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Freedom of Information and Privacy Acts

Subject: CIA LIAISON

File Number: 62-HQ-80750

SECTION 61



ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-22-2005 BY 60290 auc bce/mlt/amw

Federal Bureau of Investigation

ATTENTION

The following documents appearing in FBI files have been reviewed under the provisions of The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (Title 5, United States Code, Section 552); Privacy Act of 1974 (PA) (Title 5, United States Code, Section 552a); and/or Litigation.

FOIA/PA Litigation Executive Order Applied

Requester: _____

Subject: _____

Computer or Case Identification Number: _____

Title of Case: _____ Section _____

* File _____

Serials Reviewed: _____

Release Location: *File _____ Section _____

This file section has been scanned into the FOIPA Document Processing System (FDPS) prior to National Security Classification review. Please see the documents located in the FDPS for current classification action, if warranted. Direct inquires about the FDPS to RIDS Service Request Unit, [redacted] b2

File Number: 62-HQ-80750 Section 61

Serial(s) Reviewed: all

FOIPA Requester: David Sobel

FOIPA Subject: CIA

FOIPA Computer Number: 368692-1

File Number: _____ Section _____

Serial(s) Reviewed: _____

FOIPA Requester: _____

FOIPA Subject: _____

FOIPA Computer Number: _____

File Number: _____ Section _____

Serial(s) Reviewed: _____

FOIPA Requester: _____

FOIPA Subject: _____

FOIPA Computer Number: _____

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-22-2005 BY 60290 auc bce/mlt/amw

ATTENTION

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FOIA/PA Litigation Executive Order Applied

Requester: The JFK Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992.
Subject: FBI ID (CIA HQ Liaison File)
Computer or Case Identification Number: _____
Title of Case: _____
*File 62-80750 Section 61
Serials Reviewed: 1st NR 3743, 2nd NR 3743, 6th NR 3743

Release Location: *File _____ Section _____

FOIA/PA Litigation Executive Order Applied

Requester: _____
Subject: _____ b7C _____
Computer or Case Identification Number: _____
Title of Case: _____
*File _____ Section _____
Serials Reviewed: 62-80750 - 3727 MEMO p 1 ENCL p 8

Release Location: *File _____ Section _____

FOIA/PA Litigation Executive Order Applied

Requester: _____
Subject: _____
Computer or Case Identification Number: _____
Title of Case: _____
*File _____ Section _____
Serials Reviewed: _____

Release Location: *File _____ Section _____

*INDICATE IF FBIHQ OR FIELD OFFICE FILE NUMBER.

(THIS FORM IS TO BE MAINTAINED AS THE TOP SERIAL OF THE FILE, BUT NOT SERIALIZED.)

The above listed documents were provided to the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) under the JFK Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992. Pursuant to the Act it was necessary to provide the original documents to NARA: whenever an original document was provided, a xerox copy of the document was inserted in its place.

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES

ENCL 2

Memorandum

Tolson _____
 Mohr _____
 Parsons _____
 Belmont _____
 Callahan _____
 Conrad _____
 DeLoach _____
 Malone _____
 McGuire _____
 Rosen _____
 Trotter _____
 Evans _____
 W. C. Sullivan _____
 Tele. Room _____

3936

DATE: February 7, 1961

b7C TO :

[Redacted]

FROM : S. J. Papich

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Belmont

SUBJECT:

[Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

b1

b3

[Redacted]

b1

b3

(S)

[Redacted]

b1

b3

(S)

[Redacted]

b1

b3

(S)

SJP:ban
(5)

ban

REC-39

62-80150-3702

1 - [Redacted]

b7C

1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Papich

MAR 9 1961

[Redacted]

b7C

ENCLOSURE

Enclosure

~~MAR 14 1961~~

cc gene to

125
MAR 16 1961

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b7C

Memorandum Panich to [redacted]

b1

Re: [redacted]

b3

(S)

ACTION:

[redacted]

(S)

b1

b3

000

le

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

- Tolson _____
- Mohr _____
- Parsons _____
- Belmont
- Callahan _____
- Conrad _____
- DeLoach _____
- Malone _____
- McGuire _____
- Rosen _____
- Trotter _____
- Evans _____
- W.C. Sullivan _____
- Tele. Room _____
- Ingram _____
- Gandy _____

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: February 20, 1961

FROM : [Redacted]

b7C

b7C

SUBJECT: [Redacted]

b1
b3

(S) [Handwritten initials]

[Redacted]

b1
b3

(S)

[Redacted]

b1
b3

(S)

[Redacted]

(S)

EFM:fag fag
(6)

- 1 - Belmont
- 1 - Papich

b7C

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

1 -

*Let to NY (enc)
EFM:fag
3-7-61*

REC-39

10 MAR 19 1961
[Handwritten signature]

b1
b3

(S)

b1

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum [redacted] to Belmont
Re: [redacted]

b1

b3

(S)

b1

b3

(S)

(S)

b1
b3

OBSERVATIONS:

(S)

b1
b3

ACTION:

(S)

(S)

b1
b3

W *seen* *Q*

b7C

- ① - [redacted] Ccc advised
- ② - [redacted] was requested
to furnish available info.
Response will follow
POB
2/23/61

~~SECRET~~

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104-01

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

[Handwritten signature]

b1 TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 2-28-61

4-4-5

FROM : 

DATE: 02-22-2005
CLASSIFIED BY 60290 auc bce/mlt/amw AAG--derivative
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1) 02-22-2030

(S)

SUBJECT: 

Central Intelligence Agency

(S)




(S)




(S)



(S)



(S)


② Bureau


EES:
(3)

(S)

RECEIVED FBI
17 MAR 14 1961

62-80750-3704



CRIME RESEARCH
[Handwritten signatures]

b1

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

~~SECRET~~

1 - []

b7C

SAC, New York (105-22286)

March 7, 1961

JM REC-39

62-89750-3703
Director, FBI (105-54593)

[Redacted]

b1

(S)

Reurlet 12-14-60 and reBulet 1-24-61.

[Redacted]

b1

b3

(S)

[Redacted]

b1

b3

(S)

Enclosure

DATE: 03-09-2005
CLASSIFIED BY 60290 auc bce/mlt/amw AAG-derivative
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1,6) 03-09-2030

EHM:fag fag
(4)

UNRECORDED CO FILES IN 105-54593-1001

- Tolson _____
- Parsons _____
- Mohr _____
- Belmont _____
- Callahan _____
- Conrad _____
- DeLoach _____
- Evans _____
- Malone _____
- Rosen _____
- Tavel _____
- Trotter _____
- W.C. Sullivan _____
- Tele. Room _____
- Ingram _____
- Gandy _____

MAILED 19
MAR 7 - 1961
COMM-FBI

13 MAR 14 1961

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

OPTIONAL FORM
5010-1

UNITED STATES

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 2/27/61

FROM : SAC, WFO (62-

SUBJECT: [redacted] (S)

b1
b3

b7C

(S)

b1
b3

[redacted]

(S)

b1
b3

[redacted]

SEARCHED
SERIALIZED
INDEXED
FILED

(S)

b1
b3

[redacted]

b1
b3

[redacted]

(S)

b1
b3

[redacted]

2 - Bureau
WFO
JWR:CBB
(3)

57 MAR 22 1961 b7C

[redacted] - 46

EX-113

[redacted]

b7C

~~SECRET~~



THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
The American Embassy

Mr. Tolson	_____
Mr. Parsons	_____
Mr. Mohr	_____
Mr. Belmont	_____
Mr. Callahan	_____
Mr. Conrad	_____
Mr. DeLoach	_____
Mr. Evans	_____
Mr. Malone	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Tavel	_____
Mr. Trotter	_____
Mr. W.C. Sullivan	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Mr. Ingram	_____
Miss Gandy	_____

Handwritten initials/signature

AA
Handwritten marks

[Redacted] (S) b1

Date: March 2, 1961

To: Director, FBI

From: [Redacted] (S) b1

Subject: [Redacted] (S)

Re: telegrams 10/11/60 and 12/19/60 setting forth changes in the [Redacted] (S) b1

Handwritten: aoc
(S)

[Redacted] b7C
Handwritten: C. J. [unclear]

[Redacted] (S) b1 b3

[Redacted] (S) b1

[Redacted] (S)

2 - Bureau
AAG:vw
(3)

63 MAR 21 1961

XEROX
MAR 16 1961
Handwritten: YP

9 MAR 24 1961
162-80750-
NOT RECORDED
128 MAR 16 1961

ORIGINAL FILED IN 64-29833-253
(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

REC-60

62-80750-3704

March 10, 1961

DATE: 03-07-2005
CLASSIFIED BY 60290 auc bce/mlt/amw AAG
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1) 03-07-2030

[Redacted]

American Embassy

b1
b7C

[Redacted] (S)

Dear [Redacted]

b1
b7C

(S) [Redacted] our representative
in [Redacted] has advised me of your desire for one of
my photographs. In response to your request, it is a pleasure
for me to enclose one which I have autographed to you.

I would like to take this opportunity to thank
you for the many courtesies and cooperation you have furnished
this Bureau. My associates and I are deeply appreciative of
this, and you may be sure we are looking forward to a continu-
ation of this splendid relationship.

Sincerely yours,

MAILED 10
MAR 13 1961
COMM-FBI

J. Edgar Hoover

Enclosure

[Redacted]

Reurlet 2-28-61 (S)

1 - Foreign Liaison Unit - (Route through for review)

NOTE: Bufiles contain no derogatory information concerning [Redacted]
and the files of the Identification Division contain no arrest record for him.
We have had no previous correspondence with him. Legat advises he has
been very cooperative with the Bureau and has stated his admiration for the
Director on several occasions.

- Mr. Tolson
- Mr. Parsons
- Mr. Mohr
- Mr. Belmont
- Mr. Callahan
- Mr. Conrad
- Mr. DeLoach
- Mr. Evans
- Mr. Malone
- Mr. Rosen
- Mr. Tavel
- Mr. Trotter
- Mr. W.C. Sullivan
- Mr. Ingram
- Miss Gandy

51 MAR 17 1961

RVA:mca
(5)

~~SECRET~~

MAR 10 3 19 PM '61
FBI READING ROOM

b7C

~~SECRET~~

b1

Legal Attache, [redacted] (S)

3-10-61

Director, FBI

62-80750-3704

REC-60

[redacted]
RESEARCH (CORRESPONDENCE AND TOURS)

b7C

Reurlet 2-28-61.

Attached are one of my autographed photographs and cover letter which you may present to [redacted] as outlined in referenced letter.

b7C

Enclosures (2)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

DATE: 03-07-2005
CLASSIFIED BY 60290 auc bce/mlt/amw AAG
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1) 03-07-2030

MAR 10 3 19 PM '61
REC'D READING ROOM
FBI

Decker

with's

✓

JPM

PMZ

RWA

- Mr. Tolson.....
- Mr. Parsons.....
- Mr. Mohr.....
- Mr. Belmont.....
- Mr. Callahan.....
- Mr. Conrad.....
- Mr. DeLoach.....
- Mr. Evans.....
- Mr. Gale.....
- Mr. Rosen.....
- Mr. Sullivan.....
- Mr. Tavel.....
- Mr. Trotter.....
- Mr. W.C. Sullivan.....
- Tele. Room.....
- Mr. Ingram.....
- Miss Gandy.....

1 - Foreign Liaison Unit - (Route through for review)

RVA:elw
(5)

MAILED 10
MAR 13 1961
COMM-FBI

MAR 10 2 28 PM '61

MAR 10 2 23 PM '61
REC'D READING ROOM
FBI

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES

Memorandum

Tolson _____
 Parsons _____
 Mohr _____
 Belmont
 Callahan _____
 Conrad _____
 DeLoach _____
 Evans _____
 Malone _____
 Rosen _____
 Tavel _____
 Trotter _____
 W.C. Sullivan _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Ingram _____

TO : Mr. Belmont *abw*

DATE: March 8, 1961

FROM : [Redacted] *L'*

b7C

SUBJECT: [Redacted] *(S)*

b1

b3

b7C

b1
b3

Central Intelligence Agency

[Redacted]

Engel
Malone
W.C. Sullivan
(S)

[Redacted]

(S)

b1

b3

[Redacted]

(S)

b1

b3

[Redacted]

(S) b1

b3

[Redacted]

(S)

b1
b3

SJP:ban *ban*
(6)

- 1 - Mr. Parsons
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Branigan
- 1 - Liaison

51 MAR 22 1961

EX-113

REC-46

62-80750-3706

MAR 16 1961

LIAISON

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

DATE: 02-22-2005
CLASSIFIED BY 60290 AUC BCE/MLT/AMW AAG--derivative
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1) 02-22-2030

- Tolson _____
- Mohr _____
- Parsons _____
- Belmont _____
- Callahan _____
- Conrad _____
- DeLoach _____
- Malone _____
- McGuire _____
- Rosen
- Trotter
- W.C. Sullivan _____
- Tele. Room _____
- Ingram _____
- Gandy _____

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT *a188*

DATE: February 1, 1961 *6/21*

FROM : [Redacted] *L'* b7C

SUBJECT: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

[Redacted]

b1
b3

[Redacted]

b1
b3

RECOMMENDATION:

[Redacted]

b1
b3

SJP: jas
(8) *jas*

- 1-Parsons
- 1-Belmont
- 1-Trotter *destroyed*
- 1-[Redacted] *destroyed*
- 1-Liaison
- 1-Papich

b7C

[Redacted]

REC-62

7 MAR 22 1961

62-80752-357

Personally found by Major on 2-7-61

Returned the 3 [Redacted] 3-22-61

63 MAR 31

2-7-61 CSW

b1

(S)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

~~SECRET~~

b7C

Memorandum

TO : MR. TOLSON

DATE: 3/10/61

FROM : J. P. MOHR

SUBJECT: RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
IN COUNTERMEASURES AGAINST
TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCES

Tolson	
Parsons	
Mohr	
DeLoach	
Sullivan	
Conrad	
DeLoach	
Evans	
Malone	
Rosen	
Tavel	
Trotter	
W.C. Sullivan	
Tele. Room	
Ingram	
Gandy	

OC. I. A.

V. dec Belmont Bob

During the Director's appearance before the House Subcommittee on Appropriations on Monday, 3/6/61, Chairman Rooney asked the Director about the

b2

b7E

[Redacted]

The Director had me check into the matter and I subsequently briefed Chairman Rooney with our small part in this situation and it was at this time that Congressman Rooney requested that Bureau representatives accompany members of the Subcommittee to the State Department at 10:00 a. m. on Friday, 3/10/61, to visit the State Department Laboratory to personally check on this situation. The Chairman said he wanted the benefit of the Bureau's observations in connection with this visit, if we had any to offer. The Director designated Mr. Parsons and me to participate in the State Department venture.

b2

This morning at 10:00 a. m. , Mr. Parsons and I attended a briefing in a small classroom in the State Department which appeared to be part of the Physical Security Section of the State Department. Present from the Appropriations Committee were Chairman Clarence Cannon, Chairman John Taber, Chairman John Rooney and Congressmen Bow, Cederberg and Marshall. Also present were the Chief Clerk of the House Appropriations Subcommittee, [Redacted] and Chief Clerk of the Subcommittee [Redacted]

b7C

The group was welcomed by Secretary of State Dean Rusk. He briefly stated that the State Department did have a real problem in the countermeasure field. He thereafter turned the meeting over to other representatives. Mr. William J. Crockett, Assistant Secretary for Administration, spoke briefly and introduced

[Redacted] of the State Department. In rather general terms, [Redacted] explained what the State Department

- 1 - Mr. Parsons
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Conrad

JPM:hh

(6) 67 APR 10 1961

3 - XEROX APR 7 1961

62-30750-

NOT RECORDED

128 APR 7 1961

b7C

APR 7 1961

[Redacted]

b2

ORIGINAL FILED IN

Memorandum Mr. Mohr to Mr. Tolson
Re: RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN COUNTERMEASURES
AGAINST TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCES

b2
b7C
b7E

was trying to do in the countermeasure field and some of the problems with which they are confronted. [redacted]

[redacted] At this point I asked [redacted] if the FBI had contributed in this field in a substantial manner and he shook his head in the negative whereupon Mr. Parsons challenged him specifically about [redacted] shook his head negatively whereupon Mr. Parsons insisted that the Bureau had suggested this idea and that it appeared in the notes of his committee. [redacted] made the positive statement that he had reviewed all of the notes and that no such suggestion from the FBI appeared therein. Since it was quite obvious that [redacted] was making it plain to those present that the FBI had made no contributions, it was felt that he should be called on this which was done specifically later in the presence of Congressmen Rooney, Bow and Cederberg. *we should keep this in*

b2
b7C
b7E

yes -> mind in any further dealings with
[redacted] was followed by [redacted] who seemed to be very knowledgeable about electronic equipment and he gave a specific demonstration of [redacted]

[redacted] During his discussion, [redacted] who has been in contact with our Laboratory, made it quite plain that [redacted]

b3

[redacted] spoke very briefly on States' [redacted] and was assisted by [redacted]

b2
b7C

The group thereafter visited [redacted]

b7E

[redacted] I managed to collar Chairman Rooney, [redacted] and I asked Chairman Rooney if it wasn't his impression that [redacted] had specifically indicated the FBI had made no contributions [redacted]

b2
b7C
b7E

Memorandum Mr. Mohr to Mr. Tolson
Re: RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN COUNTERMEASURES
AGAINST TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCES

b2

b7C

b7E

program. Chairman Rooney responded in the affirmative and [redacted] endeavored to indicate specifically and definitely that [redacted] had been misunderstood. [redacted] half-heartedly tried to indicate the same; however, I made it very clear to him there wasn't any question in my mind or anybody else present that they understood just what [redacted] was trying to say [redacted] and I told him specifically and categorically that such a statement was untrue. It was pointed out that it was the Bureau who had initiated [redacted] This struck a very responsive chord with Chairman Rooney. It was also pointed out to Congressman Rooney that at one time the Bureau [redacted] [redacted] Congressmen Bow and Cederberg were present during this discussion.

The entire group was then taken to lunch as the guests of [redacted]

b7C

Chairman Rooney indicated that he had hearings scheduled for this afternoon at 1:30 p. m. , which were later canceled, for the Security Division of the State Department. In view of the developments, he wondered if it would be possible to visit the FBI Laboratory to see firsthand some countermeasure equipment. I told him the Director would be delighted to have him visit the Laboratory and as a result the entire Congressional group and Messrs. [redacted] from the State Department proceeded to the Bureau where they were given a briefing by Mr. Parsons in the Electronics Section of the Laboratory. It was very obvious that this demonstration of the actual countermeasure equipment made a deep impression, particularly on Chairman Rooney. There was shown and demonstrated to these representatives positive equipment used in technical surveillances, which material was demonstrated by [redacted] The group seemed to be obviously impressed and the contrast between the equipment used by the FBI and that used by the Russians and satellites was very apparent. Our equipment appears to be so far advanced as to indicate the Russians and the satellites in many respects are in the "Horse and Buggy Era." The meeting in the Laboratory terminated when a call was received that a roll call was going on on the Hill and that the members should report back there as soon as possible. On the way out of the building, I explained to Chairman Rooney the Director desired to meet the group but was unable to do so since he had been called out of the building. The Chairman indicated it would not be possible to do this in view of other commitments and the fact they had to return to the Hill immediately.

b7C

Memorandum Mr. Mohr to Mr. Tolson
Re: RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN COUNTERMEASURES
AGAINST TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCES

I provided transportation for Congressman Rooney and Congressman Bow to return to the Hill and during this trip Chairman Rooney indicated that he did not think from what he saw and heard at the State Department and the FBI Laboratory that the State Department people were sufficiently knowledgeable or expert enough in the field to be spending money in such large amounts for the indicated type of electronic equipment in the countermeasure field. Chairman Rooney made it plain that if any agency was to undertake this type of work it should be done by an agency who knew what they were doing such as the FBI. He told me that under no circumstances would he indicate to State Department that anything said or done by the FBI influenced his decision in this regard. He told me what he saw and heard at the State Department was not new and that he had been previously shown the microphones they found in various hearings before his Subcommittee.

b7C

I should like to point out that [redacted] appeared to be very friendly and was specifically told that we didn't appreciate the position taken by [redacted] and he was most apologetic and it was obvious that he deeply regretted that [redacted] had not presented his case in a more knowledgeable and diplomatic fashion.

[redacted] was very friendly during the entire meeting and at no time did he defend [redacted]. He told me that he personally did not hear [redacted] make the statement during his lecture that [redacted]

b2

b7C

[redacted] was the only one that I talked to who seemed to have a specific idea what they were going to spend their money for. He said they have two specific areas they want to explore [redacted]

b7E

One of the highlights of this entire affair was to observe Chairman Cannon, who is 82 years of age, actively and knowledgeably participate in everything that went

Memorandum Mr. Mohr to Mr. Tolson
Re: RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN COUNTERMEASURES
AGAINST TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCES

on and he asked more questions than anyone else. Every one of his questions was right to the point of the subject and indicated he was keenly aware and desirous of learning everything he could about the subject matter. At lunch he specifically condemned the action of the Supreme Court and its most recent decision on a microphone surveillance conducted by the police department and he said he was of the opinion that the Supreme Court should be just as desirous of protecting the society as they are in protecting the criminal element. He said that the most recent decision reminded him of an effort that might be made to permit criminals to carry guns but deny the same privilege to law enforcement officers. He made it clear on more than one occasion how much he admired the Director and wanted to be sure that Mr. Parsons and I conveyed to the Director his most cordial and best wishes. He went to great lengths to explain how the Director had personally set up his investigative staff, how pleased he was with it and how well it has worked. There can be no question but that Chairman Clarence Cannon is an ardent booster of the Director and the FBI.

The foregoing is submitted for your information.

EJM *John* ✓
I am glad Mohr took on
[redacted] so forcefully.
No one gets anywhere
with palliation.
H.

b7C

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson	_____
Parsons	_____
Mohr	_____
Belmont	_____
Catahan	_____
Conrad	_____
DeLoach	_____
Evans	_____
Malone	_____
Rosen	_____
Tavel	_____
Trotter	_____
W.C. Sullivan	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Ingram	_____
Gandy	_____

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT *clb*

DATE: March 10, 1961

b7C

FROM :

[Redacted]

~~SECRET~~

cc Mr. Parsons
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Conrad

b7C

SUBJECT:

**SOVIET ILLEGAL ESPIONAGE
ACTIVITIES;
ESPIONAGE - R**

Mr. Branigan
Mr. Papich

[Redacted]

73 Branigan

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

b1
b3

[Redacted]

(S)

b1
b3

[Redacted]

(S)

b1
b3

[Redacted]

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 65-63234-10d

b1
b3

[Redacted]

(S)

DEM:td (9)

57 MAR 23 1961

MAR 21 1961 NOT RECORDED
167 MAR 21 1961

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED BY 2803 RDM/MLC
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR
C.A. # 82-1826

SP 7 cl of Al...
11/16/94 C.A. # 88-1816
ALL CLASSIFICATION REVIEWS OF THIS

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

2-Orig
①-Yel
1-Liaison
1-Paper

SAC, NEW YORK

March 23, 1961

DIRECTOR, FBI

b1
b3

[Redacted] (S)

G 2

[Redacted] (S)

b1
b3

The above is being submitted to you for your information.

NOTE:

The above information was furnished to the Liaison Agent on [Redacted]

b3

DATE: 02-22-2005
CLASSIFIED BY 60290 auc bce/mlt/amw AAG--derivative
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1) 02-22-2030

SJP:sap (5)
DAP

REC-76
EX-112

K

62-80750-3708

MAILED 27
MAR 22 1961
COMM-FBI

19 MAR 23 1961

- Tolson
- Boardman
- Belmont
- Mohr
- DeLoach
- Casper
- Callahan
- Conrad
- Felt
- Gale
- Rosen
- Sullivan
- Tavel
- Trotter
- Tele. Room
- Holmes
- Gandy

36 MAR 30 1961
TELETYPE UNIT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

DATE: 02-22-2005
CLASSIFIED BY 60290 auc bce/mlt/amw AAG--derivative
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1) 02-22-2030

- Tolson
- Parsons
- Mohr
- Belmont
- Callahan
- Conrad
- DeLoach
- Evans
- Malone
- Rosen
- Tavel
- Trotter
- W.C. Sullivan
- Tele. Room
- Ingram
- Gandy

TO : Mr. Belmont *MB*

DATE: March 13, 1961

FROM :

[Redacted]

b7C

SUBJECT: UNKNOWN SUBJECTS: AKA

[Redacted]

b1


b3

b1

b3

IMPERSONATION

b7C



ORIGINAL FILED IN 47-42464-17

In view of the foregoing development our investigation was closed.

On March 2, 1961, the State Department made available to the Bureau a copy of the enclosed letter dated December 16, 1960, sent to the State Department by [Redacted] mentioned above. In his

SJP:ban *ban*
(7)

- 1 - Mr. Parsons
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Rosen
- 1 - [Redacted]
- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Mr. Papich

62-80750 -
NOT RECORDED
141 MAR 20 1961

b7C

51 MAR 27 1961
ENCLOSURE
MAR 17 1961
209 YAA

~~MAR 17 1961~~
LIAISON
SIX

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson	_____
Parsons	_____
Mohr	_____
Belmont	✓
Callahan	_____
Conrad	✓
DeLoach	_____
Evans	_____
Malone	_____
Rosen	_____
Tavel	_____
Trotter	_____
W.C. Sullivan	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Ingram	_____
Gandy	_____

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT DATE: March 13, 1961

b7C

FROM :

[Redacted]

b2

b7D SUBJECT:

[Redacted]

~~SECRET~~

b1

b3

9809 RDD/MG cc Mr. [Redacted]
 5/4/93 C.A. # PP. 1816 Mr. Belmont
 SP 7 CC/AM [Redacted] Mr. Conrad
 11/6/93 C.A. # PP. [Redacted] Ms. Branigan
 All class. [Redacted]
 6/24/93 [Redacted] Papich
 11/6/93 [Redacted]

CLASSIFIED BY: 306 BT/TAK
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

(S)

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 100-44744

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b1
b3

[Redacted]

(S)

ACTION: For information. UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

DEM:td (9)

JP [Signature]

XEROX
MAR 21 1961
[Signature]

MAR 21 1961

NOT RECORDED
199 MAR 21 1961

b1
b3

31 MAR 27 1961

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~



THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

American Embassy
[Redacted]

b1

CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY *SP-2 + APIC/AM*
REASON FOR EXTENSION *7-27-79*
FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2 *2, 3*
DATE OF REVIEW FOR DECLASSIFICATION *3-16-81*

Date: March 16, 1961
To: Director, FBI (62-80750) (C)
From: [Redacted] (C)
Subject: RELATIONS WITH THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

[Large Redacted Area]

b1
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P 2 - Bureau
1 - [Redacted]
1 - [Redacted]
NWP:mas (4)
RECEIVED
62-80750-3709
MAR 21 1961
CONFIDENTIAL

b1

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

*amb
4/4*

Tolson	_____
Parsons	_____
Mohr	_____
Belmont	_____
Callahan	_____
Conrad	_____
DeLoach	_____
Evans	_____
Malone	_____
Rosen	_____
Tavel	_____
Trotter	_____
W.C. Sullivan	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Ingram	_____
Gandy	_____

RA

TO : Mr. Belmont

DATE: March 29, 1961

FROM :

[Redacted]

b7C

SUBJECT:

[Redacted]

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(S)

[Redacted]

(S)

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[Redacted]

(S)

b1

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[Redacted]

b1

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[Redacted]

b1

b3

[Redacted]

b1

b3

ACTION:

For information.

SJP:ban
(6)

- 1 - Mr. Parsons
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. DeLoach
- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Mr. Papich

ban

EX 100

13

XEROX

APR 5 1961

62-7503710

REC-83

APR 4 1961

PARSONS

TELE. ROOM

MAIL ROOM

SUC.

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

- Tolson _____
- Parsons _____
- Mohr _____
- Belmont _____
- Callahan _____
- Conrad _____
- DeLoach _____
- Evans _____
- Malone _____
- Rosen _____
- Tavel _____
- Trotter _____
- W.C. Sullivan _____
- Tele. Room _____
- Ingram _____
- Gandy _____

TO : [Redacted]

DATE: March 28, 1961

b7C

FROM : S. J. Papich

SUBJECT: [Redacted]

(S)

b1

Branigan
2-1

b1

b3

(S)

b7C

(S)

b1

b3

(S)

b1

ACTION:

The above information is being directed to the attention of the Espionage Section.

- SJP:ban
(5) *ban*
- 1 - Mr. Branigan
 - 1 - [Redacted] b7C
 - 1 - Liaison
 - 1 - Mr. Papich

MAR 31 1961

APR 6 1961

XEROX
APR 3 1961
V742

NOT RECORDED
47 APR 3 1961

b7C

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

- Tolson _____
- Belmont _____
- Callahan _____
- Conrad _____
- DeLoach _____
- Evans _____
- Malone _____
- Rosen _____
- Tavel _____
- Trotter _____
- W.C. Sullivan _____
- Tele. Room _____
- Ingram _____
- Gandy _____

TO : Mr. Belmont

DATE: March 24, 1961

FROM :

[Redacted]

b7C

[Redacted]

b7C

[Redacted]

gm

SUBJECT: REORGANIZATION IN INTELLIGENCE
RESEARCH SECTION - STATE DEPARTMENT

b3

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

2-1-62
(SP)
(S)
b1
b3
ALL COPY FILED IN 62-57749-62-623
b1
b3

ACTION:

For information.

MWK:ban
(8)

- 1 - Mr. Parsons
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. N. P. Callahan
- 1 - Mr. Papich
- 1 - [Redacted]
- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - [Redacted]

b7C

66 APR 6 1961

XEROX

MAR 31 1961

vpo

62-80750-
NOT RECORDED
47 APR 4 1961

V.

WATSON file

MAR 31 1961

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

2-Orig. & 1
1-Yellow
1-Training & Ins.
1-Liaison

b1

Legal Attache




(S)

3-24-61

Director, FBI

62-80750-

REPORT WRITING



(S)

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
A preliminary review of the Bureau's files has not revealed the correspondence relative to this matter which you mentioned and the expenditure of time necessary for an extensive review to locate that correspondence is not warranted in this case.

You should immediately submit to the Bureau full justification for your proposal regarding the terminology to be used in describing CIA as a source of information mentioned in your reports in order that this matter can be reconsidered.

MAILED 27
MAR 24 1961
COMM-FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

1-Foreign Liaison Unit (detached)



(S)

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- Folsom _____
- Parsons _____
- Mohr _____
- Belmont _____
- Callahan _____
- Conrad _____
- DeLoach _____
- Evans _____
- Malone _____
- Rosen _____
- Tavel _____
- Trotter _____
- W.C. Sullivan _____
- Tele. Room _____
- Ingram _____
- Gandy _____

REC'D W/IT ROOM
 FBI
 (6)
 MAR 30 1961
 XEROX
 MAR 24 1961
 MAR 24 1961

NOTE CONTINUED:

La *MLF*

MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT

56 APR 3 1961 269


DATE: 03-09-2005
CLASSIFIED BY: 60290 auc bce/mlt/amw TAG-derivative
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3:3(1) 03-09-2030

~~SECRET~~

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 66-2435-2528

~~SECRET~~


Letter to Legal Attache,
Re: REPORT WRITING



(S)

b1

NOTE ON YELLOW CONTINUED:



(S)

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~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

DIRECTOR, FBI

3/13/61

b1

LEGAT, [redacted]

(S)

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REPORT WRITING [redacted]

(S)

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[redacted]

(S)

b1

b3

[redacted]

(S)

It is believed that there was previous correspondence with the Bureau concerning this in the past, but such correspondence cannot now be located, possibly due to the fact that administrative serials over three years old have been destroyed.

b1

2 - Bureau

1 [redacted]

JFD:plb

(3)

(S)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

DATE: 03-09-2005
CLASSIFIED BY 60290 auc bce/mlt/amw AAG--derivative
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1) 03-09-2030

162-80750 -
NOT RECORDED
141 MAR 3 1961

162-80750-2538
SEARCHED IN 162-80750-2538

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

- Tolson _____
- Parsons _____
- Mohr _____
- Belmont _____
- Callahan _____
- Conrad _____
- Loach _____
- Evans _____
- Malone _____
- Rosen _____
- Tavel _____
- Winterrowd _____
- Tele. Room _____
- Ingram _____
- Gandy _____

TO : Mr. Conrad *JW*

DATE: March 17, 1961

FROM : [Redacted] *DTM*

Central Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON TECHNICAL
SURVEILLANCE COUNTERMEASURES (TSC)
TECHNICAL SUBCOMMITTEE (TS)

In the course of contacting [Redacted]

[Redacted] regarding
equipment of possible interest to the Bureau, [Redacted] volunteered the following
information supplied him by [Redacted] (DPS).

There is a definite split in the State Department as to technical
security matters. [Redacted] and [Redacted] (DPS)
represent one school of thought while [Redacted] represent another.

[Redacted] did a poor job recently in testifying before and furnishing information
to a group of House Appropriation Committee members who checked on [Redacted] (S)
[Redacted] tried to impress the committee members with his technical knowledge,
but failed since his ideas appeared impractical. [Redacted] has fully briefed
[Redacted] since [Redacted]

- 1 - Mr. Belmont (Attention: Mr. Whitson)
- 1 - [Redacted] (Attention: [Redacted])

11 APR 5 1961

JMM:pcc (8)

XEROX
APR 6 1961
VPW

162-80250
NOT RECORDED
199 APR 6 1961

1 JMM

~~SECRET~~

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

Memorandum to Mr. Conrad
Re: NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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(S)

(S)

b2

[redacted] are particularly appreciative of the Bureau's insistence on the TSC that individual agencies not be dictated to by TSC, but allowed to act in their own best interests with TSC serving only as a coordinating group.

b7C

b7E

[redacted] has plainly stated that the State Department would encounter no trouble in its security and countermeasure efforts "if we could get rid of [redacted]"

b7C

SA [redacted] to whom [redacted] supplied this information, made no comment to [redacted] regarding this information.

b7C

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

[Handwritten signatures and initials: EJP, JWS, and others]

~~SECRET~~

Mr. Papich

b7C

SAC, WFO

4/5/61

Director, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

REC-99

62-80750-3711

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[Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

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(S)

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 62-30092

MAILED 10
APR 5 1961
COMPLETED

[Redacted]

(S)

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- Tolson _____
- Parsons _____
- Mohr _____
- Belmont _____
- Callahan _____
- Conrad _____
- DeLoach _____
- Evans _____
- Malone _____
- Rosen _____
- Tavel _____
- Trotter _____
- W.C. Sullivan _____
- Tele. Room _____
- Ingram _____
- Gandy _____

This matter should be handled promptly and results of your inquiries should be furnished to the Bureau.

REL:dcrcdy
(5)

FBI XEROX
APR 10 1961

Handwritten signatures and initials: wab, Rel, etc.

MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT

55 APR 11 1961

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson _____
 Parsons _____
 Mohr _____
 Belmont _____
 Callahan _____
 Conrad _____
 DeLoach _____
 Evans _____
 Malone _____
 Rosen _____
 Tavel _____
 Trotter _____
 W.C. Sullivan _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Ingram _____
 Gandy _____

TO : [Redacted]

b7C

DATE: March 29, 1961

FROM : S. J. Papich

SUBJECT: [Redacted]

(S)

Branigan

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[Large Redacted Block]

(S)

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[Redacted Block]

(S)

ACTION:

[Redacted Block]

(S)

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SJP:ban
(4) *ban*

- 1 - Mr. Branigan
- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Mr. Papich

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

EX 100

REC-99

*Let to WFO
4-5-61
RE: [unclear]*

RECORDED

3 APR 6 1961

5/ [unclear]
62-80715-3711

[Handwritten signature]

DATE: 03-09-2005
CLASSIFIED BY 60290 auc bce/mtl/amw AAG-derivative
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3 (1,6) 03-09-2030

XEROX
APR 10 1961
VP

~~SECRET~~

2-Orig. & 1
1-Yellow
1-Liaison

Legal Attache, [redacted]

b1
(S)

4-4-61

Director, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

[redacted]

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(S)

Reurlet 3-2-61 wherein information was
set forth concerning [redacted]

b3

[redacted]

(S)

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[redacted]

(S)

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MAILED 3
APR 4 1961
COMM-FBI

1-Foreign Liaison Unit (detached) *det/rep*

NOTE ON YELLOW:

162 80750
19 APR 4 1961

[redacted]

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REP:eft
(5)

- Tolson _____
- Parsons _____
- Mohr _____
- Belmont _____
- Callahan _____
- Conrad _____
- DeLoach _____
- Evans _____
- Malone _____
- Rosen _____
- Tavel _____
- Trotter _____
- W.C. Sullivan _____
- Tele. Room _____
- Ingram _____
- Gandy _____

MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT

XEROX
APR 6 1961

NOT RECORDED
102 APR 6 1961

55 APR 10 1961

Lo

100-189256-308

ADJUTANT GENERAL

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

~~SECRET~~

- Tolson _____
- Parsons _____
- Mohr _____
- Belmont _____
- Callahan _____
- Conrad _____
- DeLoach _____
- Evans _____
- Malone _____
- Rosen _____
- Tavel _____
- Trotter _____
- W.C. Sullivan _____
- Tele. Room _____
- Ingram _____
- Gandy _____

TO : Mr. Belmont

DATE: March 29, 1961

FROM :

[Redacted]

b7C

SUBJECT :

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b7C

You may be interested in the following information which was volunteered to the Liaison Agent on March 28, 1961, by Bureau Informant [Redacted]

Bridg

[Large Redacted Block]

(S)

65-5081-1192

(S)

ORIGINAL FILED IN (S)

SJP:ban

(6)

- 1 - Mr. Parsons
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Foreign Liaison
- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Mr. Papich

162-80750-

NOT RECORDED
176 APR 11 1961

65-5081-

17 APR 10 1961

XEROX

APR 11 1961

57 APR 12 1961

Handwritten signatures and initials

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 3/24/61

FROM : SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (62-4236)

SUBJECT: CIA MATTERS

DATE: 03-10-2005
CLASSIFIED BY 629 auc bbce/mlt/amw AAG--derivative
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1) 03-10-2030

Central Intelligence Agency

[Redacted]

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(S)
EX-114
(S)
(S)

[Redacted]

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Information regarding the nature of [Redacted]

[Redacted]

- 2 - Bureau
- 1 - San Francisco

WKW:erg
(3)

66 APR 10 1961

178 Memoes Papich to [Redacted] 3/31/61

29/1 van [Redacted] b7C
Lit to San Francisco 4/4/61

EX-114

REC-60

62-80750-3712

MAR 27 1961

EVAN

MAINTENANCE

~~SECRET~~

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 30

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson _____
 Parsons _____
 Mohr _____
 Belmont _____
 Callahan _____
 Conrad _____
 DeLoach _____
 Evans _____
 Malone _____
 Rosen _____
 Tavel _____
 Trotter _____
 W.C. Sullivan _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Ingram _____
 Gandy _____

TO :

[Redacted]

b7C

DATE: 3-31-61

FROM : S. J. Papich

SUBJECT: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

Reference is made to San Francisco letter dated March 24, 1961, captioned, "CIA Matters." In this communication

[Redacted]

(S)

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[Redacted]

(S)

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Evidence in our possession indicates that the controls established by us have been very effective. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary it is not believed necessary to set up any new program.

ACTION:

If you approve, there is enclosed herewith a letter to the San Francisco Office advising that there does not seem to be any need for establishing additional controls.

- SJP:ban
- (5)
- 1 - Mr. Branigan
- 1 - [Redacted]
- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Mr. Papich

*a

REC-60
 62-80750-3713
 APR 5 1961
 [Handwritten signatures and initials]

Enclosure

b7C

~~SECRET~~

F B I

Date: 3/30/61

Mr. Tolson	✓
Mr. Parsons	✓
Mr. Mohr	✓
Mr. Belmont	✓
Mr. Callahan	✓
Mr. Conrad	✓
Mr. DeLoach	✓
Mr. Evans	✓
Mr. Malone	✓
Mr. Rosen	✓
Mr. Tavel	✓
Mr. Trotter	✓
Mr. W.C. Sullivan	✓
Tele. Room	✓
Mr. Ingram	✓
Miss Gandy	✓

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL _____
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, PITTSBURGH (62-0) *ALLAN DULLES*

SUBJECT: ANONYMOUS TYPEWRITTEN DOCUMENT
ATTACKING ALLAN W. DULLES
MISCELLANEOUS MATTER

b7C

[Redacted] Court Reporter, USDC, Wheeling, W. Va., advised on 3/24/61 that the enclosed anonymous document containing an attack on ALLAN W. DULLES, was left in her office by a young man in the early part of 3/61. She said she could furnish no description of the young man and he did not indicate when he handed it to her whether he had merely found this document or was distributing it.

3 - Bureau (Encl. 1) **ENCLOSURE**
2 - Pittsburgh

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 03-10-2005 BY 60290 auc bce/mlt/amw

WGM/gb
(5)

1 photostat - document b3
Give to [Redacted]

4/6/61 62-80750-3717

REC-62

25 APR 11 1961

EX-117

Wick

Approved: *BCB* _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

66 APR 17 1961

To the Attorney General of The United States of America

It is hereby requested that a warrant be issued for the arrest of one Allan W Dulles, United States citizen, civilian employee of the United States government, erstwhile, supposed head of an organization calling itself the 'Central Intelligence Agency', hereinafter referred to as 'CIA'.

Charges:

Treason; conspiracy; fraud; fraud in public office; fraudulent use of public funds; fraudulent use of authority; acting without authority; violation of the public trust; misconduct in office; malfeasance in office; withholding information from his superiors, Congress, and the American public; giving false information to his superiors, Congress, and the American public; illegal use of public funds; larceny; compromise; bribery; blackmail; attempted murder.

1. In that Allan W Dulles did, during the year 1951, or 1952, or both, secretly conspire and connive with one Werner von Braun, former Nazi party member and follower of Hitler, and former German citizen, and with one Fritz Molden, former Nazi, follower of Hitler, German citizen and son-in-law of Allan W Dulles, that he, Allan W Dulles, should seek and obtain the directorship of a minor government agency called the Central Intelligence Agency, an agency of United States government unwisely set up as a civilian organ for the gathering of military information, and that upon obtaining the directorship of this agency, it would be turned into a gigantic, international organization, patterned after the Gestapo of Hitler and with agents and operators in every country on the face of the earth, and with the sole objective and purpose of undermining and collapsing every government on the surface of the earth, including the United States, and bringing them all under the rule and control of Germany, as had been intended by Hitler!

Charge; treason and conspiracy to overthrow the government of the United States of America

2. In that Allan W Dulles did obtain the directorship of this minor government agency, and did slowly turn it into a gigantic organization of intrigue, political unrest and diplomatic espionage, aimed at overthrowing every single government on the face of the earth, including that of the United States, and did allow its control and direction to come under aforementioned and other Germans and former Nazis.

Charge; conspiracy to overthrow the government of the United States of America

3. In that Allan W Dulles did, during the years 1952 to 1960, brazenly but secretly plunder and rob the United States treasury of between FIFTY BILLION and ONE HUNDRED BILLION dollars of the American taxpayers moneys, all of which were used and directed towards the sole objective and goal of the 'CIA', the undermining and collapsing, or replacing, of every government on the face of the earth, including that of the United States, and bringing every country on earth under the control and influence of Germany.

Charge; larceny of public funds; illegal use of public funds; conspiracy to overthrow the government of the United States of America.

4. In that Allan W Dulles, or the 'CIA', did, unknown to the American public or his superiors, pour millions of dollars of the United States taxpayers money into Germany, which was still in a state of war with us and without a treaty, wholly intended and directed towards the rebuilding of Germany as a world power, both East Germany, which is secretly under the control of the 'CIA', as a powerful military force, and West Germany, which is also under CIA control, as both an industrial and a military power, and all directed

Envelope
placed in
PACKERS -
4-17-61 SBM

toward the goal of German conquest and control of every country on earth, including the United States.

Charge; misuse of public funds; conspiracy to overthrow the government of the United States of America.

5. In that Allan W Dulles did, during the period of these eight years, advise his superiors, the government, and the American public that these moneys were being spent or used to 'fight communism', when in truth they were all being spent and directed towards lavish living, extravagance and wasteful spending, bribery and compromise, including the bribery and compromise of some Americans, and all directed towards the collapsing of every government on earth, including the United States, and bringing every government under the control of the CIA and Germany.

Charge; giving false information to his superiors, Congress, and the people of the United States; illegal and misuse of public funds.

6. In that Allan W Dulles, or the CIA, did illegally bribe, blackmail, or compromise certain officials and officeholders of the government in Washington and perhaps in other countries, and bring them under the influence of the CIA and its now German directors. Even some Congressmen seem to be afraid of the CIA, or of Allan Dulles.

Charge; illegal compromise; bribery; blackmail; fraud

7. In that Allan W Dulles, or the 'CIA', did, during the year 1956, 'stage' the so-called 'Hungarian revolution', which betrayed several hundred people to their deaths, for the sole purpose of getting thousands of Hungarians, or refugees, into the other countries of Europe, and especially into the United States, fifty per cent of whom were or became agents of the CIA, with specific instructions concerning the undermining and overthrow of the government of the United States.

Charge; conspiracy to overthrow the government of the United States

8. In that Allan W Dulles, or the CIA, did, during those years between 1952 and 1960, secretly form cells and organizations in every country on earth, including both United States and Russia, which they had no difficulty infiltrating for they told them they were 'selling us out to them', and that they did cause unrest and replace several governments in the world, and did set up agencies in every country they could, both giving those people false information about us and our feelings, and giving us false news about what was going on in those countries, including Russia.

Charge; giving false information to other countries about the United States and it's people; giving false information to the people of the United States.

9. In that Allan W Dulles, or the CIA, did, on or about the 1st of May, 1960, order or direct one Francis G Powers, a civilian employed as a pilot for the CIA, to fly an aircraft directly across the country of Russia, a mission that was considered by any military judgment and thought an impractical and unfeasible operation, and of not sufficient military value to merit its being undertaken, and that when this aircraft had taken off, the 'American section' of the CIA, for whom Powers worked, did brutally inform the Russian division of the CIA of the nature, time and place of this flight, so that the airplane was tracked along its entire course over Russia, and then shot down, on direction of the CIA, by Russians, in the middle of that country. The pilot did live.

Charge; attempted murder

10. In that Allan W Dulles, or the CIA, has 'hired' hundreds of Americans, thru employment agencies (specifically, Snelling & Snelling, Washington, D C) and thru coordination with 'technician' vacancies overseas, promising these people large salaries, making them sign secret contracts, giving them ridiculously

high GS ratings, 11, 9, 9 or 10, then fraudulently telling these people that they will 'hold back half their salaries until they finish their contracts, when the CIA never intended to pay them such high salaries to begin with, but used this as a means to entice them into its service and also hold them virtual prisoner in it's service, where many of them are being taught and indoctrinated to dislike everything American, their people, home, way of life, etc., and to like everything European and German, and possibly even to sabotage the very military installations they work on.

Charge; treason; fraud against the people and the government of United States, which has been made heavily indebted to many of these people unknowingly

11. In that on or about the 16th of May, 1960, Allan W Dulles, or the CIA, did, unlawfully and illegally, induce and persuade the pilot of a U S Air Force military transport plane, one Capt Lundy, either by seeking and approaching him directly, or by treacherously influencing someone, military or civilian, above him, to fly his aircraft and passengers, including one woman, along and slightly over the East German border, where the CIA had arranged with the East German army to shoot this aircraft down for the purpose of already intensifying the already tense international situation over the U2 flight. Fortunately, the aircraft was forced down by Russian fighters before it got to the point where it was to be shot down, and the crew and passengers were not injured.

Charge; attempted murder

12. In that Allan W Dulles, or the CIA, have secretly purchased, and taken complete control and management of, at least a half dozen newspapers and periodicals within the United States, and several overseas in other countries, fraudulently purchased with the U S taxpayers money, and to be used, if not already being used, to give false information and propaganda to the American people under the direction of the Germans who control the CIA. And that the CIA has infiltrated at least a dozen other papers in the U S, thru bribery, blackmail, or placing of CIA people on their staffs, and have fed the American public a stream of false news and psychological propaganda, usually quoted as coming from a gov't "source which refused to reveal it's name"; and that the CIA has tried to get the term 'propaganda' into American usage and speech, even going so far as to say that our State Dept has a 'propaganda section', when this term and word has always been obnoxious to the American people since the days of the German war, for the American people are neither interested in giving propaganda or receiving it, but rather in giving and receiving the Truth.

Charge; giving false information to the American people and the Government, and distorting the wishes and feelings of the people.

13. In that Allan W Dulles, or the CIA, did, on or about the 1st of July, 1960, illegally and unlawfully approach the pilot of an RB47 Air Force bomber, or his immediate commander, such plane being temporarily based in England and preparing to fly a 'ferreting' mission over the Berents sea, and thru the use of a large sum of money, or by using such words as "you will be doing your country a great service, etc.", or both, or by telling him that the CIA had some information not available to military people, did entice and seduce said pilot, or his immediate commander, to alter and change the proposed flight of his aircraft as planned and laid out for him by his United States Air Force Command, by approximately two hundred miles, or thirty minutes flying time; and that when said flight was carried out along this deviated course from that which had been given and ordered by the United States Air Force the plane was shot down by a Russian fighter somewhere between thirty and fifty miles off the Kola peninsula, with the result that several Americans lost their lives.

Charge; attempted murder

14. In that Allan W Dulles, or the CIA, did publish, on or about the 1st of Sept, 1960, an article in a pulp magazine, such as is generally read by the college and high school youth of America (specifically, WHISPER Magazine, issue, Sept, 1960, titled 'Uncle Sam Needs Spies', authored by a Hungarian emigre named Ladislav Farago) and said article did ask for or 'recruit' the names and addresses

young Americans who could qualify for CIA service by answering 'yes' to such questions as being "willing to commit suicide if we ask you to" or else "willing to kill someone if we ask you to, even if it is against all moral, ethic, and religious principles", and that this was an attempt to locate and pick out young men for future CIA use right here in this country for the overthrow of this country and its people. And furthermore, said article did openly brag that the CIA had 'secret offices' in several major cities of this country, and agents, or spies, scattered thruout the country, when this organization was never given, nor could have been given, any authority to conduct any kind of activity within the domestic realm of the United States, which is exclusively under the jurisdiction of the Justice Dept and the FBI.

Charge; conspiracy to overthrow the government of the United States.

15. In that Allan W Dulles, or the CIA, did aid and abet one Fidel Castro to 'take over' Cuba, both by helping him and by urging one Batista to temporarily abdicate and setting him up in luxurious exile on the island of Majorca, and that subsequently, complete control of Cuba was given to the South American commander and director of the CIA, one Che Guerrara, after and during which millions of dollars of American property were lost and also the lives of several Americans. And that the main purpose of the 'Castro overthrow' was to get thousands of Cuban refugees into this country, at least half of whom are CIA agents, with specific instructions concerning the undermining and overthrowing of this country and government.

Charge; conspiracy to overthrow the government of the United States. Loss and destruction of American property

There is also a possibility that several recent 'accidents' in the U S Navy and the Air Force were not complete accidents, but deliberate attempts to weaken our military forces.

It is thus concluded and summed up that Allan W Dulles did ruthlessly and callously betray and 'sell out' his country and his people to a faction of foreign interests and powers, with utter disregard for everything decent in human life.

Witnesses to be called:

The General Staff of the U S Army; the General Staff of the U S Air Force; the Operational Command of the U S Navy; and their intelligence sections and departments. (The officers of the U S Military Forces are guided by the codes of West Point, Annapolis, and the Air Force Academy, and are dedicated, by oath, to protect and defend the lives, property, and interests of the American people against any foreign might and influence, and to preserve the principals and beliefs by which they and their forefathers have lived. NOR WILL THEY IDLY STAND BY AND SEE THEIR OWN MEN MURDERED BEFORE THEIR VERY EYES)

As for those who might find these charges hard to believe, let this be said. If the true scope and size of this organizations operations for the past eight years could be completely grasped by the average American, it might knock him off his feet. The best way to help one to visualize the extent of this operation is by simply saying: The United States treasury is empty. This country has been bankrupted! (while Germany has again become the richest nation in Europe) →

For the benefit of those who might prosecute or convict these people, it should be noted that there are many people, here in the United States and in Europe and other countries, who were entrapped and ensnared into this organizations operations thru no complete fault of their own. For not only did this organization operate in the shadows, with little publicity, but they have always held themselves forth as American (which it originally was) and democratic, when the truth is that every effort of it has been pointed in the opposite direction of our way of life.

It might also be said that we Americans have never been a vengeful people or ones to hunger for revenge. It is always best to remember those words, 'mercy and forgiveness' when judging another, for every man should remember and hope that he also will be shown mercy by his Creator in his final judgment.

capable of starting her own war, joining either side, or even controlling
and directing both sides thru the 'CIA'.

It should also be noted that when the forefathers of this country founded it, they founded a way of life, and then laid out a government to suit that way of life. It was laid out like a tree, a three-limbed tree, one planted in special soil to bear a certain kind of fruit. They noted, at the time, that it might be necessary, someday in the future, during certain times of stress, for small branches or twigs to be grafted to this tree, or one of its limbs, and direly warned their future progeny that whenever this might happen those branches, or twigs, must be vigilantly watched, lest they suddenly shoot up and outgrow the whole limb, or even overwhelm the whole tree.

Lastly, it might be noted that it is probable that mankind will always be troubled with such people as Hitler and his Gestapo, Stalin and the OGPU, and von Braun and Dulles and the CIA, for their most likely will always be men on this earth who feel that the greatest joy of life should be the vanity and glory of having others subjugated to their will and command. It is unlikely that any preventative will ever be found for this, but only such remedies as the vigilance of the people will prescribe when needed. If there ever will be a preventative for such things as tyrannies, wars, inhumanities, etc. it must be that day when all children on earth will be taught, as the first words they are taught; "The gift of God is love, the greatest beauty of life, and thou must love thy neighbor as much as thyself."

The People of the United States of America

The Constitution of the United States explicitly and undeniably states that it is against the law for any organization to exist in this country which ~~considers itself greater or more important than the will and desire of the people, or their representatives.~~ This is The Law of the Land.

And the 4th and 5th floor of the Nat'l Press Bldg in Wash. D. C. is occupied by the 'FBI' which might be the 'propaganda section' of the CIA. And just who is building the 'Chinese A-bombs' and what will happen when they finish. Remember, if one went off somewhere, no one would know who started the thing!

1 reason, ~~usurping~~ ~~fraud~~, fraud in office, fraud against the
the, fraudulent use of public funds, fraudulent use of authority,
use of authority, ~~fraud~~ usurping authority, acting without authority,
brogation of authority, violation of the public trust, ~~misconduct~~
office, negligence of office, withholding information from his
superiors, ~~Congress~~, and the people of ~~giving~~ false information to
his superiors, Congress, and the public, violating the national
unity, illegal use of ~~public funds~~, compromise, ~~hiding~~
admission, attempted murder, and murder.

Retype of let
dated 4-3-61.

San Francisco
SJP:ban.

SAC, San Francisco

- 2 - Orig. ~~...~~
- 1 - Yellow
- 1 - Mr. Branigan April 4, 1961

Director, FBI (62-80750)

- 1 - b7C
- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Mr. Papich

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

Reference is made to your letter dated 3-24-61 captioned "CIA Matters."

You have suggested that it would be desirable for a field office to be apprised of proposed CIA interviews of individuals residing in the territory of a particular field office. The Bureau does not feel that such monitoring activity is warranted. Present controls imposed upon CIA are believed to be satisfactory.

With regard to the value to be gained if your suggestion were adopted you indicated that knowledge of a



Regarding situation number 2 described in your letter, it is not clear as to what value is to be gained by the Bureau to know that a specific individual is to be interviewed by CIA. In this connection you should bear in mind that CIA is interviewing thousands of individuals in connection with applicant matters or items dealing with the administration of the Agency's operations.

The Bureau recognizes that a check on every proposed CIA interview would reduce the possibilities of the Agency operating outside of its jurisdiction. However, the implementation of such expanded control would require the handling of voluminous correspondence, indexing, and filing. Evidence in the possession of the Bureau does not suggest the necessity for such additional control.

Background information for past controls imposed upon CIA is set forth in the following SAC letters:

- (1) Number 59, 5-24-49
- (2) Number 56-52, 10-2-56
- (3) No Number 59-6, 5-28-59

- Tolson _____
- Parsons _____
- Mohr _____
- Belmont _____
- Callahan _____
- Conrad _____
- DeLoach _____
- Evans _____
- Malone _____
- Rosen _____
- Tavel _____
- Trotter _____
- W.C. Sullivan _____
- Tele. Room _____
- Gandy _____

MAILED 10
APR 3 1961
COMM-FBI

66 APR 10 1961

SJP:ban
MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT

See memorandum Papich to dated 3-31-61, same caption, SJP:ban.

Letter to SAC, San Francisco

The threat of CIA invasion of Bureau jurisdiction or interference with our operations is a matter of continuous concern. The Bureau desires to be informed immediately if CIA activities are creating any problems for your office. Your suggestions to protect Bureau interests are appreciated but they should be weighed in the light of results being achieved through existing controls. If you have information that such controls are inadequate all pertinent details should be expedited to the Bureau.

- 1 - Orig.
- 1 - Yellow
- 1 - Mr. Parsons
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Morrell

April 10, 1961

- 1 - Mr. Papich
- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - [Redacted]

b7C

b7C

[Redacted]

Dear [Redacted]

I have just learned of your hospitalization and I want to take this opportunity to wish you a speedy recovery.

The FBI Liaison representatives join me in this expression of encouragement and good wishes, and I certainly trust this note will find you feeling much better and resting comfortably.

With kindest personal regards,

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

MAILED 31
APR 11 1961
COMM-FBI

REC'D-READING ROOM
FBI
APR 11 2 11 PM '61

REC'D-READING ROOM
FBI
APR 11 2 20 PM '61

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 03-10-2005 BY 60290 auc bce/mlt/amw

NWK:ban NOTE: See memo [Redacted] to Belmont, dated April 7, 1961, re: [Redacted]

b3

b7C

- Tolson _____
- Parsons _____
- Mohr _____
- Belmont _____
- Callahan _____
- Conrad _____
- DeLoach _____
- Evans _____
- Malone _____
- Rosen _____
- Tavel _____
- Trotter _____
- W.C. Sullivan _____
- Tele. Room _____
- Ingram _____
- Gandy _____

RECEIVED
FBI
APR 10 1 50 PM '61
REC-92

EX-105

19 APR 12 1961

MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT

~~SECRET~~

DATE: 03-10-2005
CLASSIFIED BY 60290 auc bce/mlt/amw AAG-DERIVATIVE
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1,6) 03-10-2030

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

DIRECTOR, FBI

4/4/61

LEGAT. [redacted] (S) b1

REPORT WRITING

Central Intelligence Agency
Remylet 3/13/61 and Bulet 3/24/61.

b1

b3

[redacted]

b1

[redacted]

b1

b3

[redacted]

[redacted]

25-44
66-435-
66-435-
ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

b1

b3

2 - Bureau
1 - [redacted] (S)
JFD:plb
(3) b1

162-80750-
NOT RECORDED
46 APR 19 1961

51 APR 20 1961

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

MEMORANDUM

F-0217

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 3/31/61

FROM : SAC, SEATTLE (80-502)

SUBJECT: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY (CIA)
INFORMATION CONCERNING

4/10
3/14

b7C

[Redacted]

b7D

[Redacted]

b7C

b7D

SEARCHED
SERIALIZED
INDEXED
FILED

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b7C

b7D

4 - Bureau (REG)
4 - Seattle 1 - 80-502

[Redacted]

b2
b7C
b7D

cc: Seattle
By rps for info
ART/any (8)
jdv/bjk

REC-14 62-80750-3716

9 APR 1961

NAT. SEC. [Redacted]

b7C

1 Bufiles contain no additional
pertinent information
identifiable with subject.

62 APR 18 1961

IN

b2

b7D

UNRECORDED

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

W. A. W. C.

Tolson	_____
Parsons	_____
Mohr	_____
Belmont	_____
Callahan	_____
Conrad	_____
DeLoach	_____
Evans	_____
Malone	_____
Rosen	_____
Tavel	_____
Trotter	_____
W.C. Sullivan	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Ingram	_____
Gandy	_____

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: 4-14-61

FROM :

b7C

SUBJECT: ALLEN DULLES

O.C.I.A.

For your information Dulles is departing for San Juan, Puerto Rico, on the night of 4-15-61, and will remain there through Monday, 4-17-61. His wife will be accompanying him. Dulles is scheduled to make a speech before a university group on Monday.

ACTION:

For information.

[Handwritten signature]

[Handwritten initials]

[Handwritten initials]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 03-10-2005 BY 60290 auc bce/mlt/amw

File 62-80750
PPD
REC-92
62-80750-3718

X-102

3 APR 21 1961

SJP:klh
(5)

COPY TO MR. TOLSON

- 1 - Mr. Parsons
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Papich
- 1 - L. J. [unclear]

APR 26 1961

[Handwritten signature]

UNITED STATES

Memora

ENCL

~~SECRET~~

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 4-17-61

Handwritten initials

FROM : SAC, WFO (65-8257)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

SUBJECT:

[Redacted Subject Line]

b1

b3

(S)

AAG

ReBulet to WFO dated 4-5-61.

DATE: 03-24-2005
CLASSIFIED BY 60290 auc bce/mlt/amw
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1,6) 03-24-2030

[Redacted Block]

b1

b3

(S)

[Redacted Block]

b1

b3

(S)

[Redacted Block]

b1

b3

(S)

EXP. PROC.
Handwritten notes and signatures

2-Bureau
1-WFO
AJH

Memorandum

[Redacted]

40 Belmont

4125 161

17 APR 17 1961

55 MAY 8 1961

163

cc retained

2710

b7C

APR 16 1961

EX 104

Handwritten signatures and initials

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Belmont

FROM :

SUBJECT: EVALUATION INTERNAL SECURITY -
CENTRAL AMERICAN COUNTRIES

~~SECRET~~
Classified by *SP7*
Declassify on: OADR DATE: April 26, 1961
3/22/92
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Tolson ✓
Parsons ✓
Mohr ✓
Belmont ✓
Callahan ✓
Conrad ✓
DeLoach ✓
Evans ✓
Malone ✓
Rosen ✓
Tavel ✓
Trotter ✓
W.C. Sullivan ✓
Tele. Room ✓
Ingram ✓
Gandy ✓

Aruba

b2

b7C

b7C

Pursuant to instructions, Agent Papich attended a briefing at 11 am 4/25/61 in the office of [redacted] State Department. The following information was developed:

Papich will be a member of the team which will travel to the following countries in the order mentioned: Panama, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, and Haiti. Papich is departing Washington, D. C., 6:25 pm, 4/26/61 via National Airlines, arriving New York City 7:45 pm; departing New York City 10 pm via Pan American Airways, arriving Panama 4:25 am, 4/27/61. The team will return to the US 5/17/61.

The purpose of this trip will be: (a) To evaluate the current threat of communism and procommunist forces in each country; (b) To assess the potential of each country to suppress, combat, or control the threat.

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The members of the team are [redacted] the State Department; [redacted] International Cooperation Administration (ICA); [redacted] Department of Defense. The Liaison Agent was informed that a representative from the Army and the Navy will join the team; the identities were not made available.

All members of the team, with the exception of Papich, have been receiving briefings for the past few days on each country. In fact, as indicated below, the organization of this team goes back a few months. The team will call on each embassy and will be briefed by [redacted]

Briefings will be included by the Commander in Chief of our Caribbean forces at Panama. The team members will be asking questions, all for the purpose of developing information for evaluation and assessment. At the end of the visit in each country the team will prepare a summary-type report, including recommendations which will be sent to the State Department. This material upon receipt will be in the control of [redacted]

[redacted] State Department; home phone, [redacted] Any team member is free to voice a dissent on any point and can go on record for future reference. Each team member, including the Bureau

SJP:mls (8)

- 1-Mr. Parsons; 1-Mr. Belmont; 1-Mr. Donahoe
- 1-Mr. Branigan; 1-Foreign Liaison Unit
- 1-Mr. Papich; 1-Liaison

63 66 MAY 9 1961

162-80750
NOT RECORDED
MAY 5 1961

LIAISON
~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED BY SP7 CJA/AV
ON 11/17/94 C.A. # 82-1826
Per CIA Review of 1/1/01

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 64-200-354-19

b3
b7C

Memo to Mr. Belmont

RE: EVALUATION INTERNAL SECURITY - CENTRAL AMERICAN COUNTRIES

representative, will participate in the collection of information. No over-all report will be prepared by the team at the end of the trip unless plans are changed. This entire mission has developed into somewhat of an emergency-type operation due to the Cuban crisis. The idea is to do everything possible to keep the lid on potentially explosive situations until correctional programs, such as foreign aid, education, etc., can be improved and expanded. No attempt will be made to look into the deep-rooted problems in the area, such as past political history and social and economic ills. (S) (u)

b7C

[redacted] did comment that the team was unique in that nothing like this had been done before in the particular area. He hopes that it will lead to improvement. He stressed that so far there really has not been a true focal point for receiving, coordinating, and analyzing information developed in the Central America area. He indicated that the information has been spread out in various agencies.

No contacts will be made with officials of the country governments unless the Ambassador recommends that this be done.

No information was volunteered which would shed any light on developments which led to the selection of the Bureau representative.

[redacted] did make the statement that he was glad that an FBI representative was in the group. [redacted]

b3

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The Cuban crisis led to an enlargement of the team's original objectives. (S) (u)

With regard to the team members, [redacted]

[redacted] for the State Department on programs involving foreign aid. [redacted]

b3

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[redacted] of ICA has also been engaged in this work. (Bufiles have not been reviewed concerning team members.)

~~SECRET~~

Memo to Mr. Belmont
Re: EVALUATION INTERNAL SECURITY - CENTRAL AMERICAN COUNTRIES

b7C

With regard to communication, Papich will be able to use State Department channels. Any messages from the Bureau can be transmitted through [redacted] mentioned above.

Legal Attache, Mexico City, is being advised concerning instant matter.

b7C

This team operation is essentially being handled by the State Department. It is not known what instructions have been received from the White House or any other point. [redacted] stated that no publicity is being given to this entire matter and if any questions are asked at any stopover, the answer being given by the team chairman is that the group is traveling on an inspection of US operations. It is very doubtful that this team will travel without some press comment and speculation with regard to the true objectives.

OBSERVATIONS:

As reflected above, the Bureau representative was called into this picture late, and it will be necessary for him to become oriented rapidly as the trip develops. This can be done.

Based on information made available, it does not appear that there will be any situation which will expose the Bureau to any potential damage or commitment. Since the original work of this group did touch on police training, we may wish to bear in mind that at some point in the future, the Bureau could be asked to participate in training of police and security forces.

ACTION:

Agent Papich will participate in the team assignment, but will not make any commitments which could in any way be interpreted as an FBI position, policy, or stand. If at any time an issue is raised and a request is made for a specific Bureau position on a matter, the Agent will make it clear that this should be referred to the Seat of Government.

The Agent will collect all pertinent information as the assignment progresses for appropriate reporting and future use of the Bureau.

[Handwritten signatures and initials]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

- Tolson
- Parsons
- Mohr
- Callahan
- Conrad
- Leach
- Evans
- Malone
- Rosen
- Tavel
- Trotter
- W.C. Sullivan
- Tele. Room
- Ingram
- Gandy

TO : Mr. Belmont *MB*

DATE: April 21, 1961

b7C

FROM :

[Redacted]

L'

APPEALS

SUBJECT: ~~X~~GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES

Reference is made to my memorandum dated April 19, 1961, concerning a proposed Executive Order to set up a uniform grievance procedure for all Government agencies.

[Large redacted block]

b1
b3

[Redacted block]

b1
b3

On April 19, 1961

[Redacted] Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), advised that AEC had been in telephonic contact on the afternoon of April 18, 1961, with [Redacted] CSC, to inquire how the proposed Order would affect AEC. [Redacted] said that [Redacted] stated that the Order won't be applicable to AEC. It is noted that all employees of AEC are in excepted positions as are Bureau's employees. It is further noted that from information

ORIGINAL FILED IN 100-2-1042

b7C

- SJP:ban
- (9)
- 1 - Mr. Parsons
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Mohr
- 1 - Mr. Callahan
- 1 - [Redacted]
- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Mr. Papich 1 - [Redacted]

Handwritten: XEROX, MAY 9 1961, 163, 70+

66 MAY 15 1961

Stamp: TIAL

62-80750-
NOT RECORDED
126 MAY 9 1961

Handwritten: COPY TO MR. TOLSON'S PERS. FILES

b7C

~~SECRET~~

b7C

Memorandum [redacted] to Belmont
Re: GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES

given by [redacted] as to AEC's contact with [redacted] it appears that AEC made its contact with him subsequent to the discussion between [redacted] and the Bureau Liaison representative on the early afternoon of 4-18-61, at which time [redacted] stated his position to the effect that there would have to be an exemption provision covering FBI and similar agencies in any proposed Order.

b7C

ACTION:

[redacted]

(S)

Handwritten signatures and initials:
[Signature 1] [Signature 2] [Signature 3] [Signature 4] [Signature 5] [Signature 6]

b1
b3

~~SECRET~~

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson	_____
Parsons	_____
Mohr	_____
Belmont	_____
Callahan	_____
Conrad	_____
DeLoach	_____
Evans	_____
Malone	_____
Rosen	_____
Tavel	_____
Trotter	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Ingram	_____
Gandy	_____

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont *albo*

DATE: 4-18-61

FROM :

[Redacted]

b7C

SUBJECT:

[Redacted]

b1

(S)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

[Large Redacted Block]

(S)

b1

b3

[Redacted Block]

b1

b3

(S)

ACTION:

Liaison is following closely and will keep you advised.

Handwritten initials and marks

DATE: 03-11-2005
CLASSIFIED BY 60290 auc bce/mlt/amw AAG--derivative
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1) 03-11-2030

SJP:klh
(6)

50 APR 27 1961

- 1 - Mr. Parsons
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - [Redacted]
- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Mr. Papich

b7C

XEROX
APR 24 1961

NOT RECORDED
141 APR 24 1961

2 APR 21 1961

~~SECRET~~

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 109-12-210-2871

~~SECRET~~

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson _____
 Parsons _____
 Mohr _____
 Belmont _____
 Callahan _____
 Conrad _____
 DeLoach _____
 Evans _____
 Malone _____
 Rosen _____
 Tavel _____
 Trotter _____
 W.C. Sullivan _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Ingram _____
 Gandy _____

TO :

[Redacted]

b7C

DATE: April 25, 1961

FROM :

S. J. Papich

SUBJECT:

[Redacted]

b1
b3

(S) *Branigan*

Reference is made to Washington Field Office letter dated April 14, 1961.

[Redacted]

(S)

b1
b3

[Redacted]

(S) b1
b3

ACTION:

[Redacted]

(S)

b1
b3

SJP:ban
(5) *ban*

- 1 - Mr. Branigan
- 1 - [Redacted]
- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Mr. Papich

b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

*3/23/61 WFB
4-4-61
RE: [unclear]*

REC-9562-80750-

APR 26 1961

EX 104


LIAISON *[Signature]*

b7C

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

1 - Papich



b7C

SAC, WFO (65-8257)

5-4-61

Director, FBI (62-80750)-3920

REC-122



(S)

b1

b3

Reurlet 4-14-61.



(S)

b1

b3

b1

b3



(S)

REF: ss
(5)

DATE: 03-11-2005
CLASSIFIED BY 60290 auc bce/mlt/amw AAG--derivative
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1,6) 03-11-2030




(S)

b1

b3

- Tolson _____
- Parsons _____
- Mohr _____
- Belmont _____
- Callahan _____
- Conrad _____
- DeLoach _____
- Evans _____
- Malone _____
- Rosen _____
- Tavel _____
- Trotter _____
- W.C. Sullivan _____
- Tele. Room _____
- Ingram _____
- Gandy _____



ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT

Walt
ace

~~SECRET~~

- 1-Original
- ① Yellow
- 1-Mr. Parsons
- 1-Mr. Belmont
- 1-Liaison
- 1-Mr. Papich
- 1-File 67-135387

April 24, 1961

BY LIAISON
PERSONAL

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b3
b7C

Del to
4/26/61
mwb

b3
b7C

Dear [Redacted]

I have been advised that you are being transferred from your duties in the counterintelligence field to a new overseas assignment.

During the past several years, representatives of the Federal Bureau of Investigation have had the pleasure of working with you on numerous sensitive matters of mutual interest to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency. At all times we have found you to be extremely cooperative and considerate. Your enthusiastic and constructive approach to counterintelligence problems provided a gratifying relationship.

We in the Federal Bureau of Investigation wish to express our appreciation for your fine assistance. We do wish you every success on your new assignment.

Sincerely yours,

APR 24 2 13 PM '61
 B I
 SEND-READING ROOM

SJP:ban/sap
(7) sap

See memo [Redacted] to Belmont, dated 4-21-61,
re: [Redacted]

b3
b7C

[Redacted]

SJP:ban.

REC-93 62-80450-372

- Tolson _____
- Parsons _____
- Mohr _____
- Belmont _____
- Callahan _____
- Conrad _____
- DeLoach _____
- Evans _____
- Malone _____
- Rosen _____
- Tavel _____
- Trotter _____
- W.C. Sullivan _____
- Tele. Room _____
- Ingram _____
- Gandy _____

MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 4/21/61

b1

FROM : SAC, [redacted] (S)

SUBJECT: [redacted] (S)

b7C

b1

b3

ReBulet 2/2/61.

Mr. Tolson	_____
Mr. Parsons	_____
Mr. Mohr	_____
Mr. Belmont	_____
Mr. Callahan	_____
Mr. Conrad	_____
Mr. DeLoach	_____
Mr. Evans	_____
Mr. Malone	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Tavel	_____
Mr. Trotter	_____
Mr. W.C. Sullivan	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Mr. Ingram	_____
Miss Gandy	_____

[Large redacted block]

[Handwritten signatures and initials]
APR 24 1961
b1
b3
(S)

[Large redacted block]

(S)

b1

b3

2 - Bureau (RM)
1 - [redacted] (S)
JNS:mjh
(3) b1

REC-22

62-80750-3732

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

APR 27 1961

56 MAY 15 1961 163

EX-112

[Handwritten signatures and initials]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: April 18, 1961

FROM : *EMG* LEGAT, [redacted] (S) b1

SUBJECT: [redacted] (S) b1 b3

[redacted] (S) b1 b3

[redacted] (S) b1 b3

[redacted] (S) b1 b3

(S)
RUC
2 Bureau (Encs. 5)
1 [redacted] b1

JTM:ec
(3)

b3

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

DATE: 03-11-2005
CLASSIFIED BY 60290 auc bce/mlt/amw AAG
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1,6) 03-11-2030

[redacted]

ENCLOSURE

*Rec destroyed
5/4/61
JTM*

REC-23

62-80750-3723

APR 28 1961

EX-100
REC'D

NAT. INT. SEC.

56 MAY 5 1961 ¹⁶³

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
April 18, 1961

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

[Redacted]

(S)

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b3

b2

[Redacted]

b7D

furnished information as follows:

[Redacted]

(S)

b1
b3

[Redacted]

(S)

b1
b3

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

DATE: 03-11-2005
CLASSIFIED BY 60290 auc bce/mlt/amw AAG
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1,6) 03-11-2030

62-80158-3723

ENCLOSURE

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson ✓
 Parsons _____
 Mohr _____
 Belmont _____
 Callahan _____
 Conrad _____
 DeLoach ✓
 Evans _____
 Malone _____
 Rosen _____
 Tavel _____
 Trotter _____
 W.C. Sullivan _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Ingram _____
 Gandy _____

TO : Mr. Belmont *ABW*

DATE: April 21, 1961

FROM :

[Redacted]

~~SECRET~~
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ✓

SUBJECT:

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b7C

John J. [unclear]

[Redacted]

(S)

Files do not disclose any derogatory information.

[Redacted]

RECOMMENDATION:

9803 204
57493
C.A. # 1806
Declassify on: ~~SECRET~~ *3/4/90*

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

It is respectfully recommended that the enclosed letter be sent by the Director to [Redacted] thanking him for his cooperation and wishing him well on his next assignment.

[Redacted] successor has not been selected. Liaison will follow and report.

- SJP:ban
(6)
- 1 - Mr. Parsons
 - 1 - Mr. Belmont
 - 1 - Liaison
 - 1 - Mr. Papich
 - 1 - File 67-135387

62-80750

Enclosure

56 MAY 8 1961 *163*

EX-116
 REC-62
62 80750-3726
 MAY 2 1961
Key one 4/24

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Belmont *abw*

DATE: April 26, 1961

FROM : [Redacted] *L*

DECLASSIFIED BY *SP7 cc/ALM*
ON *11/17/94 C.A. #88-1824*
PER CIA REVIEW
of 6/2/94

SUBJECT: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

- Tolson _____
- Parsons _____
- Mohr _____
- Belmont _____
- Callahan _____
- Conrad _____
- DeLoach _____
- Evans _____
- Malone _____
- Rosen _____
- Tavel _____
- Trotter _____
- W.C. Sullivan _____
- Tele. Room _____
- Ingram _____
- Gandy _____

As can be readily understood by an analysis of press statements [Redacted]

[Redacted] Most CIA employees readily accept Dulles' resignation in the very near future and at the latest within three months. The President possibly might keep him on long enough to permit Dulles to officially open the new CIA building. The general feeling is that General Maxwell Taylor will become the new Director of CIA.

[Large Redacted Block]

If Taylor becomes Director of CIA, General Cabell will be obliged to resign as Deputy Director of the Agency. The law does not permit military men to be Director and Deputy Director of the Agency at the same time.

ACTION:

In view of the above, it is going to be absolutely necessary to keep on top of all developments affecting CIA reorganization, bearing in mind that any changes there and any new personnel could have a bearing on the Bureau's work. Liaison will follow this very closely.

- ban*
30P:ban
(5)
- 1 - Mr. Parsons
 - 1 - Mr. Belmont
 - 1 - Liaison
 - 1 - Mr. Papich

Classified by *SP7 cc/ALM*
Declassify on: *DATE 3/14/92*

63 MAY 10 1961 **SECRET**

REC-62
EX-130 MAY 4 1961

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

UNITED STATES GOV

Memorandum

TO : The Director

DATE: *April 25, 1961*

FROM : N. P. Callahan

SUBJECT: The Congressional Record

ST

Original filed in: 66-1231-1953

Pages 8195-8202. Senator Dodd, (D) Connecticut, spoke concerning the Cuban situation. He commented on press reports regarding CIA's involvement in this matter. Mr. Dodd commented on the statement of Cyrus Sulzberger of the New York Times that CIA's operations have been much too public, that it has not taken sufficient camouflage precautions. Mr. Dodd stated "I concur with Mr. Sulzberger. At the same time, I believe that it would help to reassure Congress and reassure the country if CIA's very great powers and its massive operations were placed under the surveillance of a small, tight, joint committee of Congress. I plan to submit such a proposal formally within the next several days."

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 03-21-2005 BY 60290 auc bce/mlt/amw

62-80750-
NOT RECORDED
102 MAY 17 1961

280
MAY 25 1961

In the original of a memorandum captioned and dated as above, the Congressional Record for *April 24, 1961* was reviewed and pertinent items were marked for the Director's attention. This form has been prepared in order that portions of a copy of the original memorandum may be clipped, mounted, and placed in appropriate Bureau case or subject matter files.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : MR. MOHR

DATE: April 26, 1961

FROM : J. F. MALONE

SUBJECT: NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
NEWPORT, RHODE ISLAND

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY *William*

SA [redacted] in attendance at the above captioned college, furnished the following summary of his activities:

ACADEMIC-CAPABILITY STUDIES

From March 24th to the present each branch of the Armed Forces has presented a lecture designed to familiarize the students with the current organization, functions, characteristics, capabilities and limitations of their respective service. In each instance at least one lecture was devoted to the work of military research and development and the needs of the future.

The entire program was most informative and revealed some surprising insights into current capabilities of the Armed Forces. Perhaps the most significant fact is the limited capability of the U. S. Army which has been drastically reduced, due to budget limitations. Based on these presentations an overall evaluation of the U.S. Armed Forces reflects that with the possible exception of the Air Force, the Army, Navy and Marines have suffered drastic reductions in personnel and effective up to date equipment since the Korean conflict. This condition explains the students' unanimous support of President Kennedy's program to build up the conventional forces to a par with our nuclear capability.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 03-21-2005 BY 60290 auc bce/ml/tamw

[redacted]

[redacted]

- 1 - Mr. Malone
- 1 - Mr. Belmont (Att: Mr. Sullivan)

KWW:maw

DN(6)

XEROX
MAY 17 1961
YA

50 MAY 23 1961


62-80750-
NOT RECORDED
MAY 16 1961

EWQ

Mr. Tolson	✓
Mr. DeLoach	✓
Mr. Mohr	✓
Mr. Bishop	✓
Mr. Casper	✓
Mr. Callahan	✓
Mr. Conrad	✓
Mr. Felt	✓
Mr. Gale	✓
Mr. Rosen	✓
Mr. Sullivan	✓
Mr. Tavel	✓
Mr. Trotter	✓
Tele. Room	✓
Mr. Holmes	✓
Miss Gandy	✓

J.B. Belmont
74-1-18467-2
ORIGINAL FILED IN

b3
b7C



b3

BIOASTRONAUTICS - "HUMAN ENGINEERING" FOR SPACE FLIGHT

On April 20, 1961, the Air Force, as part of its program, offered a lecture on Bioastronautics in which the effects of space flight on humans were examined. This lecture was considered the high point of the program and revealed some significant observations. In spite of claims that the Russians exceed only in booster power, it was shown that they are also far ahead in the field of Bioastronautics experimentation, due to their constant emphasis on this program. The United States, once ahead in this field, has fallen behind due to lack of funds. Present plans call for renewed emphasis in this field. Some interesting theories were put forth concerning possible future "human engineering" for space flight. As an example of this human engineering, consideration is being given to drugging a space traveler so that he will be in a suspended state of life for extended periods and only awake once a day for a short period. Another possibility is the surgical removal of the intestines to allow the man to exist on dietary pills without the problem of bulky food.

RECOMMENDATIONS

None. For information.

Handwritten signatures and initials: WRC, EJP, Jhu., H. E. [unclear], EJP.

62-80750-3726

CHANGED TO

105-90951-12

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 03-21-2005 BY 60290 auc bce/mlt/amw

MAY 26 1961

BW /wc

c

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT. KP/22/98

~~TOP SECRET~~

2-Orig. and 1
1-yellow
1-Mr. Parsons

SECRET
APRIL 21 1961

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ~~SECRET~~

REC-84 62-80750-3727

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL Liaison BY SP 7-1824

DECLASSIFIED ON 11/18/94 PER CIA REG. #194 of 6/1/94

Delivered to Attorney General's Office 4/21

THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

With respect to our conversation of April 20, 1961 there is attached an enclosure

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

In connection with your interest in this matter, I suggest that you may wish to study the following, which very likely are available at the White House:

SJP:mis (7) (Classified ~~TOP SECRET~~ in view of extreme sensitivity of this entire matter) Cover memo Belmont to Parsons re ~~REXXXXXXXX~~ Central Intelligence Agency; Report for AG, April, 1961 - SJR:jad

ENCLOSURE

4-28-81

- Parsons
- Belmont
- Mohr
- DeLoach
- Casper
- Callahan
- Conrad
- Felt
- Gale
- Rosen
- Sullivan
- Tavel
- Trotter
- Tele. Room
- Holmes
- Gandy

56 MAY 25 1961

for review at FBIHQ by HSCA re 1/10/78 request. (See Bufile #62-117290) DJC:mu 2/10/78

ORIGINAL DOCUMENT SENT TO NATIONAL ARCHIVES (JFKARCA) DATE 4/19/97 HSCA 5451

Wm K. Harvey / JAD

b3

b7C

~~TOP SECRET~~
The Attorney General

~~SECRET~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
(1) The National Security Act of 1947 and the National Security Council Directives affecting CIA.

(2) A report entitled, "The Central Intelligence Agency and National Organization for Intelligence," prepared by Allen W. Dulles, William H. Jackson, and Mathias F. Correa dated January 1, 1949.

(3) A report covering a study of US intelligence prepared by Lieutenant General J. H. Doolittle in 1954.

(4) The General Mark W. Clark Task Force Report, May, 1955.

(5) Reports and studies which have been prepared by the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities which was established by the past Administration on January 14, 1956.

(6) The Joint Study Group Report on Foreign Intelligence Activities of the US Government dated December 15, 1960.

In addition, you should bear in mind that over the y various Bills have been introduced in Congress to establish a "Watchdog Committee" to periodically check and survey intelli operations, particularly those handled by CIA. I am not fam with the nature of the research and study conducted by the a of these Bills. (S) (X) (M)

Enclosure

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

Memorandum

TO : Mr. D. J. Parsons

DATE: April 21, 1961

FROM : A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
REPORT FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
APRIL, 1961

Tolson	_____
Parsons	_____
Mohr	_____
Belmont	✓
Callahan	_____
Conrad	_____
DeLoach	_____
Evans	_____
Malone	_____
Rosen	_____
Tavel	_____
Trotter	_____
W.C. Sullivan	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holmes	_____
Gandy	_____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY

REASON: 1.48

DATE: 11/17/94

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1,6)

There is enclosed herewith a letter to the Attorney General, who is being provided with a document covering [redacted]

In preparing material for the Attorney General, we worked on the premise that any document he receives undoubtedly will come to the attention of CIA. We feel that the Attorney General very likely will show the document to the President and it can be safely assumed that at that point McGeorge Bundy would be given the opportunity to review the material.

In preparing the suggestions to the Attorney General, every effort was made to be most objective. Mention was not made of some items which have been of an extremely controversial nature; for example, we did not go into the subject of coordination of intelligence operations.

[redacted] and we in the Bureau have been careful to make certain that coordination does not place any of our operations under CIA control.

- 1 - Mr. Parsons
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Liaison Section
- 1 - Mr. Papich

SJP:nck (5) Enclosures

~~SECRET~~

DATE: 03-21-2005
CLASSIFIED BY 60290 auc bce/mlt/amw
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1,6) 03-21-2030

1003 RDD/AG
5/14/93 C.A. #88-1826
Declassify on: OADR 9/1/2001
2008 6
SP 7 Dec/1961
11/17/94 C.A. #88-1826
All classified per CIA Review of 6/1/94

Security
79
34/100
31-9

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b7C

b3

REC-84 62-80750-372

7 MAY 10 1961

EX-130

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5/10/61

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum Belmont to Parsons
RE: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
REPORT FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
APRIL, 1961

~~SECRET~~

b1

b3

~~SECRET~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(S)

[Redacted]

With regard to the section pertaining to key personalities, considerable care was employed in phrasing all of the language.

(S)

[Redacted]

b3

b7C

The Director made reference to [Redacted]

ACTION:

For information:

[Handwritten initials: AB, Ad, and a symbol]

*now with
Defense
Dept.*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b3

101 X9

REC-51

The Attorney General
62-27750-3728
Director, FBI

May 9, 1961

- 1 - Mr. Parsons
- 1 - Mr. Evans
- 1 - Mr. Stanley

For your information I received a telegram on May 8, 1961,
signed by [redacted]

b7C

[redacted] This telegram reads as follows:

"I have information concerning the current investigation of the CIA which I consider important. Will be at Attorney Generals Office, Pittsburgh Pa. at 3 PM 9 May. Please advise Attorney General."

This will confirm information orally furnished to your Administrative Assistant on the evening of May 8, 1961. Our files in no information which can be identified with the sender of telegram.

No further action will be taken by the FBI in the absence of questions from you.

MAILED 2
MAY 9 1961
COMM-FBI

Wron R. White
Attorney General

- 1 - Mr. DeLoach
- 1 - Crime Records
- JAE:mar
- (8)

RECEIVED-PARSONS

163

[Handwritten signature]

REC'D-READING ROOM
FBI
MAY 9 1 25 PM '61

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAY 8 1961
WESTERN UNION

Mr. Tolson	_____
Mr. Parsons	_____
Mr. Belmont	_____
Mr. Callahan	_____
Mr. Conrad	_____
Mr. DeLoach	_____
Mr. Evans	_____
Mr. Malone	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Tavel	_____
Mr. Trotter	_____
Mr. W. J. Sullivan	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Mr. Ingram	_____
Miss Gandy	_____

11 445P EDT MAY 8 61 SPOC043 PC042
37 NL COLLECT WASHINGTON PENN 8
REF , FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

INFORMATION CONCERNING THE CURRENT INVESTIGATION OF
WHICH I CONSIDER IMPORTANT. WILL BE AT ATTORNEY GENERALS
PITTSBURGH PA. AT 3 PM 9 MAY. PLEASE ADVISE ATTORNEY

25 MAY 10 1961



*Memo to AG dated 5/9/61
CAE: m.a.r.*

b7C

EX-101

CRIME RESEARCH

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAY 8 1961

WESTERN UNION

BIA011 445P EDT MAY 8 61 SPOC043 PC042
P WFA015 37 NL COLLECT WASHINGTON PENN 8
THE CHIEF , FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHDC

I HAVE INFORMATION CONCERNING THE CURRENT INVEST
THE CIA WHICH I CONSIDER IMPORTANT. WILL BE AT
OFFICE, PITTSBURGH PA. AT 3 PM 9 MAY. PLEASE AI
GENERAL

[REDACTED]

b7C

7 9.

Handwritten initials

163

62-80

1--MR. MOHR FOR DIRECTOR

For Informational Purposes Only

The originals removed from this file and replaced with duplicate copies of the original were accessioned to the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) pursuant to the JFK Records Collection Act of 1992. Provision of the JFK Act allowed for certain information to be postponed from public release until the year 2017; therefore, the pages have NOT necessarily been released for public review in their entirety.

Under the JFK Act, originals to all material deemed assassination records must be accessioned to NARA regardless of whether the material is open in full or released with information postponed. Therefore, any documents or pages from FBI files accessioned to NARA pursuant to the JFK Act are no longer considered the possession of the FBI. The duplicate pages have been inserted strictly for research purposes.

The copies contained herein do not necessarily show the most up-to-date classification.

To attain a copy of the publicly released version of any materials maintained in the JFK Collection at the NARA facility in College Park, MD, you may contact the JFK Access Staff, at 301/713-6620.

The following materials were removed from this file and are maintained in the JFK Collection at NARA:

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 03-21-2005 BY 60290 auc bce/mlt/amw

File & Serial Number

JFK Subject Identifier
(for NARA purposes)

Additional Request #

62-80750-3727
MEMO pl Encl p 8

Wm. K. HARVEY

For Informational Purposes Only

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson _____
 Parsons _____
 Mohr _____
 Belmont _____
 Callahan _____
 Conrad _____
 DeLoach _____
 Evans _____
 Malone _____
 Rosen _____
 Tavel _____
 Trotter _____
 W.C. Sullivan _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Ingram _____
 Gandy _____

TO : MR. EVANS *Cons*

DATE: 5-1-61

FROM : C. H. STANLEY *CHS*

DATE: 03-21-2005
 CLASSIFIED BY 60290 auc bce/mlt/amw
 DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1) 03-21-2030

SUBJECT: [Redacted] (S)
 INFORMATION CONCERNING [Redacted]

b1
b3

Central Intelligence Agency

On Saturday afternoon, 4-29-61, Mr. Andrew F. Oehmann, Executive Assistant to the Attorney General, called and advised the Attorney General's office had received a telephone call from [Redacted]

b7C

According to Mr. Oehmann, [Redacted] indicated he had some information that would be of value to the Attorney General concerning [Redacted]

b3
b7C
b3
b7C

Mr. Oehmann inquired as to whether the Bureau could interview [Redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
 WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

The Washington Field Office was immediately contacted and requested to contact [Redacted] to determine what information he possessed. Late on the afternoon of 4-29-61, Washington Field advised that [Redacted] had called the Silver Spring Resident Agency on the evening of 4-27-61 and was interviewed by the Resident Agent. The Resident Agent indicated to the field office that [Redacted] had nothing specific but merely indicated he felt that [Redacted]

b3
b7C
(S)

According to the Washington Field Office, the results of the interview with [Redacted] are being forwarded to the Bureau as a matter of information.

EX-105 REC-76 62-80750-377

Mr. Oehmann was subsequently advised on the morning of May 1, 1961, concerning the results of the previous interview with [Redacted]. He stated he appreciated the quick action and as far as he was concerned, no further action was necessary.

b7C

RECOMMENDATION:

None. For information

1 - Mr. Belmont
 CHS:dlb
 -4- 67 MAY 11 1961

163

(S) *Cons*

(S)
b1
b3

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

- 1 - Mr. Ev;
- 1 - Mr. Stanley
- 1 - Mr. Cleveland

May 9, 1961

The Attorney General

EX- 105

REC-75

Director, FBI

62-80750 3730

b1

b3

[Redacted] (S)

INFORMATION CONCERNING

b1

b3

b7C

On April 28, 1961

[Redacted]

was interviewed by a Special Agent of the Bureau at his request.

There is enclosed a memorandum dated May 1, 1961, containing information furnished by

[Redacted] (S)

REC'D-READING ROOM
FBI

MAY 9 1 41 PM '61

This will confirm information furnished to Mr. Andrew F. Oehmann by a representative of this Bureau on May 1, 1961, since [Redacted] had contacted your office.

b7C

The information furnished by [Redacted] is also being furnished to the Central Intelligence Agency [Redacted]

b1

b3

b7C

[Redacted] (S)

Enclosure

✓

DATE: 03-21-2005
CLASSIFIED BY 60290 auc cbe/mlt/amw derivative
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1) 03-21-2030

1 - Mr. Belmont - sent direct

CHS:dlb

-7-

dlb

b1

b3

b7C

NOTE: On Saturday, 4-29-61, Mr. Oehmann of the Attorney General's Office telephonically contacted Mr. Evans' Office and talked with C. H. Stanley. Oehmann advised [Redacted] called AG's Office. Washington Field was immediately instructed to interview [Redacted]. Subsequently on same day WFO advised [Redacted] had been interviewed by Silver Spring Resident Agency on evening of 4-28-61. This info furnished to Oehmann on Monday, 5-1-61.

(S)

[Redacted]

- Tolson _____
- Parsons _____
- Mohr _____
- Belmont _____
- Callahan _____
- Conrad _____
- DeLoach _____
- Evans _____
- Malone _____
- Rosen _____
- Tavel _____
- Trotter _____
- W.C. Sullivan _____
- Tele. Room _____
- Ingram _____
- Gandy _____

MAILED 2
MAY 9 1961
COMM-FBI

163

MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT

MAY 11 1961

~~SECRET~~

CHS
dlb

~~SECRET~~

F B I

Date: 5/1/61

Mr. Tolson	_____
Mr. Parsons	_____
Mr. Mohr	_____
Mr. Belmont	_____
Mr. Callahan	_____
Mr. Conrad	_____
Mr. DeLoach	_____
Mr. Evans	_____
Mr. Malone	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Tavel	_____
Mr. Trotter	_____
Mr. W.C. Sullivan	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Mr. Ingram	_____
Miss Gandy	_____

Transmit the following in PLAIN TEXT
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL REGISTERED MAIL
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (Attn. Assistant Director EVANS)

FROM: SAC, BALTIMORE (62-0)

SUBJECT: [Redacted] (S)
INFORMATION CONCERNING

b1
b3

[Handwritten signature]

CENTRAL Intelligence Agency

Enclosed are four copies of self-explanatory letterhead memorandum, this date, at Baltimore.

b3
b7C

Information set forth herein was furnished SA [Redacted] stated he furnished [Redacted]

He said he desired to report this matter to the FBI because of his high regard for our Bureau.

Wick

3 - Bureau (Enc. #)
1 - Baltimore
MHK:df1
(4)

ENCLOSURE

DATE: 05-20-2005
CLASSIFIED BY 60290 auc bce/mlt/amw
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1) 05-20-2030

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

*let to AG copy gentle made
5-8-61
let to CIA - 5-8-61
CHP/...*

*REC-76
EX-109*

62-80750-3730

MAY 2 1961

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

- 1 - Mr. Stanley
- 1 - Mr. Evans
- 1 - Mr. Cleveland

Date: May 9, 1961

DATE: 04-19-2005
CLASSIFIED BY 60290 auc bce/mlt/amw AAG
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1) 04-19-2030

To: Director
Central Intelligence Agency

Attention: Director of Security

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director

Subject:

[Redacted]

(S)

b1

b3

INFORMATION CONCERNING

MAY 9 1 42 PM '61
REC'D-READING ROOM
F B I

On April 28, 1961, [Redacted]

[Redacted]
[Redacted] was interviewed by a Special Agent of this Bureau at his request.

b7C

There is enclosed a memorandum dated May 1, 1961, containing information furnished by [Redacted] regarding [Redacted]

(S)

b1

b3

b7C

[Redacted]

(S)

This is being furnished for your information and no further action is contemplated by this Bureau.

Enclosure

1 - Mr. Belmont - sent direct

CHS:dlb

-7-

EX 101 REC-75 62-80750-3731
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE
F B I
MAY 9 11 32 AM '61
MAY 10 1961
RECEIVED-D7820

- Tolson _____
- Parsons _____
- Mohr _____
- Belmont _____
- Callahan _____
- Conrad _____
- DeLoach _____
- Evans _____
- Malone _____
- Rosen _____
- Tavel _____
- Trotter _____
- W.C. Sullivan _____
- Tele. Room _____
- Ingram _____
- Gandy _____

MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT

56 MAY 15 1961 163

~~SECRET~~

BY COURIER SVC.
8 9 MAY 1961
COMM-FBI

UNITED STATES GOV

Memorandum

Tolson _____
 Parsons _____
 Mohr _____
 Belmont _____
 Callahan _____
 Conrad _____
 DeLoach _____
 Evans _____
 Malone _____
 Rosen _____
 Tavel _____
 Trotter _____
 W.C. Sullivan _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Ingram _____
 Gandy _____

TO : Mr. DeLoach

DATE: 5-5-61

FROM : D. C. Morrell *DMR*

b3

SUBJECT:

[Redacted Subject Line]

REQUEST FOR DIRECTOR'S AUTOGRAPHED PHOTOGRAPH

By letter of 4-24-61 the Director thanked [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b3

acknowledged receipt of this letter by his letter of 4-28-61. In this letter he requested one of the Director's autographed photographs.

Bufiles indicate that [Redacted]

[Redacted] Bufiles contain no derogatory information concerning him [Redacted]

b3

[Redacted]

Liaison Section recommends that [Redacted] request be granted. Liaison Section would like to personally deliver the photograph.

b3

RECOMMENDATIONS:

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 06-13-2005 BY 90290 auc bce/mlt/amw

1. That the Director autograph one of his photographs for [Redacted] in accordance with his request.

[Redacted]

b3

*EX 104
Delivered
5/9/61
muh*

REC-5 62-80750-3733

MAY 12 1961

2. That the autographed photograph be personally delivered to [Redacted] by Liaison Section.

[Redacted]

66 MAY 18 1961 163

RVA:jpr
(2)

RVA

MAILED 25
MAY 8 - 1961
COMM-FBI

CRIME RESEARCH

Don

~~SECRET~~

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson _____
 Parsons _____
 Mohr _____
 Belmont _____
 Callahan _____
 Conrad _____
 DeLoach _____
 Evans _____
 Malone _____
 Rosen _____
 Tavel _____
 Trotter _____
 W.C. Sullivan _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Ingram _____
 Gandy _____

TO : [Redacted] L

DATE: May 10, 1961

FROM : [Redacted] b7C

SUBJECT: [Redacted] (S) b1 b3

INFORMATION CONCERNING

Blaker

b1
b3

[Redacted]

(S)

b1
b3

[Redacted]

(S)

b1

[Redacted]

(S)

ACTION:

For information.

COA...

MWK:ban
(3) *ban*

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - [Redacted]

Enclosure b7C

101 X3

REC-65

62 80750-3734

MAY 12 1961

ENCLOSURE ATTACHED

2-ENCLOSURE
(a)

1 XEROX
MAY 23 1961

LIAISON

FILE

66 MAY 25 1961

DATE: 04-05-2005
CLASSIFIED BY 60290 auc bce/mlt/amw AAG--derivative
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1,6) 04-05-2030

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 03-25-2005 BY 60290 auc bce/mlt/bce/amw

48
ENCLOSURE

62-80750-3734



THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. Parsons	
Mr. Mohr	
Mr. Belmont	
Mr. Callahan	
Mr. Conrad	
Mr. DeLoach	
Mr. Evans	
Mr. Malone	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Tavel	
Mr. Trotter	
Mr. W.C. Sullivan	
Tele. Room	
Mr. Ingram	
Miss Gandy	

American Embassy

April 25, 1961

b3

Dear Mr. Hoover:

b1

b3

[redacted] your representative in [redacted] forwarded to me the photograph which you so kindly provided, and for which I would like to express my appreciation.

It has been a great pleasure to me to have associated, both personally and officially, with many of the fine men who form part of your Bureau. In every case I have felt privileged to know and maintain official relationships with these men who are a credit to their organization and to your outstanding leadership.

b7C

You may rest assured, sir, whatever I can do personally or officially to support you and your Bureau will be done with the greatest of pleasure.

REC-94

62-80750-9736

Sincerely yours,

5 MAY 15 1961

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 04-19-2005 BY 60290 auc bce/mlt/ amw

[redacted]

b7C

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Department of Justice

*noack. reply
5/1/61
as. Correspondent needs
clerical Director for
study photograph*

*W. J. ...
MAY 2 1961*

62 MAY 17 1961

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

- Tolson
- Parsons
- Mohr
- Belmont
- Callahan
- Conrad
- DeLoach
- Evans
- Malone
- Rosen
- Tavel
- Trotter
- W.C. Sullivan
- Tele. Room
- Ingram

TO : Mr. Mohr

DATE: 5/9/61

FROM : J. F. Malone *JFM*

(S)

100 Longaker

b1
b3

SUBJECT:

[Redacted]

INFORMATION CONCERNING

*S. L. Smith
Spec. Inv. Unit
Contract Dept
Spec. Inv. Unit*

Murphy

On May 4 [Redacted] a Special Agent with the
State Bureau of Investigation of North Carolina, and [Redacted]
[Redacted] State Fire Marshal's Office of North Carolina,
called at the office of [Redacted] of this division. [Redacted] stated that

b7C

[Redacted] and one of the Bureau's best friends
in law enforcement, had instructed [Redacted] to call at the Bureau for possible
assistance.

[Large Redacted Block]

(S)

b1
b3

[Redacted Block]

(S)

b1
b3

JSR:smr
(3)
1 - Liaison Section

REC-66

62-80750-3187 file

MAY 16 1961

REC-66
THREE

JFM
PERS. FILE

~~SECRET~~

Memo to Mr. Mohr

re:

[Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

b1

b3

(S)

[Redacted] stated that the purpose of contacting the Bureau was to find out how he

[Redacted]

b1

b3

b7C

(S)

Through liaison [Redacted] was put in touch with [Redacted]

[Redacted]

b1

b3

(S) b7C

[Redacted]

b7C

ACTION:

None... informative.

[Handwritten signature]

~~SECRET~~

UNCODED COPY

- Tolson _____
- Parsons _____
- Mohr _____
- Belmont _____
- Callahan _____
- Conrad _____
- DeLoach
- Evans
- Malone _____
- Rosen _____
- Tavel _____
- Trotter _____
- W.C. Sullivan _____
- Tele. Room _____
- Ingram _____
- Gandy _____

DATE: 04-07-2005
 CLASSIFIED BY 60290 auc bce/mlt/amw AAG--derivative
 DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1,6) 04-07-2030

Radio

Teletype

URGENT

5-5-61

11:49 PM EST

TD


TO DIRECTOR

Central Intelligence Agency

NW/SCA 2-1

FROM SAC, MIAMI

052151



ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 100-429575-20

b1
b3

67 MAY 16 1961

MAY 8 11 33 AM '61
Original Belmont
(H/2)
163

7:50 A.M. 5/16/61
wp 162-80150-
NOT RECORDED
47 MAY 15 1961

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
 WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOV

Memorandum

TO : The Director

DATE: May 4, 1961

FROM : N. P. Callahan

Pages 6700 and 6701. Congressman Nicotand, (R) California, spoke concerning the Cuban situation and CIA's role in the invasion failure. Mr. Nicotand stated "There has been an apparent movement to shift the entire blame for the Cuba mess on the shoulders of the CIA. This is wrong for high administration officials must share some of the blame." He commented on the need to establish a committee to check on the CIA. To accomplish this he introduced H. Con. Res. 309, a resolution establishing a joint committee to conduct an investigation and study of the foreign intelligence activities of the Central Intelligence Agency. Mr. Nicotand stated "Some bills in the past have put the FBI in the picture. I do not feel the FBI, which is doing a magnificent job, is of concern here. This resolution is concerned only with the CIA and its foreign intelligence operations." A copy of the resolution will be obtained for review.

Original filed in: 62-80750-1057

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 04-07-2005 BY 60290 auc bce/mlt/amw

62-80750-
NOT RECORDED
102 MAY 25 1961

In the original of a memorandum captioned and dated as above, the Congressional Record for 5-3-61 was reviewed and pertinent items were marked for the Director's attention. This form has been prepared in order that portions of a copy of the original memorandum may be clipped, mounted, and placed in appropriate Bureau case or subject matter files.

62-80750-1057

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

- Tolson
- Parsons
- Mohr
- DeLoach
- Casper
- Callahan
- Conrad
- Felt
- Gale
- Rosen
- Sullivan
- Tavel
- Trotter
- Tele. Room
- Ingram
- Gandy

TO : Mr. Belmont

DATE: May 2, 1961

FROM : [Redacted]

b7C

SUBJECT: [Redacted]

Boyd
Handwritten initials

b1
b3

As approved in my attached memorandum of May 1, 1961, we talked this morning with [Redacted] at State regarding the charge that SA Papich had indicated that [Redacted]

b1
b3
b7C

At the outset, [Redacted] stated that Papich had not said that [Redacted] He had, however, received the impression that Papich felt that the group should be more fully briefed by the representatives of all United States agencies in the countries which they visited.

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b3
b7C

[Large redacted block]

[Redacted] of State reviewed the instructions which had been given the group. They are to evaluate the communist threat in each country and assess the ability of each country to meet that threat, thereafter making recommendations concerning actions to be taken by the United States to assist those countries in maintaining their internal security. He said instructions had been given to all "country teams" in the areas to be visited to brief the visiting group fully and he expected that the group would ask numerous questions and develop information beyond that which was volunteered during the initial briefings. He said he would telephone the group leader and instruct him to encourage the group to ask questions.

b7C

- ENCLOSURE**
Enclosure
- 1-Mr. Parsons
 - 1-Mr. Belmont
 - 1-Mr. Papich
 - 1-Liaison Section

62-80750-
NOT RECORDED
MAY 12 1961
MAY 11 1961

XEROX
GAD:madr(5)

ENCLOSURE
67 MAY 15 1961

Handwritten signature

ORIGINAL COPY FILED

b7C

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum to Mr. Belmont

[Redacted]
[Redacted]

(S)

b1
b3

[Redacted] was completely sympathetic to SA Papich and pointed out that Papich had urged the group to be more penetrative in its approach and to inquire into what was going on. He said the group members were apparently under the impression that they should merely accept the information furnished them on the scene and, thereafter, recommend action concerning such matters as the furnishing of tear gas or riot control training to local police. Both [Redacted] agreed that this was a misunderstanding.

b7C

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We reiterated the statement which we had made on May 1

[Redacted]

stated

that he had tried to be guarded in his comments on the telephone to [Redacted] and, as a result, had given [Redacted] the erroneous impression which resulted in [Redacted] call to us yesterday.

ACTION:

For information, [Redacted] has agreed to forward the Bureau a copy of each report submitted by the group.

b7C

EP
Quaker

P *SP* *V.*

RR has an if we refused another consent against the FBI!

K

~~SECRET~~

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10-

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson _____
 Parsons _____
 Mohr _____
 Belmont _____
 Callahan _____
 Conrad _____
 DeLoach _____
 Evans _____
 Malone _____
 Rosen _____
 Tavel _____
 Trotter _____
 W.C. Sullivan _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Ingram _____

ask

TO : Mr. Belmont

DATE: May 1, 1961

b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

FROM :

[Redacted]

L'

SUBJECT:

[Redacted]

b1

b3

[Redacted]

b7C

(S)

(S)

b1

Department of State, telephoned at 4:45 p.m., May 1, 1961 and referred to the trip which Special Agent Sam Papich is now taking

b3

(S)

b7C

He stated

that "we have just heard" that Papich is having a rather hard time obtaining material for his purposes. He said he had heard from a

[Redacted]

(S)

We told [Redacted] that Papich had been briefed by State concerning the purpose of the trip and had reported to us following the briefing as a result of which we could state categorically that Papich was not under the impression that [Redacted]

and that we flatly doubted that Papich had made any statement which could be so construed. We asked for the identity of [Redacted] source and, after hesitation, he said he was meeting with the source at State at 10:00 a.m., on May 2. We then asked for an opportunity to confront the source ourselves and he said we could do this in his office at that time.

b1

b3

b7C

[Redacted] reviewed the purpose of the tour and his statement conforms with the purpose as outlined in the memorandum which Papich prepared after his briefing by State.

ENCLOSURE

b7C

ACTION:

ENCLOSURE

162-80750-

If you approve, we will meet [Redacted] source" at 10:00 a.m., Tuesday, May 2, in [Redacted] office and get the facts firsthand. We will insist that the source put up or shut up if he is at all vague in his report as to what Papich is alleged to have said.

b7C

- 1-Mr. Parsons
- 1-Mr. Belmont
- 1-Liaison Section

GAD:mad (4)

MAY 12 1961

Handwritten signatures and initials:
AP
Handwritten notes:
memo to Belmont
5/2/61
Handwritten initials:
Handwritten signature:
Handwritten signature:

b7C


ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 64-200-3354

~~SECRET~~

May 16, 1961

REC-24

62-80757-3738



b7C

Dear [Redacted]

Your letter of May 8, 1961, with enclosures, has been received.

It is most encouraging to know that our young people are alerting themselves to the menace of communism and taking steps to help in the fight against it. I cannot, however, as a matter of policy, take the action you suggested. I am enclosing one of my statements which gives suggestions for those who are interested in aiding this Bureau in the internal security field.

MAY 16 5 08 PM '61
FBI
READING ROOM

Sincerely yours,
J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 04-11-2005 BY 60290 auc bce/mlt/amw

Enclosure

4-17-61 statement re Internal Security

NOTE: Bufiles reflect nothing derogatory on correspondent. In April, 1961, he wrote to the Director commenting on the April 1 LEB Introduction and his letter was cordially acknowledged sending communism reprints. The statement currently being furnished was not sent at that time. Bufiles reflect no record of the Students Associated Against Totalitarianism.

- Tolson _____
- Parsons _____
- Fohr _____
- Imont _____
- Callahan _____
- Conrad _____
- DeLoach _____
- Evans _____
- Malone _____
- Rosen _____
- Tavel _____
- rotter _____
- .C. Sullivan _____
- Tele. Room _____
- Ingram _____
- Gandy _____

MAILED 3
MAY 17 1961
COMM-FBI

SAW:nss (3)

3 MAY 23 1961
MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT

Handwritten notes and signatures:
DWA
REC'D
SAW



b7C

May 8, 1961

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 04-11-2005 BY 60290 auc bce/mlt/amw

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover,
Director,
F.B.I.

Dear Mr. Hoover;

Thanks for your letter of reply which was received a few weeks ago.
The enclosures on the subject of Communism were studied with much interest.

I will accept your advice that education is the best means of combatting Communism.

But at the same time I would like you to know that I do not have any confidence in the United States Government's ability to combat Communism itself.

Just a few days ago, for example, radio commentator Fulton Lewis Jr. broadcast an item implying that somebody in the Central Intelligence Agency or State Department tipped off Premier Castro as to the location of the invasion site in Cuba. Mr. Lewis said that the invasion force themselves didnt know the location of the landing until they opened their sealed orders at sea. But when they arrived at the spot on the Cuban coast, Castro and his forces were already there assembled and waiting.

Your department undoubtedly does a good job keeping track of Communists. But the U.S. Government has no control over the generating of Communist thinking and sympathy among our citizens.

Take the University of California at Berkeley for example. Would you believe it that until very recently, in a student body of over 20,000 there was not a single group nor not a single voice speaking up for Americanism and out against her enemies.

During the past few weeks a group of students are organizing as the Students Associated Against Totalitarianism. I have become interested in this group and have attended several of their meetings. They are a clean cut group of young people and of good character.

They urgently require encouragement and assistance.

If you could possibly do anything at all to help them it would be of tremendous benefit. Possibly you could bring them to the attention of other interested persons or organizations.

In the meantime I have sunk \$50 into their outfit and consider it a very good investment in the future security of the U.S.A. I hope others will feel the same way.

Sincerely yours,



b7C

ENCLOSURE

REC-24 62-80750-3738

MAY 18 1961

CONFIDENTIAL

act. 5/16/61

STUDENTS ASSOCIATED AGAINST TOTALITARIANISM

Box 784

Berkeley 4, California

VICTOR WINKEL
Chairman

CHARTER MEMBERS

Charles Fox
Inta Kalnins
George H. Keith
Beverly King
Miklos Nagy
John J. Skujins
Andris Trapans
J. Arveds Trapans


Students Associated Against Totalitarianism is an organization of students attending the University of California at Berkeley. Our purpose is to oppose any expression of totalitarian attitudes or propoganda and particularly the effects of communist subversion and influence.

We intend to use all legitimate means at our disposal to expose communist operations and sources of communist propoganda. In our area, however, this is not enough for the idea is already widespread that communism is a legitimate form of government and should be allowed to compete along sidedemocracy and within democracy. It thus becomes our duty to attempt to keep the public aware of the barbarous nature of communism and the atrocities committed by the Soviet Union, both within her borders and without. In this age of decisive conflict between our democratic system and totalitarianism, our survival depends upon an alert and informed citizenry.

Since our energy will be devoted largely to this task, we have decided not to take a stand on many issues which we feel are peripheral to it. In this manner we hope to unite our members in a common struggle and to solicit help from as large a part of the public as possible.

We are and shall remain an independent organization but we shall accept money, suggestions and publications from any persons or groups who support our ideals and are kind enough to aid us. To these people we shall be happy to explain in detail our aims, our activities, and the use we make of any money offered us.

Very truly yours,



ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 04-11-2005 BY 60290 auc bce/mlt/anw

b7C

Like CANCER -- COMMUNISM kills. Help crush it!

ENCLOSURE

1-5 80750-3736

Wilkinson

TO THE EDITOR: In allowing Frank Wilkinson to speak at the University of California, the prediction of Dimitri Manuilsky of the Lenin Institute of Political Warfare, Moscow, is being fulfilled: that "The capitalist countries, stupid and decadent, will rejoice to co-operate in their own destruction," and Lenin's prediction that we will even finance that destruction.

There is no excuse for a tax-supported institution like the University to co-operate with known Communists. The argument is that all sides of every issue should be presented. Yet the left-wing political party that sponsored Wilkinson has continually brought forth but one idea, as their most recent endeavor demonstrates.

How long are we going to aid those who are dedicated to destroying us not through nuclear warfare but through the spread of their ideology?

—Beverly King.

TO THE EDITOR: The appearance of Frank Wilkinson is another in a series of incidents on the Berkeley campus which serves the purpose of weakening both the University and the United States, bringing them into disrepute and causing disturbances. Students and teachers feel that protests are helpful actions, and show that the students are thinking and stimulated. This is indeed good, if not endangered by misdirection. The students' antics in supporting every protest and new ideal that happens along, reminds one of a rebellious adolescent constantly chafing against the bit of older and wiser authority and experience. Fortunately, most outgrow rebellion for the sake of rebellion, and understand this is the means of maturing and learning to think independently. Youth is always a prime target for misdirection, as it is easy to exploit their lofty dreams and idealism which have not yet been tempered by actual experience.

—Victor Winkel.
Senior, speech.

The Great Fraud

No one who has seen the Soviet Union can take seriously any comparison between that country and the United States, unless it be in the terms of arms production. The population of the Soviet Union lives on a near-subsistence level which requires it to be compared rather with newly-developed countries in Africa and Asia.

It is unfortunate that the talk of "keeping ahead of the Soviets" ever got started because we have caused them to be taken seriously in areas where they would never even be considered an important power. It is, in fact, America which has "made" the Soviet Union and who is every day enhancing her reputation around the world by serious talk of competing with her. But if such competition ever comes, it will be in a different epoch and under different conditions those which now exist.

No trouble began when Roosevelt recognized the Soviet Union. He continued his errors and permitted the whole of Eastern Europe to be thrown into darkness. Now the leaders of free countries are at a considerable disadvantage when they attempt to use conventional diplomatic procedure with gangsters who understand nothing but force.

Under a two-column photo of Wilkinson, another article reported an interview with an old gentleman who opposed Wilkinson's appearance. The reporter's derisive treatment of his comments made it clear that any opposition to Wilkinson could come only from a hopelessly reactionary individual who is tragically out of touch with his time and preoccupied with the superfluous question of the taxpayers' money.

In a third article, the vice-chancellor in charge of student affairs congratulates the students for showing "your general good sense as you have so many times before" for not having created a scene upon Wilkinson's appearing before them.

And, indeed, why should there have been any trouble since the rioting students got just what they wanted?

—CHARLES FOX.
Berkeley.

TO THE EDITOR: When we finish patting ourselves on the back for our fairness in hearing Frank Wilkinson, let us ask ourselves this question: Is not our concern with the "free speech" issue one more instance of that process of rationalization for our ultimate fear of the bomb? For a decade atomic blackmail has been the motivation for our tolerance of acts inconceivable 20 years ago. We were scared witless when the Soviets got nuclear power: we tried to bury our fear; we began to substitute for it perverted concepts of fair play; the Soviet system, once generally conceded to be totalitarian, has little by little inched its way into our American minds as just another respectable form of government ("They have their systems and we have ours and may the best man win") or possibly even superior ("Their spatnjiks are 10 times bigger—they can't be all bad").

Underdogs

TO THE EDITOR: The real "persecuted underdogs" of this world are the millions of individuals who are held captives in their own countries and ruled over by communistic fascists. The suffering of these people is increased every time they hear of a new American act which strengthens the Soviet Union. The very word "co-existence" is anathema to them for it means only further enslavement.

—Charles Fox,
Graduate, Linguistics

Youth

TO THE EDITOR: Those who keep shouting it can't happen here should not fail to read the statements of Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, national chairman of the U.S. Communist party. Under the head "Red Party in U.S Looks to Youth" appearing in the Oakland Tribune, April 4, an interview with Mrs. Flynn answers explicitly several frequently raised questions about Communist influence in student political life.

Mrs. Flynn acknowledges that students are being increasingly attracted to the party and that their "general activity" in religious groups, peace marches and student organizations is "encouraging." She acknowledges furthermore that though they do not often come right out and join, it is simply because of fear of the House Un-American Activities Committee. Under her leadership, she adds, the party will continue to strive for the abolition of this committee.

Students who go along with the so-called liberal campus movement merely because it appears so much more intellectually sophisticated than its adversaries, can see that Mrs. Flynn will be delighted to have them among. By exploiting student idealism and the inevitable adolescent rebelliousness, by picturing all anti-Communism as a combination of Judas and George Babbitt, the Communist party is reaping the bonanza that the interview describes.

Is there no one who will point out clearly to the student body that joining Communist-front groups means in all likelihood a life-long commitment, that once one is in, the party uses every means, including overt threats and blackmail, to keep him there. What started out as sincere but misguided idealism and search for truth may be given a completely different direction from the one which the innocent freshmen from Casa Grande Poly intended. By being naive enough to let his good intentions be exploited by career agitators, he may himself find out that the only career left open to him, too, is that of agitator.

—George Keith,
Graduate, Romance languages

Campus Speech

Editor: On March 22 heard Frank Wilkinson speak at the University of California. Wilkinson, who has been identified as being an organizer for communist front groups by our federal investigative agencies, used campus as a forum for attacking the House Un-American Activities Committee. Most of my fellow students listened to his speech in contemptuous silence. However, a minor of the audience greeted Wilkinson's attacks with frenzied applause, and hissed when student asked Wilkinson if he were a communist.

The core of this minor consists of a small, organized and dedicated group. It invited Wilkinson to speak, has repeatedly attempted to mold student opinion—example, by organizing a standing committee to defend the pseudo-communist Castro regime. Scheduled to hear, is a discussion of the question of "American imperialism." (Why not Socialism? That exists.) The recent general trend

is causing increased concern among the student "Daily Californian," a campus newspaper, in March 24 editorial went far as to state that it querading communists has taken a foothold at the University. If this be so, prompt and decisive action the general public is needed in order to help end such state of affairs.

—A. TRAPANI
Berkeley.

TO THE EDITOR: Frank Wilkinson's pitch to the crowd at his economically secure youth; his belated discovery of such a state of poverty is no doubt cleverly contrived. But it is hardly likely that it was Wilkinson who invented the technique.

This is just the type of stunt we so often hear people who have escaped after being interrogated by the Communist police. They always talk about a pet of clever but forced brainwashing followed by a "sincere" confession which the captors expect as "self-criticism."

Wilkinson's crime was that he belonged to the bourgeoisie. He seeks absolution through constant self-criticism and public confession. Who is to doubt that he "sincere" in terms of this phraseology which is subverted all our values? Perhaps the sympathizers in Wilkinson's audience were not the only ones fooled by his speech?

—Charles Fox,
Graduate, Linguistic

~~SECRET~~

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104

UNITED STATES

MENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 5/17/61

FROM : SAC, WFO (65-8257)

SUBJECT:

[Redacted]

(S)

b1
b3

Re WFO letter to Bureau dated 4/14/61.

[Redacted]

(S)

b1
b3

[Redacted]

b3
b7C

[Redacted]

(S)

b1
b3

*o.k. 1/1
ml*

DATE: 04-11-2005
CLASSIFIED BY 60290 auc bce/mlt/amw AAG
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1,6) 04-11-2030

ml

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

1-d
P
2 - Bureau
1 - WFO
AJH: CBS
(3)

fwy

REC-46

EX-105

62-80750-373

MAY 18 1961

[Signature]
ESP. SEC.


55 MAY 29 1961

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO :



b7C

DATE: 5-24-61

FROM :

SUBJECT:



b3
b7C

The attached OTA 4-10-61 has been received in the Records Branch, appropriately initialed, and indicated for file. By use of instant transmittal memorandum, all necessary recording and indexing will be accomplished. It is to be noted this form is for internal use only within the Records Branch, principally by the Routing Unit where bulky material not accompanied by memorandum is usually received.

The enclosure, if bulky and not usually filed with other papers in file, may be detached but this action should be clearly noted under the word "Enclosure."

Enclosure

EX-100

REC-23

NOT RECORDED

13 MAY 24 1961

3740

ENCLOSURE

ENCLO. BEHIND FILE

67 MAY 29 1961

Content as per...

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson _____
 Parsons _____
 Mohr _____
 Belmont _____
 Callahan _____
 Conrad _____
 DeLoach _____
 Evans _____
 Malone _____
 Rosen _____
 Tavel _____
 Trotter _____
 W.C. Sullivan _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Ingram _____
 Gandy _____

REC-95

TO : [Redacted] L'

DATE: May 17, 1961

FROM : [Redacted] b7C

SUBJECT: [Redacted] b1 b3 (S)

[Redacted] (S) b1 b3

[Redacted] (S) b1 b3

ACTION:

For information.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

jad
MMK:jad (4)

- 1 - [Redacted]
- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - [Redacted] b7C

DATE: 04-11-2005
 CLASSIFIED BY 60290 auc bce/mlt/amw AAG derivative
 DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1) 04-11-2030

an
Fleming

REC-95
EX-105

62-80750-3741

MAY 24 1961

July

66 MAY 29 1961

5. m...

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI
FROM : SAC, BALTIMORE (94-238)

DATE: May 11, 1961

SUBJECT: ANONYMOUS LETTER CONCERNING
ALLEN W. DULLES, HEAD OF CIA
MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING

Attached for the Bureau are five (5) copies of a letterhead memorandum concerning captioned matter.

No investigation is being conducted by Baltimore in this matter. Local dissemination has been made to the 109th CIC Group, Frederick, Maryland.

*same document as
encl. received from
Pittsburgh & delivered
CIA on 4/6/61
(see 62-80750-3714)
mwb.*

Mr. Tolson	_____
Mr. Parsons	_____
Mr. Mohr	_____
Mr. Belmont	_____
Mr. Callahan	_____
Mr. Conrad	_____
Mr. DeLoach	_____
Mr. Evans	_____
Mr. Malone	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Tavel	_____
Mr. Trotter	_____
Mr. W.C. Sullivan	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Mr. Ingram	_____
Miss Gandy	_____

EX-116

ENCLOSURE

b3
b7C

1 cc to [redacted]
5/17/61
mwb.

- 2 - Bureau (Encs. 5)
 - 1 - Baltimore
- RRL:sld
(3)

REC-7
file 62-80750-
with mwb.

EX-116

11 MAY 24 1961

62-80750-3742

57 MAY 31 1961



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Baltimore, Maryland

May 11, 1961

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. 94-238

The attached communication, addressed, To the Attorney General of the United States, was left on a desk in [redacted]

b7C

[redacted] some-
time in March of 1961.

[redacted] the
[redacted] made the communication available to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and unsuccessful attempts were made at [redacted] office to identify the individual who left the above mentioned communication.

b7C

"THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS NEITHER RECOMMENDATIONS
NOR CONCLUSIONS OF THE FBI. IT IS THE PROPERTY
OF THE FBI AND IS LOANED TO YOUR AGENCY; IT
AND ITS CONTENTS ARE NOT TO BE DISTRIBUTED
OUTSIDE YOUR AGENCY."

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 04-11-2005 BY 60290 auc bce/mlt/amw

62-84450-3742

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. DeLoach

DATE: 5-18-61

FROM : M. A. Jones

SUBJECT: FULTON LEWIS, JR.
NEWS BROADCAST OF
MAY 18, 1961, AT 7 P. M.

- Tolson _____
- Parsons _____
- Mohr _____
- Belmont _____
- Callahan _____
- Conrad _____
- DeLoach _____
- Evans _____
- Malone _____
- Rosen _____
- Tavel _____
- Trotter _____
- W.C. Sullivan _____
- Tele. Room _____
- Ingram _____
- Gandy _____

b7C

Mr. Lewis devoted approximately the first 5 minutes of his broadcast to a discussion of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). He stated Director Allen W. Dulles is a most affable individual who enjoys parties and making contacts; however, noticeably refrained from any comment relative to Dulles' abilities with respect to directing CIA activities.

General C. P. Cabell, CIA Deputy Director, Mr. Lewis said, is a very capable individual and has a good background for his assignment. The other two top aides, however, Mr. Lewis termed inept and individuals with "left wing" viewpoints. He was severely critical in many of his comments relative to CIA and pointed out it is most disturbing to see the organization continually fail in its efforts.

He stated there is good indication that General Maxwell Taylor soon will be appointed to replace Dulles as head of CIA adding that there also is a move underfoot to combine CIA and the FBI with Mr. Hoover in overall command of both the agencies.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

REC-24
Beck

162-40750-3743

NOT RECORDED
199 MAY 24 1961

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 94-1-2184-461

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 04-11-2005 BY 60290 auc bce/mlt/amw

DWB:cfn
(3)

18 MAY 24 1961

XEROX
MAY 25 1961
Vas

CRIME RESEARCH

58 JUN 1 1961

Handwritten signature

~~SECRET~~

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson	_____
Parsons	_____
Mohr	_____
Belmont	_____
Callahan	_____
Conrad	_____
DeLoach	_____
Evans	_____
Malone	_____
Rosen	_____
Tavel	_____
Trotter	_____
W.C. Sullivan	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Ingram	_____
Gandy	_____

TO : Mr. Belmont *AB*

DATE: May 26, 1961

FROM : [redacted] *EL* *W* b7C

SUBJECT: [redacted] b3

You previously have been informed that [redacted]

[redacted] (S)

[redacted] b1

[redacted] b3

[redacted] is well known to us and has been very friendly and cooperative at all times. He does not have the over-all operational experience of [redacted] but in view of his attitude toward the Bureau, we should not encounter any problems in dealing with him.

ACTION:

For information.

SJP:ban *ban*
(5)

- 1 - Mr. Parsons
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Mr. Papich

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

DATE: 05-23-2005
 CLASSIFIED BY 60290 auc bce/mlt/amw AAG
 DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1,6) 05-23-2030

REC-12 62-80950-3744

17 JUN 1 1961

EX 100

62 JUN 8 1961

~~SECRET~~

For Informational Purposes Only

The originals removed from this file and replaced with duplicate copies of the original were accessioned to the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) pursuant to the JFK Records Collection Act of 1992. Provision of the JFK Act allowed for certain information to be postponed from public release until the year 2017; therefore, the pages have **NOT** necessarily been released for public review in their entirety.

Under the JFK Act, originals to all material deemed assassination records must be accessioned to NARA regardless of whether the material is open in full or released with information postponed. Therefore, any documents or pages from FBI files accessioned to NARA pursuant to the JFK Act are no longer considered the possession of the FBI. The duplicate pages have been inserted strictly for research purposes.

The copies contained herein **do not** necessarily show the most up-to-date classification.

To attain a copy of the publicly released version of any materials maintained in the JFK Collection at the NARA facility in College Park, MD, you may contact the JFK Access Staff, at 301/713-6620.

The following materials were removed from this file and are maintained in the JFK Collection at NARA:

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 04-11-2005 BY 60290 auc bce/mlt/amw

File & Serial Number

JFK Subject Identifier

(for NARA purposes)

Additional Request #

62-80750-NR 5/2/61

CIA LIAISON MATERIAL

For Informational Purposes Only

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson	
Belmont	
Mohr	
DeLoach	
Casper	
Callahan	
Conrad	
Felt	
Gale	
Rosen	
Sullivan	
Tavel	
Trotter	
Tele. Room	
Ingram	
Gandy	

TO : MR. BELMONT

DATE: May 21, 1961

FROM :

[Redacted]

b7C

SUBJECT:

[Redacted]

b3

b7C

[Redacted]

ASAC Richard J. Baker of the Miami Office called at 2:35 p.m. May 21, 1961, to advise of a telephone call he had received from [Redacted]

b3

[Redacted]

b3

[Redacted]

b3

b7C

[Redacted]

b3

b7C

[Redacted]

b3

b7C

102-20150-
NOT RECORDED

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b3

Baker advised [Redacted] that he would check with the Bureau and would, of course, be guided by the Bureau's advice.

[Redacted]

b3

Baker told the writer that he will do nothing further on this matter pending instructions from the Bureau, but requested if possible, that he be furnished advice prior to noon, Monday, May 22, 1961.

62 JUN 6 1961

1-Belmont
EBS:cb (6)

1-[Redacted]
1-[Redacted]

b7C

1-[Redacted]
1-[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b7C

ORIGINAL DOCUMENT SENT TO NATIONAL ARCHIVES (JFKARCA) DATE 8-14-98 FBI/DO (CIA HQ Liaison File)

b3

ORIGINAL FILED IN

Memorandum to Mr. Belmont

Re: [redacted]

b3

b3

b7C

[redacted]

[redacted]

b3

(100-429505)

ACTION:

Miami Office has been advised by teletype today not to get involved [redacted]

b3

[Handwritten signatures and initials: J, Q, M, 9, V, and others]

dmd

UNITED STATES GO

Memorandum

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 04-11-2005 BY 60290 auc bce/mlt/amw

- Tolson _____
- Parsons _____
- Mohr _____
- Belmont _____
- Callahan _____
- Conrad _____
- DeLoach _____
- Evans _____
- Malone _____
- Rosen _____
- Tavel _____
- Trotter _____
- W.C. Sullivan _____
- Tele. Room _____
- Ingram _____
- Gandy _____

TO : Mr. Mohr

DATE: May 12, 1961

FROM : Mr. DeLoach

SUBJECT:

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

2/11
ST

*ederson
Callahan*

b7C

b3

b7C

A teletype from New York dated 5-9-61 reported that

[Redacted]
interviewed several sources in Miami, Florida, relative to the recent
Cuban invasion. Among those persons interviewed by him were [Redacted]

b3

b7C

b7D

[Redacted] New
York Office stated that [Redacted] was probably identical with [Redacted]

b7C

b7D

It was recommended that this office determine from [Redacted]
the identity of the allegation relating to [Redacted]

80750

ACTION TAKEN:

NOT RECORDED
184 JUN 5 1961

I had [Redacted] talk to [Redacted] today. [Redacted] states that he
got the information relative to [Redacted] whom he said might be [Redacted] from
several persons in the Miami area but he first heard reference to this name
in an interview he had with [Redacted]

b7C

b7D

[Redacted]

[Redacted] also said that he heard the name [Redacted] being involved
in the Cuban matter from several Cubans who frequent a corner cafe about
two blocks up from the Columbus Hotel in Miami.

b7C

b7D

[Redacted]
[Redacted] he could not be certain as to just whom
he has talked with but he said he is certain [Redacted] is the name first mention-
ing [Redacted] to him. He said present at the time was [Redacted]
[Redacted] who also heard [Redacted] allegation.

b7C

b7D

- 1 - Mr. Parsons
- 1 - Mr. Belmont

REW/mlw (4)

3 XEROX
JUN 5 1961
VP

(See Recommendation next page)

12 JUN 2 1961

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 104-17-210-2057

Nanda

DeLoach to Mohr memo

Re:

b7C

RECOMMENDATION:

That this memorandum be referred to the Domestic Intelligence Division for information and any action deemed appropriate.

[Handwritten signature]

[Handwritten signature]
[Handwritten signature]

[Handwritten initials]

[Handwritten checkmark]

[Handwritten initials]

~~SECRET~~

- Parsons
- Belmont
- Evans
- 1 - DeLoach
- 1 - Casca

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

The Attorney General

May 12, 1961

Director, FBI

DATE: 04-11-2005
FBI INFO.
CLASSIFIED BY 60290 auc bce/mlt/amw AAG
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1) 04-11-2030

b1

[Redacted]

(S)

b3

b7C

[Redacted]

b7D

[Redacted] furnished the following
information:

b1

b3

[Redacted]

(S)

b1

b3

[Redacted]

(S)

MAIL ROOM

ORIGINAL COPY FILED

MAILED
MAY 12 1961
COMM-FBI

[Redacted]

(S)

b1

b3

- Olson
- Parsons
- Rosen
- Tavel
- Tele. Room
- Holmes
- Gandy
- W.C. Sullivan
- Nease
- DeLoach
- Evans
- Malone
- Rosen
- Tavel
- Tele. Room
- Holmes
- Gandy

105-83195

1 - [Redacted]

VHN:bar
(10)

66 JUN 6 1961

MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT

NOT RECORDED
141 JUN 15 1961


See NWIE page two

12 JUN 2 1961

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

The Attorney General



(S)

b1

b3

This is for your information.

1 - Mr. Byron R. White
Deputy Attorney General

NOTE: A separate letter is being directed to CIA incorporating this data.

- 2 -

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

DATE: 04-11-2005
CLASSIFIED BY 60290 auc bce/mlt/amw AAG
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3 (1) 04-11-2030

Mr. Tolson	_____
Mr. Boardman	_____
Mr. Mohr	_____
Mr. Belmont	_____
Mr. Callahan	_____
Mr. Conrad	_____
Mr. DeLoach	_____
Mr. Evans	_____
Mr. Malone	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Tavel	_____
Mr. Trotter	_____
Mr. W.C. Sullivan	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Mr. Ingram	_____
Miss Gandy	_____


ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

URGENT 5-9-61 3-07 PM JLW
TO DIRECTOR 109-12-210 /3/ AND SAC MIAMI
FROM SAC NEW YORK 105-45672 3P

*center work
call off*

Bath 1057

(S)



END PAGE ONE

*Set to AG 5/12/61 except date possible
Set to CIA 5/12/61 referring to unclassified
Place in 100-22779*

~~12 JUN 2 1961~~
~~62-80410~~
NOT RECORDED
141 JUN 6 1961

b1
b3

66 JUN 6 1961

~~SECRET~~

For Informational Purposes Only

The originals removed from this file and replaced with duplicate copies of the original were accessioned to the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) pursuant to the JFK Records Collection Act of 1992. Provision of the JFK Act allowed for certain information to be postponed from public release until the year 2017; therefore, the pages have **NOT** necessarily been released for public review in their entirety.

Under the JFK Act, originals to all material deemed assassination records must be accessioned to NARA regardless of whether the material is open in full or released with information postponed. Therefore, any documents or pages from FBI files accessioned to NARA pursuant to the JFK Act are no longer considered the possession of the FBI. The duplicate pages have been inserted strictly for research purposes.

The copies contained herein do not necessarily show the most up-to-date classification.

To attain a copy of the publicly released version of any materials maintained in the JFK Collection at the NARA facility in College Park, MD, you may contact the JFK Access Staff, at 301/713-6620.

The following materials were removed from this file and are maintained in the JFK Collection at NARA:

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 04-11-2005 BY 60290 auc bce/mlt/amw

File & Serial Number

JFK Subject Identifier

(for NARA purposes)

Additional Request # 10

62-80750-2nd NR 3743

date 8/24/61

CIA Liaison Files

For Informational Purposes Only

The Attorney General

May 22, 1961

Director, FBI

62-80750
139 -

b3
b7C

[Redacted]

This case involves an allegation that [Redacted]

b3
b7C

[Redacted]

The Criminal Division was previously advised that

b3
b7C

[Redacted]

b3
b7C

[Redacted]

b3
b7C

[Redacted]

the full investigation requested in this matter is continuing and copies of reports will be furnished to the Department upon receipt.

b3

[Redacted]

Enclosures (2)

ENCLOSURE

- Tolson
- DeLoach
- Mohr
- Bishop
- Casper
- Callahan
- Conrad
- Felt
- Gale
- Rosen
- Sullivan
- Tavel
- Trotter
- Tele. Room
- Holmes
- Gandy

- 1 - Mr. Byron R. White
Deputy Attorney General (Enclosure)
- 1 - Assistant Attorney General
Herbert J. Miller, Jr. (Enclosure)
- 1 - Mr. Evans (Enc.)
- 1 - Mr. Belmont (Enc.)

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

EJM:aeo (12)

JUN 7 1961

ORIGINAL DOCUMENT SENT TO NATIONAL ARCHIVES (LIFCARCA) 49
DATE - 8-14-98 FBI (CIA Liason File)
DJR

MAY 22 3 06 PM '61

ORIGINAL COPY FILED 62-80750-139-43

For Informational Purposes Only

The originals removed from this file and replaced with duplicate copies of the original were accessioned to the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) pursuant to the JFK Records Collection Act of 1992. Provision of the JFK Act allowed for certain information to be postponed from public release until the year 2017; therefore, the pages have NOT necessarily been released for public review in their entirety.

Under the JFK Act, originals to all material deemed assassination records must be accessioned to NARA regardless of whether the material is open in full or released with information postponed. Therefore, any documents or pages from FBI files accessioned to NARA pursuant to the JFK Act are no longer considered the possession of the FBI. The duplicate pages have been inserted strictly for research purposes.

The copies contained herein do not necessarily show the most up-to-date classification.

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The following materials were removed from this file and are maintained in the JFK Collection at NARA:

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 04-11-2005 BY 60290 auc bce/mlt/amw

File & Serial Number

JFK Subject Identifier
(for NARA purposes)

Additional Request # 10

62-80750-15th NR 3743
Dated 5/4/61

CIA Liaison Files

For Informational Purposes Only

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Parsons

DATE: May 4, 1961

FROM : A. H. Belmont *L'*

SUBJECT:

Trotter	
W.C. Sullivan	
Tele. Room	
Ingram	
Gandy	

DeLoach
Evans
Malone
Rosen
Sullivan
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

b3
b7C

Reference is made to Mr. Rosen's memorandum, April 25, last, on the captioned matter, referring to information furnished by

b3
b7C

FL

b3
b7C

b3
b7C

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 157-1201-43

- ban*
(8)
- 1 - Mr. Parsons
 - 1 - Mr. Belmont
 - 1 - Mr. Rosen
 - 1 - Mr. C. A. Evans
 - 1 -
 - 1 - Liaison; 1 -
- XEROX*
MAY 31 1961
VPJ

5-22-61
5-12-61
5-14-61

NOT RECORDED
46 MAY 31 1961

17 MAY 31 1961
62-81750

6-10-61

b7C

ORIGINAL DOCUMENT SENT TO
NATIONAL ARCHIVES (JFKARCA)
DATE 8-14-98 FBI/DO (CIA HQ Liaison File)
BTR

Memorandum Belmont to Parsons

Re:

[Redacted]

b3

b7C

[Redacted]

b3

b7C

ACTION:

It is recommended that this memorandum be forwarded to the General Investigative Division for its information and for any further action in connection with the captioned investigation.

[Handwritten initials]

Q

[Handwritten notes]
yes & press vigorously
on Cianciani, Trabucco
& Ballotti.

gpc

[Handwritten symbol]

~~SECRET~~

2 - Orig. & 1

1 - Yellow

1 - Liaison

1 - Mr. Papich **May 26, 1961**

SAC, WFO (62-0)

Director, FBI

62-80750 - 3745

b1

b3

[Redacted] (S)

INFORMATION CONCERNING

**Reference is made to your letter dated May 5, 1961.
Information received by you indicated**

b3

[Redacted]

b1

b3

[Redacted] (S)

b1

b3

[Redacted] (S)

DATE: 04-11-2005
CLASSIFIED BY 60290 auc bce/mlt/amw AAG-DERIVATIVE
REASON: 1.4 (1)
DECLASSIFY ON: 04-11-2030

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

[Signature]
SJP:cb/ban (5)
ban

NOTE:

b1

b3

[Redacted] (S)

- Tolson _____
- Parsons _____
- Mohr _____
- Belmont _____
- Callahan _____
- Conrad _____
- DeLoach _____
- Evans _____
- Malone _____
- Rosen _____
- Tavel _____
- Trotter _____
- W.C. Sullivan _____
- Tele. Room _____
- Ingram _____
- Sandy _____

MAILED 3
MAY 26 1961
COMM-FBI

MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT

50 JUN 9 1961

~~SECRET~~

ROV

~~SECRET~~



THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
American Embassy

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

[Redacted]

(S) b1

- Mr. Tolson ✓
- Mr. Parsons ✓
- Mr. Mohr ✓
- Mr. Belmont ✓
- Mr. Callahan ✓
- Mr. Conrad ✓
- Mr. DeLoach ✓
- Mr. Evans ✓
- Mr. Malone ✓
- Mr. Rosen ✓
- Mr. Tavel ✓
- Mr. Trotter ✓
- Mr. W.C. Sullivan ✓
- Tele. Room
- Mr. Ingram
- Miss Gandy

Date: May 23, 1961
To: Director, FBI (62-80750)

b1

From: Legat [Redacted]

(S)

Subject: RELATIONS WITH THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

b7C

[Redacted]

(S)

b1

[Large Redacted Block]

(S)

b1

b3

[Redacted Block]

(S)

b1

b3

P
2 - Bureau
1 - [Redacted]
NWP:mas
(3)

CC DETACHED
RECEIVED-DIRECTOR

17 JUN 7 1961

5-18

18 JUN 9 1961

DATE: 04-12-2005
CLASSIFIED BY 60290 auc bce/mlt/amw AAG-DERIVATIVE
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1,6) 04-12-2030

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

- Tolson _____
- Parsons _____
- Mohr _____
- Belmont _____
- Callahan _____
- Conrad _____
- DeLoach _____
- Evans _____
- Malone _____
- Rosen _____
- Tavel _____
- Trotter _____
- W.C. Sullivan _____
- Tele. Room _____
- Ingram _____
- Gandy _____

tea

TO :

[Redacted]

b7C

DATE: May 31, 1961

REC-72

pg. 1, 2

FROM : S. J. PAPICH

[Handwritten initials]

[Handwritten signature]

b1

b3

SUBJECT:

[Redacted] (S)

[Redacted] (S)

b1

b3

[Redacted] (S)

b1

b3

150-394

1961

jad
SJP:jad (4)
1-Branigan; 1-Liaison; 1-Papich

5- [Handwritten signature]

50 JUN 14 1961

DATE: 04-12-2005
CLASSIFIED BY 60290 auc bce/mlt/amw AAG -derivative
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1,6) 04-12-2030

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Memo Panich to [redacted] (S)
Re: [redacted]

b1
b3
b7C

[redacted]

(S)

b1
b3

ACTION:

The above information is being directed to the attention of the Espionage Section.

~~SECRET~~

ST
p. 1

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 04-12-2005 BY 60290 auc bce/mlt/amw

May 29, 1961

Mr. Tolson	_____
Mr. Parsons	_____
Mr. Mohr	_____
Mr. Belmont	_____
Mr. Callahan	_____
Mr. Conrad	_____
Mr. DeLoach	_____
Mr. Evans	_____
Mr. Malone	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Tavel	_____
Mr. Trotter	_____
Mr. W.C. Sullivan	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Mr. Ingram	_____
Miss Gandy	_____

MR. MOHR:

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Jay Sourwine, Chief Counsel, Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, told me 5-25-61 that there was a big move afoot to make Telford Taylor, Director of CIA. Taylor had an appointment with the President last week to discuss this matter. He definitely wants the job and is pulling strings so that he will replace Allen Dulles.

We are, of course, fully aware of Taylor's background. He has defended and associated with communists on numerous occasions. He has also expressed bitter statements about investigations and security programs.

RESPECTFULLY,

[Signature]
C. D. DeLoach

Prepare
file
summary
5/31

CDD:jcs
(2)

[Handwritten notes]
Jensen to DeLoach memo
6/2/61
memo A es
6-2-61

[Handwritten notes]
yes & promptly
this Taylor is
good. 62-80758-

NOT RECORDED
102 JUN 7 1961

JUN 7 1961

[Handwritten initials]

XEROX
JUN 8 1961
37 JUN 8 1961

ORIGINAL FILED IN 100-1-17

~~SECRET~~

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Callahan _____
 Conrad _____
 DeLoach _____
 Evans _____
 Malone _____
 Rosen _____
 Sullivan _____
 Tavel _____
 Trotter _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Ingram _____
 Gandy _____

TO : Mr. Sullivan *mcg*

DATE: June 8, 1961

b7C

DATE: 04-14-2005
 CLASSIFIED BY 60290 auc bce/mlt/amw AAG--gerivative
 DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1,6) 04-14-2030

FROM : [Redacted]

SUBJECT: [Redacted] (S)

[Handwritten signatures and initials]
 11/02/61
 [Handwritten signature]

b1
b3

[Redacted]

(S)

b1
b3

[Redacted]

(S)

b1
b3

[Redacted]

(S)

b1
b3

[Redacted]

(S)

b1
b3

ACTION: For information.

JUN 12 1961

L-Mr. Sullivan
SJP:cb (5)

1 [Redacted]

1-Liaison

1-Mr. Papich

~~SECRET~~

b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

~~SECRET~~

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Sullivan *W*

DATE: June 5, 1961

FROM : [Redacted] *W*

b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

SUBJECT: [Redacted] (S)

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Evans
Mr. Malone
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Mr. Ingram
Miss Gandy

b1
b3

b1
b3

[Redacted]

(S)

b1
b3

[Redacted]

(S)

b1
b3

[Redacted]

ORIGINAL FILED IN 109-12-211-647

(S)

b1
b3

[Redacted]

(S)

SJP:ban
(6) *ban*

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. Dunn
- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Mr. Papich

62 JUN 13 1961

NOT RECORDED

JUN 5 1961

JUN 7 1961

1 XEROX
JUN 8 1961
YKS

LIAISON

DATE: 04-14-2005
CLASSIFIED BY 60290 auc bce/mlt/amw AAG-derivative
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1,6) 04-14-2030

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~



THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

The American Embassy

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Mr. Tolson	✓
Mr. Belmont	✓
Mr. Mohr	✓
Mr. Callahan	✓
Mr. Conrad	✓
Mr. DeLoach	✓
Mr. Evans	✓
Mr. Malone	✓
Mr. Rosen	✓
Mr. Sullivan	✓
Mr. Tavel	✓
Mr. Trotter	✓
Tele. Room	✓
Miss Gandy	✓

JUN 20
M

Webster

[Redacted] (S)

b1

Date: June 2, 1961

To: Director, FBI

b1

b7C

From: Legat, [Redacted] (S)

auc

Subject: [Redacted] (S)

b1

b3

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b1

b3

apuh
(S)

[Redacted]

b1

b3

EX-100
33

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 100-29892-232-311

[Redacted]

b1

b3

2* - Bureau

1 [Redacted] (S)

b1

AAC:vw

(4)

66 JUN 26 1961

XEROX

JUN 20 1961

VPO

* 1 cc to Rm. 6.7.61 - LK

NOT RECORDED
170 JUN 20 1961

18 JUN 20 1961

5-17 POTER

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b1

b3

(S)

(S)

b1

b3

This matter will be closely followed and the Bureau will be promptly advised of all developments.

-2-

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Yellow
- 1 - Orig.
- 1 - Mr. Papich

June 1, 1961

SJP
ST
esa

62-80750-

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

JUN 1 5 26 PM '61
 READING ROOM
 BI
 VAL FILED IN 100-351585-2705

b7C



Dear

Reference is made to your letter dated May 24, 1961.

This Bureau has been in contact with another Government agency which has advised us that its representatives were in contact with you on April 2, 1961, in Washington, D. C., and again telephonically conferred with you on May 11, 1961. I have informed the agency concerning your communication.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover
John Edgar Hoover
Director

DATE: 04-14-2005
CLASSIFIED BY 60290 auc bce/mlt/amw
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1,6) 04-14-2030

MAILED 9
JUN 2 1961
COMM-FBI

NOTE ON
YELLOW:



(S)

b1

b3

- Tolson _____
- Parsons _____
- Mohr _____
- Belmont _____
- Callahan _____
- Conrad _____
- DeLoach _____
- Evans _____
- Malone _____
- Rosen _____
- Tavel _____
- Trotter _____
- W.C. Sullivan _____
- Tele. Room _____
- Ingram _____
- Gandy _____

SJP:ban (4)
MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT

67 JUN 8 1961

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Callahan _____
 Conrad _____
 DeLoach _____
 Evans _____
 Malone _____
 Rosen _____
 Sullivan _____
 Tavel _____
 Trotter _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Ingram _____

TO : Mr. Sullivan

DATE: June 7, 1961

b7C

FROM :

[Redacted]

DATE: 04-14-2005
 CLASSIFIED BY 60290 auc bce/mlt/amw AAG-derivative
 DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1,6) 04-14-2030

b7C

[Redacted]

b1

SUBJECT:

[Redacted] (S)

[Redacted] DC

b3

[Redacted]

b1

b3

[Redacted]

b1

b3

[Redacted]

b1

b3

[Redacted]

b1

b3

SJP:ban
(8)

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - [Redacted]
- 1 - Mr. Branigan
- 1 - Foreign Liaison
- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Mr. Papich

REC-50

EX-105

162-80750-3749

NOT RECORDED
199 JUN 14 1961

17 JUN 13 1961

XEROX

JUN 14 1961

S-APP
[Handwritten signature]

62 JUN 19 1961

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 62-80750-3749-16

~~SECRET~~

b7C

(S)

Memorandum [redacted] to Sullivan
Re: [redacted]

b1
b3

(S)

[Large redacted area]

ACTION:

For information.

b1
b3

Spec [unclear]

mc [unclear]

[Handwritten mark]

[Handwritten mark]

[Handwritten checkmark]

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

~~SECRET~~

Tolson _____
 Parsons _____
 Mohr _____
 Belmont _____
 Callahan _____
 Conrad _____
 DeLoach _____
 Evans _____
 Malone _____
 Rosen _____
 Tavel _____
 Trotter _____
 W.C. Sullivan _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Ingram _____
 Gandy _____

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Sullivan *WCS*

DATE: June 7, 1961

FROM : [Redacted] b7C

SUBJECT: [Redacted] b3

[Redacted] b1 b3 (S)

ACTION:

[Redacted] (S) b1 b3

- 1-Mr. Tavel
- 1-Mr. Waikart
- 1-Mr. Sullivan
- 1-Liaison
- 1-Mr. Papich

SJP:cb
(6)

WCS

am

EX-116 REC-562-80750-3750

9 JUN 15 1961

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

DATE: 06-13-2005
CLASSIFIED BY 60290 auc bce/mlt/amw
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3 (1) 06-13-2030

LIAISON
Papich

~~SECRET~~

35
50 JUN 21 1961 *72*

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

- Tolson _____
- Belmont _____
- Mohr _____
- Callahan _____
- Conrad _____
- DeLoach _____
- Evans _____
- Malone _____
- Rosen _____
- Sullivan _____
- Tavel _____
- Trotter _____
- Tele. Room _____
- Ingram _____
- Gandy _____

Dev

RA TO : MR. W. C. SULLIVAN *WCS*

DATE: June 9, 1961

b7C FROM : [Redacted] *L*

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 11/18/94 BY SP2 CEG/AM
P.A. #88-1826
PER CIA REVIEW OF 6/4/94

b3 *W*

SUBJECT: [Redacted]

Reference is made to my memorandum dated June 5, 1961, setting forth information volunteered by [Redacted]

b3 [Redacted]

[Large Redacted Block]

b3
b7C

[Redacted Block]

b3

ACTION: For information.

SJR:jad (5)
 1-Belmont; 1-Sullivan
 1-Liaison; 1-Papich

WCS
WCS

25 JUN 15 1961

ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-107012-2

XEROX NOT RECORDED
 JUN 16 1961 128 JUN 16 1961
VRO

125
 55 JUN 21 1961 *[Signature]*

LIAISON

~~SECRET~~

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Callahan _____
 Conrad _____
 DeLoach _____
 Evans _____
 Malone _____
 Rosen _____
 Sullivan _____
 Tavel _____
 Trotter _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Ingram _____
 Gandy _____

TO : MR. W. C. SULLIVAN

DATE: June 9, 1961

b7C

FROM :

[Redacted]

DATE: 04-15-2005

CLASSIFIED BY 60290 auc bce/mlt/amw AAG--derivative
 DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1,6) 04-15-2030

b1

b3

SUBJECT:

[Redacted]

(S)

(S)

[Redacted]

b1

b3

109-12-210-3101

[Redacted]

b1

b3

(S)

[Redacted]

(S)

b1

b3

[Redacted]

(S)

b1

b3

ACTION:

For information.

1-Belmont; 1-Sullivan
 1-[Redacted] Liaison; 1-Papich

SJP:jad (6)

Wes
7/2/61
 JUN 15 1961
 162-90750-
 NOT RECORDED
 XEROX
 JUN 16 1961

b7C

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
 WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : MR. W. C. SULLIVAN

DATE: June 9, 1961

- Tolson _____
- Belmont _____
- Mohr _____
- Callahan _____
- Conrad _____
- DeLoach _____
- Evans _____
- Malone _____
- Rosen _____
- Sullivan _____
- Tavel _____
- Trotter _____
- Tele. Room _____
- Ingram _____
- Gandy _____

FROM : [Redacted] b7C

b1

b3

SUBJECT: [Redacted] (S)

DATE: 04-15-2005
CLASSIFIED BY 60290 auc bce/mlt/amw AAG--derivative
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1,6) 04-15-2030

[Redacted]

b1

b3

[Redacted] (S)

b1

b3

[Redacted] (S)

b1

b3

ACTION:

162-80750-
~~NOT RECORDED~~

[Redacted]

b3

Liaison will also contact Mr. Anderson and direct his attention to [Redacted]

[Redacted] (S)

b1

b3

Enclosure
1-Sullivan; 1-Belmont; 1-Larrade
1-Dayngardner; 1-Liaison; 1-Papich
SJR:jad (7)

JUN 12 1961

LIATISON

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN 65-52604-102

~~SECRET~~

2-19-61)

PK

DECODED COPY

- Tolson _____
- Parsons _____
- Mohr _____
- Belmont _____
- Callahan _____
- Conrad _____
- DeLoach _____
- Evans _____
- Malone _____
- Rosen _____
- Tavel _____
- Trotter _____
- W.C. Sullivan _____
- Tele. Room _____
- Ingram _____
- Gandy _____

DATE: 04-15-2005
 CLASSIFIED BY 60290 auc bce/mlt/amw AAG-derivative
 DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1,6) 04-15-2030

Radio

Teletype

URGENT 6-7-61 9:30 PM EST RGT


b7C

TO DIRECTOR

(S)

FROM SAC MIAMI

b1



b1

b3

ORIGINAL FILED IN 109-12-210-3152

RECEIVED: 10:35 PM TELETYPE

10:40 PM CODING UNIT JUN 11 1961

175
63 JUN 12 1961
NOT

B *memo* *Sullivan*
62-8075 SIP/jad 6-7-61
 NOT RECORDED
 126 JUN 10 1961
 XEROX
Entl.
 JUN 10 1961

b7C

cc: Sullivan

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
 WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Callahan _____
 Conrad _____
 DeLoach _____
 Evans _____
 Malone _____
 Rosen _____
 Sullivan _____
 Tavel _____
 Trotter _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Ingram _____

TO : Mr. Sullivan *Nebor*

DATE: June 14, 1961

~~SECRET~~

FROM : [Redacted] *L'*

SP 7 CUC/ACW 11/18/94 O.A. #PP-1826
ALL CLASSIFICATIONS OF CIA 11/18/94 O.A. #PP-1826
Classified by SP4 [Redacted]
9803 RDD/NC 3/22/00
5/1/93 O.A. #PP-1826
 ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
 WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

SUBJECT: [Redacted] *(S)*

Reference is made to my memorandum June 12, 1961,

advising that [Redacted]

[Large Redacted Block]

(S)

(S)

(S)

[Redacted Line]

[Redacted Line] *(S)* *(S)*

[Redacted Block]

- SJP:ban (7) *ban*
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. Branigan
- 1 - [Redacted] *297*
- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Mr. Papich

EX-108

REC-20

62-80750-3

JUN 19 1961

LIAISON
Papich

JUN 23 1961 ~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b7C

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum [redacted] to Sullivan

Re: [redacted]

(S)

(S)

b1
b3

[redacted]

b3

The information in the particular communication does not endanger any Bureau operation but this, nevertheless, does not minimize the fact that [redacted]

[redacted]

b3

ACTION:

Liaison will follow closely and report results.

ERC

JHD
EP
R

WCS

✓

[Handwritten mark]

6/22/61-

[redacted]

b3

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Callahan _____
 Conrad _____
 DeLoach _____
 Evans _____
 Malone _____
 Rosen _____
 Sullivan _____
 Tavel _____
 Trotter _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Ingram _____
 Gandy _____

RA TO : Mr. Sullivan *ues/s*

DATE: June 12, 1961

FROM : [Redacted] b7C

b3

SUBJECT: [Redacted]

Morgan b7C
[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b1
b3

(S)

[Redacted]

b1
b3

(S)

[Redacted]

b1

(S)

ACTION:

Liaison is following closely [Redacted]

b3

SJP:ban
(7) *ban*

- 1 - ~~Mr. Belmont~~
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. Branigan
- 1 - [Redacted]
- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Mr. Papich

b7C

62-80750-3752

REC-1

JUN 19 1961

135
171
62 JUN 22 1961

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

DATE: 04-15-2005
CLASSIFIED BY 60290 auc bce/mlt/amw AAG-derivative
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1,6) 04-15-2030

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Memorandum

Tolson _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Callahan _____
 Conrad _____
 DeLoach *✓* _____
 Evans _____
 Malone _____
 Rosen _____
 Sullivan _____
 Tavel _____
 Trotter _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Ingram _____
 Gandy _____

TO : Mr. Mohr

DATE: June 13, 1961

FROM : C. D. DeLoach *CD*

checked in Longwood Agency

SUBJECT:

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

b3

b7C

[Redacted] of the Department gave [Redacted] the attached picture which was taken [Redacted]

b3

b7C

A check through the Alexandria Resident Agency, reflects the car is registered to the above-entitled individual.

Nothing concerning him could be located in Bureau files.

RECOMMENDATION:

That we return the picture to [Redacted] and give him the identity of the individual.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 04-15-2005 BY 60290 auc bce/mlt/amw

Enclosure

1

[Redacted]

b7C

ECK:geg
(3)

Handled with [Redacted] 6/16/60

b7C

PPH ✓
OK but did we ascertain his rank?
no - not list on Reg. lcs.

REC-4
EX-102

62-80750-3753

JUN 22 1961

CRIME RESEARCH

297

6/16/60

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson	_____
Belmont	_____
Mohr	_____
Callahan	_____
Conrad	_____
DeLoach	_____
Evans	_____
Malone	_____
Rosen	_____
Sullivan	_____
Tavel	_____
Trotter	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Ingram	_____

TO : Mr. Sullivan

DATE: June 23, 1961

FROM :

[Redacted Name]

b7C

b7C

SUBJECT: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

Reference is made to the enclosed Joseph Alsop article which appeared in the June 21, 1961, issue of the Washington Post and Times Herald. Alsop refers to the future of CIA and in general whitewashes the Agency's past errors. What is significant in his article is his reference to the possible assignment of "an intelligence coordinator" in the White House. He indicates that the President will create a new post, possibly for General Maxwell Taylor, who would be charged with reviewing and coordinating all U.S. intelligence work. There is a possibility that Alsop has obtained some "inside information."

You previously have been informed by the Liaison Section that consideration was being given to the establishment of a position of an "intelligence czar" who would approve or disapprove intelligence projects. This may be the assignment referred to by Alsop. We have received rumors to the effect that General Taylor is not interested in becoming Director of CIA. There is no specific evidence of any plan to remove Allen Dulles in the immediate future.

If General Taylor is assigned to the White House, he very likely might end up with responsibilities similar to those of Admiral Leahy during World War II. He would be a key figure in the intelligence picture.

ACTION:

For information.

SJP:ban
(5)

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Mr. Papich

Enclosure

Handwritten notes and stamps:
 62-80750-3754
 REC-72
 JUN 26 1961
 ENCLOSURE

58 JUN 29 1961

Matter of Fact By Joseph Alsop

The Future of the CIA

LAST WEEK the President received the final report of the special committee which he named after the Cuban failure to investigate the operational branch of the Central Intelligence Agency.



Alsop

This group, composed of Attorney General Robert Kennedy, Gen. Maxwell Taylor, Adm. Arleigh Burke, and CIA Director Allen W. Dulles, has been reporting serially and orally. Oral reporting was no doubt preferred because it was thought unwise to compose an elaborate paper on which public curiosity would inevitably center, as it did on the Gaither report.

The main post-Cuba study of the CIA has thus come to an end. A further report is still awaited from a second committee headed by the former president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, James R. Killian. But this committee, charged with studying the CIA's intelligence-gathering activities, has been primarily concerned with technical problems rather than problems of basic organization.

In effect therefore, the main returns are in, and it is possible to say what is likely to be done and—even more important—what is not likely to be done. In particular, it is highly unlikely that the CIA will be dismantled or divided or partly transferred to Pentagon control or otherwise hacked about in the way that some people have been demanding. Instead, the agency will be left intact.

In the end, there will be some significant personnel changes. But these changes would have occurred even if the Cuban venture had never been undertaken; for CIA Director Dulles never planned

to remain indefinitely in his post when he accepted reappointment by President Kennedy.

THE PRESIDENT asked Dulles to stay on not only because he admired him, but also to establish the principle that the CIA directorship is a nonpolitical office. Dulles accepted reappointment with enthusiasm because he rightly thought it was important to establish this nonpolitical principle.

From the first, he talked of serving no more than enough time to bridge the transition. It now seems likely that he will retire in the autumn, or perhaps just before the new year.

But the main Cuba-borne change in the picture will not be the nomination of a new CIA director, which would have occurred in any case. The main change, if present plans are approved by the President, will be the creation of a new post, probably attached to the White House, having some such title as intelligence coordinator.

The occupant of the new post will be a man of some eminence and authority—perhaps Gen. Taylor. He will be charged with reviewing and coordinating all United States intelligence work, by the intelligence branches of the armed services, by the cryptographers of the National Security Agency, and, of course, by the CIA itself.

This responsibility has in the past quite largely rested on Allen Dulles, in addition to his other duties. But with this responsibility transferred to the new intelligence coordinator, it will become possible to name a new CIA director who is primarily a technician, without Allen Dulles's standing as a public figure.

And in the person of the intelligence coordinator, the President will also have an independent analyst who can judge the results achieved

by the CIA and the lesser intelligence agencies without bureaucratic bias.

THE SCHEME seems eminently sound. Certainly it is vastly more sound than the various schemes for dismantling or dividing the CIA which have been put forward in the wake of the failure in Cuba. The people who fathered these schemes forgot the cardinal rule, that an agency's performance must be judged, not by a single failure, but by the whole record.

In judging the CIA performance, it must also be borne in mind that a grossly excessive burden has been placed on the CIA for a very long time. The CIA's operational branch has in effect been used as a kind of general fire brigade, to remedy all the results of a quite inadequate defense policy and a foreign policy marked by grave failures of foresight.


The CIA's intelligence branch has been called upon to produce, not reasonable intelligence estimates in the normal sense of the phrase, but micrometric measurements of Soviet progress which were then used to justify dangerous economies in defense investment.

These pernicious practices began under President Eisenhower and were continued by the new Administration. When you call over the times when the CIA has been employed as a fire brigade, beginning in Iran, and when you consider the risks inherent in the misuse of its estimates it is downright astonishing that a worse result than Cuba was not produced much earlier in the story.

What is amazing in fact is not that the story shows one bad failure. What is amazing is that this agency stood up so well for so long under the burden it was improperly required to carry.

Copyright, 1961, New York Herald Tribune, Inc.

- Tolson _____
- Parsons _____
- Mohr _____
- Belmont _____
- Callahan _____
- Conrad _____
- DeLoach _____
- Evans _____
- Malone _____
- Rosen _____
- Tavel _____
- Trotter _____
- W.C. Sullivan _____
- Tele Room _____
- Ingram _____
- Gandy _____



b7C



- The Washington Post and Times Herald A19
- The Washington Daily News _____
- The Evening Star _____
- New York Herald Tribune _____
- New York Journal-American _____
- New York Mirror _____
- New York Daily News _____
- New York Post _____
- The New York Times _____
- The Worker _____
- The New Leader _____
- The Wall Street Journal _____

Date 6-21-61

62-86750-27-2
BACK SIDE

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Sullivan *Sullivan*

DATE: June 19, 1961

FROM

[Redacted]

b7C

- Tolson _____
- Belmont _____
- Mohr _____
- Callahan _____
- Conrad _____
- DeLoach _____
- Evans _____
- Malone _____
- Rosen _____
- Sullivan _____
- Tavel _____
- Trotter _____
- Tele. Room _____
- Ingram _____
- Gandy _____

SUBJECT: PUBLICIZING OF DOCUMENTS
 ALLEGEDLY BELONGING TO
 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA);
 "U.S. LETTERS"
 INFORMATION CONCERNING

Branigan
 [Redacted]

b7C

Reference is made to the enclosed article captioned, "Alleged CIA Secrets Turned Over to Embassy," which appeared in the June 14, 1961, issue of the Washington Post and Times Herald. According to the article, a newspaper in Rome, Italy, had received certain documents through the mail and according to a "U.S. Embassy spokesman" the material consisted of Photostats of CIA documents.

[Large Redacted Area]

b1
b3

(S)
 65-46503-17
 ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

SJP:ban *ban*
(10)

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. Conrad
- 1 - [Redacted]
- 1 - Mr. Branigan
- 1 - [Redacted]
- 1 - Mr. O'Connor
- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Mr. Papich

b7C

~~5 JUN 28 1961~~
 5

DATE: 04-21-2005
 CLASSIFIED BY 60290 auc bce/mlt/amw AAG-derivative
 DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1,6) 04-21-2030

Enclosure

131 ENCLOSURE

66 JUN 28 1961

NOT RECORDED
 46 JUN 26 1961

XEROX
 JUN 26 1961

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

b7C

Memorandum to Sullivan
Re: PUBLICIZING OF DOCUMENTS
ALLEGEDLY BELONGING TO
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA);
"W.S. LETTERS"
INFORMATION CONCERNING

b1
b3

(S)

As previously reported, Army is conducting an investigation in an effort to identify the person (s) who might be responsible for mailing the Army material. The Bureau has not been involved in any investigation concerning the documents but our Laboratory, at the request of the Army, has examined a number of the documents. These examinations have resulted in certain lead information for the Army.

ACTION:

For information.



- 2 -

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

- Tolson _____
- Belmont _____
- Mohr _____
- Callahan _____
- Conrad _____
- DeLoach _____
- Evans _____
- Malone _____
- Rosen _____
- Sullivan _____
- Tavel _____
- Trotter _____
- Tele. Room _____
- Ingram _____
- Gandy _____

TO : MR. W. C. SULLIVAN *ms/s*

DATE: June 16, 1961

b7C

FROM : [Redacted] *L*

SUBJECT: [Redacted]

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b3

(S)

Papich

Monahan

b7C

b3

[Redacted]

b1

b3

[Redacted]

ORIGINAL COPY FILED 162-80750-90 (S)

b3

[Redacted]

b3

[Redacted]

ACTION:

jad For information.

REP: jad (5)

1-Mr. Sullivan; 1-Mr. Papich
1-Liaison; 1 [Redacted]

2 JUN 27 1961 *y*

b7C

162-80750
NOT RECORDED
145 JUN 21 1961

JUN 20 1961

XEROX
JUN 21 1961
Yps

LIAISON

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Callahan _____
 Conrad _____
 DeLoach _____
 Evans _____
 Malone _____
 Rosen _____
 Sullivan _____
 Tavel _____
 Trotter _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Ingram _____
 Gandy _____

TO : W. C. Sullivan *W.C.S.*

DATE: June 21, 1961

b7C

FROM :

[Redacted]

DATE: 04-21-2005
 CLASSIFIED BY 60290 auc bce/mlt/amw AAG- DERIVATIVE
 DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1) 04-21-2030

b1

b3

SUBJECT:

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(S)

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[Redacted]

b1

b3

[Redacted]

(S)

b1

b3

[Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

(S)

ACTION:

For information.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
 WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

b1

b3

- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Mr. Papich

SJP:gp
 (4)

REC- 65
 EX- 107

62-80750-3753

JUN 26 1961

~~SECRET~~

62 JUN 29 1961

W.C.S.
W.C.S.
W.C.S.
W.C.S.

~~SECRET~~

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Tolson _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Callahan _____
 Conrad _____
 DeLoach _____
 Evans _____
 Malone _____
 Rosen _____
 Sullivan _____
 Tavel _____
 Trotter _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Ingram _____
 Gandy _____

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TO : Mr. Sullivan *Wes*

DATE: June 21, 1961

b7C

FROM : [Redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

b2

SUBJECT: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

~~(S)~~
(U)

2-9-88
Classified by *SP8 JFB*
Declassify on: OADR
#265,955

[Redacted]

b1

b3

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 94-8-350

[Redacted]

b1

b3

[Redacted]

b1

b3

ACTION:

For information.

SJP:ban
(6)

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. DeLoach
- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Mr. Papich

WES
JFB

b2

FOI/PA #	<i>265,955</i>
APPEAL #	
CIVIL ACT. #	
E.O. #	<i>12356</i>
DATE	<i>2-9-88</i>
INITIALS	<i>SP8 JFB</i>

REC-991

62-80750-3756

EX-116

DATE: 04-21-2005
CLASSIFIED BY 60290 auc bce/mlt/amw AAG derivative
REASON: 1.4 (1)
DECLASSIFY ON: 04-21-2030

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Papich
Tolson

XEROX
JUN 27 1961

50 JUN 30 1961

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

~~SECRET~~

2 - Orig. & 1

b7C

1 - Yellow

1 - [Redacted]

SAC, San Juan

1 - Mr. G.C. Moore June 23, 1961

1 - Liaison

1 - Mr. Papich

Director, FBI

b1

b3

[Redacted]

(S)

The following information has been furnished to the Bureau on a confidential basis.

REC'D - READ
FBI

(S)

b1

b3

[Redacted]

b3

[Redacted]

The above is being submitted to you for your information.

DATE: 04-21-2005
CLASSIFIED BY 60290 auc bce/mlt/amw AAG--derivative
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1,6) 04-21-2030

SJP:ban
(7)

ban

MAILED 80
JUN 23 1961
COMM-FBI

[Redacted]

(S)

b1

b3

- Tolson _____
- Belmont _____
- Mohr _____
- Callahan _____
- Conrad _____
- DeLoach _____
- Evans _____
- Malone _____
- Rosen _____
- Sullivan _____
- Tavel _____
- Trotter _____
- Tele. Room _____
- Ingram _____
- Gandy _____

62 JUN 29 1961

TELETYPE UNIT

RECEIVED 0620M

JUN 23 1961

FBI REC-94

62-180750-3757

19 JUN 26 1961

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

EX-114

REC-12 62-80750-3758

BY TOLSON

b1

b3

(S)

Date: June 23, 1961

To:

[Redacted]

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director

Subject:

[Redacted]

b3

b3

b7C

Enclosed is a copy of a memorandum dated June 16, 1961, at San Antonio, Texas, containing information which the captioned subject furnished concerning himself to an Agent of our San Antonio office.

(S)

[Redacted]

b1

b3

The files of this Bureau disclose no subversive derogatory data identifiable with the subject.

Enclosure

1 - San Antonio

DATE: 05-23-2005
CLASSIFIED BY 60290 auc bce/mlt/amw
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1) 05-23-2030

- Tolson
- Belmont
- Mohr
- Callahan
- Conrad
- eLoach
- Malone
- McGuire
- Rosen
- Sullivan
- Tavel
- Trotter
- Tele. Room
- Holmes
- Gandy

[Redacted]

(S)

b1

b3

GCM: JRS

(6)

JUN 30 1961

MAIL ROOM


TELETYPE UNIT

NOTE CONTINUED PAGE 2

Handwritten notes: 50/90


~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~



b3

CONTINUATION OF NOTE:



(S)

b1

b3

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 6/16/61

FROM : J.E.P. SAC, SAN ANTONIO (62-0)

SUBJECT:

[Redacted]

(ATTN: DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION)

INFORMATION CONCERNING

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

There are enclosed for the Bureau four copies of a letterhead memorandum, suitable for dissemination, concerning the captioned individual.

[Redacted] appeared at the Brownsville Resident Agency on June 14, 1961, and furnished this information to SA [Redacted]. He said he believed it was his patriotic duty to bring this information to the attention of the appropriate Government agency [Redacted].

b1
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b7C
b7D

[Large Redacted Area]

EXP. PROC.

(S)

30

2-Bureau (Enc. 4) (RM)
1-San Antonio
JRH:lfe
(3)

ALL OTHER CL'S

REC-12

62-80750-3756

JUN 19 1961

*Let to CIA (w/pe)
1-SA
6-23-61
[Signature]*

[Redacted Box]

NAT. INT. SEC.
[Signature]

b7C

SA 62-0

b3

b7C

b7D

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] said he understood this, and said that if he heard nothing more concerning this matter, that he at least had the satisfaction of knowing that it had been brought to the attention of the appropriate Government agency.

REQUEST OF BUREAU:

Bureau is requested [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b3

b7C

b7D

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson	_____
Belmont	_____
Mohr	_____
Callahan	_____
Conrad	_____
DeLoach	_____
Evans	_____
Malone	_____
Rosen	_____
Sullivan	_____
Tavel	_____
Trotter	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Ingram	_____
Gandy	_____

TO : Mr. DeLoach

DATE: 6-22-61

FROM : M. A. Jones

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/9/82 BY SP8 BDD/ld
6-18-85 SP6 byaftey comp # 555157

SUBJECT: "THE CIA" BY FRED J. COOK
ARTICLE IN 6-24-61 ISSUE
OF "THE NATION" MAGAZINE

The following is a succinct summary of Fred J. Cook's article, "The CIA," which appears in the 6-24-61 "Special Issue" of "The Nation" magazine, copy attached. The entire issue is devoted to this article which runs 43 pages in length.

REFERENCES TO FBI:

The article contains 4 references to the Bureau and the introduction has one. Referring to Cook as an "astute craftsman," the introduction noted that his special articles for "The Nation"--"The FBI," "The Shame of New York," and "Gambling, Inc."--have won him "important journalism prizes" for the last 3 years.

Page 544 - In discussing the birth of CIA, Cook points out that Truman abolished OSS in 1945 as a result of bureaucratic pressure. He wrote: "The military intelligence services wanted no such powerful competitor; the FBI under J. Edgar Hoover long had felt it should be the sole gatherer and dispenser of vital information, both at home and abroad; and the Department of State and the Bureau of the Budget both had the knives out for OSS."

Page 545 - Cook refers to a memorandum Allen Dulles prepared in 1947, containing six principal recommendations concerning CIA. Cook wrote that Dulles observed that CIA's administration must have long-term continuity and professional status; "its director should be assured of long tenure, like Hoover in the FBI, 'to build up public confidence, and esprit de corps in his organization, and a high prestige.'"

Page 546 - Cook discusses the vast concentration of power in CIA and the almost dictatorial powers of its Director. Cook notes that to counterbalance these powers, Congress specified that CIA should have no arrest or subpoena powers within the United States. Cook stated: "The FBI's files, while not barred to it, were not exactly opened either; for, while other agencies were required to report their intelligence findings to CIA, the FBI was not. The CIA may obtain whatever specific information the FBI has if it requests it in writing, but this is quite a different affair from being kept informed as a matter of routine of what the FBI knows."

Page 562 - Cook quotes from a story by Thayer Waldo, a reporter for the San Francisco Chronicle: "This reporter spent the first half of last year in Cuba. At that time, with the U.S. Embassy still in operation and fully staffed, eight of its personnel were CIA agents, three worked for the FBI, and each of the Armed Services had from one to five operatives assigned to intelligence work. No special effort was required to learn these facts or to identify the individuals so engaged...one CIA man volunteered the identities of all three persons accredited to the FBI."

Enclosure
- Mr. DeLoach
S:tmf (5)

JUL 7 1961

CRIME RESEARCH

XEROX
JUN 30 1961

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

62-10477-291

REC-18 62-80750-375

Jones to DeLoach memo
Re: "The CIA" by Fred J. Cook

THE ARTICLE:

Simply stated, the theme of Cook's article is this: Under Allen Dulles, CIA, operating beneath a cloak of ultra-secrecy, has transcended its basic function as an intelligence-gathering agency and has engaged in "action" or operational activities with respect to the affairs of foreign governments. Cook urges that CIA be divested of its operational functions and restored to the capacity of an intelligence-collecting facility.

Cook outlines the policy of secrecy which cloaks the functions and activities of CIA and points out the American people are permitted to know virtually nothing about this agency which operates with an undisclosed number of employees and an unlimited budget with an estimated annual expenditure of between \$500,000,000 and \$1 billion. He notes that British intelligence has long held that the "wedding of action to intelligence is a fatal flaw in CIA."

Cook cites some of CIA's successes: (1) In 1955, CIA dug an underground tunnel and tapped Russian telephone lines located 300 yards from the American sector in Berlin, (2) in 1956, when Khrushchev delivered his secret speech denouncing the crimes of Stalin, CIA managed to get the text and smuggled it out to the Western world, resulting in a blow that was "probably one of the strongest ever struck at Communist ideology," and (3) the successful operation of the U-2 spy plane operation for 4 years. Cook observed that these activities in themselves did not constitute active meddling in, or formation of, U.S. Government policy.

Cook points out that, unfortunately, not all CIA activities fall into this legitimate intelligence role and that time and again CIA has meddled actively in the internal affairs of foreign governments. Cook feels that CIA's successes in this field raise grave questions about the drift and intent of our foreign policy and cites CIA's vaunted successes in overthrowing Massadegh in Iran in 1953 and Arbenz Guzman in Guatemala in 1954. To further illustrate his point, Cook castigates CIA for its meddling in the off-shore islands of Quemoy and Matsu which pushed the U. S. to the brink of war with Communist China in 1954 and again in 1958. Further, Cook cites CIA's intervention in the affairs of Laos in conspiring to overthrow the neutralist government in favor of a militantly anti-communist administration which has now resulted in great loss of U. S. prestige in that area of the world. Cook also points out the case of Burma on whom CIA foisted unwanted thousands of Chiang Kai-shek's so-called freedom fighters who found it more advantageous to take over practically an entire Burmese province and grow opium than to fight the Red Chinese.

Cook stated the American people cannot escape the odium of regimes with which CIA has saddled us when CIA conspires to overthrow a foreign government on the blind theory that in the war against communism anything goes. Cook holds Allen Dulles accountable for the policy and actions of CIA. Cook extensively traces the background of Allen Dulles which enabled him to become America's "Master Spy" and his close relationship with his brother, John Foster Dulles. Cook cites the espionage operation established

Jones to DeLoach memo
Re: "The CIA" by Fred J. Cook

by Allen Dulles in Switzerland during World War II at the direction of OSS. This included Dulles' contact with 2 Nazi SS agents who were working for the ambitious Heinrich Himmler.

With respect to the ill-fated invasion attempt of Cuba in April, 1961, Cook said of CIA: "Never perhaps was an intelligence estimate more disastrously wrong. . . The CIA-planned coup, almost a year in the making, backfired so tragically that Fidel Castro was presented with an hour of triumph in which to strut. Instead of being overthrown, the power of his regime, thanks to CIA, was solidified in all of Cuba." Cook devoted considerable space to CIA's part in the entire Cuban invasion affair.

In conclusion, Cook says of CIA: "The power of a billion-dollar, secret agency operating as a law unto itself is almost incalculable, not just in molding the image of America in foreign lands, but in molding at home the image Americans have of the world around them. Time and again American public opinion has been whiplashed into a warlike frenzy by glaring headlines picturing a callous Communist aggressor when, all the time, the CIA was the secret provocative. . . . It is not enough just to lop off CIA's operational arm and give its 'black arts' intriguers to some other secret agency; we need to examine in detail just what the 'black arts' have brought us, we need to consider whether they can ever be reconciled with the principles of democracy--the principles we profess. . . . Both the faith of foreign nations in us and our own faith in ourselves are at stake, for both have been deeply compromised by the shady activities and the secrecy surrounding the shadiness that have become the twin hallmarks of CIA."

OBSERVATIONS:

As the literary prostitute who wrote the vicious, unfounded lie about the Bureau which appeared in "The Nation" in 1958, Fred J. Cook needs no introduction. He has written a scathing attack on Dulles and CIA which unquestionably will provoke heated comment--pro and con--from many quarters. It will be interesting to see how CIA reacts, especially in view of the timing of Cook's article--when CIA's prestige is at rock-bottom as a consequence of the Cuban invasion debacle.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

EGG *JFK* *V.* *DJ* *ONE*

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THE NATION

SPECIAL ISSUE

JUNE 24, 1961 . . 25c

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THE

CIA

by

Fred J. Cook

LETTERS

One Small Act for Peace

Dear Sirs: In a letter in the June 10 issue, re Mary Grooms's article on shelters [May 13], Robert Berkowitz comments: "I am not certain if she regards the United States as the only warlike agent in the world." Perhaps Mr. Berkowitz will find it less inconceivable that anyone could so regard us (or rather, our government) after he has read Mr. Dreher's eye-opening article, "Hazards of Civil Defense," in the same issue in which his letter appeared. But in any case, may I suggest to him that all that really matters is whether the United States is *one* of the warlike agents in the world. I think the record clearly shows it is, and that as such it is *one* of the parties responsible for imperiling the very existence of the human race. I also think that if just *one* of the main warlike agents in today's world were to begin acting in such a way as to further—and not merely praise—peace, the threat which nuclear weapons pose to mankind would be lessened far out of proportion to the initial act for peace, because that act would finally reverse the horrible trend of the arms race. BLOSSOM D. SEGALOFF
New Haven, Conn.

Familiar Argument?

Dear Sirs: William Gilman, reviewing *The Structure of Science* in your June 10 issue, asks: ". . . Can we then absolve the Los Alamos scientists of their share of responsibility for Hiroshima?" The answer is Yes, because (a) we were at war; (b) without Hiroshima, the war would have continued for two more years and 2 million more Americans would have died; (c) far more Japanese lives, as well as property, would have been w. . . But with a continuation of the war. (d) a leading Japanese statesman said if conditions had been reversed, he would have had no hesitancy in using the bomb against America.
Chicago, Ill. ROBERT ROSENBLUTH

Regressive Tax?

Dear Sirs: In your May 13 issue, Peter Dorner presented the case for a tax on the advertising of large companies. Mr. Dorner assumes that (1) as wealth grows, the demand for an increasing number of consumer goods "reaches a state of extreme inelasticity" and (2) firms, by product differentiation and large advertising expenditures, can pass

Summer Schedule
After July 1, and through August, *The Nation* will appear on alternate weeks only, i.e., on July 15 and 29, and August 12 and 26. The normal weekly schedule will be resumed with the Sept. 2 issue.

along cost increases to the consumer.

When demand is in "a state of extreme inelasticity," the firm is in a position to pass increases in cost along to the consumer with the result that prices are higher and the quantity sold is about the same.

To the firm, a tax on advertising is an increase in the cost of doing business. If the tax can be forced on the consumer in the form of higher prices, then its economic impact is identical to that of a sales tax. A sales tax is a regressive tax.

If one grants Mr. Dorner his assumptions, one is confronted with a tax on advertising that is paid by the consumer under a system of regressive taxation. Suppose that the volume of advertising does decrease. What will disappear? Will there be less *Play of the Week* or will there be less *Gunsmoke*?

Most of the effects that Mr. Dorner is seeking could, perhaps, be better achieved through a system of grading and labeling of advertised products and by a closer look at advertising material by the FTC. This would not raise the funds needed for public welfare projects. If these funds are to be raised through taxation, however, *progressive* taxation would seem to commend itself.
Evanston, Ill. MORTON SCHNABEL

From the Bosphorus

Dear Sirs: Not for pedantry, but because I like *The Nation*, I should like to point out two inaccuracies in your editorials of April 22:

1. On page 334: ". . . One of these is Franz Joseph Strauss, his Minister of Defense, who insists that the *NATO armies, which are mostly German armies* . . ." Taint so. On this side of the ocean, Turkey has the largest military under NATO.

2. On page 335: ". . . It should not be forgotten that Syngman Rhee and Adnan Menderes, *shortly before* they were ousted from office by their irate countrymen, had also scored 'smashing' electoral victories. . ." One of the rea-

sons Adnan Menderes was ousted on May 27, 1960 (an unforgettable date for Turkey), was the discontent of the intellectuals and students over the delay by Menderes' Democrat Party in scheduling elections. The last election in Turkey took place back in 1957. Opposition leader Ismet Inonu, just before the May 27 Revolution, all but promised civil war if elections weren't held by October 27 of this year, the constitutional limit of four years since the last elections. (It is pretty much agreed that in the 1957 elections, however, manipulation of the electoral results "well known to dictators" took place.)
Istanbul FERDINAND DRYLE

In This Issue

THE CIA

by FRED J. COOK

- 529 ● Editors' Introduction
- 529 ● Part I: Secret Hand of the CIA
- 534 ● II: Allen Dulles: Beginnings
- 539 ● III: Dulles and the SS
- 543 ● IV: Dulles, Peace and the CIA
- 547 ● V: With Dulles in Iran
- 551 ● VI: Just a Little Revolution
- 556 ● VII: The Road to War
- 561 ● VIII: Fiasco in Cuba
- 569 ● IX: A Look at the Future

Crossword Puzzle (opp. 572)
by FRANK W. LEWIS

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Harold Clurman, Theatre
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THE CIA . . . by Fred J. Cook

INTRODUCTION: "The only time the people pay attention to us," Allen Dulles once said of the CIA, "is when we fall flat on our face" — or words to that effect. But as Mr. Dulles would be the first to concede, the reason for the default lies not with the people, but with the CIA itself. The disastrous Bay of Pigs episode is not the only fiasco that can be laid at the door of the lavishly financed CIA. But in this latest fiasco more of the facts came to light than in similar earlier episodes. Now, therefore, seemed an excellent time, while the facts of the Cuban fiasco are fresh in mind, to take a look at an agency which is of vital concern to national security and the well-being of the people, but about which the people know less than about any major agency of government. What interested us, as editors, were not the immediate causes of the particular fiasco; we do not propose to join the feverish post-mortem search for scapegoats. Our concern was with the basic question: how did this extraordinary agency come into being? what is known about its record? how does it fit into the American constitutional scheme of things?

On the face of it, an inquiry into an agency dedicated, as is the CIA, to secrecy in its planning, its operations, its personnel and its budget, presents a difficult journalistic undertaking. But a considerable amount of material has been published about the agency and its operations, some of it clearly inspired by the CIA with the approval of its director. True, most of the material is scattered and disparate, consisting of small items which, taken alone, have little meaning. But when put together by

an astute craftsman, they form a significant pattern.

The easiest part of our job was to find the craftsman. Fred J. Cook's special articles for *The Nation* — "The FBI," "The Shame of New York," and "Gambling, Inc.," have won him important journalism prizes for the last three years. In giving him the assignment, we told Mr. Cook to stick to the public record; we did not want him to attempt to seek out undisclosed facts or to probe into possibly sensitive areas. His assignment was simply to summarize existing published material which, long since available to potential "enemies," was still not readily available to the American public.

Mr. Cook has followed our instructions. There is not a fact hereafter set forth which has not already been published. Yet, put together, these facts add up to a story that proved new to us, as we are certain it will prove new to the reader. And enough of the known facts are presented to warrant an informed judgment about the agency. For what Mr. Cook proves is what Sir Compton Mackenzie demonstrated for *Nation* readers in another connection (see "The Spy Circus: Parasites with Cloaks and Daggers," December 5, 1959); namely, that intelligence of the cloak-and-dagger variety is a two-edged sword, and that the sharper edge is sometimes held toward the throat of the wielder.

And another lesson that Mr. Cook drives home is this: clearly the CIA must be divested of its "action" or operational functions and restricted to the sole function of gathering information for other agencies operating under customary constitutional safeguards. — Ed.



PART I SECRET HAND of the CIA

SHORTLY BEFORE 6 P.M. on December 5, 1957, a faceless man dropped a letter into a mail box in New York City's Grand Central Station area. It was to the editor of *The Nation*. The opening sentence read: "As an American intelligence officer, I feel duty bound to state my apprehensions as to the future of my country." What was the basis of these apprehensions? The threat of a rampant world communism? The menace of Soviet weaponry? The dangers of internal subversion? No. The writer, whose letter bore in almost every line intrinsic evidence of minute and intimate knowledge, was concerned about just one crucial aspect of the times — the mortal damage America

was inflicting upon itself. This was a damage, he found, that resulted directly from the careers and the power and the misconceptions of two men: the late John Foster Dulles, then Secretary of State, and his younger brother, Allen Welsh Dulles, then as now head of the vitally important Central Intelligence Agency, the official eyes and ears of American foreign policy, the medium that gathers and sifts and judges information—and so conditions the minds and predetermines the decisions of American policy makers on the highest levels.

Now, four years later, in the wake of the Cuban disaster — and other less publicized but equally significant

disasters — the words of the intelligence agent who, unburdened himself in that letter, read like the most infallible of prophecies. America was being pushed along the road to foreign policy disasters, he wrote, by the closed minds of the Dulles brothers — by their refusal to face facts as facts and their insistence on torturing facts into the framework of predetermined policy.

This is the way the intelligence officer phrased it:

The following circumstances are cause for deep concern:

1. United States foreign policy is not formulated on the basis of an objective analysis of facts, particularly those made available by In-

telligence Service, but is being determined by John Foster Dulles' personal rash conceptions.

2. The fact that Allen Dulles is in charge of collection and evaluation of all information makes it possible for the Secretary of State to distort the information received as he sees fit. *Facts thus presented disorientate not only the President and Congress but also the people of the United States.* (Italics added.)

3. As a consequence, our foreign policy is not based on the real interests of the United States. It has suffered one defeat after another and may eventually draw us into a nuclear war.

Though John Foster Dulles since has died, Allen Welsh Dulles still rules the CIA, and the Cuban debacle that his agency sponsored, planned and directed has provided graphic proof that he still retains his ability to "disorientate not only the President and Congress but also the people of the United States."

Cuba: the Lost Lesson

No issue of our times lies closer to the core of the decision of war or peace on which the very survival of mankind depends. For from our proper understanding of the facts, our recognition or denial of complicated and even at times transparent truths, must derive the formulation of our policies and the most

fateful of our decisions. Cuba is only the most recent and most striking example. When the CIA spurred on the abortive invasion under the roseate delusion that Cubans were chafing to revolt against the tyranny of Fidel Castro, the United States achieved only the disgrace and opprobrium of a British-style Suez on an even more futile scale. Not only did the invasion fail ignominiously, but the attempt helped, if anything, to solidify the iron rule of Castro. It enabled him to pose as the hero of his people, successfully repelling a "foreign" invasion. It touched off a ripple of reaction throughout Latin America where people, while they may not want a dictator like Castro, want no more the gratuitous meddling in their internal affairs by the American giant to the north. It takes no seer to perceive that all the evil fruits of the Cuban blunder have not yet been reaped.

Shockingly in this context come indications that the U.S. Government, instead of learning a most salutary lesson from the Cuban fiasco, has determined to turn its back even more resolutely upon facts and truth. In the last week of April, after officials on every level should have had time to digest the moral of Cuba, some 400 newspaper editors and columnists were called to Washington for a background briefing on foreign policy by the State Department. As James Higgins, of the *Gazette and Daily* (York, Pa.), later wrote, "There developed at this conference a very evident tendency on the part of the government to blame the press, at least part of the press, for spoiling the plans of the Central Intelligence Agency." The government theory plainly was, not that the whole conception was faulty,

but that too much had been printed about the gathering of Cuban invasion forces—and that this had alerted Castro and ruined an otherwise promising endeavor. The head-on collision of this comforting theory with the most elemental facts about modern Cuba was ignored with great determination—with such great determination, indeed, that President Kennedy, in a speech to a convention of American newspaper editors, suggested that the editors, before they printed a story, ask themselves not only "Is it news?" but "Is it in the interest of national security?" Such a censorship, even if only voluntary, would inevitably result in increasing the blackout of information from which the American people have suffered since the end of World War II. As James Higgins wrote, "The truth of the story . . . was not to be considered an important measure of its rights to see print. . . . I got the impression in Washington of a governmental closed mind."

This is a liability that could be fatal to all mankind in a world teetering on the edge of thermonuclear disaster. What America so obviously needs is not fewer facts but more, not deceptive images that fit our prejudices and preconceptions, but truth—however unpalatable. What America needs is the unvarnished truth about Chiang Kai-shek, about Quemoy and Matsu, about Laos, about Latin America—and especially about Cuba, the island (as the President so often has reminded us) that is just ninety miles from our shores, the island about which our secret and public misinformation has been demonstrated to be quite literally colossal.

The Agency Nobody Knows

In this all-pervasive atmosphere of the shut mind and the distorted fact, Central Intelligence is the key, the vital agency. Yet it is the one agency of government about which the American people are permitted to know almost nothing, the one agency over which their own elected representatives are permitted to have virtually no control. CIA is the only agency whose budget is never disclosed, whose director can sign a



voucher for any amount without checkup or explanation. How many persons does it employ, how many agents does it have? Even Congressmen do not know precisely. Its Washington headquarters staff alone is estimated to consist of more than 10,000 employees; in total, it is believed to have more persons on its payroll than the State Department. How much money does it have at its disposal? Again, even most of the Congressmen who vote the funds do not know precisely. CIA itself says this "figure is very tightly held and is known to not more than five or six Members in each House." CIA allotments are hidden in the budgetary requests of various government departments; estimates vary from a low of \$500 million annually to the \$1 billion mentioned by the conservative *New York Times*. A billion dollars a year concentrated in the hands of one man about whose activities the American people are permitted to know virtually nothing—and about whose activities it appears to be suggested they should know even less—represents the kind of power that, in essence, can well determine the nation's course and remove from its people the power of decision.

Two-Headed Monster

This danger that CIA may not just inform, but also determine policy, has been enhanced from the agency's inception by an authorized split personality. From the start, CIA has been a two-headed monster. It is not just a cloak-and-dagger agency entrusted with the important task of gathering information concerning our potential enemies throughout the world; it also has the authority to act on its own information, carrying out in deeds the policies its intelligence discoveries help to form. Though its overt acts are supposed to be under the direction of the National Security Council, the risk inherent in such a dual responsibility is obvious. With an end in view, can intelligence be impartial?

The hazards implicit in such a vast, concentrated, double-motive agency were not unforeseen. Harry Howe Ransom, of Harvard, in his *Central Intelligence and National Security*, describes the reaction of Admiral Ernest J. King in March,

1945, when the Secretary of the Navy sought his views on the formation of the proposed centralized intelligence agency. "King replied," Ransom writes, "that while such an arrangement was perhaps logical, it had inherent dangers. He feared that a centralized intelligence agency might acquire power beyond anything intended, and questioned whether such an agency might not threaten our form of government."

British intelligence, for centuries considered one of the world's most expert, has long held that the wedding of action to intelligence is a fatal flaw in CIA. So have others. In 1948, Professor Sherman Kent, of Yale, himself an intelligence officer in World War II, wrote a treatise on the purposes and the dangers of intelligence operations in a book called *Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy*. At the time CIA had just been formed and its performance lay entirely in the future, but Professor Kent struck out vigorously at what he called "the disadvantage of getting intelligence too close to policy." He added:

This does not necessarily mean officially accepted high United States policy, but something far less exalted. What I am talking of is often expressed by the words "slant," "line," "position," and "view." Almost any man or group of men confronted with the duty of getting something planned or getting something done will sooner or later hit upon what they consider a single most desirable course of action. Usually it is sooner; sometimes, under duress, it is a snap judgment off the top of the head. . . .

I cannot escape the belief that under the circumstances outlined, intelligence will find itself right in the middle of policy, and that upon occasions it will be the unabashed apologist for a given policy rather than its impartial and objective analyst.

It takes no particular insight to find the seeds of the Cuban fantasy in that perceptive paragraph.

In the aftermath of so monumental a blunder as Cuba, however, it seems pertinent to inquire: Just what is the record of CIA? Are its successes overbalanced by its failures? And does it, in its dual role of secret agent and activist operative, not merely

inform our foreign policy but, to a large measure at least, determine it?

Let it be said at once that there can be no exact score board chalking up the runs, hits and errors of CIA. Allen Dulles himself has commented that the only time his agency makes the headlines is when it falls flat on its face in public. Its successes, he intimates, cannot be publicized for the obvious reason that to do so might give away some of the secrets of his far-flung intelligence network. This is true, but only partially so. For CIA, while it refrains from public announcements, does not disdain the discreet and controlled leak. And some of these leaks have found their way into such prominence as *Saturday Evening Post* exclusives.

Where the CIA Succeeds

Despite the secrecy of CIA, therefore, there is on the public record, in the fourteen years since its creation in 1947, a partial and, indeed, highly significant record of its deeds. And by this record it is possible to judge it. Let's look first at some of the achievements.

¶In 1955, a CIA communications expert, studying a detailed map of Berlin, discovered that at one point the main Russian telephone lines ran only 300 yards from a radar station in the American sector. The CIA dug an underground tunnel, tapped the cables and, for months, before the Russians got wise, monitored every telephonic whisper in the Soviet East Sector.

¶In 1956, when Nikita Khrushchev delivered his famous secret speech denouncing the crimes of Josef Stalin before the Twentieth Communist Party Congress, a CIA agent managed to get the text and smuggle it out to the Western world. Washington was able to reveal the explosive contents before the Soviets themselves had edited the speech for public consumption. The blow was probably one of the strongest ever struck at Communist ideology. Communist parties in the United States and other Western countries, long taught by Communist propaganda to regard Stalin with reverence, felt that the bedrock of belief had been cut out from under them.

¶The U-2 spy plane operation, a

risky procedure that backfired disastrously in the end, was for years one of the world's most successful feats in espionage. From fifteen miles up, this plane took pictures of such incredible clarity and detail that it was possible to distinguish between a cyclist and a pedestrian; its radio receivers, which monitored all wave lengths, recorded literally millions of words. A single flight across Russia often furnished enough assorted information to keep several thousand CIA employees working for weeks, and the flights lasted for four years before, at the beginning of May, 1960, on the very eve of the scheduled Summit Conference in Paris, pilot Francis Powers took off on the mission on which he was shot down. The bad judgment implicit in ordering the flight at such a delicate time, the ridiculous CIA "cover story" that Powers was gathering weather data, the solemn promulgation of this fairy tale and the swift subsequent exposure of the United States before the world as an arrant liar—all of this wrecked the Summit, forced the United States to abandon the U-2 aerial espionage program, and inflicted enormous world-wide damage on American prestige. Whether, in the ideological war for men's minds, the ultimate tarnishing of the American image outweighs the positive details garnered by the U-2s in four years of successful espionage remains a forever unresolved point of debate. For one thing, the ideological war goes on, neither finally won nor irretrievably lost; for another, no one except on the very highest and most closely guarded levels of government can possibly know just how vitally important were the details the U-2s gathered.

Though the U-2 program became, in its catastrophic finale, a fulcrum of policy, the significant pattern that emerges from the Berlin wire tapping, the smuggling of the Khrushchev speech, the years-long earlier successes of U-2, seems fairly obvious. All dealt with intelligence—and intelligence only. The intent was to gather the kind of broad and detailed information on which an intelligent foreign policy may be based. These activities did not in themselves constitute active meddling in,

or formation of, policy. Unfortunately, not all CIA activities fall into this legitimate intelligence role; time and again, CIA has meddled actively in the internal affairs of foreign governments. And it is in this field that some of its most vaunted successes raise grave questions about the drift and intent of our foreign policy.



Where It Fails

Here are some of the high spots of CIA in international intrigue:

¶In 1953, with Allen Dulles himself playing a leading role, CIA sparked a coup that ousted Mohammed Mossadegh as Premier of Iran. Mossadegh, a wealthy landowner, rose to political power by capitalizing on popular hatred of the British Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, which dominated the economy of the nation, exporting Iran's greatest national resource by payment to the national treasury of what Mossadegh considered a mere pittance. Mossadegh set out to nationalize the oil industry in Iran's interest, allied himself with pro-Communist forces in Teheran, and virtually usurped the power of Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlevi. When he did, a successful CIA plot bounced Mossadegh out of office so fast he hardly knew what had hit him; the Shah was restored to power; and a four-nation consortium, in partnership with the Iranian Government, was given control over the country's liquid gold. CIA showed a tendency, if not to brag, at least to chuckle in public about this wily and triumphant coup; but the aftermath has furnished no cause for unalloyed rejoicing. The United States poured millions of dollars into Iran to shore up the government of the anti-Communist Shah. A Congressional committee found in 1957 that, in five years, Iran had received a quarter of a billion dollars in American aid. Yet the Iranian people themselves had not profited. So many American dollars had stuck to the fingers of corrupt officials that Iran was running up constant deficits, though the Congressional committee found that it should have been fully capable, with its oil revenues, of financing its own national development. Despite the

hundreds of millions of dollars in American aid, Iran remained so primitive that, in some isolated towns, in this twentieth century, residents had yet to see their first wheeled vehicle; a whole family might live for a year on the produce of a single walnut tree; and small children labored all day at the looms of rug factories for 20 cents or less. Small wonder, as *Time* reported in 1960, that Mossadegh "is still widely revered"; small wonder either that a new Premier, appointed by the Shah in early May, 1961, after a riotous outbreak in Teheran, was described by the Associated Press as the Shah's "last hope of averting bankruptcy and possible revolution. . . ."

¶In 1954, Jacobo Arbenz Guzman won an election in Guatemala and achieved supreme power. This democratic verdict by the Guatemalan electorate was not pleasing to the United States. American officials described the Arbenz regime as communistic. This has been disputed, but there is no question that Arbenz was sufficiently leftist in orientation to threaten the huge land holdings of Guatemala's wealthy classes and the imperial interests of United Fruit and other large American corporations. American disenchantment with Arbenz needed only a spark to be exploded into action, and the spark was supplied by Allen Dulles and CIA. Secret agents abroad spotted a Polish freighter being loaded with Czech arms and ammunition; CIA operatives around the world traced the peregrinations of the freighter as, after several mysterious changes of destination, she finally came to port and began unloading the munitions destined for Arbenz. Then CIA, with the approval of the National Security Council, struck. Two Globemasters, loaded with arms and ammunition, were flown to Honduras and Nicaragua. There the weapons were placed in the hands of followers of an exiled Guatemalan Army officer, Col. Carlos Castillo Armas. He invaded Guatemala, and the Arbenz regime collapsed like a pack of cards. It is perhaps significant that the Guatemalan blueprint was practically identical with the one CIA followed this April in the attempt to overthrow Castro. Only Castro was no



Arbenz. In any event, Guatemala, like Iran, remains one of the CIA's most publicly acknowledged coups; and, like Iran, the sequel raises disturbing doubts about precisely what was gained. For the promises of the CIA-backed Castillo forces to institute social and democratic reforms have not yet materialized. Half of the arable land in the nation of four million persons still remains in the hands of 1,100 families. The economy of the country is dominated by three large American corporations, topped

by United Fruit. Workers in the vineyards of United Fruit staged a strike in 1955 trying to get their wages of \$1.80 a day raised to \$3. They lost. And Guatemala is still a distressed country—so deeply distressed that the Kennedy Administration feels it must have several more bushels of American aid.

¶In 1954 and again in 1958, the United States almost went to war with Communist China over the rocky islets of Quemoy and Matsu, squatting less than three miles off the Chinese coast. When Red Chinese artillery barrages blanketed the islands, heavily over-populated with Chiang Kai-shek troops, American public opinion was conditioned to react angrily to these aggressive actions. What hardly any Americans realized at the time was that the Red Chinese had been subjected to considerable provocation. Allen Dulles' CIA had established on Formosa an outfit known as Western Enterprises, Inc. This was nothing more than a blind for CIA; and, as Stewart Alsop later wrote in the *Saturday Evening Post*, CIA agents, operating from this cover, masterminded "commando-type guerrilla raids on the mainland . . . in battalion strength." The title to Alsop's article told all: "The Story Behind Quemoy: How We Drifted Close to War."

¶In 1960 and again in 1961, the landlocked Indo-China principality of Laos threatened the peace of the world in a tug-of-war between East and West. Again the American public was confronted with glaring headlines picturing the menace of an on-sweeping world communism; it was given, at the outset at any rate—and first impressions in international sensations are almost always the ones that count—practically no understanding of underlying issues. Yet a Congressional committee in June, 1959, had filed a scathing report on one of the most disgraceful of American foreign aid operations. The committee found that, in seven years, we had poured more than \$300 million into Laos. This indiscriminate aid had caused runaway inflation and wrecked the economy of the country. At our insistence, a 25,000-man Army that the Laotians didn't want or need—and one that wouldn't

fight—had been foisted on the Laotian people. In a completely botched-up program, American resident geniuses spent some \$1.6 million to build a highway, built no highway, and wound up giving all Southeast Asia a vivid demonstration of the most unlovely aspects of the American system of bribery, graft and corruption. As if this wasn't bad enough, little Laos fairly crawled with CIA agents. These gentry, in late 1960, in another of their famous coups, overthrew the neutralist government of Prince Souvanna Phouma and installed a militarist regime headed by Gen. Phoumi Nosavan. The Phoumi Army clique had just one qualification to recommend it, but it was a qualification dear to the heart of CIA: it was militantly anti-Communist. Unfortunately, this attitude did not recommend the new regime as heartily to the Laotian people as it did to the CIA; General Phoumi had almost no popular support, and when the Communist Pathet Lao forces began to gobble up vast chunks of the nation, there was hardly any resistance. The result was inevitable. The United States was placed in the humiliating position of practically begging to get the very type of neutralist government its CIA had conspired to overthrow. A greater loss of face in face-conscious Asia could hardly be imagined.

Revolutions for Hire?

These are just a few of the best-documented examples of CIA's meddling in the internal affairs of other nations. There are others. There is the case of Burma, on whom CIA foisted unwanted, thousands of Chiang Kai-shek's so-called freedom fighters—warriors who found it much pleasanter to take over practically an entire Burmese province and grow opium than to fight the Red Chinese. There was this spring's Algerian Army revolt against Gen. Charles de Gaulle, an event in which an accusing French press contends the CIA played an encouraging hand. CIA categorically denies it, but French officialdom, suspicious as a result of previous CIA meddling in French nuclear-arms program legislation, has refrained from giving the American agency a full coat of whitewash.

Such activities obviously range far beyond the bounds of legitimate intelligence gathering. No one will argue today, in the tensions of a cold war that at almost any moment might turn hot, against the need for an expert intelligence-gathering agency. But does it follow that we need and must have an agency geared to the overthrow of governments in any and all sections of the world? Have we, who pose (most of us sincerely) as a truly democratic people, the right to send our secret agents to determine for the people of Iran or Guatemala or Laos what government shall rule them? We have never proclaimed this right; our public officials doubtless would express pious abhorrence at the thought. But, in the light of past events, we can hardly be surprised if, to the world at large, CIA actions speak louder than official protestations.

Nor can we escape the odium of regimes with which the CIA has saddled us. It follows as inevitably as day the night that, if CIA conspires to overthrow a foreign government on the blind theory that in the war against communism anything goes, the American people as a whole are burdened with responsibility for the regime that CIA has helped to install. And the record of such regimes in many remote corners of the world is decidedly not pretty. In the light of the past, it should be obvious that the future is not to be won by propping up puppets with sticky fingers.

On this whole issue, perhaps the most perceptive piece of writing was produced in the aftermath of Cuba by Walter Lippmann in a column entitled "To Ourselves Be True." Lipp-

mann, fresh from recent interviews with Khrushchev, wrote:

"We have been forced to ask ourselves recently how a free and open society can compete with a totalitarian state. This is a crucial question. Can our Western society survive and flourish if it remains true to its own faith and principles? Or must it abandon them in order to fight fire with fire?" Lippmann's answer to this last question was a ringing, "No." The Cuban adventure had failed, he wrote, because for us it was completely out of character—as out of character as for a cow to try to fly or a fish to walk. The United States, of course, must employ secret agents for its own information. "But the United States cannot successfully conduct large secret conspiracies," he wrote. ". . . The American conscience is a reality. It will make hesitant and ineffectual, even if it does not prevent, an un-American policy. . . . It follows that in the great struggle with communism, we must find our strength by developing and applying our own principles, not in abandoning them. . . ."

Probing more deeply, Lippmann analyzed Khrushchev's philosophy and explained the Soviet leader's absolute belief in the ultimate triumph of communism. The Soviet Premier, he had found, is sincerely convinced that capitalism is rigid, static; that it cannot change, it cannot meet the needs of the people, the needs of the future. Only communism can, and communism will succeed capitalism as capitalism supplanted feudalism. This, with Khrushchev, is "absolute dogma." Having explained this, Lippmann then wrote:

I venture to argue from this analysis that the reason we are on the defensive in so many places is that for some ten years we have been doing exactly what Mr. K. expects us to do. We have used money and arms in a long, losing attempt to stabilize native governments which, in the name of anti-communism, are opposed to all important social change. This has been exactly what Mr. K.'s dogma calls for — that communism should be the only alternative to the *status quo* with its immemorial poverty and privilege.

We cannot compete with communism, Lippmann argued, if we continue to place "the weak countries in a dilemma where they must stand still with us and our client rulers, or start moving with communism." We must offer them "a third option, which is economic development and social improvement without the totalitarian discipline of communism."

Obviously, the philosophy of Walter Lippmann is several aeons removed from that of the CIA man, whose record shows he has just one gauge of merit—the rigid right-wing inflexibility of the anti-communistic puppet regimes that CIA has installed and supported. The record suggests that in the CIA lexicon there is no room for social and economic reform; such phrases imply a possibly leftist tendency, and God forbid that we should ever back such! Let's give 'em, instead, a military dictatorship. This CIA philosophy-in-action is the very antithesis of the American spirit Walter Lippmann was writing about, and to understand how we came to be encumbered with it, one must understand the career and ties and outlook of one man—Allen Welsh Dulles.



PART II ALLEN DULLES: BEGINNINGS

WHEN ALLEN DULLES was eight years old, he wrote a thirty-one page essay on the Boer War, an event that was then disturbing the conscience of the world. The last sentence read: "I hope the Boers win this war because the Boers are in the right and the British in the

wrong." Questioned in after life about that small "b" in "British," Dulles explained that he wrote it that way deliberately because he didn't like the British at the time and hoped that small "b" would show just what he thought of them.

Now, sixty years later, Allen Dul-

les is very much the man foreshadowed by the boy author. The interest in foreign affairs that led him to write a small book on the Boer War at the age of eight (it was actually published by a doting grandfather) has remained with him throughout his life. Some would say, too, that

he retained the strong prejudices, or the stout convictions (depending on how you look at it), that led him at the age of eight to refuse to dignify the British with a capital letter.

The future master of the CIA was steeped in the aura of international affairs from earliest childhood. He was born on April 7, 1893, in Watertown, N.Y., where his father, Allen Macy Dulles, was a Presbyterian minister. His mother, the former Edith Foster, was the daughter of General John Watson Foster, who in 1892 had become Secretary of State in the Republican administration of Benjamin Harrison. Years later his mother's brother-in-law, Robert Lansing, was to serve as Secretary of State in the administration of Woodrow Wilson.

These family ties were to be influential both in the career of Allen Dulles and in that of his brother, John Foster, five years his senior. Allen graduated from Princeton with Phi Beta Kappa honors in 1914 and promptly went off to teach English for a year in a missionary school at Allahabad, India. Returning to Princeton, he got his Master of Arts degree, then followed in the footsteps of his older brother by joining the diplomatic service ruled by his uncle, Secretary of State Robert Lansing. On May 16, 1916, when he was twenty-three, he went off to Vienna as an undersecretary in the American embassy. Though the young man himself could have had no inkling at the time, this was where it was all to begin; here were to be woven the first permanent strands into the career of the future boss of CIA.

Beginnings in Vienna

Vienna was then the capital of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the partner of Kaiser Wilhelm's Germany in the bloody warfare of World War I. America herself was about to become involved in this most tragic of wars, from which the world has yet to salvage a formula for peace. In the striped-trouser set and the top-level society of Vienna, young Dulles, the nephew of the American Secretary of State, quickly made his mark; and when America joined the Allies, he along with other members of the

American delegation skipped across the border to Berne in Switzerland. It was here that Dulles got his first taste of the secret, high-level intrigue that so often determines the fate of empires and of peoples. As he later told a visitor: "That's when I learned what a valuable place Switzerland was for information—and when I became interested in intelligence work."

Dulles' interest doubtless was stimulated by the heady role he played in the very kind of top-drawer, behind-the-scenes maneuvering that was to mark the pattern of his later life. By the beginning of 1918, the creaky Austro-Hungarian Empire, exhausted by war, could perceive plainly before it the hideous specter of imminent collapse. Naturally, its Emperor Charles, with a ruler's primal instinct for self-preservation, wanted to salvage as much from the ruins as was possible. His negotiator in this laudable endeavor was his former tutor, Dr. Heinrich Lammasch. Lammasch had met the tall and charming Allen Dulles in Vienna; he was perfectly aware that the young man was the nephew of the American Secretary of State; and so, with an eye to establishing rapport on the highest possible levels, he approached Dulles and through him made arrangements for the salvage talks the Austrians so much desired.

The secret discussions which Allen Dulles thus played a key role in arranging began on January 31, 1918, in a villa in Grummlingen, near

Berne, belonging to a director of Krupp's. Professor George D. Heron, who often carried out secret assignments for President Wilson, headed the American delegation. Professor Lammasch and industrialist Julius Meindl led the opposing bargain hunters. The Austrians were ready to promise almost anything in the hope of preserving the Hapsburg monarchy, and the Americans, evidently blind to the already tarnished luster of the throne, deluded themselves into the belief that they were really being offered a prize—that the Austrian Emperor might be propped up as "a useful force."

Finding these nice Americans so receptive, Lammasch was effusive in his promises. Austria-Hungary would be positively delighted to follow the American lead in everything, especially if (does this sound familiar?) the generous Americans would extend financial aid and help to build "a bridge of gold" between Vienna and Washington. Dulles' immediate superior, Hugh Wilson, was intrigued by the prospect, and all of the American delegation seems to have been quite enthusiastic. The British, informed of the proposal, were far more skeptical and warned against trusting too much in the performance of the Hapsburgs. Events proved the British so right. The Austrian monarchy collapsed, Charles abdicated, and the net result was a fiasco. Yet *Time* in 1959 could write of this period that Allen Dulles, in the Switzerland of 1918, "hatched the first of the grandiose plots which were to become his trademark."

Introduction to Germany

After Berne came the great peace conference at Versailles. Secretary of State Lansing, second only to Wilson among the American negotiators, saw to it that his two nephews had reserved seats at the great event. John Foster was given the task of studying such financial problems as reparations and war debts; Allen had an even more fascinating job as assistant head of the Department of Current Political and Economic Correspondence, a key organization that handled and channeled all communications to the American delegation. Allen Dulles' immediate boss was



Ellis Dressel, a leading American expert on German affairs and a man who was convinced that the new Soviet Union represented a world menace, one that could be dealt with effectively (shades of 1945!) only through a partnership between America and a revived Germany.

This was not the prevailing view in that simpler world of 1918 in which hatred of militaristic Germany was the dominating factor. It is significant mainly because, for its day, it was an extreme view and because Allen Dulles was quite close to Dressel and shared many of his beliefs. In December, 1918, and again in early 1919, Allen accompanied his superior on trips to Germany during which they conferred with high German industrialists. The bent of Dulles' own thinking at the time is indicated in a memorandum that he wrote on December 30, 1918, entitled: "Lithuania and Poland, the Last Barrier between Germany and the Bolsheviks." It evidently was based largely on information gathered from Polish and Lithuanian refugees, and it described the Bolshevik menace in the strongest terms. Dulles even advocated support of Polish-Lithuanian intervention in Russia, writing: "The Allies should not be deterred from a military expedition because of their fear that it would require hundreds of thousands of men."

Peace concluded, Dressel was sent to Berlin as American chargé d'affaires in Germany, and Dulles went with him. Here he was thrown into contact with a stream of German politicians, industrialists and Army officers, many of whom were concerned about the new Communist menace and talked about the possibility of raising a European army—spearheaded by German generals, of course—to fight the radical Bolsheviks. Nothing came of these plans, and Dulles soon was transferred to Constantinople.

In later years, the stereotyped portrait of Allen Dulles given the American people by virtually all of the large media of information pictures a master spy, a super-sleuth, who confounded his rivals in international intrigue from his earliest days. The image, contrasted with



Drawing by Berger
John Foster Dulles

the reality of what came out of Dulles' first "grandiose plot" at Berne, seems considerably overblown, but it suffers even greater damage when one studies the acid pen portrait of Dulles in action in the Balkans left by a veteran American intelligence officer of the period.

Dabbling in Oil

The disenchanted agent was Robert Dunn, a veteran and hard-bitten American newspaper man who had received his initial training in skepticism at the hands of Lincoln Steffens. Dunn later spent nearly twenty years in Naval Intelligence. He was a lieutenant in Turkey in those first years of the 1920s, when Allen Dulles appeared upon the scene. Years later, in his book *World Alive*, published by Crown in 1956, he wrote as follows:

And now Mr. Secretary of State Colby's young men were arriving in the flesh to whistle at the nymphs on our office ceiling. Among the cooky-pushers strange to a naval staff came one beetle-browed Boston Brahmin, rich as a dog's insides with copper stock. . . .

One Allen Dulles, freckled, with toothbrush mustache, was a serious grad of the Princeton Golf Club, fresh from Versailles and drawing the fatal boundaries of Czechoslovakia.

Dunn continues by recounting how a London *Times* reporter happened to find in a second-hand book-stall an ancient volume from which anti-Semitic propagandists obvious-

ly had filched the ideas for the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*. Neither the *Times* reporter nor Dunn was very much excited by the discovery because, as Dunn wrote, the *Protocols* had been well exposed by internal evidence as forgeries and hardly anyone took them seriously any more.

But now [Dunn added], while Stamboul boiled sedition against the Entente and Kemal *chetties* threatened siege, Dulles decoded to "Secstate" academic analyses of that stale forgery. No wonder Roosevelt, later, was to growl at diplomatic myopia and the braid-on-cutaway tradition.

Such, on Dunn's testimony at least—and he soon took the first opportunity to get out of Naval Intelligence because he couldn't stand working with Dulles—was the well-coddled young man who, after two years in the Balkans, was called back to Washington to head the State Department's Division of Near Eastern Affairs.

The Near East, then as now, was a sensitive area, and for much the same reason—oil. British interests had had a hammerlock on the rich preserves of the entire Mediterranean basin and had tried to freeze out American rivals; but now such companies as Gulf and Standard Oil were no longer to be denied. The years during which Dulles headed the key Near Eastern Division were, as it so happened, the very years during which the Rockefeller interests in Standard Oil negotiated a toehold in the Iraq Petroleum Co., and the very years in which the Mellons of Gulf were laying the groundwork for valuable concessions in the Bahrein Islands. Both of these developments became public and official in 1927, the year after Dulles left the State Department to join the New York law firm of Sullivan and Cromwell.

His decision was motivated primarily by financial considerations. The highest salary he had made with State was some \$8,000 a year, and he was a married man, with a growing family. Sullivan and Cromwell (in which older brother John Foster was already a partner) belonged to the legal elite of Wall Street—one of those law firms that have made themselves the virtual brains of big

business, supplying indispensable advice on almost every financial, industrial and commercial deal. It advised both the Rockefellers and the Morgans; it fairly reeked of the kind of money that solves all a young married man's most acute financial problems.

In this plush atmosphere, Allen Dulles quickly made himself at home. He had hardly fitted himself into his law chair, indeed, before he became involved in the kind of backstage masterminding that has come to seem almost second-nature to him ever since.

The nation in question was the South American state of Colombia. By treaty, Colombia had awarded the Morgan and Mellon interests the extremely rich Barco Concession, so-called, in Notre de Santander Province. But in 1926, just as Allen Dulles was quitting the State Department, Dr. Miguel Abadía-Mendez was elected President of Colombia. He quickly proved to be a disturbing element in the placid world of American oil interests. He threatened to repudiate the Barco Concession; he aroused great popular support; and worried American oil barons decided they would have to act. They turned naturally to their legal brains. One such brain was Francis B. Loomis, a former State Department official; another, Allen W. Dulles. Pressure was immediately applied on Abadía-Mendez, but he, stubborn man, wouldn't yield. In August, 1928, he accused the American companies of refusing to pay Colombia what they owed it for the years 1923-26 and reaffirmed his intention of revoking the Barco Concession. This led a secretary in the American Embassy in Bogotá to write Washington that he was convinced "the President will not withdraw his annulment of the agreement until he is forced to do so under the pressure of a hard and fast demand."

Colombia the Gem

Force was applied. The State Department sent a sharp note to Bogotá. Colombia countered by threatening to nationalize all her oil fields. The United States served Colombia with a formal ultimatum. The Mellons threatened an economic boycott.

June 24, 1961



Drawing by Berger
Allen Dulles

Angry anti-American demonstrators paraded in the streets of Bogotá.

The full details of their labors probably never will be revealed, but the effects became obvious. In 1930, Colombia got a new President: Dr. Enrique Olaya Herrera, a former Colombian ambassador to the United States and a well-known friend of Wall Street bankers. Soon after his election, he visited New York and was promised a million-dollar loan, provided the Barco Concession was honored. It was.

This adventure in the international diplomacy of oil, revealing in its way, was actually little more than a minor vignette in the ascending careers of Allen Dulles and his older brother, John Foster. The interests and outlook of the two were intertwined almost inseparably. They were partners in the firm of Sullivan and Cromwell; they represented the same clients and the same interests; their two careers moved together in measured cadence, almost like the steps of trained dancers. Most important among their varied interests, and claiming a major share of their attention, were some of Germany's greatest international cartels.

Three of their clients represented the very top drawer of German in-

dustry. These were the Vereinigte Stahlwerke (The Thyssen and Flick trust), IG Farbenindustrie (the great chemical trust) and the Robert Bosch concern. The legal wits of the Dulles brothers aided all three.

At the onset of World War II, the German masters of American Bosch Corp. began to fear for the safety of their holdings, and an elaborate corporate cover up was arranged. The Wallenberg brothers, Swedish bankers, agreed to take over American Bosch (with the promise to return it after the war, of course), but good American front names were needed to provide camouflage. Hence it developed that in August, 1941, just a few months before Pearl Harbor, John Foster Dulles became the sole voting trustee of the majority shares. In 1942, the U.S. Government seized the shares, contending Dulles' trusteeship was merely a device to cloak enemy interests.

Business Before Politics?

Equally close and equally significant was the role that Allen Dulles played in the great Schroeder international banking house. The parent firm was German and was headed by Baron Kurt von Schroeder. A genuine scar-faced Prussian, the Baron played a key role in the accession to power of Adolf Hitler. It was in his villa at Cologne on January 7, 1933, that Hitler and von Papen met and worked out their deal for the Nazi seizure of power. In subsequent years, von Schroeder remained close to the Nazi hierarchy. He was made SS *Gruppenfuehrer* (the equivalent of general), and he was chairman of the secret "Freunden-Kreis S," which collected funds from Ruhr magnates to finance Heinrich Himmler. Outside Germany, the Schroeder financial empire stretched long and powerful tentacles. In England, it had J. H. Schroeder Ltd.; in the United States, the Schroeder Trust Company and the J. Henry Schroeder Corporation. Allen Dulles sat on the boards of directors of both.

Almost any lawyer would contend, of course, that there is nothing wrong with selling his talents where the money is and that he has a perfect right to represent any client, no matter what his pedigree. The Dulles

brothers, however, did not just happen to represent an isolated German client or two; they represented the elite of German industry, firms closely tied to the Nazi machinery, over a long period of time, on the closest terms and even in directoral capacities. Granted the complete propriety of the representation, it would be naive in the extreme to believe that such multiple, close associations do not sway political judgments.

In the long-forgotten records of the times, there are indeed some indications that this was so. In April, 1940, for example, Dr. Gerhart A. Westrich, one of Germany's leading lawyers, a man who had handled some European affairs for Sullivan and Cromwell, came to America by way of Siberia, ostensibly as Hitler's special emissary to consult with American businessmen. He established residence on a swank New York suburban estate and before long he was consulting, not just with American oil and industrial tycoons, but with a strange assortment of factory workers and mechanics. The New York *Herald Tribune* exposed this suspicious activity and charged that Westrich had made misrepresentations in applying for a driver's license. John Foster Dulles immediately came to the Nazi agent's defense. "I don't believe he has done anything wrong," John Foster said. "I knew him in the old days and I had a high regard for his integrity."

American agents began an investigation, however, and in two weeks Dr. Westrich was on his way to Japan.

The Westrich affair, inconclusive in itself, assumes greater significance when one considers the Anglo-American Fellowship and the America First Committee.

In Britain, the London branch of the Schroeder banking firm financed the Fellowship and concentrated on selling the Munich brand of appeasement to the British people. The Fellowship sought as members prominent names in the Conservative Party, big businessmen, bankers. These eminents were given the VIP treatment on conducted tours of Germany; they were entertained by Hitler and Goering, and von Ribbentrop exercised all the wiles of propaganda to sell them on the vir-

WANTED



Baron Kurt v. SCHRÖDER

BORN: Aug. 24, 1889.

PARTY NUMBER: 1475919 SS NUMBER: 276904

Former residences: Köln: Hollendla Villa, Rheinallee;
Bonn: Rolandseck.

Any information relative to the above mentioned subject should be forwarded immediately to:

JOINT SPECIAL FINANCIAL DETACHMENT
U. S. GROUP CONTROL COUNCIL
CONTROL COMMISSION FOR GERMANY (BRITISH ELEMENT)
DÜSSELDORF.

This "Wanted" poster was distributed by British and U.S. Military Governments immediately after the war.

tues of the Nazi system. There was no secret about this activity, no doubt about its aims and purposes. And so it is intriguing to find prominently listed as members of the Fellowship not just the banking house of J. H. Schroeder Ltd. itself, but the individual names of H. W. B. Schroeder and H. F. and F. C. Tiarks (see *Tory M. P.* by Simon Hoxey, published in England by Victor Gollancz). F. C. Tiarks actually served on the Fellowship's council, or governing body, and H. W. B. Schroeder and the two Tiarkses sat with Allen Dulles on the board of the J. Henry Schroeder Banking Corp.

On this side of the Atlantic, the incorporation papers for the America First Committee, devoted to persuading Americans to keep out of World

War II, were drawn up in John Foster Dulles' law office. Records of America First subsequently showed that John Foster, the more famous of the two brothers during most of their lifetimes, supported America First financially. In February, 1941, his wife contributed \$250, and in May, 1941, another \$200. On November 5, 1941, just one month before Pearl Harbor, America First records listed a \$500 contribution from "John Foster Dulles." Dulles himself, when questioned about these ties, protested: "No one who knows me and what I have done and stood for consistently over thirty-seven years of active life could reasonably think that I could be an isolationist or 'America Firster' in deed or spirit."

Yet the deed and the spirit seemed to be implicit in a series of pub-

lic speeches that John Foster Dulles made in the months before Pearl Harbor. On at least three occasions, he ridiculed the notion that America faced any danger from the Axis powers. These, he said, were simply "dynamic peoples" seeking their rightful place in the sun. In a speech before the Economic Club of New York in March, 1939, he said:

There is no reason to believe that any totalitarian states, separately or collectively, would attempt to attack the United States or could do it successfully. Certainly it is well within our means to make ourselves immune in this respect. Only hysteria

entertains the idea that Germany, Italy or Japan contemplates war upon us.

There is no public record that Allen Dulles shared either his brother's sanguine world outlook or interest in America First. But equally there is no record, public or private, that he didn't. All one can say is that, throughout their careers, the two brothers displayed a marked community of political views.

Then came Pearl Harbor.

When it did, a whole new career opened up for Allen Dulles. During his service in the State Department years before, he had become friendly

with an Assistant Attorney General named William J. (Wild Bill) Donovan. When Pearl Harbor plunged us into World War II, Donovan was picked to head America's first super-spy outfit, the Office of Strategic Services. He promptly contacted Allen Dulles and urged him to go to his old familiar stamping grounds in Berne, Switzerland. There Allen was to set up a European espionage headquarters. The reason Donovan picked him for the task was that he wanted a man who had high contacts inside Nazi Germany. On this score, Allen Dulles certainly qualified.



PART III DULLES AND THE SS

THE OFFICIALLY favored version of Allen Dulles' exploits in Switzerland in World War II goes like this: He was the very last American to slip legally across the French border in November, 1942, as German troops came pouring into Vichy France in swift reaction to the Allied invasion of North Africa. His assignment in Switzerland was to find out who in Germany might be opposed to the Hitler regime and whether they were working actively to overthrow it. In true master-spy tradition, he put out his feelers and soon the fish were swimming into his net; soon secret anti-Nazis were coming to him to funnel him vital information and to give him the most intimate details about the plot to do away with Hitler.

Some of this happened, but it isn't all that happened. To understand the significance of developments in Berne, one needs to recall the background of the times. In January, 1943, just as Allen Dulles' intelligence-gathering operation began to get going in full swing, Churchill and Roosevelt were meeting in Casablanca for the first of those Summit conferences that were to determine the conduct of the fighting and, more important, the conditions for ending it. It was at Casablanca that the two great Allied leaders proclaimed the doctrine of "unconditional sur-

render" and vowed to "spare no effort to bring Germany to her knees."

Their proclamation came at a time when a witch's brew was already boiling inside Germany. German military strategy long had been predicated on avoiding a war on two fronts. This had been a cardinal principle of Hitler himself until the seemingly endless succession of easy victories unbalanced his judgment and propelled him into war with the Soviet Union. The limitless void of Russia quickly began to engulf the Nazi war machine, and then, on top of the Eastern struggle, had come the Japanese stroke at Pearl Harbor, a blow that had surprised Hitler almost as much as it had the American fleet. This development had thrown the tremendous power and resources of America into the scales against the Axis powers, and soon both German generals and the more astute leaders of the SS saw that ultimate defeat was inevitable unless some compromise political settlement could be worked out with the Allies. A number of top-level conferences were devoted to this problem, both in the camp of the military and the camp of the SS.

In one of these secret conclaves in August, 1942, SS-Brigadefuehrer Walter Schellenberg, one of Heinrich Himmler's brightest protégés and one of the most dangerous of Nazi

secret agents, proposed a bold solution to his boss. Himmler, the master of the secret police for whom Kurt von Schroeder had raised funds in the Ruhr, was a cautious man where his own neck was involved; but he was extremely ambitious, too—and so he listened to Schellenberg. Schellenberg argued that the war was lost unless a "political solution" could be arranged. Only Himmler, he contended, could achieve this. Only Himmler could intrigue to spread dissension among the Allies, to split them apart, to achieve the needed separate settlement with the West. Himmler hesitated, caution warring with ambition. The argument between him and Schellenberg lasted until 3:30 A.M., but Himmler finally agreed to try Schellenberg's idea.

The prize at stake was enormous. If he succeeded, Himmler could make himself master of all Germany. The ruthless SS chief was well aware, as William L. Shirer makes clear in *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich*, that military cliques were plotting the assassination of Hitler. On occasion Himmler made a great pretense of activity and sent some of the more obvious bunglers before execution squads, but it seems certain he could have protected the Fuehrer much more efficiently than he did. It seems certain also that he gave the plotting generals loose rein, anticipating the

situation that would develop if and when they succeeded in blowing up his revered leader. Himmler, with his iron grip on the machinery of the secret police, felt fully competent to deal with the generals; he feared no other rival in the Nazi party; and if, in foreign affairs, he could achieve Schellenberg's "political solution," he could perpetuate the Nazi system with himself in Hitler's shoes.

Meet "Mr. Bull"

Such appear to be the compelling reasons that led Himmler and Schellenberg to send two SS agents to seek out Allen Dulles in Bern. The SS agents were a Dr. Schudekopf and Prince Maximilian Egon Hohenlohe. The Nazi version of these negotiations was contained in three documents written at the time, labeled "Top Secret," and preserved in the files of Schellenberg's dreaded Department VI of the SS Reich Security Office. Bob Edwards, a member of the British Parliament, cites these documents and quotes them fully in a pamphlet written this year, *A Study of a Master Spy (Allen Dulles)*. In studying his account, upon which the following section is based, it must be borne in mind that the documents represent an enemy version of the talks and must therefore be read with caution; nor should it be forgotten that in the shadow world of the secret agency, duplicity is a common coin and truth most difficult to determine.

Edwards, who fought with Loyalist forces in Spain during the civil war in the 1930s, has been general secretary of the Chemical Workers Union since 1947. He is a former member of the Liverpool City Council and has served in Parliament, elected with Labour and Co-operative backing, since 1955. He attracted considerable attention when he began protesting in the House of Commons about the activities of the Krupps in Bilbao and the danger of permitting the Germans to establish bases in Spain. As a result, "from absolutely reliable sources in Bonn," he says, he received a number of documents, including the three dealing with Dulles and the SS.

The first of these documents is a brief covering letter, of which only one copy was made. It is dated April

30, 1943, and is from *SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer* Ahrens to Department VI, dealing with: "DULLES, Roosevelt's special representative in Switzerland." The second is a record of conversations between Dulles, referred to throughout the report as "Mr. Bull," and Prince Hohenlohe, called "Herr Pauls." The conversations took place in Switzerland in mid-February, 1943.

"Immediately on arrival," according to the memorandum on the Dulles-Hohenlohe talks, "Herr Pauls" received a call from a "Mr. Roberts," a Dulles aid and confidant. Roberts was anxious to arrange an immediate meeting with his chief, Allen Dulles. Hohenlohe stalled until he could check up on Dulles. From Spanish diplomats, from the Swiss and from representatives of some of the Nazi satellite states in the Balkans, Hohenlohe learned that Dulles operated on the very highest level, apparently with a direct pipeline into the White House, by-passing the State Department. This convinced the SS agent that he should, by all means, see "Mr. Bull."


He was greeted, he reported, by "a tall, powerfully built, sporting type of about forty-five, with a healthy appearance, good teeth and a lively, unaffected and gracious manner. Assuredly a man of civic courage." The conversation was cordial. Hohenlohe and Dulles quickly established that they had met before, in 1916 in Vienna and in the 1920s in New York. With these preliminaries out of the way the SS report of the talk between "Herr Pauls" and "Mr. Bull" continues:

Mr. Bull said . . . he was fed up with listening all the time to outdated politicians, *émigrés* and prejudiced Jews. In his view, a peace had to be made in Europe in the preservation of which all concerned

would have a real interest. There must not again be a division into victor and vanquished, that is, contented and discontented; never again must nations like Germany be driven by want and injustice to desperate experiments and heroism. The German state must continue to exist as a factor of order and progress; there could be no question of its partition or the separation of Austria. At the same time, however, the might of Prussia in the German state should be reduced to reasonable proportions, and the individual regions (*Gau*) should be given greater independence and a uniform measure of influence within the framework of Greater Germany. To the Czech question, Mr. Bull seemed to attach little importance; at the same time he felt it necessary to support a *cordon sanitaire* against Bolshevism and pan-Slavism through the eastward enlargement of Poland and the preservation of Rumania and a strong Hungary.

German Hegemony

If this view seems hardly in accord with the publicly avowed Roosevelt-Churchill program of "unconditional surrender" and bringing "Germany to her knees," the rest of the Dulles philosophy, according to this SS report, seems to agree even less with the ideals for which thousands of Allied soldiers were at that moment dying. "Herr Pauls" reported that "Mr. Bull seemed quite to recognize" Germany's claim to industrial leadership in Europe. "Of Russia he spoke with scant sympathy. . . . Herr Pauls had the feeling that the Americans, including in this case Mr. Bull, would not hear of Bolshevism or Pan-Slavism in Central Europe, and, unlike the British, on no account wished to see the Russians at the Dardenelles or in the oil areas of Rumania or Asia Minor." Indeed, as "Herr Pauls" noted later,



"Mr. Bull" made no great secret, though he did not speak in detail, about "Anglo-American antagonisms."

The conversation now took an abrupt turn. "Herr Pauls" made what he described as "a very sharp thrust on the Jewish question" and said he "sometimes actually felt the Americans were only going on with the war so as to be able to get rid of the Jews and send them back again. To this 'Mr. Bull' replied that in America things had not quite got to that point yet and that it was in general a question whether the Jews wanted to go back. Herr Pauls got the impression that America intended rather to send off the Jews to Africa."

Discussing the reorganization of postwar Europe, "Mr. Bull" appeared to reject British ideas "in toto." Hohenlohe reported:

He agreed more or less to a Europe organized politically and industrially on the basis of large territories, and considered that a Federal Greater Germany (similar to the United States), with an associated Danube Confederation, would be the best guarantee of order and progress in Central and Eastern Europe. *He does not reject National Socialism in its basic ideas and deeds so much as the "inwardly unbalanced, inferiority-complex-ridden Prussian militarism."* (Italics added.)

Then Mr. Bull turned to the subject of National Socialism and the person of Adolf Hitler and declared that with all respect to the historical importance of Adolf Hitler and his work it was hardly conceivable that the Anglo-Saxons' worked-up public opinion could accept Hitler as unchallenged master of Greater Germany. People had no confidence in the durability and dependability of agreements with him. And re-establishment of mutual confidence was the most essential thing after the war. Nevertheless, Herr Pauls did not get the impression that it was to be viewed as a dogma of American prejudice. . . .

The conversation continued with Hohenlohe trying to get some inkling of Allied military intentions and with Dulles fending off his queries. The American agent did deliver, however, a pointed warning. He cited America's "expanding production of aircraft, which will systematically be

brought into action against the Axis powers." Then:

Mr. Bull is in close touch with the Vatican. He himself called Herr Pauls's attention to the importance of this connection, for the American Catholics also have a decisive word to say, and before the conversation ended he again repeated how greatly Germany's position in America would be strengthened if German bishops were to plead Germany's cause here. Even the Jews' hatred could not outweigh that. It had to be remembered, after all, that it had been the American Catholics who had forced the Jewish-American papers to stop their baiting of Franco Spain.

The third top-secret Nazi document deals with another talk between "Mr. Roberts," Dulles' right-hand man, and another SS agent, identified only as "Bauer." This took place in Geneva on Sunday, March 21, 1943. It was a long, rambling, inconclusive rehash of the war and its issues, but certain strong strands emerge in the SS report. "Bauer" quoted Roberts as saying "he [Roberts] did not like the Jews and it was distasteful to think that they were now able to adorn their six-pointed star with an additional wreath of martyrdom. . . ." The coolness toward the British, the pro-German warmth was there. "Bauer" quoted Roberts:

America had no intention of going to war every twenty years and was now aiming at a prolonged settlement, in the planning of which she wished to take a decisive part and did not wish to leave that again to Britain, bearing in mind the bitter experience of the past. It would be nothing else but regrettable if Germany excluded herself from this settlement, for that country deserved every kind of admiration and meant a great deal more to him than any other countries.


How Much Truth?

The impact of these reports, read eighteen years later, can only be described as shocking. The picture that emerges is of a Dulles perfectly willing to throw the Austrians and the Czechs (whom the Allies then were publicly pledged to free) to the wolves; a Dulles who "does not re-

ject National Socialism in its basic ideas and deeds," despite the smoking furnaces of the Nazi charnel houses; a Dulles who, blaming all on Prussian militarism, was looking forward to seeing a strong and resurgent Germany dominating all of Central Europe; a Dulles who was concerned primarily (as the Dulles of 1918 had been) with using Germany and Poland as buffers against Russia in the East; a Dulles who was concerned, as one would expect the Dulles of the 1920s to be, with keeping Russia out of the oil-rich Near East; a Dulles who seemed still to regard the British with a small "b," who looked with equanimity (as the Dulles who had represented some of the mightiest German corporations might be expected to do) upon German industrial leadership of Europe—a Dulles who paid "respect to the historical importance of Adolf Hitler and his work," who thought Hitler would have to go, but who did not make this seem like "a dogma of American prejudice."

One finds oneself asking the shocked question: Was this the *real* Allen Dulles?

It is not easy to decide. Always, in anything that touches upon the double-dealing shadow world of the secret agent, one must have more than normal reservations. This picture of Dulles is the picture that emerges from SS reports, but perhaps SS agents, like a lot of other secret agents, might have been tempted to tell headquarters what they knew headquarters wanted to hear. Even if the SS reports were completely accurate, there is no guarantee that Dulles actually believed all that the reports attributed to him. He was trying to pick the minds



of his SS callers, as they were trying to pick his, and in the brain-picking duel, any agent might be likely to cloak, to a degree at least, his real beliefs and intentions and to pretend to what he did not really feel. Was this what Dulles was doing? Was he being extremely cordial and agreeable to Hohenlohe merely in the hope of luring information out of him? Or were at least some of those sentiments he expressed really his own?

Whatever the truth, there is no imputation in these documents that Allen Dulles was anything but a patriot seeking to further what he conceived to be the best interests of his country. Not his motives, but his judgments, are called into question as one peruses these SS records.


In any case, the SS portrait must be assessed against some checkpoints—Dulles' own known background and certain future developments, all of which seem to fall into a pattern. Dulles certainly played the master's role in cloak-and-dagger activities in Europe. He remained the boss of the Berne nerve center of intelligence throughout the war, and he came out of the conflict with an overpowering reputation as America's master spy. Under the circumstances, it is curious to find that the pattern of German rapprochement described in Hohenlohe's report was repeated again and again in other secret dealings by American agents.

For a "Soft" Peace

One of these negotiations took place in October, 1943, when Dr. Felix Kersten, a Finnish masseur who had won the confidence of Himmler himself, went to Sweden to confer with an unnamed American agent. They discussed "the danger from the East" and "a compromise peace." Tentatively, they agreed on the restoration of Germany's 1914 boundaries (this would have included France's Alsace-Lorraine), the ending of the Hitler dictatorship, reduction of the German Army, control over German industry, and an American pledge to forget about an enlarged Poland. Still later, in the spring of 1944, another American feeler was put out by a secret agent in Yugoslavia, again for negotiations that would involve the possibility of

uniting the Western Allies with Germany for the "struggle against Bolshevism."

These repeated overtures would make it seem as if someone somewhere had some pretty determined ideas about a soft German peace and the building up of a strong post-war Germany to combat the Soviet menace. All of this occurred at a time when Russia ostensibly was our Ally and was locked in the fiercest of death grapples with Germany. If the Russians, who had their own spy system, were aware of these secret machinations—as they may well have been, for, according to the Germans, Hungarian agents had broken the code Dulles was using—the seemingly unreasonable Russian distrust of America would begin to seem less unreasonable. Such are the penalties of an intelligence operation that runs



counter to the official policy of the nation employing it.

Whether Dulles himself had any responsibility for the persistent pro-German feelers is not established, but there is one further strong indication of his attitude toward Germany in one of his best-publicized exploits. Not long after his arrival in Berne, he received a call from an emissary connected with the military side of the crosshatch of plots involving the destruction of Hitler. His caller was Hans Bernd Gisevius, German vice consul in Zurich and a member of the *Abwehr*, the secret intelligence. Gisevius was a huge, 6-foot-4 German who had been connected with anti-Hitler plots in 1938 and 1939, before the outbreak of the war. He had close connections with some of Germany's top military leaders, who had long been convinced that Hitler would have to be removed from the scene. From Dulles, Gisevius and his fellow plotters wanted just one as-

urance—that, if they killed Hitler, Washington would support them in setting up a new and presumably anti-Nazi government.

The German conspirators did not just ask for Washington's backing; they held out a threat. If the Western democracies refused to grant Germany a decent peace, they warned, they would be compelled to turn to Soviet Russia for support. This, it would seem, was hardly the tone of men inspired by great ideals. As Shirer perceptively remarks: "One marvels at these German resistance leaders who were so insistent on getting a favorable peace settlement from the West and so hesitant in getting rid of Hitler until they got it. One would have thought that if they considered Nazism to be such a monstrous evil . . . they would have concentrated on trying to overthrow it regardless of how the West might treat their new regime." No such reflection appears to have occurred to Dulles. He was inclined to accept the demands of the plotters and urged Washington to back the bargain, to promise favorable terms of peace. In this he failed. Roosevelt insisted on "unconditional surrender."

In the light of what we now know, the wisdom of the deal proposed by Dulles appears to be highly dubious. One thing is certain: Himmler knew of the plots against Hitler and deliberately left enough of the plotters free to score the near-miss of the 1944 bomb explosion in Hitler's East Prussian headquarters. Himmler certainly had every intention of dominating the Germany that would have survived the loss of the *Fuehrer*, and there can be little doubt that, if he had been successful, the Nazi system would have been perpetuated. This, at least, the doctrine of "unconditional surrender" avoided. The complete crushing of Germany, the freeing of the wraiths in its concentration camps—total victory and its revelations—made any apologia for Nazism impossible.

Such an outcome could hardly have been achieved by the Allen Dulles who peeps out at us from the pages of SS reports or by the Allen Dulles who was ready, by his own admission, to deal with the military plotters.



ALLEN DULLES came back from Berne with such a reputation as a cloak-and-dagger mastermind that his exploits are still spoken of with awe. He was decorated with the American Medal of Merit, a Presidential Citation, the Medal of Freedom, Belgium's Leopold Cross and France's Legion of Honor. These medals represented several triumphs in espionage.

The greatest feats stemmed from Dulles' contact with an employee in the German Foreign Office who has been identified only as "George Wood." A secret anti-Nazi, "Wood" risked death many times to make contact with Dulles in Berne. At each meeting, he delivered to the American agent copies of ultra-secret German documents. The impressive total of 2,600 documents reportedly was funneled into Dulles' hands by "Wood." Some are said to have been of such importance that they vitally affected the course of the war.

According to the Dulles legend, documents supplied by "Wood" gave the first clue to German experiments with the V-1 and V-2 rockets at the Peenemunde testing base on the Baltic. Dulles' information, it is asserted, warned the Allies in time, enabled them to raid Peenemunde with their heavy bombers, and set the rocket program back an all-important six months.

There is no doubt that the raid on Peenemunde did just this, but there is considerable doubt whether Dulles can claim sole credit for it. Winston Churchill, in his history of World War II, writes that German experiments with rockets at Peenemunde were known even before the war and that as early as the autumn of 1939 "references to long-range weapons of various kinds began to appear in our Intelligence reports." Edwards, the British M.P., writes categorically:

Finally, it is a well known fact that it was not Mr. Dulles who distinguished himself by discovering the V-rockets, but unassuming Miss Constance Babbington Smith, the British expert on aerial reconnaissance pho-

tography, who on June 23, 1943, identified the launching ramps on an aerial photograph of Peenemunde. The British Secret Service had known about plans for building them ever since 1939.

Fewer questions have been raised about some of Dulles' other exploits. One of these dealt with a mysterious Nazi spy by the name of "Cicero." Edwards insists that the full story of "Cicero" has not yet been told, but the accepted version goes like this: From some of the documents given him by "Wood," Dulles learned that the British Ambassador in Turkey, Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen, had a valet who was actually a Nazi spy and who used the code name of "Cicero." The tip about "Cicero" came to Dulles just in time to alter the route of an American convoy and save it from a planned U-boat attack.

Even more important than saving a convoy was the final achievement credited to Dulles—the surrender of the German Army in Italy in 1945. Dulles arranged this through his contacts in the SS, specifically through negotiations with SS-Obergruppenfuhrer Karl Wolff. As a result, the German surrender in Italy came earlier than otherwise might have been the case, and presumably the lives of thousands of Allied soldiers were saved.

The Dulles Ambivalence

With war's end, Dulles returned for a time to his law desk at Sullivan and Cromwell, but with his glamorous (and glamorized) World War II masterminding behind him, it was hardly to be expected that world events would leave him long alone. Both he and his older brother, John Foster, now began to emerge on the national scene in new and ever more powerful roles. The build-up for both was, and was to remain, tremendous. The nation's largest news media agreed with virtually a single voice that John Foster Dulles was the infallible wise man of foreign policy; his ties to top-level German industry under the Nazis, his links to America

First, his speeches proclaiming we had nothing to fear from the Axis, were all forgotten. Only some maverick columnists like Drew Pearson, I. F. Stone, Dr. Frank Kingdon and Harold L. Ickes remembered the past. And who were they to shout New York's Governor Thomas E. Dewey, who discovered and proclaimed (years before Eisenhower) that John Foster Dulles was "the greatest statesman in the world" and "the only man in the world whom the Russians fear"?

Then — and Since

Under the cover of such authoritative proclamations of highly disputable fact, the American public as a whole completely forgot that the Dulles brothers had been the high legal priests and the helpful manipulators of some of the greatest German trusts; and little significance seems to have been attached to the curious coincidence that, in the immediate postwar era, they became the spokesmen for a compassionate German policy. With the adaptability of lawyers and politicians, they seemed at times to ride both sides of the issue, but in the final analysis their weight appears to have been thrown on the pro-German side.

Typical of this ambivalence was the performance of Allen Dulles in the days right after the guns were silenced. In an article he wrote in *Collier's* in May, 1946, he based his lead paragraph on the events of 157 B.C., comparing Berlin with Carthage. "Berlin remains a monument to Prussian and Nazi philosophy," he wrote. He suggested it might be a good idea to leave in the heart of Berlin a completely devastated area as a perpetual reminder of what the Nazis and Prussian militarism had wrought. "The central area, for example, a half mile radius around Hitler's Chancellory," he explained, "might be set aside as a perpetual memorial to the Nazis and to Prussia." Berlin should no longer be the capital of Germany; it should be relegated to an inconsequential

role as a mere railroad and commercial center because "Berlin has lost its birthright. . . . It has lost it because for generations this city has housed the chief disturbers of world peace. Hence, as the capital of Germany, Berlin *'delenda est.'*"

Yet, in less than two years' time, Allen Dulles appeared to be worrying less about the horrors of Nazi and Prussian militarism and more about the virtues of a strong Germany. When Congressional committees began debating the European Recovery Program, former President Herbert Hoover, John Foster Dulles and Allen Dulles were among the leaders in the drive to rebuild German industry—with which the Dulleses, at least, had had the strongest kind of personal and financial ties. Describing this effort, Helen Fuller wrote in *The New Republic* in February, 1948:

For months, the Herter Committee on European aid has been passing for a high-minded, bipartisan group of Good Samaritans. Actually, the Herter bill that is being urged as a substitute for ERP was mainly a Hoover product. Chairman Christian A. Herter (R., Mass.), a Hoover protégé, allowed Allen Dulles, international banker and friend of Hoover, to do the drafting, called in other like-minded Wall Streeters to help.

The author went on to describe the "snail's pace" dismantling of German industry abroad, the concentrated "strong Germany" propaganda drive in the United States. She quoted John Foster Dulles' testimony, which seemingly straddled both sides of the issue. John Foster favored reparations and control; but he insisted it wouldn't be economical to duplicate Germany's steel industry in France, and all Western European countries would be positively "delighted to see Germany restored and smoke pouring out of the factories of the Ruhr as rapidly as possible." Acidly, Helen Fuller wrote: "The Inter-Allied Reparations Agency could show Dulles fat official records to the contrary. France, Belgium, the Netherlands and many others want German equipment with which to rebuild their own devastated economies."

This is the background from which the "strong Germany" policy of to-

day was to emerge. Whether the Germans of today are a completely different race from the Germans of the past who brought two of history's most horrible wars upon the world, whether the "strong Germany" policy represents the acme of wisdom or a disastrous gamble in power politics—these are questions that only the future can decide. What is important here is to understand some of the pressures producing the policy. When one examines these, one finds the Dulleses advocating a public policy that coincided neatly with the dictates of what had been their long-time private interests. The Allen Dulles of 1918, of 1942-45, of 1947-48, seems the same man, with the same strong alliances to top-level Germans regardless of their ideology; and it is this strong pull of private ties that becomes so disturbing when one tries to analyze the public performance of the man who was soon to become head of CIA.

Birth of the CIA

The agency itself was essentially the creation of President Harry S. Truman, and it resulted almost inevitably from the painful lessons of World War II. Pearl Harbor had had a permanent and understandable effect upon the thinking of American leaders. In the post-mortems conducted into that disaster, it had become apparent that ample information was available in Washington to have alerted Army and Navy commanders at the Pearl Harbor base of their danger; but no effective use had been made of the available intelligence, largely because there was no single agency entrusted with the accurate and speedy interpretation of such detail. The emergencies of war led to the hasty creation of OSS, but OSS was obviously a stopgap measure, not a final solution.

On October 1, 1945, immediately after the cessation of hostilities, Truman abolished OSS. The President apparently had a personal distaste for the nasty business of spying, and he was, in addition, under bureaucratic pressures from all sides to decapitate OSS as quickly as possible. The military intelligence services wanted no such powerful competitor; the FBI under J. Edgar Hoover long

had felt it should be the sole gatherer and dispenser of vital information, both at home and abroad; and the Department of State and the Bureau of the Budget both had the knives out for OSS. With the dissolution of the agency, however, a chaotic situation quickly arose. Intelligence reports from all the competing intelligence-gatherers flowed in bewildering profusion across the President's desk. Frequently, no two agencies agreed on anything; frequently, their analyses and predictions flatly contradicted one another. The result was that the President was almost as badly off from this plethora of advice as he would have been if he had had no advice at all, and he was left largely to follow his own hunches.

This obviously was no way to chart strategy among the perilous reefs of the cold war, and various solutions were proposed. Donovan, as early as 1944, had suggested to Roosevelt the creation of a central intelligence agency so powerful it would dominate the entire field. Opposition to such a monolithic structure was led by the Navy, which took the position that each of the services, with its own special requirements and ends in view, needed its own agents. Admiral King, in addition, foresaw in a powerful central intelligence a possible threat to democracy, and in Congress there were very real fears lest, in our hunt for intelligence, we create a potential Gestapo.

Giant Step Forward

The result was a compromise. Truman, by Executive order on January 22, 1946, set up the Central Intelligence Group, the forerunner of the present CIA. This was to be, as Ransom explains in his authoritative book, primarily "a holding company coordinating the work of existing departments." It functioned under an executive council, the National Intelligence Authority, composed of the Secretaries of State, War and Navy, and the President's personal representative. Under this setup, the practice began which continues today of having central intelligence provide for the President's personal eye a daily, exclusive and unified digest and summary of all important inter-


national intelligence. Truman, understandably, felt that a great step forward had been taken. "Here, at last," he writes in his memoirs, "a coordinated method had been worked out, and a practical way had been found for keeping the President informed as to what was known and what was going on."

The Central Intelligence Group, however, was only a temporary expedient, as OSS had been before it; and Congress, in ordering the semi-unification of the defense establishment in 1947, abolished CIG and created the present Central Intelligence Agency, functioning under a National Security Council, comparable to the former National Intelligence Agency. Before final action was taken, the advice of Allen Dulles was sought. This he gave in a significant memorandum dated April 25, 1947.

Dulles made six principal recommendations. CIA, he thought, should have absolute control over its own personnel; its chief should not have men foisted upon him for political or other reasons, but should have full say in picking his own assistants. The agency should have its own budget and the right to supplement this by drawing funds from the Departments of State and National Defense. CIA should have "exclusive jurisdiction to carry out secret intelligence operations." It should have "access to all intelligence information relating to foreign countries." It should be the "recognized agency for dealing with the central intelligence agencies of other countries." And, finally, it should have "its operations and personnel protected by 'official secrets' legislation which would provide adequate penalties for breach of security."

Principle of Separation

In his comments on the proposed agency, Dulles made several important observations. CIA, he felt, should be predominantly civilian rather than military in its high command, and if a military man was appointed to head it, he should become a civilian while he held the office. Its administration, he felt strongly, must have long-term continuity and professional status; its director should



For the home of a secret agency, the new Washington headquarters of the CIA is on the resplendent side.

be assured of long tenure, like Hoover in the FBI, "to build up public confidence, and *esprit de corps* in his organization, and a high prestige." He opposed the creation of an agency that would become "merely a coordinating agency for the military intelligence services" and warned that this "is not enough." Most significantly, in view of the future course of events, he recognized the dangers inherent in wedding information to policy.

The State Department . . . [he wrote] will collect and process its own information as a basis for the day-to-day conduct of its work. The Armed Services intelligence agencies will do likewise. But for the proper judging of the situation in any foreign country it is important that the information should be processed by an agency whose duty it is to weigh facts, and to draw conclusions from those facts, without having either the facts or the conclusions warped by the inevitable and even proper prejudices of the men whose duty it is to determine policy and who, having once determined policy, are too likely to be blind to any facts which might tend to prove the policy to be faulty. The Central Intelligence Agency should have nothing to do with policy. It should try to get at the hard facts on which others must determine policy.

The case could not be put better. With this strong, explicit statement,

virtually every expert on the subject has always been in complete agreement. But, unfortunately, this wasn't the way CIA was to be set up, and this wasn't the way that increasingly, under Allen Dulles himself in later years, it was to run.

Rumors that this cardinal principle of intelligence—the separation of information from the roles of policy and action—might be flouted by the new spy outfit were current even as it was being created. In the hearings on the National Security Act of 1947, Congressman Fred Busbey sounded an anxious note. "I wonder," he asked, "if there is any foundation for the rumors that have come to me to the effect that through this Central Intelligence Agency, they are contemplating operational activities?"


The question wasn't answered at the time, but the act in its final form left the door open and "they" walked through. The Security Act charged CIA with five specific functions: to advise the National Security Council on intelligence matters related to national security; to make recommendations to the council for coordination of intelligence activities of departments and agencies of the government; to correlate and evaluate intelligence and provide for its appropriate dissemination within the government; to perform for the bene-

fit of existing intelligence agencies such additional services as the NSC might determine could be more efficiently handled centrally; and finally, most important, "to perform other functions and duties" relating to national security intelligence as the NSC might direct. It is this "other functions and duties" clause that gave CIA broad powers to enter, not just the field of intelligence, but the field of overt activities.

The Principle Violated

The concentration of power in the hands of the agency, implicit in its organization, was increased tremendously by revisions of the CIA statute made in 1949. Three major changes placed almost dictatorial powers in the hands of its director. He was given the right to hire and fire without regard to Civil Service or other restraints. CIA was exempted from the provisions of any laws that might require publication or disclosure of the "organization, functions, names, official titles, salaries or numbers of personnel employed" (even the Bureau of the Budget was directed specifically to make no reports to Congress on any of these matters; in other words, CIA became a completely closed book). At the same time, its director was given full authority to spend any amount on his personal voucher, without accounting. "This," as Ransom comments, "is truly an extraordinary power for the head of an Executive agency with thousands of employees and annual expenditures in the hundreds of millions of dollars."

To counterbalance these sweeping powers, there were few restraints. Congress, evidently with that haunting Gestapo specter in mind, did specify that CIA should have no arrest or subpoena powers within the United States. The FBI's files, while not barred to it, were not exactly opened either; for, while other agencies were required to report their intelligence findings to CIA, the FBI was not. The CIA may obtain whatever specific information the FBI has if it requests it in writing, but this is quite a different affair from being kept informed as a matter of routine of what the FBI knows. Finally, a supposed safeguard was set



up around those all-important "other functions and duties" the CIA was empowered to perform. These were to be embarked upon only at the direction of the National Security Council, presided over by the President himself. But, as Ransom points out, the principal intelligence adviser of the NSC is the director of CIA. The director is "a constant participant in NSC deliberations," and this, to Ransom, seems "to suggest that the scope of CIA operations is to a large extent self-determined. . . . Certainly Congress has no voice as to how and where CIA is to function, other than prohibiting it to engage in domestic security activities."

This is the powerful and secretive setup—doubly powerful and insidious in its influence because it is so secretive, so free of any effective checkrein—that Congress created to protect us against the possibility of an atomic Pearl Harbor. How has it functioned?

In the beginning, as was perhaps inevitable with a new agency, its performance could be described only as decidedly spotty. Rear Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter was the first director of CIA and guided its destiny through its first three difficult years. The Korean War came during this period, and with it came the first blunders of the new agency in its primary role, the gathering of intelligence.

Early Failures

For some of these errors in strategic foresight, CIA was not alone at fault; other older and better-established arms of the intelligence services, the military and the State Department, were equally culpable. The first miscalculation—and one of the gravest in magnitude, for upon its accuracy rested the cornerstone of such deterrent policies as "massive retaliation"—dealt with the date

Russia might be expected to detonate an atom bomb. All intelligence services agreed at the end of World War II that this feat would require ten years at least, and all were astonished when the Soviets held their first successful A-bomb test in 1949. This shock was succeeded by one even greater, for the Russians in August, 1953, actually beat us to the first workable hydrogen bomb, and we learned some significant details of value to ourselves by analyzing their fallout. With these blasts, just as important though less obvious and less publicized than Sputnik, "massive retaliation" became an unworkable two-way street.

The next flub involved Korea, but again, at the outset at least, CIA was no more at fault than others. All our intelligence services thought it highly improbable that the North Korean Communists would invade South Korea and touch off a war—but they did. This first wrong guess was followed by others. One of the great surprises was the appearance in the Korean skies of the Russian MIG-15, a war plane faster than anything in our arsenal and one that inflicted crushing losses on our B-29 bombers. Yet, even after the MIG-15 appeared, we continued our fatal underestimation of the Russians. Air Force Intelligence was of the opinion—and the other intelligence services seemed to agree—that the Russians could turn out no more than six MIGs a month by hand; actually, Russian industry built 10,000 MIGs with great rapidity.

These initial blunders of intelligence in the Korean War were matters of relatively little moment compared to the final one that, in the fall of 1950, literally cost the lives of thousands of American soldiers. United Nations forces, having recovered from their initial defeats, had

driven the Red invaders from the North back across the 38th Parallel, the dividing line between North and South Korea. A decision had to be made whether to continue the attack across the border, conquering all of Korea. This course was subject to one paramount danger. If U.N. forces pressed on into North Korea, would the Chinese Communists, with their hordes of manpower, enter the war?

General Douglas MacArthur was confident that they would not. All of our intelligence forces agreed in essence on this forecast. In this, as in the recent Cuba invasion, our vision appears to have been blinded by our desires, and the intelligence for which we pay literally billions of dollars was abysmally wrong, while the advice of independent observers, whose minds were not chained by the demands of policy, was plainly right. In the Korean War, as in the case of Cuba, there were many clear and explicit warnings that a blind intelligence refused to heed.

One of these was delivered by Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas. An astute world traveler, Justice Douglas had been roaming through Southeast Asia during the

late summer of 1950. His pulse-takings convinced him that, if our troops crossed the 38th Parallel, the Communist Chinese would enter the war on a massive scale. He personally warned President Truman of this. A similar warning was sounded in Washington by the Indian representatives to the United States. But these uncommitted minds could not be expected to be so persuasive as those who were supposed to know.

Ransom, in his work on the CIA, describes the sequel in these words:

Despite the continuous barrage of propaganda warnings and the carefully monitored movement of troops into Manchuria, intelligence analysts and the policy makers failed to consider seriously such threats and apparently neglected to read history, or they would have recognized the traditional Chinese fear of an enemy north of the narrow Korean waist. President Truman records in his memoirs that "On October 20 (1950), the CIA delivered a memorandum to me which said that they had reports that the Chinese Communists would move in far enough to safeguard the Suiho electric plant and other installations along the Yalu River which provided them with power." Actually the Chinese had begun crossing the Yalu four days earlier with the ap-

parent intention of throwing the United Nations forces out of Korea.

The surprise was complete, and the massive Chinese onslaught threatened for a time to cut off and obliterate the U.N. Army. Even though MacArthur managed to rescue the bulk of his forces, he was driven back in a military debacle.

Criticism of the CIA may have had something to do with the decision of Admiral Hillenkoetter to leave his post as its director and return to naval duty. He was succeeded by General Walter Bedell Smith, who had been Eisenhower's Chief of Staff in Europe. One of Smith's first moves was to telephone Allen Dulles. Dulles had served on a committee that in 1948 had examined the CIA setup and recommended some fifty administrative changes. Smith had read the report, and when he got Dulles on the phone in his New York law office, he spoke with characteristic bluntness.

As Dulles later recalled it, Smith growled: "Now that you've written this damn report, it's up to you to put it into effect."

Dulles agreed to serve with Smith. In November, 1950, he left for Washington. He has been there ever since.



PART V WITH DULLES IN IRAN

"I CAME DOWN here to stay six months, and now see what has happened," Allen Dulles remarked to a friend some years ago, in a happier time.

A husky six-footer, weighing 200 pounds, the boss of the CIA, with his bristling mustache and thinning gray hair, greatly resembles his late brother, John Foster Dulles, but in Washington he was generally the much better liked of the two. He was less of a Messiah, more relaxed, more good-humored. A man who seems to live with a pipe in his mouth, Allen Dulles looks more like a kindly, tweedy, college professor than a mastermind of secret intelligence, and he and his wife form one of Washington's most popular party-going couples. They frequently, however,

do little more than put in an appearance and leave early. But even these fleeting visits cause some eyebrow raising, for most comparable commanders of secret agents, less gregarious than Dulles, shun the cocktail circuit with its built-in temptations to wag the tongue. This is a risk that Dulles assumes with apparent joyousness, and this much must be said for him: he has never yet been accused of dropping the wrong word into the wrong ear.

As far as personality goes, then, (and, as everyone knows, it goes far), Allen Dulles has been and still is a popular man in Washington. At sixty-eight, he is still amazingly active. He plays a good game of doubles in tennis, still shoots golf at around ninety when he has a chance

to play. Friends describe him as a man of "enormous patience," and to interviewers—he presents the candid and attractive face of a man who modestly deprecates his own cloak-and-dagger roles. "I've never been shot at," he remarked once, "and I don't know that anyone ever tried to kidnap me."

These engaging personal attributes have helped to carry Allen Dulles far and probably have helped to blunt much sharp criticism to which, otherwise, he might have been subjected. He became Deputy Director of CIA under Bedell Smith in August, 1951, and in January, 1953, with the advent of the Eisenhower administration, he was named director even as his brother became Secretary of State. Thus, as *The New York Times*

noted at the time, the nation in a most unusual move had placed "in the hands of two brothers the direction of open and secret foreign policy designed to win the 'cold war' against communism."

The result became evident almost at once. Not just intelligence, but palace coups became the work of CIA. The intrigue that topples governments became increasingly its trade mark.

Dulles had hardly made himself comfortable in the CIA director's chair when a major event abroad called for prompt and accurate analysis. In March, 1953, the report of Joseph Stalin's death flashed over the wires to a teletype in CIA headquarters at 2430 E Street N.W. in Washington. The dictator's demise raised immediate and tremendous questions. Georgi Malenkov appeared to be the No. 2 man in the Kremlin. He would probably succeed, for a time at least, to Stalin's power. What kind of ruler would he be? Would Russia be torn by revolution, by internal power struggles? Would she be more, or less, warlike?

Upon the answers to these questions depended America's posture, America's preparation to meet the changed world situation. CIA swung at once into a "crash" program designed to provide the necessary information. The instant Dulles got the word of Stalin's death, he began sending out orders to CIA agents and undercover men scattered throughout the world. He demanded from them information on what to expect, morale behind the iron curtain, arms shipments, troop movements, purges. Before long, detailed reports began to pour in.

Iran: a Tangled Web

While the foreign network was supplying overseas data, Dulles and the experts in his analysis section in CIA headquarters sifted reports and studied their voluminous files on Malenkov and the men most closely associated with him. From all of these sources, they compiled a picture and made an expert guess. A messenger rushed off to the White House with this CIA estimate: Russia was not prepared for war. There would be no revolution.

It was, as events were to show, a pretty accurate assessment, and it illustrates CIA's functioning at its best in the intelligence field that should be its primary business. But before many months had passed, CIA was to give another demonstration of its prowess, this time on a different and far more controversial level.

The development involved strategically important, oil-rich Iran. The Iranian border runs for 1,000 miles along that of the Soviet Union, and the natural resources of the country include an estimated 13 per cent of the world's oil reserves. This liquid treasure, the one great source of true wealth in Iran, long had been exploited by British interests. Baron Reuter, founder of the British news service that still bears his name, had received in 1872 a concession that gave him practically a complete monopoly over Iranian industry. International complications prevented Reuter from doing much to exercise the concession for several years, but ultimately, in the early 1900s, he and others—including J. Henry Schroeder & Co., the international German banking house with which Allen Dulles later was to be connected—formed the Industrial Bank of Persia (later the Bank of Iran), which in turn helped to finance the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. It seems worthy of note that Frank C. Tiarks, one of Allen Dulles' fellow directors in the Schroeder banking enterprises, served also as a director of Anglo-Iranian Oil and that Sullivan and Cromwell, the New York legal firm in which the Dulles brothers were such prominent partners, was the long-time legal counsel of Anglo-Iranian Oil.

These old ties are stressed because they were lying there among the stage props in the background when Allen Dulles, just a few short months after he became CIA director, popped upon the international scene in a new and decidedly spectacular role. The immediate background was this: In 1951, a new political force that threatened old and dominant financial interests had arisen in Iran. This force was Mohammed Mossadegh, himself a wealthy landowner, but a man driven by a strong anti-British phobia. Mossadegh rose to power as Premier during a time of intense na-

tionalism in Iran, and he capitalized on the sentiment of the hour by expropriating the properties of the British-owned Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. The company's royalty payments had provided a major part of Iran's foreign exchange earnings; but with the seizure by Mossadegh, there developed a bitter international dispute. The huge financial interests of the West virtually boycotted Iranian oil: Mossadegh tried to make deals with smaller, independent American companies to work the Iranian fields, but the State Department frowned upon such free enterprise. The international oil cartel held firm—and Iran lost all its oil revenues.

Democracy—and Oil

The resulting financial pressures on the Mossadegh regime were enormous. The United States offset some of these with foreign aid. In 1951, \$1.6 million was allowed for a technical rural-improvement program. The following year, with Iran drained of all oil revenue, the American foreign aid grant was raised to \$23 million, most of which was used to make up Iran's foreign exchange shortages. The Iranian financial crisis, however, remained desperate, and on May 28, 1953, Mossadegh sent a demand to President Eisenhower. Iran, he said, would have to have more American aid, or he would have to seek help elsewhere through the conclusion of an economic agreement and mutual defense pact with Russia.

Foreign analysts were convinced that Mossadegh had just one asset he could pledge to guarantee the safety of Russian investment—the rich Iranian oil fields and the refinery at Abadan, the world's largest, which Mossadegh had seized from Anglo-Iranian. It is clear that Anglo-Iranian had billion-dollar property interests at stake, but this underlying factor has hardly ever been mentioned in discussing the loftier picture—the stake of democracy: If Russia were to get Iran's oil, the Western democracies' position throughout the Middle East would be weakened, Soviet prestige would be greatly enhanced. This, naturally, was unthinkable, and so the Eisenhower administration, already great-

ly under the influence of the Dulles brothers, decided on a startling new gamble in international intrigue.

The President stalled Mossadegh for a month, then turned him down with an emphatic "No." Immediately afterwards, things began to happen. The step-by-step action was detailed by Richard and Gladys Harkness in a three-part *Saturday Evening Post* series, "The Mysterious Doings of CIA," which appeared in the late fall of 1954. The series bears intrinsic evidence on almost every page of having been written with the full, if secret, cooperation of CIA, and so its account of the coup in Iran is as authoritative as one can get. Obviously, this was one of those occasions when Allen Dulles, in triumph, permitted himself an audible public chuckle—and a discreet leak.

Enter the CIA

This, then, according to the Harknesses, is what happened:

On August 10, 1953, Allen Dulles packed his bags and flew to Europe, ostensibly to join his wife for a quiet vacation in the Swiss Alps. His departure coincided almost precisely with mounting developments in the Iranian pressure-cooker. Mossadegh was threatening to run Shah Mohammed Riza Pahlavi right off the throne and out of the country. The Premier had allied himself with the Communist Tudeh Party in Teheran and had acquired almost dictatorial powers. He was at this very moment conferring with a Russian diplomatic-economic mission. These conferences were a clear sign that the hour of supreme decision approached; yet, strangely enough, Loy Henderson, the American Ambassador to Iran, seemed to feel free to leave his vital post for a short "holiday" in the company of Allen Dulles in Switzerland. Another visitor who seemed to be drawn as if by a magnet to Dulles' picturesque hostelry in the Alps at precisely this critical juncture was Princess Ashraf, the attractive and strong-willed brunette twin sister of the Shah, who, according to the Harknesses, "had had a stormy session with her brother in his pink-marble palace, because of his vacillation in facing up to Mossadegh."

The Alpine rendezvous of master

secret agent, diplomat and Iranian princess would seem to indicate that perhaps wires were being pulled. This suspicion was reinforced when a fourth mysterious actor began to stroll slowly across the international stage. This was Brig. Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf, best known for the not entirely brilliant conduct of the Lindbergh kidnaping case in 1932 when he had been head of New Jersey State Police. Schwarzkopf now began to move leisurely around the Middle East, stopping off in Pakistan, Syria, Lebanon—and Iran. He was an old hand in Iran, having served there from 1942 through 1948 as high-level adviser in the reorganization of the Shah's national police force. He was, he said, just dropping by "to see old friends again." Mossadegh and the Russian propaganda press distrusted this pat explanation and began to rail nervously at his presence; but Schwarzkopf, undeterred, visited with the Shah and had some intimate talks with his former colleague on the national police force, Maj. Gen. Fazlollah Zahedi. Almost at once, like cause and effect, a new and tougher attitude toward Mossadegh became apparent.

Triumph for the West

On Thursday, August 13, the Shah acted. By royal decree he deposed Mossadegh as Premier and installed in his stead General Zahedi. A colonel of the Imperial Guards was sent to serve the notice on Mossadegh, but Mossadegh wasn't ready to quit. He massed tanks, jeeps and troops around his residence, and at midnight of Saturday, August 15, he seized the colonel of the Imperial Guards, clapped him in jail and proclaimed that the "revolt" had been crushed. The Shah and his Queen, taking Mossadegh at his word, promptly fled to Rome by way of Iraq.

Some hardier souls, including Schwarzkopf, remained upon the Iranian scene. The manipulations in which they now engaged never have been spelled out in detail, but it is understood that CIA cash flowed in copious quantities. The amount reliably reported is \$19 million—and \$19 million can influence a lot of men. What happened next in Iran

would seem like proof of that theorem.

On Wednesday, August 19, with the Army standing close guard around the uneasy capital [the Harknesses wrote], a grotesque procession made its way along the street leading to the heart of Teheran. There were rumples turning handsprings, weightlifters twirling iron bars and wrestlers flexing their biceps. As spectators grew in number, the bizarre assortment of performers began shouting pro-Shah slogans in unison. The crowd took up the chant and there, after one precarious moment, the balance of psychology swung against Mossadegh.

Upon signal, it seemed, Army forces on the Shah's side began an attack. The fighting lasted a bitter nine hours. By nightfall, following American-style military strategy and logistics, loyalist troops drove Mossadegh's elements into a tight cordon around the Premier's palace. They surrendered, and Mossadegh was captured as he lay weeping in his bed, clad in striped silk pajamas. In Rome, a bewildered young Shah prepared to fly home and install Zahedi as Premier, and to give Iran a pro-Western regime.

Triumph for our side! In the Harkness account, there is of course no hint of the years-long legal tie between the Dulles brothers and Anglo-Iranian Oil, nor is it emphasized that one of the major accomplishments of the coup in Iran was to save the billion-dollar scalp of Anglo-Iranian. The picture presented, obviously the CIA's flattering version of itself, was



that the overthrow of Mossadegh had been accomplished "by the Iranians themselves" and that Iran was the showcase of a new method by which CIA would develop and nurture "freedom legions among captive or threatened people who stand ready to take personal risks for their own liberty."

This sounds fine if one doesn't analyze it too closely, but the hard sequel of events, unfortunately, has refused to reflect the lofty image. In the harsh afterlight, it has become abundantly apparent that all CIA accomplished in Iran was an old-style palace coup, with money in bountiful quantities and skillful press agency pulling emotional heartstrings at a pivotal moment and achieving a much-desired end. But did this represent a great triumph for Western democracy in the ideological battle against communism? True, a new regime, oriented toward "our side," had been installed. But was this new regime motivated by any loftier concept than the idea that what was good for Anglo-Iranian Oil was good for Western democracy? Events seem to say that it was not.

\$5 Million a Month

Much of the sorry story is told in the 1957 report of the Committee on Government Operations of the House of Representatives. The report makes clear that in August, 1953, immediately after the overthrow of Mossadegh, a delighted United States began to pour mutual security funds into Iran at an average rate of \$5 million a month and that this went on for three years "to make up deficits in Iran's government budget." The committee found that, in five years from 1951 to 1956, the United States had donated a quarter of a billion dollars to Iran and that (the committee did not phrase it in precisely these terms, of course) all we had accomplished was to furnish the entire Middle East with a king-size example of graft and corruption. The committee was convinced that Iran, with some \$300 million a year fattening its treasury from restored oil revenues, should have been fully capable of financing itself and providing for its own national development *without any U.S. aid*. Yet, despite

its heavy oil revenues, despite the hundreds of millions of dollars in American aid, Iran's CIA-installed government was so corrupt that the national treasury constantly teetered on the brink of bankruptcy and reported ever-mounting deficits.

No Triumph for the People

Here are some of the exact words of the House committee. The quarter-billion dollars in American aid was administered in such "a loose, slipshod, and unbusinesslike manner" that "it is now impossible—with any accuracy—to tell what became of these funds." Amounts requested for American aid to Iran "seem to have been picked out of the air." The American aid mission to Iran was concerned only with spending as fast as possible regardless of what the money was spent for, and members who objected to this "were either disciplined or labeled as incompetent." Improvement projects were so riddled with graft and corruption that, after four years, most still were not finished. A major undertaking was the construction of a multi-million-dollar dam on the Karadj River, but this project "has resulted in virtually nothing but the relocation, at a cost to the United States Government of nearly \$3 million, of a road around the proposed site." Not only had no construction been started on the dam, there wasn't even a contract!

The effect of this type of American aid has been to make a bad situation worse. It is a hard thing to say, but true, that the American taxpayers have been milked of hundreds of millions of dollars only to provide the Communist system, on a gold-plated platter, with a priceless propaganda item. Our hundreds of millions of dollars have done virtually nothing for the people of Iran; they have enriched only the grafters and widened the gulf between the very rich and the abysmally poor. The Congressional committee in 1957 found literacy so low in Iran that, even in the cities, some estimates placed it at not more than 7 per cent. *Time*, magazine, certainly not one of the world's ultra-liberal organs, reporting in 1960 that some families were still living on the produce of a single

walnut tree, that tiny children worked all day at the looms of rug factories for 20 cents or less. *Time*, updating its report in May, 1961, found that Iran, under the pressure of the flood of American dollars, was suffering from runaway inflation. Prices were jumping at the rate of 10 per cent a year; a pound of meat in Teheran cost \$1.15; wages remained so low that teachers were earning only \$25 a month. The economy of the country was being strained to maintain a 200,000-man Army, larger than the armies of either Western Germany or Japan. Elections had been so blatantly rigged that the Shah had been forced to cancel two of them and fire three key men in his immediate entourage. One of these was the chief of the secret police, who had built himself an ostentatious mansion near the Shah's own



palace; another was General Ali Kia, chief of army intelligence, who, said *Time*, had "built a block of luxury apartments that Teheranis had taken to calling the Where-Did-You-Get-It-From Building."

This is what we have bought in Iran with our millions. The result we reap by such extravaganzas became clear this past May when 5,000 teachers rioted in the streets of Teheran in front of the Parliament building. A police major lost his head, fired his revolver and killed one teacher, wounded three others. Teachers and students then fought bloody hand-to-hand skirmishes with police, paraded the dead teacher's coffin through the streets and forced the resignation of the Premier. The Shah hastily installed Ali Amini, a wealthy, French-educated landowner with liberal political views, Amini,

concededly the last hope of avoiding revolution, took over a nation so badly looted that its government debt, only \$10 million in 1955, had soared to \$500 million. He took swift stock of the situation and reported: "There is no life left in the economic and financial agencies of the government." To striking teachers, he confessed: "The treasury is empty, and the nation faces a crisis—I dare not speak more openly lest I create a panic."

Yet some persons in Iran still were not worried. The commanders of its 200,000-man Army and its massive police force felt fully capable of handling anything and everything.

Senator Hubert Humphrey (D., Minn.) reported with a sense of shock: "Do you know what the head of the Iranian Army told one of our people? He said the Army was in good shape, thanks to U.S. aid — it was now capable of coping with the civilian population. That Army isn't going to fight the Russians. It's planning to fight the Iranian people."

Such, in the final analysis, is what the CIA and the corrupt Iranian regime that followed in its coup-making footsteps have wrought in Iran. No demonstration of "decadent capitalism" could be more apt, more pat for Khrushchev's propaganda purposes. Here, in most graphic form,

is a demonstration of the manner in which, as Walter Lippmann found, we have been doing exactly what Khrushchev expects us to do; we have been propping up dictatorial, corrupt, right-wing regimes—and so we have been proving his case for him. It should be obvious that the American ideal, if it is ever to be persuasive, if it is ever to have validity, must find loftier expression than the gun of the secret police chief clasped in fingers stained by many a dirty buck. It must concern itself with people, not with rulers; it must help the broad mass of the people; it must offer both freedom and hope, not oil profits and graft.



PART VI JUST A LITTLE REVOLUTION

IN MARCH, 1954, Allen Dulles was interviewed by *U.S. News and World Report* on the cloak-and-dagger activities of CIA behind the iron curtain. The question-and-answer sequence went like this:

Q. It is often reported in the papers that you send in *provocateurs* to stir up revolution in the satellite countries. What truth is there in that?

Dulles: I only wish we had accomplished all that the Soviets attribute to us. . . .

Q. Is that part of your function—to stir up revolution in these countries?

Dulles: We would be foolish if we did not cooperate with our friends abroad to help them do everything they can to expose and counter this Communist subversive movement.

Tacitly, then, Dulles acknowledged that the CIA was fomenting violence and revolution behind the iron curtain, but he was putting it in the gentlest possible way and on the most acceptable possible plane. We were simply "cooperating" with our friends; we were simply helping them "to expose and counter this Communist subversive movement." It all seemed very mild and very logical the way Dulles put it, but revolution is never mild, nor is killing an appeal to logic. A little reflection about Dulles' statement leads inevitably to serious questions. Is it all really so

simple? Just what is involved in stirring up a little revolution behind the iron curtain? Do such brush fires simply flare and burn themselves out, causing the Russians some well-deserved embarrassment, or do they in a very direct way involve the prestige and policy of the United States?

The answer seems clear and unequivocal to anyone who will study the record. It has been given in a number of places—in East Germany, in Poland, in Hungary, in the Middle East. Behind many of the eruptions that in recent years have shaken the peace of an uncertain world, close examination will reveal the fine, scheming hand of CIA. And it will reveal, too, that CIA time and again has stirred up the brush fires without any regard for the long-range consequences.

East Germany, 1953

Take, for example, the East German uprising of 1953. On June 17, just two months before Allen Dulles' startling coup in Iran, a series of anti-Communist riots broke out in the Soviet-dominated East Zone. In America, this was taken as an encouraging sign that all was not rosy in the communistic millennium and that perhaps the East Germans might throw off the yoke of tyranny. Such optimism was quickly dissi-

pated. Though some of the anti-Communists were well-armed, the revolt was quickly put down; and though great numbers of refugees fled across the border into West Germany, not all of the leaders of the rebellion were so lucky. The Eastern SSD (State Security Service) began a reprisal campaign that lasted for months and resulted in the seizure of hundreds of Soviet-hating Germans.

The significance of this counter drive became apparent on November 17, 1953, when *The New York Times* reported that the East German Government had accused scores of its prisoners with being Nazi *provocateurs*. The East Germans claimed (one must always regard these Communist claims with caution, of course, but then in the secret war of CIA one has no other information on which to judge) that these Western agents had been caught with plans to blast railroad bridges and stations, burn factories and government buildings and assassinate officials. Faked food stamps and counterfeit bank drafts designed to upset food rationing and bank credits were found in some of the prisoners' pockets, the East Germans asserted.

The Communists in the East Zone were incensed by these discoveries, but then presumably New Yorkers

would be a little annoyed if a squad of Russian saboteurs should be caught with plans to blow up the Croton reservoir. In any event, a number of the accused *agents provocateurs* were brought to trial. Testimony showed, the East Germans said, that these agents belonged to a mysterious organization headed by Reinhold Gehlen, a former Lieutenant General in command of counterintelligence on the Eastern front under Hitler. The East German trials resulted in the execution of four of these Gehlen agents and life imprisonment for eleven others, but not even these harsh sentences stirred up as much controversy as one other charge the East Germans made. They contended that, on some of the agents, they had found lists of names of prominent West German anti-Nazis who had been marked for ultimate liquidation.

Though it would seem extremely illogical for East German saboteurs to be carrying such lists around in their pockets, there can be no question that the East Germans, in jabbing an accusing finger at the Reinhold Gehlen spy organization, touched a sensitive nerve. Gehlen at the time was a mystery figure, virtually unknown to the 48 million citizens of the Bonn Republic; unknown to American Congressmen because his name had never been mentioned on the floor of Congress. Yet Gehlen and the private cloak-and-dagger army he headed were indisputably real. In fact, Gehlen was America's No. 1 spy in Europe, he had literally thousands of agents on his payroll, and he was being financed to the tune of between \$5 million and \$6 million a year with CIA-channeled funds.

Daniel De Luce, one of the Associated Press's veteran foreign correspondents, in an article written some months after the East German revelations, lifted a corner of the veil of secrecy that for so long had shrouded Gehlen. Gehlen's organization, De Luce said, included the elite of the old German Army's counterintelligence corps and agents of diverse nationalities scattered through Eastern Europe and the Balkans. Gehlen operated on the old secret-service principle of never letting one agent

know what another was doing, of tying all the threads together at just one place—the top. His thread-tying headquarters were located on American-requisitioned property near Munich in Bavaria, and were sealed off with barbed wire and guarded by armed state police like an atomic installation.

"On his secret reports which evaluate the findings of his costly anti-Soviet espionage program operating as far beyond the Iron Curtain as Siberia, much of American defense planning admittedly depends today," De Luce wrote.

The picture that emerges borders on the fantastic. American knowledge and security were being made dependent, to a vital degree, on men who were our recent enemies—men who had fought to the last gasp for a system that we had believed represented one of history's most monstrous evils. It is certainly questionable enough to have American foreign policy tugged and hauled all over the map by the super-secret activities of CIA cloak-and-dagger boys, operating free of any effective restraint or control; but clearly, in its relations with Gehlen, CIA had taken one further gigantic stride into the realm of dubiousness. Without the knowledge or consent of the American people or their representatives, it had placed some \$6 million worth of annual reliance in the good faith of a recent enemy, commanding an unofficial army of foreign agents (many of them apparently former Nazis at that), and it had

delegated to this weird, recent-enemy organization major responsibility for its own thinking, knowledge and safety. The secret pro-German policy, which seems to have had many powerful advocates in the highest American circles even during the horrors of World War II, had indeed brought us full-circle.

Plots—and More Plots

Yet the American public as a whole remained almost completely unaware. Few major newspapers (the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* was an exception) paid any attention to De Luce's revealing dispatch from Germany. John Foster Dulles' much-trumpeted policy that we intended to liberate the captive peoples—advanced, as events were to show, without giving the most elementary consideration to how this desirable end was to be achieved short of all-out American aid and another world war—rolled like an avalanche downhill to fresh international fiascoes that served only to increase international tensions. Time and again, with CIA in the middle of the plotting, aided frequently by its Gehlen protégés, futile revolts and short-sighted intervention marked the consistently reckless course of American foreign policy.

Here, in capsule form, are some of the well-remembered highlights of the disastrous fifties that saw the whittling away, not just of American power, but of America's moral prestige:

¶The overthrow of King Farouk in Egypt in 1952. Communists inside Egypt reportedly were making immense capital from the antics of the lascivious regime of the pudgy monarch whose principal interest in life appeared to be belly dancers. An Army revolt was organized with Generals Mohammed Naguib and Gamal Abdel Nasser in the leading roles. The Harknesses, in their *Saturday Evening Post* revelations, straight from the horse's mouth, stated flatly: "Skilled American political operatives were available to advise leaders of a pro-American Egyptian military junta when the time seemed ripe for a palace coup, and they indicated how such devious matters were best arranged." It



was another signal triumph for "our side." The coup came off on schedule, Farouk fled—and then we got Gamal Abdel Nasser.

The Egyptian strong man whom we had helped to install apparently long remained a favorite of CIA—such a favorite, indeed, that in September, 1955, a CIA agent took it upon himself to advise Nasser to ignore a forthcoming State Department note. The note was an attempt to limit Nasser's purchase of arms from Communist Czechoslovakia to a one-shot deal. It was considered important enough for Washington to send George Allen, then Assistant Secretary of State for Middle East Affairs, on a special trip to Cairo to deliver the message in person. The CIA evidently was disturbed by this attempt to pressure Nasser, and before Allen arrived, it effectively cut the ground out from under him by advising Nasser he could safely ignore the warning—a sequence that leads inevitably to the question: Who was running foreign policy, the State Department or the CIA?

We Knew All Along

¶*The Suez crisis in October, 1956.* This might be described as the final flowering of our earlier intrigues with Nasser, and even the most charitable view must produce a blush or two at what can only be described as American duplicity. First, of course, we precipitated the crisis by offering Nasser heavy financial aid and then practically slapping his face by renegeing on the offer. This touched off a chain reaction whose consequences would appear not to have been foreseen, Nasser seized the Suez Canal. And the British, French and Israelis undertook the invasion of Egypt.

When this happened, we held up our hands in righteous horror at the warlike action of our Allies and protested that we had been taken completely by surprise. John Foster Dulles testified: "We had no advance information of any kind [regarding the Israeli attack on Egypt]. The British-French participation also came as a complete surprise to us." This simply was not true. Two years later, in 1958, the CIA leaked to Don Whitehead, of the New York *Herald Tribune*, a version so detailed that it leaves little doubt that we knew

— and knew precisely — just what was going to happen before it happened. According to CIA, American intelligence agents in Israel had noted and reported the mobilization of the Israeli Army; agents on Cyprus had watched and reported British and French activity in loading combat craft and marshaling war planes and paratroopers; they had even reported that the French had given combat briefings to newspaper correspondents attached to their invasion units. Twenty-four hours before the attack, the White House had a specific warning from CIA that the Israelis would invade Egypt, that the French and British would attack Suez.

Bearing all this in mind, let's listen to the insider's view contained in the letter written to *The Nation* by an intelligence agent in 1957, a full year before Whitehead's disclosures:

I know that . . . Intelligence Service received information through various channels about the planned action. This information was duly transmitted to the State Department. Mr. [John Foster] Dulles knew the day and hour of the attack. Under these circumstances it was quite obvious that we should have dissuaded our allies from such a rash step. . . . Those in the know were surprised by the behavior of our Secretary of State at the time. Mr. Dulles' reply to a comment from a State Department official was that in our position, the best thing to do is to shut our eyes and see nothing. We shall win in any case. Both the defeat of the Arabs as well as the loss of prestige by the United Kingdom and France will benefit us. The moral prestige of the West in Arab countries has suffered untold harm by the attack on Egypt. The case speaks for itself.

¶*The invasion of Lebanon in 1958.* If the CIA was not caught napping in the Suez crisis but was made to look bad for devious reasons of policy, there seems to be no question that it had not the slightest forewarning of the military coup by a group of pro-Nasser Army officers in Iraq on July 14, 1958. King Faisal and Premier Nuri es-Said, pro-Western rulers of Iraq, were slain. Simultaneously, riots and insurrection shook the pro-Western government of Premier Chamoun in Lebanon. News of these events reached Allen Dulles

about dawn on July 14. He promptly went into action. He got his brother, Secretary of State John Foster, out of bed, and he summoned the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to an emergency conference. With both Dulles brothers urging drastic action, the panic button was pressed loud and long. The American Sixth Fleet was ordered to Lebanon; marines went charging ashore in a full-scale invasion. For a moment, world peace seemed to hang in the balance. Yet, in the calm of retrospect, this "crisis" action seemed to have almost farcical aspects. Riots, a little gunfire, the coups that overthrow governments are no particular novelty to the Lebanese. They seemed to have had no understanding, those simple folk, that the fate of the entire cold war depended upon events in Lebanon. Indeed, they regarded the landing of the marines more as an amusing and colorful sideshow; it was an event that turned an ordinary day into a fete day, and crowds lined the harbor front to watch the fun. Needless to say, a powerful nation does not look well in the robes of a circus clown, and it was freely predicted at the time that the hasty and ill-advised invasion would boomerang against American prestige. It did just that. Afro-Asian countries joined the Soviet Union in backing a United Nations resolution demanding that American troops get out of Lebanon; on October 31, the marines left—and Chamoun's government, which they had been sent to prop up, promptly fell. Chamoun remains bitter at the Americans, who, he feels, went back on promises they had made to him to support his regime at whatever cost. In the end, at great risk, we had pleased nobody; we had won ourselves another loss.

CIA on the Danube

¶*The Hungarian revolt of 1956.* The CIA's role in promoting and encouraging this abortive and tragic uprising, which we were not prepared to support after we had instigated it, remains shrouded in top-level, cloak-and-dagger secrecy. It seems well established, however, that arms were smuggled into both Poland and Hungary, either by the CIA or its Gehlen collaborators. When the Polish and Hungarian rebellions broke out in

October, 1956, both American official and public opinion appeared to be caught off base, and there were charges that CIA had been sleeping at the switch again. Not so, the agency said in self-defense. It had accurately predicted the outbreaks in both Poland and Hungary; its only error, a minor one, had consisted in estimating that the Polish revolt would come first. More important than the unresolved issues of arms-smuggling and CIA alertness is still another unresolved matter—the responsibility of CIA in whipping up the Hungarian rebels to fanatic self-sacrifice in a hopeless cause. Although the fact cannot, of course, be verified, it has been charged that Radio Free Europe works closely with CIA. RFE's propaganda broadcasts during the bloody Hungarian revolt prolonged the struggle after it was hopeless and led to needless sacrifice, according to Leslie Bain, Budapest correspondent for *The Reporter*. "America will not fail you . . . America will not fail you," he quoted the propaganda radio as repeating over and over, after it had become apparent to all the rest of the world that America would. The ruthless suppression of the Hungarian revolt by Soviet tanks and troops was certainly a grim chapter that served to strip off before the eyes of the world the mask of Russian false pretensions. But let's not forget that American luster was tarnished, too. We had been exposed as a nation that talked big, but that had no plan; we had been exposed as a nation that had let those who trusted in our words go down to death, prison and disillusionment.

Classic Meddling

Such is the record of some of the CIA's more classic meddling in the internal affairs of Europe and the Middle East. It shows that even the agency's successes (as in the case of Farouk) have a tendency to turn into long-run disasters, and it indicates strongly that America is hardly qualified, by anti-communistic enthusiasm alone, to run the internal affairs of other nations all over the world. The record in these cases, such as it is, has been written; but there remains in CIA's behind-the-scenes masterminding of European affairs

one large item of unfinished business that may be more important than all the rest—its long-term, enduring relationship with the Gehlen secret service and the possible influence of that relationship in coloring our official attitudes toward such vital issues as Berlin and the equipment of the German Army with nuclear arms.

Clearly these are matters on which the peace of the world ultimately may hinge, and so it seems pertinent to inquire: Just who is this man Reinhold Gehlen to whom, largely without the knowledge of the American people or the American Congress, we so swiftly and so completely entrusted our safety after the end of World War II?

Herr Reinhold Gehlen

Gehlen is a product of the German *Reichswehr*, a life-long professional soldier and, according to official assurances at least, no Nazi. A smallish, thin-faced man, he has a high forehead, receding fair hair and light blue eyes. The son of a publisher, he is quiet and scholarly in manner, but he speaks in the terse, clipped tones of a man long accustomed to command. He joined the *Reichswehr* in 1920; he fought in the invasions of Poland and France; and when the Russian war broke out, he was transferred to the Eastern Front where, in April, 1942, he was selected to head the German Army's key new intelligence section.

He quickly became convinced that the Soviet Union could not be overwhelmed by military means alone, and he was, De Luce says, "one of the lost voices that urged the Nazi regime . . . to win over the Russian people by generosity while rooting out the Communist system." Instead, some two million Soviet war prisoners were reduced to sub-human misery in Nazi extermination camps. The official recital of Gehlen's virtues continues by stressing the pessimistic accuracy with which he forecast events on the Eastern Front. His grim view of the war, it is said, almost earned him execution as a dangerous defeatist, but recurrent disasters so consistently fulfilled his dire predictions that he wound up being promoted to Lieutenant General at the age of forty-three.

With the collapse of the Hitler re-

gime, Gehlen saw to it that he got captured by the Americans. Here there appears to be a significant gap in the story. There is no hint of the nature of the contacts or negotiations that preceded his surrender, but one is confronted, out of the blue as it were, with the picture of a prisoner of war being treated from the start almost like a Very Important Personage. Gehlen, we are told, brought with him an imposing mass of secret information on Russia, and this presumably was a direct passport to American good graces. In any event, he was employed for eighteen months combing through his own voluminous files and putting them in order for American intelligence. Then he was rewarded with as juicy an assignment as a war prisoner ever got; he was given autonomous command of his own army of private agents, with, as De Luce wrote, "a personally chosen German staff to organize cold-war espionage in the Soviet Zone for the United States."

De Luce continued: "Gehlen's primary mission is to identify and locate at all times the forward Soviet and satellite armed forces. This is fundamental to allied security, including 400,000 American, British and French troops outposting West Germany."

The British Are Shocked

Though the American public even today remains almost totally unaware of what we did or of its possible significance, our relations with Gehlen long have represented one of the most controversial aspects of our secret cold-war policies. Quite obviously, our whole attitude toward Germany, toward France and Britain, toward all of Europe, must have been conditioned by what for long years we were told—or not told—by the multi-million-dollar espionage ring of former German agents whom we had made our principal eyes and ears in Europe. This pivotal trust on such crucial matters has shocked our closest allies, the British, who do not play the game of intelligence that way; and since the past record would seem to indicate they play it pretty well, it is perhaps of some significance to trace further the career and the influence of Reinhold Gehlen.



The Affair of Otto John

It must have been clear from the start that Gehlen's private army would have a highly equivocal status inside West Germany, where official security matters were in the hands of Dr. Otto John. All signs indicate that a fine, throat-cutting duel was waged between Gehlen and John, with Gehlen doing his best to get Chancellor Konrad Adenauer on his side. He and Adenauer held a number of secret meetings in a house across the Rhine River from Bonn, and Dr. John, who later revealed these assignations, apparently was perfectly aware that the ground was being cut from under him. CIA ostensibly was working closely with John's security forces, but its money in multi-million-dollar amounts was riding on Gehlen. The private struggle between the two West German security chiefs came to a head in early July, 1954, when Dr. John visited the United States. He went to Washington and had lunch with Allen Dulles. Outwardly, the two men gave every appearance of cordiality, but no one knows what went on between them, for on this matter CIA has never peeped a word. Dr. John returned to Bonn, and then on July 20, 1954, came an event that rattled official eyeteeth. Dr. John deserted to the Communists in East Germany, presumably taking with him a privately hoarded store of valuable state secrets.

This turncoat performance by West Germany's official intelligence

master was an embarrassing episode, but it could hardly have broken the heart of Gehlen. He was left with a clear field—almost. One other potential rival, Friedrich Wilhelm Heinz, who headed the intelligence section of the Defense Ministry in Bonn, remained in the running, but he quickly proved no match for Gehlen. The result was reported in *The New York Times* on July 20, 1955, in a dispatch from Bonn. The German Government had just announced that it had decided to take over Gehlen's organization, then estimated to include 3,000 agents. The *Times* credited reports that "the main stream of East European information received by the United States Central Intelligence Agency originates with the Gehlen organization." Of Gehlen, it commented that he was inaccessible and "something of a legendary figure." The *Times* added: "He has been credited by some with great intelligence and denounced by others as a sinister figure."

Just a few months later, on Sept. 1, 1955, the name of the mysterious Gehlen figured startlingly, if only momentarily, in an unusual upheaval in American intelligence. The Army announced in Washington that Maj. Gen. Arthur Gilbert Trudeau, who had headed the Army's G-2 (Intelligence Corps), was being transferred to a Far East post. The announcement was made to appear routine, but John O'Donnell of the *New York Daily News* apparently was fed an earful by irate Pentagon brass. For O'Donnell disclosed that Trudeau's scalp had been demanded by Allen Dulles personally. According to O'Donnell, Dulles spelled out his case in a letter to the Secretary of Defense, and the feud was carried all the way to President Eisenhower himself for final decision.

In Dulles' official letter, O'Donnell wrote, the CIA head

... charged that the Army's top intelligence officer, "without consulting the Central Intelligence Agency," had talked with West Germany's Chancellor Adenauer here last June in "an effort" to "undermine" the confidence of Adenauer in a hush-hush CIA-bankrolled setup in Germany, headed by the mysterious Reinhart von [sic] Gehlen. Furthermore, said Dulles, the General has expressed doubts about

the reliability of Gehlen as an individual and the security safeguards of the mystery organization.

The Pentagon denied quite vociferously that Trudeau, one of its favorite generals, the commander who had spearheaded MacArthur's drive to recapture Manila at the end of World War II, had ever committed such a breach of protocol as to question Gehlen's reliability. All he had done, said the Pentagon, was to express some doubts about Gehlen's security safeguards. Whatever the truth about the extent of Trudeau's criticism, the bare bones of the case boil down, it would seem, quite significantly to this: Reinhold Gehlen, just ten years earlier the master of Hitler's intelligence on the Eastern Front, had sufficient influence through Allen Dulles to cost even the Army's G-2 chief his post.

Our German Ally

Against this background, let's turn once more for an insider's view to the intelligence officer who wrote *The Nation* in 1957. His at least is not the conventional, official view, and under the circumstances, it may seem worth serious thought. He wrote:

Our Intelligence Service in West Germany collected much reliable intelligence which should have led the State Department to reconsider its point of view on Dr. Adenauer's policy. Americans serving in Fontainebleau and in West Germany are very much aware that the Germans under the guise of "friendship" are only intent on recovering their military might by using the United States as a springboard. Contacts with German military and other officials have convinced me that the Germans hate and despise Americans. They cannot forget that the United States was their enemy in the Second World War. Adenauer's assertion of friendship serves as a smoke screen which enables West Germany to mark time. Eventually Germany will spurn American tutelage and proceed with her own ambitious plans. These plans, i.e., annexation of East Germany, restoration of eastern borders, etc., can be achieved only by a world war. The United States may find that instead of using Germany for its own purposes it would be bound to a German policy. . . .

The Germans are indeed playing

the game their own way, nurturing plans for the future. This is corroborated by the fact that Gehlen's Intelligence Service in West Germany frequently conceals important intelligence and deliberately issues misleading information, regardless of our agreement for exchange of information. Nevertheless, during this postwar period, Gehlen has been considered a most loyal ally and his Service has been financed with American dollars.

Communist propaganda refers to Adenauer's West Germany as a puppet of the United States. We prefer to regard her as our most "reliable" ally. Both conceptions are wrong. Germany is our "most dangerous" ally. Our friendship with her may have disastrous consequences for the United States.

Under these circumstances, our

preference of West Germany over our old and tried allies is unpardonable. British and French officers have often expressed themselves in my presence with an obvious feeling of resentment and bitterness over the United States policy of making yesterday's enemies today's principal partners.

With this attitude, Edwards, the British Labour M.P. and skeptic of German intentions, fully agrees. In his pamphlet on Allen Dulles, he has written:

It is particularly worrying that Mr. Dulles and his agency should be maintaining close contacts with General Reinhold Gehlen's West German secret service. Though it can be counted as a NATO intelligence organization, we think there is great need for caution in our dealings with it. It is

extremely unlikely that General Gehlen has any very warm feelings for us. As for Mr. Dulles, he actually advertises his friendship with the General and after a recent visit to London went straight off to Bonn. But we have reason to believe that General Gehlen does not confine his interests to the East. The German secret service never has done so. So much the worse for us. . . . Beware the Germans, when they come bearing gifts!

An extreme view, possibly, but valuable for all of that as a caution, a warning, a reminder that there is another side to the German question. We are never told that any more, but then we have never been told about Reinhold Gehlen and his organization either—or about how we got where we are.



PART VII THE ROAD TO WAR

ONE OF THE most significant informal conferences of the postwar era was held in Allen Dulles' CIA office on a cold and dreary morning in March, 1952. His brother, John Foster, had just returned from the Far East, where he had added to his prestige by helping the Truman administration draft the Japanese peace treaty. John Foster was now about to become one of the most caustic critics of the administration that had employed him. He was full of very positive ideas about exactly what should be done to right the situation in the world.

Participating in this conference that was to forecast much of the global strategy of the Eisenhower administration before Eisenhower had even been nominated or elected were a number of important second-echelon officials—Allen Dulles, then the No. 2 man in CIA; Charles Bohlen, State Department Counselor; John Allison, then Assistant Secretary of State for the Far East; General Merrill, of Merrill's Marauders fame; John Ferguson and C. Burton Marshall, of the State Department Planning Staff.

John Foster Dulles opened the conference by expounding his views—

and quite positive views they were. He sharply criticized Truman's order interposing the Seventh Fleet between Formosa and mainland China. This, John Foster said, was really "protecting" the Chinese Communists, then battling us in Korea, from counterattack by the Nationalist forces of Chiang Kai-shek. He had discussed this "anomalous" situation with Chiang, he said, and Chiang, as was hardly surprising, fully agreed with him. Now, there were "certain islands" close to the mainland still held by Chiang's warriors, and Chiang, if given a "warrant" by the United States to insure him against the risks involved, could strengthen his already considerable forces on the islands and play merry hob with the Communists on the mainland. This, John Foster said positively, is what we should do: we should in effect, though he did not use the precise term, "unleash" Chiang; we should adopt a bold "forward" policy against the Chinese aggressors.

According to Stewart Alsop, who six years later revealed the details of this meeting in his *Saturday Evening Post* article, "The Story Behind Quemoy: How We Drifted Close to War," John Foster Dulles' proposal

was received at first with tepid politeness. Allen Dulles asked a couple of deferential questions. Nobody seemed to challenge John Foster's thesis until suddenly C. B. Marshall, "a big, articulate, irascible man," blew his top. The course Dulles proposed, he said flatly, would mean direct American intervention in the Chinese civil war. Worse, if we gave Chiang a "warrant" on the offshore islands, we would by this action "convey to a foreign entity the power to involve the United States in war." Marshall denounced Chiang's "mendicant and necessitous regime" and branded any "warrant" that would permit such a regime to drag the United States into war "an act of supreme folly."

John Foster Dulles [Alsop wrote] looked at Marshall as though he did not exist—a feat Dulles can perform brilliantly—and said not a word. There was an unhappy silence. Then Bohlen, the able diplomat, took over, asking Dulles questions which were politely phrased, but which nevertheless pointed up the risks involved in the course Dulles proposed. The meeting then broke up, on a strained and inconclusive note.

The islands under discussion were,

of course, Quemoy and Matsu, huddling almost on the doorstep of the Chinese mainland. Small, rocky nubbins of land, they were of absolutely no strategic value, as such eminent authorities as Dwight D. Eisenhower and Douglas MacArthur agreed; yet twice in succeeding years, due to the "supreme folly" of Dulles' policy, they almost dragged the United States into war, almost touched off the third world conflagration which everyone so dreads.

Islands of Folly

For John Foster Dulles wasn't to be deterred from his "bold forward" plan by the logical objections of men like Marshall and Bohlen. Almost as soon as he became Secretary of State, he loudly proclaimed what the newspapers dubbed the "unleashing" of Chiang. He did not go quite so far as to give Chiang a public "warrant," but the effect was the same. With our active encouragement, Chiang poured thousands more troops into the offshore islands, creating a situation in which he could claim that he had committed the very flower of his Army there and so, when trouble arose, *we* were committed to support *him*. The situation has overtones reminiscent of those in Germany where, as the letter-writing intelligence agent remarked, we are so wedded to German policy that, if the Germans ever determine to reunite their country, we almost certainly will be dragged into war to help them.

In the Far East, time and again, a tinder-box situation has been created by the fatuity of the American obsession with Chiang Kai-shek. Powerful American business interests, in alliance with many of the power lords who dominate the larger media of information, long have persisted in viewing Chiang as one of the great men of his age, a statesman of nobility and stature, a leader who may one day win back China from the Communists if we only give him our help. This view has been so widely sold to the American people that it is considered virtually an act of treason in many circles to challenge it.

Yet challenged it must be. The record is clear and explicit, and it

isn't at all what we have deluded ourselves into believing. Chiang has never been anything but a Chinese warlord with one guiding principle—the interests of Chiang. In his rise to power, he played footsie with the Communists, and not until he had won and wanted the big apple all for himself did he really break with them. The corruptness of his regime was one of the least-hushed World War II scandals. It offered the people of China nothing; American Army leaders in China found it almost impossible to get Chiang's "tigers" to fight, and the Japanese



Chiang Kai-shek

almost tore the country apart while Chiang and his inner circle waxed fat on the resources of the national treasury. As William J. Lederer writes in *A Nation of Sheep*, the Chinese people became "sick of him and the Soongs" and "the rotten Chinese apple was ready to drop of its own accord." Although Chiang had billions of dollars' worth of American military equipment for his 3-million-man Army, these forces were composed of conscripts who had no love for Chiang; money for its food and pay went into the pockets of grafting officers. And so, when Communists applied pressure, the troops didn't fight—they either surrendered or joined up.

Chiang fled to Formosa, taking the contents of the national treasury with him. For ten years now, Chiang's Formosan regime has been painted in the United States in glowing col-

ors as a Western-style democracy. Actually, nothing could be further from the truth. As Lederer writes, Chiang's warriors, when they first arrived, "pillaged and robbed Formosa." They killed thousands of protesting Formosans with machine-gun fire; and ever since, having taught the Formosans a democratic lesson by this process, Chiang's 2 million Chinese Nationalists have ruled some 9 million Formosans with an iron, dictatorial hand. According to Lederer, some 70 per cent of Chiang's Army is now composed of Formosan conscripts, who might fight to protect their home island but have no burning compulsion to help Chiang reconquer China. The Formosans themselves would like to be rid of the Nationalist monkey on their backs; and they have no love for the United States, which continues to prop up Chiang's discredited regime with some three-quarters of a billion dollars in annual aid.

Yet America's arch right-wing policy makers and its equally arch right-wing CIA under Allen Dulles continue to invest Chiang with a halo and to push him forward as our answer to communism in Asia. It is an infatuation that has brought us repeatedly into widespread disrepute.

Poppy Fields of Burma

Consider the case of Chiang's Burmese opium growers. In 1951, following the collapse of Chiang's regime on the mainland, several thousands of his followers fled across the Yunnan border into Northern Burma. American policy makers decided to arm and equip these Nationalist troops for a reinvasion of Yunnan Province. From Formosa, CIA allegedly masterminded the operation. Arms, munitions, supplies were airlifted into Burma, but despite this support, there is little evidence that Chiang's gallant warriors ever wreaked much damage on the Chinese Reds. Instead, the Nationalists discovered they could achieve the finer life more easily by growing opium, and a great number of them settled down in Northern Burma and proceeded to do just that.

The Burmese, a most unreasonable people, were not happy with this

ideal, CIA-created situation. For some inexplicable reason, they seemed to resent the presence of this foreign army on their soil; and when Chiang's fighters, showing no regard for Burmese sovereignty, practically took over the state of Kengtung and established their own government, the Burmese actually filed a vigorous protest with the United States. As Charles Edmundson, former Washington editor of *Fortune* and a former foreign service expert, wrote in *The Nation* (Nov. 7, 1957), the American Ambassador in Burma hadn't been let in on the secret of what the CIA and the Chinese Nationalists were up to. The Ambassador, William J. Sebald, therefore denied in perfect good faith that America had anything to do with supporting Chiang's guerrillas in Burma. Burmese Prime Minister U Nu knew better and became so incensed he suspended all U.S. Point Four activities and almost broke off relations entirely. Eventually, our own Ambassador resigned his post in protest against our own program, and American prestige throughout Southeast Asia sported a couple of very unlovely black eyes.

A four-power conference finally reached an agreement about Chiang's opium-happy warriors. Some 7,000 were evacuated to Formosa. But even this didn't solve the entire problem. Sizable remnants of the Nationalist force continued to squat in their poppy fields, and as of this spring the Burmese Army was still fighting a guerrilla war in its own country in an effort to wipe them out. In this most recent fighting, the Burmese contended they had seized American arms and supplies *only recently* airlifted into Burma. Such charges, skillfully exploited by Communist propaganda, sparked riots that resulted in the stoning and wrecking of U.S. Embassy buildings in downtown Rangoon. When such outbreaks occur, the widespread impression given the American people in glaring headlines is that we have been most foully attacked again as a result of Communist machinations; hardly ever is there any appreciation of the fact that the Communists might find it impossible to get the people on their side without the help of the

backfiring plots of our own cloak-and-dagger boys.

The "Spooks" of the Islands

Destructive as such incidents are to America's image, they do not menace the peace of the world like the more grandiose CIA endeavors that led directly to the crises of Quemoy and Matsu. In the early 1950s, the CIA established on Formosa an outfit known as Western Enterprises, Inc. This was a thinly disguised "cover" for CIA, whose agents, an incommunicative lot, became known on the island as "the spooks." These "spooks" played an active role in the build-up of Chiang's forces on the offshore islands and the raids that were launched from there. As Stewart Alsop wrote, the CIA was "responsible for organizing and equipping the Nationalist guerrillas who raided the mainland from the offshore islands." These "commando-type guerrilla raids" were "sometimes mounted in battalion strength," Alsop related. In addition, the offshore islands were used for reconnaissance, leaflet dropping, occasional bombing forays, and for blockading such Chinese ports as Amoy, on the mainland opposite Quemoy.

These offensive gestures apparently nettled the Chinese Reds, a very unreasonable and touchy folk, and in the first week of September, 1954, they became so incensed that they blasted Quemoy with heavy artillery barrages. Two American officers of the Military Advisory Group stationed on the island were killed, and the American public, in its shock at such unprovoked aggression, was whipped up to the point where it might very easily have plunged into Chiang's war. In fact, Alsop wrote that "although no more than a tiny handful of people knew it at the time, the American government came very close to responding with a conditional decision to go to war with Red China."

Alsop cited chapter and verse of the story. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, under the leadership of that old strong-China hand, Admiral Arthur Radford, voted overwhelmingly for war. They backed a policy, not just to launch bombing raids on military objectives opposite Quemoy, but to

blast targets far inland in China. If the Chinese Reds responded with an all-out attack on Quemoy, we would use nuclear weapons. This, make no mistake about it, would have been World War III. Only Matthew Ridgway dissented and fought with all his power against such an "unwarranted and tragic course." Ridgway found an ally in Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, who had been moved over from CIA and made Under Secretary of State when the Dulleses took charge. Smith shared Ridgway's horror of the prospect and telephoned his former chief, President Eisenhower, then vacationing in Denver. Eisenhower listened and scotched the reckless plan of the Joint Chiefs.

The 1954 crisis, given a chance, finally died down, and the policy known as the "releasing" of Chiang began. Until 1954, Alsop wrote, the offshore islands had been almost the "exclusive playground" of CIA; but, by the time of the first Quemoy crisis, CIA's thin "cover" of Western Enterprises, Inc. had been pretty well "blown" and control had been turned over largely to the Military Advisory Group. The presence of these uniformed military advisers on the islands represented, in effect, the public "warrant" John Foster Dulles had originally proposed we give Chiang; and when, in 1958, the Communist Chinese again shelled the islands, our prestige once more was on the line, and once more we were almost involved in war. Only a broad promise that we wouldn't permit Chiang to use the islands for any worth-while purpose, not even leaflet dropping, smoothed over the situation.

And New Laos

The Burmese crisis that all but turned friend into foe, the recurrent crises on Quemoy and Matsu, vividly illustrate the manner in which the secret and militant activities of CIA create for us a foreign policy all their own. They illustrate the way the CIA tail wags the American dog and how such wagging can quite easily plunge the whole animal—and all his brethren—into the most horrible of history's wars. But Burma and Quemoy weren't the only examples in Asia

of what is wrought by CIA. To these there must be added another example, and one of current crisis significance—Laos.

American blunders in Laos go back a full six years, and they are not by any means all of CIA's making, though it was reserved for CIA to write the final, climactic chapter. To understand how CIA masterminded us into the hole in which we now find ourselves, one has to appreciate the background. Laos became a nation in 1955 as a result of the Geneva agreement that split the former French Indo-China into its component parts. Laos was the interior principality, primitive, landlocked, with a 1,000-mile border with Red China. The Geneva agreement provided it was to have a neutralist government, but the evidence is abundant that we, no more than the Communists, wanted a neutral Laos. We wanted a Laos committed irrevocably to our side.

This becomes clear if one studies the findings of the House Committee on Government Operations which delved deeply into the Laotian muddle in 1958 and, on June 15, 1959, filed a scathing report of what it found. What the committee discovered was that all sound military advice had been disregarded by the State Department in its determination to build up an anti-Communist Laos. The committee remarked acidly that Congress had always been assured that "force objectives"—the number of foreign troops the United States will support—are established on the basis of the military judgment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In Laos this simply was not true.

The Joint Chiefs, in fact, considered Laos militarily worthless and repeatedly told the Eisenhower administration so. The House committee wrote: "U.S. support of a 25,000-man Army, of the entire military budget, and of segments of the civilian economy is, in fact, based on a political determination made by the Department of State contrary to the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff." It pointed out that the Joint Chiefs, even after they had been asked to reconsider their views, had refused to budge. In a memorandum, they had said, the House

committee wrote, that "mutual security support of Laotian forces could not be recommended 'from the military point of view,' but acquiesced in the provision of such support 'should political considerations be overriding.'"

This, then, was the beginning. The House committee's findings make it clear that, for political considerations alone, we imposed upon Laos a huge and militarily unjustified standing Army. We did this with no regard for either the characteristics or the desires of the Laotian people. The Laotians are Buddhists; they are, not in pretense but in actuality, a deeply peaceful people. As Keyes Beech wrote in the April 22, 1961, *Saturday Evening Post*: "In Laos not even the fighting cocks are blood-thirsty. They wear no spurs and do not fight to kill. As good Buddhists, Laotian soldiers were no less reluctant. They generally aimed high and expected the other fellow to return the favor."

The Cocktail Circuit

In Laos, as in so many other of the world's trouble spots, the right-wingers in our own State Department and CIA dealt only with their right-wing counterparts, a small and wealthy ruling class and this class's military cohorts. As *Newsweek* reported last May: "Our allies, the traditional ruling class, had little interest in reform. The political methods they used—stuffing ballot boxes and intimidating neutralist voters—succeeded only in driving the moderates to the Left. . . . The worst thing perhaps was that U.S. policy makers never came to terms with any elements in Laos other than those they considered to be militantly anti-Communist."

Tied to such interests, with viewpoint constricted to the cocktail circuits of Vientiane, we plunged headlong into Laos, apparently with no philosophy except that if we spent enough money, no matter how, we could buy ourselves an anti-Communist ally. As the House committee found, we repeated, on an even more flagrant scale, all the ghastly mistakes which it had criticized so strongly years previously in Iran.

Laos is about 99 per cent agricul-

tural. Its economy is primitive. The Laotian farmer usually grows what he needs, barter off his surplus to supply his other wants. Money, in much of Laos, is virtually nonexistent. Into such an economy, with evidently no regard for its disruptive effects, the United States in just six years poured \$310 million. The result was almost inevitable. The wildest currency speculation took place; the Laotian economy was all but wrecked; and the cost of living doubled between 1953 and 1958.

Cooperative Graft

As in Iran, corruption flourished like jungle growth in the tropics. The House committee found clear evidence that both the Americans who were channeling the aid dollars to Laos, and the Laotian government officials who were dispensing them, dipped greedy paws into the golden stream. The committee flatly accused one American public-works officer of accepting "bribes totaling at least \$13,000." It recounted the sordid story of a former U.S. Operations Mission Director who extracted a fantastic price for his decrepit 1947 Cadillac from an official of the Universal Construction Co., to whom he was awarding a contract. "Uncontroverted evidence," the committee wrote, "indicates that the vehicle was at that time inoperable, and that shortly thereafter it was cut up and the pieces dropped down an abandoned well. In the interim, it had stood rusting in front of Universal's main office, where it was the subject of scornful amusement by Laotians and Americans alike."

One honest American who tried to do something about the mess was "railroaded out of Laos by his superiors." The railroading was sanctioned by Ambassador J. Graham Parsons, who presided over our aid efforts in Laos at their corrupt worst, and Parsons was rewarded for his watchfulness by being called back to Washington and made Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs. In all of this time, the bulk of the American taxpayers' \$310 million was used mainly to enrich an inner circle of palace thieves; hardly any of it was used to help the Laotian people. Not until the elections

of 1958 were imminent did the Americans distributing aid in Laos suddenly come up with a crash program that they labeled "Operation Booster Shot" to try to buy some good will on the mass level.

In one acid paragraph, the House committee summed up the operational mess:

The concentration of the benefits of the aid program to the area around Vientiane and other centers of population, and the enrichment of, and speculation by, Lao merchants and public officials which attended the aid program, tended to lend credence to the Communist allegation that the Royal Lao Government was "corrupt" and "indifferent" to the needs of the people.

The People's Voice

Even an idiot, it might be presumed, should have foreseen the inevitable consequences; but our CIA and our State Department remained blind to them right up to the last moment of inescapable truth. Ex-Ambassador Parsons was testifying before the House committee just as the Laotian elections were being held in 1958. He insisted that he had reliable, "official" information that the results would be wonderful for our side. The Communist Pathet Lao, he predicted, would win only two of fifteen contested seats, and this would mean that "the integrity and independence of Laos in the free world" would have been preserved intact.

Then the votes were counted. The Communists, instead of being crushed, won a crushing victory. The House committee later reported that the Communists had won nine seats, and their sympathizers an additional four. The Royal Cabinet, indeed, had to install the pro-Red leader as the minister who, in the future, would control U.S. Foreign Aid Funds in Laos; it had to agree that, henceforth, two battalions of pro-Communist troops actually would be supported by U.S. funds. This was victory? This was assuring "the integrity and independence of Laos in the free world"?

In obvious disgust, the House committee wrote:

In summary, the decision to support a 25,000-man Army—motivated

by a Department of State desire to promote political stability—seems to have been the foundation for a series of developments which detract from that stability. . . .

The aid program has not prevented the spread of communism in Laos. In fact, the Communist victory in last year's election, based on the slogans of "Government corruption" and "Government indifference" might lead one to conclude that the U.S. aid program has contributed to an



Prince Souvanna Phouma

atmosphere in which the ordinary people of Laos question the value of friendship with the United States.

When You Can't Buy—

It might, indeed. But what the House committee found wasn't the last, or the worst, of the debacle. The final chapter, an epic in blindness and futility, was yet to be written. For the simple truth is that, having failed to buy ourselves an ally in Laos, we next tried to procure one through the CIA's favorite device—the military coup. Allen Dulles' eager beavers engineered this with cavalier disregard of any superior strategy of the State Department or the desires of the new American Ambassador on the scene, Horace H. Smith. Keyes Beech in his *Saturday Evening Post* account describes the conflict between CIA and Smith in these words:

On the political level, Smith's job wasn't made any easier by the fact that during most of his tour in Laos he was being crossed by Central Intelligence Agency operatives nesting in his own embassy. As Smith saw

it, the question was: Who was going to administer American policy in Laos—CIA or the embassy?

How many CIA agents were wandering around Laos during this period only the CIA could know. One of the more flamboyant, who blossomed everywhere, affected a copybook cover that included a manufactured British accent, a luxuriant mustache, elaborately casual but expensive clothes, and a cane with a secret compartment that held—not a sword, but brandy. . . .

As Ambassador, Smith favored a conservative coalition government which offered a little of something to all factions. CIA activists made no secret of their preference for a group of army "Young Turks."

CIA's favorite boy was Gen. Phoumi Nosavan, the forty-one-year-old Minister of Defense, who was later to emerge as the government "strong man." Phoumi was strongly anti-Communist. He was also fervently pro-Minister of Defense, because that's where the money was. . . .

The first blowup came in August, 1960, when a paratroop captain named Kong Le, whose troops hadn't been paid in three months because his superiors were looting the till, became fed up with the state of affairs and led a coup. Successful, he raced all around Vientiane in a jeep bearing legends demanding the Americans go home. The CIA boys and the brains of the American military mission on the scene were stunned. Until Kong Le suddenly went off the deep end, they had considered him one of their very own fair-haired boys, and they couldn't understand what the devil had gotten into him. Nor did they like or understand any better what Kong Le did with his new-found power.

Neutralism: a Dirty Word

He called on Prince Souvanna Phouma to take over as Premier. Souvanna was a neutralist. Depending on how you look at it, he was a sincere neutralist, hoping to bring some kind of peace to his unsettled country, or he was just a weak-kneed tool of the Communists. The Americans, to most of whom neutralism was a dirty word anyway, took the second view. Ex-Ambassador Parsons, by this time promoted to the post of supreme authority for Far

Eastern Affairs, flew to Laos to try to get some understanding with Souvanna; but he and Souvanna had never wasted any affection on each other when Parsons was Ambassador, and so it was almost inevitable that they wouldn't achieve any meeting of minds now. They didn't. The American chips went down on the CIA's boy, General Phoumi. Given the green light, Phoumi in December, 1960, actually fought a battle and captured Vientiane. Souvanna and Kong Le were chased out, and having no place else to go, they joined the Communist Pathet Lao. With him in retreat, Kong Le thoughtfully took 9,000 American rifles with which he armed the Communist forces.

Premature Celebration

In Vientiane, General Phoumi and the CIA celebrated their victory. "The celebration was premature," Keyes Beech writes. "Looked at from a cold-blooded, cold-war viewpoint, the bloodshed might have been justified if, as the CIA argued, bloodshed was necessary to 'polarize' Communist and anti-Communist factions. It might have been justified if strong and effective leadership had emerged from the smoke of battle. Unfortunately, neither of these things happened. 'Polarization' took place only at the top, between the same tired, familiar faces."

Souvanna and Kong Le, backed now by Communist manpower, began to carve up Laos. Phoumi, having distributed the best financial

plums in the government among his relatives, seemed to have lost all interest in the dreary business of fighting. Everywhere the Pathet Lao forces were victorious. The puppet government we had installed was too corrupt and inefficient to oppose them; the 25,000-man Army for which we had been paying for five years had never wanted to fight in



General Phoumi

the first place and wanted to fight even less in a corrupt cause; the Laotian people whom we had not helped, but had only helped to ruin, could hardly be expected to feel that we were worthy of their ultimate sacrifice. So there we were, having made one of history's most colossal botches of everything.

The new Kennedy Administration was bequeathed this little sweet-heart of a problem. There the Communists were, overrunning all of

northern Laos, gobbling up another country, and we were faced with just two unlovely choices. We could either go to war in defense of freedom against the Communist menace, or we could humbly sue for the reinstatement of the very kind of neutralist government (only it would be worse now because the Communists were stronger) that we had conspired to kick out.

Boxed into this dead-end street, President Kennedy at first talked tough and acted as if he would like to fight. But it quickly became apparent that the Congressional leadership of his own party would have no part of such folly, and the result was the only result really possible—long-drawn-out, largely futile negotiations for a cease-fire in Laos and the return of "neutralism," even if it meant the return of Souvanna.

No defeat that CIA has ever earned us has been more complete, more devastating. In face-conscious Southeast Asia, we had lost all the face there was to lose, and even Thailand, long considered a staunch partner of the West, began to flirt with neutralist ideas. In such manner had CIA intriguing come home to roost. As Marquis Childs wrote from Geneva, where he was dancing attendance on the Laos peace talks, if CIA was to be thoroughly investigated in the aftermath of Cuba, "the role played by that agency in the mess in Laos is perhaps more relevant than the share of responsibility which CIA must bear for the Cuban fiasco."



PART VIII FIASCO IN CUBA

IN DECEMBER, 1960, U.S. Senator-elect Claiborne Pell (D., R.I.) made a quiet visit to Fidel Castro's Cuba. A former Foreign Service officer in World War II, Senator Pell was no novice in pulse-taking, and when he went among the Cuban people, he was surprised at what he found. He later capsuled his discoveries for the New York *Herald Tribune* in these words:

The people of Cuba that I saw

June 24, 1961

and spoke to during three or four days of quiet observation were not sullen or unhappy or dissatisfied. I am afraid that it is only true that they were still tasting the satisfaction of Castro's land reform, of his nationalization of United States companies and of the other much-touted reforms put into effect by Castro. The dispossessed and disgruntled were in jail or in exile.

Senator Pell returned to Washington and explicitly warned high of-

ficials of the Kennedy Administration that the time for action against Castro was not yet.

During the same December, two other visitors to Cuba saw the same sights, came to the same conclusions, and wrote an article about them. These observers were Gen. Hugh B. Hester, U.S.A. (Ret.), holder of the Distinguished Service Medal for services in the southwest Pacific in World War II, and Jesse Gordon,

public-relations consultant. In an article, "A New Look at Cuba—The Challenge to Kennedy," published by *New World Review*, General Hester and Gordon wrote:

It must be pointed out that a Princeton poll, taken [in Cuba] last year, revealed 86 per cent of the people in support of Castro....

Most observers would agree that if elections were held tomorrow, Castro would be overwhelmingly returned to power....

The morale of Cuban workers and the militia is high....

There is no doubt about the people's spirit or their courage, tenacity and determination to hold onto the gains under the revolution....

The U.S. military high command has plans for an invasion of Cuba. Should the Kennedy Administration decide to continue along the reckless path of the previous Administration, we fear disaster will result.

No prophecy was ever better justified by the event. No prophecy was ever less hidden under a bushel. At the end of March, Gordon personally mailed reprints of the article to the White House, the State Department and members of Congress. But about 1:30 A.M. on Monday, April 17, some 1,500 Cuban exiles—trained, financed and masterminded by the CIA—stormed ashore at the Bay of Pigs on Cuba's south coast. The CIA, the agency that is supposed to know all, had insisted that Cuba was ripe for revolution.

Never perhaps was an intelligence estimate more disastrously wrong. In a few hours, it became apparent that the Cuban invaders had not the slightest chance. They were overwhelmed, killed, captured. The CIA-planned coup, almost a year in the making, backfired so tragically that Fidel Castro was presented with an hour of triumph in which to strut. Instead of being overthrown, the power of his regime, thanks to CIA, was solidified in all of Cuba.

Commenting on the consequences almost a month later, Richard H. Rovere wrote:

The passage of time does not reduce the magnitude of the folly in Cuba. The more it is examined, the worse the whole affair looks. The immediate consequences are bad enough: Castro's tightened grip on Cuba, the growing distrust of Ameri-

can leadership, the revelations of Central Intelligence "operating" procedures and of the bureau's mammoth incompetence. What is more painful, though, is the awareness that intelligence (as a quality of mind, not as data), and the best staff a twentieth-century President has had, offered so little protection against enormous error....

As it turned out, the non-professionals were mostly right, and the professionals were almost wholly wrong.

This, needless to say, is not the result that an annual \$1 billion investment in intelligence is expected to achieve—especially on an island just ninety miles from our shores, an island on which we have a huge naval base, where there are many long-time American residents, where presumably we should have the most solid contacts. This wasn't Laos, thousands of miles away in another and remote corner of the world—but Cuba, on our doorstep.

Operatives on Parade

How could it happen? How could our master intelligence agency, CIA, be so completely wrong? These questions have been only partly answered, but even the partial answers throw the book at CIA. Let's look at one eyewitness account of the CIA in action. It was written by Thayer Waldo in the *San Francisco Chronicle*.

This reporter [Waldo wrote] spent the first half of last year in Cuba. At that time, with the U.S. Embassy still in operation and fully staffed, eight of its personnel were CIA agents, three worked for the FBI, and each of the Armed Services had from one to five operatives assigned to intelligence work.

No special effort was required to learn these facts or to identify the individuals so engaged. Within thirty days of arrival in Havana, their names and agency affiliations were made known to me, without solicitation, by other correspondents or Embassy employees.

The latter included one CIA man who volunteered the identities of all three persons accredited to the FBI; and a Cuban receptionist, outspokenly pro-Castro, who ticked off the names of six CIA agents—with entire accuracy, a later check confirmed.

In addition to Embassy staffers, the CIA had a number of operatives (I knew fourteen, but am satisfied there were more) among the large colony of resident U.S. businessmen. One of these, a roofing and installation contractor, had lived in Cuba from the age of six, except for service with the Army during World War II—as a master sergeant in G-2, military intelligence. Predictably, that known background made the man a prime target for observation by Castro's people when U.S.-Cuban relations began to deteriorate seriously. He was shadowed day and night, his every contact reported. Yet the CIA made him its chief civilian agent in Havana.

Unintelligent Intelligence

Quite obviously, this wasn't a very efficient way for a super-intelligence agency to run a secret intelligence network. But then, according to Waldo, Naval Intelligence was no more efficient. During most of 1960 and into 1961, it ran a major intelligence-gathering project at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base. Some 3,800 Cubans are employed on the base, but they live outside government property, most of them in or near Guantanamo City, twenty-seven miles north. It occurred to Naval Intelligence that here, among these Cubans going back and forth every day, was a mass of raw human material from which could be culled significant data about the prevailing mood in Cuba. Naval Intelligence, as a result, ran about 140 interviews a day, questioning the Cuban workers about the attitudes of Cuban civilians toward Castro. Almost to a man, apparently, the workers assured the Americans that the Cuban people were very, very unhappy with Castro.

Waldo points out that naval-base workers are paid about 60 per cent more than comparable workers in private industry, that the suffering Cuban economy offers few job opportunities to any man who might lose the naval-base plum he had—that, in a word, it should have been expected the Cuban workers would tell Naval Intelligence only what they knew Naval Intelligence wanted to hear. Waldo quotes a South American diplomat making this wry comment on this strange intelligence

operation: "If I denounce my neighbor as my mortal enemy and then ask my servants their opinion, they are pretty apt to tell me that everyone else hates him, too—particularly if they like their jobs."

From such sources and from CIA's close contacts with *émigré* Cubans (who were convinced, naturally, like all *émigrés*, that great numbers of the Cuban people hated Castro as fervently as they did), American opinions appear to have been formed. It is necessary to use such qualifying words as "appear" and "seem," for it must be emphasized that any synthesis of the Cuba misadventure must be based on incomplete information—the kind that has become available by sweeping out from under official rugs.

Up to this point, the American people have been given no chance to find out for themselves what happened, what went wrong, who was responsible. Investigations have been held in secret, as if we were safeguarding the formula of some new miracle weapon; and when the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff testifies behind closed doors, one Senator shouts that he has been shocked out of his britches and all the chiefs should be fired—others insist blandly that *they* weren't shocked, and nobody should be fired. Such are the baffling cross-currents in the world of secrecy we have substituted for the world of information. If, therefore, any officials would quarrel with this account of the Cuban fiasco, let them first quarrel with themselves—behind closed doors.

Beginning of the Plot

It seems, then, to be well-established that in the spring of 1960, probably in late April or early May, the Eisenhower administration made a fateful decision. Castro, it felt, was moving steadily into the Communist orbit. CIA had information that some eighty Cuban fliers had been sent to Czechoslovakia to train on Russian jets; there were reports of construction projects inside Cuba that looked to CIA as if they might be designed to launch missiles. Castro, in addition, seemed to be stirring up trouble in Panama, the Domini-

can Republic, Haiti; he would have to go.

The strongest initial proponent of the "Castro must go" line appears to have been Republican Vice President Richard M. Nixon. He, it is said, argued strongly that we must support armed intervention in Cuba to get rid of Castro, and he finally won Eisenhower's consent. Once this basic decision had been made, our fate was in the hands of CIA, for CIA was supposed to know precisely how to run such delicate affairs.

This official misconception of CIA's omniscience and omnipotence quite obviously was based upon CIA's vaunted successes in overthrowing Mossadegh in Iran and Arbenz in Guatemala. Castro, we decided, was to be another Arbenz, and the Guatemala script that had worked so well was the one CIA elected to follow. In some ways, the situation seemed made to order for it. Castro's increasingly iron dictatorship, his merciless execution of dissidents were sending increasing hordes of refugees to our shores. The Miami area was swarming with them. All that CIA had to do was to train them, arm them and mold them into an invasion force.

Gaggle of Factions

Simple as this basic conception seemed, it required considerable doing. The anti-Castro Cubans were a gaggle of warring factions, ranging over all the hues of the political spectrum. They included brutal ex-cops who had served Fulgencio Batista without a qualm, arch conservatives who wanted their lands and money back, left-wing reformers who wanted to preserve Castro's land policy and Castro's nationalization of vital industry, but without Castro's dictatorship. These groups were personalized in their leadership. On the far Right were ex-Batista henchmen like Rolando Masferrer. Also far over to the Right, but free of the Batista taint, was the Movement for Revolutionary Recovery (MRR), headed by Captain Manuel Artime, who had been only briefly associated with Castro. On the Left—reformers, but strongly anti-Communist—were the followers of the People's Revolutionary Movement (MRP),

headed by Manolo Antonio Ray, Castro's former Minister of Public Works.

The CIA, with its pronounced right-wing proclivities which always seem to orientate it toward ruling shahs and military dictators, had to pick "its boys" from this divided pack; and its choice fell, where its choices always have seemed to fall, on the representatives of the Right. Only in this case its choice was more unfortunate even than usual, for in Cuba the forces of the Right were almost powerless to help it.

The Choice that Wasn't Made

Virtually all sources seem to agree that there was just one effective resistance movement inside Cuba: the MRP headed by Manolo Antonio Ray. A quiet, soft-spoken architect and civil engineer, Ray had been one of Castro's most effective resistance leaders. For some two years during the precarious course of the Castro revolution, he had directed sabotage inside Havana; and when Castro came to power, Ray had been rewarded by appointment as Minister of Public Works. He served just eight months, then he broke with Castro. He realized by that time, he says, that Castro did not intend to live up to his democratic promises, that his regime was becoming increasingly dictatorial, increasingly communistic. So Ray once more went underground, setting up his own clandestine organization to fight the new dictatorship.

He managed to evade Castro's police and to work for eight months inside Cuba. In that time, he perfected an underground network that spanned the island state. Each province had its seven-man executive council, and in each province similar organizations reached down into the separate counties. Ray kept contacts between these underground groups to a minimum, tying the threads together only at the top, and soon the effectiveness of his growing organization was demonstrated by increasing incidents of sabotage.

Ray was certainly an effective leader, not much doubt about that. But, let's whisper it, he was "left-wing." The man still had faith in the original Castro program; he

thought that land and industrial reforms were long overdue and essential to Cuba's ultimate prosperity. Those who want Cuba returned to its pre-Castro state seem to overlook the vital fact that this state was so bad it made Castro possible. Castro clambered to power over the ruins of a corrupt and brutal system. He had made great capital (see his program as he himself explained it in *The Nation*, Nov. 30, 1957) out of the fact that 85 per cent of Cuba's small-scale farmers did not own their land; out of the fact that more than half of the arable land in the nation was in foreign hands; out of the fact that more than 200,000 rural families had not a square foot of land on which to support themselves while almost 10 million acres "of untouched arable land remain in the hands of powerful interests." One of Castro's first and most popular acts had been to split up these baronial holdings. Ray believed that these objectives had been right, but he wanted them achieved in a framework of freedom. He explained his philosophy to the *New York Post* in these words:

Our movement doesn't allow politicians to come in on the backs of the people just so they can get back into power and get money for themselves. [Ray did not explain how he would prevent this.] We've had enough of that. What we want is a continuation of social reform—not a government by the rich or the exploiters. We believe in a mixed economy of private enterprise—because it is effective and efficient—and government ownership of utilities and monopolies—because these things belong to the whole people. And there must be freedom. This, Castro has destroyed.

Such a program could not fail to be anathema to rigid, right-wing minds, or to those powerful American interests whose primary concern was the repossession of their vast, Castro-sequestered holdings in Cuba. With such a program, CIA would have no truck. Though Ray's underground organization was the only effective one, he had to go it alone. He got virtually no money, no supplies, no help of any kind from CIA. He established his own training camps and financed them

by selling one-peso stamps each month to sympathizers inside Cuba. Indicative of the support he had inside the country we were trying to liberate was the fact that his collections ultimately reached 60,000 pesos a month. CIA evidently drew no conclusions from this. All the time Ray was struggling to maintain himself and his underground organization, CIA was pouring a huge flow of cash (the total finally came to \$45 million) into the promotion of its right-wing invasion.

Prying Open the Plot

Over-all direction of the Cuban endeavor was in the hands of one of CIA's deputy directors, Richard



Richard M. Bissell, Jr.

M. Bissell, Jr., a former economics instructor at Yale. Under Bissell was a large corps of CIA agents and instructors, some Spanish-speaking North Americans, at least one Filipino, and — surprisingly — quite a number of Eastern Europeans who couldn't communicate with their Cuban protégés at all except through interpreters. This was the staff that directed the training of the invasion troops in a number of camps carved out of the Guatemalan jungle. The first recruits, thirty-two in number, were flown to Guatemala in May, 1960. They were put to work hacking out a training base on jungle acres donated for the purpose by Robert Alejos, a wealthy Guatemalan landlord. Later airstrips were built on wasteland along the fringes of Alejos' coffee plantation, and American jet pilots, in civilian clothes,

were sent to Guatemala to train the Cuban fliers.

All of this activity was conducted for months without anyone in the United States outside of the highest official circles having any inkling of what was afoot. But a large-scale invasion cannot be kept hidden from public view forever, and in this case, in any event, secrecy arrangements were not of the best. Some of the Guatemalan airstrips were operated in full sight of travelers on the Pan American highway and the Guatemalan railroad, and in time the word began to get around. *The Nation* called public attention to what was going on last November, but the large wire services and major media of information continued to play blind, deaf and dumb for nearly two months. It was not until early January that *Time* finally used a short article on the Guatemalan airstrips, followed within a few days by a much more detailed story in *The New York Times*. With these news pieces, the American public at large, for the first time and still only in a tentative fashion, began to acquire information about the plot we were brewing in the Caribbean.

Picking the Leader

The publication of these first news stories almost coincided with a development of major importance in the Guatemalan camps. There CIA had picked its "fair-haired boy": twenty-nine-year-old Manuel Artime, regarded by some of Ray's followers as a Franco Falangist. By January, 1961, Artime was in solid with Frank Bender, the CIA area chief in Guatemala. Drew Pearson asserts that Artime was helped along the path to rank and glory by Bender's secretary, Macho Barker, whom Artime had promised to make sports czar of liberated Cuba. If true, this report would seem to indicate that Artime expected to dominate the government of the new Cuba and to pass out the rewards. There are some other tenuous indications pointing in the same direction. The *Chatanooga Times* Washington correspondent, Charles Bartlett, later was to reveal the existence of a super-secret unit, known as Operation 40, apparently organized to act after the

invasion, seizing control of the new government and establishing a dictatorship, possibly under Arttime.

With these machinations stirring in the background, the youthful Arttime made his move at the end of January. With the full backing of CIA, he staged a coup in the training camps. He made fiery speeches to some 1,500 freedom fighters then in training. In some instances, he changed their commanders, installing his own men, and he appealed to all to join his banner. Most did, but some 200 balked.

Those "Democratic" Rebels

Arttime didn't stand for any nonsense from these recalcitrants. Backed up by CIA all the way, he had the 200 arrested and isolated under guard. Some managed to escape through the jungles and make their way back across Mexico to Miami. Others were talked into joining up. But there remained a hard core who stood by their convictions and refused to support Arttime's budding junta. What happened to these stubborn ones should be an object lesson to a nation that has permitted its cloak-and-dagger boys to run their own private little dictatorships.

Long weeks later, after the Cuban invasion had failed, the story was told to *The New York Times* by Dr. Rodolfo Nodal Tarafa, a young lawyer who had been in the training camp at Trax, Guatemala, when Arttime staged his coup. On January 31, Dr. Nodal said, the senior military adviser in the Trax camp, known to the Cubans only as "Frank," mustered the 300 training freedom fighters and told them their two commanding Cuban officers had been sent away for "playing politics." They would be commanded henceforth, "Frank" said, by Captain San Román. This choice was distinctly unpopular with the Cubans in camp. Captain San Román had been an officer of Fulgencio Batista and was reported to have fought against Castro in the Sierra Maestra. In San Román, the freedom fighters smelled the stench of the old, brutal Batista dictatorship; and since this wasn't the kind of "cause" for which they were prepared to die, 230 of the 300 asked to resign.

Theirs was supposed to be a free volunteer army, but of course such insubordination could not be permitted. Another agent by the name of "Bernie" was summoned to deal with the trouble. He charged the 230 recalcitrants with being Communists. He declared he had authority from the Democratic Revolutionary Front to name commanders, and he had picked Captain San Román for them. That was that. But the Cubans didn't seem to see the logic in this clear, democratic reasoning. It seemed to them that they were the ones who had been elected to do the fighting and the dying, and they should have something to say about the cause for which they were prepared to make such sacrifices. They demanded that their case be heard by the Front within seventy-two hours. Otherwise, they wanted to be discharged and returned home.

A committee of five was selected to present this protest. "Bernie" refused to receive the delegation. He agreed finally to talk to a single spokesman, and Dr. Nodal was chosen. The lawyer explained to "Bernie" that the freedom fighters were neither mercenaries nor conscripts, and that they could not accept commanders who represented the very antithesis of the ideals for which they were fighting. "Bernie" suggested that the troops agree to train for five days more while they waited for a representative from the Democratic Revolutionary Front to arrive. They agreed. But seven days passed, and nothing happened. The troops again went on strike.

Iron Beneath Velvet

Now CIA took off the silken gloves of deceit. Threats and promises were freely employed. Gradually, the protesting troops were browbeaten into submission—all but twenty. These twenty were obdurate. On February 11, while the rest of the men were on field exercises, one of the advisers asked eight of the twenty to go with him. They thought, Dr. Nodal says, that there was to be another conference. Not until they had been led along a jungle track to a canvas-covered truck did they discover their error. There they were suddenly covered by three

men holding Thompson submachine guns.

The eight were driven to La Suiza, an estate where there was a Guatemalan Army camp. There they were surrounded by eight or ten men with automatic weapons. Each of the eight was taken separately from the truck; each was taken into a small room, forced to empty his pockets, forced to strip off all his clothes.

"I felt sure this was it," Dr. Nodal said. "I was sure we were going to be murdered."

But not even CIA was quite equal to that. The men, deprived of "even our love letters," as Dr. Nodal says, were permitted to dress again. They were taken to a shed 15 feet by 30, with concrete floor and galvanized iron roof—a furnace by day, an icy igloo by night. Here they were imprisoned. For twelve days, they were not permitted to bathe or shave, to have clean clothes or to eat a really edible meal. Periodically, they were questioned by another CIA mystery man, known to them only as "Pat," the chief security guard. They were given lie-detector tests, virtually at gunpoint. The object was to make them confess that they were Communists, for obviously such stubborn and disagreeable characters simply *had* to be Communists. Naturally, they wouldn't admit it, and strangely enough, as far as can be learned, the lie-detector tests didn't show it. In frustration, the CIA finally flew the stubborn holdouts, now seventeen in number, to a jungle prison in remote Peten Province in northern Guatemala. Here they were held under armed guard and warned they would be shot if they tried to escape. They were warned, too, that when the revolution succeeded they would be turned over to the new Cuban government to face trial and, probably, execution.

This fate they were spared by the failure of the invasion for which, originally, they had trained so ardently. With that unexpected collapse of all its plans, CIA acquired, if not a change of heart, at least a twinge of discretion. It released the seventeen "freedom fighters" it had held in cruel jungle imprisonment for eleven weeks, flew them back

to Miami and dumped them out. There Dr. Nodal and the others started their own resistance movement. It has one primary, over-riding principle: it will have nothing to do with CIA.

Kennedy's Dilemma

Such is the background against which the CIA set out to insure the "liberation" of Cuba from Castro. No one in Washington, of course, had any idea of the manner in which CIA was indoctrinating the principles of democracy into its "freedom fighters" in the Guatemalan jungles. It has become obvious that no one on any level of government, not the Congress, not the President, had any clear conception of what CIA was up to or how it was running the store; yet it was in such a miasma of misinformation and non-information that President Kennedy had to make a crucial decision.

It is not clear just when he first learned of the invasion plans set on foot by Nixon and Eisenhower. One version has pictured him as learning about the project for the first time shortly after the election. According to this version, the invasion had been scheduled for the late fall, but Kennedy was so shocked by the idea that the stroke was postponed to let him make the decision. Against the background of what is known, all of this appears unlikely; for Kennedy himself, in his television debates with Nixon, had proposed just such drastic action as the Eisenhower administration contemplated—and Nixon, it should be noted parenthetically, had held up his hands in pious horror at the thought. In any event, in January, Kennedy began to get detailed reports on the Cuban invasion project from CIA and from the State and Defense Departments. He was confronted with an evil dilemma.

The Cuban rebels had spent months in the training camps; they were ready to go; they could not be held in leash forever. Furthermore, the publicity so belatedly given about the Guatemalan training bases had stripped the mask from our CIA-overrun puppet state; embarrassed, Guatemalan officials yielded to public outcry and inform-

ed the United States we would soon have to get out. CIA further intensified the pressure on the President. Castro, it reported, was getting Soviet tanks and MIGs; he was stepping up his counterintelligence activities throughout the nation. It was now or never.

Such were the strong pressures for action—for a decision, as Sherman Kent once wrote, "off the top of the head." Yet even so, inside the Kennedy Administration, there was much soul-searching and a quite definite tug of war. The President himself, aware that the contemplated American-backed invasion would violate every provision of the 1948 Pact of Bogotá, prohibiting the use of force against the governments of American states, frowned on any direct American participation. Secretary of State Dean Rusk apparently doubted the wisdom of the entire venture, but he was not a strong enough man to fight for his convictions. Chester Bowles disliked the whole idea, leaked his dislike to the press, but apparently wasn't consulted in the final decision. Senator William Fulbright, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, was the one man with convictions who fought stoutly for them, but his protests were ignored. Determinative in making up the President's mind for him, it appears, was the information supplied by CIA, backed up by Navy Intelligence. This insisted that Castro's island empire was ripe for revolution. Independent analyses by amateurs that pointed to a directly opposite conclusion were ignored. It was decided to strike.

Shotgun Wedding

Before the actual invasion, there was a CIA-arranged, shotgun wedding. CIA, a great togetherness outfit, wanted to get all the anti-Castro groups together pulling in harness behind Manuel Artime, the field commander it had already selected for them. With Bissell wielding the whip, it was announced on March 22 that a Revolutionary Council had been formed two days previously in Miami. The provisional president of the council was José Miró Cardona, who had been Castro's first Premier, but had quickly broken



with the dictator. Manolo Ray was a member of the council, but its overwhelming complexion was conservative. It was understood that Cardona would become Provisional President as soon as the invading troops had carved out a foothold on Cuban soil. Later there would be free elections. Just what trust should have been placed in these promises in view of CIA's action in investing full military power in Artime, in view of the murky Operation 40, remains a matter of conjecture.

Political control established, the next consideration was CIA's invasion plan. Originally, the cloak-and-dagger agency wanted to hurl all the available invasion forces ashore at one point in one all-out assault. From the first, it appears, Manolo Ray's MRP doubted the wisdom of CIA's military conceptions. Ray felt that the only way to overthrow Castro was to use Castro's own formula against him—to infiltrate Cuba with small guerrilla groups, to build up the program of sabotage and resistance within the country to the bursting point. So strongly did Ray feel about this that it appears he even contemplated taking his MRP out of the Revolutionary Front; but, in the end, he went along because, as he later said, "we did not want to give the slightest aid to the Communists."

Dubious Military Tactic

CIA's tactical plan raised other doubts. The invasion beach it selected was in the swampy, isolated Bay of Pigs, ninety miles southeast of Havana. The idea apparently shocked Colonel Ramon Barquin, an Army officer who had been imprisoned by Batista, one of the most respected military figures among the *émigrés* and the man who almost certainly would have been Ray's choice to command the invasion had Ray had a choice. Colonel Barquin pointed out that only two narrow, easily defended paths led inland from the Bay of Pigs. One was a narrow road, the other a narrow railroad bed. On either side of these defiles, for a distance of twenty-four miles inland, stretched impenetrable, mosquito-infested swamps. "This swamp offers some advantages—you can't be

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Some U. S. Press Comment On the Cuban Invasion and the CIA

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Oakland Tribune



"P-s-s - small something burning?"

flanked," Colonel Barquin conceded. "But it makes no difference; you can be stopped easily enough." All that Castro would have to do would be to concentrate tanks and troops at the mouths of the two funnels opening onto the central Cuban plain; his task would be like putting a cork in the mouth of a bottle.

The ways to disaster had now been greased by CIA decisions that, it would seem, had erred at each and every step along the way; the invasion ship was about to be launched. On March 29, after making some changes in plan, President Kennedy flashed the green light from the White House. One of the President's modifications banned U.S. aerial strikes in support of the invaders; the Cubans must do it on their own. Another dealt with the cleaning out of Batista supporters in the invasion army. The President himself, it is said, ordered the arrest of Rolando Masferrer, the best-known Batista henchman; but, while this order was carried out, CIA heeded imperfectly the President's intent. Other Batista luminaries like Captain San Román sailed from Guatemala in command of their troops.

The attack began with surprise raids by B-26s on Castro's airfields. They wrought some damage, but, as events were to show, not enough. This was the first failure, but it wasn't the most serious. For a strategic move that reads like something out of Gilbert and Sullivan, one has to thank the masterminds of CIA. On some level—on just what level and on just whose authority the American public, presumably, will never be permitted to know—the brilliant decision was reached that the Cuban leaders of the Revolutionary Front were not to be permitted to have anything to say, or to do, with their own invasion.

Climax to a Nightmare

On April 16, the day before the actual invasion, Dr. José Miró Cardona and the members of his Revolutionary Council were in New York. They received word to go to Philadelphia. There they were met and flown to Miami. The instant they arrived, they were conducted to a small, isolated house on the out-

skirts. Here they were held virtual prisoners. They were not permitted to use the telephone. They were not permitted to communicate with anyone. They were allowed only to listen to radio reports of how their invasion was being managed for them.

Here, perhaps, is the most fantastic episode of the entire fantastic nightmare. The success of the invasion from the outset clearly depended on a mass uprising of the Cuban people in its support. But Ray, the underground commander, the only leader who could have been effective in marshaling such support, was muzzled. Obviously, he was too left-wing, too dangerous a man. Obviously, too, CIA wasn't trusting any of the other members of the Revolutionary Council; it was making certain that *they* didn't interfere with CIA's invasion.

Some genius in CIA evidently decided that the Cuban people would arise en masse if a message was beamed to them from our Swan Island radio station off the Honduran coast. And so this message was concocted:

Alert! Alert! Look well at the rainbow. The first will rise very soon. Chicó is in the house. Visit him. The sky is blue. Place notice in the tree. The tree is green and brown. The letters arrived well. The letters are white. The fish will not take much time to rise. The fish is red. Look well at the rainbow....

This gibberish, as far as can be learned, was the only notice the Cuban people ever got. Ray's underground, so assiduously kept in the dark by CIA, didn't even know an invasion was coming off—and so did nothing. The Cuban people apparently didn't make much sense out of that fish and rainbow business—and so did nothing. The invasion troops stormed ashore and found Castro, much better informed than the underground, waiting for them.

The debacle was swift. The invaders stabbed inland along the one narrow road, the one narrow railroad bed. They penetrated for twenty miles, and then they were hit by tanks, by artillery fire, by strafing from the air. American papers carried glaring headlines about Russian MIGs turning the tide, but less

hysterical reports later showed that there wasn't a MIG in the air. Castro had armed some old jet-trainer planes, and these were enough. An ammunition ship, carrying practically all of the reserve supplies for the expedition, was sunk. The narrow road and railroad track were smothered by fire. On either side the jungles hemmed in the invaders. They could not advance, they could not escape; they could only surrender.

Post-Mortem Debacle

Now, to compound the military disaster, came other disasters, the full effects of which almost certainly have not yet been totaled. First, there was the lying. As in the U-2 disaster, we tried to deny the self-evident truth. In a world that we expect to accept America's word as its bond, we deliberately set out to demonstrate again that this word was worthless. Rep. William Fitts Ryan (D., N.Y.) writes that, after the invasion had been under way for twenty-four hours, "an official representative of the State Department stood in the 20th Congressional District Office in Washington and said that neither the CIA, the State Department nor any other government agency was involved 'in any way.'" Worse, far worse, was the spectacle in the United Nations.

There Adlai Stevenson, our Ambassador to the U.N., a man of tremendous personal prestige not only among Americans but among the peoples of the world, put his prestige on the line in a lost and tarnished cause. Apparently, he hadn't been told the truth by his own government; and so, replying to charges of American intervention made by the Cuban delegate, Stevenson denied categorically that the United States had had any hand—any hand at all—in the attempt to overthrow Castro. Such charges, he said, were a tissue of lies delivered "in the jargon of communism." He added: "If the Castro regime has hostility to fear, it is the hostility of Cubans, not of Americans. . . . If the Castro regime is overthrown, it will be overthrown by Cubans, not Americans. I do not see that it is the obligation of the United States to protect Dr. Castro from the consequences of his

treason to the promises of his revolution."

To turn Stevenson's own phrase back upon him, what kind of "jargon" is this?

Even though television viewers who had venerated Stevenson turned away sick at the sight, American officials still were not willing to embrace truth. A determined effort was made, with the help of the Madison Avenue public relations firm that had been hired to handle pronouncements for the Cubans, to picture the invasion as no invasion at all—just a little guerrilla operation involving no more than 200 or 300 men, many of whom had succeeded in making contact with rebel forces in the interior of Cuba. This myth quickly was exploded by Castro. He paraded some 1,200 captives for all the world to see. He even had them tell their stories on television. There, in the full glare of the klieg lights, some were identified as former Batista thugs; and all, almost to a man, pleaded they had been deceived by the CIA.

Catastrophic as all this was, it was not the end of the catastrophe. Castro's police and Army put on a nation-wide hunt for subversives. It is estimated that 100,000 suspects were rounded up. Though many were finally released, hardly a single leader in Ray's underground escaped. Resistance leaders denounced CIA

bitterly. Their organization, they said, had been wrecked, and some wondered out loud whether this had been part of CIA's intention. In a Cuban prison, Associated Press correspondent Robert Berrellez met a twenty-two-year-old Cuban who had been one of Ray's principal lieutenants in the Cuban underground. This Cuban complained bitterly that, a month before the invasion, the CIA radio station on Swan Island had actually broadcast his name to Castro's police. "This station paid tribute to me by name for helping exiles get out of Cuba clandestinely," the resistance leader said. "That tipped off G-2 and I was finally trapped."

In the light of such stories, can one wonder that many Cubans refuse to trust CIA any more? The extent of the distrust was clearly indicated in Miami on May 23, when Ray finally took his MRP out of the Cuban Revolutionary Council. The move, he said bluntly, was in protest against the CIA's continued domination of the Cuban resistance, its continued playing of Cuban politics, its continued refusal to support MRP and its continued recruitment of former Batista officials for a new "national army." This would seem to indicate that not even a disaster of the magnitude of Cuba can change the rigid mentality of CIA, can drag it—to use an old Stevenson phrase—

"kicking and screaming into the twentieth century."

Cuba, and CIA's infatuation with Batista bravos and authoritarians of the far Right, are merely the final chapter in a book in which the plots, whatever else may be said of them, are all consistent. Iran, Guatemala, Laos, Cuba: in all of them, the CIA's fondest affection has been reserved for militarists with nineteenth-century social outlooks, for small and wealthy ruling cliques that have no sincere interest in the welfare of the millions whom they govern. The imposition of such governments merely stalls the future and gives Khrushchev his talking points. As Stuart Novins wrote in a perceptive final paragraph in his account of the Cuban fiasco in *The Reporter*:

The tragic episode ... raises a number of obvious questions about the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency. But beyond that, there is reason to doubt that even if the attack had been successful, it could have produced a viable political resolution for the bloody turmoil of Cuba's recent history. To liberate Cuba from the outside, with a government to be imposed from the outside, is not the most promising way to promote a stable democracy in Cuba and to advance the social and economic welfare of its people. Not only does Cuba know this, but far more important, the rest of Latin America knows it too.



PART IX A LOOK AT THE FUTURE

If it is true that the agency [CIA] mapped the invasion plan, herded the Cuban resistance leaders around like redheaded stepchildren and conducted military operations in their stead, then we have trusted a Government agency to make all but war without the consent of Congress.—*Rep. Paul G. Rogers (D., Fla.) in the House of Representatives, May 1, 1961.*

I want my position to be crystal clear. The Pentagon, the military services, and the intelligence services of the nation are to be the servants of the policymakers. They are not to be policymakers in themselves....

If we have learned anything in recent months...it is that the preponderance of the emphasis...on the part of the military, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the other intelligence services was overwhelmingly involved in the policymaking functions of the Government, to the point where the actions of the military and the CIA made policy through their preemption of the field.—*Senator Hubert D. Humphrey (D., Minn.) in the Senate, May 3, 1961.*

THESE TWO quotes pose an issue that, in its depth and dimensions, appears still not to have been fully

realized by the American people. This is no issue of internal organization. This is no technical issue, involving the combination of intelligence and action functions in one agency, the CIA, though that is part of it. This is an issue that goes to the very guts of the democratic processes. Involved here is the question of whether the "black" arts (sabotage, revolution, invasion) are to dominate all American democratic functions and to determine for our people willy-nilly, without debate, without knowledge even of what is at stake, the course their nation is to take in

the world. No lesser issue amounts to a tinker's damn here.

Congress alone, under our Constitution, is supposed to have the right to declare war. This safeguard was devised by the Founding Fathers with the wise intent of insuring that no Executive with a mania for power could ever determine for the people whether they were to live in peace, or to fight and die. Only the people through their representatives in Congress were to decide their own fate on this most crucial of all issues. Today, with intercontinental ballistic missiles and nuclear warheads casting a dread shadow over the world, there is more need than ever before in history for an intelligent and informed electorate to exercise the restraints and the powers of decision guaranteed in the Constitution. Yet today we practice the "black" arts on such a far-flung, billion-dollar scale, we throw around them such a mantle of spurious patriotic secrecy, that neither the people nor their watchdogs in Congress have the faintest idea what is happening until it has happened—until it is too late. In essence, CIA, which is at the root of the evil, has become a Frankenstein monster dominating the Congress that created it.

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The result is a twofold tragedy. Abroad, CIA destroys our prestige and undermines our influence. At home we do not even know what is happening.

Actions Belie Words

Our Presidents—Eisenhower was notable for this and was motivated, nearly everyone would agree, by a deep sincerity—proclaim our peaceful intentions, our devotion to the ideals of democracy and good will and world peace. The American people sincerely believe that this is what we stand for and cannot comprehend why the world at large does not believe in our so obviously good intentions. Our people do not understand that, even as our Presidents speak, the actions of CIA frequently invest their words with every appearance of the most arrant hypocrisy. The Presidents speak peace; but the CIA overthrows regimes, plots internal sabotage and revolution, foists opium-growers on a friendly nation, directs military invasions, backs right-wing militarists. These are not the actions of a democratic, peace-loving nation devoted to the high ideals we profess. These are the actions of the Comintern in right-wing robes. America, no more than the USSR, can speak out of both sides of its mouth and expect the peoples of the world to trust in its sincerity.

All of this goes on abroad, but at home the American public does not know for long months, if ever, what CIA has brewed. The power of a billion-dollar, secret agency operating as a law unto itself is almost incalculable, not just in molding the image of America in foreign lands, but in molding at home the image Americans have of the world around them. Time and again American public opinion has been whiplashed into a warlike frenzy by glaring headlines picturing a callous Communist aggressor when, all the time, the CIA was the secret provocative agent. The crisis over Quemoy was a glaring example. The U-2 incident, in which our government lied to "cover" CIA and pictured to the public a Russian bear reaching out with bloody paw to down our innocent little weather plane, was

another. Less well known, but perhaps of greater long-range importance, is the manner in which our whole attitude toward Communist China has been deliberately colored, as Charles Edmundson has written, by "the State Department's repeated and sometimes incendiary statements that all Americans held prisoner in Communist China are held illegally and in violation of international law. Every well-informed correspondent and editor in Washington knows that many of the prisoners have been U.S. intelligence agents, whom China has as much right to hold as the United States has to imprison Rudolph Ivanovich Abel, the Soviet 'master spy.'" By such tactics, Edmundson writes, the American public has been bamboozled "to the point where a rational China policy has become a political impossibility."

Making Peace Difficult

It may even be that a rational policy of any kind has become a political impossibility. Cyrus Eaton, the multi-millionaire Cleveland industrialist who has long championed a policy of coexistence with China and the Soviet Union, pointedly suggests that either CIA or some of its secretive governmental collaborators is indulging, within the United States, in propaganda activities designed to make any peaceful solution impossible. In a letter to Senator Fulbright, Eaton charges that federal funds are being funneled secretly into the promotion of demonstrations designed to inflame public opinion against visiting iron-curtain diplomats. Eaton writes:

An interesting question is, who supplies the funds to hire the professionals who surround the embassies and follow foreign visitors with insulting signs and shouted epithets? I find it hard to believe, but I am informed that substantial funds for such undesirable activities come from federal appropriations, under a disguised name.

After the Soviet Deputy Premier, Mr. Mikoyan, visited me in Cleveland, I made a point of investigating the group of Hungarians who endeavored to molest him in Cleveland, Detroit and Chicago. *It turned out that the identical people had gone into all three cities by car and had obviously been hired and fi-*

nanced by someone with ample funds, reputedly Uncle Sam. In Cleveland, representatives of the State Department gave every evidence of conniving with the Hungarian hecklers by putting at their disposal the routes and locations most advantageous for their hostile demonstrations against the Mikoyan party.

I have also looked carefully into the background of the so-called Hungarian Freedom Fighters. Many of them turn out to be former officers of the Nazi Army that invaded Hungary; they were, of course, obliged to flee the country when Hitler was defeated. (Italics added.)

This is a truly sensational charge. Eaton's very name, of course, is anathema to right-wingers, but Congressional attempts to investigate him have proved largely futile and he remains a powerful and influential man. Whether investigation would establish the validity of his charge remains uncertain; but in considering it, two facts perhaps should be borne in mind—the long love affair of CIA with the Gehlen agency, which included former Nazi officers and operated in Hungary, and the Cuban freedom fighters' recollections of the number of "East European" CIA agents who, with the aid of interpreters, directed their drills in Guatemala. If these should ever turn out to be true straws in the wind, if Eaton's charge should ever be substantiated, an entire new field of secret CIA activity might be exposed—one more pernicious than any other in its underhanded influence on American public opinion.

What Kind of Probe?

CIA is, of course, now being investigated. It is being investigated now just as it has already been investigated four times in the past—in private, in secret. Each investigation found flaws. Each reported CIA was working to correct them. Each succeeding probe found some of the same flaws and reported that CIA was working to correct them. And now, in 1961, we have come to our present pass.

In 1956, a Congressional Joint Committee called futilely for the appointment of a watchdog commission to put a checkrein on CIA. The committee took some round-house swings at CIA's most precious

forte, its ironclad secrecy. "Once secrecy becomes sacrosanct, it invites abuse," the committee wrote. "Secrecy now beclouds everything about CIA. . . ." The committee quoted with approbation the comment of Hanson Baldwin of *The New York Times* that CIA "engages in activities that, unless carefully balanced and well executed, could lead to political, psychological, and even military defeats, and even to changes in our form of government." The first part of that prediction has certainly come to pass. As for the second, the committee itself wrote: "Our form of government . . . is based on a system of checks and balances. If this system gets seriously out of balance at any point, the whole system is jeopardized and the way is open for the growth of tyranny."

The way is still open. For the Congress of 1956 did nothing. And we reaped the whirlwind in Laos and in Cuba.

The new, Executive-style investigation ordered by President Kennedy can hardly be expected to meet

the full need, the full right, of the American people to know. Gen. Maxwell Taylor heads the President's new investigating board; the President's brother, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, sits upon it. So does Allen Dulles, the man being investigated. It may be noted that



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it is rare indeed when the defendant turns star prosecutor at his own inquest.

The record of the past few years seems to say clearly that the colossal mess CIA has created demands nothing less than a full-scale Congressional investigation. It is not enough just to lop off CIA's operational arm and give its "black arts" intriguers to some other secret

agency; we need to examine in detail just what the "black arts" have brought us, we need to consider whether they can ever be reconciled with the principles of democracy—the principles we profess. It is not enough just to give Congress finally, at long last, a watchdog committee (a move, incidentally, that is still by no means certain); we need to examine publicly, in detail, the qualities of mind and the kind of hidden interests that have placed our prestige unreservedly behind wealthy oligarchies and right-wing militarists in a world in which the growing clamor on every side is for social and economic justice, social and economic change. We need to discover how and why, as Walter Lippmann wrote, we are doing just what Khrushchév expects us to do, why we are doing his propagandizing for him. Only if we make basic determinations of this kind can we hope for the future. And we cannot make them if we do not first learn the who and the how and the why that have so often placed us on the wrong and losing side—if we do not clean out the forces that put us there. This, only an aroused Congress could hope to accomplish.

tarists. M. Soustelle, at a luncheon in Washington last December 7, is said to have talked long and earnestly to CIA Deputy Director Richard Bissell, Jr., on the proposition that de Gaulle's program in Algeria could lead only to communism. CIA is said to have been impressed; General Challe, who led the revolt, is said to have had several meetings with CIA agents; he is reported to have been given the impression that he would have the support of the United States.

All of this Mr. Dulles and the CIA categorically deny. But Walter Lippmann reported from Paris that it is known that CIA agents meddled in France's internal affairs during the French debate on the nuclear-arms program. And the highest French officials, pleased by President Kennedy's prompt and whole-hearted support of de Gaulle, have called the Algerian incident closed—but they have not, pointedly they have not, given a full and clean bill of health to CIA. It is a sequence that leaves a foul taste in the mouth. As *The New Republic's* Washington correspondent wrote, commenting on the French charges and recalling the background incidents of U-2; and Cuba: "Preposterous—? Certainly! And yet . . . and yet. . . . It is not that we think for a minute that the French charge is true, but that now we are suspicious of everything."

So we are. *L'Express*, with pointed intent, quotes Allen Dulles: "The countries which are the most powerful to resist Communist subversion are those where the military are in power." We recall this hard kernel of Dulles' philosophy acting itself out in Egypt, in Iran, in Guatemala, in Laos, in Cuba. Why not in France? Could it be possible in so large a power, one of our oldest Allies? Well—why not? In the secret world of CIA anything is possible—and no one knows. We can only wonder and doubt. And doubt does not inspire confidence abroad or fervor at home. It's time to clean house.

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
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Crossword Puzzle No. 921

By FRANK W. LEWIS



ACROSS:

- 1 Not a very restrained person, considering one is rather pale, and putting on weight. (6)
- 5 and 2 down Proper speech to sign, though they're rather wordy. (12)
- 10 Drumheads should be things Kit made. (9)
- 11 Is to win wrong, when under one's influence? (2,3)
- 12 A small animal with a soft heart to examine in detail. (7)
- 13 The part of the mollusc our generation found troublesome. (7)
- 14 The Village Blacksmith does what-e'er he can. (5)
- 16 A sort of eye can let you burn it, perhaps. (9)
- 18 Dread arrest, understand! (9)
- 20 Shelters the outside coverings, according to what one hears. (5)
- 22 The direction of the carriage? (7)
- 24 A way to the heights? One should have wings! (7)
- 26 In Hamlet, they say an old man is such a child! (5)
- 27 Send to the office again checks which get big. (9)
- 28 A planner is sometimes far along with this, and digs the difference!
- 29 In return, the revolutionary scold one that might fly. (6)

DOWN:

- 2 See 5 across
- 3 Those who make lace out of rags?
- 4 Get a toe-in job, and arrange things

- this way. (9)
- 5 Man takes these occasions to make laws. (5)
- 6 The root of psychic or youthful problems? (7)
- 7 Its center is cut with a cross. (9)
- 8 Presently on board, but yet not in place. (7)
- 9 Did Cleopatra have to rouse it at last? We hope so! (6)
- 15 Making double-talk? (The fabric needs taking in.) (9)
- 17 Such words as 22 do, making precious sense. (9)
- 18 A trailer in Technicolor? (7)
- 19 What's happening around the primitive force of the plain? (7)
- 20 Coins, as changed by one that evidently rolls over and over. (7)
- 21 Go along with a canonized list. (6)
- 23 Skirts and matadors might be. (5)
- 25 When "Mr. William Shakespear" was a boy he exercised his father's, according to John Aubrey. (5)

SOLUTION TO PUZZLE NO. 920

ACROSS: 1 and 5 Standing orders; 10 Catch; 11 Seahorses; 12 Earning; 13 Acolyte; 14 Marshy; 15 Husband; 18 Overbid; 21 Starch; 24 Silence; 26 Open end; 27 Pamphlets; 28 Gayer; 29 Gasp; 30 Usurpers. DOWN: 1 Sachem; 2 Alternate; 3 Dahlias; 4 Nosegay; 6 Riotous; 7 Essay; 8 Suspends; 9 Calash; 16 Archetype; 17 Roast pig; 19 Banshee; 20 Deemed; 21 Spouses; 22 Avenger; 23 Adorns; 25 Lambs.

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Sullivan	
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TO : MR. W. C. SULLIVAN *WCS*

DATE: June 23, 1961

FROM :

b7C

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJECT: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
ARTICLE, "THE CIA" BY FRED J. COOK
JUNE 24, 1961 ISSUE OF "THE NATION"

CLASS BY *SP8 BTJ/dd*

DATE OF REVIEW *09/82*

6-18-85 SP6/ma Key Comp #55157

Synopsis

Article authored by Fred J. Cook in June 24, 1961 issue of "The Nation" reviewed and analyzed by the Liaison Agent. It is an excellent compilation of past criticisms of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). His sources are publications and past articles and he does not reveal any "secrets" heretofore not published. In addition to a strong attack against CIA, his article is directed against U.S. foreign policy and in general follows the Communist Party and Soviet line. This article should serve as an ideal manual of reference for future attacks not only against CIA, but against U.S. intelligence as such.

Several brief references to Bureau made. Cook quotes Dulles as stating that a CIA director should have tenure "like Hoover in the FBI." He also inaccurately states that Bureau wanted to be "sole gatherer and dispenser of information" prior to establishment of CIA. He also states that under National Security Act, CIA does not have access to FBI files. Reference is also made to a newspaper man who commented concerning the existence of FBI personnel in American Embassy, Havana, Cuba.

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ACTION:

ENCLOSURE ATTACHED

Stacked information remains classified per CIA letter 3/2/87

For information. Liaison will report any pertinent items received from CIA.

SJR: jad (9)

Enclosure

1-Mr. Belmont; 1-Mr. DeLoach; 1-Mr. Sullivan; 1-Mr. R.W. Smith,
1-Mr. Branigan; 1-Liaison; 1-Mr. Papich

b7C

62 JUL 6 1961

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12 JUN 29 1961
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JUN 30 1961

Memo [redacted]-Sullivan
Re: CIA, ARTICLE, "THE CIA" BY FRED J. COOK
JUNE 24, 1961 ISSUE OF "THE NATION"

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Details

The referenced article has been reviewed by Agent Papich who handles liaison with CIA. [redacted]

b3

Publication and Release of Article

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The article, which constitutes practically the entire June 24, 1961 issue of "The Nation," appeared on the newsstands on June 22, 1961. No advance notice had come to our attention. [redacted] (C)

Description and Theme

The article, consisting of 43 pages, is an excellent compilation of past criticisms of CIA. Cook has gone to books, newspapers, etc., for his "facts." He has not come up with any "secrets" not published before. Ostensibly, the entire article is a very strong attack against CIA, but in addition, it is also directed against U.S. foreign policy; so much so that the general theme follows the Communist Party and Soviet line. Cook's document should serve as an ideal manual or reference for any future attacks, not only against CIA, but against U.S. intelligence as such. As a writer, Cook appears to be antimilitary, anti-intelligence, anti-intervention, a pacifist, strongly opposed to a powerful Germany and very much against Nationalist China. Although he was writing on CIA, he rambled to great lengths on matters that specifically dealt with U.S. foreign policy.

Motive

We do not have any background information which would explain exactly why the article was written and which forces or individuals are behind it. "The Nation" takes the position that the article is informing U.S. citizens concerning a menace which is threatening U.S. security. The door was open to publishing such an

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Memo [redacted] to Sullivan
Re: CIA, ARTICLE, "THE CIA" BY FRED J. COOK
JUNE 24, 1961 ISSUE OF "THE NATION"

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

article since the Agency already has been the target of wide-spread criticism. [redacted]

[redacted]

(C)

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[redacted]

Accuracy of Article

[redacted]

b3

A review of the article has disclosed [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] he has slanted his material to picture not only CIA, but the entire U.S. Government, in a very derogatory light.

b3

References to Bureau

On page 544 of the article, he describes events which led to the creation of CIA and makes the statement, "the FBI under J. Edgar Hoover long had felt it should be the sole gatherer and dispenser of vital information both at home and abroad." (This is definitely inaccurate.)

On page 545, Cook refers to comments attributed to Allen Dulles concerning leadership. Dulles allegedly expressed the opinion that a director of CIA should be assured of long tenure "like Hoover in the FBI."

In describing powers granted to CIA under the National Security Act, Cook indicated that the files of the FBI were not available to CIA, but the Agency could obtain information from the Bureau by making a request [redacted]

b3

On page 562, he refers to an article allegedly written by Thayer Waldo in the "San Francisco Chronicle" concerning activities in the U.S. Embassy, Havana, Cuba. Waldo is quoted as stating that among

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Memo [redacted] Sullivan
 Re: CIA, ARTICLE, "THE CIA" BY FRED J. COOK
 JUNE 24, 1961 ISSUE OF "THE NATION"

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b3

the employees of the Embassy. "three worked for the FBI." [redacted]

Allen Dulles

Cook devoted so much space to attacking Allen Dulles, the question is raised, "Is Cook attacking CIA or is this attack secondary to his blast against Allen Dulles, the individual?" Throughout the entire article there is woven the theme that Allen Dulles is part of an oligarchy in the U.S. which worked to preserve a strong Germany. He implied that Dulles is working for the "financiers" and he brands Allen and John Foster Dulles as "legal priests and helpful manipulators of some of the greatest German trusts."

Characterization of CIA as Being "Right Wing"

b3

Amazingly, Cook emphasizes his contention that CIA has "pronounced right wing proclivities which always seem to orientate it toward ruling shahs and military dictators." [redacted]

Attack Upon Germany

A striking feature of the entire article is Cook's obsession to express his vehement opposition to a strong German Government. From the beginning, he characterizes Allen Dulles as a key figure in the restoration of a strong Germany. In connection with this, he devotes considerable attention to the activities of General Reinhold Gehlen, top West German intelligence official. All of his references to Gehlen are derogatory.

Cyrus Eaton

To support his criticism of CIA, Cook refers to statements attributed to Cyrus Eaton, who allegedly claimed that either CIA or some of its "secretive" collaborators were indulging in propaganda activities "designed to make any peaceful solution impossible." (Page 570) Cook

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Memo [redacted] Sullivan
Re: CIA, ARTICLE "THE CIA" BY FRED J. COOK
JUNE 24, 1961 ISSUE OF "THE NATION"

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places considerable emphasis on a charge made by Eaton that many of the so-called Hungarian Freedom Fighters were actually Nazis. He even goes so far as to suggest that some of these "Nazis" were used in the training of the Cuban rebels who participated in the recent invasion.

Unidentified Intelligence Agent Who Corresponded with "The Nation"

As indicated above, Cook used sources such as articles, and books which have been publicizing CIA activities in the past. On page 553, he does make reference to a letter which had been received by the magazine in 1957 from an intelligence agent (unidentified). This agent wrote the "The Nation" allegedly criticizing U.S. intelligence activities and our foreign policy.

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[redacted]

(C)

[redacted]

[redacted]

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98
ENCLOSURE


102-80750-3760

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

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Belmont	_____
Mohr	_____
Callahan	_____
Conrad	_____
DeLoach	_____
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Rosen	_____
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Tavel	_____
Trotter	_____
Tele. Room	_____
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Gandy	_____

TO : Mr. Sullivan

DATE: June 22, 1961

FROM : [Redacted]

L b7C

Jim Sizoo b7C

SUBJECT: LIAISON WITH IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE (INS)

Liaison with INS has been handled for the past several years by SA Sam Papich, who also handles liaison with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The purpose of this memorandum is to recommend that SA Papich be relieved of his assignment with INS in order to devote full time to CIA.

W. C. Sullivan
Papich
Date

During the early years of General Swing's tenure in INS, liaison with that agency was a particularly delicate assignment and on several occasions it was necessary for SA Papich to stand up to General Swing and straighten him out insofar as that individual can be straightened. The situation now appears to be changed. General Swing may not be at INS much longer and, in any event, he has not created any special problems for us during the current year.

On the other hand, CIA continues to be one of the most important liaison assignments as well as one of the most time consuming. Proper handling of this assignment now requires the full time and attention of a Liaison Supervisor and it is believed that SA Papich should be relieved of his INS assignment in order to devote his entire attention to CIA.

b7C

SA [Redacted] has demonstrated that he is an able, mature, and productive Supervisor in his liaison handling of such agencies as the Department of Commerce, the Federal Communications Commission, the Civil Aeronautics Board, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare and approximately 30 other miscellaneous agencies. We believe he can handle INS in addition to these other assignments.

ACTION:

62-80750-

If you approve, liaison responsibility for INS will be transferred from SA Papich to SA [Redacted]

b7C

- 1-Mr. Sullivan
- 1-Mr. Papich
- 1-[Redacted]
- 1-Liaison Section

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 167 JUL 15 1961

8 JUL 5 1961

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JUL 5 1961

I think OK, particularly with CIA under fire

56 JUL 12 1961

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

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 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Callahan _____
 Conrad _____
 DeLoach
 Evans
 Malone _____
 Rosen _____
 Sullivan
 Tavel _____
 Trotter _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Ingram _____
 Gandy _____

TO : Mr. Sullivan *Webster*

DATE: June 28, 1961

FROM : *L'* b7C

SUBJECT: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

b3

b3

b3

b3

- SJP:ban *ban*
 1 - Mr. Belmont
 1 - Mr. Sullivan
 1 - Liaison
 1 - Mr. Papich

55 JUL 13 1961

REC-77
EX-107

62-80150-160
 10 JUL 5 1961
[Signature]

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Viper

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- Belmont _____
- Mohr _____
- Callahan _____
- Conrad _____
- DeLoach _____
- Evans _____
- Malone _____
- Rosen _____
- Sullivan _____
- Tavel _____
- Trotter _____
- Tele. Room _____
- Ingram _____
- Gandy _____

TO : Mr. Sullivan *Wcho*

DATE: June 23, 1961

FROM :

[Redacted]

b7C

b7C

SUBJECT:

[Redacted]

(S)

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SYNOPSIS:

[Large Redacted Area]

(S)

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SJP:ban
(12)

- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - [Redacted]
- 1 - [Redacted]
- 1 - [Redacted]
- 1 - Mr. O'Connor
- 1 - [Redacted]
- 1 - [Redacted]
- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Mr. Papich
- 1 - [Redacted]

b7C

b3

109-12-210

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JUL 13 1961

YPO

COPY TO MR TOLSON

[Redacted]

O'Connor

[Redacted]

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 141 JUL 7 1961

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10 JUL 6 1961

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Memorandum [redacted] to Sullivan

Re: [redacted]

b1

(S)

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ACTION:

1. Liaison will continue to follow developments through contacts in other agencies.

[redacted]

(S)

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Wesley Q. V. Hayes

DETAILS:

[redacted]

(S)

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OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

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- Callahan _____
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- DeLoach _____
- Evans _____
- Malone _____
- Rosen _____
- Sullivan _____
- Tavel _____
- Trotter _____
- Tele. Room _____
- Ingram _____
- Gandy _____

TO : MR. BELMONT *WCS*

DATE: 6/28/61

FROM : W. C. Sullivan *WCS*

cc Mr. Belmont
Mr. DeLoach

[Redacted]

b7C

SUBJECT:

[Redacted]

Mr. Sullivan

b1

(S)

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Reference is made to the attached memorandum of 6/22/61, which authorized me to interview Senator Claiborne Pell (Democrat - Rhode Island) relative to the above-captioned matter. *ca Cuba*

Senator Pell has called me during the past few weeks for a luncheon engagement, but I was committed on each occasion. When I called him today to suggest discussing an official matter he asked that I go to luncheon with him, which I did. *b7C*

b1

(S)

Senator Pell forthrightly told me that when he visited Cuba in 12/60, he used his own name at all times. He has never heard of the name [Redacted] in any connection. This, then, clears up the question raised in the attached memorandum. *df*

Senator Pell stated that he remained in Cuba for five days and traveled to different localities, talking to various Cubans. He received the impression, as the result of this trip, that the Cubans would not, within the foreseeable future, revolt against Castro, not that they have any particular fondness for Castro, but they have no means of revolting, nor do they have a clear cause that would engender in them the spirit of insurrection. *D.E.*

Senator Pell stated he thought this was so clearly demonstrated that on his return to the United States he gave the matter further thought and study. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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Enclosure *attached*

EX-101 43

62-80750-1

3263

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Mr. Belmont

b3



Senator Pell pointed out that while he is a young and inexperienced Senator, as yet without power, he wanted me to know that he is most willing to be of assistance to the FBI on any occasion. I thanked him for his manifestation of good will.

RECOMMENDATION:

1. For information of the Director.
2. For referral to the Nationalities Intelligence Section of the Domestic Intelligence Division.

gpl *[scribble]* *[signature]* *[signature]* ✓ *W.C.S.*

~~SECRET~~

- 2 - [redacted]
- 1 - Yellow
- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Mr. Papich

July 5, 1961

SA [redacted] New York

Director, FBI

[redacted]

(S)

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[redacted]

[redacted]

(S)

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You are requested to furnish pertinent details to the Bureau. Your communication should be sent "Attention: Liaison Section."

[redacted]

(S)

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b3

SJP:ban
(5)

ban

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REC-52

62-80730-3764

21 JUL 5 1961

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DATE: 04-22-2005
CLASSIFIED BY 60290 auc bce/ml/tamw AAG --derivative
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1) 04-22-2030

MAIL ROOM

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56 JUL 11 1961

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OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 7/5/61

b1

FROM : SAC, [redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

(S)

SUBJECT: [redacted]

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Re Bureau letter to [redacted]

(S)

b1

DATE: 04-22-2005
CLASSIFIED BY 60290 auc bce/mlt/amw AAG--derivative
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1,6) 04-22-2030

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delivered
7-11-61*

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[redacted]

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2 - Bureau
1 - [redacted]
S [redacted]

(S)

EX-107

62-501-3965

8 JUL 6 1961

58 JUL 17 1961

b1

NAT. SEC. *[signature]*

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~~SECRET~~

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104-01

UNITED STATES

Memorandum

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: 6/28/61

FROM : Legat, [redacted] (S)

SUBJECT: RELATIONS WITH CIA

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[redacted]

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38

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

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2 - Bureau
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EX-105

REC-19

62-80750-3766

JUL 8 1961

[Handwritten signature]
LIAISON
rep

DATE: 04-22-2005
CLASSIFIED BY 60290 auc be/mlt/amw AAG--derivative
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1) 04-22-2030

[Handwritten initials]

50 JUL 11

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THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
American Embassy

b1

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. Belmont	
Mr. Mohr	
Mr. Callahan	
Mr. Conrad	
Mr. DeLoach	
Mr. Evans	
Mr. Malone	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Sullivan	
Mr. Tavel	
Mr. Trotter	
Tele. Room	
Mr. Ingram	
Miss Gandy	

IPM

DATE: 04-22-2005
CLASSIFIED BY 60290 auc bce/mlt/amw AAG--derivative
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1,6) 04-22-2030

(S)

Date: June 19, 1961
To: Director, FBI (62-80750)

Robert

From: Legat, [redacted]

b7C

NWP was

Subject: RELATIONS WITH THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

(S)

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EXP. PROC.

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(S)

[redacted]

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(S)

62-70150-3767
 JUN 20 1961
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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

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1-Yellow
1-Liaison

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Legal Attache

[Redacted]

(S)

6-29-61

Director, FBI (62-80750) - 3767

REC-17

RELATIONS WITH THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

DATE: 04-22-2005
CLASSIFIED BY 60290 auc bce/mlt/amw AAG--derivative
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1,6) 04-22-2030

Reurlet 6-19-61.

EX-104

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JUN 30 1961

COMM-FBI

[Redacted]

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Room _____

1-Foreign Liaison Unit (detached)

REP: eft (5)

6 JUL 12 1961

MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BY COURIER SERVICE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

DATE: 04-22-2005
CLASSIFIED BY 60290 auc bce/mlt/amw
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1) 04-22-2030

Date: July 6, 1961

To:




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From: John Edgar Hoover, Director

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BY COURIER SVC.
70 JUL 7
COMM-FBI

1 - [redacted] (sent direct)

- Tolson _____
- Belmont _____
- Mohr _____
- Callahan _____
- Conrad _____
- DeLoach _____
- Evans _____
- Malone _____
- Rosen _____
- Sullivan _____
- Tavel _____
- Trotter _____
- Tele. Room _____
- Ingram _____
- Gandy _____

GWH:mjm
(8)

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REC-9

EX-105

21 JUL 7 1961

82 JUL 12 1961

MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

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Belmont	_____
Mohr	_____
Callahan	_____
Conrad	_____
DeLoach	_____
Evans	_____
Malone	_____
Rosen	_____
Sullivan	_____
Tavel	_____
Trotter	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Ingram	_____
Gandy	_____

TO : Mr. Sullivan *Wes*

DATE: July 5, 1961

FROM :

[Redacted]

L b7C

SUBJECT: ⁰ CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)
NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE ARTICLE,
JULY 2, 1961, "CIA AGENTS OVERSEAS
LOSING DIPLOMATIC CLOAKS"

DATE: 04-25-2005
CLASSIFIED BY 60290 auc bce/mlt/amw AAG--derivative
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1) 04-25-2030

Reference is made to the enclosed article which appeared in the July 2, 1961, issue of the New York Herald Tribune indicating that large numbers of CIA Agents were being quietly withdrawn from American Embassies overseas. According to the article, this was being done as part of President Kennedy's plans to overhaul CIA.

Discreet inquiries made by the Liaison Agent at CIA have failed to develop any information whatsoever [Redacted]

[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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[Redacted]

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ACTION:

For information.

- SJP:ban (5) *ban*
 - 1 - Mr. Belmont
 - 1 - Mr. Sullivan
 - 1 - Liaison
 - 1 - Mr. Papich
- Enclosure

JUL 17 1961

~~SECRET~~

ENCLOSURE

Tolson _____
 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Callahan _____
 Conrad _____
 DeLoach _____
 Evans _____
 Malone _____
 Rosen _____
 Sullivan _____
 Tavel _____
 Trotter _____
 Tele Room _____
 Ingram _____
 Gandy _____

WCL

Part of Kennedy Overhaul
C. I. A. Agents Overseas
Losing Diplomatic Cloaks

By David Wise
 HYANNIS PORT, Mass., July 1.—As part of President Kennedy's overhaul of the Central Intelligence Agency, large numbers of C. I. A. agents are being quietly withdrawn from American embassies overseas, the New York Herald Tribune has learned.
 Up to now, C. I. A. agents abroad have enjoyed "diplomatic cover," the cloak-and-dagger phrase for agents operating under the guise of embassy personnel. In fact, however, American ambassadors overseas have no control over such C. I. A. agents, even though they nominally are at-

tached to the State Department. This has led to conflicts and embarrassments in the embassies in the past.
 The move does not mean that the overseas C. I. A. personnel will stop operating. But those being withdrawn from "diplomatic cover" will have to find other ways to cloak their activities, according to sources in Washington. Presumably more will now be posing as American business men. In the "dirty tricks" trade this is known as "commercial cover."
 The Kennedy administration's action is part of a general effort to change the C. I. A.
Continued on page 18, column 5

- The Washington Post and Times Herald _____
- The Washington Daily News _____
- The Evening Star _____
- New York Herald Tribune 1
- New York Journal-American _____
- New York Mirror _____
- New York Daily News _____
- New York Post _____
- The New York Times _____
- The Worker _____
- The New Leader _____
- The Wall Street Journal _____
- Date _____

JUL 2 1961

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 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 04-25-2005 BY 60290 auc bce/mlt/amw

62 70750 3 100

ENCLOSURE

and establish clear lines of authority.

Meanwhile, it was understood that the President's decision on whether and how to streamline C. I. A. is coming to a head. In the wake of the Cuban invasion disaster, Mr. Kennedy named Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor to study what might be done to overhaul the intelligence system.

Gen. Taylor, named last week as the President's "military representative" in the White House, reported orally to the Chief Executive—presumably a precaution to avoid "news leaks" about the intelligence survey.

While the Taylor report is super-secret, it can be stated that two broad changes in the intelligence establishment are currently under consideration by the White House.

First is a proposal to merge the Intelligence and Research Division of the State Department with the C. I. A. intelligence-gathering functions into a new agency.

The new agency would be related to the State Department much as in the case of the U. S. Information Agency.

The second proposal would be to take away from the C. I. A. all operational functions, such as its organization of the invasion of Cuba by anti-Castro exiles. One criticism of the C. I. A. has been that intelligence gathering and covert operations should not be conducted by the same agency.

The problem is where to put the operational arm of the C. I. A. if it removed from the agency. One solution would be to assign it to the Pentagon, but there is strong Congressional pressure against this.

In making his decision on these matters, the President is also expected to be guided by the findings of Dr. James R. Killian jr., who was named by Mr. Kennedy to head a permanent board charged with checking up on the C. I. A. and other American intelligence activities.

Not all the Administration's intelligence activities these days are directed at the Soviet Union. The White House confirmed yesterday that the President, in an extraordinary move, had ordered the F. B. I. to investigate the "leak" of U. S. contingency plans for Berlin to the press. The President's order was first reported yesterday by The Chicago Sun-Times.

Probe Not Confined

The story on Berlin planning appeared in "Newsweek" magazine. However, White House press secretary Pierre Salinger said the F. B. I. probe was not confined to "Newsweek."

Today in Hyannis Port, associate press secretary Andrew T. Hatcher said this did not mean there was a general investigation of news leaks.

"This (Berlin) is the only incident under investigation," he said. "My understanding is that it is confined to what has been termed wilful passing of secret information to persons not authorized to have that information."

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W. A. Sullivan

June 28, 1961

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SP7 CL/AMW 88-1216
11/20/94 C~~

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[Redacted]

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Declassify on: OADR 7-8-85

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CA 88-1824~~

~~9002 RDD/ME
5/5/93
C.A. # 88-1824~~

The captioned individual advised our New York Office that

[Redacted]

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[Redacted] New York was informed

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that the Bureau was not making any request for [Redacted] was free to [Redacted] the internal security of the country and was of interest to the FBI. By letter dated June 20, 1961, the New York Office forwarded a Photostat of [Redacted]

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100-100123

(S) (u)

- 1 - 62-80750
- 1 - [Redacted]
- 1 - Mr. Belmont
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - [Redacted]
- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - [Redacted]
- 1 - Mr. Papich

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JUL 11 1961

ORIGINAL FILE IN 100-100123

SJP:gp
(9)

56 JUL 12 1961

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

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DATE: 04-25-2005
CLASSIFIED BY 60290 auc bce/mlt/amw
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1) 04-25-2030

~~SECRET~~

b7C

Memorandum to Mr. Sullivan

RE: [redacted]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

[redacted]

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ACTION:

For information. With your approval, a copy of [redacted]
[redacted]

*Director's
Memo*

way should we do this

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OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104-02

UNITED STATES

NT

Memorandum

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI
(ATT: LIAISON SECTION)

DATE: 7/7/61

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (105-36501)

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SUBJECT:

[Redacted]

(S)

29640

Re Bulet, 7/5/61.

DATE: 04-25-2005
CLASSIFIED BY 60290 auc bce/mlt/amw
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1) 04-25-2030

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2-Bureau (RM)
1-New York (105-36501)

TJM:sla

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COPIES
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EX REC-36
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62-80750-3770

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

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 Belmont _____
 Mohr _____
 Callahan _____
 Conrad _____
 DeLoach _____
 Evans _____
 Malone _____
 Rosen _____
 Sullivan _____
 Tavel _____
 Trotter _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Ingram _____
 Gandy _____

TO : Mr. Sullivan *Wcho*

DATE: July 5, 1961

FROM :

b7C

SUBJECT: THE PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

By memorandum dated July 1, 1961. I advised you that

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- SJP:ban *ban*
 (6)
 1 - Mr. Belmont
 1 - Mr. Sullivan
 1 -
 1 - Liaison *b7C*
 1 - Mr. Papich

58 JUL 17 1961

62-80750-
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 128 JUL 13 1961

XEROX
 JUL 13 1961

~~TO JUL 12 1961~~

LIAISON

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
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Page 6 ~ b1, b3

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Page 22 ~ b1, b3

Page 26 ~ b1, b3, b7C

Page 34 ~ b1, b3

Page 37 ~ b1, b3, b7C

Page 38 ~ b1, b3, b7C

Page 39 ~ b3, b7C

Page 40 ~ b3, b7C

Page 43 ~ b1, b3

Page 56 ~ b1, b2, b3, b7C

Page 58 ~ b1, b3

Page 73 ~ b3, b7C, b7D

Page 74 ~ b3, b7C, b7D

Page 75 ~ b7C, b7D

Page 76 ~ Referral/Direct

Page 79 ~ b1, b3

Page 85 ~ b1, b3, b7C, b7D

Page 86 ~ b1, b3, b7C, b7D

Page 103 ~ b3

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Page 135 ~ b1, b3

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Page 137 ~ b1, b3

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Page 143 ~ b1, b3

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Page 363 ~ b1, b3
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