JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY: SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER: 157-10004-10300
RECORDS SERIES:
REPORT (PAGES 6-15)

AGENCY FILE NUMBER:

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR: SSCIA
FROM:
TO:

TITLE:
CUBAN OPERATION

DATE: 00/00/00
PAGES: 10

SUBJECTS:
CUBAN OPERATION
10 PAGES ONLY
CASTRO
COVERT ACTION

DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION: U
RESTRICTIONS: 1A, 1C, DONOR REST., REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS: X
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 09/07/94

OPENING CRITERIA:

COMMENTS:

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note).
Case#: NW 53244 Date: 06-13-2017

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The lack of proof of U.S. involvement did not prevent Castro from charging the CIA with responsibility. Indeed, almost every act of defiance against his regime has been credited to the Agency.

Castro’s emotional reactions to real or rumored security threats point up his acute sensitivity to internal resistance and suggests that he feels his regime to be far from secure from external threats. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, has reacted to the sabotage raids with much less vigor and bluster than we anticipated. Their only sharp reaction, aside from the expected propaganda, followed a series of air raids during August and September sponsored by Cuban exile groups operating from Florida and for which the Agency had no responsibility. They did no real damage, but they did demonstrate that the Cuban air defense system could be breached, and they added substantially to the psychological impact of our first two raids.

The Agency sabotage raids produced some very specific results. For example, in the political and psychological realm, reported in late August that the incidents that month, including the Santa Lucia and Casilda operations “disturbed the feeling of consolidation and tranquility which the Castro regime had succeeded in creating in recent months.” He reported that the Cubans were uncertain and apprehensive over the possibility of a U.S. campaign of subversion and sabotage because of Cuba’s vulnerability to such a campaign due to the “low ebb” of enthusiasm for the Castro regime among the people. He also stated that the raids had “raised hopes of those opposed to the regime” and that “dispirited opposition had received a fillip to its morale.”

In a September report, stated that the “most immediate effect of such attacks is the psychological blow dealt to the stability of the Castro regime with consequent boost in opposition.” Low morale and dejection in the counterrevolutionary ranks of some months ago.
ago, he said, "has given way to a wave of optimism that the
maximum leader is no longer necessarily a permanent fixture."
Ambassador Kidd also reported that Che Guavara had indicated
concern that the raids would divert much needed manpower
and resources from the economic to the military sector.

On 4 September a reliable clandestine source in Cuba
reported that the reaction of the average man on the street in
Havana to the news of the attacks on Casilda and Santa Lucia
was "surprising." Prior to the Cuban government's announce-
ment of the raids, the average man on the street seemed
apathetic, depressed and in a low state of morale. Following
the announcement their mood changed to one of pleasure, joy,
and hope. The observations of this source were reinforced
by the statements of Cuban refugees who arrived in the U.S.
shortly after the Cuban announcement of the raids.

A former Major in the Cuban Rebel Army who broke with
Castro reported after his exfiltration from Cuba in January
1964 that the 23 December Siquanes raid which destroyed a
P-6 patrol boat was a great boost to morale among disaffected
Cubans.

A Cuban lawyer with extensive connections among Cuban
government officials and in the Western community in Havana
has just reported that the "morale effects of the recent
sabotage operations are good among anti-regime segments of
the population. Such acts, to them, indicate that the outside
world is not forgetting the Cuban people, that the fight con-
tinues and suggests a possible prelude to some military action
against Castro. Opposite morale effects are noted among the
pro-regime segments who have tended to remain notably quiet
about the regime after successful sabotage operations."

A Cuban communications technician employed by the Cuban
government reported on 1 January that the "act of sabotage
against the torpedo boat on the Isle of Pines was very success-
ful in the opinion of the people and, for sure, public opinion
needed something to stimulate it. What happened at La Siguana
had such an effect. Although at times failures are suffered
which depress the people, they are anxious for something to
happen."