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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 04-12-2007 BY AUC 60324 BAW/RS/SEZ

ATTENTION

The following documents appearing in FBI files have been reviewed under the provisions of The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (Title 5, United States Code, Section 552), Privacy Act of 1974 (PA) (Title 5, United States Code, Section 552a), and/or Litigation.

☐ FOIA/PA

☐ Litigation

☐ Executive Order Applied

Requester: _____

Subject: _____

Computer or Case Identification Number: _____

Title of Case: _____ Section _____

* File _____

Serials Reviewed: _____

Release Location: *File _____ Section _____

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b2

File Number: _____ Section _____

Serial(s) Reviewed: _____

FOIPA Requester: _____

FOIPA Subject: _____

FOIPA Computer Number: _____

File Number: _____ Section _____

Serial(s) Reviewed: _____

FOIPA Requester: _____

FOIPA Subject: _____

FOIPA Computer Number: _____

File Number: _____ Section _____

Serial(s) Reviewed: _____

FOIPA Requester: _____

FOIPA Subject: _____

FOIPA Computer Number: _____

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SCANNED BY DocLab (RMD)

DATE: 4-3-07

ATTENTION

LAST SERIAL: 4857 DO NOT REMOVE FROM FILE

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE April 22, 1970

FROM

D. E. Moore

SUBJECT

RELATIONS WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

Tolson ✓
DeLoach ✓
Walters ✓
Mohr ✓
Bishop ✓
Casper ✓
Callahan ✓
Conrad ✓
Felt ✓
Gale ✓
Rosen ✓
Sullivan ✓
Tavel ✓
Trotter ✓
Tele. Room ✓
Holmes ✓
Gandy ✓

Your memorandum to Mr. DeLoach of 4/14/70 reported the results of a meeting with representatives of CIA which had been approved by the Director.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

DEM:chs (4)
1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. D.E. Moore

REC-94

CONTINUED - OVER 10 APR 29 1970

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/1/94 BY SP7 CUC/sem

PAR CDA REVIEW OF
6/1/94

59 MAY 1 1970 XEROX 29 1970

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

Memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan
RE: RELATIONS WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

[REDACTED]

b2
b3

[REDACTED]

Any further information received from CIA about this matter in subsequent meetings will be set forth in detail and any matters requiring action by the Bureau will be set forth with appropriate recommendations for a decision by the Director.

ACTION:

For information.

✓

WCS

b
WBS
mm

[REDACTED]

b3

h C 1

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO The Director

DATE

6-14-67.

FROM N. P. Callahan

SUBJECT The Congressional Record

W.D.
ST

66-1731-3100

Original filed in:

Pages A2804-A2806. Congressman Muller, (D) New York, pointed out that "the Central Intelligence Agency has, for a long time, been a weapon for fighting the threat of communism. Thomas W. Braden, writing for the Saturday Evening Post, has dealt with the history of the International Organization Division of the CIA and the devices it has used to combat the threat of communism." He included Mr. Braden's article entitled "I'm Glad the CIA is 'Immoral'" which appeared in the May 20 issue of the Post.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-21-2006 BY 60322/AAC/LP KPB/AVR

62-80750-
NOT RECORDED
124 JUN 27 1967

In the original of a memorandum captioned and dated as above, the Congressional Record for 6-13-67 was reviewed and pertinent items were marked for the Director's attention. This form has been prepared in order that portions of a copy of the original memorandum may be clipped, mounted, and placed in appropriate Bureau case or subject matter files.

55 JUL 3 1967

KBP 7.105

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

FROM : G. C. Moore

b1
b3 SUBJECT

[REDACTED]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

~~SECRET~~
SEE REVERSE
SIDE FOR
CLASSIFICATION

- 1 - Mr. C. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. J. P. Mohr
- 1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE 4/7/70

- 1 - Mr. W. S. Tavel
- 1 - Mr. G. C. Moore
- 1 - Mr. C. D. Brennan
- 1 - Mr. R. D. Cotter

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Walters _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

To advise that

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

CIA information remains
classified per letter
dated 12-4-00.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Enclosure

REC 4

JCM:djw/fb

SEE ACTION PAGE TWO

APR 28 1970

5 MAY 14 1970

~~SECRET~~
LBI POLICE
REC'D 2/11/70

CLASSIFIED BY 12-12-12
DECLASSIFY ON 12-12-12
XEROX MAY 4 1970
b1
b2
b3
b7C

Moore
e @ B...
C...

Wells N. Kent

5-11-70
(S) T...

(S) W

BACK OF PAGE

APR 27 12 09 PM 1970
REC'D DOM INTELL DIV

DATE: 2-5-2007
CLASSIFIED BY: 60322 UCW/DCG/JN
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3.3 (1) 2-5-2082
#368692 (OKA INFO. REMAINS
CLASSIFIED PER 12-4-00 LETTER)

RECEIVED-TOLSON
FBI

APR 8 3 34 PM 1970

APR 9 7 18 AM '70
REC'D SULLIVAN
FBI JUSTICE

APR 8 1 59 PM 1970
REC'D-MURR
FBI

APR 8 12 40 PM '70
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE
FBI
FILES & COMMUNICATIONS
DIVISION

APR 8 4 10 PM '70
REC'D DOM INTELL DIV
FBI
APR 8 6 17 PM 1970
RECEIVED
REC'D DOM INTELL DIV
FBI
APR 8 9 12 AM 1970
REC'D DOM INTELL DIV
FBI

APR 8 7 03 AM '70
REC'D SULLIVAN
FBI JUSTICE

APR 14 1970

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum G. C. Moore to Mr. W. C. Sullivan

RE:

[Redacted]

(S)

b1
b3

ACTION:

If approved, attached teletype will be sent
to CIA [Redacted]

[Redacted]

(S)

b1
b2
b3

Jim

gud

wel

✓

OK
ia

574

wiss

CM

~~SECRET~~

February 10, 1978

PERSONAL

~~105-78256~~
62-80750

Mr. Scott J. Werner
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Denver, Colorado

Dear Werner:

I am most pleased to commend you for the aggressive fashion in which you handled certain information relating to a matter of extreme importance to the FBI.

You performed in a forceful manner in making a statement made and thereby insured the Bureau's interests were protected. I am indeed appreciative of your admirable services.

Sincerely,
J. Edgar Hoover

Re: Thomas Riha, aka
IS - R

1 - Mrs. Randolph (Sent Direct)

cc: [unclear] (4)

Dated on Denver letter 2-12-78 re Thomas Riha, aka; Internal Security - Russia.

ORIGINAL FILED IN 67-19478-452

MAY 1 1978

CC: ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, F.B.I.

FROM : SAC, DENVER (105-451)

SUBJECT: THOMAS RIHA, aka.
IS - R
INTERNAL SECURITY - RUSSIA

DATE: February 12, 1970

Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Casper
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Felt
Mr. Gale
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Soyars
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

On the late afternoon of February 10, 1970, I was
recalled by [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

ENCLOSURE

[REDACTED]

I am enclosing, for the Bureau's information, an article which appeared in the February 11, 1970, issue of The Rocky Mountain News, a Denver newspaper. The article is captioned "Boulder housewife says she talked to Riha."

2 - Bureau (Encl. - 2)

1 - Denver

SSJ:ekw

(3) Enclosure

NOT RECORDED

MAY 1 1970

NOT RECORDED

MAR 30 1970

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

67-194768-452

Towards the end of the article it reports that MC KEVITT had received an official denial from "a Washington source" that any of the official agencies which have been named in connection with the RIHA case actually had any knowledge of where RIHA is now. The source, according to the article which MC KEVITT refused to identify, also said RIHA was not involved in espionage of any sort and that none of these agencies have ever told anyone in Boulder, Denver, or elsewhere that RIHA was alive and well.

The article points out the most frequently mentioned agencies have been the FBI, CIA, Military Intelligence agencies and the U. S. INS.

Also enclosed is an article which appeared in the Rocky Mountain News for February 12, 1970. This article is captioned "Riha case investigators' theories might be altered."

For the information of the Bureau, we only have two resident agents in Boulder, Colorado, and I have personally contacted each of them and each has assured me both verbally and by memorandum [REDACTED]

This information is being forwarded to the Bureau only for information in view of [REDACTED]

b3

b2
b3

Letter prepared 2-16-70, PJ

(Mount Clipping in Source Book)

Boulder housewife sure she talked to Riha

By ALAN CUNNINGHAM
Rocky Mountain News Writer

Don't ever wonder if he is certain she talked to Thomas Riha on the telephone last March 17, the day he first called to show up for his history classes at the University of Colorado.

What is even more remarkable than this, in the opinion of those who have been trying to pin down the exact date of Riha's disappearance, is the woman's insistence that Riha was cheerful, relaxed and interested in chatting about a local political issue.

The woman, who asks that she not be identified by name, has told the News she was in the process of telephoning a list of Boulder citizens last March, seeking support for a proposed election on whether the city should take over its public utilities.

While she has been involved in the issue for several weeks, she is sure it was on Monday, March 17 that she attempted to reach a group of people whose names began with the letters "A-Z." Among the group, she knew she was able to reach her sister, who was Thomas Riha's wife. She says he answered the telephone at his home at 11:30 a.m.

The professor seemed calm, pleasant and quite interested in the municipal issue, according to the Boulder housewife. In fact, she explained his name was on the list because he had earlier sent in a reader survey "bulletin" from a Boulder newspaper which related to the issue. She is still looking for her address information on it that, she said, she had turned to the telephone book and found it listed under "A-Z." She said she had been in the house when she called.

The date, if the Boulder housewife is correct, is significant, since Riha reportedly missed a court date to which he was ordered the previous night, and could not be reached on Saturday, March 18, by a friend who tried to telephone him repeatedly.

Many people involved in the case have speculated that Riha left Boulder and headed for the Pacific Northwest on Sunday or Monday, and that he had a CU

professor who was rumored to have seen Riha on Sunday, the 18th, vigorously dismissed this rumor as untrue when asked about it Tuesday.

But the Boulder housewife, who made the series of telephone calls, is equally adamant about the date when she talked to Riha. She says she didn't

know the man, but recognized his name when a colleague of Riha's started discussing his disappearance at her home the following weekend. She checked, found his name on her calling list, and recalled details of their conversation.

While she didn't write down the date when she made her telephone calls, the woman says she has made detailed inquiries since then — some as recently as this week — to tie in the dates of related events with that of the crucial telephone call.

In Denver Tuesday, Dist. Atty. James D. "Mike" McKevitt told the News he had received an official denial from a Washington source that any of the official agencies which have been named in connection with the case actually had any knowledge of where Riha is now.

The source, which he declined to identify, insisted further that Riha never was involved in espionage of any sort, and that none of these agencies had ever told anyone in Boulder, Denver or elsewhere that Riha was alive and well.

Most frequently mentioned agencies have been the FBI, the CIA, military intelligence agencies and the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service.

McKevitt also reported to reporters yet from former CU President Joseph Smiley in his request that Smiley divulge to McKevitt the exact source of a report to him last spring that Riha was alive.

(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.)

26 Rocky Mountain News
Denver, Colorado

Date: 2-11-70
Edition: Home
Author:
Editor: Jack Foster
Title:
THOMAS RIHA

Character:
or
Classification: 105-4151
Submitting Office: Denver
☐ Being Investigated B

ENCLOSURE

62-80750
ENCLOSURE

(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

Riha case investigators' theories might be altered

By ALAN CUNNINGHAM
Rocky Mountain News Writer

A Boulder woman's belief that she talked to Thomas Riha last March 17, as revealed Wednesday by the Rocky Mountain News, may have altered investigators' theories about what happened to the missing history professor and his wife. It may have happened.

While talking to police about her theories, Boulder police investigators expressed interest in the woman's recollection that she telephoned Riha and talked on a 10-minute conversation with him shortly before noon on Monday, the day Riha was last seen.

for his classes at the University of Colorado.

When told this by the News Wednesday, the woman said she would telephone the police department and volunteer her information.

Apparently, the woman's story proved startling to the two investigators who have been assigned fulltime to the Riha case, just as it did to many friends and neighbors of the professor, most of whom have said their last contacts with Riha were no later than the previous Thursday or Friday.

Phone survey

There has been speculation that whatever happened to him happened as early as that Friday night.

But the Boulder housewife, who was making a telephone survey at the time, told the News she is certain she talked to Riha on Monday, March 17.

She further insisted he seemed calm, relaxed and cheerful at the time.

If the woman is correct, police investigators conceded, it could well force them to revise their current theories about the case.

CIA agent

In another development, a Denver-based agent of the Central Intelligence Agency insisted the CIA has never been involved in any way with the case since Riha disappeared.

The agent, Michael M. Todorovich, insisted it hadn't been he who gave assurances to former CU president Joseph S. Bailey, Denver police chief George Semon or other officials last spring that Riha was alive and well.

Such reported assurances, coupled with great reluctance on the part of these officers to elaborate on how they got them, have become the center of a major mystery in the strange case.

Todorovich further denied having discussed the matter with anyone, and stated emphatically that it was entirely out of our jurisdiction.

Nevertheless, at least one official in the area is known reliably to have received his assurances from Todorovich himself.

(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.)

20 Rocky Mountain News
Denver, Colorado

Date: 2-12-70

Edition: Home

Author: Alan Cunningham

Editor: Jack Foster

Title:
THOMAS RIHA

Character:

or

Classification: 105-4151

Submitting Office: Denver

☐ Being Investigated B

105-78256-
ENCLOSURE
67-1527-55-62-80750
ENCLOSURE

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach *CD*

FROM : W. C. Sullivan *WCS*

SUBJECT : RELATIONS WITH CIA *0*

DATE 3/25/70

[Handwritten signature]

Tolson	_____
DeLoach	_____
Walters	_____
Mohr	_____
Bishop	_____
Casper	_____
Callahan	_____
Conrad	_____
Felt	_____
Gale	_____
Rosen	_____
Sullivan	_____
Tavel	_____
Soyars	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holmes	_____
Gandy	_____

Reference is made to my attached memoranda of 3/23 and 3/24/70 with reference to our response to CIA's letter to us of 3/11/70.

In accordance with the Director's instructions, the matter is being given attention and the various subject matters raised by CIA are being studied. It is contemplated that our memorandum and letter for the Director's approval will be ready by Monday, 3/30/70.

ACTION:

For information.

Attachment
WCS:mls (4) *mls*
1-Mr. DeLoach
1-Mr. Sullivan
1-Mr. Sizoo

[Handwritten initials: WEL, P, V, K, G, X, OK.]

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR,
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT. *KP 1/8/98*

REC-105

62-80750-4792

10 MAY 16 1970

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE *2/9/98* BY *5668 SLD/GCL*
(JFK)

[Handwritten signature]

391
70 MAY 7 1970

62-80750

3/2/70

CODE

TELETYPE

URGENT

SENT BY CODED TELETYPE

TO SAC DENVER

REC-56

FROM DIRECTOR FBI (105-78256)

1 - Mr. DeLoach 1 - Mr. J.D. Huppert
1 - Mr. Callahan 1 - Mr. A.W. Gray
1 - Mr. Sullivan 1 - Mr. Papich
1 - Mr. Rosen 1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Bishop

THOMAS RIHA, INTERNAL SECURITY - CZECHOSLOVAKIA

62-80750
IMMEDIATELY DISCONTINUE ALL CONTACT WITH THE LOCAL
CIA OFFICE.

1 - 47-3190 (Galya Tannenbaum)

SJP:wmk *wmk*
(12)

NOTE:

See memorandum D.J. Brennan, Jr. to Mr. W.C. Sullivan,
same caption, dated 3/2/70, prepared by SJP:wmk.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 2 1970

505 pm BRB
TELETYPE

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

RECEIVED
DIRECTOR'S OFFICE

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

MAY 1 1970 *JW*

ORIGINAL FILED IN 105-78256

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan *WCS*

DATE: March 2, 1970

FROM : D. J. Brennan, Jr. *DJB*

SUBJECT: THOMAS RIHA
INTERNAL SECURITY - CZECHOSLOVAKIA *C.I.A.*

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan ☒ _____
Tavel _____
Soyars _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

JW
Reference is made to [redacted]

M
Pursuant to instructions the Liaison Agent advised [redacted]

Jo
ACTION:

Enclosed is a teletype to the Denver Office instructing [redacted]

Enclosure *sent 3-2-70*
105-78256
1 - 47-3190 (Galya Tannenbaum)

SJP:wmk *wmk*
(11)

- 1 - Mr. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. Callahan
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. Rosen
- 1 - Mr. Bishop
- 1 - Mr. J.D. Huppert
- 1 - Mr. A.W. Gray
- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Mr. Papich

WCS
WCS
WCS
REC-56

105-78256-24
2 MAR 6 1970

62-80750

NOT RECORDED

MAY 1 1970

F334
MAR 10 1970

MAY 1 1970 *JW*

ORIGINAL FILED IN 105-78256-24

DATE: 04-12-2007

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

CLASSIFIED BY AUC 60324 BAW/RS/SEZ HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X.3,3(1)

WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

~~SECRET~~

- 1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
- 1 - Liaison

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Walters _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Soyars _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: April 15, 1970

FROM : C. D. Brennan *Brennan*

- 1 - Mr. C. D. Brennan
- 1 - Mr. R. C. Putnam

CONF. INFT.

SUBJECT:

b1

PURPOSE:

Enclosures

RCP:pab
(6)

~~NOT RECORDED~~

126 APR 20 1970

NO APR 20 1970

CONTINUED - OVER

~~SECRET~~

ORIGINAL FILED IN

b1

7402

54

ENCLOSURE
11 1970

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan

RE: 

b1

(S)

OBSERVATIONS:

(S)



RECOMMENDATION:

That attached letter be approved and sent.

b1

b3

6 *[Signature]* *[Signature]* *[Signature]* *[Signature]* *[Signature]* *[Signature]*

(S)



b1
b3

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Tolson _____
Walters _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Soyars _____
Tele Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

TO Mr. DeLoach *DL*

FROM Mr. W. C. Sullivan *WCS*

SUBJECT RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA

DATE March 23, 1970

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR,
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT. *RP 1/8/98*

By letter dated 3/11/70, the Director communicated with CIA Director Richard Helms referring to the existing agreement entered into between the Bureau and CIA in 1966 with regard to mutual efforts in the collection of positive intelligence in the United States. The Director noted that he would welcome any observations that CIA might desire to make to assure that national security interests continue to be served in the most effective and complete manner possible. By letter dated 3/20/70, Mr. Helms replied stating that he valued highly the Director's personal judgment in affairs bearing on the national security and suggested certain areas which warrant periodic reexamination since they have a direct bearing on domestic clandestine collection of positive intelligence.

In view of the fact this is being held very tightly and it will take several days for me to review necessary files and make proper analysis of Mr. Helms' letter, it is believed desirable to advise Mr. Helms that this matter is under study at the Bureau and that the Director will communicate with him further upon completion of our analysis. In the meantime, I am going over this matter very thoroughly and will submit the results of my analysis to the Director for his consideration and will attach a suggested additional communication to Mr. Helms.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the attached letter go forward to Mr. Helms advising him of the receipt of his letter and that this matter is receiving analysis by the Bureau.

Enclosure *sent 3-24-70*

WCS:chs (3)

- 1 - Mr. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan

REC-28

10 MAY 16 1970

Set a deadline.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/9/98 BY 5668 SD/GCL
(FK)

7402 memo 3/24/70
80 MAY 7 1970

62-80750

BACK OF DOCUMENT

RECEIVED-TOLSON
F B I

MAR 23 3 37 PM '70

MAR 23 4 00 PM 1970

REC'D DELOACH
FBI

MAR 24 2 16 PM '70

REC'D DE LOACH
FBI

IN LOCATING SUBJECTS IN THE MIDDLE
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AND THE RECORDS RECORD TO FORMED TO THE RECORD

REC'D SULLIVAN
FBI JUSTICE
APR 11 1960
MAY 1 1960
APR 11 1960
REC'D SULLIVAN
FBI JUSTICE

770
SYNOPSIS OF COLLECTION OF SOURCE INFORMATION
ADMINISTRATION SINCE THAT WAS A CATEGORICAL BASIS ON COMBINED
EFFECTS OF THE INFORMATION COLLECTED SINCE MAY 1960 ON THE BASIS OF THE
INFORMATION OF SOURCE INFORMATION
SENSITIVE STUDY 75
2/26/61
NOTATIONS HEREIN ACCOUNT FOR ACCESS AND/OR DELIVERY OF THIS DOCUMENT TO SENATE
AND HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) AND/OR HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE (HSC) ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
AND INFORMATION PROVIDED TO THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE (HSC) ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
NOTE: FORM IN WHICH ACCESS AND/OR DELIVERY WAS MADE MAY BE DIFFERENT
THAN AS REPRESENTED BY THIS DOCUMENT IN THE CASE WHEREAS THERE MAY HAVE BEEN
MORE THAN ONE ACCESS/DELIVERY FORM. SEE BUFILE 100-62-116395 (SSC) 100-62-116464 (HSC) ON THE
BASIC INFORMATION OF SOURCE INFORMATION
DATE: 11/16/68
DATE: 11/16/68

DOCUMENTS FURNISHED TO SSG RE MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., WERE ALSO FURNISHED
STATE OF KING THROUGH THE DEPT. AS INDICATED BELOW FOR INSTANT DOCUMENT, DATE
NOTING DELIVERY TO DEPT. SEE BUFILE 100-106670 FOR FORM IN WHICH FURNISHED.

TO DEPT.

MR. A. C. LUTTRELL

77. 19690801J

REF ID: A67080

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR,
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT. *RP 4/8/98*

1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Conrad

W
25
ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

March 31, 1970

BY COURIER SERVICE

REC 8-2-80750-4794

Honorable Richard Helms
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C.

DECLASSIFIED BY *(S668 SCD/GCC)*
ON *2/9/98* *(JFK)*

Dear Mr. Helms:

I have carefully reviewed your letter of March 20 setting out your observations with respect to various matters of mutual interest. I certainly appreciate your kind comments concerning me and I share your convictions as to the need for close coordination of our intelligence collection activities in behalf of the national security.

Your letter suggested nine particular areas which might be the subject of further discussions aimed at improving the coordination of our operations. A number of these topics are highly sensitive and complex and I will therefore make no effort here to set forth my views in detail. However, in response to your letter and as a prelude to any direct discussions on these matters, certain observations on my part may be appropriate.

With regard to electronic surveillance and mail coverage, there is no question as to the frequent value of such operations in developing needed intelligence. On the other hand, the use of these measures in domestic investigations poses a number of problems which may not be encountered in similar operations abroad. There is widespread concern by the American public regarding the possible misuse of this type coverage. Moreover, various legal considerations must be borne in mind, including the impact such coverage may have on our numerous prosecutive responsibilities. The FBI's effectiveness has always depended in large measure on our capacity to retain the full confidence of the American people. The use of any investigative measures which infringe on traditional rights of privacy must therefore be scrutinized most carefully. Within this framework, however, I would be willing to consider any proposals your Agency may make.



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MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

67 MAY 8 - 1970

62-80750 MAY 6 1970
see note, page 3
WCS
JFK

BACK OF DOCUMENT

RS/Conrad

RECEIVED - CONRAD
REC'D SULLIVAN
FBI JUSTICE

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SENSTUDY 75

NOTATIONS HEREIN ACCOUNT FOR ACCESS AND/OR DELIVERY OF THIS DOCUMENT TO SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) AND/OR HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE (HSC) ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

NOTE: FORM IN WHICH ACCESS AND/OR DELIVERY WAS MADE MAY BE DIFFERENT THAN AS REPRESENTED BY THIS DOCUMENT IN THAT CERTAIN EXCISIONS MAY HAVE BEEN MADE. FOR ACCESS/DELIVERY FORM, SEE BUFILE (S) 62-116395 (SSC), 62-116464 (HSC).

<u>SSC</u> 62-116395-386		<u>HSC</u> 62-116464-58	
ACC. _____	DATE _____	ACC. _____	DATE _____
DEL. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> _____	DATE 2/10/75	DEL. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> _____	DATE 9/4/75

DOCUMENTS FURNISHED TO SSC RE MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., WERE ALSO FURNISHED TO ESTATE OF KING THROUGH THE DEPT. AS INDICATED BELOW FOR INSTANT DOCUMENT, DATE DENOTING DELIVERY TO DEPT. SEE BUFILE 100-106670 FOR FORM IN WHICH FURNISHED.

_____ TO DEPT.

REC'D...
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~~SECRET~~

Honorable Richard Helms

Your offer to make available certain technical equipment developed by the Agency is most welcome and I fully reciprocate your willingness to cooperate in the exchange of relevant scientific data. I am prepared to designate appropriate representatives of the FBI Laboratory to meet with CIA technical personnel at any mutually convenient time.

With respect to the inclusion of positive intelligence courses in our training curricula, I am sure you will recognize that our training programs must be designed primarily to fulfill our own widespread and demanding responsibilities. While I appreciate your offer, I do not feel it would be feasible at this time to include the proposed courses in our training schedules. I would certainly have no objection to the holding of seminars between specialists of our two agencies in selective areas of interest when justified by specific circumstances.

Concerning the coordination of FBI-CIA activities in the exploitation of live sources, both in the communist bloc field and with regard to key nonbloc establishments, I am not aware of any significant problems. The 1966 agreement between our agencies was concerned directly with this question and I have no changes to suggest in the ground rules at this time. However, in the event your Agency has some specific proposals to make, I would welcome hearing further from you in this connection.

There is already a considerable exchange of information between our agencies concerning New Left and racial extremist matters. Frequently, as you have pointed out, there have been substantial connections between subversive and extremist elements in the United States and their counterparts abroad. We will continue to furnish your Agency information being developed by the Bureau which might have a bearing on your intelligence requirements. At the same time, we are definitely in need of additional information from your Agency as to the foreign aspects of the extremist movement in the United States, including foreign funding and support of local extremist organizations. While I do not believe there is any need for detailed discussions on this point, if you have any specific suggestions to make we would be pleased to consider them.

~~SECRET~~

Honorable Richard Helms

Similarly, I am not aware of any major problems which exist at this time in connection with the coordination of our field liaison operations. It has been my long-standing policy that serious questions affecting the coordination of our activities with other Government agencies should be handled and controlled at a headquarters level in order to avoid administrative confusion and misunderstanding.

In line with my letter of March 11 and the observations contained in your letter of March 20, I will in the immediate future designate appropriate officials of the Bureau to meet with your representatives for detailed discussions of these matters. It is my earnest hope that such conferences will lead to a sharpened understanding of the responsibilities and objectives of our respective agencies and will serve to promote more effective cooperation in our joint commitment to the national intelligence needs.

Sincerely yours,
J. Edgar Hoover

NOTE:

See memo Sullivan to DeLoach 3/30/70 captioned "Relations With CIA" prepared by WCS:mea.

~~SECRET~~

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

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TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: March 30, 1970

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR,
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT. *RP 1/8/98*

SUBJECT: RELATIONS WITH CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

Reference my memorandum 3/25/70 concerning letter 3/20/70 from CIA Director Helms. In letter, Helms expresses full agreement with Director's view that intelligence collection efforts of FBI and CIA must be closely coordinated and that periodic reappraisal of such efforts is required. He has invited Director's desires as to how such reassessments can be best conducted. He refers to 1966 conference between Bureau and CIA representatives, which resulted in agreement covering certain phases of intelligence collection, and suggests additional discussions at this time.

Helms has listed nine specific areas for possible discussion at conference between Bureau and CIA. He states he would sincerely welcome Director's observations on his proposed agenda. Specific items listed by Helms are set forth hereinafter together with my observations.

1. Electronic Surveillance Coverage (Elsurs)

Helms notes Bureau has been receptive in past to requests for this type coverage and has capability and experience in this field which cannot be duplicated by any other U.S. agency. Helms refers to October, 1969, CIA request for elsur coverage of two Indian nationals visiting U.S., one of whom had KGB connections. Bureau advised CIA at that time that it should refer such requests directly to Attorney General (AG) for approval. Helms suggests question of such coverage be reopened between FBI and CIA representatives, adding that this coverage should be rigidly controlled. *(w)*

REC 8 62-80750-4794
Comment: We have always been highly selective in our use of elsur, particularly during recent years in view of sensitive nature of this type coverage, legal considerations, and manpower commitments. CIA, which has no prosecutive responsibilities, may not understand the Bureau's position in this matter or need for great selectivity but I do not feel Director should modify stand taken in October, 1969, that CIA should seek approval directly from AG. Helms' point that no other U.S. agency has capability of FBI in this field may have merit and when CIA can first clearly justify requests

Enclosure

1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Conrad *mea*

WCS:mea (4)

1 MAY 6 1970

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BACK OF DOCUMENT

RS/Kendley

RECEIVED-TOLSON
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SENSTUDY 75

NOTATIONS HEREIN ACCOUNT FOR ACCESS AND/OR DELIVERY OF THIS DOCUMENT TO SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) AND/OR HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE (HSC) ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

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<u>SSC</u>		<u>HSC</u> 62-116464-58	
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REMARKS: DOCUMENTS FURNISHED TO SSC RE MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. WERE ALSO FURNISHED TO ESTATE OF KING THROUGH THE DEPT. AS INDICATED BELOW FOR INSTANT DOCUMENT, DATE DENOTING DELIVERY TO DEPT. SEE BUFILE 100-106670 FOR FORM IN WHICH FURNISHED TO DEPT.

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Memorandum for Mr. DeLoach
RE: RELATIONS WITH CIA

No.
It is
up to
CIA

for this type coverage to the AG, if the Director wishes we could consider handling actual installations on a highly selective basis as we currently do with respect to meritorious requests by State Department. Each one, of course, would be judged on its own merits. But, there should be no change in our October, 1969, position that CIA must first get approval for such coverage from AG.

↑ I share Tolson's view. H
2. Mail Coverage

Helms cites importance of this as intelligence tool, which has been proven in past. He has impression it has been discontinued and suggests FBI-CIA representatives confer to determine whether such coverage could be used with regard to investigations of Soviet bloc, New Left, and foreign agents (u)

Comment: In line with Director's instructions, we have discontinued this coverage in recent years. We know that other Federal agencies, including Army and CIA, utilize this type coverage frequently and often with success such as we experienced ourselves in the past. Both Army and CIA regularly make available to us results of their coverage abroad concerning individuals of interest to Bureau. This type coverage is sensitive and Helms has not spelled out specifically what CIA may have in mind here. This type coverage is too sensitive to be discussed in written correspondence. I recommend that we seek further information in direct discussions with CIA before deciding on our course of action. Of course no commitments of any kind will be made and all issues raised will be referred to the Director for a decision.

No.
we will
not do
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↑

↑ I share Tolson's view. H
3. CIA Technical Services

Helms calls attention to recent technical and scientific equipment recently developed by CIA in the counterintelligence field (specialized TV equipment, laser beam devices, etc.). He indicates willingness to share such equipment and developments with Bureau and indicates he would welcome suggestions as to how such equipment can be better employed (u)

Comment: While it is not likely CIA has developed equipment of this type which is not already known to FBI Laboratory and while some of equipment to which Helms alludes may have no applicability to our needs, I do not believe we have anything to lose by exploring this on a selective basis. Qualified personnel from FBI Laboratory could confer with appropriate CIA representatives to insure we have benefit of any recent scientific advances realized by CIA.

O.K.
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Memorandum for Mr. DeLoach
RE: RELATIONS WITH CIA

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4. Courses in Positive Intelligence Requirements and Reporting

Helms offers to make available to us training courses in positive intelligence for purpose of discussing in depth the needs of the intelligence community, including CIA.

Comment: I see no need for this at this time. We have a highly effective and comprehensive training program for our Agents in security work and I see no necessity for training lectures by CIA personnel. We regularly receive from CIA copies of the Current Intelligence Reporting List which outlines priorities and requirements of other U.S. intelligence agencies in particular areas of positive intelligence. These Lists are reviewed by appropriate supervisors at SOG and are then furnished on regular basis to interested field offices. If any new developments occur in this field, we can always reconsider if we wish. But as stated there is no need at this time. C.K. H

5. Seminars on Opposition Services

Helms suggests that FBI and CIA specialists concerning hostile intelligence services meet as needed to keep abreast of new developments and patterns on part of hostile intelligence agencies. He feels such discussions should provide an opportunity to possibly devise new means to penetrate or neutralize enemy forces.

Comment: I do not believe there is any need for conferences of type referred to by Helms except on an infrequent basis. Of course, where special circumstances warrant and provided such conferences are tightly controlled by Bureau and specifically approved by Director there would be no reason to object to them per se. C.K. H

6. Live Bloc Sources

Helms refers to prior cooperation between FBI and CIA in handling of communist bloc defectors and penetration agents but expresses belief there is room for improvement in establishing more uniform exploitation of these sources. He invites Director's suggestions for better coordination and evaluation of live source information.

Comment: Our 1966 conferences and agreement with CIA were largely concerned with coordination and handling of live sources. This agreement has proven effective as Helms agrees. I am not aware of any need for modifying the 1966 understanding but this is an area which is quite sensitive and Helms has not spelled out what he may have in mind. I feel we should listen to any proposals CIA may have to offer on this point in direct discussions with their representatives. Again, no commitments would be made and any proposals would be referred to the Director for a decision.

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Memorandum for Mr. DeLoach
RE: RELATIONS WITH CIA

~~SECRET~~

7. Live Sources in Non-Bloc Area

Helms points out diplomatic sources in this area, especially critical Middle East and Latin-American fields, could provide much needed intelligence. He urges the full potential of this area be explored by representatives of both agencies.

Comment: This is very similar to previous point (6) and again involves 1966 agreement. I think our approach should be the same; namely, while we are not aware of any problems in this area we could listen to any proposals CIA has to make and, of course, we would refer them to the Director prior to taking any action.

OK - H

8. New Left and Racial Matters

Helms notes that there is already a substantial exchange of information in this area and cites close connections between subversive elements in U.S. and abroad. He suggests we consider how we can best employ our respective manpower to meet this threat which is international in scope.

Comment: We have carefully reviewed this situation and feel CIA could definitely provide more information concerning activities of New Left and black extremists while traveling abroad and additional data concerning foreign funding or support of subversive activities in U.S. We furnish a great deal of information to CIA regarding foreign aspects of the extremist movement developed through our investigations. As to manpower commitments, our own use of manpower is, of course, under constant review. There are heavy manpower demands on FBI in a host of areas (organized crime, civil rights, applicant investigations, etc.) outside the security field. I would be definitely opposed to any discussions with CIA involving the allocation of manpower by either agency. This is a matter for each agency to decide in its own best interests and judgment.

OK - H

9. Relations With Domestic Field Offices and Legal Attaches

Helms expresses belief there are no serious conflicts in this area but there may be room to improve quality of liaison so as to expand intelligence collection efforts, particularly in view of changing conditions both here and abroad.

Comment: As indicated, Helms does not perceive any serious problems in this area either in U.S. or abroad. Our policy has always been that any matters of substance involving liaison with CIA or other agencies must be

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CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum for Mr. DeLoach
RE: RELATIONS WITH CIA

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handled at headquarters level. To do otherwise could result in loose administrative control. I feel that we should adhere strictly to our long-standing policy in this connection and I see no need for discussions with CIA on this issue.

OK. N

RECOMMENDED REPLY TO HELMS:

I do not believe the Director should seek to furnish detailed observations regarding the Bureau's position on the various matters suggested by Helms. Many of them are quite sensitive and complex and there is nothing to be gained by spelling out the Director's views in writing on such matters. Accordingly, I recommend that a general reply be sent to Helms indicating our willingness to meet with CIA representatives for direct discussions on those points which merit further elaboration or where we might at least be willing to listen to any CIA proposals.

OK. H

Bearing in mind specific observations set forth above, I think our reply to Helms should show we are amenable to direct conferences with CIA on certain of these issues but we should indicate we see nothing to be gained by discussions at this time with regard to the following:

(4) Courses in Positive Intelligence Requirements and Reporting;
(5) Seminars on Opposition Services; (8) New Left and Racial Matters;
and (9) Relations With Domestic Field Offices and Legal Attaches. With regard to the other points, any discussions with CIA would be strictly within current policies laid down by the Director and no commitments would be made by Bureau representatives. All matters requiring a decision which might arise would be referred to the Director for a decision.

If the Director desires, Inspector D. E. Moore and myself would represent the Bureau in such meetings with CIA representatives. On a selective basis, other officials of Domestic Intelligence Division could be asked to join me as required.

OK.
H

ACTION:

Attached for the Director's approval is a letter to Helms in line with the foregoing observations.

W.E.L. JWC WBS

~~SECRET~~

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Sullivan

March 24, 1970

REC 8

Honorable Richard Helms
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Helms:

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT. KP 1/8/98

DECLASSIFIED BY 8668 SLD/SCC
ON 2/9/98 (JFK)

I have received your letter of March 20, 1970, in which you suggest that certain areas having a direct bearing on domestic clandestine collection of positive intelligence warrant further consideration at this time.

An analysis is being made concerning the items mentioned in your letter and upon completion of this study, I will communicate further with you in this regard.

Sincerely yours,

*Memo Sullivan to DeLoach 3/31/70
Enc at 40 Helms 3/31/70
WCS/mea*

NOTE:

See memorandum Mr. W. C. Sullivan to Mr. DeLoach, dated 3/23/70, captioned "Relationships with CIA," prepared by WCS:chs.

Classified "Secret" since it repeats information so classified by CIA and since disclosure could seriously damage internal security interests.

WCS:chs (4)

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67 MAY 8 - 1970

TELETYPE UNIT

62-80750

Sent via courier 3/24/70



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

Mr. Tolson	✓
Mr. DeLoach	✓
Mr. Walters	✓
Mr. Mohr	✓
Mr. Bishop	✓
Mr. Casper	✓
Mr. Callahan	✓
Mr. Conrad	✓
Mr. Felt	✓
Mr. Gale	✓
Mr. Rosen	✓
Mr. Sullivan	✓
Mr. Tavel	✓
Mr. Soyars	✓
Tele. Room	✓
Miss Holmes	✓
Miss Gandy	✓

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT

KP 1/8/98

20 March 1970

The Honorable J. Edgar Hoover
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C.

FBI INFO

CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/GCL

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (X6)

(JFK) 3/9/98 4/2/98

Dear Mr. Hoover:

We have completed our review of domestic positive intelligence collection engendered by your letter of 11 March 1970. We warmly welcome periodic reexamination by our two agencies of the implementation of the 1966 agreement and the collection of positive intelligence which you proposed. I concur also with your comments that there is a need for close coordination of our efforts in the field of positive and counterintelligence collection. To be most effective, I agree that it is essential for this Agency, together with your Bureau, to conduct a continuing analysis of clandestine collection activity. The product is of growing importance to the national security and to the United States Intelligence Community. Therefore we endorse your proposal for a reexamination and bespeak your desires as to how this might be conducted.

With regard to the 1966 set of ground rules, which you sent to the then Director, Vice Admiral William F. Raborn, Jr., the competent work of our respective representatives did, in fact, produce an effective and realistic agreement. I welcome your statement that no major problems have been encountered since its adoption.

I feel strongly that there are other related subjects, of similar importance to the national security, which warrant periodic reexamination since they have a direct bearing on domestic clandestine collection of positive intelligence.

REC 8

62-80750-4795

MAY 6 1970

62-80750

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Memo W.F. Sullivan to Mr. DeLoach
(Enc.)
3-23-70
Lett to Mr. Helms
WFS:chs
3-24-70
WFS:chs

EXP. PROC.

MAR 20 1970

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As a result of our review, engendered by your letter, I believe that the following subjects are deserving of your personal consideration:

(1) Audio coverage. Audio coverage provides timely intelligence of inestimable worth to U.S. officials for policy planning, early warning, and accurate guidance necessary for the improvement of operational and collection activity here and abroad. Audio coverage is unique production because it is readily subject to local cross-checking and evaluation which is far more difficult and costly to achieve abroad. Further, such coverage is on targets which affect directly the national interests.

For several years your Bureau had been receptive to requirements and leads which resulted in valuable coverage. The quality of your production proved that your Bureau alone possesses capabilities and experience which cannot be duplicated by any other U.S. agency.

On 2 October 1969 two related requests for audio coverage were submitted by this Agency pertaining to positive intelligence targets, one of whom had KGB connections. (I refer to the case of [redacted] and [redacted] (S) [redacted] (S) Your Bureau replied that henceforth the Agency should refer all such cases directly to the Attorney General for approval.

b1

It is suggested that the question of audio coverage be reopened between representatives of your Bureau and this Agency. I would welcome your thoughts and observations on this subject.

I wish to assure you that I believe that this sensitive type of collection should be implemented under rigid and stringent controls. This is absolutely necessary in order to maintain the highest standard of security both in instituting the coverage and for the exploitation of the product. (An excellent example of this is demonstrated in your effective and secure production of [redacted] (S)

b1

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(2) Mail Coverage. Another much needed intelligence tool is mail coverage. Its importance has been proven in the past. I have the impression that it has been discontinued, and I would suggest that our representatives should confer and examine together whether this asset might be deployed against communications of the Soviet Bloc, the New Left, and identified foreign agents.

(3) CIA Technical Services. A significant expenditure of this Agency's money and personnel has been committed to research and development for the improvement of technical aids. This Agency has provided your Bureau with an appreciation of our resources and capabilities, and has offered you at cost or gratis our most sophisticated equipment.

Although we will continue these services, we would welcome any suggestions from your Bureau for improvement in the technical field including proposals how these assets can be better employed. Your comments will be particularly appreciated in view of our mutual interests in implementing Operation [redacted] (S)

(4) Courses in Positive Intelligence Requirements and Reporting. Since the collection and reporting of positive foreign intelligence is, as you say, only incidental to your main internal security and counterintelligence responsibilities, I realize that your personnel are somewhat at a disadvantage in carrying out the evaluating and reporting processes necessary for the conduct of positive intelligence. At our 1966 conference we offered to institute positive intelligence training courses, including reports writing and

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analysis, for FBI personnel. In soliciting your views on the desirability of this type of training, I wish to reiterate our willingness to provide such instruction. It would be designed to expose the needs of the Intelligence Community in depth, thus making the Current Intelligence Reporting List (CIRL) more meaningful to your personnel.

(5) Seminars on Opposition Services. Given the growing sophistication and increased capabilities of hostile intelligence services, it is suggested that CIA and FBI experts in this field meet as required at our respective Headquarters, the Washington and New York Field Offices, in order to keep abreast of new developments, modus operandi, operational tasks, and diverse missions of opposition services. I know that you will agree with me that no opportunities for improvement should be overlooked which might help to negate the efforts of hostile services who are charged with undermining the security of the United States. These sessions should also provide an opportunity to explore and devise new means to penetrate and neutralize these inimical forces.

(6) Live Bloc Sources. The record of our cooperation and coordination to exploit live penetrations and defectors from Bloc sources proves the success of our mutual effort.

I believe that there is room for substantial improvement in achieving a more uniform and efficient exploitation of the positive intelligence potential of certain of these sensitive sources. I would invite your thoughts on how we may better coordinate requirements for these sources and establish a more thorough evaluation of their positive intelligence production before it is given general dissemination within the Government. Our review would suggest that there are good reasons for consultation to explore the development of higher quality live sources, for example

(S)

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(7) Live Sources in the Non-Blot Area. Sources such as [redacted] and diplomats are a fertile field for procurement of much-needed intelligence relating to the activities of certain Latin American and Middle Eastern countries which are expanding their subversive and terrorist activities, even to the United States. I do not feel confident that both agencies have adequately exploited the full potential of this field, and would urge that this subject be explored by our respective representatives.

(8) New Left and Racial Matters. There is already a substantial exchange of information in this field. Limitations of manpower raise a serious question as to whether both agencies can keep pace with future unpredictable developments. The increasingly close connection between these forces in the United States and hostile elements abroad has been well established by both of our agencies. I feel it would be in our mutual interest to determine how we can best employ more wisely our limited manpower, knowing that this problem, which embraces bombings, hijacking, assassination, and the demeaning of law enforcement officers, is international in scope.

(9) Relations with Domestic Field Offices and Legal Attaches. I do not feel that there are any serious conflicts in this area but there may be room for improving the quality of liaison in order to expand positive intelligence collection. Given the changing situations both here and abroad, periodic re-examination of field relations could assist both agencies to make mutually-agreed adjustments.

Mr. Hoover, I wish to assure you that I value highly your personal judgment in affairs bearing on the national security. I know that your experience is derived from a unique lifetime of dedicated service to our country. In this spirit, I welcome sincerely your observations on the foregoing agenda and solicit your thoughts regarding any other item which you deem worthy of the attention of your Bureau and this Agency.

Faithfully yours,



Richard Helms
Director

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~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach *Des*

DATE: March 24, 1970

FROM : W. C. Sullivan *WCS*

SUBJECT: RELATIONS WITH CIA

#MDR/K
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 1/2/01 BY SP-2 ALM/STG

✓ Tolson *✓*
DeLoach *✓*
Walters *✓*
Mohr *✓*
Bishop *✓*
Casper *✓*
Callahan *✓*
Conrad *✓*
Felt *✓*
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Rosen *✓*
Sullivan *✓*
Tavel *✓*
Soyars *✓*
Tele Room *✓*
Holmes *✓*
Gandy *✓*

The attached memorandum dated 3-23-70 reported the receipt of a letter dated 3-11-70 from Richard Helms, Director of CIA referring to agreements between the Bureau and the CIA concerning our mutual efforts in the collection of positive intelligence in the United States. This memorandum recommended that the letter which was attached go to Mr. Helms acknowledging the receipt of his letter and advising that the matter was under consideration at the Bureau. The Director asked that a deadline be set.

A preliminary evaluation of the nine matters which have been presented by CIA indicate that they will require extensive file review and study in order that the pertinent aspects of each matter as it affects FBI interests and responsibility may be properly considered. It is my judgment that these matters lend themselves to the preparation of a series of about six memoranda with accompanying letters to CIA. To attempt to handle them in an all-inclusive memoranda might result in a lengthy and unwieldy document. Therefore, if approved, the matters raised by CIA will be handled in a series of six memoranda, the first of which is now being completed and will be sent through for approval not later than tomorrow. The remainder will be submitted in three-day intervals thereafter.

ACTION:

For information

WCS:sjr
(3)

- 1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan

3/25

REC-22

62-80750-4796

10 MAY 16 1970

No I want to all in one letter.

H

Spencer

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RECEIVED-TOLSON
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REC'D DeLOACH
F B I

MAR 25 11 37 AM '70
REC'D DeLOACH
F B I

MAR 25 12 22 PM '70
REC'D SULLIVAN
FBI JUSTICE

TO DIRECTOR, FBI (100-441100) FROM SAC, NEW YORK (100-106670) (P)
SUBJECT: [Illegible]
[Illegible text follows]

NOTE: FORMS HEREIN ACCOUNT FOR ACCESS AND/OR DELIVERY OF THIS DOCUMENT TO SENATE
COMMITTEE (SSC) AND/OR HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE (HSC) ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
NOTE: FORM IN WHICH ACCESS AND/OR DELIVERY WAS MADE MAY BE DIFFERENT
THAN THAT REPRESENTED BY THIS DOCUMENT, IN THAT CERTAIN EXCLUSIONS MAY HAVE BEEN
MADE. FOR ACCESS/DELIVERY FORM, SEE BUFILE, 62-116395 (SSC), 62-116464 (HSC).
DATE: 9/4/75

DATE: 9/4/75 DEL. DATE: 9/4/75
DOCUMENTS FURNISHED TO SSC RE MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. WERE ALSO FURNISHED
DATE OF KING THROUGH THE DEPT. AS INDICATED BELOW FOR INSTANT DOCUMENT, DATE
NOTING DELIVERY TO DEPT. SEE BUFILE 100-106670 FOR FORM IN WHICH FURNISHED.
TO DEPT.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REC-29

62-80750-4797

1 - Liaison
1 - [redacted]

BY COURIER

Date: May 8, 1970

To: Director
Central Intelligence Agency

Attention: [redacted]

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director

Subject: [redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

This is to advise that the employees listed below
are authorized to receive and receipt for Special Intelligence
delivered to Rooms 1000, 1010 and 1018, Federal Triangle
Building, 315 Ninth Street, Northwest, Washington, D. C.

In addition to the above-listed personnel, Special
Agents assigned to Room 1000 at the above address on weekend
and after-duty hours are authorized to accept and receipt for
such material.

WJM:wmk (5)

NOTE: [redacted]

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Walters _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Soyars _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

Classified "Confidential" in that this matter is so
classified by CIA.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~GROUP 1~~

Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification


66 MAY 28 1970

MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT

June 15, 1970

REC-105

62-80750-4798



b7C


Dear [redacted]:

Your letter of June 8th has been received and, in reply to your inquiry, information in our files must be maintained as confidential in accordance with regulations of the Department of Justice. I hope you will not infer either that we do or do not have data in our files regarding the Council on Foreign Relations.

With respect to the book, "The Invisible Government," it is contrary to my policy to comment on material not prepared by personnel of this Bureau. I regret I am unable to be of assistance to you.

Sincerely yours,
J. Edgar Hoover

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2-7-01 BY 60322UCW/004/4
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PC

*✓ 1/22/70
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NOTE: Bufiles contain no record of correspondent. The Council on Foreign Relations was founded in 1922 and is self-described as a non-commercial and nonpolitical organization which supports American foreign relations in an impartial and scholarly spirit. As of 1949, Allen W. Dulles was President of the Council on Foreign Relations (100-434840). "The Invisible Government" was published in 1964 and is critical of the Government's "Intelligence Community," dealing particularly with the CIA. The FBI is mentioned in this book. The criticism is leveled at the degree of influence exerted within the Government without proper control.

*book
17010 e*

54 JUN 23 1970

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

gen/...

TEB/a

X

ORIGINAL FILED IN 100-112600-701

TRUE COPY

Monday, June 8

Dear Sir:

Central Intelligence Agency

I would appreciate any information that you could give me about the Council on Foreign Relations and the "Invisible Government."

I would like to know how I can warn others.

Thank you.

Please send to this address:

Sincerely yours,



Wu

b7c

TRUE COPY

~~JUN 16 1970~~

Department of Justice *62-80750-478*
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D.C.

NOT RECORDED

191 JUN 18 1970

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE *2-13-07* BY *60322UCV/AC/HJN*
318692

ack/nml
JBT:llp
6-15-70

10/10
6-11-70
car

ORIGINAL FILED IN 101-436441-22

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 04-13-2007 BY AUC 60324 BAW/RS/SEZ

62-80750-4799
CHANGED TO
105-134594-28

AUG 18 1970

fw / cmg

F127

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

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Gandy _____
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TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: June 10, 1970

FROM : D. J. Brennan, Jr.

SUBJECT:

SYNOPSIS:

RECOMMENDATION:

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

- 1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. J. P. Mohr
- 1 - Mr. J. J. Casper
- 1 - Mr. I. W. Conrad
- 1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - [redacted]

FJC:bcw/lms
(8)

DETAILS - PAGE TWO

NOT RECORDED

191 JUL 10 1970

~~SECRET~~

7 1970

SEVEN

LIAISON

66 JUL 16 1970

ORIGINAL FILED IN 90-6-114X

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum ~~SECRET~~

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TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: 6/25/70

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 2-13-2007

CLASSIFIED BY 60322 KUP/1066/AN

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3.3(1,6) 2-13-2032

#866192

SUBJECT: LIAISON WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE

jm Buchanan

The Director has inquired regarding the nature of any liaison existing between the Washington Field Office (WFO) and CIA. Limited liaison does exist, being addressed to specific operational cases and name checks.

WFO, of necessity, is in contact with CIA concerning specific cases in the espionage field.

[Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

ACTION:

For the Director's information.

- 1 - Mr. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. Branigan
- 1 - Mr. Gray
- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - [Redacted]

GAD:mlm
(7)

6/25/70 ADDENDUM BY MR. TOLSON:

I thought all such contacts were to be handled by letter.

CT:DSS ENCLOSURE

62-80750

~~SECRET~~

REC-20

62-80750-4800

15 JUL 1970

DECLASSIFIED-10/20/04

70M 52 15 03 6M, 10

b7C

SAC, Washington Field

6/26/70

Director, FBI

REC-20 62-80750-4801

1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Branigan
1 - Mr. Gray
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Liaison
1 -

***LIAISON WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE**

Henceforth, all contacts with the Central Intelligence Agency are to be handled by letter.

EX-114

GAD:mlm
(10) *mem*

#MDR16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-12-01 BY SP-2 ALM/STG

NOTE:

See memo W. C. Sullivan to C. D. DeLoach, 6/26/70,
captioned as above, GAD:mlm.

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58 JUL 17 1970

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach *7/50/70* DATE 6/26/70
FROM : W. C. Sullivan
SUBJECT: LIAISON WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)
WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE

#moe/6
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-3-01 BY SP2MM/JTG

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My attached memorandum, 6/25/70, discussed the operational contacts between the Washington Field Office (WFO) and CIA's local domestic operations office. Mr. Tolson noted "I thought all such contacts were to be handled by letter" and the Director said "I most certainly intended the same." We are instructing WFO accordingly.

ACTION:

(1) Attached for approval is a letter to WFO instructing that all future contacts with CIA are to be handled by letter.

yes (2) If the Director desires, an SAC Letter will be prepared containing similar instructions, applicable to all offices.

Enclosures

- 1 - Mr. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. Branigan
- 1 - Mr. Gray
- 1 - Mr. Wannall
- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Mr. Cassidy

GAD:mlm
(8) *mem*

62-80750

13 JUL 10 1970

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REC'D SULLIVAN
FBI JUSTICE

JUN 26 12 46 PM '70

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SENSTUDY 71

NOTATIONS HEREIN ACCOUNT FOR ACCESS AND/OR DELIVERY OF THIS DOCUMENT TO SENATE
SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) AND/OR HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE (HSC) ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

NOTE: FORM IN WHICH ACCESS AND/OR DELIVERY WAS MADE MAY BE DIFFERENT

THAN AS REPRESENTED BY THIS DOCUMENT IN THAT CERTAIN EXCISIONS MAY HAVE BEEN

MADE. FOR ACCESS/DELIVERY FORM, SEE BUFILE 62-116395 (SSC), 62-116464 (HSC).

ACC. <u>SSC</u> <u>62-116395-386</u>	DATE <u>7/10/75</u>	HSC <u>62-116464-58</u>	DATE <u>9/4/75</u>
DEL. <u>✓</u>	DATE <u>7/10/75</u>	DEL. <u>✓</u>	DATE <u>9/4/75</u>

MISC: DOCUMENTS FURNISHED TO SSC RE MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., WERE ALSO FURNISHED
TO ESTATE OF KING THROUGH THE DEPT. AS INDICATED BELOW FOR INSTANT DOCUMENT, DATE
NOTING DELIVERY TO DEPT. SEE BUFILE 100-106670 FOR FORM IN WHICH FURNISHED.
TO DEPT.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

~~SECRET~~

1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Bishop
1 - Mr. Sullivan

DATE: June 23, 1970

1 - Mr. C.D. Brennan

1 - [REDACTED]

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TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

FROM : C. D. Brennan

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

(S)

As you were previously advised, "Time" magazine issue dated 6/22/70 contained an article critical of law enforcement and the use of police informants. In particular, it alleged that an informant being operated by the Ontario County Sheriff's Office, New York, recently appeared at Hobart College in Geneva, New York, and it was intimated his activity instigated unrest and violence on the campus.

(S)

On 6/17/70 one [REDACTED] (phonetic), who identified himself as a student at Hobart College, telephonically questioned Assistant Director Bishop in a very insulting manner as to why the FBI did not arrest [REDACTED] and charge him with the bombing of an ROTC office on Hobart College campus. The Director noted "Take no more calls from [REDACTED] We should get a discreet check done on him. H."

Discreet inquiries by the Buffalo Office through established sources revealed no information concerning [REDACTED]. However, the Hobart and William Smith Colleges telephone directory listed one [REDACTED] student during 1969-70, with home address as [REDACTED]. Additional inquiries concerning [REDACTED] by the Buffalo Office did not reveal any information.

Inquiries by Washington Field Office determined that [REDACTED]

born [REDACTED]

(S)

EPG:ssr

59 JUL 20 1970

F467

REC-84

NOT RECORDED

191 JUL 14 1970

b1

CONTINUED - OVER

18 JUL 10 1970

~~SECRET~~

ORIGINAL FILED IN

b7C

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5/21/70

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum C. D. Brennan to Mr. W. C. Sullivan

RE: [REDACTED]

b1

(S)

[REDACTED]

b7C

Buffalo, Washington Field and Bureau files contain no additional information.

ACTION:

None. For your information. ✓

lf

wcs

~~P~~

WBS

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Conrad
FROM : M. E. Williams
SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

1-Mr. Conrad
1-Office, 7133
1-Mr. Johnson
7/21/70

1-Mr. Zimmers
1-Mr. Gallagher

1-[REDACTED]
1-[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
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[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
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[REDACTED]
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[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] (S)

1-Mr. Mohr
1-Mr. Sullivan
1-Mr. Brennan
1-Mr. Casper
1-Mr. [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

NOT D- 12 JUL 28 1970
170 JUL 28 1970

WGT:moh:nlb (14)

(CONTINUED - OVER)

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DATE: 2-13-2007
CLASSIFIED BY 60322 UC/SP/CL/PLW
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X33(1) 2-13-2031
#388692

66 AUG 24 1970

ORIGINAL FILED IN 80-6-115

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach *CD*
FROM : CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
W. C. Sullivan *WCS*
SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

DATE: March 5, 1970

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. Sullivan _____
Mr. Mohr _____
Mr. Bishop _____
Mr. Brennan, C.D. _____
Mr. Callahan _____
Mr. Casper _____
Mr. Conrad _____
Mr. Felt _____
Mr. Gale _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Tavel _____
Mr. Walters _____
Mr. Soyars _____
Tele. Room _____
Miss Holmes _____
Miss Gandy _____

Attached is a memorandum dictated by Special Agent Sam J. Papich in response to the Director's request for the identification of the instances Papich had in mind when in his retirement request he indicated that CIA "believes that in the past we (FBI) did not always act in a forthright manner, and the agency undoubtedly could present a list of grievances."

A list identifying the cases and outlining the problems involved has been prepared by Papich and is attached to the memorandum. A review of the 25-page document reveals that it contains several instances in which CIA has registered its dissatisfaction and could conceivably renew its complaints, and others in which presumably CIA had no knowledge of Bureau action and has made no complaint.

For the Director's further information, I have instituted in this Division an analysis of each situation cited and a memorandum will be prepared as to each, containing my views and recommendations as a result of that analysis. This is being handled on an expedite basis and the memoranda will be sent through as soon as possible.

Enclosure

JAS:mls *mls*
(5)

1-Mr. DeLoach
1-Mr. Sullivan
1-Mr. J. A. Sizoo
1-Mr. D. J. Brennan

EX-105

REC-53

62-80750-4803

AUG 28 1970

ENCLOSURE

54 SEP 8 1970

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1-2-91 BY SP-2AM/AGG

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

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TO : The Director

DATE: March 5, 1970

FROM : Sam J. Papich

SUBJECT: RELATIONS WITH CIA

(5668 SLD/GCL -JFK- 12/19/94/9/98
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/2/94 BY SP7 CLO/ALM
C.A. #88-1826
PER CIA REVIEW OF 6/2/94

Reference is made to my letter of 3/2/70. I made the statement, "Unfortunately, CIA also believes that in the past we did not always act in a forthright manner, and the Agency undoubtedly could present a list of grievances." It is my understanding that you want such grievances identified. There is enclosed herewith a list of cases or situations which arose over the years.

Based upon a review of files and my personal recollection, this list would be representative of matters which CIA could use for making charges such as: not being forthright, not playing fairly and squarely, not cooperating, not being of assistance, not recognizing the need for concrete FBI contributions to the foreign intelligence effort. What CIA may have compiled over the years is unknown. What situations are known to CIA and have not come to our attention cannot be answered at this time. I am thinking of leaks including distorted information which may have been passed to CIA from ex-Bureau employees and CIA informants and sources.

It should be clearly emphasized that there is no indication whatsoever within CIA that the Agency has been seeking any kind of a showdown or confrontation with the FBI. Contrary to what some people may believe, the relationship between the two agencies up to the recent crisis was never better despite the problems which have arisen from time to time. I am confident that a thorough and impartial examination will conclusively support the foregoing.

In order that there may not be any misunderstanding, it is important to emphasize that the Bureau can also produce an extensive list of justified grievances. We can also produce an excellent record of support which we have given CIA; presumably CIA could do the same. There are ingredients for continuing conflict and there is also adequate machinery for maintaining sound working relations and producing badly needed intelligence information.

1- ENCLOSURE

EX-105

REC-53

ENCLOSURE

CONTINUED - OVER

Enclosure
SJP:chs/wmk (4)

AUG 28 1970

- 1 - Mr. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. Papich

By memo 1/16/75 Copyright
62-116391
avail for review to the extent
per G-Unit

(PERS. SEC. UNIT)

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT. KP/18/98

Memorandum to the Director
RE: RELATIONS WITH CIA

I believe that it would be most helpful to you and interested Bureau officials when evaluating and passing judgment on the attached material if we analyzed very briefly the role of the Bureau liaison Agent. A liaison Agent can be a simple mail courier or he can be the true Bureau Agent ready to confront any problem or issue with another agency, very often working with very limited information. It is expected that the Bureau Agent carry out his instructions forcefully and efficiently. He must be prepared to handle all types of personalities under various conditions. He must be alert for pitfalls and express himself in a most judicious and prudent manner but always making certain that the Bureau position is well fortified.

In evaluating the attached and my encounters with CIA, it should be noted that protests from the Bureau always were easy to handle because the Agent had J. Edgar Hoover behind him. However, when an Agent struck at an official on one day and solicited his cooperation the next day, it did require some resourceful action. It is believed that other liaison Agents regularly encounter similar situations. On numerous occasions I have bitterly feuded with CIA officials and this has included rough language. I have walked out on CIA officials when I felt they were unreasonable. They took the initiative by asking the Agent to return. I did try to play fairly and squarely with all of them and never hesitated to accept a confrontation; this included the Director of the Agency. When I lectured to CIA personnel over the years I always made a point to challenge them to present any grievances or raise any subject matter relating to the Bureau. I never left a discussion with any CIA official without being positive that our position was absolutely understood. The approaches utilized by me might be open to criticism. I can only refer to the records of the Bureau and CIA and I believe the Bureau's position is most favorable. I don't think CIA has ever transmitted a letter of protest to the Bureau during the eighteen years during which the Agent handled the assignment.

ACTION:

For information.

**CASES AND/OR SITUATIONS
INVOLVING CONFLICTS WITH THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)**

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION OF THIS
REFERENCE CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT. KP 1/8/78

(1) MOCASE (THE BORIS MORROS CASE)

This was a sensitive Soviet-espionage case which originated in 1943 and terminated for the most part in 1957. The case had many wide foreign ramifications and historically has been, and undoubtedly will be, one of the most important and involved cases of Soviet operations in this country and abroad. We did not disseminate any information of significance in this case until 1954. On various occasions when the Liaison Agent has become involved in heated arguments with CIA officials, they have seen fit to raise this case as an outstanding example of FBI failure to cooperate with the Agency. The position taken by CIA was that it should have been advised regarding the Soviet operational activity in foreign countries, claiming that the Agency would have had the opportunity to develop more information of significance, identify Soviet agents, and possibly prepare conditions for recruitment or doubling of Soviet operatives. We did not disseminate our reports to CIA because of the extreme sensitivity of the case. We actually did not permit CIA to handle any investigations relating to the MOCASE until 1957.

In 1957, CIA complained that it certainly had every right to have received the information earlier because many aspects of the MOCASE pertained to CIA employees and operations. CIA further argued that it had been greatly handicapped in effectively carrying out the leads in 1957 because the leads were given to the Agency at the same time that the case was publicized. The Agency argued that the failure of the Bureau to coordinate with CIA those French aspects of the case permitted the French, rather than the U. S., to play a dominating role in Europe.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11-14-2001 BY 60322 UCBAW

~~CLASSIFIED BY: SP9 CLO/Hem~~
~~DECLASSIFY ON: OADR~~

12/2/94 C.A. # PP-1826
ALL CLASSIFICATION EXCEPT
PER CIA REVIEW OF 6/2/94
SP7 CIO/ACM
5/15/95 C.A. # PP-1826

PS. 9. P2 1st & 3rd [] AND [] ABOVE P2
PS. 10 [] ABOVE P1, 2ND [] IN P1
~~62-80450-1804~~
ENCLOSURE PS. 11 [] ABOVE P2, 1st [] IN P2
PS. 13 [] IN P1, 2ND [] IN P2
62-80750-4803 PS. 14 [] ABOVE P2, 1st [] IN P2
CONT. BACK of PS.

PS. 15 [] ABOVE P1, 1st [] IN P1

PS: 17 [] ABOVE #1, [] IN #3

P5. 23 2ND [] IN P4

1. The first step in the process of the investigation is the identification of the problem. This is done by the investigator who is responsible for the study. The investigator must first identify the problem that is being investigated. This is done by the investigator who is responsible for the study. The investigator must first identify the problem that is being investigated. This is done by the investigator who is responsible for the study.

1. The first step in the process of the investigation is the identification of the problem. This is done by the investigator who is responsible for the study. The investigator must first identify the problem and then determine the scope of the investigation. The next step is to collect data. This is done by the investigator who is responsible for the study. The investigator must first identify the problem and then determine the scope of the investigation. The next step is to collect data. This is done by the investigator who is responsible for the study.

(一) 關於「中華民國」之解釋

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
 DISTRICT COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
 In and for the District of Columbia

~~SECRET~~

With regard to dealing with the French, we took the position that we would cover the leads through our Legal Attaches wherever possible and to furnish leads to CIA in those countries where we did not have Legal Attaches. CIA maintained that since we were on record that our Legal Attaches do not handle operations abroad, the Bureau had an obligation to levy those French leads on CIA or at least coordinate with the Agency before going to the French.

It is to be noted that in any argument relating to jurisdiction in this matter, CIA will fall back on the responsibilities placed on the Agency under the provisions of the National Security Act of 1947 and the implementation of the foregoing through National Security Council Directives. CIA will maintain that it is incumbent upon the Bureau to recognize the provisions of the National Security Act of 1947 and the Directives. The Agency would argue that in the MOCASE, these were ignored by the Bureau. (Bufile - 100-352385)

(2) BUREAU OPERATIONS IN MEXICO ~~(S)~~ (u)

During the 1950's, CIA periodically raised questions concerning the functions of our Legal Attache Office in Mexico City. As early as 1951, CIA claimed that the Legal Attache was acting outside of the scope of the Bureau's jurisdiction since we were on record that our Legal Attaches were acting strictly in a liaison capacity, yet we allegedly were conducting operations such as developing penetrations of the Communist Party of Mexico. A heated discussion took place in 1951 between the two Agencies but we did not change or modify the operations of our office in Mexico. CIA, from time to time, has informally raised questions on our running informants in Mexico and still being able to comply with Directives. The interpretation given by CIA is that overseas counterintelligence operations, including the operation of informants by the Bureau, must be coordinated with CIA. Further interpretation by the Agency has been that "coordination" means a discussion of the operation, including the identity of the informant, if the Agency ~~(S)~~ (u)

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feels such information is necessary. CIA officials have casually and informally referred to the situation in Mexico as a potential issue and conflict but, for several years, nobody in CIA has seen fit to create any kind of a problem. We, of course, might be vulnerable since we have been operating informants in Mexico for many years. The problem undoubtedly was greatly mitigated because of the outstanding work of former Legal Attache [redacted] and the current Legal Attache [redacted] (u)

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As an example of a situation encountered throughout the years, in 1957 our Legal Attache, Mexico City, asked the local CIA office for an up-to-date list of Soviet Embassy personnel in order to keep apprised of the identity of the Soviets officially assigned in Mexico City. The CIA office responded but included the following statement "It is understood that your office has no operations aimed at or involving the Soviet Embassy or any of the persons on the attached list. If I am wrong, I should appreciate being advised." The Legal Attache advised that in his opinion, the wording of the CIA communication did not warrant a reply. He, however, reported to the Seat of Government, that at that particular time, we did have three cases which might be considered as operations directed against the Soviet Embassy. (u) (Memorandum Belmont to Boardman, March 22, 1957, re: "Relations with CIA," 62-80750) (u)

In 1963, Legal Attache, Mexico City, received information indicating that CIA intended to penetrate the Communist Party of Mexico at the top leadership levels. The Legal Attache pointed out that this proposed action might affect top-level informants of the Legal Attache since CIA would undoubtedly be making requests of the Bureau concerning certain individuals, including those who were our informants. The Legal Attache proposed that if CIA levied any request on him, he would furnish ample information on each Party leader, but only information which was well balanced in quality and quantity, so that no one individual would stand out at the risk of being pinpointed. (u) (Memorandum Brennan to Sullivan, August 5, 1963, re: "Legal Attache Office, Mexico City," 62-80750-4132) (u)

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How much information CIA has developed over the years concerning our operational activity in Mexico City is unknown. However, we should bear in mind that former Special Agent [redacted] handled many of our operations in Mexico, including key informants, and subsequently began performing services for CIA after he left the Bureau. We also should not forget that Americans operating in Latin American countries for one agency are heavily exposed to the resources of another U. S. intelligence or investigative agency. This Agent knows from personal experience that operating in these areas constitutes a "very small world" and the exposure to leaks and errors is considerable.

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(3) THE ABEL CASE

Although CIA has not raised the point for several years, the prevailing attitude was, and probably still exists, that the FBI did not play it square with CIA in the Abel case by not making certain that the Agency was given the proper recognition for its contributions. CIA feels that in the first place, there would not have been any U. S. access or availability to the source in this case, Reino Hayhanen, because CIA took the full responsibility for moving Hayhanen from France to the U. S. in 1957. CIA claims it took the risk and responsibility of doing this after the Bureau declined to become involved in any operation designed to transport Hayhanen to the U. S. It should be noted that Hayhanen was an alcoholic and that his first contacts with CIA in Paris raised questions concerning Hayhanen's mental stability. (u)

After Hayhanen arrived in the U. S., we arranged access to him for a period, the purpose of which was to obtain a complete story of his intelligence activities in the U. S. and we were particularly interested in identifying all of his associates, especially the man who later was identified as Rudolph Abel. After a short handling period in the U. S., we dropped Hayhanen because he became a problem. It was an extremely critical situation because we had not yet identified Abel. CIA agreed to take the responsibility for the carrying and safeguarding of Hayhanen but we

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were given free access to this difficult source. This was a most fortunate arrangement as far as CIA was concerned, because this adjustment gave us the time to work with Hayhanen and subsequently develop the leads which led to the apprehension of Abel. The Agency has maintained that it was largely responsible for making absolutely certain that Hayhanen was mentally and physically prepared for testimony at the Abel trial. Hayhanen was a key witness. CIA has also referred to the heavy expenses incurred by the Agency, all for the benefit of the Bureau. CIA has complained that the Bureau never really thanked the Agency for its cooperation and CIA has been particularly irked because the Bureau did not see fit to inform the Attorney General or the White House of the role played by CIA. (u) (Bufile - 65-64538)

(4) WILLIAM P. BUNDY CASE

In July, 1953, Senator Joseph McCarthy sought to subpoena William P. Bundy, then a CIA official, to testify before the Senator's Committee. McCarthy claimed that Bundy's alleged communist activities were clearly documented. The most serious allegation was that Bundy had contributed \$400 to the defense fund of Alger Hiss. All of this was publicized. The information set forth in the newspapers emanated from a Bureau report. CIA planned to charge the Bureau with leaking the information to Senator McCarthy. CIA officials held numerous conferences concerning the matter but charges were never made against the Bureau. What information CIA has on this particular item is not known but the Agency did know that we maintained liaison with McCarthy's Committee. (Bufiles - 62-80750 and 140-1477)

(5) BUREAU DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION CONCERNING JAY LOVESTONE

In May, 1954, Allen Dulles raised the question concerning the propriety of FBI dissemination of information concerning Jay Lovestone. This information had been furnished to us by [REDACTED]

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[redacted] When interviewed by us, [redacted] made several accusations against CIA. We disseminated the information to the White House, the Attorney General, and some data also went to the State Department. Dulles took the position that by disseminating derogatory information concerning his Agency, he had been placed on the spot because the [redacted] data was not the complete story. In the past, CIA informally referred to this as an instance of very unfair conduct on the part of the Bureau. (Memorandum Keay to Belmont, May 24, 1954, re: "Relations with CIA," 62-80750)

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**(6) BUREAU HANDLING OF CIA REQUESTS FOR TOURS
FOR FOREIGN OFFICIALS**

On occasions in the 1950's, CIA complained that officials visiting the U. S. under CIA sponsorship were given excellent treatment on the tour but, nevertheless, many of the visitors left most disappointed because they had not had any contact with any Bureau officials. CIA felt that contact with Bureau officials had very significant benefits and left lasting favorable impressions because of the FBI's world-wide reputation. CIA also pointed out that when foreign visitors had no contact with Bureau officials, they were left with the suspicion that there was some kind of friction between the FBI and CIA. In 1956, we had a clear-cut policy to the effect that tours for such visitors would be of a restrictive nature in that such visitors would view our facilities normally seen by the public and nothing more. CIA was so informed but periodically indicated that our policy prevented the Agency from truly enhancing U. S. interests abroad. CIA never lodged an official complaint. (Memorandum Roach to Belmont, May 31, 1956, re: "Visit at Bureau by Foreign Police and Intelligence Officials," 62-80750)

It should be emphasized that for the past several years there would not be any basis for any form of complaint with regard to Bureau treatment of foreign officials coming to the U. S. under CIA sponsorship. The personal attention given to such officials by Assistant Director Sullivan and other officials and Supervisors in the Domestic Intelligence Division has been outstanding and benefits have accrued to the Bureau. These visitors have gone back to their native

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countries with far better impressions than in the past. In addition, we have learned more about these countries, their services, and their security chiefs by spending a few minutes with them. Needless to say, this kind of treatment has also immeasurably helped our Legal Attaches.

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[redacted] CIA surrendered but felt that we were impairing their efforts to gather information concerning Soviet-espionage activities in Europe (S) (S) Bufile - 100-11146)

(8) COLONEL JOHN GROMBACH [redacted]

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Colonel John Grombach was a retired U. S. Army officer who, during World War II, established a private intelligence network, operating throughout the world but primarily in Europe. His sources included any number of European exiles who came to the U. S. While he was in business, he was financed by the State Department, then the Department of the Army, and in the later 1940's and into the 1950's by CIA. Grombach established contact with the Bureau through one of his subordinates, [redacted] who periodically called

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on us and furnished information which Grombach felt was of interest to us. This dissemination through [redacted] continued during the period of Grombach's relationship with CIA. We never informed CIA that we were receiving such information which also was of interest to the Agency. It is possible that Grombach had given the same data to CIA but we do not know. CIA and Grombach clashed and the relationship was severed in an atmosphere of severe bitterness. [redacted]

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(S) (Bufile - 62-77306)

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(9) COMMISSION ON THE ORGANIZATION OF THE
EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT

(Herbert Hoover Commission - 1954)

In October, 1954, a task force of the captioned Commission initiated a survey of CIA's operations under the leadership of General Mark W. Clark. In January, 1955, we were advised by a representative of the task force that Senator Joseph McCarthy had furnished the group a list of CIA employees who were considered subversive. CIA became cognizant of this development and there was talk within the Agency that the Bureau had furnished the names to the Senator. When the Liaison Agent was informally approached on this, he flatly told the Agency to officially submit its charges. The Agency never did. What information CIA may have had on this matter as it pertained to the Bureau is not known. It is possible that the Agency's attitude was strictly predicated on a knowledge that we maintained liaison with the Senator's Committee. (Relations with CIA, Bufile - 62-80750)

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(10) INTERNAL SECURITY LEADS IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES

During the 1950's, we gave our Legal Attaches numerous leads stemming from internal security cases in the U. S. In many instances we did not see fit to notify CIA although the Agency always maintained that you could not separate "internal Security" from "counter-intelligence," namely a lead in France pertaining to a communist in the U. S. warranted advising CIA, if not, at least asking the Agency to handle the lead. In the last several years, it is not believed that there is any basis for complaint since we have regularly been notifying CIA concerning subjects of cases who travel abroad. If the Legal Attache is investigating, CIA is notified in order to avoid duplicate efforts. There have been exceptions where we have taken the position that CIA should not be notified because of the sensitivity of the matter. How many such exceptions are known to CIA cannot be established from our files; however, we should bear in mind that when our Legal Attaches investigate, they contact many of the same foreign officials normally contacted by CIA. How many of these foreign officials are CIA informants, or on the Agency payroll, is unknown.

(11) BUREAU OPERATIONS IN CUBA ~~(S)~~ ~~(u)~~

~~(S)~~ ~~(u)~~ We operated informants in Cuba when we had a Legal Attache's Office in Havana. Informants reported on activities of communists and other subversives in that country. During the period we operated these informants, we did not coordinate our operations with CIA. We did not advise the Agency that we had such sources. However, in 1960, after Castro came on the scene, it became infeasible to handle certain informants in a secure manner. Approval was granted to turn certain informants over to CIA. What these informants may have subsequently told CIA about past Bureau operations is unknown. This item is being cited in the event CIA had evidence to establish that we had been operational in Cuba and had not coordinated with the Agency pursuant to Directives (Memorandum Donahoe to Belmont, February 5, 1960, re: "Partido Socialista Popular," 64-200-210, 2377 and Memorandum Frohbose to Belmont, February 3, 1960, re:

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(13) BORDER COVERAGE

In June, 1957, our Phoenix Office presented a problem concerning the Bureau's handling of informants on the Mexican border. These informants were operating inside Mexico. The problem was predicated on situations which might arise as the result of CIA's endeavors to develop informants who already were being handled by the Bureau. It was pointed out that CIA logically could come in contact with such sources and could make approaches for recruitment. It was recommended and approved that in order to protect our coverage in the border area, a valuable, trusted, and reliable confidential source would continue to be utilized even if he were contacted by CIA. Our policy was that we would not identify our sources to the Agency. (S) (u)

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How much CIA learned about our border coverage is not known. Again, it is pointed out that former Bureau Agent [redacted] may have been knowledgeable. As indicated, he later began performing services for CIA. If CIA learned that we were operating informants in Mexico, it could use such information as additional evidence of Bureau failure to cooperate and coordinate with the Agency pursuant to Directives. (Memorandum Roach to Belmont, June 14, 1957, re "Communist Coverage Along the Mexican Border, Relations with CIA," 100-356015-1238) (S)

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[redacted] (S) It was recommended and approved that we not advise CIA (S)

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[redacted] (Memorandum Branigan to Belmont, June 10, 1957, re; [redacted]) (S)

(15) CIA REQUESTS FOR BUREAU LECTURE ON COMMUNISM IN THE U. S.

On September 25, 1958, CIA inquired if W. C. Sullivan could give a lecture on the communist movement in the U. S. It was recommended that Sullivan give the lecture. Such lectures were being afforded in other parts of the Government. The Director made the notation "We cannot make Sullivan available to this outfit." The Agency accepted this as an affront and a blatant refusal

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to cooperate on a most important subject of interest to both agencies. (Memorandum Sullivan to Belmont, October 1, 1958, re: "Request for Lecture on Communism by CIA,")

(16) CASE OF EDWARD ELLIS SMITH

On July 9, 1956, an official of the State Department confidentially advised the Bureau that Edward Ellis Smith, a CIA employee in Moscow, had been involved in an affair with a Soviet girl. According to our source, Smith allegedly had furnished information to the Soviet girl. We checked with the State Department and CIA and we confirmed that Smith had been involved in an affair and that he had been recalled. According to CIA and State Department, there was no indication that Smith had been involved in any espionage against the U. S. CIA gave consideration to requesting the Bureau to identify its source and then changed its mind. Whether CIA has documented this as an instance where the Bureau failed to cooperate by not volunteering the source is a matter of conjecture but, it is a case that should be kept in mind. (Bufile - 65-64084)

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(S) [REDACTED] (S) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] CIA has never been satisfied with
the efforts made by the Bureau. The Agency possibly could
take the position that we looked lightly at the allegations
and did not pursue a matter which, in their eyes, merited
a more aggressive approach. (Bufile - 105-109053)

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(Bufile - 105-109053)

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(18) LEAKS TO THE "NATIONAL REVIEW" - 1959

In April, 1959, CIA became concerned over the appearance of certain items in issues of the "National Review." The publication carried a column authored by an unidentified individual who was making derogatory references to CIA. CIA subsequently identified the author as Lyle Hugh Munson, a former CIA employee. CIA investigation indicated that Munson was obtaining his information from former CIA Agents. In checking on Munson, CIA identified some of his friends who were listed as Robert Morris, former member of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee; and Lou Nichols, former Assistant to the Director. The Liaison Agent was unable to develop any additional information as it might have pertained to Nichols in this particular matter. CIA may have additional data not revealed. (Memorandum Roach to Belmont, April 21, 1959, re: "Central Intelligence Agency," 62-80750-3341)

(19) TRAVEL OF BUREAU INFORMANTS TO CUBA ~~(S)~~ (u)

In [] we received information indicating that one of our informants [] was in a position to travel to Cuba. A question was raised concerning CIA interest in this matter, if the informant made the trip. It was recommended and approved that we not advise CIA concerning the identity of the informant or his trip to Cuba. ~~(S)~~ (u)

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It is not known if CIA acquired any knowledge but, if the Agency did, we potentially are vulnerable. The Agency could charge that we were operating outside of the U. S. and we failed to coordinate with the Agency. (Memorandum Wannall to Sullivan, [] re: [])

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(20) DISSEMINATION OF CIA INFORMATION IN A BUREAU MONOGRAPH

By letter dated May 5, 1965, we disseminated to interested agencies, including CIA, a copy of a monograph entitled "Communism in the Dominican Republic." The monograph contained considerable information which had emanated

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from CIA. We did not obtain clearance from CIA for the inclusion of this information in our monograph. Clearance approval was not obtained because of the urgency of the document. CIA was irritated because it considered our action a distinct violation of the third agency rule. The Agency never made any protest.

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(21) ~~SECRET~~ BUREAU INFORMANTS IN [REDACTED] (S)

In [REDACTED] we were operating informants in [REDACTED] (S) At the inception of our operational activity, CIA was not informed. [REDACTED] (S)

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[REDACTED] CIA was under the definite impression that we had been running these informants before we had finally coordinated with them.

[REDACTED] but no issue was made at CIA Headquarters and the matter was put to rest. (S) (u)

[REDACTED] (S) Our potential vulnerability is that we were operating in [REDACTED] without coordinating with CIA. [REDACTED] (S) (u)

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(22) ~~SECRET~~ SOLO (S) (u)

The information emanating from the captioned sensitive Bureau operation has been disseminated to CIA and other agencies for several years. The sensitive source has traveled abroad numerous times and his trips

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have included Russia. We have never identified the source to CIA and we have never coordinated with the Agency regarding any trips made by the source. Up to date, no issue has been raised.

We are potentially vulnerable in that former Bureau Agents now with CIA may have been familiar with aspects of the ~~SOLO~~ operation. We have no evidence that such ex-Agents passed any of their knowledge to CIA officials. If they have or, if CIA has become cognizant of the existence of the operation, we could be charged with failure to coordinate. The Agency could place special emphasis in this case because it has so many high-level foreign ramifications. (S) (u)

(23) HARRASSMENT OF CIA

By letter dated November 15, 1967, CIA inquired if the Bureau would check the toll calls on the home telephone of one [redacted] who was harrassing CIA in the Miami area. [redacted] allegedly was seeking information concerning the Agency's covert operations. We told CIA that we would not check the toll calls. We explained that on the basis of the information received, there was not sufficient information to justify investigation falling within the Bureau's jurisdiction. CIA accepted our response but there is no doubt that the Agency characterized our position as a concrete example of refusal to help a sister agency with a problem relating to the security of U. S. intelligence operations. (u) (Memorandum Brennan to Sullivan, November 16, 1967, re: [redacted] - Harrassment of CIA," 105-94508-12) b7C

(24) CURRENT INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

CIA became very irked when we restricted dissemination of our Current Intelligence Analysis to two copies for the Agency. CIA took the position with the Liaison Agent that CIA always has been most liberal in providing the Bureau with as many copies as we needed when it involved various types of CIA material. The Agency never made an official issue of this matter. The Liaison Agent is confident that CIA always considered this an uncooperative gesture on our part.

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(25) ESTABLISHMENT OF BUREAU LIAISON WITH

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He indicated that before there was any change in procedure, it would be necessary for CIA and FBI to come to some form of an agreement. Allen Dulles subsequently expressed disappointment in that his Agency had not been contacted by the Bureau prior to exploring the liaison arrangement. We eventually conferred with CIA and came to an agreement satisfactory to all parties concerned. (S)

Again, CIA could cite this as an instance where we failed to coordinate with the Agency in line with National Security Council Directives (Memorandum Frohbose to Belmont, March 3, 1960, re: Legal Attache Operations - Norway, Denmark, Sweden, and the Netherlands, 66-18973-123) (S)(u)

In the latter part of 1959 we gave consideration to establishing a Legal Attache in Copenhagen, Denmark. The purpose of the assignment was to follow Bureau leads in Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Holland. We did not inform CIA of our intentions. (Memorandum Frohbose to Belmont, January 14, 1960, re: Legal Attache Operations, The Netherlands, 66-18973-113) (S)(u)

(26) BUREAU DISSEMINATION OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
INFORMATION TO FOREIGN SERVICES - 1962

By letter dated November 7, 1962, CIA raised questions concerning the propriety of Bureau dissemination of counterintelligence information to foreign intelligence services. CIA, at that time, had particular reference to information which our Legal Attache had transmitted to the [REDACTED] CIA took the position that pursuant to the coordinating (S)

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Directive, the Bureau was obligated to coordinate with CIA prior to such dissemination. [redacted]

[redacted] We responded to CIA by stating that the information was the product of an internal security operation and did not relate to any operational activity abroad. CIA again surrendered. The Agency could argue that it was responsible for [redacted]

[redacted] and that we had an obligation of coordinating with the Agency. (Memorandum Branigan to Sullivan, November 9, 1962, re: [redacted])

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(27) "THE INVISIBLE GOVERNMENT," A BOOK AUTHORED BY DAVID WISE AND THOMAS ROSS

In August, 1963, we received information indicating that Wise and Ross were in the process of gathering material for a book pertaining to activities of U. S. intelligence activities. Both Ross and Wise contacted the Bureau. It was recommended that liaison orally advise CIA that these two individuals were preparing a book concerning U. S. intelligence agencies. The Director noted "I see no reason doing so."

It is not known if CIA was aware of the contact with the Bureau. Wise and Ross subsequently published the book which contained extremely derogatory information concerning CIA. (Memorandum Jones to DeLoach, re: "David Wise of the "New York Herald Tribune" and Thomas Ross of the "Chicago Sun Times")

(28) COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES - AFRICA

In April, 1960, CIA inquired if the Bureau would give any consideration to assisting the Agency toward developing coverage in Africa. CIA was looking for the services of any Negro informant who might be available. The Agency also inquired about placing a Negro in the Communist Party, USA, under a plan which would have as an eventual objective, the sending of the informant to

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Africa under an appropriate cover and for an extended period. We told CIA we had no informants available because they were necessary for our own operations. We took the position that we saw no benefit to be gained by loaning an informant on a short or long term basis.

This item is being mentioned because Africa has become vitally important to U. S. interest, bearing in mind that both the Soviets and Chinese Communists have made significant inroads into the area. CIA could argue that as early as 1960, it had the foresight to recognize the need for additional coverage, that it appealed to the Bureau for assistance, and that we did not cooperate. (Memorandum Papich to Frohbose, April 7, 1960, re: "Communist Activities in Africa," 64-200-302-110)

**(29) ADVISING THE WHITE HOUSE REGARDING CRITICISM
OF INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS - EUROPE**

By letter dated October 23, 1964, we furnished the White House information received by our Legal Attache from the U. S. Ambassador to Luxembourg. He was critical of intelligence operations in Europe and made particular reference to the overstaffing of personnel.

We do not know if CIA became cognizant of the existence of the Bureau letter bearing in mind that the Agency undoubtedly would have considered the document as relating to its operations. We do know that for several years, CIA personnel have been assigned to the White House and had access to considerable information. (Memorandum Brennan to Sullivan, October 22, 1964, re "U. S. Intelligence Operations in Europe")

**(30) THE PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY
BOARD AND JOHN MC CONE**

In May, 1963, we became embroiled with CIA in a rather critical conflict as a result of communication the Bureau sent to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. The matter dealt with [REDACTED]

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In a portion of our communication, we attributed certain information to McCone, then Director of CIA. He charged that the information attributed to him was not so because he had never made any such statement and he could prove it. The actual fact was that the information relating to McCone had been given to us by one of his subordinates who had indicated that the information originated with McCone. McCone maintained that we should have checked with him before we went on record that any information had originated with him. The record at the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board was subsequently corrected. (Memorandum Belmont to Tolson, May 16, 1963, re: "Central Intelligence Agency," 62-80750-4099)

(31) ALLEGED PENETRATIONS OF CIA

In February, 1965, Bureau representatives met with CIA officials and with [redacted] to discuss allegations made by [redacted] relative to alleged Soviet penetrations of CIA. [redacted] was interviewed in detail concerning these allegations. By letter dated February 26, 1965, we officially advised CIA that there appeared to be no basis at this time for a full investigation of the individuals involved.

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There are officials in CIA who continue to be seriously concerned about possible penetrations of the Agency and have not discarded [redacted] allegations.

We do not have any reason to believe that CIA has developed any substantive evidence to support [redacted] allegations. If it does, we could be vulnerable and could be charged that we did not cooperate and conduct the necessary investigation in 1965.

(32) VICE PRESIDENT NIXON'S TRIP TO SOUTH AMERICA - 1958

In 1958, Vice President Richard M. Nixon traveled to Latin America during which time there were numerous riots and attacks which were directed against the Vice President and his party. By letter dated May 16, 1958, we provided the Vice President with a summary of information which we had received concerning the events in Latin America relating

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to the trip. Most of this information came from CIA. Our letter could be interpreted as raising the question concerning the quality of CIA's coverage in Latin America. (S) (X)

It is not known if CIA ever became knowledgeable of the referenced communication. As already indicated, we do know that CIA personnel have been assigned to the White House. We also know that General Robert Cushman, currently Deputy Director of CIA, was attached to Vice President Nixon's staff.

If CIA is cognizant of the communication, the Agency technically could raise a question concerning a violation of the third agency rule and, furthermore, could question the Bureau's propriety of making reference to CIA's coverage in Latin America. (Bufile - 62-88461-117) (S) (X)

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(S) Although the Agency has never officially made any statement to us, it has been bitterly disappointed that the Bureau never acknowledged CIA's assistance which the Agency considered extremely valuable. (S) (X)

(34) EXCHANGE OF TECHNICAL INFORMATION

For many years, we maintained tight restrictions with regard to the exchange of technical information with CIA, particularly as it related to the technical surveillance field. CIA exhibited its equipment to us but, for many years, we declined to show any of our devices, with some exceptions.

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CIA never made any official protest but informally indicated from time to time that the lack of exchange in this highly important field was prejudicial to over-all intelligence and internal security interests. The Agency implied that we actually were more open with the British in this general area than we were with CIA.

It should be noted that the foregoing situation does not exist today. There is good exchange between the Bureau and CIA.

(35) CIA LECTURERS AT BUREAU TRAINING SCHOOLS

CIA has never been able to understand why the Bureau will not permit CIA personnel to lecture at Bureau schools or training courses. CIA has felt that through a careful selection of lecturers, the Agency could make a very valuable contribution both to the Bureau and to CIA. The Agency has indicated that its participation in some of our courses would give the Agency the opportunity to describe CIA's organization, objectives, and operational problems. Furthermore, it has been expressed that Bureau personnel could be given the opportunity to pose questions and there would be a far better over-all orientation on the part of our people.

The Liaison Agent has always resisted CIA's request. It has been a delicate matter to handle because Bureau personnel have lectured to hundreds of CIA employees.

(36) EXCHANGE IN THE TRAINING FIELD

Although CIA has never officially made an issue of the matter, the Agency has not been happy about our attitude concerning exchange of information in the training field. When the matter has been brought up for any discussion by CIA, the Agency has been discouraged. CIA informally has expressed the feeling that an exchange along certain guidelines could be most useful to the U. S. intelligence and internal security effort.

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(37) POSITIVE INTELLIGENCE

This is an area where discussion with CIA officials can rapidly generate criticism of the Bureau for failure to cooperate and offer the necessary assistance. Positive intelligence, briefly, is that information which might assist the U. S. Government in formulating foreign policy. Much of it is of a political nature and a vital portion pertains to scientific developments, military capabilities of foreign countries, and intentions of foreign countries. Positive intelligence is not only important as it concerns the communist-bloc countries but also the non-bloc nations.

There never has been any law, Directive, or Executive Order which has fixed the responsibilities for the clandestine collection of positive intelligence in the U. S. The Bureau does have a responsibility which we refer to as internal security and which falls into the accepted area of counterintelligence. We do investigate subversives, spys, and we develop penetrations of foreign intelligence services. Our work in the positive intelligence field, for the most part, has been restricted to the compliance of requests imposed upon us by the State Department, usually when a political crisis occurs in some country.

CIA has maintained that there is a tremendous unexplored field for expanded acquirement of positive intelligence in the U. S. This would mean vastly increased technical surveillance coverage, development of information, and collection of cryptographic material. CIA does not feel that we have aggressively moved on this particular subject and that over the years, the Agency has been thwarted in its attempts to do much about the problem.

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On October 21, 1969, we told CIA that future requests from CIA for technical surveillance coverage should be transmitted by the Agency directly to the Attorney General. (U) (S)

CIA has never made any official comment or protest but it has considered the afore-mentioned action by the Bureau as unfriendly and uncooperative. The Agency has looked to the Bureau as the logical point of contact and as the only organization having the resources and capabilities of adequately determining if such coverage is even feasible.

(38) MISCELLANEOUS ITEMS

The Liaison Agent recalls fragments of other situations or conflicts which occurred over the years and which resulted in the voicing of CIA displeasure or criticism. The Agent cannot recall the names of the cases which is necessary to acquire the required data. There was one instance early in the 1950's which involved information received from a source of unknown reliability charging Allen Dulles with having been a communist and a spy while in Europe. We disseminated the information to several agencies. Dulles exploded but never lodged a protest.

The Agent also has recollection of instances when CIA alleged that its source or informant was compromised by Bureau revelation of CIA information during the course of interviews conducted by us. Technically, this would be a violation of the third agency rule and, if CIA had hard core facts, we would be vulnerable, particularly if an important informant was lost. CIA never made any official issue or protest.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

There also have been instances, but cases cannot be recalled, where we included CIA information in Bureau reports but CIA had requested that the information not be passed outside of the Bureau. CIA never protested.

~~SECRET~~

62-80750-4804 IN THIS FILE SKIPPED DURING
SERIALIZATION.

NOV 16 1972

MAN

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2-13-02 BY 6032204/014/4
38692

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. C. D. Brennan *Blane*

DATE: 9/4/70

FROM : W. R. Wannall *WRW*

SUBJECT: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)
RUNNING MEMORANDUM

For a number of years the Domestic Intelligence Division has maintained a running memorandum covering relations with CIA. The memorandum is up to date through the cessation of personal liaison, and it is suggested that it be discontinued at this time.

ACTION:

If approved, we will discontinue maintenance of the running memorandum covering relations with CIA.

GAD:hc

(6)

- 1-Mr. Sullivan
- 1-Mr. Brennan
- 1-Mr. Cassidy
- 1-Mr. Wannall
- 1-

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EX-110

REC-2

62-80750-4806

15 SEP 11 1970

56 SEP 17 1970

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2-13-07 BY 60322 ucm/pcl/dk
#368192

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

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TO : C. D. Brennan *Brennan*
FROM : W. R. Wannall *WRW*

DATE: October 14, 1970

SUBJECT: (S) [REDACTED]

Classified by *135*
Exempt from GDS, Category *3*
Declassification *2/1/8*

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

If General Abrams' request is made directly to the Bureau, we will respond immediately, advising him that it is not a matter within our jurisdiction and that we cannot accede to the request.

Since [REDACTED] indicated the request may be made directly to the Attorney General, we should at this time advise him of this possibility and inform him of our opposition to acceding to the request.

ACTION:

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

If approved, attached letter to the Attorney General will be forwarded in order that he may be aware of the situation and our stand with regard to it.

Enclosure *10-15-70*

WRW:ams

(6)

- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. Mohr
- 1 - Mr. Brennan
- 1 - Mr. Wannall
- 1 - [REDACTED]

b7C

NOT RECORDED

47 OCT 23 1970

OCT 26 1970

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5-WRW

DATE: 2-13-2002
CLASSIFIED BY 60321 ucw/1016/1W
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X33(1) 2-13-2032

ORIGINAL FILED IN 100-174204-267

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. C. D. Brennap

DATE: **10/13/70**

FROM : W. R. Wannall

1 - Mr. C.D. Brennan

1 - Mr. Wannall

1

SUBJECT

Classified by 0122
Exempt from GDS, Category 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

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[redacted] was informed of the recent Congressional actions involving added responsibility for the Bureau and of our current efforts to recruit additional personnel. He was advised that our domestic jurisdiction is being expanded and our current problems with unrest in the United States were demanding the full time and attention of all our available personnel. b7C

said that the request ~~was not~~ ^{had} ~~not~~ ^{been} ~~made~~ ^{made} ~~either~~ ^{made} ~~directly~~ ^{made} ~~to~~ ^{made} ~~the~~ ^{made} ~~Bureau~~ ^{made} ~~or~~ ^{made} ~~to~~ ^{made} ~~the~~ ^{made} ~~Attorney~~ ^{made} ~~General~~ ^{made} ~~because~~ ^{made} ~~of~~ ^{made} ~~what~~ ^{made} ~~he~~ ^{made} ~~termed~~ ^{made} ~~the~~ ^{made} ~~pressures~~ ^{made} ~~behind~~ ^{made} ~~it,~~ ^{made} ~~but~~ ^{made} ~~that~~ ^{made} ~~he~~ ^{made} ~~appreciated~~ ^{made} ~~our~~ ^{made} ~~frank~~ ^{made} ~~comments~~ ^{made} ~~concerning~~ ^{made} ~~it,~~ ^{made} ~~and~~ ^{made} ~~just~~ ^{made} ~~wanted~~ ^{made} ~~to~~ ^{made} ~~pass~~ ^{made} ~~along~~ ^{made} ~~his~~ ^{made} ~~information~~ ^{made} ~~to~~ ^{made} ~~us~~ ^{made} ~~in~~ ^{made} ~~a~~ ^{made} ~~helpful~~ ^{made} ~~way.~~ ^{made}

ACTION:

(3) In the event we receive such a request, it will be evaluated at that time and appropriate recommendations made.

GAD:bsf/lrs (6)

OCT 21 1970

COPY MADE FOR MR. TOLSON

DATE: 04-13-2007

CLASSIFIED BY AUG. 60324 BAW/RS/SEE

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1, 6)

04-13-2002

~~SECRET~~

1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. Brennan
1 - Mr. Wannall

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

The Attorney General

October 15, 1970

b7C

Director, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

1 - [REDACTED]

62-80750-

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] said that Secretary of Defense Laird had indicated approval of General Abrams' request and that it would be made either directly to me or to you.

b7C

[REDACTED]

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b3

[REDACTED]

DATE: 04-13-2007
CLASSIFIED BY
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X333

1 - The Deputy Attorney General

WRW:ams

(9) *ams*

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SEE NOTE, PAGE 2

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OCT 26 1970

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COMM-FBI

GROUP 1
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downgrading and
declassification

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The Attorney General

NOTE:

See cover memorandum Wannall to Brennan, 10/14/70,
WRW:ams, same caption.

Classified "Secret" as unauthorized disclosure of this
sensitive information could result in serious damage to the national
defense interests.

DCN: MLETT DIA
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DATE: 2-26-2007

CLASSIFIED BY 60322 UCW/pch/jw

SAC, WFO

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X33(16) 2-26-2008

11/5/70

368692

Director, FBI (62-80750)

1 - Mr. Branigan

1 -
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1 -
1 -

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

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Reference is made to Bulet to Director of CIA dated
4/26/65 captioned as above, a copy of which was designated
for each office.

(S)

[REDACTED]

MAILED 22

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COMM-FBI

(S)

[REDACTED]

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(S)

[REDACTED]

(S)

EX-100 REC-76 62-80750-4808

[REDACTED]

(S)

NOV 5 1970

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2 - New York

NOV 18 1970

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(9) MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

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SEE NOTE PAGE THREE

~~SECRET~~

(S)
Letter to SAC, WFO

RE:

62-80750

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(S)

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(S)

b1

(S) Specific examples of such situations in the New York Office are not readily available to Bureau; however, Supervisors in the Soviet Section, Domestic Intelligence Division, are generally in agreement that contents of this communication also apply to Soviet matters handled in that Division.

NOTE:

This communication considered necessary in order to insure we are conforming with notification to CIA effected by letter 4/26/65. This was based on policy recommendations contained in Branigan to Belmont memorandum captioned as above dated 4/23/65 which was approved by the Director.

(S)

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~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

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TO : Mr. Bishop

DATE: 11-17-70

FROM : M. A. Jones

Central Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: "THE CIA: A STUDY IN THE
ARROGATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE
POWERS"; AN ARTICLE BY
JERROLD L. WALDEN

The George Washington Law Review, October, 1970, issue, contains captioned article which appears on pages 66 through 101. Its author, Walden, is identified as a Professor of Law at the University of New Mexico. The article traces the creation and growth of the CIA. Its main theme is, that while CIA was created as an exclusively intelligence coordinating body, its activities have ranged far and wide through the arrogation of powers largely because of ineffectual supervision and accountability of the agency by either the Executive Branch or Congress. Walden suggests that the CIA's cloak of secrecy enables it to engage in activities clearly beyond its statutory powers and to conduct "a Machiavellian policy abroad which is publicly disaffirmed by our leaders."

References to the FBI appear on pages 67, 73, 74, 76, and 82 of this article. None are derogatory concerning the FBI and all references are incidental to an explanation of CIA's role in the United States intelligence gathering network.

Bufiles contain no derogatory information identifiable with Walden.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. Bishop
- 1 - Mr. Brennan
- 1 - M. A. Jones

JHC:kjs (8)

53 DEC 1 1970

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2-26-02 BY 60322 ver/pa/w
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EX-11
REC-86

62-80750-4809

NOV 24 1970

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

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TO : Mr. Sullivan

DATE: November 10, 1970

FROM : A. Rosen

1 - Mr. Sullivan

1 - Mr. Rosen

1 - [REDACTED]

1 - [REDACTED]

1 - [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: CONFERENCE -
AIRCRAFT HIJACKINGS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

The biweekly meeting of captioned conference was held today at the State Department with representatives of a number of Government agencies in attendance. The main topic at this meeting concerned the Government's liability in connection with any civil suit filed against an airline for denying passage to an individual, which denial is based upon information provided by a United States Government agency. The representative from the Justice Department volunteered to undertake a legal study of this problem and to report to the conference at a later date.

The Customs representatives reviewed their procedures in conducting pre-departure inspections of passengers. It was pointed out that at the specific request of an airline, either foreign or United States flag, Customs officers will search all carry-on passenger baggage, including ladies' handbags. They stated they had no authority to insist a body search be conducted and that such could only be accomplished with the concurrence of the passenger involved. Customs intends to increase these baggage inspection procedures as soon as additional personnel are available. They pointed out at the present time these searches have been limited to overseas flights.

DATE: 2-26-2007
CLASSIFIED BY 60322UC/SP/CLW
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3.3(1) 8-26-2028
318192

(S)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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ACTION: This is submitted for information.

191 NOV 27 1970

RIS:jny
(6)

53 DEC 3 1970

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SIX

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Mr. Mohr

10/6/70

J. J. Casper

DATE: 04-13-2007
CLASSIFIED BY AUC 60324 BAW/RS/SEZ
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1)
04-13-2032

mm
NAME CHECKS
SUGGESTION 199-71 SUBMITTED BY
SA [REDACTED]
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

b7C

SUGGESTION: That approval be granted for a "Name Check Request" form to be used
when [REDACTED]

(S)

CURRENT PRACTICE: At the present time such name checks whether they originate
in the field or at the Seat of Government (SOG) are furnished
[REDACTED] in the form of an outgoing letter.

(S)

ADVANTAGES: The suggester states use of a form for this purpose will eliminate the
necessity for the preparation of numerous outgoing correspondence
in the form of letters and will result in a substantial saving of stenographic time.
There will also be a 50% reduction in the amount of time previously required in the
recording and filing of outgoing and incoming correspondence regarding these name
checks. By using the proposed form, it would be necessary only to place a notation
in the substantive file that [REDACTED]

(S)

OBSERVATIONS: Domestic Intelligence Division recommended adoption as a means
for streamlining and simplifying the procedure of obtaining [REDACTED]

(S)

General Investigative Division advised it occasionally submits name
checks [REDACTED]

(S)

[REDACTED] and require a check of Bureau files, Immigration
and Naturalization Service (INS) [REDACTED] Such requests are few in number and in

(S)

Enclosures
①- Bufile 62-80750
ML:das
(3)

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47 DEC 8 1970

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57 DEC 22 1970

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Memo Casper to Mohr
Re: Name Checks
Suggestion 199-71 Submitted by
SA
Domestic Intelligence Division

b7C

view thereof this form would be used infrequently. This Division had no objection to its adoption.

The National Academy Desk, Training Division, stated the form appeared worthwhile and it had no objection to approval. Forms Management Desk, Training Division, has discussed the format of the proposed form with the suggester and it has been revised to be more in conformance with the manner in which such correspondence should be prepared (sample of the amended proposed form is attached for approval). It will be given an "O" number so that it may be used by more than one division at the SOG.

RECOMMENDATIONS: (1) That the suggestion be adopted and the amended form approved.

(2) That the attached letter be forwarded to the suggester advising him of this action. His idea has been acknowledged by prior letter.

(3) On approval, this memorandum will serve as authority for the Forms Management Desk, Training Division, to take appropriate action.

~~SECRET~~

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b7C

1 - Mr. W.R. Wannall

1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]

EX-105

62-8050-4810

Date: November 30, 1970

REC 7A

To: Director
Central Intelligence Agency

Attention: [redacted]

From: (S) John Edgar Hoover, Director

Subject: [redacted]

(S) [redacted]

(S) [redacted]

(S) [redacted]

HEH:sal
(6)

NOTE:

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

(S)

[redacted]

- Tolson
- Sullivan
- Mohr
- Bishop
- Brennan, C.D.
- Callahan
- Casper
- Conrad
- Felt
- Gale
- Rosen
- Tavel
- Walters
- Soyars
- Tele. Room
- Holmes
- Gandy

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
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DEC 9 1970

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UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 66-2542-10

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September 28, 1970

PERSONAL

62-80750-

[redacted]
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C.

b7C

Dear [redacted]

I have received your suggestion that a form which you designed be approved for use when handling name check requests with a particular agency. This proposal is being evaluated by the other interested divisions at the Seat of Government and you will be advised of the final decision in this matter.

The interest which led you to submit your idea to me is indeed appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

1 - Mr. C. D. Brennan

J. Edgar Hoover

1 - Personnel file of SA [redacted]

ML:das:das

(5)

(Suggestion 199-71 dated 9/21/70)

NOTE: Suggests approval of a Name Check Request Form to be used when requesting [redacted]

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[redacted] (sample of proposed form attached).

Referred to the General Investigative Division and the National Academy Unit, Training Division, for views and recommendations since form might be used by this Division and unit also.

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57 DEC 22 1970

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ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-5-36375

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. C. D. Brennan

DATE: 1/18/71

FROM : W. R. Wannall

- 1 - Mr. W.C. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. J.H. Gale
- 1 - Mr. T.E. Bishop

- 1 - Mr. C.D. Brennan
- 1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan
- 1 - Mr. W.R. Wannall
- 1 - Mr. Nasca

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SUBJECT: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY'S
INVOLVEMENT IN ATTEMPTS TO
ASSASSINATE CASTRO

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Memorandum concerns Jack Anderson's column in 1/18/71
"Washington Post," which indicates Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) made six attempts to assassinate Premier Fidel Castro.

Anderson claims CIA's first attempt began as part of
Bay of Pigs operation (1961); after it failed sent five more
assassination teams to Cuba; and among those privy to CIA conspiracy,
his suspicion, unsupported by Warren Commission's findings, that
Castro became aware of assassination plot and somehow recruited
Lee Harvey Oswald to retaliate against President Kennedy. With
regard to first attempt, Anderson stated CIA enlisted Robert Maheu,
former FBI Agent, who recruited gambler John Roselli to arrange
assassination.

Classified by

Declassified 7/22/2000

DECLASSIFIED BY SP4-GJM/LRR

ON 3/10/81

[REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~

REC- 65

62-80750-4811

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[REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~

VHN:emj
(8)

58 JAN 29 1971

~~TOP SECRET~~

TOP SECRET CONTINUED - OVER

ENCLOSURE

XEROX

Classified by 3002

JAN 22 1971

Exempt from GDS, Category 2,3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

62-109060-4984

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 94-50053

Memorandum W. R. Wannall to Mr. C. D. Brennan
Re: Central Intelligence Agency's Involvement in
Attempts to Assassinate Castro.

~~TOP SECRET~~

[Redacted]

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ACTION:

For information.

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The Washington Merry-Go-Round

THE WASHINGTON POST Monday, Jan. 18, 1971

B7

6 Attempts to Kill Castro Laid to CIA

By Jack Anderson

Locked in the darkest recesses of the Central Intelligence Agency is the story of six assassination attempts against Cuba's Fidel Castro.

For 10 years, only a few key people have known the terrible secret. They have sworn never to talk. Yet we have learned the details from sources whose credentials are beyond question.

We spoke to John McCone, who headed the CIA at the time of the assassination attempts. He acknowledged the idea had been discussed inside the CIA but insisted it had been "rejected immediately." He vigorously denied that the CIA had ever participated in any plot on Castro's life. Asked whether the attempts could have been made with his knowledge, he replied: "It could not have happened."

We have complete confidence, however, in our sources.

The plot to knock off Castro began as part of the Bay of Pigs operation. The intent was to eliminate the Cuban dicta-

tor before the motley invaders landed on the island. Their arrival was expected to touch off a general uprising, which the Communist militia would have had more trouble putting down without the charismatic Castro to lead them.

After the first attempt failed, five more assassination teams were sent to Cuba. The last team reportedly made it to a rooftop within shooting distance of Castro before they were apprehended. This happened around the last of February or first of March, 1963.

Nine months later, President Kennedy was gunned down in Dallas by Lee Harvey Oswald, a fanatic who previously had agitated for Castro in New Orleans and had made a mysterious trip to the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City.

Among those privy to the CIA conspiracy, there is still a nagging suspicion—unsupported by the Warren Commission's findings—that Castro became aware of the U.S. plot upon his life and somehow recruited Oswald to retal-

iate against President Kennedy.

To set up the Castro assassination, the CIA enlisted Robert Maheu, a former FBI agent with shadowy contacts, who had handled other undercover assignments for the CIA out of his Washington public relations office. He later moved to Las Vegas to head up billionaire Howard Hughes' Nevada operations.

Maheu recruited John Roselli, a ruggedly handsome gambler with contacts in both the American and Cuban underworlds, to arrange the assassination. The dapper, hawk-faced Roselli, formerly married to movie actress June Lang, was a power in the movie industry until his conviction with racketeer Willie Bioff in a million-dollar Hollywood labor shakedown. The CIA assigned two of its most trusted operatives, William Harvey and James (Big Jim) O'Connell, to the hush-hush murder mission. Using phony names, they accompanied Roselli on trips to Miami to line up the assassination teams.

The full story reads like the script of a James Bond movie,

complete with secret trysts at glittering Miami Beach hotels and midnight powerboat dashes to secret landing spots on the Cuban coast. Once, Roselli's boat was shot out from under him.

For the first try, the CIA furnished Roselli with special poison capsules to slip into Castro's food. The poison was supposed to take three days to act. By the time Castro died, his system would throw off all traces of the poison, so he would appear to be the victim of a natural if mysterious ailment.

Roselli arranged with a Cuban, related to one of Castro's chefs, to plant the deadly pellets in the dictator's food. On March 13, 1961, Roselli delivered the capsules to his contact at Miami Beach's glamorous Fontainebleau Hotel.

A couple of weeks later, just about the right time for the plot to have been carried out, a report out of Havana said Castro was ill. But he recovered before the Bay of Pigs invasion on April 17, 1961.

Four more attempts were made on Castro's life,

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 3/10/81 BY SP4-jm/kss

Date

Maintained Per CIA letter 9/23/88
 SP6-Bjw/mde 1/24/89 #6454
 62-80750-4811

Note: Cover Memo
 Classified
 CIA/AD Staff

XEROX

JAN 22 1971

ENCLOSURE

Memo W.R. Wenzel
 Mr. C.D. Brennan
 Re: CIA's Involvement
 in Attempts to Assassinate
 Castro
 W.R. Wenzel

See memo Wannabe to
Brennan 11/8/71
Re: Central Intelligence
Agency's involvement in
Plans to assassinate
Castro and 1/18/71

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W.D.

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

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tor before the motley invaders landed on the island. Their arrival was expected to touch off a general uprising, which the Communist militia would have had more trouble putting down without the charismatic Castro to lead them.

After the first attempt failed, five more assassination teams were sent to Cuba. The last team reportedly made it to a rooftop within shooting distance of Castro before they were apprehended. This happened around the last of February or first of March, 1963.

Nine months later, President Kennedy was gunned down in Dallas by Lee Harvey Oswald, a fanatic who previously had agitated for Castro in New Orleans and had made a mysterious trip to the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City.

Among those privy to the CIA conspiracy, there is still a nagging suspicion—unsupported by the Warren Commission's findings—that Castro became aware of the U.S. plot upon his life and somehow recruited Oswald to retal-

See Anderson

The Washington Post _____
Times Herald _____ *B-7*
The Washington Daily News _____
The Evening Star (Washington) _____
The Sunday Star (Washington) _____
Daily News (New York) _____
Sunday News (New York) _____
New York Post _____
The New York Times _____
The Daily World _____
The New Leader _____
The Wall Street Journal _____
The National Observer _____
People's World _____

Date **JAN 18 1971**

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE *3/10/81* BY *SP4-jm/kca*
Maintained Per CIA letter 9/23/88

SP6-RJA/mde
1/24/89
#64370

3 - XEROX

2 JAN 22 1971

ENCLOSURE

62-80750-4811

iate against President Kennedy.

To set up the Castro assassination, the CIA enlisted Robert Maheu, a former FBI agent with shadowy contacts, who had handled other undercover assignments for the CIA out of his Washington public relations office. He later moved to Las Vegas to head up billionaire Howard Hughes' Nevada operations.

Maheu recruited John Roselli, a ruggedly handsome gambler with contacts in both the American and Cuban underworlds, to arrange the assassination. The dapper, hawk-faced Roselli, formerly married to movie actress June Lang, was a power in the movie industry until his conviction with racketeer Willie Bioff in a million-dollar Hollywood labor shakedown. The CIA assigned two of its most trusted operatives, William Harvey and James (Big Jim) O'Connell, to the hush-hush murder mission. Using phony names, they accompanied Roselli on trips to Miami to line up the assassination teams.

The full story reads like the script of a James Bond movie,

complete with secret trysts at glittering Miami Beach hotels and midnight powerboat dashes to secret landing spots on the Cuban coast. Once, Roselli's boat was shot out from under him.

For the first try, the CIA furnished Roselli with special poison capsules to slip into Castro's food. The poison was supposed to take three days to act. By the time Castro died, his system would throw off all traces of the poison, so he would appear to be the victim of a natural if mysterious ailment.

Roselli arranged with a Cuban, related to one of Castro's chefs, to plant the deadly pellets in the dictator's food. On March 13, 1961, Roselli delivered the capsules to his contact at Miami Beach's glamorous Fontainebleau Hotel.

A couple of weeks later, just about the right time for the plot to have been carried out, a report out of Havana said Castro was ill. But he recovered before the Bay of Pigs invasion on April 17, 1961.

Four more attempts were made on Castro's life,

© 1971, Bell & McClure Syndicate, Inc.

The Washington Merry-Go-Round**Castro Plot Raises Ugly Questions**By *Jack Anderson*

The plot to kill Cuban dictator Fidel Castro, hidden for 10 years from the public, raises some ugly questions that high officials would rather keep buried deep inside the Central Intelligence Agency.

1. Has the CIA tried to assassinate any other leaders? John McCone, who headed the CIA during the six attempts to knock off Castro, denied emphatically that the CIA has tried to kill anyone. But ex-Sen. George Smathers, one of John F. Kennedy's closest friends, told us the late President suspected that the CIA had arranged the shootings of the Dominican Republic's Rafael Trujillo in 1961 and South Vietnam's Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963.

2. Did President Kennedy personally sanction the plot against Castro? The preparations to assassinate the Cuban dictator began during the last months of the Eisenhower administration as part of the Bay of Pigs scheme. All six attempts, however, were made during 1961-63 when Mr. Kennedy occupied the White House. Smathers told us he once spoke to the late President about assassinating Castro. Mr. Kennedy merely rolled back his eyes, recalled Smathers, as if to indicate the idea was too wild to discuss. Subsequently, Mr. Kennedy told Smathers of his suspicion that the CIA may have been

behind the Trujillo and Diem assassinations.

3. Did the late Robert Kennedy know about the assassination attempts? After the Bay of Pigs fiasco, President Kennedy swore to friends he would like "to splinter the CIA in a thousand pieces and scatter it to the winds." He put his brother, Robert, in charge of the CIA with instructions to shake it up. The CIA made five attempts on Castro's life after the Bay of Pigs while Robert Kennedy was riding herd on the agency.

4. Could the plot against Castro have backfired against President Kennedy? The late President was murdered nine months after the last assassination team was caught on a Havana rooftop with high-powered rifles. Presumably, they were subjected to fiendish tortures until they told all they knew. None of the assassination teams, however, had direct knowledge of the CIA involvement. The CIA instigators had represented themselves as oilmen seeking revenge against Castro for his seizure of oil holdings.

PLOT BACKFIRE?

Former associates recall that Robert Kennedy, deeply despondent, went into semi-seclusion after his brother's assassination. Could he have been tormented by more than natural grief? He certainly learned that the assassin, Lee Harvey Oswald, had been active in the pro-Castro move-

ment and had traveled to Mexico to visit the Cuban Embassy a few weeks before the dreadful day in Dallas. Could Bob Kennedy have been plagued by the terrible thought that the CIA plot, which he must at least have condoned, put into motion forces that may have brought about his brother's martyrdom?

The last surviving brother, Sen. Ted Kennedy (D-Mass.), could give us no insight. His brothers had never spoken to him about any assassination attempts against Castro, he said. He was aware, he volunteered, only that Sen. Smathers had talked to the late President about eliminating Castro.

Smathers told us that President Kennedy seemed "horried" at the idea of political assassinations. "I remember him saying," recalled Smathers, "that the CIA frequently did things he didn't know about, and he was unhappy about it. He complained that the CIA was almost autonomous."

Tolson ☒
Sullivan ☒
Mohr ☒
Bishop ☒
Breanan, C.D. ☒
Callahan ☒
Casper ☒
Conrad ☒
Felt ☒
Gale ☒
Rosen ☒
Tavel ☒
Walters ☒
Soyars ☒
Tele. Room ☒
Holmes ☒
Gandy ☒

The Washington Post _____
Times Herald _____
The Washington Daily News _____
The Evening Star (Washington) _____
The Sunday Star (Washington) _____
Daily News (New York) _____
Sunday News (New York) _____
New York Post _____
The New York Times _____
The Daily World _____
The New Leader _____
The Wall Street Journal _____
The National Observer _____
People's World _____

Date **JAN 19 1971**

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 3/10/81 BY SP6-jm/kce
Maintained Per CIA letter 9/23/88.

LOSURE

"He told me he believed the CIA had arranged to have Diem and Trujillo bumped off. He was pretty well shocked about that. He thought it was a stupid thing to do, and he wanted to get control of what the CIA was doing."

But McCone, disagreeing vigorously, told us that "no plot was authorized or implemented" to assassinate Castro, Trujillo, Diem or anyone else. "During those days of ten-

sion there was a wide spectrum of plans ranging from one extreme to another," McCone admitted. "Whenever this subject (assassinating Castro) was brought up and it was — it was rejected immediately on two grounds. First, it would not be condoned by anybody. Second, it wouldn't have achieved anything."

There was also talk in high places, McCone acknowledged, of supporting a coup to oust Diem. The former CIA director said he had argued against this at a secret session with both Kennedy brothers. He had contended that there was no one strong enough to take Diem's place and that a coup therefore would bring "political upheaval."

"I told the President and Bobby together," recalled McCone, "that if I were running a baseball team and had only one pitcher, I wouldn't take him out of the game."

The November 1963 coup caught the United States completely by surprise, he said. While the plotters were moving on the palace, he said, then-Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge was visiting Diem. Adm. Ulysses Sharp, then our Pacific commander, had also been present but had left early to go to the airport.

McCone said President Diem escaped through a tunnel but was caught in nearby Cholon and "shot in a station wagon."

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO: *efi* Director, FBI

DATE: 1/29/71

FROM: *RP* SAC, Albany (80-630)

SUBJECT: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION CONCERNING

Enclosed for the Bureau's information is a self-explanatory letter received by the Albany Division from Deputy Superintendent John J. McGuire of the New York State Police, together with a copy of a document received by his office from Indianapolis, Indiana.

The envelope received by Mr. McGuire is also enclosed.

2 - Bureau (Encs. 3)
1 - Albany
LEC:hmm
(3)

ENCLOSURE

"ENCLOSURE ATTACHED"

*document + document Envelope
sent to CIA by CIA courier
2-4-71 Next to put in file
(of document + Envelope)
H.H. Kam*

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE *2-26-02* BY *60322 UC/MLP*
#318192

EX 105

REC-1

62-80750-4812

18 FEB 2 1971

INT. SEC.

5-100



58 FEB 10 1971

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2-26-97 BY 60322 UIC/DCH/M
368692

62-80750-4812

State Police Headquarters

17 January 1971

Dear Sirs,

Our nation has been experiencing many tragedies recently. We have seen the plane crashes carrying college football players, the bombings of University laboratories and computer centers, fires in hotels and nursing homes, coal mine disasters, and all this corresponding loss of life. We have witnessed other strife in the form of riots, drug abuse, student disorders, grisly murders, kidnappings, arson, and other forms of lawlessness.

It may seem that this is merely general discontent, or happenstance of events, but in actuality most of these things are the result of careful planning by agents of the Central Intelligence Agency.



Although supposedly working only in international areas to protect America's interests, in reality this agency has many many agents working internally to undermine our country. This agency is dedicated to the formation of a totalitarian regime for our country and later for others.

The perverted monsters of C.I.A., using secret and very effective electronic equipment, have been and plan to continue their plans for the destruction of our democratic society. This electronic equipment can cause engine failures, structural weaknesses, and many types of illnesses and death peaked from remote and hidden places.

The C.I.A. is secretly controlled by a group of Roman Catholics who are never seen and who always remain in their protective headquarters. This group has incredible designs for America and the rest of the world. This group also uses and misuses communists, fascists, socialists, criminal elements including the mafia, and others in its actions.

True Americans everywhere must remain steadfast and alert to the dangers which this agency present.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2-26-07 BY 60322 ucu/pca/HK
#818192



State Police Headquarters
Albany, New York

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2-26-07 BY 60388 ucr/ocw/jm
#318692



NEW YORK STATE POLICE
STATE CAMPUS
ALBANY, N. Y. 12226

JOHN J. MCGUIRE
DEPUTY SUPERINTENDENT
ADMINISTRATION

January 28, 1971

Mr. Leo Conroy
Special Agent in Charge
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Albany, New York

Dear Leo:

For record purposes, I am enclosing the original envelope and its enclosure which we received today postmarked Indianapolis, Indiana, January 23rd. *Rec'd*

I dare say other agencies have received this derogatory communication. However, you may want to forward it to the Bureau if you deem it necessary.

Sincerely,

John J. McGuire
Deputy Superintendent

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2-26-07 BY 60322UCY/CLP

#36698

SEARCHED	INDEXED
SERIALIZED	FILED
JAN 29 1971	
FBI — ALBANY	

Date

10-18-05

Classification of Mail:

- ☐ Unclassified
☐ Confidential
☒ Secret
☐ Top Secret*
☐ SCI*
☐ Other

Mail Category:

Letter ☒ Airtel _____
 LHM _____ Memo _____
 Report _____ Other _____
 Teletype _____

FD-501 Number _____

FD-502 Number _____

Subject _____

Date of Mail

2-4-71

Description of Material

62-HQ-80750-4813

(include identity of originating office or agency)

This serial has been removed and placed in:

☐ Special File Room, Room ⁷³⁶¹~~599~~, FBIHQ / FCIPA # 368692

☐ _____

(Field Office - Room, Cabinet, or other
location where material is stored)

This action taken based upon authority of:

☐ TS/SCICO, FBIHQ, 62-116065

☐ Field Office Manager - _____

File and Serial number

 (Signature and Title of Approving Official)

 Date

*requires special handling

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 2-26-07 BY 60222UCM/09/AN
 #368692

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGE-OUT

~~SECRET~~

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

SAC, WFO

3/8/71

Director, FBI (62-80750) - 4814

1 - [REDACTED]

b7C

(S) [REDACTED] REC-122
ST-11
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

b1
b3

DATE: 2-27-2007
CLASSIFIED BY: 60322 UCW/1004/102
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3.3(1) 2-27-2022
#360692

(S) [REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]

b1
b3

(S) [REDACTED]

(S) You are requested to review your indices and advise the Bureau in the event [REDACTED] has come to your attention in the past. You should also expeditiously advise the Bureau of any matters which may be developed in the future relating to his security or cover. No inquiries should be initiated relating to [REDACTED]

(S) Afford this matter appropriate security within your office. CIA data is classified "Secret," Group 1.

b1
b3

MAILED 12
MAR 11 1971
FBI

Tolson _____
Sullivan _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Brennan, C.D. _____
Callahan _____
Casper _____
Conrad _____
Dalbey _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Tavel _____
Walters _____
Soyars _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

DR:sfw
(4)
NOTE: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

[Handwritten signature]

[Handwritten signature]

352

56 MAR 11 1971
MAIL ROOM [] TELETYPE UNIT []

Date 10-18-05

Classification of Mail:

- ☐ Unclassified
☐ Confidential
☒ Secret
☐ Top Secret*
☐ SCI*
☐ Other

Mail Category:

Letter ☒ Airtel _____
 LHM _____ Memo _____
 Report _____ Other _____
 Teletype _____

FD-501 Number _____ FD-502 Number _____

Subject _____

Date of Mail 3-12-71

Description of Material 62-HQ-80750-NR 3-17-71
 (include identity of originating office or agency)

This serial has been removed and placed in:

☐ Special File Room, Room ⁷³⁶¹~~507~~, FBIHQ / FCIPA # 368692

☐ _____
 (Field Office - Room, Cabinet, or other
 location where material is stored)

This action taken based upon authority of:

☐ TS/SCICO, FBIHQ, 62-116065

☐ Field Office Manager - _____
 File and Serial number

 (Signature and Title of Approving Official)

 Date

*requires special handling

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 3-27-07 BY 6022 vlcw/pcc/fw
#368692

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGE-OUT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1-- Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Special Coordination Unit

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

BY COURIER

Date: March 9, 1971

To: Director
Central Intelligence Agency

Attention:

b1
b3

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director

Subject:

b1

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This is to advise that the employees listed below
are authorized to receive and receipt for Special Intelligence
material delivered to Room 1000 and Room 1006, Federal Triangle
Building, 315 Ninth Street, Northwest, Washington, D. C.

b7C

REC 9 62-80750-4816

In addition to above-listed personnel, Special
Agents assigned to Room 1000 at the above address on weekend
and after-duty hours are authorized to accept and receipt for
such material.

ST-112

5 MAR 12 1971

NOTE:

b1
b3

Tolson _____
Sullivan _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Brennan, C.D. _____
Callahan _____
Casper _____
Conrad _____
Dalbey _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Tavel _____
Walters _____
Soyars _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

Classified "Confidential" in that this matter is so
classified by CIA.

57 MAR 25 1971

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

Date

10-18-05

Classification of Mail:

- ☐ Unclassified
☐ Confidential
☒ Secret
☐ Top Secret*
☐ SCI*
☐ Other

Mail Category:

Letter X Airtel _____
 LHM _____ Memo _____
 Report _____ Other _____
 Teletype _____

FD-501 Number _____ FD-502 Number _____

Subject _____

Date of Mail 4-19-71

Description of Material 62-HQ-80750-4817
 (include identity of originating office or agency)

This serial has been removed and placed in:

☐ Special File Room, Room 5951, FBIHQ / FCIPA # 368692
☐ _____
 (Field Office - Room, Cabinet, or other
 location where material is stored)

This action taken based upon authority of:

☐ TS/SCICO, FBIHQ, 62-116065

☐ Field Office Manager - _____
 File and Serial number

(Signature and Title of Approving Official)_____
Date

*requires special handling

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 2-27-07 BY 60322UCN/014/JW
#368692

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGE-OUT

~~SECRET~~

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

SAC, Honolulu

4/1/71

Director, FBI

1 -

CHANGED:

INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Captioned "Changed" to indicate

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Afford this matter appropriate security within your office, it being noted the information received from CIA relating to the subject was classified "Secret, No Foreign Dissemination, No Dissemination Abroad."

1 - 62-80750 (CIA, Matters)

DR:sfw
(5)

NOT RECORDED
42 APR 1 1971

DUPLICATE YELLOW
~~SECRET~~

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

59 APR 9 - 1971

ORIGINAL FILED IN

DATE: 2-27-2007
CLASSIFIED BY 60322UCW/PLC/PLW
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X33(1) 2-27-2031
#368192

(S) Letter to SAC, Honolulu

RE: [REDACTED]

b1

b3

(S) NOTE: [REDACTED]

b1

b3

~~2 -~~
~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. Rosen

DATE: 3/25/71

FROM : C. D. Brennan

SUBJECT: MEDBURG
DAMAGE ASSESSMENT
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

1 - Mr. Felt
1 - Mr. Callahan
1 - Mr. Gale
1 - Mr. Dalbey
1 - Mr. Brennan
1 - Mr. Branigan
1 - Mr. Gray
1 - Mr. G. C. Moore

Tolson
Sullivan
Mohr
Bishop
Callahan
Casper
Conrad
Dalbey
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Tavel
Walters
Soyars
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

Reference my memorandum of 3/15/71 (Xerox copy attached) captioned "Burglary of FBI Resident Agency, Media, Pennsylvania, March 8-9, 1971," and my memorandum 3/23/71 (attached) captioned "Medburg, Damage Assessment, Domestic Intelligence Division." Memorandum dated 3/15 was a comprehensive analysis of 86 documents relating to work of the Domestic Intelligence Division which were taken in the Media burglary. This memorandum provided a damage assessment of each of the documents involved and set forth six separate recommendations for action deemed appropriate in connection with the loss of these documents. This included recommendation that three specific outside agencies be advised of the theft of particular documents which involved them, as follows:

(1) [Redacted]

b7D

(2) [Redacted]

b3

(3) [Redacted]

b2

Director checked this memorandum out, including above specific recommendation, without comment.

5 APR 6 1971

Encs.

NOT RECORDED

126 APR 8 1971

CONTINUED - OVER

RDC/mea

70 APR 16 1971

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/20/97 BY 1678 RSP/LPB

ORIGINAL FILED IN 52-94527-488

Memorandum for Mr. Sullivan
RE: MEDBURG

My memorandum of 3/23/71 set forth damage assessment with regard to a number of additional documents which had subsequently been identified. This memorandum pointed out that since publicity was being afforded the documents taken in the burglary (as result of disclosures of Congressman Mitchell), we would on approval advise other Government agencies whose connections with FBI investigations had been mentioned in the documents. (Specifically, this referred to Immigration and Naturalization Service, State Department, and a military intelligence unit.) The Director overruled this recommendation.

Based on the foregoing, we will not advise other Government agencies whose names were mentioned only incidentally in the stolen documents. However, we will advise those three agencies who have an immediate and direct concern in the compromise of documents as spelled out in our memorandum of 3/15/71 which the Director checked out without comment. [REDACTED]

b3

ACTION:

(1) Attached are appropriate letters to [REDACTED] [REDACTED] advising of the compromise of specific documents involving those agencies.

b2
b7D

(2) If you approve, Inspector D. E. Moore of this Division will contact [REDACTED]

b3

Wey *over* *of* *ROD for* *WBS* *Jim*
I am compromised
3/25
- 2 - *I am likewise* *24*

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

FROM : C. D. Brennan

SUBJECT: MEDBURG

1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. Felt

DATE: 4/1/71

1 - Mr. Callahan
1 - Mr. Gale
1 - Mr. Dalbey
1 - Mr. Brennan
1 - Mr. Branigan
1 - Mr. Gray
1 - Mr. G. C. Moore

1 -
1 -
1 -
1 -

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Dalbey _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Tavel _____
Walters _____
Soyars _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

DET MOORE
R. L. Callahan
W. A. Callahan
D. J. Callahan

b7C

BACKGROUND:

My memorandum 3/15/71 addressed itself to an assessment of the documents stolen from our Resident Agency at Media relating to the work of Domestic Intelligence Division. It noted specifically that information relating to three specific outside agencies,

was contained in the stolen documents. This memorandum, which included a recommendation that these three agencies be advised of the theft of particular documents which involved them, was checked out of the Director's Office without comment.

My memorandum 3/25/71 addressed itself solely to the above three agencies which have an immediate and direct concern in the compromised documents and recommended that appropriate letters be forwarded to and that Inspector D.E. Moore of the Domestic Intelligence Division personally contact

The Director indicated on this memorandum that he was opposed to this course of action at that time.

STOLEN DOCUMENTS INVOLVED:

62-80750-
NOT RECORDED

APR 13 1971

Detroit letter to the Director, dated 3/10/70, captioned "Union of American Exiles; IS-MISC; Sedition; (New Left-Foreign Influence)," enclosed for the Philadelphia Office a copy of

Both of these items were classified "Confidential." (Attached are copies of the Detroit letter and)

Enclosures

JFH:amt

APR 12 1971

CONTINUED - OVER

59 APR 15 1971

3 ENCLOSURE

~~UNIDENTIFIED~~

SIX

ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-80750-516

CLASSIFIED DECISIONS FINALIZED
BY DEPARTMENT REVIEW COMMITTEE (DRG)
DATE: 4-10-87

2/19/87
Classified by 1672 RPP/BB
Declassify on: OADR

Memo to Mr. W. C. Sullivan
RE: MEDBURG

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

X

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b2
b3

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS:

The following events have transpired since the Director indicated his opposition to the notifying of three pertinent outside agencies.

(1)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b3

(2) On 3/30/71, an extensive article appeared in a New England newspaper which set out verbatim, contents of nine of the stolen documents. The documents relating to [REDACTED] were not included in this press article.

b2
b3
b7D

CONTINUED - OVER

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Memo to Mr. W. C. Sullivan
RE: MEDBURG

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OBSERVATIONS:

[REDACTED]

b3

If the specific documents containing information concerning [REDACTED] are publicly exposed, these agencies will, of course, be readily able to identify their information since they are spelled out as the source. The information contained in [REDACTED] documents could present a touchy problem for that agency if exposed because of the topic matter of the material [REDACTED]

b2
b7D

RECOMMENDATIONS:

In view of the recent events as noted above, the following recommendations are offered for the Director's approval.

(1) That the attached letters addressed to [REDACTED] [REDACTED] advising of the compromise of specific documents involving those agencies be approved.

b2
b7D

no.
H
CONTINUED - OVER

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Memo to Mr. W. C. Sullivan
RE: MEDBURG

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

b3.

(2) If you approve, Inspector D. E. Moore of this Division will personally contact [redacted] and will alert them to information pertinent to their interests which have been compromised in the MEDBURG case.

*yes but as to nothing
else. X*

ADDENDUM: W. C. SULLIVAN, 4/1/71, WCS:amt

I think that this compromised material should be made known to [redacted]

b2
b3
b7D

*Handled with
4/6/71
baw*

*eye
SAS/MS
[signature]*

b3

WEL DIS

*I see no reason
for it*

*↑ 4/2
[signature] concurred. The
less [signature] disseminate
& publicize the media
debacle the better.
I thought I had already
made [signature] clear to
Sullivan this morn-
ing.*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

EX-114

April 19, 1971

REC-29

62-80750-4820

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

(S)

[Redacted]

b1
b3

(S)

Dear [Redacted]

I have been advised of your remarks on
April 13th at the meeting of the Security Committee,
U. S. Intelligence Board, regarding the recent article
in "Life" magazine and I thank you for your astute
observations. It was indeed thoughtful of you to think
of me and I am grateful for your support.

Sincerely yours,

MAILED 12
APR 19 1971
FBI

J. Edgar Hoover

b1
b3

(S)

NOTE: Above recommended and approved by memorandum W. R. Wannall
to Mr. C. D. Brennan dated 4/15/71, captioned [Redacted]
Comments on Life magazine article concerning Director. LFS:bsf

JCW:smj (3)

- Tolson _____
- Sullivan _____
- Mohr _____
- Bishop _____
- Brennan, C D _____
- Callahan _____
- Casper _____
- Conrad _____
- Dalbey _____
- Felt _____
- Gale _____
- Rosen _____
- Tavel _____
- Walters _____
- Soyars _____
- Tele. Room _____
- Holmes _____
- Gandy _____

REC'D - READING ROOM

MAY 13 1971

MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum

TO : Mr. C. D. Brennan

DATE : 4/15/71

FROM : W. R. Wannall

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

SUBJECT :

(S) COMMENTS ON LIFE MAGAZINE ARTICLE
CONCERNING DIRECTOR

Tolson _____
Sullivan _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Brennan, C. D. _____
Callahan _____
Casper _____
Conrad _____
Dalbey _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Tavel _____
Walters _____
Soyars _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gibson _____
b3

On 4/13/71 at a meeting of the Security Committee,
U. S. Intelligence Board

(S) [Redacted]

(S) [Redacted]

ACTION:

For information.

- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. Mohr
- 1 - Mr. Bishop
- 1 - Mr. C. D. Brennan
- 1 - Mr. Wannall
- 1 - [Redacted]
- 1 - [Redacted]

LFS:bsf
(8)

EX-114

REC-29

62-80750-4820

15 APR 26 1971

XEROX
APR 26 1971

~~SECRET~~

UNREC COPY FILED IN 94-3-4-205

DATE: 2-22-2001
CLASSIFIED BY 6022 ucl/acc/fm
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X33(1) 2-22-2032

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum

TO : MR. C. D. BRENNAN

DATE: June 1, 1971

FROM : W. A. BRANIGAN

SUBJECT: RELATIONS WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

Tolson _____
Sullivan _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Brennan, C.D. _____
Callahan _____
Casper _____
Conrad _____
Dalbey _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Tavel _____
Walters _____
Soyars _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

(S) [Redacted]

Bureau indices fail to contain any derogatory information concerning [Redacted]

(S) [Redacted]

ACTION:

The above should be directed to all Sections in the Domestic Intelligence Division for their information and record purposes.

WOC:hke

(10)

- 1-Mr. C. D. Brennan
- 1-Mr. D. E. Moore
- 1-Mr. J. A. Sizoo
- 1-Mr. R. D. Cotter
- 1-Mr. A. W. Gray
- 1-Mr. G. C. Moore
- 1-Mr. Shackelford
- 1-Mr. Wannall
- 1-Mr. Branigan

1-

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

~~SECRET~~

17 JUN 4 1971

54 JUN 10 1971

DATE: 3-8-2007

CLASSIFIED BY 60322 uc/pjcl/w

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X33(1) 3-8-2032

#26692

For Informational Purposes Only

The originals removed from this file and replaced with duplicate copies of the original were accessioned to the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) pursuant to the JFK Records Collection Act of 1992. Provision of the JFK Act allowed for certain information to be postponed from public release until the year 2017; therefore, the pages have NOT necessarily been released for public review in their entirety.

Under the JFK Act, originals to all material deemed assassination records must be accesssioned to NARA regardless of whether the material is open in full or released with information postponed. Therefore, any documents or pages from FBI files accessioned to NARA pursuant to the JFK Act are no longer considered the possession of the FBI. The duplicate pages have been inserted strictly for research purposes.

The copies contained herein do not necessarily show the most up-to-date classification.

To attain a copy of the publicly released version of any materials maintained in the JFK Collection at the NARA facility in College Park, MD, you may contact the JFK Access Staff, at 301/713-6620.

The following materials were removed from this file and are maintained in the JFK Collection at NARA:

File & Serial Number

JFK Subject Identifier

(for NARA purposes)

Additional Request # 10

62-80750 - 1st NK #4824

CIA Liaison Files

For Informational Purposes Only

Tolson _____
 Sullivan _____
 Mohr _____
 Bishop _____
 Brennan, *KB* _____
 Callahan _____
 Casper _____
 Conrad _____
 Dalbey _____
 Felt _____
 Gale _____
 Rosen _____
 Tavel _____
 Walters _____
 Soyars _____
 Beaver _____
 Tele. Room _____
 Holmes _____
 Gandy _____

Bay of Pigs tale

CIA hated JFK, former officer says

LONDON (UPI) — A former Pentagon officer said yesterday President Kennedy incurred the hatred of the Central Intelligence Agency because he tried to harness its power after the Bay of Pigs invasion.

In an interview with BBC television, Lt. Col. Fletcher Prouty indicated that the late president's efforts to curb the CIA had failed. He said two presidential directives designed to limit the agency's powers in 1961 never had been implemented.

Col. Prouty was Pentagon liaison man with the CIA, a U.S. Air Force officer, and director of special operations for the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1962 and 1963. He is now retired and a banker in Washington, D.C.

After the Bay of Pigs investigation in 1961, President Kennedy issued two memoranda to the CIA, Mr. Prouty said.

"One of them he signed personally, explicitly stating that any activity of a clandestine nature either would be so small that CIA agents alone could operate it or would be referred to the J.C.S. (Joint Chiefs of Staff) rather than permitting the CIA to mount something as large as the Bay of Pigs again," Col. Prouty said.

"I think he reacted strongly to the defeat at the Bay of Pigs and moved against the CIA to control them," he said.

Col. Prouty said he personally had handled the directives, but "for some strange reason, altho they were issued and signed by the President, there was no implementation of them."

Asked by interviewer Robert MacKenzie if he thought Mr. Kennedy had incurred the hatred of the CIA by trying to clip its powers, Mr. Prouty answered, "I do."

The Washington Post _____
 Times Herald _____
 The Washington Daily News _____
 The Evening Star (Washington) _____
 The Sunday Star (Washington) _____
 Daily News (New York) _____
 Sunday News (New York) _____
 New York Post _____
 The New York Times _____
 The Daily World _____
 The New Leader _____
 The Wall Street Journal _____
 The National Observer _____
 People's World _____

Date **JUL 3 1971**

62-80750-A

NOT RECORDED
 170 JUL 9 1971

F444
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT SENT TO
NATIONAL ARCHIVES (JFKARCA)
DATE 4-29-98 BJR

4-29-98 BJR

For Informational Purposes Only

The originals removed from this file and replaced with duplicate copies of the original were accessioned to the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) pursuant to the JFK Records Collection Act of 1992. Provision of the JFK Act allowed for certain information to be postponed from public release until the year 2017; therefore, the pages have NOT necessarily been released for public review in their entirety.

Under the JFK Act, originals to all material deemed assassination records must be accesssioned to NARA regardless of whether the material is open in full or released with information postponed. Therefore, any documents or pages from FBI files accessioned to NARA pursuant to the JFK Act are no longer considered the possession of the FBI. The duplicate pages have been inserted strictly for research purposes.

The copies contained herein do not necessarily show the most up-to-date classification.

To attain a copy of the publicly released version of any materials maintained in the JFK Collection at the NARA facility in College Park, MD, you may contact the JFK Access Staff, at 301/713-6620.

The following materials were removed from this file and are maintained in the JFK Collection at NARA:

File & Serial Number

JFK Subject Identifier
(for NARA purposes)

Additional Request # 10

62-80750-2nd NR A 4824

CIA Liaison Letter

For Informational Purposes Only

Colonel Says Kennedy's Attempts to Curb CIA Failed

LONDON (UPI) — A former Pentagon officer says President John F. Kennedy incurred the hatred of the Central Intelligence Agency because of his attempts to harness its power after the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion.

In an interview with British Broadcasting Corporation television, Lt. Col. Fletcher Prouty

indicated that the late President's efforts to curb the CIA had failed. He said two presidential directives designed to limit the agency's powers in 1961 never had been implemented.

Prouty, interviewed on the BBC's "24 Hours" program, was Pentagon liaison officer with the CIA, a U.S. Air Force colonel, and director of special opera-

tions for the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1962 and 1963. He now is with Madison National Bank in Washington.

After the investigation into the Bay of Pigs failure in 1961, Kennedy issued two national security memoranda to the CIA, Prouty said.

"One of them he signed personally, explicitly stating that any operational activity of a

clandestine nature would be either so small that CIA agents alone could operate it, or would be referred to the JCS rather than permitting the CIA to mount something as large as the Bay of Pigs again," Prouty said.

Prouty said he personally had handled the directives, but "for some strange reason, although they were issued and signed by

the President, there was no implementation of them."

Asked how the CIA could have gotten away with violating the directives, Prouty said, "There must have been some pretty violent meetings in there between June of '61 and say the beginning of the buildup in Vietnam, because to my knowledge the documents were never retracted."

Tolson _____
Sullivan _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Brennan, C.D. _____
Callahan _____
Casper _____
Conrad _____
Dalbey _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Tavel _____
Walters _____
Soyars _____
Beaver _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

The Washington Post Times Herald _____
The Washington Daily News _____
The Evening Star (Washington) H2
The Sunday Star (Washington) _____
Daily News (New York) _____
Sunday News (New York) _____
New York Post _____
The New York Times _____
The Daily World _____
The New Leader _____
The Wall Street Journal _____
The National Observer _____
People's World _____

JUL 3 1971

Date

ORIGINAL DOCUMENT SENT TO
NATIONAL ARCHIVES (JFKARCA)
DATE 4-29-98 BJR

62-80750-A
NOT RECORDED
17 JUL 9 1971

57 JUL 9 1971

USEA Subject: CIA Liaison File

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. Bishop
- 1 - Mr. C.D. Brennan

DATE: 1-29-71

Tolson _____
Sullivan _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Brennan, C.D. _____
Callahan _____
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Conrad _____
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Rosen _____
b7C _____
Walters _____
Soyars _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

TO: Mr. C. D. Brennan

FROM: A. W. Gray

SUBJECT: BOOK ATTACKING DIRECTOR AND
GOVERNMENT ALLEGEDLY BEING
PREPARED BY UNITED KLANS OF
AMERICA (UKA)
RACIAL MATTERS - KLAN

[REDACTED]
has advised that UKA Imperial Wizard Robert M. Shelton is preparing a new book which is critical of the Director and the Government. Shelton advised the informant he has included in the book an accusation that FBI Director John Edgar Hoover engages in homosexual practices with Billy Rose, a night club owner in New York City. Shelton also advised the informant the book associates the FBI and the Central Intelligence Agency with revolutionary plots throughout the world.

Informant expressed the opinion that Shelton was not personally researching this book but was having someone else furnish him with the material. While we have no information as to how far this book has developed, Shelton's scurrilous, malicious, vindictive background is well known and very little attention is paid to anything he produces. The scope of his writing and research ability at this point is illustrated by the fact that Billy Rose died at age 66 on 2-10-66 in Montego Bay, Jamaica, of pneumonia following heart surgery.

OBSERVATIONS:

This is another outrageous indication as to how far Shelton will go in his continuing efforts to embarrass the Director and the FBI.

ACTION:

Offices which handle highly placed Klan informants are being instructed to obtain further information regarding the possible preparation of this book. Through these informants, close to Shelton, we may be able to initiate steps to prevent Shelton from actually producing the book.

JVW:ljw
(6)

60 JUL 22 1971

JUL 15 1971

PERS. REC. UNIT

ORIGINAL FILED IN 157-370-66-6

UNRECORDED COPY DESTROYED

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-8-97 BY 60322UCVLC/4W
#20692

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 8/31/67

FROM : D. J. Brennan, Jr.

SUBJECT: S-1035; PROPOSED LEGISLATION TO PROTECT
U. S. EMPLOYEES' CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
AND TO PREVENT UNWARRANTED GOVERN-
MENTAL INVASION OF PRIVACY

(S)

(S)

- 1 - Mr. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. Mohr
- 1 - Mr. Bishop
- 1 - Mr. Callahan
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. Jones
- 1 - Mr. Bowers
- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Mr. Papich

CONTINUED - OVER

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

SJP:rab
(10)

JUL 15 1971

66 SEP 13 1967

NOT RECORDED

JUN 7 1971

~~SECRET~~

REC.D US GOV

SEP 7 1967


b1
b3

ORIGINAL FILED IN

~~SECRET~~


Memorandum D. J. Brennan, Jr. to W. C. Sullivan
RE: S.1035; PROPOSED LEGISLATION TO PROTECT
U. S. EMPLOYEES' CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
AND TO PREVENT UNWARRANTED GOVERN-
MENTAL INVASION OF PRIVACY

(S)



b1
b3

(S)



ACTION:

For information.

WCS *Djs* *ds* *ms*

~~SECRET~~

Tolson _____
 Felt _____
 Sullivan _____
 Mohr _____
 Bishop _____
 Brennan, C.D. _____
 Callahan _____
 Casper _____
 Conrad _____
 Dalbey _____
 Gale _____
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 Holmes _____
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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 3-8-07 BY 60322UCU/066/ku
 #318192

UPI-37

(INTELLIGENCE OVERSEER)

WASHINGTON --ONE OF THE MOST ACTIVE DOVES AND PENTAGON CRITICS IN THE HOUSE HAS BEEN NAMED CHAIRMAN OF A SUPER-SECRET SUBCOMMITTEE CHARGED WITH KEEPING TABS ON THE CIA AND OTHER INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES. HE WAS APPOINTED TO THE POST BY THE PRO-MILITARY CHAIRMAN OF THE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE.

REP. LUCIEN NEDZI, D-MICH., SAID ONE OF THE FIRST THINGS HE IS GOING TO DO IN HIS NEW JOB IS VISIT THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY IN LANGLEY, VA.

AFTER THAT, SAID NEDZI, HE HOPES TO HOLD PUBLIC HEARINGS ON U.S. INTELLIGENCE GATHERING ACTIVITIES.

AS AN EIGHT-YEAR MEMBER OF THE FULL COMMITTEE, NEDZI HAS ATTENDED BRIEFINGS BY CIA DIRECTORS FROM TIME TO TIME. BUT HIS NEW POSITION WILL PROVIDE HIM WITH AN OPPORTUNITY TO MAINTAIN CLOSE AND CONSTANT OVERSIGHT OF THE AGENCY.

THE SUBCOMMITTEE NEDZI IS TAKING OVER WAS CONSIDERED SO VITAL BY REP. L. MENDEL RIVERS, D-S.C., THAT THE LATE CHAIRMAN OF THE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE ALWAYS RESERVED THAT CHAIRMANSHIP FOR HIMSELF. NOT ONLY DID RIVERS' SUCCESSOR, REP. F. EDWARD HEBERT, D-LA., PASS UP THE POST, BUT HE EXPANDED ITS JURISDICTION.

"THE SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE IS DIRECTED TO MAKE PERIODIC INQUIRIES INTO ALL PHASES OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND WITHIN THE AGENCIES ESTABLISHED UNDER THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT, AND TO MAKE LEGISLATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS WHEN APPROPRIATE," HEBERT WROTE NEDZI IN A JULY 27TH LETTER OFFICIALLY DESIGNATING HIM CHAIRMAN.

8-3--NW1014AED

NOT RECORDED

183 AUG 12 1971

AUG 11 1971

MR. TOLSON

WASHINGTON CAPITAL NEWS SERVICE

67 AUG 13 1971

ORIGINAL FILED IN 94-56263-5

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

~~SECRET~~

DATE: 04-19-2007
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 auc baw/rs/sez
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1, 6)
04-19-2032

1 Mr. W. C. Sullivan
1 Mr. C. D. Brennan
1 - Mr. J. P. Lee
1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan
1 - [redacted]

b7C

BY COURIER

Date: August 5, 1971

To: Director
Central Intelligence Agency

Attention: [redacted]

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director

Subject: [redacted]

(C)

b1
b3

Reference is made to [redacted]

b1
b3

This Bureau has no objection to [redacted]

b3

Concerning attribution, it is not considered necessary to specifically cite this Bureau as the source of each individual report. It is also not necessary to repeat the full Bureau name in each instance and the use of the initials "FBI" is completely satisfactory.

The only modification we would request is [redacted]

ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-4270-84

b1
b2
b3

Folson _____
Felt _____
Sullivan _____
Tehr _____
Bishop _____
Brennan, C.D. _____
Callahan _____
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Woyars _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

EWL:pdr
(8)

~~SECRET~~

SEE NOTE - PAGE TWO

Group 1

Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

AUG 12 1971

TELETYPE UNIT

~~SECRET~~

Director
Central Intelligence Agency

NOTE:

See memorandum W A Branigan to Mr C D Brennan,
captioned [redacted] b1

(S) [redacted] prepared
by EWL:pur.

Classified "Secret" since it repeats information
so classified in referenced CIA communication.

- 2 -

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Director, FBI

DATE: 8/3/71

FROM : Legat, Bern (80-70) (P)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-8-01 BY 60322 ucl/

SUBJECT: VISIT OF PROFESSOR DR. HANS WALDER,
SWISS ATTORNEY GENERAL, TO THE
UNITED STATES, SEPTEMBER, 1971

Mr. Tolson	_____
Mr. Felt	_____
Mr. Sullivan	_____
Mr. Mohr	_____
Mr. Bishop	_____
Mr. Brennan	CD
Mr. Callahan	_____
Mr. Casper	_____
Mr. Conrad	_____
Mr. Dalbey	_____
Mr. Gale	_____
Mr. Ponder	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Tavel	_____
Mr. Walters	_____
Mr. Soyars	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Miss Holmes	_____
Miss Gandy	_____

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Reference my letter 7/20/71.

Prof. Dr. WALDER has indicated that he would consider it a great honor if he could see the Director on the day when he is scheduled to visit the FBI in Washington, tentatively 9/14/71. He has indicated that he has nothing definite to discuss with the Director, but merely wishes to meet him and pay his respects.

Prof. Dr. WALDER was born [REDACTED] He assumed office as Swiss Attorney General in 1968. He is the official chief of all Swiss federal police agencies, including the Swiss Federal Police, which handles security cases. His background is both theoretical and practical, he has been a public prosecutor in Zurich, handling both criminal and security cases, as well as a professor of law at the University of Bern since 1961. Personally, Prof. Dr. WALDER is energetic and intelligent, with a pleasant personality.

Prof. Dr. WALDER speaks adequate English, and while an interpreter has been requested to accompany him on his tour of the Bureau to assist in case he has difficulty with some technical expressions, his English would certainly be sufficient for a conversation of a general nature with the Director.

Prof. Dr. WALDER has often spoken highly of the Director and the Bureau. He has himself had to defend his actions and decisions against attacks from the left in Switzerland, and for this reason feels a strong sense of kinship with the Bureau.

- ③ - Bureau
(1 - Foreign Liaison)
1 - Bern
HDG:rn
(4)

62-80750-

NOT RECORDED

180 AUG 26 1971

20 AUG 30 1971

NAT. INT. SEC.

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

BER 80-70

HDG:rn

It is considered that the already excellent cooperation by the Attorney General and the Swiss federal police agencies under him would be strengthened and furthered if he could be granted his desire to meet the Director and make his acquaintance.

The Bureau is therefore requested to see if arrangements can be made for Attorney General WALDER to meet the Director, and if so, to maintain close liaison with the State Department and CIA—to confirm the date when the Attorney General will be at the Bureau in Washington.

*That is up to CIA
under whose sponsorship
he is coming to U.S.*

JH

~~SECRET~~

FBI

Date: 8/5/71

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

Transmit the following in _____

(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL _____

(Priority)

TO DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM

LEGAT, BERN (80-70) (P) 3-8-2007

DATE:

CLASSIFIED BY 60322 UCU/000/INDECLASSIFY ON: 25X3.3(1) 3-8-2032

368692

VISIT OF PROFESSOR DR. HANS WALDER,
SWISS ATTORNEY GENERAL, TO THE
UNITED STATES, SEPTEMBER, 1971

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

ReBERlet 8/3/71.

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. Belmont _____
Mr. Mohr _____
Mr. DeLoach _____
Mr. Casper _____
Mr. Callahan _____
Mr. Conrad _____
Mr. Felt _____
Mr. Gale _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Sullivan _____
Mr. Tavel _____
Mr. Walters _____
Mr. Soyars _____
Tele. Room _____
Miss Holmes _____
Miss Gandy _____

ORIGINAL FILED IN
62-80750-379
b1
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③ - Bureau
(1 - Foreign Liaison)

1 - Bern

HDG:rn

Approved: 004

Special Agent in Charge

~~SECRET~~

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

62 AUG 30 1971

62-80750-

NOT RECORDED

AUG 26 1971

AUG 11 1971

~~SECRET~~

DATE: 3-8-2007

CLASSIFIED BY 60322UCU/0044W

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3.3(1) 3-8-2032 CODE

8/12/11

CABLE

URGENT

62-80750-

TO LEGAT BERN

1 - Miss Holmes 1 - Mr. Fromson
1 - Mr. Sullivan 1 - Mr. Warrick
1 - Mr. Mohr 1 -
1 - Mr. Bishop

FROM DIRECTOR FBI

VISIT OF PROFESSOR DR. HANS WALDER, SWISS ATTORNEY GENERAL,
TO THE UNITED STATES, SEPTEMBER, NINETEEN SEVENTYONE.

REULETS JULY TWENTY AND AUGUST THREE LAST.

I REGRET THAT MY HEAVY SCHEDULE PRECLUDES ME FROM MEETING
DR. WALDER ON THE OCCASION OF HIS VISIT TO WASHINGTON AND YOU
SHOULD SO INFORM HIM. ARRANGEMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE, HOWEVER,
FOR DR. WALDER TO VISIT FBI HEADQUARTERS ON SEPTEMBER FOURTEEN
NEXT FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH APPROPRIATE BUREAU OFFICIALS ALONG THE
LINES AS OUTLINED IN YOUR LETTER OF JULY TWENTY LAST.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-8-89 BY 60322UCU/0044W
#318692

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

b7c

ORIGINAL FILED IN 64-29833-268-380

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Fulson _____
Felt _____
Sullivan _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Brown, G.D. _____
Casper _____
Conrad _____
Dalbey _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Tavel _____
W. Jones _____
Soyars _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

1 - Foreign Liaison Desk (Detached)

FCF:WAC WYMC
(10)

204
AUG 30 1971

INITIALS
DIRECTOR'S OFFICE

~~SECRET~~

see note page two

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

~~SECRET~~

CADRE TO LEGAT BERN

RE: VISIT OF PROFESSOR DR. HAUS WALTER,
CHIEF ATTORNEY GENERAL, TO THE
UNITED STATES, SIXTH FLOOR, NEW YORK UNIVERSITY



b1
b3

NOTE:

See memorandum W.R. Wannall to Mr. C.D. Brennan
dated 8/11/71 regarding Dr. Walder.

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. C. D. Brennan *CD*

FROM : R. D. Cotter *RDC/m*

SUBJECT: H. R. 10204
S. 2224

92nd Congress - 1st Session

1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
1 - Mr. D. J. Dalbey

DATE: 8/11/71

1 - Mr. C. D. Brennan
1 - Mr. R. D. Cotter
1 -

Tolson _____
Felt _____
Sullivan _____
Mohr _____
Brennan, C.D. _____
Callahan _____
Casper _____
Conrad _____
Dalbey _____
Gale _____
Ponder _____
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Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

b7C

Senator J. S. Cooper (R. - Ky) introduced S. 2224 in the Senate and Congressman R. L. Mazzoli (D. - Ky) introduced in the House H. R. 10204. - Both bills propose to amend the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, to keep the Congress better informed on matters relating to foreign policy and national security by providing it with intelligence information obtained by Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and with analysis of such information by CIA.

Section 403 of Title 50 U. S. Code provided for the establishment of CIA, outlined its duties and contained a provision to the effect that upon a written request of the Director of CIA, the Director of the FBI shall make available to the Director of CIA such information for "correlation, evaluation and dissemination as may be essential to the national security." These proposed bills, if enacted, will as a matter of law, make available to Congress and its Committees, "intelligence, conclusions, facts and analyses now available to the executive branch." Thus information which the FBI has furnished to the CIA as required by the National Security Act of 1947, could be requested by Congressional Committee or an individual member of Congress.

The Congressional Record, for 8/6/71, indicates that Senator Cooper will hold hearings on S. 2224 in the fall and that such hearings will also consider proposals establishing guidelines in matters of classification of information. The progress of these bills should be followed closely. They are of direct concern to the Bureau's security responsibilities.

RECOMMENDATION:

ENCLOSURE ATTACHED

That the Administrative Review Unit follow the progress of S. 2224 and H. R. 10204, copy of each bill is attached.

Enclosures (2)

CCED:mmm
(6)

54 SEP 2 1971

AUG 16 1971

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DATE 3-8-01 BY 60322 UC/LP/000000
#318692 ON ENVELOPE



ENCLOSURE

LA 90750-4825

Rec'd 8/5/71

92D. CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. R. 10204

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JULY 29, 1971

Mr. MAZZOLI introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Armed Services

A BILL

To amend the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, to keep the Congress better informed on matters relating to foreign policy and national security by providing it with intelligence information obtained by the Central Intelligence Agency and with analysis of such information by such Agency.

- 1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
- 2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*
- 3 That section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, as
- 4 amended (50 U.S.C. 403), is amended by adding at the
- 5 end thereof the following new subsections:

6 “(g) It shall also be the duty of the Agency to inform

I

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-8-01 BY 60322 uck/oc4/n
8 36692

1 fully and currently, by means of regular and special reports
2 to, and by means of special reports in response to requests
3 made by, the Committees on Armed Services and Foreign
4 Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committees
5 on Armed Services and Foreign Relations of the Senate
6 regarding intelligence information collected by the Agency
7 concerning the relations of the United States to foreign coun-
8 tries and matters of national security, including full and
9 current analysis by the Agency of such information.

10 “(h) Any intelligence information and any analysis
11 thereof made available to any committee of the Congress
12 pursuant to subsection (g) of this section shall be made
13 available by such committee, in accordance with such rules
14 as such committee may establish, to any Member of the
15 Congress who requests such information and analysis. Such
16 information and analysis shall also be made available by
17 any such committee, in accordance with such rules as such
18 committee may establish, to any officer or employee of
19 the House of Representatives or the Senate who has been
20 (1) designated by a Member of Congress to have access to
21 such information and analysis, and (2) determined by the
22 committee concerned to have the necessary security clear-
23 ance for such access.”

92d CONGRESS
1st Session

H. R. 10204

A BILL

To amend the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, to keep the Congress better informed on matters relating to foreign policy and national security by providing it with intelligence information obtained by the Central Intelligence Agency and with analysis of such information by such agency.

By Mr. MAZZOLI

JULY 29, 1971

Referred to the Committee on Armed Services

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DATE 3-8-82 BY 6-322ucw/loclp

A-368682

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-8-82 BY 6-322ucw/loclp

Rec'd 7/20/71

925 CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

S. 2224

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

JULY 7, 1971

MR. COOPER introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Relations jointly

A BILL

To amend the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, to keep the Congress better informed on matters relating to foreign policy and national security by providing it with intelligence information obtained by the Central Intelligence Agency and with analysis of such information by such agency.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*
3 That section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, as
4 amended (50 U.S.C. 403), is amended by adding at the
5 end thereof the following new subsections:

6 “(g) It shall also be the duty of the Agency to inform
7 fully and currently, by means of regular and special reports
8 to, and by means of special reports in response to requests

II
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-8-01 BY 60322 ucm/
2312192 DC/JP

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/1/01 BY 60322 ucm/
2312192 DC/JP

1 made by, the Committees on Armed Services and Foreign
2 Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committees
3 on Armed Services and Foreign Relations of the Senate
4 regarding intelligence information collected by the Agency
5 concerning the relations of the United States to foreign coun-
6 tries and matters of national security, including full and
7 current analysis by the Agency of such information.

8 “(h) Any intelligence information and any analysis
9 thereof made available to any committee of the Congress
10 pursuant to subsection (g) of this section shall be made
11 available by such committee, in accordance with such rules
12 as such committee may establish, to any Member of the
13 Congress who requests such information and analysis. Such
14 information and analysis shall also be made available by
15 any such committee, in accordance with such rules as such
16 committee may establish, to any officer or employee of
17 the House of Representatives or the Senate who has been
18 (1) designated by a Member of Congress to have access to
19 such information and analysis, and (2) determined by the
20 committee concerned to have the necessary security clear-
21 ance for such access.”

S. 2224

A BILL

By Mr. COOPER

Read twice and referred to the Committees on Armed Forces and Foreign Relations jointly

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-8-07 BY 60322UC
365192

Date

10-18-05

Classification of Mail:

- ☐ Unclassified
☐ Confidential
☒ Secret
☐ Top Secret*
☐ SCI*
☐ Other

Mail Category:

Letter ☒ Airtel _____
 LHM _____ Memo _____
 Report _____ Other _____
 Teletype _____

FD-501 Number _____ FD-502 Number _____

Subject _____

Date of Mail 9-10-71

 Description of Material 62-HQ-80750- NR 9-20-71
 (include identity of originating office or agency)

This serial has been removed and placed in:

☐ Special File Room, Room ⁷³⁶¹ ~~507~~, FBIHQ / FCIPA # 368692

☐ _____
 (Field Office - Room, Cabinet, or other
 location where material is stored)

This action taken based upon authority of:

☐ TS/SCICO, FBIHQ, 62-116065

☐ Field Office Manager - _____
 File and Serial number

(Signature and Title of Approving Official)_____
Date

*requires special handling

 ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 3-8-07 BY 60322 ucw/poc/hm
 # 368692

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGE-OUT

~~SECRET~~

1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. E.S. Miller
1 - Mr. Conrad
1 - Mr. Downing
1 - [redacted]

b7C

9/23/71

Airtel

62-80750-

DATE: 04-19-2007

CLASSIFIED BY 60324 auc baw/rs/sez

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1, 3, 6)

04-19-2032

(S) TO: S/C, Newark [redacted]

(S) FROM: Director, FBI [redacted]

b1


(S)

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Reur airtels 12/28/67 and 1/31/68 and Bu airtel
1/25/68.

(S)



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
ORIGINAL FILED IN

Advise whether requested arrangements can be
made.

NOTE: Based on memo to Mr. Conrad from C.F. Downing
dated 9/22/71.

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. Felt _____
Mr. Sullivan _____
Mr. Mohr _____
Mr. Bishop _____
Mr. Miller, E.S. _____
Mr. Callahan _____
Mr. Casper _____
Mr. Conrad _____
Mr. Dalbey _____
Mr. Cleveland _____
Mr. Fonder _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Tavel _____
Mr. Walters _____
Mr. Soyars _____
Tele. Room _____
Miss Holmes _____
Miss Gandy _____

taw (9)



60 OCT 12 1971

TELETYPE UNIT

~~SECRET~~

REC'D DON INLET DIA

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

TO : Mr. Conrad *W*

DATE: 4/22/71

FROM : F. Downing

DATE: 04-13-2007

CLASSIFIED BY AUC 60324 BAW/RS/SEZ

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1, 3, 6)

04-13-2032

Mr. Miller

Mr. Board

Mr. [unclear]

Mr. [unclear]

Mr. [unclear]

Mr. [unclear]

Mr. [unclear]

Mr. [unclear]

Mr. [unclear]

Mr. [unclear]

Mr. [unclear]

Mr. [unclear]

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Mr. [unclear]

Mr. [unclear]

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Mr. [unclear]

Mr. [unclear]

Mr. [unclear]

Mr. [unclear]

Mr. [unclear]

Mr. [unclear]

b1 - [unclear]
b1 - [unclear]

(S)

b1
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REC-32

62-88750-4826

b1

REC-32

NOT RECORDED

191 OCT 6 1971

EX-103

b7C

- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. Mohr
- 1 - Mr. E.S. Miller
- 1 - Mr. Conrad
- 1 - Mr. Downing

(7)

CONTINUED - OVER

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

~~SECRET~~

DATE: 04-13-2007
CLASSIFIED BY: 60324 BAW/RS/SEZ
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 8.3(1) 61
04-13-2032

1 - Mr. A. Rosen
1 - Mr. D.J. Dalbey
1 - Mr. E.S. Miller
1 - Mr. W.O. Cregar
1 - Mr. W.R. Wannall

1 - [REDACTED]
1 - [REDACTED]

b7C

October 20, 1971

BY COURIER

Honorable Richard Helms
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear Mr. Helms:

b1
b3

(S) [REDACTED]

It would be appreciated if you would furnish
this Bureau with a copy of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b3

Sincerely yours, 62-80750-

b1

(S) [REDACTED]
1 - 62-80750 (CIA Matters)

NOT RECORDED

170 NOV 2 1971

b1

FXO:dgo (10)

NOTE: 4

(S) [REDACTED]

Classified "Secret" since reference mentions an
activity, unauthorized disclosure of which could seriously
affect United States national defense interests.

b1

~~SECRET~~

Group 1

Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

55 NOV 4 1971

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

OCT 28 1971

TELETYPE

DATE: 3-8-2007

CLASSIFIED BY 60322 UCLD/OCG/JW

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3.3(1) 3-8-2032
#368692

Mr. Tolson	_____
Mr. Felt	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Mohr	_____
Mr. Bishop	_____
Mr. Callahan	_____
Mr. Casper	_____
Mr. Conrad	_____
Mr. Dalbey	_____
Mr. Cleveland	_____
Mr. Ponder	_____
Mr. Bates	_____
Mr. Tavel	_____
Mr. Walters	_____
Mr. Soyars	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Miss Holmes	_____
Miss Gandy	_____

STATE 320

9:00 URGENT 10/28/71 RNB

TO DIRECTOR NR 234-27

FROM LEGAT TOKYO (66-4) 1P

RELATIONS WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA).

Jap 29

5-Share

g Moore

(S) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

(S) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

END

51 NOV 8 1971

3RD CC: MR. DAY

NOV 4 1971

~~SECRET~~

REC 25

62-80730-4828

17 NOV 2 1971

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62-80750-4829

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F415
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L. J. J. J.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 3-8-01 BY 60322UCU/OCU-112
#368692

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CODE

TELETYPE

URGENT

11/17/71

b7C

1 - [REDACTED]

TO DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
EX-112 REC-19
FROM DIRECTOR, FBI 62-80750-4830

~~SECRET~~

b1

(S) [REDACTED]
REFERENCE IS MADE TO [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
(S) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

b3

NOTE:

(S) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

b1
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THG:emj
(3)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

DATE: 3-8-2007

CLASSIFIED BY 60322 UCU/DIC/DA

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3.3(1) 3-8-2032

#318692

Tolson _____
Felt _____
Rosen _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Miller, E.S. _____
Callahan _____
Casper _____
Conrad _____
Dalbey _____
Cleveland _____
Ponder _____
Bates _____
Tavel _____
Walters _____
Soyars _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

57 NOV 26 1971

TELETYPE

~~SECRET~~

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. A. Rosen
1 - Mr. E. S. Miller

Tolson _____
Felt _____
Rosen _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Miller, E. _____
Callahan _____
Casper _____
Conrad _____
Dalbey _____
Cleveland _____
Ponder _____
Bates _____
Tavel _____
Walters _____
Soyars _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

TO : Mr. E. S. Miller

DATE: 11/18/71

FROM : W. A. Branigan

1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)
REQUEST FOR BUREAU LECTURE
NOVEMBER 24, 1971

(S)

[Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

ACTION:

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

If approved, Mr. Cregar will handle this lecture
on 11/24/71.

WOC:pdr
(5)

DATE: 3-8-2007
CLASSIFIED BY 60322aclo/pcc/fw
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X33(1) 3-8-2032

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EX-115

REC-37

62-80750-4837

54 DEC 1 1971

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6 NOV 23 1971

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JAN 4 1972Lam/epi

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 3-8-07 BY 60322UCW/DCH/AM
#368692

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

b7C

1 - [redacted]

Date: November 22, 1971

To: Director
Central Intelligence Agency

Attention: [redacted]

From: Director, FBI 62-80950 -

Subject: (S) [redacted]

C.I.A.

This is in reference to [redacted]

[redacted]

(S) [redacted]

(S) [redacted]

b1
b3

b3

b1
b3

HGR/jak (4)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

Tolson _____
Felt _____
Rosen _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Miller E.S. _____
Callahan _____
Casper _____
Conrad _____
Dalbey _____
Cleveland _____
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Soyars _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

~~SECRET~~

55 DEC 9 1971

TELETYPE UNIT []

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

- 1 - Mr. Alex Rosen
- 1 - Mr. E. S. Miller
- 1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan
- 1 - [REDACTED]

BY COURIER

b7C

RA
EC-28
62-80750-4833
62-80750-4832X
Date: December 16, 1971
To: Director
Central Intelligence Agency

Attention: [REDACTED]

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director

Subject: [REDACTED]

(S)

(S)

(S)

(S)

b1
b3

BFR:cgc

(7)

NOTE:

Classified "Secret" to conform to the classification
afforded this matter by CIA.

NOTE CONTINUED PAGE TWO

Tolson _____
Felt _____
Rosen _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Miller, E.S. _____
Callahan _____
Casper _____
Conrad _____
Dalbey _____
Cleveland _____
Ponder _____
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Tavel _____
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Soyars _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

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downgrading and
declassification

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60 JAN 5 1972
DEC 22 1971

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61-5381

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ORIGINAL FILED IN

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

~~SECRET~~

RA

Memorandum

- 1 - Mr. Alex Rosen
- 1 - Mr. E. S. Miller

- Tolson
- Felt
- Rosen
- Mohr
- Bishop
- Callahan
- Casper
- Conrad
- Dalbey
- Cleveland
- Ponder
- Bates
- Tavel
- Walters
- Soyars
- Tele. Room
- Holmes
- Gandy

TO : Mr. E. S. Miller

DATE: 12/15/71

FROM : W. A. Branigan

- 1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan
- 1 - [Redacted]

SUBJECT:

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

RECOMMENDATION:

[Redacted]

DATE: 3-9-2007
CLASSIFIED BY 60322UCU/PCE/PLP
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X33(16) 3-9-2022
#318692

Enclosures

BFR:cgé
(5)

REC- 28

EX-104

18 DEC 21 1971

ENCLOSURE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

57 JAN 6 1972

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DEC 22 1971

ESPIONAGE

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~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

TO : Mr. Mohr

DATE: December 21, 1971

FROM : J. J. Casper

SUBJECT:

Tolson
Felt
Rosen
Mohr
DeLoach
Miller
Callahan
Casper
Conrad
Dalbey
Cleveland
Ponder
Bates
Tavel
Walters
Soyars
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

b1
b3

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

DATE: 5-9-2007 #JCE692
CLASSIFIED BY 60322 UCW/DCA/bv
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X33(1) 39-~~101~~ 2032

UNRECORDED COPY FILED
b1
b3
1-29-

Enclosure *sent*
1 - Mr. Mooney
TJB:aga *[initials]*

5(3) JAN 4 1972

SENT DIRECTOR
FOR APPROVAL

17-21-71

CONTINUED - OVER

REC-48

15 DEC 28 1971

~~SECRET~~

If you are
not yet
believing
this

2286

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum J. J. Casper to Mr. Mohr

Re:

(S)

[Redacted]

b1
b3

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(S)

[Redacted]

[Handwritten signature]

(2) If approved, that attached letter be forwarded to SAC, Norfolk.

[Handwritten signature]

[Handwritten signature]

[Handwritten signature]

OK
H

[Handwritten signature]

SAC Mooney;
Dumfries, advised.
JB/1/7

~~SECRET~~

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D.C.

12-10-71
December 1

Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Mohr	
Mr. Bishop	
Mr. Miller, E.	
Mr. Callahan	
Mr. Casper	
Mr. Conrad	
Mr. Dalbey	
Mr. Cleveland	
Mr. Ponder	
Mr. Bates	
Mr. Tavel	
Mr. Walters	
Mr. Soyars	
Tele. Room	
Miss Holmes	
Miss Gandy	

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-9-97 BY 60322UCV/100C/1W
#318692

Dear Mr. Hoover:

Perhaps you will remember me, I submitted a manuscript for consideration in the FBI bulletin.

However, that is not my reason for writing at this time. Perhaps you will think me a bit naive, but, I have always had the highest regard for the FBI, but, after reading an account in a book written by Gay Talese; the book titled "Honor Thy Father" where it comes to light that a special agent in the employ of your organization enlisted others in bombing missions against known mafioso; it seems to me that such activities are no more acceptable than the organization which you are fighting.

One subject named [redacted] was the individual referred to in the accusations. I realize that there are ways with which one organization or another uses to expedite a situation, such as the CIA and their infamous cadre, but the FBI, I am somewhat shocked.

I suppose you cannot answer this direct question, however, I will ask it anyway; Did the FBI encourage and sustain [redacted] only to dismiss him when the story was made public?

Very truly yours

EX-101
REC 16

16 DEC 14 1971

CORRESPONDENCE

COPY RETAINED IN
PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

53 JAN 5 1972

b7C

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Bishop *Bishop*

DATE: 12-16-71

FROM : G. E. Malmfeldt *Gene*

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-9-97 BY 60322UCB/10CC/700

818692

SUBJECT:

Tolson _____
Felt _____
Rosen _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Miller, E.S. _____
Callahan _____
Casper _____
Conrad _____
Dalbey _____
Cleveland _____
Ponder _____
Bates _____
Tavel _____
Walters _____
Soyars _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

b7C

The purpose of this memorandum is to recommend that the letter of December 10th from not be acknowledged.

communication is critical of the CIA referring to its employees as "infamous cadre" and makes the presumption based on reading the book "Honor Thy Father" that a Special Agent of this Bureau enlisted others in bombing missions against known "mafioso."

b7C

Bufiles indicate limited friendly correspondence with and a rejection of an article he submitted for the Law Enforcement Bulletin. This article purported to analysis the advantages and disadvantages of various handguns as far as comfort and concealment are concerned. It was without logic or merit and was poorly written. The matter correspondent refers to concerns a possible involvement of in several bombings which occurred in Tucson, Arizona and which were directed toward various hoodlum figures there.

critical characterization of the CIA and his presumptuous inquiry "Did the FBI encourage and sustain only to dismiss him when the story was made public?" do not merit the courtesy of a reply. Since this matter is pending prosecutive action, it would not be proper to discuss the details of this case.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

EX-101

REC 16

18 DEC 23 1971

1 - Mr. Malmfeldt
JJH:rmm (2)

letter not be acknowledged.

XEROX

JAN 5 1972

5 JAN 7 1972 67-429081

PERS. FILE

COPY RETAINED IN
RECORDS UNIT

Central Intelligence Agency

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. E. S. Miller

DATE: 12/17/71

FROM : W. A. Branigan

SUBJECT: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Tolson _____
Felt _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

On the late afternoon of 12/17/71 Mr. James Angleton, D.C. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), telephonically advised that he had just heard on good authority that Air Force General Walters, whose first name Angleton did not know, has been selected as the Deputy Director of CIA. Angleton advises this is being held very tightly and that responsible officials at CIA are not even aware of it. According to Angleton, General Walters is currently in Paris, France, has acted as the interpreter for two past Presidents, and is considered a strong conservative.

Angleton does not know when an announcement will be made but feels confident that Walters has been selected for the post.

ACTION:


For information. As soon as we can establish General Walters' complete identity a review of our files will be made.

WOC:hkey
(4)

1-Mr. Rosen
1-Mr. E. S. Miller
1-Mr. Branigan

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/6/94 BY SP7 aghem
per CIA review
of 6/2/94

55 JAN 5 1972



UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Cleveland

DATE: December 10, 1971

FROM : T. J. Emery

SUBJECT: HONOR THY FATHER
BY GAY TALESE
INFORMATION CONCERNING

Tolson _____
Felt _____
Rosen _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Miller, E. S. _____
Callahan _____
Casper _____
Conrad _____
Dalbey _____
Cleveland _____
Ponder _____
Bates _____
Tavel _____
Walters _____
Soyars _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

SYNOPSIS:

Captioned book, a highly publicized biography of hoodlum Salvatore (Bill) Bonanno, has been reviewed by the Special Investigative Division and, as might be expected in a work of this sort, contained numerous references to the Bureau. Although most were merely passing references, neither critical nor favorable in nature, considerable prominence was given to the still-unsubstantiated allegations that Bonanno's home and a number of other hoodlum sites in the Tucson area were bombed at the instigation of [REDACTED]

There were also a number of references to the Director, including: the often-debunked allegation that he only "gradually endorsed" the organized crime program attributed to the late Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy; charges that the Director and the Bureau showed little interest in the Tucson bombings (ignoring completely, of course, the matter of jurisdiction at the time); and a facetious observation that Bonanno sometimes got what he wanted by capitalizing upon the "fantasy of Mafia mythology as effectively as the FBI Director did at budget time."

Despite the fact that Honor Thy Father allegedly took more than six years of research, writing, and development, and strives to present a strongly sympathetic picture of Bonanno, who supplied the many family photographs and extensive background material contained therein, reports indicate that the book has completely infuriated Bonanno's father, former La Cosa Nostra "Commission" member Joseph Bonanno. According to sources close to the Bonannos, Joe has called the book "garbage" and is even threatening to disown his son for the assistance he rendered in its preparation.

SI-112

REC 20

62-80750-

4838

1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. Bates

1 - Mr. Casper
1 - Mr. Flynn
1 - Mr. M. A. Jones

1 - Mr. Cleveland
1 - Mr. Emery

1 - [REDACTED] 1 - Mr. McHale

16 JAN 11 1972

58-JMR Bishop

JEM:jsj

(12)

CONTINUED - OVER

b7C

Memorandum to Mr. Cleveland
Re: Honor Thy Father

Probably the most surprising aspect of the book, in view of its general theme, is that it makes no attempt to deny either the existence of a Mafia or the Bonannos' long-standing membership in it. It also provides extensive coverage of Joe Bonanno's mysterious disappearance (and possible kidnaping) in 1964, the Prohibition gang wars which resulted in the creation of the La Cosa Nostra "Commission" in 1931, and the recent revolt within the Bonanno La Cosa Nostra "family."

On the debit side, the book is too adulatory of the Bonannos, presenting Joe as a "radical student" who had to flee the wrath of Mussolini in the 1920's for his anti-Fascist activities, and would have the reader believe that Bill is intelligent, likeable, well-educated, warm-hearted, and "a good father," even though he drove his wife to attempted suicide and ripped the clothing off his mistress and knocked her across the room during one savage outburst. In addition, the book (either intentionally or otherwise) has a number of inaccuracies and accuses the United States Government of emulating the old Italian Black Shirt regime in its current drive against organized crime.

b7C

In reviewing Talese's latest effort, one New York Times writer concluded that his former colleague had failed to present a very good "inside picture" of organized crime, while another shrugged it off as a "tedious distraction." Either view may be considered a reasonably valid summary.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

WVC
SD/wrcw
TE
WBS
WVC
TE
WBS

Memorandum to Mr. Cleveland
Re: Honor Thy Father

DETAILS:

The various news media have devoted extensive publicity recently to captioned book, which was written by former New York Times reporter Gay Talese (true name: Gaetano Talese). In fact, major portions of the book were excerpted and run in serialized form in Esquire magazine prior to the appearance of the book itself.

A copy of Talese's work has been obtained and reviewed by the Special Investigative Division, where it was determined to be an apologetic biography--actually, almost an autobiography--of Salvatore (Bill) Bonanno, a well-known hoodlum and the son of former La Cosa Nostra "Commission" member Joseph Bonanno.

As might be expected in such a study, there are numerous references to the FBI (well over 100 in a span of 480 pages), although most are merely passing mentions which are neither critical nor favorable in tone. Needless to say, however, a prominent place is given to the highly publicized, but still-unsubstantiated, allegations that Bonanno's home and a number of other hoodlum sites in the Tucson area were bombed at the instigation of [REDACTED]

There are also a number of references to the Director, including: the often-debunked allegation that he only "gradually endorsed" the organized crime program attributed to the late Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy; charges that the Director and the Bureau showed little interest in the Tucson bombings (ignoring completely, of course, the matter of jurisdiction at the time); and a facetious observation that Bill Bonanno sometimes got what he wanted by capitalizing upon the "fantasy of Mafia mythology as effectively as the FBI Director did at budget time. "

b7C

Talese claims that the research, development, and writing of his book took more than six years, much of which was spent in gaining the confidence of various friends and relatives of the Bonannos. That he succeeded so well is a point of interest in itself. Although sources close to Joe Bonanno advise that the old gangland chieftain is furious about the

Memorandum to Mr. Cleveland
Re: Honor Thy Father

contents of the book, which he calls "garbage," there can be no doubt that the vast bulk of the material and family photographs contained therein came from Bill Bonanno, with the tacit approval of his father. Apparently unaware of how revealing the book would be until he actually saw it in print, the elder Bonanno is even threatening to disown his son for his assistance in its preparation.

As previously mentioned, Honor Thy Father is basically a biography of Bill Bonanno, ranging from his health problems as a youth to his difficulties in school, his marital problems and extramarital sex life, his gradual rise in the ranks of the mob, and finally his conviction in 1969 for mail fraud. It also includes considerable biographical data on both Bill's father and grandfather, making it clear that the subject of the book is at least a third-generation Mafioso.

In fact, the most surprising thing about the book, considering its generally favorable tone, is that it engaged in no attempt to deny either the existence of a Mafia or the Bonannos' long-standing membership in it. Starting out with Joe Bonanno's mysterious disappearance (and possible kidnaping) in 1964, Talese proceeds in a series of criss-crossing "flashbacks" to tell of the underworld maneuvering that led up to the disappearance, Bill Bonanno's difficulties in holding the mob together during his father's absence, Joe's arrival in the United States shortly after the turn of the century, Bill's marital troubles nearly 60 years later, the historical development of the Mafia in Sicily and the Prohibition gang wars which resulted in the creation of the La Cosa Nostra "Commission" in 1931, the Government's current drive against organized crime, Bill's childhood, the recent warfare within the Bonanno mob, and the financial difficulties that preceded Bill's prosecution by Postal authorities for fraudulent use of a credit card belonging to one of his business associates.

Even so, Talese leaves no doubt about the personal friendship he developed for Bill during the course of researching his book and the awe and respect he feels for Joe Bonanno. In a November 28 appearance on the NBC "Monitor" radio show, Talese explained how his wife visited with Bill's and his children played with Bill's while he and Bill worked on the book. As a further touch, Talese dedicated his book to the Bonanno children and

Memorandum to Mr. Cleveland
Re: Honor Thy Father

subsequently announced that he was establishing a trust fund for them, presumably out of the proceeds from the book, over 350,000 copies of which have been printed, at \$10 a copy. In addition, the World Publishing Company claims that it has sold the paperback rights to the book for \$451,000, slightly exceeding the amount paid for The Godfather, an earlier best seller about the Mafia.

Because of his personal feelings about Bill Bonanno, Talese tries to picture him as an intelligent, likeable, well-educated young man who is a victim of circumstances. On Page 116, for example, he refers to Bill as "a good father... attentive and warm-hearted," a passage that might unintentionally raise a few eyebrows when taken in conjunction with earlier descriptions of how Bill ripped the clothing off of his mistress and knocked her across the room and how his infidelities and criminal life once drove his wife to run away from home with the children and on another occasion to attempt suicide.

Apparently in an unsuccessful effort to head off the wrath of the underworld for the glaring spotlight he threw on it, Talese tries to explain away the mob's brutality by contrasting it to American atrocities in Vietnam. He also accuses the Government of currently engaging in a Mussolini-like witch hunt to eradicate the Mafia and, possibly tongue-in-cheek, attempts to give Joe Bonanno an air of respectability by depicting him as an "anti-Fascist student radical" who had to flee his homeland a second time in the 1920's in order to escape the retaliation of the Black Shirt authorities.

Aside from the vicarious thrills it offers its readers, Honor Thy Father holds out the promise of an almost unparalleled view of the underworld as seen through the eyes of a notorious Mafia leader. Unfortunately, though, Talese intermingles first-person reminiscences with so many unidentified excerpts from various public sources that it becomes impossible for an ordinary reader to guess when he is getting genuine "inside information" and when he is merely being served up a rehash of previously published material. On one occasion, in particular,

Memorandum to Mr. Cleveland
Re: Honor Thy Father

when Talese appears to be giving Joe Bonanno's eyewitness account of the Castellammarese gangland war during the early 1930's, certain internal errors which originally appeared in printed studies issued by the McClellan Committee make it obvious that Talese is actually quoting from the testimony of the late Joseph Valachi rather than from either Bonanno.

In another interesting passage, Talese states that the Bonannos moved to Arizona from New York City in the early 1940's because of Bill's sickly health. What Talese apparently missed during the course of his research was the fact that the Bonannos moved less than a week after the New York City police assigned 1,000 officers to the investigation of the 1943 shooting of Carlo Tresca, a New York City anarchist whose unsolved murder has often been attributed in the press to the Bonanno organization.

b7C

[REDACTED]

Following the appearance of this latest book by Talese, the New York Times took the unprecedented step of having two reporters review it. One concluded that the author had failed to present a very good "inside picture" of organized crime, and the other shrugged it off as a "tedious distraction." Either view may be considered a reasonably valid summary.

SD/wrw

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

DATE: 04-18-2007

CLASSIFIED BY AUC 60324 BAW/RS/SEZ

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(6)

04-18-2032

~~SECRET~~

Tolson _____
Felt _____
Rosen _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Miller, W. S. _____
Callahan _____
Casper _____
Conrad _____
Dalbey _____
Cleveland _____
Ponder _____
Bates _____
Tavel _____
Walters _____
Soyars _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

TO :

MR. E. S. MILLER

DATE: December 22, 1971

FROM :

W. A. BRANIGAN

SUBJECT:

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

CLASSIFIED BY 9803 RDD/mc

DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

7/27/93 C.A. #PP-1826

USA ENFO. FS

UNCLASS. FOR CIA REVIEW of 6/12/94

This memorandum reports the results of a check of Bureau indices on Major General Vernon Anthony Walters, United States Army, born January 3, 1917, New York City, believed to be selected as the new Deputy Director of CIA (not yet announced).

(S)

b1

Memorandum Branigan to Miller dated 12/17/71 reported information confidentially learned from Mr. James Angleton, CIA, that Air Force General Walters has been reliably reported to be selected as the new Deputy Director of CIA.

A review of Bureau files reveals that Colonel Vernon Anthony Walters was the subject of a name check request from the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, United States Army, on June 17, 1969. At that time Walters was residing at 555-Indian Road Terrace, Northwest, Washington, D. C., and was assigned to the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army. He was previously employed by London Guarantee and Accidental Company, New York City.

In 1962 Colonel Vernon A. Walters, Army Attache, U. S. Embassy, Rome, Italy, requested our Legal Attache in Rome to arrange for a meeting with the Director during which time he would have with him Giulio Andreotti, Italian Minister of Defense. At that time Andreotti was to visit the U.S. as a guest of the Department of Defense. Due to a curtailment of the Defense Minister's itinerary in the United States, it was impossible for him and Colonel Walters to have a meeting with the Director.

Bufiles show that Walters was very closely associated with former President Dwight D. Eisenhower and then Vice President Richard M. Nixon. As a translator-interpreter he accompanied President Eisenhower on a world tour in 1959 and then Vice President Nixon during his South American tour. Our Legal Attache in Rome advised in 1962 that Walters is an extremely dynamic, dedicated Army officer who speaks six languages fluently and at that time was a very cooperative and close contact of the Rome Office.

REC-8

62-80750

CONTINUED - OVER

WOC:hke

(4)

1-Mr. Rosen
1-Mr. E. S. Miller
1-Mr. Branigan

60 JAN 7 1972

EX-104

12 JAN 12 1972

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum from W. A. Branigan to Mr. E. S. Miller
RE: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

~~SECRET~~

b1
b7D

(S) [redacted] Walters had at one time worked for former U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Averell Harriman, and acted as the official translator for President Truman and Secretary of State, General George C. Marshall, during the Pan American Conference in 1947.

Although the information furnished by Angleton revealed Walters was an Air Force General, it is believed Angleton was referring to Major General Vernon Anthony Walters, who is identical with the individual described above. We have learned from contacts at the Air Force that Major General Walters is currently the Defense and Army Attache in Paris, France, and is expected to return to the U.S. for a still undesignated assignment in January, 1972.

Bufiles contain no derogatory information regarding General Walters.

ACTION:

For information.

DEM/wab

EM

R

4
P
7

WBS

K

DJD
jam

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Bishop *TEB*

DATE: 1-19-72

FROM : M. A. Jones *MAJ*

SUBJECT: TAPE OF JACK ANDERSON'S
BROADCAST FOR JANUARY 21, 1972

a 14

We have received a tape of Jack Anderson's broadcast for January 21st. He makes the following quote concerning the FBI:

"Richard Helms is quietly maneuvering to strengthen his position as the Nation's new intelligence czar. He now has an eye on the FBI's domestic intelligence functions. Helms has hinted cautiously that he should take charge of domestic intelligence. The CIA has a better understanding, as he pointed out, of intelligence methods. The FBI is still using crime fighting methods to catch subversives. Helms argues that the top spies are too sophisticated to be caught by the FBI's methods. Helms is also taking advantage of J. Edgar Hoover's declining popularity to strip the FBI of one of its most celebrated functions."

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

- 1 - Mr. Mohr
- 1 - Mr. Rosen
- 1 - Mr. Bishop
- 1 - Mr. Miller
- 1 - M. A. Jones

LSL:cl
(8)

COPY MADE FOR MR. TOLSON

51 JAN 27 1972 *JS*

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 3-9-07 BY 60322UCU/DCU/AD
#368692

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Tolson	_____
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Mohr	_____
Bishop	_____
Walters	_____
Callahan	_____
Casper	_____
Conrad	_____
Dalbey	_____
Cleveland	_____
Ponder	_____
Bates	_____
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Walters	_____
Soyars	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holmes	_____
Gandy	_____

ORIGINAL FILED IN 94-50053-132

WBS
16 JAN 21 1972
CRIME RESEARCH

1-Mr. Mohr
1-Mr. Rosen
1-Mr. Bishop
1-Mr. E. S. Miller

1-Mr. Branigan
1-Mr. Cregar

The Attorney General

January 25, 1972

REC-262 -80750-4841

Director, FBI

Deleted Copy Sent [redacted]

by Letter 9-30-76

Per FOIA Request

**RELATIONS WITH THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**

The following information was telephonically furnished to FBI Headquarters by Mr. James Angleton of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). I am taking the liberty of furnishing it to you as a matter of interest.

On January 20, 1972, Mr. Angleton received a telephone call from [redacted] a reporter for "The New York Times," asking Mr. Angleton for an interview. Recognizing that [redacted] was the same reporter who had written an offensive article appearing in the January 13, 1972, edition of "The New York Times" regarding the revelations of former Special Agent [redacted] Mr. Angleton refused to speak with [redacted]

On the morning of January 21, 1972, Mr. Angleton received a second call from [redacted] Having already read the Evans-Novak column appearing in the January 21, 1972, edition of the "Washington Post" wherein the Bureau's Legal Attache system was attacked (copy attached for your convenience), Mr. Angleton agreed to speak with [redacted] in order that he could set the record straight. Mr. Angleton made it quite clear to Smith that the Evans-Novak column was incorrect; that the article was a one-sided, slanted affair; and that there was no jurisdictional problem, the FBI having a perfect right to send people abroad and, in fact, the CIA welcomed the FBI Legal Attaches overseas. In response to [redacted] question as to what Mr. Angleton meant, he stated that the CIA did not have qualified people to handle the work performed by the FBI Legal Attaches nor did the CIA have the personnel to handle leads from foreign liaison services involving law enforcement matters.

Mr. Angleton told [redacted] that the FBI was an internationally known and respected organization with a reputation for excellence, and because of this when FBI representatives contacted local law enforcement officers overseas, they were afforded courteous treatment and excellent cooperation.

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Felt
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Miller, E.S.
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Casper
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Dalbey
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Ponder
Mr. Bates
Mr. Warkart
Mr. Walters
Mr. Soyars
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

WOC:hke
(10)

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

51 FEB 2 1972

6 JAN 28 1972

TELETYPE UNIT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4/2/94 BY SP9 CEC/alm
per CIA 202:EWJ/ot 6/4/94

The Attorney General

In response to a question by [] as to how the United States Government could insure that foreign governments were not playing off the CIA and FBI representatives against each other, Mr. Angleton emphatically stated that there was complete coordination overseas and that FBI and CIA representatives conferred to insure against this eventuality.

[] then questioned Mr. Angleton as to why there had been such an attack against the FBI during the past two years. Mr. Angleton related that any reference to the FBI has great public interest. He noted that an organization is only as good as the men working for it and that the FBI insists on strict discipline and a tight inspection system. Mr. Angleton advised [] that the FBI has a system of checks and balances, and if an individual in the organization is not pulling his weight, he is appropriately disciplined.

b7C

Mr. Angleton advised he had not planned to grant this interview to [] but did so inasmuch as he resented the false and erroneous accusations which appeared in the Evans-Novak column of January 21, 1972. Although Mr. Angleton had not cleared his interview with Mr. Helms prior to granting it, he subsequently briefed the Director of CIA, who agreed one hundred percent with what Mr. Angleton told reporter []. This, according to Mr. Helms, is the official CIA position regarding the FBI Legal Attaches overseas.

Enclosure

1 - The Deputy Attorney General - Enclosure

NOTE: Memorandum Branigan to Miller dated 1/21/72, entitled "Central Intelligence Agency," reported a telephonic contact Mr. James Angleton of CIA had with representatives of the Domestic Intelligence Division following his interview with reporter []. On this memorandum Mr. Rosen suggested the Attorney General be advised by memorandum and the Director indicated "Yes. H."

b7C

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : MR. E. S. MILLER

FROM : W. A. BRANIGAN

SUBJECT: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

1-Mr. Mohr 1-Mr. Branigan
1-Mr. Rosen 1-Mr. Cregar
1-Mr. Bishop
1-Mr. E. S. Miller
DATE: 1/21/72

Tolson
Felt
Rosen
Mohr
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Callahan
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Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

CLASSIFIED BY SP5 RJG/BWY

DECLASSIFY ON: NADR

4/29/83 Comp. # 22P287
9803 RDD/MB
7/27/93 C/A. # AP-1P26

On the morning of 1/21/72, Mr. James Angleton, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), advised of the following (S) (u)

Yesterday, 1/20/72, he received a telephone call from [redacted] reporter for "The New York Times," asking Angleton for an interview. Angleton, recognizing that [redacted] was the same reporter who had written an article appearing in "The New York Times" of January 13, 1972, regarding the revelations of former Special Agent [redacted] refused to speak with [redacted] (S) (u)

Angleton received another call from [redacted] early on the morning of 1/21/72. Angleton having already read the Evans-Novak column appearing in the January 21, 1972, edition of "The Washington Post" (copy attached) wherein the Bureau's Legal Attache system was attacked, agreed to speak with Smith in order that he, Angleton, could set the record straight. Although the discussion between Angleton and [redacted] did not develop into a shouting match, Angleton stated he made it quite clear to [redacted] that the Evans-Novak column was incorrect. Angleton informed [redacted] that the article was a one-sided, slanted affair; that there was no jurisdictional problem, the FBI having a perfect right to send people abroad and, in fact, the CIA welcomed the FBI's Legal Attaches overseas. In response to [redacted] question as to what Angleton meant, Angleton stated that the CIA did not have qualified people to handle the work performed by the Legal Attaches nor did they have the personnel to handle leads from foreign services involving law enforcement matters. Angleton told [redacted] that Mr. Hoover was a very prestigious person, internationally known and respected, and that when his representatives contacted law enforcement officers overseas, Mr. Hoover's reputation for excellence demanded his representatives receive courteous treatment and excellent cooperation (S) (u)

In response to a question by [redacted] as to how the U. S. Government could insure foreign governments were not playing off CIA and FBI representatives against each other, Angleton emphatically stated that there was complete coordination overseas and that FBI (S) (u)

Enclosure

WOC:hke
(7)

JAN 26 1972

REC-2

CONTINUED OVER

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

ENCLOSURE

COPY SENT TO MR. TOLSON

JAN 23 1972

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED BY SP7 cec/sem
ON 4/7/94 C.A. # 88-186
per CIA Review of 4/14/94

UNCLASSIFIED COPY FILED IN 64-4104

Memorandum from W. A. Branigan to Mr. E. S. Miller
RE: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

and CIA representatives conferred to insure against this. [] then asked why has there been such an attack against Mr. Hoover during the past two years. Angleton stated that Mr. Hoover has been a dominant person on the national scene for the past 40 years and that any reference to him has great public interest. He noted that Mr. Hoover believes his organization is only as good as the men working for it and that he insists on strict discipline and a tight inspection system. He told [] that he believes Mr. Hoover has a system of checks and balances and if an individual in the organization is not pulling his weight, he is appropriately disciplined. (X) (u)

Angleton advised at that point he had to excuse himself in that he had to attend another meeting. He stated that he had not cleared his interview with Mr. Helms but would advise him of it later in the day. Angleton had not planned to give this interview to [] but did so inasmuch as he resented the false and erroneous accusations which appeared in the Evans-Novak column of January 21, 1972. (X) (u)

ACTION:

For information.

b7C

ADDENDUM: DEM:mjt 1/21/72

Mr. Angleton called again this afternoon (1/21/72) and advised that he had briefed Mr. Helms and Mr. Helms had agreed 100 per cent with what he had told [] Helms also told Angleton that this was official CIA position. (X) (u)

SUGGEST A.G. be advised by memo.

EM

yes.
H - 2 -

R

PER
7

Memo to AG
cc Deputy AG
1/25/72
WOC/HKE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Tolson _____
 Felt _____
 Rosen _____
 Mohr _____
 Bishop _____
 Miller, E.S. _____
 Callahan _____
 Casper _____
 Conrad _____
 Dalbey _____
 Cleveland _____



Rowland Evans and Robert Novak

Hoover's Empire Abroad



J. EDGAR HOOVER has quietly won President Nixon's approval for an expansion of the FBI's international intelligence-gathering operations despite grave misgivings in the State Department and Central Intelligence Agency.

That will put the Federal Bureau of Investigation in over 25 foreign capitals, unauthorized specifically by law and unknown to the public or most congressmen. Moreover, these FBI agents, supposedly stationed abroad to help apprehend fugitives from U.S. justice, are transmitting secret intelligence reports back to Director Hoover.

This bizarre story casts further light on two intriguing aspects of Hoover: First, his undiminished ability, born of four decades of experience as the bureaucrat supreme, to get his way in Washington; second, the tenacity of Hoover's passion to get the FBI into the spy business and his animus toward the CIA.

The overseas FBI agents are called, officially and euphemistically, "legal attaches" and are assigned to U.S. embassies abroad. Legal attaches have long performed useful work in

Ottawa and Mexico City, helping track down fugitives. Similarly, the case can be made for agents assigned to London, Tokyo and perhaps one or two other foreign capitals.

But Hoover has gone far beyond this. Shielded from public and congressional scrutiny, he has quietly built an overseas network of FBI agents in some 20 countries. The latest step came last year when the director proposed expansion into another dozen capitals, and showed his legendary deftness in the bureaucratic jungles by going right to the top for approval.

In a private conversation at the White House with President Nixon, Hoover casually brought up his desire to establish a few new legal attaché offices. Like most Presidents of the past 47 years, Mr. Nixon has no desire to cross the director. He agreed.

Thus, Hoover went to the State Department armed with the President's prior approval, a *fait accompli*. State Department functionaries, faced with cutbacks in the demoralized Foreign Service, were appalled at presidential approval for a dozen legal attaché offices

containing two to six FBI agents each. Across the Potomac River, CIA officials eyed Hoover's overseas expansionism suspiciously.

In tedious negotiations, the State Department managed to cut back Hoover's expansion by about half. Finally, the FBI proposed opening new offices in six additional cities: Manila, Rio de Janeiro, Singapore, New Delhi, Canberra and Santo Domingo. Although the location of legal attaché offices is a closely guarded secret, it is understood that FBI agents will now be placed in all of these cities with the possible exception of New Delhi.

IN OTHER WORDS, Secretary of State William Rogers, who as attorney general under President Eisenhower in the late 1960s gave Hoover free rein at the FBI, decided not to make an issue of Hoover's worldwide expansionism. One reason is assurances, given to both the State Department and CIA, that the overseas FBI agents will be operating strictly under the U.S. ambassadors and will not be gathering foreign intelligence.

The truth is otherwise. The "legal attaches" are re-

quired to send foreign intelligence reports back to Hoover through FBI channels, unseen by State Department or CIA. Indeed, the director himself has reprimanded legal attaches for failure to send him sufficient intelligence material.

The caliber of the intelligence picked up by the overseas FBI agents is considered suspect by intelligence experts, however. Barred from conducting overseas operations, the legal attaches tend to pass along gossip picked up on Embassy Row and in the coffee houses. Whether the thousands of tax dollars spent for this purpose is justifiable is therefore questionable.

But, as we have reported in earlier columns, the FBI's own outstanding agents know that the bureau could stand substantial improvement in carrying out the tasks Congress has assigned to it—particularly apprehension of foreign espionage agents in the United States. In view of that, Hoover's overseas expansionism, condoned by the President and the Secretary of State, seems particularly inappropriate.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 4/29/83 BY SP5 RJE/BWY

Comp. #228287

9803 RDD/MG

7/22/93 C.A. #88-1826

SP7 ac/sem
 12/1/94 C.A. #88-1826
 per CIA Review of 6/2/94
 ENCLOSURE
 62-80750-4841

Date 10-18-05

Classification of Mail:

- ☐ Unclassified
☐ Confidential
☒ Secret
☐ Top Secret*
☐ SCI*
☐ Other

Mail Category:

Letter X Airtel _____
 LHM _____ Memo _____
 Report _____ Other _____
 Teletype _____

FD-501 Number _____ FD-502 Number _____

Subject _____

Date of Mail _____

b3

Description of Material 62-HQ-80750-4842
 (include identity of originating office or agency)

This serial has been removed and placed in:

☐ Special File Room, Room ⁷³⁶¹~~3897~~, FBIHQ / FOIPA # 368692

☐ _____
 (Field Office - Room, Cabinet, or other
 location where material is stored)

This action taken based upon authority of.

☐ TS/SCICO, FBIHQ, 62-116065

☐ Field Office Manager - _____
 File and Serial number

 (Signature and Title of Approving Official)

 Date

*requires special handling

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 3-9-07 BY 60322UCU/DC/4W
#368692

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGE-OUT

~~SECRET~~

STATE 311/318/346

1:00 PM URGENT 1/29/72 LMG

TO DIRECTOR NR 023-28

FROM LEGAT TOKYO (80-72) 2P

DATE: 3-9-2002

CLASSIFIED BY 60322 UC/LP/ALC/JAN

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3.3(1) 3-9-2002

368692

O CIA

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Belmont
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Casper
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Felt
Mr. Gale
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Mr. Tele. Room
Mr. Holmes
Miss Gandy

RELATIONS WITH BUREAU OF NARCOTICS AND DANGEROUS DRUGS (BNDD).

(S)

W. H. R. / P. R. 1/29/72
b1
b3

END PAGE ONE

62-84750- 7 FEB 3 1972

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

170 FEB 4 1972

54 FEB 7 1972

~~SECRET~~

ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-36446-521

~~SECRET~~

PAGE TWO TOK 80-72

b1
b3

TAIPEI AND TOKYO EMBASSY REACTIONS TO POSITION NOT
YET DETECTED, BUT ABOVE FURNISHED FOR BUREAU INTEREST IN VIEW POSSIBLE
SOG REPERCUSSIONS. LEGATS HONG KONG AND MANILA ADVISED SEPARATELY.

b7c

END

CC-MR. MILLER

3RD CC- MR. DAY

~~SECRET~~

Date 10-18-05

Classification of Mail:

- ☐ Unclassified
☐ Confidential
☒ Secret
☐ Top Secret*
☐ SCI*
☐ Other

Mail Category:

Letter ☒ Airtel _____
 LHM _____ Memo _____
 Report _____ Other _____
 Teletype _____

FD-501 Number _____ FD-502 Number _____

Subject _____

Date of Mail _____

b3

Description of Material 62-HQ-80750-4843
 (include identity of originating office or agency)

This serial has been removed and placed in:

☐ Special File Room, Room ⁷³⁶¹~~597~~, FBIHQ / FOIPA # 368692

☐ _____
 (Field Office - Room, Cabinet, or other
 location where material is stored)

This action taken based upon authority of:

☐ TS/SCICO, FBIHQ, 62-116065

☐ Field Office Manager - _____
 File and Serial number

(Signature and Title of Approving Official)_____
Date

*requires special handling

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
 DATE 3-9-07 BY 60322 UCW/DC/HW
#368692

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGE-OUT

~~SECRET~~

Airtel

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Mullins

3/2/72

To: SACs, Miami
San Juan (S)

From: Director, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

b1

b1
b3

b1
b3

DATE: 3-9-2007

CLASSIFIED BY 60322 ucl/mcl/mw

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X3.3(10) 3-9-2032

#368682

1 - 62-80750 (Relations with CIA)

RAM:dlw (8)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

62-80750 -

NOT RECORDED

152 MAR 7 1972

51 MAR 8 1972

DUPLICATE YELLOW

~~SECRET~~

100-441111-1000

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 04-13-2007 BY AUC 60324 BAW/RS/SEZ

Date of Mail 2/10/72

Has been removed and placed in the Special File Room of Records Branch.

See File 66-2554-7530 for authority.

Subject JUNE MAIL - Central Intelligence Agency

Removed By 97 MAR 1 1972

File Number 62-80750-✓

Permanent Serial Charge Out

FKZ

DATE: 04-13-2007
CLASSIFIED BY AUC 60324 BAW/RS/SEZ
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1, 6)
04-13-2032

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

~~SECRET~~

1 - Mr. A. Rosen
1 - Mr. E. S. Miller

EX-112

REC-53

62-80750-4844

BY COURIER

Date: February 4, 1972

1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan
1 - Mr. H. D. Clough

To: Director
Central Intelligence Agency

Attention:

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director

Subject:

(S)

*del. to CIA
employee
2/4/72
wm*

b3

b1
b3

(S)

b1
b3

AKE

mjt (S)

(S)

HDC:at/aeb

(7)

aeb

See
SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

~~SECRET~~
Group 1

~~Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification~~

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. Felt _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Mohr _____
Mr. Bishop _____
Mr. Miller, E.S. _____
Mr. Callahan _____
Mr. Casper _____
Mr. Conrad _____
Mr. Dalbey _____
Mr. Cleveland _____
Mr. Ponder _____
Mr. Bates _____
Mr. Wankart _____
Mr. Walters _____
Mr. Young _____

59 FEB 6 1972

59 FEB 13 1972

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

~~SECRET~~

Director
Central Intelligence Agency

NOTE:

Classified "Secret" to conform to the classification
afforded this matter by CIA.

(S)



b1
b3

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

DATE: 04-13-2007

FBI

CLASSIFIED BY AUC 60324 BAW/RS/SEZ

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1, 6)

Date: 3/6/72

04-13-2032

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL

(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI [REDACTED] b1

(S) FROM: SAC, MIAMI [REDACTED] (P)

SUBJECT: [REDACTED] b1 b3

Central Intelligence Agency

Re Bureau airtel to Miami and San Juan dated 3/2/72.

ORIGINAL FILED IN

NOT RECORDED
191 MAR 28 1972

3 MAR 8 1972

(S) 2 - Bureau (RM)

1 - San Juan [REDACTED] (RM)

1 - Miami

SWJ:kam

(4)

~~SECRET~~

Approved: FLO

56

MAR 30 1972

Special Agent in Charge

Sent

M

Per

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Tolson _____
Felt _____
Rosen _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Miller _____
Callahan _____
Casper _____
Conrad _____
Dalbey _____
Cleveland _____
Ponder _____
Bates _____
Wakart _____
Walters _____
Soyars _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

TO : Mr. E. S. Miller

DATE: 3/9/72

FROM : W. A. Branigan

DATE: 04-13-2007
CLASSIFIED BY AUC 60324 BAW/RS/SEZ
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1,6)
04-13-2032

SUBJECT:

[REDACTED]

(S)

[REDACTED]

(S)

[REDACTED]

(S)

[REDACTED]

b1
b3

b1

RECOMMENDATION:

[REDACTED]

(S)

(S) Enclosure

HDC:cgc
(5)

- 1 - Mr. A. Rosen
- 1 - Mr. E. S. Miller
- 1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan
- 1 - [REDACTED]

51 MAR 17 1972

F187

MAR 13 1972

EM

b1

b7C

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

DATE: 04-17-2007
CLASSIFIED BY AUC 60324 BAW/RS/SEZ
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1)
04-17-2032

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

~~SECRET~~

1 - Mr. A. Rosen
1 - Mr. E.S. Miller

DATE: 3/8/72

TO : Mr. E.S. Miller

FROM : A.W. Gray

1 - Mr. A.W. Gray

1 -
1 -

son _____
rest _____
Rosen _____
Soyars _____
Miller, E.S. _____
Callahan _____
Casper _____
Conrad _____
Dalbey _____
Cleveland _____
Ponder _____
Bates _____
Waikart _____
Walters _____
Soyars _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____ b7C

SUBJECT: WORLD ASSEMBLY FOR PEACE,
VERSAILLES, FRANCE,
2/11-13/72, also known as
International Conference on Indochina
INTERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST (FOREIGN INFLUENCE)

PURPOSE:

(S) [redacted] World Assembly for Peace
conference in Versailles, France, 2/11-13/72. Recommend letter
to field advising of such.

BACKGROUND:

(S)

(S)

ACTION: With your approval, attached is letter to Special Agents
in Charge, Indianapolis, Milwaukee, and Washington Field
instructing them to pass on CIA's complimentary remarks to
Special Agent personnel involved and place copy of attached
letter in appropriate personnel files. That attached letter
be approved and sent.

Enclosure
100-460982
PCM:mkl (6)

mkl

~~SECRET~~

ORIGINAL FILED IN

b7C

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1-Mr. Rosen
1-Mr. J. P. Mohr
1-Mr. Bishop

Tolson _____
Felt _____
Rosen _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Miller, E.S. _____
Callahan _____
Casper _____
Conrad _____
Dalbey _____
Cleveland _____
Ponder _____
Bates _____
Waikart _____
Walters _____
Soyars _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

TO : MR. E. S. MILLER

DATE: March 24, 1972

FROM : W. A. BRANIGAN

1-Mr. E. S. Miller
1-Mr. Branigan
1-Mr. Cregar

SUBJECT: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

BC This reports information confidentially furnished
by [redacted]

[redacted] *USC*

[redacted]

[redacted]

ACTION:

EX-100

REC-15

MAR 28 1972

This matter will be followed with [redacted] for further developments.

WOC:hke

(7)

54 APR 3 1972

62-80750 EM

NOT RECORDED

MAY 24 1972

b3

ORIGINAL FILED IN 65-74520-1

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/19/94 BY SP7 CEC/HEM
PER CIA REVIEW OF 6/10/94

~~SECRET~~

FBI

Date: 3/9/72

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via A I R T E L _____
(Priority)

b1

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI [redacted]

FROM: SAC, SAN JUAN [redacted]

b1

(S)

b1
b3

Reference Bureau airtel to Miami and San Juan

3/2/72.

ORIGINAL FILED IN

b1
b3

② - Bureau [redacted] (RM)

(S) 1 - Miami (Info)
2 - San Juan

SAP:dlk
(5)

NOT RECORDED
191 MAR 28 1972

16 MAR 1972

b1

Approved: 56 MAR 30 1972
Special Agent in Charge

Sent _____ M

~~SECRET~~

Per _____

Mem to Bureau 3/9/72
3/9/72
16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 04-13-2007 BY AUC 60324 BAW/RS/SEZ

62-80750-4845-
CHANGED TO
65-74520-X

MAY 25 1972

BC/UE

2

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

~~SECRET~~

DATE: 04-13-2007

CLASSIFIED BY AUC 60324 BAW/RS/SEZ

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1,6)

04-13-2032

Airtel

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Mullins

3/23/72

(S) To: SACs, Miami [redacted]

(S) San Juan [redacted]

(S) From: Director, FBI [redacted]

b1

b1

(S)

b1
b3

ReBuairtel 3/2/72, MMairtel 3/6/72 and SJairtel
3/9/72.

(S)

(S)

ORIGINAL FILED IN

b1
b3

1 - 62-80750 (Relations with CIA)

RAM:dlw (8)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

56 MAR 30 1972
R23

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DATE: 04-13-2007

CLASSIFIED BY AUC 60324 BAW/RS/SEZ

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1,6)

04-13-2032

1 - Mr. G. Sullivan

REC-51

62-80750-4846

BY COURIER

Date: March 23, 1972

EX-101
To: 101

Director
Central Intelligence Agency

Attention:

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director

Subject:

(S)

b1
b3

(S)

b1
b3

(S)

b1

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~Group 1~~

Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Mr. Tolson _____
Mr. Felt _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Mohr _____
Mr. Bishop _____
Mr. Miller, E.S. _____
Mr. Callahan _____
Mr. Casper _____
Mr. Conrad _____
Mr. Dalbey _____
Mr. Cleveland _____
Mr. Ponder _____
Mr. Bates _____
Mr. Waikart _____
Mr. Walters _____
Mr. Soyars _____
Tele. Room _____
Miss Holmes _____
Miss Gandy _____

CGS:djs
(15)

APR 5 - 1972

MAIL ROOM ☐

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

R
TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM : *REG*
BP SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (105-28120) (C)

SUBJECT: *calif* *Central Intelligence Agency*
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE)

DATE: 3/24/72

b7C

62-80750-4843
Re Bureau letter to San Francisco, dated 1/28/72.

Bureau has requested the San Francisco Office to check indices and advise the Bureau in the event had come to the attention of this office. Bureau further requested no inquiries should be initiated relating to the Subject.

San Francisco indices revealed no information identifiable with the above captioned Subject and to date Subject has not come to the attention of the San Francisco Office.

b7C

Case will be reopened and the Bureau will be advised immediately should San Francisco receive any pertinent information concerning

id

② - Bureau (RM)
1 - San Francisco
SSM/crv
(3)

EX-104

REC-4 *62-80750-4847*

16 MAR 27 1972

NAT. INT. SEC.
R

45
58 APR 5 - 1972



UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : E. S. Miller *ESM*

FROM : W. A. Branigan *WAB*

SUBJECT: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)
REQUEST FOR BUREAU LECTURE
APRIL 12, 1972

1 - A. Rosen
1 - E. S. Miller
1 - W. A. Branigan

DATE: 3/29/72

1 - W. O. Cregar

Tolson _____
Felt _____
Rosen _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Miller, E.S. _____
Callahan _____
Casper _____
Conrad _____
Dalbey _____
Cleveland _____
Ponder _____
Bates _____
Waikart _____
Walters _____
Soyars _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

Mr. Campbell _____

On March 28, 1972, [redacted] CIA, asked if Mr. William O. Cregar, Number One Man in the Espionage Section and the Bureau's alternate member on the United States Intelligence Board, could give a lecture to a class of 16 CIA intelligence officers undergoing training at CIA Headquarters. The lecture, scheduled for 9:00 a.m. on April 12, 1972, would be confined to information relating to the FBI's jurisdiction in the internal security field and be principally concerned with the FBI's participation in the United States Intelligence Board as well as the cooperation between the FBI and CIA. Similar lectures have been handled in the past, the last being November 24, 1971. They have been well received by the CIA intelligence officers and have been most useful in orienting CIA personnel concerning FBI jurisdiction and participation in the United States Intelligence Board. *b3*

The CIA personnel attending this lecture will be junior intelligence officers undergoing training in CIA's Intelligence Production Course. The lecture will last approximately one hour, followed by a question and answer period.

ACTION:

If approved, Mr. Cregar will handle this lecture on April 12, 1972.

REC-26

OK
#

62-10750-4848

EM

PEP

RSA

DJP

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 12/19/94 BY SP7 CCA/AM
C.A. #88-1826
PER CIA REVIEW
OF 6/4/94

6 APR 4 1972

WOC:pld
(5)

*Memorandum
3/31/72
WOC*

WOC

DEM

61 APR 7 1972 *53*

~~SECRET~~

REC-110

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

1 - Mr. E. C. Peterson

DATE: 04-18-2007

CLASSIFIED BY AUC 60324 BAW/RS/SEZ

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(6)

04-18-2032

BY COURIER

Date: April 25, 1972

To: Director
Central Intelligence Agency

Attention:

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director

Subject:

(S)

*Delivered to CIA
by CIA Courier
4-26-72
can*

b3

(S)

You are authorized to use the material
provided by this Bureau for the purpose indicated
and under the conditions set forth in referenced
letter.

ECP:aeb

(4)

RECORDS BRANCH
SEE ADDENDUM PAGE TWO

NOTE:

b1
b3

*Copy to
Director's Office
4-26-72*

b1
b3

Tolson _____
Felt _____
Campbell _____
Rosen _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Miller, E.S. _____
Callahan _____
Casper _____
Conrad _____
Dalbey _____
Cleveland _____
Ponder _____
Bates _____
Waikart _____
Walters _____
Soyars _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

55 MAY 8 1972

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

~~SECRET~~

WGC *DEM* *WABK* *DJD* *ECF*

~~SECRET~~

ADDENDUM: DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION 4/28/72 ECP:djs

Please place copy of this communication and

in

b1
b3

(S)

(S)

b1

Enclosure pertaining to

should be filed in

b1
b3

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 04-16-2007 BY AUC 60324 BAW/RS/SEZ

62-80750-4850

CHANGED TO

Filed and Outgoing to
105-189368-212

MM
OCT 4 - 1972

ah

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

~~SECRET~~

DATE: 04-16-2007

CLASSIFIED BY AUC 60324 BAW/RS/SEZ

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1,6)

04-16-2002

b7C

1 - [REDACTED]

(S) SAC, New York [REDACTED]

6/7/72

b1

Cv (S) Acting Director, FBI [REDACTED]

b1

(S) [REDACTED]

INFORMATION CONCERNING (NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE)
OO: NEW YORK

b1
b3

(S) [REDACTED]

As it appears, any activity of the subject in the United States will be primarily located in the New York City area. The New York Office is being designated origin.

(S) [REDACTED]

b1

Newark and New York are requested to review office indices and advise the Bureau in the event, the subject has come to your attention, other than as noted above. The Bureau also should be expeditiously advised of any information which may be developed in the future relating to the subject's activity or cover. No inquiries should be initiated relating to the subject without prior Bureau authorization.

(S) [REDACTED]

Enclosure

62-80750
~~NOT RECORDED~~

b1
b3

2 - Newark (Enclosure)
1 - 62-80750 (CIA Control File)

167 JUN 9 1972

DR:ms *mo*

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

51 JUN 14 1972

DUPLICATE YELLOW

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Letter to New York

b1

(S)

[Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

Afford this matter appropriate security within your office.

b1
b3

NOTE:

(S)

[Redacted]

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 04-16-2007 BY AUC 60324 BAW/RS/SEZ

Felt _____
Mohr _____
Rosen _____
Bates _____
Bishop _____
Callahan _____
Campbell _____
Casper _____
Cleveland _____
Conrad _____
Dalbey _____
Marshall _____
Miller, E.S. _____
Ponder _____
Soyars _____
Walters _____
Tele. Room _____
Kinley _____
Armstrong _____
Herwig _____
Neenan _____

UPI-199

(HIJACKERS)

DENVER--A TOP FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION (FAA) OFFICIAL AFFIRMED TODAY, THEN DENIED, THE GOVERNMENT HAS COMPILED A LIST OF THE NAMES OF 100,000 POTENTIAL AIRPLANE HIJACKERS.

"WE KNOW WHO THEY ARE AND WE KNOW THEM BY NAME," SAID JOHN H. SHAFFER, FAA ADMINISTRATOR. "WHEN WE GET THE SYSTEM FULLY IMPLEMENTED, WE WILL HAVE A LIST OF THOSE PEOPLE WHO LIVE IN THIS COMMUNITY, FOR EXAMPLE, WHO MIGHT POSSIBLY BE INTERESTED IN THIS THING."

SHAFFER SAID LATER HIS REFERENCE HAD BEEN TO A "HIJACKERS PROFILE" WHICH SINGLED OUT TRAITS THAT AIRLINE TICKET AGENTS AND OTHERS SHOULD WATCH FOR IN AIRPORTS.

HE DID NOT GIVE DETAILS OF ANY OF THE CHARACTERISTICS COMPILED, BUT ANOTHER FAA SOURCE SAID THE PROFILE SINGLED OUT PASSENGERS WHO ARRIVED MINUTES BEFORE TAKEOFF WITH NO LUGGAGE AND WHO PAID IN CASH.

SHAFFER, IN HIS DENIAL THAT THE LIST INCLUDED NAMES, SAID THE PROFILE WOULD BE USEFUL AND THAT THE FAA HAD HOPED TO KEEP THE INFORMATION FROM POTENTIAL HIJACKERS.

"I AGAIN SAY THIS IS NOT AN INVASION OF PRIVACY. THIS IS NOT BIG BROTHER WATCHING YOU. THIS IS BIG BROTHER TRYING TO TAKE CARE OF THE SECURITY OF THE AIR SYSTEM," HE SAID.

A NEWSMAN ASKED, "WHAT WOULD YOU CALL THIS LIST OF 100,000 NAMES."

"WE DON'T PICK THEM BY NAMES," SHAFFER SAID. "THIS IS AN ESTIMATE OF THESE PEOPLE IN OUR SOCIETY, OUT OF 200-MILLION PLUS PEOPLE ... WE FEEL THERE ARE 100,000 PEOPLE WHO MIGHT ATTEMPT ..."

"IN OTHER WORDS," THE NEWSMAN SAID, "YOU DON'T SPECIFICALLY HAVE A LIST OF NAMES."

"OH NO, NO, NO," SHAFFER SAID.

6-20--DP710PED

CWB- Does he or doesn't he?

WASHINGTON CAPITAL NEWS SERVICE
ENCLOSURE

62-88750-6

PKM

Date 10-18-05

Classification of Mail:

- ☐ Unclassified
☐ Confidential
☒ Secret
☐ Top Secret*
☐ SCI*
☐ Other

Mail Category:

Letter X Airtel _____
LHM _____ Memo _____
Report _____ Other _____
Teletype _____

FD-501 Number _____ FD-502 Number _____

Subject _____

Date of Mail 6-27-72

Description of Material 62-HQ-80750-4852
(include identity of originating office or agency)

This serial has been removed and placed in:

☐ Special File Room, Room ⁷³⁶¹~~501~~, FBIHQ / FOIPA # 368692

☐ _____
(Field Office - Room, Cabinet, or other
location where material is stored)

This action taken based upon authority of:

☐ TS/SCICO, FBIHQ, 62-116065

☐ Field Office Manager - _____
File and Serial number

(Signature and Title of Approving Official)

Date

*requires special handling

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGE-OUT

REC-37

62-80750-

4853

BY COURIER

b7C

Date: July 27, 1972

1 -

To: Director
Central Intelligence Agency

Attention:

From: L. Patrick Gray, III, Acting Director

Subject:

*Delivered to CIA
by CIA courier
7/28/72
Carm*

b3

b7C

Reference is made to

b3
b7C

ERS:fb
(4)

NOTE:

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

Felt _____
Bates _____
Bishop _____
Callahan _____
Campbell _____
Cleveland _____
Conrad _____
Dalbey _____
Jenkins _____
Marshall _____
Miller, E.S. _____
Ponder _____
Soyars _____
Walters _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Kinley _____
Mr. Armstrong _____
Ms. Herwig _____
Mrs. Neenan _____

57 AUG 3 1972

TELETYPE UNIT

AUG 1 1972

XEROX

NOTE: CONTINUED PAGE TWO

GCM/SCD

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

DATE: 04-16-2007

CLASSIFIED BY AUC 60324 BAW/RS/SEZ

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1)

04-16-2002

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : MR. E. S. MILLER

FROM : W. A. BRANIGAN

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

- 1 - Mr. A. J. Decker
- 1 - Mr. A. W. Gray
- 1 - Mr. G. C. Moore

DATE: August 17, 1972

- 1 - Mr. R.L. Shackelford
- 1 - Mr. T. J. Smith
- 1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan
- 1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

Felt _____
Baker _____
Bates _____
Bishop _____
Callahan _____
Cleveland _____
Conrad _____
Dalbey _____
Jenkins _____
Marshall _____
Miller, E.S. _____
Ponder _____
Soyars _____
Walters _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Kinley _____
Mr. Armstrong _____
Ms. Herwig _____
Mrs. Neenan _____

~~SECRET~~

(S)

CLASSIFIED BY: SSA 94003 RDD/JHC
REASON: 1.3 (C)
DECLASSIFY ON: X 1

Pg 1 + 2 all classified info per
C.I.A. info 4/1/76 + 8/29/85
1025 ECP/land/ll/22/76

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

58 AUG 23 1972

7150

REC-37

62-80750-48542-80750
CONTINUED - OVER
Comp. # 225/898
Classified by SP-4 elw/alm
Declassify on: OADR
3/16/83

1678 RFP/ming 4/22/86
9803 RDP/SC 8-16-95
227885

~~SECRET~~

972

b1
b3

Memorandum from W. A. Branigan to Mr. E. S. Miller

RE:

[REDACTED]

(S)

b1
b3

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

b1
b3

[REDACTED]

(S)

In order to

[REDACTED]

b3

[REDACTED]

the following procedure is suggested:

(1)

[REDACTED]

(S)

b1
b3

(2)

The blind Xerox copies be sent to the field either by transmittal slips or cover letters containing the instructions that information contained in the attachment should not be utilized in communications prepared for dissemination without prior approval of the Bureau and that the source of the information should be attributed to a confidential source who has furnished reliable information in the past.

[REDACTED]

(S)

b1
b3

ACTION:

For the information and guidance of the recipients of this memorandum.

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. E. S. Miller *ESM*

1 - Mr. M. A. Jones
1 - Mr. E. S. Miller
1 - Mr. T. J. Smith

DATE: 8/28/72

FROM : T. J. Smith *TJS/ELP*

1 - Mr. T. J. Deakin
1 - Mr. E. W. Larson

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

Flower
Felt _____
Baker _____
Bates _____
Bishop _____
Callahan _____
Cleveland _____
Conrad _____
Dalbey _____
Jenkins _____
Marshall _____
Miller, E.S. *ESM*
Ponder _____
Soyars _____
Walters _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Kinley _____
b3 Mr. Armstrong _____
Ms. Herwig _____
Mrs. Neenan _____

DCI Va
Attached is a letter to the Acting Director, FBI, from [REDACTED] Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). [REDACTED] requests that Special Agent [REDACTED] (Research Section, Domestic Intelligence Division) be assigned to speak [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

b3
b7C

m3
The meeting will be a closed one and approximately 150-175 CIA employees will be present. Special Agent [REDACTED] will be available for this speech and has spoken on this topic before many similar Federal Government groups in the past.

b7C

RECOMMENDATION:

If you approve, [REDACTED] whose position and telephone number are set forth in the attached communication, will be contacted and appropriate acknowledgements and arrangements will be made. *DCI Va*

Enclosure

EWL:rlc *rlc*
(6)
EWL

TJS
24

EX-104

EM
REC-28

wkw/TJS

SEP 7 1972

hu
1- ENCLOSURE

54 SEP 12 1972

1 -
1 - Special Coordination Unit

BY COURIER

Date: September 13, 1972

To: Director
Central Intelligence Agency

Attention:

From: L. Patrick Gray, III, Acting Director

Subject: ~~A~~ AUTHORIZED RECIPIENTS FOR
SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE

*Delivered to CIA by
Special Intelligence
Cover from CIA
9-14-72 cam*

b3

This is to advise that the employees listed below
are authorized to receive and receipt for Special Intelligence
material delivered to Room 910, Federal Triangle Building,
315 Ninth Street, Northwest, Washington, D. C.

of

b7C

In addition to above-listed personnel, Special
Agents assigned to Room 1002 at the above address on weekend
and after-duty hours are authorized to accept and receipt for
such material. All of the above personnel possess necessary
clearance.

cam
CAM:esd
(5) *isd*

REC-70

62-80750-4856
SEP 13 1972

EX-116

NOTE:

mcl
Felt _____
Baker _____
Bates _____
Bishop _____
Callahan _____
Cleveland _____
Conrad _____
Dalbey _____
Jenkins _____
Marshall _____
Miller, E.S. _____
Ponder _____
Soyars _____
Walters _____
Tele. Room _____
Mr. Kinley _____
Mr. Armstrong _____
Ms. Herwig _____
Mrs. Neenan _____

The above is current listing of authorized personnel
assigned to Special Coordination Unit, Nationalities Intelligence
Section, Domestic Intelligence Division, who have occasion to
receive and sign for material from couriers making deliveries.

CIA, has
requested that this list be furnished for the information of
couriers delivering material to above address.

b3

EO 12812
SEC'D 12 WICTER

70 SEP 19 1972

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

EM

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. E. S. Miller

FROM : A. J. Decker

SUBJECT:
(S)

DATE: 04-16-2007

CLASSIFIED BY AUC 60324 BAW/RS/SEZ

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 2 (1,6)

04-16-2007

~~SECRET~~

1 - Mr. E. S. Miller
1 - Mr. A. J. Decker

DATE: 10/2/72

1 - Mr. D. Ryan
1 -
1 -

Felt ☒
Baker ☒
Bates ☒
Bishop ☒
Callahan ☒
Cleveland ☒
Conrad ☒
Dalbey ☒
Jenkins ☒
Marshall ☒
Miller, E. S. ☒
Ponder ☒
Soyars ☒
Walters ☒
Tele. Room ☒
Mr. Kinley ☒
Mr. Armstrong ☒
Ms. Herwig ☒
Mrs. Neenan ☒

b7C

b1

b1

ORIGINAL FILED IN

b1
b3

FXO: dgo
(6)

NOT RECORDED

202 NOV 1 1972

OCT 26 1972

CONTINUED - OVER

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum, A.J. Decker to Mr. E.S. Miller

Re:

b1

(S)

OBSERVATIONS:

(S)

ACTION:

b1
b3

1. For information.

2. If you approve, Bureau representatives will
confirm

b3

FOS

DEAN

WGC

MM

~~SECRET~~

Date 10-18-05

Classification of Mail:

- ☐ Unclassified
☐ Confidential
☒ Secret
☐ Top Secret*
☐ SCI*
☐ Other

Mail Category:

Letter X Airtel _____
LHM _____ Memo _____
Report _____ Other _____
Teletype _____

FD-501 Number _____ FD-502 Number _____

Subject _____

Date of Mail 10-13-72

Description of Material 62-HQ-80750- NR 10-25-72
(include identity of originating office or agency)

This serial has been removed and placed in:

- ☐ Special File Room, Room ⁷³⁶¹~~507~~, FBIHQ / FCIPA # 368692
☐ _____
(Field Office - Room, Cabinet, or other
location where material is stored)

This action taken based upon authority of:

- ☐ TS/SCICO, FBIHQ, 62-116065
☐ Field Office Manager - _____
File and Serial number

(Signature and Title of Approving Official)

Date

*requires special handling

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGE-OUT

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

DATE: 04-16-2007
CLASSIFIED BY AUC 60324 BAW/RS/SEZ
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1,6)
04-16-2032

Mr. E. S. Miller

W. O. Cregar

1 - Mr. E. S. Miller
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. G. C. Moore
10/20/72
1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford
1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz
1 -
1 -

b7C

b1

b1
b3

(S)

(S)

(S)

(S)

(S)

ORIGINAL FILED

b1

62-80750-
NOT RECORDED
184 OCT 25 1972

(S) 1
(S) 1 62-80750 (CIA)

DR:egt
(10)

CONTINUED - OVER

61 OCT 30 1972

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum W. O. Cregar to Mr. E. S. Miller

Re [REDACTED]

b1

(S)

[REDACTED]

(S)

[REDACTED]

ACTION:

For information.

- 3 -

b1
b3

~~SECRET~~

Date 10-19-72

Classification of Mail:

- ☐ Unclassified
☐ Confidential
☒ Secret
☐ Top Secret*
☐ SCI*
☐ Other

Mail Category:

Letter ☒ Airtel _____
LHM _____ Memo _____
Report _____ Other _____
Teletype _____

FD-501 Number _____ FD-502 Number _____

Subject _____

Date of Mail _____

b3

Description of Material 62-HQ-80750-4857
(include identity of originating office or agency)

This serial has been removed and placed in:

☐ Special File Room, Room ⁷³⁶¹~~3991~~, FBIHQ / FOIPA # 368692

☐ _____
(Field Office - Room, Cabinet, or other
location where material is stored)

This action taken based upon authority of:

☐ TS/SCICO, FBIHQ, 62-116065

☐ Field Office Manager - _____
File and Serial number

(Signature and Title of Approving Official)

Date

*requires special handling

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGE-OUT

