

THIS FILE IS MADE AVAILABLE THROUGH THE DECLASSIFICATION EFFORTS AND RESEARCH OF:

# THE BLACK VAULT

THE BLACK VAULT IS THE LARGEST ONLINE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT / GOVERNMENT RECORD CLEARING HOUSE IN THE WORLD. THE RESEARCH EFFORTS HERE ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DECLASSIFICATION OF THOUSANDS OF DOCUMENTS THROUGHOUT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, AND ALL CAN BE DOWNLOADED BY VISITING:

[HTTP://WWW.BLACKVAULT.COM](http://www.blackvault.com)

YOU ARE ENCOURAGED TO FORWARD THIS DOCUMENT TO YOUR FRIENDS, BUT PLEASE KEEP THIS IDENTIFYING IMAGE AT THE TOP OF THE .PDF SO OTHERS CAN DOWNLOAD MORE!



U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington, D.C. 20535

July 26, 2006

MR JOHN GREENEWALD JR  
THE BLACK VAULT HEADQUARTERS  
8512 NEWCASTLE AVENUE  
NORTHRIDGE CA 91325

Subject: FBIHQ file 117-268

FOIPA No. 997059

Dear Mr. Greenewald:

The enclosed documents were reviewed under the Freedom of Information/Privacy Acts (FOIPA), Title 5, United States Code, Section 552/552a. Deletions have been made to protect information which is exempt from disclosure, with the appropriate exemptions noted on the page next to the excision. The exemptions used to withhold information are marked below and explained on the enclosed Form OPCA-16a:

Section 552

- ☒ (b)(1)  
☐ (b)(2)  
☒ (b)(3) \_\_\_\_\_  
The National Security Act of  
1947 and The CIA Act of 1949  
\_\_\_\_\_  
☐ (b)(4)  
☐ (b)(5)  
☐ (b)(6)

- ☐ (b)(7)(A)  
☐ (b)(7)(B)  
☒ (b)(7)(C)  
☒ (b)(7)(D)  
☐ (b)(7)(E)  
☐ (b)(7)(F)  
☐ (b)(8)  
☐ (b)(9)

Section 552a

- ☐ (d)(5)  
☐ (j)(2)  
☐ (k)(1)  
☐ (k)(2)  
☐ (k)(3)  
☐ (k)(4)  
☐ (k)(5)  
☐ (k)(6)  
☐ (k)(7)

100 preprocessed pages are enclosed. To expedite requests, preprocessed packages are released the same way they were originally processed. Documents or information originating with other Government agencies were not referred to those agencies as part of this release.

☒ You have the right to appeal any denials. Appeals should be directed in writing to the Co-Director, Office of Information and Privacy, U.S. Department of Justice, 1425 New York Ave., NW, Suite 11050, Washington, D.C. 20530-0001 within sixty days from the date of this letter. The envelope and the letter should be clearly marked "Freedom of Information Appeal" or "Information Appeal." Please cite the FOIPA number assigned to your request that it may be easily identified.

☐ The enclosed material is from the main investigative file(s) in which the subject(s) of your request was the focus of the investigation. Our search located additional references, in files relating to other individuals, or matters, which may or may not be about your subject(s). Our experience is, when ident, references usually contain information similar to the information processed in the main file(s). Because of our significant backlog, we have given priority to processing only the main investigative file(s). If you want the references, you must submit a separate request for them in writing and they will be reviewed at a later date, as time and resources permit.

☒ See additional information which follows.

Sincerely yours,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "D. Hardy", with a stylized flourish at the end.

David M. Hardy  
Section Chief,  
Record/Information  
Dissemination Section  
Records Management Division

Enclosure(s)

The enclosed documents, per your request, is the first 100 releasable pages contained in FBIHQ file 117-268.



## EXPLANATION OF EXEMPTIONS

### SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552

- (b)(1) (A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified to such Executive order;
- (b)(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency;
- (b)(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this title), provided that such statute (A) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld;
- (b)(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential;
- (b)(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;
- (b)(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
- (b)(7) records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information ( A ) could be reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, ( B ) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, ( C ) could be reasonably expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, ( D ) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of confidential source, including a State, local, or foreign agency or authority or any private institution which furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in the case of record or information compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, information furnished by a confidential source, ( E ) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law, or ( F ) could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual;
- (b)(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or
- (b)(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells.

### SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552a

- (d)(5) information compiled in reasonable anticipation of a civil action proceeding;
- (j)(2) material reporting investigative efforts pertaining to the enforcement of criminal law including efforts to prevent, control, or reduce crime or apprehend criminals;
- (k)(1) information which is currently and properly classified pursuant to an Executive order in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy, for example, information involving intelligence sources or methods;
- (k)(2) investigatory material compiled for law enforcement purposes, other than criminal, which did not result in loss of a right, benefit or privilege under Federal programs, or which would identify a source who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;
- (k)(3) material maintained in connection with providing protective services to the President of the United States or any other individual pursuant to the authority of Title 18, United States Code, Section 3056;
- (k)(4) required by statute to be maintained and used solely as statistical records;
- (k)(5) investigatory material compiled solely for the purpose of determining suitability, eligibility, or qualifications for Federal civilian employment or for access to classified information, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;
- (k)(6) testing or examination material used to determine individual qualifications for appointment or promotion in Federal Government service the release of which would compromise the testing or examination process;
- (k)(7) material used to determine potential for promotion in the armed services, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished the material pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence.



## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Ladd

DATE: September 29, 1947

FROM : V. P. Healy

SUBJECT:

Mr. Tolson  
Mr. E. A. Tamm  
Mr. Clegg  
Mr. Glavin  
Mr. Ladd  
Mr. Nichols  
Mr. Rosen  
Mr. Tracy  
Mr. Carson  
Mr. Egan  
Mr. Gurnea  
Mr. Harbo  
Mr. Hendon  
Mr. Pennington  
Mr. Quinn Tamm  
Tele. Room  
Mr. Nease  
Miss Gandy

Reference is made to the Director's instructions that a memorandum be prepared as to any suggestions which can be made which are workable and would not cost so much that might insure greater security from the point of view of making it impossible for individuals to enter the United States with implements that can be used for the destruction of the United States. You will recall that Mr. John McComb is preparing a report for the President's Air Policy Commission regarding measures which might be taken towards tightening up the various procedures now in existence allowing persons to enter the United States with a particular view to the possibility that an atom bomb or a portion of it could be brought into the United States. The following possible suggestions are submitted.

From conversations with representatives of the Atomic Energy Commission, it would appear that an atom bomb could be smuggled into the United States as freight even though it is of large bulk. A bomb could be planted at some location and detonated by radio after it arrived in the country. The smuggling in of parts for the bomb and their subsequent assembly probably would be impractical at present although, of course, some of the vital parts are very small (you will recall we recently had a case involving the loss of a vital part, a hemisphere, which was no larger than half a marble). Certain vital portions of the assembly could be concealed in luggage. However, it would be difficult to transport pure uranium even in relatively small proportions due to the protective coating which must be put around it to prevent injury to persons due to radiation, and certain parts of the bomb are of large bulk.

There have been a number of magazine articles concerning the possibility of bomb parts being smuggled which are for the most part based on speculation as to future developments. It must be taken into consideration, however, that at some future time it will be possible to conceal and handle uranium and other parts of the bomb in such a manner as to make possible their concealment in luggage or about the person of a traveler.

The following are the principal problems to be considered:

(1) The smuggling in of a complete bomb or parts in freight or mail packages arriving by ship or otherwise, including diplomatic shipments.

(2) Travelers arriving from abroad smuggling in their luggage or on their persons parts for the bomb.

(3) Bringing in of a complete bomb in a ship or plane which takes a legal entry into a port or air field in which event the bomb could be detonated at the port or air field with a devastating effect (without unloading the ship or plane).

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 4-7-00 BY SP4 BJA/lan

948742/050935

69 NOV 17 1947



Memorandum for Mr. Ladd

(4) Transportation of a bomb or parts for a bomb in unprotected places along the Mexican or Canadian border or in unprotected places along the sea coast.

As will be seen, the problem of control involves in addition to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the State Department (issuance of visas), Immigration and Naturalization, Customs, Border Patrol, and any other governmental organization having to do with regulation and control of foreign commerce and travel.

The following specific possible suggestions are submitted:

(1) Although general and extensive searches of persons entering the United States and of freight arriving in the United States do not appear to be possible in peace time not only because of peacetime laws but because of the tremendous cost involved in providing sufficient personnel to adequately conduct such searches, a general tightening up in the laxity now existing would be of assistance. You will recall that we have in the past called to the attention of the Attorney General the laxity existing regarding admission and control of aliens in the United States. This would involve not only tightening up by Immigration and Naturalization, but also Customs in regard to searches being made and by the State Department in connection with the issuance of visas.

This problem is complicated, of course, by diplomatic immunity as it is very probable that if parts of a bomb were smuggled in, for instance by the Russians, they would be brought in under diplomatic immunity. The extensive use of diplomatic immunity by persons entering the United States for the purpose of attending the United Nations Meeting has made this angle even more of a hazard than it has been in the past. You will recall that recently diplomatic immunity was extended to representatives of the International Labor Commission.

It may be practical to install a device at each port of entry to be used on ships unloading freight and diplomatic pouches, luggage, and packages which would register the presence of any radioactive material. The feasibility of this would have to be determined by technicians, but the cost should not be too great in the event it is practical.

(2) The most important control that can be devised is an adequate and effective foreign intelligence organization for the United States. It is evident that we should be posted at all times on the progress of all countries in making a bomb, and also as to departure from the foreign countries of packages, persons, boats, or planes carrying a bomb or its parts in order that proper protective measures may be taken. In view of the difficulties of general searches, our large, unprotected coast lines, and of the detection of bomb parts, we can only be adequately protected if our foreign intelligence is able to detect such material when it leaves for the United States from abroad. This is the same problem which was involved during the



Memorandum for Mr. Ladd

last war when the departure of espionage agents occurred time after time without any notice to the Bureau and it made our problem of detecting them as they arrived or after their arrival most difficult.

(3) Any intelligence agency which is concerned with this problem at present is greatly handicapped because of the lack of data regarding the potentialities involved and as to what a bomb or a part of a bomb looks like. If Customs, Border Patrol, or the FBI is expected to find bombs or parts being smuggled in, it is evident that we must be able to recognize such. It will be important, of course, that we know what manner, shape, and form parts for the bomb may present and whether our own experimentation with materials reflect that a foreign country could produce a small bomb or parts and materials that are capable of being smuggled. It would be necessary that agencies concerned be kept posted at all times as to developments in this field.

The Atomic Energy Commission, of course, is the only agency capable of providing the necessary technical data to the intelligence agencies. This definitely has not been done as yet. In fact, there is a great reluctance on the part of Commission representatives to discuss anything about the bomb, its size, shape, or parts. If it is considered undesirable to make restricted technical data available to Customs, Border Patrol, etc., then the Commission should station a representative at each of the ports of entry who would be capable of giving technical advice or examining suspected packages on the spot.

(4) Based on available information on atomic energy and the atomic bomb, it would not appear that changes in the statutes are at present a part of the solution of the problem. The Atomic Energy Act makes it illegal to possess uranium, parts for the bomb, etc., and general espionage and sabotage laws, as well as other statutes can be applied to effectively detain persons smuggling in materials having to do with atomic energy. As noted above, a general tightening up in enforcement of existing statutes may be of some help, that is the State Department should tighten up on the issuance of visas to suspect persons and Immigration and Naturalization should tighten up on its control of aliens. It may also be necessary that Customs and Border Patrol exercise greater vigilance in view of the possibility of smuggling in a bomb, but no changes in the present laws appear to be necessary to give any greater powers to these agencies.

This is a rapidly changing field and, of course, it is likely that loopholes will be discovered in the future in existing statutes which must necessarily be remedied quickly. Therefore, continuous attention to this phase is necessary by the Bureau, as well as other agencies involved.

VPK:mrl



THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

November 1, 1947

Director, FBI


**Suggested Security Measures with Reference to Smuggling  
Atom Bombs or Parts for Atom Bombs into the United States**

As of possible interest, there is transmitted herewith a memorandum, a copy of which has been furnished to the Honorable James V. Forrestal, Secretary of Defense; the Honorable David E. Lilienthal, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission; and Mr. S. Paul Johnston, Executive Director of the President's Air Policy Commission. This memorandum relates to possible security measures regarding the smuggling into the United States of an atom bomb or parts thereof which could later be assembled within this country.

Enclosure

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 4-7-00 BY SP4 BJA/iam

Mr. Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. E. A. Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Egan \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Gurnea \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Pennington \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Quinn Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_



SE 20

DEED

100-1-107  
11-1-47

63 NOV 1947



October 30, 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TAMM  
MR. LADD  
MR. TOLSON


With reference to Mr. Ladd's memorandum of October 22, 1947, setting forth certain problems and suggestions relative to security measures which might be taken against individuals bringing Atom Bombs into the United States, I think it might be well to not only submit these observations to the Attorney General and to Mr. Johnston of the President's Air Policy Commission but it might also be well to submit the same to the Atomic Energy Commission and to the Secretary of Defense, Mr. Forrestal.

Very truly yours,

*J. Edgar Hoover*  
John Edgar Hoover  
Director

Attachment (With Mr. Tamm's copy)

JEN:KH



RECORDED  
&  
INDEXED

Mr. Tolson  
Mr. E. A. Tamm  
Mr. Clegg  
Mr. Glavin  
Mr. Ladd  
Mr. Nichols  
Mr. Rosen  
Mr. Tracy  
Mr. Egan  
Mr. Gurnea  
Mr. Harbo  
Mr. Mohr  
Mr. Pennington  
Mr. Quinn Tamm  
Tele. Room  
Mr. Nease  
Miss Gandy

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 4-7-00 BY SP4 BJA/LBM

November 4, 1947

~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~

Honorable Brien McMahon  
United States Senate  
Washington, D. C.

My dear Senator:

Apropos of our conversation last evening, I am pleased to transmit to you herewith the substance of certain suggested security measures to prevent the smuggling of atom bombs or parts for atom bombs into the United States. I have made these suggestions available to the Atomic Energy Commission and thought you would be interested in the nature of them.

With expressions of my highest esteem and best regards,

Sincerely yours,

blind

INDEXED

Enclosure (Key's/memo 11-1-47 entitled "Suggested Security Measures with Reference to Smuggling Atom Bombs or Parts for Atom Bombs into the U.S.")

Mr. Tolson  
Mr. E. A. Tamm  
Mr. Clegg  
Mr. Glavin  
Mr. Ladd  
Mr. Nichols  
Mr. Rosen  
Mr. Tracy  
Mr. Carson  
Mr. Egan  
Mr. Gurnea  
Mr. Harbo  
Mr. Hendon  
Mr. Pennington  
Mr. Quinn Tamm  
Mr. Nease  
Miss Gandy

NOV 11 1947  
P.M.  
EAT:ml

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

DECLASSIFIED BY SP4 BTM/tem  
ON 4-7-00

NOV 21 1947



November 4, 1947

SUGGESTED SECURITY MEASURES WITH REFERENCE TO  
SMUGGLING ATOM BOMBS OR PARTS FOR ATOM BOMBS  
INTO THE UNITED STATES

From available information, it would appear that a complete atom bomb could be smuggled into the United States as freight even though it is of large bulk, and the bomb could be detonated by remote control after it has been placed at a specific location. The smuggling in of the complete parts for a bomb by carrying them on the person of a traveler or in luggage, however, would appear impractical although some parts are undoubtedly very small. It must be taken into consideration that at some future time it may be possible to conceal and handle uranium and other parts of the bomb in such a manner as to make possible their concealment in luggage or on the person of a traveler.

The following are the principal problems to be considered:

(1) The smuggling in of a complete bomb or parts in freight or mail packages arriving by ship or otherwise, including diplomatic shipments.

(2) Travelers arriving from abroad smuggling in their luggage or on their persons parts for the bomb.

(3) Bringing in of a complete bomb in a ship or plane which makes a legal entry into a port or air field in which event the bomb could be detonated at the port or air field with a devastating effect (without unloading the ship or plane).

(4) Transportation of a bomb or parts for a bomb in unprotected places along the Mexican or Canadian border or in unprotected places along the seacoast.

The following are suggested as possible security measures:

(1) Although general and extensive searches of persons entering the United States and of freight arriving in the United States do not appear to be possible in peacetime, not only because of peacetime laws but because of the tremendous cost involved in providing sufficient personnel to adequately conduct such searches, a general tightening up in searches would be of assistance. This would involve not only tightening up by Immigration and Naturalization but also Customs in regard to searches being made and by the State Department in connection with the issuance of visas.

Mr. Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. E. A. Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Carson \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Egan \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Gurnea \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Hendon \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Pennington \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Quinn Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

17-107-4  
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 4-7-00 BY SP4 BJA/lan



This problem is complicated, of course, by diplomatic immunity as it is very probable that if parts of a bomb were smuggled in, for instance by the Russians, they would be brought in under diplomatic immunity. The extensive use of diplomatic immunity by persons entering the United States for the purpose of attending the United Nations Meeting has made this angle even more of a hazard than it has been in the past.

It may be practical to install a device at each port of entry to be used on ships unloading freight and diplomatic pouches, luggage, and packages which would register the presence of any radioactive material. The feasibility of this, of course, would have to be determined by technicians.

(2) The most important control that can be devised is an adequate and effective foreign intelligence organization for the United States. It is evident that we should be posted at all times on the progress of all countries in making a bomb, and also as to departure from the foreign countries of packages, persons, boats, or planes carrying a bomb or its parts in order that proper protective measures may be taken. In view of the difficulties of general searches, our large, unprotected coast lines, and of the detection of bomb parts, we can only be adequately protected if our foreign intelligence is able to detect such material when it leaves for the United States from abroad. This is the same problem which was involved during the last war when the departure of espionage agents occurred time after time without any notice to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and it made the problem of detecting them as they arrived or after their arrival most difficult.

(3) Any intelligence agency which is concerned with this problem at present is greatly handicapped because of the lack of data regarding the potentialities involved and as to what a bomb or a part of a bomb looks like. If Customs, Border Patrol, or the Federal Bureau of Investigation is expected to find bombs or parts being smuggled in, it is evident that they must be able to recognize such. It will be important, of course, that we know what manner, shape, and form parts for the bomb may present and whether our own experimentation with materials reflects that a foreign country could produce a small bomb or parts and materials that are capable of being smuggled. It would be necessary that agencies concerned be kept posted at all times as to developments in this field.

The Atomic Energy Commission, of course, is the only agency capable of providing the necessary technical data to the intelligence agencies. If it is considered undesirable to make restricted technical data available to Customs, Border Patrol, etc., then the Commission



may be able to station a representative at each of the ports of entry who would be capable of giving technical advice or examining suspected packages on the spot.

(4) Based on available information on atomic energy and the atomic bomb, it would not appear that changes in the statutes are at present a part of the solution of the problem. The Atomic Energy Act makes it illegal to possess uranium, parts for the bomb, etc., and general espionage and sabotage laws, as well as other statutes, can be applied to effectively detain persons smuggling in materials having to do with atomic energy. This is a rapidly changing field and, of course, it is likely that loopholes will be discovered in the future in existing statutes which must necessarily be remedied quickly.



BEST COPY AVAILABLE

November 3, 1947

5:51PM

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TOLSON  
MR. Tamm  
MR. Ladd

Senator Brien McMahon (D-Conn.) telephoned me stating that about two months ago he had a conversation with Mr. Thomas Finletter, Chairman of the President's Air Policy Commission, during which Mr. Finletter asked him to call me to see if I would see Mr. Finletter and Mr. Paul Johnston, Executive Director of the President's Air Policy Commission. The Senator indicated that he had forgotten all about this conversation until he discovered a note he had written. I informed the Senator that I had seen Mr. Finletter and Mr. Johnston about a month ago. I further advised the Senator that I wrote a letter to Mr. Finletter on October 31, 1947, containing some suggestions on methods of detecting the bringing in of "the bomb" into this country. As a matter of interest to the Senator I proposed to send a copy of this letter to him. He indicated that he would certainly like to have a copy, and I told him that it would be mailed to him.

He went on to state that under the act the Atomic Energy Commission operates there is a provision giving them the right to bar exportation of any device useful in connection with atomic energy. He said that the Commission had to resort to the act for the first time a few weeks ago. In this connection he mentioned the forthcoming loans that are to be made to foreign countries. He stated that he would try to get an amendment to whatever plan results that will give this country a contractual right in the loan agreement to prevent any foreign country aided by our loans from sending material to Russia. I told him that this is a very important matter and that I was pleased to hear that he was thinking along this line.

When questioned regarding the Atomic Energy Commission, I pointed out that Admiral John Gingrich, who is in charge of security, seems to be grasping the situation very well.

The Senator said that a friend of his called and told him about a young scientist in Oak Ridge that the Russians had tried to induce to go to Russia. He said that he would send all the information he has on this to me. I told him that I would like to have it.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 4-7-00 BY SPY BJA/LAM

JEH:RGK

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover  
Director

Mr. Tolson  
Mr. E. A. Tamm  
Mr. Clegg  
Mr. Glavin  
Mr. Ladd  
Mr. Nichols  
Mr. Rosen  
Mr. Tracy  
Mr. Egan  
Mr. Gurnea  
Mr. Harbo  
Mr. Mohr  
Mr. Pennington  
Mr. Quinn Tamm  
Tele. Room  
Mr. Nease  
Miss Gandy

SENT BY CC - Mr. Nease  
TIME 5:51 PM  
DATE 11-11-47  
Tele Room

RECORDED

34

71 NOV 22 1947



November 1, 1947

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

RECORDED 11-26

EX-132  
Mr. S. Paul Johnston  
Executive Director  
President's Air Policy Commission  
Room 5839  
Commerce Building  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Johnston:

I refer to your request that I submit possible views regarding security measures which may be taken against individuals smuggling or endeavoring to smuggle an atom bomb or parts thereof into the United States.


I am transmitting herewith a memorandum which considers possible security measures in this respect. A copy of this memorandum has been furnished to the Attorney General; the Honorable James V. Forrestal, Secretary of Defense; and the Honorable David E. Lilienthal, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

Enclosure

VPK:msl



DECLASSIFIED BY SP4 BJA/18m  
ON 4-7-00

Mr. Tolson  
Mr. E. A. Tamm  
Mr. Clegg  
Mr. Glavin  
Mr. Ladd  
Mr. Nichols  
Mr. Rosen  
Mr. Tracy  
Mr. Egan  
Mr. Gurnea  
Mr. Harbo  
Mr. Mohr  
Mr. Pennington  
Mr. Quinn Tamm  
Tele. Room  
Mr. Nease  
Miss Gandy

RECEIVED  
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE  
NOV 1 11 02 AM '47  
NOV 1 10 55 AM '47  
EAT

76

November 1, 1947

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL  
BY SPECIAL MESSENGER

RECORDED

Honorable David E. Lilienthal  
Chairman  
Atomic Energy Commission  
Room 236  
Public Health Building  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Lilienthal:

As of possible interest, there is transmitted herewith a memorandum, a copy of which has been furnished to the Attorney General; the Honorable James V. Forrestal, Secretary of Defense; and Mr. S. Paul Johnston, Executive Director of the President's Air Policy Commission. This memorandum relates to possible security measures regarding the smuggling into the United States of an atom bomb or parts thereof which could later be assembled within this country.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

Enclosure

VPK:mr1

EX-133

- Mr. Tolson
- Mr. E. A. Tamm
- Mr. Clegg
- Mr. Glavin
- Mr. Ladd
- Mr. Nichols
- Mr. Rosen
- Mr. Tracy
- Mr. Egan
- Mr. Gurnea
- Mr. Harbo
- Mr. Mohr
- Mr. Pennington
- Mr. Quinn Tamm
- Tele. Room
- Mr. Nease
- Miss Gandy

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION  
MAILED 8  
NOV 3 1947  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

NOV 1 11 02 AM '47  
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE  
RECEIVED  
NOV 1 9 56 AM '47

DECLASSIFIED BY SP4 BJA/UBM  
ON 4-7-00

304

1040



November 1, 1947

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL  
BY SPECIAL MESSENGER

RECORDED

Honorable James V. Forrestal  
Secretary of Defense  
National Defense Building  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Jim:

As of possible interest, there is transmitted herewith a memorandum, a copy of which has been furnished to the Attorney General; the Honorable David E. Lilienthal, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission; and Mr. S. Paul Johnston, Executive Director of the President's Air Policy Commission. This memorandum relates to possible security measures regarding the smuggling into the United States of an atom bomb or parts thereof which could later be assembled within this country.

With kindest regards,

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

Enclosure

DECLASSIFIED BY SP4BJA/LBM  
ON 11/11/00

VPK:mr1

Mr. Tolson  
Mr. E. A. Tamm  
Mr. Clegg  
Mr. Glavin  
Mr. Ladd  
Mr. Nichols  
Mr. Rosen  
Mr. Tracy  
Mr. Egan  
Mr. Gurnea  
Mr. Harbo  
Mr. Mohr  
Mr. Pennington  
Mr. Quinn Tamm  
Tele. Room  
Mr. Nease  
Miss Gandy

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION  
MAILED 8  
NOV 3 1947 P.M.  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

69 NOV 25 1947

RECEIVED  
NOV 3 1947

NOV 1 9 55 AM '47

U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE  
NOV 1 11 02 AM '47

RECORDED COPY FILED IN 62-89223-1



November 1, 1947

**SUGGESTED SECURITY MEASURES WITH REFERENCE TO SMUGGLING  
ATOM BOMBS OR PARTS FOR ATOM BOMBS INTO THE UNITED STATES**

From available information, it would appear that a complete atom bomb could be smuggled into the United States as freight even though it is of large bulk, and the bomb could be detonated by remote control after it has been placed at a specific location. The smuggling in of the complete parts for a bomb by carrying them on the person of a traveler or in luggage, however, would appear impractical although some parts are undoubtedly very small. It must be taken into consideration that at some future time it may be possible to conceal and handle uranium and other parts of the bomb in such a manner as to make possible their concealment in luggage or on the person of a traveler.

The following are the principal problems to be considered:

- (1) The smuggling in of a complete bomb or parts in freight or mail packages arriving by ship or otherwise, including diplomatic shipments.
- (2) Travelers arriving from abroad smuggling in their luggage or on their persons parts for the bomb.
- (3) Bringing in of a complete bomb in a ship or plane which makes a legal entry into a port or air field in which event the bomb could be detonated at the port or air field with a devastating effect (without unloading the ship or plane).
- (4) Transportation of a bomb or parts for a bomb in unprotected places along the Mexican or Canadian border or in unprotected places along the sea-coast.

The following are suggested as possible security measures:

- (1) Although general and extensive searches of persons entering the United States and of freight arriving in the United States do not appear to be possible in peacetime not only because of peacetime laws but because of the tremendous cost involved in providing sufficient personnel to adequately conduct such searches, a general tightening up in searches would be of assistance. This would involve not only tightening up by Immigration and Naturalization, but also Customs in regard to searches being made and by the State Department in connection with the issuance of visas.

Mr. Tolson  
Mr. E. A. Tamm  
Mr. Clegg  
Mr. Glavin  
Mr. Ladd  
Mr. Nichols  
Mr. Rosen  
Mr. Tracy  
Mr. Egan  
Mr. Gurnea  
Mr. Harbo  
Mr. Mohr  
Mr. Pennington  
Mr. Quinn Tamm  
Tele. Room  
Mr. Nease  
Miss Gandy

VPK:mr1

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 4-7-90 BY SP4 AM/LGM

111-917-5



This problem is complicated, of course, by diplomatic immunity as it is very probable that if parts of a bomb were smuggled in, for instance by the Russians, they would be brought in under diplomatic immunity. The extensive use of diplomatic immunity by persons entering the United States for the purpose of attending the United Nations Meeting has made this angle even more of a hazard than it has been in the past.

It may be practical to install a device at each port of entry to be used on ships ~~unloading~~ freight and diplomatic pouches, luggage, and packages which would register the presence of any radioactive material. The feasibility of this, of course, would have to be determined by technicians.

(2) The most important control that can be devised is an adequate and effective foreign intelligence organization for the United States. It is evident that we should be posted at all times on the progress of all countries in making a bomb, and also as to departure from the foreign countries of packages, persons, boats, or planes carrying a bomb or its parts in order that proper protective measures may be taken. In view of the difficulties of general searches, our large, unprotected coast lines, and of the detection of bomb parts, we can only be adequately protected if our foreign intelligence is able to detect such material when it leaves for the United States from abroad. This is the same problem which was involved during the last war when the departure of espionage agents occurred time after time without any notice to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and it made the problem of detecting them as they arrived or after their arrival most difficult.

(3) Any intelligence agency which is concerned with this problem present is greatly handicapped because of the lack of data regarding the possibilities involved and as to what a bomb or a part of a bomb looks like. If Customs, Border Patrol, or the Federal Bureau of Investigation is expected to find bombs or parts being smuggled in, it is evident that they must be able to recognize such. It will be important, of course, that we know what manner, shape, and form parts for the bomb may present and whether our own experimentation with materials reflects that a foreign country could produce a small bomb or parts and materials that are capable of being smuggled. It would be necessary that agencies concerned be kept posted at all times as to developments in this field.

The Atomic Energy Commission, of course, is the only agency capable of providing the necessary technical data to the intelligence agencies. If it is considered undesirable to make restricted technical data available to Customs, Border Patrol, etc., then the Commission may be able to station a representative at each of the ports of entry who would be capable of giving technical advice or examining suspected packages on the spot.

(4) Based on available information on atomic energy and the atomic bomb, it would not appear that changes in the statutes are at present a part of the solution of the problem. The Atomic Energy Act makes it illegal to possess uranium, parts for the bomb, etc., and general espionage and sabotage laws, as well as other statutes can be applied to effectively detain persons smuggling in materials having to do with atomic energy. This is a rapidly changing field and, of course, it is likely that loopholes will be discovered in the future in existing statutes which must necessarily be remedied quickly.



## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: October 22, 1947

FROM : D. M. Ladd

SUBJECT:

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 04-06-2006 BY AUC 60309

TAM/DGC/JW

You will recall that recently you had a conference with Samuel P. Johnston and Mr. John McCone of the President's Air Policy Commission, following which you requested that I submit any possible views with reference to security measures which might be taken against individuals bringing an atom bomb into the United States.

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. E. A. Tamm	
Mr. Clegg	
Mr. Glavin	
Mr. Ladd	
Mr. Nichols	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Tracy	
Mr. Carson	
Mr. Egan	
Mr. Gurnea	
Mr. Harbo	
Mr. Mohr	
Mr. Pennington	
Mr. Quinn Tamm	
Tele. Room	
Mr. Nease	
Miss Holmes	
Miss Gandy	

From conversations with representatives of the Atomic Energy Commission, it would appear that an atom bomb could be smuggled into the United States as freight even though it is of large bulk. A bomb could be planted at some location and detonated by radio after it arrived in the country. The smuggling in of parts for the bomb and their subsequent assembly probably would be impractical at present although, of course, some of the vital parts are very small (you will recall we recently had a case involving the loss of a vital part, a hemisphere, which was no larger than half a marble). Certain vital portions of the assembly could be concealed in luggage. However, it would be difficult to transport pure uranium even in relatively small proportions due to the protective coating which must be put around it to prevent injury to persons due to radiation, and certain parts of the bomb are of large bulk.

It must be taken into consideration, however, that at some future time it will be possible to conceal and handle uranium and other parts of the bomb in such a manner as to make possible their concealment in luggage or about the person of a traveler.

The following are the principal problems to be considered:

- (1) The smuggling in of a complete bomb or parts in freight or mail packages arriving by ship or otherwise, including diplomatic shipments.
- (2) Travelers arriving from abroad smuggling in their luggage or on their persons parts for the bomb.
- (3) Bringing in of a complete bomb in a ship or plane which makes a legal entry into a port or air field in which event the bomb could be detonated at the port or air field with a devastating effect (without unloading the ship or plane).
- (4) Transportation of a bomb or parts for a bomb in unprotected places along the Mexican or Canadian border or in unprotected places along the sea coast.

As will be seen, the problem of control involves in addition to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the State Department (issuance of visas), Immigration and Naturalization, Customs, Border Patrol, and any other Governmental organization having to do with regulation and control of foreign commerce and travel.

INDEXED



The following specific possible suggestions are submitted:

(1) Although general and extensive searches of persons entering the United States and of freight arriving in the United States do not appear to be possible in peace time not only because of peacetime laws but because of the tremendous cost involved in providing sufficient personnel to adequately conduct such searches, a general tightening up in the laxity now existing would be of assistance. You will recall that we have in the past called to the attention of the Attorney General the laxity existing regarding admission and control of aliens in the United States. This would involve not only tightening up by Immigration and Naturalization, but also Customs in regard to searches being made and by the State Department in connection with the issuance of visas.

This problem is complicated, of course, by diplomatic immunity as it is very probable that if parts of a bomb were smuggled in, for instance by the Russians, they would be brought in under diplomatic immunity. The extensive use of diplomatic immunity by persons entering the United States for the purpose of attending the United Nations Meeting has made this angle even more of a hazard than it has been in the past. You will recall that recently diplomatic immunity was extended to representatives of the International Labor Commission, and numerous other similar groups.

It may be practical to install a device at each port of entry to be used on ships unloading freight and diplomatic pouches, luggage, and packages which would register the presence of any radioactive material. The feasibility of this would have to be determined by technicians, but the cost should not be too great in the event it is practical.

(2) The most important control that can be devised is an adequate and effective foreign intelligence organization for the United States. It is evident that we should be posted at all times on the progress of all countries in making a bomb, and also as to departure from the foreign countries of packages, persons, boats, or planes carrying a bomb or its parts in order that proper protective measures may be taken. In view of the difficulties of general searches, or large, unprotected coast lines, and of the detection of bomb parts, we can only be adequately protected if our foreign intelligence is able to detect such material when it leaves for the United States from abroad. This is the same problem which was involved during the last war when the departure of espionage agents occurred time after time without any notice to the Bureau and it made our problem of detecting them as they arrived or after their arrival most difficult.

(3) Any intelligence agency which is concerned with this problem at present is greatly handicapped because of the lack of data regarding the potentialities involved and as to what a bomb or a part of a bomb looks like. If Customs, Border Patrol, or the FBI is expected to find bombs or parts being smuggled in, it is evident that we must be able to recognize such. It will be important, of course, that we know what manner, shape, and form parts for the bomb may present and whether our own experimentation with materials reflect that a foreign country could produce a small bomb or parts and materials that are capable of being smuggled. It would be necessary that agencies concerned be kept posted at all times as to developments in this field.



The Atomic Energy Commission, of course, is the only agency capable of providing the necessary technical data to the intelligence agencies. This definitely has not been done as yet. In fact, there is a great reluctance on the part of Commission representatives to discuss anything about the bomb, its size, shape or parts. If it is considered undesirable to make restricted technical data available to Customs, Border Patrol, etc., then the Commission should station a representative at each of the ports of entry who would be capable of giving technical advice or examining suspected packages on the spot.

(4) Based on available information on atomic energy and the atomic bomb, it would not appear that changes in the statutes are at present a part of the solution of the problem. The Atomic Energy Act makes it illegal to possess uranium, parts for the bomb, etc., and general espionage and sabotage laws, as well as other statutes can be applied to effectively detain persons smuggling in materials having to do with atomic energy. As noted above, a general tightening up in enforcement of existing statutes may be of some help, that is the State Department should tighten up on the issuance of visas to suspect persons and Immigration and Naturalization should tighten up on its control of aliens. It may also be necessary that Customs and Border Patrol exercise greater vigilance in view of the possibility of smuggling in a bomb, but no changes in the present laws appear to be necessary to give any greater powers to these agencies.

This is a rapidly changing field and, of course, it is likely that loopholes will be discovered in the future in existing statutes which must necessarily be remedied quickly. Therefore, continuous attention to this phase is necessary by the Bureau, as well as other agencies involved.

You may desire to submit the above observations to the Attorney General and also to Mr. Johnston of the President's Air Policy Commission.

DML:da

✓



November 20, 1947

Honorable Brien McMahon  
United States Senate  
Washington, D. C.

My dear Senator:

In reviewing the substance of our discussion last evening, I recalled also our telephone conversation of November 3rd in which we discussed certain aspects of the Atomic Energy Program. At that time you advised me that a friend of yours had informed you about a young scientist in Oak Ridge, whom the Russians had endeavored to induce to go to Russia. If you have obtained any additional information concerning this situation, I would appreciate your furnishing it to me in order that if it requires any attention on the part of the Bureau I may take proper action upon it.


With expressions of my highest esteem and best regards,

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

EAT:DMG

Mr. Tolson  
Mr. E. A. Tamm  
Mr. Clegg  
Mr. Coffey  
Mr. Glavin  
Mr. Ladd  
Mr. Nichols  
Mr. Rosen  
Mr. Tracy  
Mr. Carson  
Mr. Egan  
Mr. Hendon  
Mr. Pennington  
Mr. Quinn Tamm  
Mr. Nease  
Miss Gandy



RECORDED

418

NOV 20 6 42 PM '47

U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE

FOR

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 4-7-00 BY SP4 BJA/16M



Mr. Payton Ford  
Acting The Assistant to the Attorney General

December 15, 1947

John Edgar Hoover, Director - Federal Bureau of Investigation

**Suggested Security Measures With Reference to Smuggling  
Atom Bombs or Parts for Atom Bombs Into the United States**


I refer to your memorandum of December 10, 1947, stating that the Attorney General had asked that I advise whether I thought we should have a conference, and if so what agencies should participate, concerning data relating to security measures with reference to smuggling atom bombs or parts for atom bombs into the United States contained in my memorandum of November 1, 1947.

I have no suggestions with reference to such a conference at this time. Full information in the possession of this Bureau is contained in my memorandum of November 1, 1947, and this data has been furnished to all interested agencies. No further data is available bearing on the matter.

VPK:mr1

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 4-7-00 BY SP4 BJA/LSM

Mr. Tolson  
Mr. E. A. Tamm  
Mr. Clegg  
Mr. Glavin  
Mr. Ladd  
Mr. Nichols  
Mr. Rosen  
Mr. Tracy  
Mr. Egan  
Mr. Gurnea  
Mr. Harbo  
Mr. Mohr  
Mr. Pennington  
Mr. Quinn Tamm  
Tele. Room  
Mr. Nease  
Miss Gandy



DEC 16 3 27 PM '47  
RECEIVED READING ROOM

R244 R244



COPY MS

UNITED STATE SENATE  
Washington D. C.

PERSONAL

December 9th, 1947

Honorable J. Edgar Hoover  
Federal Bureau of Investigation  
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Hoover:

This is in reply to your letter of recent date regarding  
the Oak Ridge Scientist who, I understand, was approached by  
Russians for service in Russia.

His name is [redacted] and I am [redacted] that he  
can be reached through [redacted]

Sincerely yours,

/s/ Brien McMahon  
United States Senator

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 11-10-80 BY SPUB/ALM



## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Director

DATE: January 21, 1948

FROM : D. M. Ladd

DECLASSIFIED BY AUC 60309

ON 11-18-2005

SUBJECT: Appointment with [redacted]  
10:00 A.M., January 22, 1948

Mr. Tolson	
Mr. E. A. Tamm	
Mr. Clegg	
Mr. Glavin	
Mr. Ladd	
Mr. Nichols	
Mr. Rosen	
Mr. Tracy	
Mr. Carson	
Mr. Egan	
Mr. Gurnea	
Mr. Harbo	
Mr. Hendon	
Mr. Pennington	
Mr. Quinn Tamm	
Tele. Room	
Mr. Nease	
Miss Holmes	
Miss Gandy	

For your assistance in connection with your appointment with [redacted] at 10:00 A.M., January 22, 1948, the following is submitted:

[redacted] declined to discuss the nature [redacted] business with you on the telephone, he referred to your letter to Mr. Forrestal of November 1, 1947, and Mr. Forrestal's reply of December 17, 1947, indicating what he intended to do in a certain field.

The only record of a letter to Mr. Forrestal dated November 1, 1947, is one transmitting a copy of a memorandum entitled "Suggested Security Measures With Reference To Smuggling Atom Bombs Or Parts For Atom Bombs Into the United States." You will recall that this memorandum was also sent to the Attorney General, David E. Lilienthal, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, and S. Paul Johnston, Executive Director of the President's Air Policy Commission. Mr. Johnston originally requested your views in this matter. There was received a reply to this letter from Mr. Forrestal dated December 17, 1947, and this is undoubtedly the matter that [redacted] desires to talk to you about.

There is attached a copy of the above-referenced memorandum sent to Mr. Forrestal and the original of a more detailed memorandum which was originally prepared for you.

Mr. Forrestal's letter of December 17, 1947, which is also attached, stated that as a direct result of your letter, the whole problem of preparation against the possibility of a "sneak" attack should be considered. The matter was considered at the War Council meeting and a committee was appointed headed by Dr. Bush to go into the question. Mr. Forrestal, however, pointed out that such an attack might also come through the use of biological agents and stated that the possibilities of smuggling atom bombs are not sufficiently immediate to necessitate specific safeguards at this time.

While it is believed [redacted] desires to discuss the above matters with you, in view of the mention of foreign nationals being sent to various American plants by General Fleming's outfit, there are attached a copy of the memorandum to the Attorney General dated November 21, 1947, and a copy of a memorandum from Mr. R. W. Wall to me dated January 9, 1948.

The memorandum to the Attorney General points out that there is a constant flow of commercial, economic and industrial information of intelligence value from the United States and specifically mentions on page 2 a special mission of 10 Soviet engineers, who toured major cities of the United States for a six-months' period.

ETT:VPK:esb

34 JAN 31 1948



  
The Director

in the latter part of 1946. These engineers were described as experts in various phases of municipal planning and were provided with letters of introduction to municipal officials by the Federal Works Agency. During the tours, they took copious notes and obtained many blueprints, diagrams and photographs of sewage systems, water systems, power plants, transportation terminals, et cetera, in many of the major U. S. cities.

The memorandum from Mr. Wall to me points out that Colonel L. R. Forney advised Mr. Reynolds of our Liaison Section that the Attorney General had raised the question of the leak of classified information from industrial plants to foreign countries with the Secretary for Defense. Mr. Forrestal then had a conference which was attended by representatives of Military Intelligence, the Navy and Air Forces. Colonel Forney indicated that the State, Army, Navy and Air Force Coordinating Committee is in the process of drafting a paper for the National Security Council on "Industrial Security" and is preparing legislation dealing with the protection of patent secrets.

Attachments





ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 4-7-00 BY SP4 BJA/LBM

OFFICE OF DIRECTOR  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Record of Telephone Call or Visitor

[redacted]

called - phoned Mr. Forrestal's Office

Phone No [redacted]

Hour 5:12 PM Date January 21, 1948

Mr. Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. E. A. Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Egan \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Gurnea \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Jones \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Pennington \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
Miss Holmes \_\_\_\_\_  
Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

b7C

REMARKS

When advised of the Director's absence from the office [redacted] requested to speak to the writer. [redacted] stated that Mr. Forrestal and the Director have had an exchange of correspondence on a matter which he would not disclose, however he went on to state that the Director wrote to Mr. Forrestal regarding this matter on November 1, 1947, and Mr. Forrestal replied on December 17, 1947, indicating to the Director what he intended to do in a certain field.

b7C

[redacted] has been assigned to this by the military and is working for the committee which is referred to in the letter to the Director. [redacted] should have a talk with Mr. Hoover, and inasmuch as [redacted] will be in the city for a few hours tomorrow morning he would like to make an appointment for [redacted] see the Director if at all possible.

b7C

[redacted] requested to be called. make 10 a.m. rgk

76



## For Informational Purposes Only

The originals removed from this file and replaced with duplicate copies of the original were accessioned to the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) pursuant to the JFK Records Collection Act of 1992. Provision of the JFK Act allowed for certain information to be postponed from public release until the year 2017; therefore, the pages have NOT necessarily been released for public review in their entirety.

Under the JFK Act, originals to all material deemed assassination records must be accessioned to NARA regardless of whether the material is open in full or released with information postponed. Therefore, any documents or pages from FBI files accessioned to NARA pursuant to the JFK Act are no longer considered the possession of the FBI. The duplicate pages have been inserted strictly for research purposes.

The copies contained herein do not necessarily show the most up-to-date classification.

To attain a copy of the publicly released version of any materials maintained in the JFK Collection at the NARA facility in College Park, MD, you may contact the JFK Access Staff, at 301/713-6620.

The following materials were removed from this file and are maintained in the JFK Collection at NARA:

File & Serial Number

JFK Subject Identifier  
(for NARA purposes)

117-2168-13

Edward Sargent Morgan

## For Informational Purposes Only



January 22, 1948

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TOLSON  
MR. TAMM  
MR. LADD

This morning at the instance of Mr. ~~Chaly~~, Special Assistant to Mr. ~~Forrestal~~ I saw Mr. Elihu Root, Jr. who has been designated by Mr. Forrestal to look into a major problem including the one raised in my letter to Mr. Forrestal of November 1, 1947, concerning certain security measures that might be considered for the protection of the United States. U

Mr. Root stated that he was exploring the situation and as he saw the problem there was first a need to determine exactly what methods and weapons might be used by a potential enemy, second, the means and measures to prevent such use, and third, the working out of an operational handling of these means and measures. U

He stated that as he visualized it there might be a need for a board or a committee, or preferably one person to be designated to look into this problem. He stated that he preferred the third alternative, as he felt that one person, if he were the proper type of man, would be better than a board or a committee. He stated that such a person, of course, could have an advisory committee but that the responsibility would be upon the person selected to see that the problem was met and handled. U

He stated that at this stage of his consideration of the problem he felt that probably the person or committee should be a part of the Department of Defense rather than to be detached from it or attached as a part of the White House Staff. He also stated that the man selected for it should be one who was objective in his thinking, judicial in approach, diplomatic, and able to get along with people, and at the same time sufficiently tough to see that a project was carried through. U

I told him that I was in general accord with his observations. Mr. Root stated that he had not reached any conclusion as to the individual to be designated for this task though he had thought that a man of the type of Admiral ~~Blandy~~ might be good, or possibly General ~~Groves~~. I told Mr. Root that I did not know Admiral ~~Blandy~~ but that I only knew General Groves by reputation but that I felt General Groves if selected would be operating under a hazard of some very strong prejudices already created against him, whether well founded or not. Mr. Root agreed with me in my observation. U

Mr. Tolson  
Mr. E. A. Tamm  
Mr. Clegg  
Mr. Glavin  
Mr. Ladd  
Mr. Nichols  
Mr. Rosen  
Mr. Tracy  
Mr. Egan  
Mr. Gurnea  
Mr. Harbo  
Mr. Mohr  
Mr. Pennington  
Mr. Quinn Tamm  
Tele. Room  
Mr. Nease  
Miss Gandy

RECEIVED  
JAN 23 1948  
70

RECORDED  
&  
INDEXED

117-268-13  
F B I  
34 JAN 31 1948

HSCA

1/24/95 Edward P. Morgan  
EJQ

RECORDED COPY FILED IN 62-89223-13



Mr. Root asked if I could suggest any names of persons he could consider. I gave him the name of Mr. Jerry Doyle of New York, Mr. Paul Smith of San Francisco and Mr. E. P. Morgan of Washington, D. C. I told him that Mr. Doyle and Mr. Morgan had both been in the Bureau and I knew that they had many of the qualifications that would be necessary in the man to do the job that he had in mind. I told him that both Mr. Doyle and Mr. Smith had served in the Navy Department and were consequently familiar with the problems of national defense. I also mentioned Admiral Sorensen as being an ideal type of man to do this job, but I stated I assumed by reason of his present designation as Executive Secretary of the National Security Council that he would be unavailable. Mr. Root stated that he would like to feel at liberty to contact me from time to time as he explored this problem and I replied I would be glad to talk with him and he could count on the full cooperation of the FBI.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover  
Director

JRH:ER

Mr. Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. E. A. Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Egan \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Gurnea \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Pennington \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Quinn Tamm \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Mr. Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
Miss Gandy \_\_\_\_\_



## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Ladd

FROM : V. P. Keay

SUBJECT: STUDY BY SPECIAL WEAPONS PROJECT,  
UNITED STATES ARMY, CONCERNING POSSIBILITY  
OF SMUGGLING ATOMIC WEAPONS INTO THE UNITED STATES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 4-7-60 BY SP4 BJA/LBM

May 8, 1948

Mr. Tolson	✓
Mr. E. A. Tamm	✓
Mr. Clegg	✓
Mr. Coffey	✓
Mr. Glavin	✓
Mr. Ladd	✓
Mr. Nichols	✓
Mr. Rosen	✓
Mr. Tracy	✓
Mr. Carson	✓
Mr. Egan	✓
Mr. Gurnea	✓
Mr. Hendon	✓
Mr. Pennington	✓
Mr. Quinn Tamm	✓
Tele. Room	✓
Mr. Nease	✓
Miss Gandy	✓

[redacted] Special Weapons Project, United States Army, has advised [redacted] that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had delegated the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project to make a study of the possibility of atomic weapons being smuggled into the United States to be used against this country. [redacted] stated that this project was just beginning and he desired to obtain information unofficially at this time as to whether the Bureau desired to have a representative sit in on the study of this problem.

You will recall that on November 1, 1947, the Bureau furnished to the Secretary of Defense, as well as to the Atomic Energy Commission and the President's Air Policy Commission, a memorandum containing suggested security measures with reference to smuggling atom bombs or parts for atom bombs into the United States. The memorandum in question rather thoroughly disposed of this problem from the Bureau's viewpoint.

**RECOMMENDATION:** In view of the fact that [redacted] inquiry was of an unofficial preliminary type, it is recommended that he be referred by the Liaison Section to the memorandum furnished the Secretary of Defense on November 1, 1947, pertaining to the subject in question and advised that the Bureau does not desire at this time to designate an Agent to participate in their study of the situation. It is further suggested that arrangements be made whereby the Bureau will be kept advised of any recommendations to be made by the Special Weapons Project in connection with the instant question. [redacted] telephone extension at the Pentagon is 71245.

INDEXED - 84

b7C

ESS:md



## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : R. ALBY

DATE: December 22, 1948

FROM : S. W. REYNOLDS

SUBJECT:

Mr. Tolson  
Mr. E. A. Tamm  
Mr. Clegg  
Mr. Glavin  
Mr. Ladd  
Mr. Nichols  
Mr. Rosen  
Mr. Tracy  
Mr. Egan  
Mr. Gurnea  
Mr. Harbo  
Mr. Mohr  
Mr. Pennington  
Mr. Quinn Tamm  
Tele. Room  
Mr. Nease  
Miss Gandy

[redacted] the IDA recently advised the writer that an individual identified as [redacted] of the Office of the Secretary of Defense desired to speak with the writer. [redacted] called [redacted] to his office at which time [redacted] that he had been given the assignment of preparing a study on the vulnerability of the United States to unconventional attacks. [redacted] that time indicated that his study had resulted more or less directly from the letter which the Bureau addressed to Secretary Forrestal regarding the possibility of smuggling parts of an atomic bomb into the United States which could be assembled in the United States and used for sabotage purposes. [redacted] indicated that he wondered if the FBI would be able to furnish him with certain information which he desired. He indicated that the type of information that he desired was, for example, what action could the Communist groups be expected to take in the event of war with Russia. b7C

At that time the writer advised [redacted] in the presence of [redacted] that the Bureau did not have ready for dissemination to him the information that he desired. [redacted] was advised that the Bureau would have the information on the various items which had been obtained in the course of various investigations. [redacted] was advised, however, that the FBI pursued the policy of making this information available to the Intelligence Division of the Army. b7C

At this point, [redacted] stated that the writer's remarks were correct and that the Domestic Branch, which was under his supervision, had received information of the general type desired [redacted] directly from the FBI and that if [redacted] desired this information there was no occasion to contact the Bureau unless the information in the hands of the Intelligence Division was inadequate. b7C

[redacted]  
that there was no occasion for the Bureau to give this matter any further consideration unless a specific request is raised in the future.

This matter is merely being brought to your attention for record purposes.

S.R:mk

RECORDED - 42

INDEXED - 42

DEC 23 1948

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 4-7-00 BY SP4 BTJ/LBM



COPY:AJH

OFFICE MEMORANDUM - UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: December 22, 1948

FROM : D. M. LADD

SUBJECT: STATEMENTS OF GENERAL WILLIAM J. DONOVAN  
CRITICAL OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

There is attached a corrected copy of the memorandum to the Attorney General concerning statements of General Donovan which were critical of the FBI. The information which you wanted in this memorandum has now been incorporated and if this copy as written is approved, the original will be sent to the Attorney General.

I have no explanation as to why I did not incorporate this suggestion in the original draft of the memorandum. It was due entirely to an oversight which I regret. It will not occur again.

Attachment

DEL:FA

RECORDED - 28

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

DATE 12-17-78 BY alme

#248085

117-26810  
FBI  
52 JAN 14 1949

ORIGINAL COPY FILED

8-14

94-4-4-7-1

*Handwritten notes in left margin:*  
Copy to Mr. Ladd  
by Mr. Ladd  
12-22-48  
DML  
117-26810  
FBI  
52 JAN 14 1949

1 FEB 2 1949



Copy      pk

FROM      Director    FBI

TO        D. L. Ladd

D.L. - I suggested to you that we incorporate in memo to A.G. the statement ~~that~~ Gen. D's well known hostility to the F.B.I. was certainly in part due to our exposure of the Communist infiltration of O.S.S. Gen. Donovan's brain child, as exposed in the Marsani case. Why was it left out?.

S/ H.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 11/4/02 BY SP4BJR/RAE

117-262-17

ENCLOSURE



copy pk

cc \* Mr. Ladd  
Mr. Fletcher

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

December 23, 1948


DIRECTOR, FBI

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

STATEMENTS OF GENERAL WILLIAM J. DONOVAN  
CRITICAL OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Reference is made to our conversation of December 14, 1948, in which you mentioned stories which were circulating critical of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and of its intelligence coverage. I think that these stories had their geneses in statements recently made by General William J. Donovan.

You will recall that on November 1, 1947, I transmitted to you a memorandum concerning "Suggested Security Measures with Reference to Smuggling Atom Bombs Or Parts For Atom Bombs into the United States." Copies of this memorandum were furnished to the interested agencies, including Secretary of Defense Forrestal. I am confidentially advised that



O.K. Referral/Direct to OGA  
S/ H.

DECLASSIFIED BY SP4 BSM/LSM  
CN 4-7-00

117-2-8-17

Per letter dated 12/5/02 SP4 BSM/LSM 12/5/02

ENCLOSURE



COPY:AJH

OFFICE MEMORANDUM - UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Ladd  
FROM : H. B. Fletcher

DATE: December 31, 1948

SUBJECT: NATIONAL SECURITY RESOURCES BOARD  
(Basic U. S. Security Resources  
Assumptions - 1948 through 1952)

Reference is made to the memorandum from you to the Director dated December 22, 1948, concerning which the Director approved the action suggested with respect to Mr. Daniel Cox Fahey, Jr., Director of the Planning Division of the National Security Resources Board. On December 30, pursuant to your instructions, Supervisor Whitson called upon Mr. Fahey in the Old State Building, Room 397 (phone Government 1221, Extension 3477 or 3478) and informed him of the Bureau's observations as contained in the reference memorandum.

Mr. Fahey stated that he desired to sit down with representatives of the Bureau and the Armed Services to whom copies of the Basic Security Resources Assumptions Program had been furnished to discuss with them exactly what factual material was needed, and wished that this could be done some time during the first part of the coming week.

Pursuant to your instructions Mr. Fahey was subsequently advised by phone that either Tuesday or Thursday, January 4 or 6, 1949, would be satisfactory to this Bureau.

At 10:30 A.M., December 31, 1948, Mr. Fahey advised Supervisor Whitson that he was arranging a meeting in his office at the Old State Department Building, Room 397, at 10:00 A.M. on Tuesday, January 4.

ACTION:

Mr. Fahey was advised in line with your previous instructions that the Bureau would be represented.

LW:EW

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 4-7-00 BY SP4 BTJ/lam

RECORDED - 60

117-261  
F B I  
70 FEB 14 1949

EX-109

68 FEB 21 1949

INITIALS ON ORIGINAL

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN



## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. D. M. Ladd

FROM : Mr. A. H. Belmont

SUBJECT: EXAMINATION OF BAGGAGE OF  
INCOMING DIPLOMATIC  
PERSONNEL

DATE: April 10, 1951

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

PURPOSE

To advise that the ICIS Subcommittee's recommendation that incoming diplomatic baggage over 500 pounds in weight be searched for component parts of atomic weapons was discussed on April 9, 1951, with

Referral/Direct to OGA

DETAILS

bl Referral/Direct to OGA

A check with the Bureau laboratory revealed that this assumption was inaccurate.

Referral/Direct to OGA

Accordingly, the matter was discussed by Mr. A. H. Belmont and Supervisor Whitson of the Espionage Section with

It was pointed out to him that the entire program was predicated upon the 500 maximum assumption and it was recommended to him that a check be made with the Atomic Energy Commission before the ICIS Subcommittee draft was accepted.

LW:aju

SECRET

9/16/03

CLASSIFIED BY NLS/BK/ANP (derivative)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 20X, (1)

RECEIVED 70  
INDEXED - 76



117-268

05 MAY 7 1951

5-111




  
Referral/Direct to OGA

In the presence of the Bureau representatives,  checked and determined that the Department of State was to furnish a copy of the draft to the Atomic Energy Commission for its observations, but  advised that he would have a discreet check made personally with the appropriate officials of the Atomic Energy Commission before the draft was acted upon.

ACTION

This matter will be followed and you will be advised of further pertinent developments.





~~SECRET~~

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT *AE*

DATE: April 26, 1951

FROM : MR. C. E. HENNING *CH*

DATE: 04-12-2006

SUBJECT: EXAMINATION OF BAGGAGE OF  
INCOMING DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL  
(117-268)CLASSIFIED BY AUC 60309 TAM/DCG/JW/DERIVATIVE  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1) 04-12-2031Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_  
b7C \_\_\_\_\_PURPOSEALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED

To advise that [redacted] of the  
Department who is Secretary of the ICIS telephoned at  
3:40 P.M., April 26, 1951, to state that the Department  
of State representative on the ICIS Subcommittee had  
advised him that in response to a State Department  
inquiry of the AEC concerning the proposal that incoming



(S)

ACTIONb1  
Referral/Direct to OGA

[redacted] was requested to furnish the Bureau with  
a copy of the AEC concurrence if and when it was received by  
him. [redacted] stated that he would like to obtain the  
Bureau's comments in writing concerning the proposal and  
he was advised that upon receipt of the AEC concurrence  
we would study it and furnish something to the Department  
for the ICIS.

b7C

INDEXED - 41  
RECORDED - 41~~SECRET~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 4-7-00 BY SPY 621/um

LW:ewf

66 MAY 9 1951



## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. HARBO

DATE: May 18, 1951

FROM : D. J. PARSONS

SUBJECT: EXAMINATION OF BAGGAGE OF  
INCOMING DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_

Ladd \_\_\_\_\_

Clegg \_\_\_\_\_

Glavin \_\_\_\_\_

b1

Referral/Direct to OGA \_\_\_\_\_

Tracy \_\_\_\_\_

Harbo \_\_\_\_\_

Mohr \_\_\_\_\_

Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_

Nease \_\_\_\_\_

Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

Reference is made to the memorandum from Mr. Hennrich to Mr. Belmont dated April 26, 1951, concerning this matter. Mr. Hennrich advised that the Department of State had made inquiry of AEC concerning the proposal to [REDACTED]

(S)

I am unable to understand what the statement of AEC means. It is hardly conceivable to me that their "acceptance" means that

(S)

b1

Referral/Direct to OGA \_\_\_\_\_

Inasmuch as the statement by AEC is not clear and conclusive and we do not know the manner in which the question was put to them, I would suggest that in order to avoid any effort to dodge the issue, a statement be obtained from AEC giving the minimum weight of packages to be searched in order to provide the security intended by the original proposal.

4-7-00

DJP/mek

NLS/BTA/LBM 60267 Derivative

E 948742/950985/997000?

ADDENDUM: (5/22/51) A check was made with [REDACTED] the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security, 5/21/51. It was determined that the Atomic Energy Commission has not yet furnished to the ICIS a written statement of acceptance of the ICIS proposal. [REDACTED] following this matter with AEC and when a written statement is received from AEC, the Bureau will be furnished a copy. (LW:ewf)

b7C

RECORDED - 81

INDEXED - 81

117-268

EX-10



Mr. Peyton Ford  
Deputy Attorney General  
Director, FBI

June 11, 1951

~~TOP SECRET~~

EXAMINATION OF BAGGAGE OF  
INCOMING DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL

[Redacted]

(S)

Referral/Direct to OGA

[Redacted]

(C)

On the basis of these observations, the ICIS  
Subcommittee recommendation for the search of diplomatic  
baggage [Redacted]

Referral/Direct to OGA

There should be considered also the possibility  
that baggage and shipments into the United States of other  
than diplomatic personnel could be utilized for such smuggling.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
Alden \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Laughlin \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

117-268-141  
RECORDED - 141  
JUN 12 5 22 PM '51  
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE

LW:ewf

DIRECTOR

MAILED 5  
JUN 12 1951  
COMM - FBI

60 JUN 24 1951

JUN 12 4 58 PM '51  
RECEIVED READING ROOM  
F B I  
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE

SECRET



~~SECRET~~

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

FROM : MR. C. E. HENNRICH

SUBJECT: EXAMINATION OF BAGGAGE OF  
INCOMING DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL  
Bureau file 117-268

DATE: June 6, 1951

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT  
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

PURPOSE

To set forth recent developments in this matter.

DATE: 04-12-2006

DETAILS

CLASSIFIED BY AUC 60309 TAM/DCG/JW/DERIVATIVE  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1) 04-12-2031

Reference is made to the memorandum from  
Mr. Hennrich to Mr. Belmont dated 4/26/51 and to the memo-  
randum from Mr. Parson to Mr. Harbo dated 5/18/51 on this  
matter which deals with an ICIS proposal that [REDACTED]

b1  
Referral/Direct to OGA

You will recall that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the ICIS has been requested to  
furnish the Bureau with a copy of the AEC concurrence with  
the ICIS suggestion if and when it was received by him.

b7C

A check was made [REDACTED] on 6/5/51. He  
advised that he had not yet received a copy of the Atomic  
Energy Commission's concurrence but that he would check  
further and would furnish the Bureau with a copy when such  
was received.

Later on 6/5/51 [REDACTED]  
Mr. Peyton Ford's Office advised that the Atomic Energy  
Commission had prepared a reply to the ICIS suggestion and  
had transmitted it to the Department of State member of the  
ICIS. [REDACTED] the Bureau would receive a copy  
[REDACTED]

b7C

[REDACTED] had informed him  
that the Department of State had not pressed AEC for a  
clearance and that the matter had been "hanging fire" in  
AEC for approximately two months.

LW:ewf

RECORDED - 5

INDEXED - 5

~~SECRET~~

JUN 25 1951



~~SECRET~~

[ ] commented that with all the publicity regarding new atomic weapons and particularly, atomic artillery shells, he found it hard to believe that 500 pounds would be the smallest weight of a component part of an atomic weapon.

b7C

ACTION

None. This is for your information.

~~SECRET~~



## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. D. M. LADD

FROM : MR. A. H. BELMONT

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING ATOM BOMBS OR  
PARTS THEREOF INTO THE  
UNITED STATES  
Bureau file 117-268

DATE: June 9, 1951

~~SECRET~~

Tolson ☒

Ladd ☒

Clegg ☒

Glavin ☒

Nichols ☒

Rosen ☒

Tracy ☒

Harbo ☒

Belmont ☒

Mohr ☒

Tele. Room ☒

Nease ☒

Gandy ☒

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN  
OTHERWISE

PURPOSE

To submit a reply to Peyton Ford of the Department

[Redacted Box]

(S)

BACKGROUND

b1  
Referral/Direct to OGA

You will recall that the problem of security measures which might be taken against individuals smuggling or endeavoring to smuggle an atom bomb or parts thereof into the United States was raised by the Bureau on November 1, 1947 with the Attorney General, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Executive Director of the President's Air Policy Commission. (117-268-5)

The problem was presented by the Bureau to the Honorable Brien McMahon, United States Senator, under date of November 4, 1947. (117-268-4)

On December 17, 1947, the Honorable James Forrestal, Secretary of Defense, advised the Director that as a result of the Bureau's memorandum of November 1, 1947, he had appointed a Committee headed by Dr. Vannevar Bush to go into the whole question. (117-268-10)

[Redacted Box]

(S)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN  
OTHERWISE

~~SECRET~~

4-7-00

RECORDED - 7b1

Referral/Direct to OGA

CLASSIFIED BY 105107/104 60267 EX. 32  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (1) Derivative

LW:ewf

JUN 31 1951

Adm



~~SECRET~~

b1  
Referral/Direct to OGA

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] (S) (117-268-23)

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] (S) (117-268-23) b1

The Subcommittee report was discussed orally on April 9, 1951, with Mr. Raymond Whearty, Chairman of the ICIS. It was pointed out to him that the entire program was predicated upon the assumption that the lightest possible

[REDACTED] (S)  
that a check be made with AEC before the ICIS Subcommittee draft was accepted. (117-268-24)

b1 Referral/Direct

On April 26, 1951, [REDACTED] of the ICIS, telephoned the Bureau and advised that the Department of State representative on the ICIS Subcommittee had advised him that the AEC had stated that the Subcommittee's proposal was acceptable to them. [REDACTED] requested the Bureau's comments in writing. He was requested to furnish the Bureau with a copy of the AEC concurrence and upon receipt of that, the Bureau would study it and furnish something to the Department for the ICIS. (117-268-25) b7C

||| In this regard, the Bureau Laboratory has advised that component parts of atomic weapons could be brought into this country in packages weighing less than 100 pounds. (117-268-26)

#### DETAILS

Under date of June 7, 1951, Mr. Leonard P. Bienvenu, Secretary of the ICIS, transmitted to the Bureau a copy of a memorandum dated June 1, 1951, setting forth the observations of the Atomic Energy Commission on the proposal of the ICIS Subcommittee.

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] (C)

b1  
Referral/Direct to OGA

- 2 -

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ bl  
Referral/Direct to OGA

[REDACTED] (C)

[REDACTED] (C)

bl  
Referral/Direct to OGA

OBSERVATIONS

[REDACTED] (S)

(2) The search of diplomatic baggage would be only one aspect of the problem since all baggage of all travelers, as well as other shipments into the United States in excess of the actual minimum weight of component atomic parts, would have to be made in order to prevent such smuggling.

ACTION

There is attached for approval a response to Mr. Peyton Ford's request predicated upon the observations above.

✓

Attachment

~~SECRET~~



RECORDED-44


Mr. Peyton Ford  
Deputy Attorney General  
Director, FBI

August 10, 1951

~~TOP SECRET~~

EXAMINATION OF BAGGAGE OF  
INCOMING DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL

b1  
Referral/Direct to OGA



(S)

The problem under consideration by the ICIS is one of considerable concern to this Bureau. In order to plan intelligently on those phases of this matter over which we would have any direct responsibility, it will be necessary to have the benefits of such recommendations as may be made by the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security as soon as possible.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN  
OTHERWISE

4-7-00  
CLASSIFIED BY WAS/BOX/LBM 60267 (Derivative)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X  
II 948742/950935/997059

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
Aluen \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Laughlin \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

117-268

LW: ewf

Aug 10 7 26 PM '51

U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE

FBI

Aug 11 12 12 AM '51

RECEIVED DIRECTOR

SECRET



~~SECRET~~

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

DATE: July 13, 1951

FROM : MR. C. E. HENNRICH

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING ATOM BOMBS OR  
PARTS THEREOF INTO THE  
UNITED STATES  
Bureau file 117-268

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

PURPOSE

To inform you that G. Frederick Reinhardt, Office of Eastern European Affairs, Department of State, who is the Chairman of the ICIS Subcommittee on Foreign Diplomatic and Official Personnel has sent back to the Atomic Energy Commission the Commission's opinion regarding the size of components of atomic bombs for further review on the grounds that the AEC opinion has not been cleared by all of the "necessary" sections of AEC.

To inform you that Colonel W. W. Naramore of the Department of Justice feels that this is another dilatory tactic on the part of Reinhardt to prevent consideration of the problem by ICIA.

To recommend that Liaison Section check on this matter with AEC.

DATE: 04-12-2006

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED

BACKGROUND

CLASSIFIED BY AUC 60309 TAMP/REG/US/DERIVATIVE  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 3.3(1) 04-12-2006 OTHERWISE

The problem of security measures which might be taken against individuals smuggling or endeavoring to smuggle an atom bomb or parts thereof into the United States was originally raised by the Bureau on 11/1/47 with the Attorney General, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of AEC, and the Executive Director of the President's Air Policy Commission.

(117-268-5) RECORDED

INDEXED 26

The problem was presented by the Bureau to the Honorable Brien McMahon, United States Senator, under date of November 4, 1947. (117-268-4)

b1

b7C

LW:ewf

~~SECRET~~

W. H. ...  
Stanley



~~SECRET~~

b1  
Referral/Direct to OGA

(S)

(117-268-23)

Bureau Laboratory has advised that component parts of atomic weapons could be brought into this country weighing less than 100 pounds. (117-268-26)

The Department of Justice requested the Bureau's comments on the ICIS Subcommittee report. The Bureau declined to comment until it had been furnished with a copy of the AEC concurrence in the conclusions of the Subcommittee. (117-268-25)

Under date of June 7, 1951, Mr. Leonard P. Bienvenu, Secretary of the ICIS, transmitted a copy of a memorandum dated June 1, 1951, setting forth the observations of the AEC on the proposal of the ICIS Subcommittee. The AEC memorandum did not state what the weight of the smallest component of an atomic weapon would be or what the weight of an atomic bomb would be. It did state, however, that component parts would individually weigh less than 500 pounds. Accordingly, under date of June 11, 1951, it was pointed out to Mr. Peyton Ford that the Subcommittee's

(S)

(117-268-27)

b1 Referral/Direct

On June 26, 1951, Raymond P. Whearty, Chairman of the ICIS, pointed out to Deputy Attorney General Peyton Ford of the Department that the Subcommittee of the ICIS on Foreign Diplomatic and Official Personnel under the Chairmanship of Reinhardt was a "do nothing" subcommittee which had held no meetings at all between December 1, 1950, and June 1, 1951. Whearty pointed out that in order to get the matter out of the hands of the Subcommittee, it was recommended that the Department of Justice concur with the

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

Subcommittee report in order to get it before the ICIS Standing Committee and out of the hands of Reinhardt. It was pointed out that unless this was done there would probably be "months of further inaction."

Peyton Ford advised the Bureau under date of July 5, 1951, that the Department of Justice Representative on the Subcommittee had been instructed to concur with the Subcommittee report in order to get it before the ICIS (and out of the control of Reinhardt).

#### DETAILS

At 9:55 A.M., July 13, 1951, Colonel W. W. Naramore in Mr. Peyton Ford's Office telephoned and advised that G. Frederick Reinhardt had informed Mr. Leonard Bienvenu, Secretary of the ICIS, that the Atomic Energy Commission's comments of June 1, 1951, have not been cleared by all necessary sections of AEC and, therefore, he was returning AEC's memorandum for additional consideration and clearance within AEC. Mr. Bienvenu had advised Colonel Naramore that this appeared to be a maneuver on the part of Reinhardt to initiate another period of inaction.

Colonel Naramore stated that it was his understanding that the AEC memorandum of 6/1/51 had been prepared by the Director of Intelligence and the Director of the Division of Military Application of AEC and had been reviewed and approved by Gordon Dean, the Chairman of AEC. Naramore expressed the opinion that Reinhardt was trying to get the problem "buried" in AEC through some unknown and unidentified contact there.

b7C

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

b7C

OBSERVATIONS

Reinhardt because of his position in the Department of State and on the ICIS would be able to deliberately hinder the formation of policy or the administration of policy.

What appears to be a deliberate hindering of the formation of policy has occurred in connection with the smuggling of atom bombs program. It will also be recalled that it was Reinhardt who made certain suggestions and minor changes in phraseology which delayed acceptance by the Department of State of an Agreement with the Bureau regarding the procedure for handling diplomatic and official representatives of enemy nations in the event of the outbreak of hostilities.  
(66-17446-314)

Furthermore, as Mr. Whearty of the Department pointed out in his memorandum to Peyton Ford dated 6/26/51, it was Reinhardt's Subcommittee that brought about the impasse on the question of FBI entry into enemy establishments in an emergency from the date of the Subcommittee's formation in 1949 until it was finally taken away from the Subcommittee formally over a year later.

ACTION

Because of the above circumstances, it is respectfully recommended that the Liaison Section check with its contacts in the AEC to see what action is being taken there on the resubmission of the memorandum of 6/1/51.

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

For identification purposes this memorandum was on the letterhead of the AEC and directed to Mr. R. Gordon Arneson in the Department of State on the subject, "Smuggling of Unconventional Weapons," and made reference to Mr. Chase's memorandum of April 19, 1951. The AEC memorandum was signed by John A. Hall for the AEC.

~~SECRET~~



## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT/ *LB*

FROM : V. P. KEAY *VPK*

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING ATOM BOMBS  
OR PARTS THEREOF INTO  
THE UNITED STATES  
(Bureau file 117-268)

DATE: July 19, 1951

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

4/7/00 SP4BTA/RBM

PURPOSE:

To advise results of inquiry at the Atomic Energy Commission regarding AEC's evaluation of "Smuggling of Unconventional Weapons."

REFERENCE:

Reference memorandum from Mr. Hennrich to you dated July 13, 1951, pointing out that there was evidence that [redacted] of the State Department and a member of the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security might be deliberately hindering the formation of policy in connection with the ICIS study regarding smuggling of unconventional weapons.

Referenced memorandum recommended that Liaison check with its contacts in the AEC to see what action was being taken on the resubmission of a memorandum from AEC to State dated June 1, 1951, on this problem.

DETAILS:

Agent [redacted] the Liaison Section contacted [redacted]

[redacted] This matter was explained [redacted] and he was informed that the Bureau confidentially desired to know what action was being taken on this matter. [redacted]

[redacted] informed Agent [redacted] on July 17, 1951, that [redacted] and had obtained the following information:

[redacted]

CWB:mfs

b7C  
b7D

b7C  
b7D

b7C  
b7D



b7C  
b7D

ACTION:

*It is recommended that this memorandum be routed to the Espionage Section for the attention of Mr. Whitson.*



## Office Memorandum • UNITED

/ERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

FROM : MR. C. E. HENNRICH

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING ATOM BOMBS OR  
PARTS THEREOF INTO THE  
UNITED STATES  
Bureau file 117-268

DATE: July 19, 1951

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_

Ladd \_\_\_\_\_

Clegg \_\_\_\_\_

Glavin \_\_\_\_\_

Nichols \_\_\_\_\_

Rosen \_\_\_\_\_

Tracy \_\_\_\_\_

Harbo \_\_\_\_\_

Belmont \_\_\_\_\_

Mohr \_\_\_\_\_

Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_

Nease \_\_\_\_\_

Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

PURPOSE

To attach for your information a copy of a memorandum from Mr. Peyton Ford to Mr. Raymond P. Whearty, Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security, instructing that the Justice representative on ICIS ask that the Subcommittee on Diplomatic and Official Personnel which has been considering the question of smuggling A Bombs through diplomatic channels be discharged and the question be resolved by ICIS forthwith.

To inform you that [redacted] the Department who furnished the copy of the above memorandum, as well as a copy of his memorandum to Peyton Ford on which Ford's action was predicated (and which is attached) advised on July 19, 1951, that in the absence of Whearty who is on vacation until August 1, 1951, Ford's instructions were raised in the Working Committee of ICIS [redacted] the Department [redacted] on July 18, 1951, preliminary to moving for the discharge of the Subcommittee in the regular ICIS meeting. [redacted] the Department of State who was sitting on the Working Committee raised no objection to the discharge of the Subcommittee but commented in substance that it would make no difference where the question was handled, the matter would have to be cleared with G. Frederick Reinhardt.

b7C

ACTION

4/7/00 SP4/CA/RNP

This matter is being followed and you will be kept informed of pertinent developments.

ADDENDUM: 7-19-51 [redacted] advised that he had been informed that [redacted] was on leave until August 1, 1951. (LW;ewf)

b7C

Attachments

LW:ewf

EX 86



MR. A. H. BELMONT

July 20, 1951

MR. C. E. HENNRICH

~~SECRET~~

SMUGGLING ATOM BOMBS OR  
PARTS THEREOF INTO THE  
UNITED STATES  
Bureau file 117-268

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN  
OTHERWISE

PURPOSE

To set forth results of a discussion on 7/18/51  
with [redacted] of CIA who is representing the  
Subcommittee on Unconventional Methods of Warfare of the  
Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security.

b3

To recommend that the Bureau take no action on  
request Customs to furnish us data on uninspected Soviet  
and satellite diplomatic baggage and freight arriving in  
the United States until such time as the ICIS makes  
recommendations as to action which should be taken to prevent  
possible smuggling of atom bombs or parts thereof into the  
United States.

DETAILS

Pursuant to the authorizations of [redacted]  
of the Internal Security Section and myself, Supervisor [redacted]  
[redacted] of the Internal Security Section and Supervisor [redacted]  
of the Espionage Section conferred with [redacted]  
of the Central Intelligence Agency on 7/18/51. [redacted]  
was representing the Subcommittee on Unconventional Methods  
of Warfare of the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal  
Security.

b3

b7C

[redacted] advised that [redacted] of the  
Liaison Section had previously furnished his Subcommittee  
with FBI views on the matter of smuggling into this country  
by potential enemies atomic, biological, etc., weapons.  
[redacted] stated that his inquiries were being directed to the  
Bureau at this time on the basis of [redacted] earlier  
remarks.

b3

b7C

[redacted] asked if there had been recently any  
evidence of Soviet inspired sabotage to the U. S. defense  
effort. He was advised that there was no indication of Soviet  
inspired sabotage in recent months.

b3

LV:cmf

~~SECRET~~

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
Alden \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Laughlin \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

4-7-50  
NS/CIA/ANP/60267D derivative

See letter dt 9/16/53



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

[redacted] asked if the Bureau was currently covering all shipments or baggage destined to Soviet and satellite officials in the United States from abroad. It was pointed out to [redacted] that the Customs and the Coast Guard had the primary responsibility as far as shipping was concerned and that our investigative efforts with regard to a given piece of freight or baggage would depend upon the circumstances in the individual case.

b3

He asked what coverage we had of couriers who might be bringing in atomic bombs or parts thereof in diplomatic baggage. He was informed that as CIA was well aware, the Bureau furnished data on courier movements to CIA and that the degree of interest taken in any particular courier or any particular item of diplomatic baggage would, of course, depend upon the circumstances of the case.

[redacted] stated that he was primarily concerned with the smuggling of a completed A Bomb which would be bulky enough to attract some notice. He was asked if he were aware of the dimensions of a crate in which an A Bomb would be packed.

b3

[redacted] then started to quote statistics on the size of an A Bomb which had appeared in "Look" Magazine. It was suggested to [redacted] that his Committee might wish to obtain authentic figures from the AEC before making any recommendations.

(It should be noted that the approach to the AEC on this matter has been made not by the Subcommittee on Unconventional Methods of Warfare but by the Subcommittee on Diplomatic and Official Personnel.) [redacted] stated that his greatest concern was the possibility of the Soviets sending over a completed A Bomb on a merchant vessel or submarine which would unload it onto a smaller craft which would then deposit it on a deserted beach somewhere along our coast line where it could be loaded into a truck and brought into Washington or some other key city. He stated that he had discussed this possibility with the Coast Guard and Customs and both assured him that smuggling was extremely easy. He then suggested that the Bureau was the first line of defense and that in order to prevent such successful smuggling we should have all waterfront Communists under full-time surveillance, as well as all Communists having contacts with

b3



might have access to small crafts. [ ] was told that under the Smuggling Program as depicted by him the FBI would not be the first line of defense. It would be the responsibility of CIA to advise the FBI and the domestic intelligence agencies of the shipment of such a bomb [ ]

b1  
b3

[ ] (S)  
[ ] advised that he thought that the ICIS Subcommittee would be able to come up with some recommendations within the next two weeks.

#### OBSERVATIONS

[ ] estimate referred to recommendations to be made by the ICIS Subcommittee on Unconventional Methods of Warfare. As we know, the question of smuggling atomic bombs or parts thereof in diplomatic baggage has been under consideration by the Subcommittee on Diplomatic and Official Personnel. We were recently advised that a State Department representative on the ICIS had stated that regardless of where the problem was handled any recommendations would have to be cleared with [ ] of the Department of State when the Department of Justice representatives hold responsible for delaying action thus far in the ICIS.

b3

b7C

While it is true that the Customs and Coast Guard have primary responsibility for waterfront defense and inspection of vessels and cargo, their jurisdiction does not extend over all diplomatic baggage. There is no uniform procedure at the present time for Customs to report to the Bureau or for our Field to take action concerning uninspected shipments from abroad to diplomats here in the United States.

The Bureau has not only a general intelligence responsibility with regard to the official establishments of the Soviet Union and its satellites but we have exclusive jurisdiction over investigation of espionage, sabotage, etc..



involving such diplomats and officials. Furthermore, we have sole jurisdiction over violations of the Atomic Energy Act including the unlicensed possession of fissionable materials.

In the event any criticism was directed at the Bureau because of the successful introduction of a completed A Bomb or the successful assembly of this bomb in parts introduced separately we could point out that we have no regular access to diplomatic baggage and until the ICIS arrived at recommendations which were accepted by the National Security Council there would appear to be nothing that anyone could do about such diplomatic baggage. The fact that the Bureau would be unable to state how much uninspected diplomatic baggage was coming into a given Soviet official would not be particularly pertinent since without investigative means for determining the contents the figures would have no particular significance.

#### ACTION

Accordingly, it is recommended that the Bureau take no action at this time to request Customs to furnish data on uninspected Soviet and satellite diplomatic baggage and freight arriving in the United States until such time as the ICIS makes recommendations as to action which should be taken to prevent possible smuggling of atom bombs or parts thereof into the United States.



Office 1

um • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. C. E. HENNECH

DATE: August 1, 1951

FROM : MR. L. WHITSON

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING ATOM BOMBS OR PARTS  
THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES  
Bureau file 117-268

Tolson	_____
Ladd	_____
Clegg	_____
Glavin	_____
Nichols	_____
Rosen	_____
Tracy	_____
Harbo	_____
Belmont	_____
Mohr	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Nease	_____
Gandy	_____

PURPOSE

To include in this file a pertinent reference to relations with the Coast Guard.

DETAILS

SAC Letter #91, Series 1950, dated 12/6/50 contained as item (H) a reference to the Emergency Bill to control Anchorage and movements of foreign flag vessels in waters of the United States (Public Law #679).

On October 20, 1950, the President of the United States issued Executive Order #10173 putting the provisions of Public Law #679 into effect.

Executive Order #10173 vested the enforcement of Public Law 679 in the Captain of the Port, under the supervision and general direction of the District Commander, United States Coast Guard.

The following provision of Executive Order #10173 is quoted herein: "Report of sabotage and subversive activity. Evidence of sabotage or subversive activity involving or endangering any vessel, harbor, port, or waterfront facility shall be reported immediately to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and to the Captain of the Port, or to their respective representatives."

SAC Letter #91 directed that all offices whose territories include water front areas should immediately establish contact with the Captain of the Port and the District Commander, United States Coast Guard, in order to assure the prompt exchange of reports concerning sabotage or subversive activity involving or endangering any vessel, harbor, port, or water front facility.

ACTION

None. This is for completion of the file.

105  
LWS:ewj

RECORDED



MR. D. H. LADD

August 21, 1951

MR. A. M. BELMONT

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES  
(CAPABILITIES OF THE USSR FOR  
CLANDESTINE ATTACK ON THE UNITED  
STATES WITH WEAPONS OF MASS  
DESTRUCTION AND THE VULNERABILITY  
OF THE US TO SUCH ATTACK, MID-1951  
TO MID-1952)

Bureau file 62-93351

~~SECRET~~

4-7-00

CLASSIFIED BY NIS/EOA/EMI 60267 (Derivative)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (1)

Re letter dtd 11/1/53

PURPOSE

To analyze a draft of National Intelligence Estimate-31 on capabilities of the USSR for clandestine attack on the United States with weapons of mass destruction and the vulnerability of the US to such attack (mid-1951 to mid-1952); to raise questions as to the accuracy of certain statements upon which conclusions are predicated;

[Redacted]

b1  
b3

To recommend that the representatives of the FBI meeting with the Intelligence Advisory Committee at 10:00 A.M., Friday, August 24, 1951, be instructed not to give concurrence to the draft in its present form.

DETAILS

The draft of NIE-31 on capabilities of the USSR for clandestine attack on the United States with weapons of mass destruction and the vulnerability of the US to such attack (mid-1951 to mid-1952) dated August 17, 1951, has been distributed to the interested agencies working in and with the Intelligence Advisory Committee by the Central Intelligence Agency Board of National Estimates. Representatives of the interested agencies are to meet at 10:00 A.M., Friday, August 24, 1951, in room 146 South Building of the CIA.

Statement in Draft

For the purpose of this Estimate the term "clandestine attack" does not include either surprise

cc - 117-268 (Smuggling Atom Bombs or Parts Thereof Into the United States)

LW:enf

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN  
OTHERWISE

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
Alben \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Laughlin \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

AW



~~SECRET~~

attack by undisguised military forces or the employment of conventional sabotage. "Weapons of mass destruction" refers solely to atomic, chemical, and biological weapons, since the state of development of other potential weapons of mass destruction is such that their employment during the next year is most unlikely.

Observation

This statement of the unlikelihood of use of "other potential weapons of mass destruction" is too ambiguous. There is no indication as to what these other potential weapons are. There is no indication of the basis for the statement regarding the state of their development either by the United States or by the Soviet Union and its satellites.

Statement in Draft

In analyzing U. S. defensive capabilities against clandestine attack, the Estimate considers "only those security measures that have been initiated or are anticipated."

Observation

There appears to be no anticipation of any security measures to be proposed by the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security which has been studying this problem for the past 2 years and from which Committee a report is expected. There is no statement to the effect that recommendations by the ICIS will not be received and put into operation before mid-1952.

Statement in Draft

The conclusions of the draft are as follows:

(1) The Soviets have extensive capabilities for clandestine delivery of atomic, chemical, and biological weapons in the event of an attack upon the continental US.

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

Observation

On the basis of material available to the Bureau this appears to be a reasonable conclusion.

Statement in Draft

(S) The US is vulnerable to such clandestine attack undertaken prior to, or concurrent with, the initiation of overt hostilities since there is no reasonable assurance, under existing and anticipated internal security measures, that the US could detect and prevent many of the methods of the attack available to the Soviets.

Observation

This conclusion does not take into consideration any recommendations by the ICIB which may be made adopted and put into operation during the next 12 month period. Furthermore, it avoids an analysis of the foreign intelligence responsibilities of the CIA [redacted]

[redacted] Unless there is a clear statement of CIA's (S) role and responsibility and a clear statement of the steps which can be taken by CIA to protect the United States [redacted]

b1  
b3

Statement in Draft

(S) Since there is a possibility that a pre-D-Day clandestine attack would be detected, the Soviets might estimate that the risk of loss of strategic surprise would outweigh the benefits of certain methods of clandestine attack, and with the possible exception of biological attack, might be limited to those methods not requiring the assistance of Soviet-controlled personnel.

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

Observation

This conclusion is meaningless without a definition of "Soviet-controlled personnel," since it is inconceivable that any use of weapons of mass destruction would be entrusted by the Soviets to persons not under their control, in the US or elsewhere.

Statement in Draft

(4) In attacking the US the USSR would probably attempt clandestine delivery of a limited number of atomic weapons.

(a) The most likely method of delivery being of a use of a small number of TU-4 aircraft disguised with US markings.

(b) The USSR might also employ guided missiles launched from merchant ships.

(c) The delivery of atomic weapons into key harbors by merchant ships to be detonated in the hold of the ship or laid as underwater mines is less probable because of recently adopted internal security measures.

(d) The USSR could smuggle atomic weapons into the US under cover of diplomatic immunity or at some secluded point outside normal Customs surveillance but such employment "is considered relatively unlikely" because of the complexity of the operation and the number of individuals necessarily involved.

Observation

No basis is shown for the assumption that the USSR has perfected a means of utilizing atomic war heads on guided missiles. Furthermore, under point 4(d) the Atomic Energy Commission has advised that an atomic bomb could be brought into the country in its separate component parts and could be assembled in this country without too much difficulty.

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

Statement in Draft

(5) The USSR is likely to consider the smuggling of limited quantities of nerve gas into the US for use against personnel in key installations. The necessity for relying on personnel within the United States for delivery might deter the USSR from utilizing nerve gases.

Observation

As long as competent personnel are available to the USSR and are expendable the deterrent effect of having such individuals available is not apparent.

Statement in Draft

(6) The USSR might attempt employment of biological warfare agents against humans, against livestock or crops in advance of D-Day. Attacks on livestock and crops are a possibility at any time in case the USSR visualizes a long-term military conflict. The US is vulnerable to BW attack and it would be almost impossible to prevent either the smuggling of BW agents or their local procurement.

Observation

Information available at this time to the Bureau indicates that this conclusion is probably accurate.

In support of the foregoing conclusions the draft goes into a discussion of the points involved from page 4 through page 39 of the draft.

Statement in Draft

(7) It is believed that in the event of an attack upon the US the USSR would undoubtedly consider clandestine employment of all the weapons of mass destruction available to them.

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

(8) Clandestine attack would be synchronized with Soviet over-all war plans and (with the possible exception of the use of BW agents) would be undertaken only after the USSR had decided it was prepared to become involved in a general war with the US.

(9) It is doubtful that the USSR would attempt any pre-D-Day operation which might be detected and identified sufficiently in advance of H-Hour to cause a significant loss of strategic surprise.

Observation

The foregoing general statements in items 7, 8, and 9 do not appear to be in conflict with known facts or recognized logic.

Statement in Draft

(10) "To a considerable extent, the success with which the USSR could employ methods of attack requiring either the infiltration of agents immediately prior to attack or the creation of a Soviet sabotage organization in the US is governed by the ability of the FBI, assisted by the other member agencies of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, to identify, keep under surveillance and apprehend potential saboteurs, including those already in the US. The chief obstacles to these internal security measures are:

- a. The impossibility of preventing the illegal entry of all Soviet saboteurs into the US.
- b. The ability of known Soviet-controlled personnel, including local Communists, to escape surveillance and carry out clandestine operations.
- c. The possible existence in the US of a Soviet ' sleeper ' organization, the members of which are unidentified."

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

Observation



b1  
b3

[ ] If this group (S) includes local Communists then the conclusion #3 that Soviet operations prior to D-Day might be limited to those methods not requiring the assistance of Soviet-controlled personnel becomes meaningless. It is inconceivable that the Soviets would entrust a delicate mission involving weapons of mass destruction to anyone not under their control either physically or ideologically.

Statement in Draft

(11) It would be more difficult to prevent successful Soviet employment of those methods of clandestine delivery which do not require the assistance of personnel within the US. Prevention requires not only immediate detection and identification but also instant and effective counteraction.

Observation

It would appear that the only methods not requiring the use of Soviet controlled personnel in the US would be the disguised TU-4's on one way bombing missions or the detonation of an A-Bomb in the hold of a merchant vessel in the vicinity of a US port. All of the other methods mentioned for delivery of an A-Bomb would appear to require some assistance since even the guided missile with the atomic warhead fired from a merchant vessel lying off shore would need a beacon planted somewhere within the

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

target area in order to insure accuracy. The smuggling activities would, of course, necessitate assistance from Soviet-controlled personnel within the United States. Here again it should be pointed out that the CIA should be the first line of defense and not the Coast Guard or the Air Force.

Statement in Draft

(12) US capabilities for detection, identification, and prevention of pre-D-Day clandestine delivery will be less than optimum even in mid-1952. In determining the methods of clandestine attack which the USSR would be most likely to employ, it must be assumed that the USSR is well aware of US defensive capabilities.

Observation

It would be well for CIA to spell out the US defensive capabilities [redacted]

(5)

b1  
b3

Statement in Draft

(13) It is estimated that the USSR will have a stockpile of 45 atomic weapons in mid-1951 and 100 weapons in mid-1952. This would permit the allocation of a portion of the stockpile for clandestine attack against the US.

Observation

There is no reason why the USSR could not allocate the greater part of this stockpile for clandestine attack against the US since it would be undesirable for it to destroy by atomic attack the industrial installations and the trained personnel in European countries which it is assumed they would quickly overrun and divert to their own uses.

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

Statement in Draft

(14) "Atomic bombs available to the USSR between now and mid-1952 can be expected to develop from 30 to 70 Kilotons TNT explosive power. Their weight would probably be between two and five tons; diameter three to five feet; and length four-and-a-half to seven-and-a-half feet (if a non-ballistic case is used the length is shortened to the diameter)."

Observation

b1  
b3

Statement in Draft

(15) "It is estimated that the USSR has single pulse jet V-1 missiles capable of carrying a present day atomic warhead of approximately 15 to 20 Kilotons at least 100 miles. A missile with two pulse jet engines was reportedly test flown in 1950. Such a missile could probably be available in small quantities in the near future and could carry a much more powerful atomic warhead."

Observation

What basis do we have to assume that the USSR has mastered the application of an atomic warhead to the V-1 type missile?

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

Statement in Draft

(16 & 17) The Soviet TU-4 which resembles the US B-29 could be disguised with US markings and employed for clandestine delivery of atomic bombs. Flying a one-way mission, the TU-4 has sufficient range to reach every important target in the US and the USSR has more than a sufficient number of TU-4's and trained crews to permit a limited number of such missions.

Observation



b1  
b3

(S)

Statement in Draft

(18) Present flight regulations of the Civil Aeronautics Administration and the military services require that both military and civilian aircraft follow a previously filed flight plan and enter the US by specified routes. Aircraft violating these requirements, if detected by our radar screen or other means, are intercepted in flight by US Air Force fighters. The radar screen now covers Alaska and the northeastern portion of the US and is being extended to cover significant gaps.

(19) A small number of disguised TU-4's, by taking advantage of the gaps in our radar screen, might escape detection, and this would greatly increase the probability of a successful attack on high priority targets such as the Washington area.

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

Observation

This is another example of the necessity for  
CIA assuming some responsibility [redacted]

b1  
b3

(S)

Statement is Draft

b1  
b3

Observation

The statement that neither the USSR nor any of the satellites "are known to possess" suitable aircraft proves nothing. Apparently little that the Soviets actually have is known. The problem of acquisition of transoceanic aircraft would not increase the risk of compromising the operation since even if it were known that the Soviets had commercial aircraft of such specifications the aircraft used would probably be disguised as to line and nationality, since the Soviets would hardly attempt to fly into the International Airport in New York in a clearly marked Soviet plane. CIA feels that the use of civilian aircraft is less probable since the aircraft itself would have to be detonated over the target. The Soviet Government has never shown a great deal of concern for its personnel and the plane would be on a one way mission anyway.

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

Statement in Draft

(21) The USSR is capable of launching V-1 type guided missiles with atomic warheads from merchant vessels or submarines which could operate at altitudes between approximately 200 and 7,000 feet on a prearranged pattern course that would not compromise the launching position. Such missiles could be homed with accuracy on either a local commercial radio transmitter station in the target area or on a beacon provided with a small transmitter purchased openly by a local agent, assembled and positioned in the target area.

Observation

Developments in guided missiles and their homing on equipment sending out radio impulses has been brought to this Bureau's attention in the past. However, the question again arises as to the Soviet's ability to utilize an atomic warhead on a V-1 type or other type of guided missile.

Statement in Draft

b1  
b3

 (S)

Observation

b1  
b3

 (S)

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

Statement in Draft

(23) Atomic weapons laid as underwater mines in key harbors by merchant ships or brought in to be detonated in the hold of the ship would be difficult if not impossible to detect before they went off.

(24) The Soviets are capable of laying atomic weapons as mines, as well as providing accurate time-delay actuating mechanism, to permit laying the weapon days, weeks, or months in advance of D-Day. Detonation can be brought about by coded radio signals at any time.

(25) Detonation of an atomic weapon in the hold of a ship would not be as effective as a deeper underwater burst but the damage and contamination in a port area would still be great.

Observation

On the basis of information currently in the possession of the Bureau these statements appear to be sound.

Statement in Draft

(26) Within the limits of its resources the Coast Guard has established a comprehensive port security and smuggling prevention program.

(27) The Coast Guard is awaiting approval by the Department of State for approval of a plan whereby the master of a vessel departing a foreign port for the US could file with the US consular agent at the last foreign port of call a certificate indicating the expected date of arrival, the port of origin, ports of call, and the cargo.

Observation

Statement #26 is substantially correct. With regard to #27, this would appear to provide only additional paper work unless means were devised for a complete inspection of cargo at the last foreign port of call and

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

insurance against transfer of atomic weapons at sea to the merchant vessel en route to the United States.

Statement in Brief

(22) There are certain factors which would seriously hamper the Coast Guard in detecting clandestine delivery:

- (a) During the next 18 months there will not be a feasible scientific method of detecting an atomic weapon within the hold of a merchant ship. The only certain method is complete unloading of cargo and a detailed inspection of the vessel and cargo.
- (b) The USSR possesses a number of American-built, ocean-going fishing trawlers which would have a greater chance than foreign-built vessels of escaping Coast Guard surveillance.
- (c) During the first quarter of 1951 the Soviet bloc countries had under charter more than 140 Western ships. Examination of a ship's papers is not always a reliable method of determining whether a ship is actually under Soviet control, since in all countries the utmost secrecy is usually maintained in the chartering of ships and in many instances intelligence information indicating Soviet charter or purchase is not received until more than 60 days after the transaction occurred. Therefore, it is within Soviet capabilities to obtain and employ a foreign ship for clandestine delivery before the US could learn that the ship was under Soviet control.
- (d) Although a substantial part of Finnish shipping is thought to be under Communist control Finland is not included in the Coast Guard list of countries whose ships are to be inspected.

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

Observation

The statements in the draft under [ ] and [ ] (S) above again highlight the necessity for CIA to furnish advance information [ ]

b1  
b3

Statement in Draft

(29) Because of the above factors, the USSR must be considered capable of utilizing a merchant ship for delivering an atomic weapon into a key US harbor with relatively little chance of detection.

Observation

The foregoing comment appears reasonable.

Statement in Draft

(30) The attempted smuggling of a disassembled bomb is relatively impracticable because of the technical difficulties of bomb assembly and precise adjustment and the resulting security hazard to the USSR of having an expert on the assembly of Soviet weapons in the US.

Observation

According to the Atomic Energy Commission the weapon could easily be brought into the United States in small pieces and could be assembled in this country without too much difficulty. If the Soviets intended to utilize atomic weapons in large metropolitan areas away from the water front or ship anchorage, this would be a practicable method of getting the bomb to the target site. There would not necessarily be a security hazard to the USSR of having an expert on the assembly of the Soviet weapons in the US [ ]

b1  
b3

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

Statement in Draft

(31) It is most unlikely that the USSR would attempt the manufacture of an atomic weapon within the United States, with the exception of the fissionable material.

Observation

As long as the USSR was able to bring the parts into the United States there would be no reason for them to attempt to build one of parts obtained or manufactured in the United States.

Statement in Draft

(32) Under the cover of diplomatic immunity, components for an atomic bomb or an assembled bomb could be consigned to Soviet diplomatic representatives in the US as household effects or supplies without official inspection by the Bureau of Customs. There are apparently no government authorities charged with the specific responsibility of observing the off-loading, processing, and disposition of diplomatic baggage or pouches.

Observation

The foregoing is substantially correct. This is a matter under consideration by the ICIB.

Statement in Draft

(33) Constant surveillance of all activities surrounding Soviet representatives in this country with diplomatic immunity would probably permit detection of such an operation described in item 32 before the weapon could be detonated. The surveillance, if apparent to the Soviets, would in itself be a serious deterrent to the exploitation of diplomatic immunity. In the absence of surveillance, diplomatic immunity constitutes a serious weakness in our security against clandestine attack.

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

Observation

Full-time surveillance of all Soviet representatives, if possible, would not insure this country against atomic attack. The bomb or bombs may already be planted here by reason of the unconscionable delay on the part of the ICIS in arriving at recommendations to cope with this problem. Actually the surveillance of selected individuals would probably be more productive than a surveillance of all Soviet personnel. [REDACTED]

b1  
b3

(S)  
Statement in Draft

(34) It is feasible to attempt to smuggle an atomic bomb through Customs as a commercial shipment using an import from a satellite country as a cover.

Observation

Deterioration of commercial relations with the satellite countries will soon eliminate this possibility.

Statement in Draft

(35) There are numerous methods by which the USSR could endeavor to circumvent through Customs inspection, such as delivery to a bonded carrier for transshipment. Such procedures might involve a complex organization of cover companies or dummy corporations, etc., which would increase the risk of detection.

Observation

Shipments in bond are rarely subject to thorough inspection and dummy companies would not be necessary if the A-Bomb was intended for use in a water front or warehouse area.

Statement in Draft

(36) A select number of Customs representatives have been thoroughly indoctrinated in the characteristics

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

of atomic weapons and they have been alerted to watch for shipments of appropriate weight and size.

Observation

This alerting is useless if the Customs inspectors have been furnished the descriptive data set forth under item 14 when actually an atomic weapon is known to have a minimum weight of 500 pounds. Customs inspectors would be looking for something 8 to 20 times heavier.

Statement in Draft

(37) While it is feasible for the USSR to attempt to disguise an atomic bomb in a shipment from a neutral country, the USSR would have to resort to one or more transshipment operations, thereby increasing the risk of detection.

Observation

(38)

b1  
b3

Statement in Draft

(38) Because of the complexity of the smuggling operations, the risk of detection, and the availability of simpler and more secure methods, it is considered improbable that the USSR would endeavor to smuggle an atomic weapon into the US under the guise of a commercial shipment.

Observation

If the Russians felt that U. S. thinking was actually along this line such an attempt would be probable rather than improbable.

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

Statement in Draft

(39) A more serious threat is the smuggling of an A-Bomb into this country in some isolated area where it could be loaded from a Soviet-controlled merchant vessel or submarine to a small craft which would bring it ashore and there load it into a truck for subsequent delivery to the target area and possible detonation in the parked vehicle.

Observation

This is a possible technique.

[Redacted]

(S)

[Redacted]

b1  
b3

Statement in Draft

(40) Complete security coverage of all coastal and border areas is practically impossible and the method set forth in item 39 would be the most difficult to detect. The requirement for several completely reliable Soviet-controlled personnel might be a partial deterrent to the use of this method.

Observation

It does not appear reasonable that the Soviets would be deterred from using individuals under their control.

Statement in Draft

(41) The successful detection and prevention of the foregoing type of smuggling requires a coordinated program including: (a) Air, sea and shore patrols; (b) Identification and surveillance by the FBI of Soviet-controlled personnel in the US; (c) Solicitation of local police, residents, and private organizations to report promptly suspicious activities in coastal and border areas.

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

Observation

The important step in detection and prevention is advance warning [redacted] (S)  
Surveillance of all Communist Party members and sympathizers is impossible and impracticable since numerically they exceed by many times the total Special Agent force of the FBI. Alerting of coastal areas has been accomplished by the Coast Guard. The Bureau's interest is known to the Coast Guard and Navy and reports are received from coastal areas regarding flashing lights, unidentified submarines, etc.

b1  
b3

Statement in Draft

(42) The Coast Guard has taken steps to obtain information regarding activities on coastal beaches and to set up appropriate shore and offshore patrols, the operation of which, however, is limited by a shortage of funds and personnel.

(43) Apparently no coordinated over-all plans exist for detecting and preventing the smuggling of an atomic weapon into the US at some secluded point.

Observation

As noted before, this is part of the problem which has been under consideration by the ICES for the past 2 years.

Statement in Draft

(44, 45, & 46) The Soviet Union would most likely use for clandestine attack in the chemical warfare field the nerve gases, GA and GB.

Observation

Information available to the Bureau indicates that this possibility exists and that the USSR probably has sufficient quantities of these gases available.

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

Statement in Draft

(47 & 48) Nerve gases can best be utilized against personnel in key installations when the objective is the immediate incapacitation of a high percentage of personnel.

Observation

On the basis of information available to the Bureau these conclusions appear reasonable.

Statement in Draft

(49) Although nerve gases could be delivered by disguised aircraft or guided missiles, the only method of clandestine attack likely to be considered by the USSR would be the smuggling of nerve gases into the US for dissemination by saboteurs and under present internal security measures the US is vulnerable to this method of attack.

Observation

Since it is believed that an aerosol dispenser weighing 1/2 to 1 pound would produce a fairly lethal concentration in a confined space of 100,000 cubic feet, the smuggling of such small dispensers would not be as difficult as the smuggling of heavy cylinders.

Statement in Draft

(50 & 51) Since the smuggling of this type of weapon is relatively easy it would be the responsibility of the FBI to initiate and maintain surveillance over people who might be involved.

Observation

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] It would be easier for customs to check every gas (S) cylinder or aerosol bomb imported into the US than for the FBI to embark on an impossible program of constant surveillance of all people who might have an aerosol bomb in their possession.

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

Statement in Draft

(58 & 59) It is likely that the only anti-personnel BW agents that the Soviets would consider employing prior to D-Day would be those causing diseases common to the US since the outbreak of an unusual disease would probably arouse suspicion as to its source. However, BW agents might be employed to incapacitate key personnel and also to undermine public morale.

Observation

On the basis of information available to the Bureau this appears sound.

Statement in Draft

(60 & 61) Dissemination of airborne BW agents within a building probably would cause casualties among a large portion of the personnel and a relative small quantity of BW agents could contaminate large areas outside buildings, as well as inside buildings, when sprayed under pressure from ships or moving vehicles.

Observation

✓ Since these are the reports of tests conducted in the United States the conclusions expressed appear to be accurate.

Statement in Draft

(62) Contamination of food and water would not be difficult and incidence of casualties exceeding those occurring in accidental epidemics could be expected.

Observation

This appears to be a sound conclusion.

Statement in Draft

(63) Prevention of clandestine BW attack against personnel is dependent upon local security measures and

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

upon FBI surveillance of Soviet-controlled personnel who would be involved in the operation.

Observation

Here again CIA places the responsibility on the FBI to place every possible suspect under physical surveillance and assumes no responsibility for advising the authorities of the United States in advance of any such contemplated program. It should be pointed out that surveillance of all possible suspects is not the answer since as indicated in the CIA paper BW materials in aerosol bombs are exceedingly small and what they do not point out is the fact that virulent BW agents can be raised in a kitchen of a dwelling and forced into the water supply of an area through the kitchen faucet. Surveillance is not going to counteract such methods.

Statement in Draft

(64) Because of US medical and public health capabilities it is believed there is little relative risk of a widespread epidemic resulting from clandestine BW attack against vital installations but under present internal security measures personnel in most vital installations would be vulnerable to such attack.

Observation

As indicated before, this vulnerability will exist as long as the security of the individual installation is in doubt and FBI surveillance is not the answer to the internal security of installations.

Statement in Draft

(65, 66 & 67)

The Soviets have the capability of launching BW attack against livestock, the most serious threat to the country being that of foot and mouth disease.

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

Observation

In order to have such a BW attack effective there would have to be an exceedingly widespread dissemination of BW material since the meat supply of the United States is raised, fattened and slaughtered in so many various localities.

Statement in Draft

(68 & 69) The Department of Agriculture has issued special instructions to its country agents and other official representatives regarding possible BW attack against animals. The USSR might employ BW attack against livestock in the event it visualizes a long-term military conflict even though the US could withstand a sizable loss of livestock.

Observation

The foregoing conclusions appear reasonable.

Statement in Draft

(70, 71 & 72) It would be possible for the Soviets to attack cereal plants in a given locality with rusts and other viruses, the effectiveness of which would depend upon weather conditions and other unpredictable factors.

Observation

On the basis of information available to the Bureau this is a reasonable statement.

Statement in Draft

(73 & 74) The use of chemical growth regulators and the use of harmful insects is considered unlikely, since the growth regulators' effects cannot be spread and there is no indication that the use of insects as BW agents has been developed.

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

Observation

The use of growth regulators would actually be in the field of chemical warfare rather than biological. The use of insects against crops is apparently not as reasonable as the use of insects against humans, which possibility is not explored by CIA in its discussion of BW directed against personnel.

Statement in Draft

(75 and 76) Even though a BW attack was launched against crops such as from cereal rust there would be no risk of starvation or a direct adverse effect upon the war effort, because of the abundance and diversification of domestic food production.

Observation

These conclusions appear sound on the basis of the information available to the Bureau.

ACTION

It is respectfully recommended that the Bureau's representatives attending the conference on Friday, August 24, 1951, request clarification of the items pointed out in this memorandum and decline to concur with the draft in its present form which places responsibilities on domestic agencies and particularly the Bureau when the Central Intelligence Agency should bear the initial responsibility of advising the domestic agencies in advance of such clandestine attacks.

The matter of physical surveillances by the FBI should be deemphasized and consideration should be

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

given to the placing of real restrictions on the movements of Soviet and satellite official personnel in the United States.

[REDACTED]

b1  
b3

The (S)  
Department of State should make careful check with CIA and other intelligence agencies of the US Government prior to issuing visas to such security risks instead of giving them free entry to this country and then expecting the FBI to keep them under surveillance.

Furthermore, consideration should be given to the fact that recommendations regarding action to be taken by various government agencies in meeting the problem of clandestine delivery of weapons of mass destruction are being prepared by the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security.

~~SECRET~~



## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. C. E. HENNRICH *CH*  
 FROM : MR. L. WHITSON *LW*  
 SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOM BOMBS OR  
 PARTS THEREOF INTO THE  
 UNITED STATES  
 Bureau file 117-268

DATE: August 29, 1951

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
 Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
 Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
 Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
 Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
 Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
 Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
 Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
 Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

PURPOSE

To inform you of results of conversation with  
 \_\_\_\_\_ 8/29/51. *12 10 1*

Referral/Direct to OGA

DETAILS

At 2:45 P.M., 8/29/51, \_\_\_\_\_

Referral/Direct to OGA

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
 HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
 DATE 4/7/00 BY SP8BHM/RNP

*ewf*  
 LW:ewf


RECORDED - 153  
 SE 13

117-268-11  
 SEP 6 1951  
 11

*5-AM*



Referral/Direct to OGA

A rectangular box with a black border, used for redaction of information.A large rectangular box with a black border, used for redaction of a significant portion of the document's content.

**ACTION**

Referral/Direct to OGA

*This is for your information. This matter will be followed and you will be advised of any pertinent developments.*

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : C. E. Hennrich

DATE: August 31, 1951

FROM : L. Whitson

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING ATOM BOMBS OR PARTS  
THEREOF INTO THE UNITED STATES

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

PURPOSE

To set forth the results of discussion  
with [redacted] on  
8-31-51.

Referral/Direct to OGA


DETAILS

At 3:15 P. M., 8-31-51, [redacted]


[redacted] furnished  
the writer confidentially carbon copies of two memoranda.

Referral/Direct to OGA

The first was a memorandum from [redacted]



The second item was a copy of a proposed  
memorandum from [redacted]



Referral/Direct to OGA

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

LN:eal

INDEXED - 129

SEP 1 1951

13

5-100

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 4/1/00 BY 9703/100



Referral/Direct to OGA

This memorandum instructed [redacted]

ACTION

This matter is being followed and you will be advised of all pertinent developments.

Referral/Direct to OGA

9-6-51  
[redacted] SAYS  
WAS SIGNED BY  
[redacted]  
LW

. D. M. Ladd

September 28, 1951

A. H. Belmont

**NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES**  
(Soviet Capabilities for a Surprise  
Attack on the Continental United  
States Before July, 1952)

PURPOSE:

To present for approval a No Number SAC Letter predicated upon National Intelligence Estimate 31 and Special Estimate 10 regarding Soviet capabilities for a surprise attack on the continental United States before July, 1952.

To point out variations in atomic weapon dimensions as furnished by the Atomic Energy Commission and to recommend that in order to give the SAC's a complete picture, all such dimensions should be furnished.

DETAILS:

In connection with the problem of smuggling atomic weapons, under consideration by the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security, [redacted]

Referral/Direct to OGA

In connection with the preparation of NIE 31 and SE 10, [redacted]

In an attempt to clarify the dimensions and particularly the discrepancy in weight, liaison representatives of the Bureau made inquiry at the AEC. It was determined that in connection with the waterfront safety program of the Customs Service and Coast Guard, the AEC has advised those two organizations that [redacted]

Referral/Direct to OGA

62-93351  
cc - 117-268

LWich  
Attachment



NOT RECORDED  
71 OCT 12 1951

ORIGINAL FILE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 4/7/00 BY SP4 BJA/LSM

- Tolson \_\_\_\_\_
- Ladd \_\_\_\_\_
- Clegg \_\_\_\_\_
- Glavin \_\_\_\_\_
- Nichols \_\_\_\_\_
- Rosen \_\_\_\_\_
- Tracy \_\_\_\_\_
- Harbo \_\_\_\_\_
- Alden \_\_\_\_\_
- Belmont \_\_\_\_\_
- Laughlin \_\_\_\_\_
- Mohr \_\_\_\_\_
- Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_
- Nease \_\_\_\_\_
- Gandy \_\_\_\_\_





[redacted] informed Supervisor W. F. Woods of the Correlation-Liaison Unit that these last two descriptions had actually been furnished to Customs and the Coast Guard in July or August of 1951 and he believed that a copy has been furnished to Mr. Raymond Whearty as Chairman of the ICIS.

The afore-mentioned specifications of atomic weapons are being furnished to the SAC's in connection with the instant No Number SAC Letter.

ACTION:


There is attached a summary of the material contained in NIE 31 and SE 10 with additional comment on atomic weapons and specifications.

olson \_\_\_\_\_  
add \_\_\_\_\_  
legg \_\_\_\_\_  
lavin \_\_\_\_\_  
nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
noon \_\_\_\_\_  
racy \_\_\_\_\_  
arbo \_\_\_\_\_  
lien \_\_\_\_\_  
mont \_\_\_\_\_  
ughlin \_\_\_\_\_  
ir \_\_\_\_\_  
e. Ross \_\_\_\_\_  
so \_\_\_\_\_  
ty \_\_\_\_\_

November 6, 1951

RE: ~~SOVIET ATOMIC WEAPONS~~

Referral/Direct to OGA



Dimensions and general physical description of atomic weapons available to the Soviets are extremely necessary to those agencies of the U. S. Government which are charged with the prevention of smuggling and the investigation of illegal possession of fissionable materials or atomic weapons.

On the basis of analysis of the recent Soviet atomic explosions and the analysis of recent U. S. tests, it is suggested that the previous estimates regarding the dimensions and physical description of atomic weapons available to the Soviets might be re-examined, and new estimated descriptive data might be forthcoming.

CLASSIFIED BY SP4 BTA/RNP  
4/7/00

117-268 (Smuggling of Atomic Weapons) ✓  
cc - 62-93351 (National Intelligence Estimates)

LW: ewf

ENCLOSURE



## Office Memorandum • UNIT GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

FROM : MR. C. E. HENNRICH

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC WEAPONS  
(Bureau file 117-268)

DATE: November 5, 1951

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

PURPOSE

To submit a blind memorandum for transmittal to the appropriate representatives of the Intelligence Advisory Committee by liaison for the purpose of directing their attention to the desirability of revising estimates on physical description of atomic weapons available to the Soviets.

ACTION

Blind memorandum for delivery by liaison to the appropriate representatives of the Intelligence Advisory Committee is attached.

*Memo delivered [redacted] 11/9/51*  
*Human-Chain Atomic Energy Program (IAE)*  
*[redacted]*

b3

b7C

Attachment

See letter dated 4-7-50  
4-7-50 BY BJA/AM

cc-62-93351 (National Intelligence Estimates)

LW:ewf

RECORDED 22

117-268

67

5-111

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. A. H. Belmont

FROM : Mr. C. E. Hennrich

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC WEAPONS  
(Bufile 117-268)

DATE: November 16, 1951

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

PURPOSE:

To inform you that [redacted] Criminal Division, advised on 11-15-51 that the problem of smuggling of atomic weapons was still in the hands of the Subcommittee on Clandestine Methods of Warfare. [redacted] additional data had been received from the Atomic Energy Commission, but he did not know how soon a report would be submitted.

b7C

ACTION:

This matter will be followed and you will be advised of developments.

LW:amk

C# 948742/950935/997059

4-7-52

SP4 BJA/LBm

48  
RECORDED - 135  
INDEXED - 135

EX-1



SECURITY INFORMATION

Assistant Attorney General  
James M. McInerney

December 4, 1951

Director, FBI

Attention: Mr. Raymond P. Whearty

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR  
PARTS THEREOF INTO THE  
UNITED STATES

Reference is made to the discussion between representatives of this Bureau and Mr. Raymond P. Whearty regarding this subject matter on November 15, 1951, with particular reference to the question before the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security of how to prevent the smuggling of such weapons in diplomatic baggage and pouches.

An inquiry has been received from the New York Office of this Bureau as to what policy and procedure may be followed by representatives of the FBI and of Customs in the event a shipment of diplomatic baggage from one of the "Iron Curtain" countries of suspicious weight and/or dimensions is noted. (105-14562-11)

You will recall that this matter has been under consideration by the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security for approximately two years. Can you furnish me at this time with appropriate instructions to be relayed to the New York Office of this Bureau?

DECLASSIFIED BY SP4 BJA/LBM  
CN 4-7-00

C# 948742/950935/997059

RECORDED - 66

DEC 7 1951

30

117-268 ✓  
cc-105-14562

RECEIVED READING ROOM  
FBI  
DEC 11 1951

DEC 11 1951

COMM. SECURITY INFORMATION - TOP SECRET

LW:ewj

1951

MAILED 13

DEC 17 1951

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 105-14562-11

MR. D. M. LADD

December 10, 1951

MR. A. H. BELMONT

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES  
(SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR A  
SURPRISE ATTACK ON THE CONTINENTAL  
UNITED STATES BEFORE JULY, 1952)

PURPOSE

To submit for approval a No Number SAC Letter furnishing additional data regarding the smuggling and clandestine assembly of atomic weapons, earlier data on which subject was furnished to the Field in No Number SAC Letter P, Series 1951, October 5, 1951. To attach a letter to the Criminal Division setting forth similar data for the attention of Mr. Raymond P. Wherry inasmuch as the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security has the question of smuggling of atomic weapons under consideration.

DETAILS

The information submitted in the No Number SAC Letter contemplated and in the memo to the Criminal Division was obtained by liaison from [REDACTED] of the Military Applications Division, U. S. Atomic Energy Commission.

ACTION

The proposed No Number SAC Letter and the memo to the Criminal Division are attached.

Attachments

62-93851 (NIE)  
cc-117-188 (Smuggling of Atomic Bombs)  
cc-105-14582 (Atomic Bomb in Unknown Consulate, New York City)

LW: [signature]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 4-7-00 BY SP4 BJA/len

117-268-  
NOT RECORDED  
71 DEC 18 1951

INITIALS ON ORIGINAL

ORIGINAL FILE IN

DEC 27 1951



SECURITY INFORMATION

Assistant Attorney General  
James M. McInerney

December 11, 1951

Director, FBI

Attention: Mr. Raymond P. Wheeler

SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC BOMBS OR  
PARTS THEREOF INTO THE  
UNITED STATES

Reference is made to the ~~top secret~~ memorandum from this Bureau dated December 4, 1951. In connection with the study of the captioned problem by the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security it is felt that you might be interested in the following information received from the Military Applications Division of the U. S. Atomic Energy Commission regarding atomic weapons which might be smuggled into the United States:

Referral/Direct to OGA

DECLASSIFIED BY SP4BJA/LBM  
ON 4/7/00

RECORDED COPY FILED

117-268  
cc-105-14562

(Atomic Bomb Smuggling)  
In Unknown Consulate, New York City)

RECORDED

DEC 17 1951


Referral/Direct to OGA

63 JAN 3 1952

COMM - FBI

SECURITY INFORMATION - ~~TOP SECRET~~

Referral/Direct to OGA



Can you furnish me at this time with any information regarding the status of the program relating to the smuggling of atomic bombs which has been under consideration by the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security?

- 2 -

SECURITY INFORMATION - ~~TOP SECRET~~



## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

FROM : MR. W. A. BRANIGAN

SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC WEAPONS  
Bureau file 117-268

DATE: December 28, 1951

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
Gand \_\_\_\_\_

PURPOSE

To inform you that the Bureau of Customs in setting up a watch list of persons and firms who might be used by the Soviets to introduce weapons of mass destruction is soliciting information from the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Commerce, the Department of State, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service, as well as from the Bureau.

DETAILS

Reference is made to the memorandum from Branigan to Belmont dated 12/21/51 regarding the setting up of a watch list by Customs.

On December 27, 1951, at 2:00 P.M., Mr. Frank Russell, Assistant Deputy Commissioner, Bureau of Customs, called at the Bureau and again discussed aspects of the Customs Program. He stated that in addition to the FBI, Customs was soliciting information from the CIA, the Department of Commerce, the Department of State, and the INS regarding individuals and firms to be included in the Customs' watch list. These names would include not only individuals but also importing firms, brokerage firms, and transshipment firms which might be used by the Soviets in introducing weapons of mass destruction into the United States.

Mr. Russell stated that Customs contemplated giving individuals on the watch list and shipments consigned to firms on the watch list special and thorough Customs' examination. Mr. Russell, during the course of the discussion, stated that he realized that the possibility existed that the internal security of the country might be better served in some instances by affording an individual on the watch list only routine Customs' examination and in such instances, the Customs Service would be happy to consider any observations or suggestions of this Bureau.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 4-7-00 BY SP4 BJA/LAM

Per letter dated 12/30/51 per release 12/5/52

LW: ewf

RECORDED - 36

INDEXED - 36

117-268-447  
JAN 4 1952

64 FEB 14 1952

Mr. Russell stated that Customs was interested in the Bureau alerting its field offices to the possibility of the smuggling of weapons of mass destruction, i.e., atomic, radiological, biological, etc. Mr. Russell was told that the field offices of this Bureau had been alerted to this possibility. (You will recall that this was done in No Number SAC Letter F, Series 1951, dated October 5, 1951.)

Mr. Russell stated that Customs was preparing letters to the Bureau and to the other indicated agencies explaining the purpose of the contemplated watch list and soliciting information from which the watch list could be prepared.

ACTION

When the letter from Customs is received it will be analyzed and appropriately handled.



## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. W. A. BRANIGAN  
 FROM : MR. L. WHITSON  
 SUBJECT: SMUGGLING OF ATOMIC WEAPONS  
 Bureau file 117-268

DATE: January 10, 1952

Tolson \_\_\_\_\_  
 Ladd \_\_\_\_\_  
 Clegg \_\_\_\_\_  
 Glavin \_\_\_\_\_  
 Nichols \_\_\_\_\_  
 Rosen \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tracy \_\_\_\_\_  
 Harbo \_\_\_\_\_  
 Belmont \_\_\_\_\_  
 Mohr \_\_\_\_\_  
 Tele. Room \_\_\_\_\_  
 Nease \_\_\_\_\_  
 Gandy \_\_\_\_\_

PURPOSE

To inform you that the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security will probably report on this matter February 8, 1952.

DETAILS

You will recall that the ICIS Subcommittee on Foreign Diplomatic and Official Personnel recommended on 12/5/51 that there be no change in the present practice of admitting diplomatic baggage without checking for atomic weapons.

Mr. Raymond P. Whearty on 1/8/52 stated that the matter was being examined by the Standing Committee of ICIS and that the Department of Defense was giving intensive study to the problem. It was Mr. Whearty's belief that the Treasury Department representative in ICIS will take his cue from the Department of Defense and the matter will probably go to the full ICIS membership with only the Department of State dissenting to a limitation being placed on unsearched diplomatic baggage.

Mr. Whearty stated he expected a report out of ICIS on this matter February 8, 1952.

ACTION

This matter is being followed and you will be informed of any pertinent developments.

RECORDED - 122

EX-25

JAN 17 1952

LW: ewf

63 JAN 28 1952

HEREIN UNCLASSIFIED  
 DATE 4-7-00 BY SP4 BJA/LBM

5-AM