The Station welcomed the reference for its guidance on the ABARRAS program and its exploitation of headquarters' experience and planning relative thereto.

The Station considers that at present there are insufficient advantages to be gained through direct handling and funding of ABARRAS-34 and ABARRAS-45.

To begin with, the Station has noted generally effective reciprocal collaboration between the two ABARRAS representatives and certain Station student assets, other independent democratic student leaders, and AITASE-1. In this collaboration the Station's student assets have taken advantage of the ABARRAS' presence and assistance; and the Station, through AITASE-1, has been able to steer and aid the ABARRAS on an unobtrusive basis. To illustrate, in June the ABARRAS received from their people an assortment of photographs depicting persecutions, executions, forced labor, and so forth in their homeland. Those photographs lent themselves to a number of themes they gave to AITASE-1 and his group who, using appropriate captions, prepared and obtained locally through the ABARRAS, made a display of them in a bulletin board-type showcase they control at the University, an operation which AITASE-1 reported had had some impact among the student body and put the Communist leaders on the spot. Turning to AITASE-1 for assistance in exploiting the photographs, the latter arranged for construction of an exhibit and for its placement in the offices of the Confederación de Trabajadores de la República de Panamá, the local ORIT affiliate. Then later on, in mid-July, AITASE-1 and ABARRAS-34 took the exhibit to Cariqui Province where it received further exploitation, in furtherance of AITASE-1's propaganda activities. The Station, accordingly, was able to monitor both operations and, in the case of transporting the exhibit to the interior, it also provided funds.

Both ABARRAS are in close contact with the University student leaders with whom the Station has been working directly as well as indirectly--e.g., ABARRAS-1, ABARRAS-2, NAY-S, and various others with actual or developing roles in local student affairs. Already able of using various different funding channels and now in liaison contact with ABARRAS-1, whose organization is expanding its...
activities in the student-youth field. The Station feels that direct dealings with the AABARs at this time could complicate its efforts to corral a uniting financial control in the Democratic student camp. For, to draw an analogy, the stage of democratic student politics at the University, our primary theater of operations, is small, the actual and would-be actors many, and the primary requisite for producing and directing a successful performance is for the Station to keep the cast in order through control of the business departments. It is believed that effective direct handling of the AABARs could not be sustained unless we funded them too, but this in turn not only would inevitably affect the financial control we have been able to gain over the other student activists but also probably cause splits in the Democratic camp. When our present restrictive operational funding policies have sought to deter.

3. The Station appreciates what could be gained operationally in other circumstances through direct handling and funding of either or both of the AABARs. As the capabilities and interests of our assets and other Democratic leaders dissipate, and as new figures arise, the fixed-focus of the AABARs should alter from direct handling so as to create new, successor assets and mechanisms; in this sense operations in and the outcome of the University elections next fall could hasten direct contact. Meanwhile, however, in summation of its viewpoints, the Station believes that the two AABARs here are contributing well and the Democratic student movement is benefiting from their activities without direct Station involvement; that direct handling and funding of the AABARs at the present time could affect the Station's handling and funding of its indigenous assets; that if and when necessary the Station can direct and fund the AABARs on an unwieldy basis through ABLEAS-1 (or through other appropriate indigenous assets if so required), and that, in the meantime, the Station will continue to monitor the AABARs' activities with a view to the time when direct contact and funding will provide distinct advantages.

4. The present two-slot AABAR 1/0 for Panama is believed adequate in view of their and our current activities, in the democratic student faction at the University and the gradually improving outlook for the democratic forces' resurgence in the fall elections. Ideally, the replacement of AABAR-45 with a more active, more interested, better prepared and trained leader, on a par with the kind of activist AABAR-34 appears to be, could enhance AABAR's local program; although ABLEAS-1 and our student assets accept and think well of both AABARs, it is quite evident that AABAR-34 is considerably ahead of AABAR-45 in the qualities indicated. The planned maximum of four slots is believed feasible, but on the basis that the two additional representatives dispatched be charged with primary missions in the field of secondary-
school student activities, an area in which good indigenous assets are harder to spot, gain access to, independently, recruit, and direct. Such designation of primary activity would hopefully enhance the Station’s operational emphasis on spotting and developing worthy secondary-school leaders able of becoming University leaders. In this respect, direct handling of the A-BARAS concerned would have distinct advantages. For example, the assets they develop that enter the University could be either picked up by the Station, steered unwittingly into Station-backed mechanisms, or transferred to the other A-BARAS actually concentrating their efforts at the University level. The Station also could better develop and direct operations in the secondary-school student movement because of the A-BARAS’ undivided attention, and more effectively cut into the Communists’ perennial organizational efforts and attention in the public secondary schools of the capital area and the interior provinces. On the other hand, if exclusively secondary-school student activities are not within the scope of an A-BARAS representative’s assignment, then it is felt that the addition of two more A-BARAS at the university level, or even if on an across-the-board basis, should bear the condition that the new designees will not openly identify themselves as A-BARAS representatives. We believe that open identification would necessitate their alignment with the same groups that the station, A-BARAS-34, and A-BARAS-43 already are working in, as much as for them to operate openly and independently would cause schisms and possibly further divide the democratic forces, whereupon the concentration of four A-BARAS in the same general area of activity would be counter-productive and, from then on, wasteful of manpower and talent. As extended independent, covert operators, the two additional A-BARAS could conceivably work quietly to unite the democratic forces or at best help coordinate their anti-Communist efforts.

5. With respect to Panama as a possible relocation site for the A-BARAS organization’s headquarters, the Station offers the following considerations.

a. First, there is the exclusively internal A-BARAS viewpoint. As headquarters officers who have visited this Station are aware, this Station has, because of the plant and ODINEX cover, perhaps superior facilities and services for both local and area-wide administrative and operational support purposes, and already is the operating base for various kinds of support and ODINEX officers who cover the entire area. Non-Odinex facilities and services also offer advantages; for example, the GADIC Latin American Regional Officer Center here provides the Station with direct dispatch and receipt of lateral pouches on an area-wide basis. To the Field Case Officer who headquarters personally would assign here, without preoccupation as to using an ODAICIC slot, would accrue also the factors of favorable living conditions (especially if a family man) and good operating climate.
As for the outlook for the AMABAR organization, it is not foreseen that the host government would turn down its relocation here were the preliminary arrangements and actual move conducted discreetly; nor that the general public, once clued to the shift, would resist or consistently oppose it provided there would be no sudden influx of people not actually employed by the organization who would be regarded as creating undue competition in the domestic employment market. Additional considerations are Panama's aspect as a north-south international air junction and world shipping crossroads; the availability of up-to-date office facilities and commercial services at slashed costs (at least by comparison to what overhead costs would be in Buenos Aires and Caracas), and the favorable environment for AMABAR functionaries. However, removal of the OÜOKE-PSPRIE stigma would be slight due to the traditional latino attitude that OÜOKE runs the whole show here because of its long-term real estate and strategic interests; hence, it would be only to a lesser degree that the AMABAR organization's foes and detractors could use the same propaganda attacks currently directed at the organization in its present location.

6. The observations given in the preceding paragraph should not be construed by Headquarters as a bid for relocation of the AMABAR organization in Panama. Rather, they represent and are given as an informal-consensus of Station opinion and do not take into account, among other things, relocation prospects in other countries and the specific, peculiar requirements of both KUJARK and the AMABAR organization.

1 August 1962

Distribution:
1 - Chief, Task Force
2 - Chief, WH
2 - Files