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COMMENTS: INC LHM
Dan Brigham, reporter, "New York Journal American", New York City, on May 8, 1961, came to the New York Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and advised that he had recently returned from Miami, Florida, where he had covered the recent unsuccessful invasion of Cuba, which took place on April 17, 1961. Brigham advised that he had contacted a cross section of the Cuban exiles in the Miami area in addition to sources of his own and he desired to furnish the opinions of Cuban exiles and his own personal opinions regarding the recent events which took place in Cuba on April 17, 1961.

Brigham advised that from the Cuban exiles in the Miami area he ascertained that as a result of the unsuccessful invasion of Cuba, which began on April 17, 1961, at the Bay of Pigs, he came to the conclusion, as have many exiles, that this invasion, as planned by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), was doomed to failure by design as the entire underground and the invasion itself was uncovered by the Cuban Government.

Brigham advised that he believes, as do many Cuban exiles in the Miami area, that CIA was wholly responsible for the unfortunate events of April 17, 1961. Brigham advised that from the sources in the Miami area he ascertained that the following individuals were alleged to be agents of CIA, who were responsible for the planning and carrying out of the Cuban invasion: Bernard Barker, David Morales, (First Name Unknown) Williamson, (First Name Unknown) Caldwell, (First Name Unknown) Carranza, (First Name Unknown) Avignon, and a colonel in the United

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States Air Force, who formerly had been assigned as Air Attaché to the United States Embassy in Ciudad Trujillo, Dominican Republic. Brigham also stated that another CIA agent, who was alleged to have a great responsibility in the counterrevolutionary plans for CIA, was one Frank Bender. (X)(u)

Brigham stated that at a meeting held in Miami, during March, 1961, (First Name Unknown) Caldwell had informed those present at the meeting that Dr. Jose Miro Cardona was to be chosen as president of the Revolutionary Council. Brigham stated that from his sources he ascertained that CIA agent Caldwell was a very influential individual in the planning of the abortive Cuban invasion of April, 1961.(X)

Brigham further stated that he also ascertained that another individual responsible for the failure of the Cuban invasion was one William Wyler, who had previously used the name of Guillermo Montenegro. Brigham stated that he had learned from exiles in Miami that Wyler had been involved in the recent Cuban invasion to the extent of transmitting the CIA invasion plans, but he did not know to whom Wyler had transmitted these plans. (X)(u)

Concerning the William Wyler, mentioned above, it is possible that Brigham is making reference to William A. Mieland of the United States Department of State, Washington, D.C., who formerly was in charge of Caribbean affairs in the United States Department of State and who recently had been transferred to Switzerland. (X)(u)

Brigham also advised that from Cuban exiles in the Miami area he learned that Dan Taylor, who owns and operates the ferry running between Tampa, Florida, and Havana, Cuba, was a suspect because of the fact that he travels frequently to Cuba and while in Havana appears to be allowed to roam freely and has not encountered any difficulty while in Havana with the Cuban Government authorities. Brigham stated that he had asked Taylor, prior to the invasion, if arrangements could be worked out with him, Taylor, to take (X)(u)
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him into Cuba to cover the fighting. Brigham stated that Taylor did not immediately answer, but, after a trip to Havana, Cuba, Taylor contacted Brigham in Miami, Florida, and said that he could make arrangements for Brigham to go into Cuba, which offer Brigham said he declined because he was skeptical of Taylor, because he did not, at first contact, agree to take Brigham, and he felt that Taylor may have made arrangements in Havana to have Brigham picked up when he landed in Cuba. (X) (u)

Brigham also advised that from Cuban sources in Miami he ascertained that on the weekend of April 9, 1961, the alleged CIA agents, [Caldwell] and [Carranza] allegedly left for Guatemala by plane either late on the night of April 7, 1961 or early in the morning of April 8, 1961. Brigham stated that his sources learned that [Caldwell] and [Carranza] had gone and if it were not possible that the invasion plans had been disclosed by [Caldwell] and [Carranza].

Brigham stated that he had two personal sources in Miami, Florida, whom he contacted, and identified them as Ex-Colonel Mariano Faget of the Bureau for the Repression of Communist Activities (BRAC) and Enrique Parajon, who formerly was the head of the Secret Police in Cuba, under ex-President Fulgencio Batista, and who is now closely associated with Mariano Faget. Brigham stated that he contacted Faget regarding these allegations and CIA's involvement and Faget confirmed the names of the CIA personnel in the Miami area, previously set forth, as being responsible for the invasion plans and the carrying out of these plans. (X) (u)

Brigham advised that the conclusions that he came to regarding CIA's involvement in the recent Cuban invasion were based on the opinion of Cubans now in exile in the Miami area. Brigham stated that the Cuban exiles believed that this recent invasion of Cuba by counterrevolutionaries may have been designed to fail from the very beginning and the reason given is that the invasion forces and the opposition inside the country were all picked up and the (X) (u)