This document is made available through the declassification efforts and research of John Greenewald, Jr., creator of:



The Black Vault is the largest online Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) document clearinghouse in the world. The research efforts here are responsible for the declassification of hundreds of thousands of pages released by the U.S. Government & Military.

Discover the Truth at: http://www.theblackvault.com



NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

> FOIA Case: 84727A 30 June 2017

JOHN GREENEWALD

Dear Mr. Greenewald:

This is our final response to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request dated 14 June 2016 for Intellipedia pages on "PEARL HARBOR and/or Pearl Harbor advance-knowledge conspiracy theory and/or Attack on Pearl Harbor" and search results pages. A copy of your request is enclosed. As stated in our initial response to you, dated 20 June 2016, your request was assigned Case Number 84727. For purposes of this request and based on the information you provided in your letter, you are considered an "all other" requester. As such, you are allowed 2 hours of search and the duplication of 100 pages at no cost. There are no assessable fees for this request. Your request has been processed under the provisions of the FOIA.

For your information, NSA provides a service of common concern for the Intelligence Community (IC) by serving as the executive agent for Intelink. As such, NSA provides technical services that enable users to access and share information with peers and stakeholders across the IC and DoD. Intellipedia pages are living documents that may be originated by any user organization, and any user organization may contribute to or edit pages after their origination. Intellipedia pages should not be considered the final, coordinated position of the IC on any particular subject. The views and opinions of authors do not necessarily state or reflect those of the U.S. Government.

We conducted a search of all three levels of Intellipedia for the requested topics, and located four documents that are responsive to your request. These documents are enclosed. Certain information, however, has been deleted from the enclosure.

This Agency is authorized by statute to protect certain information concerning its activities (in this case, internal URLs) as well as the names of its employees. Such information is exempt from disclosure pursuant to the third exemption of the FOIA, which provides for the withholding of information specifically protected from disclosure by statute. The specific statute applicable in this case is Section 6, Public Law 86-36 (50 U.S. Code 3605). We have determined that such information exists in this record, and we have excised it accordingly.

In addition, personal information regarding individuals has been deleted from the enclosures in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552 (b)(6). This exemption protects from disclosure information that would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. In balancing the public interest for the information you request against the privacy interests involved, we have determined that the privacy interests sufficiently satisfy the requirements for the application of the (b)(6) exemption.

Since these deletions may be construed as a partial denial of your request, you are hereby advised of this Agency's appeal procedures. You may appeal this decision. If you decide to appeal, you should do so in the manner outlined below.

• The appeal must be in sent via U.S. postal mail, fax, or electronic delivery (e-mail) and addressed to:

NSA/CSS FOIA/PA Appeal Authority (P132), National Security Agency 9800 Savage Road STE 6932 Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755-6932

The facsimile number is (443)479-3612.

The appropriate email address to submit an appeal is FOIARSC@nsa.gov.

- It must be postmarked or delivered electronically no later than 90 calendar days from the date of this letter. Decisions appealed after 90 days will not be addressed.
- Please include the case number provided above.
- Please describe with sufficient detail why you believe the denial of requested information was unwarranted.
- NSA will endeavor to respond within 20 working days of receiving your appeal, absent any unusual circumstances.

For further assistance and to discuss any aspect of your request, you may contact our FOIA Public Liaison at foialo@nsa.gov. You may also contact the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS) at the National Archives and Records Administration to inquire about the FOIA mediation services they offer. OGIS contact information is: Office of Information Services, National Archives and Records Administration, 8601 Adelphi Road-OGIS, College Park, MD 20740-6001; e-mail: ogis@nara.gov; main: 202-741-5770; toll free: 1-877-684-6448; or fax: 202-741-5769.

FOIA Case: 84727A

Finally, regarding your request for a copy of the search results pages, please be advised that the FOIA only requires that this Agency search for records that already exist at the time the search is conducted. Since no search results page existed for this case when it was received, we are not obligated to fulfill this portion of your request.

Sincerely, Paul W for

JOHN R. CHAPMAN Chief, FOIA/PA Office NSA Initial Denial Authority

Encls: a/s

.

From: Sent:	donotreply@nsa.gov Thursday, June 16, 2016 10:21 PM
To:	donotreply@nsa.gov
Subject:	FOIA Request (Web form submission)
Title: Mr.	
Full Name: John Greenewald	
email: john@greenewald.com	
Company: The Black Vault	
Postal Address:	
Postal City:	
Postal State-prov:	
Zip Code:	
Country: United States of Ameri	са
Home Phone:	
Work Phone:	

Records Requested: To whom it may concern,

This is a non-commercial request made under the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act 5 U.S.C. S 552. My FOIA requester status as a "representative of the news media" however due to your agency's denial of this status, I hereby submit this request as an "All other" requester.

I prefer electronic delivery of the requested material either via email to john@greenewald.com or via CD-ROM or DVD via postal mail. Please contact me should this FOIA request should incur a charge.

I respectfully request a copy of the Intellipedia entry (from all three Wikis that make up the Intellipedia) for the following entry(s) (Or whatever similar topic may pertain if it is slightly worded differently):

1

PEARL HARBOR

and/or

Pearl Harbor advance-knowledge conspiracy theory

and/or

Attack on Pearl Harbor

I also ask that you include a copy of the search results page, when inserting the above words / phrases into the Intellipedia search engine.

Thank you so much for your time, and I am very much looking forward to your response.

Sincerely,

1

-

John Greenewald, Jr.


(U) Attack on Pearl Harbor

From Intellipedia	Location: N	Ap Coordinates Abou
With TPP-1-4-A With TPP-1-4-A Market State (State (State)) year	This article was transferred, in part, from Wikipedia. It was imported to demonstrate displaying multiple locations with the Map Widget. Intellipedians should feel free to expand, remove, or change this page as needed.	

The attack on Pearl Harbor (called "Hawaii Operation" or "Operation Z" by the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters and the Battle of Pearl Harbor) was a surprise military strike conducted by the Imperial Japanese Navy against the United States naval base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, on the morning of December 7, 1941 (December 8 in Japan). The attack was intended as a preventive action in order to keep the U.S. Pacific Fleet from interfering with military actions the Empire of Japan was planning in Southeast Asia against overseas territories of the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and the United States.

Locations

The large marker represents the location associated with this article. Smaller markers show the location of each U.S. ship sunk in the attack.



. Doc ID: 6584853


٠

Attack on Pearl Harbor - Intellipedia

Categories: Japan United States United States Pacific Command	d World War II World War II sites
Classified By:	
Derived From: Declassify On: May 16, 2039	
,	
 This page has been accessed 1,820 times. 	
 1 watching user <u>This page was last modified 11:53, 16 May 2014 by</u> 	Most recent editors:
	(b) (6) linipodwebd
Use of this U.S. Government system, authorized or unauthorized, constitutes consent to monitor	ring of this system. Unauthorized use may subject you t
criminal prosecution Evidence of unauthorized use collected during monitoring may be used for admini	
This page contains dynamic content Highest Possible Classificati	ion is SECRET//NOFORN
N.	
`.	7
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36	6
	6/20/201

(U) Attack on Pearl Harbor


UNCLASSIFIED




(called Hawaii Operation or Operation Z by the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters and the Battle of Pearl Harbor) was a surprise military strike conducted by the Imperial Japanese Navy against the United States naval base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, on the morning of December 7, 1941 (December 8 in Japan). The attack was intended as a preventive action in order to keep the U.S. Pacific Fleet from interfering with military actions the Empire of Japan was planning in Southeast Asia against overseas territories of the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and the United States.

Locations

The large marker represents the location (coordinate 21.368022, -157.949452) associated with this article. Smaller markers show the location of each U.S. ship sunk in the attack.





(U) Attack on Pearl Harbor

(b) (3)	-P.L.	86-36
---------	-------	-------

* * 9 BA

UNCLASSIFIED

From Intellipedia

You have new messages (last change). From Intellipedia

Location: Map | Coordinates | About

(U) The genesis of the Intelligence Community in its modern form can be dated from just before 8 am local time on December 7, 1941, when nearly 350 Japanese aircraft - flying in waves from six Japanese aircraft carriers - swept from a clear sky to bomb US Navy ships and Army installations around Pearl Harbor, killing 2,402 Americans and destroying a large part of the U.S. Navy's Pacific Fleet. The shock of that disaster still reverberates. Lessons drawn from Pearl Harbor were incorporated in the intelligence reforms accomplished by the 1947 National Security Act, and its anniversary was even cited by Representatives as they passed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, IRTPA in the House on December 7, 2004.



Pearl Harbor, 7 December 1941

Contents

- 1 (U) Warning at Pearl Harbor
- 2 (U) A Photographic Record
- 3 (U) Soviet Foreknowledge?
- 4 (U) Investigations and Conspiracy Theories
- 5 (U) Effects on the Intelligence Community
- 6 (U) Locations
- 7 (U) References
- 8 (U) Links

Approved for Release by NSA on 06-30-2017, FOIA Case # 84727

(U) Warning at Pearl Harbor

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

(U) Editorial Note: The official version of the attack on Pearl Harbor is that the attack caught U.S. Government officials by surprise. This article reflects that position. This view is challenged by some scholars but strongly defended by others. Those scholars doubting the official version argue that new information from released files, and other sources, show President Roosevelt and some members of his administration knew the attack was coming. Both sides agree the attack surprised American military forces at Pearl Harbor.

(U) Washington expected war in Southeast Asia, and believed Japan was desperate enough to violently pull America into a larger struggle. The Roosevelt Administration, and its senior military commanders, believed Tokyo might order a surprise attack on British and possibly US installations; preventing interference with Japan's southern thrust toward Indochina and the Dutch East Indies. Indeed, they sent Army and Navy commanders at Pearl Harbor a "warning of war" order in late-November 1941, directing them to be ready for sudden hostilities. However decision-makers in both Washington and Pearl Harbor, reasoned any attack would take the form of sabotage.

(U) The United States had useful strategic warning of war with Japan, why were US commanders at Pearl Harbor not ready for a strike by Japanese naval aircraft? American forces had been on alert three times in the eighteen months before 7 December, yet neglected aspects of their own defense. Neither the Army nor Navy commander on the scene was "senior" to the other, thus the base had no clear chain of command. The Services conducted their own, uncoordinated patrols; maintained separate watches which rarely communicated; and hadn't established joint warning and alert procedures. Finally, Washington's November war warning was ambiguous, in it instructed the commanders to prepare their forces without alarming local civilians.

(U) Washington issued such an unhelpful directives for several reasons. It had no clandestine collection assets in Tokyo to reveal Japanese war planning, and diverted resources away from cracking Imperial naval codes and into the effort to read Japan's diplomatic cables. The US Navy (through traffic analysis) had spotted powerful Japanese forces moving toward Southeast Asia over the previous week, but Navy analysts had lost track of most of Japan's larger aircraft carriers, and Japanese deception measures apparently convinced the analysts that two or more carriers remained near Japan. Early on 7 December, code-breakers in Washington learned from intercepted diplomatic cables that Tokyo was about to break relations with the United States (and presumably to commence hostilities). The message informing Pearl Harbor of this development arrived during the actual attack.

(U) Could the attack have been prevented? Probably not, although it could have been blunted and its impact reduced. Just six months later in June 1942, the Navy, through its reading of an Imperial naval code, divined the target of a similar Japanese strike on the US airbase at Midway Island in time to prepare its defenses. The Japanese aircraft carriers nevertheless slipped through a cordon of patrol aircraft and were not spotted until they were launching a damaging air strike on Midway. The battle turned out well for the United States all the same because the early warning of Japanese plans allowed the Navy to position its own carriers in ambush.

(U) A Photographic Record

(U) The story of the Pearl Harbor disaster can be inferred from the photograph that accompanies this article, one of the most remarkable snapshots ever taken.

(U) The attack began at roughly 0753 that morning. At 0805 the battleship *Arizona* erupted in a massive explosion ignited by a bomb that detonated in its forward magazines. The fact that the *Arizona* appears unscathed in this picture indicates that the Japanese aviator who took it snapped his shutter at some point in that 12-minute window of time.

(U) Careful study of the photograph reveals a host of details. In the foreground is Battleship Row, with the battle-wagons

Nevada, Arizona, West Virginia, Tennessee, Oklahoma, Maryland, and California lying at anchor from left to right (the supply ship Vestal and the oilier Neosho complete the line-up). The wakes of Japanese aerial torpedoes lace the water, and the West Virginia, Oklahoma, and California have been hit by them and begun listing to port. A towering waterspout from a hit on West Virginia is frozen in time beside the doomed ship, and the shock waves from the torpedo hits are fanning out across the harbor. In the distance, the US Army's Hickam Field is also being bombed and strafed; acrid smoke is drifting off to the right of the picture.

(U) Japanese attackers had achieved a stunning tactical surprise; it seems that there was not an American gun firing back at this point of the attack. In a few minutes the sky would be peppered with bursting anti-aircraft shells, but for now the attackers have everything their way.

(U) To deal with the aftermath of the attack, the U.S. Navy's Chief of Naval Operations approved a contract on 11 December which established the Naval Salvage Service. Of the 19 U.S. Navy ships that were sunk or damaged on 7 December, all but 3 (USS Arizona, USS Oklahoma and the old battleship *Utah*) were successfully repaired and returned to active service during the war. While the battleship USS Arizona was too heavily damaged to be salvaged, some of its equipment and its two aft main gun turrets were successfully removed and put to use aboard other vessels. For the Japanese Navy, of the 22 ships and submarines that were part of the attacking force, only one survived the subsequent naval war in the Pacific.

(U) Soviet Foreknowledge?

(U) One of the Soviet Union's most successful spies during World War II, Richard Sorge, provided valuable reports from Imperial Japan that provided not only unheeded warnings of the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, but also unshared intelligence that Japan intended to attack the U.S. Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor as a prelude to a general Asian-Pacific campaign of conquest. Sorge's reporting confirmed that Imperial Japanese forces planned to move south toward the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies, and French Indochina, rather than attack the USSR. Although this Japanese plan included the attack on Pearl Harbor, Stalin ignored the information of vital American interest, but did shift Red Army troops from the Soviet-Manchuria border in Siberia to push back German forces before Moscow on 5 December 1941, confident that the Japanese would not launch a surprise attack on the USSR.

(U) Investigations and Conspiracy Theories

(U) As living memory fades, our understanding of Pearl Harbor seems likely to remain fairly well settled. Conspiracy theorists have insisted that the Japanese success was not due to careful planning and execution, but must have resulted from some form of malfeasance on the American side. Yet none have produced evidence to shake the basic findings of Congress' joint investigation in 1946. Congressional probers essentially attributed the disaster to a lack of imagination and vigilance (and a confused command structure) on the part of the American commanders on the scene, U.S. Navy Admiral Husband E. Kimmel (1882–1968), and U.S. Army Hawaiian Department Commander, Maj. Gen. Walter C. Short (1880–1949). Both men defended their decisions in repeated Congressional inquires running as late as 1946, yet were retired from their respective services soon after the attack (Kimmel in March 1942 and Short in February 1942).

Admiral Kimmel Testifies on Pearl Harbor @Info

(U) Congressional investigators further established that poor command decisions were compounded by poor coordination and dissemination of intelligence in Washington. This does not mean that we know all there is to be known about what happened in 1941. There have been minor revelations over the last generation, mainly about Japan's ability to read cables between Washington and its embassy in Tokyo, and the disclosure of the US Navy's decryption (in 1945) of Japanese naval messages intercepted before the attack. These have added nuance, but have not changed the basic story.

(U) Effects on the Intelligence Community


(U) Decision-makers in the White House and Congress drew several lessons from Pearl Harbor as they crafted the National Security Act in 1947. In the view of President Harry S Truman, the Japanese attack might have been prevented "if there had been something like coordination of information in the government." President Truman observed in his memoirs: "In those days the military did not know everything the State Department knew, and the diplomats did not have access to all the Army

and Navy knew." Congress and the Pentagon also saw an important military lesson: the need to enforce the principle of "unity of command" at all levels. The "theater commander" system introduced in World War II sprang from this insight, which became the basis of the Unified Command Plan that was recognized in the 1947 Act.

(U) For students of intelligence, the enduring lesson of December 7, 1941 was articulated by Roberta Wolhstetter in her 1962 classic "Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision." American commanders and intelligence officers were surprised by the Japanese attack less because they lacked clues to Tokyo's intentions and capabilities than because those clues lay unnoticed amongst volumes of unrelated or even misleading data. Wohlstetter described the warning problem as one of separating "signals" from "noise," and Pearl Harbor has quite literally become a textbook example of its difficulty.


(U) Locations

(U) The large marker represents the location (latitude: 21.368151, longitude: -157.949066) associated with this article. Smaller markers show the location of each U.S. ship sunk in the attack.



(U) References

• Fuchida Mitsuo and Okumiya Masatake. *Midway: The Battle that Doomed Japan.* 1951, English version 1955. Capt. Fuchida led the Japanese aircraft in the attack on Pearl Harbor. He describes the attack from the Japanese point of view in explaining how the battle of Midway came about.



(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

- Goldstein, Donald M, and Dillon, Katerine V. The Way It Was: Pearl Harbor: The Original Photographs . 1991.
- The Pearl Harbor Papers: Inside the Japanese Plans. 1993. The collection of primary sources includes Capt. Fuchida's detailed sketch map used to brief the emperor on the results of the attack.
- Kimmett, Larry, and Regis, Margaret. The Attack on Pearl Harbor: An Illustrated History.
- Life magazine special. Pearl Harbor: America's Call to Arms. 2001. Journalistic, but with many photographs.
- Lord, Walter. Day of Infamy. 1957. A popular account, stressing how the events affected individuals.
- Prange, Gordon W., Goldstein, Donald M, and Dillon, Katerine V. At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story of Pearl

6 8

Harbor

- --- December 7 1941: The Day the Japanese Attacked Pearl Harbor. 1988. Similar to Day of Infamy but more detailed.
- Smith, Carl. Pearl Harbor 1941: The Day of Infamy. 1999. Copiously illustrated and identifying all the vessels in Pearl during the attack.
- Wohlstedter, Roberta. Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision. 1962. A case study of the intelligence failure, arguing that signals that might have alerted intelligence were drowned out by noise of routine activity.

(U) Links

- Black Swan Theory
- World War II
- U.S. Navy
- ILC Amm

Retrieved from		
Categories: Intelligence History World War II Hawaii History	of Intelligence Attack	on Pearl Harbor Battles involving
the United States History of the United States Events in 1941		
UNCLASS	IFIED (b)(3) - P.L. 86-36
• This page has been accessed 21,203 times.		
• 7		
watching users		
This page was last modified 16:10, 7 December 2015 by		Most recent
editors: and others.	s	
	(b) (6)	

Use of this U.S. Government system, authorized or unauthorized, constitutes consent to monitoring of this system. Unauthorized use may subject you to criminal prosecution. Evidence of unauthorized use collected during monitoring may be used for administrative, criminal, or other adverse actions.

This page contains dynamic content -- Highest Possible Classification is TOP SECRET//SI/TK//NOFORN

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

Intelligence History Portal

(U) Pearl Harbor

UNCLASSIFIED

From Intellipedia

Pearl Harbor is a large natural harbor located on the island O'ahu in the Hawaiian Islands. Pearl Harbor became a US Naval base around 1908, and was attacked by the Japanese on Dec 7th, 1941. Pearl Harbor Naval Base today is home to significant combat fores of the US Pacific Fleet. Retrieved from Pearl Harbor Categories: Hawaii | Military Installations UNCLASSIFIED This page has been accessed 7,516 times. **USS** Arizona Memorial 3 watching users This page was last modified 13:36, 30 June 2010 by Most recent editors: (b) (6) Iminedweb8s Use of this U.S. Government system, authorized or unauthorized, constitutes consent to monitoring of this system. Unauthorized use may subject you to criminal prosecution Evidence of unauthorized use collected during monitoring may be used fdr administrative criminal or other adverse actions This page contains dynamic content - Highest Possible Classification is SECRET//NOFORN (b) (3)-P.L. 86-36 Approved for Release by NSA on 06-30-2017, FOIA Case # 84727

0000

6/20/2016