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INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
4800 MARK CENTER DRIVE
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22350-1500

December 14, 2016

Ref: FOIA-2013-00591

SENT VIA EMAIL TO: john@greenewald.com

Mr. John Greenewald
The Black Vault



Dear Mr. Greenewald:

This is in response to your August 2, 2013, Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request for report DODIG-2012-034.5, Quarterly Assessment of Afghan National Security Forces Metrics, Ministry of Interior Police Forces, October 2012 - March 2013. We received your request on August 5, 2013, and assigned it case number FOIA-2013-00591.

The Office of the Deputy Inspector General for Special Plans and Operations conducted a search and found the enclosed document responsive to your request. I determined that some redacted portions are exempt from release in accordance with 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(1), which pertains to information that is currently and properly classified pursuant to Executive Order 13526, section 1.4(a), military plans, weapons systems, or operations, and section 1.4(b), foreign government information; 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(3), information exempted from release by statute, in this instance 10 U.S.C. § 130c, certain sensitive information of foreign governments and certain international organizations; and 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(6), information, the release of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. In addition, the U.S. Central Command also reviewed the report and determined that portions are exempt from release pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(1), section 1.4(b); and 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(3), 10 U.S.C. § 130c, and 10 U.S.C. § 455, maps, charts, and geodetic data.

In view of the above, you may consider this to be an adverse determination that may be appealed to the Department of Defense, Office of Inspector General, ATTN: FOIA Appellate Authority, Suite 10B24, 4800 Mark Center Drive, Alexandria, VA 22350-1500. Your appeal, if any, must be postmarked within 90 days of the date of this letter and should reference the file number above. I recommend that your appeal and its envelope both bear the notation "Freedom of Information Act Appeal."

You may seek dispute resolution services and assistance with your request from the DoD OIG FOIA Public Liaison Officer at 703-604-9785, or the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS) at 877-684-6448, ogis@nara.gov, or <https://ogis.archives.gov/>. Please note that OGIS mediates disputes between FOIA requesters and Federal agencies as a non-exclusive alternative to litigation. However, OGIS does not have the authority to mediate requests made under the Privacy Act of 1974 (request to access one's own records).

Ref: FOIA-2013-00591

If you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact the Department of Defense, Office of Inspector General FOIA Requester Service Center at 703-604-9775 or via email at foiarequests@dodig.mil.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Mark Dorgan", with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

Mark Dorgan
Division Chief
FOIA, Privacy and Civil Liberties Office

Enclosure(s):
As stated

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RELEASABLE NATO//ISAF

DODIG-2012-034.5

June 28, 2013

Inspector General

United States
Department of Defense



Special Plans and Operations

Assessment of Afghan National Security Forces
Metrics (U)

Ministry of Interior Police Forces
October 2012 - March 2013 (U)

Classified by: DoD OIG: (b) (6)
Derived by: Multiple Sources
Declassify on: 20380430

Special Plans and Operations, DoDIG

Releasable to NATO//ISAF

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Inspector General

United States Department of Defense

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Ministry of Interior Police Force Metrics (October 2012 – March 2013) (U)

(U) WHO SHOULD READ THIS?

(U) This reporting product is directed to personnel within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, United States Central Command, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), and the Congressional committees responsible for and engaged in oversight, training, mentoring, advising, equipping, and other key aspects of the development of the Afghan National Police (ANP) and Ministry of Interior (MoI).

(U) PURPOSE

(U) Over the past 24 months, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) has issued multiple reports assessing U.S. Government efforts to train, equip, and advise the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF).¹ This is the fifth in a series of periodic reports that address ISAF development of the ANP/MoI and the Afghan National Army (ANA)/Ministry of Defense (MoD).

(U) The metrics reports track ANSF progress toward assuming an independent and sustainable role in security operations. The OIG collects information from recurring briefings, reports, and other data collected and disseminated by ISAF and its subordinate commands—ISAF Joint Command (IJC), and NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A)/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A)—hereafter referred to as the Command. The OIG carefully reviews and references, but does not independently validate, the data.

(U) The OIG-selected metrics used for this report provide indications of ANP development over the six-month reporting period from October 2012 through March 2013. The metrics track ANP/MoI development in three key areas: Sustainment, Professionalization, and ANP/MoI Transition to Afghan security lead.

(U) These metrics adapt over time to reflect continued ANP progress toward developing the capability to take lead and ultimate responsibility, as part of ANSF, for Afghanistan's security. For example, once most growth goals were achieved in 2011-2012, the Command placed a priority emphasis on enablers, such as logistics (supply and distribution), and on ministerial functions critical to Transition.² In line with Commander ISAF's (COMISAF) April 2013 Congressional testimony that "stewardship of resources remains a key task" in support of ANSF development, this report highlights ANP equipment supply and distribution, as well as MoI resource management and accountability metrics.

(U) Due to Coalition drawdown and decreasing resources, validation of data is increasingly difficult. ISAF is consolidating resources and reporting techniques, and is working with ANSF to improve ANSF self-assessment methods. As Coalition combat and training enablers are withdrawn, measuring the progress of transition to ANSF enabler force capabilities becomes more important. This report

¹ Accessible at www.dodig.mil

² "Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan," December 2012, p. 27: Transition is the process of transferring security authority and responsibility from ISAF to the Afghan government by the end of 2014.

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refers to ANP enabler data where metrics were published by the Command. However, consolidated enabler metrics published by the Command this period were limited primarily to ANA data.³

(U) SYNOPSIS

(U) Significant ANP accomplishments published this reporting period included:

- (U) delivery of over 99 percent of total authorized vehicles, weapons, and communications equipment into ANP logistics channels,
- (U) achievement of 97 percent of overall end strength objective,
- (U) a 26 percent increase in ALP personnel strength, with continued increase in numbers of districts approved by MoI and local shuras for ALP development,
- (U) ANP attrition and retention rates in accordance with Command goals,
- (U) advancement of the overall MoI Capability Milestone (CM) rating to CM-2B,
- (U) advancement of the Afghan Public Protection Force CM rating to CM-3, resulting in all MoI departments now rated at CM-3 or higher,
- (U) advancement of Afghanistan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) to CM1-B, the first ANP force to reach this level, and
- (U) accelerated advancement of Afghan Local Police from CM-3 to CM 2-A.

(U) The Command identified areas requiring improvement, including:

- (U) supply and distribution of vehicles, weapons, and communications equipment from depots and logistics centers to the intended ANP units,
- (U) NCO recruitment rates,
- (U) ANP management of ANP Patrolmen training,
- (U) ability to determine literacy levels of the current ANP force,
- (U) pace of overall progress with development of ministerial capacity, and
- (U) accurate assessment of ANP units as Coalition forces drawdown.

(U) BACKGROUND

(U) NTM-A and IJC were established in 2009 to help build a professional, enduring, and self-sustaining ANSF. The major challenges concerning ANSF and ANP/MoI when NTM-A and IJC were organized included:

- (U) inadequate ANSF training capacity and training management, combined with a lack of qualified instructors,
- (U) disparity between ANSF wages and wages of other key government employees,
- (U) an ANP rating system focused on quantitative rather than qualitative measurements,⁴ and
- (U) a “weak MoI logistics system lacking automation, infrastructure, and expertise.”⁵

(U) In 2010, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA), in coordination with ISAF, established the Transition process. Transition is based on the relative readiness of a geographic

³ Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) Quality Metrics and Milestones Report (QMMR), March 2013, p. A 6-1, (e.g. Fielding percentages of ANA Enablers: Engineer, Signal, and Mobile Strike Force Kandaks, and MI Companies).

⁴ “Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan—Report to Congress in accordance with sections of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181), as amended,” October 2009, pp 21-30.

⁵ “Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan,” April 2010, p. 123.

area, defined as a “tranche,” to assume security lead. Tranches are identified and initiated by phases by order of the President of Afghanistan, in coordination with ISAF and a joint Afghan-NATO review board. Once a tranche is initiated, the provinces and districts within it begin the Transition process.

(U) Each tranche, or geographic area, progresses through the Transition process by meeting higher levels of four NATO/ISAF Transition completion criteria: 1) sustainable ANSF are responsible for population security and law enforcement, accountable, and serving the people, 2) provincial governance is sufficiently inclusive, accountable, and acceptable to the Afghan people, 3) population has access to basic social services and adequate rule of law, establishing the foundation for licit economic growth, and 4) ISAF is postured to provide strategic over-watch and assistance needed for Afghan forces to achieve sustainable security.⁶

Figure 1. Provinces/Districts Transitioned to Afghan Security Lead—Tranches One Through Five

DoD OIG (b) (3), 10 USC § 130e - CENTCOM (b) (3), 10 USC § 130e, 10 USC § 435



Source: IJC Campaign and Transition Assessment Group Overview, 18 January 2013

(U) Figure 1 above depicts transition progress of provinces and districts. Tranches 1 and 2 commenced in 2011, and Tranche 3 in July 2012. The implementation of Tranche 4 in February 2013 brought the total number of districts in the transition process to 312, representing 87 percent of the Afghan population.

(U) On June 18, 2013, President Karzai announced the initiation of Tranche 5 for the remaining 91 districts, which means that Coalition forces are no longer in the lead for security in Afghanistan and

⁶ “Transition Overview,” Brief, IJC Campaign and Transition Assessment Group (CTAG), September 2012.

ANSF has assumed lead for security nationwide. Provinces will not formally complete their transitions until the end of 2014. Development assistance to provinces and districts is expected to continue beyond December 2014.⁷

(U) AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE DEVELOPMENT METRICS

(U) This reporting period, OIG used three broad indicators to measure ANP/MoI development: Sustainment, Professionalization, and Transition to Afghan security lead. Using November 2009 as a baseline for comparison, the metrics reflect ANP/MoI monthly changes over the six month period from October 2012 through March 2013 with respect to goals established by GIRoA-ISAF.

(U) “Sustainment” and the term “sustainable” used in Command reports generally refer to the ability of a system or capability to continue to function, or “endure,” after transition to ANSF or GIRoA control. These metrics, tracked and reported by the Command, are measurements of logistics and personnel management effectiveness that contribute to ANSF long-term operational capability:⁸

- (U) ANP equipping (vehicles, weapons, and communication equipment),
- (U) ANP strength, plus a focus on percent fill of validated Afghan Local Police (ALP),
- (U) ANP training capacity and fill,
- (U) ANP recruitment, and
- (U) ANP attrition.

(U) “ANP Professionalization” focuses on the developmental progress of the ANP’s capability to perform its mission. These metrics report progress with:

- (U) certified Afghan trainers,
- (U) NATO police trainers,
- (U) trained NCOs and trained patrolmen, and
- (U) ANP achievement of literacy levels 1, 2, and 3.

(U) “ANP/MoI Transition” reports key indicators of ANP/MoI readiness to transition to Afghan security lead and conduct independent operations. Key metrics which were the Command’s indicators of operational readiness during this reporting period included:

- (U) MoI Capability Milestones (CM), including
 - (U) police functional area and organization CM ratings, and
 - (U) MoI resource management CM ratings;
- (U) ANP unit effectiveness (Rating Definition Levels); and
- (U) district readiness to transition timelines for districts that had not initiated the transition process.

⁷ Transition and Provincial Outlook Report (TPOR), Annex: “COMISAF and NATO SCR: An Evolved View on Completion.” 17 March 2013.

⁸ Joint Pub 1-02, DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, as amended through 15 March 2013, p. 282.

“Sustainment” is defined as “the provision of logistics and personnel services required to maintain and prolong operations until successful mission accomplishment.”

(U) Metrics Discussion

(U) Afghan National Police/Afghan Local Police Sustainment

(U) ANP Equipping

~~(C//REL TO NATO, ISAF)~~

DoD OIG (b) (1), sec. 1.4(a), sec. 1.4(b), CENTCOM (b) (1), sec. 1.4(b)



(U) ANP/ALP Strength

~~(C//REL TO NATO, ISAF)~~

DoD OIG (b) (1), sec. 1.4(a), sec. 1.4(b), CENTCOM (b) (1), sec. 1.4(b)



~~(C//REL TO NATO, ISAF)~~

DoD OIG (b) (1), sec. 1.4(a), sec. 1.4(b), CENTCOM (b) (1), sec. 1.4(b)



(U) ANP Training Center Capacity and Fill

~~(C//REL TO NATO, ISAF)~~

DoD OIG (b) (1), sec. 1.4(a), sec. 1.4(b), CENTCOM (b) (1), sec. 1.4(b)



⁹ "Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan," December 2012, pp. 70-71.

¹⁰ Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) Quality Metrics and Milestones Report (QMMR), March 2013, p. 2.

¹¹ E-mail data update from Special Operations Joint Task Force-Afghanistan (SOJTF-A) CJ10, 3 April 2013.

¹² "Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan," December 2012, p. 69.

¹³ "Current ANP Training Capacity and Fill" monthly briefing, October 2012-March 2013, NTM-A, POC: Police Training.

DoD OIG: (b) (1), sec. 1.4(a), sec. 1.4(b); CENTCOM: (b) (1), sec. 1.4(b)



(U) ANP Recruitment

~~(C//REL TO NATO, ISAF)~~

DoD OIG: (b) (1), sec. 1.4(a), sec. 1.4(b); CENTCOM: (b) (1), sec. 1.4(b)



(U) ANP Attrition

~~(C//REL TO NATO, ISAF)~~

DoD OIG: (b) (1), sec. 1.4(a), sec. 1.4(b); CENTCOM: (b) (1), sec. 1.4(b)



(U) Afghan National Police Professionalization

(U) Certified Afghan Trainers

~~(C//REL TO NATO, ISAF)~~

DoD OIG: (b) (1), sec. 1.4(a), sec. 1.4(b); CENTCOM: (b) (1), sec. 1.4(b)



(U) NATO Police Trainers

~~(C//REL TO NATO, ISAF)~~

DoD OIG: (b) (1), sec. 1.4(a), sec. 1.4(b); CENTCOM: (b) (1), sec. 1.4(b)



¹⁴ NTM-A Police Training Operations Brief, "Courses, Expansion, Capacity," 4 April 2013.

¹⁵ "Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) Quality Metrics and Milestones Report (QMMR)," March 2013, p. 2.

¹⁶ "Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan," December 2012, p. 52.

¹⁷ NTM-A Information Brief, 20 November 2012, Slide 21 (Notes); 20 December 2012, Slide 20; 20 Jan 2013, Slide 20; Phone interview with NTM-A DCOM-P Police Training, 8 May 2012.

¹⁸ Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) Quality Metrics and Milestones Report (QMMR)," March 2013, p A. 5-4.

DoD OIG (b) (1), sec. 1.4(a), sec. 1.4(b), CENTCOM (b) (1), sec. 1.4(b)



(U) Force Development

~~(C//REL TO NATO, ISAF)~~

DoD OIG (b) (1), sec. 1.4(a), sec. 1.4(b), CENTCOM (b) (1), sec. 1.4(b)



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DoD OIG (b) (1), sec. 1.4(a), sec. 1.4(b), CENTCOM (b) (1), sec. 1.4(b)



~~(C//REL TO NATO, ISAF)~~

DoD OIG (b) (1), sec. 1.4(a), sec. 1.4(b), CENTCOM (b) (1), sec. 1.4(b)



(U) Literacy

~~(C//REL TO NATO, ISAF)~~

DoD OIG (b) (1), sec. 1.4(a), sec. 1.4(b), CENTCOM (b) (1), sec. 1.4(b)



~~(C//REL TO NATO, ISAF)~~

DoD OIG (b) (1), sec. 1.4(a), sec. 1.4(b), CENTCOM (b) (1), sec. 1.4(b)



¹⁹ Phone Interview with Chief, Literacy and Language Division, 23 April 2013.

(U) Afghan National Police/Ministry of Interior Transition

(U) ANP/MoI Organization and Resource Management Capability Milestones

~~(C//REL TO NATO, ISAF)~~

DoD OIG: (b) (1), sec. 1.4(a), sec. 1.4(b); CENTCOM: (b) (1), sec. 1.4(b)

~~(C//REL TO NATO, ISAF)~~

DoD OIG: (b) (1), sec. 1.4(a), sec. 1.4(b)

~~(C//REL TO NATO, ISAF)~~

DoD OIG: (b) (1), sec. 1.4(a), sec. 1.4(b); CENTCOM: (b) (1), sec. 1.4(b)

DoD OIG: (b) (1), sec. 1.4(a), sec. 1.4(b)

(U) Security Force Assistance

~~(C//REL TO NATO, ISAF)~~

DoD OIG: (b) (1), sec. 1.4(a), sec. 1.4(b); CENTCOM: (b) (1), sec. 1.4(b)

²⁰ "Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan," April 2010, p. 113.

²¹ The OIG-selected critical functional areas were: Strategic Planning, Policy Development, Finance and Budget, Acquisition and Procurement, Facilities and Installation Management, Logistics, Personnel Management, and Training Management.

²² "Transition and Provincial Outlook Report (TPOR)," 17 March 2013, p. 91; Acquisition and Procurement data from MoI MDB Brief, 23 February 2013, slides 16, 20.

DoD OIG: (b) (1), sec. 1.4(a), sec. 1.4(b); CENTCOM: (b) (1), sec. 1.4(b)



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DoD OIG: (b) (1), sec. 1.4(a), sec. 1.4(b); CENTCOM: (b) (1), sec. 1.4(b)



~~(C//REL TO NATO, ISAF)~~

DoD OIG: (b) (1), sec. 1.4(a), sec. 1.4(b); CENTCOM: (b) (1), sec. 1.4(b)



(U) ANP Operational Readiness

~~(C//REL TO NATO, ISAF)~~

DoD OIG: (b) (1), sec. 1.4(a), sec. 1.4(b); CENTCOM: (b) (1), sec. 1.4(b)



~~(C//REL TO NATO, ISAF)~~

DoD OIG: (b) (1), sec. 1.4(a), sec. 1.4(b); CENTCOM: (b) (1), sec. 1.4(b)



(U) District Readiness to Transition

~~(C//REL TO NATO, ISAF)~~

DoD OIG: (b) (1), sec. 1.4(a), sec. 1.4(b); CENTCOM: (b) (1), sec. 1.4(b)



²³ "Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan," December 2012, p. 86. ANP units assessed include AUP battalion-sized units, AUP Provincial HQs, AUP Regional/Zone HQs, ABP airports, ABP Border Crossing Points, ANCOP kandaks, ANCOP Brigade HQs, and a number of other Special Police units.

²⁴ Snapshot/Last Reported RDL data for top two RDLs in Cycle 16 in October 2012 was 32 percent and 61 percent respectively. Data for Cycle 15, July 2012, was 34 percent and 57 percent. Data is from "ISAF Quarterly Strategic Assessment Report," February 2013, pp.126-127; April 2013, pp. 118-119.

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DoD OIG: (b) (1), sec. 1.4(a), sec. 1.4(b), CENTCOM: (b) (1), sec. 1.4(b)



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(U) Key Acronyms

MoI: Ministry of Interior—the GIROA ministry with command, administrative, and fiscal responsibility for the ANP, ALP, and APPF.

ANP: Afghan National Police—the combined force of four “pillar” police organizations. Components include:

- **ABP:** Afghan Border Police—conducts border defense and operates airports and border crossings;
- **ANCOP:** Afghan National Civil Order Police—responds to significant events and deploys in response to large-scale civil order operations—regarded as the premiere police force in the ANP;
- **AUP:** Afghan Uniformed Police—maintains public order and supports rule of law in communities, and the largest pillar of the ANP; and
- **AACP:** Afghan Anti-Crime Police—focuses on investigations, forensics, and police intelligence.

Other MoI Police Organizations:

- **ALP:** Afghan Local Police—village-based security forces administered by the MoI and trained, in most cases, by coalition special operations forces; and
- **APPF:** Afghan Public Protection Force—responsible for security of fixed-sites and convoys.

(U) Assessment Definitions

(U) We illustrate summary statistics for ANP Sustainment and ANP Professionalism using the “stoplight” format, assigning colors to percentages indicating progress toward a Command-established goal. The few blank spaces represent unreported data. Summary statistics for progress toward ANP/MoI Transition to Afghan Security Lead are based on direct observation of performance by members of the Command and corresponding subjective values assigned by Coalition forces. The rating schemes are described below.

(U) Table 1. ANP/MoI Capability Milestone Ratings

	CM Rating	Definition	Description
	1A	Autonomous	The department is capable of autonomous operations.
	1B	Capable with Coalition Oversight	The department is capable of executing functions with Coalition oversight only.
	2A	Capable with Minimum Coalition Assistance	The department is capable of executing functions with minimal Coalition assistance; only critical ministerial functions are covered.
	2B	Capable with Some Coalition Assistance	The department is capable of executing functions with some Coalition assistance.
	3	Capable with Significant Assistance	The department cannot accomplish its mission without significant Coalition assistance.
	4	Cannot Accomplish the Mission	The department exists but cannot accomplish its mission.

Source: Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2012, p. 47.

(U) Table 2. CUAT SFA Concept Partnering Level Definitions

Rating	Description
Advised	ANSF units that have small, purpose-built advisor teams which are designed to mentor and coach units that have reached one of the top two Rating Definition Levels (RDLs): "Independent with Advisors" or "Effective with Advisors." These advisor teams also provide access to Coalition enablers, such as close air support, MEDEVAC, and joint fires.
Partnered	ANSF units that have an ongoing relationship with an ISAF combat unit. The partner units are responsible for the development of all ANSF in their area of operations (AO). The goal for partner units is to coach and mentor ANSF units until the ISAF combat unit can be replaced with an ISAF advisor team.
Autonomous	ANSF units that are required but don't have partner or advisor teams that coach or mentor them. This rating is not an indicator of a unit's ability to perform autonomously, but is primarily a function of the decreasing availability of ISAF partners and advisors in theatre.
Fielded Not Covered	Fielded units not required to be advised or partnered.

Source: Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2012, pp. 84-90.

(U) Table 3. Rating Definition Levels (assigned by the IJC, descriptions abbreviated by OIG)

	Rating	Description
	Independent with Advisors	Unit is able to plan and execute its mission and maintain command and control of subordinate elements. They can call on and coordinate a QRF and MEDEVAC assets when required, call for integrated Coalition joint effects, and exploit intelligence and operate within a wider intelligence system.
	Effective with Advisors	Unit conducts effective planning, synchronizing, directing, and reporting of operations and status. Coalition Forces provide only limited, occasional guidance to the staff and may provide enablers that are missing from higher or lower ANSF levels. Coalition Forces augment support only on occasion.
	Effective with Partners	Unit requires routine mentoring for planning, synchronizing, directing, and reporting of operations and status; coordinating and communicating with higher, lower, adjacent, and combined/joint units; and maintains effective readiness reports. Those enablers present are providing most of the support to the ANSF unit, however, Coalition Forces may provide enablers that are missing, and augment enabler support.
	Developing with Partners	Unit requires partner unit presence and assistance for planning, synchronizing, directing, and reporting of operations and status; coordinating and communicating with higher, lower, adjacent, and combined/joint units; and maintaining effective readiness reports. Some unit enablers are present and effective at this level of unit. Those present provide some of the support to the ANSF unit. Coalition Forces provide missing enablers and most of the support.
	Established	Unit is beginning organization. It is barely capable of planning, synchronizing, directing, or reporting operations and status, even with the presence and assistance of a partner unit. It is barely able to coordinate and communicate with higher, lower, adjacent, and combined/joint units. Most of the units' enablers are not present or are barely effective. Those enablers present provide little or no support to the ANSF unit. Coalition Forces provide for the missing enablers and most of the support.
	Not Assessed	Areas where insufficient data is available for complete assessment.

Source: Transition and Provincial Outlook Report, 17 March 2013, p. 98.

(U) Table 4. District Readiness to Transition—Time Remaining Until Ready to Transition to Afghan Security Lead

(U) Transition Timeline	
In Transition – Four-stage, condition-based process. Inclusion depends on: ANSF capability, threat level, local governance, and ISAF posture. The phases are: 1. Local Support 2. Tactical Support 3. Operational Support 4. Strategic Support	Time to “In Transition” Process
	< 6 Months
	6–12 Months
	12–18 Months
	18–24 Months
	> 24 Months

Source: Transition and Provincial Outlook Report, 9 December 2012, p. 3.

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Roll-up Summary Statistics of ANP/MoI Police Forces

DoD IG - Special Plans & Operations

(Data from NTM-A /CSTC-A and IJC)

June 28, 2013

DoD OIG: (b) (1), sec. 1.4(a), sec. 1.4(b); CENTCOM: (b) (1), sec. 1.4(b)

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
ANP/ALP Sustainment

DoD IG - Special Plans & Operations

(Data from NTM-A/CSTC-A and IJC)

June 28, 2013

DoD OIG (b) (1), sec. 1.4(a), sec. 1.4(b); CENTCOM (b) (1), sec. 1.4(b)



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ANP Professionalization

DoD IG - Special Plans & Operations

(Data from NTM-A/CSTC-A and IJC)

June 28, 2013

DoD OIG (b) (1), sec. 1.4(a), sec. 1.4(b); CENTCOM (b) (1), sec. 1.4(b)



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ANP/Mol Transition

DoD IG - Special Plans & Operations

(Data from NTM-A/CSTC-A and IJC)

June 28, 2013

DoD OIG (b) (1), sec. 1.4(a), sec. 1.4(b), CENTCOM (b) (1), sec. 1.4(b)



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Special Plans & Operations

Provide assessment oversight that addresses priority national security objectives to facilitate informed, timely decision-making by senior leaders of the DOD and the U.S. Congress.

General Information

Forward questions or comments concerning this assessment and report and other activities conducted by the Office of Special Plans & Operations to spo@dodig.mil

Deputy Inspector General for Special Plans & Operations
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