Dear Mr. Greenewald:

This is in response to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request.

Records responsive to your request have been processed. In order to avoid charging duplication fees unnecessarily, we have made these records available in the FBI's electronic FOIA Library (The Vault) on the FBI's public website, http://vault.fbi.gov. On the right-hand side of the home page, under the heading "Vault Links" you can search for your subject alphabetically (click on "A-Z Index"), by category (click on "Categories"), or by entering text into our search engine (click on "Search Vault"). For records responsive to this request, please enter "Uranium One Transaction" as the search term.

The available documents represent a final release of information responsive to your FOIA request.

Below you will also find additional informational paragraphs about your request. Where applicable, check boxes are used to provide you with more information about your request. Please read each one carefully.

Additional records potentially responsive to your subject may exist. Please inform us if you would like the FBI to conduct a search of the indices to our Central Records System.

Additional records responsive to your request were processed but are not currently available on The Vault. Please inform us if you would like to receive these records.

Please be advised per standard FBI practice and pursuant to FOIA exemption (b)(7)(E)/Privacy Act exemption (g)(2) [5 U.S.C. § 552/552a (b)(7)(E)/(g)(2)], this response neither confirms nor denies the existence of your subject's name on any watch lists.

For your information, Congress excluded three discrete categories of law enforcement and national security records from the requirements of the FOIA. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(c) (2006 & Supp. IV (2010). This response is limited to those records subject to the requirements of the FOIA. This is a standard notification that is given to all our requesters and should not be taken as an indication that excluded records do, or do not, exist.

For questions regarding our determinations, visit the www.fbi.gov/foia website under "Contact Us." The FOIPA Request number listed above has been assigned to your request. Please use this number in all correspondence concerning your request.

You may file an appeal by writing to the Director, Office of Information Policy (OIP), United States Department of Justice, Suite 11050, 1425 New York Avenue, NW, Washington, D.C. 20530-0001, or you may submit an appeal through OIP's FOIAonline portal by creating an account on the following website: https://www.foiaonline.gov/foiaonline/action/public/home. Your appeal must be postmarked or electronically transmitted within ninety (90) days from the date of this letter in order to be considered timely. If you submit your appeal by mail, both the letter and the envelope should be clearly marked "Freedom of Information Act Appeal." Please cite the FOIPA Request Number assigned to your request so it may be easily identified.
You may seek dispute resolution services by contacting the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS) at 877-684-6448, or by emailing ogis@nara.gov. Alternatively, you may contact the FBI’s FOIA Public Liaison by emailing foiaquestions@fbi.gov. If you submit your dispute resolution correspondence by email, the subject heading should clearly state “Dispute Resolution Services.” Please also cite the FOIPA Request Number assigned to your request so it may be easily identified.

Enclosed for your information is a copy of the FBI Fact Sheet and Explanation of Exemptions.

Sincerely,

David M. Hardy
Section Chief,
Record/Information Dissemination Section
Information Management Division

Enclosure(s)
FBI FACT SHEET

• The primary functions of the FBI are national security and law enforcement.

• The FBI does not keep a file on every citizen of the United States.

• The FBI was not established until 1908 and we have very few records prior to the 1920s.

• FBI files generally contain reports of FBI investigations of a wide range of matters, including counterterrorism, counter-intelligence, cyber-crime, public corruption, civil rights, organized crime, white collar crime, major thefts, violent crime, and applicants.

• The FBI does not issue clearances or deny clearances for anyone other than its own personnel or persons having access to FBI facilities. Background investigations for security clearances are conducted by many different Government agencies. Persons who received a clearance while in the military or employed with some other government agency should contact that entity. Most government agencies have websites which are accessible on the internet which have their contact information.

• An identity history summary check or "rap sheet" is NOT the same as an "FBI file." It is a listing of information taken from fingerprint cards and related documents submitted to the FBI in connection with arrests, federal employment, naturalization or military service. The subject of a "rap sheet" may obtain a copy by submitting a written request to FBI CJIS Division – Summary Request, 1000 Custer Hollow Road, Clarksburg, WV 26306. Along with a specific written request, the individual must submit a new full set of his/her fingerprints in order to locate the record, establish positive identification, and ensure that an individual's records are not disseminated to an unauthorized person. The fingerprint submission must include the subject's name, date and place of birth. There is a required fee of $18 for this service, which must be submitted by money order or certified check made payable to the Treasury of the United States. A credit card payment option is also available. Forms for this option and additional directions may be obtained by accessing the FBI Web site at www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/identity-history-summary-checks.

• The National Name Check Program (NNCP) conducts a search of the FBI’s Universal Index (UNI) to identify any information contained in FBI records that may be associated with an individual and provides the results of that search to a requesting federal, state or local agency. Names are searched in a multitude of combinations and phonetic spellings to ensure all records are located. The NNCP also searches for both “main” and “cross reference” files. A main file is an entry that carries the name corresponding to the subject of a file, while a cross reference is merely a mention of an individual contained in a file. A search of this magnitude can result in several "hits" on an individual. In each instance where UNI has identified a name variation or reference, information must be reviewed to determine if it is applicable to the individual in question.

• The Record/Information Dissemination Section (RIDS) searches for records and provides copies of FBI documents responsive to Freedom of Information or Privacy Act (FOIPA) requests for information. RIDS provides responsive documents to requesters seeking "reasonably described information." For a FOIPA search, the subject's name, event, activity, or business is searched to determine whether there is an associated investigative file. This is called a "main file search" and differs from the NNCP search.

FOR GENERAL INFORMATION ABOUT THE FBI, VISIT OUR WEBSITE AT www.fbi.gov

07/02/18
EXPLANATION OF EXEMPTIONS

SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552

(b)(1) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified to such Executive order;

(b)(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency;

(b)(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this title), provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld;

(b)(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential;

(b)(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;

(b)(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy;

(b)(7) records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information (A) could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of confidential sources, including a State, local, or foreign agency or authority or any private institution which furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in the case of record or information compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, information furnished by a confidential source, (E) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law, or (F) could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual;

(b)(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or

(b)(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells.

SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552a

(d)(5) information compiled in reasonable anticipation of a civil action proceeding;

(j)(2) material reporting investigative efforts pertaining to the enforcement of criminal law including efforts to prevent, control, or reduce crime or apprehend criminals;

(k)(1) information which is currently and properly classified pursuant to an Executive order in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy, for example, information involving intelligence sources or methods;

(k)(2) investigatory material compiled for law enforcement purposes, other than criminal, which did not result in loss of a right, benefit or privilege under Federal programs, or which would identify a source who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;

(k)(3) material maintained in connection with providing protective services to the President of the United States or any other individual pursuant to the authority of Title 18, United States Code, Section 3056;

(k)(4) required by statute to be maintained and used solely as statistical records;

(k)(5) investigatory material compiled solely for the purpose of determining suitability, eligibility, or qualifications for Federal civilian employment or for access to classified information, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;

(k)(6) testing or examination material used to determine individual qualifications for appointment or promotion in Federal Government service he release of which would compromise the testing or examination process;

(k)(7) material used to determine potential for promotion in the armed services, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished the material pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence.
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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Electronic Communication

Title: (U/FOC) CFIUS 10-040 Rosatom / Uranium

Date: 05/15/2015

From: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
D5-CB9D
Contact:

Approved By: UC

Drafted By:

Case ID #:

ROSATOM /URANIUM ONE

CFIUS INFORMATION

This document contains information obtained for the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS). This information is confidential pursuant to 50 App. U.S.C. 2170(c) and is exempt from FOIA and public disclosure or dissemination outside the U.S. government. It may not be used in a criminal investigation, unless prior written approval is obtained from DOJ. Consult the Office of the General Counsel for further guidance.

Synopsis: (U/FOC) This Electronic Communication places two letters received from members of the United States Congress into the case file. These letters were sent to the Treasury Department related to the captioned Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States transaction.

Reason: 1.4(c)
Derived From: Multiple Sources

Enclosure(s): Enclosed are the following items:
1. (U/FOC) House Financial Services Committee letter
2. (U/FOC) Senate request letter
This Electronic Communication places two letters received from members of the United States Congress into the case file. These letters were sent to the Treasury Department related to the captioned Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) transaction. In summary, the letters requested information pertaining to the CFIUS deliberations and adjudication.
April 30, 2015

The Honorable Jacob J. Lew  
Secretary of the Treasury  
Department of the Treasury  
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States  
1500 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW  
Washington, D.C. 20220

Dear Secretary Lew:

Recent media reports1 have raised questions regarding the review and investigation by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) of a 2010 transaction that led to a Russian state-owned company gaining control of one-fifth of all uranium production capacity in the United States.2

Accordingly, by not later than May 14, 2015, please provide all records3 reflecting CFIUS's deliberative process relating to the sale of the company Uranium One to the Russian state-owned corporation Rosatom in 2010, including but not limited to all communications by any federal government officials regarding the proposed sale and approval.4

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2 The head of the Russian corporation that now controls the uranium reserves has been quoted by the Russian media as saying: "[W]e control 20 percent of uranium in the United States. If we need that uranium, we shall be able to use it any time." Rosatom Controls 20 Pot of Uranium in US, TASS, May 25; http://tass.ru/en/archive/693787.
3 The term "records" means any written, recorded, or graphic matter of any nature whatsoever, regardless of how recorded or preserved, and whether original or copy.
4 Pursuant to Section 721(c) of the Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended, 50 U.S.C. App. 2170(c) (2012), Congress is entitled to receive all requested information. Confidentiality of information—Any information or documentary material filed with the President or the President's designee pursuant to this section shall be exempt from disclosure under section 552 of title 5, United States Code, and no such information or documentary material may be made public, except as may be relevant to any administrative or judicial action or proceeding. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to prevent disclosure to either House of Congress or to any duly authorized committee or subcommittee of the Congress.

(Emphasis added.)
Please contact the Committee's Chief Oversight Counsel, Uttam Dhillon, at (202) 225-7502 with any questions regarding this request.

Sincerely,

JEB HENSARLING
Chairman
Committee on Financial Services

cc: The Hon. Maxine Waters, Ranking Member
The Honorable Jacob Lew  
Secretary of the Treasury  
Department of the Treasury  
1500 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW  
Washington, D.C. 20220

May 13, 2015

Dear Secretary Lew:

I am contacting you regarding my continued concerns regarding national security implications of Russian government ownership of American uranium reserves.

Several years ago, there were serious questions raised regarding the national security implications of a case pending before the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS). Case No. 10-40, that would sell American uranium reserves to a Russian government owned company Atomredmetzoloto (ARMZ). I wrote President Obama in December 2010 to express my strong concerns and make sure the Administration did not take steps to undermine our national security. A copy of the letter is attached.

My primary concern was that the deal would enable the Russian government to control a sizable portion of America’s uranium production capacity. I was also concerned that the sale would give this Russian company a significant stake in uranium mines in Kazakhstan. I pointed out that Russia, as we continue to witness, has a disturbing record of supporting nuclear programs in countries that are openly hostile to the United States—such as the Islamic Republic of Iran.

I told the President America’s national and energy security had to be the top priority in this deal. Safeguards needed to be implemented to prevent Russia from shipping U.S. uranium overseas. I asked for immediate notification if the Russian company filed for licenses to export U.S. uranium.

ARMZ now owns a 100 percent stake in Uranium One. The transaction to allow the Russian majority takeover of Uranium One was approved by CFIUS, which your agency chairs. National security implications of this deal continue to be of concern, especially with the recent revelations that foreign funds may have been used to influence the decision in the case (see attached New York Times story).

To provide the maximum amount of transparency to the public and Congress regarding the CFIUS approved sale, I ask you to please provide copies of any letters, analysis, or emails by representatives of any federal agency participating in the CFIUS review that expressed any concerns regarding the national security implications of this transaction between ARMZ and Uranium One. In addition, I am requesting any official correspondence, including the legally required threat analysis carried out by the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), sent to the CFIUS panel pertaining to this proposed transaction.
If you could please provide the information requested no later than May 31, 2015, that would be greatly appreciated. If your staff has any questions, please have them contact Brian Clifford of my staff at 202-224-6441.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

JOHN BARRASSO, M.D.
United States Senator

JB:bpe
December 21, 2010

President Barack Obama
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Ave NW
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President,

I am contacting you to express my strong concerns regarding the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) recent decision to approve the sale of American uranium reserves to Atomredmetzoloto (ARMZ).

ARMZ is owned by the Russian government and has sought to acquire a controlling stake in the Canadian owned Uranium One, Inc. This transaction would give the Russian government control over a sizable portion of America's uranium production capacity. Equally alarming, this sale gives ARMZ a significant stake in uranium mines in Kazakhstan.

As you know, Russia has a disturbing record of supporting nuclear programs in countries that are openly hostile to the United States. Russia has directly aided Iran's nuclear development and agreed on October 15, 2010 to help develop Venezuela's nuclear program. This record is at great odds with our own national security.

America's national and energy security must be paramount in any future decisions by your administration. As was communicated to the NRC by my staff prior to the sale, I remain concerned with any attempt to grant an export license to ARMZ which would allow the Russian government to ship U.S. uranium overseas. I would request immediate notification should ARMZ file for a license with the NRC to export U.S. uranium.

In light of this recent NRC decision, developing U.S. uranium is critical. The U.S. imports nearly 90 percent of the uranium used in America's nuclear power plants. Currently more than a dozen license applications are pending with the NRC for uranium mines in Wyoming. These delayed applications, dating back as far as 2007, are unacceptable. I ask that you work with me to ensure an active and strategic domestic uranium industry that lessens our dangerous dependence on foreign imports.

Thank you for your attention to this pressing matter.

Sincerely,

John Barasso, M.D.
United States Senator
composed of representatives from a number of United States government agencies. Among the agencies that eventually signed off was the State Department, then headed by Mr. Clinton's wife, Hillary Rodham Clinton.

As the Russians gradually assumed control of Uranium One in three separate transactions from 2009 to 2013, Canadian records show, a flow of cash made its way to the Clinton Foundation. Uranium One's chairman used his family foundation to make four donations totaling $2.35 million. Those contributions were not publicly disclosed by the Clintons, despite an agreement Mrs. Clinton had struck with the Obama White House to publicly identify all donors. Other people with ties to the company made donations as well.

And shortly after the Russians announced their intention to acquire a majority stake in Uranium One, Mr. Clinton received $500,000 for a Moscow speech from a Russian investment bank with links to the Kremlin that was promoting Uranium One stock.

At the time, both Rosatom and the United States government made promises intended to ease concerns about ceding control of the company's assets to the Russians. Those promises have been repeatedly broken, records show.

The New York Times's examination of the Uranium One deal is based on dozens of interviews, as well as a review of public records and securities filings in Canada, Russia and the United States. Some of the connections between Uranium One and the Clinton Foundation were unearthed by Peter Schweizer, a former fellow at the right-leaning Hoover Institution and author of the forthcoming book "Clinton Cash." Mr. Schweizer provided a preview of material in the book to The Times, which scrutinized his information and built upon it with its own reporting.

Whether the donations played any role in the approval of the uranium deal is unknown. But the episode underscores the special ethical challenges presented by the Clinton Foundation, headed by a former president who relied heavily on foreign cash to accumulate $250 million in assets even as his wife helped steer American foreign policy as secretary of state, presiding over decisions with the potential to benefit the foundation's donors.

In a statement, Brian Fallon, a spokesman for Mrs. Clinton's presidential
campaign, said no one "has ever produced a shred of evidence supporting the theory that Hillary Clinton ever took action as secretary of state to support the interests of donors to the Clinton Foundation." He emphasized that multiple United States agencies, as well as the Canadian government, had signed off on the deal and that, in general, such matters were handled at a level below the secretary. "To suggest the State Department, under then-Secretary Clinton, exerted undue influence in the U.S. government's review of the sale of Uranium One is utterly baseless," he added.

American political campaigns are barred from accepting foreign donations. But foreigners may give to foundations in the United States. In the days since Mrs. Clinton announced her candidacy for president, the Clinton Foundation has announced changes meant to quell longstanding concerns about potential conflicts of interest in such donations; it has limited donations from foreign governments, with many, like Russia's, barred from giving to all but its health care initiatives. That policy stops short of a more stringent agreement between Mrs. Clinton and the Obama administration that was in effect while she was secretary of state.

Either way, the Uranium One deal highlights the limits of such prohibitions. The foundation will continue to accept contributions from foreign sources whose interests, like Uranium One's, may overlap with those of foreign governments, some of which may be at odds with the United States.

When the Uranium One deal was approved, the geopolitical backdrop was far different from today's. The Obama administration was seeking to "reset" strained relations with Russia. The deal was strategically important to Mr. Putin, who shortly after the Americans gave their blessing sat down for a staged interview with Rosatom's chief executive, Sergei Kiriyenko. "Few could have imagined in the past that we would own 20 percent of U.S. reserves," Mr. Kiriyenko told Mr. Putin.

Now, after Russia's annexation of Crimea and aggression in Ukraine, the Moscow-Washington relationship is devolving toward Cold War levels, a point several experts made in evaluating a deal so beneficial to Mr. Putin, a man known to use energy resources to project power around the world.

"Should we be concerned? Absolutely," said Michael McFaul, who served
under Mrs. Clinton as the American ambassador to Russia but said he had been
unaware of the Uranium One deal until asked about it. “Do we want Putin to
have a monopoly on this? Of course we don’t. We don’t want to be dependent on
Putin for anything in this climate.”

A Seat at the Table

The path to a Russian acquisition of American uranium deposits began in
2005 in Kazakhstan, where the Canadian mining financier Frank Giustra
orchestrated his first big uranium deal, with Mr. Clinton at his side.

The two men had flown aboard Mr. Giustra’s private jet to Almaty,
Kazakhstan, where they dined with the authoritarian president, Nursultan A.
Nazarbayev. Mr. Clinton handed the Kazakh president a propaganda coup when
he expressed support for Mr. Nazarbayev’s bid to head an international elections
monitoring group, undercutting American foreign policy and criticism of
Kazakhstan’s poor human rights record by, among others, his wife, then a
senator.

Within days of the visit, Mr. Giustra’s fledgling company, UrAsia Energy
Ltd., signed a preliminary deal giving it stakes in three uranium mines
controlled by the state-run uranium agency Kazatomprom.

If the Kazakh deal was a major victory, UrAsia did not wait long before
resuming the hunt. In 2007, it merged with Uranium One, a South African
company with assets in Africa and Australia, in what was described as a $3.5
billion transaction. The new company, which kept the Uranium One name, was
controlled by UrAsia investors including Ian Telfer, a Canadian who became
chairman. Through a spokeswoman, Mr. Giustra, whose personal stake in the
deal was estimated at about $45 million, said he sold his stake in 2007.

Soon, Uranium One began to snap up companies with assets in the United
States. In April 2007, it announced the purchase of a uranium mill in Utah and
more than 38,000 acres of uranium exploration properties in four Western
states, followed quickly by the acquisition of the Energy Metals Corporation and
its uranium holdings in Wyoming, Texas and Utah. That deal made clear that
Uranium One was intent on becoming “a powerhouse in the United States
uranium sector with the potential to become the domestic supplier of choice for
U.S. utilities,” the company declared.
Still, the company’s story was hardly front-page news in the United States — until early 2008, in the midst of Mrs. Clinton’s failed presidential campaign, when The Times published an article revealing the 2005 trip’s link to Mr. Giustra’s Kazakhstan mining deal. It also reported that several months later, Mr. Giustra had donated $31.3 million to Mr. Clinton’s foundation.

(In a statement issued after this article appeared online, Mr. Giustra said he was “extremely proud” of his charitable work with Mr. Clinton, and he urged the media to focus on poverty, health care and “the real challenges of the world.”)

Though the 2008 article quoted the former head of Kazatomprom, Moukhtar Dzhakashev, as saying that the deal required government approval and was discussed at a dinner with the president, Mr. Giustra insisted that it was a private transaction, with no need for Mr. Clinton’s influence with Kazakh officials. He described his relationship with Mr. Clinton as motivated solely by a shared interest in philanthropy.

As if to underscore the point, five months later Mr. Giustra held a fund-raiser for the Clinton Giustra Sustainable Growth Initiative, a project aimed at fostering progressive environmental and labor practices in the natural resources industry, to which he had pledged $100 million. The star-studded gala, at a conference center in Toronto, featured performances by Elton John and Shakira and celebrities like Tom Cruise, John Travolta and Robin Williams encouraging contributions from the many so-called F.O.F.s — Friends of Frank — in attendance, among them Mr. Telfer. In all, the evening generated $16 million in pledges, according to an article in The Globe and Mail.

"None of this would have been possible if Frank Giustra didn’t have a remarkable combination of caring and modesty, of vision and energy and iron determination,” Mr. Clinton told those gathered, adding: “I love this guy, and you should, too.”

But what had been a string of successes was about to hit a speed bump.

**Arrest and Progress**

By June 2009, a little over a year after the star-studded evening in Toronto, Uranium One’s stock was in free-fall, down 40 percent. Mr. Dzhakishev, the head of Kazatomprom, had just been arrested on charges that he illegally sold uranium deposits to foreign companies, including at least some of those won by
Mr. Giustra’s UrAsia and now owned by Uranium One.

Publicly, the company tried to reassure shareholders. Its chief executive, Jean Nortier, issued a confident statement calling the situation a “complete misunderstanding.” He also contradicted Mr. Giustra’s contention that the uranium deal had not required government blessing. “When you do a transaction in Kazakhstan, you need the government’s approval,” he said, adding that UrAsia had indeed received that approval.

But privately, Uranium One officials were worried they could lose their joint mining ventures. American diplomatic cables made public by WikiLeaks also reflect concerns that Mr. Dzhakishiyev’s arrest was part of a Russian power play for control of Kazakh uranium assets.

At the time, Russia was already eying a stake in Uranium One, Rosatom company documents show. Rosatom officials say they were seeking to acquire mines around the world because Russia lacks sufficient domestic reserves to meet its own industry needs.

It was against this backdrop that the Vancouver-based Uranium One pressed the American Embassy in Kazakhstan, as well as Canadian diplomats, to take up its cause with Kazakh officials, according to the American cables.

“We want more than a statement to the press,” Paul Clarke, a Uranium One executive vice president, told the embassy’s energy officer on June 10, the officer reported in a cable. “That is simply chitchat.” What the company needed, Mr. Clarke said, was official written confirmation that the licenses were valid.

The American Embassy ultimately reported to the secretary of state, Mrs. Clinton. Though the Clarke cable was copied to her, it was given wide circulation, and it is unclear if she would have read it; the Clinton campaign did not address questions about the cable.

What is clear is that the embassy acted, with the cables showing that the energy officer met with Kazakh officials to discuss the issue on June 10 and 11.

Three days later, a wholly owned subsidiary of Rosatom completed a deal for 17 percent of Uranium One. And within a year, the Russian government substantially upped the ante, with a generous offer to shareholders that would give it a 51 percent controlling stake. But first, Uranium One had to get the American government to sign off on the deal.
The Power to Say No

When a company controlled by the Chinese government sought a 51 percent stake in a tiny Nevada gold mining operation in 2009, it set off a secretive review process in Washington, where officials raised concerns primarily about the mine's proximity to a military installation, but also about the potential for minerals at the site, including uranium, to come under Chinese control. The officials killed the deal.

Such is the power of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States. The committee comprises some of the most powerful members of the cabinet, including the attorney general, the secretaries of the Treasury, Defense, Homeland Security, Commerce and Energy, and the secretary of state. They are charged with reviewing any deal that could result in foreign control of an American business or asset deemed important to national security.

The national security issue at stake in the Uranium One deal was not primarily about nuclear weapons proliferation; the United States and Russia had for years cooperated on that front, with Russia sending enriched fuel from decommissioned warheads to be used in American nuclear power plants in return for raw uranium.

Instead, it concerned American dependence on foreign uranium sources. While the United States gets one-fifth of its electrical power from nuclear plants, it produces only around 20 percent of the uranium it needs, and most plants have only 18 to 36 months of reserves, according to Marin Katusa, author of "The Colder War: How the Global Energy Trade Slipped From America's Grasp."

"The Russians are easily winning the uranium war, and nobody's talking about it," said Mr. Katusa, who explores the implications of the Uranium One deal in his book. "It's not just a domestic issue but a foreign policy issue, too."

When ARMZ, an arm of Rosatom, took its first 17 percent stake in Uranium One in 2009, the two parties signed an agreement, found in securities filings, to seek the foreign investment committee's review. But it was the 2010 deal, giving the Russians a controlling 51 percent stake, that set off alarm bells. Four members of the House of Representatives signed a letter expressing concern. Two more began pushing legislation to kill the deal.

Senator John Barrasso, a Republican from Wyoming, where Uranium One's
largest American operation was, wrote to President Obama, saying the deal
"would give the Russian government control over a sizable portion of America's
uranium production capacity."

"Equally alarming," Mr. Barrasso added, "this sale gives ARMZ a significant
stake in uranium mines in Kazakhstan."

Uranium One's shareholders were also alarmed, and were "afraid of
Rosatom as a Russian state giant," Sergei Novikov, a company spokesman,
recalled in an interview. He said Rosatom's chief, Mr. Kiriyenko, sought to
reassure Uranium One investors, promising that Rosatom would not break up
the company and would keep the same management, including Mr. Telfer, the
chairman. Another Rosatom official said publicly that it did not intend to
increase its investment beyond 51 percent, and that it envisioned keeping
Uranium One a public company.

American nuclear officials, too, seemed eager to assuage fears. The Nuclear
Regulatory Commission wrote to Mr. Barrasso assuring him that American
uranium would be preserved for domestic use, regardless of who owned it.

"In order to export uranium from the United States, Uranium One Inc. or
ARMZ would need to apply for and obtain a specific NRC license authorizing the
export of uranium for use as reactor fuel," the letter said.

Still, the ultimate authority to approve or reject the Russian acquisition
rested with the cabinet officials on the foreign investment committee, including
Mrs. Clinton — whose husband was collecting millions in donations from people
associated with Uranium One.

**Undisclosed Donations**

Before Mrs. Clinton could assume her post as secretary of state, the White
House demanded that she sign a memorandum of understanding placing limits
on the activities of her husband's foundation. To avoid the perception of
conflicts of interest, beyond the ban on foreign government donations, the
foundation was required to publicly disclose all contributors.

To judge from those disclosures — which list the contributions in ranges
rather than precise amounts — the only Uranium One official to give to the
Clinton Foundation was Mr. Telfer, the chairman, and the amount was relatively
small: no more than $250,000, and that was in 2007, before talk of a Rosatom
deal began percolating.

But a review of tax records in Canada, where Mr. Telfer has a family charity called the Fernwood Foundation, shows that he donated millions of dollars more, during and after the critical time when the foreign investment committee was reviewing his deal with the Russians. With the Russians offering a special dividend, shareholders like Mr. Telfer stood to profit.

His donations through the Fernwood Foundation included $1 million reported in 2009, the year his company appealed to the American Embassy to help it keep its mines in Kazakhstan; $250,000 in 2010, the year the Russians sought majority control; as well as $600,000 in 2011 and $500,000 in 2012. Mr. Telfer said that his donations had nothing to do with his business dealings, and that he had never discussed Uranium One with Mr. or Mrs. Clinton. He said he had given the money because he wanted to support Mr. Giustra’s charitable endeavors with Mr. Clinton. “Frank and I have been friends and business partners for almost 20 years,” he said.

The Clinton campaign left it to the foundation to reply to questions about the Fernwood donations; the foundation did not provide a response.

Mr. Telfer’s undisclosed donations came in addition to between $1.3 million and $5.6 million in contributions, which were reported, from a constellation of people with ties to Uranium One or UrAsia, the company that originally acquired Uranium One’s most valuable asset: the Kazakh mines. Without those assets, the Russians would have had no interest in the deal: “It wasn’t the goal to buy the Wyoming mines. The goal was to acquire the Kazakh assets, which are very good,” Mr. Novikov, the Rosatom spokesman, said in an interview.

Amid this influx of Uranium One-connected money, Mr. Clinton was invited to speak in Moscow in June 2010, the same month Rosatom struck its deal for a majority stake in Uranium One.

The $500,000 fee — among Mr. Clinton’s highest — was paid by Renaissance Capital, a Russian investment bank with ties to the Kremlin that has invited world leaders, including Tony Blair, the former British prime minister, to speak at its investor conferences.

Renaissance Capital analysts talked up Uranium One’s stock, assigning it a “buy” rating and saying in a July 2010 research report that it was “the best play”
in the uranium markets. In addition, Renaissance Capital turned up that same year as a major donor, along with Mr. Giustra and several companies linked to Uranium One or UrAsia, to a small medical charity in Colorado run by a friend of Mr. Giustra’s. In a newsletter to supporters, the friend credited Mr. Giustra with helping get donations from “businesses around the world.”

Renaissance Capital would not comment on the genesis of Mr. Clinton’s speech to an audience that included leading Russian officials, or on whether it was connected to the Rosatom deal. According to a Russian government news service, Mr. Putin personally thanked Mr. Clinton for speaking.

A person with knowledge of the Clinton Foundation’s fund-raising operation, who requested anonymity to speak candidly about it, said that for many people, the hope is that money will in fact buy influence: “Why do you think they are doing it — because they love them?” But whether it actually does is another question. And in this case, there were broader geopolitical pressures that likely came into play as the United States considered whether to approve the Rosatom-Uranium One deal.

**Diplomatic Considerations**

If doing business with Rosatom was good for those in the Uranium One deal, engaging with Russia was also a priority of the incoming Obama administration, which was hoping for a new era of cooperation as Mr. Putin relinquished the presidency — if only for a term — to Dmitri A. Medvedev.

“The assumption was we could engage Russia to further core U.S. national security interests,” said Mr. McFaul, the former ambassador.

It started out well. The two countries made progress on nuclear proliferation issues, and expanded use of Russian territory to resupply American forces in Afghanistan. Keeping Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon was among the United States’ top priorities, and in June 2010 Russia signed off on a United Nations resolution imposing tough new sanctions on that country.

Two months later, the deal giving ARMZ a controlling stake in Uranium One was submitted to the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States for review. Because of the secrecy surrounding the process, it is hard to know whether the participants weighed the desire to improve bilateral relations against the potential risks of allowing the Russian government control over the
biggest uranium producer in the United States. The deal was ultimately approved in October, following what two people involved in securing the approval said had been a relatively smooth process.

Not all of the committee's decisions are personally debated by the agency heads themselves; in less controversial cases, deputy or assistant secretaries may sign off. But experts and former committee members say Russia's interest in Uranium One and its American uranium reserves seemed to warrant attention at the highest levels.

"This deal had generated press, it had captured the attention of Congress and it was strategically important," said Richard Russell, who served on the committee during the George W. Bush administration. "When I was there invariably any one of those conditions would cause this to get pushed way up the chain, and here you had all three."

And Mrs. Clinton brought a reputation for hawkishness to the process; as a senator, she was a vocal critic of the committee's approval of a deal that would have transferred the management of major American seaports to a company based in the United Arab Emirates, and as a presidential candidate she had advocated legislation to strengthen the process.

The Clinton campaign spokesman, Mr. Fallon, said that in general, these matters did not rise to the secretary's level. He would not comment on whether Mrs. Clinton had been briefed on the matter, but he gave The Times a statement from the former assistant secretary assigned to the foreign investment committee at the time, Jose Fernandez. While not addressing the specifics of the Uranium One deal, Mr. Fernandez said, "Mrs. Clinton never intervened with me on any C.F.I.U.S. matter."

Mr. Fallon also noted that if any agency had raised national security concerns about the Uranium One deal, it could have taken them directly to the president.

Anne-Marie Slaughter, the State Department's director of policy planning at the time, said she was unaware of the transaction -- or the extent to which it made Russia a dominant uranium supplier. But speaking generally, she urged caution in evaluating its wisdom in hindsight.

"Russia was not a country we took lightly at the time or thought was
cuddly," she said. "But it wasn't the adversary it is today."

That renewed adversarial relationship has raised concerns about European dependency on Russian energy resources, including nuclear fuel. The unease reaches beyond diplomatic circles. In Wyoming, where Uranium One equipment is scattered across his 35,000-acre ranch, John Christensen is frustrated that repeated changes in corporate ownership over the years led to French, South African, Canadian and, finally, Russian control over mining rights on his property.

"I hate to see a foreign government own mining rights here in the United States," he said. "I don't think that should happen."

Mr. Christensen, 65, noted that despite assurances by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission that uranium could not leave the country without Uranium One or ARMZ obtaining an export license — which they do not have — yellowcake from his property was routinely packed into drums and trucked off to a processing plant in Canada.

Asked about that, the commission confirmed that Uranium One has, in fact, shipped yellowcake to Canada even though it does not have an export license. Instead, the transport company doing the shipping, RSB Logistic Services, has the license. A commission spokesman said that "to the best of our knowledge" most of the uranium sent to Canada for processing was returned for use in the United States. A Uranium One spokeswoman, Donna Wichers, said 25 percent had gone to Western Europe and Japan. At the moment, with the uranium market in a downturn, nothing is being shipped from the Wyoming mines.

The "no export" assurance given at the time of the Rosatom deal is not the only one that turned out to be less than it seemed. Despite pledges to the contrary, Uranium One was delisted from the Toronto Stock Exchange and taken private. As of 2013, Rosatom's subsidiary, ARMZ, owned 100 percent of it.

**Correction: April 23, 2015**

An earlier version of this article misstated, in one instance, the surname of a fellow at the Hoover Institution. He is Peter Schweizer, not Schweitzer.

An earlier version also incorrectly described the Clinton Foundation's agreement with the Obama administration regarding foreign-government
donations while Hillary Rodham Clinton was secretary of state. Under the agreement, the foundation would not accept new donations from foreign governments, though it could seek State Department waivers in specific cases. It was not barred from accepting all foreign-government donations.

Correction: April 30, 2015

An article on Friday about contributions to the Clinton Foundation from people associated with a Canadian uranium-mining company described incorrectly the foundation’s agreement with the Obama administration regarding foreign-government donations while Hillary Clinton was secretary of state. Under the agreement, the foundation would not accept new donations from foreign governments, though it could seek State Department waivers in specific cases. The foundation was not barred from accepting all foreign-government donations.

Andrew E. Kramer contributed reporting. Sarah Cohen contributed research.


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