

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

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HANDWRITTEN NOTES
ASSASSINATION PROJECT

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[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

~~SECRET~~

HARVEY Ex 1 R371

6/25/75

9/8/75

Project ZRRIFLE

1

1994
APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1993
CIA MEMORANDUM
AS SANITIZED
23 JUN 94
(S) (A)
(S) (B)
(S) (C)

1. Identification: The purpose of Project ZRRIFLE is to spot, develop, and use ~~foreign~~ agent assets for Division D operations. Agents will be spotted in several areas, including the United States, but ~~with~~ ~~probs~~ for operational security reasons will probably not be used in their countries of residence. Present developmental activity is being conducted in the WE and EE areas, but it is anticipated that this will be extended to other division areas. The project will be operated against third country intelligence and personnel.

2. Objective: The objective of this project is ~~to identify and develop~~ ~~agents~~ ~~in accordance with~~ requirements levied on the clandestine service ~~by the~~ ~~National Security Council~~ since these requirements are subject to frequent revision, no listing of targets would be valid for the duration of the project. Specific operations will be mounted on the basis of need and opportunity. The project will be conducted by Division D with assistance from area divisions and stations as

3. Background: needed.

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3. Background: In response to the increasing requirements ~~of the~~ ~~National Security Council~~ Division D in 1969 began the spotting of agent assets as a developmental activity. During the same

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~~Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to~~
~~Criminal Sanctions~~

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Classified by 007789
Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
Automatic declassification
Date for review to determine

period requirements for [redacted] became more rigid and in many respects more sensitive. Because most stations are not equipped to conduct this type of operation and because of the desirability of completely centralized control over this entire effort, it was determined that Division D [redacted] [redacted] could best conduct the activity. The first spotting activity has now advanced far enough to justify removing from the OSA category.

4. Operational assets:

(1) Personnel: QJWIN is under written contract as a principal agent, with the primary task of spotting agent candidates. QJwin was first contacted in 1958 [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] in connection with an illegal narcotics operation into the United States. For a period of a year and a half he was contacted [redacted] & sporadically by [redacted] in behalf of the Bureau of Narcotics. Files of this Bureau reflect an excellent performance by QJwin. In ^{October} ~~September~~ 1960,

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3

Rubin annual salary : \$ 7,700
Travel + ops expenses for
Rubin + other agents & agent candidates : 2,000
Fees for services by and
standby of agents and
agent candidates : 2,000
Travel of staff employees &
engaged in Zoriffle activity : 2,500
Hire of safehouses, automobiles
and other operational expenses : 1,000
\$ 14,700

Pay for agents on completion of jobs?

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4

1) Legal, ethical → morals, operational problems; political: non-attribution
ability.

2) One man experience (CIA/NSA) (+ effect on DDP) and experience
w/ KGB (CIA/NSA) → require most
professional, proven operationally competent, ruthless, stable,
CF-experienced ops officers (few available), able to conduct patient
search + w/ quite to pull back if mist or knowledge tells him
he should, + w/ firm high regard for operational security.
Assessments are all-important.

3) Maximum security:

a. Kubaik only (e.g., what does ~~NSA~~ know?); no approach to other Dept. agencies.

b. Within Kubaik, one focal point for control,
search, tracing, case officing, etc. - DDP authority
in this focal point mandatory. DCI officially advised?

c. Max. security cable commo for innocuous
cables only; no restrictions on travel; possibility
of one-man success (Europe) control base with
owner (non-station) commo. Word of mouth +
no backchannels re ~~trav~~
(except forward)

d. No PA's, or intermediaries; rigid case-officing,
from start to finish.

e. No approach to officials of foreign
govts.

f. No use of ~~any~~ agent who
eyes involved for a ~~U.S.~~ Govt. agency. Training
by opposition would ~~be~~ needed.

g. Use of already tested assets (e.g.,
~~Mark~~ in the search.

h. Stand-by list of Kubaik who can

pass as foreigners.

- i. Pretect ~~Method~~ ~~secret~~; the established ~~method~~
- j. No discussions in stations. No team ~~unit~~

4. Blackmail:

- a. No American citizens or residents or people who was obtained via visas
- b. No chain of connections; strictly person to person; singleton ops.
- c. No meeting any candidate in home territory.
- d. Exclude organization ~~members~~, those in record of arrests, those of mutability of purpose as criminals.
- e. Staffers involved - selection.

5. Cover: planning should include provision for planning loss or breach in case of blow.

- 6. Testing of nominees essential: re following, discretion, security, blackmail.
- 7. Former resistance personnel a possibility.
- 8. Use nobody who has never dealt w/ criminals; otherwise will not be aware of pitfalls or consider factors such as freedom to travel, wanted lists, etc.

→ 9. ~~Should have plan~~ ~~to be kept~~ ~~in file~~
~~document~~ ~~to be~~ ~~kept~~ ~~in~~ ~~file~~
~~as~~ ~~well~~

10. Possible use of staffers for the action.

11. ~~Blackmail~~

Keeping of files.

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freed to travel [6]

Legal; operational + ethical -> moral problems.

[Redacted] case.

- 1) Maximum security + within Hubark only (e.g., how much data [redacted] now know?). Limitation on number of [redacted] [redacted] objective.
- 2) One focal point for search, control, tracing, case-officer + PA selection. Complete DDP authority in this focal point mandatory. Overseas one-man control base with own (non-rotation) commo.
- 3) Every operation to be rigidly case-officered; no silk-shirt PAs.

Non-attachability:

- 4) No American citizen or American residents for direct action; possibly for approach to foreign elements. No criminal who recruited by use of another American agency. Use of case officers who can pass as foreigners - and limited official reference.
- 5) No chain of connections permitting blackmail.
- 6) Don't meet any selectee in home territory.
- 7) Avoid discussion w/ foreign officials until all possibility of search through private citizens (e.g., Opium) has been examined.

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- 8) Planning should include provision for blessing Soviets (or Greeks) in case of blow. is it above essential.
- 9) Exclude organization criminals, those with record of arrests, those who have engaged in several types of crime.

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7

10) ~~Criteria~~ recommended. ~~Tests~~ ~~Requirements~~

11) Former resistance personnel offer possibilities. (ARS archives)

12) Period of testing, surveillance, etc. for each selected.

13) ~~Only~~ ^{all} ~~personnel~~ ^{personnel} involved should have some CE experience.

14) ~~What~~ ^{stable} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ

15) What are limits on team or individuals selected? No "team" until ready to go.

16) For Danger of standbys.

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red 25/1 - eye cation

"The Magic Button"

parcotics Büro ~~Handwritten scribble~~

8

"for a living" - RIS 201 cover

Carbon - Bankruptcy - No Star

eyes - Jim A. / Contradict

not a TSO problem ~~Handwritten scribble~~ from U-2

Apply brakes

Last resort beyond last resort &

a confession of weakness -

- El Benefactor - assumption -

~~Handwritten scribble~~ Example 3 "many"

Transmittal of ~~Handwritten scribble~~ job.

~~Handwritten scribble~~ - Memo: ~~Handwritten scribble~~

~~Large blacked-out redacted section~~

~~Handwritten scribble~~ Hear

REC-11

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Quarantined -

26/1 - ~~Handwritten scribble~~ - ~~Handwritten scribble~~ - Matter -

No file Review -

1. Select proper open to run -

2. ~~Handwritten scribble~~ Max. of 2

3. Security Rules B-WRM-AS-3

4. ~~Handwritten scribble~~ Sid - Review.

5. Last Resort - Brakes - ~~Handwritten scribble~~ - ~~Handwritten scribble~~

- 6. no ~~with [redacted]~~
 - 7. no projects or papers except per cons.
 - 8. Principal Agent - ~~[redacted]~~? -
~~[redacted]~~ Proj. Draft KCH -
 tickets 1500 - from AB -
 mark spot again - still at
 project - also Dicks
 - 9. Disposal -
 - 10. Targets who's names -
 must know before
 we can spot -
 - 11. Case officering
 - 12. ~~[redacted]~~
~~[redacted]~~
 - 13. ~~[redacted]~~
~~[redacted]~~
~~[redacted]~~
- Fd list - Remember

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