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and research of John Greenewald, Jr., creator of:

The Black Vault



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U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D.C. 20535

November 3, 2016

MR. JOHN GREENEWALD JR.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

FOIPA Request No.: 1356764-000
Subject: ANDERSON, JACK NORTHMAN

Dear Mr. Greenwald:

Records responsive to your request were previously processed under the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act. Enclosed is one CD containing 1128 pages of previously processed documents and a copy of the Explanation of Exemptions. This release is being provided to you at no charge.

For your information, Congress excluded three discrete categories of law enforcement and national security records from the requirements of the FOIA. See 5 U.S. C. § 552(c) (2006 & Supp. IV (2010)). This response is limited to those records that are subject to the requirements of the FOIA. This is a standard notification that is given to all our requesters and should not be taken as an indication that excluded records do, or do not, exist.

For questions regarding our determinations, visit the www.fbi.gov/foia website under "Contact Us." The FOIPA Request Number listed above has been assigned to your request. Please use this number in all correspondence concerning your request. Your patience is appreciated.

You may file an appeal by writing to the Director, Office of Information Policy (OIP), United States Department of Justice, Suite 11050, 1425 New York Avenue, NW, Washington, D.C. 20530-0001, or you may submit an appeal through OIP's FOIAonline portal by creating an account on the following web site: <https://foiaonline.regulations.gov/foia/action/public/home>. Your appeal must be postmarked or electronically transmitted within ninety (90) days from the date of this letter in order to be considered timely. If you submit your appeal by mail, both the letter and the envelope should be clearly marked "Freedom of Information Act Appeal." Please cite the FOIPA Request Number assigned to your request so that it may be easily identified.

You may seek dispute resolution services by contacting the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS) at 877-684-6448, or by emailing ogis@nara.gov. Alternatively, you may contact the FBI's FOIA Public Liaison by emailing foipaquestions@ic.fbi.gov. If you submit your dispute resolution correspondence by email, the subject heading should clearly state "Dispute Resolution Services." Please also cite the FOIPA Request Number assigned to your request so that it may be easily identified.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "D Hardy", is positioned above the typed name.

David M. Hardy
Section Chief,
Record/Information
Dissemination Section
Records Management Division

Enclosure(s)

EXPLANATION OF EXEMPTIONS

SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552

- (b)(1) (A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified to such Executive order;
- (b)(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency;
- (b)(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this title), provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld;
- (b)(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential;
- (b)(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;
- (b)(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
- (b)(7) records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information (A) could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of confidential source, including a State, local, or foreign agency or authority or any private institution which furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in the case of record or information compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, information furnished by a confidential source, (E) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law, or (F) could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual;
- (b)(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or
- (b)(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells.

SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552a

- (d)(5) information compiled in reasonable anticipation of a civil action proceeding;
- (j)(2) material reporting investigative efforts pertaining to the enforcement of criminal law including efforts to prevent, control, or reduce crime or apprehend criminals;
- (k)(1) information which is currently and properly classified pursuant to an Executive order in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy, for example, information involving intelligence sources or methods;
- (k)(2) investigatory material compiled for law enforcement purposes, other than criminal, which did not result in loss of a right, benefit or privilege under Federal programs, or which would identify a source who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;
- (k)(3) material maintained in connection with providing protective services to the President of the United States or any other individual pursuant to the authority of Title 18, United States Code, Section 3056;
- (k)(4) required by statute to be maintained and used solely as statistical records;
- (k)(5) investigatory material compiled solely for the purpose of determining suitability, eligibility, or qualifications for Federal civilian employment or for access to classified information, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;
- (k)(6) testing or examination material used to determine individual qualifications for appointment or promotion in Federal Government service the release of which would compromise the testing or examination process;
- (k)(7) material used to determine potential for promotion in the armed services, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished the material pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence.

U. S. Department of Justice

(MATERIAL MUST NOT BE REMOVED FROM OR ADDED TO THIS FILE)

WFO FEDERAL BUREAU of INVESTIGATION

FOIPA # 1035691

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 04-06-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/TH

CLASSIFICATION NO.

105-109483

Bureau File Number

~~DO NOT DESTROY PENDING LITIGATION~~
1165
82

Serials

Volume Number

See also Nos.

105-109483 - Subject of
FOIPA Request, 2006

DO NOT DESTROY

FOIPA # 1047972

RUC

FBI

Date: 2/16/72

Transmit the following in CODE
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via TELETYPE URGENT
(Priority)

021

TO: DIRECTOR

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-15-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/CPB/TH

FROM: SAC, WFO (105-0)

THE ~~WASHINGTON MERRY GO ROUND DASH JACK ANDERSON~~,
INFORMATION CONCERNING.

b6
b7c

ON FEBRUARY SIXTEEN, INSTANT, I. [REDACTED], SELF
EMPLOYED PUBLIC RELATIONS CONSULTANT, WASHINGTON, D.C., CURRENT
REGISTERED AGENT FOR HAITI WITH THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE, WHO IN THE PAST HAS BEEN A REGISTERED AGENT FOR
OTHER FOREIGN COUNTRIES INCLUDING THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC,
ADVISED AS FOLLOWS.

CONSOLIDATED

ON FEBRUARY SIXTEEN, INSTANT, JACK ANDERSON, NEWSPAPER
COLUMNIST AT WASHINGTON, D.C., FOR THE WASHINGTON POST, ASKED
THAT DAVIDSON COME TO HIS WASHINGTON, D.C. OFFICE. ON ARRIVAL,
ANDERSON NOTED THAT DAVIDSON HAD BEEN IN THE DOMINICAN
REPUBLIC. [REDACTED] CONFIRMED HE HAD TRAVELED TO THE DOMINICAN
REPUBLIC WITHIN THE PAST WEEK, AND WHILE THERE, HAD BEEN THE
HOUSEGUEST OF PRESIDENT JOAQUIN BALAGUER OF THE DOMINICAN
REPUBLIC.

Date: 1-10-74

Initials: smv

GBN: sup

105-109483-45
SEARCHED
SERIALIZED
FEB 16 6 55 PM '72
FBI-WASH DC

Approved: [Signature]
Special Agent in Charge

Sent 8:16 M Per [Signature]

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via _____
(Priority)WFO 105-0
PAGE TWO

ANDERSON THEN TOLD [REDACTED] HE HAD BEEN MAKING INQUIRIES
WITHIN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC CONCERNING A BUSINESS VENTURE
PROPOSED BY [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] TO BUILD HOUSING UNITS WITHIN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC.

[REDACTED] ADVISED ANDERSON THAT [REDACTED] HAD PROPOSED
THE BUILDING OF HOUSING UNITS WITHIN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC.
FURTHER, THAT PRESIDENT BALAGUER WELCOMED THIS BUSINESS
OPPORTUNITY ON ITS OWN MERITS WITH THE UNDERSTANDING [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] WOULD HAVE TO OBTAIN HIS OWN FINANCING. BALAGUER
DESCRIBED THE BUSINESS ARRANGEMENT AS PERFECTLY PROPER,
WITHOUT ANY INDUCEMENTS OF ANY KIND.

[REDACTED] NOTED ANDERSON'S VISIBLE REACTION AS BEING
UNHAPPY OVER [REDACTED] REPLY.

IT IS NOTED THAT SOME OF THE INFORMATION FURNISHED BY
[REDACTED] IN THE PAST HAS BEEN SELF SERVING.

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via _____
(Priority)

WFO 105-0
PAGE THREE

ADMINISTRATIVE.

RE WFO TELEPHONE CALL TO SECTION CHIEF RAYMOND W.
WANNALL, FEBRUARY SIXTEEN, INSTANT.

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-15-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/CPB/TH

Date prepared b6
b7C

4/7/72

Date received

4/5/72

Received from (name or symbol number)

[Redacted]

Received by

SA [Redacted]

Method of delivery (check appropriate blocks)

in person by telephone by mail orally recording device written by Informant

If orally furnished and reduced to writing by Agent:
Date

Dictated _____ to _____

Transcribed _____

Authenticated
by Informant _____

Date of Report

Date(s) of activity

4/3/72

Brief description of activity or material

PRESS RELEASE OF CHILE: LA VERDAD PERTAINING
TO JACK ANDERSON

b6
b7C

File where original is located if not attached

[Redacted] - SUB-A 130

* INDIVIDUALS DESIGNATED BY AN ASTERISK (*) ONLY ATTENDED A MEETING AND DID NOT ACTIVELY PARTICIPATE.
VIOLENCE OR REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES WERE NOT DISCUSSED.

Information recorded on a card index by _____ on date _____ b2
b7D

Remarks:

INFO HEREIN MUST BE CAREFULLY PARAPHRASED AND CLASSIFIED
~~"CONFIDENTIAL"~~ TO PROTECT A HIGHLY SENSITIVE SOURCE OF
PRESENT AND CONTINUING VALUE. THIS SOURCE HAS FURNISHED
RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE PAST.

(2) WFO

1- [Redacted] - SUB-A
①-105-109483 (J. ANDERSON)

INDEX

[Redacted]

CHILE, LA VERDAD
LATIN AGENCY

[Redacted]

ORLANDO/LETELIER

59

Handwritten: 5/23/72
Block Stamp [Signature]

105-109483-47
SEARCHED INDEXED
SERIALIZED FILED
APR 12 1972
FBI - WASH. FIELD OFFICE
[Redacted]

RCC/file

(2)

CHILE

LA VERDAD

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

CONTACT: (305) 655-0198

APRIL 3, 1972

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-15-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/CPB/TH

Did Jack Anderson receive any money directly or indirectly through a conduit for his attempted compromising of U.S. government, ITT and CIA?

If so, is Mr. Anderson working for the best interests of the United States or in effect aiding or abetting a Marxist government under the guise of the U.S. public's "Right to Know"?

Mr. Wilson C. Lucom, publisher of CHILE: LA VERDAD, (P. O. Box 34421, Washington, D.C. 20034) asks these questions because of a report received through usually reliable sources from Chile as follows: [redacted] stated that

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b7C
b7D



[redacted] celebrates periodical meetings with Jack Anderson and [redacted] in the National Press Club, Washington, D.C."

The publisher of CHILE: LA VERDAD feels that this matter should be thoroughly investigated by the press, the United States government and Congress.

Also, is the Chilean government employing public relations or law firms to influence the U.S. government to grant or extend loans to Allende's Communist-Socialist government. If so, why are these firms not registered as foreign agents?

THE ABOVE IS XEROXED COPY OF THE ORIGINAL INFORMANT REPORT.

ALL NECESSARY ACTION WHICH SHOULD BE TAKEN IN CONNECTION WITH THIS INFORMATION HAS BEEN TAKEN.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-15-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/CPB/TH

Date prepared

4/7/72

Date received

4/5/72

Received from (name or symbol number)

[Redacted]

Received by

SA [Redacted]

Method of delivery (check appropriate blocks)

in person by telephone by mail orally recording device written by Informant

If orally furnished and reduced to writing by Agent:
Date

Dictated _____ to _____

Transcribed _____

Authenticated
by Informant _____

Date of Report

b6
b7C

Date(s) of activity

b2
b7D

4/15-16/72

Brief description of activity or material

BACKGROUND DATA RE [Redacted] CHIEF

INVESTIGATOR FOR JACK ANDERSON

File where original is located if not attached

[Redacted] - SUB-A 131

* INDIVIDUALS DESIGNATED BY AN ASTERISK (*) ONLY ATTENDED A MEETING AND DID NOT ACTIVELY PARTICIPATE.
VIOLENCE OR REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES WERE NOT DISCUSSED.

Information recorded on a card index by _____ on date _____

Remarks:

INFO HEREIN MUST BE CAREFULLY PARAPHRASED AND CLASSIFIED
"CONFIDENTIAL" TO PROTECT A HIGHLY SENSITIVE SOURCE OF
PRESENT AND CONTINUING VALUE. THIS SOURCE HAS FURNISHED
RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE PAST.

(2) WFO

1- [Redacted] SUB-A
①-105-109483 (J. ANDERSON)

INDEX

AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL COLLEGE,
SPRINGFIELD, MASS.

Block Stamp

105-109483-48
SEARCHED INDEXED
SERIALIZED FILED
APR 12 1972
FBI - WASH. FIELD OFFICE
[Redacted] [Signature]

CONSOLIDATED

Date

7/2/74
[Signature]

RCC/file
(2)

News Bureau
American International College
Springfield, Mass., 01109
jerry healy
tel: (413) 737-5331

For Weekend Release
April 15, 1972

Jack Anderson's
Chief Investigator
AIC Forum Speaker

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-15-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/CPB/TH

SPRINGFIELD, Mass. - Jack Anderson's chief investigator, Les Whitten, will be the featured speaker at American International College's scholastic press forum Saturday, April 29. Co-chairmen of the event, Prof. Theodore Byrne of the department of finance and Jerry Healy, director of public relations, announced that Mr. Whitten will address the high school reporters, editors and advisors at 2:15 p.m.

The scholastic forum dealing with contemporary problems and the press is under the auspices of AIC's School of Arts and Sciences. Following registration in the Campus Center's Gold and White Lounge from 8:30 to 9:15 a.m., the forum will cover a wide range of topics such as sports reporting, electronic journalism, the women's role, photo journalism, foreign and domestic policy and the economy. Highlighting the day's events will be the presentation of awards to high school newspapers.

Mr. Whitten, according to the internationally-famous syndicated columnist, is Jack Anderson's number one man and senior associate in the field of investigative reporting and "has a flavor of uncovering things, which, after all, the Washington Merry-Go-Round is all about."

Since he joined Mr. Anderson's Washington staff of four, Mr. Whitten has worked in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia; flew with a Vietnamese pilot and interviewed ex-Vietcongs fresh off the battlefield; been to Israel and Egypt; covered the most recent Mexican inauguration; and hunted for buried CIA treasure off uninhabited Florida Keys.

He stated, "Mostly my work has been in Washington where I worked on stories of financial hanky-panky by Senators, Congressmen, high officials in the government, political committees and giant corporations. My work has led to the defeat of some Congressmen and the retirement of some Congressmen; and the retirement of others -

to the outraged howls of innumerable Congressmen and Senators on the floor after they were caught with their hands in the public till.

"I have been skipped confidential State Department papers after a rendezvous at the Mayflower Hotel and incriminating police reports from police files. I have interviewed Mafia characters in their silver Cadillacs and some of my work led to the indictment of a major Mafia figure," Mr. Whitten commented.

Prior to working with Jack Anderson the AIC featured speaker was involved with the Billie Sol Estes and Bobby Baker scandels and has covered national political conventions since 1956; Bobby Kennedy's drive for the Senate and the campaigns of Hubert Humphrey, Eugene McCarthy, Richard Nixon and Barry Goldwater. He accompanied President Lyndon Johnson on the first President-in-office flight around the world and covered both Kennedy funerals.

A native of Jacksonville, Fla., and a magna cum laude graduate of Lehigh University, Mr. Whitten has also had stories which led to the ouster of a Russian spy posing as a diplomat in Washington and to the forced departure of a high Soviet UN Secretariat official who was trying to buy military hardware here. He covered the 1968 Democratic convention in Chicago, the Dominican War, and he noted, "My greatest panic came during a Navy press operation off the coast of Cuba when one of their missiles got out of whack and was pointed at the ship I was on only a couple of hundred yards away."

Mr. Whitten's career has also included a four-year assignment with Radio Free Europe in Munich, Germany and a year as news chief in New York; a year with United Press International; five years with the Washington Post and finally assistant bureau chief, Heartst Newspapers in Washington, D.C.

-aic-

THE ABOVE IS XEROXED COPY OF THE ORIGINAL INFORMANT REPORT.

ALL NECESSARY ACTION WHICH SHOULD BE TAKEN IN CONNECTION WITH THIS INFORMATION HAS BEEN TAKEN.

~~ASAC~~ *Adm*

AXO 097 346 0004Z

RR HQ BA WF

DE AX

R 24 2000Z DEC 84

F1 ALEXANDRIA (65C-587) (P)

TO DIRECTOR PRIORITY

BALTIMORE ROUTINE

WFO ROUTINE

BT

DATE: 10-17-2007
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 10-17-2032

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

~~SECRET~~

ATTENTION: SUPERVISORY SPECIAL AGENT (SSA)

UNSUB (S); UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION
IN THE WASHINGTON POST, AUGUST 26, 1984, AUTHORED BY JACK
overcup ANDERSON, ENTITLED, "THE GROWING CHEMICAL CLUB:", THE WASHINGTON
POST, AUGUST 27, 1984, AUTHORED BY JACK ANDERSON ENTITLED,
"CHEMICAL ARMS AND TERRORISM FEARED BY CIA", AND READER'S DIGEST,
SEPTEMBER, 1984, ISSUE AUTHORED BY JACK ANDERSON ENTITLED,
"POISON AND PLAGUE, RUSSIA'S SECRET TERROR WEAPONS.", ESPIONAGED
X (MEDIA LEAKS) (OO:FBIHQ)

b6
b7C

THIS COMMUNICATION IS CLASSIFIED ~~SECRET~~ IN IT'S ENTIRETY.
REFERENCE BUREAU AIRTEL TO ALEXANDRIA DATED NOVEMBER 16, 1984.

See
12/6/84
65-c
12/5
Am
65C-13263
DEC 4 6 25 PM '84
FBI WASH. F. O.
[Signature]

PAGE TWO AX 550-507 ~~SECRET~~


A COPY OF THE REFERENCED AIRTEL AND A COPY OF THE ARTICLES
IN QUESTION WILL BE PROVIDED TO THE BALTIMORE DIVISION AND WFO
BY SEPERATE COVER.

Referral/Consult



DISSEMINATION - THE CLASSIFIED INFORMATION APPEARING IN THE
ARTICLES COULD CONCEIVABLY RESULT FROM A REVIEW OF THE FOLLOWING
CLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS:

Referral/Consult



PAGE THREE AX 65C-567 ~~SECRET~~

INCLUDING MEMBERS OF THE SSCI AND HPSCI. THE TOP SECRET VERSION WAS SENT ONLY TO MEMBERS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. NONE OF THE CODE WORD INFORMATION FROM THE TOP SECRET VERSION WAS LEAKED IN THE ARTICLES.

3. DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (DIA) (CABLE) DATED DECEMBER 16, 1933. THERE WERE 95 COPIES OF THIS CABLE DISSEMINATION, 59 OF WHICH WERE DISSEMINATED WITHIN THE CIA AND 36 OUTSIDE THE CIA. THE DISSEMINATION LIST FOR THIS CABLE AND FOR THE SNIE ARE AVAILABLE.

Referral/Consult

LEAD INFORMATION -

[REDACTED]

ALTHOUGH THE DISSEMINATION IN THIS CASE IS VERY EXPANSIVE, IT DOES APPEAR TO BE AN INDICATION THAT CLASSIFIED INFORMATION COULD EASILY BE LEAKED BY [REDACTED] TO JACK ANDERSON. AS A RESULT, A DETAILED INTERVIEW OF [REDACTED] WILL BE CONDUCTED.

FBIHQ HAS REQUESTED TO CONDUCT INDICES REVIEW CONCERNING

b6
b7c

[REDACTED]

BALTIMORE AND WFO ARE REQUESTED TO CONDUCT AN INDICES REVIEW CONCERNING [REDACTED] BALTIMORE AND WFO HOLD ANY ADDITIONAL INVESTIGATION PENDING APPROVAL BY FBIHQ.

LEAD ALEXANDRIA AT LANGLEY, VIRGINIA:

WILL INTERVIEW [REDACTED]

CLASSIFIED BY G-3; DECLASSIFY ON OADR.

BT

FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:

- Teletype
- Facsimile
- _____

PRECEDENCE:

- Immediate
- Priority
- Routine

CLASSIFICATION:

- TOP SECRET
- ~~SECRET~~
- CONFIDENTIAL
- UNCLAS E F T O
- UNCLAS

Date 12/18/84

050

FM: SAC, WFO (65C-13263) (RUC) (C-1)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI PRIORITY

ATTN: SSA [redacted]

3 10⁴⁶ PM J.E.

BT

DECLASSIFIED BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH
ON 10-24-2007

~~SECRET~~

UNSUBS; UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION IN THE WASHINGTON POST, AUGUST 26, 1984, AUTHORED BY JACK ANDERSON, ENTITLED, "THE GROWING CHEMICAL CLUB:", THE WASHINGTON POST, AUGUST 27, 1984, AUTHORED BY JACK ANDERSON ENTITLED, "CHEMICAL ARMS AND TERRORISM FEARED BY CIA", AND READERS DIGEST, SEPTEMBER, 1984, ISSUE AUTHORED BY JACK ANDERSON ENTITLED, "POISON AND PLAGUE, RUSSIA'S SECRET TERROR WEAPONS".; ESPIONAGE - X (MEDIA LEAK) (OO:FBIHQ).

b6
b7C

THIS COMMUNICATION IS CLASSIFIED ~~"SECRET"~~ IN ITS ENTIRETY.

RE BU TT TO WFO DATED DEC. 4, 1984.

WFO GENERAL INDICES, CONFIDENTIAL INDICES AND ELSUR INDICES

NEGATIVE RE [redacted]

BT

4-WFO
(1-Teletype Unit)

#0050

NNNN

LBS:bp
(4)

65-13263

sig
12/19/84
RUC
12/19/84
Dest Committee

Approved: z/c

Transmitted

(Number)

(Time)

Per

02 1100001

-----END OF DOCUMENT-----

DECLASSIFIED BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH
ON 10-24-2007

INBOX.13 (#522)

TO: WF @ SAMNET-EMH

FROM: HQT X @ SAMNET-EMH

SUBJECT: 0149/PRIORITY

DATE: 20 DEC 84 23:40:25 EST

CC:

TEXT: VZCZCHQ00149
PP AX BA WF
DE HQ #0149 3560011
ZNY SSSSS
P 202209Z DEC 84

FM DIRECTOR FBI

TO FBI ALEXANDRIA (65C-587) PRIORITY

FBI BALTIMORE PRIORITY

FBI WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE PRIORITY

BT

CI-7
Revised 1-9-85 cs
Class 65C-13268 + consal date into 65C-13263 1-3-85 pm
65-13263-3
65C-13263-3

~~SECRET~~

UNSUB (S); UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

IN THE "WASHINGTON POST," AUGUST 26, 1984, AUTHORED BY JACK ANDERSON, ENTITLED, "THE GROWING CHEMICAL CLUB:," THE

"WASHINGTON POST," AUGUST 27, 1984, AUTHORED BY JACK

ANDERSON ENTITLED, "CHEMICAL ARMS AND TERRORISM FEARED BY CIA,"

AND READER'S DIGEST, SEPTEMBER 1984, ISSUE AUTHORED BY JACK

ANDERSON ENTITLED "POISON AND PLAGUE, RUSSIA'S SECRET TERROR

WEAPONS." ESPIONAGE - X (MEDIA LEAK) - OO: FBIHQ.

THIS COMMUNICATION IS CLASSIFIED "SECRET" IN ITS ENTIRETY.

RE ALEXANDRIA TELETYPE TO THE BUREAU DATED DECEMBER 3, 1984.

A REVIEW OF INDICES AT FBIHQ REVEALED THAT AIA

NA

65-13263-3
65C-13263-3
SD
8 28 P
OO: FBIHQ
12/26/84
WJD
C

b6
b7c

PAGE TWO DE HQ 0149 ~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED] WAS THE SUBJECT OF AN INTERNAL SECURITY INVESTIGATION
CONDUCTED IN 1979. WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE IS TO REVIEW
FILE NUMBER [REDACTED] AND PROVIDE POSITIVE RESULTS TO
RECEIVING OFFICES.

~~C BY G-3, DECL: OADR.~~

BT

#0149

NNNN

b6
b7C
b7D

NNNN

C-1

-----END OF DOCUMENT-----

DECLASSIFIED BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH
ON 10-24-2007

INBOX.2 (#483)

TO: AX @ SAMNET-EMH, BA @ SAMNET-EMH, WF @ SAMNET-EMH

FROM: HQTX @ SAMNET-EMH

SUBJECT: 082 PRIORITY

DATE: 20 DEC 84 19:37:21 EST

CC: HQ2 @ SAMNET-EMH

TEXT: VZCZCHQ0082
PP BA AX WF
DE HQ #0083 3551950
ZNY SSSSS
P 201711Z DEC 84

Full
65-131808

FM DIRECTOR FBI

TO FBI ALEXANDRIA (65C-587) PRIORITY

FBI BALTIMORE (65-4516) (SQ. 3) PRIORITY

FBI WASHINGTON FIELD PRIORITY

BT

~~SECRET~~

UNSUB (S); UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION IN

"THE WASHINGTON POST," 8/26/84, AUTHORED BY JACK ANDERSON,

ENTITLED, "THE GROWING CHEMICAL CLUB;" ESPIONAGE - X; (MEDIA

LEAK); OO: FBIHQ.

THIS COMMUNICATION IS CLASSIFIED "~~SECRET~~" IN ITS ENTIRETY.

REFERENCE ALEXANDRIA TELETYPE DATED 12/4/84.

FULL INVESTIGATION IS AUTHORIZED AS OF THE DATE OF THIS

COMMUNICATION CONCERNING [REDACTED] THIS

INVESTIGATION IS TO BE HANDLED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE

REGULATIONS PERTAINING TO FULL INVESTIGATIONS AS SET FORTH

IN THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S GUIDELINES. APPROPRIATE

65C-13180
3a
MA
201959
1-8-85
red
AW
[REDACTED]

b6
b7c

3

PAGE TWO DE HQ 0082 ~~SECRET~~

ADMINISTRATIVE TICKLERS SHOULD BE SET TO ENSURE AN LHM IS SUBMITTED TO REACH FBIHQ WITHIN 90 DAYS, IF SUBJECT IS A U.S. PERSON, AND BEFORE THE ANNIVERSARY OF THIS AUTHORIZATION.

RECEIVING OFFICES ARE INSTRUCTED TO IMMEDIATELY INITIATE A FULL BACKGROUND INVESTIGATION INTO THE ACTIVITIES OF [REDACTED] TO DETERMINE IF HE HAS LEAKED CLASSIFIED INFORMATION TO JACK ANDERSON OR [REDACTED] SHOULD FURNISH [REDACTED] A NATIONAL SECURITY LETTER REQUESTING TOLL RECORDS FOR [REDACTED] INVESTIGATION SHOULD EVENTUALLY LEAD TO THE INTERVIEW OF [REDACTED] REGARDING THIS LEAK.

b6
b7C
b7E

IN ADDITION, [REDACTED] SHOULD MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH APPROPRIATE ARMY INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITIES CONCERNING THE FBI INVESTIGATION INTO [REDACTED] ACTIVITIES.

~~C BY 6-3, DECL: UADR.~~

BT

#0082

NNNN

~~SECRET~~

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC
DECLASSIFICATION
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
EXEMPTION CODE 50X(1)HUM
DATE 03-29-2013 BY F54M93K42

FD-36 (Rev. 8-26-82)

FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:

- Teletype
- Facsimile
- _____

PRECEDENCE:

- Immediate
- Priority
- Routine

CLASSIFICATION:

- TOP SECRET
- SECRET
- CONFIDENTIAL
- UNCLAS E T O

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

DATE: 11-16-2007
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 11-16-2032

UNCLAS 1/2/85
Date

048

FM WASHINGTON FIELD (65C-13263) (RUC) (C-1)

TO DIRECTOR FBI PRIORITY

FBI ALEXANDRIA (65C-587) PRIORITY

FBI BALTIMORE (65-4516) PRIORITY

BT

Handwritten: JSE 7:48 P

~~SECRET~~

UNKNOWN SUBJECTS; UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF CLASSIFIED
INFORMATION IN THE "WASHINGTON POST," AUGUST 26, 1984,
AUTHORED BY JACK ANDERSON, ENTITLED, "THE GROWING CHEMICAL
CLUB;" ESP-X; MEDIA LEAK; OO:BUREAU.

ALL MARKINGS, NOTATIONS, AND ITEMS OF INFORMATION
CONTAINED IN THIS COMMUNICATION ARE CLASSIFIED "~~SECRET~~"
UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED.

RE BUREAU TELETYPE, DATED DECEMBER 20, 1984.

FULL INVESTIGATION AUTHORIZED DECEMBER 20, 1984,

CONCERNING [REDACTED]

ON JANUARY 3, 1985, WASHINGTON FIELD REVIEWED FILE NUMBER

2-WFO

LBS:mye
(2) *mye*

Handwritten: [Signature] 65-13263

b6
b7C

Approved: *[Signature]*

Transmitted

(Number)

(Time)

0048Z

JAN 9 1985
48 Per 35

4

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:

- Teletype
- Facsimile
- _____

PRECEDENCE:

- Immediate
- Priority
- Routine

CLASSIFICATION:

- TOP SECRET
- SECRET
- CONFIDENTIAL
- UNCLAS E F T O
- UNCLAS

Date _____

048 mye

PAGE TWO DE WF 0001 ~~SECRET~~

(S)

[Redacted]

b1
b3

[Redacted]

IS DESCRIBED AS FOLLOWS:

DATE OF BIRTH, [Redacted]

PLACE OF BIRTH, [Redacted]

[Redacted]

RACE, WHITE; [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

b1
b3

~~C BY G-3; DECL: OADR.~~

BT

#0001

NNNN

048 mye

Approved: _____ Transmitted _____ Per _____
(Number) (Time)

~~SECRET~~

Routing Slip
0-7 (Rev. 5-28-82)

~~SECRET~~
(Copies to Offices Checked)

CC

TO: SAC,

TO: LEGAT,

- | | | | |
|--------------------------------------|--|--|--------------------------------------|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Albany | <input type="checkbox"/> Houston | <input type="checkbox"/> Oklahoma City | <input type="checkbox"/> Bern |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Albuquerque | <input type="checkbox"/> Indianapolis | <input type="checkbox"/> Omaha | <input type="checkbox"/> Bogota |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Alexandria | <input type="checkbox"/> Jackson | <input type="checkbox"/> Philadelphia | <input type="checkbox"/> Bonn |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Anchorage | <input type="checkbox"/> Jacksonville | <input type="checkbox"/> Phoenix | <input type="checkbox"/> Canberra |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Atlanta | <input type="checkbox"/> Kansas City | <input type="checkbox"/> Pittsburgh | <input type="checkbox"/> Hong Kong |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Baltimore | <input type="checkbox"/> Knoxville | <input type="checkbox"/> Portland | <input type="checkbox"/> London |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Birmingham | <input type="checkbox"/> Las Vegas | <input type="checkbox"/> Richmond | <input type="checkbox"/> Mexico City |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Boston | <input type="checkbox"/> Little Rock | <input type="checkbox"/> Sacramento | <input type="checkbox"/> Montevideo |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Buffalo | <input type="checkbox"/> Los Angeles | <input type="checkbox"/> St. Louis | <input type="checkbox"/> Ottawa |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Butte | <input type="checkbox"/> Louisville | <input type="checkbox"/> Salt Lake City | <input type="checkbox"/> Panama City |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Charlotte | <input type="checkbox"/> Memphis | <input type="checkbox"/> San Antonio | <input type="checkbox"/> Paris |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Chicago | <input type="checkbox"/> Miami | <input type="checkbox"/> San Diego | <input type="checkbox"/> Rome |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Cincinnati | <input type="checkbox"/> Milwaukee | <input type="checkbox"/> San Francisco | <input type="checkbox"/> Tokyo |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Cleveland | <input type="checkbox"/> Minneapolis | <input type="checkbox"/> San Juan | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Columbia | <input type="checkbox"/> Mobile | <input type="checkbox"/> Savannah | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Dallas | <input type="checkbox"/> Newark | <input type="checkbox"/> Seattle | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Denver | <input type="checkbox"/> New Haven | <input type="checkbox"/> Springfield | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Detroit | <input type="checkbox"/> New Orleans | <input type="checkbox"/> Tampa | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> El Paso | <input type="checkbox"/> New York City | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Washington Field | |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Honolulu | <input type="checkbox"/> Norfolk | <input type="checkbox"/> Quantico | |
- ASAC, New Rochelle (MRA)
 ASAC, Brooklyn-Queens (MRA)

1/4/85

FBI

REUNSUB(S) UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION IN THE "WASHINGTON POST," AUGUST 26, 1984, AUTHORED BY JACK ANDERSON, ENTITLED, "THE GROWING CHEMICAL CLUB;" THE "WASHINGTON POST", AUGUST 27, 1984, AUTHORED BY JACK ANDERSON ENTITLED "CHEMICAL ARMS AND TERRORISM

- Retention For appropriate
- For information optional action Surep, by _____
- The enclosed is for your information. If used in a future report, conceal all sources, paraphrase contents.
- Enclosed are corrected pages from report of SA _____ dated _____

Remarks:

FEARED BY CIA," AND READER'S DIGEST, SEPTEMBER 1984, ISSUE AUTHORED BY JACK ANDERSON ENTITLED "POISON AND PLAGUE, RUSSIA'S SECRET TERROR WEAPONS."
ESPIONAGE-X (MEDIA LEAK)
OO:FBIHQ

C-9

ATTN: [Redacted]

Enclosed is a copy of FBIHQ

Enc. 1
Bufile
Urfile

65-13263-5

SEARCHED INDEXED

TELETYPE 12/20/84

JAN 08 1985

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

~~SECRET~~
Classified by 83
Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 03-29-2013 BY F54M93K42

1 2
12/20/84

~~SECRET~~

PRIORITY

DATE: 11-16-2007
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 11-16-2032
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

FM DIRECTOR FBI
TO FBI ALEXANDRIA (65C-587) PRIORITY
FBI BALTIMORE PRIORITY
FBI WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE PRIORITY
BT

SEARCHED _____ INDEXED _____
SERIALIZED _____ FILED _____
JAN 0 1 00 AM 1985

~~SECRET~~

UNSUB (S); UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION
IN THE "WASHINGTON POST," AUGUST 26, 1984, AUTHORED BY JACK
ANDERSON, ENTITLED, "THE GROWING CHEMICAL CLUB;" THE
"WASHINGTON POST," AUGUST 27, 1984, AUTHORED BY JACK
ANDERSON ENTITLED, "CHEMICAL ARMS AND TERRORISM FEARED BY CIA,"
AND READER'S DIGEST, SEPTEMBER 1984, ISSUE AUTHORED BY JACK
ANDERSON ENTITLED "POISON AND PLAGUE, RUSSIA'S SECRET TERROR
WEAPONS." ESPIONAGE - X (MEDIA LEAK) - 00: FBIHQ.

~~THIS COMMUNICATION IS CLASSIFIED "SECRET" IN ITS ENTIRETY.~~

RE ALEXANDRIA TELETYPE TO THE BUREAU DATED DECEMBER 3, 1984.
A REVIEW OF INDICES AT FBIHQ REVEALED THAT A

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b7C

CAS/PJR: (3)MB 12/20/84 4253 4660

1 -
1 -
1 -

b6
b7C

Signed out 12/20/84
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

2

[] WAS THE SUBJECT OF AN INTERNAL SECURITY INVESTIGATION
CONDUCTED IN [] WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE IS TO REVIEW
FILE NUMBER [] AND PROVIDE POSITIVE RESULTS TO
RECEIVING OFFICES.

b6
b7C

b7D

~~C BY G-3, DECL: OADR.~~

BT

|

~~SECRET~~

INBOX.7 (#1689)

TO: HQ2 @ SAMNET-EMH, WF @ SAMNET-EMH, AX @ SAMNET-EMH

FROM: [redacted] @ SAMNET-EMH

SUBJECT: 018/027 PRIORITY

DATE: 18 JAN 85 01:15:56 EST

CC:

DECLASSIFIED BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH
ON 10-24-2007

TEXT: [redacted] 0027 0180120Z

PP HQ WF AX

DE BA

P 0172208Z JAN 85

FM [redacted] (P)

TO DIRECTOR ROUTINE

WFO (65-13263) (C-1) PRIORITY

ALEXANDRIA (65C-587) ROUTINE

BT

~~SECRET~~

UNSUB (S); UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION IN
"THE WASHINGTON POST," AUGUST 26, 1984, AUTHORED BY JACK ANDERSON,
ENTITLED, "THE GROWING CHEMICAL CLUB;" ESPIONAGE -X; (MEDIA LEAK);

OO: FBIHQ.

ALL ITEMS OF INFORMATION CONTAINED ON THIS DOCUMENT ARE
CLASSIFIED "~~SECRET~~" BY CLASSIFICATION GUIDE NO. 3 (G-3) UNLESS
INDICATED OR OTHERWISE NOTED.

RE BUREAU TELETYPES TO ALEXANDRIA, BALTIMORE AND WFO, DATED
DECEMBER 20, 1984, AND DECEMBER 4, 1984.

RE TEL REQUESTED [redacted] TO FURNISH A NATIONAL SECURITY
LETTER REQUEST TO FBIHQ REQUESTING TOLL RECORDS FOR [redacted]

[redacted]

65-13263

JAN 17 1024 PM '85

[redacted]

Can Use

[Handwritten mark]

1/25/85

Re
1/23/85

[Handwritten initials]

b6
b7C

b6
b7C

PAGE TWO (BA 65C-4516) ~~SECRET~~

ON JANUARY 15, 1985, [REDACTED] SECURITY,

[REDACTED] ADVISED

THAT 576-3191 IS LISTED TO THE WALTER REED ARMY HOSPITAL IN WASHINGTON, D.C. THE NUMBER HAS A 202 AREA CODE AND NOT 301.

b6
b7c

[REDACTED] STATED THE NATIONAL SECURITY LETTER REQUESTING TOLL RECORDS SHOULD BE DIRECTED TO [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

LEAD: WFO AT WASHINGTON, D.C. FURNISH FBIHQ A NATIONAL SECURITY LETTER REQUESTING TOLL RECORDS CONCERNING (202) 576-3191.

~~C BY G-3. DECL: OADR.~~

BT

Washington Field Office
1900 Half Street, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20535
January 29, 1985



b6
b7C

Washington, D.C.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-28-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/CPB/TH

Dear Sir:

In connection with an investigation being conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) under its lawful and established jurisdiction, it is requested that you furnish to the FBI the toll billing record information described below. This request is being made as a necessary investigative technique under the powers of the President to protect national security against actual or potential attack or other hostile acts of a foreign power, to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the United States, or to protect national security information against foreign intelligence activities, in connection with an investigation of organizations or individuals suspected to be agents or acting in corroboration with a foreign power. Your cooperation in this matter will be greatly appreciated.

It is requested that toll billing information be furnished as follows:

- 2 - Addressee
 - ① - Washington Field Office
- LBS:cdd *cdy*
(3)

65-13863-7

Searched _____
Serialized _____
Indexed _____
Filed _____

Subscriber: Walter Reed Army Hospital
Washington, D.C.

Telephone Number; (202) 576-3191

For the period of: June of 1984-the present

You are not to disclose the existence of this request. An such disclosure could obstruct and impede the investigation.

Very truly yours,

Edward J. O'Malley,
Assistant Director
Intelligence Division

X AIRTEL

1/29/85

~~SECRET~~
TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
ATTENTION: SSA

b6
b7C

FROM: *AW* SAC, WASHINGTON FIELD (65-13263) (RUC) (C-1) ~~SECRET~~

UNSUBS; Unauthorized Disclosure
of Classified Information in
"The Washington Post",
August 26, 1984, authored by
JACK ANDERSON entitled, "The
Growing Chemical Club";
ESPIONAGE-X;
MEDIA LEAK
(OO:WFO)

All markings, notations and items of information
contained in this communication are classified "~~Secret~~"
unless otherwise noted.

Re Baltimore teletype to WFO dated 1/18/85.

Enclosed for the Bureau are two (2) copies of a
national security letter as requested in Baltimore teletype
of 1/18/85.

~~SECRET~~

~~Classify by: G-3
Declassify on: OADR~~

65-13263-8

- 2 - Bureau (Enc. 2)
- 1 - Washington Field Office

BS:cdd
(3)

~~SECRET~~

Searched _____
Serialized _____
Indexed _____
Filed _____

[Handwritten signature and initials]

b6
b7C

Memorandum



To : SAC, WFO (65C-13263) (P) (C-1) Date 2/4/85

From : SA [redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-25-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH

Subject : UNSUBS; Unauthorized Disclosure
of Classified Information in the
Washington Post, 8/26/84;
Authored by Jack Anderson
Entitled, "The Growing Chemical Clubs"
ESPIONAGE X (MEDIA LEAK)
(00:WFO)

Re WFO telcal from Special Agent (SA) [redacted] to
SSA [redacted] FBIHQ, on 2/1/85.

On 2/1/85, SSA [redacted] advised that WFO should hold
off interviewing the subject or conducting any investigation
at WALTER REED ARMY HOSPITAL so as not to alert the subject
of this investigation. SSA [redacted] further advised that
WFO would be receiving a teletype within the next one or
two days. After the contents of that teletype is read by
both the supervising agent and the case agent, SSA [redacted]
would like to arrange for a meeting to be held. At which
time, the specific investigative strategy for working this
case will be lined out.

b6
b7c

65C13263 - 9

SEARCHED	INDEXED
SERIALIZED	FILED
FEB 4 1985	
FBI - WASHINGTON FIELD	
[redacted]	[signature]

① - Washington Field Office

LBS:cdd *ell*
(1)

~~SECRET~~



U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington, D.C. 20535

February 19, 1985

DECLASSIFIED BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH
ON 10-25-2007



b6
b7C

Dear

In connection with an investigation being conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, under its lawful and established jurisdiction, it is requested that you furnish to the Federal Bureau of Investigation the toll billing record information described below. This request is made as a necessary investigative technique under the powers of the President to protect the national security against actual or potential attack or other hostile acts of a foreign power, to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security of the United States, or to protect national security information against foreign intelligence activities, in connection with an investigation of organizations or individuals suspected to be agents of or acting in collaboration with a foreign power. Your cooperation in this matter will be greatly appreciated.

~~(S)~~

It is requested that toll call record information including multiple unit dialing be furnished as follows:

Name: Walter Reed Army Hospital ~~(S)~~
Address: 6825 16th Street, Northwest ~~(S)~~
Washington, D. C.
Telephone: (202) 576-3191 ~~(S)~~
For the period of: June, 1984, to the present ~~(S)~~

1 - SAC, Washington Field

Searched _____
Serialized _____
Indexed _____
Filed _____

10

~~SECRET~~
Classified by: G-3
Declassify on: OADR

65-13263

b6
b7C



~~SECRET~~

b6
b7C

[REDACTED]

You are not to disclose the existence of this request. Any such disclosure could obstruct and impede the investigation. Please deliver the requested information to a representative of the Washington Field Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

~~(S)~~

Very truly yours,

Oliver B. Revell
Assistant Director
Criminal Investigative Division

- 2 -

~~SECRET~~

(Handwritten circled mark)

SEARCHED _____ INDEXED _____
SERIALIZED _____ FILED _____
FEB 21 10 52 AM '85

TRANSMIT VIA: AIRTEL
CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

DATE: FBI 2/19/85

DECLASSIFIED BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH
ON 10-25-2007

✓ FROM: Director, FBI
TO: SAC, Washington Field Office (65-13263)

UNSUBS; UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES OF
CLASSIFIED INFORMATION IN
"THE WASHINGTON POST," AUGUST 26, 1984,
AUTHORED BY JACK ANDERSON, ENTITLED,
"THE GROWING CHEMICAL CLUB;"
ESPIONAGE-X (MEDIA LEAK);
OO: FBIHQ

This communication is classified "~~Secret~~" in its
entirety.

Full field investigation authorized on December 20,
1984, for captioned subject.

Reference Washington Field Office airtel to the Bureau
dated January 29, 1985, captioned as above.

Enclosed is a letter to [redacted]
[redacted] requesting toll
billing information for the business telephone of subject, [redacted]
[redacted] at Walter Reed Army Hospital, 6825 16th Street,
Northwest, Washington, D. C., (202) 576-3191.

A representative of your office should deliver the
enclosed letter to [redacted] who should be reminded that
due to national security reasons, the subscriber should not be
advised of this request.

b6
b7c

Enclosures (2) *gg*

*2/21/85 for Tel call
SSA [redacted] a document
for it - Toll record is for
2 million dollar phone
Bill
CT-5*

~~SECRET~~
Classified by: G3
Declassify on: OADR

[redacted]

755 - sends -

65-13263 11
FEB 21 1985
[redacted]
FBI/DOJ



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Alexandria, Virginia

March 15, 1985

~~SECRET~~

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

DATE: 10-17-2007
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 10-17-2032

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

UNKNOWN SUBJECT(S);
UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES OF
CLASSIFIED INFORMATION IN THE
"WASHINGTON POST", AUGUST 26, 1984,
AUTHORED BY JACK ANDERSON,
ENTITLED "THE GROWING CHEMICAL CLUB",
THE "WASHINGTON POST", AUGUST 27, 1984,
AUTHORED BY JACK ANDERSON,
ENTITLED "CHEMICAL ARMS AND TERRORISM
FEARED BY CIA",
AND "READERS DIGEST" SEPTEMBER, 1984, ISSUE
AUTHORED BY JACK ANDERSON,
ENTITLED "POISON AND PLAGUE, RUSSIA'S
SECRET TERROR WEAPONS";
ESPIONAGE - X (MEDIA LEAKS)

This communication is classified ~~"Secret"~~ in its entirety. Referral/Consult



DISSEMINATION:

The classified information appearing in the articles could have conceivably resulted from a review of the following classified documents:

~~CLASSIFIED BY G-3;~~
~~DECLASSIFY ON OADR~~

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS NEITHER
RECOMMENDATIONS NOR CONCLUSIONS OF
THE FBI. IT IS THE PROPERTY OF
THE FBI AND IS LOANED TO YOUR AGENCY;
IT AND ITS CONTENTS ARE NOT TO BE
DISTRIBUTED OUTSIDE YOUR AGENCY.

65-13863-
pg 12
MAR 27 1985

~~SECRET~~



b6
b7C

~~SECRET~~


(1) The Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) dated September 15, 1983. Six-hundred copies of the SNIE were disseminated to members of the intelligence community. No foreign or contract dissemination was provided.

(2) The compliance issued papers dated December 23, 1983, and January 24, 1984. The compliance issued paper was disseminated in two versions: a secret version which was disseminated to several hundred recipients and a top secret version which was disseminated to 12 recipients. The secret version went to various locations, including members of the SSCI and HPSCI. The top secret version was sent only to members of the intelligence community. None of the code word information from the top secret version was leaked in the articles. The CIA cannot locate the dissemination list for the compliance issued papers.

(3) DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (DIA) cable dated December 16, 1983. There were 95 copies of this cable disseminated, 59 of which were disseminated within the CIA and 36 outside the CIA. The dissemination list for this cable and for the SNIE are available.

LEAD INFORMATION:

Referral/Consult




~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 3/15/85

This communication is classified ~~"Secret"~~ in its entirety. Referral/Consult



~~CLASSIFIED BY G-3;
DECLASSIFY ON OADR~~

Investigation on 1/30/85 at Langley, VA File # AX 65C-587

by SA gaj Date dictated 2/11/85

b6
b7C


~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

AX 65C-587

2

Referral/Consult



~~SECRET~~

4


~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

Date of transcription 3/15/85

This communication is classified "~~Secret~~" in its entirety. Referral/Consult



~~CLASSIFIED BY G-3;
DECLASSIFY ON OADR~~

Investigation on 1/30/85 at Langley, VA File # AX 65C-587

b6
b7C

by SA gaj Date dictated 2/11/85

~~SECRET~~

FBI

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 03-29-2013 BY ADG F54M93K42

TRANSMIT VIA:

- Teletype
- Facsimile
- AIRTEL

PRECEDENCE:

- Immediate
- Priority
- Routine

CLASSIFICATION:

- TOP SECRET
- SECRET
- CONFIDENTIAL
- UNCLAS E F T O
- UNCLAS

Date 3/15/85

DATE: 10-17-2007
 CLASSIFIED BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH
 REASON: 1.4 (C)
 DECLASSIFY ON: 10-17-2032

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
 FROM: SAC, ALEXANDRIA (65C-587) (P)

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
 WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

UNSUB(S);
 UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION
 IN THE "WASHINGTON POST", AUGUST 26, 1984,
 AUTHORED BY JACK ANDERSON, ENTITLED
 "THE GROWING CHEMICAL CLUB", THE "WASHINGTON POST",
 AUGUST 27, 1984, AUTHORED BY JACK ANDERSON,
 ENTITLED "CHEMICAL ARMS AND TERRORISM FEARED BY CIA",
 AND "READERS DIGEST" SEPTEMBER, 1984, ISSUE AUTHORED
 BY JACK ANDERSON, ENTITLED "POISON AND PLAGUE, RUSSIA'S
 SECRET TERROR WEAPONS";
 ESPIONAGE - X (MEDIA LEAKS)

This entire communication is classified ~~"Secret"~~.

Re Alexandria teletype to the Bureau, 2/1/85.

Enclosed for the Bureau is the original and five
 copies of a self-explanatory LHM. Enclosed for Baltimore
 and WFO are one copy each of the LHM.

Referral/Consult

ADMINISTRATIVE:

~~CLASSIFIED BY G-3, DECLASSIFY ON OADR~~

3-Bureau (Enc. 6)
 2-Baltimore (Enc. 1) (65-4516) (SQ. 3)
 ②-WFO (Enc. 1) (65-13263)
 2-Alexandria
 RJO:gaj
 (9)

65-13263
~~SECRET~~ 12a


Approved: _____ Transmitted _____ Per _____
 (Number) (Time)

An

~~SECRET~~

AX 65C-587,

Referral/Consult



LEADS:

ALEXANDRIA

AT ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA

Upon receipt of descriptive information concerning
 will conduct appropriate record reviews.

b6
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X Airtel

DECLASSIFIED BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH
ON 10-25-2007

4/1/85

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

~~SECRET~~

FROM: SAC, WASHINGTON FIELD (65-13263) (P) (C-1)

UNSUBS;
UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF
CLASSIFIED INFORMATION IN THE
WASHINGTON POST, 8/26/84,
AUTHORED BY JACK ANDERSON,
ENTITLED "THE GROWING CHEMICAL CLUB",
THE "WASHINGTON POST", 8/27/84,
AUTHORED BY JACK ANDERSON
ENTITLED "CHEMICAL ARMS AND TERRORISM
FEARED BY CIA", AND
"READER'S DIGEST", 9/84,
ISSUE AUTHORED BY
JACK ANDERSON ENTITLED
"POISON AND PLAGUE RUSHES SECRET
TERROR WEAPONS";
ESPIONAGE (X)-MEDIA LEAKS

All markings, notations and items of information
contained in this communication are classified ~~"Secret"~~
unless otherwise noted.

Re Director's airtel dated 3/15/85, and Alexandria
teletype to WFO dated 12/4/84.

In reference to Alexandria teletype to WFO, Alexandria
advised that a copy of Bureau airtel to Alexandria dated
11/16/84, and newspaper articles would be provided to both.

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: G-3
Declassify on: OADR

2-Bureau
2-Alexandria
2-WFO

LBS:tmc *Juc*
(6)

65-13263-13
Searched *[Signature]*
Serialized *[Signature]*
Indexed *[Signature]*
Filed *[Signature]*

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~~SECRET~~

WFO 65-13263

~~SECRET~~

Baltimore and WFO by separate cover. As of this date, WFO is still not in possession of referenced airtel or newspaper clippings.

LEADS

ALEXANDRIA DIVISION

AT ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA

Provide WFO with a copy of Bureau airtel to Alexandria dated 11/16/84, as well as copies of the articles in question.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(Handwritten mark)

INBOX.6 (#3545)

TEXT: VZCZCHQ0284

RR AX BA WF

DE HQ #0284 1370105

DECLASSIFIED BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH
ON 10-25-2007

ZNY SSSSS

R 162115Z MAY 85

FM DIRECTOR FBI

TO FBI ALEXANDRIA ROUTINE

FBI BALTIMORE ROUTINE

FBI WASHINGTON FIELD ROUTINE

BT

~~SECRET~~

UNSUBS; UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION IN THE
WASHINGTON POST, AUGUST 26, 1984, AUTHORED BY JACK ANDERSON,
ENTITLED, "THE GROWING CHEMICAL CLUB", THE "WASHINGTON POST",
AUGUST 27, 1984, AUTHORED BY JACK ANDERSON ENTITLED, "CHEMICAL
ARMS AND TERRORISM FEARED BY CIA", AND "READER'S DIGEST",
SEPTEMBER, 1984, ISSUE AUTHORED BY JACK ANDERSON ENTITLED,
"POISON AND PLAGUE RUSHES SECRET TERRORISM WEAPONS";
ESPIONAGE-X - MEDIA LEAKS

THE ENTIRE CONTENT OF THIS COMMUNICATION IS CLASSIFIED

~~"SECRET"~~

65C-13263

MAY 15 1985



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(Handwritten mark)

RE DIRECTOR'S AIRTELS DATED DECEMBER 20, 1984, AND
FEBRUARY 19, 1985, ALEXANDRIA TELETYPE DATED DECEMBER 4, 1984,
ALEXANDRIA AIRTEL OF MARCH 15, 1985, AND WASHINGTON FIELD TELE-
TYPE DATED APRIL 1, 1985.

FOR THE INFORMATION OF RECEIVING OFFICES, FBIHQ HAS REVIEW-
ED FILE CONCERNING CAPTIONED MATTER AND IT WAS NOTED THAT FBIHQ
AUTHORIZED A FULL INVESTIGATION CONCERNING [REDACTED]
ON DECEMBER 20, 1984. BALTIMORE IS INSTRUCTED TO ASSUME ORIGIN
IN THE INVESTIGATION OF [REDACTED] AND BALTIMORE SHOULD NOTE THAT
ANY INVESTIGATIVE ACTION REPORTED SHOULD BE DONE SO UTILIZING
DUEL CAPTIONED COMMUNICATIONS INCLUDING INSTANT CAPTION AND THE
CAPTION FOR THE ESPIONAGE-X INVESTIGATION OF [REDACTED]

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ALEXANDRIA IS REQUESTED TO EXPEDITIOUSLY PROVIDE THE
BALTIMORE AND WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICES THE COPY OF BUREAU AIRTEL
TO ALEXANDRIA DATED NOVEMBER 16, 1984, AS WELL AS COPIES OF THE
ARTICLES IN QUESTION.

IT IS NOTED BY FBIHQ THAT DELAYS IN THIS INVESTIGATION
ARE LENGTHY AND EACH RECEIVING OFFICE IS REMINDED THAT THIS
INVESTIGATION AS WELL AS ALL MEDIA LEAK INVESTIGATIONS ARE TO
RECEIVE EXPEDITE HANDLING. FURTHER, DUE TO THE IDENTIFICATION OF

[] AS A PRIME SUSPECT IN THIS INVESTIGATION, EACH RECEIVING OFFICE IS ADVISED THAT THIS MATTER SHOULD RECEIVE PRIORITY ATTENTION WITH INVESTIGATION BEING CONDUCTED WHICH WILL EVENTUALLY LEAD TO [] BEING INTERVIEWED CONCERNING THESE LEAKS.

BALTIMORE IS REQUESTED TO SUBMIT A LETTERHEAD MEMORANDUM TO FBIHQ CONCERNING THE INVESTIGATION OF [] IN ORDER THAT IT MIGHT BE PROVIDED TO THE OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE POLICY AND REVIEW AS REQUIRED BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL GUIDELINES WHEN AN FCI INVESTIGATION IS BEING CONDUCTED OF A UNITED STATES PERSON.

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ALL QUESTIONS SHOULD BE DIRECTED TO SUPERVISOR []

[], EXTENSION 4656, FBIHQ.

~~C BY G-3; DECL ON: OADR~~

BT

#02844

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~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 03-29-2013 BY ADG F54M93K42

TRANSMIT VIA AIRTEL

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

DATE: NOVEMBER 16, 1984

FROM: Director, FBI
TO: SAC, Alexandria


DATE: 10-25-2007
CLASSIFIED BY: 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH
REASON: 1.4.1(1)
DECLASSIFY ON: 10-25-2032

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

UNSUB (S),
UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED
INFORMATION IN
THE WASHINGTON POST,
AUGUST 26, 1984,
AUTHORED BY JACK ANDERSON
ENTITLED "THE GROWING CHEMICAL CLUB;"
THE WASHINGTON POST,
AUGUST 27, 1984, AUTHORED BY JACK ANDERSON
ENTITLED "CHEMICAL ARMS IN TERROR MAY BEARED BY CIA"
AND READERS DIGEST,
SEPTEMBER, 1984,
ISSUE AUTHORED BY JACK ANDERSON
ENTITLED "POISON AND PLAGUE, RUSSIA'S SECRET
TERROR WEAPONS."
ESPIONAGE -- X (MEDIA LEAKS)
OO: FBIHQ

This communication is classified "~~Secret~~" in its
entirety.

Enclosed for Alexandria are ~~ONE~~ copies each of a
Department of Justice (DOJ) letter to the FBI dated November 6,
1984, and a [redacted] not dated, with copies of Referral/Consult
captioned articles enclosed.



Enclosure (2)

~~SECRET~~

Classified by G-3
Declassify on: OAD

~~SECRET~~



65-13263-15
FBI/DOJ

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~~SECRET~~

Airtel to Alexandria
RE: UNSUB (S);
UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED
INFORMATION IN
THE WASHINGTON POST

Referral/Consult

DOJ has requested the FBI to [REDACTED]

Alexandria is instructed to furnish the results to
FBIHQ for review, however, Alexandria should immediately [REDACTED]

immediately contact FBIHQ prior to initiation of further
investigation. The Alexandria Division is reminded that all
media leak investigations are to receive expedite handling and
that the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] In addition, the
Alexandria Office is instructed to keep FBIHQ advised of all
pertinent developments in this investigation for inclusion in the
biweekly media leak summary.

All communications and questions should be directed to
Supervisor [REDACTED] Extension 4660, FBIHQ.

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~~SECRET~~

POISON AND PLAGUE

RUSSIA'S SECRET TERROR WEAPONS

By JACK ANDERSON AND DALE VAN ATTA

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-15-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH

In October 1980 and August 1981, Jane Hamilton-Merritt documented for Reader's Digest the use of poison gas by the Soviet-supplied Vietnamese and Pathet Lao against anti-Communist H'mong tribesmen in Laos. The gasings have continued—and spread. In this exclusive account, investigative reporters Jack Anderson and Dale Van Atta reveal top-secret intelligence on the widespread proliferation of Soviet chemical and biological weaponry—and the growing threat it poses to America.

FOUR YEARS AGO, Jose Romero^o escaped from Cuba with secret knowledge of a development so terrifying that it could surpass the Cuban missile crisis in portent. Here are the stark details he related to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA):

In the 1960s Romero studied chemistry at a college near Havana. Later he was enrolled in a special army school at Limonar in Matanzas Province and trained by Soviet instructors as a chemical and biological warfare (CBW) adviser to Fidel Castro's army.

The Russians taught him that bacteria produced by rats, flies and other organisms could be introduced into an enemy's atmosphere or water supply. Romero said he had been shown pictures of U.S. cities that were "possible chemical and biological weapons targets." One Soviet briefing claimed that a single strategically released CBW agent could contaminate a third of the United States.

Romero's story is verified by other sources, including a former interpreter for Castro. Both defectors have described Soviet chemical units and underground-storage sites,

protected by surface-to-air missiles. These facilities, one defector warned, are "part of a chemical and biological strategic system developed by the Soviets and more dangerous than anyone in the United States can realize."

"Silent Killer." Meanwhile, reports had been reaching DIA headquarters revealing that the Soviets were putting into practice in Asia what they had been preaching in Cuba's CBW schools. In March 1981 a Thai citizen died from poison placed in drinking water by Vietnamese troops near the Kampuchean border. Others bled profusely from the nose and mouth. Two months later, Thai soldiers captured two Vietnamese trying to poison the water supply in a Kampuchean relocation camp in Thailand.

From Afghanistan came one horrifying report after another of poisonings and gasings. A favorite Soviet practice: pouring deadly chemical agents into the peasants' canals (multiple and canals used primarily for irrigation).

Victims of the Soviet-made chemical and biological agents have included Lao hill tribesmen, Kampuchean resistance fighters, Afghan

mojghedjia, Thai soldiers, Iranian revolutionary guards, Chinese soldiers, even civilians in the Soviet Union. A realistic estimate puts these killed at more than 30,000.

Descriptions of the slaughter are horrendous. The biologically produced poison that has come to be called "yellow rain" causes its victims to bleed through nearly every orifice, including ears and eyes. Soviet nerve gases cause a terrible dance of death: breathing difficulty, sweating, nausea, vomiting, cramps, involuntary defecation and urination, jerking and staggering. Finally, the victims collapse in convulsions, succumbing then to complete paralysis and asphyxiation. One chemical agent used in Afghanistan causes corpses to bloat abnormally, the skin turning black and flaking away from the bones in less than a day.

Only one new Soviet agent seems relatively merciful—an unidentified substance nicknamed "The Silent Killer." Spread by Soviet troops in the eastern and northeastern provinces of Afghanistan since mid-1981, it is so swift that victims die as if frozen in place.

Blue Ears. Soviet deployment of chemical and biological weapons is by no means a recent phenomenon. Red Army troops captured by the Germans during World War II told of an extensive Soviet program beginning in 1939, including development of a "powdery yellow-brown" agent called lebeda that could be sprayed from aircraft. A Soviet scientist who defected in the 1950s reported that political prisoners were fed toxic material in ground meat; then were closely monitored for reactions. A more recent Soviet defector revealed that the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the Ministry of Defense both specifically approved research into psychochemical and biological toxins.

But certain intelligence analysts were committed to the continuing possibility that the Soviet Union was not producing, storing, and stockpiling of these materials, that they at first gave little credence to any report suggesting that the Soviets were cheating.

All this changed in 1979, when a massive explosion rocked the area

and a secret Soviet installation at Sverdlovsk in the Ural Mountains. Within four days the first seven or eight victims were admitted to a local hospital, choking, with high fever, blue ears and lips, and breathing difficulties. Each died within six to seven hours, and autopsies revealed severe pulmonary edema and blood poisoning. Soon victims were collapsing throughout the region. By the time the epidemic had run its course two months later, up to 1000 people had died.

Not until the following April did President Carter receive the unequivocal report of "strong evidence that a biological production or storage site is at the Sverdlovsk facility. It shows an extremely large number of anthrax spores were released—effectively negating any assessment of peaceful or defensive research being conducted there. This lies in the face of the 1972 convention."

Since then, intelligence has identified another "major BW-related research and production installation" at Zagorsk, six more suspected sites—at Omutninsk, Aksu, Pokrov, Berdsk, Penza and Kurgan—and a storage facility in the town of Malta. A secret report reveals that the "offensive BW program" is run by a "covert apparatus" within the Ministry of Defense called the Seventh Main Directorate.

Eroding a Theory. Governmental foot-dragging also prevailed in the investigation of "yellow rain" gassings of H'mong people in Laos. The gassings appeared to be retribution against the tribe, which had fought for the United States against the Communists in Laos until the American withdrawal in April 1975. The earliest known chemical attack occurred in the summer of 1975. But it took four years—until September 1979—before a competent U.S. medical team was dispatched to Thailand to investigate. By that time at least 450 H'mong had been killed with deadly biological weapons, according to U.S. estimates.

Even then, however, eyewitness reports weren't enough for the analysts. Among the literally millions of hours of intercepted communications it routinely records, the Na-

tional Security Agency found the pieces of the Laotian puzzle. One piece revealed that a Laotian-army chemical unit in Xiengkhoang expected a visit by a Soviet military team on February 7, 1979, and prepared Soviet-manufactured chemical items for their inspection. Another revealed that a Soviet team of seven chemical-artillery experts was scheduled to inspect chemical supplies at a Savannakhet storage facility the following June. A third indicated the Soviets would be looking over the same chemical agents used against the H'mong.

Finally, on February 2, 1982, six years after the attacks began, an interagency intelligence report concluded that the Soviets were directing chemical-weapons training, storage and use by the Pathet Lao and Vietnamese forces in Laos and Kampuchea. It also charged the Soviets with using lethal chemicals in Afghanistan.

One aspect of the attacks was unexplained: what was the killing agent in "yellow rain"? Journalist Sterling Seagrave, later the author of *Yellow Rain*, and Army medical-intelligence specialist Sharon Watson discovered that peasants killed by a fungal poison in the Orenburg district of Russia during World War II exhibited many of the same symptoms as those who died decades later in Laos. More than 30,000 Russians perished of a trichothecene toxin (T2) in that epidemic, which resulted from fungal-contaminated millet, wheat and barley. Starving peasants baked it in bread. Tests since 1981 have identified unnatural levels of T2 and other trichothecene toxins at attack sites in Laos and Kampuchea.

The most vocal critic of this evidence, Harvard biochemist Matthew Meselson, argued that the yellow-rain poisons are produced in nature by fungi on the feces of bees. That theory eroded in May when two leading Canadian scientists reported that fungi collected in Thailand had little or no ability to produce yellow-rain poisons. Rutgers University scientist Joseph D. Rosen analyzed yellow-rain samples and found not only fungal poisons but a man-made chemical

Continued

(polyethylene glycol) that could not possibly have been produced naturally. Asks Rep. Jim Leach (R., Iowa), one of Congress's top CBW experts: "How can the bee-excrement theorists explain how thousands of people have died from a bee-borne plague where no history of such plagues has ever been recorded, where the geography is so diverse, ranging from the arid mountains of Afghanistan to the jungle plateaus of Cambodia to the semi-tropical mountains of Laos?"

New Threats. Although there has been a marked decline in the use of CBW weapons since early 1983, U.S. Ambassador Eugene Douglas, the coordinator for refugee affairs who helped bring "yellow rain" to world attention, fears that the decline represents only a temporary lull as the Soviets prepare to test a new group of horror weapons. Indeed, President Reagan received an alarming report from the CIA earlier this year about biological-warfare possibilities of Soviet gene-splicing techniques. A secret program directed by Gen. V. I. Ogarkov is utilizing recent advances in biotechnology to produce toxins more potent than ever before. The report estimated that Soviet military biotech research could field such weapons in three to five years.

Intelligence agencies acknowledge another threat: the Soviets have tailored one of their strategic rockets for delivering chemical or biological weapons to America. It is the Mod 4 variant of the SS-11 "Sego" intercontinental ballistic missile with three to six re-entry warheads.

Apocalyptic Prophecy. How can we defend ourselves against such weapons? As one answer, we maintain large CW stockpiles of our own, including tons of agents located under our control in West Germany. But we are still vulnerable to the threat of Soviet-backed terrorists' using these horrific agents in America. So much more needs to be done:

Intelligence regarding chemical and biological weapons must be upgraded. All CBW agents used by the Soviets must be identified,

and defenses prepared against them.

2. As intelligence is gathered, it must be shared by all law-enforcement agencies. All thefts of deadly pathogens and chemical agents should be reported to a central information-gathering facility, perhaps at the FBI.

3. Two SWAT teams should be created, one each to deal with chemical and bacteriological threats by terrorists. A national serum bank should be established and stocked for use during massive epidemics.

4. The Customs Service, Defense and Commerce Departments should cut off any exports of chemical or biological agent precursors and gene-splicing information to Soviet-bloc countries.

5. The U.S. government must vigorously pursue verifiable chemical- and biological-weapons bans—along the lines of Vice President George Bush's chemical-weapons proposals to the Soviets last April. It should consider, along with other governments, the possibility of a nonproliferation treaty regarding CBW weapons.

We can no longer ignore the threat. We have had sufficient warning of a potential devastation so appalling that it would fulfill the plagues and pestilences in apocalyptic prophecy.

The Growing Chemical Club

WASH Post 26 Aug 1980

Secret intelligence files reveal an alarming spread of chemical-biological weapons around the world. A growing number of Third World nations have joined the "chemical club," which was already dangerous enough when its membership was limited to the two superpowers and their allies.

A recent CIA report, classified "secret," summarizes the threat posed by the expansion of chemical-biological warfare capability this way:

"The past decade has seen an ominous proliferation of chemical weapons acquired by Third World states which shows a momentum greater than heretofore appreciated. Soviet military assistance has been a common source and major stimulus to this momentum . . .

"Much of the action has been centered in the Middle East, but other areas—parts of Southeast Asia and the Horn of Africa—are increasingly at risk. The attraction of chemical weapons for Third World forces, combined with a multiplicity of open market sources of chemical material, provide further encouragement for this growth. As more nations join the chemical club, a heightened sense of vulnerability is bound to manifest itself. We therefore

expect a continued upsurge in chemical warfare activities."

From intelligence sources and a series of secret and top-secret documents, my associate Dale Van Atta has put together the details of the chemical-biological warfare threat:

- Egypt was the first Middle East country to get this type of training, indoctrination and materiel—including nerve gas—from the Soviets. Throughout the 1960s, high-level Egyptian military officers were trained in Moscow at the Red Banner Academy of Chemical Defense. Egypt used poison gas during the 1963 and 1967 Yemen campaigns.

- Iraqi soldiers also got Soviet chemical-biological warfare training in the 1960s. A dozen obstacle courses were set up in Iraq, requiring a small supply of nerve gas and other chemical agents. In 1982, the hard-pressed Iraqis used tear gas effectively to roll back an Iranian offensive, and in 1983-84 they escalated their chemical warfare to include mustard gas and a nerve agent, which decimated Iranian human-wave attacks.

- Ethiopia—itsself a victim of Italian mustard gas in 1936—acquired chemical weapons,

decontamination equipment and training from the Soviets, with Cuban advisers providing follow-up exercises. The Ethiopian army reportedly has used chemical incapacitants and irritants since 1980 against the rebel Eritrean People's Liberation Front.

- Syria has been a major recipient of Soviet chemical warfare aid, and is probably the most advanced Arab country in this grisly military art. The assistance continues to this day.

- Libya is believed to have received Soviet training, but the Russians have been hesitant to supply chemical weapons. Poland may have provided some chemical agents to Libya in 1980.

- Israel, under obvious threat from the stockpiling of chemical weaponry by its Arab neighbors, has acquired chemical-biological capability in response. Only two weeks before the Six Day War of 1967, Israeli intelligence discovered a stockpile of artillery shells loaded with Soviet nerve gas in the Egyptian-held Sinai peninsula. That set off a frantic scramble for protective gear, and led eventually to the existing Israeli stockpiles of nerve and mustard gas supplies, as well as various nonlethal agents used for riot control.

- Thailand, finding itself in a similarly threatened position from its communist neighbors, been improving its defensive chemical-biological program. It has been buying more and better protective equipment from the United States and other suppliers to counter the potential use of nerve gas by the Vietnamese, and have their own stockpiles.

- Taiwan is a special case among members of the chemical club. It has made these weapons a priority since 1979. The Taiwanese defense strategy calls for unrestricted counter attack with chemical weapons whether the invading force uses them or not.

- China, apparently suffering chemical attacks by the Soviets in 1969 and by the Japanese 10 years later, and has developed modest offensive capability. U.S. spy satellites have monitored Chinese military exercises which included the firing of chemical artillery shells at "enemy" troop concentrations. Decontamination crews moved in after the barrage, compared to the chemical weapons attacks against them across the Soviet border, the Chinese stockpile is militarily insignificant.

JACK ANDERSON

Chemical Arms In Terrorism Feared by CIA

The gravest "clear and present danger" posed by chemical and biological weapons is not from aggressor nations, which are restrained by fear of retaliation, but from terrorists or lunatics who decide to use these hideous weapons for blackmail or to publicize their causes.

A secret CIA "Special National Intelligence Estimate," which had the concurrence of eight other federal intelligence agencies, expresses concern that the use of poison gas by the Soviets and the Iraqis (who got the ingredients from West German companies) "could influence the attitudes of terrorists toward use of chemical and biological weapons."

The report, which was reviewed by my associate Dale Van Atta, points out that chemical-biological weapons are not yet popular among terrorists—probably because they're terrified of them. But it warns that "one successful incident involving such [lethal] agents would significantly lower the threshold of restraint on their application by other terrorists."

In fact, these weapons have been

used in isolated cases by terrorists and others. In 1978, for example, a Palestinian group injected cyanide into citrus fruit exported by Israel. Huk guerrillas in the Philippines poisoned pineapples destined for export. In both cases, rapid and effective response to the discovery of the poisoned fruit prevented fatalities.

Similar incidents of "consumer terrorism" have been attributed to individuals, like the person who injected cyanide into pain-reliever capsules, and the ex-convict in Australia who threatened to infect herds with hoof-and-mouth disease last January.

The low cost of chemical-biological weapons and their relatively easy availability make them attractive to terrorists. Once they have overcome their fear of the weapons through training—by the Soviets, for example—terrorists will see the advantage of deadly agents that can be smuggled into a target area virtually immune from detection.

It costs hundreds of millions of dollars to build a nuclear bomb, whereas any reasonably intelligent biology or chemistry student can make a kilogram of deadly Type A botulin toxin for \$400, according to Pentagon consultant Joseph Douglass. He adds that with a forged research permit a terrorist could get anthrax germs by mail for \$35. One supply house offers samples of five toxins, including the probable lethal

ingredient of "yellow rain," for less than \$100.

A group of experts told a United Nations panel in 1969 that "for a large-scale operation against a civilian population, casualties might cost about \$2,000 per square kilometer with conventional weapons, \$800 with nuclear weapons, \$600 with nerve-gas weapons and \$1 with biological weapons." Inflation may have changed the figures, but not the deadly bargain ratio.

The United States is wide open to terrorists with chemical-biological operations in mind. The only federal agency that monitors the sale of deadly pathogens is the Agriculture Department. Universities and other research laboratories are poorly guarded, and the necessary knowledge is easy to gather.

"Clandestine production of chemical and biological weapons for a multiple-casualty attack generally raises no greater technical obstacles than does the clandestine production of chemical narcotics or heroin," the CIA report concludes.

Among law enforcement agencies, the Secret Service is particularly aware of the near-impossibility of protection against chemical-biological attacks. An expert told the presidential bodyguards that he could stroll through the White House with a tour group and leave behind an undetectable poison that would kill all the building's inhabitants by the next morning.

FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:

- Teletype
- Facsimile
- AIRTEL

PRECEDENCE:

- Immediate
- Priority
- Routine

CLASSIFICATION:

- TOP SECRET
- SECRET
- CONFIDENTIAL
- UNCLAS E F T O
- UNCLAS

Date 5/14/85

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
 65C-87-20
 65C-6-100
 65C-13268*

TO: SAC, BALTIMORE

FROM: SAC, ALEXANDRIA (65C-587) (P) DECLASSIFIED BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH ON 10-17-2007

UNSUBS;
 UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF
 CLASSIFIED INFORMATION IN THE
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 THE "WASHINGTON POST", 8/27/84,
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 ENTITLED "CHEMICAL ARMS AND TERRORISM
 FEARED BY CIA", AND
 "READER'S DIGEST", 9/84,
 ISSUE AUTHORED BY
 JACK ANDERSON ENTITLED
 "POISON AND PLAGUE RUSHES SECRET
 TERROR WEAPONS";
 ESPIONAGE (X)-MEDIA LEAKS

full
 65C-13268*

All information contained
 herein is classified "Secret,"
 unless otherwise noted.

Re Alexandria teletype dated 12/4/84; and WFO airtel to Bureau dated 4/1/85.

Enclosed for Baltimore and WFO is one copy each of Bureau airtel to Alexandria dated 11/16/84, with newspaper articles attached. The enclosed communications were mentioned in referenced airtel.

~~CLASSIFIED BY C-3
 DECLASSIFY ON OADR~~

2-Baltimore (Enc. 1)
 2-WFO (Enc. 1) *1/21*
 2-Alexandria
 RJO:llv
 (6)

65C-13263
 2
 16

Approved: *JGL/LPC*

Transmitted

(Number) (Time)

Per

[Signature box]

~~SECRET~~

*ck w/ addresses & make
 sure they have correct file #
 its correct*

FILES INCOM.DAY16-31.465 (4421)

TO: HQ @ SAMNET-EMH, AX @ SAMNET-EMH, WF @ SAMNET-EMH

FROM: BA @ SAMNET-EMH

SUBJECT: 178/018 IMMEDIATE

DATE: 27 JUN 85 22:30:21 EDT

CC:

TEXT: BAO018 1782030Z

OO HQ AX WF

DE BA

O 272130Z JUN 85
FM BALTIMORE (65-4516)(SQ.3)(P)

TO DIRECTOR, FBI (PRIORITY)

SAC, ALEXANDRIA (PRIORITY)

SAC, WFO (IMMEDIATE)

BT

~~SECRET~~

UNSUBS; UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION IN THE
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SEPTEMBER, 1984, ISSUED AUTHORED BY JACK ANDERSON ENTITLED,
"POISON AND PLAGUE - RUSSIA'S SECRET TERRORISM WEAPONS"; ESP - X -
MEDIA LEAKS.

ALL ITEMS OF INFORMATION CONTAINED ON THIS DOCUMENT ARE
CLASSIFIED "~~SECRET~~".

RE BUREAU TELETYPE TO ALEXANDRIA, JUNE 26, 1985, AND ALEXANDRIA'S

*Rec'd
7-2-85*

No action



65-13263

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ORIGINAL

cal

DECLASSIFIED BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH
ON 10-25-2007

PAGE TWO (65-4516) (~~SECRET~~)

IMMEDIATE TELETYPE TO THE DIRECTOR, DATED JUNE 27, 1985.

WFO IS REQUESTED TO IMMEDIATELY CONTACT THE WALTER REED ARMY HOSPITAL IN WDC AND OBTAIN A DATE OF BIRTH, SSAN, AND CURRENT ADDRESS REGARDING AS SET FORTH IN REFERENCED COMMUNICATIONS.

WFO IS REQUESTED TO EXPEDITIOUSLY FURNISH ABOVE MENTIONED INFORMATION TO BALTIMORE AND FBIHQ AND SEEK FBIHQ AUTHORITY TO INTERVIEW.

~~C BY G-3. DECL: OADR.~~

BT

-----END OF DOCUMENT-----

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b7c

INBOX.4 (#4368)

TEXT: AX0002 1781514Z
OO HQ BA WF
~~DE AX~~
O 271505Z JUN 85
FM ALEXANDRIA (65C-587) (P)

cal

TO DIRECTOR IMMEDIATE

DECLASSIFIED BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH
ON 10-17-2007

BALTIMORE PRIORITY

WFO PRIORITY

BT

~~SECRET~~

ATTENTION:

UNSUBS; ~~UN~~AUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION IN
THE "WASHINGTON POST", AUGUST 26, 1984, AUTHORED BY JACK ANDERSON,
ENTITLED, "THE GROWING CHEMICAL CLUB"; THE "WASHINGTON POST"
AUGUST 27, 1984, AUTHORED BY JACK ANDERSON ENTITLED, "CHEMICAL
ARMS AND TERRORISM FEARED BY CIA"; AND "READERS DIGEST",
SEPTEMBER, 1984, ISSUE AUTHORED BY JACK ANDERSON ENTITLED,
"POISON AND PLAGUE - RUSSIA'S SECRET TERRORISM WEAPONS";
ESPIONAGE - X - MEDIA LEAKS

b6
b7c

THE ENTIRE OF THIS COMMUNICATION IS CLASSIFIED "~~SECRET~~".
RE AX AIRTEL TO BALTIMORE DATED MAY 14, 1985, AND BUREAU

*Received
6/27-85*

65C-13243
78
J
[Stamp]
 ABY

TELETYPE TO AX DATED MAY 17, 1985.

BY REFERENCED AX AIRTEL TO BALTIMORE DATED MAY 14, 1985,
A COPY OF THE BUREAU AIRTEL DATED NOVEMBER 16, 1984, AS WELL AS
A COPY OF THE ARTICLES WERE PROVIDED TO BALTIMORE AND WFO.

[REDACTED] U.S. ARMY, HAS BEEN
DEVELOPED BY ALEXANDRIA DIVISION AS A SUSPECT IN THIS
INVESTIGATION. [REDACTED] HAS PREVIOUSLY BEEN DESCRIBED TO BALTIMORE
AND WFO AS A WHITE MALE, APPROXIMATELY [REDACTED] YEARS OLD; 5'8" - 5'9";
180 POUNDS; SANDY AND CURLY HAIR WITH A LIGHT COMPLEXION.

b6
b7C

ADMINISTRATIVE:

BY AX AIRTEL TO DIRECTOR DATED MARCH 15, 1985, AN LHM
DATED MARCH 15, 1985, WAS PROVIDED FBIHQ, BALTIMORE AND WFO
SHOWING THE ENTIRE INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED BY ALEXANDRIA
DIVISION.

BALTIMORE AND WFO ARE REQUESTED TO PROVIDE [REDACTED] DATE

PAGE THREE AX 65C-587 ~~SECRET~~

OF BIRTH AND SOCIAL SECURITY ACCOUNT NUMBER SO LOCAL POLICE
RECORDS, CREDIT RECORDS AND CIA RECORDS CAN BE REVIEWED AT
ALEXANDRIA DIVISION REGARDING

b6
b7c

~~CLASSIFIED BY G-3; DECLASSIFY ON OADR.~~

BT

7290

NNNN

AIRTEL

6/24/85

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

~~SECRET~~

FROM: SAC, WASHINGTON FIELD (65C-13263) (P) (C-1)

UNSUB; UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF CLASSIFIED
INFORMATION IN THE WASHINGTON POST, 8/26/84,
AUTHORED BY JACK ANDERSON, ENTITLED "THE
GROWING CHEMICAL CLUB", THE WASHINGTON POST, 8/27/84,
AUTHORED BY JACK ANDERSON ENTITLED "CHEMICAL ARMS AND
TERRORISM FEARED BY CIA", AND READER'S DIGEST, 9/84,
ISSUE AUTHORED BY JACK ANDERSON ENTITLED "POISON AND
PLAGUE RUSSIA'S SECRET TERROR WEAPONS";
ESPIONAGE-X
MEDIA LEAKS

~~SECRET~~ All information contained herein is classified
"Secret" unless otherwise noted.

Re FBIHQ teletype to WFO dated 12/20/84; WFO
teletype to FBIHQ dated 1/4/85; FBIHQ airtel dated 2/19/85;
FBIHQ telephone call from SSA [redacted] to SA [redacted]
dated 2/4/85; and FBIHQ telephone call from SSA [redacted]
to SA [redacted] dated 2/21/85.

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b7D

For the information of FBIHQ, WFO is placing
this case in an RUC status. FBIHQ teletype dated 12/20/84,
requested WFO to review [redacted] file to determine if that
was identical to one of the subjects in this case. WFO
teletype dated 1/4/85, provided information to indicate

~~SECRET~~
Classified by: G-3
Declassified on: OADR

- 2-Bureau
- 2-Baltimore (65-4516)
- 2-Alexandria (65C-587)
- 1-WFO

WFS:amd
WZ

65-13263-19

Searched	<u>2</u>
Serialized	<u>2</u>
Indexed	<u>2</u>
Filed	<u>2</u>

[redacted box]

b6
b7C

WFO 65C-13263

~~SECRET~~

that this file was not identical with any of the subjects in this case.

On 2/19/85, FBIHQ provided a national security letter to provide telephone information on the subjects duty phone at WALTER REED ARMY HOSPITAL. On 2/21/85, SSA [] was advised by WFO that this particular phone number had a bill that exceeded two million dollars and SSA [] advised that it would not be necessary to subpoena this telephone information.

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On 2/4/85, SSA [] advised WFO to conduct no active investigation concerning the subject at WALTER REED ARMY HOSPITAL until specifically requested to do so by FBIHQ.

As of this date, there are no leads outstanding at WFO.

~~SECRET~~

C1-7
ORIGINAL
C-1

INBOX.14 (#4327)

TEXT:
VZCZCHQ0272

PP AX BA WF

DECLASSIFIED BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH
ON 10-17-2007

DE HQ #0272 1772352

ZNY SSSSS

P 262105Z JUN 85

FM DIRECTOR FBI

TO FBI ALEXANDRIA PRIORITY

FBI BALTIMORE PRIORITY

FBI WASHINGTON FIELD PRIORITY

BT

~~SECRET~~

UNSUBS; UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION IN
THE WASHINGTON POST, AUGUST 26, 1984, AUTHORED BY JACK
ANDERSON, ENTITLED "THE GROWING CHEMICAL CLUB" ET. AL.;
ESPIONAGE-X "MEDIA LEAK"; OO: FBIHQ

b6
b7c

THE ENTIRE CONTENT OF THIS COMMUNICATION IS CLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

REBUTEL DATED MAY 16, 1985.

THE REFERENCED COMMUNICATION REQUESTED ALEXANDRIA TO
EXPEDITIOUSLY PROVIDE BALTIMORE AND WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICES
WITH A COPY OF BUAIRTEL DATED NOVEMBER 16, 1984, AS WELL AS
COPIES OF THE ARTICLES PERTAINING TO CAPTIONED MATTER.

pe OSA
7/2/85
7/2/85
7/2/85

65-13268 -
JUN 20 1985
[Signature]

[Handwritten initials]

FURTHER, THIS TELETYPE REQUESTED THAT BALTIMORE SUBMIT A LETTERHEAD MEMORANDUM TO FBIHQ CONCERNING THE INVESTIGATION OF IN ORDER THAT IT MIGHT BE PROVIDED TO THE OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE POLICY AND REVIEW AS REQUIRED BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL GUIDELINES WHEN AN FCI INVESTIGATION IS BEING CONDUCTED OF A UNITED STATES PERSON.

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TO DATE, NO RESPONSE TO BUREAU TELETYPE OF MAY 16, 1985, HAS BEEN RECEIVED AND EACH RECEIVING OFFICE IS REQUESTED TO IMMEDIATELY ADVISE FBIHQ OF THE STATUS OF THIS INVESTIGATION. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT REFERENCED COMMUNICATION REMINDED RECIPIENTS THAT THIS INVESTIGATION AS WELL AS ALL MEDIA LEAK INVESTIGATIONS ARE TO RECEIVE EXPEDITE HANDLING. IN VIEW OF THIS FACT, FBIHQ EXPECTS THAT A RESPONSE WILL BE RECEIVED FROM EACH RECEIVING OFFICE PRIOR TO THE CLOSE OF BUSINESS, JULY 8, 1985.

~~C BY G-3; DECL ON: OADR~~

BT

#0272

NNNN

INBOX.8 (52316)

TEXT
BA0910 2132217Z

PP HQ AX WF

DE HA

DECLASSIFIED BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH
ON 10-17-2007

P 012100Z JUL 85
FM BALTIMORE (65-4516) (SQ. 3) (P)

TO DIRECTOR PRIORITY

ALEXANDRIA (65C-587) PRIORITY

WFO (65-13263) PRIORITY

BT

C-1
[Redacted box]

~~SECRET~~

ATTN PERSQ: SSA [Redacted box]

UNSUBS: UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION IN THE
WASHINGTON POST, AUGUST 26, 1984, AUTHORED BY JACK ANDERSON,
ENTITLED "THE GROWING CHEMICAL CLUB" ET AL; ESPIONAGE-X-MEDIA
LEADS; OO: FBIHQ.

b6
b7C

ALL ITEMS OF INFORMATION CONTAINED ON THIS DOCUMENT ARE
CLASSIFIED ~~"SECRET"~~ BY CLASSIFICATION GUIDE NO. 3 (G-3) UNLESS
INDICATED OR OTHERWISE NOTED.

RE BALTIMORE TEL TO THE DIRECTOR COPY TO ALEXANDRIA DATED
JULY 5, 1985.

RE TEL ADVISED THAT [Redacted box] HAD STATED HE WOULD NEED

✓

65-13263

JUL 8 6 05 PM '85
20
A

[Redacted box] [Handwritten signature]

PAGE TWO (BA 85-4518) ~~SECRET~~

THE DATE/TIME GROUP, SNI NUMBER AND SUBJECT OF THE DOCUMENTS IN QUESTION IN ORDER TO DETERMINE IF THE DOCUMENTS HAD EVER BEEN DISSEMINATED TO THE ARMED FORCES MEDICAL INTELLIGENCE CENTER, FT. DETRICK.

LEAD: ALEXANDRIA VIRGINIA AT LANGLEY, VIRGINIA. WILL ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN ABOVE INFO FROM THE

ADVISE BALTIMORE.

Referral/Consult

~~C BY C 3. DECL. OADR.~~

BT

3

FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:

- Teletype
- Facsimile
- _____

PRECEDENCE:

- Immediate
- Priority
- Routine

CLASSIFICATION:

- TOP SECRET
- ~~SECRET~~
- CONFIDENTIAL
- UNCLAS E F T O
- UNCLAS

Date 7/2/85

037

FM WASHINGTON FIELD (65C-13263) (P) (C-1)
 TO DIRECTOR, FBI (IMMEDIATE) *355 mt*
 FBI, ALEXANDRIA (IMMEDIATE) *355 mt*
 FBI, BALTIMORE (IMMEDIATE) *355 mt*

DECLASSIFIED BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH
ON 10-17-2007

BT

~~SECRET~~

UNSUBS; UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION
 IN THE WASHINGTON POST, AUGUST 26, 1984, AUTHORED BY JACK
 ANDERSON, ENTITLED "THE GROWING CHEMICAL CLUB" ET AL;
 ESPIONAGE-X "MEDIA LEAK"; OO:FBIHQ

ALL MARKINGS, NOTATIONS AND ITEMS OF INFORMATION
 CONTAINED IN THIS COMMUNICATION ARE CLASSIFIED ~~"SECRET"~~
 UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED.

RE BU TELETYPE TO WFO, DATED JUNE 27, 1985, AND BALTIMORE
 TELETYPE TO WFO, DATED JUNE 27, 1985. RE TELCALL BETWEEN
 SPECIAL AGENT (SA) [] WFO, AND SA [] BALTIMORE,

2-WFO

IMS:sgt
As

b6
b7c

65-13263-21

Approved: *[Signature]*

Transmitted _____

(Number)


(Time)

Searched _____

Serialized *DM*

Indexed *[Signature]*

Filed *[Signature]*



[Signature]

FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:

- Teletype
 Facsimile

PRECEDENCE:

- Immediate
 Priority
 Routine

CLASSIFICATION:

- TOP SECRET
 SECRET
 CONFIDENTIAL
 UNCLAS E F T O
 UNCLAS

Date _____

PAGE TWO DE WF #0037 ~~SECRET~~

ON JULY 1, 1985, AND WFO TELCALL TO SSA [REDACTED] AND SA [REDACTED] ON JULY 2, 1985. WFO AIRTEL TO FBIHQ, DATED JUNE 25, 1985.

ON JULY 2, 1985, LTC [REDACTED] [REDACTED], WALTER REED ARMY HOSPITAL, ADVISED THAT HE RECENTLY ASSUMED HIS DUTIES AS [REDACTED] AND COULD NOT PROVIDE ANY DETAILED BACKGROUND DATA ON [REDACTED] LTC [REDACTED] ADVISED THAT [REDACTED] DUTIES AS AN [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] WOULD NOT INCLUDE ACCESS TO ANY SENSITIVE INFORMATION CONCERNING SOVIET CHEMICAL WEAPONS. [REDACTED] DUTIES INCLUDE CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR WALTER REED ARMY MEDICAL CENTER AND ARRANGING FOR COMMON SOLDIER SKILL TRAINING. [REDACTED] WAS NOT ADVISED OF THE EXACT NATURE OF THE INTERVIEW AND WAS ASKED NOT TO ADVISE [REDACTED] OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION'S (FBI'S) INTEREST IN HIM.

[REDACTED] FIELD PERSONNEL FILE CONTAINS NO COPIES OF HIS OFFICER EFFICIENCY REPORTS (OER'S). THESE WOULD BE MAINTAINED AT THE ARMY MILPERCEN CENTER, HOFFMAN II, ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA. THESE OER'S WOULD CONTAIN A DESCRIPTION OF HIS EXACT

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Approved: _____ Transmitted _____ Per _____
 (Number) (Time)

FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:

- Teletype
- Facsimile
- _____

PRECEDENCE:

- Immediate
- Priority
- Routine

CLASSIFICATION:

- TOP SECRET
- SECRET
- CONFIDENTIAL
- UNCLAS E F T O
- UNCLAS

Date _____

PAGE THREE DE WF #0037 ~~S E C R E T~~

DUTIES.

[] FIELD PERSONNEL FILE REFLECTS THE FOLLOWING

DATA:

NAME: []; RANK: MAJOR, USAR

DATE OF RANK JANUARY, 1984; DOB: [] POB:

[] MARRIED: [] HEIGHT: 6'; WEIGHT:

167; BRANCH OF SVC: MEDICAL SERVICE CORPS; SOCIAL SECURITY

ACCOUNT NUMBER: [] EDUCATION: []

b6
b7C

Approved: _____ Transmitted _____ Per _____
(Number) (Time)

FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:

- Teletype
 Facsimile

PRECEDENCE:

- Immediate
 Priority
 Routine

CLASSIFICATION:

- TOP SECRET
 SECRET
 CONFIDENTIAL
 UNCLAS E F T O
 UNCLAS

Date _____

PAGE FOUR DE WF #0037 ~~SECRET~~

COURSE; 1982 - ENROLLED, COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COURSE;
 3983 - INTELLIGENCE SCHOOL.

NOTE - ONE OF THE ABOVE INTELLIGENCE COURSES WAS
 TITLED "SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY INTELLIGENCE ANALYST."

IN ORDER TO DETERMINE WHETHER [] HAS HAD ACCESS
 TO INFORMATION CONCERNING SOVIET CHEMICAL WARFARE INTELLIGENCE
 DATA, IT WILL BE NECESSARY FOR ALEXANDRIA TO REVIEW MAJOR
 [] OFFICER EFFICIENCY REPORTS AT THE HOFFMAN II COMPLEX.
 THESE REPORTS SHOULD REFLECT [] ASSIGNMENTS. ALSO,
 BALTIMORE SHOULD CONTACT FT. DIETRICK, MARYLAND, AND
 ATTEMPT TO DETERMINE THE EXACT NATURE OF [] DUTIES WHILE
 ASSIGNED TO THE U.S. ARMY MEDICAL INTELLIGENCE UNIT, FT.
 DIETRICK.

LEADS. ALEXANDRIA DIVISION. AT ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA.
 AT U.S. ARMY MILPERCEN CENTER, HOFFMAN II, ALEXANDRIA.
 REVIEW [] OFFICER EFFICIENCY REPORTS AND ATTEMPT TO
 DETERMINE IF HE WORKED IN ANY AREA THAT INCLUDED RESEARCH
 IN CHEMICAL WEAPONS.

BALTIMORE DIVISION. AT FT. DIETRICK, MARYLAND. CONDUCT
 INVESTIGATION AT FT. DIETRICK, MARYLAND, TO DETERMINE THE

b6
b7C

Approved: _____ Transmitted _____ Per _____
 (Number) (Time)

FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:

- Teletype
- Facsimile
- _____

PRECEDENCE:

- Immediate
- Priority
- Routine

CLASSIFICATION:

- TOP SECRET
- SECRET
- CONFIDENTIAL
- UNCLAS E F T O
- UNCLAS

Date _____

PAGE FIVE DE WF #0037 ~~SECRET~~

NATURE OF [] ASSIGNMENT WITH THE U.S. ARMY MEDICAL INTELLIGENCE UNIT, FT. DIETRICK, MARYLAND. SPECIFICALLY, ATTEMPT TO DETERMINE IF [] HAD ACCESS TO INFORMATION CONCERNING SOVIET CHEMICAL WEAPONS.

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b7C

~~C BY G-3. DECL. OADR.~~

BT

#0037

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Approved: _____ Transmitted _____ Per _____
 (Number) (Time)

ORIGINAL

DECLASSIFIED BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH
ON 10-17-2007

INBOX.2 (#5062)

TEXT:
BAO005 1862045Z

PP HQ AX WF

DE BA

P 051945Z JUL 85
FM BALTIMORE (65C-4516) (SQ. 3) (P)

TO DIRECTOR PRIORITY

ALEXANDRIA (65C-587) PRIORITY

WFO (65-13263) PRIORITY

BT

~~SECRET~~

ATTN: SSA [redacted]

UNSUBS; UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION IN THE
WASHINGTON POST, AUGUST 26, 1984, AUTHORED BY JACK ANDERSON,
ENTITLED "THE GROWING CHEMICAL CLUB" ET AL; ESPIONAGE-X-MEDIA LEAKS;

OO: FIBHQ.

b6
b7C

ALL ITEMS OF INFORMATION CONTAINED ON THIS DOCUMENT ARE
CLASSIFIED "~~SECRET~~" BY CLASSIFICATION GUIDE NO. 3, (G-3) UNLESS
INDICATED OR OTHERWISE NOTED.

RE WFO IMMEDIATE TELETYPE TO THE DIRECTOR, ALEXANDRIA, AND
BALTIMORE DATED JULY 2, 1985.

ON JULY 3, 1985, [redacted]

65-13263
JUL 3 1985
[redacted] [handwritten initials]

BSW

[REDACTED] ARMED FORCES MEDICAL INTELLIGENCE CENTER (AFMIC), FORT
DETRICK, MD., PHONE [REDACTED] FURNISHED THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION
CONCERNING [REDACTED]

b6
b7C

[REDACTED] ADVISED THAT HE ARRIVED AT AFMIC IN AUGUST
1983 AND AT THAT TIME [REDACTED] ASSIGNED TO
[REDACTED] ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA, AND
DETACHED TO [REDACTED] FORT DETRICK, MD., AS THE [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] DUTIES AT FORT DETRICK WERE: [REDACTED]



TO COMPLETE THE ABOVE DUTIES, [REDACTED] HELD A ~~TOP SECRET~~, SI-TK, SCI CLEARANCE, WHICH GAVE HIM ACCESS TO ANY AND ALL CLASSIFIED MATERIAL AT AFMIC.

[REDACTED] ADVISED THAT HE WAS AWARE OF [REDACTED]

CLOSE PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH JACK ANDERSON. APPROXIMATELY

b6
b7C

SEPTEMBER 1983, [REDACTED] HAD READ A JACK ANDERSON COLUMN IN THE "WASHINGTON POST" AND HE CAUTIONED [REDACTED] TO BE VERY CAREFUL AND AVOID TALKING TO ANDERSON ABOUT [REDACTED] DUTIES WITH THE U.S. ARMY. [REDACTED] REPLIED THAT HIS CONVERSATIONS WITH ANDERSON RELATED ONLY TO CHURCH MATTERS.

[REDACTED] WAS SHOWN A LIST OF DOCUMENTS FROM WHICH ANDERSON COULD HAVE OBTAINED THE INFORMATION USED IN THE ARTICLES IN CAPTIONED MATTER. [REDACTED] COULD NOT VERIFY THAT THE DOCUMENTS WERE EVER DISSEMINATED TO AFMIC. TO DO SO HE WOULD NEED THE DATE/TIME GROUP, SNIE NUMBER AND SUBJECT OF THE DOCUMENTS. HE DID STATE THAT IF THE DOCUMENTS HAD BEEN DISSEMINATED TO AFMIC, [REDACTED]

b6
b7C

PAGE FOUR (BA 65C-4516) ~~SECRET~~

WOULD PROBABLY HAVE REVIEWED THE DOCUMENTS. [REDACTED] DUTIES AS

[REDACTED]

ACCORDING TO [REDACTED] THERE IS NO DOCUMENTS AT AFMIC CONCERNING SOVIET CHEMICAL WEAPONS.

[REDACTED] WAS VERY COOPERATIVE DURING THE INTERVIEW AND HE PROMISED THAT HE WOULD NOT DISCUSS THIS MATTER WITH ANYONE ELSE. HE ADVISED THAT DETAILED INFORMATION ABOUT [REDACTED] COULD BE OBTAINED FROM [REDACTED] PERSONNEL FILE LOCATED AT THE MILPERCEN CENTER, HOFFMAN ILLINOIS, ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA.

REQUEST OF THE BUREAU: THE BUREAU IS REQUESTED TO AUTHORIZE AN INTERVIEW OF [REDACTED] AT THE WALKER REED ARMY HOSPITAL, WASHINGTON, D.C.

LEAD: WFO AT WASHINGTON, D.C., WFO IS REQUESTED TO CONTACT BALTIMORE CONCERNING A POSSIBLE WFO/BALTIMORE JOINT INTERVIEW OF [REDACTED] AFTER APPROVAL TO INTERVIEW IS GRANTED BY FBIHQ.

~~C BY 6-3. DECL. OADR.~~

BT

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b7c

0007 1901554Z

TO HQ WF BA

DE AX

O 091545Z JUL 85

FM ALEXANDRIA (65C-587) (P)

DECLASSIFIED BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH
ON 10-17-2007

C-1

TO DIRECTOR PRIORITY

WFO IMMEDIATE

BALTIMORE IMMEDIATE

BT

ORIGINAL

~~SECRET~~

ATTENTION: SSA [redacted] FBIHQ

o'seatt *o*
UNSUBS: UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION IN THE
WASHINGTON POST; AUGUST 26, 1984, AUTHORED BY JACK ANDERSON,
o'seatt
ENTITLED, "THE GROWING CHEMICAL CLUB"; ET AL; ESPIONAGE - X
(MEDIA LEAK); (OO: FBIHQ)

ALL MARKINGS, NOTATIONS AND ITEMS OF INFORMATION CONTAINED
IN THIS COMMUNICATION ARE CLASSIFIED "~~SECRET~~" UNLESS OTHERWISE
NOTED.

b6
b7C

RE WFO TELETYPE TO THE BUREAU DATED JULY 2, 1985, CAPTIONED
AS ABOVE.

RE TELETYPE REQUESTED ALEXANDRIA REVIEW SUBJECTS OFFICER

65-13863

JUL 9 1 30 PM '85

FBI-WASH. F. O.

[redacted]

PC
23
BN

INBOX.5 (#5865)

TO: HQ1 @ SAMNET-EMH, BA @ SAMNET-EMH, WF @ SAMNET-EMH

FROM: AX @ SAMNET-EMH

SUBJECT: 001/PRIORITY

DATE: 17 JUL 85 18:27:36 EDT

CC:

TEXT: AX0001 1981831Z
PP HQ BA WF
DE AX
P 171815Z JUL 85
FM ALEXANDRIA (65C-587) (P)

[Handwritten signature]
C-1

DIRECTOR PRIORITY

DECLASSIFIED BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH
ON 10-17-2007

BALTIMORE PRIORITY

WFO PRIORITY

BT

~~SECRET~~

(ATTENTION: SSA [redacted], FBIHQ)

b6
b7C

UNSUB(S); UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION IN THE
WASHINGTON POST, AUGUST 28, 1984, AUTHORED BY JACK ANDERSON
ENTITLED "THE GROWING CHEMICAL CLUB"; ET AL; ESPIONAGE - X, (MEDIA
LEAK); (OO:HQ)

THIS ENTIRE COMMUNICATION IS CLASSIFIED "SECRET".

RE AX TELETYPES TO THE BUREAU DATED JUNE 27, 1985, AND JULY
9, 1985.

RECORDS OF THE FOLLOWING AGENCIES WERE REVIEWED AND FOUND TO

BE NEGATIVE CONCERNING [redacted] WHITE MALE, DOB:

[redacted]

SEARCHED [redacted] INDEXED [redacted]
SERIALIZED [redacted] FILED [redacted]
JUL 17 6 55 PM '85
FBI-WASH. F. O.

[redacted]

65-13263

23
A

Original

C-1

-->READ INBOX.6 TEXT
FORMS TEXT HAS 1 DOCUMENT

INBOX.5 (#3125)

TEXT: AX0004 2261750Z
PP HQ BA WF
DE AX
P 141715Z AUG 85

FM ALEXANDRIA (85C-587) (P)

TO DIRECTOR PRIORITY

BALTIMORE (65-4518) (SQ. 3) ROUTINE

WFO (65-13263) ROUTINE

BT

DATE: 10-17-2007
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 10-17-2032

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

~~SECRET~~

ATTENTION: SSA [REDACTED]

b6
b7C


UNSUBS; UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION IN
THE WASHINGTON POST, AUGUST 26, 1984, AUTHORED BY JACK
ANDERSON ENTITLED, "THE GROWING CHEMICAL CLUB"; ET AL;
ESPIONAGE - X (MEDIA LEAKS); (OO:FB(HQ))

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS DOCUMENT IS CLASSIFIED~~

~~"SECRET" IN ITS ENTIRETY.~~

Referral/Consult

RE BALTIMORE TELETYPE TO THE DIRECTOR DATED AUGUST 1, 1985.




65-13263-24

AUG 14 4 00 PM '85

[REDACTED] *PRJ*

b6
b7C



LEADS: ALEXANDRIA AT TYSONS CORNER, VIRGINIA:

WILL OBTAIN THE DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE CIA DOCUMENTS
AND PROVIDE THE DATA TO FBIHQ AND THE RECIPIENT OFFICES.

~~CLASSIFIED BY G-3; DECLASSIFY ON OADR.~~

BT

7922

NNNN

~~SECRET~~

DATE: 10-17-2007
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 10-17-2032
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Subject
Unsub; UDCI in
The Washington Post, 8/26/84 and 8/27/84
in articles by Jack Anderson; and
Readers Digest, Sept, 1984 in
an article by Jack
Anderson;
Espionage X (Media Leak)
OO: FBI HQ

20 AUG 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation


ATTN: Criminal Division

SUBJECT: Unauthorized Disclosures (U)

A. "New 'designer bugs' advanced by Soviets" by
Tom Diaz, The Washington Times, 8 August 1985
(Attachment A) (U)

B. "'Yellow rain' spread by Soviets, nations
silently agree" by Tom Diaz, The Washington
Times, 14 August 1985 (Attachment E)

Referral/Consult



CL BY 109086
DECL CADR
DRV FRM SEC 6-82

65-13863-
25
SEP 5 1985
FBI WASH DC

~~SECRET~~

65 C - 78754

b6
b7C

~~SECRET~~


Referral/Consult



3. In view of the established nexus between the instant articles and previously reported cases, this information is being promptly forwarded to you for inclusion in your current investigation. Please direct any correspondence in this matter to the Deputy Director of Security for Personnel Security and Investigations, Attention: ~~(X)~~

b6
b7C

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE:


Mitchell P. Lawrence
Deputy Director of Security
Personnel Security and Investigations

Attachments:
As stated

cc: OGC

~~SECRET~~

New 'designer bugs' advanced by Soviets

By Tom Diaz
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

8 Aug 85

The Soviet Union is using genetic engineering to create virulent new biological weapons that could be deployed by 1989, a classified report prepared for the National Security Council says.

"Genetic engineering" is the popular name for developing, through advanced biological techniques, organisms that do not occur in nature.

"It's like making designer drugs," Robert H. Kupperman, a chemical warfare expert at Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies, said yesterday about the significance of the Soviet genetic engineering activity.

"You want to get some specific characteristic, some function," he said. "If it's just a question of killing people, there are plenty of biological

agents already in existence that we couldn't defend against."

The secret report — a copy of which was recently obtained by The Washington Times — outlines extensive violations by the Soviets of two treaties. The report was prepared last year by Central Intelligence Agency and Arms Control and Disarmament Agency analysts.

The United States unilaterally renounced the use of biological weapons in 1969 and led the negotiation of the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), which forbids development, production or stockpiling of biological and toxin weapons. A 1925 pact, known as the Geneva Protocol, forbids the use in warfare of chemical or biological agents.

Violations of these pacts cited by the CIA include production by the
see WARFARE, page 6A

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-17-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH

WARFARE

From page 1A

Soviets of deadly trichothecene mycotoxins, known as "yellow rain." The mycotoxins, which cause ghastly deaths and suffering, were transferred to Soviet allies for use in Laos and Kampuchea, and have been directly used by Soviet military forces in Afghanistan since at least 1980, according to the report.

Although the United States has destroyed its stocks of biological weapons in accordance with the 1972 treaty, the CIA report says that the Soviet Union has forged ahead with an enormous biological warfare program, boosting its offensive capability in that area along with its chemical warfare capability.

"The intelligence evidence indicates that the Soviets have maintained an offensive biological warfare program and capability

since signing the BWC," the report says.

As evidence, the report notes construction at confirmed and suspected biological weapons production sites.

"The continued construction at some of the suspect biological warfare research, production, and storage facilities the inadvertent release of anthrax in the 1979 accident at the Sverdlosk BW facility ... [and] the fact that mycotoxins have been widely used as warfare agents ... confirms the continued existence of a development, production and weaponization program or stockpiling of such agents explicitly prohibited by the [Biological Weapons] Convention."

According to the report, the Soviet program is located within the Ministry of Defense, under a "covert administrative and organization apparatus" known as the 7th Main Directorate

That directorate is responsible for "all aspects of the [biological warfare] program, including research, development, testing, production and storage."

The report raises particular concern about the directorate's activities in developing "novel" biological weapons.

"We believe the Soviets are using recent advances in biotechnology, such as genetic engineering, to develop a new class of CBW [chemical, biological warfare] agents that can be rapidly produced for deployment," the report warns. "Some of the compounds developed under this program may now be available in sufficient quantities to permit extensive testing for their usefulness as field agents. Sufficient quantities for initial munitions testing and weaponization could become available within the next five years."

According to the report, the Soviets set up a special division of their

Microbiological Industry Organization between 1972 and 1976 to develop new CBW agents.

The facility is apparently located at Koltsovo, and includes "heavily guarded, militarily sponsored facilities for development and storage of small quantities of micro-organisms until needed for rapid, large-scale production of CBW agents."

Mr. Kupperman said there are a number of reasons why the Soviets might want to develop new biological agents, even though existing weapons are lethal enough.

"Their use is deniable," he said. "It takes only a few people to spread them around."

Other advantages include the ability to spread sickness or death widely over an area to debilitate whole populations — including military units — before their use can be detected.

"They are ideal terrorist weapons," Mr. Kupperman said.

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-17-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH

'Yellow rain' spread by Soviets, nations silently agree

By Tom Diaz
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

14 Aug 85

Other nations have independently confirmed U.S. charges that "yellow rain" reported in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan is caused by Soviet chemical weapons but have kept quiet for fear of internal repercussions, according to a highly classified government report.

The intelligence analysis, made last year, disputes the theory, first stated several years ago and

repeated in an article in the current issue of Scientific American, that yellow rain is actually a mist made by the feces of millions of high-flying bees.

"Since March 1982," the intelligence report says, "when the U.S. presented to the U.N. its evidence regarding [chemical weapon] and toxin use in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan, a number of nations have indicated privately that their own analysis supports the U.S. conclusions."

"However, for a variety of domestic reasons, most of these countries have refused to make public statements to that effect."

The secret report was prepared by analysts at the Central Intelligence Agency and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency for the National Security Council.

It confirms that the Soviets have tested chemical weapons on humans, a subject about which U.S. intelligence agencies have refused to comment, and rejects the "bee-feces"

theory advanced by a Harvard professor, Matthew Meselson.

Since the mid-1970s, hundreds of witnesses have reported that people exposed to the sticky yellow mist — sometimes said to be sprayed from airplanes — suffer blisters, vomiting, diarrhea and death.

According to the report, the United States has made several high-level diplomatic protests to the Soviet Union since then about the

see RAIN, page 8A

RAIN

From page 1A

use of yellow rain, but the Soviets have continued to profess their innocence.

But the NSC report states that "while some have tried to explain the presence of toxins in Southeast Asia as natural contamination of pollen-laden bee feces or other naturally occurring phenomena, the accumulated intelligence data and scientific scrutiny will not support these postulations."

It summarizes evidence supporting the U.S. "yellow rain" charges and provides details about the Soviet role in producing and distributing chemical weapons in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan.

"Scientific analyses of physical samples collected from sites of 'yellow rain' attacks in Laos and Kampuchea, from a Soviet protective gas mask acquired in Afghanistan and of human blood and tissue from 'yellow rain' victims . . . confirmed that toxins were being used as agents of warfare," the report says. "Various mycotoxins, produced by fungi of the Fusarium genus, have been identified as components of 'yellow rain.'"

"Mycotoxins" are lethal substances produced from molds. Production, storage and use of such toxins in warfare is banned by international treaties to which the Soviet Union is a party. The United States has destroyed its own stocks of biological and toxin weapons and currently has only stores of outdated chemical weapons.

According to the report, Soviet scientists have been experimenting in the use of the Fusarium fungus to make toxin weapons since the 1940s.

"The Soviets conducted toxicity studies in humans and investigated techniques for enhancing the toxic effects by combining different toxins," the report states. "It is possible that the 'yellow rain' agent used in Afghanistan and Southeast Asia was derived from this research program."

The report says that, among other things, the bee pollen theory doesn't account for eyewitness reports of the clouds being dispensed from planes and artillery shells, the fact that levels of toxin high enough to cause rapid ill effects in humans would "certainly [be] enough to kill a bee," and that yellow rain has only been observed in war zones.

It says that intelligence data indicates that the Soviets "are directly involved in Laos in the support of

chemical warfare operations, including storage and inspection" of the weapons.

The report says it is "most likely" that the Soviet Union itself produced the weapons but doesn't rule out the possibility that the Soviets have transferred the technology to Southeast Asian countries.

"In Afghanistan, it is clearly Soviet troops which have conducted chemical and toxin warfare operations against the mujahideen," the report adds.

The secret report also details continual Soviet obstinacy in rejecting U.S. behind-the-scenes diplomatic protests regarding the chemical warfare treaty violations.

It reveals that in 1982 former Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko angrily rejected an effort by former Secretary of State Alexander Haig to deliver a U.S. note objecting to Soviet use of chemical agents.

"During the Haig-Gromyko meeting of January 1982, Secretary Haig made a strong presentation on U.S. evidence regarding Soviet complicity in use of 'yellow rain,'" the report states. "Foreign Minister Gromyko reacted angrily, calling the U.S. charges a 'pack of lies,' and refused to accept a 'non-paper' summarizing the U.S. evidence."

CI

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SERIALIZED
INDEXED
FILED
SEP 5 1985
FBI - BALTIMORE

DATE: 10-24-2007
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH
REASON: 1.4 (1)
DECLASSIFY ON: 10-24-2032

AIRTEL

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9/4/85

Director, FBI (65C-78756)

SACs, Alexandria (65C-587)
Baltimore (65C-4516)

Washington Field (65C-78756)

CI-7

Ref
65C-13263

"CHANGED;"
UNSUB(S);
UDCI IN THE WASHINGTON POST, AUGUST 26, 1984, AUTHORED BY JACK ANDERSON, ENTITLED "THE GROWING CHEMICAL CLUB;"
THE WASHINGTON POST, AUGUST 27, 1984, AUTHORED BY JACK ANDERSON, ENTITLED "CHEMICAL ARMS IN TERRORISM FEARED BY CIA;" READERS DIGEST, SEPTEMBER, 1984, ISSUE AUTHORED BY JACK ANDERSON, ENTITLED "POISON AND PLAGUE, RUSSIA'S SECRET TERROR WEAPONS;"
THE WASHINGTON TIMES, AUGUST 8, 1985, AUTHORED BY TOM DIAZ, ENTITLED "NEW 'DESIGNER BUGS' ADVANCED BY SOVIETS;" AND THE WASHINGTON TIMES, AUGUST 14, 1985, AUTHORED BY TOM DIAZ, ENTITLED "'YELLOW RAIN' SPREAD BY SOVIETS, NATIONS SILENTLY AGREE;"
ESPIONAGE-X;
OO: FBIHQ

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

~~This communication is classified "SECRET" in its entirety.~~

Re Alexandria teletype, dated 8/16/85.

Referral/Consult

Enclosed for each receiving office is a copy of [redacted]

Title marked changed to add two additional articles believed to be associated with this leak investigation.

Enclosures (2) *gww*

~~SECRET~~

Classified by G-3;
Date of Declassification: OADR

65-13263-
~~65-78756-26~~
gww

b6
b7C

CI rec'd 9/16

[redacted]

h

~~SECRET~~

~~Airtel~~ to AX, BA, WFO

Re: "CHANGED;"

UNSUB(S);

UDCI IN THE WASHINGTON POST, AUGUST 26, 1984,

AUTHORED BY JACK ANDERSON, ENTITLED

"THE GROWING CHEMICAL CLUB;"

THE WASHINGTON POST, AUGUST 27, 1984, AUTHORED BY
JACK ANDERSON, ENTITLED "CHEMICAL ARMS IN TERRORISM
FEARED BY CIA;" READERS DIGEST, SEPTEMBER, 1984,

ISSUE AUTHORED BY JACK ANDERSON, ENTITLED

"POISON AND PLAGUE, RUSSIA'S SECRET TERROR WEAPONS;"

THE WASHINGTON TIMES, AUGUST 8, 1985,

AUTHORED BY TOM DIAZ, ENTITLED "NEW 'DESIGNER BUGS'

ADVANCED BY SOVIETS;" AND THE WASHINGTON TIMES,

AUGUST 14, 1985, AUTHORED BY TOM DIAZ, ENTITLED

"'YELLOW RAIN' SPREAD BY SOVIETS, NATIONS

SILENTLY AGREE;"

ESPIONAGE-X;

OO: FBIHQ

For the information of each recipient, FBIHQ will discuss use of polygraph in interviewing [] with DOJ. You will be advised of the results of these discussions once they are completed.

Baltimore is requested to expedite coverage of leads to determine if [] had access to documents as identified by Alexandria in referenced teletype. Baltimore should complete this phase of their investigation by close of business, 9/10/85, and advise FBIHQ of the results of disseminatable teletype.

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b7c

Baltimore is further requested to prepare a letterhead memorandum concerning [] and his possible involvement in captioned matter for dissemination by FBIHQ to INSCOMHQ. INSCOM has been briefed on this matter by FBIHQ and they have requested this letterhead memorandum prior to interviews. FBIHQ concurs and requests Baltimore to submit this letterhead memorandum in a most expeditious fashion.

~~SECRET~~

ORIGINAL

NR0X.3 (#1860)

TEXT:
DA0011 2582151Z

RR HQ AX WF
DE BA

DECLASSIFIED BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH
ON 10-25-2007

R 102100Z SEP 85
FM BALTIMORE (65-4516) (SQ. 3) (P)
TO DIRECTOR (65C-78756) ROUTINE
ALEXANDRIA (65C-587) ROUTINE
WFO (65C-78756) ROUTINE

C1-7

BT

~~SECRET~~

UNSUB (S); UDCI IN "THE WASHINGTON POST", AUGUST 26, 1984, AUTHORED
BY JACK ANDERSON, ENTITLED "CHEMICAL ARMS IN TERRORISM FEARED BY
CIA;" READERS DIGEST, SEPTEMBER, 1984, ISSUE AUTHORED BY JACK
ANDERSON, ENTITLED "POISON AND PLAGUE, RUSSIA'S SECRET TERROR
WEAPONS;" "THE WASHINGTON TIMES", AUGUST 8, 1985, AUTHORED BY TOM
DIAZ, ENTITLED "NEW 'DESIGNER BUGS' ADVANCED BY SOVIETS;" AND
"THE WASHINGTON TIMES", AUGUST 14, 1985, AUTHORED BY TOM DIAZ,
ENTITLED "'YELLOW RAIN' SPREAD BY SOVIETS, NATIONS SILENTLY AGREE;"
ESPIONAGE-X; OO: FBIHQ..

b6
b7c

ALL ITEMS OF INFORMATION CONTAINED ON THIS DOCUMENT ARE
CLASSIFIED "~~SECRET~~" IN ITS ENTIRETY.


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65-13263
65C78753

SEARCHED _____ INDEXED _____
SERIALIZED _____ FILED _____

27

SEP 10 6 59 PM '85



(Handwritten signature)

(Handwritten note: c-1 rec'd 9/12)

PAGE TWO (BA 65A-4516) ~~SECRET~~

RE BUREAU AIRTEL TO BALTIMORE AND RECEIVING OFFICES DATED
SEPTEMBER 4, 1985.

CONTACT WITH THE ARMED FORCES MEDICAL INTELLIGENCE CENTER
(AFMIC), FORT DETRICK, MARYLAND, DETERMINED THAT [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] IS TDY OUT OF THE STATE OF MARYLAND UNTIL SEPTEMBER 20,
1985.

b6
b7c

BALTIMORE WILL CONTACT [REDACTED] IMMEDIATELY UPON
HIS RETURN TO FORT DETRICK AND RESULTS OF THE CONTACT WILL BE
FURNISHED TO THE BUREAU AND RECEIVING OFFICES BY DISSEMINATABLE
TELETYPE.

LHM TO FOLLOW.

~~C BY C 3. DECL. OADR.~~

BT

#



U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

~~SECRET~~

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Alexandria, Virginia
September 17, 1985

UNSUB(S) ;
UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED
INFORMATION IN THE "WASHINGTON POST,"
AUGUST 26, 1984,
AUTHORED BY JACK ANDERSON ENTITLED,
"THE GROWING CHEMICAL CLUB,"
THE "WASHINGTON POST,"
AUGUST 27, 1984,
AUTHORED BY JACK ANDERSON ENTITLED,
"CHEMICAL ARMS AND TERRORISM FEARED BY CIA,"
AND THE "READER'S DIGEST,"
SEPTEMBER, 1984,
ISSUE AUTHORED BY JACK ANDERSON ENTITLED,
"POISON AND PLAGUE, RUSSIA'S SECRET
TERROR WEAPONS"

DATE: 10-24-2007
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH
REASON: 1.4 (1)
DECLASSIFY ON: 10-24-2032

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

~~This communication is classified "Secret" in its
entirety.~~

On July 3, 1985, a representative of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) reviewed the personnel file of
[redacted] at the Military Personnel Records Center in
Alexandria, Virginia. [redacted] is a United States Army Officer.
The following information was obtained from a review of the
Officer Efficiency Reports (OERs).

b6
b7C

Period: January 16, 1974, until
March 12, 1974
Assignment: Army Medical Department (AMEDD)
Officer's Basic Course,
Academy of Health Services,
United States Army,
Fort Sam Houston, Texas
Job: Student


~~SECRET~~
Classified by G-3
Declassify on OADR

65-13863-
SEARCHED
SERIALIZED 29

This document contains neither
recommendations nor conclusions of
the FBI. It is the property of
the FBI and is loaned to your agency;
it and its contents are not to be
distributed outside your agency.

b6
b7C

SEP 20 1985



BS/SD



~~SECRET~~

UNSUB(S) ;
UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED
INFORMATION IN THE "WASHINGTON POST,"
ETC.

Period: March 14, 1974, until April 17, 1977
Assignment: Headquarters and Support Company,
8th Med Battalion, 8th Infantry
Division,
APD New York 09166,
United States Army - Europe
Job: Ambulance Medical Platoon Leader,
XO Medical Company, S-2,
Asst S-3

Period: April 18, 1977, until May 21, 1979
Assignment: Second General Hospital,
United States Army,
Medical Command in Europe,
APO New York 09180,
United States Army - Europe
Job: Assistant Resource Management Division
Office, Installation Coordinator,
Acting Inspector General,
Special Correspondence

Period: July 10, 1979, until December 20, 1979
Assignment: AMEDD, Officer's Advanced Course,
Academy of Health Services,
United States Army,
Fort Sam Houston, Texas
Job: Student

Period: December 19, 1979, until March 21, 1984
Assignment: USAMIIA,
Fort Dietrick, Maryland
Job: Detachment Commander

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~~SECRET~~

UNSUB(S) :
UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED
INFORMATION IN THE "WASHINGTON POST,"
ETC.

Period: April 1, 1984, until the present
Assignment: Headquarters Company,
Walter Reed Army Medical Center,
Washington, D.C.
Job: Chief of Plans, Operation and
Training

It was further revealed that while assigned to the 8th Medical Battalion, 8th Infantry Division, United States Army Reserve in Europe as the Battalion S-2 (Intelligence Officer), [redacted] was also the Battalion Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Officer (NBC). As the Battalion S-2 and the Battalion NBC Officer, [redacted] would have had access to classified information concerning Soviet chemical warfare intelligence data. [redacted] rating officer during this period was [redacted] Social Security Account Number [redacted]

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Also while assigned to the United States Army Medical Intelligence Center at Fort Dietrick, Maryland, as Detachment Commander, [redacted] commander, Lieutenant Colonel Edward L. Shank, Social Security Account Number [redacted], wrote a letter to Lieutenant Colonel William C. Miller, III, commending [redacted] work in disseminating information that "heightened the awareness of the Biomedical Intelligence Research Analyst to the kinds of material that can be obtained from the enemy."

Records of the following agencies were reviewed and found to be negative regarding [redacted]

<u>Date of Review</u>	<u>Agency</u>
July 10, 1985	Alexandria, Virginia, Police
July 11, 1985	Arlington County, Virginia, Police
July 12, 1985	Fairfax County, Virginia, Police

~~SECRET~~

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UNSUB(S) ;
UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED
INFORMATION IN THE "WASHINGTON POST,"
ETC.

Date of Review

Agency

July 23, 1985

Falls Church, Virginia,
Police

Referral/Consult

On July 11, 1985, the following information was
obtained from the Credit Bureau in Manassas, Virginia. The
Credit Bureau handles information for residents in the
Washington, D.C., area:

b6
b7C

Name
Date of Birth
Social Security
Account Number
Present Address
Prior Addresses

Employment

United States Army
On file since

On August 14, 1985, T-1,

Referral/Consult

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

UNSUB(S) ;
UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED
INFORMATION IN THE "WASHINGTON POST,"
ETC.


Referral/Consult

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

UNSUB(S) ;
UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED
INFORMATION IN THE "WASHINGTON POST,"
ETC.

Referral/Consult



Xerox copies of these articles are attached hereto.

~~SECRET~~

6*

By DALE VAN ATTA

A BLANKET of total news... nations of the world was encased when the Iraqis used chemical weapons (CW) against invading Iranian soldiers early in 1980.

While the world could thus event, which was the first widely acknowledged CW violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, it has little idea how appalling such internationally outlawed weapons have become to many nations.

While death is death, whatever the cause, serious agents of death are feared and abhorred more than others, and few more than the agents of chemical war.

To be sure, the specter of nuclear holocaust has paled all other mortal concerns for the last few decades. But the vicious and seemingly total, crime-like nature of lethal gases has made the agent a storm center of controversy since before the turn of the century.

Thus it is particularly alarming that the "chemical club" of nations whose military arsenals contain such gruesome weapons has been secretly growing in the past few years and threatens to multiply out of all control. Worse, it appears that private firms and citizens of Western nations, sometimes without the knowledge of their governments, have been aiding and abetting CW proliferation.

Evidence contained in highly classified US intelligence documents intended for the eyes only of President Ronald Reagan and fewer than 100 US officials shows that the Federal Republic of Germany and Switzerland are second only to the Soviet Union in responsibility for the spread of chemical weapons — a trend that is likely to continue.

The issue of proliferation was addressed most comprehensively in a September 1983 "Special National Intelligence Estimate" (SNIE) produced by the Central Intelligence Agency and published in US intelligence journals. National intelligence estimates are closely held documents representing the US intelligence community's best and most secret consensus on a given subject.

This report, entitled "Implications of Soviet Use of Chemical and Toxic Weapons (CW) in the Middle East," was classified "Secret" and "Controlled." Which means "Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals." In other words, the document was not to be shared — as some intelligence routinely is — with intelligence agencies of Australia or other allies.

It was issued by the Director of Central Intelligence, William Casey, with the Central Intelligence Agency as the lead agency. As noted in the text of the report, the intelligence and coordination of the military's Central Security Agency (CSA) and the National Security Agency (NSA) were also involved in the report's preparation.

That is the report focused on disputed claims of Soviet chemical weapons use in Laos, Kampuchea and Afghanistan, an entire section of the study was devoted to "The Chemical Weapons Program of the Soviet Union." It was a very thorough review of SNIE reports on the subject.

It was one of the World War II generation of chemical weapons scientists who, in the 1930s, first discovered that chemical weapons were not just a theoretical possibility but a practical reality.

World military assistance has been a long-term goal of the CIA since the end of World War II. Since CW capabilities are necessary for the Cold War, the CIA has been interested in the military assistance program since its inception.

One of the roles has been covered in the report, but the CIA has been interested in the military assistance program since its inception. The introduction of chemical weapons for

Dead World War... [REDACTED]

The support of the integrity... [REDACTED]

Though the Soviets were equally reluctant to supply these, they did agree after the 1967 Six-Day War to help build an Iraqi Army chemical force and provide 100 tons of chemical agents for training and laboratory use.

The training was part of an aggressive Iraqi Army CW program unopposed by any other Arab country — which included CW Soviet-style obstacle courses both at least 15 locations. The Iraqis assigned organic chemical companies to each army division and equipped them with Soviet-manufactured material such as the truck-mounted ARS-12 and DDA-33 decontamination apparatus.

The Iraqi CW program received substantial support from the West. In 1967, the CIA reported that the West was providing Iraq with chemical agents, training, and laboratory equipment. The CIA also reported that the West was providing Iraq with chemical agents, training, and laboratory equipment.

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The only details of this intelligence appeared in the New York Times of last March 30 which reported that the US had "documentation that Iraq has been buying laboratory equipment from a West German company, purchases that are believed to be linked to Iraq's nerve gas production plants."

West German officials pointed out that the company was merely selling a plant for the production of pesticides, which are close in chemical composition to the nerve agent "Tabun" first developed by German scientists in 1936.

NO subsequent story was able to establish that any West German had knowingly participated in the production of nerve gas (and not pesticides) — until now. While not naming anyone, the secret report leaves no doubt that this occurred: "West Germans have provided technical assistance in field trials of nerve agents."

All this on the basis of such knowledge, one official noted, that the US three times diplomatically urged the Iraqis to desist from CW production and use and had secretly urged the Germans to investigate and end their involvement. Three private groups failed. The first group was the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW), the second was the Physicians for Social Hygiene (PSH), and the third was the Physicians for the Human Future (PHF).

DALE VAN ATTA is a specialist in security affairs on the staff of US columnist Jack Anderson.

ally urged the Iraqis to desist from CW production and use and had secretly urged the Germans to investigate and end their involvement. Three private groups failed. The first group was the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW), the second was the Physicians for Social Hygiene (PSH), and the third was the Physicians for the Human Future (PHF).

EGYPT: The secret Israeli... [REDACTED]

More than 600 Yemenis were killed by the chemicals, one of which was identified as VR-33, a Soviet nerve agent.

ETHIOPIA: Part of a victim of Italian mustard gas in 1974... [REDACTED]

The CIA director's report concluded, however, that the... [REDACTED]

SYRIA: Despite a later start than Egypt and Iraq, the CIA believes... [REDACTED]

LIBYA: The Soviets have provided Libya with CW... [REDACTED]

At the highest level of US intelligence... [REDACTED]

ISRAEL: The stockpiling of chemical weapons by Arab... [REDACTED]

The Israelis have not shared details of their CW program with the US, and the CIA has had to resort to espionage to piece together a CW picture. "While we cannot confirm that the Israelis possess lethal chemical agents," the SNIE states, "several indications lead us to believe that they have available to them at least persistent and non-persistent nerve agents, mustard agent, and several non-control agents, matched with suitable delivery systems."

The existence of grids for testing chemical agents has been known to the CIA since the early 1970s, and possible tests were detected in January 1974. The CIA has also identified a "probable CW nerve agent production facility and storage facility in the Jordanian desert... [REDACTED]

included in original release

Chemical Club Groups
Noted Texas/Australia
12/21/84
12/21-27/84

...the US claims that their initial program...
...the possible use of...
...there have also been reports of actual gas...
...chemical poisoning by the Vietnamese...
...The SMIE notes that...

THAILAND Besides the possible use of...
...there have also been reports of actual gas...
...chemical poisoning by the Vietnamese...
...The SMIE notes that...

INDONESIA Through the country has...
...the CIA...
...the CIA...
...the CIA...

VIETNAM The intelligence...
...the CIA...
...the CIA...
...the CIA...

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA The...
...the CIA...
...the CIA...
...the CIA...

YANWAN According to the SMIE, Taiwan...
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...the CIA...
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TON POST

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 30, 1984

JACK ANDERSON

Upgrading Germ-Warfare Intelligence

There is a worrisome tendency in this country to bury our heads in the sand and pretend that no civilized nation would stockpile germ- and chemical-warfare weapons. But there is evidence that the Soviet Union is doing exactly that.

In 1980 I was condemned for reporting that the Soviets had shipped chemical weapons and technology to Iraq. The U.S. government subsequently confirmed that Iraq had used them in its war against Iran.

Now there are disturbing rumors that Soviet chemical weapons have been sent to Nicaragua.

That's because detection of chemical- and biological-weapons stockpiling is a frustrating, costly and time-consuming process, and this type of intelligence had always been a low priority for the Central Intelligence Agency.

It's the assignment of priorities—"Priority 1" being the most urgent—that determines how much spy satellite, time and other intelligence-gathering assets will be devoted to a particular problem.

CIA Director William J. Casey dealt with the question of priorities in a secret report.

Implications of Soviet Use of Chemical and Toxic Weapons for U.S. Security Interests sent to President Reagan. It was prepared by the CIA and eight other federal intelligence agencies and was reviewed by my associate Dale Van Atta.

Historically, the report points out, both the collection and analysis of intelligence on chemical and biological warfare have suffered from persistently low priorities. Not until after the 1973 Yom Kippur War did the issue receive some recognition. That was when the Israelis gave CIA

analysts tons of Soviet chemical and biological equipment captured from the Egyptians.

Priorities for gathering intelligence on various countries are assigned by the National Security Council. After the 1973 eye-opener, chemical and biological weapons (CBW) development in the Soviet Union was raised to "Priority 3" in 1975, and to "Priority 2" in 1977. In 1981, after President Reagan took office, CBW intelligence on the Soviets was given an unprecedented "Priority 1."

The difficulties of detecting chemical-biological weapons are enormous. The CIA report states: "Unlike most other systems, chemical and toxic munitions can be deployed and perhaps even employed without our being able to assess their characteristics A gas is usually invisible and usually leaves no discernible trace."

Gathering raw data is not the only problem. "On the analytic side, the intelligence effort still suffers from many years of neglect," the report says.

Officials at the policy-making level didn't learn of Soviet biological-weapons facilities until long after a suspicious anthrax epidemic broke out in 1979 near a suspected plant at Sverdlovsk.

The recent report to the president indicates that the bureaucratic situation has improved.

But the report concludes with a grave warning. Despite the steps that have been taken recently to improve intelligence-gathering on Soviet chemical and biological weapons, the report says: "There should be no illusion about the feasibility of achieving a highly reliable verification scheme for a chemical weapons ban. Substantial uncertainties will still remain."

3

UN POST

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 4, 1984 B15

JACK ANDERSON

Soviets Push Biological-Weapons Work

High on the agenda of any future disarmament negotiations should be a subject that the Soviets probably won't discuss: their continuing development of biological weapons.

These include the germs and gases that you might expect to find in their forbidden arsenal. But something much more menacing has been added: The Soviets are developing biogenetically engineered poisons.

I first alerted you to this grisly threat last February, when I quoted from one of the grimmest reports to come out of the National Security Council. It warned the president that the Soviets have mastered "gene-splicing techniques as ominous as the atom-splitting discoveries that led to the nuclear bomb."

Now I have more information: The Soviets have hidden their offensive biological warfare program in the Defense Ministry's seventh main directorate, headed by Gen. V.I. Ogarkov. The CIA has determined that the program operates research and production facilities at eight different sites.

Classified CIA reports, obtained by my associate Dale Van Atta, give these chilling assessments:

■ The Soviets maintain active research projects on natural poisons far more extensive than would be needed to guard against agricultural infestations or human epidemics. A secret CIA report states, "The research is well-supported, involves both military and civilian investigators, and in many cases has been linked with facilities associated with BW [biological warfare] research and development."

■ The CIA has learned that the Soviets are investigating a number of specific compounds

"which appear to have considerable potential as BW agents. These include silicon-containing and organofluorine compounds . . . marine neurotoxins and blue-green algal neurotoxins."

■ The CIA has figured out some of the features the Soviet scientists are looking for in their biological agents. These include persistence, stability, adaptability to special carrier solutions and the ability to be disseminated in such tiny particles that the poison will penetrate gas masks.

■ Extremely rapid-acting incapacitants are also of growing concern," the CIA reports. Already these knockout gases have been used in Afghanistan, where they are known as "the silent killer" because victims appear to have been flash-frozen without even knowing what hit them.

■ The CIA has gotten a wealth of information on Soviet biological-weapons operations straight from the horse's mouth—a key Soviet source who defected. He reported that in the 1970s a proposal was made to the Central Committee and the Ministry of Defense for research on psychochemicals as chemical warfare agents. The program was given the go-ahead and funding.

The Soviet told the CIA that "yellow rain"—the toxic weapon believed to have killed thousands in Laos and elsewhere—was "a simple agent compared with those currently being developed.

To say the U.S. intelligence community is concerned about all this would be an understatement. The CIA reports make clear that, far from having any idea of antidotes, our experts can't even identify many of the biological poisons the Soviets have been developing.

Jack Anderson

28 Oct 84 Wash Post

The KGB's Deadly Weapons

The Soviet Union's pitiless testing of deadly weapons on native populations has evoked memories of the Nazis' still-unpunished arch-criminal, Dr. Josef Mengele. Some who have conducted autopsies on the victims say the comparison may not be farfetched.

The Soviets have tested and perfected bombs that look like toys in Afghanistan, umbrella-fired poison pellets in London, "yellow rain" in Indochina and sophisticated torture techniques in Latin America. Like their Nazi counterparts, the Soviet weapons-testers carry out their experiments on helpless human guinea pigs. And like the Nazis, the Soviets take meticulous notes on their experiments, sending experts out in the field where the "live testing" has been conducted.

A particularly appalling example of the Soviets' callousness was contained in a top-secret National Security Agency report reviewed by my associate Dale Van Atta. It told of the Soviets' effort to sell the Indian army a new artillery piece. The Russians invited a delegation of Indian military officers to visit Afghanistan and to watch the new gun in action against Afghan guerrillas. The Indians declined.

For nearly five years now, Afghanistan has been the Soviet military's bloody proving ground. Except for an occasional skirmish with the Chinese or the quick suppression of civilian uprisings in Eastern Europe, the war in Afghanistan has offered the Soviet

high command its first opportunity to test men and weapons in combat since World War II.

The weapons tried out in Afghanistan range from trucks built with American technology at the Kama River plant in the Soviet Union to Mi-24 helicopter gunships, used in both combat and police actions. The high-speed choppers can fire 6,000 rounds a minute and carry sophisticated gear for spotting targets on the barren hillsides where the Afghan guerrillas hide out.

A top-secret CIA report notes that until the Vietnam War, Soviet helicopters were "somewhat crude and aerodynamically inefficient, [lacking] the speed and maneuverability required for armed combat assault." But the Soviets observed the deadly effects of U.S. helicopters in combat and came up with the Mi-24. Its crews began training in 1975, and have been perfecting their killing skills in Afghanistan.

But as they have become bogged down in Afghanistan, the Soviets have resorted to less conventional weapons to discourage the guerrillas and cow their supporters in the villages. They have used chemical weapons to kill the rebels and poison their water supply, and they have dropped so-called "butterfly" mines in fields and roads.

The air-dropped mines are usually disguised as animal manure or clumps of vegetation. But the Soviets' Mengelian scientists have also devised miniature mines that are imbedded in stuffed ani-

mals and other toys, the CIA reports. Such mines are not always lethal, but they can blow away an arm or leg of an Afghan child who picks one up.

In Laos, more than 20,000 Hmong tribesmen have died in the relentless bombardment by Soviet chemical agents known as "yellow rain." For once, the Soviets knew the toxic effects of the chemicals before they used them on the Hmong. They had already tested them on their own people.

A secret CIA report describes the specific tests of yellow rain substances done on prisoners in Soviet prison camps since World War II: "Soviet toxicity studies in humans involved injection of various doses of the toxic material to ground meat which was then fed to political prisoners, and the cause of development of liver cancer was monitored."

For its urban battlefields—the sites for political assassination and similar terrorist attacks—the KGB prefers reliable, well-tested poisons that leave the appearance of a heart attack. For example, Soviet scientists first tested a potassium cyanide spray on dogs tied to trees. When perfected, the deadly spray was used to assassinate a Ukrainian émigré in Munich; the spray gun was hidden in a rolled-up newspaper. In London, a Bulgarian émigré was killed in 1978 with a poison pellet injected by the tip of an umbrella. He appeared to have suffered a heart attack.

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included in original release

4

5

WASH. POST

WASH. Post 1 MAR 85

JACK ANDERSON

CIA Pinpoints Soviet Germ Warfare Unit

In past columns I've reported on the threat posed by the Soviet Union's persistent efforts to develop new and ever-grislier biological weapons. Now I have even more frightening evidence obtained from the most secret documents.

"The intelligence evidence indicates that the Soviets have maintained an offensive biological warfare program and capability since the [1971] Biological Weapons Convention," a CIA report states.

Though the Soviets signed the resulting treaty, they have consistently violated it—and just as consistently lied about their violations.

But the CIA has penetrated the Kremlin's efforts to cover its tracks on germ warfare testing and production. CIA sources told my associate Dale Van Atta that agency experts on Soviet military organization have even identified the unit responsible for all aspects of the Soviet program.

This "covert administrative and organizational apparatus" is hidden in the Ministry of Defense and is called the "Seventh Main Directorate."

In fact, a separate division of the Microbiological Industry Organization—a supposedly civilian agency—was created by 1976 to help the directorate in its deadly work. The division, headed by a general, includes heavily guarded, military-sponsored facilities for the development and storage of small quantities of microorganisms until they are needed for rapid, large-scale production of germ-war agents.

The CIA has also identified nine locations where the Soviets carry on their program.

The two primary sites—confirmed beyond question as biological-weapons facilities—are at Sverdlovsk and Zagorsk. Sverdlovsk was the scene of a biological weapons plant accident that killed anywhere from 200 to 1,000 people in April 1979.

The Zagorsk facility masquerades as the Scientific Research Institute of Sanitation. Not far from Moscow, Zagorsk is where the germ weapons boss, Gen. V.I. Ogarkov, spends much of his time.

Both plants were completed in 1968, with new construction continuing through last year. Both are known to be under military control, and a secret National Security Council report states that "of particular interest at Sverdlovsk and Zagorsk are highly secure special storage areas which are designed for weapons assembly and storage."

Despite their obvious military significance, the situation at Sverdlovsk and Zagorsk is somewhat confused—perhaps as a deliberate cover—by the fact that portions of the two facilities are engaged in legitimate research and production connected with the medical-pharmaceutical, agricultural and food processing industries.

The urgency of the CIA's intelligence efforts directed at suspected Soviet biological-weapons facilities is explained in the secret NSC report to the president:

"Some of the compounds developed under this program may now be available in sufficient quantities to permit extensive testing for their usefulness as field agents. Sufficient quantities for initial munitions testing and weaponization could become available within the next five years."

included in original release

FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:

- Teletype
- Facsimile
- _____

PRECEDENCE:

- Immediate
- Priority
- Routine

CLASSIFICATION:

- TOP SECRET
- SECRET
- CONFIDENTIAL
- UNCLAS E F T O
- UNCLAS

Date 9/17/85

C-1

A I R T E L

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
 FROM: SAC, ALEXANDRIA (65C-587) (RUC)

DATE: 10-24-2007
 CLASSIFIED BY 60324 AWC BAW/STP/TH
 REASON: 1.4 (1)
 DECLASSIFY ON: 10-24-2032

UNSUB(S);
 UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED
 INFORMATION IN THE "WASHINGTON POST,"
 8/26/84,
 AUTHORED BY JACK ANDERSON ENTITLED,
 "THE GROWING CHEMICAL CLUB,"
 THE "WASHINGTON POST,"
 8/27/84,
 AUTHORED BY JACK ANDERSON ENTITLED,
 "CHEMICAL ARMS AND TERRORISM FEARED BY CIA,"
 AND THE "READER'S DIGEST,"
 SEPTEMBER, 1984,
 ISSUE AUTHORED BY JACK ANDERSON ENTITLED,
 "POISON AND PLAGUE, RUSSIA'S SECRET
 TERROR WEAPONS";
 ESPIONAGE - X (MEDIA LEAKS)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
 WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

This communication is classified "~~Secret~~" in its entirety.

Re Alexandria airtel and LHM to Bureau dated 3/15/85, and Alexandria teletype to Bureau dated 8/16/85.

~~SECRET~~
 Classified by G-3
 Declassify on OADR

- 3- Bureau (Enc. 6) (RM-RRR)
 - 2- Baltimore (65-4516) (Sq. 3) (Enc. 1) (RM-RRR)
 - 2- WFO (65-13263) (Enc. 1) (RM-RRR)
 - 1- Alexandria (65C-587)
- RJO:plb
(8)

5-13263-30
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 SEP 20 1985
 b6
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 LBJ

Approved: _____ Transmitted _____ (Number)

~~SECRET~~


Enclosed for the Bureau are the original and five copies of a self-explanatory LHM. Enclosed for Baltimore and WFO is one copy each of the LHM.

ADMINISTRATIVE:

Enclosed LHM along with the 3/15/85 LHM shows the investigation conducted by the Alexandria Division. A detailed description of the classified documents in question along with a brief account of [redacted] military assignments appear in the current LHM. Additionally, xerox copies of subsequent JACK ANDERSON articles have been made a part of the LHM. These articles indicate the likelihood that ANDERSON is "milking" the classified documents. One of the articles was written by DALE VAN ATTA, who is an associate of JACK ANDERSON's.

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Information was set forth in the 2/1/85 Alexandria teletype to the Bureau regarding the interview of [redacted] Referral/Consult



[redacted] [redacted] that ANDERSON claims to have classified documents in a vaulted area. ANDERSON allegedly told [redacted] he has released only a small percentage of the available material. For many years, ANDERSON has lauded his skills of obtaining classified information. [redacted] is probably one of a number of sources.

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AX 65C-587

~~SECRET~~

As a result of the "WALKER espionage investigation," it has been determined that the Defense Investigative Service (DIS) is going to amplify the use of polygraph examinations in updating security clearances.

This investigation appears to have substantial merit. If [redacted] statement is correct and ANDERSON is in the possession of a series of classified documents, the possession would constitute a violation of the espionage statute. It is recommended that [redacted] be given a polygraph either by DIS or the FBI in order to resolve the allegations regarding disclosure of classified material.

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The military record of [redacted] was reviewed at the Military Personnel Records Center in Alexandria, Virginia, by SA [redacted]

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Referral/Consult

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U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Baltimore, Maryland 21207

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

September 20, 1985

DATE: 10-24-2007
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH
REASON: 1.4 (1)
DECLASSIFY ON: 10-24-2032

UNKNOWN SUBJECT(S);
UDCI IN THE WASHINGTON POST, AUGUST 26, 1984,
AUTHORED BY JACK ANDERSON, ENTITLED
"THE GROWING CHEMICAL CLUB;"
THE WASHINGTON POST, AUGUST 27, 1984, AUTHORED BY
JACK ANDERSON, ENTITLED "CHEMICAL ARMS IN TERRORISM
FEARED BY CIA;" READERS DIGEST, SEPTEMBER 1984, ISSUE
AUTHORED BY JACK ANDERSON, ENTITLED "POISON AND PLAGUE,
RUSSIA'S SECRET TERROR WEAPONS;"
THE WASHINGTON TIMES, AUGUST 8, 1985,
AUTHORED BY TOM DIAZ, ENTITLED "NEW 'DESIGNER BUGS'
ADVANCED BY SOVIETS;" AND THE WASHINGTON TIMES,
AUGUST 14, 1985, AUTHORED BY TOM DIAZ, ENTITLED
"'YELLOW RAIN' SPREAD BY SOVIETS, NATIONS
SILENTLY AGREE;"
ESPIONAGE-X;
00:FBIHQ

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

ALL ITEMS OF INFORMATION CONTAINED ON THIS DOCUMENT
CLASSIFIED ~~"SECRET"~~ BY CLASSIFICATION GUIDE #3 (G-3) UNLESS
INDICATED OR OTHERWISE NOTED.

Referral/Consult



DISSEMINATION:

The classified information appearing in the articles could have
conceivable resulted from a review of the following classified documents:

- 1) The Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) dated September
15, 1983. Six-hundred copies of the SNIE were disseminated to members of the
intelligence community. No foreign or contract dissemination was provided.

~~CLASSIFIED BY G-3
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR~~

05-13263
SEARCHED _____ INDEXED _____
SERIALIZED _____ FILED _____ 31
SEP 26 1985
WASH. FIELD OFFICE

"THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS NEITHER RECOMMENDATIONS NOR CONCLUSIONS OF THE FBI. IT IS THE PROPERTY OF THE FBI AND IS LOANED TO YOUR AGENCY; IT AND ITS CONTENTS ARE NOT TO BE DISTRIBUTED OUTSIDE YOUR AGENCY."



~~SECRET~~

2) The compliance issued papers dated December 23, 1983, and January 24, 1984. The compliance issued paper was disseminated in two versions: A secret version which was disseminated to several hundred recipients and a top secret version which was disseminated to 12 recipients. The secret version went to various locations, including members of the SSCI and HPSCI. The top secret version was sent only to members of the intelligence community. None of the code word information from the top secret version was leaked in the articles. [redacted] the dissemination list for the compliance issued papers. Referral/Consult

3) DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (DIA) cable dated December 16, 1983. [redacted] The dissemination list for this cable and for the SNIE are available.

It appears JACK ANDERSON had access to the complete documents mentioned above. The following list of ANDERSON articles indicate a "milking" of the classified documents:

1) DALE VAN ATTA article, dated December 21, 1984, in the NATIONAL TIMES/AUSTRALIA entitled, "CHEMICAL CLUB GROWS" (Content of article taken from the SNIE, #11-17-83 AND FROM A [redacted]) Referral/Consult

2) JACK ANDERSON article, dated November 30, 1984, WASHINGTON POST, entitled, "UPRATING GERM-WARFARE INTELLIGENCE" (Taken from the SNIE).

3) JACK ANDERSON article, dated December 4, 1984, WASHINGTON POST, entitled "SOVIETS PUSH BIOLOGICAL-WEAPONS WORK" (Taken from the SNIE).

4) JACK ANDERSON article, dated October 28, 1984, WASHINGTON POST, entitled, "THE KGB'S DEADLY WEAPONS" (Taken from the SNIE).

5) JACK ANDERSON article, dated March 1, 1985, WASHINGTON POST, entitled, [redacted] (Taken from the compliance issue paper).

LEAD INFORMATION:

Referral/Consult

[Large redacted box]

~~SECRET~~

An interview of [redacted] former superior officer at the Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center (AFMIC), Ft. Detrick, Maryland, determined that in 1983-1984, [redacted] As such [redacted] would have had access to any and all classified documents at AFMIC. Investigation is currently being conducted to ascertain, if the documents in question had ever been disseminated to AFMIC and, therefore, been accessible to [redacted]. The superior officer advised that he was aware of [redacted] with JACK ANDERSON and had in fact cautioned [redacted] to be very careful and avoid talking to ANDERSON about [redacted] duties with the U.S. Army. [redacted] had replied that his conversations with ANDERSON related only to their church.

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b7c

[redacted] is described as follows:

Race	White
Sex	Male
DOB	[redacted]
Social Security #	[redacted]
Address	[redacted]
Business Address	WALTER REED ARMY MEDICAL CENTER, Washington, D.C.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

FBI

C-1

TRANSMIT VIA:

- Teletype
- Facsimile
- AIRTEL

PRECEDENCE:

- Immediate
- Priority
- Routine

CLASSIFICATION:

- TOP SECRET
 - SECRET
 - CONFIDENTIAL
 - UNCLAS E F T O
 - UNCLAS 9/20/85
- Date _____

TO: DIRECTOR FBI (65C-78756)

FROM: SAC BALTIMORE (65C-4516) (SQ. 3) (P)

SUBJECT: UNSUB(S);
 UDCI IN THE WASHINGTON POST, AUGUST 26, 1984,
 AUTHORED BY JACK ANDERSON, ENTITLED
 "THE GROWING CHEMICAL CLUB;"
THE WASHINGTON POST, AUGUST 27, 1984, AUTHORED
 BY JACK ANDERSON, ENTITLED "CHEMICAL ARMS IN TERRORISM
 FEARED BY CIA;" READERS DIGETS, SEPTEMBER 1984,
 ISSUE AUTHORED BY JACK ANDERSON, ENTITLED
 "POISON AND PLAGUE, RUSSIA'S SECRET TERROR WEAPONS;"
THE WASHINGTON TIMES, AUGUST 8, 1985,
 AUTHORED BY TOM DIAZ, ENTITLED "NEW 'DESIGNER BUGS'
 ADVANCED BY SOVIETS;" AND THE WASHINGTON TIMES,
 AUGUST 14, 1985, AUTHORED BY TOM DIAZ, ENTITLED
 "'YELLOW RAIN' SPREAD BY SOVIETS, NATIONS
 SILENTLY AGREE;"
 EXPIONAGE-X;
 00:FBIHQ

DECLASSIFIED BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH
ON 10-24-2007

ALL ITEMS OF INFORMATION CONTAINED ON THIS DOCUMENT
CLASSIFIED "~~SECRET~~" BY CLASSIFICATION GUIDE #3 (G-3) UNLESS
INDICATED OR OTHERWISE NOTED.

Re Alexandria teletype to Bureau, dated 8/16/85 and
Bureau airtel to Baltimore and receiving offices, dated 9/4/85
and Baltimore teletype to receiving offices, dated 9/10/85.

Enclosed for the Bureau are the original and four
copies of an LHM concerning captioned matter.

Enclosed for WFO^{and Af} are two copies of same LHM.

- 2 Bureau (65-78756) (Enc. 5)
 - ② WFO (65-13263) (Enc. 2)
 - 2 Alexandria (65-587)
 - 2 Baltimore
- HLR:pdj
(8)

CLASSIFIED BY G-3
DECLASSIFY ON _____

65-13263 - 32

SEARCHED	INDEXED
SERIALIZED	FILED

SEP 26 1985

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Approved: _____ Transmitted _____
(Number)

Per _____
FBI WASH. FIELD OFFICE

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

LEAD:

BALTIMORE DIVISION

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b7C

AT FORT DETRICK, MARYLAND

Will re-interview COLONEL WILKINSON immediately upon his return from TDY and will determine if [] had access to the documents in question. WILKINSON is scheduled to return from TDY on or about September 20, 1985.

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~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 03-29-2013 BY ADG F54M93K42



U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Baltimore, Maryland 21207

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. BA 65C-4516

October 15, 1985

RE: UNSUBS (S); UDCI IN "THE WASHINGTON POST,"
AUGUST 26, 1984, AUTHORED BY JACK ANDERSON,
ENTITLED, "THE GROWING CHEMICAL CLUB;" "THE
WASHINGTON POST," AUGUST 27, 1984, AUTHORED
BY JACK ANDERSON, ENTITLED "CHEMICAL ARMS IN
TERRORISM FEARED BY CIA;" READERS DIGEST,
SEPTEMBER, 1984, ISSUE AUTHORED BY JACK
ANDERSON, ENTITLED , "POISON AND PLAGUE,
RUSSIA'S SECRET TERROR WEAPONS;" "THE
WASHINGTON TIMES," AUGUST 8, 1985, AUTHORED
BY TOM DIAZ, ENTITLED, "NEW DESIGNER BUGS
ADVANCED BY SOVIETS;" "THE WASHINGTON TIMES,"
AUGUST 14, 1985, AUTHORED BY TOM DIAZ, ENTITLED,
ENTITLED "YELLOW RAIN SPREAD BY SOVIETS, NATIONS
SILENTLY AGREE;" AND "FREDERICK NEWS POST,"
MARCH 1, 1985, ENTITLED, "SOVIETS VIOLATE
BIOLOGICAL WARFARE PACT;"
ESPIONAGE-X

Referral/Consult

DATE: 10-24-2007
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH
REASON: 1.4 (1)
DECLASSIFY ON: 10-24-2032


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This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions
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outside your agency.

~~SECRET~~

UNSUBS (S);



The following is the JACK ANDERSON article believed to have originated, in part, from the classified [redacted] dated January 24, 1985 and was in the possession of [redacted] on March 22, 1984. Following the article is the damage assessment done by the ARMED FORCES MEDICAL INTELLIGENCE CENTER, Fort Detrick, Maryland.

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JACK ANDERSON

~~SECRET~~

MARCH 1, 1985
FREDERICK NEWS POST

The Washington Merry-go-round

Soviets violate biological-warfare pact;

Columnist Jack Anderson treats two subjects today of particular interest to Frederick area readers:

• First, on biological warfare. Apparently the Soviets have kept on with offensive capability research and production while the United States, Fort Detrick in particular, have turned such weaponry into plowshares, as ordered by former President Richard Nixon in 1969.

WASHINGTON — In past columns I've reported on the threat posed by the Soviet Union's persistent efforts to develop new and ever-grislier biological weapons. Now I have even more frightening evidence obtained from the most secret documents.

"The intelligence evidence indicates that the Soviets have maintained an offensive biological warfare program and capability since the (1971) Biological Weapons Convention," one CIA report states.

Though the Soviets signed the resulting treaty, they have consistently violated it — and just as consistently lied about their violations.

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In fact, a separate division of the Microbiological Industry Organization — a supposedly civilian agency — was created by 1976 to help the directorate in its deadly work. The division, headed by a general, includes heavily guarded, military-sponsored facilities for the development and storage of small quantities of micro-organisms until they are needed for rapid, large-scale production of germ-war agents.

The CIA has also identified nine locations where the Soviets carry on their program.

The two primary sites — and the ones that have been confirmed beyond question as biological-weapons facilities — are at Sverdlovsk and Zagorsk. Sverdlovsk, the Siberian city known as Ekaterinburg in 1918 when the Bolsheviks shot Czar Nicholas II and his family there, was the scene of a biological weapons plant accident that killed anywhere from 200 to 1,000 people in April 1979.

The Zagorsk facility masquerades under the title of Scientific Research Institute of Sanitation. Not far from Moscow, Zagorsk is where the germ weapons boss, Gen. V.I. Ogarkov, spends much of his time.

Both plants were completed in 1968, with new construction continuing through last year. Both are known to be under military control, and a secret National Security Council report states that "of particular interest at Sverdlovsk and Zagorsk are highly secure special storage areas which are designed for weapons assembly and storage."

Despite their obvious military significance, the situation at Sverdlovsk and Zagorsk is somewhat confused — perhaps as a deliberate cover — by the fact that portions of the two facilities are engaged in legitimate research and production connected with the medical-pharmaceutical, agricultural and food processing industries.

The third most important biological-weapons facility, at Berdsk in Siberia, was completed in 1970, with further construction in 1984. The CIA's evidence indicates that the Berdsk plant is a backup for production and a storage facility. A new molecular biological institute, linked to Berdsk and genetic-engineering projects, has been identified at Koltsovo.

The urgency of the CIA's intelligence efforts directed at suspected Soviet biological-weapons facilities is explained in the conclusion of the secret NSC report to the president.

"Some of the compounds developed under this program may now be available in sufficient quantities to permit extensive testing for their usefulness as field agents. Sufficient quantities for initial munitions testing and weaponization could become available within the next five years."

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

FD-36 (Rev. 8-26-82)

FBI

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 03-29-2013 BY ADG F54M93K42

TRANSMIT VIA:

- Teletype
- Facsimile
- Airtel

PRECEDENCE:

- Immediate
- Priority
- Routine

CLASSIFICATION:

- TOP SECRET
- SECRET
- CONFIDENTIAL
- UNCLAS E F T O
- UNCLAS

b6
b7C

Date 10/15/85

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (65C-78756)
ATTENTION: [Redacted]

FROM: SAC, BALTIMORE (65C-4516) (SQ 3) (P)

SUBJECT: UNSUBS (S);
UDCI IN "THE WASHINGTON POST," AUGUST 26, 1984, AUTHORED BY JACK ANDERSON, ENTITLED, "THE GROWING CHEMICAL CLUB;" "THE WASHINGTON POST," AUGUST 27, 1984, AUTHORED BY JACK ANDERSON, ENTITLED "CHEMICAL ARMS IN TERRORISM FEARED BY CIA;" READERS DIGEST, SEPTEMBER, 1984, ISSUE AUTHORED BY JACK ANDERSON, ENTITLED, "POISON AND PLAGUE, RUSSIA'S SECRET TERROR WEAPONS;" "THE WASHINGTON TIMES," AUGUST 8, 1985, AUTHORED BY TOM DIAZ, ENTITLED, "NEW DESIGNER BUGS ADVANCED BY SOVIETS;" "THE WASHINGTON TIMES," AUGUST 14, 1985, AUTHORED BY TOM DIAZ, ENTITLED "YELLOW RAIN SPREAD BY SOVIETS, NATIONS SILENTLY AGREE;" AND "FREDERICK NEWS POST," MARCH 1, 1985, ENTITLED, "SOVIETS VIOLATE BIOLOGICAL WARFARE PACT;" ESP-X; OO: FBIHQ

DATE: 10-24-2007
CLASSIFIED BY: 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH
REASON: 1.4 (1)
DECLASSIFY ON: 10-24-2032

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

All items of information contained on this document are classified "~~SECRET~~" by classification guide #3 (G-3) unless indicated or otherwise noted.

Reference Baltimore teletype to receiving offices dated October 3, 1985.

Enclosed for the Bureau are the original and five copies of an LHM reflecting investigation conducted by Baltimore.

- 2-Bureau (Enc. 6)
- 2-WFO (65C-13263) (Enc. 2)
- 2-Alexandria (65C-587) (Enc. 2)
- 2-Baltimore
- HLR:kas
- (8)

65C-13263 C-1 35

[Redacted Box]
[Redacted Box]

Handwritten signature

Handwritten signature

b6
b7C

Approved: _____ Transmitted _____ (Number)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

BA 65C-4516

Referral/Consult

Enclosed for WFO and Alexandria are two copies of same LHM. Incorporated into the LHM is a xerox copy of a JACK ANDERSON article dated March 1, 1985, that appeared in the FREDERICK NEWS POST.

2*

~~SECRET~~

DATE: 10-24-2007
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH
REASON: 1.4 (1)
DECLASSIFY ON: 10-24-2032

AIRTEL

~~SECRET~~

11/6/85

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (65C-78756) (ATTN:)
FROM: SAC, BALTIMORE (65C-4516)(SQ.3)(P)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

UNSUBS(S); UDCI IN "THE WASHINGTON POST",
8/26/84, AUTHORED BY JACK ANDERSON, ENTITLED
"THE GROWING CHEMICAL CLUB"; "THE WASHINGTON
POST", 8/27/84, AUTHORED BY JACK ANDERSON,
ENTITLED "CHEMICAL ARMS IN TERRORISM FEARED
BY CIA"; "READERS DIGEST", SEPTEMBER, 1984,
ISSUE AUTHORED BY JACK ANDERSON, ENTITLED
"POISON AND PLAGUE, RUSSIA'S SECRET TERROR
WEAPONS"; "THE WASHINGTON TIMES", 8/8/85,
AUTHORED BY TOM DIAZ, ENTITLED, "NEW
DESIGNER BUGS ADVANCED BY SOVIETS"; "THE
WASHINGTON TIMES", 8/14/85, AUTHORED
BY TOM DIAZ, ENTITLED "YELLOW RAIN SPREAD
BY SOVIETS, NATIONS SLIGHTLY
AGREE"; AND "FREDERICK NEWS POST",
3/1/85, ENTITLED "SOVIETS VIOLATE
BIOLOGICAL WARFARE PACT";
ESP-X (MEDIA LEAK),
OO: FBIHQ

CI-8

ALL ITEMS OF INFORMATION CONTAINED ON THIS
DOCUMENT ARE CLASSIFIED ~~"SECRET"~~ BY CLASSIFICATION GUIDE #3 (G-3)
UNLESS INDICATED OR OTHERWISE NOTED.

Re Butel to Baltimore, dated 10/30/85.

Enclosed for the Bureau are the original and four copies
of an LHM concerning captioned matter. Enclosed for
WFO and Alexandria are two copies of same LHM.

~~CLASSIFIED BY G-3
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR~~

- 2 - Bureau (enc.5)
 - 2 - WFO (65C-13263)(enc.20)
 - 2 - Alexandria (65C-587)(enc.2)
 - 2 - Baltimore
- HLR:sat
(8)

65C-13263

SEARCHED	INDEXED
SERIALIZED	FILED
NOV 13 1985	
FBI-WASH. FIELD OFFICE	

Subelsty

37

~~SECRET~~

CI



~~SECRET~~

U.S. Department of Justice
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Baltimore, Maryland

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. 65C-4516

November 6, 1985

UNKNOWN SUBJECT(S); UDCI IN "THE WASHINGTON POST", AUGUST 26, 1984, AUTHORED BY JACK ANDERSON, ENTITLED "THE GROWING CHEMICAL CLUB"; "THE WASHINGTON POST", AUGUST 27, 1984, AUTHORED BY JACK ANDERSON, ENTITLED "CHEMICAL ARMS IN TERRORISM FEARED BY CIA"; "READERS DIGEST", SEPTEMBER, 1984, ISSUE AUTHORED BY JACK ANDERSON, ENTITLED "POISON AND PLAGUE, RUSSIA'S SECRET TERROR WEAPONS"; "THE WASHINGTON TIMES", AUGUST 8, 1985, AUTHORED BY TOM DIAZ, ENTITLED, "NEW DESIGNER BUGS ADVANCED BY SOVIETS"; "THE WASHINGTON TIMES", AUGUST 14, 1985, AUTHORED BY TOM DIAZ, ENTITLED "YELLOW RAIN SPREAD BY SOVIETS, NATIONS AGREE; AND "FREDERICK NEWS POST", MARCH 1, 1985, ENTITLED "SOVIETS VIOLATE BIOLOGICAL WARFARE PACT"; ESPIONAGE - X (MEDIA LEAK)

All items of information contained on this document are classified "~~Secret~~" by Classification Guide #3 (G-3) unless indicated or otherwise noted.

Investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has determined that the above mentioned articles authored by columnist JACK ANDERSON derived from classified documents illegally leaked to ANDERSON. Further investigation by the FBI determined that [redacted] currently assigned to the Walter Reed Army Medical Center, Washington, D.C., is a close personal friend of JACK ANDERSON and could possibly have illegally leaked the classified information to ANDERSON.

11/11/85

b6
b7C

~~CLASSIFIED BY G-3~~
~~DECLASSIFY ON: OADR~~

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.



~~SECRET~~



Investigation by the FBI determined that approximately February, 1984,



[Redacted] is described as follows:

Race:
Sex:
Date of Birth:
Social Security No.:
Address:

White
Male




b6
b7C

Business Address:

Walter Reed Army Hospital
Medical Center, Washington,
D.C.

Spouse:



Date of birth - [Redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 10-24-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH
(Copies to Offices Checked)

Routing Slip
0-7 (Rev. 5-28-82)

DATA
CI

TO: SAC,

- Albany
- Albuquerque
- Alexandria
- Anchorage
- Atlanta
- Baltimore
- Birmingham
- Boston
- Buffalo
- Butte
- Charlotte
- Chicago
- Cincinnati
- Cleveland
- Columbia
- Dallas
- Denver
- Detroit
- El Paso
- Honolulu
- ASAC, New Rochelle (MRA)
- ASAC, Brooklyn-Queens (MRA)
- Houston
- Indianapolis
- Jackson
- Jacksonville
- Kansas City
- Knoxville
- Las Vegas
- Little Rock
- Los Angeles
- Louisville
- Memphis
- Miami
- Milwaukee
- Minneapolis
- Mobile
- Newark
- New Haven
- New Orleans
- New York City
- Norfolk

TO: LEGAT,

- Bern
- Bogota
- Bonn
- Canberra
- Hong Kong
- London
- Mexico City
- Montevideo
- Ottawa
- Panama City
- Paris
- Rome
- Tokyo
- Oklahoma City
- Omaha
- Philadelphia
- Phoenix
- Pittsburgh
- Portland
- Richmond
- Sacramento
- St. Louis
- Salt Lake City
- San Antonio
- San Diego
- San Francisco
- San Juan
- Savannah
- Seattle
- Springfield
- Tampa
- Washington Field
- Quantico

DEC 17 1985

12-16-85
Date

b6
b7c

RE:

UNSUB; (S)
UDCI IN THE WASHINGTON POST AUGUST
26, 1984 AUTHORED BY JACK ANDERSON
ESPIONAGE - X

- Retention For appropriate
- For information optional action Surep, by _____
- The enclosed is for your information. If used in a future report, conceal all sources, paraphrase contents.
- Enclosed are corrected pages from report of SA _____ dated _____

Remarks:

RE AIRTEL DATED 9-4-85
FROM DIRECTOR, FBI TO AX. THE
CORRECT BUFILE # IS 65-78656
INSTEAD OF 65-78756. PLEASE
ADJUST YOUR RECORDS ACCORDINGLY.

Enc. *65-78656*
Bufile *65-78656*
Urfile *65-13263*

Cons/mst

65-13263-38

SEARCHED INDEXED
SERIALIZED FILED
DEC 17 1985

FBI/DOJ

"SOMEONE VIOLATE BIOLOGICAL WARFARE PACT?" ESPIONAGE-X (MEDIA
LEAK) - DD1 (PHO)

THIS COMMUNICATION IS CLASSIFIED "~~SECRET~~" IN ITS ENTIRETY.

RE FBIRG TELETYPE TO EACH RECEIVING OFFICE DATED OCTOBER
20, 1985 AND BALTIMORE AERTEL DATED NOVEMBER 6, 1985 WITH
ENCLOSED LHM.

FOR THE INFORMATION OF BALTIMORE, ONE COPY OF BALTIMORE'S
LEH WAS PROVIDED TO U.S. ARMY INSCOM AND THEY WERE REQUESTED TO
CONTACT BALTIMORE IN ORDER TO INITIATE PRELIMINARY MEETINGS
CONCERNING THE INTERVIEW OF [REDACTED]

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BALTIMORE IS REQUESTED TO ESTABLISH CONTACT WITH U.S. ARMY
INSCOM IN ORDER TO ARRANGE FOR A CONFERENCE IN WHICH AN
INTERVIEW AND POLYGRAPH OF [REDACTED] CAN BE PLANNED. BALTIMORE
SHOULD ENSURE THAT INPUT IS RECEIVED FROM ALEXANDRIA AND
WASHINGTON FIELD AND IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT BALTIMORE INVITE
THE CASE AGENTS FROM BOTH ALEXANDRIA AND WASHINGTON FIELD TO
ATTEND THE PRE-INTERVIEW CONFERENCE IN ORDER THAT APPROPRIATE
QUESTIONS CAN BE FORMULATED FOR THE INTERVIEW AND POLYGRAPH.

~~SECRET~~

BT

BT004

NNNN

INBOX.4 (705)

TEXT:
BAO005 0560136Z

DECLASSIFIED BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH
ON 10-24-2007

C-1

RR HQ WF AX

DE BA

R 252200Z FEB 86

FM BALTIMORE (65C-4516)(SQ. 3)(P)

TO DIRECTOR, FBI (65C-78756) ROUTINE

WFO (65C-13263) ROUTINE

ALEXANDRIA (65C-587) ROUTINE

BT

~~SECRET~~

UNSUB; UDCI IN "THE WASHINGTON POST," AUGUST 26, 1984, AUTHORED
BY JACK ANDERSON, ENTITLED "THE GROWING CHEMICAL CLUB;" "THE
WASHINGTON POST", AUGUST 27, 1984, AUTHORED BY JACK ANDERSON,
ENTITLED "CHEMICAL ARMS IN TERRORISM FEARED BY CIA;" "READERS
DIGEST", SEPTEMBER, 1984, ISSUE AUTHORED BY JACK ANDERSON, ENTITLED
"POISON AND PLAGUE, RUSSIA'S SECRET TERROR WEAPON;" "THE WASHINGTON
TIMES," AUGUST 14, 1985, AUTHORED BY TOM DIAZ, ENTITLED, "YELLOW
RAIN SPREAD BY SOVIETS, NATIONS SLIGHTLY AGREE;" AND FREDERICK NEWS
POST," MARCH 1, 1985, ENTITLED "SOVIETS VIOLATE BIOLOGICAL WAREFARE
PACT;" ESPIONAGE-X (MEDIA LEAK); OO: FBIHQ.

ALL ITEMS OF INFORMATION CONTAINED ON THIS DOCUMENT ARE
CLASSIFIED "~~SECRET~~" IN ITS ENTIRETY.

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65-13263

SEARCHED _____ INDEXED _____

SERIALIZED _____

py 40

FEB 27 1986 8 31 PM '86



PAGE TWO (BA 85C-4516) ~~SECRET~~

FOR INFO OF THE BUREAU, A MEETING CONSISTING OF BALTIMORE CASE AGENT, WFO CASE AGENT AND U.S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND (INSCOM) SPECIAL AGENT [REDACTED] WAS HELD ON FEBRUARY 24, 1986, IN THE BALTIMORE FIELD OFFICE TO DISCUSS CAPTIONED MATTER.

IT WAS CONCLUDED THAT THE BEST APPROACH TO INTERVIEWING [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THIS CASE, WOULD BE

FOR INSCOM TO INVITE [REDACTED] TO GO TO INSCOM HEADQUARTERS, FORT MEADE, MD. [REDACTED] WOULD NOT BE TOLD AT THAT TIME WHY HE WAS

BEING ASKED TO GO TO INSCOM. AFTER HE ARRIVED AT INSCOM HE WOULD

~~BE INTERVIEWED BY BALTIMORE CASE AGENT, WFO CASE AGENT AND INSCOM~~

SA.

AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE INTERVIEW, [REDACTED] WOULD BE ASKED TO SUBMIT TO A POLYGRAPH EXAM WHICH WOULD BE ADMINISTERED BY U.S. ARMY PERSONNEL. IF [REDACTED] AGREED TO THE EXAM, IT WOULD BE ADMINISTERED IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE INTERVIEW.

IT WAS CONCLUDED THAT [REDACTED] WOULD BE MORE AGREEABLE TO AN INTERVIEW AND POLYGRAPH IF HE WERE REQUESTED TO DO SO BY U.S. ARMY HEADQUARTERS AND REFUSING TO COOPERATE WOULD BE VERY DETRIMENTAL TO HIS U.S. ARMY CAREER.

INSCOM SA WILL NOT BE AVAILABLE TO PARTICIPATE IN THE

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PAGE THREE (BA 65C-4516) ~~SECRET~~

INTERVIEW UNTIL APPROXIMATELY MARCH 14, 1986. THE INTERVIEW AND
POLYGRAPH WILL BE ARRANGED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER THAT DATE.

BUREAU WILL BE PROMPTLY ADVISED OF ANY CHANGE IN THE ABOVE
SCHEDULE FOR INTERVIEW AND LIKEWISE WILL BE PROMPTLY INFORMED OF
THE RESULTS OF THE INTERVIEW.

~~C BY G-3. DECL. OADR.~~

BT

#

MEMORANDUM

TO: SAC, WFO (65C-13263) (P) (C-1)

3/5/86

FROM: SA [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: UNKNOWN SUBJECTS,
UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF
CLASSIFIED INFORMATION IN
THE WASHINGTON POST
8/26/84, AUTHORED BY JACK
ANDERSON AND TITLED "THE
GROWING CHEMICAL CLUB"
OO:FBIHQ

The following information is classified "~~Secret~~" in its
entirety.

Re Headquarters tel to WFO dated 12/24/85.

On 2/24/86, this writer met with SA [redacted] of
Baltimore FBI and SA [redacted] of the U.S. Army Intelligence
Command at the Baltimore Division. The purpose of this meeting
was discussed the specific investigative strategy for the
interview of the subject of this media leak case. It was decided
at this meeting that [redacted] would be asked to report to the
Intelligence Support Command Headquarters in Maryland and he
would be interviewed there by both Baltimore, WFO, and military
interrogators. After this interview the U.S. Army would afford
[redacted] a polygraph examination.

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The Army Intelligence Support Command will set up the
date for this interview inasmuch as they have to coordinate for a
polygraph examiner.

No leads remain outstanding at WFO in this matter.

~~SECRET~~

~~Classified by: G-3
Declassify on: OADR~~

②-WFO

LBS:las
(2)

65C 13263 - 41
SEARCHED [initials]
SERIALIZED [initials]
MAR 0 1986
FIELD OFFICE
[redacted]

C-8

INBOX.3 (#1420)

TEXT:
EAO010 1070005Z

RR HQ WF AX

DE BA

R 172200Z APR 86

FM BALTIMORE (65C-4516)(SQ. 3)(P)

TO DIRECTOR, FBI (65C-78756) ROUTINE

WFO (65C-13263) ROUTINE

ALEXANDRIA (65C-587) ROUTINE

BT

DECLASSIFIED BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH
ON 10-24-2007

~~SECRET~~

UNSUB(S); UDCI IN "THE WASHINGTON POST," AUGUST 26, 1984, AUTHORED
BY JACK ANDERSON, ENTITLED "THE GROWING CHEMICAL CLUB;" "THE
WASHINGTON POST," AUGUST 27, 1984, AUTHORED BY JACK ANDERSON,
ENTITLED "CHEMICAL ARMS IN TERRORISM FEARED BY CIA;" "READERS DIGEST,"
SEPTEMBER, 1984, ISSUE AUTHORED BY JACK ANDERSON, ENTITLED "POISON
AND PLAGUE, RUSSIA'S SECRET TERROR WEAPONS;" "THE WASHINGTON TIMES,"
AUGUST 8, 1985, AUTHORED BY TOM DIAZ, ENTITLED, "NEW DESIGNER BUGS
ADVANCED BY SOVIETS;" "THE WASHINGTON TIMES," AUGUST 14, 1985,
AUTHORED BY TOM DIAZ, ENTITLED, "YELLOW RAIN SPREAD BY SOVIETS,
NATIONS SLIGHTLY AGREE;" AND FREDERICK NEWS POST," MARCH 1, 1985,
ENTITLED "SOVIETS VIOLATE BIOLOGICAL WARFARE PACT," ESPIONAGE-X
(MEDIA LEAK); OO: FBIHQ.

98. No 56
65 13263
41A
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PAGE TWO (BA 650-4516) ~~SECRET~~

ALL ITEMS OF INFORMATION CONTAINED ON THIS DOCUMENT ARE
CLASSIFIED ~~"SECRET"~~.

RE BALTIMORE TEL DATED FEBRUARY 25, 1986 IN WHICH BALTIMORE
ADVISED RECIPIENTS THAT A MEETING WAS HELD WITH INSCOM SA [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] TO ARRANGE AN INTERVIEW AND POLYGRAPH OF [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

ON APRIL 11, 1986, SA [REDACTED] ADVISED THAT AS A RESULT OF A
CONSULTATION WITH U.S. ARMY LEGAL AUTHORITIES, IT WAS CONCLUDED THAT
CAPTIONED MATTER SHOULD BE HANDLED BY THE ARMY CRIMINAL
INVESTIGATION DIVISION AND NOT MILITARY INTELLIGENCE.

ON APRIL 16, 1986, SA [REDACTED] U.S. ARMY CID, WALTER REED
ARMY HOSPITAL, BETHESDA, MD., PHONE (202) 576-2539, ADVISED THAT
CAPTIONED MATTER HAD BEEN REFERRED TO HIS OFFICE BY INSCOM. A
TENATIVE MEETING FOR APRIL 18, 1986 WAS SCHEDULED FOR CID AND
BALTIMORE IN THE BALTIMORE FIELD OFFICE TO BRIEF THE CID REGARDING
THIS MATTER AND TO INTERVIEW AND POLYGRAPH [REDACTED] AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

RECIPIENTS WILL BE ADVISED OF THE RESULTS OF ABOVE MEETING.

~~C BY G-3. DECL. SADR.~~

BT

#

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b7c

Memorandum



To : SAC, WFO (65C-13263)(P)(C-1)

Date 5/14/86

From : SA [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH
ON 10-24-2007

Subject : UNSUBS;
UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION
IN THE WASHINGTON POST, AUGUST 26, 1984,
AUTHORED BY JACK ANDERSON, ENTITLED,
"THE GROWING CHEMICAL CLUB";
OO:FBIHQ

The following information is classified "~~Secret~~" in its entirety.

Reference Baltimore telcall to WFO on May 7, 1986, from [redacted] to SA [redacted]

Baltimore Division advised that [redacted] the suspect in this case, is currently on temporary duty away from his assignment at WALTER REED ARMY HOSPITAL. [redacted] is not expected to return to the Washington area until May 19, 1986. Baltimore anticipates scheduling a joint interview sometime after May 19, 1986.

~~SECRET~~

~~Classified by: 602
Declassify on: OADR~~

b6
b7C

WFO
LBS:lr
(1) *[Handwritten Signature]*

65C 13263-41B

SEARCHED _____	INDEXED _____
SERIALIZED <i>DM</i>	FILED <i>DM</i>
MAY 30	
OFFICE <i>[Signature]</i>	
STATUS OF INTERVIEW ?	

Memorandum



To : SAC, WFO (65C13263) (P)

Date 5/29/86

From : SA

b6
b7C

Subject : UNSUBS;
UNAUTH Disclosure in WASHINGTON
Post 8/26/84
OO: FBIHQ

The purpose of this communication is to advise reviewers of this file that this writer has been assigned as a full time monitoring agent on WFO case, "FLYNTLOCK; OO:WFO" (58A-2112) from the period of May 5, 1986 through May 30, 1986.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-24-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH

2-WFO

LBS:lr
(2)

65C13263 - 41C

SEARCHED	INDEXED
SERIALIZED <i>DM</i>	FILED <i>DM</i>
MAY 30 1986	
FBI - WASH. FIELD OFFICE	

AH

INBOX HAS 7 DOCUMENTS
FORMS.TEXT HAS 1 DOCUMENT

INBOX.1 (#2108)

TEXT:
BA0008 1642202Z

PP HQ WF

DECLASSIFIED BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH
ON 10-24-2007

DE BA

P 132100Z JUN 86

FM BALTIMORE (65C-4516)(SQ. 3)(P)

TO DIRECTOR (65C-78756) PRIORITY

WFO (65C-13263) ROUTINE

BT

~~SECRET~~

UNSUB (S); UDCI IN "THE WASHINGTON POST", AUGUST 26, 1984, AUTHORED
BY JACK ANDERSON, ENTITLED "THE GROWING CHEMICAL CLUB;" ET AL;
ESP-X (MEDIA LEAK); OO: FBIHQ.

ALL ITEMS OF INFORMATION CONTAINED ON THIS DOCUMENT ARE
CLASSIFIED "~~SECRET~~".

U.S. ARMY [REDACTED] WAS JOINTLY INTERVIEWED
BY BALTIMORE CASE AGENT, WFO CASE AGENT AND U.S. ARMY CRIMINAL
INVESTIGATION DIVISION (CID) SPECIAL AGENT [REDACTED] AT THE CID
OFFICE, WALTER REED MEDICAL CENTER, WASHINGTON, D.C.

b6
b7C

[REDACTED] DENIED PASSING CLASSIFIED INFO TO COLUMNIST JACK
ANDERSON IN ANY FORM OR MANNER. HE DID ADMIT DISCUSSING "YELLOW
RAIN" WITH ANDERSON BUT STATED ALMOST ALL INFO AVAILABLE RE "YELLOW

65C-1326342

*JWC-6
7/7/86
no leads outstanding*

Rec'd


SEARCHED *eli*
SERIALIZED
JUN 13 7 44 PM '86

[REDACTED] *GR*

b6
b7C

PAGE TWO (BA 65C-4516) ~~SECRET~~

"RAIN" IS UNCLASSIFIED. HE STATED HE WAS VERY AWARE OF HIS DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES WHEN HE WAS THE SPECIAL SECURITY OFFICER FOR THE U.S. ARMY AND WOULD NEVER, UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES, DISCUSS OR SUPPLY CLASSIFIED INFO TO UNAUTHORIZED PERSONS.

[REDACTED] STATED HE WOULD WELCOME A POLYGRAPH EXAM TO PROVE HIS INNOCENCE. SA [REDACTED] HAS SUBMITTED A REQUEST TO THE U.S. ARMY POLYGRAPH UNIT TO SCHEDULE THE POLYGRAPH EXAM. THE BUREAU WILL BE KEPT APPRISED OF DEVELOPMENTS. 

LHM TO FOLLOW.

~~C BY G-S. DECI: OADR.~~

BT

#

FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:

- Teletype
- Facsimile
- AIRTEL

PRECEDENCE:

- Immediate
- Priority
- Routine

CLASSIFICATION:

- TOP SECRET
- SECRET
- CONFIDENTIAL
- UNCLAS E F T O
- UNCLAS

6/19/86

Date

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

~~SECRET~~

FROM: SAC, WASHINGTON FIELD (65C-13263)(RUC)(C-1)

DECLASSIFIED BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH
ON 10-24-2007

UNKNOWN SUBJECTS;
 UDCI IN WASHINGTON POST, AUGUST 26, 1984,
 AUTHORED BY JACK ANDERSON, ENTITLED,
 "THE GROWING CHEMICAL CLUB"; THE WASHINGTON POST,
 AUGUST 27, 1984, AUTHORED BY JACK ANDERSON,
 ENTITLED, "CHEMICAL ARMS AND TERRORISM FEARED BY
 CIA"; READERS DIGEST, SEPTEMBER, 1984, ISSUED
 AUTHORED BY JACK ANDERSON, ENTITLED,
 "POISON AND PLAGUE, RUSSIAN SECRET TERROR
 WEAPON"; WASHINGTON TIMES, AUGUST 8, 1985,
 AUTHORED BY TOM DIAZ, ENTITLED,
 "NEW DESIGNER BUGS ADVANCED BY SOVIETS";
WASHINGTON TIMES, AUGUST 14, 1985, AUTHORED
 BY TOM DIAZ, ENTITLED, "YELLOW RAIN SPREAD BY
 SOVIETS, NATIONS SILENTLY AGREE";
 ESPIONAGE-X;
 OO: FBIHQ

This communication is classified "~~Secret~~" in its entirety.

Reference WFO teletype to FBIHQ on July 2, 1985.

For the information of Headquarters, subject, [redacted] was interviewed at his place of employment on June [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

~~Classified by: 602~~
~~Declassify on: OADR~~

b6
b7c

2-Bureau
2-Baltimore
1-WFO

LBS:lr
(5)

Paul Perry Smith
CO
9/23/86
6/23/86

65C-13263-43

SEARCHED	INDEXED
SERIALIZED	<i>du</i>

Rev 23 1986

FBI - WASH. F.I.L.

Approved: _____ Transmitted _____ (Number) _____ (Time)

[redacted]

thz

V

WFO 65C-13263

~~SECRET~~

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6, 1983, by the Baltimore and WFO case agents assigned to this matter. Also participating in the interview was U.S. Army CID Special Agent [redacted] Baltimore will furnish Headquarters with the results of this interview via separate communication.

UACB, WFO is closing this investigation inasmuch as no leads remain outstanding at WFO. The bulk of this investigation was conducted by Baltimore and there is no substantive information to be sent to Headquarters on an LHM.

READ INBOX.1 TEXT
FORMS.TEXT HAS 1 DOCUMENT

INBOX.1 (#1454)

TEXT:
BA0001 1781500Z

(L-8)

PP HQ WF

DECLASSIFIED BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH
ON 10-24-2007

DE BA

P 271445Z JUN 86FM BALTIMORE (65C-4516)(SQ 3)(P)

TO DIRECTOR (65C-78756) PRIORITY

WFO (65C-13263) ROUTINE

BT

~~SECRET~~

UNSUBS(S): UDCI IN "THE WASHINGTON POST," AUGUST 26, 1984,
AUTHORED BY JACK ANDERSON, ENTITLED "THE GROWING CHEMICAL
CLUB:" "THE WASHINGTON POST," AUGUST 27, 1984, AUTHORED BY
JACK ANDERSON, ENTITLED "CHEMICAL ARMS IN TERRORISM FEARED BY
CIA:" "READERS DIGEST," SEPTEMBER, 1984, ISSUE AUTHORED BY
JACK ANDERSON, ENTITLED "POISON AND PLAGUE, RUSSIA'S SECRET
TERROR WEAPONS:" "THE WASHINGTON TIMES," AUGUST 8, 1985, AUTHORED
BY TOM DIAZ, ENTITLED, "NEW DESIGNER BUGS ADVANCED BY SOVIETS:"
"THE WASHINGTON TIMES," AUGUST 14, 1985, AUTHORED BY TOM DIAZ,
ENTITLED, "YELLOW RAIN SPREAD BY SOVIETS, NATIONS SLIGHTLY
AGREE:" AND FREDERICK NEWS POST", MARCH 1, 1985, ENTITLED
"SOVIETS VIOLATE BIOLOGICAL WARFARE PACT:" ESPIONAGE-X (MEDIA

65C-13263-44

di

98. MAY 11 11 22 AM '86

[Redacted] (Info)

Keep closed

b6
b7c

PAGE TWO BA 65C-4516 ~~SECRET~~

LEAK): OO: FBIHQ

THIS COMMUNICATION IS CLASSIFIED "~~SECRET~~" IN ITS ENTIRETY.

RE BA TEL TO DIRECTOR AND WFO, DATED JUNE 13, 1986.

REFERENCED BALTIMORE TEL ADVISED THAT U.S. ARMY CID

SPECIAL AGENT [REDACTED] HAD SUBMITTED A REQUEST FOR U.S.

ARMY POLYGRAPH UNIT TO SCHEDULE [REDACTED]

FOR A POLYGRAPH EXAM CONCERNING CAPTIONED MATTER. SA [REDACTED]

ADVISED THAT INASMUCH AS [REDACTED] HAD SUBMITTED HIS

RESIGNATION FROM THE U.S. ARMY TO BE EFFECTIVE JULY 1, 1986,

THE ARMY HAD REFUSED TO CONDUCT THE POLYGRAPH EXAM.

[REDACTED] HAS ACCEPTED THE POSITION OF EXECUTIVE
DIRECTOR, NATIONAL STUDY CENTER, TRAUMA AND EMERGENCY MEDICAL
CENTER, UNIVERSITY OF MD. HOSPITAL, GREEN ST., BALTIMORE, MD.

IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE, BA WILL SUBMIT A REQUEST FOR BA
POLYGRAPH EXAMINERS TO CONDUCT THE EXAM OF [REDACTED] AS SOON
AS POSSIBLE AND THE BUREAU WILL BE PROMPTLY ADVISED OF THE
RESULTS.

~~C BY G-9; DECLASS: OADR.~~

BT

#

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C-8

INBOX.11 (#2294)

TEXT:
BA0012 217220Z

DECLASSIFIED BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH
ON 10-24-2007

PP HQ WFO

DE BA

P 52115Z AUG 86FM BALTIMORE (65C-4516) (SQ 3) (P)

TO DIRECTOR (65C-78656) PRIORITY

WASHINGTON FIELD (65C-13263) (CI-1) PRIORITY

BT

~~SECRET~~

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b7c

ATTN: SSA [redacted]

UNSUBS; UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION IN THE
WASHINGTON POST, AUGUST 26, 1984, AUTHORED BY JACK ANDERSON,
ENTITLED "THE GROWING CHEMICAL CLUB"; ET AL; ESP-X-MEDIA LEAKS;
OO: FBIHQ.

ALL ITEMS OF INFORMATION CONTAINED ON THIS DOCUMENT ARE
CLASSIFIED "~~SECRET~~" BY CLASSIFICATION GUIDE #3 (G-3), UNLESS
INDICATED OR OTHERWISE NOTED.

Lead covered by SA receipt of [redacted] to take type [signature]

RE BALTIMORE TELETYPE TO DIRECTOR, NO COPY TO WFO, DATED

JULY 25, 1986

FOR INFORMATION OF WFO, REFERENCED BALTIMORE TELETYPE ADVISED
THAT SA [redacted] WFO, HAD POLYGRAPHED [redacted]

65C-13263

EX 77453

*8/12/86
RUC
Admin in [redacted]
(4)*

*KMD
8-15-86*

*KMD
8-6-86 Re [redacted]*

98. AUG 5 8 02 PM '86

[redacted]

[signature]

45

~~SECRET~~

ON JULY 17, 1986, AND DECEPTION WAS NOTED IN [] RESPONSES CONCERNING CAPTIONED MATTER.

ON JULY 28, 1986, [] WAS RE-POLYGRAPHED AND AGAIN DECEPTION WAS NOTED. SA [] ADVISED THAT DURING THE COURSE OF THE INTERVIEW/POLYGRAPH EXAM, [] MADE ADMISSIONS OF HAVING HAD DISCUSSIONS WITH JACK ANDERSON CONCERNING CLASSIFIED INFORMATION. [] ALSO ADMITTED TO SA [] THAT HE HAD ILLEGALLY DESTROYED CLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS AND A CLASSIFIED TAPE. THE DESTRUCTION OF THE DOCUMENTS AND TAPE TOOK PLACE IN [] FORMER OFFICE AT THE WALTER REED ARMY HOSPITAL, WASHINGTON, D.C.

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b7C

SA [] ADVISED ON AUGUST 4, 1986, THAT THE FBIHQ POLYGRAPH UNIT HAD CONCURRED THAT [] WAS DECEPTIVE IN HIS ANSWERS.

UPON RECEIPT OF SA [] FD-302S AND POLYGRAPH REPORTS, BALTIMORE WILL PROMPTLY REINTERVIEW [] AND ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN A SIGNED STATEMENT REGARDING COMPLETE DETAILS OF [] ADMISSIONS TO SA [] IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT THE POLYGRAPH STILL INDICATES DECEPTION, EXTENSIVE EFFORTS WILL BE MADE TO DETERMINE WHAT ADDITIONAL INFORMATION MAY HAVE BEEN DISCUSSED BETWEEN [] AND ANDERSON.

IT IS NOTED THAT ON EVENING OF AUGUST 2, 1986 [] TELE-

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PAGE THREE (A 65C-4516) ~~SECRET~~

PHONICALLY CONTACTED BALTIMORE CASE AGENT AND EXPRESSED HIS WILLINGNESS AND COOPERATION IN RESOLVING THIS MATTER. IT I ALSO NOTED THAT, PRIOR TO EACH INTERVIEW, [] HAS BEEN ADVISED OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AS SATED ON FD-395. [] ADVISED HE UNDERSTANDS HIS RIGHTS AND SIGNED THE WAIVER. BALTIMORE RECOGNIZES THE URGENCY IN REINTERVIEWING AND OBTAINING A STATEMENT FROM [] PRIOR TO HIS SEEKING LEGAL REPRESENTATION, INASMUCH AS AN ATTORNEY WILL PROBABLY ADVISE [] NOT TO MAKE ANY MORE STATEMENTS OR ADMISSIONS TO THE FBI.

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LEADS TO CORROBORATE THE ADSSIONS OF [] TO SA [] ARE BEING HELD IN ABEYANCE BY BALTIMORE PENDING RECEIPT OF SA [] FD-302S AND POLYGRAPH REPORTS.

BALTIMORE IS FOLLOWING THIS MATTER VERY CLOSELY AND THE BUREAU WILL BE KEPT APPRISED OF DEVELOPMENTS.

BT

#

C-3

INBOX.8 (#2107)

TEXT:
BAD012 0632050Z

PP HQ WFO

DE BA

DECLASSIFIED BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH
ON 10-24-2007

P 042000Z MAR 87

FM BALTIMORE (65C-4516)(SQ.3)(P)

TO DIRECTOR, FBI (45-78656)(PRIORITY)

SAC, WFO (65C-13263)(PRIORITY)

BT

~~SECRET~~

ATTN FBIHQ: SSA [redacted]

ESP - X (MEDIA LEAK); OO: FBIHQ.

THIS COMMUNICATION IS CLASSIFIED "~~SECRET~~" IN ITS ENTIRETY.

FOR INFORMATION OF WFO, DURING AN INTERVIEW OF [redacted] HE

ADVISED THAT WHILE HE WAS WORKING AT WALTER REED HOSPITAL,

WDC, HE COMMUTED ON A TRAIN WITH [redacted]

[redacted] TO CONGRESSMAN HARRY REID (NEVADA). [redacted] ADVISED

THAT HE HAD DISCUSSED THE USE OF LASERS IN THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR WITH

[redacted] HE TOLD [redacted] THAT THE LASERS HAD CAUSED EYE INJURIES

AMONG OPPOSING TROOPS AND THAT HE HAD SEEN PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE

SOVIET LASER WEAPONS. [redacted] ALSO TOLD [redacted] THAT THE SOVIET

WEAPONS COULD BE USED AGAINST SATELLITES.

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3/24/87

TT to BA requesting interview results of
WFO AIT to BA 4/1/87
WFO TT to BA 4/1/87
BA to COVER
FUTERVIEW, SI

Monte
Review file
and/or contact BA
re dates of subjects employment at
Walter Reed.

May
5-6-87

3/5/87
Re [redacted]

SERIAL
MAR 4 4 30 PM '87
[redacted]

65C-13263

-46

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PAGE TWO (65C-4516) ~~(SECRET)~~

ON MARCH 3, 1987, [REDACTED] USAF, MEDICAL INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM MANAGER, FT. DETRICK, MD., ADVISED HIS DUTIES INVOLVE ANALYSIS OF INTELLIGENCE RELATED TO FOREIGN RESEARCH ON THE BIOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF NON-IONIZING ELECTROMAGNETIC RADIATION (NIEMR), INCLUDING RADIOWAVES; MICROWAVES; INFRARED, VISIBLE, AND ULTRAVIOLET LIGHT; AND LASER RADIATION. ANALYSIS COVERS BASIC BIEFFECTS RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT OF SAFETY STANDARDS AND THEIR ENFORCEMENT AND THE POTENTIAL ANTI-PERSONNEL WEAPON APPLICATIONS OF NIEMR.

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[REDACTED] ADVISED THAT IT IS CRITICAL TO DETERMINE THE TIME PERIOD OF SUCH DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN [REDACTED] LASER EYE INJURIES TO IRANIAN TROOPS WERE FIRST REPORTED BY IRANIAN OPHTHALMOLOGISTS AT THE 1984 ERGOPHTHALMOLOGY CONGRESS HELD IN TAMPERE, FINLAND, IN MAY, 1984. AN UNUSUALLY LARGE NUMBER OF IRANIANS ATTENDED THIS MEETING AND REPORTED THAT IRANIAN SOLDIERS HAD SUFFERED OVER 2000 SERIOUS EYE INJURIES DURING THE IRAN-IRAQ CONFLICT, INCLUDING MANY RESULTING FROM LASER-INDUCED RETINAL HEMMORAGE. THESE INJURIES WERE BLAMED ON LASER RANGEFINDERS MOUNTED ON IRAQI TANKS. EXPOSURE WAS APPARENTLY ACCIDENTAL, BUT IT COULD HAVE RESULTED FROM INTENTIONAL USE OF THE RANGEFINDERS BY THE IRAQIS

PAGE THREE (65C-4516) ~~(SECRET)~~

AS WEAPONS-OF-OPPORTUNITY. THIS INFORMATION WAS REPORTED DURING THE SUMMER OF 1984 AND APPEARED IN ARMED FORCES MEDICAL INTELLIGENCE CENTER (AFMIC) WEEKLY WIRE 28-84 DTD. 132000Z

JUL 84.

[REDACTED] ADVISED THAT IRANIAN ATTENDEES AT THE 1985 ERGOPHTHALMOLOGY CONGRESS ON SORENTO, ITALY, PRESENTED A PAPER ON BATTLEFIELD EYE INJURIES, BUT FAILED TO CONFIRM LASER CASUALTIES. WHEN QUESTIONED ON THIS SUBJECT, THEY REFUSED TO DISCUSS THE SUBJECT OR THEY DENIED THE CLAIMS MADE IN 1984. WESTERN PARTICIPANTS FELT THAT THE IRANIANS WERE TRYING TO OBSCURE THE ISSUE, AND AS A RESULT OF THE 1985 CONGRESS, THE QUESTION OF LASER EYE DAMAGE IN THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR REMAINED UNRESOLVED. THIS

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MATERIAL WAS REPORTED IN AFMIC WEEKLY WIRE 31-85 DTD. 022000Z AUG 85. [REDACTED] SAID THAT ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON THIS SUBJECT WAS NOT AVAILABLE UNTIL 1986. SOURCE SENSITIVITY PRECLUDES THE INCLUSION OF THAT MATERIAL IN THIS RESPONSE. IF [REDACTED] COMMENTS ON LASER WEAPONS WERE MADE AFTER MARCH, 1986, MORE INFORMATION WILL BE PROVIDED.

[REDACTED] ALSO COMMENTED ON PHOTOGRAPHS OF SOVIET LASER WEAPONS AND ANTISATELLITE LASER WEAPONS. THESE GENERALLY ARE NOT THE

PAGE FOUR (65C-4516) ~~(SECRET)~~

SUBJECT OF MEDICAL INTELLIGENCE AND HAVE NOT BEEN PART OF ANY AFMIC PUBLICATIONS. HOWEVER, UCH INFORMATION HAS BEEN REPORED IN NUMEROUS INTELLIGENCE STUDIES. [REDACTED] MAY BE REFERING TO PHOTOGRAPHS OF A MODIFIED M1974 ACRV AT THE GOLOVIO LASER DEVELOPMENT AND TES CENTER IN THE USSR. THIS DEICE HAS BEEN TENTATIVELY IDNTIFIED AS A LASER TEST VEHICL - AN EXAMPLE PHOTOGRAPH WS INCLUDED ON PAGE 10 OF THE U ARMY SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN: DIRECTED ENERGY WEAPONS (AST-266)R-054-85) DATED APRIL 1985, WHERE IT APPEARS OPPOSITE A PAGE DISCUSSING POTENTIAL SOVIET AND ANTI-SATELLITE LASER WEAPONS.

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[REDACTED] ADVISED CRITICAL ISSUES INCLUDE THE TIME OF THE DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN [REDACTED] THE TYPES OF LASER SYSTEMS DISCUSSED, THE NATURE AND NUMBER OF REPORTED INJURIES, AND ANY REFERENCES TO FOREIGN MILITARY EQUIPMENT ASSOCIATED WITH THE LASERS.

[REDACTED] ADVISED ALL THE ABOVE INFO IS ~~SECRET~~-NOFORN-WNINTEL.

LEAD: WFO AT WDC: 1. LOCATE AND INTERVIEW [REDACTED] AT THE OFFICE OF NEVADA CONGRESSMAN HARRY REID CONCERNING THE ABOVE

PAGE FIVE (65C-4516) ~~(SECRET)~~

INFORMATION AND SUBMIT RESULTS TO BALTIMORE BY FD-302. 2. DETERMINE
THE LEVEL OF SECURITY CLEARANCE OF AND IF HE HAD ANY
ADDITIONAL DISCUSSIONS RE THE ABOVE OR ANY OTHER DISCUSSIONS OF A
CLASSIFIED NATURE.

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~~C BY G-3. DECL: OADR.~~

BT

READ INBOX.1 TEXT
FORMS.TEXT HAS 1 DOCUMENT

INBOX.1 (#827)

TEXT:
BADO11 0761930Z

PP HQ WFO

DE BA

DECLASSIFIED BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH
ON 10-24-2007

2-3

P 171830Z MAR 87

FM BALTIMORE (65A-4516)(SQ 3)(P)

TO DIRECTOR (65-78656) PRIORITY

WFO (65C-13263) PRIORITY

BT

~~SECRET~~

ATTN: FBIHQ, SSA [redacted]

[redacted]; ESP-X (MEDIA LEAK); OO: FBIHQ

THIS COMMUNICATION IS CLASSIFIED "SECRET" IN ITS ENTIRETY.

DURING AN INTERVIEW OF [redacted] HE ADVISED THAT HE HAD AT ONE
TIME HAD A CONVERSATION WITH A [redacted] PRESIDENT OF "FREE THE

EAGLES", A LOBBYIST GROUP WITH THE HOWARD RUFF FOUNDATION IN
WASHINGTON, D.C. IN THE COURSE OF THE CONVERSATION, [redacted] TOLD

[redacted] THAT HE HAD SEEN CLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS THAT INDICATED THAT
140 REBELS WERE BEING TRAINED IN NICARAGUA TO BE USED IN HONDURAS.

AS A RESULT OF THIS INFORMATION BEING SUPPLIED TO [redacted] MONEY
WAS RAISED BY THE RUFF FOUNDATION TO LOBBY FOR THE SUPPORT OF
PRESIDENT REAGAN'S DECISION TO PROVIDE TRAINING AND FINANCIAL
SUPPORT FOR THE REBELS. (IT IS UNKNOWN BY BALTIMORE WHETHER THIS

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3/24/87
S.
Results of
Interview
TT to BA regarding

Call BA -
I think we need
a little more background
before we conduct
any interview
[Signature]

65C-13263-47
KM KM KM

MAR 24 1987

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[redacted]

PAGE TWO BA 65A-4516 ~~SECRET~~

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STATEMENT IS FACTUAL OR JUST [REDACTED] CONCLUSION.)

WFO AT WASHINGTON, D.C.: WILL LOCATE & INTERVIEW [REDACTED]
SUPRA, CONCERNING THE ABOVE MENTIONED CLASSIFIED CONVERSATION &
SUBMIT RESULTS TO BALTIMORE BY FD-302.

~~C BY 8-3; DECL ON: OADR~~

BT

#

INBOX.20 (#1129)

C1-15

TEXT:
B0001 0782000Z

Paul
*65c-13526**

PP HQ WFO

DE BA

P 191945Z MAR 87

DECLASSIFIED BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH
ON 10-24-2007

FM BALTIMORE (65A-4516)(SQ 3)(P)

TO DIRECTOR (65-78656) PRIORITY

WFO PRIORITY

BT

~~SECRET~~

ATTN: FBIHQ, SSA [redacted]

[redacted]; ESP-X (MEDIA LEAK), OO: FBIHQ

THIS COMMUNICATION IS CLASSIFIED "~~SECRET~~" IN ITS ENTIRETY.

RETELCALL BETWEEN SSA [redacted] & SA [redacted] MAR. 19, 1987.

BALTIMORE IS DESIROUS IN DETERMINE WHEN PHONE CALLS WERE MADE FROM [redacted] RESIDENCE TO THE OFFICE OR RESIDENCE OF JACK

ANDERSON. ADDITIONALLY, IT WOULD BE BENEFICIAL IN DETERMING IF

b6
b7C

[redacted] TELEPHONICALLY CONTACTED THE WASHINGTON POST, [redacted]

[redacted] OR ANY REPRESENTATIVE IN THE [redacted]

REQUEST OF THE BUREAU: THE BUREAU IS REQUESTED TO FURNISH A NATIONAL SECURITY LETTER TO BALTIMORE DIRECTED TO CHESAPEAKE AND

WFO A/T response dictated 3/29/87. S.

13263-48
65c-13526

SEARCHED
INDEXED
FILED
APR 19 5 32 PM '87

[redacted] *S*

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POTOMAS TELEPHONE CO., C/O [REDACTED] CUSTODIAN OF RECORDS,
SHAWAN & YORK RDS., COCKEYSVILLE, MD., CONCERNING TELEPHONE
NUMBER [REDACTED] FOR THE PERIOD JAN. 1, 1983 - DEC. 31, 1986.

WFO AT WASHINGTON, D.C.: WILL OBTAIN THE RESIDENCE & OFFICE
PHONE NUMBERS FOR JACK ANDERSON & DALE VAN ATTA. WILL ALSO OBTIAN
PHONE NUMBERS FOR THE WASHINGTON POST, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] & THE HOWARD RUFF FOUNDATION. FURNISH THE NUMBERS TO
THE BUREAU & BALTIMORE.

~~C BY G S; DEEL ON: GADR~~

BT

b6
b7C

done

FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:

- Teletype
- Facsimile
- _____

PRECEDENCE:

- Immediate
- Priority
- Routine

CLASSIFICATION:

- TOP SECRET
- ~~SECRET~~
- CONFIDENTIAL
- UNCLAS E F T O
- UNCLAS

Date 3/23/87

038

1 FM WASHINGTON FIELD (65C-13263) (P) (C-3)

2 TO DIRECTOR FBI (65-78656) ROUTINE

3 FBI BALTIMORE (65A-4516) (SQUAD 3) ROUTINE

4 BT

DECLASSIFIED BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH
ON 10-24-2007

~~SECRET~~

033P

20

[Redacted] ESP-X (MEDIA LEAK); OO:BUREAU.

6 ALL MARKINGS, NOTATIONS, AND ITEMS OF INFORMATION
7 CONTAINED IN THIS COMMUNICATION ARE CLASSIFIED "~~SECRET~~"
8 UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED.

b6
b7C

9 RE BALTIMORE TELETYPES, DATED MARCH 4, 1987, AND MARCH 17,
10 1987.

11 WASHINGTON FIELD NOTES LEADS SET OUT IN REFERENCED TELETYPES
12 AND IS PREPARING FOR SAME. WASHINGTON FIELD WOULD FIND EXTREMELY
13 HELPFUL IN ITS PREPARATION A REVIEW OF INTERVIEW RESULTS OF
14 [Redacted] AS SET FORTH IN LHMS AND FD-302S. WASHINGTON FIELD

~~SECRET~~

16 (2) Washington Field

17 MCS:mye

18 (2) *[Signature]*

21 Approved: *[Signature]*

Transmitted _____

(Number)

(Time)

Per *[Signature]*

65C-13263-49

13 11 5 2007
[Redacted Box]

b6
b7C

FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:

- Teletype
- Facsimile
- _____

PRECEDENCE:

- Immediate
- Priority
- Routine

CLASSIFICATION:

- TOP SECRET
- SECRET
- CONFIDENTIAL
- UNCLAS E F T O
- UNCLAS

Date _____

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PAGE TWO DE WF 0038 ~~SECRET~~

CAN LOCATE NO INTERVIEW RESULTS OF [REDACTED] IN WASHINGTON FIELD FILE 65C-13263.

LEADS: BALTIMORE DIVISION: AT BALTIMORE, MARYLAND: EXPEDITIOUSLY FORWARD TO WASHINGTON FIELD COPIES OF LHMS, FD-302S, AND OTHER COMMUNICATIONS SETTING FORTH THE INTERVIEW RESULTS OF [REDACTED]

b6
b7c

~~C BY G-3, DECL: OADR.~~

BT

#0038

NNNN

Approved: _____ Transmitted _____ Per _____
(Number) (Time)

TO: OFFICE SERVICES MANAGER
 Subject: Jack Anderson
 Date: _____
 Social Security Account #: _____

Aliases: _____
 Address: _____ Birth Date: _____ Birthplace: _____ Race: _____ Sex: Male Female

- Exact Spelling
- All References
- Main Security Case Files Only
- Security References Only
- Main Criminal Case Files Only
- Criminal References Only
- Main Security (If no Main, list all Security References)
- Main Criminal (If no Main, list all Criminal References)
- Restrict Locality of _____

File & Serial Number	Remarks	File & Serial Number	Remarks
	<i>Numerous refs.</i>		
	<i>Jack NORTHMAN ANDERSON</i>	<i>DOB 10/19/22</i>	<i>Long Beach California</i>
	<i>Numerous refs.</i>		
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 10-24-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH			

Requested by: _____ Squad: C-3 Extension: _____ File No: 13263-51
65C-13526

<input type="checkbox"/> General Indices: Searched by _____ Date _____ <input type="checkbox"/> Confidential Indices: Searched by _____ Date _____ <input type="checkbox"/> ELSUR Indices: Searched by _____ Date _____	<input type="checkbox"/> ISIS: Searched by _____ Date _____ <input type="checkbox"/> OCIS: Searched by _____ Date _____ <input type="checkbox"/> IIS: Searched by _____ Date _____
---	--

Consolidated by: _____ Date: _____
 Reviewed by: _____ Date: _____

SEARCHED _____ INDEXED _____
 SERIALIZED RM FILED RM
MAR 26 1987
 FBI - _____

Date 3/29
Social Security Account # _____

TO: OFFICE SERVICES MANAGER

Subject ① Howard Ruff Foundation

Aliases ② FREE THE EAGLES Lobbyist Group

Address ③ [Redacted] Birth Date _____ Birthplace _____ Race _____ Sex Male Female

- Exact Spelling
- All References
- Main Security Case Files Only
- Security References Only
- Main Criminal Case Files Only
- Criminal References Only
- Main Security (If no Main, list all Security References)
- Main Criminal (If no Main, list all Criminal References)
- Restrict Locality of _____

File & Serial Number	Remarks	File & Serial Number	Remarks
<u>FREE THE EAGLE</u>	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]
[Redacted] <u>PAC</u>	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]
[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]	[Redacted]
<u>WFO indices negative 3/29</u>		<u>WFO indices neg 3/29</u>	
<u>WFO indices neg 3/29</u>			

b6
b7c

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-24-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH

Requested by [Redacted] Squad C3 Extension _____ File No. 13263-53
65C-13526

<input type="checkbox"/> General Indices:	<input type="checkbox"/> ISIS:
Searched by _____ Date _____	Searched by _____ Date _____
<input type="checkbox"/> Confidential Indices:	<input type="checkbox"/> OCIS:
Searched by _____ Date _____	Searched by _____ Date _____
<input type="checkbox"/> ELSUR Indices:	<input type="checkbox"/> IIS:
Searched by _____ Date _____	Searched by _____ Date _____

Consolidated by _____ Date _____
Reviewed by _____ Date _____

File Review Symbols
I - Identical ? - Not identifiable
NI - Not identical U - Unavailable reference

Searched.....
Serialized KW
Indexed.....
Filed KW

AIRTEL

DECLASSIFIED BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH
ON 10-24-2007

4/1/87

Index 1,3

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (65-78656)

FROM: SAC, WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE (65C-13263)(P)(C-3)

[Redacted]

~~SECRET~~

b6
b7c

ESPIONAGE-X (MEDIA LEAK);
OO:FBIHQ

This entire communication is classified "~~SECRET~~".

Reference BA teletypes 3/17,19/87.

The following information has been developed pursuant to referenced teletypes:

- (1) NAME: JACK NORTHMAN ANDERSON
- DPOB: 10/9/22; LONG BEACH, CALIFORNIA
- MD DRIVERS
- LICENSE #: A-536-356-636-807
- RESIDENCE: 7810 KACHINA LANE
BETHESDA, MARYLAND
- RESIDENCE #: (301)365-5099
- WORK: JACK ANDERSON ENTERPRISES
1401 16TH STREET, N.W., WDC 20036
(202)483-1442

b6
b7c

(2) [Redacted]

WFO indices, Washington, D.C. telephone book, and WALES negative. Directory service for the Washington, D.C. area lists a [Redacted] phone [Redacted]. There is no indication whether this individual is identical with the [Redacted] associated with ANDERSON.

~~SECRET~~
~~CLASSIFIED BY: G-3~~
~~DECLASSIFY ON: OADR~~

65C-13263-54

2-Bureau
2-Baltimore (65A-4516)
② Washington Field Office
MCS: *tlq*
(6)

Searched.....
Serialized..... *KM*
Indexed..... *KAN*
Filed..... *KAN*

[Redacted]

S

KAN
7/11/87

WFO's Media Representative advised that he could contact the Washington Post newspaper or Jack Anderson Enterprises in a pretext attempt to determine [redacted] phone number, however, ANDERSON and [redacted] are not normal contacts of WFO and contact may arouse suspicion on ANDERSON's or [redacted] part. Pretext contact by WFO's media representative will be made if requested by Baltimore Division.

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(3) WASHINGTON POST:

- WASHINGTON POST NEWSPAPER-**
- 1150 15th St. NW-
- Circulation Department-
 - Home Delivery.....334-6100
- Advertising Departments-
 - Classified Advertising.....334-6200
 - Display Advertising-
 - Automotive Display.....334-7771
 - Fashion Advertising.....334-7609
 - Financial Advertising.....334-7634
 - Food Drug Liquor Advertising.....334-7135
 - Home Furnishings & Appliances.....334-7654
 - International Advertising.....334-6232
 - Preprints Color
 - Comics Advertising.....334-6902
 - Real Estate Display.....334-7639
 - Travel Culture Amusement
 - Advertising.....334-7753
 - Washington Post Magazine
 - Advertising.....334-6161
 - Other Display Advertising.....334-7642
 - Advertising Services.....334-7796
 - Advertising Customer Relations.....334-6130
 - Data Processing Department.....334-6018
 - Insurance and Benefits.....334-7171
- News Departments-
 - Business News.....334-7320
 - DC News.....334-7300
 - Foreign News.....334-7400
 - Magazine.....334-7585
 - Maryland and Virginia News.....334-7313
 - National News.....334-7410
 - Photo.....334-7377
 - Sports Scores Only.....334-8060
 - Style Section.....334-7535
 - Weekend.....334-6808
- Personnel Department-
 - Employment.....334-7172
 - Employee Records.....334-7170
- Promotion Department.....334-7960
- Public Relations.....334-7969
- All Other Departments.....334-6000

(4) HOWARD RUFF FOUNDATION:

WFO indices, Washington, D.C. telephone book, and Directory Service all negative.

(F) WFO did locate listings for ^(X)RUFF PAC, ^(X)FREE THE EAGLE, and [redacted] all at 214 Massachusetts Avenue, N.E., Washington, D.C., phone (202)547-2122. WFO indices negative regarding RUFF PAC, FREE THE EAGLE and [redacted]

(5) [redacted]

Baltimore Division has advised that [redacted] to Congressman HARRY REID of Nevada.

REID's office number is (202)224-3542.

On March 30, 1987, pretext call to Congressman REID's determined that [redacted] is no longer employed at that office, and they are unaware of his new employment, if any. They advised that [redacted] home phone is [redacted]

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~~SECRET~~

READ INBOX.5 TEXT
FORMS.TEXT HAS 2 DOCUMENTS

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 03-29-2013 BY ADG F54M93K42

P-3

INBOX.5-(#2701)

TO: BA @ EMH2, WFO @ EMH1

FROM: HQTX @ EMH1

DATE: 10-24-2007
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH
REASON: 1.4 (1)
DECLASSIFY ON: 10-24-2032

SUBJECT: 093/0113 PRIORITY

DATE: 3 APR 87 10:50:39 GMT

CC:

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

TEXT:
VZCZHQ0113

PP BA WF

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DE HQ #0113 0930741

ZNY SSSSS

P 021755Z APR 87

FM DIRE CTOE FBI

TO FBI BALTIMORE (65C-4516) PRIORITY

FBI WASHINGTON FIELD PRIORITY

BT

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S Way

[REDACTED] ESPIONAAE-X (MEDIA LEAK); OO: FBIHQ

~~THIS COMMUNICATION IS CLASSIFIED "SECRET" IN ITS ENTIRETY.~~

REFERENCE BALTIMORE AIRTEL TO THE DIRECTOR, MARCH 20, 1987.

REFERENCED AIRTEL REQUESTED THAT FBI HEADQUARTERS (FBIHQ)

OBTAIN FOR BALTIMORE TWO SPECIAL NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES

(SNIE). THE TWO SNIES ARE ENTITLED "SNIE 11/50/37-82", USE OF

TOXINS AND OTHER LETHAL CHEMICALS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND

AFGHANISTAN" DATED MARCH 2, 1983, AND "SNIE 11/17-84" DATED

JANUARY 24, 1984.

65C-13263-55

Referral/Consult

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~~SECRET~~

SWIE'S
4/6/87. Per
TT Rec'd on 03 4/6/87. (2) SWIE'S requested from Bob
are available from him 4/7/87.

PAGE TWO DE HQ 0113 ~~SECRET~~



Referral/Consult

~~U BY G-3; DECL NO: OADR.~~

BT

#0113

NNNN

MEMORANDUM

TO: SAC, WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE
(65C-13263)(P)

DATE: 4/6/87

FROM: SA [redacted] (C-3)

DECLASSIFIED BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH
ON 10-24-2007

SUBJECT: CHANGED
[redacted];
ESPIONAGE-X (MEDIA LEAK);
OO:FBIHQ

~~SECRET~~

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This entire communication is classified "~~SECRET~~".

Title changed to set forth identity of subject. Title previously carried as "UNSUBS; UDCI In the Washington Post, August 26, 1984, Authored By JACK ANDERSON, Entitled, 'The Growing Chemical Club'; Et al; Espionage-X (Media Leak); OO:FBIHQ."

Review of WF 65C-13263 indicates that previous title carried by Baltimore Division in its teletype dated 8/5/86, however, title change must have occurred without notification to WFO inasmuch as Baltimore teletype, 3/4/87, carries new caption.

WFO FOIMS and indexing will note new caption.

~~SECRET~~
~~CLASSIFIED BY: G-3~~
~~DECLASSIFY ON: OADR~~

fine

5 ② Washington Field Office
MCS: [initials]
(2)

65C-13263 -56
SEARCHED INDEXED
SERIALIZED FILED
APR 6 1987
FIELD OFFICE

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

DECLASSIFIED BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH
ON 10-24-2007

~~SECRET~~

Date of transcription 9/23/86

All items of information contained on this document are classified "~~SECRET~~" by Classification Guide #3 (G-3) unless indicated or otherwise noted.

On September 12, 1986, [redacted] was interviewed at the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) by Special Agents [redacted] and [redacted]. [redacted] was advised that he was being interviewed concerning information that had appeared in several Washington Post articles written by columnist JACK ANDERSON.

[redacted] was orally advised of his rights as stated on FBI form FD-395. He stated he understood his rights and agreed to the interview. He stated that both his Mormon church bishop and his attorney, GARTH STEPHENSON, were aware that he was being interviewed by the FBI concerning media leaks.

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[redacted] thereafter furnished the following information:

[redacted] stated that he had had discussions with JACK ANDERSON concerning information contained in an ANDERSON article that appeared in the Washington Post on February 21, 1984, titled "Soviets Plotting Biotech War, President Told." [redacted] stated that approximately two weeks prior to the article being published, he recalls discussing most of the contents of the article with ANDERSON and [redacted] believes that ANDERSON could have based the article solely on their conversation.

In addition to the above mentioned article, [redacted] furnished the following information:

1. [redacted] gave to ANDERSON a series of newspaper articles and magazines regarding "Yellow Rain." [redacted] advised that he had obtained the unclassified public source material

~~CLASSIFIED BY G-3~~
~~DECLASSIFY ON: OADR~~

65C-13263-57

Investigation on 9/12/86 at Baltimore, Maryland

by SA [redacted] :sp

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SEARCHED	INDEXED
SERIALIZED <i>KM</i>	FILED <i>KM</i>
BA <u>APR 06 1987</u>	
FBI - WASH. FIELD OFFICE	

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

On 9/12/86, Page 2

from the Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center (AFMIC) Library, AFMIC Analyst [REDACTED] and various other analysts at AFMIC.

2. [REDACTED] furnished to ANDERSON a copy of a treaty concerning biological weapons and signed by the United States and the Soviet Union. [REDACTED] obtained the copy from [REDACTED] a former employee of AFMIC. At that time, [REDACTED] either worked for General HARRISON RAPMUND at the United States Army Research and Development Command at Fort Detrick or a Fort Detrick Disarmament Unit (CBW). The treaty was unclassified.

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3. In 1983, [REDACTED] obtained for ANDERSON two unclassified papers from the AFMIC Library regarding opposing views of the United States and Soviet Union concerning "Yellow Rain." The papers were written by AFMIC Analyst [REDACTED]

4. [REDACTED] advised that he told ANDERSON that the Soviets were working on a new weapon concerning genetic engineering. [REDACTED] stated that he had obtained that knowledge through discussions he had had with AFMIC Analyst Dr. BARRY ERLICK, drafts of Dr. ERLICK and searches he had conducted of entries in a National Security Agency (NSA) computer terminal (Coins) with which he had access when he was the special security officer at AFMIC. [REDACTED] advised that he knew the information was classified at the "secret" level.

5. As a result of discussions that [REDACTED] had with Dr. ERLICK, [REDACTED] discussed with ANDERSON the technique of the taking of growth hormones and trace elements to develop chemical/biological weapons and the method by which the Soviets would deliver them. [REDACTED] told ANDERSON these weapons were as serious as tactical/nuclear weapons and would be ready for development in five to seven years. [REDACTED] advised ANDERSON that this subject matter would be described in a document going from AFMIC to the National Security Council. ANDERSON said he would "look" for the document and asked what the classification would be. [REDACTED] replied to ANDERSON that it was "secret".

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6. [REDACTED] verbally gave to ANDERSON examples of growth hormones and possibly viruses. He told ANDERSON they were so small (sub-microscopic) that they were difficult to work on. ANDERSON was told this information was contained in the secret report going to the National Security Council (NSC).

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

On 9/12/86 Page 3

7. ANDERSON was told by [REDACTED] that an analyst at AFMIC was working on a classified project at AFMIC concerning genetic engineering. [REDACTED] advised the interviewing agents that he probably told ANDERSON the analyst was Dr. BARRY ERLICK.

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8. [REDACTED] stated that he had given the following names and positions to ANDERSON: Colonel JIMMY WALKER, Dr. BARRY ERLICK, Analyst [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] (Central Intelligence Agency employee). [REDACTED] advised that he had told ANDERSON that he once heard Colonel WALKER refer to General WESTMORELAND as a "s.o.b."

9. [REDACTED] advised that he may have told ANDERSON that Dr. BARRY ERLICK may be willing to do an interview with ANDERSON to clear up any misconceptions about "Yellow Rain."

10. [REDACTED] told ANDERSON that he saw documents confirming that weapons and supplies are being sent from the United States to Nicaragua and that Nicaragua is distributing the equipment to Honduras and El Salvadorian rebels. [REDACTED] stated that he had observed the documents on the NSA Coins computer and the information was "secret/SCI."

11. [REDACTED] advised [REDACTED] of "Free the Eagles," a lobbyist group with the HOWARD RUFF FOUNDATION, that he had seen classified documents that stated that 140 rebels were being trained in Nicaragua to be used in Honduras. As a result of this information being supplied to [REDACTED] money was raised to lobby for the support of President REAGAN's decision to provide training and financial support for the rebels.

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12. [REDACTED] advised the interviewing agents that he is aware that the United States agencies classify documents and information because a determination is made that if unauthorized persons gain access to classified information, serious harm could come to the national security of the United States. [REDACTED] admitted that he was aware that at the time he was having discussions with ANDERSON, he was divulging classified

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Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

, On 9/12/86 , Page 4*

information to an unauthorized person. He also advised that he is aware that ANDERSON takes action (either researches and/or publishes) on any information that he receives whether it is classified or unclassified. [REDACTED] advised that he is aware that the Soviets and other "enemies" read all of ANDERSON's articles. He cited the following example: [REDACTED] once read a classified document in his office and a few days later, information in the document was reprinted in ANDERSON's column. A few days later, [REDACTED] observed an article in the Soviet newspaper, "Pravda," discussing the ANDERSON's article.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL ITEMS OF INFORMATION CONTAINED ON THIS DOCUMENT ARE CLASSIFIED "SECRET" BY CLASSIFICATION GUIDE #3 (C-3) UNLESS INDICATED OR OTHERWISE NOTED.

Date of transcription 8/22/86

On August 19, 1986, [redacted] was interviewed at the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) by Special Agents [redacted] and [redacted] was advised that he was being interviewed concerning information that had appeared in several Washington Post articles written by columnist JACK ANDERSON.

After being advised of his rights and executing a standard Advice of Rights (Fd-395) form, [redacted] stated he understood his rights and did not want an attorney present. [redacted] advised that prior to coming to the FBI office he had consulted with his attorney GARTH STEPHENSON, a retired Federal Judge, and [redacted] agreed to be interviewed.

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[redacted] advised that he had been an admirer of JACK ANDERSON since he was a small boy. He stated both he and his father have been faithfully reading ANDERSON's columns for several years. On Super Bowl Sunday in January 1983, JACK ANDERSON attended a Mormon Church function in Hagerstown, Maryland and [redacted] used this as an opportunity to introduce himself to ANDERSON. [redacted] family, at that time, was publishing a magazine, "Eastern Standard Times", and [redacted] used that fact to obtain an self-introduction to ANDERSON.

[redacted] advised he had been very concerned that false information had been previously published concerning "Yellow Rain." He saw JACK ANDERSON as a tool in getting the true facts published. [redacted] introduced himself to ANDERSON and inquired if ANDERSON was interested in the subject of "Yellow Rain." ANDERSON replied that he was. [redacted] told ANDERSON that he was the Special Security Officer or Commander of a small security detachment at a Medical Intelligence Union at Fort Detrick.

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[redacted] stated he told ANDERSON that information to establish his bona fides and to let ANDERSON know that he was in a position to know the official version of "Yellow Rain."

At a subsequent meeting [redacted] furnished to ANDERSON a United States State Department document containing approximately 25-50 pages concerning "Yellow Rain."

Investigation on 8/19/86 at Baltimore, Maryland File #
by SA's [redacted] and [redacted] SA [redacted] /dj Date dictated

65C-13263-58
SEARCHED 65C-4516
SERIALIZED [initials] FILED
8/APR 26 1987
FBI - BALTIMORE FIELD OFFICE

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Continuation of FD-302 of _____, On _____, Page _____

stated this document, which he obtained from [redacted] an analyst at Ft. Detrick, was unclassified. In addition to giving ANDERSON the document [redacted] discussed the Hirsch Report with ANDERSON, which deals with discoveries of "Yellow Rain" through interrogations of the Russians by the Germans, circa 1945.

[redacted] advised that he told ANDERSON of reading reports concerning the psychological value of "Yellow Rain", and related incidents of civilians and even armies fleeing when it was even suspected that chemical weapons were being used. During the course of their conversations, [redacted] told ANDERSON that someone in the CIA had intentionally covered over the true seriousness of biological weapons. He told ANDERSON that [redacted]

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After having observed several documents published by JACK ANDERSON, [redacted] advised that he recognized two separate items of information in two different articles as classified information that he had discussed with JACK ANDERSON. [redacted] advised that he recalls specifically using the words "growth hormones" in one article and "gene-splicing techniques as ominous as the atom-splitting discoveries that led to the nuclear bomb," in the second article.

The first article was published in the Washington Post on February 21, 1984 titled "Soviets Plotting Biotech War, President Told." [redacted] stated that in his opinion, discussions he had with ANDERSON precipitated the following paragraph in the article:

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"For example, the Soviets could reproduce such human substances as growth hormones, which have never been duplicated. One U.S. expert thinks the Soviets may be able to reproduce brain chemicals, which send command signals to various parts of the body. The fear is that the Soviets will be able to produce them in quantity and load them into spray weapons. The bio-gas will disorient and destroy the human brain".

[redacted] stated he advised ANDERSON the United States expert mentioned in the above article was Dr. BARRY ERLICK, an Analyst at the Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center, Fort Detrick, Maryland.

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The second article written by JACK ANDERSON, in which [redacted] admitted to being a source of information for a portion of the article, appeared in the Washington Post on December 4, 1984, titled "Soviets Push Biological-Weapons Work". [redacted] stated he recognized a phrase in the article as a statement that he had made to ANDERSON. The statement is:

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

"It warned the president that the Soviets have mastered gene-splicing techniques as ominous as the atom-splitting discoveries that led to the nuclear bomb".

[redacted] advised that both items of information mentioned above that appeared in JACK ANDERSON's column are classified "~~secret~~". He stated he was aware that statements he made to ANDERSON would probably be published by ANDERSON in the Washington Post, and in turn read by the Soviets. [redacted] stated at one point in time he had read a JACK ANDERSON article in the Washington Post containing classified information and two days later the Soviet newspaper Pravda had an article discussing the ANDERSON article.

[redacted] stated that he told ANDERSON, only in general terms, about a biological weapon that was far worse than "Yellow Rain", for which he had no known protection. He advised ANDERSON that there was a document on this subject going to the White House and the National Security Council concerning this.

[redacted] told ANDERSON that the Soviets were seven years ahead with 200 researchers while the United States had nothing.

[redacted] stated that he may have told ANDERSON that this research may involve "Genetic Engineering" and that this was equal to tactical nuclear weapons.

[redacted] stated that he told ANDERSON about reports of helicopters landing in Thailand following an apparent chemical attack and individuals getting out of the helicopters to take tissue and other samples. He stated that this was an indication that the effects of the chemical were being tested by the Soviets or their allies.

[redacted] stated that he told ANDERSON that he was seeing classified information of commercial importance concerning (1) computer products and (2) Petrochemicals as well as two other areas which [redacted] could not recall during this interview. He stated that he advised ANDERSON that the fact that this information was of interest and was being gathered was classified.

He related to ANDERSON that the European hospitals receiving casualties from the Iran-Iraq war in the Middle East were rapidly depleting their medical supplies due to the overwhelming effects of chemical/biological weapons used in that war.

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Continuation of FD-302 of _____

, On _____

, Page _____

During the interview [] advised that after leaving Fort Detrick and transferring to Walter Reed Hospital, he discovered that he had taken approximately five pages of classified materials along with his personal papers. [] stated that he does not remember the classification of these pages, but does remember some of the pages were typed and some were handwritten. [] advised that he burned these documents at his home.

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Additionally [] stated that approximately three months after arriving at Walter Reed Hospital he discovered, in his possession, another classified document pertaining to an administrative matter from AFMIC. [] stated that he did not remember the contents, but he remembered that the classified document was a "B" or a "G" document which is a tightly controlled document that required special handling. He could give no explanation as to how or why he would have such a sensitive document in his possession. He advised he was aware of this very serious security breach and he burned the document in his bathroom at his office at the Walter Reed Medical Facility, Washington, D.C. He advised the document had a special handling caveat with a specific dissemination channel. [] believes the document pertained to either a new addition of a book or proper handling procedures of a "B" or "G" document.

[] advised that in March 1985 a meeting/briefing concerning National Disaster Medical System and sponsored by the Chief of Staff, was held at Walter Reed Medical Center. Attendees consisted of area military doctors, [] and employees of Walter Reed. [] was given the duty of taking minutes of the meeting. He advised he took notes as well as taped the meeting on a cassette tape. Classified information was discussed during the meeting and various slides marked "Secret" were utilized. [] stated that, per procedures, he put the tapes and notes in a safe. He subsequently put the tapes and notes in his desk drawer where he intended to transcribe them. After a few weeks he took the tapes and notes to his home where he intended to transcribe them. He had the tapes and notes at his home for approximately one year before he realized he would never get around to completing the transcriptions. [] advised he destroyed the tapes on July 7, 1986, and destroyed the names and a few pages that he had transcribed from the tapes on July 28, 1986. [] admitted he had committed an illegal act by improperly handling and the eventual destruction of the tapes and notes.

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Continuation of FD-302 of _____

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, On _____, Page _____

Referral/Direct

[redacted] advised that he met JACK ANDERSON for the first time in January 1983 and the last time in September 1985. He stated during that time he went to ANDERSON's home approximately 20 separate occasions, and to his office two times. [redacted] always [redacted] when he contacted ANDERSON. He would always park by an elementary school approximately two blocks from ANDERSON's home and walk or ride his bike the remainder of the way. He advised that ANDERSON's home is on Kuchina Street, near the Congressional Country Club in Bethesda, Maryland. He could not furnish the exact street address of ANDERSON's home nor the name of the street where he parked his car. He advised he did not want to park at ANDERSON's home because of his, [redacted] automobile having a blue Fort Detrick sticker on the bumper and he did not want to have to explain to anyone why an Army officer was making so many trips to ANDERSON's home. [redacted] stated that he had told his superiors at Fort Detrick that he was having infrequent contacts with ANDERSON, but they only discussed [redacted] matters during these contacts.

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~~SECRET~~ FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:

- Teletype
- Facsimile
- AIRTEL

PRECEDENCE:

- Immediate
- Priority
- Routine

CLASSIFICATION:

- TOP SECRET
- SECRET
- CONFIDENTIAL
- UNCLAS E F T O
- UNCLAS

Date 3/26/87

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TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (65-78656)
(ATTN: SSA [redacted])

DECLASSIFIED BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH
ON 10-24-2007

FROM: SAC, BALTIMORE (65A-4516) (SQ. 3) (P)

SUBJECT: [redacted]
ESP-X (MEDIA LEAK)
OO: FBIHQ

ALL ITEMS OF INFORMATION CONTAINED ON THIS DOCUMENT
ARE CLASSIFIED "~~SECRET~~" BY CLASSIFICATION GUIDE #3 (G-3) UNLESS
INDICATED OR OTHERWISE NOTED.

Re Washington Field Office teletype to Director,
copy to Baltimore dated March 23, 1987.

Enclosed for Washington Field Office (WFO) are
copies of two FD-302s reflecting interviews of [redacted] in
which he admitted to discussing classified information with
unauthorized persons.

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For information of WFO, the Bureau has requested
that all leads in media leak investigation be conducted on
a priority basis.

~~CLASSIFIED BY: G-3
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR~~

- 2 - Bureau
 - ② - Washington Field Office (65C-13263) (C-3) (Enclosures)
 - 2 - Baltimore (65A-4516)
- HLR:glwm
(6)

Approved: _____ Transmitted _____
(Number) (Time)

65C-13263-59

SEARCHED _____	INDEXED _____
SERIALIZED <i>km</i>	FILED _____
APR 06 1987	
FBI - WASH. FIELD OFFICE	

[redacted] [initials]

~~SECRET~~

BA 65A-4516

~~SECRET~~

LEADS:

WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE,

AT WASHINGTON, D.C.

1. Will conduct leads as set forth in Baltimore teletypes to WFO on March 4, 1987 and March 17, 1987 and submit results to Baltimore and the Bureau by FD-302s.

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FBI

12

TRANSMIT VIA:

- Teletype
- Facsimile
- _____

PRECEDENCE:

- Immediate
- Priority
- Routine

CLASSIFICATION:

- TOP SECRET
 - ~~SECRET~~
 - CONFIDENTIAL
 - UNCLAS E F T O
 - UNCLAS
- Date 4/6/87

MCS/65C-13263/P

0053

FM FBI WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE (65C-13263) (P) (C-3)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (65-78656) ROUTINE

FBI, BALTIMORE (65C-4516) (SQUAD 3) ROUTINE

BT DECLASSIFIED BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH
ON 10-24-2007

~~SECRET~~

ATTN FBIHQ: SSA [redacted] ^{mye} TERRORISM SECTION

[redacted]; ESP-X (MEDIA ^{mye} LEAD); OO:FBIHQ.

THIS COMMUNICATION IS CLASSIFIED "~~SECRET~~" IN ITS ENTIRETY.
RE BALTIMORE TELETYPE DATED 3/4/87, AND WFO AIRTEL DATED
4/1/87.

REFERENCED TELETYPE SET OUT LEAD TO WFO TO INTERVIEW [redacted]
[redacted] BASED ON HIS ASSOCIATION WITH [redacted] AND EMPLOYMENT WITH
U.S. CONGRESSMAN HARRY REID, (NEVADA). WFO AIRTEL NOTED [redacted]
NO LONGER EMPLOYED WITH REID, CURRENT EMPLOYMENT UNKNOWN, AND
RESIDING AT MARYLAND LOCATION WITH HOME PHONE NUMBER [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

②-WFO
5 MCS:c1jcy
(2)

Handwritten notes:
EE
10:00P

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65C-13263-60

Approved: PC/PA

Transmitted _____

(Number)

(Time)

Per PM

APR 8 1987

[redacted]

FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:

- Teletype
- Facsimile
- _____

PRECEDENCE:

- Immediate
- Priority
- Routine

CLASSIFICATION:

- TOP SECRET
- SECRET
- CONFIDENTIAL
- UNCLAS E F T O
- UNCLAS

Date _____

^PAGE TWO DE WF ~~SECRET~~

695-8262.

LEAD:

BALTIMORE DIVISION AT BALTIMORE, MARYLAND: LOCATE

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

AT

[Redacted]

AND INTERVIEW.

~~CLASSIFIED BY: G-3; DECLASSIFY ON: OADR.~~

~~SECRET~~

BT

Approved: _____ Transmitted _____ (Number) _____ (Time) Per _____

FD-302

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 4/28/87

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[redacted]
[redacted] was interviewed regarding his knowledge of, and association with, [redacted] was advised of the identity of the interviewing agent and the purpose for the interview. [redacted] thereafter provided the following information:

[redacted] described himself as a high visibility lobbyist on behalf of anti-communist/pro-conservative American endeavors, including support of the Contras in Nicaragua and the freedom fighters in Afghanistan. [redacted] then went on to describe three organizations with which he is identified: the Ruff Foundation, Ruff PAC and Free the Eagle. [redacted] is the President of each organization and [redacted] is the Chairman of each. [redacted] noted that [redacted] also writes a financial newsletter entitled, "Ruff Times".

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According to [redacted] the Ruff Foundation is a 501(c)(2) organization under the Internal Revenue Code. Its purpose is to do research and provide education in support of the issues of a strong family, freedom, and a strong national defense. Ruff PAC is an organization which raises and expends funds for conservative legislators. Ruff PAC supports conservative candidates and congressmen in the House and Senate of the U.S. Congress. [redacted] described it as a right-to-center conservative organization. It was organized in March, 1980. Third, [redacted] described Free the Eagle as a lobbying organization categorized as a 501(c)(4) organization under the Internal Revenue Code. Its purpose is to provide research, education, and lobbying for conservative legislation. [redacted] noted that the Ruff Foundation, Ruff PAC and Free the Eagle all share common officers and were organized in pursuit of common goals, i.e. strong family values, freedom, and strong national defense. [redacted] noted that the officers to all these organizations are of the Mormon religion.

Investigation on 4/9/87 at McLean, Virginia File # 65C-13263

by SA [redacted] MCS:tlg Date dictated 4/14/87

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

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[redacted] Ruff PAC and Free the Eagle maintain offices at 214 Massachusetts Avenue, N.E., Washington, D.C., phone (202)547-2122 and 11244 Waples Mill Road, Oakton, Virginia, phone (703)385-3115.

[redacted] indicated that he first met [redacted] at the home of JACK ANDERSON, the Washington Post newspaper reporter. ANDERSON, [redacted] and [redacted] in addition to others, established the Millennial Star Foundation which [redacted] described as similar to an anti-defamation league. [redacted] ANDERSON, [redacted] and [redacted] are all Mormons and sought to establish a foundation which would provide information to the public and media in order to combat what they felt was wrong information being published about the Mormon religion. [redacted] indicated that the Mormon religion has been accused of being a cult and the Star Foundation sought to provide the other side of the picture. The Star Foundation would disseminate information in support of the Mormon religion.

[redacted] met [redacted] at ANDERSON's house as best he can recall approximately two to five times. He believes that [redacted] may have come by [redacted] office at least once. Generally there were approximately four to fifteen people present at these meetings and they were always in connection with the Mormon religion endeavors through the Star Foundation.

[redacted] indicated that at these meetings various current issue topics would come up and be discussed. [redacted] noted that ANDERSON would press people hard to squeeze information out of them. [redacted] noted that while it has been at least two years since he has seen [redacted] his recollection of [redacted] is that [redacted] always went to great lengths to separate his military and professional life from that of his religious endeavors. [redacted] would discuss and pursue Mormon religious activities with ANDERSON and the others, but steadfastly refused to discuss current issues and world events with anyone. [redacted] described [redacted] as very professional, patriotic, and careful that he not involve his military life and knowledge with ANDERSON and his other Mormon endeavors. According to [redacted] would not even discuss newspaper articles which had been published about current events or political issues. [redacted] was sensitive to his social and church relationship with JACK ANDERSON and he would not jeopardize his military career by discussing things other than social or church matters with ANDERSON.

[redacted] did not know what kind of work [redacted] did in the military but had the impression that [redacted] was in some sort of intelligence function. He drew this conclusion based on the fact that [redacted] was knowledgeable about current issues such as the

Contras because [redacted] would refuse to discuss such things with the Mormon Church and social group [redacted] thought that [redacted] may have even told him that [redacted] worked in military intelligence.

[redacted] recalls the Contra issue coming up at meetings in which [redacted] attended but [redacted] would not discuss the Contra issue. [redacted] stated that [redacted] did not discuss any classified documents or information with him. [redacted] said that if he had, [redacted] would have recognized it because [redacted] was heavily involved in support of the Contras and is quite knowledgeable. [redacted] does not ever recall any discussions with [redacted] regarding the training of 140 Contra rebels. [redacted] does not recall [redacted] saying that he had seen any documents regarding Contra training nor has [redacted] ever seen [redacted] with any such documents. To [redacted] knowledge [redacted] has not been involved in the raising of money for Contra training nor has [redacted] ever given [redacted] any information which caused him to raise money for the Contras. [redacted] noted that Ruff PAC and Free the Eagle were heavily involved in supporting the Contras and lobbying Congress to support the Contras in the past. This activity is independent of any association [redacted] had with [redacted]

[redacted] concluded with the statement that the Star Foundation is now shut down and it has been at least two years or longer since he has seen [redacted] All of the Board of Directors of the Star Foundation including ANDERSON [redacted] [redacted] now of New Jersey, would have the same high opinion of the professionalism of [redacted]

AIRTEL

DECLASSIFIED BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH
ON 10-24-2007

4/28/87

*Airtel 2
FD 302*

b6
b7c

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
ATTN: SSA [redacted] DIVISION 6

FROM: SAC, WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE (65C-13263)(RUC)(C-3)

[redacted]
ESPIONAGE-X (MEDIA LEAK);
OO:WFO

~~SECRET~~

This entire communication is classified ~~SECRET~~.

Reference Baltimore airtel, 3/20/87.

Enclosed are copies of an FD-302 setting forth
interview results of [redacted]

Information copy to Alexandria Division.

WFO observed the following vehicles and tags at the
[redacted] residence following the interview. Registration of the
vehicles is consistent with the organizations described by [redacted]
in his interview.

Virginia tag DAC 404 registered to Free the Eagle,
11244 Waples Mills Road, Fairfax, Virginia, 22030. The vehicle
is described as a 1986 Ford, 4-door Sedan.

Virginia tag DFX 417, registered to First National
Exchange Bank, c/o Free the Eagle, 13924 Braddock Road,
Centreville, Virginia, 22020. The vehicle is described as a 1983
Chrysler, 4-door Sedan.

Virginia tag LXY 706 registered to Free the Eagle,
11244 Waples Mill Road #J, Fairfax, Virginia, 22030. The vehicle
is described as a 1976 Chevrolet, 4-door Station Wagon.

~~SECRET~~
~~CLASSIFIED BY: C-3~~
~~DECLASSIFY ON: OADR~~

- 2-Bureau (Enc. 2)
 - 1-Alexandria (Enc. 1)
 - 2-Baltimore (Enc. 2)
 - ①-Washington Field Office
- MCS:tjg
(6)

5

5/1/87
[Handwritten signatures and initials]

65C-13263-62
[Handwritten numbers]

Searched.....
Serialized.....
Indexed.....
Filed.....

~~SECRET~~

FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:

- Teletype
- Facsimile
- AIRTEL

PRECEDENCE:

- Immediate
- Priority
- Routine

CLASSIFICATION:

- TOP SECRET
- SECRET
- CONFIDENTIAL
- UNCLAS E F T O
- UNCLAS

Date 4/27/87

DATE: 10-24-2007
 CLASSIFIED BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH
 REASON: 4 (1)
 DECLASSIFY ON: 10-24-2032

1 TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (65-78656)
 (ATTN: SSA [redacted])
 2 FROM: SAC, BALTIMORE (65A-4516) (SQ. 3) (P)
 3 SUBJECT: [redacted]
 4 ESP-X (MEDIA LEAK)
 OO: FBIHQ

b6
b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
 WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

5 ALL ITEMS OF INFORMATION CONTAINED ON THIS DOCUMENT
 6 ARE CLASSIFIED ~~"SECRET"~~ BY CLASSIFICATION GUIDE #3 (G-3) UNLESS
 INDICATED OR OTHERWISE NOTED. Referral/Consult



~~CLASSIFIED BY: G-3~~
~~DECLASSIFY ON: OADR~~

- 2 - Bureau (65-78656)
 - ② - Washington Field Office (65C-13263) (C-3)
 - 2 - Baltimore (65A-4516)
- JJN:glwm
(6)

Handwritten: 03 5/4/87
Handwritten: Rec'd [unclear] 5/6/87

65C-13263-63

SEARCHED _____ INDEXED _____
 SERIALIZED *km* FILED *km*

MAY 04 1987

b6
b7C

Approved: _____ Transmitted _____
 (Number) (Time)

FBI PERVILL FIELD OFFICE
 [redacted] [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

BA 65A-4516

LEAD:

WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE,
AT WASHINGTON, D.C.

Referral/Consult



If possible, WFO is requested to obtain such SNIE'S and forward same to Baltimore for review.

2*

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

DATE: 10-24-2007
CLASSIFIED BY: 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH
REASON: 1.4 (1)
DECLASSIFY ON: 10-24-2032

AIRTEL

5/21/87

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE~~

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (65-78656)
ATTN: SSA [redacted] TERRORISM SECTION

FROM: SAC, WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE (65C-13263)(RUC)(C-3)

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b7C

~~SECRET~~


[redacted]
ESPIONAGE-X (MEDIA LEAK);
OO:FBIHQ

This entire communication is classified "~~SECRET~~".

Reference BA airtel, 4/27/87; WFO secure call to BA,
5/13/87.

Enclosures for BA. No copies retained at WFO: Referral/Consult

Copy of article entitled, [redacted]



~~SECRET~~
~~CLASSIFIED BY: G-3~~
~~DECLASSIFY ON: OADR~~

2-Bureau
2-Baltimore (65A-4516)(Sq.3)(Enc.11)
① Washington Field Office
MCS: ~~ytg~~
(5)

5

Handwritten notes:
KM
5/22/87
RUC
5415
(6)


65C-13263-64

Searched.....
Serialized.....*KM*.....
Indexed.....
Filed.....*KM*.....

WFO 65C-13263

Referral/Consult


~~SECRET~~



WFO 65C-13263

Referral/Consult

~~SECRET~~



SJK

~~SECRET~~

INBOX.12 (*95)

TEXT: VZCZCHQ0050

PP AFO ALL LEGAT OFFICES

DE HQ 00050 3852126

ZNR UUUUU

P 111632Z OCT 88

FM DIRECTOR FBI

TO ALL SACS AND LEGATS PRIORITY

PERSONAL ATTENTION

BT

UNCLAS

COMMITTEE IN SOLIDARITY WITH THE PEOPLE OF EL SALVADOR

(CISPES): RESTRICTIONS ON DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION

NO DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION FROM THE FOLLOWING CATEGORIES OF FILES MAY BE MADE WITHOUT FBIHQ AUTHORITY: CISPES ORGANIZATIONAL FILES, FILES ON INDIVIDUAL CISPES OFFICIALS/MEMBERS AND FILES RELATING TO SPINOFF INVESTIGATIONS FROM CISPES INVESTIGATIONS. INFORMATION RELATING TO CISPES OR CISPES OFFICIALS/MEMBERS CONTAINED IN OTHER FILES ALSO MAY NOT BE DISSEMINATED WITHOUT FBIHQ AUTHORITY.

A COPY OF THIS COMMUNICATION MUST BE FILED AS THE TOP SERIAL IN EVERY VOLUME OF ANY CISPES FILE AND CISPES SPINOFF

GENERAL INDICES:	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Automated Search <u>WLF</u>
<input type="checkbox"/>	Manual Search _____

all
190-586 (w/f)
62-11782 (w/f)
190-627 (w/f)
190-670 (w/f)

ASAC-A ~~file~~ (info)
ASAC-Kelso
submit comm. by 10/14 w/f fail

OCT 11 3 24 1988

OS on

Continuation of ASAC Kelso

~~SECRET~~

PAGE TWO DE HQ 0050 UNCLAS

INVESTIGATION FILE IN EACH OFFICE. THE FILE COVER OF EACH VOLUME SHALL BE CLEARLY MARKED: "NO DISSEMINATION. SPECIAL RESTRICTIONS APPL, SEE TOP SERIAL."

IN ACCORDANCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE DIRECTOR, A WORKING GROUP AT FBIHQ IS FORMULATING RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING RULES WHICH WOULD GOVERN DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION RELATING TO CISPES AND ITS OFFICIALS/MEMBERS. PENDING FORMULATION OF THESE RULES, AND THE DIRECTOR'S CONSIDERATION OF THEM, ALL DISSEMINATION MUST BE APPROVED AT FBIHQ.

EACH SAC AND LEGAT SHALL SUTEL. ATTENTION AD, RMD, NLT DOB FRIDAY, 10/14/88, INDICATING COMPLIANCE WITH THIS COMMUNICATION. YOUR COMMUNICATION SHOULD SPECIFICALLY IDENTIFY BY CAPTION AND FILE NUMBER ANY CISPES FILES WHICH HAVE BEEN FORWARDED TO ANOTHER LOCATION, SUCH AS FBIHQ. DATE FORWARDED AND INTENDED RECIPIENT SHOULD BE NOTED INSOFAR AS POSSIBLE.

ANOTHER COMMUNICATION WILL BE SENT SHORTLY WHICH WILL IDENTIFY THE CISPES SPINOFF INVESTIGATIONS BY FIELD OFFICE FILE NUMBER. THIS WILL ASSIST YOU IN INSURING THAT ALL SUCH FILES HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED AND APPROPRIATELY MARKED.

BT

*0050

*Compare w/ our list
to ensure no files
overlooked.*

~~SECRET~~

NNNN

199-12988-6

SEARCHED	INDEXED
SERIALIZED	FILED
MAY 25 1983	
FBI - WASH. FIELD OFFICE	

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-16-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH

FOIPA # 1035691

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The Washington Post

Tuesday, April 5, 1983

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-28-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/CPB/TH

JACK ANDERSON

Soviet Missile May Be Peril to U.S. Weapons

The Kremlin has been shrill in its denunciation of President Reagan's dream of a sci-fi umbrella to ward off Soviet missiles. But the most frightening military intelligence report I've seen in years warns that the Soviets are beginning to produce a surface-to-air missile that might be able to shoot down some U.S. strategic missiles.

This could put the Soviets in violation of the 1972 U.S.-Soviet treaty that Moscow claims Reagan's futuristic weapon would transgress.

The Soviet super-weapon is the SA12. Tests monitored by the CIA showed that the SA12 successfully shot down Soviet missiles roughly equivalent to U.S. Pershing II missiles, which have an 1,800-kilometer range.

That means the Pershing IIs, whose planned deployment in western Europe has aroused such vociferous protest, may be obsolete before they're put in place.

This would be scary enough. But what is truly hair-raising about the SA12 is that it may be capable of knocking our Poseidon missiles out

of the sky. The Poseidons are the submarine-based long-range missiles, the supposedly invulnerable leg of our nuclear weapons triad.

Yet this is precisely what the CIA suggests in its "special weapons intelligence review," a just-completed report that is classified several levels above top secret. Though access to the report is restricted to a handful of high officials, details of its contents were given to my associate Dale Van Atta. He also saw a related State Department report on the subject so highly classified that even its code word is top secret.

The State Department experts suggest that the Soviets developed the SA12 as a weapon to use against tactical nuclear missiles, such as the Lance and the Pershing IA. And because "the distinction between strategic and tactical ABM systems is not well defined" in the 1972 treaty, the SA12's development wasn't necessarily a treaty violation.

But in addition to their obvious difference in range, tactical and strategic missiles differ in their speed. Generally speaking, the bigger the bang, the faster the flight.

Thus a Pershing IA travels its 1,800-kilometer range at 8,000 fps (feet per second). The Pershing II is faster. The Poseidons have a speed of 19,000 fps, while the Minuteman III, our best land-based missile, has a speed of 24,000 fps.

But it makes no difference to an anti-missile missile how far the incoming target has been traveling; all that matters is its speed. And the CIA report suggests that the SA12 is fast enough to intercept one of our 19,000-fps Poseidons.

This means that the SA12, designed originally to ward off U.S. short-range tactical missiles, might be capable of defending the Soviets' land-based ICBMs against our sub-based long-range missiles.

If the SA12 can in fact shoot down a Poseidon, or even if the Soviets only think it can, this would destroy the deterrent that many believe to be the only thing that keeps the Kremlin from nuclear aggression.

Bingo: The Justice Department's proposed legislation to ban bingo games on Indian reservations has drawn heavy fire from the Bureau of Indian Affairs.

Bingo has become big business on some reservations, which are generally exempt from state laws.

The Justice Department proposes putting the bingo games under state control.

In a memo to the Interior Department's legislative counsel, BIA officials said they "strongly oppose" such a move. The BIA argues that bingo revenues help tribal governments to become self-sufficient, as President Reagan wants.

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ENCLOSURE

65-12988-2

SEARCHED	INDEXED
SERIALIZED	FILED
MAY 25 1983	
FBI WASH FIELD OFFICE	

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ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-16-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH

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Memorandum




~~SECRET~~

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-28-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/CPB/TH

Subject Alleged Unauthorized Disclosure of Classified Information; <u>The Washington Post</u> , April 5, 1983, Jack Anderson	Date MAY 13, 1983 DLJ:JLM:TEM:dbm 146-7-6504
--	--

To Director Federal Bureau of Investigation	From D. Lowell Jensen Assistant Attorney General Criminal Division
--	--



Referral/Consult

The results of your inquiry should be reported to the Internal Security Section. We will then advise you what additional information, if any, will be required. (U)

Attachment



DECL OADR
DERIVED FROM SEC 6-82

~~SECRET~~

65-12988-3

SEARCHED	INDEXED
SERIALIZED	FILED
MAY 25 1993	
FBI - WASH. FIELD OFFICE	

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ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-16-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH

~~SECRET~~

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 03-29-2013 BY ADG F54M93K42

DATE: 10-16-2007
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 10-16-2032

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

AIRTEL

~~SECRET~~

5/23/83

Director, FBI

SAC, Alexandria

UNSUB; Alleged Unauthorized Disclosure
of Classified Information (UDCI); The
Washington Post, April 5, 1983, in an
Article by Jack Anderson;
ESPIONAGE - X (MEDIA LEAK);
OO: Alexandria

~~This communication is classified Secret in its entirety.~~


Preliminary inquiry initiated as of the date of this
communication.

Referral/Consult

Enclosed for Alexandria and Washington Field

[redacted] an article by Jack Anderson
in the Washington Post, 5/5/83, and DOJ's 5/13/83 letter to the FBI.

This information is being provided to WFO in the event the
Alexandria Office determines that an investigation has been conducted
at the U.S. Department of State (USDS).



Enclosures (6)

2 - Washington Field (Enclosures 6)

6:05p

~~SECRET~~
Classified by G8
Declassify on: OADR
Open Prod
5/25/83
5/26/83

SOD-1

65-12988-4
SEARCHED INDEXED
SERIALIZED FILED
MAY 21 1983
FBI - WASH. FIELD OFFICE
[redacted]

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b7C

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Airtel to Alexandria

RE: Alleged UDCI in Washington Post,
4/5/83, in an Article by Jack Anderson;
Espionage - X (Media Leak); OO: AX

This matter should be handled on an expeditious basis
and the results furnished to FBIHQ in a form suitable for dissemina-
tion to DOJ. Alexandria is further

Referral/Consult

- 2 -

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 03-29-2013 BY ADG F54M93K42

DATE: 10-16-2007
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 AMC BAW/STP/TH
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 10-16-2032
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

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PP HQ WF

DE AX

PG102030Z JUNE 83

FM ALEXANDRIA (~~678 581~~)

TO DIRECTOR PRIORITY

INFO PRIORITY

BT

~~SECRET~~

ATTENTION: RM 4255

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b7C

UNSUB; ALLEGED UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF CLASSIFIED INFO (UDIC); THE
WASHINGTON POST, APRIL 5, 1983, IN AN ARTICLE BY JACK ANDERSON; ESP-
X (MEDIA LEAK), OO: AX

~~THIS ENTIRE COMMUNICATION IS CLASSIFIED "SECRET".~~

PII MAY 23, 1983; EXPIRES SEPTEMBER 19, 1983.

RE BUAIRTEL (WITH ENCLOSURES) DATED MAY 23, 1983; CAPTIONED AS

ABOVE.

Referral/Consult

b6
b7C

65-12988-5
SEARCHED _____
SERIALIZED _____
INDEXED _____
JUN 10 6 10 PM '83
[Handwritten initials and signatures]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Referral/Consult

PAGE TWO AX 650-501 ~~SECRET~~

LEAD: WFO, AT WASHINGTON, D.C.: CONDUCT APPROPRIATE INTERVIEW

[REDACTED]

~~CLASSIFIED BY C-3; DECLASSIFY ON OADR.~~

BT

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Alexandria, Virginia
June 15, 1983

DATE: 10-16-2007
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 MUC BAW/STP/TH
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 10-16-2032

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF
CLASSIFIED INFORMATION;
THE WASHINGTON POST, APRIL 5, 1983,
IN AN ARTICLE BY JACK ANDERSON

~~This entire communication is classified "Secret."~~

On April 5, 1983, the Washington Post printed
an article by Jack Anderson, entitled "Soviet Missile May
Be Peril to U. S. Weapons."

Referral/Consult

~~CLASSIFIED BY G-3;
DECLASSIFY ON OADR~~

This document contains neither
recommendations nor conclusions of
the FBI. It is the property of
the FBI and is loaned to your agency;
it and its contents are not to be
disseminated outside your agency.

65C-12988-5A

SEARCHED	INDEXED
SERIALIZED	FILED
JUN 1983	

~~SECRET~~

b6
b7C

DATE: 10-16-2007
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 AWC BAW/STP/TH
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 10-16-2032
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

C1

X Airtel

~~SECRET~~

6/15/83

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
FROM: SAC, ALEXANDRIA (65C-501) (P)
UNSUB; ALLEGED UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE
OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION (UDCI);
THE WASHINGTON POST, 4/5/83,
IN AN ARTICLE BY JACK ANDERSON
ESP - X (MEDIA LEAK)
(OO: AX)

~~This entire communication is classified "Secret."~~

Preliminary inquiry initiated 5/23/83; expires 9/19/83.

Re Bureau airtel (with enclosures), 5/23/83, and
Alexandria teletype, 6/1/83, both captioned as above.

Enclosed for the Bureau are five copies of an LHM
re captioned subject; one copy is enclosed for WFO.

ADMINISTRATIVE:

Referral/Consult



~~SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED~~

~~CLASSIFIED BY G-3;
DECLASSIFY ON OADR~~

2-Bureau (Enc 5)
1-WFO (Info) (Enc 1) SS
1-Alexandria
SDF:kar
(4)

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65-12988-5B
SEARCHED INDEXED
SERIALIZED FILED
JUL 1983
mu

FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:

- Teletype
- Facsimile
- _____

PRECEDENCE:

- Immediate
- Priority
- Routine

CLASSIFICATION:

- TOP SECRET
- ~~SECRET~~
- CONFIDENTIAL
- UNCLAS E F T O
- UNCLAS

Date 6/21/83

#578
24

FM SAC, WFO (65-12988) (SOD-1)

TO DIRECTOR, FBI PRIORITY 10:40

FBI, ALEXANDRIA ROUTINE 11:40 pm

BT

DATE: 10-16-2007
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 10-16-2032
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

~~SECRET~~

UNSUB; ALLEGED UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF CLASSIFIED INFO
(UDIC); WASHINGTON POST, APRIL 5, 1983, IN AN ARTICLE BY
JACK ANDERSON; ESPIONAGE-X; (MEDIA LEAK), 00: [initials]

~~ALL MARKINGS, NOTATIONS, AND ITEMS OF INFORMATION
CONTAINED IN THIS COMMUNICATION ARE CLASSIFIED "SECRET"
UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED.~~

PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION INSTITUTED MAY 23, 1983;
TO EXPIRE ON SEPTEMBER 19, 1983.

REFERENCE ALEXANDRIA TELETYPE TO THE DIRECTOR, DATED
JUNE 1, 1983.



Referral/Consult

① - WFO

PW: dgh

[Handwritten signatures and initials]

65C-12988-6


Approved: *[Signature]*

Transmitted

(Number)

10:40

Per



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b7C

FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:

- Teletype
- Facsimile
- _____

PRECEDENCE:

- Immediate
- Priority
- Routine


CLASSIFICATION:

- TOP SECRET
- SECRET
- CONFIDENTIAL
- UNCLAS E F T O
- UNCLAS

Date _____

PAGE TWO DE WF 0024 ~~SECRET~~

Referral/Consult



THE UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE


OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION IN THE WASHINGTON POST NEWSPAPER,

APRIL 5, 1983, AUTHORED BY JACK ~~ANDERSON~~

ANDERSON

ADVISED

Referral/Consult



(DOE).
Approved: _____

Transmitted _____

(Number)

(Time)

Per _____

FBI

TRANSMIT VIA:

- Teletype
- Facsimile
- _____

PRECEDENCE:

- Immediate
- Priority
- Routine

CLASSIFICATION:

- TOP SECRET
- SECRET
- ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
- UNCLAS E F T O
- UNCLAS

Date 7/11/83

303

(LSC-12978)

FM WASHINGTON FIELD (RUCX) (SOD-1)

TO DIRECTOR, FBI ROUTINE 953

FBI, ALEXANDRIA ROUTINE 4/16 A

DECLASSIFIED BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH ON 11-06-2007

BT

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

UNSUB; ALLEGED UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION (UDIC); WASHINGTON POST, APRIL 5, 1983, IN AN ARTICLE BY JACK ANDERSON; ESPIONAGE - X; (MEDIA LEAK), OO:AX.

~~ALL MARKINGS, NOTATIONS AND ITEMS OF INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS COMMUNICATION ARE CLASSIFIED "CONFIDENTIAL" UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED.~~

PI INITIATED 5/23/83, TO EXPIRE 9/19/83.

RE ALEXANDRIA TELETYPE TO THE BUREAU, 6/1/83, AND WFO TELETYPE TO BUREAU, DATED 6/21/83.

IN LIGHT OF THE FACT THAT THERE ARE NO OUTSTANDING LEADS IN THIS INVESTIGATION AT WFO, THIS CASE IS BEING CLOSED.

~~C BY G-3, DECL: OADR~~

BT

#0016

NNNN

1-WFO

PW:glm

(1)

Handwritten signatures and initials

conviction 0.1

65C-12988-7

Handwritten initials

Approved: _____

2 2 1 4 2 2 2 8 7 0 6 1 1

Transmitted

953 (Number) (Time)



b6 b7C

DATE: 10-16-2007
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 MUC BAW/STP/TH
REASON: 1.4 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 10-16-2032

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535
AUGUST 1, 1983

~~SECRET~~

UNSUB; ALLEGED UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF
CLASSIFIED INFORMATION; WASHINGTON POST,
APRIL 5, 1983, IN AN ARTICLE BY JACK
ANDERSON; ESPIONAGE-X (MEDIA LEAK)

~~All markings, notations, and items of information con-
tained in this communication are classified "Secret" unless other-
wise noted.~~

On June 20, 1983, the Washington Field Office (WFO),
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Washington, D.C., (WDC),
attempted to contact and interview [redacted] Intelligence
and Research (INR), United States Department of State (USDS), WDC,
for any information she might have in regards to the above
investigative matter, possible suspects and possible motives for
the disclosures. Investigation at USDS determined that [redacted]

b6
b7C

[redacted] approximately two weeks. In light of [redacted]
[redacted] WFO conducted the following investigation.

On June 20, 1983, [redacted] Analyst, Bureau
of Intelligence and Research, United States Department of State was contacted and interviewed. [redacted] stated that [redacted] Referral/Consult

[Large redacted area]

This document contains neither
recommendations nor conclusions
of the FBI. It is the property
of the FBI and is loaned to your
agency; it and its contents are
not to be distributed outside your
agency.

~~SECRET~~
Classified by: G-3
Declassify on: OADR

5-Bureau
2-Alexandria
1-WFO
PW:kdb
(8)


Duplicate to pgs 17-22

65-12988-8
Searched
Serialized
Indexed
Filed
[Handwritten signatures and initials]

UNSUB; ALLEGED UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF
CLASSIFIED INFORMATION; WASHINGTON POST,
APRIL 5, 1983, IN AN ARTICLE BY JACK
ANDERSON; ESPIONAGE-X (MEDIA LEAK)

~~SECRET~~


Referral/Consult



UNSUB; ALLEGED UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF
CLASSIFIED INFORMATION; WASHINGTON POST,
APRIL 5, 1983, IN AN ARTICLE BY JACK
ANDERSON; ESPIONAGE-X (MEDIA LEAK)

~~SECRET~~


Referral/Consult



UNSUB; ALLEGED UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF
CLASSIFIED INFORMATION; WASHINGTON POST,
APRIL 5, 1983, IN AN ARTICLE BY JACK
ANDERSON; ESPIONAGE-X (MEDIA LEAK)

~~SECRET~~

Referral/Consult



~~SECRET~~

X AIRTEL

DECLASSIFIED BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH
ON 11-06-2007

8/1/83

~~SECRET~~

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
FROM: SAC, WFO (65-12988) (RUC) (SOD-1)

UNSUB; ALLEGED
UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF
CLASSIFIED INFORMATION
(UDIC); WASHINGTON POST,
APRIL 5, 1983, IN AN ARTICLE
BY JACK ANDERSON; ESPIONAGE-
X (MEDIA LEAD),
OO:AX

All markings, notations, and items of information
contained in this communication are classified "~~Secret~~" unless
otherwise noted.

Preliminary inquiry instituted May 23, 1983; to
expire on September 19, 1983.

Reference Alexandria teletype to the Director, dated
June 1, 1983, and WFO teletype to the Bureau dated June 21, 1983.

Enclosed for the Bureau are five (5) copies of an LHM,
dated and captioned as above. Enclosed for the Alexandria
Division are two (2) copies of the same LHM.

In light of the fact that there are no outstanding
leads in this matter, this case is being closed at WFO.

~~SECRET~~
Classified by: ~~G-3~~
Declassify on: ~~OADR~~

8-4-83
(SOD)
JL

2-Bureau (Encs. 5)
2-Alexandria (Encs. 2)
1-WFO

PW:kdb
(5)

pu

*Review for
Distribution
in 6 mos*

(RUC)

65-12988-9

SEARCHED	INDEXED
SERIALIZED	<i>slg</i>
AUG 9 1983	
<i>pu</i>	

b6
b7c

**Review For Indexing and
IIS Before Closing/Rvc.**



DIRECTOR, FBI

1/12/77

SAC, WFO (65-0)

UNSUB; UNAUTHORIZED
RELEASE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION
TO JACK ANDERSON, OCTOBER, 1976
ESPIONAGE - X

Re Alexandria airtel LHM dated 1/4/77.

WFO will take no action in this matter pending
specific instructions from the Bureau.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 07-18-2007 BY 60324 AUC-BAM/STP/TH

2-Bureau
①-WFO

JES
JES:smv
(3) *smv*

65-12275-5
~~65-0-4054~~ *kt*
Searched _____
Serialized *kt*
Indexed *kt*
Filed *kt*

F B I

Date: 10/12/71

Transmit the following in CODED
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via TELETYPE URGENT
(Priority)

009

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (65-74138)

FROM: SAC, WFO (65-11628)

TOLL LEK, SIO

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-20-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/CPB/TH

RE WFO TELETYPE, OCTOBER EIGHT LAST.

FOLLOWING INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED OCTOBER TWELVE INSTANT.

[redacted], WATCH ASSISTANT, OPERATIONS CENTER;
[redacted] TO THE DIRECTOR OF THE
SECRETARIAT STAFF AND [redacted], DIRECTOR OF THE
SECRETARIAT STAFF, ALL DEPARTMENT OF STATE (USDS), WERE
INTERVIEWED AND COULD FURNISH NO INFORMATION CONCERNING SOURCE
OF LEAK.

[redacted], OPERATIONS CENTER, USDS, HAS ADVISED
THAT [redacted], FORMER ASSISTANT OPERATIONS OFFICER,
OPERATIONS CENTER, A SUMMER INTERN DURING SUMMER OF THIS
YEAR, IS NOW A STUDENT AT UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA. PAGE
ELEVEN OF USDS SECURITY OFFICE REPORT OF INVESTIGATION IN

b6
b7c

65-11628-100

SEARCHED INDEXED
SERIALIZED FILED
OCT 12 6 21 PM '71

1 - WFO
JCC:jak
[Handwritten signature]

Approved: R.G.K. [Handwritten]
Special Agent in Charge

Sent [redacted] Per [Handwritten]
FBI-WASH. F. O.

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via _____
(Priority)

WFO 65-11628
PAGE TWO

THIS MATTER, REVEALS [REDACTED] WAS ON FOUR P.M. TO MID-NIGHT SHIFT ON JULY NINETEEN LAST, IN OPERATIONS CENTER. IN VIEW OF ABOVE, WFO DOES NOT DEEM INTERVIEW OF [REDACTED] NECESSARY AT THIS TIME AND NO LEAD WILL BE SET OUT TO HAVE HER INTERVIEWED, UACB.

ADDITIONAL INVESTIGATION BEING CONDUCTED AT USDS.

b6
b7C

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : SAC, WFO 65-11628

DATE: 10/6/71

FROM : SA [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: Tolleak

[REDACTED] Operations Center, USDS, advised [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] who was Asst Operations Officer, Operations Center,
Summer Intern during the Summer of '71 is now a student at the
University Of Minnesota.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-20-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/CPB/TH

RCW

65-11628-101

SEARCHED	INDEXED
SERIALIZED	FILED
OCT 13 1971	
FBI - WASH. F. O.	



F B I

Date: 10/13/71

Transmit the following in CODED
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via TELETYPE URGENT
(Priority)

024

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (65-74138)

FROM: SAC, WFO (65-11628)

TOLL LEK, SIO

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-20-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/CPB/TH

RE WFO TELETYPE OCTOBER TWELVE LAST.

FOLLOWING INVESTIGATION WAS CONDUCTED OCTOBER THIRTEEN

INSTANT:

[Redacted] SPECIAL ASSISTANT, OFFICE OF
ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, WHO WAS FORMER
EDITOR, OPERATIONS CENTER, DEPARTMENT OF STATE (USDS) AND
[Redacted] PERSONNEL OFFICER, PERSONNEL
OFFICE, USDS, WHO WAS FORMER EDITOR, OPERATIONS CENTER, USDS,
WERE INTERVIEWED AND COULD FURNISH NO INFORMATION CONCERNING
SOURCE OF LEAK.

b6
b7c

WITH A VIEW TO EXPLORING WHETHER COMMUNICATIONS FILE
CENTERS OF AID AND USDS MIGHT CONTAIN COPIES OF TWO TELEGRAMS

1 - WFO

JCC:jak

SEARCHED INDEXED
SERIALIZED FILED

OCT 13 5 58 PM '71

Approved: RGK/GBY
Special Agent in Charge

Sent 7 [Redacted] M Per [Redacted]

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)

via _____
(Priority)

b6
b7c

WFO 65-11628
PAGE TWO

INVOLVED IN THIS MATTER AND IF SO, WHETHER SUCH COPIES MIGHT
SHOW INITIALS OF PERSONS HANDLING THEM, [REDACTED] CHIEF,
RECORDS SERVICES DIVISION, OFFICE OF DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY
FOR OPERATIONS, USDS, AND [REDACTED] CHIEF, OFFICE OF
ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES-COMMUNICATIONS, AID, WERE INTERVIEWED;
HOWEVER, RESPECTIVE FILE CENTERS DID NOT CONTAIN COPIES OF TWO
TELEGRAMS INVOLVED.

[REDACTED] DIRECTOR, INFORMATION MANAGEMENT
SECTION, EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, USDS, WAS CONTACTED RELATIVE
TO DESTRUCTION OF CLASSIFIED MATERIAL IN OPERATIONS CENTER,
USDS, BUT NO PERTINENT INFORMATION WAS DEVELOPED.

ADDITIONAL INVESTIGATION BEING CONDUCTED AT USDS.

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : SAC, WFO (65-11628) (P)

DATE: 10/12/71

FROM : SA [redacted]

SUBJECT: TOLL LEK
ESP - X

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-20-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/CPB/TH

b6
b7c

[redacted], Chief, Physical Security
Branch, Domestic Operations Division, Office of Security,
Bureau of Administration, USDS, made available to the writer
and SA [redacted] a zerox copy of the registration
logs for visitors to the Communication Center, USDS, on
July 16-20, 1971. These logs total five ^{pages} in number and are
attached. It is noted they do not contain the name [redacted]
[redacted] or his assos. as being visitors to the center on
the indicated dates.

ADW
(1)

65-11628-103

SEARCHED	INDEXED
SERIALIZED	FILED
OCT 14 1971	
FBI - WASH. F. O.	

efm

[redacted]

[Handwritten signature]

b6
b7c



UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : SAC, WFO(65-11628)(P)

DATE: 10/13/71

FROM : SA

b6
b7C

SUBJECT: TOLL-KEK

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-20-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/CPB/TH

On 10/13/71, Donald J. Simon, Chief, Records Services Division, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Operations, USDS, advised that after a search of communications files center, his office, he could find no copies of incoming cable #3713, or outgoing cable # 130006, dated 7/18/71 and 7/19/71, respectively.

On 10/13/71, Mr. Kenneth Conner, Chief, Office of Administrative Services, Communications, Agency for International Development, advised, after a search of AID Communications Center files, that these files do not contain copies of cables 3713 and 130006, mentioned above.

Mr. Conner showed the writer ~~of~~ a copy of an outgoing telegram from WDC to Nairobi, dated 7/19/71, but it was not pertinent to above lead. This telegram, drafted, and approved by Dr. Samuel C. Adams, AID, was from Adams to Tollefson, classified "Confidential", and reads as follows: "Request urgently meet me in London no later than July 20th. Checked here you can leave Nairobi on early BOAC flights. Meet me Embassy A.I.D. Office opening of business. Confirm your arrival M.J. Paquet, A.I.D. Office, London."

Mr. Conner advised that according to the designations on the cable, 15 copies were distributed to the African Bureau of AID.

1-WFO

65-11628-104

SEARCHED	INDEXED
SERIALIZED	FILED
OCT 13 1971	
FBI - WASH. F. O.	



UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : SAC, WFO (65-11628) (P)

DATE: 10/14/71

FROM : SA

SUBJECT: TOLL LEK
ESP - X

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-20-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/CPB/TH

On 10/13/71, Mr. LOUIS C. KACHULIS, Chief, Physical Security Branch, Domestic Operations Division, Office of Security, Bureau of Administration USDS made available to the writer and SA a zerox copy of the visitor registration logs for the Operations Center, USDS, covering the dates July 16-20, 1971. There are a total of thirty-four pages making up the logs for these dates and are attached. It is noted the name JACK ANDERSON or his assos. do not appear on the logs as having visited this center during the pert. period.

b6
b7c

ADW
(1)

65-11628-105

SEARCHED _____	INDEXED _____
SERIALIZED _____	FILED _____
OCT 14 1971	
FBI - WASH. F. O.	



F B I

Date: 10/14/71

Transmit the following in CODED
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via TELETYPE URGENT
(Priority)

023

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (65-74138)

FROM: SAC, WFO (65-11628)

b6
b7C

TOLL LEK, SIO

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-20-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/CPB/TH

RE WFO TELETYPE OCTOBER THIRTEEN LAST.

FOLLOWING INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED OCTOBER FOURTEEN INSTANT:
REVIEW OF VISITOR LOGS FOR VISITORS TO OPERATIONS CENTER,
STATE DEPARTMENT (USDS) FOR PERIOD JULY SIXTEEN THROUGH TWENTY
LAST FAILED TO REVEAL NAME OF JACK ANDERSON OR MEMBERS OF HIS
STAFF, INCLUDING [REDACTED] AND

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED],

DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY FOR

ADMINISTRATION, USDS AND HIS SECRETARY, [REDACTED] AND

[REDACTED]

OPERATIONS CENTER, USDS, WERE INTERVIEWED,

BUT COULD FURNISH NO INFORMATION CONCERNING SOURCE OF LEAK.

① - WFO

JCC:jak

jak

65-11628-106
SEARCHED INDEXED
SERIALIZED FILED
OCT 14 1971
FBI - WFO

Approved: RGK/ YBO
Special Agent in Charge

Sent 7:32 M Per [Signature] [Signature]

b6
b7C

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via _____
(Priority)WFO 65-11628
PAGE TWO

RECORDS OF [REDACTED] (PROTECT),
REVEAL REPORT DATED MARCH ELEVEN LAST, CONCERNING METROMEDIA,
INC., FIVE ONE FIVE ONE WISCONSIN AVENUE, N.W., A BRANCH OF
FIRM WITH HEADQUARTERS AT FOUR EIGHT FIVE LEXINGTON AVENUE,
NEW YORK CITY. ONE [REDACTED] WAS SHOWN AS VICE PRESIDENT
AND GENERAL MANAGER IN D.C. NO OTHER OFFICERS LISTED IN
REPORT.

NINETEEN SEVENTY ONE STANDARD AND POOR'S REGISTER OF
CORPORATIONS, DIRECTORS AND EXECUTIVES LISTS METROMEDIA, INC.,
AS SUBSIDIARY OF TRANSAMERICA CORPORATION, NEW YORK CITY.

[REDACTED] IS LISTED AS CHAIRMAN AND PRESIDENT. [REDACTED]
IS LISTED AS VICE PRESIDENT AND DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS.

PRETEXT CALL TO METROMEDIA (WITHOUT DISCLOSING IDENTITY
OF CALLER OR FBI INTEREST) DEVELOPED ONE [REDACTED] IS
PRESENT VICE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL MANAGER IN D.C., [REDACTED]
ALSO VICE PRESIDENT IN D.C. OFFICE AND [REDACTED] IS
PRESIDENT, BUT SELDOM IN D.C.

b7D

b6
b7Cb6
b7C

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via _____
(Priority)

WFO 65-11628
PAGE THREE

WFO INDICES NEGATIVE RE [] AND []
OF METROMEDIA. WFO FILES REVEAL NO DEROGATORY INFORMATION RE
[] WFO LETTER TO BUREAU RE [] APRIL
TWENTY, NINETEEN FIFTYNINE, REVEALS [] VISITED WFO IN
PAST AND OFFERED COOPERATION IN ANY WAY POSSIBLE IN CONNECTION
WITH PAST PROPOSED VISIT TO RUSSIA.

BUREAU AUTHORITY REQUESTED FOR WFO TO CONTACT []
METROMEDIA IN D.C. RELATIVE TO JACK ANDERSON APPEARANCE ON
WTTG TELEVISION ON SEPTEMBER TWENTYFOUR LAST. NO CONTACT WILL
BE HAD WITH [] OF METROMEDIA UNTIL HE CAN BE
FURTHER IDENTIFIED.

ADDITIONAL INVESTIGATION BEING CONDUCTED AT USDS.

b7C
b6

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

REPORTING OFFICE WASHINGTON FIELD	OFFICE OF ORIGIN WASHINGTON FIELD	DATE 10/15/71	INVESTIGATIVE PERIOD 9/23/71 - 10/15/71
TITLE OF CASE UNSUB; Unauthorized Disclosure of Information in State Department Cables Appearing in "The Washington Post" Article, Tuesday, July 27, 1971, By Jack Anderson		REPORT MADE BY SA 	TYPED BY jak
		CHARACTER OF CASE ESPIONAGE - X	

REFERENCE: Report of SA dated 10/6/71, at WDC.

- P -

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-20-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/CPB/TH

ADMINISTRATIVE:

This report is classified "**Confidential**" inasmuch as the U.S. Department of State has so classified the telegrams which are pertinent to this investigation.

b6
b7C

In FD 302, reporting interview of of the State Department, information is reported that , who held the position of Special Assistant to the

ACCOMPLISHMENTS CLAIMED <input type="checkbox"/> NONE						ACQUIT-TALS	CASE HAS BEEN:
CONVIC.	AUTO.	FUG.	FINES	SAVINGS	RECOVERIES		

APPROVED *[Signature]* SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE

DO NOT WRITE IN SPACES BELOW

COPIES MADE:
6 - Bureau (65-74138)
2 - WFO (65-11628)
jak

[Handwritten marks]
65-11628-108

Dissemination Record of Attached Report				
Agency				
Request Recd.				
Date Fwd.				
How Fwd.				
By				

Notations

Searched _____
Serialized *[Signature]*
Indexed _____
Filed _____

WFO 65-11628

Undersecretary of State, had been [redacted] predecessor and had had an overlapping duty shift on 7/16/71 to that of [redacted] however, [redacted] had no knowledge that [redacted] had observed the incoming telegram from Kenya concerning [redacted] and/or knew of its contents. [redacted] is now assigned to Geneva and WFO does not deem it necessary and does not contemplate setting out a lead to have [redacted] interviewed in this matter at this time.

b6
b7c

LEAD

WASHINGTON FIELD

AT WASHINGTON, D. C.: As instructed by the Bureau, daily teletype summaries are being submitted in this case and the Bureau is fully aware of the progress of this case. In view of this, specific investigative leads are not being set out in this report but this matter is receiving expedite and full attention. The Bureau will continue to be kept currently advised of developments.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED BY 60324 AUC BAW/TH
ON 04-06-2007

Copy to:

Report of:

SA [redacted]

Office: Washington, D. C.

Date:

10/15/71

Field Office File #:

65-11628

Bureau File #: 65-74138

Title:

UNKNOWN SUBJECT; Unauthorized Disclosure of
Information in State Department Cables
Appearing in "The Washington Post" Article,
Tuesday, July 27, 1971, By Jack Anderson

Character:

ESPIONAGE - X

Synopsis:

Two persons employed at Agency for International Development (AID) and twenty persons employed at State Department (USDS), including USDS Office of Executive Secretariat (SS), Operations Center (SS-O), and Communications Center (OC/T), were interviewed, but were unable to furnish information concerning source of leak.

- P -

DETAILS: AT WASHINGTON, D. C.:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification~~

b6
b7c

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
Interview of CORNELIA P./CULLIVAN, Agency for International Development (AID)	2
Interview of SAMUEL R./GAMMON, U. S. Department of State (USDS)	3
Interview of KARL D./ACKERMAN, Operations Center, Executive Secretariat (SS-O) at USDS	5
Interview of JOHN S./BRIMMS, SS-O, USDS	7
Interview of ROBERT D./EMMONS, USDS	9
Interview of ALFRED R./BARR, SS-O, USDS	10
Interview of SEAN M./HOLLY, SS-O, USDS	11
Interview of CHARLES H./THOMAS, SS-O, USDS	12
Interview of PHILIP T./LINCOLN, JR., SS-O, USDS	13
Interview of MARY E./JACKMAN, SS-O, USDS	14
Interview of PHILIP C./WILCOX, USDS	15
Interview of BRIAN S./O'GRADY, SS-O, USDS	16
Interview of STANLEY R./IFSHIN, USDS	17
Interview of ANDREA L./LONG, SS, USDS	18
Interview of CHARLES W./BRAY, Office of Press Relations, USDS	19
Interview of VALERIO/MONTANARI, News Division, AID	21

WFO 65-11628

Interview of [redacted] USDS, 23
Relative to visitors to USDS building.

Interview of [redacted] USDS, 25
Relative to disposal of classified material
at USDS.

Interview of [redacted] 27

Interview of [redacted] 28

Interview of [redacted] 29

Interview of [redacted] 30
Communications Center, Office of
Communications (OC/T), USDS,
Relative to disposal of classified material
in OC/T.

Interview of [redacted] USDS, 31
Relative to OC/T visitor logs.

Interview of [redacted] USDS, 32
Relative to SS-0 visitor logs.

b6
b7c

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 10/7/711

[redacted] Secretary to DR. SAMUEL C. ADAMS, JR., Assistant Administrator for African Affairs, Agency for International Development (AID), Room 6936, State Department building, Washington, D. C., advised as follows:

[redacted] said that she never saw the incoming cable from Ambassador MC ILVAINE in Nairobi, Kenya, to DR. HANNAH, Administrator, AID, (cable #1), and that she handled the outgoing cable from DR. HANNAH to Ambassador MC ILVAINE (cable #2) only long enough to take a flimsy copy of it to a xerox machine located in a small room off DR. ADAMS office, make one xerox copy of it, after which she returned both copies to DR. ADAMS.

[redacted] advised that she knew that DR. ADAMS was to make a trip to London, England, on the evening of July 19th because she obtained an airplane reservation for him, but that she did not know at the time the purpose of his trip.

[redacted] stated that the first time that she was aware of the contents of Ambassador MC ILVAINE's cable was when she read it in JACK ANDERSON's column in "The Washington Post".

[redacted] said that she has had very limited professional contact with [redacted] and does not know either his close friends or anyone who holds a grudge against him.

[redacted] stated that she does not know JACK ANDERSON or anyone on his staff, and she knows no one in her office who knows ANDERSON or his staff. She had no information or idea as to how the leak of information occurred.

Interviewed on 10/5/71 at Washington, D. C. File # 65-11628
 by SA [redacted] and SA [redacted] Date dictated 10/5/71
 MGM:jak

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

Date of transcription 10/1/71

[redacted] Executive Assistant to the Deputy Undersecretary, Room 7210, U. S. Department of State (USDS), furnished the following information:

[redacted] stated he recalled the telegram from Kenya, regarding [redacted] AID representative, and information concerning his alleged misconduct. He stated that after reading the communication he immediately sent it to [redacted] because it was primarily of [redacted] interest. He recalled that the telegram was not enveloped as are most EXDIS telegrams. He stated a week or so later he observed the outgoing communication of Dr. JOHN A. HANNAH, Administrator, AID.

[redacted] stated that he did not have any copies made of the telegram in question and neither did he have any copies made for him by any of the other employees in his office. He stated that his secretary, [redacted] would have normally brought this message to his desk accompanied by other mail. He stated that sometimes incoming mail will sit on her desk from one minute to an hour prior to its arrival on his own desk. He stated, however, that he did not believe [redacted] ever read these messages because there were too many of them and she has too many other duties to read these messages.

[redacted] stated that his assistant at the time the telegram in question arrived in his office was [redacted] who is presently assigned to the Foreign Service Institute in Rosslyn, Virginia. He stated that his predecessor in the present position he currently holds but known as Special Assistant to the Deputy Undersecretary of State, [redacted] was also overlapping on duty in the office at the same time the telegram arrived, and that [redacted] is presently assigned to Geneva. He stated, however, that he had no knowledge that either [redacted] or [redacted] actually observed the telegram and/or knew of its contents.

[redacted] stated that on or about July 27, 1971, he received a call from an individual, whose name he could not recall, who reported to be a representative of the Columnist JACK ANDERSON.

Interviewed on 9/30/71 at Washington, D. C. File # WFO 65-11628

by SAs [redacted] and RCW:bjl Date dictated 10/1/71

WFO 65-11628

2

[] stated this individual was on a "fishing expedition" and wanted to know if the [] leak was believed to be the most critical leak at the USDS. [] stated that he referred the caller to [], Security Office, USDS. [] stated that he attempted to reach [] prior to the individual who he had just spoken with immediately after talking to this individual and determined that the individual was already in conversation with []

[] stated that he is not acquainted with JACK ANDERSON, any member of his staff or family. He indicated that he does not have any association with any member of the news media and has not been in contact with ANDERSON or any member of the news media other than mentioned above. He said he is not acquainted with [] and does not know of anyone who might want to downgrade []

[] indicated that he had no idea as to how the leak to ANDERSON occurred, but in conversation with [] [], USDS Security Officer, it was his speculation that the leak had occurred somewhere in the AID Sector of USDS. He stated that it was his personal belief that the motive for this act was not for money, but that it was for the thrill and sensation or someone who wanted to knife [] in the back.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 9/27/71

[redacted], Deputy Executive Secretary for Management, Operations Center, Room 7516, United States Department of State advised as follows:

[redacted] stated that it was the purpose of the Operations Center to alert and brief the Department on developments of significant events in the world. He stated that the Operations Center controls the internal distribution of EKDIS messages on a 24 hour basis. In this connection he stated that a watch officer is assigned to review the incoming communications to determine the proper distribution of the communications.

[redacted] stated that he was in the company of the Director of the Operations Center, namely [redacted] during July, 1971, the exact date he could not recall, when [redacted] Duty Watch Officer, brought in a communication from Nairobi pertaining to the alleged misconduct of Agency for International Development (AID) employee [redacted]. He stated that this was an EKDIS communication with 45 hard copies. He recalled that there was a question of NODIS or EKDIS distribution. He explained that the NODIS is no distribution and EKDIS is exclusive distribution. It was decided that the distribution of the communication should be limited EKDIS. He recalled that [redacted] was told to contact [redacted], Deputy Executive Secretary, in view of the tenor of the communication. The distribution was to be included for [redacted] to be shown to [redacted], Executive Secretary, the Executive Secretariat, and one copy to [redacted], Administrator, AID. According to [redacted] indicated that copies should be made for [redacted] Deputy Undersecretary for Administration and one copy to [redacted] Assistant Secretary for African Affairs.

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Interviewed on 9/23/71 at Washington, D. C. File # WFO 65-11628

by SAs [redacted] and [redacted] RCM:mbf Date dictated 9/23/71

WFO 65-11628

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[] stated that usually one copy of incoming communications is maintained at the editor's desk and also a copy is placed on the holding board which is reviewed by incoming personnel on the following shifts. [] advised that it was his personal opinion that it was impossible for a leak to occur in the Operations Center and he did not believe that this occurred in this instance because there is far more valuable information coming to the attention of the employees in the Operations Center than that reported to be leaked to JACK ANDERSON. He stated that it was his personal opinion that the logical place for the leak, was from hearsay, according to him, that it had in fact occurred in the AID sector of USDS, particularly since [] was reportedly traveling in the wake of numerous disgruntled people. He stated that it was general information that [] had in fact obtained his position at AID because of some political type appointment and that his assignment to Nairobi had also been due to a favorable nod from some high official. He stated that this in fact caused a great deal of discontentment among the AID employees acquainted with []

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[] stated that the outgoing communication from [] Administrator, AID, was sent out from the Department of State on the 19th or 20th of July, 1971 and was in fact cleared for EXDIS by [] Deputy Executive Secretary.

[] advised that he did not know JACK ANDERSON or any member of his staff or family, and could furnish no information concerning the leak to ANDERSON or whether it might have occurred. He also advised that he has no personal acquaintance or knowledge of [] and any information he has concerning him is purely hearsay.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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Date of transcription September 30, 1971

[redacted] Departmental Operations Officer, Operations Center, room 7513, United States Department of State, advised as follows:

[redacted] stated that he does not know the exact date of the arrival of a telegram from Nairobi, Kenya, but recalled the contents of the message and the fact that it concerned Agency for International Development (AID) Representative [redacted]. He stated he was the duty officer on the day that the telegram from Nairobi had arrived at the Department of State. He was unsure as to whether or not the message had arrived at the inception of his tour or had arrived at the latter part of the tour of his predecessor at the Operations Center, namely [redacted].

[redacted] stated that he recalled that he was responsible for the distribution of the correct copy of the cable from Nairobi. He recalled the distribution of the telegram was made to AID, Director, Dr. JOHN A. HANNAH, [redacted], the Executive Secretariat and one copy remained with the watch officer.

[redacted] was unsure but did not believe that one copy was designated for the editor at SSI (Operations Center Information Section). He was unsure but believed that a copy of the telegram may have been placed on the clip board in the SSI space. He also stated 3 copies were returned from SSI to the editor for Relocation Center.

[redacted] stated that he was aware of the content of the telegram, of course, because it is his duty to read such telegrams and to be aware of the content. He stated, however, that no Xerox copies were made of this telegram to his knowledge. He also opined that the editor would

Interviewed on 9/27/71 at Washington, D.C. File # WFO 65-11628

by SAS [redacted] RCW:tao
Date dictated 9/30/71

WFO 65-11628

2

have seen it upon its arrival on July 16, 1971 and he believed the editor for that particular day to have been [redacted]. [redacted] did not recall any general conversation occurring in the Operations Center about the content of the telegram on July 16, 1971.

[redacted] stated that he also handled a telegram from AID Administrator Dr. JOHN A. HANNAH to the Ambassador of Nairobi, Kenya, which he believes occurred during a similar subsequent shift to that of July 16, 1971. He recalled that the distribution of this telegram was the same as that mentioned above.

[redacted] stated that he does not know JACK ANDERSON, his staff or any members of his family and has not been in contact with him. He also stated that he did not make a copy of this telegram available to ANDERSON or any news within.

[redacted] stated that he is not acquainted with [redacted] and has no idea of anyone who might want to discredit him.

He also stated that he had no idea as to how the leakage of information may have occurred and it is just unsubstantiated theory on his part that the leakage must have come from the AID Sector of the United States Department of State.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1Date of transcription 10/5/71

[redacted], who is currently taking a Polish language course at the Foreign Service Institute, 1400 Key Boulevard, Rosslyn, Virginia, and former Departmental Operations Office, at the Operations Center, at the United States Department of State, until approximately August 19, 1971, advised as follows:

[redacted] advised he first became aware of the possible leakage of information to JACK ANDERSON on July 27, 1971, when this information appeared in ANDERSON's column in the "Washington Post." He stated that it was on this date that he was requested to obtain a copy of this telegram from Nairobi, Kenya, for [redacted] in the Secretariat's Office. [redacted] stated that he obtained a copy of the communication from the OC/T Computer. He stated that he was unable to recall if he obtained two or three copies from the Computer at this time. He stated that in the event he obtained two copies, more than likely one of the copies would have been destroyed and the other copy would have gone to [redacted]

[redacted] stated that he was unaware before the time cited above that there was a leak of information to JACK ANDERSON. He stated that he did not have a copy of the telegram made other than that mentioned above.

[redacted] advised he was not acquainted with JACK ANDERSON, his staff or any member of his family and has not been in contact with them.

[redacted] advised that he was not acquainted with [redacted] and does not know anyone who might want to discredit him.

[redacted] stated that he does not have any idea as to how the leak to JACK ANDERSON may have occurred.

Interviewed on 10/4/71 at Rosslyn, Virginia File # WFO 65-11628

by SAs [redacted] and [redacted] RGW:tao:lmt Date dictated 10/5/71

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1Date of transcription October 5, 1971

[redacted], Associate Watch Officer, Operation Center, United States Department of State, advised as follows:

[redacted] stated that his recollection of the telegram concerning Agency for International Development representative, [redacted] and his alleged misconduct in Kenya is some what hazy. He stated he believed he saw the telegram a day or two after it had arrived at the United States Department of State in Washington, D.C. He stated he did not have a copy of the telegram made for any purpose and he did not know specifically who was in possession of the telegram originally. He stated that as Assistant Watch Officer he is supposed to get telegrams which would be on the Seat Board.

[redacted] stated that he is not acquainted with JACK ANDERSON, or any member of his staff or family and has not had any contact with them. In addition, he stated that he is not acquainted with anyone in the news media field.

[redacted] advised that he is not acquainted with [redacted] and does not know anyone who might want to discredit [redacted]

It was [redacted] personal opinion that the leak of information was made by some of the career people in the Department of State because of [redacted] reported bad reputation. He stated that it just appeared to him that this type of person might want to discredit [redacted] in anyway he possibly could.

Interviewed on 10/4/71 at Washington, D.C. File # WFO 65-11628

by SAS [redacted] Date dictated 10/5/71

RCW:tao

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1Date of transcription 10/6/71

[redacted] Departmental Watch Officer, Operations Center, Room 7516, U. S. Department of State (USDS), advised as follows:

[redacted] advised that he was unsure as to the specific dates but that he did observe the incoming cable from the Ambassador at Nairobi regarding [redacted] when it was pulled from the EXDIS drawer in the Operations Center. He stated this occurred [redacted] from the office of Dr. JOHN A. HANNAH, Administrator, AID, brought in an outgoing communication from Dr. HANNAH to the Ambassador at Nairobi indicating that the distribution of this cable was to be on a limited basis. He recalled that [redacted] appeared agitated about the whole business of distribution but did not know, specifically, why. He was uncertain as to whether or not he made the actual distribution of this cable brought in by Dr. HANNAH's secretary. He did indicate, however, that he knew the content of this cable to concern [redacted]. He stated that he was certain that he did not have any Xerox copies made of either the incoming cable or the outgoing cable.

[redacted] advised that he is not acquainted with JACK ANDERSON or any member of his staff or family and has not been in contact with them. He also indicated that he is not acquainted with [redacted] and does not know of anyone who might want to discredit him. He stated that it was purely speculation on his part, however, from hearsay he had heard that [redacted] was a rather obnoxious person and more than likely someone wanted to hurt him because of his obnoxious nature.

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Interviewed on 10/6/71 at Washington, D. C. File # WFO 65-11628

by SAs [redacted] and RCW:bjl Date dictated 10/6/71

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1Date of transcription 10/6/71

[redacted] Operations Center, Room 7516, U. S. Department of State (USDS), advised as follows:

[redacted] stated he was in training for Senior Watch Officer in the Operations Center in July, 1971, when the alleged leak of information to JACK ANDERSON pertaining to AID Representative [redacted] occurred. He stated that his recollection of that particular time is somewhat hazy, however, he did recall being told that a sensitive cable had been received from Nairobi. He stated he did not see it at that time. He stated that he did see it later when he was requested to make distribution of this cable to [redacted]. He stated he called up a copy from the computer and sent a copy to [redacted]. He stated that he has forgotten what he did with the second copy which is received from the computer when copies are requested but probably placed the second copy in a burn bag. He stated he became more familiar with the situation when the contents of the cable were mentioned in JACK ANDERSON's column. He stated that he did not have any Xerox copies made of this communication at any time.

[redacted] stated he is not acquainted with JACK ANDERSON or any member of his family or staff and has not had any contact with them. In addition, he stated that he is not acquainted with [redacted] and does not know of anyone who might want to discredit him. It was his personal opinion that someone was out to get [redacted].

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Interviewed on 10/6/71 at Washington, D. C. File # WFO 65-11628

by SAs [redacted] and RCW:hjl Date dictated 10/6/71

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1Date of transcription 10/6/71

[redacted] Operations Center,
Room 7516, U. S. Department of State (USDS), advised as follows:

[redacted] advised that it is the duty of the Editor to look at all incoming cables and decide which should go to the top officers of the USDS and also to summarize the most interesting incoming cables. He stated that he did not see the incoming cable from Nairobi pertaining to AID Representative [redacted] on the date that the cable arrived in Washington, D. C. (WDC). It was his recollection that he heard about the incoming cable on the day after it had arrived in Washington. He stated that he does not usually see highly sensitive traffic.

[redacted] stated that he, at no time, had a copy of the cable mentioned above, made. He also stated that he did not know who, specifically, had the incoming cable in their possession.

[redacted] was able to determine from records of the Operations Center that he was working from midnight to 8:00 a.m. on July 16, 1971, and from 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. on July 17, 1971. He stated that on July 17, 1971, he was working with another editor, whose name he could not recall, and recalled discussing the [redacted] incident with his fellow editor. He stated that he became more aware of the incoming cable when he read the JACK ANDERSON column at a subsequent date.

[redacted] advised that he is not acquainted with JACK ANDERSON or any member of his staff or family and has not been in contact with them. He also indicated that he is not acquainted with [redacted] and does not know of anyone who might want to discredit [redacted]. It was [redacted] opinion that any leak which may have occurred to ANDERSON was definitely not from the Operations Center because the security in the Operations Center is too tight for leakage of information.

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Interviewed on 10/6/71 at Washington, D. C. File # WFO 65-11628

by SAs [redacted] and RCW:bjl Date dictated 10/6/71

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

10/8/71

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Date of transcription

[redacted], Operations Center, Room 7516, U. S. Department of State (USDS), advised as follows:

[redacted] stated that she could not recall having access to the cable from the Ambassador at Nairobi, Kenya, pertaining to AID Representative [redacted]. She said she could furnish no information as to who else might have had a copy of this cable. She stated that at no time did she have a copy of this cable. She stated that her only actual viewing of the telegram or a copy of it was when she was interviewed by her own Security Office and it was made available to her briefly at which time she scanned the first portion of it. She stated that she did not recall if she had in fact seen a outgoing cable from Dr. JOHN A. HANNAH, Administrator, AID to the Ambassador at Nairobi, Kenya.

[redacted] stated she is not acquainted with JACK ANDERSON or any member of his staff or family and has not had any contact with them. She stated that she also is unacquainted with anyone in the news media.

[redacted] stated that she is not acquainted with [redacted] and does not know of anyone who might attempt to discredit him. [redacted] also stated that she had no idea as to how the leak of information to JACK ANDERSON may have occurred.

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Interviewed on 10/7/71 at Washington, D. C. File # WFO 65-11628

SAs [redacted] and [redacted]

by [redacted] RCW:lmc Date dictated 10/7/71

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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b7c1Date of transcription 10/8/71[redacted] presently a [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted] advised as follows:

[redacted] stated that his position at the USDS on July 16, 1971, was Staff Assistant to the Deputy Undersecretary, and was a Staff Assistant to [redacted]. He stated he did not recall the exact date he saw the cable from Nairobi, Kenya, regarding AID Representative [redacted], but does recall the content of the cable. He stated that it was one of his duties to read all EXDIS as Staff Assistant to [redacted]. He recalled that he showed the cable to [redacted] and that [redacted] had not previously seen it. He could not recall if [redacted] kept it in his possession or if it was routed back to the SS Office. [redacted] stated that the usual procedure for this type of cable is for him to place it in a tray on his desk and his secretary would place it in a tray to be picked up by the Message Center Messenger and returned to the SS Office.

[redacted] stated that no copies of this cable were made at his request, and he had no knowledge of any copies being made. He has stated it would be extremely unusual for copies to be made of EXDIS messages. He stated [redacted] probably saw the cable, and could possibly have read it however it would have been unusual for her to have read the cable.

[redacted] stated that he did not see a copy of the outgoing cable from Dr. JOHN A. HANNAH, Administrator, AID to the Ambassador at Nairobi, Kenya. He also stated he did not believe a copy of this particular cable was in his office.

[redacted] stated that he is not acquainted with JACK ANDERSON or any member of his staff or family and has not had any contact with them. In addition, he stated that he is not acquainted with [redacted] and does not know of anyone who might want to discredit [redacted]. [redacted] stated that he had no idea as to how the leakage of information to JACK ANDERSON may have occurred.

Interviewed on 10/7/71 at Rosslyn, Virginia File # WFO 65-11628

SAs [redacted] and [redacted]

RCW:lmc

10/7/71

by [redacted] Date dictated [redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1Date of transcription 10/12/71

[redacted] Watch Assistant, Operation Center, Room 7516, United States Department of State, advised as follows:

[redacted] was able to determine from records of the Operation Center that he worked from 4:00 P.M. to 12:00 midnight on July 16, 1971, and also from 4:00 P.M. to 12:00 midnight on July 19, 1971. He stated that he did not recall seeing the incoming telegram from Nairobi, Kenya, pertaining to Aid Representative [redacted]. He recalled seeing this telegram on the duty desk sometime immediately after the information concerning it was set forth in the news column of JACK ANDERSON. He stated that at no time did he have any additional copies of the telegram made.

[redacted] stated that he is not acquainted with JACK ANDERSON or any member of his staff or family and has not been in contact with them. He also stated that he is not acquainted with [redacted] and does not know of anyone who might want to discredit [redacted]. [redacted] could furnish no information as to the possibilities as to how the leak of information may have occurred.

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Interviewed on 10/7/71 at Washington, D. C. File # WFO 65-11628

by SA [redacted] and [redacted] Date dictated _____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 10/8/711

[redacted] at the U. S. Department of State (USDS), Foreign Service Institute, Rosslyn, Virginia, advised as follows:

[redacted] stated that as of July 16, 1971, he was Editor at the Operations Center at the USDS. He recalled seeing the cable from the Ambassador at Nairobi, Kenya, and recalled its contents, but was unable to recall the date that he did observe this cable. He recalled that the cable was an EXDIS message and he recalled looking at this message for the possibility of including it in the information for the Relocation Center, and noting that it was not supposed to be distributed there, placed it in the burn bag to be destroyed. He recalled that there were three copies of the cable at that time and all three copies were placed in the burn bag. He stated that he did not have any additional copies made and had no reason to make any additional copies and knew of no one else who had made any copies of this cable.

[redacted] stated he believed he did see the outgoing cable from Dr. JOHN A. HANNAH, Administrator, AID and recalled its content vaguely, but did not know if it was because he had read of it in the JACK ANDERSON column.

[redacted] stated that he is not acquainted with JACK ANDERSON or any member of his staff or family and has not had any contact with them. In addition, he stated that he is not acquainted with [redacted] and did not know of anyone who might want to discredit [redacted]. It was his personal opinion that the individual or individuals responsible for the leakage of information to JACK ANDERSON was someone who had a personal vendetta against [redacted]. He indicated however, that he had no facts to substantiate this speculation.

Interviewed on 10/7/71 at Rosslyn, Virginia File # WFO 65-11628

SAs [redacted] and [redacted]

by [redacted] RCW:lmc Date dictated 10/7/71

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

b6
b7c1Date of transcription 10/7/71

[redacted] Office of the Secretariat, Room 7224, U. S. Department of State (USDS), advised as follows:

[redacted] stated that she did not see or have access to the telegram from the Ambassador at Nairobi pertaining to AID Representative [redacted]. She stated she did read information concerning the telegram in the news column of JACK ANDERSON.

[redacted] could not recall the exact date but recalled receiving an EXDIS communication from the office of AID Administrator JOHN A. HANNAH, which telegram was brought to her by Dr. HANNAH's secretary, whose name she could not recall. She stated this telegram was from Dr. HANNAH to the Ambassador at Nairobi concerning [redacted]. She recalled that she took this telegram into the office of [redacted] Deputy Executive Secretary, for his approval. After obtaining his approval she stated she placed it in the metal tube and tubed it directly to the OC/T. [redacted] stated that one copy of this outgoing telegram was retained in the office of [redacted] for approximately one day after which it was placed in the burn bag to be destroyed.

[redacted] stated that she did not have any information as to who may have had possession of the incoming telegram from Nairobi and that she did not have a copy of it made.

[redacted] advised that she is not acquainted with JACK ANDERSON, or any member of his staff or family. She indicated that she does not have any acquaintances in the news media field. She also stated that she has not had any contact with ANDERSON or any member of the news media field.

[redacted] advised that she is not acquainted with [redacted] and does not know of anyone who might want to discredit him. She stated that she did not have any information to furnish as to how the leak of information to ANDERSON may have occurred.

Interviewed on 10/6/71 at Washington, D. C. File # WFO 65-11628

by SAs [redacted] and RCW:bjl Date dictated 10/6/71

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

10/7/71

Date of transcription

[redacted], Office of Press Relations, Room 2109, United States Department of State, Washington, D. C., advised as follows:

[redacted] stated that there are more than 270 correspondents of newspapers, news agencies, magazines and syndicates accredited to the State Department who have access to the State Department building. A number of them have desks and State Department telephone extensions in the press room of the building as well.

[redacted] said that even though a person does not have a permanent pass to the building, it is a simple matter to gain access to the building. A visitor may go to a receptionist at one of the entrances, state the name of the person he desires to visit, and after telephonic confirmation by the person to be visited, the receptionist gives the visitor a temporary pass. The visitor surrenders the pass to the guard, and proceeds on his way within the building. After visiting the pertinent office, there is no accountability of the visitor's movements about the building.

[redacted] said that he had no information to indicate that JACK ANDERSON or members of his staff had been physically present inside the building between the dates July 16-20, 1971, and stated that they were not on the list of accredited newsmen.

[redacted] said further that JACK ANDERSON and his staff are not welcome visitors to the Office of Press Relations. [redacted] advised that the office is open during the week and until about 1:00 p.m. on Saturdays, at which time one press officer and one secretary are on duty.

[redacted] said that he had not seen the incoming cable from Kenya, cable #1, or the outgoing cable from Agency for International Development (AID) headquarters to Kenya, cable #2, pertaining to the [redacted] incident. He

Interviewed on 10/6/71 at Washington, D. C. File # 65-11628
 by SA [redacted] and SA [redacted] MGM:jak Date dictated 10/7/71

WFO 65-11628

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first saw contents of cable #1 when it appeared in JACK ANDERSON's column in "The Washington Post". [redacted] said that he then got confirmation that the cable mentioned in the ANDERSON column was authentic from [redacted] Executive Secretary of the State Department.

[redacted] said that he had no idea how the leak of information occurred, but thought it unlikely that JACK ANDERSON or his staff would have obtained it by physically coming into the State Department building. [redacted] said that the information could not have come from the Office of Press Relations because they did not have access to either of the cables.

[redacted] said that JACK ANDERSON and his staff have had contact with [redacted] or other officers in the Office of Press Relations from time to time, but that the contacts are generally unfriendly, and deal with press matters related to State Department operations.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 10/8/71

[redacted], News Division,
Agency for International Development, Room 4897, State
Department building, Washington, D.C., advised as follows:

[redacted] said that unlike the State Department Office of Press Relations which holds daily press conferences, his office has more limited contact with the press. He said that their yearly conference which takes place at the time the Agency for International Development (AID) budget is presented to Congress is held in a fifth floor conference room across the hall from the office of Dr. HANNAH, AID Administrator. He said that special announcements by the Administrator are sometimes held in the State Department auditorium.

Additionally, there are individual contacts by members of his office with news correspondents relative to press releases and other matters in the news media. These contacts can occur in the individual offices of AID representatives inasmuch as a large number of correspondents have permanent passes to the building. He said that perhaps thirty or more news correspondents have desks and State Department telephone extensions in the State Department press room, and that it is an easy matter for a correspondent to obtain access to the building even though he might not have a permanent pass.

[redacted] stated that he neither saw nor had access to the incoming cable from Ambassador MC ILVAINE in Kenya relative to the [redacted] incident, nor the outgoing cable from Dr. HANNAH. He said that he learned about the cables from [redacted], Office of Public Affairs, AID, who received a telephone call from [redacted] of JACK ANDERSON's staff. [redacted] told [redacted] that he had received the information contained in Ambassador MC ILVAINE's cable and intended to telephone Dr. HANNAH about the matter. [redacted] immediately told Dr. HANNAH about the call, and the latter was subsequently

Interviewed on 10/6/71 at Washington, D. C. File # 65-11628
by SA [redacted] and SA [redacted] Date dictated 10/7/71
MGM:jak

WFO 65-11628

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called by [redacted] This occurred a few days prior to the appearance of the [redacted] matter in a JACK ANDERSON column in "The Washington Post".

[redacted] said that his office does not have much contact with JACK ANDERSON or his staff. He last spoke to [redacted] about a month or more prior to the appearance of the column on the [redacted] incident. At that time, information appeared in ANDERSON's column pertaining to AID which was factually incorrect. After consulting with Dr. HANNAH, [redacted] called [redacted] to give him an accurate statement of the AID position in the matter at hand.

[redacted] said that ANDERSON chose not to publish the AID statement, so [redacted] then wrote ANDERSON a letter to the same effect as the statement. Neither his letter nor the AID statement has been acknowledged by JACK ANDERSON.

[redacted] had no idea how the leak of information occurred, and had no information to indicate that JACK ANDERSON or members of his staff were in the State Department building during the period July 16 - 20, 1971.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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10/8/71

[redacted] Date of transcription

General Services Division, Bureau of Administration, Room 1493, United States Department of State, Washington, D. C., advised as follows:

[redacted] advised that the Office of Security, United States Department of State (USDS), has deemed it unnecessary to keep logs for visitors to the State Department during the hours from 8:30 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. However, after 7:00 p.m., every visitor, not an employee of the State Department, is required to sign a log at the time of his entrance to the building. As an example, [redacted] cited the fact that [redacted]

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In general, unless a visitor is an employee of the United States Government, he must be escorted, after 7:00 p.m., to the office he wishes to visit. [redacted] advised, however, the news correspondents who possess White House passes are permitted access to the building after working hours without an escort.

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[redacted] said that within the past two weeks or so, a new regulation has been instituted which requires State Department employees to wear badges while in the building after working hours. He also said that as a result of the [redacted] leak and the [redacted] incident, as reported in JACK ANDERSON's column, there has been a restriction of access to copying (xerox) machines after working hours.

[redacted] advised that the press corridor is located in corridor # 3 of the building, Rooms 2310-2316, and the press briefing room, where daily press conferences are held, is located in Room 2408. [redacted] said that visitor's logs are maintained in the Captain of Guards Office, Room 1926, USDS.

Interviewed on 10/7/71 at Washington, D. C. File # 65-11628
 by SA [redacted] and SA [redacted] Date dictated 10/8/71
 SA [redacted] MGM: jak

WFO 65-11628

JCC:jak

1

On October 8, 1971, the records of the Captain of Guards Office, U.S. Department of State (USDS), which contain USDS visitor logs for all entrances to the USDS building, for the period July 16, 1971 through July 20, 1971, were reviewed by SAs [redacted] and [redacted] and failed to reveal the names of JACK ANDERSON or the following members of his staff: [redacted], [redacted], [redacted] and [redacted]. The above-mentioned logs pertain to after-hour visitors; no such logs were maintained during regular workday hours.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

Date of transcription 10/7/71

[redacted] General Services Administration employee at the U. S. Department of State, advised he is employed in the Disposal Room and has the duties of final destruction of material sent to this room for disposal with exception of material not adaptable to the destruction process which he places in a bag for other means of destruction. He stated he does not review any of this material, that he has never seen or heard of a communication concerning a [redacted] [redacted] nor does he know him, and that he does not know [redacted] [redacted] [redacted], or anyone else in the news media.

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Interviewed on 10/6/71 at Washington, D. C. File # WFO 65-11628

SAs [redacted] and

by [redacted] ADW:can Date dictated 10/6/71

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1Date of transcription 10/7/71

[redacted], General Services Administration employee at the U. S. Department of State, advised he is employed in the Disposal Room and has the duties of final destruction of material sent to this room for disposal with exception of material not adaptable to the destruction process which he places in a bag for other means of destruction. He stated he does not review any of this material, that he has never seen or heard of a communication concerning a [redacted] [redacted] nor does he know him, and that he does not know [redacted], [redacted], JACK ANDERSON, or anyone else in the news media.

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b7c

Interviewed on 10/6/71 at Washington, D. C. File # WFO 65-11628
 by SAs [redacted] and [redacted] ADW:can Date dictated 10/6/71

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1Date of transcription 10/7/71

[redacted], General Services Administration employee at the U. S. Department of State, advised he is employed in the Disposal Room and has the duties of final destruction of material sent to this room for disposal with exception of material not adaptable to the destruction process which he places in a bag for other means of destruction. He stated he does not review any of this material, that he has never seen or heard of a communication concerning a [redacted] [redacted] nor does he know him, and that he does not know [redacted] [redacted] JACK ANDERSON, or anyone else in the news media.

b6
b7cInterviewed on 10/6/71 at Washington, D. C. File # WFO 65-11628by SAs [redacted] and [redacted] ADW:can Date dictated 10/6/71

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1Date of transcription 10/7/71

[redacted], Communication Center, Office of Communications, Bureau of Administration, U. S. Department of State (USDS), advised each station in the Communication Center has a burn bag for disposal of communications, each communication being handled as if it carried a top classification although it might be unclassified. The center is operated on a 24-hour basis, and each shift is responsible for transporting the burn bags collected during the respective shift to the point of destruction. On the day shift, two men collect the burn bags and deliver them to a chute in the Number 5 corridor of the building where they are deposited, the chute emptying into the disposal room. Two men on each of the other shifts place the bags on a cart and take them to the disposal room where they are stored to await destruction. They are met at the disposal room by a building guard if the room is not open. This room when not in operation is kept locked. At all times there are at least two persons with the material when in route to the destruction chute or disposal room.

[redacted] stated there is no permanent detail assigned for this operation, and there is no record kept or means of determining who would have had this detail during the period July 16 - 20, 1971. He reiterated assignment for transporting the burn bags for destruction is made in the various sections on a rotating basis with no systematic scheduling of personnel.

Interviewed on 10/5/71 at Washington, D. C. File # WFO 65-11628
 by SAs [redacted] and [redacted] ADW:can Date dictated 10/5/71

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

Date of transcription 10/8/71

[redacted], Physical Security Branch, Domestic Operations Division, Office of Security, Bureau of Administration, U. S. Department of State (USDS), advised visitor registration logs which are kept on visitors to the Communication Center, USDS, are maintained for one year. He made available for review the logs denoting visitors to the Communication Center July 16-20, 1971. These logs do not contain the name JACK ANDERSON or the following members of his staff: [redacted], [redacted], [redacted] and [redacted]

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Interviewed on 10/6/71 at Washington, D. C. File # WFO 65-11628
 by SAs [redacted] and [redacted] ADW:can Date dictated 10/6/71

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Date of transcription 10/14/71

1

[redacted], Physical Security Branch, Domestic Operations Division, Office of Security, Bureau of Administration, U. S. Department of State (USDS), advised visitor registration logs which are kept on visitors to the Operations Center, USDS, are maintained for a period of one year. He made available for review the logs denoting visitors to the Operations Center July 16-20, 1971. These logs do not contain the name JACK ANDERSON or the following members of his staff: [redacted], [redacted], [redacted] and [redacted].

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Interviewed on 10/13/71 at Washington, D. C. File # WFO 65-11628

by SAs ALTON D. WILSON and DONALD J. FITZGERALD ADW:can Date dictated 10/13/71

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-26-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/STP/TH

Date of transcription September 30, 1971 b6
b7C

[REDACTED]
Operations Center, room 7513, United States Department
of State, advised as follows:

[REDACTED] stated that he does not know the exact date of the arrival of a telegram from Nairobi, Kenya, but recalled the contents of the message and the fact that it concerned Agency for International Development (AID) Representative, [REDACTED]. He stated he was the duty officer on the day that the telegram from Nairobi had arrived at the Department of State. He was unsure as to whether or not the message had arrived at the inception of his tour or had arrived at the latter part of the tour of his predecessor at the Operations Center, namely [REDACTED].

[REDACTED] stated that he recalled that he was responsible for the distribution of the correct copy of the cable from Nairobi. He recalled the distribution of the telegram was made to AID, Director, Dr. JOHN A. HANNAH, [REDACTED], the Executive Secretariat and one copy remained with the watch officer.

[REDACTED] was unsure but did not believe that one copy was designated for the editor at SSI (Operations Center Information Section). He was unsure but believed that a copy of the telegram may have been placed on the clip board in the SSI space. He also stated 3 copies were returned from SSI to the editor for Relocation Center.

[REDACTED] stated that he was aware of the content of the telegram, of course, because it is his duty to read such telegrams and to be aware of the content. He stated, however, that no Xerox copies were made of this telegram to his knowledge. He also opined that the editor would

Interviewed on 9/27/71 at Washington, D.C. File # WFO 65-11628 109

by SAS [REDACTED] RCW:tao
Date dictated 9/30/71

WFO 65-11628

have seen it upon its arrival on July 16, 1971 and he believed the editor for that particular day to have been [redacted]. [redacted] did not recall any general conversation occurring in the Operations Center about the content of the telegram on July 16, 1971.

[redacted] stated that he also handled a telegram from AID Administrator Dr. JOHN A. HANNAH to the Ambassador of Nairobi, Kenya, which he believes occurred during a similar subsequent shift to that of July 16, 1971. He recalled that the distribution of this telegram was the same as that mentioned above.

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[redacted] stated that he does not know JACK ANDERSON, his staff or any members of his family and has not been in contact with him. He also stated that he did not make a copy of this telegram available to ANDERSON or any news within.

[redacted] stated that he is not acquainted with [redacted] and has no idea of anyone who might want to discredit him.

He also stated that he had no idea as to how the leakage of information may have occurred and it is just unsubstantiated theory on his part that the leakage must have come from the AID Sector of the United States Department of State.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-26-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/STP/TH

Date of transcription 9/27/71

[redacted] for
Management, Operations Center, Room 7516, United States
Department of State advised as follows:

[redacted] stated that it was the purpose of the
Operations Center to alert and brief the Department on
developments of significant events in the world. He stated
that the Operations Center controls the internal distribution
of EXDIS messages on a 24 hour basis. In this connection he
stated that a watch officer is assigned to review the incoming
communications to determine the proper distribution of the
communications.

[redacted] stated that he was in the company of the
Director of the Operations Center, namely [redacted]
during July, 1971, the exact date he could not recall, when
[redacted], brought in a communication
from Nairobi pertaining to the alleged misconduct of Agency
for International Development (AID) employee [redacted].
He stated that this was an EXDIS communication with 45 hard
copies. He recalled that there was a question of NODIS or
EXDIS distribution. He explained that the NODIS is no
distribution and EXDIS is exclusive distribution. It was
decided that the distribution of the communication should be
limited EXDIS. He recalled that [redacted] was told to contact
[redacted], in view of the
tenor of the communication. The distribution was to be included
for [redacted], to be shown to [redacted], Executive
Secretary, the Executive Secretariat, and one copy to JOHN A.
HANNAH, Administrator, AID. According to [redacted], [redacted]
[redacted] indicated that copies should be made for [redacted]
[redacted] for Administration and one
copy to DAVID D. NEWSOM, Assistant Secretary for African
Affairs.

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Interviewed on 9/23/71 at Washington, D. C. File # WFO 65-11628 110
by SAs [redacted] and [redacted] *RCW:mbf* Date dictated 9/23/71

WFO 65-11628

[] stated that usually one copy of incoming communications is maintained at the editor's desk and also a copy is placed on the holding board which is reviewed by incoming personnel on the following shifts. [] advised that it was his personal opinion that it was impossible for a leak to occur in the Operations Center and he did not believe that this occurred in this instance because there is far more valuable information coming to the attention of the employees in the Operations Center than that reported to be leaked to JACK ANDERSON. He stated that it was his personal opinion that the logical place for the leak, was from hearsay, according to him, that it had in fact occurred in the AID sector of USDS, particularly since [] was reportedly traveling in the wake of numerous disgruntled people. He stated that it was general information that [] had in fact obtained his position at AID because of some political type appointment and that his assignment to Nairobi had also been due to a favorable nod from some high official. He stated that this in fact caused a great deal of discontentment among the AID employees acquainted with []

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[] stated that the outgoing communication from JOHN A. HANNAH, Administrator, AID, was sent out from the Department of State on the 19th or 20th of July, 1971 and was in fact cleared for EXDIS by []

[] advised that he did not know JACK ANDERSON or any member of his staff or family, and could furnish no information concerning the leak to ANDERSON or whether it might have occurred. He also advised that he has no personal acquaintance or knowledge of [] and any information he has concerning him is purely hearsay.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-26-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/STP/TH

Date of transcription October 5, 1971

[redacted] Operation
Center, United States Department of State, advised as
follows:

[redacted] stated that his recollection of the tele-
gram concerning Agency for International Development
representative, [redacted] and his alleged misconduct
in Kenya is some what hazy. He stated he believed he
saw the telegram a day or two after it had arrived at
the United States Department of State in Washington, D.C.
He stated he did not have a copy of the telegram made for
any purpose and he did not know specifically who was in
possession of the telegram originally. He stated that as
Assistant Watch Officer he is supposed to get telegrams
which would be on the Stat Board.

[redacted] stated that he is not acquainted with JACK
ANDERSON, or any member of his staff or family and has not
had any contact with them. In addition, he stated that he
is not acquainted with anyone in the news media field.

[redacted] advised that he is not acquainted with
[redacted] and does not know anyone who might want to
discredit [redacted].

It was [redacted] personal opinion that the leak
of information was made by some of the career people in
the Department of State because of [redacted] reported bad
reputation. He stated that it just appeared to him that
this type of person might want to discredit [redacted] in
anyway he possibly could.

Interviewed on 10/4/71 at Washington, D.C. File # WFO 65-11628 112
by SAS [redacted] Date dictated 10/5/71
RCW:tao

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-26-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/STP/TH

Date of transcription 10/5/71

[redacted], who is currently taking a Polish language course at the Foreign Service Institute, 1400 Key Boulevard, Rosslyn, Virginia, and former Departmental Operations Office, at the Operations Center, at the United States Department of State, until approximately August 19, 1971, advised as follows:

[redacted] advised he first became aware of the possible leakage of information to JACK ANDERSON on July 27, 1971, when this information appeared in ANDERSON's column in the "Washington Post." He stated that it was on this date that he was requested to obtain a copy of this telegram from Nairobi, Kenya, for [redacted] in the Secretariat's Office. [redacted] stated that he obtained a copy of the communication from the OC/T Computer. He stated that he was unable to recall if he obtained two or three copies from the Computer at this time. He stated that in the event he obtained two copies, more than likely one of the copies would have been destroyed and the other copy would have gone to [redacted]

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[redacted] stated that he was unaware before the time cited above that there was a leak of information to JACK ANDERSON. He stated that he did not have a copy of the telegram made other than that mentioned above.

[redacted] advised he was not acquainted with JACK ANDERSON, his staff or any member of his family and has not been in contact with them.

[redacted] advised that he was not acquainted with [redacted] and does not know anyone who might want to discredit him.

[redacted] stated that he does not have any idea as to how the leak to JACK ANDERSON may have occurred.

Interviewed on 10/4/71 at Rosslyn, Virginia, D.C. File # WFO 65-11628 113

by SAS [redacted] and [redacted] RCW:tao:lmt Date dictated 10/5/71

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 02-26-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/STP/TH

Date of transcription 10/6/71

[redacted] Departmental Watch Officer, Operations Center, Room 7516, U. S. Department of State (USDS), advised as follows:

[redacted] advised that he was unsure as to the specific dates but that he did observe the incoming cable from the Ambassador at Nairobi regarding [redacted] when it was pulled from the EXDIS drawer in the Operations Center. He stated this occurred when a secretary from the office of Dr. JOHN A. HANNAH, Administrator, AID, brought in an outgoing communication from Dr. HANNAH to the Ambassador at Nairobi indicating that the distribution of this cable was to be on a limited basis. He recalled that this secretary appeared agitated about the whole business of distribution but did not know, specifically, why. He was uncertain as to whether or not he made the actual distribution of this cable brought in by Dr. HANNAH's secretary. He did indicate, however, that he knew the content of this cable to concern [redacted]. He stated that he was certain that he did not have any Xerox copies made of either the incoming cable or the outgoing cable.

[redacted] advised that he is not acquainted with JACK ANDERSON or any member of his staff or family and has not been in contact with them. He also indicated that he is not acquainted with [redacted] and does not know of anyone who might want to discredit him. He stated that it was purely speculation on his part, however, from hearsay he had heard that [redacted] was a rather obnoxious person and more than likely someone wanted to hurt him because of his obnoxious nature.

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Interviewed on 10/6/71 at Washington, D. C. File # WFO 65-11628 114

by SAs [redacted] and [redacted] RCW:bj1 Date dictated 10/6/71

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 02-26-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/STP/TH

Date of transcription 10/6/71

[redacted], Operations Center,
Room 7516, U. S. Department of State (USDS), advised as follows:

[redacted] stated he was in training for [redacted]
[redacted] in the Operations Center in July, 1971, when the
alleged leak of information to JACK ANDERSON pertaining to
AID Representative [redacted] occurred. He stated that
his recollection of that particular time is somewhat hazy,
however, he did recall being told that a sensitive cable had
been received from Nairobi. He stated he did not see it at
that time. He stated that he did see it later when he was
requested to make distribution of this cable to [redacted]
[redacted], Deputy Undersecretary. He stated he called up a
copy from the computer and sent a copy to [redacted] He
stated that he has forgotten what he did with the second copy
which is received from the computer when copies are requested
but probably placed the second copy in a burn bag. He stated
he became more familiar with the situation when the contents
of the cable were mentioned in JACK ANDERSON's column. He
stated that he did not have any Xerox copies made of this com-
munication at any time.

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[redacted] stated he is not acquainted with JACK ANDERSON
or any member of his family or staff and has not had any contact
with them. In addition, he stated that he is not acquainted
with [redacted] and does not know of anyone who might want
to discredit him. It was his personal opinion that someone was
out to get [redacted]

Interviewed on 10/6/71 at Washington, D. C. File # WFO 65-11628 115

by SAs [redacted] RCW and RCW:bjl Date dictated 10/6/71

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 02-26-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/STP/TH

Date of transcription 10/6/71

[redacted], Operations Center,
Room 7516, U. S. Department of State (USDS), advised as follows:

[redacted] advised that it is the duty of the Editor to look at all incoming cables and decide which should go to the top officers of the USDS and also to summarize the most interesting incoming cables. He stated that he did not see the incoming cable from Nairobi pertaining to AID Representative [redacted] on the date that the cable arrived in Washington, D. C. (WDC). It was his recollection that he heard about the incoming cable on the day after it had arrived in Washington. He stated that he does not usually see highly sensitive traffic.

[redacted] stated that he, at no time, had a copy of the cable mentioned above, made. He also stated that he did not know who, specifically, had the incoming cable in their possession.

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[redacted] was able to determine from records of the Operations Center that he was working from midnight to 8:00 a.m. on July 16, 1971, and from 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. on July 17, 1971. He stated that on July 17, 1971, he was working with another editor, whose name he could not recall, and recalled discussing the [redacted] incident with his fellow editor. He stated that he became more aware of the incoming cable when he read the JACK ANDERSON column at a subsequent date.

[redacted] advised that he is not acquainted with JACK ANDERSON or any member of his staff or family and has not been in contact with them. He also indicated that he is not acquainted with [redacted] and does not know of anyone who might want to discredit [redacted]. It was LINCOLN's opinion that any leak which may have occurred to [redacted] was definitely not from the Operations Center because the security in the Operations Center is too tight for leakage of information.

Interviewed on 10/6/71 at Washington, D. C. File # WFO 65-11628 116
by SAs [redacted] ^{PCW} and [redacted] RCW:bjl Date dictated 10/6/71

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 02-26-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/STP/TH

Date of transcription 10/7/71

[redacted] Office of the Secretariat, Room 7224, U. S. Department of State (USDS), advised as follows:

[redacted] stated that she did not see or have access to the telegram from the Ambassador at Nairobi pertaining to AID Representative [redacted]. She stated she did read information concerning the telegram in the news column of JACK ANDERSON.

[redacted] could not recall the exact date but recalled receiving an EXDIS communication from the office of AID Administrator JOHN A. HANNAH, which telegram was brought to her by [redacted] whose name she could not recall. She stated this telegram was from Dr. HANNAH to the Ambassador at Nairobi concerning [redacted]. She recalled that she took this telegram into the office of [redacted] for his approval. After obtaining his approval she stated she placed it in the metal tube and tubed it directly to the OC/T. [redacted] stated that one copy of this outgoing telegram was retained in the office of [redacted] for approximately one day after which it was placed in the burn bag to be destroyed.

[redacted] stated that she did not have any information as to who may have had possession of the incoming telegram from Nairobi and that she did not have a copy of it made.

[redacted] advised that she is not acquainted with JACK ANDERSON, or any member of his staff or family. She indicated that she does not have any acquaintances in the news media field. She also stated that she has not had any contact with ANDERSON or any member of the news media field.

[redacted] advised that she is not acquainted with [redacted] and does not know of anyone who might want to discredit him. She stated that she did not have any information to furnish as to how the leak of information to ANDERSON may have occurred.

Interviewed on 10/6/71 at Washington, D. C. File # WFO 65-11628 *118*

by SAs [redacted] and RCW:bjl Date dictated 10/6/71

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 10/7/71

[redacted] General Services Administration employee at the U. S. Department of State, advised he is employed in the Disposal Room and has the duties of final destruction of material sent to this room for disposal with exception of material not adaptable to the destruction process which he places in a bag for other means of destruction. He stated he does not review any of this material, that he has never seen or heard of a communication concerning a [redacted] [redacted] nor does he know him, and that he does not know [redacted] [redacted] JACK ANDERSON, or anyone else in the news media.

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-26-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/STP/TH

Interviewed on 10/6/71 ADW at Washington, D. C. File # WFO 65-11628 120
by SAs [redacted] and [redacted] ADW:can Date dictated 10/6/71

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 10/7/71

[Redacted]

[Redacted] employee at the U. S. Department of State, advised he is employed in the Disposal Room and has the duties of final destruction of material sent to this room for disposal with exception of material not adaptable to the destruction process which he places in a bag for other means of destruction. He stated he does not review any of this material, that he has never seen or heard of a communication concerning a Mr. [Redacted] nor does he know him, and that he does not know [Redacted] [Redacted], JACK ANDERSON, or anyone else in the news media.

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-26-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/STP/TH

Interviewed on 10/6/71 ADW at Washington, D. C. File # WFO 65-11628 121
by SA [Redacted] and [Redacted] ADW:can Date dictated 10/6/71

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 10/7/71

[redacted], General Services Administration employee at the U. S. Department of State, advised he is employed in the Disposal Room and has the duties of final destruction of material sent to this room for disposal with exception of material not adaptable to the destruction process which he places in a bag for other means of destruction. He stated he does not review any of this material, that he has never seen or heard of a communication concerning a [redacted] [redacted] nor does he know him, and that he does not know [redacted] [redacted] JACK ANDERSON, or anyone else in the news media.

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-26-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/STP/TH

Interviewed on 10/6/71 at Washington, D. C. File # WFO 65-11628 122
 by SAs [redacted] and [redacted] ADW:can Date dictated 10/6/71

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-26-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/STP/TH

Date of transcription 10/7/71

[redacted] Communication Center, Office of Communications, Bureau of Administration, U. S. Department of State (USDS), advised each station in the Communication Center has a burn bag for disposal of communications, each communication being handled as if it carried a top classification although it might be unclassified. The center is operated on a 24-hour basis, and each shift is responsible for transporting the burn bags collected during the respective shift to the point of destruction. On the day shift, two men collect the burn bags and deliver them to a chute in the Number 5 corridor of the building where they are deposited, the chute emptying into the disposal room. Two men on each of the other shifts place the bags on a cart and take them to the disposal room where they are stored to await destruction. They are met at the disposal room by a building guard if the room is not open. This room when not in operation is kept locked. At all times there are at least two persons with the material when in route to the destruction chute or disposal room.

[redacted] stated there is no permanent detail assigned for this operation, and there is no record kept or means of determining who would have had this detail during the period July 16 - 20, 1971. He reiterated assignment for transporting the burn bags for destruction is made in the various sections on a rotating basis with no systematic scheduling of personnel.

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Interviewed on 10/5/71 at Washington, D. C. File # WFO 65-11628 123
by SAs [redacted] and [redacted] ADW:can Date dictated 10/5/71

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-26-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/STP/TH

Date of transcription 10/8/71

[redacted] Operations
Center, Room 7516, U. S. Department of State (USDS), advised
as follows:

[redacted] stated that she could not recall having
access to the cable from the Ambassador at Nairobi, Kenya, per-
taining to AID Representative [redacted]. She said she
could furnish no information as to who else might have had a
copy of this cable. She stated that at no time did she have
a copy of this cable. She stated that her only actual viewing
of the telegram or a copy of it was when she was interviewed
by her own Security Office and it was made available to her
briefly at which time she scanned the first portion of it.
She stated that she did not recall if she had in fact seen a
outgoing cable from Dr. JOHN A. HANNAH, Administrator, AID
to the Ambassador at Nairobi, Kenya.

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[redacted] stated she is not acquainted with
JACK ANDERSON or any member of his staff or family and has
not had any contact with them. She stated that she also is
unacquainted with anyone in the news media.

[redacted] stated that she is not acquainted
with [redacted] and does not know of anyone who might
attempt to discredit him. [redacted] also stated that she
had no idea as to how the leak of information to JACK ANDERSON
may have occurred.

Interviewed on 10/7/71 at Washington, D. C. File # WFO 65-11628 124
by SA [redacted] and [redacted] RCW:lmc 10/7/71
by [redacted] Date dictated

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 10/8/71

[redacted], Physical Security Branch, Domestic Operations Division, Office of Security, Bureau of Administration, U. S. Department of State (USDS), advised visitor registration logs which are kept on visitors to the Communication Center, USDS, are maintained for one year. He made available for review the logs denoting visitors to the Communication Center July 16-20, 1971. These logs do not contain the name JACK ANDERSON or the following members of his staff: [redacted], [redacted], [redacted] and [redacted]

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DATE 02-26-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/STP/TH

Interviewed on 10/6/71 at Washington, D. C. File # WFO 65-11628 125
by SAs [redacted] and [redacted] ADW:can Date dictated 10/6/71

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-26-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/STP/TH

Date of transcription 10/8/71

[redacted], presently [redacted]
language at the U. S. Department of State (USDS) Foreign
Service Institute, Rosslyn, Virginia, advised as follows:

[redacted] stated that his position at the USDS on July 16,
1971, was Staff Assistant to the Deputy Undersecretary, and was
a [redacted]. He stated he
did not recall the exact date he saw the cable from Nairobi,
Kenya, regarding AID Representative [redacted], but does
recall the content of the cable. He stated that it was one of
his duties to read all EXDIS as Staff Assistant to [redacted].
He recalled that he showed the cable to [redacted] and that
[redacted] had not previously seen it. He could not recall
if [redacted] kept it in his possession or if it was routed
back to the SS Office. [redacted] stated that the usual procedure
for this type of cable is for him to place it in a tray on his
desk and his secretary would place it in a tray to be picked
up by the Message Center Messenger and returned to the SS Office.

[redacted] stated that no copies of this cable were
made at his request, and he had no knowledge of any copies being
made. He has stated it would be extremely unusual for copies
to be made of EXDIS messages. He stated [redacted]
[redacted] probably saw the cable, and could possibly have read
it however it would have been unusual for her to have read
the cable.

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[redacted] stated that he did not see a copy of the
outgoing cable from Dr. JOHN A. HANNAH, Administrator, AID to
the Ambassador at Nairobi, Kenya. He also stated he did not
believe a copy of this particular cable was in his office.

[redacted] stated that he is not acquainted with JACK
ANDERSON or any member of his staff or family and has not had
any contact with them. In addition, he stated that he is not
acquainted with [redacted] and does not know of anyone
who might want to discredit [redacted]. [redacted] stated that he
had no idea as to how the leakage of information to JACK
ANDERSON may have occurred.

Interviewed on 10/7/71 at Rosslyn, Virginia File # WFO 65-11628 **126**
SAs [redacted] and [redacted] RCW:lmc 10/7/71
by [redacted] Date dictated _____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-26-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/STP/TH

Date of transcription 10/8/71

[redacted] at the
U. S. Department of State (USDS), Foreign Service Institute,
Rosslyn, Virginia, advised as follows:

[redacted] stated that as of July 16, 1971, [redacted]
at the Operations Center at the USDS. He recalled seeing the
cable from the Ambassador at Nairobi, Kenya, and recalled its
contents, but was unable to recall the date that he did observe
this cable. He recalled that the cable was an EXDIS message
and he recalled looking at this message for the possibility of
including it in the information for the **Relocation** Center,
and noting that it was not supposed to be distributed there,
placed it in the burn bag to be destroyed. He recalled that
there were three copies of the cable at that time and all three
copies were placed in the burn bag. He stated that he did not
have any additional copies made and had no reason to make
any additional copies and knew of no one else who had made
any copies of this cable.

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[redacted] stated he believed he did see the outgoing
cable from Dr. JOHN A. HANNAH, Administrator, AID and recalled
its content vaguely, but did not know if it was because he had
read of it in the JACK ANDERSON column.

[redacted] stated that he is not acquainted with JACK
ANDERSON or any member of his staff or family and has not had
any contact with them. In addition, he stated that he is
not acquainted with [redacted] and did not know of anyone
who might want to discredit [redacted]. It was his personal
opinion that the individual or individuals responsible for the
leakage of information to JACK ANDERSON was someone who had
a personal vendetta against [redacted]. He indicated however,
that he had no facts to substantiate this speculation.

Interviewed on 10/7/71 at Rosslyn, Virginia File # WFO 65-11628 127
SAs [redacted] and [redacted] RCW:lmc 10/7/71
by [redacted] Date dictated _____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 02-26-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/STP/TH

Date of transcription 10/8/71

[redacted], News Division,
Agency for International Development, Room 4897, State
Department building, Washington, D.C., advised as follows:

[redacted] said that unlike the State
Department Office of Press Relations which holds daily press
conferences, his office has more limited contact with the press.
He said that their yearly conference which takes place at the
time the Agency for International Development (AID) budget is
presented to Congress is held in a fifth floor conference room
across the hall from the office of Dr. HANNAH, AID Administrator.
He said that special announcements by the Administrator are
sometimes held in the State Department auditorium.

Additionally, there are individual contacts by
members of his office with news correspondents relative to
press releases and other matters in the news media. These
contacts can occur in the individual offices of AID representatives
inasmuch as a large number of correspondents have permanent
passes to the building. He said that perhaps thirty or more
news correspondents have desks and State Department telephone
extensions in the State Department press room, and that it is
an easy matter for a correspondent to obtain access to the
building even though he might not have a permanent pass.

[redacted] stated that he neither saw nor had
access to the incoming cable from Ambassador MC ILVAINE in
Kenya relative to the [redacted] incident, nor the outgoing cable
from Dr. HANNAH. He said that he learned about the cables from
[redacted], Office of Public Affairs, AID,
who received a telephone call from [redacted] of JACK ANDERSON's
staff. [redacted] told [redacted] that he had received the information
contained in Ambassador MC ILVAINE's cable and intended to
telephone Dr. HANNAH about the matter. [redacted] immediately
told Dr. HANNAH about the call, and the latter was subsequently

Interviewed on 10/6/71 at Washington, D. C. File # 65-11628/28
by SA [redacted] and SA [redacted] Date dictated 10/7/71
MGM:jak

WFO 65-11628

called by [redacted]. This occurred a few days prior to the appearance of the [redacted] matter in a JACK ANDERSON column in "The Washington Post".

[redacted] said that his office does not have much contact with JACK ANDERSON or his staff. He last spoke to [redacted] about a month or more prior to the appearance of the column on the [redacted] incident. At that time, information appeared in ANDERSON's column pertaining to AID which was factually incorrect. After consulting with [redacted] [redacted] called [redacted] to give him an accurate statement of the AID position in the matter at hand.

[redacted] said that ANDERSON chose not to publish the AID statement, so [redacted] then wrote ANDERSON a letter to the same effect as the statement. Neither his letter nor the AID statement has been acknowledged by JACK ANDERSON.

[redacted] had no idea how the leak of information occurred, and had no information to indicate that JACK ANDERSON or members of his staff were in the State Department building during the period July 16 - 20, 1971.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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DATE 02-26-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/STP/TH

Date of transcription 10/8/71

[redacted]
General Services Division, Bureau of Administration, Room
1493, United States Department of State, Washington, D. C.,
advised as follows:

[redacted] advised that the Office of Security, United
States Department of State (USDS), has deemed it unnecessary
to keep logs for visitors to the State Department during the
hours from 8:30 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. However, after 7:00 p.m.,
every visitor, not an employee of the State Department, is
required to sign a log at the time of his entrance to the
building. As an example, [redacted]

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In general, unless a visitor is an employee of
the United States Government, he must be escorted, after
7:00 p.m., to the office he wishes to visit. [redacted] advised,
however, the news correspondents who possess White House
passes are permitted access to the building after working
hours without an escort.

[redacted] said that within the past two weeks or so,
a new regulation has been instituted which requires State
Department employees to wear badges while in the building
after working hours. He also said that as a result of the
[redacted] leak and the [redacted] incident, as reported in
JACK ANDERSON's column, there has been a restriction of
access to copying (xerox) machines after working hours.

[redacted] advised that the press corridor is located in
corridor # 3 of the building, Rooms 2310-2316, and the press
briefing room, where daily press conferences are held, is
located in Room 2408. [redacted] said that visitor's logs are
maintained in the Captain of Guards Office, Room 1926, USDS.

Interviewed on 10/7/71 at Washington, D. C. File # 65-11628 129
by SA [redacted] and SA [redacted] and MGM:jak Date dictated 10/8/71

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 10/12/71

[redacted] Operation Center, Room 7516, United States Department of State, advised as follows:

[redacted] was able to determine from records of the Operation Center that he worked from 4:00 P.M. to 12:00 midnight on July 16, 1971, and also from 4:00 P.M. to 12:00 midnight on July 19, 1971. He stated that he did not recall seeing the incoming telegram from Nairobi, Kenya, pertaining to Aid Representative [redacted]. He recalled seeing this telegram on the duty desk sometime immediately after the information concerning it was set forth in the news column of JACK ANDERSON. He stated that at no time did he have any additional copies of the telegram made.

[redacted] stated that he is not acquainted with JACK ANDERSON or any member of his staff or family and has not been in contact with them. He also stated that he is not acquainted with [redacted] and does not know of anyone who might want to discredit [redacted]. [redacted] could furnish no information as to the possibilities as to how the leak of information may have occurred.

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Interviewed on 10/7/71 at Washington, D. C. File # WFO 65-11628-730
by SA [redacted] and SA [redacted] /hab Date dictated 10/12/71

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 10/14/71

[redacted] Physical Security Branch, Domestic Operations Division, Office of Security, Bureau of Administration, U. S. Department of State (USDS), advised visitor registration logs which are kept on visitors to the Operations Center, USDS, are maintained for a period of one year. He made available for review the logs denoting visitors to the Operations Center July 16-20, 1971. These logs do not contain the name JACK ANDERSON or the following members of his staff: [redacted], [redacted], [redacted], and [redacted].

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Interviewed on 10/13/71 at Washington, D. C. File # WFO 65-11628 132
by SA [redacted] and [redacted] ADW:can Date dictated 10/13/71

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

REPORTING OFFICE WASHINGTON FIELD	OFFICE OF ORIGIN WASHINGTON FIELD	DATE 10/22/71	INVESTIGATIVE PERIOD 10/22/71-10/22/71
TITLE OF CASE UNSUB; Unauthorized Disclosure of Information in State Department Cables Appearing in "The Washington Post" Article, Tuesday, July 27, 1971, By Jack Anderson		REPORT MADE BY [Redacted]	TYPED BY tah
		CHARACTER OF CASE ESPIONAGE - X	

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REFERENCE: Report of SA [Redacted], dated 10/15/71, at Washington, D. C.

-P-

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 02-20-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/CPB/TH

ADMINISTRATIVE

This report is classified "**Confidential**" inasmuch as the U. S. Department of State (USDS) has so classified the telegrams which are pertinent to this investigation.

It has been determined that [Redacted] mentioned in FD 302 reporting results of interview of [Redacted] in this report, is currently on USDS assignment in [Redacted]

ACCOMPLISHMENTS CLAIMED					<input type="checkbox"/> NONE	ACQUIT-TALS	CASE HAS BEEN:
CONVIC.	AUTO.	FUG.	FINES	SAVINGS	RECOVERIES		
							PENDING OVER ONE YEAR <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO PENDING PROSECUTION OVER SIX MONTHS <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO

APPROVED	SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE
COPIES MADE:	DO NOT WRITE IN SPACES BELOW
6 - Bureau (65-74138) ② - WFO (65-11628)	[Redacted]

Dissemination Record of Attached Report					Notations
Agency					
Request Recd.					
Date Fwd.					
How Fwd.					
By					

65-11628-138

Searched _____
Serialized _____
Indexed _____
Filed _____

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

DECLASSIFIED BY 60324 AUC BAW/CPB/TH
ON 02-20-2007

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Copy to:

Report of:

[Redacted]

Office: **Washington, D.C.**

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Date:

10/22/71

Field Office File #:

65-11628

Bureau File #:

Title:

**UNKNOWN SUBJECT; Unauthorized Disclosure of
Information in State Department Cables
Appearing in "The Washington Post" Article,
Tuesday, July 27, 1971, By Jack Anderson**

Character:

ESPIONAGE - X

Synopsis:

One person employed at Agency for International Development (AID) and eighteen persons employed at State Department (USDS), including USDS Office of Executive Secretariat (SS) and Operations Center, were interviewed, but were unable to furnish information concerning source of leak.

-P-

DETAILS: AT WASHINGTON, D. C.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification~~

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
Interview of [redacted], Agency for International Development (AID)	2
Interview of [redacted] Deputy Under Secretary for Management, State Department (USDS)	4
Interview of [redacted], USDS	6
Interview of [redacted] Director General of the Foreign Service, USDS	7
Interview of [redacted], USDS	9
Interview of [redacted], USDS	10
Interview of [redacted], USDS	11
Interview of [redacted], USDS	12
Interview of [redacted], USDS	14
Interview of [redacted], USDS	15
Interview of [redacted], USDS	16
Interview of [redacted], former USDS employee	17
Interview of [redacted], USDS	20
Interview of [redacted], USDS	21
Interview of [redacted], Operations Center (OC), USDS	22

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b7c

WFO 65-11628

Interview of [REDACTED], USDS	24
Interview of [REDACTED], USDS	25
Interview of [REDACTED] OC, USDS	26
Interview of [REDACTED] USDS Relative to Disposal of Classified Material at OC	27
Interview of [REDACTED] USDS	28

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

10/21/71

Date of transcription

[redacted], Office of Labor Affairs Staff, Agency for International Development (AID), Room 4527-A, State Department Building, Washington, D. C. (WDC), advised as follows:

[redacted] said that [redacted] [redacted], as AID Director in Kenya. [redacted] departed Kenya for reassignment in the United States on April 17, 1971. He served on an Evaluation Panel in AID until assigned to his present position in Labor Affairs on June 21, 1971.

[redacted] said that he first met [redacted] in Nairobi, Kenya, when the latter was making an official visit to that country. That occurred prior to the time that [redacted] became AID Director in Kenya, or was even considered for the position, as far as [redacted] knew. [redacted] said that he invited [redacted] to dinner at his home in Nairobi, along with a number of senior AID staff officers. [redacted] said that he had not met [redacted] prior to that time, and apparently none of the other AID personnel in Kenya had known him previously.

[redacted] said that he held no personal grudge against [redacted], and knew no one in Kenya or Washington, D. C. who harbored a personal animosity sufficient to leak classified information to ruin his career.

[redacted] stated that the first he heard about the [redacted] incident was when he read it in JACK ANDERSON's column in "The Washington Post". [redacted] stated that he had not seen, nor had access to the cables on which the ANDERSON column was based. He had no idea about the way that ANDERSON obtained the classified messages. He said that he does not know ANDERSON or any member of his staff, and would have no reason to contact them.

Interviewed on 10/21/71 at Washington, D. C. File # 65-11628
 by SA [redacted] and SA [redacted] Date dictated 10/21/71
 MGH:jak

WFO 65-11678

2

[redacted] said that he is not conversant with the handling of classified messages within the Operations and Communications Offices of the State Department, but in response to a query, he felt it more likely that the leak of information occurred in WDC rather than in Nairobi. He based that opinion upon the very few people who would have access to the messages at the American Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 10/15/71

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[redacted] Deputy Under Secretary for Management, Room 7208, United States Department of State, advised as follows:

[redacted] advised that his recollection of the exact time sequence regarding handling the incoming telegram pertaining to AID Representative [redacted] is somewhat hazy at this time but stated that he recalled that after reading this communication, he contacted the Director General of Foreign Service, [redacted], and recommended that [redacted] should be called out of Nairobi, Kenya. He stated that [redacted] spoke with Dr. JOHN A. HANNAH, Administrator, AID, and HANNAH was reluctant to make a decision to remove [redacted] from Nairobi. In fact, he stated that HANNAH wanted to know more about the situation and later HANNAH sent an Administrative Aide to determine additional information concerning [redacted]

[redacted] stated that in just another day or two, after the above decision was made, the Press Office of the State Department telephonically called and stated that they had had a call from a member of JACK ANDERSON's staff, indicating that they, in fact, had a copy of the telegram pertaining to [redacted]

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[redacted] stated that he did not see a copy of the telegram from Dr. HANNAH in reply to the Ambassador's telegram regarding [redacted]. He stated that no distribution of the second telegram was made to his office. He stated that it was his decision to order an investigation by their Security Office regarding a leak of information to ANDERSON.

[redacted] stated that the only other people he was aware of who had access to the telegram pertaining to [redacted] in his office were [redacted] and [redacted] who is one of his assistants. It was [redacted] recollection that the telegram in question remained in his office for several days and only he and [redacted] and [redacted] had access to it during this time. He stated that there were no copies made of the telegram while it was in his office.

Interviewed on 10/14/71 at Washington, D.C. File # WFO 65-11628

by SAs [redacted] and [redacted] RCW:vos Date dictated 10/15/71

WFO 65-11628

2

[] stated he is not acquainted with JACK ANDERSON or any member of his staff or family and has not had any contact with them. He stated however, that he has been the recent subject of some of ANDERSON's columns and that in one of them, ANDERSON referred to him as "saccharin."

[] stated that he knew [] to be a political appointee in AID and that prior to his present position at the Embassy in Kenya, handled public and congressional relations for AID. He stated prior to that, [] was connected with some agricultural trade organization. He stated he knew [] to be a very aggressive individual but indicated he did not know of anyone who may have had a grudge against him.

[] also advised that he could furnish no information as to how the leak of information to JACK ANDERSON was accomplished.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 10/15/71

1

[redacted] Deputy Under Secretary for Management [redacted] Room 7208, United States Department of State, advised as follows:

[redacted] stated that she recalled the telegram concerning AID Representative, [redacted]. She stated that the telegram was received in her office in a sealed envelope and that she read it and recalled it an EXDIS (Exclusive Distribution) telegram. She stated she took it in to [redacted] office and after his perusal, it was placed in her hold box, where it remained several days, the length of which [redacted] was unable to recall. She stated that no other persons would have access to this communication while it was in their possession without their being aware of it, and she did not recall that there was anyone else in possession of it. She stated there were no copies made of this communication while it was in their possession. She recalled that the telegram was in the hold box at the time of the JACK ANDERSON column. She was unable to recall the final disposition of the telegram but indicated it was more than likely placed in the burn bag. [redacted] stated she did not discuss the contents of the telegram with anyone other than [redacted]

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[redacted] stated that she is not acquainted with JACK ANDERSON or any member of his staff or family and has not been in contact with them.

[redacted] stated that she knows of [redacted] but does not know him personally and does not know anyone who may want to discredit him. [redacted] also advised that she is not aware of any information which would shed any light on the means by which ANDERSON was able to obtain a copy of the telegram in question. [redacted] also stated that she did not recall that there was a telegram received in her office containing the reply of Dr. JOHN A. HANNAH, Administrator, AID, to the Ambassador at Nairobi, Kenya.

Interviewed on 10/14/71 at Washington, D. C. File # WFO 65-11628
by SAs [redacted] and [redacted] RCW:vos Date dictated 10/15/71

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 10/20/71

1

[redacted] Director General of the Foreign Service, Room 7331, U. S. Department of State (USDS), advised as follows:

[redacted] advised that he first saw the telegram pertaining to AID Representative [redacted] while in the Office of Deputy Under Secretary [redacted]. According to [redacted], [redacted] told him to talk with Dr. JOHN A. HANNAH, Administrator, AID and to Assistant Secretary for African Affairs [redacted]. [redacted] stated he read the telegram regarding [redacted] and the purpose of his contacting Dr. HANNAH and [redacted] was to decide what policy should be made in handling the situation. He stated that at no time was there a copy of the cable pertaining to [redacted] in his office. He said that he saw a copy of the telegram sent from Dr. HANNAH to the Ambassador at Nairobi, Kenya, pertaining to [redacted], but did not have any copies of this communication made himself. In addition, he said [redacted] also saw the latter communication.

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[redacted] stated that he is not acquainted with JACK ANDERSON or any member of his family and has not had any contact with them. He stated that recently a member of ANDERSON's staff by the name of [redacted], who stated that he is on the staff of JACK ANDERSON, came to his, [redacted], office by appointment. [redacted] stated that [redacted] was making an inquiry regarding an entirely unrelated matter to that concerning [redacted], however, prior to [redacted] departure from his office, [redacted] stated that he hoped that his visit to [redacted] office would not cause any flare-up, as did the ANDERSON column regarding [redacted].

[redacted] advised that he is not acquainted with [redacted] and does not know of anyone who might want to discredit him.

[redacted] stated that he had no facts to substantiate his theories, but he figured that the leak of information to JACK ANDERSON may have occurred in either of one of the three following places:

Interviewed on 10/19/71 at Washington, D. C. File # WFO 65-11628

by SAs [redacted] and [redacted]

RCW:lmc

10/20/71

by _____ Date dictated _____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 10/20/71

[redacted] of Director General of the Foreign Service [redacted] Room 7331, U. S. Department of State (USDS), advised as follows:

[redacted] stated that she did not see the telegram pertaining to AID Representative [redacted] except in JACK ANDERSON's column. She stated she does not know who else may have had access to this telegram and does not know of anyone who may have had a copy made of it.

[redacted] recalled that the outgoing telegram from Dr. JOHN A. HANNAH, Administrator, AID, pertaining to [redacted] was brought to her office by [redacted] and she in turn handed it to [redacted]. [redacted] stated that she was unsure as to the final destination of this copy of Dr. HANNAH's telegram, but if a copy had been retained in her office for any length of time it would have been placed in the "Eyes Only" file. She stated that neither the former message pertaining to [redacted] or the latter one pertaining to [redacted] were discussed by the personnel in her office. In addition, she stated that there were no extra copies of either of the telegrams made in her office, although a Xerox machine is located in a nearby room.

[redacted] advised she is not acquainted with JACK ANDERSON or any member of his staff or family and has not had any contact with them.

[redacted] stated that she was formerly employed in AID at the same time [redacted] was there as a Senior Staff Member regarding Congressional relations and public affairs. She stated that she did not know of anyone who might want to discredit [redacted] and stated that he is a well known individual and described him as a very attractive person.

[redacted] stated that she could furnish no information as to how the leakage of information to JACK ANDERSON may have occurred.

Interviewed on 10/19/71 at Washington, D. C. File # WFO 65-11628
 by SAs [redacted] and [redacted] RCW:lmc Date dictated 10/20/71

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 10/13/71

[redacted] Director of Secretariat Staff, Room 7241, U. S. Department of State advised as follows:

[redacted] advised that it is the function of his office to act as the outer office of the Secretary and pass on information to the Secretary's Office. He stated that he believed that he was in London, England, at the time the telegram regarding AID representative [redacted] first arrived at the State Department. [redacted] was unsure but believed that he did see the communication upon his return from London. He stated that at no time did he have any copies of the communication in question made. He also stated that he was aware of the contents of the telegram and that the line officers directly below him would possibly also have been aware of the contents of the message. He stated that to his best recollection the line officers on duty at the pertinent period were as follows: [redacted]

[redacted], [redacted], [redacted], [redacted] currently at FSI, [redacted] and [redacted].

[redacted] stated that in addition to the above named line officers that secretaries [redacted] and [redacted] may possibly have seen the telegram in question.

[redacted] stated that he is not acquainted with JACK ANDERSON or any member of his staff or family and has not had any contact with them. He also stated that he is not acquainted with [redacted] and does not know of anyone who might want to discredit him. [redacted] stated that it was pure speculation on his part that he believed that the leak of information to JACK ANDERSON more than likely occurred from someone in the AID Office who may have had a grudge against [redacted] and found this an opportunity to discredit him.

Interviewed on 10/12/71 at Washington, D. C. File # WFO 65-11626

by SAs [redacted] and [redacted] Date dictated 10/12/71
RCJ:nbf

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 10/13/71

[redacted], Director of Information Management Section (S/S-I), Executive Secretariat, United States Department of State, advised as follows:

In regard to the usual procedure to sending a telegram to the Office of the Director of the Secretariat's Staff, Room 7241, WASHINGTON explained that a type of cover sheet is placed on top of the telegram indicating the names of the individuals to whom it is to be distributed on the staff. He stated that when the telegram has passed through each of the staff members hands it is initialed by each staff member and usually destroyed or placed in the burn bag by the last recipient of the telegram. He said that in some instances the cover sheet will be returned to S/S-I where it will be placed in a burn bag along with the telegram which was also returned with it. WASHINGTON could not recall specifically what had happened to copy number 45, the telegram in question, concerning [redacted] which had been directed to the Secretariat's Staff.

In addition, he stated that there was no way of determining whether or not the cover sheet to the communication was destroyed in the office of the Secretariat's Staff or in the S/S-I.

Interviewed on 10/12/71 at Washington, D. C. File # WFO 65-11628

by SAs [redacted] and [redacted] Date dictated 10/12/71
RCU:mbf

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

b6
b7cDate of transcription 10/13/71

[redacted], Director of Secretariat's Staff, Room 7241, United States Department of State advised as follows:

[redacted] advised that she recalled the EXDIS telegram from Nairobi, Kenya, pertaining to AID representative [redacted]. It was her recollection that someone in the office called it to her attention and that she recalled reading the telegram. She stated that she believed that she received a telephone call from the Secretariat's Office advising her to pull the telegram from the line and to the best of her recollection the officers on the Director of Secretariat's Staff did not see the telegram. It was her recollection that someone from S/S-I came to the office and picked the telegram up but stated however she may have placed it in a burn bag to be destroyed by S/S-I. She stated that if the telegram had been circulated to the line officers that they would have initialed it on the cover page and it would have then been returned to the Message Center to be destroyed. She stated that at no time did she have any additional copies of the telegram made.

[redacted] stated that she is not acquainted with JACK ANDERSON or any member of his staff or family and has not had any contact with them. She stated that sometime ago [redacted] while parking his car in the basement garage at the United States Department of State caused damage to her vehicle and left a note indicating that he would pay for the repairs. She stated that she had her car repaired and sent the bill to [redacted] and he did not respond and has not responded to this day. She said that she did not know [redacted] otherwise.

[redacted] stated that she could not furnish any information as to how the leak of information to JACK ANDERSON may have occurred.

Interviewed on 10/12/71 at Washington, D. C. File # WFO 65-11628

by SAs [redacted] and [redacted] Date dictated 10/12/71
KCW:mbf

WFO 65-11628

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In addition to the above, [] stated that it is the usual procedure when a telegram arrives in the office for a cover sheet to include the names of all line officers in the office who are to read the telegram. She stated that upon reading it they are to scratch their names out and initial beside the name indicating in fact that they have read the telegram. She stated that in most instances this cover sheet is sent with the telegram to S/S-I where it is to be destroyed. She stated that she could not recall specifically what happened to the telegram in question.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

10/18/71

Date of transcription

1

[redacted]
[redacted] United States Department of State (USDS), Room 7241,
advised as follows:

[redacted] said, that as a line officer, with access to Exclusive Distribution (EKDIS) messages because of his position, he had read the incoming cable from Nairobi, Kenya, (Cable #1), pertaining to [redacted] but had not seen the outgoing cable (Cable #2) from Washington, D. C. (WDC) to Nairobi.

[redacted] could not recall whether he had seen the cable on the date of its arrival in WDC, July 16, 1971, but thought it possible that he had seen it that day. [redacted] considered the contents "interesting" because of the subject matter, but said that it was only one of about sixty cables a day that passes through his office.

[redacted] firmly denied that he had furnished a copy of the cable, or the contents thereof, to JACK ANDERSON, his staff, or to any unauthorized person. [redacted] said that he does not know JACK ANDERSON nor any member of his staff, nor does he know [redacted] or friends of [redacted]

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Interviewed on 10/15/71 at Washington, D. C. File # 65-11628
by SA CHARLES L. CAPEHART and SA MALCOLM G. MUELLER MMH:jak Date dictated 10/18/71

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 10/18/711

[redacted], Room
7239A, United States Department of State, advised as follows:

[redacted] was unable to recall if he actually saw the telegram pertaining to AID Representative [redacted] but was aware of the contents of the telegram. He was unable to establish in his own mind whether or not this was from what people had told him was in the telegram or from reading it in JACK ANDERSON's column or if, in fact, he may have read it in the message itself. He stated that he departed Washington, D.C., for the purpose of vacation as of 2:00 p.m. on July 16, 1971 for a period of three weeks. He stated the incident was completed and handled prior to his return.

[redacted] stated that he did not know who may have read the telegram. He stated that Secretaries [redacted] and [redacted] would have had access to the telegram, but he did not know whether they did or not. He stated that [redacted] is currently out of town and due to return on October 18, 1971 to work. In regard to [redacted], he stated she resigned approximately one month ago and is now employed by Senator FRED HARRIS in his presidential campaign. It was [redacted] opinion that these secretaries would not have had sufficient cause or time to have focused their attention upon the telegram while it was in their proximity.

[redacted] advised that he is not acquainted with JACK ANDERSON or any member of his staff or family and has not had any contact with them.

[redacted] stated he is not acquainted with [redacted] and does not know of anyone who may want to discredit him.

[redacted] stated he does not know how the leakage of information to JACK ANDERSON may have occurred.

Interviewed on 10/15/71 at Washington, D.C. File # WFO 65-11628

by SAs [redacted] and [redacted] RCW: VOS Date dictated 10/15/71

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 10/19/711

[redacted]
 United States Department of State, Room 7239-C, Washington,
 D. C. (WDC), advised as follows:

[redacted] said that as a line officer in the Secretariat, he had access to Exclusive Distribution (EXDIS) messages, which would have included the incoming cablegram from Nairobi, Kenya, relative to the [redacted] incident. He said; however, that though he had access to the cable, he did not, in fact, see it because he was busy with matters in his own field of interest. He first saw the contents of the incoming cable when he read JACK ANDERSON's column in "The Washington Post". [redacted] said that he did not see the outgoing cable, cable #2, from Washington, D. C. to Nairobi, Kenya, in the above matter.

[redacted] firmly denied furnishing either cable, or the contents thereof, to JACK ANDERSON, his staff, or any unauthorized person. He said that he does not know ANDERSON or members of his staff, and has never met [redacted]

[redacted] had no idea of how the leak of information occurred in the aforementioned matter.

Interviewed on 10/18/71 at Washington, D. C. File # 65-11628
 by SA [redacted] and SA [redacted] MGM:jak Date dictated 10/19/71

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 10/19/71

[redacted] Information Management Section, Executive Secretariat, Room 7512, United States Department of State (USDS), and presently [redacted] [redacted] Washington, D. C., advised as follows:

[redacted] advised that his duties consisted of handling restricted and non-restricted telegrams distribution and that his superior was [redacted] Director of Information Management Section. [redacted] recalled that he was employed at USDS from approximately June 1, 1971 until August 27, 1971. He recalled that he was working on the day the telegram pertaining to AID representative [redacted] arrived at USDS. He stated that he saw the communication when it arrived from the Communications Center. He stated that he scammed most telegrams to avoid reproductions and to look for sensitive material. He recalled that this particular telegram pertaining to [redacted] was an EXDIS (Exclusive Distribution) and recalled that there were 45 copies of this telegram. He stated that he believed that copy number 45 of this telegram was retained in the Information Management Section to be placed in what he recalled as a chronological file. He stated that copies number 42, 43, and 44 were designated for the Relocation Center. He stated that the remainder of the copies were given by him to [redacted] Operations Center. He recalled that [redacted] told him that one copy had been designated for [redacted] in the Executive Secretariat and that one copy was distributed to Dr. JOHN A. HANNAH, Administrator, AID, marked "Eyes Only." [redacted] recalled that copy number 11 of this telegram was kept by the Senior Watch Officer and copy number 9 was placed on the duty board in the Operations Center.

It was [redacted] recollection that he believed he telephoned [redacted] JOHN A. HANNAH's Office, when the

Interviewed on 10/18/71 at Washington, D. C. File # WFO 65-11628
 by SAs [redacted] and [redacted] RCI:mbf Date dictated 10/18/71

telegram pertaining to [] was being distributed to Dr. HANNAH's Office in an effort to obtain a receipt from Dr. HANNAH's Office because of the sensitive nature of the telegram. He stated that he did not recall whether he received a receipt for the telegram or not. He stated that he did this because [] had a reputation for losing messages which had been sent to Dr. HANNAH's Office and he described [] as being very flagrant in his loose manner of handling telegrams.

[] could not recall if in fact he handled the outgoing telegram from Dr. JOHN A. HANNAH to the Ambassador at Nairobi, Kenya, pertaining to []. He stated that it was his recollection that [], Foreign Service Staff Communicator in the Information Management Section, handled distribution of this telegram. It was [] recollection that [] showed him this telegram and that he read it. He stated that he did not recall that he had anything to do with the distribution of the telegram from Dr. HANNAH to the Ambassador at Nairobi.

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[] stated that he was unsure as to whether or not he may have had any copies of either of the above telegrams Xeroxed. He stated that he may have had one copy of the first telegram pertaining to [], mentioned above, Xeroxed for [] but that he was not sure of this. He stated that he did know for sure that he did not have any copies made of the second telegram from Dr. HANNAH to the Ambassador at Nairobi.

[] stated that he is not acquainted with JACK ANDERSON or any member of his staff or family and has not been in contact with them. He also stated that he is not acquainted with [] and does not know of anyone who might want to discredit []

[] stated that he could furnish no information as to how the leak of information to JACK ANDERSON may have occurred. [] did say, however, that he was very much

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

10/20/71

Date of transcription

1

[redacted] formerly assigned to the [redacted]
 [redacted] United States Department of State (USDS),
 Washington, D. C. (WDC), now assigned to [redacted]
 [redacted] Rosslyn, Virginia, advised
 as follows:

[redacted] stated that his last day of duty with
 [redacted] occurred on July 16, 1971, at which
 time he began annual leave prior to commencing his present
 assignment [redacted] As a line
 officer in the [redacted], he had access to Exclusive Distribution
 (EXDIS) messages, and would have had access to the incoming cable
 from Nairobi, dated July 16, 1971 relative to the [redacted]
 incident. He advised that he does not recall seeing that
 cable, however, inasmuch as he was quite busy winding up his
 affairs in the [redacted]. He recalled reading about the
 contents of the cable in JACK ANDERSON's column in "The Wash-
 ington Post".

[redacted] firmly denied furnishing the cable
 or contents of it to JACK ANDERSON or any member of his staff,
 and had no knowledge of the outgoing cable dated July 19, 1971
 in the [redacted] matter.

[redacted] said that he does not know JACK
 ANDERSON or members of his staff, and does not know [redacted]
 [redacted] either.

Interviewed on 10/19/71 at Rosslyn, Virginia File # 65-11628

by SA [redacted] MGM:jak Date dictated 10/20/71

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1Date of transcription 10/21/71

[redacted], Secretariat Staff, Room 7239A, United States Department of State (USDS), advised she was not aware of the [redacted] incident until the JACK ANDERSON column which created talk within her office. She said she recalls seeing the communication in question subsequent to the ANDERSON column; that she does not recall making a copy of it, but if she did, it would have been for her boss, [redacted], Line Officer, Secretariat Staff, who would have needed it in connection with his position; and that she does not know JACK ANDERSON or any member of his staff nor has she been in contact with them.

[redacted] also advised she does not know [redacted] and knows no one who might wish to discredit him, but if there were such a party she thought it would be someone in the Agency for International Development. She could not elaborate on this other than to state *it was* for jealousy or other reasons.

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Interviewed on 10/20/71 at Washington, D. C. File # WFO 65-11628

by SAs [redacted] and [redacted] ADW:can Date dictated 10/20/71

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 10/13/71

[redacted] Operations Center,
Room 7512, United States Department of State advised as
follows:

[redacted] advised that he recalled taking the message
pertaining to AID representative [redacted] from the SCAT
Machine which is in teletype form. He stated that his office
had been alerted by the Communications Center as to the
sensitive nature of the communication. He stated that upon
taking the telegram from the SCAT Machine he took it directly
to the Senior Watch Officer which he believed to be [redacted]
[redacted] who read it and brought it into the Office of the
Director [redacted] for proper guidance.

[redacted] stated that he was aware of the contents
of the telegram in question.

[redacted] stated that on or about the same time the
information concerning [redacted] was mentioned in the JACK
ANDERSON column he was curious to see whether or not the
telegram in question was retained on the computer. He stated
that he did this because he had noticed in some instances
when a telegram was supposed to have been removed from the
computer it had not been removed and upon calling for a copy
of the communication from the computer he was immediately
furnished a copy. He recalled that he showed this copy
to the Operations Center Director [redacted] and then destroyed
it in the burn bag. He indicated that [redacted] was surprised
that a copy was available on the computer. He stated that
at no time did he have any Xerox copies of the telegram
made.

As to possible other individuals who may have seen
this telegram in question, [redacted] advised that one [redacted]
[redacted] S/S-I who is currently on leave and on assignment to

10/12/71 Washington, D. C. WFO 65-11628
Interviewed on _____ at _____ File # _____
by SAs [redacted] and [redacted] RCW:mbf Date dictated 10/12/71

WFO 65-11628

2

to Kabul, Afghanistan more than likely did observe the telegram. He stated that it was [] function to prepare summaries and handle distribution of EXDIS (Exclusive Distribution) telegrams.

[] advised that he is not acquainted with JACK ANDERSON or any member of his staff or family and has not had any contact with him. He stated that he is also not acquainted with [] and does not know of anyone who might want to discredit him. He stated that rumors around the office have it that the leak of information to ANDERSON must have occurred from someone in AID who may have had some difficulty with [] in the past. [] stated that he had no facts to substantiate this claim.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 10/14/71

[redacted], Operations Center, U. S. Department of State and currently a Special Assistant, Office of Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Public Affairs, Room 6802, U. S. Department of State advised as follows:

[redacted] stated that his memory concerning the telegram pertaining to AID representative [redacted] is extremely hazy at this time. He stated however he does not believe he actually saw the telegram in question. He stated his first knowledge of the matter was when he read it in the newspaper column of JACK ANDERSON. He stated that he does not know of anyone who may have made a copy of the telegram although, it would not be difficult to do since there are several Xerox machines in the Operations Center. [redacted] stated that his knowledge of the contents of the telegram stems specifically from the ANDERSON column and not from the contents of the telegram while it was in the Operations Center.

[redacted] stated that he is not acquainted with JACK ANDERSON or any member of his staff or family and has not had any contact with them. In addition, he stated he is not acquainted with [redacted] and does not know of anyone who might want to discredit [redacted]. [redacted] also stated that he could furnish no information as to how the leak of information to JACK ANDERSON occurred.

Interviewed on 10/13/71 at Washington, D. C. File # WFO 65-11628

by SAs [redacted] and [redacted] RCW:mbf Date dictated 10/13/71

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

10/14/71

Date of transcription

[redacted] at the Operations Center, U. S. Department of State and currently is Personnel Officer, Personnel Office, Room 2803, U. S. Department of State advised as follows:

[redacted] stated that he did not have access to the telegram from Nairobi, Kenya, pertaining to AID representative [redacted]. He also stated that he did not know who else in the Operations Center had a copy of this telegram. In addition, he stated that he did not know of anyone who may have made a copy of this telegram.

[redacted] stated that he is not acquainted with JACK ANDERSON or any member of his staff or family and has not had any contact with them. He stated that he did not know of anyone who might want to discredit [redacted] and that he is not acquainted with [redacted].

[redacted] also stated that he does not have any information as to how the leak of information to JACK ANDERSON occurred.

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10/13/71

Washington, D. C.

WFO 65-11628

Interviewed on

at

File #

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HCW:mhf

10/13/71

by

Date dictated

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

10/15/71

Date of transcription

1

[redacted] Operations Center,
Room 7516, United States Department of State, advised as follows:

[redacted] advised that her recollection of the incident concerning the telegram pertaining to AID Representative [redacted] is somewhat hazy at this time, however, she recalled reading a Seat copy on the Seat Board of the telegram and recalled that this was subsequent to the JACK ANDERSON Column in the "Washington Post." She stated that that was her only access to this telegram according to her recollection and that she did not have a copy made at any time. She also stated she was unaware of who else may have had a copy of the telegram in their possession. [redacted] stated she is not acquainted with JACK ANDERSON or any member of his Staff or family and has not had any contact with them. She also stated that she is not acquainted with [redacted] and does not know of anyone who might want to discredit him. She also stated that she does not have any information as to how the information in the telegram was leaked to JACK ANDERSON.

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Interviewed on 10/14/71 at Washington, D.C. File # WFO 65-11628

by SAs [redacted] and [redacted] RCV:ves Date dictated 10/15/71

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

10/21/71

Date of transcription

1

[redacted] Bureau of African Affairs, Room 6238, United States Department of State (USDS), advised he did not see or have in possession any of the communications concerning the [redacted] incident but became aware of the communications on Monday, July 19, 1971, on arrival at his office. He stated he may have visited his office on the previous Saturday, July 17, 1971, but he is sure he did not have duty that day as in conversation with Mr. [redacted], Bureau of African Affairs, concerning the incident he recalls [redacted] started to ask him a question concerning the Saturday and then commented to the effect he would not know as he was not there.

[redacted] stated he does not know and has never contacted JACK ANDERSON or any member of his staff, and that he does not know [redacted] and knows no one who might wish to discredit him. In his opinion as to the source of the leak of the information, he said he doubted seriously if it would have been anyone in "State" as there would be nothing to gain, and most likely be someone in the Agency for International Development. He could furnish no further information in this regard.

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Interviewed on 10/20/71 at Washington, D. C. File # WFO 65-11628

by SAs [redacted] and [redacted] ADW:can Date dictated 10/20/71

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NR050 WA CODE

1031PM NITEL 10-21-71 TMT

TO WASHINGTON FIELD (65-11628)

FROM DIRECTOR (65-74138) 1P

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-20-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/CPB/TH

TOLL LEK - SIO.

REURTEL OCTOBER TWENTY LAST, REQUESTING AUTHORITY TO
INTERVIEW [REDACTED], FORMER EMPLOYEE OF UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF STATE (USDS), CONCERNING THIS LEAK.

DATA SUBMITTED IN RETEL CONCERNING [REDACTED] IS INSUFFICIENT
TO PERMIT MEANINGFUL CONSIDERATION OF INTERVIEW REQUEST.
PROMPTLY DETERMINE NATURE OF [REDACTED] DUTIES WHILE EMPLOYEE OF
USDS, TOGETHER WITH DETAILS SURROUNDING HER REPORTED ACCESS TO
INCOMING TELEGRAM, AND THEREAFTER ADVISE BUREAU OF RESULTS
TOGETHER WITH YOUR OBSERVATIONS AS TO POSSIBLE PRODUCTIVITY OF
INTERVIEW OF [REDACTED]

BUFILES CONTAIN NO INFORMATION IDENTIFIABLE WITH [REDACTED]

END

FI WFO

FBI WFO MWM

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65-11628-139

SEARCHED INDEXED
SERIALIZED FILED

OCT 21 10 32 PM '71

FBI-WASH. F. O.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

53
10/21/71

FBI

Transmit in _____ Via Airtel _____ (Priority)

Date 10/22/71

To: SAC, WFO (65-11628)

gms From: Director, FBI (65-74138)

TOLL LEK
SIO

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-20-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/CPB/TH

Reurtels 9/29/71 and 9/28/71.

(This line for LEFT MARGIN.)

WFO is authorized to discreetly contact [redacted] Metromedia, Incorporated, Washington, D.C., to determine whether television station WTTG, a Metromedia station, has a master tape of the 9/24/71 program of Jack Anderson, and if so, to enlist cooperation of [redacted] in reviewing same to ascertain whether program portrayed actual classified U.S. State Department cable involved in this matter. At outset of interview, advise [redacted] this investigation is being conducted at the request of the Assistant Attorney General, Internal Security Division, Department of Justice.

Contact must be handled by two mature, experienced Agents who are familiar with this case. If no tape exists, further inquiry concerning matter should not be made. Under no circumstances should Jack Anderson or any member of his staff be contacted relative to this matter.

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Promptly advise Bureau of results of this contact. In the event a master tape of this program exists, and does reveal use of actual U.S. Department of State cable on Anderson's program, pertinent data should immediately be incorporated into LHM for dissemination to Department.

(Do not type below this line.)

h
[redacted] [redacted]
See me
65-11628-146
OCT 27 1971
FBI - WFO

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 02-26-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/STP/TH

Date of transcription 10/13/71

[redacted] Director of Secretariat's Staff, Room 7241, United States Department of State advised as follows:

[redacted] advised that she recalled the EXDIS telegram from Nairobi, Kenya, pertaining to AID representative [redacted]. It was her recollection that someone in the office called it to her attention and that she recalled reading the telegram. She stated that she believed that she received a telephone call from the Secretariat's Office advising her to pull the telegram from the line and to the best of her recollection the officers on the Director of Secretariat's Staff did not see the telegram. It was her recollection that someone from S/S^I came to the office and picked the telegram up but stated however she may have placed it in a burn bag to be destroyed by S/S^I. She stated that if the telegram had been circulated to the line officers that they would have initialed it on the cover page and it would have then been returned to the Message Center to be destroyed. She stated that at no time did she have any additional copies of the telegram made.

[redacted] stated that she is not acquainted with JACK ANDERSON or any member of his staff or family and has not had any contact with them. She stated that sometime ago [redacted] while parking his car in the basement garage at the United States Department of State caused damage to her vehicle and left a note indicating that he would pay for the repairs. She stated that she had her car repaired and sent the bill to [redacted] and he did not respond and has not responded to this day. She said that she did not know [redacted] otherwise.

[redacted] stated that she could not furnish any information as to how the leak of information to JACK ANDERSON may have occurred.

Interviewed on 10/12/71 at Washington, D. C. File # WFO 65-11628 - 141
 by SAs [redacted] and [redacted] Date dictated 10/12/71
 [redacted] RCW:mbf

WFO 65-11628

In addition to the above, [redacted] stated that it is the usual procedure when a telegram arrives in the office for a cover sheet to include the names of all line officers in the office who are to read the telegram. She stated that upon reading it they are to scratch their names out and initial beside the name indicating in fact that they have read the telegram. She stated that in most instances this cover sheet is sent with the telegram to S/S-I where it is to be destroyed. She stated that she could not recall specifically what happened to the telegram in question.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 10/13/71

[redacted]
[redacted], Executive Secretariat, United States
Department of State, advised as follows:

In regard to the usual procedure to sending a telegram to the Office of the Director of the Secretariat's Staff, Room 7241, [redacted] explained that a type of cover sheet is placed on top of the telegram indicating the names of the individuals to whom it is to be distributed on the staff. He stated that when the telegram has passed through each of the staff members hands it is initialed by each staff member and usually destroyed or placed in the burn bag by the last recipient of the telegram. He said that in some instances the cover sheet will be returned to S/S-I where it will be placed in a burn bag along with the telegram which was also returned with it. [redacted] could not recall specifically what had happened to copy number 45, the telegram in question, concerning [redacted] which had been directed to the Secretariat's Staff.

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In addition, he stated that there was no way of determining whether or not the cover sheet to the communication was destroyed in the office of the Secretariat's Staff or in the S/S-I.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-26-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/STP/TH

Interviewed on 10/12/71 at Washington, D. C. File # WFO 65-11628 143

by SAs [redacted] and [redacted] Date dictated 10/12/71
RCW:mbf

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 02-26-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/STP/TH

Date of transcription 10/13/71

[redacted], Room
7241, U. S. Department of State advised as follows:

[redacted] advised that it is the function of his office to act as the outer office of the Secretary and pass on information to the Secretary's Office. He stated that he believed that he was in London, England, at the time the telegram regarding AID representative [redacted] first arrived at the State Department. [redacted] was unsure but believed that he did see the communication upon his return from London. He stated that at no time did he have any copies of the communication in question made. He also stated that he was aware of the contents of the telegram and that the line officers directly below him would possibly also have been aware of the contents of the message. He stated that to his best recollection the line officers on duty at the pertinent period were as follows: [redacted]

[redacted], [redacted], [redacted], [redacted], currently at FSI, [redacted] and [redacted]

[redacted] stated that in addition to the above named line officers that secretaries [redacted] and [redacted] may possibly have seen the telegram in question.

[redacted] stated that he is not acquainted with JACK ANDERSON or any member of his staff or family and has not had any contact with them. He also stated that he is not acquainted with [redacted] and does not know of anyone who might want to discredit him. [redacted] stated that it was pure speculation on his part that he believed that the leak of information to JACK ANDERSON more than likely occurred from someone in the AID Office who may have had a grudge against [redacted] and found this an opportunity to discredit him.

Interviewed on 10/12/71 at Washington, D. C. File # WFO 65-11628 *RCW*
by SAs [redacted] and [redacted] RCW:mbf Date dictated 10/12/71

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

10/14/71

Date of transcription

[redacted], who was editor at the Operations Center, U. S. Department of State and currently is Personnel Officer, Personnel Office, Room 2803, U. S. Department of State advised as follows:

[redacted] stated that he did not have access to the telegram from Nairobi, Kenya, pertaining to AID representative [redacted]. He also stated that he did not know who else in the Operations Center had a copy of this telegram. In addition, he stated that he did not know of anyone who may have made a copy of this telegram.

[redacted] stated that he is not acquainted with JACK ANDERSON or any member of his staff or family and has not had any contact with them. He stated that he did not know of anyone who might want to discredit [redacted] and that he is not acquainted with [redacted].

[redacted] also stated that he does not have any information as to how the leak of information to JACK ANDERSON occurred.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-26-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/STP/TH

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10/13/71 Washington, D. C. WFO 65-11628 745
Interviewed on _____ at _____ File # _____
by SAs [redacted] and [redacted] RCW:mbf 10/13/71
Date dictated _____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

10/14/71

Date of transcription

[redacted], former editor, Operations Center, U. S. Department of State and currently a Special Assistant, Office of Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Public Affairs, Room 6802, U. S. Department of State advised as follows:

[redacted] stated that his memory concerning the telegram pertaining to AID representative [redacted] is extremely hazy at this time. He stated however he does not believe he actually saw the telegram in question. He stated his first knowledge of the matter was when he read it in the newspaper column of JACK ANDERSON. He stated that he does not know of anyone who may have made a copy of the telegram although, it would not be difficult to do since there are several Xerox machines in the Operations Center. [redacted] stated that his knowledge of the contents of the telegram stems specifically from the ANDERSON column and not from the contents of the telegram while it was in the Operations Center.

[redacted] stated that he is not acquainted with JACK ANDERSON or any member of his staff or family and has not had any contact with them. In addition, he stated he is not acquainted with [redacted] and does not know of anyone who might want to discredit [redacted]. [redacted] also stated that he could furnish no information as to how the leak of information to JACK ANDERSON occurred.

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-26-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/STP/TH

Interviewed on 10/13/71 at Washington, D. C. File # WFO 65-11628-1416
by SAs [redacted] and [redacted] RCW:mbf Date dictated 10/13/71

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-26-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/STP/TH

Date of transcription 10/15/71

[redacted], Deputy Under Secretary for Management, [redacted] Room 7208, United States Department of State, advised as follows:

[redacted] stated that she recalled the telegram concerning AID Representative, [redacted]. She stated that the telegram was received in her office in a sealed envelope and that she read it and recalled it an EXDIS (Exclusive Distribution) telegram. She stated she took it in to [redacted] office and after his perusal, it was placed in her hold box, where it remained several days, the length of which [redacted] was unable to recall. She stated that no other persons would have access to this communication while it was in their possession without their being aware of it, and she did not recall that there was anyone else in possession of it. She stated there were no copies made of this communication while it was in their possession. She recalled that the telegram was in the hold box at the time of the JACK ANDERSON Column. She was unable to recall the final disposition of the telegram but indicated it was more than likely placed in the burn bag. [redacted] stated she did not discuss the contents of the telegram with anyone other than [redacted]

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[redacted] stated that she is not acquainted with JACK ANDERSON or any member of his staff or family and has not been in contact with them.

[redacted] stated that she knows of [redacted] but does not know him personally and does not know anyone who may want to discredit him. [redacted] also advised that she is not aware of any information which would shed any light on the means by which ANDERSON was able to obtain a copy of the telegram in question. [redacted] also stated that she did not recall that there was a telegram received in her office containing the reply of Dr. JOHN A. HANNAH, Administrator, AID, to the Ambassador at Nairobi, Kenya.

Interviewed on 10/14/71 at Washington, D.C. File # WFO 65-11628 148

by SAs [redacted] and [redacted] RCW:vos Date dictated 10/15/71

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 10/15/71

[redacted] Operations Center,
Room 7516, United States Department of State, advised as follows:

[redacted] advised that her recollection of the incident concerning the telegram pertaining to AID Representative [redacted] is somewhat hazy at this time, however, she recalled reading a Scat copy on the Scat Board of the telegram and recalled that this was subsequent to the JACK ANDERSON Column in the "Washington Post." She stated that that was her only access to this telegram according to her recollection and that she did not have a copy made at any time. She also stated she was unaware of who else may have had a copy of the telegram in their possession. [redacted] stated she is not acquainted with JACK ANDERSON or any member of his Staff or family and has not had any contact with them. She also stated that she is not acquainted with [redacted] and does not know of anyone who might want to discredit him. She also stated that she does not have any information as to how the information in the telegram was leaked to JACK ANDERSON.

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-26-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/STP/TH

Interviewed on 10/14/71 ^{by} [redacted] Washington, D.C. File # WFO 65-11628 149
by SAs [redacted] and [redacted] RCW:vos Date dictated 10/15/71

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : SAC, WFO (65-11628)

DATE: 10/27/71

FROM : SA [redacted]

SUBJECT: TOLLEAK
ESPIONAGE - MISCELLANEOUS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-20-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/CPB/TH

On 10/22/71 the personnel file of [redacted] former secretary in the Executive Secretariat Room 7239, U.S. Department of State and currently employed by U.S. Senator FRED HARRIS in his Presidential campaign, was reviewed and the following information was obtained:

The personnel file of [redacted] was made available by [redacted], Files Section, Personnel Services Division, Room 1609, U.S. Department State.

Date of birth:
Place of birth:
Social Security Number:
Residence:
Previous address:

Education:



61-63;

Katherine Gibbs Secretarial School, 200 Park Avenue, New York, New York, 63-64

References listed for application at USDS:

DONALD JAMES PRITCHARD, Lyndhurst, Ohio, Vice President of a bank;

W. J. PFEIF, 435 Crestwood Road, Fairfield, Connecticut, GE Executive;

R. E. WEAVER, Cleveland, Ohio, Vice President, Chilcote Brewer Company

Previous employments:

1964-65, secretary, IBM World Trade Corporation, 821 North Plaza, New York, New York; 65-11628 - 1602

1-WFO

RCW:cmr cmw
(1) rcw

SEARCHED	INDEXED
SERIALIZED	FILED
OCT 27 1971	
FBI WASH. FIELD OFFICE	



b6
b7c

WFO 65-11628

1965, secretary, Weston Woods
Studios, Incorporated, Weston,
Connecticut

[redacted] entered on duty with the USDS 8/3/67. Since that time she had been assigned to Brussels, Belgium, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic and to WDC. Her assignment in WDC began 3/1/71 and terminated when she resigned effective 9/28/71. At the time of her resignation, her annual salary amount to \$8,483 and she indicated that she was terminating her job at the USDS because she had been offered another job.

There was no derogatory information noted in the personnel file of [redacted]

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F B I

Date: 10/27/71

Transmit the following in CODED
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via TELETYPE URGENT
(Priority)

007

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (65-74138)

FROM: SAC, WFO (65-11628)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-20-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/CPB/TH

TOLL LEK, SIO

RE BUREAU AIRTEL DATED OCTOBER TWENTYTWO LAST, AUTHORIZING
CONTACT OF [REDACTED], VICE PRESIDENT AND DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC
AFFAIRS, METROMEDIA, INC., WASHINGTON, D. C. (WDC), IN EFFORT
TO SECURE MASTER TAPE OF THE SEPTEMBER TWENTYFOUR LAST
PROGRAM OF JACK ANDERSON.

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IT HAS BEEN LEARNED THAT IN ADDITION TO THE PROFESSIONAL
ASSOCIATION WHICH EXISTS BETWEEN JACK ANDERSON AS A NEWS
COMMENTATOR FOR TELEVISION STATION WTTG AND [REDACTED] AS A
WTTG VICE PRESIDENT, THAT ANDERSON AND [REDACTED] HAVE ENJOYED A
DEGREE OF PERSONAL AND SOCIAL ACQUAINTANCESHIP AS MEMBERS OF
THE SAME CHURCH. THIS IS NOT TO SUGGEST THAT THIS RELATION-
SHIP WOULD IN ANY MANNER AFFECT THE RELIABILITY OR CONFIDENCE
OF [REDACTED] BUT IS BEING BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF THE BUREAU

65-11628-762

SEARCHED _____ INDEXED _____

SERIALIZED *h* FILED *h*

OCT 27 2 52 PM '71

1 - WFO
FIG:jak *jak*

FBI WASH. F. O.

Approved: RGK/ghb
Special Agent in Charge

Sent 4:54 M Per [REDACTED]

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via _____
(Priority)WFO 65-11628
PAGE TWO

SO IT WILL BE FULLY AWARE THAT THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ANDERSON AND [] IS MORE THAN A BUSINESS AFFILIATION. NOTWITHSTANDING, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT EVANS BE CONTACTED.

IN CONNECTION WITH THE ATTEMPT TO ENLIST THE COOPERATION OF [] TO REVIEW THE ABOVE-MENTIONED TAPE, IT APPEARS A DISTINCT POSSIBILITY THAT [] MIGHT REQUEST A SUBPOENA BE UTILIZED TO SECURE THE TAPE. TO BE PREPARED FOR THIS EVENTUALITY, THE BUREAU IS REQUESTED TO ADVISE WHETHER AN EFFORT SHOULD THEN BE MADE TO SECURE A SUBPOENA AND IF OBTAINED, WHETHER BUREAU AUTHORITY IS GIVEN TO SERVE THE SUBPOENA.

IN THE EVENT [] VOLUNTARILY MAKES AVAILABLE THE MASTER TAPE IN QUESTION OR IF IT IS OBTAINED BY SUBPOENA, THE PROBLEM IS PRESENTED AS TO THE AVAILABILITY OF TECHNICAL FACILITIES TO REVIEW SUCH TAPE AND TO PREPARE PRINTS OF THE PERTINENT FRAMES. THE BUREAU IS REQUESTED TO ADVISE WHETHER THE FBI LABORATORY HAS APPROPRIATE EQUIPMENT WHICH CAN BE USED

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Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

10/28/71

AIRTEL

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-20-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/CPB/TH

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (65-74138)

FROM: SAC, WFO (65-11628) (P)

**TOLL LEK
SIO**

ReWFOtel 10/20/71 and Butel 10/21/71, concerning authority requested of Bureau to interview [redacted] former employee of the U.S. Department of State (USDS) who is now employed with the Presidential Campaign Staff for Senator FRED R. HARRIS (Democrat - Oklahoma).

By way of background, the personnel file of [redacted] at the USDS reveals her birth as [redacted], Fairfield, Connecticut. She attended Miami University, Oxford, Ohio (1961 - 63) and Katherine Gibbs Secretarial School, New York, New York. [redacted] entered on duty with the USDS on 8/3/67. Since that time she has been assigned to Brussels, Belgium; Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic and at Washington, D. C. (WDC). Her assignment in WDC began 3/1/71. She resigned from the USDS effective 9/28/71, indicating she had been offered another job. Her personnel file contained no derogatory information.

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[redacted], Executive Secretariat, USDS, WDC, advised that she and [redacted] were the only two secretaries in the office of [redacted] Line Officer, Executive Secretariat, USDS, during July, 1971. However, she has no reason to believe [redacted] saw the

2 - Bureau
1 - WFO

ELG:jak
(3)

est/jak

EBM

65-11628-163

Searched _____
Serialized _____
Indexed _____
Filed _____

WFO 65-11628

telegrams concerning [redacted]. The only reason she mentioned [redacted] name was merely to indicate she was an employee in this office at the time the telegrams pertinent to this case were processed at the USDS. [redacted] could furnish no information suggesting [redacted] has any knowledge concerning the telegrams in question or the leak of the information to JACK ANDERSON or his staff.

In view of the comments of [redacted], there appears to be an absence of positive information indicating [redacted] saw the telegrams in question concerning [redacted] or could supply any information regarding them. Numerous individuals in the Executive Secretariat have already been interviewed. To interview [redacted] would at most seem to be an exercise in adding to the great number of individuals already interviewed without any assurance of productivity. It would appear best not to contact [redacted] because of her current employment in the political arena and the possible embarrassment to the Bureau which might follow should she be inclined to reveal our investigative interest in this case to the press.

In view of the above circumstances no efforts will be made to locate and interview [redacted]

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NR039 WA CODE

9:41 PM NITEL 10-29-71 DRL

TO: WASHINGTON FIELD (65-11623)

FROM: DIRECTOR (65-74138) 1P

TOLL LER - SIO.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-20-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/CPB/TH

REURTEL OCTOBER TWENTY-SEVEN LAST.

WASHINGTON FIELD IS AUTHORIZED TO CONTACT [REDACTED], VICE
PRESIDENT AND DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, METROMEDIA INCOR-
PORATED, WASHINGTON, D.C., TO DETERMINE IF MASTER TAPE OF NEWS
PROGRAM ON SEPTEMBER TWENTY-FOUR LAST OVER TELEVISION STATION WTTG
EXISTS AND IF SO, WHETHER [REDACTED] WILL MAKE TAPE AVAILABLE.

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IN EVENT TAPE EXISTS AND [REDACTED] REQUESTS SUBPOENA BE UTILIZED
TO SECURE SAME, PROMPTLY ADVISE BUREAU IN ORDER THAT MATTER MAY BE
DISCUSSED WITH DEPARTMENT RELATIVE TO ISSUANCE OF SUBPOENA.

TECHNICAL ADVICE CONCERNING EQUIPMENT NECESSARY TO REVIEW TAPE
BEING FURNISHED UNDER SEPARATE COVER.

END

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65-11628-164

SEARCHED INDEXED

SER.

OCT 30 1971

[REDACTED] 90

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9 P
[Signature]

WFO 65-11628

information does not warrant requesting State to provide for an interview of [] overseas at this time.

Concerning the lead set out in referenced report relating to the possibility of interviewing [], the Bureau is referred to WFO airtel dated 10/28/71, wherein it was recommended that she not be interviewed.

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LEADS

WASHINGTON FIELD

AT WASHINGTON, D. C.: Upon receipt of Bureau authority requested by WFO teletype 10/27/71, will contact [], Vice President and Director of Public Affairs, Metromedia, Inc., in an effort to secure the master tape of the 9/24/71 program of JACK ANDERSON.

B*
COVER PAGE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-20-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/CPB/TH

Copy to:

Report of:

SA [redacted]

Office: Washington, D. C.

Date:

11/2/71

Field Office File #:

65-11628

Bureau File #:

65-74138

Title:

UNKNOWN SUBJECT; Unauthorized Disclosure of
Information in State Department Cables
Appearing in "The Washington Post" Article,
Tuesday, July 27, 1971, By Jack Anderson

Character:

ESPIONAGE - X

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Synopsis:

Secretary-receptionist for Executive Secretariat, U.S. Department of State, has no available record or recollection of JACK ANDERSON or his staff having visited at the Executive Secretariat. [redacted], Executive Secretariat, Agency for International Development (AID), recalled seeing incoming cable from Nairobi, Kenya, concerning [redacted]. He claims he personally gave it to [redacted] AID, and had no further business with it and denies furnishing information to JACK ANDERSON or staff. [redacted] upon interview denies seeing either pertinent cable until shown them by Dr. HANNAH after staff member for JACK ANDERSON indicated he had copies of the cables and intended to make them public.

- P -

DETAILS: AT WASHINGTON, D. C.:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*See note to
Cover*

[redacted]
[redacted] automatic
[redacted]
[redacted] on

WFO 65-11628

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
Interview of [redacted] Secretary - Receptionist, Executive Secretariat, USDS	2
Interview of [redacted] Staff Officer, Executive Secretariat, AID	3 & 7
Interview of [redacted] Secretary to [redacted], AID	4
Interview of [redacted] Executive Secretary, Executive Secretariat, AID	5

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 10/21/71

1

[redacted],
Executive Secretariat, Room 7224, U. S. Department of State
(USDS), advised as follows:

There is no sign in register located for the Executive Secretariat. The Secretary and the members of his staff maintain their own personal appointment calendar on a daily basis, and anyone who is expected in the Secretariat is made known to the Receptionist. At the end of each day, this list, maintained by the Receptionist for that particular day, is destroyed, and no permanent record of visitors to the Secretary's Office or members of his staff is maintained except on their own personal calendars.

[redacted] stated that to the best of her knowledge neither JACK ANDERSON nor any member of his staff had ever visited the Secretary or any member of his staff in the Secretariat. She stated that she believed that she would have recalled ANDERSON's name if either he or any member of his staff had visited in the Executive Secretariat.

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Interviewed on 10/20/71 at Washington, D. C. File # WFO 65-11628
by SAs [redacted] and [redacted] Date dictated RCW:lmc 10/21/71

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

10/28/71

Date of transcription

1

[redacted], Executive Secretariat, Agency for International Development, Room 5665, State Department Building, Washington, D. C. (WDC), advised as follows:

[redacted] stated that he saw and read the incoming cable from Ambassador MC ILVAINE, in Nairobi, Kenya, to Dr. JOHN HANNAH, Administrator, Agency for International Development (AID), dated July 16, 1971, concerning the [redacted] incident. HARPER said that he did not see the outgoing cable, dated July 19, 1971, from Dr. HANNAH to Ambassador MC ILVAINE.

[redacted] said that it is part of his duty to read and screen incoming cables, and to send them to the appropriate persons in AID. He said that the aforementioned cable from Nairobi was brought to his office by a messenger who had received it by pneumatic tube from the State Department Operations Center. He could not recall who the messenger was who delivered the cable, but it came in a sealed envelope marked "Eyes Only Dr. HANNAH". He opened the envelope as his job requires, read the contents, put the cable in an envelope and gave it personally to [redacted], Executive Secretary, AID. [redacted] said that after he gave the message to [redacted], he had no further business with it. He stated that he did not make any copies of the cable.

[redacted] firmly denied furnishing the cable or the contents of the cable to JACK ANDERSON or to any member of ANDERSON's staff. He said that he does not know JACK ANDERSON personally or any member of his staff.

[redacted] said that he has never met [redacted], that he doesn't know any of [redacted] friends, and does not know anyone with a deep grudge against [redacted] who would try to discredit him by leaking classified documents.

Interviewed on 10/27/71 at Washington, D. C. File # 65-11628
 by SA [redacted] and SA [redacted] Date dictated 10/28/71
 MGM:jak

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

10/28/71

Date of transcription

1

[redacted],
Executive Secretariat, Agency for International Development
(AID) and secretary to [redacted], stated that she did
not see the incoming or outgoing cables relating to the
[redacted] incident, and did not make xerox copies of them
for [redacted] or for anyone else. She stated, however, that
she seldom reads any of the material that she reproduces in
the xerox machine.

[redacted] said that she does not know JACK
ANDERSON or any members of his staff. She said that she
met [redacted] on one occasion at AID headquarters, but
does not know him personally.

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Interviewed on 10/28/71 at Washington, D. C. File # 65-11628
by SA [redacted] and SA [redacted] HGM:jak Date dictated 10/28/71

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

10/29/71

Date of transcription

[redacted], Executive Secretariat (EXSEC), Agency for International Development (AID), Room 5940, State Department Building, Washington, D. C., advised as follows:

[redacted] said that it was his recollection that he saw neither the incoming cable from Nairobi (Cable #1), dated July 16, 1971, nor the outgoing cable (Cable #2) at the time of their receipt and dispatch. He recalled that he was preparing a speech for Dr. HANNAH, AID Administrator, on July 16, 1971. [redacted] said that when he is in the process of preparing speech material he closes the door of his office to visitors, and his secretary, [redacted], wards off distractions while he is so engaged.

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[redacted] said that he first read the contents of Cable #1 and Cable #2 when he was called to Dr. HANNAH's office, and shown them by HANNAH. That occurred a number of days later when HANNAH had received a telephone call from one of JACK ANDERSON's men who said that he had copies of the cables and intended to make them public.

[redacted] recalled that about the time Cable #1 came in, and Cable #2 went out, he knew that "something was up", because he saw Dr. SAMUEL ADAMS enter and leave Dr. HANNAH's office several times. He did not recall whether that occurred on Friday, July 16th, or Monday, July 19th. It was his recollection that the matter was a personnel matter, for which he has no responsibility or particular concern.

[redacted] denied that he had received a copy of Cable #1, after its arrival from [redacted], Staff Officer, EXSEC, AID, on or about July 16, 1971, and repeated that he first saw it when Dr. HANNAH showed it to him.

Interviewed on 10/28/71 at Washington, D. C. File # 65-11628
 by SA [redacted] and SA [redacted] MCM:jak Date dictated 10/28/71

WFO 65-11628

2

[redacted] firmly denied furnishing copies of the cables, or contents thereof, to JACK ANDERSON, or any member of his staff. He stated that he does not personally know ANDERSON or members of his staff.

[redacted] said that he is aware that [redacted] has an irritating, presumptuous manner, and that he rubs people the wrong way, but he knew no one who had a personal grudge against him sufficient to cause a leak of classified information in order to discredit him. [redacted] had no information as to how the leak of information occurred.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

10/29/71

Date of transcription

1

[redacted]

Agency for International Development (AID), stated that he normally maintained a log in which he logged in the arrival of "EKDIS" (Exclusive Distribution), "NODIS" (No Distribution) and "Eyes Only" messages, but that he did not log in the incoming telegram from Kenya concerning [redacted] (Cable Number 1) because of its sensitive nature. He explained that upon receipt of this cable from the State Department Operations Center, he personally delivered it directly to [redacted] Executive Secretariat, AID. HARPER stated that the message he received and read concerning [redacted] and which he delivered to [redacted] was not garbled, but was a clear version of the account. After delivering the message to [redacted], he stood by [redacted] desk while [redacted] read it. [redacted] asked if anyone else in AID had seen the cable and [redacted] told him no.

[redacted] stated he was certain he had not delivered this cable to [redacted], but to [redacted] personally. [redacted] still had the cable when [redacted] left his office.

[redacted] stated that there is a Xerox machine to which he has access, but that he made no copies of Cable Number 1 and had nothing further to do with it after giving it to [redacted]

[redacted] could not recall specifically when he had received Cable Number 1 and stated that if it had arrived in his office late on a Friday afternoon, he might not have handled it until the following Monday morning. He could not recall whether he delivered this cable to [redacted] on late Friday, July 16, 1971 or early Monday, July 19, 1971.

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Interviewed on 10/28/71 at Washington, D. C. File # 65-11628

by SA [redacted] and SA [redacted] JCC:jak Date dictated 10/28/71

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 10/21/71

[redacted]
Executive Secretariat, Room 7224, U. S. Department of State (USDS), advised as follows:

There is no sign in register located for the Executive Secretariat. The Secretary and the members of his staff maintain their own personal appointment calendar on a daily basis, and anyone who is expected in the Secretariat is made known to the Receptionist. At the end of each day, this list, maintained by the Receptionist for that particular day, is destroyed, and no permanent record of visitors to the Secretary's Office or members of his staff is maintained except on their own personal calendars.

[redacted] stated that to the best of her knowledge neither JACK ANDERSON nor any member of his staff had ever visited the Secretary or any member of his staff in the Secretariat. She stated that she believed that she would have recalled ANDERSON's name if either he or any member of his staff had visited in the Executive Secretariat.

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Interviewed on 10/20/71 at Washington, D. C. File # WFO 65-11628 767
by SAs [redacted] and [redacted] RCW:lmc Date dictated 10/21/71

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-26-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/STP/TH

Date of transcription 10/29/71

[redacted], Executive Secretariat, Agency for International Development (AID), stated that he normally maintained a log in which he logged in the arrival of "EXDIS" (Exclusive Distribution), "NODIS" (No Distribution) and "Eyes Only" messages, but that he did not log in the incoming telegram from Kenya concerning [redacted] (Cable Number 1) because of its sensitive nature. He explained that upon receipt of this cable from the State Department Operations Center, he personally delivered it directly to [redacted] [redacted], Executive Secretariat, AID. [redacted] stated that the message he received and read concerning [redacted] and which he delivered to [redacted] was not garbled, but was a clear version of the account. After delivering the message to [redacted], he stood by [redacted] desk while [redacted] read it. [redacted] asked if anyone else in AID had seen the cable and [redacted] told him no.

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[redacted] stated he was certain he had not delivered this cable to [redacted] secretary, but to [redacted] personally. [redacted] still had the cable when [redacted] left his office.

[redacted] stated that there is a Xerox machine to which he has access, but that he made no copies of Cable Number 1 and had nothing further to do with it after giving it to [redacted]

[redacted] could not recall specifically when he had received Cable Number 1 and stated that if it had arrived in his office late on a Friday afternoon, he might not have handled it until the following Monday morning. He could not recall whether he delivered this cable to [redacted] on late Friday, July 16, 1971 or early Monday, July 19, 1971.

Interviewed on 10/28/71 at Washington, D. C. File # 65-11628 168
by SA [redacted] and SA [redacted] JCC:jak Date dictated 10/28/71

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 02-26-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/STP/TH

Date of transcription 10/29/71

[redacted], Executive
Secretariat (EXSEC), Agency for International Development (AID),
Room 5940, State Department Building, Washington, D. C.,
advised as follows:

[redacted] said that it was his recollection that he saw neither the incoming cable from Nairobi (Cable #1), dated July 16, 1971, nor the outgoing cable (Cable #2) at the time of their receipt and dispatch. He recalled that he was preparing a speech for Dr. HANNAH, AID Administrator, on July 16, 1971. [redacted] said that when he is in the process of preparing speech material he closes the door of his office to visitors, and his secretary, [redacted] wards off distractions while he is so engaged.

b6
b7C

[redacted] said that he first read the contents of Cable #1 and Cable #2 when he was called to Dr. HANNAH's office, and shown them by HANNAH. That occurred a number of days later when HANNAH had received a telephone call from one of JACK ANDERSON's men who said that he had copies of the cables and intended to make them public.

[redacted] recalled that about the time Cable #1 came in, and Cable #2 went out, he knew that "something was up", because he saw Dr. SAMUEL ADAMS enter and leave Dr. HANNAH's office several times. He did not recall whether that occurred on Friday, July 16th, or Monday, July 19th. It was his recollection that the matter was a personnel matter, for which he has no responsibility or particular concern.

[redacted] denied that he had received a copy of Cable #1, after its arrival from [redacted] EXSEC, AID, on or about July 16, 1971, and repeated that he first saw it when Dr. HANNAH showed it to him.

Interviewed on 10/28/71 at Washington, D. C. File # 65-11628 169
by SA [redacted] and SA [redacted] Date dictated 10/28/71
MGM:jak

WFO 65-11628

[] firmly denied furnishing copies of the cables, or contents thereof, to JACK ANDERSON, or any member of his staff. He stated that he does not personally know ANDERSON or members of his staff.

[] said that he is aware that [] has an irritating, presumptuous manner, and that he rubs people the wrong way, but he knew no one who had a personal grudge against him sufficient to cause a leak of classified information in order to discredit him. [] had no information as to how the leak of information occurred.

b6
b7C

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 10/28/71

[redacted],
Executive Secretariat, Agency for International Development
(AID) and secretary to [redacted], stated that she did
not see the incoming or outgoing cables relating to the
[redacted] incident, and did not make xerox copies of them
for [redacted] or for anyone else. She stated, however, that
she seldom reads any of the material that she reproduces in
the xerox machine.

[redacted] said that she does not know JACK
ANDERSON or any members of his staff. She said that she
met [redacted] on one occasion at AID headquarters, but
does not know him personally.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-26-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/STP/TH

b6
b7c

Interviewed on 10/28/71 at Washington, D. C. File # 65-11628 170
by SA [redacted] and SA [redacted] Date dictated 10/28/71
MGM:jak

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 02-26-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/STP/TH

Date of transcription 10/28/71

[redacted], Executive Secretariat, Agency for International Development, Room 5665, State Department Building, Washington, D. C. (WDC), advised as follows:

[redacted] stated that he saw and read the incoming cable from Ambassador MC ILVAINE, in Nairobi, Kenya, to Dr. JOHN HANNAH, Administrator, Agency for International Development (AID), dated July 16, 1971, concerning the [redacted] incident. [redacted] said that he did not see the outgoing cable, dated July 19, 1971, from Dr. HANNAH to Ambassador MC ILVAINE.

[redacted] said that it is part of his duty to read and screen incoming cables, and to send them to the appropriate persons in AID. He said that the aforementioned cable from Nairobi was brought to his office by a messenger who had received it by pneumatic tube from the State Department Operations Center. He could not recall who the messenger was who delivered the cable, but it came in a sealed envelope marked "Eyes Only" [redacted]. He opened the envelope as his job requires, read the contents, put the cable in an envelope and gave it personally to [redacted], Executive Secretary, AID. [redacted] said that after he gave the message to [redacted], he had no further business with it. He stated that he did not make any copies of the cable.

b6
b7c

[redacted] firmly denied furnishing the cable or the contents of the cable to JACK ANDERSON or to any member of ANDERSON's staff. He said that he does not know JACK ANDERSON personally or any member of his staff.

[redacted] said that he has never met [redacted] that he doesn't know any of [redacted] friends, and does not know anyone with a deep grudge against [redacted] who would try to discredit him by leaking classified documents.

Interviewed on 10/27/71 at Washington, D. C. File # 65-11628 121
by SA [redacted] and SA [redacted] *MGM* MGM: jak Date dictated 10/28/71

11/9/71

AIRTEL

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (65-74138)

FROM: SAC, WFO (65-11628) (P)

UNSUB; Unauthorized Disclosure of
Information in State Department
Cables Appearing in "The Washington
Post" Article, Tuesday, July 27, 1971,
By Jack Anderson
ESPIONAGE - X
(OO:WFO)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-20-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/CPB/TH

ReWFO report 11/2/71.

For the information of New York which has not
previously received information in this case, this invest-
igation is being conducted at the specific request of the
Justice Department as a possible violation of the Espionage
Act (18 USC 792-798). It is based on an article by columnist
JACK ANDERSON in "The Washington Post" on 7/27/71, containing
information from classified State Department telegrams dated
7/16/71 and 7/19/71, concerning the conduct of [redacted]
[redacted], an employee of the Agency for International
Development (AID) assigned in Kenya.

b6
b7c

2 - Bureau
2 - New York
① - WFO

ELG:jak
(5)

WFO jak

ELG

65-11628-176A
Searched _____
Serialized _____
Indexed _____
Filed _____

WFO 65-11628

In connection with an interview of [redacted] by Agents of Washington Field he stated that to the best of his recollection he had received an overseas long distance telephone call at his residence in Nairobi, Kenya, on the evening of July 17, 1971, from Washington, D. C. (WDC). The caller identified himself as (First Name Not Recalled) [redacted] (phonetic), who said he was on JACK ANDERSON's staff. He read to [redacted] an account of [redacted] alleged misconduct during a social affair held in Kenya in connection with the visit there of the Vice President of the United States in July, 1971.

In an effort to determine whether a telephone call was made to Kenya from the WDC telephone number listed for the office of JACK ANDERSON during the month of July, 1971 and the identity of the person called in Kenya, and if possible the person who might have placed the call from ANDERSON's office; a subpoena was issued on 10/26/71, by the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, requesting the C & P Telephone Company, WDC, to furnish the toll records for the month of July, 1971 for this number.

[redacted]

[redacted] (This is the same number listed for the office of JACK ANDERSON.) The telephone company has no record as to the identity of the person placing this call, the person to whom the call was made, the place in Kenya where the call was made, nor the telephone number called in Kenya. The call consumed 20 minutes for which a charge in the amount of \$100 was made. The telephone company made available the following additional information: under the symbol 'RAO' on the record of this

WFO 65-11628

telephone call appears the entry "RQ"; under the heading "Cycle" are the numbers "04"; under the heading "Batch Card" appears the numbers "00" and "2313" (subheading "conntme").

A recontact was made with the telephone company seeking additional information concerning this telephone call. It was learned that the telephone records here contain nothing more relative to this telephone contact. Advice was received that overseas telephone calls information is kept by the telephone company at NYC on "mark sense cards".

LEAD

NEW YORK

AT NEW YORK, NEW YORK: Will contact appropriate source at the telephone company for full information appearing on the "mark sense card" concerning the above-mentioned overseas telephone call to Kenya in line with the foregoing comments. The telephone company at WDC advised this must be done promptly because these cards are kept for only a short period of time and are then destroyed. Expedite this investigation and submit results in report form with 6 copies for the Bureau.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

REPORTING OFFICE WASHINGTON FIELD	OFFICE OF ORIGIN WASHINGTON FIELD	DATE 11/12/71	INVESTIGATIVE PERIOD 11/3 - 12/71
TITLE OF CASE UNSUB; Unauthorized Disclosure of Information in State Department Cables Appearing in "The Washington Post" Article, Tuesday, July 27, 1971, By Jack Anderson		REPORT MADE BY SA <i>gdp</i>	TYPED BY jak
		CHARACTER OF CASE ESPIONAGE - X	

b6
b7c

REFERENCE: Report of SA dated 11/2/71, at WDC.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-20-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/CPB/TH

- P -

ADMINISTRATIVE: Reference is made to WFO airtel 11/9/71, cc-New York, wherein a lead was set out for New York to secure additional information from the telephone company concerning the telephone call to Kenya mentioned in the details of this report. New York has been requested to surep results of this lead.

In connection with Bureau Nitel 10/29/71, authorizing contact with Metromedia Incorporated, WDC, it has been learned at his office that he is out of the city and

ACCOMPLISHMENTS CLAIMED					<input type="checkbox"/> NONE	ACQUIT-TALS	CASE HAS BEEN:
CONVIC.	AUTO.	FUG.	FINES	SAVINGS	RECOVERIES		
							PENDING OVER ONE YEAR <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO PENDING PROSECUTION OVER SIX MONTHS <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO

APPROVED _____ SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE

COPIES MADE:

- 6 - Bureau (65-74138)
- 2 - New York
- 2 - WFO (65-11628)

jak *[Signature]*

DO NOT WRITE IN SPACES BELOW

177
178

Dissemination Record of Attached Report

Agency	Request Recd.	Date Fwd.	How Fwd.	By

Notations

65-11628-187

Searched _____
Serialized *[initials]*
Indexed _____
Filed _____

WFO 65-11628

will not return until the week of 11/15/71. Upon his return [redacted] will be contacted.

LEADS

NEW YORK

AT NEW YORK, NEW YORK: Will contact appropriate sources at the telephone company for full information concerning the overseas telephone call to Kenya which was made on 7/23/71, from the office number listed to JACK ANDERSON. This lead was previously set out by airtel dated 11/9/71.

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b7C

WASHINGTON FIELD

AT WASHINGTON, D. C.: Will contact [redacted] Vice President and Director of Public Affairs, Metromedia, Inc., in an effort to secure the master tape of the 9/24/71 program of JACK ANDERSON.

B*
COVER PAGE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-20-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/CPB/TH

Copy to:

Report of: SA Office: **Washington, D. C.**

Date: **11/12/71**

Field Office File #: **65-11628** Bureau File #: **65-74138**

Title: **UNKNOWN SUBJECT; Unauthorized Disclosure of Information in State Department Cables Appearing in "The Washington Post" Article, Tuesday, July 27, 1971, By Jack Anderson**

Character: **ESPIONAGE - X**

b6
b7c

Synopsis:

Subpoenas issued on 10/26/71, by U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, requesting C & P Telephone Company of Maryland and Washington, D. C. to furnish toll records for July, 1971, for numbers listed to office of JACK ANDERSON and residences of several of his staff. Review of these toll records furnished in response to these subpoenas reveals a telephone call from number listed for office of JACK ANDERSON was made to Kenya on July 23, 1971. Identity of person who placed this call, the person to whom the call was made, the place in Kenya where the call was made and the telephone number called in Kenya was not revealed by these telephone records.

- P -

DETAILS: AT WASHINGTON, D. C.:

WFO 65-11628

It has previously been reported in this case that on September 23, 1971, [redacted], Agency for International Development (AID) Representative in Kenya, was interviewed at Washington, D. C. (WDC). During the interview [redacted] stated that to the best of his recollection he had received an overseas long distance telephone call at his residence in Nairobi, Kenya, on the evening of July 17, 1971, from WDC. The caller identified himself as (First Name Not Recalled) [redacted] (phonetic), who said he was on JACK ANDERSON's staff. He read to [redacted] an account of [redacted] alleged misconduct during a social affair held in Kenya in connection with the visit there of the Vice President of the United States in July, 1971.

A review of the Congressional Directory (1971), the Washington City Directory (1970) and the Washington Metropolitan Area Telephone Directory (1971-72) reveals that "Bell-McClure Syndicate", "Parade Publications" and the office of JACK ANDERSON, is each located at 1612 K Street, N.W., WDC and each has the identical telephone number -- 347-4325. This Congressional Directory lists representatives of the Bell-McClure Syndicate as JACK ANDERSON, [redacted], [redacted], [redacted]

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b7c

The Washington Metropolitan Area Telephone Directory (1971-72) carries the following telephone information:

[redacted]
[redacted], telephone [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted] telephone [redacted]

Parade Publication, 1612 K Street, N.W., Washington, D. C., telephone 347-4325.

telephone [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted], telephone [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted], telephone [redacted]

11/18/71

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-20-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/CPB/TH

AIRTEL

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (65-74138)
FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (65-25730) (RUC)

SUBJECT: UNSUB; Unauthorized Disclosure of
Information in State Department
Cables Appearing in The Washington
Post Article, Tuesday, 7/27/71,
By Jack Anderson
ESP - X
(OO: WFO)

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b7c

SA [redacted] ReWFOairtel to the Bureau, 11/9/71; and report of
[redacted] dated 11/12/71 at WFO.

Concerning the telephone call made on 7/23/71 from
telephone number (202) 347-4325, it is noted that when the call
was made, a Mark Sense Ticket would have been prepared by the
operator in Washington, D.C. who assisted in placing the call.
This Mark Sense Ticket would have been assigned an identifica-
tion number which identifies that call made from the above
telephone number to Kenya. This Mark Sense Ticket would have
been sent to the business office that handles the above
telephone number in Washington, D.C. so that this call may be
charged to the subscriber of that number. This record would
have remained in Washington, D. C., and NY would have no record
for information concerning this telephone call.

*Note
Report
Handled*

The above information was furnished by [redacted]
[redacted] Security Supervisor, NY Telephone Co. on 11-18-71.
2-Bureau (RM)
2-Washington Field (65-11628) (RM)
1-New York

AC:kxb
(6)

*9 Expedite
handling
PLS
SPM*

65-11628-178

SEARCHED.....INDEXED.....
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NOV 19 1971
FBI - WASH. F. O.
[redacted] 187

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 11/23/71

[redacted] Public Relations, WTTG Television, Metromedia, Incorporated, 5151 Wisconsin Avenue, N.W., Washington, D. C., advised as follows:

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[redacted] stated that the television tape for the 10:00 p.m. news telecast presented on WTTG Channel 5, on September 24, 1971; which tape included a segment of a news telecast featuring JACK ANDERSON, with a blown-up State Department communication on a rear screen used as a background, had been erased, and was no longer in existence.

Additionally, [redacted] said that he had not been consulted by WTTG, prior to the fact, of having JACK ANDERSON's segment included in the 10:00 p.m. news telecast. [redacted] said that had he known about it in advance, he would have objected to the inclusion of ANDERSON's segment in the telecast. He would like to see the segment removed from the program.

[redacted] said that he recalled the JACK ANDERSON column in "The Washington Post" which pertained to the alleged misconduct of [redacted] in Kenya. [redacted] said that he knows [redacted] personally, and found it hard to believe that he had committed such indiscretions.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-26-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/STP/TH

Interviewed on 11/18/71 at Washington, D. C. File # 65-11628 178A
by SA [redacted] and SA [redacted] Date dictated 11/19/71
MGM:jak

12/1/71

AIRTEL

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-20-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/CPB/TH

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (65-74138)

FROM: SAC, WFO (65-11628) (P)

UNSUB; Unauthorized Disclosure of
Information in State Department
Cables Appearing in "The Washington
Post" Article, Tuesday, July 27, 1971,
by Jack Anderson
ESPIONAGE - X
(OO:WFO)

ReWFOairtel 11/9/71 and NYairtel 11/18/71.

On 11/30/71, [redacted], Security Office,
C and P Telephone Company, Washington, D. C., advised
that on this date he had been in contact with an unknown
employee in the toll library of the telephone company at
New York City. It was learned during this telephone
conversation that a "mark sense card" had been located
by the telephone company in New York indicating that one
[redacted] at Washington, D. C., on 8/19/71, had placed
a telephone call to [redacted] in Kenya. Further
details were not available to [redacted] however, he stated
this card is available at the telephone company in New
York City.

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b7c

For the information of the New York Division,
[redacted] is a member of the staff of JACK ANDERSON.

2 - Bureau
2 - New York (65-25730) (RM)
1 - WFO

ELG:jak
(5)

PA
65-11628-~~15~~

Searched _____
Serialized _____
Indexed _____
Filed _____

12/7/71

AIRTEL

REGISTERED MAIL

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (65-74138)

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (65-25730)(RUC)

SUBJECT: UNSUB; Unauthorized Disclosure of
Information in State Department
Cables Appearing in "The Washington
Post" Article, Tuesday, July 27, 1971,
by Jack Anderson
ESPIONAGE - X
(OO: WFO)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-20-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/CPB/TH

b6
b7c

ReWFOairtel to Bu 12/1/71.

On 12/7/71 [redacted]

NY Telephone Co., NYC, NY, advised that there are many toll
libraries in the NYC area. He added that it is impossible to
locate the information concerning the toll call in question
without the "identification number" of the "mark sense
ticket" pertaining to this call.

If WFO can furnish the necessary "identification
number" the NYO will make additional inquiries concerning
the call in question. [redacted] stated that without this
"identification number" he could furnish no information
concerning this call.

- 2 - Bureau (RM)
- ② - Washington Field (65-11628)(RM)
- 1 - New York

AC:ljk
(6)

1 - Supervisor #31

59

65-11628-182

SEARCHED.....	INDEXED.....
SERIALIZED.....	FILED.....
DEC 9 1971	
FBI - WASH. F. O.	

[redacted]

12/22/71

AIRTEL

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-20-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/CPB/TH

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (65-74138)
FROM: SAC, WFO (65-11628) (P)

**UNSUB; Unauthorized Disclosure of
Information in State Department
Cables Appearing in "The Washington
Post" Article, Tuesday, July 27, 1971,
by Jack Anderson
ESPIONAGE - X
(OO:WFO)**

ReNYairtel 12/7/71.

Attached for New York are two copies of the telephone record pertinent to this inquiry which was secured by subpoena as noted on page two of WFO airtel dated 11/9/71. The telephone call which is pertinent to this investigation was made on 7/23/71, to Kenya. The information appearing on this enclosure concerning this call is the only information available to the telephone company at Washington, D.C.

LEAD

NEW YORK

AT NEW YORK, NEW YORK: Will contact [redacted] Security Supervisor, NY Telephone Company, and show him a copy of the above-mentioned telephone record concerning

b6
b7c

- 2 - Bureau
- 2 - New York (Enc.2) (65-25730)
- 1 - WFO

ELG:jak

(5)

[Handwritten signature]

[Handwritten signature]

65-11628-183

Searched _____
Serialized _____
Indexed _____
Filed _____

WFO 65-11628

the pertinent telephone call to Kenya. Based on the information set out on this record, a request is to be made of him to locate the "mark sense card" for full information concerning this telephone call. Expedite.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-20-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/CPB/TH

Copy to:

Report of:

[REDACTED]

Office: **Washington, D.C.**

Date:

12/29/71

Field Office File #:

65-11628

Bureau File #:

65-74138

Title:

**UNKNOWN SUBJECT; Unauthorized Disclosure
of Information in State Department Cables
Appearing in "The Washington Post" Article,
Tuesday, July 27, 1971, by Jack Anderson**

b6
b7c

Character:

ESPIONAGE - X

Syno

[REDACTED] **WTIG Television, WDC, advises
that television tape for news telecast on this station for
9/24/71, which tape included a segment of a news telecast
by JACK ANDERSON, with blown-up State Department communica-
tion on screen used as background, no longer exists.**

DETAILS AT WASHINGTON, D.C.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

11/23/71

Date of transcription

1

Mr. MARK EVANS, Vice President, Public Relations, WTIG Television, Metromedia, Incorporated, 5151 Wisconsin Avenue, N.W., Washington, D. C., advised as follows:

Mr. EVANS stated that the television tape for the 10:00 p.m. news telecast presented on WTIG Channel 5, on September 24, 1971; which tape included a segment of a news telecast featuring JACK ANDERSON, with a blown-up State Department communication on a rear screen used as a background, had been erased, and was no longer in existence.

Additionally, Mr. EVANS said that he had not been consulted by WTIG, prior to the fact, of having JACK ANDERSON's segment included in the 10:00 p.m. news telecast. Mr. EVANS said that had he known about it in advance, he would have objected to the inclusion of ANDERSON's segment in the telecast. He would like to see the segment removed from the program.

Mr. EVANS said that he recalled the JACK ANDERSON column in "The Washington Post" which pertained to the alleged misconduct of BERT TOLLEFSON in Kenya. Mr. EVANS said that he knows TOLLEFSON personally, and found it hard to believe that he had committed such indiscretions.

Interviewed on 11/18/71 at Washington, D. C. File # 65-11628
 by SA EDWARD H. JOYCE and SA MALCOLM G. MUELLER HGM:jak Date dictated 11/19/71

1/11/72

AIRTEL

REGISTERED MAIL

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (65-74138)

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (65-25730)(RUC)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-20-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/CPB/TH

SUBJECT: UNSUB; Unauthorized Disclosure of
Information in State Department
Cables appearing in "The Washington
Post" Article, Tuesday, July 27, 1971,
by Jack Anderson
ESPIONAGE - X
(OO: WFO)

ReWFOairtel 12/22/71 and WFOrep 12/29/71.

On 1/10/72 RUDOLPH J. POSCH, Security Supervisor,
NY Telephone Co., NYC, NY, advised at 2:00 PM on 7/23/71, a
telephone call was made to Nairobi, Kenya, person-to-person,
to BURT M. TOLLEFSON at the American Embassy. The call was made
by a person whose name on the ticket is indistinct.

Transmitted herewith is a Xerox copy of the film
reflecting the above call. The original ticket is no longer in
existence. This Xerox copy is being forwarded to WFO, inasmuch
as the indistinct name on this Xerox copy may be determined by
WFO.

- 2 - Bureau (RM)
- 2 - Washington Field (65-11623)(Encl. 1)(RM)
- 1 - New York

AC:ljk
(6)

- 1 - Supervisor #31

59

See me

65-11628-185

SEARCHED.....	INDEXED.....
SERIALIZED.....	FILED.....
JAN 13 1972	
FBI - WASH. F. O.	

[Handwritten signatures and initials over the stamp]

1/20/72

AIRTEL

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (65-74138)

FROM: SAC, WFO (65-11628) (P)

UNSUB; Unauthorized Disclosure of
Information in State Department
Cables appearing in "The Washington
Post" Article, Tuesday, July 27, 1971,
by Jack Anderson
ESPIONAGE - X
(OO:WFO)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-20-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/CPB/TH

ReNYairtel 1/11/72, furnishing information re-
garding a telephone record showing a telephone call made
by JOSEPH SPEAR, a member of JACK ANDERSON's staff, on 7/23/71,
to BURT M. TOLLEFSON at the American Embassy, Nairobi,
Kenya

There is no information contained in referenced
airtel to indicate whether or not this information re-
sulted from the issuance of a subpoena. If a subpoena was
issued supply details.

In the event no subpoena was utilized, advise
WFO of the identity of the individual at the telephone
company to whom a subpoena could be directed should it be-
come necessary to make prosecutive use of this information.

Expedite to enable WFO to prepare an investigation
report.

2-Bureau
2-New York (65-25730)
1-WFO
ELG/lrs
(5)

PN
ELG

65-11628-186
SEARCHED _____
SERIALIZED _____
INDEXED _____
FILED _____

1/27/72

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-20-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/CPB/TH

AIRTEL

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (65-74135)
FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (65-25730) (RUC)

SUBJECT: UNSUB; Unauthorized Disclosure
of Information in State Department
Cables Appearing in The Washington
Post Article, Tuesday, July 27, 1971
by Jack Anderson
ESP - X
(OO: WFO)

ReNYairtel, 1/11/72; and WFOairtel, 1/20/72.

The Xerox copy of information obtained from New York Telephone Company was obtained from microfilm through the cooperation of the New York Telephone Co. without subpoena. It is noted that the original record has been destroyed and that only the microfilm is now available. If this microfilm is to be subpoenaed, a subpoena should be addressed to RUDOLPH J. POSCH, Security Supervisor, New York Telephone Co., 140 West St., NYC.

2-Bureau (RM)
2-Washington Field (65-11628) (RM)
1-New York

TJD:kxb
(6)

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FILE STRIPPED

Date: 4/4/72

Initials: *[Signature]*

65-11628-187

SEARCHED.....	INDEXED.....
SERIALIZED.....	FILED.....
JAN 31 1972	
FBI - WASH. F. O.	

[Signature]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

REPORTING OFFICE WASHINGTON FIELD	OFFICE OF ORIGIN WASHINGTON FIELD	DATE 2/15/72	INVESTIGATIVE PERIOD 12/23/71 - 1/19/72
TITLE OF CASE UNSUB; Unauthorized Disclosure of Information in State Department Cables Appearing in "The Washington Post" Article, Tuesday, July 27, 1971, by JACK ANDERSON		REPORT MADE BY <div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 100px; height: 15px;"></div>	TYPED BY mad
		CHARACTER OF CASE ESP - X	ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 02-20-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/CPB/TH

REFERENCE: Report of SA dated 12/29/71 at Washington, D. C.

- C -
[Handwritten signature]

ADMINISTRATIVE

The confidential source in this report is New York Telephone Company, New York. His name ^{as the Confidential Source} is not being set out in the body of this report due to the confidential nature of his position and the information he has furnished.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS CLAIMED						<input type="checkbox"/> NONE	ACQUIT-TALS	CASE HAS BEEN:
CONVIC.	AUTO.	FUG.	FINES	SAVINGS	RECOVERIES			
								PENDING PROSECUTION OVER SIX MONTHS <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO

APPROVED *mad* SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE

DO NOT WRITE IN SPACES BELOW

COPIES MADE:
 6- Bureau (65-74138)
 1- New York (65-25730)
 ① WFO (65-11628)
mad

65-11628-188

Dissemination Record of Attached Report				
Agency				
Request Recd.				
Date Fwd.				
How Fwd.				
By				

Notations

Searched *[Signature]* FILE STRIPPED
 Serialized *[Signature]* FEB 18 1972
 Indexed *[Signature]* Date: _____
 Filed *[Signature]* Initials: *[Signature]*

WFO 65-11628

A review of this case has shown that an extensive and thorough investigation has been conducted by the FBI at the Department of State and the Agency for International Development. Also, the Office of Security, United States Department of State, has conducted considerable investigation, including inquiries at Kenya. No information has been developed concerning the source of the leak. In view of the complete investigation conducted and the absence of any further logical investigative leads, this case is being closed.

- B* -
COVER PAGE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-20-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/CPE/TH

Copy to:

Report of:

[REDACTED]

Office: Washington, D. C.

Date:

2/15/72

Field Office File #:

65-11628

Bureau File #: 65-74138

Title:

**UNKNOWN SUBJECT; Unauthorized Disclosure
of Information in State Department Cables
Appearing in "The Washington Post" Article,
Tuesday, July 27, 1971, by JACK ANDERSON**

~~UNKNOWN~~
Character:

ESPIONAGE - X

Synopsis:

Telephone records show [REDACTED], member of JACK ANDERSON's staff, made telephone call to [REDACTED], Nairobi, Kenya, on July 23, 1971.

- C -

DETAILS: AT WASHINGTON, D. C.

On January 10, 1972, a confidential source in a position to furnish reliable information concerning the records of the New York Telephone Company, New York, New York, advised that at 2:00 p.m. on July 23, 1971, a telephone call was made to Nairobi, Kenya, person to person, by an individual whose name on the telephone record appears to be [REDACTED], to [REDACTED] at the American Embassy.

It has been learned from this source that the original record concerning this telephone call has been destroyed by the telephone company during the regular course of business and only the microfilm of it is now available. In the event this microfilm becomes necessary for prosecutive purposes, a subpoena should be addressed to [REDACTED] Security Supervisor, New York Telephone Company, 140 West Street, New York City.

[REDACTED] is a member of JACK ANDERSON's staff.)

1*

SAC, WFO

2/4/74

b6
b7c

SA [REDACTED]

JACK ANDERSON
NEWS COLUMNIST

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-23-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/CPE/TH

At approximately 9 AM, 2/4/74, [REDACTED] telephonically contacted the writer at the Washington Field Office. [REDACTED] identified himself as a Reporter for JACK ANDERSON and stated he was calling to notify me that they were planning to include my name in a future news article. He said he obtained my name from a subpoena which was dated October 26, 1971, and executed by me on November 1, 1971. The subpoena was made out to the Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company and requested toll records for about five telephone numbers, all of which he said were members of JACK ANDERSON's staff. He advised that one of the telephone numbers was for a [REDACTED] whose name was alike that of a member of JACK ANDERSON's staff, however, the phone number belonged to another [REDACTED]. He also advised that the phone number of [REDACTED] was also included in the subpoena.

[REDACTED] advised he considered this to be a goof on my part and planned to say so in the news article. He desired any comment I might have prior to their printing the article. I told him he should be sure of the accuracy of his facts and that I was in no position to tell a newspaper reporter what he should or should not put in his column. I also told him that if my name appeared on the subpoena as having served it that I most certainly served it and obtained the records requested in the subpoena. He asked my position in the FBI and I told him "Special Agent," and he asked if I worked on the case involving JACK ANDERSON and I told him "no comment".

3- WFO

JJG:kvb
(3)

65-11625-189

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SERIALIZED	FILED
FBI - WASH. F. O.	

2/4/74

AIRTEL

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-20-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/CPE/TH

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (65-74138)

FROM: SAC, WFO (65-11628)

ATTENTION: EXTERNAL
AFFAIRS
DIVISION

TOIL LEK
ESP - X

Attached are two copies of a memo prepared by SA [redacted] reflecting results of a telephonic contact between [redacted] Reporter for JACK ANDERSON, News Columnist, and SA [redacted]

[redacted] indicated that he planned to include [redacted] name in a future news article, and it concerned the execution of a subpoena by SA [redacted] on 11/1/71 for telephone toll records for members of JACK ANDERSON's staff.

Instant case concerned unauthorized disclosure of information in State Department cables which appeared in the "Washington Post" article on 7/27/71 by JACK ANDERSON. The article related for the most part to alleged behavior in Kenya on the part of [redacted] described an an Administrator for the Agency for International Development. According to the article, [redacted] became intoxicated at a Kenyan lodge during a visit there by former Vice President AGNEW and, while in a drunken condition, was reported to have made passes at the Vice President's secretary.

The report of SA [redacted] dated 11/12/71 at Washington, D.C. reflects the service of the subpoena in question.

Above confirms information telephonically furnished to SA [redacted] instant date.

2- Bureau (Attachments)
1- WFO

CJJ:kvb
(3)

65-~~11628~~¹¹⁶²⁸-190

Searched _____
Serialized RM
Indexed _____
Filed RM

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b7C

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOI/PA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
FOI/PA# 1178196-0

Total Deleted Page(s) = 67

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Page 16 ~ b6; b7C;
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Page 18 ~ b6; b7C;
Page 19 ~ b6; b7C;
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Page 22 ~ Duplicate;
Page 23 ~ b6; b7C;
Page 24 ~ b6; b7C;
Page 25 ~ b6; b7C;
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Page 70 ~ b6; b7C;
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Page 73 ~ b6; b7C;
Page 95 ~ b6; b7C;
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Page 130 ~ Duplicate;
Page 134 ~ Duplicate;
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Page 137 ~ Duplicate;
Page 140 ~ b6; b7C;
Page 148 ~ b6; b7C;
Page 149 ~ b6; b7C;
Page 151 ~ b6; b7C;
Page 154 ~ b6; b7C;
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Page 251 ~ Duplicate;

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 03-05-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/CPB/TH

TO: CHIEF CLERK 0 Date 9-28-71

Subject WTTG Television Station

Aliases CHANNEL 5

Address Washington, D.C. Birth Date _____ Birthplace _____ Race _____ Sex Male Female

- Exact Spelling
- All References
- Main Subversive Case Files Only
- Subversive References Only
- Main Criminal Case Files Only
- Criminal References Only
- Main Subversive (If no Main, list all Subversive References)
- Main Criminal (If no Main, list all Criminal References)
- Restrict to Locality of _____

File & Serial Number	Remarks	File & Serial Number	Remarks
<u>WTTG</u>	<u>(DC television)</u>	<u>62-9737-150 p40</u>	<u>not pertinent</u>
<u>WTTG television station</u>	<u>52-12554-269</u>		<u>not pertinent</u>
<u>Channel 5</u>	<u>157-2825-Sub-1-26 p. 599</u>		<u>(not pertinent)</u>
<u>Channel Five TV WNEW</u>	<u>Dom. Index</u>		

WTTG
DC

Requested by [Redacted] Squad S-9 Extension 2176 File No. 65-11628

Searched by [Redacted] (date) _____

Consolidated by _____ (date) _____

Reviewed by _____ (date) _____

File Review Symbols
I - Identical ? - Not identifiable
NI - Not identical U - Unavailable reference GPO 875-388

SEARCHED _____
SERIALIZED _____
INDEXED _____
FILED _____
[Signature]

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NR015 WF CODED

7:48PM URGENT 9-28-71 DLE

TO DIRECTOR (65-74138)

FROM WASHINGTON FIELD (65-11628) FOUR PAGES

TOLL LEK, SIO

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-03-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH

RE WFO TELETYPE SEPTEMBER TWENTYSEVEN LAST.

THE FOLLOWING INVESTIGATION WAS CONDUCTED SEPTEMBER
TWENTYEIGHT INSTANT:

[redacted] DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS,
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (AID); [redacted]
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF POLICY PLANNING, AFRICAN AFFAIRS; [redacted]
[redacted], DUTY SECRETARY, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARIAT AND [redacted]
[redacted], WATCH OFFICER, OPERATIONS CENTER, EACH U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF STATE (USDS), COULD FURNISH NO PERTINENT INFORMATION
CONCERNING LEAK.

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[redacted] CHIEF, COMMUNICATIONS CENTER,

END PAGE ONE

65-11628-35

[redacted] Searched _____
Serialized _____
Indexed _____
Filed _____
[redacted]

WFO 65-11628

PAGE THREE

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OFFICE OF COMMUNICATIONS, BUREAU OF ADMINISTRATION, USDS;
[REDACTED], COMMUNICATIONS MANAGER, COMMUNICATIONS
CENTER; AND [REDACTED], CHIEF, OPERATIONS STAFF,
COMMUNICATIONS CENTER, COULD SUGGEST NO SUSPECT FOR LEAK
OF TWO USDS TELEGRAMS IN THIS MATTER, DID NOT KNOW ANY
EMPLOYEES IN COMMUNICATIONS CENTER WHO WERE ACQUAINTED WITH
JACK ANDERSON OR ANY MEMBER OF ANDERSON'S STAFF, AND THEY WERE
NOT PERSONALLY ACQUAINTED WITH ANDERSON OR ANY MEMBER OF HIS
STAFF.

[REDACTED] FURNISHED LIST OF APPROXIMATELY EIGHTEEN
COMMUNICATIONS CENTER EMPLOYEES WHO HAD BEEN INVOLVED IN
PROCESSING TWO USDS TELEGRAMS INVOLVED IN THIS MATTER.

[REDACTED] STATED THAT ABOVE PERSONS HAD LOGICAL ACCESS TO
THE TWO TELEGRAMS IN CONNECTION WITH THEIR OFFICIAL DUTIES.
THESE INDIVIDUALS WILL BE INTERVIEWED.

END PAGE TWO

WFO 65-11628

PAGE THREE

[] STATED THAT BY VIRTUE OF THEIR EMPLOYMENT IN THE COMMUNICATIONS CENTER, A TOTAL OF TWO HUNDRED AND SIXTEEN PERSONS EMPLOYED THERE COULD HAVE HAD ACCESS TO ONE OR BOTH OF THE TELEGRAMS; HOWEVER, THE OPERATION OF THE COMMUNICATIONS CENTER IS SUCH THAT ACCESS WOULD HAVE BEEN LOGICALLY RESTRICTED ONLY TO PERSONS INVOLVED IN THE PROCESSING OF THE TWO TELEGRAMS AND EFFORT TO OBTAIN COPY OR GAIN ACCESS BY AN EMPLOYEE OTHER THAN ONE INVOLVED IN PROCESSING WOULD BE SUFFICIENTLY UNUSAL THAT SUCH WOULD BE BROUGHT TO ATTENTION OF SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL. NO SUCH INCIDENT WAS REPORTED. THESE INDIVIDUALS WILL NOT BE INTERVIEWED IN THE ABSENCE OF FURTHER INFORMATION INDICATING THEY HAD ACCESS TO THE PERTINENT TELEGRAMS.

CALLIHAN INFORMED THAT ON SEPTEMBER TWENTYSEVEN, ANOTHER USDS EMPLOYEE HAD MENTIONED THAT HE HAD SEEN JACK ANDERSON'S PROGRAM ON CHANNEL FIVE, WTTG TELEVISION, WDC, ON FRIDAY EVENING, SEPTEMBER TWENTYFOUR LAST, AND IN BACKGROUND DURING

END PAGE THREE

WFO 65-11628

PAGE FOUR

PROGRAM, COPY OF A USDS "EXDIS" TELEGRAM WAS VISIBLE. LATER, ON SEPTEMBER TWENTYEIGHT INSTANT, [REDACTED] HAD CALLED WTTG TO ASCERTAIN WHAT TIME ANDERSON HAD APPEARED. AN UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE REPRESENTATIVE OF WTTG INFORMED [REDACTED] THAT ANDERSON HAD APPEARED ON WTTG TELEVISION, CHANNEL FIVE AT TEN P.M., SEPTEMBER TWENTYFOUR LAST AND HAD DISCLOSED A STORY CONCERNING A [REDACTED] FROM KENYA. FURTHER, SHE STATED THAT ANY ADDITIONAL DETAILS OR TRANSCRIPT OF THE PROGRAM, IF AVAILABLE, CONCERNING THIS PROGRAM WOULD HAVE TO BE OBTAINED FROM MR. ANDERSON. BUREAU AUTHORITY REQUESTED TO CONTACT ABOVE TELEVISION STATION FOR FULL DETAILS CONCERNING ANDERSON'S PROGRAM MENTIONED ABOVE.

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b7C

ADMINISTRATIVE

WFO SEARCHING FILES UNDER WTTG TO DETERMINE ANY INFO KNOWN TO WFO WHICH WOULD PRECLUDE INQUIRY REQUESTED ABOVE. WFO HAS NO SAC CONTACT AT WTTG FOR ABOVE PURPOSE.

END

EBM FBI WA

Proxmire Unsatisfied by Benson Message

No Intent to 'Smear' Senator, Secretary Says; Exchange of Words Is Fruitless

Two more exchanges between Senator Proxmire (Dem., Wis.) and Secretary of Agriculture Ezra Taft Benson over the "threat" of a smear campaign against Proxmire have left matters about where they were.

On Wednesday, Benson wired Proxmire at Madison that neither he nor any of his assistants intended to run a smear campaign.

Benson said that a reported account of a telephone call between aides of both men was "completely inaccurate." He said that the call was made to report an action on farm price supports.

Proxmire Disappointed

Proxmire replied in a telegram that he found Benson's telegram "disappointing."

"You have failed to apologize for or withdraw the threat by your aide that your supporters will wage a dirty campaign against me unless I ease up on my criticism of your policies," Proxmire said.

The senator said that no one had charged that either Benson or his aide would wage the "dirty" campaign personally, but that "supporters" would do so.

"I should think that you would condemn and disown such intention on the part of your supporters and that you would strenuously apply your great potential influence for decency to compel them to stick to the issue," Proxmire told Benson.

Report Made

The feud began after Proxmire's election when the new senator interpreted his victory as a vote against Benson's farm policies and demanded his resignation.

Benson aide, allegedly told Robert G. Lewis, Proxmire's administrative assistant, that unless Proxmire stopped criticizing Benson the senator might be the victim of a smear campaign by Wisconsin Republicans in the 1958 elections. Proxmire interpreted that as a threat.

Benson revived the matter at a press conference Monday in Washington. The secretary was asked whether he intended to go into anyone's "past life" in the 1958 elections. The reference was to Proxmire.

"We plan to do everything we think is sound and right to promote the best interests of American agriculture," Benson replied. "If that means going to someone's back life, we might do that."

Proxmire then issued a statement that he was "disappointed" about such an answer. He interpreted it as a personal endorsement of the "outrageous attempt" by Tollefson to influence Proxmire's policy toward the department of agriculture.

"Mr. Benson's own words speak more eloquently than I can of his approval of the highly improper and possibly illegal effort by one of his subordinates to intimidate me," the senator said.

Proxmire said that he had expected Benson to repudiate Tollefson's statements to Lewis.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 03-06-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/CPB/TH

"Milwaukee Journal"
Milwaukee, Wisconsin
September 26, 1957

Delay Probe of Tollefson

Return Is Awaited

Washington, D. C.—An investigation of allegations that Bert Tollefson, an assistant to Secretary of Agriculture Benson, made political threats against Senator Proxmire (Dem., Wis.) is being held up until Tollefson returns from Europe.

This was disclosed Monday by William Brawley, staff director of the senate civil service committee, which is conducting the investigation.

In answer to an inquiry, a spokesman for the agriculture department said Tollefson went to Rome in October to attend a meeting of the food and agriculture organization (FAO) of the United Nations.

Tollefson is expected to return about Nov. 25, the spokesman said.

Both Benson and Tollefson have denied the charges made by Robert G. Lewis, administrative assistant to Proxmire.

Senator Johnston (Dem., S. C.), chairman of the committee, has said that a full investigation would be conducted to see whether Tollefson violated any federal laws.

Lewis said that Tollefson in a telephone conversation had told him that Proxmire, the new Wisconsin senator, would be subject to a "low" campaign next year if he continued to attack Benson.

Proxmire, who will seek a full six year term next year, has attacked Benson policies repeatedly and has suggested that the secretary resign.

"Milwaukee Journal"
Milwaukee, Wisconsin
November 18, 1957

SEP 22 1957
**Proxmire Aide Accuses
Benson Man of Threat**

By the Associated Press

An aide to Senator Proxmire, Democrat of Wisconsin, said yesterday that Bert Tollefson, an assistant secretary of Agriculture Benson, told him Senator Proxmire would face a "low" campaign next year if the Senator continued to criticize Mr. Benson.

Mr. Tollefson commented shortly afterward that "that's completely inaccurate and it's a distortion of the facts."

The Senator's aide, Robert G. Lewis, said Mr. Tollefson told him that Wisconsin Republicans were "going to fight fire with fire" if necessary and "set a new low in American politics."

"I do very certainly interpret this as an implied threat," Mr. Lewis told a reporter.

Mr. Tollefson, he said, telephoned him yesterday to complain about a statement by Senator Proxmire that a bi-partisan group should be formed to ask that Secretary Benson be removed from office.

Then, Mr. Lewis continued, Mr. Tollefson advised him as

a "friendly tip" that if Senator Proxmire kept up this attack on Mr. Benson a "low" campaign by Wisconsin Republicans next year would follow.

Specifically, he said Mr. Tollefson talked of a "whispering campaign" against Mr. Proxmire. He quoted Mr. Tollefson as saying that the Republicans were prepared to use Senator Proxmire's divorce from his first wife and the fact that he once worked on Wall Street for J. P. Morgan as campaign issues.

Mr. Tollefson said he did tell Lewis that "some people from Wisconsin told me that if they (Proxmire and his associates) are going to tell lies about us next time we'll have to tell the truth about him regardless of how much it hurts."

None of the conversation about the Wisconsin campaign, Mr. Tollefson added, was "done at all in the way of a threat."

He said it was Mr. Lewis, not he, who brought up the matter of Senator Proxmire's divorce, and that he had mentioned nothing about Mr. Proxmire ever working for J. P. Morgan.

"Evening Star"
Washington, D. C.
September 22, 1957

Senators Will Probe 'Threat' Against Senator

By the Associated Press

Senator Olin D. Johnston, Democrat of South Carolina, today announced an investigation of allegations that an assistant to Secretary of Agriculture Benson made political threats against Senator Proxmire, Democrat of Wisconsin.

Both Mr. Benson and the assistant, Bert Tollefson, Jr., have denied the charges made by a Proxmire aide, Robert G. Lewis. Senator Johnston, chairman of the Post Office and Civil

Service Committee, said a full probe would be conducted by that group to see whether Mr. Tollefson violated any Federal laws.

The Senator suggested that the Hatch Act, which regulates political activities of Federal employees, might have been involved.

Mr. Lewis said last Friday that Mr. Tollefson had told him the new Wisconsin Democratic Senator would be subject to a "low" campaign next year if he continued to attack Mr. Benson.

Senator Proxmire, who plans to run for a full six-year term next year, attributed his victory in the special election last month in part to farmers' dissatisfaction with Mr. Benson's policies. He suggested the Secretary resign.

Mr. Lewis said Mr. Tollefson told him Wisconsin Republicans were irate over Senator Proxmire's criticism of Mr. Benson and were ready to put on a campaign against the Democratic Senator next year which would "set a new low in American politics."

Mr. Tollefson, however, called this account of his talk with Mr. Lewis "completely inaccurate" and "a distortion of facts."

Senator Johnston said his committee "will be interested in establishing whether Mr. Tollefson has violated the Hatch Act or other Federal statutes."

"That act," the Senator said, "was designed to restrain Federal employees from engaging in improper political activities and I think it appropriate that the charges swirling about the head of Mr. Tollefson be thoroughly investigated."

According to Mr. Lewis Mr. Tollefson had said Wisconsin voters would be reminded that Senator Proxmire and his first wife were divorced. Mr. Tollefson said Mr. Lewis himself had raised that point during their conversation.

Senator Benson told a news conference Monday that he did not know any threats had been made by Mr. Tollefson.

The secretary added that he would be governed by what he considers the best interests of the country when Senator Proxmire runs for re-election next year.

"If that means going into somebody's back life, we may do that," he added.

He said later, however, that neither he nor his assistants will "enter into personalities."

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 03-06-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/CPB/TH

"Evening Star"
Washington, D. C.
September 27, 1957

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-26-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/STP/TH

Date of transcription 9/23/71

[redacted] for African Affairs, Room 6236, United States Department of State (USDS), was interviewed and furnished the following information:

[redacted] stated he was on duty Saturday, July 17, 1971, in the office of [redacted] Assistant Secretary for African Affairs. He stated he recalls the communication from Nairobi pertaining to the alleged misconduct of [redacted]. It was his recollection that he read the communication and was aware of its contents. He recalled that he resealed the envelope in which it arrived and gave it to [redacted] with instructions to place it in the safe for [redacted] Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, to observe when he returned to work on July 19, 1971. [redacted] stated that the officer on duty was [redacted] but it was his opinion that [redacted] did not handle the communication and was unaware of its contents.

[redacted] advised that he had no other copies of the communication made available from the copy he received. He stated he does not know JACK ANDERSON, any member of his staff or family.

[redacted] advised that he is acquainted with [redacted] in that he served with Agency for International Development (AID) until two years past. He stated he believed [redacted] to be unstable and incompetent although he had no personal animosity toward him and knew of no one who would want to discredit [redacted] or who would make the information in the communication described above available to any outside sources.

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Interviewed on 9/23/71 at Washington, D. C. File # WFO 65-11628 46
by SAs [redacted] and [redacted] RCW:csg Date dictated 9/23/71

WFO 65-11628

It was [redacted] opinion that any improper release of this information would have emanated from someone at AID rather than the State Department and more likely from a source in Washington, D. C. (WDC) rather than overseas. He qualified this statement indicating that [redacted] was a "pushy" individual who had in his career made bitter enemies who might want to discredit him in any way they could.

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b7c

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 9/23/71

[redacted] secretary to [redacted]
 Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, Room 6234-A, United
 States Department of State (USDS), advised as follows:

She stated that she could not recall a communication being received in [redacted] office pertaining to the information set forth in JACK ANDERSON's column of July 27, 1971. She stated that she could furnish no information concerning the message itself.

She stated that she is not acquainted with JACK ANDERSON or any member of his staff or his family. In addition, she stated she is not acquainted with [redacted] and has no information as to how the information from the communication from Nairobi was obtained by JACK ANDERSON.

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 02-26-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/STP/TH

Interviewed on 9/22/71 at Washington, D. C. File # WFO 65-11628 47
 by SAs [redacted] and [redacted] RCW:cb Date dictated 9/22/71

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-26-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/STP/TH

Date of transcription 9/23/71

[redacted] Secretary to [redacted]
Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, Room 6234-A, United
States Department of State (USDS), advised as follows:

[redacted] stated that she was on duty on Saturday,
July 17, 1971, and [redacted] was Acting Assistant
Secretary in behalf of [redacted]. She stated she
recalled the message arriving in the office and stated it was
held for [redacted] observance Monday, July 19, 1971. She
stated that she put the message in her workbox and locked it
in the safe in [redacted] office.

She stated that on Monday, July 19, 1971, [redacted]
dictated a reply to the message which was typed by her and
taken along with the message received from Nairobi to the
office of [redacted] Assistant Administrator,
Bureau for Africa, Agency for International Development (AID)
by [redacted] who is also a secretary for [redacted].
She stated this message of [redacted] was brought back to the
office of [redacted] by [redacted] because [redacted]
[redacted] Administrator, AID wanted to prepare his own reply
to the communication from Nairobi.

b6
b7C

[redacted] stated that she is not acquainted with
JACK ANDERSON, his staff or any member of his family and has
no friends in the news media. She stated she had no knowledge
of any additional copies being made of the communication
mentioned above. She stated that she does not know [redacted]
[redacted] and has no idea how the information in JACK ANDERSON's
column could have been leaked to him.

Interviewed on 9/22/71 at Washington, D. C. File # WFO 65-11628 48
by SAs [redacted] and [redacted] RCW:cb Date dictated 9/22/71

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-26-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/STP/TH

Date of transcription 9/23/71

[redacted] Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, Room 6234-A, United States Department of State (USDS) advised as follows:

He stated his recollection of the incoming telegram from Nairobi regarding [redacted] is somewhat hazy, however, he recalled receiving one copy of this communication from the African Bureau Message Center. He stated that the communication was first received by [redacted] who is an Assistant to him.

He stated that shortly after receiving the message [redacted] [redacted], Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Africa, Agency for International Development (AID), came over to his office with a copy of the communication and spoke to him about a trip to London to meet [redacted]

In addition he stated he spoke to [redacted] Director General of Foreign Service, USDS, regarding [redacted] however [redacted] had not seen the communication from Nairobi.

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b7C

[redacted] indicated that he preferred to have [redacted] return to the United States, however, [redacted] Administrator, AID, was opposed to this proposition, and he wanted [redacted] to speak to [redacted] about it.

[redacted] stated it was his recollection that [redacted] had obtained a copy of the communication from [redacted] Deputy Undersecretary for Administration.

[redacted] stated he did not have any copies made from the copy that had been made available to his office. He stated he is not acquainted with JACK ANDERSON or any member of his staff and has not had any contact with him. He stated he knew

Interviewed on 9/22/71 at Washington, D. C. File # WFO 65-11628 49
by SAs [redacted] and [redacted] RCW:cb Date dictated 9/22/71

WFO 65-11628

[redacted] as a congressional relations official at AID.
He stated he had no idea of why anyone would want to downgrade
[redacted] and could furnish no information concerning how
JACK ANDERSON had received a copy of the communication.

b6
b7C

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

9/23/71

Date of transcription

DR. JOHN R. HANNAH, Administrator, Agency for International Development, Room 5942, State Department Building, Washington, D. C., advised as follows:

[] said that he knew no one who had a personal grudge against [], such as to cause a leak of information in official communication channels. Further, he had no knowledge of anyone within the Agency for International Development (AID), who would perpetrate a leak, especially of his outgoing cable to the Ambassador of Kenya, because it was more tightly controlled than the incoming cable from Kenya.

DR. HANNAH advised that he had received a telephone call on September 2, 1971 from [] a man who works for columnist JACK ANDERSON. This occurred shortly after a State Department press conference was held, in which the question of State Department employees being given "lie detector" tests was raised, relative to leak of information cases. [] asked if DR. HANNAH had lodged a complaint or had requested an investigation be initiated to uncover sources of information utilized by JACK ANDERSON and his associates. HANNAH told [] that he had not requested such an investigation.

b6
b7C

DR. HANNAH further advised that [] is presently in the Washington area, but that he has not seen him personally yet. He said that [] would be in Washington until Friday, September 24, 1971, and that in all probability, he would see [] prior to the latter's departure for Kenya.

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DATE 02-26-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/STP/TH

Interviewed on 9/22/71 at Washington, D. C. File # 65-1162853
by Intem SA [] and SA [] JR. Date dictated MGM:jak 9/23/71

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-04-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH

Date of transcription 9/24/71

[redacted], an employee of the Agency for International Development (AID), stationed in Kenya, Africa, advised of the following, while in Washington, D.C.:

[redacted] said that to the best of his recollection, he received a long distance telephone call at his residence in Nairobi, Kenya, on the evening of July 17, 1971. The call was from Washington, D.C. from a man who identified himself as (First Name Unknown) [redacted] (phonetic), who said that he was on JACK ANDERSON's staff. [redacted] said that the telephone call was not too clear, but that he heard [redacted] read off a portion of an account of [redacted] alleged drunkenness and misbehavior at a social affair which had been held in Kenya in connection with the visit of Vice President AGNEW in July, 1971. [redacted] told [redacted] that the story was untrue, that he had not been "sloshed", and had not "wrestled" with the Vice President's secretary. [redacted] could not further identify [redacted] who made no particular reply to [redacted] denial of being drunk or unmannerly.

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b7C

[redacted] advised that he departed Nairobi on the night of July 19, 1971, via airplane, for London, England to meet [redacted] of AID headquarters, in connection with the above matter. [redacted] said that [redacted] did not show him any copies of the pertinent cables, but [redacted] briefed him on the contents of the cable which Dr. JOHN A. HANNAH, Administrator, AID, had sent to American Ambassador to Kenya, MC ILVAINE.

[redacted] said that he had not seen the full text of either cable until the morning of September 23, 1971 when he visited Dr. HANNAH in the latter's office at AID headquarters. Dr. HANNAH showed him the cables at that time.

Interviewed on 9/23/71 at Washington, D. C. File # 65-11628 54
by SA [redacted] and [redacted] Date dictated 9/24/71
SA [redacted] MGM: jak

WFO 65-11628

When asked if the public disclosure in ANDERSON's column of the aforementioned incident in Kenya might have had an adverse effect on the posture of the United States in that country, [] replied that he thought not. As evidence of that belief, [] said that Kenyan Ambassador KIBINGE, with whom he is friendly, told him that only three or four persons in Kenya would see the ANDERSON article, and that it would not be printed locally in the Nairobi newspapers. In this connection, [] stated that [] was the person who called his attention to the ANDERSON column, and that apparently [] had seen it prior to anyone at the American Embassy.

When asked if he felt that the leak of information could have originated in Nairobi, [] said that he thought the possibility was very remote. He said that to date, he has not visited the cable room of the American Embassy in Nairobi, and thus does not know the number of employees there, but based on the great distance between Kenya and the United States, he does not feel that the leak originated in Nairobi.

b6
b7C

[] stated that he is on good terms with all of his associates in Nairobi, and that he knows of no one who bears him a grudge which would result in an attempt to ruin his career. He said that many of the employees of the American Embassy in Nairobi are giving him moral support at this time. He said that he is on excellent terms with Ambassador MC ILVAINE, and felt that it was proper for the Ambassador to notify Dr. HANNAH as he had done, in order to protect himself in the situation. He felt, however, that the strong language used in describing the alleged social disturbance was unnecessary, but he holds no hard feelings toward MC ILVAINE.

In connection with the foregoing, [] said that he knows no one in Washington, D. C. who bears him ill-will to the point of trying to ruin his career by leaking such a story. He said that he intends to remain in the service of AID

WFO 65-11628

and will return to his post in Nairobi on the weekend of September 25, 1971 where his family presently resides.

When asked if he knows JACK ANDERSON personally, [] said that the only time he talked to him occurred several years ago during a father-daughter dinner dance which was held at the National Press Club in Washington, D. C. At that time, ANDERSON commented favorably on the dancing ability of []. He engaged ANDERSON in conversation for a short period of time. [] said that he knows no one on JACK ANDERSON's staff and that he had only one telephone conversation, mentioned heretofore, with [] who identified himself as such.

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It was the opinion of [] that the leak occurred in Washington, D. C., but that he had no information to indicate the source of the leak.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-26-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/STP/TH

9/24/71

Date of transcription _____

[redacted] Director of Information,
Management Section, Executive Secretariat, Room 7512,
United States Department of State (USDS), furnished the
following information:

[redacted] stated he was on duty on July 16, 1971
in his office. He stated that from information available
from his file the communication pertaining to [redacted]
Agency for International Development (AID) representative
assigned to Nairobi, Kenya, arrived in the Operations Center
between 9:00 AM and 12 Noon on July 16, 1971. He stated this
was an "EXDIS" cable for "eyes only". He stated this
communication was received from Nairobi and it was garbled,
which required a second communication to follow subsequently.
According to [redacted] communication number two, which was a
copy of the original, number one, arrived at the Operations
Center at 1:55 PM.

[redacted] stated that only one copy was indicated
on the distribution sheet for distribution outside the State
Department and that was to DR. JOHN A. HANNAH. To [redacted]
knowledge there were no other copies of the original communication
distributed.

Copy number two, which arrived at approximately
1:55 PM, was a corrected copy of the original communication
and distribution was made in accordance with the usual
procedures followed within the Operations Center. Fortyfive
copies of the communication were received from the Communications
Center and according to the distribution sheet for the communication,
one copy was forwarded to DR. HANNAH. In addition to the copy
to DR. HANNAH the following copies were distributed within the
State Department: One copy to the Editor of the Operations
Center; one copy to the Watch Officer of the Operations Center;

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Interviewed on 9/24/71 at Washington, D. C. File # 65-11628 *55*
SA [redacted] *RCW* and
SA [redacted] *RCW:jak* 9/24/71
by _____ Date dictated _____

WFO 65-11628

one copy to the Executive Secretariat; 3 copies were distributed to the Screener (relocation) and one copy distributed to Director of Staff Secretariat. All remaining copies, to [redacted] knowledge, were destroyed in accordance with standard procedures.

b6
b7C

[redacted] stated that Operations Assistant [redacted] [redacted] was on duty in the Operations Center when communications number one and two arrived. He stated [redacted] physically handled these communications and was responsible for destroying all copies not designated for distribution. He stated [redacted] was a Summer Intern in the Operations Center and has returned to school at the American University, Washington, D. C., Room 809, Leonard Hall.

[redacted] stated he was not acquainted with JACK ANDERSON or any members of his staff or his family and further advised that he could furnish no information regarding information concerning leak of the contents of the above referred to communication.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-26-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/STP/TH

9/27/71

Date of transcription

[redacted] Special Assistant to the Executive Secretary, Room 7516, United States Department of State advised as follows:

[redacted] stated that he was on duty in the Operations Center in July, 1971, the exact date he could not recall, as Departmental Watch Officer. He recalled receiving a message from the Communications Center, pertaining to the alleged misconduct of Agency for International Development (AID) representative [redacted]. He stated he received this message from a clerical assistant in the Operations Center which included 45 copies with a cover sheet from the Office of Communications. He stated that upon reading this communication he decided that it should not be EXDIS and immediately took the communication to [redacted], Director, Operations Center. He stated that [redacted], Deputy Executive Secretary for Management was in [redacted] company at the time. It was decided at this time that the distribution of the communication should be made to [redacted] Administrator, AID; one copy to [redacted] the Executive Secretariat and one copy to the Watch Desk to be exhibited to his replacement on the shift following his. The clerical assistant was to destroy the remaining 42 copies.

[redacted] stated that he was relieved by [redacted] as duty officer of the Watch Desk and that he briefed him using the copy of the communication retained at the desk.

[redacted] stated that he did not know JACK ANDERSON or any member of his staff or family. He also stated that he was not acquainted with [redacted] and could furnish no information concerning the alleged leak of information to JACK ANDERSON.

9/23/71

Washington, D. C.

WFO 65-11628 56

Interviewed on

of

File #

SAs

and

RW:mbf

9/23/71

by

Date dictated

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

9/27/71

Date of transcription

[redacted], Secretary to [redacted]
 [redacted], Executive Secretary, Room 7224, United States
 Department of State, advised as follows:

[redacted] stated that she did not see the telegram from the Ambassador in Kenya regarding [redacted] Agency for International Development Representative on July 16, 1971. She also stated that she was not aware of the discussion in the office regarding this matter until the time of the information in the JACK ANDERSON column.

She stated that it is a usual procedure for telegrams received in her office to be stacked up on her desk and at the end of the day they are placed in a "burn bag" to be destroyed. She stated that she did not have any copies of the telegram in question, and as far as she knows the telegram was destroyed.

[redacted] stated that she does not know JACK ANDERSON or any member of his staff or family. In addition, she stated that she does not know [redacted] and could furnish no information as to why anyone would want to discredit him. She also stated she had no idea as to how the leak of information of JACK ANDERSON occurred.

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 DATE 02-26-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/STP/TH

Interviewed on 9/27/71 at Washington, D.C. File # WFO 65-11628 56A
 by SAS [redacted] and [redacted] Date dictated 9/27/71
 [redacted] /KRS/jmg

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 9/28/71

[redacted], Deputy Administrator, Agency for International Development, Room 5894, State Department Building, Washington, D. C. (WDC), advised as follows:

[redacted] stated that at the time of the incoming cable from Kenya to Agency for International Development (AID) headquarters, he was preparing to depart the United States for an AID meeting in Paris, France. Dr. JOHN HANNAH, Administrator, AID, and his direct superior, showed him the incoming cable, after which they discussed it briefly prior to his plane departure for Paris. [redacted] did not see the second cable at that time because it had not yet been prepared by Dr. HANNAH.

[redacted] said that he did not stop over in London, England, but continued directly to Paris, thus he saw neither [redacted] nor Dr. ADAMS when they met in London on July 20, 1971. [redacted] said that when he returned to the United States, and to his office at AID headquarters, Dr. HANNAH informed him of the situation involving [redacted] inasmuch as he is the Administrator's immediate assistant.

[redacted] advised that he has no knowledge of how the leak of information occurred, but deplors the fact that it happened. He said that he knew of no one who dislikes [redacted] enough to attempt to ruin his career, and felt that the violation of classification regulations to do so was indefensible.

[redacted] said that over the years he has learned that personnel problems seem to create an intense interest as gossip material, and as such, often receive rather wide distribution. Apparently, in this case, the fact that the information relating to the problem was classified, made no difference to the person who leaked it.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-26-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/STP/TH

Interviewed on 9/27/71 at Washington, D. C. File # 65-11628 57
by SA [redacted] and SA [redacted] Date dictated 9/27/71
MGM:jak

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : SAC, WFO (65-11628) (P)

DATE: 9/27/71

FROM : SA [redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-04-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH

SUBJECT: TOLL LEK

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b7C
b2
b7D

[redacted] advised SA [redacted] on 9/24/71, that the records of the C&F Telephone Company, Washington, D.C. contained no information relative to a telephone call from the residence or office of Jack Anderson which was allegedly made to Nairobi, Kenya on 7/17/71 or thereafter.

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In connection with the interview of [redacted] in this case he stated that to the best of his recollection, he received a long distance telephone call at his residence in Nairobi on the evening of July 17, 1971. The call was from [redacted] (phonetic) who said that he was on Jack Anderson's staff. In an attempt to verify this information the above check was made at the C&F Telephone Company.

Report on s/d/t

*A sum identity monitored in WFO
EBM*

65-11628-57A

SEARCHED	INDEXED
SERIALIZED <i>fm</i>	FILED <i>fm</i>
SEP 29 1971	
FBI-WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE	



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-26-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/STP/TH

Date of transcription 9/28/71

[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted], advised as follows:

[redacted] was able to determine from payroll records that she was on duty the evening of July 16, 1971, on which date the telegram from Nairobi pertaining to AID representative, [redacted], was received. She stated that she did not recall that it was received on that date and was unaware of it at the time it was received. She stated that she did not discuss the telegram with anyone and was unaware of its contents on that date.

[redacted] stated that she was on duty in the Executive Secretariat until 9:30 p.m. and according to records that she was able to determine that the duty officer in the Executive Secretariat for that particular evening was [redacted]. She stated that one of her duties was to take the "burnbag" stapled closed to SSI (Information Section of Operations). She stated that she placed the burnbag in the stack of other burnbags to be burned in the SSI Section.

[redacted] stated that she did not have any copies of the telegram Xeroxed and she does not have any information indicating that anyone else may have Xeroxed a copy of the telegram.

[redacted] stated that she first became aware of the content of the message when on July 19, 1971, she read the message in the SSI Section. She indicated that she recalled that the telegram was indicated to be "EXDIS" and "EYES ONLY" for Doctor JOHN A. HANNAH, Director, AID. She opined that the telegram should have been marked "NODIS" to restrict the distribution since it was indicated to be for Doctor HANNAH only.

Interviewed on 9/27/71 at Washington, D. C.

File # WFO 65-11628 58

by SAs [redacted]
[redacted] RCW:ord

Date dictated 9/28/71

WFO 65-11628

[redacted] stated that she does not know JACK ANDERSON or any member of his staff or family and had not been in contact with them. She stated that she does not know [redacted] [redacted] and does not know anyone who might want to attempt to downgrade [redacted]. She said she had no idea as to how the leak of information to JACK ANDERSON might have occurred.

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b7C

NR012 WF CODE

8:03PM URGENT 9-29-71 GEA

TO DIRECTOR (65-74138)

FROM WASHINGTON FIELD (65-11628) 5P

TOLL LEK, SIO

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-04-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH

RE WFO TELETYPE SEPTEMBER TWENTYEIGHT LAST.

THE FOLLOWING INVESTIGATION WAS CONDUCTED SEPTEMBER
TWENTYNINE INSTANT:

[REDACTED], USDS, ADVISED

HE WAS EDITOR IN THE OPERATIONS CENTER DURING THE PERTINENT
PERIOD WHEN THE TELEGRAMS WERE RECEIVED IN THE OPERATIONS
CENTER. HE RECALLED THE CONTENT OF THE MESSAGE BUT DOES NOT
RECALL WHEN HE READ THEM. HE COULD FURNISH NO INFORMATION
CONCERNING THE LEAK.

b6
b7C

TEN OF THE EIGHTEEN EMPLOYEES IN THE COMMUNICATIONS
CENTER, USDS, WHO HAD BEEN INVOLVED IN PROCESSING THE TWO
USDS TELEGRAMS INVOLVED IN THIS MATTER WERE INTERVIEWED. NONE
END PAGE ONE

65-11628-59

Searched _____
Serialized _____
Indexed _____
Filed _____

[REDACTED]

[Handwritten signature]

[REDACTED]

WFO 65-11628

PAGE TWO

COULD SUGGEST ANY SUSPECT FOR LEAK. THEY DID NOT KNOW ANY COMMUNICATIONS CENTER EMPLOYEES WHO WERE ACQUAINTED WITH JACK ANDERSON OR STAFF. ARRANGEMENTS BEING MADE TO INTERVIEW REMAINING EIGHT OF THIS GROUP OF EMPLOYEES.

[REDACTED], OFFICE OF SECURITY, AID, ADVISED HE SERVED IN NAIROBI, KENYA, [REDACTED], USDS, FROM SEPTEMBER, NINETEEN SIXTYNINE TO AUGUST TWENTYFOUR SEVENTYONE, AT WHICH TIME HE RETURNED TO U.S. [REDACTED] FEELS POSSIBILITY OF LEAK OCCURRING IN KENYA REMOTE. WHEN SUCCESSOR TO [REDACTED] ARRIVES IN KENYA AN INQUIRY WILL BE MADE THERE LOOKING TOWARD POSSIBILITY OF LEAK ORIGINATING IN KENYA.

[REDACTED] FEELS POSTURE OF U.S. IN KENYA NOT ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY LEAK.

ADMINISTRATIVE

RE WFO TELETYPE SEPTEMBER TWENTYEIGHT LAST WHICH SET OUT NECESSITY FOR WFO TO CONTACT WTTG TO DETERMINE IF AN
END PAGE TWO

b6
b7C

WFO 65-11628

PAGE THREE

"EXDIS" COMMUNICATION WAS UTILIZED DURING JACK ANDERSON'S
SEPTEMBER TWENTYFOUR LAST WTTG TELEVISION CHANNEL FIVE,
TEN P.M. PROGRAM.

A REVIEW OF WFO INDICES UNDER WTTG REVEALS NO INFORMATION
TO PRECLUDE CONTACT WITH WTTG.

IN VIEW OF WHITE HOUSE INTEREST IN INSTANT MATTER AND
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE INTENT TO PROSECUTE, THE UTILIZATION
BY ANDERSON OF ANY "EXDIS" U.S.D. S. COMMUNICATION PERTINENT
TO THIS INVESTIGATION WOULD SHOW POSSESSION AND CONSTITUTE
PRIMA FACE EVIDENCE.

THIS RESOLUTION CAN ONLY BE DONE VIA CONTACT WITH AND
INVESTIGATION AT WTTG. IN VIEW OF JACK ANDERSON INTEREST, AND
ULTIMATELY EXPOSE FBI INTEREST, THE FOLLOWING SPECIFIC REQUEST
IS MADE OF THE BUREAU.

END PAGE THREE

WFO 65-11628

PAGE FOUR

THE BUREAU IS REQUESTED TO ADVISE IF THE CRIME RECORDS DIVISION HAS A CONTACT AT WTTG WHICH CAN BE USED BY WFO FOR THE PURPOSE OF DETERMINING ON A DISCREET BASIS IF ANDERSON DID IN FACT USE A BACKGROUND BLOW UP OF AN "EXDIS" USDS COMMUNICATION WHICH DIRECTLY RELATES TO THIS MATTER NAMELY THE TWO USDS TELEGRAMS.

THE BUREAU HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY ADVISED WFO HAS NO WTTG, SAC CONTACT. AS THE BUREAU KNOWS, THE SAC AT WFO IS NOT CURRENTLY AUTHORIZED TO ESTABLISH SUCH SAC CONTACTS AMONG THE NEWS MEDIA.

IF THERE IS NO WTTG CHANNEL FIVE METROMEDIA CONTACT AVAILABLE THROUGH THE BUREAU TO WFO THEN BUREAU AUTHORITY IS REQUESTED FOR WFO TO MAKE CONTACT WITH WTTG, ON BEHALF OF THE USDJ, TO DETERMINE IF A VIDEO TAPE EXIST FOR THE NINE TWENTYFOUR LAST ANDERSON SHOW, OR IN THE ABSENCE OF VIDEO TAPE, THE IDENTITY OF PERSONS AT WTTG

END PAGE FOUR

WFO 65-11628

PAGE FIVE

WHO HAVE PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE. SHOULD THEIR IDENTITIES BE
DETERMINED WFO WOULD SUBMIT INDIVIDUAL REQUEST FOR INTERVIEW.

END

X EBM FBI WA CLR

F B I

Date: 9/29/71

Transmit the following in CODED
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via TELETYPE URGENT
(Priority)

013

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (65-74138)

FROM: SAC, WFO (65-11628)

TOLL LEK, SIO

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-04-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH

RE WFO TELETYPE SEPTEMBER TWENTYEIGHT LAST.

THE FOLLOWING INVESTIGATION WAS CONDUCTED SEPTEMBER

TWENTYNINE INSTANT:

[Redacted]

USDS, ADVISED

b6
b7C

HE WAS EDITOR IN THE OPERATIONS CENTER DURING THE PERTINENT PERIOD WHEN THE TELEGRAMS WERE RECEIVED IN THE OPERATIONS CENTER. HE RECALLED THE CONTENT OF THE MESSAGES BUT DOES NOT RECALL WHEN HE READ THEM. HE COULD FURNISH NO INFORMATION CONCERNING THE LEAK.

TEN OF THE EIGHTEEN EMPLOYEES IN THE COMMUNICATIONS CENTER, USDS, WHO HAD BEEN INVOLVED IN PROCESSING THE TWO USDS TELEGRAMS INVOLVED IN THIS MATTER WERE INTERVIEWED. NONE

1 - WFO
ELG:jak
pk

8.9

65-11628-590
SEARCHED INDEXED
SERIALIZED FILED
SEP 29 6 10 PM '71

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b7C

Approved: RGK/ABM
Special Agent in Charge

Sent 8:23 P

[Redacted]

M Per

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via _____
(Priority)WFO 65-11628
PAGE TWO

COULD SUGGEST ANY SUSPECT FOR LEAK. THEY DID NOT KNOW ANY COMMUNICATIONS CENTER EMPLOYEES WHO WERE ACQUAINTED WITH JACK ANDERSON OR STAFF. ARRANGEMENTS BEING MADE TO INTERVIEW REMAINING EIGHT OF THIS GROUP OF EMPLOYEES.

[REDACTED], OFFICE OF SECURITY, AID, ADVISED HE SERVED IN NAIROBI, KENYA, AS REGIONAL SECURITY OFFICER, USDS, FROM SEPTEMBER, NINETEEN SIXTYNINE TO AUGUST TWENTYFOUR SEVENTYONE, AT WHICH TIME HE RETURNED TO U.S. [REDACTED] FEELS POSSIBILITY OF LEAK OCCURRING IN KENYA REMOTE. WHEN SUCCESSOR TO [REDACTED] ARRIVES IN KENYA AN INQUIRY WILL BE MADE THERE LOOKING TOWARD POSSIBILITY OF LEAK ORIGINATING IN KENYA.

[REDACTED] FEELS POSTURE OF U.S. IN KENYA NOT ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY LEAK.

ADMINISTRATIVE

RE WFO TELETYPE SEPTEMBER TWENTYEIGHT LAST WHICH SET OUT NECESSITY FOR WFO TO CONTACT WTTG TO DETERMINE IF AN

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b7C

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via _____
(Priority)WFO 65-11628
PAGE THREE

"EXDIS" COMMUNICATION WAS UTILIZED DURING JACK ANDERSON'S
SEPTEMBER TWENTYFOUR LAST WTTG TELEVISION CHANNEL FIVE,
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A REVIEW OF WFO INDICES UNDER WTTG REVEALS NO INFORMATION
TO PRECLUDE CONTACT WITH WTTG.

IN VIEW OF WHITE HOUSE INTEREST IN INSTANT MATTER AND
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE INTENT TO PROSECUTE, THE UTILIZATION
BY ANDERSON OF ANY "EXDIS" U.S.D.S. COMMUNICATION PERTINENT
TO THIS INVESTIGATION WOULD SHOW POSSESSION AND CONSTITUTE
PRIMA FACE EVIDENCE.

THIS RESOLUTION CAN ONLY BE DONE VIA CONTACT WITH AND
INVESTIGATION AT WTTG. IN VIEW OF JACK ANDERSON INTEREST AND
THE CERTAIN POSSIBILITY HE MAY LEARN OF FBI INTEREST, AND
ULTIMATELY EXPOSE FBI INTEREST, THE FOLLOWING SPECIFIC REQUEST
IS MADE OF THE BUREAU.

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via _____
(Priority)WFO 65-11628
PAGE FOUR

THE BUREAU IS REQUESTED TO ADVISE IF THE CRIME RECORDS DIVISION HAS A CONTACT AT WTTG WHICH CAN BE USED BY WFO FOR THE PURPOSE OF DETERMINING ON A DISCREET BASIS IF ANDERSON DID IN FACT USE A BACKGROUND BLOW UP OF AN "EXDIS" USDS COMMUNICATION WHICH DIRECTLY RELATES TO THIS MATTER NAMELY THE TWO USDS TELEGRAMS.

THE BUREAU HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY ADVISED WFO HAS NO WTTG, SAC CONTACT. AS THE BUREAU KNOWS, THE SAC AT WFO IS NOT CURRENTLY AUTHORIZED TO ESTABLISH SUCH SAC CONTACTS AMONG THE NEWS MEDIA.

IF There is ~~no~~ ^{FIVE} WTTG Channel ~~&~~ Melromedia contact available ^{Through the Bureau} to WFO Then Bureau authority is requested for WFO to make contact with WTTG, on behalf of the US DJ, to determine if a video tape exists for the 9/24 last Anderson show; or in the absence of video tape, the identity of persons at WTTG who have personal knowledge. Should their identities be determined, WFO would submit individual requests to interview.

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 9/29/71

[redacted], Office of Public Affairs, Agency for International Development (AID), Room 4906, State Department Building, Washington, D. C. (WDC), advised as follows:

[redacted] stated that he received the incoming telephone call from [redacted] of JACK ANDERSON's staff, at which time the information in the incoming cable from Kenya, pertaining to [redacted] was read to him [redacted]. [redacted] then asked for biographic information about [redacted] which was given to him. [redacted] told [redacted] that he would next telephone Dr. JOHN HANNAH, Administrator, AID, which he proceeded to do.

[redacted] said that he has pondered the possibilities of how the leak of information occurred, including the possibility that the information was given to the ANDERSON staff by telephone. He has wondered whether the leak originated in Kenya, but again, he has no information to support either contention.

[redacted] said that he has known [redacted] for some years, and has worked under him in AID, but that neither he, nor anyone he knows, disliked [redacted] to the point of causing a leak of classified information to smear a man's character.

[redacted] said that he does not personally know JACK ANDERSON or members of his staff, and is at a loss to understand how they obtained the information from classified communication channels.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-26-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/STP/TH

On 9/28/71 at Washington, D. C. File # 65-11628 591B
by SA [redacted] and SA [redacted] MGM:jak Date dictated 9/28/71

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

REPORTING OFFICE WASHINGTON FIELD	OFFICE OF ORIGIN WASHINGTON FIELD	DATE 9/30/71	INVESTIGATIVE PERIOD 9/20 - 28/71
TITLE OF CASE UNSUB; Unauthorized Disclosure of Information in State Department Cables Appearing in "The Washington Post" Article, Tuesday, July 27, 1971, By Jack Anderson		REPORT MADE BY SA 	TYPED BY jak b6 b7c
		CHARACTER OF CASE ESPIONAGE - X	

REFERENCE: Bureau airtel 9/17/71.

- bjm

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-04-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH

ADMINISTRATIVE:

This report is classified "~~Confidential~~" inasmuch as the U.S. Department of State has so classified the telegrams which are pertinent to this investigation.

LEAD

WASHINGTON FIELD

AT WASHINGTON, D. C.: As instructed by the Bureau,

ACCOMPLISHMENTS CLAIMED					<input type="checkbox"/> NONE	ACQUIT-TALS	CASE HAS BEEN:
CONVIC.	AUTO.	FUG.	FINES	SAVINGS	RECOVERIES		
							PENDING PROSECUTION OVER SIX MONTHS <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO

APPROVED *elbj* SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE

COPIES MADE:

6 - Bureau (65-74138)
3 - WFO (65-11628)

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How Fwd.				
By				

Notations

65-11628-61

Searched
 Serialized *✓*
 Indexed
 Filed *✓*

WFO 65-11628

daily teletype summaries are being submitted in this case and the Bureau is fully aware of the progress of this case. In view of this, specific investigative leads are not being set out in this report but this matter is receiving expedite and full attention. The Bureau will continue to be kept currently advised of developments.

B*
COVER PAGE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH
ON 05-04-2007

Copy to:

Report of: SA [redacted] Office: Washington, D. C.
Date: 9/30/71
Field Office File #: 65-11628 Bureau File #: 65-74138
Title: UNKNOWN SUBJECT; Unauthorized Disclosure of
Information in State Department Cables
Appearing in "The Washington Post" Article,
Tuesday, July 27, 1971, by Jack Anderson
Character: ESPIONAGE - X

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Synopsis: Numerous individuals employed at Agency for International
Development (AID); at Office of African Affairs, U.S.
Department of State (USDS); at Office of Communications, USDS;
at Operations Center and Office of Executive Secretariat, USDS;
all located in Washington, D. C., were interviewed but unable
to furnish information concerning possible source of leak.
[redacted] whose activities in Kenya were mentioned in
the telegrams which were the basis for ANDERSON's column, was
interviewed but has no information concerning leak.

- P -

DETAILS: AT WASHINGTON, D. C.:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

9/23/71

1

Date of transcription _____

DR. JOHN R. HANNAH, Administrator, Agency for International Development, Room 5942, State Department Building, Washington, D. C., advised as follows:

DR. HANNAH said that he knew no one who had a personal grudge against [redacted], such as to cause a leak of information in official communication channels. Further, he had no knowledge of anyone within the Agency for International Development (AID), who would perpetrate a leak, especially of his outgoing cable to the Ambassador of Kenya, because it was more tightly controlled than the incoming cable from Kenya.

DR. HANNAH advised that he had received a telephone call on September 2, 1971 from [redacted] a man who works for columnist JACK ANDERSON. This occurred shortly after a State Department press conference was held, in which the question of State Department employees being given "lie detector" tests was raised, relative to leak of information cases. [redacted] asked if DR. HANNAH had lodged a complaint or had requested an investigation be initiated to uncover sources of information utilized by JACK ANDERSON and his associates. HANNAH told [redacted] that he had not requested such an investigation.

DR. HANNAH further advised that [redacted] is presently in the Washington area, but that he has not seen him personally yet. He said that [redacted] would be in Washington until Friday, September 24, 1971, and that in all probability, he would see [redacted] prior to the latter's departure for Kenya.

Interviewed on 9/22/71 at Washington, D. C. File # 65-11628

by SA [redacted] and SA [redacted] JR. NGM:jak Date dictated 9/23/71

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

9/23/71

Date of transcription

1

[redacted] to DR. JOHN R. HANNAH, Administrator, Agency for International Development (AID), Room 5942, State Department Building, Washington, D.C., advised as follows:

[redacted] said that she has learned no additional information to indicate how the leak of information in the [redacted] matter occurred. She said that she knew of no one who held a personal animosity toward [redacted] sufficient to perpetrate a leak of information in order to discredit him, nor, for that matter, anyone in AID who would have the access to cables to do so.

[redacted] could furnish no additional information about the matter.

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Interviewed on 9/22/71 at Washington, D. C. File # 65-11628

by SA [redacted] and
SA [redacted] NGM:jak Date dictated 9/23/71

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

9/23/71

Date of transcription

1

[redacted] Office of the Administrator, Agency for International Development (AID), Room 5942, State Department Building, Washington, D. C., advised as follows:

[redacted] advised that she does not know [redacted] [redacted] closely, and has no knowledge of anyone who might harbor a grudge against him for personal reasons. She stated that her action in the matter of the cables was very limited, and she could offer no information as to how the leak occurred.

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Interviewed on **9/22/71** at **Washington, D. C.** File # **65-11628**

by **SA [redacted] and SA [redacted]** **MMJ:jak** Date dictated **9/23/71**

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

9/28/71

Date of transcription

[redacted] Agency for International Development, Room 5894, State Department Building, Washington, D. C. (WDC), advised as follows:

[redacted] stated that at the time of the incoming cable from Kenya to Agency for International Development (AID) headquarters, he was preparing to depart the United States for an AID meeting in Paris, France. Dr. JOHN HANNAH, Administrator, AID, and his direct superior, showed him the incoming cable, after which they discussed it briefly prior to his plane departure for Paris. [redacted] did not see the second cable at that time because it had not yet been prepared by Dr. HANNAH.

[redacted] said that he did not stop over in London, England, but continued directly to Paris, thus he saw neither [redacted] nor [redacted] when they met in London on July 20, 1971. [redacted] said that when he returned to the United States, and to his office at AID headquarters, Dr. HANNAH informed him of the situation involving [redacted] inasmuch as he is the Administrator's immediate assistant.

[redacted] advised that he has no knowledge of how the leak of information occurred, but deplors the fact that it happened. He said that he knew of no one who dislikes [redacted] enough to attempt to ruin his career, and felt that the violation of classification regulations to do so was indefensible.

[redacted] said that over the years he has learned that personnel problems seem to create an intense interest as gossip material, and as such, often receive rather wide distribution. Apparently, in this case, the fact that the information relating to the problem was classified, made no difference to the person who leaked it.

Interviewed on 9/27/71 at Washington, D. C. File # 65-11628

by SA [redacted] and SA [redacted] HQT:jak Date dictated 9/27/71

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

9/24/71

Date of transcription

[redacted], an employee of the Agency for International Development (AID), stationed in Kenya, Africa, advised of the following, while in Washington, D.C.:

[redacted] said that to the best of his recollection, he received a long distance telephone call at his residence in Nairobi, Kenya, on the evening of July 17, 1971. The call was from Washington, D.C. from a man who identified himself as (First Name Unknown) [redacted] (phonetic), who said that he was on JACK ANDERSON's staff. [redacted] said that the telephone call was not too clear, but that he heard [redacted] read off a portion of an account of [redacted]

[redacted] with the visit of Vice President AGNEW in July, 1971. [redacted] told [redacted] that the story was [redacted]

[redacted] could not further identify [redacted] who made no particular reply to [redacted]

[redacted] advised that he departed Nairobi on the night of July 19, 1971, via airplane, for London, England to meet [redacted] of AID headquarters, in connection with the above matter. [redacted] said that [redacted] did not show him any copies of the pertinent cables, but [redacted] briefed him on the contents of the cable which [redacted] Administrator, AID, had sent to American Ambassador to Kenya, [redacted]

[redacted] said that he had not seen the full text of either cable until the morning of September 23, 1971 when he visited Dr. HANNAN in the latter's office at AID headquarters. Dr. HANNAN showed him the cables at that time.

Interviewed on 9/23/71 at Washington, D. C. File # 65-11628
 by SA [redacted] and [redacted] Date dictated 9/24/71
 SA [redacted] MEM:jak

WFO 65-11628

2

When asked if the public disclosure in ANDERSON's column of the aforementioned incident in Kenya might have had an adverse effect on the posture of the United States in that country, [] replied that he thought not. As evidence of that belief, [] said that Kenyan Ambassador KIBINGE, with whom he is friendly, told him that only three or four persons in Kenya would see the ANDERSON article, and that it would not be printed locally in the Nairobi newspapers. In this connection, [] stated that KIBINGE was the person who called his attention to the ANDERSON column, and that apparently KIBINGE had seen it prior to anyone at the American Embassy.

When asked if he felt that the leak of information could have originated in Nairobi, [] said that he thought the possibility was very remote. He said that to date, he has not visited the cable room of the American Embassy in Nairobi, and thus does not know the number of employees there, but based on the great distance between Kenya and the United States, he does not feel that the leak originated in Nairobi.

[] stated that he is on good terms with all of his associates in Nairobi, and that he knows of no one who bears him a grudge which would result in an attempt to ruin his career. He said that many of the employees of the American Embassy in Nairobi are giving him moral support at this time. He said that he is on excellent terms with Ambassador MC ILVAINE, and felt that it was proper for the Ambassador to notify Dr. HANNAH as he had done, in order to protect himself in the situation. He felt, however, that the strong language used in describing the alleged social disturbance was unnecessary, but he holds no hard feelings toward MC ILVAINE.

In connection with the foregoing, [] said that he knows no one in Washington, D. C. who bears him ill-will to the point of trying to ruin his career by leaking such a story. He said that he intends to remain in the service of AID

WFO 65-11628

3

and will return to his post in Nairobi on the weekend of September 25, 1971 where his family presently resides.

When asked if he knows JACK ANDERSON personally, [] said that the only time he talked to him occurred several years ago during a father-daughter dinner dance which was held at the National Press Club in Washington, D. C. At that time, ANDERSON commented favorably on the dancing ability of [] young daughter. He engaged ANDERSON in conversation for a short period of time. [] said that he knows no one on JACK ANDERSON's staff and that he had only one telephone conversation, mentioned heretofore, with [] who identified himself as such.

It was the opinion of [] that the leak occurred in Washington, D. C., but that he had no information to indicate the source of the leak.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

9/29/71

Date _____

1

[redacted] Director, Office of Public Affairs, Agency for International Development (AID), Room 4906, State Department Building, Washington, D. C. (WDC), advised as follows:

[redacted] stated that he received the incoming telephone call from [redacted] of JACK ANDERSON's staff, at which time the information in the incoming cable from Kenya, pertaining to [redacted], was read to him (WILBER). [redacted] then asked for biographic information about [redacted] which was given to him. [redacted] told [redacted] that he would next telephone Dr. JOHN HANNAN, Administrator, AID, which he proceeded to do.

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[redacted] said that he has pondered the possibilities of how the leak of information occurred, including the possibility that the information was given to the ANDERSON staff by telephone. He has wondered whether the leak originated in Kenya, but again, he has no information to support either contention.

[redacted] said that he has known [redacted] for some years, and has worked under him in AID, but that neither he, nor anyone he knows, disliked [redacted] to the point of causing a leak of classified information to smear a man's character.

[redacted] said that he does not personally know JACK ANDERSON or members of his staff, and is at a loss to understand how they obtained the information from classified communication channels.

On 9/28/71 at Washington, D. C. File# 65-11628

by SA [redacted] and [redacted] Date dictated 9/28/71
SA [redacted] MNH:jak

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

Date of transcription 9/23/71

[redacted] for African Affairs, Room 6234-A, United States Department of State (USDS) advised as follows:

He stated his recollection of the incoming telegram from Nairobi regarding [redacted] is somewhat hazy, however, he recalled receiving one copy of this communication from the African Bureau Message Center. He stated that the communication was first received by [redacted] who is an Assistant to him.

He stated that shortly after receiving the message Dr. SAMUEL ADAMS, Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Africa, Agency for International Development (AID), came over to his office with a copy of the communication and spoke to him about a trip to London to meet [redacted].

In addition he stated he spoke to WILLIAM HALL, Director General of Foreign Service, USDS, regarding [redacted] however [redacted] had not seen the communication from Nairobi.

[redacted] indicated that he preferred to have [redacted] return to the United States, however, Dr. JOHN A. HANNAH, Administrator, AID, was opposed to this proposition, and he wanted [redacted] to speak to Dr. HANNAH about it.

[redacted] stated it was his recollection that HALL had obtained a copy of the communication from Mr. WILLIAM MACOMBER, Deputy Undersecretary for Administration.

[redacted] stated he did not have any copies made from the copy that had been made available to his office. He stated he is not acquainted with JACK ANDERSON or any member of his staff and has not had any contact with him. He stated he knew

Interviewed on 9/22/71 at Washington, D. C. File # WFO 65-11628
 SAs [redacted] and [redacted]
 by [redacted] RCW:cb Date dictated 9/22/71

WFO 65-11628

2

[redacted] as a congressional relations official at AID.
He stated he had no idea of why anyone would want to downgrade
[redacted] and could furnish no information concerning how
JACK ANDERSON had received a copy of the communication.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 9/23/711

[redacted] to [redacted]
[redacted], Room 6234-A, United
States Department of State (USDS), advised as follows:

[redacted] stated that she was on duty on Saturday, July 17, 1971, and [redacted] was Acting Assistant Secretary in behalf of [redacted]. She stated she recalled the message arriving in the office and stated it was held for [redacted] observance Monday, July 19, 1971. She stated that she put the message in her workbox and locked it in the safe in [redacted] office.

She stated that on Monday, July 19, 1971, [redacted] dictated a reply to the message which was typed by her and taken along with the message received from Nairobi to the office of Dr. SAMUEL C. ADAMS, JR., Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Africa, Agency for International Development (AID) by [redacted] for [redacted]. She stated this message of [redacted] was brought back to the office of [redacted] by Dr. SAMUEL ADAMS, because Dr. JOHN A. HANNAH, Administrator, AID wanted to prepare his own reply to the communication from Nairobi.

[redacted] stated that she is not acquainted with JACK ANDERSON, his staff or any member of his family and has no friends in the news media. She stated she had no knowledge of any additional copies being made of the communication mentioned above. She stated that she does not know [redacted] [redacted] and has no idea how the information in JACK ANDERSON's column could have been leaked to him.

Interviewed on 9/22/71 at Washington, D. C. File # WFO 65-11628
by SAs [redacted] and [redacted] and RGW:cb Date dictated 9/22/71

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

Date of transcription 9/23/71

[redacted] to [redacted]
[redacted] for African Affairs, Room 6234-A, United States Department of State (USDS), advised as follows:

She stated that she could not recall a communication being received in [redacted] office pertaining to the information set forth in JACK ANDERSON's column of July 27, 1971. She stated that she could furnish no information concerning the message itself.

She stated that she is not acquainted with JACK ANDERSON or any member of his staff or his family. In addition, she stated she is not acquainted with [redacted] and has no information as to how the information from the communication from Nairobi was obtained by JACK ANDERSON.

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Interviewed on 9/22/71 at Washington, D. C. File # WFO 65-11628

by SAs [redacted] and [redacted] Date dictated 9/22/71
RCW:cb

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

Date of transcription 9/23/71

[redacted] for African Affairs, Room 6236, United States Department of State (USDS), was interviewed and furnished the following information:

[redacted] stated he was on duty Saturday, July 17, 1971, in the office of [redacted], Assistant Secretary for African Affairs. He stated he recalls the communication from Nairobi pertaining to the alleged misconduct of [redacted]. It was his recollection that he read the communication and was aware of its contents. He recalled that he resealed the envelope in which it arrived and gave it to [redacted], secretary, with instructions to place it in the safe for [redacted] for African Affairs, to observe when he returned to work on July 19, 1971. [redacted] stated that the officer on duty was [redacted] but it was his opinion that [redacted] did not handle the communication and was unaware of its contents.

[redacted] advised that he had no other copies of the communication made available from the copy he received. He stated he does not know JACK ANDERSON, any member of his staff or family.

[redacted] advised that he is acquainted with [redacted] in that he served with Agency for International Development (AID) until two years past. He stated he believed [redacted] to be unstable and incompetent although he had no personal animosity toward him and knew of no one who would want to discredit [redacted] or who would make the information in the communication described above available to any outside sources.

Interviewed on 9/23/71 at Washington, D. C. File # WFO 65-11628

by SAs [redacted] and [redacted] RCW:esg Date dictated 9/23/71

WFO 65-11628

2

It was [] opinion that any improper release of this information would have emanated from someone at AID rather than the State Department and more likely from a source in Washington, D. C. (WDC) rather than overseas. He qualified this statement indicating that [] was a "pushy" individual who had in his career made bitter enemies who might want to discredit him in any way they could.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

9/24/71

Date of transcription

[redacted]
 Management Section, Executive Secretariat, Room 7512,
 United States Department of State (USDS), furnished the
 following information:

[redacted] stated he was on duty on July 16, 1971
 in his office. He stated that from information available
 from his file the communication pertaining to [redacted]
 Agency for International Development (AID) representative
 assigned to Nairobi, Kenya, arrived in the Operations Center
 between 9:00 AM and 12 Noon on July 16, 1971. He stated this
 was an "EXDIS" cable for "eyes only". He stated this
 communication was received from Nairobi and it was garbled,
 which required a second communication to follow subsequently.
 According to [redacted] communication number two, which was a
 copy of the original, number one, arrived at the Operations
 Center at 1:55 PM.

[redacted] stated that only one copy was indicated
 on the distribution sheet for distribution outside the State
 Department and that was to DR. JOHN A. HANNAN. To [redacted]
 knowledge there were no other copies of the original communication
 distributed.

Copy number two, which arrived at approximately
 1:55 PM, was a corrected copy of the original communication
 and distribution was made in accordance with the usual
 procedures followed within the Operations Center. Fortyfive
 copies of the communication were received from the Communications
 Center and according to the distribution sheet for the communication,
 one copy was forwarded to DR. HANNAN. In addition to the copy
 to DR. HANNAN the following copies were distributed within the
 State Department: One copy to the Editor of the Operations
 Center; one copy to the Watch Officer of the Operations Center;

Interviewed on 9/24/71 at Washington, D. C. File # 65-11628
 by SA [redacted] and [redacted] RCW:jak Date dictated 9/24/71

WFO 65-11628

2

one copy to the Executive Secretariat; 3 copies were distributed to the Screener (relocation) and one copy distributed to Director of Staff Secretariat. All remaining copies, to [redacted] knowledge, were destroyed in accordance with standard procedures.

[redacted] stated that Operations Assistant [redacted] [redacted] was on duty in the Operations Center when communications number one and two arrived. He stated [redacted] physically handled these communications and was responsible for destroying all copies not designated for distribution. He stated [redacted] [redacted] in the Operations Center and has returned

[redacted] stated he was not acquainted with JACK ANDERSON or any members of his staff or his family and further advised that he could furnish no information regarding information concerning leak of the contents of the above referred to communication.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

9/27/71

Date of transcription

[redacted]
[redacted], Executive Secretary, Room 7224, United States
Department of State, advised as follows:

[redacted] stated that she did not see the telegram from the Ambassador in Kenya regarding [redacted] Agency for International Development Representative on July 16, 1971. She also stated that she was not aware of the discussion in the office regarding this matter until the time of the information in the JACK ANDERSON column.

She stated that it is a usual procedure for telegrams received in her office to be stacked up on her desk and at the end of the day they are placed in a "burn bag" to be destroyed. She stated that she did not have any copies of the telegram in question, and as far as she knows the telegram was destroyed.

[redacted] stated that she does not know JACK ANDERSON or any member of his staff or family. In addition, she stated that she does not know [redacted] and could furnish no information as to why anyone would want to discredit him. She also stated she had no idea as to how the leak of information of JACK ANDERSON occurred.

Interviewed on 9/27/71 at Washington, D.C. File # WFO 65-11628
by SAS [redacted] and [redacted] /KRS/jmg Date dictated 9/27/71

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 9/28/71

[redacted]
[redacted] Room 7224, Department of state, as well as Secretary to the Deputy Director of the Secretariat, United States Department of State, advised as follows:

[redacted] was able to determine from payroll records that she was on duty the evening of July 16, 1971, on which date the telegram from Nairobi pertaining to AID representative, [redacted] was received. She stated that she did not recall that it was received on that date and was unaware of it at the time it was received. She stated that she did not discuss the telegram with anyone and was unaware of its contents on that date.

[redacted] stated that she was on duty in the Executive Secretariat until 9:30 p.m. and according to records that she was able to determine that the duty officer in the Executive Secretariat for that particular evening was [redacted]. She stated that one of her duties was to take the "burnbag" stapled closed to SSI (Information Section of Operations). She stated that she placed the burnbag in the stack of other burnbags to be burned in the SSI Section.

[redacted] stated that she did not have any copies of the telegram Xeroxed and she does not have any information indicating that anyone else may have Xeroxed a copy of the telegram.

[redacted] stated that she first became aware of the content of the message when on July 19, 1971, she read the message in the SSI Section. She indicated that she recalled that the telegram was indicated to be "EKDIS" and "EYES ONLY" for Doctor JOHN A. HANNAH, Director, AID. She opined that the telegram should have been marked "NODIS" to restrict the distribution since it was indicated to be for Doctor HANNAH only.

Interviewed on 9/27/71 at Washington, D. C. File # WFO 65-11628

by SA [redacted] RCW:ord Date dictated 9/28/71

WFO 65-11628

2

[redacted] stated that she does not know JACK ANDERSON or any member of his staff or family and had not been in contact with them. She stated that she does not know [redacted] [redacted] and does not know anyone who might want to attempt to downgrade [redacted]. She said she had no idea as to how the leak of information to JACK ANDERSON might have occurred.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

9/29/71

Date of transcription

1

[redacted], Operations Staff, Communications Center, Office of Communications, Bureau of Administration, United States Department of State (USDS), furnished the following information concerning incoming Telegram Number 3713 dated July 16, 1971, from Nairobi and outgoing Telegram Number 130006 dated July 19, 1971, from USDS to Nairobi:

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He was on duty in the Communications Center on both July 16 and 19, 1971.

He could suggest no suspect for the leak of the above-mentioned two telegrams. He did not know any employees in the Communications Center who were acquainted with JACK ANDERSON or any member of ANDERSON's staff and he was not personally acquainted with ANDERSON or any member of his staff.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Interviewed on 9/28/71 at Washington, D. C. File # 65-11628
by SA [redacted] and SA [redacted] JCC:jak Date dictated 9/28/71

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ONR 020 CODED

8:50 PM URGENT 9-30-71 ASW

TO DIRECTOR

FROM WASHINGTON FIELD P2

TOLL LEK, SIO

RE WFO TELETYPE SEPTEMBER TWENTYNINE LAST.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-04-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH

THE FOLLOWING INVESTIGATION WAS CONDUCTED SEPTEMBER
THIRTY INSTANT:

DR. SAMUEL C. ADAMS, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR
AFRICAN AFFAIRS, AID, DENIED HE FURNISHED PERTINENT
TELEGRAMS TO JACK ANDERSON AR STAFF AND STATES HE IS NOT
ACQUAINTED WITH THEM. UNABLE TO SUPPLY ANY INFORMATION
REGARDING LEAK BUT FURNISHED EXTENSIVE DETAILS OF HIS HANDLING
OF THE PERTINENT TELEGRAMS AND CONTACTS WITH TOLLEFSON.

b6
b7C

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

AND

[REDACTED]

TO

GAMMON COULD FURNISH NO PERTINENT INFORMATION.

END PAGE ONE

65-11628-62

Searched _____
Serialized _____
Indexed _____
Filed _____

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[Handwritten signatures and initials]

WFO 65-11628

PAGE TWO

FOUR EMPLOYEES AT COMMUNICATIONS CENTER, USDS, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED]

[REDACTED], COULD FURNISH NO INFORMATION AS TO SOURCE OF LEAK.

ADDITIONAL INTERVIEWS AT STATE DEPARTMENT BEING
CONDUCTED.

END

REM FBIWASH C CLR

b6
b7C

NRR009 WF CODED

7:40PM URGENT 10-1-71 DLE

TO DIRECTOR (65-74138)

FROM WASHINGTON FIELD (65-11628) THREE PAGES

TOLL LEK, SIO

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-04-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH

RE WFO TELETYPE SEPTEMBER THIRTY LAST.

DR. SAMUEL C. ADAMS, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS, AID, ON SEPTEMBER THIRTY LAST FURNISHED DETAILS OF HANDLING OF CABLES, HIS MEETING IN LONDON JULY TWENTY LAST AND HIS INTERVIEW WITH [REDACTED] IN WASHINGTON, D.C., LAST WEEK. ADAMS TOLD [REDACTED] LAST WEEK THAT HIS INEPTITUDE IN KENYA POST PRECLUDED FUTURE CAREER IN FOREIGN SERVICE. ADAMS CATEGORICALLY DENIED KNOWING JACK ANDERSON, [REDACTED] OR [REDACTED] [REDACTED]; STATED HE HAD NEVER MET THEM, SPOKEN TO THEM, OR HAD ANY CONNECTION WITH THEM. WFO NEITHER AFFIRMED NOR DENIED THAT STATE SECURITY REPRESENTATIVES HAD QUOTED ADAMS AS HAVING SAID HE KNEW ANDERSON. ADAMS STATED IF STATE REPRESENTATIVES HAD

END PAGE ONE

b6
b7C

65-11628-63

Searched
Serialized
Indexed
Filed

[REDACTED]

[Handwritten signature]

WFO 65-11628)

PAGE TWO

SO QUOTED HIM, THEY WERE MISTAKEN. ADAMS CATEGORICALLY DENIED PASSING CABLES OR INFORMATION IN THEM TO ANDERSON OR HIS STAFF. ADAMS STATED HIS STAFF HAD NO ACCESS TO CABLES. ADAMS ALSO DENIED HAVING ANY PERSONAL ANIMOSITY TOWARD

IN VIEW OF SEEMING DISCREPANCIES IN INFORMATION FURNISHED BY ADAMS TO WFO AND THAT FURNISHED BY ADAMS TO STATE REPRESENTATIVES, IT IS WFO'S RECOMMENDATION THAT ATTEMPT SHOULD BE MADE BY WFO TO RECONCILE WITH STATE SECURITY REPRESENTATIVES WHO INTERVIEWED ADAMS WHETHER POSSIBILITY EXISTS THAT ADAMS WAS MISUNDERSTOOD BY STATE INTERVIEWERS. IF STATE INTERROGATORS STAND BY INFORMATION REPORTED TO HAVE BEEN OBTAINED FROM ADAMS, STATE CLEARANCE TO CONFRONT ADAMS WITH DISCREPANCIES WILL BE SOUGHT AND IF OBTAINED, WFO WILL THEREAFTER CONFRONT ADAMS WITH SAME.

UACB, WFO WILL PRESENT THIS MATTER TO STATE SECURITY OFFICE.

END PAGE TWO

b6
b7C

WFO 65-11628

PAGE THREE

SEVENTEEN OF EIGHTEEN EMPLOYEES AT STATE COMMUNICATIONS CENTER HAVE BEEN INTERVIEWED AND COULD FURNISH NO INFORMATION AS TO SOURCE OF LEAK.

ADDITIONAL INTERVIEWS AT STATE BEING CONDUCTED.

END

PLBFBI WA

NR013 WF CODED

750 PM URGENT 10-04-71 MWM

TO DIRECTOR (65-74138)

FROM WASHINGTON FIELD (65-11628)

TOLL LEK, SIO

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-04-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH

RE WFO TELETYPE OCTOBER ONE LAST.

ON OCTOBER FOUR INSTANT, [REDACTED], KENYA DESK
OFFICER; [REDACTED], DEPUTY DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF EAST
AFRICA; AND [REDACTED], OFFICER IN CHARGE, OFFICE OF
EAST AFRICA, ALL AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPEMENT (AID),
AND [REDACTED], ASSISTANT WATCH OFFICER AND [REDACTED]
[REDACTED], DEPARTMENTAL (USDS), WERE INTERVIEWED AND STATED
THEY COULD FURNISH NO INFORMATION CONCERNING SOURCE OF LEAK.
THEY DENIED KNOWING OF LEAK UNTIL AFTER APPEARANCE OF JACK
ANDERSON ARTICLE. ALL DENIED KNOWING ANDERSON AR ANY MEMBER
OF HIS STAFF.

ADDITIONAL INTERVIEWS BEING CONDUCTED AT AID AND USDS.

E N D

EBR FBI WASH DC

b6
b7C

65-11628-64

Searched _____
Serialized _____
Indexed _____
Filed _____

[REDACTED]

F B I

Date: 10/4/71

Transmit the following in CODED
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via TELETYPE URGENT
(Priority)

013

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (65-74138)

FROM: SAC, WFO (65-11628)

TOLL LEK, SIO

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-04-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH

b6
b7C

RE WFO TELETYPE OCTOBER ONE LAST.

ON OCTOBER FOUR INSTANT, [REDACTED] KENYA DESK
OFFICER; [REDACTED] DEPUTY DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF EAST
AFRICA; AND [REDACTED], OFFICER IN CHARGE, OFFICE OF
EAST AFRICA, ALL AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (AID),
AND [REDACTED], ASSISTANT WATCH OFFICER AND [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] DEPARTMENTAL OPERATIONS OFFICER, BOTH OPERATIONS
CENTER, STATE DEPARTMENT (USDS), WERE INTERVIEWED AND STATED
THEY COULD FURNISH NO INFORMATION CONCERNING SOURCE OF LEAK.
THEY DENIED KNOWING OF LEAK UNTIL AFTER APPEARANCE OF JACK
ANDERSON ARTICLE. ALL DENIED KNOWING ANDERSON OR ANY MEMBER
OF HIS STAFF.

ADDITIONAL INTERVIEWS BEING CONDUCTED AT AID AND USDS.

65-11628-640
SEARCHED INDEXED
SERIALIZED FILED
OCT 4 17 35 PM '71

1 - WFO
JCC:jak
[Handwritten signature]

Approved: RGK/YBM
Special Agent in Charge

Sent 7:24 M Per [Signature]

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

THE WASHINGTON POST Thursday, Sept. 30, 1971

Clamping the Lid on Embarrassment

By Jack Anderson

Ever since we reported on the drunken antics of an Agency for International Development official during Vice President Spiro T. Agnew's recent visit to Kenya, AID has been tightening the lid on classified messages.

FBI agents are grilling officials and giving lie detector tests to find out who leaked the secret report. Copy machines have been moved to secured areas where they are constantly monitored.

All these precautions have been taken in the name of national security. Yet our story, which precipitated the manhunt, had nothing to do with security.

We quoted from a message that Robinson McIlvane, the American ambassador to Kenya, sent to Dr. John Hannah, the AID administrator. The message was so sensitive that it was hand-delivered to Hannah under seal. He was upset, therefore, when we printed it for 45 million Americans to read.

But the subject of the message was the hijinks of Bert Tollefson, who is in charge of the AID program in Kenya. Alleged the hush-hush message:

"The problem started with Bert's well-known pushiness and general lack of sensitivity and culminated in his getting sloshed at Treetops (a night club), making passes at the

vice president's secretary and trying to drag her down the steps to meet an elephant at ground level."

Tollefson assured us by telephone from Nairobi that it was all a misunderstanding, and blamed the whole episode on unidentified Democratic holdovers.

But Hannah took urgent steps to make sure we don't get any more of his secret messages. He issued terse instructions, intended for the eyes only of those who handle sensitive documents.

As evidence that Hannah hasn't yet plugged the leak, here are his new instructions:

"The reproduction of the State's NODIS, EXDIS, and TOP SECRET and the AID's EYES ONLY and TOP SECRET messages requires the approval of the AID Executive secretary, and such reproduction can be accomplished only by the EXSEC Staff. . . .

"All reproduction and copy machines are being located in secured areas, which will be monitored. . . . During non-working hours, all copy machines will be secured in such a way that they are inoperable."

Slow Economic Rise

Reporting to Republican congressional leaders on the economic outlook the other day, Budget Director George Shultz confided between puffs on his pipe that the economy is "moving in the

right direction but not fast enough."

He reminded them that two million men had been released from the armed forces and laid off from defense production. This has had "a heavy impact" upon the economy, he said, but it is "now largely behind us."

He insisted that "inflation has topped out" and that the "economic structure clearly is strengthening."

The GOP leaders questioned President Nixon at the secret session about his economic plans. Asked about the 10 per cent surcharge on foreign imports, he replied: "Foreign nations are curious as to how long it will last. We are not going to move too quickly."

"It's important," cautioned New York's Sen. Jacob Javits, the top Republican on the Joint Congressional Economic Committee, "that we indicate our readiness to negotiate."

Colorado's Sen. Gordon Allott, the Senate Republican Conference chairman, questioned the President about tax investment credits for businessmen.

"Is the investment credit to be recommended on a temporary or permanent basis?" he asked.

"There should be an ongoing program," said Mr. Nixon. "We'll address ourselves to it in January."

The President, sipping coffee but frowning sternly as he spoke added: "Other countries

have used the device of taxes to accelerate depreciation to permit their industries to compete better overseas. We will have to examine our whole plant and investment situation to improve its competitive position."

Footnote: the President mildly goaded Wisconsin's Rep. John Byrnes, the ranking Republican on the powerful House Ways and Means Committee, about his "disagreement" with White House tax proposals. This was a teasing reference to Byrnes's close cooperation with Chairman Wilbur Mills (D-Ark.). But Byrnes predicted that the "outline" of Nixon's proposals would be left intact by the Ways and Means Committee.

Tight Squeeze

A Highway Safety official has proposed approving bus emergency exit windows that are so small an overfed American can't squeeze through.

On Aug. 2, the agency's motor vehicle section proposed a 13-by-20-inch size, far smaller than windows on modern buses. So shocked was the agency's research chief, John Edwards, that he fired off a memo pointing out that the school bus lobby recommended a minimum of 17-by-24 inches even for children.

The mini-exit Edwards wrote, "does not appear to be based on real life conditions encountered at the time of bus crashes."

Bell-McClure Syndicate

Contract

65-11628-65

SEARCHED	INDEXED
SERIALIZED	FILED
SEP 30 1971	
FBI - WASH. F. O.	

Gramp

EB7

NR010 WF CODED

655 PM URGENT 10-5-71 MWM

TO DIRECTOR (65-74138)

FROM WASHINGTON FIELD (65-11628)

TOLL LEX, SIO

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-04-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH

RE WFO TELETYPE OCTOBER FOUR LAST.

FOLLOWING INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED OCTOBER FIVE INSTANT:

[REDACTED] TO DR. SAMUEL C. ADAMS,

ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS, AID, CLAIMED

SHE NEVER SAW INCOMING TELEGRAM CONCERNING [REDACTED]

SHE STATED SHE MADE XEROX COPY OF OUTGOING TELEGRAM CONCERNING

[REDACTED], BUT SHE DID NOT READ IT. ALSO CLAIMED SHE

DID NOT KNOW REASON FOR DR. ADAMS' TRIP TO LONDON. SHE COULD

FURNISH NO INFORMATION CONCERNING SOURCE OF LEAK.

b6
b7C

[REDACTED] REPRODUCTION SECTION,

STATE (USDS) COMMUNICATIONS CENTER, COULD FURNISH NO

INFORMATION CONCERNING SOURCE OF LEAK. LOGICAL COMMUNICATIONS

CENTER EMPLOYEES HAVE BEEN INTERVIEWED AND NONE COULD FURNISH

END PAGE ONE

65-11628-67

SEARCHED _____ INDEXED _____
SERIALIZED _____ FILED _____

Control

OCT 5 6 55 PM '71

FBI-WASH. F. O.

[REDACTED]

Searched _____
Serialized _____
Indexed _____
Filed _____

F B I

Date: 10/5/71

Transmit the following in CODED
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via TELETYPE URGENT
(Priority)

b6
b7C

010

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (65-74138)

FROM: SAC, WFO (65-11628)

TOLL LEK, SIO

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-04-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH

RE WFO TELETYPE OCTOBER FOUR LAST.

FOLLOWING INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED OCTOBER FIVE INSTANT:

[redacted] TO DR. SAMUEL C. ADAMS,
ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS, AID, CLAIMED
SHE NEVER SAW INCOMING TELEGRAM CONCERNING [redacted]
SHE STATED SHE MADE XEROX COPY OF OUTGOING TELEGRAM CONCERNING
[redacted] BUT SHE DID NOT READ IT. ALSO CLAIMED SHE
DID NOT KNOW REASON FOR DR. ADAMS' TRIP TO LONDON. SHE COULD
FURNISH NO INFORMATION CONCERNING SOURCE OF LEAK.

[redacted] REPRODUCTION SECTION,
STATE (USDS) COMMUNICATIONS CENTER, COULD FURNISH NO
INFORMATION CONCERNING SOURCE OF LEAK. LOGICAL COMMUNICATIONS
CENTER EMPLOYEES HAVE BEEN INTERVIEWED AND NONE COULD FURNISH

1 - WFO

JCC:jak

65-11628-670

SEARCHED _____ INDEXED _____

SERIALIZED *W* FILED *FV*

OCT 5 6 13 PM '71

Approved: REG/ [signature]
Special Agent in Charge

Sent [signature] FBI-WASH. D.C. [signature]

[redacted]

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via _____
(Priority)WFO 65-11628
PAGE TWO

INFORMATION CONCERNING SOURCE OF LEAK.

[REDACTED] PHYSICAL SECURITY BRANCH,
DOMESTIC OPERATIONS DIVISION, OFFICE OF SECURITY (SY), BUREAU
OF ADMINISTRATION, USDS, WAS INTERVIEWED REGARDING DISPOSAL
AND DESTRUCTION OF CLASSIFIED COMMUNICATIONS. NO PERTINENT
INFORMATION WAS DEVELOPED.

[REDACTED], EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT OPERATIONS,
AID, ADVISED THAT [REDACTED] OF AID,
IS A DIVINITY STUDENT AT SHAW UNIVERSITY, RALEIGH, NORTH
CAROLINA. PAGE THREE OF USDS SY REPORT OF INVESTIGATION IN
THIS MATTER REVEALS INTERVIEW OF [REDACTED] AND BASED ON RESULTS
OF THAT INTERVIEW, WFO DOES NOT DEEM REINTERVIEW OF [REDACTED]
NECESSARY AT THIS TIME.

INVESTIGATION HAS DETERMINED THAT [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] ^{USDS} / ON BOTH JULY SIXTEEN AND NINETEEN
LAST, IS PRESENTLY [REDACTED], RESIDING

b6
b7C

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

NR022 WF CODED

936 PM URGENT 10-6-71 MWM

TO DIRECTOR (65-74138)

FROM WASHINGTON FIELD (65-11628)

TOLL LEK, SIO

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-04-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH

RE WFO TELETYPE, OCTOBER FIVE LAST.

FOLLOWING INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED OCTOBER SIX INSTANT:

[REDACTED], [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED]

[REDACTED], GOVERNMENT SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, WHOSE DUTIES INVOLVE
DESTRUCTION OF STATE DEPARTMENT (USDS) CLASSIFIED MATERIAL,
ADVISED THEY HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF ANY COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING
[REDACTED], LEAK OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION TO JACK
ANDERSON OR STAFF AND WERE NOT ACQUAINTED WITH ANDERSON OR HIS
STAFF.

b6
b7C

[REDACTED]; [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]; AND [REDACTED] ALL OPERATIONS
CENTER, AND [REDACTED]

ALL USDS, WERE INTERVIEWED AND COULD FURNISH NO INFORMATION

END PAGE ONE

Tmt

65-11628 68

Searched
Serialized
Indexed
Filed

[REDACTED]

PAGE TWO

CONCERNING SOURCE OF LEAK.

[REDACTED], OFFICE OF PRESS
RELATIONS, USDS AND [REDACTED], CHIEF, NEWS DIVISION,
AID, WERE INTERVIEWED RELATIVE TO EXPLORING POSSIBLE ACCESS
OF ANDERSON AND HIS STAFF TO USDS BUILDING. [REDACTED] STATED
ANDERSON AND STAFF ARE NOT AMONG APPROXIMATELY TWO HUNDRED
AND SEVENTY NEWS CORRESPONDENTS WHO ARE ACCREDITED AND HAVE
ACCESS TO USDS BUILDING. HOWEVER, NOTHING TO HAVE PRECLUDED
ANDERSON OR HIS STAFF FROM HAVING ACCESS TO USDS BUILDING
DURING PERTINENT PERIODS ONCE THEY HAD OBTAINED LEGITIMATE
APPOINTMENTS WITH PERSON IN USDS BUILDING.

[REDACTED] AND [REDACTED] COULD FURNISH NO INFORMATION
CONCERNING SOURCE OF LEAK.

ADDITIONAL INTERVIEWS BEING CONDUCTED AT AID AND USDS.

E N D

5

Tmt

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F B I

Date: 10/6/71

Transmit the following in _____

CODED

(Type in plaintext or code)

Via TELETYPE _____

URGENT

(Priority)

022

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (65-74138)

FROM: SAC, WFO (65-11628)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-04-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH

TOLL LEK, SIO

RE WFO TELETYPE, OCTOBER FIVE LAST.

FOLLOWING INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED OCTOBER SIX INSTANT:

[redacted], [redacted] AND [redacted]

[redacted], GOVERNMENT SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, WHOSE DUTIES INVOLVE

DESTRUCTION OF STATE DEPARTMENT (USDS) CLASSIFIED MATERIAL,

ADVISED THEY HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF ANY COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING

[redacted] LEAK OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION TO JACK

ANDERSON OR STAFF AND WERE NOT ACQUAINTED WITH ANDERSON OR HIS

STAFF.

[redacted]; [redacted]

[redacted]; AND [redacted], ALL OPERATIONS

CENTER, AND [redacted]

ALL USDS, WERE INTERVIEWED AND COULD FURNISH NO INFORMATION

1 - WFO
JCC:jak
jak

65-11628-1080
SEARCHED _____ INDEXED _____
SERIALIZED _____
OCT 8 7 40 PM '71

Approved: RGK/gm
Special Agent in Charge

Sent 9:35 M Per [signature]

[redacted]

b6
b7C

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via _____
(Priority)

WFO 65-11628

PAGE TWO

CONCERNING SOURCE OF LEAK.

[REDACTED], OFFICE OF PRESS

RELATIONS, USDS AND [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] WERE INTERVIEWED RELATIVE TO EXPLORING POSSIBLE ACCESS OF ANDERSON AND HIS STAFF TO USDS BUILDING. [REDACTED] STATED ANDERSON AND STAFF ARE NOT AMONG APPROXIMATELY TWO HUNDRED AND SEVENTY NEWS CORRESPONDENTS WHO ARE ACCREDITED AND HAVE ACCESS TO USDS BUILDING. HOWEVER, NOTHING TO HAVE PRECLUDED ANDERSON OR HIS STAFF FROM HAVING ACCESS TO USDS BUILDING DURING PERTINENT PERIODS ONCE THEY HAD OBTAINED LEGITIMATE APPOINTMENT WITH PERSON IN USDS BUILDING.

[REDACTED] AND [REDACTED] COULD FURNISH NO INFORMATION CONCERNING SOURCE OF LEAK.

ADDITIONAL INTERVIEWS BEING CONDUCTED AT AID AND USDS.

b6
b7c

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

REPORTING OFFICE WASHINGTON FIELD	OFFICE OF ORIGIN WASHINGTON FIELD	DATE 10/6/71	INVESTIGATIVE PERIOD 9/23/71 - 10/6/71
TITLE OF CASE UNSUB; Unauthorized Disclosure of Information in State Department Cables Appearing in "The Washington Post" Article, Tuesday, July 27, 1971, By Jack Anderson		REPORT MADE BY SA 	TYPED BY jak
		CHARACTER OF CASE ESPIONAGE - X	

b6
b7C

b6
b7C

REFERENCES: Bureau airtel 9/17/71; report of SA dated 9/30/71, at Washington, D. C.

- P -

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-04-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH

ADMINISTRATIVE:

This report is classified "**Confidential**" inasmuch as the U.S. Department of State has so classified the telegrams which are pertinent to this investigation.

Confidential source mentioned in this report is (Location WFO file 65-11628-57A).

b2
b7D

ACCOMPLISHMENTS CLAIMED						<input type="checkbox"/> NONE	ACQUIT-TALS	CASE HAS BEEN: PENDING OVER ONE YEAR <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO PENDING PROSECUTION OVER SIX MONTHS <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO
CONVIC.	AUTO.	FUG.	FINES	SAVINGS	RECOVERIES			

APPROVED	SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE	DO NOT WRITE IN SPACES BELOW	
COPIES MADE: 6 - Bureau (65-74138) 2 - WFO (65-11628)		<i>Plath</i>	
<i>jak</i>			

Dissemination Record of Attached Report				Notations 65-11628-69 Searched _____ Serialized _____ Indexed _____ Filed _____
Agency				
Request Recd.				
Date Fwd.				
By				

WFO 65-11628

Identity of person at [REDACTED]

[REDACTED], to whom subpoena should
be directed is maintained at WFO.

b7C
b7D

LEAD

WASHINGTON FIELD

AT WASHINGTON, D. C.: As instructed by the Bureau, daily teletype summaries are being submitted in this case and the Bureau is fully aware of the progress of this case. In view of this, specific investigative leads are not being set out in this report but this matter is receiving expedite and full attention. The Bureau will continue to be kept currently advised of developments.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH
ON 05-04-2007

Copy to:

Report of:
Date:

SA [REDACTED]
10/6/71

Office: Washington, D. C.

b6
b7C

Field Office File #:

65-11628

Bureau File #: 65-74138

Title:

UNKNOWN SUBJECT; Unauthorized Disclosure of
Information in State Department Cables
Appearing in "The Washington Post" Article,
Tuesday, July 27, 1971, by Jack Anderson

Character:

ESPIONAGE - X

Synopsis:

Five persons employed at Agency for International Development (AID) and twenty-seven persons employed at State Department (USDS), including USDS Office of Executive Secretariat, Operations Center and Communications Center, were interviewed, but were unable to furnish information concerning source of leak.

- P -

DETAILS: AT WASHINGTON, D. C.;

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1Date of transcription 10/1/71

Dr. SAMUEL C. ADAMS, Assistant Administrator for African Affairs, Agency for International Development (AID), Room 6936, State Department Building, Washington, D. C., advised as follows:

Dr. JOHN HANNAH, Administrator, AID, called him into his office at about 9:00 a.m., or shortly before, on July 19, 1971, which was a Monday, the first day of the workweek. At that time they discussed the contents of cable number one, relating to [redacted], which had come in from Nairobi, Kenya, to Dr. HANNAH, "Eyes Only" restriction, on July 16, 1971. Dr. HANNAH had given the matter considerable thought over the weekend and ADAMS was advised of it the morning of the 19th. HANNAH asked ADAMS to go to London to meet [redacted] and discuss the matter of [redacted] alleged misconduct in depth.

ADAMS advised that the remainder of the day was spent in consulting with [redacted] of African Affairs, who also had a copy of cable number one, in obtaining airplane reservations, and in preparing a cable to [redacted] for a meeting in London on the 20th, and in packing for the trip. ADAMS said that consideration had been given to sending a reply to Ambassador McILVAINE in Kenya in the form of a joint AID-State Department message. Consequently, [redacted] prepared a draft of a message giving State Department views, and he, ADAMS, prepared a draft of a message giving AID views. Both drafts were presented to Dr. HANNAH, who, after reading them, decided against both of them. Dr. HANNAH then prepared his own draft of a message which became cable number two.

Dr. HANNAH gave ADAMS a copy of cable number one to take with him to London. ADAMS said that there was a discussion, later, about who gave him cable number two, but

Interviewed on 9/30/71 at Washington, D. C. File # WFO 65-11628
 by SAs [redacted] and [redacted] and djw Date dictated 9/30/71

WFO 65-11628

3

They met again for breakfast at the Britannia Hotel on the 21st, and resumed their discussion about [redacted] chance of rehabilitating his career. ADAMS said that Dr. HANNAH had requested him to go to London to meet [redacted] as it was his concern that the matter be handled properly. Dr. HANNAH wanted [redacted] to be given the chance of rebutting the charges against him, and the matter resolved.

ADAMS said that apparently [redacted] had no idea that their meeting in London was in connection with the incident at Treetops, and had no knowledge of Ambassador McILVAINE's cable. ADAMS was convinced that [redacted] did not know of the serious nature of ADAMS' cable to him requesting him to come to London, because [redacted] told him that he had held a cocktail party in Nairobi the night prior to his trip. ADAMS said that [redacted] never mentioned having received a long distance telephone call in Nairobi from a member of JACK ANDERSON's staff, and [redacted] had no knowledge that it occurred.

ADAMS said that he had to leave London to get to the airport for his flight home, and he left [redacted] after breakfast. ADAMS was assigned Pan-American Flight number 103; however, that was changed to a flight that terminated at Dulles rather than New York City. He left London at 11:00 a.m. on July 21, 1971, and arrived at Dulles Airport at 3:30 p.m.

ADAMS categorically denied furnishing the cables, or information in the cables, to JACK ANDERSON or any member of his staff, or to any other unauthorized person. He felt strongly that no one else in his office was responsible for the leak of information as they had no access to them.

ADAMS categorically denied knowing JACK ANDERSON. He has never met him, nor spoken to him, nor had any connection whatsoever with him, - He was equally certain that no one on his staff was acquainted with ANDERSON or his staff. ADAMS said that he has never met or spoken with [redacted] [redacted] or [redacted] and that the names are unknown to him.

b6
b7C

ADAMS said that while [] was at AID headquarters last week, he had a three hour discussion with him, during which time [] future was discussed. ADAMS was obliged to tell [] that because of continuing reports of ineptitude, that it would be unrealistic for [] to consider a career in the foreign service. ADAMS said that [] would not be pushed, but had been told that he should make plans for employment outside the Agency for International Development.

b6
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ADAMS said that he held no personal animosity toward [] and that neither he nor Dr. HANNAH had "crucified" him, but because of stupid blunders, and continuing "signals of ineptitude" from Kenya, which is a quiet and uncomplicated AID post, [] career with AID could not be considered enduring. ADAMS said that he has had brief working experience with [] inasmuch as the latter came under his bureau only recently when [] was assigned as Director of the AID mission in Kenya.

A discussion was held with ADAMS about a column of JACK ANDERSON which appeared on the day of the interview, September 30, 1971. In the column, ANDERSON referred to the tightening of AID security measures for classified messages. ANDERSON quoted a portion of an AID directive.

ADAMS said that he had read ANDERSON's column, and showed the interviewing Special Agents an AID memorandum from the Office of Management, Bureau for African Affairs, dated September 16, 1971, which contained the wording used in the ANDERSON column. The memorandum referred to a previous directive dated September 1, 1971, from the Office of Assistant Administrator for Administration (AA/A) to Assistant Administrators and Heads of Independent Offices and Staffs which pertained to the same matter.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 10/4/71

[redacted] Office of Security, Agency for International Development (AID), Room 402, Rosslyn Plaza East, Rosslyn, Virginia, advised as follows:

[redacted] served in Nairobi, Kenya, as Regional Security Officer, Office of Security, United States Department of State (USDS), from September, 1969 to August 24, 1971, at which time he returned to the United States. He has transferred positions from the Office of Security, USDS, to the Office of Security, AID, which is his current assignment.

[redacted] advised that Mr. HAROLD SNELL was the predecessor to [redacted] as the Director of AID in Kenya. Mr. SNELL, who is black, was well regarded by the AID mission in Kenya where it was felt that he had been effective in his efforts to administer the AID program. When SNELL, who is about 65 years of age, and his wife returned to the United States on home leave, they fully expected to return to Nairobi. As a result, when [redacted] arrived there to succeed SNELL, the general feeling among AID personnel in Kenya was one of disappointment.

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[redacted] advised that the AID mission in Kenya consists of about thirty persons, that it has a separate building, and is largely autonomous. The number of personnel assigned is about the same as that of the Embassy staff.

[redacted] felt that the possibility of the leak of information occurring in Kenya was very remote. He said that theoretically, the only persons who would have seen the outgoing cable from Nairobi to Washington, D.C. were Ambassador MC ILVAINE, [redacted] a communications supervisor, [redacted] and two communications technicians, [redacted] and [redacted]. [redacted] felt that those persons would have no motivation for leaking the information and nothing to gain by

Interviewed on 9/29/71 at Rosslyn, Virginia File # 65-11628
 by SA [redacted] and SA [redacted] Date dictated 9/29/71
 KGM: jak

doing it.

[redacted] advised that he has never seen the cables personally, but saw a Xerox copy of JACK ANDERSON's column, while in Nairobi, which purported to quote Ambassador MC ILVAINE. [redacted] said that the language in the cable was definitely that of the Ambassador, and on that basis, he assumed that the information was authentic. [redacted] felt that [redacted] also had access to the cable inasmuch as he is the Deputy Chief of Mission, and the immediate assistant to the Ambassador. In that connection, MATTHEWS said that there seemed to be a strained relationship between [redacted] and the Ambassador, on one side, and [redacted] on the other.

[redacted] advised that he has worked with [redacted] on matters unrelated to instant incident, and personally got along with him well. [redacted] never mentioned the incident at the Treetops Game Lodge to him, and [redacted] felt that it was improper for him to mention it to [redacted]. In that connection, [redacted] learned that Ambassador MC ILVAINE was to be the only American from the Nairobi mission to accompany the Vice President's party to the game lodge, but [redacted] managed to make the trip, utilizing the car assigned to him as Director of the AID mission. [redacted] advised that to the best of his knowledge, the only American eyewitness to the alleged misconduct of [redacted], other than the Vice Presidential party, was the Ambassador himself.

[redacted] had no knowledge that [redacted] had received a long distance telephone call from JACK ANDERSON's staff in Washington, D. C. (WDC). He learned that [redacted] had traveled to London, England, to confer with Dr. SAMUEL ADAMS, of AID Headquarters, WDC, but he knew nothing about what transpired during their meeting.

[redacted] advised that following the visit of the Vice Presidential party to the game lodge, all Americans in the official family in Nairobi were invited to the Hilton Hotel in Nairobi where the Vice President was to speak to them. The only exception was [redacted] [redacted] was advised by [redacted]

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and [redacted] of the Secret Service, that AID [redacted] was not to be admitted to the meeting. [redacted] said that [redacted] did not make an appearance at the hotel. Later in the day, after the Vice Presidential party had departed Kenya, Ambassador MC ILVAINE held a social function for all Americans of the official family, and [redacted] was in attendance at that function.

[redacted] advised that shortly before he departed Kenya for the United States, on recall, he received a request from the Special Assignment Staff, Office of Security, USDS, WDC, to look into the possibility of the leak of information originating in Kenya. [redacted] said that the request arrived just three days prior to his departure, and because Ambassador MC ILVAINE was on home leave at the time, his inquiry was not completed. [redacted] said that the inquiry will be completed by his successor, who has not yet arrived in Kenya.

It was [redacted] opinion that because of the few persons involved in the handling of the cables in Nairobi, and the lack of motivation for leaking the information, the possibility of the leak originating there was remote.

[redacted] felt that the posture of the United States in Kenya was not adversely affected by the leak because few Kenyans knew about it. He did not see JACK ANDERSON's column appear in local Nairobi newspapers.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1Date of transcription: 10/5/71

[redacted], Deputy Director, Office of East African Affairs, Agency for International Development (AID), Room 4758, State Department Building, Washington, D. C., advised as follows:

[redacted] advised that his office did not receive a copy of Ambassador MC ILVAINE's cable, nor a copy of the outgoing cable pertaining to the [redacted] incident in Kenya. He said that his first knowledge of it occurred when he read about it in JACK ANDERSON's column in "The Washington Post".

[redacted] said that the highest degree of classified messages received in his office is LIMDIS; thus, neither of the aforementioned cables came to his attention.

[redacted] said that he has limited acquaintanceship with [redacted]. He met him for one day in Nairobi, Kenya, in November, 1970 at which time their paths crossed while both were on AID trips. [redacted] has seen [redacted] only a few times in a professional capacity since the latter [redacted] in Kenya. [redacted] said that he did not know who [redacted] friends, or for that matter, enemies, are, and is not acquainted with him socially.

[redacted] said that he is not conversant about the security system of the American Embassy in Nairobi, but if asked to speculate, he would think that the leak of information occurred in Washington, D. C. rather than in Kenya.

[redacted] stated that he does not know JACK ANDERSON, nor members of his staff, and has had no contact with them.

Interviewed on 10/4/71 at Washington, D. C. File # WFO 65-11628
 by SAs [redacted] [redacted] Date dictated 10/5/71
 by [redacted] EHJ:ump

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1Date of transcription 10/5/71

[redacted], Officer in Charge for East Africa, Agency for International Development (AID), Room 4758, State Department Building, Washington, D. C., advised as follows:

[redacted] said that he neither saw, nor had access to Ambassador MC ILVAINE's cable to AID Headquarters, nor the outgoing cable to Nairobi, Kenya, relative to the [redacted] incident in that country. He first learned of the matter when he read JACK ANDERSON's column in "The Washington Post".

[redacted] said that he had never personally met [redacted] until shortly before the latter was assigned as AID Director in Kenya. He has seen [redacted] only a few occasions since that time. He has little knowledge of [redacted] friends, and knows no one who bears him a strong personal grudge.

[redacted] said that he has no idea of how the leak of information occurred. He stated that he has never known JACK ANDERSON, nor any member of his staff.

Interviewed on 10/4/71 at Washington, D. C. File # WFO 65-11628

by SAs [redacted] ELJ:mmp Date dictated 10/5/71

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1Date of transcription 10/5/71

[redacted], Desk Officer, Kenya, Africa, Agency for International Development (AID), Room 4845, State Department Building, Washington, D. C., advised as follows:

[redacted] stated that neither the incoming cable from Kenya, nor the outgoing cable to Kenya (cables number 1 and number 2), came to his office. He neither saw them nor had access to them. His first knowledge of the leak of information was the JACK ANDERSON's column which reported the [redacted] incident in Kenya.

[redacted] said that when he heard that [redacted] was travelling to London, England to meet [redacted] he thought that perhaps it was in connection with another matter, an embezzlement case which had occurred in Kenya. That matter was unrelated to the [redacted] incident.

[redacted] said that he has known [redacted] only professionally, and only since the latter became the AID Director in Kenya. He knew no one who had a grudge against [redacted] sufficient enough to cause a leak of information to ruin his career.

[redacted] stated that he does not know JACK ANDERSON, or any member of his staff, and has no information as to how the leak of information occurred.

Interviewed on 10/4/71 at Washington, D. C. File # WFO 65-11628
 by SAs [redacted] [redacted] EHJ:mp Date dictated 10/5/71

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

9/28/71

Date of transcription

1

[redacted] Deputy Executive Secretary, the Executive Secretariat, Room 7224, United States Department of State, advised as follows:

[redacted] recalled that he consulted with his superior, [redacted], Executive Secretary, regarding the telegram pertaining to [redacted], AID Representative. He recalled that after reviewing the content of the telegram, it was agreed that additional distribution should be made for [redacted] and [redacted]. He stated that he did not recall that any additional copies of the telegram were made in his office.

[redacted] stated that when telegrams are received in his office, they are placed in a "burn bag" at the end of the day to be destroyed. He stated that he did not see the telegram in question after the discussion with his superior. He was uncertain as to the specific date that he did observe the telegram in question.

[redacted] stated that it would be unusual for a secretary in his office to be familiar with the content of a telegram such as the one in question and noted that there are numerous telegrams arriving in the office on a daily basis, most of which are far more serious in nature than the telegram in question. [redacted] stated that he does not know JACK ANDERSON or any member of his staff or family. He also stated that he does not know [redacted] and does not know anyone who might want to discredit him. In addition, [redacted] stated that he has no idea how the information in the telegram may have been leaked to JACK ANDERSON.

Interviewed on 9/27/71 at Washington, D.C. File # WFO 65-11628

by SA [redacted] /gdw Date dictated 9/27/71

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1Date of transcription 9/27/71

[redacted] Executive Secretary, The Executive Secretariat, Room 7224, U.S. Department of State, advised as follows:

[redacted] recalled the telegram pertaining to AID Representative, [redacted] received July 16, 1971, but stated his recollection of the matter is not completely clear at this time. He recalled the communication "EXDIS," and after a review of the content of the message, decided that additional distribution should be made for [redacted] and [redacted]. He stated he also made the telegram available to his deputies, [redacted] and [redacted].

[redacted] advised that he is not acquainted with JACK ANDERSON, his staff, or any member of his family. He stated he did not know anyone who might want to cause trouble for [redacted] and had no idea where the leak of information may have occurred. It was his speculation that it must have been someone who had a grudge against [redacted]. In addition to the above, [redacted] advised that his Secretary, [redacted] may have physically handled the telegram in question, however, he stated he doubted she was in fact familiar with the content of it.

Interviewed on 9/27/71 at Washington, D. C. File # WFO 65-11628
 by SAS [redacted] AND [redacted]
[redacted] RCW:cac Date dictated 9/27/71

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1Date of transcription 9/27/71

[redacted], Deputy Executive Secretary, The Executive Secretariat, Room 7224, United States Department of State (USDS) advised as follows:

[redacted] stated he was not on duty at the time the telegram pertaining to [redacted], Agency for International Development (AID) Representative, arrived from Nairobi on July 16, 1971. He stated, however, he did view the telegram at a subsequent date shortly thereafter, but was not certain as to any specific date. He stated that he could recall that there was additional distribution made of the telegram to [redacted] and [redacted] by his superior, [redacted]

[redacted] stated that he did not know JACK ANDERSON or any member of his staff or family and had no idea as to how the information obtained by ANDERSON may have been leaked to him. He stated that it was a theory of his that someone who had observed the contents of the telegram made a quick Xerox copy in jest and this subsequently somehow was made available to ANDERSON. He explained this further by stating the contents of the message was somewhat gossipy and scandalous which would create anyone's interest. He stated he did not believe that the leakage occurred in the Secretariat because of the closeness of the operation in the Secretariat.

[redacted] stated that he met [redacted] a couple of years ago in a briefing, but indicated that he has not seen or heard of him until this time.

Interviewed on 9/27/71 at Washington, D.C. File # WFO 65-11628
 by SAs [redacted] and [redacted] RCW:lak Date dictated 9/27/71

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1Date of transcription 9/28/71

[redacted] Deputy Director of Policy
Planning, Bureau of African Affairs, Room 5234, U. S.
Department of State, advised as follows:

[redacted] recalled being the Duty Assistant to
[redacted] in the Office of [redacted] Assistant
Secretary for African Affairs on July 17, 1971. He
stated that during the time that he was there was from
approximately 9:00 a.m., to 1:30 p.m., and that during
this time he did not recall having access or observing
the communication from Nairobi, Kenya, regarding [redacted]
[redacted] AID representative. He also stated that he
had no knowledge of anyone making a copy of this telegram.
He also stated that he did not recall that there was any
discussion of the telegram on the day he had duty in the
Assistant Secretary's office July 17, 1971. He stated he
did, however, read the article in the "Washington Post"
written by JACK ANDERSON July 27, 1971.

[redacted] stated that he is not acquainted with JACK
ANDERSON or any member of his staff or family and has not
had any contact with them, or any news media representative.
He stated that he is not acquainted with [redacted] and
did not know of anyone who would attempt to discredit
[redacted] In addition, he stated he had no ideas as to
how a leak of information may have occurred from the U. S.
Department of State to JACK ANDERSON.

Interviewed on 9/28/71 at Washington, D. C. File # 65-11628
by SAS [redacted] and [redacted] RCW:jh Date dictated 9/28/71

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 9/29/711

[redacted], Secretariat Staff Officer, Office of Secretariat, Room 7241, United States Department of State (USDS), advised as follows:

[redacted] stated as of July 16, 1971, he was Editor in the Operations Center. He could not recall specifics concerning the telegram sent from Nairobi concerning [redacted] [redacted], AID representative. He did state, however, he believed he was on duty the afternoon of July 16, 1971, when the telegram arrived. He stated he was unable to recall the specifics mentioned in the telegram but knew it did concern misconduct regarding [redacted]. He stated that he would not have used the telegram in a summary he prepares for all telegrams received unless they are too sensitive for the summary and in this instance he felt this telegram would have been too sensitive for the summary. He stated that if the telegram had been made available to him and he did not use it in the summary, he would have immediately placed it in the burn bag.

[redacted] stated he is not acquainted with JACK ANDERSON or any member of his staff or family and has not had any contact with them. In addition, he stated he has no close acquaintance in the news media field.

[redacted] stated he is not acquainted with [redacted] and knows of no one who would discredit him. It was his opinion that the security in the Operations Center is too tight for information of the type described above to be leaked outside.

Interviewed on 9/29/71 at Washington, D. C. File # WFO 65-11628
 by SAs [redacted]
and [redacted] RCW:ss Date dictated 9/29/71

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1Date of transcription 10/1/71

[redacted], Secretary to [redacted]
[redacted], Executive Assistant to the Deputy Undersecretary
of State, Room 7210, U. S. Department of State (USDS), ad-
vised as follows:

[redacted] advised that she first became aware
of information being leaked to the Columnist JACK ANDERSON,
on July 27, 1971, when an article appeared in his column per-
taining to the alleged misconduct of AID representative [redacted]

[redacted] She stated that while incoming telegrams are
placed upon her desk prior to being taken in to [redacted]
that they usually remain on her desk for a very short period
of time depending on what her other duties are at the time
they are received. She stated that she usually takes the in-
coming mail directly in to [redacted] upon receipt if she is
at her desk at the time they are received. She stated that
she had no information concerning the telegram in question,
had not observed, did not know who did observe or had it in
their possession, and did not have a copy made of the tele-
gram.

[redacted] stated she is not acquainted with
JACK ANDERSON or any member of his staff or family or any
representative of the news media. She stated that she is
not acquainted with [redacted] and knows of no one who
would want to discredit him. She also stated that she had
no idea as to how the leak to JACK ANDERSON may have occurred.

Interviewed on 9/30/71 at Washington, D. C. File # WFO 65-11628-

by SAs [redacted] and RCW:bj1 Date dictated 10/1/71

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

9/28/71

Date of transcription _____

[redacted] Director, Operations Center, Room 7516, United States Department of State, advised that it is the function of the Operations Center to handle EXDIS communications. He stated that in his opinion the telegram in question from Nairobi pertaining to the alleged misconduct of [redacted] was well handled from his viewpoint in the operation of the Operations Center. He stated that he could not recall the exact date that the communication was received but knew it to be in July of 1971 when [redacted] Special Assistant to the Executive Secretary, but on temporary loan as a Watch Officer, brought the communication in question in for his direction since [redacted] indicated that it was extremely sensitive. He stated it was decided that due to the sensitivity of the communication, distribution should only be made to [redacted], Deputy Executive Secretary, the Executive Secretariat and to [redacted] Administrator, AID. He stated that one copy was to be retained in the Operations Center to be used for the incoming Operations Watch Officer.

[redacted] indicated that [redacted], Deputy Executive Secretary for Management, was in the office with him at the time [redacted] arrived with the communication. He stated that he showed the communication to [redacted] to get his ideas for proper distribution. He also indicated to [redacted] at this time that the way that they were handling the communication was in fact a classic example of the excellent security being handled at the Operations Center.

[redacted] advised that he did not know JACK ANDERSON or any member of his staff or family and does not know [redacted], AID, representative. He stated that it was his personal opinion that the purpose of the leak of the

Interviewed on 9/23/71 at Washington, D. C. File # WFO 65-11628
 by SAs [redacted] and [redacted] RCJ:mbf Date dictated 9/23/71

WFO 65-11628

2

information was someone attempting to discredit
He indicated that he had no ideas of how this leak possibly
could have occurred.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

10/1/71

Date of transcription

[redacted] Communications Center, Office of Communications, Bureau of Administration, United States Department of State (USDS), furnished the following information concerning Telegram Number 3713 dated July 16, 1971, from Nairobi (#1) and outgoing Telegram Number 130006 dated July 19, 1971, from USDS to Nairobi (#2):

On July 16, 1971, [redacted], as well as [redacted] Communications Manager, Communications Center and [redacted] Operations Staff, Communications Center, had been on duty. On July 19, 1971, [redacted] was not on duty, but both [redacted] and [redacted] were on duty, with [redacted] being in charge.

Concerning telegram #1, it was first received at Communications Center at 9:55 a.m.; and although a portion of the message was garbled, it was processed through the center. A corrected version of #1 was received at Communications Center at 12:36 p.m., July 16, 1971 and was thereafter processed through the center. In the case of "EKDIS" (Exclusive Distribution) telegrams, such as #1 and #2, one copy remains in the Communications Center and 45 copies were reproduced and sent to the Executive Secretariat. This procedure is followed in the case of incoming telegrams, such as #1, as well as outgoing, such as #2.

[redacted] could not state the exact time the garbled version or the corrected version of #1 left the Communications Center to be sent to the Executive Secretariat; however, he stated he understood that the corrected version arrived in the Executive Secretariat near a shift change and [redacted] believed that the corrected version would have been processed through the Communications Center before the evening shift came on duty at about 3:45 p.m., July 16, 1971, except for possibly the final stage of processing in the Reproduction Section. He added

Interviewed on 9/28/71 at Washington, D. C. File # 65-11628
 by SA [redacted] and SA [redacted] JCC:jak Date dictated 9/28/71

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that the early shift may have reproduced the 45 copies, possibly leaving to the evening shift the transmittal via tube to the Executive Secretariat. [] stated that no log is maintained in the Communications Center to show the time such communications leave the center.

[] could suggest no suspect for leak of the two USDS telegrams, #1 and #2. He did not know of any employees in the Communications Center who were acquainted with JACK ANDERSON or any member of ANDERSON's staff, and he was not personally acquainted with ANDERSON or any member of his staff.

[] furnished the names of the following Communications Center employees who had been involved in the processing of the two USDS telegrams, #1 and #2:

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#1

[], Analysis Section-Assigned distribution
(Did not work on July 19, 1971)

[], Systems Section Operator-Cleared at Booking Desk (Did not work July 19, 1971)

[], Reproduction Section-Reproduced message
(Did work on July 19, 1971)

[], Reproduction Section-Collated copies and tubed to Executive Secretariat (Did work on July 19, 1971)

#2

[], Communications Center Officer-Received message from Executive Secretariat (Did not work on July 16, 1971)

[], Message Preparation and Introduction (MPI) Section - Clocked message (Did work on July 16, 1971)

[], MPI Section Operator-Prepared message tape and entered into Automated Terminal Station (Did work on July 16, 1971)

[redacted], Analysis Section Supervisor (Did work on July 16, 1971)

[redacted] Analysis Section Distributor-Jointly determined distribution to be made of message (Did not work on July 16, 1971)

[redacted] Systems Section Operator-Cleared message at Hooking Desk (Did not work on July 16, 1971)

[redacted], Reproduction Section Operator-Reproduced message (Did work on July 16, 1971)

[redacted] Reproduction Section Operator-Collated copies and tubed to Executive Secretariat (Did work on July 16, 1971)

In addition, [redacted] informed that the following supervisory personnel were on duty in the Reproduction Section on July 16, 1971 and would have been in position to report any unusual incidents in that section:

Early Shift - [redacted], Assistant Supervisor
[redacted], Assistant Supervisor

Evening Shift - [redacted] Supervisor
[redacted], Assistant Supervisor
[redacted], Assistant Supervisor

On July 19, 1971, the following supervisory personnel were on duty in the Reproduction Section:

[redacted], Supervisor
[redacted], Assistant Supervisor
[redacted], Assistant Supervisor

[redacted] informed that merely by reason of their employment in the Communications Center, a total of 216 persons employed there could have had access to one or both of the telegrams; however, the operation of the Communications Center

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WFO 65-11628

4

is such that access would have been logically restricted only to persons involved in the processing of the two telegrams and any effort to obtain a copy or gain access by an employee other than one involved in the processing would be sufficiently unusual that such activity would be brought to attention of supervisory personnel. No such incident was reported.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 9/29/71

[redacted], Communications Manager, Communications Center, Office of Communications, Bureau of Administration, United States Department of State (USDS), furnished the following information concerning incoming Telegram Number 3713 dated July 16, 1971, from Nairobi and outgoing Telegram Number 130006 dated July 19, 1971, from USDS to Nairobi:

He was on duty in the Communications Center on July 16 and 19, 1971 and on July 19, 1971, he was Acting Chief of the Communications Center, in the absence of [redacted]

He could suggest no suspect for the leak of the above-mentioned two telegrams. He did not know any employees in the Communications Center who were acquainted with JACK ANDERSON or any member of ANDERSON's staff and he was not personally acquainted with ANDERSON or any member of his staff.

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On September 27, 1971, another USDS employee had mentioned to [redacted] that he had seen JACK ANDERSON on Channel 5, WTTC Television program, Washington, D. C. (WDC), on Friday evening, September 24, 1971, and that during the program, he had observed a copy of a USDS "EKDIS" (Exclusive Distribution) telegram visible in the background.

On September 29, 1971, [redacted] called WTTC Television to attempt to ascertain details of the ANDERSON program on September 24, 1971. An unidentified female representative of WTTC informed [redacted] that [redacted] had appeared on WTTC Television, Channel 5, WDC, at 10:00 p.m., September 24, 1971 and had disclosed a story concerning a [redacted] from Kenya. Further, she stated that any additional details or a transcript, if available, of the program would have to be

Interviewed on 9/28/71 at Washington, D. C. File # 65-11628
 by SA [redacted] and SA [redacted] JCC:jak Date dictated 9/28/71

WFO 65-11628

2

obtained from Mr. ANDERSON.

[redacted] noted that if a copy of the transcript or a tape of the ANDERSON program could be obtained showing the copy of the USDS "EKDIS" telegram, such copy of the telegram could possibly indicate from what office it was obtained.

[redacted] did not identify the USDS employee who observed the ANDERSON program, preferring not to identify him since he was not otherwise involved in this matter and had merely reported his observation of a publicly-televised program.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

10/4/71

Date of transcription

1

[redacted], Analysis Section, Communications Center, Office of Communications, Bureau of Administration, United States Department of State (USDS), furnished the following information:

On September 24, 1971 or September 25, 1971, he saw the JACK ANDERSON news program on WTTG Television, Channel 5, Washington, D. C., between 10:00 p.m. and 11:00 p.m. During the program, ANDERSON quoted text from a USDS "EKDIS" (Exclusive Distribution) telegram concerning the activities in Kenya of [redacted] of the Agency for International Development (AID). [redacted] recognized the quoted text as being similar to that contained in a USDS "EKDIS" telegram on which he had assisted in the processing in the past. During the program, ANDERSON displayed in the background a copy of a USDS "EKDIS" telegram, showing "EKDIS" markings in the left margin; however, [redacted] was unable to see the copy with sufficient clarity to read the text or to observe whether distribution or other numbers were contained on it.

[redacted] recalled that the USDS "EKDIS" telegram on which he had worked in the past had been an incoming telegram from Kenya; however, he did not recall having seen a copy of a later outgoing telegram from USDS to Kenya concerning Mr. [redacted]

[redacted] stated that based on the possible motive of someone who desired to damage [redacted] it appeared to him that any logical suspects for the leak to ANDERSON would probably be at AID or in the Vice President's Office.

He could suggest no suspect for the leak to ANDERSON of the two USDS telegrams. He did not know of any Communications Center employees who were acquainted with ANDERSON or any member of ANDERSON's staff and he was

Interviewed on 9/29/71 at Washington, D. C. File # 65-11628
 by SA [redacted] and SA [redacted] JCC:jak Date dictated 9/29/71

WFO 65-11628

2

not personally acquainted with ANDERSON or his staff.

He stated he had no employment except for that at USDS.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

10/4/71

Date of transcription

1

[redacted] Systems Section Operator, Communications Center, Office of Communications, Bureau of Administration, United States Department of State (USDS), furnished the following information:

She recalled having read in the past the text of an incoming USDS telegram concerning the activities of [redacted] in connection with her duties of processing such telegram. She stated this would not have been one of the copies prepared by the Reproduction Section which bore "EXDIS" (Exclusive Distribution) markings, but would have been a file copy maintained within the confines of the Communications Center. She did not recall having seen a copy of a later outgoing telegram concerning [redacted], but believed she recalled some mention by other employees being made that a later telegram had been sent in this regard.

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She stated she had not read any news articles and had not seen on television and had not otherwise heard that any USDS telegrams had been leaked to JACK ANDERSON. She could not suggest any suspect for the leak of two USDS telegrams to ANDERSON. She did not know any Communications Center employees who were acquainted with ANDERSON or his staff and she was not personally acquainted with ANDERSON or any member of his staff.

She stated she had no employment other than at USDS.

Interviewed on 9/29/71 at Washington, D. C. File # 65-11628
 by SA [redacted] and SA [redacted] JCC:jak Date dictated 9/29/71

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

10/4/71

Date of transcription

1

[redacted] Multilith Operator, Reproduction Section, Communications Center, Office of Communications, Bureau of Administration, United States Department of State (USDS), furnished the following information:

He did not recall reading the text of either incoming or outgoing USDS telegrams concerning [redacted]. He informed that he rarely read text of messages he ran off on multilith because of lack of time. Further, he did not recall having heard anyone discuss any telegrams concerning [redacted].

He stated he had not read any news articles, had not seen on television and had not otherwise heard that any USDS telegrams had been leaked to JACK ANDERSON. He could suggest no suspect for the leak of two USDS telegrams to ANDERSON. He did not know any Communications Center employees who were acquainted with ANDERSON or his staff and he was not personally acquainted with ANDERSON or his staff.

He stated that he normally ran off ten extra copies of "EXDIS" (Exclusive Distribution) telegrams for the purpose of insuring clarity and sufficient copies. These extra copies are furnished to the Collator who places any extra copies in a "burn-bag" for destruction.

He did not recall any suspicious incident in which employees from other sections of Communications Center or elsewhere had ever attempted to obtain extra copies of a communication from the Reproduction Section.

He stated he had part-time employment four hours per day at the Giant Food Store, Monroe Street, Arlington, Virginia, in addition to his USDS employment.

Interviewed on 9/29/71 at Washington, D.C. File # 65-11628
 by SA [redacted] and SA [redacted] JCC:jak Date dictated 9/29/71

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 10/4/711

[redacted], Collator, Reproduction Section, Communications Center, Office of Communications, Bureau of Administration, United States Department of State (USDS), furnished the following information:

She did not recall reading the text of either an incoming or an outgoing telegram concerning [redacted]. She informed that she rarely had time to read the texts of any messages she processed. Further, she did not recall having heard anyone discuss any telegrams concerning [redacted].

She stated she had not read any news articles, had not seen on television and had not otherwise heard that any USDS telegrams had been leaked to JACK ANDERSON. She could suggest no suspects for the leak of two USDS telegrams to ANDERSON. She did not know any Communications Center employees who were acquainted with ANDERSON or his staff and she was not personally acquainted with ANDERSON or any member of his staff.

She stated that any extra copies of "EXDIS" (Exclusive Distribution) telegrams furnished to her by the multilith operator are placed by her in a "burn-bag" for later destruction.

She did not recall any suspicious incident in which employees from other sections of the Communications Center or elsewhere had ever attempted to obtain extra copies of a communication from the Reproduction Section.

She stated that she had no employment other than at USDS.

Interviewed on 9/29/71 at Washington, D. C. File # 65-11628
 by SA [redacted] and SA [redacted] JCC:jak Date dictated 9/29/71

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

10/4/71

1

Date of transcription

[redacted], Communications Center Officer, Office of Communications, Bureau of Administration, United States Department of State (USDS), furnished the following information:

He did not recall reading the text of an outgoing telegram concerning [redacted]; although, according to Communications Center records, he had been involved in the processing of this telegram. He attributed this to the number of telegrams he normally processes. He recalled that after the appearance of an article in "The Washington Post", by JACK ANDERSON concerning [redacted] he, [redacted], had pulled the Communications Center file copy of an incoming telegram, and after reading it, he had ascertained that the text of the telegram was contained verbatim in the newspaper article concerning [redacted]

He could suggest no suspect for the leak of two USDS telegrams to ANDERSON. He did not know any Communications Center employees who were acquainted with ANDERSON or his staff and he was not personally acquainted with ANDERSON or his staff.

He stated he had no employment other than at USDS.

Interviewed on 9/30/71 at Washington, D. C. File # 65-11628
 by SA [redacted] and SA [redacted] JCC:jak Date dictated 9/30/71

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

10/1/71

Date of transcription

1

[redacted], Message Preparation and Introduction Section Supervisor, Communications Center, Office of Communications, Bureau of Administration, United States Department of State (USDS), furnished the following information:

She did not recall reading the text of either an incoming or an outgoing telegram concerning [redacted]. She had no independent recollection of having assisted in the processing of such telegrams; however, she did recall hearing comments from other personnel in the Communications Center sometime in the past to the effect that a [redacted] was in trouble. She did not now recall the identity of such personnel.

She stated she had not read any news article, had not seen on television and had not otherwise heard that any USDS telegrams had been leaked to JACK ANDERSON. She could suggest no suspects for the leak of two USDS telegrams to ANDERSON. She did not know any Communications Center employees who were acquainted with ANDERSON or his staff and she was not personally acquainted with ANDERSON or his staff.

She stated she had no employment other than at USDS.

Interviewed on 9/29/71 at Washington, D. C. File # 65-11628
 by SA [redacted] and SA [redacted] JEC:jak Date dictated 9/29/71

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

10/1/71

1

Date of transcription _____

[redacted] Message Preparation and Introduction Section Operator, Communications Center, Office of Communications, Bureau of Administration, United States Department of State (USDS), furnished the following information:

He did not recall reading the text of either an incoming or an outgoing telegram concerning [redacted]. He had no independent recollection of having assisted in the processing of such telegrams. He believed he may have seen a reference to [redacted] in JACK ANDERSON's column in "The Washington Post", but he was not certain.

He could suggest no suspect for the leak of two USDS telegrams to ANDERSON. He did not know any Communications Center employees who were acquainted with ANDERSON or his staff and he was not personally acquainted with ANDERSON or his staff.

He stated that he had no employment other than at USDS, but that he attended the University of Maryland six hours per week.

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Interviewed on 9/29/71 at Washington, D. C. File # 65-11628
 by SA [redacted] and SA [redacted] JCC:jak Date dictated 9/29/71

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

10/1/71

Date of transcription

1

[redacted], Analysis Section Supervisor, Communications Center, Office of Communications, Bureau of Administration, United States Department of State (USDS), furnished the following information:

He was of the opinion that he had read the text of both an incoming and outgoing USDS "EXDIS" (Exclusive Distribution) telegram concerning [redacted] in connection with his duties of processing these telegrams in the Communications Center. His duties include the obtaining of a "screening copy" of a communication after it has been reproduced in the Reproduction Section to determine clarity and correct distribution of the communication. The "screening copy" is destroyed within one to two hours after use personally by the Analysis Section Supervisor.

He stated he had read JACK ANDERSON's column in "The Washington Post" concerning [redacted] but he had not seen any television program concerning him.

He could suggest no suspect for the leak of the two USDS telegrams to ANDERSON. He did not know any Communications Center employees who were acquainted with ANDERSON or his staff and he was not personally acquainted with ANDERSON or his staff.

He stated he had no employment other than at USDS.

Interviewed on 9/29/71 at Washington, D. C. File # 65-11628
 by SA [redacted] and SA [redacted] JCC:jak Date dictated 9/29/71

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

10/1/71

1

Date of transcription _____

[redacted], Analysis Section Distributor, Communications Center, Office of Communications, Bureau of Administration, United States Department of State (USDS), furnished the following information:

She believed she recalled having seen the general text of both an incoming and outgoing telegram concerning [redacted] in connection with her duties in processing these telegrams. She did not believe she had seen a copy of these telegrams after they had been reproduced by the Reproduction Section. She explained that she probably had seen an electronic version of the telegrams on a television screen as part of her duties and she would not normally see a reproduced copy. She stated that the Analysis Section Supervisor normally obtains a "screening copy" of the reproduced communication in order to check for correct distribution, but she does not normally see this copy.

She did not recall having heard and did not know that USDS telegrams concerning [redacted] had been leaked to JACK ANDERSON.

She could suggest no suspect for the leak of two USDS telegrams to ANDERSON. She stated she did not know any Communications Center employees who were acquainted with ANDERSON or his staff and she was not personally acquainted with ANDERSON or his staff.

She stated she had no employment other than at USDS.

Interviewed on 9/29/71 at Washington, D. C. File # 65-11628
 by SA [redacted] and SA [redacted] JCC:jak Date dictated 9/29/71

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

10/4/71

1

Date of transcription _____

[redacted] Systems Section Operator,
 Communications Center, Office of Communications, Bureau of
 Administration, United States Department of State (USDS),
 furnished the following information:

He did not recall having read the text of either
 an incoming or an outgoing telegram concerning [redacted]
 He did recall having read an article by JACK ANDERSON in "The
 Washington Post" in the past concerning [redacted] which
 involved the leak of USDS telegrams to ANDERSON.

Although his duties in processing an "EXDIS" (Exclusive
 Distribution) telegram would normally include his seeing the file
 copy of such telegram, he has processed so many that he seldom
 can recall the text of any of them.

He could suggest no suspect for the leak of two USDS
 telegrams to ANDERSON. He did not know any Communications
 Center employees who were acquainted with ANDERSON or his staff
 and he was not personally acquainted with ANDERSON or his staff.

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He stated he had no employment other than at USDS.

Interviewed on 9/30/71 at Washington, D. C. File # 65-11628
 by SA [redacted] and SA [redacted] JCC:jak Date dictated 9/30/71

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 10/4/711

[redacted] Multilith Operator, Reproduction Section, Communications Center, Office of Communications, Bureau of Administration, United States Department of State (USDS), furnished the following information:

He did not recall reading the text of either an incoming or an outgoing telegram concerning [redacted] noting that he seldom had time to read the text of messages he processed.

He did not recall having heard and did not know that USDS telegrams concerning [redacted] had been leaked to JACK ANDERSON.

He could suggest no suspect for the leak of two USDS telegrams to ANDERSON. He stated he did not know any Communications Center employees who were acquainted with ANDERSON or his staff and he was not personally acquainted with ANDERSON or his staff.

He stated he normally ran off ten extra copies of "EXDIS" (Exclusive Distribution) telegrams for the purpose of insuring clarity and sufficient copies. These extra copies are furnished to the Collator who places any extra copies in a "burn-bag" for destruction.

He did not recall any suspicious incident in which employees from other sections of the Communications Center or elsewhere had ever attempted to obtain extra copies of a communication from the Reproduction Section.

He stated he had no employment other than at USDS.

Interviewed on 9/29/71 at Washington, D. C. File # 65-11628
 by SA [redacted] and SA [redacted] JCC:jak Date dictated 9/29/71

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

10/4/71

Date of transcription

1

[redacted], Collator, Reproduction Section, Communications Center, Office of Communications, Bureau of Administration, United States Department of State (USDS), furnished the following information:

She did not recall reading the text of either an incoming or an outgoing telegram concerning [redacted] informing that she seldom had time to read the text of messages she processed.

She did not recall having heard and did not know that USDS telegrams concerning [redacted] had been leaked to JACK ANDERSON.

She could suggest no suspect for the leak of two USDS telegrams to ANDERSON. She stated she did not know any Communications Center employees who were acquainted with ANDERSON or his staff and she was not personally acquainted with ANDERSON or his staff.

She stated that any extra copies of "EXDIS" (Exclusive Distribution) telegrams furnished to her by the multilith operator are placed by her in a "burn-bag" for later destruction.

She did not recall any suspicious incident in which employees from other sections of the Communications Center or elsewhere had ever attempted to obtain extra copies of a communication from the Reproduction Section.

She stated she had no employment other than at USDS.

Interviewed on 9/29/71 at Washington, D. C. File # 65-11628
 by SA [redacted] and SA [redacted] JCC:jak Date dictated 9/29/71

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 10/4/711

[redacted] Supervisor, Reproduction Section, Communications Center, Office of Communications, Bureau of Administration, United States Department of State (USDS), furnished the following information:

He did not recall reading the text of either an incoming or an outgoing telegram concerning [redacted]. Prior to September 29, 1971, he had not heard and did not know that these telegrams had been leaked to JACK ANDERSON.

He could suggest no suspect for the leak of two USDS telegrams to ANDERSON. He did not know any Communications Center employees who were acquainted with ANDERSON or his staff and he was not personally acquainted with ANDERSON or his staff.

He did not recall any suspicious incident in which employees from other sections of the Communications Center or elsewhere had attempted to obtain extra copies of a communication from the Reproduction Section.

He stated he had no employment other than at USDS.

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Interviewed on 9/30/71 at Washington, D. C. File # 65-11628
 by SA [redacted] and SA [redacted] JCC:jak Date dictated 9/30/71

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1Date of transcription 10/4/71

[redacted] Assistant Supervisor,
 Reproduction Section, Communications Center, Office of
 Communications, Bureau of Administration, United States
 Department of State (USDS), furnished the following
 information:

She did not recall reading the text of either
 an incoming or an outgoing telegram concerning [redacted]
 Prior to September 30, 1971, she had not heard and did not
 know that these telegrams had been leaked to JACK ANDERSON.

She could suggest no suspect for the leak of two
 USDS telegrams to ANDERSON. She did not know any Communications
 Center employees who were acquainted with ANDERSON or his staff
 and she was not personally acquainted with ANDERSON or his staff

She did not recall any suspicious incident in
 which employees from other sections of the Communications
 Center or elsewhere had attempted to obtain extra copies of
 a communication from the Reproduction Section.

She stated she had no employment other than at USDS.

Interviewed on 9/30/71 at Washington, D. C. File # 65-11628
 by SA [redacted] and SA [redacted] JCC:jak Date dictated 9/30/71

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

10/6/71

Date of transcription

1

[redacted] Night Supervisor, Reproduction Section, Communications Center, Office of Communications, Bureau of Administration, United States Department of State (USDS), furnished the following information:

He did not recall having read the text of either an incoming or outgoing telegram concerning [redacted], noting that he seldom had time to read communications processed by him. He claimed he had not heard and did not know that two USDS telegrams had been leaked to JACK ANDERSON.

He could suggest no suspect for the leak of two USDS telegrams to ANDERSON. He stated he did not know any employees in the Communications Center who were acquainted with ANDERSON or his staff and he was not personally acquainted with ANDERSON or his staff.

He could not recall any incident in which employees from other sections of the Communications Center or elsewhere had ever attempted to obtain extra copies of communications from the Reproduction Section.

He stated he had no employment other than at USDS.

Interviewed on **10/5/71** at **Washington, D. C.** File # **65-11628**
 by SA **[redacted]** and SA **[redacted]** JCC:jak Date dictated **10/6/71**

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 10/4/711

[redacted] Assistant Supervisor,
 Reproduction Section, Communications Center, Office of
 Communications, Bureau of Administration, United States
 Department of State (USDS), furnished the following information:

He did not recall having read the text of either
 an incoming or an outgoing telegram concerning [redacted]
 stating that he seldom had time to read any of the communications
 he processed. Prior to September 30, 1971, he had not heard
 and did not know that these telegrams had been leaked to
 JACK ANDERSON.

He could suggest no suspect for the leak of two
 USDS telegrams to ANDERSON. He stated he did not know any
 Communications Center employees who were acquainted with
 ANDERSON or his staff and he was not personally acquainted with
 ANDERSON or his staff.

He did not recall any suspicious incident in which
 employees from other sections of the Communications Center
 or elsewhere had attempted to obtain extra copies of a
 communication from the Reproduction Section.

He stated that he was employed part-time by the
 Capitol Cab Company, Washington, D. C., when his working
 hours at USDS permitted.

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Interviewed on 9/30/71 at Washington, D. C. File # 65-11628
 by SA [redacted] and SA [redacted] JCC:jak Date dictated 9/30/71

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

10/4/71

Date of transcription

1

[redacted] Assistant Supervisor, Reproduction Section, Communications Center, Office of Communications, Bureau of Administration, United States Department of State (USDS), furnished the following information:

He did not recall reading the text of either an incoming or an outgoing telegram concerning [redacted]. He had not heard and did not know that these telegrams had been leaked to JACK ANDERSON.

He could suggest no suspect for the leak of two USDS telegrams to ANDERSON. He stated he did not know any Communications-Center employees who were acquainted with ANDERSON or his staff and he was not personally acquainted with ANDERSON or his staff.

He did not recall any suspicious incident in which employees from other sections of the Communications Center or elsewhere had attempted to obtain extra copies of a communication from the Reproduction Section.

He stated he had no employment other than at USDS.

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b7C

Interviewed on 9/30/71 at Washington, D. C. File # 65-11628
 by SA [redacted] and SA [redacted] JCC:jak Date dictated 9/30/71

WFO 65-11628

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

It has previously been reported during an interview on September 23, 1971, with [redacted] AID Representative in Kenya, who was visiting Washington, D. C., that he [redacted] [redacted] had stated that to the best of his recollection, he had received an overseas long distance telephone call at his residence in Nairobi, Kenya, on the evening of July 17, 1971, from Washington, D. C., from a man who identified himself as (First Name Unknown) [redacted] (phonetic), who said he was on JACK ANDERSON's staff and who had read to [redacted] an account of [redacted] alleged misconduct during a social affair held in Kenya in connection with the visit of the Vice President there in July, 1971.

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On September 24, 1971, a confidential source reported that the [redacted]

[redacted]

b7D

The above mentioned information from the confidential source cannot be made public except upon issuance of a subpoena duces tecum.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Washington, D. C. 20535
October 6, 1971

Title : UNKNOWN SUBJECT; Unauthorized
Disclosure of Information in State
Department Cables Appearing in "The
Washington Post" Article, Tuesday,
Character : July 27, 1971 by Jack Anderson
ESPIONAGE - X
Reference : Report of SA [REDACTED] b6
dated and captioned as above. b7C

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities
are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable
information in the past.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-26-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/STP/TH

Date 9/9/71

[redacted]
N.W., advised that since June, 1971, he has been employed by the United States Department of State (USDS), Washington, D. C. (WDC). He has a temporary appointment as Student Assistant, Executive Staff. He remarked that it is anticipated he will work at State until October, 1971. He has enrolled at the School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, WDC, and in a few weeks he will be attending this school seeking an advanced degree. [redacted] hopes to remain in the employment of the State Department on a part-time basis while going to school.

Since beginning his employment at State [redacted] has been assigned as Assistant Operations Officer in the Operations Center. He was on duty here during the pertinent period July 16-19, 1971, when the telegrams, one from Kenya (July 16, 1971) and to Kenya from Dr. HANNAH (July 19, 1971) were received at the Operations Center. He saw neither of these telegrams. Also, neither of them was discussed with him when they were being processed in the Operations Center. [redacted] said it was not until July 27, 1971, when the article by JACK ANDERSON containing the information in these two telegrams was brought to his attention, that he knew anything about this information.

[redacted] further related that on July 15, 1971, his wife and her twin sister gave a party at the house of his brother-in-law. Those invited were individuals who had been acquaintances of the hostesses during their high school days but were not necessarily close friends. One of those who attended was [redacted] [redacted] did not know [redacted] and met him for the first time at this party. [redacted] conversed with [redacted] for only two or three minutes on very general topics. [redacted] told [redacted] that she had not seen [redacted] for seven or eight years but knew him only as having been a schoolmate many years ago. It was

On 9/8/71 at Washington, D. C.File# WFO 65-11628 70by SA [redacted] :csgDate dictated 9/8/71

WFO 65-11628

at this party that [redacted] first learned that [redacted] was employed by [redacted]. This is the only contact [redacted] has had with [redacted]. [redacted] said it was only a "curious circumstance" that this brief contact with [redacted] occurred the day before the telegram was received from Kenya concerning information which later appeared in JACK ANDERSON's article.

[redacted] said he could not have passed the information in the telegrams to JACK ANDERSON, his staff or the news media, because he knew nothing about the telegrams until after JACK ANDERSON's article appeared. [redacted] said he is not acquainted with JACK ANDERSON, and he knows nobody who passed the pertinent information on to ANDERSON. [redacted] is not acquainted with [redacted]

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 10/6/71

[redacted] **Reproduction**
Section, Communications Center, Office of Communications,
Bureau of Administration, United States Department of State
(USDS), furnished the following information:

He did not recall having read the text of either
an incoming or outgoing telegram concerning [redacted]
noting that he seldom had time to read communications processed
by him. He claimed he had not heard and did not know that two
USDS telegrams had been leaked to JACK ANDERSON.

He could suggest no suspect for the leak of two
USDS telegrams to ANDERSON. He stated he did not know any
employees in the Communications Center who were acquainted
with ANDERSON or his staff and he was not personally
acquainted with ANDERSON or his staff.

He could not recall any incident in which employees
from other sections of the Communications Center or elsewhere
had ever attempted to obtain extra copies of communications
from the Reproduction Section.

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He stated he had no employment other than at USDS.

Interviewed on 10/5/71 at Washington, D. C. File # 65-11628 71
by SA [redacted] and SA [redacted] JCC:jak Date dictated 10/6/71

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 10/4/71

[redacted], Reproduction Section, Communications Center, Office of Communications, Bureau of Administration, United States Department of State (USDS), furnished the following information:

She did not recall reading the text of either an incoming or an outgoing telegram concerning [redacted] informing that she seldom had time to read the text of messages she processed.

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She did not recall ~~having heard~~ and did not know that USDS telegrams concerning [redacted] had been leaked to JACK ANDERSON.

She could suggest no suspect for the leak of two USDS telegrams to ANDERSON. She stated she did not know any Communications Center employees who were acquainted with ANDERSON or his staff and she was not personally acquainted with ANDERSON or his staff.

She stated that any extra copies of "EXDIS" (Exclusive Distribution) telegrams furnished to her by the multilith operator are placed by her in a "burn-bag" for later destruction.

She did not recall any suspicious incident in which employees from other sections of the Communications Center or elsewhere had ever attempted to obtain extra copies of a communication from the Reproduction Section.

She stated she had no employment other than at USDS.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-26-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/STP/TH

Interviewed on 9/29/71 at Washington, D. C. File # 65-11628 72
by SA [redacted] and SA [redacted] JCC:jak Date dictated 9/29/71

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-26-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/STP/TH

Date of transcription 10/4/71

[redacted] Multilith Operator, Reproduction
Section, Communications Center, Office of Communications,
Bureau of Administration, United States Department of State
(USDS), furnished the following information:

He did not recall reading the text of either an
incoming or an outgoing telegram concerning [redacted]
noting that he seldom had time to read the text of messages
he processed.

He did not recall having heard and did not know
that USDS telegrams concerning [redacted] had been leaked
to JACK ANDERSON.

He could suggest no suspect for the leak of two
USDS telegrams to ANDERSON. He stated he did not know any
Communications Center employees who were acquainted with
ANDERSON or his staff and he was not personally acquainted
with ANDERSON or his staff.

He stated he normally ran off ten extra copies of
"EXDIS" (Exclusive Distribution) telegrams for the purpose of
insuring clarity and sufficient copies. These extra copies
are furnished to the Collator who places any extra copies
in a "burn-bag" for destruction.

He did not recall any suspicious incident in which
employees from other sections of the Communications Center or
elsewhere had ever attempted to obtain extra copies of a
communication from the Reproduction Section.

He stated he had no employment other than at USDS.

Interviewed on 9/29/71 at Washington, D. C. File # 65-11628 73
by SA [redacted] and SA [redacted] JCC:jak Date dictated 9/29/71

b6
b7c

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 10/1/71

[redacted], Analysis Section Distributor, Communications Center, Office of Communications, Bureau of Administration, United States Department of State (USDS), furnished the following information:

She believed she recalled having seen the general text of both an incoming and outgoing telegram concerning [redacted] in connection with her duties in processing these telegrams. She did not believe she had seen a copy of these telegrams after they had been reproduced by the Reproduction Section. She explained that she probably had seen an electronic version of the telegrams on a television screen as part of her duties and she would not normally see a reproduced copy. She stated that the Analysis Section Supervisor normally obtains a "screening copy" of the reproduced communication in order to check for correct distribution, but she does not normally see this copy.

She did not recall having heard and did not know that USDS telegrams concerning [redacted] had been leaked to JACK ANDERSON.

She could suggest no suspect for the leak of two USDS telegrams to ANDERSON. She stated she did not know any Communications Center employees who were acquainted with ANDERSON or his staff and she was not personally acquainted with ANDERSON or his staff.

She stated she had no employment other than at USDS.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-26-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/STP/TH

Interviewed on 9/29/71 at Washington, D. C. File # 65-11628 74
by SA [redacted] and SA [redacted] JCC:jak Date dictated 9/29/71

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 10/1/71

[redacted]
Communications Center, Office of Communications, Bureau of Administration, United States Department of State (USDS), furnished the following information:

He was of the opinion that he had read the text of both an incoming and outgoing USDS "EXDIS" (Exclusive Distribution) telegram concerning [redacted] in connection with his duties of processing these telegrams in the Communications Center. His duties include the obtaining of a "screening copy" of a communication after it has been reproduced in the Reproduction Section to determine clarity and correct distribution of the communication. The "screening copy" is destroyed within one to two hours after use personally by the Analysis Section Supervisor.

He stated he had read JACK ANDERSON's column in "The Washington Post" concerning [redacted] but he had not seen any television program concerning him.

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He could suggest no suspect for the leak of the two USDS telegrams to ANDERSON. He did not know any Communications Center employees who were acquainted with ANDERSON or his staff and he was not personally acquainted with ANDERSON or his staff.

He stated he had no employment other than at USDS.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-26-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/STP/TH

Interviewed on 9/29/71 at Washington, D. C. File # 65-11628 75
by SA [redacted] and SA [redacted] JCC:jak Date dictated 9/29/71

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

10/1/71

Date of transcription _____

[redacted] Message Preparation and Introduction Section Operator, Communications Center, Office of Communications, Bureau of Administration, United States Department of State (USDS), furnished the following information:

He did not recall reading the text of either an incoming or an outgoing telegram concerning [redacted]. He had no independent recollection of having assisted in the processing of such telegrams. He believed he may have seen a reference to [redacted] in JACK ANDERSON's column in "The Washington Post", but he was not certain.

He could suggest no suspect for the leak of two USDS telegrams to ANDERSON. He did not know any Communications Center employees who were acquainted with ANDERSON or his staff and he was not personally acquainted with ANDERSON or his staff.

He stated that he had no employment other than at USDS, but that he attended the University of Maryland six hours per week.

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Interviewed on 9/29/71 at Washington, D. C. File # 65-11628-76
by SA [redacted] and SA [redacted] JCC:jak Date dictated 9/29/71

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 10/1/71

[redacted], Message Preparation and Introduction Section Supervisor, Communications Center, Office of Communications, Bureau of Administration, United States Department of State (USDS), furnished the following information:

She did not recall reading the text of either an incoming or an outgoing telegram concerning [redacted]. She had no independent recollection of having assisted in the processing of such telegrams; however, she did recall hearing comments from other personnel in the Communications Center sometime in the past to the effect that a [redacted] was in trouble. She did not now recall the identity of such personnel.

She stated she had not read any news article, had not seen on television and had not otherwise heard that any USDS telegrams had been leaked to JACK ANDERSON. She could suggest no suspects for the leak of two USDS telegrams to ANDERSON. She did not know any Communications Center employees who were acquainted with ANDERSON or his staff and she was not personally acquainted with ANDERSON or his staff.

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She stated she had no employment other than at USDS.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-26-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/STP/TH

Interviewed on 9/29/71 at Washington, D. C. File # 65-11628 77
by SA [redacted] and SA [redacted] JCC:jak Date dictated 9/29/71

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-26-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/STP/TH

Date of transcription 10/4/71

[redacted], Reproduction Section,
Communications Center, Office of Communications, Bureau of
Administration, United States Department of State (USDS),
furnished the following information:

She did not recall reading the text of either an
incoming or an outgoing telegram concerning [redacted].
She informed that she rarely had time to read the texts of
any messages she processed. Further, she did not recall
having heard anyone discuss any telegrams concerning [redacted].

She stated she had not read any news articles, had
not seen on television and had not otherwise heard that any
USDS telegrams had been leaked to JACK ANDERSON. She could
suggest no suspects for the leak of two USDS telegrams to
ANDERSON. She did not know any Communications Center
employees who were acquainted with ANDERSON or his staff and
she was not personally acquainted with ANDERSON or any member
of his staff.

She stated that any extra copies of "EXDIS" (Exclusive
Distribution) telegrams furnished to her by the multilith
operator are placed by her in a "burn-bag" for later destruction.

She did not recall any suspicious incident in which
employees from other sections of the Communications Center or
elsewhere had ever attempted to obtain extra copies of a
communication from the Reproduction Section.

She stated that she had no employment other than at
USDS.

Interviewed on 9/29/71 at Washington, D. C. File # 65-11628 78
by SA [redacted] and SA [redacted] JCC:jak Date dictated 9/29/71

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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Date of transcription 10/4/71

[redacted], Multilith Operator,
Reproduction Section, Communications Center, Office of
Communications, Bureau of Administration, United States
Department of State (USDS), furnished the following
information:

He did not recall reading the text of either
incoming or outgoing USDS telegrams concerning [redacted]
He informed that he rarely read text of messages he ran
off on multilith because of lack of time. Further, he did
not recall having heard anyone discuss any telegrams concerning
[redacted]

He stated he had not read any news articles, had
not seen on television and had not otherwise heard that any
USDS telegrams had been leaked to JACK ANDERSON. He could
suggest no suspect for the leak of two USDS telegrams to
ANDERSON. He did not know any Communications Center employees
who were acquainted with ANDERSON or his staff and he was not
personally acquainted with ANDERSON or his staff.

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He stated that he normally ran off ten extra
copies of "EXDIS" (Exclusive Distribution) telegrams for the
purpose of insuring clarity and sufficient copies. These
extra copies are furnished to the Collator who places any
extra copies in a "burn-bag" for destruction.

He did not recall any suspicious incident in which
employees from other sections of Communications Center or
elsewhere had ever attempted to obtain extra copies of a
communication from the Reproduction Section.

He stated he had part-time employment four hours
per day at the Giant Food Store, Monroe Street, Arlington,
Virginia, in addition to his USDS employment.

Interviewed on 9/29/71 at Washington, D.C. File # 65-11628 79
by SA [redacted] and SA [redacted] JCC:jak Date dictated 9/29/71

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 10/4/71

[redacted] Systems Section Operator,
Communications Center, Office of Communications, Bureau of
Administration, United States Department of State (USDS),
furnished the following information:

She recalled having read in the past the text
of an incoming USDS telegram concerning the activities of
[redacted] in connection with her duties of processing
such telegrams. She stated this would not have been one of the
copies prepared by the Reproduction Section which bore "EXDIS"
(Exclusive Distribution) markings, but would have been a file
copy maintained within the confines of the Communications
Center. She did not recall having seen a copy of a later
outgoing telegram concerning [redacted], but believed she
recalled some mention by other employees being made that a
later telegram had been sent in this regard.

She stated she had not read any news articles
and had not seen on television and had not otherwise heard
that any USDS telegrams had been leaked to JACK ANDERSON.
She could not suggest any suspect for the leak of two USDS
telegrams to ANDERSON. She did not know any Communications
Center employees who were acquainted with ANDERSON or his
staff and she was not personally acquainted with ANDERSON
or any member of his staff.

She stated she had no employment other than
at USDS.

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DATE 02-26-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/STP/TH

Interviewed on 9/29/71 at Washington, D. C. File # 65-11628 80
by SA JAMES F. PRICE and SA JAMES CALVIN CONRAD JCC:jak Date dictated 9/29/71

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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Date of transcription 10/4/71

[redacted], Analysis Section, Communications Center, Office of Communications, Bureau of Administration, United States Department of State (USDS), furnished the following information:

On September 24, 1971 or September 25, 1971, he saw the JACK ANDERSON news program on WTTG Television, Channel 5, Washington, D. C., between 10:00 p.m. and 11:00 p.m. During the program, ANDERSON quoted text from a USDS "EXDIS" (Exclusive Distribution) telegram concerning the activities in Kenya of [redacted] of the Agency for International Development (AID). [redacted] recognized the quoted text as being similar to that contained in a USDS "EXDIS" telegram on which he had assisted in the processing in the past. During the program, ANDERSON displayed in the background a copy of a USDS "EXDIS" telegram, showing "EXDIS" markings in the left margin; however, [redacted] was unable to see the copy with sufficient clarity to read the text or to observe whether distribution or other numbers were contained on it.

[redacted] recalled that the USDS "EXDIS" telegram on which he had worked in the past had been an incoming telegram from Kenya; however, he did not recall having seen a copy of a later outgoing telegram from USDS to Kenya concerning Mr. [redacted]

[redacted] stated that based on the possible motive of someone who desired to damage [redacted], it appeared to him that any logical suspects for the leak to ANDERSON would probably be at AID or in the Vice President's Office.

He could suggest no suspect for the leak to ANDERSON of the two USDS telegrams. He did not know of any Communications Center employees who were acquainted with ANDERSON or any member of ANDERSON's staff and he was

Interviewed on 9/29/71 at Washington, D. C. File # 65-11628 87
by SA [redacted] and SA [redacted] JCC:jak Date dictated 9/29/71

WFO 65-11628

not personally acquainted with ANDERSON or his staff.

He stated he had no employment except for that at USDS.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 02-26-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/STP/TH

Date of transcription 9/29/71

[redacted], Communications Manager,
Communications Center, Office of Communications, Bureau
of Administration, United States Department of State (USDS),
furnished the following information concerning incoming
Telegram Number 3713 dated July 16, 1971, from Nairobi and
outgoing Telegram Number 130006 dated July 19, 1971, from
USDS to Nairobi:

He was on duty in the Communications Center on
July 16 and 19, 1971 and on July 19, 1971, he was Acting
Chief of the Communications Center, in the absence of
[redacted]

He could suggest no suspect for the leak of the
above-mentioned two telegrams. He did not know any employees
in the Communications Center who were acquainted with JACK
ANDERSON or any member of ANDERSON's staff and he was not
personally acquainted with ANDERSON or any member of his staff.

On September 27, 1971, another USDS employee had
mentioned to [redacted] that he had seen JACK ANDERSON on Channel
5, WTTG Television program, Washington, D. C. (WDC), on Friday
evening, September 24, 1971, and that during the program, he
had observed a copy of a USDS "EXDIS" (Exclusive Distribution)
telegram visible in the background.

On September 28, 1971, [redacted] called WTTG Television
to attempt to ascertain details of the ANDERSON program on
September 24, 1971. An unidentified female representative of
WTTG informed CALLIHAN that ANDERSON had appeared on WTTG
Television, Channel 5, WDC, at 10:00 p.m., September 24, 1971
and had disclosed a story concerning a [redacted] from
Kenya. Further, she stated that any additional details or a
transcript, if available, of the program would have to be

Interviewed on 9/28/71 at Washington, D. C. File # 65-11628 82
by SA [redacted] and [redacted] JCC:jak Date dictated 9/28/71

WFO 65-11628

obtained from Mr. ANDERSON.

[redacted] noted that if a copy of the transcript or a tape of the ANDERSON program could be obtained showing the copy of the USDS "EKDIS" telegram, such copy of the telegram could possibly indicate from what office it was obtained.

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[redacted] did not identify the USDS employee who observed the ANDERSON program, preferring not to identify him since he was not otherwise involved in this matter and had merely reported his observation of a publicly-televised program.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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DATE 02-26-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/STP/TH

Date of transcription 10/1/71

[redacted], Chief, Communications Center, Office of Communications, Bureau of Administration, United States Department of State (USDS), furnished the following information concerning Telegram Number 3713 dated July 16, 1971, from Nairobi (#1) and outgoing Telegram Number 130006 dated July 19, 1971, from USDS to Nairobi (#2):

On July 16, 1971 [redacted], as well as [redacted] [redacted] Communications Manager, Communications Center and [redacted] Chief, Operations Staff, Communications Center, had been on duty. On July 19, 1971 [redacted] was not on duty, but both [redacted] and [redacted] were on duty, with [redacted] being in charge.

Concerning telegram #1, it was first received at Communications Center at 9:55 a.m.; and although a portion of the message was garbled, it was processed through the center. A corrected version of #1 was received at Communications Center at 12:36 p.m., July 16, 1971 and was thereafter processed through the center. In the case of "EXDIS" (Exclusive Distribution) telegrams, such as #1 and #2, one copy remains in the Communications Center and 45 copies were reproduced and sent to the Executive Secretariat. This procedure is followed in the case of incoming telegrams, such as #1, as well as outgoing, such as #2.

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[redacted] could not state the exact time the garbled version or the corrected version of #1 left the Communications Center to be sent to the Executive Secretariat; however, he stated he understood that the corrected version arrived in the Executive Secretariat near a shift change and [redacted] believed that the corrected version would have been processed through the Communications Center before the evening shift came on duty at about 3:45 p.m., July 16, 1971, except for possibly the final stage of processing in the Reproduction Section. He added

Interviewed on 9/28/71 at Washington, D. C. File # 65-11628 83
by SA [redacted] and SA [redacted] JCC:jak Date dictated 9/28/71

WFO 65-11628

that the early shift may have reproduced the 45 copies, possibly leaving to the evening shift the transmittal via tube to the Executive Secretariat. [] stated that no log is maintained in the Communications Center to show the time such communications leave the center.

[] could suggest no suspect for leak of the two USDS telegrams, #1 and #2. He did not know of any employees in the Communications Center who were acquainted with JACK ANDERSON or any member of ANDERSON's staff, and he was not personally acquainted with ANDERSON or any member of his staff.

[] furnished the names of the following Communications Center employees who had been involved in the processing of the two USDS telegrams, #1 and #2:

#1

[] Analysis Section-Assigned distribution
(Did not work on July 19, 1971)

[] Systems Section Operator-Cleared at Booking Desk (Did not work July 19, 1971)

[], Reproduction Section-Reproduced message
(Did work on July 19, 1971)

[] Reproduction Section-Collated copies and tubed to Executive Secretariat (Did work on July 19, 1971)

#2

[] Communications Center Officer-Received message from Executive Secretariat (Did not work on July 16, 1971)

[] Message Preparation and Introduction (MPI) Section - Clocked message (Did work on July 16, 1971)

[] MPI Section Operator-Prepared message tape and entered into Automated Terminal Station (Did work on July 16, 1971)

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b7C

WFO 65-11628

[redacted], Analysis Section Supervisor (Did work on July 16, 1971)

[redacted], Analysis Section Distributor-Jointly determined distribution to be made of message (Did not work on July 16, 1971)

[redacted], Systems Section Operator-Cleared message at Booking Desk (Did not work on July 16, 1971)

[redacted], Reproduction Section Operator-Reproduced message (Did work on July 16, 1971)

[redacted], Reproduction Section Operator-Collated copies and tubed to Executive Secretariat (Did work on July 16, 1971)

In addition, [redacted] informed that the following supervisory personnel were on duty in the Reproduction Section on July 16, 1971 and would have been in position to report any unusual incidents in that section:

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Early Shift [redacted], Assistant Supervisor
[redacted], Assistant Supervisor

Evening Shift - [redacted] Supervisor
[redacted], Assistant Supervisor
[redacted], Assistant Supervisor

On July 19, 1971, the following supervisory personnel were on duty in the Reproduction Section:

[redacted], Supervisor
[redacted], Assistant Supervisor
[redacted], Assistant Supervisor

[redacted] informed that merely by reason of their employment in the Communications Center, a total of 216 persons employed there could have had access to one or both of the telegrams; however, the operation of the Communications Center

WFO 65-11628

is such that access would have been logically restricted only to persons involved in the processing of the two telegrams and any effort to obtain a copy or gain access by an employee other than one involved in the processing would be sufficiently unusual that such activity would be brought to attention of supervisory personnel. No such incident was reported.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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DATE 02-26-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/STP/TH

9/28/71

Date of transcription _____

[redacted] Director, Operations Center, Room 7516, United States Department of State, advised that it is the function of the Operations Center to handle EXDIS communications. He stated that in his opinion the telegram in question from Nairobi pertaining to the alleged misconduct of [redacted] was well handled from his viewpoint in the operation of the Operations Center. He stated that he could not recall the exact date that the communication was received but knew it to be in July of 1971 when [redacted]

[redacted] but on temporary loan as a Watch Officer, brought the communication in question in for his direction since [redacted] indicated that it was extremely sensitive. He stated it was decided that due to the sensitivity of the communication, distribution should only be made to [redacted] Deputy Executive Secretary, the Executive Secretariat and to JOHN A. HANNAH, Administrator, AID. He stated that one copy was to be retained in the Operations Center to be used for the incoming Operations Watch Officer.

[redacted] indicated that [redacted] Deputy Executive Secretary for Management, was in the office with him at the time [redacted] arrived with the communication. He stated that he showed the communication to [redacted] to get his ideas for proper distribution. He also indicated to [redacted] at this time that the way that they were handling the communication was in fact a classic example of the excellent security being handled at the Operations Center.

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[redacted] advised that he did not know JACK ANDERSON or any member of his staff or family and does not know [redacted] AID, representative. He stated that it was his personal opinion that the purpose of the leak of the

Interviewed on 9/23/71 10 at Washington, D. C. File # WFO 65-11628 84
by SAs [redacted] and [redacted] Date dictated 9/23/71
RCW:mbf

WFO 65-11628

information was someone attempting to discredit
He indicated that he had no ideas of how this leak possibly
could have occurred.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 10/1/71

[redacted]
[redacted], Executive Assistant to the Deputy Undersecretary of State, Room 7210, U. S. Department of State (USDS), advised as follows:

[redacted] advised that she first became aware of information being leaked to the Columnist JACK ANDERSON, on July 27, 1971, when an article appeared in his column pertaining to the alleged misconduct of AID representative [redacted]. She stated that while incoming telegrams are placed upon her desk prior to being taken in to [redacted] that they usually remain on her desk for a very short period of time depending on what her other duties are at the time they are received. She stated that she usually takes the incoming mail directly in to [redacted] upon receipt if she is at her desk at the time they are received. She stated that she had no information concerning the telegram in question, had not observed, did not know who did observe or had it in their possession, and did not have a copy made of the telegram.

[redacted] stated she is not acquainted with JACK ANDERSON or any member of his staff or family or any representative of the news media. She stated that she is not acquainted with [redacted] and knows of no one who would want to discredit him. She also stated that she had no idea as to how the leak to JACK ANDERSON may have occurred.

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-26-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/STP/TH

Interviewed on 9/30/71 at Washington, D. C. File # WFO 65-11628 85
by SAs [redacted] ^{RCW} and [redacted] ^{JWL} RCW:bjl Date dictated 10/1/71

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 9/29/71

[redacted], Office of Secretariat, Room 7241, United States Department of State (USDS), advised as follows:

[redacted] stated as of July 16, 1971, [redacted] in the Operations Center. He could not recall specifics concerning the telegram sent from Nairobi concerning [redacted] [redacted], AID representative. He did state, however, he believed he was on duty the afternoon of July 16, 1971, when the telegram arrived. He stated he was unable to recall the specifics mentioned in the telegram but knew it did concern misconduct regarding [redacted]. He stated that he would not have used the telegram in a summary he prepares for all telegrams received unless they are too sensitive for the summary and in this instance he felt this telegram would have been too sensitive for the summary. He stated that if the telegram had been made available to him and he did not use it in the summary, he would have immediately placed it in the burn bag.

[redacted] stated he is not acquainted with JACK ANDERSON or any member of his staff or family and has not had any contact with them. In addition, he stated he has no close acquaintance in the news media field.

[redacted] stated he is not acquainted with [redacted] and knows of no one who would discredit him. It was his opinion that the security in the Operations Center is too tight for information of the type described above to be leaked outside.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-26-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/STP/TH

Interviewed on 9/29/71 at Washington, D. C. File # WFO 65-11628 86
by SAs [redacted] and [redacted] RCW:ss Date dictated 9/29/71

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-26-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/STP/TH

Date of transcription 9/28/71

[redacted] Deputy Director of Policy
Planning, Bureau of African Affairs, Room 5234, U. S.
Department of State, advised as follows:

[redacted] recalled being the Duty Assistant to
[redacted] in the Office of [redacted], Assistant
Secretary for African Affairs on July 17, 1971. He
stated that during the time that he was there was from
approximately 9:00 a.m., to 1:30 p.m., and that during
this time he did not recall having access or observing
the communication from Nairobi, Kenya, regarding [redacted]
[redacted] AID representative. He also stated that he
had no knowledge of anyone making a copy of this telegram.
He also stated that he did not recall that there was any
discussion of the telegram on the day he had duty in the
Assistant Secretary's office July 17, 1971. He stated he
did, however, read the article in the "Washington Post"
written by JACK ANDERSON July 27, 1971.

[redacted] stated that he is not acquainted with JACK
ANDERSON or any member of his staff or family and has not
had any contact with them, or any news media representative.
He stated that he is not acquainted with [redacted] and
did not know of anyone who would attempt to discredit
[redacted] In addition, he stated he had no ideas as to
how a leak of information may have occurred from the U. S.
Department of State to JACK ANDERSON.

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Interviewed on 9/28/71 at Washington, D. C. File # 65-11628 87
by SAS [redacted] and [redacted] RCW:jh Date dictated 9/28/71

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-26-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/STP/TH

Date of transcription 9/27/71

[redacted] The
Executive Secretariat, Room 7224, United States Department of
State (USDS) advised as follows:

[redacted] stated he was not on duty at the time the
telegram pertaining to [redacted] Agency for International
Development (AID) Representative, arrived from Nairobi on July 16,
1971. He stated, however, he did view the telegram at a subsequent
date shortly thereafter, but was not certain as to any specific
date. He stated that he could recall that there was additional
distribution made of the telegram to [redacted] and
[redacted] by his superior, [redacted]

[redacted] stated that he did not know JACK ANDERSON or
any member of his staff or family and had no idea as to how the
information obtained by ANDERSON may have been leaked to him. He
stated that it was a theory of his that someone who had observed
the contents of the telegram made a quick Xerox copy in jest and
this subsequently somehow was made available to ANDERSON. He
explained this further by stating the contents of the message
was somewhat gossipy and scandalous which would create anyone's
interest. He stated he did not believe that the leakage occurred
in the Secretariat because of the closeness of the operation in
the Secretariat.

[redacted] stated that he met [redacted] a couple of years
ago in a briefing, but indicated that he has not seen or heard
of him until this time.

Interviewed on 9/27/71 at Washington, D.C. File # WFO 65-11628 88
by SAs [redacted] and [redacted] RCW:lak Date dictated 9/27/71

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 9/28/71

[redacted] the Executive Secretariat, Room 7224, United States Department of State, advised as follows:

[redacted] recalled that he consulted with his superior, [redacted] regarding the telegram pertaining to [redacted] AID Representative. He recalled that after reviewing the content of the telegram, it was agreed that additional distribution should be made for [redacted] and [redacted]. He stated that he did not recall that any additional copies of the telegram were made in his office.

[redacted] stated that when telegrams are received in his office, they are placed in a "burn bag" at the end of the day to be destroyed. He stated that he did not see the telegram in question after the discussion with his superior. He was uncertain as to the specific date that he did observe the telegram in question.

[redacted] stated that it would be unusual for a secretary in his office to be familiar with the content of a telegram such as the one in question and noted that there are numerous telegrams arriving in the office on a daily basis, most of which are far more serious in nature than the telegram in question. [redacted] stated that he does not know JACK ANDERSON or any member of his staff or family. He also stated that he does not know [redacted] and does not know anyone who might want to discredit him. In addition, MILLER stated that he has no idea how the information in the telegram may have been leaked to JACK ANDERSON.

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-26-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/STP/TH

Interviewed on 9/27/71 at Washington, D.C. File # WFO 65-11628 90
by SA [redacted] SA [redacted] Date dictated 9/27/71

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 10/5/71

[redacted] Africa, Agency for International Development (AID), Room 4845, State Department Building, Washington, D. C., advised as follows:

[redacted] stated that neither the incoming cable from Kenya, nor the outgoing cable to Kenya (cables number 1 and number 2), came to his office. He neither saw them, nor had access to them. His first knowledge of the leak of information was the JACK ANDERSON's column which reported the TOLLEFSON incident in Kenya.

[redacted] said that when he heard that Dr. SAMUEL ADAMS was travelling to London, England to meet [redacted], he thought that perhaps it was in connection with another matter, an embezzlement case which had occurred in Kenya. That matter was unrelated to the [redacted] incident.

[redacted] said that he has known [redacted] only professionally, and only since the latter became the AID Director in Kenya. He knew no one who had a grudge against [redacted] sufficient enough to cause a leak of information to ruin his career.

[redacted] stated that he does not know JACK ANDERSON, or any member of his staff, and has no information as to how the leak of information occurred.

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-26-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/STP/TH

Interviewed on 10/4/71 at Washington, D. C. File # WFO 65-11628 91
by SAs [redacted] [redacted] EHJ:mmp Date dictated 10/5/71

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 10/5/71

[redacted]
Africa, Agency for International Development (AID), Room 4758, State Department Building, Washington, D. C., advised as follows:

[redacted] said that he neither saw, nor had access to Ambassador MC ILVAINE's cable to AID Headquarters, nor the outgoing cable to Nairobi, Kenya, relative to the [redacted] incident in that country. He first learned of the matter when he read JACK ANDERSON's column in "The Washington Post".

[redacted] said that he had never personally met [redacted] until shortly before the latter was assigned as AID Director in Kenya. He has seen [redacted] only a few occasions since that time. He has little knowledge of [redacted] friends, and knows no one who bears him a strong personal grudge.

[redacted] said that he has no idea of how the leak of information occurred. He stated that he has never known JACK ANDERSON, nor any member of his staff.

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-26-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/STP/TH

Interviewed on 10/4/71 at Washington, D. C. File # WFO 65-11628 **92**

by SAs [redacted] *EHJ:mmp* Date dictated 10/5/71

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-26-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/STP/TH

Date of transcription 10/5/71

[redacted] Deputy Director, Office of East African Affairs, Agency for International Development (AID), Room 4758, State Department Building, Washington, D. C., advised as follows:

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[redacted] advised that his office did not receive a copy of Ambassador MC ILVAINE's cable, nor a copy of the outgoing cable pertaining to the [redacted] incident in Kenya. He said that his first knowledge of it occurred when he read about it in JACK ANDERSON's column in "The Washington Post".

[redacted] said that the highest degree of classified messages received in his office is LIMDIS; thus, neither of the aforementioned cables came to his attention.

[redacted] said that he has limited acquaintanceship with [redacted]. He met him for one day in Nairobi, Kenya, in November, 1970 at which time their paths crossed while both were on AID trips. [redacted] has seen [redacted] only a few times in a professional capacity since the latter became AID Director in Kenya. [redacted] said that he did not know who [redacted] friends, or for that matter, enemies, are, and is not acquainted with him socially.

[redacted] said that he is not conversant about the security system of the American Embassy in Nairobi, but if asked to speculate, he would think that the leak of information occurred in Washington, D. C. rather than in Kenya.

[redacted] stated that he does not know JACK ANDERSON, nor members of his staff, and has had no contact with them.

Interviewed on 10/4/71 at Washington, D. C. File # WFO 65-11628 93
SAs [redacted]
by [redacted] EJJ:mmp Date dictated 10/5/71

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 10/1/71

[redacted]
Reproduction Section, Communications Center, Office of Communications, Bureau of Administration, United States Department of State (USDS), furnished the following information:

He did not recall reading the text of either an incoming or an outgoing telegram concerning [redacted] Prior to September 30, 1971, he had not heard and did not know that these telegrams had been leaked to JACK ANDERSON.

He could suggest no suspect for the leak of two USDS telegrams to ANDERSON. He did not know any Communications Center employees who were acquainted with ANDERSON or his staff, and he was not personally acquainted with ANDERSON or his staff.

He did not recall any suspicious incident in which employees from other sections of the Communications Center or elsewhere had attempted to obtain extra copies of a communication from the Reproduction Section.

He stated he had no employment other than at USDS.

b6
b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-26-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/STP/TH

Interviewed on 9/30/71 at Washington, D. C. File # 65-11628 95A
by SA [redacted] and [redacted] JCC:jak Date dictated 9/30/71

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 10/4/71

[Redacted]
Reproduction Section, Communications Center, Office of Communications, Bureau of Administration, United States Department of State (USDS), furnished the following information:

He did not recall reading the text of either an incoming or an outgoing telegram concerning [Redacted]. He had not heard and did not know that these telegrams had been leaked to JACK ANDERSON.

He could suggest no suspect for the leak of two USDS telegrams to ANDERSON. He stated he did not know any Communications Center employees who were acquainted with ANDERSON or his staff and he was not personally acquainted with ANDERSON or his staff.

He did not recall any suspicious incident in which employees from other sections of the Communications Center or elsewhere had attempted to obtain extra copies of a communication from the Reproduction Section.

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b7C

He stated he had no employment other than at USDS.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-26-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/STP/TH

Interviewed on 9/30/71 at Washington, D. C. File # 65-11628 95B
by [Redacted] JCC:jak Date dictated 9/30/71

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 10/4/71

[Redacted]

Reproduction Section, Communications Center, Office of Communications, Bureau of Administration, United States Department of State (USDS), furnished the following information:

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He did not recall having read the text of either an incoming or an outgoing telegram concerning [Redacted] stating that he seldom had time to read any of the communications he processed. Prior to September 30, 1971, he had not heard and did not know that these telegrams had been leaked to JACK ANDERSON.

He could suggest no suspect for the leak of two USDS telegrams to ANDERSON. He stated he did not know any Communications Center employees who were acquainted with ANDERSON or his staff and he was not personally acquainted with ANDERSON or his staff.

He did not recall any suspicious incident in which employees from other sections of the Communications Center or elsewhere had attempted to obtain extra copies of a communication from the Reproduction Section.

He stated that he was employed part-time by the Capitol Cab Company, Washington, D. C., when his working hours at USDS permitted.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-26-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/STP/TH

Interviewed on 9/30/71 at Washington, D. C. File # 65-11628 95c
by SA [Redacted] and [Redacted] JCC:jak Date dictated 9/30/71

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 10/4/71

[redacted] Systems Section Operator, Communications Center, Office of Communications, Bureau of Administration, United States Department of State (USDS), furnished the following information:

He did not recall having read the text of either an incoming or an outgoing telegram concerning [redacted]. He did recall having read an article by JACK ANDERSON in "The Washington Post" in the past concerning [redacted] which involved the leak of USDS telegrams to ANDERSON.

Although his duties in processing an "EXDIS" (Exclusive Distribution) telegram would normally include his seeing the file copy of such telegram, he has processed so many that he seldom can recall the text of any of them.

He could suggest no suspect for the leak of two USDS telegrams to ANDERSON. He did not know any Communications Center employees who were acquainted with ANDERSON or his staff and he was not personally acquainted with ANDERSON or his staff.

He stated he had no employment other than at USDS.

b6
b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-26-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/STP/TH

Interviewed on 9/30/71 at Washington, D. C. File # 65-11628 950
by S. [redacted] and [redacted] JCC:jak Date dictated 9/30/71

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription 10/4/71

[redacted] Communications Center Officer, Office of Communications, Bureau of Administration, United States Department of State (USDS), furnished the following information:

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He did not recall reading the text of an outgoing telegram concerning [redacted]; although, according to Communications Center records, he had been involved in the processing of this telegram. He attributed this to the number of telegrams he normally processes. He recalled that after the appearance of an article in "The Washington Post", by JACK ANDERSON concerning [redacted] he, [redacted] had pulled the Communications Center file copy of an incoming telegram, and after reading it, he had ascertained that the text of the telegram was contained verbatim in the newspaper article concerning [redacted]

He could suggest no suspect for the leak of two USDS telegrams to ANDERSON. He did not know any Communications Center employees who were acquainted with ANDERSON or his staff and he was not personally acquainted with ANDERSON or his staff.

He stated he had no employment other than at USDS.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-26-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/STP/TH

Interviewed on 9/30/71 at Washington, D. C. File # 65-11628 95E
by SA [redacted] and [redacted] JCC:jak Date dictated 9/30/71

NR08 WF CODED

5:17 PM URGENT 10-7-71 DLE

TO DIRECTOR (65-74138)

FROM WASHINGTON FIELD (65-11628) TWO PAGES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-04-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH

TOLL LEK, SIO

RE WFO TELETYPE OCTOBER SIX LAST.

THE FOLLOWING INVESTIGATION WAS CONDUCTED ON OCTOBER SEVEN INSTANT: [REDACTED], WATCH ASSISTANT, OPERATIONS CENTER, USDS; [REDACTED] THEN STAFF ASSISTANT TO DEPUTY UNDERSECRETARY FOR ADMINISTRATION [REDACTED] [REDACTED] AND CURRENTLY AND [REDACTED] [REDACTED] (FSI), ROSSLYN, VIRGINIA; AND [REDACTED], OPERATIONS CENTER, USDS, AND CURRENTLY [REDACTED] THEY WERE AWARE OF THE COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING [REDACTED] BUT COULD FURNISH NO INFORMATION CONCERNING THE LEAK. ALL DISAVOWED ANY KNOWLEDGE OF JACK ANDERSON, MEMBER OF HIS STAFF, END PAGE ONE

b6
b7C

65-11628-96

Searched _____
 Serialized _____
 Indexed _____
 Filed _____

[REDACTED]

OR THEIR FAMILIES.

[REDACTED], ASSISTANT DIVISION CHIEF, GENERAL SERVICES DIVISION, BUREAU OF ADMINISTRATION, USDS, ADVISED THAT NO LOGS ARE KEPT OF VISITORS TO USDS DURING WORKING HOURS, EIGHT THIRTY AM TO SEVEN PM. EACH NON- STATE DEPARTMENT VISITOR AFTER SEVEN PM IS REQUIRED TO SIGN LOG AT TIME OF ENTRANCE, AND UNLESS HE IS GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE, MUST BE ESCROTED. REGULATIONS INSTITUTED DURING PAST TWO WEEKS REQUIRED USDS EMPLOYEES T O WEAR BADGES DURING NON-WORKING HOURS. [REDACTED] ADVISED THAT NEWS CORRESPONDENTS WITH WHITE HOUSE PASSES ARE ALLOWED ACCESS TO USDS AT NIGHT WITHOUT ESCORTS. WFO WIL EXAMINE RECORDS OF AFTER HOUR VISITIORS, FOR PERIOD JULY SIXTEEN- TWENTY LAST, WHICH EDGINS ADVISED ARE IN CAPTAIN OF GUARDS OFFICE, USDS, FOR POSSIBLE LEAD VALUE.

b6
b7C

INTERVIEWS CONTINNING AT AID AND USDS.

END

X

TMT FBI WA

2

F B I

Date: 10/7/71

Transmit the following in CODED
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via TELETYPE URGENT
(Priority)

008

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (65-74138)

FROM: SAC, WFO (65-11628)

TOLL LEK, SIO

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-04-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH

RE WFO TELETYPE OCTOBER SIX LAST.

THE FOLLOWING INVESTIGATION WAS CONDUCTED ON OCTOBER

SEVEN INSTANT: [REDACTED] WATCH ASSISTANT,

OPERATIONS CENTER, USDS; [REDACTED] THEN STAFF

ASSISTANT TO DEPUTY UNDERSECRETARY FOR ADMINISTRATION [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] ROSSLYN, VIRGINIA;

AND [REDACTED] THEN EDITOR, OPERATIONS CENTER, USDS,

[REDACTED] WERE INTERVIEWED.

THEY WERE AWARE OF THE COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING [REDACTED]

BUT COULD FURNISH NO INFORMATION CONCERNING THE LEAK. ALL

DISAVOWED ANY KNOWLEDGE OF JACK ANDERSON, MEMBERS OF HIS STAFF,

65-11628-960

SEARCHED _____ INDEXED _____

SERIALIZED _____ FILED _____

OCT 7 4 58 PM '71

1 - WFO
DJF:jak

*See WFO
Lead pg 2
Examine records*

Approved: RGK/ybr
Special Agent in Charge

Sent 5:20 M Per [REDACTED]

b6
b7C

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via _____
(Priority)b6
b7C

WFO 65-11628

PAGE TWO

OR THEIR FAMILIES.

[REDACTED], ASSISTANT DIVISION CHIEF, GENERAL SERVICES DIVISION, BUREAU OF ADMINISTRATION, USDS, ADVISED THAT NO LOGS ARE KEPT OF VISITORS TO USDS DURING WORKING HOURS, EIGHT THIRTY AM TO SEVEN PM. EACH NON-STATE DEPARTMENT VISITOR AFTER SEVEN PM IS REQUIRED TO SIGN LOG AT TIME OF ENTRANCE, AND UNLESS HE IS GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE, MUST BE ESCORTED. REGULATIONS INSTITUTED DURING PAST TWO WEEKS REQUIRE USDS EMPLOYEES TO WEAR BADGES DURING NON-WORKING HOURS. EDGINS ADVISED THAT NEWS CORRESPONDENTS WITH WHITE HOUSE PASSES ARE ALLOWED ACCESS TO USDS AT NIGHT WITHOUT ESCORTS. WFO WILL EXAMINE RECORDS OF AFTER HOUR VISITORS, FOR PERIOD JULY SIXTEEN - TWENTY LAST, WHICH EDGINS ADVISED ARE IN CAPTAIN OF GUARDS OFFICE, USDS, FOR POSSIBLE LEAD VALUE.

*INTERVIEWS CONTINUING AT AID AND USDS.*Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

NR048 WA CODE

9:39PM NITEL 10-7-71 LMR

TO WASHINGTON FIELD (65-11628)

FROM DIRECTOR (65-74138) 1P

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-04-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH

TOLL LEK, SIO

RE WFO TEL OCTOBER FIVE LAST, REQUESTING AUTHORITY TO
INTERVIEW [REDACTED]

AUTHORITY GRANTED. INSURE [REDACTED] ADVISED AT OUTSET THAT
INTERVIEW RELATES TO INVESTIGATION BEING CONDUCTED TO DETERMINE
INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBLE FOR LEAK OF TWO CLASSIFIED STATE
DEPARTMENT CABLES TO JACK ANDERSON'S STAFF IN JULY, NINETEEN
SEVENTY-ONE, AND HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH AMERICAN UNIVERSITY OR
PERSONNEL OR ACTIVITIES OF THAT INSTITUTION.

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b7C

[REDACTED] SHOULD BE INTERVIEWED OFF CAMPUS AND BUREAU FURNISHED
TELETYPE SUMMARY OF RESULTS.

FOR YOUR INFORMATION, BUFILES CONTAIN NO INFORMATION
IDENTIFIABLE WITH SIMONS NOT ALREADY IN YOUR POSSESSION.

END

FBI WFO MWM

FOR TWO

CLR

65-11628-97
SEARCHED [initials]
SERIALIZED [initials]
OCT 10 1971
Assign Lead to [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

9 43
P
a

F B I

Date: 10/8/71

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL _____
(Priority)

To: SAC, WFO (65-11628)
From: Director, FBI (65-74138)

TOLL LEK
SIO

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-04-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH

Reurtel 9/29/71 recommending contact be made at television station WTTG, Washington, D. C., for purpose of determining whether Jack Anderson utilized an actual United States Department of State (USDS) communication during his television program on at 10 p.m. Friday, 9/24/71.

For your information, Bureau has no contact at this station. Prior to considering contact with WTTG by Agents of your office, Bureau desires you first determine through [redacted] or other logical sources, identity of owner or owners of this station, as well as present manager and other executive officers who might be encountered during such contact. Names of above-mentioned individuals, together with summary of information located in your files relating to them, should thereafter be furnished Bureau, following which consideration will be given your request concerning WTTG contact.

b7D
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b7C

WFO

[Handwritten initials]

[Redacted box]

65-11628-98

k.

See me

SEARCHED [initials] INDEXED [initials]
SERIALIZED [initials] FILED [initials]
OCT 11 1971
FBI WASH FIELD OFFICE

Sent Via _____ M Per _____

NR011 WF CODED

7:35 PM URGENT 10-8-71 MWM

TO DIRECTOR (65-74138)

FROM WASHINGTON FIELD (65-11628)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-04-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH

TOLL LEK, SIO

RE WFO TELETYPE OCTOBER [REDACTED] LAST.

FOLLOWING INVESTIGATION [REDACTED] OCTOBER EIGHT INSTANT:

WFO EXAMINED THIS DATE, VISITORS LOGS, STATE DEPARTMENT,

ALL ENTRANCES TO BUILDING, PERIOD JULY SIXTEEN - TWENTY,

SEVENTYONE, RE JACK ANDERSON AND FOLLOWING MEMBERS OF HIS

STAFF: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] AND [REDACTED]; NONE OF FOREIGN NAMES

APPEARED IN VISITOR'S LOGS, USDS. IT IS NOTED THAT ABOVE LOGS

PERTAIN TO AFTER HOURS VISITORS; NO SUCH LOGS MAINTAINED

DURING WORKDAYS.

[REDACTED] USDS, APPRAISED

THIS DATE OF DISCREPANCY BETWEEN SY AND WFO INTERVIEW OF

END PAGE ONE

b6
b7C

65-11628-99

Searched _____
Serialized _____
Indexed _____
Filed _____

[REDACTED]

9/15/71

PAGE TWO

[REDACTED] AID; TO WIT, THAT [REDACTED] TOLD [REDACTED]
[REDACTED], THAT HE KNEW JACK ANDERSON BUT NOT MEMBERS OF HIS
STAFF; [REDACTED] TOLD WFO THAT HE DOES NOT KNOW ANDERSON, HAS
NEVER MET HIM OR SPOKEN WITH HIM OR ANY MEMBER OF STAFF. [REDACTED]
SUBSEQUENTLY SPOKE TO [REDACTED] THIS DATE RE DISCREPANCY OF
STATEMENTS. [REDACTED] INFORMED [REDACTED] THAT IT WAS QUITE LIKELY
THAT [REDACTED] SAID THAT HE KNEW JACK ANDERSON BY REPUTATION AS
A WRITER, ETC., BUT DID NOT KNOW HIS STAFF. [REDACTED] APOLOGIZED
FOR MISLEADING INFORMATION AND VOLUNTEERED ANY HELP BY [REDACTED]
INSTANT INVESTIGATION.

INTERVIEWS CONTINUING AT AID AND USDS.

E N D

DIR TmT

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b7C

F B I

Date: 8/4/71

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via Airtel _____
(Priority)

To: SAC, WFO

PERSONAL ATTENTION

From: Director, FBI

UNSUB; ~~Unauthorized Disclosure of~~
~~Information in State Department Cables~~
Appearing in "The Washington Post" Article,
Tuesday, July 27, 1971, by Jack Anderson
ESPIONAGE - X

b6
b7C

Enclosed is copy of letter from Assistant Attorney
General (AAG), Internal Security Division, dated 7/30/71,
title of which refers to captioned matter, together with copy
of article under by-line of Jack Anderson which appeared in
the 7/27/71 edition of "The Washington Post."

Note the expressed interest of the President in this
and other leak cases.

Anderson's article relates for the most part to
alleged behavior in Kenya on the part of [redacted]
described as an [redacted]

[redacted] According to the article, [redacted]
[redacted]
by Vice President Agnew and [redacted]

[redacted]

Anderson, in his article, states [redacted]
behavior was reported in a series of confidential State Depart-
ment telegrams and that "we have obtained copies of [redacted]"

Enclosures - 2

[Handwritten signatures and initials]

65-11628-
SEARCHED.....INDEXED.....
SERIALIZED.....FILED.....
FBI - WASH. F. O.
[redacted]

Airtel to WFO

Re: UNSUB; Unauthorized Disclosure of
Information in State Department Cables
Appearing in "The Washington Post" Article,
Tuesday, July 27, 1971, by Jack Anderson

missives." Anderson also claimed in his article to have
obtained a telegram which indicates that Hannah had ordered



In compliance with Department's request, WFO immediately initiate investigation of the leak of State Department information to Anderson, which information reportedly is of a classified nature. This investigation must be handled on a special basis and you should insure sufficient manpower is assigned to it to adequately handle all leads on an expedite basis. Results of investigation should be submitted to Bureau on a daily basis by summary teletype and leads developed are to be set out by teletype with instructions that information developed from these leads is to be furnished Bureau and WFO in similar manner. In addition to summary teletype, incorporate results of your investigation in investigative report, furnishing six copies of same to Bureau. First report in matter is to reach Bureau one week from date of receipt of instant airtel, and subsequent reports are to follow on weekly basis.

Immediately contact John A. Hannah and thoroughly interview him relative to allegations by Anderson that material in his article came from "confidential State Department telegrams." In this regard you should, during your contact with Hannah, obtain answers to the following questions:

1. Is the information in the Anderson article classified and, if so, is it properly classified;
2. Is the classified data disclosed accurate;
3. Does the data come from a specific document or documents and, if so, origin of the document or documents and name of individual responsible for the security of the classified data disclosed;
4. Extent of official dissemination of the classified data;

Airtel to WFO

Re: UNSUB; Unauthorized Disclosure of
Information in State Department Cables
Appearing in "The Washington Post" Article,
Tuesday, July 27, 1971, by Jack Anderson

5. Has the data been the subject of prior official releases;
6. Determine whether prior clearance for publication or release of this information was sought from the proper authorities;
7. Ascertain whether the material or portions thereof and enough background data have been published officially or in the press to make an educated speculation on this matter possible;
8. Can the data be declassified for the purpose of prosecution and, if so, name of the person competent to testify concerning the classification;
9. Ascertain whether declassification had been decided upon prior to the publication of this data;
10. Determine what effect disclosure of the classified data could have on the national defense.

In addition to above, you should, during your interview of Mr. Hannah, determine complete details surrounding reported contact of Hannah by Jack Anderson in effort to obtain comments relating to the alleged incidents

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Investigation of reported disclosure of information pertaining to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), also mentioned in enclosed letter from AAG, Internal Security Division, is being handled separately.

Bureau has assigned code name "TOLL LEK" to this matter, and this code name should be utilized in all intra-Bureau communications and auxiliary offices so advised. Communications prepared for dissemination outside Bureau should bear caption of instant airtel.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TO : Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

DATE: JUL 30 1971

FROM : Robert C. Mardian
Assistant Attorney General
Internal Security Division *RCM*

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-22-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/CPB/TH

SUBJECT: UNKNOWN SUBJECTS: UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION
PERTAINING TO THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS (SALT)
APPEARING IN NEW YORK TIMES ARTICLE, FRIDAY, JULY 23, 1971
BY [REDACTED]; UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION
IN STATE DEPARTMENT CABLES APPEARING IN THE WASHINGTON
POST ARTICLE, TUESDAY, JULY 27, 1971, BY JACK ANDERSON

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b7c

The July 23, 1971 edition of the New York Times carried an article containing highly classified information pertaining to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) under the byline of [REDACTED]. The July 27, 1971 edition of the Washington Post contained an article by Jack Anderson regarding information contained in classified State Department cables, copies of which Anderson claims to have in his possession. Copies of these articles are attached. A review of these newspaper reports indicates that classified information has probably been unlawfully communicated to these reporters.

The publication of those items pertaining to the SALT talks could very well compromise important interests of the United States. These facts indicate potential violations of the Espionage Act (18 U.S.C. §792-798) within the investigative jurisdiction of the FBI. Representatives of the Bureau have already been apprised of the President's interest in these matters in a conference with White House staff members on Saturday, July 24, 1971 regarding the SALT disclosures.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JUL 30 1971

RECEIVED-SECRET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~- 2 -~~

The Bureau is requested to conduct a complete investigation with regard to these unauthorized disclosures and to keep the Department advised of the progress of the investigation. Upon identification of the person or persons involved in these disclosures, all of the facts relating to these matters should be presented to the Department for a prosecutive opinion.

Attachment

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-03-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

Errant U.S. Diplomat Upsets Agnew

By Jack Anderson

The raucous misbehavior of a top American diplomat during Vice President Agnew's recent visit to Kenya has created a behind-the-scenes uproar that has reached Washington's highest levels.

The errant diplomat is AID administrator in Kenya, Bert Tollefson, Jr., 41, an ex-corn lobbyist and Republican politico from South Dakota. His antics are colorfully detailed in a series of confidential State Department telegrams.

The American Ambassador to Kenya, Robinson Mellvaine, was so outraged that he fired off the blistering "eyes only" wires to Tollefson's boss, John A. Hannah, head of the Agency for International Development. We have obtained copies of Mellvaine's missives.

"I regret to inform you," Mellvaine wrote in one cable, "that Bert Tollefson blotted his copy book (diplomatic jargon for 'fouled up') so badly during the Vice President's visit as to raise serious question as to his suitability for service abroad. Indeed, you may be hearing from the Vice President directly on the matter.

"The problem started with Bert's well-known pushiness and general lack of sensitivity and culminated in his getting sloshed at Treetops (a fancy lodge on the edge of the jun-

gle), making passes at the Vice President's secretary and trying to drag her down the steps to meet an elephant at ground level . . ."

The sequence of events that led up to this drunken climax, wrote Mellvaine, began when Tollefson was officially informed that "no Americans were invited to join the Vice President's group at Treetops. (Tollefson) came anyhow on his own and canvassed Kenyans for a bed in one of their rooms. In the end he talked someone out of a room to himself . . ."

In the course of the evening, Mellvaine related, Tollefson "repeatedly interrupted" Kenyan officials who "were explaining animals" to the Vice President. "The owner of Treetops," the Ambassador wrote, "at one point asked me, 'Who is that jackass?!—pointing to Bert.

"The incident with the Vice President's secretary," continued Mellvaine, "took place in the small hours of the morning. According to her it took all her strength to get away from him."

Even Kenyan Ambassador to the U.S. Leonard Kibinge, who was there, commented on Tollefson's "condition," Mellvaine said.

"The next morning, Bert slept through the departure at 0900 and when he did awake took the remaining Secret Service car to Nyeri leaving

them stranded and furious . . . A car had to be sent the 100 miles up to Nyeri to bring Bert back."

The whole affair, Mellvaine concluded, had substantiated his misgivings about Tollefson's performance during his three months as head of the AID program in Kenya.

"Prior to bringing out his family I developed serious questions about his judgment. He reinforced this impression by sending me a telegram from Washington . . . implying that the Vice President wanted him to co-host the reception we were giving in the Vice President's honor. Naturally I checked this with the Vice President and he was incredulous.

"I can, of course, live with the situation but will have to spend a lot of time riding herd and wonder whether all that effort is warranted in support of 'Peter's Principle.'" (The Peter Principle is a tongue-in-cheek theory which holds that everyone eventually rises to his own level of incompetence.)

When asked about the incident, AID Administrator Hannah refused comment except to call Tollefson "a very respectable fellow" and to inquire where we obtained the confidential cables.

Ambassador Mellvaine's eyewitness account, Hannah maintained, was only an "allegation." Hannah had dis-

patched Tollefson to London, he said, to discuss the matter with Samuel Adams, AID's African Administrator—a fact which is confirmed by a subsequent telegram we have obtained.

Reached in Nairobi, Tollefson denied the Ambassador's charges and said they were based on a complete misunderstanding.

Assassination

A new and far fetched theory of the assassinations of President Kennedy, Sen. Robert Kennedy, Dr. Martin Luther King and Malcolm X is circulating on Capitol Hill. It is contained in a 14-page report buttressed by various documents, which was put together by Don Riley, a labor union employee and assassination buff from San Francisco.

Its conclusion is that all four were killed by the same "conspirators": CIA agents, anti-Castro Cubans, some Dallas police, FBI operatives, "States Righters," Nazis, a "clique of very conservative businessmen (mostly oil)" and rightwing religious leaders. We have criticized every one of these groups at one time or another.

But our own investigations convince us that the new "theory," as earnest and ingenious as it may be, is pure balderdash.

NR 009 WF CODED

5:45 P M IMMEDIATE 8-5-71 ALM

TO DIRECTOR

ATTENTION: DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

FROM WASHINGTON FIELD (65-11628) 7P

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-03-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH

TOLL LEK, ESPIONAGE - X

REFERENCE BUREAU AIRTEL AUGUST FOUR LAST.

ON AUGUST FIVE INSTANT, JOHN A. HANNAH, ADMINISTRATOR,
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (AID), WASHINGTON, D. C.
(WD C), WAS INTERVIEWED. HE RELATED THAT ON FRIDAY, JULY
SIXTEEN LAST, [REDACTED], HANDED HIM
A SEALED ENVELOPE STAMPED "EYES ONLY, TO BE OPENED ONLY BY
DR. HANNAH". [REDACTED] HAD RECEIVED THIS ENVELOPE BY MESSENGER
FROM THE "CABLE ROOM" OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT. HANNAH
PERSONALLY OPENED THIS ENVELOPE AND FOUND IT CONTAINED A
TELEGRAM DATED JULY SIXTEEN LAST, FROM AMBASSADOR MC ILVAINE,
AMERICAN EMBASSY, NAIROBI, KENYA. THIS TELEGRAM WAS
CLASSIFIED "~~CONFIDENTIAL~~" AND HAND WRITTEN ON THIS COMMUNICATION
END PAGE ONE

b6
b7c

65-11628-2

Searched _____
Serialized _____
Indexed _____
Filed _____

W

WFO 65-11623

PAGE TWO

APPEARED THE WORDS "EYES ONLY DR. HANNAH".

UPON READING THE TELEGRAM IT WAS FIRST LEARNED BY
HANNAH OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THE TELEGRAM WAS SHOWN TO MAURICE J.
WILLIAMS, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR FOR AID. HANNAH THEN PUT THE
TELEGRAM BACK IN THE ENVELOPE AND PLACED IT IN HIS DESK
DRAWER. THAT EVENING IT WAS PLACED IN THE LOCKED SAFE IN HIS
OFFICE BY [REDACTED].

b6
b7c

ON MONDAY, JULY NINETEEN LAST, THE TELEGRAM WAS READ
BY SAMUEL ADAMS, ASSISTANT AID ADMINISTRATOR IN CHARGE OF
THE AFRICAN BUREAU. ADAMS WAS PERSONALLY TOLD BY HANNAH TO
ARRANGE TO SEE [REDACTED] TO DETERMINE THE FACTS. PURSUANT
TO THIS REQUEST ADAMS AND [REDACTED] MET IN LONDON.

ON THIS SAME DATE HANNAH IN LONG HAND, DRAFTED A TELEGRAM
TO THE AMERICAN EMBASSY AT NAIROBI WHICH WAS CLASSIFIED
~~"CONFIDENTIAL"~~ BY HANNAH AND READ "EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR
END PAGE TWO

WFO 65-11628

PAGE THREE

FROM HANNAH". THIS COMMUNICATION STATED HANNAH HAD ASKED DR. ADAMS TO MEET [REDACTED] IN LONDON ON TUESDAY, JULY TWENTY LAST TO "MAKE IT VERY CLEAR TO HIM THAT HIS BEHAVIOR AS REPORTED IS TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE AND LEAVING IT UP TO HIM TO RETURN TO KENYA AND DISCUSS HIS FUTURE WITH YOU". HANNAH INDICATED IN THIS TELEGRAM THAT [REDACTED] BE AFFORDED A CHANCE TO SALVAGE HIS CAREER. THIS HAND WRITTEN COMMUNICATION WAS TYPED BY THE SECRETARY, [REDACTED], WHO PERSONALLY TOOK IT FOR APPROVAL TO ROBERT M. MILLER IN THE OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE AND THEN TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT COMMUNICATIONS ROOM FOR TRANSMISSION. THERE WAS NO DISTRIBUTION OF THIS COMMUNICATION AT AID. ACCORDING TO HANNAH NO ONE ELSE AT AID HAD ACCESS TO THE INFORMATION IN THESE TELEGRAMS OR KNEW ABOUT THE INCIDENT UNTIL JACK ANDERSON'S COLUMN APPEARED IN "THE WASHINGTON POST" ON TUESDAY, JULY

END PAGE THREE

b6
b7c

TWENTYSEVEN LAST.

ON THURSDAY, JULY TWENTYTWO LAST, [REDACTED]
IN JACK ANDERSON'S OFFICE, TELEPHONED THE PUBLIC RELATIONS
OFFICE OF AID, INQUIRED ABOUT THE TELEGRAM OF JULY SIXTEEN
LAST, AND THE ANSWERING TELEGRAM PREPARED BY HANNAH. THIS
CALL WAS REFERRED TO DR. HANNAH. DURING THE CONVERSATION
[REDACTED], REVEALED THAT HE HAD A COPY OF THESE TWO TELEGRAMS
WHICH WERE READ VERBATIM [REDACTED] IN ANSWER TO THE INQUIRY
BY HANNAH HOW [REDACTED] HAD OBTAINED THE TELEGRAMS, [REDACTED] REMARKED
"WE HAVE WAYS". HANNAH ASKED [REDACTED] THAT HE NOT PUBLISH THIS
MATERIAL FOR THIS WOULD ONLY SERVE TO CRUCIFY [REDACTED] AND
RUIN HIS CAREER. NOTWITHSTANDING, THIS MATERIAL APPEARED IN
JACK ANDERSON'S COLUMN ON JULY TWENTYSEVEN LAST.

HANNAH STATED THAT HE IS OF THE OPINION THE JULY SIXTEEN
LAST TELEGRAM FROM AMERICAN AMBASSADOR MC ILVAINE WAS
END PAGE FOUR

WFO 65-11628

PAGE FIVE

CLASSIFIED "~~CONFIDENTIAL~~" ONLY TO INSURE HANNAH WOULD PERSONALLY SEE IT. HANNAH FELT IF THE VICE PRESIDENT HAD NOT BEEN IN KENYA THE ALLEGED INCIDENT NEVER WOULD HAVE BEEN REPORTED BUT THE AMBASSADOR MUST HAVE FELT TO PROTECT HIMSELF HE SHOULD REPORT IT. HANNAH SAID THE CONTENTS OF THE TELEGRAM WILL DO NO DAMAGE TO THE DEFENSE INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES OR BE OF BENEFIT TO OTHER COUNTRIES. HANNAH CLASSIFIED HIS OUTGOING TELEGRAM "CONFIDENTIAL" TO MAKE CERTAIN THE AMBASSADOR WOULD PERSONALLY SEE THE ACTION HE HAD TAKEN. MR. HANNAH SAID WHETHER THESE TELEGRAMS WERE PROPERLY CLASSIFIED OR COULD BE DECLASSIFIED FOR THE PURPOSE OF POSSIBLE PROSECUTION WOULD BE A QUESTION TO BE ANSWERED BY WILLIAM MACOMBER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ADMINISTRATION. 5X THE QUESTION OF CLASSIFICATION OR DECLASSIFICATION OF THE TELEGRAMS IN QUESTION HAS NEVER BEEN CONSIDERED.

END PAGE FIVE

WFO 65-11628

PAGE SIX

THE MATERIAL QUOTED IN THE ANDERSON COLUMN AS COMING FROM THESE TELEGRAMS IS ACCURATE. PRIOR TO THE ANDERSON COLUMN THERE WAS NO REQUEST BY PROPER AUTHORITIES FOR THE RELEASE OF THIS INFORMATION AND NO RELEASES WERE MADE TO THE KNOWLEDGE OF HANNAH.

HANNAH INFORMED THAT BEFORE VICE PRESIDENT AG NEW RETURNED TO THE UNITED STATES HE INFORMED THAT OFFICE THAT HE (HANNAH) WOULD BE INTERESTED IN TALKING TO VICE PRESIDENT AG NEW PERSONALLY CONCERNING THIS INCIDENT BUT HAS RECEIVED NO RESPONSE TO THIS CONTACT.

HANNAH REVEALED THAT ON AUGUST THREE LAST, [REDACTED] TELEPHONED HANNAH'S OFFICE BUT HANNAH WAS OUT OF THE CITY.

[REDACTED] INDICATED TO THE SECRETARY IN HANNAH'S OFFICE THAT THE ANDERSON COLUMN WAS INCORRECT AND PROOF IS AVAILABLE.

HANNAH SAID SAMUEL ADAMS IS MAKING FULL INQUIRY INTO THE
END PAGE SIX

b6
b7c

WFO 65-11628

PAGE SEVEN

ALLEGATIONS AGAINST TOLLEFSON FOR AID.

OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATION:

IT IS CLEAR AS A RESULT OF THE INTERVIEW WITH HANNAH THAT "CLASSIFIED" INFORMATION HAS BEEN UNLAWFULLY COMMUNICATED TO JACK ANDERSON'S OFFICE. HOWEVER, THERE IS SERIOUS DOUBT THAT THESE DOCUMENTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN CLASSIFIED. DR. HANNAH FEELS THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO INJURY TO THIS COUNTRY AS A RESULT OF THE PUBLICATION OF THESE DOCUMENTS, NOR HAS A FOREIGN COUNTRY BENEFITED FROM THE DISCLOSURE. HE OPINED THAT THE DETAILS IN THE DOCUMENTS WERE PURELY OF AN ADMINISTRATIVE OR PERSONNEL NATURE AND THE CLASSIFICATIONS WERE USED TO INSURE THE PROPER AUTHORITIES WOULD SEE THE INFORMATION. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES IT IS NOT BELIEVED THERE WAS JUSTIFICATION FOR CLASSIFYING THESE TELEGRAMS.

IT IS RECOMMENDED THE DEPARTMENT BE CONTACTED TO DETERMINE WHETHER FURTHER INVESTIGATION IS WARRANTED. WFO CONDUCTING NO FURTHER INVESTIGATION UACB.

END

FLB FBI WA

NR245 NA CODE

1523PM URGENT 8-6-71 DEB

TO WASHINGTON FIELD (65-11628)

FROM DIRECTOR 2P

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-03-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH

TOLL LEX; ESPIONAGE - X

RUERTEL AUGUST FIVE LAST.

PRIOR TO CONTACTING DEPARTMENT AS REQUESTED IN REFERENCED
TELETYPE, BUREAU DESIRES YOU CONTACT [REDACTED]
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ADMINISTRATION, TO DETERMINE
WHETHER THE CABLES INVOLVED, CLASSIFIED "CONFIDENTIAL" BY
THEIR AUTHORS, JOHN A. HANNAH, ADMINISTRATOR, AGENCY FOR
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (AID), AND UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR
TO KENYA, WERE IN FACT CLASSIFIED WITHOUT PROPER JUSTIFICATION
OR REASON. WASHINGTON FIELD WILL ALSO OBTAIN STATEMENT FROM HANNAH

TO WHETHER OR NOT CABLES IN QUESTION COULD BE DECLASSIFIED
FOR PROSPECTIVE PURPOSES.

b6
b7c

BUREAU ALSO DESIRES YOU PROMPTLY INTERVIEW [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] MHC,

ACCORDING TO DOCTOR HANNAH, WERE THE ONLY AID EMPLOYEES IN

END PAGE ONE

SEARCHED [initials] INDEXED [initials]
SERIALIZED [initials] FILED [initials]

AUG 6 10 31 PM '71

[REDACTED]

65-11628-3

40
10 P
cm

PAGE TWO

WASHINGTON, D. C., WHO HAD ACCESS TO CABLE OF JULY SIXTEEN
LAST TO HANNAH FROM AMBASSADOR MC ILVAINE, NAIROBI, KENYA.
DETERMINE DURING INTERVIEWS WHETHER THESE INDIVIDUALS HAVE
ANY KNOWLEDGE OF INSTANT LEAK OR OF PERSON OR PERSONS WHO
PERPETRATED THE SAME.

BUREAU ALSO DESIRES [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED] BE
INTERVIEWED CONCERNING THE JULY NINETEEN LAST CABLE FROM
HANNAH TO AMBASSADOR MC ILVAINE NOTING JACK ANDERSON CLAIMED
IN HIS ARTICLE TO HAVE ALSO OBTAINED THIS PARTICULAR CABLE.

IN ADDITION TO ABOVE INTERVIEWS, YOU SHOULD CONTACT
INDIVIDUAL IN CHARGE OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT "CABLE ROOM,"
WHICH FACILITY HANDLED BOTH OF THE CABLES INVOLVED AND
DETERMINE WHETHER PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO THAT ROOM OR MESSENGERS
ENGAGED IN DISTRIBUTION OF CABLE TRAFFIC TO AND FROM THIS
ROOM ARE IN A POSITION TO MAKE COPIES OF INCOMING AND DEPARTING
TRAFFIC. CONSIDER POSSIBILITY SUBJECT MAY BE EMPLOYED IN
OR CONNECTED WITH THIS COMMUNICATIONS ROOM.

DEPARTMENT HAS BEEN FURNISHED PERTINENT PORTIONS OF
REFERENCED TELETYPE CONTAINING RESULTS OF INVESTIGATION
THIS MATTER TO DATE.

END

DLF WFO FBI

CLF

b6
b7c

NR 027 WF CODE

11:30 PM URGENT 8-9-71 DLE

TO DIRECTOR

FROM WASHINGTON FIELD (65-11623)

TOLL LEK, ESPIONAGE DASH X.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-03-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH

RE BUTEL, AUGUST SIX, LAST.

ON INSTANT DATE, WILLIAM MACOMBER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF STATE FOR ADMINISTRATION, ADMISED AS FOLLOWS:

REGARDING THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE PERTINENT DOCUMENTS,
AND AFTER CONSULTING WITH THE LEGAL OFFICE AND THE AFRICAN
DESK, ADVISED THAT THE CONFIDENTIAL CLASSIFICATION CONTAINED
ON THESE DOCUMENTS COULD NOT BE JUSTIFIED IN TERMS OF THE
CLASSIFICATION STANDARDS. HE ADDED THAT THERE WOULD BE NO
PROBLEM REGARDING DECLASSIFICATION IN THE EVENT OF PROSECUTION.

ADMINISTRATIVE. ACCORDING TO MACOMBER, STATE SECURITY
HAS BEEN CONDUCTING AN INVESTIGATION IN THIS MATTER AND HAS
DETERMINED THAT AT LEAST THIRTY PERSONS IN USDS AND AID HAD
ACCESS TO THE DOCUMENTS. HE ALSO STATED THAT AS A RESULT
OF THE INQUIRIES TO DATE, [REDACTED] OF AID IS THE
MOST LIKELY SUSPECT OF THE LEAK BASED ON CIRCUMSTANTIAL

b6
b7c

END PAGE ONE

65-11628-4

W
Searched _____
Serialized _____
Indexed _____
Filed _____

PAGE TWO

EVIDENCE. ARRANGEMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE WITH USDS SECURITY
TO REVIEW THEIR INVESTIGATION TO DATE. UACB, WFO WILL
REVIEW THIS FILE BEFORE CONDUCTING FURTHER INVESTIGATION.
THEREAFTER, WFO WILL MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER
INVESTIGATION.

END

WA DEB

F B I

Date: 8/9/71

Transmit the following in CODE
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via TELETYPE URGENT
(Priority)

027

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, WFO (65-11628)

TOLL LEK, ESPIONAGE DASH X.

RE BUTEL, AUGUST SIX, LAST.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-03-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH

ON INSTANT DATE, WILLIAM MACOMBER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF STATE FOR ADMINISTRATION, ADVISED AS FOLLOWS:

REGARDING THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE PERTINENT DOCUMENTS,
AND AFTER CONSULTING WITH THE LEGAL OFFICE AND THE AFRICAN
DESK, ADVISED THAT THE CONFIDENTIAL CLASSIFICATION CONTAINED
ON THESE DOCUMENTS COULD NOT BE JUSTIFIED IN TERMS OF THE
CLASSIFICATION STANDARDS. HE ADDED THAT THERE WOULD BE NO
PROBLEM REGARDING DECLASSIFICATION IN THE EVENT OF PROSECUTION.

ADMINISTRATIVE. ACCORDING TO MACOMBER, STATE SECURITY
HAS BEEN CONDUCTING AN INVESTIGATION IN THIS MATTER AND HAS
DETERMINED THAT AT LEAST THIRTY PERSONS IN USDS AND AID HAD
ACCESS TO THE DOCUMENTS. HE ALSO STATED THAT AS A RESULT

OF THE INQUIRIES TODATE, [REDACTED] IS THE
MOST LIKELY SUSPECT OF THE LEAK BASED ON CIRCUMSTANTIAL

CAM: sup *avg*

65-11628-40
SEARCHED

b6
b7c

Approved: *RAK*
Special Agent in Charge

Sent 11:28 *avg*

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via _____
(Priority)

WFO 65-11628
PAGE TWO

EVIDENCE. ARRANGEMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE WITH USDS SECURITY TO REVIEW THEIR INVESTIGATION TO DATE. UACB, WFO WILL REVIEW THIS FILE BEFORE CONDUCTING FURTHER INVESTIGATION. THEREAFTER, WFO WILL MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER INVESTIGATION.

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

KWR 221 75 CODED

9:33PM URGENT 8-10-71 DLE

TO DIRECTOR

ATTN: DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

FROM WASHINGTON FIELD (65-11628)

TOLL LEK, WSPAINAGE - X.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-03-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH

REFERENCE WFO TELETYPE AUGUST NINE LAST.

IN CONNECTION WITH CAPTIONED MATTER THE OFFICE OF SECURITY (SY), UNITED STATES (U.S.) STATE DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D.C. (WDC), HAS CONDUCTED EXTENSIVE INVESTIGATION AT SPECIFIC REQUEST OF WILLIAM B. MACOMBER, DEPUTY UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ADMINISTRATION. RESULTS OF INVESTIGATION BY SY CONTAINED IN SY REPORT DATED AUGUST SIX LAST AND MARKED "LIMITED OFFICIAL USE", WAS REVIEWED TODAY.

THIS SY REPORT REVEALS THAT DURING PERIOD JULY TWENTY-THREE-THIRTY LAST, SY AGENTS INTERVIEWED APPROXIMATELY THIRTY EMPLOYEES OF STATE DEPARTMENT AND AGENCY FOR INTER-
END PAGE ONE

65-11628-5

ln

PAGE TWO

NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (AID) KNOWN TO HAVE ACCESS TO THE
"CONFIDENTIAL" TELEGRAMS PUBLICIZED IN JACK ANDERSON'S COLUMN
IN "WASHINGTON POST" ON JULY TWENTYSEVEN LAST. THE
PROCEDURES FOR DISTRIBUTION OF THESE TELEGRAMS WITHIN STATE
DEPARTMENT AND AID WERE DETERMINED FROM THESE INTERVIEWS.
THOSE INTERVIEWED DENY HAVING TRANSMITTED COPIES OF THE
TELEGRAMS IN QUESTION OR INFORMATION CONTAINED THEREIN TO
ANDERSON'S STAFF OR HAVING KNOWLEDGE OF ANY INDIVIDUAL WHO
MIGHT HAVE TRANSMITTED SUCH MATERIAL. INCLUDED AMONG THOSE
INTERVIEWED BY SY WERE [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] WHO WERE SPECIFICALLY REQUESTED
TO BE INTERVIEWED BY BUTEL AUGUST SIX LAST.

SY FILE REVEALS THAT ON AUGUST FIVE LAST SAMUEL GAMMON,
ASSISTANT TO DEPUTY UNDERSECRETARY FOR ADMINISTRATION
WILLIAM B. MACOMBER, ADVISED SY THAT NO FURTHER INVESTIGATION
END PAGE TWO

b6
b7c

PAGE THREE

WAS REQUIRED BY SY. SY ADMISES THAT BASED UPON THIS INSTRUCTION BY GAMMON, THE INVESTIGATION BY SY HAS BEEN DISCONTINUED EXCEPT FOR AN INQUIRY BEING CONDUCTED BY THE REGIONAL SECURITY OFFICER AT KENYA TO DETERMINE WHETHER THIS LEAK OF INFORMATION MIGHT HAVE EMANATED FROM THERE.

ADMINISTRATIVE

A REQUEST HAS BEEN MADE BY WFO FOR COPY OF SY REPORT MENTIONED ABOVE. CONSIDERATION BEING GIVEN BY SY TO THIS REQUEST. IN VIEW OF THE COMPREHENSIVE INVESTIGATION BY SY, INVESTIGATION BY WFO BEING HELD IN ABEYANCE PENDING RECEIPT OF COPY OF SY REPORT, AT WHICH TIME IT WILL BE MORE THOROUGHLY REVIEWED, PARTICULARLY CONCERNING DEVELOPMENT OF ANY SUSPECTS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS MADE FOR ANY FURTHER ACTION.

END

WA JWH

F B I

Date: 8/10/71

Transmit the following in CODED
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via TELETYPE URGENT
(Priority)

027

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI ATTENTION: DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE
DIVISION

FROM: SAC, WFO (65-11628)

TOLL LEK, ESPIONAGE - X

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-03-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH

REFERENCE WFO TELETYPE AUGUST NINE LAST.

IN CONNECTION WITH CAPTIONED MATTER THE OFFICE OF
SECURITY (SY), UNITED STATES (U.S.) STATE DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON, D. C. (WDC), HAS CONDUCTED EXTENSIVE INVESTIGATION
AT SPECIFIC REQUEST OF WILLIAM B. MACOMBER, DEPUTY UNDER-
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ADMINISTRATION. RESULTS OF INVESTIGATION
BY SY CONTAINED IN SY REPORT DATED AUGUST SIX LAST AND
MARKED "LIMITED OFFICIAL USE", WAS REVIEWED TODAY.

THIS SY REPORT REVEALS THAT DURING PERIOD JULY TWENTY-
THREE - THIRTY LAST, SY AGENTS INTERVIEWED APPROXIMATELY
THIRTY EMPLOYEES OF STATE DEPARTMENT AND AGENCY FOR INTER-

① - WFO

ELG:jak

SEARCHED INDEXED
SERIALIZED AUG 10 7 00 PM '71



Approved: Robert J. Kantel
Special Agent in Charge

Sent

9:03

M

Per

[Signature]

b6
b7c

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via _____
(Priority)(WFO 65-11628)
PAGE TWO

NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (AID) KNOWN TO HAVE ACCESS TO THE "CONFIDENTIAL" TELEGRAMS PUBLICIZED IN JACK ANDERSON'S COLUMN IN "WASHINGTON POST" ON JULY TWENTYSEVEN LAST. THE PROCEDURES FOR DISTRIBUTION OF THESE TELEGRAMS WITHIN STATE DEPARTMENT AND AID WERE DETERMINED FROM THESE INTERVIEWS. THOSE INTERVIEWED DENY HAVING TRANSMITTED COPIES OF THE TELEGRAMS IN QUESTION OR INFORMATION CONTAINED THEREIN TO ANDERSON'S STAFF OR HAVING KNOWLEDGE OF ANY INDIVIDUAL WHO MIGHT HAVE TRANSMITTED SUCH MATERIAL. INCLUDED AMONG THOSE INTERVIEWED BY SY WERE [REDACTED], DOCTOR SAMUEL ADAMS AND ROBERT M. MILLER WHO WERE SPECIFICALLY REQUESTED TO BE INTERVIEWED BY BUTEL AUGUST SIX LAST.

SY FILE REVEALS THAT ON AUGUST FIVE LAST SAMUEL GAMMON, ASSISTANT TO DEPUTY UNDERSECRETARY FOR ADMINISTRATION WILLIAM B. MACOMBER, ADVISED SY THAT NO FURTHER INVESTIGATION

b6
b7c

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via _____
(Priority)WFO 65-11628
PAGE THREE

WAS REQUIRED BY SY. SY ADVISES THAT BASED UPON THIS INSTRUCTION BY GAMMON, THE INVESTIGATION BY SY HAS BEEN DISCONTINUED EXCEPT FOR AN INQUIRY BEING CONDUCTED BY THE REGIONAL SECURITY OFFICER AT KENYA TO DETERMINE WHETHER THIS LEAK OF INFORMATION MIGHT HAVE EMINATED FROM THERE.

ADMINISTRATIVE

A REQUEST HAS BEEN MADE BY WFO FOR COPY OF SY REPORT MENTIONED ABOVE. CONSIDERATION BEING GIVEN BY SY TO THIS REQUEST. IN VIEW OF THE COMPREHENSIVE INVESTIGATION BY SY, INVESTIGATION BY WFO BEING HELD IN ABEYANCE PENDING RECEIPT OF COPY OF SY REPORT, AT WHICH TIME IT WILL BE MORE THOROUGHLY REVIEWED, PARTICULARLY CONCERNING DEVELOPMENT OF ANY SUSPECTS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS MADE FOR ANY FURTHER ACTION.

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

NR008 WF CODED

7:34 PM URGENT 8-11-71 DLE

TO DIRECTOR (ATTN: DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION)

FROM WASHINGTON FIELD (65-11628)

TOLL LEK, ESPIONAGE - X.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-03-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH

ON AUGUST ELEVEN INSTANT, OFFICE OF SECURITY,
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE (USDS), WASHINGTON, D.C.
(WDC), MADE AVAILABLE IT'S INVESTIGATIVE REPORT CONCERNING
CAPTIONED MATTER DATED AUGUST SIX LAST. REVIEW OF THIS
REPORT REVEALS THIRTYONE INDIVIDUALS INTERVIEWED. EIGHT OF
THESE INTERVIEWED ARE EMPLOYED BY AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT (AID) UNCLUDING DR. JOHN A. HANNAH, ADMINISTRATOR;
SAMUEL ADAMS, ASSISTANT AID ADMINISTRATOR IN CHARGE OF THE
AFRICAN BUREAU AND THEIR SECRETARIES. EACH OF THESE
INDIVIDUALS DENIED KNOWING HOW JACK ANDERSON RECEIVED
END PAGE ONE

65-11628-6

PAGE TWO

INFORMATION PUBLISHED IN HIS ARTICLE OF JULY TWENTYSEVEN LAST.

REMAINING TWENTYTHREE PEOPLE INTERVIEWED EMPLOYED BY STATE DEPARTMENT, PRINCIPALLY IN "OPERATIONS CENTER" WHERE TELEGRAMS ARE RECEIVED AND APPROPRIATE DISSEMINATION DETERMINED. EXTENSIVE INTERVIEWS OF THESE EMPLOYEES WHO WERE KNOWN TO HAVE ACCESS TO THE PERTINENT TELEGRAMS OR UNDER NORMAL PROCEDURES MIGHT HAVE ACCESS TO THEM, DETERMINED THAT NONE ADMITS TRANSMITTING THE INFORMATION TO ANDERSON'S STAFF NOR HAVING KNOWLEDGE OF ANY INDIVIDUAL WHO MIGHT HAVE TRANSMITTED SUCH MATERIAL. INVESTIGATION REVEALED TELEGRAMS IN QUESTION AVAILABLE TO NUMEROUS INDIVIDUALS UNDER NORMAL PROCEDURES IN "OPERATIONS CENTER". TWO INDIVIDUALS ADMIT MAKING COPIES OF TELEGRAMS IN QUESTION FOR READING FILES FOR THEIR RESPECTIVE OFFICES BUT DENY KNOWING ANYONE ON JACK ANDERSON'S STAFF AND EACH STATE HE DID NOT PASS INFORMATION TO PRESS.

END PAGE TWO

PAGE THREE

STATE SECURITY FILE REVEALS THAT AT INSTRUCTION OF SAMUEL GAMMON, ASSISTANT TO DEPUTY UNDERSECRETARY FOR ADMINISTRATION, SECURITY CONDUCTING NO FURTHER INVESTIGATION OF THIS MATTER AT THIS TIME EXCEPT INQUIRY BEING CONDUCTED BY REGIONAL SECURITY OFFICER AT KENYA TO DETERMINE IF LEAK EMANATED FROM THERE.

SAMUEL GAMMON ADVISED INSTANT THAT SINCE ALL INVESTIGATION IN THIS CASE TO DATE BY STATE SECURITY HAS BEEN NEGATIVE AS TO THE ONE RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS LEAK, NO FURTHER INVESTIGATION EXCEPT IN KENYA IS BEING CONDUCTED. HOWEVER, GAMMON STATED THE FILE AT STATE SECURITY IS REMAINING IN PENDING STATUS AND WILL BE REVIEWED AT LATER DATE TO MAKE FINAL DETERMINATION AS TO ANY FURTHER ACTION TO BE TAKEN BY STATE SECURITY.

ADMINISTRATIVE

AS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED, THE DOCUMENTS IN QUESTION,
END PAGE THREE

PAGE FOUR

ALTHOUGH CLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL, SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SO CLASSIFIED ACCORDING TO WILLIAM MACOMBER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ADMINISTRATION. THIS LACK OF JUSTIFICATION FOR CLASSIFICATION OF "CONFIDENTIAL" PROVIDES SERIOUS DOUBT THAT PROSECUTION WOULD FOLLOW EVEN IF THE ONE RESPONSIBLE FOR PASSING THIS INFORMATION TO JACK ANDERSON'S STAFF WERE IDENTIFIED. ADDITIONALLY, STATE SECURITY HAS CONDUCTED EXTENSIVE INTERVIEWS OF THOSE WHO HAD ACCESS TO THESE TELEGRAMS AND NO INFORMATION HAS BEEN DEVELOPED TO IDENTIFY THE ONE INVOLVED IN THE ALLEGED TRANSMITTAL TO JACK ANDERSON. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES IT WOULD APPEAR APPROPRIATE FOR THE BUREAU TO CONTACT THE DEPARTMENT TO DETERMINE WHETHER FURTHER INQUIRIES SHOULD BE MADE IN THIS MATTER AND IF SO, WHETHER THE EMPLOYEES INTERVIEWED BY STATE SECURITY ARE TO BE REINTERVIEWED. COPIES OF STATE SECURITY REPORT WILL BE FURNISHED BUREAU WITH WFO REPORT. NO FURTHER INVESTIGATION BEING CONDUCTED BY WFO, UACB.

END

DID JHW

F B I

Date: 8/11/71
CODED

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via TELETYPE URGENT
(Priority)

008

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI ATTENTION: DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE
DIVISION

FROM: SAC, WFO (65-11628)

TOLL LEK, ESPIONAGE - X

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-03-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH

ON AUGUST ELEVEN INSTANT, OFFICE OF SECURITY,
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE (USDS), WASHINGTON, D. C.
(WDC), MADE AVAILABLE IT'S INVESTIGATIVE REPORT CONCERNING
CAPTIONED MATTER DATED AUGUST SIX LAST. REVIEW OF THIS
REPORT REVEALS THIRTYONE INDIVIDUALS INTERVIEWED. EIGHT OF
THESE INTERVIEWED ARE EMPLOYED BY AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT (AID) INCLUDING DR. JOHN A. HANNAH, ADMINISTRATOR;
SAMUEL ADAMS, ASSISTANT AID ADMINISTRATOR IN CHARGE OF THE
AFRICAN BUREAU AND THEIR SECRETARIES. EACH OF THESE
INDIVIDUALS DENIED KNOWING HOW JACK ANDERSON RECEIVED

1 - WFO

ELG:jak

ELG
ELG

65-11628-60
[Signature]

b6
b7c

Approved: Robert [Signature] Sent _____
Special Agent in Charge

730

[Redacted Box]

[Signature]

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via _____
(Priority)WFO 65-11628
PAGE TWO

INFORMATION PUBLISHED IN HIS ARTICLE OF JULY TWENTYSEVEN LAST.

REMAINING TWENTYTHREE PEOPLE INTERVIEWED EMPLOYED BY STATE DEPARTMENT, PRINCIPALLY IN "OPERATIONS CENTER" WHERE TELEGRAMS ARE RECEIVED AND APPROPRIATE DISSEMINATION DETERMINED. EXTENSIVE INTERVIEWS OF THESE EMPLOYEES WHO WERE KNOWN TO HAVE ACCESS TO THE PERTINENT TELEGRAMS OR UNDER NORMAL PROCEDURES MIGHT HAVE ACCESS TO THEM, DETERMINED THAT NONE ADMITS TRANSMITTING THE INFORMATION TO ANDERSON'S STAFF NOR HAVING KNOWLEDGE OF ANY INDIVIDUAL WHO MIGHT HAVE TRANSMITTED SUCH MATERIAL. INVESTIGATION REVEALED TELEGRAMS IN QUESTION AVAILABLE TO NUMEROUS INDIVIDUALS UNDER NORMAL PROCEDURES IN "OPERATIONS CENTER". TWO INDIVIDUALS ADMIT MAKING COPIES OF TELEGRAMS IN QUESTION FOR READING FILES FOR THEIR RESPECTIVE OFFICES BUT DENY KNOWING ANYONE ON JACK ANDERSON'S STAFF AND EACH STATE HE DID NOT PASS INFORMATION TO PRESS.

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via _____
(Priority)WFO 65-11628
PAGE THREE

STATE SECURITY FILE REVEALS THAT AT INSTRUCTION OF
 [REDACTED] ASSISTANT TO DEPUTY UNDERSECRETARY FOR
 ADMINISTRATION, SECURITY CONDUCTING NO FURTHER INVESTIGATION
 OF THIS MATTER AT THIS TIME EXCEPT INQUIRY BEING CONDUCTED
 BY REGIONAL SECURITY OFFICER AT KENYA TO DETERMINE IF LEAK
 EMANATED FROM THERE.

[REDACTED] ADVISED INSTANT THAT SINCE ALL
 INVESTIGATION IN THIS CASE TO DATE BY STATE SECURITY HAS BEEN
 NEGATIVE AS TO THE ONE RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS LEAK, NO FURTHER
 INVESTIGATION EXCEPT IN KENYA IS BEING CONDUCTED. HOWEVER,
 [REDACTED] STATED THE FILE AT STATE SECURITY IS REMAINING IN
 PENDING STATUS AND WILL BE REVIEWED AT LATER DATE TO MAKE
 FINAL DETERMINATION AS TO ANY FURTHER ACTION TO BE TAKEN BY
 STATE SECURITY.

ADMINISTRATIVE

AS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED, THE DOCUMENTS IN QUESTION,

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
 Special Agent in Charge

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F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via _____
(Priority)WFO 65-11628
PAGE FOUR

ALTHOUGH CLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL, SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SO CLASSIFIED ACCORDING TO [REDACTED] OF STATE FOR ADMINISTRATION. THIS LACK OF JUSTIFICATION FOR CLASSIFICATION OF "CONFIDENTIAL" PROVIDES SERIOUS DOUBT THAT PROSECUTION WOULD FOLLOW EVEN IF THE ONE RESPONSIBLE FOR PASSING THIS INFORMATION TO JACK ANDERSON'S STAFF WERE IDENTIFIED. ADDITIONALLY, STATE SECURITY HAS CONDUCTED EXTENSIVE INTERVIEWS OF THOSE WHO HAD ACCESS TO THESE TELEGRAMS AND NO INFORMATION HAS BEEN DEVELOPED TO IDENTIFY THE ONE INVOLVED IN THE ALLEGED TRANSMITTAL TO JACK ANDERSON. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES IT WOULD APPEAR APPROPRIATE FOR THE BUREAU TO CONTACT THE DEPARTMENT TO DETERMINE WHETHER FURTHER INQUIRIES SHOULD BE MADE IN THIS MATTER AND IF SO, WHETHER THE EMPLOYEES INTERVIEWED BY STATE SECURITY ARE TO BE REINTERVIEWED. COPIES OF STATE SECURITY REPORT WILL BE FURNISHED BUREAU WITH WFO REPORT. NO FURTHER INVESTIGATION BEING CONDUCTED BY WFO, UACB.

b6
b7cApproved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 02-22-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/STP/TH

Date 8/11/71

JOHN A. HANNAH, Administrator, Agency for International Development (AID), Washington, D. C. (WDC), related that on Friday, July 16, 1971, his secretary [redacted] handed him a sealed envelope stamped "Eyes Only, to be opened only by Dr. HANNAH". [redacted] had received this envelope by messenger from the "Cable Room" of the State Department.

HANNAH personally opened this envelope and found it contained a telegram dated July 16, 1971, from Ambassador MC ILVAINE, American Embassy, Nairobi, Kenya. A corrected copy of the original telegram was also contained in this envelope because of the garbled end of the original telegram. This telegram was classified "Confidential" and hand written on this communication appeared the words "Eyes Only, Dr. HANNAH".

Upon reading the telegram it was first learned by HANNAH of alleged misconduct by [redacted] the AID representative in Kenya. The telegram was shown to MAURICE J. WILLIAMS, Deputy Administrator for AID. HANNAH then put the telegram back in the envelope and placed it in his desk drawer. That evening it was placed in the locked safe in his office by [redacted]

On Monday, July 19, 1971, the telegram was read by SAMUEL ADAMS, Assistant AID Administrator in Charge of the African Bureau. ADAMS was personally told by HANNAH to arrange to see [redacted] to determine the facts. Pursuant to this request ADAMS and [redacted] met in London.

On this same date (July 19, 1971) HANNAH, in long hand, drafted a telegram to the American Embassy at Nairobi which was classified "Confidential" by HANNAH and read "Eyes Only for Ambassador from HANNAH". This communication stated

On 8/5/71 at Washington, D. C. File # WFO 65-11628 7
 by SA's [redacted] and [redacted] Date dictated 8/11/71
 ELG:jak

WFO 65-11628

HANNAH had asked Dr. ADAMS to meet [redacted] in London on Tuesday, July 20, 1971 to "make it very clear to him that his behavior as reported is totally unacceptable and leaving it up to him to return to Kenya and discuss his future with you". HANNAH indicated in this telegram that [redacted] be afforded a chance to salvage his career. This hand written communication was typed by the secretary, [redacted] who personally took it for approval to ROBERT M. MILLER in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of State and then to the State Department Communications Room for transmission. There was no distribution of this communication to AID. According to HANNAH no one else at AID had access to the information in these telegrams or knew about the incident until JACK ANDERSON's column appeared in "The Washington Post" on Tuesday, July 27, 1971.

On Thursday, July 22, 1971, [redacted] Columnist in JACK ANDERSON's office, telephoned the Public Relations Office of AID, inquired about the telegram of July 16, 1971, and the answering telegram prepared by HANNAH. This call was referred to Dr. HANNAH. During the conversation [redacted] revealed that he had a copy of these two telegrams which were read verbatim by [redacted]. In answer to the inquiry by HANNAH how [redacted] had obtained the telegrams, [redacted] remarked "we have ways". HANNAH asked [redacted] that he not publish this material for this would only serve to crucify [redacted] and ruin his career. Notwithstanding, this material appeared in JACK ANDERSON's column on July 27, 1971.

HANNAH stated that he is of the opinion the July 16, 1971 telegram from American Ambassador MC ILVAINE was classified "Confidential" only to insure HANNAH would personally see it. HANNAH felt if the Vice President had not been in Kenya the alleged incident never would have been reported but the Ambassador must have felt to protect himself in the event of future disclosure of this matter, he should report it. HANNAH said the contents of the telegram will do no damage to the defense interests of the United States or be of benefit to other countries. HANNAH classified his outgoing telegram "Confidential" to make certain the Ambassador would

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WFO 65-11628

personally see the action he had taken. Mr. HANNAH said whether these telegrams were properly classified or could be declassified for the purpose of possible prosecution would be a question to be answered by [redacted] Assistant Secretary of State for Administration. The question of classification or declassification of the telegrams in question has never been considered.

The material quoted in the ANDERSON column as coming from these telegrams is accurate. Prior to the ANDERSON column there was no request by proper authorities for the release of this information and no releases were made to the knowledge of HANNAH.

HANNAH informed that before Vice President AGNEW returned to the United States he informed that office that he (HANNAH) would be interested in talking to Vice President AGNEW personally concerning this incident but has received no response to this contact.

HANNAH revealed that on August 3, 1971, [redacted] telephoned HANNAH's office but HANNAH was out of the city. [redacted] indicated to the secretary in HANNAH's office that the ANDERSON column was incorrect and proof is available. HANNAH said SAMUEL ADAMS is making full inquiry into the allegations against [redacted] for AID.

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

8/12/71

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED


Date _____

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 02-22-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/STP/TH

[redacted] Deputy Undersecretary
for Administration, [redacted] U. S. Department
of State, advised that since the investigation of this matter
by State Security has to date not identified the one responsible
for furnishing the telegrams in question or information con-
cerning them to JACK ANDERSON or a member of his staff, no
further investigation is being conducted by State Security
except for an inquiry being conducted in Kenya to determine
if there might have been a leak there concerning this matter.
However, [redacted] informed that the file in this case at State
Security is remaining in a pending status and it will be
reviewed at a later date to make a final determination as to
any further action to be taken by State Security.

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On 8/11/71 at Washington, D. C. File # WFO 65-11628 
by SA [redacted] ELG:jak Date dictated 8/12/71

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 8/11/71

[redacted] of State for Administration, advised, after consultation with the Legal Office and the African Desk of the United States Department of State, that the classification "Confidential" appearing on the documents in question, could not be justified in terms of present classification standards.

[redacted] further advised that the documents would be declassified in the event of subsequent prosecutive action.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-22-2008 BY 60324 UC BAW/STP/TH

On 8/9/71 at Washington, D. C. File # WFO 65-11628
by SAs [redacted] and [redacted] Date dictated 8/11/71
CAM:jak

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

REPORTING OFFICE WASHINGTON FIELD	OFFICE OF ORIGIN WASHINGTON FIELD	DATE 8/12/71	INVESTIGATIVE PERIOD 8/5 - 12/71
TITLE OF CASE UNSUB; Unauthorized Disclosure of Information in State Department Cables Appearing in "The Washington Post" Article, Tuesday, July 27, 1971, by Jack Anderson		REPORT MADE BY SA 	TYPED BY jak
		CHARACTER OF CASE ESPIONAGE - X	

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b7c

REFERENCE: Bureau airtel 8/4/71.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-03-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH

- C -

ADMINISTRATIVE:

This report is classified "**Confidential**" because the U. S. Department of State has so classified the telegrams which are pertinent to this investigation and as of the date of this report these documents have not been declassified.

As will be noted from a review of the details of this report, although the telegrams pertinent to this case are classified "**Confidential**", there is considerable doubt that this

ACCOMPLISHMENTS CLAIMED <input type="checkbox"/> NONE						ACQUIT-TALS	CASE HAS BEEN:	
CONVIC.	AUTO.	FUG.	FINES	SAVINGS	RECOVERIES		PENDING OVER ONE YEAR	<input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO
							PENDING PROSECUTION OVER SIX MONTHS	<input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO
APPROVED <i>[Signature]</i>			SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE			DO NOT WRITE IN SPACES BELOW		
COPIES MADE: 6 - Bureau 3 - WFO (65-11628)								
Dissemination Record of Attached Report						Notations <div style="border: 2px solid black; padding: 5px; display: inline-block;"> SEARCHED <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> INDEXED <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SERIALIZED <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> FILED <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> AUG 02 1971 FBI - WASH. F. O. </div>		
Agency								
Request Recd.								
Date Fwd.								
How Fwd.								
By								

WFO 65-11628

classification can be justified. Dr. JOHN A. HANNAH, Administrator for Agency for International Development (AID), expressed the opinion that the telegrams were so classified to insure the proper person would see them. HANNAH stated that although the contents of the telegrams might be embarrassing to the AID employee, there would be no damage to the defense interests of the U.S. or be of benefit to other countries.

Further in connection with the question of classification, it is to be observed that [redacted] Deputy Secretary of State for Administration, after consultation with the Legal Office and the African Desk of the State Department, expressed the opinion that the classification "Confidential" on the documents in question could not be justified.

In addition to the problem of classification in this case, this case has already been extensively investigated by State Security (SY). Countless individuals who had access to the telegrams or in a position to see them were interviewed but all denied transmitting the information to ANDERSON's staff or having knowledge of any individuals who might have transmitted such material. Except for inquiries in Kenya, SY has concluded its investigation because of the negative results of its inquiries.

In view of the above, the question of proper classification and the voluminous inquiries conducted by SY, it is recommended that further investigation not be conducted. Divulging the contents of the telegrams is no doubt embarrassing to AID but this is not the basis for investigation by the FBI or prosecutive action under 18 USC g 792-798. The facts appear to indicate a personnel or administrative problem within State and/or AID but not a situation where criminal prosecution could follow under the above-mentioned statute. This case has already been investigated by the investigative arm of the Government agency involved. We should not engage ourselves in a repeat investigation with no prospect of prosecution to follow.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Copy to:

DECLASSIFIED BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH
ON 05-03-2007

Report of: SA [REDACTED]

Office: **Washington Field**Date: **8/12/71**Field Office File #: **65-11628**

Bureau File #:

Title: **UNSUB; Unauthorized Disclosure of
Information in State Department Cables
Appearing in "The Washington Post"
Article, Tuesday, July 27, 1971, by
Jack Anderson**

Character: **ESPIONAGE - X**

Synopsis:

Investigation initiated at request of Justice Department as possible violation of Espionage Act (18 USC § 792-798), based on article by columnist JACK ANDERSON in "Washington Post" on 7/27/71, containing information from classified State Department telegrams concerning employee of Agency for International Development (AID) assigned in Kenya. JOHN A. HANNAH, AID Administrator interviewed and verified information in the ANDERSON article came from classified telegrams but unable to furnish information concerning possible leak. Copies of classified documents secured. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] for Administration advised classification "Confidential" on documents in question could not be justified. State Department Security Office has conducted extensive investigation with negative results as to person responsible for this leak. Copy of State Security report secured. State Security conducting no further investigation, except in Kenya, in view of negative results of its inquiry as to person responsible for leak to ANDERSON.

- C -

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WFO 65-11628

DETAILS: AT WASHINGTON, D. C.:

By memorandum to the FBI dated July 30, 1971, from ROBERT C. MARDIAN, Assistant Attorney General, Internal Security Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D. C., it was stated that the July 27, 1971, edition of "The Washington Post" contained an article by JACK ANDERSON regarding information contained in classified State Department cables, copies of which ANDERSON claims to have in his possession. It was stated in this memorandum that a review of this article indicates that classified information has probably been unlawfully communicated to this reporter and there is a potential violation of the Espionage Act (18 U.S.C. § 792-798) within the investigative jurisdiction of the FBI. The FBI was requested to conduct an investigation regarding this unauthorized disclosure.

The following is a copy of the article under the by-line of JACK ANDERSON and carrying the caption "Errant U.S. Diplomat Upsets Agnew", which appeared in the July 27, 1971 edition of "The Washington Post", a Washington, D.C. daily newspaper.

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

Errant U.S. Diplomat Upsets Agnew

By Jack Anderson

The raucous misbehavior of a top American diplomat during Vice President Agnew's recent visit to Kenya has created a behind-the-scenes uproar that has reached Washington's highest levels.

The errant diplomat is AID administrator in Kenya, Bert M. Tollefson, Jr., 41, an ex-corn lobbyist and Republican politico from South Dakota. His antics are colorfully detailed in a series of confidential State Department telegrams.

The American Ambassador to Kenya, Robinson McIlvaine, was so outraged that he fired off the blistering "eyes only" wires to Tollefson's boss, John A. Hannah, head of the Agency for International Development. We have obtained copies of McIlvaine's missives.

"I regret to inform you," McIlvaine wrote in one cable, "that Bert Tollefson blotted his copy book (diplomatic jargon for 'foiled up') so badly during the Vice President's visit as to raise serious question as to his suitability for service abroad. Indeed, you may be hearing from the Vice President directly on the matter.

"The problem started with Bert's well-known pushiness and general lack of sensitivity and culminated in his getting sloshed at Treetops (a fancy lodge on the edge of the jun-

gle), making passes at the Vice President's secretary and trying to drag her down the steps to meet an elephant at ground level . . ."

The sequence of events that led up to this drunken climax, wrote McIlvaine, began when Tollefson was officially informed that "no Americans were invited to join the Vice President's group at Treetops. (Tollefson) came anyhow on his own and canvassed Kenyans for a bed in one of their rooms. In the end, he talked someone out of a room to himself . . ."

In the course of the evening, McIlvaine related, Tollefson "repeatedly interrupted" Kenyan officials who "were explaining animals" to the Vice President. "The owner of Treetops," the Ambassador wrote, "at one point asked me, 'Who is that jackass?!—pointing to Bert.

"The incident with the Vice President's secretary," continued McIlvaine, "took place in the small hours of the morning. According to her it took all her strength to get away from him."

Even Kenyan Ambassador to the U.S. Leonard Kibinge, who was there, commented on Tollefson's "condition," McIlvaine said.

"The next morning, Bert slept through the departure at 0900 and when he did awake took the remaining Secret Service car to Nyeri leaving

them stranded and furious . . . A car had to be sent the 100 miles up to Nyeri to bring Bert back."

The whole affair, McIlvaine concluded, had substantiated his misgivings about Tollefson's performance during his three months as head of the AID program in Kenya.

"Prior to bringing out his family I developed serious questions about his judgment. He reinforced this impression by sending me a telegram from Washington . . . implying that the Vice President wanted him to co-host the reception we were giving in the Vice President's honor. Naturally I checked this with the Vice President and he was incredulous.

"I can, of course, live with the situation but will have to spend a lot of time riding herd and wonder whether all that effort is warranted in support of Peter's Principle." (The Peter Principle is a tongue-in-cheek theory which holds that everyone eventually rises to his own level of incompetence.)

When asked about the incident, AID Administrator Hannah refused comment except to call Tollefson "a very respectable fellow" and to inquire where we obtained the confidential cables.

Ambassador McIlvaine's eyewitness account, Hannah maintained, was only an "allegation." Hannah had dis-

patched Tollefson to London, he said, to discuss the matter with Samuel Adams, AID's African Administrator—a fact which is confirmed by a subsequent telegram we have obtained.

Reached in Nairobi, Tollefson denied the Ambassador's charges and said they were based on a complete misunderstanding.

Assassination

A new and far fetched theory of the assassinations of President Kennedy, Sen. Robert Kennedy, Dr. Martin Luther King and Malcolm X is circulating on Capitol Hill. It is contained in a 24-page report buttressed by various documents, which was put together by Don Rhee, a labor union employee and assassination buff from San Francisco.

Its conclusion is that all four were killed by the same "conspirators": CIA agents, anti-Castro Cubans, some Dallas police, FBI operatives, "States Righters," Nazis, a "clique of very conservative businessmen (mostly oil)" and rightwing religious leaders. We have criticized every one of these groups at one time or another.

But our own investigations convince us that the new "theory," as earnest and ingenious as it may be, is pure balderdash.

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"The next morning, Bert slept through the departure at 0900 and when he did awake took the remaining Secret Service car to Nyeri leaving them stranded and furious . . . A car had to be sent the 100 miles up to Nyeri to bring Bert back."

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"I can, of course, live with the situation but will have to spend a lot of time riding herd and wonder whether all that effort is warranted in support of 'Peter's Principle.'" (The Peter Principle is a tongue-in-cheek theory which holds that everyone eventually rises to his own level of incompetence.)

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Reached in Nairobi, Tollefson denied the Ambassador's

charges and said they were based on a complete misunderstanding.

The sequence of events that led up to this climax, standing. He had only two drinks, he said, and took the Vice President's secretary to meet the elephant "at her request." He blamed the imbroglione on unnamed "Democratic holdovers" in the Foreign Service.

Assassination

A new and far fetched theory of the assassinations of President Kennedy, Sen. Robert Kennedy, Dr. Martin Luther King and Malcolm X is circulating on Capitol Hill. It is contained in a 14-page report buttressed by various documents, which was put together by Don Riley, a labor union employee and assassination buff from San Francisco.

Its conclusion is that all four were killed by the same "conspirators": CIA agents, anti-Castro Cubans, some Dallas police, FBI operatives, "States Righters," Nazis, a "clique of very conservative businessmen (mostly oil)" and rightwing religious leaders. We have criticized every one of these groups at one time or another.

But our own investigations convince us that the new "theory," as earnest and ingenious as it may be, is pure balderdash.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

8/12/71

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Date

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[redacted] Assistant to Deputy Undersecretary
 for Administration, [redacted] U. S. Department
 of State, advised that since the investigation of this matter
 by State Security has to date not identified the one responsible
 for furnishing the telegrams in question or information con-
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 However, [redacted] informed that the file in this case at State
 Security is remaining in a pending status and it will be
 reviewed at a later date to make a final determination as to
 any further action to be taken by State Security.

DECLASSIFIED BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH
ON 05-04-2007

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

On 8/11/71 at Washington, D. C. File # WFO 65-11628

by SA [redacted] ELG:jak Date dictated 8/12/71

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NR 020 WA CODE

5:45 PM URGENT 8-23-71 GXC

TO WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE (65-11628)

FROM DIRECTOR (65-74138) 4P

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-03-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH

TOLL LEK, ESP-X.

REURREP AUGUST TWELVE LAST, CONTAINING RESULTS INQUIRY
OFFICE OF SECURITY, STATE DEPARTMENT (USDS) INTO THIS MATTER.

✓ REREP NOTES [REDACTED] WHO WAS ON DUTY AT USDS
OPERATIONS CENTER AS ASSISTANT OPERATIONS OFFICER ON BOTH
JULY SIXTEEN AND NINETEEN LAST, WHEN TWO USDS CABLES INVOLVED
WERE PROCESSED THROUGH OPERATIONS CENTER, ADMITTED HIS WIFE
✓ WAS LONG TIME FRIEND OF [REDACTED], INVESTIGATIVE REPORTER FOR
JACK ANDERSON, AND THAT HE AND WIFE MET HOME AT PARTY ON JULY
FIFTEEN LAST, OR DAY BEFORE FIRST PERTINENT CABLE HANDLED AT
USDS OPERATIONS CENTER. NOTE ALSO THAT ANY EMPLOYEE IN
OPERATIONS CENTER CAN CALL UP CABLES WHICH HAVE BEEN
PREVIOUSLY PLACED IN USDS COMPUTER, AND THAT OPERATIONS
CENTER HAS ONLY TERMINAL OF COMPUTER CAPABLE OF THIS
PROCEDURE, AND THAT COMPUTER READOUT IS PRINTOUT CAPABLE OF
EASY REPRODUCTION.

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b7C

END PAGE ONE

[REDACTED]

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65-11628-12
SEARCHED INDEXED
SERIALIZED FILED
AUG 23 5 45 PM '71

[REDACTED]

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PAGE TWO

TREAT ALSO REPORTEDLY REMARKED TO FELLOW EMPLOYEE AT
USDS ON DAY OF PUBLICATION OF ANDERSON'S COLUMN, THAT
ANDERSON'S STAFF WAS "ENTERPRISING IN OBTAINING INFORMATION."

REREP ALSO NOTES TWO OTHER USDS EMPLOYEES, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] AND [REDACTED], ADMITTED MAKING COPIES OF FIRST
OR INCOMING CABLE INVOLVED IN LEAK, REPORTEDLY IN
CONNECTION WITH OFFICIAL DUTIES.

BUFILES REVEAL [REDACTED] IS EMPLOYEE OF JACK ANDERSON'S
STAFF. ON FEBRUARY SIXTEEN LAST, USDS SUBMITTED NAME CHECK
FOR [REDACTED] FOREIGN AFFAIRS OFFICER TO SECRETARIAT
STAFF OF EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, USDS. BUREAU ALSO RECEIVED
NAME CHECK ON APRIL FIFTEEN LAST, FROM USDS, FOR [REDACTED]
TREAT. BUFILES CONTAIN NO DEROGATORY INFORMATION CONCERNING
EITHER NADZO OR TREAT, AND NO INFORMATION IDENTIFIABLE WITH

[REDACTED].

Leads WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE IMMEDIATELY REVIEW INDICES AND
USDS EMPLOYMENT RECORDS AND RECORDS OF OFFICE OF SECURITY
CONCERNING TREAT, [REDACTED], AND [REDACTED], AND THEREAFTER
INTERVIEW PASSAGE AND [REDACTED] CONCERNING THIS LEAK IF
AFOREMENTIONED RECORD CHECKS DEVELOP NO INFORMATION TO
REQUIRE SUCH INTERVIEWS.

END PAGE TWO

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b7c

PAGE THREE

[REDACTED] MAY BE IDENTICAL WITH [REDACTED],
ALSO KNOWN AS [REDACTED], WHO IN NINETEEN FIFTY
CHANGED HIS NAME FROM [REDACTED]. [REDACTED]
BORN [REDACTED] AT EVANSTON, ILLINOIS,
AND MARRIED [REDACTED] AT WASHINGTON, D. C., ON
JUNE SEVENTEEN, SIXTYSEVEN. AT TIME OF SUBMISSION OF USDS
NAME CHECK, IN APRIL SEVENTYONE, TREAT WAS SERVING AS
U. S. NAVY OFFICER, NAVAL COMMUNICATIONS STATION, WAHIAWA,
HAWAII, HAVING ENTERED ON DUTY WITH NAVY IN APRIL, SIXTYNINE.

Lead DURING CHECK AT USDS, DETERMINE IF [REDACTED]
IDENTICAL WITH [REDACTED], AND ADVISE BUREAU IN ORDER
THAT MEANINGFUL CHECK OF BUFILES CONCERNING TREAT AND WIFE
MAY BE MADE. UTILIZING BACKGROUND DATA FROM USDS FILE,
CONDUCT APPROPRIATE BACKGROUND INVESTIGATION OF [REDACTED]
AND FURNISH SAME TO BUREAU TOGETHER WITH YOUR
RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO INTERVIEW.

HANDLE ON EXPEDITE BASIS, SETTING OUT NECESSARY LEADS
BY TELETYPE, AND FURNISH BUREAU DAILY TELETYPE SUMMARY OF
INFORMATION DEVELOPED.

FOR YOUR INFORMATION, ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
MARDIAN ADVISED BY LETTER DATED AUGUST NINETEEN LAST, THAT
END PAGE THREE

From 1609
State Personnel

b6
b7C

PAGE FOUR

IN ESTABLISHING VIOLATIONS OF ESPIONAGE STATUTE IN LEAK CASES,
DEPARTMENT WILL RENDER A PROSECUTIVE OPINION AFTER ALL OF
THE FACTS HAVE BEEN FULLY DEVELOPED BY INVESTIGATION AND
SOURCE OF LEAK IDENTIFIED.

END

GEA FBI WFO CLR

NR 009 WF CODED

5:45 PM URGENT 8-24-71 DLE

TO DIRECTOR (65-74138)

ATTN: DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

FROM WASHINGTON FIELD (65-11623)

TCLL LEK, ESPIONAGE -X

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-03-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH

REFERENCE BUREAU TELETYPE AUGUST TWENTY THREE LAST.

WFO INDICES NEGATIVE RE [REDACTED]; [REDACTED];

[REDACTED]; [REDACTED], NEE [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED]

[REDACTED], AKA [REDACTED] STATE DEPARTMENT RECORDS ON

STATE EMPLOYEES [REDACTED] REQUESTED AND WILL

BE REVIEWED WHEN AVAILABLE AND FURTHER INVESTIGATION REQUESTED

BY BUREAU WILL BE CONDUCTED.

b6
b7c

END

MGS FBI WASHDC ACKS FOR NR008 AND NR009

TU VERY MUCH CUL

65-11628-6

EBM

Searched _____
Serialized _____
Indexed _____
Filed _____

F B I

Date: 8/24/71

Transmit the following in CODED
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via TELETYPE URGENT
(Priority)

009

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (65-74138) ATTENTION: DOMESTIC
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

FROM: SAC, WFO (65-11628)

TOLL LEK, ESPIONAGE - X

REFERENCE BUREAU TELETYPE AUGUST TWENTYTHREE LAST.

WFO INDICES NEGATIVE RE [redacted]; [redacted];

[redacted]; [redacted], [redacted] AND [redacted]

[redacted] AKA [redacted], STATE DEPARTMENT RECORDS ON
STATE EMPLOYEES [redacted], [redacted] AND [redacted] REQUESTED AND WILL
BE REVIEWED WHEN AVAILABLE AND FURTHER INVESTIGATION REQUESTED
BY BUREAU WILL BE CONDUCTED.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-03-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH

① - WFO

ELG:jak

ELG jak

65-11628-180
[Signature]

Approved: *RGK/ELM*
Special Agent in Charge

Sent *5:45 P* M Per *gen*

b6
b7C

NR017 WF CODED

7:31PM URGENT 8-25-71 ALM

TO DIRECTOR (65-74138)

ATTENTION: DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
FROM WASHINGTON FIELD (65-11628) 2P

TOLL LEK, ESPIONAGE-X

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-03-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH

REFERENCE WFO TELETYPE AUGUST TWENTYFOUR LAST.

STATE DEPARTMENT (USDS) SECURITY OFFICE (SY) FILES

BEING REVIEWED CONCERNING [REDACTED] BORN

[REDACTED] EVANSTON, ILLINOIS, WHOSE NAME WAS
CHANGED FROM [REDACTED] JANUARY FOUR NINETEEN FIFTYONE WHEN

ADOPTED BY [REDACTED]; [REDACTED], BORN [REDACTED]

[REDACTED], NEW YORK CITY, WHOSE NAME WAS CHANGED

FROM [REDACTED] ABOUT AGE [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED]

BORN [REDACTED] CHARLOTTE, NORTH CAROLINA.

USDS SY WILL FURNISH COPIES OF PERTINENT INFORMATION FROM
FILES AUGUST TWENTYSIX NEXT WHEN REVIEW OF SY FILES EXPECTED
END PAGE ONE

b6
b7c



65-11628-19
Searched
Serialized
Indexed
Filed

WFO 65-11628

PAGE TWO

TO BE COMPLETED. [REDACTED] [REDACTED] SUBJECT OF
BUREAU INVESTIGATION NINETEEN FORTYNINE. UPON COMPLETION
REVIEW OF USDS FILES, ADDITIONAL INVESTIGATION REQUESTED BY
BUREAU WILL BE CONDUCTED.

END

MGS FBI WASHDC ACKS FRXX FOR TWO TELS.

TU AND CUL

F B I

Date: 8/25/71

Transmit the following in CODED
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via TELETYPE URGENT
(Priority)

017

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (65-74138) ATTENTION: DOMESTIC
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

FROM: SAC, WFO (65-11628)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-03-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH

TOLL LEK, ESPIONAGE-X

REFERENCE WFO TELETYPE AUGUST TWENTYFOUR LAST.

STATE DEPARTMENT (USDS) SECURITY OFFICE (SY) FILES

BEING REVIEWED CONCERNING [REDACTED] BORN

[REDACTED] VANSTON, ILLINOIS,
[REDACTED] WHOSE NAME WAS CHANGED FROM

[REDACTED] JANUARY FOUR NINETEEN FORTYONE WHEN ADOPTED

BY [REDACTED] [REDACTED] BORN [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] NEW YORK CITY, WHOSE NAME WAS CHANGED

FROM [REDACTED] ABOUT AGE [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED]

BORN [REDACTED], CHARLOTTE, NORTH CAROLINA.

USDS SY WILL FURNISH COPIES OF PERTINENT INFORMATION FROM
FILES AUGUST TWENTYSIX NEXT WHEN REVIEW OF SY FILES EXPECTED

① - WFO

JCC:jak

jak

65-11628-190
[Handwritten signature]

b6
b7c

Approved: RGK/EBM
Special Agent in Charge

Sent 13p M Per gla

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via _____
(Priority)

WFO 65-11628

PAGE TWO

TO BE COMPLETED. [REDACTED] SUBJECT OF
BUREAU INVESTIGATION NINETEEN FORTYNINE. UPON COMPLETION
REVIEW OF USDS FILES, ADDITIONAL INVESTIGATION REQUESTED BY
BUREAU WILL BE CONDUCTED.

b6
b7c

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

NR 712 WF CODED

9:20PM URGENT 8-26-71 DLE

TO DIRECTOR (65-74133)

ATTN: DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

FROM WASHINGTON FIELD (65-11623) 2P

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-03-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH

TOLL LEX, ESPIONAGE - X

REFERENCE WFO TELETYPE AUGUST TWENTY FIVE LAST.

VOLUMINOUS FILES AT U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE PERSONNEL
OFFICE AND SECURITY OFFICE (SY) CURRENTLY BEING REVIEWED
CONCERNING [REDACTED], [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

SY FILES SHOW [REDACTED] WAS BORN [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] EVANSTON, ILLINOIS UNDER NAME [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. NAME CHANGED ON JANUARY FOUR NINETEEN FIFTYONE

WHEN ADOPTED BY [REDACTED], AT JUVENILE COURT,

PROVIDENCE, RHODE ISLAND. [REDACTED] MARRIED [REDACTED]

BORN [REDACTED] WASHINGTON, D.C. ON

END PAGE ONE

65-11628-²⁰7
Searched _____
Serialized frt
Indexed frt
Filed _____

b6
b7c

PAGE TWO

JUNE SEVENTEEN NINETEEN SIXTYSEVEN. TREAT IN U.S. NAVY APRIL
TWO, NINETEEN SIXTYNINE TO APRIL TWENTYTHREE NINETEEN
SEVENTYONE, WHEN HONORABLY DISCHARGED. ACCORDING TO SY
FILES FBI CONDUCTED APPLICANT TYPE INVESTIGATION ON [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] IN NINETEEN SIXTY. WFO INDICES NEGATIVE RE
[REDACTED]

UPON COMPLETION OF STATE FILE REVIEWS ADDITIONAL
INVESTIGATION WILL BE CONDUCTED.

END

b6
b7c

IR 374 WF CODED

345PM URGENT 8-27-71 NMM

TO DIRECTOR (65-74133)

ATTENTION DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE

FROM WASHINGTON FIELD (65-11623) (4 PAGES)

TOLLEK, ESPIONAGE - X

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-03-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH

b6
b7c

REBUTEL AUGUST TWENTYTHREE LAST. STATE DEPARTMENT
PERSONNEL AND SECURITY (SY) FILES REVEAL FOLLOWING:

ON JUNE TWENTY NINETEEN FORTYSIX, AT EVANSTON, ILLINOIS,
A MALE CHILD NAMED [REDACTED] WAS BORN TO [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] AND [REDACTED] (MAIDEN NAME). [REDACTED]

A FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICER FOR STATE DEPARTMENT, WAS KILLED
IN AIR CRASH IN NINETEEN FORTYSIX. ON JANUARY FOUR NINETEEN
FIFTYONE, WHEN ADOPTED BY HIS STEPFATHER, [REDACTED]
HIS NAME WAS CHANGED TO [REDACTED] TREAT BY JUVENILE
COURT, PROVIDENCE, RHODE ISLAND.

END PAGE ONE

65-11628-22
Searched _____
Serialized _____
Indexed _____
Filed _____

PAGE TWO

[REDACTED] ATTENDED PRINCETON UNIVERSITY, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY, DURING NINETEEN SIXTYFOUR - NINETEEN SIXTYSEVEN RECEIVING AN DEGREE. ATTENDED JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL FOR ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES AT BOLOGNA, ITALY AND WASHINGTON, D.C. (WDC) NINETEEN SIXTYSEVEN TO NINETEEN SIXTYEIGHT RECEIVING MA DEGREE.

DURING SUMMER NINETEEN SIXTY SIX [REDACTED] EMPLOYED AS SUMMER INTERN ON STAFF SENATOR WILLIAM PROXMIRE DEMOCRAT - WISCONSIN. [REDACTED] MARRIED [REDACTED] ON JUNE SEVENTEEN, NINETEEN SIXTYSEVEN. [REDACTED] OF CURRENT WIFE (NINETEEN SIXTYEIGHT) OF CHARLES S. DEWEY, WHO IS FORMER CONGRESSMAN A FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY AND A FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE.

[REDACTED] ENLISTED IN NAVY DECEMBER SIXTEEN NINETEEN SIXTYEIGHT, AND HONORABLY DISCHARGED APRIL TWENTYTHREE, SEVENTYONE.
END PAGE TWO

b6
b7c

PAGE THREE

HAVING BEEN A MEMBER OF A FOREIGN SERVICE FAMILY HE
HAS RESIDED IN EGYPT, GREECE, VIETNAM AND SWITZERLAND. NOW
RESIDES IN WASHINGTON, D.C. WHILE STUDENT AT PRINCETON UNIVERSITY
IN NINETEEN SIXTY SEVEN HE APPLIED FOR POSITION WITH
STATE DEPARTMENT. EFFECTIVE JUNE TWENTYONE NINETEEN SEVENTY-
ONE, HE RECEIVED APPOINTMENT AS STUDENT ASSISTANT, EXECUTIVE
STAFF, FOREIGN SERVICE, STATE DEPARTMENT, WDC.

BY CONDUCTED EXTENSIVE INVESTIGATION OF [REDACTED] IN NINETEEN
SIXTY EIGHT. DURING INVESTIGATION BIRTH VERIFIED. REFERENCES
AND PRINCETON UNIVERSITY RECORDS FAVORABLE. LAW ENFORCEMENT
RECORDS AT PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY NEGATIVE. ROOMMATES AT
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY RECOMMENDED [REDACTED]. LAW ENFORCEMENT
RECORDS NEGATIVE REGARDING TREAT/TREAT AND PARENTS AT SAN RAFAEL,
CALIFORNIA WHERE PARENTS RESIDED. INVESTIGATIONS BY CY AT
BERNE AND ZURICH, SWITZERLAND AND POME, ITALY ALL FAVORABLE.
TREAT'S EMPLOYMENT AS SUMMER INTERN ON STAFF OF SENATOR
END PAGE THREE

b6
b7c

NR006 WF CODE

410PM URGENT 8-30-71 SKA

TO DIRECTOR (65-74138)

ATTENTION DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE

FROM WASHINGTON FIELD (65-11628)

b6
b7c

TOLL LEK, ESPIONAGE-X.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-03-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH

REWFOTELETYPE AUGUST TWENTYSEVEN LAST.

STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEES [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] INTERVIEWED TODAY. EACH ADMITTED MAKING COPIES OF
INCOMING TELEGRAM INVOLVED IN LEAK BUT STATE IT WAS IN
CONNECTION WITH OFFICIAL DUTIES.

[REDACTED] MADE COPY FOR READY REFERENCE IN CONNECTION WITH
HIS OFFICIAL RESPONSIBILITIES CONCERNING THE AGENCY FOR
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (AID). [REDACTED] MADE COPY TO BE
OFFICIALY AWARE OF THIS INFORMATION AS BACK UP OFFICER AT
STATE DEPARTMENT FOR VICE PRESIDENTS TRIP ABROAD.

[REDACTED] AND [REDACTED] STATE THEY ARE NOT ACQUAINTED WITH JACK
ANDERSON, HIS FAMILY OR MEMBERS OF HIS STAFF; NEITHER ACQUAINTED
WITH [REDACTED]; EACH DENIES MAKING PERTINENT TELEGRAMS
AVAILABLE TO PRESS AND DENIES KNOWING ANYONE WHO DID.

END

LRS FBI WASH DC

65-11628-73
Searched _____
Serialized _____
Indexed _____
Filed _____

lu

F B I

Date: 8/30/71

Transmit the following in CODE
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via TELETYPE URGENT
(Priority)

006

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (65-74138) (ATTENTION: DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION)

FROM: SAC, WFO (65-11628)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-03-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH

TOLL LEK, ESPIONAGE - X.

REWFOTELETYPE AUGUST TWENTYSEVEN LAST.

STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEES [] AND []

[] INTERVIEWED TODAY. EACH ADMITTED MAKING COPIES OF INCOMING TELEGRAM INVOLVED IN LEAK BUT STATE IT WAS IN CONNECTION WITH OFFICIAL DUTIES.

[] MADE COPY FOR READY REFERENCE IN CONNECTION WITH HIS OFFICIAL RESPONSIBILITIES CONCERNING THE AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (AID). [] MADE COPY TO BE OFFICIALLY AWARE OF THIS INFORMATION AS BACK-UP OFFICER AT STATE DEPARTMENT FOR VICE PRESIDENT'S TRIP ABROAD.

[] AND [] STATE THEY ARE NOT ACQUAINTED WITH JACK ANDERSON, HIS FAMILY OR MEMBERS OF HIS STAFF; NEITHER ACQUAINTED WITH []; EACH DENIES MAKING PERTINENT TELEGRAMS AVAILABLE TO PRESS AND DENIES KNOWING ANYONE WHO DID.

65-11628-182-230
SEARCHED INDEXED

ELG:csg
Approved: RGK
Special Agent in Charge

Sent

4:10

[] [] []

b6
b7c

NR009 WF CODE

6:35PM URGENT 8-31-71 GEA

TO DIRECTOR

ATTENTION DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
FROM WASHINGTON FIELD (65-11628) 1P

TOLL LEK, ESPIONAGE - X.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-03-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH

REWFOTEL AUGUST THIRTY LAST.

STATE DEPARTMENT ADVISES EMPLOYEE [REDACTED] NOT
SCHEDULED TO RETURN TO WORK REMAINDER OF THIS WEEK.
INQUIRY AT RESIDENCE OF [REDACTED] DETERMINED HE AND FAMILY TRAVELING
AND WILL RETURN NIGHT OF SEPTEMBER THREE. [REDACTED] WILL BE
INTERVIEWED SEPTEMBER SEVEN NEXT.

b6
b7c

END

TMT FBI WA TU

65-11628-824
Searched _____
Serialized _____
Indexed _____
Filed _____

W

NR008 WF CODE

5:47 PM URGENT 9-8-71 SKA

TO DIRECTOR (65-74138)

ATTENTION DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE

FROM WASHINGTON FIELD (65-11628) (P)

TOLL LEK, ESPIONAGE-X.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-03-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH

RE WFO TEL AUGUST THIRTYONE LAST.

STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE [REDACTED] INTERVIEWED THIS
DATE. HE ADVISED HE SAW NEITHER THE JULY SIXTEEN OR JULY
NINETEEN TELEGRAMS WHICH CONCERNED ACTIVITIES OF AGENCY FOR
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (AID) EMPLOYEE [REDACTED]. HE DID NOT
LEARN OF INFORMATION IN THESE TELEGRAMS UNTIL READING JACK
ANDERSONS ARTICLE ON JULY TWENTYSEVEN.

[REDACTED] STATES HE FIRST MET [REDACTED] AT PARTY ON JULY
FIFTEEN WHEN HE AND WIFE FIRST LEARNED THAT HUME WAS ON JACK
ANDERSONS STAFF. [REDACTED] SPOKE TO HIM BRIEFLY AND HAS NOT SEEN
HUME SINCE THAT TIME. [REDACTED] ACQUAINTED WITH JACK ANDERSON
OR [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] DENIES MAKING PERTINENT TELEGRAMS OR
INFORMATION IN THEM AVAILABLE TO PRESS AND KNOWS NOBODY WHO DID.
REPORT FOLLOWS.

END

RECD TWO

KPT FBI WASH

CLR

65-11628-25
Searched _____
Serialized _____
Indexed _____
Filed _____

b6
b7c

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

REPORTING OFFICE WASHINGTON FIELD	OFFICE OF ORIGIN WASHINGTON FIELD	DATE 9/8/71	INVESTIGATIVE PERIOD 8/23/71 - 9/2/71
TITLE OF CASE UNSUB; Unauthorized Disclosure of Information in State Department Cables Appearing in "The Washington Post" article, Tuesday, July 27, 1971, by JACK ANDERSON		REPORT MADE BY <div style="border: 1px solid black; height: 20px; width: 100%;"></div>	TYPED BY CSG
		CHARACTER OF CASE ESP - X	

b6
b7C

REFERENCE: Bureau teletype 8/23/71.

- P -

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-03-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH

ADMINISTRATIVE

This report is classified "~~Confidential~~" inasmuch as the United States Department of State has so classified the telegrams which are pertinent to this investigation.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS CLAIMED <input type="checkbox"/> NONE						ACQUIT-TALS	CASE HAS BEEN:
CONVIC.	AUTO.	FUG.	FINES	SAVINGS	RECOVERIES		

APPROVED *RSW JSM* SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE

DO NOT WRITE IN SPACES BELOW

COPIES MADE:

 6-Bureau (65-74138)
 3-WFO (65-11628)

Dissemination Record of Attached Report				
Agency				
Request Recd.				
Date Fwd.				
How Fwd.				
By				

Notations

65-11628-27
[Handwritten signatures]

WFO 65-11628

LEAD

WASHINGTON FIELD

AT WASHINGTON, D. C. Will interview
who was on duty at United States Department of State Operations
Center as Assistant Operations Officer when the two telegrams
involved in this case were processed.

b6
b7c

B*
COVER PAGE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH
ON 05-03-2007

Copy to:

Report of:

[REDACTED]

Office: **Washington, D. C.**b6
b7c

Date:

September 8, 1971

Field Office File #:

65-11628Bureau File #: **65-74138**

Title:

**UNKNOWN SUBJECT; Unauthorized Disclosure of
Information in State Department Cables Appearing
in "The Washington Post" article, Tuesday, July 27,
1971, by JACK ANDERSON**

Character:

ESPIONAGE - X

Synopsis:

**Background data set out for State Department employees [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. Upon interview both of
these individuals admitted making copy of telegram dated 7/16/71,
which was received from American Embassy at Nairobi, Kenya,
concerning conduct of AID employee [REDACTED]. Each states
copy made for ready reference in connection with his official
duties at State Department. [REDACTED] states his copy of this
telegram destroyed after few days. [REDACTED] states his copy turned
over to official in State Department upon latter's request. This
State Department official confirms this copy turned over to him
at his request on 7/30/71. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] admit seeing tele-
gram dated 7/19/71, sent by AID Director Dr. HANNAH in response
to above telegram. Both claim Dr. HANNAH's telegram of 7/19/71,
came to their desks during normal course of duties at State
Department. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] state they are not acquainted
with JACK ANDERSON or his staff; each denies furnishing infor-
mation in these telegrams to ANDERSON, his staff or press; and
each denies knowing anybody who might have done so.**

- P -

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

Date 9/3/71

[redacted], Line Officer, Executive Secretariat Staff, Office of the Secretary of State, furnished the following information:

On July 19, 1971, while he was serving as a Staff Officer in the Executive Secretariat, in which capacity he was responsible for handling information dealing with the Agency for International Development (AID), he was advised at a staff meeting of the contents of the telegram dated July 16, 1971, which had been sent by the American Ambassador at Nairobi, Kenya, concerning allegations made against [redacted]. Although this telegram was dated July 16, 1971, which date fell on a Friday, he had not seen it on that date and did not hear about its content until Monday, July 19, 1971.

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b7c

Following the above-mentioned staff meeting he discussed the telegram with [redacted]. Inasmuch as [redacted] was officially responsible for all information dealing with AID as Line Officer and because [redacted] in this same capacity was officially responsible for information dealing with the Vice-President's trip abroad, they personally made two copies of this telegram on the Xerox machine available in the office. These copies were made from the master copy located in this office.

[redacted] said he felt the possession of a copy of this telegram was appropriate on his part because the message contained therein concerned an AID matter and in the event he was asked about this information by any of his superiors on an official basis he would then have been able to answer any inquiries by ready reference to the telegram at his desk. All AID traffic normally goes over his desk and as he had seen this telegram he personally made a copy of it. The fact that

On 8/30/71 at Washington, D. C. File # 65-11628

by SAs [redacted]
and [redacted] EIC:esg Date dictated 8/31/71

WFO 65-11628

2

it was marked "Exdis" (exclusive distribution) and classified "Confidential," made no difference because he sees this type of communications on a normal distribution basis. [redacted] related that this copy of the telegram only remained in his possession a few days and when there appeared to no longer be a need to keep it around, he discarded it in the receptacle used in the office for the destruction of this type of classified material.

As concerns the message sent out by [redacted] on July 19, 1971, in response to the foregoing message, [redacted] related that this telegram was seen by him and as he recalls it came into his possession during the regular distribution to him as an officer handling AID matters for the purpose of his reading and information.

[redacted] informed that he is not personally acquainted with JACK ANDERSON and knows no members of his family or staff. [redacted] said he did not pass these documents along to anyone, including the press. Also, he knows of no one who made the documents or the material contained therein available to columnist ANDERSON or his staff. [redacted] related that he is not personally acquainted with [redacted]

b6
b7c

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

REPORTING OFFICE WASHINGTON FIELD	OFFICE OF ORIGIN WASHINGTON FIELD	DATE 9/9/71	INVESTIGATIVE PERIOD 8/23/71 - 9/8/71
TITLE OF CASE UNSUB; Unauthorized Disclosure of Information in State Department Cables Appearing in "The Washington Post" Article, Tuesday, July 27, 1971, by JACK ANDERSON		REPORT MADE BY <div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 100px; height: 20px;"></div>	TYPED BY csq
		CHARACTER OF CASE ESPIONAGE - X	

b6
b7c

REFERENCE: Bureau teletype 8/23/71.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-03-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH

- C -

ADMINISTRATIVE:

This report is classified "Confidential" inasmuch as the United States Department of State has so classified the telegrams which are pertinent to this investigation.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS CLAIMED <input type="checkbox"/> NONE						ACQUIT-TALS	CASE HAS BEEN:	
CONVIC.	AUTO.	FUG.	FINES	SAVINGS	RECOVERIES		PENDING OVER ONE YEAR <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO PENDING PROSECUTION OVER SIX MONTHS <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO	
APPROVED <div style="text-align: center;"><i>[Signature]</i> SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE</div>						DO NOT WRITE IN SPACES BELOW		
COPIES MADE: 6-Bureau (65-74138) 3-WFO (65-11628)						Notations <div style="font-size: 2em; font-family: cursive;">65-11628-28</div> SEARCHED.....INDEXED..... SERIALIZED.....FILED..... FBI - WASH. F. O. <i>[Signature]</i>		
Dissemination Record of Attached Report								
Agency								
Request Recd.								
Date Fwd.								
How Fwd.								
By								

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~DECLASSIFIED BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH
ON 05-03-2007

Copy to:

Report of:
Date:

[redacted]
September 9, 1971

Office:

Washington, D. C.

Field Office File #:

65-11628

Bureau File #:

65-74138

Title:

UNKNOWN SUBJECT; Unauthorized Disclosure
of Information in State Department Cables
Appearing in "The Washington Post" Article,
Tuesday, July 27, 1971, by JACK ANDERSON

Character:

ESPIONAGE - X

b6
b7C

Synopsis: Background information for State Department employee [redacted]

[redacted] set out. Upon interview [redacted] informs he saw neither the 7/16/71, or 7/19/71. telegrams which concerned activities of AID employee [redacted]. He did not learn of information in these telegrams until reading JACK ANDERSON's article on 7/27/71. [redacted] states he first met [redacted] at party on 7/15/71, when he and wife learned for first time that [redacted] was member of JACK ANDERSON's staff. [redacted] spoke to him briefly and has not seen him since. [redacted] not acquainted with JACK ANDERSON or [redacted] denies making pertinent telegrams or information in them available to press and knows nobody who did.

- C -

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

Date 9/9/71

[redacted]

[redacted] advised that since June, 1971, he has been employed by the United States Department of State (USDS), Washington, D. C. (WDC). He has a temporary appointment as Student Assistant, Executive Staff. He remarked that it is anticipated he will work at State until October, 1971. He has enrolled at the School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, WDC, and in a few weeks he will be attending this school seeking an advanced degree. [redacted] hopes to remain in the employment of the State Department on a part-time basis while going to school.

Since beginning his employment at State, [redacted] has been assigned as Assistant Operations Officer in the Operations Center. He was on duty here during the pertinent period July 16-19, 1971, when the telegrams, one from Kenya (July 16, 1971) and to Kenya from Dr. HANNAH (July 19, 1971) were received at the Operations Center. He saw neither of these telegrams. Also, neither of them was discussed with him when they were being processed in the Operations Center. [redacted] said it was not until July 27, 1971, when the article by JACK ANDERSON containing the information in these two telegrams was brought to his attention, that he knew anything about this information.

[redacted] further related that on July 15, 1971, his wife and her twin sister gave a party at the house of his brother-in-law. Those invited were individuals who had been acquaintances of the hostesses during their high school days but were not necessarily close friends. One of these who attended was a [redacted]. [redacted] did not know [redacted] and met him for the first time at this party. [redacted] conversed with [redacted] for only two or three minutes on very general topics. [redacted] wife told [redacted] that she had not seen [redacted] for seven or eight years but knew him only as having been a schoolmate many years ago. It was

On 9/8/71 at Washington, D. C. File # WFO 65-11628

by SA [redacted] :csg Date dictated 9/8/71

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WFO 65-11628

2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

at this party that [] and his wife first learned that [] was employed by JACK ANDERSON. This is the only contact [] has had with [] [] said it was only a "curious circumstance" that this brief contact with [] occurred the day before the telegram was received from Kenya concerning information which later appeared in JACK ANDERSON's article.

[] said he could not have passed the information in the telegrams to JACK ANDERSON, his staff or the news media, because he knew nothing about the telegrams until after JACK ANDERSON's article appeared. [] said he is not acquainted with JACK ANDERSON, and he knows nobody who passed the pertinent information on to ANDERSON. [] is not acquainted with []

b6
b7c

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

F B I

Date: 9/22/71

Transmit the following in CODED
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via TELETYPE URGENT
(Priority)

017

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (65-74138)

FROM: SAC, WFO (65-11628) (P) (2P)

TOLL LEK, SIO

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-03-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH

RE WFO TELETYPE SEPTEMBER TWENTYONE LAST.

FOLLOWING INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED SEPTEMBER TWENTYTWO
INSTANT:

DR. JOHN A. HANNAH, ADMINISTRATOR, AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT (AID), ADVISED THAT ON SEPTEMBER TWO LAST []
[] OF JACK ANDERSON'S STAFF PHONED [] AND ASKED IF HE
HAD LODGED COMPLAINT WITH FBI TO INVESTIGATE ANDERSON'S SOURCES.
[] SAID NO. [] STATES HE HAS NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
RE IDENTITY OF ANYONE WHO WOULD DISLIKE [] TO EXTENT
OF RELEASING PERTINENT TELEGRAMS. [] IS CURRENTLY
VISITING IN WASHINGTON UNTIL FRIDAY OF THIS WEEK BUT []
HAS NOT SEEN HIM. EFFORTS WILL BE MADE TO INTERVIEW []

b6
b7c

1 - WFO

ELG:jak

jak

65-11628-310
SEARCHED _____ INDEXED _____
SEP 22 6 19 PM '71

Approved: R G K / *yan*
Special Agent in Charge

Sent 9 30 [] Per []

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via _____
(Priority)WFO 65-11628
PAGE TWO

[REDACTED] [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED], EACH
A SECRETARY IN OFFICE OF [REDACTED] INTERVIEWED BUT NONE ABLE TO
FURNISH INFORMATION RE IDENTITY OF PERSON WHO LEAKED CABLES
TO ANDERSON.

[REDACTED], ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS,
U. S. STATE DEPARTMENT, ADVISED HE SAW THE INCOMING CABLE FROM
KENYA ON JULY NINETEEN LAST AND WROTE A NOTE TO [REDACTED]
SUGGESTING [REDACTED] BE RETURNED TO WASHINGTON BUT [REDACTED]
DISAGREED. [REDACTED] MADE NO COPIES OF INCOMING TELEGRAM FROM
KENYA AND HAD NO INFORMATION REGARDING LEAK.

[REDACTED] AND [REDACTED], BOTH SECRETARIES TO
[REDACTED] COULD FURNISH NO INFORMATION REGARDING LEAK.

ADDITIONAL INVESTIGATION BEING EXPEDITED.

b6
b7c

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

NR91C MF CODED

8:37PM URGENT 9-23-71 ALN

TO DIRECTOR (65-74130)

FROM WASHINGTON FIELD (65-11628) (P) 3P

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-03-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH

b6
b7c

TOLL ELK, SIO


RE WFO TELETYPE SEPTEMBER TWENTYTWO LAST.

FOLLOWING INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED SEPTEMBER TWENTYTHREE
INSTANT:

ROBERT S. SMITH, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR AFRICAN
AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE (USDS), ADVISED THAT ON
JULY SEVENTEEN LAST HE SAW COPY OF TELEGRAM RECEIVED FROM
KENYA AS HE WAS ON DUTY FOR HIS SUPERIOR [REDACTED] SMITH
READ THIS TELGRAM AND PLACED IT IN SAFE TO HOLD FOR [REDACTED]
TO READ ON MONDAY, JULY NINETEEN LAST. [REDACTED] HAS NO INFORMATION
AS TO SOURCE OF LEAK. DESCRIBED [REDACTED] AS [REDACTED] AND NOT
LIKED IN AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (AID) BUT KNOWS
NO SPECIAL INDIVIDUAL WHO WOULD LEAK TELEGRAMS. SMITH NOT
END PAGE ONE

65-11628-32

Searched _____
Serialized _____
Indexed _____



WFO 65-11628

PAGE TWO

ACQUAINTED WITH JACK ANDERSON OR STAFF.

KARL D. ACKERMAN, DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, OPERATIONS CENTER; JOSEPH HERESHAN, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO EXECUTIVE SECRETARY; AND BRUCE A. FLATIN, DIRECTOR, OPERATIONS CENTER; EACH USDS, ADVISED THEY SAW TELEGRAM RECEIVED FROM KENYA DATED JULY SIXTEEN LAST BUT KNOW OF NO POSSIBLE LEAK, ARE NOT ACQUAINTED WITH [REDACTED] OR JACK ANDERSON OR HIS STAFF.

[REDACTED], AID EMPLOYEE STATIONED IN KENYA, AFRICA, BUT TEMPORARILY IN WASHINGTON, D. C. (WDC), WAS INTERVIEWED AND ADVISED THAT ABOUT JULY SEVENTEEN LAST HE RECEIVED CALL AT KENYA FROM CALLER AT WDC WHO IDENTIFIED HIMSELF AS [REDACTED] (PHONETIC) ON JACK ANDERSON STAFF. [REDACTED] READ PART OF ALLEGATIONS CONTAINED IN KENYA TELEGRAM OF JULY SIXTEEN LAST. [REDACTED] TOLD [REDACTED] THE STORY WAS FALSE.

[REDACTED] MADE NO REPLY TO [REDACTED] DENIAL.

[REDACTED] MET DR. SAMUEL C. ADAMS OF AID HEADQUARTERS IN
END PAGE TWO

b6
b7c

WFC 65-11628

PAGE THREE

LONDON, ENGLAND ON JULY NINETEEN LAST CONCERNING TELEGRAM FROM KENYA. [REDACTED] DID NOT SHOW HIM TELEGRAMS PERTINENT TO THIS INQUIRY BUT BRIEFED HIM ON CONTENTS.

[REDACTED] FEELS LEAK COULD NOT HAVE ORIGINATED IN NAIROBI AND KNOWS NOBODY IN WDC WHO WOULD PROVIDE PRESS WITH TELEGRAMS.

ADMINISTRATIVE

OFFICE OF SECURITY, USDS, ADVISED ITS REPRESENTATIVE, WHO WAS TO HAVE CONDUCTED INVESTIGATION OF THIS CASE IN KENYA, HAD HIS ARRIVAL IN KENYA DELAYED. IT IS ANTICIPATED HE WILL ARRIVE KENYA ON OR ABOUT SEPTEMBER TWENTYSEVEN NEXT AND WILL THEREAFTER CONDUCT SAME.

COMMUNICATIONS CENTER, OFFICE OF COMMUNICATIONS, BUREAU OF ADMINISTRATION, USDS, WHERE USDS COMMUNICATIONS ARE INITIALLY RECEIVED AND TRANSMITTED IS DETERMINING IDENTITY OF PERSONNEL ON DUTY AND THOSE WHO HAD ACCESS TO PERTINENT COMMUNICATIONS WHICH WERE USED IN JACK ANDERSON'S ARTICLE. THESE EMPLOYEES WILL BE INTERVIEWED.

ADDITIONAL INVESTIGATION BEING EXPEDITED.

END

HLD FOR ONE

TMT FBI WA

b6
b7c

F B I

Date: 9/23/71

Transmit the following in CODED
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via TELETYPE URGENT
(Priority)

018

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (65-74138)

FROM: SAC, WFO (65-11628) (P)

TOLL LEK, SIO

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-03-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH

RE WFO TELETYPE SEPTEMBER TWENTYTWO LAST.

FOLLOWING INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED SEPTEMBER TWENTYTHREE

INSTANT:

[Redacted] FOR AFRICAN

AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE (USDS), ADVISED THAT ON

JULY SEVENTEEN LAST HE SAW COPY OF TELEGRAM RECEIVED FROM

KENYA AS HE WAS ON DUTY FOR HIS SUPERIOR [Redacted] [Redacted]

READ THIS TELEGRAM AND PLACED IT IN SAFE TO HOLD FOR [Redacted]

TO READ ON MONDAY, JULY NINETEEN LAST. [Redacted] HAS NO INFORMATION

AS TO SOURCE OF LEAK. DESCRIBED [Redacted] AS "PUSHY" AND NOT

LIKED IN AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (AID) BUT KNOWS

NO SPECIAL INDIVIDUAL WHO WOULD LEAK TELEGRAMS. [Redacted] NOT

① - WFO
ELG:jak
eds jak

65-11628-322a
SEARCHED INDEXED
20 PM '71

b6
b7c

Approved: RGK/GBM
Special Agent in Charge

Sent 8:37 M Per gls

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via _____
(Priority)WFO 65-11628
PAGE TWO

ACQUAINTED WITH JACK ANDERSON OR STAFF.

[REDACTED], OPERATIONS

CENTER; [REDACTED] TO EXECUTIVE

SECRETARY; AND [REDACTED] OPERATIONS CENTER;

EACH USDS, ADVISED THEY SAW TELEGRAM RECEIVED FROM KENYA DATED

JULY SIXTEEN LAST BUT KNOW OF NO POSSIBLE LEAK, ARE NOT

ACQUAINTED WITH [REDACTED] OR JACK ANDERSON OR HIS STAFF.

[REDACTED], AID EMPLOYEE STATIONED IN KENYA,

AFRICA, BUT TEMPORARILY IN WASHINGTON, D. C. (WDC), WAS

INTERVIEWED AND ADVISED THAT ABOUT JULY SEVENTEEN LAST HE

RECEIVED CALL AT KENYA FROM CALLER AT WDC WHO IDENTIFIED HIM-

SELF AS [REDACTED] (PHONETIC) ON JACK ANDERSON STAFF. [REDACTED] READ

PART OF ALLEGATIONS CONTAINED IN KENYA TELEGRAM OF JULY

SIXTEEN LAST. [REDACTED] TOLD [REDACTED] THE STORY WAS FALSE.

[REDACTED] MADE NO REPLY TO [REDACTED] DENIAL.

[REDACTED] MET [REDACTED] OF AID HEADQUARTERS IN

b6
b7CApproved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via _____
(Priority)WFO 65-11628
PAGE THREE

LONDON, ENGLAND ON JULY NINETEEN LAST CONCERNING TELEGRAM FROM KENYA. [] DID NOT SHOW HIM TELEGRAMS PERTINENT TO THIS INQUIRY BUT BRIEFED HIM ON CONTENTS.

[] FEELS LEAK COULD NOT HAVE ORIGINATED IN NAIROBI AND KNOWS NOBODY IN WDC WHO WOULD PROVIDE PRESS WITH TELEGRAMS.

ADMINISTRATIVE

OFFICE OF SECURITY, USDS, ADVISES ITS REPRESENTATIVE, WHO WAS TO HAVE CONDUCTED INVESTIGATION OF THIS CASE IN KENYA, HAD HIS ARRIVAL IN KENYA DELAYED. IT IS ANTICIPATED HE WILL ARRIVE KENYA ON OR ABOUT SEPTEMBER TWENTYSEVEN NEXT AND WILL THEREAFTER CONDUCT SAME.

COMMUNICATIONS CENTER, OFFICE OF COMMUNICATIONS, BUREAU OF ADMINISTRATION, USDS, WHERE USDS COMMUNICATIONS ARE INITIALLY RECEIVED AND TRANSMITTED IS DETERMINING IDENTITY OF PERSONNEL ON DUTY AND THOSE WHO HAD ACCESS TO PERTINENT COMMUNICATIONS

b6
b7c

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via _____
(Priority)

WFO 65-11628
PAGE FOUR

WHICH WERE USED IN JACK ANDERSON'S ARTICLE. THESE EMPLOYEES
WILL BE INTERVIEWED.

ADDITIONAL INVESTIGATION BEING EXPEDITED.

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

UNCLAS MF CODED

6:53PM URGENT 9-24-71 GEA

TO DIRECTOR (65-74133

FROM WASHINGTON FIELD (65-11628) 2P

TOLL LEX, SIO

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-03-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH

REFERENCE WFO TELETYPE SEPTEMBER TWENTYTHREE LAST.

THE FOLLOWING INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED SEPTEMBER TWENTYFOUR

INSTANT:

[REDACTED]

MANAGEMENT

SECTION, EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE (USDS),

EXPLAINED RECEPTION AND HANDLING OF COMMUNICATIONS FROM NAIROBI,

KENYA, REGARDING [REDACTED] JULY SIXTEEN LAST AND ADVISED

ONE [REDACTED] CURRENTLY ENROLLED AS [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

WASHINGTON, D.C. AS INDIVIDUAL WHO

PHYSICALLY HANDLED COMMUNICATIONS JULY SIXTEEN LAST.

FILES USDS SECURITY CONTAINED NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

RE [REDACTED] TO THAT ALREADY IN POSSESSION OF THE FBI.

END PAGE ONE

b6
b7C

65-11628-33

Searched
Indexed
Filed

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

WFO 65-1162C

PAGE TWO

U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (AID) SECURITY FILES REVIEWED THIS DATE REVEAL [REDACTED] POSSIBLY IDENTICAL WITH INTRUDER WHO ATTEMPTED TO GAIN ENTRY OF ROOM OF FEMALE GUEST AT SHERATON PARK HOTEL, WASHINGTON, D.C., FEBRUARY ONE LAST. [REDACTED] DENIED INVOLVEMENT IN INCIDENT AND U.S. AID CONDUCTED NO FURTHER INQUIRY.

NEITHER FILE CONTAINED INFORMATION SUITABLE FOR LEAD PURPOSES.

REQUEST OF BUREAU

BUREAU IS REQUESTED TO FURNISH WFO COMPLETE INVESTIGATIVE FILE ON [REDACTED] INCLUDING INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED BY OTHER FBI FIELD OFFICES TO BE USED AS SOURCE OF POSSIBLE INVESTIGATIVE LEADS RE THIS MATTER.

ADDITIONAL INVESTIGATION BEING EXPEDITED INCLUDING LOCATION OF [REDACTED] AND INTERVIEW.

END

LRS FBI WASHDC

b6
b7c

F B I

Date: 9/24/71

Transmit the following in CODED
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via TELETYPE URGENT
(Priority)

015

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (65-74138)

FROM: SAC, WFO (65-11628)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-03-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH

TOLL LEK, SIO

RE WFO TELETYPE SEPTEMBER TWENTYTHREE LAST.

THE FOLLOWING INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED SEPTEMBER TWENTYFOUR
INSTANT:

[REDACTED], DIRECTOR OF INFORMATION, MANAGEMENT
SECTION, EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE (USDS),
EXPLAINED RECEPTION AND HANDLING OF COMMUNICATIONS FROM NAIROBI,
KENYA, REGARDING [REDACTED] JULY SIXTEEN LAST AND ADVISED
ONE [REDACTED], SUMMER INTERN, CURRENTLY ENROLLED AS STUDENT
AT AMERICAN UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON, D. C. AS INDIVIDUAL WHO
PHYSICALLY HANDLED COMMUNICATIONS JULY SIXTEEN LAST.

FILES USDS SECURITY CONTAINED NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
RE [REDACTED] TO THAT ALREADY IN POSSESSION OF THE FBI.

① - WFO

ATT: jak
jak

65-11628-330
SEARCHED INDEXED
M
090

Approved: RGK/SPM
Special Agent in Charge

Sent 6:50 M Per gpm

b6
b7c

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via _____
(Priority)WFO 65-11628
PAGE TWO

U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (AID) SECURITY FILES REVIEWED THIS DATE REVEAL [REDACTED] POSSIBLY IDENTICAL WITH INTRUDER WHO ATTEMPTED TO GAIN ENTRY OF ROOM OF FEMALE GUEST AT SHERATON PARK HOTEL, WASHINGTON, D. C., FEBRUARY ONE LAST. [REDACTED] DENIED INVOLVEMENT IN INCIDENT AND U.S. AID CONDUCTED NO FURTHER INQUIRY.

NEITHER FILE CONTAINED INFORMATION SUITABLE FOR LEAD PURPOSES.

REQUEST OF BUREAU

BUREAU IS REQUESTED TO FURNISH WFO COMPLETE INVESTIGATIVE FILE ON [REDACTED] INCLUDING INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED BY OTHER FBI FIELD OFFICES TO BE USED AS SOURCE OF POSSIBLE INVESTIGATIVE LEADS RE THIS MATTER.

ADDITIONAL INVESTIGATION BEING EXPEDITED. *Including*
LOCATION OF [REDACTED] and interview.

b6
b7c

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

NR015 WF CODED

7:33PM URGENT 9-27-71 GEA

TO DIRECTOR

FROM WASHINGTON FIELD (65-11628) 3P

TOLL LEK, SIO

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-03-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH

RE WFO TELETYPE SEPTEMBER TWENTYFOUR LAST.


THE FOLLOWING INVESTIGATION WAS CONDUCTED SEPTEMBER
TWENTYSEVEN INSTANT:

[REDACTED] OF THE
DEPARTMENT, OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF STATE (USDS), WASHINGTON, D.C. (WDC); [REDACTED]
DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
AND [REDACTED], OFFICE OF THE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, USDS, ALL ADVISED THEY HAD ACCESS
TO THE PERTINENT COMMUNICATIONS WHICH WERE USED IN JACK
ANDERSON'S ARTICLE. ALL ADVISED THAT THEY HAVE NO CONTACT AT
ALL WITH JACK ANDERSON OR ANY MEMBER OF HIS STAFF AND COULD
END PAGE ONE

b6
b7c

65-11628-34

Searched: _____
Serialized: _____
Indexed: _____
Filed: _____

[REDACTED] 

WFO 65-11628

PAGE TWO

OFFER NO INFORMATION AS TO THE IDENTITY OF THE INDIVIDUAL WHO MAY HAVE FURNISHED PERTINENT COMMUNICATIONS TO JACK ANDERSON.

ADDITIONALLY [REDACTED], SECRETARY TO

[REDACTED], ALSO ADVISED THAT SHE HAD ACCESS TO THE ABOVE REFERRED TO COMMUNICATIONS.

SHE STATED THAT SHE HAS NO CONTACT WHATSOEVER WITH EITHER JACK ANDERSON OR ANY MEMBER OF HIS STAFF AND COULD OFFER NO INFORMATION PERTINENT TO THIS INVESTIGATION.

[REDACTED], U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (AID), ADVISED THAT THE INCOMING CABLE FROM KENYA PERTAINING TO [REDACTED] HAD BEEN MADE AVAILABLE TO HIM AND HE DISCUSSED IT BRIEFLY WITH DR. JOHN HANNAH, ADMINISTRATOR. [REDACTED] ADVISED HE DID NOT SEE [REDACTED] REPLY.

END PAGE TWO

b6
b7c

WFO 65-11628

PAGE THREE

[REDACTED] ADVISED THAT HE IS NOT ACQUAINTED WITH JACK
ANDERSON OR ANY MEMBER OF ANDERSON'S STAFF AND COULD OFFER
NO INFORMATION PERTINENT TO THIS INVESTIGATION.

ADMINISTRATIVE

ADDITIONAL INTERVIEWS TO BE CONDUCTED AT AID AND
OPERATIONS CENTER, USDS.

END

HOL

HOLD

EBM FBI WA

b6
b7c

F B I

Date: 9/27/71

Transmit the following in CODED
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via TELETYPE URGENT
(Priority)

OB

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (65-74138)

FROM: SAC, WFO (65-11628)

TOLL LEK, SIO

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-03-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH

RE WFO TELETYPE SEPTEMBER TWENTYFOUR LAST.

THE FOLLOWING INVESTIGATION WAS CONDUCTED SEPTEMBER
TWENTYSEVEN INSTANT:

[Redacted] OF THE
DEPARTMENT, OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF STATE (USDS), WASHINGTON, D. C. (WDC); [Redacted]
[Redacted], OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
AND [Redacted], OFFICE OF THE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, USDS, ALL ADVISED THEY HAD ACCESS
TO THE PERTINENT COMMUNICATIONS WHICH WERE USED IN JACK
ANDERSON'S ARTICLE. ALL ADVISED THAT THEY HAVE NO CONTACT AT
ALL WITH JACK ANDERSON OR ANY MEMBER OF HIS STAFF AND COULD

b6
b7c

1 - WFO
LJT:jak
[Handwritten signature]

SEARCHED _____ INDEXED _____
SERIALIZED _____ FILED _____
SEP 27 6 34 PM '71
FBI - WASH. D.C.

FILE STRIPPED
Date: *[Handwritten]*
Initials: *[Handwritten]*

Approved: *RGK/ YB* Sent *5 37* M Per *[Handwritten]*
Special Agent in Charge

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)Via _____
(Priority)WFO 65-11628
PAGE TWO

OFFER NO INFORMATION AS TO THE IDENTITY OF THE INDIVIDUAL WHO
MAY HAVE FURNISHED PERTINENT COMMUNICATIONS TO JACK ANDERSON.

ADDITIONALLY [REDACTED] TO

[REDACTED], ALSO ADVISED THAT SHE HAD ACCESS
TO THE ABOVE REFERRED TO COMMUNICATIONS.

SHE STATED THAT SHE HAS NO CONTACT WHATSOEVER WITH EITHER
JACK ANDERSON OR ANY MEMBER OF HIS STAFF AND COULD OFFER NO
INFORMATION PERTINENT TO THIS INVESTIGATION.

[REDACTED], U.S.
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (AID), ADVISED THAT THE
INCOMING CABLE FROM KENYA PERTAINING TO [REDACTED] HAD BEEN
MADE AVAILABLE TO HIM AND HE DISCUSSED IT BRIEFLY WITH DR.
JOHN HANNAH, ADMINISTRATOR. [REDACTED] ADVISED HE DID NOT SEE
DR. HANNAH'S REPLY.

b6
b7c

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via _____
(Priority)

WFO 65-11628
PAGE THREE

WILLIAMS ADVISED THAT HE IS NOT ACQUAINTED WITH JACK
ANDERSON OR ANY MEMBER OF ANDERSON'S STAFF AND COULD OFFER
NO INFORMATION PERTINENT TO THIS INVESTIGATION.

ADMINISTRATIVE

ADDITIONAL INTERVIEWS TO BE CONDUCTED AT AID AND
OPERATIONS CENTER, USDS.

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

DREW PEARSON (COLUMN OF DEC. 15, '51)
JACK NORTHMAN ANDERSON, aka., JACK
(Title) ANDERSON, ROBERT S. ALLEN (COLUMN
OF DEC. 13, 1951)

(File No) WFO FILE # 65-6060

1. Receipt given by SA Delavigne for classified document originally obtained from Mr. Finletter
See A. F. (original document returned by SA Delavigne and receipt obtained)

2 *Notes of interview of* [redacted]
under Secretary of State by SAs Jov. A. Connors and Paul J. Werning

b6
b7C

Disposition:

65-6060-1A
SEARCHED..... INDEXED.....
SERIALIZED..... FILED.....
FEB 25 1952
FBI - WFO
RJB
AW

Date Received 12-24-51

From Mr. Finletter, Sec.
(Name of contributor)

Air Force
(Address of contributor)

By Kenneth D. Delavigne
(Name of Special Agent)

To Be Returned Yes ()
No (x)

Description:

See below.

File No. 65-6060-1A'

*Orig. receipt given by SA
Delavigne for classified document
originally obtained from
Mr. Finletter, Sec. AF. (Original
document returned by
SA Delavigne & receipt
obtained)*

65-6060-1A'

~~"TOP SECRET"~~

Receipt for

MEMORANDUM TO BE RETURNED TO

MR. FINLETTER, SECRETARY OF AIR FORCE.

THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

December 14, 1951

Mr. Finletter turned over

Copy No. 10 of 20

of Memorandum for the Secretary of
Defense, dated December 10, written
by Mr. Finletter, ~~TOP SECRET~~, relative
to discussions with the President the
morning of December 10, to the undersigned.

Kenneth Delavigne
Kenneth Delavigne

Federal Bureau of Investigation

*This memo
returned to
Mr. Finletter
by Kaidel.
CAG*

~~T. J. Jenkins~~

December 15, 1951

Memos by General Vandenberg and Secretary relative White House meeting 10 December were handled as follows:

General Vandenberg's memo was typed once - Original and 3 copies - all accounted for.

Secretary's memos: 3 Drafts and Final.

1st Draft:

Original and 3 copies - all accounted for.

2nd Draft:

Original and 6 copies. Original given to Mr. Lovett (no signature); remaining 6 copies accounted for.

3rd Draft:

Original and 7 copies - all accounted for.

Final

Original and 19 copies made.

Original given by Secretary to Mr. Lovett (assumption) (no signature)

Copy No. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20 accounted for.

Copy #9 missing - given to Secretary by possibly given in turn to General Vandenberg.

b6
b7C

General Vandenberg's office is closed this morning, but I will check on their receipt of Copy #9 on Monday. *Verified and copy returned.*

WGH
WGH

2

Date Received 12/14/51

From _____
(Name of contributor)

(Address of Contributor)

By Paul J. Tierney
(Name of Special Agent)

To Be Returned Yes ()
No (x)

Description: notes of interview
of _____

File No. Deputy Under Secretary
of State by SAs JOS A. CONNORS
and Paul J. Tierney.

65-6060-1A (2)

b6
b7C

9 F Connors v B J Farney

H.F. Matthews

12/14/51

Shaw & Connolly not
there at any time.

- shake hands every one
- 2 - military briefing
by Bradley - 10 min.
- 3. - ~~not~~ important to
get armistice - not stick
on anything but maps
They made commission
as to 38th parallel - ~~not~~
practical 6 percent rehabilitation
No feasible to prevent any
rehabilitation

South -

1. Interest in Europe on
part of all European allies
not as real as before
2. Decrease in jet power

Frank Pace - also favored
armistice - not minor -

Tom Hulbert - also - &
favored statement that
rebuttal on fortifications,
if violation -

Allen Whitehair - General
feeling in public - to
finish up in Korea &
get ~~over~~ armistice.

Matthew - We want
armistice - not at any price -
They want armistice not
any price.

Walt - doesn't remember
Vanderburg - Agreement
by other nations to recall
deterrent statement.

Nichols - Fed confident
of Chinese heading a
debarment statement.

Then President stated
would agree to rehabilitation
statement.

Then would like
hear from European
travellers: -

Lowell, Bradley & Pace -
Pace Lowell. - production
lag -

Pace - some as to prod. lag -
but encouraged

DeLoach - 11:40 -

Called Wells into his
office.

Collins - supported
readily meets much
Calwell - didn't talk.

Didn't take notes -
didn't see notes. -

Told Aletta Johnson
what had been decided &
quite unanimous.
Generally -
Didn't speak to anyone
else -

BULKY EXHIBIT

Re: DREW PEARSON
(Column of December 15, 1951)
JACK NORTHMAN ANDERSON, aka., Jack Anderson
ROBERT S. ALLEN
(Column of December 13, 1951)
ESPIONAGE - X

LIST OF CONTENTS

Contained herein for purposes of preserving the complete write-ups of interviews conducted in this case are memoranda of the various Special Agents who interviewed the following persons:

Mr. ROBERT A. LOVETT, Secretary of Defense
Mr. FRANCIS P. WHITEHAIR, Under Secretary of Navy
Mr. DAN KIMBALL, Secretary of Navy
Admiral WILLIAM FECHTELER, Chief of Naval Operations
General OMAR BRADLEY, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff
Colonel WILLIS MATTHEWS, Aide to General BRADLEY
Admiral ROBERT L. DENNISON
General HARRY H. VAUGHAN
General ROBERT LANDRY
Admiral SIDNEY W. SOUERS
Mr. FRANK PACE, Secretary of Army
Mr. THOMAS K. FINLETTER, Secretary of Air Forces
General HOYT VANDENBERG, Chief of Staff, Air Force
General J. LAUTON COLLINS, Chief of Staff, Army
Major General CHARLES P. CABELL, Director Joint Staff, Army
Mr. JAMES LAY, Executive Secretary, National Security Council
Mr. JAMES WEBB, Under Secretary of State
Mr. FREEMAN MATTHEWS, Deputy Under Secretary of State
Rear Admiral THOMAS H. ROBBINS
Mr. EVERETT GLEASON, Deputy Executive Secretary, N.S.C.
Mr. JOHN K. EMERSON, Planning Advisory Bureau, State
Mr. KEN YOUNG, Office Foreign Military Affairs, Secretary of Defense
Mr. ALEXIS JOHNSON, Deputy Assistant Secretary, State Department
Mr. JOSEPH SHORT, Press Secretary to the President

65-6060-1B1

SEARCHED.....	INDEXED.....
SERIALIZED.....	FILED.....
JAN 1951	
FBI - WASH. F. O.	

LIST OF CONTENTS

Investigative notes of Special Agents: JOSEPH CONNORS
KENNETH DELAVIGNE
THOMAS J. JENKINS
MAURICE A. TAYLOR
PAUL J. TIERNEY
CARLE GRAHAM

BULKY EXHIBIT

Date received DECEMBER 1951

DREW PEARSON (COLUMN OF DEC. 15, 1951)

JACK NORTHMAN ANDERSON, aka., JACK ANDERSON

(Title of case)

ROBERT S. ALLEN

COLUMN OF DECEMBER 13, 1951) ESPIONAGE-X

Submitted by Special Agent GRAHAM

Source from which obtained INVESTIGATIVE NOTES

Address _____

Purpose for which acquired INVESTIGATIVE

Location of bulky exhibit CCO ROOM 531

Ultimate disposition to be made of exhibit To be preserved for the complete write-ups of interviews conducted in this case.

List of contents:

(FOR CONTENTS SEE ATTACHED PAGE)

~~_____

_____~~

*Destroyed per instructions
SA Carl Graham 10/10/55 eea*

TCM

File # 65-6060-1B1

SEARCHED.....	INDEXED.....
SERIALIZED.....	FILED.....
JAN 9 1951	
FBI - WASH. F. O.	

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65-6060-1B1

WFO

co-Mr. Hennrich
Mr. Branigan
Mr. Marchessault

MR. D. M. LADD

December 13, 1951

MR. A. H. BELMONT

ALLEGED LEAK FROM WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE,
DECEMBER 10, 1951,
TO JACK ANDERSON, LEG MAN FOR DREW PEARSON;
Espionage - X.

In accordance with instructions, Mr. Hennrich and I interviewed Secretary of Defense Lovett at his office in the Pentagon, starting at 6:30 p.m. and ending at 7:45 p.m. today (December 13). Mr. Lovett was alone. The interview concerned information in the possession of Jack Anderson, leg man for Drew Pearson, which information Mr. Lovett believed came from one of the Government representatives attending a White House conference on the afternoon of December 10, 1951, presided over by President Truman. The information concerned was of a "top secret" nature.

DEVELOPMENTS PRIOR TO THE CONFERENCE

In laying the groundwork for the conference itself, Mr. Lovett advised that the Defense Department had been considering four points in connection with the present cease-fire discussions in Korea, as follows, which points were presently matters of conflict between the United Nations Forces and the Communist peace representatives:

1. The UN representatives desire to rotate the soldiers in Korea in order to allow the men who have been in the field to come home after a certain period of service. This rotation by UN is man for man and, as a matter of fact, there are some 5,000 less UN soldiers in Korea now than at the beginning of the peace talks. On the contrary, the Communists have rotated by replacing divisions or crates, with the result that they now have over 200,000 more men in Korea than when the peace talks started.

2. The exchange of prisoners of war. The UN wants to exchange man for man to insure the return of all UN prisoners and also because the UN has a far greater number of Communist prisoners (approximately 175,000 to 10,000) than there are UN prisoners under the control of the Communists. Mr. Lovett advised that there is a humanitarian principle involved also, as it is felt that the Communist prisoners will be liquidated if they are returned in toto.

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3. *Your combatants*
Chauvat

AMB:LL

Mess
[Signature]

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SERIALIZED <i>ML</i>	FILED <i>ML</i>
DEC 14 1951	
FBI - WASH. F. O.	

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3. A special Air Force problem involving the question of whether the Communists should be allowed to build air fields in North Korea after the cease fire preceding the armistice.
4. The question of whether the Communists should be allowed to repair roads, bridges, railroads, etc., after the cease fire has been put into effect.

Mr. Lovett stated that there had been a full agreement on the first three points and, as a result, instructions on these three points had already been sent to General Ridgway. However, on point No. 4 regarding rehabilitation and repairs, the President called from Key West on Saturday, December 9, as he wanted further explanation of this point because he could not see why we should allow the Communists to build up by such rehabilitation and repairs during the cease-fire period. As a result, a conference was called by the President for 10:30 a.m., Monday, December 10, 1951, and the White House issued invitations to the Secretaries of the three Services, the three Chiefs of Staff, General Bradley and Mr. Lovett from Defense, the Acting Secretary of State, and the Deputy Under Secretary of Political Affairs. On Sunday, December 9, Mr. Lovett requested that the Director of the Joint Staff, General Cabell, be present also. The purpose of the conference was to consider this question of rehabilitation and repairs. The position of the Defense Department was that such rehabilitation and repairs were as necessary in South Korea as they were in North Korea and that we would probably lose more than we would gain if both sides were prohibited from rehabilitating and repairing the areas under their jurisdiction.

WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE OF DECEMBER 10, 1951

Mr. Lovett advised that he had made inquiry, since talking with the Director, of Secretary Frank Pace and General Joe Collins, and, as best the three of them could remember, the following were present at the conference:

? Edw. Toley ?

not known Cabell

✓ President Truman

✓ Secretary of Defense Lovett -

✓ General Omar Bradley - Chief of Staff -

✓ General Joe Collins - Army -

✓ General Hoyt S. Vandenberg - Air -

✓ Admiral William Pechler - Navy -

✓ General Cabell ^{Director} Joint Staff -

✓ Secretary Frank C. Pace - Army -

✓ Secretary Thomas K. Finletter - Air -

✓ Acting Secretary Francis P. Whitehair - Navy -

✓ Acting Secretary James E. Webb - State -

✓ Mr. H. Freeman Matthews - State -

✓ Admiral Sidney Sowers - White House -

✓ James Loy - National Security Council

✓ General Vaughan - White House

✓ Admiral Dennison - White House

General Robert Landry - White House

In addition to the above, Mr. Lovett said that

Joe Short and Matt Connelly, press representatives of the White

House, were at the conference, but he does not know how long or whether they merely came in and out delivering messages. Mr. Lovett had previously indicated to the Director that Mr. Edward Foley of the Treasury Department may have been present, but he now believes that Foley was not there.

The President came in and shook hands with everyone at the conference and it was remarked that he looked tan and fit. The conference then discussed the question of repairs and rehabilitation and, after it was explained to the President that we would lose as much as we would gain through such prohibition and there was unanimous agreement on this point, the President agreed and approved the instructions authorizing a dispatch to General Ridgway on that point.

Mr. Lovett advised that the President then asked about the NATO agreement in Rome. Mr. Lovett and General Bradley discussed this at the conference.

A discussion then ensued as to "how tough do you get if there is a violation of the armistice." Mr. Lovett advised it was pointed out that every condition that is put into an armistice points up necessary action if the Communists should violate that particular condition and such a violation would immediately raise a question of what action would the UN Forces take if the Communists violated a condition of the armistice. It was decided it would be better to take a general stand and make general conditions in the armistice, rather than get too specific, and at the same time make it plain to the Communists that if the armistice were not kept "there would be a hell of a war" and that any breaking of faith in the armistice would result in a war extending to other fields, such as China, and that it would not result in a resumption of just the Korean war.

Mr. Lovett advised that the White House conference, which was held in the Cabinet Room, lasted from 10:30 a.m. until approximately 11:45 a.m. on December 10.

Mr. Lovett advised that at the close of the conference the President called aside Mr. Webb and spoke to him briefly near the door. Mr. Short went outside and advised the press, who were present in the White House in great number and who had been clamoring for information, that they had discussed world affairs, including Korea. Mr. Lovett said that Mr. Short made no further statement.

In answer to our questions, Mr. Lovett advised that all of the above-listed individuals were present throughout the conference, with the exception of Short and Connelly. There was no secretary taking notes and no minutes were kept of the meeting. There was no written agenda prepared for the items to be taken up. He noted no one taking notes, although Admiral Dennison, General Vaughan, and General Landry were behind him and he did not know as to them. Mr. Lovett stated that he made no notes and dictated no memorandum following the conference. Mr. Lovett did not know and had not made inquiry as to whether any other persons dictated memoranda following the conference. Relative to the inquiries that Mr. Lovett had indicated he would cause Colonel Scaddell to make, these were merely inquiries as to who was present at the conference.

ACTIVITIES OF JACK ANDERSON

Mr. Lovett advised that yesterday afternoon (December 19), exact time not known to him, Jack Anderson, long man for Drew Pearson, contacted Acting Secretary Whitehair (probably not in his office) and showed to Whitehair or read to him a story which purported to be almost a verbatim account of the important things set forth above which occurred at the conference at the White House on December 10. Mr. Lovett said that Whitehair was shocked and told Anderson it would be a bad idea to publish this material. Whitehair spoke to his executive officer about Anderson's visit and they agreed that Admiral Dennison should be advised. Admiral Dennison reported this to the President, who was very much upset. The President got word to General Bradley, who called Pearson or Anderson, and Anderson was asked to come over and bring his story. Anderson came to see General Bradley about 7:00 p.m. and brought the story, which was read by General Bradley and his aides, Colonel Clifton and Colonel Matthews. Bradley attempted to get Anderson to "kill" the story entirely, but Anderson said he had checked with Pearson and that the story was already on the Hall Syndicate wires and would come out this Saturday, December 15. Anderson said it was impossible to "kill" the story. General Bradley and his aides marked in red pencil two parts which they stated would be especially injurious to the security of this country, and Anderson said he would recommend that these two parts be "killed." The first part was a statement attributed to

the President that if we did not get a cease fire by December 27, we should arrange to extend the time. The second part related to concessions we might be prepared to make to the Communists.

In answer to our queries, Mr. Lovett advised that he did not know the full content of Anderson's paper. He stated that neither Whitehair nor General Bradley had secured a copy of Anderson's paper and that the only source from which the contents could be obtained in the Government would be recollections of Whitehair, General Bradley, and Bradley's two aides. He said that when the article comes out on Saturday, it will be possible for these gentlemen to compare it with what they read on Anderson's paper. He advised that he did not know the exact excerpts of Anderson's paper which shocked Whitehair, but rather thought it was the fact that Anderson had what appeared to be an accurate picture of the conference. He pointed out that Anderson's story had background which would indicate that it must have come from someone actually at the conference; for example, it started out by saying that the President, tanned and fit, walked briskly into the conference room and shook hands with everyone, including his own White House aides. Other background information made it appear that the story must have been given to Anderson by someone actually at the conference.

Mr. Lovett was asked whether all of the items in Anderson's story pertained to the conference and, specifically, whether the two items which General Bradley red-penciled occurred at the conference. Mr. Lovett stated that he did not recall any discussion at the conference of extending the time if we did not get a cease fire by December 27, although he conjectured that this might have happened while the President was talking to Mr. Webb at the door. He said that the second point (on concessions we might make) was probably covered in some measure at the conference. He asked whether there were any items mentioned at the conference that were not in Anderson's story. He did not know. He asked whether, in view of the fact that three of the four points covered in the cease-fire agenda had already been acted on and dispatched to General Ridgeway prior to the conference, it would be possible that the story was secured from these

dispatches or from sources other than those within the actual conference. He stated he had not thought of this and that it might be possible. He pointed out that if Anderson's story carried an item concerning the cease fire date of December 27, and this was not discussed at the conference, it was very pertinent and therefore it was very necessary that the exact story by Anderson be furnished us, in so far as possible, for comparison purposes as to exactly what went on at the conference. Mr. Lovett said that when the story comes out, such a comparison can be made. He said that General Bradley would not be back until Saturday, December 15, but that his two aides, Colonels Clifton and Matthews, were available for interview.

Mr. Lovett related that when Anderson came over to see General Bradley, at Bradley's request, he came over on a basis of trade; that is, "if he would bring the article over and give Bradley a chance to screen it, Bradley would tell him where the Defense Department learned that he had this information." After Bradley and his aides had gone over the story and red-penciled it, Anderson asked where they had learned he had the story. General Bradley told him from the President, whereupon Anderson "damn near fell off the chair." After leaving Bradley's office and while walking down the corridor, Anderson commented, "I guess Whitehair must have told."

Mr. Lovett related that when Whitehair told of Anderson's visit to him, he said that he told Anderson, "For god's sake tell Pearson that if he publishes this story it will throw suspicion on me," pointing out that he was the newest member of the conference and that it was known he had a longstanding acquaintance with Pearson. Whitehair definitely told Lovett he did not give out any information on the conference, and Lovett stated this was borne out by the fact that Whitehair reported Anderson's visit to him and that had Anderson got it from Whitehair, he would not have come back to Whitehair to verify it.

APPENDIX OF MR. LOVETT

Mr. Lovett advised he believed that this story was leaked by a member of the conference and that it was done deliberately. He said he based this feeling on the fact the story had color and background that it would be difficult to secure from anyone who was not at the conference, and that the story set forth what various persons said at the conference.

Mr. Lovett went on to relate that he was extremely concerned about leaks in the Defense Department and he earnestly wanted to find out one person who was responsible for leaks, in order that he could make an example of him. He advised that he believes these leaks occur in four ways:

1. By flannel mouths who talk too much at cocktail parties;
2. Through officials who wanted to show that they "knew it all";
3. Through officials who assumed that everyone in the Pentagon was cleared for all types of security information, with the result that they talked to anyone in the Pentagon;
4. Through leaks by members of Congress.

Mr. Lovett was asked to explain this last point. He said that frequently members of Congress, such as members of the Senate Armed Services Committee or members of other Congressional committees who had to consider such things as appropriations for the armed services, would call the Defense Department for information on the current situation in Korea or in some phase of the Defense Department activities. Rather than write a reply, the Defense Department sends up an officer, who talks to the Congressman and furnishes him the information. This is done with the understanding that it is very confidential and "in 99 out of 100 cases" the Congressman observes the confidence. Mr. Lovett was asked whether it was necessary to furnish such information to the Congressmen. He stated that unless the information is furnished, the Defense Department does not

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get its appropriations or satisfactory action from the Congress. Mr. Lovett advised that he could recall four instances where Congressmen betrayed confidences to the papers and, as he recalls these individuals, they were Senator Kane, another Senator, and two Representatives - "Gavin and Zand or someone like that." He was not at all sure of this.

Mr. Lovett advised he was certain that Generals Bradley and Collins and Secretary Pace had not given out any information from this conference and had not fallen into any pitfalls, such as dictating memoranda after the conference. He said he was sure of them.

Mr. Lovett advised that in the matter of dealings with Congress, some difficulty had been experienced with the Air Force, in that Secretary Finletter and General Vandenberg had gone direct to Congress, after rules advice to the Air Department had been made in the Department of Defense. He said he could not say how this could pertain to this particular matter, however.

Mr. Lovett further advised it was well known that the Armed Services used Pearson "to send up trial balloons" on their problems, in order to find out what the reaction would be.

It was our impression that Mr. Lovett was rather frank with us and he appeared to be sincere in his desire to get to the bottom of leaks in the Defense Department.

REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION

Mr. Lovett advised that General Bradley called him yesterday (December 12) and said that the President would call Lovett this morning (December 13). Bradley said that the President had asked that Lovett call Director Hoover and see if this leak could be traced. This morning (December 13) Admiral Dennison did call Mr. Lovett and requested him to call the Director and ask that this leak be traced. Lovett asked Dennison why he was being requested to call the FBI and asked whether there was any feeling on the part of the President that the

Defense Department was responsible for this leak. Admiral Dennison said "no," but it was felt that Lovett would follow through more vigorously than their own Executive Staff. Mr. Lovett advised that it occurred to him the President might want the request to come from outside the White House so that it would not exclude the members of the White House staff. Mr. Lovett said that he, Secretary Pace, General Collins, and General Bradley were the only ones in the Defense Department who know of the request for investigation.

It was pointed out to Mr. Lovett that if a full investigation is launched into this matter, it may be necessary to talk with everyone who was at the conference and, on that basis, we would like to know if this request for investigation emanated direct from the President and if we could do state in conducting the investigation. He said it did and we should.

Mr. Lovett said it had occurred to him that possibly there was a microphone in the Cabinet Room.

It was pointed out to Mr. Lovett that we had previously conducted investigations for leaks along this same line and that it was apparent a condition existed in the Defense Department where information supposedly restricted to a very small tight group of officials received wide dissemination as a result of memoranda dictated following the conference, which, in turn, went through many hands.

It was further pointed out to Mr. Lovett that on the basis of our discussion with him, there was doubt whether all of the information contained in Anderson's story covered topics discussed at the conference in question; therefore, it was highly desirable that we know exactly what was in Anderson's story and exactly what topics were discussed at the conference, for comparison purposes. He reiterated that such an analysis can be made when Pearson's article comes out on Saturday, December 15.

RECOMMENDATION:

From the above information, it appears that we will be required to make an investigation. It likewise appears that under the set of circumstances, the chances of success are small. The only accurate sources of information would be Anderson and Pearson, who will not talk if past experience with them is indicative. The individual who gave the information to Anderson would be a fool to talk.

Nevertheless, it is believed we should follow the logical steps, even though they will probably only prove that this information has had rather wide dissemination.

The suggested steps, in order of preference, are:

1. Interview Colonels Clifton and Matthews of General Bradley's office at once for full details as to what was in Anderson's story.
2. Interview Whitehair for the base information and at the same time interview him as a possible source of information to Pearson. Secure from him his recollection of what went on at the conference.
3. Interview General Bradley upon his return Saturday, December 15, for his recollection of what went on at the conference and the details of Anderson's story.
4. Secure a copy of Pearson's column for Saturday, December 15, in order to compare it with the information supplied us as to what went on at the White House conference.
5. Interview every individual who attended the White House conference, with the possible exception of President Truman, to secure their detailed recollections of what went on at the conference and the topics discussed. The purpose of this is to get a composite picture against which we can compare the picture obtained of Anderson's story and the resultant Pearson column. Ascertain from all persons who attended the conference whether they made notes; whether they dictated memoranda; whether they discussed the conference with other persons; and

what distribution was made of any memoranda dictated and through whose hands they passed. Secure copies of these memoranda for comparison with Pearson's column.

- C. Follow up any logical leads by interviews with other persons having access to this information.
- F. In addition to the above, inasmuch as Mr. Lovett brought up the question as to whether there might not be a microphone in the Cabinet Room, it is recommended that Admiral Dennison be contacted and advised that this question was raised by Mr. Lovett and, if Admiral Dennison so desires, we have Laboratory representatives make a thorough check of the Cabinet Room for a possible microphone.

As this will be a lengthy investigation, it is recommended that the experienced Agents of the WFO who conducted the prior investigation of the alleged Pearson leak be called in for briefing and instructed to conduct this investigation at once.

In keeping with the above recommendation, I contacted SAC Hood of WFO tonight (December 13) and he will bring Agents to my office at 9:00 a.m. on December 14 for proper briefing, in order that this investigation may be immediately instituted.

12-15-51

WASHINGTON FROM WASH FIELD

15

9:45 A.M.

DIRECTOR

U R G E N T

DREW PEARSON, ALLEGED LEAK FROM WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE DEC TEN FIFTY ONE TO JACK ANDERSON, LEG-MAN FOR DREW PEARSON, ESPIONAGE DASHX. COL. WILLIS MATTHEWS, AID TO GEN OMAR BRADLEY, ADVISED THAT UPON THE RETURN OF GEN BRADLEY FROM WHITE HOUSE ABOUT SIX THIRTY PM WEDNESDAY DEC TWELVE, BRADLEY ADVISED MATTHEWS AND COL CHESTER V. CLIFTON, PRESS RELATIONS OFFICER FOR JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, THAT PRES TRUMAN WAS GREATLY CONCERNED OVER FACT THAT DREW PEARSON POSSESSED KNOWLEDGE OF WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE ON MONDAY DECEMBER TEN AND THAT A COLUMN HAD BEEN PREPARED CONTAINING DETAILS OF THAT CONFERENCE. BEFORE ANDERSON ARRIVED GEN. BRADLEY TELEPHONED SEC ROBERT LOVETT AND FRANCIS P. WHITEHAIR AND DISCUSSED LEAK AND PRESIDENTS CONCERN. COL MATTHEWS STATED MATTER OF CONCERN TO COL CLIFTON, PRESS OFFICER, AND HE WAS IN AND OUT CONFERENCE ROOM DURING ANDERSONS VISIT, HOWEVER, HE RECALLED THAT GEN BRADLEY HAD READ ALOUD THE COLUMN TEXT RELATING TO INSTANT CONFERENCE AND HE REMEMBERED THAT REFERENCE WAS MADE TO THE PRESIDENTS ENTERING THE WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE ROOM, SHAKING HANDS WITH EVERYBODY AND A REFERENCE TO HIS SUNTAN WAS MADE. HE ADVISED THAT HIS RECOLLECTION WAS THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS QUOTED RATHER FREELY AND IT WAS INDICATED THE INFORMATION EMANATED FROM A SOURCE CLOSE TO THE WHITE HOUSE OR AN INFORMED SOURCE. HE RECALLED THERE

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WAS REFERENCE TO CEASE FIRE AND THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS OPPOSED TO THE COMMUNISTS REBUILDING AIR FIELDS, ROADS, ETC. HE DID NOT RECALL ANY MENTION WAS MADE OF EXCHANGE OF PRISONERS. COL MATTHEWS STATED THERE WERE TWO ITEMS WHICH WERE PARTICULARLY OBJECTIONABLE TO GEN BRADLEY AND ANDERSON AGREED HE WOULD DELETE ANYTHING CONSTITUTING SECURITY VIOLATIONS. HE STATED HE REMEMBERED ONE OBJECTIONABLE ITEM IN WHICH IT WAS STATED THAT WE ARE ANXIOUS FOR AN ARMISTICE AND WOULD GO TO ALMOST ANY LENGTH. FURTHER, THE PRESIDENT HAD URGED THAT WE NOT GO AND MAKE ANY FOOLISH MISTAKE THEREAFTER. MATTHEWS COULD NOT RECALL THE SECOND ITEM. HE INDICATED GEN BRADLEY DID NOT COMMENT ON THE TRUTH OR ACCURACY OF COLUMN AND STATED THAT HE, COL MATTHEWS, URGED GEN BRADLEY TO CIRCLE WITH A PENCIL THE OBJECTIONABLE ITEMS WHICH GENERAL BRADLEY DID. HE STATED THE MEETING WITH ANDERSON ENDED AMICABLY AND IT WAS AGREED THAT THE COLUMN WAS NOT HARMFUL AS CORRECTED.

COL CLIFTON, WHO IS INTIMATELY ASSOCIATED WITH THE PRESS, AND ANDERSON PARTICULARLY, FURNISHED MORE COMPLETE INFORMATION. HE CONFIRMED THE ABOVE REGARDING ARRIVAL OF GEN BRADLEY FROM WHITE HOUSE AT SIX THIRTY PM DEC TWELVE AND STATED GEN BRADLEY HAD RELATED THAT ANDERSON HAD VISITED FRANCIS WHITEHAIR THE PREVIOUS DAY ON PRETEXT OF WANTING TO MEET HIM AND THEN PRODUCED A PAPER AND READ A DESCRIPTION OF WHAT TRANSPIRED AT THE PRESIDENTIAL CONFERENCE. IN THIS, ANDERSON DIRECTLY QUOTED ADM WILLIAM FECHTELER AND GEN HOYT VANDENBERG WHICH ALARMED WHITEHAIR WHO REPORTED THE MATTER TO

WFO 6060

THE PRESIDENT. COL CLIFTON STATED IN THE LATE AFTERNOON DEC TWELVE GEN BRADLEY VISITED WHITE HOUSE TO CLEAR A CABLE TO GEN RIDGWAY AND WAS INFORMED OF THE LEAK BY THE PRESIDENT WHO WAS GREATLY DISTURBED . GEN BRADLEY VOLUNTEERED TO HANDLE THE MATTER AS THE PRESIDENT FELT THE STORY MIGHT UPSET THE ENTIRE TRUCE NEGOTIATIONS. GEN BRADLEY RELATED WHITEHAIR HAD CALLED PEARSON CONCERNING THE COLUMN AND PEARSON DECLARED NOTHING IN THE COLUMN ENDANGERED SECURITY AND ADDING THE COLUMN HAD ALREADY BEEN DISPATCHED. COL CLIFTON STATED HE DEEMED IT ADVISABLE TO VERIFY THIS AND CONTACTED RUSS WIGGINS, WASHINGTON POST, WHO INFORMED HIM THE STORY DID NOT APPEAR IN COLUMNS PREPARED FOR PUBLICATION DEC THIRTEEN AND FOURTEEN. CLIFTON THEREAFTER CONTACTED ANDERSON AND TOLD ANDERSON THERE WAS GREAT ALARM OVER THE COLUMN WHICH ENDANGERED THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. IN REPLY ANDERSON TOLD CLIFTON IF THERE WAS ANYTHING IN THE COLUMN THAT WAS A VIOLATION OF SECURITY HE DID NOT WANT TO PUBLISH IT. ANDERSON AGREED TO BRING THE COLUMN OVER TO GEN BRADLEYS OFFICE AND GO OVER IT AND SAID HE WOULD DO SO IF IN EXCHANGE COL CLIFTON WOULD TELL HIM HOW CLIFTON HAD FOUND OUT ABOUT THE COLUMN. TO THIS CLIFTON SAID HE AGREED. SHORTLY THEREAFTER ANDERSON CAME OVER TO THE PENTAGON TO GEN BRADLEYS OFFICE AND THERE IN THE PRESENCE OF GEN BRADLEY, ANDERSON, CLIFTON AND COL MATHEWS THE COLUMN WAS READ ALOUD BY GEN BRADLEY. GEN BRADLEY POINTED TO TWO ITEMS IN THE COLUMN WHICH GEN BRADLEY CONSIDERED DANGEROUS AS REFLECTING THINKING AT HIGH LEVEL WHICH WOULD LEAD COMMUNISTS TO BELIEVE WE WERE TOO

WFO 6060

ANXIOUS FOR AN ARMISTICE. CLIFTON STATED THE COLUMN INDICATED THAT THE PRESIDENT COMMENTED WE SHOULD DO EVERYTHING WE CAN TO OBTAIN A CEASE FIRE BUT SHOULD MAKE NO CONCESSIONS THAT WE WILL REGRET LATER. HE STATED GEN BRADLEY FELT THIS SHOULD BE CHANGED AND IT WAS AGREED THAT THE FIRST PORTION SHOULD BE DELETED AND MADE TO READ THAT THE PRESIDENT COMMENTED WE SHOULD NOT MAKE ANY CONCESSIONS WHICH WE WOULD REGRET LATER. THE SECOND OBJECTIONABLE ITEM INDICATED THAT WE WOULD GRANT AN EXTENSION OF A FEW DAYS IF DETAILS WERE NOT WORKED OUT BY DEC TWENTY SEVEN FIFTY ONE. GEN BRADLEY INSISTED THIS SHOULD BE CHANGED AND MADE TO READ: UNDOUBTEDLY THERE WILL BE SOME DETAILS THAT WILL HAVE TO BE WORKED OUT AFTER THE DEC TWENTY SEVEN DEADLINE. FOLLOWING THE TWO CORRECTIONS AT THE PLACES MARKED ON THE TEXT BY GEN BRADLEY AS COL MATTHEWS HAS STATED IT WAS AGREED ALL AROUND THAT THE COLUMN WOULD NOT BE HARMFUL AND IN FACT MIGHT BE HELPFUL. ALTHOUGH GEN BRADLEY DID NOT APPROVE OR DISAPPROVE THE PUBLICATION AND DID NOT AFFIRM OR DENY THE TRUTH OR ACCURACY OF THE STATEMENTS, THE CORRECTIONS IMPOSED ON HIM BY ANDERSON'S PRESENTATION IN EFFECT CONSTITUTED AN APPROVAL. COL CLIFTON INDICATED THIS IS NECESSARY ROUTINE HANDLING OF STORIES WHICH CONSTITUTE ACCOMPLISHED SCOOPS OF NEWS AND ALTHOUGH THEY ARE UNABLE TO PREVENT PUBLICATION THEY ENDEAVOR TO PROTECT NATIONAL INTEREST BY PERSUADING REPORTERS NOT TO PUBLISH ANY ITEMS WHICH WOULD ENDANGER NATIONAL SECURITY. COL CLIFTON ALSO RECALLED THE COLUMN MENTIONED

WFO 6060

THE PRESIDENTS ENTRANCE INTO THE CONFERENCE ROOM WHERE HE GREETED EVERYONE IN GOOD SPIRITS AND ASKED QUOTE HOW DO YOU ALL LIKE MY SUNTAN UNQUOTE. HE ALSO RECALLED AN ITEM SUBHEADED QUOTE SILENT ADMIRAL UNQUOTE WHICH QUOTED A STATEMENT BY ADM FECHTELER THAT THE NAVY STANDS READY TO CARRY ON ITS PART IN THE KOREAN WAR IF CALLED ON ANY TIME, ANY PLACE AND UNDER ANY CONDITIONS. COL CLIFTON ADVISED IN DEALING WITH ANDERSON THE LATTER STATED HE HAD MORE DETAILS THAN SET FORTH IN THE COLUMN AND MENTIONED TWO ITEMS, ONE QUOTING GEN COLLINS CONCERNING ROTATION OF TROOPS AND WHAT SHOULD BE DONE ABOUT IT. ANOTHER QUOTED GEN VANDENBERG CONCERNING HOW THE AIR WAR WOULD AFFECT US. ANDERSON CLAIMED THAT HE HAD OMITTED THESE ITEMS AS AFFECTING SECURITY. COL CLIFTON STATED THE COLUMN OF ROBERT S. ALLEN IN THE NY DAILY MIRROR LAST NIGHT DEC THIRTEEN FIFTY ONE CONTAINED A FULL RESUME OF THE WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE AND IN FACT WENT INTO GREATER DETAIL THAN DID THE PEARSON COLUMN. CLIFTON EXPRESSED THE OPINION THAT ALLEN HAD SCOOPED PEARSON BY TWO DAYS AND IN ADDITION TO THE MATERIAL USED BY ANDERSON IN THE ORIGINAL COLUMN BEFORE DELETION OF TWO ITEMS BY GEN BRADLEY. THE COLUMN IN THE NY MIRROR BY ALLEN ALSO CONTAINED THE TWO QUOTATIONS FROM GEN COLLINS AND FROM GEN VANDENBERG, WHICH QUOTATIONS JACK ANDERSON HAD DECLINED TO USE ON THE GROUNDS OF SECURITY. COL CLIFTON STATED HE HAD DISPLAYED THIS COLUMN TO CLAYTON FRITCHEY, CHIEF OF PUBLIC

WFO 6060

INFORMATION, DEPT OF DEFENSE, WHO INFORMED CLIFTON HE WAS FAMILIAR WITH THE MATTER, THAT HE WAS AT THE HOME OF DREW PEARSON PLAYING BRIDGE ON THE EVENING OF DEC TWELVE WHEN ANDERSON CALLED PEARSON TO INFORM HIM OF THE CALL RECEIVED FROM GEN BRADLEYS OFFICE. FRITCHEY RELATED TO CLIFTON THAT PEARSON HAD DISPLAYED A COPY OF THE COLUMN TO FRITCHEY WHO EXPRESSED THE OPINION THAT IT WAS NOT HARMFUL. LATER AFTER THE CHANGES WERE MADE UPON OBJECTION BY GEN BRADLEY AS RELATED BY CLIFTON TO FRITCHEY, CLIFTON STATED FRITCHEY EXPRESSED THE OPINION HE DID NOT SEE ANYTHING WRONG WITH PUBLISHING THE COLUMN IN EITHER FORM. IN CONCLUSION COL CLIFTON REMARKED THAT HE WAS FAMILIAR WITH PEARSONS STYLE OF WRITING AND INFORMATION TECHNIQUES AND BELIEVED THE SOURCE OF INSTANT LEAK WAS SOME INDIVIDUAL WHO ATTENDED THE PRESIDENTS CONFERENCE. COL CLIFTON EXPRESSED THE OPINION THAT AFTER READING THE STORY BY ROBERT ALLEN IN THE NY MIRROR, CLIFTON CONCLUDED IN ALL PROBABILITY THE SAME SOURCE WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR GIVING THE STORY TO BOTH COLUMNS.

HOOD

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

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CONF WASH AND WASH FLD FROM NEW YORK 1 15 12-22 PM
DIRECTOR AND WFO URGENT

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102-2
New Ref.
ATTENTION INSPECTOR CARL HENNRICH
COLUMN OF ROBERT S. ALLEN, N. Y. POST DEC., THIRTEEN FIFTYONE. REF
TEL CALL INSPECTOR HENNRICH DEC FOURTEEN LAST. NY POST "BLUE FINAL"
EDITION DEC THIRTEEN LAST CONTAINS COLUMN OF ALLEN WHICH IS QUOTED
AS FOLLOWS "REDS- CEASE-FIRE TERMS N. G. BY ROBERT S. ALLEN -
WASHINGTON, DEC, THIRTEEN- THE UN CAN HAVE A CEASE FIRE IN KOREA,
BUT AT THE COST OF IMPORTANT CONCESSIONS TO THE REDS.

THAT-S WHAT THE JOINT CHIEFS TOLD THE PRESIDENT IN THEIR BIG
CONFERENCE WITH HIM AFTER HIS RETURN. GEN. BRADLEY DECLARED THE POR-
TRACTED TRUCE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE REACHED THE POINT "WHERE A FEW CON-
CESSIONS ON BOTH SIDES COULD BRING AN AGREEMENT IF THE COMMUNISTS
REALLY WANT ONE."

"WHAT DO THEY WANT QUESTIONMARK" ASKED THE PRESIDNT.

"THE DEADLOCK GETS DOWN TO THIS," EXPLAINED BRADLEY. "WE ARE DE-
MANDING THE RIGHT TO CONTINUE TO ROTATE OUR TROOPS AS WE HAVE BEEN
DOING FOR MONTHS. THE REDS ARE FLATLY REFUSING TO ALLOW THAT. THEY
ARE INSISTING ON A COMPLETE FREEZE ON REPLACEMENTS AND WEAPONS. BUT
THEY HAVE INDICATED THEY WOULD MAKE CONCESSIONS ON THAT IF WE WILL
ALLOW THEM TO BUILD SOME AIRFIELDS IN NORTH KOREA. WE HAVE REFUSED
TO DO THAT. OBVIOUSLY, THEY ARE USING THE ROTATION ISSUE TO TRY TO
WREST CONCESSIONS FROM US ON THE AIRFIELD DEMAND."

END OF PAGE ONE

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PAGE TWO

GEN. HOYT VANDENBERG VIGOROUSLY OPPOSED GIVING ANY GROUND ON THAT.

"I WANT A CEASE FIRE, IF ONE CAN BE WORKED OUT THAT IS FAIR AND PROPER," DECLARED THE AIR CHIEF OF STAFF. "BUT I DON-T SEE HOW WE CAN SAFELY DO ANYTHING THAT WILL ENABLE THE REDS TO BUILD UP THEIR AIR STRENGTH. THAT IS WHAT PERMITTING THEM TO BUILD AIRFIELDS WILL AMOUNT TO. SUCH BASES IN NORTH KOREA WILL BE OF GREAT COMBAT VALUE TO THEM, IF THEY DECIDE TO BREAK THE TRUCE NEXT SPRING, WHICH I WOULDN-T PUT PAST THEM."

GEN. J. LAWTON COLLINS WAS INCLINED TO FAVOR SOME TERMS ON THE AIR-FIELD DISPUTE. HE THOUGHT SOMETHING COULD BE WORKED OUT ON THAT. BUT THE ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF WAS ADAMANT IN INSISTING THE COMMUNISTS BE REQUIRED TO AGREE TO ROTATION OF UN GROOPS.

"THAT WOULD BE A SERIOUS BLOW TO THE MORALE OF OUR MEN," COLINS ARGUED. "I AM STRONGLY OPPOSED TO ANY CONCESSION ON THAT. IT IS AN UNFAIR DEMAND, AND THE ONLY REASON THEREDS ^{ARE} ~~ON~~ MAKING IT IS TO TRY TO FORCE US TO GIVE IN ON AIRFIELDS.

"OUR ARMY CAN HOLD THE PRESENT LINE UNTIL HELL FREEZES OVER, AND I AM FLATLY OPPOSED TO GIVING THE SLIGHTEST GROUND ON THE REPLACE-MENT ISSUE. THE REDS WOULD HAVE THE SAME RIGHT AS US ON THAT, AND I DON-T SEE WHY THEY SHOULD OBJECT TO IT, EXCEPT FOR TRADING PURPOSES."
END OF PAGE TWO

PAGE THREE

BRADLEY AGREED WITH COLLINS, BUT EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF NOT ALLOWING THE COMMUNISTS TO BUILD UP A POWERFUL AIRFORCE.

PRESIDENT TRUMAN LISTENED INTENTLY TO THE MILITARY LEADERS AND SAID NOTHING UNTIL THEY FINISHED. THEN HE TOLD THEM-

"AS YOU KNOW I AM VERY ANXIOUS TO BRING THE FIGHTING TO AN END IF THAT IS POSSIBLE. BUT I WILL NOT AGREE TO CONCESSIONS TO THE COMMUNISTS THAT WE MAY REGRET LATER ON. WE WANT TO BE VERY CAREFUL THAT WE DO NOT SELL OURSELVES SHORT IN OUR EAGERNESS TO SECURE A TRUCE FOR OUR MEN."

ALSO DISCUSSED WAS THE QUESTION OF BUILDING UP THE SOUTH KOREAN ARMY, AS THIS COLUMN HAS REPORTED WAS PROPOSED BY GENERAL RIDGWAY.

" COPY OF COLUMN MAILED BUREAU DECEMBER FIFTEEN

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12-15-51

WASHINGTON FROM WASH FIELD

15 2:00 P.M.

DIRECTOR

U R G E N T

DREW PEARSON, ALLEGED LEAK FROM WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE DEC TEN FIFTY ONE, TO JACK ANDERSON, LEG-MAN FOR DREW PEARSON, ESP DASH X. GEN. ROBERT LANDRY AIR FORCE AID TO THE PRESIDENT, ATTENDED MEETING AT WHITE HOUSE DEALING WITH PROBLEMS IN WESTERN PACIFIC AND WESTERN EUROPE ON DEC. TEN LAST, AND REGARDS IT AS MOST IMPORTANT HE HAS ATTENDED THERE. HE KNEW OF CONFERENCE BEING SCHEDULED WHILE AT KEY WEST WITH PRESIDENT. FOLLOWING STAFF CONFERENCE WITH PRESIDENT AT TEN A.M., DECEMBER TEN LAST, LANDRY INQUIRED IF STAFF SHOULD ATTEND THE MAIN CONFERENCE, AND PRESIDENT ADVISED AFFIRMATIVELY. LANDRY STATES NO STENOGRAPHER PRESENT, AND HE KNOWS OF NO NOTES MADE DURING OR AFTER CONFERENCE. CONFERENCE LASTED APPROXIMATELY ONE HOUR. HE SAW NO ONE ENTER OR LEAVE ROOM DURING CONFERENCE. NO AGENDA FURNISHED IN ADVANCE. PRESIDENT ENTERED, SHOOK HANDS WITH ALL PRESENT AND STARTED CONFERENCE BY EXPRESSING CONCERN OVER WORLD CONDITIONS, ESPECIALLY IN KOREA. PRESIDENT EXPRESSED FEAR THAT LET-DOWN OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD LOWER MORALE IN THIS COUNTRY AND ALSO STATED HE WAS INTERESTED BECAUSE IT WOULD BE A DIFFICULT YEAR. PRESIDENT ASKED FOR VIEWS ON THESE MATTERS AND FOR BRIEFING ON KOREAN SITUATION BY GEN. BRADLEY. BRADLEY REPORTED LITTLE PROGRESS ON ARMISTICE AND THAT UN COULD NOT YIELD ON ANY MAJOR POINTS. LANDRY BELIEVES BRADLEY BROUGHT UP QUESTION OF REHABILITATION

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65-6060-4

OF RAILROADS, ROADS, ETC., BUT BRADLEY THOUGHT IT NOT A MAJOR ISSUE AND WAS ONE ON WHICH UN MIGHT YIELD. PRESIDENT WANTED ADVISERS OPINIONS ON THIS. BRADLEY ALSO DISCUSSED RED AIR FORCE SITUATION. GEN. COLLINS ASSURED PRESIDENT UN FORCES COULD NOT BE DISLODGED FROM KOREA. DISCUSSION OF WHAT UN TO DO IF ARMISTICE FAILED LED TO STATEMENT THAT THEN UN MIGHT HAVE TO USE CERTAIN THINGS AND REDS SHOULD BE SO ADVISED. ADMIRAL FECHTELER OPPOSED ANY COMMITMENT WE MIGHT BE FORCED TO CHANGE THROUGH INTERNATIONAL CHANGE, BUT INSISTED ON TAKING A FIRM STAND. GEN. VANDERBERG SPOKE OF AIR SITUATION AND RECOMMENDED COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL TO JAPAN OF OUR FORCES IN KOREA, IN EVENT OF CEASE FIRE TO AVOID BEING TRAPPED AND TELL REDS IF THEY PROCEED FURTHER, IT MEANS ALL-OUT WAR. VANDERBERG'S VIEW ON THIS DIFFERS FROM OTHERS PRESENT. PRESIDENT FINALLY AGREED WITH BRADLEY'S VIEW ON REHABILITATION OF RAILROADS AND ROADS. SECRETARY LOVETT OPPOSED YIELDING OF ANY MAJOR POINTS TO REDS. ACTING SECRETARY OF NAVY, WHITEHAIR, OF OPINION ASIATIC PEOPLE CONTENT TO CARRY ON NEGOTIATIONS INDEFINITELY. SECRETARY FRANK PACE AGREED WITH BRADLEY AND FELT UN WON ITS POINT IN STOPPING AGGRESSION AND PUSHING ENEMY BACK TO ITS OWN LAND AND THESE POINTS TO BE CONSIDERED IN PRESENT NEGOTIATIONS. PACE ALSO CONCERNED OVER BUILD-UP OF RED AIR FORCE. FREEMAN MATTHEWS, OF STATE DEPARTMENT, OF OPINION PROGRESS MADE ON PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AND STATE DEPT. AND MILITARY MEN ARE IN AGREEMENT ON NEGOTIATIONS. RELATIVE WESTERN EUROPE, SECRETARY LOVETT EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER FRENCH FINANCES AND STATED BRITAIN CANNOT MEET MILITARY COMMITMENTS. HIS OPINION GERMANY IS KEY TO BUILD-UP OF STRENGTH OF WESTERN EUROPE. PACE STATED HE FOUND TROOP MORALE AND SPIRIT GOOD IN

AUSTRIA AND GERMANY. LANDRY BELIEVES PRESIDENT CONTENT WITH PRESENT POLICIES OF NEGOTIATIONS. PRESIDENT STATED GLAD FOR THEIR IDEAS AND EMPHASIZED THERE MUST BE NO LET-DOWN. LANDRY DOES NOT RECALL PRESIDENT STOPPING TO CONVERSE WITH ANYONE WHILE DEPARTING FROM CABINET ROOM. ON LEAVING CONFERENCE, LANDRY STOPPED IN MAT CONNOLLY-S OFFICE, AND JOE SHORT, SECRETARY, ASKED IF PRESIDENT DESIGNATED SOMEONE TO SEE SHORT ABOUT ISSUING PRESS RELEASE. ADMIRAL DENNIS AND CONNOLLY WERE PRESENT THEN. LANDRY SAID NO AND SUGGESTED SHORT SEE PRESIDENT OR LOVETT. LANDRY KNOWS OF NOTHING BEING PUT IN WRITING ABOUT THIS CONFERENCE. HE STATES HE HAS DISCUSSED IT WITH NO ONE BUT PRESIDENT SINCE THEN. LANDRY STATES NOT PERSONALLY ACQUAINTED AND HAS HAD NO CONTACT WITH DREW PEARSON OR JACK ANDERSON. LAST SAW PEARSON OVER ONE YEAR AGO. HAS NO INFORMATION CONCERNING POSSIBLE SOURCE OF LEAK OF INFORMATION.

HOOD

12-15-51

WASHINGTON FROM WASH FIELD

15

5:30 PM

DIRECTOR

U R G E N T

DREW PEARSON, ALLEGED LEAK FROM WHITEHOUSE CONFERENCE DEC TEN, FIFTYONE, TO JACK ANDERSON, LEG-MAN FOR DREW PEARSON, ESP DASH X. JAMES E. LAY, JR., EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, INTERVIEWED HIS OFFICE THIS DATE. HE FURNISHED GENERAL INFO AS TO TOPICS DISCUSSED AT PRESIDENT'S CONFERENCE MORNING OF DEC TEN LAST. LAY STATES HE TOOK PERSONAL NOTES AT CONFERENCE FOR BENEFIT OF PRESIDENT AND PLACED THEM IN LAY'S OFFICE SAFE. HE DESCRIBED NOTES AS PERSONAL PROPERTY OF PRESIDENT, THEREFORE NO REQUEST MADE BY INTERVIEWING AGENTS TO PRODUCE NOTES PENDING BUREAU AUTHORITY. LAY STATES HIS SECRETARY WOULD HAVE ACCESS TO SAFE BUT DOUBTS ANYONE BUT HE PERSONALLY COULD INTERPRET THEM. LAY ADVISED HE BRIEFED HIS DEPUTY, S. EVERETT GLEASON, AS TO COMMENTS OF VARIOUS INDIVIDUALS PRESENT AT CONFERENCE. STATES GLEASON IS HIS ALTERNATE AND KEEPS HIM PERSONALLY ADVISED ON SUCH MATTERS IN ORDER THAT HE BE AS WELL INFORMED AS LAY. LAY COMMENTED AS FOLLOWS CONCERNING FOLLOWING PORTION OF ROBERT S. ALLEN ARTICLE AS REFLECTED IN NY TEL. QUOTE THE UN CAN HAVE A CEASE FIRE IN KOREA BUT AT THE COST OF IMPORTANT CONCESSIONS TO THE REDS. THAT'S WHAT THE JOINT CHIEFS TOLD THE PRESIDENT

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WFO 65-6060

IN THEIR BIG CONFERENCE WITH HIM AFTER HIS RETURN. GEN BRADLEY DECLARED THE PROTRACTED TRUCE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE REACHED THE POINT WHERE A FEW CONCESSIONS ON BOTH SIDES COULD BRING AN AGREEMENT IF THE COMMUNISTS REALLY WANT ONE. END QUOTE. LAY DESCRIBED THIS AS A GOOD SUMMATION OF BRADLEY'S IDEAS PRESENTED AT THE CONFERENCE. AS TO THE ALLEGED STATEMENT OF GEN VANDENBERG IN ALLEN'S ARTICLE, QUOTE I WANT A CEASE FIRE IF ONE CAN BE WORKED OUT THAT IS FAIR AND PROPER. BUT I DON'T SEE HOW WE CAN SAFELY DO ANYTHING THAT WILL ENABLE THE REDS TO BUILD UP THEIR AIR STRENGTH. THAT IS WHAT PERMITTING THEM TO BUILD AIR FIELDS WILL AMOUNT TO. SUCH BASES IN NORTH KOREA WILL BE OF GREAT COMBAT VALUE TO THEM IF THEY DECIDE TO BREAK THE TRUCE NEXT SPRING, WHICH I WOULDN'T PUT PAST THEM. UNQUOTE. LAY STATED THAT THIS QUOTATION WAS DEFINITELY ERRONEOUS AND WAS NOT DISCUSSED BY VANDENBERG AT THE CONFERENCE. ACCORDING TO LAY, VANDENBERG MADE NO SUCH STATEMENT AT THE CONFERENCE, BUT INDICATED AGREEMENT WITH SUGGESTION OF GEN BRADLEY THAT POSSIBLY CONCESSIONS ON AIR FIELDS MIGHT BE MADE IN THE FUTURE. LAY COULD NOT RECALL A STATEMENT ATTRIBUTED TO GEN J. LAWTON COLLINS THAT THE COMMUNISTS' REFUSAL TO AGREE ON ROTATION OF TROOPS WAS QUOTE AN UNFAIR DEMAND AND THE ONLY REASON THE REDS ARE MAKING IT IS TO TRY TO FORCE US TO GIVE IN ON AIR FIELDS. END QUOTE. LAY FURTHER COULD NOT RECALL A

WFO 65-6060

STATEMENT ATTRIBUTED TO COLLINS BY ALLEN AS TO THE REPLACEMENT
ISSUE THAT QUOTE THE REDS WOULD HAVE THE SAME RIGHT AS US ON
THAT AND I DON'T SEE WHY THEY SHOULD OBJECT TO IT EXCEPT FOR
TRADING PURPOSES. UNQUOTE. LAY DESCRIBED ALLEN'S REPORT AS TO
THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT REGARDING CONCESSIONS AS AN
EXCELLENT RESUME OF THE PRESIDENT'S ATTITUDE. LAY WAS OF THE
OPINION THAT INFORMATION RELATING TO THE PRESIDENT'S ATTITUDE
AS TO CONCESSIONS COULD ONLY HAVE COME FROM SOMEONE ATTENDING
THE CONFERENCE INASMUCH AS HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT SUCH ATTITUDE
WAS CLEARLY KNOWN TO ANYONE UNTIL THE CONFERENCE. UNDERSECRETARY
OF STATE JAMES E. WEBB AND ASS'T SECRETARY OF STATE H. FREEMAN
MATTHEWS INTERVIEWED DEC FOURTEEN LAST. BOTH FURNISHED GENERAL
INFORMATION AS TO MATTERS DISCUSSED AT CONFERENCE. ROBERT S.
ALLEN ARTICLE NOT AVAILABLE THAT DATE AND THUS THEIR REACTIONS
THERE TO NOT KNOWN AT PRESENT. EFFORTS WILL BE MADE TO DISCUSS
SAID ARTICLE ^{EARLY} ~~WHEN~~ NEXT WEEK.

HOOD

12-15-51

WASHINGTON FROM WASH FIELD

15

7:00 P.M.

DIRECTOR

U R G E N T

DREW PEARSON, ALLEGED LEAK FROM WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE DECEMBER TEN, FIFTY ONE, TO JACK ANDERSON, LEG-MAN FOR DREW PEARSON, ESPIONAGE DASH X. — ADMIRAL WILLIAM M. FECHTELER, CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, ON INTERVIEW, ADVISED HE ATTENDED WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE TEN THIRTY AM, MONDAY, DECEMBER TEN LAST, ALSO ATTENDED BY MESSRS. LOVETT, WHITEHAIR, PACE, FINLETTER; GENERALS BRADLEY, COLLINS AND VANDENBERG, AS WELL AS MESSRS. WEBB AND MATTHEWS, STATE DEPT. ALSO PRESENT, IN ADDITION, WERE MR. LAY, ADMIRAL DENNISON, ADMIRAL LANDRY, GENERAL VAUGHAN AND GENERAL CABELL. FECHTELER RECALLED ALL PRESENT WERE SEATED WHEN PRESIDENT ARRIVED, AND AFTER SHAKING HANDS AND PERSONALLY GREETING EVERYONE IN ROOM OPENED THE MEETING. GEN. BRADLEY, AS FIRST SPEAKER, GAVE A RESUME OF THE MILITARY SITUATION IN KOREA, DISCUSSED THE GROUND SITUATION, COMMENTED ON THE AIR BUILD-UP OF THE COMMUNISTS FORCES AND MENTIONED THE NAVY AND AIR INTERDICTION IN THE EASTERN SECTION. FOLLOWING GEN. BRADLEY, MR. LOVETT SPOKE, IN GENERAL DETAILS, CONCERNING THE PROGRESS OF THE KOREAN PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AND BROUGHT OUT THAT ALL WERE EXASPERATED BY THE SLOWNESS; HOWEVER, SOME PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE THOUGH NOT AS FAST AS WE WISHED. ACCORDING TO FECHTELER, THE PRESIDENT PROCEEDED AROUND THE CONFERENCE TABLE ASKING FOR VIEWS OF THE STATE DEPT., AND MR. WEBB DEFERRED TO MR. MATTHEWS, WHO

65-6060
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SPOKE BRIEFLY, DETAILS NOT RECALLED. THEREAFTER, MR. FINLETTER MENTIONED THE IMPORTANCE IN GETTING AN ARMISTICE AND MENTIONED THE IMPORTANCE IN NOT PERMITTING COMMUNISTS TO REBUILD THEIR AIRFIELDS. ADM. FECHTELER STATED HE NEXT VOICED HIS MISGIVINGS RE PROPOSALS OF THE STATE DEPT. TO HAVE THE SIXTEEN NATIONS OF THE UN MAKE CERTAIN THREATS TO THE COMMUNISTS AS TO WHAT WOULD BE DONE IF THEY VIOLATED THE TERMS OF THE ARMISTICE, AND HE RECALLED, AT THIS POINT, EITHER MR. WEBB OR MR. MATTHEWS OF THE STATE DEPT. VOICED SOME DISAGREEMENT WITH ADM. FECHTELER AND INDICATED THAT A THREAT OF RETALIATION WOULD BE SOME DETERRENT TO THE COMMUNISTS SHOULD THEY VIOLATE THE TERMS OF THE ARMISTICE. FECHTELER STATED, APPARENTLY, SOME PLACE IN THE CONFERENCE THERE WAS SOME QUESTION AS TO THEIR ABILITY TO HOLD OUT IN KOREA, AND GENERAL COLLINS TOOK SOME EXCEPTION AND MADE A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT THE COMMUNISTS CAN'T RUN US OUT OF KOREA. ADM. FECHTELER RECALLED GENERAL VANDENBERG TALKED ABOUT THE RUSSIAN MIGS PAREN RUSSIAN AIRPLANES UNPAREN, AND IN RELATION TO THE MIGS AND THE PRESENT BUILD-UP OF THE COMMUNISTS AIR FORCES, GEN. VANDENBERG POINTED OUT THE VULNERABILITY OF OUR AIR FORCES IN RELATION TO THE BUILD-UP OF COMMUNISTS AIR FIELDS. FECHTELER STATED MR. WHITEHAIR ALSO MADE A SHORT TALK, ALTHOUGH ON MATTERS GENERALLY NOT PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT TO THE POINTS UNDER DISCUSSION. HE ALSO RECALLED THERE WAS SOME DISCUSSION OF THE SITUATION IN EUROPE AND RECALLED MR. PAGE GAVE A GLOWING REPORT ON THE MORALE OF OUR FORCES IN EUROPE. ADM. FECHTELER POINTED OUT HE GATHERED AT THIS CONFERENCE THAT THERE HAD BEEN SOME PRIVATE

PRIOR CONVERSATIONS WITH PRESIDENT TRUMAN OVER THE POINTS IN DISCUSSION AND HE EXPRESSED THE BELIEF THAT INSTANT CONFERENCE WAS A SORT OF WINDOW DRESSING TO FORMALIZE THE POLICY. FECHTELER WAS COGNIZANT THAT JACK ANDERSON, PEARSON LEG-MAN, HAD PREPARED A COLUMN RELATIVE TO THIS CONFERENCE, HAVING LEARNED THIS ON WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER TWELVE, FROM DAN KIMBALL, SECRETARY OF THE NAVY. FECHTELER ADVISED HE DID NOT KNOW DREW PEARSON, ANDERSON OR ANY PEARSON EMPLOYEES, AND HAD NO SUGGESTION AS TO HOW LEAK MAY HAVE OCCURRED. ALTHOUGH FECHTELER CONFIDENTIALLY POINTED OUT THAT DURING THE TENURE OF OFFICE OF FRANCIS P. MATTHEWS, FORMER SECRETARY OF NAVY, ADMIRAL FORREST SHERMAN HAD TOLD [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] ALSO CONFIDENTIALLY STATED DURING THE WAR [REDACTED] HAD CONFIDED THAT HE HAD THE SAME EXPERIENCE WITH [REDACTED] ALSO CONFIDENTIALLY POINTED OUT HE SHARED THE GENERAL FEELING THAT [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] ALTHOUGH HE POINTED OUT HE WAS MAKING NO INFERENCES OR ACCUSATIONS, AND AGAIN INSISTED HE HAD NO SUGGESTIONS AS TO HOW INSTANT LEAK MAY HAVE OCCURRED. ADMIRAL FECHTELER WAS MADE COGNIZANT OF THE COLUMN BY ROBERT S. ALLEN IN THE NEW YORK POST DECEMBER THIRTEEN, WHICH WAS BASED UPON THE WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE, AND ALTHOUGH FECHTELER ADVISED HE COULD NOT VERIFY ANY OF THE CONTENTS AS TO ACTUAL QUOTATIONS HE CONSIDERED THE ALLEN COLUMN TO BE SUBSTANTIALLY AN ACCURATE REPORT OF THE SUBSTANCE OF THE CONFERENCE AND EXPRESSED THE BELIEF IT MUST HAVE BEEN PREPARED ONLY THROUGH THE ASSISTANCE OF A LEAK FROM SOMEONE

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PRESENT. AFTER GOING OVER THE ALLEN COLUMN, FICHTELER CONCLUDED HE
COULD SEE NO INACCURACIES IN IT.

MAJOR GENERAL CHARLES P. CABELL, USAF, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF,
ADVISED HE ATTENDED THE WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE MONDAY, DECEMBER TEN; THAT
THIS WAS THE FIRST SUCH CONFERENCE HE EVER ATTENDED AND DID SO ONLY AS AN
OBSERVER AND TOOK NO PART IN THE DISCUSSIONS. GENERAL CABELL WAS UNABLE
TO RECALL SPECIFICALLY WHAT WAS SAID, BY WHOM AND IN WHAT ORDER THE
SPEAKERS OFFERED THEIR CONTRIBUTIONS. CABELL WAS UNAWARE THAT INSTANT
INVESTIGATION HAD BEEN UNDERTAKEN, ALSO UNAWARE THAT ANY ALLEGED LEAK
HAD OCCURRED CONCERNING THE PRESIDENTIAL CONFERENCE. CABELL ADVISED HE
DID NOT KNOW DREW PEARSON EXCEPT BELIEVES HE MET PEARSON CASUALLY ON
ONE OCCASION A LONG TIME AGO AND PROBABLY WOULD KNOW BY SIGHT; DOES
NOT KNOW JACK ANDERSON OR ANY OTHER PEARSON EMPLOYEE. IN CONNECTION WITH
THE DISCUSSION AT THE CONFERENCE, CABELL ADVISED HE COULD NOT RECALL
ANY MENTION MADE ABOUT EXTENDING THE CEASE FIRE NEGOTIATIONS DEADLINE,
AND SAID HE DID NOT THINK THE PRESIDENT OR ANYONE ELSE MENTIONED
THIS. HE SAID THERE MIGHT HAVE BEEN A QUESTION POSED BY SOMEONE IN ATTENDANCE
CONCERNING WHAT WOULD HAPPEN WHEN THE THIRTY DAY DEADLINE WAS PASSED,
AND NO AGREEMENTS REACHED, BUT CABELL POINTED OUT THAT QUESTION HAD
ARISEN MANY TIMES PREVIOUSLY, IN VARIOUS JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF MEETINGS
ATTENDED BY CABELL, AND HE COULD NOT RECALL THAT THAT POINT WAS MENTIONED
AT THE PRESIDENTIAL CONFERENCE. THE TEXT OF THE COLUMN OF ROBERT S. ALLEN
IN THE NEW YORK POST DECEMBER THIRTEEN LAST WAS BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF

GENERAL CABELL, AND HE EXPRESSED THE BELIEF IT WAS NOT AN ACCURATE ACCOUNT OF THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE PRESIDENTIAL CONFERENCE. FOR INSTANCE, CABELL POINTED OUT THAT HE BELIEVES THE COMMENTS ATTRIBUTED TO GENERAL COLLINS IN THE ALLEN COLUMN WERE MORE IN LINE WITH THINGS GENERAL COLLINS HAD SAID PREVIOUSLY, INCLUDING COMMENTS MADE BY HIM AT FORMER CHIEFS OF STAFF MEETINGS. CABELL BELIEVED THE STATEMENT ATTRIBUTED BY ALLEN TO PRESIDENT TRUMAN WAS ACCURATE IN SUBSTANCE, BUT WAS NOT A VERBATIM ACCOUNT. IN APPRAISAL OF THE ALLEN COLUMN, CABELL STATED IT CONTAINED A CONTINUOUS THREAD TO INDICATE ALLEN HAD AN INFORMANT WHO ATTENDED THE CONFERENCE. CABELL POINTED OUT SOME OF THOSE IN ATTENDANCE AT THE CONFERENCE WERE NOT KNOWN TO HIM; ALSO OTHERS WERE NOT INTIMATELY KNOWN TO HIM, BUT HE COULD NOT SUGGEST ANY PERSON OR PERSONS ATTENDING THAT CONFERENCE AS HAVING BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR ANY LEAK.

HOOD

12-15-51

WASHINGTON FROM WASH FIELD

15

8:00 P.M.

DIRECTOR

U R G E N T

DREW PEARSON, ALLEGED LEAK FROM WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE DECEMBER TEN, FIFTY ONE, TO JACK ANDERSON, LEG-MAN FOR DREW PEARSON, ESPIONAGE DASH X. PRESIDENTIAL AIDE GENERAL HARRY VAUGHAN INTERVIEWED THIS DATE. UNABLE SUGGEST IDENTITY PERSON RESPONSIBLE FOR LEAK. STATES, HOWEVER, FROM STANDPOINT OF SECURITY, STATE DEPT. WEAKEST OF ALL GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS THIS AREA, BUT HAS NOTHING SPECIFIC TO INDICATE STATE DEPT. INVOLVED IN LEAK OF INFORMATION UNDER INVESTIGATION. VAUGHAN WAS FURNISHED MATERIAL CONTAINED IN ALLEN ARTICLE, APPEARING IN NEW YORK POST DECEMBER THIRTEEN, AND INFORMS MATERIAL, WHILE NOT CONSISTING QUOTES OF STATEMENTS AND VIEWS EXPRESSED AT CONFERENCE, IS EXTREMELY ACCURATE, AND STATES IT WOULD BE QUOTE MIRACULOUS UNQUOTE IF THE INDIVIDUAL WRITING IT DID SO WITHOUT ACTUALLY HAVING ATTENDED THE CONFERENCE OR WITHOUT HAVING ACCESS TO A PERSON WHO DID ATTEND. DENIES ANY TYPE OF PERTINENT CONTACT WITH PEARSON OR ASSOCIATES AND STATES PEARSON HAS SOME ENMITY TOWARD HIM FOR NUMER OF YEARS.

SECRETARY OF THE ARMY FRANK PACE INTERVIEWED THIS DATE AND ADVISED THAT HE COULD NOT FURNISH ANY INFORMATION RELATIVE TO THE ALLEGED LEAK. THE ARTICLE PREPARED BY ROBERT S. ALLEN WAS READ TO PACE, AND HE ADVISED THAT IT WAS POSSIBLE THAT SOMEONE, WHO WAS NOT IN ATTENDANCE, COULD HAVE PREPARED IT, BUT THAT THIS WAS IMPROBABLE. HE STATED THAT THE

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65-6060-7

MATERIAL APPEARING IN THE ARTICLE WAS ESSENTIALLY THAT WHICH WAS DISCUSSED AT THE CONFERENCE. HOWEVER, HE STATED THAT THE INFORMATION ATTRIBUTED TO GENERAL COLLINS WITH RESPECT TO QUOTE UNTIL HELL FREEZES OVER UNQUOTE DEFINITELY WAS NOT STATED BY GENERAL COLLINS. PACE ADVISED THAT HE HAS MET PEARSON ON TWO OCCASIONS AND HAS NOT SEEN HIM FOR THE PAST SIX MONTHS, AND HAS NOT SEEN OR TALKED TO ANY OF PEARSON-S EMPLOYEES OR ASSOCIATES FOR THE PAST THREE MONTHS. DENIES THAT HE HAS DISCUSSED THE CONFERENCE WITH ANYONE OTHER THAN POSSIBLY SECRETARY LOVETT OR SECRETARY FINLETTER.

HOOD

12-16-51

WASHINGTON FROM WASH FIELD

16

9:45 A.M.

DIRECTOR

U R G E N T

DREW PEARSON, ALLEGED LEAK FROM WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE DECEMBER TEN, FIFTY ONE, TO JACK ANDERSON, LEG-MAN FOR DREW PEARSON, ESPIONAGE DASH X. THOMAS K. FINLETTER, SECRETARY, AIR FORCE, ON INTERVIEW, ADVISES HE WAS NOT INVITED TO WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE SCHEDULED FOR TEN THIRTY AM, DECEMBER TEN LAST, UNTIL ABOUT ONE HALF HOUR BEFORE THAT TIME. HE HAD NO PRIOR BRIEFING FOR THE CONFERENCE. HIS DESCRIPTION OF WHAT TRANSPIRED AT CONFERENCE WAS LESS DETAILED, BUT AGREES SUBSTANTIALLY WITH WHAT OTHER PERSONS INTERVIEWED HAVE SAID. HE BELIEVES THE PRESIDENT, PRIOR TO THE CONFERENCE, HAD THE IDEA THE COMMUNISTS WERE OUT-TRADING THE UNITED STATES, BUT LATER AGREED WITH OTHERS AT THE CONFERENCE THIS WAS NOT THE CASE. FINLETTER PREPARED NO NOTES DURING CONFERENCE. AFTER THE CONFERENCE, GENERAL VANDENBERG DICTATED A MEMORANDUM TO FINLETTER-S SECRETARY CONCERNING HIS VIEWS ON WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS FROM KOREA IN EVENT OF CEASE FIRE ORDER. FINLETTER TORE UP THIS MEMO AND PREPARED A SECOND ONE OF HIS OWN ON THE SAME SUBJECT AND PERSONALLY DELIVERED THE ORIGINAL OF THIS TO SECRETARY LOVETT. ON DECEMBER ELEVEN LAST FINLETTER PREPARED A THIRD MEMO FOR LOVETT. EIGHTEEN OF THE TWENTY PREPARED COPIES WERE AVAILABLE WITH ONE HAVING PREVIOUSLY GONE TO VANDENBERG AS WELL AS LOVETT. ONE COPY OF THIS MEMO FURNISHED BUREAU BY MY MEMO OF DECEMBER FIFTEEN LAST. THE VANDENBERG MEMO AND FINLETTER-S FIRST MEMO WERE TORN

65-6060
RBH:DDJ

65-6060-8

TO PIECES AND ARE STILL MAINTAINED IN FINLETTER-S OFFICE. HE STATES HE DOES NOT KNOW JACK ANDERSON AND HAS NOT SEEN PEARSON FOR SOME MONTHS, AND HAS DISCUSSED THE CONFERENCE WITH NO UNAUTHORIZED PERSON. HE HAS NO SUSPICIONS AS TO WHOSE MIGHT BE RESPONSIBLE FOR LEAK OF INFORMATION.

HOOD

DIRECTOR, FBI

December 15, 1951

SAC, WFO (65-6060)

~~TOP SECRET~~

DREW PEARSON,
ALLEGED LEAK FROM WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE
DECEMBER 10, 1951, TO JACK ANDERSON, LEG-MAN
FOR DREW PEARSON,
ESPIONAGE - X.

DECLASSIFIED BY 60309 URT/DA/DC/BJ
ON 6/13/86

As a matter of interest, there is attached hereto a memorandum dated December 10, 1951, prepared by THOMAS K. FINLETTER, following his attendance at the President's Conference at the White House on December 10, 1951.

It is requested that the original and a copy be returned to the Washington Field Office.

Att.

RBH:DDJ *AD*

4

65-6060-9

DIRECTOR, FBI

12-17-51

SAC, WFO (65-6060)

DREW PEARSON
Alleged Leak from White House
Conference, December 10, 1951
to JACK ANDERSON, Leg-man for
DREW PEARSON
ESPIONAGE - X

The following persons have been interviewed by Agents of
the WFO in connection with this investigation:

General OMAR BRADLEY
Admiral WILLIAM FECHTELER
General CHARLES CABELL
Secretary FRANK C. PACE
Secretary THOMAS K. FINLETTER
Acting Secretary FRANCIS P. WHITEHAIR
Acting Secretary JAMES E. WEBB
H. FREEMAN MATTHEWS
JAMES LAY
General HARRY VAUGHN
General ROBERT LANDRY

The following interviews will be held on Monday, Decem-
ber 17, 1951:

General JOE COLLINS
CLAYTON FRITCHEY (Department of Defense)
S. EVERETT GLEASON (National Security Council)

Short reinterviews will be had with Messrs. WEBB and MATTHEWS
in order to obtain their comments relative to the news column of
ROBERT S. ALLEN that appeared in the New York Post December 13 last.

General HOYT S. VANDENBERG is out of the city and the date
of his exact return is unknown; however, this will be available to
us on December 17.

Admiral DENNISON of the White House has been ill and it is
not known if he will be available on December 17.

Admiral SOUERS of the White House is absent from the city
until December 19th.

The above interviews will in all probability conclude the
inquiries of this office, unless unforeseen developments occur.
The investigation will continue to be expedited.

RBH/agg

65-6060-10

12-16-51

WASHINGTON FROM WASH FIELD

16

8:00 PM EST

DIRECTOR

U R G E N T

DREW PEARSON, ALLEGED LEAK FROM WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE, DECEMBER TEN, FIFTYONE TO JACK ANDERSON, LEG-MAN FOR DREW PEARSON.

ESPIONAGE - X. FRANCIS P. WHITEHAIR, UNDERSECRETARY OF THE NAVY INTERVIEWED TODAY. ADVISED HE ATTENDED WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE DECEMBER TEN IN PLACE OF SECRETARY DAN KIMBALL. ARRIVED AND LEFT ALONE, RETURNING IMMEDIATELY TO PENTAGON WHERE HE FURNISHED RESUME TO SECRETARY KIMBALL SAME AFTERNOON. MADE NO NOTES OR MEMOS AND DISCUSSED CONFERENCE WITH NO ONE ELSE. FOLLOWING DAY BETWEEN FIVE AND SIX PM, JACK ANDERSON, WHOM HE HAD NEVER MET, VISITED HIS OFFICE WITHOUT APPOINTMENT, INTRODUCED HIMSELF, AND STATED DREW PEARSON DESIRED THAT HE MAKE ACQUAINTANCE OF WHITEHAIR, AS ANDERSON COVERS PENTAGON FOR PEARSON. THEY EXCHANGED PLEASANTRIES, THEN ANDERSON STATED HE UNDERSTOOD WHITEHAIR ATTENDED THE WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE AND INQUIRED WHO WAS PRESENT, FOLLOWING THIS WITH A QUERY AS TO WHETHER THERE WERE ANY JOKES TOLD IN THE CONFERENCE. WHITEHAIR STATED HE ANSWERED NEITHER OF THESE QUESTIONS, INDICATING IT WAS IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE COUNTRY NOT TO DISCUSS THE CONFERENCE. HE STATED ANDERSON THEN PULLED FROM HIS POCKET A GLOSSY PAPER, FOLDED LIKE A NEWSPAPER, AND ASKED IF IT WERE NOT TRUE THAT GENERAL VANDENBERG STATED THAT WE SHOULD REACH AN ARMISTICE WITH THE COMMUNISTS AND WITHDRAW, AND THAT WE SHOULD NOT BOMB BEYOND THE YALU RIVER. WHITEHAIR DECLINED TO CONFIRM THIS QUERY, AND

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65-6060-11

PAGE TWO.....

ANDERSON THEN ASKED DIDN'T JIMMY WEBB SAY THAT WE SHOULD REACH AN ARMISTICE AND THEN IMPOSE A THREAT IN THE EVENT THE ARMISTICE TERMS WERE VIOLATED. ANDERSON ALSO ASKED IF ADMIRAL FECHTELER HAD NOT OPPOSED THIS PROPOSITION OF INCLUDING A WARNING TO THE COMMUNISTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. WHITEHAIR STATED HE DID NOT ANSWER EITHER QUESTION, BUT DID STATE ADMIRAL FECHTELER TALKS VERY LITTLE ABOUT ANYTHING. ANDERSON WAS PERSISTENT, AND INQUIRED WHETHER WHITEHAIR SAW THE PRESIDENT AND MAY HAVE INQUIRED REGARDING THE PRESIDENT BEING TANNED. WHITEHAIR STATED HE MAY HAVE, INDICATING IN THE AFFIRMATIVE THAT HE SAW THE PRESIDENT, WHICH WAS OBVIOUS, AND HE COULD NOT RECALL ABOUT THE SUNTAN OF THE PRESIDENT. HE STATED ANDERSON THEN PUT THE PAPER AWAY AND HE GAVE ANDERSON A LECTURE TO THE EFFECT THAT SUCH MATERIAL MAY BE DANGEROUS TO THE US AND GIVE COMFORT TO THE ENEMY, BUT THAT ANDERSON SHOULD DRAW NO INFERENCES FROM ANYTHING STATED BY HIM. WHITEHAIR EXPRESSED THE BELIEF ANDERSON'S ORIGINAL INTENTION WAS TO MERELY OBTAIN ANECDOTES OR PLEASANTRIES AS WINDOW DRESSING FOR THE COLUMN, AND HAD NOT INTENDED TO REVEAL TO WHITEHAIR HIS MATERIAL, BUT THAT THIS WAS A DEVELOPMENT FROM WHITEHAIR'S REFUSAL TO COOPERATE AT THE OUTSET. WHITEHAIR ADVISED THAT ON WEDNESDAY MORNING, AROUND EIGHT O'CLOCK, HE DISCUSSED THIS INCIDENT WITH SECRETARY KIMBALL AND TOLD HIM THE ENTIRE STORY. HE ADVISED, APPARENTLY KIMBALL RELATED THE INCIDENT TO ADMIRAL FECHTELER AND LATER IN THE MORNING, ADMIRAL FECHTELER BROUGHT THE MATTER TO THE ATTENTION OF ADMIRAL DENNISON, WHO HAD COME OVER TO THE PENTAGON ABOUT ELEVEN THIRTY AM ON ANOTHER MATTER. WHITEHAIR SURMISED DENNISON RETURNED AND BROUGHT THIS MATTER TO THE ATTENTION OF THE

PAGE THREE. . .

PRESIDENT, AND LATTER DENNISON THEN CONTACTED WHITEHAIR, AND ADVISED HIM THE PRESIDENT DESIRED THAT WHITEHAIR BRING THIS MATTER TO THE ATTENTION OF SECRETARY LOVETT, AND AT THE SAME TIME, ADVISED MR. LOVETT THAT THE FBI SHOULD BE ADVISED. WHITEHAIR STATED HE FELT THE IMPORTANT THING WAS TO STOP THE STORY AND AT HIS SUGGESTION, ADMIRAL DENNISON CALLED BACK AND OBTAINED THE PRESIDENT'S AUTHORIZATION TO CONTACT PEARSON. HE THEREAFTER PHONED DREW PEARSON, WHOM HE HAD MET ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS SINCE HIS APPOINTMENT AS NAVY UNDER-SECRETARY IN AUGUST OF THIS YEAR. HE STATED HE APPEALED TO PEARSON ON TWO GROUNDS. FIRST: THAT HE WAS GREATLY EMBARRASSED BY PEARSON'S ACTION IN SENDING HIS YOUNG MAN TO VISIT WHITEHAIR ON A FRIENDLY BASIS AND, SECONDLY: AND MOST IMPORTANT, THAT DISCLOSURES OF THE CONFERENCE DISCUSSIONS MIGHT INJURE THE COUNTRY. PEARSON REPLIED THAT HE WISHED WHITEHAIR HAD CALLED HIM YESTERDAY. WHITEHAIR DECLARED THAT PEARSON STATED THAT QUOTE YOU NEEDN'T WORRY, YOU DIDN'T TELL ANDERSON ANYTHING UNQUOTE AND ALSO INSISTED THAT THE STATEMENT WOULD NOT HURT THE PRESIDENT OR THE COUNTRY, AND AS A MATTER OF FACT, PEARSON THOUGHT THE PRESIDENT WOULD LIKE IT. AS INDICATED, WHITEHAIR ADVISED HE KNEW PEARSON AND EXPLAINED THAT HE HAD FIRST RECEIVED AN INVITATION TO VISIT PEARSON WHEN HE WAS GENERAL COUNSEL ESA, AND WAS INVITED BY PEARSON ALONG WITH MIKE DISALLE, HOWEVER, HE DID NOT ACCEPT THIS INVITATION. ON A SATURDAY AFTERNOON, SHORTLY AFTER HIS APPOINTMENT, HE WAS AGAIN INVITED TO THE HOME OF PEARSON FOR AN INFORMAL BUFFET SUPPER AND ACCEPTED, DRIVING JUSTICE HUGO BLACK AND HIS WIFE TO PEARSONS IN WHITEHAIR'S CAR. HE RECALLED

PAGE FOUR.....

THAT ON THIS OCCASION, PERSONS PRESENT INCLUDED: MR. AND MRS. ABE FORTAS; WALTER CRONKHITE; A SISTER OF PEARSON, AND FRED BLUMENTHAL, PEARSON'S OFFICE MAN AND REPORTER. HE RECALLED THAT SOMETIME LATER, PEARSON HAD DROPPED INTO HIS OFFICE FOR A BRIEF VISIT, INQUIRING HOW HE LIKED HIS JOB, AND EXCHANGING SMALL TALK. ON ONE OTHER DAY, PEARSON DROPPED IN VERY BRIEFLY WHILE IN THE BUILDING TO SEE THE SECRETARY OF NAVY, KIMBALL. WHITEHAIR STATED HE KNEW NO OTHER REPORTER ASSOCIATED WITH PEARSON, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF BLUMENTHAL, WHOM HE HAD ALSO SEEN IN HIS OFFICE IN CONNECTION WITH A MATTER RELATING TO THE HARVEY MACHINE COMPANY AND ITS EFFORTS TO OBTAIN A LOAN, WHICH PEARSON APPARENTLY OPPOSED. WHITEHAIR LIKEWISE DID NOT KNOW ROBERT S. ALLEN OR TRIS COFFIN, WITH WHOM PEARSON WAS ASSOCIATED UNTIL RECENTLY. THE NEW YORK POST COLUMN OF ROBERT ALLEN DATED DECEMBER THIRTEEN, WAS DISPLAYED TO WHITEHAIR, WHO READ IT AND STATED IT WAS UNDOUBTEDLY BASED ON KNOWLEDGE OF SOMEONE WHO ATTENDED THE CONFERENCE. HE STATED THAT THE QUOTATIONS OF THE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL COLLINS APPEARED REASONABLY ACCURATE, MENTIONING THAT COLLINS HAD STATED THAT QUOTE FOR MY MONEY THE COMMUNISTS CANNOT DRIVE US OUT OF THIS COUNTRY; RATHER THAN UNTIL HELL FREEZES OVER UNQUOTE. WITH REFERENCE TO BRADLEY'S ALLEGED QUOTATIONS, HE STATED HE DID NOT RECALL THAT BRADLEY HAD PLACED ROTATION OF TROOPS CONTRA UN CONCESSIONS ON AIRFIELDS AS INDICATED IN THE COLUMN, BUT THAT BOTH MATTERS WERE DISCUSSED IN GENERAL. BRADLEY'S PRESENTATION OF THE POINTS AT ISSUE IN THE TRUCE NEGOTIATIONS. WHITEHAIR COULD OFFER NO SUSPECT AND HAD NO SUGGESTIONS FOR

PAGE FIVE.....

SOLUTION OF THE LEAK TO ANDERSON, PEARSON, OR ALLEN. HE AFFIRMATIVELY DECLARED HE DID PLACE COMPLETE RELIANCE IN ADMIRAL FECHTELER AND SECRETARY PACE, AND OF COURSE PROCLAIMED HIS OWN INTEGRITY. HE EXPLAINED THIS WAS NO REFLECTION ON ANYONE ELSE PRESENT, BUT THAT HE HAD MORE INTIMATE ASSOCIATION WITH THESE TWO MEN.

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12-17-51

WASH FROM WASH FIELD

17

7:30 P.M.

DIRECTOR

DREW PEARSON: ALLEGED LEAK FROM WHITEHOUSE CONFERENCE
DECEMBER TENTH, FIFTYONE, TO JACK ANDERSON, LEGMAN FOR
DREW PEARSON; ESP DASH X. CHIEF OF AIR FORCE GENERAL HOYT S.
VANDENBERG WAS INTERVIEWED TODAY AND ADVISED THAT HE HAD
ATTENDED THE CONFERENCE AT THE WHITEHOUSE ON DECEMBER TENTH,
LAST. GENERAL VANDENBERG STATED THAT HE HAD NOT MADE ANY
NOTES AT THE CONFERENCE AND HAD NOT PREPARED ANY MEMORANDA
OR SEEN ANY MEMORANDA WHICH ANYONE ELSE HAD PREPARED CONCERNING
THE CONFERENCE. HE STATED THAT THE MEMO WHICH HE HAD PREPARED
WITH MR. FINLETTER ON DECEMBER TENTH, LAST, REFERRING TO THE
WHITEHOUSE CONFERENCE WAS MATERIAL WHICH WAS NOT DISCUSSED
AT THE WHITEHOUSE CONFERENCE AND WHICH HE, MR. FINLETTER AND
MR. LOVETT THOUGHT SHOULD BE BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF THE
PRESIDENT, AND THAT IT PERTAINED TO AN ALTERNATE PROPOSAL IN
CONNECTION WITH THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS. HE STATED THAT THE ONLY
PERSONS HE HAS DISCUSSED THE CONFERENCE WITH ARE MR. LOVETT
AND MR. FINLETTER. HE STATED THAT THE ORIGINAL OF THE MEMO
PREPARED IN MR. FINLETTER'S OFFICE ON DECEMBER TENTH, FIFTYONE,
A COPY OF WHICH WAS PREVIOUSLY FURNISHED THE BUREAU, WAS DELIVERED
PERSONALLY TO MR. LOVETT BY MR. FINLETTER AND HIM. GENERAL
VANDENBERG STATED THAT A COPY OF THE MEMO WAS GIVEN TO
HIM AND HE GAVE IT TO HIS AIDE, COLONEL

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65-6060-12

PAGE TWO

CHARLES V. MURPHY, BUT HE REITERATED THAT THE CONTENTS OF THIS MEMO WERE NOT DISCUSSED AND HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH THE CONFERENCE HELD AT THE MEETING ON DECEMBER TENTH, LAST. THE ARTICLE BY ROBERT S. ALLAN^E WAS SHOWN TO GENERAL VANDENBERG AND HE ADVISED THAT IN HIS OPINION THIS ARTICLE COULD ~~NOT~~ HAVE BEEN WRITTEN WITHOUT THE WRITER'S HAVING ACCESS TO WHAT TRANSPIRED AT THE CONFERENCE. HE POINTED OUT THAT EVERYTHING APPEARING IN THE ARTICLE HAD BEEN SOMETIME OR OTHER IN THE PAST PUBLICLY STATED BY THE INDIVIDUALS TO WHOM THE MATERIAL WAS ATTRIBUTED, AND THAT CERTAINLY ANYONE WHO HAD FOLLOWED THE KOREAN SITUATION AND ANALYZED VARIOUS ARTICLES APPEARING IN THE PRESS ON THE SITUATION COULD HAVE PREPARED THE ALLAN^E ARTICLE. HE FURTHER COMMENTED THAT THE ALLAN ARTICLE WAS, IN FACT, ERRONEOUS IN ITS REPORTING OF WHAT ACTUALLY TRANSPIRED. HE STATED THAT THE WHOLE REASON FOR THE CONFERENCE IN HIS OPINION WAS FOR THE PRESIDENT TO RECEIVE REASONS WHY CERTAIN NEGOTIATION INSTRUCTION HAD BEEN SENT TO GENERAL RIDGEWAY IN JAPAN. GENERAL VANDENBERG STATED THAT THE PART OF THE ARTICLE ATTRIBUTED TO HIM WAS ABSOLUTELY INCORRECT AND STATED THAT HE HAD ONLY MADE A SHORT STATEMENT AT THE CONFERENCE WHICH WAS NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE ALLAN^E ARTICLE. HE STATED WITH RESPECT TO GENERAL COLLINS' REMARK QUOTE UNTIL HELL FREEZES OVER UNQUOTE THAT HE COULD NOT RECALL THIS REMARK AND DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT GENERAL COLLINS WOULD MAKE SUCH A REMARK IN SPEAKING TO THE PRESIDENT AND THAT HE FEELS CONFIDENT THAT IF GENERAL COLLINS HAD MADE SUCH REMARK,

PAGE THREE

HE WOULD HAVE CERTAINLY REMEMBERED IT. HE CONCLUDED BY STATING THAT THE ALLAN^E ARTICLE WAS A POOR REPORT ON WHAT HAPPENED AT THE CONFERENCE, AND STATED THAT WHOEVER PREPARED THE ARTICLE MUST HAVE HAD VERY LITTLE INFORMATION ON WHAT ACTUALLY TRANSPIRED, UNLESS THE WRITER DELIBERATELY SLANTED THE ARTICLE IN THAT FASHION. HE STATED THAT HE WAS NOT ACQUAINTED WITH JACK ANDERSON AND BELIEVES THAT HE HAS MET DREW PEARSON ONCE ABOUT TWO YEARS AGO IN THE DEFENSE BLDG., AND THAT THE LAST TIME HE SAW ROBERT S. ALLAN^E WAS IN EUROPE WHEN ALLAN^E WAS INTELLIGENCE OFFICER FOR GENERAL PATTON. HE DENIED SEEING OR TALKING TO ANY OF THESE INDIVIDUALS SINCE THE CONFERENCE IN QUESTION.

HOOD

WASH FROM WASH FIELD

17

12-17-51

8:30 P.M.

DIRECTOR

U R G E N T

DREW PEARSON, ALLEGED LEAK FROM WHITEHOUSE CONFERENCE DECEMBER TEN, FIFTYONE, TO JACK ANDERSON, LEGMAN FOR DREW PEARSON; ESP DASH X. MR. S. FVERETT GLEASON, DEPUTY SECURITY OFFICER, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, ADVISES THIS DATE THAT HIS SUPERIOR, MR. JAMES E. LAY, JR., BRIEFED HIM GENERALLY ON LAY'S RETURN FROM CONFERENCE. FURNISHED GLEASON WITH DETAILED BRIEFING ON WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER TWELFTH. GLEASON NOTIFIED JOHN EMERSON, PLANNING OFFICER, STATE DEPT., OF GENERAL CONTENTS OF DECISIONS REACHED AT PRESIDENT'S CONFERENCE ON DECEMBER TENTH; HOWEVER, STATES APPEARED EMERSON ALREADY FAMILIAR WITH RESULTS OF CONFERENCE THROUGH INFO FURNISHED EMERSON BY STATE DEPT. OFFICIALS. EMERSON'S INTEREST IN CONFERENCE BASED ON FACT THAT HE WORKED ON STAFF PREPARING NSC DRAFT RE KOREAN SITUATION. JAMES E. WEBB, UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE, REINTERVIEWED TODAY AND PRESENTED WITH COPY OF EXCERPTS FROM COLUMN OF ROBERT ALLEN APPEARING IN QUOTE NEW YORK POST UNQUOTE DECEMBER THIRTEENTH. CONTENTS OF COLUMN INDICATE ALLEN RECEIVED INFO FROM SOMEONE AT CONFERENCE. H. FREEMAN MATTHEWS, DEPUTY UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE, FURNISHED SAME COLUMN AS THAT GIVEN WEBB, STATED IN HIS OPINION COLUMN COULD HAVE BEEN PREPARED BY A NEWSPAPERMAN WELL VERSED IN BACKGROUND LEADING UP TO CONFERENCE WITHOUT OBTAINING ANY INFO

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PAGE TWO

FROM THOSE IN ATTENDANCE AT CONFERENCE. ADMIRAL DENNISON OF WHITEHOUSE STAFF ALSO INTERVIEWED TODAY AND ADVISES DID NOT SEE THE PEARSON RELEASE IN THE POSSESSION OF ANDERSON. CLAIMS DOES NOT KNOW PEARSON OR ANDERSON AND DENIES ANY DISCLOSURE ON HIS PART OF INFO INVOLVED. ADVISES ONLY NOTES OF CONFERENCE TO HIS KNOWLEDGE WERE THOSE MADE BY LAY, WHO TOOK MINUTES OF MEETING. STATES FIRST KNEW FACT MEETING TO BE HELD ON DECEMBER EIGHTTH, WHEN ADVISED BY PRESIDENT. DOES NOT RECALL DISCUSSION AT MEETING OF DECEMBER TWENTYSEVENTH CEASE FIRE EXTENSION. STATES UNABLE SUGGEST ANY SUSPECT AS RESPONSIBLE FOR LEAK. SUGGESTS STATE DEPT. AS POSSIBLE SOURCE OF LEAK, BUT HAS NO FACTS TO SUPPORT THIS OTHER THAN PAST EXPERIENCE IN LEAKS OF INFO. THAT DEPT. HIS ACCOUNT OF DISCUSSIONS AT CONFERENCE SUBSTANTIALLY THE SAME AS THOSE DEVELOPED THROUGH OTHER INTERVIEWS. DENNISON READ AND ANALYZED BOTH THE ALLEN AND PEARSON COLUMNS AND STATES HIS OPINION NEITHER COULD HAVE BEEN WRITTEN BY OUTSIDE INDIVIDUAL WITHOUT ASSISTANCE. ADVISES HIS RECOLLECTION THAT OVER ONE HALF OF CONFERENCE DEVOTED TO DISCUSSION OF EUROPEAN SIUTATION AND INDICATED HE CONSIDERED IT UNUSUAL THAT NEITHER COLUMN CONTAINED ANY DETAILS CONCERNING EUROPEAN DISCUSSIONS.

HOOD

2-17-51

WASHINGTON FROM WASH FIELD

17 9:30 P.M.

DIRECTOR

URGENT

DREW PEARSON: ALLEGED LEAK FROM WHITEHOUSE CONFERENCE DEC. TEN, NINETEEN FIFTY ONE TO JACK ANDERSON, LEG DASH MAN FOR DREW PEARSON; ESPIONAGE DASH X. GENERAL JOSEPH COLLINS, ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF, INTERVIEWED TODAY AND ADVISED HE HAD ATTENDED THE CONFERENCE AT THE WHITEHOUSE DEC. TEN LAST. COLLINS ADVISED MEETING OPENED BY BRISPING BY GENERAL BRADLEY, THEN PRESIDENT CALLED ON LOVETT, FOLLOWED BY VANDENBERG AND THEN ADMIRAL FECHTELER. THEREUPON THE PRESIDENT TURNED TO THE SECRETARIES, PAGE, FINLITER AND ACTING SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, WHITEHAIR, FOR REMARKS. COLLINS ADVISED HE FOLLOWED WHITEHAIR AS SPEAKER AND MADE BRIEF POINTS, SPEAKING AT DIFFERENT TIMES. HIS FIRST REMARKS WERE BASED ON A POINT WHICH HAD BEEN RAISED BY ADMIRAL FECHTELER, AND COLLINS ADVISED HE POINTED OUT SOME DISAGREEMENT WITH ADMIRAL FECHTELER'S REMARKS AND THEN WENT ON TO DISCUSS THE ARMISTICE AND CONCESSIONS THAT COULD BE CONSIDERED. LATER THE PRESIDENT EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER THE AIR BUILDUP OF THE COMMUNISTS AND THE POSSIBILITIES THAT WE MIGHT NOT BE ABLE TO MAINTAIN OUR FORCES IN KOREA. COLLINS THEREUPON INTERJECTED WITH

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65-6060-14

THE COMMENT THAT HE WOULD GUARANTEE THAT WE WOULD NOT BE THROWN OUT OF KOREA. FOLLOWING GENERAL COLLINS' LAST REMARKS, HE ADVISED MR. WEBB WAS CALLED UPON AND HE DEFERRED TO MR. MATTHEWS, WHO OUTLINED THE POSITION OF THE STATE DEPT. HE ADDED MR. WEBB ALSO SPOKE A FEW WORDS, DETAILS NOT RECALLED. COLLINS ADVISED HE WENT TO CONFERENCE IN SAME CAR WITH ADMIRAL FECHTELER AND RETURNED TO PENTAGON FOLLOWING CONFERENCE WITH FECHTELER, THEREAFTER, DISCUSSING THE PROCEEDINGS WITH NO ONE ELSE AND MADE NO RECORD OF SAME. THE NEW YORK POST COLUMN, PREPARED BY ROBERT S. ALLEN, RELATIVE TO WHITEHOUSE CONFERENCE, WAS DISPLAYED TO GENERAL COLLINS AND HE ADVISED THAT PORTION ATTRIBUTED TO HIM AS REFLECTED IN THE ALLEN COLUMN WAS A FAIR SUMMATION OF HIS PORTION, ALTHOUGH NOT IN THE EXACT WORDS AS RECALLED BY GENERAL COLLINS. HE WAS POSITIVE IN STATING HE DID NOT USE THE PHRASE QUOTE UNTIL HELL FREEZES OVER UNQUOTE, ALTHOUGH HE WAS NOT CERTAIN ABOUT HIS HAVING MADE ANY REMARKS CONCERNING TROOP ROTATION. CONCERNING THE PRESIDENTIAL QUOTATION AS REFLECTED BY ALLEN, GENERAL COLLINS SAID IT WAS ESSENTIALLY WHAT THE PRESIDENT HAD STATED, BUT NOT AN EXACT QUOTATION, ALTHOUGH IN SUBSTANCE WAS ACCURATE. HE ADVISED THE ALLEN QUOTATION ATTRIBUTED TO GENERAL VANDENBERG WAS ESSENTIALLY CORRECT AND THAT THE REMARKS ATTRIBUTED

TO GENERAL BRADLEY WERE GENERALLY ACCURATE, ALTHOUGH IN THE CONFERENCES GENERAL BRADLEY HAD NOT STRESSED THAT THE MATTER OF TROOP ROTATION HAD BEEN HELD AS A BARGAINING POINT AGAINST THE CONSTRUCTION OF AIR FIELDS ON THE PART OF THE COMMUNISTS. GENERAL COLLINS HAD NO SUGGESTION AS TO HOW A LEAK MAY HAVE OCCURRED, IF A LEAK DID OCCUR, AND EXPRESSED THE BELIEF THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE THAT THE COLUMN BY ROBERT ALLEN COULD HAVE BEEN PREPARED BY SOMEONE WHO HAD PICKED UP A FEW BITS OF DATA HERE AND THERE FROM PERSONS WHO MAY HAVE OBTAINED IT EVEN SECOND OR THIRD HAND, WHICH PERSONS MAY HAVE ALSO POSSESSED KNOWLEDGE OF PREVIOUS CONFERENCES RELATIVE TO SIMILAR SUBJECT MATTER. CONCERNING THE PERSONNEL PRESENT AT THE CONFERENCE, GENERAL COLLINS SAID HE HAD NO PERSONAL SUSPICIONS AND POINTED OUT HE HAD NOT SEEN OR HAD ANY CONTACT WITH DREW PEARSON IN MORE THAN A YEAR. GENERAL COLLINS ADVISED HE KNEW WHO JACK ANDERSON WAS, BUT NEVER HAD MET HIM AND KNEW OF NO OTHER PERSONS IN PEARSON'S EMPLOY. CONCERNING ROBERT S. ALLEN, GENERAL COLLINS ADVISED HE KNEW ALLEN, BUT HAD NOT SEEN OR TALKED TO HIM IN MORE THAN A YEAR. CLAYTON FRITCHEY DIRECTOR PUBLIC INFORMATION, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, ADVISED HE POSSESSED NO INFO CONCERNING PROCEEDINGS, WHITEHOUSE CONFERENCE, DEC. TEN AND DID NOT KNOW WHO ATTENDED OTHER THAN PEARSON'S CONJECTURE. HE ADVISED ON AFTERNOON TUESDAY DEC. ELEVEN, JACK ANDERSON VISITED

HIS OFFICE BETWEEN THREE AND FIVE P.M. ANDERSON INQUIRED REGARDING THE WHITEHOUSE CONFERENCE AND FRITCHEY INDICATED HE POSSESSED NO INFORMATION. ANDERSON INFORMED FRITCHEY HE HAD PRETTY GOOD FILL IN AND FRITCHEY GATHERED FROM ANDERSON'S MANNER ANDERSON CONSIDERED THE MATERIAL AUTHENTIC. ON WEDNESDAY, DEC. TWELVE FRITCHEY VISITED DREW PEARSON'S HOME FOR DINNER AND BRIDGE, ALTHOUGH PEARSON DOES NOT PLAY BRIDGE PERSONALLY. ENROUTE FRITCHEY WENT BY HOME OF FRITCHEY'S ASSISTANT, COLONEL CLARKE NEWLON, WHO LATER JOINED FRITCHEY AT THE PEARSON RESIDENCE FOR BRIDGE. DINNER GUESTS AT THE PEARSON HOME INCLUDED PEARSON AND WIFE, EDWARD FRITCHEY, OF KENTUCKY, MR. FRITCHEY AND ATTORNEY, PETER OSBURY AND WIFE. WHILE AT DINNER OR POSSIBLY JUST BEFORE DINNER, JACK ANDERSON CAME IN AND FRITCHEY WAS INVITED ASIDE AND SHOWN AN ARTICLE WHICH HE GATHERED WAS PART OF A COLUMN TYPEWRITTEN ON SEVERAL YELLOW PAGES. FRITCHEY LEARNED FROM PEARSON THAT THE MATERIAL CONTAINED SEVERAL ITEMS TO WHICH GENERAL BRADLEY OR COLONEL CLIFTON OBJECTED AND THAT ANDERSON WAS GOING TO PRESENT THEM TO THESE OFFICERS. PEARSON INVITED FRITCHEY TO READ THE COLUMN MATERIAL WHICH HE DID AND ADVISED HE FOUND IT RATHER INNOCUOUS AND PRETTY TAME. HE STATED DESPITE THIS, IT STRUCK HIM THAT THE FACT THAT THERE APPEARED TO BE A LEAK FROM AN IMPORTANT CONFERENCE WAS IMPORTANT.

HE STATED HE DID NOT SUGGEST THIS TO PEARSON NOR DID HE SUGGEST THAT PEARSON NOT PUBLISH THE COLUMN, STATING THAT HE DID NOT FEEL IT WOULD CAUSE ANY FUROR AS IT IS KNOWN PEARSON HAS EXCELLENT SOURCES AND THIS SORT OF THING OCCURS REGULARLY. FRITCHEY ADVISED THAT ANDERSON THEN DEPARTED AND AN HOUR OR SO LATER ANDERSON RETURNED WHILE FRITCHEY WAS PLAYING BRIDGE. HE DID NOT SEE THE COLUMN ON THIS OCCASION; HOWEVER, PEARSON SAID THE COLUMN HAD BEEN CHANGED IN ONE OR TWO PLACES IN ACCORDANCE WITH GENERAL BRADLEY'S SUGGESTION AND PEARSON INCLUDED THAT THE COLUMN WOULD BE CHANGED AS SUGGESTED. FRITCHEY GATHERED FROM THIS THAT THE COLUMN WOULD BE DISPATCHED AND ALSO CONCLUDED THAT THE COLUMN HAD APPEARED, ALTHOUGH PERHAPS NOT IN THE WASHINGTON POST, AS EDITORS OFTEN EXERCISE THE PREROGATIVE TO DELETE COLUMNS OR PORTIONS. FRITCHEY EXAMINED THE ROBERT ALLEN COLUMN OF THE NEW YORK POST, DEC. THIRTEEN, AND SAID THAT TO HIS RECOLLECTION, THEY ARE PRETTY WELL PARALLEL TO THE PEARSON MATERIAL HE HAD READ. FRITCHEY RELATED THAT ON SATURDAY DECEMBER FIFTEEN, BEFORE NOON, ANDERSON HAD VISITED HIM ON ANOTHER MATTER AND HE TWEETED ANDERSON ABOUT BEING SCOOPED BY ALLEN. HE DECLARED ANDERSON APPEARED GENERALLY SURPRISED AND LEFT IN A HURRY, APPARENTLY IN SEARCH OF A NEW YORK POST CONTAINING THE ALLEN COLUMN. FRITCHEY COULD OFFER NO SUGGESTION AS TO THE SOURCE OF THE LEAK NOR FURNISH

WFO 65-6060

Page Six

ANY INVESTIGATIVE LEADS IN THIS DIRECTION. HE ALSO SAID HE
COULD DRAW NO CONCLUSIONS AS TO WHETHER A COMMON SOURCE MAY
HAVE BEEN USED TO FURNISH INFO FOR THE PEARSON AND THE ALLEN
COLUMNS OR IF A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE HAD BEEN USED.

HOOD

12-18-51

WASH FROM WASH FIELD

18

8:00 PM

DIRECTOR

URGENT

DREW PEARSON, ALLEGED LEAK FROM WHITEHOUSE CONFERENCE DECEMBER TEN, LAST, TO JACK ANDERSON, LEGMAN FOR DREW PEARSON; ESPIONAGE DASH X. RE INTERVIEW WITH MR. JAMES E. WEBB, UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE, THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL DETAILS BEING SET FORTH OF INTEREST TO THE BUREAU: WEBB STATES THAT SUBSEQUENT TO DECEMBER TEN CONFERENCE HAS SEEN JIM FREE, WASHINGTON CORRESPONDENT FOR THE RALEIGH NEWS AND OBSERVER AT RALEIGH, NC, IN CONNECTION WITH AN ITEM APPEARING IN THE NY TIMES DECEMBER TEN, FIFTYONE, TO THE EFFECT THAT WEBB CONTEMPLATED LEAVING THE STATE DEPT. FREE REPRESENTS THE NEWSPAPER IN WEBB'S HOMETOWN AND WAS NATURALLY INTERESTED IN THIS STORY. WEBB ALSO TALKED WITH JOHN HIGHTOWER, WHO COVERS THE STATE DEPT FOR ASSOCIATED PRESS, AND ALSO TALKED WITH JAMES RESTON WHO REPRESENTS THE NY TIMES. WEBB STATES HIGHTOWER RAISED TWO POINTS IN DISCUSSING THE PRESIDENT'S CONFERENCE, ONE QUOTE WAS THERE A WORLD CRISIS? UNQUOTE AND TWO, QUOTE WAS EUROPE DISCUSSED UNQUOTE. WEBB GAVE HIGHTOWER THIS BACKGROUND: THE PRESIDENT IS FURNISHED WITH A GREAT NUMBER OF WRITTEN REPORTS CONCERNING THE WORLD SITUATION. HE TAKES HIS POSITION SERIOUSLY AND TAKES THE WHOLE SITUATION SERIOUSLY. THE PRESIDENT WANTS TO GET THE FULL QUOTE FLAVOR UNQUOTE OF THE THINKING OF THE TOP PEOPLE AS IT IS THE PRESIDENT'S POLICY TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH WHAT GOES ON AROUND

JAC:PJT:cas *pd*

65-6060

H.T.

pd

65-6060-15

PAGE TWO

THE WORLD. WEBB STATES HE GAVE THIS INFO TO HIGHTOWER FOR BACKGROUND. JAMES RESTON CONTACTED WEBB ON TUESDAY, DECEMBER ELEVEN, AND WAS GIVEN GENERALLY SAME BACKGROUND INFO CONCERNING THE DECEMBER TEN CONFERENCE AS WAS GIVEN TO HIGHTOWER. RESTON INQUIRED CONCERNING CHURCHILL'S VISIT AND WANTED TO KNOW THE POLICY OF THE US AS TO CHURCHILL. WEBB ADVISED HIM THAT THE GOVT WAS MAKING A VERY CAREFUL STUDY OF THE BACKGROUND AND PROBLEMS IN CONNECTION WITH OUR RELATIONS WITH GREAT BRITAIN AND EUROPE AND THE FAR EAST, AND INDICATED THAT THIS COUNTRY WOULD BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS THESE PROBLEMS WHETHER CHURCHILL TALKED ABOUT THEM OR NOT. RESTON ALSO INQUIRED AS TO RECENT CHANGES IN THE STATE DEPT AND WEBB DISCUSSED THE SIGNIFICANCE AND HISTORY OF THESE CHANGES. A REPORTED RESIGNATION OF SECRETARY OF STATE DEAN ACHESON WAS ALSO DISCUSSED.

HOOD

12-18-51

WASH FROM WASH FIELD

18

8:00 PM

DIRECTOR

URGENT

DREW PEARSON, ALLEGED LEAK FROM WHITEHOUSE CONFERENCE DECEMBER TEN, LAST, TO JACK ANDERSON, LEGMAN FOR DREW PEARSON; ESPIONAGE DASH X. ALEXIS JOHNSON, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS, STATES WAS ADVISED BY H. FREEMAN MATTHEWS, DEPUTY UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE, ON DECEMBER TEN, FIFTYONE, AFTER MATTHEWS RETURNED FROM CONFERENCE THAT THE PROPOSED DRAFT TO RIDGEWAY HAD BEEN APPROVED AT THE CONFERENCE. NO DETAILS GIVEN TO JOHNSON BY MATTHEWS AS TO CONVERSATIONS OF MEMBERS PRESENT AT PRESIDENT'S CONFERENCE. JOHNSON IN TURN ADVISED ROBERT J. MC CLURKIN, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR NORTHEAST ASIA AFFAIRS, WHOSE DUTIES COVER ACTIVITIES IN KOREA AND JAPAN, AND WHO WAS MR. JOHNSON'S PRINCIPAL ASSISTANT IN WORKING ON THE DRAFT TO RIDGEWAY, THAT THE DRAFT HAD BEEN APPROVED. NO FURTHER DETAILS FURNISHED MC CLURKIN AS JOHNSON HIMSELF NOT IN POSSESSION OF SAME. SIMILAR INFO FURNISHED BY JOHNSON TO JOHN EMERSON, PLANNING ADVISORY BUREAU, FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS. JOHN K. EMERSON STATES ADVISED BY MR. ALEXIS JOHNSON, AS SET FORTH ABOVE, AND ALSO BY S. EVERETT GLEASON, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, WITH WHOM HE HAD COLLABORATED ON A NATIONAL SECURITY DRAFT CONCERNING KOREAN MATTERS, TO THE EFFECT THAT THE

JAC:PJT:eas *ps*

65-6060

MT

ph

65-6060-16

PAGE TWO

CONFERENCE WOULD CAUSE NO CHANGES IN THAT NSC DRAFT. MR. EMERSON ADVISED THAT MR. GLEASON FURNISHED HIM NO FURTHER INFO CONCERNING THE PRESIDENT'S CONFERENCE. KEN YOUNG, OFFICE SECRETARY DEFENSE, OFFICE OF FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS, AN INDIVIDUAL WHOM S. EVERETT GLEASON MENTIONED AS A POSSIBLE PERSON WHOM HE TELEPHONED TO ADVISE THAT THE RESULTS OF THE PRESIDENT'S CONFERENCE WERE SUCH THAT NO CHANGES WOULD BE NECESSARY IN THE NSC DRAFT ON KOREA, IN WHICH YOUNG HAD COLLABORATED, WAS CONTACTED, AND YOUNG ADVISED THAT HE HAD NEVER BEEN NOTIFIED BY GLEASON CONCERNING THE PRESIDENT'S CONFERENCE. IT WAS POINTED OUT THAT GLEASON WAS DOUBTFUL THAT HE HAD CONTACTED YOUNG, BUT MENTIONED HIS NAME AS A POSSIBILITY.

HOOD

12-18-51

WASHINGTON FROM WASH FIELD

18 9:30 P.M.

DIRECTOR

U R G E N T

DREW PEARSON, ALLEGED LEAK FROM WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE DECEMBER TEN, FIFTY ONE, TO JACK ANDERSON, LEG-MAN FOR DREW PEARSON, ESPIONAGE DASH X. SECRETARY OF NAVY DAN KIMBALL INTERVIEWED TODAY AND ADVISED HE WAS ABSENT FROM TOWN AT TIME OF WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE DECEMBER TEN LAST AND IN HIS STEAD CONFERENCE WAS ATTENDED BY UNDERSECRETARY FRANCIS WHITEHAIR. KIMBALL RELATED FOLLOWING CONFERENCE WHITEHAIR DISCUSSED SAME WITH HIM ONLY IN GENERAL TERMS AND DID NOT FURNISH TO HIM A SUMMARY OF STATEMENTS MADE BY THOSE IN ATTENDANCE WITH THE EXCEPTION OF FURNISHING BRIEF RESUME OF REMARKS BY MR. WHITEHAIR AND ADMIRAL FECHTELER. KIMBALL RELATED HE HAD DISCUSSED CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS WITH NOONE, MADE NO MEMORANDUM OR NOTES PERTAINING TO CONFERENCE AS RECEIVED FROM MR. WHITEHAIR. HE ADVISED HE LEARNED LATE THE FOLLOWING EVENING OR MORNING DECEMBER TWELVE FROM UNDERSECRETARY WHITEHAIR OF ANDERSON-S CONVERSATIONS WITH WHITEHAIR AND OF THE OBVIOUS LEAK OF INFORMATION CONCERNING THE CONFERENCE DISCUSSIONS. HE STATED HE REPORTED THIS MATTER THE SAME MORNING TO ADMIRAL FECHTELER AND ADMIRAL FECHTELER, IN TURN, GAVE THE INFORMATION TO ADMIRAL DENNISON, WHO INFORMED THE PRESIDENT. SECRETARY KIMBALL ADVISED HE HAD NO SUGGESTION AS TO THE IDENTITY OF ANY POSSIBLE SOURCE TO PEARSON, ANDERSON OR ROBERT S. ALLEN.

HOOD

65-6060
MAT/CAG:DDJ. *ADJ*

W-T
jk

65-6060-17

12-18-51

WASHINGTON FROM WASH FIELD

18

9:30 P.M.

DIRECTOR

U R G E N T

DREW PEARSON, ALLEGED LEAK FROM WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE DECEMBER TEN, FIFTY ONE, TO JACK ANDERSON, LEG-MAN FOR DREW PEARSON, ESPIONAGE DASH X. COPIES OF DREW PEARSON COLUMNS NOW AVAILABLE WHICH APPEARED PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER AND NEW YORK MIRROR DECEMBER FIFTEEN, FIFTY ONE, DISPLAYED TO CLAYTON FRICHEY, DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC INFORMATION, DEFENSE DEPT., TODAY. FRICHEY STATED BOTH COLUMNS ARE REASONABLY ACCURATE ACCOUNTS OF THE MATERIAL ORIGINALLY DISPLAYED TO HIM BY JACK ANDERSON AT PEARSON HOME NIGHT DECEMBER TWELVE TO BEST OF HIS RECOLLECTION. HE NOTED SEVERAL VARIANCES IN TEXT AND STATED HE WOULD PREFER THAT OF PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER AS TABLOIDS HAVE TENDENCY TO EDIT OR DELETE. AT THIS TIME, FRICHEY ADVISED THAT ON EVENING DECEMBER SEVENTEEN, HE HAD RECEIVED INVITATION FROM MRS. LUVIE PEARSON, WIFE OF SUBJECT, TO PLAY BRIDGE AT THE PEARSON RESIDENCE TONIGHT, DECEMBER EIGHTEEN. HE EXPRESSED THE THOUGHT THAT MR. PEARSON MAY HAVE IN MIND MAKING SOME DISCREET INQUIRIES OF FRICHEY CONCERNING CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS ARISING FROM THE LEAK, WHICH IS THE SUBJECT OF INSTANT INVESTIGATION, AND INQUIRED WHETHER HE SHOULD ADMIT THAT HE HAD BEEN INTERVIEWED. FRICHEY WAS TOLD THAT NO SUGGESTIONS OR INSTRUCTIONS OR THIS NATURE COULD BE GIVEN TO HIM. IT WAS POINTED OUT TO MR. FRICHEY THE INVESTIGATION WAS CONDUCTED ON A CONFIDENTIAL BASIS, AND AT THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE PRESIDENT. COLONEL CHESTER V. CLIFTON, PRESS AIDE TO GENERAL OMAR BRADLEY, ALSO WAS RECONTACTED THIS DATE, AND DREW PEARSON COLUMN AS IT APPEARED IN NY MIRROR OF DECEMBER FIFTEEN ABOVE, WAS DISPLAYED. CLIFTON STATED THAT

65-6060
MAT/CAG:DDJ

65-6060-18

PAGE TWO

THE COLUMN DISPLAYED TO HIM FOLLOWED GENERALLY HIS RECOLLECTION OF THE CONTENTS OF THE MATERIAL WHICH ANDERSON SHOWED TO GENERAL BRADLEY, AND WHICH THE GENERAL READ TO COLONEL WILLIS MATTHEWS AND HIMSELF ON THE EVENING OF DECEMBER TWELVE. HE REMARKED THAT ALL OF THE POINTS APPEARED IN THE PUBLISHED COLUMN. HE STATED THE FIRST PARAGRAPH IN THIS COLUMN DID NOT STRIKE HIM AS BEING IDENTICAL IN FORM, ALTHOUGH HE THOUGHT THAT WAS AN INTRODUCTION CONTAINING MUCH THE SAME THOUGHT AS IN THE ANDERSON MATERIAL. HE PARTICULARLY NOTED THAT THE TWO ITEMS WHICH WERE OBJECTIONABLE AND HAD BEEN MARKED FOR DELETION BY GENERAL BRADLEY DID NOT APPEAR AND THAT THE ITEMS CORRECTED AS AGREED UPON DID APPEAR IN THE COLUMN. COLONEL CLIFTON IDENTIFIED THE REPORTER OF ALLEN WHO COVERS THE PENTAGON AS PAUL SCOTT, SAYING HE OCCUPIES ABOUT THE SAME RELATION AS ANDERSON DOES TO PEARSON.

HOOD

65-6060-19

SEARCHED.....	INDEXED.....
SERIALIZED <i>jh</i>	FILED <i>jh</i>
DEC 19 1951	
FBI - WASH. F. O.	

CD

December 10, 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1. The conference with the President today on the Korean situation failed to bring out certain important points.

2. At the meeting it was decided that, since we now have what we went into Korea to get, namely the defeat of the aggression, we should adopt the attitude of conceding all points within reason to get the cease-fire.

3. What wasn't said, however, is that once we get a cease-fire, from that moment on our military position deteriorates. The Chinese, free from our interdiction campaign, can bring in men and materiel - and no inspection teams of ours are going to stop them. Our morale will go down. Our fighting ability will go down. And our domestic support for the operation will go down further than it already has.

4. Moreover, the attaining of the cease-fire may fail to defeat the Russo-Chinese plan of pinning down large quantities of our military power in Korea. This results from the fact that an agreement to permit the gradual withdrawal of UN and Communist troops, without a firm decision in advance by the UN to punish a violation of the cease-fire by aggressive means, is not to our interest, and cannot be carried out without risking all we have fought for in Korea. Once we withdraw our troops they are going to be very hard to put back. On the contrary it would be easy for the Communists to withdraw beyond the Yalu and come back whenever they want to.

In short, a cease-fire without a firm position and statement as to what the UN intends to do if the terms of the cease-fire are broken and without provision for the rapid withdrawal of UN troops, is a disadvantageous operation from our point of view.

5. The question arises what then should we do? The following is suggested:

a. Make a provision in the cease-fire arrangements which will result in the United Nations ground troops being pulled out as rapidly as they can be after the signing of the cease-fire.

b. Leave a thin line of South Korean troops, and maybe even a token United Nations force, in South Korea.

c. Make arrangements with our major allies to issue a joint statement, approved by the UN, serving notice on China that we no longer intend to hold the Korean front by great ground forces as at present, but that if the Chinese run over our modest forces that will bring down vast retaliatory action by the UN on the mainland of China. We should also consider whether this statement might not contain a request to Russia to use her best efforts to prevent the Chinese from violating the cease-fire agreement.

d. We must agree with our friends in the UN what this vast retaliatory action means. It presumably would mean a naval blockade, harassment of the lines of communication by bombing, continuing the use of guerrilla troops, and maybe releasing Chiang for action on the mainland. The question of certain other special air action would have to be considered; also the use of the A-bomb. These are, however, in a way, questions of detail. The important thing is to get agreement with our friends in UN to be ready to go through with a good tough campaign, but without the use of ground troops other than Chiang's.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : SAC, WFO (65-6060)

DATE: December 18, 1951

FROM : DIRECTOR, FBI

SUBJECT: DREW PEARSON,
ALLEGED LEAK FROM WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE
DECEMBER 10, 1951, TO JACK ANDERSON, LEG-MAN
FOR DREW PEARSON,
ESPIONAGE - X.

Reurlet December 15, 1951.

There is attached the original of Copy No. 10 of 20 copies of a memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, bearing the stamped signature of Thomas K. Finletter, dated December 10, 1951, together with one photostatic copy thereof. This is being returned in accordance with your request.

Enclosure
mf

65-6060-20

SEARCHED	INDEXED
SERIALIZED	FILED
DEC 19 1951	
FBI - WASH. F. O.	

ES

W 20

Mr. C. E. Hennrich

December 18, 1951

W. A. Branigan

ROBERT S. ALLEN COLUMN APPEARING
IN "NEW YORK POST," 12-13-51

The New York Office furnished the following information:

The "New York Post" regularly publishes four weekday editions as follows:

- (1) "Night Extra." This is published as of 9:30 A.M. each day.
- (2) "7 Blue Final**" printed at 1:30 P.M.
- (3) "7 Blue Final*" printed at 3:15 P.M.
- (4) "7 Blue Final" printed at 7:20 P.M.

In the editions published by the "New York Post" for December 13, 1951, Robert S. Allen had two different columns. The first column entitled "Must Truman Toss Out McGrath" appeared only in the "Night Extra" edition. The second column which contained the story on Korea was printed in all three of the "7 Blue Final" editions.

This is for your information.

WAB:jmr

65-6060-21

SEARCHED	INDEXED
SERIALIZED	FILED
DEC 19 1951	
FBI - WASH. F. O.	

WASHINGTON FROM WASH FIELD 12/19/51

DIRECTOR

URGENT

DREW PEARSON. ALLEGED LEAK FROM WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE, DECEMBER TEN FIFTYONE, TO JACK ANDERSON, LEGMAN FOR DREW PEARSON. ESPIONAGE X. ADMIRAL SIDNEY W. SOUERS INTERVIEWED TODAY AND UNABLE IDENTIFY INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBLE FOR LEAK. ADVISED IN HIS OPINION ACTUAL CONFERENCE INACCURATELY REPORTED IN BOTH PEARSON AND ALLEN COLUMNS WHICH HE STATES APPARENTLY WERE WRITTEN ON BASIS OF INFORMATION FROM IDENTICAL SOURCE. STATES OPINION PEARSON AND ALLEN ARTICLES COULD HAVE BEEN PREPARED PRIMARILY ON BASIS OF CURRENT AND ACUTE KNOWLEDGE OF POLITICAL EVENTS PLUS AT LEAST SOME AID FROM INDIVIDUAL HAVING ACCESS TO WHAT WAS DISCUSSED AT CONFERENCE. ADVISED IN HIS OPINION CONFERENCE INVOLVED WAS NOT OF UNUSUAL IMPORTANCE, STATED BOTH COLUMNS FAILED TO REPORT ANY OF THE FOUR ITEMS WHICH HE CONSIDERED OF MAJOR SIGNIFICANCE WHICH WERE DISCUSSED AT CONFERENCE.

WOOD

KTD:VIM
65-6060

65-6060-22

WASHINGTON FROM WASH FIELD 12/20/51

DIRECTOR

URGENT

DREW PEARSON. ALLEGED LEAK FROM WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE
DECEMBER TEN FIFTYONE TO JACK ANDERSON, LEGMAN FOR DREW
PEARSON. ESPIONAGE - X.

ADMIRAL DENNISON REINTERVIEWED TODAY AT WHICH TIME SUMMARIZED
FOR AGENTS NOTES MADE COVERING CONFERENCE BY JAMES LAY. AS
INDICATED BEFORE BY OTHER SOURCES, BOTH THE PEARSON AND ALLEN
COLUMNS MISSED SEVERAL IMPORTANT MATTERS WHICH WERE ACTUALLY
DISCUSSED AT CONFERENCE, REPORTED ON MATTERS WHICH WERE
DISCUSSED WITHOUT COMPLETE ACCURACY. DENNISON ADVISED THAT
AFTER REVIEW OF LAY NOTES, HE IS EVEN MORE CONVINCED IN HIS
OPINION THAT BOTH COLUMNS WERE BASED ON INFORMATION ACTUALLY
FURNISHED FROM CONFERENCE AND THAT THEY WERE NOT WRITTEN PURELY
ON BASIS OF SPECULATION AND ACUTE AWARENESS OF KOREAN NEGOTIATIONS.
LAY NOTES SUBSTANTIATE DENNISON'S STATEMENT THAT CONSIDERABLE
PORTION OF CONFERENCE DEVOTED TO EUROPEAN DISCUSSION WHICH, AS
BUREAU KNOWS, NOT COVERED IN EITHER COLUMN. JOSEPH SHORT INTER-
VIEWED AND HAS FURNISHED COPY OF ACTUAL NEWSPAPER RELEASE MADE
IN CONNECTION WITH CONFERENCE INCLUDING QUESTIONS ASKED BY
REPORTERS AND HIS ANSWERS THERETO, REVIEW OF WHICH DOES NOT
INDICATE EITHER COLUMN COULD HAVE BEEN BASED THEREON.

HOOD

KTD:VIM

65-6060-23

CC W JD

cc-Mr. Marchessault

MR. A. H. BELMONT

December 20, 1951

MR. C. E. HENNRICH

DREW PEARSON
ALLEGED LEAK FROM WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE
DECEMBER 10, 1951
TO JACK ANDERSON, LEG-MAN FOR DREW PEARSON
ESPIONAGE - I

While interviewing Mr. Joseph Short, Press Secretary to the White House, on December 20, he advised it was his belief that Drew Pearson extensively uses newspaper reporters who are associated with reputable news media and who feed to Pearson, for a price, off-the-record comments which are made in the course of legitimate interviews and which the news media represented reported by the particular reporter would not use because it is off the record. In this connection, he named Gene Davis, formerly of Trans-Radio Press, and Tris Coffin, who was "peddling" to Pearson while employed by CBS. He stated that these two had been caught but that he had no doubt there are others.

In this regard, he stated that while Mrs. Roosevelt was in the White House she used to comment extensively off the record and was "not security conscious." He said that Mrs. Roosevelt's comments begun appearing in Robert Allen's material and that Mrs. Short, who was then covering Mrs. Roosevelt's press conferences, together with another unnamed woman reporter, observed a woman reporter feverishly making notes of Mrs. Roosevelt's off-the-record comments and actually tailed her to Robert Allen's office. She was confronted and was fired from the agency which she represented. It was Mr. Short's observation that the information concerning the instant investigation may have come into Pearson's hands through such a contact as mentioned above. It was his opinion, although Short stated he had no facts upon which to base it, that the leak in this particular case would have emanated from a "second echelon" who possibly had been briefed by someone who actually attended the conference. Short was unable to relate any facts that would reflect upon the identity of the person responsible for the leak.

Mr. Short furnished a transcript of the press conference which he held immediately following the December 10 conference, which is attached. While no particular significance is attached to the questions and answers set forth, the details of the transcript indicate that the press conference was covered, probably by microphone.

ACTION: For your information.

CEH:LL
Attachment

SEARCHED	INDEXED
SERIALIZED	FILED
DEC 20 1951	
FBI - WASH F. O.	

65-6060-24

cc-Mr. Hennrich
cc-Mr. Marchessault

MR. A. H. BELMONT

December 20, 1951

MR. F. J. BAUMGARDNER

LEAK
ALLEGED ~~LEAK~~ FROM WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE
DECEMBER 10, 1951
TO JACK ANDERSON, LEG-MAN FOR DREW PEARSON
ESPIONAGE - X

At 11:45 a.m., 12/20/51, Supervisor McAndrews of the NYO called in connection with the captioned matter. He stated that in reply to a telephonic request from Inspector C. E. Hennrich, investigation had been made at the Bell Syndicate, New York, on December 20, 1951, and that the following facts had been developed:

Drew Pearson's column was filed with the Bell Syndicate by teletype wire direct from Pearson's home to the New York Office of Bell Syndicate at approximately 4:00 p.m., December 11, 1951. A change for this column came through from Pearson, by wire, on December 12, 1951. Pearson's column carried the date-line, Washington, 12/14/51. The change reads as follows:

"One hour after column's release (that would be 5:00 p.m., 12/11/51), President Truman asked General Bradley to use his influence to stop its publication. As a result, the column in question, half of which pertained to the meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Monday (12/10/51) was submitted personally to General Bradley for his perusal. General Bradley did not concur with the President that the column should be killed. However, he has suggested the following changes, which I am happy to make.

"Second paragraph, under caption 'Silent Admiral,' should read: 'President Truman commented that no concessions should be granted that we would later regret.'

"Next last paragraph, make third and closing sentence read: 'Some details will be left to iron out after the December 27 deadline.' In other words, omit 'though' and words 'we are sure to grant a short extension to clear them up.'

"Many thanks. (signed) Drew Pearson"

FJB:LL

65-6060-25

SEARCHED.....	INDEXED.....
SERIALIZED.....	FILED.....
DEC 20 1951	
FBI - WASH. F. O.	

The New York Office of the Bureau obtained the original column as filed by Pearson with the Bell Syndicate, as well as the original correction. The NYO is still working on the Post-Hall Syndicate to obtain the requested information concerning Robert Allen's column.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

DEC 20 1

TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson	_____
Mr. Ladd	_____
Mr. Nichols	_____
Mr. Belmont	_____
Mr. Clegg	_____
Mr. Glavin	_____
Mr. Harbo	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Tracy	_____
Mr. Laughlin	_____
Mr. Mohr	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Mr. Nease	_____
Miss Gandy	_____

CONF WASH AND WASH FLD 15 FROM NEW YORK 20 3-42 P
DIRECTOR AND SAC VERY URGENT

ATTN. INSP. HENNRICH

DREW PEARSON, ALLEGED LEAK FROM WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE DEC TENTH, FIFTY ONE, TO JACK ANDERSON, LEG MAN FOR DREW PEARSON, ESP - X. HENRY M. SNEVILLY, SECY AND TREAS OF BELL SYNDICATE, INC, TWO TWO NINE WEST FORTYTHIRD ST, NYC, A SUBSIDIARY OF NORTH AMERICAN NEWSPAPER ALLIANCE, INC., WAS INTERVIEWED IN HIS OFFICE ON THE MORNING OF DEC TWENTIETH. HE ADVISED THAT DREW PEARSON HAS HIS OFFICE IN HIS HOME IN WASH, DC, IN WHICH IS LOCATED A TELETYPE WHICH HE USES IN DISPATCHING HIS NEWS RELEASES TO BELL SYNDICATE. UPON RECEIPT OF THESE TELETYPES FROM PEARSON, THEY ARE READ BY SNEVILLY TO DETERMINE IF THEY MIGHT CONTAIN MATERIAL THAT IS LIBELOUS OR SLANDEROUS AGAINST THE PUBLIC INTEREST OR AGAINST SECURITY MATTERS IN GENERAL. THEREAFTER THEY ARE SENT TO ANY ONE OF A NUMBER OF EDITORS IN THE SYNDICATE WHO PROOFREAD THEM FOR GRAMMATICAL CORRECTIONS AND OTHER JOBS DONE BY AN EDITOR FOR A COLUMNIST. HE STATED HOWEVER THAT IN NO INSTANCE DO THEY CHANGE THE CONTENT OF ANY OF PEARSONS RELEASES WITHOUT CLEARING THEM DIRECTLY WITH PEARSON. SNEVILLY STATED THAT IN PRACTICALLY ALL INSTANCES WHEREVER THERE IS SOME MATERIAL THEY ARE NOT SURE OF HE PERSONALLY CONTACTS PEARSON BY TELEPHONE FOR CLAFI-FICATION. HE STATED HE RECALLED PEARSONS ARTICLE OF DEC FIFTEEN

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SERIALIZED _____ FILED *ja*
DEC 20 5 30 PM '51
FBI - WASH. F. O.

END PAGE ONE

BUREAU ADVISED

65-6060-26

PAGE TWO

THAT APPEARED IN NY DAILY MIRROR PARTICULARLY BECAUSE OF THE FACT THAT THERE WAS A FOLLOWUP TELETYPE WITH SOME CORRECTIONS THEREON. HE SUBSEQUENTLY OBTAINED FROM HIS FILE THE ORIGINAL TELETYPE MESSAGE SENT FROM PEARSONS OFFICE IN WASHINGTON TOGETHER WITH THE FOLLOWUP CORRECTION THAT HE HAD RECD FROM PEARSONS OFFICE. IT APPEARS THAT THE ORIGINAL TELETYPE MESSAGE FROM PEARSON WAS DATED DEC ELEVENTH, THE CORRECTED TELETYPE WAS DATED DEC TWELFTH. SNEVILY RELEATED THAT THIS IS A MORE OR LESS STANDARD PROCEDURE IN DEALING WITH PEARSON WHEREBY THEY RECEIVE THE STORY AT LEAST THREE TO FOUR DAYS BEFORE ITS PUBLICATION. AFTER RECEIPT OF NEWS STORIES FROM PEARSON THEY SEND OUT THE EDITED COPY BY TELETYPE TO CHICAGO AND SAN FRANCISCO, WHICH OFFICES THEN SEND IT TO OTHER SUBSCRIBERS IN THOSE AREAS VIA MAIL. THERE IS SET FORTH HEREAFTER A COPY OF THE PERTINENT PORTION OF PEARSONS STORY THAT APPEARS IN THE TELETYPES OBTAINED FROM SNEVILY. A PHOTO-STATIC COPY OF THE BELL SYNDICATES TELETYPE TOGETHER WITH THE CORRECTION WILL BE FORWARDED TO THE BUREAU UNDER SEPARATE COVER.

QUOTE FROM THE BELL SYNDICATE, INC.--RELEASE SATURDAY, DEC. 15, 1951.

DREW PEARSON

ON

THE WASHINGTON MERRY-GO-ROUND

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DREW PEARSON SAYS.../CAPS/ TRUMAN GOT FAVORABLE REPORT ON KOREAN

END PAGE TWO

PAGE THREE

TRUCE AT JOINT CHIEFS MEETING. U. S. TROOPS COULD STAY IN KOREA
TILL "HELL FREEZES OVER." TOP EXECUTIVES DESERTING TRUMAN.

/END CAPS/

WASHINGTON.--MOST OF THE WORLD WAS INTRIGUED OVER PRESIDENT
TRUMAN-S MUCH-PUBLICIZED MEETING WITH THE JOINT CHEIFS OF STAFF FOL-
LOWING HIS RETURN FROM KEY WEST. HOWEVER, IT TURNED OUT TO BE
PRETTY MUCH ROUTINE AFTER ALL. HIGHLIGHT OF THE MEETING WAS AN
OPTIMISTIC ASSURANCE FROM GEN. OMAR BRADLEY THAT A CEASE-FIRE
COULD BE WORKED OUT IN KOREA.

THE NATION-S HIGHEST DIPLOMATIC AND MILITARY CHIEFS WERE WAITING
IN THE CABINET ROOM WHEN PRESIDENT TRUMAN STRODE IN. HE WAS GRINNING
BROADLY. SHAKING HANDS WITH EVERYONE AROUND THE CONFERENCE TABLE,
HE REPORTED THAT IT WAS "GOOD TO BE BACK," AND ASKED HOW THEY LIKED
HIS SUN TAN.

AFTER THAT, HE LET THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF DO MOST OF THE TALK-
ING, AND HERE IS A BRIEF, CHRONOLOGICAL ACCOUNT OF WHAT HAPPENED AT
THE MEETING WHICH CAUSED SO MUCH WORLD-WIDE SPECULATION.....

THE PRESIDENT SAT BACK, LISTENED INTENTLY AND CALLED FOR EVERY-
ONE-S VIEWS. OCCASIONALLY, HE BOUNCED HIS FINGERS TOGETHER REFLECTIVE-
LY, IN A QUICK, IMPULSIVE GESTURE, AND MADE SUCH COMMENTS AS...

"THAT-S A TOUGH ONE."

GENERAL BRADLEY LED OFF WITH A SUMMARY OF THE KOREAN SITUATION.
HE REPORTED THAT THE COMMUNISTS SEEMED TO BE READY TO COME TO TERMS,
THAT A CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT COULD BE WORKED OUT IF BOTH SIDES MADE
CONCESSIONS.

END OF PAGE THREE

PAGE FOUR

HOWEVER, GEN. HOYT VANDERBERG, AIR CHIEF OF STAFF, OPPOSED MAKING ANY MAJOR CONCESSIONS. HE WAS PARTICULARLY ADAMANT AGAINST ALLOWING THE COMMUNISTS THE RIGHT TO BUILD AIRFIELDS DURING THE CEASE FIRE.

GEN. J. LAWTON COLLINS, THE ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF, VIGOROUSLY OPPOSED GIVING IN TO THE COMMUNISTS ON TROOP ROTATION. THE CHINESE HAVE PROPOSED A FREEZE ON ALL TROOPS ENTERING KOREA, THUS BLOCKING REPLACEMENTS FOR COMBAT VETERANS WHO HAVE BEEN PROMISED THE CHANCE TO GO HOME ON ROTATION. THIS WOULD BE A "BLOW TO MORALE," COLLINS WARNED.

--SILENT ADMIRAL--

HOWEVER, GENERAL COLLINS READILY AGREED THAT "MINOR CONCESSIONS" ON OTHER POINTS SHOULD BE MADE IN ORDER TO WIN CONCESSIONS FROM THE COMMUNISTS.

PRESIDENT TRUMAN-S ONLY COMMENT WAS THAT EVERY EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO REACH A CEASE-FIRE, BUT NO CONCESSIONS SHOULD BE GRANTED THAT WE "WOULD LATER REGRET."

/MORE/

MERRY-GO-ROUND--SATURDAY, DECEMBER 15--PAGE 2.

LEAST TALKATIVE OF THE JOINT CHIEFS WAS ADMIRAL FECHTELER, WHO MADE A SHORT, HALF-MINUTE SPEECH IN WHICH HE ASSURED THE PRESIDENT THAT THE NAVY IS PREPARED TO CARRY OUT "ANY MISSION ANY TIME ANY PLACE."

END OF PAGE FOUR

PAGE FIVE

FOR THE ARMY-S PART, GENERAL COLLINS ASSURED THE PRESIDENT THAT THE ARMY COULDN-T BE BLASTED OUT OF KOREA, BUT COULD HOLD ON "UNTIL HELL FREEZES OVER."

ANOTHER CONCESSION DISCUSSED WAS THAT OF GIVING IN TO THE COMMUNISTS ON INSPECTION TEAMS BEHIND THE LINES. WE HAVE BEEN HOLDING OUT FOR INSPECTION BY JOINT U. N. COMMUNIST TEAMS, BUT THE REDS HAVE BEEN ARGUING FOR INSPECTION BY "NEUTRAL NATIONS."

BY NEUTRAL NATIONS, THE COMMUNIST NEGOTIATORS SAID THEY MEANT POLAND AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA. LATER, HOWEVER, THEY AGREED THAT THEY WOULD ALSO CONSIDER DENMARK, SWEDEN AND SWITZERLAND AS "NEUTRAL NATIONS." THESE THREE WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO US, AND GENERAL BRADLEY PROPOSED GIVING GROUND ON THIS POINT. THIS HAS NOW BEEN DONE.

THE CHIEF THEME OF THE MEETING WAS THAT A CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT MAY BE CLOSE AT HAND. ALL SIGNS POINT TO A SETTLEMENT WITHIN THE NEXT TWENTY DAYS. THOUGH SOME DETAILS WILL BE LEFT TO IRON OUT AFTER THE DECEMBER TWENTYSEVEN DEADLINE, WE ARE SURE TO GRANT A SHORT EXTENSION TO CLEAN THEM UP.

ANOTHER MATTER THAT WAS DISCUSSED AT THE WHITE HOUSE WAS THE QUESTION OF WITHDRAWING U. N. TROOPS FROM KOREA ALTOGETHER--AFTER THE ARMISTICE. HOWEVER, THE FACTS REGARDING THIS SHOULD NOT BE MADE PUBLIC NOW. UNQUOTE. QUOTE FROM THE BELL SYNDICATE, INC, 229 W. 43 ST., NEW YORK.

END OF PAGE FIVE

PAGE SIX

CONFIDENTIAL TO EDITORS.

ONE HOUR AFTER THE COLUMN RELEASED FOR DECEMBER 15 WAS ON THE TELETYPE TO NEW YORK, PRESIDENT TRUMAN ASKED GENERAL BRADLEY PERSONALLY TO USE HIS INFLUENCE TO STOP ITS PUBLICATION.

AS A RESULT THE COLUMN IN QUESTION, HALF OF WHICH PERTAINED TO THE PRESIDENT-S MEETING WITH THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ON MONDAY WAS SUBMITTED PERSONALLY TO GENERAL BRADLEY FOR HIS PERUSAL.

GENERAL BRADLEY DID NOT CONCUR WITH THE PRESIDENT THAT THE COLUMN SHOULD BE KILLED. HOWEVER, HE HAS SUGGESTED TWO CHANGES WHICH I AM HAPPY TO MAKE.

THE SECOND PARAGRAPH UNDER CAPTION "SILENT ADMIRAL" SHOULD READ "PRESIDENT TRUMAN COMMENTED THAT NO CONCESSIONS SHOULD BE GRANTED THAT WE -WOULD LATER REGRET.-"

ALSO THXHH TFHHE STORY MAKE THE THIRD AND CLOSING SENTENCE OF THIS PARAGRAPH READ..."SOME DETAILS WILL BE LEFT TO IRON OUT AFTER THE DECEMBER 27 DEADLINE." IN OTHER ~~WORDS,~~ OMIT THE WORD "THOUGH" AND THE WORDS "WE ARE SURE TO GRANT A SHORT EXTENSION TO CLEAN THEM UP."

MANY THANKS,

DREW PEARSON

THE FOLLOWING INFO WAS OBTAINED FROM THE POST HALL SYNDICATE INC., TWO NINE FIVE MADISON AVE., NYC, ROBERT M. HALL, PRESIDENT. MR. HALL ADVISED THAT THE COLUMN FROM ROBERT S. ALLEN FOR DECEMBER THIRTEEN
END OF NPAGE SIX

PAGE SEVEN

LAST WAS RECEIVED BY THE POST HALL SYNDICATE ON DECEMBER ELEVEN LAST THROUGH THE MAIL AND DISTRIBUTED THROUGH THE MAIL BY THE SYNDICATE ON THE SAME DATE MARKED FOR RELEASE ON OR AFTER DECEMBER THIRTEEN LAST. THE COLUMN CONTAINS INFO ABOUT THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES AND DATA CONCERNING INCOME TAX AND LABOR SITUATIONS IN ADDITION TO THE PERTINENT COLUMN IN THE "NEW YORK POST." THE ORIGINAL RECEIVED FROM MR. ALLEN IS MARKED WITH CORRECTIONS WHICH ARE OF INDIVIDUAL WORDS AND NOT OF ANY PERTINENT PARAGRAPHS. MR. HALL ADVISED THAT THESE CORRECTIONS WERE MADE AFTER DICTATION BY MR. ALLEN AND THAT IT IS CUSTOMARY IN ALL OF HIS COLUMNS TO RECEIVE MATERIAL SO MARKED. MR. HALL ADVISED THAT HE COULD NOT MAKE AVAILABLE THE ORIGINAL COPY OF MR. ALLEN-S WITHOUT SPECIFICALLY OBTAINING MR. ALLEN-S PERMISSION, WHICH HE INDICATED HE WOULD NOT LIKE TO DO, HOWEVER, HE PERMITTED THE AGENTS TO LOOK OVER THE ORIGINAL COPY OF THE COLUMN AND IT WAS NOTED THAT NO MATERIAL, PHRASES OR PARAGRAPHS WERE DELETED THEREFROM. MR. HALL FURTHER ADVISED THAT POST HALL SYNDICATE EXAMINED THE COPY FOR POSSIBLE LIABLE AND HE STATED THAT THIS IS CUSTOMARY PRACTICE IN PUBLISHING ALL OF THEIR COLUMNS THAT ARE HANDLED BY THEIR SYNDICATE AND THAT THEY DID NOT IN THIS CASE MAKE ANY DELETIONS OR CORRECTIONS. IN REGARD TO THE PERTINENT COLUMN AS IT APPEARED IN THE "NY POST" THE MIMEOGRAPHED COPY DISTRIBUTED BY POST HALL A PHOTOSTAT COPY OF WHICH FOLLOWS BY MAIL, IS AS

END OF PAGE SEVEN

PAGE EIGHT

FOLLOWS...WHAT THE REDS WANT DASH THE UN CAN HAVE A CEASE FIRE IN KOREA, BUT AT THE COST OF IMPORTANT CONCESSIONS TO THE REDS. THAT-S WHAT THE JOINT CHIEFS TOLD THE PRESIDENT IN THEIR BIG CONFERENCE WITH HIM AFTER HIS RETURN. GENERAL BRADLEY DECLARED THE PROTRACTED TRUCE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE REACHED THE POINT -WHERE A FEW CONCESSIONS ON BOTH SIDES COULD BRING AN AGREEMENT IF THE COMMUNISTS REALLY WANT ONE.- -WHAT DO THEY WANT /Q/- ASKED THE PRESIDENT. -THE DEADLOCK GETS DOWN TO THIS,- EXPLAINED BRADLEY. -WE ARE DEMANDING THE RIGHT TO CONTINUE TO ROTATE OUR TROOPS AS WE HAVE BEEN DOING FOR MONTHS. THE REDS ARE FLATLY REFUSING TO ALLOW THAT. THEY ARE INSISTING ON A COMPLETE FREEZE ON REPLACEMENTS AND WEAPONS. BUT THEY HAVE INDICATED THEY WOULD MAKE CONCESSIONS ON THAT IF WE WILL ALLOW THEM TO BUILD SOME AIRFIELDS IN NORTH KOREA. WE HAVE REFUSED TO DO THAT. OBVIOUSLY, THEY ARE USING THE ROTATION ISSUE TO TRY TO WREST CONCESSIONS FROM US ON THE AIRFIELD DEMAND.- GENERAL HOYT VANDENBERG VIGOROUSLY OPPOSED GIVING ANY GROUND ON THAT. -I WANT A CEASE FIRE, IF ONE CAN BE WORKED OUT THAT IS FAIR AND PROPER,- DECLARED THE AIR CHIEF OF STAFF. -BUT I DON-T SEE HOW WE CAN SAFELY DO ANY-

END OF PAGE EIGHT

PAGE NINE

THING THAT WILL ENABLE THE REDS TO BUILD UP THEIR AIR STRENGTH. THAT IS WHAT PERMITTING THEM TO BUILD AIRFIELDS WILL AMOUNT TO. SUCH BASES IN NORTH KOREA WILL BE OF GREAT COMBAT VALUE TO THEM, IF THEY DECIDE TO BREAK THE TRUCE NEXT SPRING, WHICH I WOULDN-T PUT PAST THEM.- GENERAL J. LAWTON COLLINS WAS INCLINED TO FAVOR SOME TERMS ON THE AIRFIELD DISPUTE. HE THOUGHT SOMETHING COULD BE WORKED OUT ON THAT. BUT THE ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF WAS ADAMANT IN INSISTING THE COMMUNISTS BE REQUIRED TO AGREE TO ROTATION OF UN TROOPS. -THAT WOULD BE A SERIOUS BLOW TO THE MORALE OF OUR MEN,- COLLINS ARGUED. -I AM STRONGLY OPPOSED TO ANY CONCESSIONS ON THAT. IT IS AN UNFAIR DEMAND, AND THE ONLY REASON THE REDS ON MAKING IT IS TO TRY TO FORCE US TO GIVE IN ON AIRFIELDS. OUR ARMY CAN HOLD THE PRESENT LINE UNTIL HELL FREEZES OVER, AND I AM FLATLY OPPOSED TO GIVING THE SLIGHTEST GROUND ON THE REPLACEMENT ISSUE. THE REDS WOULD HAVE THE SAME RIGHT AS US ON THAT, AND I DON-T SEE WHY THEY SHOULD OBJECT TO IT, EXCEPT FOR TRADING PURPOSES.- BRADLEY AGREED WITH COLLINS, BUT EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF NOT ALLOWING THE COMMUNISTS TO BUILD UP A POWERFUL

END PAGE NINE

PAGE TEN

AIRFORCE. PRESIDENT TRUMAN LISTENED INTENTLY TO THE MILITARY LEADERS AND SAID NOTHING UNTIL THEY FINISHED. THEN HE TOLD THEM...-AS YOU KNOW I AM VERY ANXIOUS TO BRING THE FIGHTING TO AN END IF THAT IS POSSIBLE. BUT I WILL NOT AGREE TO CONCESSIONS TO THE COMMUNISTS THAT WE MAY REGRET LATER ON. WE WANT TO BE VERY CAREFUL THAT WE DO NOT SELL OURSELVES SHORT IN OUR EAGERNESS TO SECURE A TRUCE FOR OUR MEN.- ALSO DISCUSSED WAS THE QUESTION OF BUILDING UP THE SOUTH KOREAN ARMY, AS THIS COLUMN HAS REPORTED WAS PROPOSED BY GENERAL RIDGWAY. HE WANTS TO INCREASE THE ROK DIVISIONS FROM ELEVEN TO TWENTY. NO DECISION WAS REACHED ON THE MATTER, BUT PRESIDENT TRUMAN STRONGLY APPROVED THE PLAN. -I AM FOR PROMPT ACTION ON THAT,- HE SAID. -IT SEEMS TO ME A VERY SOUND THING TO DO. SIMILARLY, THE PRESIDENT APPROVED MOVING TO KOREA ONE OF THE TWO NATIONAL GUARD DIVISIONS NOW IN JAPAN. THIS HAS BEEN SUGGESTED BY RIDGWAY IN ORDER TO PERMIT THE TRANSFER OF ONE OF THE BATTLE DASH EXPERIENCED DIVISIONS IN KOREA TO EUROPE. GENERAL EISENHOWER HAS REQUESTED THAT." IT WILL BE NOTED THAT THE MIMEOGRAPHED COPY IS IDENTICAL WITH THE COLUMN THAT APPEARED IN THE "NY POST" BLUE EDITION OF DECEMBER THIRTEEN LAST. HOWEVER, IT WILL FURTHER BE NOTED THAT THE "NY POST" COLUMN CONCLUDES WITH THE STATEMENT "ALSO DISCUSSED WITH THE QUESTION OF BUILDING UP THE

END PAGE TEN

PAGE ELEVEN

SOUTH KOREAN ARMY AS THIS COLUMN HAS REPORTED WAS PROPOSED BY GENERAL RIDGWAY," WHEREAS THE MIMEOGRAPHED COPY CONTINUES AS QUOTED ABOVE.

A MIMEOGRAPHED COPY OF THE ENTIRE RELEASE WAS MADE AVAILABLE BY [] [] TO THE AGENTS AND IS BEING RETAINED IN THIS OFFICE. []

STATED THAT THIS MIMEOGRAPHED COPY WAS SENT TO ALL OF THE NEWSPAPERS SUBSCRIBING TO ALLEN-S COLUMN AND THAT IN HIS OPINION THE COLUMN IN THE "NY POST" BLUE FINAL EDITION OF DEC THIRTEEN LAST WAS CUT FOR SPACE SAVING REASONS. HE ADVISED THAT IT IS CUSTOMARY FOR NEWSPAPERS RECEIVING COPIES OF THE COLUMNS TO PRINT ANY PORTION OR ALL OF THE COLUMN AT THEIR DISCRETION. HE DID STATE THAT THE "PHILADELPHIA DAILY NEWS" USUALLY PUBLISHES THE ENTIRE RELEASE AS SENT OUT BY POST [] BUT HE DID NOT KNOW WHETHER THEY HAD DONE IT ON THIS OCCASION. NO LEAD IS BEING SET OUT FOR THE PHILA OFFICE, IT IS LEFT TO THE BUREAU-S DISCRETION. IT IS NOTED THAT [] REQUESTED THAT HIS IDENTITY IN THIS MATTER BE KEPT CONFIDENTIAL AND IT IS SUGGESTED THAT THE BUREAU BE DISCREET IN USING THE NAMES OF INDIVIDUALS CONNECTED WITH BOTH THE POST HALL SYNDICATE AND THE BELL SYNDICATE.

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b7D

SCHEDIT

END

Abruptly cutting his vacation short by fully a week, Harry S. Truman flew to Washington from Key West, Fla., last Sunday for a hastily summoned meeting the following morning of the nation's highest military and diplomatic officials.

He also planned to confer with Attorney General J. Howard McGrath.

A crisis was approaching in the deadlocked Korean truce negotiations, necessitating decisions which only the President could make. Mr. Truman, however, insisted: "There is nothing wrong, there is no emergency. I don't want a lot of people to get it in their minds that the world is coming to an end."

The actual situation: Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway wanted instructions about what kind of truce conditions he could make, particularly concerning exchange of prisoners and inspection. UN negotiators now think they know what kind of package the Reds might buy.

Mr. Truman did not explain why he planned to meet with McGrath, but no explanation was needed. Disturbed by revelations of graft in the Internal Revenue Bureau, he was determined to "clean up and clean out" his Administration.

Still another problem facing the President was the controversy over defense production. In fact, Mr. Truman rarely had been plagued by more problems, or beset by more troubles.

NEWS WEEK 12/17/51

65-6060-27

SEARCHED.....	INDEXED.....
SERIALIZED <i>jh</i>	FILED <i>jh</i>
DEC 21 1951	
FBI - WASH. F. O.	

[Signature]

Truman Meets His Advisers on World Affairs

White House Keeps Silence on Details Of Discussions Here

By Joseph A. Fox

President Truman today met for more than an hour with top military and foreign affairs advisers but at the end of the session the White House would only say that the conference had "discussed the world situation and no policy decisions were made."

Asked if the conferees discussed "any special aspects of the world situation that might be mentioned," Joseph Short, the President's press secretary, responded "I can't go beyond what I said."

Asked if the problem of spurring the Korean truce negotiations was taken up, Mr. Short said "Korea was among the subjects discussed but the meeting was not confined to that subject."

After the President had broken off his vacation in Key West Saturday night a week earlier than he anticipated, officials here indicated that he wanted a detailed first-hand account of recent developments in Korea with full reports on possible new moves in the armistice talks.

The deadline for the Korean truce negotiations is December 27.

Attending today's meeting were Secretary of Defense Lovett, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary of the Army Pace, Air Force Secretary Finletter, Assistant Navy Secretary Francis Whitehair, Acting Secretary of State Webb and Deputy Undersecretary of State H. Freeman Matthews.

Mr. Short said that the meeting took up European affairs, but he insisted, as the President had yesterday in Key West, that today's meeting was simply like those the President holds periodically with military and foreign affairs chiefs.

Asked if Mr. Truman might meet with the same group to continue today's talks, Mr. Short said that unquestionably there would be additional talks but that he wouldn't say if they'd be tomorrow or the next day.

Asked about the possibility of "new directives in connection with the handling of cease-fire negotiations in Korea," Mr. Short said "I don't know of any but that doesn't mean anything."

Today's conference was held in the cabinet room, and those who participated entered and left the executive offices by rear doors, thus avoiding reporters in the lobby.

President Truman also said yesterday that one of the reasons for his return was to talk with people recently in Europe.

Defense Secretary Lovett just returned and Secretary of State Acheson will be in Wednesday.

Secretary of the Treasury Sny-

der and W. Averell Harriman are due back shortly

When the President's unexpected homecoming was announced at a hastily summoned press conference at 6:30 Saturday night, Irving Perlmeter, acting press secretary had declined to go beyond the bare fact that a meeting was to be held today, and would not say that no emergency was involved. Washington officials, however, said at once that they knew of no emergency.

Stressing that he didn't want any great fuss made about his decision to get back to the White House, the President commented also that Secretary Lovett had been working on the military budget for the next fiscal year and that he wanted to go over the figures on that.

President Truman had two long sessions with Budget Director Frederick J. Lawton in Key West, but their talk was devoted mainly to the prospective outlay for the civil functions of the Government.

65-6060-28

SEARCHED.....	INDEXED.....
SERIALIZED.....	FILED.....
DEC 21 1951	
FBI - WASH. F. O.	

Truman Sees Top Aides On Korean Snarl

[By Associated Press]

President Truman reviewed the world situation with particular emphasis on the Korean truce negotiations, at a White House conference today with his military and diplomatic advisers.

One of the matters presumably discussed was what course the United States should follow if the present Korean talks fail to produce a complete armistice by Dec. 27, the deadline set by truce negotiators when the issue of a buffer zone across Korea was settled on Nov. 27.

Mr. Truman cut short his Florida vacation by a week to fly back yesterday for this and other conferences.

In and Out Side Door

Meeting with Mr. Truman were Secretary of Defense Lovett, Undersecretary of State Webb, the secretaries of the three armed services and the members of the joint chiefs of staff.

The conference lasted about an hour. The participants left as they had entered—by a side door.

There was no immediate announcement by the White House on the results of the parley.

"There Is Nothing Wrong"

Seeking to allay tension which grew out of the sudden announcement Saturday that he was flying back to Washington, Mr. Truman told reporters Sunday:

"There is nothing wrong—don't get it into your minds that the world is coming to an end."

Mr. Truman also disclosed then that he will follow up the study of the delicate international situation with a conference with Attorney General McGrath and other officials of the Justice department which will presumably cover a congressional investigation into federal tax scandals.

Silent on Scandals

The White House has maintained resolute silence on published reports Mr. Truman is considering some "dramatic move" in the tax scandals.

These reports have speculated he might assign FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover to a government-wide inquiry; that he might name Republican and Democratic lawyers to prosecute miscreants and that he might set up a bi-partisan commission to make an inquiry independent of current hearings by a House ways and means subcommittee.

The announcement from Key West late Saturday that Mr. Truman was flying back to Washington Sunday for his White House

Truman Sees Top Aides On Korean Snarl

[Continued from first page]

conference today sparked widespread speculation as to the purpose of the meeting, especially since Irving Perlmeter, assistant Presidential press secretary, refused to answer questions concerning it.

"Pleasant Month's Vacation

However, Mr. Truman told reporters upon boarding the Presidential plane, the Independence, at Key West:

"I don't want any great amount of fuss on this. It is necessary for me to have a bi-monthly conference with the joint chiefs of staff on the world situation.

"It is much easier for me to go back than to take all these people away from their work. I've had a very pleasant month's vacation and I'm going to put in a week of hard work in Washington."

Then, he went on to add:

"I also have a conference scheduled with the Attorney General and several people in his office."

Upon his arrival in Washington less than four hours later, the President was asked whether the conference with McGrath would cover the matters brought into the inquiry by the House committee headed by Rep. King (D) of California.

He said it would cover "everything that has to do with the attorney general" McGrath was among those who met Mr. Truman at the airport.

65-6060-29

SEARCHED.....	INDEXED.....
SERIALIZED.....	FILED.....
DEC 21 1951	
FBI - WASH. F. O.	

TIMES-HERALD - EVENING 12/10/51

Washington

MERRY- GO-ROUND

By Draw Pearson

WASHINGTON, Dec. 14. — The world sat up over Pres. Truman's publicized meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff when he returned from Key West, but it was routine. The highlight was an assurance from Gen. Omar Bradley that a cease-fire could be worked out in Korea.

The diplomatic and military chiefs were waiting when HST strode in, grinning. He shook hands all around, said it was "good to be back," and here is a "good to be back" asked how they liked his tan. He let the joint chiefs do most of the talking, and here is a brief account of what happened.

Truman sat back, called for views, and made such comments as: "That's a tough one." Bradley led with a summary of the Korean situation, reported the Reds seemed ready to come to terms, that a cease-fire agreement could be worked out if both sides made concessions. Gen. Vandenberg, Air chief, opposed major concessions, adamant against allowing the Communists to build airfields during the cease-fire. Gen. Collins, Army chief, opposed giving in on troop rotations. The Chinese propose a freeze on all troops entering Korea, blocking replacements for combat veterans. This would be a blow to morale Collins warned.

Silent Admiral

Collins agreed "minor concessions" should be made to win some in return. Truman commented that no concessions should be granted. "Admiral Fechteler made only a half-minute speech, pledged that the Navy is prepared to carry out any mission any time any place." For the Army, Collins pledged the Army couldn't be blazed out of Korea, could hold on "until hell freezes over."

One concession discussed was yielding to the Reds on inspection behind the lines. We have been holding out for it by U.N. Communist teams, but the Reds want it by "neutral" nations—and that meant Poland and Czechoslovakia. Later they agreed to consider Denmark, Sweden and Switzerland. These would be acceptable to us. Bradley proposed giving ground where and it has done. The principle theme was a cease-fire may be close, with

FILE STRIPPED

SEP 14 1951

Initials *Sal ml*

a settlement within 20 days. Some details will be left to iron out later. Another matter discussed was the question of withdrawing U.N. troops altogether—after the armistice. The facts regarding this must not be published now.

*N. Y. Daily Mirror
12/15/51*

65-6060-30

SEARCHED.....	INDEXED.....
SERIALIZED <i>fa</i>	FILED <i>fa</i>
DEC 21 1951	
FBI - WASH. F. O.	

Truman Session With Pentagon, State Chiefs 'Covers the World'

By Marshall Andrews
Post Reporter

President Truman talked over tangled world affairs with Defense and State Department officials for more than an hour yesterday, but what they discussed was not revealed. "The meeting," said Press Secretary Joseph Short, "discussed the world situation. No policy decisions were made." Questioning by reporters brought out that Korea was among the subjects under review, but "the discussion was not confined to Korea." Beyond that, Short added, "the world was covered."

Truce Deadline 17 Days Off

Only 17 more days remain before a 30-day truce period expires on the Korean battlefield. Unless an armistice agreement is reached by December 27, both sides will be free to drive their fronts forward as fast as they have power to go.

At yesterday's meeting in the Cabinet Room at the White House were Secretary of Defense Robert A. Lovett, the Secretaries of the armed services, with Navy Undersecretary Francis B. Whitehair acting for Secretary Dan A. Kimball, who is out of the city; Acting Secretary of State James E. Webb and Deputy Undersecretary H. Freeman Matthews for Secretary Dean Acheson, who is in Europe; and the Joint Chiefs of Staff headed by their chairman, Gen. Omar N. Bradley. They entered and left the White House by a side door.

Asked if any doctrines concerning the cease-fire in Korea were "in the making," Short said:

"I don't know of any—but that doesn't mean anything."

Like Routine Meetings

Short emphasized Mr. Truman's explanation, just before leaving Key West on Sunday, that yesterday's meeting was "similar" to regular semimonthly meetings with the Joint Chiefs. Asked if the meeting could be regarded as the forerunner of day-to-day military talks, he said there "undoubtedly" would be "other meetings of essentially the same group, but I don't know when."

As for the President's Key West statement that he would meet this week with "some people" back from Europe, Short pointed out that Lovett had just returned from there. Acheson and Treasury Secretary John W. Snyder are expected back Wednesday, he said, and W. Averell Harriman, Director of Mutual Security, should return in about 10 days.

Asked if Mr. Truman planned to see Attorney General J. Howard McGrath during the day, Short replied that he did not, but that he would see McGrath soon." Pressed for a more specific answer Short said no date had been set.

Speculation was plentiful that the President had cut short his Florida vacation primarily because of scandals involving Justice Department personnel uncovered by a House committee.

Short was asked if Mr. Truman planned to see Democratic National Chairman Frank E. McKinney and Indiana Committeeman Frank M. McHale, who were reported to have made large profits from the sale of stock in a firm selling tractors to the Government. He said he did not "know of any appointment to see McHale or McKinney."

65-6060-31

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DEC 21 1951	
FBI - WASH. F. O.	

18

WASHINGTON Post 12/11/51

Truman Has Parley With Top Advisers

President Truman yesterday conferred for more than an hour with top military and foreign policy advisers on global problems, including Korea, but the White House insisted that "no policy decisions were made" at the meeting.

The high level meeting with acting Secretary of State Webb, Defense Secretary Lovett, and the joint chiefs of staff, which was Mr. Truman's explanation for winging back to Washington from Key West a week ahead of schedule, was carried on in an atmosphere of secrecy.

The top brass ducked out a side door after their session with Mr. Truman, to avoid reporters. All White House secretary Short would tell newsmen was that "the world situation" was under discussion, and that "Korea was among the subjects discussed." Short added, however, that the meeting was "not confined to that subject."

He emphasized that Mr. Truman normally meets every two weeks with the joint chiefs of staff.

Short's statement that "no policy decisions were made" apparently ruled out any immediate new directive to the U.N. truce negotiators in Korea, struggling to reach an armistice settlement with the Communists before Christmas.

65-6060-32

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SERIALIZED.....	FILED.....
DEC 21 1951	
FBI - WASH. F. O.	

TIMES-HERALD

12/21/51

NO DETAILS OF TALK

But Truce Is Thought to Be Nearer Than News From Front Hints

DEADLINE MAY BE PUT OFF

U. N. Side Held Not Opposed to Extension—Compromise on Supervision Possible

By W. H. LAWRENCE

Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

WASHINGTON, Dec. 10—President Truman conferred for more than an hour today with the nation's highest military and diplomatic officials amid continuously optimistic reports that a military cease-fire agreement in Korea might be closer at hand than front-line reports had indicated.

There was said to be a strong belief that the Chinese and North Korean Communists had concluded that it was militarily impossible to expel United Nations forces from Korea and now really wanted a cessation of the fighting there. This view was stated despite reports of a major build-up in Communist air strength, which was regarded here, for the moment anyway, primarily as a bargaining weapon at the peace table.

In quarters that have followed closely the long drawn-out negotiations at Kaesong and Panmunjom, there was speculation that a compromise might be near on the controversial inspection-enforcement issue, which has deadlocked the truce talks since Nov. 27. On that day agreement was reached on a cease-fire line to be effective in thirty days if final agreement could be reached on other outstanding issues.

Dec. 27 Is Deadline

Few believed that all the odds and ends of an armistice could be bargained out and agreed to by Dec. 27, the present deadline for the negotiators to reach complete agreement on an armistice if the agreed cease-fire line was to be made effective.

There seemed general agreement that the United Nations policy-makers would not oppose a further extension of this time limit, now only seventeen days off, if the present battlefront lull continued. This attitude would change quickly, it was added, if it became apparent to the United Nations Command that the Communist negotiators were stalling the talks to build up their strength and mount another major offensive against United Nations armies in the field.

This is a decision that would rest largely upon advices from Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, Supreme United Nations Commander, who must think first of the security of his command.

No Confirmation Is Given

The White House offered no confirmation of these guardedly optimistic reports. Indeed, it furnished no solid news at all on the hastily summoned meeting of the President and his military and diplomatic advisers, which had been announced with dramatic suddenness at Key West Saturday night when Mr. Truman decided to terminate his month-long Florida holiday.

Joseph Short, White House press secretary, announced only that the "world situation" had been canvassed in a meeting lasting more than an hour during which "no policy decisions were made."

He did say, in response to questions, that the Korean situation had been discussed, but he added that the conference "was not confined to that subject." He declined to disclose other subjects discussed.

Asked if any new directives were being prepared concerning the handling of the cease-fire talks in Korea, Mr. Short said that he did not know of any himself, but added quickly that his lack of knowledge on this subject "doesn't mean anything."

Mr. Short said that the group meeting with the President in the Cabinet room had included Robert A. Lovett, Secretary of Defense; James E. Webb, Acting Secretary of State; Frank Pace Jr., Secre-

Continued on Page 3, Column 1

65-6060-33

SEARCHED.....	INDEXED.....
SERIALIZED.....	FILED.....
DEC 21 1951	
FBI - WASH. F. O.	

N.Y. TIMES - 12/11/51

TRUMAN CONFERS WITH TOP ADVISERS

Continued From Page 1

tary of the Army; Francis P. Whitehair, Under Secretary of the Navy; Thomas K. Finletter, Secretary of the Air Force; General of the Army Omar N. Bradley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Gen. J. Lawton Collins, Army Chief of Staff; Admiral William M. Fechteler, Chief of Naval Operations; Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Air Force Chief of Staff, and H. Freeman Matthews, Deputy Under Secretary of State.

Only Announced Appointment

The meeting with the military and diplomatic advisers was the only announced appointment scheduled by Mr. Truman on his first day back at his desk in Washington from his Florida trip. It had been indicated that the President first intended to ask participants in today's meeting to fly to Florida to meet with him. When other work mounted, including the question of how best he could deal with new reports of scandals in government, he decided it would be easier for him to cut short his Florida trip and return here.

All the participants in the military-diplomatic conference entered the White House executive office by a side door and left by the same exit, without talking with newsmen in the lobby.

In the cautiously optimistic reports of a possible Korean ceasefire in the not distant future, which followed in the wake of this session, the talk of compromise on the controverted inspection-enforcement issue centered on elaboration of a Communist proposal first made at Panmunjom on Dec. 5.

At that time the Communists suggested Poland and Czechoslovakia, both members of the Soviet bloc, as two "neutral" nations qualified to supervise enforcement of an armistice by behind-the-lines inspection on both sides after agreement had been reached on a ceasefire.

At that same session, however, the Communist negotiators conceded, in response to Allied questioning, that they also would consider Switzerland, Sweden and Denmark as "neutral" nations qualified to supervise the behind-the-lines inspection because none of these countries had troops participating in the Korean fighting.

Proposal at Later Stage

While the Communist-bloc states obviously were unsatisfactory to the United Nations side as truly neutral, there was said to be no reason for the United Nations to object in principle to turning over supervision of the armistice enforcement to the three non-Communist countries mentioned by the Communist negotiators.

Indeed, it was stated in some quarters that the United Nations had in mind proposing at a later stage in the negotiations that neutral states take over the armistice supervision on the ground that it would be more satisfactory to both sides to limit the behind-the-lines activities of both former-sets of belligerents.

This does not mean, of course, that agreement on the inspection issue would be automatic, once the two sides have agreed upon neutral supervisors, but finding agreement on that point should facilitate other outstanding questions such as the scope of operation of the inspectors.

Once the tricky inspection-enforcement issue is out of the way, the principal remaining question before the military negotiators will be agreement on exchange of prisoners of war. While this may be haggled over for some time, it seems probable to some experts here that it will be settled finally by exchanging all the prisoners held by one side for all the prisoners held by the other.

A. H. BELMONT

December 17, 1951

C. E. HENNRICH

DREW PEARSON, Alleged Leak from
White House Conference,
December 10, 1951, to JACK ANDERSON,
Leg-Man for DREW PEARSON
ESPIONAGE - X

I went over the investigations of this case with Special Agent in Charge Hood in some detail on December 17. Interviews have been completed with all but two of the persons who attended the December 10 conference plus those who had knowledge of what was discussed. Those remaining to be interviewed are Secretary Dan Kimball, who will be interviewed on December 18, and Admiral Sidney Souers, who will be interviewed on December 19.

Analysis of the information developed up to this time indicates that there was limited dissemination of information as to what actually went on at the President's conference of December 10, 1951. The Washington Field Office is carefully analyzing this particular problem in order to come up with as definite a picture as possible as to exactly who did have access to the specifics of the conference prior to the time they were known to be in Anderson's possession.

Regarding the problem as to whether Anderson's information and, in addition, Allen's column could have been prepared from information available from sources other than someone who attended or had detailed information regarding the conference of December 10, there is divergent opinion. The consensus is that the information must have come from someone who knew what went on at the December 10 conference. This is modified by statements that certain of the information is not accurate and some not true. It is further modified by the fact that many of the persons interviewed are unable to recall exactly what was discussed at the conference and, of the items discussed, exactly what was said by certain individuals. It has been pointed out that most of the matters discussed had been previously discussed in great detail on many occasions by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and those officially interested in the particular problems. The conviction of those who feel that the information in question had to have come from someone who had knowledge of what went on at the December 10 conference

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DEC 21 1951	
FBI - WASH. F. O.	

65-6060-34

is generally based on the fact that most of the items in Anderson's paper and Allen's column were actually discussed in some form at the conference. As pointed out above, some of the information was inaccurate.

At this point, it appears necessary that we actually determine when the Pearson column of December 15, appearing in the New York "Daily Mirror," was filed with Bell Syndicate. Since Allen actually printed a similar column in the "New York Post" on December 13, it is important that we know when he filed that column since Allen's information may have been made available by Pearson. We cannot overlook the possibility that Allen may have originally obtained the information and made it available to Pearson. The timing, therefore, of the filing of any columns would have significance in analyzing these questions. It is, I think, a fair assumption that Pearson is aware of our investigation. If the leak originated with someone who attended the December 10 conference they would, in all probability, have notified Pearson that the investigation is going on. Since this is true, I feel that we should now go directly to Bell Syndicate to obtain information as to when Pearson's column was filed. We should obtain a copy of the complete column. I think we should also make similar inquiries regarding the Allen column as to the time of filing.

In the event results of pending interviews do not indicate otherwise, we should, after obtaining the information regarding the Pearson columns, interview Joseph Short, Press Secretary at the White House. Short was not present at the December 10 conference to our knowledge. He did make a brief statement to the press regarding the conference. He should be interviewed to determine if Anderson, or a representative of Pearson or of Allen, was at the White House on that date and, if so, complete details should be obtained as to Short's observations of who they talked to, what questions were asked, etc. Short should also be discreetly questioned regarding his knowledge of Pearson's and Allen's sources in the Government which would have a bearing on this investigation. Thereafter, interviews should be had with Drew Pearson, Jack Anderson and Robert Allen. In order that the record may be clear and, on the off chance that we may develop information, it is felt that these interviews will have to be conducted.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

If you approve, the New York Office will be telephonically instructed to initiate inquiries at Bell Syndicate in New York. It is not definite whether Bell Syndicate handles Allen's column. In the event it does not, inquiries should be initiated at the "New York Post" for information regarding Allen's column.

A. H. BELMONT

December 17, 1951

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cc-Mr. Marchessault

MR. A. H. BELMONT

December 21, 1951

MR. C. E. HENNRICH

DREW PEARSON
ALLEGED LEAK FROM WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE
DECEMBER 10, 1951, TO JACK ANDERSON,
LEG-MAN FOR DREW PEARSON
ESPIONAGE - X

I talked with Secretary Robert A. Lovett on the morning of December 21. I advised him we have now interviewed all the persons who attended the President's conference on December 10 and, in addition, have interviewed those individuals who were indicated as having been furnished information regarding any phase of the conference. I told him that the information furnished to us was that relatively little dissemination of the facts of the conference was made by those in attendance. I pointed out we had developed no substantial information indicating the identity of any person who may have leaked information.

I pointed out to Secretary Lovett that a most significant development of the investigation was the close social contacts of Clayton Fritchey, Director of Public Information, Department of Defense, with Drew Pearson. I pointed out that the evening when General Bradley had Jack Anderson over to the Pentagon to go over the proposed column, Fritchey was having dinner and playing bridge at the Pearson home. I pointed out it had been developed that Fritchey was to play bridge at the Pearson home again during the week of December 17. I pointed out in this connection that we had developed no information indicating that Fritchey was in possession of facts regarding the conference, and Mr. Lovett hastened to assure that Fritchey was not in possession of any such information. Mr. Lovett made no specific comment concerning the Fritchey-Pearson relationship. His demeanor was such, however, that I gathered he was not pleased.

We then discussed the Pearson and Allen columns in general. Mr. Lovett indicated that the theory had been presented to him that an astute newspaperman could have written the columns without actually having access to the facts discussed at the conference. He noted that many items in the columns were inaccurate; also that the columns made no reference to many items actually discussed at some length at the conference, including NATO.

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DEC 21 1951	
FBI - WASH. F. O.	

18

I advised Secretary Lovett that in our interrogation of the persons who attended the conference, we have accepted their word as to the extent of dissemination or discussion of matters pertaining to the conference, and have made no effort to question any secretaries, aides, or assistants for the purpose of verifying such statements, but that we have, of course, followed through where it has been indicated information was passed on, in order to determine whether further dissemination was made by those receiving such information. Secretary Lovett stated he definitely felt that no inquiries should be made at this time to verify the statements of persons who attended the conference.

Secretary Lovett was informed it would appear to be logical at this point to consider interviews with Drew Pearson, Jack Anderson, and Robert Allen. He was requested to advise as to whether he desires these interviews to be conducted. He commented that the desirability of such interviews, of course, is a matter of judgment and that it was his judgment no affirmative results could be expected from such interviews. On the other hand, he commented that such interviews might well result in a blast at the Administration from the press generally. He concluded that these interviews should not be conducted at this time.

Secretary Lovett stated that in the absence of a clear-out indication that some particular individual had actually leaked information from the conference, he was of the definite feeling at this time that no further inquiries should be made in this matter and that he would be prepared to so recommend to the President. I told Secretary Lovett that a report is being prepared reflecting our investigation to date, so that he can have an opportunity to go over in detail the interviews conducted. I told him we would be glad to confer with him at any time regarding the investigation and to conduct any further investigation which is desired. He indicated he felt that no further investigation would be desired.

The Washington Field Office is now preparing the report in this matter and have advised it will be completed over the week end. Our present plans are to deliver a copy of the investigative report to Secretary Lovett, together with a cover letter confirming his decision that Drew Pearson, Jack Anderson, and Robert Allen not be interviewed at this time. This cover letter will also request his desires as to further investigation.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

It is recommended that at the time we deliver the report to Secretary Lovett, we orally advise Admiral Dennison of the White House that the report has been so delivered.

Since the investigation has indicated some contact with Pearson and Jack Anderson on the part of Under Secretary Whitehair, and definite association on the part of Clayton Fretchey, I think it might be desirable, when we deliver the report to Secretary Lovett and when we advise Admiral Dennison of its delivery to Lovett, that we orally point out to these two men that so long as association between responsible individuals in the Defense establishment and elsewhere and columnists such as Drew Pearson continues, it can be expected that leaks will occur.

65-6060-36

Subject of FOIPA Request

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Form No. 1

THIS CASE ORIGINATED AT

WASHINGTON FIELD

~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

~~TOP SECRET~~
FILE NO. ~~SECRET~~

REPORT MADE AT WASHINGTON, D.C.	DATE WHEN MADE 12/22/51	PERIOD FOR WHICH MADE 12/14-22/51	REPORT MADE BY R. B. HOOD, SAC
TITLE DREW PEARSON (Column of December 15, 1951) JACK WORTHMAN ANDERSON, aka Jack Anderson ROBERT S. ALLEN (Column of December 13, 1951)			CHARACTER OF CASE ESPIONAGE - X

SYNOPSIS OF FACTS:

On 12/11/51 JACK ANDERSON, Reporter for DREW PEARSON, approached FRANCIS P. WHITEHAIR, Under Secretary of Navy, asked some innocuous questions concerning background of White House conference held preceding date; then confronted WHITEHAIR with statements attributed to participants at conference, requesting verification. WHITEHAIR states he rebuked ANDERSON and declined to comment on conference; reported matter to DAN KINBALL, Secretary of Navy, and facts of proposed PEARSON column furnished President TRUMAN. On request, ANDERSON submitted pertinent portion of proposed news column for 12/15/51 release to General OMAR BRADLEY on 12/12/51. Specific objection to phraseology of two items in column made by General BRADLEY on security grounds, and PEARSON made requested changes. Column of ROBERT S. ALLEN appearing in 12/13/51 issue of New York Post reported substantially same information as PEARSON possessed relative to Presidential conference of 12/10. Columns referred to set forth. News dispatches referring to specific items discussed at conference set forth as of interest to instant investigation. At President's request, investigation conducted to determine whether leak may have emanated from any person in attendance at White House conference. All participants at conference interviewed as well as those identified as having knowledge of items discussed there. These interviews did not result in identification of any person responsible for leak of information.

5-1-36
 DECLASSIFIED BY SP1A/afk
 ON 11-11-89
 ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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 DATE _____ BY _____

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APPROVED AND FORWARDED: <i>[Signature]</i>	SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE	DO NOT WRITE IN THESE SPACES		
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DETAILS: AT WASHINGTON, D. C.

This investigation was initiated on a request of the President through Secretary of Defense ROBERT A. LOVETT. On December 13, 1951, Secretary LOVETT advised Assistant Director ALAN H. BELMONT and Inspector CARL E. HENFELH that the President had requested him to inform the Bureau that an investigation should be made concerning information in the possession of JACK ANDERSON, leg man for DREW PEARSON, which information it was believed came from one of the government representatives attending a White House conference on December 10, 1951, presided over by President TRUMAN. The information concerned was of a "~~top secret~~" nature.

At that time Secretary LOVETT advised that the Defense Department had been considering four primary points in connection with the present cease-fire discussions in Korea and which points were presently matters of conflict between the United States and the Communist peace representatives. He stated that as a result of the feeling of the President that some of these matters were in need of further discussion, a conference was called by the President for 10:30 A.M., December 10, 1951, and the White House issued invitations to those whose attendance was desired.

Mr. LOVETT stated he had determined the following individuals were present at the conference:

President TRUMAN
Secretary of Defense ROBERT A. LOVETT
General OWEN BRADLEY, Chief of Staff
General J. LAWTON COLLINS, Army
General HOYT S. VANDEBERG, Air
Admiral WILLIAM FECHTLER, Navy
General CHARLES P. GABELL, Director of Joint Chiefs of Staff
Secretary FRANK C. PACE, Army
Secretary THOMAS R. FINGLETTER, Air
Acting Secretary FRANCIS P. WHITEHAIR, Navy
Acting Secretary JAMES E. WEBB, State
Mr. H. FREEMAN MATTHEWS, State
Admiral SIDNEY SOWERS, White House
JAMES LAY, National Security Council
General HARRY VAUGHAN, White House
Admiral ROBERT L. JENNISON, White House
General ROBERT LANDRY, White House

Mr. LOVETT, during the interview, furnished a summary of the various matters which were discussed at the conference. Mr. LOVETT advised that because of the widespread interest which had been general in connection with the conference, newspaper reporters were present at the White House in great number and at the conclusion of the conference were clamoring for information. He advised that to his knowledge, Mr. JOSEPH SHORT, press correspondent for the White House, advised the reporters that the conference had discussed world

WFO 65-6060

affairs including Korea and made no further statement.

Mr. LOVETT informed that he had taken no notes during the conference and subsequent thereto, had prepared no written record of the matters covered at the conference. He further informed that there was no recording of the conference and that no written agenda had been prepared specifying the items to be discussed.

Secretary LOVETT advised that on the afternoon of December 12, 1951, JACK ANDERSON, leg man for DEWEY PEARSON, contacted Acting Secretary of the Navy WHITEHAIR and showed to Mr. WHITEHAIR or read to him a story which purported to be almost a verbatim account of the important matters set forth above which were discussed at the conference. He stated that Mr. WHITEHAIR was shocked and informed ANDERSON that it would be wrong to publish this material. Mr. LOVETT stated that Mr. WHITEHAIR brought this to the attention of the President. He stated that the President informed General BRADLEY who called either PEARSON or ANDERSON and asked that the material be brought over so that he might examine it. He stated that about 7:00 P.M. on the same day ANDERSON came to see General BRADLEY and brought the story with him. He stated that the story was read by General BRADLEY and his Aides, Colonel CLIFTON and Colonel MATTHEWS.

He stated that General BRADLEY attempted to get ANDERSON to "kill" the story entirely but ANDERSON advised him that he had checked with PEARSON and that the story was already on the Bell Syndicate wires and would come out Saturday, December 15, 1951. He stated that ANDERSON informed General BRADLEY that it was impossible to "kill" the story. He further added that General BRADLEY and his Aides marked in red pencil two parts which they stated would be especially injurious to the security of this country and that ANDERSON informed General BRADLEY that he would recommend that these two parts be deleted.

Mr. LOVETT stated that the first part was a statement attributed to the President that if we did not get a cease-fire by December 27, we should arrange to extend the time. The second part related to concessions we might be prepared to make to the Communists. Mr. LOVETT advised that he did not know the full contents of ANDERSON's article. He stated that neither Mr. WHITEHAIR nor General BRADLEY had secured a copy of ANDERSON's article and that the only source from which the contents could be obtained in the government would be recollections of Mr. WHITEHAIR, General BRADLEY, and General BRADLEY's two aides. He stated that he did not know the exact excerpts of ANDERSON's article which shocked Mr. WHITEHAIR but rather was of the opinion it was the fact that ANDERSON had what appeared to be an accurate report of the conference.

Secretary LOVETT pointed out that ANDERSON's story appeared to have background which would indicate that it must have come from someone actually at the conference. He furnished as an example that the article started out by saying that the President, tanned and fit, walked briskly into the conference room and shook hands with everyone including his own White House Aides.

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MAT:CEO/sl

INTERVIEW WITH FRANCIS P. WHITEHAIR

Mr. FRANCIS P. WHITEHAIR, Undersecretary of the Navy since August 6, 1951, was interviewed at his office on December 16, 1951, by Special Agents MAURICE A. TAYLOR and CARL E. GRAHAM.

Mr. WHITEHAIR advised that he had attended the White House Conference on December 10 as substitute for Secretary DAN KIMBALL. At the conclusion of the conference, he departed alone, returning immediately to the Pentagon Building. He made no notes or memoranda but furnished a resume of the conference to Secretary KIMBALL the same afternoon and discussed the matter with no one else.

On the following afternoon, December 11, Mr. WHITEHAIR returned to his office between 5 and 6 p.m., at which time he was informed by an aide, Marine Captain WHITELY, that JACK ANDERSON was waiting to see him. ANDERSON had no previous appointment with Mr. WHITEHAIR, and they were not acquainted. Mr. WHITEHAIR advised that he talked with ANDERSON a short time in his office and found him to be an attractive, personable young man. He advised ANDERSON indicated he would not take much of Mr. WHITEHAIR's time, adding that he covers the Pentagon for DREW PEARSON and Mr. PEARSON wanted ANDERSON to become acquainted with Mr. WHITEHAIR. They exchanged a few pleasantries and then ANDERSON stated he understood Mr. WHITEHAIR was at the big meeting. WHITEHAIR replied, "You know there are a lot of big meetings." ANDERSON stated, "No, no, I mean the one at the White House." Mr. WHITEHAIR stated he remarked that unfortunately Secretary KIMBALL had been away, intimating that he had replaced Mr. KIMBALL. ANDERSON then asked who was present at the conference, and WHITEHAIR advised ANDERSON that the national interests precluded him from giving him this information. ANDERSON then inquired whether any jokes were told at the meeting. WHITEHAIR again advised ANDERSON that the best interests of the country made it impossible to discuss the conference. He thinks he mentioned this was merely the renewal of the bimonthly meeting of the President with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Mr. WHITEHAIR advised that ANDERSON thereupon pulled from his pocket a glossy yellow or gold paper folded like a newspaper and, reading from this paper, inquired if it were not true that General VANDENBERG had stated that we should reach an armistice with the Communists and thereafter withdraw. Also, General VANDENBERG had contended that we should not bomb beyond the Yalu River. Mr. WHITEHAIR declined to answer this query. ANDERSON then inquired

if JIMMY WEBB had not stated that we should reach an armistice and impose a threat to the Communists in the event the terms of this armistice were violated. Mr. WHITEHAIR refused to answer this question also. ANDERSON then inquired if Admiral FECHTELER did not oppose the above proposition of including a warning and threat to the Communists in the event of an armistice violation. Mr. WHITEHAIR stated he told ANDERSON that Admiral FECHTELER talks very little about anything. WHITEHAIR stated ANDERSON was persistent and inquired whether WHITEHAIR saw the President and he may have also asked regarding the President being tanned. WHITEHAIR advised he may have indicated that he saw the President, which was obvious, and could not recall whether he had commented on the suntan of the President. He advised ANDERSON then put the paper in his pocket and he lectured ANDERSON briefly, pointing out such material may be dangerous to the security of the United States and afford comfort to the enemy. He stressed ANDERSON should draw no inferences from anything stated by WHITEHAIR.

Mr. WHITEHAIR expressed the belief that ANDERSON's original intention was to merely obtain anecdotes or pleasantries for background or window dressing for his column and had not intended to reveal his material to WHITEHAIR, but this was a development from WHITEHAIR's refusal to cooperate from the outset.

Mr. WHITEHAIR advised on early Wednesday morning, December 12, he discussed the above incident with Secretary KIMBALL relating the entire story. He understands thereafter Secretary KIMBALL related the ANDERSON incident to Admiral FECHTELER, and later in the morning Admiral FECHTELER brought the matter to the attention of Admiral DENNISON of the White House who had visited the Pentagon about 11:30 a.m. on another matter. Mr. WHITEHAIR surmised that Admiral DENNISON had informed President TRUMAN as Admiral DENNISON contacted him later in the day and reported the President desired that WHITEHAIR report this matter to the attention of Secretary of Defense LOVETT and inform Mr. LOVETT that the FBI should be advised.

Mr. WHITEHAIR stated he felt the most immediate thing was to prevent publication of the story, if possible, and at his suggestion, Admiral DENNISON obtained authorization of the President for WHITEHAIR to contact DREW PEARSON. About 5 p.m., December 12, Mr. WHITEHAIR phoned PEARSON whom he had met on several prior occasions since his appointment as Undersecretary and appealed to PEARSON to withhold the column from publication. He stated he based his request on two grounds; first, that he was newly appointed and trying to perform his job and did not wish to become involved as a result of PEARSON's action in sending his representative to make friends with WHITEHAIR and then asked a series of questions about a confidential conference. Mr. WHITEHAIR's

WFO 65-6060

second and most important argument was that the disclosure of the conference discussions might well impair the security of the country. He stated PEARSON was somewhat apologetic and said he wished WHITEHAIR had called him yesterday and then told WHITEHAIR that he need not worry, that he had not told ANDERSON anything, and insisted that the statement would not hurt the President or the country and, as a matter of fact, he thought the President would like it.

Mr. WHITEHAIR advised that his senior aide, Captain SELMAN S. ROWLING, USN, had listened to the conversation with PEARSON and submitted the following memorandum:

"12 December 1951

"At about 1735 Wednesday, 12 December, the Under Secretary directed me to get Mr. Drew Pearson on the phone for him and to listen in. There follows the substance of the conversation:

"Mr. Whitehair said that as Mr. Pearson knew, Mr. Anderson was in to see him yesterday afternoon. That Mr. Anderson and he had chatted for a while and that Mr. Anderson started asking about the President's conference Monday morning, as to who was there, and if there were any jokes told, etc. Mr. Whitehair gave him some innocuous answers, to innocuous questions, but when Mr. Anderson asked other questions and brought out a notepad to take notes, the Under Secretary told him not to do that, that he could not talk about the conference. Mr. Whitehair then said to Mr. Pearson that if he planned to publish anything about this conference he wished that he would reconsider and not do it, because if he had anything it might hurt our national interests, and since it was well known that Mr. Anderson had been in to see the Under Secretary he might be blamed for the leak.

"Mr. Pearson said that he had already released a brief outline of the conference saying that the President would like a truce, providing no serious concessions were necessary, etc., but that he didn't see that Mr. Whitehair should be apprehensive, as Anderson had told him that Whitehair hadn't told him anything, and that General Bradley and he (Pearson) were old friends and had talked this situation over many times, and that many other friends of his (Pearson's) were at the conference: Finletter, Vandenberg, and Jimmy Webb.

"Mr. Whitehair protested again, stating he was new here, trying to do a job and certainly didn't want to get involved in such a matter, and that it was now known that Anderson had been to Mr. Kimball's office and hadn't

"gotten in to see Mr. Kimball, and had then come down to see him (Mr. Whitehair) -- Mr. Whitehair not then knowing that Anderson had tried but had been unable to see Mr. Kimball first.

"Mr. Pearson then said that Anderson was trying to see Mr. Kimball on an entirely different matter, and had had instructions to get in to meet Mr. Whitehair, and further that he (Pearson) thought the article was a pretty good one, favorable to the President and to the military, and would do the President some good, and certainly not hurt our national interests.

"Mr. Whitehair said that he was glad to hear that, and thanked Mr. Pearson."

In connection with his acquaintance with DREW PEARSON, Mr. WHITEHAIR advised that when he was General Counsel for the Economic Stabilization Administration, he had been invited to the PEARSON home, along with MIKE DISALLE, but had not accepted the invitation. Shortly after his appointment as Under-secretary of Navy, he was again invited to the PEARSON home for an informal buffet dinner on a Saturday afternoon and accepted. He recalled that he went in his car and drove Justice HUGO BLACK and his wife, who were also guests. Others present included DREW PEARSON, a sister of Mr. PEARSON, Attorney ABE FORTAS and his wife, WALTER CRONKITE, radio commentator, and FRED BLUMENTHAL (reporter and office manager of Mr. PEARSON). Mr. WHITEHAIR also recalled that PEARSON had paid him a casual visit one afternoon on a subsequent occasion inquiring how he liked his job and exchanging pleasantries. On one other occasion PEARSON had been in the Pentagon to contact the Secretary of Navy and dropped in for a brief visit with Mr. WHITEHAIR. Mr. WHITEHAIR advised he had never furnished PEARSON with any information.

Mr. WHITEHAIR advised he did not know ROBERT S. ALLEN. He advised that he was not acquainted with JACK ANDERSON prior to the meeting described above and did not know any other individual employed by PEARSON with the exception of FRED BLUMENTHAL. He explained he had met BLUMENTHAL previously on two occasions in his office. This occurred in connection with a controversy growing out of efforts of the Harvey Machine Company to negotiate a twenty-seven million dollar loan from the Government. Considerable opposition developed because of alleged inefficiency of the Harvey Machine Company in manufacturing defective shells for the Government during the war.

DREW PEARSON apparently had interested himself in opposing the loan efforts of the Harvey Company and sent BLUMENTHAL to see WHITEHAIR, at which time BLUMENTHAL displayed a confidential Navy document to WHITEHAIR. Sometime thereafter, BLUMENTHAL again visited WHITEHAIR and the latter returned the

WFO 65-6060

document to BLUMENTHAL, stating he was certain BLUMENTHAL had made photo-static copies. He said BLUMENTHAL was surprised, stating he thought WHITEHAIR would retain the document.

The "New York Post" column of ROBERT S. ALLEN published December 13, 1951, was displayed to Mr. WHITEHAIR, who stated it was pretty accurate and undoubtedly based upon the knowledge of someone who had attended the conference. He stated the quotations attributed to the President and General COLLINS appeared reasonably accurate but observed that in connection with the column's statement that the Communists cannot drive us out of Korea, COLLINS had stated "For my money, the Communists cannot drive us out of Korea," rather than "until hell freezes over" as indicated in the ALLEN column. Mr. WHITEHAIR was positive General COLLINS had not said "until hell freezes over."

Mr. WHITEHAIR thought that the quotations and alleged statements of General BRADLEY were rather accurate with the exception that he did not recall that General BRADLEY had portrayed the Communists as playing off their efforts to demand concessions on airfields against the rotation of troops advocated by the U.N. He recalled that both matters were discussed in General BRADLEY's presentation of the various points at issue in the truce negotiations. With reference to the quotations of General VANDENBERG in the column, Mr. WHITEHAIR advised he could not recall that General VANDENBERG had argued particularly about airfields but possibly this was mentioned.

Mr. WHITEHAIR advised that his contribution to the conference touched briefly upon the fact that he was new in his job and his knowledge of the behavior and characteristics of the orientals, Koreans in particular, in the light of his many years' experience in the Far East as a Military Government Specialist and Prisoner of War Officer. He stated that based on his knowledge of oriental psychology, he offered the opinion to the conference that the Communists would prolong negotiations indefinitely and then say no, which supported the position of Admiral FECHTELER.

Concerning an alleged leak of information relative to the proceedings at the White House conference, Mr. WHITEHAIR stated he could offer no suggestions as to the identity of any person in attendance who may have been responsible for a leak, if a leak occurred.

WFO 65-6060
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INTERVIEW WITH SECRETARY OF NAVY DAN KIRBALL

Secretary of Navy DAN KIRBALL was interviewed at his office in the Pentagon on the afternoon of December 18, 1951, by Special Agents CARL E. GRAHAM and MAURICE A. TAYLOR.

Secretary KIRBALL advised that he was out of the city at the time of the White House Conference on the morning of December 10, 1951, and was represented at the conference by Under Secretary FRANCIS WHITEHAIR, who returned to the Pentagon before noon, at which time he furnished Mr. KIRBALL with a general summary of what had transpired at the conference. He recalled in particular that Mr. WHITEHAIR had informed him concerning the remarks made by Mr. WHITEHAIR and Admiral WILLIAM FECHHEIMER. Mr. KIRBALL advised he had made no notes, and that no memoranda had been prepared on the above discussion or the conference. He also stated he had no further discussions with anyone concerning the conference proceedings.

Secretary KIRBALL stated that on the following afternoon, December 11, 1951, he had returned to his office about 4:30 P.M., at which time his secretary advised that JACK ANDERSON had wanted to see him. Secretary KIRBALL told the girl that he did not wish to see ANDERSON at all. However, he learned that ANDERSON had left his office and had gone down to visit Mr. WHITEHAIR. Later that evening, or early the next morning, WHITEHAIR reported to Secretary KIRBALL that ANDERSON had questioned him concerning the White House Conference and thereafter read several items from notes indicating he had been briefed on a number of matters discussed at the conference. On the same morning, Mr. KIRBALL informed Admiral FECHHEIMER of the above developments and Admiral FECHHEIMER advised he would inform Admiral DENNISON of the White House. Mr. KIRBALL understood that Admiral DENNISON had advised President TRUMAN on the same date.

WFO 65-6060
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INTERVIEW WITH ADMIRAL WILLIAM M. FECHTELER

Admiral WILLIAM M. FECHTELER, Chief of Naval Operations, was interviewed on December 15, 1951, by Special Agents MAURICE A. TAYLOR and CARL E. GRAHAM, at the office of Admiral FECHTELER, Room 4E, 632, Pentagon.

Admiral FECHTELER recalled he had attended the White House Conference held at 10:30 A.M., December 10, 1951. He advised that he did not take any notes during the conference and made no memoranda thereafter pertaining to the conference; he also advised he had not discussed the proceedings of the conference with anyone.

Admiral FECHTELER furnished the substance of his own contribution to the conference, which covered a single item. Admiral FECHTELER voiced his misgivings to an earlier State Department proposal that the sixteen member nations of the UN forces represented in Korea issue a threat to the Communists of dire consequences to be visited on them if a violation of the armistice agreement occurs. In this connection, Admiral FECHTELER urged that he did not believe in threats or in committing ourselves to a course of action which we might not be able or find desirable to effectuate at the time when some violation occurred, and he stressed he did not believe in issuing threats in any event.

Admiral FECHTELER furnished the background of instant matter as known to him, advising that he first learned of the PEARSON-ANDERSON leak on Wednesday morning, from Secretary DAN KIMBALL, as they were going to a conference together. Secretary KIMBALL related that on the previous day ANDERSON had an appointment with FRANCIS WHITEHAIR, during which ANDERSON questioned Mr. WHITEHAIR concerning the conference, and then read from a paper concerning the details of the conference, which alarmed WHITEHAIR, who reported the matter to Secretary KIMBALL. Admiral FECHTELER advised that after lunch he had occasion to talk with Admiral DENNISON, White House Attache, and DENNISON first learned of the leak from Admiral FECHTELER, and subsequently the matter was reported to the President.

Admiral FECHTELER pointed out he did not know DREW PEARSON, JACK ANDERSON, or any known PEARSON employee, and he had no specific suggestion as to how any leak may have occurred.

Admiral FECHTELER was made cognizant of the column by ROBERT S. ALLEN in the "New York Post" of December 13, 1951, which column

WFO 65-6060

purported to contain the substance of the White House Conference. Admiral FECHNER said he could not verify the accuracy of the ALLEN column as to actual quotations, but in all, considered the ALLEN column to be substantially an accurate report of remarks which were included in the conference. He expressed the belief that the ALLEN column must have been prepared with assistance from someone who was present at the conference, and he concluded he could not point out any inaccuracies in the ALLEN column.

Admiral FECHNER was asked concerning the item reportedly in the ANDERSON column to the effect that we would seek an extension beyond the deadline of December 27, 1951, in the event details were not completed prior to that date. Admiral FECHNER stated he did not recall the President had indicated we would seek or permit extension beyond the December 27 deadline, although he thinks the date may have been mentioned during the conference. He did recall that the President in substance said we should not make any concessions which we will regret later.

In conclusion, Admiral FECHNER advised that during the proceedings he did not observe anybody coming into or leaving the room, and recalled when the meeting concluded, approximately 11:40 A.M., everyone left the White House at about the same time.

WFO 65-6060
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INTERVIEW WITH GENERAL OMAR BRADLEY

General OMAR BRADLEY, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was interviewed by Inspector CARL E. HENNRICH and Special Agent M. A. TAYLOR.

General BRADLEY advised he was informed by the President of the leak to DREW PEARSON, which was exposed when JACK ANDERSON approached FRANCIS WHITEHAIR to confirm material obviously originating at the conference. General BRADLEY stated that about 6:00 P.M., December 12, 1951, he had visited the White House at which time the President told him of the disclosure and expressed great concern that the truce negotiations would be jeopardized through an untimely news item. General BRADLEY volunteered to see if he could prevent publication of the information in PEARSON'S possession. General BRADLEY stated he ascertained from a source at the "Washington Post" that the PEARSON column was not made up for publication in the "Post" for December 13 and 14, which would be Thursday and Friday of the week of the conference. General BRADLEY advised that his press aide, Colonel C. V. CLIFTON, thereafter telephoned JACK ANDERSON, who came over to the office of General BRADLEY about 7:30 P.M., December 12, 1951.

General BRADLEY related that when ANDERSON arrived at the office of General BRADLEY he displayed a typewritten copy of a column to General BRADLEY and his assistants, Colonel WILLIS MATTHEWS and CHESTER CLIFTON. General BRADLEY read aloud the portions of the column dealing with the White House conference of December 10. His recollection was that the column referred to the conference as an important White House conference and described the President's entering the conference room, making a joking reference to his suntan, and proceeding around the conference table shaking hands with each individual present. General BRADLEY recalled the column indicated that General BRADLEY had led off by outlining the military situation in Korea, in which General BRADLEY was fairly optimistic.

Subsequently, reference was made in the column to a statement attributed to Admiral WILLIAM FECHTELER to the effect that the Navy was ready to perform its mission any time, anywhere in the Korean war. General BRADLEY believed there may have been a reference to a statement allegedly made at the conference by General HOYT VANDENBERG, but stated later he believed this was mentioned by ANDERSON verbally.

General BRADLEY advised that he also recalled two items in particular which he pointed out to ANDERSON as very undesirable and which ANDERSON agreed

WFO 65-6060

to change to conform with suggestions of General BRADLEY. One of these items quoted the President as saying we ought to do everything we could to get a cease-fire, but should not make any concessions we will regret later. General BRADLEY suggested changing this to simply state that the President had declared we should not make any concessions which we will regret later. The second item indicated that it was agreed at the conference that if we did not succeed in obtaining a cease-fire by the December 27 deadline we would ask for a few days extension of time. General BRADLEY advised that at his suggestion this was changed to a statement that there would undoubtedly be some details which would have to be worked out subsequent to the December 27 deadline. In connection with these changes, General BRADLEY advised that he had informed the President that the changes had been made and told President TRUMAN that the article, as modified, was not particularly harmful. He said he did not recall the President referring to the date December 27, 1951, at the conference.

General BRADLEY stated he did not request ANDERSON to kill or withdraw the story, explaining it was his understanding from talking to WHITEHAIR that it had been dispatched and he preferred not to ask favors of DEAN PEARSON. General BRADLEY expressed the opinion that the column was based, in part at least, on information obtained from someone present at the conference, and that it was fairly accurate and was not particularly harmful. He stated he did not authorize the publication but could not prevent its publication, and chose to suggest the changes, which he marked on the typewritten copy at the suggestion of Colonel WILLIS MATTHEWS.

General BRADLEY mentioned that ANDERSON had stated he had displayed the column to someone unnamed at the Pentagon who had stated that it was harmless and contained nothing which would violate security. General BRADLEY also had a recollection that ANDERSON had indicated that he had further information concerning the White House conference, but had refrained from including this in the watered down version for publication.

General BRADLEY, with reference to his participation in the conference, advised that at the beginning Secretary ROBERT LOVETT suggested that General BRADLEY inform the President of the military situation, which General BRADLEY did, advising him of the Communist buildup of men, planes, and equipment in the past couple of weeks, and also discussing the several points in the negotiation and mentioning that a few concessions could be made on both sides. He particularly expressed the view of the Joint Chiefs that repair and rehabilitation was equally advantageous to the UN and a ban would be unenforceable.

At this time the column of ROBERT S. ALLEN which appeared in the "New York Post" on December 13, 1951, was displayed to General BRADLEY, who

WFO 65-6060

read it carefully and expressed the opinion that he did not believe he recognized it as identical with that of ANDERSON, and did not believe it to be as accurate. He stated some of the quotations are pretty close to those of ANDERSON's and that the same person could have given the material to both men, relating it a bit differently, or he thought perhaps ALLEN could have obtained the material from PEARSON or ANDERSON prior to the time that ANDERSON's material was watered down in column form.

General BRADLEY pointed out several differences. He stated that at the conference General VANDENBERG had not expressed as great concern as attributed to him in the ALLEN column. He stated that the references to General COLLINS were fairly accurate, and the quotation that General COLLINS stated we could "hold the present line until hell freezes over" was accurate. With reference to General COLLINS' inclination to make concessions on the airfield dispute, he stated COLLINS' view was that four or five airfields could be conceded to the Communists.

General BRADLEY advised that with reference to the statement in the ALLEN column attributed to him, that the Reds were trying to bargain rotation against airfields, this is not entirely accurate, but that reference to the rotation of troops was made and this was discussed as one of the serious points at issue in negotiations with the enemy.

General BRADLEY advised that the quote attributed to President TRUMAN, that he was very anxious to end the fighting but would not agree to concessions we may regret later, was accurate to the best of his recollection. He also believed some reference was made at the conference to building up the South Korean Army and how soon we could withdraw safely.

General BRADLEY was questioned concerning any possible suspicions he might have concerning anyone present at the conference, and he stated he felt that no member of the Military or Naval services present was responsible for the leak. He admitted he had in mind one civilian present at the conference whom he would not trust with confidential information of this character. He said he had absolutely no facts to support his suspicions, except that this person had been reported to have leaked information on a prior occasion. He confided that he had made his suspicions known to the President and had promised the President that he would not reveal the name of this person to any other individual. General BRADLEY did not furnish any information which would point to the individual under his suspicion.

General BRADLEY advised he did not make any notes during or after the conference; thereafter, did not make any record or memorandum of the proceedings. Furthermore, he stated he had not discussed the proceedings of the conference with anyone except as indicated above.

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INTERVIEW WITH COLONEL CHESTER V. CLIFTON

Colonel CHESTER V. CLIFTON, press officer and aide to General OMAR BRADLEY, was interviewed in the office of his associate, Colonel WILLIS MATTHEWS, on the afternoon of December 14, 1951, by SAs CARL E. GRAHAM and MAURICE A. TAYLOR.

Colonel CLIFTON advised that at about 6:30 p.m. on December 12, 1951, General BRADLEY had returned to his office from the White House and advised that the President was greatly concerned about an alleged leak to DREW PEARSON or his reporter, JACK ANDERSON, of matters discussed at the White House conference held on the morning of December 10, 1951. Colonel CLIFTON stated he understood that ANDERSON had prepared a story containing direct quotations which were very accurate, indicating the information was authentic. He explained that he learned from General BRADLEY, that FRANCIS WHITEHAIR, acting Secretary of Navy at the conference, had been approached by ANDERSON under the pretext that he wanted to meet with Mr. WHITEHAIR, who is comparatively new as under Secretary of Navy, and thereafter endeavored to question Mr. WHITEHAIR about the conference proceedings. When Mr. WHITEHAIR declined to furnish anything, ANDERSON pulled a paper from his pocket and read descriptive material of the conference proceedings which was so accurate Mr. WHITEHAIR became alarmed, and reported the matter which ultimately reached the President. Colonel CLIFTON related that the President felt that premature or inaccurate disclosures might jeopardize our entire truce negotiations with the Communists. So, General BRADLEY volunteered his assistance in view of past experience with PEARSON in a similar matter. He recalled that on one occasion in the past when PEARSON had prepared a column dealing with top secret atomic information, General BRADLEY had requested PEARSON not to use the material in the interests of national security and PEARSON had respected General BRADLEY's request in that matter. Colonel CLIFTON related that in the light of that prior incident, General BRADLEY had volunteered to help on this occasion. Colonel CLIFTON understood from General BRADLEY that Mr. WHITEHAIR had called DREW PEARSON, who indicated that the column already had been dispatched, but insisted that nothing contained therein constituted a danger to security or a source of embarrassment. Colonel CLIFTON stated he phoned "RUSS" WIGGINS of the Washington Post, who advised him that nothing concerning the White House conference appeared in the PEARSON columns scheduled for publication December 13 and 14. Colonel CLIFTON advised that before having PEARSON again contacted by his superior, General BRADLEY, he thought he would discuss the matter with JACK ANDERSON and called him after locating ANDERSON at the Senate Press Gallery.

WFO 65-6060

He stated ANDERSON assured him he did not wish to violate security and there was no security violation in the PEARSON column, but agreed to come over with the column and discuss it. At the same time, ANDERSON inquired how CLIFTON learned of the column's existence, and offered to submit the column for editing in exchange for being informed as to who told Colonel CLIFTON he had the information concerning the conference. To this Colonel CLIFTON agreed. A short time thereafter, around 7:00 p.m., JACK ANDERSON came over to General BRADLEY's office and there in the presence of ANDERSON, Colonel MATTHEWS and himself (CLIFTON) General BRADLEY read aloud the portion of the column dealing with the White House conference. Colonel CLIFTON recalled there were two points in the article which were considered objectionable, although General BRADLEY did not indicate to ANDERSON that anything in the column was accurate or indicate in any way that he approved publication of the column. Colonel CLIFTON explained this type of editing is necessary in handling stories where reporters have secured confidential information in the nature of scoops, as they are unable to prevent publication and endeavor to protect national security by persuading the reporters to delete items which greatly endanger the national interest.

The first of the objectionable items above, in substance, quoted the President as stating we would grant an extension of a few days if details of the peace negotiations were not worked out by the cease fire dead line of December 27, 1951. Colonel CLIFTON advised this objectionable item was rephrased and in substance was made to read that undoubtedly there will be some details that will have to be worked out after the December 27th dead line. The other objectionable item in substance had quoted the President as saying that we ought to do everything we can to get a cease fire, but we should make no concessions that we would regret later. Colonel CLIFTON advised this item was considered objectionable in that it would tend to make it look like we are too anxious to obtain an armistice. So, the item was changed in substance to show the President commenting we should make no concessions we would regret later. Colonel CLIFTON stated that apart from the above changes, it was agreed in ANDERSON's presence that the column was not particularly harmful and might in fact be helpful. Thereafter, ANDERSON departed with the understanding he would recommend to PEARSON that the suggested changes be inserted in the column.

Just before leaving, ANDERSON reminded Colonel CLIFTON they had agreed that on the condition of ANDERSON submitting the column, Colonel CLIFTON would tell ANDERSON how it had been learned that the column had been prepared. In reply to ANDERSON, CLIFTON told him he learned it from the President.

WFO 65-6060

He stated ANDERSON appeared to be genuinely startled at this, and then as they were walking down the hall, ANDERSON shook his head and said "it must have been WHITEHAIR who told him."

To the best of his recollections, Colonel CLIFTON furnished the material contained in the PEARSON column as read aloud to him by General BRADLEY in ANDERSON'S presence. He recalled the column had started out with a description of the President entering the conference room in good spirits, and after greeting everyone made some remark, in substance, inquiring as to how they all liked his suntan. In addition to the two items above, considered objectionable and changed in accordance with General BRADLEY'S suggestions, Colonel CLIFTON recalled the PEARSON column contained a sub-title along in the middle of the column, captioned "Silent Admiral" which described a statement at the conference attributed to Admiral FECHTELER. It was Colonel CLIFTON'S recollection that in substance the comments attributed to FECHTELER were to the effect that the Navy was ready to carry on its part in the Korean war if called on, any time, any place, and under any condition. Colonel CLIFTON said he could not recall additional items in the PEARSON column, but did remember that next to the last item was the previously described objectionable reference to the granting of extensions of time beyond the December 27 deadline. In connection with ANDERSON'S protestation that the column contained no violation of security, ANDERSON had told General BRADLEY and his two assistants that he had lots more information from the conference and he had purposely left it out because there might be some question of security. In this connection, he referred to statements attributed to General VANDENBERG dealing with the air war and how it would affect us and by General COLLINS concerning troop rotation, and what we should do about it.

Colonel CLIFTON stated he is familiar with the DREW PEARSON style of reporting and his information techniques from considerable experience with ANDERSON and he feels that this information originated from an eye witness who attended the White House conference. He cautioned, however, that the entire story may not have been obtained from such a source of information and added that it may have been the work of two or more reporters working in conjunction, such as ANDERSON and McNAMARA, another PEARSON reporter, or ROBERT ALLEN and PAUL SCOTT. He also called attention to the possibility that direct quotations could have been passed on by a secondary source in the person of an assistant to one of those attending the conference. In this connection, Colonel CLIFTON stated that a surprising degree of detail can be assimilated by a man trained in this respect to receive information from the top man and be able to retain it in order to make or implement decisions.

Colonel CLIFTON stated that a leak of this nature was not the sort of thing that was handled by a telephone conversation between the source and the reporter. He said this sort of matter would almost necessarily indicate a person to person briefing with the informant giving the reporter a complete "fill-in" or "run-down" on the entire proceedings.

At this time, Colonel CLIFTON called attention to a column by ROBERT S. ALLEN, which he stated appeared in the New York Mirror December 13, 1951, but actually appeared in the "Blue Final" of the New York Post on the evening of that date. Colonel CLIFTON stated that reading the ALLEN column tended to confuse a bit his recollections of the ANDERSON material, but believed the column was in general similar to the ANDERSON column. He observed that the ALLEN column appeared to include the material in ANDERSON's column and in addition contained quotations by General VANDENBERG and General COLLINS, recalling in this connection, that ANDERSON had stated he had such items in his possession, but did not choose to use them.

After reading the ROBERT S. ALLEN column last night (December 13, 1951) Colonel CLIFTON remarked he called Mr. CLAYTON FRITCHEY, Director of Public Information, Department of Defense. They discussed the ALLEN column and Colonel CLIFTON's recollection of Mr. FRITCHEY's comment was FRITCHEY remarked that ALLEN had "scoped" PEARSON by two days. The following day, Colonel CLIFTON and Mr. FRITCHEY discussed the matter of the ALLEN and PEARSON columns and Mr. FRITCHEY told Colonel CLIFTON that he was at the DREW PEARSON residence at the time the discussion in General BRADLEY's office took place on the night of December 12. Mr. FRITCHEY told Colonel CLIFTON that he was playing bridge at the PEARSON home when ANDERSON came by the DREW PEARSON residence on his way to the Pentagon to take the column to General BRADLEY. Colonel CLIFTON stated FRITCHEY had related to him that PEARSON had showed the column to him (FRITCHEY). Colonel CLIFTON said FRITCHEY had made the observation he did not see anything harmful in the column as it had been displayed to him by PEARSON.

At the conclusion of this interview, Colonel CLIFTON summed up his observations by saying in his opinion there are two ways that the information got out: either a leak by some member actually in attendance at the White House conference, or some member in attendance told it to his respective staff and the information leaked from that point. He continued that it was his belief that the leak actually came from a person who had attended the White House conference. Colonel CLIFTON added it was his own conclusion that the same source who furnished the data to JACK ANDERSON also had given the same information to ROBERT S. ALLEN.

WFO 65-6060

On December 18, Colonel CLIFTON was reinterviewed for the purpose of displaying to him the DREW PEARSON column as published in the New York Daily Mirror, December 15, 1951. It was Colonel CLIFTON's observation that with only possibly minor editing, such as a comma here or there, he could see nothing significant in the PEARSON column as different from the original column which had been presented by ANDERSON and read by General BRADLEY. He stated he thought all the principal points were in the column. He did not believe the first paragraph in the column displayed is identical in form with the ANDERSON material, but he thought that the material that ANDERSON displayed to General BRADLEY did have an introduction containing much the same thought. He noted particularly the second sentence in the opening paragraph referring to an assurance from General BRADLEY that a cease fire could be worked out in Korea.

INTERVIEW WITH COLONEL WILLIS MATTHEWS

Colonel WILLIS MATTHEWS, Aide to General OWEN BRADLEY, was interviewed in his office at the Pentagon on the afternoon of December 14, 1951, by Special Agents CARL E. GRAHAM and MAURICE A. TAYLOR.

Colonel MATTHEWS confirmed the story of Colonel CHESTER CLIFTON of the return of General BRADLEY to the Pentagon about 6:30 p.m. on December 12, 1951, with the report from President TRUMAN of the news leak to JACK ANDERSON and the subsequent visit of ANDERSON to the office of General BRADLEY between 7:00 and 7:30 p.m. the same evening. Colonel MATTHEWS also advised that upon arrival, ANDERSON had displayed a lengthy typewritten document on long sheets of yellow paper, resembling teletype paper, which he presumed to be a full column. He stated perhaps one third or more of the material was devoted to the White House Conference and that General BRADLEY read this portion out loud in the presence of ANDERSON, Colonel CLIFTON, and himself. He advised that ANDERSON furnished no copy to General BRADLEY and no notes were made.

Colonel MATTHEWS stated that ANDERSON indicated that the column, as prepared, did not have any items dangerous to security and informed General BRADLEY that he would delete or recommend deletion of anything constituting a security violation. He advised that General BRADLEY did not approve anything in the column or indicate that anything was accurate or inaccurate. However, General BRADLEY objected to two items and designated these items on ANDERSON's copy at the suggestion of Colonel MATTHEWS. He stated ANDERSON agreed to change the two items to conform with the suggestions of General BRADLEY and Colonel CLIFTON. He stated he was not completely clear as to the two items, but believed in one item, ANDERSON agreed to delete a statement indicating that we are anxious for an armistice and would go to considerable lengths to obtain it, and to leave in the column a statement by the President that we should not go and make any foolish concessions or mistakes which we would regret thereafter.

Colonel MATTHEWS advised that prior to the arrival of ANDERSON at the office of General BRADLEY on the evening of December 12, 1951, General BRADLEY had called Secretary ROBERT LOVETT discussing the alleged leak and informing him of the concern of the President. General BRADLEY also called Under Secretary FRANCIS WHITEHAIR, who had originally reported the leak and discussed the leak and the President's concern with Mr. WHITEHAIR.

WFO 65-6060

With reference to his recollections of the ANDERSON article read by General BRADLEY, Colonel MATTHEWS stated that it began by referring to the White House conference and indicating that the information hereafter came from an informed source or a source close to the White House. He stated it described President TRUMAN as entering the conference room, shaking hands with everybody, and making a remark about Florida and his suntan. He stated the article quoted the President and indicated that the President opposed granting the Communists the right to rebuild air fields, roads, etc. He believed some remark was made by the President to the effect that we should get along with the armistice negotiations.

Colonel MATTHEWS advised that he knew of the White House conference on December 10, in advance, but was not informed of the topics for discussion and had not discussed the conference with General BRADLEY or anyone else. He stated, so far as he knew, no notes or memoranda were made by General BRADLEY. Colonel MATTHEWS was able to furnish no individuals as suspects.

INTERVIEW WITH MR. CLAYTON FRICHEY

Mr. CLAYTON FRICHEY, Director, Office of Public Information, Department of Defense, was interviewed at his office in the Pentagon on December 17, 1951, by Special Agents CARL E. GRAHAM and MAURICE A. TAYLOR.

Mr. FRICHEY advised he possessed no information regarding the proceedings and discussions of the White House Conference held December 10, 1951, and did not know the identities of those in attendance other than from normal conjecture. Mr. FRICHEY was advised it was understood he possessed some information regarding an alleged leak from the conference to DREW PEARSON or JACK ANDERSON, his reporter. Mr. FRICHEY stated on the afternoon of Tuesday or Wednesday of last week, at about 3:00, 4:00 or 5:00, ANDERSON had visited him in his office. On this occasion, ANDERSON inquired as to what transpired at the White House Conference, and FRICHEY said he knew nothing. ANDERSON replied that he had a "pretty good fill-in" on the conference, and FRICHEY gathered from ANDERSON's manner that he considered the material authentic, but not particularly exciting, and that it had proved to be something of a let-down. ANDERSON gave FRICHEY no details of the information in ANDERSON's possession. Mr. FRICHEY remarked that he knew ANDERSON rather well, but that ANDERSON does not visit him very often, and added that the reporters, including ANDERSON, know who to see and who is vulnerable, indicating he was not in the latter category.

At this point, Mr. FRICHEY stated he was able to place the date of ANDERSON's visit as Tuesday, December 11th, which was the day before he had visited DREW PEARSON's home for dinner and bridge. He mentioned DREW PEARSON does not play bridge personally, but his wife enjoys the game. FRICHEY stated that in route to PEARSON's residence, he had gone by the home of his assistant, Lieutenant Colonel F. CLARENCE NEWLAN, and remarked that NEWLAN did not have dinner. He explained, later in the interview, that Colonel NEWLAN and his wife joined the group for bridge after dinner. Dinner guests included DREW PEARSON and wife, Attorney PETER ANSBERRY and his wife, EDWARD PRITCHARD of Kentucky, and Mr. FRICHEY.

While at dinner, or possibly just before dinner began, JACK ANDERSON arrived at the PEARSON home, and PEARSON invited FRICHEY into

the hallway or reception room adjoining the living room, where he was shown an article pertaining to the White House Conference. He stated it was typewritten on several pages of yellow paper larger than the ordinary letter size, and he gathered it was part of the column. PEARSON told FRENCHY the article contained several items to which General BRADLEY or his assistant, Colonel CLIFTON, or both, objected, and ANDERSON was going to show it to these officers. At PEARSON's invitation, FRENCHY read the article, which impressed him as being rather innocuous and pretty tame. FRENCHY stated, however, it struck him that despite the fact the column was not sensational, the fact that it indicated a leak had occurred in such an important conference was significant and important. He stated he did not suggest this to PEARSON, nor did he suggest that PEARSON withhold publication of the column. He advised PEARSON did not ask him to approve the article or to edit it in any way, and he did not do so. He stated he supposed PEARSON showed him the column to double check the story, as this is a normal technique. He remarked that it is well-known here that PEARSON has excellent sources, and this sort of thing occurs regularly, and he did not feel it would cause any future.

Mr. FRENCHY advised that ANDERSON then departed, and an hour or two later returned, at which time FRENCHY was playing bridge. He stated he did not see the column on this second visit of ANDERSON; however, PEARSON informed him that one or two changes were suggested by General BRADLEY, and PEARSON stated that the column would be changed as suggested. FRENCHY gathered from this that the column would be dispatched, and added it was his conclusion that the column had appeared, although, perhaps, not in the "Washington Post" as editors often exercise the prerogative to delete columns or portions of columns, and in some instances, such as with the tabloids, to divide columns and publish them piecemeal in different editions.

Mr. FRENCHY advised that shortly before noon on Saturday, December 15th, JACK ANDERSON came to his office on another unimportant, unrelated matter, at which time FRENCHY rebuffed ANDERSON for being accepted by ROBERT S. ALLEN, whose column, containing information similar to that of ANDERSON, had appeared in the "New York Post" on December 15, 1951. FRENCHY advised that ANDERSON expressed surprise, which appeared to be genuine. FRENCHY stated he had learned of the ALLEN column from Colonel CLIFTON, and thought he had a copy in his desk box; however, he could not locate the copy, and ANDERSON departed, apparently in search of a "New York Post" containing the ALLEN column. FRENCHY stated that, on this second visit of ANDERSON, he did not mention the subject of an

Investigation, nor did FRIEDHEIM know about the investigation at that time. FRIEDHEIM stated that he had first learned of any possible difficulty in connection with the column while at the home of PEARSON on December 12, 1951. He did not know who PEARSON or ANDERSON blamed for exposing ANDERSON, but gathered from Colonel CLIFTON that FRANCIS WHITEHEAD had reported the matter. He stated he presumed PEARSON knew that ANDERSON had seen FRIEDHEIM on the previous day, and told FRIEDHEIM he had a good fill-in on the conference proceedings.

Mr. FRIEDHEIM was asked for his recollections of the content of the original material, which he read at the PEARSON home on the evening of December 12. He stated that he read the article hurriedly, but recalled that it quoted General BRADLEY, JOE COLLINS and possibly General VANDEGRIFT, although he was not sure about this, and also contained a quotation from the President. He stated it appeared to him that it was pretty much a statement of positions taken in the past by these officials. He thought the President had been quoted as saying we should not make concessions which would hurt our positions, and that General COLLINS had declared he thought we could hold the present line or our present positions whether there was an assistance or not.

Mr. FRIEDHEIM examined the "New York Post" column of ROBERT ALLEN dated December 13, 1951, which was available at this time, and said that the material in this column pretty well paralleled that of the ANDERSON material described above, but could offer no suggestion in this connection. He stated he did not have any idea where PEARSON or ANDERSON had obtained the information on which the PEARSON article was based, nor did he have any idea whether PEARSON actually prepared it. He stated the same was true with reference to ALLEN, whom he knows, but has not seen in several months, the last occasion being when ALLEN visited the Pentagon Building to attend a regular weekly press conference of General GEORGE MARSHALL. In this connection, he mentioned that ALLEN has a leg-man, who covers the Pentagon in much the same manner as ANDERSON does for PEARSON, but he does not know the name of this reporter. Mr. FRIEDHEIM stated he knew no one who attended the conference, who was particularly close to PEARSON, nor anyone who had ever furnished any confidential information to PEARSON in the past. As indicated, he declared he did not know with certainty who attended the conference. He stated he did not recall any red hot tips coming out of the Pentagon since the last investigation had been made concerning PEARSON's leaks, and he thought that PEARSON may have been frightened somewhat at the time of that investigation. He suggested that the type of individual, who might furnish information to PEARSON would be one interested in politics and very ambitious, politically or otherwise.

WFO 65-6060

Mr. FRITCHEY stated he had known DREW PEARSON for about ten years and visits him periodically averaging, perhaps, once a month. He did not believe he had seen PEARSON since the visit on December 12, 1951.

On December 18, 1951, Mr. FRITCHEY was reinterviewed by Agents GRAMAM and TAYLOR, at which time he was shown the DREW PEARSON column dated December 14th, which appeared in the "New York Daily Mirror" of December 15, 1951, and the DREW PEARSON column, which appeared in the "Philadelphia Bulletin" of December 15th. Mr. FRITCHEY examined both columns, and stated they are reasonably accurate accounts of the material, which ANDERSON had displayed to him on the night of December 12 at the home of PEARSON. He stated that tabloid papers have a tendency to condense and rewrite, and he thought, perhaps, the article in the "Bulletin," which is slightly different from the "Mirror" column, would be more likely to be an exact or nearly exact copy as furnished by PEARSON.

As a matter of interest, Mr. FRITCHEY advised that on the evening of December 17th, Mrs. LUVIE PEARSON, wife of DREW PEARSON, phoned him and invited him to play bridge the night of December 18, 1951, at the PEARSON residence. Mr. FRITCHEY expressed the thought that, perhaps, Mr. PEARSON contemplated making some discreet inquiries of him concerning developments growing out of the instant leak.

WFO 65-6060

DREW PEARSON AND ROBERT S. ALLEN COLUMNS

The column under the by-line of DREW PEARSON appearing in the New York Daily Mirror for December 15, 1951, reads as follows:

"Washington, Dec. 14. -- The world sat up over Pres. Truman's publicized meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff when he returned from Key West, but it was routine. The highlight was an assurance from Gen. Omar Bradley that a cease-fire could be worked out in Korea.

"The diplomatic and military chiefs were waiting when NST strode in, grinning. He shook hands all around, said it was 'good to be back', asked how they liked his ten.

"He let the joint chiefs do most of the talking, and here is a brief account of what happened:

"Truman sat back, called for views, and made such comments as: 'That's a tough one'.

"Bradley led with a summary of the Korean situation, reported the Reds seemed ready to come to terms, that a cease-fire agreement could be worked out if both sides made concessions.

"Gen. Vandenberg, Air Chief, opposed major concessions, was adamant against allowing the Communists to build airfields during the cease-fire.

"Gen. Collins, Army chief, opposed giving in on troop rotation. The Chinese propose a freeze on all troops entering Korea, blocking replacements for combat veterans. This would be a blow to morale Collins warned.

"Silent Admiral

"Collins agreed 'minor concessions' should be made to win some in return. Truman commented that no concessions should be granted that we 'would later regret'.

"Admiral Fechteler made only a half-minute speech, pledged that the Navy is prepared to carry out 'any mission any time any place'.

"For the Army, Collins pledged the Army couldn't be blasted out of Korea, could hold on 'until hell freezes over'.

"One concession discussed was yielding to the Reds on inspection behind the lines. We have been holding out for it by U.N.-Communist teams, but the Reds want it by 'neutral' nations -- and that meant Poland and Czechoslovakia. Later they agreed to consider Denmark, Sweden and Switzerland. These would be acceptable to us. Bradley proposed giving ground here and it has been done.

"The principal theme was that a cease-fire may be close, with a settlement within 20 days. Some details will be left to iron out later.

"Another matter discussed was the question of withdrawing U.N. troops altogether -- after the armistice. The facts regarding this must not be published now."

Through inquiry at the Bell Syndicate, Inc., 229 West 43rd Street, New York City, it was ascertained that in the original column as dispatched by PEARSON to Bell Syndicate there appeared under the caption "Silent Admiral" the following:

"President TRUMAN's only comment was that every effort should be made to reach a cease-fire, but no concessions should be granted that we 'would later regret'".

On the basis of the same inquiry it was ascertained that following the dispatch of the original article to Bell Syndicate, PEARSON requested that the above paragraph be changed to read:

"President TRUMAN commented that no concessions should be granted that we would later regret."

It was further determined from the Bell Syndicate that in the original dispatch signed by DREW PEARSON the following was contained:

"The chief theme of the meeting was that a cease-fire agreement may be close at hand. All signs point to a settlement within the next 20 days. Though some details will be left to iron out after the December 27 deadline, we are sure to grant a short extension to clean them up."

Subsequent to the filing of the original dispatch and before publication, PEARSON requested that the last sentence of the above paragraph be changed to read: "Some details will be left to iron out after the December 27 deadline." In making the request for this change PEARSON stated in addition, "In other words, omit the word 'though' and the words 'we are sure to grant a short extension to clean them up'."

The New York Post for December 13, 1951, in its "Blue Final" edition attributed the following column to ROBERT S. ALLEN:

"Washington, Dec. 13. - The U.N. can have a cease-fire in Korea, but at the cost of important concessions to the Reds.

"That's what the Joint Chiefs told the President in their big conference with him after his return. Gen. Bradley declared the protracted truce negotiations have reached the point 'where a few concessions on both sides could bring an agreement if the Communists really want one'.

"What do they want?' asked the President. 'The deadlock gets down to this,' explained Bradley. 'We are demanding the right to continue to rotate our troops as we have been doing for months. The Reds are flatly refusing to allow that. They are insisting on a complete freeze on replacements and weapons. But they have indicated they would make concessions on that if we will allow them to build some airfields in North Korea. We have refused to do that. Obviously, they are using the rotation issue to try to wrest concessions from us on the airfield demand.'

"Gen. Hoyt Vandenberg vigorously opposed giving any ground on that.

"I want a cease-fire, if one can be worked out that is fair and proper,' declared the Air Chief of Staff. 'But I don't see how we can safely do anything that will enable the Reds to build up their air strength. That is what permitting them to build airfields will amount to. Such bases in North Korea will be of great combat value to them, if they decide to break the truce next spring, which I wouldn't put past them.'

"Gen. J. Lawton Collins was inclined to favor some terms on the airfield dispute. He thought something could be worked out on that. But the Army Chief of Staff was adamant in insisting the Communists be required to agree to rotation of U.N. troops.

"That would be a serious blow to the morale of our men,' Collins argued. 'I am strongly opposed to any concession on that. It is an unfair demand, and the only reason the Reds are making it is to try to force us to give in on airfields.'

WFO 65-6060

"Our Army can hold the present line until hell freezes over, and I am flatly opposed to giving the slightest ground on the replacement issue. The Reds would have the same right as us on that, and I don't see why they should object to it, except for trading purposes."

"Bradley agreed with Collins, but emphasized the importance of not allowing the Communists to build up a powerful Air Force.

"President Truman listened intently to the military leaders and said nothing until they finished. Then he told them -

"As you know I am very anxious to bring the fighting to an end if that is possible. But I will not agree to concessions to the Communists that we may regret later on. We want to be very careful that we do not sell ourselves short in our eagerness to secure a truce for our men."

"Also discussed was the question of building up the South Korean Army, as this column has reported was proposed by General Ridgway."

Through the Post Hall Syndicate, Inc., 295 Madison Avenue, New York City, it was ascertained that the mimeographed copy of the quoted ALLEN article reflected that the article, as filed by ALLEN, also included the following:

"He wants to increase the ROK divisions from 11 to 20. No decision was reached on the matter, but President Truman strongly approved the plan. 'I am for prompt action on that,' he said. 'It seems to me a very sound thing to do.' Similarly, the President approved moving to Korea one of the two National Guard divisions now in Japan. This has been suggested by Ridgway in order to permit the transfer of one of the battle-experienced divisions in Korea to Europe. General Eisenhower has requested that."

The original dispatch filed by PEARSON with Bell Syndicate Incorporated was received by wire at approximately 4 P.M. on December 11, 1951. The change in the PEARSON column was received at Bell Syndicate from PEARSON by wire on December 12, 1951. The dispatch from ROBERT S. ALLEN to the Post Hall Syndicate Incorporated was received by them by mail on December 11, 1951.

WFO 65-6060

NEWS DISPATCHES

In order to show what details of the President's conference of December 10, 1951, were reported in general news dispatches, the items appearing in several publications were examined, and the following quotations therefrom are set forth as being of possible interest to this investigation.

WASHINGTON STAR, December 10, 1951,
by JOSEPH A. FOX

"Korea was among the subjects discussed but the meeting was not confined to that subject." (Mr. JOSEPH SHORT).

".....officials here indicated that he (the President) wanted a detailed first-hand account of recent developments in Korea with full reports on possible new moves in the armistice talks."

"The deadline for the Korean truce negotiations is December 27."

"Mr. Short said that the meeting took up European affairs....."

"President Truman also said yesterday that one of the reasons for his return was to talk with people recently in Europe."

NEWSWEEK, December 17, 1951.
National Affairs

"The actual situation: General Matthew B. Ridgway wanted instructions about what kind of truce conditions he could make, particularly concerning exchange of prisoners and inspection."

WASHINGTON TIMES HERALD, December 10, 1951.
Evening Edition

"One of the matters presumably discussed was what course the United States should follow if the present Korean truce failed to produce a complete armistice by December 27, the deadline set by truce negotiators....." (Associated Press)

NEW YORK TIMES, December 11, 1951,
by W. H. LAWRENCE

"There was said to be a strong belief that the Chinese and North Korean Communists had concluded that it was militarily impossible to expel United Nation forces from Korea and now really wanted a cessation of the fighting there....."

"In quarters that have followed closely the long drawn-out negotiations..... there was speculation that a compromise might be near on the controversial inspection-enforcement issue, which has deadlocked the truce talks since November 27....."

"Few believed that all the odds and ends of an armistice could be bargained out and agreed to by December 27, the present deadline for the negotiators to reach complete agreement on an armistice....."

"There seemed general agreement that the United Nations policy-makers would not oppose a further extension of this time limit, now only seventeen days off, if the present battlefront lull continued."

"In the cautiously optimistic reports of a possible Korean cease-fire in the not distant future, which followed in the wake of this session, the talk of compromise on the controverted inspection-enforcement issue centered on elaboration of a Communist proposal..... At that time the Communists suggested Poland and Czechoslovakia, both members of the Soviet bloc, as two 'neutral' nations qualified to supervise enforcement of an armistice..... At the same session, however, the Communist negotiators conceded, in response to Allied questioning, that they would also consider Switzerland, Sweden and Denmark as 'neutral' nations qualified to supervise the behind-the-lines inspection....."

WFO 65-6060
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INTERVIEW WITH ADMIRAL ROBERT L. DENNISON

Admiral DENNISON was interviewed at his residence on December 17, 1951, by Inspector CARL E. HENRICH and SA KENNETH T. DELAVIGNE. He advised that in pursuance of the decision of the President to have the December 10, 1951, meeting, he telephonically advised Admiral LALOR of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, of the fact the meeting was to be held and furnished similar advice to Mr. WEBB of the Department of State, and informed he made both of these telephonic contacts on December 8, 1951, from Key West.

With reference to the question as to whether an agenda had been prepared and distributed to those who attended the meeting, Admiral DENNISON advised that none had been prepared. He said that in a general way those who attended the conference would know of problems which had arisen regarding world affairs and would certainly be prepared to present the views of the particular department involved in a conference of this type. He said that the persons he had called would be aware of the fact that certain questions regarding cease fire negotiations would come up at the conference by reason of a previous exchange of radio messages referring to unresolved questions.

Admiral DENNISON stated that at the time the conference broke up no particular group was observed by him to be gathered in any sort of a discussion to the extent that such a fact was brought to his attention. He advised he recalled that the President desired to see Mr. WEBB following the conference and it is his recollection that at the end of the conference, Mr. WEBB went to the office of the President. When WEBB left the Cabinet Room, he left by a door which would take him out to the corridor where the press would be aware of the fact that he had gone to the President's office. The remainder of the persons attending the conference left through another door and the press would not necessarily be aware of their specific presence at the time. Admiral DENNISON advised that he does not recall that anyone arrived at the conference following the arrival of the President. He likewise is unable to recall that anyone left before the end of the conference and did not recall any secretaries or other persons having occasion to enter the conference room during its progress. He stated that he took no material to the conference, took no notes whatever and informed that he recalled seeing no one take notes with the exception of Mr. JAMES LAY, who took notes for the President.

WFO 65-6060

Admiral DENNISON advised that upon the conclusion of the conference, in view of the interest of the press in the meeting, he instructed Mr. JOSEPH SHORT of the White House staff to advise the press that at the meeting the President had discussed world affairs and no policy decisions had been reached. DENNISON stated he might not have used these exact words, but the words do reflect the sense of what he told SHORT. He stated he did not furnish Mr. SHORT any further information as to what had transpired at the conference. This statement was made after conferring with Admiral SOUERS. He was advised it has been indicated that SHORT had stated to the press that Korea had been discussed at the meeting. He said SHORT may have made such a statement, but he does not recall authorizing him to so state.

Admiral DENNISON was requested to furnish the identity of all individuals with whom he had discussed the conference. He replied he had discussed the conference with no individual who had not attended it. He further advised he has made no written record of any type pertaining to any matter under discussion at this conference. He stated he does not know DREW PEARSON, does not know JACK ANDERSON and does not know ROBERT ALLEN. He advised he has not had contact with any of these individuals or any employees or representatives or associates of these persons in any way concerning the subject matter of this investigation. He does not know whether anyone who would have any connection with these persons was present at the White House on December 10.

Admiral DENNISON read the column under the by-line of DREW PEARSON appearing in the New York Daily Mirror for December 15, 1951, and furnished his comments concerning the relative points of accuracy and inaccuracy as appearing in the article. He advised that the statement concerning the fact that the diplomatic and military chiefs were waiting when the President walked into the conference room, is obviously correct. He advised that the statement that the President shook hands all around is true and that in fact the President to the best of his recollection, shook hands with all individuals in the Cabinet Room. Concerning the mention appearing in the PEARSON article of the President's tan, he stated he doubts that this is true and informed he is unable to recall any comment concerning whether the President had a suntan. With regard to the statement that the President permitted the Joint Chiefs of Staff to do most of the talking, he stated he believes this is accurate. In the same regard, he advised with respect to the comment attributed to the President "that's a tough one," that while the President probably did not use these exact words, he might from time to time have made comments identical in sense.

Admiral DENNISON advised the statement that General BRADLEY led with a summary of the Korean situation is accurate and informed that in fact General BRADLEY did so at the direction of the President and spent perhaps as much as eight minutes in covering the Korean military situation, including in his briefing, the use of maps prepared for this purpose. He stated he is reasonably certain General BRADLEY did not, as reported in the PEARSON column, say the Reds seem ready to come to terms, but believed that from the summary furnished by General BRADLEY it could be accurately concluded he did state a cease fire agreement could be worked out if both sides made concessions. In explaining this, he advised he does not recall General BRADLEY actually making such a statement, but informed that a conclusion based on what he did state to this effect would not be erroneous.

With regard to the comments attributed to General VANDENBERG in the PEARSON article, Admiral DENNISON advised he could not recall General VANDENBERG commented particularly on the subject matter of major concessions.

In connection with the statement attributed to General COLLINS concerning the opposition to making concessions in connection with the rotation of troops, Admiral DENNISON advised he saw no particular reason to attribute this comment specifically to COLLINS, adding that COLLINS did not take any stronger position in this regard than anyone else at the conference. He stated the statement does accurately reflect the view held by many individuals. He did state General COLLINS did comment on the matter of troop rotation. He commented particularly that the wording of this portion of the PEARSON article in his opinion implies that some individuals at the conference favored the making of concessions with respect to this point and he stated such was not the case. Still in connection with the statement attributed to General COLLINS, Admiral DENNISON informed he could not recall COLLINS making the comment that we should make minor concessions in order to receive the same. In the same regard in connection with the comment attributed to the President, to the effect no concessions should be granted that we would later regret, Admiral DENNISON advised the President did make a statement to this effect but not necessarily in the same words.

Relating to the comment concerning Admiral FECHTELER, he stated FECHTELER did speak very briefly, but he cannot recall that he made the "any mission any time any place" statement and informed that according to his recollection, such a statement does not appear at all to fit in with what the Admiral was actually talking about.

With respect to the "until hell freezes over" statement attributed to General COLLINS, Admiral DENNISON stated he does not feel that General

COLLINS would have used this language at this conference, but informed that at the conference COLLINS expressed an optimistic attitude as to the ability of the UN forces to stay in Korea and to the best of DENNISON's recollection, put some sort of a time limit on the ability of these forces to stay in Korea.

Admiral DENNISON, commenting in connection with the section of the PEARSON article dealing with inspection behind the lines, advised he cannot recall that General BRADLEY offered the proposal attributed to him in the article, nor can he recall specific mention in the conference of the countries mentioned in the article.

Admiral DENNISON stated the conclusion in the PEARSON article that the principal theme was that a cease fire may be close, with the settlement within twenty days, is an inaccurate statement and commented similarly concerning the statement there was discussed the question of withdrawing U.N. troops altogether after the signing of an armistice.

Admiral DENNISON advised that to the best of his recollection, there was no discussion concerning the December 27th cease fire extension. (This relates to an item which JACK ANDERSON agreed to delete from the column after he discussed it with General BRADLEY and attributes the particular statement to the President.)

Admiral DENNISON likewise read the article attributed to ROBERT S. ALLEN, as appearing in the New York Post for December 13, 1951. He stated the statement that the Joint Chiefs told the President the U.N. could have a cease fire in Korea at the cost of important concessions, is inaccurate and no such statement to his knowledge has been made by the Joint Chiefs. He advised General BRADLEY did not use the words attributed to the effect that a few concessions on both sides could bring an agreement if the Communists really want one, but did advise that during his comments, BRADLEY undoubtedly made statements from which such a conclusion could be inferred. With further regard to the statement attributed to General BRADLEY, Admiral DENNISON advised he would describe this portion of the article as generally accurate as to the sense of what was actually said by General BRADLEY. He added that he cannot, of course, say that these were the exact words used by General BRADLEY.

Admiral DENNISON commented on the statements attributed to General VANDENBERG by advising he could not recall General VANDENBERG stating to the effect he desired a cease fire. He believed the General had made a statement with respect to the potentialities involved in the build up of Red air strength. He stated he did not recall the General using the words "which I wouldn't put past them."

Concerning the comments attributed to General COLLINS, Admiral DENNISON felt that a reading of the ALLEN article would suggest that the matter of rotation of troops was in dispute and informed that such was not the case. He stated he does not believe that General COLLINS said "it is an unfair demand, and the only reason the Reds are making it is to try to force us to give in on air fields." He stated that the comment attributed to COLLINS concerning the ability of the U.N. armies to hold in Korea is essentially correct. He informed that the ALLEN article is accurate in indicating the opposition of the President to the agreement on a complete freeze with respect to replacements and weapons.

Admiral DENNISON commented with respect to the statements attributed to and comments made concerning the President, and advised that the President did not, as commented in the article, listen intently to the Joint Chiefs and then make a final statement, but during the conference did, in at least a general way, express the views attributed to him.

In summarizing his views concerning both the PEARSON and ALLEN articles, Admiral DENNISON informed he felt it is likely both columns were prepared from the same basic material. He commented that it appears somewhat strange that practically no mention was made of the European situation, whereas in fact more than one half of the time of the conference was expended in a discussion of the European situation. He advised that in his opinion, it appears quite unlikely that either article could have been written by an individual who did not have at least limited access to the agenda of the conference. He described the two articles as relatively accurate as to the subject matters under discussion, to the extent to which they were reported in the columns, but as inaccurate in attributing the views indicated to the persons mentioned in the articles. He commented without attaching any significance to this fact, that both articles purported to mention only the views of armed forces personnel, including the President, and failed to mention the views of civilian persons in attendance, some of whom had very definite views and expressed them.

Admiral DENNISON observed that he was unable to see from a perusal of the PEARSON and ALLEN columns why anyone from the conference would disclose information for the press. He particularly stated he saw no interest to be served on behalf of any agencies represented. He commented that there was a remarkable degree of agreement on the part of all present concerning the items described and advised that such disagreement that did exist was primarily with respect to details or timing rather than substance. Admiral DENNISON was requested to furnish any information in his possession which would reflect upon the question at issue namely, who of those attending

WFO 65-6060

the conference may have furnished information to the press or who may have been responsible for information getting to the press. DENNISON stated that he had absolutely no facts upon which to base any opinion as to who might have been responsible for any information being furnished to the press. He did state that because of his intimate knowledge of certain individuals, he would state that it would be, in his opinion, psychologically impossible for them to be responsible. In this group, he placed the following:

The President, General BRADLEY, JAMES LAY, Admiral SOUERS, Secretary LOWYTT, Admiral FECHTELNER, General LANBRY, General VAUGHAN, and H. FREEMAN MATTHEWS.

DENNISON specifically pointed out that there should be no inference that others might be suspected by him, informing that his degree of association with the remaining individuals has been less extensive.

Admiral DENNISON, after receiving the approval of the President, reviewed for the benefit of the interviewing agents, on December 20, 1951, the notes which had been made at the December 10 conference by Mr. JAMES LAY. In conducting this review and analysis, Admiral DENNISON discussed the various points of accuracy and inaccuracy of the material appearing in the PEARSON and ALLEN columns, a substantial portion of which he had already commented on in the interview conducted on December 18. He informed upon the completion of the review of the notes, that this review had served more definitely to confirm his previously expressed opinion that both the PEARSON and ALLEN articles were written by an individual who had had access in some form to at least a limited account of the conference. Admiral DENNISON in commenting on the relation of the columns to the conference notes, pointed out that certain matters actually covered at the conference of particular security significance, were not covered in either of the columns.

WFO 65-6060

INTERVIEW WITH GENERAL HARRY H. VAUGHAN

General VAUGHAN was interviewed December 15, 1951, at his residence by Special Agents THOMAS J. JENKINS and KENNETH T. DELAVIGNE.

General VAUGHAN advised that he had attended the conference of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Cabinet Room of the White House on December 10, 1951. General VAUGHAN stated he had made no preparations for the conference and had taken no notes while at the conference. He stated he observed that JAMES LAY had taken notes at the conference, but he was unable to say whether Mr. LAY's notes were voluminous or not. He stated that he had not prepared any memoranda on the conference and that he had not discussed it with anyone with the exception of General LANDRY, at which time he remarked to General LANDRY the wide difference of opinion of General VANDENBERG and General COLLINS with respect to the withdrawal of our troops in Korea in the event of a cease fire order.

He stated after the President left the room he, VAUGHAN, immediately started for his own office and outside of the Cabinet Room he stopped for a moment and kidded Mr. WEBB about a red tie he was wearing, and that, thereafter, he went directly to his own office.

The article appearing in the "New York Post 'Blue Final'" edition for December 13, 1951, under the by-line of ROBERT S. ALLEN, was read to General VAUGHAN. He was asked to comment as to whether this column accurately reflected the statements or views expressed at the conference by the individuals mentioned.

General VAUGHAN stated the material appearing in the article was substantially that which transpired at the conference. He stated he could not, of course, recall the exact verbiage of the various speakers at the conference, but the theme set forth in the article was substantially the same, and the statements attributed to the various individuals attending the conference were substantially the statements made by these individuals at the conference.

General VAUGHAN stated it was remotely possible, in his opinion, that a person not in attendance at the conference could have prepared the article, but he thought it was miraculous if this was done in the absence of actual attendance or access to an oral or written account of the proceedings. General VAUGHAN pointed out the person preparing the ALLEN article could have discussed the conference with someone, who had talked to a person attending the conference and who had possibly divulged what transpired at the conference with no intention of divulging these matters. In explaining this, General VAUGHAN stated it was possible some person attending the conference may have discussed what transpired at the conference with one of his subordinates and the subordinate was responsible for the leak.

General VAUGHAN stated the portion of the article attributed to the President was "pretty near on the nose", and that this could not have been gotten out of thin air. He pointed out General BRADLEY, at the conference, had mentioned the building up of the forces of the South Koreans, and stated it would be some months before those forces would be self-sufficient.

General VAUGHAN stated that during his years of experience at the White House, he had found the security of the State Department was not good, mainly because of their peculiar administrative set-up and described it as not as effective as the security maintained in other Government agencies. He explained this by saying that perhaps due to their administrative set-up, matters of highly confidential nature are filtered down within the State Department from high level to lower level subordinates. He stated he felt it was, undoubtedly, due to this filtering process in the State Department that the Department had been responsible on many occasions in the past for the untimely or premature release of confidential matters. General VAUGHAN specifically pointed out he was in no way stating the State Department or any member of that Department was responsible for the leak involved in this inquiry. He did state that if he had to give a quick answer as to the source of this leak, he would say the State Department. He stated he could not conceive of the leak emanating from the White House. He stated he had the highest regard for the White House staff, and he knew of no one on the staff whose activities gave him any cause for suspicion.

General VAUGHAN stated he is of the opinion that, if the leak occurred through an individual in the military establishment, it would not be an accidental divulgence but rather a deliberate divulgence, and he contrasted this type of divulgence to that which he had offered in connection with the State Department.

General VAUGHAN stated in his opinion, this would be true of a military establishment because it is his belief that BREW PEARSON has on his payroll at least one individual highly placed in each of the three establishments who serves as an informant for him. He stated he bases this on the

WFO 65-6060

many articles which have been written by PEARSON on confidential military and political matters in the past which certainly, in his opinion, could only have come from the military establishments involved. In this connection, General VAUGHAN pointed out that when LOUIS JOHNSON was Secretary of Defense he knew Mr. JOHNSON was a close friend of DREW PEARSON, and PEARSON visited Mr. JOHNSON in his office about twice a week, and that TRIS COFFIN, a leg-man for PEARSON, was in Mr. JOHNSON's office almost every day. He stated it was his opinion that JOHNSON was PEARSON's pipeline to the Department of Defense.

With respect to DREW PEARSON, General VAUGHAN pointed out he was naturally prejudiced to PEARSON because of the continued, unjustified criticism he had received from PEARSON in his newspaper articles. General VAUGHAN was asked when he had last seen PEARSON or any of his employees. General VAUGHAN stated that he had first met PEARSON about two months ago at a dinner in the Carlton Hotel when he was introduced to him in the lobby by Commissioner F. JOSEPH DONAHUE of the District of Columbia, at which time he merely acknowledged the introduction. He said he had not seen or talked to PEARSON or any of his employees since the conference occurred on December 10, 1951.

During the interview with General VAUGHAN, with relation to DREW PEARSON, he advised in the past he had become acquainted with other leg-men working for PEARSON but had had no contact with any of these individuals with relation to the conference on December 10, 1951.

General VAUGHAN was asked if he knew JACK ANDERSON. He stated that he did know him and that he believed the last time he saw ANDERSON or spoke to him was at the Argentina Embassy, he believed in about 1948, when he (VAUGHAN) received a decoration from the Argentina Government, pointing out that ANDERSON was present at the ceremony as PEARSON's "inside man".

General VAUGHAN was asked to furnish, on the basis of his long experience in the White House and association and contact with the personnel attending various Presidential conferences of the type involved, any suspicions or suggestions which, in his opinion, might be of any possible aid to the FBI in carrying out the instructions of the President that the source of the leak in this matter be identified. He replied that the information attributed to him hereinbefore constitutes all that he is able to offer.

INTERVIEW WITH GENERAL ROBERT LANDRY

General ROBERT LANDRY, Air Force Aide to the President, was interviewed by Special Agents THOMAS J. JENKINS and KENNETH T. DELAVIGNE in his office at the White House on December 14, 1951. General LANDRY advised that he had attended a meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the President on December 10, 1951, in the Cabinet Room at the White House.

General LANDRY stated he made no notes at the conference, nor did he recall seeing anyone else making any notes. He stated he had not been briefed on the agenda for the conference and that no printed agenda was prepared. He stated as soon as the conference was over, he himself did not stop to talk to anyone but started towards his own office and while enroute, he stopped in the office of Mr. MATT CONNELLY and that Mr. JOE SHORT and Admiral DENWISON were there and Mr. SHORT asked General LANDRY if the President had designated someone to see SHORT about giving out a press release. General LANDRY stated that he told SHORT, "No", and suggested that he see Mr. LOVETT or the President.

General LANDRY stated at no time has he prepared a memorandum concerning what transpired at the conference nor has he seen any memoranda prepared by anyone else. He further stated he has not heard of any memoranda being prepared on this conference. General LANDRY stated he had not discussed this conference with anyone other than the President.

General LANDRY stated he did not know JACK ANDERSON and that he had never met DREW PEARSON and that to his knowledge, he knows no one in the employment of DREW PEARSON. He stated, of course, he knows of DREW PEARSON and knows him when he sees him. He stated he has not talked to him on the telephone and that he did not see him in the White House at the time of the conference. He stated the last time he saw PEARSON was about a year ago.

General LANDRY was asked if he had any suspicions about anyone who would have had any connection with the alleged leak of information of what transpired at the conference and he replied in the negative, and stated he was unable to furnish any information, whatsoever, in this regard.

INTERVIEW WITH ADMIRAL SIDNEY W. SOUERS

Admiral SIDNEY W. SOUERS was interviewed on December 19, 1951, by Inspector CARL E. HENNRICH and Special Agent KENNETH T. BELAVIGNE. At the beginning of the interview, Admiral SOUERS indicated that he was already aware of the fact that the President had requested the Federal Bureau of Investigation to endeavor to identify the reported leak involved in this matter.

Admiral SOUERS advised during the conference he made no notes and subsequent to the conference did not dictate or record in any form any of the matters discussed at the conference. He likewise advised he has not discussed the matters considered at the conference with anyone. He advised that he did not know positively that the meeting was to be held until the morning of the meeting.

He advised, to the best of his recollection, that he received a telephone call during the evening of December 8, 1951, from a JERRY GREEN of the New York News, who called him in relation to the rumored return of the President to Washington. He advised that he furnished GREEN no information and recalled that following the conclusion of the conference on December 10, 1951, GREEN again called him and wanted to know what had happened, to which Admiral SOUERS responded, he could not furnish him any information whatsoever.

Admiral SOUERS advised that he did not know of the meeting in advance, nor the specific matters which would be discussed. He advised, however, that due to his knowledge of current conditions and his position that he could surmise as to the matters which would be on the agenda. In this regard, he commented that newspaper reporters and journalists possessing an awareness of political conditions and particularly with regard to the existing situation in Korea, and having knowledge of the fact a meeting was to be held, could likewise engage in speculation as to the matters which would be discussed at such a meeting and do so with a relatively fair degree of accuracy.

Admiral SOUERS advised that upon the termination of the conference and acting on instructions received by him, he and Admiral DENWISON instructed Mr. SHORT, with respect to the making of a press release, that the reporters should be told the President discussed world affairs and no decisions on policy were reached.

Admiral SOUERS read the article by DREW PEARSON which appeared in the "New York Mirror" on December 15, 1951, and the article prepared by ROBERT S. ALLEN appearing in the "New York Post" on December 13, 1951. In commenting on these columns, Admiral SOUERS advised that in his opinion both represented poor reporting. In explanation of this, he pointed out that according to his understanding of the matters actually discussed at the conference, four key points were involved. He stated that none of the key points is covered in either of the newspaper articles in question. He advised that both articles rather accurately reflect the atmosphere which prevailed at the conference. He did comment that it is his belief that a considerable portion of the views expressed in the two articles had already appeared in some form or other in the press prior to the conference. In support of his statement that the two columns are considerably inaccurate, he stated that to the best of his recollection General VANDENBERG did not express opposition to major concessions. Along the same line, he advised that the comment appearing in the PEARSON column with respect to Admiral FECHTELER is not only inaccurate but fails to make reference to an extremely important position expressed by FECHTELER at the conference. He stated that he is reasonably certain that General COLLINS did not make the statement, "until Hell freezes over", and with further regard to the columns, advised that the articles did not set forth an extremely important comment made by COLLINS at the meeting, the publication of which would have been of widespread interest. He stated it was particularly significant to note that whereas considerable discussion was held at the conference with relation to the European situation, neither column commented in this regard. He stated that the portion of the PEARSON article relating to yielding to the Reds on inspection behind the lines is untrue since this discussion was not engaged in at this conference, to the best of his recollection.

Admiral SOUERS commented that there is nothing unusual about the fact that the President shook hands with those gathered at the conference, since it is frequently his habit to do so at meetings of this nature.

With further relation to the PEARSON article, Admiral SOUERS commented that in his opinion the statement that the "principal theme was that a cease-fire may be close" was inaccurate. On the other hand, in commenting as to the last paragraph of the PEARSON article pertaining to the discussion of the withdrawal of U.N. troops, he advised in his opinion the inclusion of this statement in the PEARSON article definitely lends some credence to the viewpoint that at least some of the information reflected in the article was obtained from a person having knowledge of the conference.

WFO 65-6060

In analyzing the quality of the information contained in the columns, Admiral SOUERS advised that it appeared to him the major portion of the two articles could have been written by an individual sufficiently knowledgeable as to international affairs, who had at least some degree of access to what was actually covered at the conference. In the same regard, he advised it appeared to him from a study of the two columns that the information perhaps was made available through a subordinate of an individual who attended the conference.

Admiral SOUERS was asked as to whether he recalled any mention at the conference by the President as to possible extension of the December 27 cease-fire deadline. He stated he did not recall this.

Admiral SOUERS advised that he was unable to furnish any specific suggestion that he felt would assist the Federal Bureau of Investigation in carrying out the request of the President.

WFO 65-6060
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INTERVIEW WITH SECRETARY OF THE ARMY, FRANK C. PACE

Secretary PACE was interviewed on December 15, 1951, in his office by Special Agents THOMAS J. JENKINS and KENNETH T. DELAVIGNE.

Mr. PACE advised that he had attended the conference at the Cabinet Room of the White House on December 10, 1951.

Mr. PACE stated he had not been briefed on what was to be discussed at the conference, but he had taken no notes at the conference and had not noticed anyone else at the conference taking notes. Mr. PACE stated since the conference he had prepared no memoranda, nor had he seen any memoranda prepared by anyone else pertaining to the conference, and, likewise, advised that he has discussed the conference with no one, with the exception of Mr. LOVETT, Secretary of Defense, and Mr. FINLETTER. He pointed out that he does not specifically recall discussing the conference with Mr. LOVETT or Mr. FINLETTER, but since the three of them returned to the Pentagon from the White House in Mr. LOVETT's car, immediately after the conference, it is quite possible that the three of them did discuss or at least mention certain items which had been brought up at the conference.

The article attributed to ROBERT S. ALLEN, as published by the "New York Post (Blue Final)" edition of December 13, 1951, was read to Secretary PACE. Secretary PACE was asked if the material appearing in the article was discussed at the meeting, and he replied in the affirmative. He pointed out that he could not recall the exact verbiage used by the various individuals at the conference, but that the material appearing in the article reported substantially the views of the individuals mentioned as expressed at this conference.

Secretary PACE was asked if, in his opinion, the ALLEN article could have been prepared by anyone who had not been in actual attendance at the conference or had had access to a substantially complete and accurate written or oral report of the conference. He replied that it was within the realm of possibility, but during his discussion of this point, indicated his view that the article could not have been written without aid of some type.

WFO 65-6060

He pointed out, however, with respect to the views of General COLLINS as reported in the article, that these were substantially General COLLINS' views, but that he was positive that the verbiage used in the article was not accurate, particularly where General COLLINS is quoted as having said "until hell freezes over". He stated that he knows that General COLLINS did not say that. Secretary PACE stated that he is not certain that General COLLINS, at the conference, made as complete a statement of his views as is reported in the ALLEN article, and doubts that COLLINS did do so.

Secretary PACE, with respect to the statements attributed in the ALLEN article to General BRADLEY, advised it is his recollection that, during the conference, General BRADLEY did comment on airfields in North Korea and rotation of troops. Secretary PACE stated that he can't recall that General BRADLEY tied these two items together in making his comments at the conference. He stated that he cannot recall whether, at the conference, General BRADLEY agreed with General COLLINS or not. With respect to the remarks made by the President, as quoted in the Allen article, he stated that this was substantially what the President said at the conference, although he could not recall the President's exact words. He stated that, with respect to the build-up of the South Korean Army, this matter was discussed by himself at the conference.

Secretary PACE advised that he did not know JACK ANDERSON, and that he had met PEARSON only on about two occasions, both at social functions, and that on both of those occasions, the only conversation he had had with PEARSON was of a social nature. He stated that the last time that he saw or spoke to DREW PEARSON was six or seven months ago. He stated that the only employee he knows of DREW PEARSON is TRIS COFFIN, whom he has met on about two occasions, and had never discussed with COFFIN any matters concerning the Department of Defense. He stated that he would say that he had not seen or talked to TRIS COFFIN for at least three months. He stated that he does not know and has never talked to ROBERT S. ALLEN.

Secretary PACE was asked whether he could furnish any information or make any suggestions which would assist the FBI in carrying out the desires of the President in this matter that the source of the alleged leak of information be identified. Secretary PACE replied that it was inconceivable to him that anyone who attended the conference had passed on or divulged anything that

WFO 65-6060

was discussed at the meeting. However, he stated that it was his opinion that the material appearing in the ALLEN article came from someone who attended the conference or someone who knew why the President had called the meeting. Secretary PACE stated that, otherwise, he was unable to be of any assistance. Secretary PACE was asked if he knew of or was suspicious of any security weakness in the Departments represented at the conference which might suggest a source for this leak, and he responded negatively.

INTERVIEW WITH THOMAS K. FINLETTER

THOMAS K. FINLETTER, Secretary of the Air Force, was interviewed on December 14, 1951, in his office in the Pentagon by Special Agents THOMAS J. JENKINS and KENNETH T. DELAVIGNE. Mr. FINLETTER advised he attended a conference held in the Cabinet Room at the White House on December 10, 1951.

Secretary FINLETTER advised that prior to the commencement of the conference, he was not briefed concerning the agenda in any way. He recalled that General VANDENBERG came to his office sometime before the meeting on the morning of December 10, and said something about the meeting at the White House, but he did not recall exactly what was said by General VANDENBERG or discussed in this connection.

Secretary FINLETTER advised he had gone from his office to the conference with Secretary PACE. He stated that upon conclusion of the meeting, he went downstairs from the conference room with Secretary LOVETT. He stated that Secretary PACE was detained a minute or two and joined Secretary LOVETT and him downstairs and they all three rode together back to the Pentagon in LOVETT's car.

He stated he is positive he took no notes of any sort at the conference, and advised that during the conference, he could possibly have made a single note. He stated that if he did make such a note, he left it behind him at the conference or took it with him and destroyed it later. He advised that any note he did make was extremely brief and in no way could be considered to be approximate full notes. He stated he can almost positively state he did not put pencil to paper. He advised he cannot recall seeing anyone else at the conference taking notes.

He advised that following the Presidential meeting, he met General VANDENBERG at 12:00 Noon, and then at 1:00 P.M., had luncheon with the Secretary of Defense and a group of labor representatives. He advised that he dictated no memorandum or writing of any sort with direct and immediate relation to the meeting. He advised he has seen no memoranda or material of any sort written by anyone relating to the conference concerned with this investigation.

WFO 65-6060

He advised he is positive he has discussed the meeting only with VANDENBERG and LOVETT. In qualifying this, he advised that even these discussions were not as to the actual conference but pertinent more to matters which were logical follow-throughs and outgrowths of the items discussed at the conference and the views expressed of those in attendance.

Mr. FINLETTER stated that on the day of the conference, General VANDENBERG came to his office about 12:00 Noon and dictated a rough draft memorandum to Mr. FINLETTER's secretary, CLARE SHANDS, concerning the views on the withdrawal of troops from Korea in the event of a cease-fire order. He stated that after this memorandum was typed up, he destroyed it and dictated to the same secretary another rough draft memorandum of his own (FINLETTER) along the same lines, the original of which was furnished to Mr. LOVETT during the latter part of the afternoon of December 10, 1951. He stated that the following day he prepared a new memorandum for Mr. LOVETT pertaining to the same matter. Mr. FINLETTER made a copy of this memorandum available and is set forth as follows:

"December 10, 1951

"MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

"1. The conference with the President today on the Korean situation failed to bring out certain important points:

"2. At the meeting it was decided that, since we now have what we went into Korea to get, namely the defeat of the aggression, we should adopt the attitude of conceding all points within reason to get the cease-fire.

"3. What wasn't said, however, is that once we get a cease-fire, from that moment on our military position deteriorates. The Chinese, free from our interdiction campaign, can bring in men and materiel - and no inspection teams of ours are going to stop them. Our morale will go down. Our fighting ability will go down. And our domestic support for the operation will go down further than it already has.

WFO 65-6060

"4. Moreover, the attaining of the cease-fire may fail to defeat the Russo-Chinese plan of pinning down large quantities of our military power in Korea. This results from the fact that an agreement to permit the gradual withdrawal of UN and Communist troops, without a firm decision in advance by the UN to punish a violation of the cease-fire by aggressive means, is not to our interest, and cannot be carried out without risking all we have fought for in Korea. Once we withdraw our troops they are going to be very hard to put back. On the contrary it would be easy for the Communists to withdraw beyond the Yalu and come back whenever they want to.

"In short, a cease-fire without a firm position and statement as to what the UN intends to do if the terms of the cease-fire are broken and without provision for the rapid withdrawal of UN troops, is a disadvantageous operation from our point of view.

"5. The question arises what then should we do? The following is suggested:

"a. Make a provision in the cease-fire arrangements which will result in the United Nations ground troops being pulled out as rapidly as they can be after the signing of the cease-fire.

"b. Leave a thin line of South Korean troops, and maybe even a token United Nations force, in South Korea.

"c. Make arrangements with our major allies to issue a joint statement, approved by the UN, serving notice on China that we no longer intend to hold the Korean front by great ground forces as at present, but that if the Chinese run over our modest forces that will bring down vast retaliatory action by the UN on the mainland of China. We should also consider whether this statement might not contain a request to Russia to use her best efforts to prevent the Chinese from violating the cease-fire agreement.

"d. We must agree with our friends in the UN what this vast retaliatory action means. It

WFO 65-6060

presumably would mean a naval blockade, harassment of the lines of communication by bombing, continuing the use of guerrilla troops, and maybe releasing Chiang for action on the mainland. The question of certain other special air action would have to be considered; also the use of the A-bomb. These are, however, in a way, questions of detail. The important thing is to get agreement with our friends in UN to be ready to go through with a good tough campaign, but without the use of ground troops other than Chiang's.

(Signed) Thomas K. Finletter"

With respect to the final memorandum prepared by Mr. FINLETTER, he had in his office, at the time of the interview, eighteen copies of this memorandum. He advised that the original had gone to Mr. LOVETT and he believed that another copy went to General VANDENBERG. He stated an original and nineteen copies of this memorandum were prepared.

In connection with the VANDENBERG rough draft memorandum and the rough draft memorandum of FINLETTER, these were located at the time of the interview in Mr. FINLETTER's office torn in pieces, and it was not possible, at the time of the interview, for his secretaries to piece together all of the copies of the memoranda, but they were able to piece together from the confidential waste in his office the originals of these two rough draft memoranda.

Secretary FINLETTER advised all of the memoranda in question were dictated to his secretary, Miss CLARE SHANDS. He advised the security regulations in his office are very exacting and are of the type to prevent the entrance of any outside individual during the daytime. He advised that during the evening hours all confidential material is securely locked up. He advised the material handled in his office, and particularly the memoranda under discussion, would have been seen only by himself, Miss SHANDS, another secretary, Mrs. SALLY POOLE, and his aide, Colonel WILLIAM HIPPS. He informed top secret material handled in his office would not be examined even by official military and civilian personnel outside his immediate staff, as identified above. He stated he is completely certain of the security of his office and stated it to be his opinion that it would be most irregular for any individual, other than himself

WFO 65-6060

and the three members of the staff, to see these memoranda. With further relation to the security of the memoranda involved, he stated that he recalls he personally delivered the original to Secretary LOVETT.

In connection with this memorandum Colonel WILLIAM HIPPS, aide to Mr. FINLETTER, subsequently furnished a case history concerning these memoranda prepared by General VANDENBERG and Secretary FINLETTER relative to the meeting at the White House on December 10, 1951. General VANDENBERG's memorandum was typed once with original and three copies. All copies accounted for ordered destroyed by Secretary FINLETTER. Mr. FINLETTER had prepared one draft original and three copies, all accounted for and ordered destroyed. Mr. FINLETTER prepared a second draft with original and six copies, the original of which was given to Mr. LOVETT with no signature, the remaining six copies accounted for. The third draft original and seven copies all accounted for. The final memorandum, a copy of which is set forth above, was prepared as an original and nineteen copies. The original was given by Mr. FINLETTER to Mr. LOVETT and copy number nine was given to General VANDENBERG. The copy furnished General VANDENBERG was returned and all other copies have been accounted for in Mr. FINLETTER's office. Secretary LOVETT advised Inspector CARL E. HENNRICH and Special Agent CARL A. GRAHAM that he had in his possession the original memorandum prepared by Mr. FINLETTER. In connection with the original of the rough draft which was delivered to Mr. LOVETT by Mr. FINLETTER, Mr. FINLETTER advised and had at the time of the interview this original rough draft memorandum which he stated he obtained from Mr. LOVETT's office so that he could prepare the final memorandum for Mr. LOVETT on this matter.

He was asked as to whether he knows JACK ANDERSON, an employee of DREW PEARSON, and he informed he knows no individual by this name. In response to questions, he likewise advised he does not know any employee or associate of DREW PEARSON. He stated that some years ago he did know an individual, whose name he could not recall, who was employed as a "leg-man" for PEARSON, but has had no contact with this individual. He advised he is acquainted with DREW PEARSON, but advised he has not seen him for months and stated positively he has not discussed the matter under investigation with PEARSON in any way. He stated he discussed this meeting only with General VANDENBERG and Secretary LOVETT and on the basis indicated herein before. He recalled that on December 11, 1951, he had luncheon at 1:00 P.M. at the

WFO 65-6060

Metropolitan Club with Admiral SOUERS and in this regard informed that it is possible he may have mentioned the meeting during his luncheon with SOUERS, but does not think this occurred and advised that if it did occur, it was merely a mention and not a discussion. He was specifically questioned as to whether he had in mind any suspects who might have been responsible for the leak of information involved, or whether he possessed any other information of possible aid or pertinence to this investigation, and in response thereto advised he possesses no information whatsoever.

WFO 65-6060
KTD:TJJ:LEH

INTERVIEW WITH GENERAL HOYT S. VANDENBERG,
CHIEF, U.S. AIR FORCE

General HOYT S. VANDENBERG was interviewed on December 17, 1951, at his office by Special Agents KENNETH T. DELAVIGNE and THOMAS J. JENKINS.

He stated on December 8, 1951, General BRADLEY told him that the President was making inquiry about a message the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent to General RIDGWAY concerning the peace negotiations, and they drew the conclusion that the President possibly would come back to Washington to discuss the reasons behind the message and the conditions being discussed in the peace negotiations.

General VANDENBERG stated he had been officially informed of the meeting by his Aide, Brigadier General R. A. GRUSSENDORF, who had been informed by General ROBERT LEE that Admiral LALOR, Assistant Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had received word that the meeting was to be held on December 10, 1951. He stated that on December 9, 1951, in preparation for this conference, he requested his office to have on his desk on the morning of December 10, 1951, the available air strength and composition of the Air Force in Korea and other Far Eastern units, and also a paper which had been prepared a week before on the location of all F-86 planes other than those in Korea. He stated that he desired this information so that he would have it available at the meeting at the White House in the event the President made any inquiry concerning these matters. He stated that on the morning of the conference and just prior to the conference he had discussed with Mr. FINLETTER the information on the F-86 planes, advising him that this information should be available at the meeting in the event the President made any inquiry concerning it.

In connection with the question as to whether he had prepared any memorandum or other record with relation to the matters covered at the conference, General VANDENBERG explained that he had an alternate proposal on the peace negotiation insuring protection of the 8th Army. He stated at the time of the conference at the White House he had this alternative proposal in mind and mentioned it at the conference without giving any details. In this connection General VANDENBERG stated that what he said at the conference was substantially as follows: "There

WFO 65-6060

is a possible additional approach to this question. If the UN could come out with a very strong statement to the effect that if there was a violation to the present line of contact, there would be a new war with no holds barred, and we might be able to afford to pull out practically all troops immediately after a cease-fire and let the Reds put in as many airfields and troops as they desired." He pointed out at the conference this statement by himself, which was the only statement he made at the conference, was discussed for about a minute and a half by those present.

He stated shortly following the conference on the same day he conferred with Mr. FINLETTER about this alternate proposal, and together they prepared a memorandum for Mr. LOVETT, Secretary of Defense. He stated after the memorandum was prepared he and Mr. FINLETTER personally delivered the original to Mr. LOVETT. He stated there was nothing in the memorandum that had been discussed at the President's conference, and, in fact, specifically described its contents as relating to matters which had not been discussed at the White House conference. General VANDENBERG stated that he had a copy of this memorandum, and he had given it to his aide, Colonel CHARLES V. MURPHY, for possible use of the State Department in the event the proposal appeared to have any merit. He stated Colonel MURPHY was an officer on a special assignment in his (VANDENBERG's) office to assist him for speech writing.

General VANDENBERG stated since the conference he had discussed it only with Secretaries LOVETT and FINLETTER.

General VANDENBERG read the article attributed to ROBERT S. ALLEN as appearing in the "New York Post" for December 13, 1951.

He stated in connection with remarks in the article attributed to himself, they were definitely not stated by him at the conference although he has made similar remarks at the Joint Chiefs of Staff conferences and has stated them in public.

General VANDENBERG stated he believed that the article was largely in error on what actually transpired at the conference. He stated he was of the opinion that any person who had access to what transpired at the conference could have written a far better article unless the writer had deliberately slanted it, pointing out that the ALLEN article did not reflect the real purpose of the meeting. General VANDENBERG

WFO 65-6060

further stated he believes the ALLEN article could have been prepared by someone who had closely followed the Korean situation and the public statements and positions proclaimed by the various Joint Chiefs of Staff without access to an actual account of the meeting.

With respect to the material in the article attributed to General BRADLEY, General VANDENBERG stated he could not recall General BRADLEY saying that the UN could have a cease-fire in Korea. He pointed out that no one is sure of a cease-fire and that everyone is wondering if a cease-fire can be obtained. He further stated with respect to the statement attributed to General BRADLEY concerning rotation of troops and the building of airfields in North Korea, General BRADLEY may have said this but it certainly was not the main subject matter of the conference. He pointed out the main reason for the conference was not the concessions that would be made but how far the United States would go before ceasing the negotiations. General VANDENBERG further pointed out that he did not think General BRADLEY would say the Communists refused to agree with the UN view relating to the rotation of troops because the negotiations are still being carried on and that the matter concerning the rotation of troops has not come to the breaking point. General VANDENBERG stated that as far as he knows the Reds have not tried to trade on the issue of new airfields as against the issue of rotation of troops. He pointed out the U.S. has insisted as one of the points in the negotiation that there were to be no new airfields constructed in North Korea. He stated he does not recall General BRADLEY stating that the Reds have indicated they would make a concession on troop rotation if allowed to build some airfields in North Korea. He feels positive that if General BRADLEY had made such statement that he certainly would have remembered it, pointing out that the United States' position has always been positive on not allowing the construction of new airfields in North Korea, and therefore, this point was not discussed at the conference because it was an accepted fact.

With respect to the material attributed to General COLLINS, General VANDENBERG stated he could not recall this matter being brought up at the conference but it had been discussed at previous Joint Chiefs of Staff meetings. He is positive that General COLLINS did not relate the points concerning rotation of troops to the points concerning the construction of new airfields in North Korea. He stated he is of the opinion that General COLLINS has always maintained that the UN forces

WFO 65-6060

are strong in Korea and that we can hold the peninsula; however, he did not recall General COLLINS saying this at the conference, and he is positive that General COLLINS made no remarks concerning the airfield point. General VANDENBERG stated that he would have been extremely surprised if General COLLINS had made the remark at the conference "Until hell freezes over". He stated that this meeting was much more dignified, and he believes that General COLLINS would not have spoken to the President in such language, and if General COLLINS had so spoken, he (VANDENBERG) would have certainly remembered it.

Concerning that part of the article which states General BRADLEY agreed with General COLLINS, he stated he does not recall this at the conference or does he recall any mention of the importance of not allowing the Communists to build up a powerful Air Force.

With respect to that part of the article which refers to the President listening intently to the military leaders and saying nothing until they had finished, General VANDENBERG stated that was not what happened at the conference. He stated the President first had General BRADLEY brief those present on the Korean situation and then the President told the conference what was troubling him concerning the instructions sent to General RIDGWAY. He stated General BRADLEY and Secretary LOVETT together with Acting Secretary WEBB did most of the talking. He stated General COLLINS and himself had very little to say.

With respect to that part of the article attributed to the President concerning the President's anxiety to bring the fighting to an end, General VANDENBERG stated that he couldn't recall the President saying this, but that the President could have stated it, and he would expect the President at such a conference to say substantially what is attributed to him in the article. He pointed out he is definite that the President did not say "but I will not agree to concessions to the Communists that we may regret later on". He stated the President had not made this point in that way. He stated that the article makes it appear that the President thought the members attending the conference wanted peace at any price. He stated, however, actually such was not the case. He stated at the conclusion of the conference the President agreed with those present on their reasons for sending the negotiation instructions to General RIDGWAY.

WFO 65-6060

General VANDENBERG advised with respect to the statement in the article that the buildup of South Korea was discussed, that this was true. He pointed out, however, this is not unusual and this question is normally discussed at all meetings of this type because of the importance of this question.

He was asked to state whether he recalled any comment by the President during the conference as to a possible extension of time in the event a cease-fire order was not achieved by December 27, 1951. It is to be noted that a reference to such an alleged statement on the part of the President was contained in the PEARSON article in the possession of JACK ANDERSON. General VANDENBERG advised to the best of his knowledge the President made no such reference.

General VANDENBERG stated he was not acquainted with JACK ANDERSON or any other employee or associate of DRAW PEARSON. He stated he has only met DRAW PEARSON on one occasion which was about two years ago when he was introduced to him in the Pentagon Building. He stated the last time he had any contact of any sort with ROBERT S. ALLEN was when the latter was the Intelligence Officer for General GEORGE PATTON in Europe during World War II.

He was asked if he could furnish any information or had any suggestions which might assist the FBI in carrying out the desire of the President in this matter. He replied in the negative.

WFO 65-6060
MAT:CEG/bjg

INTERVIEW WITH GENERAL J. LAWTON COLLINS

General J. LAWTON COLLINS, Army Chief of Staff, was interviewed by Special Agents MAURICE A. TAYLOR and CARL E. GRAHAM in his office, Room 3E668, Pentagon, on December 17, 1951.

General COLLINS advised he attended the White House conference Monday, December 10, 1951. General COLLINS stated that he followed Mr. WHITENAIR as speaker and related he made three points, speaking at two different times. General COLLINS advised he first directed remarks to the question as to whether a U.N. statement containing a threat would have any deterring effect on the Communist enemy. It had been suggested that it would have an effect on the Russians and possibly on the amount of aid afforded the Chinese by the Russians. Admiral FECHTELER doubted the wisdom of including any threat to be contingent on breach of an armistice agreement as no one knows what action we may find desirable several years from now when the agreement may be violated. General COLLINS said his own views in the matter were that he did not agree with Admiral FECHTELER's position, but rather concurred with the position that while the Chinese Communists might disregard a warning, it still might have a good effect on the Russians. General COLLINS stated while he was speaking, he covered another matter, namely, that the armistice might be all we will get, that we may not get a peace treaty for several years, and that we may want to stay there a long time; and that whatever the conditions of the armistice, we will want to rebuild and make repairs in the rear areas. General COLLINS continued that he also stated he would favor everything in connection with repairs and rehabilitation except in connection with permitting military airfields to be built and pointed out we may have to give in on one or two commercial airfields.

General COLLINS remarked that at a later time during the proceedings of the conference, the President expressed great concern over the air build-up of the Communist forces and the possibility that we might not be able to maintain our forces in Korea. General COLLINS stated this was the reason that he again spoke. General COLLINS stated he assured the President that if this was what was causing the President's concern, he would guarantee that we will not be thrown out of Korea.

The article prepared by columnist ROBERT S. ALLEN which appeared in the "New York Post" December 13, 1951, was displayed to General COLLINS. That column in substance indicated General COLLINS favored some terms on

the airfield dispute but insisted the Communists be required to agree on troop rotation, pointing out the lack of troop rotation would effect the morals of our men. In addition General COLLINS was reported by ALLEN to have stated our army could hold the present line "until hell freezes over." General COLLINS related the ALLEN article substantially set forth his position in this matter and that part of the remarks attributed to him by ALLEN actually may have been made by him. He related he may have made some mention of troop rotation at the conference but he was not sure that he did mention it.

General COLLINS was not absolutely certain as to the language he employed in the above statement and advised he may have used the phrase I will "put my money" or "for my money," we will not be thrown out, but is certain that he did not say that our forces can hold on in Korea "until hell freezes over." He commented that this is not an expression which he uses and added that he would not have used it before the President at a formal conference.

The ALLEN news column quoted the President as having remarked in substance that he was anxious to bring the fighting to an end if possible but would not agree to concessions that we may regret later on. Also the President warned the necessity of being careful lest in our eagerness to secure truce we sell ourselves short. Concerning this statement attributed to the President, General COLLINS stated it was essentially what the President had said but not a word for word quotation. The ALLEN column was noted to attribute to General VANDENBERG in substance he was vigorously opposed to giving any ground on the matter of permitting the Communists to build airfields, pointing out bases in North Korea would be of great combat value in the event the Communists decide to break the truce next spring. General COLLINS stated ALLEN's remarks attributed to General VANDENBERG were essentially correct although not as complete as General VANDENBERG had outlined his position. The ALLEN column in substance set forth General BRADLEY as having pointed out the issues of the deadlock on the matter of rotation of our troops along with the Communists' insisting on a freeze on replacements and weapons. Also General BRADLEY was reported as having indicated the Communists would make concessions on rotation if they were permitted to build some airfields. General COLLINS related that the ALLEN column was essentially accurate but he did not believe that General BRADLEY had indicated the Communists were trading a rotation of troops against airfields as stressed by ALLEN.

General COLLINS could offer no suggestion as to how a leak had occurred and expressed the belief it would be possible for someone to have prepared the column of ROBERT S. ALLEN from bits of information picked up here and there from individuals receiving the information second or third

WFO 65-6060

hand from an official who attended the conferences, such second or third hand sources being persons possessed of intimate knowledge of the subject matter and previous conferences. As for the personnel present at the White House conference, General COLLINS advised he had no personal suspicions concerning any member present.

General COLLINS advised that he did not make any notes during or after the conference, and thereafter did not make any record of memorandum of the proceedings of the conference. Furthermore, he stated he had not discussed the proceedings of the conference with anyone.

General COLLINS recalled his acquaintanceship with DREW PEARSON dated back several years when he was Chief of Public Information shortly after the war. He advised his first meeting with PEARSON came about following a PEARSON article which had criticized General EISENHOWER unjustly so he invited PEARSON to his home to talk the matter over. At that time, General COLLINS advised he and PEARSON reached a "gentlemen's agreement" that whenever PEARSON received any complaints or allegations of inefficiency, dishonesty, or other malfeasance in connection with the Army, he would first make them known to General COLLINS, who would in turn ascertain and furnish the true facts to PEARSON. If the facts were as alleged, PEARSON could publish them; but if he could show they were false or inaccurate, PEARSON would refrain from publication. General COLLINS related that this working arrangement with PEARSON had been satisfactory for a considerable time. General COLLINS recalled that sometime during the period of the GARRSON brothers fraud investigations, PEARSON had called him one Sunday to inquire whether the Army had a contract for the manufacture of caskets and in which contract the GARRSONS had an interest. General COLLINS advised he ascertained that the information presented by PEARSON was not true and so advised PEARSON, who refrained from making any mention of it. Sometime later General COLLINS recalled PEARSON had published a critical article containing erroneous information, so he had PEARSON to lunch in the Pentagon and called his attention to PEARSON's having violated their "gentlemen's agreement". General COLLINS advised he recalled no further incidents thereafter.

General COLLINS stated that he had never engaged in any social dealings with PEARSON and had never visited in his home or received him except on the one occasion. As a matter of fact, he has not seen PEARSON in more than a year. General COLLINS added that he knows who JACK ANDERSON is, but never had met him; likewise, he did not know the identity of any other of PEARSON's employees. Concerning ROBERT S. ALLEN, General COLLINS stated he knew ALLEN, but had not seen nor talked with him in more than a year.

WFO 65-6060
MAT/CAO:esk

INTERVIEW WITH MAJOR GENERAL CHARLES P. CABELL

Major General CHARLES P. CABELL, United States Air Forces, Director, Joint Staff, was interviewed at his office, Room 2E928, Pentagon, on December 15, 1951, by Special Agents MAURICE A. TAYLOR and CARL E. GRAHAM.

General CABELL advised that he had attended the White House conference held at 10:30 AM, December 10, 1951, as an observer with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He advised he had taken no part in the actual proceedings. He stated he did not discuss anything which occurred at the conference with anyone with the exception of a conversation with Admiral THOMAS ROBBINS of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Reference will be made to this conversation with General ROBBINS hereinafter. General CABELL made no notes or memoranda during or following the conference. He returned to the Pentagon immediately following the conference.

General CABELL stated he was unaware that any leak had occurred or that an investigation was in progress at the time he was interviewed. He declared he was not acquainted with ROBERT S. ALLEN or JACK ANDERSON or any other of DREW PEARSON'S employees. He stated he thought he may have met DREW PEARSON on one occasion at a cocktail party but was not certain of this.

General CABELL also stated that Admiral WILLIAM FECHTELNER had spoken briefly concerning the question of introducing into the truce negotiations a threat that in the event of breach the Communists could expect the war to be widened, which threat we later might not be able or desire to carry out. In connection with this, General CABELL advised he had a subsequent discussion with Admiral THOMAS ROBBINS, although it is recalled with reference to the alleged newspaper column prepared by JACK ANDERSON some reference was made about extending the cease-fire negotiations deadline beyond December 27, 1951. General CABELL advised that he did not recall that President TRUMAN or the others made specific reference to the cease-fire date or indicated that an extension beyond this date would be sought or granted. He stated he was not certain whether the deadline had been mentioned at all, but that if so it was not belabored in the discussion. General CABELL recalled that that question and all other questions pertinent at the Presidential conference previously had been discussed at great length in various Joint Chiefs of Staff meetings attended by General CABELL.

WFO 65-6060

The column of ROBERT S. ALLEN dated December 13, 1951, which appeared in the "New York Post," was displayed to General CABELL for his examination. He expressed the belief it was not an accurate account of the proceedings at the White House conference, but that it contained a continuous thread to indicate the author, ALLEN, had an informant who attended the conference. For example, General CABELL stated that the ALLEN column indicates that the Communists were bargaining the rotation of troops issue against concessions from us on their airfield demands. He stated he did not believe General BRADLEY placed emphasis on the airfields versus rotation items and that these were merely two items mentioned in connection with the negotiations. He stated that there is some feeling that the Communists are using the rotation question to wrangle concessions generally, but he did not believe this was specifically brought out in the White House conference.

With reference to the statement attributed to General COLLINS in the ALLEN column to the effect that General COLLINS was inclined to favor some terms on the airfield dispute, General CABELL stated this was an oversimplification and not strictly accurate. He stated that it appeared that this reflected some views which COLLINS may have expressed in the past at previous meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

General CABELL referred further to the ALLEN column and to the statement in it attributed to the President. General CABELL advised he considered it an accurate summation, although not a verbatim quotation.

WFO 65-6060
PJT:JAC/agg

INTERVIEW WITH MR. JAMES E. LAY, JR.

Mr. JAMES E. LAY, JR., Executive Secretary, National Security Council, was interviewed by Special Agents JOSEPH A. CONNORS, JR. and PAUL J. TIERNEY on December 15, 1951.

Mr. LAY advised that he attended the President's conference at the White House on December 10, 1951, as a representative of the National Security Council. At this time, he explained, the National Security Council was preparing a draft concerned with present truce negotiations in Korea.

Mr. LAY commented in detail as to the opinions expressed by the various individuals attending the aforementioned conference.

Mr. LAY advised that there was no written or oral agenda or program for the conference. He added that no minutes were kept, and there was no record of any actions to be taken. He did not recall anyone taking notes, with the exception of Secretary PINLETTER, who may merely have been "doodling."

Mr. LAY advised that he made notes at the conference for the President's benefit. He brought the notes directly from the conference to his office and placed them in a safe. He described the notes as the personal property of the President. He advised that, to his knowledge, no one but himself has seen the notes. He added that his secretaries have access to the safe where his notes are maintained, but did not think anyone who did not have a thorough understanding of what went on could decipher the notes. He explained that the notes consisted of personal abbreviations, etcetera. The secretaries in Mr. LAY'S office are Miss BONNIE CHAPPIN and Miss INA HOLTZSCHNEIDER.

Mr. LAY advised that, following the conference, he informed his Deputy, Mr. S. EVERETT GLEASON, as to the opinions expressed by the various individuals who attended the conference. He explained that he and GLEASON worked together on the NSC aspects of the Korean problem, and in this connection, he advises GLEASON of all important matters in connection therewith. He stated he attempts to keep GLEASON as well informed as himself concerning all details of current developments in connection with the NSC.

Mr. LAY advised that, subsequent to the conference, the "Time" magazine representative at the White House, whose name he could not recall, telephoned him, asking two questions: (1) He, facetiously, asked Mr. LAY if the latter were the cause of the President's sudden return to Washington from Key West, to which question Mr. LAY answered, "No." (2) Mr. LAY was then asked if a reported request of General EISENHOWER to be replaced was discussed at the

WFO 65-6060

conference. Mr. LAY informed that he advised the newspapermen that he was unable to say anything about the conference.

In answer to a specific question, Mr. LAY advised that he could not recall any discussions at the conference concerning a recommendation of the President that there be an extension of time in the event an armistice were not obtained by December 27, 1951. Mr. LAY advised that the conference did relate to concessions which might be made to the Communists.

Mr. LAY advised that he does not know, nor has he spoken to DREW PEARSON or PEARSON'S leg-man, JACK ANDERSON. He was unable to furnish any information as to a possible source of the leak of information from the White House conference.

Mr. LAY furnished the following information concerning indicated portions of the column of ROBERT S. ALLEN in the "New York Post" of December 13, 1951:

Quotes from ALLEN Column

"The UN can have a cease fire in Korea, but at the cost of important concessions to the Reds. That's what the Joint Chiefs told the President in their big conference with him after his return. General BRADLEY declared the protracted truce negotiations have reached the point where a few concessions on both sides could bring an agreement if the Communists really want one".

"General ROY VANDENBERG vigorously opposed giving any ground on that. (Referring to concessions on the Communists' airfield demand). He wanted a cease-fire if one can be worked out that is fair and proper declared the Air Chief of Staff, but I don't see how we can safely do anything that will enable the Reds to build up their air strength. That is what permitting them to build airfields will amount to. Such bases in North Korea will be of great combat value to them if they decide to break the truce next Spring which I wouldn't put past them".

Remarks of Mr. LAY

Mr. LAY described this as a good summation of General BRADLEY'S remarks at the conference. He also advised that General BRADLEY'S ideas in this respect conceivably could have come from another source, inasmuch as he believed that they had been previously discussed.

Mr. LAY advised that this statement, as to VANDENBERG'S expressions at the conference, is false. VANDENBERG generally agreed with the statement of General BRADLEY at the conference. He explained that General BRADLEY clearly indicated that later in the negotiations, the UN might be willing to make concessions as to airfields if the number of airfields were, appropriately, limited.

Quotes from ALLEN column

A statement attributed to General COLLINS relating to concessions on rotation of UN troops that "it is an unfair demand and the only reason the Reds are making it is to try to force us to give in on airfields".

Statement attributed to General COLLINS that "our Army can hold the present line until hell freezes over".

The statement attributed to the President that "as you know I am very anxious to bring the fighting to an end if that is possible. But I will not agree to concessions to the Communists that we may regret later on. We want to be very careful that we do not sell ourselves short in our eagerness to secure a truce for our men".

"Also discussed was the question of building up the South Korean Army".

Remarks of Mr. LAY

Mr. LAY could not recall General COLLINS making a statement to this effect.

Mr. LAY described this as correct in thought, but considered the words "until hell freezes over" as wrong. To his recollection, General COLLINS assured the President the Army troops could hold the line for the next year.

Mr. LAY described this as a good summation of the views expressed by the President at the conference. Mr. LAY advised that, in his opinion, this information, in particular, could have come from no source except through an individual who was in attendance at the conference on December 10, 1951. He explained that he did not feel that anyone who attended the conference had a clear idea of the President's views on matters discussed at the conference. Mr. LAY based this conclusion on the fact that the President had been at Key West for sometime prior to the conference.

Mr. LAY advised that the matter of building up the South Korean Army was discussed at the conference, as indicated above.

INTERVIEW WITH MR. JAMES E. WEBB

Mr. JAMES E. WEBB, Under Secretary of State, was interviewed at his home, 3407 Rodman Street, Northwest, on the evening of Friday, December 14, 1951, by Special Agents JOSEPH A. CONNORS, JR., and PAUL J. TIERNEY. Special Agent RALPH ROACH of the Liaison Section of the Bureau was also present during the interview.

Mr. WEBB advised that he was in attendance at the President's conference held at the White House on the morning of December 10, 1951. He furnished general background information of events leading up to the conference and also details as to the comments of various individuals in attendance at the conference.

Mr. WEBB advised that there was no formally prepared agenda for the conference. He further advised that he took no notes during the conference, and that he does not know whether anyone else present took notes.

In answer to a specific question, Mr. WEBB advised that he did not recall any discussion at this conference concerning a suggestion by the President that in the event an armistice was not reached by December 27, 1951, arrangements should be made for an extension of the time.

The conference terminated between 11:30 and 11:35 A.M., at which time, pursuant to the President's specific request, Mr. WEBB stayed with the President and went into his office for a further conference with respect to the impending visit of British Prime Minister CHURCHILL to the United States. WEBB then returned to his office and dictated a brief memo to include (1) that no notes or instructions had been taken at the President's conference in connection with the discussion of the proposed draft to be issued to General RIDGWAY, inasmuch as Mr. H. FREDMAN MATTHEWS was present during the discussion and was in a position to see that the necessary action required by the State Department would be taken. (2) The second part of WEBB'S memo dealt with the necessary data that would have to be prepared to brief the President on matters that would be discussed with Prime Minister CHURCHILL.

WEBB stated he had not discussed the details of the conversations in the President's general conference on December 10, 1951, with anyone. He stated he was not acquainted with JACK ANDERSON, who is associated with Columnist DREW PEARSON; that he does know DREW PEARSON, but has not been in contact with him for at least six months. Nevertheless, he has seen other newspapermen subsequent to December 10, one of whom was LIA FRIS, Washington correspondent for the Raleigh News and Observer at Raleigh, North Carolina. Another was JOHN HIGHTOWER, who covers the State Department with Associated Press, and the third and last was JAMES RESTON, associated with the New York Times. HIGHTOWER raised two points in questioning WEBB: (1) Was there a world crisis? (2) Was Europe discussed? WEBB gave HIGHTOWER this background:

WFO 65-6060

The President is furnished with a great number of written reports concerning the world situation. He takes his position seriously, and takes the whole situation seriously. The President wants to get the full "flavor" of the thinking of the top people, as it is the President's policy to keep in close touch with what goes on around the world. WEBB gave this information to HIGHTOWER for background.

JAMES RESTON contacted WEBB on Tuesday, December 11, 1951, and he was given generally the same background information concerning the December 10th conference as was given to HIGHTOWER. RESTON'S inquiries of WEBB also touched on the reported resignation of Secretary of State DEAN ACHESON. WEBB briefed RESTON on the very close relationship between ACHESON and the President, and stated such a report of ACHESON'S resignation was not true. RESTON inquired concerning CHURCHILL'S visit, and wanted to know the policy of the United States as to CHURCHILL. WEBB advised him that the Government was making a very careful study of the background and problems in connection with our relations with Great Britain in Europe and the Far East, and indicated that this country would be prepared to discuss these problems whether CHURCHILL talked about them or not. WEBB advised that RESTON in recent articles has been throwing rather sharp barbs at the State Department with respect to some of its actions, and he felt that RESTON should be briefed as to the Department's activities as set forth above. RESTON also inquired as to recent changes in the State Department, and WEBB discussed the significance and history of these changes.

Mr. WEBB was also contacted by JIM FREE concerning the statement in the December 10, 1951, issue of the "New York Times" to the effect that he, WEBB, contemplated resigning. He stated FREE is a representative of his hometown newspaper and was interested in this article.

Mr. WEBB was re-interviewed in his office at the State Department by Special Agents JOSEPH A. CONNORS, JR., and PAUL J. TIERNEY on December 17, 1951, to make available to him the contents of the news column of ROBERT S. ALLEN, as it appeared in the December 13, 1951, issue of the New York Post "Blue Final" edition. His comments on this column follow:

The column quotes General BRADLEY to the effect that the truce negotiations have reached the point "where a few concessions on both sides could bring an agreement if the Communists really want one." The column also attributes to the President the question "What do they want?", and BRADLEY'S response was "The deadlock gets down to this." Mr. WEBB stated the President did not say "What do they want?" The President's inquiry was more along these lines, "Why are we willing to go this far with them?" Mr. WEBB made it clear that it was not the position of anyone, including

WFO 65-6060

BRADLEY, that the talks had reached the stage of a deadlock. While this could possibly be the opinion of General MATTHEW RIDGWAY who is conducting the negotiations, responsible officials in Washington have never regarded the status of these talks as reaching a deadlock. They have always felt that we will get an armistice for two reasons, (1) the Communists in North Korea have been very badly hurt, (2) the United Nations forces in Korea are in a position of strength and can hold their present lines. It is felt that while we want an armistice from the position of global strategy, the Communists are anxious to obtain an armistice because of their present weakness in their position. Therefore, Mr. WEBB reiterated that these negotiations have never gotten to a deadlock stage and to quote that they have is not correct.

With respect to the statement attributed to General BRADLEY by ROBERT ALLEN to the effect that the Communists would make concessions on our stand on rotation of troops if we made concessions that allowed them to build some airfields in North Korea, Mr. WEBB stated that this topic was discussed at the conference, and he felt that perhaps this information could have come from someone in attendance at the conference. However, in WEBB'S opinion, this information was also available to others not in attendance at the conference who had previously sat in on discussions in the Defense and interested Departments and who, prior to the conference, knew General BRADLEY'S position concerning these points at issue. Therefore, in Mr. WEBB'S mind such a well informed person could have anticipated what remarks General BRADLEY would make when these topics were discussed.

The December 13, 1951, column of ROBERT ALLEN attributes the following statement to General VANDENBERG:

"I want a cease-fire if one can be worked out that is fair and proper, but I do not see how we can safely do anything that will enable the Reds to build up their air strength. That is what permitting them to build air fields will amount to. Such bases in North Korea will be of great combat value to them, if they decide to break the truce next spring, which I wouldn't put past them."

Mr. WEBB stated that this was an erroneous statement of General VANDENBERG'S position, that at the present time the Communists have a powerful air force in North Korea which is well known. WEBB stated that VANDENBERG'S position in this connection was that if a cease-fire is obtained with the threat of a "greater sanction," that air power would be the sanction, and that he would withdraw all air power from Korea for re-deployment in Japan and other strategic areas. VANDENBERG went so far as to recommend that if a cease-fire is obtained that ground troops could be removed from South Korea so that in the event the cease-fire is later violated they would not be destroyed by the Communists. He suggested that they, too, be reassigned to other strategic locations.

With respect to the position of General J. LAWTON COLLINS, wherein he insisted that Communists be required to agree to the rotation of UN troops and is quoted in the column as follows:

WFO 65-6060

"That would be a serious blow to the morale of our men. I am strongly opposed to any concession on that. It is an unfair demand and the only reason the Reds are making it is to try to force us to give in on air fields. Our Army can hold the present line until hell freezes over and I am flatly opposed to giving the slightest ground on the replacement issue. The Reds would have the same right as us on that, and I don't see why they should object to it, except for trading purposes."

Mr. WEBB'S opinion was that this quotation of COLLINS had a strong "flavor" of someone who was in attendance at the conference. He stated that it was COLLINS' position that it would be impossible to maintain ground forces without rotation.

WEBB described the ALLEN column as a whole not as "upsetting as it might be" from the security point of view. He added that from reading the column, one might gain the impression that United States top officials had decided to get tough with the Communists, whereas actually the discussions at the President's conference were concerned with granting concessions to the Communists. Mr. WEBB considered references in the column to discussions of building up the South Korean Army as harmful from the security standpoint, inasmuch as he felt that they did not want this fact released for general information. Mr. WEBB advised that references were made to building up the South Korean Army at the conference.

Mr. WEBB advised that after considering the column as a whole, he was of the opinion that possibly someone attending the conference gave a newspaperman too much detailed background concerning the conference, thus enabling a column such as the ALLEN column to have been written. Mr. WEBB was questioned as to who might be the source of the information contained in the ALLEN column. He advised that he had no suspects as to the source of the leak.

WFO 65-5060

INTERVIEW WITH MR. H. FREEMAN MATTHEWS

Mr. H. FREEMAN MATTHEWS, Deputy Under Secretary of State, Room 5121, New State Department, was interviewed by Special Agents JOSEPH A. CONNORS, JR., and PAUL J. TIERNEY, on December 14, 1951. Special Agent RALPH ROACH of the Liaison Section of the FBI was also present at the interview:

Mr. MATTHEWS advised that he attended the President's conference held at the White House on the morning of December 10, 1951. He furnished in detail information relating to comments of various individuals in attendance at the President's conference.

With respect to the item in the material shown by JACK ANDERSON to General BRADLEY on the evening of December 12, 1951, wherein it was stated that the President had indicated we would grant an extension of time if cease-fire were not obtained by December 27, 1951, Mr. MATTHEWS advised that to his recollection this matter was not discussed at the conference.

Mr. MATTHEWS returned directly to his office from the December 10, 1951 conference, and told ALEXIS JOHNSON, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, of the President's approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff draft of instructions to General RIDGWAY, and that the opinion of those attending the conference was unanimous to the effect that an armistice was extremely desirable at this time. MATTHEWS said that other than talking to JOHNSON, he spoke to no one else concerning the events taking place at this conference.

Mr. MATTHEWS stated that he did not take any notes during the conference and prepared no memorandum or record concerning it thereafter; also, to the best of his recollection, no one came in or went out of the conference room during the conference. He stated there was no agenda available prior to the conference as to the topics to be discussed.

Mr. MATTHEWS does not know JACK ANDERSON. He has previously met DREW PEARSON, but has not been in contact with him for the past few years. Mr. MATTHEWS had no suggestions or suspicions as to where, or in what manner, the alleged leak occurred.

Mr. MATTHEWS was reinterviewed by Special Agents CONNORS and TIERNEY on December 17, 1951.

The contents of the column of ROBERT S. ALLEN appearing in the "Blue Final Edition" of the New York Post, December 13, 1951, concerning the White House conference of December 10, 1951, were exhibited to Mr. MATTHEWS for his perusal and comments.

WFO 65-6060

With respect to the initial comments attributed to General BRADLEY by ALLEN to the effect that truce negotiations have reached the point where a few concessions on both sides could bring an agreement, Mr. MATTHEWS stated that the General did indicate that a stage had been reached where things might break quickly, and suggested that we make concessions on minor issues. Mr. MATTHEWS stated that a careful review of the communique and news bulletins for the ten days immediately prior to the President's conference on December 10 would contain this information. He commented that if the New York Times was obtained to cover this period, it would be apparent that this statement attributed to General BRADLEY by ALLEN was common knowledge. However, this was BRADLEY'S position at the conference. To Mr. MATTHEWS' recollection, General BRADLEY did not make the statement that "They are using the rotation issue to try to wrest concessions from us on the air field demand."

Mr. MATTHEWS described the statements attributed to General HOYT VANDENBERG as being inaccurate. He explained that VANDENBERG favored the "greater sanction" theory and suggested a withdrawal of the air force and ground troops from Korea and their re-deployment in strategic areas such as Japan.

In connection with the statements attributed to General J. LAWTON COLLINS concerning rotation of UN troops, Mr. MATTHEWS stated that COLLINS may have discussed rotation, but that the matter of rotation was not a point in issue at the conference since there was complete agreement as to the position of the United Nations on rotation. Mr. MATTHEWS advised that from the article it would appear that there was much argument at the conference on the rotation issue which is not true. Mr. MATTHEWS could not recall General COLLINS' making a statement to the effect that the Reds were demanding concessions as to rotation in order to force us to give in on airfields.

Mr. MATTHEWS described the statement attributed to General BRADLEY as to "the importance of not allowing the Communists to build up a powerful air force" as being incorrect since it is common knowledge that the Communists already have a powerful air force.

In connection with the statements attributed to President TRUMAN by ALLEN, Mr. MATTHEWS advised that the President may have said that we were trying to bring the war to an end and may have remarked that we might be making too many concessions, but to his recollection these statements were made at the beginning of the conference. He did not recall that the President made this statement: "We want to be very careful that we do not sell ourselves short in our eagerness to secure a truce for our men."

In Mr. MATTHEWS' opinion the ALLEN column was an inaccurate report of what had occurred at the White House conference on December 10. He felt

WFO 65-6060

that if ALLEN had obtained his information from someone attending the conference, he would have received much more accurate information. He also described that ALLEN column as a "poor job" of reporting the conference. In conclusion, Mr. MATTHEWS stated that any good newspaperman who had been closely following truce negotiations as released to the press prior to the White House conference and who maintained close contact with the lower echelon of individuals at the Pentagon working on topics of discussion would have been in a position to write ALLEN'S column without ever having had contact with anyone in attendance at the White House conference.

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INTERVIEW WITH REAR ADMIRAL THOMAS H. ROBBINS, JR.

Rear Admiral THOMAS H. ROBBINS, JR., member of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, attached to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was interviewed at his office, Room 2E1010, on the afternoon of December 19, 1951, by Special Agent MAURICE A. TAYLOR.

Admiral ROBBINS advised that he possessed no information concerning the proceedings at the White House Conference on December 10, 1951, with the exception of a single item which was brought to his attention, probably at noon on the day of the conference, at the regular briefing of Admiral WILLIAM FECHTELNER, attended by Admiral ROBBINS and about eight other senior officers. He mentioned these briefings are held on Monday, Tuesday and Thursday.

Admiral ROBBINS advised Admiral FECHTELNER had informed the group at the briefing that he had attended the White House Conference and desired to apprise them of his remarks opposing a certain course of action in Korea.

Admiral ROBBINS stated that subsequently it became necessary for his committee to consider this point in order to prepare certain recommendations for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He stated this item was only one of a number in the preparation of their report. At 4:30 P.M. on Friday, December 14, he conferred with Major General CHARLES CABELL, ALANZO P. FOX and Colonel E. C. CRESS, who constitute the Joint Strategic Survey Committee and discussed the above point raised by Admiral FECHTELNER. On Monday, December 17, Admiral ROBBINS contacted General CHAR BRADLEY in the presence of Major Generals CHARLES CABELL and ELMER J. ROGERS, and advised General BRADLEY that in connection with the positions taken by his Committee on the point in question, they were aware of the remarks of Admiral FECHTELNER at the White House. Admiral ROBBINS advised that this constituted all knowledge in his possession concerning the White House Conference and all discussions in which he had participated on this subject.

INTERVIEW WITH MR. S. EVERETT GLEASON

Mr. S. EVERETT GLEASON, Deputy Executive Secretary, National Security Council, was interviewed by Special Agents JOSEPH A. CONNORS and PAUL J. TIERNEY on December 17, 1951.

Mr. GLEASON advised that Mr. JAMES E. LAY, JR., Executive Secretary, National Security Council, immediately after returning from the White House conference on December 10, 1951, advised Mr. GLEASON that the conference would not necessitate any changes in a draft with which Mr. GLEASON was concerned. Mr. GLEASON explained that he and a small group of individuals had been working on a National Security Council draft which contained recommendations relating to the present truce negotiations in Korea and which possibly would be affected by the conference. At this time, the information furnished Mr. GLEASON by Mr. LAY concerning the conference was only enough to assure Mr. GLEASON that the draft would not have to be changed.

GLEASON stated that at approximately 4:00 P.M. on December 10, he contacted JOHN EMERSON, Planning Officer, Far Eastern Bureau, Department of State, who was also working on the NSC draft and advised EMERSON that no changes in the draft would be necessary as a result of the White House conference on that date. According to GLEASON, he furnished EMERSON no further information. EMERSON advised GLEASON that he understood from his superiors in the State Department that no changes would be necessary.

GLEASON stated that he may have telephonically contacted Mr. KENNETH YOUNG, who is the Department of National Defense representative assisting in the preparation of the draft, and advised him that no changes in the draft would be necessary as a result of the White House conference. GLEASON could not definitely recall if he had contacted YOUNG in this connection.

According to GLEASON, YOUNG is on the staff of Mr. FRANK WASH, Special Assistant to Secretary of Defense LOVETT.

GLEASON advised that on midmorning, December 12, 1951, Mr. LAY orally advised him in more detail as to the position taken by various individuals at the White House conference on December 10. This briefing of GLEASON took place in Mr. LAY'S office. No one else was present, GLEASON took no notes, and GLEASON has not discussed with any other individual the detailed briefing furnished him by Mr. LAY.

GLEASON advised that to the best of his recollection LAY indicated that General VANDENBERG suggested pulling out our air force in the event a cease-fire was obtained in Korea, and that the President expressed some concern lest the North Koreans drive all the way down to Pusan. As he further recalled, General COLLINS assured the President that the Army could hold the line.

WFO 65-6060

In connection with LAY's briefing, Mr. GLEASON recalled that the President indicated a willingness to follow along the lines suggested by General BRADLEY and that previously he had been worried that the United States might be making too many concessions.

The column of ROBERT S. ALLEN appearing in the New York Post December 13, 1951, was exhibited to Mr. GLEASON. He stated that from his understanding the statements attributed to General BRADLEY and to the President by ALLEN expressed the thoughts of these individuals as relayed to him by LAY.

GLEASON advised that prior to attending the conference on the morning of December 10, LAY may have mentioned to him the fact that the President was concerned over the matter of concessions. He added that he definitely did not mention this fact to anyone nor had he had any knowledge as to whether other individuals in Washington were aware of the President's attitude prior to the conference.

GLEASON advised that his social life was limited to his family and very close friends of long standing whose intelligence precluded them from ever making inquiry as to the nature of his assignments. He has no newspaper friends and does not know columnist DREW PEARSON, JACK ANDERSON, or any of their representatives. Mr. GLEASON stated that he had been concerned about this matter and had been considering the whole thing in his own mind. From past experience, he knew that in some instances stories are "planted" with columnists in order to accomplish some objective that would benefit the individual giving the story. In analyzing this possibility as applied to the facts in instant case, he could see no objective to be obtained by so doing. He stated there has been no "knock down fight" on any matters of policy and that contrariwise there had been a high degree of unanimity of thinking by all individuals at the conference concerning the issues involved, and therefore it was his conclusion that the story appearing in the newspaper had not been "planted."

WFO 65-6060
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INTERVIEW WITH MR. JOHN K. EMERSON

Mr. JOHN K. EMERSON, Planning Officer, Advisory Bureau, Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State, was interviewed by Special Agents JOSEPH A. CONNORS, JR., and PAUL J. TIERNEY in his office, Room 3011, New State Department Building, on December 18, 1951.

Mr. EMERSON advised that he was one of several individuals who with Mr. S. EVERETT GLEASON, National Security Council, were preparing a National Security Council draft concerned with present truce negotiations in Korea.

According to Mr. EMERSON, on December 10, 1951, subsequent to the White House conference, his superior, Mr. ALEXIS JOHNSON, indicated to him that as a result of the conference no changes in the draft on which EMERSON was working would be necessary. Mr. JOHNSON furnished him no further information concerning the White House conference.

Mr. EMERSON advised that subsequently Mr. GLEASON telephoned him also indicating that no draft changes were necessitated as a result of the conference. Mr. GLEASON furnished him no further information concerning the White House conference.

INTERVIEW WITH MR. KEN YOUNG

Mr. KEN YOUNG, Office, Secretary Defense, Office of Foreign Military Affairs, Far East Specialist, Room 3-D 928, Pentagon, was interviewed on December 18, 1951, by Special Agents JOSEPH A. CONNORS, JR., and PAUL J. TIERNEY.

Mr. S. EVERETT GLEASON previously indicated that he may have called Mr. YOUNG when he, GLEASON, learned that as a result of the White House Conference on December 10, that it would be unnecessary to make any changes in the draft of a NSC paper that Mr. YOUNG had assisted in preparing. Mr. GLEASON was doubtful at the time of the original interview with him that he had called YOUNG; nevertheless, YOUNG was personally contacted and questioned whether he had received a call from Mr. GLEASON concerning this matter. He stated that he had not, and further that he was advised by no one of any details relating to the President's conference of December 10, 1951.

INTERVIEW WITH MR. ALEXIS JOHNSON

Mr. ALEXIS JOHNSON, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State, was interviewed by Special Agents JOSEPH A. CONNORS, JR., and PAUL J. TIERNEY, on December 18, 1951.

WFO 65-6060
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Mr. JOHNSON advised that he had worked on the draft of instructions prepared for General MATTHEW RIDGWAY with H. FREEMAN MATTHEWS, Deputy Under Secretary, State Department, CHARLES BOHLEN, Counselor, State Department, and others. Mr. JOHNSON was interested in the decisions reached at the White House conference on December 10 only in so far as it affected the draft which he helped prepare for General RIDGWAY. When Mr. MATTHEWS returned from the President's conference he called Mr. JOHNSON and told him that the draft had been approved as drafted. He did not go into any detail at this time. Later in the afternoon he spoke with Mr. JOHNSON in a general fashion and told him that the general philosophy of the men who had worked on the draft had been adopted at the White House conference and that there was no objection to the message being transmitted to General RIDGWAY. He did not furnish Mr. JOHNSON with a detailed summarization of the views of those present at the conference. Mr. JOHNSON in turn advised Mr. ROBERT J. McCLURKIN, his principal assistant, who is Assistant Director in the Office of North East Asia Affairs which handles Korea and Japan, and told McCLURKIN that their draft had been approved. He stated that this was all he told McCLURKIN as actually it was all he knew. He also indicated that he possibly told the same to JOHN EMERSON, Planning Officer, Planning Advisory Bureau, Far Eastern Affairs.

The DREW PEARSON column appearing in the New York Daily Mirror of December 5, 1951, was exhibited to Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. JOHNSON advised that he had no previous knowledge of the existence of this column. He stated that he was in no position to comment as to whether the column accurately portrayed the White House conference of December 10 because he had never been advised as to the details thereof.

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INTERVIEW WITH MR. JOSEPH SHORT

Mr. JOSEPH SHORT, Press Secretary of the White House, was interviewed by Inspector CARL E. HENNICH and Special Agent KENNETH T. DELAVIGNE. He advised that he possessed no prior knowledge as to the matters which were to be discussed at the White House conference on December 10, 1951. Mr. SHORT informed that upon the termination of the conference, he was authorized by the President, following consultation with Admiral DENNISON and Admiral SOUERS, to release to the press, the statement that the President had discussed world affairs and no decisions on policy were reached. Mr. SHORT stated that because of his lack of knowledge as to the actual discussions of the conference, he was, of course, necessarily limited to the authorized statement in his contact with the press. He produced from his files, in substantiation of his statement, and furnished a typewritten copy which he informed fully covers all comments and questions made at this press release.

Mr. SHORT said that FRED BLUMENTHAL, of DREW PEARSON'S office, at times covers the White House. He was unable to state whether BLUMENTHAL had been present on December 10, but indicated he was relatively certain he did not see him on this date. He was unable to furnish any statement which would indicate who may have been responsible for the leak of information from the President's conference of December 10, 1951. In discussing this matter, Mr. SHORT furnished certain background and activities which had come to his attention concerning DREW PEARSON, which he indicated had served as confirmation for his opinion as to the unscrupulous nature of PEARSON, but in relating this background, was unable to tie any of these activities into the instant investigation.

P E N D I N G

WFO 65-6060

ADMINISTRATIVE PAGE

LEAD

THE WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE:

AT WASHINGTON, D.C.:

Will await Bureau instructions as to what, if any, further investigation is desired.

follows:

Previous correspondence in this case has carried the title as
DREW PEARSON;
Alleged Loak from White House Conference;
December 10, 1951,
to JACK ANDERSON, Leg-man for DREW PEARSON
Espionage - X

Washington, D. C.
December 26, 1951

M E M O R A N D U M

RE: DREW PEARSON, Et Al
ESPIONAGE - X

On December 19, 1951, I telephonically requested SAC MURPHY at Charlotte to check and ascertain if in the Raleigh News and Observer there was any article by a reporter named FREE with reference to the President's conference held December 10 last. He telephonically advised later in the day that the only item in that paper between the 11th and 18th of December was an AP dispatch. No article by FREE could be located in the paper.

R. B. HOOD
SAC

RBH:MCP
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65-6060-37

SEARCHED	INDEXED
SERIALIZED	FILED
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FBI - WASH. F. O.	

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65-6060-38

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MS

DREW PEARSON

ON

THE WASHINGTON MERRY-GO-ROUND

(COPYRIGHT, 1951, BY THE BELL SYNDICATE, INC.)

DREW PEARSON SAYS: (CAPS) TRUMAN GOT FAVORABLE REPORT ON KOREAN TRUCE AT JOINT CHIEFS MEETING; U.S. TROOPS COULD STAY IN KOREA TILL "HELL FREEZES OVER;" TOP EXECUTIVES DESERTING TRUMAN. (END CAPS) WASHINGTON.--MOST OF THE WORLD WAS INTRIGUED OVER PRESIDENT TRUMAN'S MUCH-PUBLICIZED MEETING WITH THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF FOLLOWING HIS RETURN FROM KEY WEST. HOWEVER, IT TURNED OUT TO BE PRETTY MUCH ROUTINE AFTER ALL. HIGHLIGHT OF THE MEETING WAS AN OPTIMISTIC ASSURANCE FROM GEN. OMAR BRADLEY THAT A CEASE-FIRE COULD BE WORKED OUT IN KOREA.

THE NATION'S HIGHEST DIPLOMATIC AND MILITARY CHIEFS WERE WAITING IN THE CABINET ROOM WHEN PRESIDENT TRUMAN STRODE IN. HE WAS GRINNING BROADLY. SHAKING HANDS WITH EVERYONE AROUND THE CONFERENCE TABLE, HE REPORTED THAT IT WAS "GOOD TO BE BACK," AND ASKED HOW THEY LIKED HIS SUN TAN.

AFTER THAT, HE LET THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF DO MOST OF THE TALKING, AND HERE IS A BRIEF, CHRONOLOGICAL ACCOUNT OF WHAT HAPPENED AT THE MEETING WHICH CAUSED SO MUCH WORLD-WIDE SPECULATION:

THE PRESIDENT SAT BACK, LISTENED INTENTLY AND CALLED FOR EVERYONE'S VIEWS. OCCASIONALLY, HE BOUNCED HIS FINGERS TOGETHER REFLECTIVELY, IN A QUICK, IMPULSIVE GESTURE, AND MADE SUCH COMMENTS AS: "THAT'S A TOUGH ONE."

GENERAL BRADLEY LED OFF WITH A SUMMARY OF THE KOREAN SITUATION. HE REPORTED THAT THE COMMUNISTS SEEMED TO BE READY TO COME TO TERMS, THAT A CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT COULD BE WORKED OUT IF BOTH SIDES MADE CONCESSIONS.

HOWEVER, GEN. HOYT VANDENBERG, AIR CHIEF OF STAFF, OPPOSED MAKING ANY MAJOR CONCESSIONS. HE WAS PARTICULARLY ADAMANT AGAINST ALLOWING THE COMMUNISTS THE RIGHT TO BUILD AIRFIELDS DURING THE CEASE-FIRE.

GEN. J. LAWTON COLLINS, THE ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF, VIGOROUSLY OPPOSED GIVING IN TO THE COMMUNISTS ON TROOP ROTATION. THE CHINESE HAVE PROPOSED A FREEZE ON ALL TROOPS ENTERING KOREA, THUS BLOCKING REPLACEMENTS FOR COMBAT VETERANS WHO HAVE BEEN PROMISED THE CHANCE TO GO HOME ON ROTATION. THIS WOULD BE A "BLOW TO MORALE," COLLINS WARNED.

--SILENT ADMIRAL--

HOWEVER, GENERAL COLLINS READILY AGREED THAT "MINOR CONCESSIONS" ON OTHER POINTS SHOULD BE MADE IN ORDER TO WIN CONCESSIONS FROM THE COMMUNISTS.

PRESIDENT TRUMAN'S ONLY COMMENT WAS THAT EVERY EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO REACH A CEASE-FIRE, BUT NO CONCESSIONS SHOULD BE GRANTED THAT WE "WOULD LATER REGRET."

(MORE)

LEAST TALKATIVE OF THE JOINT CHIEFS WAS ADMIRAL FECHTELER, WHO MADE A SHORT, HALF-MINUTE SPEECH IN WHICH HE ASSURED THE PRESIDENT THAT THE NAVY IS PREPARED TO CARRY OUT "ANY MISSION ANY TIME ANY PLACE."

FOR THE ARMY'S PART, GENERAL COLLINS ASSURED THE PRESIDENT THAT THE ARMY COULDN'T BE BLASTED OUT OF KOREA, BUT COULD HOLD ON "UNTIL HELL FREEZES OVER."

ANOTHER CONCESSION DISCUSSED WAS THAT OF GIVING IN TO THE COMMUNISTS ON INSPECTION TEAMS BEHIND THE LINES. WE HAVE BEEN HOLDING OUT FOR INSPECTION BY JOINT U.N.-COMMUNIST TEAMS, BUT THE REDS HAVE BEEN ARGUING FOR INSPECTION BY "NEUTRAL NATIONS."

BY NEUTRAL NATIONS, THE COMMUNIST NEGOTIATORS SAID THEY MEANT POLAND AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA. LATER, HOWEVER, THEY AGREED THAT THEY WOULD ALSO CONSIDER DENMARK, SWEDEN AND SWITZERLAND AS "NEUTRAL NATIONS." THESE THREE WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO US, AND GENERAL BRADLEY PROPOSED GIVING GROUND ON THIS POINT. THIS HAS NOW BEEN DONE.

THE CHIEF THEME OF THE MEETING WAS THAT A CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT MAY BE CLOSE AT HAND. ALL SIGNS POINT TO A SETTLEMENT WITHIN THE NEXT 20 DAYS. THOUGH SOME DETAILS WILL BE LEFT TO IRON OUT AFTER THE DECEMBER 27 DEADLINE, WE ARE SURE TO GRANT A SHORT EXTENSION TO CLEAN THEM UP.

ANOTHER MATTER THAT WAS DISCUSSED AT THE WHITE HOUSE WAS THE QUESTION OF WITHDRAWING U.N. TROOPS FROM KOREA ALTOGETHER--AFTER THE ARMISTICE. HOWEVER, THE FACTS REGARDING THIS SHOULD NOT BE MADE PUBLIC NOW.

--BRASS HAT CHRISTMAS--

BECAUSE THE CAPTAIN OF THE NAVY AMPHIBIOUS LANDING CRAFT USS NEW KENT LIVES NOT FAR FROM BALTIMORE, ITS CREW WILL HAVE TO SPEND CHRISTMAS AT BALTIMORE, DESPITE THE FACT THAT MANY OF THEIR FAMILIES LIVE AT THE SHIP'S HOME BASE--NORFOLK.

ORDINARILY NAVAL VESSELS TIE UP AT THEIR HOME BASE FOR CHRISTMAS. AND BECAUSE NORFOLK HAS BEEN THE HOME BASE FOR THE NEW KENT, MANY WIVES OF THE MEN AND OFFICERS HAD MOVED TO THAT CITY. HOWEVER, CAPT. RONALD WOODAMAN LIVES AT GLENCOE, MD., A SUBURB OF BALTIMORE, SO HE IS TAKING THE SHIP TO BALTIMORE FOR THE HOLIDAYS.

THIS MEANS THAT HALF THE OFFICERS AND 68 OF THE ENLISTED MEN WILL HAVE TO TRAVEL BACK TO NORFOLK TO SPEND CHRISTMAS WITH THEIR FAMILIES.

--IF I WERE PRESIDENT--

HARRY TRUMAN CONSTANTLY COMPLAINS TO FRIENDS: "I CAN'T GET GOOD MEN TO COME INTO THE GOVERNMENT."

WHAT HE DOESN'T REALIZE IS THAT FEW MEN WANT TO RISK SCANDAL CONTAMINATION BY SERVING WITH MEDIOCRITIES; THOUGH MANY WOULD COME IN IF THE PRESIDENT CLEANED HOUSE, BEGAN WITH A NEW SLATE.

(MORE)

MERRY-GO-ROUND--SATURDAY, DECEMBER 15--PAGE 3.

THERE ISN'T A CHANCE IN THE WORLD THAT HE'LL APPOINT THEM, BUT HERE IS A ROLLCALL OF A CLEAN-UP CABINET WHICH SOME OF TRUMAN'S FRIENDS PREPARED THE OTHER NIGHT WHILE PLAYING THE GAME OF "IF I WERE PRESIDENT":

FOR SPECIAL PROSECUTOR--WILY, DRAMATIC EX-SEN. BURTON K. WHEELER OF MONTANA, ONCE ONE OF THE SENATE'S GREATEST PROSECUTORS.

ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE TAX DIVISION--ADRIAN DE WIND, ABLE CHIEF COUNSEL OF THE KING COMMITTEE.

ALIEN PROPERTY CUSTODIAN--GEN. TELFORD TAYLOR, THE SMALL-BUSINESS ADMINISTRATOR; OR JOSEPH BORKIN, THE EX-JUSTICE DEPARTMENT TRUSTBUSTER. BOTH ARE INTIMATELY FAMILIAR WITH THE GIANT NAZI BUSINESS ENTERPRISES NOW BEING ADMINISTERED BY THE CUSTODIAN.

SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY--RANDOLPH PAUL, THE BRILLIANT FORMER CHIEF COUNSEL OF THE TREASURY.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE--MAURY MAVERICK OR LEON HENDERSON, BOTH TWO-FISTED CRUSADERS WITH YEARS OF WASHINGTON KNOW-HOW.

CHIEF COUNSEL OF THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE--BRUNO SCHACHNER, ASSISTANT COUNSEL OF THE KING COMMITTEE.

TO CREATE FURTHER CONFIDENCE IN THE WHITE HOUSE, MR. TRUMAN MIGHT SUBSTITUTE PAUL PORTER FOR SECRETARY MATT CONNELLY, WHO HAS NO LOVE FOR THE GRAFT PROBES.

(END PEARSON COLUMN FOR SATURDAY, DEC. 15, 1951.)

12/12/51 MG519P

PEARSON SPECIAL FOR ILLINOIS AND TENNESSEE AND COAL-AREA PAPERS.

AVAILABLE TO ALL SUBSCRIBERS.

--NEW COAL METROPOLIS--

THE SMALL TOWN OF JOPPA, ILLINOIS, WILL SOON BECOME THE HUB FOR A VAST NEW MARKET FOR COAL--A MARKET SO IMMENSE THAT EVEN EXPERIENCED COAL OPERATORS CANNOT VISUALIZE ITS SIZE.

THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF COAL INVOLVED IS EXPECTED TO COME TO 17,500,000 TONS ANNUALLY--OR ABOUT TWICE THE COAL REQUIRED YEARLY BY THE WHOLE STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS.

THIS IMMENSE TONNAGE OF COAL WILL GO CHIEFLY TO THE TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY'S STEAM-GENERATING PLANTS AND TO ELECTRIC ENERGY, INC.--A GROUP OF FIVE PRIVATE POWER COMPANIES SUPPLYING A SECRET INSTALLATION OF THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION.

THIS TREMENDOUS INCREASE IN COAL CONSUMPTION IS GOOD NEWS FOR SOUTHERN ILLINOIS COAL OPERATORS WHO, ALONG WITH THE REST OF THE INDUSTRY, HAVE LONG BEEN FACED WITH DWINDLING MARKETS. IT'S ALSO ENCOURAGING NEWS FOR DOZENS OF SMALL TOWNS IN THE MIDWEST DEPENDENT ON COAL MINING, AND INDIRECTLY MAY BE A "SHOT IN THE ARM" TO THE WHOLE INDUSTRY.

ELECTRIC ENERGY, INC., WILL USE 2,500,000 TO 3,000,000 TONS ANNUALLY IN ITS ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT AT JOPPA. THIS POWER HAS BEEN EARMARKED FOR THE NEW ATOMIC PLANT ACROSS THE OHIO RIVER AT KEVIL, KY.

THE TVA WILL NEED AT LEAST 12,500,000 TONS PER YEAR TO KEEP ITS SIX STEAM PLANTS GOING. THIS COAL WILL BE DUMPED INTO BARGES AT JOPPA FOR DELIVERY TO TVA TERMINALS VIA THE OHIO AND TENNESSEE RIVER.

CHIEF DIFFICULTY THUS FAR IS THE LACK OF ADEQUATE RAIL TRANSPORTATION TO JOPPA, NOW SERVED ONLY BY THE CHICAGO AND EASTERN ILLINOIS RAILROAD. BOTH THE NEW YORK CENTRAL AND THE BURLINGTON ROAD ARE SEEKING INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION PERMISSION TO BUILD SHORT EXTENSIONS RUNNING INTO JOPPA. THIS HAS THE SUPPORT OF BOTH TVA AND THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION WHICH DEMAND THAT THERE BE NO CURTAILMENT OF THEIR FUEL SUPPLY BY FLOOD, WRECKS OR ANYTHING ELSE.

THE CHICAGO AND EASTERN ILLINOIS IS TRYING TO MAINTAIN ITS MONOPOLY AS THE ONLY LINE NOW SERVING JOPPA, BUT OFFICIALS POINT OUT THAT THERE'S MORE THAN ENOUGH COAL INVOLVED TO KEEP ALL THREE RAILROADS BUSY.

THE CONTROVERSY BETWEEN THE RAILROADS IS NOW UNDER CONSIDERATION BY THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION. ONCE THE ICC "CLEARS THE TRACKS" THE LITTLE TOWN OF JOPPA WILL BECOME THE COAL CAPITAL OF THE MIDWEST.

(COPYRIGHT, 1951, BY THE BELL SYNDICATE, INC.)

12/12/51 MG530P

65-6060-39

SEARCHED.....	INDEXED.....
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DEC 26 1954	
<i>[Signature]</i>	

From Post-Hall Syndicate, Inc.
295 Madison Avenue, New York 17 N.Y.
FOR RELEASE THURSDAY, DECEMBER 13, 1951, OR THEREAFTER

12/11/51

ROBERT S. ALLEN REPORTS

By Robert S. Allen

Washington, December 13 -- President Truman has not yet made up his mind whether he should or should not fire Attorney General Howard McGrath.

The decision depends on two things: How much hotter the Internal Revenue scandals become, and what happens on certain charges involving McGrath that congressional and other quarters are known to be investigating.

Behind-the-scenes, it is clearly apparent the President is peeved at the head of the Justice Department. The President is particularly sore because of McGrath's recent talk before the Federal Bar Association in which he bombastically declared, "Not one lawyer working for the United States will be found to be derelict in his duty or to his oath of office."

The President considers this a "reckless" statement, to say the least, in the light of the sensational disclosures concerning T. Lamar Caudle, former head of the Justice Department's Tax Division, and Charles Oliphant, former general counsel of the Revenue Bureau.

Further, the President is fully aware that McGrath knows that other U.S. Attorneys are due to be involved in spectacular exposes.

In the President's inner council, a sharp tug-of-war is taking place over what course should be pursued in dealing with the reverberating tax scandals, of which only the surface has been scratched --- provided the congressional props are not stifled, which could happen. Powerful forces already are secretly at work on that.

-MORE-

One group of the President's intimate advisors is strongly urging dramatic action.

Foremost among them are democratic national chairman Frank McKinney and Clark Clifford, former White House legal assistant. They are telling the President he must "clean house hard and fast" if lasting political damage is to be averted. McKinney, particularly, is stressing the danger of serious political losses as a result of the scandalous explosions.

Clifford is advocating the appointment of a leading Republican and Democrat to do the scourging job. But, so far, no one has been found who will take it.

Another inner faction is giving the President a directly opposite viewpoint.

These advisors are contending the "storm will soon blow over" and they want the President to ride it out and do nothing. Prominent among these counselors is Matt Connolly, presidential secretary and the most conservative member of what is known in the Capital as the "White House clique". One of Connolly's closest friends is the registered lobbyist of Dictator Franco.

Note: Last Friday, McGrath phoned the President and proposed flying to Key West to discuss the sour situation with him. Significant of their strained relations, the President turned McGrath down. The next day, after talking over the phone to Clifford and several others, the President abruptly decided to cut his vacation short and return to Washington. The first McGrath knew about that was from a press flash.

* * *

WHAT THE REDS WANT --- The UN can have a cease fire in Korea,

-MORE-

but at the cost of important concessions to the Reds.

That's what the Joint Chiefs told the President in their big conference with him after his return. General Bradley declared the protracted truce negotiations have reached the point "where a few concessions on both sides could bring an agreement if the Communists really want one."

"What do they want?" asked the President.

"The deadlock gets down to this," explained Bradley. "We are demanding the right to continue to rotate our troops as we have been doing for months. The Reds are flatly refusing to allow that. They are insisting on a complete freeze on replacements and weapons. But they have indicated they would make concessions on that if we will allow them to build some airfields in North Korea. We have refused to do that. Obviously, they are using the rotation issue to try to wrest concessions from us on the airfield demand."

General Hoyt Vandenberg vigorously opposed giving any ground on that.

"I want a cease fire, if one can be worked out that is fair and proper," declared the Air Chief of Staff. "But I don't see how we can safely do anything that will enable the Reds to build up their air strength. That is what permitting them to build airfields will amount to. Such bases in North Korea will be of great combat value to them, if they decide to break the truce next spring, which I wouldn't put past them."

General J. Lawton Collins was inclined to favor some terms on the airfield dispute. He thought something could be worked out on that. But the Army Chief of Staff was adamant in insisting the Communists be required to agree to rotation of UN troops.

-MORE-

"That would be a serious blow to the morale of our men," Collins argued. "I am strongly opposed to any concessions on that. It is an unfair demand, and the only reason the Reds on making it is to try to force us to give in on airfields. Our Army can hold the present line until hell freezes over, and I am flatly opposed to giving the slightest ground on the replacement issue. The Reds would have the same right as us on that, and I don't see why they should object to it, except for trading purposes."

Bradley agreed with Collins, but emphasized the importance of not allowing the Communists to build up a powerful airforce.

President Truman listened intently to the military leaders and said nothing until they finished. Then he told them:

"As you know I am very anxious to bring the fighting to an end if that is possible. But I will not agree to concessions to the Communists that we may regret later on. We want to be very careful that we do not sell ourselves short in our eagerness to secure a truce for our men."

Also discussed was the question of building up the South Korean army, as this column has reported was proposed by General Ridgway. He wants to increase the ROK divisions from 11 to 20. No decision was reached on the matter, but President Truman strongly approved the plan.

"I am for prompt action on that," he said. "It seems to me a very sound thing to do."

Similarly, the President approved moving to Korea one of the two National Guard divisions now in Japan. This has been suggested by Ridgway in order to permit the transfer of one of the battle-experienced divisions in Korea to Europe. General Eisenhower has requested that.

* * *

TAX ADVICE --- When you tackle your next income tax return, possibly next month, the following is some mighty sound advice by the American Bar Association. The ABA has just sent it out to its members in a confidential bulletin:

"For the ordinary taxpayer, the Revenue Act of 1951 is undoubtedly looked upon as simply a tax increase measure. While that is true, there are several provisions which relieve hardships for the general taxpayer, and there are many provisions which relieve hardships in special circumstances. The only way to be sure whether the act contains a provision which may affect you is to check carefully EACH SEPARATE PROVISION OF THE ACT."

* * *

LABOR EXODUS --- The mobilization machinery will soon be without a top labor advisor.

George Harrison, AFL railroad head, who has been labor assistant to Mobilization Director Charles Wilson will shortly quit. So far no replacement is in sight.

Further, Wilson isn't exerting himself to find one. He was never enthusiastic about having a labor aide in the first place.

Harrison was appointed after a bitter clash between Wilson and the AFL and CIO. President Truman finally intervened and, in effect, required Wilson to put a labor leader on his staff. Harrison, an Administration supporter, was named. But after all the wrangling and fussing, Harrison has virtually done nothing on this job. A handsome office was set up for him, but he has visited it rarely. His formal resignation will merely be official recognition of a fact.

-MORE-

Harrison's departure from Wilson's organization may be followed by that of other laborites. Several of them on the staff of the Wage Stabilization Agency have let it be known they will quit after the holidays.

* * *

HERE AND THERE --- White House Secretary Matt Connolly may be involved in the tax probe soon. Congressional investigators have run across his trail in a certain case and are checking it closely. Connolly is urging the President to "take it easy and not get excited" by the explosions.....Charles Bay, U. S. Ambassador to Norway, is such a warm admirer of King Haakon that he is cutting his stay short here and is flying to Oslo especially to attend the King's birthday party. By doing that, Bay will keep the Soviet Ambassador from being the ranking guest. Bay is dean of the diplomatic corps in Norway and as such will preside at this affair, but the Red ambassador would step into that place if Bay didn't show up. He is the ranking diplomat in Oslo by virtue of having served there longest, just as the Norwegian ambassador is dean in Washington because he has been in the Capital longer than any other foreign diplomat.....The numerous restaurants and snack-bars in the Pentagon serve more than 45,000 cups of coffee daily --- an average of 1½ cups for the 30,000 military and civilians who work in the vast building.

(Copyright 19 51, Post-Hall Syndicate, Inc.)

65-6060-40

SEARCHED.....	INDEXED.....
SERIALIZED <i>ja</i>	FILED <i>ja</i>
DEC 26 1951	
FBI - WASH. F. O.	

WLB

FROM THE BELL SYNDICATE, INC., 229 W. 43 ST., NEW YORK.

CONFIDENTIAL TO EDITORS:

ONE HOUR AFTER THE COLUMN RELEASED FOR DECEMBER 15 WAS ON THE TELETYPE TO NEW YORK, PRESIDENT TRUMAN ASKED GENERAL BRADLEY PERSONALLY TO USE HIS INFLUENCE TO STOP ITS PUBLICATION.

AS A RESULT THE COLUMN IN QUESTION, HALF OF WHICH PERTAINED TO THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ON MONDAY WAS SUBMITTED PERSONALLY TO GENERAL BRADLEY FOR HIS PERUSAL.

GENERAL BRADLEY DID NOT CONCUR WITH THE PRESIDENT THAT THE COLUMN SHOULD BE KILLED. HOWEVER, HE HAS SUGGESTED TWO CHANGES WHICH I AM HAPPY TO MAKE.

THE SECOND PARAGRAPH UNDER CAPTION "SILENT ADMIRAL" SHOULD READ "PRESIDENT TRUMAN COMMENTED THAT NO CONCESSIONS SHOULD BE GRANTED THAT WE 'WOULD LATER REGRET.'"

ALSO IN THE NEXT TO THE LAST PARAGRAPH OF THE STORY MAKE THE THIRD AND CLOSING SENTENCE OF THIS PARAGRAPH READ: "SOME DETAILS WILL BE LEFT TO IRON OUT AFTER THE DECEMBER 27 DEADLINE." IN OTHER WORDS, OMIT THE WORD "THOUGH" AND THE WORDS "WE ARE SURE TO GRANT A SHORT EXTENSION TO CLEAN THEM UP."

MANY THANKS,

DREW PEARSON

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TO WASHINGTON MERRY-GO-ROUND EDITORS:

WE BELIEVE DREW PEARSON'S CURRENT COLUMN SERIES ON CORRUPTION IN GOVERNMENT WILL HAVE WIDE READER INTEREST. YOU MAY WISH TO START IT OFF WITH THE FOLLOWING PROMOTION BOX ON THE FRONT PAGE.

THE BELL SYNDICATE.

(BOX)

--GRAFT IN GOVERNMENT--

TODAY, DREW PEARSON, WHO PIONEERED THE FIRST STORIES ON TAX FRAUDS, BEGINS A SERIES OF VITALLY IMPORTANT COLUMNS ON CORRUPTION IN GOVERNMENT--HOW IT GOT STARTED, WHO IS RESPONSIBLE, WHAT IS THE CURE. READ THE FIRST OF THESE COLUMNS ON PAGE ----- (TODAY OR TOMORROW)

(END BOX)

12/13/51 MG453P

Director, FBI

December 20, 1951

SAC, New York

65-3339
DREW PEARSON;
ALLEGED LEAK FROM WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE
12-10-51 TO JACK ANDERSON, LEG MAN FOR
DREW PEARSON;
ESPIONAGE - X

Attention: Inspector Carl Hennrich

ReNYtel to Bureau and WFO dated December 20, 1951, captioned as above.

In accordance with the information contained in referenced teletype, there are attached for the Bureau two photostatic copies of a teletype received by the Bell Syndicate, Inc., 229 West 43rd Street, New York City, which teletype was received by them from DREW PEARSON in Washington, D. C. The first teletype, which is four pages in length, contains information concerning the President's meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff as well as other miscellaneous material for the use of the Bell Syndicate in the PEARSON column. Attached to these four pages is a teletype received from PEARSON by Bell Syndicate on December 12, 1951, which contains several corrections to be made in the teletype of December 11, as well as other information concerning PEARSON's column. One copy of the above is also being directed to the WFO.

There are also attached for the Bureau two copies of a column prepared by ROBERT S. ALLEN and dated December 11, 1951, which was directed to the Post-Hall Syndicate, Inc., 295 Madison Avenue, New York 17, N. Y. This release is six pages in length, part of which appeared in ALLEN's column in the New York Post on December 13, 1951. This material was obtained from ROBERT HALL, the President of the Post-Hall Syndicate, Inc. There is also attached for the information of the WFO one photostatic copy of the above-mentioned press release of ROBERT ALLEN. RUC.

TGS:RAA
65-

Encs.

cc - Washington Field (Encs.) *mm*

65-6060-41

SEARCHED.....	INDEXED.....
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DEC 20 1951	
FBI - WASH. F. O.	

Andrew

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : SAC, WASHINGTON FIELD

DATE: December 21, 1951

FROM : *WAM*

SAC, Charlotte

*65-6060**
*65-3339**

SUBJECT:

DREW PEARSON

Alleged Leak from White House Conference,
12-10-51, to JACK ANDERSON, Leg Man for PEARSON
ESPIONAGE - X

Confirming conversation with ASAC HOOD December 19, 1951, a review of the Raleigh News and Observer published during the period December 11 through December 16, 1951, failed to reflect any local story written by JIM FREE or any other staff member pertaining to the White House Conference held December 10, 1951. There did appear an AP release in the publication of December 11, 1951, captioned "President Holds Conference with Top Military and Diplomatic Advisors". The story did mention that Mr. WEBB attended the meeting. There was no article in the paper relating to JAMES E. WEBB's resignation as Under Secretary of State.

It was determined that JIM FREE is the Washington Correspondent of the Raleigh News and Observer.

WAM:IJM

65-6060-42
Graham
CS

PHILADELPHIA BULLETIN

Circ.: e. 71,113
S. 685,942

Page: B-22

Date: DEC 15 1951

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer
File No.

Washington Merry-Go-Round:

Hopeful Report on Chances For Truce Given to Truman

By DREW PEARSON

Washington, Dec. 15 — Most of the world was intrigued over President Truman's much-publicized meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff following his return from Key West.

However, it turned out to be pretty much routine after all. Highlight of the meeting was an optimistic assurance from General Omar N. Bradley that a cease-fire could be worked out in Korea.

The Nation's highest diplomatic and military chiefs were waiting in the cabinet room when President Truman strode in. He was grinning broadly. Shaking hands with everyone around the conference table, he reported that it was "good to be back," and asked how they liked his sun tan.

After that, he let the Joint Chiefs of Staff do most of the talking, and here is a brief, chronological account of what happened at the meeting which caused so much worldwide speculation:

The President sat back, listened intently and called for everyone's views. Occasionally he bounced his fingers together reflectively, in a quick, impulsive gesture, and made such comments as: "That's a tough one."

General Bradley led off with a summary of the Korean situation. He reported that the Communists seemed to be ready to come to terms, that a cease-fire agreement could be worked out if both sides made concessions.

However, General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Air Force chief of staff, opposed making any major concessions. He was particularly adamant against allowing the Communists the right to build airfields during the cease-fire.

General J. Lawton Collins, Army chief of staff, vigorously opposed giving in to the Communists on troop rotation. The Chinese have proposed a freeze on all troops entering Korea, thus blocking replacements for combat veterans who have been promised the chance to go home on rotation. This would be a "blow to morale," Collins warned.

Silent Admiral

However, General Collins readily agreed that "minor concessions" on other points should be made in order to win concessions from the Communists.

President Truman commented that no concessions should be granted that we "would later regret."

Least talkative of the Joint Chiefs was Admiral Fechteler, who made a short, half-minute speech in which he assured the President that the Navy is prepared to carry out "any mission, any time, any place."

For the Army's part, General Collins assured the President that the Army couldn't be blasted out of Ko-

rea, but could hold on "until hell freezes over."

Brass Hat Christmas

Because the captain of the Navy amphibious landing craft USS New Kent lives not far from Baltimore, its crewmen will have to spend Christmas at Baltimore despite the fact that many of their families live at the ship's home base—Norfolk.

Ordinarily naval vessels tie up at their home base for Christmas. And because Norfolk has been the home base for the New Kent, many wives of the men and officers had moved to that city. However, Captain Ronald Woodaman lives at Glen-coe, Md., a suburb of Baltimore, so he is taking the ship to Baltimore for the holidays.

This means that half the officers and 68 of the enlisted men will have to travel back to Norfolk to spend Christmas with their families.

If I Were President

Harry Truman constantly complains to friends: "I can't get good men to come into the government."

What he doesn't realize is that few men want to risk scandal contamination by serving with mediocrities; though many would come in if the President cleaned house and began with a new slate.

There isn't a chance in the world that he'll appoint them, but here is a rollcall of a cleanup group which some of Truman's friends prepared the other night while playing the game of "if I were President":

For special prosecutor — Willy, dramatic ex-Senator Burton K. Wheeler, of Montana, once one of the Senate's greatest prosecutors.

Assistant attorney general for the tax division—Adrian DeWind, able chief counsel of the King committee.

Alien property custodian—General Telford Taylor, the small-business administrator, or Joseph Bor-kin, the former Justice Department trust-buster. Both are intimately familiar with the giant Nazi busi-ness enterprises now being admin-istered by the custodian.

Secretary of the Treasury—Ran-dolph Paul, the brilliant former chief counsel of the Treasury.

Commissioner of internal revenue — Maury Maverick or Leon Henderson, both two-fisted crusad-ers with years of Washington know-how.

Chief counsel of the Bureau of Internal Revenue—Bruno Schach-ner, assistant counsel of the King committee.

To create further confidence in the White House, Mr. Truman might substitute Paul Porter for Secretary Matt Connelly, who has no love for the graft probes.

(©1951)

65-6030-43
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JAN 2 1952
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CG

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : SAC, Washington Field

DATE: January 4, 1952

gvt FROM : Director, FBI ~~Washington Field~~

SUBJECT: Drew Pearson (Column of 12/15/51);
Jack Northman Anderson, aka Jack Anderson
Robert S. Allen (Column of 12/13/51)
ESPIONAGE - X

Re report SAC R. B. Hood dated December 22, 1951.

You are advised that no further investigation is desired in connection with this matter and you are authorized to close your file.

close

65-6060-44

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JAN 7 1952	
FBI WASH. F. O.	

Anderson

A Column Infuriates President

By Drew Pearson

Drew Pearson's column today takes the form of a letter to his daughter, Mrs. George L. Arnold, of Santa Monica, Calif.

Washington, D. C.,
January 28, 1952.

Dear Daughter:

The house has seemed very empty ever since you kids left. I suppose I shouldn't call you kids any more inasmuch as you're a



Pearson

grown up lady now with two sons of your own. But, anyway, it's been lonesome since you left. We packed up the electric train and put it in the attic till next Christmas, when I hope you'll be back, and when little Drew will be able to operate it almost as much as his grandfather.

Only next time, please don't fly. We almost held our breath until that plane got back to Los Angeles.

A lot of things have been happening since you left. Among others, Harry Truman has been trying to put me in jail again. Undersecretary of the Navy Whitehair tipped him off that I had written a column about a White House conference with General Bradley and he immediately blew his top.

The column had only been on the teletype to New York one hour when I began to hear about it.

The President was really mad. He stormed and raged and said he would throw me in jail. I can't begin to repeat his language, but it was pretty rough.

Finally he told General Bradley to get hold of me and kill the column.

However, when General Bradley read the column, he didn't seem to think there was much wrong. He suggested only two changes, which I was glad to make.

The Investigation

The column was published on schedule as corrected, no military secrets were revealed, and so far I am still out of jail. But that didn't end the matter. Immediately afterward, the President ordered the FBI to make a superduper investigation of your old man, together with just about everyone I've ever talked to at the Army and Navy.

On top of this, Jim McInerney, Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Justice Department's Criminal Division (his boss, Howard McGrath, doesn't like me), had the FBI contact some men who once worked for me and appealed to them to disclose my news sources. Naturally, they didn't. They didn't know my sources in the first place and wouldn't have revealed 'em if they did.

The White House investigators then dug back into what I said in defense of Gen. George Marshall when Senator McCarthy attacked him, and have been trying to find out where I got the material I used one whole year ago. I compared General Marshall's wonderful war record with McCarthy's failure to take part in any combat missions; so the investigators want to know where I got McCarthy's war record, which they say was supposed to be a complete secret.

Funny how the President now wants to protect one of his worst senatorial enemies and go after a newsman who defended his old friend Marshall. However, that's the way things are sometimes done around here these days.

Meanwhile, I went down to Reidsville, N. C., last week, to the only town where I was supposed to have spent some time in jail—aside from a short interim in a Siberian jail as the guest of the Soviet.

I don't know whether it's because a criminal always returns to the scene of a crime or whether the folks of Reidsville wanted to give their most famous alleged jailbird a homecoming reception. But anyway, I went down to North Carolina and had a wonderful time.

P. W. Glidewell, the attorney who defended me against the charge of taking a sponge bath

in the Southern Railroad yards at 3 a. m. after taking down a Chautauqua tent, introduced me to the Reidsville Chamber of Commerce, where I spoke in the evening, and we had quite a time.

Judge Ira Humphries, who acquitted me for taking the bath in the railroad yards, has retired now. And the court house where I was tried has been torn down. (Incidentally, your father was never actually put in jail—just held for an hour by a very courteous cop.)

The welcoming committee drove me down to the railroad yards to try to find the spigot and the scene of the alleged crime, but

we couldn't locate it. The town has changed too much.

But, though things have changed a lot, there is one thing about this and the other small towns that hasn't changed—the people. Their understanding of the fundamental things of life remains unchanged and unspoiled by the complexities of modern civilization, and as long as we have this kind of people in America I am not too much worried about what's going to happen to my grandsons in the future. Give both of them a hug, and I hope to stay out of jail a little while longer.—Your Father.

(Copyright, 1952, the Bell Syndicate, Inc.)

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Date: 9/14/62
Initials: hmf

65-3339-Sub A

WFO

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National Archives

65-3339-Subject
of FOIPA Request, 2006

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FOIPA # 1047972

EXTRA COPIES
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Date: 9-1-2004

Initials: WFO

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Surveillance Log

2-26-1951

Re: Drew Pearson
Espionage R
65-3339

SAs James Frew
Robert Weemis
Edwin Dalrymple
W. M. Conner

Duty hours 8⁰⁰ am to 5⁰⁰ pm

65-3339-Sub A-1

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FBI - WASH. F. O.	

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b7C

Surveillance Log - 65-3339
2-26-51

Jack H. Anderson

The following surveillance was conducted on 2-26-51 by SAs James Frew, Robert Weems, Edwin Dalrymple & W. M. Conner re: Jack Northman Anderson:

7²⁵_{am} Surveillance instituted in vicinity of subject's residence at 13200 Midway Ave., Twinbrook, Md. Car noted parked adjacent to dwelling was 1950 or 1951 Buick Sedan - Two Tone green - License tags West Virginia 128-885

7⁵⁴ Two women and man left above residence & entered car noted above. Due to distance & short time which individuals were in sight outside the car, no description of the women was obtained. The man, as far as could be observed, fitted the description of the subject

7⁵⁶ Above car departed & proceeded to 3003 Ferndale St. via Vers Mill Rd, Newport Mill Rd. & Capital View Ave.

8⁰⁹_{am} Both women left car at above address & one kissed driver of car before departing.

8¹² am. Above mentioned car left 3003 Ferndale St.
with same driver and an unidentified male
passenger. (Since it was not possible to ob-
serve car while parked at above address, it
is not known whether unidentified man came
from residence or not.) Car proceeded to
William's Chevrolet Co. at Colesville Pike and
Eastern Ave., Silver Spring, Md. Unidentified
man left car, entered premises of above
company and returned to the car after
approximately 3 to 4 minutes. The car then
proceeded downtown, first via 16th St. +
later via 13th St. It proceeded east on
Pa. Ave. to 15th St., then south on 12th
toward Constitution Ave. Due to intersecting
traffic the car was not observed there
after.

Subsequently repeated spot checks were
made of parking areas in the vicinity of
the Pentagon Bldg. and 29th St. and Dunbarton
St. but car was not observed.

4⁰⁵ pm. Spot check revealed car noted above
J was parked in vicinity of 29th St.
+ Dunbarton St. Surveillance reinstated
at that point.

5¹⁷ pm. Same man referred to above, believed to
J be the subject entered Buick car, W. Va.
tag 128-885 + drove to East Executive place
ETW beside the White House. 5²⁹ pm He parked the
5²⁹ pm. car and walked north to Pa. Ave and
east to 15th St. Thereafter he proceeded
to 15th + G. St. + stood on the N. ~~W~~ E.

J. corner where he appeared to be looking
around. Due to crowded conditions on
the sidewalk he was not observed there-
after. Efforts were made to locate subject
without success until 6³⁰ pm.

J. 6³⁰ pm. Surveillance discontinued.

Robert O. Keems; J. M. Conner
James Frew
Edwin Dalrymple

Surveillance Log

Re: Jack N. Anderson

WA file # 65-3339

Feb. 27, 1951

SAs William M. Conner
James Frew
Robert A. Neeme
Malcolm P. Carr

65-3339-Sub. A-2

SEARCHED.....	INDEXED.....
SERIALIZED <i>ll</i>	FILED <i>ll</i>
MAR - 6 1951	
FBI - VA - h. c. c.	

Graham *ll*

R: Jack N. Anderson
Feb. 27, 1951

Surveillance Log

The following physical surveillance was conducted by SAs James Fraw, William M. Conner, Robert A. Steens and Malcolm P. Carr:

7:40 Am. Surveillance instituted in vicinity subject's residence. Green two-tone Buick sedan ~~observed~~^{more} bearing N. Va. plate 128-885 observed parked to side of subject's residence on Midway Ave.

During morning, about 10:00 Am woman dressed in bright red house coat or dress observed at side door, apparently dumping trash or picking up paper.

During various intervals there was some activity in subject's residence. One other person, who appeared to be rather stout woman, ~~and~~^{was} seen near picture window.

4:50 Pm. Surveillance discontinued. Subject not observed throughout surveillance.

Malcolm P. Carr

Wm. M. Conner

James Fraw

Robert A. Steens

FEBRUARY 28, 1951

SURVEILLANCE LOG
DREW PEARSON
ESPIONAGE - R
65-3339

AGENTS: JAMES FREW
TROY H. GIST
WILLIAM M. CONNER
EDWIN DALRYMPLE

65-3339-Sub A-3
DUTY HRS: 8⁰⁰ AM to 5⁰⁰ PM

SEARCHED.....	INDEXED.....
SERIALIZED <i>eb</i>	FILED <i>eb</i>
FEB 28 1951	
FBI - WASH. D. C.	

Graham

RE: JACK N. ANDERSON
65-3339

FEBRUARY 28, 1950

The following physical surveillance was conducted on this date by SA's JAMES FREW, TROY H. GIST, WILLIAM N. CONNER and Edwin Dalrymple.

7⁴⁵ AM - Surveillance instituted vicinity of 13200 MIDWAY
AVE., TWIN BROOK, Md. Buick Sedan, W. Va. license
128-885, observed parked at residence of Jack N. ANDERSON.

9³² AM - ANDERSON left residence, entered Buick Sedan,
and drove alone to Drew Pearson residence at
1313-29th St. NW. He drove via Viers Mill Rd.,
Connecticut Ave., Cathedral Ave., Rock Creek Parkway
& "P" St. NW to 29th St. NW, entering 1313-29th
St. at 10⁰² AM.

12³⁰ PM - Anderson left 1313-29th St. NW, entered
Buick Sedan, and drove via 29th St NW, PA.
Ave., "K" St, 17th St. & "H" St NW, parking his
auto on N. side of "H" St. NW adjacent to
18th St. NW, N. of Roger-Smith Hotel. He

RE: JACK N. ANDERSON

FEBRUARY 28, 1951

65-3339

then walked East on "H" St. NW for $\frac{1}{2}$ block, after which he began running. At 17th St. Anderson stopped for a traffic light. When traffic light turned green he did not cross 17th St. immediately but hesitated and looked around. He then continued East on "H" St. walking slowly. After walking for $\frac{1}{2}$ block he again began running, stopping at ~~17th~~ Conn. Ave. & "H" St. before crossing Conn. Ave. He proceeded as far as entrance to U.S. Chamber of Commerce, turned around, and walked slowly back across Conn. Ave. & entered B. & O. RR ticket office at NW corner of intersection. After about 2 minutes ANDERSON left the B. & O. office, walked East on "H" St. for $\frac{1}{2}$ block, crossed to S. side of "H" St., and proceeded to the Cosmos Club, "H" St. & MADISON PL. NW, where he entered at 12⁵⁰ pm.

~~17th~~ 4¹² pm - Anderson observed walking West in 1700 Block

RE: JACK N. ANDERSON
65-3339

FEBRUARY 28, 1951

~~WHR~~ of "H" St. He entered his auto (Buick Sedan) and drove to 1313-29th St NW, entering at 4³⁰ pm

~~WHR~~ 6¹⁰ pm - Anderson entered Buick Sedan + drove via Dumbarton St., 28th St., "P" St + Rock Creek Parkway to Conn. Ave. He proceeded NW on Conn. Ave. in the direction of his residence

~~WHR~~ 6³⁰ pm - Surveillance discontinued.

Edwin Dalrymple
James New
Droy H. Gist
W.M. Conner

MARCH 1, 1951

SURVEILLANCE LOG

DREW PEARSON

Espionage - R

65-3339

AGENTS: MALCOLM CARR

W. M. CONNER

EDWIN DALRYMPLE

JAMES FREW

DUTY HRS: 8⁰⁰ AM - 5⁰⁰ PM

65-3339-Sub A-4

SEARCHED	INDEXED
SERIALIZED	FILED
MAR - 6 1951	
FBI - VA	

[Redacted Box]

RE: JACK N. ANDERSON

65-3339

MARCH 1, 1951

The following physical surveillance was conducted on this date by SA's Malcolm CARR, W.M. CONNER, Edwin DALRYMPLE and James FREW:

① 7⁴⁵ AM - Surveillance instituted vicinity of 13200 MIDWAY Ave., Twin Brook, Md.

(JACK N. ANDERSON)

② 10⁰⁸ AM - Subject entered his auto (Buick Sedan) and drove VIA VIERS MILL RD., GEORGIA AVE., 5TH ST. NW & 3RD ST. NW to the U.S. CAPITOL Grounds, parking across Constitution Ave. from the Senate Office Bldg.

③ 10⁵⁰ - Subject entered Senate Wing of U.S. Capitol BLDG. A search of the press galleries and corridors of the Capitol Bldg was conducted but Anderson was not located.

④ 12¹⁵ PM - Anderson observed leaving Senate Office

RE: JACK N. ANDERSON
65-3339

MARCH 1, 1951

OLDG. accompanied by an unknown man described as follows:

UNKNOWN

age - 30-35

Height - 5' 11"

Weight - 170 lbs

Hair - Dark, straight,
receding at temples

DRESS: Wearing light gray

suit, red tie, no hat
or topcoat

Anderson and unknown entered Anderson's AUTO and
Drove to 1313 - 29th St NW, entering at 12³⁰ pm

2¹⁵ pm - Anderson and same unknown left 1313 - 29th St NW,
reentered auto, and returned to Senate Office Bldg,
(WB) where they entered at 2³⁰ pm. They proceeded to
room 318, where a hearing was being conducted by
Senator Fulbright and a senate sub-committee on Banking.
Anderson and unknown sat together at the press
table and conferred occasionally. During most of
the afternoon Anderson was observed reading

RE: JACK N. ANDERSON
65-3339

MARCH 1, 1951

a textbook in Government or History.

(W) 5⁰⁰ pm - Unknown left Senate Office Bldg., walked to Capitol Bldg., secured his hat & coat from the Senate Press Gallery, and entered a 1950(?) Pontiac Convertible with VA. license # 162-714, in which he drove away alone.

(W) 5¹⁰ pm - Anderson left Senate Hearing Room, secured his topcoat from the Senate Press Gallery, entered his auto, and drove to the George Washington Univ. Campus Area, parking in the 700 Block of 21st St NW.

5⁵⁰ pm - Anderson observed carrying textbook and entering GW Classroom Bldg at NW corner of 21st & "G" Sts NW. Numerous students were observed entering this Bldg. at this time. Surveillance discontinued.

Edwin Dalrymple
James A. Kent
W. M. Conner
Malcolm G. Carr

MARCH 2, 1951

SURVEILLANCE LOG

DREW PEARSON

Espionage - R

65-3339

AGENTS: EDWIN DALRYMPLE

JAMES FREW

TROY H. GIST

ROBERT A. WEEMS

DUTY HRS: 8⁰⁰ AM - 5⁰⁰ PM

65-3339-Sub A

SEARCHED.....	INDEXED.....
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MAR - 0 1951	
FBI - W. A. M.	

Graham

RE: JACK N. ANDERSON

65-3339

MARCH 2, 1951

The following physical surveillance was conducted on this date by SA's Edwin DALRYMPLE, James FREW, Troy H. GIST and Robert A. Weems:

7⁴⁵ AM - Surveillance instituted vicinity of 13200 MIDWAY AVE., TWIN BROOK, MD.

9⁴⁰ AM - ANDERSON entered Buick Sedan alone and drove to the Pentagon Building via CONN. Ave., Cathedral Ave., Rock Creek Parkway and Memorial Bridge. He parked on the parking lot at the MALL ENTRANCE to the Pentagon, but not in the area specifically marked for PRESS Automobiles.

10²⁹ AM - Anderson entered the Mall Entrance to the Pentagon and proceeded to room 2E756. This room was marked "Dept. of Defense, Press Room." He remained in this office for only about one half minute. He then walked along the "E" ring and

RE: JACK N. ANDERSON

March 2, 1951.

#65-3339

entered an escalator opposite room 2E878, which goes to lower floors. The surveillance was discontinued at this point for security reasons. A search of this area was made after a brief period with negative results.

11⁰⁰ am - Anderson observed in the reception room of the Director of Public Relations, USAF (Rm 4D922).

EH He was observed to be walking around in this room as if waiting for someone.

11⁴⁵ am - Anderson observed to leave rm 4D922 with ~~an~~ unknown Air Force officer #1. They proceeded to room 4C851 and entered together. This room was marked: "LIAISON DIVISION, ADMINISTRATIVE RECORDS SECTION, MISS LINDEMAN." Shortly thereafter Anderson was observed in this room talking with unknown Air Force officer #2, who was occupying a desk in this room. Anderson was

RE: JACK N. ANDERSON
65-8339

MARCH 2, 1951

not observed to leave this room.

12⁵⁵pm - Anderson observed leaving Mall Entrance of
EA Pentagon. He entered his auto and returned to
Drew Pearson's residence^{1313-29th NW}, entering at 1¹⁰pm.

4⁵²pm - Anderson left 1313-29th NW, entered his auto,
EA and proceeded NW on Conn. Ave. in the direction
of his residence. The surveillance was
discontinued at 5¹⁵pm.

Eduin Dalrymple
Droy L. Grist
Robert A. Greene
James New.

MARCH 3, 1951

SURVEILLANCE LOG
DREW PEARSON

Espionage - R
65-3339

b6
b7C

AGENTS: MALCOLM CARR
W.M. CONNER
EDWIN DALRYMPLE
ROBERT A. WEEMS

Duty HRS: 8⁰⁰ AM - 5⁰⁰ PM

65-3339-Sub A-~~5~~6

SEARCHED.....	INDEXED.....
SERIALIZED.....	FILED.....
MAR - 3 1951	
FBI - WASH. F. O.	

[Redacted] 230

RE: JACK N. ANDERSON

65-3339

MARCH 3, 1951

The following physical surveillance was conducted on this date by SA's MALCOLM CARR, W.M. CONNER, EDWIN DALRYMPLE and Robert A. WEEMS:

7⁴⁵ AM - Surveillance instituted vicinity of
① 13200 MIDWAY AVE., TWIN BROOK, Md.

9⁰⁵ AM - ANDERSON left his residence, entered Buick Sedan alone, and drove to GEORGE WASHINGTON
① UNIV. campus area, parking in 2000 block of "G" St. NW.

9³³ AM - Anderson, carrying leather portfolio & book, entered the GW Library Bldg., 2000 Bldg., "G" St NW.

1⁰⁵ PM - ANDERSON came out front door of GW Library Bldg accompanied by an unknown man. He and unknown stood in front of this building and talked earnestly for about

RE: JACK N. ANDERSON
#65-3339

MARCH 3, 1951

Ten minutes. Unkman described as:

UNKMAN

Age - 36-40

Height - 6'1"

Weight - 215 lbs

Build - Med-heavy

Hair - Black, straight, no
part, receding at temples

Comp. - Med-dark

Characteristics - Full face and
neck; thick lips; walks
slowly

Dress - No hat; tan

Gabardine topcoat; mixed
brown tweed suit;
Carried brown leather

briefcase.

1¹⁵pm - Unkman walked west on "G" stair. Anderson
entered his auto and drove to U.S. Capitol Grounds,
parking near the NE corner of the Capitol Bldg.

1²⁵pm - Anderson entered Capitol Bldg. at NE entrance. He
looked into the Snackbar near this entrance and
then entered the nearby elevator which leads to the
Senate Press Gallery. The surveillance was dis-
continued at this point for security reasons.

RE: JACK N. ANDERSON
65-3339

MARCH 3, 1951

2¹⁰ pm - Anderson left Capitol Bldg., entered his auto, and drove to ^{ENT SINGLAIK} ~~ENT~~ Service Station, 2nd St and Louisiana Ave NW, where his auto was serviced.

2³⁰ pm - Anderson reentered his auto and drove via Constitution Ave., Rock Creek Parkway, Conn. Ave. and Conn. Ave. extended to corner of Lincoln Ave. and Old Bladensburg Rd. He was observed shopping in a Food market at this intersection.

2⁵⁵ pm - Surveillance discontinued.

Malcolm P. Carr
Edwin Dalrymple
W. M. Conner
Robert A. Steens

Surveillance Log

65-3339

3-5-51

Re: Jack Anderson

Drew Pearson
Espionage-R

Agents Troy Sest
Robert Weems
James Trew
Wm M. Conner

Duty Hours 8⁰⁰ am - 5⁰⁰ pm.

65-3339-Sub A-7
SEARCHED.....INDEXED.....
SERIALIZED.....FILED.....
MAR - 7 1951
FBI WASH. F. O.

b6
b7C

Surveillance Log

65-3339

The following surveillance was conducted on 3-5-51 by SAs Troy Dist, James Frew, Robert Weems & W.M. Conner re: Jack Northman Anderson:

9⁴⁰ am Subject left residence with two unidentified woman & departed in car W. Va. tags 128-885. Due to distance involved no description was obtained of the women. One was noticed to be wearing a bright red coat however. Subject drove to 4000 - 16th St. & let women out of car. They were last seen approaching door of above residence. Name plates indicate that several doctors maintain offices at this address. Subject continued to intersection of 29th & Dunbarton Sts., parked his car at 10¹⁵ am and was not observed further.

11⁵⁰ am Subject left above point, drove car to Capitol, parked car & entered the Capitol Bldg. He was observed entering

elevator designated for use of U.S. Senators & was not observed further.

2¹² pm. Subject left Capitol Bldg., entered his car and drove to National Archives Bldg at 9th + Pa Ave. NW. He parked in front of main entrance, entered the bldg. & was not observed further. After approximately five minutes he left Archives & drove to 29th St and Dunbarton Sts where he parked his car & was not observed further.

3³⁴ pm. Subject entered car & drove back to Archives Bldg where he entered at 3⁴⁵ pm.

3⁵⁵ pm. Subject left Archives closely followed by two women believed to be identical with women who rode with him in the morning & drove to 29th St & Dunbarton. At this point subject left the car but the women remained in it. They arrived here at 4⁰⁵ pm.

4¹⁷ pm. Subject reentered car & drove with women out Connecticut Ave. In view of the fact that he appeared to be

proceeding home the surveillance was
discontinued on Connecticut Ave just
beyond Chevy Chase Circle

W.M.

W.M. Cowley
Roy L. Gist
James H. New
Robert O. Keenan

MARCH 6, 1951

SURVEILLANCE LDG

DREW PEARSON

Espionage - R
65-3339

b6
b7C

AGENTS: MALCOLM P. CARR
W. M. CONNER
EDWIN DALRYMPLE
JAMES FREW

DUTY HRS: 8⁰⁰ AM - 5⁰⁰ PM

65-3339-Sub A-8

SEARCHED.....	INDEXED.....
SERIALIZED <i>ll</i>	FILED <i>ll</i>
MAR - 8 1951	
FBI WASH. F. O.	

[Redacted Box]

Surveillance Log 65-3339

The following surveillance was conducted on 3-6-51 by SAs Malcolm P. Carr, Edwin Dalrymple, James Frew + W.M. Conner re: Jack Northman Anderson:

9³⁰ am. Subject left residence, entered car and drove toward Wash., D.C. (Car license W Va 128-885) He traveled via Uers Mill Rd, Halpine Rd., Rockville Pike + Wisconsin Ave to the Key Bridge. After crossing the bridge into Virginia he proceeded to Colonial Village on Wilson Blvd. He was last observed at intersection of Wilson Blvd and N. Rhodes St. He was not observed further due to traffic conditions

Repeated attempts were made to locate the subject by spot checks at 1808 Queens Lane (Blumenthal's residence), Pentagon Bldg, Dept of State, 1313-29th St. N.W. and the U.S. Capitol Bldg.

12¹⁵ pm. Subject's car observed parked at Pentagon Bldg. Car had not been there at time of last previous check at

11³⁵ am.

12³⁵ pm. Subject observed in Pentagon Bldg., walking in the 9th corridor on the 4th floor. He was accompanied by an unknown man + both proceeded to 4th floor snack bar where both had lunch. Unknown man was approx. 6' tall - white - light complexion - wgt 195 hair - light brown or sandy - wearing light brown suit + medium dark tortoise shell glasses.

1⁰⁵ pm Subject + companion left snack bar + walked to Rm 4D 927 where both entered. Between 1⁰⁵ pm and 2¹⁵ pm subject spent his time in offices of the Directorate of Legislation + Liaison, adjacent to Rm. 4D 927 except for brief periods when he was observed crossing the hall to offices of the Directorate of Public Relations. Surveillance was discontinued at this point for security reasons and surveillance was immediately reinstated in Pentagon Parking Area where subject's car was parked. It was observed that the above unknown man apparently is employed in office adjacent to Rm. 4D 927.

3²⁰ pm. Subject observed leaving Pentagon. He drove his car to Executive Place, beside the White House + parked. Subject walked to Hotel Washington at 15th St. and Pa. Ave. He entered lobby and was observed using a telephone booth there.

3⁴⁰ pm. Subject left above hotel + walked east on F St. until he reached the Columbia Theatre at 1112 F St. NW. At this point subject purchased ticket and entered the ~~theat~~ theatre alone. He was not observed further.

4⁴⁵ pm. Surveillance discontinued.

Wm. M. Conner
Melvin B. Carr
Edwin Dalrymple
James A. New

Surveillance Log

Re: Drew Pearson
Jack T. Anderson
H:ID file # 65-3339

March 7, 1951

Malcolm P. Carr
Malcolm G. Mueller
James Drew
Groy Gist

Note: ① Ford with Md Lic 664-269 registered
to Paul J. Scott, 3223 Terrace Drive, Wash DC.

② Packard Sedan (black) 1949 model 1950 Virginia
License 749-665 issued to
Thomas Leonard McNamara, 3127 N 7th St
Arlington Va. 67-3339 - Sub A 9

SEARCHED.....	INDEXED.....
SERIALIZED <i>ls</i>	FILED <i>ls</i>
MAR - 8 1951	

b6
b7C

Surveillance Log

R. Drew Pearson
March 7, 1951

The following physical surveillance was conducted by Special Agents Malcolm S. Mueller, Roy Gist, James Grew and Malcolm P. Carr regarding Jack N. Anderson:

7:45 AM Surveillance instituted in vicinity 13200 Midway Dr. Germ Brook, Md. Subject's car observed parked in usual spot.

12:07 Pm Subject, accompanied by woman, presumably his wife but whose description was unobtainable due to position of agents, departed from residence and entered Subject's Buick. Subject drove via Viers Mill Rd., to Conn. Ave, thence South Kensington where subject's woman passenger was discharged at 3003 Fernside, Kensington. Left momentarily and proceeded to Colesville Rd., into 16th St and South via 16th, 13th and Florida Ave.

(2)
Re: Drew Pearson

March 7, 1951

Entered onto New Jersey Ave to 3rd St
and Lincolnton to Capitol via ~~State~~ ^{the}
Constitution Ave. Parked in usual spot
at 12³⁵ pm. and after sitting in car
for about five minutes, he locked
his car, leaving of Capitol and
entered.

Upon entering Capitol, he met and
stopped to talk to unidentified man
standing in front of elevator to left of
entrance and then both walked partly
thru building to Press elevator. Both
rode to Senate ^{Chamber} Press gallery. Conversation
not overheard but ^{was} they were observed to
be talking as if ~~close~~ ^{good} friends or associates.
Got off elevator at Senate Chamber
Press Gallery and talked about 15 minutes,
thereafter both entered Press Gallery.

They were not further observed in
Capitol Bldg.

Unknown man described as:

(3)

Re: Drew Pearson

March 7, 1951

About 35 yrs of age,
5' 8" in hgt.

150 lbs

Brown hair (dark)

Has newspapers under arm

2:06 Pm Subject left Capitol and entered his car alone. Drove over usual route to 29th and Dunbar. At the car observed parked facing south on 29th on SW corner. Subject not observed leave car but it is assumed he entered Pearson's.

5:11 Pm Subject and unidentified man left Pearson residence and walked to subject's car where they talked for awhile. Subject entered his car and unidentified man walked to middle of 2900 block of N St NW and entered black Packard with '50 Va.

license # 749-665. No description of man obtainable due to position of agents and rain.

(4)

Re Drew Pearson

March 7, 1950

Subject drove south to Penna Ave. NW, east on Penna Ave to 76th, right on 76th, to Constitution Ave. Turned east on Constitution and proceeded directly to Capitol where he parked to north of north wing. Entered building alone at 5:40 P.m.

6:53 P.m. Subject departed from Capitol accompanied by unidentified man whose description was unobtainable due to darkness. This man talked with subject awhile and then entered '49 Ford Sedan (black) bearing '50 Md. plates 664-769. Subject then proceeded to Sinclair Sta. at 2nd & Constitution Ave. NW. After car serviced, Subject proceeded west on Constitution into Parkway, onto Conn. Ave. At Chevy Chase Circle it appeared obvious subject was on way home, the surveillance was dropped.

Re: Drew Pearson

March 7, 1951

at 7.25 Pm. No further activity.

Malcolm P. Carr
Malcolm J. D. Muller
Ligy H. Grist
James H. New.

Surveillance Log -

Re: Drew Pearson
Jack N. Anderson
65 - 3339


Date: March 8, 1951

By: Troy H. Gist
Malcolm G. Mueller

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b7C

65-3339-Sub A-10

SEARCHED.....	INDEXED.....
SERIALIZED <i>llh</i>	FILED <i>llh</i>
MAR - 3 1951	
FBI - WASH. F. O.	



llh

Re: Drew Pearson,
John N. Anderson

March 8, 1951

The following physical surveillance was conducted this date on John N. Anderson by Special Agents Gray H. Gist, Malcolm G. Mueller, James Newpher, & Robert Weems.

7:50 a.m. - Surveillance instituted in vicinity of Subject's home in Twin Brook, Md.; his auto was parked in front of house.

10:02 a.m. - Subject left residence in his auto alone and drove to the Pentagon Mall Entrance, via Conn. ave. & Rock Creek Parkway. He entered Pentagon Bldg. & proceeded to room 2E-756, which he entered at 10:40 a.m.

10:55 a.m. - Subject left Rm. 2E-756, proceeded down "E" corridor to River Entrance where he got on "up" escalator, went to 4th floor and entered Rm. 4D-922. He came out of this room shortly thereafter and walked down the stairway at the 8th corridor. Surveillance was discontinued at this point for security reasons and subsequent attempts to locate Subject were unsuccessful.

2:32 p.m. - Subject left Pentagon alone, entered his auto, and drove to 29th & Dumbarton Sts., N.W., where he parked and entered Pearson's residence.

4:30 p.m. - Surveillance discontinued - relief arrived.

Gray H. Gist } Robert A. Weems
Malcolm G. Mueller } James O. Newpher

Surveillance Log

Re: Drew Pearson
(Jack N. Anderson)
Espionage - R
WFO file # 65-3339

March 8, 1951
Hours 3-12 pm

Special Agents Carl Maisch
William Conner
Malcolm Carr
Carlton Giovannetti

65-3339-Sub A-11

SEARCHED.....	INDEXED.....
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MAR - 8 1951	

[Redacted]

EG

b6
b7C

Re: Drew Pearson
March 8, 1951

Surveillance Log

The following physical surveillance was conducted by Special Agents Carl Muisch, William Conner, Malcolm Carr, and Carlton Giannetti regarding Jack M. Anderson:

4:00 Pm. Surveillance instituted in vicinity of 29th and Dunbarton Sts. NW. Subject's car observed parked adjacent to Pearson's residence, facing north on 29th St.

6:12 Pm. Subject departed Pearson's residence and entered car. Drove east on Dunbarton to 28th, south on 28th to M., thence east to 26th, south to Penna. Ave., east on Penna to 21st and south to spot between G & H Sts. where he parked, heading south. Left car and entered S W building located on NW corner of G St and 21st.

7:27 Pm. Subject departed from G & H alone, drove north via 22nd to Conn., out Conn Ave to Viers Mill Rd. and home.

(3)

Re: Drew Pearson
March 8, 1951

8:03 Pm. Subject entered residence. Parked
car in usual spot.
11:20 Pm. No further activity noted.
Surveillance discontinued.

Malcolm P. Carr
Carl F. Maisch
W. M. Conner
Carlton A. Houmann

Surveillance Log.

65-3339.

March 9, 1951.

Drew Pearson
Espionage - R.

8⁰⁰ A - 4⁰⁰ P.

Vicinity: Twin Brook, Md.

SA. James Frew.

SA. Courtland J. Jones.

SA. Malcolm C. Mueller.

SA. Elam C. Hedges.

65-3339 - Sub A ¹²/₁₅

SEARCHED.....	INDEXED.....
SERIALIZED <i>h</i>	FILED <i>h</i>
MAR - 5 1951	
FBI - WA. D. C.	

Graham

Surveillance Log 65-3339.

Re: Jack N. Anderson March 9, 1951

The following surveillance was conducted
by Special Agents Courtland J. Jones,
Elson S. Hedges, Malcolm G. Wheller and
James Frew.

8⁰⁰ AM. Surveillance instituted at subject's residence.

10²⁶ AM. Subject entered his car (W. Va. 128-885)
and proceeded to Capitol via View Mall
Rd., 16th St., 13th St., Florida Ave, N.J. Ave.,
3rd St. and Constitution Ave.

11¹² AM. Subject entered Capitol & proceeded
to Senate Press Gallery.

3³⁵ P. Subject left Capitol, entered car &
proceeded to 1313-29th St. NW.

3⁴⁶ P. Subject entered above address.

4⁰⁰ P. Surveillance turned over to relief agent.

James Frew
Courtland J. Jones
Elson S. Hedges
Malcolm G. Wheller

Surveillance Log


Re: Drew Pearson
(Jack N. Anderson)
Espionage - R
HH file # 65-3339

March 9, 1951
Hours 3-12 pm

SAs Frederick Doblratz
Robert Steens
James Newpher
Malcolm Carr

65-3339-Sub A.13

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MAR 12 1951	
FBI - WASH	



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b7C

Re: Drew Pearson
March 9, 1951

Surveillance Log

The following physical surveillance was conducted by Special Agents Frederick Dabbs, James Newpher, Robert Steens and Malcolm P. Carr regarding Jack N. Anderson:

4:00 Pm. Surveillance instituted in vicinity 29th and Dunbarton Sts. n.w. Subject's car parked on north side of Dunbarton at intersection of 29th and Dunbarton.

9:30 Pm. Subject departed from Pearson's and entered his car. It was noted that he apparently was last to leave the office since lights were observed go off as he departed. Drove to 28th, north to P St, thence to Parkway. Entered onto Conn. and proceeded into Bladensburg Rd, and Wiers Mill Rd. and then home. Parked car in usual spot and entered home at 10:04 Pm.

11:35 Pm. Surveillance discontinued. No further activity.

Frederick J. Dabbs
James A. Newpher

Malcolm P. Carr
Robert A. Steens

Surveillance Log

65-3339

March 10, 1951

Drew Pearson

8 AM - 4 PM

Espionage - R.

Re: Jack M. Anderson

Vicinity: Twin Brook and Carfuld Hospital.

SA. Carlton A. Giannetti

SA. Robert A. Weems.

SA. William M. Conner.

SA. James Frew.

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65-3339-Sub A-14

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FBI WASH. F. O.	

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Surveillance Log.

65-3339. Re: Jack W. Anderson March 10, 1951.

The following surveillance was conducted by SAs Carlton A. Giovannetti, Robert A. Dreems, William M. Conner and James Frew.

8⁰⁰_{A.} Surveillance instituted subject residence.

8⁰⁵_{A.} Subject & two unknown women left house, entered car (W. Va. 128-885) and proceeded to Garfield Hospital via View Mill Rd, Georgia Ave, 13th St & Fla. Ave.

8⁴²_{A.} Subject & both women entered hospital.

9¹³_{A.} Subject left hospital, entered car & proceeded to O.W. University & entered one of school buildings at 9²⁴_{A.}

12⁰⁸_{P.} Subject left school & returned to hospital arriving at 12²²_{P.}

4⁰⁰_{P.} Surveillance turned over to relief agents.

James Frew.
Carlton A. Giovannetti
W. M. Conner
Robert A. Dreems.

Surveillance Log -

Re: Drew Pearson
Jack N. Anderson
65-3339

Date: March 10, 1951
3 - 12

By: SA's - Troy H. Gist
- Elsum B. Gedges
- James Newpher
- Carl Maisch

65-3339-Sub A-15

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MAR 12 1951	



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b7C

March 10, 1951

Re: Jack N. Anderson

The following physical surveillance was conducted on above subject this date by Special Agents Gray D. Gist, Elson G. Hedges, James Neopher, + Carl Maisch.

3:40 p.m. - Surveillance instituted in vicinity of Garfield Memorial Hospital, 10th St. and Fla. ave., N.W.

11:00 p.m. - Subject and unidentified woman (believed to be his wife) left above hospital, entered his car, and proceeded home, via 13th St. and Ga. ave., N.W., arriving at 11:35 p.m.

11:45 p.m. - No further activity; surveillance discontinued.

Gray D. Gist
Elson G. Hedges
James A. Neopher
Carl F. Maisch

Surveillance Log -

Re: Drew Pearson,
Jack N. Anderson
65-3339

b6
b7C

Date: March 12, 1951
8 - 5 p.m.

By: SAs - Troy H. Gist
- James Drew
- James Newpher
- Carl Maisch

65-3339-Sub A-16

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MAR 12 1951	
FBI - WASH. D. C.	

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65-3339

Surveillance Log
Re: Jack N. Anderson

March 12, 1951.

The following surveillance was conducted
by SAs Troy H. West, James Neugebauer, Carl
Mirsch & James Brown.

8⁰⁰/_A Surveillance instituted at subject's residence.

10³⁶/_A Subject entered car (W. Va. 128-885) & proceeded
to 1313-29th St entering at 11⁰⁷/_A.

11³⁴ - Subject and unidentified woman entered above car,
proceeded west on N St. to Wis. ave; turned south,
and pulled to the curb where woman got out;
she was not observed further, but from brief
observation she appeared to be about 28-30 yrs. of age,
brown hair, 5'5", 120 lbs., & was wearing a red coat.
Subject proceeded to 17th + F Sts, N.W. where he parked &
got out of his car; due to heavy vehicular & pedestrian
traffic he could not be observed further.

12:39 p.m. - Subject entered above car and drove to 14th St. +
N.Y. ave., where he parked on N.Y. ave. and entered the
Union Trust Co., corner of 14th + G Sts, N.W. In bank
subject stood at counter and appeared to be writing
checks when he had a slight ~~fit~~ dizzy spell, put his
hand to his head, sat in a chair with his head ~~on~~
in his hands for a short time, and heaved on the
floor. A bank clerk then assisted him downstairs

in the bank where he laid down on a couch.

1:58 p.m. - Subject left the bank, entered his car, and proceeded to the parking area on the capital grounds, parked his car & entered the capitol at 2:12 p.m.

2:54 p.m. - Subject entered his car & drove to Garfield Memorial Hospital, 10th St. & Fla. ave., N.W. where he entered at 3:06 p.m.

4:00 p.m. - Surveillance turned over to relief agents.

George H. Hiest
James O. Kreyher
Carl F. Maish
James A. Allen

Surveillance Log
3-12-51


Re: (Jack Northman Anderson)
- Drew Pearson
Espionage - R.
65-3339

SAs C.A. Giovannette
W.D. Cone
R.A. Weems
W.M. Conner

Duty hours - 3⁰⁰pm to 12⁰⁰midnight

65-3339 - Sub A

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MAR 12 1951



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b7C

Surveillance Log

65-3339
3-12-51

The following surveillance was conducted on 3-12-51 by SAs W. O. Cone, C. A. Giovannette, R. A. Weems + W. M. Conner re: Jack Northman Anderson:

3³⁰ pm. Surveillance instituted in vicinity of Garfield Hospital. Subject's car was parked in hospital parking area.

4¹⁰ pm. Subject left hospital with unidentified woman and drove to intersection of 3rd St. + Constitution Ave. N.W. He was not observed past this point due to intersecting traffic. Due to security reasons no opportunity was available to secure a description of the woman who accompanied the subject.

Spot checks were made at the U.S. Capitol, George Washington Invt, Union Station and National Archives + F.B.I. Identification Bldg. from 4²² pm to 4⁴⁰ pm. Subject was last observed at 4²² pm.

4⁴⁵ pm. Subject's car was observed parked on Executive Pl. just south of the White House. Surveillance reinstated at this point.

6⁵² pm. Subject returned to his car and drove to Garfield Hospital + parked + entered the hospital.

8¹² pm. Subject left hospital, appeared to place

65-3339
3-12-51

something in the trunk of his car and spoke briefly to unidentified man and woman who appeared to have walked out of the hospital with him. No opportunity was available to secure a description of the man + woman. They drove away in car which had been parked adjacent to his: (~~Car~~ license Va. - 183581). Subject proceeded directly home and did not leave again.

11¹⁰ pm. All lights were out in subjects residence. No further activity. Surveillance discontinued.

W. M. Conner
Walton O. Cone
Carlton A. Gouvinette
Robert A. Williams

Surveillance Log

Re: Drew Pearson
(Jack N. Anderson)
NY file # 65-3339

Hours 8-5 pm
March 13, 1951

SAs Frederick Dobbartz
Malcolm Mueller
Elson Hedges
Malcolm Carr

b6
b7C

65-3339-Sub. A
18

SEARCHED.....	INDEXED.....
SERIALIZED <i>ll</i>	FILED <i>ll</i>
MAR 13 1951	
FBI - WASH. F. O.	

[Signature]

①

Re: Drew Pearson
3/13/51

Surveillance Log

The following physical surveillance was conducted by Special Agents Malcolm Miller, Elson Hedges, Frederick Soliday and Malcolm Carr concerning Jack D. Anderson:

- 7:40 Am. Surveillance instituted in vicinity Anderson's residence. No activity observed but car parked in usual spot.
- 10:10^{min} Am. Subject, alone, departed by personally owned car and drove south on Viers Mill Rd., into Georgia Ave and thence to Blair Rd. where he turned left off Georgia Ave. Surveillance agents unable to further observe route of Anderson due to traffic obstruction at this point.
- 10:40 Am. Subject's car observed parked in usual spot on Capitol grounds; however, subject not seen. Check of Senate Press Gallery and Senate Office Bldg. failed to disclose whereabouts of subject.

Re: Drew Pearson
3/13/51

3:36 Pm. Subject observed running to his car, coming apparently from east entrance of Senate Office Bldg. Drove away alone via Constitution Ave to Penna Ave. and last observed on Penna. Ave. at about 11th or 12th. Agents unable to determine further route due to rain and heavy traffic obstruction.

3:48 Pm. Subject's car located in parking area at Garfield Hospital but subject not observed.

4:00 Pm. Surveillance discontinued.

Malcolm P. Carr
Friedrich Dobbatz
Malcolm J. Mueller
Elmer S. Hedger

65-3339

Surveillance Log

Drew Pearson

March 13, 1951

Espionage - R.

3 p - 12 p

Vicinity: Garfield Hospital, Capitol & Twin Brooks

SA. Troy H. Gist

SA. James O. Newberry


SA. Carl F. Weisich

SA. James F. New.

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65-3339-Sub A-19

SEARCHED.....	INDEXED.....
SERIALIZED.....	FILED.....
MAR 1 1951	



160

Surveillance Log.

65-3339

3-12-51

Re: DREW PEARSON

ESPIONAGE - R

Re: Jack N. Anderson.

The following surveillance was conducted by Special Agents James Hrew, Troy Gist, Carl Mairch and James Newpher regarding the activities of Jack Anderson.

3:40 P.M. Anderson's car observed in parking area
J of Garfield Hospital, 11th + Florida, N.W.

4:07 P.M. Anderson left hospital and proceeded to
J U.S. Capitol.

4:23 P.M. Entered Senate wing, U.S. Capitol
J

6:12 P.M. Left U.S. Capitol. Proceeded west on Constitution
J to Virginia Avenue, west on Virginia to 21st
then north to G St., and parked at 21st
+ G Sts., N.W.

3-13-51

Re: DREW PEARSON

ESPIONAGE - R

6:24 P.M. - Entered Classroom Building northwest
F Corner of 21st + G Sts. N.W.

7:07 P.M. - Anderson observed entering car. Drove
F west on G, north on 22nd, east on New
Hampshire Ave. to Florida, and proceeded
east to parking area Garfield Hospital.

7:23 P.M. - Entered Garfield Hospital, proceeded
F by elevator to the 3rd floor, then to
rear of building to Ward R, room
62 where Mrs. Olivia Anderson is
a patient.

8¹⁶ P.M. - Subject entered car & proceeded
F to 3003 Herndale Kensington, Md.
arriving at 8⁵³ P.M.

10¹⁴ P.M. - Subject entered car & proceed home
F arriving at 10²⁷ P.M.

11 ²² p.m. All lights in house turned off.

11 ³⁵ p.m. Surveillance discontinued

James Frew.
Roy H. Gist
Carl F. Meisch
James O. Kenyon

Surveillance Log 65-3339

Re: Drew Pearson
Espionage - R
(Jack Northman Anderson)

SA's C.A. Giovannette
R.A. Weems
J. R. Craig
W.M. Conner

3-14-51
Duty hours - 8⁰⁰ am - 5⁰⁰ pm.

65 3339 Sub A-20

SEARCHED	INDEXED
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MAR 14 1951	
FBI - WASH. F. O.	

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Surveillance Log 65-3339
3-14-51

The following surveillance was conducted on 3-14-51 by SAs C.A. Giovannette, J. R. Craig, R.A. Weems + W.M. Conner re Jack Northman Anderson:

7⁴⁵_{am.} Surveillance instituted at subject's residence. His car was parked at that point.

8⁵⁵_{am.} Subject left residence alone and drove to 1313 - 29th St. where he parked his car and was not observed further. He arrived at 9²⁵_{am.}

9⁵⁰_{am.} Subject left above location alone and drove to Colonial Village in Virginia. He parked his car on N. Rhodes St. between Lee Highway and Wilson Blvd. The subject was not observed further. This location is adjacent to the residence of Blumenthal at 1808 Queens Lane.

11⁰⁵_{am.} Subject was observed approaching his car and man who could not be identified was just driving away from the area in automobile registered in name of Fred Blumenthal (Pontiac Convertible Ca license - 162-714). Subject immediately drove off being the other car and both proceeded to 29th St. and Dunbarton St. NW. The Pontiac was parked at the corner + the driver was not observed.

3-14-51

further. Subject stopped at the above intersection for approximately one minute and then drove north. Due to security considerations and intervening traffic he was not observed further.

Spot checks were repeatedly made at U.S. Capitol, Garfield Hospital, Pentagon Bldg

1 $\frac{30}{pm}$. Subject observed driving north on 30th St. at M. St. NW. He proceeded to 29th + Dunbarton St. and parked on the NW. corner at 1 $\frac{33}{pm}$.

3 $\frac{50}{pm}$. Subject had not been observed subsequent to 1 $\frac{33}{pm}$ and surveillance was discontinued.

W. M. Conner

R. A. Steene

Arthur G. Giovanetti

~~Joe R. Craig~~

Surveillance Log

3/14/51

65-3339

Re: Drew Pearson

Jack N. Anderson

Hours: 3⁰⁰ PM - 12⁰⁰ PM


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by: Malcolm P. Carr
Frederick J. Dobratz
Malcolm S. Mueller
Elson S. Hedges

Note: unidentified man is believed by SA Carr to be the man who drives 1944-50 Packard bearing Va. license and who was previously identified (as Blumenthal)

65-3339-Sub A-21

SEARCHED.....	INDEXED.....
SERIALIZED.....	FILED.....
MAR 15 1951	



192

Surveillance Log 65-3339 3/14/51

Re: Jack N. Anderson

3 ³⁵ PM Surveillance instituted at Pearson's residence

5 ⁵⁸ Subject and unidentified man departed from Pearson's residence and drove in subject's car to Carl's Waffle Shop, 1234 Wisconsin Ave. N.W.

6 ⁰³ Subject and unidentified man entered Carl's Waffle Shop. Both ate together and made no contacts. None

6 ⁴⁰ Subject and unidentified man departed from Carl's Waffle Shop and drove back to Pearson's residence where unidentified man left subject's car. Subject continued alone via 29th Street, Gue Street and Florida Avenue to Garfield Memorial Hospital

6 ⁵³ Subject entered Garfield Memorial Hospital

8 ⁰⁵ Subject departed alone from Hospital and drove via 11th Street, Monroe Street, 13th Street, Piney Branch Road, Georgia Avenue and Viers Mill Road to Viers Mill Shopping Center.

8 ³⁵ Arrived at Viers Mill Shopping Center and entered Viers

Surveillance Log (cont) 65-3339 3/14/51

Mill Theater alone. Subject observed seated alone in theater.

10 ¹⁵ PM - Departed from View Mill Theater and drove home.

10 ²⁰ - Subject arrived and entered his home.

11 ²⁵ - Surveillance discontinued. Lights extinguished in subject's home. No further pertinent activity noted.

Malcolm P. Miller
Frederick J. Dolbuck
Malcolm P. Carr
Elsam B. Hedger

Surveillance Log

Re: Drew Pearson,
Jack M. Anderson
65-3339

Date: March 15, 1951
8 am - 5 pm.

65-3339-22

SEARCHED.....	INDEXED.....
SERIALIZED.....	FILED.....
MAR 15 1951	

LSD

By: SA's - James Grew
 Note: Study rooms 141 & 142, - Troy D. Gist
 5th floor, Lib. of Congress Annex - Carl Maisch
 are occupied by - James Neuffer

L.P. MARVIN & (HENRIETTA B. SAFFORD, 2620 K.N.W. ST. 5879)
 H.B. SAFFORD.

Rooms have glass doors but door of room 142 is covered by paper maps so interior cannot be seen. Entry to both rooms is apparently thru door of room 141. Current telephone directory lists LONDON P. MARVIN, JR, LT. COMMDR USNR, 3032 Q St. N.W. NORTH 0355 & Lib. of Cong. Annex.

March 15, 1951

RE:

Jack M. Anderson

The following results were obtained from a physical surveillance conducted on above date & Subject by Special Agents James Drew, Troy D. Gist, Carl Maisch, and James Newpher.

7:55 a.m. - Surveillance instituted in vicinity of Subject's home in Twin Brook, Md.; his auto was parked on the street nearby.

10:43 a.m. - Subject entered auto and proceeded to the Sinclair Service Station, 2nd & Constitution Ave., N.W., where he left his car and walked to the Library of Congress Annex, 2nd & P Ave., S.E., entering at 10:37. Inside the Annex, Subject inquired of Officer Russell McEbray the location of office of Commander Marvin, and was advised he is in Room 141, Fifth Floor, after which Subject took elevator to the Fifth Floor and was not observed further.

Anderson (cont'd)

Mar. 15, 1951

1:14 p.m. - Subject and unknown man observed leaving Library of Congress Annex. They walked to and entered the Capitol Bldg., and then entered ~~the~~ ^a dining room on the first floor of North Wing, where they ate lunch. Due to large crowd in and outside of the dining room, they were not further observed. Unknown man was of slender build, being about 5' 11^{1/2}" tall, 155 lbs., and was wearing midnite blue hat and a Chesterfield-type topcoat.

3:09 p.m. - Subject entered his car at Sinclair Service Station and drove to the Garfield Memorial Hospital, 10th St. & Fla. Ave., N.W., which he entered at 3:22 p.m.

4:05 p.m. - Surveillance turned over to relief.

Troy H. Gist
James H. New
Carl F. Maisch
James O. Kenyon

Washington, D.C.
March 15, 1951

Surveillance Log
Drew Pearson
Espionage - R
65-3339
(Re Jack Northman Anderson)

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agents: Robert A. Weand
Richard L. Keeler

Hours of duty: 3:00 P.M. 12:00 A.M.

65-3339-23 ^{Sub A}

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MAR 13 1951	
FBI WASH. F. O.	

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Washington, D.C.

March 15, 1951

Surveillance Memo

Re: Drew Pearson

(Jack Northman Anderson.)

The following surveillance was conducted
by SA's Robert A. Weems and Richard L. Keeler.

4⁰⁰ P.M. Surveillance instituted in the vicinity
of the Garfield Hospital. Subject's car
1950 Buick Sedan, W.D.A. tags 128-885
observed parked in Garfield Hospital
parking lot.

4⁰⁷ Subject left Garfield Hospital in his
car and proceeded to De Sales street
and Conn ave N.W. Subject parked car
in front of Colony Restaurant, 1730 De Sales
St. N.W. Arrived at 4:17 P.M. Due to traffic
conditions agents were unable to
determine where subject went after

Re show person
John Northman Anderson

leaving Car.

5:15 Subject observed entering Car
parked in front of Colony Restaurant.
Subject proceeded south to Penn.
ave and thence east on Penn ave
to the vicinity of the Capital Bldg.
Subject parked Car and entered Capital
Bldg by entrance located on Northeast
Corner, ground floor. arrived at 5:35 P.M.

6:15 Subject observed leaving same
doorway of Capital Bldg. He entered
his Car and proceeded to Geo. Washington
University. Entered at 6:22 P.M.

7:10 Subject left Geo. Washington ^{University} ~~Hospital~~
and proceeded to Garfield Hospital. arrived
at 7:18 P.M.

8:03 Subject left Garfield Hospital and
proceeded to his residence 13200 Midway
Ave, Twin Brook, Md. arrived at 8:37 P.M.

Re: Drew Benson
(Jack Northman Anderson)

10⁰⁵ PM. Lights out in subjects
residence.

11²⁵ No activity noted. Surveillance
discontinued.

Richard L. Kester
Robert A. Adams

Surveillance Log

Re: Drew Pearson
(Jack N. Anderson)
Espionage - X
NYO file # 65-3339

March 16, 1951
8-5 pm.

SAs James Frew
Courtland J. Jones
Frederick J. Dolbratz
Malcolm P. Carr

65-3339-Sub A 24

SEARCHED.....	INDEXED.....
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MAR 17 1951	



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Re: Drew Pearson
March 16, 1951

Surveillance Log

The following physical surveillance was conducted by Special Agents James Frew, Frederick J. Dobbratz, Courtland J. Jones and Malcolm P. Carr concerning Jack N. Anderson:

7:40 Am. Surveillance instituted in vicinity of Anderson's residence at Twin Brook, Md. Car parked in usual spot.

12:15 Pm. Subject, alone, departed from residence and drove to Drew Pearson's, where he arrived at 1:15 Pm. Parked in front of Pearson's and entered.

1:28 Pm. Anderson, alone, left Pearson's and drove directly to Pentagon, arriving there and parking at Mall Entrance at 1:45 Pm.

Subject ~~then~~ went directly to Room 2E 756. Was observed crossing hall to about Room 2E 757 after about 5 minutes in building. Returned to 2E 756 momentarily. A spot

check of room at 2:05 Pm. failed to disclose Anderson's whereabouts.

2:25 Pm. Anderson observed entering corridor on 2nd floor coming from 2nd ring. Walked to 3rd ring to Room 2E 757 and entered. Left

Re: Drew Pearson
3/16/51

Room momentarily and took escalator to 2nd floor. Anderson stopped at Rm 2E 864 and tried door but door apparently locked and he continued on around E ring toward 7th Corridor. Believed Anderson reentered Room 2E 756. 4:15 P.m. Surveillance passed over to relieving agents.

Malcolm P. Carr
Engelhardt Deblauw
C. Jones
James Frew

Surveillance Log -

Re: Drew Pearson,
Jack N. Anderson
65-3339

Date: March 16, 1951
3 p.m. to 12

By: SA's - Troy H. Gist
- Elson G. Hedges
- Carl F. Maisch
- James O. Newpher

65-3339 Sub A 25

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Re: Jack M. Anderson - March 16, 1951

The following results were obtained from a physical surveillance conducted on the above Subject and date by Special Agents Troy H. Gist, Elsum G. Hedges, Carl F. Maische, & James C. Neuphor.

4:00 p.m. - Surveillance instituted in vicinity of Mall Entrance of the Pentagon Bldg; Subject's car observed parked in front of above entrance in visitors parking area.

4:22 p.m. - Subject left Pentagon, entered car, and drove to the parking grounds of the U.S. Capitol, parked his car, and entered the North wing of the Capitol; he was not observed further.

4:55 p.m. - Subject left U.S. Capitol and drove to 29th and Dumbarton Sts, N.W., where he parked and entered Pearson's residence.

7:03 p.m. - Subject left Pearson's residence and drove

Anderson (cont'd)

3/16/51

to the Garfield Memorial Hospital, 10th St
and Fla. Ave., N.W., which he entered at 7:15 p.m.

8:06 p.m. - Subject left above hospital and drove
to the Food Fair Super Market, corner of
Viers Mill Rd. and Conn. Ave. extended, where
he purchased groceries, and then drove
on to his residence, entering at 9:04 p.m.

10:47 p.m. - Lights out in subject's residence.

11:10 p.m. - Surveillance discontinued.

Tracy H. Gist
Carl F. Maisch
Elmer S. Hedges
James O. Thompson

Surveillance Log 65-3339

Re: Drew Pearson
Espionage - R
(Jack Northman Anderson)

SAs W. O. Cone
M. S. Mueller
C. A. Giovannette
W. M. Conner


Duty hours 8⁰⁰ am to 5⁰⁰ pm.
3-17-51

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65-3339 Sub A₂₆

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MAR 10 1951	
FBI - WASH. F. O.	

llh



Surveillance Log

65-3339

3-17-51

The following surveillance was conducted by
SAs W. O. Cone, M. G. Mueller, C. A.
Liovannetti + W. M. Conner on 3-17-51
re: Jack Northman Anderson:

7⁵⁵_{am.} Surveillance instituted at subject's
residence. His car was parked in
front of the house.

9⁰³_{am.} Subject left home, drove alone to
George Washington University and parked
in front of the University Library. It
was not observed which building he
entered.

12¹⁶_{pm.} Subject appeared from above library,
put books in car + entered drug
store on opposite side of the street.

12²²_{pm.} Subject emerged from above drug
store carrying large paper bag, entered
car and drove to Garfield hospital
where he parked + entered.

1⁰⁹_{pm.} Subject left front entrance of hospital,
took car to rear of building and
picked up woman, presumably his
wife. He drove immediately to his
residence and he + the woman entered
at 1⁴⁵_{pm.}

4⁰⁰_{pm.} Subject had not been observed since prior
entry to home. Surveillance discontinued

W. M. Conner

Surveillance Log

65-3339.

March 19, 1951

Drew Pearson - Esp-R

8-5 P.M.

Re: Jack M. Anderson

SA. Troy H. Dist.

SA. James O. Neugaber.

SA. Malcolm L. Carr.

SA. James Allen.

Vicinity: Twin Brook, Md.

Sergetown.

Mayflower Hotel
U.S. Capital.

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MAR 20 1951	
F. O.	

[Redacted Box] [Initials]

65-3339 Sub A 27

Note: Other than regular lunch room activity there were several special luncheons in the Mayflower — one was by B.F. Goodrich Co. + another by the Wash. Song Contest. ~~An~~ Attempt was made to observe them here but crowds were large + results negative

Surveillance log.

65-3339

March 19, 1951

Re: Jack N. Anderson.

The following surveillance was conducted by
LAs. Terry H. Gint, Malcolm P. Carr, James E.
Mempher and James Frew.

7⁵⁵ Surveillance instituted at subject's residence.

12¹⁹_p Subject entered car (W.Va. 128-885) and proceeded
to 1313-29th St. N.W. arriving at 12:51 p.m.

12⁵⁴_{p.m.} Subject & man ~~believed to be~~ identified as
Blumenthal entered car & proceeded to Wisconsin at Prospect. N.W.
where both left car. Due to traffic it was impossible
to ascertain exact building entered but it was on
east side of Wisconsin near Prospect.

12⁵⁹_p Subject & above man entered car & proceeded
to vicinity Mayflower Hotel where car was put
in parking lot. Both entered lobby of Mayflower
Hotel but due to large luncheon crowd
there was not ~~observed~~ observed further. The
car was observed & kept under surveillance.

2 ¹⁵ _P

Both men entered car and proceeded west on M St. to 25th st where Blumenthal got out. Subject made U turn and proceeded to Capitol, via M St, 20th & Constitution Ave where he entered Capitol & went to Senate Press Gallery.

4 ⁵⁰ _{PM}

No further activity noted
surveillance discontinued

James Frew
Roy H. Hest
James A. Neuphan
Michael P. Carr

Surveillance Log 65-3339

Re: Drew Pearson
Espionage - R
(Jack Northman Anderson)

3-20-51
Duty Hours 8⁰⁰ am - 5⁰⁰ pm.

SAs E. S. Hedges
W. O. Cone
R. A. Weems
W. M. Conner

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65-3339 Sub A 28

SEARCHED.....	INDEXED.....
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MAR 21 1951	

709

Surveillance Log

3-20-51

65-3339

The following surveillance was conducted on 3-20-51 by SAs E. H. Hedges, W.O. Cone, R. A. Weems and W.M. Conner re: Jack Northman Anderson:

8⁰⁰ am. Surveillance instituted at subject's residence. He car was parked in front.

9⁵⁰ am. Subject left alone and drove to the U. S. Capitol. Due to traffic conditions he was not observed entering the building although he parked the car in his usual location.

12⁴⁰ pm. Subject appeared on sidewalk from direction of above building, entered car and drove to Sinclair Gas Station at 2nd + Constitution Ave. From there he proceeded to Pearson's office + parked his car.

1⁰⁷ pm. Subject and two unidentified men left Pearson's office and drove to Wm. S. Martin Restaurant, 1264 Wisconsin Ave. N.W. where they parked + entered. Because of security considerations it was not possible to obtain descriptions of the subjects' companions.

2⁰⁵ pm. Subject and two companions left restaurant + returned to Pearson's office. One

3-20-51
65-3339

man left the car at this point + subject + one man drove to vicinity of M. St. and 19th St. NW. Subject's companion left the car at this point and subject continued to U.S. Capitol. Subject proceeded immediately to the Press room behind the Senate Press Gallery. Thereafter he appeared briefly in the above mentioned gallery, returned to the Press room + was not observed again.

4¹⁷ pm. Subject left U.S. Capitol + drove to Pearson's office.

4³⁰ pm. Subject not observed thereafter - no further activity. Surveillance discontinued.

E. J. Hedges
W. M. Conner
Walter O. Conner
Robert A. Helms

Surveillance Log

RE: Drew Pearson
(Jack N. Anderson)
WFO File # 65-3339

Date: 3-21-51

Hours: 8-5

Special Agents:

Elsie J. Hedger

Carl F. Marsek

Malcolm J. Mueller

Frederick J. Dobbs

(Murdant man at Post Hotel may have been
Miss Decker, Secretary to Budget Committee
at Continental Hotel)

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65-3339-Sub A2

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MAR 21 1951	
FBI - WASH. F. O.	



[Handwritten signature]

3-21-51

Surveillance Log

RE: Jack Anderson
(65-3339)

The following surveillance was conducted by Special Agents Elson G. Hedges, Carl F. Marsch, Malcolm G. Mveller and Frederick J. Dobbratz:

7³⁰_{am} Surveillance instituted vicinity of subject's home, Twin Brook, Md.

10¹⁰_{am} Subject and unidentified woman (dark hair, approx. 28-30 yrs old) entered subject's car & proceed to Viers Mill Shopping Center, where woman entered Drug Store making a purchase, while subject waited in car

10²²_{am} Subject and woman returned in his car to subject's home, both entering five minutes later.

10³⁵_{am} Subject observed leaving his home, proceeding by his auto along Viers Mill Rd, across Newport Mill Rd to Old Bladensburg Rd & south on Conn. Ave to Drew Pearson's

2/
residence, 29th & Dumbarton, N.W.

11 01^{am} Subject observed entering Drew Pearson's residence

11 23^{am} Subject departed Drew Pearson's via car along Penna Ave, N.W. to 15th & New York Ave, N.W., where he parked car and proceeded on foot to Union Trust Co. Bank, 14th & G, N.W.

11 35^{am} Subject entered Union Trust Co. Bank

11 40^{am} Subject departed Bank proceeding on foot to Nat'l Press Bldg., 14th & F, N.W.

11 44^{am} Subject entered Press Bldg. and went to the 10th Floor

11 52^{am} Departed Press Bldg. & returned on foot to his car @ 15th & N.Y., N.W.

11 57^{am} Subject in car, proceeded down 14th St on to Penna Ave to the Union Station Plaza, where he parked his car on F St & proceeded in direction of Continental Hotel, N. Capitol St.

Due to traffic congestion at Union Station Plaza, it was not possible to determine exact destination of subject.

12¹¹
pm

Subject next observed crossing N. Capital St., from Continental Hotel with unidentified man, both entering subject's car, and then proceeding to the U.S. Capitol grounds, & parking his car.

12¹⁵
pm

Subject & unidentified man observed entering Senate Wing of U.S. Capitol. A check of the Cross Gallery, U.S. Senate, and Senate Office Bldg. failed to disclose whereabouts of subject.

6⁵⁵
pm

Subject observed leaving Senate Wing of U.S. Capitol alone & proceeding to his car.

6⁵⁷
pm

Subject departed Capital Plaza, proceeding down Constitution Ave to Rock Creek Parkway on the Conn. Ave, N.W., proceeding north on Conn. Ave in direction of home.

4

7 ¹⁰/_{pm} Surveillance discontinued.

Note: Unidentified man observed with subject
is described as follows:

5' 10" -

165 lbs

fair complexion

30-35 yrs old

dark brown tweed topcoat

brown hat

brown bow tie

SA: Friedrich J. Dobkatz
Malcolm G. Mueller
Eugene S. Hedges
Carl L. Maisch

Surveillance Log 65-3339

Re: Drew Pearson
Espionage - R
(Jack Northman Anderson)

SAs W. O. Cone
Robert Weems
F. J. Dobbertz
W. M. Conner

Duty hours 8⁰⁰ am to 5⁰⁰ pm.
3-23-51

It is noted that auto mentioned in
attached log - license DC - K-2549 is
registered ~~as~~ as 1940 Ford Coupe in
the name Marvin P. Langdon Jr.,
Library of Congress, Rm 141.

65-3339-Sub A 30

SEARCHED.....	INDEXED.....
SERIALIZED.....	FILED.....
MAR 2 1951	
F. C.	

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Surveillance Log

3-22-51

65-3339

The following surveillance was conducted on 3-22-51 by SAs Robt. Weems, W.O. Cone, F.J. Dobratz and W.M. Conner re: Jack Northman Anderson:

- 8⁰⁰ am Surveillance instituted at subject's residence. His car was parked in front of the house.
- 9⁵⁰ am. Subject left residence and drove to Pearson's office and parked car.
- 11³¹ am. Subject left above location and drove to the Pentagon Bldg. and parked at the Mall entrance. Subject visited rooms 2E 757 and 2E 764 (Press + Legislative Liaison) for approximately 15 minutes and then proceeded down the E corridor. He turned to the "down" escalator opposite the River entrance. Due to security considerations he was not observed further. (It was noted that a portion of the area reached by said escalator houses the H.Q. - USAF - these offices are new + still under construction)
- (Spot checks were made at various locations in the Pentagon where the subject has been seen in the past but he was not located)
- 4¹⁵ pm. Subject left Pentagon, drove to U.S. Capitol and parked. He walked to

the Senate Office Bldg. but could not be observed further.

6⁰⁵/_{pm}. Subject was observed leaving U. S. Capitol. He drove to the Library of Congress Annex and picked up an unidentified man. They drove approximately 1½ blocks and parked near the intersection of First St. + E. Capitol St SE. Subject and companion sat at this point for approximately 15 minutes and talked.

6²⁵/_{pm}. Subject's companion left the car and entered car parked immediately in front of the subject's car. Both drove off and were observed to the intersection of Virginia Ave. and Rock Creek and Potomac Parkway N.W. At this point intersecting traffic made it impossible to observe car driven by the unidentified man any further. Subject proceeded on toward his home. He was last observed driving north on Connecticut Ave. beyond Chevy Chase Circle. Surveillance was discontinued at this point.

Car driven by unidentified man referred to above was Ford convertible coupe (1939 to 41 approx.) License DC - K 2549 and New York license LM - 42.

Robert A. Keene, Walton O. Cove
Friedrich J. Dolan, U. M. Conner

Surveillance Log

65-3339

March 22, 1951

Drew Pearson - 5 sp. - R.

8:00 - 7:00 P

Re: Jack M. Anderson

Vicinity: Twin Brook, Ind.
U.S. Capitol.

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SA James O. Newpher

SA Carl F. Mausch

SA Troy H. Gist

SA James F. New

65-3339 - Sub A 31

SEARCHED.....	INDEXED.....
SERIALIZED.....	FILED.....
MAR 23 1951	
FBI WASH. F. O.	



109

Note: When subject deposited letters at the Senate Post Office casual observation thru the waiting slot revealed the following info:

Letter #1 To: Mrs. DAN SUSCO

11738 MAYFIELD AVE.

LOS ANGELES, CAL.

Return Address: Box 160

ECKHAM, W. Va.

page 2

Handwritten scribble

Letter #2. TO-

LT. RAYMOND P. HORSPOOL

U.S.S. MASSEY DD 778

c/o F.P.O.

SAN FRANCISCO, CAL.

Return address:

Box 160

ELKHAM, W. Va.

J. E. New

Surveillance Log

65-3339

Re: Jack N. Anderson

March 22, 1957

The following surveillance was conducted by SAs: Troy H. Galt, James O. Newpher, Carl F. March & James F. New.

7⁵⁵_A Surveillance instituted at subject's home.

9²²_A Subject entered car (W. Va. 155-885) & proceeded to 1313 - 29th St. NW. via Connecticut Ave arriving at 9⁵⁸_A

10¹⁴_A Subject entered car & proceeded to Wisconsin & Prospect St where he parked car and entered 1227 Wisconsin Ave. - The Courant Press, a printing & engraving shop.

10¹⁷_A Subject left shop, entered car & drove to U.S. Capitol where he proceeded to the Senate Post Office & pushed 2 letters thru the mailing slot. He then proceeded to the Senate Press Gallery.

6²⁴_{p.} Subject entered car & proceeded to Penna & 14th St. NW, where he parked car. He walked to the National Press Bldg which he entered. It was noted that the elevator he took stopped at the 10th floor. For security reasons none of the surveilling agents entered the elevator with him. He entered the building at 6³⁹_{p.}

6⁴⁵_{p.} Subject left building, entered car & proceeded enroute home via Constitution ave, Rock creek Pkwy & Conn. ave. At Conn. ave and Nebraska the surveillance was discontinued.

7⁰³_{p.} Surveillance discontinued

James Frew
 James O. Neuphauser
 Carl F. Masch
 Gray H. Bist

Surveillance Log

Re: Jack N. Andersson
65-3339

Date: March 26, 1951
8 am to 5 pm

By: Special Agents —
James Drew
Roy W. Gist
Carl H. Maish
James O. Neuber

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b7C

65-3339-Sub A

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MAR 2 1951	
FBI WASH. F. O.	

[Redacted]

re: Jack N. Andersson

March 26, 1951

8:00 a.m. - Surveillance instituted in vicinity of Subjects home in Twin Brook, Md. by Special Agents Troy H. Gist, James Drew, Carl W. Maisch, & James O. Newpher - with following results:

8:12 a.m. - Subject entered his car, drove to and entered Pearson's residence in Georgetown, D.C.

9:55 a.m. - Subject entered his car and drove to parking area on Capitol grounds where he parked his car and entered the Senate Office Bldg. at 10:06 a.m. When entering building subject was reading what appeared to be a written statement of some nature; after entering the Senate Bldg, he proceeded to Room 325, Office of Sen. Tobey, and when he came out about three minutes later he was not carrying above-mentioned material. Subject then proceeded to Room 318 where the Helms Crime Hearing was in session. He attended this hearing until shortly before it adjourned for lunch at 1:07 p.m.; it was noticed that he left the room on about three occasions for brief periods of time. After leaving the above Senate Hearing, Subject

Jack M. Anderson (cont'd)

3-26-51

was not observed further, inasmuch as he was walking toward the Capitol Bldg. He was also observed attending the afternoon session.

6:05 p.m. - Subject left North wing of Capitol Bldg and drove to Pearson's residence, which he entered at 6:18 p.m.

6:53 p.m. - Subject entered car, drove to Rock Creek Parkway via P St. and surveillance was discontinued at Conn. ave. & Nebraska ave. when it appeared subject was going home.

Lois H. Gist
James G. Newkirk
Carl F. Maish
James Frew.

Surveillance Log

65-3339

Re: Drew Pearson
Espionage - R
(Jack Northman Anderson)

SAs W.O. Cone
C.A. Giovannetti
Robert Weems
W.M. Conner

3-27-51


Duty hours 8⁰⁰ am - 5⁰⁰ pm

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65-3339-Sub A 33

SEARCHED.....	INDEXED.....
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MAR 20 1951	
FBI - WASH. F.	

[Handwritten initials]



Surveillance Log 65-3339

The following surveillance was conducted on 3-27-51 by SAs W. O. Cone, Robert Wams, C. A. Giovannetti & W. M. Conner re: Jack Northman Anderson:

- 8⁰⁰ am Surveillance instituted at subjects' residence.
- 10¹⁰ am Subject left home alone and drove to 1313 - 29th St. N.W. and parked nearby.
- 12³⁵ pm. Subject left Pearson's office with unidentified man and Pearson. They drove to parking lot on De Salle St. N.W., opposite the Mayflower, left the car and entered the Mayflower Hotel. Pearson checked his hat and they were last observed at the entrance to the dining room.
- 2¹⁵ pm. Subject, Pearson and unidentified man reappeared in hotel lobby & proceeded to subject's car. Pearson left other two and walked west on De Salle St. Subject and unidentified man drove to U. S. Capitol and parked the car. Subject walked to the Senate wing of the Capitol and unidentified man walked to the Senate Office Bldg. Due to security considerations neither individual was observed further.

Following is a description of the unidentified man referred to above: approx. 5'10", 160 to 170 lbs. build medium, black hair - parted on side - ruddy complexion - wears glasses and

wearing dark grey suit. He wore no hat or coat.

6⁰¹ pm Subject left U. S. Capitol alone and drove to 21 St. NW. between G and H Sts. He parked car and walked toward one of George Washington University buildings.

7²⁶ pm. cont Subject left George Washington University and drove to Connecticut Ave. N.W. at Cathedral St. He was last observed driving north on Connecticut Ave. from that point and surveillance was discontinued.

Robert A. Heems
Carlton A. Hovener
W. M. Conner

Surveillance Log

Re: Arew Pearson
(Ar. Re: Jack Anderson)
Espionage - X
The FD file # 65-3339

Hours 8⁴⁵ pm
March 28, 1951

Special Agents Frederick Sobratz
Malcolm Mueller
Elsam Hedges
Malcolm Carr

65-3339 Sub A

- 34

SEARCHED.....	INDEXED.....
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MAR 31 1951	
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[Signature]

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Surveillance Log

L. Drew Pearson
(Jack N. Anderson)
March 28, 1951.

The following physical surveillance was conducted by Special Agents Frederick Sobelraty, Malcolm Mueller, Elsum Hedger and Malcolm Carr concerning Jack N. Anderson:

7:45 Am. Surveillance instituted in vicinity of Anderson's residence at Twin Brook, Md. Car parked in usual spot.

10:18 Am. Anderson departed alone from residence and proceeded directly to usual parking place just east of Capitol, coming via Viers Mill Rd., Georgia Ave., Blair Rd., and 5th St. Arrived at 11:01 Am. and left car ^{and} walked to and entered east entrance of Senate Office Bldg.

11:03 Am. Anderson observed by SA Mueller leaving Rm 259, the Office of Senator Fullbright (Ark). He proceeded west in corridor and not further observed.

1:05 Pm. Anderson observed in west corridor, 2nd floor without topcoat but destination could not be discreetly ascertained.

(2)

Re. Drew Pearson
(Jack A. Anderson)
March 28, 1951

5:45 Pm. Subject observed leaving north
wing of Capitol. Walked to car and
proceeded down Constitution Ave., to
17th St., up 17th to Connecticut Ave. NW.
Surveillance discontinued at Connecticut
Ave. and Albemarle St NW when it was
apparent he was headed home at 6:30 Pm.

Malcolm P. Carr
Frederick Dobson
Malcolm J. Mueller
Simon B. Hedges

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : SAC, WFO

DATE: February 20, 1951

FROM : L. W. R. OBERNDORF, SA

SUBJECT: DREW PEARSON
ESPIONAGE - RALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 04-06-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/TH

On the evening of February 17, 1951, Inspector A. C. BELMONT of the Bureau orally furnished the following information to SA M. A. TAYLOR and the writer.

He stated that a confidential source had advised that the source is a close friend of JACK N. ANDERSON, a PEARSON leg man who is employed by Bell Syndicate and who resides at 3200 Midway Avenue, Twinbrook, Rockville, Maryland. Source advised that when recently contacted by ANDERSON, source indicated that he might not desire to talk to ANDERSON because of the recent publication by the subject of alleged confidential Army messages.

Source also made reference to ANDERSON regarding the charges of Senator McCARTHY on the floor of the Senate. In reply, ANDERSON referred to the McCARTHY speech and stated that it was he who had obtained this information from a contact which he saw almost daily at the Pentagon. ANDERSON stated that after he received the information, he took it to a high ranking general and asked the general to clear the information for publication because ANDERSON was afraid of it. The general allegedly stated that it would be O.K. to use the information provided that ANDERSON left out the date.

The source described ANDERSON as being a man and as being married and stated that ANDERSON's wife had given birth to their first child about two weeks ago. He described ANDERSON further as follows:

Height: 5'10"
Weight: 185
Hair: Light brown to blond
Teeth: Nice teeth
Eyes: Blue
Complexion: Fair
Characteristics: Wears no hat; good looking;
slow and deliberate in his
movements; tail conscious
Clothes: Regularly wears mixed brown suits,
tweed jackets, green sport shirts
and big knotted ties

LWRO:BR
65-3339

65-3339-31

SEARCHED.....	INDEXED <i>tol</i>
SERIALIZED.....	FILED <i>tol</i>
FEB 20 1951	
FBI WASH. F. O.	

Graham

Memo, SAC
RE: DREW PEARSON
ESPIONAGE - R
February 20, 1951
LWRO:BR 65-3339

Mr. BELMONT stated that this source must be protected at all costs and that the information furnished by the source would only appear in the administrative section of a report. He stated further that this information was being furnished to WFO as an investigative lead and that whereas no instructions were being issued to institute a surveillance of ANDERSON, consideration should be given to a surveillance as a logical investigative step.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : SAC, WFO

DATE: February 23, 1951

FROM : L.W.R. OBERNDORF, SA

SUBJECT: DREW PEARSON
ESPIONAGE - XALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 03-05-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/CPB/TH

SAC STEIN advised me that Inspector ^AKEY of the Bureau had called and instructed that an Agent of this office immediately consult with Bureau liaison representative WES REYNOLDS regarding certain information to be furnished to General BOLLING of G-2. This information concerns PEARSON's leg man, JACK ANDERSON, and was received by this office from the Bureau on the evening of February 17, 1951.

I instructed Agent GRAHAM to contact Mr. REYNOLDS immediately in order to make the necessary arrangements and also advised that Agent M. A. TAYLOR might accompany GRAHAM and REYNOLDS if the situation warranted.

LWRO:BR
65-3339

65-3339-41

SEARCHED.....	INDEXED.....
SERIALIZED.....	FILED <i>hol</i>
FEB 23 1951	
FBI - WASH, F. O.	

Graham

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : SAC, WFO

DATE: February 23, 1951

FROM : L. W. R. OBERNDORF, SA

SUBJECT: DREW PEARSON
ESPIONAGE - X

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 03-05-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/CPB/TH

On the afternoon of February 19, 1951, ROY GREEN, Resident Agent, Hyattsville, advised Agent CHARLES LYONS concerning the current automobile registration for suspect JACK NORTHMAN ANDERSON, 13200 Midway Avenue, Twin Brook, Maryland, Maryland license 682-786, registered for 1948 Oldsmobile 78 Sedan, Motor 8-151343H, serial 78W3626. There is no further description of car available.

LWRO:BR
65-3339

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FEB 23 1951	
FBI - WASH. F. O.	

Graham

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : SAC, WFO

FROM : SA M. A. TAYLOR

SUBJECT: DREW PEARSON
ESPIONAGE - R

DATE: FEBRUARY 26, 1951

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 03-05-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/CPB/TH

The following credit information was secured at the Credit Bureau, 1221 "G" Street, N.W., on 2/19/51, by SA M. A. TAYLOR concerning DREW PEARSON and five present or former associates, particularly JACK ANDERSON, current suspect.

The credit report dated 1/19/50, concerning JACK N. [REDACTED] ANDERSON, 2800 Devonshire Place, N.W., disclosed that ANDERSON was 28 years of age; was married in August, 1949; and had been residing at the above address since June, 1947, where he rented an apartment from D. WHITT COHEN at 4750 Vermont. He formerly resided at 1917 Kenyon Street, N.W., for a period of four months, and, prior to this, resided in China. He originally came from 2173 Fardown Avenue, Cottonwood, Utah. His wife was born [REDACTED] and resided at 2800 Devonshire Place, N.W., from the time of their marriage in August of 1949. She previously lived at [REDACTED]

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JACK ANDERSON has been employed by DREW PEARSON since May, 1947, as a Reporter at an estimated \$90 per week, according to the report, and was formerly a War Correspondent in China for various newspapers for a period of two years. Before this, he was a Reporter for the "SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, TRIBUNE" for 5 years. His wife - [REDACTED] - was employed as a [REDACTED] having been appointed [REDACTED]

Credit data indicated that two loans had been made to ANDERSON - high credit, \$1800 - with satisfactory results. He was reported as having a standard savings account. One suit was noted, bearing date stamp - 12/20/50 - subsequent to above report, identified as Docket #A30953, for money due in the sum of \$651.36. The Plaintiff was LOUISE B. MAZZA (JACK N. ANDERSON), 1313 29th Street, N.W., Attorney - PAUL L. SWEENEY.

The current City Directory lists JACK NORTHMAN ANDERSON at 13200 Midway (Twinbrook, Maryland), phone - Rockville 4669.

MAT:PJD
65-3339

65-3339-47

SEARCHED.....	INDEXED.....
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FEB 26 1951	
FBI - WASH. F. O.	

Graham

WFO 65-3339

BLUMENTHAL, FREDERICK G. (DOROTHY B. W.)

The credit report dated 11/11/47 disclosed that FREDERICK A. BLUMENTHAL, 4814 Mc Arthur Blvd., N.W., was about 48 years of age; married; and had resided at this address since 9/1/47, sharing a house with E. M. WOOD, who said the BLUMENTHALS were people of excellent character. The report indicated that BLUMENTHAL came here from New York City, address not known, and was then employed by the Democratic National Committee, Ring Building, 18th & M Streets, N.W., since 8/1/47, as a writer in public relations with an estimated salary at \$3200.

His wife - DOROTHY - was born 8/14/09, according to the credit report, and was employed as an Administrative Clerk at an estimated \$2500 per annum with CIA, having been appointed 3/10/47. She came here from North Syracuse, N.Y., and previously resided at Scotts Hotel, 1426 21st Street, N.W., for approximately six months; was a satisfactory tenant and well regarded by those contacted. Her nearest relative was listed as Mrs. FRED GURZNEY, no address given. This data concerning DOROTHY BLUMENTHAL appears to be somewhat at variance with known information regarding her background.

Two small accounts for BLUMENTHAL indicated satisfactory payment within thirty days.

The current Phone Directory reflects FREDERICK G. BLUMENTHAL, 1808 Queens Lane, Arlington, Virginia, Chestnut 2000.

WFO 65-3339

PEARSON, DREW

(LUVIE)

The credit report dated 10/27/50 reflects that DREW PEARSON, 2820 Dumbarton Street, N.W., and wife live at the above address, where PEARSON has resided since November, 1933. It was indicated that he owns the property, assessed in his wife's name, valued at \$21,100, and identified as "Lot #807-#808, Square 1235."

The report indicated this was PEARSON'S second marriage, and that he had previously married FELICIA GIZYCKA - daughter of Countess ELEANOR GIZYCKA - better known as ELEANOR PATTERSON.

The report described PEARSON as a well known News Correspondent and Editorial Writer, and, since 1932, Author of "THE WASHINGTON MERRY-GO-ROUND" - a political column presently appearing in "THE WASHINGTON POST" and syndicated to more than 150 papers in the United States. He also has a weekly broadcast on current events.

PEARSON'S early education included attendance at PHILLIPS ACADEMY, Exeter, New Hampshire, and SWARTHMORE COLLEGE, graduating in 1919. Since leaving college, he has been identified with various papers. Among past assignments are: Reporting Arms' Conference in Japan, China and Siberia, and, more recently, the meeting of the American Republics, in South America. He was also Director of the American Friends Service Commission in Serbia in 1921 and 1923, and was formerly on the Staff of the "BALTIMORE SUN", "U.S. DAILY", and others. He was described as commanding an excellent salary, and generally regarded as being in good financial circumstances. The report reflected, as cross references, GEORGE ABELL and ROBERT S. ALLEN.

PEARSON'S present wife was previously married to GEORGE ABELL, and has one child - TYLER ABELL. She was described as unemployed. Mrs. PEARSON was formerly MAX LUVIE MOORE - daughter of DAS TYLER MOORE, Aide to President THEODORE ROOSEVELT. She previously resided at 3264 "N" and 1744 "R" Streets, N.W., and had spent practically all of her life in the home of her Grandmother - Mrs. BUTLER - regarded as having considerable means. Mrs. PEARSON also owns 2822 Dumbarton Avenue, N.W., valued at \$10,350, identified as "Lot #806, Square 1235."

WFO 65-3339

A copy of the above report was furnished to the Retail Merchants' Credit Association, 417 South Hill Street, Los Angeles, California.

The current phone directory indicates that DREW PEARSON is located at 1313 29th Street, N.W., phones - Michigan 4800 and Michigan 4321. This is an office address around the corner from his residence. His home phone is listed in the name of Mrs. DREW PEARSON - Michigan 6687.

WFO 65-3339

ALLEN, ROBERT S. (RUTH FINNEY)

The credit report dated August 25, 1947 disclosed that ROBERT S. ALLEN, 1525 28th Street, N.W., has resided at this address since 1932, and owns the property. He was born 7/14/00; and was married in March, 1929. They have no children. He was formerly a well known Correspondent and Editorial Writer; served as Public Relations Officer with the Third Army during the recent war; lost an arm in the Service; and was discharged with the rank of Colonel. He was formerly co-Author for a number of years with DREW PEARSON in the column - "THE WASHINGTON MERRY-GO-AROUND" - and it is reported he is still in receipt of income from royalties from this source. At the present time, he is connected with "LOOK" in an executive capacity. He formerly was in charge of the local office for the "PHILADELPHIA RECORD", 1265 National Press Club, and the "CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR", 1285 National Press Club. His wife - the former RUTH FINNEY - is unemployed, but occasionally does some free lance writing and reporting. She came to Washington from California some 15 years earlier and was employed from about 1920 by the "WASHINGTON DAILY NEWS", Scripps Howard Newspaper Alliance.

WFO 65-3339

ABELL, GEORGE, Mrs. (JANE)

The credit report dated August 26, 1948, under the name of Mrs. GEORGE ABELL, 1413 35th Street, N.W., indicated that she was 38 to 40; married; dependent; unemployed; and having residence at the above address since 1/1/46, renting the house from Mrs. MARGARET WELLER at \$325 per month. She was previously twice married to JOE D. HAMILTON, and originally to GEORGE MASON GRANT, Jr. She reportedly possesses independent means, and owns a 200 acre farm at Paoli, Pennsylvania - a suburb of Philadelphia. She was described as a recognized leader of D.C. Society.

Her husband - GEORGE ABELL - was listed as a Writer by profession, who writes political articles and articles on national events for various Syndicates, and also does some free lance writing for various magazines. Since prior to 1930, he has been associated with the newspaper business. Prior to 10 years ago, ABELL was an employee of DREW PEARSON and "THE WASHINGTON MERRY-GO-ROUND" Syndicate. He also writes a weekly poem for the "SUNDAY TIMES HERALD", under the title - "READY-WILLING AND ABELL." He has been connected with this paper for about a year.

WFO 65-3339

COFFIN, TRIS (TRISTRAN) (MARGUERITE A.)

The credit report dated March 31, 1950, reflects TRIS COFFIN, 5601 Warwick Road, ChevyChase, Maryland, has resided at that address for two weeks, and is reportedly buying the property. He formerly resided at 8408 Woodcliff Court, Silver Springs, Maryland, for ten years. He is 37; married; two dependent children; and has been employed for five years as a News Commentator for the American Broadcasting Company, having a program called "NEWS OF TOMORROW", carried in Washington, D.C. Salary was refused, but was estimated to be \$500 per month. He is author of the book "MISSOURI COMPROMISE." Also, for the past two months, he has been associated with the DREW PEARSON Radio Program

ANDERSON, JACK N.

A review of the CP Indices disclosed that C299 was able to furnish four brief items concerning JACK N. ANDERSON:

On 6/16/47, C-299 advised ANDERSON tried to reach HOYT HADDOCK, who was not available. ANDERSON spoke with SETH LEVINE re information on the Maritime Strike. LEVINE indicated he was busy with the TAFT-HARTLEY ACT, and suggested that ANDERSON call HOYT later at his office or at his home.

On 9/30/47, ANDERSON contacted LEVINE, who stated "they are in town, and are staying at 824 Connecticut Avenue, N.W." He suggested that ANDERSON hold up writing anything about them until later.

On 10/2/47, ANDERSON endeavored to contact SETH LEVINE stating that he was called from DREW PEARSON'S Office and that he was working on a story for SETH and was to call him when something developed. JACK left word that nothing has developed yet and he would call SETH when something happens.

WFO 65-3339

On 6/26/49, ANDERSON contacted LOU MOSES, stating that he wanted to check a story with HAROLD SHAPIRO. (This pertains to the JUDITH COPLIN Case.) MOSES stated that SHAPIRO was not at home, and he had no idea where he could be reached. ANDERSON inquired if SHAPIRO had been to work this past week, and MOSES said he did not know.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : SAC, Washington Field

DATE: February 28, 1951

FROM : Director, FBI

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~SUBJECT: DREW PEARSON
ESPIONAGE - XDECLASSIFIED BY 60324 AUC BAW/CPB/TH
ON 03-05-2007

Reference is made to the personal conversation had on February 17, 1951, between Inspector A. H. Belmont and ASAC Howard Fletcher relative to information received from a confidential source concerning Jack N. Anderson, Pearson's "leg man." You will recall that Anderson advised the confidential source that he was the person who received the information in question for Pearson.

A check of the Bureau files reflected that inquiry was made of Major General Bolling in January, 1950, in connection with information received on January 16, 1950, to the effect that Jack Anderson in addition to dodging the draft in World War II was secretly conveying secret information to Drew Pearson.

The Department of the Army on February 14, 1950, advised that their files fail to confirm the allegation.

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For your further information and guidance, Jack Anderson is married to [redacted]. She is presently on maternity leave. She is [redacted] years of age, born in [redacted]. Jack Anderson was born October 19, 1922, his legal residence is Salt Lake City, Utah, and the Bureau files reveal that he is employed with Drew Pearson.

65-3339-61

SEARCHED.....	INDEXED.....
SERIALIZED <i>ll</i>	FILED <i>ll</i>
MAR 1 1951	
FBI - WASH. F. O.	

Graham EG

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 03-05-2007 BY 60324 AUC/BAW/CPB/TH

3-1-51

WASHINGTON FROM WASH FIELD

1

7:00p

DIRECTOR

U R G E N T

DREW PEARSON, ESPIONAGE DASH R. INVESTIGATION AT JOINT
CHIEFS OF STAFF. COL. CHESTER V. CLIFTON AND CDR. EDWARD L.
BEACH, PRESS RELATIONS OFFICERS AT JCS INTERVIEWED. ADVISE
JACK ANDERSON FREQUENTLY CONTACTS THEM FOR INFORMATION. SINCE
FIRST PART OF JANUARY THIS YEAR THEY HAVE ADOPTED PRACTICE
OF WRITING MEMO RELATING FULL FACTS OF ANDERSON-S VISITS AND
REMARKS. CDR BEACH ADVISED, AND PRODUCED MEMO IN SUBSTANTIATION,
THAT JACK ANDERSON CAME TO COL. CLIFTON-S OFFICE IN PENTAGON
ABOUT TWELVE FORTYFIVE P.M. ON FEBRUARY ONE, NINETEEN FIFTYONE.
CLIFTON UNABLE TO SEE HIM EXCEPT BRIEFLY, SO BEACH INTERVIEWED
HIM. THE MATTER OF THE DISPATCHES QUOTED IN PEARSON-S
COLUMN OF DECEMBER THIRTY, FIFTY CAME UP. ANDERSON ADMITTED
THAT HE WAS THE SOURCE FOR THE QUOTES IN PEARSON-S COLUMN. ANDERSON
SAID THAT THE MAN WHO HAD SHOWN THEM TO HIM WAS NOT WORRIED BECAUSE
ONLY HE AND ANDERSON KNOW OF IT, AND NEITHER OF THEM WILL REVEAL
WHO HE WAS. ANDERSON ALSO STATED THAT HE HAD HAD ACCESS TO A
COPY OF THE STENOGRAPHIC NOTES OF THE WAKE ISLAND CONFERENCE.
BEACH GOT THE IMPRESSION THAT ANDERSON HAD JUST COME
FROM HIS SOURCE, AND THAT THE SOURCE WAS IN THE PENTAGON.
CLIFTON ADVISED THAT A FEW DAYS AFTER THE DECEMBER THIRTY,

CWL:plb
65-3339

Searched _____
Serialized elaf
Indexed _____
Filed _____

65-3339-62

PAGE TWO

FIFTY COLUMN HE SAW ANDERSON AND DISCUSSED THE PUBLICATION OF THE QUOTATIONS. ANDERSON TOLD HIM THAT THE MAN WHO GAVE THE INFORMATION TOLD HIM IT WOULD BE ALL RIGHT TO USE IT PROVIDED HE CHANGED THE DATE AND CHANGED THE WORDING A LITTLE, STATING THAT QUOTE HE WOULDN'T BREAK SECURITY IF HE DID THESE THINGS. UNQUOTE. GENERAL OMAR BRADLEY INTERVIEWED. STATES HE DID NOT AUTHORIZE OR CLEAR ANY INFORMATION FOR PUBLICATION BY PEARSON. OFFERED FULLEST PERSONAL COOPERATION IN INVESTIGATION. COL. HARRY O. PATTESON, CDR. CHARLES H. MEAD, MAJOR L. A. TURK, JOINT INTELLIGENCE GROUP, JCS, ADVISED PRESENT AT TELECONFERENCES AND REVIEWED INSTANT TELECONS. STATE DID NOT FURNISH INFORMATION TO PEARSON OR STAFF, AND DO NOT KNOW THEM. DO NOT HAVE ANY INFORMATION AS TO PEARSON-S POSSIBLE SOURCE OF INFORMATION. INVESTIGATION CONTINUING. BUREAU WILL BE KEPT ADVISED.

STEIN

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 03-05-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/CPB/TH

FBI WASH FIELD

3-1-51

7:15 P

DIRECTOR

U R G E N T

DREW PEARSON, ESP. R. DISCREET SURVEILLANCE OF JACK ANDERSON SINCE AM,
FEBRUARY TWENTY SIX, HAS REFLECTED NO PERTINENT DEVELOPMENTS TO DATE.
ANDERSON HAS NOT VISITED PENTAGON DURING THIS PERIOD. ANDERSON APPARENTLY
TAKING NIGHT COURSES AT GW UNIVERSITY. REBULET FEBRUARY TWENTY EIGHT.
GENERAL EUGENE F. HARRISON OUT OF TOWN AND WILL NOT BE AVAILABLE FOR
INTERVIEW BEFORE MARCH TWELVE, NEXT. ACCORDING TO MEMBERS OF HIS STAFF,
ALL DETAILS RE CONVERSATION WITH CONSTANTINE BROWN ARE CONTAINED IN
MEMORANDA, PERTINENT CONTENTS OF WHICH ARE SET OUT IN MYTEL OF FEBRUARY
TWENTY SIX. INVESTIGATION CONTINUING.

STEIN

MO

LWRO:dm *dm*

65-3339

Searched _____
Serialized *6/22/51*
Indexed _____
Filed _____

65-3339-63

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : SAC, WFO

FROM : SA EDWIN DALRYMPLE

SUBJECT: DREW PEARSON
Espionage - R

DATE: March 9, 1951

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 03-05-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/CPB/TH

SURVEILLANCE MEMORANDUM

Re: JACK NORTHMAN ANDERSON

Age: 28

Height: 5'10"

Weight: 185 lbs.

Build: Medium heavy, full face and neck, heavy through shoulders

Hair: Light brown, sandy blond hair, straight

Eyes: Blue

Complexion: Fair

Characteristics: Good appearance, slightly prominent chin in profile

Dress: Never wears hat; light gray top coat; chocolate brown suit and light gray suit with faint check; occasionally wears green or red sport shirts and loud ties

1
5/1
24
-7

Wife: [redacted]

Age: [redacted]

Presently on maternity leave from [redacted] (child born [redacted])

b6
b7C

Residence Address: 13200 Midway Avenue,
Twin Brook, Maryland

Business Address: 1313 29th Street, N. W., or
2820 Dumbarton Street, N.W.,
the residence of DREW PEARSON

65-3339
ED:BW

65-3339-76A

SEARCHED.....	INDEXED.....
SERIALIZED <i>ft</i>	FILED <i>ft</i>
MAR - 9 1951	
FBI - WASH. F. O.	

Graham

Memo to SAC
Re: DREW PEARSON
Espionage - R

March 9, 1951

Automobiles: 1950 two-tone green Buick Sedan,
West Virginia license # 128-885,
presently being used by ANDERSON.
This automobile registered to Mrs.
RACHEL FARLEY, possibly ANDERSON's
mother-in-law.

1948 Oldsmobile 78 Sedan, Maryland
license #682-786, registered to
ANDERSON, but not observed to date.

PURPOSE OF INVESTIGATION OF ANDERSON

ANDERSON, employed as a reporter or "legman" by DREW PEARSON, has admitted to a confidential informant that he obtained information from secret Army documents, portions of which were quoted verbatim in the DREW PEARSON column of December 30, 1950. Investigation has indicated this leak probably occurred at the Pentagon, although the pertinent Army documents were also distributed to State Department and Central Intelligence Agency. ANDERSON is known to visit the Pentagon frequently to get news material for PEARSON.

PURPOSE OF SURVEILLANCE

Surveillance instituted to determine activities and contacts of ANDERSON, the identification of ANDERSON's acquaintances and possible sources within the Pentagon of particular importance.

This surveillance must be extremely discreet at all times. It should be temporarily discontinued at any time if necessary to insure security.

RESULTS OF SURVEILLANCE TO DATE

ANDERSON maintains no regular schedule. He usually leaves between 8:45 A.M., and 10:00 A. M. He is a fast driver and frequently parks illegally. He has visited the Senate Office Building and the Senate Press Gallery on several occasions, parking on the capitol grounds. He has visited the Pentagon

Memo to SAC
Re: DREW PEARSON
Espionage - R

March 9, 1951

on several occasions, utilizing the parking lot at the Mall entrance. He has stopped briefly in the Defense Department Press Room and has spent considerable time in the Air Force Public Relations Office. He attends George Washington University on Thursday nights and Saturday mornings. He is known to visit the Cosmos Club, located at Madison Place at H Street, N. W. He has been described by an informant as "surveillance conscious," but to date he has shown no evidence of this.

ASSOCIATES, KNOWN AND SUSPECTED CONTACTS

Pentagon Offices

Department of Defense Press Rooms--2E756--765
Air Force Public Relations Office--4D922
Air Force Directorate of Legislation and Liaison--4D927
Army Public Information Office--2E628--644
Navy Chief of Information--4D727
PHILIP C. WOODYATT--Room 2C557 at Pentagon,
Resides at 2812 South Wakefield Street, Arlington, Virginia.
WOODYATT reportedly secured employment in Army through efforts
of DREW PEARSON. WOODYATT described as:
Age: 36
Height: 6'
Weight: 175 lbs
Hair: red
Eyes: blue
Characteristics: thin face, nervous type
Brigadier General A. ROBERT GINSBURGH--3E933
Major DAVID I. WALSH--4C851

Other Locations

SAMUEL P. INGRAM, reportedly employed by House Republican Campaign Committee, George Washington Inn, New Jersey Avenue and C Street S. E. An informant stated that an individual possibly identical with INGRAM [redacted] which was later published by DREW PEARSON.

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b7C
b7D

Memo to SAC
Re: DREW PEARSON
Espionage - R

March 9, 1951

FREDERICK G. BLUMENTHAL, reporter for PEARSON, resides 1808 Queens Lane (Wilson Boulevard), Colonial Village, Arlington, Virginia; drives 1950 gray Pontiac convertible, Virginia license 162-7114

JOHN DONOVAN, Attorney, Room 902, American Security Building, 730 15th Street, N. W., resided 1310 16th Street, N. W., in 1948. Employed by DREW PEARSON since 1945.

TRIS COFFIN, employed by PEARSON and by Times Herald, resides 5601 Warwick Place, Chevy Chase, Maryland.

Bell Syndicate Offices--listed in telephone directory at Albee Building, 1426 G Street, N. W. Not listed on directory at Albee Building. Noted that Bell Syndicate publishes PEARSON articles in various newspapers.

(Title) _____

(File No.) _____

Item	Date Filed		Disposition
1	12-21-76	Letter from General Cooksey <i>see</i>	
2	12-21-76	Copy of General Gata letter <i>see</i>	
3	12-21-76	Memo from [redacted]	b6 b7C
4	12-21-76	Newspaper article 12-16-76 <i>see</i>	
5	2-2-77	<i>see</i> Agent notes in [redacted]	
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 02-15-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/CPB/TH			

65-253-1A

SEARCHED _____	INDEXED _____
SERIALIZED _____	FILED _____
DEC 21 1976	
FBI - ALEXANDRIA	
<i>McM/er</i>	

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-16-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/CPB/TH

File No. 65-253-1A⁽¹⁾

Date Received 12/21/76

From [Redacted]

(ADDRESS OF CONTRIBUTOR)

SA [Redacted] (AGENT)

To Be Returned Yes No Receipt Given Yes No

Description:

Letter from General
Cooksey -

b6
b7c

File No. 65-253-1A(2)

Date Received 12/21/76

From _____
(NAME OF CONTRIBUTOR)

(ADDRESS)

SA _____
(AGENT)

To Be Returned Yes No Receipt Given Yes No

Description:
Copies of General Tate letter

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-16-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/CPB/TH

b6
b7c

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-15-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/CPB/TH

File No. 65-253-1A(3)

Date Received 12/21/76

From

(ADDRESS OF CONTRIBUTOR)

SA (AGENT)

To Be Returned Yes No Receipt Given Yes No

Description:

*Memo from Maj -
Francisco*

b6
b7C

DAMI-DOS

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR RESEARCH DEVELOPMENT AND ACQUISITION.

SUBJECT: Classified Information in GAO Publication.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 07-17-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH

1. Brigadier General Tate's letter points out an area of continuing concern for the intelligence community. There was in fact one item in the 6 October 1976 article that is still classified. The 5 October 1976 expose of the Maverick system contained no classified material.
2. The FBI has in the past attempted to locate the source or sources of classified information leakage within the civilian community. They have not been overly affective however in regards to Mr. Anderson's sources. We of course actively seek out DA violators
3. Individual GAO reports are reviewed by the Security Division of OACSI to insure that the material is correctly classified. Each item that is classified is marked with brackets and appropriately classified e.g. C-Confidential, S-Secret etc.
4. Classified GAO reports are distributed to the Congress and to other agencies having a legitimate "need to know." They are issued as classified documents to be protected to a degree commensurate with their classification. B.G. Tates suggested special classified annex would be issued to the same agencies. Control of the annex would be as difficult to monitor as is the present system.

This page was released

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-15-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/CPB/TH

File No. 65-253-1A(4)

Date Received 12/21/76

From [Redacted]
ADDRESS OF CONTRIBUTOR

SA [Redacted] (T)

To Be Returned Yes No Receipt Given Yes No

Description:

Jack Anderson
newspaper article,
dated 10/6/76

b6
b7C

Army missiles fail to meet required performance marks

By Jack Anderson
with Les Whitten

WASHINGTON — The Pentagon has the disturbing habit of sweeping its mistakes under the secrecy label.

Government accountants have found, for example, that the Army's short-range defense system is "troubled by uncertainty and high cost." But the accountants don't have authority to over-

Merry-go-round

rule the military brass on secrecy. So the misspending has been concealed from the public.

We have obtained a copy, however, of the General Accounting Office's classified study of the short-range air defense system, which the Army called SHORAD for short. Clearly the taxpayers are entitled to know how their money has been wasted. As for military security, intelligence experts concede that the Soviets know all about the SHORAD system because of its widespread use in Europe.

The GAO report uses such words as "inadequacies" and "deficiencies" to describe the system. To call it a "troubled" system would be a mild assessment.

The story necessarily is technical. The GAO study covered three basic components of the SHORAD system: Chaparral missiles, Roland missiles and anti-aircraft artillery.

The Chaparral missiles form the backbone of the SHORAD system. These missiles, mounted on tracked vehicles, were rushed to Europe at the end of the 1960s to fill an "urgent" defense gap. They were supposed to be integrated with existing military weapons such as the Navy's Sidewinder missiles.

The arriving Chaparral missiles, according to the government accountants, had some "performance weaknesses" such as "an inability to engage incoming aircraft, inadequate warhead, etc."

This was a polite way of saying they didn't work, since their function was to engage incoming aircraft.

The Army recognized the deficiencies and intended to correct them. Or, to put it in the bureaucratic language of the Army brass, they "planned an expedited product improvement program."

But the accountants reported despairingly: "Although the Army has since come up with a number of improvements, they have not yet been made to the system. Thus the system in use today is still essentially the same as originally fielded."

Here are a few of the "performance weaknesses" that the GAO cited:

—The Chaparral is a sunshine weapon. Its "unrestricted use... is possibly only in fair-weather conditions." Unfortunately, this occurs only about 25 percent of the time. Thus an enemy need merely strike during bad weather.

—Unhappily, Chaparral missiles are also susceptible to enemy countermeasures. In fact, enemy planes could "essentially" have complete protection from Chaparral attack, the report warns.

—Chaparral missiles also have limited tactical use. Worse, the "survivability" of their launch unit in combat is a major problem.

—The Chaparral system relies on the gunner's ability visually to detect and distinguish between friendly and enemy aircraft. This is difficult to do with planes flying faster than sound. Thus in gloomy weather, the missile operators might shoot down the wrong planes.

Footnote: Despite all its problems, the Army wants to buy more Chaparrals, a move that the GAO labels "questionable." The Army is also developing the Roland as part of the answer to the Chaparral's inadequacies. But now "serious problems" have developed in the Roland program.

ARMY MISSILES FAIL TO MEET

REQUIRED PERFORMANCE MARKS

By Jack Anderson
with Les Whitten

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MERRY-GO-ROUND

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TAKEN FROM HUNTSVILLE, AL. HUNTSVILLE TIMES, 6 Oct 76

This page was released

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-15-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/CPB/TH

File No. 65-253-1A ⁽⁵⁾

Date Received 1/24/77

From Agent notes
(NAME OF CONTRIBUTOR)

(ADDRESS OF CONTRIBUTOR)

SA (TE)
AGENT)

To Be Returned Yes No Receipt Given Yes No

Description:

agent notes
re

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b7c

1/24/77

Major John R. FRANCISCO, Directorate of Intelligence
Operations, Security Division, Dept of Army, Room 2E461,
Pentagon.

1. Jack Anderson article, 10/6/76, Huntsville Times,
Huntsville, Ala. & others
2. Paragraph ten classified Confidential.
Properly classified.
3. According to Securitization Guide for Chaparral
Missile System. Classification effective
6/21/74. Not declassified. Classified
"Confidential" in GAO report. Accurate
4. Came from GAO report. Anderson states
he has copy. Captioned "Study by the Staff,
U.S. GAO, Roland + Chaparral Missile &
Anti aircraft Gun Programs. Dept of
Army". Date unknown. Probably in
March, 1976. Not aware of GAO official
with security responsibility.
5. Possibly 200 copies published
6. No prior official releases
7. Not aware of anyone seeking release
8. Not cognizant of any
9. Can probably be declassified. Chaparral
FAAR Project Officer, U.S. Missile Command.

10. No decision to declassify prior to disclosure.

11. Not grave or serious effect.

Same effect.

DATE: 07-17-2007
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1)
07-17-2032
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Complaint Form
FD-71 (Rev. 7-21-67)

NOTE: Hand print names legibly; handwriting satisfactory for remainder.

Indices: Negative See below

Subject's name and aliases
UNSUB;
Unauthorized Release of
Classified Information to
JACK ANDERSON, October,
1976

Character of case
ESPIONAGE - X


Complaint received
 Personal Telephonic Date 12/20/76 Time 3:15 p.m.

Address of subject

Complainant's address and telephone number
Pentagon
Room 2E461, OX 7-2622

Subject's Description	Race	Sex <input type="checkbox"/> Male <input type="checkbox"/> Female	Height	Hair	Build	Birth date and Birthplace	Referral/Consult
	Age	Weight	Eyes	Complexion			
Scars, marks or other data							

Facts of con



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DATE 03-28-2013 BY ADG F54M93K42

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65 new

65-253-1
SEARCHED INDEXED
SERIALIZED FILED
DEC 21 1976
FBI

Credit to
[Redacted]

Action Recommended O & A 65-253
SA [Redacted] (Agent)

b6
b7C

~~SECRET~~

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 03-28-2013 BY ADG F54M93K42

FD-302 (REV. 11-27-70)


FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Date of transcription 1/4/77

Information contained herein is unclassified unless
otherwise indicated:

Referral/Consult



~~CLASSIFIED BY 2095
EXEMPT FROM E.O. 12958 1 2 3 4
DATE OF DECLASSIFICATION: INDEFINITE~~

Interviewed on 12/21/76 at Arlington, Virginia File # AX 65-253 - 2

by SA [redacted] ^{WMC} krl Date dictated 12/28/76

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b7C

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AX 65-253

Referral/Consult



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Alexandria, Virginia
January 4, 1977

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DATE: 07-17-2007
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1)
07-17-2032
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

UNKNOWN SUBJECT;
UNAUTHORIZED RELEASE OF
CLASSIFIED INFORMATION TO
JACK ANDERSON, OCTOBER, 1976

Information contained herein is unclassified
unless otherwise indicated.

Referral/Consult



ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 03-28-2013 BY ADG F54M93K42

~~CLASSIFIED BY 3005
EXEMPT FROM GDS SCHEDULE 1 2 3 4
TYPE OF DECLASSIFICATION: EXEMPT~~

5-Bureau
1-WFO (Info)
①-Alexandria
WMC:krl
(7) *fw*

fw

~~This document contains neither
recommendations nor conclusions of
the FBI. It is the property of
the FBI and is loaned to your agency;
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distributed outside your agency.~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



65-253-3
SEARCHED INDEXED
SERIALIZED FILED

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1/4/77

Date of transcription

Information contained herein is unclassified unless
otherwise indicated: Referral/Consult



Interviewed on 12/21/76 at Arlington, Virginia File # AX 65-253

by SA [redacted]:krl - 2 - b6 Date dictated 12/28/76
b7C

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.


~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AX 65-253
2.

Referral/Consult



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 03-28-2013 BY ADG F54M93K42

1/4/77

A I R T E L

~~DATE: 07-17-2007
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1)
07-17-2032~~

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE~~


TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
FROM: SAC, ALEXANDRIA (65-253)(C)

UNSUB;
Unauthorized Release of
Classified Information to
JACK ANDERSON, October, 1976
ESPIONAGE - X
(OO: ALEXANDRIA)

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are five copies
of an LHM regarding captioned matter. One copy is also
enclosed for the information of WFO.

Referral/Consult

LHM classified ~~Confidential~~ inasmuch as



The Alexandria Division does not contemplate any
additional inquiries and is placing this matter in a closed
status, UACB.

2-Bureau (Enc. 5)
1-WFO (Enc. 1)(Info)
①-Alexandria
WMC:krl
(4)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MATERIAL ATTACHED.

Close
stopped
4-77
65-253-4

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

TRANSMIT VIA: Airtel

PRECEDENCE: _____

CLASSIFICATION: _____

DATE: 1/12/77

To: SAC, Alexandria (65-253)

✓ From: Director, FBI

UNSUB;
Unauthorized Release of
Classified Information to
Jack Anderson, October, 1976
ESPIONAGE - X

~~DATE: 07-17-2007
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1)
07-17-2032
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE~~

Reurairtel 1/4/77.

As you are aware, unauthorized disclosures of classified defense information to the press or other public media may be a violation of the espionage statutes, however, this Bureau does not initiate investigations of such matters unless specifically instructed to do so by the Assistant Attorney General (AAG), Criminal Division, U.S. Department of Justice. In order for the AAG to make a determination in this regard, the AAG, in the past, with respect to these matters, has requested that he be furnished the following information:

(This line for LEFT MARGIN.)

1. The date and identity of the article or articles disclosing the classified information.
2. Specific statements in the article which are considered classified and whether the data was properly classified.
3. Whether the classified data disclosed is accurate.
4. Whether the data came from a specific document and, if so, the origin of the document and the name of the individual responsible for the security of the classified data disclosed.

(Do not type BEYOND THIS MARGIN.)

1 - WFO

(Do not type below this line.)

65-253-5

SEARCHED _____	INDEXED _____
SERIALIZED _____	FILED _____
JAN 13 1977	
FBI - ALEXANDRIA	

b6
b7c

FBI/DOJ

(Handle promptly)

~~SECRET~~

Airtel to Alexandria

Re: Unsub;
Unauthorized Release of
Classified Information to
Jack Anderson, October, 1976

5. The extent of official dissemination of the data.
6. Whether the data has been the subject of prior official releases.
7. Whether prior clearance for publication or release of the information was sought from proper authorities.
8. Whether the material or portions thereof or enough background data has been published officially or in the press to make an educated speculation on the matter possible.
9. Whether the data can be declassified for the purpose of prosecution and, if so, the name of the person competent to testify concerning the classification.
10. Whether declassification had been decided upon prior to the publication or release of the data.
11. What effect the disclosure of the classified data could have on the national defense.

[redacted] Alexandria should promptly contact [redacted] and advise him of the Bureau's procedure for handling these types of investigations as stated above. He should also, at this time, be requested to furnish or arrange to have furnished, the answers to the questions set out above.

FBIHQ will hold the LHM submitted with referenced airtel until receipt of the above requested material, after which this matter will be presented to the Department for a determination as to any further action to be taken.

~~SECRET~~

DATE: 07-17-2007
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1)
07-17-2032
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE


FD-302 (REV. 11-27-70)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Date of transcription 2/1/77

Information contained herein is unclassified unless
otherwise indicated: Referral/Consult



~~CLASSIFIED BY 3695
EXCEPT FROM GDS. CATEGORY 1 2 (3) 4
DATE OF DECLASSIFICATION: INDEFINITE~~

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 03-28-2013 BY ADG F54M93K42

Interviewed on 1/24/77 at Arlington, Va. File # AX 65-253-6
by SA ^{mc} krl Date dictated 1/28/77
b6
b7c

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 03-28-2013 BY ADG F54M93K42

DATE: 07-18-2007
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1)
07-18-2032

Alexandria, Virginia
February 1, 1977

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

UNKNOWN SUBJECT;
UNAUTHORIZED RELEASE OF
CLASSIFIED INFORMATION TO
JACK ANDERSON, OCTOBER, 1976

Information contained herein is unclassified unless
otherwise indicated.

Referral/Consult



~~CLASSIFIED BY 3695
EXEMPT FROM GDS, CATEGORY 1 2 3 4
DATE OF DECLASSIFICATION: INDEFINITE~~

~~This document contains neither
recommendations nor conclusions of
the FBI. It is the property of
the FBI and is loaned to your agency;
it and its contents are not to be
distributed outside your agency.~~

5-Bureau
1-WFO (Info)
②-Alexandria (65-253)
WMC:kr1
(8) *kr1*

65-253-7
[Handwritten initials]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

b6
b7c

~~SECRET~~

FD-302 (REV. 11-27-70)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1.

Date of transcription 2/1/77

Information contained herein is unclassified unless otherwise indicated:

Referral/Consult



Interviewed on 1/24/77 at Arlington, Va. File # AX 65-253

by SA bxl - 2 - b6
b7C Date dictated 1/28/77

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

DATE: 07-17-2007
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1)
07-17-2032

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 03-28-2013 BY F54M93K42

X

2/1/77

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
FROM: SAC, ALEXANDRIA (65-253)(P)

UNSUB;
Unauthorized Release of
Classified Information to
JACK ANDERSON, October, 1976
ESPIONAGE - X
(OO: ALEXANDRIA)

ReAXairtel and LHM to Bureau, 1/4/77; and Bureau
airtel to Alexandria, 1/12/77.

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are five copies of
an LHM regarding captioned matter. One copy is also enclosed
for the information of WFO.

LHM is classified ~~Confidential~~ inasmuch as it contains

[Redacted]

[Redacted] was reinterviewed in accordance
with Bureau instructions in referenced airtel. Information
developed has been incorporated in the form of an LHM for
presentation by the Bureau to the Department of Justice.
Alexandria does not contemplate any additional inquiries
pending a prosecutive decision from the Department.

b6
b7C
b7D

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MATERIAL ATTACHED.

2-Bureau (Enc. 5)
1-WFO (Enc. 1)(Info)
②-Alexandria
WMC:krl
(5) *pl*

65-253-8

FD-217
submitted,

[Redacted]

b6
b7C

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 3 1977


The Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Richard L. Thornburgh
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division

RLT:JHD:JJT:njs
146-7-79-508

Unknown Subject; Unauthorized Release of Classified
Information to Jack Anderson, October, 1976

This is in reply to your memorandum dated February 3,
1977, requesting advice as to whether further investigation
is desired in this matter.



Referral/Consult

~~Classified By FBI
Exempt From GDS, Category 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

65-253-9


SEARCHED	INDEXED
SERIALIZED	FILED
MAR 15 1977	
KANDRIA	

b6
b7c

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

Referral/Consult



The results of your inquiry should be furnished to the
Criminal Division, Attention: Internal Security Section.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TRANSMIT VIA: Airtel

PRECEDENCE: _____

CLASSIFICATION: [REDACTED]

DATE: 3/14/77

To: SACs, Alexandria (65-253) (Enclosure)
WFO (Enclosure)

From: Director, FBI (65-76137)

UNSUB;
Unauthorized Release of
Classified Information to
Jack Anderson, October, 1976
ESPIONAGE-X

DATE: 07-18-2007
CLASSIFIED BY 60724 AUC BAW/STP/TH
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1)
07-18-2032

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

ReBuairtel dated 1/12/77.

Enclosed for each recipient is one copy of a self-explanatory memorandum dated 3/3/77, from Assistant Attorney General (AAG) Richard L. Thornburgh, classified "~~Confidential~~," which relates to captioned matter.

WFO, contact the appropriate official at the General Accounting Office (GAO) and obtain a copy of the GAO report described in the enclosed AAG memorandum, as well as determine the exact number of copies of this report published and to whom they were disseminated.

Alexandria, recontact [REDACTED] regarding the AAG's comments as set out in enclosed memorandum pertaining to more definitive answers to the questions contained in the memorandum dated 11/5/69, from the Director, FBI, to the Director of Inspection Services, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, on the subject of Unauthorized Disclosure of Classified Information to Press and Other Public Media.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MATERIAL ATTACHED

THIS DOCUMENT WILL BECOME UNCLASSIFIED
UPON REMOVAL OF THE ATTACHMENTS

65-253-10

SEARCHED	INDEXED
SERIALIZED	FILED
MAR 15 1977	
ALEXANDRIA	

(Do not type below this line.)

*Declassified
by 6855 on
11/30/72*

This line for LEFT MARGIN.

Do not type BEYOND THIS MARGIN.

b6
b7c

~~SECRET~~

Airtel to Alexandria and WFO
Re: UNSUB;
Unauthorized Release of
Classified Information to
Jack Anderson, October, 1976
65-76137

Also, determine from whether the Department of Army has met with GAO officials as previously indicated, and if so, whether any information pertinent to this matter was developed during the meeting.

b6
b7c

Submit results of investigation in form suitable for dissemination.

- 2 -

~~SECRET~~

X

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-16-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/CPE/TH

3/29/77

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (65-76137)
FROM: SAC, WFO (65-12275) (RUC)

b6
b7C

UNSUB; UNAUTHORIZED RELEASE OF
CLASSIFIED INFORMATION TO JACK
ANDERSON, OCTOBER, 1976
ESPIONAGE - X

Re Bureau airtel dated 3/14/77, enclosing Departmental
letter dated 3/3/77.

On 3/29/77, the Department's request as contained in
its letter of 3/3/77, was relayed to [redacted] Director of
Security, U.S. General Accounting Office. [redacted] requested that
either the Department or FBI Headquarters address a formal
written request for the desired document and information regard-
ing its dissemination to [redacted] Director, Office of
Administrative Services, United States General Accounting Office,
441 G Street, N.W., Washington, D.C., 20548.

WFO taking no further action.

2-Bureau
1-WFO

JES:smv
(3)

65-253-11

SEARCHED	INDEXED
SERIALIZED	FILED
APR 15 1977	
[redacted]	ANDRIA

b6
b7C

Routing Slip
 0-7 (Rev. 7-12-76)

(Copies to Of Checked)

4/14/77

(Date)

TO: SAC:

- | | |
|--|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Albany | <input type="checkbox"/> Houston |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Albuquerque | <input type="checkbox"/> Indianapolis |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Alexandria | <input type="checkbox"/> Jackson |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Anchorage | <input type="checkbox"/> Jacksonville |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Atlanta | <input type="checkbox"/> Kansas City |
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| <input type="checkbox"/> Boston | <input type="checkbox"/> Little Rock |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Buffalo | <input type="checkbox"/> Los Angeles |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Butte | <input type="checkbox"/> Louisville |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Charlotte | <input type="checkbox"/> Memphis |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Chicago | <input type="checkbox"/> Miami |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Cincinnati | <input type="checkbox"/> Milwaukee |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Cleveland | <input type="checkbox"/> Minneapolis |
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| <input type="checkbox"/> Denver | <input type="checkbox"/> New Haven |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Detroit | <input type="checkbox"/> New Orleans |
| <input type="checkbox"/> El Paso | <input type="checkbox"/> New York City |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Honolulu | <input type="checkbox"/> Norfolk |

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| <input type="checkbox"/> Oklahoma City |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Omaha |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Philadelphia |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Phoenix |
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| <input type="checkbox"/> Sacramento |
| <input type="checkbox"/> St. Louis |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Salt Lake City |
| <input type="checkbox"/> San Antonio |
| <input type="checkbox"/> San Diego |
| <input type="checkbox"/> San Francisco |
| <input type="checkbox"/> San Juan |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Savannah |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Seattle |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Springfield |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Tampa |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Washington Field |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Quantico |

TO LEGAT:

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| <input type="checkbox"/> Bern |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Bonn |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Brasilia |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Buenos Aires |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Caracas |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Hong Kong |
| <input type="checkbox"/> London |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Madrid |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Manila |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Mexico City |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Ottawa |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Paris |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Rome |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Tokyo |

- SAC, New Rochelle (MRA) ASAC, Rapid City ("Mini")

RE: **Unsub; Unauthorized Release Of Classified Information To Jack Anderson, October, 1976 Espionage-X OO:AX**

ReWFO Airtel 3/29/77

- For information Retention optional For appropriate action Surep, by _____
- The enclosed is for your information. If used in a future report, conceal all sources, paraphrase contents.
- Enclosed are corrected pages from report of SA _____ dated _____

Remarks:

**Enclosed for Alexandria is one copy of referenced WFO Airtel.
 Bureau will submit formal written request to GAO.**

65-253-11A

SEARCHED <i>llh</i>	INDEXED <i>llh</i>
SERIALIZED <i>llh</i>	FILED <i>llh</i>
APR 15 1977	
ALEXANDRIA	

Enc. **1**
 Bufile **65-76137**
 Urfile **65-253**

b6
 b7C

~~SECRET~~

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 03-28-2013 BY ADG F54M93K42

FD-302 (REV. 11-27-70)


DATE: 07-17-2007
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1)
07-17-2032

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Date of transcription 5/2/77

Referral/Consult



Interviewed on 4/21/77 at Arlington, Virginia File # AX 65-253-12

by SA [redacted] ^{ymc} klh Date dictated 4/27/77
b6
b7C

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 03-28-2013 BY ADG F54M93K42



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Alexandria, Virginia
May 6, 1977

DATE: 07-17-2007
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1)
07-17-2032

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

UNKNOWN SUBJECT;
Unauthorized Release Of
Classified Information to
JACK ANDERSON, October, 1976

Reference is made to Alexandria memorandum
dated February 1, 1977.

In accordance with the instructions contained
in the memorandum of Richard L. Thornburgh, Assistant
Attorney General, Criminal Division, United States
Department of Justice, captioned as above and dated
March 3, 1977, a representative of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI) contacted [redacted]
of the Department of the Army and obtained the following
information:


b6
b7c

This document contains neither
recommendations nor conclusions of
the FBI. It is the property of
the FBI and is loaned to your agency;
it and its contents are not to be
distributed outside your agency.

- 5 - Bureau
 - 1 - WFO
 - ② - Alexandria (65-253)
- WMC:klh
(8) *klh*

65-253-13

SEARCHED	INDEXED
SERIALIZED <i>PA</i>	FILED <i>de</i>



C

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

DATE: 07-18-2007
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1)
07-18-2032

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 03-28-2013 BY ADG F54M93K42

x

5/6/77

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (65-76137)
FROM: SAC, ALEXANDRIA (65-253) (P)


UNSUB;
Unauthorized Release of
Classified Information to
JACK ANDERSON, October, 1976
ESPIONAGE - X
(OO: ALEXANDRIA)

Re Bureau airtel to Alexandria, 3/14/77.

Enclosed for the Bureau are five copies of an LHM
dated and captioned as above. One copy is also enclosed
for the information of WFO.

Referral/Consult

When recontacted on 4/21/77



- 2 - Bureau (Enc 5)
 - 1 - WFO (Enc 1) (65-12275) (Info)
 - ② - Alexandria
- WMC:klh
(5) llh

65-253-14

SEARCHED	INDEXED
SERIALIZED	FILED



b6
b7c

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~


DATE: 07-18-2007
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 AUC BAW/STP/TH
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1)
07-18-2032
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 03-28-2013 BY ADG F54M93K42

REGISTERED

Date: April 20, 1977
To: Director
Office of Administrative Services
General Accounting Office
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20548
From: Clarence M. Kelley, Director
Subject: UNKNOWN SUBJECT;
UNAUTHORIZED RELEASE OF
CLASSIFIED INFORMATION TO
JACK ANDERSON, OCTOBER, 1976
ESPIONAGE - X

Enclosed is one copy each of two letterhead memoranda, both classified "Confidential," dated January 4, 1977, and February 1, 1977, at Alexandria, Virginia, which contained background information regarding captioned matter.



Referral/Consult

1 - Alexandria (65-253)
1 - WFO (65-12275)

65-253-15
AX, WFO, SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

Step 6/21/77
per [signature] 6/21/77
[signature]

SEARCHED INDEXED
SERIALIZED FILED
APR 21 1977
ALEXANDRIA
[initials]

~~SECRET~~

b6
b7c

**Director
Office of Administrative Services
General Accounting Office**

Referral/Consult



Enclosures - 2

NOTE FOR ALEXANDRIA AND WFO:

**Copy being furnished for informational purposes
only.**

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-16-2007 BY 60324 AUC BAW/CPB/TH

February 7 1978

The Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Benjamin R. Civiletti
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division

Unknown Subject; Unauthorized Release of Classified
Information to Jack Anderson, October, 1976

This is in response to your communication of January 25, 1978, which referred to us a letter from the General Accounting Office (GAO) dated January 18, 1978, and requested to be advised what further investigation, if any, is desired in this matter.

As we were informed by your memorandum of February 3, 1977, on December 21, 1976, Major John R. Francisco, Directorate of Intelligence Operations, Security Division, Department of the Army, informed your Bureau that the Jack Anderson column of October 6, 1976, contained classified information. Specifically, in this column, Anderson claimed to have in his possession a copy of the General Accounting Office's classified study of the Army's short-range air defense system, and assertedly quoted from this study which concerns the performance weakness of the U. S. Army Chaparral Missile System during inclement weather conditions. The Army informed the Bureau that this information was contained in the "GAO Staff Study, Roland and Chaparral Missile and Antiaircraft Gun Programs," dated March 17, 1976 and that this information is classified and has not been declassified.

The Bureau was advised that the disclosure of this classified information on the Chaparral Missile System would not have a grave or serious effect on the national defense, but that it could have some effect since the information would be beneficial to an enemy of the United States.

DO NOT DESTROY
HISTORICAL VALUE,
NATIONAL ARCHIVES

65-253-16

Chaparral
Info

The Bureau was advised that appropriate officials of the Department of the Army would meet with GAO officials to discuss the aforementioned unauthorized disclosure and attempt to formulate measures to prevent future unauthorized disclosures of similarly classified GAO documents of this nature.

By our memorandum of March 3, 1977, we requested that the Bureau obtain additional specific information about this matter from the Army and the GAO. In addition, you were requested to advise the Army that should it desire any additional investigation, it must supply definitive answers to the eleven questions asked of the originating agencies in unauthorized disclosure cases. Further you were requested to obtain a copy of the GAO report, ascertain the number of copies that were printed, to whom they were disseminated and determine whether any pertinent information was developed during a meeting that was to be held between the Army and GAO to discuss the unauthorized disclosure.

By a letterhead memorandum, dated May 6, 1977 at Alexandria, Va., you informed us that Major John R. Francisco had been interviewed on April 11, 1977 and had advised that, after further consideration, the Army had decided that it did not wish to pursue this matter. The Army decided that the publication of the information was not of such significance as to warrant any additional inquiries, and that it did not intend to furnish more definitive answers to the eleven questions.

The GAO letter to you, dated January 18, 1978, furnished a copy of the "Confidential" report in question, of which 142 copies were printed. GAO has been able to identify the recipients of 96 of those copies. GAO advised that because of the wide distribution of the report, and the likelihood that a copy was made by someone and given to Jack Anderson, rather than giving him a controlled, prenumbered report, it seems highly unlikely that the source of the unauthorized disclosure can be located.

GAO informed you that it had never been contacted by the Army regarding this matter. Further, since the publication

of the report, two supervisors in GAO's Distribution Section have been removed from their positions and substantive changes to tighten controls on classified materials have been instituted.

In view of the foregoing, prosecution for violation of 18 U.S.C. 793 is precluded and no further investigation of this matter is warranted at this time.

Routing Slip
 0-7 (Rev. 5-13-77)

(Copies to Office) Checked

TO: SAC:

- Albany
- Albuquerque
- Alexandria
- Anchorage
- Atlanta
- Baltimore
- Birmingham
- Boston
- Buffalo
- Butte
- Charlotte
- Chicago
- Cincinnati
- Cleveland
- Columbia
- Dallas
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- Knoxville
- Las Vegas
- Little Rock
- Los Angeles
- Louisville
- Memphis
- Miami
- Milwaukee
- Minneapolis
- Mobile
- Newark
- New Haven
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- New York City
- Norfolk

- Oklahoma City
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- Phoenix
- Pittsburgh
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- Richmond
- Sacramento
- St. Louis
- Salt Lake City
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- San Diego
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- Springfield
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- Quantico

TO LEGAT:

- Bern
- Bonn
- Buenos Aires
- Caracas
- Hong Kong
- London
- Madrid
- Manila
- Mexico City
- Ottawa
- Paris
- Rome
- Tokyo

SAC, New Rochelle (MRA) ASAC, Rapid City ("Mini") 2-17-78
 (Date)
 RE: **UNKNOWN SUBJECT;**
Unauthorized Release of Classified
Information to Jack Anderson, October, 1976

For information Retention optional For appropriate action Surep, by _____
 The enclosed is for your information. If used in a future report, conceal all sources, paraphrase contents.
 Enclosed are corrected pages from report of SA _____ dated _____

Remarks:

"DO NOT DESTROY:
 HISTORICAL VALUE,
 NATIONAL ARCHIVES"

65-253-16A

SEARCHED _____	INDEXED _____
SERIALIZED _____	FILED _____
FEB 21 1978	
FBI - ALEXANDRIA	

[Signature]

Enc. 1
 Bufile 65-76137
 Urfile 65-253

TRANSMIT VIA: Airtel

PRECEDENCE: _____

CLASSIFICATION: _____

DATE: 5/11/77

To: SACs, Alexandria
Baltimore
Washington Field Office

✓ From: Director, FBI

JACK N. ANDERSON v. ^{numerous} _{ref's}
RICHARD M. NIXON, et al.
(U.S.D.C., D.C.)
CIVIL ACTION NO. 76-1794
BUDED 5/20/77

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Re Bureau airtel to Alexandria and other offices dated 10/14/76; Baltimore teletype to Bureau dated 10/15/76; Alexandria teletype to Bureau dated 10/19/76; and Washington Field Office (WFO) airtel and letterhead memorandum dated 10/20/76, all captioned "ELSUR, JACK N. ANDERSON, 7300 Burdette Court, Bethesda, Maryland, 20034."

For the information of receiving offices, plaintiff, Jack N. Anderson, the syndicated newspaper columnist, has filed a Complaint in the United States District Court (U.S.D.C.), District of Columbia (D.C.), alleging from July, 1969, until sometime in 1974, a conspiracy amongst the defendants, including former Acting Director Gray and Director Kelley to unlawfully abridge plaintiff's First Amendment rights as a journalist and his rights of privacy, to be free from unlawful search and seizure, and to the protection of his life, liberty and property from interference without due process of law. Plaintiff seeks damages as to past activities and declaratory and specific relief against future actions. Plaintiff alleges a wide variety of wrongdoings as part of this conspiracy from improper electronic surveillance to planning physical harm to plaintiff. Specifically, as to FBI activities, the Complaint alleges unlawful investigation aimed at discovering and prosecuting persons who had given information to plaintiff, particularly involving one [redacted] improper

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62-284-1

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MAY 12 1977	
FBI-ALEXANDRIA	
[redacted]	C

Airtel to SAC, Alexandria
Re: JACK N. ANDERSON v.
RICHARD M. NIXON, et al.

providing of information about plaintiff to defendant John W. Dean, III, by deceased Director Hoover and unlawful investigation conducted to determine plaintiff's source as to documents taken from the Bureau of Indian Affairs, 1972.

Simultaneous with the filing of the Complaint, plaintiff served his First Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents to defendant Kelley. Pursuant to a protective order issued by the U.S.D.C., Director Kelley's response to these discovery efforts has been stayed until the present time.

Currently pending before the U.S.D.C. is a Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, For a Summary Judgment filed on behalf of defendants Kelley and Gray. In response to this Motion, plaintiff has requested the Court to require defendant Kelley to answer a limited number of his Interrogatories and Document Requests in order that he might better respond to defendants' Motion. The U.S.D.C. by Pre-trial Notice and Order filed 4/27/77, has ordered defendant Kelley to respond to the following Interrogatories and Requests for Documents within 30 days:

INTERROGATORIES

" 1.0 Do you, or does the agency under your supervision, possess any information respecting any of the matters listed in this Interrogatory 1.0, parts 1.1-1.18, (a) whether (where pertinent) such matters were consummated or only were attempted, contemplated or discussed, and (b) whether or not there was any involvement or potential involvement of your agency:

1 . . .

1.3 Wiretapping of any telephone of plaintiff;

. . .

1.5 Electronic surveillance (bugging) of plaintiff;

Airtel to SAC, Alexandria
Re: JACK N. ANDERSON v.
RICHARD M. NIXON, et al.

1.6 Transmission or delivery of false information
to plaintiff;

. . .

1.8 Administration of drugs to plaintiff;

1.9 Electronic eavesdropping on plaintiff;

1.10 Electronic eavesdropping on any telephone which
resulted in the overhearing of any conversation in which plaintiff

(a) was a participant, or

(b) was mentioned;

1.11 Infliction of physical harm on plaintiff;

1.12 Physical surveillance of plaintiff, of any
associates or relatives of plaintiff, plaintiff's home or office, or
of any other building on premises occupied by plaintiff;

. x .

2.0 If the answer to any part of Interrogatory 1.0
is affirmative, state with respect to such matter;

. . .

2.2 The name, home and business address, and
home and business telephone numbers, of every individual possessing
information with respect to the item, with a summary of the infor-
mation the individual possesses;

. . . ."

Airtel to SAC, Alexandria
Re: JACK N. ANDERSON v.
RICHARD M. NIXON, et al.

REQUESTS FOR DOCUMENTS

1. Records which are a record of, relate to or reflect any of the information described in Interrogatories 1.0-1.18, served this day.

. . .

15. Records of investigation, surveillance, burglary, wiretapping and any other interference with, reports on and proposals to deal with plaintiff carried out, proposed or attempted to be carried out or suggested or communicated to the "White House Plumbers," including defendants John Ehrlichman, Egil Krogh, David Young, E. Howard Hunt and G. Gordon Liddy.

16. Records of any wiretaps, proposed wiretaps or attempted wiretaps of plaintiff's home or office not otherwise specified above.

17. Records of any proposals, suggestions or attempts to do physical harm to plaintiff by poison.

. . . ."

In referenced communications, Alexandria, Baltimore, and Washington Field Offices have completed the necessary indices checks and file reviews as to "consummated" acts involving electronic surveillance (Interrogatories 1.3, 1.5, 1.9, 1.10 and Document Request 16) and further file reviews with regard to "consummated" acts of electronic surveillance will not be required. However, because of the nature of the ELSUR indices and the review of general indices conducted in conjunction therewith, "attempted," "contemplated," or "discussed" electronic surveillance matters would not necessarily be revealed. Therefore, should documents be located during the requested file reviews,

Airtel to SAC, Alexandria
Re: JACK N. ANDERSON v.
RICHARD M. NIXON, et al.

infra, relating to "attempted," "contemplated," or "discussed" electronic surveillance during the period July 1, 1969, to December 31, 1974, two copies of these documents should be forwarded to FBI Headquarters, Attention: Legal Counsel Division, even though it is highly unlikely that "contemplated" or "discussed" electronic surveillance, or for that matter any of the activities covered in the Interrogatories or Document Requests, will be provided to plaintiff as not being relevant to the issues alleged in the Complaint.

With regard to the remaining Interrogatories (1.0 [as it relates to other Interrogatories], 1.6, 1.8, 1.11, 1.12, 2.0, and 2.2) and Document Requests (1[as it relates to those Interrogatories], 15 and 17), review of all appropriate main case files and cross file references to plaintiff relating to the period July 1, 1969, to December 31, 1974, must be undertaken in order that a complete response can be made. This review should be made for information responsive to these Interrogatories and Document Requests both as to FBI activities and activities of other Federal governmental agencies or entities and certain individuals. These individuals are as follows:

Richard M. Nixon	Herbert W. Kalmbach
Henry A. Kissinger	Egil Krogh, Jr.
Richard M. Helms	David R. Young, Jr.
John N. Mitchell	John J. Caulfield
H. R. Haldeman	Anthony T. Ulasewicz.
John D. Ehrlichman	E. Howard Hunt
Charles W. Colson	G. Gordon Liddy
Richard J. Kleindienst	James W. Mc Cord, Jr.
John W. Dean, III	Edward H. Levi
Robert C. Mardian	George Bush
Jeb Stuart Magruder	Donald G. Alexander

Should documents be located during these file reviews responsive to the above interrogatories and document requests relating to the period July 1, 1969, to December 31, 1974, two copies of each should be submitted to FBI Headquarters, Attention: Legal Counsel Division.

Airtel to SAC, Alexandria
Re: JACK N. ANDERSON v.
RICHARD M. NIXON, et al.

In order to comply with the U. S. D. C. 's Order in this matter, a Buded of 5/20/77, has been set.

To assist receiving offices in determining if file references are identical to plaintiff, plaintiff is identified as follows:

Name:	Jack Northman Anderson
Race:	Caucasian
Sex:	Male
DOB:	October 19, 1922
POB:	Long Beach, California
SSAN:	528-20-6909

Should you have any questions with regard to this matter, SA [redacted] Civil Litigation Unit, extension [redacted] should be contacted.

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b7C

5/16/77

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: *R* SAC, ALEXANDRIA (62-284) (~~BUC~~)

JACK N. ANDERSON v.
RICHARD M. NIXON, et al.
(U.S.D.C., D.C.)
CIVIL ACTION NO. 76-1794
BUDED: 5/20/77

Re Bureau airtel to Alexandria, 5/11/77.

With regard to the Interrogatories and Document Requests as contained in referenced Bureau airtel, the Alexandria Office conducted a review of main case files and cross file references to plaintiff relating to the period 7/1/69, to 12/31/74.

This file review revealed that the Alexandria Office does not possess any information relative to any matters listed in said Interrogatories, (a) whether such matters were consummated or only attempted, contemplated, or discussed, and (b) whether or not there was any involvement or potential involvement. Neither does the Alexandria Office possess any documents as enumerated in said Request for Documents.

Therefore, the Alexandria Office is not submitting any documents regarding captioned matter.

2 - Bureau
① - Alexandria
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62-284-2
SEARCHED _____ INDEXED _____
SERIALIZED *B* FILED *S*



United States Department of Justice
 Federal Bureau of Investigation
 New York, N. Y.

SAC
 ASAC 1
 ASAC 2
 SEC. 1
 SEC. 2
 SEC. 3
 SEC. 4
 SEC. 5
 SEC. 6
 SEC. 7

December 19, 1951

MEMORANDUM

Re: DREW PEARSON;
 ALLEGED LEAK FROM WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE
 12-10-51 TO JACK ANDERSON, LEG MAN FOR
 DREW PEARSON;
 ESPIONAGE - X

65-10729*

SUPERVISOR
 CLERK
 UNIT

At 9:35 a.m. on December 19, 1951, Inspector [redacted] of the Bureau telephonically furnished the following information concerning the captioned matter:

By way of background, [redacted] advised that on December 10, 1951, President TRUMAN called a conference at the White House following his return from Key West. Immediately following this conference JACK ANDERSON, the leg man for DREW PEARSON, had in his possession a verbatim report of the conference. This report contained items of great importance to the Pentagon. It was learned that DREW PEARSON and ROBERT ALLEN contemplated filing stories based upon this verbatim report. The Pentagon succeeded in contacting both PEARSON and ALLEN and eliminating from their stories certain items of importance to the Pentagon.

On December 13, 1951, ROBERT ALLEN's column in the New York Post, blue final edition, carried the story of the Presidential conference. This column did not carry the items in which the Pentagon was interested. The New York Office was requested to furnish, and did furnish, a copy of this paper to the Bureau.

On December 15, 1951, DREW PEARSON in his column in the New York Mirror and Philadelphia Inquirer reported on the Presidential conference. Again this column did not contain the items of interest to the Pentagon, so far as the Bureau knows. The PEARSON column was placed on the Bell Syndicate wire.

[redacted] instructed that the New York Office contact the Bell Syndicate and obtain a copy of the column of DREW PEARSON as originally filed. [redacted] desired to know when the column was filed and whether the items ordered killed by the Pentagon appeared in the original column as filed and were subsequently deleted, or whether the original column as filed was filed without the items of interest to the Pentagon. He desired the complete column

TJMCA:RAA

65-15923

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DEC 19 1951	
FBI - NEW YORK	
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65-15923-1	

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Re: DREW PEARSON;
ALLEGED LEAK FROM WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE
12-10-51 TO JACK ANDERSON, LEG MAN FOR
DREW PEARSON;
ESPIONAGE - X

as filed submitted to the Bureau and the Washington Field Office by teletype. Any modifications of the column following its original filing should be pointed out in this teletype.

Concerning the column of ROBERT S. ALLEN, [redacted] did not know whether this column was handled by the Bell Syndicate. In any event he desired the same handling of this column as set out above concerning PEARSON's column. This information should also be incorporated in a teletype to the Bureau and WFO.

b6
b7C

[redacted] instructed that the matter should be handled most discreetly by experienced agent personnel and indicated that despite the fact that PEARSON unquestionably knows the Bureau is investigating him, our inquiry in this matter can result in embarrassing publicity insofar as the Bureau is concerned if it is not properly handled by the New York Office.

[redacted]

SA

[redacted] handling

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FD-36

MR. SCHEIDT
MR. WHELAN
MR. HARGETT
MR. GILBERT
MR. GRANVILLE
MR. HAMILTON
MR. LADD
MR. NICHOLS
MR. ROSEN
MR. TRACY
MR. WOOD
MR. WYATT
MR. ZIEGLER
MR. BELMONT
MR. MOHR
MR. WINTERROWD
MR. NEASE
MR. GANDY

NEW YORK, N. Y. DECEMBER 20, 1951

Transmit the following Teletype message to:

BUREAU
SAC, WASHINGTON FIELD (VERY URGENT)

att. Insp.

DREW PEARSON; ALLEGED LEAK FROM WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE DECEMBER TENTH, ONE, TO JACK ANDERSON, LEG MAN FOR DREW PEARSON; ESPIONAGE - X. HENRY M. SNEVILY, SECRETARY AND TREASURER OF BELL SYNDICATE, INC., TWO TWO NINE WEST FORTY THIRD ST., NYC, A SUBSIDIARY OF NORTH AMERICAN NEWSPAPER ALLIANCE, INC., WAS INTERVIEWED IN HIS OFFICE ON THE MORNING OF DECEMBER TWENTIETH. HE ADVISED THAT DREW PEARSON HAS HIS OFFICE IN HIS HOME, *in Washington D.C.* IN WHICH IS LOCATED A TELETYPE WHICH HE USES IN DISPATCHING HIS NEWS RELEASES TO BELL SYNDICATE. UPON RECEIPT OF THESE TELETYPES FROM PEARSON, THEY ARE READ BY TO DETERMINE IF THEY MIGHT CONTAIN MATERIAL THAT IS LIBELOUS OR SLANDEROUS AGAINST THE PUBLIC INTEREST OR AGAINST SECURITY MATTERS IN GENERAL. THEREAFTER THEY ARE SENT TO ANY ONE OF A NUMBER OF EDITORS IN THE SYNDICATE WHO PROOFREAD THEM FOR GRAMMATICAL CORRECTIONS AND OTHER JOBS NORMALLY DONE BY AN EDITOR FOR A COLUMNIST. HE STATED HOWEVER THAT IN NO INSTANCE DO THEY CHANGE THE CONTENT OF ANY OF PEARSONS RELEASES WITHOUT CLEARING THEM DIRECTLY WITH PEARSON. STATED THAT IN PRACTICALLY ALL INSTANCES ^{RE} WHENEVER THERE IS SOME MATERIAL THEY ARE NOT SURE OF

b6
b7c

HE PERSONALLY CONTACTS PEARSON BY TELEPHONE FOR CLARIFICATION. *He stated he advised me recalled Pearsons article of Dec 15 that appeared in N.Y. Daily Mirror*
~~HE PERSONALLY CONTACTS PEARSON BY TELEPHONE FOR CLARIFICATION. HE ADVISED ME READING A COPY OF DREW PEARSONS ARTICLE DATED IN WASHINGTON, DECEMBER FOURTEENTH, IN WHICH HE RECALLED IT PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT THERE WAS A FOLLOWUP TELETYPE WITH SOME CORRECTIONS THEREON. HE SUBSEQUENTLY OBTAINED~~

FROM HIS FILE THE ORIGINAL TELETYPE MESSAGE SENT FROM PEARSONS OFFICE IN WASHINGTON TOGETHER WITH THE FOLLOWUP CORRECTION THAT HE HAD RECEIVED FROM PEARSONS OFFICE. IT APPEARS THAT THE ORIGINAL TELETYPE MESSAGE FROM PEARSON

TGS:RAA (#1)

Approved: *[Signature]*
Special Agent in Charge

Sent *342 PM*

Per *[Signature]*

65-159231-2

to open 65-20

73

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Transmit the following Teletype message to:

- 2 -

WAS DATED DECEMBER ELEVENTH, THE CORRECTED TELETYPE WAS DATED DECEMBER TWELFTH. SNEVILY RELATED THAT THIS IS A MORE OR LESS STANDARD PROCEDURE IN DEALING WITH PEARSON WHEREBY THEY RECEIVE THE STORY AT LEAST THREE TO FOUR DAYS BEFORE ITS PUBLICATION. AFTER RECEIPT OF ~~THE~~ NEWS STORIES FROM PEARSON THEY SEND OUT THE EDITED COPY BY TELETYPE TO CHICAGO AND SAN FRANCISCO, WHICH OFFICES THEN SEND IT TO OTHER SUBSCRIBERS IN THOSE AREAS VIA MAIL. THERE IS SET FORTH HEREAFTER A COPY OF THE PERTINENT PORTION OF PEARSONS STORY THAT ~~APPEARED IN~~ ^{appears} ~~in the teletypes obtained from Snevily~~ ^{in the teletypes obtained from Snevily} A PHOTOSTATIC COPY OF THE BELL SYNDICATES TELETYPE TOGETHER WITH THE CORRECTION WILL BE FORWARDED TO THE BUREAU UNDER SEPARATE COVER.

QUOTE FROM THE BELL SYNDICATE, INC.--RELEASE SATURDAY, DEC. 15, 1951.

DREW PEARSON

ON

THE WASHINGTON MERRY-GO-ROUND

(COPYRIGHT, 1951, BY THE BELL SYNDICATE, INC.)

DREW PEARSON SAYS: (CAPS) TRUMAN GOT FAVORABLE REPORT ON KOREAN TRUCE AT JOINT CHIEFS MEETING; U.S. TROOPS COULD STAY IN KOREA TILL "HELL FREEZES OVER;" TOP EXECUTIVES DESERTING TRUMAN. (END CAPS)

WASHINGTON.--MOST OF THE WORLD WAS INTRIGUED OVER PRESIDENT TRUMAN'S MUCH-PUBLICIZED MEETING WITH THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF FOLLOWING HIS RETURN FROM KEY WEST. HOWEVER, IT TURNED OUT TO BE PRETTY MUCH ROUTINE AFTER ALL. HIGHLIGHT OF THE MEETING WAS AN OPTIMISTIC ASSURANCE FROM

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____

Special Agent in Charge

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Transmit the following Teletype message to:

- 3 -

GEN. OMAR BRADLEY THAT A CEASE-FIRE COULD BE WORKED OUT IN KOREA.

THE NATION'S HIGHEST DIPLOMATIC AND MILITARY CHIEFS WERE WAITING IN THE CABINET ROOM WHEN PRESIDENT TRUMAN STRODE IN. HE WAS GRINNING BROADLY. SHAKING HANDS WITH EVERYONE AROUND THE CONFERENCE TABLE, HE REPORTED THAT IT WAS "GOOD TO BE BACK," AND ASKED HOW THEY LIKED HIS SUN TAN.

AFTER THAT, HE LET THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF DO MOST OF THE TALKING, AND HERE IS A BRIEF, CHRONOLOGICAL ACCOUNT OF WHAT HAPPENED AT THE MEETING WHICH CAUSED SO MUCH WORLD-WIDE SPECULATION:

THE PRESIDENT SAT BACK, LISTENED INTENTLY AND CALLED FOR EVERYONE'S VIEWS. OCCASIONALLY, HE BOUNCED HIS FINGERS TOGETHER REFLECTIVELY, IN A QUICK, IMPULSIVE GESTURE, AND MADE SUCH COMMENTS AS: "THAT'S A TOUGH ONE."

GENERAL BRADLEY LED OFF WITH A SUMMARY OF THE KOREAN SITUATION. HE REPORTED THAT THE COMMUNISTS SEEMED TO BE READY TO COME TO TERMS, THAT A CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT COULD BE WORKED OUT IF BOTH SIDES MADE CONCESSIONS.

HOWEVER, GEN. HOYT VANDENBERG, AIR CHIEF OF STAFF, OPPOSED MAKING ANY MAJOR CONCESSIONS. HE WAS PARTICULARLY ADAMANT AGAINST ALLOWING THE COMMUNISTS THE RIGHT TO BUILD AIRFIELDS DURING THE CEASE-FIRE.

GEN. J. LAWTON COLLINS, THE ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF, VIGOROUSLY OPPOSED GIVING IN TO THE COMMUNISTS ON TROOP ROTATION. THE CHINESE HAVE PRO-

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Transmit the following Teletype message to:

- 4 -

POSED A FREEZE ON ALL TROOPS ENTERING KOREA, THUS BLOCKING REPLACEMENTS FOR COMBAT VETERANS WHO HAVE BEEN PROMISED THE CHANCE TO GO HOME ON ROTATION. THIS WOULD BE A "BLOW TO MORALE," COLLINS WARNED.

--SILENT ADMIRAL--

HOWEVER, GENERAL COLLINS READILY AGREED THAT "MINOR CONCESSIONS" ON OTHER POINTS SHOULD BE MADE IN ORDER TO WIN CONCESSIONS FROM THE COMMUNISTS.

PRESIDENT TRUMAN'S ONLY COMMENT WAS THAT EVERY EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO REACH A CEASE-FIRE, BUT NO CONCESSIONS SHOULD BE GRANTED THAT WE *WOULD LATER REGRET."

(MORE)

MERRY-GO-ROUND--SATURDAY, DECEMBER 15--PAGE 2.

LEAST TALKATIVE OF THE JOINT CHIEFS WAS ADMIRAL FECHTELER, WHO MADE A SHORT, HALF-MINUTE SPEECH IN WHICH HE ASSURED THE PRESIDENT THAT THE NAVY IS PREPARED TO CARRY OUT "ANY MISSION ANY TIME ANY PLACE."

FOR THE ARMY'S PART, GENERAL COLLINS ASSURED THE PRESIDENT THAT THE ARMY COULDN'T BE BLASTED OUT OF KOREA, BUT COULD HOLD ON "UNTIL HELL FREEZES OVER."

ANOTHER CONCESSION DISCUSSED WAS THAT OF GIVING IN TO THE COMMUNISTS ON INSPECTION TEAMS BEHIND THE LINES. WE HAVE BEEN HOLDING OUT FOR INSPECTION BY JOINT U.N.-COMMUNIST TEAMS, BUT THE REDS HAVE BEEN ARGUING

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
 Special Agent in Charge

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

 Transmit the following Teletype message to:

- 5 -

FOR INSPECTION BY "NEUTRAL NATIONS."

BY NEUTRAL NATIONS, THE COMMUNIST NEGOTIATORS SAID THEY MEANT POLAND AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA. LATER, HOWEVER, THEY AGREED THAT THEY WOULD ALSO CONSIDER DENMARK, SWEDEN AND SWITZERLAND AS "NEUTRAL NATIONS." THESE THREE WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO US, AND GENERAL BRADLEY PROPOSED GIVING GROUND ON THIS POINT. THIS HAS NOW BEEN DONE.

THE CHIEF THEME OF THE MEETING WAS THAT A CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT MAY BE CLOSE AT HAND. / ALL SIGNS POINT TO A SETTLEMENT WITHIN THE NEXT 20 DAYS. THOUGH SOME DETAILS WILL BE LEFT TO IRON OUT AFTER THE DECEMBER 27 DEADLINE, WE ARE SURE TO GRANT A SHORT EXTENSION TO CLEAN THEM UP.

ANOTHER MATTER THAT WAS DISCUSSED AT THE WHITE HOUSE WAS THE QUESTION OF WITHDRAWING U.N. TROOPS FROM KOREA ALTOGETHER--AFTER THE ARMISTICE. HOWEVER, THE FACTS REGARDING THIS SHOULD NOT BE MADE PUBLIC NOW. UNQUOTE. QUOTE FROM THE BELL SYNDICATE, INC., 229 W. 43 ST., NEW YORK.

CONFIDENTIAL TO EDITORS;

ONE HOUR AFTER THE COLUMN RELEASED FOR DECEMBER 15 WAS ON THE TELETYPE TO NEW YORK, PRESIDENT TRUMAN ASKED GENERAL BRADLEY PERSONALLY TO USE HIS INFLUENCE TO STOP ITS PUBLICATION.

/AS A RESULT THE COLUMN IN QUESTION, HALF OF WHICH PERTAINED TO THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ON MONDAY WAS SUBMITTED PERSONALLY TO GENERAL BRADLEY FOR HIS PERUSAL.

GENERAL BRADLEY DID NOT CONCUR WITH THE PRESIDENT THAT THE COLUMN

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
 Special Agent in Charge

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Transmit the following Teletype message to:

- 6 -

SHOULD BE KILLED. HOWEVER, HE HAS SUGGESTED TWO CHANGES WHICH I AM
HAPPY TO MAKE.

THE SECOND PARAGRAPH UNDER CAPTION "SILENT ADMIRAL" SHOULD READ
"PRESIDENT TRUMAN COMMENTED THAT NO CONCESSIONS SHOULD BE GRANTED
THAT WE 'WOULD LATER REGRET.'"

ALSO IN THE NEXT TO THE LAST PARAGRAPH OF THE STORY MAKE THE THIRD
AND CLOSING SENTENCE OF THIS PARAGRAPH READ: "SOME DETAILS WILL BE
LEFT TO IRON OUT AFTER THE DECEMBER 27 DEADLINE." IN OTHER WORDS,
OMIT THE WORD "THOUGH" AND THE WORDS "WE ARE SURE TO GRANT A SHORT
EXTENSION TO CLEAN THEM UP."

MANY THANKS,

DREW PEARSON

-0-

-0-

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-0-

Approved: _____
Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

7

Transmit the following Teletype message to:

THE FOLLOWING INFO WAS OBTAINED FROM THE POST HALL SYNDICATE INC., TWO NINE FIVE MADISON AVENUE, NYC, ROBERT M. HALL, PRESIDENT. MR. HALL ADVISED THAT THE COLUMN FROM ROBERT S. ALLEN FOR DECEMBER THIRTEEN LAST WAS RECEIVED BY THE POST HALL SYNDICATE ON DECEMBER ELEVEN LAST THROUGH THE MAIL AND DISTRIBUTED THROUGH THE MAIL BY THE SYNDICATE ON THE SAME DATE MARKED FOR RELEASE ON OR AFTER DECEMBER THIRTEEN LAST. THE COLUMN CONTAINS INFO ABOUT THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES AND DATA CONCERNING INCOME TAX AND LABOR SITUATIONS IN ADDITION TO THE PERTINENT COLUMN IN THE "NEW YORK POST". THE ORIGINAL RECEIVED FROM MR. ALLEN IS MARKED WITH CORRECTIONS WHICH ARE OF INDIVIDUAL WORDS AND NOT OF ANY PERTINENT PARAGRAPHS. MR. HALL ADVISED THAT THESE CORRECTIONS WERE MADE AFTER DICTATION BY MR. ALLEN AND THAT IT IS CUSTOMARY IN ALL OF HIS COLUMNS TO RECEIVE MATERIAL SO MARKED. MR. HALL ADVISED THAT HE COULD NOT MAKE AVAILABLE THE ORIGINAL COPY OF MR. ALLEN'S WITHOUT SPECIFICALLY OBTAINING MR. ALLEN'S PERMISSION, WHICH HE INDICATED HE WOULD NOT LIKE TO DO, HOWEVER, HE PERMITTED THE AGENTS TO LOOK OVER THE ORIGINAL COPY OF THE COLUMN AND IT WAS NOTED THAT NO MATERIAL, PHRASES OR PARAGRAPHS WERE DELETED THEREFROM. MR. HALL FURTHER ADVISED THAT POST HALL SYNDICATE EXAMINED THE COPY FOR POSSIBLE LIABLE AND HE STATED THAT THIS IS CUSTOMARY PRACTICE IN PUBLISHING ALL OF THEIR COLUMNS THAT ARE

Approved: _____
Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Transmit the following Teletype message to:

HANDLED BY THEIR SYNDICATE AND THAT THEY DID NOT IN THIS CASE MAKE ANY DELETIONS OR CORRECTIONS. IN REGARD TO THE PERTINENT COLUMN AS IT APPEARED IN THE "NY POST" THE MIMEOGRAPHED COPY, DISTRIBUTED BY POST HALL ^{a photostat copy of which follows by mail,} IS AS FOLLOWS: "WHAT THE REDS WANT DASH THE UN CAN HAVE A CEASE FIRE IN KOREA, BUT AT THE COST OF IMPORTANT CONCESSIONS TO THE REDS. THAT'S WHAT THE JOINT CHIEFS TOLD THE PRESIDENT IN THEIR BIG CONFERENCE WITH HIM AFTER HIS RETURN. GENERAL BRADLEY DECLARED THE PROTRACTED TRUCE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE REACHED THE POINT 'WHERE A FEW CONCESSIONS ON BOTH SIDES COULD BRING AN AGREEMENT IF THE COMMUNISTS REALLY WANT ONE.' 'WHAT DO THEY WANT?' ASKED THE PRESIDENT. 'THE DEADLOCK GETS DOWN TO THIS,' EXPLAINED BRADLEY. 'WE ARE DEMANDING THE RIGHT TO CONTINUE TO ROTATE OUR TROOPS AS WE HAVE BEEN DOING FOR MONTHS. THE REDS ARE FLATLY REFUSING TO ALLOW THAT. THEY ARE INSISTING ON A COMPLETE FREEZE ON REPLACEMENTS AND WEAPONS. BUT THEY HAVE INDICATED THEY WOULD MAKE CONCESSIONS ON THAT IF WE WILL ALLOW THEM TO BUILD SOME AIRFIELDS IN NORTH KOREA. WE HAVE REFUSED TO DO THAT. OBVIOUSLY, THEY ARE USING THE ROTATION ISSUE TO TRY TO WREST CONCESSIONS FROM US ON THE AIRFIELD DEMAND.' GENERAL HOYT VANDENBERG VIGOROUSLY OPPOSED GIVING ANY GROUND ON THAT. 'I WANT A CEASE FIRE, IF ONE CAN BE WORKED OUT THAT IS FAIR AND PROPER,' DECLARED THE AIR CHIEF OF STAFF. 'BUT I DON'T SEE HOW WE CAN

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
 Special Agent in Charge

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Transmit the following Teletype message to:

SAFELY DO ANYTHING THAT WILL ENABLE THE REDS TO BUILD UP THEIR AIR STRENGTH. THAT IS WHAT PERMITTING THEM TO BUILD AIRFIELDS WILL AMOUNT TO. SUCH BASES IN NORTH KOREA WILL BE OF GREAT COMBAT VALUE TO THEM, IF THEY DECIDE TO BREAK THE TRUCE NEXT SPRING, WHICH I WOULDN'T PUT PAST THEM.' GENERAL J. LAWTON COLLINS WAS INCLINED TO FAVOR/SOME TERMS ON THE AIRFIELD DISPUTE. HE THOUGHT SOMETHING COULD BE WORKED OUT ON THAT. BUT THE ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF WAS ADAMANT IN INSISTING THE/COMMUNISTS BE REQUIRED TO AGREE TO ROTATION OF UN TROOPS. 'THAT WOULD BE A SERIOUS BLOW TO THE MORALE OF OUR MEN,' COLLINS ARGUED. 'I AM STRONGLY OPPOSED TO ANY CONCESSIONS ON THAT. IT IS AN UNFAIR DEMAND, AND THE ONLY REASON THE REDS ON MAKING IT IS TO TRY TO FORCE US TO GIVE IN ON AIRFIELDS. OUR ARMY CAN HOLD THE PRESENT LINE UNTIL HELL FREEZES OVER, AND I AM FLATLY OPPOSED TO GIVING THE SLIGHTEST GROUND ON THE REPLACEMENT ISSUE. THE REDS WOULD HAVE THE SAME RIGHT AS US ON THAT, AND I DON'T SEE WHY THEY SHOULD OBJECT TO IT, EXCEPT FOR TRADING PURPOSES.' BRADLEY AGREED WITH COLLINS, BUT EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF NOT ALLOWING THE COMMUNISTS TO BUILD UP A POWERFUL/AIRFORCE. PRESIDENT TRUMAN LISTENED INTENTLY TO THE MILITARY LEADERS AND SAID NOTHING UNTIL THEY FINISHED. THEN HE TOLD THEM: 'AS YOU KNOW I AM VERY ANXIOUS TO BRING THE FIGHTING TO AN END IF THAT IS POSSIBLE. BUT I WILL NOT AGREE TO CONCESSIONS TO THE COMMUNISTS THAT WE MAY REGRET LATER ON. WE WANT TO BE VERY CAREFUL THAT WE DO NOT SELL OURSELVES

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____

Special Agent in Charge

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Transmit the following Teletype message to:

SHORT IN OUR EAGERNESS TO SECURE A TRUCE FOR OUR MEN.' ALSO DISCUSSED WAS THE QUESTION OF BUILDING UP THE SOUTH KOREAN ARMY, AS THIS COLUMN HAS REPORTED WAS PROPOSED BY GENERAL RIDGWAY. HE WANTS TO INCREASE THE ROK DIVISIONS FROM ELEVEN TO TWENTY. NO DECISION WAS REACHED ON THE MATTER, BUT PRESIDENT TRUMAN STRONGLY APPROVED THE PLAN. 'I AM FOR PROMPT ACTION ON THAT,' HE SAID. 'IT SEEMS TO ME A VERY SOUND THING TO DO. SIMILARLY, THE PRESIDENT APPROVED MOVING TO KOREA ONE OF THE TWO NATIONAL GUARD DIVISIONS NOW IN JAPAN. THIS HAS BEEN SUGGESTED BY RIDGWAY IN ORDER TO PERMIT THE TRANSFER OF ONE OF THE BATTLE DASH EXPERIENCED DIVISIONS IN KOREA TO EUROPE. GENERAL EISENHOWER HAS REQUESTED THAT." IT WILL BE NOTED THAT THE MIMEOGRAPHED COPY IS IDENTICAL WITH THE COLUMN THAT APPEARED IN THE "NY POST" BLUE EDITION OF DECEMBER THIRTEEN LAST. HOWEVER, IT WILL FURTHER BE NOTED THAT THE "NY POST" COLUMN CONCLUDES WITH THE STATEMENT "ALSO DISCUSSED WITH THE QUESTION OF BUILDING UP THE/SOUTH KOREAN ARMY AS THIS COLUMN HAS REPORTED WAS PROPOSED BY GENERAL RIDGWAY", WHEREAS THE MIMEOGRAPHED COPY CONTINUES AS AS QUOTED ABOVE. A MIMEOGRAPHED COPY OF THE ENTIRE RELEASE WAS MADE AVAILABLE BY [REDACTED] TO THE AGENTS AND IS BEING RETAINED IN THIS OFFICE. [REDACTED] STATED THAT THIS MIMEOGRAPHED COPY WAS SENT TO ALL OF THE NEWSPAPERS SUBSCRIBING TO ALLEN'S

COLUMN AND THAT IN HIS OPINION THE COLUMN IN THE "NY POST" WAS

Blue final edition of Dec 13 last was.

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____

Special Agent in Charge

b6
b7c

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Transmit the following Teletype message to:

CUT FOR SPACE SAVING REASONS. HE ADVISED THAT IT IS CUSTOMARY FOR NEWSPAPERS RECEIVING COPIES OF THE COLUMNS TO PRINT ANY PORTION OR ALL OF THE COLUMN AT THEIR DISCRETION. HE DID STATE THAT THE "PHILADELPHIA DAILY NEWS" USUALLY PUBLISHES THE ENTIRE RELEASE AS SENT OUT BY POST HALL. BUT HE DID NOT KNOW WHETHER THEY HAD DONE IT ON THIS OCCASION. NO LEAD IS BEING SET OUT FOR THE PHILADELPHIA OFFICE, IT IS LEFT TO THE BUREAU'S DISCRETION. IT IS NOTED THAT [REDACTED] REQUESTED THAT HIS IDENTITY IN THIS MATTER BE KEPT CONFIDENTIAL AND IT IS SUGGESTED THAT THE BUREAU BE DISCREET IN USING THE NAMES OF INDIVIDUALS CONNECTED WITH BOTH THE POST HALL SYNDICATE AND THE BELL SYNDICATE.

b6
b7C
b7D

b6
b7C

[REDACTED]

Approved: _____
Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M Per _____

Director, FBI

December 20, 1951

SAC, New York

DREW PEARSON;
ALLEGED LEAK FROM WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE
12-10-51 TO JACK ANDERSON, LEG MAN FOR
DREW PEARSON;
ESPIONAGE - X

b6
b7C
b7D

Attention: Inspector [redacted]

b6
b7C

ReNYtel to Bureau and WFO dated December 20, 1951, captioned as above.

In accordance with the information contained in referenced teletype, there are attached for the Bureau two photostatic copies of a teletype received by the Bell Syndicate, Inc., 229 West 43rd Street, New York City, which teletype was received by them from DREW PEARSON in Washington, D. C. The first teletype, which is four pages in length, contains information concerning the President's meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff as well as other miscellaneous material for the use of the Bell Syndicate in the PEARSON column. Attached to these four pages is a teletype received from PEARSON by Bell Syndicate on December 12, 1951, which contains several corrections to be made in the teletype of December 11, as well as other information concerning PEARSON's column. One copy of the above is also being directed to the WFO.

b6
b7C

There are also attached for the Bureau two copies of a column prepared by [redacted] and dated December 11, 1951, which was directed to the Post-Hall Syndicate, Inc., 295 Madison Avenue, New York 17, N. Y. This release is six pages in length, part of which appeared in [redacted] column in the New York Post on December 13, 1951. This material was obtained from [redacted]

[redacted] There is also attached for the information of the WFO one photostatic copy of the above-mentioned press release of [redacted] RUC.

TGS:RAA
65-

Encs.

cc - Washington Field (Encs)

RUC
mech

mech

65-15923-3

RUC

NEW YORK, N.Y.
12/26/51

b6
b7C

MEMO

RE: DREW PEARSON;
ALLEGED LEAK FROM WHITE HOUSE
CONFERENCE 12/10/51 to JACK
ANDERSON, LEG MAN FOR DREW PEARSON;
ESPIONAGE - X

This is to record the fact that on 12/20/51, the writer interviewed
JOHN NEVILLE, Vice President of Bell Syndicate, Inc. SAS [redacted]
and [redacted] interviewed [redacted]
[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]
SA

TGS:MAR

65-15973-4

1 8

73

FBI

Date: SEPTEMBER 4, 1975

Transmit the following in PLAINTEXT
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via TELETYPE NITEL
(Precedence)

003

TO DIRECTOR

FROM LOUISVILLE (66-2568)

ATTN: LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION

REPORTER'S COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, ET AL, V.
AMERICAN TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY, ET AL (U.S.D.C,
D.D.C) CIVIL ACTION 74-1889 BUDED SEPTEMBER 8, 1975.

RE LOUISVILLE TELETYPE TO THE BUREAU, DATED SEPTEMBER
2, 1975.

LINE FOUR OF REFERENCED TELETYPE STATES JANUARY 1, 1975,
WHICH SHOULD BE JANUARY 1, 1970. PLEASE CORRECT BUREAU COPIES,
LOUISVILLE COPIES CORRECTED.

END

BFJ/jt

(1)

DO NOT REPRODUCE THIS DOCUMENT

Searched _____
Serialized _____
Indexed _____
Filed _____

66-2568-5

Approved: _____
Special Agent in Charge

Sent 5:37 M Per SW

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Memorandum

TO : Law Enforcement Agencies
listed below

DATE: August 26, 1975

FROM : Eugene E. Siler, Jr.
United States Attorney
Eastern District of Kentucky

SUBJECT: Toll Records for Reporters and News Media

As a defendant, the United States is opposing litigation in which reporters are demanding advance notice before telephone toll records relating to them are released by telephone companies to law enforcement agencies. The Assistant Attorney General in the Criminal Division has requested us to advise the Department of Justice whether or not we have requested telephone toll records for the following persons or organizations for the period January 1, 1970 to June 1975. I have replied in the negative from our own records and memory. However, it is requested that your office send back to us a verification that you have never requested from our office permission to obtain these toll records, in the event our records are incomplete, which we think they are not. We need to hear from you by September 8, 1975.

Jack Anderson
1401 16th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
Tele: 202 347-4325



b6
b7c

66-2568-4

SEARCHED	INDEXED
SERIALIZED	FILED
SEP 1 1975	
FBI - LOUISVILLE	

Handwritten initials and date: 9/1/75

Dow Jones & Co., Inc.
22 Cortland Street
New York, NY 10007
Tel: 202-783-0164

Knight Newspapers, Inc.
1 Herald Plaza
Miami, FL 33101
Tel: 202-638-2844

EES:kf

Copy to:

FBI, Louisville
U.S. Secret Service, Louisville
Postal Inspectors
AT&F, Louisville
AT&F, Cincinnati

P. O. Box 1467
Louisville, Kentucky 40201
September 3, 1975


Honorable Eugene E. Siler, Jr.
United States Attorney
Eastern District of Kentucky
Federal Building
Lexington, Kentucky

Re: Reporters' Committee for
Freedom of the Press, Et Al,
V. American Telephone and
Telegraph Company, Et Al
(U.S.D.C., D.D.C.) Civil
Action 74-1889

Dear Mr. Siler:

Reference is made to your letter of August 26, 1975,
concerning toll records for Reporters and News Media. This is
to advise that according to the records of our office, a request
has never been submitted to your office for permission to obtain
any toll records for individuals or companies listed in your
letter.

Very truly yours,


Stanley S. Czarnecki
Special Agent in Charge

1 - Addressee
① - 66-2568
BFJ/mmh
(2) *mmh*

66-25
Searched _____
Serialized _____
Indexed _____
Filed _____

F B I

Date: SEPTEMBER 2, 1975

Transmit the following in plaintext

TELETYPE

(Type in plaintext or code)
NITEL

Via _____

(Priority)

007

TO DIRECTOR *JAC*
FROM LOUISVILLE (66-2568)

ATTN: LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION

REPORTERS' COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, ET AL., V. AMERICAN TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY, ET AL (U.S.D.C., D.D.C) CIVIL ACTION 74-1889 BUDED SEPTEMBER 8, 1975.

RE BUREAU NITEL TO ALL SACS, AUGUST 28, 1975.

THE FILES OF THIS DIVISION CONTAIN NO RECORD OF THIS FIELD OFFICE HAVING REQUESTED ANY TELEPHONE TOLL RECORDS FOR THE FIFTEEN INDIVIDUALS AND COMPANIES LISTED IN REFERENCED TELETYPE, DURING THE PERIOD JANUARY 1, ¹⁹⁷⁰~~1975~~, THROUGH JUNE 30, 1975, OR FOR ANY OTHER PERIOD. THIS OFFICE INITIATED A CONTROL FILE IDENTIFYING ALL PERSONS ON WHOM TELEPHONE TOLL RECORDS WERE OBTAINED BY SUBPOENA, ON MARCH 7, 1975. ANY RETRIEVAL OF THIS TYPE INFORMATION FOR DATES PRIOR TO THAT TIME IS DONE BY NAME SEARCH OF OFFICE INDICES AND INDIVIDUAL FILE REVIEW. #.

END.

BFJ/mmh
(1) *mmh*

66-2568-2
Searched _____
Serialized *[initials]*
Indexed *[initials]*
Filed *[initials]*

Approved: *[Signature]*
Special Agent in Charge

Sent 9:39 M Per *[Signature]*

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

NR 007 WA PLAIN

11:50AM NITEL 8-28-75 LXS

TO ALL SACS

FROM DIRECTOR

REPORTERS' COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, ET AL.,

W. AMERICAN TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY, ET AL. *66-2446*

U.S.D.C., D.D.C. CIVIL ACTION 74-1889 / BUDED SEPTEMBER

08, 1975

AS A DEFENDANT IN THIS CASE, THE UNITED STATES IS OPPOSING LITIGATION IN WHICH PLAINTIFFS ARE DEMANDING AT LEAST FIVE DAYS' NOTICE BEFORE TELEPHONE TOLL RECORDS RELATING TO PLAINTIFFS ARE RELEASED BY DEFENDANT TELEPHONE COMPANIES TO LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES AFTER SUBPOENA OR OTHER LAWFUL DEMANDS.

IN ORDER TO RESPOND TO DISCOVERY MOTIONS, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE HAS REQUESTED THAT EACH FBI FIELD OFFICE REVIEW ITS FILES TO DETERMINE THOSE INSTANCES, INCLUDING RELEVANT CIRCUMSTANCES, WHERE THE FIELD OFFICE REQUESTED TELEPHONE TOLL RECORDS DURING THE PERIOD JANUARY 1, 1970,

~~DO NOT DESTROY-PENDING LITIGATION~~

*ice to
66-2446*

*Open
Search
[Signature]*

66-2560

SEARCHED	INDEXED
SERIALIZED	FILED
AUG 29 1975	
FBI - [illegible]	


[Signature]

DO NOT DESTROY-PENDING LITIGATION

No. 100


PAGE TWO

THROUGH JUNE 30, 1995, FOR THE BEST AVAILABLE COPY



(2) JACK ANDERSON, 51401 16TH STREET, N.W.

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20036, TELEPHONE: (202) 347-4325



b6
b7C

PAGE THREE

Summary No 12/14



b6
b7C

(14) DOW JONES AND COMPANY, INC., 22
CORTLANDT STREET, NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10007, DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA TELEPHONE: (202) 783-0164.

94-61-98 (10-73) No 12/14

(15) KNIGHT NEWSPAPERS, INC., 1 HERALD PLAZA,
MIAMI, FLORIDA 33121, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA TELEPHONE:
(305) 638-2844.

THE DEPARTMENT HAS ALSO REQUESTED THAT EACH
FBI FIELD OFFICE ADVISE WHETHER IT MAINTAINS A CONTROL
FILE IDENTIFYING ALL PERSONS ON WHOM TELEPHONE TOLL

PAGE FOUR

RECORDS ARE OBTAINED OR WHETHER THE ONLY POSSIBLE RETRIEVAL OF THIS INFORMATION IS BY NAME SEARCH OF OFFICE INDICES AND INDIVIDUAL FILE REVIEWS.

EACH OFFICE SHOULD FURNISH THE INFORMATION REQUESTED ABOVE TO FBIHQ, ATTENTION: LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION, BY SEPTEMBER 8, 1975. IF POSITIVE INFORMATION IS DEVELOPED REGARDING TOLL RECORDS OF NAMED PLAINTIFFS, THIS SHOULD BE FURNISHED IN LETTERHEAD MEMORANDUM FORM WITH COVER AIRTEL. IF NO PERTINENT TELEPHONE TOLL RECORDS WERE REQUESTED AND NO CONTROL FILE IS MAINTAINED, ADVISE FBIHQ BY AIRTEL ONLY.

FOR YOUR GUIDANCE, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE HAS ADVISED THAT THIS REVIEW NEED NOT BE CONDUCTED AT THIS TIME IF IT IS EXCESSIVELY BURDENSOME TO YOUR OFFICE. ACCORDINGLY, IF, AFTER INITIAL REVIEW, YOU DETERMINE THE COMPLETION OF THE PROJECT WOULD BE EXCESSIVELY BURDENSOME, TERMINATE THE PROJECT AND ADVISE FBIHQ PROMPTLY BY NITEL OF DETAILS OF BURDEN, INCLUDING ESTIMATE OF FILES AND PAGES INVOLVED AND ESTIMATE OF MAN HOURS NECESSARY TO COMPLETE THE PROJECT.

END

FBILS KBC

CLR

U. S. Department of Justice

(MATERIAL MUST NOT BE REMOVED FROM OR ADDED TO THIS FILE)

WFO

FEDERAL BUREAU

of

INVESTIGATION

Bureau File Number

Volume Number 1

Serials 1 thru

See also Nos.

*105-109483 - Subject of
FOIPA Request, 2006*

**DO NOT
DESTROY**

FOIPA # 1047972

Reed

CLASSIFICATION NO. 105-109483
Sub D

S-1

Ashbrook Asks Probe of Leak Of 'State Secrets'

Associated Press

Rep. John M. Ashbrook, R-Ohio, yesterday asked the House Internal Security Committee to find out how columnist Jack Anderson obtained secret government documents.

"Those in government who would play games with our state secrets," he said, "should be made emphatically aware that the rules of the game are such that U.S. authorities will play for keeps with these vandals."

Anderson gave the documents, marked secret, to a number of newspapers last week, and has quoted from them in recent columns.

DATE 1-9-72

PAGE A-32

___ THE WASHINGTON POST
& TIMES HERALD

___ THE EVENING STAR

THE SUNDAY STAR

___ THE WASHINGTON DAILY NEWS

___ WASHINGTON-AFRO AMERICAN

Sub D
105-109483-1

SEARCHED	INDEXED
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FEB 18 1972	
<i>(Signature)</i>	

By MARY McGRORY

The Scribes Turn on Anderson

This week's man-bites-dog story comes from the press itself. Several of his fellow columnists have set upon Jack Anderson for spilling the beans about the White House meetings on the India-Pakistan war.

Humbler colleagues applaud Anderson for his coup. In their simple way, they see him doing the reporter's job, the chronicling of government follies. But the higher orders have let it be known that they regard Anderson as an unworthy conduit for state secrets.

He is, it should be explained, not one of the happy few who make the Georgetown scene, the Sans Souci and the White House backgrounders. One of his critics intimated that while it is all right for Anderson to record low-level peccadillos of, say, the Agriculture Department, he is getting out of his depth when he takes on Henry Kissinger and has, in fact, been the tool of would-be bureaucratic assassins who are out to "get Henry."

Another saw him as the unwitting handmaiden of a saboteur of the China policy, and a third as an oaf who did not know what he was doing at all.

Anderson just possibly could have thought he had a whale of a story. The informant just possibly could have thought the India-Pakistan policy was witless and could have wanted the public to see to what lengths the best brains in government went to get India.

One of Anderson's critics solemnly warned that such revelations could not only sink

Kissinger and China, but also inhibit participants in future discussions. From the evidence of the Anderson papers, that might not be a bad idea. Nobody inside once pointed out what everyone outside knew — that Pakistan didn't have a Chinaman's chance and that everyone but us and Chou En-lai was on India's side. If they had known their utterances would reach print, somebody might have mentioned it, just for the record.

Their confidential ramblings suggest they had no idea of how to go about implementing the President's dislike of Indira Gandhi. Mr. Sisco of the State Department suggests a shaded map of the combat area. Mr. Williams of AID cautions about stopping shipments of vegetable oil to India — it may depress the home market. Mr. Kissinger says he will take it up with the President. Gen. Westmoreland makes one of his celebrated off-the-mark military prophecies.

Luckily, these and their other more strenuous fancies were unavailing. No serious damage has been done to anything but Henry Kissinger's reputation, especially at Harvard, where his performance as the senior strong-arm bureaucrat is regarded as conduct unbecoming a scholar.

But his job is safe. And so is the China trip, which seems to have been the reason for the baffling presidential tilt toward Pakistan. India won, Bangladesh is free, the Seventh Fleet has steamed off to

calmer waters, there were no American casualties. The Indian ambassador, cold-shouldered by the administration, consoles himself in Coventry by reading the Anderson Papers.

The paper-passer is still at large.

Anderson has surpassed his detractors in celebrity. More people read his secrets than their laments. The public has learned once again that insiders do not necessarily have inside information, which it already knew from the Pentagon Papers.

But solid as was his achievement as a journalist, it is as a diplomat that Anderson may have performed the higher duty which his critics saw him flunking. He alone can claim credit for retaining the slender thread on which U.S.-India relations hang. By publishing the secret cable of the U.S. ambassador to India, Kenneth B. Keating, who at the height of the crisis wired the home office to ask if it had lost its mind, Anderson assured the Indians that one American understood. Keating is so popular in New Delhi that he could be elected to parliament.

As for the White House, the task of berating Anderson was taken off its shoulders by his brother scribes. If it feels it was unfairly spied upon by the press, it has to remember it has spied upon the press in its day. Dan Schorr of CBS was trailed by the FBI investigating him for a mythical job. The only job open at the White House right now is for a plumber.

DATE

1-16-72

PAGE

C-1

THE WASHINGTON POST
& TIMES HERALD

THE EVENING STAR

THE SUNDAY STAR

THE WASHINGTON DAILY NEWS

WASHINGTON-AFRO AMERICAN

Sub D
105-109483-2

SEARCHED	INDEXED
SERIALIZED	FILED
FEB 18 1972	

CJ

Jack Anderson: A funny story

FBI probes policy leak

By TED KNAP

Scripps Howard Staff Writer

The Justice Department has directed the FBI to investigate who leaked highly embarrassing classified documents detailing White House policy meetings on the India-Pakistan war to columnist Jack Anderson, administration sources said today.

A Justice Department spokesman ended several days of "no comment" by admitting for the first time that the matter was "under investigation."

Earlier reports were that a search for the source of the leak was being conducted only within each of the departments which had officials at the secret meetings. Government sources said the probe now has moved to a higher level with the calling in of the FBI and also the Internal Security Division of the Justice Department, which would handle any prosecution.

NO MUZZLE

But the government has not tried to suppress further publication of the Anderson columns, as it did after initial publication of the Pentagon papers last year.

The Washington Post today said Mr. Anderson gave it the full texts of three of the secret documents. The Post, which carries Mr. Anderson's column, said the three documents were on the letterhead of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and of Warren G. Nutter, assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs.

The Post quoted Mr. Anderson as saying his sources for the papers hold high positions in the Nixon administration.

"If the sources were identified," the Post quoted Mr. Anderson, "it would embarrass the administration more than it would me. It would make a very funny story."

Mr. Anderson said the documents show that, contrary to the administration's professions of strict neutrality, Mr. Nixon sided strongly with the military dictatorship in West Pakistan against the world's largest democracy in India.

'GETTING HELL'

Dr. Henry Kissinger, Mr. Nixon's chief adviser on national security, was quoted as saying in a Dec. 3 strategy session, "I am getting



Jack Anderson, left, and Henry Kissinger.

hell every half hour from the President that we are not being tough enough on India."

Mr. Anderson said the documents disclose that Dr. Kissinger sought to get around the ban on U.S. arms shipments to Pakistan by having them sneaked in thru Jordan or Saudi Arabia.

"Dr. Kissinger asked whether we have the right to authorize Jordan or Saudi Arabia to transfer military equipment to Pakistan," Mr. Anderson quoted from the Dec. 6 minutes. "Mr. (Christopher) Van Hollen (State Department Asia expert) stated that the United States cannot permit a third country to transfer arms which we have provided them when we, ourselves, do not authorize the sale direct to the ultimate recipient."

'OUT OF CONTEXT'

Dr. Kissinger said yesterday in San Clemente, Calif., that Mr. Anderson quoted "out of context" from the documents, but refused to elaborate. In response, Mr. Anderson told Scripps-Howard newspapers he would make the full memoranda available to the public.

Mr. Anderson wrote that a cable from Kenneth Keating, U.S. ambassador to India, warned that "any action other than rejection (of the plan to ship planes to Pakistan by way of Jordan) would pose enormous further difficulties in Indo-U.S. relations."

The documents indicated the United States was considering sending eight F104s via Jordan to resupply the Pakistan air force, which

had been crippled by initial Indian attacks. The war was over in two weeks, before any such shipment was made. Mr. Anderson said the documents indicate that a final decision had not been reached.

Mr. Anderson said the President overrode the advice of State Department senior officials to appeal to the West Pakistan government to atop persecuting Bengalis in East Pakistan, and to remain neutral between West Pakistan and India. One of those participating in the secret meetings wrote this report, according to Mr. Anderson:

Dr. Kissinger said that we are not trying to be even-handed. The President does not want to be even-handed. The President believes that India is the attacker. . . .

"Dr. Kissinger said that we cannot afford to ease India's state of mind. 'The Lady' (Mrs. Indira Gandhi, India's prime minister) is cold-blooded and tough and will not turn into a Soviet satellite merely because of pique. We should not ease her mind. He invited anyone who objected to this approach to take his case to the President."

STATE LEAK

Speculation here is that the leak came from the State Department, which has had its ego bruised lately by Dr. Kissinger's emergence as the dominant foreign policy figure in the administration. Mr. Anderson refused to pinpoint his source.

The minutes described meetings in early December of the Special Action Group, comprised of State, Defense, CIA, and White House officials. The papers were variously classified, including "secret sensitive." Mr. Anderson said he has received two calls from "friends" in the government warning that he could be indicted.

Government officials said that altho classifications were violated, the substance of the reports indicates they would not be covered by laws against sabotage or espionage.

When several newspapers published excerpts of the secret Pentagon papers last year, Atty. Gen. John Mitchell asked the courts to suppress further publication. His request was rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court. Following an FBI investigation, the government is prosecuting Daniel Ellsberg for having leaked the papers to the press.

— THE EVENING STAR

— THE SUNDAY STAR

✓ — THE WASHINGTON DAILY NEWS

— WASHINGTON-AFRO AMERICAN

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ANDERSON STRIKES AGAIN

New White House Leaks

New York Times News Service

Syndicated columnist Jack Anderson has reported that Henry A. Kissinger, presidential assistant for national security affairs, told senior administration officials during the Indo-Pakistani crisis that President Nixon "does not want to be even-handed."

"We are not trying to be even-handed," Kissinger was reported as saying. "The President believes that India is the attacker."

Kissinger was also reported to have told top administration aides: "We cannot afford to ease India's state of mind."

The views attributed to Kissinger were published in Anderson's column, which is syndicated to 700 newspapers, including the Washington Post. Anderson's reporting of highly classified government documents in recent weeks has re-

portedly incensed the White House.

Anderson has repeatedly asserted that his disclosure of top-secret government documents involves no threat to national security, but rather exposes the "activities and often the blunders of our leaders."

The Kissinger comments came from notes of "secret sensitive" strategy sessions at the White House on Dec. 6 and 8, according to Anderson. The India-Pakistan war broke out Dec. 3 and ended Dec. 17.

Anderson contended that the White House explanation of the reasons for sending the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier Enterprise to the Bay of Bengal during the war was deceptive.

Contrasting the official explanation that the mission of

the task force was to "evacuate American citizens from embattled Dacca," Anderson said that perusal of confidential documents in his possession showed that there were in fact these four primarily military reasons:

- To compel India to divert both ships and planes to shadow the U.S. task force.
- To weaken India's blockade against East Pakistan.
- Possibly to divert the Indian aircraft carrier Vikrant from its military mission.
- To force India to keep planes on defense alert, thus reducing their operations against Pakistani ground troops.

Administration officials, who declined to be named, said yesterday that a security investigation is under way to determine who "leaked" information to Anderson.

DATE 1/1/72

PAGE A-5

___ THE WASHINGTON POST
& TIMES HERALD

THE EVENING STAR

___ THE SUNDAY STAR

___ THE WASHINGTON DAILY NEWS

___ WASHINGTON-AFRO AMERICAN

9
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TOM WICKER

Laudable Job by Jack Anderson

NEW YORK—The remarkable series of documentary excerpts now being published by columnist Jack Anderson is a public service of the first order. Since the authenticity of these documents has not been denied by an obviously discomfited White House, they provide a valuable glimpse into the making of policy—in this case, a policy that to many Americans seems disastrous.

More than that, the Anderson papers suggest the extent to which the government can, and does, mislead the public in the pursuit of what the President and his advisers may decide is the national interest. They show again the abundant use of security classification to keep the public in ignorance. And they demonstrate that publication is one of the few remaining checks on the foreign policy powers of the imperial presidency.

The papers make one thing perfectly clear—that President Nixon, with the aid of Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, set out deliberately to put the United States into a position of support for Pakistan at whatever cost. "We are not trying to be evenhanded," said Kissinger to high administration officials.

That might have been a proper course for a nation opposing, say, Hitler's expansionism. In the complex situation on the Indian subcontinent,

Pakistan's obvious weakness—if nothing else—made self-defeating a policy of all-out opposition to India. That the brutal excesses of Pakistani repression of the Bengalis were overlooked, to the point where all aid to India was to be suspended while clandestine means of arming the Pakistanis were sought, is simply repugnant to the American conscience—or ought to be.

Besides, nobody in Washington bothered to make clear to the public that Washington was not being "evenhanded." Thus, its condemnation of India sounded more like a considered, fair analysis than a deliberate, purposeful policy; and that is the kind of swampy ground in which credibility gaps are dug.

That is even more true of the instance documented by Anderson in which Kissinger and others sought to transfer to Pakistan arms already delivered to Jordan—while maintaining the public posture that arms were not being supplied to either participant in the war! That is entirely worthy of the men who brought you "reinforced protective reaction."

So was the public pretense that an American carrier task force in the Bay of Bengal was there to evacuate threatened Americans, if it is true (as alleged in the Anderson papers) that its actual mission was to divert Indian ships and planes and thus to

weaken the Indian drive against East Pakistan.

Nor do the various stories now being advanced to explain these and other administration actions seem to hold much water. If, for instance, the task force actually was there to stop India from overrunning West Pakistan, too, as administration leaks now suggest, nothing in India's actual behavior toward West Pakistan seems to have warranted such action; nor is it likely that one carrier task force could have been so effective a deterrent; and, in any case, the American people still were being misled about the deployment of their forces.

And if, as other articles have suggested, Nixon's intent really was to solidify an American alignment with China, also a supporter of Pakistan, against the Soviet Union, the curious results are that Soviet power on the subcontinent is vastly extended, as a result, and American influence in India is at lowest ebb. If we now are closer to China than we were, what suggestion was there in their acrimonious history that Peking and Moscow were likely to be soon reconciled? In order to gain face in China, did we really need to lose our shirts in India?

~~There~~ behind the facade of secrecy and security that shields so much of this government's purposes and activities in the world, a policy that was dubious at best was shaped to Nixon's personal dictates, and presented to the public as something other than what it was. But the valuable documents Anderson has been publishing must have been supplied to him by someone with access to them who believed either that that manner of making policy, or the policy itself, or both, ought to be exposed to the American people.

How else could that be done, except by publication? And if it is to be maintained, as the Nixon administration did in the Pentagon papers case, that stamping "top secret" on the government's memos and minutes makes them immune to publication and superior to the First Amendment, then security classification becomes an all-encompassing means of concealing whatever the government wants to conceal.

It took years for someone to challenge that arrogant privilege, in the case of the Vietnam war; but it has happened much more quickly in the India-Pakistan case. Maybe the government is now finding its own officials less willing to let deception and ineptitude be shrouded in "secrecy."

DATE 11/4/72

PAGE A-7

___ THE WASHINGTON POST
& TIMES HERALD

THE EVENING STAR

___ THE SUNDAY STAR

___ THE WASHINGTON DAILY NEWS

___ WASHINGTON-AFRO AMERICAN

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PAKISTAN DISCUSSIONS

High-Level Leak Is Probed

New York Times News Service

An investigation is under way in the executive branch to try to learn who leaked notes of White House strategy sessions about the India - Pakistan war. The inquiry reportedly is being conducted by the FBI.

The investigation, according to government sources, is being directed at individuals in the State and Defense Departments and on the National Security Council staff who had access to the classified notes.

The action was triggered by a series of quotations in Jack Anderson's syndicated column, which yesterday said President Nixon was "furious" with subordinates during the war for not taking a stronger stand against India.

Anderson quoted Henry A. Kissinger, Nixon's adviser on national security, as having told a meeting of senior administration officials: "I'm getting hell every half hour from the President that we are not being tough enough on India."

According to Anderson, Kissinger directed that all U.S. officials "show a certain coolness" to the Indians. "The Indian ambassador is not to be

treated at too high a level," he is quoted as having said.

The quotations were the latest in a series of verbatim reports of secret White House strategy sessions dealing with the crisis that Anderson has published recently.

The quotations are not official minutes of the meetings, but rather notes prepared by representatives of the various departments attending. Yesterday Anderson said he had been given two complete sets of notes of the meetings of the Washington Special Action Group, a high-level strategy committee assembled to deal with the India-Pakistan conflict in early December.

The columnist said he had received scores of other classified documents, including secret intelligence reports and cablegrams, that he intended to publish during the next two weeks.

"I am trying to force a showdown with the administration over their classification system," he said. "Everything Kissinger does—even the toilet paper he uses—is being stamped 'secret.' That's not in the public interest in a democracy."

Anderson said neither he nor members of his staff had yet been questioned by government investigators, but that he had "positive" information that the FBI had already interrogated individuals at the White House and State and Defense Departments in an effort to discover who had provided him with the documents.

Gerald L. Warren, acting press secretary at the White House, declined to comment.

In the column published yesterday, Anderson quoted from notes taken during the Washington Special Action Group's meetings of Dec. 3, Dec. 4 and Dec. 8.

In the first session, he quotes Richard Helms, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, as saying the Indians were "currently engaged in a no-holds-barred attack on East Pakistan and that they had crossed the border on all sides."

"Dr. Kissinger remarked

that if the Indians have announced a full-scale invasion," the column continued, "this fact must be reflected in our U.N. statement."

On Dec. 4, Kissinger is quoted as having said, "On AID matters, the President wants to proceed against India only." He was referring to the Agency for International Development.

According to the column, this instruction was amplified on Dec. 8, when, "Dr. Kissinger stated that current orders are not to put anything in the budget for India. It was also not to be leaked that AID had put money in the budget only to have the 'wicked' White House take it out."

On Dec. 4, the administration suspended its aid program in India.

DATE 1/4/72

PAGE A-8

THE WASHINGTON POST & TIMES HERALD

THE EVENING STAR

THE SUNDAY STAR

THE WASHINGTON DAILY NEWS

WASHINGTON-AFRO AMERICAN

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Anderson Releases Papers On Secret U.S. Policy Sessions

By ORR KELLY
Star Staff Writer

Syndicated columnist Jack Anderson has made public "SECRET SENSITIVE" minutes of three White House meetings dealing with the India-Pakistan War.

The documents show the government was secretly favoring Pakistan in the war while saying publicly that it was not taking sides.

Anderson used extensive quotations from the documents in recent columns and then released the dull text as a deliberate challenge to the government's system of classifying information.

After the Anderson columns appeared, the White House began coordinating a broad-scale investigation to learn who leaked the documents to him.

Material Confirmed

The White House today refused to say whether the published material is authentic. But a State Department official who asked not to be identified said there is no question of the authenticity of the documents.

Anderson released the documents after Henry A. Kissinger, presidential adviser for national security affairs, told newsmen yesterday he was quoted out of context in excerpts from the documents printed earlier by Anderson.

Anderson gave the documents to the Washington Post last night, and the paper printed them today. The Star obtained its own copies of the documents.

DATE 1/5/72

PAGE A-1

THE WASHINGTON POST
& TIMES HERALD

THE EVENING STAR

THE SUNDAY STAR

THE WASHINGTON DAILY NEWS

WASHINGTON-AFRO AMERICAN

Anderson said in an interview last night that his column prepared for release tomorrow would carry excerpts from secret documents dealing with relations between the United States and Japan. The column will appear on the same day President Nixon meets with Japanese Prime Minister Eisaku Sato in San Clemente, Calif.

"I Am . . . Getting Hell"

One of the documents released by Anderson quoted Kissinger as telling a White House meeting on Dec. 3 that:

"I am getting hell every half hour from the President that we are not being tough enough on India. He has just called me again. He does not believe we are carrying out his wishes. He wants to tilt in favor of Pakistan. He feels everything we do comes out other wise."

The documents provide more detail on the meetings than had been made public previously, but many details

Texts of secret policy planning sessions—Page A-6.

essential details had already been used by Anderson in his syndicated column.

He did not release what he said were "dozens" of other documents giving what he called a complete picture of the government's decision-making process during the India - Pakistan War.

Meetings of WSAG

The papers released by Anderson covered meetings of the Washington Special Action Group at the White House on Dec. 3, 4 and 6. The WSAG is a top advisory committee to the National Security Council.

All the documents are marked "SECRET SENSITIVE" and one paper, covering the Dec. 4 meeting, says: "In view of the sensitivity of information in the NSC (Na-

tional Security Council) system and the detailed nature of this memorandum, it is requested that access to it be limited to a strict need-to-know basis."

The documents appeared to have come from two different offices in the Pentagon—although it is quite possible that copies of the minutes also would be available in the other areas of the government.

Anderson says he has even more such documents. The disclosures amount to a major leak of sensitive government papers—in some way even more disturbing to high government officials than the release of the Pentagon Papers earlier this year.

In that case, the documents covered essentially a period of history ending about 1965.

The papers published by Anderson, on the other hand, cover a current international crisis.

The minutes of the meeting of Dec. 3 were made by James H. Noyes, deputy assistant secretary of defense for Near Eastern, African and South Asian Affairs, and approved by his boss, G. Warren Nutter, assistant defense secretary for international security affairs.

The minutes of the Dec. 4 and 6 meetings were prepared by Navy Captain H.N. Kay, who works in the office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the Pentagon.

Government sources said an investigation of the source of the apparent leak to Anderson was being coordinated from the White House and involved security agencies at the State and Defense Departments as well as the Secret

See PAPERS, Page A-10

SEARCHED.....	INDEXED.....
SERIALIZED.....	FILED.....
FEB 18 1972	
FBI - WASH. F. O.	
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~~Continued From Page A-1~~
Service. Contrary to earlier reports, the Federal Bureau of Investigation has not been called into the case so far.

Officials at the State and Defense Departments seemed to be most concerned about two aspects of the case.

The Concern

Several officials called attention to a column published by Anderson on Dec. 28 describing a secret intelligence report in which Emory Swank, U.S. ambassador to Cambodia, gave an unflattering assessment of top Cambodian officials. Publication of the report, the U.S. officials said, will greatly complicate Swank's task in dealing with the Cambodian government.

Anderson acknowledged that an argument could be made that the cables of an ambassador to his government should be classified.

"But I think I had a duty to report his warning that the country (Cambodia) is about to collapse," he said.

Two Key Discrepancies

The other concern raised about the Anderson papers is that a pattern of leaks now may make government officials reluctant, in the future, to offer proposals that might be embarrassing if they were published, or to be candid in their comments on policies under consideration.

The Anderson documents reveal what appear to be two major discrepancies between what the administration was doing — or thinking about doing — at the height of the India - Pakistan crisis and what it was telling the public.

Anderson suggested a comparison be made between the minutes of the sessions — particularly Kissinger's comment that he was getting hell from the President for not being tough enough on India — and a Kissinger "background" briefing for the press on Dec. 7. Anderson said the comparison would show the government "lied" to the public.

In that backgrounder, Kissinger denied the administration was "anti-Indian."

Arms Transfer Suggested

The other major discrepancy noted by Anderson arises from the minutes of the Dec. 6 meeting in which Kissinger is said to have asked whether the United States could authorize Jordan or Saudi Arabia to transfer American military equipment to Pakistan.

Two State Department officials responded that such a transfer would be illegal and that the Jordanians would probably be grateful if the United States "could get them off the hook" by denying authority for such a transfer.

The government said publicly at that time that it was not providing aid to either country.

~~Assistant Secretary of State~~
Joseph Sisco said that "as the Paks increasingly feel the heat we will be getting emergency requests from them."

"Dr. Kissinger said that the President may want to honor those requests," the minutes went on. "The matter has not been brought to presidential attention but it is quite obvious that the President is not inclined to let the Paks be defeated. Mr. (David) Packard (then deputy defense secretary) said that we should look at what could be done. Mr. Sisco agreed but said it should be done very quietly. Dr. Kissinger indicated he would like a paper by tomorrow (Dec. 7)."

Although the minutes seem to imply a presidential decision to prevent the defeat of Pakistan by India, it appears that the participants in the meetings had already accepted the inevitability of an Indian victory in East Pakistan, or what is now called Bangladesh, and that the discussion of possible aid to Pakistan really centered on efforts to prevent

an Indian victory over West Pakistan as well.

Thus, Sisco is reported to have said that, "from a political point of view our efforts would have to be directed at keeping the Indians from 'extinguishing' West Pakistan."

Seeks Confrontation

Anderson said in an interview that he hoped by publication of the documents to force a confrontation over what he described as "massive" overclassification of documents. But it was not clear what type

of confrontation he envisioned.

He would not discuss the source of the documents he has received. The guess of officials at the Pentagon and State Department was that the documents were supplied to Anderson by someone bitterly opposed to the policy followed by the United States during the India-Pakistan war, and that they might have been sent to him anonymously.

However, Anderson said, "I don't recall ever receiving a n o n y m o u s .secret documents."

In the case of the Pentagon papers, a confrontation between the government and the press came when the government went to court to try to prevent publication of the papers.

In the case of the Anderson papers, there has been no request not to publish the documents. Anderson said he has not been questioned by government investigators, and the government would not even confirm on the record, that an investigation is under way.

Kissinger Asks for Report: Who Did What to Whom?

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF
STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301
December 5, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Washington Special Action Group Meeting on Indo - Pakistan Hostilities; 4 December 1971.



~~SAMUEL DePALMA~~

1. The NSC Washington Special Action Group met in the Situation Room, The White House, at 11:00, Saturday, 4 December to consider the Indo - Pakistan situation. The meeting was chaired by Dr. Kissinger.

2. Attendees

Dr. Henry Kissinger; Dr. John Hannah, AID; Mr. Richard Helms, CIA; Dr. G. Warren Nutter, Defense; Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, JCS; Mr. Christopher Van Hollen, State.

Mr. James Noyes, Defense; Mr. Armistead Selden, Defense; Rear Admiral Robert Welander, OJCS; Captain Howard Kay, OJCS; Mr. Harold Saunders, NCS; Colonel Richard Kennedy, NSC; Mr. Samuel Hoskanson, NSC; Mr. Donald MacDonald, AID; Mr. Maurice Williams, AID; Mr. John Waller, CIA; Mr. Samuel DePalma, State; Mr. Bruce Laingen, State; Mr. David Schneider, State.

3. **SUMMARY.** It was decided that the US would request an immediate meeting of the Security Council. The US resolution would be introduced in a speech by Ambassador Bush as soon as possible. The USG UN approach would be tilted toward the Paks. Economic aid for Pakistan currently in effect will not be terminated. No requirements were levied on the CS.

DATE 1/5/72

PAGE A-1

- ___ THE WASH
& TIMES HERALD
- ✓ THE EVENING STAR
- ___ THE SUNDAY STAR
- ___ THE WASHINGTON DAILY NEWS
- ___ WASHINGTON-AFRO AMERICAN

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4. MR. HELMS opened the meeting by indicating that the Indians were currently engaged in a no holds barred attack of East Pakistan and that they had crossed the border on all sides this morning. While India had attacked eight Pak airfields there were still no indication of any ground attacks in the West. Although not decreeing a formal declaration of war President Yahya has stated that "the final war with India is upon us," to which Mrs. Gandhi had responded that the Pak announcement of war constituted the ultimate folly. The Indians, however, had made it a point not to declare war. The Indian attacks have it a major POL area in Karachi resulting in a major fire which will likely be blazing for a considerable length of time, thus providing a fine target for the Indian Air Force. Mr. Helms indicated that the Soviets were increasingly supporting India. He opined, however, that the Soviet assessment is that there is not much chance of a great power confrontation in the current crisis.

5. DR. KISSINGER remarked that if the Indians have announced a full scale invasion, this fact must be reflected in our UN statement.

6. MR. HELMS indicated that we do not know who started the current action, nor do we know why the Paks hit the four small airfields yesterday.

7. DR. KISSINGER requested that by Monday the CIA prepare an account of who did what to whom and when.

8. MR. DePALMA suggested that if we refer to the Indian declaration in our discussion in the U.N., that we almost certainly will have to refer to remarks by Yahya.

9. DR. KISSINGER replied that he was under specific instructions from the President, and either someone in the bureaucracy would have to prepare this statement along the lines indicated or that it would be done in the White House.

10. MR. HELMS referred to the "no holds barred" remark in the official Indian statement and similar remarks that were being made from the Pak side.

11. DR. KISSINGER asked whether the Indians have stated anything to the effect that they were in an all out war.

12. MR. HELMS said that the terminology was "no holds barred."

13. DR. KISSINGER asked what the Paks have said. MR. HELMS said the terminology was "final war with India." Dr. Kissinger suggested this was not an objectionable term. It did not seem outrageous to say that they (the Paks) were trying to defend themselves.

14. DR. KISSINGER then asked what was happening in the UN, to which MR. DePALMA responded that the UK, Belgium, Japan and possibly France were joining for a call for a Security Council meeting. The Japanese had detected some slight tilt in our letter requesting the meeting. The Japanese preferred a blander formulation. We have not, however, reacted to the Japanese.

15. DR. KISSINGER asked to see the letter and requested that it be promulgated in announcing our move in the UN, to which MR. DePALMA responded affirmatively.

16. DR. KISSINGER stated that while he had no strong view on the letter, our position must be clearly stated in the announcement.

17. DR. KISSINGER stated he did not care how third parties might react, so long as Ambassador Bush understands what he should say.

18. DR. KISSINGER said that whoever was putting out background information relative to the current situation is provoking Presidential wrath. The President is under the "illusion" that he is giving instructions; not that he is merely being kept apprised of affairs as they progress. DR. KISSINGER asked that this be kept in mind.

19. MR. DePALMA indicated that he did not yet know whether the Security Council would be convened in the afternoon or evening (this date). However, the first statements at the meeting would likely be those by the Indians and Paks. He suggested that Ambassador Bush should be one of the first speakers immediately following the presentation by the two contesting nations. He felt that the impact of our statement would be clearer if it were made early. Dr. Kissinger voiced no objections.

20. MR. DePALMA asked whether we wanted to get others lined up with our resolution before we introduced it. This, however, would take



MAURICE J. WILLIAMS

time DR. KISSINGER suggested rather than follow this course, we had better submit the resolution as quickly as possible, alone if necessary. According to DR. KISSINGER the only move left for us at the present time is to make clear our position relative to our greater strategy. Everyone knows how all this will come out and everyone knows that India will ultimately occupy East Pakistan. We must, therefore, make clear our position, table our resolution. We want a resolution which will be introduced with a speech by Ambassador Bush. If others desire to come along with us, fine; but in any event we will table the resolution with a speech by Ambassador Bush.

21. DR. KISSINGER continued that it was important that we register our position. The exercise in the UN is likely to be an exercise in futility, inasmuch as the Soviets can be expected to veto. The UN, itself, will in all probability do little to terminate the war. He summarized the foregoing by saying that he assumed that our resolution in the UN will be introduced by a speech and there will be no delay. We will go along in general terms with reference to political accommodation in East Pakistan but we will certainly not imply or suggest any specifics, such as the release of Mujib.

22. DR. KISSINGER asked how long the Indians could delay action in the Council. MR. DePALMA said they could make long speeches or question our purpose. MR. VAN HOLLEN said that they would draw out as long as possible which would allow them to concentrate on the situation in East Pakistan. Mr. DePALMA said that they could shilly-shally for three or four days which, MR. HELMS stated, would be long enough for them to occupy East Pakistan. Mr. DePALMA stated that we could always try to force a vote. DR. KISSINGER reiterated that there was no chance in getting anything useful in the UN.

23. MR. DePALMA suggested that in all likelihood one side or the other will veto.

24. Concerning the matter of economic aid, DR. KISSINGER stated that the President had directed that cutoff was to be directed at India only. He indicated, however, that he wanted to read the announcement to the President so that the latter would know exactly what he might be getting into. At this point MR. WILLIAMS asked whether some mention should be made in the statement explaining why aid for Pakistan is not being cut off. DR. KISSINGER said that information would be kept for background only.

25. MR. WILLIAMS said that the Department of Agriculture indicated that the price of vegetable oil was weakening in the United States; thus cutting off this PL-480 commodity to India could have repercussions on the domestic market. He asked, therefore, whether oil could be shipped in place of wheat. DR. KISSINGER said that he will have the answer to that by the opening of business Monday.

26. DR. KISSINGER then asked for a brief rundown on the military situation. ADMIRAL ZUMWALT responded that he thought the Paks could hold the line in East Pakistan for approximately one or two weeks before the logistics problems became overriding. He expected the Soviets to cement their position in India and to push for permanent usage of the naval base at Visag. He anticipated that the Soviet's immediate short range objective would be to gain military advantage through their current relationship with India.

27. DR. KISSINGER indicated that the next meeting will convene Monday morning (Dec. 6).

H. N. Kay

Captain, USN

South Asia-MAP Branch, J5

Extension 72400

President 'Wants to Tilt in Favor of Pakistan'

Here are the texts of the secret government documents released by columnist Jack Anderson:

SECRET SENSITIVE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

Refer to: 1-29643-71

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
AFFAIRS
MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: WSAG Meeting on
India-Pakistan

Participants: Assistant to the
President for National Security
Affairs, Henry A. Kissinger;
Under Secretary of State,
John N. Irwin; Deputy Secretary
of Defense, David Packard;
Director, Central Intelligence
Agency, Richard M. Helms;
Deputy

Administrator (AID), Maurice J. Williams; Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Thomas H. Moorer; Assistant Secretary of State (NEA), Joseph J. Sisco; Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), G. Warren Nutter; Assistant Secretary of State (IO), Samuel De Palma; Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), Armistead I. Selden, Jr.; Assistant Administrator (AID-NESA), Donald G. MacDonald.

Time and Place: 3 Dec. 1971,
1100 hours, Situation Room,
White House.

SUMMARY:

Reviewed conflicting reports about major action in the West Wing. CIA agreed to produce map showing areas of East

Pakistan occupied by India. The President orders hold on issuance of additional irrevocable letters of credit involving \$99 million, and a hold on further action implementing the \$72 million PL 480 credit. Convening of Security Council meeting planned contingent on discussion with Pak Ambassador this afternoon plus further clarification of actual situation in West Pakistan. Kissinger asked for clarification of secret special interpretation of March 1959 bilateral U.S. agreement with Pakistan.

KISSINGER: I am getting hell every half hour from the President that we are not being tough enough on India. He has just called me again. He does not believe we are carrying out his wishes. He wants to tilt in favor of Paki-

DATE 1/5/72

PAGE A-6

- ___ THE WASHINGTON POST & TIMES HERALD
- ✓ THE EVENING STAR
- ___ THE SUNDAY STAR
- ___ THE WASHINGTON DAILY NEWS
- ___ WASHINGTON-AFRO AMERICAN

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9



HENRY KISSINGER

stan. He feels everything we do comes out otherwise.

HELMS: Concerning the reported action in the West Wing, there are conflicting reports from both sides and the only common ground is the Pak attacks on the Amritsar, Pathankat, and Srinagar airports. The Paks say the Indians are attacking all along the border; but the Indian officials say this is a lie. In the East Wing, the action is becoming larger and the Paks claim there are now seven separate fronts involved.

KISSINGER: Are the Indians ~~seizing~~ territory?

HELMS: Yes; small bits of territory, definitely.

SISCO: It would help if you could provide a map with a shading of the areas occupied by India. What is happening in the West — is a full-scale attack likely?

MOORER: The present pattern is puzzling in that the Paks have only struck at three small airfields which do not house significant numbers of Indian combat aircraft.

HELMS: Mrs. Gandhi's speech at 1:30 may well announce recognition of Bangladesh.

MOORER: The Pak attack is not credible. It has been made during late afternoon, which doesn't make sense. We do not seem to have sufficient facts on this yet.


KISSINGER: Is it possible that the Indians attacked first, and the Paks simply did what they could before dark in response?

MOORER: This is certainly possible.

KISSINGER: The President wants no more irrevocable letters of credit issued under the \$99 million credit. He wants the \$72 million PL 480 credit also held.

WILLIAMS: Word will soon get around when we do this. Does the President understand that?

KISSINGER: That is his order, but I will check with the



RICHARD HELMS

President again. If asked, we can say we are reviewing our whole economic program and that the granting of fresh aid is being suspended in view of conditions on the Subcontinent. The next issue is the UN.

IRWIN: The Secretary is calling in the Pak Ambassador this afternoon, and the Secretary leans toward making a U.S. move in the U.N. soon!

KISSINGER: The President is in favor of this as soon as we have some confirmation of this large-scale new action. If the U.N. can't operate in this kind of situation effectively, its utility has come to an end

and it is useless to think of U.N. guarantees in the Middle East.

SISCO: We will have a recommendation for you this afternoon, after the meeting with the Ambassador. In order to give the Ambassador time to wire home, we could tentatively plan to convene the Security Council tomorrow.

KISSINGER: We have to take action. The President is blaming me, but you people are in the clear.

SISCO: That's ideal!

KISSINGER: The earlier draft statement for Bush is too evenhanded.

SISCO: To recapitulate, after we have seen the Pak Ambassador, the Secretary will report to you. We will update the draft speech for Bush.

KISSINGER: We can say we favor political accommodation but the real job of the Security Council is to prevent military action.

SISCO: We have never had a reply either from Kosygin or Mrs. Gandhi.

WILLIAMS: Are we to take economic steps with Pakistan also?

KISSINGER: Wait until I talk with the President. He hasn't addressed this problem in connection with Pakistan yet.

SISCO: If we act on the Indian side, we can say we are keeping the Pakistan situation "under review."

KISSINGER: It's hard to tilt toward Pakistan if we have to match every Indian step with a Pakistan step. If you wait until Monday, I can get a Presidential decision.

PACKARD: It should be easy for us to inform the banks involved to defer action inasmuch as we are so near the weekend.

KISSINGER: We need a WSAG in the morning. We need to think about our treaty obligations. I remember a letter or memo interpreting our existing treaty with a special India tilt. When I visited Pakistan in January 1962, I was briefed on a secret document or oral understanding about contingencies arising in other than the SEATO context. Perhaps it was a Presidential letter. This was a special interpretation of the March 1959 bilateral agreement.

Approved: Illegible signature for G. Warren Nutter, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

Prepared by: (s) initials, James H. Noyes, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern, African and South Asian Affairs

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Disclosures Reported Pleasing Keating

By SYDNEY H. SCHANBERG
New York Times News Service

NEW DELHI — Sources close to Ambassador Kenneth B. Keating indicate that he was not unhappy about the disclosure of his secret cablegram to Washington taking issue with American policy on the Indian-Pakistani war.

Asked yesterday to comment on his policy views and on last month's cablegram, which was divulged in Washington by columnist Jack Anderson, Keating would say only: "This is a matter I cannot discuss."

It is known in New Delhi, however, that from the time Pakistani troops in East Pakistan moved to crush the Bengali secession movement there last March, Keating campaigned privately against the Nixon administration's pro-Pakistani stand. He even did so publicly until he was silenced by Washington in April.

Posture Correct

In recent months, Keating's official posture has been rigidly correct. He has refused to discuss his views with reporters, even in private. In his regular columns in a U.S. Information Service fortnightly newspaper that is widely distributed in India, he has consistently defended the administration policy. He has been criticized for doing so in the Indian press and elsewhere.

From the beginning of the India - Pakistan crisis, which culminated in India's victorious support of the East Pakistan separatists, the American ambassador's cables to Washington have argued strongly for a different American policy. He pressed for a policy that would be based on what he views as the moral and political "realities" on the subcontinent.

grams to Washington. His view all along, according to confidants, was that Pakistan was an unstable, crumbling military dictatorship; that India was not only an increasingly stable democracy but also the dominant power on the subcontinent; and that East Pakistan seemed certain to emerge as an independent state. The Bengali separatists

have proclaimed the establishment of Bangladesh.

The ambassador argued that the morality of the situation, a reference to "genocide," as well as the political realities should lead the United States to lean toward India rather than Pakistan.

By his determined dissent, Keating, a former Republican senator from New York who is

a political appointee of President Nixon and a former law partner of Secretary of State William P. Rogers, may have caused these two men considerable anguish and irritation over the last 10 months, but his arguments have had little obvious effect.

There have been periodic press reports that Keating has threatened to resign.

Only a few days after the Pakistani crackdown in East Pakistan began, he sent a cable containing more than a hint of outrage. In it he referred to the killings of Bengalis as "selective genocide" and urged Washington to come down hard on the Pakistani military regime. The word "massacre" was also used.

Reportedly Rebuked

After an April 15 news conference in Bombay at which he differed with the administration's contention that the events in East Pakistan were an "internal affair," he was reported to have been rebuked by Washington and told to confine his public remarks to support the administration position.

"The phrase 'internal affair' should not be overdone," he said at the news conference. He added that the meaning of the phrase was "limited to the geographical fact that all of this is taking place in what is now Pakistan."

The Pakistan government is understood to have filed a protest with Washington about his remarks.

Keating continued to press his argument in his cable

DATE

PAGE

THE WASHINGTON POST
& TIMES HERALD

✓ THE EVENING STAR

THE SUNDAY STAR

THE WASHINGTON DAILY NEWS

WASHINGTON-AFRO AMERICAN

Sub D
105-109483-10

SEARCHED.....	INDEXED.....
SERIALIZED.....	FILED.....
FEB 18 1972	
FBI - WASH	

9

JAMES J. KILPATRICK

Leak of Papers to Anderson a Grave Breach

We are in the midst of another of those great ruffled flaps involving the press, the government, and the ethics of public and private conduct. This one is serious.

The story goes back to the first week in December, when the Washington Special Action Group met at the White House to discuss the suddenly flaming war launched by India against East Pakistan. The WSAG, in effect, is the super-National Security Council of this administration — a top-level coordinating body intended to serve the President with the best advice and intelligence that can be pulled together by skilled and experienced men.

The three WSAG meetings of Dec. 3, 4 and 6 were held in confidence, of course, behind locked doors, but written minutes were prepared. These minutes were stamped "secret-sensitive," which is the classification level just below "top secret," and then were distributed among an estimated 50 to 75 persons in the Pentagon, State Department, CIA, and the White House.

A person or persons un-

known made copies of the memoranda and gave them to columnist Jack Anderson. He excerpted them for use in his column, and a few days later supplied the texts for use by newspapers generally. In one view—it is the view of anti-Nixon liberals—Anderson performed a great public service, and his anonymous informant was a man of noble character who risked his job in the name of truth and honesty in government.

There is another view. The importance of this disquieting affair does not lie in the memoranda themselves. The importance lies in the leak. Make no mistake: This leak must be found, and it must be stopped. This is a breach of trust, and a breach of security, of the most profound implications.

The memoranda are embarrassing, no more. For the most part, the minutes reflect the discussion of men trying to find out what is going on, and seeking to decide what best to

do about it. The President, they are advised, is angry at India for its aggressive action; he wants "a tilt toward Pakistan." There is much talk of the futility of the United Nations. One detects sympathy for the plight of the emerging nation of Bangladesh; it promises to become "an international basket case." The conferees come to no particular decisions. They agree to prepare certain papers for the President. Their discussion is candid, spontaneous, unreserved.

Subsequent to these private meetings, the White House was publicly to assert its neutrality in the India-Pakistan war. Obviously the White House was not neutral. This was self-evident to every editor and critic in the country.

It is a fair surmise that every government in history has taken public positions inconsistent with its private wishes. Diplomats know this.

What matters, to repeat, is the leak itself. This is not to

be compared with the action of the Washington Post last month in blowing Henry Kissinger's cover as the source of a recent backgrounder; that was no more than an ill-mannered breach of professional rules. Neither is it to be compared with Daniel Ellsberg's clandestine distribution last spring of the aging "Pentagon Papers." Ellsberg was then out of the government.

We must infer, in this instance, that someone still employed at the very highest levels of confidence — someone holding top secret clearance, with access to other memoranda of immense importance — has wantonly violated the trust reposed in him. This goes beyond disloyalty; it sails close to the windward edge of treason. What other documents one must wonder, has this person secretly copied? Where will he peddle them next? This is the alarming aspect. Anderson thinks it "funny," but then Anderson would. It is not funny at all.

DATE 1-11-72

PAGE A-9

___ THE WASHINGTON POST
& TIMES HERALD

THE EVENING STAR

___ THE SUNDAY STAR

___ THE WASHINGTON DAILY NEWS

___ WASHINGTON-AFRO AMERICAN



Sub D
105-109403-11

SEARCHED.....	INDEXED.....
FEB 18 1972	
WASH. F. O.	

109

JAMES RESTON

Leaks Through the Xerox System

The Nixon administration is now trying to fathom a mystery. Why, it wants to know, are so many more government secrets now leaking to the press? Who is responsible for these breaches of security, and what is to be done about them? The FBI and the military intelligence services are now scrambling desperately for the answer.

There are many theories. The political theory is that the federal civil servants, most of them appointed during the long executive domination of the Democratic party, are trying to embarrass the present Republican administration.

The philosophical theory is that the antiwar bureaucrats are handing over to the press any documents that might show the difference between what the President and his closest associates are saying in public and what they are saying in private. And if you study the disclosures of the Pentagon papers and the Anderson papers, there is obviously something to these political and philosophical theories.

Nevertheless, the guess here is that the real explanation is not primarily political or philosophical, but scientific and technical. The real source of the leaks is Chester Carlson, who invented the electrostatic copying or Xerox system, which now dominates the federal government and influences the flow of information in every other big institution in the country.

Washington is really run by intelligent women secretaries, who are constantly being asked by forgetful Cabinet members, what about this and that, so they keep the records, and Xerox whatever they might forget.

The Xerox system is so simple that nobody in this town can do without it. Henry Kissinger has a meeting of the principal advisers to the President in the Cabinet Room of the White House to discuss what to do about the Indo-Pakistani crisis, and naturally, he wants a record of what is said, which is recorded by the official rapporteur, and then Xeroxed for the participants, and circulated so that everybody concerned knows what was said and what they are supposed to do about it.

Switch now to the Xerox or copying room in the basement of the White House. The operator, unless he is policed, can punch 10, or 11, or 15 copies of the secret record, and circulate them as he likes. The possibilities of leaks are obvious.

Every copy going to any authorized person in the Kissinger meeting on the Indo-Pakistani war can easily and quickly be Xeroxed and circulated to the "responsible persons" in his own department, passing through aides and secretaries, who have other Xerox machines, and while most of them merely pass the message along to its intended receiver, anybody along the line can intercept and duplicate the message and circulate it at will, or so it seems.

This complicates J. Edgar Hoover's problem of plugging the leaks. Finding the source of the Pentagon papers was easy, but getting to the leak of the Anderson papers, with all those copying machines around, is a puzzle.

Why Anderson? He has never been known to be close to any high officials in the State or Defense departments, but what of the technicians on the Xerox machines? With all this easy copying technique around, even the FBI doesn't quite know where to turn.

It would be hard to prove that the recent security leaks are the result of anti-Nixon, anti-war sentiments within the civil service or the Foreign Service of the United States. The tradition in both serves the President, no matter what he does, but once secrets are copied and circulated widely by Xerox, the elements of accident and disclosure are obviously far greater than ever in the past.

Quick modern electrostatic copying has had a much greater influence on security and diplomacy than is generally realized. The theory was that, if you could copy documents quickly, you could expand knowledge, information, and truth, and while there is a lot to be said for this, it has worked out in surprising ways.

For example, ambassadors or Foreign Service officers of the United States abroad, who used to be able to send their dissents privately to the State Department, or the President, now have to calculate that their dissents will be copied and circulated in Washington, so they tend to be cautious.

Always now, they have that Xerox machine in mind. Will

they really be able to speak their minds privately, or will their views be circulated all over Washington and hurt their careers? For the men in the Foreign Service, who feel that the State Department has lost its influence and authority in the last few years, this is a serious question.

No doubt some of them still keep writing what they believe, even if they think the White House will not like their dissents, but a lot of them, maybe most of them, hold back for fear of how their judgments will look after they are copied and circulated around Washington.

So maybe the mystery is not political or philosophical but merely technical. Paradoxically, the copying machines which were intended to expand information and truth are going in the opposite direction.

Beyond this, it is overwhelming officials here in paper work and keeping them from the definition and resolution of their main problems. The modern copying machines are not informing Washington so much as they are enslaving and confusing it, and keeping it from solving its security problems, and getting at the doubts of its loyal dissenters.

DATE 1-14-72

PAGE A-11

THE WASHINGTON POST & TIMES HERALD

THE EVENING STAR

THE SUNDAY STAR

THE WASHINGTON DAILY NEWS

WASHINGTON-AFRO AMERICAN

Sub D
105-109483-12

SEARCHED.....	INDEXED.....
SERIALIZED.....	FILED.....
FEB 18 1972	
FBI - [unclear]	

U.S. Show of Force in Bay of Bengal

By Jack Anderson

Throughout the Indian-Pakistan War, the American people once again were misled by their leaders.

Secret documents dispute, for example, the White House explanation for dispatching a naval task force to the Bay of Bengal.

Official spokesmen emphasized that the task force's main mission was to evacuate American citizens from embattled Dacca.

We have studied the secret White House papers dealing with the two-week war. These make clear that the task force—including the aircraft carrier Enterprise, the most powerful ship in the Navy—was sent into Indian waters as a "show of force."

This provocative naval deployment was intended (1) to compel India to divert both ships and planes to shadow the task force; (2) to weaken India's blockade against East Pakistan; (3) possibly to divert the Indian aircraft carrier Vikrant from its military mission, and (4) to force India to keep planes on defense alert, thus reducing their operations against Pakistani ground troops.

The evacuation of American citizens was strictly a secondary mission, adopted more as the justification than the reason for the naval move.

Here's how the "Top Secret" orders to the task force were

finally worded: "Situation: U.S. citizens may have to be evacuated from the area affected by the present India-Pakistan conflict. The situation may also arise which will require the presence and utilization of a CVA (carrier) to ensure the protection of U.S. interests in the area . . .

"Mission: To form a contingency evacuation force capable of helo (helicopter) evacuation of civilians, of self protection, and of conducting naval air and surface ops (operations) as directed by higher authority in order to support U.S. interests in the Indian Ocean area."

Secret Excerpts

Meanwhile, those anonymous aides, who whisper the latest word from the White House into the ears of newsmen, have stopped pretending that the task force was intended to evacuate stranded Americans.

Now the aides are leaking the story that President Nixon had learned of the Soviet-Indian plans not only to lop off East Pakistan but to dismember West Pakistan. The task force was ordered into the Indian Ocean, according to this line as a deterrent.

But this, too, is a distortion of the information contained in the White House papers. Here are excerpts from the "Secret Sensitive" strategy session that took place in the

White House's fabled Situation Room shortly before the decision to present a "show of force" in the Bay of Bengal:

"Mr. Helms (the CIA chief) opened the meeting by briefing the current situation . . . It is reported that prior to terminating present hostilities, Mrs. Gandhi intends to attempt to eliminate Pakistan's armor and air force capabilities . . .

"Assessing the situation in the West, General Ryan (the Air Force chief) indicated that he did not see the Indians pushing too hard at this time, rather they seem to be content with a holding action . . .

"Dr. Kissinger (the President's chief foreign policy-maker) suggested that . . . if the Indians smash the Pak air force and the armored forces, we would have a deliberate Indian attempt to force the disintegration of Pakistan. The elimination of the Pak armored and air forces would make the Paks defenseless.

Scare Tactics

"It would turn West Pakistan into a client state. The possibility elicits a number of questions. Can we allow a U.S. ally to go down completely? Can we allow the Indians to scare us off? . . .

"Mr. Sisco (assistant State secretary in charge of Asian affairs) stated that if the situation were to evolve as Dr. Kissinger had indicated, then, of course, there was a serious

risk to West Pakistan. Mr. Sisco doubted, however, that the Indians had this as their objective . . .

"Dr. Kissinger stated that what we may be witnessing is a situation wherein a country (India), equipped and supported by the Soviets, may be turning half of Pakistan into an impotent state and the other half into a vassal . . . One could make a case, he argued, that we have done everything two weeks too late in the current situation . . .

"Mr. Packard (deputy Defense secretary) stated that perhaps the only satisfactory outcome would be for us to stand fast, with the expectation that the West Paks could hold their own . . .

"Dr. Kissinger said that we are not trying to be even handed. The President does not want to be even handed. The President believes that India is the attacker . . .

"Dr. Kissinger said that we cannot afford to ease India's state of mind. The lady is cold blooded and tough and will not turn into a Soviet satellite merely because of pique. We should not ease her mind. He invited anyone who objected to this approach to take his case to the President."

Next day, preparations were made to send a task force into the Bay of Bengal to confront both Soviet and Indian warships.

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DATE 12-31-71

PAGE 1

THE WASHINGTON POST & TIMES HERALD

THE EVENING STAR

THE SUNDAY STAR

THE WASHINGTON DAILY NEWS

WASHINGTON-AFRO AMERICAN

9

Sub D
105-109483-13

SEARCHED	INDEXED
SERIALIZED	FILED
FEB 18 1972	
FBI - WASH. F. O.	

Scully 100

U.S., U.N. Damaged by Indian Blitz

By Jack Anderson

Pakistan wasn't the only loser of the bloody, two-week war over Bangladesh. The Indian blitz also badly damaged two bigger victims.

We have already shown from the secret White House Papers that the United States suffered a strategic defeat. Thanks to President Nixon's bungling, Russia has emerged as India's partner, and the United States is out in the cold on the Indian subcontinent.

The other big loser is the United Nations, which failed dismally to keep the peace between India and Pakistan. The U.N.'s impotence, as it groped for an international consensus to end the struggle, caused President Nixon's foreign policy adviser, Henry Kissinger, to blurt at a secret White House meeting:

"If the U.N. can't operate in this kind of situation effectively, its utility has come to an end, and it is useless to think of U.N. guarantees in the Middle East."

America's U.N. Ambassador, George Bush, suggested in one secret report that Secretary General U Thant's ineffectiveness might be attributed to "physical strain due to his recent illness." But Kissinger put the matter more bluntly by calling the U.N. wrangle a "farce."

Kissinger made clear his contempt for the U.N. at a

White House strategy session on Dec. 4.

"We will have difficulty in the U.N.," suggested Samuel DePalma, the State Department's specialist in international organizations, "because most of the countries who might go with us do not want to tilt toward Pakistan to the extent we do."

"We have told the Paks we would make our statement," replied Kissinger. "Let's go ahead and put in our own statement anyway regardless of what other countries want to do. We need now to make our stand clear even though it has taken us two weeks of fiddling."

Kissinger's Comments

The secret minutes continue: "Dr. Kissinger (said) it was important that we register our position. The exercise in the U.N. is likely to be an exercise in futility, inasmuch as the Soviets can be expected to veto. The U.N. itself, will in all probability do little to terminate the war."

At this point, Kissinger declared: "Nothing will happen at the Security Council because of Soviet vetoes. The whole thing is a farce."

"The Soviet tactic will be to stall, as they do not want a cease-fire yet," agreed Christopher Van Hollen, another State Department expert.

DePalma said the Indians "could shilly-shally for three or four days"—long enough,

chimed in CIA director Richard Helms, "for them to occupy East Pakistan."

Footnote: When Indian troops threatened Dacca, Secretary General U Thant's first reaction was to evacuate the U.N. mission.

This brought stern, secret instructions from State Secretary Bill Rogers to Ambassador Bush: "Request U.S.U.N. (U.S. delegation) to convey to SYG (Secretary General) or appropriate senior official our deep concern regarding decision of SYG to withdraw all U.N. officials from East Pakistan as demanded by Indian government."

"In earlier message from Dacca, U.N. group in East Pakistan was cited as having been instructed by U.N.N.Y. (U.N. headquarters) to 'defer evacuation of U.N. officials so they may be in place for possible assistance in arranging cease-fire . . ."

"Suggest in course of discussion you stress critical role which U.N. can play in protecting human rights and seeking peace during current crisis."

Washington Whirl

Reverse Justice—We reported earlier that the Justice Department was trying to reduce a U.S. Court of Claims commissioner's damage recommendation to a Miami Herald photographer named Doug Kennedy who was wounded by American Marines in the Dominican Republic six years

ago. The court recommended Kennedy receive \$100,000. Subsequently, however, he was stricken with cancer. So the Justice Department promptly sought to cut down his award on the ground that cancer had reduced his life expectancy. Now Kennedy has died and his wife and child need the award more than ever.

PX Blues—Three separate surveys taken by the Pentagon, a civilian research firm and the Army itself have turned up widespread dissatisfaction with the multibillion-dollar commissary system. The Pentagon study found "customers rated commissary service unsatisfactory." The civilian survey showed 76.9 per cent of commissary customers wanted a better selection. The Army discovered that, out of eight aspects of military life, the commissaries and post exchanges ranked seventh. Meanwhile, despite revelations of waste and corruption in the system, the generals in charge continue to assure Defense Secretary Mel Laird that all is well.

Dole's Dunning—Sen. Bob Dole (R-Kan.), the brassy Republican National Chairman, has sent out letters soliciting \$50 and \$75 contributions for the Senate campaign of his old pal, Sen. Bob Griffin (R-Mich.). But the letters were sent to non-Michigan money men, thus angering other GOP candidates who see the dunning as poaching on their homestate preserves.

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DATE 1-1-72

PAGE B-7

- THE WASHINGTON POST & TIMES HERALD
- THE EVENING STAR
- THE SUNDAY STAR
- THE WASHINGTON DAILY NEWS
- WASHINGTON-AFRO AMERICAN

Sub D
105-109483-14
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FEB 18 1972

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Probe Is On To Find Leak To Anderson

Associated Press

U.S. officials said yesterday a security investigation is under way to find out who "leaked" to a columnist inside information about White House strategy sessions early this month concerning the India-Pakistan conflict.

The officials, who declined to be identified by name, voiced concern about the publication of the material by columnist Jack Anderson.

Anderson columns have been quoting from what Anderson says are classified reports. They deal in part with suggestions by some administration officials that some countries such as Jordan be allowed to transfer U.S.-furnished arms to Pakistan.

The administration did not engage in such transfers, and maintained its embargo on weapons deliveries to Pakistan.

Some of Anderson's material is said to come from meetings of the special action group that deliberated U.S. India-Pakistan policy at the White House during the first days of December.

The group is led by presidential adviser Henry A. Kissinger, head of the White House National Security Council staff, and includes senior representatives from concerned agencies such as the State Department, the Defense Department and the Central Intelligence Agency.

DATE 1-1-72

PAGE A-3

THE WASHINGTON POST
& TIMES HERALD

THE EVENING STAR

THE SUNDAY STAR

THE WASHINGTON DAILY NEWS

WASHINGTON AFRICAN AMERICAN

9
Sub D
105-109483-15

SEARCHED	INDEXED
SERIALIZED	FILED
FEB 18 1972	
FBI - WASH. F. O.	

10

Secret Minutes Dispute Kissinger

By Jack Anderson

We can now document from secret White House minutes our charge that presidential braintruster Henry Kissinger lied to reporters when he told them the Nixon administration wasn't anti-India.

Contrary to Kissinger's statement to the press, the minutes show that President Nixon not only ordered a pro-Pakistan policy but became furious with his subordinates for not taking a stronger stand against India.

"I am getting hell every half hour from the President that we are not being tough enough on India," complained Kissinger at the Dec. 3 strategy session.

Three days later, according to the minutes, Kissinger "directed that henceforth we show a certain coolness to the Indians. The Indian ambassador is not to be treated at too high a level."

The India-Pakistani conflict was reviewed almost daily by a crisis team known as the Washington Special Action Group. Here's a typical ex-

cerpt from the secret minutes for Dec. 4:

"Mr. Helms (the CIA director) opened the meeting by indicating that the Indians were currently engaged in a no-holds-barred attack of East Pakistan and that they had crossed the border on all sides... Although not decreeing a formal declaration of war, President Yahya has stated that 'the final war with India is upon us'...

"Dr. Kissinger remarked that if the Indians have announced a full scale invasion, this fact must be reflected in our U.N. statement.

"Mr. Helms indicated that we do not know who started the current action...

"Dr. Kissinger requested that by Monday the CIA prepare an account of who did what to whom and when.

"Mr. DePalma (Assistant State Secretary) suggested that if we refer to the Indian declaration in our discussion in the UN, that we almost certainly will have to refer to remarks by Yahya.

"Dr. Kissinger replied that

he was under specific instructions from the President, and either someone in the bureaucracy would have to prepare this statement along the lines indicated or that it would be done in the White House.

Kissinger's Semantics

"Dr. Kissinger asked whether the Indians have stated anything to the effect that they were in an all-out war.

"Mr. Helms said that the terminology was 'no holds barred.'

"Dr. Kissinger asked what the Paks have said. Mr. Helms said the terminology was final war with India.' Dr. Kissinger suggested this was not an objectionable term. It did not seem outrageous for the Paks to say they were trying to defend themselves..."

Later in the meeting, Kissinger instructed: "On AID matters, the President wants to proceed against India only."

The secret minutes of the December 8 meeting shed more light on this:

"Dr. Kissinger emphasized that the President has made it clear that no further foreign exchange, (surplus) commodities or development loans could be assigned to India without approval of the White House.

"Mr. Williams (Deputy AID Director) stated there was no problem of anything sliding through.

"Dr. Kissinger inquired what the next turn of the screw might be.

"Mr. Williams said that the only other possible option was taking a position concerning AID material currently under contract. This, however, would be a very messy problem inasmuch as we would be dealing with irrevocable letters of credit..."

"Dr. Kissinger stated that current orders are not to put anything in the budget for India. It was also not to be leaked that AID had put money in the budget for India only to have the 'wicked' White House take it out."

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DATE 1-3-72

PAGE B-9

THE WASHINGTON POST & TIMES HERALD

THE EVENING STAR

THE SUNDAY STAR

THE WASHINGTON DAILY NEWS

WASHINGTON-AFRO AMERICAN

9

Sub D

105-109483-16

SEARCHED.....	INDEXED.....
FEB 1 8 1972	
FBI - WASH.	

Secret / U.S. Papers Bared

By Sanford J. Ungar
Washington Post Staff Writer

Syndicated columnist Jack Anderson, in a major challenge to the secrecy of American policy in the Indo-Pakistani war, last night gave The Washington Post the full texts of three secret documents describing meetings of the National Security Council's Washington Special Action Group (WSAG).

The documents indicate that Henry A. Kissinger, President Nixon's national security adviser, instructed government agencies to take a harder line with India than with Pakistan in public statements and private actions during last month's war on the Indian subcontinent.

The release by Anderson came after Kissinger told reporters Monday night that the columnist, in stories based on the documents, had taken "out of context" remarks indicating that the administration was against India.

Anderson said he would make the documents available to other members of the press today and invited Sen. J. W. Fulbright (D-Ark.), Chair-

man of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, to use them as the basis for an investigation of U.S. policy in South Asia.

Fulbright, out of Washington during the congressional recess, could not be reached for comment.

At the same time, the Justice Department acknowledged yesterday that the FBI is investigating the nature of the security leak that put dozens of such documents in the columnist's hands.

Pentagon sources said a similar investigation was under way by Defense Department security agents. They said the scope of the investigation would be narrow because "very few people" have access to minutes of WSAG meetings.

Anderson, in an interview with The Washington Post, said he also had copies of cables from the U.S. ambassadors to India and Pakistan, as well as numerous other documents bearing on American policy.

He showed this reporter a briefcase with approximately 20 file folders, each containing some of the documents.

Anderson declined to name his sources but suggested that they hold high positions in the Nixon administration.

"If the sources were identified," he said, "it would embarrass the administration more than it would me. It would make a very funny story."

Since the controversy last year over release of the Pentagon Papers, a top-secret history of American policy in Vietnam, Anderson said, his sources had become more, rather than less, willing to make public classified material.

Many of the statements in the three documents made available last night had already appeared in Anderson's column, which is distributed to 700 newspapers, including The Washington Post.

But the full texts provided substantially more details of the back-and-forth discussion at the WSAG meetings among representatives of the White House, State and Defense departments, Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Council, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Agency for International Development.

See DOCUMENTS, A9, Col. 1

DATE 1-5-72

PAGE A-1

THE WASHINGTON POST
& TIMES HERALD

THE EVENING STAR

THE SUNDAY STAR

THE WASHINGTON DAILY NEWS

WASHINGTON-AFRO AMERICAN

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Jack Anderson Bares Secret Papers

DOCUMENTS, From A1

The documents covered WSAG meetings held on Dec. 3, 5 and 6.

The first of the three meetings was held on the opening day of full-scale hostilities between India and Pakistan, December 3. That was the day Pakistani aircraft launched a series of strikes against Indian airfields on the western border. Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi immediately proclaimed her country to be on a "war footing."

By the second meeting, December 5, Indian troops were pouring into East Pakistan against retreating Pakistani forces. The following day, Mrs. Gandhi announced India's recognition of Bangladesh as a sovereign country.

Anderson gave The Post

typewritten copies of photocopies of the documents in his possession.

Anderson's copies, which were inspected by a representative of The Post, showed that the original documents were on the stationery of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and of the assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, G. Warren Nutter.


Each page was stamped "SECRET SENSITIVE" at both top and bottom, and the first page of each document carried an indication of how long it would remain classified under the government's security regulations.

The document describing the Dec. 6 meeting, signed by Navy Capt. Howarn N. Kay, of the Office of the Joint Chiefs, included these significant statements:

• "Dr. Kissinger also directed that henceforth we show a certain coolness to the Indians; the Indian Ambassador is not to be treated at too high a level."

• "Dr. Kissinger then asked whether we have the right to authorize Jordan or Saudi Arabia to transfer military equipment to Pakistan. Mr. (Christopher) Van Hollen (deputy assistant secretary of state for South Asian affairs) stated that the United States cannot permit a third country to transfer arms which we have provided them when we, ourselves, do not authorize sale direct to the ultimate recipient, such as Pakistan."

• "Mr. (Joseph) Sisco (assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern and South Asian affairs) suggested that what we are really interested in are



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
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412

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SECRET SENSITIVE
SECRET SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Staff, US Army
Chief of Staff, US Air Force
Chief of Naval Operations
Commandant of the Marine Corps

SUBJ: Washington Special Action Group Meeting on Indo/Pakistan
Activities: 4 December 1971

1. Attached for your information is a memorandum for record concerning subject meeting.
2. In view of the sensitivity of information in the NEC system and the detailed nature of this memorandum, it is suggested that access to it be limited to a strict need-to-know basis.

For the Chairman, JCS:

A. K. KNOZEN
Captain, U. S. Navy
Executive Assistant to the
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

By Ellsworth Davis—The Washington Post

A copy of one of secret documents columnist Anderson gave to The Washington Post.

what supplies and equipment could be made available, and the modes of delivery of this equipment. He stated that from a political point of view our efforts would have to be directed at keeping the Indians from 'extinguishing' West Pakistan."

Another document prepared by Kay, concerning the Dec. 4 meeting, included this item:

• "Dr. Kissinger said that whoever was putting out background information relative to the current situation is provoking Presidential wrath. The President is under the 'illusion' that he is giving instructions; not that he is merely being kept appraised of affairs as they progress. Dr. Kissinger asked that this be kept in mind."

Anderson said he intended his columns on the Indo-Pakistani situation, and now the release of the documents, as an opportunity for a "show-down" on the government security classification system.

He said he had been "timid" at first about quoting from the documents, but later quoted more extensively when he became convinced of the "colossal blunders" in American policy.

His sources initially provided only a few documents, Anderson explained, but said he eventually "talked them into compiling for me what I considered to be a complete set. I wanted all of them so I could do my own selection."

Invoking his own view of what might harm national security, he said he would not release the exact texts of cables, "just in case they would be useful to cryptographers."

The columnist said that no government agents had contacted him about the documents but that his sources told of investigations proceeding at the State Department, Defense Department and the White House, allegedly under the coordination of Robert C. Mardian, assistant attorney general in charge of the Justice Department's Internal Security Division.

"If Mardian's investigating me," said Anderson, who took over the "Washington Merry-Go-Round" column from the late Drew Pearson, "I'm going to investigate him."

"I have an idea I'll know more about him than he knows about me. He can take his to a grand jury, and I'll take mine to the public."

A Justice Department spokesman said last night,

however, that "assistant attorney generals don't coordinate investigations." If any prosecution were initiated, he added, that might fall into "Mardian's bailiwick."

The spokesman stressed that he "cannot comment on a matter under investigation."

State Department officials denied that any investigation was under way there. Other sources at State said that no one there had yet been required to take lie detector tests, as in some previous security investigations. There was no comment from the White House.

Another Probe Set On Anderson Papers

Another congressional committee has announced that it is planning hearings on the government's security classification system.

In the wake of disclosures by syndicated columnist Jack Anderson concerning secret U.S. strategy sessions in connection with the India-Pakistan War, Rep. William Moorhead (D-Pa.) said yesterday his House Subcommittee on Foreign Operations and Government Information will open extensive hearings in March.

Moorhead said the hearings are intended to review the first five years of operation of the Freedom of Information Act, but also will consider "the whole problem of classification."

The Pittsburgh congressman said his hearings may "overlap" with others announced Wednesday by a House Armed Services Subcommittee but they will be "much broader," he said.

"The Anderson papers will be one thing we consider,"

Moorhead said in a telephone interview from Pittsburgh.

His subcommittee, which also conducted hearings last June after the disclosure of the Pentagon Papers on the war in Vietnam, will examine the use that government agencies have made of exemptions in the Information Act to request requests for documents.

An FBI investigation into Anderson's sources for Defense Department memoranda and State Department cables continued yesterday. The Justice Department indicated, however, that no prosecution on the scale of the Pentagon Papers case was anticipated.

Rep. Paul N. McCloskey (R-Calif.), a candidate for the Republican presidential nomination, yesterday added his voice to the criticism of American policy in the Indian subcontinent as revealed in the Anderson columns.

"This government has the right to keep secret its ongoing diplomatic negotiations," McCloskey said while campaigning in Newport, N.H., "but the government does not have the right to try to deceive the American people and the Congress concerning the reasons why we make national policy."

DATE 1-7-72

PAGE A-2

THE WASHINGTON POST
& TIMES HERALD

THE EVENING STAR

THE SUNDAY STAR

THE WASHINGTON DAILY NEWS

WASHINGTON-AFRO AMERICAN

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FEB 18 1972

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The Washington Merry-Go-Round

Nixon's One Man State Department

By Jack Anderson

Owlsh, offish Henry Kissinger, the foreign policy wizard, is simply over his head in paperwork.

He is trying to serve President Nixon as a one-man State Department. But the paperwork is too voluminous, the problems too overwhelming even for the brilliant Kissinger to master.

Still he tries to manage every foreign crisis, to absorb every new detail, to advise the President on every development. During the three hectic weeks before Christmas, the secret White House Papers show Kissinger had his fingers in the following pies:

- He directed the top-level strategy sessions on the Indian-Pakistani conflict. He submitted the option papers, for example, that persuaded President Nixon to dispatch a naval task force into the Bay of Bengal.

- Kissinger compiled a grim situation report showing a dangerous intensification of North Vietnamese military pressure in Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam. Not only were our Laotian allies in possible peril, but the government we support in Cambodia appeared to be in danger of collapse. He recommended air strikes against North Vietnam.

- He orchestrated the delicate U.S. strategy in the Middle East. Under his direction,

Ambassador George Bush probed and pressed in the backrooms of the United Nations for a diplomatic solution while Egypt and Syria deployed their forces for a military showdown. To keep a military balance, Kissinger urged the shipment of Phantom jets to Israel.

Calling Kissinger

- He became deeply involved in preparing the new international monetary agreement. President Nixon's unilateral economic moves last August caused a diplomatic backfire around the world. He did not consult with America's trading partners. He offered no explanation to the International Monetary Fund. He ignored the diplomatic niceties. In all this, he was advised chiefly by Treasury Secretary John Connally. Kissinger was called in, finally to unravel the international disorder.

- He stage-managed the President's globe-trotting to placate ruffled allied leaders. Not only were the briefing papers prepared under Kissinger's supervision, but he traveled with the President. Kissinger seemed to be everywhere—conferring with British Prime Minister Edward Heath, breakfasting with French President Georges Pompidou and, after hours, hitting the night spots with beautiful young ladies.

- All the while Kissinger

continued to prepare for the presidential pilgrimages to Peking and Moscow. He not only handled the arrangements but plotted the big-power chess that the President will play with our two chief adversaries.

- More than anyone else, Kissinger served as ring master for the three-ring Paris peace talks, Vienna SALT and Brussels NATO conference that were going on simultaneously behind closed doors. He called the signals from the White House.

He also kept close watch through horn-rimmed glasses upon such far-flung trouble spots as Cuba, Chile and Korea. He monitored the diplomatic cables, intelligence digests and situation reports that poured into Washington from around the globe. His interpretations and recommendations, largely, guided the President in setting policy everywhere.

Paper Clip War

Day after day, Kissinger processed dozens of option papers, security memoranda and briefing papers for the President. Kissinger also worked on several major national security studies on such subjects as "Prisoners of War" and "Laos Peace Initiatives."

In short, Henry Kissinger has been running U.S. foreign policy out of his basement of-

ice in the White House. The final decisions, to be sure, have been made by the President. But Kissinger has guided the President's thinking and directed the implementation of his policies.

The State Department, with its worldwide foreign service network, has been relegated largely to a messenger service. Kissinger accepts briefing papers from the State Department, and the department's specialists participate in White House strategy sessions.

But the final formulation of policy is handled by Kissinger. In preparation for the President's Peking visit, for example, veteran strategists at the State Department submitted briefing papers but weren't invited to join the advance party now in Peking. This mission is completely controlled by Kissinger.

Yet Kissinger has been able to operate in almost total secrecy. Congress has sought in vain to find out what he's doing, but he has refused to testify as Secretary of State Bill Rogers is required to do. The State Department, which is charged with the conduct of foreign affairs, can't even keep up with Kissinger.

Not until we got hold of the White House Papers has the public been given a glimpse into Kissinger's secret operations.

Bell-McClure Syndicate

DATE

1-7-72

PAGE

C-23

THE WASHINGTON POST
& TIMES HERALD

THE EVENING STAR

THE SUNDAY STAR

THE WASHINGTON DAILY NEWS

WASHINGTON-AFRO AMERICAN

105-109483-19
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FEB 18 1972
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Jack Anderson

Telling Truth Is Best Policy

THE GOVERNMENT could easily have avoided the grief caused by publication of the secret White House papers on India and Pakistan merely by doing one thing—telling the truth.

If presidential adviser Henry Kissinger had not lied to the press in his December background briefing on the Asia war, there would have been no story for us to write. The documents would simply have confirmed what the public had already been told.

Instead, the White House chose to mislead the public flagrantly. Kissinger said the administration was not anti-India, a misrepresentation that must have been obvious to both India, Pakistan and the allies of both.

The secret papers prove that the administration was militantly anti-India. It was this contradiction, not the fact that the papers were classified, that made them news.

Indeed, it is doubtful that the various sources who made the papers available would have done so if the administration had not engaged in such bald-faced deception.

Now, unfortunately, the administration seems bent on widening its credibility gap. It is thundering off in search of our sources instead of making good the solemn promise it made during the court battle over the Pentagon Papers.

At that time, the government admitted there was "massive over-classification" of official documents. It promised to reform the classification system, which it had determined by chronic overuse of the "secret" stamp.

Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart summarized the state of affairs in one sentence: "When everything is classified," he wrote, "nothing is classified." Today, documents which might genuinely need to be kept temporarily from public view are lost in a classified shuffle of miscellaneous cables, correspondence, intelligence summaries and other bric-a-brac.

Government officials almost daily demonstrate their contempt for the security labels by slipping newsmen selected secret papers which make them look good.

If these labels had any real meaning, the government itself would be the nation's number one security risk.

But while high officials have debased and cheapened the "secret" stamps, they still find them useful for one purpose: to keep their actions and particularly their blunders hidden from public view.

But this passion for secrecy

DATE 1-9-72

PAGE C-7

THE WASHINGTON POST & TIMES HERALD

THE EVENING STAR

THE SUNDAY STAR

THE WASHINGTON DAILY NEWS

WASHINGTON-AFRO AMERICAN

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FEB 18 1972

is far more serious than mere bureaucratic bungling. Secrecy, as the Supreme Court has observed, is not merely undemocratic, it is anti-democratic.

The proper function of our political system depends on the ability of the public to be informed. This is the crucial mission of the First Amendment — to promote a maximum flow of news and commentary to every citizen.

There is no way this fundamental concept, so basic to democracy, can be squared with a system of "security" classification which is, in reality, a legalized form of censorship.

The White House papers on India and Pakistan contain not a shred of information that threatens the nation's security. Instead, they reveal the inside policy maneuverings and public deceptions of our top officials.

They tell the story of foreign policy moves that may have pushed India—the world's second largest nation and its largest democracy—into the arms of the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, we find ourselves locked in an embrace with a feeble, beaten military dictatorship.

Putting the secret stamp on such information has nothing to do with national security. Rather, it has to do with political security.

Nassikas' Giveaway

WE EXPOSED in a series of columns last June how Federal Power Commission chairman John Nassikas lied to Congress, sold out the public in a \$4 billion rate case and suppressed his own economist's opposition to the giveaway.

Our charges were investigated by Rep. Neal Smith (Iowa), who summoned Nassikas and others to testify before his House Special Small Business Subcommittee. Now Smith has completed his formal report. In many respects, it is tougher than our columns.

"It is the view of this subcommittee," declares the report, "that the public has lost confidence in the ability of the FPC to set just and reasonable producer rates for the sale of natural gas in interstate commerce . . .

"The subcommittee believes that the action taken by the FPC in creating higher rates for gas produced in the southern Louisiana area was not in the public interest."

We had estimated this rate increase would cost America's consumers \$4 billion. Smith's subcommittee estimated the sell-out closer to \$4.5 billion.

Bell-McClure Syndicate



Joseph Kraft

The Anderson Papers

JACK ANDERSON achieved a journalistic coup in publishing the minutes of the secret White House meetings on the India-Pakistan crisis. But how much of a hero is the man who leaked the information?

My strong impression is that he accomplished very little public good, if any. On the contrary, his actions are almost certain to drive the Nixon administration deeper than ever into secret dealings on a restricted basis.

On the good side of the ledger, the leak has now provided unmistakable information that the President deliberately tilted American policy in favor of Pakistan and against India. But that much was known to everybody in touch with the State Department and White House at the time of the crisis.

Sens. Edmund Muskie, Edward Kennedy and Frank Church, among others, said so. Hundreds of us wrote it. Indeed, one reason Henry Kissinger held his background briefing of Dec. 7 was to take the edge off the charges the White House was biased in favor of Pakistan.

A second and more important gain from the revelation has to do with information about the way the government works. The secret minutes provide detailed, irrefutable evidence that day-to-day foreign policy is made in the White House as never before.

They equally show that top officials allowed themselves to be treated as mere lackeys by the White House. Some of them—including such supposed heavyweights as the chief of naval operations—said, and apparently regularly say, things silly enough to issue from the mouth of Bertie Wooster.

Then there is the matter of truth-telling. According to the minutes released by Anderson, Henry Kissinger told a meeting of officials on Dec. 3 that "he (the President) wants to tilt in favor of Pakistan."

On Dec. 7, in a background session with reporters subsequently released by Sen. Barry Goldwater, Dr. Kissinger said: "There have been some

DATE 1-9-72

PAGE C-7

THE WASHINGTON POST & TIMES HERALD

THE EVENING STAR

THE SUNDAY STAR

THE WASHINGTON DAILY NEWS

WASHINGTON-AFRO AMERICAN

Sub P
105-109483-21
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FEB 18 1972
109

comments that the administration is anti-Indian. This is totally inaccurate."

Seen thus starkly, Dr. Kissinger told a flat lie. My impression is that, taken in the larger context, his remarks at the secret conference were not in such flagrant contradiction with his remarks at the background briefing. Still, he was plainly trying to manipulate public opinion.

BUT SO WHAT? Does the new evidence do more than confirm a universal judgment? After the U-2 and the Bay of Pigs and the credibility gap, is there anybody not impossibly naïve or ill-informed who doesn't know that the government lies? Is one more bit of evidence a noble act? Or is it just a pebble added to the Alps?

Set against these gains, there is the way the administration is apt to react. Maybe the President and Dr. Kissinger are going to say to themselves: "Golly, we sure erred in not telling the truth and nothing but the truth. Jack Anderson has taught us that honesty is the best policy."

But much more likely, they are going to feel that the minutes of the meeting were legitimately classified internal working papers of the government. Probably they are going to feel that the stuff was leaked not for any large purpose, but out of opposition to the policy. And almost certainly—and I say this as an opponent of the policy—they will be right in this surmise.

In these circumstances, the limited trust they have in the outside world is going to be even more sharply limited. The morbid suspicion they have of the bureaucracy—a suspicion that the departments and agencies are full of crypto-Democrats out to get the administration—is only going to be intensified. And that deep suspicion is going to yield two sets of adverse reactions.

For one thing, security will be tightened. There is apt to be an end to the kind of minutes that were taken at Dr. Kissinger's meetings. They will certainly not be spread through the bureaucracy anymore.

Secondly, the limited access

which experienced officials now have to White House decision-making is going to be even further curbed. The President and Dr. Kissinger are going to keep things to themselves more than ever. Important decisions which are even now made with too little consultation and with too small an input from the outside are going to be made by an even more narrowly circumscribed group of men.

No doubt Anderson gets high marks for his acumen and industry and courage as a journalist. But his source, the man who leaked the stuff, is something else. Whatever his motives, he has done this country a disservice.



Tom Braden

Net Effect of the Anderson Leaks

IT IS already fashionable to say that the secret and private papers leaked to columnist Jack Anderson told us nothing we did not already know. In fact, they remind us of important truths we have insufficiently learned.

The first of these is that President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger are embarked upon a major change in United States foreign policy. What the American people had presumed was a polite how-do-you-do to China turns out to be a firm understanding.

The Anderson papers strongly suggest that part of this understanding was to back Pakistan against India. The papers have so far not revealed two additional pieces of evidence which buttress this view.

LAST OCTOBER 12, U.S. Ambassador Kenneth Keating called upon Indian Premier Gandhi with the warning that if India did not cease aid to dissidents in East Pakistan, Pakistan would attack from the West.

Somewhat taken aback by receiving this word from a friendly power, Madam Gandhi inquired what, in the event of such an attack would be the attitude of the United States. Keating replied that he had fulfilled his instructions and was empowered to say nothing more.

Kissinger also took a hand in attempting to frighten the Indians. He told the Indian ambassador here that if India became involved in war with both Pakistan and China, the United States could be of no assistance. The implication that Mr. Nixon's chief foreign policy aide was delivering a message from the Chinese seemed clear, and it hastened Madam Gandhi's determination to formal alliance with Moscow.

The second truth which emerges from the Anderson papers is that somebody in the United States government—and at a high level—is opposed to the new China policy and is not averse to destroying Kissinger in the process of opposing the pol-

icy. If Kissinger's influence is weakened as a result of the leak, it will be the nation's loss.

The President's assistant has been a brilliant, as well as an efficient public servant. In three years he has managed to turn the foreign policy making of the nation from obsession with ideology to judgment of power. If, in the course of this turn-around, options have not always been made clear, the fault lies not with Kissinger but with Mr. Nixon's determination that the cold war ideology still required lip service.

IT MAY BE ARGUED whether the new China policy required quite the brusqueness which the United States displayed towards its oldest friend in the East, but the Anderson papers seem to show Kissinger as a somewhat reluctant follower of the hard line. "The President is blaming me" and "He wants to tilt towards Pakistan" are not the remarks of a man with sole responsibility for each

step in an agreed course. Indeed, they seem slightly plaintive, and have set Indian representatives here in Washington to wondering what they have done to arouse Mr. Nixon's personal pique.

Finally the Anderson papers are a reminder that public exposure of private conversations among government officials can be almost as destructive of government as the the reporting of actual life and death military secrets.

Minutes of high level meetings may never be as frank again, and those who attend high level meetings may wonder whether they should say what they think or say what their enemies in the room might approve.

To reduce men to such a choice makes a mockery of government. Nobody will argue against the public's right to know the logic behind its foreign policy. But the difference between reporting the making of foreign policy and reporting private conversations is the difference between the reporter and the spy.

Los Angeles Times

DATE 1-11-72

PAGE A-15

- THE WASHINGTON POST & TIMES HERALD
- THE EVENING STAR
- THE SUNDAY STAR
- THE WASHINGTON DAILY NEWS
- WASHINGTON-AFRO AMERICAN

105-109483-22 Sub D

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FEB 18 1972	
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WASHINGTON AND AMERICAN

THE WASHINGTON DAILY NEWS

THE SUNDAY STAR

THE EVENING STAR

THE WASHINGTON POST & TIMES HERALD

PAGE

C-1

DATE

1-16-72

The Mormon Muckraker: Another Side

By Phil Casey

Jack Northman Anderson is a man of many sidelines. There's this daily newspaper column he took over from Drew Pearson, "Washington Merry-Go-Round," which appears in more than 600 daily and weekly newspapers. He does a weekly radio news show and five 90-second TV newscasts each week. He writes for Parade Magazine and is its Washington bureau chief. He invests in land and business and writes books. He lectures everywhere.

He has nine children. He is a man of the house. It's a Mormon household. Nobody drinks or smokes or swears,

including him. It's a serene, well-ordered place, and he spends as much time there as he can, and that's quite a bit.

Anderson is suddenly being celebrated for his revelation of secret White House policy-making on the India-Pakistan war.

He avoids the cocktail party and embassy circuit, and is home most nights. He's home most weekends. Of course, he's working much of the time he's home, but he's also around, patting heads, listening, talking, being with his wife.

It's a large house, a thing of fieldstone, brick and wood, painted white. There are 16 rooms, four baths and

two toilets, and all are needed. Besides his kids, who are everywhere, there are two nephews living there, and a young man described simply as a friend.

There are sometimes more than that. A cousin lived there for years but he got married last summer and departed. There was a Chinese girl who lived there for a time.

"She was a Mormon Chinese girl," explained Anderson. "Where did we meet her? I met her in Taiwan at church, where else?"

The feelings of Jack and Olivia Anderson toward children are simple.

"We don't have children because

See ANDERSON, G8, Col. 1

INDEXED

INDEXED

FEB 18 1972

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
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


By Gerald Martineau—The Washington Post

Jack Anderson: In his office, an atmosphere of get-the-rascals-out.



By Gerald Martineau—The Washington Post



United Press International

At right, Anderson displays secret government documents Jan. 5 after the taping of his TV show. At his home in Bethesda, Tanya Anderson, 11, bounces on the trampoline while Kevin, 14, Rodney, 10, and Randy, 12, wait their turns.



The Anderson family (minus Cheri, 20, Lance, 19, and Tina, 15): seated on the floor, from left: Brian, 4, Tanya, 11, Olivia and Jack Anderson, Kevin, 14, Laurie, 17, Randy, 12, and Rodney 10.

By Gerald Martineau—The Washington Post

ANDERSON, From G1

of religion," Anderson said. "We have them because we love them."

The place isn't as cramped as it might be. Two of his children — Cheri, 20, and Lance, 19 — are away at college, she at Brigham Young University in Utah, and he at Kirkland Hall College in Easton, Md. But there's still a goodly group: nine Andersons, two nephews, the friend, and kids from all over their Bethesda neighborhood.

It's easy to spot the Anderson house. For one thing, there's a solid bank of windows on the second floor facing the street.

"You see that row of windows," a friend and neighbor said, "and you just know that behind each window is a kid peering out."

Right in front of the front door of their home stands a trampoline. There are kids dancing in the air above it all day.

You can tell which are the Anderson kids. They are five boys and four girls and they all look alike, with mostly blonde hair.

Things can get confused, with all those people, living there or visiting.

Cheri, his eldest daughter (the children range from 20 years to 4) came home from college one night recently and met a strange boy in the foyer.

"It's all right," she said, as she put down her suitcase. "I live here, too."

Anderson goes to bed at 2 a.m. and awakes at 7:30 a.m. most days. He stays home practically every morning, working in his combined den and office and talking to and being with whomever is around.

Sometimes he lunches at home, but generally he's grabbing a sandwich at his office at 1612 K St. NW, or eating in some posh place. He's partial to the Montpelier Room at the Madison Hotel, and he likes the Empress Restaurant, a Chinese place on Vermont Avenue NW. One reason he prefers the Empress is that he owns part of it, and likes to see how his money is doing.

Wherever he dines, whatever he drinks is soft. His home is a palace of soft drinks. Bottles of Coke, ginger ale, root beer and such stuff are everywhere. But

Anderson keeps booze on the premises for dissolute friends, acquaintances, news sources and fallen-away Mormons, if such there be.

The other day, when Anderson stepped out of the house to be photographed by the news media suddenly enamored of him, a reporter who had been interviewing him went around scouting the big house. He found a pretty blonde girl sitting at the dining room table, which is big enough for a dozen or so Andersons.

She explained she was just one of the friends, preparing her Sunday night sermon and lesson for the Mormon church at 16th Street and Columbia Road NW. She didn't smoke or swear, she said, but she had

been known to take a drink, because only one of her parents is a Mormon.

Anderson pointed out that his Mormon sons have a lot of hair.

"I told Kevin to cut his hair one day just before he was to give a 2½-minute sermon in church. Well, he not only didn't cut his hair, he gave a sermon explaining that Jesus Christ — even Brigham Young himself — had long hair and a beard. He said he figured that St. Peter wouldn't be asking people what they had on their heads, but what they had in their hearts."

"Yes, and after that I cut three inches off," said Kevin, who is 14. "It doesn't show," said his father.

This Saturday was busier

than usual for Anderson.

"I now take a nap sometime on the weekend," he said, making it sound like a holiday on the Riviera. "I like that. Either Saturday or Sunday, I take a nap."

But that Saturday a photographer from The Washington Post was there, trying to assemble the family for some photos. A photographer from Parade showed up to try the same thing, and a Japanese reporter dropped in.

For days before, Anderson's time had been infiltrated by reporters and photographers dispatched by editors entranced over his emergence as a piece of news in himself.

Anderson likes the publicity, he said, for what it

men, wishing even his victims well, though that doesn't stop him from cutting another notch on his column's gun.

Anderson on the podium is another thing, though. There he sounds somewhat like the column. He's bombastic, loud, even evangelical.

A few weeks ago, in a speech at the National Press Club, he began a fiery speech on behalf of "the people's right to know," with a joke, sort-of. In this joke, delivered at the top of Anderson's lungs, the divorced wife of a newspaperman is asked by her daughter if prostitutes ever get pregnant.

"Certainly," her mother says, "where else do you think newspapermen come from?"

Most of the people in the joint were newspapermen or their dependents, and it was uphill for Anderson from then on, but he prevailed, and gave government secrecy hell.

Anderson is obviously a complex man, a gentle, Mormon muckraker, scourge of the rascals, quick to pounce on any public official's wart (he has exposed congressmen's halitosis and candruff, among other things). But he seems somehow an innocent, just pushing along, outraged when his peers prove less than divine.

Tom Dowling, in an essay in *The Washingtonian* magazine last May, compares him to Huck Finn, "poling his raft downstream, deciding which riverbrush to investigate, which rascalion to twit, and which polecat to bag and drop overboard."

And Dowling, now a sports columnist for *The Evening Star*, says, "Twain's river—that masterful symbol for the flow of a nation's life, the journey of innocence toward experience, knowledge, freedom, and even disenchantment—is not an inapposite metaphor for the column. Fed by its river network of information that is rained back upon the land, the Merry-Go-Round flows on, a formula, an institution . . . For almost 40 years the column has navigated every bend and shoal in the river without losing its boyish curiosity and exuberance, its rough and ready sense of frontier justice. . . ."

And Dowling ends his essay with this: "That is Anderson's role as he poles on downstream, an American innocent investigating the shoals no one else will visit, prepared to fight wrongdoers and to laugh at rogues. He stands pre-eminent as the journalist of the common man."

Anderson's shop is a white-walled suit of offices (a comfortable reception room and four small offices, on K Street NW, near 16th Street. He has a staff of six: his personal secretary for 15 years, Opal Ginn; another secretary and receptionist, Cathy Fisher; three reporters and writers, Les Whitten, Britt Hume, and Joe Spear, and a researcher and leg man, Ray Cole.

"Get their names in," asked Anderson. "They're all great. I couldn't ask for better. Les Whitten is the best reporter in town. Would you put that down?"

Whitten, a former Washington Post reporter, 43, is Anderson's chief assistant, a writer of mystery novels and translator of *Beaude-laire*.

It's a tiny and enthusiastic admiration society, and the offices have an atmosphere of get-the-rascals-out, rake-the-muck and guilty 'til proved innocent.

"Yes, I like my job," Anderson told a reporter. "I don't mind raking the muck. I have a sense of outrage, and I'm glad. I think public office is a public trust. I think sunlight is the best disinfectant. I don't believe that our government should work in the dark. The big question is, does the government have the right to lie?"

"Kissinger orchestrates our foreign affairs, and he operates in total darkness. Foreign policy is being made in the dark recesses of Henry Kissinger's basement office or offices. These days, every time some kid blows his nose, it's a state secret."

A reporter asked how it felt to be Anderson. "After all," the reporter asked, "aren't you what every young reporter wants to become when he enters the business, to protect the people's right to know, to expose wrongdoing?"

Anderson smiled happily. "I thank you," he said. "I hope that's so. I'd like to think so."

See ANDERSON, G9, Col. 1

will do to make the column even better read than it is. As it is, about 40 to 50 million people are thought to be reading it daily. He wants more.

Anderson was trying to relax in a sports shirt, sweater, slacks and loafers and drinking Cokes. He is 49, six feet tall, and weighs 195 pounds. The hair is brown, the eyes are blue. He smiles easily and often, and speaks softly. His ancestry is Danish and Swedish and he looks it.

His sideburns show gray, and he was asked if he does anything with his hair. "It's tinted brown," he said. "I don't care, but the television people do. I wouldn't care if it were all gray." He should weigh less, his wife said, but he and she nibble

too much food at night. She thinks maybe he should eat breakfast, and then maybe he wouldn't be so hungry nighntimes.

Anderson, like Drew Pearson, the partner from whom he inherited the column upon Pearson's death in September, 1969, is very different from the column. Pearson was a courtly man, urbane, soft-spoken. Anderson is gentle, friendly and open, even-tempered, not given to shouting.

The column, as we all know, shouts. It is abrasive, acerbic, dogmatic, didactic and sometimes a pain.

So instead of the tough, loud, brassy guy one might expect to reside behind that column, there is Anderson, just another pleasant, kind

Miss Ginn, who was Pearson's secretary before she left to join Anderson when he took over the Parade magazine bureau 15 years ago, was asked later if Anderson was always as well-dressed as he was that day.

She said no. "Did anything match?" she asked.

Anderson argued with her, saying he had become a classy dresser since he started his TV shows last September. TV people are very big on clothes and hair, he said, and they're getting to him.

When Anderson, Whitten, Hume and Spear are in the office and the phones are ringing and there is a general exuberance about some guy getting caught with his political pants down, an observer is apt to develop a heavy awareness that we're all guilty and we'd better beware of that quartet.


There is a lot of talk in the office about "the Kansas City milkman." He is the reader they want to reach, they say. Of course, they like congressmen, senators, Presidents and such as that to read them, but they keep yapping so much about the Kansas City milkman that one wishes a poll would show that no Kansas City milkman ever heard of them.

"Of course, I think we reach a cross-section," Anderson said. "The intelligentsia, the average reader, everyone, but we try to write clearly and simply and directly. There's no room to fool around in a 750-word column. We want to get the news out."

Anderson's concern with milkmen may stem from his beginnings. His father was a postal clerk, and Anderson, born in Long Beach, Calif., grew up in Salt Lake City, Utah, and a little town nearby, Cottonwood. It was rural, mountain country, and beautiful, Anderson recalls.

"I'd go out the back door and there was Mt. Olympus, right in my backyard. It was wonderful, and awe-inspiring."

Even in those days, Anderson didn't mess around or waste any time. By the time he was 12, he was a summer-time reporter for a weekly, the Murray, Utah, Eagle, earning \$7 a week.



By Gerald Martineau—The Washington Post

Anderson in the study of his home, where he works in the mornings.

"I got around on my bicycle," he said, "and I covered everything, fires, the town council, everything. I remember handling the town tax report. I didn't understand a damn word of it, but I got the treasurer to go over and over it with me, just as if he were explaining it to a 12-year-old boy, which I was, and I came up with what is probably the only clear, simple and accurate tax story ever written."

He later covered Boy Scout news for the Desert News and the Salt Lake City Tribune. By the time he was 18, he was a full-time reporter and desk man on the Tribune.

After a year at the University of Utah, the Mormon church called him to do missionary work. From the time he was 19 to 21, he was touring the South, holding street meetings, going door-to-door seeking converts, talking to anybody who would listen.

Mormon families have to support the missionaries, so Anderson's mother went to work as a cab driver to support him on the two-year mission.

"Most of what I did was proselyting," Anderson said, "but it was a wonderful experience. I learned more than I ever could have any other way. People regarded me as a minister, which I was, in the eyes of the church, and they came to me with their problems. Imagine there I was, 19, and people were coming to me telling me everything, their fears, their sins, their marital problems. Oh, I learned a lot."

After that, he went to the Merchant Marine Academy, because a cadet midshipman, sailing to India and the South Pacific, and then got the Desert News to credit him as a war correspondent. He ended up with Chinese guerrillas behind the Japanese lines. He had stumbled onto a base

where the Office of Strategic Services was operating. The OSS, a forerunner of the Central Intelligence Agency, was horrified at the sight of a reporter. So, Anderson was taken, on foot, to the Chinese guerrilla band 40 miles away.

"There was this Chinese general," recalled Anderson, "at least, he called himself a general, and he was a Christian. He knew one hymn in English, and we'd sit around at night singing, 'God Be With You Until We Meet Again.'"

It came to his attention that the Chinese Nationalist and Communist troops were fighting each other instead of the Japanese. He filed a report on this, but he doesn't know what became of it.

His draft board was looking for him and caught up with him in 1945. He was inducted into the Army in Chungking and later worked for Stars and Stripes in Shanghai.

A few months after he was discharged from the Army, he headed for Washington to look for a news job. He'd heard about Drew Pearson and applied to him.

"I was lucky," Anderson said. "Drew was looking for someone. He later told me he had more than 100 applications, including one from an ex-congressman, but he wanted someone young and experienced. I fit the bill. I think he was impressed by the war correspondent stuff, but I was no war correspondent. It was a joke. I must have filed less than any correspondent in history."

From then on, Anderson was Pearson's right hand man. There wasn't much money in it (at the time of Pearson's death, Anderson was making \$14,000 a year), but he was earning \$40,000 a year from Parade magazine. About 14 years ago, after Anderson complained, Pearson made him a partner and it was agreed that Anderson would inherit the column.

That last was all-important to Anderson. He says he didn't worry much about the money, but he deeply wanted the column.

He makes a lot of money now, grossing somewhere in excess of \$200,000, but netting a great deal less. He gets about \$120,000 off this

from the column, and barely breaks even. Salaries total \$90,000, and Mrs. Pearson's percentage and Anderson's office and travel and other expenses take up the rest.

"How much do you think we clear, Livvey?" he asked his wife the other day. Mrs. Anderson, who handles the accounts, shrugged and said, "Oh, about 25 cents."

But lectures, Parade magazine's \$20,000 (reduced because he can't devote as much time to it as he did), his TV and radio shows and investments give him a big, though not lavish, income. He has a small interest in the Annapolis, Md., Evening Capital.

Anderson didn't get a Pulitzer Prize for his expose of the late Sen. Thomas Dodd's misuse of campaign funds, but he's hoping the Pulitzer lightning might strike this time. He's not uptight, however. He loves his job, and all those rascals.

He was asked if he didn't ever get tired of all those 18-hour days, the little sleep, the constant pressure of deadlines.

"Of course I do," he said, "but there's something of

the crusader in me, I guess. We're the only game in town. No other column is doing our job. There should be more of us. I feel we have to do as much as we possibly can. Besides, I like it. We all do."

Meanwhile, there are occasional vacations, though they don't sound restful. "If the kids want to go to Disneyland, we take a vote, and we go to Disneyland," Anderson said. "We try to let them decide."

No matter who decides, the trips can get very long. Mrs. Anderson has driven the children to California and Utah and back three times. She likes it. She and her husband get to go abroad on business trips once in a while.

She's a West Virginian, daughter of a coal miner and an amazing woman. She runs that home and those nine children with no maid, no cook, no once-a-week clean-up woman.

"It's not all me," she said. "The children help and they help each other. It works out."

Her husband was asked if, as a Mormon, he had ever

considered taking a second wife.

"Many times," he said, grinning at his wife. "But that was outlawed by the Mormons back in the 1890s."

"Yes," Mrs. Anderson said wryly, "but not until after Congress had outlawed it."

One thing the Andersons agree on, wholeheartedly is that she is the best deal he ever got from the FBI. She was a secretary in the FBI fingerprint section when they met, and she remained there for a year or so after they married, in 1949.

"Where'd we meet?" Anderson said. "In church, of course. Where else?"

Besides getting the names of all his staff in the story, Anderson thought it might be nice to get the names of his children in, too, so that no one should feel left out.

So here come the children, in their order of arrival: Cheri, 20, Dance, 19, Laurie, 17, Tina, 15, Kevin, 14, Randy, 12, Tanya, 11, Rodney, 10, and Brian, 4. The Andersons say they don't know whether this list is final.

Why I Blew The Whistle

by Jack Anderson

EDITOR'S NOTE: Newspaper columnist Jack Anderson, who exposed the U.S. role in the recent Indian-Pakistan conflict, has been with PARADE nearly 20 years and is today its Washington Bureau Chief. Readers will recall such articles in these pages as "Congressmen Who Cheat," "The Great Highway Robbery," and "Let's Retire Congressmen at 65."

Like all investigative reporters, Anderson is provocative and controversial. Many government officials and politicians of both parties object to his ferreting out secrets they would rather keep hidden.

In this article, Jack Anderson tells why he believes the people have a right to know.

PARADE welcomes the opinions of its readers. Tell us what you think of Anderson's views and in a future issue we will present a cross-section of the comments.



A tireless muckraker, Jack Anderson is responsible for important exposés.

WASHINGTON, D.C.

Do you feel as an American citizen that you have the right to know about an impending war?

This question is pointed up by the secret documents I got out of the White House. They tell a chilling story. While Americans sang of peace on earth last December, grim men sat in guarded rooms in Washington, Moscow and Peking making life-and-death decisions. The world might have awakened on Christmas morning, not to jingle bells, but to the roar of nuclear warfare.

When I became aware of the developing confrontation, I was determined to inform the American people. The only way this could be accomplished was to rip the secrecy labels off the details. For the dangerous drift toward Armageddon, during the second week of December 1971, was classified top secret.

Two third-class powers, India and

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PAGE 5

THE WASHINGTON POST & TIMES HERALD

THE EVENING STAR

THE SUNDAY STAR

THE WASHINGTON DAILY NEWS

WASHINGTON-AFRO AMERICAN

PARADE SECTION

S-1
S-2
S-3
S-4
S-5
S-6

S-7
S-9

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WHY I BLEW THE WHISTLE

CONTINUED

squadron, including two guided-missile destroyers and a pair of submarines, set sail from Vladivostok for the troubled waters.

The scene was set for another Gulf of Tonkin incident. In the secret documents, the parallels are frequent and frightening.

Meanwhile, other moves were taking place on the ground. The White House situation room learned the Chinese were gathering weather reports along the China-India border, an unusual move indicative of military interest.

The Chinese were a worry to the Russians. In remote Kathmandu, Nepal, in the Himalayas, the Soviet military attaché warned the Chinese attaché that Chinese intervention to aid Pakistan would be met with massive Russian force.

The same day, U.S. intelligence reported: "According to a reliable clandestine source, President Yahya Khan claimed . . . today that the Chinese Ambassador in Islamabad had assured him that within 72 hours the Chinese army will move towards the [Indian] border."

CIA hears Mrs. Gandhi

Back in New Delhi, the Central Intelligence Agency picked up a remark by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi "that she had some indications that the Chinese intend to intervene along India's northern border . . ."

Soviet forces, meanwhile, had been massed for months on the border of China's remote Sinkiang Province, where the nuclear test range is located. The Soviets might welcome an excuse to drive into Sinkiang and destroy China's nuclear works.

There was a hint of this in an ominous, secret intelligence cable from New Delhi on Dec. 13. The Russian Ambassador to India, Nikolai M. Pegov, was quoted as assuring Indian officials "that a Soviet fleet is now in the Indian Ocean and that the Soviet Union will not allow the U.S. Seventh Fleet to intervene. If China should decide to intervene, said Pegov, the Soviet Union

would open a diversionary action in Sinkiang."

As it happened, the Pakistan army crumbled, and the brief war came to an end. But for a few days, the world stood on the edge of another world war and the American people were never told about it.

Through my sources, I had followed the developments. I felt someone should blow a warning whistle. So I sought documentary evidence, available only in secret papers, of what was going on. It seemed a matter of peace or war, of life and death. Certainly, the public had a right to know.

Too often in the past, the price of secrecy has been bloodshed. Lyndon Johnson campaigned on a peace platform in 1964, saying he did not intend "to send American boys to do what Asian boys should be doing." Not until seven years later did we learn from the Pentagon Papers that Johnson had been making opposite plans in secret.

Public misled

We also learned seven years too late that the public was misled about the Gulf of Tonkin incident. Johnson's announcement that North Vietnamese torpedo boats had staged an unprovoked attack upon a U.S. destroyer led to a Senate resolution which was repeatedly cited, thereafter, as legal authorization for prosecuting the Vietnam war. The truth remained classified.

In 1961, *The New York Times* learned

of the preparations for the Bay of Pigs invasion, but the story was suppressed in the name of national security. Later, a bitter President Kennedy realized that the press could have saved him a major disaster. "I wish you had run everything on Cuba," he told the paper's late publisher Orville Dryfoos.

Warnings hidden

During the Korean War, the people weren't told of repeated Chinese warnings that China would intervene if U.S. troops crossed the 38th Parallel. There was no public opinion, therefore, to restrain Gen. Douglas MacArthur from sending his troops to the Yalu. This brought Chinese "volunteers" flooding across the river into Korea.

The American people, whose sons must do the dying when the government's policies lead to war, are entitled to know all the dangers. Certainly, the government has the right to classify information that might jeopardize the national security. But the government has badly abused this right.

The classification system gives the executive branch the absolute authority to make whatever it pleases a state secret. Neither Congress nor the courts can declassify documents. Our leaders use this power to control the flow of news to the people. Thanks to freedom of the press, they can't stop newspapers from publishing the news. So they try to cut off undesirable news at the source. The classification system is used, in short, as

Pakistan, were fighting over the fate of East Pakistan. Just offstage, the world's three great powers—China, Russia and the United States—began making moves in a far more dangerous game.

On Dec. 7—30 years to the day after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor—a message was received in the situation room in the basement of the White House. It was stamped "Top Secret Umbra." Umbra means the darkest part of a shadow. In U.S. intelligence circles, it is the symbol for the darkest of secrets.

This cable warned that three Soviet ships—a destroyer armed with missiles, a seagoing minesweeper and a tanker—had passed eastward through the Strait of Malacca to join other Soviet warships in the Bay of Bengal.

China rumblings

Intelligence reports brought into the White House other evidence that the Soviets were supporting the Indian thrust into East Pakistan. There were simultaneous rumblings out of China that the Chinese might intervene on the side of Pakistan.

It was a situation that the U.S. was better equipped to observe than to alter.

On Dec. 8, Henry Kissinger, the President's foreign policy czar, told a strategy meeting grimly: "We may be witnessing a state [India], backed by the Soviet Union, turning half of Pakistan into an impotent state and the other half into a vassal." He warned the assembled policymakers that they must consider the long-range consequences.

They began planning at once to counteract the Soviet ploy. On Dec. 10, a decision was made to send an American flotilla, led by the carrier Enterprise, into the Bay of Bengal. The ships, called Task Force 74, were to make "a show of force." It was suggested the flotilla would divert Indian ships and planes from the war with Pakistan and, thereby, relieve the pressure on President Yahya Khan's beleaguered forces.

Forces alerted

The risks were apparent. On Dec. 10, the commander of the Seventh Fleet flashed the secret word that the "primary air threat would be from IAF (Indian Air Forces) aircraft . . ." The next day, Washington warned Task Force 74 that it "must be alert to the possibility of provocative and irrational acts by hostile forces."

Adm. John McCain, the Pacific commander, asked for and received permission to maintain aerial surveillance of the Russian squadron.

Not long afterward, a new Soviet

continued

a censorship system.

There are more than 20 million documents locked away in government file cases under a variety of secrecy labels. Only a tiny portion—perhaps one percent—directly relate to national security. The rest are classified to protect the bureaucrats and safeguard our leaders from public scrutiny.

Many citizens were appalled at the spectacle of their government's secret papers being spread across the pages of newspapers. What right did I have, many have demanded, to declassify papers?

Under the license granted the press by the First Amendment, I have the right, and probably the duty, to expose government secrets.

Risks are small

For all the risks in a Constitution that gives freedom of the press priority over the government's secrets, the newspapers' handling of both the Pentagon Papers and my revelations indicate that the risks are minimal.

The gravest breach of security the government could find in the Pentagon Papers was the account of "Operation Marigold." This was a confidential peace initiative in 1966 in which the U.S. communicated with Hanoi through a Polish diplomat. Yet this information was spelled out at length in President Johnson's memoirs.

As for the so-called Anderson Papers, no government official has even claimed there was a significant breach of security. I took the utmost care in releasing classified information in my possession. References to the government's intelligence sources and other military details remain tightly guarded.

For about 25 years I have tried to break down the walls of secrecy in Washington. But today the walls are thicker than ever. More and more our policymakers hide behind those walls.


Free press vital

Only the press can stand as a true bulwark against an executive branch with a monopoly on foreign policy information. It has all the authority it needs in the First Amendment. As the late Justice Hugo Black put it so eloquently in his last opinion:

"The government's power to censor the press was abolished so that the press would remain forever free to censure the government. The press was protected so that it could bare the secrets of government and inform the people. Only a free and unrestrained press can effectively expose deception in government. And paramount among responsibilities of a free press is the duty to prevent any part of the government from deceiving the people and sending them off to distant lands to die of foreign fevers and foreign shot and shell."



Jack Anderson has been working as a reporter in Washington since 1947. His column, in 600 U.S. newspapers, brings him 200 to 300 letters a day. Many offer him news tips.



on the cover:

**Jack Anderson
and the Anderson Papers**

inside:

The People's Right To Know
by Jack Anderson

The Anderson Papers

By TOM WICKER

The remarkable series of documentary excerpts now being published by the columnist Jack Anderson is a public service of the first order. Since the authenticity of these documents has not been denied by an obviously discomfited White House, they provide a valuable glimpse into the making of policy—in this case, a policy that to many Americans seems disastrous.

More than that, the Anderson papers suggest the extent to which the Government can, and does, mislead the public in the pursuit of what the President and his advisers may decide is the national interest. They show again the abundant use of security classification to keep the public in ignorance. And they demonstrate that publication is one of the few remaining checks on the foreign policy powers of the imperial Presidency.

The papers make one thing perfectly clear—that President Nixon, with the aid of Dr. Henry Kissinger, set out deliberately to put the United States into a position of support for Pakistan at whatever cost. "We are not trying to be even-handed," said Dr. Kissinger to high Administration officials.

That might have been a proper course for a nation opposing, say, Hitler's expansionism. In the complex situation on the Indian subcontinent, Pakistan's obvious weakness—if nothing else—made self-defeating a policy of all-out opposition to India. That the brutal excesses of Pakistani repression of the Bengalis was overlooked, to the point where all aid to India was to be suspended while clandestine means of arming the Paks were sought, is simply repugnant to the American conscience—or ought to be.

Besides, nobody in Washington bothered to make clear to the public that Washington was not being "even-handed." Thus its condemnation of India sounded more like a considered, fair analysis than a deliberate, purposeful policy; and that is the kind of swampy ground in which credibility gaps are dug.

That is even more true of the instance documented by Mr. Anderson in which Dr. Kissinger and others sought to transfer to Pakistan arms already delivered to Jordan—while maintaining the public posture that arms were not being supplied to either participant in the war! That is entirely worthy of the men who brought you "re-enforced protective reaction."

So was the public pretense that an American carrier task force in the Bay of Bengal was there to evacuate threatened Americans, if it is true (as alleged in the Anderson papers) that its

IN THE NATION

actual mission was to divert Indian ships and planes and thus to weaken the Indian drive against East Pakistan.

Nor do the various stories now being advanced to explain these and other Administration actions seem to hold much water. If, for instance, the task force actually was there to stop India from overrunning West Pakistan, too, as Administration leaks now suggest, nothing in India's actual behavior toward West Pakistan seems to have warranted such action; nor is it likely that one carrier task force could have been so effective a deterrent; and, in any case, the American people still were being misled about the deployment of their forces.

And if, as other articles have suggested, Mr. Nixon's intent really was to solidify an American alignment with China, also a supporter of Pakistan, against the Soviet Union, the curious results are that Soviet power on the subcontinent is vastly extended, as a result, and American influence in India is at lowest ebb. If we now are closer to China than we were, what suggestion was there in their acrimonious history that Peking and Moscow were likely to be soon reconciled? In order to gain face in China, did we really need to lose our shirts in India?

Thus, behind the facade of secrecy and security which shields so much of the Government's purposes and activities in the world, a policy that was dubious at best was shaped to Mr. Nixon's personal dictates, and presented to the public as something other than what it was. But the valuable documents Mr. Anderson has been publishing must have been supplied to him by someone with access to them who believed either that that manner of making policy, or the policy itself, or both, ought to be exposed to the American people.

How else could that be done, except by publication? And if it is to be maintained, as the Nixon Administration did in the Pentagon Papers case, that stamping "Top Secret" on the Government's memos and minutes makes them immune to publication and superior to the First Amendment, then security classification becomes an all-encompassing means of concealing whatever the Government wants to conceal.

It took years for someone to challenge that arrogant privilege, in the case of the Vietnam war; but it has happened much more quickly in the India-Pakistan case. Maybe the Government is now finding its own officials less willing to let deception and ineptitude be shrouded in "security."

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The New York Times
JAN 4 1972

Columnist Says Nixon Pressed Policy Against India

By **TERENCE SMITH**
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 3—President Nixon was "furious" with his subordinates during the recent India-Pakistan war for not taking a stronger stand against India, the syndicated columnist Jack Anderson reported today.

Mr. Anderson quoted Henry A. Kissinger, the President's adviser on national security, as having told a meeting of senior Administration officials: "I'm getting hell every half-hour from the President that we are not being tough enough on India."

According to Mr. Anderson, Mr. Kissinger directed that all United States officials "show a certain coolness" to the Indians. "The Indian Ambassador is not to be treated at too high a level," he is quoted as having said.

The quotations in Mr. Anderson's column today were the latest in a series of verbatim reports of secret White House strategy sessions dealing with the crisis that the columnist has published during the last several days.

His column is syndicated to 700 newspapers, 100 of them overseas. Mr. Anderson took

over the column on the death of his colleague Drew Pearson in September, 1969.

The publication of the reports, which Mr. Anderson says are classified "secret sensitive," has infuriated the White House and unsettled national security officials.

Government sources confirmed today that an investigation had been started by the White House to determine who leaked the classified documents.

The sources said the new investigation, reportedly being conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, is directed at individuals in the State and Defense Departments and on the National Security Council staff who have had access to the notes quoted by Mr. Anderson.

The quotations published by the columnist are not official minutes of the meetings, but rather notes prepared by representatives of the various departments attending.

In a telephone interview today, Mr. Anderson said he had been given two complete sets of notes of the meetings of the Washington Special Action Group, a high-level strategy committee assembled during crises, that dealt with the India-Pakistan conflict. The meetings were held in early December.

Notes by Pentagon Aides

The notes he has published so far, the columnist said, are from those taken for the Defense Department and are signed by two Pentagon officials.

Mr. Anderson said he had received scores of other classified documents, including secret intelligence reports and cablegrams, that he intended to publish during the next two weeks.

"I am trying to force a show-

down with the Administration over their classification system," the columnist said. "Everything Kissinger does—even the toilet paper he uses—is being stamped 'secret.' That's not in the public interest in a democracy."

Mr. Anderson said neither he nor members of his staff had yet been questioned by Government investigators, but that he had "positive" information that the F.B.I. had already interrogated individuals at the White House and State and Defense departments in an effort to discover who had provided him with the documents.

Aide Declines Comment

Gerald L. Warren, the acting Press Secretary at the White House, declined today to say whether an investigation had been ordered. He also declined all comment on the Anderson columns.

In the column published today, Mr. Anderson quotes from notes taken during the Washington Special Action Group's meetings of Dec. 3, Dec. 4 and Dec. 8.

In the first session, he quotes Richard Helms, director of Central Intelligence, as saying the Indians were "currently engaged in a no-holds-barred attack on East Pakistan and that they had crossed the border on all sides."

"Dr. Kissinger remarked that if the Indians have announced a full-scale invasion," the column continues, "this fact must be reflected in our U.N. statement."

On Dec. 4, Mr. Kissinger is quoted as having said, "On AID matters the President wants to proceed against India only." He was referring to the Agency for International Development.

This instruction was amplified on Dec. 8, when, according to the column, "Dr. Kissinger stated that current orders are not to put anything in the budget for India. It was also not to be leaked that AID had put money in the budget only to have the 'wicked' White House take it out."

On Dec. 4, the Administration suspended its aid program in India.

The New York Times


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—Associated Press

Columnist Jack Anderson with secret documents.

Anderson Makes It to the Top

DATE 1/6/72

PAGE A-8

___ THE WASHINGTON POST
& TIMES HERALD

THE EVENING STAR

___ THE SUNDAY STAR

___ THE WASHINGTON DAILY NEWS

___ WASHINGTON-AFRO AMERICAN

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By ROBERT WALTERS

Star Staff Writer

For Jack Anderson, the two years and three months since the death of his mentor, Drew Pearson, have been a bitter-sweet period of working and waiting for the combination of circumstances that would prove him the rightful heir to the country's most popular syndicated newspaper column.

Sometime late last week or early this week — the precise moment is difficult to identify — Anderson's patience, determination and non-stop muck-raking paid off: The 49-year-old writer achieved, on his own, the status that would have made Pearson proud of his protege.

Anderson joined Pearson in 1947 and by the late 1960s he shared the byline on the "Washington Merry-Go-Round" column — but Pearson was a legend in his own time ~~and~~ until the day of his death, Sept. 1, 1969, widely regarded as the moving force in the venture.

Future Uncertain

When Anderson took over the column, his editors and his readers were naturally uncertain about its future. Pearson was, in the show business saying, "a hard act to follow." He seemed to make news as often as he reported it, and was feared, respected, despised or loved — depending upon the beholder — by many politicians and newspaper readers.

Everything that brought celebrity to Pearson was visited upon Anderson in recent years — highly publicized libel suits filed by the targets of his exposes, a federal grand jury investigation aimed at flushing out the source of his "leaks" and angry public attacks from politicians — but as of only a week ago he had not achieved the prominence Pearson enjoyed.

Today, that has changed. Television networks are vying for him as a guest on early-morning news and late-night talk programs; his name and current exploits are spread across the front pages of the nation's newspapers. In short, Jack Anderson finally has made it on his own.

Reluctant to Talk

Anderson is reluctant to talk about the phenomenon, but one associate, Les Whitten, puts it this way: "The measure of having arrived is that comedians now are making jokes about Jack. That's when you know you've broken through."

It wasn't easy, even after Anderson secured an undetermined number (he says there are "dozens" but is characteristically chary about being more specific) of highly classified government documents detailing much of the Nixon administration's decision-making process during the India-Pakistan war.

The first several columns written from that material cited "intelligence reports" as the source of the information, but contained no references to specific documents. The result, in Whitten's words, was "Nobody paid any attention."

Considered Showdown

Faced with the problem of "how to make people recognize that we had a great story," Anderson briefly considered staging an unusual public showdown with White House Press Secretary Ronald L. Ziegler.

That plan called for Anderson to attend one of the twice-daily news briefings Ziegler conducts for reporters who cover the White House. Anderson would challenge Zie-

gler to deny the accuracy of the material in the initial columns, then would offer the President's spokesman a deal: If Ziegler was right, Anderson would give up the column — but if Anderson's information was authentic, Ziegler would quit his job.

The scheme was abandoned, Whitten says, "because it would have looked like we

were ballyhooing our own story. Instead, Anderson adopted an alternate strategy. He began identifying all of the details in the documents, including their "Secret/Sensitive" classification.

Anderson, who believes that "all of us (newsmen) should expose and oppose," got an early start in journalism. At the age of 12, he began writing for the Murray (Utah) Eagle.

then moved up to the ~~Deseret~~ News, one of two daily papers in Salt Lake City, where his parents, both conservative Mormons, moved when he was two-years-old.

After two years of covering Boy Scout news without pay for the Deseret News, Anderson was offered \$7 a week to perform the same task for the city's other paper, the Salt Lake Tribune. By the time he was 13, he was a full fledged reporter on the Tribune staff.

At 19, however, Anderson took leave of journalism to fulfill a two-year obligation to perform missionary work for the Mormon Church. Traveling through Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi and South Carolina, "I did everything from preach funerals to perform marriages," he recalls.

World War II Work

With the advent of World War II, Anderson entered the Merchant Marine officer training program, but he soon prevailed upon the Deseret News to apply for war correspondent's credentials for him and began writing "strictly local hero stuff—nothing big."

At one point, Anderson found himself with Chinese guerrillas behind Japanese lines in China. He ended up at a base operated by the Office of Strategic Services, predecessor to the Central Intelligence Agency.

"They were horrified," says the chunky, sandy-haired reporter, recalling the reaction of intelligence operatives meeting a wet-behind-the-ears newsman.

His draft board wanted him to perform more mundane war chores. After being inducted in 1945, he served briefly at a "GI haberdashery in Chungking," then was assigned to the military newspaper, Stars and Stripes, in Shanghai.

Divides Profits

Anderson today is something of a "multi-media" phenomenon, the cornerstone of which is the seven-days-a-week column, currently appearing in slightly more than 700 newspapers. The column produces about \$300,000 in annual income, but out of that Anderson pays salaries and expenses for a staff of seven, and he divides profits with Pearson's widow.

In addition, Anderson lectures about once a week; writes for Parade magazine, a Sunday newspaper supplement; syndicates a brief, nightly television program to 16 stations; and owns an interest in the Annapolis (Md.) Evening Capital.

Much of the income from those ventures goes toward supporting his wife and nine children, ranging in age from 4 to 20. His credo for newsmen: "If the powerless are being oppressed, they can hold their own and somebody will pay attention. That's our job."

Full Picture Still Lacking Despite Documents Leak

By ORR KELLY
Staff Writer

Syndicated columnist Jack Anderson charged Friday that "throughout the India-Pakistan war, the American people once again were misled by their leaders."

In a column on Monday, he said, "We can now document from secret White House minutes our charge that presidential brain-truster Henry Kissinger lied to reporters when he told them the Nixon administration wasn't anti-India."

Were Anderson's conclusions solidly grounded in the evidence?

The administration has not directly acknowledged the existence of the minutes cited by Anderson, but Kissinger told reporters Tuesday that the excerpts quoted had been taken out of context. Anderson responded late that night by making public copies of three of the four sets of minutes he had cited.

"I don't think the public should have to take either my word or Dr. Kissinger's... I invite reporters to compare Dr. Kissinger's statements at the secret strategy sessions with the transcript of Dr. Kissinger's background briefing to reporters on Dec. 7."

Anderson followed up last night by providing a copy of still another document to the New York Times. This was a paraphrased account of cables sent by Kenneth B. Keating, U.S. ambassador to India, protesting Kissinger's account of events as given in his background session on Dec. 7.

Of special interest in the newspaper articles ~~are accounts of a background briefing~~ for reporters on Dec. 4 by a high State Department official later identified as Asst. Secretary Joseph Sisco, who was an important participant in some of the meetings cited by Anderson.

In addition, Kissinger held a background session with reporters at the White House on Dec. 7, which he began by saying "there have been some comments that the administration is anti-Indian. This is totally inaccurate." Later he said, "We do not say we are unsympathetic to India's problems or that we do not value India," and that "this country... in many respects has had a love affair with India."

The papers released by Anderson are almost certainly authentic. But they give only a partial, and possibly a seriously distorted, view of governmental decision-making during the early days of the India-Pakistan war.

The Keating cables indicate that Kissinger carefully cast events in such a light as to make it appear the United States was virtually without blame in the South Asian affair. Keating complained that this didn't correspond with his view of what had happened.

Disputes Belief

He also disputed an assertion by Kissinger that when Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was in Washington in early November, "we had no reason to believe that military action was that imminent and that we did not have time to begin work on a peaceful resolution."

"With vast and voluminous ~~efforts of intelligence community~~, reporting from both Delhi and Islamabad, and my own decisions in Washington," Keating cabled, "I do not understand statement that Washington, was not given the slightest inkling that any military operation was in any way imminent."

The minutes quote Kissinger as telling officials at the Dec. 3 session that "I am getting hell every half hour from the President that we are not being tough enough on India," while Nixon was publicly reported to have told congressional leaders on Dec. 7 that the United States would maintain "absolute neutrality" and would not become "physically involved in any way" in the fighting. But throughout the period covered by the papers made public by Anderson the administration made no secret of its vigorous opposition to the course of military action being followed by India.

In his background on Dec. 4, Sisco said India "bears the major responsibility" for the outbreak of hostilities, and U.N. Ambassador George Bush, on the following day, publicly described India as the "main aggressor." Charles W. Bray III, the State Department press spokesman, said Bush's words reflected the administration opinion.

Kissinger, in his background

DATE 1/6/7

PAGE A 8


THE WASHINGTON POST
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Interpretation

der on Dec. 7, backed off from the use of the word, "aggressor," because "I don't want to use emotionally charged words." But he repeated that "We are saying that military action was not justified." The word "aggressor" was not used "in this building," he said, but then he added: "We did not disagree with it."

The minutes of the meetings disclosed by Anderson show that on Dec. 3, 4 and 5 Kissinger was telling the Special Action Group to "show a certain coolness" to the Indians. He added that President Nixon felt his aides were "not being tough enough on India" and that he wanted public statements "to tilt in favor of Pakistan."

The minutes also show that Kissinger wanted a speech drafted for Bush that would be a tough statement opposed to India's actions.

At his ~~background~~ meeting

with reporters, Kissinger was asked about Bush's charges that India was the aggressor. Kissinger responded with a lengthy answer that ended with the comment that ended, "Besides the charge of aggression was not made in this building in the first place."

To the correspondents at the briefing, this was a clear implication that Bush had gone beyond the wishes of the White House in his harsh terminology. In the minutes of the Dec. 3 meeting, Kissinger is quoted as saying, "The earlier draft statement for Bush is too evenhanded."

Throughout the background, Kissinger acknowledged the administration's opposition to India's course of action, but he insisted that it was not based on any personal pique or anti-India feeling on his part or that of the President.

"When we have differed with India, as we have in recent weeks, we do so with great sadness and with great disappointment," he said.

The minutes give a hint

of, and the Keating ~~cables~~ bear out, the policy dispute that went on barely below the surface and was widely reported during December. They also present a picture of the President applying pressure through Kissinger on the bureaucracy to carry out his policy of opposition to India's military actions.

"We have to take action," Kissinger remarked during the Dec. 3 meeting. "The President is blaming me, but you people are in the clear."

"That's ideal," Sisco replied.

The White House gave serious consideration to the possibility of authorizing countries which had received military equipment from the United States to send planes and other equipment to help Pakistan. However, this proposal seemed to be put forward primarily as a method of helping out if there were a full-scale Indian attack on West Pakistan, as well as East Pakistan, and was opposed by State Department officials ~~on both legal and practical grounds.~~

Press Gag Unlikely On Pakistan File

By LYLE DENNISTON

Star Staff Writer

The government apparently will take no legal steps to stop further disclosures in the newspapers of secret documents describing White House meetings on foreign policy.

An official investigation of the leak of classified papers to Washington columnist Jack Anderson is aimed primarily at stopping the leak, government sources said.

It is possible, they added, that the person or persons who passed out the documents could face criminal prosecution. There is no sign of an early move on a criminal case, but it has not been ruled out.

However, neither Anderson nor any newspaper which published documents he had supplied to them is in legal trouble now, and probably will not be later, it was indicated.

Anderson has been publishing materials out of the minutes of White House strategy sessions — mainly dealing with the India-Pakistan war — for more than a week. The passage of that much time without a government court challenge was interpreted as a strong sign that there will be no such challenge.

Anderson also has published

material from documents showing deterioration of U.S. relations with Japan, from material he says was prepared for President Nixon's meeting today with Japanese premier Eisaku Sato.

And he has made public the text of a Dec. 8 secret cable from Ambassador Kenneth B.

See PROBE, Page A-8

DATE 1/6/72

PAGE A1

THE WASHINGTON POST
& TIMES HERALD

THE EVENING STAR

THE SUNDAY STAR

THE WASHINGTON DAILY NEWS

WASHINGTON-AFRO AMERICAN

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PROBE

No Curbs of Media Expected on Papers

Continued From Page A-1
~~Keating in India, to Secretary~~
of State William P. Rogers.

Official sources recalled that the Justice and Defense departments acted within a matter of hours in June to try to stop the New York Times from disclosing the contents of the so-called Pentagon papers — the 47-volume study of the origins of the Vietnam war.

At that time, officials were asked to make quick assessments of the possible threat of disclosure to national security, and research was done swiftly on the legal remedies available if such a threat were deemed to exist.

There is no indication that any such activity is now going on about Anderson's disclosures.

Part of the reason for this, officials indicated, was the difficulty the Supreme Court has posed for any attempt by the government to stop news media disclosures of classified documents. By a 6-3 decision on June 30 permitting publication of the Pentagon Papers, the court said:

"Any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity . . . The government thus carries a heavy burden of showing justification of the enforcement of such a restraint."

Apparently, officials have made up their minds that the kinds of disclosures being made by Anderson do not raise enough of a threat to security to justify a court challenge.

The main threat officials apparently see at this point, it was indicated, was to the secrecy of White House meetings on sensitive issues of diplomacy and military policy.

First Objective

Thus, the first object of the current investigation is to find out how the minutes of those sessions could get past the controls the government maintains over classified documents.

If that leak is not shut off, one source suggested, it could force officials holding strategy sessions to alter the way such meetings are conducted and the method of communicating their results to other officials who need to know what was discussed or decided.

Viewed in that light, the investigation appeared to be primarily a security study, rather than an attempt to lay the basis for criminal action against the source of the leak.

However, officials said it would be wrong to conclude that the government has given up its option of starting a criminal case like the one it is pressing against Daniel Ellsberg, who admitted leak-

~~ing the Pentagon papers, and~~
against Ellsberg's close
friend, Anthony Russo Jr.

Revisions in Works

The disclosure of the new set of secret papers came after the government had begun taking a series of steps to revise its document-classification procedures.

It is clear, however, that the altered system of security classification is far from fully developed at this point.

For example, an interagency committee which has been meeting since last January to plan a complete overhaul of classification methods is still at the job, but has recently lost its chairman — Asst. Atty. Gen. William H. Rehnquist, who is about to become a Supreme Court justice. He has not been replaced yet.

In addition, a long-dormant Pentagon board which gave guidance on classification has been "revitalized," and has started taking some action, but apparently has not issued broad new directives.

Efforts to keep up the pressure on the government to reduce the number of documents that are classified are expected to resume in Congress this year.

A House Government Operations subcommittee, which last year took seven days of mostly critical testimony about the extent of classification, is planning to hold three or four months of hearings starting in March on the over-all issue of "freedom of information" in the government.

Rep. F. Edward Hebert, D-La., chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, said yesterday that soon after Congress reconvenes a subcommittee of his panel will open an inquiry into the classification of government secrets.

Existing law needs revision, Hebert said, to "strike a proper balance between the right of the public to know and the indispensable ability of our government to function effectively." But abuse of the classification system doesn't give individuals the right to ignore classifications, he said.

Text of Keating Cable

This text, slightly paraphrased, of the Dec. 8 secret cable from Ambassador Kenneth B. Keating, in India, to Secretary of State William P. Rogers was made available by columnist Jack Anderson.

Keating said he was very interested to read an article by the International Press Service (USIA) correspondent in the morning's wireless file reporting "White House officials' explanation of development of present conflict and United States role in seeking to avert it. While he appreciated the tactical necessity of justifying the administration's position publicly, he felt constrained to state that elements of this particular story do not coincide with his knowledge of the events of the past eight months.

Specifically, the IPS account states that the United States government's \$155-million relief program in East Pakistan was initiated "at the specific request of the Indian government." His recollection, and he referred the State Department to his conversation with Foreign Minister Swaran Singh in New Delhi on May 25, is that the government of India was reluctant to see the relief program started in East Pakistan prior to a political settlement on grounds that such an effort might serve to "bail out Yahya." (General Mohammad Agha Yahya Khan was the president of Pakistan at the time.)

Amnesty Restricted

In noting offer of amnesty for all refugees, story fails to mention qualification in Yahya's Sept. 5 proclamation that amnesty applies to those "not already charged with specific criminal acts," which Ambassador Keating took to be more than a minor bureaucratic caveat in East Pakistan circumstances.

Story indicates that both the secretary (Rogers) and Dr. Kissinger informed Ambassador Jha (Lakshmi Kant Jha, Indian ambassador to the United States) that Washington favored autonomy for East Pakistan. Keating said he was aware of our repeated statements that we had no formula for a solution, and our relief that our outcome of negotiations would probably be autonomy if not independence, but he regretted that he was uninformed of any specific statement favoring autonomy.

Also according to story, Jha was informed by department on Nov. 19 that "Washington and Islamabad (capital of Pakistan) were prepared to discuss a precise timetable for establishing political autonomy for East Pakistan." Ambassador Keating said the only message he had on record of this conversation (a department message to him on Nov. 21) makes no reference to this critical fact.

Statement Questioned

With vast and voluminous efforts of the intelligence community, reporting from both Delhi and Islamabad, and with his own discussions in Washington, Ambassador Keating said he did not understand the statement that "Washington was not given the slightest inkling that any military operation was in any way imminent." See (for) example DIAIB, 219-71 of Nov. 12 (Defense Intelligence Agency Intelligence Bulletin No. 219-71 of Nov. 12) stating specifically that war is "imminent."

Statement that Pakistan had authorized U.S. to contact Mujibur through his attorney seems an overstatement, since according to Islamabad 11760 (message from American embassy in Pakistan) Yahya on Nov. 29 told Ambassador Farland (Joseph Farland, United States Ambassador to Paki-

stan) nothing more than that a Farland-Brohi meeting would be a good idea since Ambassador Farland would be able to obtain from Brohi at least his general impressions as to the state of the trial and its conduct." Keating said he was unaware of any specific authorization from Yahya "to contact Mujibur" through Brohi, (Brohi was apparently the defense attorney for Sheik Mujib, leader of the East Pakistani autonomy movement, then imprisoned and on trial in West Pakistan). In any case, as we are all only too unhappily aware, Yahya told Ambassador Farland on Dec. 2 (Islamabad 11555) that Brohi allegedly was not interested in seeing him.

Pakistan Issued Supplies

The statement on GOP (Government of Pakistan) agreement on distribution by U.N. of relief supplies in East Pakistan obscures the fact that the U.N. never had nor intended to have sufficient personnel in East Pakistan to handle actual distribution, which was always in Pakistani government hands.

Keating said he made the foregoing comments in the full knowledge that they may not have been privy to all the important facts of this tragedy. On the basis of what he did know, he did not believe those elements of the story (reporting the background) either add to our position or, perhaps more importantly, to American credibility.

KEATING.

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PAGE

A-8

THE WASHINGTON POST
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THE EVENING STAR

THE SUNDAY STAR

THE WASHINGTON DAILY NEWS

WASHINGTON-AFRO AMERICAN

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The Anderson Papers

With the publication by columnist Jack Anderson of "secret sensitive" minutes of three White House meetings dealing with the India-Pakistan war, the administration has a new problem on its hands. What it will do about it is still unclear. Apart from launching an intensive investigation into the source of the leak, the White House has so far been strangely quiet about the whole affair.

Perhaps this is because the documents themselves, though routinely stamped secret, are in no way damaging to national security or for that matter to the administration itself. On the contrary, they offer a fascinating insight—fragmentary as it may be—into the decision-making process at high levels in the administration, reflecting considerable credit on the people concerned.

The charge of some critics that these memoranda show that the administration misled the public in the course of the India-Pakistan crisis is inevitable and, in our view, quite untenable. Throughout the episode it was perfectly clear to everyone in this town that the government strongly opposed India's all-out invasion of East Pakistan, and made no secret whatever of the fact in the United Nations and elsewhere. It is also quite true, as presidential adviser Henry Kissinger maintained in a public briefing, that the long-range policy of this country is not and should not be "anti-Indian."

On the contrary, whether or not one agrees with the administration's decisions during this period, the secret documents establish convincingly that they were rational decisions, taken after careful deliberation. The men involved accurately predicted from the outset the outcome of the fighting in East Pakistan and demonstrated a keen appreciation of the problems that Bangladesh would face after the defeat of Pakistani forces there.

But even though in this case no harm was done by the publication of the documents, the administration can hardly afford to ignore the fact that a breach in its own internal security system was involved. Whatever may be said about the absurdities of the present practice of classifying documents and about the "public's right to know," no administration can afford to have confidential in-house deliberations spread on the public record as a matter of course. It is necessary for any government to keep its own counsel, just as it is the obligation of any newspaper to inform the public as best it can on what the government is up to. The responsibilities, in short, are different.

It is likely that more strenuous efforts to prevent similar leaks will be made in the future. One place to start, perhaps, would be to put an end to the practice of writing down everything that is said at a presumably secret meeting and spreading it all over the bureaucracy.

DATE 1/6/72

PAGE A-10

___ THE WASHINGTON POST
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___ THE WASHINGTON DAILY NEWS

___ WASHINGTON-AFRO AMERICAN

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Modern Muckraker

Jack Northman Anderson

By WILLIAM M. BLAIR

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 5—“Sunlight is the best disinfectant.” From that premise, Jack Anderson operates as a muckraker to expose what he considers wrongdoing in and out of government, with emphasis on governmental secrets. He conducts his Washington Merry-Go-Round column with “a sense of outrage” he says, because “public office is a public trust” and sunlight on government blunders is the best way to inform the voters of what their elected officials may be up to.

The column, which he took over after the death of Drew Pearson in 1969, is regarded as one of the most influential around the country because the 40-year-old, self-styled “investigative reporter” gives it an inside-Washington flavor readily absorbed in the hinterland.

“We carry a big stick,” says the columnist, who today disclosed top-secret Government reports on discussions of policy on the Indian-Pakistani crisis. Each week he and his staff of seven turn out seven columns for daily newspapers and one for weekly newspapers, plus a 10-minute radio show and television commentaries. He is also Washington editor for Parade magazine.

A Mormon Missionary

All this is a long way from his beginnings, the son of Mormons in Utah and his service as a missionary for the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints at the age of 19.

Jack Northman Anderson was born in Long Beach, Calif., on Oct. 19, 1922. His parents — his father was a postal clerk — took him to Salt Lake City, the church capital, when he was 2 years old.

When he was 12 he became the Boy Scout editor of The Deseret News, a church-owned newspaper, but after two years The Salt Lake Tribune offered him \$7 a week to cover Boy Scout News. He had worked his

way onto The Tribune's reportorial staff by the time he was 18.

Then came his missionary work in southern states. Mormon missionaries finance their own way, and his mother became a taxi driver to enable him to fulfill his obligation.

In World War II he entered the Merchant Marine officers' training school. He had served about seven months when The Deseret News, at his urging, got him accredited as a war correspondent. He went to the Pacific and was with Chinese guerrillas behind Japanese lines.

He recalls that the Army was horrified to find that a young civilian correspondent, in search of home-town news, had managed to get to a base operated by the Office of Strategic Services, a forerunner of the Central Intelligence Agency. It was arranged for him to go with guerrillas operating along the Hankow-Peking railroad. He emerged with a report that Chinese Nationalist troops were fighting Chinese Communist troops rather than the enemy, but World War II was about over and no one seemed interested.

Caught in the Draft

All the while his draft board was looking for him. The draft caught up with him in 1945, and he was inducted into the Army at Chungking, serving with the Quartermaster Corps. Later he was assigned to the service newspaper, Stars and Stripes.

He headed for Washington in 1947 because friends told him he should try to get a job with Drew Pearson and find out what goes on backstage in the news capital of the world. Mr. Pearson hired him immediately.

Mr. Pearson was more of a “backroom reporter.” Mr. Anderson has said, while he is “more of the muckraker.” The column, he added, has become “a court of last resort for the voiceless, the little people.” It generates 200 to 300 letters a day, which often contain tips.

Critics of the chunky, sandy-haired columnist have charged that he pays for information. Mr. Anderson denies this, saying, “We don't use the column to blackmail anybody and we don't use the column to enrich anybody.”

He also laughs at stories that he runs a “back-alley” shop. Such talk stems in part from his being caught with a Congressional investigator who was bugging a hotel room in connection with the Sherman Adams-Bernard Goldfine case in the Eisenhower Administration.

Mr. Anderson received reams of documents from aides of the late Senator Thomas J. Dodd, Democrat of Connecticut. Ensuing disclosures led to Senate censure of Mr. Dodd for having diverted to his own use funds received as campaign contributions.

An Abrasive Quality

Friends concede that Mr. Anderson sometimes displays an abrasive quality, particularly when dealing with officials he feels are lying. He believes that as an independent reporter he can do what most reporters cannot: decide who is telling the truth.

Fellow Mormons have criticized the columnist. When Ezra Taft Benson was Secretary of Agriculture under President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Mr. Anderson aroused the ire of Mormons around Mr. Benson, a church leader, when he discussed what he regarded as shortcomings in the department.

Mr. Anderson has not held a high church position but attends regularly.

Members of his staff who describe him as even-tempered and easy to work with, say they have never seen him really angry. In his frequent lectures he is inclined to be bombastic in the style of an evangelical preacher and laces his speeches with earthy humor.

Father of Nine Children

His column, syndicated to slightly more than 700 newspapers—more than any other Washington column—grosses about \$300,000 a year, which Mr. Anderson splits with Mr. Pearson's widow. His payroll is about \$90,000 a year. He gets \$1,000 to \$1,500 for lectures and averages about one a week; he

also draws \$40,000 a year from Parade. In addition, he has real estate and oil investments and an interest in The Annapolis (Md.) Evening Capital.


The father of nine children, he works at home during the mornings to be with his wife, the former Olivia Farley, and family and is seldom seen on the Washington cocktail circuit. Mrs. Anderson, a miner's daughter, was working for the F.B.I. when they met.

A colleague who has known him for years commented that in “Jack's case the guys who scream the loudest are often the ones who leaked a story in the first place.” He recalled an instance in which an Army general who had given a Pentagon story wound up in charge of the investigation of the leak.

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The New York Times

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The New York Times/Jack Manning

MAKES PAPERS PUBLIC: Jack Anderson, the ~~columnist~~
who provided Indian-Pakistani papers, at his hotel here.

Anderson Ready for Battle With Government, but Appears Unlikely to Get One

A 'Low-Key' U.S. Inquiry On Disclosures Foreseen

By JACK ROSENTHAL

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 5—The columnist Jack Anderson said today that he was ready, if necessary, for a battle with the Government over his disclosure of secret India-Pakistan papers, but he appeared unlikely to get it.

The Justice Department conceded that the matter was under investigation but would say no more. And officials of three agencies, speaking privately, left the impression that the Administration regarded the disclosures more as an embarrassment than as a damaging security breach.

One official said that "measured, low-key analysis" might even be a more accurate description than the word "investigation," in contrast to prior extensive inquiries by the Justice Department into security leaks.

It is widely felt that these have often been undertaken more for deterrent effect than out of real hope of discovering reporters' sources. But this time an official said: "There's no banging of cymbals. Right now, we're assessing where we are."

Reflecting the same relative calm, senior Pentagon sources said the disclosures primarily affected diplomatic sensitivity rather than military security.

Lower-Level Source Seen

And some officials, noting that as many as 25 persons in the Pentagon alone had access to the documents, which dealt with United States policy toward the Indian-Pakistani conflict, expressed belief that Mr. Anderson's source was not a trusted senior official but possibly a junior assistant.

This was at odds with Mr. Anderson's view, expressed in an interview today. "My sources—and they are plural—are some of their own boys," he said. "And if they want to

finger them, they're going to wind up with bubble gum all over their faces."

"These sources are no Ellsbergs who left the Government two years ago," he continued, referring to Dr. Daniel Ellsberg, the former Defense Department official indicted for his role in the Pentagon papers case. In fact, Mr. Anderson said, the flow of documents to him is continuing.

Today, his office distributed copies of three of the documents, secret internal accounts of White House strategy sessions during the Indian-Pakistani war, to 17 newspapers, the Associated Press and United Press International.

The impression of apparent Government calm appeared to differ from the reaction Mr. Anderson said he had experienced. "I've had no overt, direct threats," he said, but he told of receiving telephone calls from two officials, also friends, saying that he risked being indicted.

"And there are more subtle, sophisticated pressures you learn to sense," the columnist said.

He said he understood that the Federal investigation of the disclosures was being coordinated by Robert C. Mardian, head of the Justice Department's Internal Security Division.

"If Mr. Mardian is going to investigate me, I guess I should investigate him," Mr. Anderson declared. "I expect I'll find out more about him than he will on me. I don't think the Government has as much right to investigate reporters as they do to investigate the Government."

In any event, he added, he is sure no investigation can uncover his sources—"unless the sources themselves are careless." He said no previous investigation, including one last summer that reached the

grand jury stage, had succeeded in doing so. The investigation last summer concerned an article Mr. Anderson had written about plans for bombing in Vietnam.

The view within the Government that the disclosures were more embarrassing than damaging squared with Mr. Anderson's own assessment.

"When I first starting getting them," he said, "I felt very strongly that these documents should not have been classified 'secret,' but 'censored.' The security stamp is being used as promiscuously as a stapling machine."

Mr. Anderson has presided over Washington Merry-Go-Round, a Washington exposé column with more than 700 newspaper subscribers, since the death in 1969 of Drew Pearson, its founder. Five other reporters work for Mr. Anderson, but it was he himself who obtained the documents in the current controversy.

Through its 35-year history, the column has developed a reputation for pursuing tips and leads from Government employees, often anonymous.

Mr. Anderson today offered the following guarded chronology of how he had obtained the current set of documents.

"During the India-Pakistan war, one of my sources told me we were bungling. Here was a conflict between a military dictatorship and the world's second largest democracy, and whose side did we—the largest democracy—come out on? The dictatorship."

His sources became even more troubled, he recounted, when American warships were sent into the Bay of Bengal. They feared that the Soviet Union might react. "It sounded like another Gulf of Tonkin situation, but much hairier," Mr. Anderson said.

Documentation Requested

He said he had persuaded his sources that if they wanted him to write about their fears he would have to have access to documents to authenticate his reports.

"They gave me a dozen representative documents," Mr. Anderson said. But he insisted

that he could not rely only on selected papers, he explained.

"In time, they let me see a whole massive file of documents," he said. "Then I, not they, did the selecting."

Ultimately, he used secret passages in a total of seven articles prior to releasing the full documents to other newspapers, he said.

At first, he declared, he was "cautious, even timid." The fighting was still going on and he had determined that he would print no military secrets, he declared.

It became evident to him, he went on, that there were no military secrets involved, only potential embarrassment.

"And if something is classified 'Secret' just because it could be embarrassing, then secrecy no longer means anything," he asserted. "I said to my staff, 'Let's publish all we can get until the Government adopts a sensible policy on classification.'"

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[Redacted box with initials]

Read this, please, but ~~don't~~ tell anyone what it says
or who wrote it. If you must tell, attribute it to a
former Government aide writing in a large
metropolitan daily.

By BILL MOYERS

Following my address at the University of Maine commencement last June, a student said to me: "Mr. Moyers, you've been in both journalism and Government; that makes everything you say doubly hard to believe." The skepticism which she expressed toward two of our major institutions is widespread, one reason being, I am convinced, the indiscriminate use of backgrounders as the source of "hard" news stories.

The backgrounder permits the press and the Government to sleep together, even to procreate, without getting married or having to accept responsibility for any offspring. It's the public on whose doorstep orphans of deceptive information and misleading allegations are left, while the press and the Government roll their eyes innocently and exclaim: "No mea culpa!"

I know. I used to do a little official seducing myself. The objects of the chase—members of the Washington press corps—were all consenting adults. Having been around much longer than I and being more experienced, they came to each tryst more eagerly than I had expected. As when the noted correspondent of a major network implored me, "If I can't use what you have just told me, can I use what you haven't just told me?" Assuming the classic posture of the incorruptible but ingenuous press secretary—eyebrow arched casually, condescendingly, in the manner of Clark Gable, and a smile like Whistler's Mother—I merely looked him in the eye and he was had. That night his gravelly voice carried to millions of homes across the nation the word we wanted out in the first place but were unwilling to announce explicitly.

Every major newspaper picked up the story the next day, quoting the network reporter quoting "high Administration officials." Never mind that two months later the trial balloon burst. Except for a few crusty veterans in the White House press corps, no one knew who was responsible for the story. And my accomplice? He was back for more. Score one for the Official Version of Reality.

The backgrounder has its defense,

most ably put forward, ironically, by the victims themselves, the reporters. Three years ago, in one of those periodic fits of repentance which befalls an ex-press secretary when he has been away from Washington too long, I confessed to misgivings about the practice and suggested some changes. My proposals were modest. Always identify a source by his specific agency, I suggested; this would replace the loose anonymity of "high U. S. officials" with more accountable terms like "a Defense Department spokesman," "a White House source," or "an official of the Interior Department." Embargo the contents of a group background session for at least one hour, I went on, permitting hastily summoned reporters time to cross-check what they have been told. A few other suggestions followed, equally sensible, of course.

You would have thought I had proposed abolishing the First Amendment, so wrathfully did the press corps rise up to proclaim the absolute indispensability of the backgrounder. Perjury, naiveté, and hypocrisy were but the lesser sins of which I stood condemned, perhaps accurately if somewhat excessively. For two weeks one could travel the length of the National Press Club bar by the light of my effigies, no mean distance.

Some of the arguments in support of the backgrounder I appreciate. As Jules Frandsen, veteran head of the Washington bureau of United Press International, wrote: "A lot of skulduggery in Government and in Congress would never come to light if everything had to be attributed." True, but I am not protesting this form of backgrounding. A single reporter digging for a more detailed story can usually check with other sources the information he gets privately from one official, unless he is lazy or on the take. And the good reporters, of which there are many in Washington, learn to throw away self-serving propaganda offered by a disgruntled or ambitious official.

Background sessions which are held


to provide reporters with understanding of complicated issues are also useful. Explaining the President's new budget or the ramifications of legislative proposals requires giving reporters access to experts whose names would be meaningless to the public.

But these are not the practices that cause harm and create an unbelieving and untrusting public. It is when the press becomes a transmission belt for official opinions and predictions, indictments and speculation, coming from a host of unidentified spokesmen—when the press permits anonymous officials to announce policy without accountability—that the public throws up its hands in confusion and disgust.

Mr. Kissinger's *sotto voce* threat to the Soviets, which in true Orwellian fashion had to be denied when its source was identified, is only the latest revelation of the ease with which public officials have come to use the backgrounder as a primary instrument of policy, propaganda, and manipulation. "The interests of national security dictate that the lie I am about to tell you not be attributed to me." There are plenty of other examples.

In 1966 an official in Saigon gave a

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Dusan Ludwig

backgrounder in which he led reporters to believe that certain Pentagon studies had forecast a long war in Vietnam—that it would take 750,000 troops in Vietnam to end the war in five years (at the time we had 290,000 men there). The President then told a news conference that Secretary McNamara could find no evidence of any such studies having been made. Later, sources identified only as “U. S. officials” said no such studies had been made, except perhaps as one man’s opinion. The source of the original backgrounder turned out to be no less an authority than the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen. ~~William~~ M. Greene. Whom was the public to be-

lieve: the “high official” in Saigon or “U. S. officials” in Washington? There had been such studies, but the Government, by manipulating the press, obscured the fact.

In 1967 Gen. William C. Westmoreland, the U. S. commander in South Vietnam, told a group of reporters in Washington that he was “deeply concerned” that the Cambodian port of Sihanoukville was about to become an important source of arms for Vietcong troops in South Vietnam. Furthermore, he said, the military was considering contingency plans to quarantine the port. Reporters agreed to hold their stories until the general had left town, and then they quoted “some U. S. officials.” The Government was obviously trying to put extra pressure on then-Premier Sihanouk to crack down on the arms shipments—a worthy goal, as the Government saw it. But instead of using available diplomatic channels to reach Sihanouk, Washington enlisted the press as its surrogate. By conspiring to quote plural sources when in fact they had talked to only one man, reporters wittingly became a party to the kind of double-dealing and concealment the press so often condemns on the part of the Government.

Such backrounders occur frequently. Mr. Kissinger just happened recently to get caught. A mild case of righteous indignation broke out over the incident and some editors have now instructed their reporters to walk out if an official refuses to permit attribution. Representatives of the White House and reporters have been trying to put down some ground rules for the future, but a high source in Washington told me off-the-record that when the rules are issued they will not be for attribution.

In the end very little will change. The Government will go on calling backrounders as long as the Government wants to put its best face forward. Reporters will be there to report dutifully what isn’t officially said by a source that can’t be held officially accountable at an event that doesn’t officially happen for a public that can’t officially be told because it can’t officially be trusted to know. But don’t quote me on that.

Bill Moyers, press aide to President Johnson and former publisher of Newsday, conducts a regular television program over National Educational Television, Channel 13 in New York.

Texts of Secret Documents on Top-Level U.S. Discussions of Indian-Pakistani War

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 5—Following are the texts of three secret documents made public today by the columnist Jack Anderson describing meetings of the National Security Council's Washington Special Action Group on the crisis between India and Pakistan:

Memo on Dec. 3 Meeting

Secret Sensitive

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

Refer to: 1-29643/71

International Security Affairs
Memorandum for Record

SUBJECT

WSAG meeting on India/Pakistan participants.

Assistant to the President for national security affairs—Henry A. Kissinger
Under Secretary of State—John N. Irwin

Deputy Secretary of Defense—David Packard

Director, Central Intelligence Agency—Richard M. Helms

Deputy Administrator (A.I.D.)—Maurice J. Williams

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff—Adm. Thomas H. Moorer

Assistant Secretary of State (N.E.E.A.R.)—Joseph J. Sisco

Assistant Secretary of Defense (I.S.A.)—G. Warren Nutter

Assistant Secretary of State (I.O.)—Samuel De Palma

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (I.S.A.)—Armistead I. Selden Jr.

Assistant Administrator (A.I.D./N.E.S.A.)—Donald G. MacDonald

TIME AND PLACE

3 December 1971, 1100 hours, Situation Room, White House.

SUMMARY

Reviewed conflicting reports about major actions in the west wing. C.I.A. agreed to produce map showing areas of East Pakistan occupied by India. The President orders hold on issuance of additional irrevocable letters of credit involving \$99-million, and a hold on further action implementing the \$7-million P.L. 480 credit. Convening of Security Council meeting planned contingent on discussion with Pak Ambassador this afternoon plus further clarification of actual situation in West Pakistan. Kissinger asked for clarification of secret special interpretation of March, 1959, bilateral U. S. agreement with Pakistan.

KISSINGER: I am getting ~~near~~ every half-hour from the President that we

are not being tough enough on India. ~~He~~ just called me again. ~~He~~ does not believe we are carrying out his wishes. He wants to tilt in favor of Pakistan. He feels everything we do comes out otherwise.

HELMS: Concerning the reported action in the west wing, there are conflicting reports from both sides and the only common ground is the Pak attacks on the Amritsar, Pathankot and Srinagar airports. The Paks say the Indians are attacking all along the border; but the Indian officials say this is a lie. In the east wing the action is becoming larger and the Paks claim there are now seven separate fronts involved.

KISSINGER: Are the Indians seizing territory?

HELMS: Yes, small bits of territory, definitely.

SISCO: It would help if you could provide a map with a shading of the areas occupied by India. What is happening in the West—is a full-scale attack likely?

MOORER: The present pattern is puzzling in that the Paks have only struck at three small airfields which do not house significant numbers of Indian combat aircraft.

HELMS: Mrs. Gandhi's speech at 1:30 may well announce recognition of Bangladesh.

MOORER: The Pak attack is not credible. It has been made during late afternoon, which doesn't make sense. We do not seem to have sufficient facts ~~on this yet~~.

KISSINGER: Is it possible that the Indians attacked first and the Paks simply did what they could before dark in response?

MOORER: This is certainly possible.

KISSINGER: The President wants no more irrevocable letters of credit issued under the \$99-million credit. He wants the \$72-million P.L. 480 credit also held.

WILLIAMS: Word will soon get around when we do this. Does the President understand that?

KISSINGER: That is his order, but I will check with the President again. If asked, we can say we are reviewing our ~~whole~~ economic program and that the granting of fresh aid is being sus-

pending in view of conditions on the ~~subcontinent~~. The next issue is the U.N.

IRWIN: The Secretary is calling in the Pak Ambassador this afternoon, and the Secretary leans toward making a U.S. move in the U.N. soon.

KISSINGER: The President is in favor of this as soon as we have some confirmation of this large-scale new action. If the U.N. can't operate in this kind of situation effectively, its utility has come to an end and it is useless to think of U.N. guarantees in the Middle East.

SISCO: We will have a recommendation for you this afternoon, after the meeting with the Ambassador. In order to give the Ambassador time to wire home, we could tentatively plan to convene the Security Council tomorrow.

KISSINGER: We have to take action. The President is blaming me, but you people are in the clear.

SISCO: That's ideal!

KISSINGER: The earlier draft for Bush is too even-handed.

SISCO: To recapitulate, after we have seen the Pak Ambassador, the Secretary will report to you. We will update the draft speech for Bush.

KISSINGER: We can say we favor political accommodation but the real job of the Security Council is to prevent military action.

SISCO: We have never had a reply either from Kosygin or Mrs. Gandhi.

WILLIAMS: Are we to take economic steps with Pakistan also?

KISSINGER: Wait until I talk with the President. He hasn't addressed this problem in connection with Pakistan yet.

SISCO: If we act on the Indian side, we can say we are keeping the Pakistan situation "under review."

KISSINGER: It's hard to tilt toward Pakistan if we have to match every Indian step with a Pakistan step. If you wait until Monday, I can get a Presidential decision.

PACKARD: It should be easy for us

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The New York Times
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5 DECEMBER 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT

Washington Special Action Group meeting on Indo-Pakistan hostilities; 4 December 1971.

1. The N.S.C. Washington Special Action Group met in the Situation Room, the White House, at 1100, Saturday, 4 December, to consider the Indo-Pakistan situation. The meeting was chaired by Dr. Kissinger.

2. Attendees

A. Principals:

Dr. Henry Kissinger
Dr. John Hannah, A.I.D.
Mr. Richard Helms, C.I.A.
Dr. G. Warren Nutter, Defense
Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, J.C.S.
Mr. Christopher Van Hollen, State

B. Others:

Mr. James Noyes, Defense
Mr. Armistead Selden, Defense

Rear Adm. Robert Welander, O.J.C.S.

Capt. Howard Kay, O.J.C.S.

Mr. Harold Saunders, N.S.C.

Col. Richard Kennedy, N.S.C.

Mr. Samuel Hoskanson, N.S.C.

Mr. Donald MacDonald, A.I.D.

Mr. Maurice Williams, A.I.D.

Mr. John Waller, C.I.A.

Mr. Samuel De Palma, State

Mr. Bruce Laingen, State

Mr. David Schneider, State

3. Summary. It was decided that the U. S. would request an immediate meeting of the Security Council. The U. S. resolution would be introduced in a speech by Ambassador Bush as soon as possible. The U.S.G.-U.N. approach would be tilted toward the Paks. Economic aid for Pakistan currently in effect will not be terminated. No requirements were levied on the J. C. S.

4. Mr. Helms opened the meeting by indicating that the Indians were currently engaged in a no holds barred attack of East Pakistan and that they had crossed the border on all sides this morning. While India had attacked eight Pak airfields there were still no indications of any ground attacks in the West. Although not decreeing a formal declaration of war, President Yahya has stated that "the final war with India is upon us," to which Mrs. Gandhi had responded that the Pak announcement of war constituted the ultimate folly. The Indians, however, had made it a point not to declare war. The Indian attacks have hit a major P.O.L. area in Karachi resulting in a major fire which will likely be blazing for a considerable length of time, thus providing a fine target for the India air force. Mr. Helms indicated that the Soviet assessment is that there is not much chance of a great power confrontation in the current crisis.

5. Dr. Kissinger remarked that if the

Indians have announced a full scale invasion, this fact must be reflected in our U.N. statement.

6. Mr. Helms indicated that we do not know who started the current action, nor do we know why the Paks hit the four small airfields yesterday.

7. Dr. Kissinger requested that by Monday the C.I.A. prepare an account of ~~who did~~ what to whom and when.

8. Mr. De Palma suggested that if we

refer to the India declaration in our discussion in the U.N., that we almost certainly will have to refer to remarks by Yahya.

9. Dr. Kissinger replied that he was under specific instructions from the President, and either someone in the bureaucracy would have to prepare this statement along the lines indicated or that it would be done in the White House.

10. Mr. Helms referred to the "no holds barred" remark in the official India statement and similar remarks that were being made from the Pak side.

11. Dr. Kissinger asked whether the Indians have stated anything to the effect that they were in an all-out war.

12. Mr. Helms said that the terminology was "no holds barred."

13. Dr. Kissinger asked what the Paks have said. Mr. Helms said the terminology was "final war with India." Dr. Kissinger suggested this was not an objectionable term. It did not seem outrageous to say that they (the Paks) were trying to defend themselves.

14. Dr. Kissinger then asked what was happening in the U.N., to which Mr. De Palma responded that the U.K., Belgium, Japan and possibly France were joining for a call for a Security Council meeting. The Japanese had detected some slight tilt in our letter, requesting the meeting. The Japanese preferred a blander formulation. We have not, however, reacted to the Japanese.

15. Dr. Kissinger asked to see the letter and requested that it be promulgated in announcing our move in the U.N., to which Mr. De Palma responded affirmatively.

16. Dr. Kissinger stated that while he had no strong view on the letter, our position must be clearly stated in the announcement.

17. Dr. Kissinger stated he did not care how third parties might react, so long as Ambassador Bush understands what he should say.

18. Dr. Kissinger said that whoever was putting out background information relative to the current situation is provoking Presidential wrath. The President is under the "illusion" that he is giving instructions; not that he is merely being kept apprised of affairs as they

to inform the banks involved to defer action inasmuch as we are near the weekend.

KISSINGER: We need a WSAG in the morning. We need to think about our treaty obligations. I remember a letter or memo interpreting our existing treaty with a special India tilt. When I visited Pakistan in January, 1962, I was briefed on a secret document or oral understanding about contingencies arising in other than the SEATO context. Perhaps it was a Presidential letter. This was a special interpretation of the March, 1959, bilateral agreement.

Prepared by:

/S/ initials

JAMES M. NOYES

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern, African and South Asian Affairs

Approved:

(illegible signature)

For G. Warren Nutter Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

Distribution: Secdef, Depsecdef, CJCS, ASD(ISA), PDASD(ISA), DASD: NEASA & ~~PPNSCA~~, Dep Dir: NSCC & ~~PPNSCA~~, CSD files, R&C files, NESA.

Account of Dec. 4 Meeting

Covering Memorandum

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

Secret-Sensitive

Memorandum for: Chief of Staff, U.S. Army

Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force

Chief of Naval Operations

Commandant of the Marine Corps

SUBJECT

Washington Special Action Group meeting on Indo/Pakistan hostilities; 4 December 1971

1. Attached for your information is a memorandum for record concerning subject meeting.

2. In view of the sensitivity of information in the N.S.C. system and the detailed nature of this memorandum, it is requested that access to it be limited to a strict need-to-know basis.

For the chairman, J.C.S.:

A. K. KNOIZEN

Captain, U.S. Navy

Executive assistant to the

Chairman, Joint Chiefs


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Report on the Meeting

Secret Sensitive

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301



Associated Press

SECRET INDIA-PAKISTAN PAPERS, which Jack Anderson, the columnist, distributed in Washington yesterday. They are classified Secret-Sensitive.

progress. Dr. Kissinger asked that this be kept in mind.

19. Mr. De Palma indicated that he did not yet know whether the Security Council would be convened in the afternoon or evening (this date). However, the first statements at the meeting would likely be those by the Indians and Paks. He suggested that Ambassador Bush should be one of the first speakers immediately following the presentation by the two contesting nations. He felt that the impact of our statement would be clearer if it were made early. Dr. Kissinger voiced no objections.

20. Mr. De Palma asked whether we wanted to get others lined up with our resolution before we introduced it. This, however, would take time. Dr. Kissinger suggested rather than follow this course, we had better submit the resolution as quickly as possible, alone if necessary. According to Dr. Kissinger the only move left for us at the present time is to make clear our position relative to our greater strategy. Everyone knows how all this will come out and everyone knows that India will ultimately occupy East Pakistan. We must, therefore, make clear our position, table our resolution. We want a resolution which will be introduced with a speech by Ambassador Bush. If others desire to come along with us, fine; but in any event we will table the resolution with a speech by Ambassador Bush.

21. Dr. Kissinger continued that it was important that we register our position. The exercise in the U.N. is likely to be an exercise in futility, inasmuch as the Soviets can be expected to veto. The U.N., itself, will in all probability do little to terminate the war. He summarized the foregoing by saying that he assumed that our resolution in the U.N. will be introduced by a speech and there will be no delay. We will go along in general terms with reference to political accommodation in East Pakistan but we will not imply or suggest any specifics, such as

the release of Mujib.

22. Dr. Kissinger asked how long the Indians could delay action in the Council. Mr. De Palma said they could make long speeches or question our purpose. Mr. Van Hollen said that they would draw out as long as possible which would allow them to concentrate on the situation in East Pakistan. Mr. De Palma said that they could shilly-shally for three or four days which, Mr. Helms stated would be long enough for them to occupy East Pakistan. Mr. De Palma stated that we could always try to force a vote. Dr. Kissinger reiterated that there was no chance in getting anything useful in the U.N.

23. Mr. De Palma suggested that in all likelihood one side or the other will veto.

24. Concerning the matter of economic aid, Dr. Kissinger stated that the President had directed that cutoff was to be directed at India only. He indicated, however, that he wanted to read the announcement to the President so that the latter would know exactly what he might be getting into. At this point Mr. Williams asked whether some mention should be made in the statement explaining why aid for Pakistan is not being cut off. Dr. Kissinger said that information would be kept for background only.

25. Mr. Williams said that the Department of Agriculture indicated that the price of vegetable oil was weakening in the United States; thus cutting off this P.L.-480 commodity to India could have repercussions on the domestic market. He asked, therefore, whether oil could be shipped in place of wheat. Dr. Kissinger said that he will have the answer to that by the opening of business Monday.

26. Dr. Kissinger then asked for a brief rundown on the military situation. Admiral Zumwalt responded that he thought the Paks could hold the line in East Pakistan for approximately one or two weeks before the logistics problems became overriding. He expected

the Soviets to cement their position in India and to push for permanent usage of the naval base at Visag. He anticipated that the Soviet's immediate short range objective would be to gain military advantages through their current relationship with India.

27. Dr. Kissinger indicated that the next meeting will convene Monday morning (Dec. 6).

/S/ H. N. Kay
H. N. KAY
Captain, U.S.N.
South Asia M.A.P. Branch, J5
Extension 72400

Memo on Dec. 6 Meeting

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

6 December 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD
SUBJECT

Washington Special Action Group meeting on Indo-Pakistan hostilities; 6 December 1971.

1. The N.S.C. Washington Special Action Group met in the Situation Room, the White House, at 1100, Monday, 6 December, to consider the Indo-Pakistan situation. The meeting was chaired by Dr. Kissinger.

2. Attendees

A. Principals:

Dr. Henry Kissinger
Mr. David Packard, Defense
Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson, State
Gen. William Westmoreland, J.C.S.
Mr. Richard Helms, C.I.A.
Mr. Donald MacDonald, A.I.D.

B. Others:

Mr. Christopher Van Hollen, State
Mr. Samuel De Palma, State
Mr. Bruce Lanigen, State
Mr. Joseph Sisco, State
Mr. Armistead Selden, Defense
Mr. James Noyes, Defense
Mr. John Waller, C.I.A.
Mr. Samuel Hoskanson, N.S.C.
Col. Richard Kennedy, N.S.C.
Mr. Harold Saunders, N.S.C.
Rear Adm. Robert Welander, O.J.C.S.
Capt. Howard Kay, O.J.C.S.
Mr. Maurice Williams, A.I.D.

3. Summary. Discussion was devoted to the massive problems facing Bangladesh as a nation. Dr. Kissinger indicated that the problem should be studied now. The subject of possible military

Terms Used in Texts

A.I.D.—Agency for International Development

A.S.D. (I.S.A.)—Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs.

C.I.A.—Central Intelligence Agency

C.J.C.S.—Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.
D.A.S.D.—N.E.A.S.A. & P.P.N.S.C.A.—Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, near Eastern, African and South Asian Affairs; Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Policy Plans and National Security Council Affairs.

Dep Dir: N.S.C.C. & P.P.N.S.C.A.—Deputy Director, Policy Plans and National Security Council Affairs.

International Security Affairs
of Defense Department
J.C.S.—Joint Chiefs of Staff

aid to Pakistan is also to be examined, but ~~on a very close hold basis~~. The matter of Indian redeployment from East to West was considered as was the legality of the current sea "blockade" by India.

4. Mr. Helms opened the meeting by briefing the current situation. He stated that the Indians had recognized Bangladesh and the Paks had broken diplomatic ties with India. Major fighting continued in the East but India is engaged in a holding action in the West. Mr. Helms felt that the Indians will attempt to force a decision in the East within the next 10 days. The Indians have almost total air superiority now in the East where they can employ approximately a hundred of their aircraft against Pak ground forces and logistic areas. The Indians, however, have not yet broken through on the ground in East Pakistan. Major thrust of the Indian effort in East Pakistan is in the northwest corner of the province. The airfield at Dacca is all but closed. The Indians are registering only minor gains in the Jessore area, but they claim to have taken Kamalpur. In the West, Indian activity is essentially limited to air attacks. The Paks appear to be on the offensive on the ground and have launched air strikes in Punjab. Overall, the Paks claim 61 Indian aircraft destroyed; the Indians claim 47 Pak planes. In naval action one Pak destroyer has been sunk by the Indians and another claimed sunk [sic]. The Indians also claim the sinking of one Pak submarine in eastern waters. Moscow is increasingly vocal in its support of

Westmoreland re-enforced this by noting there was no means of evacuating West Pak forces from the east wing, particularly in view of Indian naval superiority.

8. Dr. Kissinger stated that the next state of play will involve determining our attitude toward the state of Bangladesh.

9. Mr. Williams referred to the one and a half million urdu speaking (Bihari) people in East Pakistan who could also be held hostage.

10. Dr. Kissinger asked if there had already been some massacre of these people. Mr. Williams said that he certainly thinks there will be. Dr. Kissinger asked if we could do anything, to which Mr. Williams stated that perhaps an international humanitarian effort could be launched on their behalf. Dr. Kissinger asked whether we should be calling attention to the plight of these people now. Mr. Williams said that most of these people were, in fact, centered around the rail centers; that they are urban dwellers and that some efforts on their behalf might well be started through the U.N. Dr. Kissinger suggested that this be done quickly in order to prevent a bloodbath. Mr. Sisco stated that while the U.N. cannot do anything on the ground at this time, public attention could be focused on this situation through the General Assembly.

11. Mr. Williams referred to the 300,000 Bengalis in West Pakistan, and that they too were in some jeopardy. Mr. Sisco said that this humanitarian issue could be a very attractive one for the General Assembly and that we would begin to focus on Assembly action. Mr. MacDonald cited as a possible precedent the mass movement of population from North-Vietnam in 1954.

12. Returning to the military picture, Mr. Williams stated that he felt that the primary thrust of the Indian Army would be to interdict Chittagong and cut off any supply capability still existing for the Paks in the East. He said that he felt that the major thrust of the Indian Army in the East would be to destroy the Pak regular forces. He felt that a major job would be to restore order within the East inasmuch as it will be faced with a massacre as great as any we have faced in the 20th century.

13. General Westmoreland suggested that the Indians would probably need three or four divisions to continue to work with the Mukti Bahini; the remainder could be pulled out to assist the Indian forces in the West.

14. Mr. Sisco opined that the Indians would pull out most of their troops once the Pak forces are disarmed, inasmuch as the Indians will be working with a very friendly population; thus, they will turn the military efforts over to the Mukti Bahini as quickly as possible. He felt that the extent and timing of Indian withdrawal from East Pakis-

tan would depend to a large degree on developments in the West.

15. In response to a question, General Westmoreland stated that Indian transportation capabilities were limited from West to East, and that it would probably take at least a week to move one infantry division. It might take as much as a month to move all or most of the Indian forces from the East to the West.

16. Mr. Sisco said that the long term presence of Indian forces in Bangladesh would have to be addressed. Mr. Van Hollen remarked that should the Indian Army remain more than two or three weeks after the situation in East Pakistan is wrapped up they would, in fact, become a Hindu army of occupation in the eyes of the Bengalis.

17. Mr. Van Hollen raised the problem of the return of the refugees from India. Inasmuch as Bangladesh is predominantly Moslem, the return of 10 million refugees, most of whom are Hindu, would present another critical problem.

18. General Westmoreland suggested that the Indian position in the West was not unadvantageous. He briefly discussed the order of battle in West Pakistan and suggested that the Indians were in relatively good shape. He said that he expected the major Pak effort to be toward Kashmir and the Punjab. The Indians, he felt, will be striking toward Hyderabad so as to cut the main L.O.C. to Karachi. He did not think that the Indians necessarily plan to drive all the way to Karachi. He also suggested that the current Indian move in that direction could very well be diversionary in order to force the Paks to pull reserves back from the Kashmir area.

19. Mr. Packard asked about the P.O.L. supply situation for Pakistan. Mr. Helms said that at the present time it looked very bad. The overland L.O.C.'s from Iran, for example, were very tenuous.

20. Mr. Williams suggested that the reason for the Indian thrust to the south, was essentially political. Inasmuch as the Indians do not want to fight on the border they will have to give ground in Kashmir. In order to ward off parliamentary criticism, Mrs. Gandhi may be going for some Pak real estate in the south.

21. Dr. Kissinger then asked about U.N. initiatives. Mr. Sisco said that we are now reviewing the situation with Ambassador Bush. Two Security Council resolutions have been vetoed by the Soviets. However, there is a groundswell building in New York for an emergency session by the General Assembly to be convened under the provisions of the "threat to peace" mechanism. The crisis could be moved into the Assembly through a simple majority vote.

22. Dr. Kissinger and Mr. Sisco agreed that any resolution introduced into the General Assembly must retain ~~two key elements: Cease fire and withdrawal of~~

L.O.C.—Line(s) of communication
 N.E.A.—Near Eastern Affairs, Section of State Department
 N.E.S.A.—Near Eastern and South Asian
 N.S.C.—National Security Council
 O.J.C.S.—Office of Joint Chiefs of Staff
 O.S.D. Files—Office of Secretary of Defense Files
 Paks—Pakistanists
 P.D.A.S.D. (I.S.A.)—Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs
 P.O.L.—petroleum, oil and lubricants
 R & C Files—Records and Control Files
 P.L.—public law
 Secdef—Secretary of Defense
 U.S.G.—United States Government
 W.S.A.G.—Washington Special Action Group
 Council of National Security
 Council
 Staff

India and is not supporting any U.N. moves to halt the fighting. The Chinese press made its strongest attack on India this morning.

5. Dr. Kissinger then asked for a military assessment, questioning how long the Paks might be able to hold out in the East. General Westmoreland responded that it might be as much as three weeks.

6. Dr. Kissinger asked what is to be done with Bangladesh. Mr. Helms stated that for all practical purposes it is now an independent country, recognized by India.

7. Ambassador Johnson suggested that the Pak armed forces now in East Pakistan could be held hostage. General

JAN 6 1972

military forces. Dr. Kissinger agreed that our U.N. delegation has handled the situation extremely well to date. Mr. Sisco said that although it is very likely that the crisis will be introduced in the General Assembly, we must remember that there are 136 countries represented therein and we can expect all sorts of pressure to be generated. Mr. DePalma suggested that when the resolution is introduced in the Assembly there will be a new twist, i.e.: the Indians will be no longer terribly interested in political accommodation. By that time that issue will have ceased to be a problem.

23. Mr. DePalma said that a Council meeting was scheduled for 3:30 today and at that time we could try to get the Council to let go of the issue in order to transfer it to the Assembly, it being quite obvious that we are not going to get a cease-fire through the Security Council.

24. Dr. Kissinger asked if we could expect the General Assembly to get the issue by the end of the day, to which Mr. DePalma replied that hopefully this will be the case.

25. Dr. Kissinger said that we will go with essentially the same speech in the General Assembly as was made in the Security Council, but he would like something put in about refugees and the text of our resolution.

26. Dr. Kissinger also directed that henceforth we show a certain coolness to the Indians; the Indian Ambassador is not to be treated at too high a level.

27. Dr. Kissinger then asked about a legal position concerning the current Indian naval "blockade." Mr. Sisco stated that we have protested both incidents in which American ships have been involved. However, no formal proclamation apparently has been made in terms of a declaration of a war, that it is essentially still an undeclared war, with the Indians claiming power to exercise their rights of belligerency. State would however, prepare a paper on the legal aspects of the issue. Ambassador Johnson said that so far as he was concerned the Indians had no legal position to assert a blockade.

28. Dr. Kissinger asked that a draft protest be drawn up. If we considered it illegal, we will make a formal diplomatic protest. Mr. Sisco said that he would prepare such a protest.

29. Dr. Kissinger then asked whether we have the right to authorize Jordan or Saudi Arabia to transfer military equipment to Pakistan. Mr. Van Hollen stated the United States cannot permit a third country to transfer arms which we have provided them when we, ourselves, do not authorize sale direct to the ultimate recipient, such as Pakistan. As of last January we made a legislative decision not to sell to Pakistan. Mr. Sisco said that the Jordanians

would be weakening their own position by such a transfer and would probably be grateful if we could get them off the hook. Mr. Sisco went on to say that as the Paks increasingly feel the heat we will be getting emergency requests from them.

30. Dr. Kissinger said that the President may want to honor those requests. The matter has not been brought to Presidential attention but it is quite obvious that the President is not inclined to let the Paks be defeated. Mr. Packard then said that we should look at what could be done. Mr. Sisco agreed but said it should be done very quietly. Dr. Kissinger indicated he would like a paper by tomorrow (7 Dec.).

31. Mr. Sisco suggested that what we are really interested in are what supplies and equipment could be made available, and the modes of delivery of this equipment. He stated that from a political point of view our efforts would have to be directed at keeping the Indians from "extinguishing" West Pakistan.

32. Dr. Kissinger turned to the matter of aid and requested that henceforth letters of credit not be made irrevocable. Mr. Williams stated that we have suspended general economic aid, not formally committed, to India which reduces the level to \$10-million. He suggested that what we have done for Pakistan in the same category does not become contentious inasmuch as the Indians are now mobilizing all development aid, for use in the war effort, whereas remaining aid for East Pakistan is essentially earmarked for fertilizer and humanitarian relief. A case can be made technically, politically and legally that there is a difference between the aid given India and that given to Pakistan.

33. Dr. Kissinger said to make sure that when talking about cutoff of aid for India to emphasize what is cut off and not on what is being continued.

34. Dr. Kissinger then asked about evacuation. Mr. Sisco said that the Dacca evacuation had been aborted.

35. Dr. Kissinger inquired about a possible famine in East Pakistan. Mr. Williams said that we will not have a massive problem at this time, but by next spring this will quite likely be the case. Dr. Kissinger asked whether we will be appealed to bail out Bangladesh. Mr. Williams said that the problem would not be terribly great if we could continue to funnel 140 tons of food a month through Chittagong, but at this time nothing is moving. He further suggested that Bangladesh will need all kinds of help in the future, to which Ambassador Johnson added that Bangladesh will be an "international basket case." Dr. Kissinger said, however, it will not necessarily be our basket case. Mr. Williams said there is going to be

need of massive assistance and resettling of refugees, transfers of population and feeding the population. Dr. Kissinger suggested that we ought to start studying this problem right now.

36. Mr. Williams suggested that the Indians had consistently requested refugee aid in cash. The Indians in turn will provide the food and support for the refugees. This has provided India with a reservoir of foreign currency. Dr. Kissinger also asked that this problem be looked at by tomorrow to determine whether we could provide commodities in lieu of cash. We do not want to cut off humanitarian aid. We would like to provide material rather than cash.

37. The meeting was then adjourned.
/S/ H. N. KAY
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Extension 72400.

The Secrecy Dilemma

● You can't run the Government if every important secret is going to be handed over to the press

● You can't run a free press if it is a crime to publish everything the Government stamps secret

By **ARTHUR SCHLESINGER Jr.**

A popular Government, without popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps both.

—JAMES MADISON (to W. T. Barry, Aug. 4, 1822).

IT says in the 29th chapter of Deuteronomy, "The secret things belong unto the Lord our God." This has not been a view, however, wholly accepted by the American press. Last month, when Jack Anderson published classified documents showing how the Nixon Administration really felt about the Indo-Pakistani war, he observed an established tradition of journalism. At the same time he transgressed an established tradition of government. Here were the two solemn principles, disclosure and confidentiality, equally portentous and equally venerated, in sharp collision. The conflict of principles left many Americans, I would think, considerably baffled.

It should have given some too a sense of intellectual discomfiture. Republicans who denounced Anderson might have remembered their own delight when The Chicago Tribune printed secret defense plans of the Roosevelt Administration shortly before Pearl Harbor. Democrats who applauded Anderson might have remembered their intense displeasure over equivalent journalistic audacity when they were in power. Still, both Republicans and Democrats probably agree that you cannot run a government if every internal memorandum is promptly handed to the press. And

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both probably agree that you cannot run much of a press if it is a crime to publish anything stamped secret by the Government. The question is whether between these extremes it is possible to discern further guiding principles.

One principle surely is that the Government's case for a measure of secrecy is not altogether frivolous or self-serving. "The Federalist" is generally worth consulting on these matters; and its authors clearly specified two fields where secrecy seemed to them essential. The first was diplomatic negotiation: "It seldom happens in the negotiation of treaties, of whatever nature, but that perfect secrecy and immediate dispatch are sometimes requisite." Woodrow Wilson, it is true, later appeared to repudiate this doctrine when he said that "diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view" and called for "open covenants of peace,

openly arrived at." Before World War I the French Assembly did not know the secret clauses of the Franco-Russian alliance; nor did the British Foreign Secretary inform even his own Cabinet of the military understandings between the British and French General Staffs. This is what Wilson hoped to abolish.

But, as he himself made clear at Versailles, he really meant by "diplomacy" not the processes but the results of negotiation. In practice he favored plenty of talk out of "the public view" but no concealment of results—i.e., open covenants secretly arrived at. As for the negotiating process, Jules Cambon, who was French Ambassador to Berlin before

The recent publication of secret documents has produced a collision between two equally venerated principles—disclosure and confidentiality

The New York Times

FEB 6 1972

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FEB 18 1972

109

World War I and whom that acute student of diplomacy Harold Nicolson regarded as perhaps the best professional of the century, was only mildly exaggerating when he wrote, "The day secrecy is abolished, negotiation of any kind will become impossible." His recent trans-Atlantic shuttling suggests that Henry Kissinger would agree. Whether blowing the secrecy destroys his capability for future private negotiations is a problem that one hopes Mr. Kissinger has pondered.

A second field noted in "The Federalist" as requiring secrecy was that of intelligence: "There are cases where the most useful intelligence may be obtained, if the persons possessing it can be relieved from apprehensions of discovery." Contemplation of these two fields led "The Federalist" to conclude: "So often and so essentially have we heretofore suffered from the want of secrecy and dispatch, that the Constitution would have been inexcusably defective, if no attention had been paid to those objects." In such terms "The Federalist" vindicated the right of the executive branch to conduct negotiations and, by inference, intelligence operations, without any immediate obligation to supply Congress or the people the detail of what it was doing.

So from the start the American Government has been into secrecy. War, of course, provided a third category of legitimate restriction. The National Archives tells us that such classifications as "secret," "confidential" and "private" can be traced back to the War of 1812. Military plans, movements and weaponry remain items that can be plausibly withheld from immediate publication. A fourth category includes information that might compromise foreign governments or leaders or American friends or agents in foreign lands. The case for withholding such information is obviously strong; as too is the case, in a fifth category, for withholding personal data given to the Government on the presumption that it will be kept confidential—tax returns, personnel investigations and the like. A sixth category includes official plans and decisions which, if prematurely disclosed, would lead to speculation in lands or commodities, preemptive buying, private enrichment and higher governmental costs. One doubts

whether the most righteous opponent of official secrecy would seriously argue that Government must at once throw open its files in these six categories.

Yet no one can doubt either that a legitimate system of restriction has long since escalated into an extravagant and indefensible system of denial. The means by which this has been done is primarily the device of "security classification"—i.e., restricting access to public information on the grounds of national security. In 1962 the House Committee on Government Operations found there were "more than a million Government employes [permitted] to stamp permanent security designations on all kinds of documents," adding that few of them seemed to heed Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara's sensible injunction, "When in doubt, underclassify." The General Accounting Office estimates that the security system costs taxpayers from \$60- to \$80-million a year.

Testifying last summer before Congressman William Moorhead's Foreign Operations and Government Information Subcommittee, William G. Florence, a retired Pentagon security officer, portrayed the contemporary condition of the classification frenzy. The Pentagon's top security officer, he said, believed that the classification system should even extend to information in the public domain; and zealous security-stampers, particularly in the Navy, had been discovered classifying newspaper clippings. Florence estimated that the Pentagon files contained about 20 million classified documents and that "the disclosure of information in at least 99.5 per cent of those classified documents could not be prejudicial to the defense interests of the nation." He later changed this estimate to read that 1 to 5 per cent "must legitimately be guarded in the national interest," but this hardly affects the point. The classification system has plainly got hopelessly out of control.

And the reason for this is evident enough—it is that the only control over the system has been exercised by the executive branch itself. The legal basis for security classification was first provided by general orders of the War and Navy Departments;

then by a 1940 executive order of President Roosevelt's, still confined to military intelligence; then by a 1951 executive order of President Truman's, extending the system to nonmilitary agencies and authorizing any executive department or agency to withhold information it considered "necessary in the interest of national security"; then in 1953 by President Eisenhower's executive order 10501—"The bible of security-stamping," Florence calls it. It was as a result of this order that the system got completely out of hand,

for it provides no effective control over the classification of documents and no feasible method for their declassification once the sacred stamp has been placed on them.

Neither the Truman nor Eisenhower executive orders were based on specific statutory authority; but, as Eisenhower's Commission on Government Security argued in 1957: "In the absence of any law to the contrary, there is an adequate constitutional and statutory basis upon which to predicate the Presidential authority to issue Executive Order

10501." This very formulation implies, however, that Congress has the power to control the classification system should it wish to do so.

Since Congress has not wished to do so, the executive branch has had a free hand in dealing with classified information. Naturally this has made it vulnerable to its own worst instincts. "Every bureaucracy," Max Weber has written, "seeks to increase the superiority of the professionally informed by keeping their knowledge and their intentions secret. . . . The concept of the official

secret is the specific invention of bureaucracy." If secrecy in some cases remains a necessity, it also can easily become the means by which Government dissembles its purposes, buries its mistakes, safeguards its reputation, manipulates its citizens, maximizes its power and corrupts itself.

The secrecy system, once out of control, offers temptations few governments have the fortitude to resist. I suppose there may be situations of dire emergency when gov-

(Continued on Page 38)

The New York Times

FEB 6 1972

ernments have no alternative but to deceive the people. But uncontrolled secrecy makes it easy for lying to become routine. And, even short of lying, governments can hardly resist exploiting secrecy to their own advantage. There have been few greater frauds, for example, than the idea put over by the executive on Congress and public opinion that only those with access to classified information know enough to have a judgment on questions of foreign policy. Actually 99 per cent of the information necessary for intelligent political judgment is available to any careful reader of The New York Times. We would have been far better off in Vietnam during the Kennedy years had our Government confined itself to reading newspaper dispatches and never opened a Top Secret cable signed Harkins or Nolting. The myth of inside information — "if you only knew what we knew" — is essentially a trick to obstruct democratic control of foreign policy and defend the monopoly of the national security bureaucracy.

As Justice Potter Stewart has observed, a secrecy system constructed on present lines will inevitably be "manipulated by those intent on self-protection and self-promotion." It will also inevitably invite defiance. Indeed, given Congressional apathy, defiance remains about the only recourse when legitimate secrecy balloons into illegitimate secrecy and an administration runs the system in the interest not of the nation but of itself. So, as a corrective, aggrieved citizens through our history have felt themselves morally warranted in violating what they have seen as a system of secrecy laid down unilaterally by the executive branch for its own protection. In 1844 the Tyler Administration, anxious to avoid public debate over the acquisition of Texas, tried to sneak a treaty of annexation through the Senate in executive session. Senator Benjamin Tappan of Ohio, irate at this procedure, wrote his brother Lewis, the New York abolitionist: "Suppose I send you the Treaty & Correspondence, will you have it published in the Evening

Post in such a way that it cannot be traced back?" Lewis Tappan, a little apprehensive, consulted with Albert Gallatin, who had served as Jefferson's Secretary of the Treasury and later as minister to Paris and to London. The elder statesman told him to go ahead. William Cullen Bryant published the treaty in an Evening Post extra, and Tyler's stratagem was defeated. Were the Tappans, Gallatin and Bryant to be condemned? Or, did Tyler's abuse of secrecy justify their action?

The answer might well be that the functioning of democracy requires some rough but rational balance between secrecy and disclosure, between official control of information and public need for it. When the Government upsets that balance by deceiving the public, lying to it or withholding information essential for informed debate and decision, a healthy democracy is likely to move, in one way or another, to re-establish the balance, whether through the agency of dissenting officials, indignant legislators or resourceful newspapermen. "Secrecy can be preserved," Justice Stewart has reminded us, "only when credibility is truly maintained."

THIS principle of re-establishing the balance is confessedly elusive. Anyone who acts on it is taking a chance. Only the aftermath can prove him right or wrong in deciding that government has violated its part of the contract. "The line of discrimination between cases may be difficult," as Jefferson wrote in a discussion of the question whether the violation of written law was ever justified; "but the good officer is bound to draw it at his own peril and throw himself on the justice of his country and the rectitude of his motives."

The Anderson case suggests the problem. Has the Nixon Administration really fulfilled its part of the contract? Has it maintained the credibility that Justice Stewart tells us is necessary to justify the preservation of secrecy? Has it given the nation the kind of information it needs if democratic control of the Government is not to become a fic-

tion? Here is a President who last year held five formal press conferences, plus four fast-minute chats with White House correspondents; who in the year before held four formal conferences and one at the last minute. Here is an executive branch which old Washington hands regard as the least open the country has seen for years. Then came the Indo-Pakistani war—with the President in an evident pet; with a valuable Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs saying in private "the President does not want to be even-handed," demanding in private that his colleagues "tilt" American power in favor of Pakistan, while telling the press, "There have been some comments that the Administration is anti-Indian. This is totally inaccurate" (and while the State Department, if that body matters any longer, was proclaiming in public a stance of "absolute neutrality"); and with a proven military dunderhead, still inexplicably blessed with great responsibility, wrong once again in his military forecasts. Here, above all, was an Administration dead against internal or external debate in the face of highly controversial decision.

Given this situation, what recourse was there? If the Anderson columns display the kind of Government we have, it is surely appropriate in a democracy that we know it; it is definitely not the function of a secrecy system to shield public officials from accountability for their tantrums, folly or mindlessness. Nor did the disclosure jeopardize ongoing negotiations or intelligence operations or military plans. Worst of all, by outlining the "tilt" policy only behind locked doors, the Nixon Administration deprived Congress and the electorate of the opportunity—one might say the right—to discuss President Nixon's pro-Pakistan program on its merits. This was the unpardonable sin; and some anonymous, disgusted and courageous bureaucrat, with the help of Jack Anderson, was trying to rectify the situation and to re-establish the balance.

What can be done to save the Republic from the perennial need for restoring the balance in such desperate ways? Government has the right to preserve for a period both the confidentiality of its internal processes and the security of information in those categories where security is vital. It has manifestly abused that right. Writing in 1953, Harold Nicolson said, "I am confident that, in the Free

World at least, the age of secret treaties is behind us." He was wildly optimistic; and it is ironic that secret covenants should have enjoyed so rich and rank a revival in Woodrow Wilson's native land. The contents of the so-called Hyde Park Aide-Memoire concerning the uses of atomic energy, signed by Roosevelt and Churchill at Hyde Park on Sept. 18, 1944, were not known in this country until published by the State Department in 1960. The Symington subcommittee in the Senate has unearthed a parade of secret agreements withheld from Congress and the people—Ethiopia in 1960, Laos in 1963, Thailand in 1964, South Korea in 1966, Thailand again in 1967, not to mention secret annexes to the Spanish Bases Agreement of 1953. Senator Clifford Case has now introduced a bill—or rather revived a bill the Senate passed in 1955—that would require the President to transmit all executive agreements to the foreign affairs committees of both houses. If the President deems an agreement too sensitive for publication, he can hand it over under the seal of secrecy; but he can no longer lock it up in his own office and tell no one.

IN addition to the control of secret agreements, we urgently need a rational and orderly system for the classification and declassification of official documents and for the withholding and release of nonclassified documents. The Nixon Administration has recently shown itself aware of the need for reform. In the wake of the Pentagon Papers, President Nixon asked Congress for \$636,000 to begin the declassification of World War II papers—a vast mountain of material, 160 million pages in 49,000 cubic feet of storage space. This was to have launched a declassification program that would have employed 110 persons for five years at a cost now set at \$6-million. Congress has thus far not provided the funds, though it is expected to do so this year.

The legislative hesitation may well be justified. The National Archives estimates that at least 95 per cent of the classified documents of World War II would be declassified as a result of this program.

Thus we would be spending at least \$6-million (in all likelihood the ultimate cost would be much greater) to identify that 5 per cent of World War II documents that must, it is supposed, be kept secret for a few years longer.

"Systematic declassification," William L. Langer has written, "is patently impossible: The records are so voluminous that it would take large teams of highly qualified personnel years to complete the assignment." Professor Langer is not only the leading American historian of European diplomacy; he also served as chief of the Research and Analysis Branch of the Office of Strategic Services, in an equivalent post in the Central Intelligence Agency and as a member of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. His testimony cannot be dismissed as that of a naive scholar who has spent his life in the stacks and doesn't understand the realities of public affairs.

Document-by-document declassification will not do. An automatic declassification procedure was nominally instituted in 1961; but this system, however praiseworthy in intent, left so many exceptions as to become substantially meaningless. What we must have is a system which after a stated period (of which more later) automatically declassifies practically everything, including information on diplomatic negotiations and military planning. A longer period—probably a very much longer period—should apply to documents that describe intelligence operations, compromise foreign citizens or invade the privacy of American citizens, that is, the materials in categories two, four and five of legitimate restriction. (The allegation that declassification would expose our diplomatic and military codes is now a bogeyman. With the domination of cryptography by sophisticated computers, the old ciphers have been abandoned, and the new ones, David Kahn, the author of "The Codebreakers," tells us, "are, in all practical senses, unbreakable.")

The schedule of automatic declassification should be accompanied by some form of appellate procedure. That is, if a department or agency


feels that disclosure in a particular case would injure the nation, it should have an opportunity to claim exemption before an independent review board. But the burden of proof must always be on those who wish to lock the information up.

The executive has it within its power to establish such a system immediately on its own initiative. If it does not do so, then Congress must pass legislation defining the criteria for classification and declassification and providing for Congressional oversight of the results. If Congress is by any chance serious in its big talk about reclaiming lost powers, it ought to pass such legislation anyway. (One difficulty is that Congress's own record in making public its own papers and proceedings is far from inspiring.)

THE question remains how long the closed period should be. Practice abroad varies widely. Denis Mack Smith, the best English historian of Italy, has just published a book entitled "Victor Eman-

uel, Cavour and the Risorgimento" dealing with events in the period from 1840 to 1870. In conducting his research, he was denied access to the papers of Count Cavour and to the royal archives. Cavour died a solid 110 years ago; Victor Emanuel died 94 years ago. This would seem an excess of caution. In the Soviet Union, though the Bolsheviks threw open the Czarist files, they have clamped down hard on their own; a scholar doing research in Moscow runs the risk of being expelled as a spy.

But other nations are responding to the pressures for access. Until very recently the French required specific clearance for the use of official documents after 1871; in a burst of liberalism, the Archives Diplomatiques have now accepted a 30-year rule in principle. The British for a long time had a 50-year rule; Sir Alec Douglas-Home, as Prime Minister, once remarked that his inclination "would be rather to tighten up the 50-year rule than to relax it." But Harold Wilson's



TOP SECRET? - The Pentagon Papers are trundled into the office of Senator Allen Ellender on June 28, when Congress was officially permitted to see them.



HERBLOCK

Herblock in The Washington Post.

"Somebody around here has been putting out accurate information."

The New York Times

FEB 6 1977

our Government, in one of its few visible achievements, reduced the closed period (except for Home Office papers and other records breaching personal privacy) to 30 years. The Heath Government has recently in one brilliant stroke opened the Cabinet records and other departmental papers for World War II — the period which the Nixon Administration would keep closed for five more years until its declassification teams slog through the snow-drifts of records, drift by drift.

MOREOVER, Mr. Justice Caulfield's historic decision in the recent prosecution of The London Sunday Telegraph and Jonathan Aitken for publishing a secret report about Bifra has greatly damaged the old Official Secrets Act; now the Government has appointed a Committee of Inquiry under Lord Franks to review the whole problem of Government secrecy. It should be added that in Sweden, as always an admirable country, almost all records, I understand, including very recent

papers and excepting only royal documents of the King in council, can be examined by any citizen.

For most of its history, the United States has led the world in permitting access to official archives. That indispensable series, "Foreign Relations of the United States," began the publication of diplomatic dispatches in 1861. Until nearly the end of the 19th century, the new volume each year published official secrets of the year preceding, with no perceptible harm to national security. The 1870 volume ran a dispatch of that same year from George P. Marsh, the American Minister in Florence, in which he criticized the Italian Government for its "vacillation, tergiversation and duplicity." The dispatch was reprinted in an Italian newspaper on the very day that Marsh was dining with the Minister of Foreign Affairs. "Was Mr. Marsh handed his passport?" William M. Franklin, the able present Director of the State Department Historical Office has written. " . . . No, as Mr. Marsh had

to admit the only result was that the Italians treated him better than ever. He continued happily and successfully in his Italian post until his death 12 years later." Perhaps candor is a more negotiable diplomatic commodity than those State Department officials understand who in recent years have tried to prevent the publication in "Foreign Relations" of dispatches 20 or more years old because they contain frank comment on men still active in the public life of their countries.

Partly for this reason and even more because budgetary allocations to the Historical Office have failed to keep pace with the swelling flood of documentation, the series has fallen behind even the 20-year rule it set for itself after the war. The year 1971, for example, saw the publication of volumes for 1946; and subsequent years will be even further delayed until the Nixon Administration decrees the release to the State Department of the National Security Council records of the Truman Administration. The situation is made worse by

the fact that scholars are not permitted access to State Department files before the "Foreign Relations" volumes for the year have been released (and access is permitted only on a restricted basis for the several years preceding). Nevertheless "Foreign Relations" remains an impressive achievement. Most other nations committed to documentary series are still bogged down in the prewar period.

Concerned with the delays, President Kennedy wrote Secretary of State Dean Rusk on Sept. 6, 1961, "In my view, any official should have a clear and precise case involving the national interest before seeking to withhold from publication documents or papers 15 or more years old." If our Government had lived up to the Kennedy rule, historians would be much happier. Its failure to do so has contributed to the recent pressure for much more rapid disclosure. Other events, of course, have intensified the pressure, including the disclosures by Jack Anderson, Neil Sheehan, and Daniel Ellsberg. In addition, the knowledge that Government officials do not hesitate to show classified documents to members of Congress or newspapermen when they find leaking to their own or their department's advantage, or when they are trying to combat their own Government's policy, has increased outside skepticism about the sacrosanctity of the secrecy system. Undoubtedly the proliferation of memoirs in which former Presidents, diplomats and even Special Assistants to Presidents break the official deadline with impunity has also encouraged people to question the 20-year or even the 15-year rule.

Now we have the apparition of Dr. Edward Teller, who not too long ago was hound-

ing J. Robert Oppenheimer as a security risk, suddenly asking, "Can we and should we keep any secret for more than a year?" He evidently received this revelation as a member of a Task Force for Security set up by the Pentagon in 1970 under the chairmanship of Frederick Seitz, the physicist and former president of the National Academy of Sciences. The Task Force itself concluded more formally that it was unlikely "that classified information will remain secure for periods as long as five years and that it is more reasonable to assume its knowledge by others in periods as short as a year

through independent discovery, clandestine disclosure or other means." It added: "Classification establishes barriers between nations, friendly as well as not, creates areas of uncertainty in the public mind on public issues and impedes the flow of useful information within our own country." The Task Force even reflected that "more might be gained than lost if our nation were to adopt, unilaterally if necessary, a policy of complete openness in all areas of information" but decided that, "in spite of the great advantages that might accrue from such a policy, it is not a practical proposal at the present time." Instead it recommended a 90 per cent decrease in the amount of scientific and technical information under classification.

THE idea of no secrets at all is an arresting one. It is perhaps true that our secrecy system has kept more things from the American people than it has from the enemy. The North Vietnamese, the Chinese and the Russians knew all about the C.I.A. war in Laos; only the American Congress and electorate were kept in the dark. It is also true that the secrecy system has been a fertile source of blunder and folly in foreign policy. Without secrecy, the British would not have got into Suez nor the Americans into the Bay of Pigs, nor would it have been so easy for successive administrations to deepen American involvement in Indochina.

Moreover, the abolition of secrecy might well diminish international tensions by making it harder for one power to place the most sinister possible interpretation on the actions of another. Ignorance makes it easy to conclude the worst; but the worst may not always be the most accurate. We begin to see today that both America and Russia did things in the early Cold War that each government saw as modestly defensive in purpose and that the other government saw as intolerably aggressive and hostile. If a series of Pentagon Papers and Kremlin Papers, recording in Sheehan-Anderson detail what

these two governments were actually saying and planning in their inner councils, had been published, say, in 1944, each side might have reconsidered its view that the other was fanatically bent on world conquest. Herbert Feis, after half a career in the State Department and the other half as a historian and therefore with intimate knowledge of both interests, recently and, I believe, correctly observed of the conventional objections to shortening the closed period, "Earlier publication of the American record would, on the whole, dispel suspicion and mistrust of our policies rather than nourish them."

But I guess that Dr. Seitz and his comrades are right. The abolition of official secrecy presupposes a different world. If rigorously carried out, it would make international negotiation difficult and personal privacy impossible. But it is an excess in a good direction; and the same kind of skepticism about secrecy has recently produced a number of more moderate schemes for a still drastic abbreviation of the closed period. Congressman Moorhead, whose instructive hearings have thrown much light into the more shadowed recesses of the secrecy system, recently proposed that any paper stamped Secret should become public in two years; Top Secret would take three years. He would also empower a Congressionally appointed commission to grant exceptions. Senator Muskie would

“Whether blowing the secrecy about his recent trans-Atlantic shuttling destroys Mr. Kissinger’s capability for future private negotiations is a problem one hopes he has pondered.”

set up an independent board authorized to transmit classified documents at any time to Congress and, when they are two years old, to make them public. George Ball, the former Under Secretary of State and an astute and experienced public servant, has advocated a five-year rule.

Yet such ideas raise problems — problems which the total abolition of secrecy would raise in even more acute form. It is important, for example, that disclosure not be so precipitate as to inhibit Government officials from making unorthodox suggestions. The McCarthy period had a dismal enough effect on the public service; think what that effect would have been if members of the Foreign Service knew that everything they put on paper or said at a meeting would be submitted to Roy Cohn in the next two or three years. It is also important that disclosure not be so rapid as to invite fishing expeditions by one political party in the files of its predecessor. And, from the viewpoint of the historian, it is urgently important that the system of disclosure not tend to dilute the research quality of documentary records. Herman Kahn—not the thermonuclear Herman Kahn, but the Herman Kahn now at Yale, whose services as head of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library and later of the Presidential libraries system have benefited a generation of scholars—recently said, “My own conviction is that there has been a decline in the qualities of frankness and honesty in our records to a considerable degree because of the great pressure to make everything immediately available to historians and journalists who want to do historical writing about what happened yesterday, last month or last year.” Too much eagerness on the part of historians for instant access may well defeat their own long-term interests.

Perhaps is one reason why some historians have taken a more circumspect position. Professor Langer suggests that confidential and secret documents be made available “to qualified scholars” after five or 10 years. James MacGregor Burns proposes eight to 10 years. My own vote would be for 10 years—i.e., two and a half Administrations—with some type of appellate procedure to permit extensions in categories two, four and five and other exceptional cases. I am strengthened in the belief that a decade would be about right

by the remark of Winston Churchill in the House of Commons on May 15, 1930: “When we come to the question of how far these matters are affected by the lapse of time I would point out that it is nearly 10 years ago. That is a very long time.” With the increase in the velocity of history, it is an even longer time 40 years later. Yet the Nixon Administration refuses to make a blanket declassification of World War II documents after 27 years!

If Congress declines to make a frontal attack on the secrecy system, it is still not without means of improving public access to official records. The Freedom of Information Act, passed in 1966 after a decade's labor and perseverance by Congressman John Moss of California, is based on the proposition that disclosure should be the rule, not the exception, and that, in Moss's words, “the burden should be on the agency to justify the withholding of a document and not [on] the person who requests it.” The act further provides for judicial review when access is denied. However, the act also allows for nine categories of exception, the first of which is for matters “specifically required by executive order to be kept secret in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy.” When Julius Epstein of the Hoover Institution on War, Peace and Revolution tested the statute in his laudable campaign to secure the release of the Operation Keelhaul documents—a file dealing with the forced repatriation of Soviet displaced persons after World War II—the

courts rejected his plea. In practice, the Freedom of Information Act has simply not affected classified information. The Moorhead subcommittee will hold hearings this spring with a view to amending the act and restricting the range of exceptions.

Another means of legislative action lies in the narrowing of the use of “executive privilege” as a means by which the executive branch withholds information. Members of Congress ordinarily can obtain classified documents on request, at least when it serves the purpose of the executive branch. The effect of classification is usually less to deny secret information than to prevent public discussion and debate of such information (and also to make it harder to know what to request). Congress also on occasion may request unclassified material—internal memoranda, minutes of meetings and so on—that might reveal disagreements within the executive branch or expose bureaucrats advocating unpopular views to Congressional retaliation. Immediate Congressional or public access to the internal communications of the executive would undoubtedly end the full and frank exchange among Government officials on which wise policy depends. When Government wants to turn down Congressional requests for material, classified or unclassified, and if methods of bureaucratic attrition fail, it may threaten or invoke executive privilege.

Obviously executive privilege is essential to protect the inner workings of Govern-



The secrecy dilemma

ment. Obviously also it is liable to grave abuse. A decade ago President Kennedy tried to end the practice by which lesser officials in the executive branch assumed this authority on their own cognizance. “Executive privilege,” he wrote Representative Moss in 1962, “can be invoked only by the President and will not be used without specific Presidential approval.” However, when President Nixon's Secretary of Defense cried executive privilege last summer as an excuse for not showing the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, even on a confidential basis, the Pentagon's five-year plan for military assistance, the sorely tried chairman, Senator Fulbright, responded by introducing legislation requiring the President to take personal responsibility for the use of executive privilege and to explain his reasons in detail. Senator Sam Ervin, as usual a mighty fortress on such issues, held hearings on the Fulbright bill last autumn before his Subcommittee on the Separation of Powers.

THE problem is that the secrecy system has been unilaterally determined and controlled by a major party at interest—the executive branch of the Government. The result is that Government has been able to move rather easily from legitimate to illegitimate uses of secrecy. Harold Nicolson, we have seen, lost no opportunity to emphasize the essentiality of secrecy in negotiations. But he distinguished sharply between negotiation and policy and always added, with equal emphasis, that policy “should



Oliphant in The Denver Post.

never be secret, in the sense that in no circumstances should the citizens of a free country be committed by their Government to treaties, engagements, promises or commitments, of which they have not had full knowledge," which the press has not had full opportunity to publish and the legislature to debate and approve. "I feel it to be the duty of every citizen in a free country," Nicolson declared, "to proclaim that he will not consider himself bound by any treaty entered into by the Administration behind his back."

This was President Nixon's particular offense in the Indo-Pakistani affair—keeping his policy secret from the American people. But he was far from the first offender. Every President since the war has done much the same thing at one point or another. If governments were always wiser than citizens, such a course might be justified. But the theory of democracy is that they are not; and the practice of recent years generally verifies the theory. Illegitimate secrecy has corrupted our conduct of foreign affairs and deprived the people of the information necessary for the democratic control of foreign policy. So long as the executive branch persists in these abuses and so long as Congress remains unwilling to assert itself, the courage of the Andersons, Sheehans and Ellsbergs would seem to provide the only restraint and recourse if we are to get our democracy back into working equilibrium. However, with intelligence and determination, we can surely think up a better way. ■

FEB 6 1972

The New York Times

JAN 7 1972

Keating Held Not Unhappy Over Pakistan Cable 'Leak'

By SYDNEY H. SCHANBERG
Special to The New York Times

NEW DELHI, Jan. 6—Sources close to Ambassador Kenneth B. Keating indicated today that he was not unhappy about the disclosure of his secret cablegram to Washington taking issue with American policy on the Indian-Pakistani war.

Asked to comment today on his policy views and on last month's cablegram, which was divulged in Washington yesterday by the columnist Jack Anderson, Mr. Keating would say only: "This is a matter I cannot discuss."

It is known in New Delhi, however, that from the time Pakistani troops in East Pakistan moved to crush the Bengali secession movement there last March, Mr. Keating campaigned privately against the Nixon Administration's pro-Pakistani stand. He even did so publicly until he was silenced by Washington in April.

In recent months, Mr. Keating's official posture has been rigidly correct. He has refused to discuss his views with newsmen, even in private. In his regular columns in a United States Information Service fortnightly newspaper that is widely distributed here, he has consistently defended the Administration policy. He has been criticized for doing so in the Indian press and elsewhere.

From the beginning of the India-Pakistan crisis, which culminated in India's victorious support of the East Pakistan separatists, the American Ambassador's cables to Washington have argued strongly for a different American policy. He pressed for a policy that would be based on what he views as the moral and political "realities" on the subcontinent.

Only a few days after the Pakistani crackdown in East Pakistan began, he sent a cable containing more than a hint of outrage. In it he referred to the killings of Bangalis as "selective genocide" and urged Washington to come down hard on the Pakistani military regime. The word "massacre" was also used.

After an April 15 news con-

ference in Bombay at which he differed with the Administration's contention that the events in East Pakistan were an "internal affair," he was reported to have been rebuked by Washington and told to confine his public remarks to support of the Administration position.

"The phrase 'internal affair' should not be overdone," he said at the news conference. He added that the meaning of the phrase was "limited to the geographical fact that all of this is taking place in what is now Pakistan."

The Pakistan Government is understood to have filed a protest with Washington about his remarks.

Mr. Keating continued to press his argument in his cablegrams to Washington. His view all along, according to confidants, was that Pakistan was an unstable, crumbling military dictatorship; that India was not only an increasingly stable democracy but also the dominant power on the subcontinent; and that East Pakistan seemed certain to emerge as an independent state. The Bengali separatists have proclaimed the establishment of Bangladesh (Bengal nation).

The Ambassador argued that the morality of the situation, a reference to "genocide," as well as the political realities should lead the United States to lean toward India rather than Pakistan.

Another point he reportedly pressed was that if the United States did not take this course, the Soviet Union would, and thus would pre-empt the position of the most influential great power on the subcontinent, an event that has come to pass.

By his determined dissent, Mr. Keating, a former Republican Senator from New York who is a political appointee of President Nixon and a former law partner of Secretary of State William P. Rogers, may have caused these two men considerable anguish and irritation over the last 10 months,

but his arguments have had little obvious effect.

According to authoritative sources, Mr. Keating was present at the meeting in Washington in Mid-June when a high Administration official told India's Foreign Minister, Swaran Singh, that no U.S. Arms had been shipped to Pakistan since March 25, and that none were in the pipeline. When the news about a post-March arms shipment broke a few days later, both Mr. Keating and Mr. Swaran Singh were said by those close to them to have felt personally deceived.

There have been periodic press reports that Mr. Keating has threatened to resign. But, though confidants say Mr. Keating realizes that the Administration might get annoyed enough at some point to oust him, the silver-haired Ambassador, a physically fit 71 years, seems perfectly relaxed and unperturbed.

His sense of humor is also unimpaired. Talking the other day about the Indian policeman assigned to him—reportedly because of threats linked to American policy toward India—Mr. Keating said jocularly: "He goes everywhere with me. But I don't let him sleep with me. I drew the line there."

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White House Took Steps to Stop Leaks Months Before Anderson Disclosures

By ROBERT M. SMITH
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 8—The communist Jack Anderson has been able to disclose secret memoranda concerning National Security Council meetings recently despite White House steps months ago to prevent leaks to reporters and to insure the secrecy of council proceedings.

According to reliable sources, the White House quietly ordered David R. Young of Henry A. Kissinger's national security staff and Egil Krogh Jr. of John D. Ehrlichman's domestic advisory staff to investigate the leaks and to stop them. The action was prompted, according to Government sources, after an article in The New York Times July 23 that dealt with the talks on limitation of strategic arms and caused concern in the White House.

It is not known specifically what Mr. Krogh and Mr. Young have done in the five months since the security assignment was added to their duties. They are reported to have reviewed the procedures used by the council and to have inquired into the methods used by council members, such as Secretary of State William P. Rogers, to prepare for meetings and to handle the council's papers.

F.B.I. Called In

Presumably, Mr. Krogh and Mr. Young have had their task made more difficult by the disclosures by Mr. Anderson. The Justice Department has confirmed that the Administration had called on the Federal Bureau of Investigation to investigate the leaks.

According to one source, Mr. Krogh and Mr. Young are authorized to call on the F.B.I. but hold the principal responsibility because "it is a White House problem" and because "it would be inappropriate to send some F.B.I. man around to talk with people like the Secretary of State." It is not known whether Mr. Rogers himself was interviewed.

The article that prompted the move was written by the Pentagon correspondent of The Times, William Beecher. The article reported that American negotiators had proposed to the Soviet Union an arms-control agreement that would halt construction of both land-based missiles and missile submarines. Mr. Beecher also reported that a companion proposal would allow as many as 300 defensive missiles in both the United States and the Soviet Union to protect offensive missiles.

The article said that the

American proposals had been made orally at negotiations in Helsinki but that specific draft agreements were still being written in Washington.

According to one Government official, the disclosure came "during a very critical stage of the negotiations" and the proposals involved "were not even in any written memo." He said the Administration's feeling was that the information had to come from someone present at the discussions of the National Security Council.

Officials at council meetings include representatives of the Defense and State Departments, the intelligence community and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The F.B.I. has conducted an extensive investigation over more than four months in an effort to uncover Mr. Beecher's sources. The inquiry has been conducted here, elsewhere in the United States and abroad, and was still going on last week.

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Sub P. 11 1976
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The Anderson Papers

By JAMES RESTON

WASHINGTON — The Anderson Papers on the U. S. Government's handling of the Indo-Pakistani war suggest that the Nixon Administration has learned very little from the damning disclosures of the Pentagon Papers on the Vietnam war.

For Jack Anderson's classified documents tell much the same story of damaging decisions arrived at in secret; of subjective Presidential orders imposed on the objective analysis of the President's own principal advisers; of official explanations which mislead the Congress and the American people, and finally of defiant disclosures of the true facts by officials who have lost faith in the judgment and truthfulness of their superiors.

Every time these official deceptions are published, the issue is presented to the public as a conflict between the Government and the press, but the issue is much deeper than that. It is a conflict within the Government itself on how to make and present policy in such a way as to retain the confidence and trust of the civil service, the Congress, the nation, and the other governments of the world.

If you read the official reports on the meetings of the National Security

WASHINGTON

Council's Special Action Group for Dec. 3, 4 and 6, it is hard to get the impression that Dr. Henry Kissinger and other top officials are really grappling with the political, strategic and moral problems of the Indo-Pakistani crisis. Mainly they are being told by Dr. Kissinger, who is obviously under pressure from his boss, what the President wants done—he wants no even-handed stuff but wants to favor Pakistan—and there is a clear suggestion that the bureaucrats are opposing the President.

"I'm getting hell every half hour from the President," says Dr. Kissinger, "that we are not being tough enough on India . . . the President is blaming me, but you people are in the clear."

The impression left by the papers is that the President decided to go along with his friends in Pakistan, and that the official explanations were so inaccurate or incomplete that even the American Ambassador in New Delhi, Kenneth Keating, protested that they "did not add to our position, or, more importantly, to American credibility."

It is the old story, and it has poisoned American policy and diplomacy under both Presidents Johnson and Nixon for almost a decade. The issue is "credibility."

Something new seems to have come over American political life, and it is not official lying. It is the widespread public tolerance of misleading official statements, and even a general tendency not to denounce the twisters who indulge in this practice but the reporters who expose it.

The Johnson and Nixon Administrations have been deceitful, clumsy and unsuccessful, but even after the Pentagon Papers and the Anderson Papers, the reaction seems to be, not that they were wrong and deceptive, but that they were caught.

It is clear that policy is being planned, not in the State Department, but in the White House, and that in the Indo-Pakistani case it was being guided primarily by Dr. Kissinger, who is not available for questioning even in secret by the responsible committees of the Congress.

"We need to think about our treaty obligations," Dr. Kissinger told the National Security Council Special Action Group in the Dec. 3 meeting. "I remember a letter or memo interpreting our existing treaty with a special Indian tilt. When I visited Pakistan in January, 1962, I was briefed on a secret document or oral understanding about contingencies arising in other than a SEATO context."


What does that mean? What secret document or understanding? And though the Senate is supposed to ratify such treaties, nobody on Capitol Hill seems to know about any secret understanding with India or Pakistan.

Even the President seems to be left in the dark at points under this system. For here is Kissinger, in the Dec. 4 meeting, saying that whoever was putting out "background" information on the Indo-Pakistani war was provoking Presidential wrath. "The President is under the 'illusion,'" Dr. Kissinger is quoted as saying, "that he is giving instructions; not that he is merely being kept apprised of affairs as they progress. Dr. Kissinger asks that this should be kept in mind."

Again from the Dec. 4 memo: "Dr. Kissinger said he did not care how third parties [countries] might react, so long as Ambassador Bush understands what he should say."

It is an interesting approach for a Government that came into office vowing to have an "open policy" that would "bring us together"—and is now going to Peking and Moscow to negotiate a "generation of peace."

Never mind what "third parties" think. Never mind the human consequences of the massacres in East Pakistan. Never mind the strategic implications of losing influence in India to the Russians. Never mind doing one thing and saying another. Just do as the President says!



The New York Times
FEB 18 1972

Anderson File:

Backstage With the Crisis Managers

WASHINGTON — There has never been much doubt about the sympathies of the Nixon Administration as it watched Pakistan bloodily dismember herself and India move in to help strip the corpse. The Administration was partial to Pakistan. The question, for a year, has been not whether Washington was even-handed but whether it was level-headed.

The most vivid and fascinating, though not necessarily conclusive, evidence bearing on the question poured forth last week in the form of minutes of three White House strategy meetings in early December, in the first days of open conflict between India and Pakistan, and secret cables to and from American diplomatic missions. All this was part of a large but sensitive file that came into the possession of columnist Jack Anderson last month and quickly became known here as the New Anderson Tapes or the Kissinger Connection.

Its dramatic qualities were magnificent:

OFFSTAGE WRATH AND THUNDER — Kissinger: I am getting hell every half-hour from the President that we are not being tough enough on India. . . . The President is under the "illusion" that he is giving instructions.

TENSION-BREAKING WIT AND SARCASTIC — Kissinger: The President is blaming me, but you people are in the clear.

Sisco: That's ideal!

BRAVE CHALLENGE TO THE FATES — Kissinger: Everyone knows how all this will come out and everyone knows that India will ultimately occupy East Pakistan. We must, therefore, make clear our position, table a resolution. . . . [although] the exercise in the U.N. is likely to be an exercise in futility.

HOSTILITY HEDGED BY PRUDENCE — Williams said that the Department of Agriculture indicated that the price of vegetable oil was weakening in the United States; thus cutting off this \$480 commodity to India could have repercussions on the domestic market.

AGGRESSIVE HUMANITARIANISM

Williams referred to the one and a half million Urdu-speaking (Bihari) people in East Pakistan, who could so be held hostage. . . . Kissinger asked whether we should be calling attention to the plight of these people now. . . . Sisco said that this humanitarian issue could be a very attractive one for the General Assembly. . . .

REGRESSIVE HUMANITARIANISM

Kissinger inquired about a possible famine in East Pakistan. . . . whether we will be appealed to to help Bangladesh. . . . Johnson added that Bangladesh will be an "international basket case." Kissinger said, however, it will not necessarily be our basket case. . . .

And, in a sequence that Mr. Anderson quoted in his column but failed to distribute with his texts:

BITIFUL HELPLESS GIANTISM

Kissinger: The elimination of the Pak armored and air forces would make the Paks defenseless. It would turn West Pakistan into a client state. . . . Can we allow a U. S. ally to go down completely? Can we allow the Indians to scare us off? . . . Sisco doubted, however, that the Indians had this as their objective. . . . Packard stated that perhaps the only satisfactory outcome would be for us to stand fast, with the expectation that the West Paks could hold their own. . . . Kissinger said that we cannot afford to ease India's state of mind. "The lady" [Mrs. Gandhi] is cold-blooded and tough and will not turn into a Soviet satellite merely because of pique.

The next day, President Nixon ordered a naval task force of eight ships, led by the nuclear aircraft carrier Enterprise and carrying 2,000 Marines, to steam into the Bay of Bengal. The stated purpose was to help evacuate American citizens. The more important purpose, according to Mr. Anderson, was to divert Indian military and intelligence energies. One consequence was that the Russians told the Indians to hurry up with the conquest of Bangladesh and assured them that a Soviet fleet in the Indian Ocean would not allow the Americans to intervene.

Mr. Anderson had dribbled out many of these secrets in his columns since mid-December, charging deception by the Administration and challenging the "secret" label on his file. The minutes that he released were from Pentagon note-takers for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. But he also

possesses additional quotations from the notes of other departments, plus cables to and from an anguished and resisting Ambassador to India, Kenneth Keating, and intelligence reports on Russian efforts and allied attitudes.

The material could have come from Government opponents of the whole policy, who felt that Pakistan deserved at least equal blame for her brutal suppression of Bengali separatists—or that, in any case, the United States had only advertised its helplessness, alienated India at a crucial moment of her history and cleared the way for the Soviet Union to gain an important friend in South Asia and a massive presence in the Indian Ocean. Or it might have come from persons who shared Mr. Anderson's conviction that Washington had foolishly risked a naval clash with the Russians and lied to the country about the depth of its commitment to Pakistan.

Basically, these arguments have turned on what the United States did and why.

The Anderson papers reconfirm that President Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger, his principal adviser and actor on security affairs, were not nearly so exercised about Pakistani suppression of the East Bengalis as about what they saw as Indian aggression against Pakistan. The first was seen as an internal affair, beyond our of-

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FEB 18 1972

JAN 10 1972
Sup. The New York Times

official concern no matter how deplorable, the second as a threat to the balance of power in South Asia and the whole idea of the sanctity of frontiers — an idea that Washington deems essential to world stability, even though it has often bent the concept for its own convenience, to wit: Cuba.

So through the worst of the blood-bath in East Pakistan, Mr. Nixon only quietly urged restraint upon the West Pakistanis, offered some money to relieve the refugee load, warned the Indians not to exploit the opportunity to dismember Pakistan once and for all, and availed himself of Pakistan's assistance in the higher-priority project of improving relations with China.

The Nixon-Kissinger doctrine of power balance appeared to require a rough parity between India and Pakistan and an effort to let China (pro-Pakistan) and the Soviet Union (pro-India) vie for influence in South Asia while the United States patrolled the seas and remained on amicable terms with everyone.

Only after India refused to accept this vision for the subcontinent and obtained pledges of Soviet support against Pakistan and China did the White House increase the pressure on Pakistan to save herself through a political settlement. The White House prayed for time, but the Indians, unimpressed by the progress, attacked. This only exaggerated the sense of

betrayal in Washington and probably exacerbated the President's wrath.

The Anderson papers confirm that the White House feared a larger war aimed at dismembering West Pakistan as well, though leading military and diplomatic analysts were skeptical. They reveal a desperate search for actions to reinforce angry words, by deploying the fleet and secretly toying with the idea of letting Jordan and other countries pass on American planes and equipment to Pakistan.

They show the President and Mr. Kissinger to have been the driving force behind a reluctant bureaucracy, even in the early stages, when the facts on the fighting were still obscure. They suggest that dissenting views were not particularly welcome and tended to be offered only through an occasional question about tactics.

But they do not unscramble the many motives and passions that shape the policy: the traditional affinity here for Pakistan's military rulers (notorious in Mr. Nixon's case) and the traditional dislike of what is seen as Indian sanctimony; the calculation that China promised to be a more

powerful and probably less obstreperous partner in Asia than India; the desire to strengthen (read, balance) China against threats of Soviet encirclement; the commitment to the permanence of national frontiers everywhere; the fear of aggravating separatist tendencies in India herself and of Communist advances into Bangladesh, Burma and other parts of the region; the need to play a role and assert American interests, and the need to honor the President's private promises, threats and sense of outrage.

Whatever its origin, the drama played on last week. The Enterprise and other ships kept up their maneuvers in the Indian Ocean and the Pentagon reasserted its plan to keep contesting that sea against the Soviet Fleet. India extended diplomatic recognition to North Vietnam and the United States protested that this cast doubt on India's fitness to remain chairman of the largely idle International Control Commission for Indochina. The feeling was that India should be even-handed in other people's wars.

—MAX FRANKEL

John W. Moore
March 2, 1971

'Leaks Follow the Course of Greatest Impact'

WASHINGTON—The choicest bits of the White House's secret strategy sessions on the Pakistan-India fuss had already been published in Jack Anderson's syndicated column—read by an estimated 45 million muck-hungry Americans—when Presidential aide Henry Kissinger decided that the best way to fight back was to say that his statements had suffered distortion by being printed out of context.

That was a mistake. Last week Mr. Anderson responded to Mr. Kissinger's criticism by releasing to the press the full text of the White House minutes, and these were printed by The New York Times, The Washington Post and other major newspapers across the country.

It was no great act of largesse. Mr. Anderson could spare a few secret documents; he says he gets dozens of them every week "from officials of integrity who believe Uncle Sam can tell the truth and survive." A smaller selection, he says, comes "from people who are out to get even with their boss or somebody else." The officials who slipped him these White House papers might qualify in both categories. Mr. Kissinger, having upstaged the entire State Department and some of the Defense Department, is not without bureaucratic enemies.

Those who recall Mr. Anderson's being caught in 1954 eavesdropping on Bernard Goldfine in the Sheraton-Carlton Hotel, or sending an assistant to dig through J. Edgar Hoover's garbage can last year, would have been easily persuaded that Mr. Anderson got the documents by some light-fin-

ged technique. But Mr. Anderson says they came the usual way—"from friends in sensitive government positions." The friends were "appalled by the Administration's siding with the Pakistani dictatorship" and by the "misleading information coming out of the White House."

Sensing an opening, Mr. Anderson softened them up further by implanting the fear—which he shared—that the presence of the United States fleet in the Bay of Bengal might be pointing to another Gulf of Tonkin incident.

If the Johnson Administration's secret plans in 1964 for covert war against North Vietnam—and for subsequent bombing of the North—had been known in advance of the Tonkin episode, the escalation of the war might have been prevented. Right?

And if the public knew what the White House was thinking about India and Pakistan, it might even mean preventing a conflict with Russia. Right?

"Quite frankly," says Mr. Anderson, "this was persuasive with my friends. Originally they gave me about a dozen documents. They said these were the key ones. But I didn't feel I should write without seeing all the documents of this period. I told my sources, 'I trust you guys, and when you say this is a representative sampling I'm sure you're telling the truth. But somebody might argue that you had misled me by picking out just the documents that prove what you want to prove. I think I've got to see them all.'

"They said, 'You're crazy.' I said,

'No. You've got to decide whether you work for the country or for Kissinger.' So they gave me all of them."

In dealing with people so disposed, Mr. Anderson benefits from the first law of leak physics: Leaks tend to follow the course of greatest impact. Officials with a secret tale to tattle know that through Mr. Anderson's column they will reach 700 newspapers, which is by far the most widespread circulation of any political column in American journalism.

Not that all 700 newspapers always use it. Some editors don't appreciate what Mr. Anderson does to some of their heroes. Others are occasionally afraid he may be leading them down the libel path. His column about the sex problems encountered by cartoonist Al Capp on college campuses, for instance, was carried in only two newspapers on the East Coast.

When Mr. Anderson inherited the Merry-Go-Round column from Drew Pearson in 1969 there were some doubts about his ability to handle it. True, he had helped produce the column since 1947, and Mr. Pearson had contributed little during his last years (the series that ruined the career of the late Senator Thomas Dodd, for example, was almost entirely Mr. Anderson's handiwork). Nevertheless, during most of his career Mr. Anderson—an unglamorous teetotaling Mormon family man (nine children)—was overshadowed by his suave boss and partner, who handled the big-name contacts in Georgetown salons.

Mr. Anderson, now 49, is not a

party goer. He takes his religion very seriously and teaches Sunday school.


Big physically (about six feet, 200 pounds), a onetime halfback and brash, Mr. Anderson likes to cultivate the reputation of a Peck's Bad Boy, an outsider. He has a Middle American background: an upbringing in Utah, no college degree, experience on Utah newspapers and the Stars and Stripes before reaching Washington. He has never received an important journalism prize. He likes to take jibes at the "Establishment press," though his column, in the sense that it is a key conduit to some portions of the Establishment, is also very much a part of it.

If, after all this, there were any lingering doubts about Mr. Anderson as proprietor of the Merry-Go-Round column, they must surely have been dispelled by the White House papers coup. Now, with a staff of four legmen (Les Whitten, Brit Hume, Joe Spear, Ray Cole) operating out of five rooms in Howard Hughes's old office suite on K Street, Mr. Anderson is biting hard enough to be forgiven what appears to be an extra layer to his customary cockiness. He's even challenging the White House to get tough about his latest gambit.

"I didn't get my information out of a Daniel Ellsberg, who belonged to another Administration and has been out of government two years," he says. "I got my information from some of Nixon's own boys."

—ROBERT SHERRILL

Mr. Sherrill is a freelance writer based in Washington.



Tilt: The Machine Stops

By ANTHONY LEWIS

LONDON, Jan. 9—The fascination of Jack Anderson's papers lies less in their substance than in the decisional process they disclose. President Nixon's bias in the India-Pakistan crisis had hardly been a secret. But no outsider heretofore has had such an authentic glimpse of the way this President's foreign policy is made and carried out.

The flavor is of some ancient Oriental court. Deep in the inner recesses of the palace the unapproachable potentate draws up his edicts. A grand vizier emerges periodically and proclaims them to the other courtiers. If anyone asks a question, the grand vizier warns him to be less curious or he may lose his head.

What is so striking about these records of top-level meetings is that, evidently, only one of the participants has access to the President. Again and again, Henry Kissinger invokes the spirit of the absent God to shape or terminate a discussion.

"The President is blaming me . . ."

"Wait until I talk with the President . . ." "He has just called me again"—the phrases come from Kissinger one after another. Most memorable of all was that brief but dispositive sentence: "He wants to tilt in favor of Pakistan."

Professor Zbigniew Brzezinski of Columbia University, the foreign affairs scholar, was asked while visiting England what he thought was significant in the Anderson papers. They had left him with two main impressions, he said: President Nixon's remoteness from the decision-making process, and the importance of his personal biases in policy.

"Only one official is the link between the deliberative process and the President," Brzezinski said. It appears, therefore, that the President "makes the decisions outside the deliberative process."

The Anderson papers do not tell us what may have been said at earlier conferences of the President, Kissinger and perhaps others. But the implication is certainly there, as Brzezinski says, that Mr. Nixon does not hear

AT HOME ABROAD

dissenting voices because they have no access to him.

Certainly no hint of dissent was tolerated in the meetings of which we have transcripts. Kissinger curtly rejected even the prudential suggestion that American policy be presented in a way that made its tilt less flagrant.

Presidential isolation is a subject of which we heard much in the Johnson years. The danger is obvious. We all know, ourselves, how far our thoughts may stray from reality if we brood on a problem without the corrective of outside advice and discussion.

For a President, correction lies in some degree of openness to the machinery of government outside the White House—and to unofficial comment. If those channels are closed, policy is more likely to reflect personal bias. And so there is a link between Brzezinski's twin conclusions:

that Richard Nixon is a remote President, even less reachable than Lyndon Johnson, and that personal relations play a greater role in his foreign policy than in that of any other President since World War II.

The India-Pakistan affair happens to illustrate the possible costs of such a closely held decisional process. One is that the American position will stray so far from reality that it will lose persuasiveness in the world. That was really why the American Ambassador in New Delhi, Kenneth Keating, cabled Secretary of State Rogers last month in protest at the official justifications being given for American policy.


Mr. Keating is a realist and a loyal Republican who certainly did not want to argue with his President. His motive in speaking up was evidently a simple concern that the Administration was injuring itself in telling Baron Munchausen tales about American policy; as the Anderson paraphrase of his cable put it, U.S. credibility was suffering.

But an even more serious concern

is raised by the Keating cable and the whole record of American policy in the India-Pakistan affair: the possibility that the Administration began to believe its own misrepresentations of the situation. That is always a risk of isolation.

One reason for favoring Pakistan over the months of crisis in 1971 was undoubtedly a desire on the part of the President and Kissinger to keep a united Pakistan in being as a balance to Indian power in the subcontinent. The unreality, the self-deception, lay in the notion that Yahya Khan was the means toward the end.

Yahya was a stupid and brutal man whose rigidity destroyed Pakistan. It was only Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger who kept him afloat. Without their blind support the necessary political changes in Pakistan—the ones occurring now—might have come much sooner, perhaps even on time to avoid war. That is the price that may have to be paid for a cloistered, self-feeding policy mechanism in the White House.



The New York Times
JAN 10 1972

FEB 16 1972

Leak Laid to Wrong Man, Anderson Says

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 15—Columnist Jack Anderson asserted today that the Nixon Administration had erroneously concluded that a rear admiral was the source of secret documents leaked to him about the American role in the recent Indian-Pakistani war.

At a news conference in New York Mr. Anderson said the admiral, Robert O. Welander, had been "banished" from the Pentagon to sea duty because the White House, on the basis of information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, thought he was the source of the leaks.

"But the information will keep coming because they plugged the wrong leak," Mr. Anderson said. "The F.B.I. got the wrong man. I never have talked to Welander. He gave me nothing. His career is ruined because the F.B.I. made a mistake."

'Hardly a Demotion'

Jerry W. Friedheim, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense in charge of public affairs, declined to discuss Mr. Anderson's remarks. He said "no comment" when asked a series of questions dealing with the substance of Mr. Anderson's assertions.

The Pentagon did confirm that Admiral Welander, who is 47 years old, had been transferred on Feb. 1 from a job in the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the post of commander of a Cruiser-Destroyer Flotilla 6, based in Charleston, S. C. A Navy Department source said that such a flotilla usually consisted of about a dozen ships and "could hardly be called a demotion" for Admiral

Welander, who achieved his rank last July.

He is to report to his new post on March 1 and the Defense Department said he was on leave, "whereabouts unknown." No one answered the phone at his last listed residence, in Alexandria, Va., outside Washington.

At the afternoon news briefing, Ronald L. Zigler, the White House press secretary, said that Admiral Welander had served as the liaison officer between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the White House, but he refused to discuss a series of questions pertaining to Mr. Anderson's charges.

President Nixon said at a news conference last week that "we have a lot of circumstantial evidence" on the identity of the source of the leaked documents, but he added that as a lawyer, he did not consider it adequate to take to court.

Minutes for the Pentagon

Mr. Anderson, in a telephone interview this evening, said that Admiral Welander's staff was responsible for preparing for the Pentagon the minutes of the Washington Special Action Group of the National Security Council, which met throughout the Indian-Pakistani crisis.

Some of the documents were published in part by Mr. Anderson and made available by him to other newspapers, but he repeated that Admiral Welander had had nothing to do with leaking them to him.

Asked if he was willing to take a lie-detector test, he said he was.

Mr. Anderson's columns in December and January carried excerpts not only from the Special Action groups' meetings but from secret cablegrams

and intelligence estimates during the Indian-Pakistani war. They disclosed strong anti-Indian bias the Administration, which had accused India of starting the war.

Henry A. Kissinger, the President's adviser on national security affairs, who conducted the meetings, was quoted in the minutes as saying that Mr. Nixon wanted a definite "tilt" in American policy toward Pakistan.

The documents also indicated that the State and Defense Departments did not share Mr. Kissinger's conviction that India planned to crush West Pakistan once East Pakistan, now known as Bangladesh, fell.

Publication of the Anderson papers helped stir a political controversy here over the wisdom of the Administration's pro-Pakistan policy—a dispute that persists.

Mr. Anderson, who said he had "several sources" for his secret documents, related that his sources had informed him that Admiral Welander was "purged" as a result of the F.B.I. investigation.

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'Show a...Coolness to the Indians'

~~SECRET~~
HENRY KISSINGER
SECRET SENSITIVE
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF
STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

6 December 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Washington Special Action Group Meeting on Indo-Pakistan Hostilities; 6 December 1971

1. The NSC Washington Special Action Group met in the Situation Room, The White House at 1100, Monday, 6 Dec. to consider the Indo-Pakistan situation. The meeting was chaired by Dr. Kissinger.

2. Attendees

a. Principals:

Dr. Henry Kissinger; Mr. David Packard, Defense; Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson, State; General William Westmoreland, JCS; Mr. Richard Helms, CIA; Mr. Donald MacDonald, AID.

b. Others:

Mr. Christopher Van Hollen, State; Mr. Samuel DePalma, State; Mr. Bruce Lanigen, State; Mr. Joseph Sisco, State; Mr. Armistead Selden, Defense; Mr. James Noyes, Defense; Mr. John Waller, CIA; Mr. Samuel Hoskanson, NSC; Colonel Richard Kennedy, NSC; Mr. Harold Saunders, NSC; Rear Admiral Robert Welander, OJCS; Captain Howard Kay, OJCS; Mr. Maurice Williams, AID.

3. SUMMARY

Discussion was devoted to the Massive problems facing Bangla Desh as a nation. DR. KISSINGER indicated that the problem should be studied now. The subject of possible military aid to Pakistan is also to be examined, but on a very close hold basis. The matter of Indian redeployment from East to West was considered as was the legality of the current sea "blockade" by India.

4. MR. HELMS opened the meeting by briefing the current situation. He stated that the Indians had recognized Bangla Desh and the Paks had broken diplomatic ties with India. Major fighting continued in the East but India is engaged in a holding action in the West. MR. HELMS felt that the Indians will attempt to force a decision in the East within the next ten days. The Indians have almost total air superiority now in the East where they can employ approximately a hundred of their aircraft against Pak ground forces and logistic areas. The Indians, however, have not yet broken through on the ground in East Pakistan. Major thrust of the Indian effort in East Pakistan is in the northwest

corner of the province. The airfield at Dacca is all but closed. The Indians are registering only minor gains in the Jessore area, but they claim to have taken Kamalpur. In the West Indian activity is essentially limited to air attacks. The Paks appear to be on the offensive on the ground and have launched air strikes in the Punjab. Overall, the Paks claim sixty-one Indian aircraft destroyed; the Indians claim forty-seven Pak planes. In naval action one Pak destroyer has been sunk by the Indians and another claimed sunk. The Indians also claim the sinking of one Pak submarine in eastern waters. Moscow is increasingly vocal in its support of India and is not supporting any UN moves to halt the fighting. The Chinese press made its strongest attack on India this morning.

5. DR. KISSINGER then asked for a military assessment, questioning how long the Paks might be able to hold

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
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& TIMES HERALD

_____ THE EVENING STAR

_____ THE SUNDAY STAR

_____ THE WASHINGTON DAILY NEWS

_____ WASHINGTON-AFRO AMERICAN



out in the East. GENERAL WESTMORELAND responded that it might be as much as three weeks.

6. DR. KISSINGER asked what is to be done with Bangladesh. Mr. Helms stated that for all practical purposes it is now an independent country, recognized by India.

7. AMBASSADOR JOHNSON suggested that the Pak armed forces now in East Pakistan could be held hostage. GENERAL WESTMORELAND reinforced this by noting there was no means of evacuating West Pak forces from the East Wing, particularly in view of Indian naval superiority.

8. DR. KISSINGER stated that the next state of play will involve determining our attitude toward the state of Bangladesh.

9. MR. WILLIAMS referred to the one and half million Urdu speaking (Bihari) people in East Pakistan who could also be held hostage.


10. DR. KISSINGER asked if there had been already been some massacre of these people. MR. WILLIAMS said that he certainly thinks there will be. DR. KISSINGER asked if we could do anything, to which MR. WILLIAMS stated that perhaps an international humanitarian effort could be launched on their behalf. DR. KISSINGER asked whether we should be calling attention to the plight of these people now. MR. WILLIAMS said that most of these people were, in fact, centered around the rail centers; that they are urban dwellers and that some efforts on their behalf might now well be started through the UN. DR. KISSINGER suggested that this be done quickly in order to prevent a blood-bath. MR. SISCO stated that while the UN cannot do anything on the ground at this time, public attention could be focused on this situation through the General Assembly.

11. MR. WILLIAMS referred to the 300,000 Bengalis in West Pakistan, and that they too were in some jeopardy. MR. SISCO said that this humanitarian issue could be a very attractive one for the General Assembly and that we would begin to focus on Assembly action. MR. MacDONALD cited as a possible precedent the mass movement of population from North Vietnam in 1954.

12. Returning to the military picture, MR. WILLIAMS stated that he felt that the primary thrust of the Indian army would be to interdict Chittagong and cut off any supply capability still existing for the Paks in the East. He said that he felt that the major thrust of the Indian army in the East would be to destroy the Pak regular forces. He felt that a major job would be to restore order within the East inasmuch as it will be faced with a massacre as great as any we have faced in the twentieth century.

13. GENERAL WESTMORELAND suggested that the Indians would probably need three or four divisions to continue to work with the Mukti Bahini; the remainder would be pulled out to assist the Indian forces in the West.

14. MR. SISCO opined that the Indians would pull out most of their troops once the Pak forces are disarmed, inasmuch as the Indians will be working with a very friendly population; thus, they will curtail the military efforts over the Mukti Bahini as quickly as possible. He felt that the extent and timing of Indian withdrawal from East Pakistan would depend to a large



JOSEPH J. SISCO

degree on developments in the West.

15. In response to a question, GENERAL WESTMORELAND stated that Indian transportation capabilities were limited from West to East, and that it would probably take at least a week to move one infantry division. It might take as much as a month to move all or most of the Indian forces from the East to the West.

16. MR. SISCO said that the long term presence of Indian forces in Bangladesh would have to be addressed. MR. VAN HOLLEN remarked that should the Indian army remain more than two or three weeks after the situation in East Pakistan is wrapped up they would, in fact, become a Hindu army of occupation in the eyes of the Bengalis.

17. MR. VAN HOLLEN raised the problem of the return of the refugees from India. Inasmuch as Bangladesh is predominantly Moslem, the return of ten million refugees, most of whom are Hindu, would present another critical problem.

18. GENERAL WESTMORELAND suggested that the Indian position in the West was not unadvantageous. He briefly discussed the order of battle in West Pakistan and suggested that the Indians were in relatively good shape. He said that he expected the major Pak effort to be towards Kashmir and the Punjab. The Indians, he felt, will be striking toward Hyderabad so as to cut the main OC to Karchi. He did not think that the Indians necessarily plan to drive all the way to Karachi. He also suggested that the current Indian move in that direction could very well be diversionary in order to force the Paks to pull reserves back from the Kashmir area.

19. MR. PACKARD asked about the POL supply situation for Pakistan. MR. HELMS said that at the present time it looked very bad. The overland LOC's from Iran, for example, were very tenuous.

20. MR. WILLIAMS suggested that the reasons for the Indian thrust to the south was essentially political. Inasmuch as the Indians do not want to fight on the border they will have to give ground in Kashmir. In order to ward off parliamentary criticism, Mrs. Gandhi may be going for some Pak real estate in the South.

21. DR. KISSINGER then asked about UN initiatives. MR. SISCO said that we are now reviewing the situation with Ambassador Bush. Two Security Council resolutions have been vetoed by the Soviets. However, there is a ground swell building in New York for an emergency session by the General Assembly to be convened under the provisions of the "threat to Peace" mechanism. The crisis could be moved into the

Assembly through a simple majority vote.

22. DR. KISSINGER and MR. SISCO agreed that any resolution introduced into the General Assembly must retain two key elements; cease fire, and withdrawal of military forces. DR. KISSINGER agreed that our UN delegation has handled the situation extremely well to date. MR. SISCO said that although it is very likely that the crisis will be introduced in the General Assembly, we must remember that there are 136 countries represented therein and we can expect all sorts of pressures to be generated. MR. DePALMA suggested that when the resolution is introduced in the Assembly there will be a new twist, i.e.; the Indians will be no longer terribly interested in political accommodation. By that time that issue will have ceased to be a problem.

23. MR. DePALMA said that a Council meeting was scheduled for three-thirty today and at that time we could try to get the Council to let go of the issue in order to transfer it to the Assembly, it being quite obvious that we are not going to get a cease fire through the Security Council.

24. DR. KISSINGER asked if we could expect the General Assembly to get the issue by the end of the day, to which MR. DePALMA replied that hopefully this will be the case.

25. DR. KISSINGER said that we will go with essentially the same speech in the General Assembly as was made in the Security Council, but he would like something put in about refugees and the text of our resolution.

26. DR. KISSINGER also directed that henceforth we show a certain coolness to the Indians; the Indian Ambassador is not to be treated at too high a level.

27. DR. KISSINGER then asked about a legal position concerning the current Indian naval "blockade." MR. SISCO stated that we have protested both incidents in which American ships have been involved. However, no formal proclamation apparently has been made in terms of a declaration of a war, that it is essentially still an undeclared war, with the Indians claiming power to exercise their rights of belligerency. State would however, prepare a paper on the legal aspects of the issue. AMBASSADOR JOHNSON said that so far as he was concerned the Indians had no legal position to assert a blockade.

28. DR. KISSINGER asked that a draft protest be drawn up. If we considered it illegal, we will make a formal diplomatic protest. MR. SISCO said that he would prepare such a protest.

29. DR. KISSINGER then asked whether we have the right to authorize Jordan or Saudi Arabia to transfer military equipment to Pakistan. MR. VAN HOLLEN stated the United States cannot permit a third country to transfer arms which we have provided them when we, ourselves, do not authorize sale direct to the ultimate recipient, such as Pakistan. As of Last January we made a legislative decision not to sell to Pakistan. MR. SISCO said that the Jordanians would be weakening their own position by such a transfer and would probably be grateful if we could get them off the hook. MR. SISCO went on to say that as the Paks increasingly feel the heat we will be getting emergency requests from them.

30. DR. KISSINGER said that the President may want

to honor those requests. The matter has not been brought to Presidential attention but it is quite obvious that the President is not inclined to let the Paks be defeated. MR. PACKARD then said that we should look at what could be done. MR. SISCO agreed but said it should be done very quietly. DR. KISSINGER indicated he would like a paper by tomorrow (7 Dec).

31. MR. SISCO suggested that what we are really interested in are what supplies and equipment could be made available, and the modes of delivery of this equipment. He stated that from a political point of view our efforts would have to be directed at keeping the Indians from "extinguishing" West Pakistan.

32. DR. KISSINGER turned to the matter of aid and requested that henceforth letters of credit not be made irrevocable. MR. WILLIAMS stated that we have suspended general economic aid, not formally committed, to India which reduces the level to \$10.9M. He suggested that what we have done for Pakistan in the same category does not become contentious inasmuch as the Indians are now mobilizing all development aid for use in the war effort, whereas remaining aid for East Pakistan is essentially earmarked for fertilizer and humanitarian relief. A case can be made technically, politically and legally that there is a difference between the aid given India and that given to Pakistan.

33. DR. KISSINGER said to make sure that when talking about cutoff of aid for India to emphasize what is cut off and not on what is being continued.

34. DR. KISSINGER then asked about evacuation. MR. SISCO said that the Dacca evacuation had been aborted.

35. DR. KISSINGER inquired about a possible famine in East Pakistan. MR. WILLIAMS said that we will not have a massive problem at this time, but by next spring this will quite likely be the case. DR. KISSINGER asked whether we will be appealed to to bail out Bangladesh. MR. WILLIAMS said that the problem would not be terribly great if we could continue to funnel 140 tons of food a month through Chittagong, but at this time nothing is moving. He further suggested that Bangladesh will need all kinds of help in the future, to which AMB. JOHNSON added that Bangladesh will be an "international basket case." DR. KISSINGER said, however, it will not necessarily be our basket case. MR. WILLIAMS said there is going to be need of massive assistance and resettling of refugees, transfers of population, and feeding the population. Dr. Kissinger suggested that we ought to start studying this problem right now.

36. MR. WILLIAMS suggested that the Indians had consistently requested refugee aid in cash. The Indians in turn will provide the food and support for the refugees. This has provided India with a reservoir of foreign currency. DR. KISSINGER also asked that this problem be looked at by tomorrow to determine whether we could provide commodities in lieu of cash. We do not want to cut off humanitarian aid. We would like to provide material rather than cash.

37. The meeting was then adjourned.

/s/H. N. Kay
H.N. KAY
Captain, USN
South Asia/MAP Branch,
J5
Extension 72400
~~SECRET SENSITIVE~~

Jack Anderson: His Code of Ethics

By John Carmody

Columnist Jack Anderson, who certainly should know, says that "the traffic in private documents and private information in this town is startling."

In fact, he says, "there's a file (two inches) thick" on himself circulating around town right now, composed of "raw" government information apparently compiled from various federal sources.

"If the government is going to do it," the celebrated muck raker says, "then I'm going to do it in return."

The man whose staff has recently scored page one triumphs with revelations about ITT and the Republican Party, Ambassador Ar-

thur Watson, and the administration's Pakistan "tilt" to name three, says he plans to publish a few private files himself one of these days to prove the extent of the current traffic.

"Of course" Anderson adds, "I'll get permission of the people named in the files first."

The syndicated columnist sees nothing unethical about this. "If the government were pure," says Anderson, "then I wouldn't want to—but it isn't."

On a related matter, the use of private documents for disclosure of possible wrongdoing involving the government, he says:

"I have as much right or more to inspect private documents about public matters than the government does.

In fact, it's not a right, I feel it's a duty."

Anderson won't discuss it, but he apparently feels the column he inherited from the late Drew Pearson in 1969 is better supervised—if that's quite the word—under the new regime.

"I've told my reporters two conditions when they come to work for me," he says. "And it's automatic discharge if they violate them.

"One—I can't tolerate using the column to black-jack someone in order to get news or two, using the column to promote his own financial interests."


"Having said that," Anderson adds, "It's implicit when I or one of my reporters call that we pack a certain amount of wallop. It's proba-

bly quite true that people cooperate with us in hope of not getting knocks on their own heads."

Anderson recalls a recent call to a "middle level" government official who "was just white, just frightened when I called." And a congressman "sighed audibly" when he heard the columnist's "harmless question" during a recent visit.

He also insists he does not "make an out and out deal" with a source who might be involved in wrongdoing himself. "I grant immunity," says Anderson, "I'll spare him any small embarrassments. But I can't guarantee it—I've hit some of my own sources, you can't help it in our business."

The columnist denies a See ANDERSON, B3, Col. 2



Associated Press

Columnist Jack Anderson

DATE 4-3-72

PAGE B-1

THE WASHINGTON POST & TIMES HERALD

THE EVENING STAR

THE SUNDAY STAR

THE WASHINGTON DAILY NEWS

WASHINGTON-AFRO AMERICAN

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Jack Anderson: His Code of Ethics

ANDERSON, From B1
practice often ascribed to his syndicated reports—that if proved incorrect, he'll reprint the original article in its almost entirety and than admit that he erred. "If the circumstances justify it," says Anderson, "I'll reprint part of the original, sure."

Yet, he recalls that on the occasion of his "worst error"—reporting that Office of Economic Opportunity chief Donald Rumsfeld had lavishly redecorated his office when he hadn't—the OEO director went out of his way to say he'd "consider it a favor" if Anderson didn't bother to run a retraction.

A serious Mormon, Anderson says he truly regrets those occasions when his disclosures have "ruined the lives" of people.

"They possibly wouldn't believe it," he says, "but it's true. It's a cruel thing to do but in our business some times we have to do it. And


I'm in the same boat you know. I've accepted that with the role I've accepted—and I've got to be especially careful." He stresses that his investigatory authority runs only towards public figures.

"I haven't the right to do that to my neighbors," says Jack Anderson.

The New York Times Magazine

AUGUST 13, 1972 / SECTION 6

10 The Anderson strategy:
"We hit you—pow!
Then you issue
a denial, and—bam!—
we really let
you have it"
By Susan Sheehan



The New York Times
AUG 13 1972

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The Anderson strategy:

"We hit you—pow! Then you issue a denial, and—bam!—we really let you have it"

By Susan Sheehan

Few reporters ever go from writing news to being news, and certainly no reporter has made the passage more conspicuously than Jack Anderson in 1972. As a result of two journalistic coups—the publication of secret White House documents showing the Nixon Administration's duplicity during the India-Pakistan war and the publication of the Dita Beard memo, which suggested that, in return for \$400,000 toward the cost of the Republican convention, the Justice Department made a favorable out-of-court settlement with International Telephone & Telegraph Corp. in an antitrust case—Anderson, whose byline appears under his syndicated "Washington Merry-Go-Round" column in 965 daily and weekly newspapers in the United States and abroad, has become a front-page headline: "Anderson Urges Secret-Data Curb," "Anderson Accuses Kleindienst of Lying About I.T.T. Case," "Anderson Wins Pulitzer Prize."

Two weeks ago, when he broadcast a false story that Senator Thomas F. Eagleton, the Democratic Vice-Presidential nominee, had been arrested for drunken and reckless driving during the 1960's, Anderson learned the special pain reserved for the famous: the well-publicized fiasco. After he conceded that he could not produce Eagleton's arrest record, the front-page headline read "Anderson Backs Off." A couple of years ago, his shocking error would have attracted little attention.

Anderson has been accorded the full-dress media treatment rendered nowadays to celebrities-of-the-moment, be they perpetrators of autobiographical hoaxes, political assassins or muckrackers. His face, which reminded *The New Yorker* of a bed, "not an unmade one but a fresh, crisp, nononsense hotel bed," has been on the covers of *Time* and *Parade*. Morley Safer profiled Anderson admiringly on "Sixty Minutes" while William Buckley devoted 60 anything-but-admiring minutes to him on "Firing Line." "You exercise the right to inspect the files of anyone who wants to rat on his employer. You just look over them lasciviously and decide what to hand out to your enormous constituency," Buckley charged. Lasciviousness is in the eye of the beholder, but Anderson's constituency is an undeniably enormous 67 million. The "Merry-Go-Round" now runs in over 300 more newspapers than it did three years ago when Anderson took it over upon the death of its long-time proprietor, Drew Pearson.

Anderson is enjoying the lucrative fringe benefits that accrue to a byliner-turned-headliner. His lecture agents are booking more lectures than he can deliver, at a fee that has risen to \$2,000; Random House has given him a \$100,000 advance for an

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Jack Anderson and (facing page) some of his targets: Nixon, Kissinger, Eagleton and Laird.

account of the India-Pakistan and I.T.T. affairs, to be called "The Anderson Papers"; and a company has been formed to package Anderson for national radio and television.

"Anderson's the overnight success story of the year," a Congressional aide commented last month, which brought to mind a remark once made by a ballerina credited with instant stardom. "I don't know any other business where a girl can work eight days a week for nine years and suddenly be proclaimed an overnight success," the ballerina observed. In Anderson's case, notoriety came after 25 mostly unrecognized years of working in Washington, albeit a mere six days a week. As all of us readers and/or watchers of *Time*, *Parade*, "Sixty Minutes," etc., already know, Anderson does not muckrake on the Sabbath; he is a practicing Mormon and devoted family man who prefers to spend Sunday in church and at home with his wife and nine children.

Jack Anderson came to Washington in the spring of 1947 and applied for a job with Drew Pearson. Pearson already had a few reporters and secretaries

helping him with the column he had launched 15 years earlier and with his influential Sunday-night radio show, but he happened to have a vacancy on his staff; he had just learned that one of his reporters was a card-carrying member of the Communist party and felt that keeping a Communist on his staff would be carrying his liberalism a little too far. He wanted to replace the reporter with a young man who had had some newspaper experience. Anderson was then 24 and already had almost 12 years of newspapering behind him.

Pearson hired Anderson in April, 1947, as a part-time assistant at \$50 a week. "Within a few weeks—I was diligent and I was lucky—I nailed a guy Drew was anxious to nail," Anderson recalls. "He decided I was holding my own and made me a full-time assistant at \$100 a week." Before long Pearson considered his youngest employe his chief investigative reporter. Over the years, many of the column's major exposés were Anderson's handiwork, among them the series on Senator Thomas Dodd's financial transgressions that led to Dodd's political demise.

In 1954 Anderson accepted a job as Parade magazine's Washington correspondent and informed Pearson of his intention to quit the column. He was fed up with anonymity (for seven years his name had very rarely appeared in or on the column) and concerned about his future. Pearson pleaded with him to stay and promised him that if he did, the "Merry-Go-Round" would one day be his. He told Anderson he could take the Parade job and still work for the column. "I pointed out to Drew that since there was no legal way he could will the column to me, the fact that he wanted me to be his successor wasn't enough," Anderson says. "Editors and readers had to know I existed. Drew agreed to let me write the column under my own name when he went on vacation and promised we'd eventually have a joint byline." Although Parade was soon paying him two or three times as much as Pearson (in 1963, Anderson's salary from Pearson was \$11,440, his Parade income \$28,500), and although regular bylines did not come until 1966—far later than he would have liked—Anderson stayed on. He loved the work and he understood how painful it was for Pearson to see someone else's name on the column. "For Drew, giving me a byline was like giving me a little bit of his blood," he says.

Drew Pearson died unexpectedly of a heart attack on Sept. 1, 1969. That day Anderson informed Pearson's widow, Luvie, that at their near-parting, 15 years earlier, Drew had asked him to pay her an unspecified amount of money annually after he inherited the column. She and Anderson settled promptly and amicably on a sum of \$12,000 a year. An executive of the syndicate that distributed the "Merry-Go-Round" flew to Washington to negotiate a new five-year contract with Anderson later the same day. Anderson signed for a lower amount than Pearson had been getting because he knew that many publishers and editors disliked the column and suffered its presence in their newspapers only because Pearson was a household word. His death would presumably provide them with a good excuse to drop the column now that it was in the hands of his lesser known heir, a man Arthur Kroek of The New York Times then thought of simply as "Pearson's Anderson."

At the time of Pearson's death, Anderson occupied a two-room office with a staff of two: Opal Ginn, a discreet, helpful and cheerful woman, as well as a crack secretary, who had been with him for 15 years and who partakes liberally of the cigarettes, coffee and alcoholic beverages from which he abstains; and Joseph Spear, a mustachioed former teacher of high-school science with a year's experience in educational writing, who had been helping him with his Parade chores for six months.

Anderson figured that if he was going to make a success of the "Merry-Go-Round," he would have to add two good investigative reporters to his staff. Within four months of taking over the column, he had hired Leslie Whitten, now 44, an alumnus of

The Washington Post and the Hearst chain (and also a writer of mystery novels and a translator of Baudelaire), and Brit Hume, now 29, who had had several years of newspaper experience in Hartford and Baltimore and several months at the Washington Journalism Center. Spear, 31, switched from Parade to the column, and the four men now produce the "Merry-Go-Round." In addition Anderson recently hired Michael Kiernan, 25, a former editor of Interplay, an international affairs magazine, to help with the radio work and Parade. The men share a five-room office with Opal Ginn, a receptionist-secretary named Dana Crock and a busy Xerox machine.

Whitten, Hume and Spear work independently on stories and turn them in to Anderson, who independently researches and writes his own stories. Anderson decides which stories will be used on a given day and in what order they will run. He may kill a story submitted by one of his associates, send it back for more work or run it with heavy, light or no editing. He periodically mentions the trio in his column and has encouraged them to write books and give lectures.

Anderson's associates are possibly the most underpaid first-rate newspapermen in Washington (Spear earns \$11,300 a year, Hume \$14,300, Whitten \$22,000), but they pursue scandal with the purposeful exhilaration of a pack of beagles on the trail of a fox, and they sound as if they could collectively strip Jack Valenti, former assistant to Lyndon Johnson, of his unofficial title of world's most idolatrous employe. Hume has told a reporter that Anderson is "the most tolerant, generous boss in the world"; Spear has described him as "the ultimate boss" and if Valenti slept better because Lyndon Johnson was in the White House, well, according to Whitten, "when you work for Jack, you get out of bed in the morning with a snap."

In the last three years, Anderson has continued to rake the muck Pearson had raked during his 37 years as proprietor of the "Merry-Go-Round," but he has made some changes in the column, changes that primarily reflect the differences in the two men.

When Pearson got a good story from one of his sources and made a few phone calls to check it out, word-of what he was up to got around; after the procedure had cost him a few scoops, he stopped doing any checking (he was a secretive man to begin with) and became totally dependent on the reliability of his sources. Anderson, a very open man, believes that even his best sources can inadvertently mislead him. He says he checks out his stories with additional people and usually with the subject; if a subject denies a story that Anderson can prove, he will run the story along with the denial. He claims to have lost some scoops that way but feels that "losing a story now and then is a risk worth taking for the sake of accuracy." He has cultivated a wider range of

(Continued on Page 76)



Anderson

(Continued from Page 11)

sources than Pearson and has improved the columns reputation for accuracy, but the Eagleton mistake raises serious doubts about the extent to which he does cross-check his material. After Eagleton called his story "a damnable lie," Anderson admitted that he had broadcast it without verification because "I wanted to score a scoop." The story turned out to be based on four-year-old recollections by True Davis, a former Ambassador to Switzerland who is now head of a Washington bank largely owned by the United Mine Workers. Davis had allegedly seen photostats of the arrest records. Anderson first said he had "located photostats of half a dozen arrests for drunken and reckless driving," later said he had "traced but had not seen photostats of Eagleton's traffic records" and then apologized July 30 on "Face the Nation" "for publicizing documents that I have not seen and have not verified" but refused to retract the story. Anderson met privately with Eagleton on Aug. 1 and agreed during the meeting to a complete retraction. "How shall we do it?" Anderson asked. "The press is right outside," Eagleton replied. The two men came out of the meeting and, under the klieg lights, Eagleton graciously accepted Anderson's second apology and retraction.

In his later years, many Pearson columns took the form of "A Letter to My Grandson," the "letter" serving as a pretext for Pearson to address himself to the state of the nation or the world. "I think the column ought to be a news column, not a personal-opinion column," Anderson says, and it is a felicitous conviction. When he does a non-news column, like the one last July 4 on what is good and bad about America, he falls into the kind of crudely self-righteous oratory on the virtues of America that passed for wisdom during the cold war a decade ago, but which the informational content of his columns implicitly contradicts today.

Pearson tended to divide the country's politicians into friends and enemies (often for

ideological reasons) and conducted what appeared to be endless personal vendettas against such enemies as James Forrestal, Lewis Strauss and Richard Nixon. He overlooked his enemies' virtues—and the flaws in such friends as Lyndon Johnson. Asked who his enemies are, Anderson, a more evenhanded and pragmatic man than his predecessor, answers, "I guess Spiro Agnew and Henry Kissinger consider me their enemy. To me they're just stories. Down deep I'm anti-Nixon, and I'm not going to vote for him, but last March, when I learned of some kind and generous deeds Nixon had done privately that contrasted with his robotlike public image, I was glad to write a column about Nixon's hidden human side."

The fact that a person turns up in the column in a consistently unfavorable light is as likely to reflect the persistence of the column's sources as Anderson's bias. In the spring of 1970, two Anderson columns viewed with breathless alarm the costly, illegal plans to refurbish Secretary of the Interior Walter Hickel's private office and dining room. Both columns accused George Gauzza, the Interior Department's Management Operations Director, of complicity in the decorating extravaganza. On Feb. 25, 1971, a column noted that Gauzza had taken an extended trip to Guam and Saipan to do "property inventories" in the Pacific Territories, thus adding a leg of 6,194 miles to a planned trip to the West Coast. On Oct. 29, 1971, the column reported that despite Gauzza's "past manipulations" he had been recommended for a Distinguished Service Award, the Government's highest civilian honor, but that the recommendation had been turned down. Anderson's column on Dec. 19, 1971, concerned Gauzza's "appetite for nepotism"; Gauzza's brother and his nephew were long-time employees of the Department of the Interior, and he has recently hired his cousin and his cousin's wife.

"After we ran those two columns on Hickel's redecorating schemes, we started receiving anonymous tips on this cat Gauzza," Joe Spear says. "The tips—and they've

all proved accurate—arrive in the mail. They're typed on plain paper. The type has a squarish face; I can spot it the minute I see the envelopes on my desk. Whenever I call the flack over at Interior to check an item, he says, 'Don't tell me you're going to be dumping on old George again.' I say, 'Well, I'm sorry, but that's the way it is,' and he says, 'I'd sure like to know who has it in for old George.' Poor George is really no different from any other bureaucrat. Bureaucrats are all alike. They're all going to take their junkets when they can and hire their friends and relatives when they can. Gauzza's just the one we're catching at it. Once someone gets into the column, the odds are that he'll get in again."

The characters who most regularly ride the "Merry-Go-Round" are a multitude of malfeasants. Congressmen violate Federal laws by taking kickbacks from their employes and accept cash from the industries they are supposed to regulate. Out-of-town mayors visit Washington to indulge in drunken whoring. The conduct of the country's appointed officials is as dismal as that of its elected officials. The American Ambassador to France gets drunk on an airplane and tries to stuff money down the fronts of stewardesses' blouses; an American AID administrator in Kenya makes passes at Spiro Agnew's secretary and tries to drag her down the steps of a hunting lodge to meet an elephant at eye level.

Most of the readers seem to relish the daily dose of venality and incompetence in high places — indeed, like George Gauzza's unknown enemy, they add to their pleasure by playing elf to Anderson's Santa Claus. The column's critics, on the other hand, dismiss a good deal of what Anderson publishes as "trivia" and "marginalia." When he devoted a column to Senator Herman Talmadge's habit of chewing tobacco and "splattering tobacco juice in the Capitol's historic hallways," a New York Times man observed that the Senator's personal habit was of concern only to the Senate's cleaning crews; when he wrote that Melvin Laird, the Secretary of Defense, had not one but two limousines at his beck and call, a Washington Post reporter's two-word comment was, "Ho hum."

"When Senator Talmadge behaves in an uncouth way,

I think I ought to write about his behavior," Jack Anderson says. "People in power get too puffed up with their own importance, too swollen with hot air, because they're treated with such deference and they're granted as many privileges as Roman emperors. I consider it my function to be a needle to deflate the windbags, to let the hot air out. A column on Talmadge's tobacco-spitting reminds him that he's human and brings him down to our level. It's not marginalia when the Mayor of Tucson comes to Washington

Anderson's targets: Potentates, panjandrums, moguls, magnates and high-muck-a-mucks

and bites a girl on the leg. I'm morally outraged by his conduct and there's also a phenomenon that incident is relevant to. People in power think that their positions entitle them to do as they please, even though they know that if they're caught doing some of what it pleases them to do, they won't be able to explain their conduct to the public's satisfaction. After our column on the Mayor of Tucson's shenanigans in Washington he was defeated when he ran for re-election. If Arthur Watson, our Ambassador to France, has a drinking problem, that's hardly trivia. We the people are depending on him to conduct some very delicate negotiations with the Chinese in Paris. I think the taxpayer is entitled to better representation over there. The caliber of President Nixon's ambassadorial appointments may help the voters decide how they want to vote in November."

While much of Jack Anderson's moral outrage seems genuine, his defense of the column's subject matter sounds like a rationale developed after years of being accused of titillating for titillation's sake. One wishes that after his earnest, high-toned defense of the column on Watson's in-flight drinking he had added, "And besides, it was one hell of a funny story, wasn't it?" Or that he would admit, as Luvie Pearson does with appealing candor, "Leave out all those stories about the tobacco chewers and you

don't have a salable column." One is at least as skeptical of the ho-hums of Anderson's critics. The columns Anderson writes about Pentagon limousines or Congressmen cheating on their income taxes or their wives are read in Washington with the same zest as in the hinterlands. The housewives who read them in Prairie du Chien are just a little less hypocritical than the Establishment journalists in Washington, who look down their noses most at the Anderson columns they are most apt to bring up at cocktail parties.

Few corporate executives, generals and government officials are mentioned in the Anderson column, which is instead peopled by titans, tycoons, potentates, panjandrums, moguls, magnates, high-muck-a-mucks, bigwigs, brass hats and czars (e.g. "Walter Ulbricht, the Communist czar of East Germany," "Kremlin czar Leonid Brezhnev," "President Nixon's environmental czar William Ruckelshaus," "foreign policy czar Henry Kissinger"). Anderson's characters rarely have something to say, state or comment upon; they whine, huff, snort, grump, growl, mutter, bare their fangs or worse: A column that ran last November began, "The old F.B.I. bulldog, J. Edgar Hoover, has taken another bite out of us."

What Hoover had actually done was to have dared to find fault with a previous Anderson column, a tactical error that usually brings additional epithets upon the faultfinder, and a counterattack. When Roger Stevens, the chairman of the board of the John F. Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts, released a letter calling an Anderson column that had criticized the Center "erroneous in practically every respect," the "Merry-Go-Round" dubbed him the Kennedy Center's "Lord High Pooh-bah," and went on to say, "We are happy to amend our column with additional facts that make it clear the situation is even worse than we originally reported."

"We hit you—pow, then you issue a denial, and—bam, we really let you have it," Brit Hume says enthusiastically. It is a lesson that czar Kissinger learned this winter. In mid-December, Anderson began to print some of the remarks Kissinger had made at meetings of the Washington Special Action Group held in early December at the White

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(over)

House to direct Administration strategy during the India-Pakistan war over Bangladesh. On Jan. 3 Kissinger accused Anderson of taking "out of context" his remarks indicating that the Nixon Administration was working against India. The following day, Anderson released the complete text of the secret meetings on which his columns were based. One suspects that Kissinger wished he had forgone context.

There is no combination of words in the English language that Jack Anderson regards as a cliché—not "boon companion," not "wine-dark seas," not "the story can now be told." There is no vegetable he cannot press into service as a metaphor. "Mr. Nixon is a very private person, an artichoke whose center has never been exposed," he wrote in the column on the President's hidden human side. "The East Berlin skyline is dominated by a futuristic television tower, which resembles a giant cocktail pick thrust through a massive silver onion," he noted on a trip to Germany. There is no lead paragraph Anderson considers too melodramatic. "The smell of scandal is blowing in from Micronesia far out in the Pacific," led the column one day. "One thing about Lake Michigan that smells worse than the pollution is the odor of corruption that emanates from the Federal courthouses along its shores," was the lead a few months later.

There is no smelly scandal or odorous corruption that Anderson and his fellow beagles cannot scent. There are no minutes of "hush-hush meetings," no "blistering, eyes-only" telegrams, no terrible secrets "locked in the darkest recesses of the Central Intelligence Agency" that they, with the help of their intrepid sources, cannot obtain. They will not be intimidated no matter how many Government "gumshoes" are put on their tail. They will never be accused of false humility when it comes to describing the effect of their latest sleuthing. The June 27 column began, "The custodians of Government secrets are gnashing their teeth again over our access to the still-secret portions of the Pentagon Papers." On slow days the column simply recapitulates its accomplishments — Congressmen it has forced to resign, office refurbishing plans it has thwarted.

Jack Anderson's red-hot-and-blue prose evokes the same kind of condescending criticism from high-brow journalists that the purple prose of Irving Stone, Harold Robbins and Irving Wallace does from the book reviewers. Anderson doesn't care. "I don't address the column to college professors; I address it to the Kansas City milkman," he says. "When you write for the masses, you have to dramatize the news. I do some needling and oversimplifying so that my readers won't get lost in a literary bog." He is far more interested in pleasing his readers than he is in pleasing the Establishment press. "The Pulitzer Prize is a commercial asset and I'm delighted to have it," he says, "but I know the Establishment's approval is short-lived because ultimately I'm not its kind of journalist. My readers are my grass-roots strength. They're the ones who'll holler if any editors and publishers try to cancel the column."

Anderson's attitude toward his prose is modest to the point of amnesia. One evening he was at a TV studio taping five of his shows. Chatting with a reporter in the studio, he happened to mention that he had written the scripts for two shows and that Joe Spear had written the other three. The reporter asked which ones were Anderson's. He studied them and replied, "I honestly can't remember."

The publication of the minutes of the Washington Special Action Group meetings (whose authenticity has never been denied) and of the Dita Beard memo (whose authenticity was unconvincingly denied) did a great deal for Anderson's credibility rating, and until the Eagleton incident, at least, most of his critics would attempt to find other ways of belittling his achievements. Joseph Kraft, for example, in his syndicated column of Jan. 9, 1972, wrote that the President's maneuvering in favor of Pakistan was already "known to everybody in touch with the State Department and White House at the time of the crisis." Kraft then addressed himself to the fact that Kissinger had told a meeting of officials on Dec. 3 that the President wanted to tilt in favor of Pakistan and had told a group of reporters at a background session four days later that the Administration was not anti-Indian.

Cranking up the "Merry-Go-Round"



Anderson (right) confers with his staff in his Washington office. They include Leslie Whitten (left foreground), Michael Kiernan, Joseph Spear and Brit Hume.

"Seen thus starkly, Dr. Kissinger told a flat lie," Kraft wrote. "My impression is that, taken in the larger context, his remarks at the secret conference were not in such flagrant contradiction with his remarks at the background briefing. Still, he was plainly trying to manipulate public opinion. But so what? Does the new evidence do more than confirm a universal judgment? After the U-2 and the Bay of Pigs and the credibility gap, is there anybody not impossibly naive or ill-informed who doesn't know that the Government lies? Is one more bit of evidence a noble act? Or is it just a pebble added to the Alps?" Kraft continued contemptuously, "Maybe the President and Dr. Kissinger are going to say to themselves: 'Golly, we sure erred in not telling the truth and nothing but the truth. Jack Anderson has taught us that honesty is the best policy,'" but Kraft thought not. He was afraid that publication of the secret minutes would drive the Administration ever deeper into secrecy ("There is apt to be an end to the kind of minutes that were taken at Dr. Kissinger's meetings") and concluded that Anderson's source had "done this country a disservice."

Anderson suffers ho-hummers and prose snobs affably and saves his wrath for critics of his major scoops like Joseph Kraft. "Those supercilious Ivory Tower journalists who sit around on their duffs and suck their thumbs are a

pain in the neck," he says. "Joe Kraft's idea of research is to go and have a cozy chat with Henry Kissinger. I know that Kissinger isn't going to tell me anything Richard Nixon doesn't want me to know and since I want to know precisely what Richard Nixon doesn't want me to know, Henry Kissinger would be a lousy source for me. Administrations have always had a talent for taking in guys like Kraft. They flatter them, invite them to White House soirées, and give them an occasional off-the-record crumb of information. Kissinger didn't manipulate public opinion; he lied through his teeth. He manipulated Joe Kraft."

I first saw Jack Anderson at a luncheon held at the National Press Club last December at which he was one of the speakers. He started his speech, at the top of his voice, by telling a joke that made no one laugh; after that inauspicious beginning, he denounced secrecy in Government, raging on and on like a summer thunderstorm.

He inveighed against the injustice of Daniel Ellsberg facing a possible jail sentence for giving away the same material that Lyndon Johnson had used with impunity in his memoirs, for which Johnson had been paid \$1.2-million; claimed that in the name of national security Government officials had turned the classification system into a censorship system to protect their own political security and

ended up by urging the assembled reporters to go after these misclassified documents with him and break down the wall of secrecy that surrounded Washington.

Most of those who heard Anderson were receptive to the substance of what he had to say but put off by the way he said it, or rather bellowed it, arms flailing, fingers pointing, eyes rolling, in a menacing hellfire-and-brimstone tone that reminded a third of those present of Billy Graham, a third of Oral Roberts and a third (the novel-reading, movie-going third) of Elmer Gantry.

I saw Jack Anderson a few months later in the living room of his home after I had received this magazine assignment. To my surprise, he was a soft-spoken, unthreatening and unbombastic man who didn't preach or tell bad jokes. Over the next three months I rarely heard him raise his voice in private or lower it during his public appearances. "Le style est l'homme même" ("the style is the man himself"), Georges de Buffon said in 1753 upon being accepted into the French Academy, and I couldn't help wondering which style de Buffon would have thought was Jack Anderson.

Like many young Mormons, Anderson spent two years as a missionary. He was sent to the South to seek converts for his church and traces his evangelical public speaking style to his travels as a missionary. "My audiences were

accustomed to listening to revivalist preachers," Anderson says. "The louder you were, the better they seemed to like it, and when you're competing with a passing freight train in a backwater Southern town, you really learn to yell."

Jack Anderson's parents, Agnes and Orlando Anderson, are Mormons who remain proud of the fact that every member of the family has spent at least two years on a mission for the church. Jack and his two brothers served as missionaries when they were young men. Mormon missionaries have to pay their own expenses; Orlando Anderson was a low-paid postal worker, so Agnes Anderson went to work as a cab driver to subsidize her son's travels for the church. After their retirement, they set off together on a mission.

Jack Northman (his maternal grandmother's maiden name) Anderson was born in Long Beach, Calif., on Oct. 19, 1922. His mother, who had emigrated from Denmark at the age of 15, and his father had met and married in Utah, but when jobs grew scarce there they had moved to California. The family returned to Utah when Jack was 2, and he grew up in Salt Lake City and suburban Cottonwood, where his parents still live. His mother remembers him as a precocious child: At 1 he spoke clearly, at 2 he knew the alphabet and at 4 he asked her, "What's the difference between 40 miles per hour and lickety-split?" He was a good student, she says, and "never gave us the slightest bit of trouble."

Jack Anderson realized his family was one of the poorest in Cottonwood but says he felt a sense of deprivation only once during his youth. Each fall he got a pair of shoes and a pair of corduroy pants that had to last out the school year. In his final year of junior high school, he was president of the student body and presided over the graduation ceremony. "By June my shoes had holes and my corduroys were rather abused," he recalls. "The other kids were better dressed, and I felt embarrassed about my shabby clothes."

Orlando Anderson believed in the work ethic; one of Anderson's first jobs was with The Murray Eagle, a weekly newspaper within bicycling distance of his home, the sum-

mer he was 12. "Newspaper work seemed exciting and glamorous to me—I really don't know why, perhaps it had something to do with a movie I'd seen. I've never been interested in anything except journalism since I was 12."

Anderson was editor of both his junior high and high school newspapers, took up typing and shorthand in high school because he thought they would be useful journalistic tools and worked after school on local newspapers. During his freshman year at the University of Utah, he was a full-time reporter and desk man for The Salt Lake City Tribune.

In 1941, the church asked him to go on a mission. "Lord knows I didn't want to go," he said recently. "I was doing exactly what I wanted to do—getting an education and working on a newspaper—and I didn't want to be sidetracked for two years. I wasn't very religious but I knew it would break my folks' heart if I didn't accept." Anderson reported to the Mission Home in Salt Lake City for training on Dec. 7, 1941; two weeks later he left for the South. "Nineteen-year-olds weren't getting drafted in 1941, and I had no particular inclination to volunteer for the Army," he says.

The two years of missionary work proved to be very educational for a young man who had led a sheltered life in a homogeneous Utah suburb. "I presided over weddings and funerals and listened to people's marital troubles," Anderson says. "Oh, I learned a lot! Those two years taught me more about human nature than all of my years of columning."

Early in 1944 Anderson went home. His missionary service had ended but the war hadn't. "If you want me to be totally truthful, the prospect of fighting hand-to-hand with bayonets didn't appeal to me," he says. "I looked around for an alternative—there weren't many that late in the war—but the merchant marine program was open, so I applied for it and was accepted. I'm not proud of what I did but I really didn't want to serve in the infantry."

After completing his officers' training in California, Cadet Midshipman Anderson put to sea; his first cargo run took him to New Guinea and his second to India, where he met up with some newspapermen who told him how easy

it was to get accredited as a war correspondent. The idea of becoming a war correspondent appealed to him so he resigned from the merchant marine in the spring of 1945, got a Utah paper to accredit him, lined up a few small Southern papers to help pay his expenses, and went to Chungking. "I dreamed of being another Ernie Pyle, and I did spend some time with the Nationalist Chinese guerrillas who were operating behind Japanese lines," he says, "but I didn't write many stories and few of those I wrote were printed. I was probably the least important war correspondent in all of World War II."

Anderson's draft board had been looking for him and caught up with him in China shortly after the war ended. He spent most of his months in the Army as a newsman—first with Stars and Stripes, later as a broadcaster for XMHA, the Armed Forces' radio station in Shanghai. He got out of the Army in the fall of 1946 and returned to the United States.

In Chungking Anderson and his fellow war correspondents occasionally sat around discussing their post-war plans. Anderson told his colleagues he wanted to be a newspaperman in Washington because it was "the news capital of the free world." One of the other correspondents suggested he apply for a job with Drew Pearson; it would be a fine way for him to find out what really went on in Washington's back rooms. Although Anderson had heard of Pearson, he had never read his column—it was carried in The Salt Lake City Telegram, a paper he rarely saw—but the advice sounded good and in April, 1947, he acted upon it.

The year after Anderson went to work for Drew Pearson he met a young woman named Olivia Farley, a West Virginia mine foreman's daughter, and he married her in 1949 after an 11-month courtship.

Livvy Anderson, who was working for the F.B.I., resigned from her job in early 1951, shortly before the first of the Andersons' nine children was born. "I think Jack's changed two diapers in his life," she says. "He's always played with the children some but after half an hour he's ready to go back to work. People like Jack, they've always got something on their minds."

The Andersons set up

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housekeeping in an apartment, but as their financial situation improved and their tribe increased they moved into a series of ever-larger houses. Their present home in Maryland is an eight-bedroom frame and fieldstone structure with a scruffy lawn ("Jack's record for cutting grass is comparable to his record for changing diapers," Livvy Anderson says). In addition to the seven children still at home (the two oldest are away at college) there are always a few nephews, friends, and friends of friends in residence, which suits Anderson, who prefers never to leave the house empty for fear his files will be plundered.

The Andersons' life-style is as different from that of most other successful Washington journalists and their wives as the "Merry-Go-Round" is different from standard journalism.

The typical successful Washington journalist lives in an old, elegantly furnished home in Georgetown, Wesley Heights or Cleveland Park, the fashionable sections of northwestern Washington. He

buys his wardrobe of mod but subdued clothes at an expensive haberdashery, drives a foreign car and wears his graying hair longer than he used to.

"Before I got a television show, I didn't pay much attention to my clothes," Jack Anderson says. "I didn't even know you weren't supposed to wear pleated pants until the TV people sat me down and told me. A friend in Salt Lake City who I think has terrific taste took me to a place out there and helped me buy a whole new wardrobe. After I got home, I went to a factory warehouse in Frederick, Md., and bought a few more things." The most charitable adjective that can be accurately applied to Jack Anderson's new Salt Lake City-Frederick wardrobe is polychromatic. He now owns an assortment of cinnamon, wine-red and mustard jackets and any number of matching and mismatching pants and ties. His graying hair has been tinted cinnamon for the benefit of TV, but Anderson wears it as short as an F.B.I. agent's.

The first thing one notices as one walks through the

front door of Anderson's 10-year-old house in Bethesda is the entrance-hall ceiling, a jazzy affair consisting of aqua, red and gold Chinese tiles. An identical ceiling can be seen at the Empress, a mid-town Chinese restaurant in which Anderson has a \$5,000 investment; the Empress had some tiles left over and Anderson had just the place for them.

Anderson gets up around 7:30 A.M., drives his blue Cadillac hardtop to the radio studio, where he tapes his daily show, and goes to the office, where he spends a lot of time on the phone. His usual lunch is a sandwich and a Coke at his desk. When he does go out to eat, the restaurant he picks is likely to be the Empress, whose investors receive a 20 per cent discount on meals. Though Washington journalists lunch often with important politicians or bureaucrats, it is hard to think of a member of the Administration who would want to be seen in a restaurant — or any other public place — with Jack Anderson. He is often in his office until 7:30 P.M., and then,

instead of going to dinner parties, he either goes home (where, after dinner, he works in his study until 1:30 A.M.) or keeps a rendezvous with a source who has a story to tell or a document to share.

The typical wife of the typical successful Washington journalist is diet-thin, high-strung and well turned out in the latest boutique fashions. Since she is as socially ambitious and smitten with power as her husband, she gives her share of the right dinner parties, with the help of her cook.

Livvy Anderson, a good-natured, amply contoured woman who is usually to be found in wash-and-wear blouses and slacks, seems content to be the calm eye of the hurricane in a house of ringing doorbells and telephones and coming and going children and house guests. In the late-night and early-morning hours she performs her tasks as bookkeeper for the "Merry-Go-Round" — she writes the pay checks, pays the bills and fills out all the income tax forms—and sometimes sleeps till noon. She has raised her children to be self-reliant and they get their own breakfasts and pitch in with the cooking, cleaning and laundry (she doesn't employ so much as a once-a-week cleaning woman). She doesn't miss her former job, doesn't give dinner parties and isn't impressed by the high and the mighty. When Lyndon Johnson invited the Andersons up to his hotel room in Atlantic City during the 1964 Democratic convention, Livvy wore sneakers.

Jack and Livvy Anderson are well on their way to upper-middle-class affluence. Their house in Bethesda is worth over \$100,000, they have a 50-acre farm in Washington County, Md., and they recently purchased a \$110,000 summer home in Rehoboth Beach, Del. He owns some oil stocks ("It's all right for me to have oil stocks because I attack the oil interests in the column," he says. "My rule is not to write about anything that will further my own financial interests") and has a half-interest in a 500-acre tract of land near Fredericksburg, Va.; the land, for which he paid \$30,000 between 1966 and 1971, has already quadrupled in value. He owns a small part of a newspaper in Annapolis, Md., a small part of a motel in Daytona Beach, Fla., and a small part of an office

The case of the O.E.O. office

What Anderson has called his "worst error" before Eagleton occurred on Sept. 22, 1969, when he wrote that Donald Rumsfeld, then Director of the Office of Economic Opportunity, had used some of the money he had saved by cutting anti-poverty programs to fit out his office with such luxuries as a bedroom and a private bathroom. No such refurbishing had taken place.

Thinking it might be instructive to learn how the "worst error" had been made, I asked Anderson. "A reporter who knew I was over my head in work right after Drew's death gave me the story," he told me. "I'd rather not mention his name because I haven't given him credit for the good stories he's given me so it seems unfair to blame him for the lemon. The reporter had worked at O.E.O. at one point and had good sources there. One of his sources had given him the blueprints for Rumsfeld's office redecoration. Normally I would have walked over to O.E.O. to make sure the redecorating had actually been carried out, but I was so swamped I had Opal Ginn call instead. She asked Rumsfeld's secretary if his office had been redecorated, the secretary said yes, and I ran the story. Right after it appeared, Rumsfeld invited me over to see his un-redecorated office. While I was with him, I told him about Opal's call. Rumsfeld at that time was an assistant to the President as well as O.E.O. Director and had a White House office I didn't even know about. Rumsfeld suggested that his secretary may have thought Opal was phoning

about the redecorating of his White House office."

I called Donald Rumsfeld, who is now the Director of the Cost of Living Council, and reached Richard Cheney, an Assistant Director, who has worked with Rumsfeld since 1969. I asked him to comment on Anderson's account of how the error had been made. Cheney had accompanied Anderson and Rumsfeld on the post-error office tour and differed with Anderson on three major points. First of all, he said, there had never been any plans to do anything to Rumsfeld's O.E.O. office except to paint it and hang some drapes there; consequently, there had never been any blueprints. Second, none of the furniture ordered for Rumsfeld's White House office arrived until November, 1969, so Rumsfeld's secretary wouldn't have said yes to Opal Ginn's question in September even if she had thought Opal had been referring to that office. Third, Cheney did not recollect any mention of the White House office during the course of the tour.

Anderson had told me he had seen the blueprints for the redecorating of Rumsfeld's O.E.O. office but hadn't kept a copy of them. I called the reporter who had given Anderson the story and asked him if he still had the blueprints. He didn't out said he would try to get them from his O.E.O. source. He called back to say he was sorry, the source no longer had the blueprints either.

The truth about Anderson's error seems as elusive as truth almost always is in Washington—S.S.

The grand old man



Drew Pearson, Anderson's boss for 22 years, taught him the trade but begrudged him recognition. "Giving me a byline was like giving me a little bit of his blood," Anderson says.

building in midtown Washington. "I put \$15,000 into that building five or six years ago and I've already been able to write off the whole investment as a tax loss although the building has gone up in value," he says. "It somehow seems wrong to do that when you haven't lost anything. I learned about the real-estate depreciation laws as a result of that investment. I'm opposed to the laws and I've written against them, but I'd invest in other buildings as long as that's what the laws allow." One of Anderson's investment partners occasionally appears in his column — Myer Feldman, a Washington lawyer-operator-Anderson informant who resigned from his White House job as special counsel to President Johnson after he got into income tax trouble with the I.R.S. Feldman is now head of McGovern for President, Inc., a corporation set up to handle McGovern's campaign financing. When McGovern put his own money into a trust fund, Feldman was one of two men he chose to manage it. (Anderson claims ignorance of Feldman's episode with the I.R.S.)

Even reporting that never appears in his column can prove profitable. In 1969 Anderson received \$12,500 from The National Enquirer for the results of his three-week investigation into Teddy Kennedy's accident at Chappaquiddick, which included transcripts of interviews with many of the witnesses. "I also agreed to do them some favors, like calling Jeane Dixon to ask her to write a piece

for The National Enquirer," Anderson says. "The money came in handy and I didn't let them use my byline, but I'm not particularly proud of what I did. In retrospect I guess it was a mistake because I had no way of knowing what slant they'd give the Chappaquiddick information."

"Have you made many other mistakes?" I inquired.

"Ask me the right questions and I'll answer them," he replied.


I introduced the subject of I. Irving Davidson, a name that causes Anderson's face to look like an unmade bed after a very hard night. In 1963 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee conducted hearings on the activities of a number of registered foreign agents — among them Davidson, whose clients then included the Governments of Nicaragua and Ecuador, the Indonesian National Army and Israeli Aircraft Industries (his present clients include Haiti and the Dominican Republic). Most of Davidson's testimony before the committee had to do with his wheeling and dealing on behalf of Nicaragua, but the hearings also established that in 1960 Davidson had paid Drew Pearson and Jack Anderson's hotel bills at the Beverly Wilshire Hotel while they were in Los Angeles to attend the Democratic convention. Anderson and Davidson shared an office from 1954-1964, as well as Opal Ginn's salary. In 1965, Davidson's Xerox machine was used to copy the incriminating documents two members of Thomas Dodd's staff had removed from Dodd's Senate office.

(Several nonadmirers of Anderson consider it ironical that Anderson's first columns based on the Dodd papers concerned Dodd's improper relationship with a registered foreign agent.) Davidson's office is now a floor below Anderson's and he often comes up to visit. Anderson's associates told me they had heard from other people that Davidson went around town boasting of his influence on the column, that they had heard Davidson make phone calls from Anderson's office during which he had said, "Hi, Jim, say hello to my good friend Jack Anderson" (Anderson had managed a few awkward words), that since 1965 Anderson had acquired a Xerox machine of his own and that they now used Davidson's only when theirs was broken, and that Davidson was often useful to them: When Joe Spear went to Israel to write some stories for the column, Davidson arranged for him to meet a close personal friend — the chief of Israeli intelligence.

Davidson was indicted in June on a charge of bankruptcy fraud by the Justice Department's Organized Crime and Racketeering Strike Force in Los Angeles. The indictment accuses him of transferring \$200,000 in assets to a corporation in Panama, of which he was a partner, from a Los Angeles corporation, of which he was secretary-treasurer, just before the Los Angeles corporation declared bankruptcy. The Los Angeles corporation was an \$11-million real-estate venture financed by a loan from the Teamsters Union pension fund. Davidson denies any wrongdoing and says the transfer of assets never took place. Anderson says he doesn't know what Davidson was indicted for.

Keeping in mind Caesar's wife, the unlucky lady whose husband maintained that she had to be free from suspicion as well as from guilt, I asked Anderson if he felt his relationship with Irving Davidson was a mistake. "In 1960 Drew and I were assigned hotel rooms in different parts of Los Angeles," he replied. "That was very inconvenient since we had to work together and when I ran into Irv and he offered us two rooms in his suite, we used them. He paid for them and we later reimbursed him. I'm aware that that arrangement could be misconstrued, and when he offered me his hospitality at

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the 1968 Republican convention in Miami Beach, I declined it. I don't think there was anything wrong with my moving into an office with Irv in 1954. He wasn't a foreign agent then; he was doing public relations for some clients in Pennsylvania, but it was a serious mistake on my part to have stayed on with him as long as I did after he picked up clients like Nicaragua. I stayed on, quite frankly, because Irv was a fabulous news source. I picked up many story leads just by being in the office with him. There is no one else I know who can put me through to Clint Murchison, Jimmy Hoffa, Mafia figures and banana republic dictators. Drew once wrote a column that made Papa Doc Duvalier's regime look good when Irv represented Haiti as a *quid pro quo* for some other stuff Irv had given him, but I've never done anything like that. The mere fact that Irv represents Haiti would keep me from writing anything pro-Haiti. I've told my staff that Irv is to be regarded only as a news source and that he has no influence with me. The best evidence of that is the stories I've done blasting Jimmy Hoffa, the Murchisons and other friends and clients of Irv's. The column is pure and I think I should be judged on the column."

One day last May, Maxine Cheshire devoted her entire gossip column in The Washington Post to the fact that Wyatt Dickerson, a Washington entrepreneur who had had serious financial and legal difficulties in the past, was the president of a new corporation that had been formed to package Jack Anderson for radio and television. Anderson was quoted in the Cheshire column as saying that Les Whitten had objected to the deal because of Dickerson's previous legal problems, of which he himself had been unaware. "I'm supposed to know about Dickerson's

having been sued for fraud, and I'm embarrassed that I didn't until after the deal went through," Anderson said when I asked him if signing up with Dickerson fell into the mistake category. (Anderson's professed ignorance toward Davidson and Dickerson is so convenient that one begins to suspect that he practices the art of feigned innocence.) "I don't know as much as I'm given credit for knowing about all the operators in this town. Les feels strongly that I shouldn't be associated with a man like Dickerson. He and Brit and Joe believe that when you're in our line of work it's not enough for your conduct to be above reproach, it also has to be seen to be above reproach, and they're probably right. After the Cheshire column came out, Dickerson offered to pull out of the corporation. That presented me with a moral dilemma. He had done an enormous amount of work for me, and if I'd accepted his offer, I would have made more money on the profitable deal he'd put together, but my gain would have been at his expense. I think it will be fairer to let him withdraw after a while when he's been amply recompensed for his work."

The phone rang as we were discussing Wyatt Dickerson in Anderson's green-and-orange living room. He went to the kitchen to answer it and returned with a grin on his face. "This will amuse you," he said. "That was Wyatt Dickerson on the phone. He just wanted to tell me that as a result of the Cheshire column, Art Buchwald and Rowland Evans had called him to ask him to handle their radio and TV syndication."

Dickerson's phone call reminded me of two other stories I'd heard that week. In 1958 Anderson broke the Sherman Adams-Bernard Goldfine story. While pursuing it, he and a Senate investigator were caught in a Washington hotel room using some recording equipment to eavesdrop on a nearby room in Goldfine's suite. "Getting caught like that was the most embarrassing thing that ever happened to me," Anderson had told me, "but I later found out it didn't hurt me at all. Everyone thought it proved we were getting just the kind of keyhole evidence they suspected we were getting." When I went to see I. Irving Davidson, I asked him

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if the Foreign Relations Committee hearings had caused him any grief. "On the contrary," he said. "My testimony showed how well-connected I was and brought me more clients."

All three stories seem to shed as much light on the Washington scene as any to be read in the "Merry-Go-Round."

The office in which the Anderson column is produced is as lively as the Press Room stage set in "The Front Page," Ben Hecht and Charles MacArthur's 1928 fantasy of what newspaper life ought to be.

On a recent afternoon, the dramatis personae included Byron Bloch, a dashing, leather-jacketed product-safety consultant, who was explaining the latest outrage Detroit was foisting off on the benighted car buyer to Les Whitten, the column's resident consumer defender, who had taken a call from Ralph Nader, another good source minutes earlier; and the well-connected I. Irving Davidson, who had brought his good friend Bobby Baker in to see his good friend Jack Anderson. Davidson had recently been indicted for what he claimed was "a mere technical violation of the bankruptcy law." Baker, just out of jail, met with Anderson behind closed doors; a few days later, the column contained an episode from Chapter I of the memoirs Baker said he had started to write in prison.

The phone-call dialogue overheard in the "Merry-Go-Round" office is ready made for a comedy or melodrama.

Les Whitten (to uncooperative Justice Department aide): "Dealing with you people is like dealing with the Kremlin, although I bet the Kremlin gives out more information. Tell your boss when he comes in that I'm going to

send him a copy of Franz Kafka's 'The Castle' so he'll know what I'm talking about . . . Kafka. . . That's K-A-F-K-A."

Brit Hume (to terrified source): "If you didn't pledge to take a lie-detector test when you took the job, don't take one now because those things are goddamn reliable. Make some excuse—say that you've heard they hurt your arm. They do, you know. It's painful when the blood pressure gadget is pumped up. . . Uh huh, Jack had the investigator who caught him eavesdropping on Goldfine's room give me one on the Dita Beard caper. He figured people would believe that guy was impartial. . . Yeah, it is just like Jack. . . Sure, I passed with flying colors. . . Damn right Dita baby didn't take a lie-detector test. Neither did the ———ing scoundrels at I.T.T. or Justice. Whatever you do, don't admit anything. It'll blow over. We've been through this before."

It is 8 o'clock on a summer evening and Jack Anderson is leaning back in his chair, his legs on top of the desk, his shoes off, his avocado-colored socks in view. His staff and his grab bag of visitors have left for the day, the phones have finally stopped ringing and he is about to leave. "I've got an appointment with some men who have registered in a false name in a midtown hotel," he is saying. "I'm going to take the hotel elevator and get out a floor or so above theirs and check to see whether I'm being followed; if I'm not, I'll walk down the stairs to their room. I think I'll get a very good story tonight." Anderson slips on his shoes and heads for the door of his office. He checks the lock as he goes out. ■