This document is made available through the declassification efforts and research of John Greenewald, Jr., creator of:

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Dear Mr. Greenewald:

You were previously advised we were consulting with another agency concerning information located as a result of your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request.

This consultation is complete and the enclosed material is being released to you with deletions made pursuant to Title 5, United States Code, Section(s) 552 as noted below. See the enclosed form for an explanation of these exemptions.

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11 pages were reviewed and 11 pages are being released.

✔️ Deletions were made by the Internal Revenue Service and the Air Force Office of Special Investigations. To appeal those denials, please write directly to that agency.

For your information, Congress excluded three discrete categories of law enforcement and national security records from the requirements of the FOIA. See 5 U.S. C. § 552(c) (2006 & Supp. IV (2010). This response is limited to those records that are subject to the requirements of the FOIA. This is a standard notification that is given to all our requesters and should not be taken as an indication that excluded records do, or do not, exist.

For questions regarding our determinations, visit the www.fbi.gov/foia website under “Contact Us.” The FOIPA Request Number listed above has been assigned to your request. Please use this number in all correspondence concerning your request. Your patience is appreciated.
You may file an appeal by writing to the Director, Office of Information Policy (OIP), United States Department of Justice, Suite 11050, 1425 New York Avenue, NW, Washington, D.C. 20530-0001, or you may submit an appeal through OIP's FOIAonline portal by creating an account on the following website: https://foiaonline.regulations.gov/foia/action/public/home. Your appeal must be postmarked or electronically transmitted within sixty (60) days from the date of this letter in order to be considered timely. If you submit your appeal by mail, both the letter and the envelope should be clearly marked "Freedom of Information Act Appeal." Please cite the FOIPA Request Number assigned to your request so that it may be easily identified.

See additional information which follows.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

David M. Hardy
Section Chief,
Record/Information Dissemination Section
Records Management Division

Enclosures (2)

In response to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request submitted to the Records Management Division in Winchester, VA, enclosed is a processed copy of the referral responses from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI).

The material contained in this release represents the final release of information regarding your FOIA request. This material is being provided to you at no charge.
EXPLANATION OF EXEMPTIONS

SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552

(b)(1) (A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified to such Executive order;

(b)(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency;

(b)(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this title), provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld;

(b)(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential;

(b)(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;

(b)(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;

(b)(7) records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information (A) could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of confidential source, including a State, local, or foreign agency or authority or any private institution which furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in the case of record or information compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, information furnished by a confidential source, (E) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law, or (F) could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual;

(b)(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or

(b)(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells.

SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552a

(d)(5) information compiled in reasonable anticipation of a civil action proceeding;

(j)(2) material reporting investigative efforts pertaining to the enforcement of criminal law including efforts to prevent, control, or reduce crime or apprehend criminals;

(k)(1) information which is currently and properly classified pursuant to an Executive order in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy, for example, information involving intelligence sources or methods;

(k)(2) investigatory material compiled for law enforcement purposes, other than criminal, which did not result in loss of a right, benefit or privilege under Federal programs, or which would identify a source who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;

(k)(3) material maintained in connection with providing protective services to the President of the United States or any other individual pursuant to the authority of Title 18, United States Code, Section 3056;

(k)(4) required by statute to be maintained and used solely as statistical records;

(k)(5) investigatory material compiled solely for the purpose of determining suitability, eligibility, or qualifications for Federal civilian employment or for access to classified information, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;

(k)(6) testing or examination material used to determine individual qualifications for appointment or promotion in Federal Government service he release of which would compromise the testing or examination process;

(k)(7) material used to determine potential for promotion in the armed services, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished the material pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence.

FBI/DOJ
Synopsis: Request to open instant matter.

Enclosures: Attached are several LM documents provided by LM Special Investigator.

Details: On 11/02/1999, Lockheed Martin Tactical Aircraft Systems (LM) Special Investigator contacted SA concerning an incident involving two LM employees and possibly two foreign nationals. A further update was faxed to SA on 11/16/1999, and a meeting between SA and IRS was held at LM on 11/18/1999. The results of the meeting and an explanation of the incident will be spelled out in the remainder of this EC. The attached LM documents are the results of research done by as well as interviews conducted with LM employees described more fully in the remainder of the EC.
To: Dallas
From: Dallas
Re: 11/19/1999

(U) It is LM's concern that there may be an ongoing attempt to elicit LM proprietary or USG classified information from them via LM employee Boyd B. Bushman. Bushman is a U.S. male national, DOB 07/20/1936, SSN 527-44-3323, and was hired by LM on 07/23/1982. His job title is that of Senior Specialist in the Special Programs department and he has Top Secret and SCI/SAP clearances. Bushman has asked for LM to establish proprietary information agreements with Fnu and both believed to be foreign nationals, in order to receive "scientific data and video recording of physics experiments" from and "wave theory" data from. According to Bushman, the data and video pertain to successful exploitation of gravity/anti-gravity physics. Bushman denied any "real interest" in the data so his reason for requesting LM to establish the aforementioned agreement with is unknown.

(U) The connection between Bushman, is somewhat cloudy. According to Bushman, another LM employee, a U.S. male national, introduced him to and advised him to a retired U.S. Marine who was hired by LM in March 1978 and His job title is in the Business Development department. described as the "ultimate networker" whose value to LM lies primarily in in the industry. commented in particular on strong relationships with U.S. military command personnel. claims that sent a facsimile message to LM's Prague office, which came into and which he then shared with Bushman. According to, he only assisted Bushman in arranging for follow-up contact with at Bushman's request. Per Bushman displayed an interest in the mathematical analysis conducted by and allegedly developed by pertaining to Einstein's Theory of Relativity. stated he did not know and that Bushman had sought assistance in arranging a joint meeting with. It is unknown if there is any connection between other than their shared interest in a related area of physics. Why Bushman wanted to get them together for a meeting is also unknown. According to Bushman, had arranged for Bushman to travel to Prague and meet The three of them would then travel to Holland (possibly where resides) where they would hold discussions and receive
To: Dallas  From: Dallas
Re:  11/19/1999

Based on research conducted by [redacted] it is believed [redacted] may be a Ph.D. for an institute in the Czech Republic. His bonafides are undetermined at this time. Bushman said he was unaware of how [redacted] became acquainted with [redacted] but that he believed [redacted] was a genuine Ph.D. scientist supposedly somehow associated with Prague University. [redacted] supposedly has conducted experiments uncovering five seemingly plausible new understandings or laws of physics and gravity. Bushman advised he simply wished to obtain [redacted] data and scientific evidence to conduct an analysis of of [redacted] representations to determine whether or not they are valid.

It was also determined that [redacted] had previously dropped off a package of information at LM's Prague office but had been requested to return and retrieve the data because no proprietary agreements existed between LM and [redacted] institution. [redacted] did return and pick up the package. [redacted] advised that LM fears this to be some kind of provocation by an unknown party who might be trying to set up LM by accusing them of illegally obtaining proprietary information. LM is also concerned about [redacted] being the true owner of the information and does not want to obtain any information they are not legally entitled to.

[redacted] opined that based on his interviews with both Bushman [redacted] he believes Bushman would try to blame any problems on [redacted] characterized [redacted] as a "loose cannon" but controllable if given explicit instructions. Bushman appears to be an extremely intelligent scientist, largely self-taught, who will talk down to those he does not consider his intellectual equal. Bushman has apparently made the appropriate formal requests to LM to arrange for proprietary data agreements with [redacted] institution. Bushman admitted it was tempting to simply accept [redacted] data without regard to the restrictions and laws that are in place regarding the release and removal of the information from the country of origin, LM company policy, and legal ownership of the information. Bushman stated he would wait until the proper agreements were in place before receiving the data. A facsimile from [redacted] to SA dated 11/16/1999 indicated that LM's Special Programs section is "very interested" in receiving [redacted] data but are holding any further contact in abeyance until LM Security and the LM Legal Department give them permission to proceed further.
To: Dallas From: Dallas

Re: ____________________________
11/19/1999

research into both Bushman's and LM personnel files revealed no remarkable pertinent information or history of misconduct for Bushman, however, file "disclosed a history of allegations of misconduct, violations of security and classified handling procedures, and suspicious contacts with foreign nationals."

When _____ was queried about ___ being a security concern for LM, he responded with the "loose cannon" comment and gave SA ___ a copy of an e-mail message sent to ___ from LM Associate General Counsel ______ dated 11/18/99 regarding the cessation of any further outside communication outside of LM regarding the ______ information. _____ further characterized ___ as being very gung-ho and action oriented. Subsequent to this investigation, it was discovered independently by SA _____ and confirmed by _____ that Bushman has recently released sensitive LM information to Jane's Defense Weekly, a British publication, which resulted in Bushman's access to some USAF programs being suspended.

____ also gave SA ____ a copy of a 09/24/1999 LM Foreign Contact Form listing contact between Bushman and ____ The contact consisted of a "Sept, 1999 telephone call" and listed _____ current address as ____ The form also listed the reasons for the contact which are consistent with those previously discussed in instant EC. There is apparently some confusion over the exact identity and origin of ____ Research done by ____ seemed to indicate that the title used by Bushman in his Foreign Contact Form may have alluded to _____ education, title, and institution. Nothing definitive could be ascertained however, so the attempt to positively identify ___ and his organization is still ongoing. According to information provided by _____ on 11/19/1999, a phone number of ____ has been used on two separate faxes sent by ____ along with two addresses in the Czech Republic. ___ advised _____ apparently wrote some articles for the Fusion Information Center, New Energy News, and the Institute for New Energy in Salt Lake City, Utah. ______ checks conducted on ____ appear to verify this.

request of the FBI is to assist LM by checking various databases in order to ascertain if any of the and if so what kind of threat it might pose to LM.
To: Dallas
From: Dallas
Re: (S) 11/19/1999

(S) In summation, it appears that Bushman wants to
legitimately obtain information as it may pertain to
research he is performing in his employment with LM. It is
unknown what connection may have to any of this other
than the fact that was apparently going to be involved
in a meeting with Bushman before those plans got
scuttled. involvement hinges around his ability to set
up such a meeting. The most intriguing questions revolve around
the identification of and the legitimacy of his
information. advised LM is holding off on granting
Bushman's department permission to obtain information
until it's ownership and legitimacy can be better determined.

(S) It is requested that be
opened and assigned to SA in order to determine if this is
some kind of
iv) In 1997, released an exposition of the Eurofighter 2000 to media representatives that contained internal LMTAS assessments of the EF 2000 program and aircraft.
Precedence: ROUTINE

To: Dallas

From: Dallas
FW-3
Contact: SA

Approved By: 

Drafted By: 

Case ID #: (Pending)
Title: FNU

Synopsis: (S) Results of USAF OSI interview of Lockheed Martin
employee Boyd Bushman.

(x) Classified By: G-3, FBI/Dallas
Reason: 1.5
Declassify On: X

Details: (x) On 01/10/2000, SAs and met with United States Air Force (USAF) Office of Special
Investigations (OSI) Region 7/OL-G SAC regarding an interview of Lockheed Martin Tactical Aircraft Systems (LM)
employee Boyd Bushman which conducted recently.

(x) Bushman stated the purpose of his interview with
Bushman was to discuss the removal of Bushman by OSI from USAF
Special Access Programs. Stressed that Bushman's security
Clearance had not been revoked, only his access to certain USAF
programs. Advised this would in effect make it more
difficult for LM to justify Bushman's continued employment at LM.

(x) Bushman claimed he had not provided
any information to Jane's Defence Weekly writer.
would have been in violation of USAF security rules. Further characterized Bushman as "strange" and more of an "idea guy" than a practical applications expert. It was impression Bushman has only an MBA degree and no advanced degrees in any hard science.

(U) Following a [ ] analysis by IRS [ ] of several items of information provided earlier by LM Security, it is anticipated that an interview of Bushman will be in order to determine Bushman's further knowledge of any possible (witting or unwitting) links between Bushman and [ ]

(U) [ ] Investigation at Fort Worth continuing.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

To: Dallas

From: Dallas
FW-3
Contact: SA

Date: 02/11/2000

Synopsis: Meeting and further information from Lockheed Martin Security.

Details: On 02/11/2000, SAs and met with Lockheed Martin Tactical Aircraft Systems (LM) Security Special Investigator for an update on instant matter. provided the following information:

LM employee Boyd Bushman is apparently going to contest the U.S. Air Force's (USAF) decision to remove his security clearance as it applies to projects LM is working on for the USAF.

was amenable to helping arrange interviews with several other LM employees, including Bushman, who might have knowledge about captioned matter. Upon the completion of further FBI database checks and analysis by IRS these interviews will be scheduled through office at LM. The
To: Dallas  From: Dallas  
Re:  02/11/2000  

(S) purpose of the interviews will be to further identify captioned subject.  

(U) (X) Investigation at Fort Worth continuing.
Synopsis: Interview with Boyd Bushman.

Details: On 02/29/2000, SA and IRS interviewed Lockheed Martin Tactical Aircraft Systems (LM) employee Boyd Bushman regarding his knowledge of captioned matter. Upon being advised of the identities of SA and IRS, Bushman voluntarily provided the following information.

The FBI's national security responsibilities were explained to Bushman and he expressed an understanding of same. Bushman provided a DOB of 07/20/36 and a SSN of 527-44-3323. Bushman stated he has been employed at LM since April, 1986. His LM title is Senior Scientist.

Bushman advised (aka first came to his attention about three months ago when a LM "marketeer" by the name of told Bushman about someone who knew of new methods to modify flight. Bushman then spoke with over the