

DISPATCH

CLASSIFICATION

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PROCESSING ACTION

MARKED FOR INDEXING

NO INDEXING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIED DESK
CAN JUDGE INDEXING

MICROFILM

Near East Division

FROM

Tehran

SUBJECT

Forwarding of Article Entitled "Intelligence Policy"

ACTION REQUIRED - REFERENCES

1. Attached is a mimeographed article entitled "Intelligence Policy" written by S. Dedijs who gives his return address as: Research Policy Program, University of Lund, Lund, Sweden.

2. The article was not accompanied by a letter of any kind, it had only the handwritten note at the top of the first page which says "My toughness with the intell community here is only apparent. Any comments?" S. Dedijs, Princeton '34."

3. The Ambassador received this via the open mail, he does not intend to acknowledge it or reply in any way.

4. It will be noted that in the autobiographical note (pages 11 to 13) the author claims to have been born in the Balkans, to have worked for the Soviet NKVD, the Communist Party, USA, and to have joined and have been expelled from the OSS. The article itself appears to be of little or no interest.



Distribution:

Orig & 2 - C/NE w/att H/W

Attachment:

1 article H/W

HR70-14
(U)

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: MAR 2008

CROSS REFERENCE TO	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER	DATE
		AUG 30 1973
	CLASSIFICATION	HQS FILE NUMBER
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Int. Dist.: 1- RI 1 - <input type="checkbox"/>	ORIGINATING	
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	29AUG 73	

DISPATCH

22 Aug '73

Embassador:

I read this myself.

I don't think it is worth
much. It asks a lot of
questions but doesn't answer
them.

It may be of some interest
to Washington, however because
of the background of the author

NKVD

CPUSA

OSS

etc.

Sent to hyp.

Was sent to Kerensky in open
mail in brown envelope with
no letter, only the note.
Ambros has no intention of answering

SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
OFFICE OF THE AMBASSADOR

Date 8/21

To Callahan

- For Your Information
- For Your Comments
- For Your Approval
- Please prepare reply for Ambassador's Signature
- Please prepare reply on behalf of Ambassador, for your signature.
- As You Requested
- Please file
- Note and return.

I received your paper yesterday in the mail. Would you please have someone read it and decide whether it is worth sending to Washington. Wt

Swedish Foreign Policy Program,
The Institute of Foreign Policy,
Stockholm

Dear Mr Helms,
My toughness with
the intell. community
here is only apparent
Any comments?

INTELLIGENCE POLICY^x

"Everything I say must be understood not as a
statement but as a question"

Niels Bohr

S. Dethlefsen
Princeton 134

1. A new social, political, and policy problem is born

The most advanced democratic countries are discovering that national intelligence (the procurement, evaluation, and utilisation of information from the world environment for their domestic and foreign policies) is becoming a serious social, political and policy formation problem. Soon all the other of the world's countries, regardless of their political system, degree of development or size, will simultaneously start to make this same discovery in the course of their own social evolution or by the diffusion of the idea from abroad.

Right now the process of this social discovery is accelerating. According to the social sciences a social phenomenon or situation becomes "a social problem" in a given society, when a number of influential individuals or groups inside or outside its establishment starts asking publicly and insistently questions about it. During the past few decades a small number of courageous scholars and concerned members of the tightly closed intelligence communities in the democratic countries, especially the USA, have written books, monographs, articles about such questions as:

Who and how decides about the goals, objectives, organisation, tasks, missions of our national intelligence? Who defines it and what is the

(§) see "An autobiographic note" at the end of the article

x/ To appear in Swedish in the September issue of "Internationella Studier" published by The Institute of Foreign Policy, Stockholm

system of basic principles - i.e. the doctrine - of our national intelligence? Is a wider and greater public control of the intelligence production system, management system and policy system necessary, desirable, and possible? What does intelligence cost us? How many are engaged in it, who and where are they and how selected? What is the return on our investment in intelligence? How much waste and abuse is involved: is the intelligence community subverting our basic national values and quality of our life? What should we know and how about intelligence and what should we do about it in the future?

Until very recently the general informed public bought hundreds of thousands of copies of novels and memoirs dealing with spying, a very small part of intelligence activities, while tending to ignore almost completely all the above questions about intelligence vital for national existence and well being. Now the situation is rapidly changing. Stimulated among other by injections of more or less continuous intelligence "scandals", "threats" and "abuses", the demos in the democracies is making intelligence a problem of wide public concern. Mass media, interest and pressure groups, politicians, "concerned citizens" and "trouble makers" are making intelligence questions objects of public debate and political problems. The demands for the democratisation of the intelligence policy and its control are being raised. The national policy machinery is being set creakingly in motion to deal with it.

2. The genesis of demand for intelligence policy

Those members of the intelligence community and their godfathers in the establishment who expect that the demand for public debate on national intelligence doctrines and policies will blow away with the smell of the latest scandals will be very disappointed. Everything points to ^{a/} growing concern about national intelligence needs, organization and operations.

From a historical perspective, the emergence of intelligence as a social problem is part of a general learning trend peculiar to the 20th century. During World War I we learned - in Clemenceau's words - that war was too important to be left to the generals. In the thirties we learned that the economic life of a country is too important to be left to business men and entrepreneurs. In the 1960ies we learned that science and technology are too important to be left to the scientists and technologists. And all along we have been learning that foreign affairs are too important to be left to diplomats, and government to bureaucrats and politicians. At last with an increasing amount of social conflicts between the intelligence community and the rest of society we are learning that intelligence is too important to be left to professional intelligencers. Intelligence, as all other key functions and institutions has to be on tap but not on top of society.

There is a number of contingent (for example, the end of the cold war) and long range factors which are making intelligence into a social and a political problem, are giving rise to demand for a radical and continual review of national intelligence doctrine and policy. Here I shall list only a few of these factors:

The global interdependence constant - an analogue to the constant, according to the latest knowledge, gravitational constant from the physical universe - is rapidly increasing in value. This increase in interdependence among all parts of the globe is giving rise to new intelligence needs.

The number of independent national states on the globe has increased from about 50 in 1939 to close to 200 in 1973 thus increasing the demand for national intelligence estimates of capabilities, intentions, and status and counter-intelligence problems.

Volumes could and should be written - for there are none - on what science and technology are doing to change radically the production, management and techniques of intelligence. Spying is not dying. Yet, the new opportunities offered by science and technology for the procurement and processing of information is dwarfing the importance of spying in the intelligence production.

Slowly, the basic intelligence goal for individual countries is changing from intelligence for national existence and security to intelligence for national growth and development.

The costs of intelligence for each country are increasing as a whole and per unit output. The budget bureaus, treasury departments and parliamentary committees tend to look askance these days at Sir Francis Walsingham's statement in late 1500 that "Intelligence is never too dear" and are insisting on cost-benefit estimates even in impossible cases.

3. Does every country need an intelligence policy?

A review of scholarly literature on intelligence shows that there are very few histories about it. The history of intelligence in modern societies have still to be written. The first semi-theoretical writing on the relation of intelligence policy to the science, technology, economic development and social well being policy was written by Francis Bacon in 1624-26 in his "new Atlantis". It followed the extremely intense effort to develop the British intelligence by Sir Francis Walsingham, the secretary of State of Elisabeth I of England, who had herself painted in a dress covered with a pattern of eyes and ears.

Any research in the history of any human society since the beginning of man will show that it had intelligence activities. Intelligence is a cultural universal: all societies, throughout history, sedentary or migrating, have had to have it. Intelligence is a cultural universal because every country and every society throughout history is a complex behaviour system which has to extract from its environment, information it considers relevant for its existence and growth, analyses it, evaluates it, and acts accordingly. In present day societies this information has to do with various fields of domestic and foreign ^{politics} economics, defence, climate, transport, science, technology, education, health, culture, national character, biographic and personality information, etc.

The rapid changes of the national systems themselves, of their mutual relations, and of the international and global environment require rapid changes at all levels and sectors of intelligence: production, evaluation, management and structures deciding on objectives and goals.

all sectors and institutions, all organisations and agencies of a modern developed society have needs for intelligence. The need to identify and formulate organisational and national intelligence policies by means of social objectives and values, is giving rise to demands for new forms of social control of intelligence. The intelligence policy system consists of a broadening national intelligence community working to define the national intelligence needs, the intelligence doctrine, to set priorities and to insure that the intelligence objectives and operations of various organisations, institutions and agencies do not subvert the basic goals and life style of the country. The fact that intelligence policy is becoming a social and political problem calls for the democratisation of the intelligence production, management and policy systems.

4. How to democratize the intelligence policy?

The democratization of the policy processes in various social fields, a wider participation of individual citizens and groups in these processes, is a constant preoccupation of thoughtful statesmen of our age, regardless of their political ideology. This is an especially difficult task in connection with the intelligence policy. For secrecy, semilegality and illegality are, in the view of some intelligencers, basic "production factors" of good intelligence.

Some aspects of the production system, management and policy system of intelligence have to varying ^{degrees} to be based on secrecy, and sometimes on semilegality and even illegality. The democratisation of the intelligence processes and policies requires a widening

intelligence community, and opening up for public debate on many of its problems including that of secrecy. Here there exists an as yet systematically not studied relation of a contradictory nature between the need to democratize intelligence and to control it on the one hand and its secrecy and illegality requirements on the other.

International experience shows that the range of secrecy considered necessary for the effective functioning of the national intelligence systems is extremely wide. The public revelations and studies of intelligence in the USA are considered unthinkable, for example, in the Soviet Union and are punished by prison and even death. Why this extreme range in secrecy about intelligence: is the USA as a nation a loser and the Soviet Union a gainer because of it, or vice versa, remain very important questions to be answered? Thus it is important to assess systematically what aspects of intelligence goal determination, production, and management must be kept secret and how to combine these requirements for secrecy with the demand for social control and openness. If secrecy is a "production factor" of good intelligence, it is also a "production factor" of waste, incompetence, subversion, and other abuses. These and other problems of intelligence policy are calling for a greater effort to understand all of its key aspects, to rationalise them as it is humanly possible.

5. The research and teaching of intelligence

Independently of the means supplied by natural sciences and technology to gather and process information for it, good intelligence for immediate and long range national purposes is or is increasingly becoming the product of applied social science research. The intelligence community of every country spends a considerable portion of its time using the methods of the social sciences to study systematically and painstakingly the intelligence systems of "friends" and "foes". Many intelligence organisations in the world hold courses, seminars aiming to train its new recruits and to "freshen up" and retrain their experienced operatives, managers and policymakers. Yet all of this scholarly and social science research activity is going on in secret in the world intelligence community with very limited access to open, objective scholarly criticism.

The social and behavioural sciences are studying practically all the past, all the known and all the emerging aspects of man and his society. Yet, the literature on intelligence includes among an enormous number of literary case studies, histories, "spy novels", memoirs, etc. very few systematic social science studies of its various aspects. Very few social scientists in the most open and democratic countries have had so far the social and scientific courage to engage in research on intelligence to teach on it, to help make it a social problem, to suggest openly new alternative modes of its organisation and functioning. Two swords of Damocles hang over those social scientists who start doing research on the national intelligence system of their country: the accusation by the establishment of their country of producing information useful to "the enemy", and opprobrium by their scientific peers of being "a spy"

working for the establishment. I conjecture, however, that in the near future, under the pressure of demands for intelligence policy, many more social scientists may enter the field of research and teaching of intelligence.

Today in the United States where you have degrees in hotel management, embalming, and on practically every other human activity, there does not seem to be one single among its over 4000 universities and colleges offering a single course on intelligence. This, also can be expected to change rapidly. One can expect within the next decade that many universities will start offering courses at the undergraduate or graduate level, degrees, PhD theses on intelligence. Conferences and symposia both national and international are going to be held on the production processes and on comparative intelligence policies. The problem of training of intelligencers should and will become to a large extent similar to the problem of training f.e. business managers and jurists. Young men and women will take courses in intelligence, just as they take courses in economics or antropology regardless of whether they want to become professional economists or antropologists.

6. The global system and the future of national intelligence systems

The influx of new, young, creative brains independent of national intelligence communities and their manias, coupled with the increasing global ^{inter-}dependence and its dynamics, will start producing a whole new crop of questions for study, research and actions:

How much harm to the national interests of a country would result from a unilateral "Intelligence disarmament"? How much of national intelligence that is being done is redundant to the basic national

How should spying be completely eliminated from the world intelligence activities?

What is the world cost of intelligence in general and of spying in particular? How many individuals are engaged in the world today as professional intelligencers and spies? What are the comparative characteristics of national intelligence systems of countries according to their political systems, degree of development and size? What is the effect of the national intelligence activities and policies on the regional and global tensions, conflicts and wars? Would the "intelligence disarmament" - at least of some of its aspects - contribute to the easing of world political tensions and armed conflicts? To my knowledge, no international organization or research center has, as far as I know, produced as yet - but it undoubtedly will start producing - studies on these and other much more better formulated global intelligence questions.

(5)

An Autobiographical note:

Harry Ransom wrote in 1970 in his "The Intelligence Establishment" that "formidable difficulties confront any scholar who sets out to describe the history, structure, and principal methods of intelligence". To this, I would add that a researcher and teacher on intelligence has to explain his motives - although he has to abandon hope to be believed.

My own interest in intelligence policy has its origin in two sources: one, right now dominant, is intellectual and the other experiential.

A migrating intellectual born in the early years of this century in the turbulent Balkans gets involved in intelligence activities and develops sensitivities relevant to them from the early childhood. At the age of three, on June 28, 1914, I was playing at the feet of Colonel Apis, the head of military intelligence of the kingdom of Serbia, who was visiting my father on the very day when the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand, which Apis has helped organize, was taking place in Sarajevo. At 14 as a gymnasium student in Rome, I was supplying the poet-ambassador of Yugoslavia, M. Rakich, with information on Mussolini's imperialist designs on Yugoslavia found in secondary school history and geography textbooks. At 27, in 1938, I was working for the Soviet NKVD in the USA under the leadership of Muryaga Golubich, one of Sarajevo plotters. At 32 I was sent by the Communist Party of USA to join, was trained, and later kicked out of the OSS, the first USA central intelligence agency. One year later, right during the siege of Bastogne in the Ardennes offensive, as a paratrooper bodyguard of general Maxwell Taylor, commander of the USA 101 Airborne division, I was invited and refused to join the USA counter-intelligence.

From 1945 to 1949 as a foreign correspondent, translator at high level political talks, member of the Yugoslav UN delegation, as most other people in such professions, I engaged in such intelligence activities as preparing reports on the state, capabilities and intentions of various "opponents" of Yugoslavia, recruited agents (I helped penetrate the USA military mission in Athens during the Greek civil war in 1947), lifting diplomatic papers, identifying and following "enemy" agents, etc. One phase of this period involved identifying Stalin's agents in Yugoslavia's mass media after the 1948 Stalin-Tito break. From 1949 to 1955 as a researcher and director of a Yugoslav nuclear center I was involved in a number of tragi-comic defensive and offensive actions in this field. I was shocked but not surprised to hear Milovan Djilas, then still a close collaborator of Tito, tell me in 1953, "Stevo, for the past eight years our counter intelligence has spent a lot of effort whether you are working for Truman or Stalin". In 1956 in the office of Sir E. Appleton, Nobel Prize in physics, vice-chancellor of Edinburgh university, where I was working in theoretical physics I was invited by a model English gentleman of the old school named Marlott, to work for "Her Majesty's intelligence Service" - which made the Yugoslav government send a sharp protest note to prime-minister Eden. My divorce from Yugoslav establishment in 1954 was followed by seven years of intense, continuous, stimulating and at times hilarious counter-intelligence surveillance and pressures, which followed me even to Copenhagen where I joined Bohr's institute in 1961.

Since settling happily in Sweden in 1962 my "experiential" involvement in intelligence work has ceased completely, not that I hope to be believed especially by some of my left oriented students. On the other

hand my intellectual interest in the subject has greatly increased. First, as a student of the research process and policies, I have been intrigued by their many similarities (and differences) to intelligence process and policies and am trying to find why. My discovery in 1972 in the JSA that no university offers its students a course on intelligence, has prompted me to suggest that it should and then was amused by the shocked disbelief on the face of university department heads and officials. My intellectual interest has grown especially in view of the realisation of the growing need for people outside the intelligence community to understand whatever can be rationalised about the intelligence problems, processes and policies.