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November 10, 2009

Mr. John Greenewald, Jr.

[REDACTED]

Dear Mr. Greenewald:

SUBJECT: FOIA REQUEST - FY 2009-05

This refers to your electronic mail request for a copy of the report entitled, "Democratic Influence through Internet Usage in the Peoples Republic of China." Your FOIA request was received at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, on July 13, 2009 and was assigned our tracking number FY 2009-05.

During our search, we examined the files maintained by Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey and identified the enclosed redacted version of the document you requested as responsive to your request. Review of the identified document reveals that it is partially exempt from disclosure under exemptions (b)(1) and (b)(6) of the FOIA since it contains classified information and privacy information, which, if disclosed, would constitute an unwarranted release of security information regarding national defense and/or foreign policy, and invasion of personal privacy, respectively. A copy of all releasable portions is enclosed.

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Fees associated with the processing of your request were waived in this instance.

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Because your request has been denied in part, you are advised of your right to appeal this determination, in writing, to: Judge Advocate General of the Navy (Code 14), 1322 Patterson Avenue SE, Suite 3000, Washington Navy Yard, DC 20374-5066.


Your appeal must be postmarked within 60 calendar days from the date of this letter to be considered. A statement as to why your appeal should be granted should be included and the enclosed copy of this letter should be attached. Both the appeal letter and the envelope should bear the notation, "Freedom of Information Act Appeal."

For your information and consideration in this matter, the response process particular to your request was reviewed by the highest authority and the document itself was reviewed by a subject matter expert to determine what was releasable.

Any questions concerning this matter should be directed to LN1 Bernhardt at 831-656-2506 or ldberha@nps.edu.

I am the official responsible for the partial denial of your request.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Alberto Munguia", with a stylized flourish extending from the end of the name.

Alberto Munguia
Captain, U.S. Navy
Judge Advocate General's Corps

(b)(1)

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL Monterey, California



THESIS

DEMOCRATIC INFLUENCE THROUGH INTERNET USAGE IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (U)

by

(b)(6)

September 2002

Thesis Advisor:
Second Reader:

(b)(6)

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**DEMOCRATIC INFLUENCE THROUGH INTERNET USAGE IN THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (U)**

(b)(6)

Ensign, United States Navy
B.S., Maine Maritime Academy, 2001

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE IN INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND OPERATIONS

from the

**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
September 2002**

Author:

Approved by:

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ABSTRACT (U)

(U) The People's Republic of China (PRC) is a totalitarian regime that can be influenced through the Internet. Over 35 percent of China's citizens utilize the medium, including numerous international dissidents and pro-democracy advocates. This study illustrates China's Internet usage characteristics, provides case analyses of democratic and non-democratic Internet usage, and illustrates how the PRC and its citizens interact over the Internet. Finally, I provide my observations and recommendations of what the United States should do, through the Internet, to effectively encourage democracy in China.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (U)

(U) The People's Republic of China (PRC) is a totalitarian regime that can be influenced through the Internet. Over 35 percent of China's citizens utilize the medium, including numerous international dissidents and pro-democracy advocates. This study illustrates China's Internet usage characteristics, provides case analyses of democratic and non-democratic Internet usage, and illustrates how the PRC and its citizens interact over the Internet. Finally, I provide my observations and recommendations of what the United States should do, through the Internet, to effectively encourage democracy in China. The United States must create Internet avenues for dissidents, private NGOs, and pro-democracy advocates to travel. I discuss these avenues and how they relate to each aforementioned entity.

I. INTRODUCTION (U)

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A. (U) INFRASTRUCTURE

(U) China's Internet infrastructure consists of nine Internet Access Providers, which link China's networks to other international networks [Ref. 15]. Each network is directly connected to numerous countries, including the United States [Ref. 1]. By July 2001 these access providers accommodated approximately 620 Internet Service Providers (ISPs), which serviced approximately 1600 Internet Content Providers [Ref. 15]. China has more than 290,000 web sites on the Internet [Ref. 24]. Many PRC Internet users are young, technologically savvy individuals. Ages range in the 20s and 30s, and most are students, professors, and intellectuals [Ref. 18]. These young users are about 30% of total users, which indicates that the Internet is spreading out to the common citizen [Ref. 24]. A Nielsen survey determined that most men aged 16 – 34 are likely to surf the Net with family [Ref. 3]. Of the population over 16 years old, more than 80 percent used the Internet "twice or more than twice a week" [Ref. 3]. China experienced rapid Internet growth in the late 1990's, sometimes doubling the number of users every six months

[Ref. 24]. This drastic increase in usage indicates how important Internet access is becoming to Chinese citizens.

B. (U) ACCESS METHODS

(U) The Chinese population accesses the Internet through three methods, each exhibiting different usage characteristics. To gain access, the common citizen can use Internet Service Providers, Internet Cafes, and most recently, schools and libraries. ISPs and ICPs face serious availability roadblocks. The cost of creating and operating an ISP is significant. Most providers have experienced price controls that have restricted profits and increased access cost [Ref. 18]. The ISPs are given freedom to determine service cost, but their profits are minimal due to government requirements [Ref. 9]. The license to operate an ISP mandates that ISPs must publish their fees and cannot deviate from those costs [Ref. 9]. Therefore, it doesn't appear that the PRC is controlling service fees to decrease public Internet access. Sources from the Nielson/NetRatings illustrate that only 5 percent of the Chinese population has access through an ISP [Ref. 3]. This indicates that the cost of home connectivity is generally beyond the common citizen. Therefore, they must seek Internet access elsewhere.

(U) The most popular and most recently available method of accessing the Internet is through schools and libraries. The PRC is currently undertaking construction of an information network that will link the entire nation through schools and libraries. It will be completed in 2005, and will allow users to freely log on to the network [Ref. 17]. The Minister of Culture Sun Jiazheng stated, "The project will create a brand new channel for the exchange of cultural information in China without the limits of time and space. By using modern information technology, cultural resources will be digitized and put onto the computer network, which will be available throughout the country." [Ref. 17] This National Digital Library has the potential to connect millions more citizens, even in the most remote locations. One of the most interesting facets of this program is that users don't need a computer to access the library. Television with a special box for Internet access will enable 320 million TV viewers connectivity to the medium [Ref. 17]. This technology, called MyWeb, is being created by Microsoft. The company has secured major licensing agreements with leading ISPs in China [Ref. 8]. Mr. Wang Ping Guo, managing director of NetChina IT co., stated, "We are very optimistic about the market

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for MyWeb (television) set-top boxes in China. They contribute significantly to the exponential growth of Internet users in the next few years." [Ref. 8] The MyWeb service will allow poorer citizens without computers access to the Internet. There are already 15,000 set-top boxes in the Asian market, with another 100,000 to be sold in 2002 [Ref. 8].

(U) The fastest growing form of Internet access is through numerous Internet cafes. They are the easiest way for the common citizen to get access time because there are over 94,000 cafes in China [Ref. 31]. Over 30 million of China's 1.3 billion people log on, which is up from 4 million in 1999 [Ref. 26]. This equates to 20 percent of the 22.5 million Internet users using cafes as their primary access point [Ref. 2]. Also, up to 15 percent of children in large cities use Internet cafes [Ref. 4]. These businesses are important to users because they are the gateway to Internet chat rooms. Users can log into the rooms and "chat" real-time with any other user. One of the largest is the Feiyu Net Café near Beijing University, which contains over 1000 computers [Ref. 18].

C. (U) GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS

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D. (U) USAGE

(U) Chinese citizens use the Internet for several different reasons. They include: news, entertainment, business, and communication. Gathering news is a huge Internet attraction. The Nielson survey illustrated that more than 40 percent of Chinese Internet surfers used the medium to browse news items, and send emails [Ref. 4]. Sites with news summaries contain information that has condensed information from a range of sources [Ref. 14]. Obviously, all news in the pre-Internet era was difficult to obtain, due to China's enormous size and PRC implemented controls. Now, the Internet allows the common individual to obtain information from multiple sources in rapid fashion. Many newspapers have developed online editions, which feature full-length articles and keyword searching [Ref. 14]. Also, news is considered a form of Internet entertainment, which is on the rise, although the government censors numerous news websites. News and first-hand accounts from remote areas can be easily gathered, thus making human rights violations and other events in distant provinces easily available [Ref. 29].

1. (U) E-Commerce

(U) E-Commerce is an extremely hot-topic within the People's Republic of China, and it is a driving force behind the public's need for Internet access. The profit motive has proven to be a huge motive on the Internet's development [Ref. 29]. Although very few businesses have gone completely on-line, both the PRC and citizens agree that the Internet will play a large role in future business. Some companies are already listing themselves on ChinaMarket.com, or MeetChina.com to do their business [Ref. 13]. There is a great disparity between State Owned Enterprises (SOE) and privately owned companies. The PRC gives incentives to SOEs, which utilize government Internet protocol and software [Ref. 13]. The smaller family businesses usually do not have the resources or expertise to effectively use E-Commerce advantageously. It is uncertain when most Chinese business will be E-Commerce compliant. The government sees the

Internet as a growth necessity, so it will push to create a globally competitive E-Commerce system.

2. (U) Breakthroughs

(U) The PRC recently conveyed the need for the development of several breakthroughs concerning Internet technology through the Global Information Infrastructure Commission. The country has insufficient bandwidth, technology, and information sharing capabilities [Ref. 18]. The government wants a smooth transition to wide band and high-speed public information net with combination of sound, data, and video [Ref. 18]. These capabilities will enhance future businesses to effectively conduct E-Commerce.

(U) Upgrading technology is a serious concern of the PRC. The government wants to create a creative, appropriately organized, profitable, and competitive research and production mechanism [Ref. 18]. A focus on what is needed to improve connectivity will allow the government to better control the medium.

(U) Finally, the ability to securely share information is critical to move the PRC into the 21st Century. They want a thorough coordination of technology to improve information sharing. New establishment and improvement of information systems in all departments and industries is encouraged [Ref. 18].

E. (U) CHAPTER-BY-CHAPTER SUMMARY

(U) The current chapter illustrates how important the Internet is to China's population. The medium is expanding from the urban regions with availability to the most rural communities.

(U) In Chapter II, I will describe how the Internet correlates to democracy. I will discuss the Internet savvy democratic governments of Barcelona, Spain, and Iceland.

(U) In Chapter III, I will illustrate the relationship between the Burmese government and its citizens. It addresses how the Burmese dictatorship attempts to control information, and how dissenters combat censorship. Also, it will show how the Internet can be an important free-speech tool.

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(U) In Chapter IV, I will overview the relationship between the PRC, pro-democracy activists and mainland citizens.

(U) In Chapter V, I will provide my observations and recommendations. Several methods of promoting democracy in China will be discussed.

II. THE INTERNET AND DEMOCRACY (U)

(U) The Internet is a tool that promotes free speech, connects people, and can be used to share information. Therefore, I believe that the medium is pro-democracy. To illustrate this point I will use as examples the democratic governments of Barcelona, Spain and Iceland. Each situation is an excellent example of how the Internet influences government, and how the government influences citizen Internet usage.

A. (U) BARCELONA, SPAIN

(U) Unlike the PRC, Barcelona's government wants to discover, survey, and listen to the opinions of citizens on important issues [Ref. 21]. Peter Alcober, City Councilor in charge of Civic Participation stated, "The general objective is to use the new information technologies to facilitate the transmission (sending, receiving, exchanging) of information, opinions and knowledge between the citizens and the administration regarding issues, which are (or are defined and being) important to the city of Barcelona. The aim is to provide a channel for all citizens who want to express their opinions on everything undertaken by the City Council, capitalizing on the vast potential for participation afforded by the new technologies." [Ref. 21]

(U) Barcelona has several citizen participation criteria, which are aided by the Internet:

- Participation by the entire municipal organization. All city departments are involved. Therefore, citizens can directly deal with politicians and specialists involved.
- The citizen chooses the extent to which they want to participate.
- The contributions are not binding in terms of the decisions, but they are taken into consideration for the final draft of the proposals.

(U) The aforementioned criteria show how the Internet can be used to influence government. The citizens can communicate their opinions freely, without fear of reprisal. This type of electronic participation can increase commitment to the community, improve trust in government, and empower citizens [Ref. 28].

B. (U) ICELAND

(U) Iceland's electronic government/public interaction is another excellent example of how the Internet promotes democracy. They believe that officials must grant citizens access to government information for democracy to work. [Ref. 20]. This access can create numerous advantages:

- Information can be accessed from almost anywhere.
- Updating of information is faster and easier.
- Information can be made more accessible by providing the user with search facilities.
- Communications between citizens and their government can be made easier.

(U) These aforementioned advantages illustrate how extensive use of government information, without limitation to anyone, can promote democracy [Ref. 20]. Every citizen with computer access will have the right to voice his or her opinion on government topics. Therefore, for the Internet and democracy to meld, the citizens must have access to the medium. Reinforcing democracy will depend on citizen Internet access capabilities, and computer literacy [Ref. 20]. With the tools provided by the Icelandic government, importance will be placed on ensuring that all citizens can gain access to the Internet, will not be hindered by computer illiteracy, economic standing, or location of residence [Ref. 20].

(U) Both examples illustrate how citizens and government can positively interact through the Internet. Both governments tout the benefits of information dissemination through the electronic medium. They illustrate how almost any government-related information desired by citizens can be found through the Internet. Each user can participate to the extent he or she desires. Information is accurate and up-to-date. These characteristics are inherently democratic. In a democracy, citizens must have the right to access information and do with it what they choose. Both Barcelona and Iceland have citizens who are informed and can freely voice their opinions.

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(U) In this chapter I provided evidence that a citizen can utilize the Internet to effectively communicate with government, and that this capability is inherently democratic. The next chapter will illustrate how Internet savvy dissidents affect the Burmese dictatorship.

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III. BURMA/SLORC INTERNET RELATIONSHIP (U)

A. (U) BURMA INTERNET BACKGROUND

(U) Internet technology has connected people on a global scale. This connection has translated to become the forefront of organizational structure for the PRC and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), alike. The Internet is a tool widely used by NGOs to deal with their issues. Situations, such as Burma, suggest that we look deeper to derive the true relationship between computer-based communications and the "voice" of the people. This situation directly correlates to what can happen in China. By comparing what has happened in Burma to what can happen in China, one can deduce possible outcomes in the PRC. "The past decade is replete with examples of how advanced information flows have played a central role in helping grassroots activists, who seek democratic rule, to counter dictatorial regimes" [Ref. 10]. The Information Age's weapon-of-choice is the Internet [Ref. 10]. This is true because this weapon can be wielded by anyone with a phone line and a computer. It allows people to expeditiously and efficiently gather in an electronic fashion. In the early 1990s, a few Burmese exiles opposed to the regime in Rangoon began communicating on the Internet via electronic mail [Ref. 10]. In 1993, the first pro-democracy Burmese website, BurmaNet, was launched in Thailand [Ref. 10]. It was the first regular and consistent source of information on Burma available on the Internet [Ref. 10]. Within the next few years the amount of BurmaNet members increased drastically. The number of subscribers went from a handful to over 750 users in under 5 years [Ref. 10].

B. (U) SLORC

(U) Burma is ruled by a fierce dictatorship called the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC). The government forces strict regulations on many things, including Internet access. These regulations consist of strict penalties for possession of unauthorized electronic equipment, and suppressive Internet connection policies [Ref. 10]. "The case of Burma raises intriguing questions about the effect of modern computer communications on the balance of power between citizens and elected officials, and among local, national, and international power structures and, ultimately, their effect on

the conduct of diplomacy in the 21st century" [Ref. 10]. I believe the Burmese grassroots activists have created excellent examples of how to disseminate Internet propaganda, while the SLORC has illustrated that it is possible, but difficult to operate defensively.

(U) In September 1996, SLORC began to counter the activist's pro-democracy propaganda [Ref. 10]. Any opposition to SLORC's government within Burma was met with exile [Ref. 10]. The exiled were scattered about the globe. From Australia to the United States and Europe, the outcasts found it difficult to communicate their ideas with each other, so there was little in the form of protest. E-mail became the first tool for the activists to voice their opinions [Ref. 10]. These communications began an international protest of SLORC. It began as BurmaNet, an Internet site where views and information could be collected. This site enabled the once globally separated protesters to come together and discuss their issues in the electronic environment. This wouldn't have been possible prior to the Information Age. With the "free-Burma" voices growing louder the Burmese government had no choice but to try and match the protesters by implementing their own counter-propaganda. Their first action was to impose strict punishments for owning unauthorized computer communications equipment. The Computer Science Development Law chastised offenders with a prison sentence of 7 to 15 years and fines up to \$5,000 [Ref. 10]. To counter BurmaNet SLORC created the soc.culture.burma newsgroup whose purpose was to transmit the government's official statements, and counter BurmaNet's propaganda [Ref. 10]. Also, In May 1997, the government began its own mailing list, MyanmarNet, to compete with BurmaNet [Ref. 10]. It was moderated and censored to reflect positive opinions of SLORC [Ref. 10]. Unfortunately, SLORC's attempt was futile. "SLORC's ability to fight back outside its borders when the Internet is used against it appears to be limited to monitoring public Internet discussions and trying to publicize its own point of view. The delete key can't do very much to you. The only currency that works on the Internet is the ability to persuade, entertain, whatever." [Ref. 10] These offensive and defensive cases are critical in understanding the role of the Internet. The ability of the exiled Burmese to join in an electronic forum to express their beliefs directly impacted SLORC. This is validated by the government's policy implementation. The overall result was an increased voicing of public opinion, which SLORC could not counter effectively. "SLORC's ability to fight back outside its borders

when the Internet is used against it appears to be limited to monitoring public Internet discussions and trying to publicize its own point of view.” [Ref. 10] This quote illustrates that people scattered across the globe can still electronically gather and communicate in a virtual environment outside of their country’s borders.

C. (U) HARVARD UNIVERSITY VS. PEPSICO

(U) The use of the Internet to shape policy was further exemplified in Harvard University’s student body. They were appalled by the Burmese government’s human rights violations. A few student activists decided not to attack the government, but to go directly at one American company doing business in Burma.

(U) The company “choice” was Pepsi. “The advent of computers on university campuses linking student groups into national and international networks seems to have invigorated social activism and has transformed the character of student protests.” [Ref. 10] The Harvard activities started out much like the BurmaNet protests. They discovered that Pepsi was cooperating with SLORC, and sought out ways to sway the snack food giant’s operations. They started with Harvard’s food service division. Food service was inquiring about shifting from Coke products to Pepsi. The students saw this as their conduit to indirectly attack American business relationships with Burma. Through the Internet they held meetings, protested, and posted comments about the issues. These actions had a direct effect on promoting the Massachusetts Selective Purchasing Agreement and on Pepsi’s business operations in Burma [Ref. 10]. The bill bans corporations that do business in Burma from getting new contracts with the Commonwealth of Massachusetts [Ref. 10]. Massachusetts Governor William Weld stated, “Supporters of this and other bills to impose sanctions on Burma have been particularly successful in their use of electronic mail to keep their movement going, leading one activist to describe this as the first ‘cybercampaign’.” [Ref. 10] While the bill was moving through the state legislature in 1995 and 1996, activists continued to use the Internet to push it along [Ref. 10]. In 1996, the Pepsi shareholders decided to withdraw from Burma, and they did not get the contract with Harvard [Ref. 10]. This outcome indicates that there is a way for the “netizen” to affect policy.

D. (U) OUTCOMES

(U) The Burma case illustrates the effectiveness of the Internet on large societal structure, and it also shows its effect on the individual. Would Pepsi still be operating in Burma if there were no Internet? Would students with only partial interest in human rights still protest for the cause if their inboxes weren't constantly filled with anti-Pepsi propaganda? I believe the answer to be two-fold. There would still be participation, but it would be of a lesser magnitude. This medium plays an important role in arousing concerns and forging cross-border alliances [Ref. 10]. The Internet, and the electronic network that stretched from Burma's borders around the world continued to be the medium for protests against SLORC. [Ref. 10] Without it, the Burmese protest intensity would diminish the farther one gets from Burma. Without the Web, an outcast in Halifax, Nova Scotia, would grow tired of his beliefs falling on uninterested ears. Most likely he would decide to go on with his life and leave the protesting to others. Spin-offs of BurmaNet, such as freeburmacoalition.org, freeburma.org, and soros.org/burma would never have existed. These websites are among many imbued with the same message. This message would be much quieter without the Internet. Therefore, I believe that Pepsi wouldn't have pulled out of Burma because of the costs. When PepsiCo became a target, activists were initially able to gather in small forums to voice their opinions [Ref. 10]. Then, the forums grew as electronic postings were ready by individuals who never knew of the Burmese situation [Ref. 10]. They observed how PepsiCo used relatively cheap labor in Burma to increase profits [Ref. 10]. This proves that the Internet allows issues and opinions to be observed by people around the globe who might not have ever known these situations existed without the electronic medium. Without the Internet, the only dissenters for SLORC to deal with would be within or near its borders. This would be a relatively easy task when compared to what took place in Massachusetts.

E. (U) RELEVANCE TO CHINA

(U) The Burma case illustrates the effect of computer communications on the balance of power. More and more people are using the Internet to gather information and voice their opinions. It is becoming increasingly difficult for governments to match their opposition in the electronic forum. Therefore, the effects of Internet usage in China could directly parallel the Burmese case. Like Burma, China has numerous internal and

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external dissenters using the Internet to gather information and voice their opinions on numerous topics. I believe these characteristics are inherently democratic (See Figure 1).

<i>Burma/China Comparison</i>		
	Burma	China
Totalitarian Government	Yes	Yes
Censorship	Yes	Yes
Need for Western Business	Yes	Yes
Numerous Exiled Dissidents	Yes	Yes
Susceptible to Anti-government Campaigns	Yes	Yes

(UNCLASSIFIED)

Figure 1. Burma/China Comparison (U).

(U) In the next chapter I will describe the Internet interactions between the PRC and its pro-democracy grassroots activists. I will show how each entity uses the Internet for gathering, protesting, and propaganda dissemination.

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IV. PRC VS. PEOPLE (U)

(U) Both pro-democracy grassroots activists and the PRC are attempting to use the Internet to their advantage. Their offensive and defensive actions are constantly changing to counter their target's intentions. The people want to voice their opinions, while the PRC wants to quench their thirst for free speech. Activists have rushed to embrace the Internet as a tool for promoting a more liberal and democratic Chinese state [Ref. 29]. The methods used by grassroots activists to evade detection are extremely dynamic. The Internet has been a blessing because it facilitates access to information and provides a safer channel of communication [Ref. 29]. Their actions are a constant headache for the PRC, because they are surprisingly effective. Lo states, "There is always a lag in computer knowledge between the bureaucracy and the e-population." [Ref. 29]

A. (U) PRC ACTIONS

(U) The PRC's ability to control or disrupt Internet usage is somewhat effective, but still illustrates several shortfalls. They utilize numerous methods of censorship combined with harsh penalties for anti-government actions. The penalties include Internet access revocation, fines, and imprisonment. In 2001, 19 individuals in China were being detained for using the Internet for religious or political purposes [Ref. 31]. Their methods include: blocking websites, blocking email, censoring or disabling Internet forums and chat rooms, and banning numerous types of foreign correspondence [Ref. 5]. Blocking of domestic and foreign websites happens unpredictably at the PRC's discretion [Ref. 5]. Operators and webmasters are given no warning, and can be shut down at a moment's notice. If discovered quickly, the dissident websites may have had little time to convey their message(s). Therefore, it is imperative that the dissidents use internal and external methods to inform their audience of the website's existence.


B. (U) EMPLOYMENT OF HACKERS

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adjunct to government computer network operations [Ref. 23]. This active recruitment of hackers is an extremely new concept employed by the PRC, and the opportunity to implant agents could pose problems for democratic influencers. The employment of PRC hackers is supported throughout the Chinese government. The aforementioned conference was titled, "Government Information Security High Level Review," and was attended by representatives of the Ministry of Public Security, the State Information Center of the Information Security Research Institute, the China Academy of Engineering, and other government information security organizations [Ref. 23]. If the United States is to encourage the development of democratic practices through the Internet it must be wary of professional hackers employed to deter offensive computer operations.

C. (U) GRASSROOTS ACTIVISTS



(U)Another method to circumvent "Goliath" (a.k.a. the PRC) is through electronic mail. Email broadcasts are extremely important to dissident groups, and are used to communicate with domestic and international contacts [Ref. 24]. The PRC finds it extremely difficult to filter the dissident correspondence, which can contain thousands of anti-government periodicals [Ref. 5]. Email blocking is random, and the PRC usually blocks well-known dissident organizations [Ref. 5]. This control makes it difficult for

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activists to maintain a constant flow of dissident information through web sites. Therefore, they utilize numerous international email providers, such as Hotmail [Ref. 5]. The accounts located outside of China are difficult to block by the PRC.

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(U) In the next chapter I will provide recommendations for US policy dealing with promoting democracy within the People's Republic of China.

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V. OBSERVATIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS (U)


(U) The United State must promote democracy through the voices of the Chinese dissenters and pro-democracy advocates. Helping them overcome the censors, and promoting free speech, will enable the "voice" of democracy to be heard. The totalitarian system will feel the pro-democracy effect of additional, US backed, pressures from exiled Chinese dissidents, and other nations enjoying democracy [Ref. 27]. While the power of the PRC comes from the suppression of free information flow to its citizens, freedom of speech, and defeating any opposition, providing substantial means for grassroots activists and common citizens to voice their beliefs will aid our influence [Ref. 27]. The PRC is likely to view the potential increase in pro-democracy information dissemination as independent work of overseas dissenters. Therefore, we must create several Internet avenues for the activists to travel. They may include:

- methods to circumvent PRC-implemented Internet roadblocks
- robust US based e-mail services
- illustrate use of Internet technology in foreign democratic governments

(U) These actions will give the activists new, easy-to-use means of protest and information dissemination, while allowing the United States increased monitoring and influence capabilities. The totalitarian system will be degraded by the additional pressures from exiled Chinese dissidents, private NGOS, and other pro-democracy advocates [Ref. 27].

A. (U) METHODS OF DEMOCRATIC ENCOURAGEMENT

(U) As previously stated, there are several aspects of the Internet that can be used to encourage democracy in China. They will be promulgated by the US government in overt and covert fashions. Figure 2 illustrates these aspects and their associated organizations.




1. (U) US Government Actions

(U) The United States should participate in influencing China through the aforementioned methods. These methods, or tools, can be effective in promoting democracy through overt and covert techniques. US efforts should remain covert in several of these categories. Providing Internet access to dissidents and private NGOs must be kept secret. Circumventing PRC-implemented Internet roadblocks is important when trying to get information to mainland Chinese citizens. Censoring and website-blocking will always be used by the PRC. The Chinese censors constantly block proxy servers and search for new methods to block dissident websites [Ref. 6]. For example, in 2001, users could read CNN.com by accessing Europe.CNN.com, but that website was blocked by the PRC in February 2001 [Ref. 6]. This illustrates that the PRC is not extremely efficient in their Internet information control. We can exploit this vulnerability by creating more US-backed websites that will be difficult to block. We can circumvent censorship and website blocking by creating a changing set of IP addresses. The activists will be constantly updated with new IP's, so they can continue getting their message across. It is already evident that the United States is interested in helping pro-democracy activists circumvent the censors. In 2001, Safeweb, which creates technology to overcome Internet roadblocks, received one million dollars from the CIA [Ref. 6]. Also,

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in the same year Congress allocated \$800,000 for Voice of America's Internet news operations, in an attempt to promote democracy in China [Ref. 6]. This illustrates the United State's interest in promoting democracy, but I don't believe that it is enough. We must combine these efforts with other methods of US-dissenter interaction, such as those outlined before (See Figure 2).



(U) Websites are an important pro-democracy tool, which should be covertly provided by the United States to dissidents and private NGOs. The US would provide the technology to the intended operators and maintain monitoring capabilities embedded within the websites. The operators will be required to use these websites in a pro-democracy fashion. The websites will contain chat rooms, forums, and polling capabilities. The US should monitor all activity within the sites.

2. (U) Dissident actions

(U) The dissidents will receive the aforementioned tools and utilize them in overt and covert fashions. Their Internet access will rely on the US providing a changing set of IP addresses and available proxy server information. They will maintain secrecy about where they acquire the tools, and will use them overtly. The IP addresses will allow the dissidents to operate their covert US-backed websites, effectively getting the pro-democracy message to their target audiences. The operators will provide e-mail capabilities, forums, chat rooms, and polling capabilities to those interested.

3. (U) Private Non-government organization actions

(U) The NGO's actions will somewhat parallel those of the dissidents. The United States will again provide the Internet technology, and the NGOs will use them to promote their ideals. All over their actions will be overt, since they want as much interaction with government as possible.

B. (U) IMPORTANCE OF DEMOCRACY IN CHINA

(U) The PRC's totalitarian regime will be unsustainable with the diffusion of Internet technology within China [Ref. 27]. In several democratic governments, the Internet provides access to uncensored information and news, which have traditionally been concealed by the PRC [Ref. 27]. It is important that the citizens of China realize the relationship and benefits of democracy combined with the Internet because an informed citizenry based on the free flow of information is inherently democratic [Ref. 27]. The Chinese citizens must be exposed to governments that utilize the Internet in their relationship with their citizens. The aforementioned governments of Barcelona, Spain, and Iceland are excellent examples. The relationships with their people are what many Chinese dissidents seek and wish to duplicate. Scottish journalist Gavin Esler stated, "The Internet offers an unprecedented opportunity to reconnect people to the political process by helping people become more informed citizens, by helping elected representatives to be more responsive to those citizens, and by engaging more people in public policy discussions and debate." [Ref. 11] We need to educate the Chinese populace on the importance of the Internet and democratic relationships through Internet

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democracy portals. The citizens must see how the Internet will give them the freedoms they desire.

(U) The 1999 National Security Strategy supports these recommendations. It states that achieving a stable, open, prosperous People's Republic of China is a goal of the United States [Ref. 22]. By giving the dissenters the means and information to get their pro-democracy message to China, we will make significant progress in reaching this goal. I have illustrated the evidence that the Internet is an important part of discussing and creating a democratic government in China for the United States government and grassroots activists. The democratic ideal of free speech will inevitably be realized for Chinese on the Internet, where they will be able to diffuse mass e-mails, post threads, create discussion groups, and publish journals [Ref. 27]. This evidence is supported by the section of our National Security Strategy that discusses China, and illustrates how important it is for China to become democratic. By combining our interests with that of the pro-democracy activists, we will effectively support a transition to a more democratic China.

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