RRF:kid (#1)
(6)

ESP. SEC.

Approved: EJ Gowers Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

58 SEP 20 1957

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/13/03 BY SP4 BSR/RMP

September 17, 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TOLSON
MR. BOARDMAN
MR. BELMONT

On Thursday, September 12, 1957, I attended the meeting of the National Security Council presided over by the Vice President. The matter for discussion at this Council meeting was the "Relation of Port Security Programs to United States Policy Toward Poland." General Cutler briefed the Council upon this matter, indicating certain objections by the Treasury Department and the Budget Bureau to the required coverage which rested upon the Treasury Department that registered its objection primarily because of the cost of the same, and the same objection was voiced by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget. The Secretary of the Treasury stated he was not opposing the policy but he felt it would be better if there was but one port on the Atlantic and one port on the Pacific Coasts into which these vessels might enter. The Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, Admiral Strauss, raised the question as to the danger of these vessels bringing in atomic or hydrogen bombs and felt, therefore, that they should not be allowed to enter what might be called the large or busy ports but should be directed to enter the smaller ports where, if there was any smuggling of bombs, it would cause less damage.

There was general discussion as to this. It was agreed, however, that the paper as submitted by the Planning Board would prevail. General Cutler inquired of me as to whether the IIC had any views to express upon the matter, and I pointed out that the IIC was interposing no objection but I did want it to be thoroughly recognized that the admission of Polish ships to United States ports and the granting of shore leave to Polish seamen would create an internal security hazard. I called attention to the defection of the seventy passengers and crew members of the "Batory" last August when that boat docked at Copenhagen and I also pointed out that the Captain of the "Batory" had but a few years ago, when he defected and sought asylum in Great Britain, reported that the Polish merchant fleet was an important factor being exploited by the USSR for its own purposes. I stated it was a fact that there was quite active Polish espionage going on in this country at the present time and that no doubt the admission of Polish vessels would create a further security problem which should, of course, be recognized

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
Nease
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

JEH:TLC
(7)

NOT RE
102 SEP 17 1957

MAIL ROOM
58 SEP 20 1957

SENT FROM D. O.
TIME 10:35 AM
DATE 9-18-57
BY

by all. The Secretary of State responded that he did not believe that the few changes which had occurred upon the part of the present Polish Government represented any substantial change in attitude by that Government and that he believed that it was entirely probable that the Polish merchant fleet personnel would be utilized by the USSR for espionage activities.

The Vice President brought the subject to a termination by stating that the paper would be forwarded to the President by General Cutler indicating the approval of the Council and that it should be understood that the action being taken was in the form of an experiment which would be closely watched by all appropriate units of the government so that it might at any time be re-evaluated.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: 9/5/57

FROM : W. A. Branigan

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF ATOMIC WEAPONS

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mason
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

The advisory group on the detection device program was requested on 6/4/57 to prepare a classification guide for use in standardizing classification of information in connection with the detection device program. By memorandum to the Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures dated 8/28/57 (received 8/30/57) Mr. Leonard P. Bienvenue, Executive Secretary, ICIS, transmitted a draft classification guide which had been prepared by the advisory group with the assistance of the AEC advisor to the Joint IIC-ICIS Committee.

A review of the draft shows that it is very comprehensive, covering both general and specific subject matters of the detection device program. The proposed classifications are minimal and in no instance does there appear to be a suggested classification which would be objectionable from a practical standpoint of being too high. Two items appearing on page 4 of the draft are suggested as unclassified. One of these involves the physical appearance and housing of [redacted] device, which is the most sensitive now available. It is believed that a "Confidential" classification should be assigned in the case of certain "custom-built" housing for [redacted] devices since the National Security Council directives relating to this program require "covert" examination of diplomats. If the concealment of a [redacted] device for examination of diplomats and their baggage is not classified, the "covert" requirement of the National Security Council cannot be fulfilled. b7E

The general capabilities of [redacted] device with regard to its meter readings might also be classified Confidential (although the draft indicates these to be unclassified) since any capable scientist could determine from the general response or

3 ENCLOSURE

Enclosure
117-268
cc - Belmont
Branigan
Whitson
LW:blb
(4)

RECORDED - 73 6 SEP 18 1957

INDEXED - 73

55 SEP 24 1957

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meter reading the specific capability of the device. Specific capabilities are classified Confidential except for capabilities as to weapon parts, which are classified Secret.

RECOMMENDATION:

At the next meeting of the Joint IIC-ICIS Committee, the attached draft will be discussed and questions will be raised with the AEC advisor regarding the possible need for classification of "custom-built" housing for [redacted] and classification of the general capabilities of the device. b7E

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Rec'd from ICIS 8-30-57 LWB

ICIS-P25/507

August 28, 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Lish Whitson, Chairman
Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures

Members of the Advisory Group

FROM: Leonard P. Bienvenu
Executive Secretary, ICIS

SUBJECT: Classification Guide

At the meeting of the Committee on June 4, 1957, it was agreed that a classification guide for use in standardizing practices and procedures in connection with the detection device program should be prepared by the Advisory Group, with the assistance of the AEC Advisor to the Committee.

There is enclosed copy of a draft Classification Guide dated August 14, 1957, which has been prepared in accordance with the above decision. It will be the subject of review and discussion at a meeting of the Committee to be scheduled at an early date.

Enclosure

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DATE 6/13/03 BY SP4BJA/RNP

cc: Col. Graham
Mr. Kelly
Capt. Bromley
Capt. Stewart
Mr. Gale
Mr. Russell
Mr. Corthell
Lt. Cmdr. Clizbe

memo for Belmont 9/5/57 LWB

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

117-368-1434

ENCLOSURE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

COMMITTEE B CLASSIFICATION GUIDE

Date of Approval _____

Used by _____

_____

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DATE 6/13/03 BY SP4 BSR/RNP

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

117-36[illegible]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ Advisory Group Draft # 8/14/57

~~COMMITTEE B~~ CLASSIFICATION GUIDE

Foreward

1. Purpose

The purpose of this Guide is to provide a common basis for evaluating the degree of protection which must be provided to documents, photographs, equipment, material, information, etc., pertaining to the operation of detecting devices to prevent the clandestine introduction of atomic weapons and special nuclear materials into this country. This Guide is, therefore, an aid to establishing the classification of categories of that information. In addition, it indicates those categories of information which are considered to be Restricted Data as that term is defined in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.

2. Use of the Guide

It must be clearly understood by all users that this is a guide in the true sense of the word and cannot be considered as an index to mechanical classification. The determination of what classification to assign to a document, material, or information is premised on an evaluation of the content as a whole. Many cases will arise when individual parts, phrases, or pieces standing alone may justifiably be assigned to specific classification but when combined may implicitly or explicitly reveal information which must be more highly classified than any of the individual parts. In using this Guide to assign classification, consideration should be given to whether the effect upon international relations may require a higher classification than a specific topic otherwise requires. On the other hand certain specified phrases or sentences from material of a given classification may be reviewed by authority and assigned a lower classification than the particular material otherwise requires.

appropriate classifying

3. Definitions

a. Program -- The word program as used in this guide refers to the use of detecting devices to prevent the clandestine introduction of atomic weapons and special nuclear materials into this country.

b. Extent -- The word extent as used in this guide refers to the number of devices, number of operators of devices, number and specific locations of monitoring points, schedules of spot check operations or the number and designation of the participating governmental agencies.

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117-264-1424

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

This material contains information affecting the national defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, U.S.C., Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

c. Classification Categories -- The classification categories Top Secret, Secret and Confidential defined in Executive Order 10501 are indicated by the entries TS, S and C respectively, in the column headed "Classification."

d. Restricted Data -- Classified items which constitute Restricted Data as defined in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 are indicated by the designation RD in the column headed "R.D."

e. Unclassified -- Unclassified items are indicated by the entry "U" in the classification column and "No" in the RD column.

f. Defense Information other than Restricted Data -- Defense Information other than Restricted Data which constitutes information affecting the national defense as defined in Executive Order 10501 is indicated by the abbreviation for the appropriate classification category in the classification column and by "No" in the RD column.

g. Special Nuclear Material - Sec 11 t Atomic Energy act definition.

4. Authority

Delete will be covered in Memorandum

This guide has been approved by the Division of Classification, USAEC, and ~~(water Operations Agencies)~~ IIC - ICIS to provide basic classification policy to agencies and contractors involved in the program.

5. Comments and Suggestions

It is requested that users forward suggestions concerning revision or amplification of this guide ~~through appropriate channels~~ to IIC + ICIS.

6. Dissemination of Information

Although the existence of a national program for the detection of contraband fissionable materials is unclassified, it should not be publicly disclosed prior to the issuance of the authorized press release by the Treasury Department.

Subject	Classification	R. D.
1. Program Operations		
1.1 Existence of a National Program (Until such time as formal press release is made, then	~~U~~ C U)	No
1.2 Extent of the National Program	S	No
1.2.1 Any information that reveals the over-all monitoring capability	S	No

Subject	Classification	R. D.
1.3 Extent of local coverage and techniques used to obtain this coverage.	C	No
1.3.1 General information on local coverage such as the fact that all stations or a particular station within a certain port of entry may be or are monitored or the fact that a certain station has been monitored in the past.	U	
1.3.2 ~~Unit allowance lists, compilation of allowance lists,~~ or other information from which the total ~~number of devices at a local area or for the nation~~ detection effort could be determined. The number of personnel or equipment assigned to any specific area.	C	No
1.3.3 Specific information about present or planned operations in a port of entry such as what pier will be monitored, what types of traffic will be monitored.	C	No
1.3.4 Extent of covert monitoring of freight, mail and cargo.	C	No
1.4 Any information as to whether or not agencies other than the announced participating agencies are participating in the program.	C	No
1.5 Reports on monitoring activities		
1.5.1 Field reports of the detection of radioactivity on the person or in the personal effects of diplomatic travelers.	C	No
1.5.1.1 Travel statistics on diplomats ~~of concern~~ when related to this program.	C	No
1.5.2 Field reports of the detection of radioactivity other than special nuclear materials on the person or in the personal effects of other than diplomatic travelers.	C	No

Subject		Classification	R. D.
1.5.3	Field reports of the detection of special nuclear material on the person or in the personal effects of any traveler.	S	No
1.5.4	Field reports of the detection of radioactivity other than special nuclear materials in freight, mail or cargo.	C	No
1.5.5	Field reports of the detection of special nuclear material in freight, mail or cargo.	S	No
1.6	Estimates of the effectiveness of operations which include only information which is classified as defense information (Non-RD) by topics of this guide.	S	No

2. Detection Devices Used in the Program

2.1 [redacted] b7E

~~2.1.1 Devices themselves~~ ~~C~~ ~~No~~

Should be classified in cases of certain "custom built" housing for M-1 because "cover" requirement on items of diplomats.

→ 2.1.~~1~~ ~~Physical appearance and~~ Enter the physical appearance of the housing when not identified as containing a device. ~~C~~ U

2.1.~~2~~ 3 Internal components, circuits or sub-assemblies C No

2.1.~~3~~ 4 Specifications which do not reveal weapon detection capabilities or special nuclear material detection capabilities. C No

2.2 Capabilities

suggestion → 2.2.1 ~~General (response or meter reading in conventional units such as mr/hr)~~ Response to radioactivity ~~C~~ C No

~~2.2.2 Specific (response to a specified source of radioactivity under defined conditions)~~ ~~C~~ ~~No~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Subject	Classification	
2.2.~~2~~ ~~General~~ Response to special nuclear material (equipment generally effective for shielded plutonium, relatively ineffective for shielded uranium)	C	No
2.2.~~3~~ ~~Specific~~ Response to a specified mass of special nuclear material under ~~defined~~ conditions	C	RD
2.2.4 ~~Response for detection~~ Information on effectiveness for detection of weapons or weapons components including responses thereto	S	RD
2.1.5.5. ~~Capability for weapons detection in general~~	S	RD
2.1.5.6 ~~The response to a weapon component parts~~	S	RD
2.1.5.7 ~~Detection capability for any weapon~~	S	RD

3. Existence of Projects to Develop the Following Types of Devices

a.	Passive devices	C	No
b.	X-ray fluoroscopic devices for package inspection	C	No
c.	Cobalt 60 fluoroscopic devices for personal inspection	C	No
d.	Active devices	C	No

(Specifications and capabilities of these devices will be assigned classification as the equipments become available for operational use)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Rec'd ICIS 9-12-57 LW

SECRET

ICIS-P25/522

September 10, 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Lish Whitson, Chairman
Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures

Advisory Group

FROM: IPB/LPB Leonard P. Bienvenu
Executive Secretary, ICIS

SUBJECT: Detection Device Program - Recommendations of August 20, 1957.

Copies are enclosed of letters dated August 26, 1957, from the Chairmen, IIC and ICIS, to the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, and of the enclosure to those letters, a statement dated August 20, 1957, of recommendations approved by the IIC and ICIS, based on review of the current detection device program.

The special attention of the Advisory Group is invited to Recommendation 6 on page 2 of the recommendations dated August 20, 1957.

Enclosures

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DATE 6/16/03 BY SP4 BDA/ENP

cc: Col. Graham
Mr. Kelly
Capt. Bromley
Capt. Stewart
Mr. Gale
Lt. Cmdr. Clizbe
Mr. Corthell
Mr. Russell

112-2662-1425
NOT RECORDED
6 SEP 18 1957

INDEXED - 73
EX-131

FBI
55 SEP 24 1957

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5

~~SECRET~~

August 26, 1957

Honorable Robert B. Anderson
The Secretary of the Treasury
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Anderson:

Enclosed is a statement dated August 20, 1957, of recommendations approved by the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security, based on review of the current detection device program for the prevention of the clandestine introduction into the United States of nuclear weapons or components thereof. It is requested that your department take steps to implement those recommendations which pertain to its responsibility, as indicated parenthetically at the end of each recommendation.

Sincerely yours

/s/
J. Edgar Hoover
Chairman
Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference

/s/
J. Walter Yeagley
Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee
on Internal Security

Enclosure

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 6/16/03 BY SP4 RSA/ENP

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117-364-1435

~~SECRET~~

August 26, 1957

Honorable Lewis L. Strauss
Chairman
Atomic Energy Commission
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Strauss:

Enclosed is a statement dated August 20, 1957 of recommendations approved by the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security, based on review of the current detection device program for the prevention of the clandestine introduction into the United States of nuclear weapons or components thereof. It is requested that your agency take steps to implement those recommendations which pertain to its responsibility, as indicated parenthetically at the end of each recommendation.

With regard to Recommendation No. 7, we recognize that in discussions of responsibility for determining the nuclear or non-nuclear character of material detected by search, your representatives took a position in opposition to assignment of this responsibility to the AEC. Nevertheless, after full consideration, the two internal security committees are of the view that such responsibility should be assumed by AEC, and we trust that you will cause this recommendation to be implemented.

FBI
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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/16/03 BY SP4 CTA/RNP

Sincerely yours,

/s/
J. Edgar Hoover
Chairman,
Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference

/s/
J. Walter Yeagley
Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee
on Internal Security

Enclosure

ENCLOSURE
117-[illegible]-1425

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

August 23, 1957

RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE IIC AND ICIS, BASED ON REVIEW OF THE CURRENT DETECTION DEVICE PROGRAM FOR THE PREVENTION OF THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR COMPONENTS THEREOF

In accordance with the provisions of Presidential directives on the subject, the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (IIC) and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS) are jointly responsible (in conjunction with the AEC) for coordinating the implementation of a broad program of countermeasures designed to detect and defend against the clandestine introduction into the United States of nuclear weapons or component parts thereof. The overall program, which was approved as a broad guide to the departments and agencies concerned, included a number of suggested courses of action designed to aid in the prevention of such introduction through various channels and avenues of entry capable of utilization by hostile forces.

Based upon the assignment given jointly to the IIC and the ICIS by the President, recommendations on various aspects of the problem have been made over the past several years to the NSC and to other departments and agencies concerned. At this time, in the light of a recent review of elements of the countermeasures program which deal specifically with the development and use of detection devices for the examination of persons and shipments, the IIC and ICIS recommend that the responsible agencies place emphasis upon completion of the following actions in order to facilitate implementation of those elements of the program which are treated below.

Recommendations:

1. In the light of improved Soviet capabilities, research and development activity should be accelerated in the fields of passive, active, and fluoroscopic devices, and status reports furnished thereon to the IIC and ICIS on a quarterly basis. (AEC)

b7E

2. [redacted] detection device installations should, insofar as practicable, be custom built to insure maximum efficiency of the device. (For example, lead shielding should be utilized where practicable to permit [redacted] devices to operate with improved efficiency and effectiveness.) (Treasury, Justice)

3. Improved operational and search techniques developed on the basis of experience gained in the use of detection devices should be utilized by all operating agencies, and full advantage taken of training courses offered by the AEC. (Treasury, Justice)

4. Definite lines of responsibility should be established within each agency involved in the operation of the detection device program, including responsibility for supervision of personnel training, and operation of equipment in use at various locations; and there should be full participation by such agencies in the interdepartmental Advisory Group established to assist in achieving coordinated implementation of the program. (Treasury, Justice)

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117-368-1425

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5. The Department of the Treasury, exclusive of the functions described in Paragraph 7, should be responsible for supervising the operational aspects of the detection device program to insure maximum effectiveness in the utilization of such devices and should report thereon to IIC and ICIS on a quarterly basis. (Treasury)

6. The IIC-ICIS Advisory Group (composed of representatives of Customs, Coast Guard, INS, AEC) should be responsible for making continuing studies and analyses of all aspects of the detection device program (including operational, research, development, procurement, training, etc.) and should report such analyses, together with appropriate recommendations, to the IIC and ICIS on a semiannual basis. (The Advisory Group)

7. In instances where examinations by the detection devices indicate the presence of radioactive materials and there is sufficient reason to believe that same may contain special nuclear material, the AEC should be responsible for taking action to determine the nuclear or non-nuclear character thereof, when such material is available for examination. (AEC)

8. Agencies having operational responsibilities should take all practicable measures to expedite the acquisition and installation of the total number of devices called for within the limits of the currently agreed detection device program. (Treasury, Justice)

9. Where possible spot-check manual examinations of incoming express, freight and mail shipments should be intensified and extended to include use of detection devices, and these examinations should include shipments in bond, warehouse shipments, bulk shipments, and shipments not ordinarily examined in appraisers' stores. (Treasury)

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED S[redacted] GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: 9/10/57

FROM : W. A. Branigan

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mason
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

A meeting of the Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures has been set for 10 a.m., Thursday, 9/12/57, in the ICIS conference room. The agenda contains two discussion items. One of these, the draft classification guide for detection device matters, was the subject of a separate memorandum dated 9/5/57. The other discussion item is a request to the Joint Committee from the chairman of ICIS. Mr. Yeagley requests that the Joint Committee consider National Intelligence Estimate No. 11-2-57 entitled "The Soviet Atomic Energy Program" dated 5/7/57. This estimate pointed out that the majority of the Soviet nuclear weapons already tested have contained plutonium alone or a combination of plutonium and uranium. In view of these facts the ICIS requests an analysis be made to determine whether our detection devices should be considered more effective than previously thought relative to nondiplomatic shipments.

The predominance of plutonium as a Soviet weapons component has been recognized by the FBI and the IIC agencies. The IIC and ICIS joined in a report to the National Security Council (NSC) entitled "Reappraisal of U.S. Policy Regarding Soviet Bloc Shipments Afforded Diplomatic Immunity," which is embodied in NSC document 5527 dated 12/1/55. In paragraph 16 of that document the IIC and ICIS stated: "While it is true that data on Soviet test shots indicate that plutonium has been used in most test shots, AEC advice indicates that the limited United States capability to detect shielded uranium might suggest that uranium-235 would be selected for clandestine introduction. It must be assumed that the Soviets are capable of properly shielding fissionable material."

The precise detection capability of our devices is not really a matter at issue with regard to nondiplomatic shipments because such shipments can be taken apart and physically examined.

117-268

cc - Belmont
Branigan
Day
Whitson

LW:blb
(5)

RECORDED - 73 117-268-1426

INDEXED - 73

6 SEP 23 1957

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/16/03 BY SP4 BAW/ENM

EX-131

F68

55 SEP 24 1957

Memorandum for A. H. Belmont
Re: Smuggling of Atomic Bombs
Bufile: 117-268

RECOMMENDATION:

If you approve, the IIC and ICIS comments on the NSC document will be brought to the attention of the Joint Committee. The Joint Committee will also be reminded that nondiplomatic shipments can be physically examined. It will be suggested that nothing in the National Intelligence Estimate should cause any re-evaluation of the capabilities of devices now available.

DONE 9-12-57 LW

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: September 16, 1957

FROM : SAC, Detroit (66-2276)

SUBJECT: [redacted]
SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS

Re SAC Letter 57-47, Section (K).

Captain LAWRENCE E. RINGEY, 75th Ordnance Detachment, EOD, Ft. Wayne, Michigan, was contacted September 11, 1957. He advised as follows:

The EOD enclosure list attached to the above SAC Letter should be corrected as set out below:

The 46th Ordnance Detachment, EOD (page 3), and the 75th Ordnance Detachment, EOD, are under the sole command of Captain RINGEY. First Lt. CHARLES W. CLAYPOOL is no longer assigned to Ft. Wayne.

The 46th and 75th Ordnance Detachments, EOD, will continue under Captain RINGEY until approximately January, 1958. In January, the 46th Ordnance Detachment will have a trained replacement to take over the command vacated by CLAYPOOL.

On a 24-hour basis, RINGEY can be contacted in the following manner:

Ft. Wayne, Michigan, Building #90, from 7 a.m. to 4:30 p.m., c/o VInewood 3-6600, Extension 577. Off duty hours, he can be reached at his home, c/o LU 2 - 5392.

UAC, the 46th and 75th Ordnance Detachments, EOD, are to be contacted as above.

These Detachments cover the entire State of Michigan. They have no additional geographic responsibility.

6 - Bureau (REGISTERED)
2 - Detroit
1 - 117-35
GBN:JLK
(4)

117-268-1427

RECORDED-45 SEP 18 1957

EX-137

55 SEP 24 1957

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/4/03 BY SP6BTAP/RP

The 75th is stationed at Ft. Wayne and the 46th was recently relocated to Selfridge AFB, Mt. Clemens, Michigan, under direct command of Captain RINGEY, who is assigned at Ft. Wayne.

RINGEY stated he would immediately notify Detroit when he is relieved of the 46th EOD Command. Upon receipt of this information, Detroit will notify the Bureau.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI DATE: 9/17/57

FROM: SAC, NEWARK (117-00)

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES

Re SAC Letter #57-47 and New York letter to Bureau, 9/11/57, bearing above caption.

Referenced New York letter sets forth the Explosive Disposal Units within the Newark Division, with the name of the Commanding Officer, location of the ED Unit, telephone number and extension.

Newark has contacted the 72nd Ordnance Detachment (Explosive Disposal), Raritan Arsenal, Metuchen, N. J., and obtained the information requested in referenced SAC Letter #57-47, which is the same as set forth in referenced New York letter with the exception of the telephone number for the ED Unit. New York letter set forth WH 3-4233, Ext. 832, whereas the local telephone number of the ED Unit at Raritan Arsenal is LIberty 8-3340, Ext. 823.

Sgt. [redacted] ED Unit at Raritan Arsenal, on 9/12/57, in the absence of Lt. MORGAN E. TACKETT, Commanding Officer of the Unit, furnished information concerning the 42nd Ordnance Detachment, Delaware Storage Activity, Pedricktown, N. J., and the 60th Ordnance Detachment, Fort Dix, N. J., which corresponds with that listed in referenced New York letter. This information is as follows:

b6
b7C

EXPEDITE

NEWARK FIELD DIVISION

42nd Ordnance Detachment
(Explosive Disposal)
Delaware Storage Activity
Pedricktown, N. J.
Tel: PEnnsgrove 800, Ext. 77

1st Lt. JAMES H. ROBERTS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/16/03 BY SP4 GMA/RNP

117-268-1438

2-Bureau (RM)
1-New York (info) (RM)
1-Newark

RECORDED-45

19 SEP 18 1957

WEJ:AM
(4)

EX-131

55 SEP 24 1957

SEP. SEC.

NK 117-00

60th Ordnance Detachment
(Explosive Disposal)
Fort Dix, N. J.
Tel: RAymond 4-2000
Ext. 25210
25148

1st Lt. KENNETH V. BARNWELL

72nd Ordnance Detachment
(Explosive Disposal)
Raritan Arsenal, Metuchen, N. J.
Tel: LI 8-3340, Ext. 823

1st Lt. MORGAN E. TACKETT

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: Sept. 16, 1957

FROM : SAC, Cincinnati (117-57)

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/16/03 BY SP4 BJP/RNP

Re SAC Letter No. 57-47 (K).

In compliance with instructions set forth in reference letter, Captain CARLSON W. HALL was interviewed by SA [redacted] on September 11, 1957.

b6
b7C

Capt. HALL stated he is Commanding Officer of the 71st Ordnance Detachment, E.O.D., Fort Hayes, Ohio (Fort Hayes being located within the City Limits of Columbus, Ohio).

He stated his detachment has no clear cut area of jurisdiction but in general, it covers the southern part of Ohio; the northeast part of Ohio and all of the state of West Virginia. He advised the northwest section of Ohio is covered by the 44th Ordnance Detachment, E.O.D., located at the Erie Ordnance Depot, Port Clinton, Ohio, and under the command of First Lt. HAROLD J. JOHNSON. In this regard, Capt. HALL said any Ordnance Detachment may be called to any area in the U. S. depending on the need.

EXP. PROC. SEP 19 1957

Capt. HALL related it is anticipated his organization will be moving from Fort Hayes, Ohio, to the Lordstown Military Reservation, Lordstown, Ohio, ten miles south of Warren, Ohio, on or about October 31, 1957, and that the 73rd Ordnance Detachment, now located in Kentucky, will be transferred to Kings Mills, Ohio. Kings Mills is about ten miles northeast of Cincinnati.

Capt. HALL stated he would notify the Cincinnati office just prior to his organization's move to Lordstown, Ohio.

He furnished the following background information:

2 - Bureau (RM)
1 - Cleveland (Info)(RM)
1 - Louisville (Info)(RM)
1 - Pittsburgh (Info)(RM)
1 - Cincinnati (117-57)

RECORDED - 117-263-1429

SEP 20 1957

GLM:alc
(6)

EX-157

55 SEP 24 1957

ESPIONAGE

CI. 117-57

Name:	Capt. CARLSON W. HALL, Commanding Officer, 71st Ordnance Detachment, E.O.D., Fort Hayes, Ohio.
Home address:	3999 Beechcreek Road, Columbus, Ohio.
Home telephone number:	BElmont 5-5381
Business telephone number;	CApitol 1-5861, Ext. 16 (Fort Hayes)
Senior Enlisted man:	M/Sgt. [redacted]
Home address:	[redacted] Columbus, Ohio.
Home telephone number:	[redacted]
Business telephone number:	CApitol 1-5861, Ext. 16 (Fort Hayes)

b6
b7C

RUC.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: September 5, 1957

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
Nease
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTO THE UNITED STATES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4/16/03 BY SP2 AM/ENS

A joint IIC-ICIS subcommittee, in a report dated March 10, 1955, recommended a limited national program for the use of devices which will detect radioactive materials. This program was considered minimum in nature. On February 10, 1956, Treasury Assistant Secretary David Kendall called upon the Director as IIC Chairman and explained that Treasury could not spend the amount of money involved in the recommended program. Treasury subsequently made its own "counterproposal" for purchase and use of a small number of devices by Customs and Coast Guard, and IIC-ICIS letter of April 23, 1956, asked Treasury to go ahead with its "counterproposal" and to report its progress.

IIC-ICIS letter of June 10, 1957, asked Treasury to report its progress since no report had been received. IIC-ICIS letters of August 26, 1957, asked Treasury, Justice, and the Atomic Energy Commission to expedite implementation of the detection device program.

By letter of August 29, 1957, copy attached, Treasury Assistant Secretary Kendall states that Coast Guard is acquiring [redacted] devices but that the $285,000 necessary for Customs to implement its portion of the program is not being spent because of the cut in the Customs appropriation request for 1958.

b7E

117-263 1430

RECORDED-45
EX-131
SEP 20 1957

ACTION:

The attached letter is mentioned in the agenda which has been prepared for the IIC meeting to be held on September 11. Pat Coyne is reported to have indicated to the ICIS Secretariat that this matter should be resolved by the National Security Council since Treasury's refusal to spend money is preventing the strengthening of our countermeasures program. Coyne may speak to this point during the IIC meeting. IIC cannot, however, dictate to Treasury how its reduced appropriation should be employed.

ENCLOSURE

Enclosure
GAD:hke (6)
1-Mr. Boardman
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Mr. Day
1-Liaison Section

EX-131
58 SEP 24 1957

OFFICE OF DIRECTOR
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. Jones
Mr. Nease
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/16/03 BY SP4B TK/ENP

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EXP. PROC.
AUG 30 1957

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: September 12, 1957

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTO THE UNITED STATES

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
Nease
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

My memorandum of September 5, attached, discussed the letter in which Treasury reported that it could not, due to an appropriations cut, implement that portion of the detection device program which involved the Bureau of Customs. During the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (IIC) meeting on September 11, Pat Coyne stated that he intended to flag this matter for the National Security Council during the briefing which he would furnish the Council regarding the recent IIC-Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS) report concerning the status of the internal security program. Coyne pointed out that IIC and ICIS were jointly charged by the President with the responsibility for administration of the countermeasures program and that failure by Treasury to purchase additional detection devices for use by Customs created a gap in our defense against the clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons. Coyne said he believed the IIC should point this out in a letter to the National Security Council (NSC) and he was also going to recommend that ICIS prepare such a letter. The members agreed with this suggestion. Coyne further recommended that the letters be forwarded to NSC not later than September 17, since the Planning Board will meet on that date to consider, among other annual reports, that submitted by IIC-ICIS.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6-14-83 BY SP2 AUTP/RW

ACTION:

Attached for approval is a proposed IIC letter informing NSC of the substance of the Treasury letter in which it advised it could not implement the Customs portion of the detection device program. If approved, concurrence of the military members will be sought.

Enclosures (2)

GAD:bjt;hke
(6)

ENCLOSURE
EX-131

1-Mr. Boardman
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Mr. Day
1-Liaison Section

OK, but I hope this isn't building up to another hassle before the N.S. Council

RECORDED-45
117-268-6431
6 SEP 20 1957

no letter necessary
9/17

58 SEP 24 1957

EX-131

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

DRAFT - September 11, 1957

BY COURIER SERVICE

Honorable James S. Lay, Jr.
Executive Secretary
National Security Council
Executive Office Building
Washington, D. C.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/16/03 BY SP4 BAW/RW

My dear Mr. Lay:

The joint report of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (IIC) and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS) entitled "Status of the Internal Security Program of the United States as of June 30, 1957," which was submitted to the National Security Council (NSC) on August 27, 1957, makes note of the program recommended by the two internal security committees for the use, at selected ports of entry and in the search of ships, of passive devices developed by the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) designed to detect radioactive materials. The program recommended envisaged use of these devices by the Bureau of Customs, the Coast Guard and the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

The IIC and ICIS have been informed by letter dated August 29, 1957, from Assistant Secretary of the Treasury David W. Kendall that funds for the purchase of

DRAFT

ENCLOSURE 117-364-1431

~~SECRET~~

Letter to Honorable James S. Lay, Jr.

the necessary additional equipment, and the necessary personnel to operate it, totaling $285,000 were budgeted in the Bureau of Customs and Treasury Department fiscal 1958 budget request as sent to the Congress. The Commissioner of Customs and the Assistant Commissioner were reported to have discussed this item fully with the House Appropriations Committee. Mr. Kendall reports that the Committee reduced the appropriations request for the Bureau of Customs by $1,650,000 indicating that the increase over 1957 which was allowed should be used to meet the sharply increased work load which is being experienced in all regular Customs activities. Mr. Kendall has advised that under these circumstances it has been determined by the Bureau of Customs and the Treasury Department that the purchase of the additional detection devices cannot be handled under the reduced Bureau of Customs appropriation and that this portion of the program is not, consequently, being implemented at this time.

This is being furnished for your information.

Sincerely yours,

Chairman
Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference

CONFIDENTIAL

cc - Liaison
Whitson

RECORDED - 23 117-268-1483
INDEXED - 23

1 EX-107

Date: September 19, 1957

DECLASSIFIED BY SP4BJA/RNP
ON 10/16/03

To: Mr. Ralph Kelly
Commissioner
Bureau of Customs
Department of the Treasury
Washington 25, D. C.

BY COURIER SVC.
30 SEP 20
COMM - FBI

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: DETECTION DEVICE PROGRAM

Reference is made to your letter of September 12, 1957, advising that since representatives of the Bureau of Customs at the port of New York are qualified to make a determination as to whether radioactive material detected with the use of [redacted] detection devices should be released, such items will be referred to the Atomic Energy Commission for advice after September 23, 1957, in special cases only.

At the present time the Bureau of Customs in New York City advises the New York representatives of the FBI when radioactive materials are detected by use of [redacted] devices. You requested to be advised whether the FBI will want to be notified of those cases referred to the Atomic Energy Commission when your new procedure goes into effect.

b7E

It would be appreciated if you would instruct your New York representatives to notify the New York Office of the FBI whenever there is a response on the [redacted] device to some item on the person or

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Parsons
Rosen
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Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

cc - 1 - New York (117-192)

LW:blb
(6)

CONFIDENTIAL

SEE NOTE ON PAGE 2.

Mr. Ralph Kelly

in the baggage or accompanying shipment of a foreign diplomat or official. We would also appreciate being notified in those cases where a determination is made by representatives of the Bureau of Customs that source material or special nuclear material under the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 is detected. In all instances where an item is referred to the Atomic Energy Commission, we would also like to be advised.

NOTE:
Classified Confidential because the detection device program as such is so classified. At the present time Customs, NY, advises the NYO of the FBI of all material detected by the detection devices which is referred to the AEC Office, NY, by Customs for identification. We are interested under the AEA essentially in source material and special nuclear material. Certain radioactive by-products of nuclear reaction in the form of isotopes would have to be referred by Customs to AEC for positive identification in any event. Under the new plan Customs will eliminate from consideration any radioactive chemicals and ores which normally would have been referred by it to AEC for identification.

Orig
1 - Tellow
5 - IIC
1 - Mr. Boardman
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Whitson
1 - Mr. Day
1 - Liaison Section
September 17, 1957

BY COURIER SERVICE

Mr. J. Patrick Coyne
National Security Council
Executive Office Building
Washington, D. C.

SMAB

Dear Mr. Coyne:

Your letter of September 12, 1957, concerning certain security measures in connection with the recent visit to McGuire Air Force Base of a Russian passenger plane is being furnished to the Chairman of the Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures, known as "Committee B," in order that your commendation may be furnished to the responsible personnel.

I am indeed pleased that prompt action was taken in this matter in order that this additional safeguard to our security could be in operation.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

Chairman
Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference

SEP 17 2 55 PM '57
RECD-READING ROOM
FBI

GAD:hke
(12)

(Memorandum Mr. Belmont to Mr. Boardman, 9/16/57, re "Countermeasures to Detect and Defend Against the Clandestine Introduction of Nuclear Weapons Into the United States," GAD:hke)

FBI
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/16/03 BY SP4 TAM/KNP

Tolson
Nichols
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Belmont
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
Nease
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy
MAIL ROOM

BY COURIER SVC.
26 SEP 18
COMM - FBI

RECORDED 117-2-68-1132

19 SEP 20 1957

E.F.D.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 9/20/57

FROM : SAC, ANCHORAGE (117-00)

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES

Re SAC letter 57-47 dated 8/20/57.

Colonel ALMON M. MANLOVE, Ordnance Officer for United States Army Alaska, Fort Richardson, Alaska, advised that the 176th Explosives, Ordnance Disposal Squadron, under command of Captain HENRY G. WILLIAMS, JR., has jurisdiction concerning explosive disposal over the entire Territory of Alaska and is the only such detachment in Alaska.

For information of Bureau, the Anchorage Office maintains active liaison with Captain HENRY G. WILLIAMS, JR., of the 176th Explosives, Ordnance Disposal Squadron. This squadron is located in Building T-45553, Fort Richardson, Alaska, telephone number TOwnsend 2-8114. Captain WILLIAMS resides at Quarters 511J, Fort Richardson, Alaska, telephone TOwnsend 3-3251.

EX-PROC

35

2 - Bureau
1 - Anchorage
HAF/btw
(3)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/16/03 BY SP4 BTK/ENP

RECORDED - 23 117-268-1434

54

12 SEP 26 1957

EX 105

58 SEP 25 1957

117-268

cc - Whitson

SAC, San Francisco (117-90-67) September 23, 1957

Director, FBI (117-268)

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF
AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
INTO THE UNITED STATES

RECORDED-45 117-268-1435

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/16/03 BY SP4BHK/RNP

Reurlet 9/13/57.

SAC Letter 57-47 (K) requires that each field office should arrange to make certain that the location of the Explosive Ordnance Disposal Detachments within its area, the names of the commanding officers and the telephone numbers and extensions for such detachments are up to date and correct at all times.

San Francisco's proposal for a contact with the Sixth Army headquarters at San Francisco on a yearly basis on behalf of the field offices receiving copies of this letter is not satisfactory. It should be obvious that a contact on a yearly basis cannot be expected to maintain in an up-to-date status at all times the location of the Explosive Ordnance Disposal Detachments, the identities of their commanding officers, the telephone numbers and extensions of the detachments and the area served by each detachment. These data must be maintained in an up-to-date condition for use in an emergency. The field offices covering the locations of the individual detachments should establish liaison with those detachments as indicated in referenced SAC Letter for the purpose of maintaining currently the required data as is being done elsewhere in the U.S.

cc - 1 - Butte
1 - Los Angeles
1 - Phoenix
1 - Portland
1 - Salt Lake City
1 - San Diego
1 - Seattle

MAILED 6
SEP 23 1957
COMM-FBI

Mail Rm.

Tolson
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Holloman
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LW:blb
(11)

58 SEP 26 1957

OFFICE MEMORANDUM UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI DATE : 9/13/57

FROM : SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (117-00-67)

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/16/03 BY SP4 STP/RMP

Re SAC letter 57-47(K)

Referenced SAC letter requested the field offices covering the Army headquarters set forth in the enclosure to relet to contact the Ordnance Officers listed at those headquarters to obtain the precise address of each of the Explosive Ordnance Disposal Detachments within his specific jurisdiction and determine the area served by each. This data should then be furnished to the other field divisions covering the locations of those Detachments.

The headquarters for the 6th Army is located at the Presidio of San Francisco. 6th Army covers the States of Washington, Oregon, California, Arizona, Nevada, Idaho, Montana, and Utah.

On 9/5/57, Colonel BRUCE D. MOORING, Ordnance Officer, Building 223, Presidio of San Francisco, and JULIUS G. DOKA, 548th Ordnance Detachment, Presidio of San Francisco, furnished the following breakdown of the Explosive Ordnance Disposal Detachments and the areas of responsibility served by each:

3 - Bureau
2 - Butte
2 - Los Angeles
2 - Phoenix
2 - Portland
2 - Salt Lake City
2 - San Diego
2 - Seattle
2 - SF 135-319 (EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL UNITS)
1 - San Francisco (117-00-67)

RECORDED-45 117-00-67-1435

EX-13

1 - Butte, Los Angeles, Phoenix, Portland, SLC, SD, Seattle 9/23/57 LM/klb

HPF/af #12
(20)

EXP. PROC.

DIRECTOR, FBI
SAC, SF (117-00-67)
HPF/af

170th Ordnance Detachment, EOD, Fort Lewis, Washington, phone Tacoma, Juniper 8-3611, Ext. 27105, Ext. 32105 or Ext. 31205. (Ask for Ordnance Officer on duty.) Current officer in charge - First Lieutenant CONRADO A. GORCIA. The 170th Ordnance Detachment covers the State of Washington, with exception of Camp Hanford.

62nd Ordnance Detachment, EOD, Camp Hanford, Washington, phone Richland 6-7600, Ext. 5181. (Ask for Ordnance Officer on Duty.) Current officer in charge - First Lieutenant THOMAS E. SAMPLE. The 62nd Ordnance Detachment covers Camp Hanford, Washington, the Hanford Atomic Works, and it also covers the entire States of Idaho and Montana.

53rd Ordnance Detachment, EOD, Vancouver Barracks, Washington, phone Vancouver, Oxford 3-1486. (Ask for Ordnance Officer on duty.) Current officer in charge - First Lieutenant DANIEL W. DOTY. The 53rd Ordnance Detachment covers the entire State of Oregon.

70th Ordnance Detachment, Fort Mac Arthur, California, phone San Diego, Academy 3-8449. (Ask for Ordnance Officer on duty.) Current officer in charge - First Lieutenant WILLIAM E. DE LONG. The 70th Ordnance Detachment covers the counties of San Diego County and Imperial County, California and also covers the entire State of Arizona.

58th Ordnance Detachment, Fort Mac Arthur, California, phone San Pedro, Terminal 2-4571, Ext 5241. (Ask for Ordnance Officer on duty.) Current officer in charge - First Lieutenant T. D. SMITH. The 58th Ordnance Detachment covers the following California counties: Mono, Inyo, San Bernardino, Kern, San Luis Obispo, Santa Barbara, Ventura, Los Angeles, Orange and Riverside.

548th Ordnance Detachment, EOD, Presidio of San Francisco, phone West 1-6111, Ext 5557, Ext. 5556, and Ext. 5221. (After duty hours call 6th Army staff duty officer, Ext. 2497.) (Ask for Ordnance Officer on duty.)

DIRECTOR, FBI
SAC, SF (117-00-67)
HPF/af

Current officer in charge - Major JULIUS G. DOKA.
It is noted that the 49th Ordnance Detachment and the 87th Ordnance Detachment are headquartered at the Presidio of San Francisco; however, these Detachments come under the immediate jurisdiction of the 548th Ordnance Detachment.

The 548th Ordnance Detachment directly covers all other California counties not covered by the 58th Ordnance Detachment, and the 70th Ordnance Detachment listed above. The 548th Ordnance Detachment covers the entire States of Nevada and Utah.

Referenced SAC letter requested that each field office should take steps to assure that the location of the Detachment, the name of the Commanding Officer, and the phone number and extension for the Detachment are up-to-date and current at all times.

Colonel MOORING, Ordnance Officer, Presidio of San Francisco, has advised that the location of the above Detachments and telephone numbers and the extensions are not subject to any anticipated change; however, the Commanding Officers are constantly changing and the Commanding Officers are not necessarily on duty other than during regular working hours.

Consequently, it is suggested that for record purposes, emergency calls to the above Detachments should be directed to the "Ordnance Officer on Duty" at the time of the call, rather than to attempt to locate the Commanding Officer of record.

In view of the fact that the areas covered by the Explosive Ordnance Disposal Detachments listed above overlap the Bureau field offices, it is suggested that the request outlined in referenced SAC letter be handled in the following manner by the field offices within the 6th Army area:

DIRECTOR, FBI
SAC, SF (117-00-67)
HPF/af

Offices receiving copies of this letter should open a 135 case file bearing the caption "Explosive Ordnance Disposal Detachments, Located Thereof." The location of the Explosive Ordnance Disposal Detachments covering each field division as set forth above should be catalogued therein for record purposes. Recontacts concerning any changes in the above list should be handled directly through Headquarters 6th Army at San Francisco and any change noted will be furnished to the other field offices within 6th Army area.

In this respect, the San Francisco Office will set-up a tickler to recontact the Commanding Officer of the 548th Ordnance Disposal Detachment on a yearly basis, which contact will be more or less handled in the same manner as other plant informant type of contacts, and the purpose of recontacting will be to determine if any change in the above list of Ordnance Detachments has occurred, and will subsequently furnish any change to the other field divisions within the 6th Army.

The Bureau is requested to advise if the above method of handling instant matter is approved.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 9/18/57

FROM : SAC, LITTLE ROCK (98-00)

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/16/03 BY SP4BSTR/KNP

Re SAC letter 57-47 dated August 20, 1957, Section K, with enclosure.

On September 4, 1957, First Lieutenant JOE F. HARRISON Commanding Officer, 52nd Explosive Ordnance Detachment, Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, advised as follows:

(1) Address of Detachment:

Building 816, Fort Chaffee, Arkansas

(2) Telephone Number of Detachment:

SUnset 2-2081, Extension 558, Fort Chaffee, Arkansas (through Fort Smith, Arkansas)

(3) Area Covered by Detachment:

1. For Dallas Field Division:

Bowie and Cass Counties.

2. For Oklahoma City Field Division:

The following Counties:

Adair	Hughes	Okmulgee
Atoka	Latimer	Ottawa
Cherokee	LeFlore	Pittsburgh
Choctaw	Mayes	Pushmataha
Coal	McCurtain	Rogers
Craig	McIntosh	Sequoyah
Creek	Muskogee	Wagoner
Delaware	Nowata	Washington
Haskell	Okfuskee	

117-268-1436

24

2 SEP 20 1957

2 - Bureau
2 - Dallas
2 - Oklahoma City
1 - Little Rock (98-00)
DMD/vih
(7)

RECORDED-45

EX-131

58 SEP 23 1957

3. For Little Rock Field Division:

The entire State of Arkansas.

The Bureau and interested offices will be advised of any changes made in the foregoing.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268)

DATE: 9/20/57

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (117-110)

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/16/03 BY SP4 BSR/ENP

Re SAC letter 57-47 K, dated 8/20/57.

On September 16, 1957, Colonel WILLIAM F. MEANY, Ordnance Officer, 5th United States Army, 1660 East Hyde Park Boulevard, Chicago, Illinois, was contacted by SA [redacted] Colonel MEANY was co-operative and advised that Captain G. A. BUCK is the Staff Explosive Disposal Officer for the 5th United States Army and would be in a better position to furnish the information requested in referenced SAC letter.

b6
b7C

Accordingly on September 16, 1957, Captain BUCK also contacted and he furnished the following information concerning the Explosive Disposal Detachments within the jurisdiction of the 5th United States Army. BUCK was advised that his office telephone number is BUtterfield 8-5800, Extension 509 and his home address and telephone number is 135 Nicholson Road, Fort Sheridan, Illinois, IDlewood 3-0277.

1. Name of Unit

41st Ordnance Detachment (ED).

Address of Unit

Rocky Mountain Arsenal, Denver 2, Colorado.

2 - Bureau (RM)
2 - Denver (RM)
2 - Detroit (117-35)(RM)
3 - Kansas City (RM)
1 - Chicago (117-110)

RECORDED-45

117-3.62-1437

SEP 23 1957

NJW:JAM
(10)

EX-137

58 SEP 26 1957

Telephone Number and Extension of Unit

AT 8-0711, Extension 6202.

Commanding Officer

Captain HARLEY K. POUJOL, departing October 14, 1957, and will be replaced by Captain CLARENCE R. HAMPTON to assume command on or about October 18, 1957. Home address of POUJOL is 2224 Geneva Street, Aurora, Colorado. Home telephone EM 6-8493.

Area Served by Unit

States of Colorado, Wyoming, North Dakota and South Dakota.

2. Name of Unit

171st Ordnance Detachment (ED).

Address of Unit

Fort Carson, Colorado.

Telephone Number and Extension of Unit

ME 36644, Extension 2643.

Commanding Officer

Captain WILLIAM G. LAWHEAD. Home address Colorado Springs. Home telephone ME 3-2703.

Area Served by Unit

States of Colorado, Wyoming, North Dakota and South Dakota.

3. Name of Unit

46th Ordnance Detachment (ED).

Address of Unit

Selfridge Air Force Base, Mount Clemens, Michigan.

Telephone Number and Extension of Unit

Headquarters 5th Army did not possess this information.

Commanding Officer

1st Lieutenant HENRY A. WILDE, JR. Home address and telephone number - this information not in possession of 5th Army Headquarters.

Area Served by Unit

The State of Michigan South of the Straits of Mackinaw.

4. Name of Unit

75th Ordnance Detachment (ED)

Address of Unit

Fort Wayne, Michigan.

Telephone Number and Extension of Unit

VInewood 3-6600, Extension 577.

Commanding Officer

Captain LAWRENCE E. RINGEY. Home address 5281 Nickel, Dearborn, Michigan. Home telephone LU 2-5392.

Area Served by Unit

The State of Michigan South of the Straits of Mackinaw.

5. Name of Unit

50th Ordnance Detachment (ED).

Address of Unit

Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri.

Telephone Number of Unit

Fort Leonard Wood, Extension 1022R.

Commanding Officer

Captain DONALD F. KNAPP. Home address 506 Rolla Street, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. Home telephone number 4218 M.

Area Served by Unit

States of Missouri and Iowa.

6. Name of Unit

63rd Ordnance Detachment (ED)

Address of Unit

Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri.

Telephone Number of Unit

Fort Leonard Wood, Extension 1022.

Commanding Officer

Captain HIRAM C. EBERHARDT, JR. Home address 353 Crocker Street, Leiber Heights, Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. Home telephone 4228 W.

Area Served by Unit

States of Missouri and Iowa.

7. Name of Unit

74th Ordnance Detachment (ED)

Address of Unit

Unit presently on special assignment at Camp Mc Coy, Wisconsin. However unit is permanently assigned at Fort Riley, Kansas, and will return there on or about September 24, 1957.

Commanding Officer

First Lieutenant CHARLES F. GARDNER.

Area Served by Unit

States of Kansas and Nebraska.

8. Name of Unit

88th Ordnance Detachment (ED).

Address of Unit

Fort Riley, Kansas.

Telephone Number and Extension of Unit

CEdar 8-2111, Extension 6-1133.

Commanding Officer

First Lieutenant RALPH O. EKONEN. Home address Fairmont Trailer Court, Manhattan, Kansas. Home phone number, none.

Area Served by Unit

States of Kansas and Nebraska.

9. Name of Unit

51st Ordnance Detachment (ED).

Address of Unit

Fort Sheridan, Illinois.

Telephone Number and Extension of Unit

IDlewood 2-5000, Extension 4136.

Commanding Officer

1st Lieutenant EDWARD P. GAINOR. Home address, apartment 32, Nicholson Road, Fort Sheridan Illinois. Home telephone IDlewood 3-1104.

Area Served by Unit

States of Indiana, Illinois, Wisconsin and Minnesota and Northern Peninsula of Michigan.

10. Name of Unit

64th Ordnance Detachment (ED).

Address of Unit

Fort Sheridan, Illinois.

Telephone Number and Extention of Unit

IDlewood 2-5000, Extension 4210.

Commanding Officer

2nd Lieutenant CHARLES R. PERRY. Home address 123 Nicholson Road, Fort Sheridan, Illinois. Home telephone IDlewood 3-1211.

Area Served by Unit

States of Indiana, Illinois, Wisconsin, and Minnesota and Northern Peninsula of Michigan.

11. Name of Unit

543rd Ordnance Detachment (EDC).

Address of Unit

Fort Sheridan, Illinois.

Telephone Number and Extension of Unit

IDlewood 2-5000, Extension 4208.

Commanding Officer

Captain LEWIS M. HAYNES. Home address 63 Nicholson Road, Fort Sheridan, Illinois. Home phone IDlewood 3-1042.

Area Served by Unit

States of Indiana, Illinois, Wisconsin and Minnesota and Northern Peninsula of Michigan.

From the above it is noted that at least two units serve a given area. Captain BUCK advised that these units are equally responsible for the territory and it would make no difference as to which unit is notified in the event such action becomes necessary.

Captain BUCK explained the abbreviation (ED) as standing for Explosive Disposal and advised that as of September 1, 1957, the detachments are no longer referred to as EOD Units, the O having been dropped. BUCK explained (EDC) as meaning Explosive Disposal Control and indicated that this unit, the 543rd, in actual emergency would function as a control unit for the other detachments.

Offices receiving copies of this letter should comply with instructions as set forth in referenced SAC letter.

A tickler has been prepared in the Chicago Office to follow the above matter.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268) DATE: September 23, 1957

FROM : SAC, WFO (117-151)

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF OR OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

Re Section K, SAC Letter 57-47, 8/20/57, instructing contact with the various Explosive Ordnance Disposal Detachments.

WFO has complied with this instruction and the following information is set forth in response thereto.

The current commanding officer of the 67th Explosive Ordnance Disposal Detachment (EOD), headquartered in the basement of the Messhall at Fort McNair, 4th and O Streets, S. W., Washington, D. C., is Captain JOHN C. CRAVEN, U. S. Army. The telephone number of the detachment in duty hours (8 to 4:30 daily) is EX 3-7700 (Government Telephone Code 150), extension 36 or 76. In other than duty hours the detachment is contacted through the Provost Marshal's office on the base, phone EX 3-7700 (Code 150), extension 59 or 157. Captain CRAVEN's home address and telephone number are 130 Choctaw Drive, Forest Heights, Maryland, LOgan 7-2531.

Because the 57th Explosive Ordnance Disposal Detachment is an integral part of the Prodip Program of this office, liaison with this detachment is also maintained by WFO.

The current commanding officer of the 57th EOD, headquartered at Building T-1, South Post, Fort Myer, Virginia, is Captain FRANK L. MILLER, U. S. Army. The telephone number of the detachment is JAckson 7-9400 (Code 1213), extension 1066 or 1176.

2 - Bureau
1 - Baltimore (Info)(RM)
1 - Richmond (Info)(RM)
2 - WFO
(1 - 66-2395 PRODIP)
AHS/pcn
(6)

117-268-1436

RECORDED-45

18 SEP 24 1957

EX-150

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/10/03 BY SP4 STP/RNP

FBI SEC.

This telephone number is valid full time in that it is monitored by the Fort Myer switchboard and should there be no answer, assistance will be rendered by the switchboard operator, who is kept currently informed as to what action to take. Captain MILLER's home address and telephone number are Apartment 252, California Hall, Fort Myer, Virginia, JAckson 7-9400 (Code 1213), extension 450.

As to the area served by these two EODs, Captain CRAVEN of the 67th EOD advised SA [redacted] on September 19, 1957, that the Second Army, Fort Meade, Maryland, has disposed of specific geographical areas of responsibility for its EOD Detachments, preferring to assign EOD missions from Army Headquarters. In an emergency the detachment receiving a request for assistance will respond immediately. Otherwise the unit receiving the request will telephonically contact Second Army Headquarters at Fort Meade to clear with that headquarters as to which detachment should handle the mission.

b6
b7C

Captain CRAVEN stated that he and Captain MILLER of the 57th EOD have unofficially agreed that in the Washington metropolitan area the 67th EOD will handle all requests for assistance on the Washington-Maryland side of the Potomac River and the 57th EOD those requests on the Virginia side of the Potomac River.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: 9/21/57

FROM : SAC, Birmingham (17-00-57)

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/10/03 BY SP4 BJA/ENP

Re SAC Letter #57-47.

On 9/18/57, 1st Lt. GERALD J. MARCOTTE, 142nd Ordnance Detachment, EOD, Ft. McClellan, Ala., advised he is commanding officer of that unit and the day-time phone for the unit is ADams 6-4411, Extension 3183. He stated his unit may be reached by phone at night and on weekends by calling the Duty NCO Office, Ft. McClellan, ADams 6-4411, Extension 4243, which office will always be able to reach members of his Ordnance Detachment. MARCOTTE stated his unit works under the supervision of 3rd Army Headquarters, Ft. McPherson, Ga., and demolition work covered by his unit is not specifically confined to exact areas within the 3rd Army territory.

MARCOTTE advised that generally his unit covers the entire States of Alabama and Mississippi and upon instructions from 3rd Army Headquarters, the southern portions of the State of Tennessee in both the eastern and western sectors. He added that his unit has performed work in other states upon specific instructions from 3rd Army Headquarters. He said the majority of the work of his unit is confined to the States of Mississippi and Alabama.

MARCOTTE advised his detachment does no demolition work on Navy or Air Force installations or in any situation wherein explosives or suspected explosives are located under water. He stated the branch of

EXP. PROC.

2 - Bureau
2 - Mobile
2 - Memphis
2 - New Orleans
2 - Knoxville
1 - Birmingham
CS:rvm
(11)

RECORDED - 6 117-368-1439

EX - 137

18 SEP 25 1957

ESP. SEC.

58 SEP 26 1957

service on whose installation an explosive might be located is responsible for that explosive and the Navy is responsible for explosives located under water. He said that responsibility for these explosives relate only to military type explosives or explosives found on military installations.

Arrangements were made with Lt. MARCOTTE to notify the Birmingham Office regarding any changes of commanding officers of the 142nd Ordnance Detachment, changes of locations or of telephone numbers of that unit.

FD-36 (Rev. 3-13-56)

F B I

Date: 9/23/57

Transmit the following message via AIRTEL

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. Nease
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (117-new)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/14/03 BY SP4 BSK/RDP

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

SUBJECT: CARNEGIE INSTITUTION OF WASHINGTON,
DEPARTMENT OF GENETICS
COLD SPRING HARBOR, LONG ISLAND, NY
ATTENTION:
SMAB; AEA

On 9/20/57, Deputy Collector of Customs, Idlewild Airport, NY, advised that BOAC flight GANUM arrived Idlewild 9/19/57 and the following item was listed on airway bill number 527376: A one pound cardboard carton manifested as one box of phosphorus 32. b6 b7C

This box was shipped from the Radio Chemical Center, Buckinghamshire, England, to the Carnegie Institution of Washington, Department of Genetics, Cold Spring Harbor, Long Island, NY, attention NO RECORD 9-25-57 LW

The size of the box was 4 x 4¼ x 5¼ inches and the following markings appeared on the box: 0-39440, RC reference 999-A, principal content P. 32.

The activity of the package was 10MC and the radiation 0.1.

b7E

The material was released by AEC.

LEONARD SOLON, Radiation Branch, AEC, advised on 9/20/57 that the material causing the reaction was neither special nuclear material nor source material under the terms of the AEA but was by-product material. C.

NO ACTION NECESSARY LW

RECORDED - 86 POWERS 117-262-14 1 6

INDEXED-86

15 SEP 25 1957

3 - Bureau (RM)
1 - NEW YORK (117-192)
1 - NEW YORK (117-new)

JEH:SBF
(5)

Approved: E. J. Power Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

F61

55 SEP 27 1957

FD-36 (Rev. 3-13-56)

FBI

Date: 9/24/57

Transmit the following message via AIRTEL

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. Nease
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (117-New)

SUBJECT: ~~COMBINED DEVELOPMENT AGENCY~~
SMAB - AEA

b6
b7C

On 9/23/57, Inspector [redacted] US CUstoms Idlewild Airport, New York City, advised that Pan American Airways Flight of 9/21/57 arriving at Idlewild carried the following described material as cargo on airway bill number 26-15-239913.

Two packages measuring 5X8X11½ inches each package weighing nine pounds. These packages bore red and white cross bone labels - principal contents uranium samples - activity 2 M.C. - radioactivity less than one.

[redacted]

b7E

[redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/16/03 BY SP4 BTA/RNP

Material was shipped by Combined Development Agency Care of American Consul General, Johannesburg South Africa, to the US Atomic Energy Commission, Washington, D.C.

ALBERT ZILA A.E.C., NYC, advised instant material was source material and was no doubt being shipped to Washington, D.C. for ASSAY purposes.

NO ACTION NECESSARY. LW

3 - Bureau
1 - New York (117-192)
1 - New York (117-New)

JHK:rlf
(6)

POWERS
RECORDED - 86

EX 105

117-269-1441

20 SEP 25 1957

55 SEP 27 1957

Approved: R. J. Powers
Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M

P

ESP SEC.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268) DATE: 9/18/57

FROM : SAC, NEWARK (117-115)

SUBJECT: [redacted] SMAB

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/16/03 BY SP4 JR/ENP

b6
b7C

Re New York Airtel, 8/31/57, to Bureau and Newark.

Enclosed herewith for the information of the Bureau and New York is a blank memorandum setting forth information in the files of the Newark Office concerning [redacted] father of captioned individual.

RUC.

2-Bureau (Encs. 5) (RM)
1-New York (Enc. 1) (Info) (RM)
1-Newark

JTM:AM
(4)

ENCLOSURE

117-268-1442

RECORDED - 83
INDEXED - 83

4 SEP 20 1957

EXP.

No dissemination. Unverified information 9-14-42 re father of person who brought in radioactive material of no interest to AEC. LW

55 SEP 27 1957

117-268

ESP

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

Newark, New Jersey

September 18, 1957

[redacted]

On September 14, 1942, H. F. Wooge, Captain, Commanding Detective Bureau, New Jersey State Police, advised that Trooper [redacted] Ridgewood Station, Troop "B," had received information from one [redacted] N. J., to the effect [redacted] had been told that a man by the name of [redacted] had passed remarks that were derogatory to the United States and he wished he were back in Germany. He was also alleged to have said that Germany was going to win the war.

[redacted] was reported to work for [redacted] and the plant was supposed to be doing defense work.

[redacted] would not divulge the name of his source, and Trooper [redacted] had no personal knowledge of [redacted]

b6
b7C

The Hoboken Police Department on October 7, 1942, advised that [redacted] New Jersey, and resided at [redacted] New Jersey. He was employed in [redacted] and was described as follows: Born [redacted] Germany; naturalized citizen; brown hair; blue eyes; five feet seven inches; 160 pounds; light complexion; medium build; scar on left index finger.

[redacted] was not questioned at his place of employment by the Hoboken Police Department since he lived in [redacted]

This confidential memorandum and its contents are loaned to you by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and are not to be distributed outside of agency to which loaned.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/16/03 BY SP4 [redacted]/RNP

ENCLOSURE 117-[redacted]-1442

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: September 13, 1957

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTO THE UNITED STATES

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
Nease
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

During the IIC meeting on June 5, 1957, the members discussed the status of negotiations being conducted by State with the Canadian Government to secure permission for Customs to use a portable detection device during its regular inspection of baggage on board U.S.-bound trains between St. Johns, Quebec, and St. Albans, Vermont. It was noted that State had proposed to discuss other aspects of the countermeasures program with the Canadians, including several IIC programs, and the IIC members had objected to this. The Director instructed that the matter be followed by FBI Liaison.

As noted during the IIC meeting on September 11, 1957, this matter was discussed with the Canadians by State in June, 1957, and Mr. Warren Chase of State reported that he did not discuss any IIC programs with the Canadians. He reported that the Canadian Government had the request under advisement. As of September 4, 1957, no reply had been received from Canada.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/16/83 BY SP6 BTM/mjw

ACTION:

We are in no position to force prompt action in this matter on the part of the Canadian Government. Liaison will, however, inquire periodically at the Department of State to determine whether a reply has been received from Canadian authorities.

GAD:hke
(7)

1-Mr. Boardman
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Bartlett
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Mr. Day
1-Liaison Section

EX 105

RECORDED - 83

117-268-1444

21 SEP 25 1957

memo Roach to Belmont 9-19-57

memo Belmont to Boardman 3-4-58. HHD:gale

FOR 56 SEP 27 1957

Bartlett

Liaison

1-16-57 JFD

OSMAB

Copied

Day

Bartlett

66-8603-4 ENCLOSURE COPY FILED IN

OFFICE MEMORANDUM - - - UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI DATE: SEP 16 1957

FROM : SAC, Savannah (117-35)

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES

b6
b7C

Re SAC Let dated 8/20/57.
Charlotte letter to Director dated 8/30/57.

On 9/7/57, SA [redacted] contacted 1st Lt. DEWEY G. WEEKS, 38th Ordn. Det., Fort Stewart, Ga., and ascertained that his organization is trained and qualified to dispose of and disarm conventional and atomic type explosive devices. He stated that his organization operates under the direction of the 547th Ordn. Det., EDC, Ft. McPherson, Ga., his control unit, in handling regular duty assignment; however, in an emergency he will operate on his own initiative. He has orders to assist local authorities and the FBI, and is aware of his responsibilities as set out in his manual, Standing Operational Procedures, Explosive Ordnance Disposal, Policies and Procedures. He stated that he will advise the FBI on all Atomic weapons incidents.

Lt. WEEKS advised that his unit is subject to answering calls to all states in the Third Army area of North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Tennessee, and Kentucky, however, he would not likely be called if a unit closer to the point of the incident is not on an assignment. He pointed out that his unit is closest to the State of Florida, and that he would probably be called to Florida, southeast Georgia, and southwest South Carolina prior to other units in the Third Army Area, unless he is already on assignment.

EXPEDITE

2 - Bureau
2 - Atlanta
2 - Louisville
2 - Charlotte
2 - Miami
2 - Mobile
2 - Memphis
2 - Knoxville
2 - Savannah

HAB:rp
(18)

RECORDED - 83
117-368-1445
EX 105
20 SEP 19 1957

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5/16/03 BY SP4 BTA/RNP

55 SEP 27 1957

EX-REC.

Lt. WEEKS advises that someone in his unit is on duty 24 hours per day and that the unit is prepared to answer calls from civilian law enforcement agencies on a moments notice via telephone. He was advised that this Bureau is establishing liaison and that his name, unit and telephone number would be maintained permanently in the Savannah Office and in the Bureau. He promised to immediately notify the Savannah Division in case his address, telephone number, or organization name changes. Also, he will advise in case of a change in command of the unit.

The following is the identity of the commanding officer and identity of the unit at Fort Stewart, Ga.:

1st Lt. DEWEY G. WEEKS, Commanding Officer
38th Ordnance Det., EOD, Bldg. #293,
Fort Stewart, Ga.
Telephone Hinesville, Ga. #41, Ext. 698
Residence House #14182, Stewart Homes, Ft. Stewart, Ga.
Residence Telephone - Hinesville, Ga. #41, Ext. 774

The second in command of this unit is 1st Lt. JAMES E. WALKER, who has the same business address and telephone number. His residence telephone is Hinesville, Ga. #41, Ext. 2495.

Lt. WEEKS advised that there are six units who perform a similar function located at six Army installations in the Third Army area. They are the ones enumerated in the list enclosed with ref SAC Letter.

The Savannah Division will promptly advise the Bureau of any change in the location, telephone number, identity, or change in command of above detachment, and will obtain the same information as set out herein regarding the explosive disposal unit at Ft. Jackson, S. C.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268) DATE: September 17, 1957

FROM : SAC, NEW ORLEANS (100-14856)

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES

Re SAC Letter 57-47 (K) dated August 20, 1957, with which was enclosed a list of explosive ordnance disposal units having responsibility for handling the disarming of atomic weapons. Also San Antonio letter to Bureau dated September 10, 1957.

b6
b7C

On August 29, 1957, Staff Sergeant [redacted] Security NCO, 45th Ordnance Detachment, Explosive Ordnance Disposal, Fort Polk, Louisiana, was contacted by SA [redacted] and furnished the following information:

Unit: 45th Ordnance Detachment, Explosive Ordnance Disposal
Location: Fort Polk, Louisiana
Commanding Officer: First Lt. WILLIAM P. GARMON
Unit Telephone #: Leesville, Louisiana 2611
Extension 5828
Area covered by Unit: All of the State of Louisiana.

Lt. GARMON was not available for contact as he was away on leave.

EXP. PROC.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/16/03 BY SP4 SFA/2NP

2 - Bureau (REGISTERED)
1 - New Orleans
JAG:ejf
(3)

EX-105

RECORDED - 33

13 SEP 19 1957

ESP. SEC.

55 SEP 27 1957

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 9/18/57

FROM : SAC, ALBUQUERQUE (117-00)

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES.

Re SAC Letter 57-47 dated 8/20/57, section (K), and San Antonio letter to Director dated 9/10/57.

A review referenced letters reflects that the area of New Mexico is covered by the 133rd Ordnance Detachment, Explosive Ordnance Disposal of the Fourth U. S. Army, which detachment is located at Fort Bliss, Texas, the commanding officer being 1st Lt. ROBERT E. CALDWELL, Fort Bliss extension 28287.

The El Paso Office is therefore requested to arrange and make certain, for the Albuquerque Office, that the location of the detachment, the name of the commanding officer and the telephone number and extension for the detachment are up to date and correct at all times, and to advise the Albuquerque Office of any changes that may be made in the future.

2 - Bureau (RM)
2 - El Paso (RM)
1 - Albuquerque
JPC:fd
(5)

EX 105

RECORDED - 93 117-212-1447

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/16/03 BY SP4STA/ENP

26 SEP 30 1957

Whitson ESP. SEC.

55 SEP 27 1957

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268) DATE: 9/21/57

FROM : SAC, OKLAHOMA CITY (117-25)

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES

Reference San Antonio letter to Bureau dated 9/10/57.

Relets sets out the area covered by the 61st Ordnance Detachment, Fort Sill, Oklahoma.

Lieutenant DONALD J. WHITE, Commanding Officer, 61st Ordnance Detachment, Fort Sill, Oklahoma, advised SA [redacted] b6 b7C [redacted] on 9/16/57 that the telephone number of this detachment during duty hours is ELgin 3-2300, Extension 26116, and Extension 36209. After duty hours the telephone is Extension 6219.

This detachment is located in Building 2025 on Adams Road on the Fort Sill Military Reservation.

(2) - Bureau (RM)
1 - Dallas (RM) (Info.)
1 - Oklahoma City
AMT/vlb
(4)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/16/03 BY SP4 AOJB/RMP

RECORDED - 83 117-262-1484

EX 105

24 SEP 26 1957

ESP

55 SEP 27 1957

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268)

DATE: 9/23/57

FROM : SAC, PITTSBURGH (117-38)

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4/14/03 BY SP4/STP/CMP

Re SAC Letter 57-47 (K).

Captain WILBUR P. EDWARDS, JR., 145th Ord. Detachment (EOD), Island Avenue, Neville Island, Pa., telephone FEderal 1-9818 (no extension), advised on 9/9/57, that as commanding officer of the above Unit, only the following counties in Pennsylvania comprise the zone of his responsibility:

Erie, Warren, McKean, Crawford, Forest, Elk, Cameron, Venango, Mercer, Clarion, Jefferson, Lawrence, Butler, Armstrong, Indiana, Beaver, Allegheny, Westmoreland, Washington, Greene, Fayette and Somerset.

Captain EDWARDS states that the 145th Ord. Detachment (EOD), Neville Island, Pa., is the only detachment under his jurisdiction; however, he noted that he is subject to call to any area, not in this jurisdiction, at any time. He explained that in the event of a complaint being received in any county of West Virginia or counties in Pennsylvania other than those listed above, he immediately contacts his Headquarters by telephone for instructions. His Headquarters is the 549th Ord. Detachment EODC, Fort George Meade, Maryland.

Cincinnati letter to Bureau dated 9/16/57 advises that the 71st Ordnance Detachment, EOD, Fort Hayes, Ohio (located Columbus, Ohio), has jurisdiction over all of the state of West Virginia.

It is noted that Cameron County, Pa., mentioned above is covered by the Philadelphia Office.

(2) - Bureau (RM)
2 - Baltimore (RM)
1 - Philadelphia (Info)(RM)
2 - Pittsburgh

117-268-1449

RECORDED - 83

16 SEP 26 1957

SAM/ban
(7)

EX-105

16 SEP 27 1957

PG 117-38

Bedford, Blair, Cambria and Clearfield Counties covered by the Pittsburgh Division are not under the jurisdiction of the 145th Ordnance Detachment (EOD), Neville Island, Pa.

Baltimore is requested to contact the 549th Ordnance Detachment EODC, Fort George Mead, Maryland, to determine the Ordnance Unit that has jurisdiction over Bedford, Blair, Cambria and Clearfield Counties, Pa., and advise Bureau and Pittsburgh.

Read from ICIS secretariat 9-24-57 LW

~~SECRET~~

September 24, 1957

MEMORANDUM TO: Franklin L. Welch, Chairman
Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures

FROM: Leonard P. Bienvenu
Executive Secretary, ICIS

SUBJECT: Use of Dosimeters

OSD/HR

Enclosed is a copy of a memorandum dated September 17, 1957, from the Director, Office of Security, Department of State, giving the results of a further test carried out by means of a dosimeter. The enclosure is furnished for information and any comment the Committee may wish to submit.

Enclosure

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/16/03 BY SP4 JTA/LMP

1 ENCLOSURE

INDEXED - 83

117-268-1450

NOT RECORDED
6 SEP 26 1957

cc: Mr. Whitson
Mr. Kelly
Col. Graham
Capt. Stewart

55 SEP 27 1957

~~SECRET~~

117-268

OFFICE MEMORANDUM UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: 9/24/57

TO : Director, FBI

FROM : SAC, Savannah (117-35)

SUBJECT : SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES

Re SAC Let 57-47 dated 8/20/57.

On 9/17/57 it was determined through contact at Fort Jackson, S. C., that Captain RICHARD M. BARB, who was listed as the Commanding Officer of the 48th Ordnance Detachment, is no longer at Fort Jackson, S. C. It was further determined that Captain BARB had been replaced by 2nd Lt. WILLIAM S. FISKE.

On 9/17/57, 2nd Lt. WILLIAM S. FISKE advised that he is now Commanding Officer of the 48th Ordnance Detachment with headquarters at Fort Jackson, S. C. Lt. FISKE stated that his Detachment was under direct operational control of the Third Army Headquarters and that his Detachment was at Fort Jackson inasmuch as the Third Army considered Fort Jackson a strategic location. He further stated that with reference to their assignments and area covered by his Detachment, the Third Army governs their responsibility as to where they proceed on assignment, but generally speaking the Explosive Ordnance Disposal

2 - Bureau
2 - Atlanta
2 - Louisville
2 - Charlotte
2 - Miami
2 - Mobile
2 - Memphis
2 - Knoxville
2 - Savannah

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/16/03 BY SP4 STP/RNP

117-268-1451

RECORDED - 78

11 SEP 26 1957

HAB:jrh
(18)

55 SEP 30 1957

Detachment nearest the scene is dispatched by the Third Army Headquarters.

Lt. FISKE also stated that the Third Army has responsibility for all land areas on the Eastern Seaboard up to the Second Army border line which is Virginia. FISKE stated specifically that his Detachment handles assignments covering (1) Southern part of North Carolina that is nearer to Fort Jackson than Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and (2) all of the State of South Carolina.

FISKE stated his Detachment is on duty call 24 hours a day, and that any needs for the services of his detachement should be directed to him at the following address:

2nd Lt. WILLIAM S. FISKE,
48th Ordnance Detachment,
Fort Jackson, South Carolina
Telephone - ALPINE 2-7211, Extension 3126

FISKE also stated that at the present time he is residing at Bachelor Officer Quarters #4526 at Fort Jackson, South Carolina, with telephone extension #82245. FISKE pointed out, however, that his residence at Bachelor Officer's Quarters is only temporary, and that the Savannah Office would be notified of any change as to his place of residence.

FISKE further advised that his assistant is Acting First Sergeant JAMES JOHNSON but pointed out that this individual's position was merely temporary and that he would advise the Savannah Office within the next few weeks of the name of his permanent assistant.

FISKE was informed as to the Bureau's interest in his Detachment and the Bureau's need for the services rendered by his Detachment in such matters pertaining to explosive devices aboard aircraft and motor vehicles and the smuggling of atomic bombs or parts thereof and other weapons of mass destruction into the United States.

FISKE concluded by saying that his Detachment stands ready at all times to be of service to the Bureau in connection with captioned matter and stated that his Detachment would be ready to move on such assignments within a matter of ten minutes notice. RUC.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 9/24/57

FROM : SAC, EL PASO (117-00)

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/16/03 BY SP4BTA/ENP

Re SAC Letter 57-47 (K) dated 8/20/57, with which was enclosed a list of explosive ordnance disposal units having responsibility for handling the disarming of atomic weapons. Re San Antonio letter to the Director dated 9/10/57.

b6
b7C

On 9/3/57 First Lieutenant ROBERT E. CALDWELL, Commanding Officer, 133 Ordnance Detachment, Fort Bliss, Texas was contacted by SA [redacted] at which time he furnished the following information as to the area of responsibility of his detachment:

DETACHMENT	LOCATION	TELEPHONE	C.O.
133 Ordnance Detachment, Explosive Ordnance Disposal	Building 2091 Room 218, Ft. Bliss, Texas	Ft. Bliss LO 5-4611 Extension 28287	First Lt. ROBERT E. CALDWELL

Area Covered: All of New Mexico and the following counties in Texas, comprising parts of the Dallas, El Paso and San Antonio Divisions:

Andrews	Brewster
Crane	Culberson
Ector	El Paso
Gaines	Rudspeth
Jeff Davis	Loving
Midland	Pecos
Presidio	Reeves
Terrell	Upton
Ward	Winkler

EXP. PROC. SEP 26 1957

117-208-1459

RECORDED - 78 2 SEP 26 1957

(2) - Bureau (RM)
1 - San Antonio (117-66) (RM)
1 - Dallas (RM)
1 - Albuquerque (RM)
1 - El Paso (117-00)
DVE:bak
(6)

55 SEP 30 1957

EX-116

ESP. SEC.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: September 19, 1957

FROM : R. R. Roach

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTO THE UNITED STATES

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
Nease
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

Reference is made to your memorandum to Mr. Boardman dated September 13, 1957, in the above-captioned matter. You will recall that the Department of State discussed instant matter with the Canadians in June, 1957.

In an attempt to determine if final action has been taken in this matter, Mr. Bartlett of the Liaison Section checked on September 19, 1957, with Mr. J.P. McDonnell at the Department of State. Mr. McDonnell advised that no answer has been received from the Canadian Government; however, he has perfected arrangements whereby he will be notified when this matter is received from the Canadians, and as soon as it is received he will advise the Bureau.

ACTION:

Liaison will continue to check on this matter.

OHB:awj
(6)

#948742/950935/997059
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/16/03 BY SP4BJA/ENP

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Whitson
1 - Mr. Day
1 - Liaison Section
1 - Mr. Bartlett

EX 105

RECORDED - 83
117-268-1453

18 SEP 26 1957

5

585 SEP 30 1957

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOIPA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET

Serial Description ~ COVER SHEET 08/22/1957

Total Deleted Page(s) ~ 28

Page 8 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 9 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 10 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 11 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 12 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 13 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 14 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 15 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 16 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 17 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 18 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 19 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 21 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 27 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 28 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 29 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 32 ~ Duplicate
Page 124 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 125 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 131 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 132 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 133 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 134 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 161 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 162 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 163 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 164 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 176 ~ Referral/Direct

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

Mr. Tompkins

October 18, 1957

Herbert Brownell, Jr.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. Nease
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

I have your memorandum to me dated October 16, 1957 on the subject "Clandestine Introduction of Nuclear Weapons and Components". The Internal Security Division is charged with the responsibility of following up to see that the Department of Justice is not in arrears in any respect in carrying out its part of the program of the National Security Council on this subject. If the Division finds that there is any arrearage which it is not able to eliminate it should report the same to the Attorney General at regular intervals.

From your memorandum of October 16 it is not quite clear to me whether the items covered by you are the only items as to which the Department has a responsibility. If there are any additional ones please advise me.

On the item as to dissemination of information, you should obtain regular reports from INS until such time as the deficiency in this aspect of the program is eliminated. As to detection devices, you should cover this aspect of the matter completely with INS. As to control of land borders and the Gulf Coast, you should follow up to see that a final report is obtained at an early date. As to the use of civil aircraft in unconventional attack, you should consult with the Deputy Attorney General to expedite the introduction of legislation; and you should also consult with him as to the advisability of asking the Budget Bureau to consider in our so-called b items an appropriation for the additional planes.

We have always considered this subject as of highest priority under the Internal Security Program of the National Security Council and therefore all interested agencies of the Department of Justice must act in accordance with this policy.

CC - Mr. Rogers
Mr. Hoover
General Swing
Mr. Andretta

RECORDED-42

NO ACTION NECESSARY
LW.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EXP. PROC.

OCT 18 1957

NOV 12 1957

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. R. R. Roach

DATE: November 6, 1957

FROM : Mr. O. H. Bartlett

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTO THE UNITED STATES

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
Nease
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

In connection with the above-captioned subject, Liaison has been following with State for several months to make sure we are advised of the results of the State discussions with the Canadians.

Mr. J. P. McDonnell, State, advised me on November 5, 1957, that State has received no answer from the Canadian Government; however, he has perfected arrangements at State whereby he will be notified when this matter is received in his department. As soon as State receives the Canadians answer, the Bureau will be advised through Liaison.

ACTION:

Liaison will continue to check on this matter.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/19/03 BY SP4 SSA/RNP

OHB:bjt
(5)

1 - Mr. Whitson
1 - Mr. Day
1 - Liaison Section
1 - Mr. Bartlett

RECORDED-84
EX-137
117-268-1507
NOV 8 1957

55 NOV 13 1957

117-268

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268) DATE: 11/8/57

FROM: SAC, DENVER (117-126)

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS
OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

Re Chicago letter to Bureau dated September 20,1957.

AT FORT CARSON, COLORADO

SFC [redacted] 171st Ordnance Detachment (EOD) advised SA [redacted] on September 23, 1957, the Commanding Officer of this organization is Captain WILLIAM G. LAWHEAD, who resides at [redacted] Colorado, and his home telephone number is [redacted] He stated this organization is located in Building #803 at Fort Carson and the telephone number is ME 3-6644, Extension 2643. b7C

AT ROCKY MOUNTAIN ARSENAL, DENVER 2, COLORADO

On October 18, 1957, SA [redacted] was advised [redacted] Deputy Intelligence Officer, Inspector General's Office, that the Commanding Officer of the 41st Ordnance Detachment (ED) is CLARENCE R. HAMPTON. The telephone number and extension of this unit is ATlas 8-0711, Extension 6202. The unit serves the area of Colorado, Wyoming, North Dakota, and South Dakota. [redacted] advised that Captain HAMPTON had just appeared at that post and had not yet obtained a residence.

On November 4, 1957, Major ANTHONY M. LYDON, Provost Marshal, Rocky Mountain Arsenal, advised that Captain HAMPTON's home residence and telephone number is [redacted]

Major LYDON stated that this unit keeps in constant touch with the military police desk at the Rocky Mountain Arsenal and in the event it is necessary to contact Captain HAMPTON, his whereabouts will always be known to this desk, which has telephone number AT 8-0711, Extension 211.

(2) - Bureau (RM)
1 - Denver
DJW:mjb
(3)

RECORDED - 33
117-268-1370
21 NOV 13 1957

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/19/03 BY SP4BJA/KNP

56 NOV 18 1957

DO-6

OFFICE OF DIRECTOR
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Nease
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. Jones
Mr. Clayton
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/20/03 BY SP4 STP/ENP

EXP. PROC
30 NOV 14 1957

5 White

In reply refer to
SY/P

November 12, 1957

TO: The Honorable
J. Edgar Hoover
Chairman
Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference
Department of Justice
Washington 25, D. C.

FROM: E. Tomlin Bailey
Director
Office of Security

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/20/03 BY SP4BJA/ENP

SUBJECT: [redacted]

Reference is made to my letter, dated May 2, 1957, on the captioned matter.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] 117-268-1510 b2 b7E

[redacted]

NOV 20 1957

[redacted]

cc to mail for IIC members Board

The original of this letter is being retained in the IIC files in Mr. Day's Office.

58 NOV 26

117-268

FD-36 (Rev. 3-13-56)

F B I

Date: 11/18/57

Transmit the following message via AIRTEL

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Nease
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. Clayton
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268)

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (117-New)

SUBJECT: [redacted]
SMAB - AEA

On 11/16/57, Inspector [redacted] U. S. Customs Idlewild Airport, New York, advised that [redacted] arrived on Pan American Airlines [redacted] He entered as a non-resident having [redacted] home address [redacted]

[redacted] declared orally two metal objects made up of 75% Magnesium and 25% Thorium to be used as samples to make an alloy. These objects weighed 310 and 410 grams and registered 96 on green and 62 on red [redacted]

Customs is holding material pending determination if a license is necessary before releasing same.

[redacted] can be reached at [redacted]

Customs will advise re release of material.

POWERS

NO RECORD. NO ACTION PENDING CUSTOMS ACTION.

RECORDED - 26

INDEXED - 26

NOV 19 1957

2 - Bureau
1 - New York (117-192)
1 - New York (117-New)

TGS:eah
(5)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/20/03 BY SP4 DSA/RNP

Approved: E J Powers Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

58 NOV 29 1957

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268) DATE: 11/21/57

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (117-314)

SUBJECT: DOMINION MAGNESIUM LTD.
CANADA - SMAB
AEA

Re NY airtels 7/12/57, 8/30/57, and 9/30/57.

On 10/20/57, ALBERT ZILA, Atomic Energy Commission, NYC, advised that analysis of thorium sintered pellets had been completed and instant material did not appear to be special interest material and same was released. C.

2-Bureau (117-268) RM
1-New York (117-192)
1-New York (117-314)

NO ACTION NECESSARY
LW

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/20/03 BY SP4 BSTAR NP

RECORDED - 7
INDEXED - 7
NOV 25 1957
EX-EC.

TGS:EG
(4)

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN 12/10/57

DATE: November 21, 1957

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: JOINT IIC-ICIS COMMITTEE ON COUNTERMEASURES

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
Nease
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

As indicated in my memorandum of October 28, attached, the IIC Working Committee on October 17 approved, with two minor suggestions, a Classification Guide prepared for use in the detection device program by the Advisory Group of the Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures.

The two suggestions have been adopted by ICIS and joint IIC-ICIS letters, already signed by the Acting Chairman of ICIS, have now been forwarded for the signature of the Director as IIC Chairman. These letters forward copies of the Guide to the department heads concerned with the devices. Letters are addressed to the Attorney General (Immigration), the Secretary of the Treasury (Customs and Coast Guard), and to the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (Research and Development).

ACTION:

Attached for approval and signature of the Director as IIC Chairman are the three letters noted above.

Enclosures

GAD:hke
(7)

1-Mr. Boardman
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Branigan
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Mr. Day
1-Liaison Section

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/20/03 BY SP4 PJH/RNP

117-268-1513

RECORDED-45
INDEXED - 45

15 NOV 25 1957

ENCLOSURE Classified

58DEC9 1957

LIAISON

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. R. R. Roach

DATE: November 18, 1957

FROM : Mr. S. J. Papich

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mason
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
DETECTION OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS COMING
INTO THE UNITED STATES
SMAB

On November 15, 1957, James Greene, Chief, Border Patrol, Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), advised the Liaison Agent that as a result of discussions held before the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS), INS will have certain responsibilities relating to the possible detection of the movement of nuclear materials into the United States. Greene explained that U. S. Customs and/or the Coast Guard are equipped with detection devices and will be covering most of the principal ports. However, there are certain areas, particularly along the Gulf Coast and the Mexican border area where it will be necessary for personnel of the Border Patrol to cover individuals who might be transporting nuclear materials into this country. INS is being provided with approximately 30 detection devices and Border Patrol personnel are currently being trained in the use of the machine.

Greene stated that instructions are being prepared by headquarters to INS personnel in the field to the effect that if any information is developed indicating an unauthorized transportation of nuclear materials into this country, the nearest FBI office is to be advised as there may be a violation under the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. Greene inquired if such instructions met with the Bureau's approval.

This matter was discussed with the Espionage Section on November 18, 1957, on which date Greene was advised by the Liaison Agent that the proposed instructions were satisfactory, as far as the Bureau's responsibilities were concerned. It was suggested that INS might also desire to notify the Atomic Energy Commission at the same time that the Bureau was notified. It was explained to Greene that such is the procedure now being followed in New York City by the Bureau of Customs. Greene felt that this was a good suggestion and he would take steps to incorporate this into the other instructions. 117-268

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4/20/83 BY SP4 [illegible]

ACTION:
RECORDED - 49
INDEXED - 49
For information.

NOV 26 1957

SJP:bjt (5)
1 - Mr. Branigan
1 - Mr. Day
1 - Liaison Section
1 - Mr. Papich

EX-[illegible]
117-268

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RECORDED - 34
117-268

Date: November 14, 1957

To: Director of Special Investigations
The Inspector General
Department of the Air Force
Building Tempo E
4th and Adams Drive, S. W.
Washington, D. C.

Attention: Lieutenant Colonel Joseph J. Cappucci
Assistant Chief
Counterintelligence Division

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: COUNTERMEASURES REQUIRED TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION AND DETONATION IN PLACE OF DEMOLITION ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES

DECLASSIFIED BY SP1BTP/ENP ON 4/20/83

Reference is made to the letter from Lieutenant Colonel Joseph J. Cappucci dated November 6, 1957, requesting advice regarding the downgrading of a Top Secret letter dated December 22, 1952, to the Honorable James S. Lay, Jr., Executive Secretary, National Security Council; a report to the President captioned as above dated December 4, 1952, also classified Top Secret; and a memorandum to the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, and others, dated October 6, 1952, from Mr. J. P. Coyne, National Security Council Representative on Internal Security, classified Secret.

The documents mentioned above were not assigned their classification by the FBI. The letter to the Honorable James S. Lay, Jr. and the report to the President were the joint responsibility of the members of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (IIC), the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission and representatives of the Department of State and Treasury Department members of the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS).

LW:bbr (5)

SEE NOTE LAST PAGE.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EX-CONFIDENTIAL
DOWNGRADED TO CONFIDENTIAL

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
Nease
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

MAIL ROOM
58 NOV 20 1957

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Director of Special Investigations
The Inspector General
Department of the Air Force

By memorandum of December 29, 1952, from the Honorable James S. Lay, Jr. to the chairmen of the IIC and the ICIS, the internal security committees were notified that the President had authorized implementation of the recommendations in the report of December 4, 1952, under the coordination of the IIC and ICIS in conjunction with the Atomic Energy Commission. As a result, there was established the Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures for the purpose of following the implementation of the recommendations mentioned.

Mr. Franklin L. Belch, Assistant Chief, Counterintelligence Division, Directorate of Special Investigations, The Inspector General, Department of the Air Force, is the chairman of the Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures. You may wish to make inquiry through him regarding the possible downgrading of the documents mentioned by you and whether the provisions of the documents continue to be applicable.

NOTE: Classified ~~confidential~~ because the existence of the countermeasure program and the joint responsibility of the IIC and ICIS for its coordination so classified.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: 11-20-57

FROM : SAC, Atlanta (117-26)

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES

117-268-1504

Re Atlanta letter dated 10-31-57.

Captain ROGER A. HOISINGTON, Operations Officer, 547th Ordnance Detachment (EDC), Ordnance Section, Headquarters, Third Army, Fort McPherson, Georgia, advised SA [redacted] on 11-1-57 that the correct telephone number for the 59th Ordnance Detachment (ED), Fort Campbell, Kentucky, is Geneva 9-3521, Extension 3238, rather than the number 3521.

All offices should correct Exhibit B (Third Army Explosive Disposal Detachments) to show the correct telephone number.

b7C

EX-131

NOV 26 1957

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/20/03 BY SP4BTA/ENP

RECORDED - 40

117-268-1504

2 - Bureau
1 - Birmingham
1 - Charlotte
1 - Knoxville
1 - Louisville
1 - Memphis
1 - Miami
1 - Mobile
1 - New Orleans
1 - Savannah
1 - Atlanta (117-26)

ETK:mml
(12)

INTERSEC.

CONFIRMATION (no action)

SECRET

1 - Be
1 - Dug
1 - Liaison
1 - Whitson

RECORDED-18

117-260

EX-103

Date: November 18, 1957

To: Mr. J. Tomlin Bailey
Director
Office of Security
Department of State
515 22nd Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF ATOMIC WEAPONS INTO THE UNITED STATES

6/20/03 SPHAT/jenp

On the afternoon of November 8, 1957, the FBI received information from the Bureau of Customs that a shipment under diplomatic seal from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Commerce at Brussels, Belgium, addressed to Baron Silvercruys, the Belgian Ambassador to the United States, had arrived at the National Airport, Washington, D. C., under bond, from New York on November 7, 1957. Customs advised the shipment evidenced radioactivity when checked [redacted] detection device. b2 b7E

Representatives of the FBI determined that the shipment was a gray canvas duffle bag, bearing official seals of the Belgian Government, containing what appeared to be a wooden box approximately nine and one-half inches by sixteen inches by twenty inches, and weighing approximately 35 pounds. The shipment yielded mild gamma radiation. The radiation level was approximately four times that of a watch dial. While the exact nature of the contents is

LW:bbr
(13)

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Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
Nease
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

MAIL ROOM

58DEC 3

SECRET

SEE NOTE ON PAGE 2.

Mr. A. Devlin Bailey

unknown, there was nothing to indicate that the shipment contained anything of intelligence interest.

No further investigation of this matter is being made by the Bureau.

1 - Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
Department of the Army

Attention: Chief, Security Division

1 - Director of Naval Intelligence

1 - Office of Special Investigations
Department of the Air Force

1 - Atomic Energy Commission

1 - Mr. J. Patrick Coyne
National Security Council
Executive Office Building
Washington 25, D. C.

BY COURIER SERVICE

1 - Mr. J. Walter Yeagley
Chairman
Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security
Department of Justice Building
Washington, D. C.

NOTE: Classified ~~Secret~~ because application of detection device program to diplomatic pouch is so classified and also to protect Bureau's investigative techniques, [redacted] b2 b7E Dissemination being made to Coyne at his request regarding any incidents in which radioactivity noted in any diplomatic shipment.

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Nichols
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. Nease
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

AIRTEL

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI 11/12/57

FROM: SAC, WFO (117-new)

Who

SHIPMENT OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL TO AMBASSADOR BARON SILVERCRUYS, BELGIAN EMBASSY, WASHINGTON, D. C., CONTAINING RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL AT NATIONAL AIRPORT, WASHINGTON, D. C., NOV. 8, 1957
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

DRAYCAR

On the afternoon of November 8, 1957, this office received information from Inspector KELLY, U. S. Customs, that a shipment received by air at the Customs Office at National Airport, Washington, D. C., had evidenced radioactivity on cursory examination. He stated the shipment had been received at the airport as part of an air cargo on the evening of November 7, 1957, and was destined to the Ambassador of Belgium at Washington, D. C.

An SA of WFO was dispatched to the U. S. Customs Office at National Airport and determined that instant shipment had been received at the airport under bond and diplomatic seal via Eastern Airlines from New York. This shipment had arrived in the U. S. via Sabena Airlines. The shipment consisted of a soft gray canvas duffle bag tied with a string to which were affixed official seals of the Belgian Government. Shipment was addressed to BARON SILVERCRUYS, 3330 Garfield Street, N. W., Washington, D. C., which is the address of the Chancery of the Embassy of Belgium. Shipment originated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Commerce at Brussels, Belgium. Examination by Customs [redacted]

b2
b7E

3 - Bureau
1 - WFO
LWRO/pcn
(4)

INDEXED-18 117-[illegible]
RECORDED-18
EX-147
[illegible] NOV 26 1957

AIRTEL

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/20/03 BY SP4 [illegible]/ENP

WFO 117-new

[redacted] Duffle bag contained what appeared to be a wooden box with dimensions of 9½ x 16 x 20". b2 b7E

35 lbs per WFO

Pursuant to Bureau instructions, personnel of FBI Laboratory were taken to National Airport by WFO personnel for further examination. Information received by this office from Laboratory personnel indicated shipment yielded mild Gamma radiation such as from the face of a clock and no evidence of Beta or Alpha rays. Shipment was [redacted]

WFO was subsequently advised by FBI Laboratory [redacted] exact nature of contents could not be determined. Radiation level was approximately four times that of a watch dial and consequently insignificant. b2 b7E

Because of low level of radiation and because [redacted] failed to indicate shipment contained anything of intelligence interest to this Government, no further investigation was conducted. WFO recommends no dissemination since this might tend to reveal delicate investigative techniques utilized.

C.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 11/26/57

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (117-New)

SUBJECT: [redacted]
SMAB
AEA

ReNYairtel 11/18/57.

b7C

On 11/20/57, Inspector [redacted] New Jersey Customs, Idlewild Airport, NYC, advised that AEC license #R-189 had been issued for importation of two metal objects in possession of [redacted] on his arrival in N[redacted] 11/16/57, and that material had been released by Customs.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/20/03 BY SP4 BSR/ENP

RECORDED-46
INDEXED-46

117-268-1537

NOV 29 1957

EX-132

ESP:mzm

2-Bureau
1-New York (117-192)
1-New York (117-New)

WJP:mzm
(4)

DEC 5 1957

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ICIS-P25/543

November 14, 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Franklin L. Welch, Chairman
Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures

FROM: Leonard P. Bienvenu
Executive Secretary, ICIS

SUBJECT: Survey of Unaccompanied Soviet Bloc Shipments

Reference is made to the memorandum dated May 6, 1957 (ICIS-P25/465), from the Chairman, ICIS, concerning the above subject. Enclosed for information and any comment you deem desirable is a copy of the report by Customs for the month of April, 1957.

Enclosure

CC: Col. Graham
Mr. Kelly
Mr. Whitson
Capt. Stewart

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/20/03 BY SP1 BSK/lmf

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INDEXED - 20
[redacted] 117-348-1518
NOT RECORDED
15 DEC 2 1957
ENCLOSURE 20
58 DEC 4 1957
117-268
5-FBI

~~SECRET~~

ICIS-P25/544

November 20, 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Franklin L. Welch, Chairman
Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures

FROM: Leonard P. Bienvenu
Executive Secretary, ICIS

SUBJECT: [redacted]

b2
b7E

Enclosed for information and any comment the Committee may wish to submit is copy of a memorandum dated November 12, 1957, from the Director, Office of Security, Department of State, to the Chairman, ICIS, giving the results of [redacted]

Enclosure

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/24/03 BY SP4 BKK/RP

cc: Mr. Whitson
Col. Graham
Capt. Stewart
Mr. Kelly

INDEXED - 20

117-268-1519

NOT RECORDED
15 DEC 2 1957

EX 105

EX 105

~~SECRET~~

ENCLOSURE
FOR
58 DEC 4 1957

117-268

5-FBI

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

November 22, 1957

Delivered by ICIS 11/27/57 [illegible]

Honorable William P. Rogers
The Attorney General
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Rogers:

[redacted]

Enclosed is a copy of a Classification Guide for the Detection Device Program dated November 20, 1957. This Guide was prepared in consultation with, and has been approved by, the Division of Classification, U. S. Atomic Energy Commission, and it has been approved by the internal security committees. The Guide is intended to serve as a means of providing basic classification policy to agencies and contractors involved in the detection device program, and as a means of standardizing practices and procedures in connection with use of the detection devices. As such, we anticipate that it will prove to be of value in facilitating implementation of the program, and we will appreciate your making such dissemination of the information contained in the Guide as you deem appropriate.

Your continued cooperation in the implementation of the detection device program is appreciated by these committees.

Sincerely yours,

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/20/03 BY SP4 BSR/LMP

RECORDED - 20

J. Edgar Hoover
Chairman
Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference

117-268-15-28

SIGNED

15 DEC 2 1957

John F. Doherty
Acting Chairman, Interdepartmental
Committee on Internal Security

(THIS IS THE FBI FILE COPY AS THE LETTER WAS PREPARED BY ICIS)

Enclosure

cc: Commissioner,
Immigration and Naturalization Service

(Cover memorandum from Belmont to Boardman, 11/21/57, re "Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures" ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ GAD:hke)

58 DEC 6 1957

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

November 22, 1957

Delivered by ICIS 11/22/57 Board

Honorable Lewis L. Strauss
Chairman
Atomic Energy Commission
Washington 25, D. C.

3 mm

Dear Mr. Strauss:

Enclosed is a copy of a Classification Guide for the Detection Device Program dated November 20, 1957. This Guide was prepared in consultation with, and has been approved by, the Division of Classification, U. S. Atomic Energy Commission, and it has been approved by the internal security committees. The Guide is intended to serve as a means of providing basic classification policy to agencies and contractors involved in the detection device program, and as a means of standardizing practices and procedures in connection with use of the detection devices. As such, we anticipate that it will prove to be of value in facilitating implementation of the program, and we will appreciate your making such dissemination of the information contained in the Guide as you deem appropriate.

Your continued cooperation in the implementation of the detection device program is appreciated by these committees.

Sincerely yours,

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/20/13 BY SP4 BTA/KRW

Board D

RECORDED - 20

117-262-1521

J. Edgar Hoover
Chairman
Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference

(This is the FBI file copy as the letter was prepared by ICIS)

SIGNED

15 DEC 2 1957

John P. Doherty
Acting Chairman, Interdepartmental
Committee on Internal Security

LIAISON

Enclosure

(Cover memo Belmont to Boardman, 11/21/57, re "Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures," GAD:hke

58 DEC 6 1957

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

November 22, 1957

Delivered by ICIS 11/22/57 BOB

Honorable Robert B. Anderson
The Secretary of the Treasury
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Anderson:

Enclosed is a copy of a Classification Guide for the Detection Device Program dated November 20, 1957. This Guide was prepared in consultation with, and has been approved by, the Division of Classification, U. S. Atomic Energy Commission, and it has been approved by the internal security committees. The Guide is intended to serve as a means of providing basic classification policy to agencies and contractors involved in the detection device program, and as a means of standardizing practices and procedures in connection with use of the detection devices. As such, we anticipate that it will prove to be of value in facilitating implementation of the program, and we will appreciate your making such dissemination of the information contained in the Guide as you deem appropriate.

Your continued cooperation in the implementation of the detection device program is appreciated by these committees.

Sincerely yours,

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/20/03 BY SP4 JTA/ENP

J. Edgar Hoover
Chairman
Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference

(This is the FBI file copy as the letter was prepared in ICIS.)

(Cover memorandum from Belmont to Boardman, 11/21/57, re "Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures," GAD:hke)

SIGNED
RECORDED - 20 117-268-13
John F. Doherty
Acting Chairman, Interdepartmental
Committee on Internal Security

DEC 2 1957

Enclosure

58 DEC 6

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LIAISON

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI (117-268) DATE: 11/26/57

FROM : SAC, Philadelphia (117-75)

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES

Re SAC Let 57-47 dated 8/20/57 and mylet dated 9/12/57.

CIC, Philadelphia, has now advised that the 69th Ordnance Detachment (EOD), formerly located at Swarthmore, Pa., has now moved. The current address is:

69th Ordnance Detachment (EOD)
Building 94B
Valley Forge Army Hospital
Phoenixville, Pennsylvania

Telephone Number: WEllington 3-5863
Extension - 482

New Commanding Officer: 1st Lt. JAMES P. MOONEY

The Bureau will be notified of any subsequent changes as they occur.

2 - Bureau (117-268) R.M.
1 - Baltimore (117-46)(info) R.M.
1 - Pittsburgh (117-38)(info) R.M.
1 - Philadelphia (117-75)

JWG:jag
(5)

RECORDED - 54

EX - 126

117-268-1533

12-3
NOV 27 1957

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/20/03 BY SP1 BCP/RNP

69 DEC 5 1957

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: 12/3/57

FROM : V. A. Branigan

SUBJECT: JOINT IIC-ICIS COMMITTEE ON COUNTERMEASURES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/20/03 BY SP4GTA/ENP

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Boardman
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Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

At 10 a.m., 12/2/57, Mr. Don Gale, AEC-Naval Research Laboratory representative on the advisory group regarding detection devices phoned the Bureau and advised that on Friday, 11/29/57, the advisory group, consisting of Gale, and representatives of the agencies operating the detection devices, i.e., Customs, Coast Guard and Immigration, met and decided upon a means of inspection of the effectiveness of detection device operations at the port of New York. This would

[redacted]

The proposed inspection program of the advisory group is in line with Recommendation No. 6 of the recommendations of the IIC and ICIS dated 8/20/57, which was disseminated to the interested agencies 8/26/57.

b2
b7E

Gale said it appeared to the advisory group that the

[redacted]

Gale will discuss the matter further with Leonard Bienvenu, Executive Secretary of ICIS, and with the Department of State representative on ICIS.

RECOMMENDATION:

In the event the inspection plan of the advisory group is brought up for discussion with Bureau representatives or in the Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures, it is suggested that the Bureau position be that the advisory group should work out its own procedures and that we are interested only in the results of its studies and analyses which it reports to the IIC and ICIS with appropriate recommendations on a semiannual basis.

1 - Belmont
1 - Branigan
1 - Day
1 - Whitson
LW:bbr
(5)

RECORDED - 54

INDEXED - 54

EX-135

10 DEC 5 1957

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

LIAISON

58 DEC 10 1957

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. R. R. ROACH

DATE: December 9, 1957

FROM : MR. J. M. FITZGERALD

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
Nease
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTO THE UNITED STATES

In connection with the above matter, Liaison has been following with State to make sure we are advised of the results of State discussions with the Canadians.

On December 6, 1957, Mr. James P. McDonnell, State, advised that a letter dated November 19, 1957, had been received from the U. S. Embassy in Ottawa, Canada, reflecting that the Embassy has been talking with the Canadian Department of External Affairs, but that as yet State has not even secured Canadian concurrence on the minutes of the June, 1957, meeting between the U. S. and the Canadians on this topic. McDonnell said that State is continuing to pursue this matter actively with the Canadians and he will keep us advised through Liaison regarding developments.

ACTION:

For information. Liaison will continue contact with McDonnell on this matter.

EX 105

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/20/03 BY SP4BJA/RNP

JMF:jlk
(5)
1 - Mr. Whitson
1 - Mr. Day
1 - Liaison Section
1 - Mr. Fitzgerald

RECORDED-18 117-268-1525

DEC 10 1957

FCC 58 DEC 11 1957

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. L. V. Boardman 12-19-57

DATE: November 22, 1957

FROM : A. H. Belmont

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mohr
Parsons
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Trotter
Nease
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTO THE UNITED STATES

By IIC-ICIS letters dated August 26, 1957, nine recommendations for action in connection with the Detection Device Program were forwarded to Justice, Treasury, and the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). A copy of these recommendations is attached.

Recommendation number one asks AEC to accelerate its research and development of all types of detection devices and to furnish quarterly status reports to the IIC and ICIS. Recommendation seven asks that "in instances where examinations by the detection devices indicate the presence of radioactive materials and there is sufficient reason to believe that same may contain special nuclear material, the AEC should be responsible for taking action to determine the nuclear or non-nuclear character thereof, when such material is available for examination." AEC letter of November 18, attached, agrees with recommendation one but states that AEC cannot assume the responsibility outlined in recommendation seven and a copy of a letter from AEC to General Cutler is furnished. The letter to General Cutler recommends that the National Security Council (NSC) agree to a division of responsibility wherein the agencies operating the devices would be responsible for identifying all detected radioactive materials.

During the experimental phase of the Detection Device Program, it was learned through experience that various materials caused a reaction on the devices. Due to inexperience and lack of training, Customs agents operating the devices sometimes called upon the AEC to identify such materials even though they were obviously not nuclear in character. From the reports which we have received, it appears that the only instances wherein AEC has been asked to identify such materials have occurred in New York City, although the ports of entry open to Soviet

Enclosures

GAD:bdh/mje (8)
1 - Mr. Boardman
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Whitson
1 - Mr. Bates
1 - Mr. Daunt
1 - Section Tickler
1 - Mr. Bau

RECORDED - 75 105

117-2-67-1526

DEC 13 1957

6 DEC 20 1957

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bloc personnel and where the Detection Device Program recommends use of devices include Laredo and San Antonio, Texas; St. Albans, Vermont, and Messina, New York, and, for unaccompanied diplomatic shipments, Washington, D. C.

A training course was arranged by AEC and held in New York City this year in order to train the operators of the devices in their proper use and to instruct them how to distinguish between the nuclear material in which we are interested and the other radioactive materials which activate the devices. This is in line with recommendation three: "Improved operational and search techniques developed on the basis of experience gained in the use of detection devices should be utilized by all operating agencies, and full advantage taken of training courses offered by the AEC."

Under the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act "special nuclear material," mentioned in recommendation seven, above, [redacted] material so declared by AEC. (42 USC 2014t) The Act further states that title to any special nuclear material in this country rests with the United States and it shall be administered and controlled by AEC. (42 USC 2072) This is the reason that the IIC-ICIS recommendation states that where there is sufficient reason to believe that special nuclear material is involved, AEC should be responsible for identifying it. We did not ask that AEC participate in the detection aspects of the program or that AEC assist in identifying anything which did not appear to be the special nuclear material which AEC alone must control and dispose of. In the several years the devices have been used, there has been only one occasion when such a violent reaction was caused by a shipment under diplomatic immunity as to necessitate examination of the shipment. This occurred this year when an Israeli scientist was found to be shipping a radium compound to Israel.

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b7E

We believe AEC has misinterpreted the recommendation we made.

ACTION:

If you approve, we will arrange immediately through liaison for a meeting of representatives of AEC, Treasury, ICIS, IIC, and also Pat Coyne of NSC to discuss this matter in an endeavor to reach an agreement which will relieve NSC of the necessity of deciding this problem.

NDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: December 2, 1957

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTO THE UNITED STATES

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Pursuant to my memorandum of November 22, attached, IIC and ICIS representatives met on November 29 with Colonel Brown and Mr. John Kelly of Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and Frank Russell, Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner of Customs. Pat Coyne, who had first said he wanted to attend, was not present due to his inability to discuss this matter with General Cutler (Cutler was unavailable until December 2, and Coyne is to be out of town the week of December 2).

It was pointed out to the AEC representatives that IIC-ICIS had asked AEC to identify material detected by the devices only in instances where there is sufficient reason to believe that it may contain special nuclear material, whereas the impression given in AEC's letters to General Cutler and IIC-ICIS is that AEC had been asked to identify all materials detected. Mr. Kelly, who actually prepared the letters for the signature of Admiral Strauss, acknowledged that the letters were unclear, but stated that they had been based on a legal opinion drawn in AEC that AEC did not have the authority or responsibility for doing this work. He admitted that a legal opinion drawn by Treasury indicated that AEC was responsible. It was suggested that since there is a legal question involved, this should be settled by the Attorney General promptly. Kelly said AEC was concerned over the possible effect of growth of the detection device program in that many more requests for AEC identifications might result. Mr. Russell stated that Customs feels it is acting as an agent for AEC in examining shipments of radioactive materials since some of these are illegal unless licensed by AEC. He said Customs had no objection to performing the law enforcement function but expected cooperation from AEC in the matter of laboratory examinations.

By AEC estimate, it would cost $25,000 to equip the Customs Laboratory in New York to make the examinations now

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Enclosure
GAD:hkepe
(8)

RECORDED - 75 117-268-1521

EX 105 8 DEC 13 1957

1-Mr. Boardman
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Mr. Day
1-Mr. Bates
1-Mr. Daunt
1-Liaison Section

LIAISON

FBI
58 DEC 18 1957

performed by AEC. According to Russell, greater expense would probably be necessary in other Customs Laboratories as they are not as well equipped as the one in New York.

When pressed for information concerning the volume of examinations being conducted by AEC as a result of the detection device program, Kelly said there had been a marked decrease in requests from Customs subsequent to the training school held by AEC this summer. He said that at the present time AEC receives about two calls weekly and that half of these can be handled on the telephone. Of the average one call weekly requiring an AEC examination, about half necessitate a detailed laboratory procedure. Kelly stressed that these were very rough estimates and were not based on any survey or statistics. Kelly stated that in his opinion, if AEC were required to handle these examinations on a country-wide basis and the device program was materially enlarged, AEC would "farm out" the examinations to university laboratories in various parts of the country.

OBSERVATION:

Since a legal question exists, we believe that the Attorney General should rule concerning the authority and responsibility of AEC to participate in this program to the extent recommended. If, in the Attorney General's opinion, AEC does have the authority and responsibility, as we believe, this should settle the question without further discussion by either the National Security Council or the heads of the agencies concerned.

ACTION:

If you approve, we will, upon the return of Pat Coyne next week, arrange for another meeting on the working level and ask that the AEC and Treasury legal opinions be made available. We will then ask the ICIS, on which Justice is represented, to secure the opinion of the Attorney General concerning this problem.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: December 9, 1957

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

Tolson
Nichols
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Belmont
Mohr
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SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTO THE UNITED STATES

As indicated in my memorandum of December 2, attached, we discussed with Pat Coyne on December 9 the letters of Admiral Strauss indicating that Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) did not believe it should be responsible for identifying materials detected by our devices even though believed to be special nuclear material. We briefed Coyne on the results of our meeting of November 29 with representatives of ICIS, AEC, and Treasury, and we explained that conflicting legal opinions existed. Coyne, who was in Florida last week observing missile tests, stated that General Cutler had, in his absence, addressed a letter to the AEC Chairman recommending that Cutler, Strauss, and Coyne meet on December 12 and discuss this matter. General Cutler's letter indicated his belief that the problem could be solved without referring it to the NSC. Coyne stated that he would raise the question of the conflicting legal opinions during this conference and would take steps to see that the opinion of the Attorney General was secured. He said that in view of this development, it would be unnecessary to hold another meeting of representatives of the interested agencies at this time.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/20/03 BY SP1BTA/RNP

ACTION:

If you approve, we will take no further action until we find out what develops during the discussions between General Cutler, Admiral Strauss, and Pat Coyne. Coyne is very positive in his belief that AEC is and should be responsible for the limited portion of the identification aspects of this program which they were asked to undertake. It is entirely possible that this matter may be finally settled as a result of his discussion with Admiral Strauss together with the securing of a controlling legal opinion from the Attorney General.

Enclosures
GAD:hke
(7)
1-Mr. Boardman
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Mr. Bates
1-Mr. Day
1-Liaison Section

RECORDED - 75 117-268-1538

EX 105

58 DEC 18 1957

LIAISON

DEC 13 1957

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 66-8003-4

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: December 5, 1957

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTO THE UNITED STATES

Tolson
Nichols
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IIC and ICIS on August 26, 1957, made various recommendations concerning the detection device program. The first of these was:"in the light of improved Soviet capabilities, research, and development activity should be accelerated in the fields of passive, active, and fluoroscopic devices and status reports furnished thereon to the IIC and ICIS on a quarterly basis." AEC letter of November 27, 1957, copy attached, forwards the first of these reports to the two Chairmen.

AEC is working on three broad types of detection techniques:

(1) Passive - wherein radiations from a radioactive substance are detected, measured, or otherwise analyzed.
(2) Fluoroscopic - wherein an "X-ray" is used to reveal the presence of dense substances.
(3) Active - wherein the object being inspected is bombarded with high energy particles resulting in fission and emanation of gamma rays which may be detected.

2 ENCLOSURE

EX-135

In the "passive" field, AEC is working in a number of directions, but the most significant development is that they have achieved some success with [redacted] which, if successful, could be used with the present detection devices to identify the substance which has activated a device. If completely successful, it would be possible to take a reading, after a detection device has been activated, and determine from the reading the nature of the substance involved. This might obviate the necessity of locating radium-dial clocks and watches in the baggage of incoming passengers. AEC expects to give a demonstration to IIC and ICIS early in 1958.

b2
b7E

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Enclosure
GAD:hke (6)
1-Mr. Boardman
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Mr. Day
1-Liaison Section

RECORDED - 1

62-268-1529

21 DEC 16 1957

EX-135

63 DEC 18 1957

LIAISON

Memorandum from Mr. Belmont to Mr. Boardman
RE: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTO THE UNITED STATES

Several fluoroscopic or X-ray type techniques are being studied and one of these devices is now being evaluated. AEC expects to demonstrate it in early 1958. It should be noted, however, that at best this technique will only serve to locate dense objects and will not identify them.

Less progress has been made in development of an active device since serious problems of health are involved and special technical difficulties have been encountered. No experimental model has yet been developed. The desirability of an active device is that if perfected, it will be possible to identify special nuclear materials with a reasonable degree of certainty without physically examining them.

ACTION:

No reply is necessary. We will schedule the AEC report for consideration by the IIC Working Committee and, in the absence of a specific request, no reply will be made.

Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization Swing stated he had a public relations matter in that the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS), headed by Mr. Yeagley, had directed a letter to the Immigration and Naturalization Service urging the setting up of equipment along the border, particularly the Mexican border, to prevent the smuggling in of any parts of an atom bomb, and that such equipment has now been procured and is awaiting installation but that he, Commissioner Swing, has not authorized it because he knows that as soon as he does so there will be a violent objection along the Mexican border, particularly when they start stopping all automobiles to be checked in this manner. Commissioner Swing stated he understood that the Customs Bureau of the Treasury Department was supposed to install such equipment at other places in the country but that it has not yet procured all of its equipment. The Attorney General stated he thought the matter should be referred back to the National Security Council for review because he could see that the Department of Justice would receive some unfavorable publicity if it suddenly put into operation this type of checking at the Mexican border.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/20/03 BY SP4 BSR/RNP

NOT RECORDED
231 DEC 19 1957

57 DEC 23 1957

1 - Liaison
1 - Donohoe
1 - Whitson

[redacted] b7C

Date: December 19, 1957

To: Captain John A. Waters
Director of Security
Atomic Energy Commission
Room 926
1717 H Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: [redacted]
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

b7C

The memorandum from this Bureau dated July 18, 1955, captioned as above is downgraded from Secret to Confidential. [redacted]

Mr. Armando di Girolamo, Chief
1 - Records Administration Branch, Attn: ~~External Security Division~~ [redacted]
(by r.s. 0-6 same date)

(1) - 117-268 (Smuggling of Atomic Bombs)

LW:bbr
(8)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/20/03 BY SP4BSTK/RNP

NOTE: This relates to the general reaction of detection device to a small quantity of mineral specimens. Downgrading is for purpose of bringing classification in line with new classification rules for detection device program.

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
Nease
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

YELLOW DUPLICATE
DEC 20 1957
MAILED

117-268
NOT RECORDED
146 DEC 23 1957

DEC 27 1957
MAIL ROOM

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : SAC, Albany

DATE: December 13, 1957

FROM : Director, FBI (117-268)

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES - CLASSIFICATION OF CORRESPONDENCE

Reference is made to SAC Letter 57-47 (K).

Customs, Coast Guard and the Immigration Border Patrol are acquiring devices for the detection of radioactive material to assist in the discovery of fissionable material which may be smuggled into the United States.

[redacted] b2 b7E

use by Customs at New York City, at Idlewild International Airport and at San Antonio, Texas. Customs plans ultimately [redacted] major Customs installations.

Enclosures (2)

2 - Albuquerque (Enclosures - 2)
2 - Anchorage (Enclosures - 2)
2 - Baltimore (Enclosures - 2)
2 - Boston (Enclosures - 2)
2 - Buffalo (Enclosures - 2)
2 - Butte (Enclosures - 2)
2 - Charlotte (Enclosures - 2)
2 - Chicago (Enclosures - 2)
2 - Cleveland (Enclosures - 2)
2 - Detroit (Enclosures - 2)
2 - El Paso (Enclosures - 2)
2 - Honolulu (Enclosures - 2)
2 - Houston (Enclosures - 2)
2 - Indianapolis (Enclosures - 2)
2 - Knoxville (Enclosures - 2)
2 - Los Angeles (Enclosures - 2)
2 - Miami (Enclosures - 2)
2 - Milwaukee (Enclosures - 2)
2 - Minneapolis (Enclosures - 2)
2 - Mobile (Enclosures - 2)
2 - Newark (Enclosures - 2)
2 - New Haven (Enclosures - 2)
2 - New Orleans (Enclosures - 2)
2 - New York (Enclosures - 2)
2 - Norfolk (Enclosures - 2)
2 - Philadelphia (Enclosures - 2)
2 - Phoenix (Enclosures - 2)
2 - Pittsburgh (Enclosures - 2)
2 - Portland (Enclosures - 2)
2 - Richmond (Enclosures - 2)
2 - San Antonio (Enclosures - 2)
2 - San Diego (Enclosures - 2)
2 - San Francisco (Enclosures - 2)
2 - San Juan (Enclosures - 2)
2 - Savannah (Enclosures - 2)
2 - Seattle (Enclosures - 2)
2 - Washington Field (Enclosures - 2)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/23/03 BY SP4 BSP/RNP

REVISED PAGE ONE. NO ADDITIONAL YELLOW MADE. LW

5-RW

Letter to Albany
Re: Smuggling of Atomic Bombs or Parts Thereof
and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction Into
the United States - Classification of Correspondence
Bufile: 117-268

[redacted]

b2
b7E

The Atomic Energy Commission is responsible for development and improvement of these and other detection devices for radioactive material. Some of this work is being done at Oak Ridge, Tennessee.

Enclosed are two copies of a "Classification Guide for Detection Device Program" dated November 20, 1957, approved by the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security, which has been furnished to Customs, Coast Guard, Immigration and Naturalization Service and Atomic Energy Commission. You should observe classification suggestions set forth therein in any reports or memoranda prepared for dissemination to other agencies containing matters relating to the detection device program. In the event you receive information regarding shipments in bond which are radioactive or regarding travellers carrying radioactive materials destined to points within field divisions not receiving copies of this letter, you should inform the office concerned regarding the proper classification to be used in event of dissemination.

NOTE: Predicated on Classification Guide for Detection Device Program disseminated by IIC-ICIS 11/22/57 to AG for INS, Secretary of Treasury for Customs and Coast Guard, and Strauss, AEC. Letter is being sent to all offices covering ports of entry plus Knoxville, which covers Oak Ridge. Bufile 117-268 will be reviewed for possible downgrading of outgoing communications relating to detection devices. Cover memo Branigan to Belmont 12/11/57 same subject, LW:bbr.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: 12/11/57

FROM : W. A. Branigan

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
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Mohr
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Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES - CLASSIFICATION OF CORRESPONDENCE

IIC and ICIS on 11/22/57 transmitted to Attorney General for INS, Secretary of Treasury for Customs, and Coast Guard, and to AEC a "Classification Guide for Detection Device Program," covering the classification of information relating to that program.

The coverage of our borders and seacoasts by detection devices for radioactive material is being expanded. Information will be received from INS, Customs and Coast Guard by the various offices covering ports of entry. It is necessary that those offices know the approved classifications of such information so that they can properly classify it in the field in preparing reports and memoranda for dissemination.

RECOMMENDATION:

There is attached a copy of a letter to all offices covering ports of entry and also to Knoxville, which covers Oak Ridge, where AEC research on detection devices is conducted, transmitting copies of the classification guide.

Let to Albany + 37 field offices
12/13/57
cm/bbs.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4/28/03 BY SP4BJTA/RNP

117-268-1530

RECORDED - 83

INDEXED - 83

FX-131

3 DEC 19 1957

117-268
Enclosure
1 - Belmont
1 - Branigan
1 - Whitson
LW:bbr
(4)

1 - [illegible]on
1 - Donohoe
1 - Whitson

117-268

Date: December 19, 1957

To: Captain John A. Waters
Director of Security
Atomic Energy Commission
Room 926
1717 H Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC WEAPONS
INTO THE UNITED STATES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/23/03 BY SP4 BTP/PNP

Reference is made to the "Classification Guide for Detection Device Program" dated November 20, 1957.

The memorandum from this Bureau captioned as above dated January 6, 1955, is downgraded from Secret to Confidential. (117-268-665)

1 - Bureau of Customs

1 - Chief, Intelligence Division
Coast Guard Headquarters
1300 E Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

BY COURIER SERVICE

117-268-1

RECORDED - 75
EX-135

21 DEC 20 1957

LW:bbr
(8)

NOTE: This letter set out information regarding the response of the device to radioactivity (not to weapon components).

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
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Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

DEC 27 1957

MAIL ROOM

BY COURIER SVC.
56 DEC 19
COMM - FBI

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1 - Donohoe
1 - Whitson

Assistant Attorney General
William F. Tompkins

December 19, 1957

Director, FBI

Same

INTRODUCTION OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL BY
ISRAELI COURIER, IDLEWILD AIRPORT, NEW YORK,
MAY 10, 1955

Reference is made to the "Classification Guide for Detection Device Program" dated November 20, 1957, which was disseminated by the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security to the Attorney General on November 22, 1957.

The memorandum from this Bureau dated May 11, 1955, captioned as above, is downgraded from Secret to Confidential. (117-268-761)

117-268

LW:bbr
(5)

DECLASSIFIED BY SP4BJA/RNP
ON 6/23/03

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NOTE: This furnished information regarding the reaction of the detection device to the unknown contents of an Israeli pouch. This memorandum classified ~~Confidential~~ because it indicates disclosure of radioactive material in the Israeli pouch and the existence of the detection device program is still classified ~~Confidential~~. Being sent to Tompkins because item to be downgraded was addressed to Tompkins. Downgrading is for purpose of bringing classification in line with new classification rules for detection device program.

RECORDED - 75

117-268-15

1 BW

COMM - FBI
DEC 19 1957
MAILED 19

EX 101

18 DEC 20 1957

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MAIL ROOM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1 - Liaison
1 - Donohoe
1 - Whitson

117-266

Date: December 19, 1957

To: Director
Central Intelligence Agency
2430 E Street, N. W.
Washington 25, D. C.

Attention: Deputy Director, Plans

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: INTRODUCTION OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL BY ISRAELI COURIER, IDLEWILD AIRPORT, NEW YORK, MAY 10, 1955

The memorandum from this Bureau dated May 11, 1955, captioned as above, is downgraded from Secret to Confidential. (117-268-763)

LW:bbr
(6)

DECLASSIFIED BY SAB STA/RNP
ON 6/25/03
Per letter dtd 10/29/03 62262uc/mls/sta/mjp
11/6/03

NOTE:
This furnished information regarding the reaction of the detection device to the unknown contents of an Israeli pouch. This memorandum classified ~~Confidential~~ because it indicates disclosure of radioactive material in the Israeli pouch and the existence of the detection device program is still classified ~~Confidential~~.
Downgrading is for purpose of bring classification in line with new classification rules for detection device program.

RECORDED - 75 117-268-1535

BY COURIER SVC.
56 DEC 19
COMM - FBI

EX 105

26 DEC 1957

27 DEC 1957

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MAIL ROOM ☐

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1- Liaison
1- Donohoe
1- Whitson

117-268

Date: December 19, 1957

To: Mr. Roderic L. O'Connor
Administrator
Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs
Department of State
Washington 25, D. C.

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: INTRODUCTION OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL BY ISRAELI COURIER, IDLEWILD AIRPORT, NEW YORK, MAY 10, 1955

The memorandum from this Bureau dated May 11, 1955, to the Administrator, Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, Department of State, captioned as above is downgraded from Secret to Confidential.

(117-268-763)

DECLASSIFIED BY SP4BTA/ENP
ON 6/23/03

LW:bbr
(6)

NOTE: This furnished information regarding the reaction of the detection device to the unknown contents of an Israeli pouch. This memorandum classified ~~Confidential~~ because it indicates disclosure of radioactive material in the Israeli pouch and the existence of the detection device program is still classified ~~Confidential~~. Downgrading is for purpose of bringing classification in line with new classification rules for detection device program.

Tolson
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Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

BY COURIER SVC.
56 DEC 19
COMM-FBI

MAIL ROOM

RECORDED - 75 117-268-
EX 105
13 DEC 20 1957

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1 - Liaison
1 - Donohoe
1 - Whitson

117-268

Date: December 19, 1957

To: Captain John A. Waters
Director of Security
Atomic Energy Commission
Room 926
1717 H Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF
INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

The memorandum from this Bureau dated July 1, 1955, captioned as above, is downgraded from Secret to Confidential. (117-268-802)

Per letterdtd 10/29/03 60267 UC/MLG/BSR/RNP 11/6/03
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4/23/03 BY SP4RJA/ENP

1 - Director
Central Intelligence Agency

EX 108

LW:bbr
(7)

BY COURIER SVC.
RECORDED
57 DEC 27 1957

117-268-

NOTE:
7/1/55 memo set forth reaction of portable detection devices to a cargo of carborundum-like sand bearing either thorium or uranium. Downgrading is for purpose of bringing classification in line with new classification rules for detection device program.

Tolson
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Gandy

57 DEC 27 1957

MAIL ROOM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1 - Liaison
1 - Donohoe
1 - Whitson

117-268

DECLASSIFIED BY SP4BJA/RNP
ON 6/23/03

Date: December 19, 1957

To: Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
Department of the Army
The Pentagon
Washington 25, D. C.

Attention: Chief, Security Division

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: INTRODUCTION OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL BY ISRAELI COURIER, IDLEWILD AIRPORT, NEW YORK, MAY 10, 1955

Reference is made to the "Classification Guide for Detection Device Program" dated November 20, 1957.

The memorandum from this Bureau dated May 11, 1955, captioned as above, directed to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army, with copies for Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy, and Director of Special Investigations, The Inspector General, Department of the Air Force, is downgraded from Secret to Confidential. (117-268-763)

BY COURIER SVC
57 DEC 20

1 - Director of Naval Intelligence

1 - Office of Special Investigations
Department of the Air Force

RECORDED - 75

57 DEC 27 1957

LW:bbr
(6)

MAILED 4
DEC 19 1957
COMM-FBI

117-268-1558

Tolson
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MAIL ROOM

NOTE:
This furnished ~~information~~ regarding the reaction of the detection device to the unknown contents of an Israeli pouch. This memorandum classified ~~Confidential~~ because it indicates disclosure of radioactive material in the Israeli pouch and the existence of the detection device program is still classified ~~Confidential~~. Downgrading for purposes of ~~continuing~~ classification in line with new classification rules for detection device program.

~~SECRET~~

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Nease
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. Clayton
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

ICIS-P25/553

DEC 2 0 1957

Honorable J. Edgar Hoover
Chairman
Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference
Washington 25, D. C.

WH ~~HOOVER~~ JSON

Dear Mr. Hoover:

For the information of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, there are enclosed five copies of a letter to the

[redacted] b1 b3

Sincerely yours,

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/23/03 BY SP4BDN/LNP

SIGNED

J. Walter Yeagley
Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee
on Internal Security

Enclosure

ORIGINAL IS IN IIC FILES, ROOM 7651. THIS IS FBI COPY.

RECORDED - 60

EX-135

~~SECRET~~

(3)

1 - Liaison
1 - Donohoe
1 - Whitson

117-268

Date: December 20, 1957

To: Mr. J. Tomlin Bailey
Director
Office of Security
Department of State
515 22nd Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/23/83 BY SP4 RTA/RNP

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF OR OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

The memorandum from this Bureau dated June 24, 1955, to the Director, Office of Security, Department of State, with copy for the Director of Security, Atomic Energy Commission, is downgraded from Secret to Confidential. (117-268-794)

1 - Atomic Energy Commission

BY COURIER SVC.
59 DEC 23
COMM - FBI

Mr. Armando di Girolamo, Chief
1 - Records Administration Branch, Attn: [redacted] b7C
(by r.s. 0-6 same date)

LW:bbr
(8)

RECORDED - 60

117-268-1538

NOTE: 6/24/55 memo reported radioactivity in baggage of Minister of Finance for Thailand. Downgrading is for purpose of bringing classification in line with new classification rules for detection device program.

Tolson
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Gandy

DEC 27 1957

MAIL ROOM

EX-135

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 11/13/57

FROM : SAC, NEW HAVEN (117-29)

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES

Re SAC Letter No. 57-47, Section (K) entitled as above.

By letter dated 10/30/57, the NYO advised that the Ordnance Disposal Detachment of the U. S. Army which covers the State of Connecticut is as follows:

542nd Ordnance Detachment Headquarters
1st U. S. Army
Governors Island, New York
Commanding officer: Major L. F. LICALZI
Telephone: Whitehall 4-7700, extension 7266 and 7268
This O.D.D. is manned twenty four hours a day.

The NYO has been requested to advise New Haven of any future change regarding the above.

2 Bureau
1 New Haven
RCP:md
(3)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/23/83 BY SP4 BTM/ENP

RECORDED-11 117-268-1539

EX-135

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57 DEC 27 1957

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117-268

Date: December 23, 1957

To: Captain John A. Waters
Director of Security
Atomic Energy Commission
Room 926
1717 H Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

Memoranda from this Bureau dated August 9 and August 26, 1955, captioned as above are downgraded from Secret to Confidential. (117-268-849 & 862)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/23/03 BY SP4 BJA/RNP

LW:bbr
(6)

RECORDED - 23

NOTE:

117-268-1544

8/9/55 memo indicated general reaction [redacted] to ten ounces of crude uranium ore. 8/26/55 memo related to general reaction [redacted] to 3½ pounds of natural uranium. Downgrading is for purpose of bringing classification in line with new classification rules for detection device program.

b2
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MAIL ROOM

60 DEC 23

SECRET

1 - Liaison
1 - Donohoe
1 - Whitson

117-268

Date: December 23, 1957

To: Captain John A. Waters
Director of Security
Atomic Energy Commission
Room 926
1717 H Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF OR OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

The memorandum from this Bureau dated August 25, 1955, captioned as above is downgraded from Secret to Confidential. (117-268-861)

Copies

BY COURIER SVC. 6 DEC 23 COMM-FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4/23/13 BY SP4 BJA/RNP

1 - Mr. Armando di Girolamo
Chief, Records Administration Branch

Attention: [redacted] b7C (by r.s. 0-6 same date)

117-268-1541

LW:bbr
(7)

RECORDED - 23

DEC 26 1957

NOTE: This memo related to the reaction of the detection device at the Morgan Annex, U.S. Post Office, NYC, to a "pseudo-medical" apparatus. Downgrading is for purpose of bringing classification in line with new classification rules for detection device program.

Tolson
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MAIL ROOM DEC 30 1957

58

1 - Liaison
1 - Donohoe
1 - Whitson

117-268

Per letter dtd 10/29/03 60267 uc/ncs /BJM/RNP 11/6/03

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/23/03 BY SP4BDA/ENP

Date: December 23, 1957

To: Captain John A. Waters
Director of Security
Atomic Energy Commission
Room 926
1717 H Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

The memorandum from this Bureau captioned as above dated July 1, 1955, with copies to the Central Intelligence Agency, the Bureau of Customs and the Coast Guard, is downgraded from Secret to Confidential.
(117-268-814)

RECORDED - 23

117-268-1542

DEC 23 1957

1 - Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Attention: Deputy Director, Plans

1 - Bureau of Customs

1 - Chief, Intelligence Division
Coast Guard Headquarters
1300 E Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

BY COURIER SERVICE

60 DEC 23

LW:bbr
(9)

NOTE: This correspondence related to the general reaction of the detection device in the Customs examination room of the NY Post Office to a small quantity of raw ore. Downgrading is for purpose of bringing classification in line with new classification rules for detection device program.

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
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Parsons
Rosen
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Trotter
Nease
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

MAIL ROOM

58 DEC 30 1957

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268) DATE: 12/19/57

FROM : SAC, SAN DIEGO (66-998)

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES

Re No number SAC letter A dated 1/28/52.

This office has no names to recommend for enclosure on the Bureau of Customs Watch List at this time.

The Bureau will be kept advised of any and all pertinent developments.

2 - Bureau (AM)
1 - San Diego

GHB:rk
(3)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/23/93 BY SP4 RJTA/LCW

RECORDED - 23

27

18 DEC 23 1957

EX-132

1 - Liaison
1 - Donohoe
1 - Whitson

117-268

Date: December 26, 1957

To: Captain John A. Waters
Director of Security
Atomic Energy Commission
Room 926
1717 H Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/23/63 BY SP4 RDA/RNP

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF OR OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

The memorandum from this Bureau dated September 7, 1955, captioned as above is downgraded from Secret to Confidential. (117-268-870)

1 - Bureau of Customs

BY COURIER SVC. 6 4 DEC 26

1 - Mr. Frederick H. Schmidt
Director of Security
Department of Health, Education and Welfare
Fourth Street and Independence Avenue, S. W.
Washington, D. C.

BY COURIER SERVICE

RECORDED - 23

1 - Mr. Armando di Girolamo, Chief
Records Administration Branch

117-268-15944

(by r.s. 0-6 same date)

Attention: [redacted] b7C

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mohr
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Rosen
Tamm
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LW:bbr
(9)

MAIL ROOM

NOTE: The memo of 9/7/55 related to the reaction of the detection device to a foam rubber mat containing radium. Downgrading is for purpose of bringing classification in line with new classification rules for detection device program.

Rec'd from ICIS
12-12-57 Ltr

SECRET

ICIS-P25/547

December 3, 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Franklin L. Welch, Chairman
Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures

FROM: John F. Doherty, Chairman
ICIS Standing Committee

SUBJECT: Use of Passive Detection Devices During Arrival of Soviet Planes

OSMAB

The ICIS Standing Committee has noted a report dated September 16, 1957, from the Advisory Group to your Committee regarding the arrival of a Soviet Jet TU-104 passenger plane at McGuire Air Force Base on September 14, 1957. We have also considered the draft letter dated October 8, 1957, to the Department of State, which your Committee approved, pursuant to the recommendation contained in the last paragraph of the Advisory Group report.

In its consideration of the desirability of sending the letter proposed by your Committee to the Department of State, the ICIS Standing Committee noted that the situation in connection with the plane arrival of September 14, 1957, was exceptional in nature as the Soviet Ambassador to the United Nations and the members of his immediate staff were aboard. Furthermore, it would seem that policy considerations may have been involved as the special arrangements which the Advisory Group described apparently were considered necessary to insure the personal safety of these high-ranking Soviet officials. Secondly, it appears that the principal subject discussed in the proposed letter to State essentially represents an operational problem, which would seem to require little more than improved coordination of the operating personnel of the agencies involved in handling Soviet plane arrivals.

In view of the reasons noted above, the Standing Committee suggests that, instead of sending the proposed joint IIC-ICIS letter to State, it might be preferable for your Committee to request the Advisory Group to transmit its observations directly, and in an informal manner, to appropriate operating personnel in Air Force and Customs so that these agencies will be aware of the coordination needed to achieve improved handling of future arrivals. We would appreciate your views on the above suggestion as soon as possible.

cc: Mr. Welch
Mr. Kelly
Mr. Whitson
Capt. Stewart
Col. Graham

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/23/03 BY SP4 DTA/RNP

INDEXED-46

EX-108

117-268-
NOT RECORDED
21 DEC 27 1957

SECRET

FBI
58 DEC 31 1957

5-RW

Recd 2-3-58 from ICIS LW

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

January 29, 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: John F. Doherty, Chairman
ICIS Standing Committee

FROM: Franklin L. Welch, Chairman SIGNED
Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures

SUBJECT: Use of Passive Detection Devices During Arrival of Soviet Planes (Re ICIS Problem 25)

Reference is made to your memorandum dated December 3, 1957, commenting on the draft letter dated October 8, 1957, to the Department of State which had been approved by this Committee. You suggested that, instead of sending the proposed Joint IIC-ICIS letter to State, the Advisory Group be requested to transmit its observations, which had been the basis of the proposed letter, directly and informally to appropriate operating personnel in Air Force and Customs.

This Committee has carefully considered your suggestion and we feel obliged to observe that, in our opinion, something more than coordination among operating personnel of Air Force and Customs is required. We are convinced that coordination at a policy level is involved, and we feel that this could perhaps most conveniently be achieved by the State, Treasury and Defense members of the ICIS Standing Committee agreeing to arrange appropriate notification through Departmental channels to State, Customs and Air Force operating personnel as to the necessity for procedures in conformity with the detection device program on occasions of Soviet plane arrivals such as those of September 4 and September 14, 1957.

cc: Mr. McTiernan
Mr. Gafford
Mr. Dorsz
Mr. Bailey
Col. Graham

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/23/03 BY SP4 BTP/LMP

(Received 1545)

5 - Bard

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

117-268

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: December 23, 1957

FROM : MR. R. R. ROACH

SUBJECT: SOVIET U. N. DELEGATION
ESPIONAGE - R

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Mohr
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Trotter
Nease
Tele. Room
Holloman
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On December 19, Mr. John Kelly, Division of Military Application, Atomic Energy Commission, advised Liaison Agent Bates that he had a copy of a letter from U. S. Customs in New York to Commissioner of Customs in Washington dated December 3, 1957. This letter pointed out that on September 17, 1957, Customs was checking the baggage from the Queen Mary. A man was observed escorting the USSR U.N. delegation. He was believed to be an employee of Amtorg Trading Corporation. This man acts as an interpreter and expediter for the USSR U. N. people. He observed Customs using the [redacted] He informed Customs Inspector [redacted] he did not want Soviet baggage subjected to the small X-ray device since U. S. diplomatic baggage was not subject to X-ray when entering the Soviet Union. [redacted] told him there was no intention of X-raying the baggage. There was no reaction [redacted]

b2
b7E

On November 20, 1957, the baggage from the Liberte was being checked and the same man was observed escorting three USSR U. N. people. This man advised Customs that all of the baggage was diplomatic. There was again no reaction [redacted] The letter pointed out that it was possible that the Soviets were not aware [redacted]

b2
b7E

ACTION:

For your information.

NOT RECORDED
76 JAN 2 1958

1 DEC 31 1957

CWB:mje;jlk
(6)
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Branigan
1 - Mr. Whitson
1 - Liaison Section
1 - Mr. Bates

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/23/03 BY SP4 GAN/RNP

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

05mi-B

ICIS-P25/548

December 26, 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Franklin L. Welch, Chairman
Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures

FROM: Leonard P. Bienvenu
Executive Secretary, ICIS

SUBJECT: Survey of Unaccompanied Soviet Bloc Shipments

Reference is made to the memorandum dated May 6, 1957 (ICIS-P25/465), from the Chairman, ICIS, concerning the above subject. Enclosed for information and any comment you deem desirable is copy of a letter dated November 25, 1957, from the Commissioner of Customs, with attached survey of shipments for the month of August, 1957.

There is also enclosed a copy of a letter dated December 10, 1957, from the Commissioner of Customs, with attached survey of shipments for the month of September 1957.

Enclosure

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/23/13 BY SP4BSTA/RNP

cc: Col. Graham
Mr. Kelly
Mr. Whitson
Captain Stewart

117-268
NOT RECORDED
20 JAN 9 1958

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

6 ENCLOSURE

5-Rel

55 JAN 9 1958

117-268

Tic: 1 - Belmont
1 - Branigan
1 - C. W. Bates
1 - Day
1 - Whitson

N[illegible], New York

December 30, 1957

Director, FBI (117-268)

SUAB

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/23/97 BY SP4BSTA/RNP

ReBulet to Albany 12-13-57, copies of which were furnished New York.

AEC has received information from Commissioner of Customs that on 9-17-57 while Customs representatives in New York were checking the baggage of passengers from the Queen Mary the [redacted] detection device was used on selected items of baggage. A man believed by Customs to be an employee of Amtorg Trading Corporation was observed escorting the USSR United Nations representatives. This man observed Customs inspectors [redacted] and informed one of the Customs inspectors that he did not want Soviet baggage subjected to the "X-ray device" since United States diplomatic baggage was not subjected to "X-ray" when entering the USSR. The Customs inspectors told this man there was no intention of X-raying Soviet diplomatic baggage. b2 b7E

On 11-20-57 three USSR United Nations personnel arrived on the Liberte. The same man was observed by Customs escorting these persons. The man advised the Customs representatives that all baggage of the three United Nations representatives was diplomatic.

Customs has indicated that it is possible that the Soviets are not aware of the nature and use of [redacted] device since the afore-mentioned comments by the escort were directed at the use of [redacted] b2 b7E

The NYO should identify the individual referred to by Customs and should arrange to be notified promptly of any comments made by Soviet-bloc representatives regarding the device used in this program at Idlewild International Airport and in the port area.

LW:mcc
(8)

RECORDED - 94

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DEC 30 1957
COMM-FBI

DEC 31 1957

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Holloman
Gandy

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DO-6

OFFICE OF DIRECTOR
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Nease
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. Jones
Mr. Clayton
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/23/83 BY SP4 BAW/RMP

EXP. PROC.
DEC 20 1957

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ICIS-P25/559

January 3, 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Franklin L. Welch, Chairman
Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures

FROM: LB Leonard P. Bienvenu
Executive Secretary, ICIS

SUBJECT: Survey of Unaccompanied Soviet Bloc Shipments

Reference is made to the memorandum dated May 6, 1957 (ICIS-P25/465), from the Chairman, ICIS, concerning the above subject. Enclosed for information and any comment you deem desirable is copy of a letter dated December 18, 1957, from the Acting Commissioner of Customs, with attached survey of shipments for the month of October, 1957.

Enclosure

cc: Col. Graham
Mr. Kelly
Mr. Whitson
Captain Stewart

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/23/03 BY SP4BTA/ENP

NOT RECORDED
20 JAN 9 1958

2 ENCLOSURE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

55 JAN 9 1958

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: December 19, 1957

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/23/03 BY SP4 COP/ERW

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTO THE UNITED STATES

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The Director's memorandum of December 17 concerning the Attorney General's Staff meeting on that date reflects that Commissioner Swing of INS questioned the public relations aspect of the detection device program and that the Attorney General thought the matter should be reviewed by the National Security Council. Mr. Swing said that he had secured the detection devices and had been asked to use them by ICIS.

This request was actually made by letter of April 25, 1956, to the Attorney General from the IIC and ICIS Chairmen. Joint letters of that date also were sent to Treasury and Atomic Energy Commission asking them to implement a limited national program for the use of devices which will detect radioactive materials. The program was submitted to IIC and ICIS on March 10, 1955, by the Advisory Group to the Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures. This Advisory Group, which included representatives from Immigration, Customs, Coast Guard, and AEC, agreed and recommended that a limited number of the devices be used in specified areas to protect against the clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons. The program called for use by border patrol officers of Immigration of 31 portable devices, to be divided among five INS regions. The devices were to be used in the examination of aliens and no where in the program is it stated all automobiles are to be stopped and examined, as indicated by Mr. Swing. At the time ICIS asked us to join in the letters implementing the program, we were told by ICIS that the Attorney General (then Mr. Brownell) had reviewed and approved the program as it affected INS. In addition, Bureau memorandum of November 17, 1955, informed the Attorney General and Mr. Rogers of the status of the program for use of the devices, and it was pointed out that INS was to procure 31 [redacted] devices for use by the border patrol in the examination of aliens.

b2
b7E

GAD:hke (6)
1-Mr. Boardman
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Mr. Day
1-Liaison Section

RECORDED - 94

SENT DIRECTOR 12/20/57

58 JAN 14 1958

12/31/57 GAD:mje

117-268-15

20 JAN 7 1958

LIAISON

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

Memorandum from Mr. Belmont to Mr. Boardman
RE: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTO THE UNITED STATES

It would appear that Commissioner Swing has not been fully informed by his representative on the Advisory Group, Allan W. Corthell, or he would know that detection devices have been used in New York City and San Antonio for the past several years without a public relations crisis having arisen. In fact, there has already been newspaper coverage of the devices.

The proposal of the Advisory Group looked toward use of the devices by border patrol officers acting in the capacity of Customs officers (a responsibility formally delegated to them by Customs). Customs acts as the agent of AEC in enforcing AEC rules concerning import and export of the materials in which we are interested.

It appears that a general misunderstanding exists which should be straightened out within the Department by the ICIS Chairman. There is no point in taking up the time of the National Security Council with operational details concerning use of our detection devices.

ACTION:

If you approve, Liaison Agent Day, the IIC Secretary, will discuss this matter with ICIS Chairman Yeagley pointing out that Commissioner Swing and Attorney General Rogers should be briefed by Mr. Yeagley or someone from ICIS concerning the detection device program and the participation in it of INS.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. L. V. Boardman

DATE: December 31, 1957

FROM : A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTO THE UNITED STATES

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 12-23-75 BY SP4 Kelley

As approved in my memorandum of December 19, attached, Liaison Agent Day discussed with ICIS Chairman Yeagley on December 30, the comments made by INS Commissioner Swing during the Attorney General's staff meeting. Yeagley, who had been on leave, said that former Attorney General Brownell, just prior to his departure, reviewed all pending matters in the Department with the result that INS was "needled" concerning their delay in implementing their portion of the Detection Devices Program. Yeagley said that neither he nor anyone in ICIS had brought any pressure to bear on INS and he certainly did not want to see this matter referred to the National Security Council. He agreed that this program should depend on the complete agreement of the agencies involved and the operational details should not become issues to be decided by the National Security Council. He said he would discuss this matter with immigration officials.

Later on December 30, Mr. Yeagley telephoned and said he had just completed a conference with INS Assistant Commissioner Howard and Mr. Corthell and had learned from them that INS had secured the portable detection devices recommended for its use in the limited national program developed by the advisory group to the Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures and had planned to have the devices used by INS inspectors acting in their Customs capacity. INS has learned, however, that the Bureau of Customs is not putting its portion of the program into effect and INS feels that if Customs itself is not going to use its share of the devices, INS, acting for Customs, will not do it either. Further, the Mexican government has severely criticized the INS handling of "wetbacks" along the Texas-Mexican border and INS fears additional criticism if it starts a new inspection procedure.

Mr. Yeagley said that he would report this matter to ICIS and would recommend that no further action be taken at this time. He said he would see that the Attorney General did not raise the issue with the National Security Council but he could not answer for Pat Coyne.

117-267-4538

Enclosure
GAD:mje (6)
1 - Mr. Boardman
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Whitson
1 - Section Tickler
1 - Mr. Day

EX-116

RECORDED - 94

58 JAN 14 1958

20 JAN 6 1958

LIAISON

Memo Belmont to Boardman
Re: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTO THE UNITED STATES

ACTION:

The IIC position in this matter is sound. We have joined in making recommendations looking toward improvement of internal security. If the responsible agencies fail to follow our recommendations, we cannot force them to and we will take no further action in this matter.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: January 8, 1958

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTO THE UNITED STATES (DETECTION DEVICE PROGRAM)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/23/83 BY SP4AR/DM

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The attached memorandum from Robert Cutler to Admiral Strauss dated January 3, 1958, reflects Cutler's understanding that the AEC will continue to examine radioactive materials detected by devices utilized in this program. In addition, Cutler points out to Strauss that it is his understanding that no further action will be necessary in connection with Strauss's letter of November 18, 1957, which requested that this matter be presented to the National Security Council.

This confirms our understanding of the decision reached at the meeting between Strauss and Cutler on this matter December 24, 1957, which we received through liaison from Admiral Strauss.

ACTION:

There is enclosed for substitution in the Director's copy of the IIC agenda for January 8 a page six which notes this more recent development.

Enclosures

JJD:hke
(6)

1-Mr. Holloman
1-Mr. Boardman
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Day
1-Liaison Section

RECORDED - 75

117-268-1551

EX-131

20 JAN 10 1958

2 ENCLOSURES
EX-131
58 JAN 15 1958

LIAISON

DO-6

OFFICE OF DIRECTOR
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Mr. Tolson ✓
Mr. Boardman ✓
Mr. Belmont ✓
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Nease
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. Jones
Mr. Clayton
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/23/03 BY SP4 BAW/LW

EXP PROC
JAN 6 1958

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 1/10/58

FROM : SAC, EL PASO (117-00)

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/23/03 BY SP4 BTA/ENP

Reference SAC Letter # 57-47 (K) dated August 20, 1957, and El Paso letter to the Bureau dated September 24, 1957.

On January 7, 1958, it was ascertained that 1st Lt. RONALD KEAR has been made Commanding Officer of the 133rd Ordnance Detachment, Fort Bliss, Texas. The following information is set forth as to the area of responsibility of his detachment:

DETACHMENT	LOCATION	TELEPHONE	C.O.
133 Ordnance Detachment, Explosive Ordnance Disposal	Building 2091 Room 218, Ft. Bliss, Texas	Ft. Bliss LO 5-4611 Extension 2-8287	First Lt. RONALD KEAR

Area Covered: All of New Mexico and the following counties in Texas, comprising parts of the Dallas, El Paso and San Antonio Divisions:

Andrews	Brewster
Crane	Culberson
Ector	El Paso
Gaines	Rudspeth
Jeff Davis	Loving
Midland	Pecos
Presidio	Reeves
Terrell	Upton
Ward	Winkler

2 - Bureau (REGISTERED MAIL)
1 - San Antonio (REGISTERED MAIL) (117-66)
1 - Dallas (REGISTERED MAIL)
1 - Albuquerque (REGISTERED MAIL)
1 - El Paso

117-268-1552

RECORDED - 96

14 JAN 13 1958

EX - 126

DVE:ief
(6)

55 JAN 16 1958

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268) DATE: 1/15/58

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (117-192)

SUBJECT: SMAB

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/23/03 BY SP4BTK/RNP

ReBulet dated 12/30/57.

Mr. FRANK B. LAUGHLIN, Assistant Collector of Customs, U.S. Custom House, NYC, was informed by SA [redacted] on 1/7/58, of the desirability that the NYO be notified promptly of any comments made by Soviet-block representatives regarding the device used in this program at Idlewild International Airport, and in the New York Port area. Mr. LAUGHLIN stated he would take appropriate steps to see that the NYO is notified promptly of any such comment in the future. b7C

On 1/13/58, THOMAS FLEMING, Assistant Deputy Collector of Customs, and [redacted] Customs Inspector, identified photos of [redacted] as the individual who had made the remark concerning use of the "X-ray device" on 9/17/57, at the Queen Mary and who had made other comment set forth in relet on 11/20/57, at the Liberte. They stated that they were the Customs personnel involved in those incidents. They had received the impression that [redacted] was from Amtorg from some unrecalled source. b7C

[redacted]

WILL BE DISCUSSED AT JOINT IIC-ICIS COMMITTEE ON COUNTERMEASURES 1-23-58 LW

RECORDED - 96
INDEXED - 96
EX-131

3- Bureau (RM)
(2- 117-268)
1- [redacted] (17)
1- New York (117-192)

EWC:sel
(5)

b7C

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Holloman
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117-268

RECORDED - 96

Date: January 22, 1958

To: Mr. E. Tomlin Bailey
Director
Office of Security
Department of State
515 22nd Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

DECLASSIFIED BY SP4BTA/ENP
ON 6/23/03

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF
OR OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO
THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

On January 12, 1958, U. S. Customs, New York, advised that [redacted] Swiss Embassy, Ottawa, Canada, arrived at the port of New York on that date aboard the "Queen Mary" en route to Ottawa. [redacted] was carrying a small canvas bag, weighing three pounds, measuring 24 inches by ten inches. This bag caused a reaction on [redacted] detection device. The bag was not searched because of [redacted] diplomatic status.

b2
b7C
b7E

BY COURIER SVC.
2 JAN 22
COMM - FBI

1 - Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
Department of the Army

Attention: Chief, Security Division

1 - Director of Naval Intelligence

1 - Office of Special Investigations
Department of the Air Force

1 - Mr. J. Patrick Coyne
National Security Council
Executive Office Building
Washington 25, D. C.

BY COURIER SERVICE

LE:bbr
(10)

MAIL ROOM

CONFIDENTIAL

SEE NOTE ON PAGE 2.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mr. E. Tomlin Bailey

1 - Mr. J. Walter Yeagley
Chairman
Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security
Department of Justice Building
Washington, D. C.

NOTE:
Classified ~~Confidential~~ because Classification Guide for Detection Device Program provides that data regarding detection of radioactivity in the personal effects of diplomatic travellers shall be so classified.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FD-36 (Rev. 3-13-56)

F B I

Date: 1/17/58

Transmit the following message via AIRTEL

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM SAC, NEW YORK (117-new)

SUBJECT [redacted]
SMAB - AEA

CHARLES H.

On 1/17/58, Inspector [redacted] US Customs, advised that [redacted] was a passenger aboard the "SS Queen Mary" that arrived port of New York, 1/17/58. [redacted] was traveling on a diplomatic passport issued [redacted] He stated he was [redacted] Swiss Embassy at Ottawa, Canada, and was destined to his post in Ottawa. [redacted] was carrying a small canvas bag weighing three pounds which measured 24 inches long and 10 inches wide. This bag gave a reading of [redacted] This bag was not searched.

b2
b7C
b7E

For information.

POWERS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/23/23 BY SP4C3TA/RNP

3 - Bureau (RM)
1 - New York (117-192)
1 - New York (117-new)

TGS:RCM (#1)
6

Ltr to Bureau dtd 1/20/58
cc: Commd'r of Customs
Patrick V. Gurney
1/22/58
Law file

RECORDED - 96
INDEXED - 96
117-268

117-263-158

21 23
JAN 23 1958

EX-131

Approved: Edward J. Power
Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

1 - [redacted]t
1 - [redacted]an
1 - Day
1 - Whitson

SAC, Albany (117-61)

January 23, 1958

Director, FBI (117-268)

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS
THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

The Bureau has been advised that Highgate Springs, Vermont, is a designated port of entry by automobile for Soviet-bloc diplomatic and official personnel. Fifteen Soviet-bloc nonimmigrants are reported to have entered the United States through Highgate Springs between 6/1/57 and 12/1/57.

You should determine from the appropriate Customs and Immigration authorities the number of these nonimmigrants who were diplomatic and official personnel, broken down as to their respective countries and, furthermore, bring these figures up to date as of 12/31/57.

This matter should be handled promptly.

LE:bbr
(7)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/23/03 BY SP4BSTR/ENP

NOTE: The Advisory Group on the Detection Device Program has submitted a draft status report on that program as of 12/31/57. It will be discussed in the Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures prior to the submission of the report to the parent committees. The Advisory Group for the first time calls attention to the fact that Highgate Springs, Vermont, is a designated port of entry by auto for Soviet-bloc diplomatic and official personnel and as such is considered separately from the port of St. Albans, Vermont, which is now apparently a port of entry by train only. The information being requested of Albany is necessary for the completion of the IIC and FBI records in this matter.

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Sandy

MAIL ROOM

RECORDED-13
EX - 146
6 JAN 24 1958

55 JAN 28 1958

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Allen W. Dulles, Chairman
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington 25, D. C.

Hugh S. Cumming, Jr.
Director of Intelligence and Research
Department of State
1155 New State Dept. Bldg.
Washington 25, D. C.

Maj. Gen. Robert A. Schow
Asst. Chief of Staff, Intelligence
Dept. of the Army
Room 2B464, Pentagon
Washington 25, D. C.

Rear Admiral Lawrence H. Frost
Director of Naval Intelligence
Dept. of the Navy
Room 5C572, Pentagon
Wash. 25, D. C.

Maj. Gen. Millard Lewis
Asst. Chief of Staff Intelligence
U. S. Air Force
Room 4A932, Pentagon
Washington 25, D. C.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/23/93 BY SP4BSTR/RMP

Brigadier General Richard Collins
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Room 2E956, Pentagon
Washington 25, D. C.

Harry Traynor
Room 304
Atomic Energy Commission
Germantown, Maryland

Allen Belmont
Assistant Director, FBI
Room 1742
Department of Justice Bldg.
Washington 25, D. C.

RECORDED
INDEXED
15 JAN 29 1953
1-22-53

117-268-1536

2 [illegible]
58 JAN 31 1958

117-268

5-KW

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. R. R. Roach

DATE: January 23, 1958

FROM : Mr. C. W. Bates

SUBJECT: [redacted]
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
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Holloman
Gandy

On January 20, 1958, Mr. Neil Nadin, Assistant to Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) Commissioner John Graham, advised the writer that [redacted] of his and Commissioner Graham. He said that [redacted] related an incident to him wherein he was interviewed by the FBI some months ago. [redacted] he was not too sure why he had been interviewed.

Nadin was informed that the writer recalled this matter and that all of this information was in the AEC files. He was further advised [redacted] had called the AEC in February, 1957, and had inquired about the statute which gives monetary rewards to individuals furnishing information about the clandestine introduction of atomic weapons into the United States. Nadin was informed that the Bureau interviewed [redacted] determine his interest and as to whether he might have information which would be of interest to the Bureau. [redacted] interviewed by agents of the Washington Field Office on March 1, 1957, at which time he advised the agents that his interest in this legislation was prompted solely by his desire to acquaint himself with the statute so that he could write intelligently about it. [redacted] writer for a publication entitled "World Secret Service Association News."

Nadin was further advised that the results of the interview were furnished to the AEC. He was told that there should be no doubt [redacted] as to why he was interviewed since his call to the AEC was discussed. Nadin was referred to the AEC security file concerning all of this information. (Bureau files 117-268-1236 and 1239; and [redacted]

ACTION:

None. This is for record purposes.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/23/03 BY SP4 BTA/ENP

CWB:bjt
(3)

1 - Liaison Section
1 - Mr. Bates

RECORDED - 75
INDEXED - 75

EX-125

55 FEB 3 1958

117-268-1239

21 JAN 30 1958

5-Copies

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: 2/4/58

FROM : W. A. Branigan

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mason
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

At 2:25 p.m., 2/4/58, Mr. Frank Welch, OSI, Chairman of the Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures, phoned and informed SA Whitson that he had received word through Defense channels that the Department of State had agreed with the USSR that on 2/6/58 or 2/7/58 the USSR could send a Soviet jet T104 from Moscow to the U.S. to bring the new ambassador here. The itinerary would be as follows: Moscow; Copenhagen, Denmark; London, England; Keflavik, Iceland; Gander, Newfoundland (where a Military Air Transport safety crew will board the plane); and Friendship Airport, Baltimore. If weather does not permit a landing at Friendship, McGuire AFB, New Jersey, will be the alternate airport. The Soviet jet will return to Moscow on 2/9/58 or 2/10/58.

Mr. Welch was informing Leonard Bienvenu, Executive Secretary, ICIS, and Mr. Don Gale, the Chairman of the Advisory Group on Detection Devices.

RECOMMENDATION:

For your information. This matter will be followed with Mr. Welch. It should be observed there are no detection devices at Friendship or in the Baltimore area at the present time.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/23/03 BY SP4/BTA/ENP

RECORDED - 19 117-268-1558

18 FEB 5 1958

117-268
1 - Belmont
1 - Branigan
1 - Day
1 - Whitson
LW:bbr
(5)

ESPIONAGE

FEB 14 1958

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268) DATE: January 30, 1958

FROM : SAC, BALTIMORE (117-46)

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES

Re Baltimore letter to Director dated 10/11/57.

AT FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND

On 12/12/57 it was ascertained from the 549th Ord. Detachment (EODC), Fort George G. Meade, Maryland, that Captain WILLIAM R. BOWIE, Jr., is the Commanding Officer and that his business and home phone numbers remain the same. The 549th EODC remains at Fort Meade in Building T-3416 and the telephone number is OR 4-3311, Extension 5182, 5183, or emergency extension 4725.

The Commanding Officer of the 149th EODC continues to be 1st Lt. ALEX F. De GIORANNI and the 149th is located in Building T-3426, telephone number OR 4-3311, extension 2498.

AT ABERDEEN PROVING GROUND, MARYLAND

On 1/7/58 Captain ROBERT E. MAGEE, Commanding Officer 25th MPCI, advised that the 544th EOD Detachment has been replaced by the 68th EOD which is located in Building 4719, telephone Aberdeen 1000, Extension 33259. The commanding officer of the 68th EOD is Captain HARRY C. MARTIN. This unit has jurisdiction anywhere in the 2nd Army area; however, it is under the command of the 549th EOD at Fort Meade, Maryland.

The other EOD unit at Aberdeen Proving Ground, according to Captain MAGEE, is the 259th EOD which is located in Building 4717, telephone Aberdeen 1000, Extension 33214. The commanding officer is Captain ORVAL B. STEVER and this unit has jurisdiction only at Aberdeen Proving Ground.

EXP. PROC.

RECORDED-24 117-268-1558

(2) - Bureau (REGISTERED MAIL)
1 - Pittsburg (Info.) (REGISTERED MAIL)
1 - Philadelphia (Info.) (REGISTERED MAIL)
1 - Baltimore

EX-137 JAN 31 1958

REW:cjg
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117-268-1559 (Yellow only)
CHANGED TO
105-63626-180

FEB 14 1958

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/23/03 BY SP4RTX/RNP

Read from IC/S 1-20-58 LW

~~SECRET~~

OSmal

January 14, 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Franklin L. Welch, Chairman
Committee B

FROM: Donald I. Gale, Chairman
Advisory Group

SUBJECT: ~~Semi-annual~~ status report on clandestine introduction problem

The attached status report as of December 31, 1957 was prepared by the Advisory Group to furnish information concerning the use of devices for detecting the clandestine entry of atomic weapons or components into the United States. The report discusses the operational status of the problem with particular emphasis on diplomatic arrivals, presents a summary of the most recent technical developments, and brings to attention a number of considerations of interest to the program.

Discussed in Committee B 1-23-58. Will be referred to IC and IC/S. LW

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/23/93 BY SP4 JOTA/KNP

REC-17 117-261 1561

EX-126 NOT RECORDED 15 FEB 6 1958

2 ENCLOSURES

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117-268

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REPORT

BY

ADVISORY GROUP OF COMMITTEE "B"

For Period Ending December 31, 1957

Concerning the use of detection devices for the detection of clandestine introduction of atomic weapons or components into the United States.

January 14, 1958

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4/23/03 BY SP4 BSR/ENP

117-268-1561

ENCLOSURE

~~SECRET~~

1. INTRODUCTION

The Advisory Group report of January 24, 1957 was the first of a number of semi-annual reports concerning the use of devices for the detection of clandestine importation of fissionable material into the United States through legal ports of entry. It presented the background of the problem and brought to date in rather complete form the status of the problem including operational procedures, equipment development, detection capability, and the general overall effectiveness of the various operations. A number of conclusions were made. The next report, dated June 26, 1957, and the present report are status reports giving the results of field operations and discussions of various topics of interest to the program. This report discusses operations observed by the Advisory Group on inspection trips made during November and December 1957. The Coast Guard member of the group did not take part in this study.

FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/23/03 BY SP4BR/ENP

2. STATUS OF OPERATIONS

2.1 General

The present detection program consists of a continuation of the original experimental program, with some improved operations due to the training course and more assignees responsibility for the program. Some preliminary additional operations are being instituted by the Coast Guard.

Customs is employing the original five (5) [redacted] detectors in New York and San Antonio for the survey of persons and handcarried baggage and about fifteen (15) [redacted] for a variety of applications including the survey of passengers, baggage, mail, and cargo. Due to a cut in Treasury appro-

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priations Customs did not have funds for the purchase of the 15 [redacted] and 75 [redacted] originally budgeted for FY'58. The Coast Guard has recently delivered to the field 125 of the newest [redacted] for use in the survey of category vessels and for other port security work. INS has 31 of these [redacted] but has not as yet distributed them for field use.

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2.2 Diplomatic Channels

Not since April 27, 1956 has there been an instance in which a radioactive source has been detected on a Soviet bloc diplomat. However, several incidents involving Soviet bloc personnel have occurred within the past several months which are believed of sufficient interest to be included in the report. These and the use of [redacted] during three arrivals of Soviet bloc diplomats at Laredo, Texas, are discussed in Appendix A.

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2.2.1 New York Idlewild Airport

The Advisory Group delayed its observation of New York activities until after the air operation had been transferred to the new terminal building, described in the last status report. The same two [redacted] that had been used previously at the airport were moved to the new terminal [redacted] One of the equipments was made inoperative during the moving procedure and was being repaired at the time. The majority of the incoming arrivals were, however, [redacted] such that most passengers and baggage passed by the operable detector. [redacted] Normally,

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one of a few port patrol officers permanently assigned to this duty, is stationed at each desk. While the observations showed that on many occasions neither passengers nor baggage were stopped appropriately in front of the detector, the on the spot discussions together with subsequent instruction by Mr. Fleming, assigned by Customs to have responsibility for the program in New York, should help the situation.

During the period June 1, 1957, to November 30, 1957, a total of ten (10) Soviet bloc diplomats and 81 Soviet bloc UN representatives entered the United States through this airport.

2.2.2. Pre-cleared Flights from Montreal to La Guardia

During the six (6) months period from March 1, 1957, to September 1, 1957, forty seven (47) Soviet bloc non-immigrants were pre-cleared in Montreal for entry in New York by plane at La Guardia airport. Detection devices are not used in these cases.

2.2.3. New York Passenger Piers

Until recently the operation on the piers has been carried out jointly by Coast Guard and Customs. However, Customs has now taken over the major portion of this work of surveying passengers, baggage, and effects. Two Coastguardsmen remained to assist and train Customs personnel in the [redacted] until about January 1, 1958.

The pier operations are judged to be about the same as in the past. The operation actually observed was the use [redacted] during the survey of cart loads of passengers, baggage, and effects as they left the pier following the arrival of the S.S. Santa Paula with about 100 passengers. Two Coastguardsmen and two Customs port patrol officers were involved in the search. Actual search techniques were quite good and a number of radioactive articles were found. In this type of oper-

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ation the devices are not actually used to scan the person of the passenger.

[redacted] b2 b7E

the present the plan of using several detectors in this type of operation will be continued.

A total of 32 Soviet bloc diplomats and 11 Soviet bloc UN representatives entered the United States through New York by ship during the period June 1, 1957, to November 30, 1957.

2.2.4 San Antonio Airport

The last report discussed a change in procedures which had been instituted by Customs in an effort to speed up the Customs examinations. This led to a reduced effectiveness of the search by the [redacted] of persons and handcarried effects. Temporary arrangements made at that time whereby [redacted] b2 b7E

[redacted] have not been very satisfactory. This problem was foreseen at the time. However, no other possibility is apparent under existing arrangements and it was left that Mr. Seawell, the Customs officer in the Laredo Customs Collection District with assigned responsibility for the detection program, would continue to seek the cooperation of airlines personnel in this matter.

There have been no Soviet bloc diplomats or diplomatic shipments entering through San Antonio since inauguration of the non-stop Air France flight from Mexico City to New York in late summer 1954. No Soviet bloc non-immigrants have entered during the past six months.

2.2.5 Laredo Train

Search techniques used on passengers' baggage aboard the train were about the same as previously reported. In general, the

operation was judged to be fair. Operational procedures were improved in that baggage which caused a signal on the instrument was immediately opened and examined rather than noting the baggage with a chalk mark for later examination, as had been done in the past. However, the Group was somewhat disappointed that the survey techniques with the detector had not been improved appreciably since the time of the training course. In as much as the inspector with the instrument was observed to be hurrying in order to survey all baggage in the short time available it was pointed out in later discussion that a thorough survey of each piece examined was desired even though all baggage could not be covered. Subsequently it was determined that an instrument could be transferred to Laredo from San Antonio to provide a thorough survey of a larger number of pieces of baggage. Several additional points regarding the search were discussed with Mr. Seawell and it is believed that the search techniques will be improved.

Three Soviet bloc diplomats and UN representatives entered the United States through Laredo by rail during the six months prior to November 20, 1957. Use of the detector in the case of the arrivals of each of the Soviet bloc diplomats is discussed briefly in Appendix A. In addition 53 Soviet bloc nationals entered in the six months period, some by rail and some by automobile. The baggage and effects of these persons are manually examined.

2.2.6 St. Albans Train

On June 26, 1957, representatives from Treasury and State discussed with Canadian officials the use of [redacted] b2 b7E Canada for the survey of passengers and baggage on trains en route to St. Albans from Montreal. There has been no answer as yet from the Canadian government. Recent inquiry by the U. S. State Department indicates

that the Canadian government is considering the matter. Twenty-two Soviet bloc non-immigrants entered the U.S. through St. Albans during the past six months.

2.2.7 Massena-Syracuse

In 1954 when the experimental detection program was being set up it was understood that Syracuse, New York, was a designated port of arrival by air for Soviet bloc nationals. However, as it was further understood that this port was soon to be removed from the list of designated ports no effort was made to study the airport for possible installation of detection devices. Some time later it came to the attention of the Advisory Group that Massena, and not Syracuse, was the designated port and that it was still open for arrivals of these people.

The Advisory Group has recently looked into the situation at Massena. Massena is presently served by one flight daily from Canada. This flight originates at Montreal and is pre-examined before departure. Use of devices must therefore be accomplished in Montreal if these flights are to be covered. There have been no Soviet bloc nationals clearing Customs for entry at Massena within the past six months. However, it was learned from INS that four (4) Soviet bloc non-immigrants entered at Syracuse during this same period.

2.2.8 Highgate Springs, Vermont

It recently came to the attention of the Advisory Group that Highgate Springs, Vermont was a designated port of entry by automobile for Soviet bloc non-immigrants. Fifteen (15) of these people entered through the port within the interval June 1, 1957 to December 1, 1957. Designation of this port was made on January 23, 1956. (ICIS was notified)

2.3 Other Channels

2.3.1 New York Post Office and Appraisers Store

The procedure for handling parcel post at the post office is described in the January 1957 report and has not changed materially. A demonstration of the search techniques on the canvas containers of packages showed the techniques to be reasonably good. On the average a total of some 200 containers each loaded with a large number of packages are surveyed daily. While the capability of the detector for a package at the center of the container is not particularly good, packages are small and their placement in the containers is purely random so that a good examination is made on a spot check basis. In general, one man for each tour of duty is assigned use of the equipment.

A definite improvement was observed in the search technique at the Appraisers Store. This is believed due to the instructions by Mr. Fleming and by the cooperation and direction of the assistant appraiser. Two men are assigned responsibility for use of [redacted] b2 b7E each employing the instrument for eight hours on alternate days. By this new procedure considerable more time is spent in the actual survey and the men have been trained to employ satisfactory techniques. In general at least half of the shipments brought daily for appraisal are viewed by the device, concentrating on the types of items considered most suitable for concealing atomic weapons or components.

2.3.2. Washington, D.C. Post Office, Appraisers Store, and Airport

All foreign parcel post processed at the post office for Russian and other Soviet bloc diplomats is manually searched and also inspected [redacted] b2 b7E In addition some 5% of all other incoming foreign mail is surveyed by the device. A demonstration of the use of the equipment showed the techniques to be good.

Numerous shipments including diplomatic shipments

under seal enter through the Georgetown customs house. All shipments arriving at the customs house are inspected [redacted] In addition a considerable quantity of merchandise is shipped directly to consignees' warehouses. [redacted] employed in these cases on a limited spot check basis. Samples of these shipments are opened for appraisal purposes at the Appraisers' Store or on location. b2 b7E

[redacted] used on all incoming inbond shipments at the Washington airport. This includes an appreciable number of shipments consigned to Soviet bloc embassies and their personnel.

Overall use of the portable detectors in Washington, D. C. was judged to be good. The effort by Mr. Paul Kelly, the Customs officer in Washington, D. C. with responsibility for the program, has already led to improved techniques. He will continue to supervise and seek improvement of the various operations.

2.3.3 New York Pier Cargo

The severe limitations of the technical effectiveness of the employment [redacted] even with proper use on general packaged cargo were discussed in the January 1957 Advisory Group report. This phase of the operation was not observed on the most recent Advisory Group trip. b2 b7E

2.3.4 Vessels

The Coast Guard search of Category Vessels [redacted] was discussed in the last report. During November and December 1957 a total of 125 new [redacted] were distributed to the various Coast Guard districts. Because of the very recent initiation of operations in several ports it was decided to postpone observation of these areas until some future date.

used success a demonstration of this equipment should be possible in about six months. Both cost and weight of this equipment will be less than the earlier model.

3.4 [redacted] b2 b7E

[redacted] has been constructed at Oak Ridge National Laboratory. This can provide information for identification of single radioactive sources. The utility of this equipment for field use has not yet been determined. A model of the equipment is planned for the next demonstration.

3.5 Active Detection Device

On the basis of measurements to date there is reason to believe that an active device may be possible which would be of valuable application to the problem. [redacted] has been demonstrated that fissionable materials can be distinguished from others with the exception

[redacted] b2 b7E

the results of these measurements are satisfactory then the development of a practical detector for field application appears to depend on the availability of an appropriate neutron source.

4. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

4.1 Pre-inspection in Canada and Mexico

For some time Customs has been pre-inspecting air passenger baggage in Montreal for flights destined to a number of United States cities including Massena and New York. Detection devices are not used in these examinations. Because negotiations are still underway with the Canadian government for use of devices in Canada on the train it was conceived that

it might be appropriate to introduce the concept of use of devices during pre-examination into the present negotiations. Furthermore, the Customs member of the Group reported a short time ago that preliminary negotiations were underway to initiate pre-inspection in Mexico City for flights to New York and other United States cities. It was therefore agreed that the use of detection devices in the pre-inspection procedures should be discussed with the proper U.S. officials so that the subject could be introduced into the negotiations as appropriate.

The Advisory Group met on December 3, 1957, with two representatives each from Customs and State to discuss the above problem. It was agreed that the accomplishment of the required survey by the devices would be almost impossible at the port of arrival, but that by suitable procedures a proper search could be made at the time of pre-inspection. The State representatives questioned the advisability of confusing the present negotiations with Canada by introducing the additional problem at this time. As regards Mexico, in addition to the general belief that there might be some objection to alerting the Mexican government to our use of devices the State representatives were of the opinion that negotiations for pre-inspection in Mexico were in such a preliminary and sensitive status that it would be inadvisable to introduce this subject at present. It was decided, therefore, to await developments and postpone any negotiations for the use of devices in pre-inspections in either Canada or Mexico.

4.2 Soviet Plane Arrivals

A Russian jet TU-104 passenger plane arrived at McGuire AFB on September 4, 1957 and another on September 14, 1957, both with Soviet UN officials. [redacted] during these arrivals has been discussed previously in Advisory Group reports of September 11, 1957 and September 16, 1957 to Committee B.

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4.3 Overt Use [redacted] are used overtly in New York, except in the case of accompanied Soviet bloc baggage and effects, both at the piers and at the airport for the isolation of radioactive items first indicated by [redacted] In addition, on some ships [redacted] b2 b7E are used for the examination. In this case the devices are used overtly.

Because of the request of a travel representative for Soviet delegations arriving at New York (see Appendix A.2) that devices not be used in the case of a particular party of Soviet bloc diplomats, Mr. Flynn, the Assistant Surveyor of Customs in New York and a past member of the Advisory Group, raised the question regarding [redacted] b2 b7E these people. Although the detectors are used overtly on the baggage and effects of Soviet bloc diplomats on the train in Laredo the Advisory Group advised Mr. Flynn to avoid any such use in New York until direction to the contrary had been issued through the ICIS-IIC Committees, to whom this matter would be reported by the Advisory Group.

4.4 Source Identification

Subsequent to the AEC training course of July, 1957, Customs officials in New York informed the New York AEC Operations Office that they considered themselves capable of identifying radioactive sources in a great majority of cases. The New York AEC office agreed that Customs could do much of the identification and indicated its willingness to assist Customs in special cases that might arise. The Customs Bureau in Washington and the Atomic Energy Commission have since concurred in this arrangement. On October 6, 1957, the new procedure was put into effect. The new system appears to be functioning satisfactorily and has led to a great reduction in the number of instances which involve AEC notification and consultation. There were ~~some four~~ SIX instances in which Customs has contacted the AEC for assistance in the first ten

weeks of this new procedure.

4.5 San Antonio as a Port of Entry

San Antonio, Texas is a designated port of entry by air for Soviet bloc diplomats and nationals. Since the inauguration in the summer of 1954 of a non-stop Air France flight from Mexico City to New York, and other flights which have been initiated since, there has been essentially no use of this port by the Soviet bloc. Unless there are reasons otherwise the Advisory Group suggests that San Antonio might be removed from the list of designated ports of entry for these persons in order that [redacted] might be employed in some other location to more advantage. b2 b7E

4.6 Customs Maintenance Technician

Customs has selected a port patrol officer with technical training in electronics to maintain the detection devices in New York. ~~This man~~ AEC is providing maintenance training for this technician, is to be trained briefly at NRL, and then with an engineer from NRL and one from the New York AEC Operations Office will service and repair some mal-functioning equipment in New York as further training. The technician will be given maintenance instruction on all types of passive detection equipment now in use as well as certain background information on equipments now being developed.

4.7 Customs [redacted] b2 b7E

Customs is now employing in its various field activities a total of about 15 of the original experimental [redacted] including several originally assigned to the Coast Guard and later turned over to Customs after the new Coast Guard equipments were obtained. Funds for new equipments will not be available at least until July 1, 1958. Many of these early models are now operating considerably less than optimum and are in need of repair. Since the effort and expense involved in the

training for and the repair of these instruments is considerable, and because at best the instruments are inferior to the new models, it was suggested that arrangements be worked out whereby Customs might obtain, on some sort of a reimburseable basis, about ten new equipments from Coast Guard, if this could be done without unduly interferring with the Coast Guard program. The Advisory Group discussed the matter with both Customs and Coast Guard and determined that such arrangements were feasible. The details of the transaction are now being carried out.

4.8 AEC Training Course

The AEC training course held in New York during July 1957 for the training of Customs, Coast Guard, and INS supervisory personnel in various aspects of the detection program was well attended by the participating agencies and was generally quite successful as judged by the comments of the students and instructors. Any future training courses would likely follow the outline of this course but would in all probability emphasize the practical use of devices and identification procedures somewhat more with less formal study of physics principles. The positive results of the course have already been demonstrated by the improvement in operations in a number of cases.

4.9 Demonstration of New Detection Devices

A demonstration of a number of new equipments is planned by the AEC during the first part of 1958. In discussions with the AEC it appears likely that it will be held at the time of the April meeting of the Technical Consultants Panel. Planned for demonstration are the [redacted] for package inspection, stationary and portable models of [redacted] b2 b7E

Committee B and the Advisory Group will be included in those invited to attend the demonstration.

4.10 Classification Guide

At the request of and in discussion with Committee B, the AEC and the Advisory Group prepared a classification guide to serve as a common basis for determining the classification of equipment and operational aspects involved in the clandestine introduction problem. This guide, dated November 20, 1957, is available to all participating agencies.

4.11 Operational Test of Detection Capability of Devices

Some time ago the AEC Technical Consultants Panel suggested that a test be devised [redacted] used in order to evaluate the capability of these devices under actual operating conditions. Committee B subsequently requested the Advisory Group to work out the necessary arrangements whereby such a test could be performed. b2 b7E

During the past few months the Advisory Group in conjunction with the AEC has discussed the problem a number of times with the State Department. Procedures for carrying out the test are now essentially complete. The [redacted] is giving some difficulty and is now under consideration. It is hoped that in the near future final preliminary procedures for carrying out the tests can be submitted to Committee B for discussion and comment.

4.12 Coast Guard Participation on Advisory Group

By a memorandum of 17 October 1957 to Tre[illegible] the Coast Guard requested to be relieved of participation in Advisory Group activities including operational studies in the field and discussions at the Washington level. For this reason the Coast Guard representative of the Group did not participate in the preparation of this report. The disposition of the above Coast Guard request is not known to the Advisory Group.

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APPENDIX

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DATE 6/23/03 BY SP/BJA/RNP

A. CASES INVOLVING SOVIET BLOC PERSONNEL

A.1 Use of Detection Device During Arrivals of Soviet Bloc Diplomats at Laredo, Texas

There have been three arrivals of Soviet bloc diplomats at Laredo during the past six (6) months. These were by rail.

On August 16, 1957, a Military Attache entered with five (5) checked pieces of baggage in the baggage car and five (5) pieces in his roomette. All pieces of checked baggage were surveyed [redacted] and 3 of the 5 pieces in the roomette were surveyed. The remaining two pieces were on a high rack and the inspector considered that an attempt to check them would have resulted in alarming or antagonizing the Attache. b2 b7E

On September 4 a 3rd Secretary arrived, accompanied by his wife. The detector was used on all baggage in the presence of his wife while the diplomat was out of the room with an immigration officer.

A 2nd Secretary entered on October 19 with four (4) suitcases and three (3) handpieces in his roomette with a checked trunk in the baggage car. The trunk which was about 2 feet x 2 feet x 4 feet in size and weighted 222 pounds was surveyed with the detector. The suitcases and handpieces were not surveyed because the inspector was met at the door of the roomette by the Secretary who remained in the doorway and did not give the inspector opportunity to enter.

A.2 Objection to Use of [redacted]

During the processing of passengers and baggage from the S.S. Queen Mary on September 17, 1957, a man who was escorting a USSR United Nations delegation from the pier confronted the users [redacted] and requested that the small "x-ray device" not be used on the Soviet baggage, pointing out that U. S. diplomatic baggage was not subject to x-ray when entering the Soviet Union. Customs believes this man to be b2 b7E

117-268-1561

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employed by the (USSR Delegation to the UN Amtorg Trading Corporation) as an expediter and interpreter for all USSR diplomats and UN delegates at New York.

Apparently this expediter had witnessed the use of the detector on some baggage other than Soviet bloc diplomatic baggage and objected to its employment in his case. The inspector handling the equipment informed the expediter that there was no intention of x-raying the Soviet baggage.

[redacted]

On November 20, 1957, while processing the passengers from the S.S. Liberte, the same expediter escorted three USSR United Nations delegates from the pier. As he approached the Customs barrier [redacted] b2 b7E [redacted] he stated for all to hear that the baggage on the nearby handtruck was diplomatic mail. [redacted]

[redacted]

A.3 Objection to Manual Examination of Baggage

On May 24, 1957, a group of nine (9) Russian nationals entered the United States from Mexico by train at Laredo, Texas, en route to Moscow. During the examination of the first two of these people, a man and a woman in a compartment, there was evidenced considerable reluctance to the opening of their baggage. Suspicion was further aroused when a bribe was offered a number of times to avoid the opening of the baggage. Because of this reaction to the normal customs examination it was decided to transport all of the party and their baggage to the Customs office at the highway bridge where better facilities for examinations were available. Again there was considerable reluctance on the part of the Russian party to leave the train for the Customs office. Eventually, a personal search of the three men in the party and all baggage including five (5) steamer trunks and various other boxes, bundles, and suitcases were made. The examination revealed no contraband of any kind.

~~SECRET~~

A.4 Objection to Manual Examination of Diplomat's Baggage

On December 4, 1957, Deputy Collector Paul Kelly and Customs Examiner Dan Carroll of the Washington Customs Mail Bureau were instructed by the Deputy Collector of Customs in Charge at Washington, D. C. to proceed to the Union Station and there make an examination of the contents of five (5) suitcases and a duffle bag that had been shipped from Canada and had arrived in bond consigned to the First Secretary of the Polish Embassy. After arrival at the station [redacted] b2 b7E [redacted] When the officers started to open and physically examine the contents of the bags the diplomat protested, claiming that he did not have the keys to several of the bags. He finally departed in a huff, stating that he would report the matter to the Department of State. Examination was withheld. Very shortly afterwards the Deputy Collector in Charge called by phone and advised Mr. Kelly that the Department of State had requested that the bags be passed without examination as accompanied baggage and instructed the officers to be guided by the request. On the following day the baggage was released to the same diplomat without examination and the facts of the incident were reported by Mr. Kelly to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Read from ICIS-1820-58 LW

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

January 13, 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Franklin L. Welch, Chairman
Committee B

FROM: Donald I. Gale, Chairman
Advisory Group

SUBJECT: ~~Proposal for transfer of ten (10) Coast~~ Guard [redacted] to Customs

1. Enclosed for your consideration is a draft letter prepared by the Advisory Group for IIC - ICIS signature proposing that the Coast Guard make available to Customs ten (10) of its [redacted] The Coast Guard has requested that ICIS submit a letter.

b2
b7E

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/23/03 BY SP4 DSR/RMP

Discussed in Committee B 1-23-58. Capt Stewart, CG will handle. No letter needed. LW

REC- 17

117-268-1560

NOT RECORDED
FEB 6 1958

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1 ENCLOSURE

55 FEB 10 1958

117-268

5-LW

DRAFT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

January 13, 1958

Honorable Robert B. Anderson
Secretary of the Treasury
Room 3330
15th & Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W.
Washington 25, D. C.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/23/03 BY SP4 BOK/RNP

Dear Mr. Anderson:

1. The Bureau of Customs is now employing in its various field activities five (5) [redacted] detection devices and about fifteen (15) of the original experimental [redacted] Included in this latter number are a few originally assigned to the Coast Guard and later turned over to Customs after the new Coast Guard equipments were obtained.

b2
b7E

2. The effort and expense involved in the training for and the repair of the experimental instruments would be considerable and in any case the instruments are inferior to the new models. Therefore, since Customs has been unable for the time being to designate funds for the purchase of new instruments it would be desirable if in the interest of the overall detection program the Coast Guard could make available to Customs ten (10) [redacted] for immediate use. It is understood that these instruments might be obtained from the Coast Guard maintenance shop and possibly from a few ports. It is believed that the resulting decrease in the Coast Guard program will be more than offset by the benefits derived from Customs use of the instruments.

b2
b7E

117-268-1560 ENCLOSURE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3. It is understood that Customs is willing to authorize repayment in new equipment to the Coast Guard for these instruments, or will return the instruments in the unforeseen event that the need for a program does not exist at the time of reimbursement. The deadline date for either of these contingencies is July 1, 1959.

Very sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover
Chairman
Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference

J. Walter Yeagley
Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee
on Internal Security

AIRTEL

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI 2/5/58

FROM: SAC, WFO (105-NEW)

ARRIVAL OF SOVIET TU-104 AIRCRAFT AT FRIENDSHIP AIRPORT, BALTIMORE, MARYLAND, FEBRUARY 5 OR 6, 1958
IS-R

ReBuairtel 2/4/58, instructing that WFO establish liaison with INS officials covering arrival and departure of aircraft. Friendship Airport covered by Baltimore District of INS.

Supervisor JESSE F. FARR, Baltimore FBI, advised telephonically on 2/5/58, that arrangements perfected with INS whereby info of interest to Bureau will be made available at Friendship Airport immediately after arrival of plane in question.

WFO contemplates having SA on hand to obtain entry data from INS at Friendship Airport. FBI will not participate nor take any action with regard to entry. No fisurs contenplated. Bureau will be kept informed.

3-Bureau
1-Baltimore (info)
1-WFO
CJJ:arg
(5)

AIRTEL

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/24/03 BY SP4 RUSA/RNP

REC-48 111-362-156

FEB 5 1958

55 FEB 11 1958

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: February 4, 1958

FROM : R. R. ROACH

SUBJECT: DEMONSTRATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR CLANDESTINE USE

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
Nease
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

The ICIS Secretary has advised that a demonstration will be given in the ICIS Conference Room (Room 2515, Justice Building) at 2:00 p.m. on February 11 by representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They will demonstrate and discuss recently developed small portable nuclear weapons suitable for clandestine use. These are of interest to IIC both in connection with our annual contribution to the report of the National Security Council Net Evaluation Subcommittee and in connection with our joint responsibility with ICIS for development of countermeasures against the clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons.

The ICIS Secretary indicated that due to space limitations, the IIC representatives should be limited to about fifteen, not counting the Secretary, and that these should possess a "Q" (Atomic Energy) clearance. The ICIS invitation has been extended to the military members of IIC.

ACTION:

It is recommended that Mr. Belmont, as the IIC Working Committee member; Inspector Moore, who represents the Director in connection with the Net Evaluation studies; Supervisor Whitson, of the Espionage Section, who represents FBI on the Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures and handles the Net Evaluation studies on the working level; Supervisor Day of the Liaison Section, the IIC Secretary; and a representative of the Laboratory attend this briefing.

GAD:hke
(7)

1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Parsons
1-Mr. D. E. Moore
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Mr. Day
1-Liaison Section

OK.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/24/03 BY SP2 AK/RNP

REC- 23

117-268-

10 FEB 11 1958

55 FEB 13 1958

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Nease
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. Clayton
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

AIRTEL

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

2/6/58

FROM: SAC, WFO (105-24450)

ARRIVAL OF SOVIET TU-104 AIRCRAFT
AT FRIENDSHIP AIRPORT, BALTIMORE,
MARYLAND, FEBRUARY 5 OR 6, 1958
IS - R

ReBuairtel 2/4/58.

On 2/5/58, [redacted] Office of Eastern European Affairs, U. S. Dept. of State, telephonically advised SA [redacted] that the following persons are scheduled to arrive at Friendship Airport aboard Soviet TU-104 Aircraft on 2/6/58 (in addition to crew members):

1. MIKHAIL ALEKSEEVICH MENSHIKOV, Amb, WDC
2. [redacted] WDC
3. [redacted] Embassy, WDC
4. [redacted] WDC
5. [redacted] Emb, WDC
6. [redacted] and child, WDC
7. [redacted] UN, NYC
8. [redacted] UN, NYC
9. [redacted], UN, NYC
10. [redacted], UN, NYC

b7C

WFO indices contain no info identifiable with above-named persons or those crew members listed in reBuairtel.

3 - Bureau
1 - Baltimore (info)
1 - New York (info)
1 - WFO

NDD:jad
(6)

AIRTEL

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/24/03 BY SP4 COTA/RNP

REC-65 105-24450-1365

76FEB 12 1958

cc Wick

Read from ICIS 4:35 pm 2-13-58 LW

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ICIS-P25/571

February 13, 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Franklin L. Welch, Chairman
Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures

FROM: Leonard P. Bienvenu
Executive Secretary, ICIS

SUBJECT: Survey of Unaccompanied Soviet Bloc Shipments

Reference is made to the memorandum dated May 6, 1957 (ICIS-P25/465), from the Chairman, ICIS, concerning the above subject. Enclosed for information and any comment you deem desirable is copy of a letter dated January 27, 1958, from the Acting Commissioner of Customs, with attached survey of shipments for the month of November 1957.

Enclosure

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 6/24/03 BY SP4 BTW/ENP

cc: Col. Graham
Mr. Kelly
Mr. Whitson
Capt. Stewart

REC- 17

117-268-1566

EX-128

FEB 14 1958

3 ENCLOSURE
55 FEB 19 1958

EX-128

117-268

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5-FW

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268) DATE: 2/18/58

FROM : SAC, ALBANY (117-61)

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

Re Bureau letter to Albany, 1/23/58.

On January 29, 1958, Mr. EARL TITCOMB, Regional Supervisory Immigrant Inspector, INS, Northeast Regional Office, Burlington, Vermont, advised SA [redacted] b7C that the following is a breakdown of the Soviet-bloc nonimmigrants who entered the United States at Highgate Springs, Vermont during the period 6/1/57 - 12/31/57, according to category:

	OFFICIAL PERSONNEL	OTHER ENTRIES
Poland	2	15
USSR	1	0

cc: (2) - Bureau (117-268)
1 - Albany (117-61)
JWS:tmv
(3)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/24/03 BY SP4 BJM/RNP

EXPEDITE

REC-48

117-268-1567

EX-138

14 FEB 19 1958

55 FEB 19 1958

1 - Whitson

SAC, New York

February 14, 1958

Director, FBI

SMAB
(Buffile 117-268)
(NYfile 117-192)
PRODIP
(Buffile 66-17440)
(NYfile 100-90409D)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/24/03 BY SP4BTA/ENP

Re SAC Letter 57-47 (K) dated 8/20/57 and NYlet 9/11/57 re Smuggling of Atomic Bombs or Parts Thereof, and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction Into the United States.

Reurlet 9/27/57 captioned Prodip.

In your liaison with the Explosive Ordnance Disposal units for the First Army area and particularly the 542nd Ordnance Detachment, Governors Island, New York, you must bear in mind two separate situations which would require the assistance of Explosive Ordnance Disposal units.

The first situation would be the discovery of a suspected clandestine nuclear weapon at any point within the jurisdictional area of the First Army. This might occur at any time prior to or subsequent to the development of an emergency war situation.

The second situation would be the initiation of procedures under Prodip where at the direction of the President the Department of State, assisted by the FBI, would enter diplomatic and official premises of a foreign nation, or nations, for the purpose of taking foreign personnel into protective custody. Following such entry into such premises, Agents of the FBI will check them in the interests of public safety and specifically for the purpose of discovering any clandestine nuclear weapons concealed therein. The war plans of the New York Office and specifically the New York Office plan of operations under Prodip states that a team technically skilled in mine and booby trap detection and in the disarming of explosive devices will be provided by local U.S. Army authorities.

LW:bbr
(6)
XXXX

SEE NOTE ON LAST PAGE.

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
Nease
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

55 FEB 19 1958

MAIL ROOM

0-1(2) NY 3-13-58 LW

COMM - FBI MAILED 34

117-268-

RECORDED

FEB 17 1958

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

Letter to New York
Re: SMAB
(Bufile 117-268)
PRODIP
(Bufile 66-17440)

Currently steps are being taken in the Second Army area, through formal recognition of a mission of the Explosive Ordnance Disposal detachments in the Washington, D. C., area to support the FBI in the disarming of booby traps and clandestine nuclear weapons at the outbreak of a war emergency. Bureau liaison has been advised by the office of the Chief of Ordnance, Department of the Army, that Major William Clark, Staff Officer of the Explosive Ordnance Disposal detachment at Governors Island, should be cognizant of any such mission for the First Army area.

Accordingly, the New York Office should immediately, through its liaison with the appropriate officials on Governors Island, make absolutely certain that in the event of a war emergency it will have the necessary services of an Explosive Ordnance Disposal detachment for the purpose of disarming booby traps and clandestine nuclear weapons.

You should make clear to the officers concerned that this is a situation which would not arise elsewhere in the First Army area. Should the First Army desire to put in writing a description of the "support mission" in time of a war emergency, you should explain that the New York Office cannot make any specific commitments in this regard but would appreciate a draft of any written document relating to the "support mission" so that such draft could be forwarded to the Bureau.

With regard to the discovery of a suspected clandestine nuclear weapon within the territory of other field divisions, you should determine whether it would be desirable from the Army's point of view for the field office concerned to make its request for assistance directly to Governors Island after receiving Bureau authorization. Unlike the situation under Prodip, where instruction from the Bureau to commence that program carries with it the authorization to call upon the Explosive Disposal Ordnance units, other reported findings of clandestine nuclear weapons must be specifically reported to the Bureau and authorization obtained by the field office concerned, including the New York Office, prior to calling upon the

Letter to New York
Re: SMAB
(Bufile 117-268)
PRODIP
(Bufile 66-17440)

Explosive Ordnance detachments for assistance in disarming such weapons.

Please handle promptly.

NOTE:
Predicated upon memorandum Branigan to Belmont 2/10/58 re Procedures for Interning Enemy Diplomatic Personnel in the Event of Hostilities.

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Nease
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

AIRTEL

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI 2/7/58

FROM: SAC, WFO (105-24450)

ARRIVAL OF SOVIET TU-104 AIRCRAFT AT FRIENDSHIP AIRPORT, BALTIMORE, MARYLAND FEBRUARY 5 or 6, 1958 IS - R

ReBuairtel 2/4/58 and WFO airtel 2/6/58.

The records of INS, Baltimore, Maryland, disclosed that the following persons arrived in U. S., aboard Soviet Aircraft TU 104A, at Friendship Airport on 2/6/58. These persons are listed as crew members other than those previously set forth in reBuairtel.

1. [redacted] - interpreter
2. [redacted] chief pilot
3. [redacted] navigator
4. [redacted] - navigator
5. [redacted] - engineer
6. [redacted] - engineer
7. [redacted] wireless operator
8. [redacted] - stewardess

b7C

WFO indices reflect that [redacted] were crew members of the TU 104 which arrived at McGuire AFB, N. J., on 9/14/57. All of above-listed persons were crew members of the TU 104 which arrived at McGuire AFB on 9/4/57.

WFO will submit FD 210 on all persons arriving in U.S. on TU 104A on 2/6/58.

3- Bureau
1- Baltimore (Info)
1- New York (INfo)
1- WFO
MDD:lmg
(6)

AIRTEL

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6/24/03 BY SP4 CTAG/NS

NOT RECORDED
76 FEB 1958

64 FEB 14 1958

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

OSMAB

February 19, 1958

Per letter dtd 10/21/03 60267/UC/ULS/BJA/RNP
NSE INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 6/24/03 BY 60267/UC/RNP
11/6/03

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TOLSON
MR. BOARDMAN
MR. BELMONT

On Thursday, February 13, 1958, I attended the meeting of the National Security Council at the White House. In the absence of the President, it was presided over by the Vice President.

The matter for discussion was the "United States Policy on Continental Defense."

In attendance were practically all the members of the Council with their innumerable aides and assistants.

The attached papers were passed out by Mr. James S. Lay, Jr., Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, for the information of the members and to be added to the papers already received for this meeting of the National Security Council.

The principal matter affecting the interests of the Bureau was the issue dealing with whether the Treasury Department should continue to make use of, and if possible, increase the use of the detection devices at the ports of entry. General Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President, outlined the pros and cons that have arisen in regard to this matter, and then Mr. Fred C. Scribner, Jr., the Under Secretary of the Treasury who was representing the Secretary of the Treasury, made a few remarks, but by no means as strong as I thought they would be, in support of the Treasury's position. I was then called upon to express my views and I did so in line with the suggestions made in the brief prepared for me. I pointed out the importance of the continuation of this project and cited a number of the instances wherein it had been useful. The Attorney General and Admiral Lewis Strauss, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, concurred with me as to this. Then a discussion arose as to what would be done if we found radioactive devices in any of the diplomatic shipments.

Mr. Allen Dulles, Director of CIA, and Admiral Strauss both stated that there was nothing that the Government could do other than

Tolson
Boardman
Belmont
Mohr
Nease
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
Lay

Attachment (with original)

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FEB 30 5 28 PM 58
RECEIVED-DIRECTOR
SENT FROM D. C.

to just make a note of the same. The Under Secretary of State, Christian Herter, representing the Secretary of State, spoke up and said he thought something could be done. He said that all that would be necessary would be to alert the State Department at once as to the indication of radioactivity and the State Department would contact the embassy involved and insist that the shipment be opened, whether it be pouch or freight shipment, to determine whether it had therein any radioactive devices which should not be brought into the country. This seemed to be a surprise to most of those present, but no one, of course, questioned the statement of the Under Secretary of State and I assume that henceforth when any such shipments are found, steps will be taken to notify the State Department. It will be interesting to see if action will be taken as indicated by Under Secretary Herter.

The next matter which came up for discussion concerned the Coast Guard screening. General Cutler again presented the pros and cons of this argument and he called upon me to make a statement concerning the same. I then followed in general the remarks suggested in the brief prepared for me and pointed out that even though it was quite difficult, it seemed to me that the matter should not be completely dropped just because there had been some adverse court rulings, but that the Treasury Department and the Department of Justice should certainly make an effort to draft legislation which would put the responsibility up to Congress; that if Congress then passed a law and the Supreme Court later ruled it was unconstitutional, then the responsibility would be on the Supreme Court, but that if Congress would not pass such a law, then the responsibility would be on the Congress. This view was concurred in by the Attorney General and the conference agreed that the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General would confer with the view in mind of drafting a law that would be able to correct the situation which has developed within the Coast Guard.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. Boardman	
Mr. Belmont	
Mr. Nease	
Mr. Parsons	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Tamm	
Mr. Trotter	
Mr. Clayton	
Tele. Room	
Mr. Holloman	
Miss Gandy	

TO : Mr. J. Edgar Hoover
Chairman, IIC

DATE: January 29, 1958

FROM : J. Walter Yeagley
Justice Representative on ICIS

SUBJECT: Use of Detection Devices to Prevent Clandestine Introduction of Weapons or Fissionable Material

Enclosed for the information of the members of the IIC are five copies of a memorandum dated January 14, 1958, on this subject to the Assistant Attorney General, Internal Security Division, from the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization.

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DATE 6/24/03 BY SP4BSA/RNP

4cc attached for IIC, ACSI, ONI, OSI.

memo from Mr. Belmont to Mr. Boardman 2/5/58

EX-109 REC-50 JAN 29 1958

ENCLOSURE

55 FEB 27 1958

FEB 21 1958

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: February 5, 1958

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTO THE UNITED STATES (DETECTION DEVICE PROGRAM)

Gibson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
Nease
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4/24/13 BY SP4 AT/RW

By attached memorandum of January 29, 1958, ICIS Chairman Yeagley has furnished, for IIC information, five copies of a memorandum from INS Commissioner Swing to AAG Tompkins concerning INS participation in the detection device program. General Swing notes that Immigration has secured 31 of the portable devices which will react to radioactive material and that these devices would be used by Immigration Patrol Inspectors operating, in border and Gulf areas, in their capacity of customs inspectors. Immigration states that inasmuch as it would be acting for the Bureau of Customs in using the detection devices, it will not commence using them until Customs secures the additional devices originally recommended for its use by IIC and ICIS. The memorandum reflects that the Attorney General "has approved the delay in initiating this phase of the program" and suggests that IIC and ICIS be advised of this.

General Swing raised this same problem during the Attorney General's Staff meeting on December 17, 1957, as reflected in the Director's memorandum of that date. Further, as reported in memoranda concerning the National Security Council Planning Board consideration of the new continental defense paper, Treasury Under Secretary Scribner has stated flatly that he will not authorize Customs to purchase any more of the present detection devices until they have been improved. (The present devices are sensitive to radioactive materials, including radium dials, some fertilizers and chemicals, and all fissionable material but will not distinguish between the various sources.) Mr. Scribner stated that while the devices had resulted in catching radium-dial wrist watches, nothing whatever could be done if the devices indicated that radioactive material was being introduced by an individual with diplomatic immunity. Mr. Scribner has stated that when the devices are

Enclosure
GAD:hke
(6)
1-Mr. Boardman
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Mr. Day
1-Liaison Section

REC- 50 117-268-1570

EX-136

10 FEB 21 1958

55 FEB 26 1958

LIAISON

improved, he will get more of them, and until such time, he will continue using the devices presently in the possession of Customs.

In order to avoid a "hassle" at the National Security Council over this issue, we have, with the Director's approval, not objected to deletion from the new continental defense paper of language stating that effective use should be made of existing devices. Treasury had insisted on deletion of this, interpreting it as an effort to make Customs purchase additional devices. In view of this, and in view of General Swing's refusal, with the Attorney General's approval, to use the devices until Customs purchases more of them, it is apparent that there will be no increase in the detection device program until such time as improved devices are developed by the Atomic Energy Commission.

Current and continuing National Security Council policy approved by the President states, "All Soviet bloc diplomatic officials, pouches, baggage, effects and other shipments afforded immunity from inspection [redacted] b2 b7E [redacted] There has been no thought of revoking this policy, and this will require Treasury to continue the program presently in effect.

ACTION:

No reply is necessary or expected to Mr. Yeagley's memorandum. Copies have been furnished to the IIC military members. If a question is raised in the Working Committee concerning this, we will take the position that IIC has joined with ICIS in recommending a minimum program for the use of detection devices, but that IIC will not become involved in disputes with the various agencies involved in the program concerning the extent of their participation.

~~SECRET~~

January 29, 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. Walter Yeagley, Chairman
Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security

J. Edgar Hoover, Chairman
Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference

J. Patrick Coyne
NSC Representative on Internal Security

FROM: Franklin L. Welch, Chairman
Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures

SUBJECT: Semi-Annual Status Report on Detection Device Program

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/24/03 BY SP4BTA/ENP

Enclosed is copy of a status report dated January 29, 1958, for period ending December 31, 1957, on the use of devices for detecting the clandestine entry of nuclear weapons or components into the United States.

The report was prepared by the Advisory Group of the Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures (Committee B), and it contains discussion of the operational status of the program with particular emphasis on diplomatic arrivals, and summarizes the most recent technical developments.

Committee B has reviewed the enclosed report and invites attention to the following points:

1. It will be noted in Paragraph 2.2.4, Page 4, that there have been no Soviet bloc diplomats or diplomatic shipments entering through San Antonio since late summer, 1954, and there have been no Soviet bloc non-immigrants in the past six months. It is, therefore, deemed desirable to seek guidance of the parent committees as to whether consideration should be given to moving the equipment from San Antonio to a site where it will receive more use, and whether some recommendation should be made to the Department of State for the removal of San Antonio from the list of ports of entry.

REC-69 [illegible]-211-1511

2. It will be noted, as set forth in the last sentence of Paragraph 2.1, Page 2, that INS has acquired 3 [redacted] but has not yet distributed them for field use. The IIC and ICIS may wish to consider some action to insure the use of these instruments, now that they have been obtained.

b2
b7E

10 FEB 25 1958

CC: Mr. McTiernan
Mr. Gafford
Mr. Dorsz
Mr. Bailey
Mr. Graham

EX-135

When the attachments are removed, this transmittal letter becomes Confidential.

~~SECRET~~

FGF 2 ENCLOSURE 58 MAR 11 1958 EX-135

REPORT

BY

ADVISORY GROUP OF COMMITTEE "B"

For Period Ending December 31, 1957
Concerning the use of detection devices for the detection of clandestine introduction of atomic weapons or components into the United States.

January 29, 1958

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 6/24/03 BY SP4 CTR/RWP

117-268-1571
ENCLOSURE

1. INTRODUCTION

The Advisory Group report of January 24, 1957 was the first of a number of semi-annual reports concerning the use of devices for the detection of clandestine importation of fissionable material into the United States through legal ports of entry. It presented the background of the problem and brought to date in rather complete form the status of the problem including operational procedures, equipment development, detection capability, and the general overall effectiveness of the various operations. A number of conclusions were made. The next report, dated June 26, 1957, and the present report are status reports giving the results of field operations and discussions of various topics of interest to the program. This report discusses operations observed by the Advisory Group on inspection trips made during November and December 1957. The Coast Guard member of the group did not take part in this study.

2. STATUS OF OPERATIONS

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 6/24/00 BY SP4/BTA/PAO

2.1 General

The present detection program consists of a continuation of the original experimental program, with some improved operations due to the training course and more assignees responsibility for the program. Some preliminary additional operations are being instituted by the Coast Guard.

Customs is employing the original five (5) [redacted] detectors in New York and San Antonio for the survey of persons and handcarried baggage and about fifteen (15) [redacted] for a variety of applications including the survey of passengers, baggage, mail and cargo. Due to a cut in Treasury appropriations, Customs did not have funds for the purchase of the 15 [redacted] and 75 [redacted] originally budgeted for FY'58. The Coast Guard has recently delivered to the field 125 of the newest [redacted] for use in the survey of category vessels and for other port security work. INS has 31 of these [redacted] but has not as yet distributed them for field use.

b2
b7E

2.2 Diplomatic Channels

Not since April 27, 1956 has there been an instance in which a radioactive source has been detected on a Soviet bloc diplomat. However, several incidents involving Soviet bloc personnel have occurred within the past several months which are believed of sufficient interest to be included in the report. These and the use of [redacted] during three arrivals of Soviet bloc diplomats at Laredo, Texas, are discussed in Appendix A.

2.2.1 New York Idlewild Airport

b2
b7E

The Advisory Group delayed its observation of New York activities until after the air operation had been transferred to the new terminal building, described in the last status report. The same two [redacted] that had been used previously at the airport were moved to the new terminal [redacted] One of the equipments was made inoperative during the moving procedure and was being repaired

at the time. The majority of the incoming arrivals were, however, [redacted] such that most passengers and baggage passed by the operable detector. b2 b7E

[redacted] Normally, one of a few port patrol officers permanently assigned to this duty, is stationed at each dock. While the observations showed that on many occasions neither passengers nor baggage were stopped appropriately in front of the detector, the on-the-spot discussions together with subsequent instruction by Mr. Fleming, assigned by Customs to have responsibility for the program in New York, should help the situation.

During the period June 1, 1957, to November 30, 1957, a total of ten (10) Soviet bloc diplomats and 81 Soviet bloc UN representatives entered the United States through this airport.

2.2.2. Pre-cleared Flights from Montreal to La Guardia

During the six (6) months period from March 1, 1957, to September 1, 1957, forty seven (47) Soviet bloc non-immigrants were pre-cleared in Montreal for entry in New York by plane at La Guardia airport. Detection devices are not used in these cases.

2.2.3. New York Passenger Piers

Until recently the operation on the piers has been carried out jointly by Coast Guard and Customs. However, Customs has now taken over the major portion of this work of surveying passengers, baggage, and effects. Two Coastguardsmen remained to assist and train Customs personnel in [redacted] until about January 1, 1958.

The pier operations are judged to be about the same as in the past. The operation actually observed was the use [redacted] during the survey of cart loads of passengers, baggage, and effects as they left the pier following the arrival of the S.S. Santa Paula with about 100 passengers. Two Coastguardsmen and two Customs port patrol officers were involved in the search. Actual search techniques were quite good and a number of radioactive articles were found. In this type of operation the devices are not actually used to scan the person of the passenger. b2 b7E

[redacted] the present, the plan of using several detectors in this type of operation will be continued.

A total of 32 Soviet bloc diplomats and 11 Soviet bloc UN representatives entered the United States through New York by ship during the period June 1, 1957, to November 30, 1957.

2.2.4 San Antonio Airport

The last report discussed a change in procedures which had been instituted by Customs in an effort to speed up the Customs examinations. This led to a reduced effectiveness of the search by the [redacted] of persons and handcarried effects. Temporary arrangements made at that time whereby [redacted] b2 b7E

have not been very satisfactory. This problem was foreseen at the time. However, no other possibility is apparent under existing arrangements and it was left that Mr. Seawell, the Customs officer in the Laredo Customs Collection District with assigned responsibility for the detection program, would continue to seek the cooperation of airlines personnel in this matter.

There have been no Soviet bloc diplomats or diplomatic shipments entering through San Antonio since inauguration of the non-stop Air France flight from Mexico City to New York in late summer 1954. No Soviet bloc non-immigrants have entered during the past six months.

2.2.5 Laredo Train

Search techniques used on passengers' baggage aboard the train were about the same as previously reported. In general, the operation was judged to be fair. Operational procedures were improved in that baggage which caused a signal on the instrument was immediately opened and examined rather than noting the baggage with a chalk mark for later examination, as had been done in the past. However, the Group was somewhat disappointed that the survey techniques with the detector had not been improved appreciably since the time of the training course. Inasmuch as the inspector with the instrument was observed to be hurrying in order to survey all baggage in the short time available, it was pointed out in later discussion that a thorough survey of each piece examined was desired even though all baggage could not be covered. Subsequently, it was determined that an instrument could be transferred to Laredo from San Antonio to provide a thorough survey of a larger number of pieces of baggage. Several additional points regarding the search were discussed with Mr. Seawell and it is believed that the search techniques will be improved.

Three Soviet bloc diplomats and UN representatives entered the United States through Laredo by rail during the six months prior to November 20, 1957. Use of the detector in the case of the arrivals of each of the Soviet bloc diplomats is discussed briefly in Appendix A. In addition, 53 Soviet bloc nationals entered in the six months period, some by rail and some by automobile. The baggage and effects of these persons are manually examined.

2.2.6 St. Albans Train

On June 26, 1957, representatives from Treasury and State discussed with Canadian officials the use of [redacted] Canada for the survey of passengers and baggage on trains en route to St. Albans b2 b7E

from Montreal. There has been no answer as yet from the Canadian government. Recent inquiry by the U. S. State Department indicates that the Canadian government is considering the matter. Twenty-two Soviet bloc non-immigrants entered the U. S. through St. Albans during the past six months.

2.2.7 Massena-Syracuse

In 1954, when the experimental detection program was being set up, it was understood that Syracuse, New York, was a designated port of arrival by air for Soviet bloc nationals. However, as it was further understood that this port was soon to be removed from the list of designated ports, no effort was made to study the airport for possible installation of detection devices. Some time later it came to the attention of the Advisory Group that Massena, and not Syracuse, was the designated port and that it was still open for arrivals of these people.

The Advisory Group has recently looked into the situation at Massena. Massena is presently served by one flight daily from Canada. This flight originates at Montreal and is pre-examined before departure. Use of devices must, therefore, be accomplished in Montreal if these flights are to be covered. There have been no Soviet bloc nationals clearing Customs for entry at Massena within the past six months. However, it was learned from INS that four (4) Soviet bloc non-immigrants entered at Syracuse during this same period.

2.2.8 Highgate Springs, Vermont

It recently came to the attention of the Advisory Group that Highgate Springs, Vermont was a designated port of entry by automobile for Soviet bloc non-immigrants. Fifteen (15) of these people entered through the port within the interval June 1, 1957 to December 1, 1957. Designation of this port was made on January 23, 1956.

2.3 Other Channels

2.3.1 New York Post Office and Appraisers Store

The procedure for handling parcel post at the post office is described in the January 1957 report and has not changed materially. A demonstration of the search techniques on the canvas containers of packages showed the techniques to be reasonably good. On the average a total of some 200 containers each loaded with a large number of packages are surveyed daily. While the capability of the detector for a package at the center of the container is not particularly good, packages are small and their placement in the containers is purely random so that a good examination is made on a spot check basis. In general, one man for each tour of duty is assigned use of the equipment.

A definite improvement was observed in the search technique at the Appraisers Store. This is believed due to the instructions by Mr. Fleming and by the cooperation and direction of the assistant appraiser.

Two men are assigned responsibility for use of [redacted] each employing the instrument for eight hours on alternate days. By this new procedure, considerable more time is spent in the actual survey and the men have been trained to employ satisfactory techniques. In general, at least half of the shipments brought daily for appraisal are viewed by the device, concentrating on the types of items considered most suitable for concealing atomic weapons or components.

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2.3.2 Washington, D.C. Post Office, Appraisers Store, and Airport

All foreign parcel post processed at the post office for Russian and other Soviet bloc diplomats is manually searched and also inspected [redacted] In addition, some 5% of all other incoming foreign mail is surveyed by the device. A demonstration of the use of the equipment showed the techniques to be good.

Numerous shipments including diplomatic shipments under seal enter through the Georgetown customs house. All shipments arriving at the customs house are inspected [redacted] In addition, a considerable quantity of merchandise is shipped directly to consignees' warehouses. [redacted] is employed in these cases on a limited spot check basis. Samples of these shipments are opened for appraisal purposes at the Appraisers' Store or on location.

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[redacted] is used on all incoming inbond shipments at the Washington airport. This includes an appreciable number of shipments consigned to Soviet bloc embassies and their personnel.

Over-all use of the portable detectors in Washington, D.C., was judged to be good. The effort by Mr. Paul Kelly, the Customs officer in Washington, D. C. with responsibility for the program, has already led to improved techniques. He will continue to supervise and seek improvement of the various operations.

2.3.3 New York Pier Cargo

The severe limitations of the technical effectiveness of the employment [redacted] even with proper use on general packaged cargo were discussed in the January 1957 Advisory Group report. This phase of the operation was not observed on the most recent Advisory Group trip.

2.3.4 Vessels

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The Coast Guard search of Category Vessels [redacted] was discussed in the last report. During November and December 1957, a total of 125 new [redacted] were distributed to the various Coast Guard districts. Because of the very recent initiation of operations in several ports, it was decided to postpone observation of these areas until some future date.

3. EQUIPMENT DEVELOPMENT

[redacted] b2 b7E

[redacted]

[redacted] b2 b7E

[redacted] With continued success, a demonstration of this equipment should be possible in about six months. Both cost and weight of this equipment will be less than the earlier model.

3.4 [redacted]

[redacted] has been constructed at Oak Ridge National Laboratory. This can provide information for identification of single radioactive sources. The utility of this equipment for field use has not yet been determined. A model of the equipment is planned for the next demonstration.

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3.5 Active Detection Device

On the basis of measurements to date there is reason to believe that an active device may be possible which would be of valuable application to the problem. [redacted] it has been demonstrated that fissionable materials can be distinguished from others with the exception of

[redacted]

[redacted] b2 b7E If the results of these measurements are satisfactory, then the development of a practical detector for field application appears to depend on the availability of an appropriate neutron source.

4. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

4.1 Pre-inspection in Canada and Mexico

For some time, Customs has been pre-inspecting air passenger baggage in Montreal for flights destined to a number of United States cities including Massena and New York. Detection devices are not used in these examinations. Because negotiations are still underway with the Canadian government for use of devices in Canada on the train, it was conceived that it might be appropriate to introduce the concept of use of devices furing pre-examination into the present negotiations. Furthermore, the Customs member of the Group reported a short time ago that preliminary negotiations were underway to initiate pre-inspection in Mexico City for flights to New York and other United States cities. It was, therefore, agreed that the use of detection devices in the pre-inspection procedures should be discussed with the proper U. S. officials so that the subject could be introduced into the negotiations as appropriate.

The Advisory Group met on December 3, 1957, with two representatives each from Customs and State to discuss the above problem. It was agreed that the accomplishment of the required survey by the devices would be almost impossible at the port of arrival, but that by suitable procedures, a proper search could be made at the time of pre-inspection. The State representatives questioned the advisability of confusing the present negotiations with Canada by introducing the additional problem at this time. As regards Mexico, in addition to the general belief that there might be some objection to alerting the Mexican government to our use of devices, the State representatives were of the opinion that negotiations for pre-inspection in Mexico were in such a preliminary and sensitive status that it would be inadvisable to introduce this subject at present. It was decided, therefore, to await developments and postpone any negotiations for the use of devices in pre-inspections in either Canada or Mexico.

4.2 Soviet Plane Arrivals

A Russian jet TU-104 passenger plane arrived at McGuire AFB on September 4, 1957 and another on September 14, 1957, both with Soviet UN officials. [redacted] during these arrivals has been discussed previously in Advisory Group reports of September 11, 1957 and September 16, 1957, to Committee B.

4.3 Overt Use [redacted] b2 b7E

[redacted] are used overtly in New York, except in the case of accompanied Soviet bloc baggage and effects, both at the piers and at the airport for the isolation of radioactive items first indicated by [redacted] In addition, on some ships [redacted] are used for the examination. In this case the devices are used overtly.

Because of the request of a travel representative for Soviet delegations arriving at New York (see Appendix A.2) that devices not be used in the case of a particular party of Soviet bloc diplomats, Mr. Flynn, the Assistant Surveyor of Customs in New York and a past member of the Advisory Group, raised the question regarding [redacted] those people. Although the detectors are used overtly on the baggage and effects of Soviet bloc diplomats on the train in Laredo, the Advisory Group advised Mr. Flynn to avoid any such use in New York until direction to the contrary had been issued through the ICIS-IIC Committees, to whom this matter would be reported by the Advisory Group. b2 b7E

4.4 Source Identification

Subsequent to the AEC training course of July 1957, Customs officials in New York informed the New York AEC Operations Office that they considered themselves capable of identifying radioactive sources in a great majority of cases. The New York AEC office agreed that Customs could do much of the identification and indicated its willingness to assist Customs in special cases that might arise. The Customs Bureau in Washington and the Atomic Energy Commission have since concurred in this arrangement. On October 6, 1957, the new procedure was put into effect. The new system appears to be functioning satisfactorily and has led to a great reduction in the number of instances which involve AEC notification and consultation. There were six instances in which Customs has contacted the AEC for assistance in the first ten weeks of this new procedure.

4.5 San Antonio as a Port of Entry

San Antonio, Texas is a designated port of entry by air for Soviet bloc diplomats and nationals. Since the inauguration in the summer of 1954 of a non-stop Air France flight from Mexico City to New York, and other flights which have been initiated since, there has been essentially no use of this port by the Soviet bloc. Unless there are reasons otherwise, the Advisory Group suggests that San Antonio might be removed from the list of designated ports of entry for these persons in order that [redacted] might be employed in some other location to more advantage. b2 b7E

4.6 Customs Maintenance Technician

Customs has selected a port patrol officer with technical training in electronics to maintain the detection devices in New York. AEC is providing maintenance training for this technician. This man is to be trained briefly at NRL, and then with an engineer from NRL and one from the New York AEC Operations Office, will service and repair some malfunctioning equipment in New York as further training. The technician will be given maintenance instruction on all types of passive detection equipment now in use as well as certain background information on equipments now being developed.

4.7 Customs [redacted] b2 b7E

Customs is now employing in its various field activities a total of about 15 of the original experimental [redacted] including several originally assigned to the Coast Guard and later turned over to Customs after the new Coast Guard equipments were obtained. Funds for new equipments will not be available at least until July 1, 1958. Many of these early models are now operating considerably less than optimum and are in need of repair. Since the effort and expense involved in the training for and the repair of these instruments is considerable, and because at best the instruments are inferior to the new models, it was suggested that arrangements be worked out whereby Customs might obtain, on some sort of a re-imburseable basis, about ten new equipments from Coast Guard, if this could be done without unduly interfering with the Coast Guard program. The Advisory Group discussed the matter with both Customs and Coast Guard and determined that such arrangements were feasible. The details of the transaction are now being carried out.

4.8 AEC Training Course

The AEC training course held in New York during July, 1957, for the training of Customs, Coast Guard, and INS supervisory personnel in various aspects of the detection program was well attended by the participating agencies and was generally quite successful as judged by the comments of the students and instructors. Any future training courses would likely follow the outline of this course, but would in all probability emphasize the practical use of devices and identification procedures somewhat more with less formal study of physics principles. The positive results of the course have already been demonstrated by the improvement in operations in a number of cases.

4.9 Demonstration of New Detection Devices

A demonstration of a number of new equipments is planned by the AEC during the first part of 1958. In discussions with the AEC, it appears likely that it will be held at the time of the April meeting of the Technical Consultants Panel. Planned for demonstration are the [redacted] b2 for package inspection, stationary and portable models of [redacted] b7E Committee B and the Advisory Group will be included in those invited to attend the demonstration.

4.10 Classification Guide

At the request of and in discussion with Committee B, the AEC and the Advisory Group prepared a classification guide to serve as a common basis for determining the classification of equipment and operational aspects involved in the clandestine introduction problem. This guide, dated November 20, 1957, is available to all participating agencies.

4.11 Operational Test of Detection Capability of Devices

Some time ago the AEC Technical Consultants Panel suggested that a test be devised [redacted] Committee B subsequently requested the Advisory Group to work out the necessary arrangements whereby such a test could be performed.

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During the past few months, the Advisory Group in conjunction with the AEC has discussed the problem a number of times with the State Department. Procedures for carrying out the test are now essentially complete. The problem of [redacted] giving some difficulty and is now under consideration. It is hoped that in the near future final preliminary procedures for carrying out the tests can be submitted to Committee B for discussion and comment.

4.12 Coast Guard Participation on Advisory Group

By a memorandum of 17 October 1957 to Treasury, the Coast Guard requested to be relieved of participation in Advisory Group activities, including operational studies in the field and discussions at the Washington level. For this reason, the Coast Guard representative of the Group did not participate in the preparation of this report. The disposition of the above Coast Guard request is not known to the Advisory Group.

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APPENDIX

A. CASES INVOLVING SOVIET BLOC PERSONNEL

A.1 Use of Detection Device During Arrivals of Soviet Bloc Diplomats at Laredo, Texas

There have been three arrivals of Soviet bloc diplomats at Laredo during the past six (6) months. These were by rail.

On August 16, 1957, a Military Attache entered with five (5) checked pieces of baggage in the baggage car and five (5) pieces in his roomette. All pieces of checked baggage were surveyed [redacted] and 3 of the 5 pieces in the roomette were surveyed. The remaining two pieces were on a high rack and the inspector considered that an attempt to check them would have resulted in alarming or antagonizing the Attache. b2 b7E

On September 4, a 3rd Secretary arrived, accompanied by his wife. The detector was used on all baggage in the presence of his wife while the diplomat was out of the room with an immigration officer.

A 2nd Secretary entered on October 19 with four (4) suitcases and three (3) handpieces in his roomette with a checked trunk in the baggage car. The trunk, which was about 2 feet x 2 feet x 4 feet in size and weighed 222 pounds, was surveyed with the detector. The suitcases and handpieces were not surveyed because the inspector was met at the door of the roomette by the Secretary who remained in the doorway and did not give the inspector opportunity to enter.

A.2 Objection to Use of [redacted] b2 b7E

During the processing of passengers and baggage from the S.S. Queen Mary on September 17, 1957, a man who was escorting a USSR United Nations delegation from the pier confronted the users [redacted] and requested that the small "x-ray device" not be used on the Soviet baggage, pointing out that U. S. diplomatic baggage was not subject to X-ray when entering the Soviet Union. Customs believes this man to be [redacted] employed by the USSR delegation to the UN as an expediter and interpreter for all USSR diplomats and UN delegates at New York.

Apparently this expediter had witnessed the use of the detector on some baggage other than Soviet bloc diplomatic baggage and objected to its employment in his case. The inspector handling the equipment informed the expediter that there was no intention of X-raying the Soviet baggage. [redacted]

On November 20, 1957, while processing the passengers from the S.S. Liberte, the same expediter escorted three USSR United Nations delegates from the pier. As he approached the Customs barrier [redacted] he stated for all to hear that the baggage on the nearby hand-truck was diplomatic mail. [redacted] b2 b7E

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 7/3/03 BY SP4 CTA/RNP

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ENCLOSURE

A.3 Objection to Manual Examination of Baggage

On May 24, 1957, a group of nine (9) Russian nationals entered the United States from Mexico by train at Laredo, Texas, en route to Moscow. During the examination of the first two of these people, a man and a woman in a compartment, there was evidenced considerable reluctance to the opening of their baggage. Suspicion was further aroused when a bribe was offered a number of times to avoid the opening of the baggage. Because of this reaction to the normal Customs examination, it was decided to transport all of the party and their baggage to the Customs office at the highway bridge where better facilities for examinations were available. Again there was considerable reluctance on the part of the Russian party to leave the train for the Customs office. Eventually, a personal search of the three men in the party and all baggage including five (5) steamer trunks and various other boxes, bundles, and suitcases was made. The examination revealed no contraband of any kind.

A.4 Objection to Manual Examination of Diplomat's Baggage

On December 4, 1957, Deputy Collector Paul Kelly and Customs Examiner Dan Carroll of the Washington Customs Mail Bureau, were instructed by the Deputy Collector of Customs in Charge at Washington, D. C. to proceed to the Union Station and there make an examination of the contents of five (5) suitcases and a duffle bag that had been shipped from Canada and had arrived in bond consigned to the First Secretary of the Polish Embassy. After arrival at the station, [redacted] b2 b7E When the officers started to open and physically examine the contents of the bags, the diplomat protested, claiming that he did not have the keys to several of the bags. He finally departed in a huff, stating that he would report the matter to the Department of State. Examination was withheld. Very shortly afterwards, the Deputy Collector in Charge called by phone and advised Mr. Kelly that the Department of State had requested that the bags be passed without examination as accompanied baggage, and instructed the officers to be guided by the request. On the following day, the baggage was released to the same diplomat without examination and the facts of the incident were reported by Mr. Kelly to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: 2/13/58

FROM : W. A. Branigan

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Parsons
1 - Mr. Branigan
1 - Mr. Day
1 - Mr. Whitson

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mason
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: JOINT IIC-ICIS COMMITTEE ON COUNTERMEASURES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/24/03 BY SP4 COTA/ENP

SYNOPSIS:

Semiannual status report on detection device program disseminated to FBI, 2/3/58. Customs still attempting to cover all ports of entry for Soviet-bloc diplomats and officials [redacted] Coast Guard now has 125 [redacted] for use in ship searches and arrangements are being made between Customs and Coast Guard for a loan of about ten of these to Customs. Immigration now has 31 [redacted] but has not yet distributed them for field use in support of the detection device program. There are insufficient detection devices at the present time to cover all of the ports of entry through which Soviet-bloc diplomats are permitted to enter the U.S.

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RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. It is respectfully recommended that the FBI position and the IIC position should be that since no Soviet-bloc diplomats or diplomatic shipments have entered the U. S. through the Port of San Antonio since late Summer of 1954, the Department of State should be asked to consider the removal of San Antonio from the approved list of ports of entry and the substitution therefor of a port of entry to be used by Soviet jet transports now being used to bring high-ranking Soviet officials to the U.S. The unused [redacted] at San Antonio could then be set up at the airport designated to receive Soviet jets.

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2. It is respectfully recommended that the FBI position and the position of IIC should be that expensive new model detection devices, so seriously needed to cover ports of entry for Soviet

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diplomats, should be used and not merely held in storage. In this regard, a loan of some of the 31 devices now held by Immigration might be made by INS to Customs, which has been unable to obtain funds to procure such devices.

3. It is suggested that these matters be referred to the Working Committee of the IIC at its next meeting, 2/19/58.

DETAILS:

Re memorandum Branigan to Belmont, 1/28/58 which stated that the Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures, Mr. Franklin L. Welch, OSI, Chairman, was referring the semi-annual status report on the detection device program prepared by the Advisory Group to the IIC and the ICIS for the information of those committees and any action which they deemed appropriate.

On 2/3/58 the ICIS Secretariat transmitted to the chairmen of the IIC and ICIS and to Mr. J. Patrick Coyne, NSC representative on internal security, a memorandum from Mr. Welch transmitting the "Semiannual Status Report on Detection Device Program." The status report covers the period from 6/26/57 through 12/1/57. The text of the report is summarized as follows:

Customs is still using five [redacted] of the [redacted] which were loaned to them by AEC in 1954. One of these is located at the San Antonio International Airport, two are at the International Airport at Idlewild, New York, and two are used on the New York piers. Customs is still using about 15 [redacted] which are distributed as follows:

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New York piers; New York airport; Laredo, Texas; and St. Albans, Vermont.

[redacted] in use at the airports of Massena and Syracuse, New York, which are alternate ports of entry for Soviet-bloc personnel traveling by air. It is not known that [redacted] is in use at Highgate Springs, Vermont, which is a subordinate port of entry for automobiles within the St. Albans Immigration District. [redacted] are used by Customs at the New York Post Office and appraiser stores and the Washington, D. C. Post Office and appraiser stores and National Airport for the inspection of incoming foreign shipments. b2 b7E

The Coast Guard, under its port security program, uses [redacted] ship searches. During November and December, 1957, a total of 125 [redacted] were distributed to the various Coast Guard districts. The Immigration Service has received 31 [redacted] of the newest type but has not yet authorized their use in the field. Due to a cut in Treasury appropriations, Customs did not have funds during 1957 for the purchase of 15 [redacted] and 75 [redacted] for which Customs had originally budgeted. b2 b7E

It was noted that during the period of the report, flights of Soviet-bloc personnel from Montreal were pre-cleared in Montreal for entry at New York at LaGuardia Airport. Detection devices were not used in these cases. The question of the use of [redacted] in preinspecting air passenger baggage in Canada and in Mexico for flights to New York and other U. S. cities has been under consideration by Customs and the Department of State.

AEC and the Naval Research Laboratory will demonstrate to the IIC and ICIS in the near future the following equipment which has recently been developed:

1. [redacted]

2. [redacted] b2 b7E

3. [redacted]

The Naval Ordnance Laboratory has developed [redacted]

The Naval Research Laboratory is working on [redacted] active detection device which can distinguish fissionable materials from other materials. Other items of interest are: b2 b7E

AEC is providing training for a Customs technician who will maintain the detection devices in New York in a state of good condition. AEC held a training course in July, 1957, for Customs, Coast Guard and Immigration supervisory personnel. Since this course was given, Customs and AEC have been able to reduce the number of instances in which Customs was forced to call on AEC for its opinion as to the nature of a radio active source. There were only six instances in the first ten weeks after the new identification procedures were adopted by Customs in which Customs had to seek AEC advice. Because of the budgetary limitations on Customs which prevented the purchase of [redacted] Customs and Coast Guard are working out details of a transaction whereby Customs will borrow about ten of the [redacted] from Coast Guard. A classification guide relating to the operations of the detection device program, drafted by AEC and the Advisory Group, was accepted by the IIC and ICIS and under date of 11/20/57 was made available to all interested agencies. The Advisory Group is working out preliminary procedures for testing the capabilities of passive detection devices under actual operating conditions. b2 b7E

By memorandum dated 10/17/57 to the Treasury the Coast Guard requested to be relieved of participation in Advisory Group activities, including operational studies in the field and discussions at Seat of Government level. Coast Guard did not participate in the preparation of the Advisory Group status report. The Advisory Group has consisted of representatives of Customs, Coast Guard, Immigration and AEC, the four agencies directly concerned with the development of the devices and their everyday use. The disposition of the Coast Guard request was not known to the Advisory Group.

In an appendix to the report there is discussion of certain incidents involving Soviet-bloc diplomatic and official personnel. Three Soviet diplomats have entered at the Port of Laredo, Texas, during the past six months. In two instances baggage available to the Customs inspectors was checked [redacted] but other baggage not immediately available, and under the control of the diplomats, was not checked. In the third instance all baggage of the diplomat was checked in the presence of the diplomat's wife while the diplomat was elsewhere. b2 b7E

Memorandum from Mr. Branigan to Mr. Belmont
Re: Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures

In September, 1957, an employee of the USSR Delegation to the United Nations [redacted] *who was escorting a Soviet United Nations delegation from a New York pier, confronted the Customs representatives* [redacted] *and requested that the small "x-ray device" not be used on Soviet diplomatic baggage because U. S. diplomatic baggage was not subject to x-ray when entering the Soviet Union.* [redacted] *are not used on Soviet diplomatic baggage at the New York piers* [redacted]

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In May of 1957 (actually earlier than the period covered in this report) nine Russian nationals (not diplomats) entered the U. S. from Mexico by train at Laredo en route to Moscow. Suspicion of Customs was aroused when a bribe was offered a number of times to avoid the opening of the baggage of this party. Eventually, a personal search of the men in the party and all of their baggage was made. The examination revealed no contraband of any kind.

On 12/4/57 five suitcases and a duffle bag, shipped and bonded from Canada to the First Secretary of the Polish Embassy, Washington, D. C., were released to Polish diplomat at the request of the Department of State without examination. Customarily, unaccompanied baggage is manually searched. The bags were checked [redacted] *without any reaction being noted.*

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: 1/28/58

FROM : W. A. Branigan

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Branigan
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1 - Mr. Whitson

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Nichols
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Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: JOINT IIC-ICIS COMMITTEE ON COUNTERMEASURES

SYNOPSIS:

At meeting of Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures, 1/23/58, Advisory Group report on detection device program discussed and it was proposed report be transmitted to IIC and ICIS calling attention to nonuse of port of San Antonio, Texas, by Soviet-bloc officials since 1954 and also nonuse of 31 detection devices representing investment of over $21,000 by INS. Coast Guard representative on Joint Committee will explore with Treasury official possible loan of 10 detection devices by Coast Guard to Customs. AEC intends to demonstrate new developments in detection devices to representatives of IIC and ICIS about 4/22/58. Joint Committee declined to accept recommendation of Standing Committee, ICIS, that the Advisory Group be responsible for coordinating action of State, Customs and Air Force at McGuire AFB, New Jersey, in connection with arrivals of Soviet jet aircraft since this involves matters of policy on a Departmental level and Departments concerned, i.e., State, Treasury and Defense, are all represented on Standing Committee of ICIS.

RECOMMENDATION:

For your information. When the Advisory Group report is received by the IIC it will be analyzed.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/24/03 BY SP4BJK/RMP

DETAILS:

At Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures, Mr. Franklin L. Welch, OSI, Chairman, meeting Thursday, 1/23/58, the draft of the semiannual status report on the detection device program prepared by the Advisory Group was discussed with Mr. Donald I. Gale, AEC representative who is the chairman of the Advisory Group.

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Memo to Belmont 2-13-58 LWhitson

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FEB 28 1958

Memorandum from Mr. Branigan to Mr. Belmont
Re: Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures

In connection with the draft report, it was noted that a Soviet representative in New York, who had requested Customs representatives there to refrain from using [redacted] detector on Soviet diplomat baggage, had been incorrectly identified as an employee of Amtorg. The Bureau representative pointed out that the Soviet was actually [redacted] an employee of the Soviet Delegation to the UN, according to identification made by Customs representatives in New York. [redacted] detection devices are never used on diplomatic baggage in New York. Diplomatic baggage is checked [redacted] b2 b7E

In connection with the comments on the status of AEC's research and development program for detection devices, Mr. John Kelly, AEC representative for the Joint Committee, stated that it was planned that AEC would afford demonstrations of improved devices to representatives of IIC and ICIS at the Naval Ordnance Laboratory about 4/22/58. These would include improvements in [redacted]

The Joint Committee instructed Mr. Pfuntner of the ICIS Secretariat to prepare a memorandum transmitting the Advisory Group report to the IIC and the ICIS, pointing out in the memorandum of transmittal that Soviet-bloc diplomats have not used the port of San Antonio, Texas, for entry into the U.S. since 1954, which raises a question as to whether the detection device equipment now there should be moved to some other port of entry and also whether San Antonio should remain on the list of Soviet-bloc ports of entry since it is not used by them. It was also suggested that the memorandum of transmittal point out to the parent committees that the INS has in its possession 31 [redacted] but has not distributed them for field use and that the parent committees might wish to see that these devices are used as soon as practicable in this program, either by INS or by Customs, since they represent an investment of over $21,000. b2 b7E

The Advisory Group representative stated that he understood Customs will like to borrow 10 [redacted] from Coast Guard and that both Customs and Coast Guard had requested that the IIC and ICIS direct a letter to the Secretary of the

Treasury requesting that such a loan be arranged. The members of the Joint Committee were opposed to such action since this was an internal operational matter within the Treasury Department. Captain Stewart, Coast Guard representative on the Joint Committee, stated he would discuss the possibility of a loan [redacted] by Coast Guard to Customs with the Treasury representative on ICIS. b2 b7E

Mr. Pfuntner of the ICIS Secretariat advised that the Standing Committee of ICIS had considered for several months a recommendation of the Advisory Group and of the Joint IIC-ICIS Committee that the Department of State be requested to coordinate with the Air Force and Customs more closely in the future in connection with arrivals of Soviet jet planes bearing UN diplomats into McGuire AFB, New Jersey. This suggestion had been made because Air Force and Customs representatives at McGuire AFB had not been told in advance by the Department of State of the plans agreed to between State and the Soviets regarding the handling of diplomatic passengers and cargo. According to Pfuntner, the Standing Committee of ICIS was referring the problem back to the Joint Committee with a recommendation that the Advisory Group do the necessary coordinating with Air Force and Customs since this was an operational matter. The Joint IIC-ICIS Committee was unanimous in its opinion that the Advisory Group (which consists of representatives of AEC, INS, Coast Guard and Customs) could not be substituted for the Department of State in a matter of this kind which actually depended upon policy commitments at a high Department of State level. The Standing Committee recommendation was incomprehensible and Mr. Pfuntner was instructed to tell the Standing Committee of ICIS that the Joint Committee still felt that the place for the matter to be worked out to insure both policy and operational coordination was in the Standing Committee of ICIS where State, Defense and Treasury, the Departments having the sole interest in both policy and operations at McGuire AFB, were represented.

- Whitson

2-21-58

Airtel

To: SAC, New York

From: Director, FBI

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS
THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES

In the event detection devices for radio-active material used by Customs indicate presence of such material in a diplomatic pouch, diplomatic shipment, or diplomatic baggage, arrangements should be perfected by you so that you are immediately notified by the appropriate Customs official. You should then notify the Bureau by phone immediately furnishing details as to the identity of the traveler and the pouch, shipment, or baggage involved as well as information regarding notification by Customs to its headquarters or to other agencies of the Government and whether steps were taken to detain the diplomat or the questioned item.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 6/24/03 BY SP4 BJK/RNP

1 - WFO
1 - Albany
1 - Dallas
1 - San Antonio

LW:cvg
(8)

REC-5

12 FEB 25 1958

NOTE: At meeting of National Security Council 2-13-58 Under Sec'y of State, Christian Herter, representing the Sec'y of State, said that if there was an indication of radio-activity in a diplomatic pouch or shipment the State Dept would contact the Embassy involved & insist that the shipment be opened whether it be a pouch or freight shipment to determine whether it had therein any radio-active devices which should not be brought into the country. The field is being alerted at this time on the basis of Herter's oral comment so that we will be in a position to furnish such info to State & other interested agencies as expeditiously as possible. The responsibility for operation of the detection devices & for detaining a diplomat or diplomatic shipments is Customs. An "action paper" regarding the NSC meeting of 2-13 has not yet been issued. If the "action paper" contains statements of U.S. Govt policy along the lines indicated by Herter the field will be so advised.

Tolson
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Boardman
Belmont
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
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Trotter
Nease
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

MAILED 11
FEB 21 1958
COMM-FBI

FEB 27 MAIL ROOM

35 FEB 27 1958

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: February 11, 1958

FROM : MR. A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: DEMONSTRATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR CLANDESTINE USE

Tolson
Nichols
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Rosen
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Trotter
Nease
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

Mr. Roach's memorandum of February 4, 1958, reflected that we would attend a briefing on the capability of small portable nuclear weapons at the Department of Justice today (February 11). Assistant Directors Parsons and Belmont and Supervisors Whitson and Day attended. Representatives of the other IIC agencies were present, as were Pat Coyne of National Security Council, and representatives of the Department, Immigration, Customs, Coast Guard, Atomic Energy, Defense, and the Army.

Major Egan, of the Army, [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

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b2
b7E

Major Egan discussed the use of this weapon [redacted]

[redacted]

AHB:LL:mn
(5)
cc--Mr. Boardman
cc--Mr. Belmont
cc--Mr. Whitson
cc--Mr. Day

REC- 48 117-268-1572

EX.-126

55 MAR 3 1958

117-268

55 MAR 3 1958

5-RM

Memorandum to Mr. Boardman from Mr. Belmont

Re: Demonstration of Nuclear Weapons for Clandestine Use

[redacted] b2 b7E

After the briefing, a number of questions were asked pertaining to the possible clandestine entry of such a weapon into the United States. A weapon of this size, [redacted]

[redacted] b2 b7E

Treasury representatives inquired whether such a bomb would be detected by [redacted] devices presently in use in New York and other locations to guard against the clandestine entry of nuclear weapons. Both Major Egan and the Atomic Energy representative present stated the devices would detect such a weapon. [redacted] will detect gamma rays and neutrons and indicate presence of radioactive material b2 b7E

With reference to the National Security Council meeting this coming Thursday, February 13, as we have previously advised, Pat Coyne has taken a strong stand, attempting to force Treasury to purchase additional detection devices, while Under Secretary Scribner, of Treasury, has sought to play down the effectiveness of the present devices. From the way Coyne reacted this afternoon, there is a good chance he will seek to play up this demonstration at the National Security Council meeting Thursday, in an effort to force Treasury to purchase further detection devices. [redacted] will detect [illegible] neither is effective for weapons. Positive indication would demand further investigation

Read from ICIS 2-21-58 LW

~~SECRET~~

ICIS-M25/572

February 14, 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Franklin L. Welch, Chairman
Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures

FROM: Leonard P. Bienvenu
Executive Secretary, ICIS

SUBJECT: Detection Device Program - Arrival of Soviet Jet Aircraft on February 6, 1958 (Re ICIS Problem 25)

Enclosed is copy of a report dated February 10, 1958, prepared by the Advisory Group regarding the arrival of the Soviet jet aircraft at Friendship Airport on February 6, 1958.

It is requested that the Committee review the enclosed report and submit any comments deemed desirable.

Enclosure

FBI
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 6/29/03 BY SP4BJA/LMP

cc: Mr. Whitson
Col. Graham
Mr. Kelly
Capt. Stewart

When attachments are removed letter of transmittal can be downgraded to ~~Confidential~~.

ENCLOSURE 48

REC- 48 111-117-1576

EX. - 126

FEB 26 1958

~~SECRET~~

55 FEB 28 1958

117-268

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: Franklin L. Welch, Chairman, Committee B

FROM: Donald I. Cale, Chairman, Advisory Group

SUBJECT: Use of passive detection device during arrival of Russian jet TU-104 passenger plane at Friendship Airport on 6 February 1958. This diplomatic flight was for the purpose of transporting Ambassador Mikhail Menshikov to Washington, D. C.

10 February 1958

FBI
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/24/03 BY SP1BJA/PMP

111-268-1576

~~SECRET~~

ENCLOSURE

~~SECRET~~

Representatives of several government agencies met with airport officials at Friendship Airport, Baltimore, Maryland, on 4 February 1958, to work out preliminary arrangements for the arrival of a Soviet jet TU-104 passenger plane transporting Mr. Mikhail A. Menshikov, the newly-appointed Soviet Ambassador to the United States, to Washington, D. C. The Ambassador, other passengers, and the crew were to enjoy diplomatic privileges. Security aspects of the arrival, both as regards harm to the incoming Soviets as a result of possible demonstrations, and the possible attempt to introduce atomic weapons or components, were discussed. Arrangements for safety of the Soviet personnel were left to the airport security police. Proposed use of a detection device and its use during the arrival are discussed below.

It was pointed out by State that in the case of United States diplomatic flights into Moscow, the Soviet counterparts of INS and Customs carry out their various responsibilities aboard the plane. The U. S. diplomats are then ushered without interruption through the terminal building to waiting automobiles. Baggage is unloaded directly from the plane to vehicles for subsequent delivery.

Because of the desire to have all passengers pass a detection device, and in view of the practice in Moscow calling for diplomats to traverse the terminal building, it was agreed to require the Soviets to follow the route through Public Health, INS, and Customs employed in other international flights. Expeditious procedures were to be used on all personnel with particular emphasis on not detaining the Ambassador. It was further decided to have baggage and effects off loaded in the usual manner and taken to the Customs examination area for clearance formalities.

[redacted]

As soon as information was obtained concerning the expected date and time of arrival, [redacted] b2 b7E

[redacted]

The plane arrived at 4:30 p.m., on 6 February 1958, with 12 passengers including the Ambassador and his wife, 14 Russian crewmen, 1 RAF crewman and 3 USAF personnel. There were 17 suitcases and 3 briefcases belonging to the Russian passengers, 10 small suitcases belonging to the Russian crewmen, and some additional baggage belonging to the RAF and USAF crewmen. Also arriving were 18 boxes and 3 bags of cargo, weighing a total of 810 pounds.

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117-268-1576

OSURE

The State Department Chief of Protocol and a special party of some 20 Soviet bloc officials from Washington were on hand to meet the Ambassador. After greeting the Ambassador as he debarked from the plane, the Chief of Protocol escorted the party hurriedly on a route through the Public Health, Immigration, and Customs areas to a location set up by the press for a statement by the Ambassador. It turned out that the incoming Ambassador and his wife were included in this party, with the [redacted] b2 b7E

A very careful survey of all remaining passengers, baggage, and cargo was achieved. The Russian crewmen were at first returned directly to the plane after passing Public Health and INS without clearing through Customs. Customs subsequently requested that the crew and their baggage be cleared. The interpreter assigned to expedite procedures showed some reluctance to request the crew to leave the plane again, this time with their baggage, for clearance through Customs, pointing out that later a car from Washington would pick up the luggage from the plane. Customs stood firm, and in a short time the crew and 10 small pieces of luggage were passed by Customs [redacted] The crew with their baggage then went back to the plane. There was, of course, no assurance that all items were in fact removed from the plane during this operation, leaving open the possibility that smuggling could occur at a later time. It was hoped that the stationing of a Customs officer at the plane during its entire stay would discourage any such action. [redacted] b2 b7E

The Advisory Group believes that the over-all operational procedures were most successful [redacted] The cooperation obtained from all government agencies and from officials at the airport in planning the traffic handling procedures and carrying them out during the plane's arrival was excellent.

No signals were obtained.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268) DATE: Feb. 17, 1958

FROM : SAC, SAN ANTONIO (117-66)

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES

Remylet to Bureau dated 9/10/57 setting out the names, locations, telephone numbers and Commanding Officers of the various Ordnance Detachments in the Fourth U. S. Army Area which have responsibility for handling the disarming of atomic weapons.

On February 13, 1958, SA [redacted] checked with Major MORRISON B. PARKER, Commanding Officer of the 546th Ordnance Detachment, Fort Sam Houston, and was informed that the only change in the list previously submitted is that First Lieutenant RONALD KEAR has replaced First Lieutenant ROBERT E. CALDWELL as the Commanding Officer of the 133rd Ordnance Detachment, Fort Bliss, Texas. b7C

2 Bureau
1 cc. Albuquerque
1 cc. Dallas
1 cc. El Paso
1 cc. Houston
1 cc. Little Rock
1 cc. New Orleans
1 cc. Oklahoma City
1 SA

JEJ :JMW
(10)

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FEB 20 1958

REC- 23

27 FEB 20 1958

ESP. SEC.

55 MAR 4 1958

Read from ICIS 3-5-58 4:05pm LW

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ICIS-P25/581

February 27, 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Franklin L. Welch Chairman
Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures

FROM: Leonard P. Bienvenu
Executive Secretary, ICIS

SUBJECT: ~~Survey of Unaccompanied~~ Soviet Bloc Shipments

Reference is made to the memorandum dated May 6, 1957 (ICIS-P25/465), from the Chairman, ICIS, concerning the above subject. Enclosed for information and any comment you deem desirable is copy of a letter dated February 14, 1958, from the Acting Commissioner of Customs, with attached survey of shipments for the month of December, 1957.

Enclosure

cc: Col. Graham
Mr. Kelly
Mr. Whitson
Captain Stewart

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PARSONS

REC- 67 EX-136

117-268

10 MAR 6 1958

WHITSON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ESP/REC

3 ENCLOSURE

55 APR 4 1958

117-268

~~SECRET~~

Recd from ICIS
4:05 pm 3-5-58
LW

February 18, 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Franklin L. Welch, Chairman
Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures

FROM: Donald L. Cole, Chairman (SIGNED)
Advisory Group

SUBJECT: Arrangements for Performing Tests to Evaluate the Capability of the Present Detection Devices

Some time ago Committee B requested the Advisory Group to work out and implement a test arrangement to permit evaluation of the capability of the present detection program involving passive devices.

Enclosed for your consideration is a letter to the Secretary of State and enclosures giving complete working details for carrying out such tests. The procedures have been discussed with and have the informal approval of all agencies involved.

Enclosures

cc: Mr. Whitson
Col. Graham
Mr. Kelly
Capt. Stewart

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DATE 6/24/03 BY SP4 BTA/RNP

REC-35

MAR 6 1958

ENCLOSURE

58 MAR 19 1958

119-268

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~~SECRET~~

February 14, 1958

Honorable John Foster Dulles
The Secretary of State
Washington 25, D. C.

Attention: Mr. E. Tomlin Bailey
Director, Office of Security

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 6/24/03 BY SP4 BOP/LENP

Dear Mr. Dulles:

As you are aware, the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security have joint responsibility, under Presidential directive, for the development of programs for safeguarding against clandestine introduction of fissionable weapons and materials into this country. Since the summer of 1954, a number of passive detection devices have been in use at a few selected ports of entry.

[redacted]

b2
b7E

[redacted]

111-286-1580

~~SECRET~~ ENCLOSURE



b2
b7E

We would appreciate very much your participation in this test procedure.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover
Chairman, IIC

J. Walter Yeagley
Chairman, ICIS

Rec'd from ICIS 2-10-58 LW

Mr. Whitson

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JOINT IIC-ICIS COMMITTEE ON COUNTERMEASURES

MINUTES OF MEETING

JANUARY 23, 1958

The Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures met at 11:00 a.m., in Room 2515, Department of Justice. The following members were present:

IIC:	Mr. Franklin L. Welch, Chairman (Air Force) Mr. Lish Whitson (FBI)
ICIS:	Col. Neil M. Wallace, Alt. (Defense) Capt. John R. Stewart (Treasury)
AEC Advisor:	Mr. John S. Kelly

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Advisory Group:

Naval Research Laboratory:	Mr. Donald Gale, Chairman
ICIS Secretariat:	Mr. Carl E. Pfuntner

REC- 35

117-268-1584

~~ENCLOSURE~~

MAR 6 1958

5-LW

5 MAR 10 1958

117-268

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1. Minutes

The Committee approved the minutes of its meeting of October 1, 1957, without change.

2. Receipt By CIA of Advisory Group Report of January 24, 1957, on Detection Device Program

Mr. Welch invited attention to a letter dated October 23, 1957, from CIA, acknowledging receipt of the above report and of the IIC Comments and Joint IIC-ICIS recommendations based thereon.

3. AEC Quarterly Report on the Development of Detection Devices

The first AEC quarterly report on development of detection devices had been forwarded to IIC and ICIS by letter dated November 27, 1957, from the Director of Military Application, AEC. It had been distributed to Committee B by memorandum dated December 17, 1957. Mr. Kelly asked whether the Committee would consider it worthwhile for AEC to schedule demonstrations of devices which were in a research and development stage. An appropriate time for such a demonstration would be April 22, 1958, while [redacted] would be in Washington. An improved X-ray device could be demonstrated and it could be placed alongside a Bureau of Customs [redacted] so that the capability of the two devices could be compared. Second, two versions [redacted] devices could be demonstrated. [redacted] b2 b7E

The Committee agreed that it would be desirable to have such a demonstration as that outlined by Mr. Kelly and accordingly, he will forward appropriate invitations to IIC, ICIS, Committee B and certain persons in charge of operations in Customs, INS and Coast Guard.

With regard to the quarterly report itself, it was indicated, in response to a question by Mr. Kelly, that if possible, future reports should be less technical.

Mr. Kelly pointed out that research and development programs had now been accelerated, in response to Council directive, to the point beyond which further acceleration would probably result in diminishing returns. After a brief discussion, it was agreed that discussion on this point would be included in the next quarterly report.

Following further discussion, it was agreed that Committee B would note the first quarterly report from AEC.

4. Use of Passive Detection Devices During Arrival of Soviet Planes

The Committee considered the memorandum dated December 3, 1957, from the ICIS Standing Committee suggesting that the Advisory Group be requested to transmit its observations (contained in the report of September 16, 1957) directly and informally to operating personnel in Air Force and Customs.

Following discussion, it was agreed that something more than operational coordination was needed, and that reply to that effect should be made to the ICIS Standing Committee, with the suggestion that the State, Treasury and Defense members of that Committee might arrange for appropriate instructions to be forwarded through Departmental channels to operating personnel in State, Customs and Air Force. The Secretary was directed to draft a reply along these lines and to clear it with members.

// /Enclosed is copy of a memorandum dated January 29, 1958, which was prepared and cleared pursuant to the above discussion./

5. Survey of Unaccompanied Soviet Bloc Shipments

The Committee noted the memorandum dated December 26, 1957, from the Executive Secretary, ICIS, and its enclosures, letter dated November 25, 1957 from the Commissioner of Customs, attaching survey of shipments for August, 1957, and letter dated December 10, 1957, attaching survey of shipments for September, 1957.

// The Committee noted the memorandum dated January 3, 1958, from the Executive Secretary, ICIS, enclosing letter dated December 18, 1957, attaching survey of shipments for October, 1957.

6. Proposal for Transfer of Ten Coast Guard [redacted] to Customs

b2
b7E

The Committee considered the memorandum dated January 13, 1958, enclosing a draft letter of the same date, prepared by the Advisory Group for Joint IAC-ICIS signature, requesting that the Coast Guard make available to Customs 10 [redacted]

There was discussion as to the appropriateness and desirability of a letter from IAC and ICIS to Treasury on a matter which appeared to be susceptible of administrative handling between two branches (Coast Guard and Customs) of one Department (Treasury).

It was agreed that further effort should be made to insure handling of this matter within Treasury before giving further consideration to the proposed letter. Capt. Stewart agreed to undertake // to have the desired transfer of equipment accomplished by administrative steps within Treasury; to that end, he will consult the Treasury representative on ICIS.

7. Semi-Annual Status Report on the Use of Detection Devices for Period Ending December 31, 1957

The Committee considered the report dated January 14, 1958, which had been prepared by the Advisory Group and forwarded by memorandum of the same date. In the course of discussion, the following points were made:

1. Page 12, last sentence, change "some four instances" to "six instances".

2. Page 13, paragraph 4.6, insert a second sentence to read, "The AEC is providing maintenance training for this technician."

3. Page 4, paragraph 2.2.4, it was noted that the equipment at San Antonio is receiving very little use, that this should be brought to the attention of IRC and ICIS and that it should be suggested that consideration be given to moving the equipment and possibly to recommending to State that San Antonio be removed from the list of ports of entry.

4. Page 15, paragraph 4.11, Mr. Gale said that the Advisory Group hoped that arrangements for tests by simulated entries would be completed soon.

5. Appendix -- [redacted] Soviet Bloc Diplomats --

It was noted [redacted] were used on Soviet bloc diplomats entering the country by train at Laredo. They were not used, however, at the piers and airport in New York. It was agreed that although in a sense this represented an inconsistent policy, nevertheless, it would not be desirable to urge any change; the situation at Laredo was different in two respects: [redacted] air terminal, and secondly, there was undoubtedly a great difference in the rank of diplomats entering Laredo and those entering New York. b2 b7E

6. Page 2, last sentence of paragraph 2.1, it was noted that while INS had acquired 31 [redacted] they had not been distributed for field use.

The Committee agreed to amend the status report as indicated above, and to forward it to IRC and ICIS, drawing special attention to points 3 and 6 above.

/Enclosed is copy of a transmittal memorandum dated January 29, 1958, which was prepared and cleared pursuant to the above discussion. Also enclosed is copy of the revised status report, dated January 29, 1958, as forwarded to IRC and ICIS./

Redspro
IC 15-12 Ltr 10-25

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

January 29, 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: John P. Doherty, Chairman
ICIS Standing Committee

FROM: Franklin L. Welch, Chairman
Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures

SUBJECT: Use of Passive Detection Devices During Arrival of Soviet Planes (Re ICIS Problem 23)

Reference is made to your memorandum dated December 3, 1957, commenting on the draft letter dated October 8, 1957, to the Department of State which had been approved by this Committee. You suggested that, instead of sending the proposed Joint IIC-ICIS letter to State, the Advisory Group be requested to transmit its observations, which had been the basis of the proposed letter, directly and informally to appropriate operating personnel in Air Force and Customs.

This Committee has carefully considered your suggestion and we feel obliged to observe that, in our opinion, something more than coordination among operating personnel of Air Force and Customs is required. We are convinced that coordination at a policy level is involved, and we feel that this could perhaps most conveniently be achieved by the State, Treasury and Defense members of the ICIS Standing Committee agreeing to arrange appropriate notification through Departmental channels to State, Customs and Air Force operating personnel as to the necessity for procedures in conformity with the detection device program on occasions of Soviet plane arrivals such as those of September 4 and September 14, 1957.

cc: Mr. McTiernan
Mr. Gafford
Mr. Doroz
Mr. Bailey
Col. Graham

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DATE 6/24/03 BY SP4 STP/NP

REC-35 117-2[illegible]-[illegible]

10 MAR 6 1958

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ESP REC.

55 MAR 12 1958

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. R. R. Roach

DATE: March 3, 1958

FROM : Mr. O. H. Bartlett

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTO THE UNITED STATES

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
Nease
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

Liaison has been following with State in the above-captioned matter to make sure we are advised of the results of State discussions with the Canadians.

On March 3, 1958, Mr. J. P. McDonnell, State, advised that this matter is still pending with the Canadians and no final answer has been received from them. He advised that he will let us know as soon as some answer is received from the Canadians.

ACTION:

For information. Liaison will continue contact with State on this matter.

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/24/03 BY SP4 BJA/ENP

OHB:bjt
(5)

1 - Mr. Whitson
1 - Mr. Day
1 - Liaison Section
1 - Mr. Bartlett

REC- 35

14 MAR 6 1958

55 MAR 10 1958

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. L. V. Boardman

DATE: March 4, 1958

FROM : A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTO THE UNITED STATES

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
Nease
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

Soviet bloc diplomatic and official personnel are permitted to enter the United States by train at Laredo, Texas, and Saint Albans, Vermont. Trains arriving at Laredo halt for a period sufficient to permit inspection and interrogation by Customs and Immigration. Trains entering through Saint Albans are not thus delayed and Customs inspectors normally board these trains at Saint Johns, Quebec, (about 40 miles from Saint Albans) and are able to complete their inspections by the time the train arrives at Saint Albans.

National Security Council policy requires inspection of diplomats and diplomatic shipments by devices which will detect radioactive materials. IIC and ICIS, who are jointly responsible to the President for the program involving use of these devices, asked State to secure permission from Canada for our Customs inspectors to use portable detection devices on United States-bound trains between Saint Johns and Saint Albans. A conference, requested by State, was held with the Canadians in June, 1957, and the ~~Canadian~~ Government took ~~this~~ State's request under advisement.

My memorandum of September 13, 1957, enclosed, noted that while we are in no position to force prompt action in this matter on the part of the Canadian Government, Liaison will, however, inquire periodically at State to determine whether a reply has been received from the Canadian authorities. We have been following this matter regularly with State and it is apparent that the Canadians are delaying action. As reported by memorandum of December 9, 1957, the Canadians had not then even concurred in the minutes of the June, 1957, meeting.

Enclosure

GAD:jmk (7)
1 - Mr. Boardman
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Bartlett
1 - Mr. Whitson
1 - Section Tickler
1 - Mr. Day

REC-24

EX-128

16 MAR 10 1958

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/24/03 BY SP4/STA/RNP

58 MAR 13 1958

Memo Belmont to Boardman
RE: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTO THE UNITED STATES

OBSERVATION:

This is a foreign relations matter which apparently will not be resolved for sometime. In the meantime, Soviet bloc personnel and their baggage arriving by rail from Canada are not being examined by our devices. IIC and ICIS could attempt to hasten action by writing a formal letter to State urging that additional pressure be brought to bear on the Canadian Government for an answer in this matter. The only alternative is to continue following through Liaison although this will merely keep us informed and will not resolve the problem.

ACTION:

If you approve, we will not further inject IIC into this foreign relations matter by writing a formal letter to State. We will continue to inquire of State regularly in order that we may be informed of any developments.

OFFICE OF DIRECTOR
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Nease
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. Jones
Mr. Clayton
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

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DATE 6/24/03 BY SP4 STAFF/KNP

EXP. PROC.
MAR 3 1958

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268) DATE: 3/7/58

FROM : SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (135-319)

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES

Re SAC letter 57-47(K) and San Francisco letter to Bureau dated 9/13/57.

During liaison contact with the 548th Ordnance Detachment, EOD, Presidio of San Francisco, San Francisco, California, on February 19, 1958, it was determined that certain changes have occurred within the 548th Ordnance Detachment in the past few months pertaining to the counties covered by that ordnance detachment in connection with their area of responsibility.

The following data is the current operational proceedure in effect within the 548th Ordnance Detachment in relationship to the counties covered by that detachment:

Major JULIUS G. DOKA is the current officer in charge of the 548th Ordnance Detachment and his office is located in Building 223, Ordnance Section, Presidio of San Francisco (West 1-6111, Extention 4203 and Extention 4204), (after duty hours call 6th Army Staff Duty Officer).

It is noted that the 49th Ordnance Detachment and the 87th Ordnance Detachment are headquartered at the Presidio of San Francisco and that these detachments come under the immediate jurisdiction of the 548th Ordnance Detachment.

EXPEDITE

3 - Bureau (117-268)
1 - Los Angeles
1 - San Diego
1 - Salt Lake City
2 - San Francisco
(1 - 117-00-67)
(1 - 135-319)

HPF:PCB #12
(8)

REC-39 117-268-1587

EX-135

8 MAR 11 1958

ESP. SEC.

55 MAR 14 1958

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SF 135-319
HPF:PCB

The 548th Ordnance Detachment has the responsibility of explosive ordnance disposal missions in the following counties within the 6th U.S. Army area:

1. All counties in California except--

San Bernardino County (covered by the 58th Ordnance Detachment);
Kern County (covered by the 58th Ordnance Detachment);
Santa Barbara County (covered by 58th Ordnance Detachment);
Ventura County (covered by 58th Ordnance Detachment);
Los Angeles County (covered by 58th Ordnance Detachment);
Orange County (covered by 58th Ordnance Detachment);
Riverside County (covered by 58th Ordnance Detachment);
San Diego County (covered by 70th Ordnance Detachment);
Imperial County (covered by 70th Ordnance Detachment).

2. The 548th Ordnance Detachment covers the entire State of Nevada with the exception of Clark County, which is covered by the 58th Ordnance Detachment.

3. The 548th Ordnance Detachment covers the entire State of Utah.

The San Francisco Office will continue to contact the officer in charge of the 548th Ordnance Detachment to assure that the location of the detachment, the name of the commanding officer and the telephone numbers and extentions are current at all times.

Information copies are being furnished to the Salt Lake City, San Diego and Los Angeles Offices so that the above changes, which affect their field divisions, can be noted in the appropriate records.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268) DATE: 3/7/58

FROM : SAC, SAN DIEGO (66-998)

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES

Re No. number SAC letter A dated 1/28/52.

This office has no names to recommend for inclusion on the Bureau of Customs Watch List at this time.

The Bureau will be kept advised of any and all pertinent developments.

2 - Bureau (AM)
1 - San Diego

GHB:rk
(3)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/24/03 BY SP4 BTR/LNP

REC-70 117-268-158

EX-135

12 MAR 12 1958

55 MAR 14 1958

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : W. A. Branigan

DATE: March 10, 1958

FROM : L. Whitson

SUBJECT: JOINT IIC-ICIS COMMITTEE ON COUNTERMEASURES

Tolson
Boardman
Belmont
Mohr
Nease
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
Clayton
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

At 3:45 p.m., 3-7-58, Mr. Carl Pfuntner, ICIS Secretariat, phoned with regard to a possible meeting of the Joint Committee on Friday, March 14. He stated there appeared to be several matters to discuss including review of a proposal by the advisory group (consisting of INS, Customs, Coast Guard and AEC) for controlled field experiments on the effectiveness of the use of the detection devices at ports of entry.

Pfuntner also expressed concern regarding the demonstration of new equipment to be given by AEC at the Naval Ordnance Laboratory, April 29, 1958. Pfuntner stated that, after the demonstration, AEC planned a sort of round-table discussion regarding the devices demonstrated and he was of the opinion that this discussion period should be opened to permit the attendance of those agency representatives on a working level who would be afforded the demonstration of new equipment the previous week.

Mr. Pfuntner was informed that, since it was presumed that the persons on a working level would have the opportunity to ask questions after their demonstration on April 22, it would not be necessary for them to again attend the discussion period which would follow the second demonstration on April 29 since presumably there would be a full exchange of information within the individual agencies. Pfuntner stated he would explore the matter further.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/24/03 BY SP4 AM/pw

RECOMMENDATION:

None. For your information.

LW:tw
(4)

1 - Mr. Branigan
1 - Mr. Day
1 - Mr. Whitson

REC-19 11-26[illegible]

MAR 13 1958

EX-136

55 MAR 14 1958

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ICIS-P25/585

March 7, 1958

SMAK

MEMORANDUM TO: Frankline L. Welch, Chairman
Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures

FROM: Leonard P. Bienvenu
Executive Secretary, ICIS

SUBJECT: Survey of Unaccompanied Soviet Bloc Shipments
(Re ICIS Problem 25)

Reference is made to the memorandum dated May 6, 1957, (ICIS P-25/465), from the Chairman, ICIS, concerning the above subject. Enclosed for information and any recommendation you deem desirable is copy of letter dated March 3, 1958, from the Acting Commissioner of Customs, with attached survey of shipments for the month of January 1958.

Enclosures

CC: Mr. Whitson
Col. Graham
Mr. Kelly
Capt. Stewart

3 ENCLOSURE

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/24/03 BY SP4BJA/ENP

EX. - 126
REC- 48

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

117-267

NOT RECORDED
18 MAR 13 1958

55 APR 2 1958

117-268

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268) DATE: 3/12/58

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (117-192)

This is not an FOIPA deletion

SUBJECT: [redacted] INTO [redacted] UNITED STATES [redacted]
AEA

ReBuairtel, 2/21/58.

On 2/26/58, Assistant Surveyor JOSEPH FLYNN, U.S. Customs, NYC, advised that his service has standing instructions to advise the FBI, NYC; AEC, NYC; and U.S. Customs, Washington, D.C., whenever the detection devise is activated by a diplomat, a diplomatic pouch, a diplomatic shipment or diplomatic baggage. FLYNN stated, however, that they are unable to detain any foreign diplomatialthough they have authority to hold and question an American diplomat when either he or his baggage or shipments activates the detection devise. FLYNN also stated that every effort is made to determine a description of the particular piece of baggage, etc., that has activated the detection devise. For information.

2-Bureau (117-268)
1-New York (117-192)

TGS:mec
(3)

REC- 91 117-268-1311

EX-128

13 MAR 13 1958

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/24/03 BY SP4BJR/LNP

55 MAR 19 1958

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Belmont

FROM : R. R. Roach

DATE: March 7, 1958

OSMAB

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
Nease
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS DETECTION DEVICE PROGRAM

On March 6, 1958, our Liaison representative had an occasion to discuss the above program with Fred C. Scribner, Under Secretary of the Treasury, while visiting with him on other matters. Scribner stated that he was sorry to have missed the National Security Council Meeting February 13, 1958, at which this and other portions of the Port Security Program were discussed. However, he stated he was pleased certain areas of policy were clarified during this Council Meeting particularly the decision to take action concerning diplomatic shipments entering the United States. It was suggested to Scribner that perhaps the terminology in this decision; namely, that action would be taken if a detection device "indicates substantial radio activity" needs some clarification. He agreed that this was true; but the word "substantial" was a lot more definitive than the term "unusual," which had also been proposed.

Scribner pointed out the Treasury was now ready to buy and put into use the devices they had earlier agreed to purchase. He pointed out that the only problem would be getting the money for their purchase from other sources in Treasury since funds were not appropriated for this purpose. He stated that he hoped that the new devices which Atomic Energy Commission promises to demonstrate in April will be much more effective than those presently available. He feels that Customs and Coast Guard can more efficiently enforce the Program and thereby reduce cost without reducing the effectiveness of the Program.

Scribner stated that there was never any question in his mind that a threat to our security exists through the clandestine introduction of atomic weapons. He would

JJD:pwf (5)

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Whitson
1 - Liaison Section
1 - Mr. Doud

REC- 23

117-268-1572

EX-117

MAR 17 1958

MAR 19 1958

LIAISON

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4/24/92 BY SP4 AMP/pw

Memo Roach to Belmont

Re: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND
DEFEND AGAINST CLANDESTINE
INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
DETECTION DEVICE PROGRAM

question how far we should go to meet this threat recognizing our extensive wide-open land and coastal borders. He feels that the deterrent factor is very important and has suggested that Customs look into the potential value [redacted] b2 b7E

ACTION:

None. For information.

Page 129 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 144 ~ b2 , b7E
Page 161 ~ Referral/Direct to OGA
Page 162 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 163 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 164 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 173 ~ Referral/Direct to OGA
Page 206 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 207 ~ Referral/Direct
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Page 211 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 212 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 214 ~ Referral/Direct to OGA
Page 215 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 216 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 217 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 221 ~ b2 , b7E
Page 222 ~ b2 , b7E
Page 223 ~ Referral/Direct to OGA
Page 224 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 225 ~ b2 , b7E
Page 226 ~ b2 , b7E
Page 227 ~ b2 , b7E
Page 228 ~ b2 , b7E
Page 229 ~ b2 , b7E
Page 236 ~ Duplicate of memo and report dated January 29, 1958
Page 237 ~ Duplicate
Page 238 ~ Duplicate
Page 239 ~ Duplicate
Page 240 ~ Duplicate
Page 241 ~ Duplicate
Page 242 ~ Duplicate
Page 243 ~ Duplicate
Page 244 ~ Duplicate
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Page 249 ~ Duplicate
Page 253 ~ Referral/Direct to OGA
Page 259 ~ Referral/Direct to OGA
Page 260 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 261 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 262 ~ Referral/Direct

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Page 129 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 144 ~ b2 , b7E
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Page 162 ~ Referral/Direct
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Page 217 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 221 ~ b2 , b7E
Page 222 ~ b2 , b7E
Page 223 ~ Referral/Direct to OGA
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Page 262 ~ Referral/Direct

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : L. V. Boardman

DATE: 3/3/58

FROM : A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC WEAPONS

1 - Mr. Boardman
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Liaison
1 -- Mr. Day
1 - Mr. Branigan
1 - Mr. Whitson

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mason
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

The IIC and ICIS transmitted to the Secretary of the Treasury, 8/26/57, a number of recommendations in connection with the detection device program for identification of radioactive material. Treasury was given the responsibility for coordinating the operational aspects of the program and was requested to submit to the IIC and the ICIS quarterly reports on its activities.

Under date of 2/25/58, A. Gilmore Flues, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, transmitted to Director, as chairman of IIC, a quarterly report for the period ending 12/31/57. This report is not at variance with the Advisory Group report which was submitted to the IIC and ICIS under date of 1/29/58. It sets forth that Customs

[redacted]

Referral/Direct to OGA

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/19/03 BY SP4AM/DK

Enclosure
LW:smk
(7)

ENCLOSURE

EX-136

REC- 17

EX-136 117-268-159

52 APR 1 1958

10 MAR 17 1958

5- DAB

Memorandum from Mr. Belmont to Mr. Boardman
Re: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC WEAPONS

Referral/Direct to OGA

[redacted]

It could be observed there may be matters where although the Coast Guard itself might not benefit, its experience and observations would be of considerable benefit to the agencies of the Advisory Group. For example, Coast Guard has 125 [redacted] *in active use and no other agency has had the breadth of experience in their use that Coast Guard has. Obviously, Coast Guard could not benefit from the other agencies as to the use of* [redacted] *at this time, whereas the other agencies and the Advisory Group could benefit from Coast Guard's experience.*

b2
b7E

RECOMMENDATION:

It is respectfully recommended that the attached Treasury report be referred to the Working Committee of the IIC for consideration at its next meeting.

Discussed 31/1/58 at IIC w/c and desired no action need be taken at this time Board

DO-6

OFFICE OF DIRECTOR
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Nease
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. Jones
Mr. Clayton
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

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DATE 6/9/03 BY SP4 BSTP/ENP

Memo Belmont to Boardman 3-3-58 Lou Nichols

Jno Conrad
~~to Hoover~~
J. J. Gallagher

EX-[illegible]
FEB 26 1958

62-6

OFFICE OF DIRECTOR
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Nease
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. Jones
Mr. Clayton
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/9/03 BY SP4 CTA/LNP

EXP. PROC.
MAR 4 1958

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Office Memorandum

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN 3-19-58

DATE: March 5, 1958

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTO THE UNITED STATES

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
Nease
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

During the National Security Council meeting on February 13, 1958, attended by the Director and at which the new Continental Defense policy paper was discussed, Under Secretary of State Herter said he thought something could be done if a diplomatic shipment gave an indication of radioactivity. As a result of this statement, State was asked to report at the next Council meeting as to the action possible if there were substantial evidence that a shipment entering the U.S. under diplomatic immunity contained radioactive material.

The requested report was made at the Council meeting on February 27 and NSC Secretary Lay's memorandum of March 3, attached, reports that if a detection device indicates substantial radioactivity in a diplomatic shipment, the shipment will be detained and State will request an appropriate foreign official to appear at the port of entry and remove "the objectionable object" for examination. If this is refused, the shipment will be removed from the U.S. Foreign missions will not be advised of this policy, and State "will develop procedures for giving appropriate instructions to all U.S. personnel concerned with the entry of diplomatic shipments." This Council action is to be implemented by "State, in coordination with the IIC and the ICIS."

The unknown quantity here is the statement that action will depend upon indication by a detection device of "substantial radioactivity." No explanation is given as to what is meant by this and the phrase is susceptible to varying interpretation. Our detection devices are such that a partially shielded nuclear weapon might cause a relatively weak reaction while a radium dial wrist watch passing near a device might cause a strong reaction. In addition, our devices are sensitive to both gamma rays and neutrons. It is apparent that there are technical and procedural problems which must be resolved before the new policy can be made effective.

Enclosure
GAD:hke
(6)

1-Mr. Boardman
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Mr. Day
1-Liaison Section

EX-136 REC- 17

62-268-1595

MAR 14 1958

58 MAR 21 1958

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/9/03 BY SP4 AM/lcp

Memorandum from Mr. Belmont to Mr. Boardman
RE: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTO THE UNITED STATES

The IIC and the ICIS have stated, in various studies prepared during recent years, that completely assembled nuclear weapons or components thereof could be introduced into this country under diplomatic immunity without fear of detection. We will have to examine closely the procedures developed by State in connection with this new policy in order to determine what effect they will have upon the introduction of nuclear material via diplomatic shipments.

ACTION:

We will discuss the new policy at the IIC Working Committee meeting scheduled for March 12.

Discussed ... should that we will wait & see what is done by State ...

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: March 7, 1958

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTO THE UNITED STATES (DETECTION DEVICE PROGRAM)

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
Nease
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

During the IIC Working Committee meeting on February 19, the members discussed the status report prepared concerning the detection device program by the Advisory Group of the Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures and noted the points to which attention had been invited by the transmittal memorandum from the Chairman of the Joint Committee.

The members agreed that since Soviet bloc nationals are not using the airport at San Antonio, Texas, [redacted] detection device now stationed there might well be moved to a site where it would receive more use. The members also agreed that it would be desirable that effective use be made of the portable [redacted] which had been secured by the Immigration and Naturalization Service but which are not being used. The Secretary was instructed to inform the ICIS Secretary of the Working Committee views and to follow any action taken in this matter by ICIS. b2 b7E

The IIC views were, accordingly, furnished to ICIS Secretary Bienvenu immediately. The ICIS Standing Committee, however, did not consider the status report until March 6. The ICIS Secretary has advised that at this meeting, it was agreed that the San Antonio [redacted] should be moved to New York where it might be used in connection with ship arrivals, and it was noted that Customs has secured from Coast Guard 13 portable devices for its use and that Immigration is considering offering its 31 devices to Customs. The ICIS Standing Committee agreed that the Joint Committee on Countermeasures and its Advisory Group should be asked to reassess the detection device program after these arrangements have been placed into effect.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/9/93 BY SP2 STP/LMW

ACTION:

For information. We will inform the Working Committee members of these developments at the meeting on March 12.

GAD:hke (8)

1-Mr. Boardman
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Parsons
1-Mr. Branigan
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Mr. Day
1-Liaison Section

55 MAR 20 1958

62-268-1596
EX.-126 REC-79
12 MAR 12 1958

Recd from ICIS 3-17-58 10:00 am FBI

~~SECRET~~

ICIS-P25/588

March 12, 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Franklin L. Welch, Chairman
Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures

FROM: J. Walter Yeagley, Chairman
Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security

OSMAE

SUBJECT: ~~X~~ Detection Device Program (Re ICIS Problem 25)

Enclosed is copy of a letter dated February 25, 1958, from the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, and its enclosure, a report for the quarter ended December 31, 1957, on the operational aspects of the detection device program. The report was submitted pursuant to Recommendation No. 5 of the IIC-ICIS letter of August 26, 1957.

It is requested that your Committee review the enclosed report and comment on the degree of adequacy of the IIC-ICIS recommendations of August 26, 1957.

& the implementation

Enclosures

Noted at Joint IIC-ICIS meeting
No comments necessary.

cc: Mr. Whitson
Col. Graham
Mr. Kelly
Capt. Stewart

FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/9/03 BY SP1 BDA/RNP

REC- 23

117-268-1597

EX. - 126

~~SECRET~~

MAR 18 1958

2 ENCLOSURE EX. - 126

58 MAR 19 1958

117-268

5-FBI

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268) DATE: 3/12/58

FROM SAC, SAN DIEGO (66-998)

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES

Re SAC letter 57-47 (K) and San Francisco letter to the Bureau dated 3/7/58.

By letter to Phoenix dated 10/2/57, copies to Salt Lake City and Albuquerque, the San Diego Office advised that the Explosive Ordnance Disposal Detachment, San Diego, is the 70th Ordnance Detachment, Fort Rosecrans, San Diego 6, California, telephone ACademy 3-8449. First Lieutenant WILLIAM DELONG is the Commanding Officer and has home telephone number [redacted] DELONG advised on 9/6/57 that the 70th Ordnance Detachment covers San Diego and Imperial Counties in California, all of Arizona, all of Nevada, effective 12/1/57 and Western New Mexico, if called. b7C

Upon receipt of the information set forth in referenced San Francisco letter which reflects that the 548th Ordnance Detachment covers the entire State of Nevada, with the exception of Clark County, which is covered by the 58th Detachment, Lieutenant DELONG was recontacted to resolve the discrepancy regarding Nevada. He advised the information which he had furnished on 9/6/57 is correct and that the 548th Detachment had apparently furnished our San Francisco Office outdated information. He stated he would immediately write the 548th Detachment and call their attention to the fact that the State of Nevada, since 12/1/57, has been covered by the 70th Detachment.

2 - Bureau
1 - San Francisco [redacted] b2
1 - Salt Lake City
1 - San Diego

WED/mar
(5)

REC- 48 117-268-1598

EX-136

15 MAR 17 1958

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/9/03 BY SP2 DSA/ENP

58 MAR 19 1958

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: 3/14/58

FROM : W. A. Branigan

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Branigan
1 - Mr. Day
1 - Mr. Whitson

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
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Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: JOINT IIC-ICIS COMMITTEE ON COUNTERMEASURES

Carl Pfuntner, ICIS Secretariat, has advised that a meeting of the Joint Committee is scheduled for 10 a.m., 3/17/58 for the purpose of considering a plan proposed by the Advisory Group (consisting of representatives of INS, Customs, Coast Guard and AEC) for a field testing of the effectiveness of the present detection device program in selected ports of entry.

Briefly, the Advisory Group recommends that through the good offices of the Department of State

[redacted]

b2
b7E

Advisory Group states the procedures have been discussed with and have the informal approval of State, Customs and AEC but propose that the chairmen of IIC and ICIS sign a letter to the Secretary of State making a formal request for Department of State participation.

It would appear that the procedures are unnecessarily complicated. This is not specifically a test of the capability of the detection device but of the capability of the individual operating it. As such, it would appear to be essentially an inspection problem for the Treasury Department, which has accepted responsibility for the operation of the detection device program.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is respectfully recommended that the FBI and the IIC position should be that since this proposed operation

58 APR 11 1958

LW:smk
(5)

REC-24 117-268-1594

EX-112

MAR 19 1958

55 MAR 20 1958

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 9/19/83 BY SP4 BTA/lcmp

is essentially an inspection of the capabilities of the Treasury Department personnel operating the detection devices (Customs), the testing should be worked out by Treasury with the cooperation of the Advisory Group and that any letter to State or AEC, which the Treasury representatives deem necessary, should be sent by Treasury rather than the chairmen of IIC and ICIS.

This is playing games. Suggest we tell committee this is up to ICIS & we will not suggest it or back it.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED S GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: 3/17/58

FROM : W. A. Branigan
OSMAB

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Branigan
1 - Mr. Day
1 - Mr. Whitson

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mason
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: JOINT IIC-ICIS COMMITTEE ON COUNTERMEASURES

Re memorandum Branigan to Belmont, 3/14/58 concerning proposed field testing of the effectiveness of present detection device program in selected ports of entry. At meeting of Joint Committee, 10 a.m., 3/17/58, Advisory Group recommendation for field testing of effectiveness of present detection device procedures was discussed. FBI and IIC representative stated that this was up to ICIS and that the IIC would not suggest it or back it.

The Advisory Group representatives felt that some sort of field test of procedures was necessary [redacted] The AEC advisor to the Joint Committee, John Kelly, stated that this could not be done on a laboratory level and requested that the broad problem be presented to the IIC and ICIS even though the IIC might not be in favor of the specific program proposed by the Advisory Group. b2 b7E

The ICIS representatives stated that they recognized that the agencies concerned, namely State, AEC and Customs, had informally approved the field test procedures but they could not speak for ICIS at this time regarding the formalities proposed by the Advisory Group. The Coast Guard ICIS representative suggested that instead of a letter from the chairmen of IIC and ICIS to the Department of State, as proposed by the Advisory Group, a letter from Treasury to State might be more appropriate. At the request of the ICIS representatives, the Advisory Group and the AEC technical advisor, Mr. Pfuntner of ICIS Secretariat, will draft a memorandum from Mr. Frank Welch, Chairman of the Joint Committee, to the IIC and ICIS pointing out the problem and asking for guidance. The draft of such a memorandum will be considered in the next meeting of the Joint Committee now scheduled for 10 a.m., Monday, 3/24/58.

LW:smk
(5)

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REC-47 117-268-1600

MAR 19 1958

58 APR 11 1958

58 MAR 21 1958

117-268

Memorandum from Mr. Branigan to Mr. Belmont
Re: JOINT IIC-ICIS COMMITTEE ON
COUNTERMEASURES

RECOMMENDATION:

This matter will be followed with Mr. Pfuntner and any draft will be brought promptly to your attention.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: March 19, 1958

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

OSMAB

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTO THE UNITED STATES

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
Nease
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

National Security Council policy requires that all Soviet bloc diplomatic officials and shipments be subjected to covert examination by devices which will detect radioactive materials. In connection with the arrival in the United States of the special Soviet jet aircraft flights of September, 1957, and February, 1958, it was necessary that arrangements for this examination be made very hurriedly in view of uncertainty concerning the exact time of arrival of the plane and the procedures to be used in permitting its passengers to be admitted to the U.S.

The Department of State is the agency which has full information concerning these flights and concerning what visas have been issued to their passengers. In order to assist the agencies (Customs and Immigration) which are also involved in examining the passengers and using the detection devices, the Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures decided that it would be advisable to ask State to advise the other agencies as far in advance as possible of the details concerning these flights. Mr. Branigan's memorandum of October 14, 1957, ATTACHED secured the Director's approval of informing the ICIS Secretariat that we had no objection to a letter making such a request being presented to the IIC and ICIS Chairmen for signature.

This matter was stalled within ICIS for several months thereafter inasmuch as the National Security Council was considering first a revised U.S. civil aviation policy toward the Soviet bloc, and second, the continental defense policy which included NSC review of the detection device program.

Now that NSC has re-endorsed the detection device program and has expanded it so that action can now be taken

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Enclosures
GAD:hke (6)
1-Mr. Boardman
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Mr. Day
1-Liaison Section

REC- 67 11-208-1601

6 MAR 21 1958

EX-128

APR 9 1958

ENCLOSURE EX-128

LIAISON

when there is indication of substantial radioactivity in a diplomatic shipment, ICIS has prepared the attached proposed joint letter.

The proposed letter asks that State, where time permits, advise the interested agencies as far in advance as possible concerning similar future flights and asks that State continue to make arrangements in order that NSC policies can be carried out with respect to the detection device program. The letter also makes reference to the ICIS letter of August 23, 1957, in which ICIS suggested security measures to be applied in connection with Soviet aircraft flights to this country. These measures, which are in line with the IIC position on this question, include the placing of a U.S. "safety crew" aboard Soviet planes, adequate measures to prevent unauthorized departures of persons and materials and careful examination of Soviet shipments. This letter and my memorandum of August 28, 1957, concerning it are also attached.

ACTION:

Done 8/29/57

The proposed ~~joint letter~~ is attached for approval. If approved, we will ~~distribute~~ copies to the military members of the IIC and secure ~~their~~ concurrence. After the letter has been approved by ICIS and signed by the ICIS Chairman, it will be submitted for the signature of the Director as IIC Chairman.

~~SECRET~~

DRAFT

March 18, 1958

Honorable John Foster Dulles
The Secretary of State
Washington 25, D. C.

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/9/03 BY SP4 PCSM/RMP

Dear Mr. Dulles:

The Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (IIC) and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS) have considered reports regarding the special Soviet jet aircraft flights of September 4 and September 14, 1957, bringing Soviet United Nations personnel, and arriving at McGuire Air Force Base, and the Soviet flight arriving on February 6, 1958, at Friendship Airport, Baltimore, bringing the newly-designated Soviet Ambassador to Washington. We are of course interested in insuring that procedures in conformity with the ICIS recommendations of August 23, 1957, with particular reference to the detection device program are followed on occasions of such Soviet plane arrivals.

In connection with the third of the above-mentioned flights, the Department of State took the initiative in arranging meetings of representatives of interested government agencies prior to the arrival. We therefore request that where time permits in the case of similar future arrivals the Department of State advise the interested departments and agencies as far in advance as possible of the expected arrival date of such flights and continue to undertake similar arrangements in order to facilitate the establishment by the agencies concerned of appropriate procedures as required under approved policies including (1) the covert

117-268-1691

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ENCLOSURE

examination by use of the devices of all Soviet bloc officials, pouches, baggage, effects, and other shipments afforded immunity from inspection and search (NSC Action 1524-g) and (2) the detention, examination, etc., in appropriate instances, of diplomatic shipments in which ~~material of~~ substantial radioactivity is indicated by detection devices (NSC Action No. 1868). It is understood that should such flights become so frequent as to create greater problems and burdens than have so far been encountered, your Department may want to review this question of coordination with the other interested agencies.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover
Chairman, Interdepartmental
Intelligence Conference

J. Walter Yeagley
Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee
on Internal Security

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. L. V. Boardman

DATE: March 14, 1958

FROM : A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTO THE UNITED STATES

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At the joint request of IIC and ICIS, State has been negotiating with Canada in an effort to secure permission for Customs inspectors to use [redacted] in examining baggage on U.S.-bound trains between Saint Johns, Quebec, and Saint Albans, Vermont.

b2
b7E

On March 12, 1958, State furnished us a copy of a February 18 dispatch from the U.S. Embassy at Ottawa. This dispatch enclosed a copy of a February 14 letter from the Canadian Department of External Affairs and the minutes of a meeting on June 26, 1957, at which the proposal was discussed. The Canadian letter states that the U.S. proposal was, in the main, based on three assumptions:

(1) Canada has agreed that in the event of an attack, U.S. industry and Government must be preserved;

(2) Since 1953, Soviet capability for covert attack on the U.S. has grown while its capability for overt attack has decreased;

(3) There is danger of fissionable material being introduced into the U.S. by passengers on U.S.-bound trains from Montreal and such materials can be detected successfully [redacted]

b2
b7E

The letter challenges each of these assumptions and states that the Canadian authorities concerned do not consider that there is a case at this time to place before the Canadian government in support of the U.S. proposal. This means, of course, that Customs must either arrange to use the portable detection device after arrival of the trains at Saint Albans or continue its present practice of not using the devices at all to examine Soviet bloc nationals arriving via these trains. It is a matter of approved National Security Council (NSC) policy that "all Soviet bloc diplomatic officials and shipments should be subjected to covert

GAD:mje (7)

1 - Mr. Boardman
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Bartlett
1 - Mr. Whitson
1 - Liaison Section
1 - Mr. Day

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REC-6 117-268-1603

6 MAR 21 1958

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55 APR 24 1958

examination by present detection devices as they become available."

This is a matter of considerable interest to IIC and ICIS, and we have been following State for an extended period in order that we might be informed of its progress in these negotiations. In order that we might furnish the details of the Canadian reply to the other IIC members, Liaison Agent Bartlett asked that State either furnish us with additional copies or authorize our reproducing them. He was informed that State had asked its representatives in Canada for "clarification" of matters in the correspondence and, therefore, did not want copies made and disseminated at this time.

OBSERVATION:

This matter has dragged on and on for many months already while State has "negotiated" with the Canadians. It would appear that we are headed for further delay and we cannot understand what matters State desires be clarified inasmuch as the Canadian reply is perfectly clear and they have said no. In the meantime, the NSC policy is not being carried out.

We could suggest to the ICIS Secretary that he secure the latest information concerning this matter from the State Department member of ICIS in order that the matter might be further considered by ICIS and a decision made by Treasury as to what action to take concerning examination of Soviet bloc diplomatic officials and shipments entering the U.S. at Saint Albans, Vermont. This is, however, a State Department responsibility.

ACTION:

For information.

The agencies operating these devices are ICIS agencies. I think it is ICIS responsibility to see that they are used.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Orig - Strauss
1 - Yellow
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Parsons
1 - Mr. Whitson
1 - Mr. Day
1 - Liaison Section

5- IIC

117-268-1004

February 28, 1958

BY COURIER SERVICE

REC-24

EX-117

Honorable Lewis L. Strauss
Chairman
U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
Washington, D. C.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4/9/03 BY SP1 BJA/BNP

Dear Admiral:

Your invitation of February 21, 1958, to a demonstration of detection devices, tentatively scheduled for the afternoon of April 28, 1958, has been discussed with my IIC colleagues, and, while the date is somewhat distant for us to make a firm commitment at this time, we are most interested in viewing the new devices and we hope to be present on the date scheduled.

At this time, the following plan to attend the demonstration:

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army, two of the following:

Major General Robert A. Shaw
Brigadier General Royal B. Reynolds, Jr.
Colonel Elmer E. Ulsch

For the Office of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy:

Captain Samuel B. Frankel
Captain John R. Bromley

For the Office of Special Investigations, Department of the Air Force:

Brigadier General John K. Murray
Mr. Gilbert R. Levy

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FEB 27 1958 MAIL ROOM

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GAD:hke
(12)

(See NOTE ON YELLOW on next page.)

SENT DIRECTOR FOR APPROVAL 2-28-58

Honorable Lewis L. Strauss

I hope that it will be possible for me to attend the demonstration but, in any event, Assistant Directors Alan H. Belmont and Donald J. Parsons will be present.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover
Chairman
Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference

NOTE ON YELLOW: Incoming, attached, indicates AEC will demonstrate 4 or 5 devices for detection of radioactive materials for use in program discussed by National Security Council on February 13 with Director participating. Liaison has learned demonstration will be held at Naval Ordnance Laboratories near Silver Spring. A "dress rehearsal" demonstration will be given about a week before for the Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures and its Advisory Group. IIC working people can attend this, according to John Kelly of AEC.

DO-6

OFFICE OF DIRECTOR
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

February 25, 1958

It is noted that the attached communication is addressed to the Director and J. Walter Yeagley.

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Nease
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. Jones
Mr. Clayton
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

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EXPRESS

FEB 25 1958

CARD MADE IN TELE ROOM 2-25-58 RLD

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: March 21, 1958

Tic: 1 - Belmont
1 - Branigan
1 - Whitson
1 - Day

FROM : W. A. Branigan

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Nichols
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Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: JOINT IIC - ICIS COMMITTEE ON COUNTERMEASURES OSMAB

At 3:55 p.m., 3-21-58 Mr. Carl Pfuntner, ICIS Secretariat, telephoned and informed SA Whitson that he had been unable to prepare in advance of the meeting of the Joint Committee scheduled 3-24-58 a draft regarding the field testing procedures for detection devices as proposed by the Advisory Group. He stated he would have a draft ready, however, for the Joint Committee's consideration at the time of the meeting.

Pfuntner stated that at the Standing Committee of the ICIS on 3-20-58 the Department of State representative advised that State had been considering National Security Council Action 1868 concerning diplomatic shipments showing evidence of "substantial" radioactivity. After conferring with representatives of AEC, Customs and the Naval Research Laboratory, State could not come up with a satisfactory definition of "substantial." Accordingly, the Standing Committee of ICIS voted to refer the problem of the interpretation of the "substantial" in NSC Action 1868 to the Joint IIC - ICIS Committee on Countermeasures. Pfuntner stated it would be on the agenda for the 3-24-58 meetings.

OBSERVATION:

The Joint Committee has a technical advisor from AEC and can also call upon the services of the Advisory Group (Customs, Coast Guard, INS and AEC), which reports to the IIC and ICIS on the Detection Device Program.

RECOMMENDATIONS: EX. - 135 REC- 23 117-268-1805

6 MAR 25 1958

After obtaining the necessary facts from the AEC and the Advisory Group regarding the reaction of detection devices to the nuclear components of clandestine devices, appropriate comments will be made by the IIC representative on the Joint Committee for the consideration of the Working Committee of the IIC.

58 APR 11 1958

With regard to the field testing draft, no comments will be made at the meeting and the draft will be analyzed and appropriate recommendations made within the Bureau prior to any concurrence regarding its transmittal to the IIC and ICIS.

55 MAR 26 1958

117-268

(5)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4/9/03 BY SP4 AM/lmp

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: March 18, 1958

FROM : W. A. Branigan

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Rosen
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Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: JOINT IIC-ICIS COMMITTEE ON COUNTERMEASURES

Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures (Committee B) met at 10 a.m., 3-17-58. Chairman Frank Welch, OSI, announced that Mr. J. P. Coyne, National Security Council representative for internal security matters, had informed him that the ONI representative on the Intelligence Advisory Committee had questioned the Naval Research Laboratory as to what Mr. Don Gale (the AEC and NRL representative on the Advisory Group) had been doing at Friendship Airport on the occasion of the arrival of the Soviet jet transport. The facts were that Gale was in the airport terminal building supervising [redacted] all of the passengers of the Soviet plane, with the exception of the Russian Ambassador and his wife, and all the baggage from the plane had been routed. Apparently, the ONI representative on IAC was not aware of the detection device program. Coyne, according to Welch, was taking steps to put the ONI officer straight in the matter. Gale who was present at the Joint Committee meeting stated that his superior in the Naval Research Laboratory was aware of the detection device program and had, in fact, accompanied him to Friendship Airport.

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Mr. Pfuntner of the ICIS Secretariat distributed a memorandum from Mr. J. Walter Yeagley, Chairman of ICIS, requesting that Committee B review the quarterly report on the detection device program from the Treasury Department and comment on the degree of adequacy of the implementation of the IIC-ICIS recommendations of 8-26-57 on which the quarterly report was predicated. The IIC representative stated that the report had been considered by the Working Committee of the IIC and no comments were necessary. Accordingly, Committee B instructed Mr. Pfuntner that Committee B considered no comment necessary.

Mr. Gale of the Advisory Group announced that the Department of State had authorized a large number of Polish passengers which would disembark from the "Batory" at Halifax to cross the United States at Vanceboro, Maine, en route Detroit. Gale stated that it would

117-268

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Branigan
1 - Mr. Day
1 - Mr. Whitson

LW:tw
(5)

55 MAR 27 1958

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REC- 48 117-268-1606

6 MAR 26 1958

EX-136

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apparently be impossible for Customs to check all of these people and their baggage with the portable [redacted] devices available but that their baggage could be physically inspected. The ICIS representatives indicated that Customs would do the best it could under the circumstances and report any pertinent results to the IIC and ICIS. b2 b7E

This raised discussion of the question, pending for some while, of Canadian consent for Customs use [redacted] in Canada. The IIC representative stated that it had been indicated the Canadians were not favorably inclined toward Customs checking items leaving Canada, but were more concerned with shipments entering Canada at Halifax and Vancouver. ICIS is following State on this matter.

(NOTE: 3-24-58 STATE TO SENT TO IIC & ICIS NOTIFICATION OF CANADA REFUSAL LW)

The Committee B also considered a Customs report on unaccompanied Soviet-bloc diplomatic shipments through January, 1958. Mr. John Kelly, AEC technical advisor to Committee B, pointed out that certain Soviet shipments which were listed weighed considerably more than they should; for example, a package measuring twelve inches in length by ten inches in diameter and allegedly containing film weighed 215 pounds, according to the Customs schedule. Kelly pointed out that this approximated the weight of steel rather than film. Mr. Pfuntner of the ICIS Secretariat stated that he would check back with Customs to determine the accuracy of the figures.

Committee B also discussed the proposed field testing of detection device procedures as proposed by the Advisory Group. This has been the subject of a separate memorandum.

RECOMMENDATION:

None. For your information. The pending matters will be followed with Mr. Pfuntner and you will be advised of pertinent developments.

OFFICE MEMORANDUM - UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

To: DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268) Date: 3/18/58

From: SAC, NEW YORK (117-192)

Subject: SMAB
~~PRODIP~~

ReBulet to New York, 2/14/58 under above dual caption, and enclosed 0-1 form dated 3/13/58.

On 3/17/58, SAs [redacted] conferred with Major JAMES S. LiCALZI, Commanding Officer of 542nd Ordnance Detachment, First Army, Governors Island, NY. This unit has responsibility for disposal of explosives in the First Army Area.

b7C

Major LiCALZI stated that in event of war emergency, upon request of the New York Office, he would immediately dispatch a unit from the 542nd Ordnance Detachment to the New York Office. This unit will be available to support the New York Office in handling any problems encountered by the New York Office in its searches under Prodip. This unit will be available so long as needed by New York and be equipped to handle any nuclear disposal problem encountered. The request will be made by the New York Office by telephone direct to Major LiCALZI at Whitehall 4-7700, extensions 7266 or 7268.

With regard to the problem of disposal of any clandestine device which may be encountered in the First Army Area by the FBI, as may arise at any time, Major LiCALZI requested that whatever FBI office encounters this problem should make a request for assistance direct to him at the above listed number. He prefers that such requests not be relayed to him through the New York Office. He further requested that the FBI office making the request also communicate at once with what it believes to be the nearest Ordnance Detachment, and advise that unit that the

3-Bureau (Enc.1) RM
(2-Bufile 117-268) (SMAB)
(1-Bufile 66-17440) (PRODIP)
2-Albany (RM) (117-61)
2-Boston (RM)
2-Buffalo (117-25) RM
2-Newark (RM)
2-New Haven (117-29) RM
1-New York (100-90409D) (PRODIP)
1-New York (117-192)

EWC:EG
(15)

REC-17 117-268-1607

26

11 MAR 21 1958

EX-128

EX-PROC

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55 MAR 27 1958

request for assistance is being made to Major LiCALZI.

Major LiCALZI stated that by so doing, valuable time may be saved in getting units to the scene where the device has been located, as such unit will probably be the one dispatched by him, and it will prepare itself for action immediately upon receipt of the notice from the FBI office, though it will not move until commanded to do so by his office.

Major LiCALZI stated that his telephone extensions are manned twenty-four hours every day by himself or someone acting for him.

It is noted that all offices receiving copies of this letter have previously been advised of the location of detachments in their respective territories.

Accordingly, those offices, as well as New York, upon reported findings of clandestine nuclear weapons, will obtain specific Bureau approval and then call upon Major LiCALZI for assistance for disposal and immediately notify the nearest Ordnance Detachment that it is requesting such assistance from Major LiCALZI.

NY 117-192

The following up-to-date list of Ordnance Detachments in the First Army Area has been received from Major LiCALZI, who stated that from time to time he will advise the NYO of changes that occur in this list.

This list supersedes the list previously furnished to all offices in the First Army Area. These offices will be kept advised of information furnished by Major LiCALZI in the future concerning these detachments.

Unit	Commanding Officer
542d Ordnance Detachment (Explosive Disposal Control) Governors Island, New York 4,NY Tel: WHitehall 4-7700; Ext. 7266 or 7268. (This unit controls all Explosive Disposal Units in First Army Area)	Major JAMES S. LI CALZI, Commanding Capt. RICHARD C. ROBINSON, Operations Officer
40th Ordnance Detachment (Explosive Disposal) Fort Niagara, Youngstown, New York Tel: Youngstown 7-7381, Ext. 360	1st Lt. WALTER KORSGAARD
42nd Ordnance Detachment (Explosive Disposal) Delaware Storage Activity Pedricktown, New Jersey Tel: Pennsgrove 800, Ext. 77	1st Lt. JAMES H. ROBERTS 2nd Lt. DAVID K. WILLARD (assumes command 4 April 1958 vise Lt. ROBERTS)
54th Ordnance Detachment (Explosive Disposal) Fort Totten 59, New York Tel: Bayside 9-1900, Ext. 3249	1st Lt. WALTER G. GREINER
55th Ordnance Detachment (Explosive Disposal) Fort Devens, Mass. Tel: Ayer, Mass. SPruce 2-3311, Ext. 3313 or 3012	1st Lt. EARL F. THOMPSON

NY 117-192

Unit	Commanding Officer
60th Ordnance Detachment (Explosive Disposal) Fort Dix, New Jersey Tel: Raymond 4-2000, Ext. 25210	1st Lt. CLARENCE GREENHILL 2nd Lt. EDWARD L. HARDY (assumes command on departure of Lt. GREENHILL)
65th Ordnance Detachment (Explosive Disposal) USA Garrison, Ft. Williams, Maine Tel: Portland, SPruce 2-4072	1st Lt. LAWRENCE W. WHITNEY
66th Ordnance Detachment (Explosive Disposal) Fort Slocum, New York Tel: New Rochelle 9-0900, Ext. 68	1st Lt. ROBERT A. DONAHUE
72nd Ordnance Detachment (Explosive Disposal) Raritan Arsenal, Metuchen, New Jersey Tel: WH 3-4233, Ext. 823	1st Lt. MORGAN E. TACKETT
132d Ordnance Detachment (Explosive Disposal) Fort Tilden 95, New York Tel: Neptune 4-2900, Ext. 48	1st Lt. CLIFTON D. PRUETT, JR.
143rd Ordnance Detachment (Explosive Disposal) Seneca Ordnance Depot (NDA) Romulus, New York Tel: Justice 5-4481, Ext. 7258 or 7560	Capt. WILLIAM C. KISSINGER Capt. NICHOLAS MIKU (Acting CO until new CO arrives)
144th Ordnance Detachment (Explosive Disposal) Fort Devens, Mass. Tel: Ayers, Mass. SPruce 2-3311, Ext. 2307	Capt. NICHOLAS MIKU
146th Ordnance Detachment (Explosive Disposal) Fort Banks, Mass. Tel: Boston LIberty 2-6000, Ext. 279	1st Lt. CHARLES R. BAILEY

Tic - 1 - Mr. Ezell
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Whiteon

117-268

Date: March 26, 1958

To: Captain John A. Waters
Director of Security
Atomic Energy Commission
Room 1008
1717 H Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS
THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

The memorandum from this Bureau dated May 10, 1956, captioned as above, should be downgraded from "Secret" to "Confidential."

(117-268-1063)

LW:smk
(6)

NOTE:

Referenced memo discussed the reaction [redacted] detection device at Idlewild Airport to ten pounds of radioactive rare earth. This should be classified "Confidential" under the "Classification Guide for Detection Device Program."

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REC- 19 117-268-1068

EX-136

BY COURIER SVC.
92 MAR 26
COMM-FBI

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LBI

55 MAR 27 1958

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/9/03 BY SP4 GTN/ENP

1 - Mr. Branigan
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Whitson

117-268

Date: March 26, 1958

To: Captain John A. Waters
Director of Security
Atomic Energy Commission
Room 1008
1717 H Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

The memoranda from this Bureau, captioned as above, dated September 12, and September 19, 1956, should be downgraded from "Secret" to "Confidential."

(117-268-1122, 1133)

LW:smk
(6)

EX-136 REC- 19 117-268-1607

NOTE:

Letters reflect detection device reaction to uranite and thorium ore which is now classifiable as "Confidential" under "Classification Guide for Detection Device Program."

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10 MAR 28

BY COURIER SVC.
92 MAR 26
COMM - FBI

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MAIL ROOM

55 MAR 27 1958

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/9/03 BY SP4 BTM/RNP

c - 1 - Mr. Branigan
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Whitson

117-268

Date: March 26, 1958

To: Captain John A. Waters
Director of Security
Atomic Energy Commission
Room 1008
1717 H Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE U. S.
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

The memoranda from this Bureau, captioned as above, dated October 4, and October 12, 1956, should be downgraded from "Secret" to "Confidential."

(117-268-1139, 1145)

LW:smk
(6)

NOTE:
Referenced memoranda discuss reaction of detection device to radioactive material which reaction is classifiable "Confidential" in the "Classification Guide for Detection Device Program."

REC- 19 117-268-1145

BY COURIER SVC.
92 MAR 26
COMM - FBI

EX-106

16 MAR 27 1958

FBI
MAIL ROOM

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/9/03 BY SP4 JTA/RNP

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55 MAR 27 1958

Tic - 1 - Mr. Branigan
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Whitson

117-268

Date: March 26, 1958

To: Captain John A. Waters
Director of Security
Atomic Energy Commission
Room 1008
1717 H Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

The memorandum from this Bureau dated October 26, 1956, captioned as above, should be downgraded from "Secret" to "Confidential."

(117-268-1153)

LW:smk
(6)

EX-136 REC-19 117-268-1611

19 MAR 27 1958

NOTE:

Memorandum discussed detection device reaction to ten pounds of crude uranium ore which is now classifiable "Confidential" under the "Classification Guide for Detection Device Program."

BY COURIER SVC.
MAR 26
COMM - FBI

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55 MAR 27 1958

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 4/9/03 BY SP4 BJA/RNP

LBI

1 - Mr. Ezell
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Whitson

117-268

Date: March 26, 1958

To: Captain John A. Waters
Director of Security
Atomic Energy Commission
Room 1008
1717 H Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE U. S.
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

The memorandum from this Bureau dated May 25, 1956, captioned as above, should be downgraded from "Secret" to "Confidential."

(117-268-1069)

1 - Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
Department of the Army

Attention: Chief, Security Division

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/9/03 BY SP4/BTA/RNP

LW:smk
(7)

REC- 23

117-268-1012

MAR 27 1958

NOTE: Referenced memo discussed the reaction of detection device at Idlewild Airport to radioactive therapeutic material. This should be classified "Confidential" under the "Classification Guide for Detection Device Program."

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58 MAR 28 1958

MAIL ROOM

BY COURIER SVC.
92 MAR 26
COMM - FBI

Tic 1 - Mr. Ezell
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Whitson

117-268

Date: March 27, 1958

To: Captain John A. Waters
Director of Security
Atomic Energy Commission
Room 1008
1717 H Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

The memoranda from this Bureau dated June 4, 1956, the first dealing with a mail package from Finland and the second dealing with a collection of minerals from South Africa, should be downgraded from "Secret" to "Confidential."

(117-268-1072, 1074)
(Brazeau)

b7C

LWisemk
(7)

1 - [redacted]

REC- 13 117-268 1613

16 MAR 28 1958

NOTE:

Referenced memoranda discuss the reaction of [redacted] detection device to a 16-pound mineral sample contained in a mail package and the reaction [redacted] to a collection of minerals which included pitchblende. These memoranda should be classified "Confidential" under the "Classification Guide for Detection Device Program."

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58 APR 1 1958

BY COURIER SVC.
94 MAR 27
COMM - FBI

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- Mr. Boardman
- Liaison
- Mr. Whitson

117-268

Date: March 26, 1958

To: Captain John A. Waters
Director of Security
Atomic Energy Commission
Room 1008
1717 H Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: [redacted] b7C
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

The memorandum from this Bureau dated December 29, 1955, captioned as above, should be downgraded from "Secret" to "Confidential."

(117-268-951)

LW:smk
(6)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 6/9/03 BY SP4BJA/ENP

NOTE:

This related to the reaction of a detection device at Port of New York to certain pieces of unidentified ore. It should be classified "Confidential" according to the "Classification Guide for Detection Device Program."

BY COURIER SVC.
93 MAR 27
COMM - FBI

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REC-61 117-268-1614

EX-126

18 MAR 28 1958

APR 1 1958

T - 1 - Mr. Exell
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Whitson

117-268

Date: March 27, 1958

To: Captain John A. Waters
Director of Security
Atomic Energy Commission
Room 1008
1717 H Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/9/03 BY SP4BTW/RWP

Subject: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS
THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

The memorandum from this Bureau dated May 25, 1956, captioned as above, should be downgraded from "Secret" to "Confidential."

(117-268-1070)

LW:emk
(7)

1 - 62-40361 (Ward's National Science Establishment, Inc.)

b2
b7E

NOTE:
Referenced memo discusses reaction of [redacted] device to a package containing "under-sea stones." This should be classified "Confidential" according to the "Classification Guide for Detection Device Program."

BY COURIER SVC
94 MAR 27
COMM-FBI

REC-13 13

117-268-1145

12 MAR 28 1958

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55 APR 1 1958

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EX-128

62-41361-1

FILED IN

- 1 - Mr. Ezell
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Whitson

b7C

[redacted]

Date: March 26, 1958

To: Captain John A. Waters
Director of Security
Atomic Energy Commission
Room 1008
1717 H Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: [redacted] b7C
MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING

(ESPIONAGE)



The memorandum from this Bureau dated March 22, 1956, captioned as above, should be downgraded from "Secret" to "Confidential."

[redacted] green check 117-268 under serial 1098) b7C

1 - Mr. E. Tomlin Bailey
Director
Office of Security
Department of State
515 22nd Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

LW:smk
(8)

1 - 117-268 (Smuggling of Atomic Bombs)

117-268-✓
NOT RECORDED
76 MAR 27 1958

NOTE:

Memo discussed reaction of mineral samples of torbernite on detection device Idlewild Airport. This is classifiable as "Confidential" under the "Classification Guide for Detection Device Program."

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FBI 237
63 MAR 31 1958
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DATE 6/9/03 BY SP4 BSA/ENP

YELLOW DUPLICATE
MAR 26 1958
MAILED

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: 3/25/58

FROM : W. A. Branigan

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Branigan
1 - Mr. Day
1 - Mr. Whitson

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SUBJECT: JOINT IIC-ICIS COMMITTEE ON COUNTERMEASURES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/9/03 BY SP4BJS/LMP

Re memorandum Branigan to Belmont, 3/17/58 regarding discussion of Advisory Group recommendation for field testing of effectiveness of present detection device procedures. FBI and IIC representatives stated this was up to ICIS and that the IIC would not suggest it or back it. At the request of the ICIS representatives, the Advisory Group and the AEC technical advisor, Mr. Pfuntner of ICIS Secretariat was to draft a memorandum from Mr. Frank Welch, Chairman of the Joint Committee, to the IIC and the ICIS pointing out the problem and asking for guidance. A draft of this memorandum was circulated at the Joint Committee meeting 3/24/58. This draft, copy of which is attached, points out that in the opinion of the scientific and technical experts it is impossible to devise laboratory experiments which will reliably determine the detection capability of the devices nearly as well as the field tests proposed by the Advisory Group.

Briefly, the Advisory Group recommends that through the good offices of the Department of State,

[redacted]

b2
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Advisory Group states the procedures have been discussed with and have the informal approval of State, Customs and AEC but propose that the chairmen of IIC and ICIS sign a letter to the Secretary of State making a formal request for Department of State participation. The draft memorandum from Welch to IIC and ICIS states "It is believed that the plan outlined in the draft letter to the Secretary of State (a letter proposed for the signatures of the chairmen of the IIC and the ICIS) and its enclosures would constitute the needed controlled experiments and it is recommended that this plan or one similar to it be approved by the IIC and the ICIS."

REC- 91

Enclosure
LW:smk
(5)

ENCLOSURE

EX-110

6 APR 1 1958

58 APR 11 1958

Memorandum from Mr. Branigan to Mr. Belmont
Re: Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. It is respectfully recommended that Mr. Carl Pfuntner of the ICIS be advised that the quoted sentence should clearly show that the Advisory Group, not the Joint IIC-ICIS Committee, is recommending the plan to the IIC and ICIS. The Advisory Group consists of representatives of Customs, Coast Guard and Immigration, and a representative for the AEC and Naval Research Laboratory. The sentence should, therefore, read: "The Advisory Group believes that the plan outlined in the draft letter to the Secretary of State and its enclosures would constitute the needed controlled experiments and the Advisory Group recommends that this plan or one similar to it be approved by the IIC and the ICIS."

PFUNTNER ADVISED
3-28-58, LW
JOINT COMMITTEE CONCURRED
3-31-58, LW

2. With this change there would appear to be no objection to the memorandum going forward for the consideration of the parent committees but the IIC position on the recommendation should continue to be that any arrangements for testing the detection devices in the field are a matter within the purview of the Advisory Group and the ICIS agencies involved and no action by the IIC is necessary.

D R A F T

~~SECRET~~

March 21, 1958

MEMORANDUM TO: Chairmen, IIC and ICIS

FROM: Franklin L. Welch, Chairman
Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures

SUBJECT: Arrangements for Performing Tests to Evaluate the Capability of the Present Detection Devices

As the result of a suggestion by the AEC Technical Consultants Panel [redacted] and pursuant to discussion in the Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures, the Advisory Group undertook to work out procedures for carrying out the above-mentioned tests [redacted] United States. The Advisory Group, in consultation with representatives of the Department of State, Department of the Treasury (Customs Bureau), and the AEC, prepared a draft letter to the Secretary of State containing five enclosures. A copy of the draft letter dated February 14, 1958, and copies of its enclosures, are enclosed.

b2

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It should be noted that in the opinion of the scientific and technical experts, it is impossible to devise laboratory experiments which will reliably determine the ~~effectiveness of the detection~~ detection capability of the devices nearly as well as the proposed practical field tests. In the course of any given period of time of practical operations the detection devices will give a number of readings from items entering the country in various types of shipments and on the persons of individuals. However, in view of the variations in the conditions under which such readings are obtained and

memo Brown(C) to Belmont 3-25-58 CWL:pmc

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ENCLOSURE

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117-268-1616

in the composition of the sources of the readings, there is no "control" element upon which to base an estimate of the ~~effectiveness~~ detection capability of the devices and thus of the program for their use. ~~It is believed~~ THE ADVISORY GROUP believes that the plan outlined in the draft letter to the Secretary of State and its enclosures would constitute the needed controlled experiments and ~~it is recommended~~ THE ADVISORY GROUP recommends that this plan or one similar to it be approved by the IIC and ICIS. The proposed procedures have ~~working level~~ tentative approval within State (Bailey), Customs (Straus), and AEC. If ~~the~~ the plan is acceptable to IIC and ICIS as submitted, or with modifications, the Advisory Group of Committee B desires to coordinate it further with State (Steubel), Customs and AEC, before the dispatch of the proposed letter to State.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268)

DATE: 3/26/58

FROM : SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (135-319)

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES

ReSan Diego letter to Bureau, 3/12/58, San Diego airtel to Bureau, 10/16/57 and San Francisco letter to Bureau, 3/7/58.

Upon receipt of San Diego letter dated 3/12/58 the San Francisco Office recontacted the 548th Ordnance Detachment, Presidio of San Francisco, to confirm the information set forth in San Francisco letter dated 3/7/58.

Upon recontact with the 548th Ordnance Detachment it was determined that the information set forth in San Francisco letter dated 3/7/58 is correct as set forth and is the current procedure in effect within the 6th Army area.

It appears that the Commanding Officer of the 70th Ordnance Detachment is confused as to his territory as no part of the State of Nevada is covered by the 70th Ordnance Detachment.

The 548th Ordnance Detachment reiterated that Clark County, Nevada, is covered by the 58th Ordnance Detachment and the remaining counties in Nevada are covered by the 548th Ordnance Detachment.

2 - Bureau (117-268) (REG.)
1 - San Diego (66-998)
1 - Salt Lake City
1 - San Francisco

HPF/af #12
(5)

REC-19 117-261-1617

29 APR 1 1958

EX-128

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ESP. SEC.

58 APR 3 1958

EX-BRC

Read from ICIS 3-24-58 LW app 3-31-58

~~SECRET~~

JOINT IIC-ICIS COMMITTEE ON COUNTERMEASURES

MINUTES OF MEETING

MARCH 17, 1958

The Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures met at 10:00 a.m., in Room 2515, Department of Justice. The following members were present:

IIC:	Mr. Franklin L. Welch, Chairman (Air Force)
	Mr. Lish Whitson (FBI)
ICIS:	Col. Alexander Graham
	Col. Albert W. Jones (Defense)
	Capt. John R. Stewart (Coast Guard)

* * * * *

AEC Advisor:	Mr. John S. Kelly
Naval Research Laboratory:	Mr. Donald Gale
ICIS Secretariat:	Mr. Carl H. Pfuntner

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/19/03 BY SP4BJA/ENP

117-268

NOT RECORDED 6 APR 1 1958

117-268

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FIP 58 APR 1 1958

5-KW

~~SECRET~~

1. Minutes

The Committee approved the minutes of its meeting of January 23, 1958, without change.

2. Arrival of Soviet Jet Aircraft on February 6, 1958, at Friendship Airport

The Committee considered the report dated February 10, 1958, which had been prepared by the Advisory Group and which was transmitted by memorandum dated February 14, 1958, from the Executive Secretary, ICIS.

Mr. Welch ~~(and Mr. Whitcomb)~~ referred to comments ~~they~~ Re had received from Mr. Coyne concerning criticism, by a retired Colonel who is apparently a city official of Baltimore, of the procedures which had been followed in connection with the February 6 arrival. This criticism had evidently been based on misunderstanding, and Mr. Coyne was taking the necessary steps to clarify the record, especially insofar as the criticism touched on the presence of Mr. Gale at the airport.

The Committee agreed that the procedures followed in connection with the February 6, 1958, arrival at Friendship Airport appeared to be satisfactory, and the IIC and ICIS will be so notified.

3. Surveys of Unaccompanied Soviet Bloc Shipments

The Committee noted the survey of December 1957, which had been distributed by memorandum dated February 27, 1958, from the Executive Secretary, ICIS.

The Committee considered the survey for January 1958 which had been distributed by memorandum dated March 7, 1958, from the Executive Secretary, ICIS. The Committee agreed that further inquiry should be made as to the first (seven packages weighing 200 pounds each), fourth (six packages weighing 362 pounds each), and eighth (nine packages weighing 215 pounds each) items listed on the first page of the survey for January 1958. It appeared to members that these packages were extremely heavy for their indicated size and contents.

/On March 18, 1958, the Secretary made informal inquiry of Mr. Sander of the Bureau of Customs. He agreed that the weight seemed to be high, and agreed to check the New York Customs Office on these specific shipments. When additional information is received from Mr. Sander, the Secretary will report to the Committee./

4. Arrangements for Performing Tests to Evaluate the Capability of Present Detection Devices

By memorandum dated February 18, 1958, the Chairman of the Advisory Group distributed to the Committee a draft letter dated February 14, 1958, to the Secretary of the Treasury and enclosures, giving working details for carrying out [redacted] tests. The proposed letter and enclosures were considered by the Committee. b2 b7E

Mr. Gale explained that the procedures as set forth in the letter and enclosures had been discussed with representatives of State, Customs, and AEC. If the procedures were approved by the Committee, the Advisory Group had agreed with Customs that they would be further coordinated in that agency before being forwarded to IIC and ICIS.

Col. Graham asked whether, in order to avert any possible mishap, it would be necessary to inform SAC in advance of each test to be made. Mr. Kelly said that there was no likelihood of the kind of mishap Col. Graham had in mind. Readings on the devices are constantly obtained by Customs, and if the source of a reading was not identifiable by Customs, the incident would still not reach military channels, but would simply call for consultation with AEC. There was no possibility of any report on such occurrences getting into military channels unless and until the AEC should clearly declare that a given item was a nuclear weapon or a component of a nuclear weapon.

With regard to the proposal that a joint IIC-ICIS letter be sent to State, Mr. Whitson said that he did not believe that IIC would want to request State to carry out the program as set forth in the proposed letter. IIC would not want to inject itself into such an inspection program, which would appear to be not only a test of the adequacy of the devices, but of the proficiency of personnel as well. Any test of operating proficiency was properly an inspection function of Treasury. However, IIC did not object if the ICIS wished to send the proposed letter to State. Mr. Gale said that the tests as proposed had been very carefully designed to check equipment and not the proficiency of operators. He pointed out that the

[redacted] b2 b7E

Mr. Kelly emphasized the importance of such practical tests as those being proposed, and said that no laboratory tests, however elaborately devised, could take the place of the practical field tests under consideration. He felt that this was a proposal for testing the over-all efficiency of the program, and that it ought to be backed up by IIC and ICIS. Mr. Whitson said that the IIC did not feel that any special backing by the parent committees was necessary since the agencies concerned apparently were agreed on the procedures to be followed. Mr. Kelly said that in spite of this agreement on procedures, it was necessary that the agencies be requested to go through with the tests. He felt that the nature of the tests, involving possible embarrassment and inconvenience to the bearers of the test material, should be coordinated by the parent committees. It might consider sending a letter to Treasury soliciting cooperation.

Following further discussion, it was agreed that a draft letter to IIC and ICIS should be prepared recommending that the simulated entry tests be made and covering the following points:

1. The effectiveness of the equipment cannot be determined on the basis of the laboratory tests; and,

2. Controlled field tests are necessary and are advised by the Technical Consultants Panel.

A draft letter is to be prepared by the Secretary for consideration at the next meeting.

5. Quarterly Report by Treasury on the Operational Aspects of the Detection Device Program

Copies were distributed of a report by Treasury on the detection device program for the quarter ending December 31, 1957, which had been submitted by a letter dated February 25, 1958, from the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury and was being distributed to Committee B under memorandum dated March 12, 1958, from the Chairman, ICIS.

Mr. Whitson said that the IIC working committee had examined the Treasury report and had no comments.

It was agreed that members would notify the Secretary of any comments on the Treasury report which they might have. No comments by ICIS mbrs.

Next Meeting

The Committee agreed that it would meet next on March 24, 1958, at 10:00 a.m., in Room 2515, Department of Justice.

Rec'd from ICIS
3-31-58 LW
MPP 3-31-58



~~SECRET~~

JOINT IIC-ICIS COMMITTEE ON COUNTERMEASURES

MINUTES OF MEETING

MARCH 24, 1958

The Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures met at 10:00 a.m., in Room 2515, Department of Justice. The following members were present:

IIC:	Mr. Franklin L. Welch, Chairman (Air Force)
	Mr. Lish Whitson (FBI)
ICIS:	Col. Alexander Graham
	Lt. Col. Albert W. Jones, Alt. (Defense)
AEC Adviser:	Mr. John S. Kelly

* * * * *

Department of State: (Diplomatic Courier Service)	Mr. B. J. Humes (For Item 2)
Advisory Group:	Mr. Donald Gale, Chairman (NRL)
ICIS Secretariat:	Mr. Carl H. Pfuntner

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117-268
NOT RECORDED
6 APR 1 1958

117-268
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58 APR 1 1958

1. Minutes

Copies of the minutes for the meeting of March 17, 1958, were distributed at the meeting. Consideration was postponed until the next meeting.

2. Shipments Entering the United States Under Diplomatic Immunity

Copies were distributed of a memorandum dated March 24, 1958, from the Chairman, ICIS. This memorandum referred to NSC Action No. 1868, February 27, 1958, and requested the Committee to work out whatever definition or criteria would be appropriate for applying the term "substantial radioactivity".

The ensuing discussion pertained to technical details of new detection devices involving "restricted data". It is, accordingly, not summarized in these minutes. The Committee agreed that a draft reply to the memorandum dated March 24, 1958 should be prepared in the light of this discussion, and such a draft is being prepared for consideration at the next meeting.

3. Arrangements for Performing Tests to Evaluate the Capability of Present Detection Devices

Copies were distributed of a draft memorandum dated March 21, 1958, to the Chairmen, IIC and ICIS, on the above subject. This draft had been prepared pursuant to discussion at the last meeting (see Item 4, minutes of March 17, 1958).

The Committee agreed on amendments to the March 21 draft, and it was approved pending concurrence by Mr. Whitson. with Amendment per memo Brannigan to Belmont 3-25-58

4. Quarterly Report by Treasury on Detection Device Program

At the last meeting (see Item 5, minutes of March 17, 1958) there had been discussion of the Treasury report for the quarter ended December 31, 1957, submitted by Treasury letter dated February 25, 1958, and distributed to Committee B by memorandum dated March 12, 1958, from the Chairman, ICIS. At that time Mr. Whitson had indicated that he would have no comment on the Treasury report and other members had indicated they would transmit their comments to the Secretariat. Mr. Welch, Captain Stewart and Colonel Graham now indicated that they had no comments on the report.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: March 26, 1958

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTO THE UNITED STATES

Tolson
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see 117-268-1603

My memorandum of March 14, attached, discussed the Canadian rejection of a proposal that U.S. Customs inspectors be permitted to use a detection device in examining baggage on U.S.-bound trains between Saint Johns, Quebec, and Saint Albans, Vermont.

see 117-268-1618

By letter of March 21, attached, State is formally notifying the Director, as IIC Chairman, concerning this. The State letter is actually a reply to the joint IIC-ICIS letter of March 27, 1956, which asked State to discuss this proposal with the Canadian Government. The letter requires no reply.

The State letter points out the possibility that the Canadian Government might be receptive to a proposal for the furnishing of detection devices to Canadian officials for use in various Canadian ports. State notes that IIC "may wish to pursue this matter with the interested agencies."

OBSERVATION:

It took two years to get this reply to our request. The Canadian letter clearly states that it is their opinion that it is improbable that the Soviet Union would wish to introduce nuclear weapons into North America, and that the Canadian authorities are "dubious about the efficacy of the measures proposed...." In the light of these Canadian views, it would appear impractical to attempt to pursue this matter further. Although IIC and ICIS have been jointly charged by the President with the responsibility for the detection device program, the agencies using the devices are ICIS agencies. Further, IIC and ICIS have asked Treasury to be responsible

filed 117-268-1603 bac 3/14/58

Enclosures

GAD:pwf;hke
(6)

1-Mr. Boardman
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Mr. Day
1-Liaison Section

117-268-1611

REC-24

6 APR 2 1958

EX-128

FC 8

63 APR 24 1958

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for supervising the operational aspects of the program. IIC should not, therefore, become involved in the operational details.

ACTION:

We will schedule this for consideration by the IIC Working Committee. We will state, as indicated above, that we do not believe that this matter should be pursued further.

Date: 3-24-58

To: Director, FBI

From: Legat, Mexico

Re: MEXICO CITY OFFICE FORMS

ATT: FORMS MANAGEMENT DESK,
TRAINING AND INSPECTION DIVISION

ReBulet 3-20-58 concerning the adoption of form called "Incoming Diplomatic Pouch Log," new form MEX-5.

Attached are two copies of the new form. All copies of the old forms have been exhausted and a copy of revised Mex-5 has been placed in the form book in this office. Obsolete forms MEX 4 and MEX 5 have been removed from the form book.

2 Bureau
1 Mexico
JNS/FvS
(3)

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NOT RECORDED
145 APR 3 1958

INITIALS ON ORIGINAL

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

55 APR 4 1958

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

~~SECRET~~

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: 3/24/58

FROM : W. A. Branigan

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Parsons
1 - Mr. Branigan
1 - Mr. Day
1 - Mr. Whitson

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Tele. Room
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Gandy

SUBJECT: JOINT IIC-ICIS COMMITTEE ON COUNTERMEASURES

At a meeting of the Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures (Committee B), 10 a.m., 3/24/58, there was a discussion of the meaning of the term "substantial radioactivity" as used in NSC Action Number 1868, which provides that the Department of State should develop procedures for the detention and inspection or refusal of entry of diplomatic shipments which the detection devices indicate have "substantial radioactivity." The Department of State representative on the ICIS Standing Committee had recommended, and the ICIS concurred, that the matter be referred to Committee B for consideration.

The following facts were developed during the course of the discussion in which John Kelly, Technical Advisor to the Joint Committee from AEC, Bernard J. Humes, Diplomatic Mail Branch, Division of Communication Services, Department of State, and Don Gale, Chairman of the Advisory Group representing the Naval Research Laboratory, as well as AEC, participated:

1. "Substantial radioactivity" would appear to mean radioactivity indicative of the presence of fissionable material.

2. The significance of this radioactivity would lie in its nature rather than in its quantity.

3. Although the [redacted] devices now in use will not distinguish fissionable material from other types of radioactive material, the improvements, which will be demonstrated to the IIC and the ICIS during April, 1958, will go a long way toward such identification. b2 b7E

REC- 46 117-216-

4. The new [redacted] which is sensitive to neutrons, will enable the operator of the device to locate neutron sources such as plutonium or beryllium compounds which could be used as weapon's components with a ~~high degree of~~ accuracy.

6 APR 4 1958

5. There is no legitimate excuse for a neutron source to be carried in diplomatic shipments.

LW:smk
(6)

Memo Branigan to Belmont 3-31-58 LW:smk

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~~SECRET~~

58 APR 7 1958

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~~SECRET~~

Memorandum from Mr. Branigan to Mr. Belmont
Re: JOINT IIC-ICIS COMMITTEE ON COUNTERMEASURES

6. [redacted] b1

[redacted] (S)

7. Working models, such as those to be demonstrated to the IIC and the ICIS, can be placed in the field for use at a port of entry and if contracts can be let by the end of this fiscal year, devices embodying the new improvements can be ready by October 1 or later. Customs has $50,000 to spend on detection device equipment which it is considering turning over to the Naval Research Laboratory before the end of the fiscal year.

Mr. Pfuntner of the ICIS Secretariat is drafting a definition of significant radiation along the lines indicated and this will be further discussed at a meeting of the Joint Committee, 10 a.m., 3/31/58.

RECOMMENDATION:

For your information. This matter will be followed and you will be advised of pertinent developments.

~~SECRET~~

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

~~SECRET~~

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: 3/31/58

FROM : W. A. Branigan

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HERE IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Parsons
1 - Mr. Branigan
1 - Mr. Day
1 - Mr. Whitson

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SUBJECT: JOINT IIC-ICIS COMMITTEE ON COUNTERMEASURES

At a meeting of the Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures (Committee B), 10 a.m., 3/31/58, Mr. Carl Pfuntner, ICIS Secretariat, presented a draft memorandum from Franklin L. Welch, Chairman of Committee B, to Mr. J. W. Yeagley, Chairman of ICIS, in response to the request of ICIS for Committee B to develop a definition of the term "substantial radioactivity" which can be used as a basis for the preparation by the Department of State for procedures to carry out the provisions of NSC Action 1868. NSC Action 1868 provides that the Department of State should develop procedures for the detention and inspection or refusal of entry of diplomatic shipments which the detection devices indicate have "substantial radioactivity."

There is attached a copy of the draft as revised by the discussions in Committee B.

REC- 46

The draft states, in brief, that "substantial radioactivity" relates to radioactivity characteristic of fissionable materials or nuclear weapon components and that whereas the passive detection devices now in field operation are unable to distinguish fissionable materials and components from innocuous radioactive items, devices have been developed which can positively identify neutron sources and which can distinguish [redacted] from other (S) b1 sources of gamma radiation. Committee B recommends that the procedures to be developed by the Department of State be predicated on the use of new devices as they become available and one of each will be available on experimental basis on 7/1/58. The ICIS representatives on Committee B and the AEC technical advisor concurred in the draft.

4:05 PM 4-2-58 TOLD BIENVENU TO DISREGARD AND THAT IIC WAS SENDING LETTER. LW

ADVISED BIENVENU, ICIS, IN PFUNTNER'S ABSENCE, 1:35 PM 4-2-58, LW

6/11/03
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RECOMMENDATION:

It is respectfully recommended that the IIC representative on the Joint Committee inform Mr. Pfuntner by phone that there is no objection to the memorandum as now drafted going forward from the Joint Committee to the ICIS.

ENCLOSURE
Enclosure
LW:smk
(6)

58 APR 7 1958

SEE ADDENDUM PAGE 2.

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum Branigan to Belmont
Re: Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures
117-268

~~SECRET~~

ADDENDUM BY ESPIONAGE SECTION
April 1, 1958
LW:smk

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b7E

The existing passive detection devices [redacted] cannot distinguish between a source of radioactivity which is fissionable (a nuclear weapon component) and a source of radioactivity which is harmless. Until the new equipment which will distinguish between sources of radioactivity is available, we have no realistic basis on which to recommend the opening of a diplomatic pouch with any degree of assurance that a radioactivity source contained therein is dangerous.

The IIC position with regard to diplomatic shipments has been, all along, that limitations in size and weight must be placed on diplomatic shipments to prevent the introduction of adequately shielded fissionable material. The NSC Action does not call for the placing of limitations on size and weight. Both the Department of State and the Department of Defense resisted the imposition of such restrictions at the time this matter was first studied [redacted]

b2
b7E

These Departments were afraid that if we placed restrictions on Soviet-bloc pouches the bloc would place restrictions on our pouches [redacted] Defense and State have similar fears with regard to action taken against Soviet-bloc pouches containing radioactive material. However, with detection devices that are able to distinguish between weapon material and harmless radioactive material, there is less likelihood of an incident being created over harmless radioactive material in a diplomatic pouch.

Under the circumstances, therefore, the proposed draft definition of "significant radiation" is directed toward material which could be used in atomic weapons.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Orig. Yeagley 1-Mr. Day
1-Yellow 1-Liaison
5-IIC
1-Mr. Boardman
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Whitson

April 3, 1958

VIA LIAISON

W.P.Bi 4/3/58

Mr. J. Walter Yeagley
Chairman
Interdepartmental Committee on
Internal Security
Department of Justice Building
Washington, D. C.

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/10/03 BY SP4/BTA/KMP

Dear Mr. Yeagley:

Your memorandum of March 24, 1958, invited the attention of the Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures to National Security Council Action 1868 and asked the Joint Committee to develop a definition of the term "substantial radioactivity" which could be used as a basis for the preparation of procedures to carry out the provisions of this NSC Action.

Your referral of this question to the Joint Committee has been considered by the IIC, and it is our belief that definition of terms used in National Security Council documents is not within the purview of the IIC. We consider further that a proper understanding of National Security Council intent in this Action can only be obtained from those who prepared it. Hence, it is our belief that it would be a better procedure for the Department of State, rather than referring this matter to the ICIS for a definition, to consult with the Department of State Representative who attended the National Security Council meeting at which this was resolved or with Mr. J. Patrick Coyne, the National Security Council Representative on Internal Security. This is suggested because it does not appear that there was any indecision on the part of the National Security Council as to what was desired. In the light of the foregoing, referral of such a matter to the internal security committees at this point can serve only to delay implementation of the Council's Action.

GAD:hke
(13)

REC-24 17-2[illegible]

NOTE ON YELLOW: Prepared pursuant to Director's instruction at IIC meeting, April 2. The letter has been cleared with the military members, who concurred in it. ~~Classified "Secret"~~ since it discusses, in paraphrased terms, the subject matter of a "Top Secret" National Security Council document.

~~SECRET~~

EX-135

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58 APR 8 1958

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Mr. J. Walter Yeagley

The IIC is, of course, ready to assist in the coordination of such procedures as may be developed by the Department of State in this matter, particularly, those relating to the prompt notification of interested agencies and continued review and dissemination of pertinent intelligence.

Sincerely yours,

Chairman
Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference

~~SECRET~~

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

~~SECRET~~

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: 4/1/58

FROM : W. A. Branigan

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Parsons
1 - Mr. Branigan
1 - Mr. Day
1 - Mr. Whitson

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SUBJECT: JOINT IIC-ICIS COMMITTEE ON COUNTERMEASURES

At the meeting of the Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures (Committee B), 10 a.m., 3/31/58, Mr. John S. Kelly, AEC technical advisor to the Joint Committee, presented for discussion a draft of the second quarterly status report on the development of detecting devices. This report discusses the various projects on which work has been done during the past quarter and comments on those devices which will be demonstrated to the agencies of the IIC and the ICIS in April, 1958.

With regard to passive detection devices, research on [redacted] is under way at the Borden Research Laboratory, Philadelphia; Pilot Chemical Company, Boston; Naval Research Laboratory and Oak Ridge Laboratory of the AEC. No outstanding improvement in performance [redacted] has yet been achieved.

b2
b7E
b1

The Oak Ridge Laboratory has developed [redacted] These indicate the energy of detected gamma radiation and should be able, under ordinary circumstances, to [redacted] and such things as radium painted dials. One of these [redacted] Both of these devices will be demonstrated in April.

The Naval Research Laboratory has developed a neutron detector [redacted] This device is sensitive to neutrons [redacted] all normal conditions. (This is a marked improvement over the current plastic detector for neutrons [redacted] A model of this device will be demonstrated in April.

b2
b7E

117-268
Enclosure
LW:smk
(6)

EX-135

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55 APR 8 1958

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Memorandum from Mr. Branigan to Mr. Belmont
Re: Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures
117-268

[redacted] *project at the Allen B. DuMont Laboratories has been discontinued by AEC for the time being.* [redacted] [redacted] *constructed by DuMont were fragile and "imploded" under use. The Naval Research Laboratory has developed alternate techniques.* b2 b7E

Studies on [redacted] *are continuing but no* [redacted] *that are more sensitive than conventional* [redacted] *now in use have been developed.*

The Naval Ordnance Laboratory has completed an X-ray fluoroscope that is more powerful than the X-ray device now used by Customs. This fluoroscope will be demonstrated in April.

[redacted] *is still under development. (This has been under development for the past three years.) This* [redacted] *will be described but not demonstrated in April.* b2 b7E

Studies regarding active detectors (devices whereby a suspect shipment is bombarded with high energy particles which would induce identifiable activity in fissionable materials) are continuing. Considerable research will be necessary before the development of operating equipment can be started. This type of active detection equipment will be the subject of discussion during the April demonstrations.

RECOMMENDATION:

None. For your information. When the final version of the AEC quarterly report is received it will be disseminated to the other IIC agencies. Secret restricted data draft is attached.

~~SECRET~~

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: March 28, 1958

FROM : R. R. ROACH

SUBJECT: DETECTION DEVICE PROGRAM

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A demonstration of new devices, developed by AEC for use in the captioned program, is scheduled for the afternoon of April 29, 1958, at the Naval Ordnance Laboratory. The IIC members and their aides have been invited to attend this, and IIC letter of February 28 informed Admiral Strauss concerning the IIC representatives who would attend.

Mr. John Kelly of AEC telephoned the IIC Secretary today and stated that a "dress-rehearsal" demonstration had been arranged for the afternoon of April 22 and that it would be possible for IIC working-level people to attend this. He pointed out that all members of the Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures, together with its Advisory Group, are being invited to attend. This will include Supervisor Whitson who represents FBI on this Joint Committee. In addition, it is believed that C. D. Smith of Army, B. L. Willard of Navy, and John L. Westrate of OSI should attend together with SA Day, the IIC Secretary, and SA Daunt who assists with IIC work and handles liaison with the Treasury agencies who operate these devices.

ACTION:

If you approve, Mr. Kelly will be advised that the IIC working people named above will attend the "dress rehearsal" on April 22.

GAD:hke (5)

1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Mr. Day
1-Liaison Section

APR 2 1958

LIAISON

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

6/10/03 SPUBSTARNP

Date of Removal 4-29-58

Report
Letter to John Foster Dulles
Enclosure _____ submitted by

Dated 4-1-58 has been removed for Mr. Day 76 51

to be sent to Mr. Hoyt Vse

Subject L m a B

Synopsis The DOC & the DCDI have considered reports regarding the spread Soviet jet aircraft flights of Sept 4 & Sept 14, 1957

This is to be removed from file upon the return of the item and forwarded to the Coordinator of Mail and Files

Removed by Mlg

Date Request Received _____

File Number 117 - 268. NR

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DATE 6/10/03 BY SP4BSR/RNP

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN 4-7-58

DATE: April 4, 1958

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

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SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTO THE UNITED STATES

My memorandum of March 19, attached, secured approval of a proposed joint IIC-ICIS letter to the Department of State asking that State advise the interested departments and agencies as far in advance as possible of the expected arrival date of special Soviet aircraft flights to this country in order to facilitate the implementation of approved Government policies including the use of devices which are sensitive to radioactive material.

The letter has been considered by the military members, who have concurred in it, and has now been approved by each of the ICIS members and signed by the ICIS Chairman.

ACTION:

Attached for signature of the Director as IIC Chairman is the previously approved letter discussed above.

Enclosures

GAD:hke
(6)

1-Mr. Boardman
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Mr. Day
1-Liaison Section

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REC- 92

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EX-135

5 7 APR 10 1958

LIAISON

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: 4/14/58

FROM : W. A. Branigan

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Branigan
1 - Mr. Day
1 - Mr. Whitson

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SUBJECT: JOINT ~~IIC~~-ICIS COMMITTEE ON COUNTERMEASURES

While discussing a Net Evaluation Subcommittee matter with Mr. J. P. Coyne, NSC representative on internal security (which has been handled separately), Mr. Coyne raised the matter of the ICIS request to the Joint Committee to supply a definition of the phrase "substantial radioactivity" as used in NSC Action 1868 which provides for the detention and opening of suspected diplomatic pouches. He stated that he thought that the IIC letter to ICIS on this matter was well drafted and he desired to furnish some additional background regarding the drafting of the action paper. He stated that at the NSC meeting where the question of opening diplomatic pouches was raised by Mr. Christen Herter of the Department of State, he, Coyne, as well as Admiral Strauss, both stated that the existing detection devices were not capable of distinguishing between radiation from fissionable material and radiation from harmless material. Coyne stated that this was clearly understood by the persons present when the proposal was made that pouches be opened when there were reactions on the detection devices showing the presence of radioactivity. Coyne stated that the language initially proposed would not modify the word radioactivity; that later a draft was circulated using the expression "unusual radioactivity" and finally State proposed, and the NSC adopted, the phrase "substantial radioactivity."

Coyne expressed surprise that the ICIS had referred the question of a definition of "substantial radioactivity" to Committee B. (This would indicate that in this one instance, at least, ICIS did not clear an action which it took with Coyne.)

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RECOMMENDATION:

None. For your information.

LW:smk
(5)

REC- 23

117-24-1626

10 APR 16 1958

55 APR 17 1958

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: April 11, 1958

FROM : R. R. ROACH

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTO THE UNITED STATES (DETECTION DEVICE PROGRAM)

Tolson
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On April 11, 1958, Leonard Bienvenu and Carl Pfuntner, of the ICIS Secretariat, discussed with SAs Whitson and Day a proposal which Bienvenu asked that we consider informally. Bienvenu referred to the IIC letter of April 3 which informed ICIS that IIC would not attempt to define terms used in National Security Council documents and that a proper understanding of NSC intent in a document could only be obtained from those who prepared it. These comments were aimed specifically at the attempts by the Department of State to involve ICIS and the Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures in an effort to define the term "substantial radioactivity" as used by NSC in fixing a procedure for the halting and opening of diplomatic shipments.

Bienvenu suggested the possibility of ICIS withdrawing its request that the Joint Committee attempt to define "substantial radioactivity" and proposed that ICIS, instead, ask the Joint Committee to prepare procedures for the implementation of the NSC Action, including procedures specifying the circumstances under which diplomatic shipments would be halted. Bienvenu was informed that this was precisely the situation to which IIC had objected, i.e., the use of the Joint Committee in an effort to define words used by the National Security Council. We told Bienvenu that the Council had specifically instructed State to develop procedures "for giving appropriate instructions to all U.S. personnel concerned with the entry of diplomatic shipments" and that the IIC stood ready to assist in coordination of implementation of the Council Action as soon as State had developed those procedures. We pointed out that IIC could not join in developing the procedures because (1) this responsibility had been specifically assigned to State by NSC, and (2) the development of procedures will necessarily involve interpreting the Council's intent and IIC was not present at the Council meeting when this action was taken and is in no position to attempt to interpret its action.

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GAD:hke (5)
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Mr. Day 1-Liaison Section

EX-135 REC-24

APR 16 1958

58 APR 21 1958

Memorandum from Mr. Roach to Mr. Belmont

RE: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTO THE UNITED STATES (DETECTION DEVICE PROGRAM)

We told Bienvenu that the IIC desired that the NSC Action be carried out without any delay and that the first step toward compliance would have to be taken by State before it would be possible for IIC to take any action. We recommended to Bienvenu that he discuss this matter thoroughly with Pat Coyne inasmuch as Coyne feels strongly that the responsibility for action rests with State.

ACTION:

For information.

DO-6

OFFICE OF DIRECTOR
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Nease
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. Jones
Mr. Clayton
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

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DATE 6/10/03 BY SP4 BOJAPMP

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APR 4 1958

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. L. V. Boardman

DATE: April 7, 1958

FROM : A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTO THE UNITED STATES (DETECTION DEVICES PROGRAM)

Tolson
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The Atomic Energy Commission has furnished IIC with copies of its Second Quarterly Progress Report on the development of devices which will detect radioactive materials. The report refers to four new devices which will be demonstrated to IIC, ICIS, and other interested groups on April 22 and 29 at the Naval Ordnance Laboratory. Details concerning the plans for the demonstrations are set forth.

Copies of the AEC report are being furnished to the IIC military members.

ACTION:

1. Inasmuch as the report is concerned with new devices which will be demonstrated to us, no action will be taken concerning the report, and the Working Committee will consider, following the demonstrations, whether any action is indicated regarding the new devices.

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2. In the reply to the invitation issued by Admiral Strauss to attend the demonstration, the Director expressed the hope that it would be possible for him to attend but, in any event, Assistant Directors Belmont and Parsons would be present. Inasmuch as the demonstration is scheduled to last three hours, and will be held in the Naval Ordnance Laboratory north of Silver Spring, we do not believe it is essential for the Director to attend. In the event he does not, Belmont and Parsons will express his regrets.

1 - Mr. L. V. Boardman
1 - Mr. A. H. Belmont
1 - Mr. D. J. Parsons
1 - Mr. L. Whitson
1 - Liaison Section
1 - Mr. G. A. Day

GAD:jyl (7)

REC-24 EX-135

58 APR 21 1958

APR 16 1958

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI (117-268) DATE: 4/15/58

FROM : SAC, Pittsburgh (117-38)

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES

Re SAC Let 57-47; and mylet to Bureau, 9/23/57.

The 145th Ordnance Detachment formerly located at Island Avenue, Neville Island, Pa., has moved. The current address for this detachment is as follows:

145th Ordnance Detachment (EOD)
Box 183A, RD #1
Greensburg, Pa.
(located on Pennsylvania Highway 71,
5.8 miles southwest of Greensburg, Pa.)

Telephone Number - Lafayette 7-1566
Commanding Officer - Captain Wilbur P. Edwards, Jr.

Information has been received that the zone of responsibility of the 145th Ordnance Detachment has been enlarged and further inquiries are being made to definitely ascertain the scope of same.

The Bureau will be notified of such changes as they are received.

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EX-128 REC-19 11-241 1630

4 APR 17 1958

2 - Bureau (RM)
1 - Baltimore (117-46)(Info.)(RM)
1 - Philadelphia (117-75)(Info.)(RM)
1 - Pittsburgh

DWE/jep
(5)

58 APR 21 1958

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. L. V. Boardman

DATE: April 9, 1958

FROM : Mr. A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTO THE UNITED STATES

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see 117-268-1603
see 117-268-1619

My attached memoranda of March 14 and 26 discuss the position taken by the Canadian Government concerning our request that Customs inspectors be permitted to use a portable detection device in examining baggage on U.S.-bound trains between Saint Johns, Quebec, and Saint Albans, Vermont. The Canadians indicated that they believed it improbable that the Soviet Union would wish to introduce nuclear weapons into North America and that they were "dubious about the efficacy of the measures proposed." State forwarded copies of their correspondence with the Canadians to IIC and ICIS and indicated that Canada might be receptive to proposal for the use of our devices by Canadian officials at Canadian ports. The Director agreed that IIC should not become involved in pursuing such a proposal.

At the IIC Working Committee meeting on April 9, this matter was considered and it was agreed that a letter should be forwarded to State pointing out that we have noted the Canadian doubt concerning the danger and the counter measures, but that both of these matters have been studied repeatedly by the Internal Security Committees and the National Security Council and the council has concurred in the use of detection devices as a counter measure. It was further agreed that the letter should point out that the IIC considers that questions as to where the devices are to be used and the methods by which they are to be used are matters to be resolved by the agencies using them and, inasmuch as these agencies are all represented on ICIS, a copy of the letter is being forwarded to ICIS.

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ACTION:

Attached is a draft letter expressing the Working Committee opinion. If you approve, copies of the draft will be distributed and concurrence of the military members secured. The letter will, thereafter, be submitted for signature of the Director as IIC Chairman.

ENCLOSURE

GAD:jyl (6)

1 - Mr. Boardman
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Whitson
1 - Liaison Section
1 - Mr. Day

ENCLOSURES

117-268

58 MAY 2 19

EX-128

REC-46

APR 21 1958

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

DRAFT - April 9, 1958

Mr. Roderic L. O'Connor
Administrator
Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/10/03 BY SP4 STR/KSP

Dear Mr. O'Connor:

The Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference has reviewed your letter of March 21, 1958, together with its enclosures which reflect the apparent Canadian disagreement both with the danger of clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons into North America and with the efficacy of the countermeasures proposed.

Your attention is called to the fact that both of these matters have been reviewed repeatedly, not only by the internal security committees but also by the National Security Council, and the Council has concurred in the use of detection devices as a countermeasure to the clandestine introduction of nuclear materials.

With reference to your note concerning the possibility that the Canadian Government might be receptive to a different proposal, the IIC feels that questions as to

117-2677-1631

ENCLOSURE

D R A F T

~~SECRET~~

Mr. Roderic L. O'Connor

where these devices are to be used and as to the methods by which they are to be used are matters to be resolved by the agencies actually using the devices. It is noted that these agencies are all represented on the Inter-departmental Committee on Internal Security, and we are, therefore, forwarding a copy of this communication to the Chairman of that committee.

Sincerely yours,

Chairman
Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference

D R A F T

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: April 15, 1958

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
Nease
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTO THE UNITED STATES

see 117-268-1631

My memorandum of April 9, attached, secured approval of a proposed letter to State indicating the IIC position concerning the Canadian Government's rejection of a proposal for use of a detection device on U.S.-bound trains in Canada.

With the concurrence of the military members, we have edited the final paragraph of the letter to emphasize our belief that we should not pursue this proposal further in view of the position taken by the Canadian Government and to note that further details concerning operation of a device at St. Albans, Vermont, should be resolved by the agency responsible for using the device. As indicated in the letter, a copy is to be forwarded to the ICIS Chairman.

ACTION:

Attached for consideration and signature of the Director as IIC Chairman is the letter discussed above. The military members concur in this letter.

Enclosures Recd 4-18-58

GAD:hke
(6)
1-Mr. Boardman
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Mr. Day
1-Liaison Section

REC-46

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EX-128

APR 21 1958

LIAISON

58 APR 28 1958

DO-6

OFFICE OF DIRECTOR
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Nease
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. Jones
Mr. Clayton
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

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DATE 6/10/03 BY SP4 GOTA/RNP

EXP PROC.
APR 15 1958

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: April 16, 1958

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
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Nease
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTO THE UNITED STATES

Joint IIC-ICIS letter to State, April 7, 1958, asked that State advise interested agencies as far in advance as possible of the expected arrival date of special Soviet aircraft flights to this country in order to facilitate implementation of approved Government policies, including the use of devices which are sensitive to radioactive material.

State letter, April 14, attached, acknowledges our request and indicates that it will be granted but, if such flights should occur more frequently and become "an onerous burden," the question of coordination will be reviewed with the interested agencies. State notes it is having difficulties in establishing appropriate procedures pursuant to NSC Action 1868, which requires that diplomatic shipments be examined if the detection devices indicate "substantial radioactivity." This is the question which was referred by ICIS to the Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures and which we have rejected, pointing out that interpretation of National Security Council language can only be accomplished by NSC itself.

The State letter requires no reply. Copies are being made for distribution to the other IIC members.

ACTION:

For information.

Enclosure

GAD:hke
(6)

1-Mr. Boardman
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Mr. Day
1-Liaison Section

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/10/03 BY SP1BJA/ENP

REC-28 117-2[illegible]-

EX-135

APR 18 1958

66 APR 23 1958

5-Feb

~~SECRET~~

Orig & 1 - O'Connor
5 - IIC
1 - Yellow
1-Mr. Day 1 - Mr. Boardman
1-Liaison Sec. 1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Whitson

April 16, 1958

BY COURIER SERVICE

Mr. Roderic L. O'Connor
Administrator
Bureau of Security and
Consular Affairs
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/10/03 BY SP4 JTK/RNP

Dear Mr. O'Connor:

The Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference has reviewed your letter of March 21, 1958, together with its enclosures which reflect the apparent Canadian disagreement both with the danger of clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons into North America and with the efficacy of the countermeasures proposed.

Your attention is called to the fact that both of these matters have been reviewed repeatedly, not only by the internal security committees but also by the National Security Council, and the Council has concurred in the use of detection devices as a countermeasure to the clandestine introduction of nuclear materials.

REC-67

With reference to your note concerning the possibility that the Canadian Government might be receptive to a different proposal, the IIC feels that this matter should not be pursued further at this time in view of the position taken by the Canadian Government. The IIC considers that further details concerning the operation of a detection

EX-135

BY COURIER SVC. 23 APR 21 COMM-FBI

APR 22 1958

GAD:hke
(14)

~~SECRET~~

(Cover memorandum from Mr. Belmont to Mr. Boardman, 4/15/58, re "Countermeasures to Detect and Defend Against the Clandestine Introduction of Nuclear Weapons into the United States" GAD:hke)

(Classified "~~Secret~~" ~~Use~~, to discussion of detection device program and Canadian attitude toward clandestine introduction problem.)

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MAIL ROOM

55 APR 24 1953

~~SECRET~~

Mr. Roderic L. O'Conner

device at St. Albans, Vermont, should be resolved by the agency responsible for using the device and, inasmuch as this agency is represented on the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security, we are forwarding a copy of this communication to the Chairman of that committee.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

Chairman
Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference

1 - Mr. J. Walter Yeagley
Chairman
Interdepartmental Committee on
Internal Security
Department of Justice Building
Washington, D. C.

~~SECRET~~

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: 4/18/58

FROM : W. A. Branigan

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Branigan
1 - Mr. Day
1 - Mr. Whitson

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SUBJECT: JOINT IIC-ICIS COMMITTEE ON COUNTERMEASURES

At meeting of the Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures (Committee B), 4/15/58, the following action was taken:

1. Under date of 4/14/58, Chairman, ICIS, requested Committee B to review programs relating to internal security and affecting countermeasures appearing in NSC 5408 on continental defense, (ICIS memorandum attached). Committee B discussed programs and instructed Mr. Pfuntner of ICIS Secretariat to prepare draft reply to Yeagley for consideration by Committee B at its next meeting.

2. Under date of 4/10/58, ICIS transmitted to Committee B, Customs' reports covering inspection of unaccompanied shipments to Soviet-bloc personnel in U.S. and letter from Customs to ICIS dated 4/8/58 clarifying excessive weights of such shipments reported by Customs in previous months. New York Customs Office had been reporting total weight of several packages in a shipment instead of the greatest weight of one such package, (Items attached). These reports were noted and Mr. Pfuntner was instructed to follow the matter of accurate reporting with the Customs representative in ICIS.

3. Under date of 4/10/58, ICIS transmitted to Committee B a request for comments on the AEC second quarterly progress report which had been disseminated to the IIC and ICIS, 4/3/58. Mr. Pfuntner was instructed to notify the ICIS that Committee B had no comments on the report since it had been the subject of discussion with the technical advisor to Committee B from the AEC prior to the submission of the report to the parent committee and nothing more can be done until the new equipment is demonstrated, (Item attached).

4. Under date of 4/8/58, ICIS transmitted to Committee B documents relating to the status of negotiations with the Canadian Government for U.S. use of detection devices on trains on Canadian soil, with a recommendation from the Advisory Group that it might be desirable to pursue the possibility of Canadian use of detection devices at Canadian ports of entry, (Items attached).

Enclosures
LW:smk
(5)

ENCLOSURE

REC- 67 100-358-1

EX-135

10 APR 22 1958

55 APR 26

EX-135

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The IIC representative pointed out that the IIC had already taken action in this regard and had recommended that the matter not be pursued further with the Canadians and further, that the IIC had taken the position that the responsible operating agencies would have to determine their own procedures on the Canadian border. Accordingly, Committee B instructed the Advisory Group, which consists of Customs, Coast Guard, Immigration and a representative from the AEC/Naval Research Laboratory, to attempt to work out a satisfactory operation, the principal responsibility being that of Customs. The Advisory Group representative present, Mr. Donald Gale, stated that the problem of pre-clearance of air travelers at Montreal was not capable of solution at this time.

5. A report by Department of State dated 3/3/58 on [redacted] *and a similar report dated 4/1/58, were referred to Committee B by ICIS under date of 4/7/58, (Items attached). Committee B noted the reports and the AEC technical advisor stated there was nothing significant in them.*

b2
b7E

6. Mr. Carl Pfuntner, ICIS Secretariat, advised orally that the ICIS had requested Committee B's evaluation of the operations of the Advisory Group with regard to the coverage of passengers and crew of the Soviet jet transport which landed at Friendship Airport, Baltimore, in February. Inasmuch as a joint letter from IIC and ICIS to the Department of State had indicated that the operations at Friendship had been satisfactory, Mr. Pfuntner was instructed to advise ICIS that Committee B considered the operations of the Advisory Group satisfactory.

RECOMMENDATION:

None. For your information. Any drafts prepared by Pfuntner will be analyzed and recommendations made. The next meeting of Committee B is scheduled for 10 a.m., 4/23/58.

Rec'd from NCIS
4-15-58 LW

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JOINT IIC-ICIS COMMITTEE ON COUNTERMEASURES

MINUTES OF MEETING

MARCH 31, 1958 tR

The Join IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures met at 10:00 a.m., in Room 2515, Department of Justice. The following members were present:

IIC:	Mr. Lish Whitson, Acting Chairman (FBI)
ICIS:	Col. Alexander Graham Lt.Col. Albert W. Jones, Alt. (Defense)
AEC Adviser:	Mr. John S. Kelly

* * * * *

Advisory Group:	Mr. Donald Gale, Chairman (NRL)
ICIS Secretariat:	Mr. Carl H. Pfuntner

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DATE 6/10/03 BY SP4 DTA/RNP

~~ENCLOSURE~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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ENCLOSURE 117-268-15 4

1. Minutes

The Committee approved the minutes of its meeting of March 17, 1958, with the following change:

Page 2, item 2, first line of second paragraph - delete the words "and Mr. Whitson" and change the word "they" to "he".

Copies were distributed of the minutes of the meeting of March 24, 1958, and the Committee approved them without change.

2. Shipments Entering the United States Under Diplomatic Immunity

Copies were distributed of a draft memorandum dated March 26, 1958, to the ICIS in reply to the ICIS memorandum dated March 24, 1958, regarding the development of a definition of the term "substantial radioactivity" as used in NSC Action No. 1868. The March 26 draft had been prepared pursuant to discussion at the last meeting of Committee B (see item 2, minutes of March 24, 1958).

The Committee amended the March 26 draft memorandum to the ICIS and approved it, subject to comment by Mr. Whitson.

3. Arrangements for Performing Tests to Evaluate the Capability of Present Detection Devices

At the last meeting (see item 3, minutes of March 24, 1958) the Committee had amended and approved a draft memorandum dated March 21, 1958, to the Chairmen, IIC and ICIS, on the above subject, pending concurrence by Mr. Whitson. Mr. Whitson had subsequently suggested changes in the draft. These were now brought to the attention of the Committee, and it was agreed that with the changes the letter should be forwarded to IIC and ICIS.

4. Second Quarterly Status Report on the Development of Detecting Devices for the IIC and ICIS

Copies were distributed of a preliminary draft of the second AEC quarterly report, entitled as above. Following discussion, Mr. Kelly indicated that he would revise the draft and distribute copies for further discussion at the next meeting.

5. Review of Programs listed in NSC 5408

Attention was invited to NSC 5802/1, the new Continental Defense policy dated February 27, 1958, and to the provision that programs in NSC 5408 were to be reviewed for the purpose of recommending retention, revision, or cancellation (paragraph 1 b). The ICIS Standing Committee had agreed that this Committee should be asked to undertake the necessary review of the appropriate programs, and written request along these lines would be forthcoming. The Committee agreed that members should review the pertinent portions of NSC 5408 as preparation for undertaking the review at the next meeting, by which time the referral from ICIS would have been received.

Next Meeting

The Committee agreed to meet next on Tueseay, April 15, 1958, at 10:00 a.m., to consider:

1. Minutes of March 31, 1958.

2. Review of Programs listed in NSC 5408 (see item 5 above).

3. Second Quarterly AEC Report (see item 4 above).

Rec'd from ICIS 4-15-58. LWE

~~SECRET~~

APR 7 1958

ICIS-P25/601

MEMORANDUM FOR: Franklin L. Welch, Chairman
Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures

FROM: Leonard P. Bienvenu
Executive Secretary, ICIS

SUBJECT: Use of Dosimeters.

Enclosed for information and any comment the Committee may wish to submit are copies of memoranda dated March 3, 1958, and April 1, 1958, from the Director, Office of Security, Department of State, to the Chairman, ICIS, giving the [redacted] b2 b7E

Enclosures

cc: Mr. Whitson
Col. Graham
Mr. Kelly
Capt. Stewart

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ENCLOSURE

APR 22 1958

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~~SECRET~~

ENCLOSURE 117-2[illegible]-1[illegible]
4

Rec'd from ICIS 4-15-58. LWW

~~SECRET~~

ICIS-P25/600

April 8, 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Franklin L. Welch, Chairman
Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures

FROM: LPB Leonard P. Bienvenu
Executive Secretary, ICIS

SUBJECT: Status of Negotiations with the Canadian Government for U.S. use of Detection Devices on Trains on Canadian Soil.

Enclosed is a copy of a memorandum from the Chairman, Advisory Group, to Committee B, on the above subject.

In order to facilitate discussions of the recommendations of the Advisory Group, copies are enclosed of the letter dated March 21, 1958, from the Administrator, Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, Department of State, with enclosures (copy of Ottawa despatch No. 728, and a copy of a letter dated March 10, 1958, from Mr. Milton C. Rewinkel of the U. S. Embassy, Ottawa).

Enclosures

Add Group 3 to mark not with caution. Pertains to Air transport trains. Air transport not capable of detection.

cc: Mr. Whitson
Col. Graham
Mr. Kelly
Capt. Stewart

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~~SECRET~~

APR 22 1958

5. LWW

~~2 ENCLOSURES~~

1 ENCLOSURE

117-268-10

~~SECRET~~

April 3, 1958

MEMORANDUM TO: Franklin Welch, Chairman
Committee "B"

FROM: Donald I. Cale, Chairman
Advisory Group

SUBJECT: Status of negotiations with the Canadian Government for U. S. use of detection devices on trains on Canadian soil

The Department of State was informed by the Canadian Government about 1 March 1958, that U.S. use of detection devices on trains in Canada would not be permitted. The original dispatch appeared to leave open possibility that the Canadian Government might be receptive to their using devices at ports where diplomats and other nonimmigrants of the Soviet bloc enter Canada. The Department of State inquired into this matter. The U.S. Embassy in Canada is of the opinion that Canada might be receptive to such procedures but have not discussed this possibility with the Canadian Government.

By letter of 21 March 1958, the Department of State advised Mr. Hoover and Mr. Yeagley of the results of these Canadian negotiations. At the same time it was pointed out that it may be desirable to pursue the possibility of Canadian use of detection devices at their ports of entry.

The Advisory Group has discussed this problem from the point of view of operations and capability of the program, and is of the opinion that it is highly desirable to make arrangements to use detection devices at the Canadian ports. It is pointed out in this connection that (a) there are only a few Canadian ports where detection devices would be required in order to survey all legal arrivals, (b) arrivals by air and ship have been found to be much more easily covered than are arrivals by rail and highway such as would generally be required at the U.S.-Canadian border, and (c) complete coverage at Canadian ports would require a much smaller number of equipments than would be required for complete coverage of ports along the U.S.-Canadian border.

Previous negotiations were concerned with the use only of portable [redacted] on trains entering the U.S. at St. Albans, Vermont. If discussions are held with the Canadian Government leading towards use of devices at their ports of entry [redacted] should also be considered. b2 b7E

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ENCLOSURE

Read from ICIS 4-15-58. LW

~~SECRET~~

ICIS-P25/604

April 14, 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Franklin L. Welch, Chairman
Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures

FROM: J. Walter Yeagley, Chairman
Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security

SUBJECT: Review of NSC 5408 Programs

Reference is made to NSC 5802/1, United States Policy on Continental Defense, adopted by the Council and approved by the President on February 19, 1958. As indicated in paragraph e, page 1 of that document, the Council agreed that the programs in NSC 5408 should be reviewed by the responsible departments and agencies in accordance with paragraph 1-b. That paragraph, as shown on page 1 of the document, indicates that the review of such programs should have as its objective "to determine whether such programs are currently valid or should be cancelled or changed".

In view of the joint IIC-ICIS responsibility for the development and coordination of countermeasures against the clandestine introduction of fissionable material, it is requested that your Committee review the program listed in sub-paragraphs a and b of paragraph 20, "Internal Security", of NSC 5408, and submit comments and recommendations.

Prentiss will prepare Liaison

cc: Mr. Whitson
Col. Graham
Mr. Kelly
Capt. Stewart

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NO APR 22 1958

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ENCLOSURE

Read from 1615 4-15-58 ecd

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ICIS-P25/606

April 10, 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Franklin L. Welch, Chairman
Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures

FROM: Leonard P. Bienvenu, Executive Secretary
Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security

SUBJECT: Customs Surveys of Unaccompanied Shipments to Soviet Bloc Personnel, Officials and Offices

Enclosed is a copy of a letter dated April 8, 1958, from the Acting Commissioner of Customs. This letter encloses the subject survey for February 1958. Also, it encloses amended reports which have been prepared to correct discrepancies in the reporting of various shipments arriving at New York during the months of July, August, September, October, November and December, 1957, and January and February, 1958.

The April 8 letter from Bureau of Customs and its enclosures in part resulted from informal inquiries to Customs pursuant to discussion at the meeting of Committee B on March 17, 1958 (see Item 3, minutes of that date).

Enclosure

cc: Mr. Whitson
Col. Graham
Mr. Kelly
Capt. Stewart

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~~ENCLOSURE~~

Noted Apparently with thanks. ~~ENCLOSURE~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

10 APR 22 1958

ENCLOSURE

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177-10-

23

FBI

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Nease
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. Clayton
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Gandy

~~SECRET~~

April 16, 1958

MEMORANDUM TO: J. Edgar Hoover, Chairman
Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference

J. Walter Yeagley, Chairman
Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security

J. Patrick Coyne
NSC Representative on Internal Security

FROM: Franklin L. Welch, Chairman (SIGNED)
Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures

SUBJECT: Report by the Department of the Treasury on the Detection Device Program for the Quarter Ended December 31, 1957.

Reference is made to the above report which was submitted by letter from the Department of the Treasury dated February 25, 1958, and distributed to this Committee by memorandum from the Chairman, ICIS, dated March 12, 1958.

This Committee has examined the Treasury report and has noted the information contained in it. We have no comment to submit on the report.

This was discussed at IIC/WC
3/17/58

CC: IIC (5 copies)
Mr. Clear
Mr. Dorsz
Mr. Bailey
Mr. Doherty
Mr. McTiernan
Mr. Ambrose

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REC- 35

~~SECRET~~

APR 24 1958

received in liaison 4/21/58 9:30 AM MKG for GAD

55 APR 25 1958

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268) DATE 4/21/58

FROM : SAC, SAN DIEGO (66-998)

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES

Re San Diego letter to the Bureau dated 3/12/58 and San Francisco letter to the Bureau dated 3/26/58.

First Lieutenant WILLIAM DE LONG, Commanding Officer, 70th Ordnance Detachment, Ft. Rosecrans, San Diego, California, was recontacted in view of information contained in referenced San Francisco letter. Lt. DE LONG advised that a reverification of the area under the jurisdiction of his group indicated that the data as provided by the 548th Ordnance Detachment was correct.

2 - Director, FBI
1 - San Diego

GHB:rk
(3)

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DATE 6/10/03 BY SP4 ROSA/RNP

REC-79
EX.-126

117-26[illegible]-[illegible]

FBI - SAN DIEGO
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ESP: SEC.

28 MAY 2 1958

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN 4-24-58

DATE: April 23, 1958

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTO THE UNITED STATES

Tolson
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A demonstration of newly developed detection devices was attended by working level representatives of interested agencies and departments on April 22. A separate memorandum is being prepared concerning this. As Agent Day identified himself prior to receiving a special pass, which was issued to all persons attending the demonstration, he was asked whether the Director planned to attend the demonstration to be held on April 29 for the IIC and ICIS members and others. He stated that he knew the Director hoped to be present, but that he, Day, did not know whether or not the Director would find it possible to attend.

John Kelly, of the Military Applications Division of the Atomic Energy Commission, who actually arranged the demonstration, asked Day to inform the Director that Admiral Strauss had indicated that he definitely planned to be present for the demonstration on April 29. Kelly asked whether the Director planned to be present and was informed that Day did not know whether he would find it possible to attend.

As you know, Belmont and Parsons will attend the April 29 demonstration. It is not recommended that the Director attend inasmuch as the demonstration lasts for approximately three hours and it is believed that the Director can be adequately briefed by the memoranda described the demonstration.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/10/03 BY SP4 STA/RNP

ACTION:

For information.

GAD:hke
(6)
1-Mr. Boardman
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Mr. Day
1-Liaison Section

117-26

REC-95

EX-136

10 APR 28 1958

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Tic - 1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Branigan
1 - Mr. Day
1 - Mr. Whitson

~~SECRET~~

SAC, Albany

April 29, 1958

Director, FBI (117-268)

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES

REC- 19 117-268-116

Reference is made to the letter to Albany dated 12/13/57 concerning the classification of correspondence regarding the detection device program.

The Bureau of Customs has advised that [redacted] detection devices for radioactive material are being sent to the Collectors of Customs at Baltimore, Boston, Detroit, El Paso, Galveston, Laredo, Los Angeles, New Orleans, New York, Nogales, Philadelphia, Rochester, St. Albans, San Diego, San Francisco, Seattle and Tampa. These portable devices will be used by Customs inspectors within the jurisdiction of the collectors indicated. Additional devices may be sent to the various Collectors of Customs as they become available.

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2 - Albuquerque
2 - Anchorage
2 - Baltimore
2 - Boston
2 - Buffalo
2 - Butte
2 - Charlotte
2 - Chicago
2 - Cleveland
2 - Detroit
2 - El Paso
2 - Honolulu
2 - Houston
2 - Indianapolis
2 - Jacksonville (Enclosure-1)
2 - Los Angeles
2 - Miami
2 - Milwaukee
2 - [illegible]
2 - Mobile
2 - Newark
2 - New Haven
2 - New Orleans
2 - New York
2 - Norfolk
2 - Philadelphia
2 - Phoenix
2 - Pittsburgh
2 - Portland
2 - Richmond
2 - San Antonio
2 - San Diego
2 - San Francisco
2 - San Juan
2 - Savannah
2 - Seattle
2 - Washington Field

COMM - FBI
APR 29 1958
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LW:smh
(81)

NOTE: Per oral advice received 4/22/58 from Mr. Frank Russell, Customs, and copy of letter from Bureau of Customs to certain collectors dated 4/22/58. (Continued on page 3.)

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58 MAY 2 1958

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DECLASSIFY ON: 25X
INFORMATION CONTAINED HERE IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

~~SECRET~~

Letter to SAC, Albany
Re: Smuggling of Atomic Bombs or Parts Thereof
and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction into
the United States
117-268

The Bureau is primarily interested in the clandestine introduction of atomic bombs or their radioactive components [redacted] (S) devices do not distinguish between weapon components and other radioactive material. Radium dialed watches, clocks and compasses, for example, could cause a violent reaction of the detection device. Customs attempts to screen out such innocuous sources of radiation by means of physical examination of any suspected shipment. Customs cannot make a physical examination of an accompanied diplomatic shipment. Procedures are being considered by the Department of State for the detention of certain suspected diplomatic shipments by Customs, but pending the establishment of such procedures, Customs is not detaining accompanied diplomatic shipments which cause a reaction on the [redacted]

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b7E

The collectors are being instructed that when a detection device reacts to the contents of any diplomatic baggage or pouch which is passed without manual examination, no attempt should be made to open and inspect such a shipment but the nearest office of the FBI should be notified immediately. Likewise, the nearest office of the FBI should be informed forthwith in the event of an apparent criminal violation of the Atomic Energy Act in respect to any imported article or merchandise.

In the event you should receive a report from Customs regarding a reaction to the contents of an item entering the United States under diplomatic immunity, you should obtain all available facts from Customs and report them to the Bureau immediately with your recommendations for investigative activity regarding the diplomatic shipment involved and the diplomatic personnel concerned. Alleged violations of the Atomic Energy Act should be handled by you in accordance with existing Bureau procedures.

Enclosed for the Jacksonville Office is a copy of a "Classification Guide for Detection Device Program" dated 11/20/57. The classification suggestions set forth therein

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Letter to SAC, Albany
Re: Smuggling of Atomic Bombs or Parts Thereof
and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction into
the United States
117-268

should be observed in any reports or memoranda, prepared for dissemination to other agencies, containing matters relating to the Detection Device Program. In the event information is received regarding shipments in bond, which are radioactive, or regarding travelers carrying radioactive materials destined to points within field division not receiving copies of this letter, the office concerned should be informed regarding the proper classification to be used in event of dissemination of such information.

NOTE CONTINUED FROM PAGE ONE.

"Classification Guide" being forwarded to Jacksonville since all other offices receiving copies of this letter received "Classification Guide" with Bulet 12/13/57.

~~SECRET~~

April 7, 1958

Honorable John Foster Dulles
The Secretary of State
Washington 25, D. C.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/10/03 BY SP4 USTA/RNP

Dear Mr. Dulles:

The Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (IIC) and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS) have considered reports regarding the special Soviet jet aircraft flights of September 4 and September 14, 1957, bringing Soviet United Nations personnel and arriving at McGuire Air Force Base, and the Soviet flight arriving on February 6, 1958, at Friendship Airport, Baltimore, bringing the newly designated Soviet Ambassador to Washington. We are, of course, interested in insuring that procedures in conformity with the ICIS recommendations of August 23, 1957, with particular reference to the detection device program are followed on occasions of such Soviet plane arrivals.

In connection with the third of the above-mentioned flights, the Department of State took the initiative in arranging meetings of representatives of interested Government agencies prior to the arrival. We therefore request that, where time permits, in the case of similar future arrivals, the Department of State advise the interested departments and agencies as far in advance as possible of the expected arrival date of such flights and continue to undertake similar arrangements in order to facilitate the establishment by the agencies concerned of appropriate procedures as required under approved policies including (1) the covert examination by use of the devices of all Soviet bloc officials, pouches, baggage, effects, and other shipments afforded immunity from inspection and search (NSC Action 1524-e) and (2) the detention, examination, etc., in appropriate instances, of diplomatic shipments in which substantial radioactivity is indicated by detection devices (NSC Action No. 1868). It is understood that should such flights become so frequent as to create greater problems and burdens than have so far been encountered, your Department may want to review this question of coordination with the other interested agencies.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

J. Edgar Hoover
Chairman, Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference

SIGNED

J. Walter Yeagley
Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security

BY COURIER SVC.
9 - APR - 7
COMM - FBI

NOT RECORDED
APR 7 1958

LIAISON

THIS IS THE FBI FILE COPY AS THE LETTER WAS TYPED BY ICIS.

62 APR 9 1958

DO-6

OFFICE OF DIRECTOR
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Nease
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. Jones
Mr. Clayton
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

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DATE 6/10/03 BY SP4 BOA/RNP

~~SECRET~~

April 4, 1958

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/10/03 BY SP4BTA/RNP

MEMORANDUM TO: J. Edgar Hoover, Chairman
Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference

J. Walter Yeagley, Chairman
Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security

FROM: Franklin L. Welch, Chairman SIGNED
Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures

SUBJECT: ~~Arrangements for Performing Tests to Evaluate the Capability of the Present Detection Devices~~

As the result of a suggestion by the AEC Technical Consultants Panel, and pursuant to discussion in the Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures, the Advisory Group undertook to work out procedures for carrying out the above-mentioned tests by means of simulated clandestine introduction of radioactive material into the United States. The Advisory Group, in consultation with representatives of the Department of State, Department of the Treasury (Customs Bureau), and the AEC, prepared a draft letter to the Secretary of State containing five enclosures. A copy of the draft letter dated February 14, 1958, and copies of its enclosures, are enclosed.

It should be noted that in the opinion of the scientific and technical experts, it is impossible to devise laboratory experiments which will reliably determine the detection capability of the detection devices nearly as well as the proposed practical field tests. In the course of any given period of time of practical operations the detection devices will give a number of readings from items entering the country in various types of shipments and on the persons of individuals. However, in view of the variations in the conditions under which such readings are obtained and in the composition of the sources of the readings, there is no "control" element upon which to base an estimate of the detection capability of the devices and thus of the program for their use. The Advisory Group believes that the plan outlined in the draft letter to the Secretary of State and its enclosures would constitute the needed controlled experiments and the Advisory Group recommends that this plan or one similar to it be approved by the IIC and ICIS. The proposed procedures have tentative approval within State, Customs and AEC. If the plan is acceptable to IIC and ICIS as submitted, or with modifications, the Advisory Group of Committee B desires to coordinate it further with State, Customs, and AEC, before the dispatch of the proposed letter to State.

REC- 91

~~SECRET~~

7 ENCLOSURE

EX-101

APR 29 1958

~~SECRET~~

February 18, 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Franklin L. Welch, Chairman
Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures

FROM: Donald I. Calo, Chairman (SIGNED)
Advisory Group

SUBJECT: Arrangements for Performing Tests to Evaluate the Capability of the Present Detection Devices

Some time ago Committee B requested the Advisory Group to work out and implement a test arrangement to permit evaluation of the capability of the present detection program involving passive devices.

Enclosed for your consideration is a letter to the Secretary of State and enclosures giving complete working details for carrying out such tests. The procedures have been discussed with and have the informal approval of all agencies involved.

Enclosures

cc: Mr. Whitson
Col. Graham
Mr. Kelly
Capt. Stewart

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DATE 6/10/03 BY SP4RJA/DFW

ENCLOSURE

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

February 14, 1958

Honorable John Foster Dulles
The Secretary of State
Washington 25, D. C.

Attention: Mr. E. Tomlin Bailey
Director, Office of Security

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/19/03 BY SP4BTA/RAP

Dear Mr. Dulles:

As you are aware, the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security have joint responsibility, under Presidential directive, for the development of programs for safeguarding against clandestine introduction of fissionable weapons and materials into this country. Since the summer of 1954, a number of passive detection devices have been in use at a few selected ports of entry.

[redacted]

b2
b7E

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~ ENCLOSURE



b2
b7E

We would appreciate very much your participation in this test procedure.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover
Chairman, IIC

J. Walter Yeagley
Chairman, ICIS

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. D. J. Parsons

~~SECRET~~

DATE: April 24, 1958

FROM : B. J. White

SUBJECT: ~~DEVICES FOR~~ DETECTION OF FISSIONABLE MATERIALS

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont ✓
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
Nease
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

Special Agents L. Whitson, G. A. Day, and John F. Gallagher attended a conference at Naval Ordnance Laboratory on April 22, 1958, relating to devices for the detection of fissionable materials. These devices have been developed for the purpose of detection of any surreptitious entry of nuclear bomb components into the United States.

The problem has resolved itself into the detection and identification [redacted] (S)

WHITSON

A. [redacted]

b1
b2
b7E

[redacted] (S)

b1
b2
b7E

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CLASSIFIED BY [redacted]
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X1

6/11/03 Declassify

EX-128 REC-91

58 MAR 6 1958

JFG:np (4)

~~SECRET~~

LIAISON

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: April 30, 1958

~~SECRET~~

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTO THE UNITED STATES (DETECTION DEVICE PROGRAM)

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
Nease
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

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CLASSIFIED BY NSIC/Bit/RMP exec Derivative 6/11/83
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (1)

My memorandum of April 23, attached, discusses a letter received by IIC from the Department of State in which State proposes to postpone action on the National Security Council decision to open diplomatic pouches if our detection devices reflect substantial radioactivity. The State letter gives the impression that the inability of our present detection devices to distinguish between fissionable and other radioactive materials was not previously known and suggests that nothing be done until newly developed detection devices, which cannot be put into use until 1959 at the earliest, are available.

This letter was discussed by the IIC Working Committee on April 30 and it was agreed that we must reply to State's letter or be put in the position of tacitly agreeing with it. A proposed reply was prepared which informs State that it is our understanding (Pat Coyne has said so) that the limitations of our detection devices had been discussed by the Council at the time it took action and that the State interpretation of "substantial radioactivity" does not appear to take the NSC proceedings into consideration. We suggest that State may desire to consult with Pat Coyne concerning this. We further note that the new detection devices, which State reflects could be put into field operation about January 1, 1959, could be available only if orders are placed promptly by the operating agencies and, even with the new devices, there would be no assurance that there could always be an accurate identification [redacted] so (S) that it cannot be identified by even the newest detection devices). b1

2 ENCLOSURES 62

The letter points out that the State position would indefinitely postpone implementation of the Council Action

Enclosures

GAD:hkel (6)
1-Mr. Boardman
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Mr. Roy
1-Liaison Section

REC-62 117-

MAY 2 1958

61 MAY 2 1958

~~70 MAY 19 1958~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum from Mr. Belmont to Mr. Boardman
RE: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND
DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE
INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
INTO THE UNITED STATES
(DETECTION DEVICE PROGRAM)

and notes, however, that the IIC has no responsibility under this Action until such time as implementing procedures are developed by State. Copies of the letter are to be forwarded to Pat Coyne and ICIS.

ACTION:

The proposed letter discussed above is attached. If approved by the Director, we will secure final concurrence from the military members prior to presenting the letter to the Director for his signature as IIC Chairman.

OK

~~SECRET~~

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: April 23, 1958

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTO THE UNITED STATES (DETECTION DEVICE PROGRAM)

Tolson
Nichols
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Nease
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

National Security Council Action 1868, approved by the President on March 3, 1958, states that "if a detection device indicates substantial radioactivity in a diplomatic shipment," the shipment will be detained and opened or refused in accordance with stated procedures. State was instructed to develop "procedures for giving appropriate instructions to all U.S. personnel concerned with the entry of diplomatic shipments," and the Council Action was assigned for implementation by "State, in coordination with IIC and ICIS." At the IIC meeting on April 2, Pat Coyne said he believed State was deliberately attempting to delay implementation of this Action. Coyne pointed out that the President had ordered that these shipments be detained and that this action should be taken.

By letter of April 21, copy attached, the Administrator of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, of the Department of State, has advised that State believes that "substantial radioactivity" should be interpreted to mean a signal or reading which is characteristic of fissionable material. The letter states that it has been learned from technical experts that the present detection devices cannot distinguish fissionable from other radioactive materials but that the Atomic Energy Commission has developed new devices which, within certain limits, should make this important distinction. The new AEC devices could, according to State, be put into field operation about January 1, 1959. State says that in view of this "and the serious repercussions that would occur if a diplomatic pouch containing an innocuous item should be unnecessarily challenged," the Council Action should be implemented at the time the new devices are put into use.

If we accept State's letter unchallenged, the Council Action concerning diplomatic shipments will not be put into

ENCLOSURE

Enclosures
GAD:hke
(7)

REC-62 117-268-2

1-Mr. Boardman
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Parsons
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Mr. Day
1-Liaison Section

Ex-117

MAY 2 1958

LIAISON

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4/11/83 BY SP1 AlW

effect until Treasury purchases the new detection devices which, even if ordered now, would not be available until next year. We consider it highly unlikely that Treasury will purchase any number of the new devices even at that time. Further, State's comment concerning the inability of the present devices to distinguish fissionable materials is very misleading since Coyne has informed us that this fact was fully established and discussed by the Council at the time the action was taken. In other words, the Council, in full knowledge of what our devices would and would not do, decided that action should be taken concerning diplomatic shipments under certain circumstances. The fact that there have been later developments in the detection device field should have no bearing whatever on the action taken by the Council.

The new devices to which State makes reference will be viewed by the IIC Working Committee members on April 29. A Working Committee meeting is scheduled for the afternoon of April 30.

ACTION:

We will schedule the State communication for consideration by the Working Committee at its meeting on April 30. At this time, the members will have viewed the new devices and will be better able to consider the comments to be made in our reply.

DO-6

OFFICE OF DIRECTOR
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

April 22, 1958

NSC Action 1868 provides that diplomatic pouches will be opened for inspection if our detection devices reflect that they contain "substantial radioactivity."

hbb

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Nease
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. Jones
Mr. Clayton
Tele. Room
Mr. Holloman
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

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EX-DEC 32

APR 22 1958

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

DRAFT - May 1, 1958

Mr. Roderic L. O'Connor
Administrator
Bureau of Security and
Consular Affairs
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/11/03 BY SP4BTA/RNP

Dear Mr. O'Connor:

The Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (IIC) has considered your letter of April 21, 1958, concerning implementation of National Security Council Action 1868 and your interpretation of the phrase "substantial radioactivity" contained therein.

It is our understanding that the inability of detection devices presently in field use to distinguish fissionable from other radioactive materials had been discussed by the Council at the time its action was taken. The interpretation which you have placed upon the phrase "substantial radioactivity" does not appear to take into consideration the proceedings in the National Security Council if our understanding is correct. For this reason, it is suggested that you may desire to consult with the National Security Council Representative on Internal Security, Mr. J. Patrick Coyne, who was present during the Council's discussion of this matter.

DRAFT

~~SECRET~~

ENCLOSURE

DRAFT ~~SECRET~~

Mr. Roderic L. O'Connor

Your letter reflects your belief that implementation of NSC Action 1868 should become effective only after newly developed detection devices are put into use. Prototypes of these devices have been demonstrated during April, 1958, and, according to your letter, such devices could be put into field operation about January 1, 1959. This date is apparently predicated upon the assumption that orders for the new devices would be placed promptly by the operating agencies. However, there is no assurance that even with the new devices, there could always be an accurate identification [redacted] b2 b7E

The IIC considers that the position expressed in your communication would have the practical effect of indefinitely postponing implementation of the Council's Action. We note, however, that the IIC has no responsibility under NSC Action 1868 until such time as implementing procedures are developed by the Department of State.

Copies of this communication are being forwarded to Mr. J. Patrick Coyne and to the Chairman of the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security.

Sincerely yours,

Chairman
Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference

Recd from ICIS 5-1-58 LW

~~SECRET~~

ICIS-P25/6[illegible]5

May 1, 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Franklin L. Welch, Chairman
Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures

FROM: J. Walter Yeagley, Chairman
Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security

SUBJECT: Shipments Entering the United States Under Diplomatic Immunity

Reference is made to my memorandum dated March 24, 1958, referring to NSC Action No. 1868 and requesting your Committee to develop a definition of the term "substantial radioactivity".

In view of the position taken by the IIC regarding this matter, and in view of other developments which have occurred since my request of March 24, the ICIS has agreed that the request should be withdrawn and, accordingly, this will inform your Committee that no response to the memorandum of March 24, 1958, is expected.

cc: Mr. Whitson
Col. Graham
Capt. Stewart
Mr. Kelly

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/11/03 BY SP4BTA/RNP

~~SECRET~~

NOT RECORDED
16 MAY 1 1958

5-Rec'd

58 FCB MAY 2 1958

117-258

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

cc: 1 - Boardman
1 - Belmont
1 - Kayne
1 - Liaison

May 2, 1958

BY COURIER SERVICE

Mr. J. Patrick Coyne
National Security Council
Executive Office Building
Washington 25, D. C.

DECLASSIFIED BY SP4BJA/RNP
ON 6/11/03

Dear Pat:

This will confirm information furnished to you by Special Agent G.A. Day on May 1 and 2, 1958, as follows:

Staff Officer [redacted] United States Bureau of Customs, Idlewild Airport, New York City, on May 1, 1958, advised that [redacted] French courier, traveling on French Diplomatic Passport Number [redacted] destined to the French Consulate in New York City, arrived at Idlewild Airport via Air France Flight [redacted] reflected that the diplomatic pouch, destined to the French Consulate in New York City, showed 100 points over on the green (normal background, 55 points) and 30 points over on the red (normal background, 18 points).

COMM - FBI
49 MAY - 5
BY COURIER SVC.

b2
b7C
b7E

Mr. Rooney said that another French courier from the French Consulate, who was meeting [redacted] at the airport, wondered about the delay and stated that the French diplomatic pouch normally contained papers and documents. This second courier volunteered that he would request permission from the French consul in New York City to telephone [redacted] from the French Consulate and explain what else, if anything, was in the diplomatic pouch. [redacted] stated that [redacted] was permitted to proceed and nothing was seized inasmuch as it was a diplomatic pouch.

REC'D-READING ROOM
MAY 2 5 44 PM '58
FBI
b7C

REC-9 117-26[illegible]-1674

Subsequently [redacted] received a call from the second courier who stated that the contents of the French diplomatic pouch that arrived on May 1, 1958, are secret and could not be divulged to [redacted] however, the French consul [redacted] advise the United States Department of State.

b7C

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AM:mce (6)

MAIL ROOM

15 MAY 5 1958

NOTE: Classified ~~Confidential~~ since response of detection device to radioactivity is so classified.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mr. J. Patrick Coyne

The above information was also furnished by this Bureau to [redacted] State Department, and Atomic Energy Commission. b7C

Sincerely,

J. Edgar Hoover

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

~~SECRET~~

TO : MR. TOLSON

DATE: April 30, 1958

FROM : D. J. PARSONS

Tolson
Boardman
Belmont
Mohr
Nease
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
Clayton
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTO THE UNITED STATES (DETECTION DEVICE PROGRAM)

Yesterday afternoon, Mr. Belmont and I attended the joint IIC and ICIS conference held for the purpose of demonstrating presently available devices designed to inspect baggage and packages coming into this country, as a deterrent to the importation of fissionable materials.

While some progress has been made, there is no vast improvement in these detection facilities. By way of background, this project under the auspices of the Atomic Energy Commission [redacted] b2 b7E [redacted] This, of course, would be the most useful and beneficial, but such equipment was described as still two years away.

With the present equipment it is possible to bring either [redacted] (5) [redacted] (5) [redacted] This is the principal improvement which has been made in the last year. b1 b2 b7E

EX-102 REC-46

Another new development [redacted] The equipment is not sufficiently sensitive to be used as a detector. b2 b7E

In addition to members of the IIC and ICIS member agencies, Commissioner John F. Floberg and other members of the AEC were present.

ACTION: None. For information.

DJP/mek (3) 1- Mr. Belmont

~~SECRET~~

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CLASSIFIED BY NSIC/A/RNP 6/11/03 DECLASSIFY ON: 25X1

4-41 (Rev. 11-6-57)

DECODED COPY

☐ Radio ☒ Teletype

Tolson
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Nease
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Clayton
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

URGENT 5-1-58 3-37 PM JLW

TO DIRECTOR 4

FROM SAC, NEW YORK 011915

Smuggling of Atom Bombs - Atomic Energy Act

[redacted] FRENCH DIPLOMATIC COURIER. SMAB-AEA. REFERENCE NY TEL TO BUREAU MAY 1 INSTANT. STAFF OFFICER [redacted] US CUSTOMS, IDLEWILD AIRPORT, NY, ON MAY 1 INSTANT HAS FURTHER ADVISED THAT [redacted] THE PREVIOUSLY UNIDENTIFIED FRENCH COURIER WHO MET [redacted] AT IDLEWILD THIS DATE CALLED [redacted] FROM THE FRENCH CONSULATE NYC AND STATED THAT CONTENTS OF THE FRENCH DIPLOMATIC POUCH THAT ARRIVED THIS DATE ARE SECRET AND COULD NOT BE DIVULGED TO [redacted] STATED ACCORDING TO [redacted] THAT THE FRENCH CONSUL WOULD ADVISE THE US STATE DEPARTMENT AND THAT US CUSTOMS WOULD PROBABLY BE ADVISED BY STATE. FOR INFO.

b7C

RECEIVED 3:40 PM TELETYPE

3:43 PM CODING UNIT JAL

Mr. Belmont

REC-69 11-11-117-268

EX-135

MAY 7 1958

Subject to Copyright Agreement with State

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58 MAY 8 1958

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

~~SECRET~~

Orig & 1 - O'Connor
1 - Yellow
4 - IIC
1 - Mr. Boardman
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Day
1 - Mr. Whitson
1 - Liaison

May 6, 1958

BY COURIER SERVICE

RIC- 35

117-268-1647

Mr. Roderic L. O'Connor
Administrator
Bureau of Security and
Consular Affairs
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/11/03 BY SP4BSTA/ENP

Dear Mr. O'Connor:

The Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (IIC) has considered your letter of April 21, 1958, concerning implementation of National Security Council Action 1668 and your interpretation of the phrase "substantial radioactivity" contained therein.

It is our understanding that the inability of detection devices presently in field use to distinguish fissionable from other radioactive materials had been discussed by the Council at the time its action was taken. The interpretation which you have placed upon the phrase "substantial radioactivity" does not appear to take into consideration the proceedings in the National Security Council if our understanding is correct. For this reason, it is suggested that you may desire to consult with the National Security Council Representative on Internal Security, Mr. J. Patrick Coyne, who was present during the Council's discussion of this matter.

BY COURIER SVC.
53 MAY 7
COMM - FBI

Your letter reflects your belief that implementation of NSC Action 1668 should become effective only after newly developed detection devices are put into use. Prototypes of these devices have been demonstrated during April, 1958, and, according to your letter, such devices could be put into field operation about January 1, 1959. This date is apparently

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(14)

~~SECRET~~

(Cover memorandum from Mr. Belmont to Mr. Boardman, 5/5/58, re "Countermeasures to Detect and Defend Against the Clandestine Introduction of Nuclear Weapons Into the United States (Detection Device Program)" GAD:hke)

(Classified ~~"Secret"~~ as this has been agreed by IIC-ICJ to be proper classification of discussion of limitations of the capability of detection devices.)

MAIL ROOM

~~SECRET~~

Mr. Roderic L. O'Connor

predicated upon the assumption that orders for the new devices would be placed promptly by the operating agencies. However, there is no assurance that even with the new devices, there could always be an accurate identification [redacted] b2 b7E

The IIC considers that the position expressed in your communication would have the practical effect of indefinitely postponing implementation of the Council's Action. We note, however, that the IIC has no responsibility under NSC Action 1868 until such time as implementing procedures are developed by the Department of State. It is suggested that the substance of your letter be furnished to the National Security Council, together with our comments hereto expressed.

Copies of this communication are being forwarded to Mr. J. Patrick Coyne and to the Chairman of the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

Chairman
Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference

1 - Mr. J. Patrick Coyne BY COURIER SERVICE
National Security Council
Executive Office Building
Washington, D. C.

1 - Mr. J. Walter Yeagley
Chairman
Interdepartmental Committee on
Internal Security
Department of Justice Building
Washington, D. C.

~~SECRET~~

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN 5-13-58

DATE: May 5, 1958

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTO THE UNITED STATES (DETECTION DEVICE PROGRAM)

Tolson
Nichols
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Gandy

117-268-1643

My memorandum of April 30, attached, secured the Director's approval of a proposed IIC reply to the Department of State letter of April 21, 1958, proposing that implementation be delayed concerning the National Security Council decision to open diplomatic pouches if our detection devices reflect substantial radioactivity. The IIC military members have now concurred in this letter.

Pat Coyne advised the IIC Secretary on May 5 that he approved of the letter and had disapproved of a draft letter on the same subject currently being considered within ICIS. He has instructed ICIS to redraft their letter along the lines of ours (ICIS does not make a move without Coyne's approval).

Coyne said that State had not yet informed NSC of the position being taken with regard to the NSC Action involved, and he asked that a sentence be included in our letter recommending that this be done. We have, therefore, added a sentence to the next to last paragraph of our letter suggesting that the substance of State's letter be furnished to NSC together with our comments. The IIC military members also concur in this.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4/1/83 BY SP2 [illegible]

ACTION:

Attached for signature of the Director as IIC Chairman is the letter which has already been approved by the IIC members, to which the sentence suggested by Coyne has been added.

Enclosures sent 5-6-58

GAD:hkel (6)
1-Mr. Boardman
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Mr. Day
1-Liaison Section

FX-108

REC-35 117-2[illegible]-1647

10 MAY 8 1958

LIAISON

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

SECRET

DATE: 4/24/58

FROM : W. A. Branigan

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT CLANDESTINE ATOMIC WEAPONS

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Parsons
1 - Mr. J. F. Gallagher
1 - Mr. Day
1 - Mr. Branigan
1 - Mr. Whitson

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Tele. Room
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Gandy

At 1 p.m., 4/22/58, G. A. Day and L. Whitson, Domestic Intelligence Division, and J. F. Gallagher, Laboratory, attended demonstration at Naval Ordnance Laboratory of equipment developed by Atomic Energy Commission, Naval Ordnance Laboratory and Naval Research Laboratory to assist in the detection and identification of fissionable material, [redacted] b1 Approximately 27 other representatives (S) from the various agencies comprising the IIC and the ICIS also attended.

After brief introductory remarks by Mr. John Kelly, Atomic Energy Commission Technical Advisor to the Joint IIC - ICIS Committee on Countermeasures, demonstrations were given of six devices.

[redacted] (S)

b1
b2
b7E

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HERE IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

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remove their watches and leave them outside the room in which [redacted] demonstrated in order to properly calibrate [redacted] normal background radiation. This improved [redacted] device which is now being used by the Coast Guard and Customs for ship searches and luggage searches, respectively. b2 b7E

A demonstration was also given of the [redacted] now used by Customs to check persons and [redacted] shipments suspected of smuggling items. [redacted]

In contrast to the [redacted] there was demonstrated [redacted]

b2 b7E

No demonstrator was able to state what the unit cost to Government agencies of the various new items would be. In response to an inquiry by Customs officer, who was considering the feasibility or replacing the [redacted] with the new [redacted] understood that for the next demonstration on 4/29/58, estimated cost figures of these items would be given. Nevertheless, it was an extremely interesting and worthwhile demonstration.

The demonstration was discussed at the meeting of the Joint IIC - ICIS Committee on Countermeasures with representatives of the Advisory Group, 10 a.m., 4/23/58. It

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was suggested, during the course of the discussion, that more of the demonstration be in the form of presentation in the Naval Ordnance Laboratory auditorium with large photographs to illustrate the functions and operations of various devices; that during the introductory remarks in the subsequent presentation, the precise function of each item in relation to the functions of the other items should be clarified; the comments of the scientists giving the demonstrations should be in understandable "laymen's language" and they should bear in mind that their listeners are not so much interested in the internal working of a device as they are in learning what the device will do and what its limitations are. It was also brought out in the discussion that at the close of the demonstrations there were comments by one of the scientists regarding the future development of more powerful active devices, including [redacted] and a device which will [redacted] At the demonstration on the 22nd, these comments were almost unintelligible. It was suggested that these comments be made in "laymen's language" and supported by various slides or photographs. (It was noted, however, in connection with the comments made regarding the [redacted] that the [redacted] b2 b7E

OBSERVATIONS:

This was an extremely interesting demonstration of scientific equipment. [redacted] b1

[redacted] (S)

RECOMMENDATION:

None. For your information.

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ENCLOSURE 117-268-1648

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN 5-12-58

DATE: May 9, 1958

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

Tolson
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Boardman ✓
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SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTO THE UNITED STATES (DETECTION DEVICE PROGRAM)

ICIS has furnished copies of a report submitted by Treasury concerning the operational aspects of the detection device program for the quarter ended March 31, 1958. These reports were requested by IIC-ICIS letter of August 20, 1957.

The report reflects no change in the operations of Coast Guard, but several instances have been reported in which the devices "have revealed violations of the postal laws, Customs regulations, and the Dangerous Cargo Regulations." No further details are furnished concerning this. Coast Guard is now receiving data from Atomic Energy Commission concerning arrivals of incoming source material or concentrations. This should assist Coast Guard in its problem of identifying the materials involved.

Customs has been faced with the problem of covering passengers arriving in Canada on board the Polish vessel S.S. BATORY destined to the United States. It was decided detection devices could not be used in Canada and State is now considering designation of Detroit, Michigan, as a port of arrival to supplement St. Albans, Vermont. Detection device coverage is planned at both points. Customs is receiving 31 portable devices from the Immigration and Naturalization Service and 10 from Coast Guard. The report states that these "will largely replace those which have been in use by Customs for the past several years and have outlived their usefulness." This is an interesting development, inasmuch as it was our impression that the devices received from INS and Coast Guard were to be used to augment the Customs program and not merely to replace devices currently in use.

No reply is expected from IIC because Treasury addressed its cover letter to ICIS alone. IIC should,

GAD:hkel (6)
1-Mr. Boardman
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Mr. Day
1-Liaison Section

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EX-123

58 JUN 2 1958

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however, formally note the report.

ACTION:

We will include consideration of the report in the agenda for the next IIC Working Committee meeting.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Mem • UNITED ERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: 5-12-58

FROM : W. A. Branigan

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS (JOINT IIC - ICIS COMMITTEE ON COUNTERMEASURES)

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Joint IIC - ICIS Committee (Committee B) met 10 a.m., 5-9-58. It considered memo dated 5-8-58 from ICIS regarding Customs Survey of Unaccompanied Soviet-bloc Shipments. No unusual items were noted. Memo and enclosure attached.

The quarterly report on Detection Device Program from Treasury was received for study and discussion at the next meeting of Committee B 5-20-58. Report attached.

Committee B reviewed NSC 5408 Programs and a draft reflecting the committee's comments will be prepared and circulated to the committee by Mr. Pfuntner of ICIS. ICIS representatives stated that because of newspaper curiosity regarding the use of the portable detection device by Coast Guard, Treasury was now considering a press release regarding detection devices. Both State and Defense have strong reservations on any press release and this matter will be discussed in near future in ICIS. Coast Guard representative stated there has been great increase of transshipments [redacted] from behind the Iron Curtain through the port of Antwerp. These are [redacted] equipment. Defense representative stated explosive ordnance disposal units are prepared to give 16-hour courses to police and fire departments on weapons components so that local agencies can handle emergencies which might arise due to accidents in transporting U.S. weapons. This is a matter which has been coordinated between Defense and AEC. Mr. Don Gale, Chairman of Advisory Group informed Committee B that Customs has made $50,000 available to the Naval Research Lab for the purchase of 7 or 8 [redacted]

b2
b7E

RECOMMENDATION:

None. These matters will be followed at the next meeting of Committee B, 5-20-58.

Enclosures
LW:cvg
(5)
1 - Belmont
1 - Branigan
1 - Day
1 - Whitson

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EX-135

MAY 22 1958

58 MAY 23 1958

1 ENCLOSURE

31

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4

ICIS-25/619

May 9, 1958

MEMORANDUM TO: Franklin L. Welch, Chairman
Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures

FROM: Leonard P. Bienvenu, Executive Secretary
Interdepartmental Committee on
Internal Security

SUBJECT: Treasury Report for the Quarter Ended March 31, 1958, on the Operational Aspects of the Detection Device Program

Enclosed is a copy of a letter dated May 2, 1958, from the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury and its attachment, the above mentioned report.

It is requested that your Committee review the Treasury Quarterly Report and submit any comments you may deem appropriate.

Enclosure

cc: Mr. Whitson
Lt. Col. Jones
Mr. Kelly
Capt. Stewart

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Hold for discussion next meeting (5-20-58) LW

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EX-135 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MAY 22 1958

7 ENCLOSURE

EX-135

31

Read ICIS 5-9-58 lw

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ICIS-P25/618

May 8, 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Franklin L. Welch, Chairman
Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures

FROM: Leonard P. Bienvenu
Executive Secretary, ICIS

SUBJECT: Survey of Unaccompanied Soviet Bloc Shipments

Reference is made to the memorandum dated May 6, 1957, (ICIS-P25/465), from the Chairman, ICIS, concerning the above subject. Enclosed for information and any comment you deem desirable is copy of a letter dated May 1, 1958, from the Acting Commissioner of Customs, with attached survey of shipments for the month of March 1958.

Enclosure

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CC: Mr. Whitson
Col. Graham
Capt. Stewart
Mr. Kelly

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117-208-1650

ENCLOSURE

Mr. Whitson

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JOINT IIC-ICIS COMMITTEE ON COUNTERMEASURES

MINUTES OF MEETING

APRIL 23, 1958

The Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures met on Wednesday, April 23, 1958, at 10:00 a.m., in Room 1630, Department of Justice. The following members were present:

IIC:	Mr. Franklin L. Welch, Chairman (Air Force)
	Mr. Lish Whitson (FBI)
ICIS:	Col. Alexander Graham
	Lt. Col. Albert W. Jones, Alt. (Defense)
	Capt. John R. Stewart
	Capt. William L. Sutter (Coast Guard)

* * * *

Advisory Group:	Mr. Donald I. Gale, Chairman (NRL)
ICIS Secretariat:	Mr. Carl H. Pfuntner

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117-268-1650

ENCLOSURE

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1. Minutes

Copies were distributed of the minutes for the meeting of April 15, 1958. The Committee amended and approved these minutes. Because of the nature of the amendment, the chief purpose of which was to insure that the minutes could retain the classification "Confidential", it was agreed that page 2 should be retyped. Therefore, all copies were returned to the Secretary, and a copy of the minutes with the revised page 2 substituted for the original page is enclosed.

2. Demonstration of New Types of Detection Devices -- Naval Ordinance Laboratory, April 22, 1958

There was discussion of the demonstrations and briefings which had been presented at NOL the previous day, April 22, 1958. Various comments and suggestions for possible improvement were offered with a view to assisting Mr. Gale and others concerned in the repetition of these demonstrations scheduled for April 29, 1958.

3. Review of NSC 5408 Programs

Copies were distributed of a draft memorandum dated April 22, 1958, to the Chairmen IIC and ICIS on the above subject. This draft had been prepared pursuant to discussion at the last meeting (see Item 6, minutes of April 15, 1958). There was brief preliminary discussion of the draft and it was agreed to postpone detailed consideration until the next meeting.

Next Meeting

The Committee agreed to meet next on Friday, May 9, 1958, at 10:00 a.m., to consider:

1. Minutes of April 23, 1958

2. Review of NSC 5408 Programs - Draft dated April 22, 1958 (see Item 3 above).

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JOINT IIC-ICIS COMMITTEE ON COUNTERMEASURES

MINUTES OF MEETING

APRIL 15, 1958

The Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures met on Tuesday, April 15, 1958, at 10:00 a.m., in Room 2515, Department of Justice. The following members were present:

IIC:	Mr. Franklin L. Welch, Chairman (Air Force)
	Mr. Lish Whitson (FBI)
ICIS:	Col. Alexander Graham
	Lt. Col. Albert W. Jones, Alt. (Defense)
	Capt. John R. Stewart
	Capt. William L. Sutter (Coast Guard)
AEC Advisor:	Mr. John S. Kelly

* * * * *

Advisory Group:	Mr. Donald I. Gale, Chairman (NRL)
ICIS Secretariat:	Mr. Carl H. Pfuntner

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ENCLOSURE

117-968-1650

1. Minutes

The Committee approved the minutes of its meeting of March 31, 1958, without change.

2. Use of Dosimeters

By Secretariat memorandum dated April 7, 1958, copies had been distributed of memoranda dated March 3, 1958, and April 1, 1958, from the Director, Office of Security, Department of State, giving the results of tests of the use of [redacted] The Committee noted the two memoranda. b2 b7E

3. Use of Detection Devices on U.S.-Bound Trains Travelling in Canada

A memorandum dated April 3, 1958, from the Chairman of the Advisory Group summarized the status of negotiations with the Canadian Government on the above subject. Also, a letter dated March 21, 1958, from the Administrator, Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, Department of State, to the Chairman, ICIS (a similar letter was sent to IIC) made reference to the IIC-ICIS letter of March 27, 1956, on this subject, and gave the results of negotiations with Canada. This letter with its enclosures, as well as the Advisory Group memorandum of April 3, 1958, was distributed to Committee B by Secretariat memorandum dated April 8, 1958.

Mr. Whitson said that the IIC was writing to State and to the ICIS indicating that in view of the Canadian position IIC did not urge further negotiations with Canada at this time. He observed that the Canadian view, indicated in the February 14 letter from the Canadian Under Secretary of State for External Affairs to the U. S. Embassy in Ottawa, that clandestine attack with nuclear weapons was improbable, together with the expressed Canadian doubt as to the efficacy of the detection devices, virtually destroyed any basis for further discussions at this time, looking toward the use of devices at Canadian ports, even though the March 10 letter from the Counselor of the U. S. Embassy, Ottawa, indicated the opinion that there was some chance of arranging for Canadian use of devices at Canadian ports. It was the general consensus of Committee B that the terms in which the Canadian Government had rejected the proposal for the use of detection devices made it infeasible to pursue the matter further with Canada.

Mr. Cole stressed the operational difficulties of accomplishing an effective check of trains entering the country from Canada if devices could be used only after the trains had crossed the border.

Following further discussion it was agreed that the Advisory Group should work out as effective procedures as were possible in the light of the Canadian rejection of the proposal to use devices on Canadian territory, and to report on these procedures in the next semi-annual status report.

4. AEC 2nd Quarterly Progress Report on the Development of Detection Devices

The above quarterly progress report had been submitted by letter dated April 3, 1958, from the Director of Military Application, AEC, and had been distributed to Committee B by memorandum from the Chairman, ICIS, dated April 10, 1958.

The Committee had reviewed a preliminary draft of this quarterly report at its meeting on March 31, 1958 (see Item 4, minutes of that date). It was agreed simply to note the report at this time, since further discussion of research and development on new devices could best take place after the demonstrations scheduled for April 22 and April 29, 1958.

5. Customs Surveys of Unaccompanied Shipments to Soviet Bloc Personnel, Officials and Offices

By Secretariat memorandum dated April 10, 1958, there was distributed to the Committee a letter dated April 8, 1958, from the Acting Commissioner of Customs. The Customs letter enclosed the subject survey for February 1958. It also enclosed amended reports which had been prepared to correct discrepancies in the report of various shipments arriving at New York during the months of July, August, September, October, November and December 1957, and January and February 1958. The April 8 letter from Customs and the amended reports resulted in part from informal inquiries to Customs pursuant to the discussion at the meeting of Committee B on March 17, 1958 (see Item 3, minutes of that date). It was generally agreed by the Committee that its concern over what had appeared to be the extremely heavy weight of some shipments listed in the report for January 1958 was now cleared up by the amended reports. It was noted, however, that the erroneous reporting method was apparently still being followed in the February survey, and the Secretary was directed to request amendments to that report.

6. Review of NSC 5408 Programs

By memorandum dated April 14, 1958, from the Chairman, ICIS, the Committee was requested to review the programs listed in subparagraphs a and b of Paragraph 20 of NSC 5408. This review was called for under the agreement reached by the National Security Council as shown in NSC 5802/1 (paragraph c, page i, and paragraph 1b of that document). The objective of the review was, as indicated on page 1 of NSC 5802/1, "to determine whether such programs are currently valid or should be cancelled or changed."

The Committee discussed each of the programs listed in subparagraphs a and b of Paragraph 20, NSC 5408, and the Secretary was directed to prepare a draft of comments and recommendations to the parent Committees for consideration at the next meeting. Enclosed for consideration at the meeting scheduled for April 25, 1958, is copy of a draft dated April ~~28~~ 22, 1958.

7. Arrival of Soviet Jet Aircraft on February 6, 1958, at Friendship Airport

On March 17, 1958 (see Item 2, minutes of that date) the Committee had considered a report dated February 10, 1958, prepared by the Advisory Group on the above subject and had indicated that it had considered the procedures described therein to be satisfactory. A memorandum reporting this to the ICIS was now approved by the Committee (copy of this memorandum dated April 16, 1958, enclosed for information and completion of files).

8. Report by the Department of the Treasury on the Detection Device Program for the Quarter Ended December 31, 1957

On March 24, 1958 (see Item 4, minutes of that date) the Committee considered the above report which was submitted by letter from Treasury dated February 25, 1958, and distributed by memorandum from the Chairman, ICIS, dated March 12, 1958. The Committee had noted the information contained in the report and had agreed that it had no comment to submit on the report. The Committee now approved a memorandum reporting this to the Chairmen, IIC-ICIS, (copy of this memorandum dated April 16, 1958, is enclosed for information and completion of files).

Next Meeting

The Committee agreed that the next meeting will be held on Friday, April 25, 1958, at 10:00 a.m., in Room 2515, Department of Justice. The following will be considered:

1. Minutes of the meeting of April 15, 1958.

2. Review of NSC 5408 Programs.

   Enclosed for consideration is a draft dated April ~~16~~ 24, 1958, prepared pursuant to Item 6 above.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268)

DATE: 5/21/58

FROM : SAC, PITTSBURGH (117-38)

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS, OR PARTS THEREOF, AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES

Re Pittsburgh letter to Bureau, 4/15/58.

On 5/8/58, Lieutenant WARREN L. PARKER, Officer in Charge, 145th Ordnance Detachment (EOD), Box 183A, R. D. #1, Greensburg, Pa., advised SA [redacted] b7C [redacted] that he took over command of this Ordnance Detachment on 5/1/58. Lieutenant PARKER also furnished information concerning the zone of responsibility of the 145th Ordnance Detachment and furnished the addresses and phone numbers of other Ordnance Detachments who are responsible for counties within the territory of the Pittsburgh Division.

This information is listed as follows:

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2 - Bureau (RM)
1 - Philadelphia (117-75)(Info)(RM)
1 - Baltimore (117-46)(Info)(RM)
1 - Cincinnati (117-57)(Info)(RM)
1 - Louisville (Info)(RM)
1 - Pittsburgh

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145th Ordnance Detachment
Box 183A, R. D. #1
Greensburg, Pa.
(located on Pennsylvania Highway 71,
5.8 miles southwest of Greensburg, Pa.)
Commanding Officer: Lt. WARREN L. PARKER
Office telephone number Lafayette 7-1566
Home telephone number [redacted] b7C

The 145th Ordnance Detachment is responsible for the following counties in Pennsylvania and West Virginia:

Pennsylvania

Allegheny
Armstrong
Beaver
Butler
Clarion
Clearfield
Crawford
Elk
Erie
Fayette
Forest
Greene
Indiana
Jefferson
Lawrence
McKean
Mercer
Somerset
Venango
Warren
Washington
Westmoreland

West Virginia

Barbour
Braxton
Brooke
Clay
Doddridge
Fayette
Gilmer
Grant
Greenbrier
Hampshire
Hancock
Hardy
Harrison
Lewis
Marion
Marshall
Mineral
Monongalia
Monroe
Nicholas
Ohio
Pendleton
Pocahontas
Preston
Randolph
Summers
Taylor
Tucker
Upshur
Webster
Wetzel

56th Ordnance Detachment
Indiantown Gap, Pa.
Office telephone number Lebanon 3-2601, Ext. 1049

The 56th Ordnance Detachment is responsible for the following counties in the Pittsburgh Division:

Bedford
Blair
Cambria

71st Ordnance Detachment
Fort Hayes, Columbus, Ohio
Office telephone number CA 4-7034

The 71st Ordnance Detachment is responsible for the following counties in the Pittsburgh Division in West Virginia

Cabell	Mason	Roane
Calhoun	Pleasants	Tyler
Jackson	Putnam	Wirt
Kanawha	Ritchie	Wood

73rd Ordnance Detachment
Fort Knox, Kentucky
Office telephone number Fort Knox 5048
Officer in Charge: Lt. ALEX F. GIOVANNI

The 73rd Ordnance Detachment is responsible for the following counties in the Pittsburgh Division in West Virginia:

Boone	Mingo
Lincoln	Raleigh
Logan	Wayne
McDowell	Wyoming
Mercer	

549th Ordnance Detachment
Fort Meade, Maryland
Office telephone number Baltimore, Md. OR 43311

The 549th Ordnance Detachment is responsible for the following counties in the Pittsburgh Division in West Virginia:

Berkeley
Jefferson
Morgan

Lieutenant PARKER furnished SA DAVID W. EGBERT with road maps of Pennsylvania and West Virginia with lines drawn showing the separation of the zones of responsibility of the Ordnance Detachments listed above. These maps are being placed in the 1A exhibit section of Pittsburgh file 117-38.

Lieutenant PARKER advised that he would notify the Pittsburgh Office of any subsequent changes to the above information. The Bureau will be notified of such changes as they are received.

For the information of Philadelphia, Lieutenant PARKER also advised that the 145th Ordnance Detachment's zone of responsibility covers Cameron County in Pennsylvania which is in Philadelphia Division.

Tic -- Mr. Whitson

SAC, Albany

5/27/58

Director, FBI (117-268)

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES

Bulets 12/13/57 and 4/29/58. (117-268-1640)

At the present time the Department of State permits Soviet-bloc diplomatic and official personnel to enter the United States at Syracuse, New York; New York City; St. Albans and Highgate Springs, Vermont; and Laredo and San Antonio, Texas. On and after 6/1/58, San Francisco, California, will replace San Antonio, Texas, as such a port of entry.

2 - New York
2 - San Antonio
2 - San Francisco
1 - Washington Field

LW:smk
(11)

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NOTE:

Change from San Antonio to San Francisco is predicated upon information contained in a draft memo from the Joint IIC - ICIS Committee on Countermeasures (Committee B) to the chairmen IIC and ICIS which is discussed in memo Belmont to Boardman dated 5/26/58 re "Countermeasures to Detect and Defend Against Clandestine Atomic Weapons." Referenced letters of 12/13/57 and 4/29/58 discuss, in detail, the detection device program.

117-268-1653

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62 JUN 3 1958

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~~JOINT~~ IIC-ICIS COMMITTEE ON COUNTERMEASURES

MINUTES OF MEETING

MAY 20, 1958

The Joint IIC ICIS Committee on Countermeasures met on Tuesday, May 20, 1958, at 10:00 a.m., in Room 2515, Department of Justice. The following members were present:

IIC: Mr. Franklin L. Welch, Chairman (Air Force)
Mr. Lish Whitson (FBI)

ICIS: Col. Alexander Graham
Lt. Col. Albert W. Jones, Alt. (Defense)
Capt. William L. Sutter (Coast Guard)

AEC Advisor: Mr. John S. Kelly

* * * * * *

Advisory Group: Mr. Donald I. Gale, Chairman (NRL)

ICIS Secretariat: Mr. Carl H. Pfuntner

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117-268

58 JUN 4 1958

1. Minutes

The Committee approved the minutes of its meeting of May 9, 1958 with the following amendment: Page 3 - delete the first paragraph.

2. Quarterly Report of the Treasury Department on the Operational Aspects of the Detection Device Program for the Quarter Ended March 31, 1958

The Committee considered the above report which had been submitted by letter dated May 2, 1958 from the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, and which had been referred to Committee B by ICIS Secretariat memorandum dated May 9, 1958.

The Committee agreed to reply to ICIS indicating that it had noted the above report and that the information contained in it will be taken into consideration in preparing the response to the request by ICIS of May 16, 1958 for an over-all estimate of the effectiveness of the program now in operation (see Item 3 below). (Draft memorandum dated May 23, 1958, enclosed.)

3. ~~X~~ Detection Device Program

The Committee considered a memorandum dated May 16, 1958, from the Acting Chairman, ICIS, on the above subject, referring to the fact that, with the accomplishment of the loan arrangements between INS and Customs, all available devices were now in operation, and requesting that the Committee undertake an over-all estimate of the effectiveness of the present program. It was agreed that such an estimate could not be ~~undertaken~~ furnished until the next report of the advisory group had been received. An interim reply to ICIS along these lines will be drafted for consideration at the next meeting (see enclosed draft memorandum dated May 23, 1958).

4. ~~X~~ Improved Detection Devices

The Committee considered a memorandum dated May 16, 1958, from the Acting Chairman, ICIS, on the above subject, referring to the briefings on new devices on April 22 and April 29, 1958, and requesting consideration of the detection device program with a view to submitting recommendations pertaining to the use of the new devices.

Messrs. Kelly and Gale pointed out that the $50,000 which Customs had transferred to NRL would be used to obtain several (probably 7 or 8) new [redacted] These would be ready for delivery early in 1959 ~~in September or October, 1958.~~ After they had been acquired and put into use, it would be possible to recommend as to whether, and how many, more might be needed. ~~It was not known whether~~ The $50,000 expenditure should ~~would~~ enable enough of the new [redacted] ~~to cover ports of entry designated for entry of Soviet bloc diplomats.~~ to replace [redacted] in use and provide one or two additional devices for adequate coverage.

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for delivery early in 1959.

Furthermore, with regard to the other devices which had been demonstrated, the AEC was purchasing about [redacted] for field testing and evaluation by Customs and Coast Guard. No recommendations could be made on those devices until such field tests had been made. for field testing by Customs will be made available in June, 1958.

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b7E

It was agreed that a draft memorandum along the above lines should be prepared as an interim reply to the ICIS memorandum of May 16, 1958 (see enclosed draft dated May 23, 1958).

5. Customs Surveys of Unaccompanied Shipments to Soviet Bloc Personnel, Officials and Offices

On April 15, 1958 Committee B had noted the above report for February, 1958 (see Item 5, minutes of April 15, 1958). The Committee had directed the Secretary to inquire of Customs as to whether some of the reported weights were not still erroneous in that they represented total shipment weights rather than the piece weights of shipments containing several packages of identical size.

Mr. Pfuntner reported he had made the requisite inquiry of Customs and had been informed that each of the items which the Committee had questioned did, indeed, constitute an example of the above-mentioned type of error. Customs was now hopeful that all offices submitting these reports clearly understood the correct manner of reporting.

6. Review of NSC 5408 Programs

Pursuant to discussion at the last meeting, a revised draft memorandum dated May 12, 1958, to the Chairmen IIC and ICIS, on the above subject had been prepared.

The Committee reviewed the May 12 draft and agreed on amendments thereto. The Committee approved the draft as amended. Mr. Whitson requested that five copies of the draft with agreed changes noted in them be furnished him informally for clearance with the IIC working group. After receipt of his comments, unless they involve a proposal for substantive change in the draft, the memorandum will be forwarded to IIC and ICIS.

Next Meeting

The Committee agreed to meet next on Tuesday, May 27, 1958, at 10:00 a.m., to consider:

1. Minutes of May 20, 1958.

2. Draft memorandum to ICIS dated May 23, 1958 (copy enclosed) on Treasury report for quarter ended March 31, 1958 (see Item 2 above).

3. Draft interim memorandum dated May 23, 1958 (copy enclosed) on estimate of effectiveness of present detection device program (see Item 3 above).

4. Draft interim reply dated May 23, 1958 (copy enclosed) on use of improved devices (see Item 4 above).

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. L. V. Boardman

DATE: May 28, 1958

FROM : Mr. A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTO THE UNITED STATES (DETECTION DEVICE PROGRAM)

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
Nease
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

By memorandum of April 4, 1958, the joint Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (IIC)- Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS) Committee on Countermeasures forwarded, for IIC review, copies of a proposal for the testing of our present detection devices, together with a suggested joint IIC-ICIS letter addressed to the Secretary of State. This letter would have asked

b2
b7E

[redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 10/1/03 BY SP4 [illegible]

This proposal was discussed by the IIC working committee on April 9, and, as previously approved by the Director, we stated that this was a complicated procedure; amounted to an unnecessary playing of war games; and tests could be conducted without formal letters from the chairmen of the two internal security committees. We opposed raising such a complicated test procedure involving actio by the IIC and ICIS chairmen. The working committee concurred in this and the ICIS Secretariat was so notified.

On May 27, 1958, the ICIS Secretary furnished copies of a revised draft letter for IIC consideration. This letter, copy attached, incorporates the very same features to which we objected previously in that it again [redacted] The ICIS Secretary said that he felt sure we would not approve this but the ICIS standing committee had asked him to check with IIC because Pat Coyne had insisted that if any letter was to be written, it should be a letter signed by both the IIC and ICIS chairmen.

b2
b7E

We told Bienvenu, the ICIS Secretary, that his present letter does not alter the IIC position and that it was our opinion that if the operators of the devices wished to test them, this could be done without formal letters, [redacted]

REC- 4

117-268-1655

20 JUN 5 1958

GAD:bjt (6)
1 - Mr. Boardman
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Whitson
1 - Liaison Section
1 - Mr. Day
Enclosure

ENCLOSURE

20 JUN 8 1958

LIAISON

Memorandum Mr. Belmont to Mr. Boardman
RE: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTO THE UNITED STATES (DETECTION DEVICE PROGRAM)

OBSERVATION:

There appears to be little which could be gained from tests such as ICIS proposes. The shortcomings and weaknesses of our present detection devices are well known and a formal test, sponsored by the Director, could be used by Treasury as an argument against continuing the program if it developed that radioactive materials had managed to escape detection.

ACTION:

For information. We will continue to maintain the position approved by the Director in this matter.

3
R
B.

ICIS-P25/629

Honorable John Foster Dulles
The Secretary of State
Washington 25, D. C.

Attention: Mr. E. Tomlin Bailey
Director, Office of Security

Dear Mr. Dulles:

The Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security have joint responsibility, under Presidential directive, for the development of programs for safeguarding against clandestine introduction of fissionable weapons and materials into this country. Since the summer of 1954, a number of passive detection devices have been in use at a few selected ports of entry.

[redacted]

[redacted]

b2
b7E

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4/11/03 BY SP4 CSTA/ENP

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover
Chairman, Interdepartmental
Intelligence Conference

J. Walter Yeagley
Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee
on Internal Security

117-268-1655

ENCLOSURE

Page 148 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 149 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 150 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 151 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 152 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 153 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 154 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 155 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 156 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 157 ~ Referral/Direct to OGA
Page 158 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 161 ~ Referral/Direct to OGA
Page 162 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 163 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 164 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 165 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 166 ~ Referral/Direct to OGA
Page 167 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 168 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 169 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 170 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 171 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 172 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 173 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 180 ~ Referral/Direct to OGA
Page 187 ~ b2 , b7E
Page 188 ~ b2 , b7E
Page 189 ~ Referral/Direct to OGA
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Page 191 ~ b2 , b7E
Page 192 ~ b2 , b7E
Page 193 ~ b2 , b7E
Page 194 ~ b2 , b7E
Page 195 ~ b2 , b7E
Page 197 ~ b2 , b7E
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Page 205 ~ Referral/Direct
Page 217 ~ b1 , b2 , b7E
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Page 187 ~ b2 , b7E
Page 188 ~ b2 , b7E
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DO-6

OFFICE OF DIRECTOR
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Callahan
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Malone
Mr. McGuire
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. Jones
Mr. W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Mr. Ingram
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

EXP. PROC.

APR 19 1960

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/19/03 BY SP4BJTA/RNP

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Mohr
Parsons
Belmont
Callahan
DeLoach
Malone
McGuire
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

TO : *MR. A. H. BELMONT*

DATE: *April 22, 1960*

FROM : *F. A. FROHBOSE*

SUBJECT: *COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTO THE UNITED STATES*

The Atomic Energy Commission has furnished copies of its Quarterly Status Report on the Development of Detection Devices covering the first quarter of 1960. Copies have been made available to the other IIC members.

[redacted] (5)

b1

[redacted] (5)

ACTION:

No action is required by IIC concerning the Atomic Energy Commission's report. We will, however, schedule it for notation at the next Working Committee meeting.

~~Enclosure~~

GAD:hkeplke
(6)

1-Mr. Parsons
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Liaison
1-Mr. Day

6/19/03
CLASSIFIED BY NSIS/DOJ/ENP 60267 (Derivative)
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X1 (1)

REC- 44 117-360-2

12 MAY 10 1960

99

5-MM

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

- Tolson
- Mohr
- Parsons
- Belmont
- Callahan
- DeLoach
- Malone
- McGuire
- Rosen
- Tamm
- Trotter
- W.C. Sullivan
- Tele. Room
- Ingram
- Gandy

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: 5-12-60

FROM : Mr. D. E. Moore

SUBJECT: [redacted] IS - R Bufile [redacted]

[redacted] IS - R Bufile [redacted]

b7C

Supervisor [redacted] NYO, advised 6:40 p.m., 5-12-60, that subjects, Soviet diplomatic couriers, arrived at Idlewild Airport, New York, [redacted] aboard Scandinavian Airlines, Flight [redacted] They had 5 pieces of luggage, which included diplomatic pouch number [redacted]

This pouch consisted of a wooden box wrapped in brown canvas. The box was approximately 3 feet by 1 foot by 8 inches and wighed approximately 38 pounds.

[redacted] detection device. After the box had been [redacted] the yellow signal light flashed but the red light did not come on. After the box had been removed from [redacted] a signal was flashed there. These devices have no equipment for registering the intensity of radiation but it was noted that no reaction occurred prior to the time the box was actually [redacted]

b2
b7E

The couriers took the luggage, including the diplomatic pouch, to the UN Delegation. New York is alert and will try and determine whether the box remains there or is brought on to Washington by the couriers. Customs advised AEC in New York City and, according to Customs, AEC showed no concern concerning the [redacted]

ACTION:

The above information will be disseminated to State, J. P. Coyne of the National Security Council, Army, Navy and Air Force.

Richard L. Bowen, State, was advised, 5-REC-4

Russell Ash, NSC, ad[illegible] by Graham Day, [illegible]

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Branigan
1 - Mr. Whitson
1 - Mr. Day
1 - Mr. F. L. Jones

DEM:mtb
(7)

117-2[illegible]-
NOT RECORDED
126 JUN 3 1960

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/19/03 BY SP1 [illegible]

61 JUN 9 1960

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

c - 1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Shubatt
1 - Mr. Whitson

117-268

Date: May 18, 1960

To: Office of Security
Department of State

DECLASSIFIED BY SP4BTA/RNP
ON 6/19/03

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director

Subject: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

This will confirm information furnished to [redacted] of the Department of State by Special Agent [redacted] of this Bureau on May 12, 1960. The same information was furnished to [redacted] in the Office of the National Security Council Representative on Internal Security by Special Agent [redacted] of this Bureau on May 12, 1960. b7C

[redacted] Soviet diplomatic couriers, arrived at Idlewild Airport, New York, at [redacted] 1960, aboard Scandinavian Airlines, Flight [redacted] They had five pieces of luggage, which included diplomatic pouch number 160. This pouch consisted of a wooden box wrapped in brown canvas, weighing approximately 38 pounds, and having the dimensions of approximately 3' by 1' by 8". After this pouch had been [redacted] detection device signaled the presence of gamma radiation. After the pouch had been removed [redacted] in the Airport and gamma radiation was signaled by that device. The FBI and the Atomic Energy Commission offices in New York City were informed by Customs authorities and Customs stated that no reaction of [redacted] occurred prior to the time the pouch was actually [redacted] b2 b7C b7E

The couriers took the luggage, including t[redacted], the Soviet United Nations Delegation Headquarters in [redacted] City.

EX-105 REC-72

LW:skn (See note on page 2)
(12)

BY COURIER SVC.
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
90 MAY 16
COMM-FBI

MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT

MAY 19 1960

Office of Security
Department of State

These data are being furnished also to Mr. J. Patrick Coyne, National Security Council Representative on Internal Security, and to Mr. John F. Doherty, Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security.

1 - Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army

Attention: Chief, Security Division

1 - Director of Naval Intelligence

1 - Office of Special Investigations
Air Force

Attention: Chief, Counterintelligence Division

1 - Mr. J. Patrick Coyne (BY SPECIAL MESSENGER)
National Security Council
Executive Office Building
Washington 25, D. C.

1 - Mr. John F. Doherty
Chairman
Interdepartmental Committee on
Internal Security
Department of Justice Building
Washington 25, D. C.

NOTE: Classified ~~"Confidential"~~ because reports of the detection of radioactivity in the effects of diplomatic travelers are so classified.

F B I

Date: 5/16/60

Transmit the following in PLAIN TEXT
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268)

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (117-192)

SUBJECT: SMAB
AEA

SOVIET DIPLOMATIC COURIER
IS-R

SOVIET DIPLOMATIC COURIER
IS-R

ReNYairtel, 5/13/60.

7-Bureau (117-268) (SMAB) (RM)

3-Washington Field (117-151) (SMAB) (Info.) (RM)

1-New York (117-192) (SMAB)
1 (Inv.)
1-New York (100-81783) (SOVIET DIPLOMATIC COURIERS)
1
1

JTC:hd
(16)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/19/03 BY SP4BTA/ENP

Approved: Sent M Per
Special Agent in Charge

50 MAY 23 1960

EX-100
REC 78 117-268-2044

5 MAY 17 1960

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

NY 117-192

On 5/12/60, [redacted] Staff Officer, US Customs, NY International Airport, NYC, advised SA [redacted] that their new [redacted] device had triggered a bell when a 39 pound brown canvas covered pouch was being cleared through Customs. This pouch appeared to contain a wooden box, 3'x1'x8". It was sealed and labeled as Soviet Diplomatic pouch #160. [redacted] explained that the pouch, when brought into close proximity to the device, gave a reading of yellow. It was brought into the US by [redacted] who was accompanied by [redacted] are Soviet Diplomatic Couriers who arrived at NY International Airport on [redacted] at approximately [redacted] via Scandinavian Airlines System, Flight [redacted] (arriving from Copenhagen, Denmark). They had been issued A-1 visas and both were destined for the Soviet Embassy, Washington, D.C.

b2
b7C
b7E

On 5/16/60, [redacted] AEC, NYC stated that he had been advised that the US Customs Office should only have contacted the FBI in the event [redacted] device gave a reading of red. [redacted] further advised that those were the current instructions concerning the use of [redacted] and that Customs was in error in having notified the NYO.

b2
b7C
b7E

F B I

Date: 5/13/60

Transmit the following in PLAIN TEXT
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268)

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (117-192)

SUBJECT: SMAB
AEA

[redacted]
SOVIET DIPLOMATIC COURIER
IS-R

NO ACTION. DISSEMINATION MADE ON BASIS OF INFO FROM NY 5-12-60. LW

[redacted]
SOVIET DIPLOMATIC COURIER
IS-R

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/19/03 BY SP4BTA/RNP

7 - Bureau (117-268) (SMAB) (RM)
[redacted]
3 - Washington Field (117-151) (SMAB) (Info.) (RM)
[redacted]
1 - New York (117-192) (SMAB)
1 - [redacted] (Inv.)
1 - New York (100-81783) (SOVIET DIPLOMATIC COURIERS)
1 - [redacted]
1 -

b2
b7C
b7D

EX-100 REC- 28

117-268-2045

1 MAY 23 1960

JTC:epo
(16)

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

67 MAY 24 1960

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

NY 117-192

On 5/12/60, [redacted] Staff Officer, US Customs, NY International Airport, NYC, advised SA [redacted] that their new [redacted] device had triggered a bell when a 38 pound brown canvas covered pouch was being cleared through Customs. This pouch appeared to contain a wooden box, 3'xl'x8". It was sealed and labeled as Soviet Diplomatic pouch # 160. [redacted] explained that the pouch, when brought into close proximity to the device, gave a reading of yellow. It was brought into the US by [redacted] who was accompanied by [redacted] are Soviet Diplomatic Couriers who arrived at NY International Airport on [redacted] at approximately [redacted] via Scandinavian Airlines System, Flight [redacted] (arriving from Copenhagen, Denmark). They had been issued A-1 visas and both were destined for the Soviet Embassy, Washington, D.C. b2 b7C b7E

[redacted] advised that AEC had been notified. They plan no action. [redacted] added that the pouch was cleared by Customs and that the Soviet Couriers were not delayed. b7C

A Special Agent of the FBI observed [redacted] entering the Soviet Delegation to the UN, 680 Park Ave., NYC, at 5:40 pm along with the pouch and other Soviet Courier baggage.

Fisur units, thereafter, reported no pertinent activity on the part of the Couriers until 5/13/60, at 11:46 a.m. when they departed the Soviet Delegation and proceeded to Pennsylvania Railroad Station, NYC, where they boarded a train for Washington, D.C. Fisur units advised that along with other Courier baggage, the Couriers were in possession of a pouch similar to the pouch described above.

It is noted that on 5/12/60, [redacted] advised SA [redacted] that captioned couriers were scheduled to depart NYC for Washington, D.C. on [redacted] via Pennsylvania Railroad, [redacted] Source added that they are tentatively scheduled to depart the US for Copenhagen [redacted]

b2
b7C
b7D

NY verified this courier departure. WFO cognizant of above. NY and WFO will continue to remain alert re movement of pouch and their future travel plans.

On 5/13/60, [redacted] AEC, NYC, advised SA [redacted] that he had been notified by US Customs of [redacted] to the courier pouch. [redacted] said that he was expecting to receive additional data re this matter in the near future; that he will advise the NYO of his findings in an effort to clarify this matter.

b2
b7C
b7E

NYO will recontact [redacted] on 5/16/60.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: 5/25/60

FROM : W. A. Branigan

SUBJECT: JOINT IIC-ICIS COMMITTEE ON COUNTERMEASURES

Tolson
Mohr
Parsons
Belmont
Callahan
DeLoach
Malone
McGuire
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

A meeting of the Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures was held 5/18/60. The Committee noted the quarterly report of the AEC on the detection device program which had previously been noted in the IIC and the ICIS.

The Committee also noted the monthly reports of unaccompanied diplomatic shipments made by Customs for February and March, 1960. The Advisory Group, represented by Mr. Don Gale of AEC, was requested to determine on the Advisory Group's next inspection of operation of the detection device program at the port of New York whether bulky shipments such as the bus which was delivered to the Soviets at the port of New York was actually inspected with portable detection devices. (This bus had been promptly reported to the New York Office of the FBI by Customs at the time of its arrival.)

The FBI, Army, Defense, and AEC representatives at the Joint Committee meeting were cognizant of the fact that no positive conclusions had been drawn in National Intelligence Estimate 11-7-60 on clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons which changed in any way the concept of Soviet capabilities. The Department of Defense representative for ICIS stated that he would raise the question of how this Estimate might affect the detection device program in the next meeting of the Standing Committee of ICIS.

ACTION:

None. For your information. The next meeting of the Joint Committee will be held on call by the chairman, Mr. Chester Smith, of Army.

REC- 33

23 MAY 26 1960

LW:skn
(5)
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Branigan
1 - Mr. Day
1 - Mr. Whitson

EX-102

51 JUN 1 1960

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117-268

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Read from ICIS 6-3-60 LW

JOINT IIC-ICIS COMMITTEE ON COUNTERMEASURES

MINUTES OF MEETING

MAY 18, 1960

The Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures met on Wednesday, May 18, 1960, at 10:00 a.m., in Room 2515, Department of Justice. The following members were present:

IIC:	Mr. Chester D. Smith, Chairman (Army)
	Mr. Lish Whitson (FBI)
ICIS:	Captain Donald B. Ingersoll (Defense)
	Lt. John A. Flynn, Alternate (Const Guard)
AEC Advisor:	Mr. Donald I. Cale

* * * *

ICIS Secretariat: Mr. Carl E. Pfuntner

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EX-112

REC-87 117-268-2047

10 JUN 10 1960

CONFIDENTIAL

52 JUN 15 1960

117-268

1. Minutes

The Committee approved the minutes of its meeting of March 14, 1960, with the following changes:

Page 4, 10th line, last word, change "declation" to "evaluation."

Page 4, 2nd full paragraph from bottom of the page, 2nd line, change "the device" to "this specific model"; 5th line, insert "the ICIS representative from" before the word "Defense."

The Committee approved the minutes of its meeting of March 15, 1960, without change.

2. Customs Surveys

The Committee considered the surveys on Soviet bloc unaccompanied shipments for February 1960 (submitted by Customs letter dated March 18 and distributed by ICIS Secretariat memorandum dated March 24) and March 1960 (submitted by Customs letter dated April 15 and distributed by ICIS Secretariat memorandum dated April 26). The Committee agreed to note the two surveys, and it was agreed that no items of special significance were contained in them. However, the Secretary was requested to inquire of Customs regarding the procedures that had been followed to examine the bus which was reported in the February survey as having arrived at New York.

3. AEC Quarterly Report for January-March 1960

The Committee considered the above report, which had been submitted by AEC letter dated April 18, 1960, and distributed by ICIS Secretariat memorandum of April 21.

Mr. Gale reported that with regard to the [redacted] it was now expected that four of the ten being produced would be completed by June 1, 1960, and that the remainder would be ready by about June 15.

Following some general discussion of the status of the detection device program, the Committee noted the AEC report.

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b7E

4. Detection Device Program - Report of Radioactive Diplomatic Pouch

The Secretary invited attention to a memorandum dated May 16, 1960, from FBI to the Department of State, describing the detection of gamma radiation from a Soviet pouch [redacted] The Committee noted the memorandum, and Mr. Gale indicated that the Advisory Group would check into the apparent irregularity of the procedures which had been followed in this case.

Next Meeting

The Committee will next meet at the call of the Chairman.

Read from ICIS
6-3-60 LW

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ICIS-P25/889

May 24, 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chester D. Smith, Chairman
Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures

FROM: Leonard P. Bienvenu
Executive Secretary, ICIS

SUBJECT: Survey of Unaccompanied Soviet Bloc Shipments

Reference is made to the memorandum dated May 6, 1957 (ICIS-P25/465) from the Chairman, ICIS, concerning the above subject.

Enclosed for information and any comment you may deem desirable is a copy of a letter dated May 19, 1960, from the Acting Deputy Commissioner of Customs, and its enclosure, the report on the above-mentioned survey for the month of April 1960.

Enclosure

cc: Mr. White
Col. Kieffer
Mr. Gale
Capt. Maloney

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DATE 6/19/03 BY SP4 BSS/ENP

ENCLOSURE ATTACHED

2 ENCLOSURES

EX-112

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REC-87 117-268-2048

10 JUN 1960

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7 JUN 94 1960

envelope only

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DATE 6/19/03 BY SP4 JOS/RNP

117-268 — 2018

ENCLOSURE

Rec'd from ICIS 6-10-60 LW

~~SECRET~~

ICIS-P25/894

June 7, 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chester D. Smith, Chairman
Joint IAC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures

FROM: Leonard P. Bienvenu
Executive Secretary, ICIS

SUBJECT: Detection Device Program - Advisory Group Report Dated January 26, 1960

Enclosed for information and completeness of files is a copy of a letter dated May 25, 1960, from the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, regarding steps taken to implement the above report.

The ICIS Standing Committee noted the enclosure on June 2, 1960, and agreed to schedule it for further discussion after information is available as to the outcome of the NSC review of the internal security paragraphs of NSC 5802/1 (Continental Defense).

Enclosure

CC: Mr. Whi[illegible]
Col. Kiefer
Mr. Gale
Capt. Maloney

117-268
NOT RECORDED
23 JUN 21 1960

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/19/03 BY SP4CBT/ENP

ENCLOS[illegible]

50 JUN 22 1960

~~SECRET~~

When the attachments are removed, this transmittal letter becomes UNCLASSIFIED.

117-268

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268) DATE: 6/10/60

FROM : SAC, SAN DIEGO (66-998)

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES

Re SAC letter 57-47(K) and San Diego letter to the Bureau dated 4/21/58.

The Explosive Ordinance Disposal Detachment in San Diego, California, continues to be the 70th Ordinance Detachment, Fort Rosecrans, San Diego 6, California.

On 6/6/60, it was determined that Lt. THOMAS J. GORDON has replaced Captain WILLIAM E. DE LONG as the detachment commanding officer. The following pertinent data is furnished for information:

Commanding Officer - Lt. THOMAS J. GORDON
Office Telephone - ACademy 3-8449
Residence Telephone - [redacted] b7C

2 - Bureau (Reg)
2 - San Diego

GHB:blc
(4)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/19/03 BY SP4BSTP/RNP

117-268-2049

REC-53

EX 109

13 JUN 15 1960

64 JUN 20 1960

DIRECTOR, FBI (100-354839) 6/13/60

SAC, NEW YORK (65-14825)

SPIA
ESPIONAGE - R

ReBulet dated 6/9/60.

Relet reflects that a Soviet-bloc shipment, consisting of telephone equipment and electrical machines, arrived at the port of New York during the month of April, 1960. A review of US Customs reports covering the month of April, 1960, as furnished to the NYO, fails to reflect that any technical equipment whatsoever, consigned to Soviet-bloc estblishments was received during that month.

On 6/13/60, [redacted] Inspector, US Customs, NYC, advised SA [redacted] that a search of his records indicated that no such shipment, as described in reBulet, was received at the port of New York during April, 1960. After an exhaustive search of Customs' files, [redacted] stated that he could locate only one shipment of technical equipment during the past several months, which might possibly be identical with the shipment in question. He advised that actually this was a small part of a larger shipment of sundry non-technical items which had been consigned to [redacted] at the USSR Delegation to the UN. [redacted] stated that in this consignment were five crates, each containing an electric typewriter; three crates, each containing five cartons of telephone instruments and telephone dials; and one crate containing telephone parts. He advised that this shipment had arrived at New York on 2/17/60 aboard the Norwegian motor vessel, Black Swan. b7C

Established sources, covering the Soviet establishments in the NYC area, have not furnished any information reflecting to what use the Soviets have put the above equipment. It would appear however, since it was consigned [redacted] that it is being utilized at the Soviet Delegation to the UN, 680 Park Ave., NYC. b7C

2 - Bureau (100-354839)(RM)
1 - New York (65-14825)

WJD:slf
(3)

117-268-

NOT RECORDED
174 JUN 16 1960

51 JUN 20 1960

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/20/03 BY SP4 STP/lenp

ORIGINAL FILED IN

Read from ICIS 6-28-60 LW

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ICIS-P25/898

June 22, 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chester D. Smith, Chairman
Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures

FROM: Leonard F. Mennema
Executive Secretary, ICIS

SUBJECT: Survey of Unaccompanied Soviet Bloc Shipments

Reference is made to the memorandum dated May 6, 1957 (ICIS-P25/465) from the Chairman, ICIS, concerning the above subject.

Enclosed for information and any comment you may deem desirable is a copy of a letter dated June 17, 1960, from the Deputy Commissioner of Customs, and its enclosure, the report on the above-mentioned survey for the month of May 1960.

Enclosure

cc. Mr. Whitson
Col. Kieffer
Mr. Gale
Capt. Maloney

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/20/03 BY SP4 STA/ENP

117-268

NOT RECORDED
10 JUL 11 1960

ENCLOSURE ATTACHED

1 ENCLOSURE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

59 JUL 12 1960

117-268

Detection Device Program Used On Active Devices

(2) enclosures to Bureau
to Bureau with Los Angeles
dated 7/6/60

1 - [illegible]
1 - probation flash for

[redacted]

b7C

[illegible] the number [illegible]

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DATE 6/20/03 BY SP4 CAK/KSP

117-268-

ENCLOSURE

(SECRET)

2 - Orig and 1
1 - Yellow
1 - Mr. Parsons

June 24, 1960

Mr. John F. Doherty
Justice Representative on ICIS

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Whitson
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Day

DETECTION DEVICE PROGRAM -
USE OF ACTIVE DEVICES

Your memorandum of June 20, 1960, forwarded for my comments a proposed Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS) letter to the National Security Council concerning future development and use of an active detection device. It is noted that the proposed letter reflects the views IIC has previously expressed concerning this matter.

It is observed that the ICIS has made no recommendation for consideration by the National Security Council but has, rather, asked for guidance as to use and further development of the active device. It is suggested that the Council would be interested in the recommendations of the Departments represented on the ICIS even in the event those Departments may not be able to agree upon a unanimous ICIS position.

I have no further comment to make concerning this proposed letter other than to express the hope that this question may be promptly and finally resolved.

GAD:jas
(3)

(Cover memorandum L'Allier to Belmont, 6/23/60, re COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTO THE UNITED STATES, GAD:jas)

NOTE: Classified "Secret" to conform with classification given by the Department of State to discussion of use of active device on diplomatic personnel.

DECLASSIFIED BY SP4STA/pmp
ON 6-30-03

REC-23 117-26[illegible]

MAILED 10
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Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

62 JUN 3

TYPE UNIT

(SECRET)

Rcd from ICIS 7-7-60 cw

ICIS-P25/908

July 5, 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chester D. Smith, Chairman
Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures

FROM: LPB Leonard P. Bienvenu
Executive Secretary, ICIS

SUBJECT: Detection Device Program - Implementation of NSC Action No. 1868, as amended

Enclosed for the information of your Committee is a copy of a Department of State letter dated June 28, 1960, which contains, in its third and fourth paragraphs, information on the institution of procedures for the implementation of NSC Action No. 1868, as amended.

Enclosure

cc: Mr. W[illiam] ✓
Col. Kieffer
Mr. Gale
Capt. Maloney

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/20/03 BY SP4STA/ENP

Detection Device Program - Nsc Action 1868

59 JUL 12 1960 99

ENCLOSURE

SECRET

117-268
NOT RECORDED
10 JUL 11 1960

117-268

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Mohr
Parsons
Belmont
Callahan
DeLoach
Malone
McGuire
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: June 23, 1960

FROM : R. O. L'ALLIER

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTO THE UNITED STATES

OSMAB

By the attached memorandum of June 20, 1960, Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS) Chairman Doherty asks for Bureau comments concerning a revision of a proposed ICIS letter to the National Security Council (NSC). The proposed letter asks for an NSC decision regarding development and use of an active detection device. (An active detection device is one which bombards a questioned object with radioactivity and positively identifies any fissionable material contained therein.)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/30/93 BY SP4 MLK/kmb

The Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) has developed such a device to the point where they are nearly ready to demonstrate it. State, however, has declined to permit use of the device on accompanied diplomatic baggage because scattered radiation, however, harmless, might be subject to identification by a foreign government and cause an international incident or reprisals. Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (IIC) has pointed out that the scattered radiation is completely harmless and that identification of it would require a special detection program on the part of a foreign government. State, nevertheless, is adamant in its refusal and the AEC, which has spent much money in research and development of the active device, wants a final decision concerning it before spending more money and effort.

There is no need to use an active device on other than accompanied diplomatic shipments because anything else is subject to open manual examination. The proposed ICIS letter makes all of the facts available, including the IIC's previous comments and should result in a much-needed decision.

2 ENCLOSURES

The IIC position concerning this question is essentially the same as suggested by the ICIS comments at the bottom of page 8 in its letter; namely, that from an internal security standpoint, use of the active device would increase our ability to detect clandestine introduction of nuclear materials. We recognize, however, that there are broad national policy considerations

Enclosures
GAD:jas
(6)
1 - Mr. Parsons; 1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Whitson; 1 - Mr. Day

EX-102

REC-14 62-2[illegible]2051

62 JUL 13 1960

10 JUL 7 1960

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involved which are outside the scope of the IIC's responsibilites. We do not want to ask ICIS to include the IIC position in its letter because ICIS would then ask the Director as IIC Chairman to join in signing the letter and thus share responsibility for the entire letter. When the letter reaches Jimmy Lay at the National Security Council, it will be referred to IIC for our views. This is standard procedure, and we can state our position at that time.

ACTION:

Attached for approval is a brief reply noting that the proposed letter reflects the views previously expressed by the Director and observing that ICIS has made no specific recommendation for NSC consideration. We suggest that the views of the ICIS members would be of interest to NSC even if ICIS could not agree upon a unanimous position.

DEW

I hope we are not leading up to another hassle at the National Security Council where we will be all alone in our position.

6/14

Read from ICIS
6-28-60 LW

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

P25/900

June 27, 1960

Osmab

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chester D. Smith, Chairman
Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures

FROM: LFB Leonard P. Bienvenu
Executive Secretary, ICIS

SUBJECT: Detection Device Program - Report of ~~Soviet~~-Bloc Use of Devices

Referral/Direct to OGA

Enclosed is a copy of a [redacted]

The enclosure is furnished for the information of your Committee and any comment it may desire to make.

cc: Mr. Whitman
Col. Kieffer
Mr. Gale
Capt. Maloney

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/20/03 BY SP4 SJA/ENP

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REC-31

NOT RECORDED
7 JUL 11 1960

ENCLOSURE ATTACHED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

51 JUL 13 1960

117-268

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DATE 6/20/03 BY SP4 SOTA/ENP

ENCLOSURE

119-268 2052

DO-6

OFFICE OF DIRECTOR
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Mr. Tolson ✓
Mr. Mohr ✓
Mr. Parsons ✓
Mr. Belmont ✓
Mr. Callahan
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Malone
Mr. McGuire
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. Jones
Mr. W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Mr. Ingram
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/20/03 BY SP4BCTA/ENP

JUL 7 1960

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: July 8, 1960

FROM : R. O. L'ALLIER

Re
Tamm
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTO THE UNITED STATES

The National Security Council, by the attached memorandum of 7/5/60, has circulated material received by it from the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security asking for guidance concerning the development and use of an active detection device (an "active" device is one which shoots a brief stream of radiation into an object and, by measuring the response, can positively identify fissionable material contained therein). NSC Secretary Lay has asked for the views of the IIC concerning this.

IIC considered this question in December, 1959, and IIC letter to ICIS 12/16/59, copies of which are enclosed with the ICIS material, suggested that an effort be made to modify procedures so as to meet State's objection to use of the device. State had originally agreed to such use, providing the radiation was "minimal" and providing that no identifiable radiation would be received on the person by an accompanying foreign diplomat. The Atomic Energy Commission subsequently advised that, inevitably, scattered harmless radiation would reach anyone accompanying the baggage and no device could be constructed which would avoid this. Further, it would be technically possible for another country to develop equipment which could be carried on the person and would detect such scattered radiation.

State considers that any radiation, however harmless, would violate the immunity of a foreign diplomat. The ICIS material points out that nondiplomatic shipments are subject to open search and seizure so there is no need to use the active device on them. It is estimated that it would cost two hundred thousand dollars to complete development of the device and another two hundred and ten thousand dollars to produce six of them, which would be the number required to cover diplomatic channels.

Enclosures
GJD:hke
(6)
1-Mr. Parsons
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Mr. Wannall
1-Liaison

REC- 72

ENCLOSURE

Memorandum from Mr. L'Allier to Mr. Belmont
RE: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND
DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE
INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
INTO THE UNITED STATES

ACTION:

Attached for approval is a proposed letter to Mr. Lay noting that IIC has been interested in the active device because it offers [redacted] means by which fissionable material enclosed in a diplomatic shipment might be positively identified. We refer to the two criteria laid down by State and the effort which has been made to meet these, stating that detailed discussion of the possible means by which a diplomat might determine that he had been subjected to radiation is no longer relevant in view of State's position. The letter refers to the ICIS observation that failure to use the active device will continue a shortcoming in the Detection Device Program and states that IIC concurs in this view.

b2
b7E

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Mohr
Parsons
Belmont
Callahan
DeLoach
Malone
McGuire
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT DATE: July 14, 1960

FROM : R. O. L'ALLIER

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTO THE UNITED STATES

Brent

My memorandum of July 8, 1960, secured the Director's approval of an Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (IIC) letter to the National Security Council in this matter. The IIC Working Committee discussed this draft letter at its meeting on July 13, 1960, and approved it with the addition of a final paragraph.

After noting that IIC concurs in the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS) statement that failure to use the active detection device will mean continuation of a shortcoming in the detection device program, the letter now states that with regard to completion of development of the device, the IIC wishes to point out that intelligence information concerning the arrival in this country of a particular diplomat may make it essential that a determination be made regarding his baggage. An active device would permit this.

ACTION:

Attached for approval and signature of the Director, as IIC Chairman, is the letter in which the military members have concurred.

GLD:jas
(6)

Enclosure 7-15-60

1 - Mr. Parsons
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Whitson
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Day

REC- 72

INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 4/25/03 BY SP4BJA/RNP

EX-104

67 JUL 26 1960

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

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Mohr
Parsons ✓
Belmont
Callahan
DeLoach
Malone
McGuire
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: July 27, 1960

FROM : R. O. L'ALLIER

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTO THE UNITED STATES

The Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference has received the attached report from the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) concerning AEC's progress during the second quarter of 1960 in the development of devices which will detect the presence of radioactive materials.

(5)

Referral/Direct to OGA

ACTION:

No action or reply by IIC is necessary. We will schedule this report for formal notation by the Working Committee at its next meeting.

Enclosure

GAD:hke
(6)
1-Mr. Parsons
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Mr. Day
1-Liaison

6/25/03 (DERIVATIVE)
CLASSIFIED BY [illegible] NSICG 00267
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (1)

REC- 25 117-268-

7 JUL 29 1960

ENCLOSURE

51 AUG 8 1960

Received from ICIS 8-1-60 mw

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SMAB

JOINT IIC-ICIS COMMITTEE ON COUNTERMEASURES

MINUTES OF MEETING

JULY 27, 1960

The Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures met on Wednesday, July 27, 1960, at 10:00 a.m., in Room 2515, Department of Justice. The following members were present:

IIC:	Mr. Chester D. Smith, Chairman (Army)
	Mr. Lish Whitson (FBI)
ICIS:	Col. Pierre V. Kieffer (Defense)
	Capt. Frederick G. Wild (Coast Guard)
AEC Advisor:	Mr. Donald I. Gale

* * * * *

Advisory Group:	Mr. Allan W. Corthell (INS)
	Lt. John A. Flynn, Alt. (Coast Guard)
ICIS Secretariat:	Mr. Carl H. Pfuntner

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/25/03 BY SP4BJA/RNP

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

117-268

NOT RECORDED

11 AUG 12 1960

59 AUG 12 1960

117-268

1. Minutes

The Committee approved the minutes of its meeting of May 18, 1960, without change, subject to final comment by Defense. (Defense subsequently approved the minutes.)

2. Detection Device Program - Report of Radioactive Diplomatic Pouch

Mr. Gale referred to Item 4 of the May 18 minutes, regarding the detection of gamma radiation from a Soviet pouch [redacted] device. As agreed at that time, he had checked into the apparent irregularities of the procedures which had been followed, and had found that these procedures raised no problems for either State or Customs. b2 b7E

The Committee noted the above report by Mr. Gale.

3. Customs Surveys

The Committee noted the Customs surveys of unaccompanied Soviet Bloc shipments for the months of April, May, and June 1960, which had been distributed by ICIS Secretariat memoranda of May 24, June 22, and July 18. It was agreed that no significant items appeared in these surveys.

Reference was made to Item 2 of the minutes of May 18, 1960. The Committee had noted Customs surveys at that time and had requested the Secretary to inquire of Customs regarding the procedures that had been followed in examining the bus which was reported in the February survey. Mr. Pfuntner read a memorandum dated May 24, 1960, by the Assistant Collector of Customs, New York, which had been furnished to the Secretariat by memorandum dated May 25, 1960, from the Deputy Commissioner of Customs. The memorandum contained a description of the shipment containing the bus and spare parts and indicated that examination had involved use of the device. The Committee noted this information and agreed that appropriate inspection procedures had been followed.

4. Detection Device Program - Advisory Group Report Dated January 26, 1960

The Committee considered a letter dated May 25, 1960, from Treasury which had been distributed by ICIS Secretariat memorandum of June 7, 1960. The Treasury comments were noted and it was agreed that the action taken by Treasury in response to the ICIS letter of March 29, 1960, was appropriate.

5. Report of Soviet Bloc Use of Devices

A Coast Guard report dated June 7, 1960, had been distributed by ICIS Secretariat memorandum dated June 27, 1960. The report contained information on the possible use of detection devices in the course of search of an Italian ship by a boarding party at Constanza, Roumania. The Secretary reported that it was apparently the informal Coast Guard opinion that the information was "not too reliable" but was of interest because it was the first hint of such a possible program. The Committee noted the report.

6. Implementation of NSC Action No. 1868, As Amended

A State letter dated June 28, 1960, containing information on the institution of procedures for the implementation of NSC Action No. 1868 had been distributed by ICIS Secretariat memorandum dated July 5, 1960. The Committee noted the State letter.

7. Advisory Group Report For the Period Ending June 30, 1960, Concerning the Use of Detection Devices

The Committee considered the above report dated July 18, 1960, which had been distributed by memorandum of the same date from the Advisory Group. Various questions were raised with Mr. Gale, Mr. Corthell, and Lt. Flynn, and there was agreement on changes to be made in the report. It was agreed, with regard to paragraph 5.2, which indicated that Coast Guard was not procuring any portable neutron detectors, that the letter of transmittal to IIC and ICIS should indicate the understanding that Coast Guard was to review this in the light of the comments made by the President at the time of approval of amendment of the Port Security Program.

It was agreed that the Advisory Group report, as amended, should be forwarded to the IIC and ICIS with the comment noted above, and with an indication that Committee B favored the Advisory Group's recommendation contained in paragraph 7 of the report.

Next Meeting

The Committee will meet next at the call of the Chairman.

Recd from ICIS 8-1-60 LW

~~SECRET~~

ICIS-P25/917

July 29, 1960

OSMAB

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chester D. Smith, Chairman
Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures

FROM: Leonard P. Bienvenu
Executive Secretary, ICIS

SUBJECT: AEC Quarterly Status Report on the Development of Detection Devices (April-June, 1960)

Enclosed is a copy of a letter dated July 26, 1960, from the Director of Military Application, Atomic Energy Commission, transmitting the AEC Quarterly Status Report on the Development of Detection Devices (April-June, 1960), in accordance with the request contained in a joint IIC-ICIS letter of August 26, 1957. The enclosed report is furnished for information and any comment or recommendations the Committee may wish to submit.

Enclosure

2 ENCLOSURE

CC: Mr. Whitcher
Col. Kieffer
Mr. Gale
Capt. Maloney

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/25/03 BY SP4BSTA/RNP

117-268-
NOT RECORDED
11 AUG 12 1960

When the attachments are removed, this transmittal letter becomes UNCLASSIFIED.

NOTED AT JOINT IIC-ICIS COMMITTEE ON COUNTERMEASURES 8-10-60 LW

59 AUG 12 1960

~~SECRET~~

117-268

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Mohr
Parsons
Belmont
Callahan
DeLoach
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Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT DATE: August 1, 1960

FROM : R. O. L'ALLIER

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTO THE UNITED STATES

Smab

The National Security Council Planning Board, at its meeting on July 29, 1960, discussed the development and use of the "active" detection device which the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) has nearly ready for demonstration. This device would, according to AEC, offer the only means of positively identifying both major types of fissionable material if concealed in a diplomatic shipment.

State pointed out that use of the device would result in scattered harmless radiation reaching the person of an accompanying diplomat. State advised that it could not approve such a procedure because it would violate the diplomat's immunity and, if detected, would result in a major diplomatic incident. The Joint Chiefs of Staff Representative [redacted] b2 b7E [redacted] He added, however, that the Joint Chiefs would defer to the opinion of State in this matter.

The Planning Board agreed that, (1) the active device should not be used against diplomatic personnel at this time; (2) AEC should continue to develop the device until a prototype is ready for demonstration; (3) AEC should report to the Planning Board concerning how long it will be before the prototype is ready and what length of time would be involved in developing procedures so that the device could be used if the international situation changes. It was agreed that this problem need not be referred to the National Security Council itself at this time but should, rather, await completion of the prototype.

ACTION:

For information.

GAL:hke
(6)
1-Mr. Parsons
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Mr. Day
1-Mr. Gordon

117-268-2060

7 AUG 2 1960

REC-18

58 AUG 5 1960

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/25/03 BY SP4 DPH/LMP

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

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Tolson
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W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: August 1, 1960

FROM : R. O. L'ALLIER

6/25/03
CLASSIFIED BY NILS/BJA/RNP 60267 DER.IVative
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SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTO THE UNITED STATES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

The Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures has forwarded the attached report received from its Advisory Group and covering the use of devices which will detect radioactive materials during the first six months of 1960.

[redacted] (S) b1

[redacted] (S)

[redacted] (S) b1

[redacted] (S)

Smuggling of Atomic Bombs.

ACTION:

X-102 REC 34 117-268-2061

12 AUG 4 1960

We have scheduled the report for discussion by the Working Committee at its meeting on August 3 and will, if you approve, suggest to the Chairman of the Joint Committee, who participates in IIC Working Committee meetings, that an effort be made to develop the recommended procedures.

Enclosure
GAD:hke (6)
1-Mr. Parsons
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Mr. Day
1-Liaison

51 AUG 8 1960

SECRET

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI (117-268) DATE: 8/10/60

FROM : SAC, Philadelphia (117-75)

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEOPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES; ATOMIC ENERGY ACT

Re Philadelphia letter 2/23/55.

Relet set forth the procedure followed by the United States Coast Guard in searching and surveilling "category" vessels.

On 8/5/60 Commander R. C. BURKE, Executive Officer, Captain of the Port Office, United States Coast Guard, advised that the Coast Guard had received new instructions regarding the handling of "category" vessels. From now on, the Coast Guard will not meet the vessel and surveil it up the Delaware River. The ship will not be boarded until it arrives at its dock. At that time it will be boarded and searched by Customs Officials instead of by the Coast Guard. The Customs Service will then maintain a dockside watch while the ship is in port. The only action taken by the Coast Guard will be to maintain a waterside watch while the "category" vessel is in port.

On 8/8/60 the above matter was discussed with CHARLES J. BEISWINGER, Agent in Charge, Customs Agency Service. Mr. BEISWINGER promised to keep this office advised if any matter came to his attention concerning these "category" vessels, which would be of interest to the FBI.

The above is being brought to the attention of the Bureau for information only. The Philadelphia Office will continue to maintain liaison with the Coast Guard, Customs and INS regarding this matter.

2 - Bureau (117-268)
1 - Philadelphia (117-75)

MBD:JAW
(3)

EX 100 117-268-2062

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/25/03 BY SP4BSP/ENP REC-4

AUG 12

SEC

57 AUG 16 1960

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268) DATE: 8/11/60

FROM : SAC, BALTIMORE (117-46)

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS, OR PARTS THEREOF, AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES

Re Baltimore letter to the Director dated 1/25/60.

AT FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND

On June 20, 1960, Major CLYDE COMBS, Commanding Officer, 549th EOD, Fort Meade, advised there are no changes in location or telephone extensions of the 549th EOD or in his residence. Major COMBS is the CO of the 549th EOD and is also the CO of the 28th EOD. The location of the 28th EOD is Building T4562; telephone number is OR 4-3311, Extension 2498.

AT ABERDEEN PROVING GROUND (APG), MARYLAND

On August 2, 1960, Lt. GLENN O. RYBURN, CO, 544th Ordnance Detachment, advised SA [redacted] that he had replaced Capt. JAMES H. ROBERTS as CO of this organization. The organization is still located in Building S-4722, APG, and the telephone number is Aberdeen 1000, Extensions 32221 or 32257.

b7C

AT ARMY CHEMICAL CENTER, MARYLAND

On August 2, 1960, Lt. JACK L. WELCH, CO, 149th EOD, advised SA [redacted] that his organization is located in Bldg. 1487 and the telephone number is Edgewood 1000, Extension 6248.

EX-100

C

(2) - Bureau (RM)
1 - Philadelphia (INFO) (117-75) (RM)
1 - Pittsburgh (INFO) (117-38) (RM)
1 - Baltimore
RMW:neh
(5)

REC- 11 117-268-2063

15 AUG 16 1960

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/25/03 BY SP4BJR/RNP

62 AUG 18 1960

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: August 5, 1960

FROM : R. O. L'ALLIER

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTO THE UNITED STATES

Tolson
Mohr
Parsons
Belmont
Callahan
DeLoach
Malone
McGuire
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

The National Security Council Planning Board agreed on July 29, 1960, that an "active" detection device should not be used at this time because of State's objection to radiation, no matter how harmless, reaching diplomatic personnel accompanying diplomatic shipments. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) representative

[redacted] b2 b7E

He added, however, that the Joint Chiefs would defer to the objections of State in this matter and the suggestion was not discussed.

Mr. Ash, acting in Pat Coyne's place, advised the IIC and the ICIS Secretaries at 5:00 p.m., on August 5, 1960, that Gordon Gray had requested that IIC and ICIS jointly consider the JCS suggestion. Ash said he, himself, had recommended this to Mr. Gray, not as an attempt to reverse the Planning Board's decision regarding the active device, but to provide an answer in the event the same suggestion is made by JCS during the Council's consideration of the matter at a later date. He said that Mr. Gray had asked that the request be transmitted to the two committees orally in order to save time and that the views of the committees should be furnished in a joint communication to NSC Secretary Lay.

This is a question which should be considered by the Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures with the assistance of its Advisory Group and its Atomic Energy Commission representative. It may be technically feasible to do what JCS suggests, but the opinion of the technical experts should be received. Inasmuch as Ash stated that the reply should be submitted at the earliest practicable date, the ICIS Secretary has arranged to convene the Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures during the week of August 8. FBI is represented on this committee.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/25/03 BY SP3 JTA/pvo

GAD:hke (7)

1-Mr. Parsons
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Mr. Wells
1-Mr. Day
1-Liaison

EX 109

REC-72 117-268-2064

10 AUG 18 1960

57 AUG 29 1960

LIAISON

Memorandum from Mr. L'Allier to Mr. Belmont
RE: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND
DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE
INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
INTO THE UNITED STATES

ACTION:

The FBI representative on the Joint Committee will follow this matter closely to insure that this matter is handled promptly.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Read from ICIS 8-15-60 CW

JOINT IIC-ICIS COMMITTEE ON COUNTERMEASURES

MINUTES OF MEETING

AUGUST 10, 1960

SMAB

CJ

The joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures met on Wednesday, August 10, 1960, at 10:00 a.m., in Room 2515, Department of Justice. The following members were present:

IIC:	Mr. Lish Whitson, Acting Chairman (FBI)
ICIS:	Capt. Frederick G. Wild (Coast Guard)
	Col. Pierre V. Kieffer (Defense)
AEC Advisor:	Mr. Donald J. Gale

* * * * * * *

Department of State:	Mr. Edmund J. Dorsz
Advisory Group:	Mr. Allan W. Corthell (INS)
	Mr. Irving S. Brown (Customs)
	Lt. John A. Flynn, Alt. (Coast Guard)
ICIS Secretariat:	Mr. Carl H. Pfuntner

6

REC. ATTACHED

2 ENCLOSURE

6

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/25/03 BY SP4DJA/ENP

REC-78 117-268-2065

15 AUG 25 1960

51 AUG 30 1960

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

117-268

1. Minutes

The Committee approved the minutes of its meeting of July 27, 1960.

2. Use of Active Detection Devices

The Committee considered the memorandum dated August 8, 1960 from the Executive Secretary, ICIS, to the Chairman, ICIS, regarding a query on the above subject arising out of discussion at the Planning Board of the ICIS letter of June 29, 1960. The query had to do with

[redacted]

b2
b7E

Following discussion, the Committee agreed it would report to the parent committees that [redacted] which would meet the criteria of State of the irradiation of diplomatic and official personnel. The Secretary was directed to prepare a letter in accordance with the discussion, and to clear it telephonically with members. Enclosed is a copy of the letter dated August 12, 1960 to IIC and ICIS, as subsequently approved by members.

3. AEC Quarterly report on Detection Devices

The Committee noted the above report for the period April-June, 1960, as submitted by AEC letter dated July 26, 1960.

4. Implementation of NSC Action 1868

Mr. Dorsz notified the Committee that State was notifying Customs that the procedures for implementing NSC Action No. 1868 as amended could be placed into operation at once.

5. Use of Detection Devices by Coast Guard

Lt. Flynn reported that he had checked on the procurement by Coast Guard of portable neutron detectors (see item 7, minutes of July 27, 1960) and had ascertained that under the revised port security program the spot check ship searches would be made by Customs personnel, with Coast Guard taking the Customs officers to the ships. Accordingly, it was the case that Coast Guard would not be procuring the portable devices.

Next Meeting

The Committee will meet next at the call of the Chairman.

~~SECRET~~

August 12, 1960

MEMORANDUM TO: J. Edgar Hoover, Chairman
Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference

John F. Doherty, Chairman
Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security

J. Patrick Coyne
NSC Representative on Internal Security

FROM: Chester D. Smith, Chairman (SIGNED)
Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures

SUBJECT: Use of Active Detection Devices

Pursuant to the inquiry set out in the memorandum dated August 8, 1960, from the Executive Secretary, ICIS, to the Chairman, ICIS, this Committee in consultation with its Advisory Group and with a representative of the Department of State has again considered the possibility [redacted]

Of primary importance is the fact that, whatever the manner of [redacted] as was explained in the letter of June 29, 1960, from the Chairman, ICIS to the Executive Secretary, NSC. Furthermore, [redacted] the fact of his receiving radiation would be, in the frequently repeated opinion of the Department of State, a violation of the status of the diplomat. [redacted] would not be practicable for the reason given above. Thus, whatever the technical possibility of such an operation, it appears to this Committee to be definitely infeasible.

b2
b7E

CC: IIC (5 copies)
Mr. Clear
Mr. Hanes
Mr. Rossides
Mr. Devine
Mr. McTiernan

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/25/03 BY SP2 STP/RMP

~~SECRET~~

Rec'd from ICIS
8-16-60 LW

~~SECRET~~

ICIS-P25/926

August 16, 1960

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. Chester D. Smith, Chairman
Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures

FROM: Mr. Carl H. Pfuntner
Acting Executive Secretary, ICIS

SUBJECT: Implementation of NSC Action No. 1868 as Amended (Re ICIS Problem 25)

Enclosed is a copy of a letter dated August 9, 1960 from the Department of State and its attachment, a copy of intradepartmental procedures which the Department of State is putting into effect at Idlewild International Airport, for implementing NSC Action No. 1868, as amended.

It is requested that your Committee review these procedures and submit any comments which it may have on them.

SMAB

Enclosure

CC: Mr. White
Col. Kieffer
Mr. Gale
Capt. Wild

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/25/03 BY SP4 RTA/RNP

When the attachments are removed, this transmittal letter becomes ~~Confidential~~.

NOTED NO COMMENTS LW

ENCLOSURE ATTACHED

2 ENCLOSURES

~~SECRET~~

102 REC-8 117-268-2066
15 AUG 25 1960
59 AUG 29 1960
117-268

envelope only

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/25/03 BY SP1 CTX/RMP

ENCLOSURE

117-268 2066

Read from ICIS 8-18-60 LW

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ICIS-P25/927

August 17, 1960

SMAB

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chester D. Smith, Chairman
Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures

FROM: Carl H. Pfuntner
Acting Executive Secretary, ICIS

SUBJECT: Survey of Unaccompanied Soviet Bloc Shipments

Reference is made to the memorandum dated May 6, 1957 (ICIS-P25/465) from the Chairman, ICIS, concerning the above subject.

Enclosed for information and any comment you may deem desirable is a copy of a letter dated August 16, 1960, from the Deputy Commissioner of Customs, and its enclosure, the report on the above-mentioned survey for the month of July 1960.

Enclosure

CC: Mr. Whitney
Col. Kieffer
Mr. Gale
Capt. Wild

REC-78 117-268-2067

15 AUG 25 1960

EX-107

NOTED: NO COMMENTS LW

ENCL ATTACHED

4 ENCLOSURE

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/25/03 BY SP4 DJA/RNP

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

53 AUG 30 1960

117-268

envelope only

ALL FBI INFORMATION ~~CONTAINED~~
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/26/03 BY SP4 EDA/ENP

117-268-2061

ENCLOSURE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

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Parsons ✓
Belmont ✓
Callahan
DeLoach
Malone
McGuire
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: August 17, 1960

FROM : R. O. L'ALLIER

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTO THE UNITED STATES

Previous memoranda have reported that the National Security Council Planning Board have asked that IIC and ICIS jointly consider a suggestion that an active detection device might be used [redacted]

This matter has been considered by the Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures (Committee B) and by the Advisory Group. The conclusion was reached that the [redacted] b2 b7E

The State Department has said that any radiation of a foreign diplomat would be a violation of diplomatic status. Therefore, the above groups concluded that while [redacted] would be possible, it would be impractical. In effect, we [redacted] b2 b7E

The enclosed draft of a joint letter from IIC and ICIS has been received from ICIS. This letter states that it has been concluded that while possible [redacted] it is not practical.

ACTION:

If you approve the enclosed draft IIC-ICIS letter, it will then be sent to the other IIC members for their approval.

Enclosure

BAW:hke (6)

1-Mr. Parsons
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Mr. Wells
1-Liaison

REC- 39

94-53 SEP 7 1960

ENCLOSURE

62-117-268 2068

4 SEP 2 1960

5-Yard

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DRAFT

~~SECRET~~

ICIS-P25/__

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/25/03 BY SP4 SBR/KAP

August 16, 1960

LETTER FROM CHAIRMEN, IIC AND ICIS TO EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, NSC

Dear Mr. Lay:

The NSC Planning Board at its meeting on Friday, August 5, 1960, considered the ICIS letter of June 29 on use of active devices and decided to request that IIC and ICIS consider jointly the possibility of utilizing

[redacted]

person. The request was transmitted orally, and the precise language of the query was as follows: b2 b7E

[redacted]

Pursuant to the above-mentioned request, we have considered the possibility of [redacted]

[redacted] b2 b7E as was explained in the letter of June 29, 1960, from the Chairman, ICIS to the Executive Secretary, NSC. Furthermore, whether a diplomat

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~ ENCLOSURE 117-268-2068

~~SECRET~~

[redacted]

frequently repeated opinion of the Department of State, a violation of the status of the diplomat. [redacted] b2 b7E

[redacted]

[redacted] Thus, whatever the technical possibility of such an operation, it appears to be definitely infeasible.

Sincerely yours,

~~SECRET~~

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

~~SECRET~~

6/25/5-03
CLASSIFIED BY NLS/BSA-60267-(Declassify)
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1
per letter dated 11/4/03

60267 TUC/NLS/BSA/05
11-4-03

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Malone
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Tamm
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: August 5, 1960

FROM : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Branigan
1 - Mr. Donahoe
1 - Mr. L'Allier
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Hall

SUBJECT: ATOMIC WEAPONS REWARDS ACT OF 1955
(PUBLIC LAW #165 - 84th CONGRESS)

1955

In a letter 7-22-60 which furnished us a survey on the subject of sabotage, CIA mentioned that the possible award covered by the captioned act has received little or no publicity and that it is perhaps important that international publicity be given this possible award from time to time. In a memorandum from Mr. Papich to Mr. L'Allier 7-25-60 it was recommended that the Internal Security Section consider conferring with Mr. DeLoach regarding an article on sabotage which could publicize the captioned law.

The Atomic Weapons Rewards Act of 1955 provides for the payment of up to $500,000 to anyone furnishing original information regarding the illegal introduction into the United States of an atomic weapon or special nuclear material. Bureau files indicate that this act received considerable publicity in the United States at the time of its passage and that it has been publicized overseas by appropriate United States Government agencies only where it was deemed the political effects would not be detrimental to the interests of the United States. The State Department renewed the request for publicity to overseas posts in July, 1958. This limitation on overseas publicity may be the limited publicity to which CIA referred. However, publicity overseas is a matter for the State Department and CIA rather than the FBI. This law was publicized by us in the FBI Law Enforcement bulletin for November, 1955.

The activities for which the captioned law offers a reward are not in themselves sabotage. As far as the FBI is concerned the smuggling of atomic weapons is supervised in the Espionage Section and violations of the Atomic Energy Act in the Nationalities Intelligence Section. The Internal Security Section has no information on any developments in the sabotage field which would serve as the basis for an article which could be used to publicize the captioned law. Inquiries of the supervisors handling the smuggling of atomic weapons and violations of the Atomic Energy Act indicate that they know of no current developments or information in those fields which could serve as the basis for such an article.

117-268-NR 2069

REC-52

This Section will remain alert for any developments in the sabotage field which could serve as the basis for an article which could include publicity regarding the captioned law.

SEP 7 1960

53 SEP 15 1960

GWH:ser (7)

EX-105

52 SEP 9 1960

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

SEE ADDENDUM PAGE 2

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum to Mr. Belmont
RE: ATOMIC WEAPONS REWARDS ACT OF 1955
(PUBLIC LAW 165 - 84th CONGRESS)

ACTION:

Copies of this memorandum have been furnished to the Liaison, Espionage and Nationalities Intelligence Sections in order that those sections may also be alert for any opportunities to publicize the possible rewards offered by the captioned law.

ADDENDUM BY ESPIONAGE SECTION: LW:skn 8/17/60

The 1960 draft report from the IIC and ICIS to National Security Council on internal security programs shows that the Federal Aviation Agency, INS, and Customs have been informed by the ICIS that it would be desirable to have the Atomic Weapons Rewards Act publicized in material to be distributed to the operators of civil aircraft entering or leaving the U.S. It would appear that adequate publicity on the Act has been given with the exception of those areas behind the Iron Curtain, in which apparently no publicity has been afforded. It would appear that publicity [redacted] (5) is a matter outside the jurisdiction of this Bureau and is something which should be considered by CIA, with State and the Operations Coordinating Board.

b1

~~SECRET~~

DO-6

OFFICE OF DIRECTOR
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Callahan
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Malone
Mr. McGuire
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. Jones
Mr. W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Mr. Ingram
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/25/93 BY SP4 COTA/ENP

34

~~EXP. PROC.~~

AUG 24 1960

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Mohr
Parsons
Belmont
Callahan
DeLoach
Malone
McGuire
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: August 25 1960

FROM : R. O. L'ALLIER

SECRET

SUBJECT: DEVICES TO DETECT CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE UNITED STATES BY DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS

In response to a request of the National Security Council (NSC) Planning Board (PB), the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), observer to the PB has submitted the enclosed memorandum from AEC.

[redacted] (S)

b1

[redacted] (S)

[redacted] (S)

b1

[redacted] (S)

BAW:sap (7)
Enclosure

SECRET

REC- 19

1-Parsons
1-Belmont
1-Whitson
1-Day
1-Liaison
1-Wells

11 SEP 8 1960

2 ENCLOSURES

58 SEP 12 1960

6/25/03
CLASSIFIED BY [redacted] NSIC/STP/ENP 00267 Derivative
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (1)

~~SECRET~~

L'Allier to Belmont
RE: DEVICES TO DETECT CLANDESTINE
INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
IN THE UNITED STATES BY DIPLIMATIC CHANNELS

[redacted] b1

[redacted] (S)

The PB will consider this report at a later date. There is no action necessary at this time by the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference.

ACTION:

For information.

~~SECRET~~

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Mohr
Parsons
Belmont
Callahan
DeLoach
Malone
McGuire
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: August 24, 1960

FROM : R. O. L'ALLIER

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTO THE UNITED STATES

[redacted] (S)

b1

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Enclosed is the joint letter, prepared by ICIS, to NSC for the Director's signature as IIC Chairman. It has already been signed by Mr. John F. Doherty, Chairman, ICIS. The letter will be dated by ICIS upon return to them by the Bureau.

ACTION:

That the enclosed letter be signed by the Director as Chairman of the IIC.

Enclosure sent 8-25-60 lmb

BAW:hke
(6)

ENCLOSURE

1-Mr. Parsons
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Liaison
1-Mr. Wells

117-268-2011

REC-39

4 SEP 2 1960

53 SEP 15 1960

~~58 SEP 17 1960~~

~~SECRET~~

6/25/03
CLASSIFIED BY NSG/BJA/RNP 00207 (Derivative)
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (1)

~~SECRET~~

August 26, 1960

ICIS-P25/929

Mr. James S. Lay, Jr.
Executive Secretary
National Security Council
Room 300, Executive Office Building
17th & Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
Washington 25, D.C.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/25/03 BY SP4/BR/RMP

Dear Mr. Lay:

The National Security Council Planning Board at its meeting on Friday, August 5, 1960, considered the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security letter of June 29 on use of active devices and decided to request that the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference and ICIS consider jointly the possibility of [redacted] The request was transmitted orally, and the precise language of the query was as follows: b2 b7E

[redacted]

Pursuant to the above-mentioned request, we have considered the possibility of [redacted] b2 b7E as was explained in the letter of June 29, 1960, from the Chairman, ICIS, to the Executive Secretary, NSC. Furthermore, whether a diplomat [redacted] frequently repeated opinion of the Department of State, a violation of the

117-268-Sub H

THIS PIECE OF MAIL WAS PREPARED BY ICIS, AND THIS IS THE FBI FILE COPY.

(Cover memorandum, 8/24/60, from Mr. L'Allier to Mr. Belmont, re "Countermeasures to Detect and Defend Against the Clandestine Introduction of Nuclear Weapons Into the United States," BAW:hke)

SENT FROM D. O.
TIME 4:53 PM
DATE 8-25-60
BY CEH

~~SECRET~~ GIVE IT TO Gen. L.W. WELLS, LIAISON FOR DELIVERY CEH

1 ENCLOSURE

117-268-Sub H

status of the diplomat, [redacted] b2 b7E Thus, whatever the technical possibility of such an operation, it appears to be definitely infeasible.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover
Chairman, Interdepartmental
Intelligence Conference

John F. Doherty
Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee
on Internal Security

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 9/15/60

FROM: SAC, SAVANNAH (117-35) (157-0-22)

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES; BOMBINGS AND ATTEMPTED BOMBINGS, PLAN OF ACTION, TAMPA DIVISION RACIAL MATTERS

Re Savannah letter to Bureau, 9/16/57, and Tampa letter to Savannah, 9/6/60.

It has been ascertained that 1st Lt. DEWEY G. WEEKS, Fort Stewart, Ga. has been replaced and that the following is the identity of the person and unit at Fort Stewart which is qualified to disarm atomic and other types of explosive devices:

1st Lt. T. W. H. CAFFEY, Commanding Officer
38th Ordn. Det. (ED)
Building 1901, Fort Stewart, Georgia
Office telephone - Hinesville, Ga. TR 6-3571, ext. 698
Res. Tel.: [redacted]

b7C

Lt. CAFFEY advises that his unit operates under the supervision of 547th Ordn. Det. (ED), Fort McPherson, Ga., but he will give assistance upon direct requests on his own initiative provided his unit is the closest one available in the 3rd Army area to the place where assistance is needed. He operates principally in SE Georgia, Lower South Carolina, and all of Florida.

EXP. PROC.

2 - Bureau
2 - Jacksonville
2 - Miami
2 - Tampa
2 - Savannah (117-35) (157-0-22)

HAB:afw
(10)

EX 104

REC-32 117-368-2072

SEC. D

SEP 16 1960

Tic - 1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Linton
1 - Mr. Whitson

Date: September 19, 1960

To: Chief
Intelligence Division
Coast Guard Headquarters
1300 E Street, N. W.
Washington 25, D. C.

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director

Subject: VISIT OF NIKITA S. KHRUSHCHEV
TO GENERAL ASSEMBLY, UNITED NATIONS
SEPTEMBER, 1960

This will confirm information furnished orally by Special Agent [redacted] of this Bureau to Lieutenant Robert Cutler, Duty Officer, United States Coast Guard, on September 16, 1960. b7C

This Bureau is in receipt of an anonymous note hand printed in pencil in an envelope bearing New York postmark September 11, 1960. The note reads:

"Kruschev ship carries thermonuclear head to be sunk near New York Harbour. Explodable - remote control."

No record or reference which would in any way identify the author of this communication was found in files of the FBI Laboratory.

1 - Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army

Attention: Chief, Security Division

1 - Director of Naval Intelligence

1 - 117-268 NOT RECORDED
145 SEP 21 1960

1 - 117-268 (SMAB)
LW:skn
(12)

YELLOW DUPLICATE
SEP 19 1960
MAILED

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/25/03 BY SP1 BSS/ALM/JP

61 SEP 21 1960

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 62-104457-1233

Chief
Intelligence Division
Coast Guard Headquarters

1 - Office of Special Investigations
Air Force

Attention: Chief, Counterintelligence Division

1 - Office of Security
Department of State

Tic - 1 - Mr. Whitson

SAC, New York

9/23/60

Director, FBI (62-104045)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/25/03 BY SP4 AATR/RNP

(C)

VISIT OF NIKITA S. KHRUSHCHEV
TO GENERAL ASSEMBLY, UNITED NATIONS
SEPTEMBER, 1960

For your information, the Bureau is in receipt of an anonymous note hand printed in pencil in an envelope bearing New York postmark 9/11/60, 7 p.m., Grand Central Station. The envelope was addressed in pencil hand printing to "Edgar Hoover, FBI, Wasington D. C., Personal." It bore a red and white commercial adhesive lettered Special Delivery.

Inside the envelope was a piece of aluminum foil, inside of which was the message on a white three by five card, on the reverse side of which was a red line approximately 13/32 of an inch from the edge of the five-inch side. The text of the message was:

"To Edgar Hoover 8/10/60

"Kruschev ship carries thermonuclear head to be sunk near New York harbour. Explodable - remote control"

The FBI Laboratory checked the hand printing against the National Security File and the Anonymous Letter File. No record or reference which would in any way identify the author of this communication was found in either of these files.

The Latent Fingerprint Section of the Identification Division examined the envelope, note, and piece of aluminum foil but no latent impressions of value were developed.

The Intelligence Division of the Coast Guard; Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; Office of Naval Intelligence; Office of Special Investigations, Department of the Air Force; and the Office of Security, Department of State, have been informed of the anonymous message.

1 - 117-268 (SMAB)
LW:skn
(5)

62-104045-
NOT RECORDED
167 SEP 23 1960

YELLOW DUPLICATE
SEP 23 1960
MAILED

61 SEP 29 1960

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: Oct. 5, 1960

FROM : SAC, SAN ANTONIO (117-66)

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES

Re San Antonio letter to Bureau dated 2/15/60, setting out a list of Explosive Ordnance Detachments in the Fourth Army Area.

On October 4, 1960, Major EDWARD A. ZAWORA, 546th Ordnance Detachment, (Control Center) Headquarters, Fourth U. S. Army, furnished a current list of Explosive Ordnance Detachments in the Fourth Army Area.

Detachment	Location	Telephone	Commanding Officer
45th Ordnance Detachment	Camp Leroy Johnson, La.	New Orleans WH 7-5571 Ext. 162	Lt. DONALD E. TABER
47th Ordnance Detachment	Ft. Hood, Texas	Ft. Hood, Ext. 32209	Capt. WALTER ZETLAU
52nd Ordnance Detachment	Pine Bluff Arsenal, Pine Bluff, Ark.	Jefferson 4-4600,Ext.617	Capt. ROY D. WIKE
61st Ordnance Detachment	Fort Sill, Okla.	Ft. Sill, Ext. 36209	Lt. CLARENCE GREENHILL
133rd Ordnance Detachment	Fort Bliss, El Paso, Texas	Ft. Bliss, Ext. 26287	1st Lt. GENE FALCK
546th Ordnance Detachment	Ft. Sam Houston, San Antonio, Tex.	CA 2-8411 Ext. 4646 or 5308	Major EDWARD A. ZAWORA

2 Bureau
1 cc. Albuquerque
1 cc. Dallas
1 cc. El Paso
1 cc. Houston
1 cc. Little Rock
1 cc. New Orleans
1 cc. Oklahoma City
1 San Antonio
JEJ:JMW
(10)

REC- 26 117-268-2073

6 OCT 7 1960

50 OCT 13 1960

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/26/03 BY SP4BSA/RNP

EX-100

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104-01

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Director, FBI (117-268) DATE: 10/28/60

FROM : SAC, Buffalo (117-25)

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF, AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES

Re SAC letter 57-47K and mylet, 4/26/60.

Inquiry in October of 1960, has established that Captain THOMAS J. GIRKOUT, JR., continues to be the Commanding Officer of the 143rd Ordnance Detachment (Explosive Disposal Unit), situated at Seneca Ordnance Depot, Romulus, N.Y. The telephone number for this Detachment is Justice 5-4491, extension 362, or Justice 5-4481, extension 363. These numbers are monitored 24 hours per day. Captain GIRKOUT resides at the Bachelor's Officers Quarters at this facility.

Lt. PAUL J. DMYTRYCK continues to be the Commanding Officer of the 40th Ordnance Detachment (Explosive Disposal Unit) located at Fort Niagara, N.Y. The telephone number of this Detachment is Youngstown,N.Y., Shadyside 5-3381 and this telephone is monitored 24 hours a day.

The territory covered by the 143rd Ordnance Detachment and the 40th Ordnance Detachment remains the same as it was when set forth in Buffalo letter, 4/26/60.

(2) - Bureau (RM)
1 - Buffalo
GJL:jcf
(3)

REC-41

117-268-2094
2

17 NOV

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/25/03 BY SP1BJA/RNP

DO-6

OFFICE OF DIRECTOR
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Parsons
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Callahan
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Malone
Mr. McGuire
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tamm
Mr. Trotter
Mr. Jones
Mr. W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Mr. Ingram
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

File

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 6/25/03 BY SP4 BTA/ENP

EXP. PROC.

OCT 27 1960

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Mohr
Parsons ✓
Belmont
Callahan
DeLoach
Malone
McGuire
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: November 1, 1960

FROM : R. O. L'ALLIER

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTO THE UNITED STATES

~~SECRET~~

The Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), by the attached letter of October 25, 1960, has forwarded copies of its quarterly report on the status of development of devices which will detect fissionable and other radioactive materials. The current report covers the third quarter of 1960 and is forwarded for the information of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference.

[redacted] (S) Referral/Direct to OGA

[redacted] (S)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

ACTION:

Copies of the attached report are being furnished to the other IIC members, and the report, which requires no acknowledgement or IIC action, will be placed on the agenda of the next Working Committee meeting for formal notation.

Enclosure

GAD:hke
(6)
1-Mr. Parsons
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Liaison
1-Mr. Day

REC-82 117-268

EX-113

22 NOV 22 1960

2 ENCLOSURES

6/25/03
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~~SECRET~~

NOV 29 10 99

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268) DATE: 11/25/60

FROM : SAC, BALTIMORE (117-46)

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/25/03 BY SP4 EJT/RNP

Re Baltimore letter to Director, August 11, 1960.

AT FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND

On October 2, 1960, Major WILLIAM BOWIE, Commanding Officer, 549th EOD and 28th EOD was interviewed by SA [redacted] Major BOWIE advised that he has replaced Major COMBS as Commanding Officer. He stated that the 549th EOD is located in Building T-4562, telephone extensions OR 4-7141, extension 5182 or 5183. He stated the 28th EOD is located in Building T-4572 at Ft. Meade, telephone extension 2498 or 2178.

AT ABERDEEN PROVING GROUND, MARYLAND

On October 26, 1960, Lt. GLENN O. RYBURN, JR., Executive Officer, 544th Ordnance Detachment, advised SA [redacted] that captain ROBERT E. CALDWELL is the Commanding Officer of this organization. The organization is located in Building S-4722 and the telephone number is Aberdeen 1000, extensions 32221 or 48183.

AT ARMY CHEMICAL CENTER, MARYLAND

On November 15, 1960, Sgt. CORNELIUS J. McMULLIN, Sr., First Sergeant, 149th EOD, advised that Lt. JACK WELCH is the present commanding officer of this organization which is located in Building 1487, telephone number Edgewood 1000, extension 6248.

EXP. PROC.

b7C

2 - Bureau (Registered Mail)
1 - Philadelphia (Info) (Registered Mail)(117-75)
1 - Pittsburgh (Info)(Registered Mail)(117-38)
1 - Baltimore
REW:nlp
(5)

EX-135 REC-35 117-268-2076

30

18 NOV 29 1960

62DEC 2 1960

ESP REC.

BA 117-46

AT DOVER AIR FORCE BASE, DELAWARE

On August 26, 1960, First Lt. ANDREW C. THOMPSON, Jr., 607th Air Base Group, Dover Air Force Base, advised SA TRAVIS L. LYNCH that the 98th Fighter Interceptor Squadron, Dover Air Force Base, Delaware no longer maintains an explosive ordnance disposal unit. The responsibilities of the unit are now assigned to the Dover Air Force Base Disaster Control Office,

Lt. THOMPSON advised that his unit, The Base Disaster Control Unit, is primarily responsible for explosive ordnance disposal responsibilities at the Dover Air Force Base; however, in certain emergencies they may assist or give advice to civilian personnel for protection in their community. He said that ordinarily to obtain any assistance from this unit it will be necessary to contact the Base commander for clearance. The Base Disaster Control Office for the 1607th Air Base Group has telephone number Redfield 4-8211, extension 8077. In the event that Lt. THOMPSON or an assistant cannot be located at this number the Officer of the Day at Dover Air Force Base should be contacted at telephone number Redfield 4-8211, extension 383.

*

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
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McGuire
Rosen
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Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: December 15, 1960

FROM : R. O. L'ALLIER

SUBJECT: COUNTERMEASURES TO DETECT AND DEFEND AGAINST THE CLANDESTINE INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS INTO THE UNITED STATES

Referral/Direct to OGA

By the attached letter of December 14, 1960, the Department of State is advising IIC that it is

[redacted]

Copies of the attached material are being furnished to each of the other IIC members. No IIC acknowledgement or action is required, and State is merely carrying out Presidentially approved National Security Council policy.

ACTION:

For information.

GAD:hke
(6)

Enclosures

1-Mr. Parsons
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Whitson
1-Liaison
1-Mr. Day

EX 100 REC- 58

117-96[illegible]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/25/03 BY SP4 BTA/PNP

11 DEC 20 [illegible]

2 ENCLOSURES

59 DEC 22 1960

SENT DIRECTOR 12-17-60

1 - Stokes
1 - J. White
1 - Kay
1 - Whitson

SAC, WFO [redacted] (S)

SECRET

1/23/61

Director, FBI [redacted] (S) b1

[redacted] (S)

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EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

Bourlet 1/12/61.

[redacted] (S)

[redacted] (S) b1

[redacted] (S)

[redacted] (S)

1 - 117-268 (Smuggling of Atom Bombs)

LW:bar
(8)

YELLOW
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6/25/03
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117-268-
NOT RECORDED
46 JAN 26 1961

59 JAN 27 1961

SECRET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ICIS-P25/963

January 19, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chester D. Smith, Chairman
Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures

FROM: Leonard P. Bienvenu
Executive Secretary, ICIS

SUBJECT: ~~X~~Survey of Unaccompanied Soviet Bloc Shipments

Reference is made to the memorandum dated May 6, 1957, (ICIS-P25/465) from the Chairman, ICIS, concerning the above subject.

Enclosed for information and any comment you may deem desirable is a copy of a letter dated January 17, 1961, from the Deputy Commissioner of Customs, and its enclosure, the report on the above-mentioned survey for the month of December 1960.

Enclosure

CC: Mr. Whitson
Col. Kieffer
Mr. Gale
Capt. Wild

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/25/03 BY SP4 SJH/RNP

ENCLOSURE ATTACHED

REC-46 117-268-2078

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EX-17

1 ENCLOSURE

59 FEB 10 1961

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

envelope only

ALL FBI INFORMATION ~~CONTAINED~~
~~HEREIN~~ IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/25/03 BY SP4 RSTA/RNP

117-268-2078

ENCLOSURE

131

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Belmont

DATE: 2-2-61

~~SECRET~~

Tolson
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Parsons
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Conrad
DeLoach
Malone
McGuire
Rosen
Trotter
Evans
W. C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

FROM : W. A. Branigan

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

SUBJECT: ~~SMUGGLING~~ OF ATOMIC BOMBS

The following information is furnished regarding the use of radiation detection equipment by Bureau agents [redacted] (S)

b1
b2
b7E

Geiger counters or other devices such as [redacted] radiation detector used by Customs on incoming baggage have not been used by Bureau agents [redacted] However, (S) a Geiger counter or [redacted]

On September 16, 1955, a Special Agent of the Washington Field Office [redacted] (S)

b1
b2
b7E

The place to detect fissionable material is at the port of entry where sensitive devices [redacted] The Department of State has objected to the use of a device which would identify shielded uranium on the ground that the devices throw off neutrons in small quantities which might strike a diplomat accompanying the suspect item.

REC-16 62-114 117-268-1070

6/25/03
CLASSIFIED BY NSI/BTA/RNP 60267 AMG
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1 - Mr. Parsons
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Conrad
1 - Mr. Branigan
1 - Mr. Whitson

LW:bjs (6)

79 03 FEB 20 1961

1 XEROX
FEB 16 1961

FEB 15 1961

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

b1

Once fissionable material has reached [redacted] the chances of it being discovered by [redacted] (S) other than a thorough search of the premises would appear to be out of the question.

ACTION:

For information.

~~SECRET~~

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI DATE: 2-24-61

FROM : SAC, BIRMINGHAM (117-00-57)

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR PARTS THEREOF AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTO THE UNITED STATES

Re Birmingham letter to Director 9-21-57, copies of which sent to same offices receiving this letter.

On 2-15-61, Lt. MITCHELL J. MAVROMAT, Commanding Officer, 142nd Ordnance Detachment, EOD, Ft. McClellan, Ala., advised that his unit is still under the direct supervision of Third Army Headquarters, Ft. McPherson, Ga. and still covers the same territorial area described in referenced letter. He stated in cases of emergency, he may be reached during the day time on week days by calling Anniston, Ala. ADams 6-4411, Extension 3183. He said his unit may be reached by phone at night on week days by calling Duty NCO Office, Ft. McClellan, Ala., ADams 6-4411, Extension 4243, which office will always be able to reach members of his Ordnance Detachment. Lt. MAVROMAT said his home number is [redacted] and his first assistant in that unit is Sgt. WILLIAM EDWARDS who may be reached by calling [redacted] Extension 3056. Lt. MAVROMAT advised that the same responsibility as to types of explosives as well as area covered are handled by his office as set forth in referenced letter. b7C

Arrangements were made with Lt. MAVROMAT to notify the Birmingham Office regarding any changes of Commanding Officers of the 142nd Ordnance Detachment, changes of locations or telephone numbers of that unit, or any change in responsibility of that detachment.

2 - Bureau
2 - Mobile
2 - Memphis
2 - New Orleans
2 - Knoxville
1 - Birmingham
CS:mjm
(11)

REC- 69 117-968-

EX-71

7 FEB 27

51 MAR 1 1961

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/25/83 BY [illegible]

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

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Parsons
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Conrad
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Malone
McGuire
Rosen
Trotter
Evans
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy
Mr. Tave

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: February 10, 1961

FROM : R. O. L'ALLIER

SUBJECT: INTERDEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE (IIC)
WEEKLY REPORT, 2/3 - 2/9/61

1. Internal Security Aspects of Current Developments in Cuba

The Working Committee, at its meeting on February 9, 1961, considered the three proposals which had been developed during the previous meeting and agreed that the IIC should not attempt to take any action as a group concerning the Cuban refugees.

2. IIC Working Committee Meeting, February 9, 1961

The Working Committee met at Navy on February 9, 1961. The minutes of this meeting have been prepared and submitted for approval.

3. Countermeasures to Detect and Defend Against the Clandestine Introduction of Nuclear Weapons Into the United States

117-368
NOT RECORDED
133 FEB 16 1961

At the request of Russell Ash of the National Security Council, the Joint IIC-ICIS Committee on Countermeasures prepared informative material concerning the Detection Device Program. Copies of this material have been made available to the IIC members for their information.

4. Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference

By memorandum of February 8, 1961, the Department's Office of Legal Counsel asked for comments concerning continuing the IIC. These were prepared and submitted dated February 10, 1961.

ACTION:

FEB 15 1961

For information. The next report will be submitted on February 17, 1961.

GAD:hkc (5)
1-Mr. Parsons
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Divison
1-Mr. Day

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99 52 FEB 20 1961

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 7-25-98 BY SP3 BTC/AC C# 369688

ORIGINAL FILED IN

It seems that here, in spite of all our armaments, lies our Achilles heel. At no other time in history was this possible, but with the possession of nuclear devices, easily concealed and transported, the thing is quite possible.

Is there any defense against it ?

The critical nuclear mass is so small, and the modern triggering devices so simple today, that a determined enemy, in a carefully thought out plan could immobilize us, probably without firing a shot.

The attack, as I see it, might not come from the skies at all.

Fifty of these devices, spotted in our strategic cities and critical areas, would render the nation impotent in a matter of hours. A few dedicated men, like the Japanese Kamikaze pilots, standing by in the sites occupied by the hidden bombs would be all they need.

Is there no defense at all against this?

Like the " mad bomber "---how do you prevent him ?

I thought I would pose this possibility for you, knowing quite well that you and your organization must have given much thought to it, and wondering just what precautions are being taken.

The " sneak attack " may come this way, not by way of rockets.

The defeat of America and the communization of the world could easily come about in this fashion, without atomic destruction for us or the enemy. The result would be a " Sovietized World. "

As to myself, I am retired from business after fifty years.

I have read with great interest and enjoyment your book on "Masters of Deceit," and have bought it for others.

If you can find a little spare time in your busy day I would like to hear from you concerning this "frightful" possibility, and the measures which might be taken to prevent it.

Sincerely yours,



b7C

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 2/15/61

FROM : SAC, NEWARK ~~(98-0)~~

SUBJECT: [redacted]

INFORMATION CONCERNING

Reference letter of [redacted] to the Bureau, 2/6/61; Bulet to [redacted] 2/13/61, copies of which were furnished Newark with a request that we check our indices for background information concerning [redacted]

A review of Newark files showed that on 7/22/42, a [redacted] whose address was [redacted] wrote a letter to this office stating that he would like to give some extra time to the Government and volunteered to work in some capacity in the Newark Office of the FBI.

[redacted] described himself as 49 years of age, an executive employed as [redacted] and formerly employed for ten years as advertising director of the [redacted]

[redacted] stated that he had a son, [redacted] and a son, [redacted] who was a student at [redacted]

[redacted] was thanked for his inquiry, told that all work of the Bureau was done by full time Special Agents, furnished the qualifications for SA applicants and informed that all citizens could be of great assistance by reporting all matters pertaining to the National Defense to the FBI.

There is insufficient available information to determine whether or not the above individual is identical with [redacted] who corresponded with the Bureau. However, there is a similarity in the spacing and setup of the typed letter submitted to this office in 1942 and the letter sent [redacted] to the Bureau 2/6/61.

Newark files contain no further information identifiable with [redacted]

2 - Bureau
1 - Newark
WVM:vwb

52 MAR 3 1961

117-268

REC-65 117-268

EX-114

7 FEB 28 1961

CRIME RESEARCH

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 1/25/82 BY SP4 AM/jen

-112

REC-47 62-20[illegible]

February 13, 1961

[redacted]

b7C RE: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS

Dear [redacted]

The matters which you discussed in your letter of February 6, 1961 are receiving attention. I appreciate your writing me as you did to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

For your information, I am taking the liberty of furnishing copies of your communication to other agencies of the United States Government having an interest in the subject matters.

Sincerely yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/25/03 BY SP2 per letter dated 11/4/03 [illegible] 11/4/03

MAILED 5 FEB 13 1961 COMM-FBI

1 - Newark - Enclosure

ATTENTION SAC: Immediately furnish Bureau background information regarding [redacted] as revealed by check of your files. No investigation necessary.

DONE 2-14-61 BY RJS LW

NOTE: After approval, letterhead copies of letter will be sent with photostats of incoming to State, CIA, Army, Navy and Air Force. [redacted] his letter states that clandestine nuclear devices planted in the U.S. could be used by an enemy for blackmail. He asks if there is any defense against clandestine nuclear attack and wonders just what precautions are being taken. He states that he read with great interest and enjoyment the Director's book, "Masters of Deceit." He refers to himself as retired from business. No identifiable references [redacted] Bureau indices.

b7C

RJS

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W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

FEB 1 1961

LWmhd (9)

DECLASSIFIED-DISCLOSURE

MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT

62 MAR 3 1961

February 27, 1961

REC-67 117-168-2183
EX-108

[redacted]

b7C

Dear [redacted]

Your letter of February 18, 1961, has been received.

I appreciate your interest in our statement of December 21, 1953, relating to atomic devices. I regret that our supply of this bulletin has been depleted, and I am unable to suggest where it might be obtained.

Enclosed is some other material which may be of interest to you.

Sincerely yours,

MAILED 27
FEB 27 1961
COMM-FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/25/03 BY SP4 DTA/ENP per letter dated 4/4/03 60267 uc/NLS/ISSA/BS 11/4/03

Enclosures (4) Director's 10-18-60 speech
Communist Illusion and Democratic Reality
Communist Target--Youth
Expose of Soviet Espionage
1 - SA Lish Whitson Room 2710

NOTE: Bufiles contain no derogatory information concerning correspondent. On 2-6-61 he wrote to us and suggested the possibility that an enemy power could quite easily smuggle into the country atomic bombs. Copies of his letter were disseminated on 2-14-61 to the State Department, CIA, Army, Navy and Air Force. Inquiry by the Newark Office in February, 1961, reflected no derogatory information concerning correspondent. The

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CJH:gcb (4)
COMM-FBI ROOM TELETYPE UNIT

62 MAR 3 1961

NOTE continued next page

Note continued.

reprint he requested is captioned "Description of Atomic Devices and Component Parts," and was designed for release to representatives of duly constituted law enforcement agencies. We do not have copies available for distribution.

[redacted] b2

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. Parsons	
Mr. Mohr	
Mr. Belmont	
Mr. Callahan	
Mr. Conrad	
Mr. DeLoach	
Mr. Evans	
Mr. Malone	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Tavel	
Mr. Trotter	
Mr. W.C.Sullivan	
Tele. Room	
Mr. Ingram	
Miss Gandy	

February 18, 1961

Secretary to
Mr. J. Edgar Hoover,
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington 25, D.C.

Dear Si r:

Reference your letter to me of Feb. 13, 1961

On Dec. 21, 1953 Mr. Hoover or the Federal Bureau of Investigation issued a warning against the smuggling of atomic devises into the United States---that is a warning for people to be on the watch for them. I wonder if you have available this pamphlet or document, and if I might have a copy, or where could I find one ? I have read only a brief excerpt of the statement, and would like to have the full text. Would this be possible ?

REC- 67 117-268

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/25/03 BY SP4 STP/RNP

Si [redacted] b7C

EX-108

2 FEB 28 1961

cc

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
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Belmont
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W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

TO : Mr. Belmont

DATE: 1-30-61

FROM : W. A. Branigan

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/23/03 BY SP4 [illegible]

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS

Bureau liaison representative, B.A. Wells, arranged for representatives of the Armed Services interested in Explosive Ordnance Disposal to discuss matters of mutual interest with SA Whitson, Espionage Section, 9:30 a.m., 1-25-61. Present at the discussion were: Mr. Carleton L. Thulin, Army Ordnance; Major R. W. Zinn, Army Ordnance, Munitions Building; Major Sidney F. Smith, Army Ordnance, U.S. Naval Propellant Plant, Indian Head, Maryland; Major H. P. Metcalf, U.S. Air Force, Naval Propellant Plant; Major J.E. Quay, U.S. Marine Corps, Bureau of Weapons, Department of Navy.

Mr. Thulin and his associates explained the Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) mission and stated that all EOD units now have nuclear capability and responsibility, but only Navy EOD units have underwater disposal capability.

SA Whitson and SA R. E. Lenihan were also informed that at the present time no U.S. Intelligence had determined the precise configuration of Soviet nuclear weapons and the possible appearance of Soviet clandestine nuclear devices was strictly a matter of speculation. The EOD people are seeking a portable active detection device to detect emissions of gamma and other types of radiation from suspected devices. They are also seeking a portable X-ray machine to assist in determining the interior configuration of suspected devices with particular reference to the location of fissionable material. In the absence of such equipment, EOD feels that the only solution would be to place a shaped charge on the suspect item and blow it up. This would necessitate clearing the area of people and assuming a substantial risk of blast, heat and radiation damage. Thulin pointed out that the effects would be considerably less than would be the case if the clandestine nuclear device was permitted to detonate as planned by its makers.

REC-46 117-2[illegible]-081

Thulin's group asked if the Bureau agents felt EOD needed an active detection device to verify the presence of uranium in a weapon. They were told that they were the experts and should know what tools they needed to discharge their responsibilities. Thulin stated that the Naval Research Laboratory had informed them that within 18 months to 2 years it would have a prototype of a portable active detection device for a cost of $300,000 in research after which the devices would probably be obtained for between $20,000 and $25,000 a unit. Thulin asked if the Bureau was interested in such devices for its

1 - ~~Mr. Parsons~~
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Conrad (Attention: Heilman)
1 - Mr. Branigan
1 - Mr. Wells
1 - Mr. Whitson

61 MAR 8 1961

LW:mhd (7)

CONTINUED SECOND PAGE

EX-113

18 MAR 1 1961

own use. He was told that was a matter which would have to be taken under advisement when the devices were available, but that even if Bureau agents requesting the services of EOD units for the disarming of suspected nuclear devices had used some type of detection equipment, it would appear reasonable that the EOD units would use their own detection equipment upon a suspected item before doing anything to the item.

Thulin stated that they were looking ahead to the time when additional countries would have nuclear capability even though they might have no delivery capability by manned aircraft or mission, but the military agreed that the problem would change only in degree and not in substance. Mr. Thulin's group recognized that the FBI had investigative responsibility under the Atomic Energy Act in connection with clandestine nuclear devices and wondered how disposal of the suspected item would affect our collection of evidence. It was pointed out to them that the disarming of a suspected nuclear device took precedence over anything else and that we would, of course, try to get photos, etc., to assist investigation looking toward establishing the facts of how the weapon got where it was, but if we had not completed our crime scene search before the EOD unit was ready to dismantle or blowup the suspect item, we were not going to insist that they delay action until our investigation was completed.

The military representatives and particularly Major Sidney F. Smith raised technical questions regarding portable X-rays and problems of radiography. Agents Whitson and Lenihan pointed out these were properly matters which they might wish to discuss with appropriate representatives of the FBI Laboratory, and that liaison representative Wells could arrange for a meeting at an appropriate time.

ACTION: For information. This matter will be followed by liaison.

Mr. Thulin advised liaison that he had no need to contact Lab at the time. Lab advised

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

F B I

Date: 2/24/61

Transmit the following in Plain Text
(Type in plain text or code)

Via Airtel
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (117-268)

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK

SUBJECT: SMAB

Staff Officer, [redacted] US Customs, Idlewild Airport, advised NYO at 7:22 p.m., 2/24/61 of arrival of following radioactive material:

The radioactive material consisted of merchandise of one half pound of refined uranium oxide. The name of the passenger carrying this material is [redacted]

His place of birth was not known. [redacted]

arrived at Idlewild [redacted] The uranium oxide was contained in a glass jar and steel container. The reading on the portable machine concerning this material [redacted]

The purpose of the importing was to be used as an assay sample in checking for uranium oxide in US.

b7C
b2
b7C
b7E

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 6/26/81 BY SP2 [illegible]

3 - Bureau (117-268)
1 - New York

EFM:smb
(5)

2-28-61 N/R [redacted] NO ACTION NECESSARY SINCE NO DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL AND NO SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL INVOLVED. EGW

b7C

REC-58 117-268-2085

7 FEB 27 1961

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

51 MAR 1961

[redacted] advised that Mr. MC LOUGHLIN of the Atomic Energy Commission had been notified and had authorized release pending check of the license by [redacted] b7C

For information.

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