AGENCY: ROCKCOMCOP
RECORD NUMBER: 178-10002-10394
RECORD SERIES: ASSASSINATION FILES
AGENCY FILE NUMBER: ASSASSINATION MATERIALS, L. FLETCHER PROUTY

ORIGINATOR: ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION

FROM:

TO:

TITLE: L. FLETCHER PROUTY

DATE: 04/15/1975
PAGES: 15

SUBJECTS:
ASSASSINATIONS, FOREIGN LEADERS
ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES
PROUTY, L. FLETCHER

DOCUMENT TYPE: DEPOSITION
CLASSIFICATION: Secret
RESTRICTIONS: 1A; 1B; 1C; 4
CURRENT STATUS: Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 07/12/1993

OPENING CRITERIA:

COMMENTS:

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note).
Case#: NW 53244 Date: 06-13-2017
STAFF INTERVIEW
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION
ON CIA ACTIVITIES

Thursday, May 15, 1975
Washington, D.C.
SECRET

STAFF INTERVIEW

PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION

ON CIA ACTIVITIES

---

Washington, D. C.

Thursday, May 15, 1975

The Staff met, pursuant to notice at 4:00 o'clock p.m.,
at 712 Jackson Place, N. W., Washington D. C.

PRESENT:

MARVIN L. GRAY, JR., Staff member

---
Whereupon,

L. FLETCHER POURTY
called for interview by Counsel for the President's Commission
on CIA Activities, having been first duly sworn by the Notary
Public, was examined and testified as follows:

EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR THE COMMISSION

BY MR. GRAY:

Q. Sir, would you state your full name for the record?

A. My name is L. Fletcher Pourty.

Q. And you are a retired Air Force Colonel, who for a
substantial period of time, and particularly around the late
1950's and early 1960's served as a CIA appointed liaison
with the Air Force with certain support of a paramilitary nature.

Q. Is that correct?

A. But it should be the other way around, I serves as an
Air Force officer in support of CIA, I was in the Air Force.

Q. And your office was in the Air Force?

A. Yes, my office was in the Pentagon, in the Air Force.

Q. Before the reporter arrived you told me that in
December 1959 or January 1960 or possibly as late as February
1960, you were approached by the Air Division of the Covert
Action Staff of the CIA, who said they had a special job
requiring Air Force support, and they wanted an L-23, is that
correct?
A. Yes.

Q. And I don't think I can repeat what you explained to me about the L-20, so maybe you had better repeat that.

A. The L-20 was a special single engine plane that had been purchased by the CIA called the Helio Courier. The Air Force owned a number of these aircraft. So we provided cover for CIA by giving them Air Force insignia and Air Force designation, the L-20, and Air Force serial numbers. And these aircraft, or at least some of them, were based at Eglin Air Force Base in Florida. They were at Eglin Air Force Base because that is where the CIA kept most of its aircraft in the country.

Q. And how was this mission originally described to you?

A. Originally it was one of a number of missions that we were operating over a period of time. But it was one of the few that we operated with L-20's. The people who came over from the Air Division stated that they had a place to land the plane in Cuba on a road, on a small road, and they had a photograph of it. And they were going to let two men out there and then fly the plane back with a pilot and copilot to Eglin Air Force Base. And the men that were being left off would be equipped with a high powered rifle and a telescopic sight. They were Cubans. We never saw them, of course. This is what we were told they were, because we didn't interfere with who was on the plane, we simply put the plane in the air. But this
was a normal procedure. And the object of their mission in Cuba was to go to a building in Havana where one of the men knew his way around and was pretty sure that he could get into, and if possible, he would shoot Castro.

Q. Did you recall who told you this?

A. No, I don't, because we were working every day with these people. And I think if you had a listing of the Air Division staff at that date I probably could tell you it was one of four men, something like that, a Division of maybe 30 men, it would have been one of three or four, or two of three or four. The thing was, we were doing these things every day, it was not an odd thing that came up, it was something that we were doing quite regularly.

Q. It surprises me that the CIA would describe the mission to you in this much detail, it doesn't seem consistent with compartmentation and need-to-know particularly in view of the sensitive nature of the mission.

A. That is an awfully good point you are making. In those days it did, because the more urgent part of my job was to brief my boss, the Chief of Staff, Air Force, and through him the Secretary, Air Force, or the Secretary of Defense, or whoever, as required.

Q. Let's go off the record for a minute.

(Discussion off the record.

MR. GRAY: Back on the record.

SECRET
THE WITNESS: And since that was a real serious responsibility, we wouldn't fly the mission unless we knew that it had the approval of the Security Council, or that at least the overall program had approval of the Security Council. And this was understood for years. We had no problem with that at all. I don't think that I ever sent out a mission that we didn't know what they were going to do and where they were going. And this seems, at least in certain applications, to have ceased in this day and age. But I think that is due to other things. But in 1959-60 we would know where it was going - even to the point that I would want to know when they came back, I would really want to know if they went where they told me. We were pretty sure about how we did it.

BY MR. GRAY:

Q. Do you recall briefing the Chief of Staff or any of your other superiors on this mission?

A. Yes. My usual arrangement was to brief the Director of Plans, the Major General who was my immediate boss.

Q. Did you remember who that was at that time?

A. In 1959 I would say that was General Cary, or possibly General Martin. Again, it is a question of who was where at that time. But I think if we put those two names down we will be awfully close to it.

Q. Was this mission concerned at all as to the proprietary or morality or whatever? Did thoughts of that nature concern you when you heard it?
A. The concern that we would have was that the military would not be involved. We just wouldn't participate in it. And actually the CIA had the same idea at that time. What we were doing was helping Cubans. And if the Cubans, with their own little command structure, wanted to operate and could, you might say, convince CIA that this was something that was important to them, or that they thought they could achieve, on their own, if we would just give them so much as a little help, the missions would be sent. As a result, we didn't concern ourselves with too many of them, for the simple reason, we weren't asked for. It was almost like mechanics, you know. There were missions that we turned down, but mostly because we thought they wouldn't succeed or that we would not be able -- the favorite phrase -- to disclaim plausibly that the military or the Government of the U.S. was involved. And we were serious about that business in those days.

Q. Did you recall anyone else that you briefed on this raising any questions about this particular mission?

A. No, with no, what you might say barriers to the operation, with everything cleared and laid on in a perfectly normal manner, we got on with other business. We knew right away that it didn't succeed -- I say right away, within 10 days -- and there were so many other things going on, it was on with the rest of it.

Q. Did you ever hear what happened to interrupt the
plans?

A. I don't think I have a clear memory about it. But all of us in that business kind of felt that most of those Cubans were not able to do what they thought they could do. Castro was operating the bloc system, and I think it was a lot more effective than we gave him credit for.

Q. How are you able to place a time as to December 1959 or January 1960 or February 1960? Why are you sure it is in that two- or three-month period.

A. I will tell you why that is pretty easy to figure. The Agency wasn't running what I would call hard missions until late in 1959. You know Castro came in at the beginning of 1959. And things didn't really jell until later in the year. And a good reason for that, the training of Cuban exiles hadn't produced really professionals in terms of pilots or drop teams or saboteurs or what have until after they had had quite a bit of training. At the other end of the calendar, General Eisenhower had made it very clear to all of us who were operating overflights that nothing was to be done. A little later in 1960 when he was supposed to meet at the summit with Khruschchev and other world leaders, we hauled every overflight. And to this day I can't understand why the U-2 went out. But all the flights that I had anything to do with, the Tibetan flight, the Laotian flights, the Cuban flights, all of that overflight program we hauled on direct orders. And since the meeting in
Paris was scheduled for May 1, I doubt if we flew anything after March 15, or even maybe March 1, because there would be no interference with it. So I can put it between those dates without any trouble.

Q. You said at times it was a matter of concern to make sure that the operations you had requested to support, or at least the type of operation, had been approved by the National Security Council, or whoever else was required. Did you recall when you made any such inquiries in this case?

A. The way we would work that is, having briefed, you might say, the Air Force chain of command, if I was not told to stop, it was gone. Again, it was a matter of working with people that I had been with for years. It wasn't one kind. They knew me, they knew the program. And if I briefed them and there was nothing to interfere within a day or two, we would go. Now, sometimes they would want additional briefings. But I don't remember one in this case.

Q. I believe at some point one of the news coverages had the name of one of the Cubans involved.

A. I don't put much story in that. I looked up some notes that I thought might be pertinent, but I don't -- we didn't work with the Cubans -- there were a few Cubans we got to know, like Artemio, but they were not involved in this kind of operation.

Q. Did you ever get a project name for this, or is there
anything that you can suggest, in other words, that we can go
to the Agency indices to try to track down the paperwork behind
it if any.

A. No. You see our overall project was called TAB-6.
That was the code, an international code, Agency and military.
And if we called it TAB-6, just like a TAB-7 or TAB-9 in a lot
of documents, people all over the world knew that TAB-6 was a
certain type program. And most of the time when it was like
this, pure mechanical program, we would just continue calling
it TAB-6, maybe with a date and an airplane number, but
nothing else. Now, sometimes a program would be broken off
TAB-6, and we would have a separate code number. This was just
an ordinary flight.

Q. You say the use of the L-28 was fairly rare. Would
there be any Air Force records which would enable us to pin
down any flight this war or pin it down to one of a few, some-
thing like that?

A. Well, there were two things I think you would find.
We usually went to elaborate detail to cover the flight. For
example, if a plane leaves and is not in the air -- if it doesn't
land it is presumed lost. Now, we would put another plane in
the air to cover it, one with the actual numbers of the one
that was supposed to be in the air. We would put that one in
the air from some field where nobody knew it took off. And
if the one would pick up the flight, come in and land, so that
control towers, air traffic controllers could show a record of a plane coming in.

Now, this was normal procedure for the people at Eglin, whether the plane was going to Guatemala, or Nicaragua, anything what we called black flight would be covered that way.

Q. I would presume that you have got a record of those, or that it could be available?

A. Now, sometimes when the crew would, say, be mercenaries like Air America, they would just take off. And they knew we had them covered in Air Defense Command. And there would be no record at all, nothing, they wouldn't tell anybody where they were going. We would have to see what Eglin had on its record. But I would think, my personal view would be that they ran this very professionally, and you will find there was a flight.

Q. Would that be preserved after 15 years, or be destroyed?

A. I say there are two sides of this. The man in the tower at Eglin would just know plane number 1, 2 or 3 was left, and I think it would be dropped from the book with the others, and I think the law requires 90 days or something like that. The other thing is, the Air Defense Command would have a record, because it is harder to tell the Air Defense Command not to go after a bogey in the sky than to have them go. But again, 15 years is a long record.
1. What about on the Agency's side, would you be familiar enough with their records and records-keeping processes to offer any guidance as to how we might try to run this down.

2. Well, the Cuban program was a big program that had general approval so long as only Cubans were involved. And up to the point that the Agency was involved, I think you would find them very professional, I think you would find that they have records. But to say what happened after it left the Agency control, then I don't think there would be a record. That is the base program. And of course, I imagine you have heard that from other people too, that you have got to disclaim plausibly. We went so far as to take the decals off the motors, to take the decals off all the engine parts, to take all the American language fuels classification symbols, or whatever, so that the plane was what we call sanitized. Now, if that plane went down, everybody would just disclaim entirely that they had ever even heard of it anywhere. Which means that you don't have any records anywhere, not even the airplane. That is the kind of mission the thing was.

3. But the pilots would normally at least have been Agency people, and not Cubans, is that right?

4. In this instance they would be either Agency contract employees -- not Agency full-time employees, but contract employees, or Cubans, because that is what we were doing in Guatemala, we were training them. You would find either one.
But in either case they would have been people flying, you
might say, under Agency supervision. We never knew what
nationality they were, whether they were like Air American
pilots, of indeterminate nationality, or whether they were Cubans
I would presume, if I look back at it, since th L-23 was very
easy to fly, that it was a Cuban crew.

Q. Is there anything else you can think of that would
give us more lead on running this down, either through the
Agency or through the Air Force or some other suitable source?

A. I have been looking through the New York Times
micro film. I have a little flickering memory that there was a
little announcement from Havana. I must admit that it was only
a light recollection, and I have been trying to find it in the
To date I haven't found it. But that kind of thing -- Havana
used to blaze every time they got one of those. And that was
one way we knew how far they got sometimes.

Q. If you find that, would let me know?

A. I certainly will.

Q. Aside from this instance, was there any other similar
operation, Agency operation that you knew of, similar to the
one that appeared to be designed to assassinate a foreign
leader or support an assassination attempt upon a foreign
leader?

A. Well, I don't know how deep you go into these subjects.
But I know what you might call the anatomy of an assassination doesn't begin with the assassination. If you can remove the government or assist people who are probably going to remove it inevitably, a successful one, and not assassination -- there are a number of those called coup d'états. There were quite a few of those things where, for many reasons, the Agency would be keeping in touch with a group who were not in power, but who, with the run of events, or with a little assistance, or even in some cases up to the point where if the man doesn't leave he may be killed -- he doesn't have much choice -- sure, the Agency was involved in that, there has been a record of that for years.

Q. What specific one do you have in mind?

A. I think one that is pretty clear is that over a period of time the Agency worked rather diligently with General Rene Barrientos in Bolivia when he made his move. Dr. Victor Paz Estenssoro, who was President of Bolivia left. So there was no assassination, he took over.

The Agency for a long time had worked with Barrientos. Now, I doubt if the Agency ever got to the point with any of them where they said, if he doesn't go by tomorrow we will have to shoot that guy, because events roll up, you see.

Another case where this kind of development took place was one removed from Trujillo -- I believe Trujillo was followed by Juan Boscit -- it might have been Bleager -- but I
think Juan Bosch. Juan Bosch, I recollect, was replaced by
Donald Reid Kabaral. Now, Kabaral was in my office in the
Pentagon at about 7:00 o'clock in the evening the day before
he became President of the Dominican Republic. Now, the only
reason he was there was because somebody in the Agency sent him
there. And we gave him a little bit of help that he needed.
He took an Eastern Airlines plane out of Washington for San
Juan that night, I think at 8:30, and transferred out of San
Juan for Santo Domingo. The change of government took place
that night, and he was the President of the Dominican
Republic the next day. And nobody was killed.

But that is really -- you know, the Agency can say,
and the government can say, that an assassination is not our
business. An assassination is when everything else fails.

Or like in the case of Diem, the President of South
Vietnam, where the government went to every extreme to persuade
him and his brother to go to Europe. Madame Nhu was already
in Europe. And they had brought tickets or arranged his flight
to Europe, and they had arranged for him to make a speech and
all that. But he didn't go. Well, what happens when you expose
the palace guard like that, they all know that thousands of
people hate them. Any palace guard is hated in most cases.

And they leave, they run for their own lives. And so when Mr.
Diem came back to the palace there was nobody there to protect
him. He made a mistake. And when he realized that he went in the
tunnel, and they found him at the other end of the tunnel, and
he was killed. There was no assassination plan. All that talk
about the assassination of Diem is by people who don't know the
inside. There was no assassination of Diem. But there was a
removal of Diem. And when it didn't work he got assassinated
by others. And that was, I think, the reasonably spontaneous.

Once another government knows that the support of the
CIA, or the support of this government, is being removed, then
many, many people are exposed, and they begin to run. Just as
we saw in Saigon. And if they don't run, they get killed.

So where a lot of people make a mistake is -- and I
worked on so darned many of these -- is that you don't start with
a plan to assassinate, that is what is wrong, that is why the
Agency says, no, we don't do that. Now, in that fine sense, I
could agree with the Agency. But all the rest of the machinery
is there. And it gives the people on the outside the initiative
to go further. And a lot of time the initiative improves the
gun and the bullets after everything else. Assassination has to
be treated wisely, or it becomes complete aberration.

MR. GRAY: We will conclude here.

(Whereupon at 4:30 p.m., the interview was concluded.)