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and research of John Greenewald, Jr., creator of:

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U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D.C. 20535

August 1, 2018

MR. JOHN GREENEWALD, JR.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

FOIPA Request No.: 1343174-000
Subject: 62-HQ-80750

Dear Mr. Greenewald:

You were previously advised we were consulting with another agency concerning information located as a result of your Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts (FOIPA) request.

This consultation is complete and the enclosed material is being released to you with the appropriate exemption noted next to the redacted information pursuant to Title 5, United States Code, Section(s) 552/552a as noted below. Below you will find checked boxes under statute headings indicating the appropriate exemptions asserted to protect information which is exempt from disclosure. The checked exemption boxes used to withhold the information are further explained in the enclosed Explanation of Exemptions.

Section 552

☒ (b)(1)

☐ (b)(2)

☒ (b)(3)

CIA Act of 1949

National Security Act of 1947

50 U.S.C. Section§ 3024 (i)(1)

☐ (b)(4)

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☐ (b)(7)(A)

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☒ (b)(7)(C)

☒ (b)(7)(D)

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☐ (b)(7)(F)

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Section 552a

☐ (d)(5)

☐ (j)(2)

☐ (k)(1)

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158 pages were reviewed and 149 pages are being released.



The appropriate redactions were made by Central Intelligence Agency

For your information, Congress excluded three discrete categories of law enforcement and national security records from the requirements of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). See 5 U.S. C. § 552(c) (2006 & Supp. IV (2010)). This response is limited to those records subject to the requirements of the FOIA. This is a standard notification that is given to all our requesters and should not be taken as an indication that excluded records do, or do not, exist.

For questions regarding our determinations, visit the www.fbi.gov/foia website under "Contact Us." The FOIPA Request Number listed above has been assigned to your request. Please use this number in all correspondence concerning your request.


You may file an appeal by writing to the Director, Office of Information Policy (OIP), United States Department of Justice, Suite 11050, 1425 New York Avenue, NW, Washington, D.C. 20530-0001, or you may submit an appeal through OIP's FOIA online portal by creating an account on the following web site: <https://foiaonline.regulations.gov/foia/action/public/home>. Your appeal must be postmarked or electronically transmitted within ninety (90) days from the date of this letter in order to be considered timely. If you submit your appeal by mail, both the letter and the envelope should be clearly marked "Freedom of Information Act Appeal." Please cite the FOIPA Request Number assigned to your request so it may be easily identified.

You may seek dispute resolution services by contacting the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS) at 877-684-6448, or by emailing ogis@nara.gov. Alternatively, you may contact the FBI's FOIA Public Liaison by emailing foipaquestions@fbi.gov. If you submit your dispute resolution correspondence by email, the subject heading should clearly state "Dispute Resolution Services." Please also cite the FOIPA Request Number assigned to your request so it may be easily identified.



See additional information which follows.

Sincerely,



David M. Hardy
Section Chief,
Record/Information
Dissemination Section
Information Management Division

Enclosures

The enclosed documents represent the final release of information responsive to your Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts (FOIPA) request. This material is being provided to you at no charge.

EXPLANATION OF EXEMPTIONS

SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552

- (b)(1) (A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified to such Executive order;
- (b)(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency;
- (b)(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this title), provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld;
- (b)(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential;
- (b)(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;
- (b)(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
- (b)(7) records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information (A) could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of confidential source, including a State, local, or foreign agency or authority or any private institution which furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in the case of record or information compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, information furnished by a confidential source, (E) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law, or (F) could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual;
- (b)(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or
- (b)(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells.

SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552a

- (d)(5) information compiled in reasonable anticipation of a civil action proceeding;
- (j)(2) material reporting investigative efforts pertaining to the enforcement of criminal law including efforts to prevent, control, or reduce crime or apprehend criminals;
- (k)(1) information which is currently and properly classified pursuant to an Executive order in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy, for example, information involving intelligence sources or methods;
- (k)(2) investigatory material compiled for law enforcement purposes, other than criminal, which did not result in loss of a right, benefit or privilege under Federal programs, or which would identify a source who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;
- (k)(3) material maintained in connection with providing protective services to the President of the United States or any other individual pursuant to the authority of Title 18, United States Code, Section 3056;
- (k)(4) required by statute to be maintained and used solely as statistical records;
- (k)(5) investigatory material compiled solely for the purpose of determining suitability, eligibility, or qualifications for Federal civilian employment or for access to classified information, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;
- (k)(6) testing or examination material used to determine individual qualifications for appointment or promotion in Federal Government service the release of which would compromise the testing or examination process;
- (k)(7) material used to determine potential for promotion in the armed services, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished the material pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOI/PA
DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET
FOI/PA# 1343174-0

Total Deleted Page(s) = 9
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Page 119 ~ b6; b7C; b7D;
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
SAC, Philadelphia (67-367)

5-25-88

PERSONAL ATTENTION

Director, FBI

b1 Per CIA
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ReurFD-468 5-11-88.

(S) Enclosed is a letter for presentation to [redacted] at his retirement function on 6-10-88. A copy is included for your files.

Enclosures (2)

JB:lyw (5)

Cyw

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-20-2018 BY [redacted]

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MAILED 22

MAY 26 1988

FBI

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Telephone Rm.
Director's Sec'y

MAIL ROOM
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62-80750-6806

JUL 13 1988

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Telephone Rm _____
Director's Sec'y _____

INBOX.10 (#4098)

TEXT: VZCZCNY0110

RR HQ

DE NY #0110 2421808

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FM FBI NEW YORK () (IT-2)

TO DIRECTOR FBI ROUTINE

ATTN: UNIT CHIEF, MIDDLE EAST TERRORISM, TERRORISM SECTION

BT (S)

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THIS COMMUNICATION IS CLASSIFIED "~~SECRET~~" IN ITS ENTIRETY.

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
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
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OF INVESTIGATION

INBOX.19 (#5741)

TEXT: VZCZCNK0005

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FM NEWARK (1-333) (P) (C-10)

TO DIRECTOR, FBI (PRIORITY)

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CIA
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-20-2018 BY [REDACTED]

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Director's Sec'y	

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THIS ~~ENTIRE~~ COMMUNICATION IS CLASSIFIED "~~SECRET~~".

RE: BUREAU TELETYPE TO MIAMI, DATED 3/14/88

REFERENCED BUREAU TELETYPE REQUESTED NEWARK TO NOMINATE ONE

b1 Per CIA
b3

INDIVIDUAL TO ATTEND [REDACTED] WHICH

WILL BE HELD AT ROOM 1A07, CIAHQ, LANGLEY, VA, FROM 8:30 AM, WEDNESDAY, 4/20/88, THROUGH 4:00 PM FRIDAY, 4/22/88.

NEWARK IS NOMINATING SA [REDACTED] TO ATTEND AFOREMENTIONED COURSE.

C BY G-3, DECL: OADR

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ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SLIP

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10 Aug.

TO: (Name, office symbol, room number)

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ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-20-2018 BY [redacted]

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Action	File	Note and Return
Approval (S)	For Clearance	Per Conversation
As Requested	For Correction	Prepare Reply
Circulate	For Your Information	See Me
Comment	Investigate	Signature b1 Per CIA
Coordination	Justify	b3

REMARKS

clearances, and similar actions.

FROM: (Name, org. symbol, Agency/Post)

PCS/LCG/ID
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Room No.—Bldg.

Phone No.

5041-102

☆ U.S. Government Printing Office: 198


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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-20-2018 BY [redacted]

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RR HQ

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FM FBI PHOENIX (66-1602)

TO DIRECTOR FBI/ROUTINE/


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
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
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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
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PAGE 1 OF 2
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ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 02-20-2018 BY [redacted]

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FM DIRECTOR FBI (62-80750)

TO FBI PHOENIX (66-1602) ROUTINE

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS CENTER

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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATION MESSAGE FORM

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OF INVESTIGATION

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Director's Sec'y	_____

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FM CIA/DDO

TO FBI//INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

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ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 02-20-2018 BY

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OF INVESTIGATION

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FM FBI PHOENIX (225C-34) (C)

TO DIRECTOR FBI/ROUTINE/

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CITE: //3630//

Mr. Tolson	_____
Mr. DeLoach	_____
Mr. Mohr	_____
Mr. Bishop	_____
Mr. Casper	_____
Mr. Callahan	_____
Mr. Conrad	_____
Mr. Felt	_____
Mr. Gale	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Sullivan	_____
Mr. Tavel	_____
Mr. Trotter	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Director's Sec'y	_____

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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATION MESSAGE FORM

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PAGE 1 OF 2

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DATE 02-20-2018 BY [REDACTED]

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
TO 46/DIRECTOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

ATTN: DDO/EA/TP

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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATION MESSAGE FORM

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
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WARNING NOTICE—INTELLIGENCE SOURCES OR METHODS INVOLVED

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Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

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
MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Secretary of State for
Intelligence and Research
Assistant Secretary of State for
European and Canadian Affairs
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
Director, National Security Agency
✓ Assistant Director, Intelligence Division,
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: The Political Role of the Securitate in the
Romanian Government

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WARNING NOTICE



2. Unlike his predecessor, Minister of Interior Tudor Postelnicu continues to exert direct control over the State Security Department [Securitate], which makes him the most powerful individual in the Romanian security apparatus. Postelnicu is not

b1 Per CIA
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12 NOV 4 1988

DECL OADR DRV [REDACTED] BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. ALL
PORTIONS CARRY CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROLS OF OVERALL
DOCUMENT.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-20-2018 BY [REDACTED]

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WARNING NOTICE - INTELLIGENCE SOURCES OR METHODS INVOLVED

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popular within the security apparatus. In addition, his position places him in charge of monitoring the activities of the leadership of state and party organizations, thus aggravating the fear others have of him. Postelnicu owes his position and influence to the support of Elena Ceausescu and her son Nicu; he is their principal confidant for security matters. In the last year, Nicolae Ceausescu has tried to decrease Postelnicu's influence, possibly even considering naming him as a judet first secretary. However, so far he remains in his position. Elena Ceausescu once proposed that Postelnicu replace Ion Coman as the Party Secretary responsible for military and security affairs. This has not yet happened because Nicolae Ceausescu supports Coman; and the military, with Ilie Ceausescu, a Deputy Minister of the Ministry of National Defense and Ceausescu's brother in the forefront, is opposed to Postelnicu assuming this position. In an effort to penetrate the military, Postelnicu has proposed to Nicolae Ceausescu that the Intelligence Directorate (DI) of the General Staff of the Romanian Ministry of National Defense be merged with the Securitate and put under Securitate control.

3. On the other hand, Chief of State Security Iulian Vlad has considerable prestige within the security apparatus. Securitate officials describe him as intelligent, cunning, skilled, knowledgeable of his trade, calm in manner, and as having an open mind. In his position he must support Postelnicu, yet Vlad is wary of him. Postelnicu has constant direct access to Nicolae and Elena Ceausescu while Vlad does not see them as often.

4. Because it is used to maintain the Ceausescu regime and is given free reign to do so, the security apparatus exercises great influence on the state and party leadership. Even though the fiction is maintained that the Securitate is under the control of the party, in reality the party is under the control of the Securitate. No important position is filled without the Securitate's approval, the leadership is monitored constantly by the Securitate, and the Securitate compiles dossiers on officials in positions of responsibility at all levels. In recent years the penetration of all segments of Romanian society, including government, military, party apparatus at the judet level, trade enterprises and academia, has been a principal objective of the security apparatus. The Securitate believes it has succeeded in this objective and very few sectors of activity are not under its control. The control extends from the physical protection of Nicolae Ceausescu to the local level where, as an example cited,

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WARNING NOTICE—INTELLIGENCE SOURCES OR METHODS INVOLVED

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(S) [REDACTED]

unrest such as that which occurred in Brasov in November 1987, can be snuffed quickly.

5. In recent years the primary goal of the Securitate has been to maintain the power of the Ceausescu clan. As one senior Securitate official noted, it was not the security of the state that concerned the Securitate but the security of Nicolae, Elena, and the whole family. The Securitate must therefore spend an inordinate amount of time and energy controlling anti-regime activities internally and popularizing the Ceausescus abroad. Because of their activities in recent years, the Securitate has become extremely unpopular within the country. This situation has resulted in an apparent deterioration of morale within the ranks of the Securitate; dissatisfaction with the regime is expressed openly with officials speaking against Nicolae and especially against Elena. Upon occasion, Securitate officials have not moved against the populace particularly when the people were protesting against food shortages, even if derogatory statements were made about the Ceausescus by protesters. There have been cases where Securitate officials have not executed some of their responsibilities in reporting on the attitudes and statements of other Romanian officials. Corruption within the Securitate is widespread.

6. Notwithstanding possible morale problems within the security apparatus, it remains the best paid sector in Romania and its officials and their families enjoy many perks in the system. As a result, the Securitate continues to be docile and there is little likelihood it will move against Nicolae Ceausescu. However, if Ceausescu dies or is removed from power it is almost certain the Securitate will abandon the rest of the family.

7. This report is being shared with the U.S. Ambassador and DCM in Bucharest.

(S) [REDACTED]

b1 Per CIA
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
RICHARD F. STOLTZ
Deputy Director for Operations

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DISTRIBUTION


Deputy Director for Intelligence

Chairman, National Intelligence Council

National Intelligence Officer for Europe

(S)

b1 Per CIA
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Memorandum



Exec AD Adm. _____
Exec AD Inv. _____
Exec AD LES _____
Asst. Dir. _____
Adm. Servs. _____
Crim. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Insp. _____
Intell. _____
Lab. _____
Legal Coun. _____ b6
Off. Cong. & Public Affs. _____ b7C
Rec. Mgnt. _____
Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

~~SECRET~~

Date 9/28/88

SSE
CLASS
SRC'D
SER
REC

Subject: LIAISON CONTACT - CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

This communication is classified ~~SECRET~~ in its ~~entirety~~.

b1 Per CIA
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PURPOSE:

(S) [Redacted Box]

RECOMMENDATION:

None, for informational purposes only.

[Handwritten signature]

*THIS IS A HIGHLY
APPROPRIATE RESPONSE -*
[Handwritten signature]

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-28-2018 BY [Redacted Box]

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67-80750-6816

1 - [Redacted Box]
1 - [Redacted Box]
1 - [Redacted Box]

16 OCT 20 1988
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TJF:jf (4)

law *adj.*

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Classified by: 3048
Declassify on: OADR

[Redacted Box]

2 JUN 09 1989

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Memorandum from [] to []
Re: Liaison Contact - Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

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DETAILS:

b1 Per CIA
b3 Per CIA
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(S) On 9/8/88, SA [] Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Los Angeles Office, advised SSA [] that on 9/12/88, [] would be visiting the Los Angeles Office of the FBI to discuss []. [] advised that [] had not been so advised by [] and that [] was not to confirm this visit with the Los Angeles Office [] until [] had discussed this matter with SSA [] supervisor. (S)

b1 Per CIA
b3 Per CIA

(S) On 9/9/88, [] contacted [] and explained that it had been [] understanding that [] and [] would jointly visit the Los Angeles FBI Office after 10/1/88. [] agreed that his understanding, based upon prior telephone conversations with [] had been that [] and [] would jointly visit [] Office after the beginning of the new Fiscal year. (S)

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(S) On 9/9/88, [] contacted [] and advised that he was unaware of any trip by [] to Los Angeles for the purpose of meeting with FBI personnel on 9/12/88. [] advised that although [] previously had stated that he would have liked to have visited our Los Angeles Office during his trip in September to the western United States, [] had advised that this was not possible. [] stated that if [] wanted to meet with FBI SA personnel in Los Angeles, that [] would be able to accompany [] after the new Fiscal year began in October, 1988. [] advised that it was [] understanding that [] was willing to postpone his Los Angeles visit with the FBI until after 10/1/88. (S)

b1 Per CIA
b3 Per CIA
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(S) [] stated that [] had advised him that [] had agreed to an earlier visit by [] to the Los Angeles Office, and [] advised that this was not the case. Additionally, [] stated that he preferred that all contact between headquarters' personnel from other agencies and our field offices concerning [] be conducted with [] being present or, if that was not possible, with [] prior consent. (S)

b1 Per CIA
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(CONTINUED-OVER)

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Memorandum from [] to []
Re: Liaison Contact - Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

b1 Per CIA
b3 Per CIA
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(S) DETAILS (CON'T):

(S) [] then advised that in addition to []
visiting our Los Angeles Office, [] would also be visiting
our San Francisco Office during the same week as the Los Angeles
visit. [] advised that he was surprised by this
information but, as this visit to San Francisco was to discuss a
(S) [] would attempt to arrange for
(S) [] to meet our San Francisco personnel.

(S) Upon checking, [] determined that [] did not
have a current, appropriate security clearance on file at the
(S) FBI Security Office and, therefore, [] recontacted []
to advise [] could not enter FBI office space
without proper clearances being on file at our Security Office. b1 Per CIA
(S) [] was advised to contact our Security Office to arrange b3 Per CIA
for passing of [] clearance information to the FBI. b6
b7C

(S) Later that afternoon, [] called the Security
Office and was advised that the CIA had properly transmitted the
(S) appropriate security clearance for []

(S) [] instructed [] supervisor, Los Angeles,
and Bill Cleveland, supervisor, San Francisco, that [] was
to visit with SA personnel from their offices on the week of
9/12/88 and that no information was to be exchanged until
(S) [] telephoned [] from each their respective offices.
[] advised [] and Cleveland that he expected all
personnel from the headquarters of other agencies, including the
CIA, who visited any of our field offices to discuss [] (S)
matters to provide [] with advance notice and receive
permission to visit. [] advised that [] wanted to
(S) discuss this policy with [] prior to conducting business at
Los Angeles and San Francisco. Cleveland stated that he was
unaware of any visit to his office by anyone from the CIA during
the week of 9/12/88. [] and Cleveland advised that they would
comply with [] instructions.

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b3 Per CIA
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ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 02-28-2018 BY [redacted]

7/29/88

MEMORANDUM TO MESSRS: REVELL

[redacted]

DU HADWAY

[redacted]

BINNEY

[redacted]


POMERANTZ

[redacted]

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RE: RELATIONS WITH THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)



Enclosures

69-80750-601

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FROM CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES~~

Exec AD Adm. _____
Exec AD Inv. _____
Exec AD LES _____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Servs. _____
Crim. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Insp. _____
Intell. _____
Lab. _____
Legal Coun. _____
Off. Cong. & Public Affs. _____
Rec. Mgnt. _____
Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____
Off. Liaison & Int. Affs. _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

ENCLOSURE

1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]

JMM:ICE (20)

18 AUG 9 1988

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Messrs. Memorandum from [] dated 7/29/88
Re: Relations with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

(S)

In the event you experience unnecessary delays, or if denials are issued where it is essential our field offices and Legal Attaches be informed of the information from CIA, it is requested that you contact SSA [], Domestic Liaison Unit, Office of Liaison and International Affairs, Ext. [] Room 7452.

It is requested that all supervisory personnel be advised of the above, as well as the information in the attached CIA teletypes.

[]

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88-8740748 MCR

PAGE 001

TOT: 281505Z APR 88

CIA 029993

~~CONFIDENTIAL NOFORN WHINTEL~~

281505Z CIA 029993

TO: NPIC, DIRNSA, DEPT OF STATE, DIA, TREASURY DEPT,
SECRET SERVICE//ID, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
US CUSTOMS SERVICE W, DOEHQ//DASI AND LLNL//, DEPT OF COMMERCE, USTR;
ZEN/FRB, DEA, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE,
DEPT OF JUSTICE//JCC, FAA//ACS 400, WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM,
ZEN/CIA OFFICE OF CURRENT OPERATIONS, USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//J-2,
CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE//AEAGB, HQ USAF RAMSTEIN AB GE//IN,
CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK//N-2, COMSIXTHFLT, COMFAIRMED, FOSIF ROTA SP,
USNMR SHAPE BE//SURVEY, USNATO BRUSSELS, FICEURLANT,
CDRFORS COM FT MCPHERSON GA//FCJ2-100-CM//, USCINCCENT//J2,
COMIDEASTFOR, COMUSNAVCENT PEARL HARBOR HI, USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI,
CDRWESTCOM FT SHAFTER HI, COMIPAC HONOLULU HI,
CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI, HQ PACAF IDHS HICKAM AFB HI,
COMSEVENTHFLT, FOSIF/WESTPAC, USFJ//J-2, 13AF CLARK AB PI//DOI,
COMUSKOREA SEOUL KOR//SA, CINC UNC SEOUL KOR//SA,
MAC INTEL CEN SCOTT AFB IL//IN, COMUSFORCARIB KEY WE,
USCINCLANT NORFOLK VA, USCINCSO QHTS PANAMA,
USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL//SOJ2-O, CDR JSOC FT BRAGG NC, JTFME.

(S)

SERIAL:

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PASS: NSA FOR ZKZK OO DLS DE (FOR NSOC);
STATE FOR INR, DSTAD, SCT, ACDA, USIA, AID, OIR FOR FRB.

~~-----~~
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
~~-----~~

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REPORT CLASS ~~CONFIDENTIAL--WHINTEL--NOFORN~~

DIST: 28 APRIL 1988

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DATE 02-28-2018 BY

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COUNTRY: WORLDWIDE

(S)

SUBJ:

b1 Per CIA
b3

2. GUIDANCE FOR OBTAINING APPROVAL TO USE
DISSEMINATION CONTROLLED INFORMATION

DOI: 28 APRIL 1988

SOURCE: DCID 1/7 - REQUIREMENT TO PROTECT SOURCES
OR METHODS.

THIS NOTICE IS A REISSUE OF GUIDANCE ON THIS SUBJECT. PLEASE ENSURE
THAT ALL NEW PERSONNEL READ IT. YOUR ATTENTION IS AGAIN CALLED TO
THE GUIDANCE GIVEN IN PARAGRAPH TEN REGARDING CALLS DURING NON-DUTY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
ENCLOSURE

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62-80750-6917

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HOURS WHICH SHOULD BE FOLLOWED ONLY ON MATTERS REQUIRING IMMEDIATE ATTENTION AND WHICH CANNOT WAIT UNTIL NORMAL DUTY HOURS FOR RESOLUTION. SINCE THIS NOTICE CONTAINS THE LATEST GUIDANCE AND PHONE NUMBERS, TO AVOID CONFUSION ALL PREVIOUS NOTICES SHOULD BE DESTROYED. ALSO NOTE GUIDANCE IN PARAGRAPH ELEVEN REQUESTING THAT REPORTS BE IDENTIFIED BY TD OR CIA NUMBER RATHER THAN DATE/TIME GROUPS.

b1 Per CIA
b3

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
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
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
b1 Per CIA
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--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS (NOFORN): NEITHER THE DO
REPORT NOR INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THAT REPORT MAY BE RELEASED TO
FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS, FOREIGN NATIONALS OR NON-U.S. CITIZENS WITHOUT
THE PERMISSION OF THE ORIGINATOR.

(S)


b1 Per CIA
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10. THE CIA POINTS OF CONTACT FOR REQUESTING APPROVAL TO USE
INFORMATION BEARING DISSEMINATION CONTROLS ARE:

(S)

b1 Per CIA
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- (S) 11. AS A MINIMUM, THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION SHOULD BE SUBMITTED IN A REQUEST FOR CLEARANCE:

b1 Per CIA
b3

--THE NAME OF THE PUBLICATION IN WHICH THE INFORMATION WILL BE USED, OR THE IDENTIFICATION OF THE ORGANIZATION TO WHICH THE REPORT ITSELF IS TO BE SENT;

--THE PLANNED DISTRIBUTION OF THE PUBLICATION IN WHICH THE INFORMATION WILL BE USED. THE REQUESTER SHOULD BE IN A POSITION TO PROVIDE EVIDENCE OF THE NEED-TO-KNOW OF THE INDIVIDUAL ORGANIZATIONS ON THE INTENDED DISTRIBUTION;

--THE CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROLS WHICH THE PUBLICATION WILL CARRY.

b1 Per CIA
b3

(S) 13. IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT THIS GUIDANCE BE RETAINED FOR READY REFERENCE AND USE BY NEWLY ASSIGNED PERSONNEL. YOUR ASSISTANCE IN IMPLEMENTING THESE DISSEMINATION CONTROL PROCEDURES IS OF VITAL IMPORTANCE AND GREATLY APPRECIATED.

(S) 14. (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: THE [REDACTED] NUMBER ASSIGNED TO THIS MESSAGE IS FOR REFERENCE PURPOSES ONLY.)

b1 Per CIA
b3

DISSEM: FIELD: SENT TO CDRFORSCOM, USCINCEUR, CINCUSAREUR, CINCUSNAVEUR, CINCUSAFE, COMSIXTHFLT, COMIDEASTFOR, COMFAIRMED, CINCUSAC, USNMR SHAPE (FOR SACEUR), USNATO BRUSSELS, USCINCPAC, PACFLT, WESTCOM, COMIPAC, PACAF, COMSEVENTHFLT, FOSIF/WESTPAC, FOSIF/ROTA, USCINCSO, USCINCLANT, USCINCSOC, CINCMAC, JSOC, USCINCCENT, COMUSFORCARIB, USEFK, USEFJ, COMUSNAVPHIL, 13AF DOI.

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COMUSNAVCENT, JTFME, FICEURLANT.

WARNING: REPORT CLASS ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~--WARNING NOTICE--INTELLIGENCE
SOURCES OR METHODS INVOLVED--~~NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS.~~

DECL: OADR BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. ALL PORTIONS CARRY
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[REDACTED] NNNN

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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PAGE 001

TOT: 281502Z APR 88

CIA 029990

~~SECRET NOFORN WINTEL~~

281502Z CIA 029990

TO: NPIC, DIRNSA, DEPT OF STATE, DIA, TREASURY DEPT,
SECRET SERVICE//ID, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
US CUSTOMS SERVICE W, DOEHQ//DASI AND LLNL//, DEPT OF COMMERCE, USTR,
ZEN/FRB, DEA, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE,
DEPT OF JUSTICE//JCC, FAA//ACS 400, WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM,
ZEN/CIA OFFICE OF CURRENT OPERATIONS, USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//J-2,
CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE//AEAGB, HQ USAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE//IN,
CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK//N-2, COMSIXTHFLT, COMFAIRMED, FOSIF ROTA SP,
USNMR SHAPE BE//SURVEY, USNATO BRUSSELS, FICEURLANT,
CDRFORS COM FT MCPHERSON GA//FCJ2-100-CM//, USCINCENT//J2,
COMIDEASTFOR, COMUSNAVCENT PEARL HARBOR HI, USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI,
CDRWESTCOM FT SHAFTER HI, COMIPAC HONOLULU HI,
CINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI, HQ PACAF IDHS HICKAM AFB HI,
COMSEVENTHFLT, FOSIF/WESTPAC, USFJ//J-2, 13AF CLARK AB PI//DOI,
COMUSKOREA SEOUL KOR//SA, CINC UNC SEOUL KOR//SA,
MAC INTEL CEN SCOTT AFB IL//IN, COMUSFORCARIB KEY WE,
USCINCLANT NORFOLK VA, USCINCSO QHTS PANAMA,
USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL//SOJ2-0, CDR JSOC FT BRAGG NC, JTFME.

b1 Per CIA
b3 Per CIA
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PASS: NSA FOR ZKZK 00 DLS DE (FOR NSOC);
STATE FOR INR, DSTAD, SCT, ACDA, USIA, AID, OIR FOR FRB.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
~~-----~~

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REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET--WINTEL--NOFORN~~

DIST: 28 APRIL 1988

COUNTRY: WORLDWIDE

SUBJ:

b1 Per CIA
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THIS NOTICE IS A REISSUE OF GUIDANCE ON THIS SUBJECT. IT IS BEING
REISSUED TO ENSURE THAT NEW PERSONNEL ARE AWARE OF THE

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ENCLOSURE
~~SECRET~~

62-80750-6817

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ESTABLISHED POLICY OF THE DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS THAT UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES WILL "EXCLUSIVE FOR" DISSEMINATIONS BE INCLUDED IN COMPUTERIZED DATA BANKS NOR SHOULD THEY BE SUBJECT TO ANY COMPUTER GENERATED DISSEMINATION PROCESS.

b1 Per CIA
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(S) [REDACTED]

DISSEM: FIELD: SENT TO CDRUSFORSCOM, USCINCEUR, CINCUSAREUR, CINCUSNAVEUR, CINCUSAFE, COMSIXTHFLT, COMIDEASTFOR, COMFAIRMED, CINCUSAC, USNMR SHAPE (FOR SACEUR), USNATO BRUSSELS, USCINCPAC, PACFLT, WESTCOM, COMIPAC, PACAF, COMSEVENTHFLT, FOSIF/WESTPAC, FOSIF/ROTA, USCINCSO, USCINCLANT, USCINCSOC, CINCMAC, JSOC, USCINCCENT, COMUSFORCARIB, USEK, USFJ, COMUSNAVPHIL, 13AF DOI, COMUSNAVCENT, JTFME, FICEURLANT.

WARNING: REPORT CLASS ~~SECRET~~ --WARNING NOTICE--INTELLIGENCE SOURCES OR METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

DECL: OADR DRV HUM 4-82 BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER ALL PORTIONS CARRY CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROLS OF OVERALL DOCUMENT. ORIG/REL:

[REDACTED] NNNNEND OF MESSAGE

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b1 Per CIA

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(S) [REDACTED]

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Blitzer

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

CLASS
SRC'D
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REQ

National Intelligence Council

CIA

-NIC 03234/88
31 October 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: National Intelligence Officer for Warning

FROM: Andre LeGallo
National Intelligence Officer for Counterterrorism

SUBJECT: Terrorism Warning and Forecast Meeting -- October

1. The Terrorism Warning and Forecast Meeting was held on 21 October. The following key judgments were derived from the discussion:

- While its network was debilitated by arrests in 1986-87, upcoming events in 1989 point up the potential for renewed terrorism by Hizballah in Europe.

- While a joint RAF-Red Brigades (BR) communique was released following the attempted assassination of Hans Tietmeyer, there is no evidence of European terrorist groups collaborating in joint operations.

- The support provided by Algeria facilitates the operations of international terrorist groups.

- The release of Mithileshawr Singh does not necessarily portend the early release of the remaining western hostages in Lebanon.

2. Hizballah in Europe. CIA believes the Hizballah have been trying to establish terrorist cells in Europe since at least 1984 -- possibly earlier. In 1984, the arrest of a Lebanese Shia, al-Atat, in Switzerland led to the arrests of the Ladispoli Seven in Italy; a group of Lebanese Shia suspected of planning to attack the US Embassy in Rome. Sporadic events occurred after these incidents. In 1985, the arrest of Sami Nasr, a Palestinian with links to Hizballah, led the Hizballah to seize two Cypriot students in Beirut. Later analysis of this period shows that the Hizballah were developing local Muslim immigrants for subversive activities in Italy, West Germany and France.

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HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-28-2018 BY [redacted]

3 MAY 25 1989

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

SUBJECT: Terrorism Warning and Forecast Meeting -- October

Three sets of arrests in 1987 unraveled information about an extensive Hizballah network in Europe with ties to Beirut through Imad Mughniyah and Abd al-Hadi Hammadi: The arrests of the Hammadi brothers in West Germany with explosives, the arrest in Italy of Bashir Khudr, a Lebanese Shia, with C-4, and the French arrest of Fuad Salah (who led the Hizballah-backed group that carried out the Paris bombings in 1986) with methyl nitrate and C-4. Information found on the persons of these individuals and explosives evidence showed links with all of these operatives back to Lebanon -- specifically to Mughniyah and the Hammadi family.

The relative tranquility in Western Europe at this time points to the success of European counterterrorist efforts and Iran's apparent interest in lowering its terrorist profile. A number of upcoming events next year -- the end of the Hammadi trial, the Iranian-imposed deadline for the release of Anis Naccache, and the Salah group trials -- all point to motivations for renewed terrorism in 1989. Hizballah could reorganize its cells with sleeper operatives and undiscovered caches. Since Mughniyah and Hammadi are willing to conduct independent operations, even Iranian pressure might not prevent renewed activity.

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(S) [REDACTED]

3. RAF-Red Brigades (BR). A joint RAF-BR communique following the September 1988 attack on West German Finance Ministry State Secretary Hans Tietmeyer increased concerns about linkages and joint operations among the various West European terrorist groups. DIA believes the Tietmeyer attack was conducted solely by the RAF; it was not a joint operation. There is no evidence of BR involvement. There is evidence, however, that the RAF felt it had to strike an IMF-related target to retain credibility as the leading anti-imperialist force in West Germany. The communique, however, was almost certainly a joint effort. The language was almost identical to that contained in BR-RAF documents prior to the Tietmeyer attack. We have evidence that the BR and RAF engaged in a dialogue in 1987-88, in hopes of expanding mutual cooperation. There are no indications, however, that this cooperation had expanded beyond philosophical discussions.

(S) [REDACTED]

The RAF is most likely instigating closer cooperation between the two groups. RAF was the originator of the Western European Anti-Imperialist Front. Due to other counterterrorist successes in Belgium and France, the RAF lost the Combatant Communist Cells (CCC) and eventually Action

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SUBJECT: Terrorism Warning and Forecast Meeting -- October

Directe (AD) as partners. Ethnic groups such as Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) and the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) are not necessarily interested in forming a Front; and 17 November is sequestered and too insular. Therefore, it is logical for the RAF to press for closer ties with the BR, a group which might show more interest in forming a Front.

It is also logical for BR to desire closer ties. The Union of Communist Combatants (UCC) has been dismantled by police successes and the Fighting Communist Party (PCC) had been taking hits from the authorities even prior to the recent arrests. Also, BR is no longer the potent force that it once was in the seventies and early eighties.

DIA believes that, although the BR and RAF may have been moving towards increased cooperation, the arrest, since June, of 32 members of the PCC -- the only operational faction of the BR -- will likely inhibit any significant cooperation in the short term. DIA does not feel, however, that the BR have been dismantled to the point of inhibiting a limited relationship in the future. BR and RAF personnel have reportedly met frequently in the past and will likely continue to do so. However, the current emasculated condition of the BR suggests that its primary emphasis will be on rebuilding its infrastructure in Italy, rather than expanding cooperation with other groups. At the same time, some element associated with the BR might conduct a terrorist action to make it appear that the group is upholding its part of this "joint venture."

Italian CT forces have had tremendous success in stopping the activities of the BR-UCC and in apprehending BR-PCC members. Assassinations, such as the April 1988 attack against Italian Senator Ruffilli, are likely to continue after the group rebounds from its recent arrests and successfully rebuilds.

More than likely, the RAF has been rebuilding. The Tietmeyer attack represents a return to action after a long period of dormancy. West German security forces have been unable to capture the few hard-core members still at large. The group eventually will be able to marshal its resources for another operation of this nature. Since no one was apprehended during the attack, there is obviously at least one RAF cell still at large capable of conducting assassinations. Based on the first joint communique, the attack may have been a kidnap attempt -- a more ambitious operation than the previous assassinations. This could indicate that the RAF is capable of launching larger-scale operations.

Reports indicate that RAF elements are operating outside West Germany. Fingerprints of RAF operative Andrea Klump were found at the

SUBJECT: Terrorism Warning and Forecast Meeting -- October

scene of an attempted moped bombing in Rota on 17 June. And reports indicate RAF support elements have been operating in Cuba and France. West German success in cracking down on the RAF apparatus probably has forced some support elements to relocate outside the country. The availability of an external safehaven may assist coordination of future RAF terrorist activity in Western Europe.

A joint operation by the RAF-BR against US interests is unlikely. The RAF will likely regroup after the unsuccessful assassination attempt on Tietmeyer and concentrate their efforts on domestic German targets. We can, however, expect to see an attack in the future based on their stated intentions, publications and ideology. The BR are not likely to conduct any short-term operations against the US, especially since it appears that they currently do not have an effective infrastructure.

b1 Per CIA
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(S)

4. Algeria. Algiers maintains relations with several radical groups largely because of its traditional leftist orientation and sympathy for national liberation movements, and also because such activity provides the regime some influence over these groups. Algiers argues that its links to Middle Eastern and other radicals allow it to serve as a diplomatic conduit, to moderate the radicals' behavior, and to steer the extremists away from radical Arab regimes. President Benjedid's government has publicly condemned terrorism and, in some cases, has ended or scaled down support for liberation movements.

While publicly condemning international terrorism, Algiers has acted as mediator in international terrorist incidents and provides safehaven for groups that employ terrorist tactics. Importantly, such support has apparently facilitated terrorist activities, particularly by the Abu Nidal Organization (ANO).

Because the Algerians regard the Palestinian cause as a legitimate political struggle, they offer military and other facilities to Palestinian factions for attacks against Israel. Like most Arab states, Algeria views attacks inside Israel or the Occupied Territories as legitimate acts of war. Algeria provides almost unrestricted safehaven

SUBJECT: Terrorism Warning and Forecast Meeting -- October

to a number of Palestinian groups, almost certainly including the Palestinian Front for the Liberation of Palestine - Special Command (PFLP-SC), the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF), Fatah's Force 17.

Algeria maintains contacts with Hizballah and such non-Middle Eastern groups as Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA). Most recently, Algeria has limited its support to ETA to the provision of safehaven. Other fragmentary evidence indicates Algiers has provided safehaven to other terrorist groups as well.

CIA believes Algerian-ANO relations expanded in the period leading up to the April 1987 Palestine National Council (PNC) meeting held in Algiers. They believe that the Algerians were seeking to facilitate ANO's entry into the mainstream Palestinian movement.

Despite ANO's limited presence (estimates range from five to 400), recent developments suggest that the Algiers-based contingent is deeply involved in operational activities worldwide. Such activity probably violates the understanding by which Algiers permitted the group to establish a presence there. There are indications that ANO operatives worldwide rely on the group's Algerian infrastructure for support.

Because Algeria values its role as mediator, particularly between the West and the Middle East, and retains a sympathy for national liberation movements, it is likely to maintain contacts with and support -- at least passively -- radical groups. In the case of ANO, CIA believes that Algiers permitted the group to establish a presence there in order to prove their ability to moderate the behavior of radical terrorists, as well as to foster Palestinian unity. In the wake of renewed terrorist activity by Abu Nidal and international publicity about the group's use of Algeria to facilitate its operations, Algiers may reduce its support for the group.

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(S) [REDACTED]

5. Implications of the Singh Release. Mithileshwar Singh and the other three Beirut University College professors (Turner, Steen and Polhill) were seized by friends of Hizballah's Beirut security chief Abd al-Hadi Hammadi for the same reasons as the two German hostages, Schmidt and Cordes. Abd al-Hadi's goal was to use these hostages to block extradition and prosecution of his brother Muhammad Hammadi, currently on trial in Germany for his part in the TWA 847 hijacking.

SUBJECT: Terrorism Warning and Forecast Meeting -- October

Cordes, the last German hostage, was freed September 12 after lengthy negotiations between Bonn and Tehran. We have no evidence that Bonn made any specific commitments about Muhammad's sentencing, but Abd al-Hadi apparently believed he was assured of a "fair trial" and humanitarian considerations. However, we assume that Abd al-Hadi's concerns about his brother were reasonably satisfied and that he no longer had a personal agenda regarding the BUC4.

Given Iran's recent attempts at rapprochement with the West, State thought that if Iran were to move on the hostages, they would move first on the BUC4 which were most accessible to them, i.e., they were unencumbered by extraneous concerns by the kidnappers. Three days after Cordes' release, we saw a communique by Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine, the first one in over six months.

According to State, the new communique was radically different from the earlier ones. The content was less Islamic and more Palestinian. The demands were more modest and the tone was almost one of pleading for the US to provide a pretext for them to release the hostages and so end the problem which they saw as having gone on for too long. Although the demands and tone in subsequent communiqués stiffened, State believes Singh was released as a goodwill gesture about a week after the first of the new IJLP communiqués.

The speed and ease of his release was so surprising and so different from previous IJLP actions that State thought it might have been written by a different group. State's chief Shia consultant thought the hostages might actually have been handed over to a Palestinian group. This seemed to be confirmed by remarks made by Singh immediately after his release. A careful perusal of Singh's debriefing soon disabused us of this notion. The captors were most likely Palestinian members of Hizballah. This would in part explain the Palestinian trappings displayed by the IJLP from the beginning. CIA does not believe the IJLP is a "real" organization, but a name used to shield the actual captors and possibly one pulled together to carry out this specific operation. Reliable reporting indicates Hizballah members who were friends of the Hammadi's were for the abduction and detention of the German hostages as well.

This still leaves open the question of why Singh was released. The traditional approach of trying to determine who benefited from the release didn't seem to work. No Palestinian element gained any political capital from the release and neither Hizballah nor Iran won any kudos for the release. CIA believes Singh was released because he is not an American citizen, and that the release was probably encouraged by Iran.

SUBJECT: Terrorism Warning and Forecast Meeting -- October

A glimpse into what may have happened surfaced in the press, which noted that before the release, the Iranians warned Genscher who told Shultz. We have no corroborating evidence, but we assume that the message passed along by Iran contained more than the name and date of the hostage to be released. This could have been an opening gambit by Iran. It was a relatively cheap one for them; they gain some credit but don't have to waste an American hostage doing so.

From the tone and speed of Singh's release, State expected other IJLP communiques to pour forth. They have not. This would confirm our supposition that the flurry of IJLP activity prior to the release was merely a smoke screen providing continuing deniability (both internally and externally) for Iran while its real agenda was conducted through Genscher.

Whatever the nature of the Iranian Gambit, it seems to have stalled. It is unlikely that we will see further activity before the American elections or before Tehran gets its own political house in order. This delay could work against the remaining BUC4 because Muhammad Hammadi's trial is going badly.

Abd al-Hadi may have believed that his brother Muhammad would be treated as a juvenile by the German court, get a 15-year sentence and be freed after serving, at most, 10 years. It is not clear why Abd al-Hadi might believe that his brother would be treated as a juvenile. In German law, this is not a mere question of chronology to be determined by his birth date. If (as seems likely) the court decides Muhammad acted as an adult, he would be sentenced as an adult and could receive much more than ten years. CIA anticipates renewed risks to German interests, if Abd al-Hadi is not satisfied with Muhammad's treatment. Moreover, Justice Department seems intent on once again approaching the Germans regarding extradition before the end of the trial. In short, setbacks in Muhammad's trial could cause his brother to dig in his heels on the BUC4 and make them less accessible to Iran for future overtures to the West.

b1 Per CIA
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(S)

Andre Legatto
Andre Legatto

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SUBJECT: Terrorism Warning and Forecast Meeting -- October

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- 1 - Charles L. Allen, US Army Intel & Sec., B-1, IAOPS-IS, Arl. Hall Sta.
- 1 - R. Rand Beers, NSC, Rm. 302, OEOB
- 1 - Ted McNamara, National Security Council, Rm. 302, OEOB
- 1 - Richard Armitage, DOD/ASD/ISA, Rm. 4E808, Pentagon
- 1 - USCINCSOC (Attn: SOJ2 - Col. Pheneger), MacDill AFB, FLA
- 1 - Larry Ropka, DOD/ISA, Rm. 4E813, Pentagon
- 1 - Michael Romey, Dept. of Treasury, Rm. 2049
- 1 - William Braun, DOJ/Criminal Division, Rm. 6300, 1400 New York Ave.
- 1 - Jeffrey Shumaker, USCG-ICC, Rm. 3119, 2100 2nd St.

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Memorandum

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To : Mr. J. H. Geer *dmw*

Date 1/30/89

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From : [redacted] *dmw*

Subject :

LIAISON CONTACT - ^①CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

This communication is classified ~~SECRET~~ in its
~~entirety.~~

b1 Per CIA
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PURPOSE:

To report contact with [redacted] CIA Headquarters (CIA).

RECOMMENDATION:

That coordination with the CIA continue regarding CHI.

dmw

[redacted]

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2 -

[redacted]

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dmw

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Memorandum from [] to Mr. J. H. Geer
Re: Liaison Contact - Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA)

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DETAILS:

(S)

On 1/12/89, Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) []
[] met with [] CIAHQ, regarding []

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(S)

Based upon the concurrence from San Francisco, the
office of origin in this matter, and a "no foreign policy
objection" obtained by Assistant Section Chief []
SSA [] granted approval []

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TO ACTING DIRECTOR (ROUTINE)

ATTN: SPECIAL STAFF, INTD

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Memorandum

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To : Mr. J. H. Geer *WJG*

Date 12/19/88

From : [redacted] *WJG*

Subject : FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (FCI)
CRITERIA FOR NEW AGENT SELECTION

CIA

This communication is classified ~~SECRET~~ in its entirety.

PURPOSE:

To advise of initial discussion with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) regarding their hiring criteria.

RECOMMENDATION:

None. For information.

WJG

SYNOPSIS:

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b1 Per CIA
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Enclosure

1 - [redacted]

(Attn: [redacted])

1 - Mr. J. H. Geer

WM:crj (5)

1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]

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WJG
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Gib

5th Mr. Geer

66 JUL 14 1989

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Memorandum from [] to Mr. J. H. Geer
Re: Foreign Counterintelligence (FCI)
Criteria for New Agent Selection

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(S) DETAILS:

(S) b1 Per CIA
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Discussions were held at CIAHQ with []
[] and others regarding the CIA's hiring
criteria. They centered around case officers bound for Directorate
of Operations, most closely analogous to Special Agents (SAs). Only
one to two percent of the case officers working counterintelligence
(CI) at the new CI center []
People going there are subject to close security scrutiny, and (S)
maturity and Agency experience are valued. There was little
discussion with the CIA about what makes a good CI officer as one to
two percent is not worth much discussion. Also, as with us, there
tends to be a feeling that a good officer is a good officer
regardless of his specialty as we tend to say about SAs. b1 Per CIA
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Memorandum from [] to Mr. J. H. Geer
Re: Foreign Counterintelligence (FCI)
Criteria for New Agent Selection

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b3 Per CIA

DETAILS: (continued)

(S) [] mentioned that a good test for analytical skills exists which he said he would furnish and recommended that SA [] and SA [] talk to some CIA recruiters which we intended to do. (S) [] suggested that achieving an FCI hiring criteria may be best done by getting some FCI experts into a room and hammering out a consensus on criteria and going with that, and then measuring people hired under the new criteria against an existing group of good agents.

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To date, the CIA's hiring criteria does not seem applicable to us from these points of view: the high cost of hiring and intensive scrutiny of each person, the amount of psychology and psychological testing involved, the lack of FCI criteria themselves and the fact that to date it appears that they are looking for people similar to ours in the modified program.

It is interesting to note that the CIA does not consider a person fully hired until he/she has been there for three years and has passed his/her second polygraph.

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A. WORK ORIENTATION

1. Leadership: ability to motivate another person or group of persons toward the accomplishment of a specific goal.
2. Team Player: ability to work on an equal basis with other persons in order to accomplish a mutual goal.
3. Task Commitment: ability to persevere and overcome obstacles in order to accomplish a goal.
4. Work Standards: ability to judge one's work against internal standards, with a minimal need for recognition and reward
5. Achievement Motivation: desire to strive toward new levels of success and to meet new challenges.

B. INTERPERSONAL ORIENTATION

1. Social Acuity: effectively interacts with other persons in a variety of social situations.
2. Social Persuasion: can influence the attitudes and behavior of other persons without coercion.
3. Communication Skills: ability to convey information to other persons in a cogent manner.

C. SELF ORIENTATION

1. Self-Confidence: maintaining a belief in one's abilities, judgments, and values despite criticisms from other persons.
2. Personal Integrity: possessing an ethical code of conduct which guides one's decisions and behavior.
3. Emotional Stability: ability to respond effectively and realistically in stressful situations.
4. Personal Maturity: ability to control impulses, delay gratification, and take responsibility for one's actions.

D. COGNITIVE ORIENTATION

1. Problem-Solving Ability: ability to formulate an effective plan of action in response to an ambiguous situation.
2. Intellectual Ability: ability to learn novel concepts and tasks with a minimal amount of effort and repetition.

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CITE CIA/NC 83855.1

FROM: CIA WASH DC//DDO NC OPS STAFF//FORMAT

SUBJECT: JANUARY 88 JOINT FOREIGN MATERIEL PANEL (JFMP) MEETING

DATE: WEDNESDAY, 13 JANUARY 1988

PLACE: DIAC - BOLLING AIR FORCE BASE

ROOM B2-130

TIME: 1030 HOURS

ONLY ADDRESSEES WILL BE PERMITTED TO ATTEND. OTHER INTERESTED
PERSONNEL SHOULD CONTACT DIA/DT-3C OR NC/FORMAT AT THE BELOW
NUMBERS FOR CLEARANCE. IF MORE INFORMATION IS REQUIRED,
CONTACT MIKE LAMB OR TOM BENJAMINSON AT AV2432918 OR SUSAN AT
351-2569.

PAGE 3 RUEAIIA 5335 ~~SECRET~~

FILE: ~~JFMP MEETING. DECL OADR DRV NUM 4 82.~~

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Director's Sec'y _____

To : The Director

Date 12/29/88

From : *MA* M. Ahlerich *CIA*

SSP Subject : BRIEFINGS FOR SENATE AND HOUSE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES
ON CRASH OF PAN AM FLIGHT 103

CLASS *R*
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PURPOSE: To request authority to brief Members of captioned Committees on the Bureau's inquiry into the crash of Pan Am Flight 103.

DETAILS: Professional Staff of both the House and Senate Intelligence Committees have requested Bureau briefings regarding the investigation into the crash of Pan Am Flight 103. The House Intelligence Committee briefing is scheduled for Tuesday, January 3, at 11:00 a.m. and the Senate Intelligence Committee briefing is now scheduled for 2:00 on the same date. The briefings are primarily for Members of the two committees but some staff will also attend.

TOM LATIMER, Staff Director of the House Intelligence Committee, advised that [redacted] of the CIA's Counterterrorism Center will participate in the House Intelligence briefing, as will a representative from the State Department. He also indicated that it would be appropriate for a representative from the FBI Laboratory to attend and explain the various physical characteristics of the suspected explosive.

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The Congressional Affairs Office (CAO) was contacted by a representative of the Office of Legislative Affairs, DOJ, on December 29, 1988, who advised that JOE WHITEY, of the Associate Attorney General's Office, wanted a meeting with the FBI and Ambassador BREMER, of the State Department prior to the briefings of the Intelligence Committees to discuss details. The CAO will follow this and advise appropriate FBI personnel.

1 - Mr. Revell
1 - [redacted]
1 - Mr. Ahlerich
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
3 - Mr. Rissler
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
LER:glh (13)
CAH

SR
SSA LARRY E. RISSLER
ROOM 7240, TL-245

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Memorandum to The Director from Milt Ahlerich
RE: BRIEFINGS FOR SENATE AND HOUSE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES ON
CRASH OF PAN AM FLIGHT 103

RECOMMENDATION: 1. That a representative of the Criminal Investigative Division be designated to conduct briefings, within the limits of what may be discussed regarding a pending case, before the House and Senate Intelligence Committees on January 3, 1989.

APPROVED: *[Signature]*

Director	Adm. Servs.	Off. of Cong. & Public Affs.
Exec. AD-Adm.	Crim. Inv.	Off. of Lia. & Intl. Affs.
Exec. AD-Inv.	Ident.	Rec. Mgmt.
Exec. AD-LES	Inspection	Tech. Servs.
	Intell.	Training
	Laboratory	
	Legal Coun.	

* Dep. Asst. Dir. hicks
will handle for CIO

2. That a representative of the Laboratory Division participate in captioned briefings.

APPROVED: *[Signature]*

Director	Adm. Servs.	Off. of Cong. & Public Affs.
Exec. AD-Adm.	Crim. Inv.	Off. of Lia. & Intl. Affs.
Exec. AD-Inv.	Ident.	Rec. Mgmt.
Exec. AD-LES	Inspection	Tech. Servs.
	Intell.	Training
	Laboratory	
	Legal Coun.	

3. That CAO coordinate captioned briefing.

APPROVED: *[Signature]*

Director	Adm. Servs.	Off. of Cong. & Public Affs.
Exec. AD-Adm.	Crim. Inv.	Off. of Lia. & Intl. Affs.
Exec. AD-Inv.	Ident.	Rec. Mgmt.
Exec. AD-LES	Inspection	Tech. Servs.
	Intell.	Training
	Laboratory	
	Legal Coun.	

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10/20/88

CIA

~~ESL~~ Director Sessions:

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RE: NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
MEDALS OF ACHIEVEMENT

On November 4 at 3:00 p.m. at CIA Headquarters Auditorium, Judge Webster is scheduled to present National Intelligence Medals of Achievement to SSA [redacted] who is currently an Assistant Legal Attache in Mexico City, former SSA [redacted] who was from the Intelligence Division and is now retired, and to former SSA [redacted] who is retired from the FBI Boston Division and is currently back with the FBI on a special purchase order project.

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Judge Webster will also present, at the same awards ceremony, a National Intelligence Certificate of Distinction to SSA [redacted] who is detailed to the Intelligence Community Staff from the Intelligence Division.

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In brief summary, the awards are for the following accomplishments:

[redacted]:

[redacted] was a key player in efforts to improve interagency coordination of extremely complex technical issues. In this capacity, he made major contributions to our Nation's ability to counter the most advanced forms of hostile technical penetration.

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Enclosures (5)

APPROVED:

Director
Exec. AD-Adm
Exec. AD-Inv
Exec. AD-LES

Adm. Servs. _____
Crim. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Inspection _____
Intell. _____
Laboratory _____
Legal Coun. _____
Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____
Off. of Lia. & Int. Affs. *WJ*
Rec. Mgmt. _____
Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____

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Classified by: 02
Declassify on: OADR

62-80750-10824

4-ENCLOSURE

- ENCLOSURE ATTACHED
- 1 - Mr. Revell
 - 1 - Mr. Otto
 - 1 - [redacted]
 - 1 - Mr. Bayse
 - 1 - [redacted]
 - 1 - Mr. Geer

QW
JMW:ice (12)

- 1 - [redacted] *251 383*
- 1 - [redacted]
- (Attn: [redacted])
- 1 - [redacted]
- 1 - [redacted]

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"UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS."

12 1989

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Note to Director from O. B. Revell dated 10/20/88
Re: National Intelligence
Medals of Achievement

[redacted]:

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The award is for outstanding contribution to the Intelligence Community as a staff officer in the National Intelligence Office for Foreign Denial and Intelligence Activities and for fostering a better understanding and working relationship between CIA and FBI.

[redacted]:

[redacted] supervised and participated directly in handling the FBI's responsibilities in a complex, difficult and sensitive counterintelligence case directed against a hostile intelligence service's efforts to acquire sensitive, embargoed high technology from the United States.

[redacted]:

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[redacted] certificate is for his support and participation in a study resulting in a National Intelligence Estimate of major importance to the United States.

Copies of the recommendations for the awards with more complete details are attached. Also, a copy of guidelines for award recommendations is attached for your information. Our FBI [redacted] has coordinated details of the awards. If you should desire to attend the award ceremony, SSA [redacted] will make the necessary arrangements.

O. B. Revell

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RECOMMENDATION FOR INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AWARD

(Submit 10 copies with: description of performance or service warranting award; bio profile; and unclassified citation)

1. NAME OF PERSON RECOMMENDED (Last/First/Middle) <div></div>		2. SOCIAL SECURITY NO. <div></div>	3. GRADE/RANK GS-14
4. YOB <div></div>	5. PARENT ORGANIZATION Federal Bureau of Investigation	6. TITLE/PLACE OF ASSIGNMENT DURING AWARD PERIOD TSCM Program Manager, Technical Services Division FBI Engineering & Research Facility, Lorton, VA	
7. RECOMMENDED AWARD National Intelligence Medal of Achievement		8. INCLUSIVE DATES FOR WHICH RECOMMENDED 15 February 81 - 1 December 87	
9. IF RETIRING, DATE OF RETIREMENT N/A		10. HOME ADDRESS Legal Attache Office US Embassy, P. O. Box 3087 Laredo, Texas 78044	11. TELEPHONE OFFICE: 905-511-0377 HOME:
12. HAS NOMINEE RECEIVED OR BEEN RECOMMENDED FOR ANOTHER AWARD FOR THIS SERVICE OR ACT? Yes: <input type="checkbox"/> If so, indicate award _____ No: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			
13. TITLE AND SIGNATURE OF INDIVIDUAL <div></div> Chairman, Countermeasures Subcommittee Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Committee, IG/CM(T)		14. DATE 6/27/88 b1 Per CIA b3	
15. TITLE AND SIGNATURE OF HEAD OF INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION MAKING RECOMMENDATION R. M. Huffstutler Deputy Director For Administration Central Intelligence Agency		16. DATE	
17. TITLE AND SIGNATURE OF HEAD OF NO. <div></div> Assistant Section Chief, Engineering Section Technical Services Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation		18. DATE	
19. REPORT OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AWARDS REVIEW PANEL The Intelligence Community Awards Review Panel, having considered the foregoing recommendation on _____: <input type="checkbox"/> recommends approval <input type="checkbox"/> does not recommend approval <input type="checkbox"/> recommends award of _____ Chairman, ICARP			
20. REPORT OF NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD The National Foreign Intelligence Board, having considered the foregoing recommendation on _____: <input type="checkbox"/> recommends approval of _____ <input type="checkbox"/> does not recommend approval Executive Secretary, NFIB			
THE RECOMMENDATION IN SECTION 20 IS APPROVED: _____ DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE _____ DATE			

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Narrative Justification
For The Award Of The
National Intelligence Medal of Achievement

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(U) [] Supervisory Special Agent, Federal Bureau of Investigation, distinguished himself by exceptional meritorious service during the period 15 February 1981 through 1 December 1987 while serving as the Program Manager, Interagency Telephone Laboratory, and as the Chairman and member of several Intelligence Community (IC) coordinating/working groups.

(U) As Program Manager of the Interagency Telephone Laboratory (ITL), he directed a major IC technical surveillance countermeasures (TSCM) program during a period of dynamic change and increasing complexity. ITL was established as the technical support activity of the Telephone Security Group (TSG), Countermeasures Subcommittee, Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Committee, Interagency Group/Countermeasures (Technical). ITL's mission is to provide technical support to the IC on all matters pertaining to TSCM for telephones and telephone systems.

(U) (C) ITL was created in response to a recognized need to develop effective countermeasures against the audio surveillance threat posed by telephones. The importance of ITL lies in the fact that, historically, telephones have been considered the most significant audio surveillance vulnerability posed to our classified conversation areas. Accordingly, ITL was tasked to develop policies and procedures for properly selecting and installing telecommunications equipment. Additionally, ITL actively pursued the development of new countermeasures techniques and equipment used by the TSCM community to examine telephone systems in the field.

(U) (C) In the last several years, the telecommunications industry has undergone major technological advances which threatened to drastically increase the technical surveillance vulnerabilities of telephone systems. As the government's conventional telephones and key systems were replaced with new electronic, computer controlled equipment, traditional methods for protecting these systems were inadequate. TSCM technicians could no longer test and evaluate telephones with existing equipment and techniques. Past telephone security protective measures and inspections were simply no longer valid.

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(U) (C) In the wake of this telecommunications revolution, [] took the lead in initiating efforts to expand and improve ITL's mission of technical investigative support to IC TSCM activities worldwide. Under his direction, the laboratory flourished. Today,

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it has a staff of five engineers/technicians (an increase of three) and a modern test and evaluation facility to handle a steadily increasing workload. A major improvement and expansion of ITL's physical plant was accomplished with the installation of a state-of-the-art shielded enclosure test facility. The capabilities of the ITL in evaluating suspected technical penetrations of telephone instruments and associated equipment were significantly enhanced due to [] efforts to obtain the necessary resources to purchase new generations of analytical/test equipment.

(U) (C) [] began several programs designed to improve the IC countermeasures assessment of the vulnerabilities associated with the various telephone systems, domestic and foreign, used by U.S. Government organizations throughout the world. He fostered a dialogue with the telecommunications industry to insure that the Intelligence Community's views and concerns regarding "on-hook" audio telephone security were recognized and addressed. He coordinated and managed efforts by ITL to develop a national standard for the design and manufacture of high security computerized telephone instruments. Telephones designed under this standard could be installed in sensitive discussion areas without adding costly protective devices or applying expensive construction techniques to physically protect the entire telephone system. This accomplishment typifies [] approach of identifying cost effective solutions to complex technical security problems; a philosophy which has resulted in huge monetary savings to the US Government. Additionally, [] undertook the complete revision of the standards governing the installation of telephone systems used in sensitive compartmented information facilities. This was a major undertaking requiring both expert technical knowledge and keen interpersonal skills. As a national program manager, he proved extremely successful at coordinating unified national strategies on issues affecting agencies with many diverse departmental views.

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(U) (C) [] in his capacity as Chairman, Telephone Security Group (TSG), Countermeasures Subcommittee, under the IG/CM(T), played a significant role in coordinating the development of an acceptable "on-hook" audio security standard for the governments new STU-III Secure Voice System; a multi-billion dollar program of the utmost importance to our national security. The groundwork performed by [] in developing the necessary interagency coordination with the National Security Agency, the STU-III proponent, made possible the timely identification of potential exploitable weaknesses with the STU-III and for the TSCM community to rapidly develop countermeasures.

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(U) (C) As the first Chairman of the Capitol Hill Advisory Group (CHAG), Countermeasures Subcommittee, under the IG/CM(T), [] established CHAG as an effective mechanism for providing physical and technical security support to Congress. He personally provided the necessary research, engineering and contracting support for the installation of an advanced in-place monitoring system (IPMS) which is designed to remotely sense and locate clandestine radio frequency transmitters targeted against sensitive Congressional facilities. [] played a continual role in efforts by the IC to establish a professional and highly effective, state-of-the-art TSCM capability within the U.S. Capitol Police (USCP). These efforts included: coordinating TSCM basic and advance training at national level training centers for police members assigned to TSCM duties; working closely with USCP to build an inventory of advance technology TSCM equipment; and assisting in developing technical threat and vulnerability data. [] extensive history of dedicated support to Capitol Hill was recognized throughout the IC as well as Congress which frequently praised his outstanding efforts on their behalf. In fact, upon learning of [] eminent reassignment, various Congressional activities voiced their hopes that [] would receive some national recognition for the outstanding support he provided Capitol Hill.

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(U) (C) As the senior FBI representative on the Countermeasures Subcommittee, Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Committee, IG/CM(1) (formerly the Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Subcommittee, SECOM), [] was one of its most active members. He continually worked to foster and promote common approaches and positions regarding the formation of effective national TSCM policy and procedures for countering hostile technical surveillance. He participated on numerous working groups formed to tackle very complex technical security issues such as drafting new standards for the physical and acoustic protection of the nations most sensitive discussion areas. His personal interest in reducing government expenditures on high dollar TSCM equipment lead to the discovery of significant cost differences between what individual agencies paid for the same item. He became a strong advocate for fostering equipment commonality and helped devise uniform equipment specifications/capabilities. He actively pursued joint, interagency purchases of TSCM equipment, which eventually resulted in significant savings to the federal government. As a member of the FBI, he often served as focal point on threat and vulnerability queries concerning foreign government technical surveillance offensive and defensive capabilities within the United States. His

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(U) assistance in this regard materially added to numerous National Foreign Intelligence Board threat estimates.

(C) In summary, [] was a driving force behind efforts to provide the Intelligence Community with the countermeasures tools and techniques necessary to keep pace with a rapidly changing and increasingly complex hostile technical surveillance threat. His distinguished record of support to the TSCM community is second to none. [] unselfish dedication and exemplary service reflects great credit upon the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the entire Intelligence Community.

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BIO PROFILE
OF

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[redacted] was born on [redacted] in Talomas, Mexico, a small town bordering the state of New Mexico. Although he resided in Mexico until the age of 14, he attended schools in the United States. He was a graduate of Hatch Valley High School, Hatch Valley, New Mexico. His childhood experiences centered around an active outdoor life typical of those who live on the Southwest ranges.

Upon graduating from high school, Mr. [redacted] served in the U.S. Coast Guard from January 1964 to January 1968; receiving an honorable discharge. In January 1968 he entered New Mexico State University where he received a Bachelor of Science Degree in Electrical Engineering in January 1973. After completing college, he worked two years as a government employee with the Army Missile Command, White Sands, New Mexico.

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In 1975, he joined the Federal Bureau of Investigation. For the first three years, Mr. [redacted] worked criminal investigations at the Houston Field Office, Houston, Texas. In October 1977, he was trained as a technical surveillance countermeasures (TSCM) technician. From 1978 to 1980, he was assigned to the Chicago Field Office, Chicago, Illinois. During this period he was involved in criminal investigations, counterterrorist operations, and technical investigative support/services.

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In 1980, Mr. [redacted] assumed the position of Supervisory Special Agent, Technical Security Division which is currently located at the FEI Engineering Facility, Lorton, Virginia. In this capacity, he held the position of Program Manager, Interagency Telephone Laboratory (ITL), which is responsible for providing technical support on issues relating to technical surveillance countermeasures for telephone systems used in sensitive discussion areas. ITL provides direct technical support to the Telephone Security Group (TSG), Countermeasures Subcommittee, Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Committee, IG/CM(T). During this period, Mr. [redacted] served on several important national TSCM policy and coordinating groups to include: Chairman, Telephone Security Group; Member, Audio Countermeasures Working Group, SECCM; Member, Survey Panel; Member, Interagency Training Center (ITC); Member, Countermeasures Subcommittee.

In November 1987, Mr. [redacted] received an important career advancement when he was reassigned to the US. Embassy in Mexico City as the Assistant Legal Attache.

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C I T A T I O N

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[REDACTED] SUPERVISORY SPECIAL AGENT, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, IS HEREBY AWARDED THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE MEDAL OF ACHIEVEMENT FOR EXCEPTIONALLY MERITORIOUS SERVICE WHILE SERVING AS THE PROGRAM MANAGER, INTERAGENCY TELEPHONE LABORATORY AND AS CHAIRMAN OF SEVERAL NATIONAL TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COUNTERMEASURES COORDINATING GROUPS DURING THE PERIOD 15 FEBRUARY 1981 THRU 1 DECEMBER 1987. AS A KEY PLAYER IN EFFORTS TO IMPROVE INTERAGENCY COORDINATION ON EXTREMELY COMPLEX TECHNICAL ISSUES, HE MADE MAJOR CONTRIBUTIONS TO OUR NATIONS ABILITY TO COUNTER THE MOST ADVANCED FORMS OF HOSTILE TECHNICAL PENETRATION. [REDACTED] UNSELFISH DEDICATION AND EXEMPLARY SERVICE REFLECTS GREAT CREDIT UPON HIMSELF, THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION AND THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.

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RECOMMENDATION FOR INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AWARD

(Submit 10 copies with: description of performance or service warranting award; bio profile; and unclassified citation)

1. NAME OF PERSON RECOMMENDED (Last/First/Middle)		2. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.	3. GRADE/RANK
			GS-15
4. YOB	5. PARENT ORGANIZATION	6. TITLE/PLACE OF ASSIGNMENT DURING AWARD PERIOD	
	Federal Bureau of Investigation	Staff Officer, National Intelligence Officer/Foreign Denial and Intelligence Activities	
7. RECOMMENDED AWARD		8. INCLUSIVE DATES FOR WHICH RECOMMENDED	
National Intelligence Certificate of Distinction		30 Oct 85 - 1 April 88	
9. IF RETIRING, DATE OF RETIREMENT		10. HOME ADDRESS	11. TELEPHONE
1 April 1988			OFFICE (703) 482-0169 HOME:
12. HAS NOMINEE RECEIVED OR BEEN RECOMMENDED FOR ANOTHER AWARD FOR THIS SERVICE OR ACT?			
Yes: <input type="checkbox"/> If so, indicate award _____ No: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			
13. TITLE AND SIGNATURE OF INDIVIDUAL MAKING RECOMMENDATION		14. DATE	
Murat Natirboff Murat Natirboff, National Intelligence Officer/ Foreign Denial and Intelligence Activities		18 March 88	
15. TITLE AND SIGNATURE OF HEAD OF INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION MAKING RECOMMENDATION		16. DATE	
H.F. Hutchinson, Jr., Acting Chairman, National Intelligence Council		22 March 88	
17. TITLE AND SIGNATURE OF HEAD OF NOMINEE'S PARENT ORGANIZATION (if other than recommender)		18. DATE	
James H. Keen Assistant Director for Intelligence Division		3/30/88	
19. REPORT OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AWARDS REVIEW PANEL			
The Intelligence Community Awards Review Panel, having considered the foregoing recommendation on _____			
<input type="checkbox"/> recommends approval <input type="checkbox"/> does not recommend approval <input type="checkbox"/> recommends award of _____			
20. REPORT OF NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD			
The National Foreign Intelligence Board, having considered the foregoing recommendation on _____			
<input type="checkbox"/> recommends approval of _____ <input type="checkbox"/> does not recommend approval			
THE RECOMMENDATION IN SECTION 20 IS APPROVED:			
[Signature] DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE		1 Apr 88 DATE	

RECOMMENDATION FOR THE
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE CERTIFICATE OF DISTINCTION

[redacted]

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1. It is recommended that [redacted] be awarded the National Intelligence Certificate of Distinction in recognition of his outstanding contribution to the Intelligence Community as Staff Officer in the National Intelligence Office for Foreign Denial and Intelligence Activities, National Intelligence Council, during the period 30 October 1985 to 1 April 1988.

2. One of Mr. [redacted] most important contributions to the Intelligence Community has been his fostering of a better understanding and working relationship between the CIA and his parent organization, the Federal Bureau of Investigation. During his 29-month tour in the National Intelligence Council, he acted as an intermediary between the agencies, sharing insights on the capabilities and vulnerabilities of the Soviet and East European threat to US interests in the continental United States. Mr. [redacted] performed indepth analyses of the loss of classified material in several espionage cases. His years of experience as an FBI investigator paid dividends in his accurate portrayal of intelligence loss in these instances. The working relationships Mr. [redacted] established will continue to profit the Intelligence Community long after his retirement.

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(S) 3. Responding to a December 1985 request from the Interagency Group/Counterintelligence, [redacted] devised a new intelligence publication, a type-script memorandum which sharply focused on the specific Soviet intelligence threat to US presence in foreign countries. Despite the press of normal NIO/FDIA activities and establishing interagency working relationships, he was able to produce memoranda [redacted]

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[redacted] These memoranda required in-depth research and analysis, on-site investigation and coordination and precise judgments defining the scope, complexity, capability and vulnerability of the Soviet threat in each of these various locations. These memoranda were very well received by embassies, consulates, and US bases.

4. Mr. [redacted] played an invaluable role in the numerous National Intelligence Officer/Foreign Denial and Intelligence Activities (NIO/FDIA) hosted conferences. Many of these conferences were initiated by him to share counterintelligence information among agencies with operating responsibilities in a particular region. Such conferences were held in San Diego to cover the US Southwest, in Colorado, Texas, Florida, and in the Washington area. These conferences have played an invaluable role in sharing foreign counterintelligence information and encouraging cooperation among agencies, ones that historically have worked independently.

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5. Throughout his assignment, Mr. [] demonstrated an exceptional ability to identify the key issues of complex problems and to formulate effective measures to achieve results. His organizational ability, his leadership and his willingness to undertake the most difficult tasks have produced an unbroken string of successful actions -- briefings, conferences and reports that have sustained a high level of productivity in the office of the NIO/FDIA.

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6. Mr. [] richly deserves the special recognition afforded by awarding him the National Intelligence Certificate of Distinction. He is not being recommended for any other Intelligence Community or CIA award for this performance.

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RECOMMENDATION FOR INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AWARD

(Submit 10 copies with: description of performance or service warranting award; bio profile; and unclassified citation)

1. NAME OF PERSON RECOMMENDED (Last/First/Middle)

[Redacted]

2. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

[Redacted]

3. GRADE/RANK

GS 14

4. YOB

[Redacted]

5. PARENT ORGANIZATION

Federal Bureau of Investigation

6. TITLE/PLACE OF ASSIGNMENT DURING AWARD PERIOD

Supervisory Special Agent/Boston, Massachusetts

7. RECOMMENDED AWARD

National Intelligence ^{MOA} Certificate of Distinction

8. INCLUSIVE DATES FOR WHICH RECOMMENDED

May 1983 - 1 April 1988

9. IF RETIRING, DATE OF RETIREMENT

1 April 1988

10. HOME ADDRESS

[Redacted]

11. TELEPHONE

OFFICE: [Redacted]
HOME: [Redacted]

12. HAS NOMINEE RECEIVED OR BEEN RECOMMENDED FOR ANOTHER AWARD FOR THIS SERVICE OR ACT?

Yes: ☐ If so, indicate award _____
No: ☒

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14. DATE

22 JUN 1988

15. TITLE AND SIGNATURE OF HEAD OF INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION MAKING RECOMMENDATION

Richard F. Stolz, Deputy Director for Operations CIA

16. DATE

23 JUN 1988

17. TITLE AND SIGNATURE OF HEAD OF NOMINEE'S PARENT ORGANIZATION (if other than recommender)

James H. Geer, Assistant Director Intelligence Division FBI

18. DATE

19. REPORT OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AWARDS REVIEW PANEL

The Intelligence Community Awards Review Panel, having considered the foregoing recommendation on _____:

- ☐ recommends approval
☐ does not recommend approval
☐ recommends award of _____

Chairman, ICARP

20. REPORT OF NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD

The National Foreign Intelligence Board, having considered the foregoing recommendation on _____:

- ☐ recommends approval of _____
☐ does not recommend approval

Executive Secretary, NFIB

THE RECOMMENDATION IN SECTION 20 IS APPROVED:

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

DATE

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A. Description of Performance:

A. Supervisory Special Agent [redacted] cooperation and active involvement in joint CIA/FBI counterintelligence operations spans over twenty five years of service with the Bureau. He is a Bureau agent who exemplifies in the finest sense the meaning of "dedicated, tireless, hardworking, and professional". His incisive operational mentality and the talented management of his subordinate special agents earned him the highest admiration of Agency officers who worked with him. Mr. [redacted] never forgot the principles and problems of face-to-face agent handling and often taught his subordinates by example through direct participation in cases.


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(S)

D. SSA [redacted] direction, cooperation, and skill provided the critical Bureau contribution required to make these cases outstanding examples of the significant achievements that can be obtained through joint FBI/CIA counterintelligence operations.

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3. Biographic Profile:

A. Mr. [] received BA at George Washington University (1958-1962) with a degree in Government and International Affairs.

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B. Mr. [] family is comprised of wife []
[]

C. Work History:

Entered on Duty for New Agents Training: 10 September 1962 to 14 December 1962.

First Office Charlotte, N.C. January 1963 then reassigned to Fayetteville Resident Agency on 21 March 1963.

Transferred to New Orleans, La. on 20 August 1964.

Monterey, California for Russian Language School on 24 June 1965.

Transferred to New York City, NY on 28 April 1966.

New York to Washington Field Office on 21 June 1972.

Washington Field Officer to FBI Headquarters on 28 April 1975.

FBI Headquarters to Boston Field Office on 28 November 1978.

Retired in Boston 1 April 1988.

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RECOMMENDATION FOR INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AWARD

(Submit 10 copies with description of performance or service warranting award, bio profile, and unclassified citation)

1. NAME OF PERSON RECOMMENDED (Last/First/Middle) <div></div>		2. SOCIAL SECURITY NO. <div></div>	3. GRADE/RANK GM-15
4. YOB <div></div>	5. PARENT ORGANIZATION FBI	6. TITLE/PLACE OF ASSIGNMENT DURING AWARD PERIOD FBI Unit Chief, Soviet Analytic Unit Intelligence Division, FBI Hqs b6 b7C	
7. RECOMMENDED AWARD National Intelligence Certificate of Distinction		8. INCLUSIVE DATES FOR WHICH RECOMMENDED Summer 1985 - Summer 1987	
9. IF RETIRING, DATE OF RETIREMENT		10. HOME ADDRESS <div></div>	11. TELEPHONE OFFICE: <div></div> HOME: <div></div>
12. HAS NOMINEE RECEIVED OR BEEN RECOMMENDED FOR ANOTHER AWARD FOR THIS SERVICE OR ACT? Yes: <input type="checkbox"/> If so, indicate award _____ No: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			
13. TITLE AND SIGNATURE OF INDIVIDUAL MAKING RECOMMENDATION NIO/FDIA - <i>Murat Natirboff</i> Murat Natirboff		14. DATE 3 June 88	
15. TITLE AND SIGNATURE OF HEAD OF INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION MAKING RECOMMENDATION C/NIC - <i>Fritz W. Ermarth</i> Fritz W. Ermarth		16. DATE 8 June 88	
17. TITLE AND SIGNATURE OF HEAD OF NOMINEE'S PARENT ORGANIZATION (if other than recommender) <i>James H. Geer</i> Asst Director, Intel Div, FBI - James H. Geer		18. DATE 6/13/88	
19. REPORT OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AWARDS REVIEW PANEL The Intelligence Community Awards Review Panel, having considered the foregoing recommendation on <u>26 AUG 1988</u> , <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> recommends approval <input type="checkbox"/> does not recommend approval <input type="checkbox"/> recommends award of _____ <div style="text-align: right;"><i>George H. Owens</i> Chairman, ICARP</div>			
20. REPORT OF NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD The National Foreign Intelligence Board, having considered the foregoing recommendation on <u>12 September 1988</u> , <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> recommends approval of <u>National Intelligence Certificate of Distinction.</u> <input type="checkbox"/> does not recommend approval <div style="text-align: right;"><div></div> Executive Secretary, NFIB</div>			
THE RECOMMENDATION IN SECTION 20 IS APPROVED: <div style="text-align: center;"><i>Robert M. Gates</i> Robert M. Gates, DDCI, for DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE</div> <div style="text-align: right;">30 SEP 1988 DATE</div>			

BIO-SKETCH

NAME:

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DOB:

SSN:

EOD FBI: 31 August 1964.

EDUCATION: BS 1961 Social Sciences, St. Johns University, NY.
Law degree from St. Johns 1964.
Admitted to practice law NY, 7 April 1972.

PAST WORK ASSIGNMENTS:

Mobile, Alabama; Selma Resident Agency

Chicago, NY, Portland, FBI Hqs.

Attended Army War College, Carlisle, Pa, July 81 - June 82.

ASSIGNMENTS IN FBI INCLUDED: Domestic security work, terrorism, investigations, and at FBI Hqs supervisor, unit chief and inspector aide.

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT: Detailed to Intelligence Community Staff as Deputy Director, Community Counterintelligence and Security Countermeasures Office (CCISCMO).

(At time of project for which award is being recommended: FBI Unit Chief, Soviet Analytic Unit, Intelligence Division, FBI HQS)

GRADE: GM-15

HOME

ADDRESS:

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HM PH:

OF PH:

FAMILY:



CITATION

[redacted] of the Federal Bureau of Investigation is hereby awarded the National Intelligence Certificate of Distinction in recognition of his sustained superior performance during the period 1985-1987 in support of a National Intelligence Estimate of major importance to the United States. Displaying continued diligence and unflagging dedication, he represented the FBI with great effectiveness over an extended period of time in matters involving many diverse and complex issues. The consistent balance and good judgment he brought to this task contributed significantly to the production of the Estimate, and reflected great credit on him, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Intelligence Community.

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GUIDELINES FOR PREPARATION OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AWARD RECOMMENDATIONS

AWARD	IN RECOGNITION OF:	CRITERIA
<p>National Intelligence Distinguished Service Medal (NIDSMD)</p>	<p>Distinguished meritorious service or achievement in a duty of great responsibility within the Intelligence Community which distinctly benefits the interests of the United States and constitutes a major contribution to the foreign intelligence mission of the Intelligence Community.</p>	<p>The stipulation "duty of great responsibility" normally will limit this award to very senior persons. It is intended to recognize sustained superior service or achievements rather than one-time contributions. Performance within or on behalf of an individual component will be more appropriately recognized by award of the Distinguished Service Medal of the military services, the CIA Distinguished Intelligence Medal, or other comparable civilian awards. However, there may be instances where the accomplishments contribute to the effective functioning of the Intelligence Community as a whole.</p>
<p>National Intelligence Medal of Achievement (NIMOAA)</p> 	<p>Especially meritorious conduct in the performance of outstanding service by a member of the Intelligence Community. Recognizing performance of an especially difficult duty in a clearly exceptional manner, the service must relate directly to the Intelligence Community's mission to provide the intelligence required for national security policy determinations.</p>	<p>This award is to recognize achievements which do not warrant the NIDSMD. Involvement in the senior level of the Community is normally a prerequisite, but there may be exceptions. Service within and on behalf of an individual organization will be more appropriately recognized by the Department of Defense Legion of Merit, the CIA Intelligence Medal of Merit, or other comparable civilian awards. However, there may be instances where the accomplishments benefit the Community as a whole.</p>
<p>National Intelligence Certificate of Distinction (NICD)</p> 	<p>Sustained superior performance of duty of high value by a member of the Intelligence Community or for a significant single act of special merit.</p>	<p>This award is to recognize achievements on behalf of the Intelligence Community which do not warrant the NIDSMD or NIMOAA. It may be awarded regardless of the rank or grade of the nominee.</p>
<p>National Intelligence Meritorious Unit Citation (NIMUC)</p>	<p>Collective performance of a unit or group that has resulted in accomplishments of a clearly superior nature and of significant benefit to the Intelligence Community.</p>	<p>This award recognizes achievements by a unit whose collective performance deserves special recognition. Normally, individual awards to members of the unit will not be warranted, but such dual recognition of individual performance is not totally precluded.</p>

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RECOMMENDATION FOR INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AWARD

(Submit 10 copies with: description of performance or service warranting award; bio profile; and unclassified citation)

1. NAME OF PERSON RECOMMENDED (Last/First/Middle)		2. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.	3. GRADE/RANK
4. YOB	5. PARENT ORGANIZATION	6. TITLE/PLACE OF ASSIGNMENT DURING AWARD PERIOD	
7. RECOMMENDED AWARD		8. INCLUSIVE DATES FOR WHICH RECOMMENDED	
9. IF RETIRING, DATE OF RETIREMENT		10. HOME ADDRESS	11. TELEPHONE OFFICE: HOME:
12. HAS NOMINEE RECEIVED OR BEEN RECOMMENDED FOR ANOTHER AWARD FOR THIS SERVICE OR ACT? Yes: <input type="checkbox"/> If so, indicate award _____ No: <input type="checkbox"/>			
13. TITLE AND SIGNATURE OF INDIVIDUAL MAKING RECOMMENDATION			14. DATE
15. TITLE AND SIGNATURE OF HEAD OF INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION MAKING RECOMMENDATION			16. DATE
17. TITLE AND SIGNATURE OF HEAD OF NOMINEE'S PARENT ORGANIZATION (if other than recommender)			18. DATE
19. REPORT OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AWARDS REVIEW PANEL The Intelligence Community Awards Review Panel, having considered the foregoing recommendation on _____: <input type="checkbox"/> recommends approval <input type="checkbox"/> does not recommend approval <input type="checkbox"/> recommends award of _____ Chairman, ICARP			
20. REPORT OF NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD The National Foreign Intelligence Board, having considered the foregoing recommendation on _____: <input type="checkbox"/> recommends approval of _____ <input type="checkbox"/> does not recommend approval Executive Secretary, NFIB			
THE RECOMMENDATION IN SECTION 20 IS APPROVED: _____ DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE _____ DATE			

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ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 03-01-2018 BY [REDACTED]

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OCT 28
FBI
DEPT OF JUSTICE

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SSR

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CLASS

DE RUEAIIA #3052/3893 3020259

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~~SECRET~~ SVC H/W ZZK ADDRESSEES CORRECTED

RR RUEAIIA RUEKJCS RUEADWD RUEOAYB RHDJAAA RUCIAEA RUEAHQA

RUEHFB RUETIAA RULSMCA RUKLDAR RUDMNIC RUEHDC

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R 251935Z OCT 88 ZFG

FM CIA/NC

TO RUEAIIA/CIA//WASHINGTON DC/DDO/SE/RR/HILL

RUEAIIA/CIA//WASHINGTON DC//DDO/EA/RR/STENT

RUEAIIA/CIA//WASHINGTON DC/DDA/SD/OL/BURTON

RUEAIIA/CIA//WASHINGTON DC/DDI/CRES/IRC/SEG/EVANS

RUEKJCS/DIA//DAM-2C/DT-FMO/LAMB

RUEKJCS/DIA//DB-4B/MIKLICH

RUEADWD/HQ DA//DAMI-ISH/KLOSTER/DAMI-FIT-EA/RENSHAW//

RUEOAYB/FSTC INTEL OPS//AIFIM/AIFIMA-PRUGH//

RUDMNSC/NAV TECHINTCEN//NFMP/DANIELS

RHDJAAA/HQ AFSC//INJ/OPENSHAW

RUCIAEA/FTD WPAFB OH//XOCF/KING

RUEAHQA/HQS USAF//INXM/FOLEY

RUEHFB/FBI//LAB/[REDACTED]//

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1D 53 AUG 10 1989

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RUEORDF/DIRAFMIC FT DETRICK
MD//AFMIC-CR/TORIAN//USSS//J CARLON/
RUETIAA/DIRNSA//T5151/W07
RULSMCA/CG MCCDC//IN//QUANTICO VA//J ALVAREZ//
RUCDGDA/DIR MSIC REDSTONE ARS AL
ARSENAL/AIAMS-D/STREET
RUKLDAR/CDR AMC//ALEX VA//AMCMI-FR/NICHOLSON
RUDMNIC/COMNAVINTCOM//NIC-03/TRUNBULL

PAGE 2 RUEAIIA 3052 ~~SECRET~~

RUEHDC/DEPT OF COMMERCE//EA/OFA/5212/KRUSE

BT

~~SECRET~~

CITE CIA/NC 321085

FROM: CIA WASH DC//DDO NC OPS STAFF//FORMAT

SUBJECT: NOVEMBER 88 JOINT FOREIGN MATERIAL PANEL (JFMP)
MEETING

DATE: WEDNESDAY, 9 NOVEMBER 1988

PLACE: DIAC BUILDING, BOLLING AFB, WASHINGTON DC
ROOM B6-150

TIME: 1030 HOURS

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

ONLY ADDRESSEES WILL BE PERMITTED TO ATTEND. OTHER INTERESTED
PERSONNEL SHOULD CONTACT DIA/FMO OR NC/FORMAT AT THE BELOW
NUMBERS FOR CLEARANCE. IF MORE INFORMATION IS REQUIRED,
CONTACT MIKE LAMB OR TOM BENJAMINSON AT AV243-2918 OR NICK
KNISKA AT 351-2569.

~~FILE: JFMP MEETING. DECL OADR DRV HUM 4-82.~~

BT

#3052

NNNN

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ZCZCEXA949EYA356

PP RUEHFB

DE RUEAIIA #9070 2082300

ZNY SSSSS

P R 262258Z JUL 88

FM CIA/NC

TO RUDHAAT/CDR USAISA WASHDC//DO-OS

INFO RUDHAAA/CDR INSCOM AHS VA//IAOPS-H-PCO

RUEKJCS/DIA//WASHINGTON DC//DAM-1

RUEHFB/FBI WASHDC/[]/

BT

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 03-12-2018 BY []

CITE CIA/NC 175260

~~SECRET NOFORN RODCA WNINTEL~~

WARNING: CONTAINS GRANTOR SHADOW (U) AND RODCA MATERIAL.

LIMIT ACCESS TO THOSE INDIVIDUALS WITH VERIFIED ACCESS TO BOTH

CAVEATS. USAISA FOR COL LACKEY; INSCOM IAOPS-H-PCO FOR MAJ

STEWART; FBI FOR SSA []; DIA DAM 1B FOR MR. RAE.

FROM: ⁶ CIA WASH DC//DDO NC OSEL

SUBJECT: CONTROLLED CONTACT COORDINATION REQUEST NUMBER 067-881

62-80750-16826

53 AUG 08 1989

~~SECRET~~

Exec AD Adm.	_____
Exec AD Inv.	_____
Exec AD LES	_____
Asst. Dir.:	_____
Adm. Serv.	_____
Crim. Inv.	_____
Ident.	_____
Insp.	_____
Intell.	_____
Lab.	_____
Legal Coun.	_____
Off. Cong. & Public Affs.	_____
Rec. Mgmt.	_____
Tech. Servs.	_____
Training	_____
Off. Liaison	_____
Int. Affs.	_____
Telephone Rm.	_____
Director's Sec'y	_____

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~~SECRET~~

PAGE 2 RUEAIIA 9070 ~~S E C R E T~~

REF: CDRUSAISA WASHDC//DO-OS-SLB//MSG DTG P092005Z JUN 88

(U) 1. ~~(S/NF)~~ THIS AGENCY COORDINATES REQUEST FROM ARMY ISA
FOR CONTACT WITH SUBJECT OF REFERENCE TO ASSESS HIS SUITABILITY
AS A POTENTIAL ACCESS AGENT TO PERSONS RESIDING IN IRAN.
SUBJECT MAY BE CONTACTED DIRECTLY WITHOUT NC PARTICIPATION,
HOWEVER A COURTESY CALL TO NC/NEW YORK WOULD BE APPRECIATED.

b1 per CIA
b3

(S)

2. ~~DECL OADR DRV HUM 4-82.~~

BT

#9070

NNNN

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Memorandum

TO : Acting
Director, FBI

DATE: 7/27/87

FROM : SAC, MILWAUKEE (66-2177)

ATT.: Correspondence/UCR Section
Records Management Division

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-28-2018 BY [redacted]

b6
b7C

SUBJECT: CORRESPONDENCE MATTERS
RECOMMENDATION FOR LETTER FROM DIRECTOR

This communication is classified "~~Secret~~" in its entirety.

This form may be utilized where applicable in conjunction with Bureau letter

to Albany and all offices dated 11-7-73 captioned "Correspondence Matters."

CLASS
SRC'D
SER
REC

Name

Rank (if applicable)

b1 per CIA
b3

Name of Head of Agency

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

W.H. WEBSTER

Address of Agency (include Zip Code)

DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

BASIS FOR RECOMMENDATION: (Amplify under "Remarks.")

- ☐ Promotion (Indicate from _____ to _____)
- ☐ Serious illness (Indicate where confined; if hospital, how long confinement will be.)
- ☐ Death (Indicate next of kin, widow, if any, and children, if any.)
- ☐ Death in family (Indicate relationship.)
- ☐ Editorial or feature article (Indicate whether complimentary or derogatory; also indicate editor, or newspaperman, to be written to, with address and Zip Code.)

- ☐ Appreciation for assistance in Bureau case. Identify case by caption under "Remarks."

b1 per CIA
b3

☒ Other

REMARKS: (Set forth below a clear, concise, justification for recommendation. Be specific omit generalities. If applicable include Bureau file number.)

[Large redacted area for remarks]

2 - Bureau
2 - Milwaukee 1989
CWS/1b (3)

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SECRET

Ack let to
8-13-87
NO: am

Milwaukee
8-12-87.

~~SECRET~~

August 13, 1987

PERSONAL
BY LIAISON

all
8/19/87

b1 per CIA
b3

SSP
CLASS
SRC'D
SER
REC

(S)

APPROVED:

Director _____	Adm. Servs. _____	Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____
Exec. AD-Adm. _____	Crim. Inv. _____	Off. of Lia. & Int. Affs. _____
Exec. AD-Inv. _____	Ident. _____	Rec. Mgnt. _____
Exec. AD-LES _____	Intelligence _____	Tech. Servs. _____
	Legal Coun. _____	Training _____

Sincerely yours,

John E. Otto
Acting Director

1 - Honorable William H. Webster
Director of Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency

1 - Milwaukee (66-2177)
ReurFD-468 dated 7-27-87 and Bucal from [redacted] to [redacted]
SA [redacted] 8-12-87.

1 - Mr. Geer - Enclosure

NOTE: Letter recommended by SAC, Milwaukee, and Bufiles show nothing to preclude.

NB:arm (6)

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-28-2018 BY [redacted]

~~SECRET~~
Classified by 05
Declassify on OADR

Exec AD Adm. _____
Exec AD Inv. _____
Exec AD LES _____
Asst. Dir. _____
Adm. Servs. _____
Crim. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Insp. _____
Intell. _____
Lab. _____
Legal Coun. _____
Off. Cong. & Public Affs. _____
Rec. Mgnt. _____
Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

MAIL ROOM

2 MAY 13 1989

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Memorandum

~~SECRET~~



Exec AD Adm. ☒
Exec AD Inv. ☒
Exec AD LES ☒
Asst. Dir. ☐
Adm. Servs. ☐
Crim. Inv. ☒
Ident. ☐
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Intell. ☐
Lab. ☐
Legal Coun. ☐
Off. Cong. & Public Affs. ☐
Rec. Mgnt. ☐
Tech. Servs. ☐ b6
Training ☐ b7C
Telephone Rm. ☐
Director's Sec'y ☐

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-28-2018 BY [redacted]

To : Mr. Revell

Date 1/11/88

From : [redacted]

CLASS
SRC'D
SER
REG

Subject : FBI DETAILEE
COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

PURPOSE: To recommend an assignment of a GM-15 Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) to the Counterterrorism Center (CTC), CIA for an initial one-year period.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1) That the detailing of an FBI SSA to the CTC, CIA, be approved.

APPROVED: ^{3/3}
Director ☒
Exec AD-Adm. ☒
Exec AD-Inv. ☒
Exec AD-LES ☒
Adm. Servs. ☒
Crim. Inv. ☒
Ident. ☒
Inspection ☒
Intell. ☒
Laboratory ☒
Legal Coun. ☒
Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. ☐
Off. of Lia. & Intl Affs. ☐
Rec. Mgnt. ☐
Tech. Servs. ☐
Training ☐

~~SECRET~~

Classified by G-3
Declassify on: OADR

1 - Mr. Revell
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
1 - Mr. Pomerantz

100/SC (13)

1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]

MAY 11 1988

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See memo for 2 C to Dir
2/29/88 SRC:pr

Airtel SF
JDC/KM

1XC RM 4251

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum from [] to Mr. Revell
Re: FBI Detailee
Counterterrorism Center
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

b6
b7C

2) That the assignment of CIA Research Analyst to the
TRAC, TS, CID, be approved.

APPROVED: *[Signature]* 3/3
Director *[Signature]* Adm. Servs. *[Signature]* Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____
Exec AD-Adm. *[Signature]* Crim. Inv. *[Signature]* Off. of Lia. _____
Exec AD-Inv. *[Signature]* Ident. *[Signature]* & Intl. Affs. _____
Exec AD-LES *[Signature]* Inspection _____ Rec. Mgmt. _____
Laboratory _____ Tech. Servs. _____
Legal Coun. _____ Training _____

3) That the SSA selected be a GM-15.

APPROVED: *[Signature]* 3/3
Director *[Signature]* Adm. Servs. *[Signature]* Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____
Exec AD-Adm. *[Signature]* Crim. Inv. *[Signature]* Off. of Lia. _____
Exec AD-Inv. *[Signature]* Ident. *[Signature]* & Intl. Affs. _____
Exec AD-LES *[Signature]* Inspection _____ Rec. Mgmt. _____
Laboratory _____ Tech. Servs. _____
Legal Coun. _____ Training _____

4) That initially, the assignments mentioned above be
on a trial basis for a one-year period.

APPROVED: *[Signature]* 3/3
Director *[Signature]* Adm. Servs. *[Signature]* Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____
Exec AD-Adm. *[Signature]* Crim. Inv. *[Signature]* Off. of Lia. _____
Exec AD-Inv. *[Signature]* Ident. *[Signature]* & Intl. Affs. _____
Exec AD-LES *[Signature]* Inspection _____ Rec. Mgmt. _____
Laboratory _____ Tech. Servs. _____
Legal Coun. _____ Training _____

5) That the detailee be authorized to use his FBI
credentials while conducting any overt business on behalf of the
CIA.

APPROVED: *[Signature]* 3/3
Director *[Signature]* Adm. Servs. *[Signature]* Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____
Exec AD-Adm. *[Signature]* Crim. Inv. *[Signature]* Off. of Lia. _____
Exec AD-Inv. *[Signature]* Ident. *[Signature]* & Intl. Affs. _____
Exec AD-LES *[Signature]* Inspection _____ Rec. Mgmt. _____
Laboratory _____ Tech. Servs. _____
Legal Coun. _____ Training _____

6) That the TSL, TS, CID, be increased by one SSA,
GM-15.

APPROVED: *[Signature]* 3/3
Director *[Signature]* Adm. Servs. *[Signature]* Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____
Exec AD-Adm. *[Signature]* Crim. Inv. *[Signature]* Off. of Lia. _____
Exec AD-Inv. *[Signature]* Ident. *[Signature]* & Intl. Affs. _____
Exec AD-LES *[Signature]* Inspection _____ Rec. Mgmt. _____
Laboratory _____ Tech. Servs. _____
Legal Coun. _____ Training _____

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Memorandum from [] to Mr. Revell
Re: FBI Detailee
Counterterrorism Center
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

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b7C

7) If recommendation five is approved, that the Domestic Terrorism Target Staffing level in the San Francisco Division be reduced by one.

APPROVED: *3* / *US* / *W*
Director _____
Exec AD-Adm. _____
Exec AD-Inv. _____
Exec AD-LES _____
Adm. Servs. _____
Crim. Inv. _____
Ident. _____
Inspection _____
Intell. _____
Laboratory _____
Legal Coun. _____
Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____
Off. of Lia. & Int. Affs. _____
Rec. Mgmt. _____
Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____

(S) SYNOPSIS: During recent discussions between Criminal Investigative Division (CID), Terrorism Section (TS) Chief Steven L. Pomerantz and Deputy Chief [] of the CTC, CIA, a need to strengthen both organizational and operational ties between the two agencies was identified. To fill that continuing need and to insure the future success of this critical interface between the two agencies, it was agreed that the FBI would consider detailing an SSA, GM-15 to the CTC, CIA, for an initial one-year period; concomitantly, the CIA would detail an experienced Research Analyst to the Terrorist Research and Analytical Center (TRAC), TS, CID, for a one-year period. The SSA assigned to the CTC would retain and use FBI credentials in the conduct of any overt duties undertaken in connection with his assignment. This SSA would also be directly assigned to the CTC, CIA, but would remain under the administrative control of the TS, CID. If this detailee is to remain under the control of the TS, CID, the target staffing level (TSL) for the TS would have to be increased by one SSA.

b1 per CIA
b3

(S) DETAILS: During recent discussions between [] Deputy Chief of the CTC, CIA, and Terrorism Section Chief Steven L. Pomerantz, a need for close and continuing cooperation between the FBI and the CTC, CIA, was clearly indicated in cases of international terrorism wherein there is a commonality of interest. To insure the success of the critical interface, it was agreed that the FBI would consider detailing a SSA, GM-15, to the CTC, CIA, for an initial one-year period; concomitantly the CIA would detail an experienced Research Analyst to the TRAC, TS, CID, for same one-year period on a trial basis. The FBI SSA assigned to the CTC would provide a direct and continuing liaison link with the FBI and, in particular, the TS of the CID, which has overall program management responsibilities. The CIA analyst assigned to the FBI would provide the same direct and continuing liaison link with the CIA and, in particular, the CTC.

b1 per CIA
b3

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Memorandum from [] to Mr. Revell
Re: FBI Detailee
Counterterrorism Center
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

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(S) This SSA would have continuing access to information in the CTC that impacts upon FBI responsibilities; moreover, the SSA could facilitate the FBI gaining access to information which the CIA would not recognize as important to or impacting on the FBI. Finally, the SSA could foster and facilitate more joint operations between the FBI and the CIA where indicated.

The CIA, for its part, is in complete concurrence with this concept. [] advised that the SSA assigned to the CTC at the CIA would have access to all incoming information as well as being fully integrated into the CTC operations. In return, the FBI Agent could help the CIA to better understand the Bureau and its role as a law enforcement agency within the Federal system, as well as the Attorney General Guidelines that govern both domestic and international terrorism investigations.

b1 per CIA
b3

With regard to the assignment of an experienced CIA Analyst to TRAC, TS, CID, for a one-year period, the TS believes that approval is warranted because of potential benefits to the FBI. This CIA Analyst could certainly assist the FBI in refining its analytical approach. Moreover, the sharing of analytical techniques and methodologies in addition to information as well as the establishment of a direct liaison link between the analytical components of both agencies can only foster closer cooperation.

Because the CTC is not familiar with FBI operating procedures in terrorism investigations, there has been some initial confusion as to the role of the FBI. The FBI Agent detailed to the CTC must have considerable experience in terrorism investigations as well as detailed knowledge of the Foreign Counterintelligence Guidelines issued by the Department of Justice. It is anticipated that this detailee will contribute critical input into the future success of any FBI/CIA joint operations inasmuch as that Agent will be directly responsible for the interface between the two. Therefore, this Agent should have a thorough understanding of both the nature and importance of this continuing liaison relationship with the CTC of the CIA.

Inasmuch as senior analytical personnel assigned to the CTC are at grade level GS-14, it is preferable that, if approved, this SSA be a GM-15 inasmuch as he will interface with and report directly to [] the Deputy Chief of the CTC.

b1 per CIA
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Memorandum from [] to Mr. Revell
Re: FBI Detailee
Counterterrorism Center
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

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Further, this detailee will effectively function as the law enforcement liaison with the CTC as well as participating in a coordination role in any CIA ad hoc working groups formed to coordinate U.S. Government activity in international terrorist crisis situations.

If approved, the TS will continue to be responsible for the detailee's performance appraisal; therefore, the detailee should remain a GM rather than reverting to a GS rating.

The TS also recommends that the Agent selected be a GM-15 inasmuch as he will be interfacing directly with and advising decision makers within the CIA. Further, analysts who will provide support are GS-14 and below. This detailee will be a decision maker and assist in the decision making process of the CIA in regard to those areas of particular concern to the FBI.

The TS also recommends that initially the assignment be on a trial basis for a one-year period. This would allow for reevaluation of the assignment to determine if it is productive and effective for both the FBI and the CIA.

The TS also recommends that the detailee be authorized to use his FBI credentials while conducting any overt business on behalf of the CTC, CIA. Although the detailee will be assigned to the CIA, the use of FBI credentials by this Agent will obviously open many doors for him in the law enforcement community and other Federal, state and local agencies. The individual assigned will have to insure that it is made clear to any contacts that although he is a FBI Agent, he is detailed to the CIA or in cases where that is not appropriate for security reasons to whatever appropriate governmental agency is being used as a cover.

The TS has previously coordinated with the Legal Counsel Division regarding the use of FBI credentials by the detailee. Legal Counsel Division has advised that there is no legal reason that would preclude the use of FBI credentials by the detailee.

By previous arrangement with the Administrative Services Division in the assignment of SSA [] to the Department of Energy as a GM-15, this detailee to the CIA would also be assigned from the Terrorism Section; therefore, the TSL of the TS will have to be increased by one SSA, GM-15.

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~~SECRET~~

Memorandum from [] to Mr. Revell
Re: FBI Detailee
Counterterrorism Center
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

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Present program commitments of the TS simply will not allow detailing of a SSA, GM-15 from within existing complement. Further, as the TS, CID, will maintain administrative control over the Agent assigned, the TSL of the TS must be adjusted accordingly.

If the detailing of this Agent is approved, the Terrorism Section has identified the San Francisco Division as the field office from which this position will come. This decision was based on current and projected domestic terrorism workload in the San Francisco Division for Fiscal Year 1988, TSL. The following figures were utilized as the basis for the aforementioned decision:

TARGET STAFFING LEVEL

FY88

San Francisco

13

Burn Rate as of July 4, 1987 8.29
Burn Rate as of September 30, 1987 8.56

It is therefore requested that the Domestic Terrorism TSL for Fiscal Year 1988 for the San Francisco Division be set at 12 in order to staff the position of FBI Detailee to the CTC, CIA.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

5/27/88

MEMORANDUM TO MESSRS:

REVELL

GEER

DUHADWAY

POMERANTZ

SSP
CLASS
SRC'D
SER
REC

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 02-28-2018 BY [REDACTED]

b6
b7C

RE ~~CIA COUNTERINTELLIGENCE CENTER (CIC)~~
~~RELATIONS WITH CIA~~

This communication is classified "~~Secret~~" in its
entirety.

The new CIA Counterintelligence Center, combining components from the Deputy Directorate for Operations (DDO), the Deputy Directorate for Intelligence (DDI), and CIA Office of Security is now operational. The CIC will provide better internal coordination and capability in CIA's counterintelligence areas of focus.

An organizational chart and a copy of a breakdown of principal CIC components and their responsibilities is attached for your information.

Effective immediately, all Double Agent travel concurrence requests to the CIC are to be directed as follows:

Director of Central Intelligence

Attn: [REDACTED]

Associate Deputy Director for Operations
for Counterintelligence (ADDO/CI)

Room 7E17

CIA Headquarters Building

b1 per CIA
b3

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Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

Enclosures

ENCLOSURE

1 - [REDACTED]
1 - [REDACTED]
1 - CIA Relations

JMW:Ice (17)

MAIL ROOM ☐

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Classified by: 03
Declassify on: OADR

13 JUN 28 1988

(CONTINUED OVER)

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Messrs. Memorandum from [redacted] dated 5/27/88
Re: CIA Counterintelligence Center (CIC)
Relations with CIA

b6
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b1 per CIA
b3

(S) [redacted]
(Note: All other travel concurrences which must be approved by CIA in Counterterrorism and other FCI-related agent travel will continue to be directed as follows:

Director of Central Intelligence

(S)

[redacted]
CIA Headquarters Building

b1 per CIA
b3

(S) [redacted] is authorized to approve all nondouble agent related travel concurrences.)

Normal correspondence with CIC which is not for travel concurrence will be directed as follows:

Director of Central Intelligence
Attn: Hugh E. Price

(S)

[redacted]
CIA Headquarters Building

Other executives of CIC who will have periodic contact with the FBI in their new capacities are: b1 per CIA
b3

(S)

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- 2 -

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Messrs. Memorandum from [] dated 5/27/88
Re: CIA CounterIntelligence Center (CIC)
Relations with CIA

b6
b7C

Telephone numbers for all of the groups and branches of the CIC are set forth in the attached breakdown of CIC groups, areas of Jurisdiction.

Please route this information to all pertinent personnel to assure familiarity by FBIHQ personnel with the new CIA CIC operations. Any other questions regarding the CIA CIC may be directed to FBI [] SSA []
[] Extension 4643, Room 7452.

[]
Inspector-In-Charge
Office of Liaison and
International Affairs

~~SECRET~~

- 3 -

~~SECRET~~

5 May 1988

(S) SUBJECT: CIA's Counterintelligence Center

(S) [redacted] Chief, Counterintelligence Center, [redacted]
Responsible for the defense of CIA's foreign operations, the security of all CIA components against penetration by foreign security and intelligence services, and developing CIA policy with respect to counterintelligence issues.

(S) b1 per CIA
b3

(S) [redacted] Special Assistant to C/CIC, [redacted]
Handles particularly sensitive cases and assists C/CIC in dealing with other US agencies and foreign intelligence and security services.

(S) b1 per CIA
b3

(S) [redacted]
Conducts, commissions, and coordinates research in CIA to further the understanding of the counterintelligence threat against the United States, provides collection requirements and maintains counterintelligence data bases, and produces CI studies.

(S) [redacted]
Produces studies for the policy maker, analyst, and field operations officer on the intelligence and security services and the counterintelligence threat from all countries of the world except the Soviet Union.

(S) [redacted]
Maintains and augments counterintelligence data banks, develops new methodology in addressing counterintelligence issues, and provides analytic support to counterintelligence operations, investigations, and field surveys.

(S) b1 per CIA
b3

Hugh E.
Price
(3rd)
[redacted]
62-80750-6829

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ENCLOSURE


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b1 per CIA
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Counterintelligence Center

(S)

ADDO/CI
and
C/CI Center

S/A

b1 per CIA
b3 4,

~~SECRET~~

January 19, 1988

RE: ^① CIA APPOINTMENT OF
INSPECTOR GENERAL WILLIAM F. DONNELLY
EFFECTIVE JANUARY 18, 1988

Director Sessions:

For your information, [redacted] our [redacted]
[redacted] has been advised that effective January 18,
1988, WILLIAM F. DONNELLY, formerly Deputy Director of
Administration at CIA, has been appointed as Inspector General of
CIA. You met BILL DONNELLY at the lunch where you were provided
general briefings on CIA.

b6
b7C

In an internal administrative announcement, Judge
WEBSTER has announced to the CIA General Staff that he is
strengthening the role of the office of Inspector General. The
Inspector General will now report directly to Judge WEBSTER and
holds the rank of Deputy Director, subordinate only to the
Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and to the Deputy Director
of Central Intelligence (DDCI).

Additionally, Judge WEBSTER has announced that the
Inspector General's staff will be enlarged and CIA's most
talented, highly-rated GS-15s through SIS-03s from across the
agency will serve at least one-year terms in the Office of
Inspector General. Successful completion of that assignment is
viewed internally in the CIA as a key assignment leading to more
senior positions in the agency.

Additionally, Judge WEBSTER has informed his staff
internally that he views the Inspector General's charter as
broader than it had been, heretofore. In addition to normal
inspection, investigation, and audit activities, their role will
be, in a constructive sense, directly involved in improving
overall agency management, insuring accountability and
discipline, and encouraging the raising of standards and quality
of performance, as well as playing a significant role in the
development of top managers and leaders of the future.

The Domestic Liaison Unit, CIA liaison representative
will maintain close contact with Inspector General DONNELLY to
assure that matters of mutual concern to the FBI and CIA are
effectively addressed.

Exec AD Adm. _____
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Off. Liaison _____
Int. Affs. _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

1 - Mr. O. B. Revell
1 - Mr. [redacted]
1 - Mr. J. E. Otto
1 - Mr. [redacted]
1 - Mr. [redacted]

120 7589

O. B. Revell

1 - Mr. J. H. Geer
1 - Mr. [redacted]
1 - Mr. [redacted]
1 - Mr. [redacted]
1 - DLU (CIA Relations)

b6
b7C

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BY LIAISON

Date: February 19, 1988

To: Mr. Lee S. Strickland
Chief, Information Services Division
Central Intelligence Agency
1107 Ames Building
Washington, D.C.

From: Gary L. Stoops
Security Programs Manager

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 03-01-2018 BY [REDACTED]

b6
b7C

Subject: REQUEST CONSIDERATION FOR DECLASSIFICATION
OF DOCUMENT

This document is classified "~~Confidential~~"; however, is
"~~Unclassified~~" when separated from classified enclosures.

(S) Reference is made to a telephonic conversation on
February 8, 1988, between [REDACTED] Classification
Manager of your office, and Mrs. [REDACTED] Document
Classification Specialist of my office.

b1 Per CIA
b3

Request is made for declassification consideration of
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) document SW 85-10065, dated
August 1985, entitled "Free World (Non-US) Ground Weapons
Fire-Control Computers."

A representative of our Technical Services Division has
advised he believes that information in the document has been
public knowledge for three to five years, and the interest of the
Government and the public would best be served by
declassification. This study is currently protected by Warning
Notice Intelligence Sources or Methods Involved (WNINTEL).
Justification for this request, is as follows:

CONFIDENTIAL MATERIAL ENCLOSED

- 1 - Mr. Bayse
1 - Mr. McCreight
1 - Mr. Stoops
2 - Mr. [REDACTED]
1 - Mr. [REDACTED]

(Attn: Mr. [REDACTED], Mr. [REDACTED])

DELIVERED BY LIAISON
DATE 2/22/88

62-80750-1230

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Director's Sec'y _____

13 MAY 1988
MAIL ROOM

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~~SECRET~~

11 MAR 16 1988

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mr. Lee S. Strickland

The study SW85-10085 came about as a result of the DCI's exceptional analyst award granted in 1983. The aim of the program was to produce an Unclassified reference handbook for military attaches, data exchange agreement personnel within various U. S. Government agencies and, to a limited extent, covert collection entities for the purpose of identification of Free World (non-U. S.) computerized fire control systems for a variety of field army, tube artillery weapon systems. A need for such a study was recognized after several years of analytical work about the subject (fire control computers) because numerous overt and covert collection systems had considerable difficulties understanding collection requirements concerning performance, parametric data, and identification and use of various fire control computers. Because of the anticipated and sought-after wide distribution of the study, all information gathered from international firms and used for the study was deliberately kept Unclassified to avoid possible compromise of classified information. However, an exception was made in the case of Table ^{b1} per CIA 3 where some parametric data was derived from company proprietary ^{b3} sources in order to give it meaning and completeness:

(S)

during this program or during the writing of the study were covert or sensitive intelligence sources or methods employed in obtaining such information. Consequently, our representative believes the "WNINTEL" (inside cover) caveat was inappropriately applied to the study.

The study SW85-10085 at the time of its publication contained company proprietary information which has become public knowledge since 1985, as a result of its disclosure in numerous armament magazines (e.g., International Defense Review, Mil Technology, etc.) and in product information brochures issued by the company of the proprietary information. The particular classified information, now public knowledge, is contained on Table 3, page 19, and is marked. Appended (enclosures 2-5) are company data from their unclassified sales brochure.

The "~~Confidential~~" classification of the study was applied by the CIA during the review and editing process. Since the cited company proprietary information is now public knowledge and the fact that all other data on Table 3 has appeared in numerous defense-oriented magazines for at least five years, it is requested that Table 3 be declassified to "Unclassified" and the entire study be unclassified as well.

- 2 -

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Mr. Lee S. Strickland

Your expeditious handling of our request in this matter will be greatly appreciated.

Any questions you may have with regard to these matters may be directed to Unit Chief [REDACTED] FTS [REDACTED]

b6
b7C

Return documents to Section Chief Gary L. Stoops,
Security Programs Manager, Room 4246, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Washington, D.C. 20535.

Enclosures (5)

- 3 -

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Memorandum

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ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 03-01-2018 BY [redacted]



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Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

To : Mr. Bayse *wms/co*

3/25/88

Date

From : E. W. Ludemann *EW*

From :

Subject : COVERT COMMUNICATIONS MEETING
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)
[redacted]

Subject :

(S) This document is classified "~~SECRET~~" in its entirety,
unless otherwise noted. (U)

b1 per CIA
b3

(U) PURPOSE: To report the results of a Covert Communications
Coordination Meeting held on 3/1/88 at the CIA in Rosslyn,
Virginia. (S)

(S) [redacted]
1 - Mr. Geer
(Attn: Mr. [redacted])

1 - Mr. [redacted]
(Attn: Mr. [redacted])

1 - Mr. Bayse

1 - Mr. [redacted]

1 - Mr. [redacted]

2 - Mr. Naylor

(Attn: [redacted])

1 - Mr. [redacted]

1 - Mr. [redacted]

1 - Mr. [redacted]

3 APR 15 1988

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~~Classified by: 9175~~
~~Declassify on: OADR~~

OCS:tlw (11)

(Continued Over)

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Memorandum from [redacted] to Mr. Bayse
Re: COVERT COMMUNICATIONS MEETING
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
[redacted]

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b1 per CIA
b3

RECOMMENDATION: That close coordination continue between the CIA
and the FBI on the covert communications
requirements and technical developments.

APPROVED: Adm. Servs. _____ Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. _____
Crim. Inv. _____ Ident. _____ Ctr. of Lia. & Int. Affs. _____
Director _____ Inspection _____ Exec. AD-Adm. _____ Intell. _____ Rec. Mgmt. _____
Exec. AD-Inv. _____ Laboratory _____ Tech. Servs. _____
Exec. AD-LES _____ Legal Coun. _____ Training _____

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b7C

b1 per CIA
b3

DETAILS: On 3/1/88, FBI representatives Messrs. [redacted] met with CIA
representative Mr. MIKE CALANEDES who is the Contracting Officer's


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Memorandum from [] to Mr. Bayse
Re: COVERT COMMUNICATIONS MEETING
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

b1 per Clb6
b3 b7C

(S)



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~~SECRET~~

Memorandum from [] to Mr. Bayse
Re: COVERT COMMUNICATIONS MEETING
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

b1 per CIIB6
b3 b7C

(S)

(S)


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Memorandum from [redacted] to Mr. Bayse
Re: COVERT COMMUNICATIONS MEETING
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

b1 per Cb6
b3 b7C

(S)



~~SECRET~~

Memorandum

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 03-01-2018 BY [redacted]



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Training _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

~~SECRET~~

To : Mr. J. H. Geer *JHG/ut*

Date 2/16/88

From : [redacted] *JET/ut*

SSP
CLASS. *J*
SRC'D *J*
SER *J*
REC *J*
Subject: LIAISON CONTACT *CP* CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

This communication is classified "~~Secret~~" in its entirety.

b1 per CIA
b3

PURPOSE:

(S)

[Redacted box for Purpose]

RECOMMENDATIONS:

None, for informational purposes only.

JET/ut
b1 per CIA
b3
b6
b7C

DETAILS:

(S) [Redacted box for Details]

62-88750-6830X3

① - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]

TJF (4)

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MAR 21 1988

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FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 03-01-2018 BY [redacted]

b6
b7C

February 12, 1988

BY LIAISON

ST
SDS

Mr. Stanley M. Moskowitz
Director, Office of Training and Education
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Moskowitz:

(S) On behalf of the Intelligence Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, I would like to express gratitude for the cooperation of your office in providing two instructors who conducted a training course at our San Francisco Field Office from January 12-22, 1988.

Specifically, I would like to personally thank [redacted]

b1 per CIA
b3

Branch for their presentation of the "Seminar on Intelligence Analysis." [redacted] professional knowledge and teaching skills were of the highest caliber and reflected very favorably on themselves and the Central Intelligence Agency. The course was both intellectually stimulating and practically useful and was well received by all those in attendance.

(S) Again, I am most appreciative of the fine effort displayed by these individuals. They should be recognized for a job well done.

Sincerely,

62-80750-16830X4
James H. Geer
Assistant Director in Charge
Intelligence Division

17 MAR 16 1988

COVERED BY LIAISON
DATE 2/16/88 [signature]

b6
b7C

1 - Mr. J. H. Geer

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Director's Sec'y _____

MAIL ROOM
1/14/88

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Mr. Stanley M. Moskowitz

NOTE: Conveys appreciation to CIA for its assistance in providing instructors for "Seminar on Intelligence Analysis," held January 12-22, 1988, in San Francisco, California.

EGG mmb
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- 2 -

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Memorandum

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 03-01-2018 BY [redacted]

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Director's Sec'y _____

~~SECRET~~

To : Mr. J. H. Geer *John*

Date 10/20/88

From : [redacted] *John*

Subject : LIAISON CONTACT - CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA) *O*

BSE
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FOR
[initials]

This communication is classified ~~SECRET~~ in its entirety.

PURPOSE:

To report contact with [redacted] CIAHQ, Langley, Virginia.

b1 per CIA
b3

RECOMMENDATION:

(S)

John None, for informational purposes only.

62-80750-6031

2 NOV 7 1988

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SC:mlh (5) *def*

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Classified by: 3048
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Memorandum from [] to Mr. J. H. Geer
Re: Liaison Contact - Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

DETAILS:

(S) On 10/18/88, Supervisory Special Agent [] met with [] CIAHQ, concerning FBI asset reporting of interest to the CIA. [] was advised that an FBI asset recently returned from the People's Republic of China (PRC) and stated that the economy in China is in a "crisis state" and that Party Secretary ZHAO Ziyang is taking the brunt of the criticism for failing economic reform policies. [] was further advised that more "right-wing" factions of the Chinese Communist Party are steadily gaining influence because of the slower pace of economic reform. b1 per CIA b3

(S) Discussion continued, centering around the possible fall from authority of ZHAO as a scapegoat due to the economic problems in the PRC.

~~SECRET~~

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
1 - Liaison Unit

b6
b7C

April 8, 1988

BY LIAISON

m
Mr. Gardner R. ~~Hathaway~~, Chief
Counterintelligence Staff
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C.

Dear Gus:

b1 per CIA
b3

(S) As you probably know, [redacted] of your staff recently gave a presentation at a counterintelligence conference at our academy in Quantico, Virginia. In attendance were personnel from various FBI field divisions who are involved in illegals investigations. [redacted] presentation was highly (S) informative, interesting and was well received by the participants. Please pass on to [redacted] our appreciation for his contribution to our conference.

(S) We were also pleased [redacted] and [redacted] of your staff were able to attend the conference.

62-80750-6832
Sincerely yours,

APR 21 1988

(S) James H. Geer
Assistant Director in Charge
Intelligence Division

RECEIVED BY LIAISON
4/13/88

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Exec AD Inv.
Exec AD LES

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APPROVED:

Director _____
Exec AD-Adm. _____
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Director's Sec'y _____

MAIL ROOM ☐

114 MAY 19 1988
13 MAY 19 1988

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ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 03-01-2018 BY [REDACTED]

b6
b7C

(S)
June 22, 1988

BY LIAISON

CIA

b1 per CIA
b3

[REDACTED]
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C.

(S)
Dear [REDACTED]

Thank you very much for addressing our recent seminar for undercover Agents. I was told that the presentation was very well received, and that the attendees learned a great deal about your Agency.

I thought you would like to hear what the attendees thought of your presentation, so I have selected a few comments from the class critiques:

- very informative and interesting - good part of the class - an interesting hour;
- very well prepared and provided information that was very enlightening;
- provided a very good perspective for the class;
- fascinating talk - worked very hard to make the presentation relevant to undercover work;

In conclusion, the class obviously enjoyed your presentation and learned a great deal about how your Agency approaches undercover work. I hope that we will continue to share information and that perhaps we may call upon you to address future seminars.

Thank you again for your time.

Sincerely,

62-80750-16833
JUL 15 1988

John J. Covert
Section Chief
Investigative Support Section

Exec AD Adm. _____
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Adm. Servs. _____
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1 - Mr. Simpson
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FIC/KR

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Hand delivered by
SSA [REDACTED] *CIA*
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
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DATE 03-01-2018 BY

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
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
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ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 03-01-2018 BY

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(When Approved)


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b1 per CIA
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(S)



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FORM 4092B

CONTINUATION SHEET

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b1 per CIA
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(S)



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b1 per CIA
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
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b1 per CIA
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FORM 4092B


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
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
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


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FORM
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
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
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b1 per CIA
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


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b1 per CIA
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FORM 40928


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


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DATE 03-01-2018 BY [REDACTED]

BY LIAISON

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Date: November 21, 1988

To: Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Attention: [REDACTED]
Deputy Director for Legislation
Office of Congressional Affairs

b1 per CIA
b3

From: William S. Sessions, Director *WSS*

Subject: INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM FOR THE
101ST CONGRESS, 1ST SESSION

Attached are revised versions of the FBI's legislative proposals for the Intelligence Community Legislative Program. Please have your staff contact SSA [REDACTED] Congressional Affairs Office at 324-4515 if there are any questions regarding these revisions.

b6
b7C

Enclosure

- 1 - Mr. Revell - Enclosure
- 1 - Mr. Geer - Enclosure
- 1 - Mr. Ahlerich - Enclosure
- 1 - Mr. DuHadway - Enclosure
- 1 - [REDACTED] - Enclosure
- 1 - [REDACTED] - Enclosure
- 1 - [REDACTED] - Enclosure
- 1 - [REDACTED] - Enclosure
- 1 - [REDACTED] - Enclosure
- 1 - [REDACTED] - Enclosure
- 1 - [REDACTED] - Enclosure

*By Comm. staff
11/23/88*

(54)

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NOTE: The attached revisions of proposed amendments to the Fair Credit Reporting Act and the Social Security Act are submitted to ensure the requested authority is mandatory and to restore a deletion. These changes were made by CAO and have been reviewed and approved by INTD Special Staff.

Exec AD Adm. *[initials]*
Exec AD Inv. *[initials]*
Exec AD LES *[initials]*
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Servs. *[initials]*
Crim. Inv. *[initials]*
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Legal Coun. *[initials]*
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Rec. Mgnt. *[initials]*
Tech. Servs. *[initials]*
Training *[initials]*
Off. Liaison & Int. Affs. *[initials]*
Telephone Rm. *[initials]*
Director's Sec'y *[initials]*
MAIL ROOM *[initials]*

Mr. Majh (14)
1-ENCLOSURE
RJK

APPROVED: *WSS*
Director *[initials]*
Exec. AD-Adm. *[initials]*
Exec. AD-Inv. *[initials]*
Exec. AD-LES *[initials]*
Adm. Servs. *[initials]*
Crim. Inv. *[initials]*
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Training *[initials]*

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Bm/s

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TITLE VI
FBI ENHANCED COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AUTHORITIES

Access to Consumer Reports

SEC. 601 The Consumer Credit Protection Act is amended by inserting "(1)" before the existing paragraph of Section 608 (15 U.S.C. 1681f.) and adding the following new paragraphs:

"(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 1681b. of this title, a consumer reporting agency shall furnish a consumer report to the Federal Bureau of Investigation when presented with a request for a consumer report made pursuant to this subsection by the Federal Bureau of Investigation providing that the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or his designee, certifies in writing to the consumer reporting agency that such records are sought for foreign counterintelligence purposes and that there are specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe the person to whom the requested consumer report relates is an agent of a foreign power as defined in Section 101 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801).

"(3) Notwithstanding the provision of Section 1681b. of this title, a consumer reporting agency shall furnish identifying information respecting any consumer, limited to name, address, former address, place of employment, or former place of employment, to a representative of the Federal Bureau of Investigation when presented with a written request signed by the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or the Director's designee, stating that the information is sought in connection with an authorized foreign counterintelligence investigation.

"(4) No consumer reporting agency, or officer, employee, or agent of such institution, shall disclose to any person that the Federal Bureau of Investigation has sought or obtained a consumer report or identifying information respecting any consumer under this section."

62-80750-6835

~~SECRET~~

Access to Social Security Information

SEC. 602 The Social Security Act is amended by adding at the end of Section 1106 (42 U.S.C. 1306) a new subsection (f):

"(f) FBI REQUESTS FOR FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PURPOSES.

"Notwithstanding Section 1306 (a), the Secretary of Health and Human Services, or the Secretary of Labor, as the case may be, shall disclose information in the Secretary's possession relating to the address, former address, place of employment, and former place of employment of a named person, when presented with a certification signed by the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or the Director's designee, stating that:

"(1) The information is sought in connection with an authorized foreign counterintelligence investigation; and,

"(2) There are specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe the person is an agent of a foreign power as defined in Section 101 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801)."

~~SECRET~~

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DATE 03-01-2018 BY [REDACTED]

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b7C

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

April 8, 1988

BY LIAISON

(S)

[REDACTED]
Special Assistant to the Director
of Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C.

b1 per CIA
b3

O
CIA

(S) Dear [REDACTED]

During recent conversations you indicated that Judge Webster was to be interviewed, part of which would touch on two meetings he had as Director of the FBI. The meetings were on November 19, 1986, and November 24, 1986, and were with representatives of a foreign government. You inquired whether the FBI had any objection to disclosure of the specific identities of the foreign representatives during the interview.

In that regard, this letter confirms what you were previously advised, i.e., the FBI has no objection to disclosure of the identities of the representatives of the foreign government.

Sincerely,

62-80750-6836

(S)

[REDACTED]
Special Assistant to the
Director

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b7C

Exec AD Adm. _____
Exec AD Inv. _____
Exec AD LES _____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Servs. _____
Crim. Inv. _____
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Intell. _____
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Legal Coun. _____
Off. Cong. & _____
Public Affs. _____
Rec. Mgnt. _____
Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____
Off. Liaison & _____
Int. Affs. _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

1 - [REDACTED]
1 - [REDACTED]
JEC:aeb/ (4)

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DATE 4/13/88

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
SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

4 JUN 6 1989

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(S)



b1 per CIA
b3

NOTE: The above-noted representatives are as follows:


November 19, 1986 Meeting



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November 24, 1986 Meeting



The above was discussed with  Office of Liaison and International Affairs, and Executive Assistant Director Revell.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 03-01-2018 BY [redacted]

3 MAY 1988

b6
b7C

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation DE-315

ATTENTION: Intelligence Division

SUBJECT: ~~Soviet Attempts to Establish
Pen Pal Relationships~~

(S)

HQ 1275

1. An ~~ex-~~ employee of CIA/ Dora D. O'Steen, [redacted] has provided the information noted in paragraphs 2 through 4 below. She is available for discussion of the matter described.

b1 per CIA
b3

new/ [redacted] 4/9/88

2. Mrs. O'Steen's 9-year old daughter is a fourth grade student at the Louise Archer School in Vienna, Virginia. In February 1988 a "Russian professor" appeared at the school to talk about Russia. In the course of his visit he asked the children in the fourth grade for the names and addresses of those who wished to correspond with Russian pen pals. All the students in the class reportedly signed up.

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to do
some thing
of course
and subjects
to Rick Director

3. On 24 March 1988 Mrs. O'Steen's daughter received a letter, ostensibly from a fourth grader in the Soviet Union. In this brief letter the writer, Signe (last name not given), provided some basic (uninteresting) biographic data concerning her family and asked Mrs. O'Steen's daughter to enter into correspondence with her. Mrs. O'Steen subsequently established that her daughter was one of at least four Louise Archer fourth graders who had received letters from the USSR, all on 24 March 1988.

DE-315
62-80750-6836

4. Mrs. O'Steen was told by the principal of the Louise Archer School, Ms. Judy RAMIG, that the "Russian professor" was one Igor TIPANAS whose visit to the school had been arranged through the parents of another Louise Archer School fourth grader, Robert and Lois McCormick, residing 428 Knoll Street NW, Vienna, Va. TIPANAS reportedly stayed with the McCormicks while in the D.C. area.

WARNING NOTICE
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
OR METHODS INVOLVED

NO response required
of INTD.

CL BY Signer
DECL - OADR
DERIVED FROM HUM 4-82

b6
b7C

Stupid
Remarks
of course
and subjects
to Rick Director

1 MAY 25 1989

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5. Igor's TIPANAS is almost certainly identical with Igor Ol'Gertovich TIPANS, DPOB 2 February 1953, Riga, Latvia, USSR. TIPANS was one of 19 Soviets who was invited to the U.S. in December 1987 by the "Center for Soviet-American Initiatives" (believed identical with the "Center for US - USSR Initiatives", described as a peace seeking organization based in San Francisco). TIPANS was listed as an engineer/physicist in his U.S. visa request. Our only other possible trace on TIPANS is to a FNU TIPANS, mentioned in a Department of the Army FSTC (Foreign Science and Technology Center) message of 3 April 1987. The FSTC, a U.S. Army research facility in Charlottesville, Va. indicated no interest in this FNU TIPANS.


6. TIPANAS' attempts to encourage the establishment of pen pal relationships between U.S. and Soviet children may be no more than the part of a normal Soviet propaganda ploy. It is noted, however, that TIPANAS' efforts in the Vienna, Va. area may be reflective of Soviet attempts to engage these children in longterm relationships. It is perhaps noteworthy that many U.S. Government employees, particularly those working for CIA and other sensitive government agencies, as well as businessmen doing business with the U.S. Government, and foreign diplomats reside in the Vienna area. The building of bonds of friendship with the USSR as well as the collection of biographic data on children of such people, would certainly be in the Soviets' interest.

7. Please address all correspondence concerning this matter to the CI Staff, Attention: Counterespionage Branch, referencing the CIOL number given below.

8. All portions of this document are classified ~~Secret~~.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS:

(S)



b1 per CIA
b3

CIOL-0365-88

~~SECRET~~

~~FEDERAL GOVERNMENT~~

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DATE 03-01-2018 BY [REDACTED]

b6
b7C

Honorable William H. Webster
Director of Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C.

Dear Judge Webster:

It is a distinct honor for me to invite you to attend a portrait dedication ceremony to be held in your honor on July 20 at 2 p.m. in the east wing of the J. Edgar Hoover F.B.I. Building.

Your many friends, former FBI colleagues, associates in Washington and representatives of the Bar Association in St. Louis wish to express, yet again, their deepest appreciation for your leadership as FBI Director.

To place on permanent display the life-size portrait of the FBI's third Director is a small tribute to show our esteem and gratitude for the contributions you have made to our country.

Moreover, I personally look forward to this occasion as one of the very special moments in my first year as Director of the FBI.

Sincerely yours,

William S. Sessions

William S. Sessions
Director

- 1 - St. Louis
- 1 - Mr. Otto
- 1 - Mr. Revell
- 1 - [REDACTED]
- 1 - Mr. Ahlerich
- 1 - [REDACTED]
- 1 - Mrs. [REDACTED]
- 1 - [REDACTED]
- 1 - Telephone Room

APPROVED: [Signature] 5/14
Director [Signature]
Exec AD-Adm. _____
Exec AD-Inv. _____
Adm. Servs. _____
Crim. Inv. _____
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Inspection _____
Intell. _____
Laboratory _____
Legal Coun. _____
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Off. of Lia. & Intl. Affs. _____
Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____

DELIVERED BY LIAISON

DATE 5/20/88

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- Exec AD Inv. _____
- Exec AD LES _____
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- Legal Coun. _____
- Off. Cong. & Public Affs. _____
- Rec. Mgnt. _____
- Tech. Servs. _____
- Training _____
- Telephone Rm. _____
- Director's Sec'y _____

NOTE: Letter coordinated with the Director's secretary and Judge Webster's secretary.

DJM:dpm (15)

b1 per CIA
b3

Pat Myers
Rm 7861
TL 213

12 JUN 8 1988

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FBI/DOJ

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OF 11/1/88

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DATE 03-01-2018 BY [redacted]

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Telephone Rm.	_____
Director's Sec'y	_____

INBOX.30 (#7770)

TEXT:

VZCZCSF0013

RR HQ

DE SF #0013 2540104

ZNY SSSSS

R 090030Z SEP 88

FM FBI SAN FRANCISCO ([redacted]) (P)(SQ 11)

TO DIRECTOR FBI/ROUTINE/

BT

~~SECRET~~

CITE: //3790//

PASS: INTD, CI-2H.

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b1 per CIA
b3

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16 MAY 18 1989

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DATE 03-01-2018 BY

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FM DIRECTOR FBI

TO YB/DIRECTOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY


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b1 per CIA
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(S)



JET/DWL

OTC/otc (3)

9/19/88

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SEE NOTE PG 3
OCT 3 1988

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1 - CIA COORDINATION FOLDER

10-2005
SEP 19 1988

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16 MAY 18 1989

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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATION MESSAGE FORM

b1 per CIA
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PAGE 2

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
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b1 per CIA
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(S)

PAGE 3 ~~SECRET/UNINTEL~~
9/19/88



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b6
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Memorandum

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DATE 03-01-2018 BY [redacted]



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Exec AD Inv. _____
Exec AD LES _____
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Off. Cong. & Public Affs. _____
Rec. Mgnt. _____
Tech. Servs. _____
Training _____
Telephone Rm. _____
Director's Sec'y _____

~~SECRET~~

To : Mr. J. H. Geer *JH*

Date 8/24/88

From : [redacted]

Subject :

PROPOSED SYSTEM FOR [redacted] RELEASE
AND DISSEMINATION OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY (CIA) INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORTS (IIRs)

b1 per CIA
b3

This communication is classified "~~Secret~~" in its
entirety.

Reference is made to memorandum from [redacted]
[redacted] to Mr. JAMES H. GEER, dated 5/13/88, captioned as
above.

PURPOSE: To notify Intelligence Division of the progress made on
implementing a systematic approach for the [redacted] release and
dissemination of CIA IIRs.

RECOMMENDATION: That CI-3 Section, B Unit (CI-3B), coordinate
with CI-2 Section to obtain [redacted] release and dissemination
authority of CIA IIRs.

(S)

DE-89

SCD

62-80750-68410

1 - Mr. J. H. Geer

1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]

(Attn: [redacted])
[redacted] (9)

1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]

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(CONTINUED - OVER)

~~SECRET~~
Classified by 9912
Declassify on: OADR

[Handwritten signature]

18 JUN 20 1989

~~SECRET~~