

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

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[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

1 TESTIMONY OF THOMAS A. PARROTT

2 Mr. Schwarz. Would you state your name and address for  
3 the record, please?

4 Mr. Parrott. Thomas A. Parrott, 3512 P Street, N.W.,  
5 Washington, D.C. (b)(3)

6 Mr. Schwarz. Now Mr. Parrott, when did you first become  
7 associated with the CIA?

8 Mr. Parrott. In 1949, September of 1949.

9 Mr. Schwarz. And briefly, what was your career at the  
10 Agency until you assumed a position in connection with the  
11 so-called Special Group?

12 Mr. Parrott. Well, I started out in the Office of Policy  
13 Coordination, which was a euphemism for, I guess, the Dirty  
14 Tricks Department. My first job was as a Deputy to Colonel  
15 Thomas Betts, who was in charge of planning. I did that for  
16 about a year or so and then I became the Chief of the Operations  
17 Staff of OPC. I moved from that to Deputy Director of the  
18 Soviet Division at a time when as soon as they had merged with  
19 OPC and the action arm at OSO, the secret intelligence arm,  
20 they put these together in 1952 and I was the Deputy Chief of  
21 the Soviet Division at that time. I did that for two and a half  
22 years. I moved to Frankfurt as the Chief of Frankfurt base.  
23 I came back from there in 1957 and was assigned as the so-called  
24 Board Assistant to Allen Dulles for the Operations Coordinating  
25 Board.

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

1 discussed or attempted, as a matter of principle no official  
2 records were kept of planning, of approvals or of implementation.  
3 The few written records that do exist are either largely  
4 tangential to the main events or were put on paper from  
5 memory years after.

6 William Harvey has retained skeletal notes of his  
7 activities during the years in question and they are our best  
8 source of dates, and Dr. Edward Gunn of the Office of Medical  
9 Services has a record of whom he met and when, and cryptic  
10 references to the subject discussed. ~~Ray Trichler~~ of TSD <sup>(U)(A)</sup>  
11 has a record of two or three dates that are pertinent, and so <sub>10/14/63</sub>  
12 forth."

13 Mr. Parrott. This all has to do with assassination.

14 Senator Baker. Yes.

15 Mr. Parrott. And your question is --

16 Senator Baker. Do you have any information that would  
17 confirm or dispute that appraisal, that the efforts, the  
18 planning and the implementation of efforts to assassinate  
19 Castro were not committed to paper, and because of the extreme  
20 sensitivity of operations, and it was a matter of principle  
21 that no official records were kept?

22 Mr. Parrott. I have no direct knowledge. I assume that  
23 probably is true. All I can say again is the records that  
24 I was responsible for did not include this but not because  
25 they were too sensitive but because it wasn't said.

WARD &amp; PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

11 ✓4. Supply Drops - Cuba

Gen. Cabell explained that the Pinar de Rio supply mission had not taken place because of the absence of specified communication from the DZ, and the Escambray operation had been canceled because of weather. He said that these missions are still planned, and assumed that the Group had no objections. The members so signified.

✓5. U-2, Cuba

Gen. Cabell said that the photographic coverage on the first flight had been only about 50%, because of cloud cover. He continued that we are analyzing the exact results on a priority basis and that some time after the middle of next week we should be in a position to make recommendations for the missions required to extend the coverage.

Mr. Gray commented somewhat wryly that this was all right with him since he "would certainly not be available to discuss anything of this kind before the middle of next week." The other members appeared to have the same reaction.

✓6. Policy Consideration Re Cuban Exiles

Mr. Gray said that Assistant Attorney General Yeagley had spoken to him after his meeting with Col. King and Messrs. Esterline and Holman. He had said that the information given to him by the CIA representatives, and the arrangements for future coordination if necessary, were entirely satisfactory to him. He had stated, however, that a problem remains with respect to action the FBI should take; that is, the FBI needs guidance in its handling of Cuban exile groups other than those under the direction of CIA.

The Group agreed that the best way to attack this problem would be to have Mr. Yeagley attend next week's Special Group meeting and discuss the matter at first hand. Mr. Parrott was asked to make arrangements for this.

✓7. Value of Cuba to the USSR as a Base Vis-a-vis Cape Canaveral

Mr. Parrott gave Mr. Merchant the gist of the OSI memorandum