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7 Dec 74

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE/ []

NIACT IMMEDIATE

TO: SECRETARY KISSINGER, WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON

FROM: AMB. HELMS, TEHRAN []

1. FOREIGN MINISTER KHALATBARI SUMMONED ME SATURDAY EVENING ~~ON~~
 SHAH'S INSTRUCTION. HE READ TO ME AT DICTATION SPEED HIS
 TRANSLATION INTO ENGLISH OF TELEGRAM IN FARSI FROM IRANIAN
 AMBASSADOR IN CAIRO KHOSROVANI. SINCE KHALATBARI IS NOT STRONG
 IN ENGLISH, THIS ORAL TRANSLATION SUFFERS BUT ~~IT~~ AT LEAST DOES NOT
 WANDER FROM THE ORIGINAL. THIS MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT SADAT TO THE
 SHAH ~~IS~~ IS DESIGNED TO INFORM IRAN OF EGYPTIAN POLICY FOR THE
 NEXT FEW MONTHS AND WAS DISPATCHED TO HIM IN QUOTE FULL SECRECY UNQUOTE.

2. THE TELEGRAM READS: BEGIN TEXT PRESIDENT SADAT SAID EGYPT IS EAGER
 TO HAVE PEACE, TO SETTLE ALL DIFFERENCES, AND TO HAVE STABILITY
 SO THAT IT CAN GET ON WITH ECONOMIC REFORMS ~~AND ECONOMIC REFORMS~~
 LOOKING TO THE PROSPERITY AND WELFARE OF ITS PEOPLE. TO ~~ACHIEVE~~ THIS
 END

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: MAR 2008

~~IT~~ IT INTENDS THAT THE NEXT STEP TO BE TAKEN TOWARD
 SOLVING THE DIFFERENCES WOULD BE THE WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES
 FROM CERTAIN PARTS OF THE SINAI SO THAT THE CEASEFIRE LINE CAN
 BE ~~RE~~ DRAWN BEHIND THE REGION WHERE THE OIL WELLS ARE
 LOCATED, THE OIL WELLS WHICH ARE BEING EXPLOITED BY ISRAEL AT THIS
 TIME. PRESIDENT SADAT IS OF THE OPINION THAT THUS FAR THE USG
 HAS NOT FAILED TO LIVE UP TO THE ENGAGEMENTS IT HAS MADE. OF
 COURSE IT HAS NOT PROCEEDED AT THE SAME PACE AS IT HAS BEFORE,

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NEVERTHELESS IT IS TO BE RECOGNIZED THAT POLITICAL PRESSURE
 BY THE USG ON ISRAEL IS CONTINUING. THE TROUBLE IS THAT THE
 PRIME MINISTER OF ISRAEL HAS NOT THE SAME AUTHORITY AS MRS.
 GOLDA MEIR HAD AND HAS TO PREPARE PUBLIC OPINION CAREFULLY
 AND GRADUALLY. IN ANY CASE IT IS PRESIDENT SADAT'S INTENTION DURING
 HIS VISIT TO WASHINGTON TO BRING UP THE SUBJECT OF THE NEW
 CEASEFIRE LINE. PARAGRAPH PRESIDENT SADAT THEN EXPLAINED THAT
 AMERICA IS TRYING TO HAVE AN AGREEMENT BEFORE BREZHNEV'S VISIT
 TO EGYPT. THE SOVIET UNION WANTS THINGS TO BEGIN WITH THE GENEVA

(2)

CONFERENCE SO THAT IT WILL BE ABLE TO GO TO THE DEFENSE OF ARAB RIGHTS BY WORDS AND SPEECHES, WHILE AMERICA WANTS AT LEAST SOME PROGRESS TO BE MADE BEFORE THE GENEVA CONFERENCE IS CONVENED, ~~AND IN THAT WAY~~ THEREBY ~~HAVING~~ ^{ASKED} DONE SOMETHING FOR THE ARABS. PARAGRAPH AT THIS ~~POINT~~ ^{WILL} KHOSROVANI ~~ASKED~~ SADAT ABOUT SYRIA. SADAT ANSWERED THAT IT IS POSSIBLE THAT MINOR CHANGES ^{WILL} TAKE PLACE ON THE SYRIAN FRONT, BUT HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE SITUATION OF SYRIA IS DIFFERENT FROM THAT OF EGYPT, BECAUSE IN SYRIA THE SOVIET UNION DOES NOT CREATE PROVOCATIONS AND GIVES ASSISTANCE TO SYRIA, WHILE IN EGYPT FOR THE LAST YEAR AND A HALF THE SOVIET UNION HAS NOT BEEN GIVING ANY MILITARY OR ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE AND HAS AS WELL STOPPED FURNISHING SPARE PARTS AND HAS RECENTLY DEFERRED EVERYTHING PENDING THE VISIT OF MR. BREZHNEV. AS FOR THE OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES SADAT SAID THAT HE TELLS THEM THAT THE RETURN OF CERTAIN PARTS OF ~~THEIR~~ OCCUPIED ARAB LANDS IS NOT AGAINST THEIR INTEREST, BECAUSE IN REALITY IT IS ISRAEL WHO IS THE LOSER BY RETURNING THOSE LANDS AND OIL WELLS TO THE ARABS. PRESIDENT SADAT IS OF THE OPINION THAT CERTAIN ISRAELIS ARE IN FAVOR OF ANOTHER WAR BECAUSE THEY REALIZE THAT ~~THE~~ TIME FACTOR IS RUNNING AGAINST THEIR ^R INTERESTS EVEN THOUGH ~~THE~~ THE LOSSES OF LIFE AND MATERIEL ^{WOULD} DURING THE OCTOBER WAR OBLIGE THEM TO CALCULATE CAREFULLY BEFORE UNDERTAKING ANY NEW ADVENTURE. HE ALSO BELIEVES THAT OTHER ISRAELIS REALIZE THAT EVEN IF ISRAEL WINS ANOTHER WAR, NO DEFINITE RESULT WOULD BE ACHIEVED BECAUSE A LOCAL VICTORY WOULD NOT SOLVE THE GREAT PROBLEMS WHICH DIVIDE THE ARABS AND ISRAELIS. MOREOVER THE SOVIET UNION, IN ~~SPITE~~ ^{WANT} OF APPEARANCES, DOES NOT ~~WAR~~ TO BECOME WIDESPREAD. IT ONLY DESIRES TO PREVENT THE UNITED STATES FROM HAVING ANY SUCCESS. END OF TEXT.

3. ~~THE~~ THE IRANIAN AMBASSADOR CONCLUDES ~~BY~~ TELEGRAM BY GIVING HIS OPINION THAT SADAT IS ANXIOUS THAT SYRIA AND OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES NOT STRONGLY OPPOSE THE PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL OF THE ISRAELIS FROM THE SINAI EVEN THOUGH HE WILL UNDERSTAND IF THEY ARE NOT FULLY SATISFIED OR RELUCTANTLY ACCEPT THIS FORMULA.

4. ~~SECRET~~ KHALATBARI QUOTED THE SHAH TO ME AS COMMENTING,
 WHEN HE READ ~~THE~~ TELEGRAM, THAT THIS WAS QUOTE AN UNHOPED
 FOR OPPORTUNITY UNQUOTE AND THAT NO ONE EXPECTED SADAT
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 STEP BY STEP WITHDRAWAL. IN ANSWER TO ~~MY~~ QUESTION HE SAID
 THAT THE TELEGRAM CONTAINED NO REFERENCE TO ANY ASSURANCE
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5. DO YOU WANT THE FOREGOING PUT IN STATE DEPARTMENT
 CHANNELS? IF SO, PLEASE ADVISE. WARM REGARDS.

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