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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. TOLSON

DATE: 3-2-54

- Tolson
- Ladd
- Nichols
- Belmont
- Clegg
- Glavin
- Harbo
- Rosen
- Tamm
- Gearty
- Mohr
- Winterrowd
- Tele. Room
- Holloman
- Sizoo
- Miss Gandy

FROM : The Executives Conference

SUBJECT: [Redacted]

The Executives Conference consisting of Messrs. Tolson, Harbo, Glavin, Tamm, Henrich, Holloman, Boardman, McGuire, Mohr, and Tracy, on March 1, 1954, considered a request from the Central Intelligence Agency.

[Redacted]

The Identification Division advised that the matter can be handled by a conference and that [Redacted]

The Executives Conference unanimously recommends that CIA be informed the Bureau will be pleased to confer with their representatives in connection with this matter. If approved, arrangements will be made by the Liaison Section of the Bureau for a conference in the Identification Division.

SJT:dph

cc - Mr. Harbo  
Mr. Mohr

#368692  
DATE: 10/24/06  
CLASSIFIED BY 60322ud/lp/bos  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X33( ) 10/24/2031

S. P. [unclear]  
CONF 3/9/54  
[unclear]

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MAR 19 1954

~~SECRET~~

MAR 24 1954

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TWO RE

MEMO • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT *AMB*

DATE:

March 15, 1954

FROM : V. P. *VP*

SEE REVERSE  
SIDE FOR  
COMMUNICATION  
ACTION

SUBJECT: JAY LONESTONE  
ESPIONAGE - IS

See TV Serial  
Form 1774

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b3  
Holloman  
Sa...  
Gandy

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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The above information is being prepared in the attention of the Espionage Section.

1 - Mr. Hennrich  
- Mr. Wannall

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CIA REVIEW OF 6/24/94

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# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: March 18, 1954

FROM : V. P. [Signature]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 10/24/06 BY 60322UC/LP/bce

SUBJECT: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY;  
JOINT COMMITTEE ON CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Ladd \_\_\_\_\_
- Nichols \_\_\_\_\_
- Belmont \_\_\_\_\_
- Clegg \_\_\_\_\_
- Glavin \_\_\_\_\_
- Harbo \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Tracy \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Trotter \_\_\_\_\_
- Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Holloman \_\_\_\_\_
- Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

Reference is made to my memorandum dated March 15, 1954, setting forth information concerning a bill proposed in Congress for the creation of a 10-man committee which would have the responsibility of watching over the activities of the CIA in a manner similarly performed at the present time by the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. You will recall that Senator Mansfield of Montana made a statement before the Senate concerning the bill on March 10, 1954. Attached hereto is a copy of Senator Mansfield's statement which appeared in the Congressional Record on March 10, 1954. Mansfield submitted for appropriate reference in the Senate a resolution to establish a Joint Committee on Central Intelligence (S. Com. Res. 569). Concurring with him in the submission of the resolution were 20 other Senators, whose identities are set forth in the Congressional Record.

Briefly, the Joint Committee on Central Intelligence would be organized to "make continuing studies of the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency and of problems relating to the gathering of intelligence affecting the national security and of its coordination and utilization by the various departments, agencies, and instrumentalities of the Government."

In his statement Mansfield called attention to the fact that CIA's position of responsibility to none but the National Security Council was something which should be changed. He pointed out that there had been no Congressional inspection of the Central Intelligence Agency since the latter's establishment in 1947. He stated that the appropriations of the agency were hidden in allotments to other agencies and that the Bureau of the Budget did not report the CIA's personnel strength to the Congress. In referring to the sensitivity of the CIA's operations Mansfield stated, "There is a profound difference between an essential degree of secrecy to achieve a specific purpose and secrecy for the mere sake of secrecy. Once secrecy becomes sacrosanct, it invites abuse." He maintained that secrecy now beclouded everything about CIA, "its cost, its efficiency, its successes, and its failures." He stated, "An aura of superiority has been built around the CIA" and that the Administration appeared to support the view that the CIA officials merited an immunity which had never been claimed for other Government agencies. He declared that in his belief the CIA did not enjoy the same degree of confidence in Congress and among

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Memo to Belmont

Re: Central Intelligence Agency;  
Joint Committee on Central Intelligence

the American people which had been gained by the Atomic Energy Commission. He did not believe that the CIA would ever obtain such confidence under present arrangements. Mansfield made reference to the Hoover Commission Report of 1949 which reportedly stated that the CIA had not "yet achieved the desired degree of proficiency and dependability" in the estimate of the Commission.

Mansfield then referred to statements which appeared in newspapers concerning the failings of CIA. All of this has previously been reported to the Bureau.

Included in the Congressional Record of March 10, 1954, are the contents of a letter dated August 25, 1953, directed to Allen Dulles of the CIA by Senator Mansfield, who requested answers to several questions concerning CIA's relationship with Congress. Also included are the contents of a reply to Mansfield in a letter dated September 4, 1953, by General Charles P. Cabell, Deputy Director of CIA. In his reply Cabell stated that CIA already has appeared before various committees, such as the Armed Services, Government Operations, and Judiciary. He pointed out that the CIA gives detailed briefings "on the various aspects of CIA work" to House and Senate Appropriations Committees and that the Armed Services Committee also receives briefings. Cabell is quoted as stating that in the opinion of the CIA the present ties with Congress were adequate. With regard to the establishment of a Joint Committee on Central Intelligence Cabell stated that such a project involved many factors, some of which were not within the knowledge of CIA, and that "it would not appear appropriate for CIA to express an opinion on the establishment of such a group."

With regard to the Hoover Commission Report, Cabell is quoted as stating that a special group appointed by the President in 1945 conducted a detailed survey of CIA and that many of the recommendations of this group, as well as those of the Hoover Commission, were carried into effect and implemented upon the advent of General Smith as Director of CIA in October, 1950. (Cabell obviously was referring to the well-known Dulles Committee Report.) Cabell is further quoted as stating, "We feel, and have been informed by impartial observers, that the organization and the end product have been continuously and vigorously improved."

It is interesting to note that one of the newspapers used as a source of information concerning CIA's failings is the Richmond, Virginia, "News Leader." The articles which are quoted do not contain information not already known to the Bureau but

Memo to Belmont

Re: Central Intelligence Agency;  
Joint Committee on Central Intelligence

it is very obvious that the author of the articles did considerable research work or had access to a source who was fairly well informed concerning the organizational setup of the CIA.

ACTION:

None. The above is being made a matter of record.

PH



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I wish also to commend the chairman of the Committee on Rules and Administration [Mr. JENNER] for the position he has taken as chairman of the committee in calling the committee together to consider the report on next Tuesday.

I think the action on the part of both Senators is proper. The case should be closed. Final action should be taken on it, and I hope that can be done next week.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Let me say to the Senator that it was only with the full cooperation of the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Rules and Administration and the chairman of the subcommittee, the Senator from Wyoming [Mr. BARRETT], that it was possible to expedite this matter. We also had the cooperation of the staff of the committee.

While I shall not at this time propound a unanimous-consent request, I am hopeful that when the subject is brought to the attention of the Senate, Senators on the other side of the aisle will explore the situation to see if we cannot arrive at a reasonable division of time for a couple of days, or whatever time it may be felt is necessary to debate the question, so that the attention of the Senate may be concentrated on that subject. I hope it will not be delayed by extraneous matters. I believe that when the seat of any United States Senator is at stake he and the State he represents, as well as the Senate, are entitled to have as prompt action as the facts developed will warrant.

Mr. CLEMENTS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. KNOWLAND. I yield.

Mr. CLEMENTS. I can speak for only one Member of the Senate. I believe that Senators on this side of the aisle will desire only sufficient time to present the case of the Senator from New Mexico [Mr. CHAVEZ] in the proper light.

Mr. GORE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. KNOWLAND. I yield.

Mr. GORE. In order that the distinguished majority leader may be fully advised, let me say to him that the calling of Calendar No. 703, Senate bill 796, would entail considerable debate, of such length that perhaps it could not be concluded in 1 day, whereas Calendar 1032, House bill 5509, might well be disposed of within a much briefer time.

Mr. KNOWLAND. I did not necessarily mean the bills would be called up in the order mentioned. I am mindful of the fact that undoubtedly there will be some debate. What I have in mind is this: If debate runs out today after the Senator from Montana [Mr. MANSFIELD] speaks on a different subject, I wish to be in a position to proceed to the consideration of certain other bills.

Tomorrow the time will be controlled under the unanimous-consent agreement. The vote is to come at 4 o'clock. We can then return to the consideration of whatever is the unfinished business at that time, and the debate on the two bills referred to can be continued on Friday, if necessary.

Mr. BUSH. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. KNOWLAND. I yield.

Mr. BUSH. With respect to Calendar No. 703, Senate bill 796, I advise the majority leader that I had not realized that he was about to bring up that bill. Frankly, I am not prepared to debate the bill at this time, but I may be prepared in 24 or 48 hours. I agree with the Senator from Tennessee [Mr. GORE] that consideration of Senate bill 796 should be postponed, if possible. I shall be glad to advise the majority leader as soon as we are ready to have it considered. There are certain points of difference. Minority views have been filed and we are in the process of trying to reach an agreement which will accommodate the minority point of view, which would make the bill generally more acceptable.

Mr. KNOWLAND. We have discussed the bill from time to time. I certainly have no desire to move ahead if the distinguished Senator from Connecticut is not prepared to do so this afternoon. I wished to give notice that the bill should be taken up for consideration in the near future. Very soon we shall have a heavy program, including tax legislation, appropriation bills, and major parts of the administration's legislative program, as well as the important measure now pending. I am afraid that if we do not consider the Senator's bill soon it may be lost in the general teup of the session later. So, if the Senator is hopeful that the bill will be passed, I think the sooner we can get to it the better it will be.

Mr. BUSH. I thank the distinguished majority leader. I assure him that I shall be ready within 48 hours to take up the bill at his convenience.

Mr. KNOWLAND subsequently said: Mr. President, earlier in the day I gave notice that among several bills for which consideration would be sought was Calendar No. 620, Senate bill 2231, a bill to amend the Trading With the Enemy Act relating to debt claims. That was one of the bills with respect to which I had given advance notice to the leadership on the other side of the aisle. We are attempting this afternoon to devise a program to fill in the time when debate on the pending legislation runs out. I should like to be prepared to take up the bill referred during the afternoon.

#### JOINT COMMITTEE ON CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Mr. MANSFIELD obtained the floor. Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, would the Senator mind if I suggested the absence of a quorum?

Mr. MANSFIELD. That is agreeable to me, provided I do not lose the floor.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may suggest the absence of a quorum without the Senator from Montana losing the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none.

Mr. KNOWLAND. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The Chief Clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. PAYNE in the chair). Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, on behalf of myself, the Senator from Wyoming [Mr. BARRETT], the Senator from Ohio [Mr. BURKE], the Senator from Maryland [Mr. BUTLER], the Senator from Indiana [Mr. CAPEHART], the Senator from Kentucky [Mr. CLEMENTS], the Senator from Texas [Mr. DANIEL], the Senator from Georgia [Mr. GEORGE], the Senator from Iowa [Mr. GILLETTE], the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. HUMPHREY], the Senator from Colorado [Mr. JOHNSON], the junior Senator from South Carolina [Mr. JOHNSTON] the senior Senator from West Virginia [Mr. KILGORE], the Senator from New York [Mr. LEHMAN], the senior Senator from South Carolina [Mr. MAYBANK], the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. MARTIN], the Senator from South Dakota [Mr. MUNDT], my colleague, the senior Senator from Montana [Mr. MURRAY], the junior Senator from West Virginia [Mr. NEELY], the Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. PASTORE], and the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT], I ask unanimous consent to submit for appropriate reference a concurrent resolution to establish a Joint Committee on Central Intelligence.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the concurrent resolution will be received and appropriately referred.

The concurrent resolution (S. Con. Res. 69) was referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration, as follows:

*Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring).* That there is hereby established a Joint Committee on Central Intelligence to be composed of 5 Members of the Senate to be appointed by the President of the Senate, and 5 Members of the House of Representatives to be appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives. In each instance not more than three members shall be members of the same political party.

Sec. 2. The joint committee shall make continuing studies of the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency and of problems relating to the gathering of intelligence affecting the national security and of its coordination and utilization by the various departments, agencies, and instrumentalities of the Government. The Central Intelligence Agency shall keep the joint committee fully and currently informed with respect to its activities. All bills, resolutions, and other matters in the Senate or the House of Representatives relating primarily to the Central Intelligence Agency shall be referred to the joint committee. The members of the joint committee who are Members of the Senate shall from time to time report to the Senate, and the members of the joint committee who are Members of the House of Representatives shall from time to time report to the House, by bill or otherwise, their recommendations with respect to matters within the jurisdiction of their respective Houses which are (1) referred to the joint committee or (2) otherwise within the jurisdiction of the joint committee.

Sec. 3. Vacancies in the membership of the joint committee shall not affect the power of the remaining members to execute the functions of the joint committee, and shall be filled in the same manner as in the case of the original selection. The joint committee shall select a chairman and a vice chairman from among its members.

Sec. 4. The joint committee, or any duly authorized subcommittee thereof, is au-

thorized to hold such hearings, so sit and act at such places and times, to require, by subpoena or otherwise, the attendance of such witnesses and the production of such books, papers, and documents, to administer such oaths, to take such testimony, to procure such printing and binding and to make such expenditures as it deems advisable. The cost of stenographic services to report such hearings shall not be in excess of 25 cents per hundred words.

SEC. 5. The joint committee is empowered to appoint such experts, consultants, technicians, and clerical and stenographic assistance as it deems necessary and advisable. The committee is authorized to utilize the services, information, facilities, and personnel of the departments and establishments of the Government.

SEC. 6. The expenses of the joint committee, which shall not exceed \$ per year, shall be paid one-half from the contingent fund of the Senate and one-half from the contingent fund of the House of Representatives upon vouchers signed by the chairman. Disbursements to pay such expenses shall be made by the Secretary of the Senate out of the contingent fund of the Senate, such contingent fund to be reimbursed from the contingent fund of the House of Representatives in the amount of one-half of the disbursements so made.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, the concurrent resolution just submitted proposes to establish a Joint Committee on Central Intelligence, to be composed of five Members of the Senate, to be appointed by the President of the Senate, and five Members of the House of Representatives, to be appointed by the Speaker of the House. In each instance not more than three members shall be of the same political party.

Mr. President, events during the past year have convinced me that an urgent need exists for regular and responsible congressional scrutiny of the Central Intelligence Agency. Such scrutiny is essential to the success of our foreign policy, to the preservation of our democratic processes, and to the security of the Intelligence Agency itself. The sooner we provide a legislative framework for proper congressional-CIA relations, the quicker we can begin to build mutual confidence.

This is a prerequisite for effective operation by an executive agency, especially one hidden behind closed doors. If we fail to establish some sort of permanent, continuing link between Congress and the CIA the only result will be growing suspicion. From that, in all likelihood, will come sporadic investigations by various committees of Congress.

It should not be surprising that a great many Members of Congress are already questioning the wisdom of continuing to allow almost complete independence to a Government agency as vital and powerful as CIA. In the first place, the whole concept of peacetime foreign intelligence operations has been alien to American tradition. It was not until 1947, when CIA was established, that this Nation began to develop an intelligence service of any significant size. Even then many harbored serious doubts as to whether such an organization belonged in a democracy in peacetime.

Nevertheless, by 1947 most Americans realized that the United States was confronted with a foe which would use any means to attain its aim—the conquest

of the world. Information on the capabilities and intentions of aggressive nations became imperative, especially in view of the developments in atomic energy.

The need for the Central Intelligence Agency is seldom questioned any longer and I certainly am not challenging it now. What I am concerned with, however, is CIA's position of responsibility to none but the National Security Council. I believe this should be changed. It is true that intelligence services of other major countries operate without direct control of the legislatures. This is understandable in a totalitarian government, such as the Soviet Union. It is even understandable in a parliamentary democracy, such as Great Britain, where the entire administration is a part of and is responsible to Parliament. Our form of government, however, is based on a system of checks and balances. If this system gets seriously out of balance at any point the whole system is jeopardized and the way is opened for the growth of tyranny.

There has been almost no congressional inspection of the Central Intelligence Agency since the latter's establishment in 1947. It is conceivable that as the need for an intelligence service had been evident in 1946, the Congressional Reorganization Act of that year would have made provisions for congressional participation in the committee structure of Congress. As it is now, however, CIA is freed from practically every ordinary form of congressional check. Control of its expenditures is exempted from the provisions of law which prevent financial abuses in other Government agencies. Its appropriations are hidden in allotments to other agencies, and the Bureau of the Budget does not report CIA's personnel strength to Congress. Each year only a handful of Members in each House see even the appropriation figures. There is no regular, methodical review of this agency, other than a briefing which is supplied to a few members of the appropriations committees.

Mr. President, I agree that an intelligence agency must maintain complete secrecy to be effective. If clandestine sources of information were inadvertently revealed, they would quickly dry up. Not only would the flow of information be cut off, but the lives of many would be seriously endangered. In addition, much of the value of the intelligence product would be lost if it were known that we possessed it. An example is the breaking of a code. If we break a code we can continue to intercept and decipher important messages as long as the enemy or potential enemy is unaware of our knowledge. However, the instant the enemy learns that we have the key, they will stop using that code or possibly use it only to mislead us. Secrecy for these purposes is obviously necessary.

However, there is a profound difference between an essential degree of secrecy to achieve a specific purpose and secrecy for the mere sake of secrecy. Once secrecy becomes sacrosanct, it invites abuse. If we accept this idea of secrecy for secrecy's sake we will have no

way of knowing whether we have a fine intelligence service or a very poor one.

Secrecy now beclouds everything about CIA—its cost, its efficiency, its successes, and its failures. It has been mustered against questions or proposals regarding CIA by Members of Congress. It is difficult to legislate intelligently for this agency because we have no information which we can be positive is correct.

An aura of superiority has been built around the CIA. Calls for an investigation of CIA personnel have been met with a resistance not encountered from any other agency. The administration appears to support the view that CIA officials merit an immunity which has never been claimed for the State Department or other Government agencies handling equally confidential material. CIA seems to have marked out for itself a setting above other Government agencies, Congress, and the public.

I do not believe that responsible congressional auditing of the CIA is incompatible with the maintenance of the degree of secrecy necessary to the legitimate operations of this agency. On the contrary it has many advantages. It would protect the reputation of the agency against unjustified attacks. It would make unnecessary sporadic investigations which might lead to unauthorized disclosures. Adequate funds would be assured for all legitimate purposes. Most important, the assertion of congressional interest in this field would reduce the threat to our democratic processes which this uncontrolled agency by its very nature now poses.

The kind of congressional role which is called for in this situation is similar to that played by the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. The resolution which I am introducing today is similar to one I sponsored last July. It proposes the creation of a Joint Committee on Central Intelligence. This committee would be composed of 5 Members of the Senate and 5 Members of the House. No more than 3 Members in either House would be selected from the same political party. The committee would make continuing studies of the activities of the Agency, its problems, its utilization by other departments and agencies, and its coordination with them. From time to time the members of the committee would report to the Senate and House and recommend such legislation as might be needed.

The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy offers a model for congressional participation in the control of CIA. The joint committee deals with a subject that requires at least as much secrecy as would a committee on intelligence. It deals with a subject that is even more vital to our national security.

The Atomic Energy Commission has earned the respect of both the executive and legislative branches of the Government. It has been entrusted with the most vital secrets of state and it has proved worthy of that trust. Other Members of Congress have full confidence in its judgment. Their legislative actions affecting atomic energy are based on the secure knowledge that trusted Members of both Houses are fully cognizant of developments in atomic energy.

They do not have to depend on the unilateral judgment of the executive branch as to what Members of Congress ought or ought not to know.

The Atomic Energy Commission also benefits from its ties with the committee because it provides the commissioners with a clear channel into which they can direct their legislative problems. The security of the atomic energy program, moreover, is not periodically threatened by sporadic investigations and embarrassing questions from the floor of Congress.

I do not believe that the Central Intelligence Agency enjoys the same degree of confidence in Congress and among the American people which has been gained by the Atomic Energy Commission. And I do not believe the CIA will ever obtain it under present arrangements. On the contrary, all signs point to a steady loss of confidence. How could it be otherwise when we are left to wonder about the efficiency and economy of its operation, if the only assurances we have of the effectiveness of the service are those proffered by the men who run it?

Until a committee of the kind I am proposing is established, there will be no way of knowing what serious flaws in the Intelligence Agency may be covered by the curtain of secrecy in which it is shrouded. In 1949 the Hoover Commission examined the CIA. A task force stated that—

The Central Intelligence Agency has not yet achieved the desired degree of proficiency and dependability in its estimate. Without it, the National Security Council cannot succeed in assessing and appraising the objectives, commitments, and risks of the United States in relation to our \* \* \* military power, with sufficient continuity or definiteness to constitute a practical guide to the Military Establishment as to the size of our military needs.

It recommended that vigorous steps be taken to improve the Central Intelligence Agency and its work.

Mr. President, have these steps been taken? We do not know and we have no way of finding out. Yet we are asked to go on appropriating vast funds without debate or question for this Agency.

Recently the Washington Star carried a story to the effect that CIA "has become so topheavy and unwieldy that it should be scrapped altogether and replaced by a new organization." Is this charge true? The columnist who reported this view said further that "our legislators feel strongly that there must be much overlapping and useless expenditure in the activities" of the five separate groups engaged in intelligence—CIA, the State Department, the Navy, the Army, and the Air Force. Is this charge true? He also wrote that "legislators who have been in close contact with the CIA believe that there is much deadwood in the organization which should be eliminated and it contains too many 'pals' of men with influence in the Government. Is this charge true?"

The fact is that we do not know whether these and other charges similarly unrelated to secrecy are true or not true. And if we are to appropriate funds for this Agency, we ought to know.

Neither do we know if CIA is staying within the limits established by law or if it has expanded beyond its original purposes. On December 30, 1952, the same columnist asserted that "the CIA established an intelligence service in the United States," although the law creating the Agency specifically prohibits it from "police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers or internal-security functions." Yet, as was pointed out in an article in the New York Times on July 19, 1953, two CIA agents gave reports to the FBI that Owen Lattimore was about to leave this country. Nevertheless, they later refused on security grounds to testify in court on their role in this matter. Does this incident mean that the CIA is getting into the internal security field in competition with the FBI? Does it mean that officials of this Government Agency can defy the courts?

What of the quality of the product which CIA is producing? CIA officials claim that the United States intelligence system is second only to that of the Soviet Union. I do not know whether this is a boast of strength or a confession of weakness. Hanson Baldwin has reported that some observers believe it is actually not as effective, in terms of end results, as the British Secret Service with roughly 3,000 employees, or the Israeli service with roughly 300. Others believe that this country is spending too much money on intelligence for the results we are obtaining. The amount is a classified figure, but published estimates of the annual appropriation run from \$500 million to \$800 million. Personnel estimates in the press run between 8,000 and 30,000 employees.

Whatever the cost, we ought to be certain of the quality of our intelligence. Faulty intelligence estimates could jeopardize our entire defense and our foreign policy. Both of these must be based on cold knowledge and intelligent evaluation of the capabilities and intentions of other countries. If our premises are wrong, it is logical to assume that the policies based upon them will be wrong.

The Central Intelligence Agency plays a more direct role in foreign policy than that of simply providing some of the information on which our policies are based. It also serves, apparently, as an instrument of policy. Time magazine recently reported that—

Though CIA officials do not admit it publicly the agency was from the start engaged in a wide range of "covert activities," espionage aid to resistance movements and perhaps sabotage.

Exactly how many and what kind of activities are carried on, I do not know. This is a field in which information is even more closely guarded. Nevertheless, several such activities have been reported in the press, and we can assume that there have been others which have not made the headlines.

In the Washington Post of January 9, 1953, the following undertakings of CIA agents were cited as a "sampling of exploits which have been the subject of many whispered complaints":

1. Subsidization by CIA of a neo-Nazi organization which had marked for liquida-

tion the leaders of the Social Democratic Party.

The Social Democratic Party was the party of Ernst Reuter, later mayor of Berlin and vehement anti-Communist.

2. Incarceration for 8 months of a Japanese citizen under excuse of cross-examination—a job initially undertaken by General Willoughby's Army Intelligence and passed on to CIA.

3. Tapping of the telephone of Jose Figueres, former Costa Rican President—

And, by the way, he is now President again—

at which a CIA man was caught red-handed.

4. Abortive effort by CIA undercover men to start a revolution in Guatemala and blame it on the United Fruit Co.

5. Burmese and Siamese and Vietnamese suspicions of CIA activity in promoting guerilla forays from the Burmese border into mainland China on the part of the tattered-mallion expellees among Chiang Kai-shek's defeated Nationalists.

I do not need to point out the tremendous impact which this sort of activity could have on our foreign policy. Other countries cannot be expected to distinguish between CIA policy and United States policy. If these reports are true, then it would appear to others that it was United States foreign policy to promote a neo-Nazi organization, to incarcerate a Japanese citizen, and start a revolution in one of our neighboring countries. Moreover, the Burma episode, according to the Washington Post, "led to the resignation in disgust of one of the best and most respected of our career Ambassadors on the ground not only that he did not go along with the black diplomacy around him, but that he was kept in ignorance of it." Is there any wonder that there should be increasing concern with the absence of control over this agency? We cannot permit CIA, any more than we can permit any other government agency, to have free reign to do anything it wants anywhere in the world. If its agents play carelessly with fire, the whole world might get burned.

I do not have official verification of any of the criticisms I have mentioned. All my information, as I have indicated, has been taken from public sources. But the point is that any of these reported incidents could be true, and we would not know the facts. Would it not be far more sensible if Congress were aware of the general policies being pursued by Central Intelligence? Is there any other way that we can be reasonably certain that public funds are not being wasted? That the country is getting the intelligence it needs for its protection?

If a joint committee is established, CIA officials would not have to seal their lips and put on the face of martyrdom, everytime they were criticized. They would have a congressional channel to present their side. The joint committee, in turn, could maintain the confidence of Congress and the public, without loss of security. Until we create some sort of "watchdog committee," however, we will have nothing but continued anxiety about the Central Intelligence Agency and its widespread activities.

It is characteristic of our system of government that we are suspicious, and rightly so, of unrestrained power. Technically, the CIA is part of the executive branch, and the executive branch is subject to the checks and balances of our Constitution. Actually the nature of its work, and its peculiar place in our governmental structure, have given this agency in effect a position inviting irresponsibility. At its best this makes for continued suspicion; at its worst it is a menace to free government.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed at this point in my remarks a letter dated August 25, 1953, written by me to the Director of Central Intelligence, and the reply which I received, dated September 4, 1953, signed by C. P. Cabell, lieutenant general, United States Air Force, Acting Director. There being no objection, the letters were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

AUGUST 25, 1953.

HON. ALLEN W. DULLES,  
Director of Central Intelligence,  
Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. DULLES: As you know, I have introduced a bill to establish a joint congressional committee, along the lines of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, for the CIA. I would appreciate receiving an answer from you on the questions listed below:

1. What is the present relationship between Congress and CIA?

(a) Before what committees, other than Appropriations, have CIA representatives appeared on agency business? Is there any regular survey of CIA's activities by any committee? What is CIA's procedure for getting desired legislation? How many Members of Congress know CIA's annual appropriation?

(b) In what instances do Members of Congress receive intelligence reports from CIA? Is it only when some other executive agency recommends it to support their position?

2. Does the Central Intelligence Agency feel that the present ties with Congress are adequate? What is its opinion of a Joint Committee on Central Intelligence similar to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy?

3. What action was taken on the Hoover Commission recommendation that vigorous efforts be made to improve the internal structure of the CIA and the quality of its product?

Must close now but hoping to hear from you soon, and with best personal wishes, I am,

Sincerely yours,

MIKE MANSFIELD.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY,  
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR,  
Washington, D. C., September 4, 1953.  
The Honorable MIKE MANSFIELD,  
United States Senate,  
Washington, D. C.

DEAR SENATOR MANSFIELD: In Mr. Dulles' absence from the country, I am taking the liberty of replying to your letter of August 25, 1953, regarding CIA relations with the Congress. The answers below are numbered in accordance with the numbers of the questions in your letter.

1. (a) CIA representatives have appeared on Agency business before the following Senate committees: Armed Services, Government Operations (permanent Subcommittee on Investigations), Judiciary (Immigration Subcommittee), (Internal Security Subcommittee).

Agency representatives have appeared before the following House committees: Armed Services, Foreign Affairs, Government Operations, Un-American Activities.

Agency representatives also have appeared before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and liaison is maintained with the Joint Committee on Printing.

Concerning regular surveys of CIA's activities by congressional committees, it should be noted that special subcommittees of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees receive a detailed briefing on the various aspects of CIA work in the course of the annual review of CIA's budget requirements. The Armed Services Committees also receive briefings on CIA, particularly in connection with CIA legislation. In addition, in connection with atomic energy, the joint committee is regularly advised of CIA's activities in this field.

CIA legislation is handled by the Armed Services Committee in both Houses.

The CIA appropriation figure is very tightly held and is known to not more than 5 or 6 Members in each House.

1. (b) The only committee which receives intelligence reports from CIA on a regular basis is the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. The Agency also makes certain information available to the Immigration Subcommittees of the Judiciary Committees of both Houses, and has also been of some assistance to the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary.

CIA intelligence reports are not made available merely to support the position of another executive agency, in fact there would probably be many instances in which CIA could give intelligence reports to certain other committees if requested.

2. It is our opinion that, from our point of view, the present ties with Congress are adequate. As far as we are able to determine, these ties are stronger than those which exist between any other nation's intelligence service and its legislative body.

In view of the fact that a decision to establish a joint congressional Committee on Central Intelligence involves many factors, some of which are not within the knowledge of CIA, it would not appear appropriate for CIA to express an opinion on the establishment of such a group.

3. At about the same time as the Hoover Commission subcommittee was making its study of intelligence in 1949, a special group appointed by the President, consisting of Mr. Allen Dulles, Mr. William H. Jackson, and Mr. Matthias F. Correa, was requested to make a detailed survey of CIA. At the time of the survey, these men were all in private life. Many of their recommendations, as well as those of the Hoover Commission, were carried into effect and were largely implemented upon the advent of General Smith as Director in October 1950 and Mr. Jackson as Deputy Director. This implementation has been carried forward by Mr. Dulles, who succeeded Mr. Jackson as Deputy Director, and subsequently succeeded General Smith as Director. While it is safe to say that no intelligence organization is ever completely satisfied with the quality of its end product, nevertheless, we feel, and have been informed by impartial observers, that the organization and the end product have been continuously and vigorously improved.

I know that Mr. Dulles would be happy to discuss this entire problem with you in greater detail at your convenience upon his return.

Sincerely,

C. P. CABELL,  
Lieutenant General, USAF, Acting  
Director.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed at this point in my remarks three editorials pertaining to the Central Intelligence Agency, all published in the Richmond News Leader.

There being no objection, the editorials were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Richmond (Va.) News Leader of March 30, 1953]

THE CIA: WHO WATCHES THE WATCHDOG?

In heavily guarded offices at 2430 E Street in Washington, on the grounds of the old naval hospital there, this Nation's Central Intelligence Agency directs the most secret and least publicized operations of the United States Government. Not even the Atomic Energy Commission functions with the secrecy of the CIA; the taxpayers know something of atomic research—how much it costs, in general how well it is succeeding, where the principal work is being done.

Of the CIA, whose expenditures are reckoned by well-informed observers at something in the neighborhood of \$1 billion a year, the taxpayer knows nothing.

This almost invisible agency of the Government came into existence in 1947, as the successor to an unwieldy central intelligence group that was organized after World War II. By way of background, it should be noted that prior to World War II, there was no American intelligence agency; we relied largely upon the reports of diplomatic and military officers, openly gathered at consulates and embassies around the world. During the war, the cloak-and-dagger Office of Secret Services was set up to direct American espionage, but this went out of existence with the end of hostilities.

The National Security Act of 1947, creating the CIA, gave the new body some simple—and sweeping—duties. The CIA is to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the Government. By one provision, it is specifically directed that the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.

Even the sweeping terms of this enactment were regarded as inadequate by the CIA. So in June 1949 the administration obtained from Congress one of the most amazing laws ever put on the books—Public Law 110 of the 81st Congress. This is the law that makes CIA almost literally a law unto itself.

By this enactment, CIA is made exempt from all rules of purchasing that apply to other agencies. It may hire and fire at will, without regard to civil service regulations. All provisions of law and all regulations "relating to the expenditure of Government funds" are specifically waived for the CIA. It is above any law that might require "the publication or disclosure of the organization, functions, names, official titles, salaries, or numbers of personnel employed by the Agency." The Director of the Bureau of the Budget is flatly instructed to make "no reports to the Congress" of CIA's expenditures, either lump sum or itemized. CIA spends what it pleases, as it pleases, "solely on the certificate of the Director, and every such certificate shall be deemed a sufficient voucher for the amount therein certified." No ordinary Congressman can touch it; no ordinary citizen is even admitted to the CIA's office.

For all the taxpayers know, the CIA may be doing an appallingly inefficient job. It may be wasting millions of dollars in fantastically extravagant and unnecessary schemes. It may be needlessly duplicating the work of other agencies. It may be the worst run bureaucracy in Washington. Westbrook Pegler has made the flat and unqualified charge that the CIA "slipped subsidies of millions of dollars to the AFL, [David] Dubinsky, the Garment Workers Union, and a mysterious group of persons unknown," in some nebulous venture to strengthen free trade unions in Europe against Communist infiltration. This charge

the CIA neither affirms nor denies; it simply evades answering.

From what little has been printed about the CIA, it is known that the Agency has had its internal difficulties. In October 1947 several employees were fired as "bad security risks." On another occasion, Senator McCARTHY charged (with apparent accuracy) that a pervert dismissed from the State Department had turned up on CIA's payroll. The Agency came in for severe criticism when South Korea was invaded—to this Nation's total surprise—in June 1950 and again the following fall when the size of the Chinese Communist intervention was tragically underestimated. CIA was badly mousetrapped last year when it swallowed a false tip that Owen Lattimore was about to skip the country for Russia.

The extent of CIA's successful efforts is understandably unknown; in common with intelligence services everywhere, the Agency never mentions its successes. It is known that CIA had a hand in reporting Soviet Russia's first atomic explosion. Beyond that, nothing can be pinned down.

Of CIA's organization and routine, little has been officially disclosed. One account is that CIA has 5 major divisions—3 to collect information, 1 to index information, the fifth to evaluate the information and prepare the CIA's estimates. These estimates (originated by Gen. Walter Bedell Smith when he was director of CIA in 1950-52) are summaries of intelligence prepared by the agency for the President and other top officers of the Government. They arrive daily at the White House, it is said, mimeographed in purple ink and sealed in a blue folder. Other more extensive estimates are prepared weekly and monthly. These are compiled not merely from the reports of the CIA's espionage agents—the cloak-and-dagger spies of adventure fiction—but more matter-of-factly from the reports of Foreign Service observers, military and naval intelligence officers, immigration officials, narcotics inspectors in far-off corners of the world, and employees of the Treasury and Commerce Departments in foreign stations. It has been estimated that about 90 percent of CIA's work is no more secret than a Carnegie library, and the bulk of its work lies simply in correlating factual information that is lying around for anyone to pick up.

How many employees this worldwide operation involves, how much they are paid, how well they are doing their jobs, whether the jobs are worth doing—to all of these questions the CIA stands dumb. Of a few executives, some names and skeleton facts are known. The top brass include:

Allen Welsh Dulles, 59, director of the CIA; brother of the Secretary of State, graduate of Princeton and George Washington Universities, lawyer, in United States diplomatic service, at Vienna, Berne, Berlin, Constantinople, 1916-26, delegate to international conferences of 1925-33, attached to OSS in World War II.

Sherman Kent, 49, assistant director for national estimates; native of Chicago; graduate of Yale and member of Yale's faculty (professor of history) since 1928; chief of the Europe-Africa Division of OSS, 1941-45; State Department, 1946; instructor in National War College, 1947; author of *Strategic Intelligence* (1947).

Loftus E. Becker, 41; deputy director for intelligence; native of Buffalo; graduate of Harvard and Harvard Law School; lawyer; rose from private to major in World War II, served with Ninth Army in Europe, attended the Nuremberg trials as an adviser on German military organizations; joined CIA in April 1951.

Matthew Baird, 42, director of training; native of Ardmore, Pa., graduate of Princeton and Oxford; educator, former headmaster of the Arizona Desert School; served 44 months with Air Force in World War II,

mostly in South Pacific; resident of Arizona, cattle breeder and rancher.

Frank G. Wisner, 43, acting deputy director, native of Laurel, Miss., graduate of the University of Virginia; lawyer; served in World War II as a naval intelligence officer, later with OSS in Africa, Middle East, Balkans, France, and Germany; discharged as commander; with State Department, 1947, as deputy assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas; joined CIA, 1948.

Walter Reid Wolf, 58, deputy director; graduate of Yale; banker; vice president of National City Bank of New York since 1936; leader in many civic activities.

Charles Pearre Cabell, 49, director of the general staff; native of Dallas, graduate of West Point; holds rank of major general in the Air Force; formerly director of intelligence for the USAF, attended the Yalta Conference.

That about exhausts our notes on the CIA, and a thin batch of facts it is to work with. What disturbs us about the Central Intelligence Agency is this very thinness. To be sure, we recognize that some secret operations are necessary if this Nation is to be properly vigilant in the cold war, and secret operations would cease to be secret if they were conducted in kilig lights and full publicity. But we are far from certain that the sweeping secrecy of the CIA—extending even to its most routine operations—can be justified, or that the value of many of its investigations outweighs the old, established value of Government accountability directly to the people.

Congress long ago created a special committee to watch the Atomic Energy Commission, in part to keep a check on the day-to-day activities of men with tremendous power over mighty weapons. It would be in the public interest, as we see it, for a similar committee to be set up to watch the watchdogs of the CIA, to make spot-checks on expenditures, to keep budget requests in line, to see that secret policies are not down by the director of the CIA are not opposed to the people's wishes as the people's representatives understand them.

We are uneasy about this outfit—the power it holds, the secrecy with which it shrouds its operations, the potential for evil that lies in the CIA's virtually unchecked authority. And we commend to Congress a searching study of the powers it has vested in the agency. What Congress has given, Congress can take away—and in the case of the CIA, some taking away of excess power might prove exceedingly wise.

[From the Richmond (Va.) News Leader of July 17, 1953]

#### "ABOUT WHICH YOU ACTUALLY KNOW NOTHING"

One of our more articulate critics, in a letter full of strawmen and ad hominem arguments, takes us severely to task in the Forum today for an editorial of July 13. In that editorial we reviewed the astonishing law under which the Central Intelligence Agency is permitted to conceal every aspect of its operations—including the size of its budget and the length of its payroll—from the American people. At no time has this newspaper suggested that CIA activity be fully revealed to the American people. What we have demanded is an amendment to the basic CIA law that would provide some measure of public accountability for funds, and place some restrictions upon the CIA's now unlimited opportunities for international troublemaking.

One phrase in Mr. Lucas' letter serves to buttress the point we have been making. He says we are spreading mistrust of an agency about which you actually know nothing discreditable. Knock off the last word: We most assuredly mistrust an agency of Government about which we actually know nothing. The CIA is responsible not to the

people of the United States, in the sense that the people are permitted to form their own opinions of whether they are getting value received, but solely to the National Security Council—a group of top Government officials who have a thousand other concerns and cannot possibly maintain a close check on the CIA's day-to-day spending.

Nothing like the CIA exists anywhere in the American Government. The Atomic Energy Commission deals in secrets of the most vital nature, yet the AEC's budget is a matter of public record; the AEC publishes an annual report; a special committee of Congress keeps a watchdog eye on its activities; the AEC's budget is not sacrosanct, and can be trimmed whenever the American people conclude that too much money is being poured into atomic research. The FBI is a highly secret outfit, yet it is no secret that the FBI spent nearly \$77 million in the last fiscal year, and that it employs some 14,000 persons whose average salary is \$4,800. Similarly, the defense establishment deals constantly in matters of the deepest secrecy, yet the budgets of Army, Navy, and Air Force are available for any citizen's inspection. No one in his right mind would suggest that every American should have a pass to the Pentagon's code room, or access to Secretary Wilson's private files; yet the very essence of the American form of government by the people is reflected in the fact that the people are kept fully informed on military spending and can check the high brass whenever the spirit moves them to do so.

None of this applies to the Central Intelligence Agency. It is a separate and clandestine entity in our Government. One of the most reliable budgetary experts in Washington has told us that he believes CIA's spending "is in the neighborhood of a billion dollars a year," yet no committee of Congress can check on this figure nor can the beleaguered American people find out whether the CIA is worth its cost—whatever the cost may be. Funds may be transferred to the CIA from other agencies of the Government "without regard to any provisions of law limiting or prohibiting transfers between appropriations." Surely that clause in the CIA Act makes a mockery of congressional control over the public purse.

No restrictions are laid upon the CIA's activities. The status reads that "Notwithstanding any other provisions of law, sums made available to the agency by appropriations or otherwise may be expended for purposes necessary to carry out its functions." The CIA, of course, decides for itself what its functions are. The law specifically approves expenditures for "personal services without regard to limitations on types of persons to be employed; radio-receiving and radio-sending equipment; purchase, maintenance, and cleaning of firearms, including purchase, storage, and maintenance of ammunition; acquisition of necessary land; construction of buildings and facilities without regard to 36 Statutes, 699, 40 United States Code 259, 267."

All sums made available to the CIA "may be expended without regard to the provisions of law and regulations relating to the expenditure of Government funds; and for objects of a confidential, extraordinary, or emergency nature, such expenditures to be accounted for solely on the certificate of the Director, and every such certificate shall be deemed a sufficient voucher for the amount therein certified."

We deny, as vigorously as we know how, that any such sweeping concealment is in the public interest. The most effective restraint yet devised on the extravagant ambitions of Government officials is the vigilant watch of the American people and the American press. Once that restraint is wiped out, and power is permitted to breed unchecked in the darkness, waste and corruption are provided a fertile soil in which to grow. Certainly we mistrust the CIA—and we will

continue to spread that mistrust in the fervent hope that others will awake to the dangers inherent in this unknown and unknowable OGPU in our midst.

[From the Richmond (Va.) News Leader of July 24, 1954]

#### TO WATCH THE CIA

Senator MIKE MANSFIELD, of Montana, this week offered a resolution that merits wide-spread and immediate public support. He proposes the establishment of a Joint Committee on Central Intelligence, to be patterned after the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.

"The CIA is in somewhat the same category as the AEC," Senator MANSFIELD said, "and just as a special committee, with well-defined authority and powers has been created on a joint congressional basis to oversee and supervise the interests of the AEC, so I believe should a joint congressional committee be created for the same purpose in connection with the CIA \* \* \* for purposes of seeing that good management is maintained in the CIA and also to keep a constant check on its intelligence policies. It is well, too, that this joint committee should be in a position to criticize any mistakes which the CIA may make."

This newspaper has been urging the creation of such a committee for the past several months. At present the CIA is wholly beyond the reach of the Congress that created it. The agency's budget is secret; its payroll is secret; its employees are under orders to ignore congressional committees and to refuse to answer their questions. By law the CIA has unlimited authority to spend virtually unlimited amounts of money for wholly unlimited purposes. Neither the Congress nor the public has any way of knowing whether the CIA is doing a good job or a terrible job, whether it is wasting millions or spending its funds with scrupulous care.

Senator MANSFIELD's proposed committee has been needed for a long time. We commend his resolution warmly to Virginia's delegation on the Hill.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I yield the floor.

#### MEDICAL SERVICE CORPS, REGULAR ARMY

Mr. KNOWLAND. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. PURCELL in the chair). The clerk will call the roll.

The Chief Clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. GOLDWATER in the chair). Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

Mr. KNOWLAND. Mr. President, pursuant to my earlier announcement, I ask unanimous consent that the unfinished business be temporarily laid aside and that the Senate proceed to the consideration of House bill 5509, to amend the Army-Navy Medical Services Corps Act of 1947, relating to the percentage of colonels in the Medical Service Corps, Regular Army.

I might say to the acting minority leader that the other bill which I had contemplated might be called up today I have agreed to have go over until at least Friday, because tomorrow the time for debate will be controlled.

So far as I know, there was no objection to the Medical Service Corps bill in the committee, but I will address an inquiry to the junior Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. DUFF], who is representing the Armed Services Committee in connection with the bill. I understand no minority views were filed.

Mr. DUFF. The Senator is correct.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, as acting minority leader, I may say that I understand that the ranking minority member of the Committee on Armed Services has no objection to the bill.

Mr. DUFF. The Senator is correct; the Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL] raised no objection, and there was no objection to the bill in the committee.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will state the bill by title.

The CHIEF CLERK. A bill (H. R. 5509) to amend the Army-Navy Medical Services Corps Act of 1947, relating to the percentage of colonels in the Medical Service Corps, Regular Army.

Mr. KNOWLAND. I might say, before the Senate acts on the bill, that I understand the Senator from Pennsylvania is prepared to make a statement about the bill for the information of the Senate.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the present consideration of the bill?

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the bill.

Mr. DUFF. Mr. President, the purpose of this bill is to repeal an existing provision of law which limits the number of permanent colonels in the Medical Service Corps of the Regular Army to 2 percent of the authorized Regular Army officer strength of that corps. This 2-percent limitation contrasts with a limitation of 8 percent which is applicable to all other male arms and branches of the Army.

The 2-percent limitation was included in the original legislation as recommended by the Department of the Army. The basis for the limitation was the number of positions justifying officers of this permanent rank in the then existing tables of organization for Medical Service Corps officers.

Since the Army-Navy Medical Service Corps Act of 1947 was enacted, the Department of the Army has significantly broadened the utilization of Medical Service Corps officers, with the result that today there are many additional areas and positions of responsibility for officers of the Medical Service Corps that did not exist in 1947.

The Department of the Army is attempting to relieve medical and dental officers from administrative and managerial duties, so that they may devote more time to the exercise of their professional duties and qualifications. Army representatives maintain that the full achievement of the objective of relieving professional officers of administrative and managerial duties is hindered by the 2-percent limitation which restricts career opportunities for Medical Service Corps officers.

Furthermore, the continued existence of this limitation handicaps the Army in procuring and retaining officers who possess the educational, scientific, and

technical qualifications desired in the Medical Service Corps.

Enactment of this bill will enable the Medical Service Corps to have the same percentage of officers serving in the permanent grade of colonel as is now authorized for the other arms and branches of the Army. Notwithstanding this fact, Army representatives have assured the committee that the enactment of this bill will not result in full utilization of the authority in the near future. The additional positions of permanent colonel would be filled gradually during the next few years, as officers become qualified and demonstrate the ability to serve in this grade.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill is open to amendment.

If there be no amendment to be proposed, the question is on the third reading of the bill.

The bill (H. R. 5509) was ordered to a third reading, read the third time, and passed.

#### MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE

A message from the House of Representatives, by Mr. Chaffee, one of its clerks, announced that the House had disagreed to the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H. R. 5337) to provide for the establishment of a United States Air Force Academy, and for other purposes; asked a conference with the Senate on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses thereon, and that Mr. SHORT, Mr. ARENDS, Mr. COLE of New York, Mr. SHAFER, Mr. VINSON, Mr. BROOKS of Louisiana, and Mr. KILDAY were appointed managers on the part of the House at the conference.

#### STATEHOOD FOR HAWAII

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill (S. 49) to enable the people of Hawaii to form a constitution and State government and to be admitted into the Union on an equal footing with the original States.

Mr. JACKSON obtained the floor.

Mr. JOHNSON of Colorado. Mr. President, will the Senator from Washington yield at this time, to permit me to suggest the absence of a quorum?

Mr. JACKSON. I am happy to yield for that purpose.

Mr. JOHNSON of Colorado. Then, Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the call of the roll be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I rise today in support of the amendment offered by the distinguished Senator from New Mexico [Mr. ANDERSON] to add as title II of the Hawaiian statehood bill the bill reported from the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs providing statehood for Alaska.

I should like to make it clear at the outset that I have always supported statehood for both Hawaii and Alaska.



# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT *[Handwritten initials]*

FROM : V. P. KEATY *[Handwritten initials]*

SUBJECT: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
INTERVIEW OF ALLEN W. DULLES *D.C.*  
APPEARING IN "U. S. NEWS AND  
WORLD REPORT," MARCH 19, 1954

DATE: March 16, 1954

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Ladd \_\_\_\_\_
- Nichols
- Belmont \_\_\_\_\_
- Clegg \_\_\_\_\_
- Glavin \_\_\_\_\_
- Harbo \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Tracy \_\_\_\_\_
- Gearty \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Holloman \_\_\_\_\_
- Sizoo \_\_\_\_\_
- Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

*[Handwritten signature]*

SYNOPSIS:

Interview of Allen Dulles, Director of CIA, appeared in March 19, 1954, issue of "U. S. News and World Report." Interview covered 7 pages and was set up in a question and answer manner. Article, which is attached, does not contain any information not already known to Bureau. The Director was mentioned in connection with work of Intelligence Advisory Committee and regarding CIA's cooperation in connection with "suspicious characters" who are trying to get to the United States. Pertinent comments of Dulles set forth below.

ACTION:

None. For your information.

*[Stamp: 10/24/06 60322 UC/Lp/600]*

DETAILS:

The March 19, 1954, issue of "U. S. News and World Report" which appeared on the newsstands March 16, 1954, carries the results of a question and answer interview of Allen Dulles, Director of the CIA. A copy of the article is attached hereto. The article consists of 7 pages and Dulles' photograph is carried on the cover of the magazine.

In general, Dulles did not give any information not already known to the Bureau. He very clearly avoided becoming involved in any controversial question. Set forth are some of the pertinent comments made by him.

SJP:lw

Attachment

53 APR 5 1954

RECORDED - 7  
INDEXED - 76

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MAR 19 1954

*[Handwritten initials]*

Memo to Belmont

Re: CIA  
Interview of Allen W. Dulles  
Appearing in "U. S. News and  
World Report," March 19, 1954

Dulles stated that the CIA was not satisfied with its coverage at the present time and that the agency was trying constantly to improve coverage.

He was asked if the CIA became involved in stirring up revolutions in foreign countries. It appears that Dulles is evasive but he is quoted as stating, "We would be foolish if we did not cooperate with our friends abroad to help them to do everything they can to expose and counter this Communist subversive movement."

Dulles was questioned regarding the evaluation of information which might be disseminated by CIA and which might have an effect on U. S. policies. Dulles then made reference to the fact that once a week he meets with heads of the other intelligence agencies of the Government. He referred to the other agencies and also made reference to "a representative of J. Edgar Hoover." Dulles obviously was referring to Intelligence Advisory Committee meetings.

Dulles was asked if the CIA had machinery available to warn the Government when the Chinese in 1950 decided to come down south of the Yalu River. Dulles answered that the event occurred before he was with the CIA. He made mention of the fact that the "particular machinery" was organized by General Bedell Smith late in 1950. In his comments Dulles cleverly side-stepped any indication that he would have been responsible for any errors made by CIA in connection with the Yalu affair. He stated that the so-called machinery actually did not start functioning until after the Yalu affair.

Dulles was questioned regarding the size of the agency and he stated that CIA did not publish such figures.

He was questioned concerning the rumors the CIA is to be investigated by committees of Congress. Dulles then stated that the CIA already was in close touch with the armed services and appropriations committees. He was quoted as stating that "Any investigation, whether by a Congressional committee or any other body, which results in a disclosure of our secret activities and operations or uncovers our personnel would help a potential enemy just as if the enemy were able to infiltrate their agents right into our shop."

He was questioned concerning the bill introduced to set up a Joint Congressional Committee on Intelligence. Dulles

Memo to Belmont

Re: CIA

Interview of Allen W. Dulles  
Appearing in "U. S. News and  
World Report," March 19, 1954

replied that he had studied these bills; that they were put in by good friends of the agency; but he did not know whether this would add anything very much to the present system of Congressional control exercised through the armed services and appropriations committees. He stated that he would cooperate with Congress in every way compatible with the need for security. He made mention that under the law he is responsible for "protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure."

It was pointed out to him that the Accounting Office must have a list of CIA employees and vouchers of the money they spent. Dulles stated this was not the case and that this was not required of CIA. He stated, "We couldn't operate with security if it were."

With regard to recruitment, he advised that this was the greatest problem faced by the agency.

He was asked if his pay scale was high enough and his job tenure secure enough to attract good people. Dulles replied that the hold on the people "is their interest in the work." He indicated that he was holding some people in the CIA at a great sacrifice to themselves.

With regard to clearance of employees he stated that if a man or a woman is just out of college, security could be cleared in six weeks or so. If the candidate had "quite a career" it might take from six to eight weeks to three or four months.

When questioned regarding OSS security risks, he stated that proportionately, the number of security risks in OSS was not high. He commented that General Donovan had been obliged to hire thousands of people practically overnight. Dulles stated that if the CIA inherited any security risks from the OSS, they already have been weeded out. He advised that he was proud of the security service of the CIA. He stated the CIA was using the lie detector but people were not forced to take the test. He stated the lie detector results were not used as being conclusive but utilized to give clues to be followed up in other ways.

The question was asked, "We understand that the FBI is not permitted to operate overseas. Does that leave you the only operating agency overseas?" His reply was, "The State

Memo to Belmont

Re: CIA  
Interview of Allen W. Dulles  
Appearing in "U. S. News and  
World Report," March 19, 1954

Department, of course, operates overseas." Dulles then went on to advise that the CIA operates overseas in the field of intelligence and counterintelligence rather than in security. He stated, "This security problem doesn't come up directly, except in so far as we would cooperate with J. Edgar Hoover in connection with any suspicious characters we might learn about who were trying to get to the United States."

Dulles was asked if the CIA was doing a good job. He replied that he probably was a prejudiced witness. He stated, "Whether CIA is doing a good job I must leave to others to answer. . . .I consider CIA an efficient organization."

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MARCH 19, 1954

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# U.S. News & World Report

The United States News ©

World Report ©

## SIGNS OF BUSINESS UPTURN

EXCLUSIVE INTERVIEW

# "WE TELL RUSSIA TOO MUCH"

Says

**Allen W. Dulles**

Director,  
Central Intelligence  
Agency of U. S.



**KEEPING  
AMERICA  
ON THE GO**

*with Timken Tapered Roller Bearings*



## Why the man behind the plow is now ahead of it

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
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### "WE TELL RUSSIA TOO MUCH"

**EDITOR'S NOTE:** How does Russia go about getting most of its U. S. secrets? Is laxity by Americans responsible for "leaking" critical information?

Conversely, how good is U. S. intelligence about Russia? Is reliable information being gotten through the Iron Curtain? If so, how?

To get the real story of just how each side collects its information about the other, on which vital decisions often are based, U. S. News & World Report invited to its conference room the country's top intelligence expert—Allen W. Dulles, head of the Central Intelligence Agency. The interview with Mr. Dulles follows.

ALLEN W. DULLES, Director of the U. S. Central Intelligence Agency, has been ferreting out information on this country's enemies and their plans since World War I, when he handled U. S. intelligence work in Switzerland. In World War II, he returned to Switzerland for the Office of Strategic Services and directed a network of agents within Germany. There, he also was responsible for negotiating the surrender of German troops in Italy. Mr. Dulles, a lawyer in private life, is the brother of John Foster Dulles, U. S. Secretary of State. He has headed the CIA since February, 1953.

**Q** Do the Soviets have an advantage over us in collecting intelligence, Mr. Dulles?

**A** Many advantages. In the first place, they have far greater facilities for operating in the United States than we have behind the Iron Curtain. Also we Americans publish a great deal in our scientific and technical journals and in congressional hearings. And, of course, in our free system of government, what we do in the field of legislation for national defense is open to the public. I would give a good deal if I could know as much about the Soviet Union as the Soviet Union can learn about us by merely reading the press.

Sometimes I think we go too far in what our Government gives out officially and in what is published in the scientific and technical field. We tell Russia too much. Under our system it is hard to control it.

**Q** Are members of the press in any way utilized as intelligence agents, do you think, by any of the governments of the world?

**A** We keep out of that. Frankly, the press is a great source of information for all agencies of the Government. We don't enroll on our staff any newspaper people that are still active in the business. If you start that you run the danger of throwing a shadow over all the legitimate press.

**Q** The Soviet Government uses them, of course—

**A** Well, in the Soviet case everybody is a servant of the Government. A Tass representative works for the Government almost as much as an ambassador. As you know, it's a bit different in the United States in this respect.

**Q** Would you develop your statement that the legiti-

mate press is one of the best sources of information? Do you mean by what is printed or by word of mouth?

**A** What is printed mainly but also by radio.

**Q** Are there many agents running around the world in the various countries today or just a handful?

**A** Undoubtedly the intelligence services of many countries have widespread agent networks. Certainly the Soviet intelligence leads the field in this respect. They recruit and run agents in all important countries of the world, and through their "front organizations" they control a great many more.

**Q** How would you evaluate what we are learning about what's going on behind the Iron Curtain? Do you feel reasonably assured that we are well informed about what is happening behind the Iron Curtain?

**A** One has to distinguish between various fields. We know a good deal more in certain fields than we do in others. Naturally, for security reasons, I am not going to disclose just what they are. It's the toughest job intelligence has ever faced—getting good information from behind the Iron Curtain. It is, of course, very important for our Government that we all succeed in that. We are not satisfied with the coverage at the present time, and are trying constantly to improve it.

**Q** What was your background in intelligence work before you came into the Government for this particular job?

**A** In World War I, I was in the Foreign Service. I was in Vienna in 1916 and into 1917. When the United States declared a state of war with Germany, we were given our passports in Vienna as the Germans



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
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## Soviet Has World's Biggest Intelligence Net . . . Propaganda Of U. S. Effective in Satellites . . . Averting "Pearl Harbors"

forced the Austrians to break with us at the time we entered the war in April, 1917. Then I went to Bern, Switzerland, and worked in our legation there. I was not an intelligence officer—I was a Foreign Service officer—but my job there was really a political-intelligence job. So, I've been interested in intelligence since World War I.

**Q** You were in the Office of Strategic Services, weren't you?

**A** Yes, in World War II, I was in the Office of Strategic Services. Working with Bill Donovan [William J. "Wild Bill" Donovan, Director of OSS], I organized the OSS office in New York, and then went again to Switzerland. That was a good place to follow what was going on in Germany, Austria and the occupied countries of Europe.

**Q** Were you in contact with agents who worked behind the enemy lines?

**A** A great many.

**Q** Therefore you became familiar with these techniques in those days—

**A** Correct.

**Q** Did you learn quite a lot in that period?

**A** There couldn't have been a better school for intelligence. At that time, during World War II, I was in direct contact with one of the right-hand men of Admiral Canaris, who was the head of the Military Counterintelligence Service for the Wehrmacht [German Army]. He, like quite a number of Canaris's men, was anti-Hitler and joined the plot against him. The fact that there were these anti-Nazis greatly facilitated our intelligence work.

For example, there were several men in the German Foreign Office who worked against Hitler and Ribbentrop [Nazi Foreign Minister], and I was in touch with them. Then toward the end of the war a German S. S. General in North Italy named Karl Wolff got in touch with me with regard to the surrender of the German armies there, and for several months we had hectic negotiations which finally ended in the German capitulation in Italy.

All in all, this World War II experience was intelligence by the "case" method and, as a lawyer, I find this the most practical way of getting an education.

**Q** Would you say we are as successful in penetrating the satellite countries as we were in penetrating Germany during the last war?

**A** Germany was a pipe dream compared with what we have to meet now.

**Q** The satellites as well as Soviet Russia?

**A** Yes. The intelligence service in Germany during the war, you see, was split. There was great rivalry between Canaris and Himmler [Nazi Minister of Interior]. Also there was in Germany an active, fairly aggressive anti-Hitler underground. Of course, there is a situation in the U.S.S.R. today which is somewhat similar.

**Q** Was this among the military?

**A** It included both military and civilians. It was the Goerdeler-Beck group [Dr. Karl Goerdeler and Col. Gen. Ludwig Beck, involved in a plot against Hitler's life in 1944], with ramifications down into the trade unions. It was even penetrated by the Communists—and partly betrayed by the Communists, too, at the end.

### STIRRING UP REVOLTS?—

**Q** Since you can't tell us what you do, could you tell us some of the things that you don't do? For instance, it is often reported in the papers that you send in provocateurs to stir up revolutions in satellite countries. What truth is there in that?

**A** I only wish we had accomplished all that the Soviets attribute to us. I'm not going to deny all the compliments they give us in reporting on our activities. I think it's better for them to be left a little in the dark as to how much they say is true and how much is false.

**Q** Is that part of your function—to stir up revolutions in these countries?

**A** Let me answer in this way: The Soviet Union is mounting a "cold war" on the free world, and is using all the techniques that Communist inventiveness can supply. They have built up a whole series of "front organizations"—associations of youth, lawyers, women, and Cominform. They penetrate and control the major labor unions in France, Italy, Indonesia, and many other countries of the world—

**Q** And some of ours—

**A** In many countries of the world they have very vigorous political parties spearheaded by a hard core of Communists, and they use those political parties for their own ends in order to try to bring about Communist revolutions. That whole movement constitutes a threat to the stability of the free world. It constitutes a threat behind our North Atlantic Treaty Organization lines. We would be foolish if we did not co-operate with our friends abroad to help them to

(Continued on next page)

... "Marxist line doesn't go over well in the Middle East"

do everything they can to expose and counter this Communist subversive movement.

**Q** *Could you tell us in a general way whether the intelligence you gather indicates that Communism is growing any stronger or weaker in the satellite countries?*

**A** Two or three years ago I was rather discouraged about the situation in the satellite countries from our point of view. I had a feeling that the period of domination was getting so long that the younger elements wouldn't know anything about freedom. That, however, has not proven to be true. People who have never known freedom as we know it still have an inherent love and desire for freedom and that is shown by the defectors and political refugees who come over.

**Q** *Is there real evidence of that?*

**A** Oh, yes, and it is very encouraging. Take the Polish fliers who flew those MIG's out. They were young men. They had known nothing but slavery. And there are many others from all walks of life.

**Q** *But they realize the difference—*

**A** Yes.

**Q** *Do you have your own system of interviewing people who escape from behind the Iron Curtain, or do you depend upon the other Government agencies?*

**A** It's a common enterprise.

**Q** *It's a vast enterprise, isn't it?*

**A** Very important and very large.

**Q** *Aren't hundreds of thousands interviewed every year?*

**A** No, it wouldn't be as large as that. You have to be selective. To do a good job of interviewing requires great skill, a good knowledge of languages, and takes a long while. What you do is select those who, because of their background and native intelligence, are likely to be persons of knowledge. You have to do that because the field is so vast. Take the situation when there were thousands and thousands of East Germans fleeing into West Germany—you couldn't possibly interview all of them.

AID FOR REFUGEES—

**Q** *What is done to aid the refugees who escape to the West to get freedom and a better life?*

**A** If they are bona fide political refugees and they come over to us, we grant them asylum and do not turn them back. This is in keeping with our declared policy. Most of them arrive in Germany, Austria, Turkey, or in the Far East at Hong Kong, for example. Here several agencies, both Government and private, help in providing assistance to these refugees.

The refugees are, of course, initially housed and fed and provided with clothes and other necessities. In addition, there is a large effort directed at preparing these people for a new life in the Western world.

**Q** *Do you think these defectors have an innate*

*sense of freedom which causes them to come over, or do you think the propaganda we disseminate influences them?*

**A** I think it's both. Some come out from ideological motives. Our propaganda, particularly in the satellites, has had a real effect.

**Q** *Is Russian propaganda having much effect on Europe today?*

**A** I don't think it's having as much effect today as formerly. It is having substantial effect in Southeast Asia.

**Q** *What about the Middle East?*

**A** To some slight extent, but not too much. The Marxist line doesn't go over well in the Middle East. But when they play the nationalist theme, which they do a great deal, of course, that's more effective.

**Q** *How about parties, like the Tudeh, in Iran, which are openly Communist parties, and yet the members are all Moslems? It used to be said that the Communists could make no inroads on the Moslems because the religion was contrary—*

**A** The Communists make inroads in all the religions. It is quite true that the tenets of the Moslem religion are not compatible with Marxism, but neither are those of Christianity or Judaism.

POLICY ROLE FOR CIA—

**Q** *Can you evaluate the use to which you put your information in the matter of guidance, policy making, and so on? Is this information being utilized every day, for instance? Is it used in policy making?*

**A** I think it is becoming more and more so. The estimates that we make are used as the intelligence basis of the policy papers. Each week at the meeting of the National Security Council I have the opportunity to brief the Council on any new developments during the past week and to give the intelligence background for papers that may be on the agenda for discussion. In doing that, I co-ordinate with the other intelligence services of the Government to see if they have any intelligence that they would like to have me give, and so I try to represent not just the CIA but the intelligence community as a whole.

**Q** *Do you present a positive interpretation, or do you present two views?*

**A** I would present my views as Director of Central Intelligence. If there is a dissent from that view, I would indicate it.

**Q** *Do you present many papers that way?*

**A** Quite a number. I'm inclined to encourage split papers rather than a wishy-washy product that comes when people who don't really agree try to find vague expressions to bridge a disagreement. I think that's the worst thing in intelligence. Let's have a clear-cut statement. If there is a clear-cut difference, then let the policy makers consider that fact.

## ... "Much of our work is related to analysis of intelligence"

**Q** How would you divide your attention on the globe? Isn't Latin America getting a lot of attention right now?

**A** Well, the State Department gathers the bulk of the information in the political and economic field.

**Q** But in intelligence you are the only one authorized—

**A** There's nothing esoteric about the word "intelligence." A cable from the State Department regarding political developments in a country is intelligence. Normally they would do most of the reporting on the political side, and in many countries on the economic side.

**Q** Do your estimates have any influence on the changes in the military budget?

**A** We do not prepare estimates directed to budgetary matters. We just go along about our business reporting the facts as we see them, and when a situation comes up that requires an estimate, we make one.

**Q** Might it not be a guidance in deciding whether it is safe or not to make certain cuts?

**A** Those who prepare the budget would have to answer that. We have given our estimate of what we think the capabilities and intentions of the various powers are. Just how that enters into the budget discussions around the table. I wouldn't be told.

### HOW THE CIA OPERATES—

**Q** Do your operations today in co-ordinating this information differ from what was done under the preceding Administration?

**A** Then it was the custom for the Director of CIA to brief the President alone, but he also attended the meetings of the National Security Council in the same capacity as I now do, as adviser.

**Q** Is the CIA connected with any other department of the Government, or is it an independent agency of its own?

**A** The CIA is under the National Security Council and, hence, is under the President directly. It is an independent agency. My relations with the State Department are exactly the same as my relations with the Department of Defense. Those are the two departments, naturally, with which I have the most business to transact. I also work closely with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

**Q** But you operate completely independent of them—

**A** Yes, except that I often look to them for policy guidance and support, and where we are operating in a zone of U. S. military occupation or operations we have special responsibilities to the theater commander.

**Q** What are you occupied with mostly in your work—with analysis of information that is available to everybody?

**A** Many agencies collect intelligence. Then the processing of this intelligence is divided among the agencies by National Security Council directives—for example, the Army handles its intelligence; Navy, naval, etc. This processed intelligence is then used on a joint co-operative basis to prepare estimates—which are analyses of the sum total of all intelligence and a projection into the future of what may develop.

A great deal of our work is related to the analysis of intelligence. It is not so much analysis of information that we get from the public as of information that we get from all the intelligence sources of Government.

**Q** Including the military?

**A** Oh, yes, including the military. We also get information from the State Department. We get information from our own sources.

### Economic Information: 20% of Total

**Q** What proportion of that information would you say could be regarded as economic information?

**A** I should say that 20 per cent would be economic, possibly more..

**Q** And the rest of it would be political?

**A** Political, military, psychological—information on the attitudes of other people—what are they thinking about in a certain country—and also technological and scientific information.

**Q** It is your function to evaluate that information for the benefit of our own Government?

**A** That's correct—but not to do it all by ourselves.

**Q** And your job is to disseminate information, too, when you get finished evaluating it?

**A** That's right, but we have a check on our own evaluation. Once a week I sit down with the heads of the other intelligence agencies of the Government, that is, the intelligence officer of the State Department, the heads of the Army, Navy and Air Force intelligence, an intelligence officer from the Joint Chiefs and the Atomic Energy Commission, and a representative of J. Edgar Hoover. We sit around, just about like this, around a table—

**Q** To get information?

**A** No. It is largely to go over the finished product.

**Q** Your finished product?

**A** No, the finished product of a joint effort by all the intelligence agencies. You can divide the information that we disseminate into various categories. We get some raw intelligence. We disseminate that, but always with a good deal of caution. We haven't evaluated it, but it might fit in with what some other department knew and, therefore, would be important. If you waited to evaluate it, it might lose some of its value.

Then we have intelligence which we process in our own shop and disseminate. Finally we have intelligence

(Continued on next page)

### ... "We don't talk much about some of our duties"

which goes through the mill of evaluation with the other intelligence agencies. That we call "national estimates." We have a high-level board in CIA which includes distinguished military men, economists, professional and technical people. This is our Board of National Estimates. It generally prepares the first drafts of the "national estimates," and then we get contributions from the other intelligence agencies.

#### LESSON OF PEARL HARBOR—

**Q** Why is all of this necessary all of a sudden—or have we been doing it for many, many years?

**A** You've heard the story of Pearl Harbor. It seems to me that here was a typical instance where intelligence was available to the Government, but where there was not sufficient machinery set up to pull together the people best able to evaluate it—to get the information to the proper intelligence officers.

**Q** Each one had his own interpretation then, is that it?

**A** That was one of the troubles. But also the machinery wasn't sufficient to get the intelligence fast enough to the appropriate people.

**Q** Some of us in the press knew that war with Japan was coming. The Secretary of State gave out a great deal of information. It is puzzling that Washington newspapermen should know war was coming, but the military services didn't know—

**A** Did you know where it was coming?

**Q** No. We expected it in Southeast Asia. Was this machinery of yours available when the Chinese in 1950 decided to come down south of the Yalu?

**A** That was before I was with the CIA, so I can't give you the exact date. The particular machinery I refer to was organized by Gen. Bedell Smith, after he became Director late in 1950. It was based, in part, on a report made by a group, including myself, that the National Security Council had called to Washington about a year before. We were called down to make a report on the working of the Central Intelligence Agency, and we submitted a classified report to the NSC. Later Bedell Smith came in and carried out the general recommendations of that report.

**Q** So that your machinery was really set up after the Yalu incident?

**A** It didn't really start functioning until after the Yalu affair.

**Q** Well, are we organized now to prevent another Pearl Harbor?

**A** We have an organization now to which the intelligence that was neglected at the time of Pearl Harbor would be submitted, and where it would be processed quickly. It works on a 24-hour basis. Anything coming in would go to our watch officer, and to comparable officers in the Pentagon. If these officers felt that this

intelligence showed up a critical situation, we would immediately call a meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Committee. This is the Committee I mentioned before which includes the heads of the various intelligence agencies.

At any time of the day or night this Committee would sit down and go over any critical intelligence and make an immediate report to the President and the National Security Council. The machinery is there to function, and unless there was a "human" failure it would function.

**Q** You assume that you would have enough advance warning so that you could meet and evaluate?

**A** All we can do is provide the machinery to assure that, if we do get information that gives us a warning, we will act on it.

**Q** Have you ever made a post-mortem of the Pearl Harbor situation in so far as it relates to messages that were going back and forth between Honolulu and Japan in the days preceding the attack, so that you might have machinery now that would be aware of that kind of transmission?

**A** We have machinery to which that kind of information would be submitted. Error might creep in in the handling of this information, but, in my opinion, we have machinery to which information of that critical type would now be sent on an urgent basis.

#### DUTIES ASSIGNED TO CIA—

**Q** There is a good deal of confusion as to the exact duties of the Central Intelligence Agency and its relation to the service intelligence agencies. Can you set us straight on this point?

**A** CIA's duties are spelled out in the National Security Act of 1947 and the CIA Act of 1949. The 1947 law provided for the unification of the armed services. It also set up the CIA. Under the law we have these duties:

We advise the National Security Council on intelligence matters that relate to our nation's security; we help to co-ordinate intelligence activities throughout the Government and evaluate intelligence reports. That includes intelligence received by everybody, not merely what we collect ourselves.

In addition the CIA under this law of 1947 carries out certain intelligence services, which the law describes as services of common concern, assigned to it by the National Security Council.

These are the type of activities which intelligence services throughout the world traditionally carry out. We don't talk much about some of these duties. Others are quite open. For example, we monitor daily millions of words of open broadcasts and in this way pick up the propaganda line which other countries are putting out over the air.

**Q** How big an agency do you have?

## ... "I see that the President is kept informed"

**A** We don't publish our figures.

**Q** *Has it ever been published how much appropriations you have?*

**A** No, but I have seen some speculation in the press with figures which were several times exaggerated.

**Q** *What committees of Congress do you have to deal with regularly?*

**A** We deal with the armed services committees of the Senate and the House, and we deal with both appropriations committees. Also we make periodic reports to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.

**Q** *Don't they show in the budget some lump sum that you use?*

**A** No.

**Q** *Don't you have to appear before committees in executive session and explain your operations?*

**A** I appear before a subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee and talk with them and give them a picture of the nature of the work we are doing, tell about our personnel, and where the money goes.

**Q** *So that there is a check on the Agency—*

**A** Oh, yes, and not only by Congress. We work closely with the Bureau of the Budget and operate within policies established by the National Security Council. We consult on an almost daily basis with other agencies of the Government, particularly the State and Defense departments. Further, we make periodic reports on our activities to the National Security Council, and I see that the President is kept informed of all important developments. CIA is not a policy-making agency: we furnish intelligence to assist in the formulation of policy.

### THREAT IN INVESTIGATION—

**Q** *What can you tell us about the rumors that CIA is to be investigated by committees of Congress?*

**A** I have no way to judge about that, and, as I just mentioned, we are already in close touch with the armed services and appropriations committees. I would like to say this about investigations. Any investigation, whether by a congressional committee or any other body, which results in a disclosure of our secret activities and operations or uncovers our personnel would help a potential enemy just as if the enemy were able to infiltrate their agents right into our shop.

If it were necessary to go into the details of operations before any committees anywhere—the security of your operations would quickly be broken. You couldn't run an intelligence agency on that basis. No intelligence agency in the world is run on that basis.

In intelligence you have to take certain things on faith. You have to look to the man who is directing the organization and the result he achieves. If you haven't someone who can be trusted, or who doesn't get

results, you'd better throw him out and get somebody else.

**Q** *I understand a bill has been introduced into Congress to set up a Joint Congressional Committee on Intelligence which would do in the intelligence field what the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy does in the atomic field. Can you tell us anything about this?*

**A** I have studied these bills. They have been put in, I believe, by good friends of the Agency who are interested in finding a way to reconcile the exercise of congressional authority with the special need for security in an operation like that of CIA.

However, I don't know whether it would add anything very much to the present system of congressional control exercised through the armed services and appropriations committees. I naturally wish to respect the prerogatives of Congress and recognize that their confidence is essential if the Agency is to receive appropriations necessary to carry on its work efficiently.

Certainly I shall co-operate with the Congress in every way compatible with the need for security. When the 80th Congress set up the CIA they recognized this problem and wrote into the law that as Director I should be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. Any disclosure which leads to publicity and gets information into the hands of potential enemies would to my mind be "unauthorized."

**Q** *How do you get around the fact that the Accounting Office must have a list of your employes and vouchers of the money you have spent?*

**A** That is not the case. That is not required of our Agency. We couldn't operate with security if it were.

**Q** *So that it wouldn't be possible for a foreign government to get a list of your employes and their salaries—*

**A** No, by golly. It would be highly dangerous if they could.

### RECRUITMENT PROBLEMS—

**Q** *Do you have any trouble getting well-qualified people for intelligence work?*

**A** That's the greatest problem we have, because intelligence, more than anything else, depends upon the quality of your personnel. We built the Agency with a nucleus of those who had worked in intelligence during the war, with OSS and other intelligence agencies. We try to recruit on the basis of a careful study of the background of a person, if he's a mature person. Or we take our people after graduation from college or professional schools, put them in professional training in our own shop, and then try them out. I have wide powers of hiring and firing, because you have to have that.

*(Continued on next page)*

... "We have been using the lie detector for several years"

**Q** *Is your pay scale high enough and your job tenure secure enough so that when you get good people who do a job well you can keep them?*

**A** The hold on the people is their interest in the work. That, more than the salary, holds them. I'm holding some people in CIA at great sacrifice to themselves. The interest in the work makes them want to stick with it.

**Q** *How long does it take to clear your employes for security?*

**A** That depends on the nature of the case. If a man or woman is just out of college, we ought to be able to clear security in six weeks or so. If the candidate has had quite a career, served in various parts of the world, in various agencies of the Government, it takes longer. It may then take anywhere from six or eight weeks to three or four months.

**Q** *Do you find security risks from time to time?*

**A** Oh, certainly.

**Weeding Out Security Risks**

**Q** *Didn't a great many security risks turn up in the OSS?*

**A** Proportionately it was not high. The OSS had thousands of employes. Bill Donovan was told that he had to organize an intelligence service practically overnight. That was at a time when there was a tremendous call on man power throughout the country. Well, you couldn't pull together thousands of people under those conditions without getting some bad apples. I think, however, that the percentage was very low.

**Q** *It was a natural place to infiltrate, certainly—*

**A** Undoubtedly the enemy was trying to infiltrate.

**Q** *Didn't you inherit some security risks from the OSS?*

**A** If we did, I believe they have been weeded out. Everybody that carried over has been carefully investigated in recent years. Further, we keep constantly checking on our people.

**Q** *What about the report that there are Soviet agents even in the Central Intelligence Agency?*

**A** I naturally assume that the Soviets will attempt to penetrate the CIA and all the other intelligence services of the United States. I have in CIA a security service of which I have reason to be proud, and I don't think that the Soviets are going to find it easy to penetrate us; however, we have to keep on our guard all the time.

**Q** *I saw a story the other day about the use of the lie detector by your security people in CIA with some criticism of your Agency. Have you any comment on that?*

**A** We have been using the lie detector for several years, and on the whole have found it helpful. We don't force people to take the test, but almost everybody chooses to do it.

Also you should remember that we never use lie-detector results as conclusive. It merely gives clues to be followed up in other ways, particularly the ordinary methods of questioning. No one has any access to the readings of the lie detector except our own security office. Since we have been using the lie detector it has saved us a good many headaches and has also helped establish the innocence of some people who were falsely accused. Of course, you need to have experienced operators to get the real benefit from the tests.

**Q** *We understand that the FBI is not permitted to operate overseas. Does that leave you the only operating agency overseas?*

**A** The State Department, of course, operates overseas.

**Q** *I mean strictly in the field of security?*

**A** We operate overseas in the field of intelligence and counterintelligence rather than in security. This security problem doesn't come up directly, except in so far as we would co-operate with J. Edgar Hoover in connection with any suspicious characters we might learn about who were trying to get to the United States. Also we make our facilities available to the State Department to help check visa applications.

**Q** *Do we exchange intelligence information with allied governments?*

**A** We have cordial and co-operative relationships with certain services in the free world.

**Q** *Could they be improved?*

**A** Well, you can always improve everything.

**CIA: HERE TO STAY?—**

**Q** *Now that the CIA has had a trial run of about seven years, how would you sum up its accomplishments? Is it here to stay, is it doing a good job?*

**A** I am probably a prejudiced witness. The real test will be whether the CIA properly serves its customers—those who formulate our policy in national-security matters. Today's world is a very complicated one. Policy, whether in the field of diplomacy or defense, must be based on the best estimate of the facts which can be put together. That estimate in turn should be given by some agency which has no axes to grind or backs to scratch, and which itself is not wedded to any particular policy. That is our job in CIA. If we can carry it out honestly and fearlessly we can fill a real need in Government. And we can't do the job by living in an ivory tower. We need the help of all the other intelligence agencies in the Government.

Whether CIA is doing a good job I must leave to others to answer. In intelligence work one should never be satisfied and always seek to improve. Personally I think we are improving. I am proud of the personnel that we have got together and of their loyalty and dedication to their work. I consider CIA an efficient organization.

62-80750-2304

March 18, 1954

INDEXED-74  
RECORDED-74



b7C

Dear

Your letter of March 12, 1954, has been received.

In answer to your inquiry, I have to advise that this Bureau has never conducted an investigation concerning Radio Free Europe and there is no information available to us to indicate that it is engaged in any activity constituting a violation of any Federal statute within our investigative jurisdiction.

I trust that this information will be of value to you.

Sincerely yours,

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10/24/02 BY 60322 UC/LP/ka

John Edgar Hoover  
Director

b3

NOTE:

There is no record in Bufiles of correspondent.

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Ladd \_\_\_\_\_
- Nichols \_\_\_\_\_
- Belmont \_\_\_\_\_
- Clegg \_\_\_\_\_
- Glavin \_\_\_\_\_
- Harbo \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Tracy \_\_\_\_\_
- Gearty \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Holloman \_\_\_\_\_
- Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

TEB:mer  
signed  
FY 1954


MAILED 3  
MAR 18 1954  
COMM - FBI

MAR 18 1954  
RECEIVED  
FBI

TEB

*Handwritten initials*





b7C

March 12, 1954

11

Dear Mr. Hoover,

I am a young housewife very interested in good government. I have lived in Las Vegas for about 15 years, and know the class of people here, very well, people from every walk of life and I suppose every type of ex-racketeer. It's getting to the point that one doesn't know who to trust. It's a terrible feeling. But let's face it.

B

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10/21/02 BY 60322/UC/BAW

62-80750-2304  
MAR 12 1954

RECORDED - 14  
62-80750-2304

CRIMINALS

2/  
I have a question  
and your's is the  
only answer I will  
accept. I don't care to call on  
my local F. B. I.

I am a member  
of the Las Vegas Women's  
Republican Club and  
at our last meeting  
which was March 10,  
Rep Bell was one of  
our guest speakers.

He spoke of the  
subject of "Radio Free Europe,"  
and ask that everyone  
please donate to that  
cause. We always try  
to do what we can  
for any worthy cause.


3/

But we also like to know that our donations are going to help our Country and not to hinder it. I will do anything to help fight Communism. So this is my question.

"Is Radio Free Europe a good cause that will help our Country?"

I would appreciate your answer as soon as possible.

Sincerely



b7c



# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. TOLSON

DATE: 10/29/06

DATE: 9/15/54

FROM : J. P. MOHR

CLASSIFIED BY 60300 uc/lr/bcc

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X33 + 18/29/2031

SUBJECT: (S)  
Information Concerning

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Ladd \_\_\_\_\_
- Nichols \_\_\_\_\_
- Belmont \_\_\_\_\_
- Glavin \_\_\_\_\_
- Harbo \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Tracy \_\_\_\_\_
- Gearty \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Holloman \_\_\_\_\_
- Sizoo \_\_\_\_\_
- Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

b1  
b3

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] (S)

[Redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE  
JPM:DW

INDEXED-96  
RECORDED-96  
EX-123

62-80750-2306

MAR 24 1954

58 MAR 25 1954

*Handwritten signatures and initials*

[Redacted]

~~SECRET~~

b1  
b3

[Redacted]

This advise should not have been given.  
H.

[Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

(S)

V. J. DeLoach

This CIA operation is becoming more fantastic every day.  
H. C.

~~SECRET~~

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: March 19, 1954

FROM : V. P. [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Ladd \_\_\_\_\_
- Nichols \_\_\_\_\_
- Belmont \_\_\_\_\_
- Clegg \_\_\_\_\_
- Glavin \_\_\_\_\_
- Harbo \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Tracy \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Trotter \_\_\_\_\_
- Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Holloman \_\_\_\_\_
- Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

SUBJECT: [redacted]

b1  
b3

SYNOPSIS:

[redacted]

ACTION:

[redacted]

[redacted]

(S) CH 38-1860  
Classified by [redacted]  
Declassify on: OADR 11/20/89 ✓

DATE: 10/29/06  
CLASSIFIED BY: C0322nd/hp/b  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3.3( ) 10/29/2031

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

With regard to informing the President, it is being suggested to the Attorney General that he may desire to alert the President concerning the developments as reported by the Bureau [redacted]

RECORDED - 23  
INDEXED - 23  
EX-129

62-80750-2307  
MAR 24 1954

SJP:lw  
Attachment sent 3-23-54  
1 - [redacted] b7C

~~SECRET~~ 9th id. ESP [redacted]

(S)

Memo to Belmont

~~SECRET~~

DETAILS:

b1  
b3

[Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

(S)

~~SECRET~~



SAC, Washington Field Office

March 16, 1954

Director, FBI

RECORDED - 26

62-99750-2308

[Redacted]

b1  
b3

[Redacted]

b1  
b3

In the event this name comes to your attention in the course of any type of investigation, you should take no action other than to advise the Bureau.

RDG:fk

DATE: 10/29/04  
CLASSIFIED BY: 60322 ucl/lp/bce  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3.3(1) 10/29/2031

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Ladd \_\_\_\_\_
- Nichols \_\_\_\_\_
- Belmont \_\_\_\_\_
- Clegg \_\_\_\_\_
- Glavin \_\_\_\_\_
- Harbo \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Tracy \_\_\_\_\_
- Gearty \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Holloman \_\_\_\_\_
- Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

MAILED 8  
MAR 16 1954  
COMM - FBI

MAILED - DOVEDAY

Handwritten notes and signatures in the bottom right corner.

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT *OK/bs*

~~SECRET~~

DATE: March 12, 1954

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Ladd \_\_\_\_\_
- Nichols \_\_\_\_\_
- Belmont \_\_\_\_\_
- Clegg \_\_\_\_\_
- Glavin \_\_\_\_\_
- Harbo \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Tracy \_\_\_\_\_
- Gearty \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Holloman \_\_\_\_\_
- Sizoo \_\_\_\_\_
- Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

FROM : V. P. Keay *PKA*

SUBJECT: (S) [Redacted] (S)

[Redacted] (4)

b1  
b3

*Handwritten signature*

*Handwritten signature*

(S) [Redacted]

b1  
b3

[Redacted] (S)

ACTION:

The above is being made a matter of record, bearing in mind that the captioned name possibly might come to the attention of the Bureau at some future date.

b7c

SJP:lw

*Handwritten initials*

10/29/06  
DECLASSIFIED BY 60322 UC/LP/bee  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3.3(1) 10/29/2031

RECORDED - 25  
INDEXED - 25

62-80750-2308

MAR 22 1954

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

~~SECRET~~

*Handwritten signature*

~~SECRET~~

Date: March 3, 1954

Central Intelligence

To: Director, FBI

From: [Redacted] (S)

b1  
b3

Subject: RELATIONS WITH CIA

Reference Bureau letter February 8, 1954.

[Redacted]

[Redacted] (S)

[Redacted]

[Redacted] (S)

[Redacted]

[Redacted] (S)

It is suggested that the Legal Attache, at the end of 60 days, advise the Bureau as to results of this comparison.

JNS:rgb

*01 from [unclear] sent [unclear] 6/2/54*

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

RECORDED - 3

62-80750-2316

DATE: 10/29/06  
CLASSIFIED BY: 60322 uc/lj/bca  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3 (P) 10/29/2031

~~SECRET~~

70 APR 1 1954

~~SECRET~~

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT *amb*

DATE: February 10, 1954

*Viper*

FROM : V. P. *Keay*

DATE: *10/29/06*  
CLASSIFIED BY: *60322 uc/lp/bca*  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3.3 *(S) 10/29/2030*

- Tolson
- Ladd
- Belmont
- Clegg
- Glavin
- Harbo
- Rosen
- Tracy
- Gearty
- Mohr
- Winterrowd
- Tele. Room
- Holloman
- Sizoo
- Miss Gandy

SUBJECT: [REDACTED] (S)

Reference is made to my memoranda dated January 26, January 29, and February 5, 1954, concerning the captioned matter. Pursuant to the recommendations set forth in memorandum dated January 29, 1954, approved by the Director, the Liaison Agent on February 9, 1954, apprised Allen Dulles of the CIA concerning the Bureau's views.

[REDACTED]

b1  
b3

(S)

[REDACTED]

SJP:ld  
1 - Mr. Branigan

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

RECORDED - DEPT 62-80750-2311

INDEXED - II  
EX-129

MAR 30 1954

~~SECRET~~

*62-11197*

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

~~SECRET~~

b1  
b3

Memo to Belmont

Re:

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(S)

b1  
b3

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(S)

ACTION:

None. For your information.

No memorandum is being prepared for the Attorney

General

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(S)

b1  
b3

*[Handwritten signature]*

~~SECRET~~

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

~~SECRET~~

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE:

FROM : V. P. Reddy

February 5, 1954

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

- Tolson
- Ladd
- Nichols
- Belmont
- Clegg
- Glavin
- Harbo
- Rosen
- Tracy
- Gearty
- Mohr
- Winterrowd
- Tele. Room
- Holloman
- Sizoo
- Miss Gandy

SUBJECT:

[Redacted subject line]

b1  
b3

[Redacted paragraph 1]

[Redacted paragraph 2]

[Redacted paragraph 3]

b1  
b3

[Redacted line]

Comment:

RECORDED - 90

62-80750-2312

INDEXED - 90

MAR 30 1954

[Redacted line]

**ACTION:** The Liaison Agent will follow this matter pursuant to any instructions which will emanate as a result of my memorandum of January 29, 1954.

SJP:lw

1 - Mr. Branigan

DATE: 10/29/06  
CLASSIFIED BY: 60327 uc/kp/bca  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3.3(A) 10/29/2031

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 62-711171

February 1, 1954

Mr. Tolson ✓  
Mr. Boardman ✓  
Mr. Nichols ✓  
Mr. Belmont ✓  
Mr. Mohr ✓  
Mr. DeLoach ✓  
Mr. Casper ✓  
Mr. Callahan ✓  
Mr. Conrad ✓  
Mr. Felt ✓  
Mr. Gale ✓  
Mr. Rosen ✓  
Mr. Sullivan ✓  
Mr. Tavel ✓  
Mr. Trotter ✓  
Tele. Room ✓  
Miss Holmes ✓  
Miss Gandy ✓

*handled off security*  
~~SECRET~~  
*WJ*

Mr. Tolson:

[Redacted]

(S)

b1  
b3

[Redacted]

(S)

C. D. DeLoach

b1  
b3

RECORDED

[Redacted]

(S)

62-80750-2313

MAR 30 1954

13

I agree  
Dulles  
should be  
given our  
views as  
appear on P. 2  
of Key memo  
of Jan 29.

DATE: 10/29/06  
CLASSIFIED BY 60322uc/lp/lcc  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3.3 (1) 7/29/2031

~~SECRET~~

03 APR 7 1954

~~SECRET~~

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

# Office Memo • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: January 29, 1954

FROM : V. P. Keay

DATE: 10/29/06  
CLASSIFIED BY: 60322uc/lp/bca  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3.3(1) 10/29/2023

- Tolson
- Ladd
- Nichols
- Belmont
- Clegg
- Glavin
- Harbo
- Rosen
- Tracy
- Gearty
- Mohr
- Winterrowd
- Tele. Room
- Holloman
- Sizoo
- Miss Gandy

SUBJECT:

[Redacted]

(S)

b1  
b3

[Redacted]

(S)

b1  
b3

[Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

(S)

RECORDED-42 102-80750-2314  
MAR 30 1954

[Redacted]

(S)

APR 13 1954 Mr. Branigan  
Memo to Belmont  
SJP 2-10-54

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 68-7777



Memo to Belmont

Re:

[Redacted]

~~SECRET~~

(S)

[Redacted]

(S)

RECOMMENDATION:

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(S)

b1  
b3

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(S)

Attached now.  
1/1/54

F.R.

Jan

Leonard  
H

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: January 26, 1954

FROM : V. P. [redacted]

DATE: 10/29/06

CLASSIFIED BY 60322 UC/LP/bc

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3.8(1) 10/29/203

SUBJECT: [redacted]

b1  
b3

- Tolson
- Adams
- Belmont
- Mohr
- Winterrowd
- Tele. Room
- Holloman
- Sizoo
- Miss Gandy

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

SYNOPSIS:

[Large redacted block]

b1  
b3

[Redacted block]

SJP:kfc:lw

1 - Mr. Branigan

5 5 APR 12 1954

RECORDED-42

INDEXED-42

62-80750-2315

MAR 30 1954

~~SECRET~~

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

62-71797-1

Memo to Belmont  
from V. P. Keay

~~SECRET~~

[Redacted]

(S)

b1  
b3

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(S)

RECOMMENDATIONS:

b1  
b3

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(S)

~~SECRET~~

See note on next page. H

~~SECRET~~

b1  
b3

Memo to Belmont  
from V. P. Keay

[Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

b1  
b3

*This paragraph disagree with . . .*  
That after conferring with the Liaison Agent if  
Dulles still desires to meet with the Director regarding this  
matter, such a meeting will be arranged.

*I don't see how you can take  
the position you propose to  
take in addition to this*

(S) [Redacted]

b1  
b3

*I don't believe  
it should be done & have  
neither money nor man  
power to do it. Our objections  
even if sound will get us  
where against such a line  
wps. - 3 -*

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b1  
b3

Memo to Mr. Belmont

[Redacted]

(S)

BACKGROUND:

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(S)

b1  
b3

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b1  
b3

Memo to Mr. Belmont  
from V. P. Keay

[Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

b1  
b3

(S)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

b1  
b3

(S)

THE BUREAU'S POSITION:

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(S)

~~SECRET~~

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT *mlb* **SECRET** DATE: March 15, 1954

FROM : V. P. *Keefe*

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10/29/00 BY 60322uc/lp/lca

SUBJECT: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
~~PROPOSED BILL TO CREATE JOINT COMMITTEE~~  
FOR SUPERVISION OF CIA OPERATIONS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

- Tolson
- Ladd
- Nichols
- Belmont
- Clegg
- Glavin
- Harbo
- Rosen
- Tamm
- Nease
- Winterrowd
- Tele. Room
- Holloman
- Sizoo
- Miss Gandy

The "Evening Star" of March 11, 1954, indicated that a group of Senators, led by Senator Mansfield of Montana, had proposed a bill for the creation of a 10-man committee, which would have the responsibility of watching over the activities of the CIA in a manner similarly performed at the present by the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. Senator Mansfield is quoted as stating that the "growing suspicion" of CIA might lead to "sporadic investigations by various committees of Congress" unless a single, over-all committee were established. The article reflected that Senator McCarthy had been considering a further probe of the CIA.

Senator Mansfield was quoted as stating that the CIA at present was "freed from practically every ordinary form of Congressional check" and as a result it was difficult to legislate intelligently for the CIA because there was no information which was correct. He stated that Congress could only guess at the amount spent by the CIA "somewhere between \$500 and \$800 million" and personnel reportedly "between 8,000 and 30,000 employees." In this connection the Liaison Section furnished information by memorandum dated February 12, 1953, indicating that

[Redacted]

Senator Mansfield went on to state that calls for investigation of CIA had been met with a resistance not encountered from any other agency. He stated, "The Administration appears to support the view that CIA officials merit an immunity which has never been claimed for the State Department or any other Government agencies handling equally confidential material." Senator Mansfield allegedly stated that CIA did not enjoy the same degree of confidence from Congress and the country that the Atomic Energy Commission did and he went on to state, "All signs point to a steady loss of confidence."

For your information, Mansfield first proposed the creation of a Joint Committee to serve as a watchdog over CIA in a speech before the Senate on July 20, 1953. His proposal at that

SIP-10  
DATE: 10/30/06  
CLASSIFIED BY: 12760322uc/lp/lca  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3.3(1)

162-80750-2316  
MAR 22 1954  
~~SECRET~~

*LAIS*

Memo to Belmont

Re: Central Intelligence Agency  
Proposed Bill to Create Joint Committee  
for Supervision of CIA Operations

~~SECRET~~

time apparently was an outgrowth of Senator McCarthy's threat to have his committee investigate the CIA. [REDACTED]

b1  
b3

In addition to the Senator Mansfield action, last summer Congressman James T. Patterson of Connecticut also proposed a resolution on the creation of a Joint Committee on Central Intelligence to be composed of nine Senators and nine Members of the House (H. Con. Res. 167, 83rd Congress). (S)

b1  
b3

[REDACTED] (S)  
ACTION:

The Liaison Agent will review the Congressional Record for more detailed information concerning Senator Mansfield's statements. Any pertinent details obtained from such a review will be called to your attention.

ERC

JAN

✓

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

INDEXED -

62-80750-2316X

~~SECRET~~ - AIR COUNTER

Date: 90 April 12, 1954

RECORDED - 63

To: [Redacted]

~~64-200-210-1149~~

From: Director, FBI

DATE: 10/29/06

Subject: [Redacted]

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3.3(1) 10/29/2031

b1  
b3

[Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

(S)

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Ladd \_\_\_\_\_
- Nichols \_\_\_\_\_
- Belmont \_\_\_\_\_
- Clegg \_\_\_\_\_
- Glavin \_\_\_\_\_
- Harbo \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Tb1 \_\_\_\_\_
- b3 \_\_\_\_\_
- M... \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Rm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Holloman \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

SJP:lw  
1 - Foreign Service Desk (Detached)

1-67-150105

NOTATION ON YELLOW

LEGAT  
3 APR 14  
COMM-FBI

[Redacted]

(S)

51 MAY 17 1954

~~SECRET~~

VPK



~~SECRET~~

To: Director, FBI

March 16, 1954

Subject:

[Redacted]

b1  
b3

(S) [Redacted]

b1

(S)

[Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

b1  
b3

(S)

[Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

(S)

ABOVE TO BE DISCUSSED  
AT MONTHLY STAFF CONF  
WITH CIA - APRIL, 1954  
SIA

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. BELMONT *ah*

DATE: March 17, 1954

FROM : W. A. BRANIGAN *WAB*

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

SUBJECT: PROCESSING OF INTELLIGENCE SUMMARIES  
RECEIVED FROM OTHER AGENCIES

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Ladd \_\_\_\_\_
- Nichols \_\_\_\_\_
- Belmont \_\_\_\_\_
- Clegg \_\_\_\_\_
- Glavin \_\_\_\_\_
- Harbo \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Tracy \_\_\_\_\_
- Gearty \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Holloman \_\_\_\_\_
- Sizoo \_\_\_\_\_
- Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

*STAMM*  
*Ke...*

As you know the Espionage Section reviews a number of intelligence summaries and publications received by the Bureau from other agencies and routes them to interested personnel in the Bureau. On a great number of these publications we have authority to destroy them after we have reviewed the material of interest and there is no necessity for filing. Where Bureau officials indicate that certain material should be indexed and filed, the publications are filed.

*Carbone*  
*PAPAH*

DATE: 10/29/106  
CLASSIFIED BY: 60322awc/yp/bca  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3.3(f) 10/29/2003

[Redacted]

b1  
b3

RECOMMENDATION:

1. It is recommended the FBI Laboratory advise whether or not it desires to continue to receive this material and whether or not it desires that the material be permanently retained in the files.

*Lab would like to see all issues but no need to file except in unusual instances.*  
*Ajr*

2. [Redacted]

b1  
b3

*Destroyed*  
*Attachment*  
*50 APP 6 1954*  
*SSB/CAS*

*3/2/54*  
[Redacted] (S)  
RECORDED-27  
INDEXED-27  
162-80750-2317  
MAR 29 1954  
*5-55*

b1  
b3

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE:

March 24, 1954

FROM : V. P. Keay

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

SUBJECT: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY;  
JOINT COMMITTEE ON CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE


- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- W.C. Sullivan \_\_\_\_\_
- Belmont \_\_\_\_\_
- Clegg \_\_\_\_\_
- Glavin \_\_\_\_\_
- Harbo \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Tracy \_\_\_\_\_
- Gearty \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Holloman \_\_\_\_\_
- Sizoo \_\_\_\_\_
- Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

*Viper*

*Mike*

As you know, on March 10, 1954, Senator Mansfield of Montana submitted a resolution in the Senate proposing the establishment of a Joint Committee on Central Intelligence, which group would be authorized to follow and check the activities of CIA. On March 23, 1954, Alex Dulles, Director of the CIA, furnished the following information to the Liaison Agent.

*gjm*



b1  
b3

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 62-100929

ACTION:

None. For your information.

CLASSIFIED BY 60322uc/lp/bca  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25AS/S  
6/29/2031

SJP:lw

58 APR 8 1954

RECORDED-33

INDEXED-33

62-80750-2318

MAR 26 1954

~~SECRET~~

LLAYSON

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Tolson *✓*

FROM : L. B. Nichols

SUBJECT:

DATE: March 25, 1954

Tolson  
Ladd  
Nichols  
Belmont  
Clegg  
Glavin  
Harbo  
Rosen  
Tracy  
Mohr  
Winterrowd  
Tele. Room  
Holloman  
Miss Gandy

Messrs. Arens, Duffy and Schroeder, of the Internal Security Subcommittee, called on me this afternoon. Arens stated that [redacted] had been talking to them about Jay Lovestone, the Free Trade Union Committee, and his associates, Irving Brown [redacted] Carmel Office, and Bertram Wolfe. He pointed out that there are rumors that Central Intelligence Agency money is going into the outfit; that all labor activities are cleared through Jay Lovestone; that it is his understanding that witnesses are available such as [redacted] They have been told that Lovestone is still a Communist and that Offie is a questionable character.

b7C

I told Arens that quite frankly the Bureau did not desire to become involved in such a matter, as Arens had requested whether we could give them any assistance. I further pointed out that I felt that if they were going into this, they should give consideration to taking the matter up with the Attorney General in view of the policy considerations which are involved; that Pegler, of course, had printed the allegation that CIA money was in back of Lovestone; that this would involve another agency, and that if they got into this, I could anticipate all sorts of problems that would arise.

Arens then inquired about the recent allegations we had received on the arrest of Offie. I told him we had checked these out carefully and there was no basis for them.

The three of them agreed that they should go cautiously.

I further made it clear that in view of the present atmosphere, we in the Bureau were going to be exceedingly cautious in anything we did in view of the accusations which had been leveled at the Bureau and the challenges which had been directed at the confidential character of our files.

cc: Mr. Boardman  
Mr. Belmont

LBN:arm

62-80750-  
NOT RECORDED  
126 APR 6 1954

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10/21/01 BY 60267NLS

94367 EP/LS

51 APR 13 1954

ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-2621-19

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. GLAVIN

DATE: April 1, 1954

FROM : N. P. CALLAHAN

DATE: 10/29/04  
CLASSIFIED BY 60302uc/hp/bce  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3.3(1) 10/29/2003

- Tolson
- Ladd
- Clegg
- Glavin
- Harbo
- Rosen
- Tracy
- Laughlin
- Mohr
- Winterrowd
- Tele. Rm.
- Holloman
- Gandy

SUBJECT:

[Redacted Subject]

b1  
b3

(S)

PURPOSE:

[Redacted Purpose]

[Redacted Purpose]

(S)

BACKGROUND:

[Large Redacted Background Section]

b1  
b3

CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS:

[Redacted Current Developments Section]

FOR INSTRUCTIONS AS TO  
TO DISSEMINATION  
SEE FILE 117-268-152

62-80750-  
NOT RECORDED  
176 APR 12 1954

INITIALS ON ORIGINAL

~~SECRET~~

ORIGINAL FILED IN 117-268-468

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum to Mr. Glavin

April 1, 1954

Re:

[Redacted]

b1  
b3

(S)

[Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

b1  
b3

(S)

Mr. Schmid pointed out that he had just returned to the office this morning after having been on extended annual leave for the past two weeks and had just gotten a brief "fill-in" on developments in connection with this matter. (u)

I pointed out to Mr. Schmid the undesirability of the phraseology referred to above being contained in the proposed letter. He was in complete agreement with the writer that these phrases should not be utilized and that if he is in attendance at the meeting this afternoon, or is otherwise contacted in connection with this letter, he will exert every effort to have this phraseology changed. (u)

This is submitted for record and information purposes. You will be advised of all developments in connection therewith. (u)

*Mr. Tolson orally advised  
by Mr. [unclear] 4/1/54*

*✓ [unclear] 4/1/54*

~~SECRET~~

*Now  
Amended  
1/70*

*The word [unclear] in  
proposed letter [unclear]  
[unclear]*



~~SECRET~~

SAC, Baltimore  
Director, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE. April 5, 1954

PERSONAL AND  
CONFIDENTIAL

b1  
b3

RECORDED - 26  
INDEXED - 26

62-80750-2319

EX-121

DATE: 10/29/06  
CLASSIFIED BY: 60322uc/lp/bce  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X33( ) (10/29/2003)

b1  
b3

- Telecom \_\_\_\_\_
- Ladd \_\_\_\_\_
- Nichols \_\_\_\_\_
- Belmont \_\_\_\_\_
- Clegg \_\_\_\_\_
- Glavin \_\_\_\_\_
- Harbo \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Tracy \_\_\_\_\_
- Laughlin \_\_\_\_\_
- Lohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Rm. \_\_\_\_\_
- Holloman \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

SJP:lw

RECEIVED WITH NOTATION ON YELLOW

27 APR 20 1954

MAILED 4  
APR 5 1954  
COMM - FBI

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: April 3, 1954

FROM : SAC, WFO (62-0)

b1  
b3

SUBJECT:

[Redacted]

(S) *Carroll*

[Redacted]

de

b1  
b3

[Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(S)

Above for information and such action as the Bureau may deem appropriate.

*de*

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

TFO:RMR

RECORDED-11

INDEXED-11

EX-127

62-80750-2320

21 APR 7 1954

*[Signature]*

EX-127

DATE: 10/29/06

CLASSIFIED BY 60322uc/ep/bce

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3.3(4) 10/29/2031

*file 62-80750*

60 MAY 3 1954

58 APR 13 1954

~~SECRET~~ L. P. [Signature]

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: April 1, 1954

FROM : V. P. *[Handwritten initials]*

SUBJECT: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

- Tolson
- Ladd
- Nichols
- Belmont
- Clegg
- Harbo
- Glavin
- Rosen
- Tracy
- Mohr
- Trotter
- Winterrowd
- Tele. Room
- Holloman
- Miss Gandy

*1/5* As you know, Allen Dulles, Director of CIA, appeared before the House and Senate Appropriations Committees within the last two weeks. On March 24, 1954, Dulles made reference to his appearance before the referenced committees and indicated to the Liaison Agent that he had not experienced the problems which he had anticipated. Dulles gave the impression of being very pleased with the results.

Since March 24, 1954, Liaison Agent Papich has been in contact with four different CIA officials, all of whom volunteered comments to the effect that Dulles had done an excellent job when he testified before the Appropriations Committees. Briefly, the CIA officials seem to be extremely happy over Dulles' performance.

ACTION:

None. For your information.

*Handwritten signature/initials*

*Handwritten initials*

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
 DATE 10/29/06 BY 60322uc/lp/ka

RECORDED - 86

SJP:bas

EX - 107

62-80750-2321

APR 8 1954

*Handwritten signature*  
 5 APR 14 1954

*Handwritten signature*

# Office Memorandum

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT *WAB*

DATE: April 7, 1954

FROM : V. P. *W*

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Boardman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Nichols   
 Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
 Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
 Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
 Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
 Trotter \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
 Holloman \_\_\_\_\_  
 Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

You may be interested in the following comments which were volunteered to Liaison Agent Papich on April 6, 1954, by Allen Dulles, Director of the CIA.

[Redacted]

[Redacted] (S)

[Redacted]

[Redacted] (S)

[Redacted]

[Redacted] (S)

b1  
b3

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 62-98810-1

ACTION:

None. For your information. ✓

SJP:lw *W*

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

RECORDED-48

62-80750-2322

DATE: 10/29/06  
CLASSIFIED BY 60322uc/lp/bce  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3.3 (10/29/2031)

13 APR 13 1954

~~SECRET~~ LIASON

55 APR 10 1954

~~SECRET~~

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: April 8, 1954

FROM : SAC, BALTIMORE (94-238)

40897

SUBJECT:

[Redacted]

b1  
b3

(S)

~~PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL~~

Reference is made to Bureau letters dated April 5, 1954, and October 17, 1951, furnishing this office with instructions regarding the above captioned matter.

[Redacted]

b1  
b3

[Redacted]

(S)

In the event any information comes to the attention of this office which would be of interest in this matter the Bureau will be advised.

~~EX-PROC.~~

JFF:afw  
REGISTERED MAIL

DATE: 10/29/06  
CLASSIFIED BY 60322uc/lp/bce  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X REC-10/29/2013

*gp*

INDEXED - 21  
RECORDED - 21  
62-80750-2323

[Redacted]

b1  
b3

APR 8 1954

13

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

~~SECRET~~

*LIA*

*Brake*  
*gan*  
*PAR*

58 APR 21 1954

~~SECRET~~

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT *AKB*

DATE:

April 12, 1954

FROM : V. P. Keay *VPK*

- Tolson
- Boardman
- Nichols
- Belmont
- Glavin
- Harbo
- Rosen
- Tamm
- Tracy
- Mohr
- Winterrowd
- Tele. Room
- Holloman
- Miss Gandy

SUBJECT:

[Redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

*Central Intelligence Agency*

[Redacted]

[Redacted] (S)

[Redacted]

[Redacted] (S)

[Redacted]

[Redacted] (S)

A review of the Bureau files [Redacted]  
failed to disclose any derogatory information concerning

Comment:

[Redacted]

[Redacted] (S)

ACTION:

None. For your information.

RECORDED - 6

*62-80750-232*

INDEXED - 6

13 APR 15 1954

SJP:lw  
1 - Mr. Cotter

EX - 104

DATE: *10/29/06*

CLASSIFIED BY *60322 uc/4/...*  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3.3(1) *10/29/2031*

~~SECRET~~ APR 26 1954

b1  
b3

b1  
b3

b3

b1  
b3

~~SECRET~~

RECORDED - 36 **62-80750-2325**

VIA LIAISON

EX-112

Date: April 19, 1954

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

To: Director  
Central Intelligence Agency  
2430 E Street, N. W.  
Washington, D. C.

Attention:

[Redacted] (S)

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject:

[Redacted] (S)

b1  
b3

Reference is made to your undated inquiry  
received by this Bureau on April 15, 1954, through our  
liaison representative.

[Redacted]

b1  
b3

(S)

[Redacted]

(S)

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Ladd \_\_\_\_\_
- Nichols \_\_\_\_\_
- Belmont \_\_\_\_\_
- Clegg \_\_\_\_\_
- Glavin \_\_\_\_\_
- Harbo \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Tracy \_\_\_\_\_
- Gearty \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Holloman \_\_\_\_\_
- Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

SBD:GAS

DATE: 10/29/86  
CLASSIFIED BY: 60322 uc/lp/bca  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3.3(1) 10/29/2031

~~SECRET~~

ABx  
wabx  
st

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: April 14, 1954

FROM : V. P. Keay /PKA

SUBJECT: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)  
REACTION TO ATTORNEY GENERAL'S SPEECH  
OF APRIL 9, 1954

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Ladd \_\_\_\_\_
- Nichols \_\_\_\_\_
- Belmont \_\_\_\_\_
- Clegg \_\_\_\_\_
- Glavin \_\_\_\_\_
- Harbo \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Tracy \_\_\_\_\_
- Gearty \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Holloman \_\_\_\_\_
- Sizoo \_\_\_\_\_
- Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

You may be interested in the following information which was volunteered to the Liaison Agent on April 13, 1954, by [redacted]

[Large redacted block]

[Redacted line]

ACTION:

CA 98-1926 None. For your information.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 11/22/99 BY SP7/ld/my

9803 RDD/MS  
4/21/93 C.A. # PP-1926  
SP 7 OCL/AM  
6/23/94 C.A. # PP-1926  
SJP:bas

Remains UNCLASSIFIED PER CIA REVIEW OF 6/1/94

APR 25 1954

62-80750-2326  
APR 20 1954

TOLSON

b3



# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Tolson *V. per [unclear]*

FROM : L. B. Nichols *1/13/54*

SUBJECT: *cf* CIA REQUEST FOR COPIES OF  
SPEECH BY ATTORNEY GENERAL  
April 9, 1954

DATE: April 13, 1954

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Ladd \_\_\_\_\_
- Nichols \_\_\_\_\_
- Belmont \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Glavin \_\_\_\_\_
- Harbo \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Tracy \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Trotter \_\_\_\_\_
- Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Holloman \_\_\_\_\_
- Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

*[Handwritten signature]*

Mike Horan, of Deputy Attorney General Rogers' office, advised DeLoach at 5:00 p. m. today that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had made two calls to the Department relative to inquiring as to the availability of copies of the speech given by the Attorney General on April 9, 1954. Horan stated they had specifically requested four copies of this speech. He did not know the nature of the CIA request; however, in his opinion, CIA is interested in the high praise given by the Attorney General to the FBI and its undercover informants and specifically to that portion of the speech which indicated that the FBI had received information indicating the illness of Stalin, prior to his death, and the fact that Malenkov would be the probable successor.

Horan stated that four copies of the speech had been referred to CIA.

It is entirely probable that we will receive requests from CIA based upon the above-mentioned remarks.

ACTION:

For information.

*[Handwritten checkmarks]*

*cy*

CDD:arm

RECORDED - 5

*62-80750-2327*

INDEXED - 5

13 APR 21 1954

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE *10/29/06* BY *60322uc/lp/bcd*

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 94-1-173-1

*50 APR 20 1954*

~~SECRET~~

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: April 22, 1954

FROM : V. P. Keay

SUBJECT: JAY LOVESTONE  
ESPIONAGE - IS

o CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE Agency

g

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b1  
b3

(S)

(S)

ACTION:

The Liaison Agent will continue to follow this matter with the CIA.

SJP:lw

- 1 - Mr. Hennrich
- Mr. Wannall

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

62-80750- ✓

NOT RECORDED  
189 APR 20 1954 ORIGINAL  
INITIALS CW

I see no reason to follow it up.  
It is CIA's "Baby".

H.

DATE: 10/29/86  
CLASSIFIED BY 60322uc/lp/bec  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3.3(4), 6/29/2031


24W

5 5 MAY 4 1954

~~SECRET~~

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 61-1292-853

COPIES:pjs




~~SECRET~~

April 16, 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TOLSON  
MR. BOARDMAN  
MR. BELMONT


*Central Intelligence Agency*

*AM*



b1  
b3

*1272-842*  
ORIGINAL FILED IN 617



(S)

Very truly yours,

J. E. H.

John Edgar Hoover  
Director

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

JEH:mpd

*62-80750*

NOT RECORDED  
135 APR 22 1954

DATE: *10/29/06*  
CLASSIFIED BY *60322uc/ep/lee*  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3.3( *10/29/2031* )

~~SECRET~~

60 APR 27 1954

*F488*

MR. J. H. BELMONT

April 15, 1954

MR. V. P. KEAY

b1  
b3

[Redacted]

(S)

~~SECRET~~

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

esa

[Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b1  
b3

[Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(S)

ACTION:

None, For your information.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

SDB:mpm

1 - Mr. Nichols

I suggest a current memo to AG so he  
will be informed.

T.

DATE: 10/29/01

CLASSIFIED BY 60322uc/ep/b...

Yes. H.

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3.3(7) 10/29/2031

162-80750- ✓

NOT RECORDED

176 APR 21 1954

55 APR 27 1954

~~SECRET~~

INITIALS ON ORIGINAL

F488

ORIGINAL FILED IN 117-268-477

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

62-80750- ✓

NOT RECORDED  
199 APR 27 1954

INITIALS ON ORIGINAL

60 APR 30 1954

~~SECRET~~

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: April 23, 1954

FROM : W. A. Brantzen

SUBJECT

[Redacted]

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Ladd \_\_\_\_\_
- Nichols \_\_\_\_\_
- Belmont \_\_\_\_\_
- Clegg \_\_\_\_\_
- Glavin \_\_\_\_\_
- Harbo \_\_\_\_\_
- pb1 \_\_\_\_\_
- Tracy \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Holloman \_\_\_\_\_
- Sizoo \_\_\_\_\_
- Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

SYNOPSIS:

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] (S)

[Redacted]

[Redacted] (S) D

[Redacted]

[Redacted] (S)

b1  
b3

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

65-62562-9

65-62562

Attachment

DATE: 10/29/04  
 CLASSIFIED BY: 60322uc/6/bic  
 DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3.3(4) 10/24/2031

WBW:gks

~~SECRET~~

13 APR 27 1954

SP 56

~~SECRET~~

RECOMMENDATIONS:

[Redacted]

(S) b1  
b3


[Redacted]

(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

DETAILS:



b1  
b3

(S)

~~SECRET~~



162-80750 - ✓

NOT RECORDED  
86 APR 30 1954



SEARCHED  
SERIALIZED  
INDEXED  
FBI

ORIGINAL FILED IN

62-65036-9

~~SECRET~~

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : L. V. Boardman

DATE: April 23, 1954

FROM : A. H. Belmont

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

- Tolson
- Nichols
- Belmont
- Mohr
- Glavin
- Harbo
- Rosen
- Tracy
- Gearty
- Mohr
- Winterrowd
- Tele. Room
- Holloman
- Nease
- Miss Gandy

SUBJECT :

[Redacted]

ESPIONAGE - R

b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(S)

b1  
b3

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(S)

65-82006  
LVS:blb  
Attachment

~~SECRET~~

DATE: 10/29/06  
CLASSIFIED BY 60322uc/lp/bie  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X33(1) 10/29/03

CAS

~~SECRET~~

RECOMMENDATION:

[Redacted]

b1  
b3

[Redacted] (S)

[Redacted] (S)

b1  
b3

detached and sent - 6 PM 4-23-54 TAC


~~SECRET~~

*892*

162-80750-



NOT RECORDED  
199 APR 27 1954



~~SECRET~~

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: April 23, 1954

- Tolson
- Boardman
- Nichols
- Belmont
- Glavin
- Harbo
- Rosen
- Tamm
- Tracy
- Mohr
- Winterrowd
- Tele. Room
- Holloman
- Miss Gandy

FROM : W. A. Branigan *3/10/54*

DATE: 10/29/82  
 CLASSIFIED BY 60322uc/4p/bee  
 DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3.3(4) 10/29/2031

SUBJECT: [Redacted] (S)

b1  
b3

SYNOPSIS:

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] (S)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] (S)

b1  
b3

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

65-62562

Attachment with H-20-50

WBW:gks

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
 WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

13 APR 27 1954

~~SECRET~~

ESP SEC

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 65-62562-110

~~SECRET~~

[Redacted]

[Redacted] (S)

RECOMMENDATIONS

[Redacted]

[Redacted] (S)

b1  
b3

[Redacted]

[Redacted] (S)

REC

✓

OK

~~SECRET~~

Office Memorandum UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Tolson  
FROM : L. B. Nichols

DATE: April 2, 1954

SUBJECT: ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

~~SECRET~~

- Tolson
- Ladd
- Nichols
- Belmont
- Clegg
- Glavin
- Harbo
- Rosen
- Tracy
- Mohr
- Trotter
- Winterrowd
- Tele. Room
- Holloman
- Miss Gandy

*Handwritten notes:*  
 (iv)  
 Kennedy  
 Jefferson  
 MacCallahan  
 Giffith

By reference from the Director's Office, I talked to [redacted]

[Large redacted area containing the main body of the memorandum]

(S)

cc: Mr. Boardman  
Mr. Belmont

LBN:arm

RECORDED - 68

INDEXED 68

62-80750-2328

DATE: 10/24/06

CLASSIFIED BY 60322/14/06

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3.3

~~SECRET~~

EX-129

19 APR 15 1954

~~SECRET~~

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 66-6200-105

b1  
b3

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

FROM : MR. V. W. RAY

SUBJECT: JAY LOVESTONE  
ESPIONAGE - IS

~~SECRET~~

9803 RDD/ACM  
5/25/93 C.A. # 88-1926

DATE: April 5, 1954

4/26/83

SP1 AG/JC

10/8/87 # 254103

SP 7 OLC/ACM  
10/9/94 C.A. # 88-1926

Classified by SP16SK/dms

Declassify on OADR  
77,988

See Top Serial  
Form 4-74

- Tolson ✓
- Boardman ✓
- Nichols ✓
- Belmont ✓
- Mohr ✓
- Rosen ✓
- Tamm ✓
- Tracy ✓
- W.C. Sullivan ✓
- Tele. Room
- Holloman
- Miss Gandy

b1  
b3

[Redacted]

(S) [Handwritten signature]

SYNOPSIS:

[Redacted]

[Large redacted area]

b1  
b3

850

PHOTODUPLICATIONS CONCURRED IN

SJP:mdm  
1 - Mr. Wannall, Rm. 1538  
1 - Mr. Aull, Rm. 2714

62-80750 - ✓

NOT RECORDED

46 APR 27 1954

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

51 MAY 6 1954



DATE: 10/29/04  
CLASSIFIED BY L0322uc/Lp/bca  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3.3( ) 10/29/2031

254103

FOI/PA #	227988
APPEAL #	
CIVIL ACT. #	
E.C. #	12353
DATE	6/29/84
[CLASSIFIED PER CIA LETTER 5/18/84] (X)	

10/6/87

DMS/JC

ALL INFO. CLASSIFIED PER  
CIA LETTERS DATED

3/22/89 AND 10/1-89

8123 MCH/MG 7/10/91 #254103

ALSO PER CIA LETTER  
OF 11/6/91

9803 RDD/ACM  
COMP. # 293983

ALL CLASSIFICATION  
PER CIA REVIEW OF 6/6/94  
SP 7 CUC/ACM  
10/9/94 C.A. #88-1826

~~SECRET~~

b1  
b3

[Redacted]

[Redacted] (S)

ACTION:

The above is being referred to the attention of the Espionage Section.

ere

✓ ↗

DETAILS:

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] (S)

[Redacted]

[Redacted] (S)

b1  
b3

~~SECRET~~

# Serial Charge-Out

RECORDS MANAGEMENT DIVISION  
RECORD/INFORMATION DISSEMINATION SECTION

## SERIAL CHARGE OUT

This Document Has Been Removed

**TOP SECRET MATERIAL**

Document can be located in the

SPECIAL FILE ROOM, ROOM #7369  
NOTE TO DISCLOSURE:

Please proceed as usual

processing other documents in the request.

FOIPA # 368692

*SECTION 34*

File # 62-80750

Serial NR

b3

Date of Mail

Date

7/6/06

Initials

BCE

Analyst

Team

CU-1

b7c

copy:emp

~~SECRET~~

The Attorney General

April 16, 1954

Director, FBI

[Redacted]

~~SECRET~~

b1  
b3

esw  
b1  
b3

[Redacted]

This is to advise you of the most recent developments concerning this matter.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b1  
b3

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

cc: Mr. William P. Rogers  
Deputy Attorney General

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

b1  
b3

WRG:MFS

DATE: 10/29/06  
CLASSIFIED BY: 60322 uc/kp/bce  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3.3 ( ) 10/29/3031

62-80750  
SEARCHED  
SERIALIZED  
APR 26 1954

350

MAY 6 1954

~~SECRET~~  
INTERNAL USE ONLY

ORIGINAL FILED IN 67-117-268-485  
b3

~~SECRET~~

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. S. J. Tracy

DATE: 4-21-54

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Ladd \_\_\_\_\_
- Nichols \_\_\_\_\_
- Belmont \_\_\_\_\_
- Clegg \_\_\_\_\_
- Glavin \_\_\_\_\_
- Harbo \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Tracy \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Trotter \_\_\_\_\_
- Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Holloman \_\_\_\_\_
- Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

FROM : G. J. Engert *[Signature]*

SUBJECT:  (S)

b1  
b3

(S)

b1  
b3

(S)

(S)

**ACTION TO BE TAKEN:**

None. The above is being submitted for record purposes.

GJE:fm *[Signature]*

Attachment

DATE: 10/29/06  
CLASSIFIED BY: 60322uc/lp/bce  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3.3 (E) 10/29/2031

*b.h.s.*

*S*

*S*  
*211-ENCL.*  
*34*



ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

RECORDED-34 62-80750-2329  
INDEXED-34  
APR 23 1954

~~SECRET~~

*[Handwritten signature]*

20 MAY 7 1954



~~SECRET~~

DATE: 10/29/06  
CLASSIFIED BY 60322uc/lp/bce  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3.3(1) 10/29/2031

4

Date: April 21, 1954  
To: Director, FBI (S)  
From: [Redacted]  
Re: [Redacted] (S)

b1  
b3

Rebulet of April 7, last, captioned as above.

[Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

b1  
b3

[Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

(S)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

102-80750-  
NOT RECORDED  
141 MAY 13 1954

JNS:MEG

*Jan*

52 MAY 21 1954

~~SECRET~~

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 102-80750-11

~~SECRET~~

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont *AKS*

DATE: April 15, 1954

FROM : V. P. Keay *AKS*

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Boardman \_\_\_\_\_
- Nichols \_\_\_\_\_
- Belmont *AKS*
- Glavin \_\_\_\_\_
- Harbo \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Tamm \_\_\_\_\_
- Tracy \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Holloman \_\_\_\_\_
- Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

SUBJECT:

[Redacted]

*Report*

*AK*

b1  
b3

APR 10/29/05  
 b0322uc/lp/bca  
 DECLASSIFY ON: 2035 (1) 10/29/2031

[Redacted]

(S)

b1  
b3

[Redacted]

(S)

*2*

[Redacted]

(S)

b1  
b3

ACTION:

RECORDED-34

62-80750-2330

[Redacted]

(S)

APR 23 1954

SJP:bas

cc - Mr. G. J. Engert

4207

68 MAY 10 1954

*Memo to SJP 4/21/54  
by [unclear]*

*Engert  
me  
AK*

~~SECRET~~

b1  
b3

[Redacted]

(S)

ADDENDUM, 4-19-54:

OK 4/19

This matter has been discusses with Mr. Engert and Mr. Tracy, who will be available to discuss this matter with the CIA men at 10:00 a.m. tomorrow (April 20).

JAS

AM

[Handwritten signature]

[Redacted]

(S)

b1  
b3

OK 4/20

~~SECRET~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

10/29/06  
60322uc/4/bce  
CONFIDENTIAL (S) (10/29/2003)

10896

VIA LIAISON


Date: April 30, 1954

To: Director  
① Central Intelligence Agency  
2430 E Street, N.W.  
Washington, D. C.

Attention: [Redacted]

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director  
Federal Bureau of Investigation


Subject: [Redacted]



b1  
b3


G.L.R.-1

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(S)

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b3




(S)



1  
S  
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RECEIVED REL  
PR 30 2  
C D



(S)

APR 30 2 00 PM '54

U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE

- Tolson
- Ladd
- Nichols
- Belmont
- Clegg
- Glavin
- Harbo
- Rosen
- Tracy
- Gearty
- Mohr
- Winterrowd
- Tele. Room
- Holloman
- Miss Gandy

SJP:saw

EX - 104

RECORDED-42  
INDEXED-42

62-80750-334

MAY 3 1954

MAY 13 1954

F488

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Office Memorandum ~~SECRET~~ UNITEL GOVERNMENT

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: April 26, 1954

FROM :

[Redacted] (S)

*Ks* [Redacted] (S) b1

SUBJECT:

[Redacted] (S)

~~SECRET - AIR COURIER~~ *Papash*

b1  
b3

[Redacted] (S)

[Redacted]

b1  
b3

[Redacted] (S)

[Redacted] (S)

DATE: 10/29/06  
CLASSIFIED BY 60322 UC/LP/bce  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X33(1) 10/29/2031

WCS: JES

RECORDED-29

62-80750-2333

INDEXED-29

27 APR 30 1954

5/5/54

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

EX-112

*FDAP*

03 MAY 11 1954

~~SECRET~~

*LIAISON*

Copy:sdj

~~SECRET~~

April 26, 1954

Mr. Nichols:

RE: CONGRESSMAN FRED BUSBEY  
(R., Illinois)

40895  
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

[Redacted]

b1  
b3

[Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b3

C. D. DeLoach

CDD:arm

think it best to let him dig up  
his own data. \*-- I concur.

LBN

H.

162-80750-  
NOT RECORDED  
191 MAY 14 1954

10/29/06  
CLASSIFIED BY 60322 uc/4/bc  
UNCLASSIFY ON: 25X3.3(1) 10/29/2031

51  
MAY 19 1954

~~SECRET~~

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 61-1292-006

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: April 28, 1954

FROM : W. A. Branigan

~~TOP SECRET~~  
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN  
OTHERWISE

Classified by SP7 mac/vp  
Declassify on: OADR 8/13/85

SUBJECT: MOCASE  
ESPIONAGE - R

DECLASSIFIED BY 60322 UC/lp/bee  
ON 10/20/06 BY SP7 mac/vp  
NON-SENSITIVE TO  
DISSEMINATION  
AS INSTRUCTIONS AS

FOI/PA # 217,484  
CIVIL ACT. # ✓  
E.O. # 12356  
DATE 8-13-85 INITIALS VP

Tolson  
Ladd  
Nichols  
Belmont  
Clegg  
Glavin  
Harbo  
Rosen  
Tracy  
Mohr  
Winterrowd  
Tele. Room  
Holloman  
Gandy

SYNOPSIS:

Information obtained by Boris Morros in Mocase disseminated approximately 23 times since 1950 to the White House, the Attorney General and other Government agencies

[Redacted]

[Redacted] (U)

[Redacted]

However, this raises a question as to how we will meet our responsibilities in disseminating future information. National Security Council Directive No. 1, relating to coordination between CIA and other intelligence agencies, provides that members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) should immediately furnish to other members any information indicating an impending crisis or a condition affecting the security of the United States requiring immediate action or decision. Thereafter the Director of CIA should immediately convene the IAC and thereafter prepare an intelligence estimate. The Directive also requires intelligence agencies maintain a continuing interchange of information with each other and with CIA and, further, that the intelligence organizations within the limits of their capabilities shall provide or procure such intelligence as may be requested by the Director of CIA.

When and if we receive information in this case of the type referred to in the National Security Council Directive, we should carefully evaluate it and make a decision at that time as to the officials and agencies of the Government to whom it should be disseminated.

~~TOP SECRET~~

ORIGINAL

176 MAY 14 1954

1954

Attachment  
100-352385  
ETT:blb

*on but before question  
to get a firm answer  
want to pass on it  
instruction does not apply*

21 1954

FOR INSTRUCTIONS AS  
TO DISSEMINATION  
SEE FILE 100-352385-1481

ORIGINAL FILED IN 100-352385-198

b3

b3

~~TOP SECRET~~

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that the attached letter again  
advising [redacted] be  
approved.

b3

*gac*

*V* */*

DETAILS:

You will recall that in the Mccase investigation we have obtained information relating to international matters, developments within the USSR, etc., and have disseminated such data on approximately 23 separate occasions. The dissemination has been to the White House, the Attorney General, members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee and other officials and agencies of the Government. Each of the letters of dissemination in the past has contained a paragraph identifying all of the recipients of the information.

On March 16, 1954, we disseminated the most recent information obtained in this case which was provided by Bureau informant Boris Morros. [redacted]

b3

[redacted]

*(u) (S)*

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (U)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b3

It is anticipated that we will obtain from Boris Morros additional information which should be disseminated. The National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 1 (revised 3-28-52) relating to coordination between CIA and other intelligence organizations states in part as follows:

"6. Whenever any member of the Intelligence Advisory Committee obtains information that indicates an impending crisis situation, such as the outbreak of hostilities involving the United States, or a condition which affects the security of the United States to such an extent that immediate action or decision on the part of the President or the National Security Council seems to be required, he shall immediately furnish the information to the other members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee as well as to other officials or agencies as may be indicated by the circumstances. The Director of Central Intelligence shall immediately convene the Intelligence Advisory Committee. After receiving the views of the Intelligence Advisory Committee members, the Director of Central Intelligence shall promptly prepare and disseminate the national intelligence estimate in accordance with paragraphs 4 and 5 above.

"9. The intelligence organizations in each of the departments and agencies shall maintain with the Central Intelligence Agency and with each other, as appropriate to their respective

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

responsibilities, a continuing interchange of intelligence information and intelligence available to them.

"11. The intelligence organizations within the limits of their capabilities shall provide, or procure, such intelligence as may be requested by the Director of Central Intelligence or by one of the other departments or agencies."

It would appear that this Directive definitely places a responsibility upon the Bureau to disseminate information to members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee, including CIA. It is also noted that the Directive specifies that intelligence organizations shall provide or procure such intelligence as may be requested by the Director of CIA.

Therefore, when and if we receive additional information from this source which is of the character referred to in the National Security Council Directive and which should be disseminated in accordance with the Directive, we should very carefully evaluate the information and make a decision at that time as to the officials and agencies of the Government to whom the information should be disseminated.

~~TOP SECRET~~

MAN

177

# Office Memorandum UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

**SECRET**

SEE REVERSE  
SIDE BAR  
CLASSIFIED DATE: April 30, 1954  
ACTION

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Boardman \_\_\_\_\_
- Belmont \_\_\_\_\_
- Glavin \_\_\_\_\_
- Harbo \_\_\_\_\_
- Tracy \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Holloman \_\_\_\_\_
- Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

FROM : MR. V. P. KEAT

SUBJECT: JAY LOVESTONE  
ESPIONAGE - IS

See Top Serial  
Form 774

SP 7 cc/ACM pp. 1026  
10/19/4 C.A. #4/26/83  
ALL CLASSIFICATION DECLASSIFY ON: OADR  
PER CDR REVIEW of 6/2/94

9803 RDD/ACM  
5705193  
O.A. # 102-1038

SP 8 TJ/PAC  
5/6/88  
#274508

227,988  
227,989  
227,922

b1  
b3

SYNOPSIS:

[Redacted]

b1  
b3

[Redacted]

ACTION:

The Liaison Agent is advising [Redacted]

[Redacted]

Page 4

also, see Page 3

DATE: 10/29/06  
CLASSIFIED BY: 60322 uc/lp/bce  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3.3 (1/22/29/2003)

162-80750-  
NOT RECORDED  
141 MAY 10 1954  
COPIES OF ORIGINAL

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

DETAILS:

[Redacted]

SJP:mpm

1 - Mr. Nichols

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall, Rm. 1533

9 news directed  
to A/S  
5/4/54  
29 MAR 1954

~~SECRET~~

ORIGINAL COPY FILED 6-1-72-860

b1  
b3



~~SECRET~~

[Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

(S)

b1  
b3

[Redacted]

(S)

*Further check on this.*

(S)

*Perms  
To Amend  
5-4-54  
EAB*

[Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

(S)

~~SECRET~~

[Redacted]

(S)

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b3

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(S)

*all  
one*

*✓*

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: May 3, 1954

FROM : V. P. Keay

SUBJECT: MOCASE  
ESPIONAGE - R  
100-352385

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 10/24/06 BY 60322uc/lp/bca

Tolson	_____
Boardman	_____
Nichols	_____
Belmont	_____
Glavin	_____
Harbo	_____
Rosen	_____
Tamm	_____
Tracy	_____
Mohr	_____
Winterrowd	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holloman	_____
Miss Gandy	_____

On April 30, 1954, Liaison Agent Papich personally delivered to Allen Dulles, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Bureau letter dated April 29, 1954

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b3

100-352385-1998


SJP:lw INITIALS ON ORIGINAL  
1 - Mr. Turner  
51  
51 MAY 21 1954

62-80150-  
NOT RECORDED  
176 MAY 14 1954

8 MAY 11 1954

Memo to Belmont

Re: McCabe  
Espionage - R  
100-352385



b3

ACTION:

None. For your information.

*GAC*

*GMA* ✓  
✓

# Office Memorandum

~~SECRET~~ UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DATE: May 4, 1954

FROM : V. P. *Keagy*

SUBJECT: GENERAL WALTER BEDELL SMITH  
INFORMATION CONCERNING

- Tolson
- Boardman
- Nichols
- Belmont
- Mohr
- Harbo
- Rosen
- Tamm
- Tracy
- Nease
- Winterrowd
- Tele. Room
- Holloman
- Miss Gandy

*ch (S)*

*(u)*

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b3

(S)  
(S)

ACTION:

same. For your information.

DATE: 10/29/06  
 CLASSIFIED BY 60322uc/lp/bce  
 DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3.3(1) 10/29/2031

*gnc*

SJP:lw

*9803 eod/mg 4/21/93 C.A. #88-1826*  
*SP4 2/21/89 CA 88-1826*  
 Classified by *SP4 elw/alm*  
 Declassify on: *ORDR 11/20/89*  
**Comp. #293983**  
*9803 eod/alm*  
*5/25/93 C.A. #88-1826*  
*SP7 ccl/alm*  
*10/13/94 C.A. #88-1826*  
 All classification per  
 OADR Rev. EW of 10/13/94

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
 EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN  
 OTHERWISE

**162-80750-1**  
 NOT RECORDED  
 MAY 10 1954

60 MAY 13 1954

F488

ORIGINAL FILED IN 94-42836-30

~~SECRET~~

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT <sup>AB</sup>

DATE: May 4, 1954

FROM : V. P. <sup>ART</sup>

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Boardman \_\_\_\_\_
- Nichols \_\_\_\_\_
- Belmont \_\_\_\_\_
- Glavin \_\_\_\_\_
- Harbo \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Tamm \_\_\_\_\_
- Tracy \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Winterrowd \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Holloman \_\_\_\_\_
- Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

SUBJECT: [Redacted] (S)

DATE: 10/29/02  
CLASSIFIED BY 60322uc/Lp/bca  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3.3(1) (10/29/2003)

b1  
b3

SYNOPSIS:

[Large redacted area]

b1  
b3

*ENC*

ORIGINAL FILED IN 65-62161-27

SJP:10  
Attachment  
55 MAY 27 1954

62-80750 - (S)  
NOT RECORDED  
126 MAY 24 1954

~~SECRET~~

~~21 MAY 18 1954~~

b1  
b3

~~SECRET~~

Memo to Belmont

Re:  (S)

(S)

b1  
b3

RECOMMENDATION:

*Revised  
2/5/17/54  
Gus  
1*

(S)

(S)

Addendum

(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b1  
b3

Memo to Belmont

Re:  (S)

DETAILS:

b1  
b3

(S)

~~SECRET~~





Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. S. J. Tracy

DATE: 5-6-54

~~SECRET~~

- Tolson
- Ladd
- Nichols
- Belmont
- Clegg
- Glavin
- Harbo
- Rosen
- Tracy
- Mohr
- Trotter
- Winterrowd
- Tele. Room
- Holloman
- Miss Gandy

FROM : G. J. Engert

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

SUBJECT:

[Redacted]

b1  
b3

[Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

b1  
b3

(S)

[Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

(S)

RECOMMENDATION:

That the attached letter be delivered by the Liaison Section  
of the Bureau to [Redacted]

GJE:fm

Attachments

b1  
b3

DATE: 10/29/06

CLASSIFIED BY 60322 uc/lp/bee

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3.3(1) 10/29/2031

RECORDED-53  
INDEXED-53

62-80750-2335

8 MAY 13 1954

EX - 108

[Redacted]

~~SECRET~~

20 MAY 19 1954

~~SECRET~~

40894

62-80750-2336

VIA LIAISON

Date: May 7, 1954  
RECORDED-53  
INDEXED-53  
To: Director  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington 25, D. C.

[Redacted] (S)

b1  
b3

EX-108

[Redacted] (S)

From: John Edgar Hoover - Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Subject: [Redacted] (S)

RECEIVED DIRECTOR  
MAY 10 4 53 PM '54

b1  
b3

[Redacted] (S)

[Redacted] (S)

b1  
b3

[Redacted] (S)

[Redacted] (S)

REC'D STICE  
MAY 10 11 54 AM '54

SENT FROM D. C.  
TIME 9:40 PM  
DATE 5-10-54  
BY JW

DATE: 10/29/06  
CLASSIFIED BY: 60322 uc/ep/lee  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3.3(1) 10/29/2031

- Tolson
- Boardman
- Nichols
- Belmont
- Mohr
- DeLoach
- Casper
- Callahan
- Conrad
- Felt
- Gale
- Rosen
- Sullivan
- Tavel
- Trotter
- Tele. Room
- Holloman
- Gandy

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

~~SECRET~~

JUN 7 - 1954

RECEIVED READING ROOM  
MAY 10 9 22 AM '54

Handwritten signatures and initials, including "66's" and "A. J. ..."

outside envelope

10/30/06 60322 uc/Lp/bce



ENCLOSURE

62-80750-2336

~~SECRET~~

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: May 10, 1954

*Viper*

FROM : MR. V. P. [redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

- Tolson
- Boardman
- Belmont
- Mohr
- Parsons
- Quinn Tamm
- Nease
- Glavin
- Ladd
- Nichols
- Rosen
- Tamm
- Tracy
- Mohr
- Winterrowd
- Tele. Room
- Holloman
- Miss Gandy

b1  
b3

SUBJECT: [redacted]

RE: [redacted]

SYNOPSIS:

*Central Intelligence Agency*

[Large redacted block]

b1  
b3

ACTION:

[Redacted block]

ORIGINAL FILED IN 65-62482-4

**1 ENCL**

DATE: 10/30/06  
CLASSIFIED BY 60322uc/4/bce  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X5.34, 6, 10/30/2031

62-80750-V

NOT RECORDED

70 JUN 4 1954

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b1  
b3

Memo to A. H. Belmont  
from V. P. Keay

(S) [Redacted] RE: [Redacted]  
(S) [Redacted]

DETAILS:

[Redacted]  
[Redacted]  
(S)

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b3

[Redacted]  
(S)

[Redacted]  
(S)

[Redacted] (S)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b1  
b3

Memo to A. H. Belmont  
from V. P. Keay

RE: [redacted]

(S)

4. That the Bureau in appraising a case will weigh each one on its individual merits and will act to the best interest of the United States. That this would include cooperation with a foreign intelligence service if it were to the best interest of all concerned in handling a given case.

[redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted] (S)

b1  
b3

[redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted] (S)

[redacted]  
[redacted]  
[redacted] (S)

~~SECRET~~

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

COPY

~~SECRET~~

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: May 11, 1954

FROM : V. P. KEAY

DATE: 10/30/06  
CLASSIFIED BY 60322uc/LP/bce  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3.3(1) 10/30/2031

SUBJECT:  (S)  
INFORMATION CONCERNING

*CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION*

b1

(S)

(S)

b1  
b3

SJP:djs:lw  
1 - Mr. Broden

~~SECRET~~ 62-80750-V

NOT RECORDED  
126 MAY 18 1954

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

68 MAY 25 1954

*347*

ORIGINAL FILED IN 105-12607-140



~~SECRET~~

b1

Memo to Belmont

Re: [redacted] (S)  
Information Concerning

[redacted] (S)

b1  
b3

ACTION:

[redacted] (S)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Office 1

idum • UNITED

S GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI  
FROM : SAC, NEW ORLEANS (47-0)  
SUBJECT: [redacted] (S)

DATE: 5/13/54

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

b1  
b3

[redacted]

10892

LR-8

[redacted]

b1  
b3

[redacted] (S)

It was ascertained from [redacted]

that

he knew of no [redacted]

at that time.

b7C

[redacted]

b1  
b3

(S)

171334 25-10-10

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~

RECORDED - 4  
INDEXED - 4

62-80750-2337

JTR:gp

EX-122

MAY 17 1954

10/30/06 #368692

CLASSIFIED BY 60322 UC/LP/b

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3.1 10/30/2031

68 MAY 26 1994

Handwritten signatures and initials, including "PAPER" and "EARS".

~~SECRET~~

40893

DIRECTOR, FBI  
5/13/54

b1  
b3

[Redacted]

The above is being furnished to the Bureau for information.

5/25/54

[Redacted]

b1  
b3

*Handwritten initials*

62-80750-2337

~~SECRET~~

