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FOR THE RECORD

By Brig. Gen. Landsdale

Subject: Outline of Covert Operations

My other memorandum on this same subject today describes the tasking by Deputy Secretary Gilpatric and the handling of this highly sensitive information. The acquisition of the information is noted in this present memorandum.

After Deputy Secretary Gilpatric gave me the requirement last night, I talked to Bruce Cheever (who was acting for Bill Harvey while Harvey was out of town). I sketched in the purpose, which was to get a fix for Gilpatric as one of the U.S. negotiators with the Soviets on whether or not all actions (sabotage, etc.) had come to a stop. I mentioned that this was a sensitive point brought up by Adlai Stevenson when he talked with the U.S. negotiators in New York; he didn't want the U.S. embarrassed and Gilpatric wanted to be sure of this. Cheever commented that he hoped my memorandum wasn't going to be shown to Stevenson; I reassured him that I was writing it as an "eyes only" for Gilpatric, but it must be correct.

I asked about covert operational assets both inside Cuba and outside, if they had stop orders on actions. Bruce said that they all had such orders, but pointed out that some of the Cubans were quite emotional about stopping actions against Castro and he wasn't certain that everyone would hold to the orders.

I then asked about assets inside Cuba, did they only have the two action teams there? How about any psychological operations? Bruce said he believed there were only the two teams and would check further to be sure. He knew the teams were supposed to be collecting intelligence. As for psychological operations, all CIA assets had been turned over to USIA for operational use. I asked about the balloon operation. He said that this was not in being yet.
This morning I talked to Bruce again, checking the points in my memorandum. He said that there were only the two action teams, a small one (Central Cuba) and the big one (200-man in Western Cuba), but they definitely were on intelligence collection. I asked if all others were under control, no boats going out, etc. He said yes, but again pointed out that the Cubans were restive. I then asked if any independent groups were in motion. He said CIA couldn't guarantee any groups not under CIA control, but that the word had gotten around to stop actions at this time and none were known to CIA currently, although maybe there was one not known to CIA. I commented again that any action would embarrass the negotiations, which was why I was asking. Bruce said he understood.

I then checked with Don Wilson, USIA, who confirmed that all CIA psychological assets had been turned over to USIA for operational use and were being used as desired by the President. I checked with Bob Hurwitch, State, to see if he knew of any actions in preparation or on the way; he said no, everything appeared to be at a halt. I checked with General Johnson to see if any U.S. military activity might have a Cuban action group. He said no, there are firm orders holding such actions.

I then wrote the "eyes only" memorandum to show to Mr. Gilpatric, on "Outline of Covert Operations."