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Discover the Truth at: **<http://www.theblackvault.com>**



September 28, 2018

MR. JOHN GREENEWALD JR.
SUITE 1203
27305 WEST LIVE OAK ROAD
CASTAIC, CA 91384

FOIPA Request Number: 1342753-001
Subject: 066-HQ-19009

Dear Mr. Greenewald:

The enclosed documents were reviewed under the Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts (FOIPA), Title 5, United States Code, Section 552/552a. Below you will find check boxes under the appropriate statute headings which indicate the types of exemptions asserted to protect information which is exempt from disclosure. The appropriate exemptions are noted on the enclosed pages next to redacted information. In addition, a deleted page information sheet was inserted to indicate where pages were withheld entirely and identify which exemptions were applied. The checked exemptions boxes used to withhold information are further explained in the enclosed Explanation of Exemptions.

Section 552

☐ (b)(1)

☐ (b)(2)

☐ (b)(3)

☐ (b)(4)

☐ (b)(5)

☒ (b)(6)

☐ (b)(7)(A)

☐ (b)(7)(B)

☒ (b)(7)(C)

☐ (b)(7)(D)

☒ (b)(7)(E)

☐ (b)(7)(F)

☐ (b)(8)

☐ (b)(9)

Section 552a

☐ (d)(5)

☐ (j)(2)

☐ (k)(1)

☐ (k)(2)

☐ (k)(3)

☐ (k)(4)

☐ (k)(5)

☐ (k)(6)

☐ (k)(7)

174 pages were reviewed and 140 pages are being released.

Below you will also find additional informational paragraphs about your request. Where applicable, check boxes are used to provide you with more information about the processing of your request. Please read each item carefully.

- ☒ Document(s) were located which originated with, or contained information concerning, other Government Agency(ies) [OGA].
- ☒ This information has been referred to the OGA(s) for review and direct response to you.
- ☒ We are consulting with another agency. The FBI will correspond with you regarding this information when the consultation is completed.
- ☐ In accordance with standard FBI practice and pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(7)(E) and Privacy Act exemption (j)(2) [5 U.S.C. § 552/552a (b)(7)(E)/(j)(2)], this response neither confirms nor denies the existence of your subject's name on any watch lists.

For your information, Congress excluded three discrete categories of law enforcement and national security records from the requirements of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). See 5 U.S.C. § 552(c) (2006 & Supp. IV (2010)). This response is limited to those records that are subject to the requirements of the FOIA. This is a standard notification given to all our requesters and should not be taken as an indication that excluded records do, or do not, exist. Enclosed for your information is a copy of the Explanation of Exemptions.


For questions regarding our determinations, visit the www.fbi.gov/foia website under "Contact Us." The FOIA Request Number listed above has been assigned to your request. Please use this number in all correspondence concerning your request.

You may file an appeal by writing to the Director, Office of Information Policy (OIP), United States Department of Justice, Suite 11050, 1425 New York Avenue, NW, Washington, D.C. 20530-0001, or you may submit an appeal through OIP's FOIA online portal by creating an account on the following website: <https://www.foiaonline.gov/foiaonline/action/public/home>. Your appeal must be postmarked or electronically transmitted within ninety (90) days from the date of this letter in order to be considered timely. If you submit your appeal by mail, both the letter and the envelope should be clearly marked "Freedom of Information Act Appeal." Please cite the FOIPA Request Number assigned to your request so it may be easily identified.

You may seek dispute resolution services by contacting the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS) at 877-684-6448, or by emailing ogis@nara.gov. Alternatively, you may contact the FBI's FOIA Public Liaison by emailing foipaquestions@fbi.gov. If you submit your dispute resolution correspondence by email, the subject heading should clearly state "Dispute Resolution Services." Please also cite the FOIPA Request Number assigned to your request so it may be easily identified.

- ☐ The enclosed material is from the main investigative file(s), meaning the subject(s) of your request was the focus of the investigation. Our search located additional references, in files relating to other individuals, or matters, which may or may not be about your subject(s). Our experience has shown such additional references, if identified to the same subject of the main investigative file, usually contain information similar to the information processed in the main file(s). As such, we have given priority to processing only the main investigative file(s) given our significant backlog. If you would like to receive any references to the subject(s) of your request, please submit a separate request for the reference material in writing. The references will be reviewed at a later date, as time and resources permit.
- ☒ See additional information which follows.

Sincerely,



David M. Hardy
Section Chief
Record/Information
Dissemination Section
Information Management Division

Enclosure(s)

In response to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to the Records Management Division in Winchester, VA, please find enclosed a processed copy of FBI Headquarters file 66-HQ-19009 (Section 3), which is responsive to your request.

The enclosed documents represent the second (2nd) interim release of information responsive to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request.

As previously indicated, document(s) were located which originated with, or contained information concerning another agency(ies). We are consulting with the other agency(ies) and are awaiting their response. Our office has processed all other information currently in our possession. The FBI will correspond with you regarding those documents when the consultation is completed.

In addition, inquiries regarding your OGA referral designated within the release as "Referral/Direct" may be directed to the following agency at:

National Security Council
Director of Access Management
725 17th Street, NW
Washington, DC 20504

The responsive material has been placed on a CD-Rom and is being provided to you at no charge.

EXPLANATION OF EXEMPTIONS

SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552

- (b)(1) (A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified to such Executive order;
- (b)(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency;
- (b)(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this title), provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld;
- (b)(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential;
- (b)(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;
- (b)(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
- (b)(7) records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information (A) could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of confidential source, including a State, local, or foreign agency or authority or any private institution which furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in the case of record or information compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, information furnished by a confidential source, (E) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law, or (F) could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual;
- (b)(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or
- (b)(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells.

SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552a

- (d)(5) information compiled in reasonable anticipation of a civil action proceeding;
- (j)(2) material reporting investigative efforts pertaining to the enforcement of criminal law including efforts to prevent, control, or reduce crime or apprehend criminals;
- (k)(1) information which is currently and properly classified pursuant to an Executive order in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy, for example, information involving intelligence sources or methods;
- (k)(2) investigatory material compiled for law enforcement purposes, other than criminal, which did not result in loss of a right, benefit or privilege under Federal programs, or which would identify a source who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;
- (k)(3) material maintained in connection with providing protective services to the President of the United States or any other individual pursuant to the authority of Title 18, United States Code, Section 3056;
- (k)(4) required by statute to be maintained and used solely as statistical records;
- (k)(5) investigatory material compiled solely for the purpose of determining suitability, eligibility, or qualifications for Federal civilian employment or for access to classified information, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;
- (k)(6) testing or examination material used to determine individual qualifications for appointment or promotion in Federal Government service the release of which would compromise the testing or examination process;
- (k)(7) material used to determine potential for promotion in the armed services, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished the material pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOI/PA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
FOI/PA# 1342753-1

Total Deleted Page(s) = 34
Page 9 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 10 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 11 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 12 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 13 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 14 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 15 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 16 ~ Referral/Direct;
Page 17 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 18 ~ Referral/Consult;
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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN *JTB*

DATE: July 8, 1957

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

Problem Revisions made 7/11/57

SUBJECT: OPERATION ALERT 1957
JULY 12 - 19

Tolson _____
 Nichols _____
 Boardman _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
 Rosen _____
 Tamm _____
 Nease _____
 Winterrowd _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holloman _____
 Gandy _____

✓ Minnich

Attached is the plan covering the extent of the Bureau's participation in Operation Alert 1957. The relocation phase of the exercise begins at 11 a.m., EST, 7/12/57, and closes at 12 noon, EST, 7/19/57. The plan encompasses over-all Government plan, over-all FBI plan, physical facilities at Quantico, notification procedures, personnel to be evacuated, field office participation, test exercise problems, communications, and the operation of the Bureau in Washington during the test exercise.

All participating divisions have been afforded the opportunity of submitting suggestions for the exercise and during the course of the exercise they are requested to promptly submit separate memoranda incorporating any suggestions for improvement of operations within their jurisdiction.

Recapitulation of Bureau plan for relocation phase of Operation Alert 1957 follows:

Dates: July 12 - 19, 1957

Place: Quantico, Virginia

Time: 11 a.m., EST, 7/12/57. We will have simulated an alert at approximately 9:30 a.m., EDST, this date, so that all personnel evacuating to Quantico will be at site per Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM) instructions prior to actual start of test. Test terminates 12 noon, EST, 7/19/57.

Personnel:

(59) - 24 - officials and Agents - 35 clerical employees. As many of these employees as possible will be released after first two days of exercise and others subsequent thereto. *66-19009-131*

ENCLOSURE

Enclosure. *JTB*
JTM:vep (13)

1 - Mr. Nichols
 1 - Mr. Boardman
 1 - Mr. Belmont
 1 - Mr. Mohr

1 - Mr. Parsons
 1 - Mr. Tamm (Attention Sloan)

66 JUL 22 1957

1 - Mr. Holloman
 1 - Mr. Baumgardner
 1 - Mr. Bland
 1 - Mr. Branigan
 1 - Section
 1 - Mr. Minnich

RECORDED-29
 EX-131

24 JUL 22 1957

JTB

Shifts - Two 12-hour shifts for officials and Agents. 8-hour shifts for clerical personnel where possible.

Meals - Served in dining room.

Sleeping - On third floor, temporary partition will separate male and female participants.

Security:

24-hour guard duty by Quantico Agent personnel.

Communications:

(IN INTEREST OF ECONOMY
RADIO WILL BE UTILIZED
MORE FULLY THAN DURING
PAST EXERCISES)

Telephones - (19 lines)

- 11 - regular commercial lines
 - 1 - through Triangle, Virginia
 - 10 - through Fredericksburg, Virginia
- 8 - special lines
 - 1 - direct to Bureau switchboard, Justice Building
 - 2 - direct to Interagency Communications Center, HIGHPOINT, ODM relocation site (R/S) and Interagency Communications Center.
 - 2 - microwave circuits to HIGHPOINT
 - 1 - microwave circuit to Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) R/S.
 - 1 - extension off of U.S. Marine Corps switchboard, Quantico.
 - 1 - Red Line Network private system providing direct communication between White House R/S and R/S's of 7 agencies. Intra-agency calls may be made subject to "cut off" if the President desires to use the line.
- 1 - Mobile telephone - in Director's car operated through switchboard at HIGHPOINT. Local Washington, D. C., and highway coverage is provided for. A log of operations and directory is in the car.

Teletypes - (9)

- 3 - to Richmond
- 1 - to Midland, Va., main radio station (to be discontinued after Operation Alert 1957).
- 1 - to Justice R/S.
- 2 - to HIGHPOINT, one of which is microwave

Memorandum for Mr. Boardman

RE: OPERATION ALERT 1957
JULY 12 - 19

- 1 - microwave to CIA R/S
- 1 - private line teletype on Red Line Network
- Radio - (2)
 - 1 - 450 watt field office type installation
 - 1 - radio-teletype installation

Field Office Participation: 52 for general alert and special problems
18 will be given actual availability checks.

Test Problems: 73 - (224 field office contacts) Problems include an actual availability check of Agents in headquarters city of 18 offices, contacts with Department of Justice and Liaison Agents. Problems simulate PRODIP and DETPRO procedures and situations which may arise from these programs in an actual emergency. Sabotage, espionage and censorship problems are included as are problems requiring field offices to test their radio-activity detection devices and auxiliary power units.

Reports of Test: Reports of R/S occurrences submitted daily for the Director's information. A total of 5 reports covering specified time periods required by ODM submitted to ODM R/S via teletype in accordance with specified time schedules. A daily communications report via teletype to ODM R/S.

A report of the exercise must also be prepared for use at cabinet level critique to be held Friday afternoon, 7/19/57. Identity of participants, time and place are not known at this time.

SUMMARY OF DETAILS:

I. ALERT

ODM plan provides for personnel to be at relocation site (R/S) prior to 11 a.m., EST, 7/12/57, therefore, an alert will be simulated by

Memorandum for Mr. Boardman

RE: OPERATION ALERT 1957
JULY 12 - 19

Bureau at approximately 9:30 a.m., EDT, 7/12/57. Established notification procedures will be placed into operation, however, Departmental officials will not be notified. Upon receipt of notification employees or their alternates (187) scheduled for immediate relocation in an actual emergency will report to the corridor outside Room 1541 where they will be checked off. Personnel participating in exercise at Quantico will be instructed to depart immediately via personal car and/or Bureau bus for the R/S and other employees will be instructed to resume normal duties. A log will be kept denoting time notification given, time "check off" completed, time last employee departs Justice Building, time Bureau bus clears 14th Street Bridge, time Bureau bus arrives at Marine Corps Reservation and time last relocatee arrives at R/S for exercise.

II. QUANTICO FACILITIES

1. Security

SAC Quantico will institute strong security measures on a 24-hour basis, utilizing Quantico Agent personnel. A controlled access to the R/S will be effectuated through a check in and registration system. Individuals entering the Academy Building will be required to identify themselves and register upon entering.

2. Sleeping Accommodations

The third floor of the Academy will be utilized. A temporary partition will be erected across the third floor corridor separating the male and female sleeping accommodations.

3. Meals

Served as follows:

Breakfast - 7 a.m., EST, to 9 a.m., EST
Luncheon - 12 noon, EST, to 2 p.m., EST
Dinner - 6 p.m., EST, to 8 p.m., and for night shift
11 p.m., EST, to 1 a.m., EST.

III. COMMUNICATIONS

Emergency communications facilities at R/S will be rigidly tested. In interest of economy radio will be utilized more fully than during past exercises. Radio contact will be had with all field offices at least once. Telephone and teletype messages will be directed to and from several field offices and to and from Bureau Liaison

Memorandum for Mr. Boardman

RE: OPERATION ALERT 1957
JULY 12 - 19

Agents at R/S's of other agencies as necessary. Liaison Agents will remain at R/S's of other agencies as long as warranted with recall controlled at Bureau R/S.

IV. FIELD OFFICE PARTICIPATION

All offices will be contacted at headquarters city from Bureau R/S and field offices will be required to contact their R/S. Field offices will activate and man their R/S's with a minimum staff from 11 a.m., EST, 7/12/57, to 8 p.m. (Local time), 7/13/57. A minimum of 73 test problems is planned, involving 224 field office contacts.

V. AVAILABILITY OF FIELD AGENT PERSONNEL

18 field offices will be contacted after normal working hours and instructed to carry out availability checks of Agents in duty status at headquarters city. These offices are unaware of this scheduled check and they will be instructed to complete the check and advise time instructions received, the number of Agents in duty status in headquarters city, time required to contact 50% of them, number of Agents requiring more than one call to contact and time first attempt to contact Bureau R/S is made.

VI. TEST PROBLEMS

Problems have been devised to cover all field offices and simulated situations which will encompass the following:

1. A substituted message to each office to simulate alert to standby to initiate Emergency Detention Program (DETPRO). Later in course of exercise subsequent to receiving appropriate authority from the Attorney General a substituted message will be sent to all offices simulating instructions to institute DETPRO.
2. Problems relating to security index, i.e., apprehension of individuals on security index covering anticipated situations which may arise.
3. Problems involving information to and from Liaison Agents at R/S's of agencies Bureau normally does business with.
4. Problems involving detention of diplomats of enemy nations and their dependents.

Memorandum for Mr. Boardman

RE: OPERATION ALERT 1957
JULY 12 - 19

5. Problems developed by the Laboratory pertaining to use of instruments to detect presence of radioactivity, simulated breakdowns of various communications and cryptographic facilities and requiring field offices to operate radio equipment on emergency power.

6. Specific problems developed to cover simulating contacts with informants, operational matters in censorship field, landing of enemy agents, sabotage and treason. Some of these problems require an office to contact road or resident agents, or their R/S.

ACTION:

The Director will be kept advised of daily developments at Bureau's relocation site during course of our participation in Operation Alert 1957.

R *JB* *Jim* *Q*

✓ *+*

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO MR. R. R. ROACH

DATE July 19, 1957

FROM MR. A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: OPERATION ALERT, 1957

Tolson _____
 Nichols _____
 Boardman _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
 Rosen _____
 Tamm _____
 Trotter _____
 Nease _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holloman _____
 Gandy _____

At 10:00 AM, July 19, Mr. Wilson White of the Department called at Deputy Attorney General Rogers' request. He said Mr. Rogers thought possibly that at the expanded Cabinet meeting at 11:00 o'clock this morning the question might come up as to whether authority had been obtained from the White House during the recent exercise to institute the Emergency Detention Program. Mr. White wanted to know if we had cleared with ODM the fact that authorization would be simulated.

I told Mr. White that the President's proclamation which authorizes this program has been prepared by the Department and we understand, from the Department, has been sent to the White House; that during the current exercise no mention was made of this document in view of the sensitive nature of the program and the document was not included among the emergency documents circulated to other agencies. I advised Mr. White that a day or two before the Alert began, I had spoken to Mr. William Foley to insure that when we called the Department from our relocation site, we would get prompt authority to launch the Program and I understood that Mr. Foley had discussed this with someone in the Department. At any rate, when I called from the relocation site, we got promptly authority. I told Mr. Foley we had not taken up this matter with ODM as this was a matter handled by the Department. I told him that frankly I did not see how any problem could arise on this as I assumed that the Department had simulated getting authority from the White House.

For your information.

AHB:mn

cc - Mr. Belmont
 Mr. Roach
 Mr. Bland
 Mr. Baumgardner

(5)

10:15am
 Dr. advised A
 66-19009-134
 RECORDED 78
 EX 105
 24 JUL 22 1957

59 JUL 23 1957

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

Mr. Tolson _____
 Mr. Nichols _____
 Mr. Boardman _____
 Mr. Belmont _____
 Mr. Mohr _____
 Mr. Parsons _____
 Mr. Rosen _____
 Mr. Tamm _____
 Mr. Trotter _____
 Mr. Nease _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Mr. Holloman _____
 Miss Gandy _____

UPIA

(SECURITY)

CHAIRMAN TOM MURRAY PREDICTS HIS HOUSE CIVIL SERVICE COMMITTEE WILL ACT THIS SESSION ON LEGISLATION TO MEET THE ISSUES RAISED BY A SUPREME COURT DECISION LIMITING THE FEDERAL EMPLOYEES SECURITY PROGRAM. THE COMMITTEE PLANS TO OPEN HEARINGS TOMORROW ON THE NEW LOYALTY PROGRAM PROPOSED LAST MONTH BY THE COMMISSION ON GOVERNMENT SECURITY HEADED BY LOYD WRIGHT, BUT THE GROUP IS NOT EXPECTED TO ACT ON THE WRIGHT PLAN THIS SESSION.

MURRAY SAID, HOWEVER, HE BELIEVED HIS COMMITTEE WOULD ACT ON A SHORTER-RANGE MEASURE INTRODUCED AFTER THE SUPREME COURT RULING LAST YEAR THAT THE CURRENT SECURITY PROGRAM DID NOT APPLY TO GOVERNMENT WORKERS IN "NON-SENSITIVE" JOBS.

7/19--12222A

66-17000-A
 NOT RECORDED
 24 JUL 22 1957

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : L. V. BOARDMAN *LB 7/11/57*

DATE: July 10, 1957

FROM : A. H. BELMONT *9*

SUBJECT: OPERATION ALERT 1957

Tolson ☒
 Nichols ☒
 Boardman ☒
 Belmont ☒
 Mason ☒
 Mohr ☒
 Parsons ☒
 Rosen ☒
 Tamm ☒
 Nease ☒
 Winterrowd ☒
 Tele. Room ☒
 Holloman ☒
 Gandy ☒

On 7/9/57 a document entitled "Operation Alert 1957, Security Guidelines for Exercise Documents" was received by Bureau Plans Desk, Liaison Section, from James J. Canavan, Defense Plans Coordinator, Department of Justice. A copy of this document is attached to the ticklers for Mr. Belmont and Mr. Roach and one copy is being retained by Bureau Plans Desk.

This document points out that Operation Alert 1957 is an exercise for training purposes and that individual action documents issued during the exercise should not be identified with or related to any official plans of the Government. It sets forth examples which would require security classification rather than "Official Use Only." It also sets forth terminology to be utilized in all correspondence and action documents, when necessary to refer to organizations created for Operation Alert purposes. Additionally, it sets forth the names of the officials in charge of such agencies.

Since we do not issue action documents to other Government agencies, the provisions of the attached document would appear not to require any action by us.

ACTION:

For information.

Ticklers: Boardman
 Belmont (Enclosure)
 Roach (Enclosure)
 Minnich
 Liaison

JTM:ja *ja*
 (6)

EX-105
 RECORDED - 9

66-19009-135

15 JUL 23 1957

55 JUL 25 1957

Office Memorandum UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: July 10, 1957

FROM : MR. R. R. ROACH

SUBJECT: DEFENSE PLANS
OPERATION ALERT - 1957

Tolson _____
 Nichols _____
 Boardman _____
 Belmont _____
 Mason _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
 Rosen _____
 Tamm _____
 Nease _____
 Winterrowd _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holloman _____
 Gandy _____

On July 10, 1957, Mr. Ed Cox, Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM), advised Mr. Bartlett, Liaison Section, that the pouch containing the essential papers to start the play of the operation alert at 8:00 A.M. on Monday, July 15 will be ready for distribution on Sunday, July 14. Mr. Cox stated that the pouch will contain papers reflecting the international situation, the domestic situation, the events which have already taken place, the fall-out map and the damage assessment data. This material will be available at 4:30 P.M. EDT on Sunday, July 14, at the east loading platform at the Pentagon. It will be addressed to the FBI and Elmer Colbert of ODM will be at the loading platform. The pouch will be a post office pouch and will be locked with a rotary lock. Mr. Cox mentioned that similar pouches will be sent to each agency participating in operation alert and the pouches are not to be opened until 8:00 A.M., Monday, July 15.

The Bureau has an armed courier run between Washington and Quantico. The 4:30 P.M. run on Sunday, July 14, will be handled by SA W. G. Eames. Mr. Eames has been instructed to pick up the pouch and deliver it to Quantico. The Bureau has the necessary key for opening the pouch in the Routing Unit of the Records Section at the Bureau. Mr. Eames has been instructed to take this key with him on this particular run in order that the pouch can be opened at Quantico. The key will then have to be returned to the Bureau for use on Monday, July 15.

Mr. Cox of ODM was advised that the Bureau would have an agent pick up the Bureau's pouch at the Pentagon at 4:30 P.M., July 14.

ACTION:

For information.

CHB:jlh (8)
 1 - Mr. Belmont
 1 - Mr. DeLoach
 1 - Mr. Medler
 1 - Mr. Minnich
 1 - Mr. Eames
 1 - Liaison Section
 1 - Mr. Bartlett

RECORDED - 166-19009-136

3 JUL 15 1957

X-110

55 JUL 25 1957

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. TOLSON

DATE: July 18, 1957

FROM : J. P. MOHR

SUBJECT: COST OF BUS TRIPS TO
DEPARTMENTAL RELOCATION SITE
OPERATION ALERT - 1957

BUPPLANS

Tolson _____
 Nichols _____
 Boardman _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
 Rosen _____
 Tamm _____
 Trotter _____
 Nease _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holloman _____
 Gandy _____

You will recall that the Director approved our furnishing a bus and a driver to the Department in order to take personnel from Washington, D. C., to Martinsburg, West Virginia. Our driver drove a group up on Monday, July 15, 1957, and brought them back on the afternoon of Tuesday, July 16, 1957. The Director had previously indicated in a memorandum concerning his conversation with the Attorney General about the use of the bus that we would be glad to make the bus available on a reimbursable basis.

As pointed out, our driver made two trips to Martinsburg which involved 280 miles at a cost of operating the bus at 15.2¢ per mile or a total cost of \$42.56.

John Airhart of the Department called me today and stated he is preparing his cost figures for Operation Alert, 1957, and wanted to know what we were going to charge the Department for the use of the bus. I told Mr. Airhart I would let him know. After discussing this with you I called him back and told him the Director was making no charge for the use of the bus and that we would absorb the cost of the bus. Mr. Airhart stated that this was a fine gesture on the part of the Director and expressed his appreciation.

The foregoing is submitted for your information:

cc: Mr. Newman
 Mr. Jackson

JPM:eam
 (4)

EX-110

RECORDED - 1

66-19009-137
 24 JUL 23 195761 JUL 26 1957
 F323

LITTON

July 19, 1957

PERSONAL AND ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mr. David L. Butler
Cleaves Food Service Corporation
8405 Ramsey Avenue
Silver Spring, Maryland

Dear Mr. Butler:

I have received many reports of the excellence of the food and service at the FBI Academy in Quantico, Virginia, during the recent exercises there. I appreciate your contribution as an assistant manager during this period.


I am sure the success of the operation was due to a great extent to the thoughtfulness and industry displayed by you during this period.

Please accept my thanks for your interest and enthusiasm which contributed to the excellent morale existing at the FBI Academy.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

cc: SAC, Quantico



INDEXED - 17
RECORDED - 1
66-19009

15 JUL 23 1957

(Enclosures to Memo Mr. Belmont to Mr. Boardman, dtd. 7/17/57, re: Food Service, Relocation Site, Operation Alert, 1957.)

HLS:chb

HLS:chb

(4)

(3)

Tolson _____
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Belmont _____
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Mohr _____
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Nease _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

55 JUL 25 1957

REC'D-READING ROOM

JUL 19 11 38 AM '57

FBI

July 19, 1957

PERSONAL AND ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Colonel Ward B. Cleaves
President
Cleaves Food Service Corporation
8405 Ramsey Avenue
Silver Spring, Maryland


Dear Colonel Cleaves:

I have had many reports of the excellent food and service provided by you during the exercises held recently at the FBI Academy at Quantico, Virginia.

I want to take this means of expressing to you and the members of your staff at the Academy my appreciation for the thoughtfulness, service and excellent food served to all during their stay there.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover



cc: SAC, Quantico

RECORDED - 1

INDEXED - 1

66-19207-139

15 JUL 21 1957

JUL 19 11 38 AM '57
REC'D-READING ROOM
FBI

HLS:chb

(4) UM

(Enclosures to Memo Mr. Belmont to Mr. Boardman, dtd. 7/17/57, re: Food Service, Relocation Site, Operation Alert, 1957) HLS:chb (6)

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Gandy _____

55 JUL 25 1957

July 19, 1957

~~PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mr. George Henderson
c/o FBI Academy
Quantico, Virginia

Dear Mr. Henderson:

I have received many reports of the excellence of the food you prepared during the recent exercises held at the FBI Academy. I am sure that your talents aided in maintaining the high morale of our employees, and I want to acknowledge your contribution.

Please accept my thanks for the devoted service you have rendered at the Academy.

Sincerely yours,

RECORDED - 1 J. Edgar Hoover

COMM - FBI cc - Quantico (sent separately)
JUL 19 1957
MAILED 19

66-19009-140
15 JUL 23 1957

REC'D-READING ROOM
B I
JUL 19 11 36 AM '57

Based on memorandum from Mr. Belmont to Mr. Boardman dated 7-17-57 re: Food Service, Relocation Site, Operation Alert, 1957. HLS:chb

HLS:chb:mbk
(4)

Tolson _____
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Rosen _____
Tamm _____
Trotter _____
Nease _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

55 JUL 25 1957

July 19, 1957

~~PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mr. Thomas D. May
c/o FBI Academy
Quantico, Virginia

Dear Mr. May:

I want to extend to you my appreciation for the wonderful service and delicious food served to all during the recent exercises at Quantico.

On an assignment such as this which requires long hours of tedious work, the serving of fine food always helps morale.

The outstanding job done by you and your staff contributed to the success of the test operation. Will you please convey to them my appreciation for the wonderful way they took care of us.

INDEXED - 1
RECORDED - 1
Sincerely yours,

66-17009-174

15 JUL 23 1957

J. Edgar Hoover

REC'D READING ROOM

JUL 19 11 36 AM '57

COMM - FBI
JUL 19 1957
MAILED 19

cc: SAC, Quantico (sent separately)

Based on memo Mr. Belmont to Mr. Boardman, dated 7/17/57, re: Food Service, Relocation Site, Operation Alert, 1957. HLS:chb.

HLS:chb/smk

(3)
55 JUL 25 1957

Tolson _____
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Trotter _____
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Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: July 19, 1957

FROM : Mr. R. R. Roach

SUBJECT: OPERATION ALERT 1957
LIAISON ASSIGNMENT WITH STATE DEPARTMENT

Tolson _____
 Nichols _____
 Boardman _____
 Belmont _____
 Mason _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
 Rosen _____
 Tamm _____
 Nease _____
 Winterrowd _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holloman _____
 Gandy _____

SYNOPSIS:

Pursuant to instructions, Liaison Agent M. W. Kuhrtz remained in Washington July 12-15, 1957, in order to obtain State Department authority and to coordinate with State the apprehension of enemy diplomats. This action necessary since State Department personnel did not evacuate until Monday, July 15, 1957. State's authority for apprehension of enemy diplomats was effected by telephone calls between Quantico and Washington at 10:45 a.m., July 12, 1957. Kuhrtz departed Washington 8:45 a.m. Eastern Daylight Time (EDT), July 15, 1957, arriving at the U. S. Beef Cattle Reserve Station (State Relocation Site) at 10:05 a.m. Eastern Standard Time (EST), July 15, 1957. Desk and telephone provided at site. Kuhrtz attended all of State's staff meetings while at the site as an observer which permitted Kuhrtz to gain a firsthand knowledge of State's problems arising from the operation, some of which were of intelligence interest to the Bureau. Mr. Roderic O'Connor, Administrator, Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, served as Acting Secretary of State for the purpose of this operation. On July 17, 1957, Mr. Loy W. Henderson, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration arrived with a number of State officials via helicopter from Washington for briefings. On July 18, 1957, Governor Christian A. Hexter, Under Secretary, and two other State officials arrived via helicopter from Washington for briefings. Some of State's activity presented security problems such as the following: (1) Consideration to evacuate approximately 100,000 unscreened European refugees to the United States. This matter ultimately resolved by evacuating the entire number to Africa. (2) The problem of clearing large numbers of skilled laborers for immediate transfer abroad to rebuild our foreign bases. (3) The possible utilization of large numbers of Mexican and South American laborers to replenish our depleted labor force. Mr. O'Connor stated that FBI Liaison was of great assistance in coordinating certain State problems involving security and added that he was hopeful that the Bureau would continue to provide Liaison representation during future exercises since it would be most necessary in case of a real attack. Kuhrtz had sleeping accommodations at the Blue Ridge Motel, Front Royal, Virginia. He returned to Washington on July 18, arriving at 6:05 p.m. EDT. Four other Government agencies had Liaison representatives at State's site.

RECORDED - 1

66-19009-142

24 JUL 23 1957

1 - Mr. Belmont

1 - Mr. Minnich

1 - Liaison Section

55 JUL 20 1957

WHR:bjt
 (5)

Memorandum Mr. Roach to Mr. Belmont

RE: OPERATION ALERT 1957

LIAISON ASSIGNMENT WITH STATE DEPARTMENT

RECOMMENDATION:

In view of the security problems resulting from State's exercises and the fact that State is very receptive to including a Bureau representative in a Liaison capacity in its Operation Alert activities, it is recommended that the Bureau continue to maintain Liaison representation with State on all evacuation planning.

[Handwritten initials: JAB, Q, Sam, V., W.]

DETAILS:

Pursuant to instructions, Liaison Agent M. W. Kuhrtz remained in Washington through Phase I of Operation Alert, July 12-15, 1957. This was necessary since the State Department personnel did not evacuate to their relocation site until Monday, July 15, 1957, for Phase II of Operation Alert. Previous arrangements were made to coordinate certain problems pertinent to the Bureau Phase I operations with appropriate State personnel in Washington.

Kuhrtz was contacted at his desk in Washington by Mr. Belmont at 10:43 a.m. EDT, July 12, 1957, requesting that State authority be obtained for the apprehension of enemy diplomats in the United States. Mr. John F. Depenbrock, Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, State Department, was contacted by Kuhrtz at 10:44 a.m. EDT, at which time the necessary State authority was obtained for Bureau apprehension of enemy diplomatic personnel. Mr. Belmont was advised of this State authority by Kuhrtz at 10:45 a.m. EDT. At 3:39 p.m. EDT, July 12, 1957, Kuhrtz received a call from Mr. Roach, Quantico, which simulated advising State of the identities of foreign Government employees of enemy nations to be taken into custody. This action includes those assigned to the United Nations. This call also simulated advice from State relative to the Bureau's apprehension of diplomats of friendly nations engaged in espionage against the United States.

On Monday, July 15, 1957, Kuhrtz departed Washington at 8:45 a.m. EDT, arriving at State's relocation site at 10:05 a.m. EST, same date. This site is located on the U. S. Beef Cattle Reserve Station (a Government reservation) on Route 522, 3 miles south of Front Royal, Virginia. State evacuated approximately 130 people for this operation. Kuhrtz was provided desk space in the area occupied

Memorandum Mr. Roach to Mr. Belmont
RE: OPERATION ALERT 1957
LIAISON ASSIGNMENT WITH STATE DEPARTMENT

by State's Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs.

Mr. Roderic L. O'Connor, Administrator, Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, served as Acting Secretary of State for the purpose of Operation Alert 1957. He remained at the site throughout the operation. On July 17, 1957, Mr. Loy W. Henderson, Deputy Under Secretary for Administration, arrived at the site with Mr. C. Douglas Dillon, Deputy Under Secretary for Economic Affairs, along with five other State Officials. This group arrived from Washington via helicopter and they spent approximately two hours at the site for briefing of State's activities. On July 18, 1957, Governor Christian A. Herter, Under Secretary and two other officials arrived via helicopter for the same type briefings.

During the course of the operation a total of 14 contacts were made between Kuhrtz and Quantico. Kuhrtz was included in all of State's staff meetings as an observer. These staff meetings usually occurred twice a day. This permitted Kuhrtz to gain a firsthand knowledge of all of State's policy problems and decisions arising from the operation, some of which were of intelligence interest and were accordingly related to Quantico. There were a number of security problems arising out of situations considered by State such as the following:

- (1) The U. S. Army in Europe was confronted with 650,000 refugees which were seriously hampering their offensive. Initial consideration was to require each NATO country to evacuate its proportionate share to its home country. This action would have placed approximately 100,000 unscreened European refugees in the United States. This matter was ultimately resolved by evacuating the entire number to Africa.
- (2) The problem of clearing large numbers of skilled laborers for immediate transfer abroad to rebuild our foreign bases.
- (3) The problem of possibly utilizing large numbers of Mexican and South American laborers to replenish our depleted labor force.

None of the above problems was officially proposed to FBI, Quantico. It is pointed out that State conducted a very active exercise from July 15 through July 18, 1957. On July 18, they completed their accomplishment report for the Secretary's use at the President's Conference on July 19, 1957.

Memorandum Mr. Roach to Mr. Belmont
RE: OPERATION ALERT 1957
LIAISON ASSIGNMENT WITH STATE DEPARTMENT

Mr. O'Connor advised Kuhrtz that although this was his first participation in Operation Alert, he was confident that FBI Liaison at the site was of great assistance in coordinating certain of the security problems arising. O'Connor stated that in view of these complex security problems that he was hopeful the Bureau would continue to provide a Liaison representative during future exercises since it would be most necessary in case of a real attack.

Kuhrtz had sleeping accommodations at the Blue Ridge Motel Front Royal, Virginia, and at 2:10 p.m. EST, July 18, 1957, departed for Washington. He arrived in Washington at 6:05 p.m. EDT on the same date.

The following additional agencies had Liaison representatives at Front Royal: U. S. Information Agency; Central Intelligence Agency; General Services Administration, and a representative from the Operations Coordination Board of the National Security Counsel staff.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: July 19, 1957

FROM : R. R. ROACH *R3*SUBJECT: BUPLANS OPERATION ALERT 1957 ✓ *Winnich* *Ans B*

Tolson	_____
Nichols	_____
Boardman	_____
Belmont	_____
Mason	_____
Mohr	_____
Parsons	_____
Rosen	_____
Tamm	_____
Nease	_____
Winterrowd	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holloman	_____
Gandy	_____

SA Jerome J. Daunt acted as Liaison representative between the Department of Justice and the Bureau relocation sites between July 12, 1957, and July 16, 1957.

William E. Foley of the Department was the Acting Attorney General at the Justice relocation site, Federal Building, Martinsburg, West Virginia, from Friday, July 12, 1957, until Monday noon, July 15, 1957. During this period, there were approximately 35 Justice employees at the relocation site, all but 5 of whom were Communications and Records Sections personnel. Outside of Foley, the only operational people from Justice were: John A. Airhart of the Criminal Division and James Canavan, Nathan Lenvin, and William Huntley of the Internal Security Division. *Winnich* *Roach* *Ans B*

Deputy Attorney General Rogers arrived at the site at noon on Monday, July 15, 1957, and upon his arrival asked Foley two specific questions; namely, whether Justice was doing everything expected of them by ODM, and whether the FBI had received immediate authority to execute the Emergency Detention Program. Rogers left the site the same day after giving a brief talk to the Executive Reserves. The Executive Reserves arrived at the site at approximately 1:00 p.m., July 15, 1957, sixteen in number. They were briefed during the afternoon of the 16th and the morning of the 17th by the various divisions in the Justice Department. James Canavan briefed the Reserves on the Emergency Detention Program as it appears in the Attorney General's portfolio. No figures were given to the Reserves at this time. The Reserves were cleared for "Top Secret" and Rogers was aware of the briefing.

Assistant Attorney General Tompkins arrived at the site on the noon of Monday, the 15th, and left with the Reserves on noon of the 16th. Tompkins did not participate in the briefings. The Justice Department did not prepare any exercise problems for this Alert. Outside of briefing the Executive Reserves, the Alert was only used to give the division personnel of the Department who had not participated in the previous Alerts an opportunity to go up to the Justice relocation site and acquaint themselves with the operation. As Airhart observed, as far as Justice was concerned, Operation Alert 1957 was a complete flop in every area, including communications, pointing out that between Friday, the 12th, and Monday, the 15th, the communications staff

JJD:hke

(5)

1-Mr. Belmont 1-Mr. Winnich
1-Mr. Daunt 1-Liaison Section

RECORDED - 1

66-19009-143

JUL 23 1957

55 JUL 25 1957

Memorandum from Mr. Roach to Mr. Belmont
RE: BUPLANS - OPERATION ALERT 1957

was hardly able to test its capability, having received a mere total of 46 messages. One Executive Reserve observed that the Reserves had come from all sections of the country, including California, and that if a situation exists such as pictured during Operation Alert 1957, the Reserves would be unable to travel to the Department's relocation site. It was suggested that local attorneys be selected and briefed as Executive Reserves.

INS, whose site is located across the street from the Justice site in Martinsburg City Hall, was represented by Allan Cothrell between the 12th and 15th. On the 15th, General Howard arrived at the site and left on the morning of the 16th. INS worked very few test problems on Monday and Tuesday.

ACTION:

None. For your information.

MS Guil
G
JHR
✓
7-5

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. BELMONT

DATE: July 19, 1957

FROM : MR. R. R. ROACH

SUBJECT: OPERATION ALERT 1957
(CONCLUDING SUMMARY)

Tolson _____
 Nichols _____
 Boardman _____
 Belmont _____
 Mason _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
 Rosen _____
 Tamm _____
 Nease _____
 Winterrowd _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holloman _____
 Gandy _____

Reference is made to the memorandum from Mr. Belmont to the Director dated July 17, 1957, in which it was reported that a concluding and final summary memorandum concerning Operation Alert 1957 would be prepared covering the activities at the Bureau's site on July 18 and 19, 1957. Operation Alert concluded at 12 noon, July 19, 1957, Eastern Standard Time. By amended instructions received from the Office of Defense Mobilization on 7/17/57, all agencies were permitted to discontinue their communications operations at noon. (We had been previously instructed to keep communications open until 5:00 p.m., EST). There follows a summary of activities for the above-mentioned period.

RELEASE OF PERSONNEL

On 7/18/57, three additional persons were released from the relocation staff, one from the Records and Communications Division and two from the Communications Staff. Total personnel on duty at the close of business on 7/18/57 were 18. On the morning of 7/19/57, five additional personnel were released from the Communications Section, leaving a total at the relocation site at the time it was closed (12 noon on 7/19/57) of 13 people as follows:

Domestic Intelligence Division	2	Laboratory Division	2
Communications Section	8	Records Section	1

RRR:chb
(11):

cc - Mr. Nichols
 cc - Mr. Mohr
 cc - Mr. Parsons
 cc - Mr. Tamm
 cc - Mr. Holloman
 cc - Mr. Belmont
 cc - Mr. Baumgardner
 cc - Mr. Bland
 cc - Mr. Roach
 cc - Mr. Minnich

RECORDED - 9
 EX-110

66-19009-144
 JUL 23 1957

55 JUL 25 1957

Memorandum to Mr. Belmont from Mr. R.R. Roach
Re: Operation Alert 1957
(Concluding Summary)

July 19, 1957

In addition to the relocation site personnel we released Liaison Agent Kuhrtz, assigned to the State Department, on the afternoon of 7/18/57. Liaison Agent Bates, as previously arranged, returned from Washington to the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) relocation site at 2:42 p.m. on July 18, 1957. At the conclusion of the AEC briefing at 5:00 p.m., Bates returned to Washington.

OFFICE OF DEFENSE MOBILIZATION (ODM) REPORTS

Our final exercise progress and evaluation report was transmitted to ODM via teletype at 3:35 p.m. on 7/18/57. The information contained in this report is the same as covered in your memorandum to the Director dated July 17, 1957, which touched upon personnel on duty 7/15-18/57, at national and field level, estimated out-of-pocket cost of exercise (\$4588.25) and the fact that we were in a high state of readiness to meet the situation, both pre-attack and post-attack. In addition, by teletype dated 7/19/57, we certified to ODM pursuant to their instructions the destruction of their document number SSC 6389. This document pertained to the International and world situation which was used for assumptions in Operation Alert 1957. The information used was considered restricted and thus the reason ODM desired it destroyed after the test. Our daily communications reports to ODM were filed on the evening of 7/18/57, and at noon (conclusion of the exercise) on 7/19/57.

LIAISON

During the last two days of Operation Alert, 1957, July 18-19, 1957, there were two Bureau liaison Agents assigned to other agencies. Agent Kuhrtz at the Department of State and Agent Whaley at ODM. These Agents reported that activities at State and ODM had begun to taper off by noon, July 18, 1957.

Although there was still activity of interest to the Bureau going on at ODM, Kuhrtz reported from State that Under Secretary of State Herter had arrived on 7/18/57, attended briefings and lectures and returned to Washington on the afternoon of July 18, 1957.

Memorandum to Mr. Belmont from Mr. R.R. Roach

Re: Operation Alert 1957
(Concluding Summary)

July 19, 1957

After the return of Herter to Washington, State started shutting down on their operations but remained open until noon, 7/19/57. At the conclusion of Herter's visit, there being no further activity of interest to the Bureau, Agent Kuhrtz was instructed to return to Washington on the afternoon of July 18, 1957.

In view of the continued need for contacts with ODM from the Bureau's relocation site, Agent Whaley remained at ODM until the end of the operation. He returned to Washington on the afternoon of July 19, 1957.

Agent Bates, who attended a briefing at the AEC site at 3:00 p.m. on 7/18/57, returned to Washington at 5:00 p.m. on the same date.

NOTICE TO THE FIELD

SAC Letter 57-22(e), pertaining to Operation Alert 1957, instructed the field to resume normal operations as of 12 noon, EST, July 19, 1957. In view of this, and the fact that previous instructions had been sent concerning field radio operations, no further notification to the field was necessary to terminate field participation in Operation Alert 1957.

OUTSIDE PROBLEMS

Subsequent to the last report to the Director dated July 17, 1957, the following problems from outside agencies were received and handled:

At 4:52 p.m., July 17, 1957, a teletype was received from the General Services Administration (GSA) requesting that all agencies advise the number of vehicles of all descriptions on hand and the number of available vehicles for reassignment to the Inter-Departmental Motor Vehicle Pool. It was further requested that any requirements for vehicles by agencies be made known to GSA supported by priority claim. In answer to this request, a teletype was sent to GSA on July 17, 1957, advising them that we had no vehicles available for reassignment and no additional vehicles were being requested.

Memorandum to Mr. Belmont from Mr. R.R. Roach
Re: Operation Alert 1957
(Concluding Summary)

July 19, 1957

At 7:33 p.m., July 17, 1957, a teletype was received from the Inter-Agency Communications Branch of ODM, inquiring of the Bureau and a number of other agencies whether the Bureau had experienced difficulties during Operation Alert with the mobile radio telephone. ODM desired to know particularly the number of attempts of placing a call with no contact made with ODM Control Center. In answer to this reply, a teletype classified Confidential was sent to ODM on the morning of 7/18/57, advising that the mobile radio telephone was not placed in service during the exercise due to previously reported difficulties in making contacts enroute to the relocation site. This message to ODM was coordinated with the Administrative Division.

On the morning of July 18, 1957, we received a teletype from the Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA), Region 2, in which they duplicated a previous request made of the Bureau concerning alleged sabotage of a chlorine storage facility at Charleston, West Va., and that sabotage was suspected. The message contained a request for investigation. In view of the fact that this was a repeat of an identical request from FCDA on 7/14/57, they were advised of the duplication and that our teletype of 7/14/57, to them had pointed out that the leakage in the chlorine storage facility was due to structural failure in the storage tank with no evidence of sabotage and that therefore no further investigation in the matter was being conducted.

On 7/18/57, the Denver Office reported a contact made with this office by a representative of the Rocky Mountain Arsenal to the effect that the local officials at the Arsenal had located a suspected sabotage nuclear device located in the Flatiron Plant, five miles west of Loveland, Colorado; further that a downed enemy aircraft with a suspected nuclear device aboard had been located 64 miles west of Denver. The Arsenal representative informed the Denver Office that members of the explosives ordnance disposal unit were proceeding to the Flatiron Power Plant and arrangements were made for Agents of the Denver Office to meet this unit at the site. The disposal unit will disarm the weapon and the Denver Office will instigate investigation concerning sabotage. With reference to the downed enemy aircraft,

Memorandum to Mr. Belmont from Mr. R.R. Roach
Re: Operation Alert 1957
(Concluding Summary)

July 19, 1957

necessary military agencies have been informed both by the Rocky Mountain Arsenal and by the Bureau in Denver. Denver simulated contact with the 4602 Air Command Intelligence Service Squadron at Ent Air Force Base, Colorado. In view of the fact that Denver did not indicate they were maintaining close liaison with the 4602 Air Command Intelligence Service Squadron to determine whether civilian personnel may be aboard the downed enemy aircraft, they were instructed to make certain that close liaison was carried out with the Air Force so that the Denver Office would be promptly informed should enemy civilian personnel be present with espionage, sabotage or subversive activities missions. Denver was instructed to simulate the action taken with no reply necessary to the Bureau.

On the morning of July 19, 1957, there was received at the relocation site a request from the Director of the Office of Emergency Resources asking that certain information be supplied concerning the machine print-outs of damage summaries supplied by ODM during the exercise. These summaries have to do with bomb damage, fallout and personnel casualties. ODM requested that a written reply be submitted not later than July 26, 1957, to H. Burke Horton, Director, National Damage Assessment Center, ODM, Executive Office of the President, Washington, D.C. This request was telephonically supplied to the Laboratory who will take appropriate action.

EXPANDED MEETING OF THE CABINET
JULY 19, 1957

On the afternoon of July 18, 1957, we received a message from the White House Liaison Office at Highpoint which confirmed an expanded Cabinet meeting scheduled for 11:00 a.m., July 19, 1957, at the White House.

The Director was invited to attend and confirmation was requested of acceptance by telephonic notification to the White House Liaison Office. Calls to be made to Auburn (ODM), extensions 532 or 533. This information was furnished to the Bureau at 3:00 p.m., 7/18/57, with advice that if the Director approved, we would notify the White House Liaison Office that the Director would attend. The Director approved and at 4:45 p.m., I called Auburn on extension 532, which is the White House Liaison Office and advised that the Director would attend.

Memorandum to Mr. Belmont from Mr. R.R. Roach

Re: Operation Alert 1957

(Concluding Summary)

July 19, 1957

COMMUNICATIONS

There are set forth below figures showing the final totals of all messages sent and received at the relocation site during the test Alert:

	Incoming	Outgoing	Total
Radiograms	266	259	525
Teletypes	647	414	1061
Telephone	309	339	648
Code Groups	40,602	8369	48,971

The total cost of messages emanating from Quantico was \$62.05, consisting of \$19.90 for teletype charges to field offices and \$42.15 for telephone toll messages.

CONCLUSION

This memorandum concludes the reporting on Operation Alert 1957, from the Bureau's relocation site. As above-indicated, the Bureau ceased activities at the site at 12 noon, Eastern Standard Time, July 19, 1957. No further reports are required and no further instructions are necessary to the field.

Office Memorandum, UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: July 19, 1957

FROM : Mr. R. R. Roach

SUBJECT: OPERATION ALERT 1957
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Tolson _____
 Nichols _____
 Boardman _____
 Belmont _____
 Mason _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
 Rosen _____
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 Winterrowd _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holloman _____
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The Liaison Agent accompanied the [] personnel to that agency's relocation site in Warrenton, Virginia, on Monday, July 15, 1957. The Liaison Agent returned to Washington, D. C., on July 16, 1957.

In 1956, approximately 700 [] employees were involved in the Alert exercises. This year about one-third of that number took part in the operation. [] did not become engaged in any problems and practically all activity at the relocation site was restricted to briefings of a planning nature. The personnel involved held discussions concerning the potential needs for money, personnel, facilities, etc., in the event of an emergency. The Liaison Agent was treated courteously and no questions were posed involving the Bureau.

The National Security Council (NSC) was represented at the [] site by Russell Ash and Patrick Coyne. There was no Bureau of the Budget representative present. As of July 16, 1957, none of the top [] officials appeared. The Liaison Agent did not note any significant change in the equipment or facilities at the [] site.

It was significant that the Liaison Agent heard many comments among the employees at the working level, such as "Operation Alert is a waste of time;" "The time spent at relocation could better be employed in more positive work;" "The Operation is a boondoggle." Numerous comments were made to the effect that Operation Alert exercises were being handled in a manner which did not touch on reality. For example, it was pointed out that under actual emergency conditions it was most doubtful that all of the designated personnel would ever arrive at the relocation site.

ACTION:

None. For your information.

SJP:bjt (5) bjt

1 - Mr. Belmont

1 - Mr. Minnich

Liaison Section

Mr. Roach

55

JUL 23 1957

RECORDED - 9

JUL 23 1957

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. BOARDMAN *SPD 7-22-57*

DATE: July 17, 1957

FROM : MR. BELMONT *W*SUBJECT: *15* FOOD SERVICE
RELOCATION SITE
OPERATION ALERT, 1957

Tolson	_____
Nichols	_____
Boardman	_____
Belmont	_____
Mason	_____
Mohr	_____
Parsons	_____
Rosen	_____
Tamm	_____
Nease	_____
Winterrowd	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holloman	_____
Gandy	_____

W

to

The Cleaves Food Service Corporation catered the meals served at the relocation site during Operation Alert, 1957. The employees of this corporation went out of their way to provide excellent food and service during this period, even to the extent of providing a huge cake and coffee and decorating the dining room to celebrate the birthday of two of the clerical employees which added greatly to the high morale existing at the relocation site.

SAC Sloan concurs in the recommendation that letters of appreciation be sent to Ward B. Cleaves, President, Cleaves Food Service Corporation, Thomas C. May, Manager, Mr. David L. Butler, Assistant Manager, George Henderson, Chef, and Benny Nugent, Head Waiter.

ACTION:

If approved, the enclosed letters of appreciation should be sent to the above-named individuals.

Enclosures *sent 7-19-57*

cc: Mr. Boardman
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Minnich
Mr. Sloan

JB from 215

HLS:chb *W*

(6)

RECORDED - 71

INDEXED - 71

EX-131

66-19009-146
24 JUL 23 1957

153
61 JUL 25 1957

2 *for*

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

DATE: July 11, 1957

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: DEFENSE PLANS - OPERATION ALERT 1957
ESTIMATE OF COST

In connection with our participation in Operation Alert 1957, we are required to transmit to Office of Defense Mobilization from our relocation site via teletype no later than 5:30 p.m., EST, 7/18/57 an estimate of our out-of-pocket cost for Operation Alert 1957, which is to include travel, per diem and relocation facility operational costs. Salaries of personnel are not to be included.

SAC Letter 57-37 (3) instructed field offices to submit such an estimate to reach Administrative Division no later than 5 p.m., EST, 7/16/57.

Regarding relocation site and Seat of Government estimate of costs, SAC Sloan has been advised of the requirement concerning estimate of cost and he has advised he will prepare such an estimate for transmittal to the Administrative Division. Mr. Lou Wherry, Communications Section, has been advised and will prepare an estimate of communications cost for transmittal to Administrative Division. Mr. Jackson of the Administrative Division advises he prepared the estimate of cost for Operation Alert 1956 and for purposes of figuring estimate of cost for Operation Alert 1957, in addition to the information from Mr. Sloan and Mr. Wherry, he needs a list of participating personnel. Also he should be advised upon the release of any personnel from our relocation site or the return of Liaison Agents from the sites of other agencies. Attached to each tickler of this memorandum is such list.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That SAC Sloan no later than 8 a.m., 7/17/57, transmit through Mr. Belmont at relocation site to the Administrative Division, attention Mr. Jackson, the required estimate of cost.

Enclosure

- 1 - Mr. Nichols (Attention Mr. Wherry - with enclosure)
- 1 - Mr. Boardman (with enclosure)
- 1 - Mr. Belmont (with enclosure)
- 1 - Mr. Mohr (Attention Mr. Jackson - with enclosure)
- 1 - Mr. Tamm (Attention Mr. Sloan - with enclosure)
- 1 - Mr. Parsons (with enclosure)
- 1 - Mr. Baumgardner (with enclosure)
- 1 - Mr. Bland (with enclosure)
- 1 - Mr. Branigan (with enclosure)
- 1 - Section (with enclosure)
- 1 - Mr. Minnich (with enclosure)

24 JUL 24 1957

64 JUL 26 1957

Memorandum Belmont to Boardman

RE: DEFENSE PLANS - OPERATION ALERT 1957
ESTIMATE OF COST

(2) That Mr. Wherry of the Communications Section no later than 8 a.m., 7/17/57, transmit through Mr. Belmont at relocation site to the Administrative Division, attention Mr. Jackson, the required estimate of cost.

(3) That the Defense Plans Coordinator at the relocation site be immediately advised of the release of any personnel, including Liaison Agents departing sites of other agencies, which information will in turn be immediately furnished to Mr. Jackson of the Administrative Division.

[Handwritten signatures and initials]
R J
J
A
S
V
G.H.

OPERATION ALERT 1957
PARTICIPATING PERSONNEL

I. Personnel Departing for Relocation Site - 9:00 a.m., 7/11/57

Ambrose, Mary P.
Foster, Mildred
Frank, Alvin C.
Mooney, Nancy A.

Price, Charles E.
Strickland, Clyde E.
Van Slyke, Marie M.
Wassink, Miriam B.

II. Personnel Departing for Relocation Site - 5:30 p.m., 7/11/57

Roach, R. R.
Rushing, T. D.

III. Personnel Departing for Relocation Site - 9:30 a.m., 7/12/57

Arnette, Casey W.
Atkins, Caroline C.
Baumgardner, F. J.
Belmont, Alan H.
Bibler, P. R.
Bland, J. F.
Bowie, Barbara
Branigan, W. A.
Brown, J. W.
Burd, Miles T.
Cox, P. L.
Dale, Martha
DeLoach, C. D.
Donohue, J. D.
Downing, C. F.
Elkins, Kenneth

Ferguson, Helen T.
Gallagher, J. F.
Graves, Theresa M.
Haines, Shirley K.
Hall, Theola S.
Heilman, W. R.
Huelskamp, B. L.
Keough, Mary E.
Lawson, Harold W.
Levecque, Catherine N.
Lewis, Lorena
Marshall, Jean Hope
Martis, Helen
McCord, Ruth
Medler, O. G.
Micer, Peggy

Millen, R. L.
Minnich, J. T.
Murphy, R. Stairit
Parsons, Donald J.
Pfafman, R. F.
Richardson, Fay
Schemmel, John R.
Sutton, B. L.
Thomas, H. Joann
Tweedon, Mildred
Ulmer, Ernest B.
Wannall, W. A.
Wherry, Louis E., Jr.
Whitson, L.
Wielkiewicz, Rose M.
Wyrick, Elise W.

66-19009-147
ENCLOSURE

IV. Liaison Agents at Other Agency Sites

<u>Agency</u>	<u>Relocation Site</u>	<u>Liaison Agent</u>	<u>Date Agent Arrives at Site</u>	<u>Means of Transportation</u>	<u>Per Diem Claimed</u>
Atomic Energy Commission	Quantico	C.W. Bates	7/15/57	Bureau Car	No
ACSI - G-2	Fort Bragg, N.C.	D.J. Sullivan	7/11/57	Train - GTR (\$10.40 one way)	Yes
CIA	Warrenton Training Center, Warrenton, Va.	S.J. Papich	7/15/57	Private (No cost to Bureau)	No
Dept. of Defense	Fort Richie, Md.	G.A. Day	7/12/57	Bureau Car	No
Dept of Justice and INS	Martinsburg, W. Va.	J.J. Daunt	7/12/57	Bureau Car	Yes
ODM	HIGHPOINT Bluemont, Va.	W.T. Whaley	7/12/57	Bureau Car	Yes
State Dept.	U.S. Beef Cattle Research Station Front Royal, Va.	M.W. Kuhrtz	7/15/57	Bureau Car	Yes
White House	Camp David, Md.	O.H. Bartlett	7/12/57	Bureau Car	Yes

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

Mr. Tolson	✓
Mr. Nichols	✓
Mr. Boardman	✓
Mr. Belmont	✓
Mr. Mohr	✓
Mr. Parsons	✓
Mr. Rosen	✓
Mr. Tamm	✓
Mr. Trotter	✓
Mr. Nease	✓
Tele. Room	✓
Mr. Holloman	✓
Miss Gandy	✓

July 18, 1957

Dear Mr. Hoover:

I want to thank you and your associates for the many courtesies and the hospitality shown me during my recent visit to the site of the Federal Bureau of Investigation "Operation Alert, 1957" relocation exercises.

Although I had been pretty well forewarned by "Inspector" Boleyn through his reports of the fine job done in past exercises, I still was not fully prepared for what I observed. Despite any reservations which one might have had concerning the basic assumptions of the exercise, there was never a question about the dedication of participating staff carrying out the FBI mission. Al Belmont and his relocation staff are to be congratulated on the effectiveness of their operation. The status of advance planning was also noteworthy.

Again, thanks for a most interesting and informative experience.

Sincerely,



J. J. Eigenmann

Honorable J. Edgar Hoover
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Department of Justice
Washington 25, D. C.

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JUL 24 1957

EXP. PROC.

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EX-131

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July 19, 1957

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

125
Mr. Lawrence Benjamin Nugent
c/o FBI Academy
Quantico, Virginia

Dear Mr. Nugent:

I want to take this means of expressing my appreciation for the excellent service you rendered to our employees recently during the special exercises held at the FBI Academy.

I am sorry to hear that it was necessary for Mrs. Nugent to submit to surgery, and I hope that she will have a speedy recovery.


Sincerely yours,
J. Edgar Hoover

cc - Quantico (sent separately)

NOTE: Address per previous correspondence. Mrs. Nugent underwent surgery at Freedman's Hospital, Washington, D. C., recently and is reported well on the way to recovery. Nugent has been head waiter at the FBI Academy since its opening and has been a faithful and loyal employee.

Based on memorandum from Mr. Belmont to Mr. Boardman dated 7-17-57 re: Food Service, Relocation Site, Operation Alert, 1957. HLS:chb

HLS:chb:mhb RECORDED-42
(4)



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FBI
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Nichols _____
Boardman _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

5 JUL 25 1957

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: July 17, 1957

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: OPERATION ALERT 1957
EXPANDED CABINET MEETING AT WHITE HOUSE
11:00 A.M., JULY 19, 1957

Tolson _____
Boardman _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Harbo _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
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Gandy _____

This is a condensed summary reflecting the Bureau's operations at its relocation site covering the period from the time (all times Eastern Daylight Time) of the simulated alert within the Bureau at 9:30 a.m. on July 12, through July 17, 1957. A detailed summary memorandum with attachments, including a memorandum to the Attorney General, was also submitted today.

For the Director's information, we are listing our observations first, followed by a brief resume' of the exercise.

OBSERVATIONS

(1) Once again, these Operation Alert exercises have made it crystal clear that proper timing of the initiation of our emergency programs, particularly the Emergency Detention Program and the program involving protective custody of enemy diplomatic officials, is necessary if these programs are to serve their maximum purpose. For example, in the current exercises, Government agencies were relocated on the morning of July 12, 1957, based on a presumed 2-hour notice that an attack had been launched on the United States. As a result, while we received almost immediate authority for these

AHB:LL *ll*

(11)

cc--Mr. Nichols
cc--Mr. Mohr
cc--Mr. Parsons
cc--Mr. Tamm
cc--Mr. Holloman
cc--Mr. Belmont
cc--Mr. Baumgardner
cc--Mr. Bland
cc--Mr. Roach
cc--Mr. Minnich

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24 JUL 24 1957

EX-131

*Henry J. Tolson,
Parsons,
Belmont
7-23-57
JH:K*

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Memorandum to the Director from Mr. Belmont

Re: OPERATION ALERT 1957

Expanded Cabinet Meeting at White House - 11 a. m., 7/19/57

two emergency programs, from a practical standpoint our Agents in the field would not have been able to do more than initiate the programs before the bombs fell. Maximum benefits under these programs will be derived only if they are authorized sufficiently in advance of an attack for them to be properly executed. If executed as far as possible in advance of an actual attack, they will (1) prevent communist Security Index subjects from committing sabotage just prior to or simultaneous with an attack; (2) prevent communist Security Index subjects from flooding the country with anti-American propaganda; (3) prevent communist Security Index subjects who are labor leaders in such major unions as the United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America and the International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers from calling strikes in essential industries; (4) determine through searches whether any nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction (chemical or biological) are concealed in enemy diplomatic premises; (5) disrupt espionage channels of communications and transfer of funds; and (6) present the opportunity of obtaining positive intelligence, possibly of an impending attack, by interrogating Security Index subjects after they are arrested and from possible defectors among diplomats taken into protective custody.

It is, of course, recognized that the President must carefully consider all of the factors before authorizing these programs, in view of the far-reaching effect once the programs are put into operation. Nevertheless, the benefits to be derived by timing the programs to obtain the maximum results are such as to require a most careful study of developments such as those depicted in the build-up to the actual attack as set forth under the terms of Operation Alert 1957.

(2) Insofar as the FBI is concerned, this Operation, lasting from July 12 through July 19, was far too long. We thoroughly tested our communications and emergency facilities, operations and planning within two days. Keeping in mind that the primary purpose of this test exercise is to test our ability to perform during an emergency, the 5-day period from July 15 through July 19 was a waste of time from our standpoint. The other agencies, beginning on July 15, tested their abilities to perform services for people in bombed-out areas,

Memorandum to the Director from Mr. Belmont

Re: OPERATION ALERT 1957

Expanded Cabinet Meeting at White House - 11 a.m., 7/19/57

such as providing food, shelter, medical aid, et cetera, and carrying out governmental functions after a nuclear attack. These activities are outside the scope of our responsibility and there is no necessity for us to participate in this portion of an alert program.

If you agree, we will carefully, but discreetly, explore the possibility that in future alert exercises the FBI carry out its portion of the alert by a hard-hitting 2 or 3-day simulated program and then get out and get back to our work.

(3) The entire Operation Alert at Quantico went smoothly. Equipment was very adequate. No difficulty with other agencies. Field offices handled problems efficiently under central direction from Quantico. Spirit, attitude, and competence of Bureau personnel at Quantico excellent.

RELOCATION - JULY 12, 1957

Within 7 minutes of our simulated alert at 9:30 a.m., all 187 persons scheduled for relocation in an emergency were accounted for and checked off.

Bureau bus left at 9:38 a.m. and arrived at Quantico at 10:27 a.m. All 59 employees relocated to Quantico arrived by 10:37 a.m.

Quantico was operational at 10:30 a.m., one hour after the alert sounded; and Justice relocation and Highpoint were so notified. The simulated bombing started at 12 noon (11 a.m. Eastern Standard Time).

Memorandum to the Director from Mr. Belmont

Re: OPERATION ALERT 1957

Expanded Cabinet Meeting at White House - 11 a. m., 7/19/57

SCHEDULED PROBLEMS

Seventy-three problems were worked with our field offices, designed to thoroughly test our communications system, both here at the relocation site and in the field, with particular emphasis on the use of our radio system. As the problems required intercommunication between field offices, relocation sites and resident agencies, as well as field office contacts with outside agencies, and all contained the time factor, they resulted in a widespread check of the alertness and speed of response of our field personnel and the capability of our communications system.

The Emergency Detention Program was authorized by the Department at 10:50 a. m. and launched at 10:55 a. m. All offices were contacted by 12:09 p. m. and replies received back from all offices by 1:43 p. m. Theoretically, we arrested all subjects on the Security Index (13, 222) except those killed by bombing.

Authorization was received from State Department at 10:44 a. m. to initiate program to take enemy officials into protective custody. Problem was launched at 10:47 a. m. and replies received from the field by 11:54 a. m. Diplomats involved: New York - 306 Soviets and 172 satellites; Washington Field - 303 Soviet and 291 satellites; grand total - 1, 072 (as compared with 852 in Operation Alert 1956).

Other problems worked involved arrest of enemy agents landing by submarine, sabotage, espionage, et cetera. The Laboratory staged problems involving emergency equipment, simulated breakdowns of equipment, et cetera. Field offices found to have good understanding of emergency equipment.

OUTSIDE PROBLEMS

Through 3:00 p. m., July 17, we had received a total of 18 problems from other agencies requiring action by us. This represents a distinct drop from the 41 problems we encountered last year. We handled these problems promptly, replying to other agencies where

Memorandum to the Director from Mr. Belmont

Re: OPERATION ALERT 1957

Expanded Cabinet Meeting at White House - 11 a.m., 7/19/57)

necessary. Problems included sabotage, capture of Russian military airplane crew, submission of names for Censorship Watch List, looting of Federal Reserve bank in Albany, disruptive tactics by subversive groups, and alleged compromise of security at Roanoke, Virginia. Summary of each problem attached to over-all summary memorandum submitted on July 17, 1957.

AVAILABILITY CHECKS

We conducted availability checks in 19 offices, involving over 2,800 Agents. All offices contacted their Agents within the hour except Kansas City (42 Agents), which required 1 hour and 7 minutes. The shortest time for a small office was 5 minutes (Butte - 6 Agents); medium office, 21 minutes (Philadelphia - 83 Agents); large office, 28 minutes (Los Angeles - 220 Agents). Censure recommended for Special Agent in Charge, Kansas City.

IMPORTANT PROCLAMATIONS AND EXECUTIVE ORDERS

We recorded as an attachment to our over-all summary memorandum submitted July 17 a summary of the numerous proclamations and executive orders issued during the exercise, setting into operation emergency measures. One of the proclamations authorized the protective custody of enemy diplomats. Another suspended the writ of habeas corpus for 60 days. No mention was made of our Emergency Detention Program, in accordance with previous arrangements with the Department of Justice.

COMMUNICATIONS

Radio is less susceptible to bombing than telephone or teletype. For dual reasons of economy and to thoroughly test our radio network, emphasis was placed on radio. Found to be highly effective and rapid. Teletype, telephone and microwave also were thoroughly tested. Communications at Quantico were highly effective and we could have handled even greater volume than we did.

Memorandum to the Director from Mr. Belmont

Re: OPERATION ALERT 1957

Expanded Cabinet Meeting at White House - 11 a.m., 7/19/57

LIAISON

Liaison Agents relocated with their agencies as follows:
July 12 - Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM) at Bluemont, Virginia; G-2 at Fort Bragg, North Carolina; Defense at Fort Ritchie; Justice at Martinsburg, and White House at Camp David; July 15 - Atomic Energy Commission at Quantico; Central Intelligence Agency at Warrenton, and State Department at Front Royal. Agents were released and returned to Washington during course of exercise as activity permitted. Value and effectiveness of liaison arrangement again demonstrated by cutting red tape, ironing out problems, and furnishing advance information of value. Ranking officials expressed appreciation for Director's designation of Agents to relocation sites.

BOMB DAMAGE AND FALLOUT

Information furnished by field offices regarding bomb damage and fallout, provided by radiograms, furnished prompt and accurate data prior to usable information from Civil Defense or Office of Defense Mobilization. Based on simulated attack, if Bureau personnel had not relocated, 8,806 would have been killed and 1,004 injured, for a total of 9,810 out of total Bureau personnel of 13,446. This casualty figure would include 3,408 Agents. Estimated these casualties would be cut in half if 2 or 3-hour warning allowed partial evacuation.

Forty-six field offices were damaged or affected by fallout to extent they were unusable. Quantico was not affected. No field office relocation site was damaged; 10 were affected by fallout, 5 sufficiently to require moving them.

INSPECTOR

Mr. Joseph Eigenmann, Bureau of Budget, was briefed in detail regarding Bureau emergency operations while at Quantico from July 12 through July 14.

Memorandum to the Director from Mr. Belmont

Re: OPERATION ALERT 1957

Expanded Cabinet Meeting at White House - 11 a. m., 7/19/57

COST FIGURES AND PERSONNEL ESTIMATES

Estimated out-of-pocket cost of Operation Alert 1957 to the FBI, as furnished to ODM on July 18, totaled \$4,588.25. Broken down as to field offices (travel, per diem, communications, supplies, et cetera), \$2,043.16, and Seat of Government (communications, supplies, per diem, travel), \$2,545.09.

Out-of-pocket communications cost at Quantico was held to \$102.75. It is noted that salaries of participating personnel are not included in these figures, as they were not requested by ODM. However, we utilized considerably less personnel than last year, both at Quantico and in the Field, as we cut down to the minimum.

Out-of-pocket costs estimated in 1956 were \$7,706.52, as compared with \$4,588.25 in 1957, a savings of \$3,118.27.

Personnel in the field and at the Bureau relocation site at start of exercise, July 12, estimated at 398, including radio personnel and field relocation personnel. By the evening of July 16, this had been cut to an estimated 150 as a result of release of personnel from Quantico, field relocation sites and field radio stations.

PERSONNEL

Of the 59 employees (a marked reduction over the 76 in 1956) who had relocated to Quantico on July 12, we had released 38 by the afternoon of July 17, leaving a balance of 21, fifteen of whom were communications personnel required to man communications equipment on a 24-hour basis. Once again, our employees approached this entire exercise in a businesslike, serious manner; worked long hours, including week end; exhibited a fine attitude, and promptly and effectively handled the work. Services and security by Quantico staff were excellent. List of personnel submitted July 17, 1957.

Memorandum to the Director from Mr. Belmont

Re: OPERATION ALERT 1957

Expanded Cabinet Meeting at White House - 11 a.m., 7/19/57

DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED

(1) Temporary delays due to normal equipment difficulties immediately reported and repaired. These were not the fault of the Bureau and caused no delay as we could utilize other lines of communication. Backlog occurred during peak loads in coding at Quantico and moving traffic from radio station at Midland to Quantico. Equipment is adequate and this can be remedied by additional personnel or sending routine messages uncoded during an emergency. No action necessary.

(2) Undesirable delay in availability check for Kansas City Office. Separate memorandum submitted recommending censure.

(3) Radio operator at Richmond Office called to hospital on emergency annual leave on July 15, leaving no operator. This points up the fact that in some of our offices we have only one trained radio operator. Referred to Administrative Division for analysis and whether remedial action is feasible or desirable at this time.

(4) Volume of traffic between Quantico and Midland radio station required use of both commercial land line teletype and Bureau radio teletype circuit, as neither could have handled the traffic alone. Bureau contemplates discontinuing commercial land line teletype after Operation Alert 1957. Records and Communications Division submitting a separate memorandum for reconsideration as to discontinuance of this line.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendations are attached to the over-all summary submitted July 17, 1957.

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BY COURIER SERVICE

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EX-126

66-19009-151

Date: July 15, 1957

To: Lieutenant General M. H. Silverthorn
(USMC Retired)
Assistant to the Director for Plans
and Readiness
Office of Defense Mobilization
Washington 25, D. C.

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
SUBJECT: OPERATION ALERT 1957
FELLOWSHIP OF RECONCILIATION

This will confirm information orally furnished on July 11, 1957, to Mr. Innes Harris of the Office of Defense Mobilization and to Mr. Earl Lane of the Atomic Energy Commission by Special Agent Orrin H. Bartlett of this Bureau.

A confidential source who has furnished reliable information in the past has advised that the Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR) had organized a demonstration scheduled for July 12, 1957, between the hours of 11 a.m., and 2 p.m., to protest "Operation Alert 1957." The demonstration was to be held in front of the City-County Building in Detroit, Michigan.

It was planned that an FOR pamphlet would be distributed stating there is no defense against nuclear attack and the A-bomb and H-bomb should be outlawed. It was reported that the proposed demonstration was announced in the June-July, 1957, issue of the FOR publication "Michigan FOR News" and similar FOR demonstrations were planned for New York City and elsewhere.

The Detroit Police Department was aware of the planned demonstration and ~~counteracted~~ to cover it.

36 JUL 16

COMM - FBI

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Nease _____
Winterrowd _____
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Gandy _____

59 JUL 29 1957

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Letter to Lieutenant General M. H. Silverthorn (USMC Retired)
Assistant to the Director for Plans
and Readiness
Office of Defense Mobilization

The FOR is a national organization founded in England in December, 1914, and extended to the United States in November, 1915, with headquarters in New York City. From its inception the organization has functioned as a semireligious socialist-pacifist group. The activities of the FOR have included opposition to peace-time conscription, advocacy of pacifism, the abolishment of Selective Service laws and poll taxes, campaigning for racial equality, the establishment of a permanent Fair Employment Practices Commission and opposition to the use of the atomic bomb.

Communism has been denounced by the FOR, but in December, 1955, that organization submitted a petition to President Eisenhower calling for a Christmas amnesty for sixteen persons convicted under the Smith Act. (100-16922-52)

1 - Captain John A. Taters
Director of Security
Atomic Energy Commission

BY COURIER SERVICE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mr. Tolson_____
Mr. Nichols_____
Mr. Boardman_____
Mr. Belmont_____
Mr. Mohr_____
Mr. Parsons_____
Mr. Rosen_____
Mr. Tamm_____
Mr. Trotter_____
Mr. Nease_____
Tele. Room_____
Mr. Holloman_____
Miss Gandy_____

F B I

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Date: July 10, 1957

Transmit the following message via AIRTEL
AIR MAIL - REGISTERED
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

SAC, DETROIT (100-6156)
DIRECTOR, FBI, Attention: Buplans Desk
FELLOWSHIP OF RECONCILIATION, IS-C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

Classified by SP8 JAL
Declassify on: OADR #084,706

CINAL. DE 604-S* advises that WILLIAM ALLAN and HELEN WINTER
(Detroit Smith Act Subjects) discussed a demonstration being
supported and organized by the FOR, scheduled for July 12, 1957,
between the hours of 11:00 a.m., to 2:00 p.m. (S) (U)

The demonstration will protest "Operation Alert, 1957." It will
be held in front of Detroit's City-County Building. It is
planned that an FOR pamphlet will be distributed, stating there is
no defense against a nuclear attack and that the A-bomb and H-bomb
should be outlawed.

(S) (U) ALLAN indicated to WINTER that he was reading about the proposed
demonstration from an article in the June - July 1957, issue of
the FOR publication, "Michigan FOR News".

Appropriate Detroit Police Department officials have been
apprised of planned demonstration as it appears in above-mentioned
publication. The PD plans to cover the demonstration.

(S) (U) ALLAN stated, according to the Informant, that similar FOR
demonstrations are planned for New York City and elsewhere. NO
further details were furnished.

④ - Bureau REGISTERED
Attn: Buplans Desk
2 - New York REGISTERED
5 - Detroit (100-6156)
(66-2276)
(100-807 - WILLIAM ALLAN)
(100-13740 - HELEN WINTER)
(100-25197)

ODM + AEC adv 7/11/57
by Bartlett
Confirming letter to be sent
11-19007-151
RECORDED - 77
EX-126

GBN:DK
(11)

AIRTEL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JUL 11 1957

a. Minnie

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 61-3415-670

~~TOP SECRET~~

cc Mr. Nichols Mr. Belmont
Mr. Tamm Mr. Roach
Mr. Holloman Mr. Baum-
Mr. Parsons gardner
Mr. Mohr Mr. Minnich

The Attorney General

July 18, 1957

Director, FBI

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 07-03-2018 BY [redacted] ADG

b6
b7C

OPERATION ALERT 1957

Downgraded to ~~SECRET~~
by [redacted] on 6/10/2016

Inasmuch as the activities of the FBI were largely concentrated in the first few days of Operation Alert 1957, I thought you would like to have a brief summary of our participation for the period July 12 through July 17, 1957.

At 9:30 A.M., July 12, we simulated an actual relocation alert within the Bureau. Within seven minutes, all employees scheduled for relocation were notified and accounted for, and thereafter, those to participate in this exercise at our relocation site departed within eight minutes of the sounding of the alert and arrived at our relocation site in less than an hour. Our relocation site became fully operational at 10:30 A.M. and the Department of Justice and Highpoint were so notified.

Our first step was to secure immediate authority for launching our emergency programs. At 10:44 A.M. the Department of State requested us to take into protective custody all enemy diplomats. The program was immediately launched on a simulated basis and successfully completed. It is interesting to note that, unlike the situation we encountered during Operation Alert 1956, the Department of State gave us immediate authority to launch this program. It would thus appear that the importance of reaching a prompt decision in this matter is now fully realized by the Department of State.

At 10:35 A.M., July 12, we requested a decision from the Department of Justice relocation site as to whether the Emergency Detention Program should be launched. At 10:56 A.M. Mr. William Foley, acting for the Attorney General, authorized the institution of this program, with the result that we simulated launching the program at once, utilizing radio, teletype, and telephone to issue instructions to our fifty-two field divisions. All field divisions had been reached by 12:09 P.M. and replies had been received back from all offices within

AHB:rmw
(13)

NOTE: (Enclosure to memo to Director from Mr. Belmont, 7/17/57, re "Operation Alert 1957, Summary Memorandum, July 12-17, 1957," AHB:LL.)

~~TOP SECRET~~

E R T

55 JUL 26 1957

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Tele. Room
Holloman
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JUL 18 1957
COMM - FBI

EX-126 RECORDED-12 66 1724-152

~~TOP SECRET~~

The Attorney General

two hours. The prompt authority by the Department of Justice enabled us to carry out this program with no delay.

Once again, these Operation Alert exercises have made it crystal clear that proper timing of the initiation of our emergency programs, particularly the Emergency Detention Program and the program involving protective custody of enemy diplomatic officials, is necessary if these programs are to serve their maximum purpose. For example, in the current exercises, Government agencies were relocated on the morning of July 12, 1957, based on a presumed two-hour notice that an attack had been launched on the United States. As a result, while we received almost immediate authority for these two emergency programs, from a practical standpoint, our Agents in the field would not have been able to do more than initiate the programs before the bombs fell. Maximum benefits under these programs will be derived only if they are authorized sufficiently in advance of an attack for them to be properly executed. If executed as far as possible in advance of an actual attack, they will (1) prevent communist Security Index subjects from committing sabotage just prior to or simultaneous with an attack; (2) prevent communist Security Index subjects from flooding the country with anti-American propaganda; (3) prevent communist Security Index subjects who are labor leaders in such major unions as the United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America and the International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers from calling strikes in essential industries; (4) determine through searches whether any nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction (chemical or biological) are concealed in enemy diplomatic premises; (5) disrupt espionage channels of communications and transfer of funds; and (6) present the opportunity of obtaining positive intelligence, possibly of an impending attack, by interrogating Security Index subjects after they are arrested and from possible defectors among diplomats taken into protective custody.

It is, of course, recognized that the President must carefully consider all of the factors before authorizing these programs in view of the far-reaching effect once the programs are put into operation. Nevertheless, the benefits to be derived by timing the programs to obtain the maximum results are such as to require a most careful study of developments such as those depicted in the build-up to the actual attack as set forth under the terms of Operation Alert 1957.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

The Attorney General

Seventy-three problems were prepared in advance of the test, simulating conditions which would face us at a relocation site in the event of an emergency. These problems were designed to thoroughly test our communications both at our relocation site and in the field, with particular emphasis on the use of our radio system. As the problems required intercommunication between field offices, relocation sites, and resident agencies, as well as field office contacts with outside agencies, and all contained the time factor, they resulted in a widespread check of the alertness and speed of response of our field personnel as well as the ability of our communications system.

As during past Operation Alert exercises, we received a number of problems from other agencies. These were handled promptly and, wherever necessary, replies were sent at once to the initiating agency.

You may be interested to know that as part of our preparedness test during this exercise, we required, on a surprise basis, more than one third of our field offices to contact all Special Agents on duty status in headquarters city and report to us the time required to accomplish this. All offices were able to contact all Agents in a surprisingly short time, usually in far less than an hour, the maximum time being one hour and seven minutes.

Our Liaison Agents again accompanied critical agencies to their relocation sites and were able to contribute materially to the success of the operation from the standpoint both of the agency involved and the Bureau. Ranking officials of these agencies freely expressed the opinion that the presence of our Agents materially assisted in solving any problems touching on the field of FBI activities.

Under conditions which would exist following an attack of the nature contemplated in Operation Alert 1957, telephone and teletype communication facilities would be destroyed or badly disrupted. To the contrary, study of the results of the attack reflected that radio contact could still be maintained. Because of this, we stressed the use of our radio network during this exercise. We found our radio to be highly effective. During the course of the exercise, our teletype, telephone, and microwave systems were all thoroughly tested and produced excellent results.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

The Attorney General

Insofar as the FBI is concerned, this exercise, lasting from July 12 through July 19, was far too long. We thoroughly tested our communications and emergency facilities, plans, and operations within two days. From a practical standpoint, a maximum of three days would be adequate for FBI participation in this type of exercise.

I wish to advise you that this Bureau approached and carried out Operation Alert 1957 with full seriousness of purpose not only in the planning stages but during the entire exercise. We carefully examined our procedures, planning, and organization to insure that we will be in a position to carry out our responsibilities to the fullest extent in the event of an emergency.

cc - Mr. William P. Rogers
Deputy Attorney General

- 4 -

~~TOP SECRET~~

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: July 22, 1957

FROM : Mr. R. R. Rosen

SUBJECT: ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
OPERATION ALERT 1957

Tolson	_____
Nichols	_____
Boardman	_____
Belmont	_____
Mason	_____
Mohr	_____
Parsons	_____
Rosen	_____
Tamm	_____
Nease	_____
Winterrowd	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holloman	_____
Gandy	_____

Liaison Agent Bates is a member of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) relocation cadre. Based on prior Bureau approval, Bates went to the AEC relocation site at Quantico, Virginia, on July 15, 1957, and returned to the Bureau on July 16, 1957. He returned to the AEC site on July 18, for the final briefing of the exercise. During the exercise the AEC operated with a staff of from 70 to 130 people. The main problem of the AEC was to furnish atomic weapons to the military and to maintain production of materials to be used in future weapons. According to the information furnished by the Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM), two of the AEC weapons storage sites were destroyed. These were at Rapid City, South Dakota, and Westover, Massachusetts. There were other operational difficulties at the storage sites at Spokane, Washington; Albuquerque, New Mexico, and Bosier Base, Louisiana. This was caused by fallout in the area, but AEC felt these sites would be operational in about 15 days. In the final review of the exercise, AEC felt that their production facilities had not been damaged to any extent and they were still in a position to produce atomic weapons during the exercise. The communications system at the site functioned smoothly and handled approximately 75,000 words per day, which is three times the daily average handled normally by the AEC headquarters in Washington. AEC feels that its cadre facilities and communications are adequate to continue AEC operations under such an emergency.

They did feel that one deficiency in the exercise was that no plans had been made by the AEC for the care of the families of the cadre members and that in this exercise the AEC field offices were not sufficiently involved to give a good assessment of what would happen in an actual alert.

As a general sum up, AEC pointed out that 85 U. S. cities were hit with a total of 168 atomic and hydrogen weapons. Total casualties were 50,000,000; 40% of American industry was destroyed; 20% of the electrical power outlets were lost; 40% of the petroleum industry was lost and it was estimated it would take 20 years to rebuild the U. S. to its position today.

ACTION:

RECORDED 57

JUL 25 1957

This is submitted for your information.

CWB: 59 JUL 29 1957

1 - Mr. Belmont	1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Minnich	1 - Mr. Bates

Liaison B

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont *Wohr*

DATE: July 15, 1957

FROM : Mr. R. R. Roach *R*SUBJECT: OPERATION ALERT - 1957
ESTIMATE OF COST

Tolson _____
Boardman _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Harbo _____
Wohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
 Sizoo _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

At 3:00 P.M. EST, July 15, 1957, in compliance with request from Bureau relocation site, SAC L. L. Laughlin, WFO, telephonically advised Supervisor Minnich that an estimate of costs for his office in connection with Operation Alert - 1957 is as follows:

Travel	\$ 7.84
Per diem	63.00
Transportation of things	0.00
Communication services	3.25
Other contractual services	0.00
Supplies	0.00
Equipment	<u>0.00</u>

Total cost-\$74.09

SAC Laughlin was advised that he need not submit confirmation of these figures to the Bureau as required by SAC Letter 57-37 (3).

ACTION:

Informative.

- 1 - Mr. Mohr (Attention: Mr. Jackson)
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Roach
- 1 - Mr. Minnich

JTM/pjm.
(5) *pjm*

RECORDED-42

24 JUL 26 1957

EX 105

39 JUL 31 1957

66-19009-154

3-*[signature]*/1957

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: July 23, 1957

FROM : MR. R. R. ROACH

SUBJECT: OPERATION ALERT - 1957
BLUEMONT, VIRGINIA
(OFFICE OF DEFENSE MOBILIZATION
RELOCATION SITE)

Tolson	_____
Nichols	_____
Boardman	_____
Belmont	_____
Mason	_____
Mohr	_____
Parsons	_____
Rosen	_____
Tamm	_____
Nease	_____
Winterrowd	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holloman	_____
Gandy	_____

Approximately 1200 civilian and military personnel at relocation exercise at High Point, Bluemont, Virginia, site of Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM). Liaison Representative arrived at site early morning July 12, 1957, and remained until 11:00 A.M., July 19, 1957. This exercise appeared to run smoothly and ODM had only minor problems and none that could be considered serious. Gordon Gray, the new Director of ODM, advised Bureau Representative that there were not as many communications between the relocating agencies in this operation as had been in the past since ODM wanted to cut down and wanted the messages to be fewer, but to be more in detail and as it worked out this had been very satisfactory. Gray was at the site every day, but almost every evening returned to Washington. The President visited the site for an hour and one half on July 15, 1957, and received a briefing on the exercise. Gray stated that the President appeared to be very pleased with the operation as a whole. There was a strong rumor going around that the President was concerned that the site was so visible from the air and that he had left explicit instructions that it should be completely camouflaged. Gray was advised that the Bureau relocation site was in operation as of 10:30 A.M., July 12, 1957, and he stated that he was pleased to hear that we had gone into operation so rapidly. There were no serious security problems, only the ones that have occurred in previous years, namely the revealing of the site's name "High Point" in various articles in Washington newspapers. Inasmuch as there are numerous newspapermen connected with this operation, security people are unable to stop these leaks. Bureau Liaison Representative had access to all facilities at the site and was courteously received and treated.

ACTION:

RECORDED-42

INDEXED-42

66-19009-155

This is submitted for your information JUL 25 1957

EX 103

WTW:jlh (5)

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Minnich
- 1 - Liaison Section
- 1 - Mr. Whaley

59 JUL 31 1957

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : D. J. Parsons *PJ*

DATE: 7-29-57

FROM : B. J. White *BOW*
*MM*SUBJECT: DATA FOR OPERATION ALERT 1957

The data relative to Operation Alert 1957 will be packaged and maintained in the Physics and Chemistry Section of the Laboratory for one year. This material will be destroyed following Operation Alert 1958.

ACTION: For information only.

JFG/RL
JFG:PT
(5) *P*

1 - Minnich

Tolson _____
Nichols _____
Boardman _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
Trotter _____
Nease _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

EX 105
RECORDED - 4

66-19009-156
18 JUL 30 1957

55 AUG 2 1957

Mr. Tolson	✓
Mr. Nichols	✓
Mr. Boardman	
Mr. Belmont	
Mr. Mohr	
Mr. Parsons	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Tamm	
Mr. Trotter	
Mr. Nease	
Tele. Room	
Mr. Holloman	
Miss Gandy	

The CLEAVES FOOD SERVICE CORPORATION

Industrial Restaurant Operators

8405 HAMSEY AVENUE • SILVER SPRING MARYLAND

WARD B. CLEAVES

JOHN J. CLEAVES
JULY 26 1957

July 26, 1957

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Hoover:

I and members of the staff of my company are deeply grateful as well as very proud to receive a letter such as you wrote me on July 19, 1957.

We hope that the Bureau will continue to be happy with our food service operation for many years to come.

Sincerely yours,

THE CLEAVES FOOD SERVICE CORPORATION

Ward B. Cleaves
Ward B. Cleaves
President

WBC:gl

EX-110

RECORDED - 91
INDEXED - 91

JUL 29 1957

*Copy to
Bulld 7-19-57
no ack*

25 AUG 2 1957

EXP. PROC.
JUL 29 1957
32

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: July 2, 1957

FROM : Mr. R. R. Roach

SUBJECT: DEFENSE PLANS - OPERATION ALERT 1957

On July 1, 1957, Mr. Bartlett of the Liaison Section attended a meeting of the Interagency Planning Group at the Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM). Mr. John Grady, ODM, Chairman of the Group, stated that no details are known as yet concerning the President's participation in Operation Alert 1957. Mr. Grady stated that a regular Cabinet meeting will be held on Friday, July 12, 1957, and that it is believed Operation Alert will be discussed in Cabinet in view of the fact that July 12 is the beginning of the three day Civil Defense portion of the test. Mr. Grady further advised that on Friday afternoon, July 19, 1957, a "Cabinet-type" meeting will be held which will be the close of the test exercise. The heads of participating agencies and their deputies who operated the relocation site during the test will attend this meeting. It would appear that the Director would not attend the July 12 meeting unless a special invitation is forthcoming; however, it is believed that the Director will be expected to attend the July 19 meeting, together with the Bureau official responsible for operating the Bureau's relocation site during the test exercise.

Mr. Grady advised that ODM has run into difficulty with their electronic computer. This is a massive electronic device located at ODM's relocation site at HIGHPOINT (Bluemont, Virginia). This device is capable of receiving damage assessment information from all over the country, together with prevailing winds at the moment and coming out with the answer as to what areas are radioactive. ODM has attempted to run tests on this device and found out that to obtain the answer desired it will take 56 hours and the answer will be in the form of a stack of paper 7½ feet high, the paper being 14" by 20". Mr. Grady said that the electronic computer was supposed to have the job completed so that ODM could have a sealed package at each relocation site at 8:00 a.m. on Monday, July 15, in order that the agencies could start the test; that in view of the time it takes the computer, this information would not be available until Tuesday night or Wednesday morning, at which time the test would be half over. Mr. Grady said that instead of using the winds of the moment, they will preset the device with winds of a typical July day and that this is the information that will be used for the test.

Mr. Grady further stated that for the Civil Defense portion of the test beginning July 12, the Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA) will furnish each agency over the communications circuit the

RECORDED-38

EX-126

66-19009-158
7 JUL 31 1957

1 - Mr. Boardman

1 - Mr. Belmont

1 - Mr. Branigan

1 - Mr. Nichols

1 - Mr. Parsons

1 - Liaison Section

1 - Mr. Bartlett

Tolson _____
Nichols _____
Boardman _____
Belmont _____
Mason _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
Nease _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____

Sloan

James

AKHB:bjt (8) hie
53 AUG 6 1957

LIAISON

RE: DEFENSE PLANS - OPERATION ALERT 1957

Mr. Grady further advised that on the morning of July 15, ODM will furnish each agency with a sealed envelope containing a scenario which will include: (1) the international situation; (2) the domestic situation which will show the economy of the United States at the beginning of the test and (3) a listing of all actions in force between the C situation and the D plus situation.

ACTION:

~~J.P.~~ J.P. ✓

Per [unclear] 7-15-57 11 AM [unclear]

Deputy Attorney General

July 10, 1957

William F. Tompkins, Assistant Attorney General
Internal Security Division

Relocation Staff for Operation Alert 1957

There follows a list of Departmental officials who will serve as Acting Attorney General at the Relocation Site during the week of July 15 to July 19 in connection with Operation Alert 1957.

Acting Attorney General

July 12 through 14

William B. Foley

July 15

William P. Rogers

July 16 a.m.

J. Walter Yeagley

July 16 p.m. - July 17

W. Wilson White

July 18 - July 19

John F. Loherty

James J. Canavan will act as Executive Officer of the Site for the entire test.

The Staff Communications Officer will act as duty officer at the Site during other than regular working hours. He will be responsible for contacting higher officials when necessary.

un

*William B. Foley
to [unclear]
7/11/57 [unclear]*

RECORDED

66-19659-159
RECORDED
15 JUL 11 1957

cc - FBI

55 AUG 6 1957

[Signature]

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. L. V. BOARDMAN *LB*

DATE: July 11, 1957

FROM : A. H. BELMONT *7-20-57*

SUBJECT: DEFENSE PLANS - OPERATION ALERT 1957

On July 11, 1957, a carbon copy of a memorandum from Assistant Attorney General Tompkins to the Deputy Attorney General dated July 10, 1957, was personally delivered to Supervisor Minnich, Liaison Section, by James J. Canavan, Defense Plans Coordinator, Department of Justice, which memorandum pertains to the Departmental relocation staff for Operation Alert 1957.

The memorandum lists Department officials who will serve as Acting Attorney General at the Department relocation site during the week of July 15 to July 19 in connection with Operation Alert 1957 as follows:

Acting Attorney General

July 12 through 14	William E. Foley
July 15	William P. Rogers
July 16 a.m.	J. Walter Yeagley
July 16 p.m. - July 17	W. Wilson White
July 18 - July 19	John F. Doherty

Additionally, James J. Canavan will act as executive officer of the site for the entire test and the Staff Communications Officer will act as duty officer at the site during other than regular working hours and he will be responsible for contacting higher officials when necessary.

ACTION:

For information.

JTM:uep (10) *uep*

- 1 - Boardman
- 1 - Belmont
- 1 - Branigan
- 1 - Bland
- 1 - Baumgardner
- 1 - McGuire (Attn. Mr. Wherry)
- 1 - Parsons (Attn. Mr. Gallagher)
- 1 - Section
- 1 - Minnich

RECORDED-38

EX-126

66-19009-160
15 JUL 31 1957

55 AUG 6 1957

Office Memorandum

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. BELMONT

DATE: July 15, 1957

FROM : D. J. PARSONS

SUBJECT: OPERATION ALERT 1957
BOMB DAMAGE - FIELD OFFICES - PROBLEM #8

The table below indicates the extent of blast damage, resulting from mock detonations, to the field offices:

Tolson _____
Nichols _____
Boardman _____
Belmont _____
Mason _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
Nease _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

COMPLETE - 25SEVERE - 6MODERATE - 9SLIGHT - 4

Albany
Buffalo
Cincinnati
Cleveland
Dallas
Denver
Honolulu
Houston
Indianapolis
Kansas City
Knoxville
Little Rock
Los Angeles
Louisville
Memphis
Mobile
New Orleans
Norfolk
Omaha
Phoenix
Portland
San Diego
Savannah
Seattle
Washington Field

Atlanta
New Haven
New York City
Philadelphia
St. Louis
San Francisco

Albuquerque
Anchorage
Birmingham
Milwaukee
Miami
Minneapolis
Newark
Oklahoma City
Pittsburgh

Baltimore
Chicago
Detroit
Salt Lake City

SUMMARY:

25 offices completely destroyed
19 additional offices damaged

Of the 8 offices not damaged, two (Butte and Springfield) were affected by fallout. Therefore, 46 offices were made unuseable at least for a temporary period.

Ten of our field office relocation sites were affected by fallout, but it was necessary to move only five of them: Albany, Denver, Los Angeles, Oklahoma City and Pittsburgh. Bureau relocation site at Quantico was not affected.

NOT AFFECTED

El Paso Butte
Boston Charlotte
Richmond San Juan
San Antonio Springfield

EX-116
RECORDED - 4

1- Mr. Belmont
1- Mr. Roach
JFG/mek (5)

66-19009-161
15 AUG 1957

ACTION: For information. This completes Problem #8.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: July 15, 1957

FROM : Mr. A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: OPERATION ALERT - 1957

Tolson _____
 Boardman _____
 Nichols _____
 Belmont _____
 Parsons _____
 Rosen _____
 Tamm _____
 Sizoo _____
 Winterrowd _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holloman _____
 Gandy _____

This report covers the Bureau's activity at the relocation site from 4:00 P.M. EST, Sunday, July 14, to 3:00 P.M. EST, Monday, July 15.

OUTSIDE PROBLEMS

On the night of July 14, we received a teletype from Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM), press center, addressed to all information officers in the Government network, requesting each agency prepare a separate draft press release covering each major action to be taken by the agency. We contacted Justice relocation site and advised Justice that, in accordance with previous arrangements, FBI would not reply to this as any press matters will be handled by Justice; further, that no mention should be made of our emergency programs in any press release. Mr. McGuire at the Bureau was advised of this on the morning of July 15 in the event of any inquiry at the Bureau.

At 1:05 A.M. EST, July 15, Liaison Agent Whaley called from ODM relocation site to advise that ODM was concerned about three persons who have been attempting to obtain information regarding Operation Alert from the ODM news headquarters at Roanoke, Virginia (Newspoint). These individuals have been insistent in their attempts and have bandied about code words of the Alert. ODM wanted Agent Whaley to go down to Newspoint to obtain full details regarding the real identities of these persons and the security of the Operation. Agent Whaley told ODM this was not in the Bureau's jurisdiction. Upon ODM's insistence that full details be given the Bureau, Agent Whaley told them to report the details to our Resident Agent at Roanoke. We alerted our Richmond Office concerning this possible contact of the Resident Agent at Roanoke and SAC Roche

Enclosure

- 1 - Mr. Nichols
- 1 - Mr. Boardman
- 1 - Mr. Holloman
- 1 - Mr. Parsons
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Sizoo
- 1 - Mr. Baumgardner
- 1 - Mr. Bland
- 1 - Mr. Roach

RECORDED - 4

66-19009--162
15 AUG 1 1957

EX-118

AHB/pjr
 55 AUG 14 1957

Memorandum for The Director
Re: Operation Alert - 1957

was instructed that this be handled in such a manner as to keep the FBI out of it, that the three individuals are probably newspapermen and we should not get involved. The Resident Agent is to merely accept any information without comment or suggestion and report it to Richmond, which will advise us. I told SAC Roche that, if any newspapers contact him, he is not to comment but to refer the newspapers to ODM. On the morning of July 15, Mr. McGuire was advised of this at the Bureau in the event the Bureau received any inquiries.

ACTIVITIES AT OTHER AGENCIES

Liaison Agent Whaley advised at 8:25 A.M. EST that the President had arrived at the ODM relocation site at 8:15 A.M. and was in conference with Gordon Gray, director of ODM. Agent Whaley advised at 9:44 A.M. EST that the President had left the relocation site, presumably en route to Washington, D. C.

Agent Whaley said that ODM now has a complete staff to handle the second phase of Operation Alert - 1957. He stated ODM proposes to close "Newspoint," which is the ODM news outlet located at Roanoke, Virginia.

The majority of Government agencies will increase their activities starting today. In accordance with previous arrangements, our Liaison Agents with State Department, Central Intelligence Agency and Atomic Energy Commission relocated today with their agencies. They will maintain close contact with us and, at such time as they are not needed, they will return to Washington. Inasmuch as the General in charge of G-2 relocation site at Fort Bragg is returning on the morning of July 16, we have instructed our Liaison Agent to likewise return to Washington.

It is noted that we have now released three Liaison Agents from the relocation sites. In each instance, the ranking official of the agency at the site expressed appreciation for the fact that Bureau Agent had accompanied the agency and the need for close Bureau liaison during an emergency. Mr. Shanley of the White House commented that he appreciated the fact that Mr. Hoover had seen fit to have one of his representatives participate in the White House relocation operation.

Memorandum for The Director
Re: Operation Alert - 1957

COMMUNICATIONS

Communications continue to operate smoothly. In two instances, we had temporary tie-ups of telephone and teletype lines to Highpoint, both caused by difficulty outside the Bureau relocation site, and the trouble was cleared promptly after we reported it. In one instance, a teletype machine needed an adjustment and was out of service for one hour. A telephone repairman repaired it promptly. In none of these instances was our operation disturbed as we were able to utilize other facilities.

BOMB DAMAGE AND FALLOUT

Prior to Operation Alert - 1957, the Laboratory sent to the field instructions for the reporting of mock bombings within the field office territories. The field did an outstanding job in handling this important phase and it is interesting to note that by 102 radiograms from the field reports were received on 156 of the approximately 165 bombings simulated.

It is particularly interesting to note that 100 per cent of this information affecting the Bureau installations was received from the field prior to any usable information received from Federal Civil Defense or Office of Defense Mobilization. We are, therefore, many hours ahead in evaluating the bomb damage sustained and our operational abilities in the field.

The Bureau relocation site at Quantico was not damaged nor affected by fallout. Forty-six of our field offices were damaged or affected by fallout to the extent that they were unusable. None of our relocation sites were damaged and, of ten affected by fallout, in only five instances was it necessary to move them.

Attached for the Director's information is a copy of Mr. Parson's memorandum reflecting the details of damage to our field establishments.

Memorandum for The Director
Re: Operation Alert - 1957

PERSONNEL

We are releasing additional personnel late this afternoon. Domestic Intelligence Division is releasing four supervisors, leaving a balance of six supervisors and officials, including all-night coverage. Records and Communications Division is releasing two, leaving a total of 23. Despite the amount of bomb damage and fallout information being received for analysis and plotting, Laboratory Division is able to release two personnel. This means that, as of this evening, we will have a total of 41 personnel remaining from the original 59 which relocated on July 12. In comparison with last year, we started with the figure 76 and in four days had reduced to 48. Thus, we are presently working with seven less personnel than last year although we have two days longer to run than we did at a comparable period last year. We will continue to release personnel as rapidly as possible.

ACTION:

A subsequent report will be submitted on Tuesday, July 16, 1957.

R

/

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Belmont *Arthur*

DATE: July 31, 1957

FROM : R. R. Rogers *R*SUBJECT: DEFENSE PLANS--
OPERATION ALERT 1957

Tolson	_____
Nichols	_____
Boardman	_____
Belmont	_____
Mason	_____
Mohr	_____
Parsons	_____
Rosen	_____
Tamm	_____
Nease	_____
Winterrowd	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holloman	_____
Gandy	_____

All Operation Alert 1957 exercise material, documents, messages, and related items have been placed in ~~new~~ folders and catalogued and will be retained by Buplans Desk for one year. The material will be destroyed subsequent to Operation Alert 1958.

ACTION:*mig* For information.

JTM:nje (4)
 1 - Mr. Belmont
 1 - Section
 1 - Mr. Minnich

RECORDED - 4

55 AUG 6 1957 *347*

EX - 116

7 AUG 1 1957

66 19009-163

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: July 17, 1957

FROM : A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: OPERATION ALERT 1957
SUMMARY MEMORANDUM -
JULY 12 THROUGH 17, 1957

Tolson _____
Boardman _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Harbo _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
 Sizoo _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

This is a summary memorandum covering the Bureau's activities at its relocation site starting the morning of July 12 (the day of the simulated attack on the United States) and running through July 17. An additional brief summary memorandum will be prepared covering activities on July 18 and 19, when the operation ends.

Brief mention is also made of the Bureau's participation prior to the simulated attack at 11:00 a.m. Eastern Standard Time (EST), July 12.

PARTICIPATION PRIOR TO JULY 12, 1957

Operation Alert 1957 started early in June, with an assumed international situation which quickly developed into a Plan C situation (a situation based on international situation of utmost gravity, short of general war, in which the United States forces have become engaged in overseas military operations). As the operation developed, periodic announcements from the Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM) reflected a cumulative build-up of the dangerous international situation, reflecting an attack on

AHB:LL

(11)

cc--Mr. Nichols
cc--Mr. Mohr
cc--Mr. Parsons
cc--Mr. Tamm
cc--Mr. Holloman
cc--Mr. Belmont
cc--Mr. Baumgardner
cc--Mr. Bland

RECORDED - 40

cc--Mr. Roach
cc--Mr. Minnich

ENCLOSURES (Attachments A, B, C and D
and Memorandum to the Attorney General)

61 AUG 13 1957 FS

66-19009-164
AUG 7 1957

Memorandum to the Director from Mr. Belmont

Re: OPERATION ALERT 1957

SUMMARY MEMORANDUM - 7/12 through 17/57

United States forces overseas on June 20; expansion of the simulated foreign war on July 3; and instructions that agencies participating in the relocation phase send a small group of communications employees to their relocation site on July 8. In compliance, we sent a small group of communications employees to Quantico on the morning of July 8, and communications were manned in accordance with instructions from ODM thereafter.

Starting June 19, and up until July 12, reports, as required by ODM (4 in number), were filed by us with ODM in Washington, D. C., reflecting FBI was prepared to meet its responsibilities under the developing situation; that we had manned our communications at the relocation site; and, finally, that we had fully manned our relocation site as of the morning of July 12.

RELOCATION - JULY 12, 1957

ODM instructions were that participating agencies should be at their relocation sites, ready for operation, prior to the warning of the simulated attack at 11:00 a. m. EST, July 12, 1957.

At 8:30 a. m. EST (9:30 a. m. Daylight Time) a simulated alert was sounded by Belmont at the Bureau. The prearranged notification system which we will use in an actual emergency was placed into effect, and all persons (187) scheduled for relocation in an emergency were accounted for and checked off by 8:37 a. m.

The personnel designated to relocate during Operation Alert 1957 departed immediately for Quantico by Bureau bus and personal car (total relocated, 59). The bus departed Justice Building at 8:38 a. m. and arrived at Quantico at 9:27 a. m. All personnel had arrived at Quantico by 9:37 a. m. At 9:30 a. m., Highpoint (ODM) was notified that FBI was fully operational, and Justice relocation site was so notified at 9:35 a. m.

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From the above, it will be noted that all 187 people scheduled for emergency relocation had been accounted for within 7 minutes of the alert; all persons scheduled to depart for Quantico in this test had left the building within 8 minutes and had arrived at Quantico in less than an hour. Bureau relocation site was fully operational one hour from the alert.

All 52 field offices relocated during the alert from 11:00 a.m. EST, July 12, to 8:00 p.m. local standard time, July 13, utilizing 2 Agents, each standing 12-hour shifts. Where practical, the actual field relocation site was used; otherwise, a resident agency was used. For economy reasons, field relocation ceased on July 13, with ODM concurrence. For the rest of the test, field office headquarters were used.

SCHEDULED PROBLEMS

Seventy-three problems were prepared in advance of the test, simulating conditions which would face us at a relocation site in an emergency. These problems were designed to thoroughly test our communications system both here at the relocation site and in the field, with particular emphasis on the use of our radio system. As the problems required intercommunication between field offices, relocation sites, and resident agencies, as well as field office contacts with outside agencies, and all contained the time factor, they resulted in a widespread check of the alertness and speed of response of our field personnel, as well as the ability of our communications system.

These problems were all initiated during the first 2 days (July 12 - 13) and all were completed by July 13 except 13 which were of a continuing nature.

Unlike other Government agencies participating in this exercise which did not start to function at peak load until July 15 on a national headquarters basis, the Bureau's emergency responsibilities required that our emergency programs be launched immediately the morning of July 12. Therefore, the bulk of our activity and testing with our field offices occurred on July 12 and 13. This was pointed out in advance to ODM and ODM concurred with our planning.

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Because of the classified and delicate nature of our emergency work, our problems were simulated in the field; however, actual messages were sent, requiring specific action, and actual emergency conditions were simulated at Quantico.

A brief resume of the scheduled problems is set forth below:

Emergency Detention Program

Immediately upon arrival at Quantico, a contact was made with Liaison Supervisor at Justice relocation site (9:35 a. m.) and he was requested to obtain immediately authority to launch our Emergency Detention Program. At 9:50 a. m., our Liaison representative at Justice relocation advised that William E. Foley, acting for the Attorney General, had authorized the program covering both citizens and aliens. As a result, the program was started immediately at 9:55 a. m., utilizing radio (39 offices), teletype (9 offices), and telephone (4 offices). All 52 field offices had been contacted by 11:09 a. m. and the required replies had been received back from all offices by 12:43 p. m.

Thus it will be seen that even though we purposely placed a heavy load on our radio facilities (39 out of 52 offices), we had handled this entire problem within 2 hours and 53 minutes after the Department authorized the program. This required us to contact all 52 offices, which in turn contacted their own relocation sites and then reported back to us. As noted above, we had no difficulty getting proper authority from the Department.

Theoretically, the Emergency Detention Program operated successfully, enabling us to apprehend subjects on the Security Index except those bombed out or killed by the attack. (Persons on Security Index as of July 12, 1957: 13,222.)

Once again, the Operation Alert exercise has made it unmistakably clear that if the Emergency Detention Program is to work

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effectively, it should be launched well in advance of any attack on this country. The effectiveness of this detention program will be in direct ratio to the amount of time we are afforded to make arrests in advance of any attack--at the very minimum, a period of 48 hours. The point to be made is that for the Bureau to negate the real and grave potential of sabotage prior to or simultaneous with an attack, we must be given an opportunity in advance to remove these people from the streets.

Protective Custody Enemy Diplomats

At 9:43 a.m., July 12, immediately after arrival at Quantico, Mr. Belmont contacted Special Agent Kuhrtz, who is liaison with State Department, to check as to whether State wanted enemy officials taken into protective custody. After checking with State Department representative John F. Depenbrock, Kuhrtz called back at 9:44 a.m., authorizing immediate initiation of the program. Justice relocation was so advised at 9:50 a.m. The problem was launched at 9:47 a.m. and replies received from the field by 10:54 a.m. Four offices were involved: Washington Field, New York, Baltimore, and Philadelphia.

It is noted that the difficulty we encountered last year in getting State Department authorization has apparently been overcome, inasmuch as we received immediate authorization this year.

We also simulated problems involving enemy diplomats who were traveling and issued instructions that they be located and picked up.

Total Soviet and satellite diplomatic personnel involved as of July 1, 1957: New York, 306 Soviet and 172 satellite; Washington, 303 Soviet and 291 satellite--grand total 1,072.

It is interesting to note that during Operation Alert 1956, the number of personnel involved was 220 less, as shown by the following breakdown: New York, 245 Soviet and 100 satellite; Washington, 277 Soviet and 230 satellite--grand total 852.

While the reported bomb bursts during this exercise do not reflect that clandestine weapons were set off in the Soviet Embassy

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or in New York, past and current studies of potential Soviet attacks do include this possibility. Bearing this in mind, the effectiveness of using this protective custody program to search the Soviet Embassy and other official buildings for possible clandestine weapons would depend on the implementation of the program in advance of an attack.

Espionage Problems

A number of espionage and counterespionage problems were worked during the course of the exercise, requiring recognition of situations that would face us during an actual emergency, such as the location and arrest of enemy agents landing by submarine; the apprehension of espionage subjects on the Security Index; decision as to whether subjects in the Special Section of the Security Index should be arrested or allowed to continue operation under observation; presentation to the State Department of Security Index subjects employed by the United Nations or friendly foreign governments; and placing of names on the Censorship Watch List.

Internal Security Problems

Other problems affecting our internal security were worked under conditions to simulate the actual situation insofar as possible, such as reports on sabotage; notification to other Government agencies of emergency detention arrests; placing stops on Security Index subjects out of the country; taking action on flash notices received in the Identification Division on security subjects; selecting informants who would be arrested and placed with subjects during an emergency; and maintenance of daily statistics on arrests.

Laboratory Problems

A number of problems were staged by the Laboratory for the purpose of testing technical equipment and the knowledge of field offices to utilize such equipment during an emergency, including:

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1. Periodic checking at Quantico of radioactivity and exposure to radio active hazards.
2. Instructions to 7 field offices to operate on emergency power for a period of 30 minutes.
3. Requiring 6 offices to utilize dosimeter equipment to check radioactivity and report back to Quantico.
4. Requiring 5 offices to set up radioactivity detection meters and report simulated readings to Quantico.
5. Simulated breakdown of cryptographic encoding equipment at Quantico and its repair.
6. Simulated breakdown of telephone switchboard at Quantico and its repair.
7. Simulated breakdown on radio teletype link between Quantico and radio station at Midland and its repair.
8. Simulated breakdown of commercial electrical power and actual utilization of emergency electrical generator at Quantico.

OUTSIDE PROBLEMS

Up through 3:00 p.m., July 17, 1957, we had received from other agencies a total of 18 problems requiring action by us. In contrast, we received 41 such problems during Operation Alert 1956 and 16 problems during Operation Alert 1955. We made a point of handling these problems promptly. Where necessary for record purposes, replies were sent to the other agencies, but, where not necessary, action was simulated for economy reasons.

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ATTACHMENT A to this memorandum sets forth a concise summary of each of these problems; however, selected examples are set forth below:

1. On July 12, 1957, at 8:48 p.m., SAC Kelly called from New York to state Civil Defense headquarters at Peekskill, New York, had reported that police were guarding the remnants of a Russian military plane which crashed at White Plains, New York. Police captured 8 military crew members who apparently were the full complement of the plane and parachuted from it. Civil Defense notified the Air Force, which will question the crewmen. New York is maintaining liaison and will interrogate them if it is indicated they had an espionage or sabotage mission. As this was military equipment and military personnel, the Air Force has jurisdiction and is handling. Problem completed.
2. At 7:30 p.m., July 12, 1957, Kansas City reported by radiogram that Civil Defense had advised that persons in the Kansas City area were in hospitals and suffering from possible contamination of water and milk, with sabotage indicated. We instructed Kansas City to simulate immediate investigation and advise Civil Defense that investigation resulted in apprehension of two individuals who confessed to contaminating Kansas City water supply. Subjects in custody and the U. S. Attorney advised. Problem completed.
3. On the morning of July 13, 1957, National Censorship Bureau requested submission of the number of names that would be submitted by the Bureau and other agencies for the Censorship Watch List, and the number of names that could be released to friendly foreign governments for their censorship lists. Simulated numbers were furnished by us to the National Censorship Bureau by teletype on July 13, 1957. Problem completed.

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4. At 7:10 p. m., July 13, 1957, ASAC Simon called from New York to advise that Civil Defense at Albany had sent a message to Civil Defense at Peekskill, New York, at 12:26 a. m. that day, stating the FBI had arrested 383 persons in Albany for looting a federal reserve bank; that detention facilities were available for only 150 and asking what disposition could be made of the other 233 persons. Civil Defense in Peekskill sent a message to Civil Defense at Albany stating they had referred the matter to Civil Defense headquarters at Harvard, Massachusetts, for advice. Civil Defense at Harvard replied it had contacted FBI headquarters. ASAC Simon was instructed to advise Civil Defense at Peekskill that our Albany Office had consulted with U. S. Attorney at Albany, who had arranged with the Bureau of Prisons to take custody of these individuals; that they are presently in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons and the matter has been handled. Problem completed.
5. At 1:52 a. m., July 14, 1957, we received a teletype from Civil Defense at Olney, Maryland, reporting bad leakage of chlorine stored in Charleston, West Virginia, and sabotage suspected. At 8:28 a. m., July 14, a reply was sent to Civil Defense advising that the West Virginia State Police had previously reported this matter to us and immediate investigation by the FBI revealed the leakage was the result of structural failure in the storage tank. No evidence of sabotage was indicated. Problem completed.
6. At 9:42 p. m., July 13, 1957, San Francisco advised by teletype that Civil Defense at Santa Rosa, California, had reported that a false report had been circulated that bombs had been dropped on Oxnard, Edwards Air Force Base, Pt. Vincente, California, and Helena, Montana. Civil Defense felt these false reports might be disruptive tactics by subversive groups. San Francisco advised Civil Defense that the FBI was conducting appropriate investigation. No additional action necessary.

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7. At 8:05 p.m., July 14, 1957, we received a teletype from ODM Press Center, addressed to all information officers in the Government network, requesting that a separate draft press release covering each major action to be taken by each agency be filed with them prior to 5:00 p.m., July 16, 1957. At 9:50 p.m., July 14, through our Liaison at Justice relocation, we advised the Department the FBI was not filing a separate press release in this matter; that Justice should include in its report any necessary comments regarding FBI operations; however, no mention should be made of the FBI's emergency programs.

8. At 1:05 a.m., July 15, 1957, Liaison Agent Whaley at Highpoint (ODM relocation) advised that Newspoint (Roanoke, Virginia) reported 3 persons had been attempting to obtain information at Newspoint regarding Operation Alert. ODM was apprehensive about the security of the operation at Newspoint and wanted Whaley to go down to Roanoke to get the facts. We had our Resident Agent at Roanoke receive the information, which reflected that persons connected with Operation Alert had been contacted in several instances while at hotel bars or social parties, by strangers who asked what was going on and, in one instance, one of the strangers mentioned the code name for the Post Office relocation site. As this was not within the jurisdiction of the FBI, and had the earmarks of a two-day sustained party, Richmond was instructed to stay out of it and avoid publicity. Whaley so advised ODM.

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AVAILABILITY CHECKS

We made availability checks on a surprise basis in 19 field divisions (6 each on July 12 and 16, and 7 on July 15), during the evening at varying times between 7:30 p.m. and 10:30 p.m., EST. In general, the availability checks were satisfactory, as we found the Special Agent in Charge and Assistant Special Agent in Charge available and Agents were reached promptly during the check.

The Kansas City Office was unable to contact all of its Agents in duty status in headquarters city within the hour (required 67 minutes). This was deemed unsatisfactory and explanation was required. Separate memorandum has been submitted, recommending censure for Special Agent in Charge Wyly.

COMMUNICATIONS

This exercise further reflected that communications at Quantico are the lifeline of any emergency operation conducted from the Bureau relocation site. We found communications equipment and personnel to be highly effective during this exercise.

For dual reasons of economy and to thoroughly test our radio network, we worked the majority of our problems utilizing the radio network as the medium of communications. Because radio messages can be monitored outside the Bureau, it was necessary during this exercise to code all of these radio messages, thus throwing a very heavy burden on our coding personnel. While there was a backlog during the peak period of contact with our offices, the delay was minimum and promptly cleared. Even supposing all radio messages were coded in an emergency, this delay could be eliminated by adding

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additional personnel. However, in an actual emergency, it is probable that many of our messages would be sent in clear text as, under the circumstances, we would not care who monitored them.

Teletype, telephone, and microwave systems were also tested and found to operate effectively. Utilizing all of these methods of communication, we could have handled a much greater volume if necessary.

Summary of Messages Sent and Received

from July 12 through 11:00 a. m., July 17, 1957

	<u>Incoming</u>	<u>Outgoing</u>	<u>Total</u>
Telephone	265	268	533*
Teletype	469	279	748**
Radio	265	257	522***
TOTALS	<u>999</u>	<u>804</u>	<u>1,803</u>

*Only 56 were toll calls.

**Majority of these were service messages required by ODM during exercise.

***As compared with 242 in 1956.

(The thorough test afforded our coding unit is reflected by the fact that these messages required handling 47,704 code groups, as compared to 10,695 code groups during the exercise in 1956.)

Where we had unavoidable mechanical delays, the delays were reported promptly and repairs were made properly. We experienced no real inconvenience from these mechanical equipment delays as we were able to shift our messages at once to other lines. During the test, all offices were contacted by radio, 23 by teletype, and 20 by telephone.

We had no difficulty reaching our field offices, and the communications ability of other Government agencies has shown a continued improvement as reflected by the fact we had little difficulty in our communications with other agencies. Any significant delays in communications are shown under the section of this memorandum entitled "Difficulties Encountered."

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LIAISON

Five Liaison Agents accompanied their agencies to their relocation sites at the start of the exercise (White House, Justice, Office of Defense Mobilization, Department of Defense, and G-2). All of these 5 Agents had contacted the Bureau relocation site from the relocation sites of their agencies by 9:50 a. m., July 12. The remaining 3 Liaison Agents relocated with their agencies on July 15 (State, Central Intelligence Agency, and Atomic Energy Commission), inasmuch as those agencies were scheduled to start substantial activities on July 15.

Liaison Agents kept in close contact with the Bureau relocation site and we had no difficulty in reaching them. The Agents were able to keep us advised of over-all Government planning, as well as the activities of their individual agencies. In several instances, we utilized the Liaison representatives to clarify requests from their agencies and, of course, to obtain authority for our emergency programs. Once again, as in previous Operation Alert exercises, we found that the presence of Liaison Agents with their agencies permitted us to receive intelligence information and to cut out red tape and operate smoothly in our relations with other agencies. Up until Wednesday afternoon, we had more than 125 telephone contacts between Liaison Agents and Quantico.

Inasmuch as some of the Government agencies were not participating to the extent they did in past Alert exercises, we continually scrutinized the necessity of our Agents accompanying or remaining with their agencies. As stated above, 3 Liaison Agents did not relocate with their agencies until July 15 and, in 6 instances, we released the Liaison Agent from his relocation site as his presence appeared no longer necessary (White House, July 13; Department of Defense, July 14; G-2, July 16; AEC, Justice, and CIA, also July 16.)

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The value of having our Liaison representatives relocate with their agencies is indisputable. By continuing that procedure during the current Operation, we have further established the pattern that these representatives will be able to serve us in this capacity in an emergency. In the same manner as preceding years, we received favorable comment from ranking representatives of the other agencies concerning the presence of our Agents at their relocation sites. As an example, Mr. Shanley, of the White House, expressed his appreciation for the presence of our Liaison Agent at Camp David and the fact that the Director had seen fit to have one of his representatives participate in the White House relocation operation. Also, Mr. Gordon Gray, Director of Office of Defense Mobilization, advised our Liaison Agent he appreciated the fact the Director had designated a Liaison representative to accompany ODM; that he felt that in an actual emergency, we should have at least one, if not more, man at ODM, as he felt the liaison between ODM control point and FBI was very necessary.

BOMB DAMAGE AND FALLOUT

Prior to Operation Alert 1957, the Laboratory sent to the field instructions for the reporting of mock bombings within the field office territories. The field did an outstanding job in handling this important phase, and it is interesting to note that by 102 radiograms from the field, reports were received on 156 of the approximately 165 bombings simulated.

It is particularly interesting to note that 100 per cent of this information affecting the Bureau installations was received from the field prior to any usable information received from Federal Civil Defense or Office of Defense Mobilization. We were, therefore, many hours ahead in evaluating the bomb damage sustained and our operational abilities in the field.

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The Bureau relocation site at Quantico was not damaged nor affected by fallout. Forty-six of our field offices were damaged or affected by fallout to the extent that they were unusable. None of our relocation sites was damaged and, of 10 affected by fallout, in only five instances was it necessary to move them.

Based on casualties that would have been suffered in the simulated attack on this country, computed on the basis of a normal "in place" population and not a deployed population that would have evacuated to selected relocation sites, Bureau personnel would have suffered casualties as follows: Of the total personnel of the Bureau (13,446), 8,806 would have been killed and 1,004 injured, or a total of 9,810. Of the 6,111 Agents in the service, 2,742 would have been killed and 666 injured, or a total of 3,408. These casualties would be reduced, of course, if personnel were relocated through advance notice of the attack.

The details of the casualties in each of our offices and the Seat of Government, and the field offices which were bombed out completely or suffered damage, are set forth in ATTACHMENT B to this summary memorandum.

INSPECTOR

Mr. Joseph Eigenmann, of the Bureau of the Budget, visited the Bureau relocation site from the afternoon of July 12 through July 14. He was briefed in detail concerning the Bureau's operations in the event of an emergency. He was also shown the physical layout at our relocation site and the personnel and equipment in actual operation during the exercise. This included a visit to our radio station.

IMPORTANT PROCLAMATIONS AND EXECUTIVE ORDERS ISSUED

The attack phase of Operation Alert 1957 commenced on July 12, 1957. Between June 20, 1957, the date on which the President was assumed to have proclaimed a national emergency, and July 12, 1957, preliminary administrative and economic actions by the President and

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various agencies of the Government had been taken. On July 12, 1957, the President issued two proclamations and eight executive orders, as compared with the Operation Alert 1956 figures of eight presidential proclamations and 19 executive orders. These set in operation many emergency measures, including placing of wartime controls on the nation's economy, giving Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA) emergency powers over state governments, and suspending privilege of writ of habeas corpus for 60 days as to persons detained in Federal Civil Defense matters, including Defense Department participation therein; establishing censorship; ordering protective custody of enemy official personnel and control of diplomatic and consular property; mobilizing Armed Forces; protecting the banking system; and suspending the publication of documents in the Federal Register.

Planned actions by various temporary and permanent agencies, for which predication had been laid in the preattack period, made unnecessary the issuance of new directives after the attack. In some instances, however, directives were forthcoming--for example, the Office of Emergency Resources, a temporary agency supplanting Office of Defense Mobilization, issued a directive on procurement of manpower through Selective Service for the military and through Emergency Manpower Agency for civilians. The Civil Service Commission adopted emergency indefinite appointments and authorized direct recruitment. FCDA delegated its statutory powers to acquire private property to the temporary Emergency Energy and Minerals Agency. There were no proclamations, orders or directives transmitted to the Bureau relocation site which mentioned the FBI.

ATTACHMENT C is a running memorandum synthesizing these documents.

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COST FIGURES AND PERSONNEL ESTIMATES

Estimated Out-of-Pocket Expenses

The estimated out-of-pocket cost of Operation Alert 1957 to the FBI, as furnished to Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM), totaled \$4,588.25, which is broken down into computations as follows:

Costs to Field Offices (including travel, per diem, transportation of things, communications service, other contractual services, supplies and equipment)	\$2,043.16
Costs to Bureau relocation site (including per diem for personnel stationed at site, utilities, laundry and office supplies)	501.62
Communications cost at Bureau's relocation site	102.75
Cost of Seat of Government personnel participation (Employees' relocating to Bureau's site and Liaison Agents at sites of other agencies)	<u>1,940.72</u>
TOTAL	<u>\$4,588.25</u>

You will note that the salaries of participating personnel are not included in these figures, as they were not requested by ODM.

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Estimated Participating Personnel

We were required to submit, and did submit to ODM on July 15, 1957, the total estimated participating personnel during the period from 11:00 a.m. EST, July 12, 1957, to 6:00 p.m. EST, July 14, 1957, at the national level and field level, as follows:

National level	125*
Field level	<u>273**</u>
Total	<u>398</u>

*Figure includes Quantico, Midland radio station and Sowego radio station staffs, personnel relocated to Quantico, Liaison Agents at sites of other agencies, couriers and armed guards.

**Figure based on two Agents manning each field office relocation site and three participants at headquarters city of each field office (Special Agent in Charge or member of chain of command, radio operator and code clerk), with the exception of San Diego (estimated to have 14 participants in view of radio relay station), Anchorage, Honolulu, and San Juan (estimated to have two radio operators participating), and Washington Field (considered to have only one participant at headquarters city).

We submitted to ODM figures for the period from July 15 to July 18, 1957, as follows:

National level	121***
Field level	168****

***This figure represents the maximum as of July 15, 1957, which was reduced drastically as we went along. As of July 15, we reduced personnel relocated to Quantico by 11 and Liaison Agents at other sites by 2. However, in the estimate submitted to ODM, 9 additional couriers and armed guards were utilized during the stated period.

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****This figure was reduced by 105 since field offices were not required to man their relocation sites beyond 8:00 p. m., local standard time of the respective field office, July 13, 1957.

DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED (NO ACTION RECOMMENDED)

1. In checking over the CW radio station at the relocation site, it was found that the antenna was not functioning properly. A quick check revealed that one end of the antenna, located above the roof of the FBI Academy building, had been detached from its support by workmen installing an elevator in the building. This was repaired immediately and the CW transmitter was tested and found to perform satisfactorily.

2. Due to the heavy emphasis we placed on sending messages by radio, we experienced delay in some instances in moving traffic from the radio station at Midland to our relocation headquarters. This occurred during peak periods. The equipment is adequate and the delay could be reduced or avoided by adding personnel to the radio station to perform teletype functions. This caused no difficulty during our test exercises; however, it should be borne in mind in the event of a real emergency.

3. During the peak load periods when we were communicating with the Field giving instructions and working problems and receiving replies by radio, we experienced a backlog in coding and decoding, causing a delay of several hours; this, despite the fact the employees in the coding unit worked very long hours and were very competent. The number of code groups handled was more than four times as great as during Operation Alert 1956, due in large degree to the fact all our radio messages were in code. This should be borne in mind from the standpoint of additional personnel in the coding unit in a real emergency. However, an ameliorating factor in an emergency would be that we would send and receive by radio many messages not in code; that is, messages which might be monitored without distress to us.

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4. Telephone. Interagency Communications System (ICS) circuit GP 5010 was out of service for 35 minutes and 29 minutes, respectively, on July 12; 23 minutes on July 13; and 5 minutes on July 15. The trouble was reported immediately by us in each instance and was found to be at Highpoint. ICS circuit 5124 was out of service for 23 minutes on July 13 for the same reason. On July 12, one cord pair on the switchboard was out of service for 1 hour and 40 minutes, and on July 13 another cord pair was out of service for 1 hour and 5 minutes. The trouble was reported immediately and repaired. It did not cause us difficulty, since the switchboard was not being operated to full capacity.

5. Teletype. TWX Teletype RH 280 was inoperative from 9:15 a. m. to 10:35 a. m. on July 12, and from 5:00 p. m. to 6:45 p. m. on July 13, due in each instance to line trouble not under our control, which was reported immediately and repaired. TWX Teletype Circuit RH 466 was inoperative from 5:00 p. m. to 6:45 p. m., July 13; from 11:00 p. m. to 12:midnight, July 14; and from 8:55 a. m. to 9:55 a. m., July 15, due to line trouble, which was reported immediately and corrected. ICS Duplex (simultaneous sending and receiving) teletype circuit 3650-23 was inoperative for sending from 9:00 a. m. to 10:45 a. m., July 13, and was reported and corrected. ICS circuit 3651 (simultaneous sending and receiving crypto teletype circuit) was inoperative from 9:35 a. m. to 11:08 a. m., July 12, due to equipment trouble at Highpoint. We could not send on this circuit from 9:43 a. m. to 12:37 p. m., July 13, because cipher tapes furnished us by NSA were defective; inoperative from 10:00 p. m. to 11:50 p. m., July 14, because of equipment trouble on our machine which was reported and cleared up by repairmen; inoperative from 10:20 p. m. to 11:30 p. m., July 15, due to faulty operation of equipment at Highpoint. These outages on this circuit were minor compared to Operation Alert 1956, when this circuit was inoperative for practically the entire exercise. ICS red line crypto teletype circuit 3670-07 was inoperative from 7:00 p. m. to 10:05 p. m., July 15. Our unit had a burned-out motor controller unit which was reported immediately and replaced with our spare unit by a repairman. Highpoint sent a replacement and picked up the defective unit at 8:45 a. m., July 16. These temporary difficulties did not interfere with our operations, as we had sufficient lines to enable us to send messages as necessary.

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DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED (ACTION RECOMMENDED)

1. As set forth elsewhere in this report, during the availability checks, delay was encountered at Kansas City. A separate memorandum has been submitted with recommendation for censure.

2. At 3:26 p.m., July 15, 1957, we received a message from the Richmond Office that the radio station was going off the air until further notice, inasmuch as the radio operator had been called to the hospital and was on emergency annual leave. This points up the fact that in some of our offices we have only one trained radio operator. In a real emergency, if something happened to this operator, we would have no contact with the radio station at the office in question. This is being referred to the Administrative Division for analysis as to whether this situation exists in more than one office and whether remedial action is feasible or desirable at this time.

memo prepared by Admin Div.

3. In order to handle the volume of traffic between the Bureau relocation site and the Midland radio station, it was necessary to utilize both the commercial land line teletype and the Bureau radio teletype circuit, as neither could have handled the traffic alone. This is significant, inasmuch as the Bureau contemplates discontinuing the commercial land line teletype after Operation Alert 1957. While we did not encounter difficulty during the current exercise, the Records and Communications Division is submitting a separate memorandum for possible reconsideration by the Bureau.

*Memo to LEO
LEW
8-1-57*

Memorandum to the Director from Mr. Belmont

Re: OPERATION ALERT 1957

SUMMARY MEMORANDUM - 7/12 through 17/57

PERSONNEL

Fifty-nine employees reported to Quantico from Washington for relocation by the morning of July 12, 1957. We were able to release 9 personnel on the evening of July 13 and further reduction was effected as follows: July 14 - 1; July 15 - 8; July 16 - 12; July 17 - 8, so that on the evening of July 17 we had cut down to 21. It is noted that this was a marked reduction over the personnel utilized in Operation Alert 1956, when we started out with 76 employees. This was largely due to the fact our employees were more experienced and "knew the ropes," with the result that the Operation was able to get under way immediately and proceed smoothly throughout.

Once again, our employees approached this entire exercise in a businesslike, serious manner, with the result that careful attention was given to every detail of the Operation and our responsibilities were promptly and effectively handled. This, of course, required that on many occasions the clerical employees, in addition to the supervisors, work long hours throughout the Operation, including the entire week end. The employees uniformly were willing and exhibited a fine attitude.

As in past Operations, SAC Sloan and his staff at Quantico handled the physical security of the building on a 24-hour basis and furnished the services so necessary to the proper running of the Operation. It was evident that the Quantico staff had gone to great care in setting up the physical needs, such as partitioning, desks, telephones, supplies, and security. Upon our arrival, we found the building and equipment completely ready and were able to start the Operation at once. I consider that SAC Sloan and his staff did an excellent job.

Attached is a list of personnel who took part in Operation Alert 1957, including SAC Sloan and his staff at Quantico and the Liaison Agents who operated with their agencies. (ATTACHMENT D)

Memorandum to the Director from Mr. Belmont

Re: OPERATION ALERT 1957

SUMMARY MEMORANDUM - 7/12 through 17/57

OBSERVATIONS

Once again, these Operation Alert exercises have made it crystal clear that proper timing of the initiation of our emergency programs, particularly the Emergency Detention Program and the program involving protective custody of enemy diplomatic officials, is necessary if these programs are to serve their maximum purpose. For example, in the current exercise, Government agencies were relocated on the morning of July 12, 1957, based on a presumed two-hour notice that an attack had been launched on the United States. As a result, while we received almost immediate authority for our two emergency programs, from a practical standpoint our Agents in the field would not have been able to even start the programs before the bombs fell. Yet, from the increasing tenseness of the international situation as it was pictured from the first part of June, including attack on our forces overseas, it should have been clear that an attack was imminent or at least that the situation was so serious as to warrant the Attorney General's and the President's authorizing the Emergency Detention Program days ahead of July 12 and seriously considering exploratory searches of the Russian and satellite embassies and official establishments for possible clandestine nuclear weapons.

Maximum benefits under these programs will only be derived if they are authorized sufficiently in advance of an attack for them to be properly executed. They are designed to assist in protecting the internal security of the country by:

1. Preventing communist Security Index subjects from committing sabotage just prior to or simultaneously with an attack;
2. Preventing communist Security Index subjects from flooding the country with anti-American propaganda through the use of concealed mimeograph machines;
3. Preventing communist Security Index subjects who are labor leaders in such major unions as the United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America and the International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers from calling strikes in essential industries;

Memorandum to the Director from Mr. Belmont

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SUMMARY MEMORANDUM - 7/12 through 17/57

4. Determining through searches whether any nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction (chemical or biological) are concealed on enemy diplomatic premises - (the mere presence of such a weapon or a portion of such a weapon in a foreign establishment in this country would serve as a stern warning of enemy intent to attack);
5. Disrupting espionage channels of communications and transfer of funds by taking enemy diplomats into protective custody;
6. Obtaining positive intelligence by interrogating Security Index subjects after they are arrested and from defectors among diplomats taken into protective custody. (It is possible that both Security Index subjects and enemy diplomats may have advance intelligence concerning an attack, which would become available to the United States through interrogation.)

Of course, it is recognized that the President is not going to authorize these programs in the absence of a compelling reason, as the premature initiation of the programs themselves could bring on war, particularly that one affecting enemy diplomats. Nevertheless, the build-up pictured by ODM from the first part of June until the attack came on July 12 in Operation Alert 1957 was sufficiently alarming to warrant the serious consideration of initiating both these programs well in advance of July 12.

Memorandum to the Director from Mr. Belmont

Re: OPERATION ALERT 1957

SUMMARY MEMORANDUM - 7/12 through 17/57

RECOMMENDATIONS

(1) Insofar as the FBI is concerned, this operation, lasting from July 12 through July 19, was far too long. We thoroughly tested our communications and emergency facilities, operations and planning within two days. Keeping in mind that the primary purpose of this test exercise, as far as we are concerned, is to test our ability to perform during an emergency, the 5-day period July 15 through July 19 was a waste of time as far as we are concerned. The other agencies, beginning on July 15, tested their abilities to perform services for people in bombed-out areas, such as providing food, shelter, medical aid, et cetera, and carrying out governmental functions after a nuclear attack. These activities are outside the scope of our responsibility and there is no necessity for us to participate in this portion of an alert program.

In an actual emergency, we would immediately carry out our planned emergency programs and then resume our normal activities under existing conditions at the time. Therefore, it is recommended that our part in future test exercises be confined as nearly as possible to simulating our operations during an actual emergency situation.

If you agree, we will carefully but discreetly explore the possibility that in future alert exercises the FBI carry out its portion of the alert by a hard-hitting two or three-day simulated program and then get out and get back to our work.

Memorandum to the Director from Mr. Belmont

Re: OPERATION ALERT 1957

SUMMARY MEMORANDUM - 7/12 through 17/57

(2) It is very obvious that communications are the lifeline of any guidance, instructions or control to emanate from the Bureau relocation site in an emergency. If we are unable to communicate with our field personnel, the Bureau's over-all activities will have no guidance or control from headquarters and, to all intents and purposes, each field office will be operating on its own. Our programs and responsibilities in an emergency are such that central control and direction from relocation headquarters are most desirable, if not essential.

During the current Operation Alert, we have purposely thrown a heavy load on our radio facilities in order to test them severely, in the belief that other forms of communication, such as telephone and teletype, would be badly disrupted, if not destroyed, at least temporarily in any nuclear attack. Estimated damage from the simulated attack in this exercise bears out this contention, as the only form of communication not severely damaged was radio.

Our radio facilities proved to be capable of efficiently handling a heavy load. We received efficient and prompt response from our field offices. There was some delay at headquarters and at our Midland radio site during the peak loads, due to the need for additional coding personnel at Quantico and additional personnel at Midland to speed up teletype transmission between Midland and Quantico. We will need a reserve of trained personnel to handle these duties.

The analysis of bomb damage from the simulated attack in Operation Alert 1957 reflects that 39 of our field office headquarters would have been rendered inoperative, so that radio contact with those field headquarters would not be possible. Among these offices are those handling the majority of security problems--namely, our large cities. In order to insure that we can contact our key offices in an emergency, it will be necessary to have available emergency radio facilities at the relocation sites of those offices. At the present time such emergency radio facilities would be available only at Honolulu, Anchorage, and Shepherdstown, West Virginia (Washington Field Office relocation site). The following key offices (together with WFO)

Memorandum to the Director from Mr. Belmont

Re: OPERATION ALERT 1957

SUMMARY MEMORANDUM - 7/12 through 17/57

cover about 75 per cent of our security problems:

New York

Los Angeles

San Francisco (has temporary equipment from Army
at San Jose Resident Agency)

Chicago

Detroit

Philadelphia

Newark

*Memorandum
Belmont
7/31/57
JTM/awf.*

The Bureau has previously considered the establishment of emergency radio facilities at these offices, but lack of funds did not permit the purchase of equipment. Such equipment should be purchased when feasible.

Done

(3) By separate memorandum, we recommended that the Special Agent in Charge at Kansas City be censured for delay during the availability check of his office.

(4) In view of the excellent attitude displayed by all employees engaged in Operation Alert 1957, and their willingness to serve long hours, it is recommended that letters of commendation be sent to those clerical employees who participated in the exercise.

*Done 7/24/57
See Attachment D. All names of
clerical employees commended
are underscored.
Jh*

vgp ✓

Memorandum to the Director from Mr. Belmont

Re: OPERATION ALERT 1957

SUMMARY MEMORANDUM - 7/12 through 17/57

(5) The staff at Quantico, both before and during the entire exercise, rendered excellent assistance. It is recommended that a letter be sent to Special Agent in Charge Sloan expressing appreciation to the personnel.

✓

Letter to SAC Sloan
7/24/57
hhr

(6) Rather than wait until the entire operation has concluded, it is recommended that the attached summary memorandum dated July 18, 1957, be sent to the Attorney General, copy for Deputy Attorney General Rogers. Should the last two days of the exercise require further comment, which is highly unlikely, a further memorandum will be sent.

done

✓

(7) We will send the final teletype report required by Office of Defense Mobilization on July 18, covering out-of-pocket costs and number of participating personnel as reflected in this memorandum. No further reports to ODM will be necessary. The events of the last day and a half of the exercise will be recorded in a separate memorandum for the file.

done

✓

7.5

A

ATTACHMENT A
OUTSIDE PROBLEMS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Belmont *W.A.*

FROM : R. R. Rouch *R*

SUBJECT: DEFENSE PLANS
OPERATION ALERT 1957
JULY 12-19, 1957
OUTSIDE PROBLEMS

DATE: July 18, 1957

Tolson _____
Boardman _____
Nichols _____
Belmont _____
Harbo _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
 Sizoo _____
Winterrowd _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

During the course of Operation Alert 1957, in addition to those problems initiated by the Bureau, we received many inquiries and problems which emanated from other U.S. agencies which required prompt handling at the Bureau's relocation site. There is set forth a brief summary pertaining to each of these outside problems.

PROBLEM # 1

The Butte Office by teletype dated 7/11/57 advised that the United States Attorney, Charles B. Moriarty, Seattle, requested U.S. Attorney, Boise, Idaho, to inquire of FBI, Butte, the number of alien enemies or suspected nationals who might be within the Butte area. Also requested Bureau Agents to survey a number of usable libraries which might be available to the courts and USA's during the emergency and thereafter.

By teletype dated 7/11/57 the Butte Office was instructed to advise USA, Boise, inquiries re nondangerous alien enemies or suspected nationals and plans for their control should be directed to INS. Further that the USA be advised that no action being taken re survey of usable libraries as all available Agent personnel engaged in performing emergency functions of the FBI.

PROBLEM # 2

At 6:50 p.m., 7/11/57 Mr. Belmont received a call from SAC Murphy, Dallas, who advised United States Attorney at Ft. Worth had sent messages to eight offices in his area requesting they telephone him at his relocation site on Saturday, 7/13/57 advising him of the total number of employees engaged in the relocation test for the period July 12 through 14 and July 15 through 19, 1957.

ENCLOSURE

RECORDED - 40

66-19009-164

6 AUG 7 1957

Handwritten signature

Memorandum to Mr. Belmont
RE: DEFENSE PLANS
OPERATION ALERT 1957.
JULY 12-19, 1957
OUTSIDE PROBLEMS

The USA indicated he was to make a report regarding the total number of employees of Department of Justice so engaged during these periods. The offices involved were Albuquerque, Houston, San Antonio, El Paso, New Orleans, Oklahoma City, Little Rock, and Dallas.

Mr. Belmont advised SAC Murphy the Bureau is making a separate report regarding total number of Bureau personnel engaged in this exercise including field employees and SAC Murphy should notify the other seven offices to disregard the request of the USA.

On 7/12/57 Bureau Plans Supervisor Minnich telephonically advised Mr. Ben Willis, Defense Plans Office, of the manner in which the Fort Worth USA's request was handled. Willis advised he would notify Mr. Canavan of the Department Defense Plans Office and they would probably send clarifying instructions to other United States Attorneys concerned.

PROBLEM # 3

At 8:48 p.m., 7/12/57, SAC Kelly, New York, advised Civil Defense headquarters at Peekskill, New York, had reported a Russian military plane had crashed on golf course at White Plains, New York, and remnants of plane were under guard by White Plains Police Department. Eight military crew members who apparently parachuted from the plane captured by White Plains Police Department and in custody of that department. There was no indication plane carried more than eight crew members.

Civil Defense advised OSI and SAC Kelly instructed Resident Agent at White Plains to establish liaison with White Plains Police Department and OSI interrogation team who will question crewmen to determine what, if any, information is obtained from them regarding espionage and sabotage. Further, if any indication that this was espionage or sabotage, FBI Agents will interview. OSI has responsibility to notify 4602 Air Intelligence Service Squadron.

Memorandum to Mr. Belmont
RE: DEFENSE PLANS
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OUTSIDE PROBLEMS

PROBLEM # 4

At 7:30 p.m., 7/12/57 Kansas City Office by radiogram reported information from Civil Defense to effect that after a bombing attack on Kansas City a number of people had been received at hospitals in the Kansas City area suffering from nausea indicating contamination of water and milk. Civil Defense advised sabotage of the area's water supply was suspected. In view serious nature this allegation we immediately simulated instructions to Kansas City Office relocation site (relocation site contacted as one metagon bomb hit Kansas City 2:03 p.m., EST, 7/12/57) to have Kansas City conduct immediate investigation and advise Bureau promptly of results.

At 10:50 a.m., 7/13/57 Kansas City Office telephonically advised additional information received from Civil Defense early this date that a number of the people were ill before the bombs fell on Kansas City and physicians had learned illness was due to *Clastridium Botulium* and that the causative bacteria had been introduced through the area's public water system. Also, unless additional medical help could be rushed immediately to Kansas City at least fifty per cent of the people would die.

SAC Wyly, Kansas City, advised for purpose of this problem it was assumed Kansas City Office had launched immediate investigation and had been successful in apprehending two individuals, enemy agents, who had confessed that they had planted these bacteria in the public water system and it was assumed these individuals were in custody and the U.S. Attorney is taking action against them on a charge of sabotage. He had so advised Civil Defense authorities Kansas City of the simulated FBI action. Action by Kansas City considered appropriate.

Insofar as medical problem is concerned, it is not a matter for the FBI but should be handled by Civil Defense.

PROBLEM # 5

At 10:45 p.m., 7/12/57 Pittsburgh Office advised by radiogram of the receipt of report from Army Intelligence Corps, Pittsburgh, that Lock Number Nine on the Ohio River South of Wheeling, West Virginia, had been sabotaged according to West Virginia State

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Police, Charlestown, West Virginia.

Simulated inquiry by Pittsburgh Office developed information indicating sabotage was not involved.

PROBLEM # 6

At 1:30 a.m., 7/13/57 San Francisco Office by radiogram advised Phoenix, Honolulu offices and Bureau that according to Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA), Region Number Seven, Phoenix, Tucson, Arizona, and Honolulu extensively damaged by bombing with high casualty rate. United States Attorney, San Francisco, operating at FCDA headquarters, requested FBI ascertain status USA's office Phoenix and Honolulu and judicial systems as result of bombing. USA requested identity and location of USA representative at Phoenix and Honolulu. He requested message back to him by 7:00 a.m., and that message not be simulated.

At 3:37 a.m., 7/13/57 Phoenix Office responded to San Francisco radiogram, advised U.S. Attorney there was in operation at his relocation site and only one court in session that district sitting in regular term at Prescott, Arizona.

We have no indication that Honolulu responded to San Francisco radiogram. However, it is assumed they responded direct to San Francisco without cutting in Bureau, which appears to be proper.

PROBLEM # 7

At 10:09 a.m., EST, 7/13/57 Mr. Tom Courtney at the AEC relocation site advised that AEC had received an interagency communication from the "newly created" National Censorship Organization. Courtney ^{advised} that the FBI was included as one of the action agencies. Censorship asks the following questions: (1) Number of persons to be submitted for censorship purposes and (2) Number of the listings on this censorship list which may be turned over to friendly foreign governments. Courtney stated he desired to check with the FBI as to the figures we would submit to Censorship as he felt that all AEC's censorship

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OUTSIDE PROBLEMS

subjects would be covered in the FBI submission. Courtney drew this conclusion based on the fact that the Bureau had investigated all AEC applicant and related cases and, therefore, any persons that AEC may list would be covered by FBI censorship listings. It was determined that the Bureau had not received the communication from the National Censorship Organization. At 10:50 a.m., Agent Daunt at the Justice relocation site phoned and stated Justice had received a message for the FBI and INS in regard to the censorship matter referred by AEC. He was told that the FBI's answer to the censorship inquiry would be handled at the FBI relocation site. A teletype was transmitted to National Censorship furnishing simulated answers to their questions with a suggestion that future messages relating to operations of the FBI in the censorship field be sent directly to the FBI.

In answer to Courtney's request that AEC be permitted to use the Bureau's name in AEC's answer to Censorship, he was told that the AEC should not refer to the Bureau in making its reply to Censorship that our listings did not include the AEC Watch list as we have no knowledge of any of the names which AEC may submit and that they should handle the problem with Censorship direct and in their own name. Courtney stated he understood and would so handle the problem.

PROBLEM # 8

ASAC Simon, New York, called at 7:10 p.m., 7/13/57 advising that our Liaison Agent at Peekskill had been advised by Civil Defense at Peekskill that Civil Defense had received a message from Civil Defense, Albany, alleging that FBI had arrested 383 persons in Albany for looting a Federal Reserve Bank, that there was jail room for only 150 and there remained the question of disposing of the other 233. Mr. Simon said that our Liaison Agent at Peekskill told Civil Defense that this was a problem for the Bureau of Prisons. Subsequently, however, at 6:50 a.m., Civil Defense at Peekskill communicated with Civil Defense at Albany advising the matter had been referred to FCDA at Harvard, Massachusetts, and that FCDA was to contact FBI Headquarters for advice.

Memorandum to Mr. Belmont
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Mr. Belmont advised Mr. Simon to tell Civil Defense at Peekskill that he had contacted our Albany Office (simulated) which had made arrangements through the United States Attorney to have the Bureau of Prisons take charge of all these 233 persons that they were in custody and that the matter had been handled.

PROBLEM # 9

By teletype at 5:05 a.m., July 14, 1957, Civil Defense, Region Number Two, advised FBI at relocation site that a chlorine storage tank at Charlestown, West Virginia, was leaking badly and that sabotage was expected. FCDA requested investigation and advice of FBI.

By teletype at 9:00 a.m., July 14, 1957, we advised FCDA, Region Two, that acting on a previous report from the West Virginia State Police immediate investigation by FBI Agents had revealed that the leakage was a result of a structural failure in the storage tank, no evidence of sabotage developed and no further investigation being conducted.

PROBLEM # 10

At 10:58 p.m., on 7/13/57 the Office of Emergency Resources (OER) asked for a planning report from all Government agencies by teletype. At 2:22 p.m., on 7/14/57 in response to specific questions asked by OER, FBI replied that its programs prior to the attack had been reviewed and had been adapted to the situation after the attack; and that our planned programs were adequate to meet situations arising within FBI area of responsibility. We had no changes to suggest in OER directives or policies.

OER is the simulated wartime equivalent of Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM) which was created by the promulgation of document 105 of Operation Alert on 6/21/57.

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OUTSIDE PROBLEMS

PROBLEM # 11

A teletype was received from San Francisco at 9:42 p.m., July 13, 1957, advising that Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA), Santa Rosa, California, had reported to FBI San Francisco that a false report had been circulated that bombs had been dropped on Oxnard, Edwards Air Force Base, Pt. Vincente, California, and Helena, Montana. FCDA advised since these reports were definitely not true they believed false reports might be disruptive tactics by subversive groups within the area.

San Francisco teletype stated that FCDA was advised by that office that the FBI was taking appropriate action. No additional action necessary in this matter.

PROBLEM # 12

At 8:05 p.m., EST, 7/14/57, we received a teletype from ODM Press Center addressed to all information officers in the Government network requesting that a separate draft press release covering each major action to be taken by each agency under responsible column in briefing guides for Operation Alert 1957 be filed with PIPELINE prior to 5:00 p.m., EST, July 16, 1957. PIPELINE is the Press Center.

At 9:50 p.m., EST, 7/14/57, Liaison Agent J. D. Daunt at the Department of Justice relocation site was instructed to advise the Department information officer that the FBI was not filing a separate press release in this matter; that Justice should include in its report pertinent comments regarding FBI operations; however, that no mention should be made of the specific emergency programs carried out by the FBI during the course of the alert.

PROBLEM # 13

At 1:05 a.m., EST, 7/15/57, Liaison Agent Whaley at HIGHPOINT telephonically advised that NEWSPPOINT (at Roanoke, Virginia,) reported three persons had been attempting to obtain information at NEWSPPOINT on Operation Alert. These individuals reportedly

Memorandum to Mr. Belmont

RE: OPERATION ALERT 1957

JULY 12-19, 1957

OUTSIDE PROBLEMS

were insistent in their attempts and had bandied about code words utilized by various agencies during the course of the alert and NEWSPOINT officials were apprehensive as to their real identities and the security of the operation. Whaley was instructed it would be all right for him to tell NEWSPOINT to contact our Resident Agent at Roanoke, Virginia, furnishing him all the details; however, that no actual investigation was to be requested of the Resident Agent by NEWSPOINT officials but they were merely to furnish the story to the Resident Agent.

At 8:10 a.m., 7/15/57, Mr. Belmont telephonically instructed SAC Roche at Richmond that this matter was to be handled in such a manner as to keep the FBI out of it. It was pointed out that the three individuals were probably newspapermen; that the Bureau should not get involved; that the only reason the Bureau agreed to have the Resident Agent at Roanoke take the message was because HIGHPOINT was insistent that the Resident Agent should only accept the information offered, should make no comment or suggestion and should report the information to Richmond which would advise Bureau's relocation site. SAC Roche was also advised if there should be any inquiry from the newspapers he and the Resident Agent should make no comment but refer the newspapers to the source. Mr. McGuire at the Bureau was advised concerning this.

At 3:07 p.m., 7/15/57, SAC Roche telephonically advised Mr. Belmont that according to a Mr. McMillen, Acting Director of the News Relocation Site at Roanoke, who had talked to the Resident Agent that the occurrence referred to was actually three separate incidents. (1) One involved a relocated individual who was in a bar with five others from the relocation site when three uninvited individuals joined them and inquired regarding their identities and what they were doing. One of the uninvited individuals mentioned the code word for the Post Office relocation site. (2) Another relocated individual advised that she was alone at a hotel room bar drinking beer when she was approached by two unidentified men and later a third who inquired as to what she was doing. They made no inquiry regarding Operation Alert. (3) A group of relocated individuals having a party in the room of one of them reported an unknown individual telephoned and wanted to know if anything was going on.

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The party broke up at 5:00 a.m.

According to SAC Roche, these occurrences possess all the earmarks of a two-day sustained party with no indication of any publicity on the matter and Mr. Belmont instructed him to do nothing further and a report on the matter would not be necessary. In view of the facts developed, Agent Whaley advised ODM that we will take no further action on this matter.

PROBLEM # 14

At 1:55 p.m., on July 15, 1957, the Bureau received at its relocation site a teletype from the Commissioner of Federal Supply Service (GSA) requesting that any surplus motor vehicles used by us be turned in at once to the nearest departmental relocation motor pool for their use in essential motor transportation services.

After appropriate identification of this GSA agency the Commissioner of FSS was advised by teletype on 5/15/57 that this Bureau had no excess vehicles.

PROBLEM # 15

At 8:44 p.m., July 16, 1957, the Bureau received a teletype via HIGHPOINT from the National Advisory Commission for Aeronautics. This message stated that the National Advisory Commission for Aeronautics at the Ames Aeronautical Laboratory at Moffett Field, California, had advised that one Harry Opportunist, research scientist, had been AWOL since July 11, 1957, and was believed to be aboard a Panamanian freighter, the SS "Traitor." The vessel departed San Diego on July 11, destination unknown. According to an Ames Laboratory scientist, he had seen Opportunist aboard the vessel on the 11th of July, at which time he was observed on the ship's deck with the captain during loading operations. NACA advised that a list of missing classified material charged to Opportunist and the latter's description would be furnished. A brief description of Opportunist was supplied with the referenced message. This problem was handled by sending the following

Memorandum to Mr. Belmont
RE: DEFENSE PLANS
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teletype to NACA at their relocation site at 9:45 A.M., July 16, 1957: The subject of your inquiry, Harry Opportunist, was taken into custody by US authorities in the Panama Canal Zone. He is presently being held for trial. The classified documents in his possession have been recovered and will be returned to NACA in due time.

PROBLEM # 16

By teletype dated July 16, the Small Business Administration (SBA) advised FBI relocation site that there was a local rumor to the effect that a submarine had landed enemy agents near Cape Lookout, North Carolina; further, that timberland fires of uncertain origin had been reported along US Highway 70 between Salisbury, Greensboro, and Durham, North Carolina.

By teletype at 9:45 A.M., July 17, we advised SBA we had previously received the information and that investigation had reflected the suspected enemy saboteurs to be local fishermen. In addition, we had determined that the timberland fires had been started by lightning during a local thunderstorm.

PROBLEM # 17

By teletype dated July 16, 1957, the SBA advised that a report had been received that enemy agents at Mayaguez, Puerto Rico, had started rumors to the effect that the US was using poison gas and the enemy would retaliate.

We advised the SBA by teletype at 9:48 A.M., July 17, 1957, that we had taken into custody on July 16, 1957, two enemy agents in Mayaguez and had seized mimeograph machines together with a number of leaflets which reflected alleged use of poison gas by the US. We further advised the SBA that through the mediums of press, radio, and television, the general public had been made aware of the false nature of the rumors.

PROBLEM # 18

At 10:00 P.M., July 16, 1957, the San Juan Office, by radiogram, requested advice regarding furnishing figures concerning total number of personnel participating in Operation Alert 1957 to Civil Defense Director for Puerto Rico.

Memorandum to Mr. Belmont
RE: DEFENSE PLANS
OPERATION ALERT 1957
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OUTSIDE PROBLEMS

At 10:28 A.M., July 17, 1957, we advised San Juan by radiogram that information requested by Civil Defense Director, Puerto Rico, was being furnished by Bureau to ODM headquarters; no action necessary by them and Civil Defense Director should be so advised.

All of the outside problems were completed with the action noted under each problem.

B

ATTACHMENT B
BOMB DAMAGE AND FALLOUT

MR. BELMONT

July 15, 1957

D. J. PARSONS

OPERATION ALERT 1957
BOMB DAMAGE - FIELD OFFICES - PROBLEM #8

The table below indicates the extent of blast damage, resulting from mock detonations, to the field offices:

<u>COMPLETE</u> - 25	<u>SEVERE</u> - 6	<u>MODERATE</u> - 9	<u>SLIGHT</u> - 4
Albany	Atlanta	Albuquerque	Baltimore
Buffalo	New Haven	Anchorage	Chicago
Cincinnati	New York City	Birmingham	Detroit
Cleveland	Philadelphia	Milwaukee	Salt Lake City
Dallas	St. Louis	Miami	
Denver	San Francisco	Minneapolis	
Honolulu		Newark	
Houston		Oklahoma City	
Indianapolis		Pittsburgh	
Kansas City			
Knoxville			
Little Rock			
Los Angeles			
Louisville			
Memphis			
Mobile			
New Orleans			
Norfolk			
Omaha			
Phoenix			
Portland			
San Diego			
Savannah			
Seattle			
Washington Field			

SUMMARY: 25 offices completely destroyed
19 additional offices damaged

Of the 8 offices not damaged, two (Butte and Springfield) were affected by fallout. Therefore, 46 offices were made unusable at least for a temporary period.

Ten of our field office relocation sites were affected by fallout, but it was necessary to move only five of them: Albany, Denver, Los Angeles, Oklahoma City and Pittsburgh. Bureau relocation site at Quantico was not affected.

NOT AFFECTED

El Paso	Butte
Boston	Charlotte
Richmond	San Juan
San Antonio	Springfield

6 AUG 7 1957

66-19009-164
ENCLOSURE

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. BELMONT

DATE: July 16, 1957

FROM : D. J. PARSONS

SUBJECT: OPERATION ALERT 1957
 DAMAGE ASSESSMENT - PERSONNEL LOSSES
 GENERAL SUMMARY

Tolson _____
 Nichols _____
 Boardman _____
 Belmont ☒ _____
 Mason _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
 Rosen _____
 Tamm _____
 Nease _____
 Winterrowd _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holloman _____
 Gandy _____

The following tabulation shows the effects of the mock attacks based upon radio reports from field offices:

Targets hit by nuclear explosions.....	154
Bombs failing to explode (duds).....	2
Number of states suffering from blast.....	47
Number of field offices completely destroyed.....	25
Number of offices damaged or unuseable.....	21
Number of resident agencies destroyed or damaged.....	53
Number of relocation sites affected by blast.....	0
Number of relocation sites moved because of fallout.....	5

By way of explanation as to how this mock attack and exercise were planned, it should be pointed out that each of the Civil Defense areas was allotted in advance so many bombs which they were to allocate for targets in their areas. When the mock attack took place, the local Civil Defense was to notify the Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA) giving information as to the type of bomb, and the point of detonation. FCDA then reported this information and their evaluation to the other agencies. This information was also reported to the Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM) in order that their giant computer could be used to evaluate damage and casualties.

Based on our previous experience in relying on other agencies, the Laboratory sent instructions to the field prior to the beginning of Operation Alert for the reporting of mock bombings within the field office territories. It is interesting to note that all of the bombs affecting Bureau installations were reported from the field prior to any useable information that was received from FCDA or ODM. It is also interesting to note that 102 radiograms were received from the field containing information which was plotted and evaluated at our relocation center and we were, therefore, many hours ahead in evaluating damage to Bureau facilities and operating abilities in the field. It is further interesting

ENCLOSURE
 Enclosure

RECORDED - 40

66-19009-164
AUG 7 1957

1- Mr. Belmont
 1- Mr. Roach

JFG/mek (5)

Memo Mr. Parsons to Mr. Belmont
Re: Operation Alert 1957
Damage Assessment - Personnel Losses
General Summary

to note that we have had conflicting reports from FCDA and ODM concerning the number of bombs and targets. However, the most recent information which was not received until late Sunday afternoon (7/14/57) shows that they finally reached the figure of 156 detonations. Their computations were in error, however, since they reported only 29 FBI field offices damaged.

FALLOUT

Fallout casualties were plotted on a situation map at the relocation site using the actual winds for July 12, 1957, the date of the mock attack, and the bomb-drop data received from field offices. As a result of this study actual and simulated messages were sent to field office relocation sites to advise of the fallout hazards in their areas. For example, it is noted that the SAC at Cleveland, acting upon local Civil Defense advice, advised that he was simulating a move of his relocation site from Fremont, Ohio, to Sandusky, Ohio; it was apparent from the situation map that Fremont was clear and Sandusky was in the fallout from a blast at Detroit. Cleveland was so advised and instructed to maintain their site at Fremont.

On July 13, 1957, a fallout summary report was received from FCDA. Although this was well after we had made our evaluations and sent instructions to the field, it was noted that the FCDA fallout summary was accurate and compared favorably with our map prepared at Quantico.

RELOCATION SITES

Although no relocation sites were affected by the blasts, five were forced to move because of fallout contamination at the selected sites. In this connection it is noted that Los Angeles, one of the offices forced to move its relocation site, was subjected to two nuclear blasts totaling 40 million tons. Oklahoma City was forced to move because the upper air winds were from the southeast, an unusual flow of air since the normal upper air winds in this vicinity are from the west.

CASUALTY REPORT

The attached casualty report sets forth the estimates as reflected in the aggregate population summaries turned out by the massive electronic computer at the National Damage Assessment Center of the Office of Defense

Memo Mr. Parsons to Mr. Belmont
Re: Operation Alert 1957
Damage Assessment - Personnel Losses
General Summary

Mobilization. It is pointed out that these casualties are representative of a normal "in place" population and not a deployed population that would have evacuated to selected relocation sites. It is reasonable to assume that an efficient evacuation upon a two- or three-hour warning could have cut these mock casualty figures in half.

ACTION

For information.

Memo Mr. Parsons to Mr. Belmont
 Re: Operation Alert 1957 - Bomb Damage
 Personnel Losses

<u>Field Office</u>	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Total Killed</u>	<u>Total Injured</u>	<u>Agents</u>	<u>Agents Killed</u>	<u>Agents. Injured</u>
Albany	79	20	12	51	11	7
Albuquerque	54	46	2	37	31	2
Anchorage	22	6	2	14	1	1
Atlanta	82	33	12	59	17	8
Baltimore	193	10	15	121	5	10
Birmingham	44	3	6	29	1	3
Boston	204	67	25	134	27	19
Buffalo	80	32	12	48	14	8
Butte	59	2	5	38	2	3
Charlotte	110	0	6	76	0	4
Chicago	481	0	19	317	0	16
Cincinnati	103	60	15	66	36	14
Cleveland	165	111	18	111	69	13
Dallas	96	6	7	67	3	6
Denver	89	65	8	56	45	5
Detroit	327	111	66	216	65	34
El Paso	36	0	2	25	0	1
Honolulu	18	5	1	10	1	1
Houston	56	7	7	38	1	4
Indianapolis	110	71	16	75	34	16
Kansas City	115	80	6	75	47	3
Knoxville	60	19	6	39	14	4
Little Rock	49	41	3	32	26	3
Los Angeles	491	408	34	323	262	22
Louisville	75	62	6	52	38	6
Memphis	67	4	3	43	3	2
Miami	137	106	10	92	68	8
Milwaukee	77	44	12	48	19	9
Minneapolis	108	79	9	75	47	8
Mobile	58	36	6	39	23	4
Newark	308	6	37	202	4	26
New Haven	72	22	11	47	13	7
New Orleans	91	82	3	63	55	2
New York	1801	848	270	1308	459	221

66-19009-164

ENCLOSURE

Memo Mr. Parsons to Mr. Belmont
 Re: Operation Alert 1957 - Bomb Damage
 Personnel Losses

<u>Field Office</u>	<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Total Killed</u>	<u>Total Injured</u>	<u>Agents</u>	<u>Agents Killed</u>	<u>Agents Injured</u>
Norfolk	34	21	7	22	13	5
Oklahoma City	55	45	3	36	26	3
Omaha	62	55	3	43	36	3
Philadelphia	255	94	159	35	14	
Phoenix	60	46	1	40	29	1
Pittsburgh	142	72	10	89	36	9
Portland	48	35	2	32	21	2
Richmond	63	0	3	42	0	2
Saint Louis	108	61	28	60	31	11
Salt Lake City	54	0	3	36	0	2
San Antonio	62	0	3	43	0	2
San Diego	79	60	3	54	41	3
San Francisco	422	278	51	283	156	39
San Juan	45	5	6	28	1	2
Savannah	58	42	5	38	27	3
Seattle	166	43	15	111	8	17
Springfield	68	0	3	44	0	2
Washington Field	692	657	20	474	431	24
Seat of Government	5056	4800	145	451	410	22
TOTAL	13,446	8,806	1,004	6,111	2,742	666

ATTACHMENT C
IMPORTANT PROCLAMATIONS AND
EXECUTIVE ORDERS ISSUED

RECEIVED
JAN 10 1964

Office Memorandum UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: 7/18/57

FROM : W. A. Branigan

SUBJECT: OPERATION ALERT 1957
IMPORTANT PROCLAMATIONS AND
EXECUTIVE ORDERS ISSUED

Tolson	_____
Boardman	_____
Nichols	_____
Belmont	_____
Harbo	_____
Mohr	_____
Parsons	_____
Rosen	_____
Tamm	_____
Sizoo	_____
Winterrowd	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holloman	_____
Gandy	_____

The attack phase of Operation Alert 1957 commenced on July 12, 1957. It was assumed that on June 20 the President had proclaimed a national emergency. Between that date and July 12, some 174 preliminary administrative and economic actions by the President and various agencies of the Government contained in the "Briefing Guides for Operation Alert 1957" could have been taken to place the U.S. in a state of war readiness. This reduced the number of Presidential proclamations and executive orders necessarily promulgated on D-day, July 12.

The Office of Emergency Resources (OER), a temporary agency supplanting ODM, supplied a summary of the preliminary actions, none of which directly affected the FBI, in a series of teletypes beginning at 9 p.m., 7/14/57. These actions included the creation of various temporary agencies which would be responsible for basic necessities in time of war, such as: Office of Emergency Resources (OER); Emergency Food Agency (EFA); Emergency Production Agency (EPA); Emergency Transport Agency (ETA); Emergency Manpower Agency (EMA); Emergency Housing Agency (EHA); Emergency Energy and Minerals Agency (EEMA); Emergency Stabilization Agency (ESA); Emergency Communications Agency (ECA); and Emergency Economic Agency (EEA). They also included numerous orders and directives from those agencies. The names of these agencies had been changed from those initially published in the Operation Alert 1957 documents, but their functions were the same as indicated therein.

At 11:12 a.m., July 12, after a meeting of the President's Cabinet, the President's statement proclaiming a state of war and declaring a national emergency and a Civil Defense emergency (Document D-182) was released to all departments and agencies. At the same time, the following executive orders were promulgated:

ENCLOSURE

D-183: Instructing FCDA to handle all civil defense relief and rehabilitation matters; authorizing use of military assistance; authorizing Secretary of Defense to prescribe military areas; and suspending writ of habeas corpus for 60 days. (Although the latter provision is in connection with FCDA and Defense matters, it could help us in the Security Index program.)

RECORDED - 40

6 AUG 7 1957

66-190e9-164

[Handwritten signature/initials]

Memorandum for A. H. Belmont
Re: Operation Alert 1957
Important Proclamations and
Executive Orders Issued

D-185: Ordering protective custody of enemy official personnel. (This would have confirmed the action already taken by State and FBI under Operation Alert 1957.)

D-186: Ordering control of diplomatic and consular property. (This would have confirmed the action of State and FBI in searching such property and seizing contraband, and also would provide control of buildings and other property.)

No texts of D-185 and D-186 were distributed. Drafts of such documents to be considered for actual use are under preparation in State.

D-187: Establishing an Office of Censorship and providing for its operations. (The FBI, after censorship of international communications was imposed, would supply names for the censorship watch lists and the FBI Laboratory would make examination of original correspondence in cases of special interest to the FBI.)

D-188: Mobilizing armed forces for military and civil defense purposes. (No text of this appeared in the Documents Annex for Operation Alert 1957 issued by the Office of Defense Mobilization.)

At 5:09 p.m., 7/12/57, three Presidential documents were publicized to all Government departments and agencies:

Proclamation D-189 on needs of manpower and production; on emergency financial aid to families in distress and freezing wages, rents and prices; and on mobilization of health resources. (Editorial changes were made in this document by teletype to all Government departments and agencies from ESA, 7/15/57, at 6:45 p.m.)

Executive Order D-190 on protection of the banking system, and relieving directors, officers or employees of any liability for actions undertaken in good faith pursuant to the order.

Executive Order D-191 on protection of the savings and loan systems, similar to D-190.

These three documents did not directly affect the FBI.

Memorandum for A. H. Belmont.
Re: Operation Alert 1957
Important Proclamations and
Executive Orders Issued

On 7/13/57 at 1:58 a.m., all Government departments and agencies were advised of the suspension of the publication of documents in the Federal Register. To do this, the President signed Executive Order D-194.

At 10:35 a.m. EST, 7/13/57, a release was made to all Government departments and agencies of the President's statement on the attack and the emergency (D-195).

The foregoing Presidential actions consisted of two proclamations and eight executive orders, as compared with the Operation Alert 1956 figures of eight Presidential proclamations and 19 executive orders.

Planned actions by the various temporary agencies and the permanent agencies and departments, for which predication had been laid in the preattack period, made unnecessary a flood of new paper directives after the attack.

In some instances, however, directives were forthcoming. The Office of Emergency Resources issued its manpower "Directive #2," assigning to the Selective Service System responsibility for procuring military manpower and assigning to the Emergency Manpower Agency, also referred to as Emergency Manpower Administration (EMA), responsibility for coordinating the use of civilian manpower. This directive, which was issued at 2:51 p.m., 7/12/57, and supported by additional orders at 7:03 p.m., 7/13/57, provided that all claimants for civilian manpower, including the Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA) and the Department of Defense, would request civilian manpower from the EMA. The claimant agencies would recruit or otherwise procure manpower in accordance with methods and apportionments established by the EMA. The FCDA was given authority in confronting local emergency requirements to take direct manpower action but so far as practical the disruption of work by surviving high priority civilian services should be avoided.

At 5:29 p.m., 7/12/57, the Civil Service Commission transmitted its Emergency Circular No. 1, suspending career conditional appointments; adopting emergency indefinite appointments; authorizing direct recruitment; and instructing Civil Service Commission offices to modify standards to meet local needs.

Only one FCDA directive was received. This, issued at 7:41 a.m., 7/14/57, delegated its powers under the Federal Civil Defense Act to acquire private property to the Emergency Energy and Minerals Agency. This directive is in accord with Title 50, Appendix, U. S. Code, Sections 2281-h and 2296.

There were no Presidential proclamations, executive orders or departmental or agency directives, regulations or instructions, which were transmitted to the Bureau relocation site that mentioned the FBI.

ATTACHMENT D

PERSONNEL

D

66-19009-164
ENCLOSURE

QUANTICO

OPERATION ALERT - 1957

PERSONNEL

Administrative Division

John P. Mohr - Assistant Director

Clude C. Carey - Chauffeur ✓

Thomas E. Moten - Chauffeur ✓

Records and Communications Division

Cartha D. DeLoach - Inspector

Ruth McCord ✓

Records Section

O. George Medler - Special Agent

Kenneth Elkins ✓

R. Storit Murphu ✓

V. Fay Richardson ✓

John R. Schemmel ✓

Communications Section

Louis E. Wherry, Jr. ✓

Mildred M. Foster ✓

Alvin C. Frank ✓

Theola S. Hall ✓

Catherine M. Levesque ✓

Charles E. Price ✓

Teletype Unit

Shirley K. Haines ✓

Jean Hope Marshall ✓

Nancy A. Mooney ✓

Clude E. Strickland ✓

Elise W. Wyrick ✓

Coding Unit

Mary P. Ambrose ✓
Casey W. Arnette ✓
Caroline C. Atkins ✓
Theresa M. Graves ✓
Harold W. Lawson ✓
H. Joann Thomas ✓
Ernest B. Ulmer ✓
Macie M. Van Slyke ✓
Jacquelyn Ann Walden ✓
Miriam B. Wassink ✓

Domestic Intelligence Division

Alan H. Belmont - Assistant Director
Lorena H. Lewis - Secretary ✓

Internal Security Section

Fred J. Baumgardner - Chief
Paul R. Bibler - Special Agent
Joseph D. Donohue - Special Agent
Helen I. Ferguson - Secretary ✓
Rose M. Wielkiewicz - Secretary ✓

Espionage Section

William A. Branigan - Chief
Barbara L. Bowie - Secretary ✓
Helen M. Martis - Secretary ✓
W. Ray Wannall - Special Agent
Lish Whitson - Special Agent

Subversive Control Section

James F. Bland - Chief
Miles T. Burd - Secretary ✓
Paul L. Cox - Special Agent
Peggy J. Micer - Secretary ✓
Theron D. Rushing - Special Agent
Mildred J. Tweedon - Secretary ✓

Liaison Section

Ralph R. Roach - Chief
J. Wright Brown - Special Agent
Martha A. Dale - Secretary ✓
Bernard L. Huelskamp - Special Agent
John T. Minnich - Special Agent

Liaison Agents at Sites of Other Agencies

Orin H. Bartlett - White House
Charles W. Bates - Atomic Energy Commission
Jerome J. Daunt - Department of Justice
Graham A. Day - Department of Defense
Meffert W. Kuhrtz - Department of State
Sam J. Papich - Central Intelligence Agency
Wesley T. Whaley - Office of Defense Mobilization
Daniel J. Sullivan - Assistant Chief of Staff,
Intelligence, G-2

Liaison Employees Other Than Those Participating at Quantico

Joy A. Eastham - Clerk ✓

Mrs. Eastham, in addition to her duties in the Special Memorandum Unit of the Liaison Section, voluntarily performed numerous duties in connection with the planning phases of Operation Alert - 1957. During the two-week period previous to the start of the Operation, she willingly sought out and solved many of the overwhelming clerical-type duties associated with the paper work required by the Operation.

Laboratory Division

Donald J. Parsons - Assistant Director
Mary E. Keough - Secretary ✓

Electronics Section

Richard L. Millen - Chief
Robert F. Pfafman - Special Agent
Ben L. Sutton - Special Agent

Cryptanalysis-Translation Section

Churchill F. Downing - Chief

Physics-Chemistry Section

John F. Gallagher - Special Agent
William R. Heilman - Special Agent

Laboratory Employees Other Than Those Participating
at Quantico

Wilbur E. Stahl - Special Agent
Lyman G. Hailey - Special Agent

The above Special Agents made particularly valuable contributions to the success of the radio communications phase of the exercise prior to and during the most critical period. Special Agent Stahl, Electronics Section, working with Special Agent Sutton prior to the Alert, was instrumental in getting Atomic Energy Commission, Highpoint and Central Intelligence Agency microwave circuits straightened out. During the most critical period, he manned the microwave equipment shack continuously from early Friday morning, July 12, until Saturday night, July 13. Special Agent Hailey, Electronics Section, primarily concerned with radio frequencies, interference and over-all radio operations problems of the CW network, was on duty at the Midland radio station, charting traffic flow, filling in where necessary, and generally keeping things running smoothly on a continuous basis from early Friday morning, July 12, to midnight, Saturday, July 13.

FBI Academy

Henry L. Sloan - Special Agent in Charge
C. Pershing Bell - Assistant Special Agent in Charge
Hayes Beckwith, Jr. - Maintenance Employee
Luther C. Blake - Clerk
Dan A. Brant - Special Agent
Charles H. Bridgewater, Jr. - Secretary
John A. Chase - Special Agent
James A. Ford - Maintenance Employee

*General letter
to SAC Sloan
per Rec #57
memo. of
JH*

William G. Harrell - Maintenance Employee
John R. Harrison - Special Agent
Bruce C. Hodge - Special Agent
Glenn Eugene Ing - Special Agent
Charles P. Jones, Jr. - Maintenance Employee
John M. Kirsch - Special Agent
William F. Kyle - Maintenance Employee
Harold K. Light - Special Agent
Wallace H. Mann, Jr. - Chief Clerk
Barney C. Olson - Gunsmith
Victor R. Schaefer - Special Agent
Kenneth Shaffer - Clerk
John F. Snellings - Maintenance Employee
J. Leroy Sullivan - Maintenance Employee
Hillard D. Thorpe - Special Agent
Joseph P. Varnick - Gunsmith
George A. Zeiss III - Special Agent

Employees of the Cleaves Food Service Corporation are covered by a separate memorandum.

July 31, 1957

RECORDED - 1

66-19009-165

EX-110

Mr. J. Cordell Moore
Director
Division of Security
Department of the Interior
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Moore:

Your kind letter of July 24, 1957, has been received, and your generous comments relative to the assistance which this Bureau was privileged to afford concerning Operation Alert are indeed appreciated.

Letters such as yours are most encouraging, and you may be sure that Special Agent William P. Baker will be grateful for your good words regarding him. Likewise, I know that the other representatives whom you named will be pleased to know of your favorable comments, and I am apprising them of the contents of your communication.

As you know, the FBI is always anxious to be of any service possible. Please feel free to call on us whenever our help is needed.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

- cc - Mr. William P. Baker, with copy of incoming.
- cc - Mr. Wesley T. Whaley, with copy of incoming.
- cc - Mr. Jerome J. Daunt, with copy of incoming.
- cc - Mr. Daniel J. Sullivan, with copy of incoming.
- cc - Mr. Orrin H. Bartlett, with copy of incoming.
- cc - Personnel file of Mr. William P. Baker, with copy of incoming.
- cc - Personnel file of Mr. Wesley T. Whaley, with copy of incoming.
- cc - Personnel file of Mr. Jerome J. Daunt, with copy of incoming.
- cc - Personnel file of Mr. Daniel J. Sullivan, with copy of incoming.
- cc - Personnel file of Mr. Orrin H. Bartlett, with copy of incoming.

NOTE: (See next page.)

CBF:ogh



Tolson _____
Nichols _____
Boardman _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
Trotter _____
Nease _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

50 AUG 12 1957

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

Mr. J. Cordell Moore

NOTE: Bufiles reflect Moore is most cooperative and friendly with the Bureau. The Director sent him a note expressing sympathy on his father's death on 3-26-57. William P. Baker, EOD 3-5-51, assigned Investigative Division in GS-12. Wesley T. Whaley, EOD 7-7-47, assigned Domestic Intelligence Division in GS-13. Jerome J. Daunt, EOD 4-28-47, assigned Domestic Intelligence Division in GS-14. Daniel J. Sullivan, EOD 12-2-40, assigned Domestic Intelligence Division in GS-14. Orrin H. Bartlett, EOD 8-15-34 as Clerk, 5-1-39 as SA, resigned 1-21-49, reinstated 10-3-49, assigned Domestic Intelligence in GS-14.



UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

July 24, 1957

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. Nichols	
Mr. Boardman	
Mr. Belmont	
Mr. Mohr	
Mr. Parsons	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Tamm	
Mr. Trotter	
Mr. Nease	
Tele. Room	
Mr. Holloman	
Miss Gandy	

Honorable J. Edgar Hoover
The Director
U. S. Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Sir:

During the last few days immediately preceding Operation Alert 1957, it was necessary to obtain name checks on numerous individuals who were expected to participate in the exercise. In spite of the heavy work-load which the Federal Bureau of Investigation had at the time, we were able to obtain all of the information we requested.

The courtesy with which the employees of the Bureau received and acted upon our requests certainly reflects great credit on your organization.

I do not usually single out individual names because I realize that I do not know the names of all those who assist in obtaining the information we request. I would, however, like to specifically mention the courtesy extended by Mr. William P. Baker in the Name Check Section.

I hope it is not inappropriate to mention at this time also the excellent service that has been rendered during my five years as Director of the Division of Security with the various liaison officers, all of whom have been outstandingly courteous and helpful. They include the present liaison officer, Wes Whaley; Jerry Daunt, Dan Sullivan, Orin Bartlett and others. Yours is a splendid organization.

Sincerely yours,

J. Cordell Moore
Director, Division of Security

J. Cordell Moore

EXP. PROC.

JUL 26 1957

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 62-544734-1

*Encl (for ref only)
ack 7-31-57
CBF*

*10 antest made
7-30-57
del*

RECORDED - 1 66-19009-165

EX-110

AUG 7 1957

*3-1-11
JUL 26 1957*

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Director

DATE: July 16, 1957

FROM : A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: OPERATION ALERT 1957

Tolson _____
 Boardman _____
 Nichols _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
 Rosen _____
 Tamm _____
 Sizoo _____
 Winterrowd _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holloman _____
 Gandy _____

This report covers the Bureau's activity at the relocation site from 3 p.m. EST, Monday, July 15, to 3 p.m. EST, Tuesday, July 16.

PERSONNEL

This afternoon we are releasing 12 additional personnel: Three from Records and Communications; five from Domestic Intelligence Division; and four from the Laboratory, including Assistant Director Parsons, who finds it possible to return.

This will leave 29 of the original 59 who were relocated by July 12, broken down as follows:

Domestic Intelligence Division

Supervisors - 4
 Stenographers - $\frac{3}{7}$

Laboratory

Supervisors - 2

Records and Communications

Supervisor - 1
 Clerical employees - $\frac{19}{20}$

Upon the completion of the summary report on the night of July 17, we will release additional personnel.

cc - Mr. Nichols
 Mr. Boardman
 Mr. Holloman
 Mr. Parsons
 Mr. Belmont
 Mr. Sizoo
 Mr. Baumgardner
 Mr. Bland
 Mr. Roach

RECORDED - 64
 EX 105

66-19007-166
 21 AUG 12 1957

LIASON
 cm

55 AUG 16 1957
 ARB:bib

(See Addendum of Administrative Division page 4)

Memorandum for the Director
Re: Operation Alert 1957

Liaison Supervisor Bates returned to Washington from Atomic Energy Commission relocation site this morning. We expect to release Liaison Supervisors Daunt (Justice) and Papich [] this afternoon. This will leave only two^{b7E} Liaison supervisors with their agencies, namely, Whaley at ODM, and Kuhrtz at State. Both of these are still considered necessary in view of the activity at those agencies.

An examination of our contact with our field offices reflects it is possible at this point to eliminate the all-day radio monitoring in the field (8:30 a.m. to 10 p.m.), thus saving personnel in the field. Therefore, a radio message was sent to all field offices instructing that normal radio coverage be resumed at 1 p.m., today.

ACTIVITIES AT OTHER AGENCIES

Liaison Agent Daunt advised July 15 that Deputy Attorney General Rogers had arrived to assist in the briefing of Justice Executive Reserves. Daunt said that the Bureau's detention programs would be discussed by Mr. Canavan of the Department for the benefit of the Executive Reservists. Daunt was instructed to mention to Mr. Rogers that these programs carry a Top Secret classification and mention that undoubtedly the Department has seen to it that the Reservists in question are cleared for Top Secret. Daunt said Olney did not come to Justice relocation but Tompkins would come out on July 15. On July 16, Daunt advised that Rogers and Tompkins had left Justice relocation.

Liaison Agent Kuhrtz advised at 8:27 a.m., July 16, that State Department has outlined a very ambitious program regarding this exercise at Front Royal. One hundred thirty people have relocated, with Roderic L. O'Connor in charge and Under Secretary Herter expected to arrive afternoon of July 16.

Liaison Agent Whaley advised from ODM relocation on July 16 that Director Gordon Gray of ODM continues to expect a build-up of the operation from agencies which swung into the operation on July 15. Gray expressed appreciation to the Director for making Whaley available at the relocation site.

Memorandum for the Director
Re; Operation Alert 1957

COMMUNICATIONS

Communications continue to operate smoothly under normal conditions.

OUTSIDE PROBLEMS

Outside problems have dropped off. We had one inquiry from General Services Administration, inquiring whether we had spare automobiles that could be made available for emergency pool. We told them we did not.

We have received a heavy volume of teletype messages from ODM and other agencies reflecting the organization of their operations, regulations and instructions issued to Government agencies, conditions throughout the country as the result of the bombing attack, etc. These have been scrutinized; where applicable to the Bureau, appropriate analysis and record have been made and will be part of the over-all report.

DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED

At 3:26 p.m., July 15, we received a message from the Richmond Office that the radio station was going off the air until further notice inasmuch as the radio operator had been called to the hospital and was on emergency annual leave. This points up the fact that in some of our offices we have only one trained radio operator. In a real emergency, if something happened to this operator, we would have no contact with the radio station in question. In our over-all report, this is being referred to the Administrative Division for analysis as to whether this situation exists in more than one office and whether remedial action is feasible or desirable at this time.

Memorandum for the Director
Re: Operation Alert 1957

ACTION:

Inasmuch as the over-all report in this operation covering the period July 12 to July 17 will be prepared tomorrow, no daily report will be submitted. Anything which may occur of real significance will, of course, be called to the Director's attention.

~~7-6~~
WJH
ADDENDUM OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION: WBH:mfj, 7/30/57

The matter which Mr. Belmont refers to on page 3 under the paragraph "Difficulties Encountered" was handled by a survey conducted by the Communications Section in 1955 and this resulted in the issuance of SAC Letter 55-36 dated 5/24/55. Therefore, this memo is being referred to the Communications Section for consideration of Mr. Belmont's observation.

WJH
7/30

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: August 5, 1957

FROM : Mr. R. R. Roach

SUBJECT: DEFENSE PLANS -
OPERATION ALERT 1957

Tolson _____
 Nichols _____
 Boardman _____
 Belmont _____
 Mason _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
 Rosen _____
 Tamm _____
 Nease _____
 Winterrowd _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holloman _____
 Gandy _____

Reference is made to my memorandum to you dated July 31, 1957, in the above-captioned matter. Referenced memorandum reported the receipt of the Cabinet paper which was received on July 29, 1957, pertaining to a critique of Operation Alert 1957, which took place at the expanded meeting of the Cabinet on July 19, 1957. This paper noted several unresolved problems which were raised by various participants in the meeting. An example was the item "including in our future planning considerations involving possible enemy use of sabotage."

Liaison was instructed to go to the Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM) and ascertain the identity of the participants raising each unresolved problem, in addition to a more detailed description of each unresolved problem and an indication as to any action planned in connection with it.

On August 2, 1957, Mr. Bartlett of the Liaison Section discussed instant matter with Mr. John Grady, Plans and Readiness, ODM. Mr. Grady advised that ODM had no part in the preparation of the Cabinet paper in that it was prepared from notes taken by the Cabinet Secretary during the enlarged Cabinet meeting on July 19, 1957. Mr. Grady advised that ODM does not know the identities of the participants raising the particular questions nor does ODM have any more details concerning these unresolved problems. Mr. Grady said that these items will probably be considered in future plans for Operations Alert.

Without specific instructions, Liaison will not go to the Secretary of the Cabinet in order to determine who raised the questions and more details concerning them.

The Bureau has completed detailed plans on the items set forth which affect the Bureau and it is believed that no further action should be taken at this time.

8 AUG 13 1957

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that no further action be taken at this time concerning this matter.

OHB:bjt (8) ljt

1-Mr. Belmont

1-Mr. Baumgardner

1-Mr. Bland

1-Mr. Branigan

1-Mr. Clegg

1-Mr. Minnich

1-Mr. Bartlett

SENT DIRECTOR

8/13/57

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. L. V. Boardman

DATE: September 26, 1957

FROM : Mr. A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: DEFENSE PLANS - FINAL PROGRESS AND
EVALUATION REPORT ON OPERATION ALERT 1957

Two copies of a document dated 8-26-57 issued by Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM) classified "Secret" entitled "Exercise Progress and Evaluation Report No. 10" received Liaison Section 9-24-57 (one copy attached and one copy retained Defense Plans Desk Liaison Section). Document is summary of final reports submitted by agencies participating in Operation Alert 1957 (O/A 1957). The report places emphasis on unresolved problems and matters needing attention during the next 12 months. Items which appear of interest and worthy of comment are broken down under subheadings denoting content of the document thereunder and the relationship to the Bureau's Defense Planning is set forth under the subheading Comments.

1. Participation

Estimated that approximately 537,600 persons participated in O/A 1957.

2. Costs

Total out-of-pocket costs incurred by all Federal agencies excluding salaries \$1,761,937.

3. Appraisal of Progress

Exercise was rated successful and agencies appraised their current readiness to meet an emergency before attack as well as afterward as follows:

- A. High state of readiness - 37 percent of agencies.
- B. Generally satisfactory - 45 percent of agencies.
- C. Considerable improvement needed - 18 percent of agencies.

Comments:

We were and are in a high state of readiness to meet our responsibilities and fulfill our obligations, in the event of a national emergency, and it was so reported to ODM.

ENCLOSURE

4. Matters Needing Attention

Regarding top-level coordination the physical impracticability of providing safeguards for conferences by telephone and TV media is a major barrier. The advisability of providing for Liaison between

Enclosure
JTM:sfh (10)

- | | |
|-------------------|---------------------|
| 1 - Mr. Boardman | 1 - Mr. Baumgardner |
| 1 - Mr. Belmont | 1 - Mr. Bland |
| 1 - Mr. Nichols | 1 - Section |
| 1 - Mr. Parsons | 1 - Mr. Minnich |
| 1 - Mr. Brantigan | |

68 OCT 16 1957

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
Nease
Tele. Room
Holloman
Gandy

1957
OPERATION ALERT
BUREAU

RECORDED-45

INDEXED-45

66-19009-769

3 OCT 14 1957

Memo from Mr. A. H. Belmont to Mr. L. V. Boardman
RE: DEFENSE PLANS - FINAL PROGRESS AND
EVALUATION REPORT ON OPERATION ALERT 1957

agencies by placing staff members at relocation sites of agencies concerned with interrelated subject matters should be explored.

Comments:

Since the Bureau's initial participation in alert exercises, we have had Liaison Agents relocating with agencies with which we normally do business. Also, our planning calls for relocation of eleven Liaison Agents with such agencies in the event of an emergency.

5. Damage Assessment

A. Work should begin on development of on-the-ground surveys by technically competent people and capabilities in radiological monitoring at the local level must be substantially improved.

Comments:

This is a forecast of something our defense planning has consistently recognized. Our field offices have been supplied with sufficient radiation detection and monitoring equipment with certain designated personnel primarily responsible for maintenance, instruction and use of same. Additionally, each In-Service Class receives a one-hour lecture on the use and interpretation of the equipment.

B. "Consideration must also be given to the possible enemy use of sabotage."

Comments:

This statement is identical to one appearing in a cabinet paper pertaining to a critique of O/A 1957 which took place at an expanded meeting of the Cabinet on 7-19-57. Liaison discussed this question with ODM in an effort to determine the identity of the agency raising the question; to obtain a more detailed description of the action causing the question and to obtain an indication as to any action planned in connection with it. ODM was unable to furnish any information concerning this question (Memo Belmont to Boardman 8-5-57 "Defense Plans O/A 1957"). This appears to be a gratuitous statement of caution alerting all agencies to the possibility of enemy sabotage. Its brevity and terminology prevents proper analysis and further efforts at this time to obtain clarification from ODM do not appear warranted.

6. United States - Canadian Planning

Joint mobilization planning effort, as well as Canadian participation at relocation sites in future exercises seems highly desirable.

Memo from Mr. A. H. Belmont to Mr. L. V. Boardman.
RE: DEFENSE PLANS - FINAL PROGRESS AND
EVALUATION REPORT ON OPERATION ALERT 1957

Comments:

The nature of our responsibilities plus presence of our Legal Attache in Ottawa and the RCMP representative in Washington, D. C. negates necessity of Canadian participation at our relocation site.

7. Communications

Require strengthening, particularly in the field, and plans should be developed for the rerouting of traffic and providing alternate channels of communication.

Comments:

We thoroughly tested our communication facilities during O/A 1957 and they were not found wanting. Our radio network, which is less susceptible to bombing than telephone or teletype, was found to be highly effective and rapid.

8. Morale Factors

"Particular attention must be given to the families of essential emergency workers and essential Federal employees, and policies developed for such arrangements as should be made for them."

Comments:

This factor is recognized in our defense planning through utilization of our "stay behind" Agents who will render assistance to families of personnel evacuated to the degree permitted by circumstances of the emergency.

9. Records

Plans should be made for a detailed appraisal of records, the loss of which would seriously impair survival and rehabilitation.

Comments:

This item has been thoroughly examined over the years and our defense planning more than adequately provides for contingencies with regard to our essential records.

10. Emergency Documents

Many documents were hastily prepared for the exercise and inadequately reviewed or cleared before issuance.

Comments:

Any documents submitted to us by the Department are reviewed upon receipt and comments are promptly furnished.

Memo from Mr. A. H. Belmont to Mr. L. V. Boardman
RE: DEFENSE PLANS - FINAL PROGRESS AND
EVALUATION REPORT ON OPERATION ALERT 1957

Observations:

Continuous consideration of all phases of defense planning by all Bureau Divisions has projected our planning to the degree where we have considered and made provisions for items which are now being raised by ODM as matters needing attention.

ACTION:

None, informative.

[Handwritten initials]

[Handwritten initials]

[Handwritten checkmark]

OFFICE OF DIRECTOR
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. Nichols _____
Mr. Boardman _____
Mr. Belmont _____
Mr. Mohr _____
Mr. Parsons _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Tamm _____
Mr. Trotter _____
Mr. Jones _____
Mr. Nease _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Holloman _____
Miss Holmes _____
Miss Gandy _____

~~EXP. PROC.~~

SEP 24 1957

Roach
Mifflin
Jeff

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Marshall
FROM : P. F. O'Donnell

DATE: JUL 30 1973

SUBJECT: BUPLANS
OPERATION ALERT 1957

BUFILE: 66-17404-35

The above captioned file is presently maintained in the Special File Room of the Records Section, Files and Communications Division. You are requested to have the substantive supervisor, responsible for this matter, review the file to determine if it is necessary to continue to maintain the file in the Special File Room, or whether it may be returned to the regular file sequence. The appropriate notation should be made on this memorandum which should be returned to the Filing Unit, Room 1116 IB. This memorandum will be filed in the case file to record the action taken in connection with this review.

JEB:ncf
(2)

ADDENDUM: INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

8/1/73

RHH:glw

It is recommended that this file be returned to regular file sequence.

*Removed from Special
File Room 8-3-73
all*

(notation 66-19009-✓)

79 AUG 3 1973

66-19009
NOT RECORDED

AUG 3 1973

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 10-6-64

FROM : W. S. Tavel *WST*SUBJECT: BUPLANS.
OPERATION ALERT 1957

Bufile 66-19009

Tolson	_____
Belmont	_____
Mohr	_____
Casper	_____
Callahan	_____
Conrad	_____
DeLoach	_____
Evans	_____
Gale	_____
Rosen	_____
Sullivan	_____
Tavel	_____
Trotter	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holmes	_____
Gandy	_____

The above captioned file is presently maintained in the Special File Room of the Records Branch, Files and Communications Division. You are requested to have the substantive supervisor, responsible for this matter, review the file to determine if it is necessary to continue to maintain the file in the Special File Room, or whether it may be returned to the regular file sequence. The appropriate notation should be made on this memorandum which should be returned to the Filing Unit, Room 1113 IB. This memorandum will be filed in the case file to record the action taken in connection with this review.

WST:snw
(2)

Retain in
Spec File room
WST
6-8-67

Maintain
in Special file room
10/30/64

66-19009
NOT RECORDED

FEB 9 1965

FBI - 1021105
REC'D - 1021105

OCT 1 15 01 64 N 24

K146
75 FEB 9 1965

[Signature]

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont *ABW*

FROM : R. R. Roach *R*

SUBJECT: BUPLANS - ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ FILES
RECORDS BRANCH

DATE: October 29, 1958

Tolson _____
Boardman _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Nease _____
Parsons _____
Rosen _____
Tamm _____
Trotter _____
Clayton _____
Tele. Room _____
Holloman _____
Gandy _____

Memorandum from C. F. Downing to R. T. Harbo dated 7-18-52 contained approved recommendation for retention of certain files pertaining to defense plans. *J Waitart*

Subsequent to submission of referenced memorandum, the following Buplans files have been added to those maintained in the Confidential File Room of the Records Branch:

66-19009 - Operation Alert 1957
66-19012 - Operation Alert 1958
66-19016 - Presidential Emergency Action
Documents, Pre-positioning Program
66-19017 - Defense Plans - Mobilization Plan C
66-19018 - Defense Plans - Mobilization Plan D-minus

The foregoing files all contain information ranging from ~~confidential to top secret~~ and pertain not only to the Bureau's defense planning but to Government-wide defense planning, including that of the White House. It is, therefore, considered necessary and desirable that these files continue to be maintained in the Confidential File Room.

RECOMMENDATION:

That retention of the files set forth herein in the Confidential File Room be approved.

- Jm*
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Nease (Attention: Mr. Valtard)
1 - Liaison Section
1 - Mr. Harbo

66-19009
NOT RECORDED
145 NOV 4 1958

JTH:n

*Retains in
Spec. File Room
WPS
6-8-67*

*Removed from Special
File Room per memo 7-30-73
from O'Connell to Marshall
23k Handled 8-3-73*

7186
NOV 6 1958

all

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 66-19104-35

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Parsons *J*

DATE: 7/24/58

FROM : B. J. White *BJW*
*Wm*SUBJECT: DATA FOR OPERATION ALERT 1957
1957 AND 1958

Tolson	_____
Nichols	_____
Boardman	_____
Belmont	_____
Mohr	_____
Parsons	_____
Rosen	_____
Tamm	_____
Trotter	_____
Nease	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holloman	_____
Gandy	_____

51

The data relative to Operation Alert 1957, which was maintained in the Physics and Chemistry Section of the Laboratory until the completion of Operation Alert 1958, has been destroyed.

The data relative to Operation Alert 1958 will be packaged and maintained in the Physics and Chemistry Section of the Laboratory for one year. This material will be destroyed following Operation Alert 1959. *if there has to be one.*

ACTION:

For information only.

1-Mr. Minnich, Room 7635

JFG:FCP (5)

*208**ST*

REC-65

JUL 25 1958

EX-128

1 auto copy
7-24-58

55 AUG 5 1958

66-19009-170

LIADON

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 66-19012-1