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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FOI/PA DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET FOI/PA# 1325741-0

Total Deleted Page(s) = 5

Page 26 ~ Duplicate - Pages 20-23;

Page 27 ~ Duplicate - Pages 20-23;

Page 28 ~ Duplicate - Pages 20-23; Page 29 ~ Duplicate - Pages 20-23;

Page 36 ~ Referral/Consult;

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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FOI/PA DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET FOI/PA# 1204182-0

Total Deleted Page(s) = 5

Page 26 ~ Duplicate - Pages 20-23;

Page 27 ~ Duplicate - Pages 20-23;

Page 28 ~ Duplicate - Pages 20-23; Page 29 ~ Duplicate - Pages 20-23;

Page 36 ~ Referral/Consult;

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, F-

## Office Memorandum • United States Government

FROM: E. D. Mason

DATE: 2/15/56

Nichols \_\_\_\_\_ Belmont \_\_\_\_ Harbo \_\_\_\_ Mohr \_\_\_\_

Tolson \_\_\_ Boardman

Parsons \_\_ Rosen \_\_\_ Tamm'\_\_\_

Tele. Room

Holloman

Sizoo \_\_\_\_ Winterrowd

SUBJECT: SUGGE

SUGGESTION #444-56
Made by SA James J. Middleton
Chicago Office

SUGGESTION: That a second floating serial such as the FD-238\*(copy attached) or a page 2 be made of the FD-238 setting forth background information, reliability, availability, residence, employment and phone number of witnesses utilized in prosecutive reports involving subjects of security investigations. Periodically the Bureau requests such information. The Special Agent to whom the 134 file (Security Informants) is assigned would have the responsibility of maintaining this summary of information in a current status.

PRESENT PROCEDURE: Each agent preparing a prosecutive report reviews the 134 files on the witnesses utilized and extracts necessary information from the individual files. The agent then summarizes this information in his own words.

ADVANTAGES STATED: If the information was prepared in advance and thereafter maintained in a current status, the review of the 134 files by agents unfamiliar with the informant could be eliminated. In addition, the wording of the information submitted to the Bureau on each informant would be standardized. Any change to be made on the floating serial could be made in ink or if completely changed it would not have to be reserialized.

<u>DISADVANTAGES STATED:</u> Placing the suggestion in effect would involve some time; however, suggester feels when completed on all 134 files, the resultant saving in time would be justified.

OBSERVATIONS: SAC Hostetter, Chicago, recommends favorably as he believes a considerable amount of agent time as well as unnecessary duplication of work in reviewing the files could be saved. The suggested procedure would effect a standardization of background information, and needed information could be easily located.

SAC Kelly, New York, recommends favorably. At the present time there is no great uniformity on how the agent sets out the information and the suggestion would save much agent time in locating the desired information.

RECORDED-41

\* (Form FD-238 is maintained as top (floating) serial in all Security Informant files.)

66-2542-3-1002

23 FER 21 1956

belmar 8 **195**6



SAC McCabe, Philadelphia, believes the suggestion in principle has merit. He points out, however, certain flaws and possible modifications to the suggestion. Inasmuch as requests are not received regarding every informant, he suggests that the summaries be prepared only when a request is received and that no project is needed for the preparation of a summary on every 134 file. It would be preferable to place the information on a 3x5 card to be maintained as a separate section of the Agent's Informative Index. He feels the responsibility of keeping the summary in current status could be more easily fixed by dating the summary appearing on the card and checking all cards periodically by a single tickler such as every 60 days.

Inspector Sizoo, Domestic Intelligence Division, recommends unfavorably as the percentage of individuals on whom we have 134 files and who are considered as potential witnesses in Government prosecutions is too low to warrant expenditure of time needed to prepare memoranda as suggested. Memoranda can be written on the informants as required and to prepare numerous memoranda which may not be used is wasteful.

CONCLUSION: In view of the fact that the Bureau does not request such information on every informant, it appears that the necessary project to institute the suggested procedure for each 134 file does not appear justified.

RECOMMENDATION: That the suggestion not be adopted.

Al pub

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Mu



Date	

	ool Number	Office	File
Гуре	e of Informant: SI PSI CS	Bureau	File
			Serial No.
	Name		
	Aliases		
	Code Name		
	Symbol Number		
	Date and Place of Birth		
	Description		
	Photograph	******************************	***************************************
	Background Investigation:		
	(A) File references checked		
	(B) Credit Inquiry		
	(C) Local Criminal Check		
	(D) Bureau Identification Record		
	(E) Selective Service Check		
	(F) Check of Armed Services Record		
	(G) Informants Canvassed		
	(H) Reliability Check		
	(I) Patriotism		
	(J) Reputation		
	Informant Advised Of:		
	(A) Not Bureau employee		
	(B) Activities Voluntary		
	(C) Relationship Confidential	**********	***************************************
	Fig. 1 states of		***************************************
	(E) Membership Not Sponsored		
	(F) Not to Retain Copies of Notes - Reports		
	(G) Reports to be submitted under Code Number and in Third		
	(H) Payments are Income		
	(1) Use Public Telephones		
	(J) No Office Contact Personally		
	Statement of Cooperation		
11.	Post Office Box Number Assigned	***************************************	
	Informant Indices Card Made		
	Agent who handles information		
4 11	Alternate Agent	********	1920-0-483-0-250-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0

NO SERIAL NUMBER: KEEP ON TOP OF OTHER SERIALS IN FILE.

ENCLOSURE

nitials..... Agent
...... Supervisor

DATE OF MAIL 2-24-56

HAS BEEN REMOVED FOR MR. CAMPHERE TO BE KEPT PERMANENTLY SIN HIS OFFICE, ROOM ISO

> HAS BEEN REMOVED AND PLACED IN THE SPECIAL FILE ROOM OF RECORDS BRANCH

SEE FILE 66-2554-7530 FOR AUTHORITY.

JUNE MAIL Security Suf. - Seul.

REMOVED BY

FILE NUMBER 66 - 2542 - 3 - 1003

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGEOUT

SAC, Albany

March 1, 1956

Director, FBI (66-2542-3) - /604

RECORDED-89

SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM

EN-143 There are being transmitted under separate cover copies of the following pamphlets for possible use in connection with the captioned program:

- "Communist Attack on Religion"
- "Education -- communist style"
- "The Katyn Forest Murdera"
- "Terror in the Baltics"

Twenty-five copies of each publication are being forwarded to the New York Office. Ten copies of each publication are being forwarded to your office and the Baltimore, Boston, Buffalo, Chicago. Cincinnati, Cleveland, Denver, Detroit, Indianapolis, Los Angeles Milwaukee, Minneapolis, Newark, New Haven, Pittsburgh, Philadolphia, Portland, St. Louis, San Francisco and Scattle Offices. Five copies of each publication are being forwarded to all other continental offices.

Requests for additional copies of these publications & should be directed to the Central Research Section at the Bore 2.

2 - All continental offices

JFC:mjh (3)COMM - FBI

NOTE: Copies of these publications are being forwarded to the field in varying quantities depending on the extent of Communist Party activity in the territories covered by the individual offices. Plastiplate will be dated on approval of letter.

> Memorandum W. C. Sullivan to Mr. A. H. Belmont dated 2/28/56. JFC:mjh

ele. Room

oardman ichols elmont

rsons

## Office Memorandum . UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: February 28, 1956

Nichols Belmont

Sizon Winterrowd Tele. Room

FROM

W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT:

SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM

Bufile 66-2542-3

The Central Research Section regularly forwards to the field material for possible use in connection with captioned program. United States Information Agency (USIA) recently prepared the following pamphlets, copies of which are enclosed, and furnished a supply of these publications to the Bureau:

> "Communist Attack on Religion" "Education -- communist style" "The Katyn Forest Murders" "Terror in the Baltics"

The first two titles are self-explanatory. The pamphlet The Katyn Forest Murders!' outlines the proof of the murder of several thousand Polish soldiers by Soviet authorities during World War II. The mamphlet entitled "Terror in the Baltics" describes the Soviet conquests of Estonia, Latviá and Lithuania.

The enclosed letter advises the field that copies of these publications are being forwarded under separate cover.

### RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that the enclosed letter to all continental offices be approved.

Enclosures

JFC:mih

(4)

1 - Section tickler

1 - J. D. Donohue

1 - Mr. Belmont

MAR 5 1958

DATE OF MAIL 3- 22- 56

HAS BEEN REMOVED FOR THE CONFIDENTIAL FILE ROOM OF THE DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION.

HAS BEEN REMOVED AND PLACED IN THE SPECIAL FILE ROOM OF RECORDS BRANCH

SEE FILE 66-2554-7530 FOR AUTHORITY.

SUBJECT JUNE MAIL Security Informants Genl.

REMOVED BY

FILE NUMBER 66-2542-3-1005

### Memorandum . UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO

The Director

DATE: 3/20/56

FROM

J. P. Mohr

Record Person Security In Forming The Total Property Security In Forming The Property Security Securit

SUBJECT:

The Congressional Record

Pages 5163-5164

Congressman Ashley, (D) Ohio, spoke concerning the use of confidential informants in the Covernment security program. References to the Department of Justice have been noted, and a reference to the FBI was noted and set forth in an earlier necorandum prepared today.

76 APR 19.

In the original of a memorandum captioned and dated as above, the Congressional Record for the Director's attention. This form has been prepared in order that portions of a copy of the original memorandum may be clipped, mounted, and placed in appropriate Bureau case or subject matter files.

Original filed in:

	F. France	12	4	-
te				

		March 21, 1956
To: Director, FBI	From:	Employee assigned to (Division) Birmingham
SUGGESTION		

That FD 238 (Security Informant Review Sheet) and FD 237 (Criminal Informant Review Sheet) be stapled, or otherwise securely attached, to the inside of FD 245 (file front). (Sample attached).

Current practice or rule (Include manual citation as well as facts)

FD 238 and FD 237 are now filed on top of all other serials in file, however, they are given no serial number.

Advantages of suggestion

When the file is opened, the sheet can be more easily read or posted. The filing of serials in these two classifications would be made easier and faster because only the top would have to be removed, which would be one operation. It is also believed that the sheets would not get as ragged as they ordinarily do if they were stapled to the file front inside.

memo & D mosen to my relacing 4/18/50 1964

None that I have been able to think of

Annual Savings (Show basis for estimate) Approximate savings cannot be estimated; however, if this procedure was in use, it is believed that you could file 10 separate communications in 10 separate files in the same time that it would take to file 6 files removing the top sheet from inside of file

Of file.

(The use by the United States of my suggestion shall not form the basis of a further clarmot a finature by me, my heirs, or

assigns upon the United States)

Mr. X Mrs. Miss Clerk

Signature and Title of Suggester

3377

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b6 b7C

FD-238, (7-12-55)	Date
Mark opposite each item the number of the serial or serials in egarded as no variable, changes may be noted by adding the new ser is to all appliable items, the Agent and Field Supervisor should init	which the information appears. Although these items are ial number and crossing out the old. When form is complete ial the form at the end.
Symbol Number	Office File
ype of Infor ant: SI PSI CS	Bureau File
,	Serial No.
1. Name	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
2. Aliases	
3. Code Nan:	
4. Symbol Nº "ber	
5. Date and 'lace of Birth	
6. Descript on	
7. Photogra, h	
8. Backgroun: Investigation:	
(A) File references checked	
(B) Cred : Inquiry	
(C) Loca. Criminal Check	
(D) Bure u Identification Record	****
(E) Sele live Service Check	
(F) Chec. of Armed Services Record	
(G) Info mants Canvassed	
(H) Reliability Check	
(I) Patriotism	
(J) Repuration	
9. Informant Advised Of:	
(A) Not lureau employee	***************************************
(B) Activities Voluntary	***************************************
(C) Rela ionship Confidential	
(D) Bure u Labor Policy	•
(E) Memb rship Not Sponsored	
(F) Not to Retain Copies of Notes - Reports	
(G) Reports to be submitted under Code Number and in Third	
(H) Payments are Income	
(1) Use Lublic Telephones	
(J) No Office Contact Personally	,
O. Statement of Cooperation	
1. Post Office Box Number Assigned	
2. Informant Indices Card Made	
3. Agent who handles information	
4. Alternate Agent	-
L5. Concealm )t and Characterization Guide	
· ; .	
NOTOR DATA VINIDAD	Initiais
NO SERVED NUMBER: KEEP ON TO OF OTHER SERIALS I. L'ILE.	Supervisor
C. C. Campat Dutting It 2100.	

DATE OF MAIL 4-4-56

HAS BEEN REMOVED FOR THE CONFIDENTIAL FIRE ROOM OF THE DOMESTIC-INVESTIGATION OF THE DOMESTIC

> HAS BELLY RULISVED AND PLACED IN THE SPECIAL FILE ROOM OF RECORDS BRANCH

SEE FILE 66-2554-7530 FOR AUTHORITY.

SUBJECT JUNE MAIL lecurity Inf. - Steneral

REMOVED BY 5 7 APR 24 1956

FILE NUMBER 66 - 2542 -3 - 1007

DATE OF MAIL	4-	23	-56

HAS DEEN REMOVED FOR THE CONFIDENTIAL FILE ROOM OF THE DOMESTIC -INTELLEGENCE DIVISION.

HAS BEEN REVIOURD AND PLACED IN THE SPECIAL FILE ROOM OF RECORDS BRANCH

SEE FILE 66-2554-7530 FOR AUTHORITY.

SUBJECT JUNE MAIL REMERTES SUBJECT. - Skel.

REMOVED BY\_

2542-3-1008

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGEOUT

## Office Memorandum · United States Government

TO : Mr. Tolson

DATE: 4/18/56

FROM:

SUBJECT:

E. D. Mason

SUGGESTION #663-56

Made by

Birmingham Office

ь6 ь7с

Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
Tamm \_\_\_\_
Sizoo \_\_\_\_
Winterrowd \_\_\_
Tele, Room \_\_\_

Holloman

Tolson

Nichols Belmont

Mohr

Parsons

Boardman

SUGGESTION: That Form FD-238 (Security Informant Review Sheet) and Form FD-237 (Criminal Informant Review Sheet) be stapled, or otherwise securely attached to the inside of Form FD-245 (File Front). Samples are enclosed.

PRESENT PROCEDURE: Forms FD-237 and FD-238 are not serialized in the file, and are maintained as the top serial in file.

ADVANTAGES STATED: Sheet can be more easily read or posted when the file is opened; filing of serials in these two classifications would be more easier and faster because only the top would have to be removed, which would be done in one operation. Suggester believes these sheets would be subject to less wear and tear. Suggester also believes that 10 separate communications could be filed in 10 separate files in the same time that it would take to file 6 files by removing the top sheet from the inside of the file.

OBSERVATIONS: SAC Fults, Birmingham, recommends favorably. Inasmuch as an FD-209 form (Memorandum for Recording Contacts with Criminal and Security Informants) must be filed with each contact of an informant, any way in which the process can be expedited and facilitated would be advantageous.

Assistant Director Belmont does not believe the suggestion should be followed, however, he he points out that this is essentially a field office administration and filing matter. His objections are: if staples become loose, as they sometimes do, this might result in minor lacerations of clerks' hands in handling such files; and there is the likelihood of the review sheet being torn and mutilated by reason of the corner or other file cover slipping under it between the staples. He states a check with the Records Section at the Bureau indicates there have been a noticeable number of instances of personnel being injured by staples, particularly when heavy material such as cardboard is stapled.

RECORDED - 24

Mr. Winterrowd, Investigative Division, has no objection to the adoption of the suggestion, but he also points out that this is a field administration problem. [7-122] INDEXED - 24

does not like the idea of having this material stapled to the file fronts. He suggests that the information contained on FD-237 and FD-238 be mimeographed on the inside of the field office file front. This work can be done on the mim ograph machine.

ceh (2)

NECONDED LIVE FILL D IN

E. D. Mason memo for Mr. Tolson Re Suggestion #663-56

ASAC Fletcher, WFO, believes the suggestion is desirable, but recommends that these sheets be stapled only at the top of the file cover so that anyone reviewing the file can be certain there is nothing on the back of the stapled material which would be of importance. He believes the suggested procedure should be authorized on a permissive basis.

ASAC E. E. Brown, Philadelphia, recommends unfavorably. The forms would have to be revised or some of the items at the bottom cut off as some informant's files still have the old type file covers where the Acco Fastener is placed on the outside of the file, (new file covers are longer and have a  $l^{\frac{1}{4}}$  inch flap at the top so as to allow the Acco Fastener to be placed inside the file). If the forms were not stapled at one end of the cover, the forms would become crumpled. He doesn't consider the suggestion any material savings.

RECOMMENDATION: That the suggestion and countersuggestions not be adopted.

www fress

Vom

May 3, 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TOLSON

MR. NICHOLS

MR. BOARDMAN

MR. BELMONT

Yesterday, Congressman Walter, of the House Un-American Activities Committee, called to see me.

Congressman Walter stated that he had recently named as head of the staff of his Committee Mr. Richard Arens, who has been serving with one of the Senatorial Committees. The Congressman stated that he had two matters which he wanted to specifically discuss with me.

He stated that he assumed that from time to time certain confidential informants of the Bureau being exposed in trials of Smith Act cases, denaturalization cases and appearances before the Subversive Activities Control Board thereafter became inactive as informants for the FBI in view of their exposure. He stated that he would like to have the cooperation of the Bureau in furnishing to him the identities of any such persons so that the Committee might consider calling such ex-informants and building hearings about such information as they may have already disclosed in judicial or administrative proceedings.

I told the Congressman that his assumption, of course, was correct and that the names of these persons had appeared from time to time in the press. He said he realized this but that many times his. Committee would not note the names and for that reason he was hopeful that a list of such persons might be furnished to him and other names furnished in the future as the usefulness of the informants is at an end in so far as the FBI is concerned. I told him that I would have a check made of what names might be available. I pointed out to him that, of course, the names of some informants used in denaturalization proceedings would be a matter for the Immigration and Naturalization Service to pass upon and he said he understood that. I would, therefore, like to have a list of names of such informants with whom we are thoroughly through and who are of no more value to the Government so that we may forward the same to Congressman Walter.

Tolson
Boardman
Nichols
Belmont

Tame Sizes Vincerrowd Cele, Room

Hellowin Gardy 5 MAY 8

SENT PROM D. O.

NOT RECORDED 191 MAY . 7 956 2

SOM FILED

The second matter that the Congressman desired to take up was that of Judge Edgerton, of the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals. The Congressman stated that he had in mind calling Judge Edgerton before his Committee, and if the facts could be developed, having the Judiciary Committee look into the situation with a view to initiating impeachment proceedings against Judge Edgerton. The Congressman stated that he understood that Edgerton had been a member of a communist group in the District of Columbia after he, Edgerton, had become a Judge of the Circuit Churt of Appeals for the District of Columbia. I inquired of the Congressmen as to the identity of this organization and he stated that it had Hened his mind for the time being, but that he would look it up. The Congressmen was desirous of receiving from us any information which might be furnished to him dealing with Judge Edgerton. I told Congressman Walter I would have our files looked into and see wast, if any information might be available and then a determination would be made as to weether it could be supplied. Will you please have an appropriate summary made upon Judge Edgerton with an indication as to any material which should not be furnished to the Congressman because of its confidential character.

Puring the course of my conversation with the Congressman, he mentioned the fact that his Committee would shortly issue a pamphlet dealing with the views of prominent persons as to the meaning of the recent alleged change in the attitude of the Soviet Government on world relations. He stated this publication would be forthcoming shortly and he believed it would serve a useful purpose in establishing the fact that there has been no real change in the Russians' goal and intentions, but merely a deceptive change to apply to methods and tactics.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover Director FD-252 (12-14-54)

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

# EMPLOYEE SUGGESTION # 161-56

Date: 5/4/56

To:

Director, FBI

From: SA THEODORE A.

SA THEODORE A. SANDERS Division of assignment: KNOXVILLE

SUGGESTION: It is suggested that efform be maintained in the sub file of a security informant to show the identity of communications and reports in all cases where information from a security informant has been reported. This form to be kept in the sub file as a top document and not to be serialized. (See attached Sample 1). It is suggested that a form be used by Agents in identifying those communications and reports in cases where the information from the informant is reported. This form to be routed to the Agent or supervisor handling the security informant for the purpose of entering the data on the form maintained in informant's sub file. (See attached Sample 2).

Current practice or rule (include manual citation as well as facts): Manual of Instructions, Section 107M, 18, page 11, states that security informant files should be maintained in such a fashion that the identities of the cases in which an informant (cont'd)

Advantages of suggestion: The form suggested (Sample 1) would be of value in showing the identity and location of all communications

or reports in which information obtained from an informant was subsequently reported for its contents per se, or to characterize or document an individual or organization. The greatest value of this form lies in the fact that should the security informant be discredited at a later date, the title of all cases and dates of communications or reports would readily be available. A review of this form would show all offices receiving the communications and would greatly facilitate any corrective action taken pursuant to Section 107S of the Manual of Instructions. Use of form (Sample 2) would facilitate the recording of this info in informant's sub file.

Disadvantages of suggestion:

RECORDED-75

Mr. The use by the United States of my suggestion shall not form the basis of a further claim of any hature by

me, my heirs, or assigns upon the United States.

suig 2. 120

Mrs.

x Mr.

(Signature of Suggester)

Recommendations and comments of Division Head: (See page 2)

86 JUN 14 1056

(Signature & Title) , which

Current practice or rule (include manual citation as well as facts): (cont'd)

has furnished competent evidence can be furnished immediately to the Bureau by simply referring to the files of the informant without the necessity of conducting extensive research. Section 107S, pages 16 and 17, set forth corrective action to be taken in the event a security informant is discredited.

### RECOMMENDATIONS AND COMMENTS OF DIVISION HEAD:

I recommend that serious consideration be given to the above suggestion. It does not appear to entail any considerable additional administrative burden, but should operate in a substantially automatic manner and would greatly simplify the task of the field office in taking the necessary action when for some reason or other it is necessary to know the distribution afforded information furnished by an informant and, more specifically, in those instances where parallel distribution must be made of qualifying information relative to the source.

FD----

RECORD OF REFORTED SECURITY INFORMATION

Symbol Number_	
Type of Inform	ant ST
Office File Nu	mber

b7D

Information obtained from the above Informant, either orally or by written report, has been set forth in the following communications:

DATE & TYPE OF COMMUNICATION	TITLE OF CASE		OFFICE FILE NO.	
Report of SA JOHN DOE dated 4/12/56		; SM -C	100 <b>-</b> 6363	b6 b7C
Letter to NY dated 4/23/56		SM-C	100-4534	
Letter to Bureau dated 4/26/56	CP, USA-FUNDS;	IS-C	100-7865	
Airtel to Atlanta dated 5/1/56	was.; SM-C		100-360	

Entries May Be Fandwritten Keep on Top of Other Serials in File Do Not Serialize

SAMPLE NO. 1

ENCLOSUM:

### SAMPLE NO. 2

FD----

TO:	SAC

FROM: SA JOHN DOE

RE: SI

b7D

b6 b7C

Information obtained from the above Informant has been incorporated in the communication described below:

Airtel	dated	toOffice	File	entitled	and the state of t
Teletype	dated	toOffice	File	entitled	
Letter	dated	toOffice	File	entitled	······································
Report	of SA JOHN D	OCE	datedSM-C	4/12/56 Office File	100-6363

PIFASE ROUTE THIS FORM TO AGENT OR SUPERVISOR HANDLING ABOVE INFORMANT.

ROUTE TO
Destroy after making entry on
FD----Record of Reported Security

Information

SAMPLE NO. 2

A - E GLOSUM



## Emorandum • united states government

Mr. A. H. Belmont Arthri TO

DATE: May 14. 1956

Tolson

Nichols .

Parsons

Rosen Tamm

Boardman . Belmon Mason Mohr.

Mr. F. J. Baumgardner FROM

SUBJECT: SUGGESTION NUMBER 761-56

SECURITY INFORMANTS - General

Nease Reference is made to Employee Suggestion Number Winterrowd 761-56 submitted by Knoxville to the effect that a form be Tele. Room Holloman \_ maintained in the sub file of a security informant to show Gandy the identity of communications and reports in all cases where information from a security informant has been reported. This form will not be serialized and will always remain on the top In addition it is suggested that another form be of the file. used to identify communications and reports in cases where the information is obtained from an informant which form will be routed to the Agent or Supervisor handling the informant so that he can enter the appropriate data on the first form maintained on the informant's sub file. The purpose of this suggestion is to have readily available the identity and location of all communications or reports in which information obtained from an informant was subsequently reported so that if the informant is discredited at a later date the title of all cases and communications will be readily available.

It is not felt that this suggestion should be adopted for the following reasons:

There now is a floating serial on the top of each informant file known as FD-238 which is a check sheet on which various items are checked off relating to administrative matters in each informant's file. is not felt that we should add another floating serial to each informant's file.

The main purpose of this suggestion is to have readily available the identity of files, etc., to which information from informant has been channelized. data is now available in all informants! files as copies of channelized reports which are based on information from informants row indicate to which files the information It is now required that one copy of every is channelized. channelized memorandum must be placed in informant's sub file. Since these channelized memoranda indicate the files where the information is channelized, it is not felt an over-all floating serial containing the same information should be utilized.

RECORDED - 93

cc - Mr. Belmont

Mr. Baumgardner Mr. Donohue

20 MAY 29 1956

offe 3 LNOLOSURE A JDD:ojk

FUNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 66 - 3482

Memorandum for Mr. Belmont

(3) Since it is not believed this new form in the nature of a floating serial be utilized, it is likewise felt that Form Number 2 which would be used as a means of obtaining information for Form Number 1 should also not be used.

### RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that this memorandum be routed to the Training and Inspection Division and it is not recommended that Suggestion Number 761-56 be adopted. It should be noted it will require more work to keep the proposed floating serial up to date over a period of time than it would be to review the file at the time the informant is discontinued.

ADDENDUM BY TRAINING AND INSPECTION DIVISION: 5/21/56 - ceh

Training and Inspection Division Division recommends unfavorably in view of the observations set forth above. The recent Clerical Supervisors' School also recommended unfavorably as the forms would be too much duplication and would result in too much work. Some of the members of the school were opposed to floating serials.

mand Path M

1/000

·b7D

Office	IVICMOVEMAUM • UNITED STATES GOVERNMEN	T
	SAC, New York (Your file DATE: 5/14/56	•
FROM:	Director, FBI (Bufile & serial 66-2542-3	
SUBJECT:	Security Informant Program Office of Origin: My	
1. ()	The deadline in this case has passed and the Bureau has not received a report. You are instructed to submit a report immediately. In the event a report has been submitted, you should make a notation of the date on which it was submitted on this letter and return it to the Bureau, Room# 1243	

on this letter and return it to the Bureau, Room# /24	<u>3</u> ,
monthly ltn Report submitted 5/4/56	<u></u>
Report will be submitted	t/
Reason for delay	/

Advise Bureau re status of this case.

MAY 1 5 1956 FUI - NEW YORK Advise Bureau when report may be expected. Summa immediately.

(Place your reply on this form and return to the Bureau. Note on the top serial in the case file the receipt and acknowledgment of this communication.)

SEATCHED \_

SELIALIZED .

INDEXED -

FILED ...

## Memorandum • United States Government

The Director

DATE: 3 29.56

FROM : J. P. Mohr

SUBJECT: The Congressional Record

On pages 5163-5164. Congression Aphley. (D) Ohio. spoke concerning the use of confidential informants in the Government accuraty program. Up. Ashley stated, "How much longer, I wonder, are we going to be content to find excuses for a security system lackin; both in principle and honesty." He included excerpts from a decipion of the court of appeals on this subject. It is stated in the decision. "Furthermore, in considering the public interests in the preservation of system under which unidentified informers are encouraged to make unchallengable statements about their neighbors, it is not eniss to beer in mind whether or not us must look forward to a day when substantially everyone will have to contemplate the possibility that his neighborn are being encouraged to make reports to the PBI about what he says, what he reeds and what meetings! he obtenda." 2 . will Intermedia 684 2016

> Note this is the seme man critizing uo in the Tilimon ceso.

In the original of a memorandum captioned and dated as above, the Congressional Record for visit was reviewed and pertinent items were marked for the Director's attention. This form has been prepared in order that portions of a copy of the original memorandum may be clipped, mounted, and placed in appropriate Bureau case or subject matter files. TO APR 18 1830

DATE OF MAIL 5-25-56

HAS FEEN REMOVED FOR THE CONFIDENTIAL FILE ROOM OF THE DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION.

HAS BEEN RUISVED AND PLACED IN THE SEE HAY, PILE ROOM OF RECORDS BRANCH

SEE FILE 66-2554-7530 FOR AUTHORITY.

SUBJECT JUNE MAIL Sery. Inf- General

59 JUN 5 1956

REMOVED BY

FILE NUMBER 66-2542-3-1012

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGEOUT

Mr. Boardman
Mr. Donohue
Mr. Bly

SAC, New York

June 7, 1956

Director, FBI (66-2542-3)

RECORDED - 40 66 - 2542-3-1013

The New York Office has furnished to all offices at least two copies of the June 5, 1,56, article setting forth the text of the speech made by Nime to whether, first secretary of the Communist Party, forth Union, on February 25, 1956, denouncing Stalin.

2cc - Albany Albuquerque Anchorage Atlanta Baltimore Birmingham Boston Buffalo Butto Charlotte Chicago Cincinnati Cleveland Dallas Denver Detroit El Paso Honolulu Houston Indianapolis Kansas City Knoxville Little Rock Los Angeles Louisville Memphis

2co - Miami Milwaukee Minnesporis Mobil. Mewgr New Heren Now Orleans Norfolk Oklahova City Omaha Philadelphia Phoenix Pittebusch. Portland Richmond St. Louis Salt Lake City San Antonio San Diego San Francisco San Juan Sevenneh Seattle Springfield Washington Field Office

MAILED 5.

Rosen Tamm

Nease

Winterrowd \_\_\_\_ Tele. Room \_\_\_

Holloman -

Tolson Nichols Boardman NOTE ON YELLOW:

HOB:hif

(109)

See memo Belmont to Boardman, 6/5/56, HOB:hif, entitled "Security Informant Program."

Original on Plastiplate.

ENGLOSURE

Letter to SAC, New York

The following offices have been furnished ten copies of the article: Baltimore, Buffalo, Cleveland, Detroit, Indianapolis, New Haven, Pittsburgh, and Seattle.

The following offices have been furnished twenty copies of the article: Chicago, Los Angeles, Newark, Philadelphia, and San Francisco.

The New York Office has a large number for its use. If any office needs additional copies, request should be made promptly of the New York Office for same.

This denouncement of Stalin enumerating the crimes committed by him over a twenty-year period is a tremendous psychological weapon to assist in bringing about defections among Communist Party leaders. Every effort should be made to immediately capitalize on this development. All Agents handling interviews of Communist Party members should be thoroughly conversant with Khrushchev's speech and the charges against Stalin contained therein. Those offices receiving extra copies of Khrushchev's speech should consider furnishing such copies to those Communist Party leaders believed to be most susceptible for defection. The copies could be furnished at the time of interview or reinterview or mailed prior thereto.

Wach office should give this matter prompt and aggressive supervision.

## ffice Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Mr. L. V. Boardmañ

DATE: June 5, 1956

Tolson Nichols

Boardman Belmont Mohr .

Parsons Rosen

Winterrowd

Tele. Room Holloman

Gandy

FROM

Mr. A. H. Belmont

XSECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM SUBJECT:

Attached is the yellow of a plastiplate letter to SAC, New York, copies to all other offices, which advises that the New York Office has furnished to all field offices copies of Nikita Khrushchev's speech given February 25, 1956, wherein he denounced Stalin for crimes committed over a 20-year period.

This letter to all offices points out that this denouncement of Stalin is a tremendous psychological weapon for use in bringing about the defection of Communist Party leaders. All offices are instructed to have Agents handling interviews of Communist Party members become familiar with Khrushchev's speech and the crimes committed by Stalin. The field offices are further instructed to consider furnishing copies of Khrushchev's speech to Communist Party leaders believed to be susceptible for defection at the time of interview, reinterview or mailed to them prior thereto. Each office is instructed to give this matter prompt and aggressive supervision.

The New York Office was telephonically instructed on June 4, 1956, to obtain 500 copies of the June 5, 1956, "New York Times" article. On June 5, 1956, the New York Office was instructed by airtel to furnish two copies to each field office with additional copies to the 13 offices engaged in Toplev interviews of Communist Party leaders.

### RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that the attached yellow of the plastiplate letter to SAC, New York, copies to all other offices, be approved. After approval, it should be returned to Mr. H. O. Bly, Room 1517, for preparation for dissemination.

Bufile 66-2542-3

3- . ~ \ . i

cc - Mr. L. V. Boardman

Mr. A. H. Belmont

Mr. J. D. Donohue

Mr. H. O. Bly

HOB:hif

Enclosure

DATE OF MAIL 6-26-56

HAS BEEN REMOVED FOR THE CONFIDENTIAL FILE ROOM OF THE DOMESTIC-INFELLITEENCE DEVISION.

> HAS BEEN REMOVED AND PLACED IN THE SPECIAL FILE ROOM OF RECORDS BRANCH

SEE FILE 66-2554-7530 FOR AUTHORITY.

SUBJECT JUNE MAIL Lecey. Int. - General

MOVED BY BY JUL 10 1956

REMOVED BY\_

FILE NUMBER 66-25-42-3-1014

SAC, Springfield (66-1368)

June 29, 1956

Director, FBI (66-2542)

PERSONAL ATTENTION

CONFIDENTIAL (INFORMANT) AND SIMILAR TYPES OF COVERAGE

Reurlet dated 6-11-56 reflecting that you are currently operating 5 security informants and are attempting to develop 3 additional potential security informants.

Bufiles reflect that as of April 10, 1956, your office was operating the same number of informants and was attempting to develop 7 additional potential security informants.

The decrease in the number of potential security informants being developed by your office is being brought to your personal attention so that immediate positive steps will be taken to reverse this unfavorable trend.

NOTE ON YELLOW:

Original incoming mail is "June" and is not being attached.

RECORDED -	9		
RECORDE	66-254	2-3-	1013
EX 120	16 JUL 3	1956	* a
COM	7 - FR		X P
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Tolson Nichols Boardman Belmont Mason . Mohr \_ Parsons Rosen \_ Nease Winterrowd Tele. Room

STANDARD FOR NO. 64 ce. Memorandum • united states government MR. J. A. SJZ00 DATE: June 11, 4956 MR. A. H. BELLMÓN Nichols FROM Boardman Belmont DEVELOPMENT OF SECURITY INFORMANTS -SUBJECT: At his request, I talked in some detail to Special Agent Winterrowd Tele. Room John Keane, of the Los Angeles Office, on June 7, 1956. Holloman Gandy Keane has an intense interest in the development of informants. He feels that the present system of evaluating informant coverage in a field office is not correct, in that the lack of coverage is not sufficiently pinpointed. He stated that to have 100% coverage in the Communist Party would require an informant in each club, of which there are over 200 in Los Angeles, for example. He felt that each office should be required to show the extent of its coverage by clubs rather than geographically, as only in this manner would the real informant coverage be shown. I told Keane that his idea had merit and that as a result of

the Informant Conferences recently held, instructions are being prepared at the Bureau requiring the SACs to set forth steps they are going to take to increase their informant coverage and, particularly, the method by which they are going to insure that suffcient man power is applied to develop informants. I pointed out that after a certain time the law of diminishing returns sets in and we must be careful that in our attempts to reach 100% coverage we do not go overboard in costs both as to man power and funds. Nevertheless, I agreed that we should make the offices pinpoint just what coverage they have, and I think that in our instructions to the field we should require, say, a quarterly report reflecting the number of clubs, sections and divisions of the Party, together with those in which we have informant coverage and those where we do not. This will

definitely pinpoint the problem to the SAC and force him to give it

AHB: LI cc--Mr. Belmont

attention.

cc--Mr. J. A. Sizoo/

RECORDED - 72

77 JUL 46 1958

### Memorandum to Mr. J. A. Sizoo from Mr. Belmont

Mr. Keane also felt that there was a large reservoir of man power tied up in the preparation of security reports and he felt that if we could severely streamline security reports, man power would be made available for the development of informants. His thought was that when a subject has been placed on the Index, the case has been made, and in the annual reports thereafter, information should be restricted to a positive showing that the subject is still active, leaving out cumulative data which may have been assembled in the file. He extended this thought to the original report recommending a person for the Index, and stated that the essential thing is the proof the individual should be on the Index and that other material is extraneous.

I pointed out to Mr. Keane our problem of dissemination here at the Seat of Government and the name checks from other Government agencies, running well over a million, and that we disseminate reports in answer to many of these name checks. He felt that if a requesting agency needed further details, we could always go back to the field.

While I do not agree with Mr. Keane on this, and so advised him, I do agree that any manner in which we can cut out extraneous material from our security reports is desirable, provided it can be done without hurting the security program. For example—the present suggestion being considered by the field to limit documentation. Another example is the possibility of setting forth examples of meetings attended by a subject reported by an informant, and thereafter briefing cumulative information on additional meetings reported by the same informant.

I told the supervisors at the Los Angeles Office of Keane's suggestion and requested them to be continuously studying proper ways and means to streamline our reports without cutting out material essential to the security program. They suggested the possibility of issuing a glossary containing thumbnail sketches on organizations, rather than repeated thumbnail sketches in each report. There are disadvantages to this, but we should consider the pros and cons.

Please see that the above suggestions are given thought, but I do feel we should be constantly alert to cut out unnecessary red tape and extraneous material from our reports, at the same time continuing to operate on a sound basis.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE EMPLOYEE SUGGESTION# 7-5% 6-26-56 Date: To: Director, FBI Division of assignment: LOUISVILLE From: C. KENNETH ARNOLD, JR. SUGGESTION: The Criminal Informant Review Sheet (FD-237) and the Security Informant Review Sheet (FD-238) be made the first document in the file. UCurrent practice or rule (include manual citation as well as facts): Section 108-F-8 (p. 4), M of I provides that FD 237 be kept on top of other serials in the file in criminal informant files. Section 107-M-20 (p. 4), M of I provides that FD 138 be kept on top of other serials in Security Informant Files. Advantages of suggestion: By placing these forms on the bottom of the file the wear which is presently being experienced by having to remove them from the file each time additional material is added or removed will be reduced to a minimum. Further, the adoption of this suggestion will make for greater ease in the serializing process since it would no longer be necessary to remove and replace these forms each time additional material is added to the files. B WITE TO 2542-3-1617 Disadvantages of suggestion: See pa use by the United States of my suggestion shall now form gipe basis of a further claim of any nature by me, my heirs, or assigns upon the United States. ack 7/10/56-61 h Mr. leved to mirelly there of Mrs. Intellegence Mer. Miss Recommendations and comments of Division Head: I think this suggestion It will save wear and tear on the form itself has considerable merit. duce clerical function on handling the form. be adopted. 3181.

Disadvantages of the suggestion: The only disadvantage foreseeable to the writer is that when the file grows to two volumes resort would have to be had to the first volume to locate the serials referenced on FD-237 and FD-238. The inconvenience to be occasioned appears to be nominal, however, since the serials referred to would probably be found in the first volume of the informant file. The information reflected on the forms in question appears to be of the type which would be developed in the early stages of the utilization of a person as an informant and would necessarily be contained in the first volume of the file.

Criminal Informant Review Sheet FD-237 (8-18-55)

Mark\_opposite each item the number the serial or serials in which the information of ars. Although these items are regarded as nonvariable, changes may be noted by adding the new serial number and crossing out the old. When form is complete as to all applicable items, the Agent and Field Supervisor should initial the form at the end.

Symb	ol Number	Office	File
Туре	of Informant: CI PCI CS	Bureau	File
			<u>Serial No.</u>
1.	Name		
2.	Aliases		
3.	Informant Index Card Made		
4.	Description		
5.	Background Developed		
6.	Photograph		
7.	Credit Check		
8.	Local Criminal Check		
9.	Bureau Identification Record (FD-9)		
10.	Past Criminal Activities		
11.	Criminal Associates		
12.	Availability To Other Divisions		
13.	Advised of FBI Jurisdiction		
14.	Advised of Confidential Relationship		
15.	Advised Not Employee of Bureau		
16.	Advised to Furnish Information Only to Bureau		
17.	Advised Payments are Income		
18.	Advised Not to Contact Office Personally		
19.	When Designated C1		
20.	Indices Search Slip (FD-160) Summarized		
21.	Statement of Willingness to Aid Bureau		
22.	Arrangements for Payment		
23.	Symbol Number Assigned		
24.	Bureau Advised of Symbol		
25.	Service Record Checked, if any		
26.	Flash Notice Placed or Removed		

Completed:	
Approved:	***************************************

Security Informant FD-238 (8-25-55)	Review	Sheet
-------------------------------------	--------	-------

FD-	238' (8-25-55)		Date	***************************************
	• Mark opposite each item the number of the serial or serial or decided as nonvariable, changes may be noted by adding the new to all applicable items, the Agent and Field Supervisor should	s in which the serial number initial the form		
Symt	ool Number	Office	File	
Туре	e of Informant: SI PSI CS	Bureau	File	
	<del></del>	,	<u>Se</u>	rial No.
	Name			
	Aliases			
3.	Code Name	••••••	••••••	***************************************
4.	Symbol Number			
5.	Date and Place of Birth			
6.	Description	***************************************	***************************************	
7.	Photograph	••••••	•••••	
8.	Background Investigation:			
	(A) File references checked		***************************************	
	(B) Credit Inquiry	••••••	***************************************	
	(C) Local Criminal Check		••••••	
	(D) Bureau Identification Record	•••••		
	(E) Selective Service Check	***************************************		
	(F) Check of Armed Services Record	•••••		
	(G) Informants Canvassed		***************************************	•••••••
	(H) Reliability Check	•••••		•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••
	(I) Patriotism		***************************************	
	(J) Reputation		•••••	
9.	Informant Advised Of:			
	(A) Not Bureau employee		*************************	
	(B) Activities Voluntary		********************	
	(C) Relationship Confidential			
	(D) Bureau Labor Policy			***************************************
	E) Membership Not Sponsored			
	(F) Not to Retain Copies of Notes - Reports			
	(G) Report to be submitted under Code Number and in Thi			
	(H) Payments are Income			
	(I) Use Public Telephones			
	(J) No Office Contact Personally			
10	Statement of Cooperation			
	Post Office Box Number Assigned			
	Informant Indices Card Made			
	Agent who handles information			
	Alternate Agent			••••••••••••
	Concealment and Characterization Guide			***************************************
				Agent
	SERIAL NUMBER:			Agent
LL E	EP ON TOP OF OTHER SERIALS IN FILE.		•••••••	Supervisor
	Ve. 5.	***		1 F

#### ffice Memorandum UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO

Tols on

DATE: 7/19/56

FROM

 $\mathcal{D}_{ullet}$ Mason

SUBJECT:

SUGGESTION NUMBER 7-57

Made by Mr. C. Kenneth Arnold

Louisville Office

That FD-237 and FD-238 be made the first document SUGGESTI ON: in the file. FD-237 (Criminal Informant Review Sheet) is placed on top of all serials in a criminal informant file and is a ready reference for files containing data under items listed on the form opposite which items serials have been shown. FD-238 Security Informant Review Sheets is placed on top of all serials in a security informant file and is a ready reference for files containing data under items listed on the form opposite which items serials have been shown. FD-237 and FD-238 enclosed.

Form is made the last document in the file; PRESENT PROCEDURE: it is the top serial.

ADVANTAC ES: Save wear and tear on the form; would not be necessary to remove form each time material is added to file.

OBSER VATIONS: Investigative Division has no objection to suggestion but feels this is merely a filing procedure and that form's usefulness would not be affected by being on the top rather than the bottom or vice versa. Domestic Intelligence Division recommends unfavorably. Having the form as a top serial will serve as a handy reference and will be a flash to agents to remind them to To change the location of the form in make any changes necessary. all informant files would take a considerable amount of time. and Communications Division recommends unfavorably. It takes very little, if any, additional time to remove form and refile it incidental to regular mail filing duties. If form was placed as first serial in file-it would be necessary for agent to call first volume of file when he desired the review sheet even though ordinarily he would need only the last section of an informant file. It is easier to write on a top serial in a file than a bottom serial; therefore, entries made on form would be more legible if form is top serial.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

RECORDED - 84 // That the suggistion not be adopted.

Enclosures

cc - Personnel file of C. Kenneth Arnold, Jr. with cc of suggestion form

I WILLY MIT

JUL 24 1956

Tol son Nichols Boardman Belmont Mason . Mohr . Parsons Rosen Tamm Nease Winterrowd Tele. Room Holloman

1.7

31 COPY UNRECORDED

FD-252 (12-14-54)

### FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

EMPLOYEE SUGGESTION# 7-57

Date: 6-26-56

To:

Director, FBI

From:

C. KENNETH ARMOLD, JR.

Division of assignment: LOUISVILLE

SUGGESTION: The Criminal Informant Review Sheet (FD-237) and the Security Informant Review Sheet (FD-238) be made the first document in the file.

Current practice or rule (include manual citation as well as facts):

Section 108-F-8 (p. 4), M of I provides that FD 237 be kept on top of other serials in the file in criminal informant files. Section 107-M-20 (p. 4), M of I provides that FD 138 be kept protegy of tother serials in Security Informant Files.

By placing these forms on the bottom of the file the wear which is presently being experienced by having to remove them from the file each time additional material is added or removed will be reduced to a minimum. Further, the adoption of this suggestion will make for greater case in the serializing process since it would no longer be necessary to remove and replace these forms each time additional material is added to the files.

Disadvantages of suggestion:

See page two:

The use by the United States of my suggestion shall not form the basis of a further claim of any nature by me, my heirs, or assigns upon the United States.

upon the United States.

Mr. Mrs. Miss

(Signature of Suggester)

Recommendations and comments of Division Head: I think this suggestion has considerable merit. It will save wear and tear on the form itself and materially reduce clerical function in handling the form. I recommend that it be adopted.

Special Agent in Charge

Disadvantages of the suggestion: The only disadvantage foreseeable to the writer is that when the file grows to two volumes respect would have to be had to the first volume to locate the serials referenced on FD-257 and FD-238. The inconvenience to be occasioned appears to be nominal, however, since the serials referred to would probably be found in the first volume of the informant file. The information reflected on the forms in question appears to be of the type which would be developed in the early stages of the utilization of a person as an informant and would necessarily be contained in the first volume of the file.

DATE OF MAIL 7- 25-56

HAS THE REMOVED FOR THE CONFIDENTIAL FIRE ROOM OF THE DOMESTIC INTELLICENCE DIVISION.

HAS BEEN REMOVED AND PLACED IN THE SPECIAL FILE ROOM OF RECORDS BRANCH

SEE FILE 66-2554-7530 FOR AUTHORITY.

SUBJECT JUNE MAIL Security Sylormants - Genl

59 AUG 3 1958

REMOVED BY

FILE NUMBER 66-2542-3-1019

<sup>3</sup> D-36	(6-21-55)	, B .
		N. F
	FBI Mr. Token	
	Date: 7/30/56 Mr. Boardman	4
	Transmit the following message via AIR TEL Mr. Mason Mr. Mohr	
	AMSD REGISTERED  (Priority or Method of Mailing)  Mr. Parsons Mr. Rosen Mr. Rosen Mr. Tomm	
	From SAC, DETRO IT (100-8482) (100-8482-sub-2) Mr. Nelse Mr. Winterrowd	b7D
an.	To: DIRECTOR, FBI (66-2542-3)(100-247898)	
Ü	CSECURITY INFO. MANT PROGRAM	
	THOMAS DE LITT DENNIS SMITH ACT OF 1940; IS-C	
	Attached is a 8 page photographic copy of a mimeographed memo	
	captioned "Combating the Informer Evil" which was furnished by a source close to the Subject on 7/27/56.	b7D
	The attached report is the only copy available to the Detroit Office; however, the Lab. has been furnished one roll of 35 mm.	.1
	micro-file film with approximately 200 exposures and requested to furnish the Detroit Office two copies of each in which this memo is included.	
	Other information received from this informant appears to include CP Funds, dues, and sustainer material as well as what appears to be code names used in the underground for District 7.	
	Portinent information will be immediately sent to the Bureau	13
	upon receipt of photographs from the Lab. and upon completion of analysis of material.	art
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	Approved: Sent M Per	
	Special Agent in Charge	

E. D. MASON

SUGGESTION 202-53 Proposed Form for Criminal and Security Informant Files in Field Offices.

It seems advisable to resolve once and for all the question as to whether it is more economical for the field to maintain in each file on potential informants and criminal and security informants a form on which may be checked off the presence of certain essential information.

For example, there are 37 items which must necessarily be adequately covered in the file in order to properly handle a security or potential security informant. In addition to the identity of the informant there must be present information as to where the informant may be contacted and the informant's business and home addresses. The informant's description must be shown and whether the informant has a criminal record must necessarily be present. The degree of cooperation which can be expected from an informant is a necessary essential in order to properly contact and handle the informant.

The problem experienced by the field is that in order to locate these individual items of information which are so necessary in the handling of an informant it is necessary often to peruse a rather lengthy file. The proposal which has been made to the Bureau is that a sheet be prepared listing each of the 37 items and providing a space on the form for the serial number where the item may be found. Thus, in order to determine where an informant may be contacted it will not be necessary to review a great many serials in the file but the form will immediately refer the reviewer of the file to a specific serial with the net result there will be a considerable saving of Agent time.

The desirability of having such a form is a recurring question and in my opinion the Bureau has not adequately established a strong foundation for its past action of turning down requests for this form.

For example, in July Inspector Williams recommended that such a form be authorized. It was his belief that considerable Agenty Supervisory time would be saved without in any way sacrificing quality. The substantive aspects of handling an informant do not even enter this question. The form is designed purely to quickly refer the reviewer of a file to the location in a file where essential data can be found in exactly the same menner that an index in the

EDM: he

Manual of Rules and Regulations refers the reader to a specific section of the Manual.

After receiving Inspector Williams' suggestion the views of several field offices were obtained. Baltimore felt that the form would not be helpful to Supervisors. Philadelphia and WFO agreed with Baltimore. Knoxville felt the form would be helpful, and so did Charlotte.

The Investigative Division doesn't care one way or the other, but believes the adoption of the form should depend upon whether time is actually saved in the field.

It is this one point which in my mind has not been clarified-- "whether time will be saved in the field."

The Bureau's consideration of the form thus far has all been based on views of offices and views of Inspectors (Brown, Nugent, Stein, and Van Pelt favor the form) but no one has any specific measurement of how much will be saved in time.

While ASAC Roy Moore of Chicago was attending In-Service training this week he expressed himself rether vigorously in favor of such a form. While we are in possession of views pro and con as to the merits of the form, no one can prove as yet whether the form saves time or does not save time. We can expect that until we have specific facts we will continue to get requests for the use of the form.

ASAC Moore is desirous of experimenting with the form and would like to have permission to try it in the Chicago Office for a period of six months, during which time he will keep specific figures as to how much time is actually saved by the use of the form. If the picture becomes clear with adequate facts before the expiration of six months the Bureau will be advised promptly with a recommendation.

It is noted that the Executives Conference turned down on 7/30/53 the proposal that such a form be made available for fieldwide use in the handling of criminal informants. The Executives Conference had no actual figures on which to base its decision. It is proposed that we get such figures in order that the Executives Conference may subsequently reconsider this matter.

#### RECOMMENDATION

That the Executives Conference authorize the Chicago Field Division to use the attached forms -- one relating to criminal informants and one relating to security informants -- for a period of six months and keep detailed figures as to time saved in order that the Bureau may have actual figures with which to measure the benefits or disadvantages of the proposed forms.

## · Office Memorandum • united states government

•									
TO :	Dire	ctor, FBI	(66-2542)		DATE:	August	8, 19	56	
FROM :	SAC,	Seattle							b7D
SUBJECT:	SEAT	RITY INFOR TLE DÎVISI RNAL SECUR		Ţ	*				
monthly the fol	y repor	onsive to rts on the g is set f	SAC letter n Security In orth:	umber 56-34 formant Pro	4 instru ogram be	acting to submit	that tted	` •	
(1) Ad	ctive	Communists	•	During Pag 30 days	st	Total f	to Date	? ``\	:
	Number	r contacte	đ	4		35		•	
(2) Oth	ner Ind	dividuals:						1	
	(a) (b) (c) (d)	ative but	sed ntacted mpletely Coop not PSI mate	erial		1 0 0 0	\	SE CONTRACTOR OF THE PROPERTY	
	(e) (f)	being Deve	operative and eloped as PSI mpletely Nega	I O		0			٧,
(3) Res	ults:						*\		
	Numbe	er PSI Deve er of Sourcer er of Infor	eloped ces Developed rmants Develo	0 1 1 Oped 0		3 8 0	*	区区	
Analysi	s of F	rogress	•				•		
known hand this	e has s is s	a member of therein vonever been ubstantiat	Bufile 100-32 of the Commun oluntarily so dropped or sed by the fa portedly a "	nist Party ome time ag expelled b act that in	although so. As by the Cl	h he ce far as P as a	ased is member	~	4
2 -Burea 1 -Seat JPM:1g (3)		(a) (a) (b) 1856	REC	OHUED-42	ALIS 17	253· (.).	1034		b7D

SE	b7D
home of one of the most important security subjects in Tacoma, Wash. successfully identified the persons present at this meeting.	
he was contacted but had no information to report. He is being contacted on a regular basis and it is expected that in the fall, when CP activities will be stepped up in that area, he will develop into a valuable security informant.	
(Bufile 100-329122) continues to be friendly and in an interview had with her on July 24, 1956, she identified a few people known to her to be CP members in Spokane, Washington. She has a reluctance to name the people with whom she associated in the CP. It is possible that the interview had with her on the date mentioned may be the first step of the hurdle toward her full and complete cooperation in the matter of identifying persons she knows to be members of the CP and desire to fully cooperate in this program.	
Bufile 100-350248) because of has limited his activity, and it is expected that soon he will be in a position, if he is so inclined, to participate in this program. was contacted and had nothing to report.	b6 b7C b7D
and Continued efforts will be made to develop as security informants.	
Persons Contacted During July, 1956  [Bufile 100-350248], [Bufile (100-352133), [100-327462].	b6 b7С b7D
With the exception of the above-named are to be recontacted in an effort to develop them as PSI's. In addition to these three re-contacts, this office has authority to contact the following under this program:	
(Bufile 100-251305) (Bufile 100-395263).	b7D
The file on [ (Bufile 100-385178) has been reopened and a further contact is contemplated with him during	

SE	b7D
Communist Interview	
In accordance with current instructions for reporting, it should be pointed out that to date under this program 35 active communists have been contacted. At the time of the contact with these persons some were active members of the CP and others were members of the CP who had ceased or lessened their activity in the CP but who never were officially dropped or expelled by the CP. For that reason each was considered for informant development.	
Other Individuals	
A case was opened on  There is no record of his name appearing in the files of this office being a member of a subversive organization. Through a potential security informant it was learned that  Who attend CP meetings at visited the home of after having attended near the residence of the potential security informant. As it appears that is probably well acquainted with it is believed that he has potentiality if he otherwise measures up as a PSI.	<b>b</b> 7D
Potential Confidential Sources	
The case of [Bufile 100-352133] was closed by a report which will go forward to the Bureau in a day or so as it appears that because of his age, which has affected his memory and his expressed intent to cease all activity in the CP, he would not measure up to a potential security informant. Although cooperative, is not regarded as more than a source by this office.	b6 b7С
The following individuals could be classified and are so considered by the Seattle Office as potential confidential sources inasmuch as they were cordial and friendly when contacted and more or less indicated that they would not resent being recontacted in the future. They did, however, indicate that they did not desire further association with the CP at this time:	
(Bufile 100-413863)  (Bufile 100-352814)  (Bufile 100-188727)  (Bufile 100-351663)  Bufile 100-181924)  (Bufile 100-378688)  (Bufile 100-412616)	b7D

SE	
CL	

No individuals as yet are regarded under this program as  $_{\rm b7D}$  security informants.

# Results are considered to be PSI material.

#### Utilization of Agents

During July, 1956 one Agent, helped by other Agents, was assigned to this program due to the recent transfer of one of the Agents regularly assigned to this program and, because of the leave situation and the necessity for research to identify prospects for interview, other Agents were used on a part time basis.

Administrative controls have been established to effect the SAC authority type of interview on a much broader scale. The utilization of other Agents on a part time basis has been found to be effective and this office expects to devote more Agent time to this program in the future. Agents have been alerted to the possibility of developing informants by the use of persons with no previous subversive connections but who are friendly to active communists and who might be discreetly approached by these communists to affiliate with the Party.

Continued effort is being made to identify individuals who have in the past operated in the Underground of the Communist Party and who have returned to this area with the view of determining the desirability of conducting interviews with them under this program.

When files are reviewed for any purpose consideration is being given to the desirability of interviewing the person who is the subject of the file. It is expected that definite results within the next thirty days will be more apparent from this new authority.

During the past three month period particular effort has been exerted by the office's security squad to pinpoint membership within the CP. Agents have been conducting Fisur, using Tesur and established informants to accomplish this. They also have been developing new sources among neighbors, friends and fellow employees of subjects. This latter type of contact has been interpreted as falling within the Panel Source Program. This type of effort will continue. Emphasis in the future will be shifted directly to the SAC authorized type of interview.

SAC, Denver

August 15, 1956

b7D

Calling


Reurlet dated August 9, 1056, advising that Agents in your office handling security matters are requested to spend one quarter of their time under this program.

The Bureau expects you to take a personal interest in the Security Informant Program to insure that sufficient time is spent on it by Agents in your office to produce the desired results. In your next monthly letter, the actual percentage of time being spent on this program by Agents in your office handling security matters should be set forth. In addition, there should be included a brief, narrative analysis of the progress being made and your comments as to what work is planned in the future.

ele. Room \_ dolloman \_\_\_ Gandy \_\_\_\_

Parsons \_\_\_\_\_ (4)
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_ (4)
Tamm \_\_\_\_\_ Nease \_\_\_\_ At the first force of the content of the

RJM:mag



### ice Memoriadum • united states government

FROM	SAC, DENVER
SUBJECT:	SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM

DIRECTOR, FBI

Re SAC letter 56-34 dated 6-18-56.

The following reflects the progress of this program in the Denver Division as of 7-31-56.

1.		ve Communists Number contacted 0	
2.	Othe:	r Individuals	
	(a)	Cases opened 27	
	(b)	Cases closed2.	
	(c)	Number contacted(7)	
	(d)		
		not potential informant material 1	-
	(e)	Number cooperative and being	
		developed as PSI'S 3	_
	(f)	Number completely negative 3	
3.	Resu:	1ts	
	(a)	<u>*</u>	_
	(b)		
	(c)	Number of informants developed 0	

Eleven agents are presently assigned to the Security Squad, and each agent is requested to spend onequarter of his time under the Security Informant Program.

The above program has resulted in the development of three PSI'S.

2/- Bureau (REG) Denver

EX-100

b7D

8-9-56

· DATE:

1-J. D. Donohue

2-Original and copy 1-Yellow file copy 1-Bureau file (66-2542-3)

SAC, Washington Field

August 10, 1986

Director, FBI (100-3-99)

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA TOPLEY INTERNAL SECURITY - C

59461

You should contact Ransdell, Inc., printers and publishers, Washington, D. C., and attempt to discreetly obtain 200 copies of the pamphlet, "Are Communism and Democracy Mutually Antagonistic?" If copies of this publication are available, they should be forwarded to the Bureau marked to the attention of the Central Research Section.

For your information, this pamphlet consists of a transcription of a debate on the topic, "Are Communism and Democracy Mutually Antagonistic?" which was presented on the American Forum of the Air and broadcasted over the Mutual Broadcasting System on May 21, 1946.

JFC:njp (8)

NOTE:

By letter dated July 16, 1956, New York was authorized to purchase 200 copies of the above pamphlet at 10¢ per copy. By letter dated 8-6-56, New York advised that copies not available there but could probably be obtained through Ransdell, Inc. During recent series of conferences held in the field to facilitate the development of additional security informants. a number of comments were received to the effect that this pamphlet provided excellent conversational material for use in contacting potential security informants. In this debate, Clare Booth Luce and William Henry Chamberlin opposed William Z. Foster and Dr. Harry F. Ward.

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AUG 1 0 1956

110T RECORDED 194 AUG 14 1956;

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OMGINAL FILE

B

V. C. Sullivan

During the recent series of conferences held in the field to facilitate the development of additional security informants, the field office Agents who participated requested that additional public source material which could be furnished to potential informants be forwarded to the field.

During the period from June 33 to August 3, 1956, the publications listed on the enclosure were forwarded to the field by routing slip by the Central Research Section. These publications have all been previously approved for use in connection with the captioned program. The number of copies furnished to each office varied with the amount of Communist Party activity in the territories covered by the individual offices.

The Central Research Section is presently attempting to obtain additional public source material which would be suitable for use in connection with the captioned program. Any additional publications which are obtained will be promptly forwarded to the field after they have been approved for use in the Toplev program.

#### RECOMPLENDATION:

None. For your information and for recording.

#### Enclosure

JFC:njp

(6)

1-Mr. J. F. Condon

1-Section tickler

1-J. D. Donobue

1-Mr. Belmont

<u>-1-38-2542-3</u>

NOT RECORDED

ENCLOSURL

WORKEL COTY FILED IN

#### PUBLICATIONS FORWARDED TO FIELD FOR USE IN TOPLEY PROGRAM

"Communist Attacks on Religion"

"The Deadly Parallel"

"Democracy vs. Communism"

"Education - Communist Style"

"The Great Pretense"

"How You Can Teach About Communism"

"The Katyn Forest Murders"

"The Negro in American Life"

"The Phantom American Negro"

"Primer on Communism"

"A Red Paper on Forced Labor"

"Where Are They Now"

1 - Bu. file (66-2542-3) 1 - Yellow file copy

1 - J. F. Condon

1 - Section tickler 1 - J. S. Johnson

2 - Original and copy

August 1, 1956

SAC, New York

Director, FBI (100-3-99)

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA TOPLEV INTERNAL SECURITY - C

ReBulet 6-25-56 captioned "Primer on Communism and How You Can Teach about Communism published by the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, Internal Security - C."

You should discreetly obtain 100 additional copies of each of the above publications and forward them expeditiously to the Bureau marked to the attention of the Central Research Section.

JFC:njp/nar **(7)** 

NOTE:

Pamphlet entitled Primer on Communism costs \$.50 per copy. Pamphlet entitled How You Can Teach about Communism costs \$.25 per copy. These publications previously approved for use in connection with captioned program and copies of each forwarded to offices where majority of Communist Party activity is concentrated. By letter dated 7/24/56, WFO requested 25 additional copies of each publication. Only seven copies of each publication available at the Bureau, and these are being forwarded to WFO. It is felt that a supply of each of these publications should be maintained in the Central Research Section to accommodate any future requests which may be received from the field for additional copies.

3oardman \_\_\_\_ NOT RECORDED 29 AUG 2 1956

Tamm Nease Winterrowd \_\_\_\_ Tele. Room \_

Vichols \_\_\_\_\_

Belmont \_

Mason .... Mohr

Parsons ... Rosen \_

## UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO

The Director

: J.P. Mohr FROM

The Congressional Record

A5923

Senator Butler, (R) Maryland, extended his remarks to include a number of his weekly newsletters concerning the 'Soviet road to world conquest. References to the Director contained in two of the letters (pages A5921 and A5922), in regard to use of informants, were set forth in an earlier memorandum.

NOT RETURNED 191 AUG 7 956

In the original of a memorandum captioned and dated as above, the Congressional was reviewed and pertinent items were marked for the Director's attention. This form has been prepared in order that portions of a copy of the original memorandum may be clipped, mounted, and placed in appropriate Bureau case or subject matter files.

#### JULY, 1956

	Number contacted.	117	
2.	Other Individuals  a. Cases opened.  b. Cases closed.  c. Number contacted.	1 <b>7</b> 91 435 559	
	<ul> <li>Number contacted.</li> <li>Number completely cooperative</li> <li>but not potential informant</li> <li>material.</li> </ul>	200	2
	e. Number cooperative and being		

3. Results

1.

Number of PSIs developed.

Number of sources developed. a.

developed as PSIs.

b.

Number completely negative.

Number of informants developed. C.

66-2542 Sub 3

cc - Mr. Boardman

Mr. Belmont

f.

Mr. Baumgardner Mr. Donohue

Active Communists

RECORDED = 7

Z SEP 12 1956

110

249

\* Potential Security INFORMANTS.

Memorandum for Mr. Boardman

It is interesting to note that under the General Interview Program of contacting subjects of security investigations for the month of June, 1956, 184 persons were interviewed. During the first month of the operation of our new Security Informant Program designed to cut red tape and accelerate interviews with individuals in order to obtain additional informant material, 676 persons were contacted. During June, 1956, of those subjects interviewed under the General Interview Program, 2 persons were developed as sources of information whereas in July, 1956, under the Security Informant Program 36 sources, 40 potential security informants and 11 informants were developed.

In the future in order that a clear picture regarding the progress of this program can be presented the figures for the current month, the preceding month and the grand total from the inception of the program will be set out.

The field has shown considerable enthusiasm and optimism for this program and it is the general feeling that we will obtain additional coverage through the acceleration of interviews with communists and other individuals. In view of its importance close supervision is being given to the work of each office and letters will be directed to those offices not showing sufficient progress. It was not necessary to send any letters to the field this month.

In My Wood

#### PROPOSED CHANGES IN YBI MANDDOOK. PART I

59462

The accord paragraph of subsection Sa, which begins on page 18b and concludes on page 19, should be deleted.

Subsection 8b, now on page 10, should be revised to read as follows:

b. To pay enyone on a continuing basis, obtain specific Aureau authorization. In requesting this authorization. a justification must be set forth containing following tions using those authordings;

Residence and employment.

Current membership in organizations. Summary of information furnished during

pertinent period. Amount paid for services and expenses by month.

Type and number of meetings attended on other activity.

Symbor of unition and oral reports submi Information furnished of unusual value. Approximate number of persons on whom

informant furnished coverage and their is Informant's potential for educacement. Stability and reliability. (Set forth p weaknesses, domestic difficulties, indica of untrustworthiness or unreliability, or similar problems presented by informant and .tep. being taken to prevent any such mituations from

later becoming source of endarrossment to Sursey. (11) Indestrinction egainst disclosure. (State whether every apportualty has been taken to properly indoctrinate informant against naking any discleaure of his relationship with Bureau through

any modica) ill necessary action taken on information for inhed. Macellaneous. (Any other netters concerning informant's operation which should be brought to

Bureau's attention. Recommendation, (New fallowing wording as nearly an possible: "I, therefore, recommend that outhorise be granted to continue (increues, decrease) juga ments to the above informant up to 1 (enough) po \_(nonth, week) for services, plus [\_\_(unount) per\_\_\_(month, west) for expenses actually \_ months, cffective\i

incurred for a parted of

applicable, substitute potential informati confidential of conel course or course of information for the want information information for the want information information for the want information information

Tolson Boardman Belmont Mohr\_

Parsons Rosen Tamm . Nease

Winterrowd . Tele. Room

Subsection 3d, page 19, should be revised to read as follows:

d. Then payments have been authorized for a definite period of time, it is necessary to advise the Eureau at least two weeks in advance of the expiration of the payment period as to whether the services of the informant are to be continued and to make a further recommendation concerning additional payments. This justification letter should be submitted every three months in the same form as outlined in subscotion to above. If the informant is not being paid on Eureau authorization, a communication must be transmitted to the Eureau overy three manths after the date of designation containing the same information set out above in 5h except those items agreeming payments. Set out recommendation of SAC recording continuance of informatical

Subsection 5, page 20c, should be revised to read as fellows:

5. Every 3 menths a letter of justification should be submitted to Surceu requesting continuation of payments to security confidential sources. See subsection 30, pace 18th for farm of letter. If the security source is not being paid on Bureau cuthorisation and is being used regularly, the Agent handling the source must distant a memorandum to the SAC for the file containing the same certification as to stability and reliability as required by payment letters.

Subsection D captioned, "Source of Information," page 80d, should be revised to read as follows:

1. Definition - An individual, organization or concern which willingly furnishes information to representatives of Sureau with sufficient frequency to justify listing for the benefit of all Agents and there is no reason. under ordinary eircumstances, to protect their identity in Bureau communications. If, however, it is repeatedly necessary to conceal the identity of such a source, consideration chould be given to listing as an informant or confidential source and assigning a symbol number. Every three months a letter of justification should be submitted to the Bureau requesting continuation of marments to security sources of information. See aubsection ab. made les for form of letter. If the accurity source of information is not being paid on Bureau authorization and is being used regularly, the Agent handling the source of information nust distate a memorandum to the SAC for the file containing the same certification as to stability and reliability as required by papeant letters.

cc - lonohue loardman Belmont Training & Inspection

59464

PROPOSED CHANGES IN FBI HANDROOK, PART I



NOTE ON YELLOW:

See memo Belmont to Boardman dated September 11, 1956, captioned "Security Informants and Sources, Justification Letters," JDD:201

W. C. Sullivan

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA TOPLEV INTERNAL SECURITY - C 100-3-99

The Central Research Section regularly forwards to the field public source material suitable for use in connection with the captioned program. The Committee on Un-American Activities, U.S. House of Representatives (HCUA) recently issued a pamphlet entitled "TRIAL BY TREASON," a copy of which is enclosed. This pamphlet is a documented study of the manner in which the communist movement exploited the cases of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg and Morton Sobell, who were convicted of conspiracy to commit espionage on behalf of the Soviet Union.

Additional copies of this publication have been obtained by the Central Research Section. It is felt that this publication provides excellent material for use in attempting to develop additional security informants.

#### RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that the Central Research Section be authorized to forward copies of the enclosed publication by routing slip to the 24 offices listed below, in which the majority of communist activity is concentrated. The number of copies furnished to these offices will vary in accordance with the amount of communist activity within the territory covered by the individual offices. Routing slips will be used in the interest of economy.

Albany	Detroit Philadelphia		
Baltimore	Indianapolis	Pittsburgh	
Boston	Los Angeles	Portland	
Buffalo	Milwaukee	St. Louis	
Chicago	Minneapolis	San Diego	
Cincinnati	Newark	San Francisco	
Cleveland	New Haven	Seattle	
Denver	New York	Washington Field	

126 SEP 12 356

#### Enclosure

JFC:njp
(6)
1-Section tickler 2 1-Mr. Belmont
1-J. F. Condon D 4 1 1 1 66-2542-3
1-J. D. Denonue

#### ffice Memorandum UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Tolson

DATE: 8/17/56

> Tolsca Niche's

Tames

Winterrowd Tele. Room

Holloman

Boardman Belment

FROM :

Mason E. D.

SUBJECT:

LEGAL TECHNICALITIES

Memorandum Assistant Director Mohr to Line Toloon 8/13/56 entitled "Increase Fees of Timespea" states that according to Public Law 875, Eighty-fourth Congress, approved 8/1/56, witnesses hereafter appearing in U. S. Courts and before U. S. Commissioners shall receive \$4 for each day's attendance and 8¢ per mile for transportation. If the point of testimony is so far from the witness's residence that he cannot return thereto from day to day he shall receive an additional ellocates of \$8 per day for expenses.

It is ourgested that witness fees so courtour as there deserve to be classified as "logal tocketeslities" which immensely-discourage the propertion of crime. The \$4 which the pitness red Aves for his day's absence from work is pay for d hours at the present minimum wage scale of \$1 per If the witness must stay overnight his receives \$87870 total of \$12 per day thich is the per diem allowed to Federal employees but leaves the witness nothing for salary. If the witness is caployed by himself, as is so often the case, he is then receiving; in effect, nothing for his day's work.

This subject may be worth some mention in that session of the Criminal Law Section, American Bar Association Meeting, August 27-31, 1956, which will discuss the subject "Are The Courts Handouffing" The Police."

This natter of witness face mancada vescrue mention in that session of the Criminal Law 958 ction which is going to discuss "An Appraisal of Federal Loyalty-Security Procedures." One of the principal speakers is Dudley B. Bonsal of the New York Bar

Mr. Hicholo CC -Mr. Roben Crino Records Scatton

DIDERCHAM (a) La

17 AUG 24 1956

DRIGINAL COPY FILED

Memo to Mr. Tolson

who was chairman of the special committee of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York which brought out a report on the Federal Loyalty-Security Program and suggested that Hearing Boards be given power to subpoena witnesses and that employees against whom charges are being heard be given a greater neasure of confrontation by witnesses. They suggest that the Hearing Board should consider subpoena of any witness other than an informant who is "under cover and will continue to remain under cover." If such a recommendation were adopted, the FBI would find it necessary to advise all other vitnesses that they would be subject to subpoens. In addition, those subpoenced would draw those ridiculously low fees for their appearance. Those two facts would seen to constitute a major readblock in our efforts to get the average citizen to provide information in cases of this type.

RECOMMENDATION: Hone...for information.

DATE OF MAIL 8-24-56

HAS BEEN REMOVED FOR THE CONFEDENCE ME PILE ROOM OF THE DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION.

> HAS BEEN REMOVED AND PLACED IN THE SPECIAL FILE ROOM OF RECORDS BRANCH

SEE FILE 66-2554-7530 FOR AUTHORITY.

JUNE MAIL Lecurity Angormants Went.

REMOVED BY 59 SEP 19 1956

FILE NUMBER 66- 2542-3-1024

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGEOUT

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATE GOVERNMENT

Mr. L. V. Boardman

DATE: September 26, 1956

Tolson Nichols.

Boardman Belmont Mason Mohr.

Parsons

Mr. A. H. Belmont

SECURITY INFORMANTS PROGRAM

Genetal Rosen Tamm As the result of our conferences on security informants in April and May of this year, SAC Letter 56-34 dated June 18, 1956, set forth changes in policy and procedure which, among other things, permits the SAC in certain Nease Winterrowd Tele. Room Holloman . Gandy. instances to approve interviews with individuals to determine whether such persons have any informant potential. This program has saved considerable correspondence between the field and the Bureau and has accelerated our informant program. If such individual is cooperative Bureau authority must then be obtained to develop the subject as an informant. This authority in the SAC does not apply, however, to delicate situations or to those individuals employed in the newspaper field, education field, and the like.

The following is a tabulation summarizing results of this program for the current month of August, the preceding month of July, and the grand total from the inception of this program which has been in existence for the past two months.

		<u>AUGUST</u>	JULY	TOTAL	
1.	Active Communists Number contacted	131	117	248	
2.	Other Individuals a. Cases opened. b. Cases closed. c. Number contacted. d. Number completely cooperative but not potential informant	1270 739 663	1791 435 559	3061 1174 1222	•
	material. e. Number cooperative and being developed as PSIs.*	248	200	448	
	developed as PSIs.	107	110	217	
	f. Number completely negative.	308	249	<b>557</b>	
3.	Results				
	a. Number of PSIs developed.	34	40	74	
	b. Number of sources developed.	33	36	69	
	c. Number of informants developed	. 3	11	14	

66-2542 Sub 3

RECORDED-91 66-255/2

cc - Mr. Boardman


\* Potential security Informants. Mr. Belmont

Mr. Baumgardner

Mr. Donohue

JDD:oik₁

60 OCT 4



14 OCT 2 1956

Memorandum for Mr. Boardman

It is pointed out that the number of active communists contacted under this program showed an increase in the month of August over the month of July. Likewise, the number of other individuals contacted increased over the past month. In August, fewer cases were opened than in July on individuals other than communists, however, more cases were closed than in the previous month which reflects considerable review on the part of the field and elimination of those cases determined undesirable for contact under this program. The number of individuals contacted who were cooperative but not PSI material showed an increase of 48 over the last month but the number cooperative and being developed as PSIs decreased from 110 to 107.

The field continues to show great interest and enthusiasm in this project which is an effective means of obtaining PSI material by the acceleration of interviews and the elimination of those individuals who have no desire to assist the Bureau or are in no position to do so. It was necessary during the past month to send only one communication to a division which reflected lack of progress under this program and close supervision will be maintained to be certain that all offices maintain the proper interest to make it a success.

Next month another memorandum will be prepared showing the progress of the Security Informant Program and it will reflect the figures for the current month, the preceding month and the grand total from the inception of the program.

HAR THE OWN AM

W. C. Sullivan

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA TOPLEV 100-3-99

In view of the recent manifestations of anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union, every effort is being made to develop additional security informants from among communists who are of Jewish origin. To further this program, the Central Research Section has furnished to the field copies of several publications dealing with Soviet anti-Semitium which have been issued by various anticommunist Jewish organizations.

On April 13, 1956, the "Daily Worker," east coast communist newspacer, printed an editorial which was excremely critical of Soviet anti-Semitism. The circulation of the "Daily Worker" is a little over 7,000 and is largely limited to the New York area. It is, therefore, felt that many members of the Communist Party, USA, who are of Jewish origin may not have had an opportunity to read this editorial.

Since the field has already been furnished considerable material on Soviet anti-Semitism from anticommunist sources for use in connection with the captioned program, it is felt that this editorial which appeared in the "Daily Worker" would provide excellent material for developing potential security informants who are of Jewish origin. Copies of this editorial could be furnished anonymously to individuals being considered for development as informants prior to any contact in an effort to get them to cooperate with the Bureau. Grant

#### RECOLUMENDATION:

It is recommended that the Central Research Section be authorized of the enclosed excerpts from this editorial to reproduce 500 copies for dissemination to the field. They will be distributed to the field by routing slip as in the past. Enclosure

JFC:njp

(6)

1 - J. F. Condon

1 - Section tickler

1 - J. D. Donohue

1 - Mr. Eelmont

∠1 - 66-2542-3 j.··

-8-00 U GE BENDEO

The following comments on Soviet anti-Semitism appeared in an editorial in the "Daily Worker" on April 13, 1956:

b 49 -

"WE FEEL a deep sense of indignation, anger and grief over the latest disclosures of violation of socialist principles under the Stalin regime in the Soviet Union. We refer to the apparent confirmation this week by a Jewish Communist paper in Poland of the charge that a large number of Jewish writers and other Jewish leaders were framed up and executed and that Jewish culture was virtually wiped out.

"We denounce and protest this crime not only because of the horrible actions themselves. We have here a gross departure from the socialist principles upon which the Soviet Union, the first socialist state in the history of man, is founded.

"...socialist principles were criminally violated in the late 1940s when Jewish leaders were framed and executed, when Jewish newspapers and other expression of Jewish culture were banned.

"We register our strong dissatisfaction that the Soviet leaders have not offered any explanation of what took place.

"Every supporter of socialism every honest foe of racism, has a right to expect an explanation and a duty to ask for it.

"...the Soviet leaders should explain to their friends and other honest workers in all countries, how these crimes were perpetrated. What false theories, if any, played a part in the violations? What has been done to punish all those responsible? What has been done to rectify the misdeeds? What is being done to guarantee against repetition of these actions against any minorities in the Soviet Union?

"For our part, we frankly admit we were too prone to accept the explanation of why Jewish culture had disappeared in the Soviet Union in the late 1940s. Had we not done so, we would have served the cause of socialism better." 1 - Yellow file copy 1 - Bufile 66-2542-3

1 - J. F. Condon

1 - Section tickler

1 - J. D. Donohue

1 - Mr. Belmont

1 - J. S. Johnson

2 - Original and copy September 14, 1956

SAC, New York

Director, FBI (100-3-99)

59465

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA INTERNAL SECURITY - C TOPLEY

You should attempt to obtain 300 copies of the booklet Soviet Crimes and Khrushchev's Confessions published by the Public Affairs Committee of Freedom House, New York City. The copies of this booklet should be forwarded to the Bureau marked for the attention of the Central Research Section.

This matter should be handled immediately so that the most effective use possible can be made of this bookiet in connection with the captioned program.

JFC:mjh

170 SEP 0 1956

Tolson Nichols Boardman Belmont Mason Mohr Parsons Rosen Tamm Nease Winterrowd Tele. Room Holloman Holloman

W @ 300

MR. L. V. BOARDMAN

MR. A. H. BELMONT

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA INTERNAL SECURITY - C TOPLEY Bufile 100-3-99

Sizemity Informants formit

188 SEP 18 1956

An article which appeared on page 6 of the September 11, 1956, issue of the Daily Mirror, daily newspaper published in New York City, set forth that the Public Affairs Committee of Freedom House had issued a booklet dealing with the crimes committed by the Soviet Union against its citizens and the free world. The Director instructed, "We should get a copy of this rept. H."

The text of this report appears on pages 128-142 of the September 7, 1956, issue of U.S. News & World Report and was reviewed by the Central Research Section for possible use in connection with the captioned program. The report is a chronological account of the "crimes against humanity" in the Soviet Union from 1917 when the communists seized power until the present time. It proves that suppression, persecution, and mass murder have been used by the Soviet regime since its inception and not merely since the 1930s as present communist propaganda claims. It also shows that the present Soviet leaders were "deeply involved" in the crimes for which they are now trying to place the blame on Stalin alone. The article sets forth that the crimes of Stalin which were exposed by Khrushchev (purges, military mistakes, personal vengeance) were all crimes which weakened the communist movement. As yet, Khrushchev has made no mention of all the crimes committed by Stalin against the people of the Soviet Union, and has given every indication that the present Soviet leaders intend to continue the repressive measures developed under Stalin.

It is felt that this booklet would prove extremely effective in contacting potential security informants. It would be used in an anonymous fashion, such as being sent through the mails to individuals for the purpose of softening them up prior to interview, and, therefore, could not be traced to the Bureau. A letter is enclosed instructing the New York office to obtain 300 copies of this booklet. The cost of 300 copies is \$36.00.

Laclosures

JFC:nar

(9)

1 - J.F. Condon

1 - Section tickler

1 - J.D. Donohue

1 - Mr. Belmont

1 - Mr. Boardman

1 - J. E. Johnson

1 - Mr. Nichols 1 - Bufile 66-2542-3

RO SEP 18 1956

# Memorandum to Mr. L. V. Boardman from Mr. A. H. Belmont

The New York office is forwarding a copy of this booklet to the Bureau today. Upon receipt, it will be immediately sent to the Director for his perusal.

The September 7, 1956, issue of U. S. News & World Report is enclosed for the Director's information.

### RECOMMENDATIONS:

- (1) That the enclosed letter to the New York office be approved.
- (2) That the Central Research Section be authorized to forward copies of this booklet to the field by routing slip after they have been obtained by the New York office. The number of copies furnished to the field will vary in accordance with the amount of communist activity within the territories covered by the individual offices. Routing slips will be used in the interest of economy.

DATE OF MAIL 9-25-56

HAS BEEN REMOVED FOR THE CONFIDENTIAL FIELD ROOM OF THE DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION.

> HAS BEEN REMOVED AND PLACED IN THE SPECIAL CLE ROOM OF RECORDS BRANCH

SEE FILE 66-2554-7530 FOR AUTHORITY.

Levy. Inft. - Senl.

REMOVED BY 20019 1956

FILE NUMBER 66-25423-1026

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGEOUT

### September II. 1956

#### PROPOSED CHANGES IN MANUAL OF INSTRUCTIONS

Section 107 N of the Manual of Instructions entitled "Security Informants" should be changed as follows:

Subsections 5, 6, 10, 11, 13, 14 and 23 should be deleted and a new subsection 5 added as follows:

To pay anyone on a continuing basis, obtain specific Bureau authorization. In requesting this authorization a justification must be set forth containing the following items using these subheadings:

Residence and employment.

Current membership in organizations.

Summary of information furnished during pertinent period.

imount paid for services and expenses by month.

Type and number of meetings attended and other activity.

Number of pritten and aral reports submitted.

Information furnished of unusual value. Approximate number of persons on whom informant furnished coverage and their importance.

Informant's potential for advancement.

Stability and reliability. (Set forth personal weaknesses, domestic difficulties, indications of untrustworthiness or unreliability, or other similar problems presented by informant and steps being taken to prevent any such situations from later becoming source of embarrassment to the Bureau.

(11)Indoctrination against disclosure. (State whether every opportunity has been taken to properly indoctrinate informent again making any disclosure of his relationship with Bureau through any media.)

NOT RECORDED 21 SEP 18 1500

NOTE ON YELLOW:

See memo Belmont to Boardman dated 9-11-56. captioned "Security Informants and Sources, Justification Letters."

JDD:aml

Belmont Mason -Mohr Parsons Rosen Tamm Nease Winterrowd \_

Nichols -Boardman

- (12) All necessary action taken on ingraction furnished.
- (13) Miscellaneous.

  (Any other matters concerning informatis operation which should be brought to Bureau's attention.)
- (14) Recommendation.

  (Use following wording as nearly as possible:

  "I, therefore, recommend that authority be granted to continue (increase, decrease) payments to the above informant up to \$\frac{1}{2}\$ (amount) per (month, week) for services, plus \$\frac{1}{2}\$ (amount) per \_\_\_\_\_\_ (month, week) for expenses actually incurred for a period of \_\_\_\_\_\_\_ months, effective \_\_\_\_\_\_ (date)."

(Where applicable substitute potential informant, confidential source, panel source or source of information for the word informant.)

Subsections 7, 8, 9 and 12 should now follow subsection 22.

Old subsections 15 and 16 should now read as follows;

If the informant is not being paid on Bureau authorization, a communication must be transmitted to the Bureau every three months after the date of designation containing the same information set out above in subsection 5 except those items concerning payments. Recommendation of SAC regarding continuance of informant should also be set forth.

Section 107 U 6 entitled "Security Confidential Sources" should be changed as follows:

(a) Every three months a letter of justification should be submitted to the Bureau requesting continuation of payments to security confidential sources. See 107 N 5 for form of letter.

Subsections (b), (c) and (d) should be deleted and new (b) should read as follows:

(b) If the security source is not being paid on Bureau authorization and is being used regularly, the Agent handling the source must dictate a memorandum to the SAC for the file containing the same certification as to stability and reliability as required by payment letters.

Section 87 E 5c should be changed as follows:

(5) Every three months submit letter of justification to Bureau requesting continuation of payments to panel sources. See 107 N 5 of Manual of Instruction for form of letter.

Delete (5) (a), (b), (c), (d), (e) and (f). The next paragraph should now read as follows:

If the source is not being paid on Bureau authorization, Agent handling source must prepare memorandum to SAC for file containing the same certification as to stability and reliability as required by payment letters.

DATE OF MAIL 10-24-56

HAS EEEN REMOVED FOR THE CONFIDENTIAL FILE DOOM OF THE DEMESTIC INVESTIGENCE DIVISION.

HAS BEEN REMOVED AND PLACED IN THE SPECIAL FILE ROOM OF RECORDS BRANCH

SEE FILE 66-2554-7530 FOR AUTHORITY.

SUBJECT JUNE MAIL Secy. Inft. - Several

REMOVED BY = 70 1958

FILE NUMBER 66 - 2542 - 3 - 1027

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGEOUT

W. C. Sullivan

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA TOPLEV INTERNAL SECURITY - C Buffle 100-3-99

General Intelligence work

By letter dated October 5, 1956, New York office furnished copies of a pamphlet entitled Now They Admit It... Communist Confessions of Crimes against Jews, issued by the American Jewish Committee (AJC), a copy of which is enclosed. Through the use of quotations from both communist and noncommunist sources, this pamphlet emphasizes the crimes committed in the Soviet Union against persons of Jewish origin. The New York office also advised that it could probably obtain 500 additional copies of this pamphlet without charge through Mrs. Lucy Dawidowicz, a source of information at the AJC. It is felt that this pamphlet would be of considerable assistance in developing additional security informants from among communists of Jewish origin. As in the past, this material will be furnished anonymously to potential informants prior to interview in an effort to dispose them favorably toward cooperating with the Bureau.

The New York office also advised that Mrs. Davidowicz has, in the past, furnished substantial quantities of public source material which have been utilized in connection with the captioned program without any cost to the Bureau. She has also been of considerable assistance to the New York office in furnishing information regarding several Jewish communist front groups. In addition, she has expressed a great admiration for the Bureau's work in the internal security field. The New York office suggested that a letter be forwarded to Mrs. Davidowicz expressing the Bureau's appreciation for her cooperation. Buffles contain no data which would preclude this correspondence with Mrs. Davidowicz.

### RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That the enclosed letter instructing the New York office to obtain 500 additional copies of the publication entitled "Now They Admit It... Communist Confessions of Crimes against Jews" be approved, and that the Central Research Section be authorized to furnish copies to the field by routing slip.

(2) That this memorandum be routed to the Crime Records Section so that a letter of appreciation to Mrs. Dawidowicz can be prepared.

JEC:min ENCLOSURE (IDA with

- J. F. Condon 1 - Mr. Be - Section tighter 1 - M. A.

NOT RECORDED 140 001 31/1956 DRIGINAL COST FILED

### e Memorandum UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

9 го	:	Mr.	$L_{ullet}$	<b>v</b> •	Boardman
					J 110

CIR DATE: November 2, 1956

Boardman lmont ason Mohr .

Parsons Rosen Tamm

Nease .

Winterrowd Tele. Room

FROM : Mr. A. H. Belmont

SECURITY INFORMANT

BRONX COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM OF POLITICAL PRISONERS INTERNAL SECURITY - C

	PLULLUM
	Gandy
New York advised by teletype that according	_
to Communist Party (CP) member, report	rted
during a meeting of the Bronx Committee for Freedom	2
of Political Prisoners (BCFPP), she had been contacted by the	te.
Emergency Civil Liberties Committee (ECLC) relative to a campai	ign
which the ECLC is to undertake against the FBI. Allegedly the	
ECLC plans a national campaign against the FBI for "molesting t	the

people in the streets and in their homes." This will be in the form of a test case which they will take to the U.S. Supreme Court.

The ECLC, according to requested a meeting with the BCFPP in order to work out a plan of compaign. It was decided requested a meeting with to have representatives of both groups meet at the residence of Altshuler 11/19/56. New York advised the informant was alerted to report any and all activity in this mutter.

This apparently refers to the Bureau's activity in conducting interviews with subversives under our various interview programs. At the present time we have two specific programs which involve interviews with subversives. These are the Toplev and Security Informant Programs. The Toplev Program was inaugurated in 1951 and consists of interviewing high-ranking communists as potential informants. The Security Informant Program embodies interviews with rank-and-file communists and other subversives not only to develop informants but also as a means of resolving security investigations.

These programs have met with outstanding success and as an example our two highest ranking informants in the Party today were developed through such interviews. We have obtained voluminous

Enclosure

cc - 100-384660 (Emergency Civil Liberties Committee) RECORDED-18.

cc - Mr. Boardman

Mr. Belmont

Mr. Rushing

Mr. Donohue

EX-126

TDR:JDD:ojk

FILED INBECORDED COPY

rec

Memorandum for Mr. Boardman
Re: SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM
BRONX COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM OF POLITICAL PRISONERS

intelligence information through these interviews which have not only produced informants and resolved security investigations but also has had a disruptive effect on the Party itself. For years the Party and sympathetic front groups have kept up a running attack on the FBI through media of the CP press due to our interview programs. To be certain we are on firm ground under these programs the field has been instructed to be most circumspect in making approaches to communists.

### OBSERVATIONS:

The Party and sympathetic organizations have in the past taken steps to try to make our interview programs ineffective and to cause us embarrassment; however, this represents the first indication that there is a plan under consideration to make a test case of an interview. It is not clear how they intend to approach this problem. To offset any such attack which the ECLC contemplates our Agents are presently under instructions that when a subject is appropried to inform the subject he is under no restriction of movement and he may terminate the contact at will. In other words, we make it clear during our interview that we are not impeding or hindering the subject's activity or physical movement in any way. In the past various tactics by the CP to hamper us in connection with these interviews have been brought to the attention of the field and it is felt that we should realert the field to this development. New York has been telephonically instructed to have attend the proposed meeting on 11/19/56 if possible and to develop all other information through its sources and informants on this matter.

### ACTION:

- (1) We will follow this closely with New York and if it is ascertained a concrete plan to embarrass the Bureau is being developed recommendations to counter such a plan will be made in order to fully protect the Bureau.
- (2) In order that the field may be aware of this latest attempt by the Party and its sympathetic organizations to embarrass the Bureau, there is attachedyproposed letter to all SACs. (Duplimat)

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## Office Memorandum. UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

: Mr. A. H. Belmont

DATE: November 15, 1956

Tolson .

Nichols Boardman Belmont . Mason

Mobr Parsons Rosen

Nease.

Winterrowd

Tele. Room Holloman . Gandy

FROM : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner

SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANTS.

SAC Letter 56-34 permits the SAC in many instances to authorize interviews with individuals to determine if they have any potential as informants. In certain cases the field must get Bureau authority to make such contacts but in either event if the individual is cooperative background investigation must Do then be conducted, results furnished to the Bureau and specific authority obtained to approach the individual as a security informant.

In view of this change the provision in the Manual of Instructions, Section 107, on security informants which requires authority to contact an individual to determine if he is willing to act as an informant is no longer necessary and should be deleted.

### ACTION:

For approval, there is attached for transmittal to the Planning Section, Training and Inspection Division, appropriate changes in Section 107 of the Manual of Instructions and Part I of the FBI Handbook.

Enclosure

cc - Mr. Belmont

Mr. Baumgardner

Planning Section
Training and Inspection Division

Mr. Donohue

JDD:oik (5)

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RECORDED - 24

11 NOV 26 1956

W. C. Sullivan

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA TOPLEY INTERNAL SECURITY - C Bufile 100-3-99

SELLARY INFERMENTS - ECHERAL

Since January, 1954, the Central Research Section has been forwarding to the field public source anticommunist pamphlets for use in connection with the captioned program. This practice was initiated at the specific request of the Agents who are attempting to develop additional security informants so that this material could be furnished orior to, during, and after interviews. The Agents engaged in this program requested that, wherever possible, public source material be forwarded which is not identified as being issued by any Government agency since, for the purpose of developing informants, this type of material is not as effective as publications of private organizations. (100-3-99-1660, 1749)

Since the inception of this practice, many favorable comments regarding the effectiveness of the material furnished to the field have been received during conferences both at the Seat of Government and in the field. In addition, a number of offices have requested additional copies of several publications which have been forwarded to the field.

A survey made by the Bureau in 1955 disclosed that this public source material was utilized effectively by the field in the following ways: (1) It is mailed anonymously to potential informants before they are interviewed; (2) It is furnishedto potential informants during interviews as a basis for suggesting further discussion at subsequent interviews; (3) It is mailed to potential informants after they have been interviewed: (4) It is used as a basis for discussions at security squad conferences: (5) It is studied by Agents prior to interviews with potential informants as possible material for discussion during the actual interviews. memorandum setting forth the results of this survey is enclosed.

The Denver office recently advised that this public source material was also furnished to newly developed security informants to increase their knowledge of communism in an effort to further their development in the Communist Party, USA. A carbon copy of the Denver letter is enclosed.

NOT RECORDED

126 NOV 28 956

**Enclosures** 

JFC:mjh

1 - J. F. Condon

1 - Section tickler

1 - J. D. Donohue 1 - Mr. Belmont

- Bufile 66-2542-3

MR. A. H. BELMONT

W. C. Sullivan

COMMUNIST PARTY. USA TOPLEV INTERNAL SECURITY - C Bufile 100-3-99

D SECURITY - SEEPRINGINGS-6-868 WILL

Reference is made to my memorandum dated November 1, 1956, which recommended that the field not be restricted to using public source material in an anonymous manner while attempting to develop additional security informants. The issue has been raised whether or not the Bureau, in using this public source material, could possibly be violating the Copyright Law.

The following information was furnished by Mr. R. S. MacCarteney. Chief, Reference Division, Copyright Office, Library of Congress, and his assistant, Mr. D. J. Plumb. Title 17 (Copyright Law) of the U. S. Code provides that any person who is entitled to the protection of the Copyright Law has the exclusive right "To print, reprint, publish, copy, and vend the copyrighted work. (Section 1 (a)). Copyright for any work is secured ... by publication thereof with the notice of copyright... (Section 10).

With reference to the material being furnished to the field for possible use in connection with the captioned program, most of these publications are not copyrighted. There is, therefore, no possibility of any violation of the Copyright Law in this instance, since the Copyright Law is not applicable. The copyrighted material which is being furnished to the field was obtained by the Bureau legally. from the organization which holds the copyright. This material has not been reprinted by the Bureau and is not being sold by the Bureau. There is, therefore, no possible violation of the Copyright Law in this case. The only material which is being sent to the field which was reprinted by the Bureau is a reprint of extracts 5 from an editorial which appeared in the April 13, 1956, issue of the Daily Worker, east coast communist newspaper. The records of the Copyright Office, Library of Congress, disclose that the Daily Worker is not copyrighted so there is no possible violation of the law in this instance.

On items to be forwarded to the field in the future for use in connection with the captioned program, a check will be made at the Bureau to insure that dissemination of this material is proper under the Copyright Law.

Enclosures

JFC:mjh

1 - Section tickler 1 - J. D. Donohue

1 - Mr. Belmont 1 - Bufile 66-2 542-3

NOT RECORDED 126 NOV 28 1956

Memorandum to Mr. Belmont

C.

Re: COMMUNIST PARTY, USA TOPLEV INTERNAL SECURITY - C Bufile 100-3-99

During the period of alm ost aree years in which the field has been using this public source material to the Eureau's advantage, there have been no instances in which any problem has arisen or in which the Bureau has been embarrassed through the use of these publications. Recently, however, the issue was raised that these publications should only be forwarded anonymously to individuals being considered for interview prior to the interview in an effort to dispose them favorably toward cooperating with the Bureau. It is believed that this restriction on the use of this public source anticommunist material drastically reduces its effectiveness. The difficulties which are being encountered presently in attempting to develop additional security informants are too well known to need further comment. Any restriction in the use of this public source material which has proved so effective in the past will merely add to these difficulties.

This entire matter was taken up at the recent Internal Security-Espionage Conference. The Conference voted unanimously in favor of using this public source material both openly and anonymously. It was indicated by the men that the restriction of the use of this public source material would seriously interfere with its effectiveness.

### RECOMMENDATION:

In view of the unanimous vote by the members of the Internal Security-Espionage Conference, and in view of the fact that this public source material has been used effectively for almost three years without any unfavorable repercussions, it is recommended that the field not be restricted to using this material anonymously in the future. If this recommendation is approved, no further action will be necessary.

Memorandum to Mr. Belmont

Re: COMMUNIST PARTY, USA TOPLEV INTERNAL SECURITY - C Bufile 100-3-99

A copy of the publication Copyright Law of the United States of America is enclosed together with my memorandum dated November 1, 1956. It is to be noted that this memorandum sets forth that the recent Internal Security-Espionage Conference voted unanimously in favor of using this public source material both openly and anonymously. The class pointed out how valuable and helpful it has been to them. It was indicated by the Agents attending this Conference that any restrictions on the use of this public source material would seriously interfere with its effectiveness. A letter to all continental offices authorizing the field to continue using this public source material either anonymously or publicly is enclosed.

### RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that the enclosed letter to the field be approved.

Memorandum to Mr. Belmont

Re: COMMUNIST PARTY, USA

TOPLEY

INTERNAL SECURITY - C

Bufile 100-3-99

A copy of the publication Copyright Law of the United States of America is enclosed together with my memorandum dated November 1, 1956. It is to be noted that this memorandum sets forth that the recent Internal Security-Espionage Conference voted unanimously in favor of using this public source material both openly and anonymously. The class pointed out how valuable and helpful it has been to them. It was indicated by the Agents attending this Conference that any restrictions on the use of this public source material would seriously interfere with its effectiveness. A letter to all continental offices authorizing the field to continue using this public source material either anonymously or publicly is enclosed.

### RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that the enclosed letter to the field be approved.

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
THE AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 04-24-2014
C32W33B91

COMPICENTIFE

cc - Nichols Kleinkauf Boardman Belmont Thornton Donohue November 19, 1956

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Director, FAI

BRONX COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM OF POLITICAL PRISONERS INTERNAL SECURITY - C

EMERGENCY CIVIL LIBERTIES COMMITTEE INTERNAL SECURITY - C

Captioned organizations, which have been under investigation by this Bureau for a considerable period of time as communist front organizations, are jointly sponsoring a meeting to be held on the evening of November 19, 1956, for the purpose of planning a national campaign against this Bureau "for molesting people in the streets and in their homes" and to bring a test case concerning this before the United States Supreme Court. A confidential informant, who has furnished reliable information in the past, has advised that at this meeting I. Philip Sipser, a prominent labor attorney, will talk on civil liberties and the program of the Emergency Civil Liberties Committee in connection with the afore-mentioned matter. According to the informant, Sipser will outline the national campaign against this Bureau.

It is to be noted that the October 4, 1944, issue of the "Daily Worker" listed an Isadore Sipser, Brooklyn, New York, as one of the persons to be contacted by members of the International Workers Order, the Communist Political Association, and the American Labor Party in getting out to vote. One I. Philip Sipser has been identified as a contributor to the Civil Rights Congress. It is not known whether these individuals are identical with the Sipser who is to speak at the November 19, 1956, meeting.

Another confidential informant, who has furnished reliable information in the past, has advised that recently Claude Lightfoot, chairman of the Illinois-Indiana Communist Party, stated that this Bureau is herassing Communist Party members through interviews with them and that the purpose of

100-412902

cc - Bufile 66-2542 Sub 3 (Security Informant Program)

JHK:gft (13)

CONFIDENCE ASS

Nichols \_\_\_\_\_ Boardman \_\_\_\_ Belmont \_\_\_\_ Mason \_\_\_\_

Rosen \_\_\_\_\_ Tamm \_\_\_\_\_ Nease \_\_\_\_\_

Winterrowd \_\_ Tele. Room \_ Holloman \_\_\_ Letter to The Attorney General

these interviews is twofold; namely, to herase the Communist Party and to influence the current discussion in the ranks of the Communist Party. Lightfoot commented that this Bureau's program is partially successful because some people become scared and either talk to the Agents of this Bureau or refuse to have anything more to do with the Communist Party. Lightfoot further stated that there has been some discussion within the Party as to whether the Party should raise publicly the issue of herasament, stating that this might be done through bringing the matter to the attention of the American Civil Liberties Union or through various newspapers or other meens which might bring the matter to the attention of the public, and that the Bureau would be accused of being a political police which is trying to participate in the inner affairs of the Communist Party and trying to intimidate people.

The second informant also edvised this matter has not yet been raised officially but there is a possibility it may be considered both by the national office of the Communist Party and by the leadership of the Illinois-Indiana Communist Party District.

It appears that the afore-mentioned refers to the effective program which this Bureau has been carrying on for a number of months of interviewing individuals on whom there was definite evidence of Communist Party affiliations but on whom there was reason to believe these individuals had ceased open Party activities. For your information, out of deference to the so-called communist or former communist, in conducting these interviews the Special Agents avoided conducting the interviews at the homes or places of business of the individuals but approached them on the street or elsewhere so they could be talked to without attracting attention. In each instance the agents fully identified themselves and if a particular individual did not want to talk, that was up to him. This practice was followed so that in the event the individual had broken with the communists and for his own reason did not went to publicly declare himself. either through fear of retaliation on the part of the communists or for business Letter to The Attorney General

reasons, the individual could declare himself to the Bureau under circumstances whereby there was no conceivable way to embarress the individual. This program was designed with a twofold function in mind: (1) the civil liberterian principle and (2) to discharge our duty of seeking additional information concerning the communist conspiracy.

In view of the fact, as noted above, that the Communist Party might try to publicize the Bureau's activity in this regard through the American Civil Liberties Union. an official of this Bureau on November 14, 1956, contacted Irving Ferman, Washington, D. C., representative of the American Civil Liberties Union, and explained the progress to him and the manner in which individuals were approached under the progress. Mr. Ferman advised he thought this was certainly laudable. Mr. Ferman was also advised that in view of the success of this program on the part of the Bureau there has been talk recently that the communists are rapidly reaching the point where they would have to combet the program and that they had elected a plan seeking to use the American Civil Liberties Union to protest the program. It was pointed out to Mr. Ferman that he might be desirous of this information in order that the American Civil Liberties Union could protect itself by not becoming a dupe of the communists. Mr. Ferman advised he appreciated this and would bring it to the attention of Patrick Malin. executive director of the American Civil Liberties Union.

Further pertinent details received concerning the afore-mentioned will be furnished you promptly.

- cc Mr. William P. Rogers Deputy Attorney General
- cc Assistant Attorney General William F. Tounkins

November 15, 1956

59466

### PROPOSED CHANGE IN MANUAL OF INSTRUCTIONS FRI HANDOOK

The Manual of Instructions, Section 107, Security Informants, should be changed as follows:

- CONTACT WITH POTENTIAL INPORMANTS D.
  - When background information obtained as described under subsection C, transmit results to Bureau in the same numerical sequence as set out in subsection C, and request authority to approach individual
    - 2. When authority granted by Bureau to approach as potential informant, steps should be taken to develop his potentiality and he should be made aware of Bureau policy.

The following change should be made in Part I of the FBI Handbook:

CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS Section 26.

Security informant

Contact with potential informants When background information has been obtained in the manner described above the results of the inquiry should be transmitted to the Bureau in the same sequence as set out in 2. above and authority requested to approach the individual as a PSI. When authority is granted by the Bureau the approach should be made and if the individual does furnish information he should be designated by a permanent symbol number and the Bureau advised. Advise Bureau of any weakness of informant and safeguards being followed to insure security and prevent embarrassment to the Burezu.

Nichols Boardman \_\_\_\_ Belmont \_\_\_\_ Mason Mohr. Parsons \_\_\_\_ Rosen Nease \_ Winterrowd \_\_\_ Tele. Room .\_\_

Gandy \_\_\_.

Tolson

"Security Informants," JDD:ojk. JDD: of

See memo to Belmont from Baumgardner dated, 11/ 15/36 captioned

UNINECORDE

ur. L. nont Mr. Rushing Mr. Donohue

Original on Duplimat.

SAC, Albany

Wil.

-

Tolson Nichols -Boardman . Mason \_ Mohr Parsons . Rosen Nease -

Winterrowd \_\_\_\_

Tele. Room \_

Holloman \_\_\_\_

November 6, 1956

Director, FBI (100-358086)

#### INTERVIEWS WITH SECURITY SUBJECTS

Information has been received that the Emergency Civil Liberties Committee (ECLC) plans a national campaign against the FBI for "molesting the people in the streets and in their homes." Reportedly, the ECLC will make a test case of an interview by the FBI and when ready will take the case as high as the U.S. Supreme Court. It is not known exactly how the ECLC intends to implement this plan.

Agents conducting interviews and reinterviews with security subjects and other individuals should be instructed to be most circumspect in making such contacts and to be alert to any situation which could result in embarrassment to the Bureau. Any information received reflecting the activity of the ECLC or any other group along this line should be brought promptly to the attention of the Bureau.

,	2cc - Albuquerque	2cc - Miami
	2cc - Anchorage	2cc - Milwaukee
	20c - Atlanta	2cc - Minneapolis
	2cc - Baltimore	200 - Mobile
	2cc - Birmingham	200 - Newark
	2cc - Boston	2cc - New Haven
	2cc - Buffalo	2cc - New Orleans
	2cc - Butte	2cc - New York
	2cc - Charlotte	2cc - Norfolk
	2cc - Chicago	2cc - Oklahoma City
	2cc - Cincinnati	2cc - Omaha
	200 - Cleveland	2cc - Philadelphia
	2cc - Dallas	200 - Phoenix // hely
	200 - Denver	2cc - Pittsburgh 66-0
	2cc - Detroit	2cc - Portland NOT RECORD
	2cc - El Paso	20c - Richmond 44 NOV 13 19
	20c - Honolulu	2cc - St. Louis
	2cc - Houston	2cc - Salt Lake City
	2cc - Indianapolis	20c - San Antonio
	2cc - Kansas City	200 - San Diego
	2cc - Knoxville	2cc - San Francisco / Nova
	2cc - Little Rock	2cc - San Juan
	2cc - Los Angeles	200 - Savannah MAIL
	200 - Louisville	2cc - Seattle
20	2cc - Hemphis	2cc - Springfield
,		200 - Washington Field

Lec - 66-2542-3 (Security Informants Program)

NOTE ON YELLOW: No Manual or Handbook changes necessary.

See memo Belmont-Boardman 11/2/56 TDR:JDD:ojk, captioned
TDR:JDD:ojk (8) \*BIP, BOPPP, IS-C.\*

cc - 100-384660 (Emergency Civil Liberties Committee)

# THE Memorandum • United States Government

Mr. L. V. Boardman

DATE: November 27, 1956

Mohr

Rosen

Mr. A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: SECURITY INFORMANTS PROGRAM

Tamm As the result of our conferences on security Winterrowd . informants in April and May of this year, SAC Letter 56-34 dated June 18, 1956, set forth changes in policy and procedure Tele. Room Holloman which, among other things, permits the SAC in certain instances to approve interviews with individuals to determine whether such persons have any informant potential. This program has saved Gandy considerable correspondence between the field and the Bureau and has accelerated our informant program. If such individual is cooperative Bureau authority must then be obtained to develop the subject as an informant. This authority in the SAC does not apply, however, to delicate situations or to those individuals

The following is a tabulation summarizing results of this program for the month of October, the preceding month of September, and the grand total from the inception of this program which has been in existence for the past four months.

employed in the newspaper field, education field and the like.

7	touties Assissant as	<u>october</u>	SEPTEMBER	TOTAL
1.	Active Communists Number contacted.	164	142	554
2.	Other Individuals a. Cases opened. b. Cases closed. c. Number contacted. 1. Number cooperative but not potential informant material. 2. Number cooperative and being developed as PSIs. 3. Number completely negative	1268 1140 933 296 129 508	958 961 794 273 132 389	5404 3353 3016 1056 473 1487
2	The section is			

З. Results

Number of sources, PSIs and informants developed.

61 48

66-2542-3

cc - Mr. Boardman

RECORDED - 54 Mr. Belmont

Mr. Baumgardner

Mr. Donohue

16-2542-3.

JDD: ojk

Memorandum for Mr. Boardman RE: SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM 66-2542 Sub 3

It is noted that the number of active communists and other individuals initially contacted under this program again showed an increase over the previous month. All other categories show a substantial increase except the number of persons contacted who were cooperative and are being developed as PSIs. There was a decrease of three in this group.

The field is continuously recontacting and reinterviewing communists and other individuals who have been uncooperative in the past where circumstances indicate additional contacts may prove profitable from the standpoint of obtaining information of value to the Bureau. The field continues to show considerable enthusiasm and interest in this program which is an effective means of obtaining PSI material by the acceleration of interviews and the elimination of those persons who have no desire to assist the Bureau or are in no position to do so. During the past month it was necessary to direct letters to two offices, Atlanta and Springfield, which reflected a lack of progress and close supervision is being maintained on all offices to insure proper interest is maintained and to make certain this program is a success.

### ACTION:

Next month another memorandum will be prepared showing the progress of the Security Informant Program and it will reflect the figures for the current month, the preceding month and the grand total from the inception of the program.

- 2 -

HAS BEEN TRANSPED FOR THE COMPLDENT OF THE BOOM OF THE POWERED INTELLIGENCE DIVISION.

HAS BEEN REMOVED AND PLACED IN THE SPECIAL FILE ROOM OF RECORDS BRANCH

SEE FILE 66-2554-7530 FOR AUTHORITY.

SUBJECT JUNE MAIL Secy Suft. - General

F832/

REMOVED BY 87 DEC 19 1956

FILE NUMBER 66-2542-3-103/

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGEOUT

Employee Suggestion. FD-252 (11-14-55) 10-15-56 To: From: Employee assigned to (Division) SAC, SAN DIEGO Director, FBI SAN DIEGO SUGGESTION Attention: Central Research Section It is suggested that Central Research compile a list of instances where Russia and other Iron Curtain countries have used Informants (Stool Pigeons) to bring to trial members of the underground in their countries. All other known instances of the use of Informants by Iron Curtain countries should be listed. Current practice or rule (Include manual citation as well as facts) Not applicable. Advantages of suggestion CP members and CP sympathizers, who might be willing to defect except for their aversion to being considered "stool pigeons", might be persuaded to become Informants if concrete examples of the use of Informants by Russia and other Iron Curtain countries could be given them, especially examples which have received some notoriety in the newspapers or other publications. Naturally, any instances where the use of Informants was publicized in the Soviet or Communist presses would be of inestimable value. Disadvantages of suggestion Mone known. The following the following the series of the Annual Savings (Show basis for estimate) INDEXED-31 Not applicable. il far me cut (The use by the United States of my suggestion shall not form the basis of a further claim of any nature by me, my heirs, or assigns upon the United States) WILLIAM E. DETTWEILER, JR. Signature and Title of Suggester Special Agent Suggestion appears sound; however, its commendations and comments of Division Head practicability is unknown from the Bureau's standpoint

атлараяр Регм но. ба

# Office Memorandum • United States Government

го	:	Mr. Tolson	Van	DATE:	10/31/56
			12 115		

FROM: Q

Q. Tamm

SUBJECT:

SUGGESTION #198-57

Made by SA William E. Dettweiler, Jr.

San Diego Diviston

SUGGESTION: That the Central Research Section of Domestic Intelligence Division compile a list of instances

Intelligence Division compile a list of instances gandy where Russia and other Iron Curtain countries have used Informants (Stool Pigeons) to bring to trial members of the underground in their countries. All other known instances of the use of Informants by Iron Curtain countries should be listed.

ADVANTAGES STATED: Communist Party (CP) members and CP sympathizers, who might be willing to defect except for their aversion to being considered "stool pigeons," might be persuaded to become Informants if concrete examples of the use of Informants by Russia and other Iron Curtain countries could be given them, especially examples which have received some notoriety in the newspapers or other publications. Suggester states that any instances where the use of Informants was publicized in the Soviet or communist presses would be of inestimable value.

OBSERVATIONS: SAC Maynor, San Diego, believes the suggestion is sound although he does not know its practicability from the Bureau's standpoint.

Inspector Sizoo, Domestic Intelligence Division, believes the suggestion has some merit, but it is also subject to criticism. For years, all opponents of communism in the United States have been pointing to the informant system in Soviet Russia as being especially wicked and antidemocratic, and to offer examples of this condemned system to communists in this country as reasons why they should serve as informants would be inconsistent. We know that the informant system in Russia has been tied into rigged and totally unjust court trials and procedures. It would be hard to separate something of value from the valueless in this particular maze.

Mr. Sizoo states, More of there is no reason why the Central Research Section cannot keep this suggestion on its Nagangagend during the course of its other work keep an eye open for some legitimate examples which can be written up and sent to the field for use in the informant development program. Mr. Sizoo notes that two monographs have already been sent to the field treating the subject of "stool pigeon."

Enclosures - detached - contro & MDEXED-3F

ceh cc - Wr. Belmont (attention Mr. W. C. Sullivan) (sent separately)
(4) C. Frensonnel file of SA William E. Dettweiler, Jr.

Tolson
Nichols
Boardman
Belmont
Mason
Mohr
Parsons
Rosen
Tamm
Nease
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman

1415

Q. Tamm memo for Mr. Tolson Re Suggestion #198-57

RECOMMENDATIONS: 1. That the suggestion be adopted to the effect that Central Research Section will be alert to legitimate examples which can be written up and furnished the field for use in the informant development program. I am affect. The exilicity on preceding page in valid 4 over riding.

SAC, San Diego. (Countled, According to

3. That the enclosed letter be forwarded to SA William E. Dettweiler, Jr. (Com the (Ch. Accadionedicia))

ADDENDUM BY TRAINING AND INSPECTION DIVISION: 11/2/56 - ceh

In view of the comments of Mr. Belmont and as a letter of appreciation has already been sent to Agent Dettweiler, no further action is recommended.

WWW NEWN

March Missen

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

ro : Mr. L. V. Boardman

DATE: November 30, 1956

Rosen . Tamm \_

FROM : Mr. A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: SE

SECURITY INFORMANTS PROGRAM

For the past four months the field has been reporting on a monthly basis results of work performed under the Security Informant Program. SAC Letter 56-34 dated June 18, 1956, sets forth changes in policy and procedure which permit the acceleration of interviews with individuals in an effort to obtain potential informants. It has been found during the past quarter that certain changes in the format of the monthly report are necessary and are set forth in the attached letter to Albany with copies to all offices.

### ACTION:

For approval, there is attached  $\sqrt{a}$  letter to Albany with copies to all offices.

Of 1/8

CX

at A

ENCLOSURA

00-2342-0

EX-122

sure RECORDED-31

Enclosure

cc - Mr. Boardman Mr. Belmont

Mr. Baumgardner

Mr. Donohue

All grad

66-2512-3-1034

B DEC 7 1956

JDD:ojk (5)

50 DEC 10 1956

# Office Memorandum • United States Government

TO

SAC, Albany

December 5, 1956

FROM

**W** Director, FBI (66-2542-3)

subject:

SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM

Re SAC Letters 56 - 34 and 56 - 56 which have been incorporated in Section 87 of the Manual of Instructions.

Certain changes have been made in the manner of reporting results under this program and all offices should, therefore, carefully review previous instructions as well as directions contained in this letter to be certain the statistics are reported promptly and properly in the future.

2cc → Albuquerque 2cc = Anchorage 2cc - Atlanta 2cc = Baltimore 2cc = Birmingham 2cc = Boston 2cc - Buffalo 2cc ≈ Butte 2cc = Charlotte 2cc = Chicago 2cc - Cincinnati 2cc = Cleveland 2cc = Dallas 2cc = Denver 2cc = Detroit 2cc = El Paso 2cc = Honolulu 2cc = Houston 2cc = Indianapolis 2cc = Kansas City 2cc = Knoxville 2cc = Little Rock 2cc = Los Angeles 2cc = Louisville 2cc = Memphis 2cc - Miami

2cc Milwaukee 2cc - Minneapolis 2cc - Mobile 2cc = Newark 2cc = New Haven 2cc = New Orleans 2cc = New York 2cc = Norfolk 2cc = Oklahoma City 2cc ≈ Omaha 2cc = Philadelphia 2cc - Phoenix 2cc = Pittsburgh 2cc = Portland 2cc = Richmond 2cc = St. Louis 2cc = Salt Lake City 2cc = San Antonio 2cc = San Diego 2cc = San Francisco 2cc = San Juan 2cc = Savannah 2cc = Seattle 2cc - Springfield 2cc - Washington Field

ENCLOSURE -3-1034

Letter to SAC, Albany Re: SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM 66=2542=3 The report should take the following form: During Past Total to 30 Days Date Active Communists Ã. Number contacted. B. Other Individuals 1. Cases opened. 2. Cases closed. Number contacted. Number cooperative but not potential informant material. b. Number cooperative and having informant potential. Number completely negative. Ca Results Number of sources, PSIs and informants developed. With regard to items A and B, report only initial contacts with active communists and other individuals for the current month and from June 18, 1956, to date. Since reports up to this time have reflected contacts with active communists prior to June 18, 1956, as well as those since that time, review your monthly reports on this program submitted since July 1, 1956, and in your next report submit revised figures if necessary in your column entitled "Total to Date." Reinterviews and recontacts should not be counted under A or B but comment regarding such activity should be set forth in the narrative portion of the report. However, if an individual was contacted once or several times prior to June 18, 1956, and has been recontacted since that time he should now be counted once under A or B. B, 3, (a), (b) and (c) should reflect results of contacts reported under B, 3 and the total of these items should equal B, 3 in both columns. It is noted that the report under this program previously required figures on the number of individuals "completely" cooperative but not potential informant material. In this new format under B, 3, (a) the word = 2 =

Letter to SAC, Albany Re: SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM 66=2542=3

"completely" is deleted. It has been found that many individuals upon being contacted for the first time are not "completely" cooperative but are worthy of recontacting to determine the extent of their cooperation. For purposes of this report if there is any degree of cooperation list it as a cooperative contact under B, 3 (a) or (b).

Once an individual has been placed in category B, 3, (a), (b) or (c) as the result of initial contacts his category should not be changed even though subsequent contacts reveal a different category is applicable inasmuch as the final affirmative results of all contacts will be shown in item C. For example, an individual may be cooperative and appear to have informant potential during initial contact but subsequent contacts may disclose that he actually has no informant potential. If such a person was placed in category B, 3, (b) as the result of the initial appraisal it will not be necessary to delete him from this category and place him in B, 3 (a).

If a file is opened and a review of the information contained therein is negative or preliminary inquiries indicate further action undesirable merely indicate in this report one case opened and one case closed. Do not count this as one negative contact under B, 3 (c).

Item C should contain the results of all affirmative contacts since June 18, 1956, reported under A and B. An individual should not be listed as a source, PSI or informant until Bureau authority has been received for the utilization or development of such person and as mentioned above the individual should be counted only once. It will not be necessary to break down the results as heretofore but list one total of sources, PSIs and informants for the month and to date from June 18, 1956. Negative results may be the subject of comment in the narrative portion of the report which should also contain a brief analysis of the progress being made, the number of Special Agents being utilized full time or part time in conducting interviews under this program and the percentage of time being spent on the program (not the number of days or hours) by all Agents assigned to security work in your office.

cc - Mr 3oardman Mr. Belmont Mr. Baumgardner Mr. Donohue

SAC, Albany

December 5, 1956

Director, FBI (66-2542-3)

## SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM

Re SAC Letters 36-34 and 56-56 which have been incorporated in Section 87 of the Manual of Instructions.

Certain changes have been made in the manner of reporting results under this program and all offices should, therefore, carefully review previous instructions as well as directions contained in this letter to be certain the statistics are reported promptly and properly in the future.

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2cc - Milwaukee
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                                             2cc - Washington Field
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          2cc - Miami
          See memo to Boardman from Belmont dated 11/30/56 captioned
Boardman ____
Belmont ____
          "Security Informant Program," JDD:0jk, 7 1988
Mohr -
Parsons _
          JDD:ojk
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Letter to SAC, Albany Re: SCURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM 66-2542-3

The report should take the following form:

During Past Total to 30 Days Bate

- A. Active Communists
  Number contacted.
- B. Other Individuals
  - 1. Cases opened.
  - 2. Cases closed.
  - Number contacted.
    - a. Number cooperative but not potential informant material.
    - b. Number cooperative and having informant potential.
    - c. Number completely negative.
- C. Results
  Number of sources. PSIs and informants developed.

With regard to items A and B, report only initial contacts with active communists and other individuals for the current month and from June 18, 1956, to date. Since reports up to this time have reflected contacts with active communists prior to June 18, 1956, as well as those since that time, review your monthly reports on this program submitted since July 1, 1956, and in your next report submit revised figures if necessary in your column entitled "Total to Date." Reinterviews and recontacts should not be counted under A or B but comment regarding such activity should be set forth in the narrative portion of the report. However, if an individual was contacted once or several times prior to June 18, 1956, and has been recontacted since that time he should now be counted once under A or B. In item B. 3. (a). (b) and (c) should reflect results of contacts reported under B. 3 and the total of these items should equal B, 3 in both columns.

It is noted that the report under this program previously required figures on the number of individuals completely cooperative but not potential informant material. In this new format under B, 3, (a) the word

Letter to SAC, Albany Re: SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM 66-2542-3

"completely" is deleted. It has been found that many individuals upon being contacted for the first time are not "completely" cooperative but are worthy of recontacting to determine the extent of their cooperation. For purposes of this report if there is any degree of cooperation list it as a cooperative contact under B. 3 (a) or (b).

Once an individual has been placed in category B, 3, (a), (b) or (c) as the result of initial contacts his category should not be changed even though subsequent contacts reveal a different category is applicable inasmuch as the final affirmative results of all contacts will be shown in item C. for example, an individual may be cooperative and appear to have informant potential during initial contact but subsequent contacts may disclose that he actually has no informant potential. If such a person was placed in category B, 3, (b) as the result of the initial appraisal it will not be necessary to delete him from this category and place him in B, 3 (a).

If a file is opened and a review of the information contained therein is negative or preliminary inquiries indicate further action undesirable merely indicate in this report one case opened and one case closed. Do not count this as one negative contact under B, 3 (c).

affirmative contacts since June 18, 1956, reported under A and B. An individual should not be listed as a source, PSI or informant until Bureau authority has been received for the utilization or development of such person and as mentioned above the individual should be counted only once. It will not be necessary to break down the results as heretofore but list one total of sources, PSIs and informants for the month and to date from June 18, 1956. Negative results may be the subject of comment in the narrative portion of the report which should also contain a brief analysis of the progress being made, the number of Special Agents being utilized full time or part time in conducting interviews under this program and the <u>nercentage</u> of time being spent on the program (not the number of days or hours) by all Agents assigned to security work in your office.

MR. A. H. BELMONT

W. C. Sullivan

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA TOPLEV INTERNAL SECURITY - C Bureau File 100-3-99

On November 27, 1956, copies of the publications listed in the enclosure were forwarded to the field by the Central Research Section. All of these publications have been previously approved for use in connection with the captioned program. The supply of those publications indicated by an asterisk was limited and distribution of these publications was limited to the following offices in which Communist Party membership and activity are concentrated:

Albany
Baltimore
Boston
Buffalo
Chicago
Cincinnati
Cleveland
Denver
Detroit
Indianapolis
Los Angeles
Milwaukee

Minneapolis
Newark
New Haven
New York
Philadelphia
Pittsburgh
Portland
St. Louis
San Diego
San Francisco
Seattle
Washington Field

## RECOMMENDATION:

None. For your information and recording purposes. This material was forwarded by routing slip as in the past.

Enclosure

JFC:mjh

(5)

1 - Section tickler

1 - J. D. Donohue | E. C.

1 - Mr. Belmont

1 - Bufile 66-2542-3

140 DEC 9. 1956

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ORIGINAL CONTRIBUTED IN

### November 29, 1956

- 1. Soviet crimes and Khrushchev's confessions
- 2. Under The Soviet Heel
- 3. Christianity vs. Communism
- 4. This Is Our Home
- 5. Do We Leave The Russian Jews To Their Fate?
- 6. Communism: Threat to Voluntary Groups
- 7. The Jews Under Stalin's Successors
- 8. Anti-Semitism Continues in the Soviet Satellites
- 9. Communist Anti-Semitism
- 10. Now They Admit It
- 11. Editorial, Daily Worker, April 13, 1956 (Reprinted by the Bureau)
- 12. Jews under Soviet Rule\*
- 13. Aspects of Soviet Antisemitism\*
- 14. The Negro in American Life\*

66-2542-3-V

	4	#267-57	
		11/21/56	
Discates EDI	From:	Employee assigned to (Division	on)
Director, FBI	SA JAMES M. POWERS -	G5-// New York	74.
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The question then arises - Is there any way we can diminish this contact with undesirable elements and yet continue at top speed on our informant program?

The attitude has been expressed by many agents that if they were assigned to their home communities, then when the question of development of neighborhood sources, Panel Sources, or Potential Security Informants arose, the majority of them would contact people they have had contact with over the years, such as friends, neighbors or associates. Even if these people were not utilized directly they certainly would form a base, or as it were, a pool from which additional and pertinent contacts could be made, depending on a specific need.

The purpose of this suggestion is the formulation of a plan whereby an agent not assigned to his home territory can at least render the benefit of his knowledge to those agents who are assigned there. The plan calls for the gathering and placing of pertinent information in the hands of personnel who may have the opportunity to utilize it.

With the passage of time, the majority of agents, now in the field, have of course, lost many of their contacts at home. For this reason it is suggested that the following plan commence with the current new agents' class. If the idea proves productive, contact with agents new assigned to the field could be made.

On the Friday signaling the end of new agent training the informant problem should be explained to each agent. should then be requested to submit the names of any person whom they felt might be in a position to assist the Bureau in any capacity whatsoever. A thumbnail sketch could be submitted with each name. It would not be a requirement that the agent know intimately the person whose name he is submitting; sufficient I think, that he has a reasonable belief that the person is willing or is in a position to be of assistance to the Bureau. Next would come the transmittal of this information to the field office or resident agency in which this person, whose name was submitted, resides. Agents, upon receipt of such information would then be able to conduct indices, credit checks, etc., with, I am sure, a much lower mortality rate than now exists. If the person lived or worked in an area where the agent needed a source. contact could then be made. Such contact would at all times be discretionary.

Upon contact the individual rould be advised that the interviewing agent had met agent X (agent submitting the name) in Washington or elsewhere and while discussing a problem with him, agent X had suggested that the individual might be in a position to assist the interviewing agent for some particular reason. If preferred, agent X's name need not be mentioned at all, and the contact could be made under any of the usual reasons. The purpose of the plan is, after all, just the location of sources and each agent could use his own discretion. Another advantage of this suggestion is that contact by an intermediary agent would prevent the development of too intimate a relationship which might otherwise arise if agent X had made the contact.

It is believed that the formation of such a pool of contacts would result in an increase in all types of informant coverage. A boyhood chum who is now business agent for a union, a former neighbor who now resides near a Security Index subject . . . the potential is there and the situations are limitless. It is sincerely believed that the suggestion will prove beneficial with a minimum expenditure of time and/or money.

# Office Memorandum · united states government

TO : IR. L. V. BOARDHAR

DATE: November 29, 1956

Tolson — Nichols — Boardman Belmont Mason Mohr —

Parsons Rosen \_ Tamm \_

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FROM: 12. A. M. BELM

SUBJECT:

SUGTESTION NO. 267-57 INCREASE AND INCLEMENTATION OF INFORMANT COVERAGE

Winterrowd Under date of 11-21-56 SA James 11. Powers, New York Office, points out that in the development of Tele, Room Holloman Gandy potential sources substantial background is obtained only to discover for one reason or another the potential source fails to meet certain basic prerequisites. He suggests that friends, neighbors and associates of an agent back in his home community could form a pool from which additional and pertinent contacts could be made. To implement such a program SA Powers suggests that during their training session new agents submit names of persons whom they feel might be in a position to assist the Bureau in any capacity whatsoever. A thumbnail sketch would be submitted with each name, and this information would then be transmitted to the field office in which the person resides whose name was submitted. In making this suggestion Agent Powers points out that the agent submitting a name need not know intimately the person whom he suggests, sufficient only that he has a reasonable belief that the person is willing or is in a position to be of assistance to the Burcau.

The SAC recommended against adoption of this proposal on the basis that an agent's personal acquaintances back hone in most instances will not be the type which could be developed as security or criminal informants.

#### OBSER VATIONS:

The first prerequisite of any potential source is his willingness to cooperate; the second, his being in a position to give current information of value. Under provisions of SAC Letter 56-34, dated June 18, 1956, SACs were given permission to authorize interviews with any

1 - Mr. Boardman

1 - Training and Inspection Division

1 - Mr. Belmont

1 - Mr. McNerney

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Memorandum to Mr. Boardman Re: SUGGESTION No. 267-57

individuals who are not subjects of active security investigations, or not on the Security Index, or not subjects of investigations specifically requested by the Burcau, or where no delicate situation exists. Review of office files and a check of residence and employment must be made before conducting such SAC authorized interviews. If this initial interview determines the individual may be cooperative, then complete background investigation will be made in accordance with current manual instructions.

This procedure saves much time and correspondence by eliminating those persons who are not friendly with the Bureau and have no potential for informant development. It can be seen that this program, already in effect, overcomes the basic objection which gave rise to the suggestion under consideration and, at the same time, establishes immediately the cooperativeness of the person interviewed as a potential source.

Domestic Intelligence Division concurs with the opinion of SAC, New York, that in most instances an agent's personal acquaintances back home will not be the type which could be developed as informants. It is further pointed out that the agent's acquaintanceship with any individual does not preclude the possibility of such person having factors in his background which would prevent his use as a source. The background investigation would have to be conducted in any event.

Proposed suggestion does not appear to of fer any program which would be more effective than that already in use by the Bureau.

### RECOMMEND ATION:

That the above suggestion not receive favorable consideration.

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Training and Inspection Division agrees with the above recommendation. No further action appears necessary as suggester has been thanked for his suggestion.

My www

66-25-42-3-1038
CHANGED TO
66-25-42-3-7-6/6X

APR 26 1057
PS

C

DATE OF MAIL 12-26-56

HAS BEEN HEMOVED FOR THE CONFEDENTIAL PLIE POOM OF INTERIOR DEVISION

> HAS BEEN REMOVED AND PLACED IN THE SPECIAL FILE ROOM OF RECORDS BRANCH

SEE FILE 66-2554-7530 FOR AUTHORITY.

REMOVED BY 57 JAN 17 1957

FILE NUMBER 66-2542 -3-1039

PERMANENT SERIAL CHARGEOUT

STANDARD FORM NO. 64 MemorEndum UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT : Mr. L. V. Boardman DATE: December 14, 1956 Nichols FROM: Mr. A. H. Belmon Boardman Belmont -Mason SUBJECT: SUGGESTED CHANGES IN MANUAL OF Parsons INSTRUCTIONS, MANUAL OF RULES AND Rosen Tamm REGULATIONS AND FBI HANDBOOK Nease SECURITY INFORMANTS - SOURCES AND CONTACTS Winterrowd Tele. Room Holloman -At the present time instructions are Gandy. outstanding that gifts should not be given to informants and expenditures for such purpose will not be approved as blue slip items. In addition gifts to office contacts and sources shall not be reclaimed as blue slip items. The field was advised by SAC Letter 55-28 dated April 8, 1955, as follows: Gifts to office contacts and sources shall not be reclaimed as blue slip items. Gifts should not be given to informants since such actions might be misconstrued and the relationship between Agents and informants shall be maintained on a businesslike basis. Expenditures for gifts to informants will not be approved as blue slip items. Since it has been necessary to refer to this regulation on occasion it is suggested that it be incorporated in the appropriate Manuals and FBI Handbook. ACTION: There are attached for transmittal to the Training and Inspection Division suggested changes in the Manual of Instructions, Manual of Rules and Regulations and FBI Handbook. Enclosures Mr. Boardman Mr. Belmont 14 3/11 9 1977 Training and Inspection Division Mr. Donohue RECORDED - 71 CULLY JDD:ojk (5)

cc - Mr. Boardma Mr. Belmont" Training and Inspection Division Mr. Donohue

December 14, 1956

### PROPOSED CHANGES IN MANUAL OF INSTRUCTIONS SECTION 107

#### N. PAYMENTS

such actions might be misconstrued. Relationship between Agents and informants shall be maintained on a businesslike basis. Expenditures for gifts to informants will not be approved as blue slip items. Investigative employees must not approach directly or indirectly representatives of companies, private industries or insurance companies and request assistance regarding payments of money, gifts or products of such companies to informants.

#### U. CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE

- 6. Security Confidential Source Certification of Stability and Payments...
- 7. -c. Gifts to sources shall not be reclaimed as blue slip items.

## SECTION 87

- E. INVESTIGATIONS OF COMMUNIST FRONT, NATIONALIST TYPE
  AND MISCELLANEOUS ORGANIZATIONS
  - 5. Panel Sources
    - c. (5) Add to this paragraph the following sentence:

      Gifts to sources shall not be reclaimed as

      blue slip items.

ichols oardman elmont	See attached memo to Boa captioned "Suggested Cha of Rules and Regulations	anges in Manual of s and FBI Handbook,	Instructions,	Manual
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cc - Mr. Boardmin Mr. Belmont

Training and Inspection Division

Mr. Donohue

December 14, 1956

PROPOSED CHANGES IN MANUAL OF RULES AND REGULATIONS SECTION 6

K. SOURCES OF INFORMATION

made item 3.

Add to this paragraph the following sentence: Gifts to sources shall not be reclaimed as blue slip items.

L. SAC CONTACTS

11. Gifts to office contacts shall not be reclaimed as blue slip items.

See attached memo to Boardman from Belmont dated 12/14/56, captioned "Suggested Changes in Manual of Instructions, Manual of Rules and Regulations and FBI Handbook, Security Informants - Sources and Contacts," JDD:ojk.

JDD:03/2

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WY

cc - Mr. Boardman Mr. Belmo Training and Inspection Division Mr. Donohue

December 14, 1956

PROPOSED CHANGES IN FBI HANDBOOK PART I

26. CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS

A. Security Informant

8. Payments

a. Add to this paragraph the following sentence:

Gifts should not be given since such
actions might be misconstrued. Expenditures
for gifts to informants will not be approved
as blue slip items.

C. Confidential Source

5. Add to this paragraph the following sentence:

made item 7 Gifts to sources shall not be reclaimed as

blue slip items.

pade item

1. Add to this paragraph the following sentence:

3. Add to this paragraph the following sentence:

4. Blue slip items.

See attached memo to Boardman from Belmont dated 12/14/56, captioned "Suggested Changes in Manual of Instructions, Manual of Rules and Regulations and FBI Handbook, Security Informants - Sources and Contacts," JDD:ojk.

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