JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10005-10267
RECO SERIES :

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
FROM : TREVERTON, GREGORY F.
TO : FILES.

TITLE :
MEMORANDUM/CHRON

DATE : 05/27/75
PAGES : 3

SUBJECTS :
INTERVIEW WITH GOODWIN, RICHARD
SUBJ: INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN LATIN AMERICA

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : S
RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/05/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
BOX 390-3

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED

Released under the John F. Kennedy
Assassination Records Collection
Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note).
Case #: NW 53244 Date: 06-13-2017

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED
the President probably did not know of the gun transfer, but he said that the assassination and the U.S. role with respect to it would have come as no surprise to the President. He doubted that the CIA even would have had to clear the transfer, although a general policy of that sort might have been passed by the Special Group.

Goodwin reported no other mention of assassinations. In fact, he said he once heard a CIA man say that assassination was a bad idea because once started, it never ended. However, an agent in the field might regard killings of one sort or another as within his mission in supporting one political faction over another. And of course someone might have gotten carried away. It was clear from the Bay of Pigs that the CIA sometimes acted without, or even against, instructions (e.g. by bringing Batista followers into the Bay of Pigs invasion team). In general, Latin American work seemed to attract the worst personnel in all Washington agencies including the CIA.

2. CIA Activities in Brazil:

Goodwin knew little of CIA activities in Brazil. The United States had strongly backed Quadros and never liked Goulart. In the period before 1964, the U.S. gave political support to anti-Goulart factions: followers of Kubitschek and even to the Furtado in the Brazilian northeast. The U.S. had been involved in Brazilian elections for many years and presumably spent a good deal in the 1963 congressional elections. On the military side, Walters was brought from Rome to keep in contact with the Brazilian military. How much further Walters' activities might have extended Goodwin did not know.