Modern Air Occupation Strategy
Case Study: Operation Southern Watch

By
Lt Col Merrick Krause

For
Dr. Mark Clodfelter

25 March 2001
**Report Documentation Page**

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Modern Air Occupation Strategy  
Case Study: Operation Southern Watch  
By  
Lt Col Merrick E. Krause  

At approximately 8:15 a.m. Eastern Standard Time today, British Royal Air Force GR-1 "Tornado" aircraft enforcing the Southern No-Fly Zone struck an Iraqi military radar site approximately 15 miles south of Al Basrah near Ash Shuaybah. The strikes were in response to two Iraqi violations of the Southern No-Fly Zone and aircraft illuminations by Iraqi surface-to-air missile sites...Coalition air and naval forces are responsible for enforcing the no-fly zones over Iraq and UN-mandated maritime sanctions. At the same time, these forces continuously assess the level of threat posed by the Iraqi forces and take actions that are necessary to reduce these threats and to defend themselves...Since Desert Fox, Saddam Hussein has significantly increased the threat to our pilots and air crews patrolling the no-fly zones through his rhetoric and actions. Iraq has announced its intent to bring down a coalition aircraft, and in fact has issued a bounty to Iraqi military personnel for a successful engagement. Despite repeated warnings, Iraqi actions and intentions pose serious threats to our coalition forces and friends in the region. Our actions today are an appropriate response to these threats and are in support of UN mandates. 

--News Release, United States Central Command, March 4, 1999

Today, British Royal Air Force, US Navy and US Air Force combat aircraft, including B-2 bombers flown from the United States, halted columns of Iraqi tanks moving toward the Kuwaiti border. This Iraqi movement of troops was in violation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 949. Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, UAE, and Oman have condemned Iraq's provocative actions and have pledged to support Kuwait with ground and air forces. The United States and Britain are presently mobilizing additional air and ground reinforcements, but are awaiting consultation with Coalition partners before deploying these forces. Coalition aircraft are continuing to monitor the situation and enforce UNSCRs in the Iraq southern no-fly zone.


The specter of American coffins, draped in flags, carried across a lonely tarmac to the echoing, mournful tones of a bugle, haunts responsible United States decision makers. From Iraq to Kosovo, reality has proved false the alluring myth of an antiseptic war. Less experienced
politicos and pundits are realizing today what American statesmen and warriors have long known to be true: war is not surgery and bombs are not scalpels. Until recently, the ability to use low-risk and low-cost means to inhibit an enemy’s military operations was a desired but elusive prospect. Now, with modern information and aerospace technology, the United States can apply air power to thwart enemy military actions by “occupying” the enemy’s country. This article attempts to stimulate thought on the viability of the notion of air occupation by focusing on Iraq and using Operation SOUTHERN WATCH (OSW) as a case study. The analysis presents a practical strategic framework that might assist strategists considering an air occupation for another situation.

Confusing terminology is distracting—so this paper reduces two concepts to the single term of “air occupation.” Aerial denial is the ability to prevent hostile forces from effectively operating within a desired area. It is a relatively low-risk, low-cost capability to dissuade enemy military operations through aerospace power. Conversely, an air siege is a more aggressive posture, and includes bombing to punish, enforcement of no-fly zones, and other aggressive air activities without a significant friendly ground force presence in the target country. Air occupation is used throughout this analysis to reinforce the deterrent and coercive nature of aerospace forces used to control certain elements in an adversary country without the support of an occupying ground force. Thus, an air occupation incorporates elements of both aerial denial and air siege campaigns. An air occupation is not as debilitating to an enemy as a fully developed ground occupation. However, an air occupation is less invasive and requires less commitment in material, personnel, and national will—albeit to achieve more modest objectives. Indeed, though not a panacea, an air occupation or a well-enforced aerial denial campaign (that
can escalate if required) can be a viable, relatively low risk method to shape, coerce, or contain an adversary.¹⁴

Why choose Operation SOUTHERN WATCH as a case study? OSW provides exceptional insights into the conduct of an air occupation, as well as the political and military implications of that endeavor. With over 216,000 missions flown over Iraq in support of no-fly zones since 1992, more than 700 separate incidents of Iraqi surface-to-air missile and anti-aircraft fire, and more than 150 violations by Iraqi aircraft in the Southern no-fly zone since December 1998, the Iraq situation is definitely a drain on US military resources and political capital.⁵ The following investigation uses OSW as a case study for creating a proactive military strategy to help achieve the National Command Authority’s (NCA) policy objectives with respect to Iraq, including regional stability, the free flow of oil, and a viable Iraq not posing a threat to its neighbors. The insights from this exercise may prove useful in refining engagement strategy and in offering a framework for use in similar crises—though successful air occupation is a situationally dependent endeavor.

Historical Example of Air Occupation

Since the objective of most air control operations was long-term political stability, pacification, and administration, the techniques for achieving those goals were contrary to the training and natural inclination of most military men: the military defeat of the enemy.

--David J. Dean, *Airpower in Small Wars*, 1985⁶

As a vestige of its colonialist history, the post-World War I British military faced a dilemma: it needed to exert control over its colonies, when political administration was ineffective, through the use of force—yet the British military was diminished after the war and it needed an alternative to large ground expeditions to occupy disorderly colonies. The Royal Air Force (RAF), a separate service still in its infancy, saw an opportunity to increase its influence
and likewise increase efficiencies in colonial operations. In 1920, a RAF air-expeditionary force working in concert with resident ground forces crushed Mohammed bin Abdullah Hassan, the Mad Mullah, in British Somaliland. Because of the success of that operation, Winston Churchill, Minister of War and Air, asked Air Chief Marshal Hugh Trenchard to help save the Empire money by attempting a much more ambitious (and now contemporaneously familiar) undertaking—the control of Mesopotamia, modern Iraq, from the air. Over 100,000 men participated in ground operations with 63 aircraft supporting them during the 1920 insurrection. In 1922, the British army began withdrawing from Iraq and shifted responsibility for continued stability to the RAF. The typical doctrine employed to maintain order was first to deliver an ultimatum. Then, if the desired response was not evident, bomb the offender.7

Today, rapid communications technology, precision engagement capability, and the opportunities of the post Cold War unipolar strategic environment have made aerial denial or air occupation viable options to achieve state objectives.8 Examples of recent No-Fly Zones include: Operation DESERT RESOLVE (Iraq, 1991), Operation SOUTHERN WATCH (southern Iraq, 1991 – present), Operation PROVIDE COMFORT (northern Iraq, 1991), Operation DELIBERATE FORCE (Bosnia, 1995), Operation NORTHERN WATCH (northern Iraq, 1997 – present), and Operation ALLIED FORCE (Serbia, 1999).

Strategic Framework

*The object of war is a better state of peace—even if only from your own point of view.*


A strategic framework is useful to guide any analysis of a strategy, especially one involving the use of force. The following framework describes the methodology of the analysis
in this paper. It is by no means prescriptive. The methodology can be expanded or molded to fit other cases or applications.¹⁰

1) Strategic Context/Background
   a) Recent history
   b) Players
   c) Assumptions
2) Political Objectives
   a) Stated and implied
   b) Coalition/allies
3) Military Capabilities and Vulnerabilities
   a) US Resources
      i) Actual (mobilized)
      ii) Potential (latent)
      iii) Limiting factors (LIMFACs)
   b) Coalition factors
   c) Adversary assessment
      (1) Enemy Objectives
      (2) Enemy Centers of Gravity
         (a) Avoid Mirror Imaging
         (b) Avoid Group Think
      (3) Enemy Strategy
      (4) Enemy order of battle
4) Strategic Concept
   a) Description of type of operation/conflict
   b) Military Objectives
   i) Stated and unstated
      (1) Priorities
      (2) Timeframe
   ii) Thresholds for phases
   c) Course of Action
      i) Objective—strategy—task
      ii) Constraints (externally-imposed)
      iii) Restraints (self-imposed)
   iv) Phase objectives (Deploy, Employ, Post-Conflict/Conflict termination)
   v) Tests
      (1) Adequate
      (2) Feasible
      (3) Acceptable
      (4) Consistent
5) Expected/Potential Results
   i) Red-team/War-game Plan & Contingencies
      *(Avoid Not Asking Enough/Asking Too Many ’What Ifs’*)
   ii) Risk/Benefit Analysis
   iii) Endstate/Exit or Transition Strategy

**Operation SOUTHERN WATCH Case Study**

*Kuwait is liberated. Iraq’s army is defeated. Our military objectives are met. Kuwait is once more in the hands of Kuwaitis, in control of their own destiny. We share in their joy, a joy tempered only by our compassion for their ordeal…*

--United States President George H. W. Bush, 1991¹¹

*You have won, Iraqis. Iraq is the one that is victorious. Iraq has succeeded in demolishing the aura of the United States, the empire of evil, terror, and aggression. Iraq has punched a hole in the myth of American superiority and rubbed the nose of the United States in the dust.*

--Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, 1991¹²

1) Strategic Context/Background

Operation SOUTHERN WATCH began shortly after Operation DESERT STORM, or the Gulf War, in late 1991. It is still in effect today, characterized by frequent overflights of Iraq, shots from Iraqi ground forces at US and Coalition aircraft, and bombing in response to UN Security
Council Resolutions (UNSCR) violations. OSW has been replete with instances of enemy probing and challenges. General Tommy Franks, commander of US Central Command, recently told the Senate Armed Services Committee that pilots have entered the southern no-fly zone 153,000 times since 1992. In the past twelve months alone, since March 2000, allied pilots entered the zone 10,000 times. On 500 occasions, the Iraqis fixed radar on the aircraft or engaged them with anti-aircraft weapons.\textsuperscript{13}

A controversial operation, OSW remains under the oversight of US Central Command, CENTCOM, headquartered in Tampa, Florida. Joint Task Force Southwest Asia (JTF-SWA), based in Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, actually conducts OSW operations. Coalition partners principally include the United States, Britain, Saudi Arabia, and France, though France no longer actively participates. However, members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which includes most of the Arab nations on the Arabian Peninsula, are in close coordination with and to varying degrees support the JTF.

After the Gulf War, Iraq’s military status and capability had fallen dramatically from its 1990 position of the world’s fourth largest army (the US was third) and sixth largest air force.\textsuperscript{14} The Coalition crushed Iraq’s integrated air defense system (IADS), made most of its operational jet aircraft inoperable, and decimated its regular army. However, the Republican Guard (RGFC), Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein’s loyal, best trained, and best supplied forces, remained cohesive and under firm control. Hussein retained control over his country through merciless repression of the Kurdish minority in northern Iraq and the Shi’ite majority in the south. His priorities, consistent since his rise to power in the 1970s, remained intact: first and foremost, to personally survive; retake Kuwait, which he considered an Iraqi province; support the Palestinian cause (to coalesce support in the Arab world); and finally, gather personal wealth and power.\textsuperscript{15}
Hussein’s first aggressive act after defeat came immediately after the cease-fire ending DESERT STORM. He elected to consolidate his regime’s power through repressing his internal threats, the Kurds and the Shi’ites, though he also purged suspected coup leaders throughout. After the 1991 Safwan Cease-fire agreement permitted Hussein to use helicopters, he conducted weeks of devastating strikes against civilians and refugees in these regions. In response, the UN and the Coalition denounced the level of violence against his population and announced resolutions to inhibit his actions. Subsequently, in addition to providing humanitarian aid to the Kurds in the north, the Coalition began enforcing no-fly zones (NFZ), or aerial exclusion zones.

Throughout the 1990s, Hussein challenged the Coalition and violated the post-conflict United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs). Typically, his hindrance of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) verification missions by the UN Special Commission of Monitoring (UNSCOM) initiated a confrontation. After delaying inspections in 1992, 1993, 1994, and again in late 1997 through 1998, Hussein increased NFZ challenges by flying his fighter jets through the prohibited airspace. He also threatened Coalition aircrews and/or moved forces south toward Kuwait. His largest movement of force occurred when he deployed his Republican Guard toward Kuwait in 1994.

After each probe, the Coalition met Hussein’s provocation with either a deployment of a large number of (typically US) forces to the Gulf region and/or military attacks against Iraq to show resolve and to punish. In January 1993, in response to NFZ violations and threats against Coalition aircraft, the Coalition attacked air defense nodes in southern Iraq. In June 1993, the Coalition conducted USN cruise missile (TLAM) strikes against various Iraqi military facilities.¹⁶ In response to the 1994 deployment of Hussein’s ground forces toward the Kuwaiti border, the US responded with Operation VIGILANT WARRIOR. After Hussein began attacking
the Kurds in the north in 1996, the Coalition responded with Operation DESERT STRIKE. In late 1997, Hussein forced the UNSCOM inspectors out of Iraq and threatened to shoot down an American U-2. A massive US deployment followed this threat until November 1997, when the 1997 Primakov Accord lessened tension somewhat for two months. Subsequently, UN Secretary General Kofi Aanan seemed to negotiate reduced Iraqi interference with UNSCOM in February 1998. The US began redeploying forces in mid-1998 when tensions abated. However, in late 1998, Hussein expelled the UNSCOM inspectors and announced there would be no further WMD inspections in Iraq. In response, after a large force deployment in November 1998, the Coalition launched the intensive three-day Operation DESERT FOX, a series of manned aircraft and countrywide cruise missile attacks against Iraq in December 1998.17

Throughout 1999 and 2000, Hussein refused to allow WMD inspectors into Iraq. Moreover, though UN sanctions remained in place, Iraq’s black-market and illegal trade with numerous countries continued to make Hussein and his cronies rich. From December 1998 to February 2001, Iraqi aircraft made more than 150 violations of the southern no-fly zones and there were more than 700 separate incidents of Iraqi surface-to-air missile and anti-aircraft artillery fire directed against Coalition pilots, including more than 30 in January 2001 alone.18 The UK and US responded through selected bombing, reportedly against radars, missiles, or the offending Iraqi gunners, in a manner similar to the 1922 British model.19

Today, the sanctions regime is under increasing pressure. Arab countries, such as Egypt and Jordan, appear to have attempted to ingratiate themselves with Iraq. Some first world countries, principally France and Russia, undermine sanctions through continued criticism and by conducting civilian flights into Iraq, despite active no-fly zones.
Indeed, it appears that Iraq shifted its strategy in the mid-1990s from one of open confrontation through moving troops and aggressive rhetoric to one of brinkmanship, where Hussein asserts Iraqi sovereignty by threatening Coalition aircraft in the NFZs and expelling WMD inspectors. Hussein initiated these acts concurrently with an intensive and increasingly savvy Iraqi information campaign that created the impression that sanctions were hurting only the Iraqi people, not threatening his hold on power. These actions led to the deployment of additional US forces to Southwest Asia when Hussein became recalcitrant and precluded the Coalition from reaching a consensus on action. Grabbing the initiative, he sometimes appeared to cooperate to achieve concessions from the international community, such as the “oil for food” program, but he also tested US and Coalition resolve with troop movements and attacks on Coalition aircrews in the no-fly zones. Particularly evident was the concern of some Arabs of the visible US military presence on Muslim territory, the distaste of vocal Islamic traditionalists for infidel troops in the Gulf, and the French and Russian desire to resume open trade with Iraq.

Several UNSCRs legitimized Operation SOUTHERN WATCH, and justified Operation PROVIDE COMFORT and subsequently Operation NORTHERN WATCH. Though dozens of UNSCRs apply to Iraq, three were the principal antecedents to these operations. First, UNSCR 687, 3 April 1991, established the requirements for the cease-fire following the Gulf War, established a demilitarized zone in southern Iraq, and provided for the UNSCOM to inspect for WMD. Second, UNSCR 688, 5 April 1991, ordered Iraq to cease oppression of civilians, particularly the Kurds in northern Iraq and the Shi’ite Muslims in southern Iraq, and established provisions granting international, humanitarian organizations access to those suffering. Third, UNSCR 949, 15 October 1994, condemned the 1994 Iraqi deployment of a substantial Republican Guard force (RGFC) toward the Kuwaiti border, ordered the withdrawal of those
forces, and prohibited further military enhancements in southern Iraq. This last prohibition created a “no-drive zone” in southern Iraq, in which Hussein was restricted from adding or enhancing his military forces.

The United Kingdom, France, and the US issued demarches against Iraq to enforce UNSCRs. On 26 August 1992, the UK, France, and US established no-fly zones for rotary and fixed wing aircraft south of 32°N latitude. The demarche called for the Coalition to monitor compliance with the UNSCRs, support UNSCOM inspections, and stipulated that the Coalition would tolerate no threat to its aircraft (the right of self-defense). The US/UK demarche of 20 October 1994, a result of Hussein’s RGFC movements toward the Kuwaiti border, ordered that Hussein immediately withdraw units deployed after 20 September 1994 and that he cooperate with UNSCOM. Additionally, the demarche prohibited Hussein from enhancing his military capabilities below 32° N. The third significant demarche was a result of actions leading to the 3-4 September 1996 DESERT STRIKE. This demarche extended the southern NFZ to 33° N, disallowed deployment of surface to air missiles (SAMs) below 33° N, permitted no reconstitution of SAMs destroyed in DESERT STRIKE’s cruise missile attacks, and ordered Iraq to cease threatening Coalition aircraft.

2) Political Objectives

— US Objectives Analysis

By focusing on the US perspective in the strategic framework, it is possible to find clearly articulated US objectives. With respect to the entire expanse of Southwest Asia and the Middle East, the stated US goals are the free flow of oil at reasonable prices; stability, including no regional hegemon, and secure regional partners; and a just, lasting, comprehensive Middle-East Peace. With respect to Iraq itself, the US desires a stable Iraq with its current borders
intact, not persecuting its internal population, posing no threat to its neighbors, including Israel, and capable of self-defense, but possessing no WMD. The United States’ long-term goal is to reintegrate Iraq in the international community of law-abiding, peaceful nations. However, it is arguable that despite humanitarian desires and the quest for stability, the ultimate US interest in the Persian Gulf, particularly since the 1973 fuel crisis, has been “access to oil in reasonable amounts and at a predictable price.”

The present Bush administration is advocating emerging strategy initiatives including “smart sanctions,” and reenergizing the sanctions regime, particularly where WMD is concerned. Better tailored sanctions may comprise a part of a national security strategy to counter Hussein’s successful manipulation of international sentiment by linking US/UK demarche enforcement to the professed suffering of the Iraqi people caused by economic sanctions. Though common UNSCRs relate the sanctions and demarche enforcement, they do not share a direct causal linkage; the reality is that Coalition military overflights do not directly cause starvation and deprivation of the Iraqi people.

The critical contention is that economic sanctions hurt the Iraqi people and not Hussein. This contention resulted in an erosion of Arab political will to maintain the sanctions regime. “U.N. sanctions on Iraq under the Clinton administration were ‘about to crash, Mr. Powell [Secretary of State, Colin Powell] said…’ Frankly, the alternative was to just keep on a downward path crashing into a hillside. The sanctions policy was collapsing before our eyes.” Yet, enforcing UNSCRs through aerial denial, which prevents Hussein from building-up his ground forces in the south and inhibits his repression of the Kurds and Shi’ites, does not increase the poverty of the Iraqi people. The incorrect linkage made by media sources is a manifestation of the international perception of the impact of sanctions, and hence a political problem that may
affect the sustainability of either OSW operations or a more comprehensive WMD and counter-repression sanctions regime.\textsuperscript{30} Moreover, this argument against sanctions fails to recognize that the air occupation has successfully prevented Hussein from further repressing minorities or attacking Kuwait for more than a decade.

Documented evidence of Hussein’s failure to provide for his ailing populace is relatively overlooked in international dialog: “Despite all the concerns expressed regarding the nutritional and health status of the Iraqi people,” a UN official observed that the Iraqi government had submitted $84 million for health-sector contracts when it had more than $624 million to spend.\textsuperscript{31} Recently, however, Hussein ordered the formation of 21 military divisions to “fight alongside Palestinians in their uprising against Israel,” the Iraqi News Agency INA reported.\textsuperscript{32} Many recognize these inconsistencies, but insufficient international political will exists to maintain sanctions without increased US lobbying and pressure, and perhaps changes in economic and diplomatic tactics. However, the NFZs remain a necessary element in preventing Hussein from regaining a military advantage.

An additional element of US Iraqi policy is the overthrow of Hussein’s regime. The Clinton administration proposed sponsoring the overthrow of Hussein’s government together with emphasizing containment, economic sanctions, and the oil-for-food program, to reduce the plight of the Iraqi people.\textsuperscript{33} Congress funded Iraqi opposition groups in October 2000. The Treasury Department’s Foreign Assets Office cleared $4 million for this purpose the first week of February 2001.\textsuperscript{34} Concurrently, Secretary Powell stated that the US “reserves the right” to use military force, if required, to prevent Iraq from injuring its neighbors or using WMD.\textsuperscript{35} Additionally, Secretary Powell commented:

They [the Iraqis] are threatening their neighbors. Iraq is a problem for its own people. I think we have to keep reminding everybody that his is an arms-control
problem...They made a commitment to do away with these [WMD] weapons and
I think that the international community and the United Nations have to hold them
to that commitment.36

The common interest of the current administration’s policy, and the primary pillar for
continuation of sanctions and NFZs, appears to be Iraqi WMD capability. A White House
spokesman said, “The President expects Saddam Hussein to live up to the agreements he’s made
with the UN, especially regarding the elimination of weapons of mass destruction.”37 Secretary
Powell added, “His [Hussein’s] only tool, the only thing he can scare us with are those weapons
of mass destruction, and we have to hold him to account.”38 Mr. Powell also told the House
International Relations committee that UN inspectors must return to hunt for evidence of nuclear,
chemical, or biological weapons: “The inspectors have to go back in.”39

— Other Party Objectives

From the perspective of Southwest Asians, the potential for an Iraqi military resurgence,
with WMD, looms. Other concerns include: a militant Iran; Persian dominance of the Arabian
Gulf; and the overt presence of US military forces in a region not yet comfortable with liberal
Western democracies. The Palestinian uprisings, in the wake of the Israeli withdrawal from
southern Lebanon in 2000, became a focal point for Hussein to ingratiate himself with the Arab
community. On 6 January 2000, Hussein announced the establishment of a military command
for Special Forces he plans to use to support a Palestinian revolt, and “more than 6.5 million
volunteers for a jihad…against the Jewish state.”40 He also announced the deployment of the
RGFC Hamorabi division toward the Jordanian border to participate in his desired war against
Israel, and he paraded new military weapons and equipment from Syria, France, and Germany,
as well as new Russian-made SA-8 and SA-9 SAMs.41 Additionally, Hussein spurred continued
Palestinian anger by paying a reward to the families of deceased rioters or terrorists.
Based on rhetoric, arguments against continuing sanctions, and the recent Egyptian invitation for Iraq to participate in a conference condemning the Israelis, Arab and GCC resolve to thwart Iraqi aggressions appears to be waning. However, though Arab populated countries generally decry sanctions against Iraq as ineffective, they do not uniformly release Hussein from responsibility. For example, The Gulf Times, a Qatari newspaper, reported that GCC ministers called for Iraq “to execute the commitments contained in (UN) Security Council resolutions,” and denounced Iraqi officials for “making threatening remarks against Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, and for unveiling a map in the Iraqi parliament that showed Kuwait as Iraqi territory.”\(^{42}\)

The US has a long history of supporting Egypt and Saudi Arabia, both economically and militarily, and has friendly relations with several other Gulf states. However, Hussein’s public diplomacy campaign has created a difficult regional dynamic. In addition, the bombing of the USS Cole has again raised doubts, particularly in light of the Khobar Towers bombing in 1996, as to the security of American forces in the region—whether the bombing was a bin Laden, Palestinian, or Iraqi venture.\(^{43}\)

Internationally, Hussein has more leverage because of the oil and fuel shortage that began in late 1998. Moreover, growing international fatigue with UN economic sanctions, seen by many as causing suffering for the Iraqi people, has elevated Hussein’s position. For example, Al-Quds al Arabi, a London based Arabic newspaper, wrote in September 2000: “President Saddam Hussein must be the happiest of Arab leaders as he watches from the safety of Baghdad the angry protests in a variety of European countries against high fuel taxes.”\(^{44}\)

3) **Military Capabilities and Vulnerabilities**\(^ {45} \)

*If we ever experience the misfortune of a downed aviator, and he’s marching—being dragged through the streets of Baghdad, stand by. I think a lot of the public haven’t focused on this.*

--Senator John W. Warner, Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman, 2001\(^{46}\)
— US Resources and Coalition Factors

Estimates of capabilities and vulnerabilities—for both sides—are critical components to any military strategy. Since 1991, the USAF has restructured itself to support increased contingency commitments by creating ten Air Expeditionary Forces (AEFs). Each AEF has available over 100 aircraft with complementary capabilities and attendant maintenance and support personnel and equipment. Guard and reserve aircraft are included in AEFs to supplement active duty units. The service further maintains a robust intra-theater airlift and command, control, and reconnaissance (including space and data/voice communications) capability. The USAF also retains bombers based in the US that can reach Iraq in a day.

The US Navy, though also downsized tremendously since 1991, maintains nearly year-round presence in the Persian Gulf region with a carrier task force and additional vessels. The USN also brings to the table TLAM cruise missiles, ship-born missile defense systems, and the unique capability to conduct boarding operations of suspect surface vessels in support of UNSCR 660 and 661. The Navy, of course, provides its own “floating bases” for aircraft. However, due to reduced USN sea-borne resupply and refueling capability, US naval operations in the Gulf region frequently require port-calls, and USAF support, such as airborne refueling, as well as command and control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) assets. The US Army provides critical missile defense assets and armed personnel to defend Kuwait—a credible deterrent to Iraqi aggression. The US Marines maintain an air or ground presence in the Gulf for OSW operations and conduct extensive training with regional allies.

Saudi Arabia and the UK are the Coalition partners with the most combat power in the region. Britain is the only Coalition partner that actively flies enforcement missions against Iraq
in OSW. However, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait permit significant US and UK military presence in their countries, and their respective military leaders work together with the JTF leadership. Other GCC countries, to varying degrees, provide support such as port facilities, resupply, and liaison. These countries, as well as Saudi Arabia, have made disapproving statements when the US deployed large numbers of aircraft and other forces in response to Hussein’s aggressive actions. Pundits expect, though, other GCC countries would likely provide more active support if Hussein chose to again attack Kuwait or Saudi.

— Adversary Assessment

Hussein’s goals dictate his strategic approach. His foremost objective is to remain in power. As an autocrat and dictator of Iraq, Hussein himself is a key center of gravity (COG). In the near-term, he wants sanctions relief, but he is willing to circumvent sanctions through illegal trade to avoid losing face. Yet, some reports note that Iraq has a surplus in oil-for-food monies, meaning it has not applied the funds to assist the Iraqi people as required by the UN, and $2 billion appears to have been used to buy banned items, such as weapons. In the longer-term, based on historical precedent and recent statements, it appears that Hussein still wishes to rebuild his economy and military forces, perhaps renewing his intent of either becoming the pan-Arab leader, Gulf hegemon, or ersatz emperor of a resurgent Babylonian Empire. With respect to WMD, Hussein has not allowed inspections since he expelled UNSCOM in 1998, and according to a defector, “There are at least two nuclear bombs which are ready for use. Before the UN inspectors came, there were 47 factories involved in the project. Now there are 64.”

Yet, Hussein is the key center of gravity in Iraq. His loyal bodyguards, the RGFC (i.e., capable, loyal fielded forces), and the economy of Iraq (particularly oil money and black-market trade, hidden from the sanctions enforcers) are other centers of gravity. As dictator who rose to
power through manipulation of the secular Arab Ba’th party in the 1970s, he has maintained power through thuggery, assassination, propaganda, torture, deception, and attacking neighbors.

Hussein historically has used external enemies to coalesce his internal power base. He began the Iran-Iraq war in 1980 because of his fear of losing power, using traditional territorial desires and anti-Persian sentiments to bolster his position. He has repeatedly espoused anti-Israeli and anti-US rhetoric, appealing to the racist elements in Islamic society, touting himself as the leader of a holy war in contradiction to a more secular Arab Ba’th party doctrine. Moreover, when invading Kuwait, he used alleged Kuwaiti slant drilling and the historic Iraqi claim to Kuwait territory to justify his actions and to gain popular support.

Since the 1991 Gulf War, Hussein has learned several lessons from Coalition NFZ operations. He has found that direct military challenges typically result in punishment, with his forces taking the losses. It is obvious that the US and UK felt threatened sooner than their GCC partners, and the GCC states became weary of sanctions and US presence. Therefore, the US frequently had trouble mustering support for larger military actions. Additionally, Hussein knew Iraq could withstand limited strikes indefinitely, particularly if the oil continued to flow, funding his endeavors. These lessons played into his brinkmanship strategy.

Hussein’s centralized decision-making process demonstrates two general paths he appears to have taken with regard to international relations: compliant and recalcitrant. He weighs his personal status and his economic and military situation in his calculus of which path to follow. The variables he uses in his calculus include his desired status as the pan-Arab leader standing firm against US and Zionist infidels, his potential status as a participating member of the community of legitimate nations, his status as a prospective Arab protector of his weaker
GCC regional neighbors from the Persian mullahs, and his income from “oil-for-food” and the black market. Then, he selects his path.

The compliant approach is more direct. By acquiescing to sanctions, Hussein feels his status, and perhaps power diminish. However, his cooperation creates a more favorable environment for the UN to lift sanctions because the positives of perceived compliance with the UNSCRs may outweigh the negatives of the perceived punishment of the Iraqi populace by economic sanctions. Arab pressure to lift sanctions and reduce American regional presence would also play in Hussein’s favor in this equation. The removal of sanctions would then lead to a resurgence of Hussein’s military and economic power and substantially increased Iraqi influence, in the long-term. However, if his status decreases too much before the UN lifts sanctions, he might lose control to internal opponents before his resurgence in national power can occur. Therefore, while sanctions remain in effect, Hussein must strengthen his alliances and weaken those of the US (i.e., with respect to the Coalition) to maintain short-term control while eroding sanctions for a longer-term increase in power.

Hussein contrasts his attitude of compliance toward the UN with recalcitrance toward the US. When he feels strong or perceives an opportunity to weaken US alliances in the region, he increases his provocative actions. His support for a war against Israel, RGFC troop movements toward Jordan, and reported anti-aircraft artillery firings against Coalition aircraft in both northern and southern NFZs are recent examples. Remaining recalcitrant, Hussein works against regional alliances and promotes a feeling of sanctions weariness through images of sick children and manipulation of willing Arab and Western press outlets. Meanwhile, he refuses to allow UN inspectors to return to Iraq, which might lead to sanctions removal but would negatively affect his WMD production programs. Additionally, he encourages trade with the French and
Russians, who then violate the NFZs with commercial flights knowing that OSW air-patrols will not fire on civilians. Indeed, Hussein perceives the concepts of human rights and liberal democracy as weaknesses, and he therefore vacillates between compliance and recalcitrance to create the impression of Iraq as a proud, unbowed victim.

Iraq has a large range of military capabilities and actions available when following a recalcitrant path. Hussein’s perception of thresholds determines how he uses his resources. Moreover, the notion of thresholds is the nexus linking his strategy and OSW’s strategy, and understanding that notion is the key to removing his initiative. Hussein aims to provoke US (Coalition) military responses that will undermine Coalition resolve along a US/UK versus GCC/French/UN split and lead to the lifting of sanctions. Therefore, he historically initiates actions meant to provoke the US but not directly threaten the GCC.

At the low end of Hussein’s spectrum of action is an ongoing information operation and media exploitation effort made easier by tightly controlled access of foreign reporters and inflammatory rhetoric targeted specifically at Arab populations. Minor NFZ violations threatening Coalition aircraft and encouraging prospective trading partners to violate the NFZs with civilian flights increase his provocation level. More provocative Iraqi actions, such as expelling UNSCOM, produced results like DESERT FOX. Actions more provocative still could include large-scale internal repression of the Kurds or Shi’ites or large troop movements toward Kuwait. The highest category of provocation, moving troops to the Kuwaiti border, is the only one that directly threatens the GCC members. Accordingly, Hussein has restrained himself from such large-scale direct military confrontation since the early 1990s because he found that it was more productive to exploit the gray area where the US feels provoked to act while the GCC does not feel threatened.
Since DESERT FOX, low-key rhetoric and tailored responses to threats against Coalition aircraft have generally maintained the status quo ante bellum (from late 1998). Unfortunately, recent US press accounts, particularly after the 16 February 2001 US military response to Iraqi NFZ violations, document the continuing deterioration in Arab support for sanctions—which the press typically ties to enforcement of the demarches. This erosion of the sanctions regime is not a failing of the OSW operation itself, but a symptom of the adjunct UN policies enabling OSW to conduct operations. However, economic sanctions are a contentious component of a complete national strategy to contain Iraq as well as a UN effort to force Iraq to live up to the conditions in UNSCRs 687, 688, and 949.

4) Strategic Concept

What is absolutely key is that our responses are at times and places of our choosing. That leaves us always in a position of advancing our initiative rather than directly responding to his [Iraqi Dictator Saddam Hussein's] initiative.

--General Tommy Franks, CINCCENT, 2000

By analyzing the strategic environment, objectives, capabilities and COGs, as well as Hussein’s approach to decision-making, it is possible to create a strategic concept to undermine Hussein’s strategy. The key problem is that the US and Coalition need a way to maintain and enforce sanctions, and in concert with aerial denial and deterrence, to contain Iraq until further negotiations change the strategic environment or Hussein falls from power. The strategy must be to enforce the NFZs as desired while maintaining the military capability to escalate when necessary, though that capability need not reside solely in US forces. The air occupation must work in conjunction with the economic sanctions regime, which may erode certain Coalition members’ will more than the air occupation itself. Thus, the chosen strategy must not disrupt the relationship between the US and regional GCC allies. If the US political goal is to maintain stability and free flow of oil in the region while assuring Iraq is viable but poses no threat to its
neighbors, the mission of OSW is then to enforce the conditions of the UNSCRs 687, 688, and 949, and the US/UK demarches.

As the executor of Operation SOUTHERN WATCH, Joint Task Force Southwest Asia operates under the strategy of the Commander in Chief of CENTCOM, Gen. Tommy Franks. CENTCOM’s Theater Strategy presents its regional objectives in the context of “Shaping the Central Region for the 21st Century.” CENTCOM correctly notes the necessity to balance presence versus projection and warfighting readiness versus peacetime engagement. This strategy, importantly, does not focus solely on Iraq. Its major components are:

**Warfighting**
1. Protect and preserve US interests in the Central Region
2. Develop and maintain forces and infrastructure needed to respond to the full spectrum of military operations
3. Deter conflict through demonstrating resolve
4. Maintain command readiness to fight and win decisively
5. Protect the force

**Engagement**
1. Maintain, support and contribute to coalitions and collective security
2. Promote/support responsible regional militaries
3. Promote efforts to counter WMD, drugs, etc.
4. Establish/maintain close relationships with regional pol/mil leaders

**Development**
1. Promote and support environmental and humanitarian efforts
2. Educate key leaders and US public on mission of USCENTCOM and region
3. Develop a positive command climate
4. Participate in concept and doctrine development
5. Maintain regional awareness of security, political, social and economic trends

The OSW course of action (COA), fulfilling CENTCOM’s objectives, should enforce UNSCR 687, 688, and 949, among others, though the inspections detailed in UNSCR 687 are effectively moribund until further agreements with Iraq are reached. Furthermore, the COA must minimize the repercussions of the enforcement on regional partners and the Iraqi people, while allowing forces to remain prepared to fight and win should Iraq threaten the Coalition or a regional partner. To accomplish these goals, the strategist must balance external constraints with internal military restraints.
The constraints OSW must take into account are: the sensitivities of the GCC allies to US presence; the media view, whether justified or not, of the effects that sanctions have had (directly or indirectly) on the Iraqi populace; French and Russian desires to open the Iraqi market to trade for self-aggrandizement; and American sensitivity to potential US losses. Moreover, there remains the need to balance those objectives against domestic and international political currents against sanctions to assure the free flow of oil at reasonable prices. Additionally, to comply with the constraints set above, US rhetoric should remain at a minimum and US presence should be discrete to the GCC but pervasive to the Iraqis.

The restraints that the US military places on itself, therefore, must appear in tailored rules of engagement (ROE). These ROE should permit responses to UNSCR violations in a selective fashion, neither using overwhelming force nor insignificant tit-for-tat reprisals. Furthermore, to guarantee surprise and freedom of action, certain lower-level, prearranged responses to enemy provocations of threats must occur immediately, at the initiative of the JTF-SWA commander, since delays incurred while awaiting higher headquarters or NCA approval may remove the element of surprise, increasing risk while reducing effectiveness. Retaining the initiative also best exploits the speed and precision inherent in the application of aerospace power. Additionally, promoting proactive public diplomacy that reinforces the idea that Coalition ROE permits force for self-defense and reducing the regime’s power only, not for punishing civilians, is certainly helpful in sending the correct message. For example, US Central Command has published the following paragraph at the end of many press releases to reinforce the intent and humanity of current rules of engagement: “Coalition aircraft never target civilian populations or civilian infrastructure and go to painstaking lengths to avoid injury to civilians and damage to civilian facilities.”
Warfighting or air campaign “phases” do not lend themselves easily to the ongoing OSW mission, occurring at the low-end of the spectrum of conflict with no clear termination point. However, if an Iraqi threat necessitates a further deployment of US forces, the deployment should not be just a show of force. Instead, significantly reducing Iraqi military capability should replace the “signal” of resolve made by dropping a limited amount of bombs. Only a significant destruction of Hussein’s military capability will achieve multidimensional effects. For example, deliberately and appreciably reducing Hussein’s military apparatus takes away something he values while simultaneously reducing his aggressive options by reducing his power.

Because each US deployment stressed the psyche of the GCC in the 1990s, and the current policy of low rhetoric and tailored responses has maintained the status quo, further escalation through deployment will risk eviscerating the remainder of the air occupation regime. Therefore, large-scale US deployments should be conducted with broad Coalition support and with the intent to use force, because each deployment risks the end of GCC support for a significant US presence on Arab soil. After deployment, the US administration should then recall added US forces as rapidly as possible to minimize enmity from the local Arab populations. Furthermore, the deployment should occur under UN auspices and with full consultation with Coalition partners, unless a crisis absolutely precludes that course.

These factors may lead to a course of action replete with minor military responses to minor Iraqi provocations. Therefore, it would be more advisable (and more economical) to respond only at times and locations of the Coalition’s choosing, with force tailored to cause significant military attrition of valuable Iraqi equipment or military infrastructure—but with low rhetoric, so as not to inflame regional emotions. The intent of this COA will be to enforce the air occupation through aerial denial, and directly attacking Iraqi military capability when necessary,
while maintaining a credible deterrent and increasing positive military ties with Coalition partners. Once Iraq allows renewed WMD inspections, and when the UNSC is convinced internal repression and threats to Iraq’s neighbors are reduced, this COA should produce a reduced US presence in the region, with greater reliance on US global power as a deterrent.

Three concerns are significant to implementing the described COA. First, the force employment strategy must remain flexible enough to adapt to changing constraints, yet provide enough punch to damage substantially Iraqi military capability if Coalition force becomes necessary. Second, political leaders must recognize the mismatch of the strategic thresholds between the US and the GCC. Active and persistent consultation with all Coalition partners and the UN will help balance risks, cost, requirements, capability, UN politics, and GCC concerns. Third, US force posture must include self-protection capability while retaining a defensive capability should Iraq choose to threaten or directly attack US or allied forces. As General Nathan Twining, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs from 1957 to 1961, wisely said, “Forces that cannot win will not deter.”

Military leaders, their logisticians, and US diplomats must weigh these three areas of interest and consult with US administration policy-makers, Congress (who holds the power of the purse), and the Coalition partners to achieve a consensus for action. Furthermore, closer coordination between ONW and OSW is necessary to provide a more consistent US approach.

The proposed COA, “Initiative, Tailored Response, & Consultation,” includes:

1. Tailor responses to Iraqi provocations at the time and place of the Coalition’s choosing.
2. Minimize rhetoric and visibility of US military presence in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and throughout the GCC.
3. When large-scale provocations threaten Coalition allies, deploy with the intent to use significant force.
4. Maximize opportunities to train, consult, and communicate with GCC Coalition partners and Turkey.
5. Reduce forward presence in Saudi Arabia to the minimum levels necessary, in keeping with the above requirements, and emphasize global power, expeditionary mobility, and propositioning of equipment and ordnance.
6. As required, change OSW operations to maximize the effects of limited presence, particularly through robust joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities (ISR) while retaining the ability to strike to reduce Iraqi military capabilities in response to selected UNSCR/demarche violations.

7. Present a credible deterrent to future Iraqi aggression against Kuwait through US regional presence, exercises with Coalition partners, and global power.

According to US Joint Doctrine, adequacy, feasibility, acceptability, and consistency provide key tests for a COA. A tailored response COA with low rhetoric and the minimally necessary forward US presence on Arab soil is adequate for maintaining stability and the flow of oil and balancing regional partners’ concerns. Not unlike the conduct of OSW operations since 1999, continuing to tailor responses to strike less frequently but harder will not only allow linkage of the response to a violation, providing legitimacy for the response, but will also permit more significant attrition of Iraqi military capabilities. Additionally, by the Bush administration de-coupling demarche enforcement from economic sanctions, there is perhaps an opportunity to reinstate the new UN Monitoring, Observation, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) through Arab and Iraqi trade-partner pressure on Hussein. Yet, this approach is feasible and sustainable only if the US defense budget provides sufficient resources, such as funding for deployments, training, ordnance, and spare parts. The budget must recognize the detriment of OSW’s continued combat action on the readiness of US forces and plan accordingly for modernization, renovation, and resupply.

Is the plan acceptable? Yes, as it currently stands. Proportionality is a key ingredient to acceptability, and tailored responses are necessarily proportionate. Yet, there is no assurance that the plan of maintaining a sanctions regime enforced by principally US aerospace power, no matter the level of support of the regional allies or the UK, will force Hussein to succumb and allow inspections. Since Hussein’s policy is to use time as a weapon and portray his populace as victims, there are domestic, regional, and international political pitfalls with this approach. However, since maintaining stability and the free flow of oil are paramount, and there is no
leverage for WMD inspections if there are no sanctions or US pressure, an air occupation is necessary to enforce the UNSCRs and to preclude Iraq from invading Kuwait or threatening its neighbors. Barring a major policy shift, maintaining the status quo by well-coordinated political and military actions to keep the initiative, and reduce stress on the GCC, is the best hope for continued stability.

Finally, is the plan consistent with US Joint doctrine? At the strategic level, it is consistent. At the operational level of war, while conducting the actual day-to-day mission of enforcement, commanders will have to pay close attention to the political issues of managing a multi-national Coalition in a thorny political climate in which repercussions can be severe.

5) Expected/Potential Results

_It may be of interest to future generals to realize that one makes plans to fit circumstances and does not try to create circumstances to fit plans._

–General George S. Patton

In the next few years, a version of the current OSW mission will likely prevail. Hussein will probably remain in power. He may escalate, resulting in a Coalition reaction, or US deployment. However, a modest reduction in US presence may be possible due to increased use of mobility and global power projection capabilities. The size of this reduction will depend on Coalition military capabilities and the cooperation of GCC governments to sustain US military presence on their soil. If the Bush administration adjusts economic sanctions to take into account Arab concerns and perceptions of the suffering Iraqi people, OSW may continue to be viable. OSW may increase in importance, though operationally changes in the conduct of armed overflights may occur, if Iraq allows UNMOVIC to begin inspections. Generally, however, sanctions weariness will continue to erode international political will unless the Bush administration takes aggressive diplomatic action to bolster Coalition and UN members. Such
diplomatic action appears to be well underway to forestall a collapse of sanctions. As President Bush commented, “What we’re doing is taking a weak policy and strengthening it.”

Some possibilities for OSW include:

1. Hussein remains in power and the sanctions regime is lifted *de facto* due to pervasive third party trade violations;
2. The sanctions regime is lifted *de iure* by the UNSC due to renewal of inspections, forcing the lifting of the US/UK demarches;
3. A wildcard occurs, such as: Hussein dies, is overthrown, or launches a WMD or conventional attack against Israel or a Coalition member.

Of these possibilities, it is more likely that either of the first two options might occur. Yet, the combination of forward and global US force must be sufficient to respond to the third, and unilaterally if required. That potentially necessitates persistent involvement in the Gulf region for decades. Therefore, consultation, a regional focus, and close military and diplomatic contact with GCC allies must be more of a priority than simply containing Iraq. In fact, close relationships with the GCC will help promote the conditions for a post-conflict reduction in forward strength, though continued partnership in regional affairs and training should continue.

The lasting benefits will emerge in the next decades, and stability and the free flow of oil will be immediate products of an effective air occupation of Iraq.

**Implications and Conclusion: A Template…not dogma**

*The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish…the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature. This is the first of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive.*

--Major General Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, I, 1832

The examination of the air occupation strategy over Iraq and Operation SOUTHERN WATCH emphasizes both a strategy-to-task methodology and a capabilities-based approach to carrying out the intended strategy. For the case of air occupation, where full-scale warfare is
neither politically practical nor desirable, the presented approach shows how to dissect motivations, determining what an adversary values, and what outcomes military pressure can effect through politically acceptable means in a constrained environment. The implications of such a methodology recognize that each situation is different. Now, however, through advanced technology and capabilities, old concepts like the British air occupation have become both more effective and practical.

Adversary modeling, plus a critical analysis of the American and allied political objectives and military capabilities, are vital steps in designing a coherent course of action. In addition, as shown in this analysis, strategy reassessment is another essential key to success. As US policy changes with regard to Iraq and the Coalition, military strategy too must change or risk becoming irrelevant or destructive. Now, as the policy is in review, a consistent and well-executed military strategy provides the necessary stability to allow the policy makers to re-evaluate their concepts and provide solutions that are more flexible.

In conclusion, an air occupation is a viable concept when the strategist tailors the strategy to the particular situation, balances the objectives, constraints, and restraints, and frequently reassesses the operation with respect to capability, effects, and political will. Though it is not a panacea, an air occupation is a tool that permits decision-makers to conduct policy in a relatively low-risk manner. Moreover, it may provide the interim stability necessary to achieve lasting results in concert with diplomatic means, especially at the low end of the spectrum of war.


2 For a discussion into other “aerial denial” and “air siege” operations, please see AFDD-2, Organization and Employment of Aerospace Power, February 17, 2000, available on-line at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service_pubs/afd2.pdf, p. 17-18. “Aerial denial” reflects deterrent and coercive actions through the effective control of enemy airspace. Additionally, “aerospace” includes both traditional air power functions plus the synergistic advantages space operations provide, including communications, navigation, and other capabilities that make air power applications more effective.
Numerous books consider coercion, deterrence, compellance, punishment, sanctions, *et cetera*. The concept of holding at risk what an enemy values to compel the adversary is an interesting concept in this discussion of air occupation. A good reference is: Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966). Please see Schelling for a more detailed discussion of assurances, deterrence, coercion, and compellence. “Compliance is a necessary condition for stopping the damage but not sufficient, and if the damage falls mainly on the adversary, he has to consider what other demands will attach to the same compellent action once he has complied with the initial demands.” Italics added by Schelling, 90.


David J. Dean, *Airpower in Small Wars: The British Air Control Experience* (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University Press, 1985), p. 8. Italian efforts in North Africa before WWI also relate to this discussion. However, because of the scope of the RAF expeditions and the fact that the RAF was a separate air service during its 1920s air occupation efforts, Italian bombing campaigns were not included.

By 1921, Churchill had become the Colonial Secretary, and subsequently placed Iraq under the control of the RAF.

Many use the term “sensor-to-shooter loop” to describe the capability to translate information from the surveillance unit to the force employment element, allowing extremely rapid responses to enemy moves or changes in the battlefield.

The framework presented here reflects a contemporary US strategist point of view, though it is adaptable for other nations or other circumstances. It is not dogmatic, but simply a general manner for organizing an analysis.


TLAMs are US Navy cruise missiles capable of flying hundreds of miles then autonomously attacking a target with a conventional warhead.

DESERT FOX is one example where an aerial denial campaign shifted to an air siege. It was a three-day series of military attacks to reduce military capability and perhaps punish or provide a “message” to Hussein. Though
denial versus siege may be a doctrinal terminology discussion, air occupation may provide a common term the unity of action across doctrinal seams.


20 The Secretary General of the UN recently rebuked Hussein by the for running a surplus in the oil-for-food cache—meaning there are funds available to feed and provide humanitarian support to the Iraqi people, but Hussein has chosen not to use the money. Moreover, Iraq actually cut oil production in 2000 because Hussein had achieved oil export levels not seen since before the Gulf War and could afford to try to extort protection money outside of oil-for-food channels while using his starving populace as a media device.


24 A demarche is a political declaration of demarcation. These demarches are not UN policy; instead, they are Coalition political actions used to enforce UN resolutions.

25 Regarding northern Iraq, in April 1994, the US, UK, and France issued a demarche restricting Iraqi flights above 36°N to protect the Kurds, establishing Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, followed by ONW, 1 June 1997. A Combined Task Force (CTF) in Turkey administers ONW under the supervision of European Command (EUCOM). ONW is a separate entity from OSW, with separate chains of command and until the late 1990s, relatively infrequent coordination.


33 *National Security Strategy*, p. 43.


38 Ibid.


45 I discuss US military capabilities and vulnerabilities in general terms only due to the sensitivities of ongoing operations.


48 Bernard Reich, Lecture at National War College, February 12, 2001. Mr. Reich, among others, propose that the Saudis are seeking a “special relationship with the US” like the US maintains with Israel. With decreasing oil profits and strains on the Saudi (as well as other GCC governments’) welfare state, some degree of US support and presence is desirable. Against the backdrop of Muslim distaste for Western infidels in their holy lands, this need for military and financial support presents a dichotomy for the Gulf Arabs, especially Saudi Arabia.

49 For CENTCOM’s perspective, see “Regional Threats to US Interests and Security,” available on-line at http://www.centcom.mil/theater_strat/regional_threats.htm. They present Hussein’s objectives as: 1) survival of regime, 2) maintaining residual WMD capability, 3) sanctions relief, 4) dividing the Coalition, 5) safeguarding Iraqi sovereignty, 5) reasserting his authority over all Iraq, and 6) hegemonic goals in the region.


51 Karsh, *Saddam Hussein*. Karsh and Rautsi mention several conflicting goals of Hussein’s throughout their treatment. However, the goals tend to revolve around his survival, willingness to use brutality, and his self-possessed aggrandizement of power.

Karsh, *Saddam Hussein*, p. 150-274.

One of Hussein’s claims against Kuwait to justify his attack in 1990 was that they were drilling from Kuwaiti territory into Iraqi oil supplies (slant drilling) and stealing Iraqi oil.

Col Kevin Kennedy, Lt Col Christopher Bowman, Lt Col Kevin Degnan, Maj Robert Blanke, Maj Dave Toomey, and the author developed and explored components of American-Iraq strategy in USAF XOOC/Checkmate, the Headquarters Air Force strategy group, from August 1998 to December 1998. Unclassified elements of this research, compiled from multiple open sources, are in this analysis. Assertions and inaccuracies are the author’s responsibility alone.

Perhaps Milosevic, as some pundits propose, learned these lessons from Hussein before initiating the ethnic cleansing campaign in Kosovo—which precipitated the NATO response, ALLIED FORCE.


Beyond a certain level of action, however, CINC or NCA approval may be necessary. Prior approval of certain types of actions may facilitate rapid decisions at all levels.


Turkey has internal challenges with its Kurdish minority, and Turkey does not support an independent Kurdish state. Arab countries similarly do not want an independent Shi’ites state made out of southern Iraq, fearing this would be a projection of Iranian power into traditional Arab lands. Therefore, a viable, independent Iraq is desirable to most governments in the region.

*Joint Publication Capstone and Keystone Primer*. Also, see Joint Publication 5-0, *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations*, for expanded information on planning joint operations and Joint Publication 3-01, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*.

Ibid.

