DRAFT BRIEFING NOTES 18 February 1963

TRAINING

I. We estimate that at least 1,000, and perhaps as many as 1,500 persons came to Cuba during 1962, from all the other Latin American countries with the possible exception of Uruguay, to receive ideological indoctrination or guerrilla warfare training or both. More have gone in 1963 despite the limited facilities for reaching Cuba at present.

A. The largest contingents have come from Venezuela, Peru, Ecuador, Argentina, and Bolivia.

B. Some of the courses are as short as four weeks, designed to let it appear that the trainees had merely attended some conference or celebration and done a little sightseeing.

C. Other courses last as long as a year, and may include intensive training in such things as sabotage, espionage, or psychological warfare. Many trainees have stayed on in Cuba indefinitely.

II. We have devoted a great deal of effort to monitoring Latin American travel to Cuba at the main jump-off points such as Mexico and Curacao. We have to do this because the Cubans go to great lengths to conceal the fact that some of these trainees have ever been to Cuba, and how long they stayed.
A. We know a great deal about this travel from our penetrations of the Communist parties, from controlled agents we have been able to maneuver into the training courses in Cuba, and from cooperative travel control authorities in Latin American countries.

B. The Cuban Embassy in Mexico City gives the trainee a visa on a separate piece of paper, so that his passport, when he goes home, will only show that he has been in Mexico. We have a record, however, of those who fly on to Cuba.

C. In other cases, particularly in the case of travel through Montevideo before the quarantine, the Cubans furnished passports under other names for travel by way of Curacao.

D. We derive some of our figures from travel control points, and another set from the information we receive from penetration agents of established reliability in the Communist parties. Some of the Latin American governments are also able to maintain fairly accurate lists of their nationals known to have been in Cuba. We get a certain amount of crosschecking from lists of names furnished us by several of our agents who have
undergone training, and in confessions of captured guerrillas who had been in Cuba.

E. Thus in the case of Peru, for instance, we come up with a list of 235 names of individuals known to have made extended stays in Cuba in 1961 and 1962. We have to make allowance for some who did not receive guerrilla training, and allowance in the opposition direction for those whose names have escaped our surveillance. But we are guided in these adjustments by the cross-checking information I have mentioned.

F. Some of the trainees arrive, and many go home, by way of the Iron Curtain and Western Europe, using Soviet, Czech, or Cuban aircraft and probably shipping as well for the trip between Cuba and the Bloc. This is another attempt to conceal their movements, and in some cases permits further indoctrination and training in Bloc countries.

G. We feel fairly certain that under the circumstances our estimate of 1,000 to 1,500 guerrilla warfare trainees in 1962 is an accurate one. We also believe that the tempo of this training is being stepped up, just as we know that it increased in 1962 over 1961.
III. The basic training covers cross-country movement of guerrillas, firing, care of weapons, and general guerrilla tactics. One of our Brazilian agents took such a four-week course more than a year ago, ostensibly going to Cuba for a convention, and returning to his Havana hotel every few days during the course to spread the word that he had been sightseeing.

A. An Argentine trainee who took a longer course and then was sent home by way of Europe has given us a great deal of detail on the type of training. He reports that some of the trainees remain indefinitely. The Cubans sometimes refer to these men as their International Brigade. Sometimes they are formed into national units from a particular country, in effect forming a packaged cadre which can be returned to the homeland to lead a "Liberation Army."

B. A trainee who recently returned to Peru after several months of training Cuba, said that all his fellow trainees were asked to mark bridges and other similar demolition targets on detailed maps of Peru. They were also required to fill
out a lengthy questionnaire on sabotage targets, possibilities for subversion of police, methods for illegal entry and travel, suitable drop zones for air supply, possible points of attack against police and military posts, and similar information necessary for directing subversion and insurrection.

IV. We keep getting reports that in such countries as Colombia, Venezuela, and Peru, where there are guerrilla forces either in action or in being in the hills, the Cubans carry on their training by providing instructors or advisors for these forces. These reports are invariably second-hand, and we have not been able to confirm any of them.

A. In some cases, it has turned out that a reference to "a Cuban" with the guerrillas referred to someone who had been trained in Cuba and was training others, rather than a Cuban national.

B. We know positively that three Cuban nationals were involved in the strike violence at La Oroya, Peru, last December, which culminated in some four million dollars worth of damage to the smelter of the American-owned Cerro de Pasco mining company. One of these Cubans has also been
directing the armed invasions of big ranches in the Andean highlands by land-hungry Indians. This information contributed to the decision of the Peruvian junta to crack down on Communists in January. Unfortunately, by that time the Cuban nationals had either gone underground or fled the country, and the Peruvians are still looking for them. We have no direct reports that these Cubans have worked with the Peruvian guerrillas.

C. In Brazil, in fact, the complaint of guerrillas in training camps there was that they had been recruited by a promise of Cuban instructors, but found there were none. This came to light when the report of a Cuban intelligence agent, relaying their complaints to Havana, turned up in the wreckage of the Varig airliner which crashed in Peru in November.

D. We do not rule out the possibility that there are Cubans in the field with active guerrilla forces, but we have no evidence at present to prove it.