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the period 1953 to 1955 he claims he was reading files, and then he began to work on correspondents, and to do some work with code clerks. What was he doing between 1955 and 1957, 1958? Do you have any idea?

S

He worked in the American Department against the Embassy personnel. That could be against military, correspondents. I don't recall the situation but I think in 1953 or so, 1954, he worked on military (American) and I think he could have gone along those lines until 1958.

M

Do you know why he was transferred from the American Department?

S

Yes. That is another thing. He says -- and again I think he lies -- that he had some, I mean finally he acknowledged that in 1954 he had some troubles with [woman and got an unpleasant illness, and in that way he had troubles and was punished. But as I recall it, these things happened in 1957 or 1958, and that was practically the reason why he was dismissed from the American Department, why he was sent to the Tourist Department. So here he also twists the facts. It is a lie because it very clearly supports his explanation about his career in those years. That also of course -- now it can be only a conclusion. He claims that he was accepted in the Party--that he joined the Communist
organization had begun investigation -- also that the FBI too -- in the field of State Department, CIA. Evidently, their information was that the investigation can lead to the exposure of their recruitments, their agents. Therefore, they decided to send an agent with a mission to be introduced to American intelligence, to get the confidence of American intelligence in order first of all, in a long range sense, to find out your interests; then -- this is more important -- to give misinformation mainly on question of penetration. Only by that kind of reasoning can we explain NOSENKO's statement that he worked in that section in that period, that he was in a position to know that. And on the basis too can be understood why he said that there were no recruitments of Embassy personnel -- that there were only approaches, except for STORSBERG. At the same time he said that there is no penetration in CIA and according to his information -- I quote main points which in my opinion are important -- "KGB does not read American military codes, ciphers". The same applied to the "ciphers of Ambassador". And he says "only a little of State Department" traffic was read. And he said that "there are no agents in American Embassy".

M

No American agents.
S  Yes, without question.

A  And to know it in detail enough to give him the advice or
counsel, the guidance, and the brief so that he would be able to
make the contacts...

S  It is not his knowledge, it is their lie which was...

A  But they had to know something very definitely.

S  That lie was worked out on the basis of very exact infor-

mation about...

A  The state of affairs.

S  Yes. And about our problems.

R  They would not have necessarily gotten that out of CIA, they
could have gotten it out of other...

S  They could get it through different and through many channels --
through French, through British, but then we cannot exclude an
American channel too.

M  Yes. But not just CIA. It could be CIA. I think it is
important, because when he first came out, he was almost aroused --
you know: "What can I do to help?" -- but later because of his own
c
character -- [he is a drunk and he is a woman chaser] -- he got
difficult. But his line, the way he presented himself was exactly
as you say: "I'll do everything, I am at your service."
Where would GRU/GRU/NOSEK fit into this?

A: Yes, on behalf of the Second Chief Directorate. There is no question.

A: He would have put the plan forward.

R: As one of the supporters of that operation.

S: NOSEK has gone back on that, by the way. He now has said he only saw him once or twice.

M: NOSEK is a close friend of NOSEKOIs.

S: That NOSKNO has a connection with the VIADUKT mission.

A: At this point we can discuss the VIADUKT's aspect. It is here.

M: Perhaps, it's not clear in general. As they evidently got back information that VIADUKT did not succeed in his mission, that he himself was under some suspicions, they apparently began to think now to do...

S: He came in September. I left in August. It is, of course, interesting that he came to England and I think that was VIADUKT's mission. I know that he was sent to England. Maybe, in that way, there were some...

S: The situation and second, to get access to the English to get access to me in order to influence my writing and so on. It is interesting to me because I'm caught in a writing and so on. It is interesting to me because I'm the only one...

S: Well, I think with two missions: first to mislead about French...
more drastic things to improve situation and in that way they began
to act with NOSENKO in view of defecting in the beginning of 1964.
We don't know -- certainly, evidently in 1962 they did not plan to
sent NOSENKO out.

M  To have him defect?

S  Yes.

M  But certainly in 1962 some of the things that NOSENKO said
later appeared in the VIADUCT operation. The bit about WATKINS,
the Canadian Ambassador; the bit about DEJEAN,

S  In that way, I don't mean they built up DEJEAN[6] operation at
that time, even maybe earlier, but my point is they apparently
did not plan his defection from the beginning.

M  Not NOSENKO. All I am saying is that it is quite clear that
the same guiding hand that ran the NOSENKO operation also ran the
VIADUCT operation.

S  Yes. You see, besides American situation they were, of
course, disturbed by situation in France[6].

M  And Britain too.

S  Yes.

A  And also you have an additional fact that as each operation took
place you had the sources or penetrations reporting back the results.

S  Yes. The results were cumulative, a very flexible situation.

Between VIADUCT's coming and NOSENKO's coming there is very
M The journalist, Jack RAYMOND.

A So this whole story of the escape and his being shot...

S It is nonsense, of course, without question. And here of course as it has connection it is important that besides support of cherepanov's documents, NOSENKO tried to assure that VIADUCT is completely genuine.

M And that CHEREPANOVA thing really happened.

S No, I mean besides CHEREPANOVA -- that is clear. But he also showed that VIADUCT is genuine defector, and he not only which showed that but he also supported all information/was given by VIADUCT on DEJEAN. And it is also, of course, important how they built up that situation during NOSENKO's defection in Switzerland and in France.

M May I go back to the CHEREPANOVA thing again? This shows an understanding of how they work. Do you remember the timing now -- this is the 4th of November 1963 -- at the same time this was going on you had the BARGHOORN incident with which NOSENKO is very obviously identified -- you know, he came into the BARGHOORN operation. Now, he was, according to his story, at that time (in 1963) in the Tourist Department -- one of the Deputy Chiefs of the Tourist Department. He was deeply involved in the BARGHOORN operation and presumably, as one of the Deputy Chiefs,
A  Like dominoes. Hit one and they all fall.

M  Everything is interconnected, over and over and over again.

S  And that makes for them, of course, very difficult to do anything in the future.

A  That is right. It contradicts the...

S  ...because it should be and that of course makes our situation easier.

M  Why do you think they have gone so far -- at least it seems to me far too far -- in interconnecting everything? In other words, it is almost too obvious. One thing is linked to the other, and in turn is linked to the other. Why do you think they did so much of that?

A  Let me just go further in your statement. When [VIADUCT] came to England, there were many people involved. Only those people who knew Anatol had doubts about him -- everybody else believed in his bona fides. So, if they had a penetration they would have a feeling that he was going over very nicely. And there were a number who thought he was the hottest thing that ever existed. The same goes for NOSENKO. Because of the impact of the information and the fact that they would never know that we were still in direct and immediate communication in which he was getting information and
putting his fingers on these matters. In other words, if we did not have Anatol and were working only from the information, it is quite possible that he would be in a senior advisory position. This goes for VIADUCT with the British and certainly goes for NOSENKO here, because up until very recently the FBI believed that NOSENKO was the most important single element that they had ever seen.

Oh, yes. In general, you see, evidently they build up that, because their operation was successful. And, in my opinion, first of all they had success with PENKOFSKIY. After PENKOFSKIY, they introduced NOSENKO, and evidently they had information that he was doing well. And in that way, they saw that there would be no danger to connect him with VIADUCT, or with CHEREPANOV.

His report back to Moscow after the first meeting must have been the greatest window they had -- in one sense -- of contacts and so on.

Absolutely.

And here of course again the question: why was his introduction to American intelligence done in 1962; and, namely, when NOSENKO came to your people in Geneva and says: "I have important information for you." What is it? First of all, BELITSKIY -- he is provocateur of KGB. Certainly they could assume that I know that about BELITSKIY. But we also cannot exclude that at that time.
S Yes.

M That hasn't been ratified. The treaty has not been ratified. It won't even come up for debate probably for many months.

S And that was certainly dangerous point for future. And then he also has his hopes. If he could be for certain period led to believe that he could be tried, it would be useful. But, of course, he is not afraid because it makes prestige for him in the future and he comes back -- he could be exchanged in the way the British did with LONSDALE. But that's why the KGB is and will be more active with provocations. Of course, I understand they were eager to save WYNNE because there was big pressure there.

M What I'd like to ask if we could do is in preparation for this interrogation phase -- and assuming that there will be an increased investigation in the personnel field, which you will work on with SOLIE -- that'll go ahead, and assuming that we agree that when we start with NOSENKO we'll bring VIADUCT here and have that in a parallel --

A But the point here is this -- and why I want to still try to center on this.

Arthur would like to have the first opportunity to interrogate VIADUCT directly, alone. And naturally he would do it here. Now, shouldn't we consider doing this sometime soon? Instead of waiting until this other problem of NOSENKO -- in other words, how long can we continue to keep both of these people in suspended animation?
M Well, I don't think NOSENKO will take quite that long. I mean, I think if you could do this, if you could bring VIADUCT over here.

S Now.

M After the fourth of July.

A That's what I mean.

M For a week or two we could play games.

A That's right. But then we don't have to really because Arthur feels that he has enough to break him.

S But where?

A Here.

M We ought to be able to sit down right here.

A He'd do it here because you're here.

S But in England nobody would know for what reason he brought here.

M Oh, the reason would be that he was coming here to work with us because he thinks it's the best thing in the world.

A He would be invited here as a hero.

M That's how we've played it all along.

R That possibility hasn't been disturbed at all.

S Now I think at first it is better to interrogate VIADUCT.

M Well, at the same time I want to be getting ready for the NOSENKO thing. We have to be thinking about it and I would like to get as many leads in addition to the major points which it is clear that he has lied
documents. It could appear in various documents.

S  No, that was a direct quotation.

M  That quotation could appear in more than one document.

R  How long was it, was it a long section?

M  Yes, I'm trying to get to that.

S  Maybe in several, but that was big quotation, explanation and that
   can be a document only -- I know I don't think that it would be distributed
   outside the United States, as I understand now.

A  Well, what was the purpose of your studying it? Why was it in-
   cluded in this study you were reading?

S  What are the Americans doing against the Soviets. Training.
   Just examples, you see. They do such work, they are quoting documents
   like this.

R  You feel that if we're able to produce something like that, you'll
   recognize it?

S  Yes, I'm sure of that. Now here in your penetration, it's inter-
   esting that he mentioned of course\[SHAPIRO\] but without inside knowledge,
   that I discussed that matter here I doubt that they would risk giving away
   \[SHAPIRO\]. I mean confirm my information. The same with\[EDWIN\].
   Although with \[EDWIN\] of course there is difference because I told not only
   to you, but British too. That pseudonym. And as I understand it, I told
   at that time that \[EDWIN\] was an important agent -- very important agent.
   I mean, could be an intelligence officer. And --
A. Why did you tell the British?

S. Because I was not sure about the nationality. My idea was that he could be a British or American and that is why I told both. And I --

I mean recommended to make some investigations.

M. Well, what did you think about the story they gave him to account for the cryptonym [EDWIN?]

R. Had you heard of [SEVASTYANOV?]

S. That namely it was to hide -- just to give you ideas that [SEVASTYANOV] is old.

M. -- finished, all over --

S. Yes.

M. I know but did you -- have you ever heard of [SEVASTYANOV?] does it -- is this a --

S. No, evidently without question he is their agent, but not...

M. Everybody knows it.

S. Then of course -- it is also interesting that he mentions the French businessman DEMICHEL.

M. DEMICHEL, yes.

S. GRIBANOV and ANDREYEVA -- of course now, it supports practically -- but also now it's evidently --

M. That ties into the VIADUCT --

S. It's evidently French, yes. Not at least, maybe not one of, but at least French -- they -- got such information about GRIBANOV and ANDREYEVA.
and their interest towards businessmen. And the same, of course, says VIADUCT. What also drew my attention was FAURER,\(^{(s)}\)_5\(^{(s)}\) CARMEN,\(^{(s)}\) (phonetic) -- and here I think it's interesting that he mentioned the name CARMEN,\(^{(s)}\) I did not mention that, I did not know it. But I said that there was a girl visited Moscow as tourist who was approached and who planned to be transferred to some NATO organization or so. Here I would like to get all the results of investigations of that case in CIA and in FBI separately. Because that material can be done. NOSENKO came and told that and even mentioned her name that such recruitment was done, and so forth. Without question he has in mind that case which I described. I am not sure that he gave the name.

M What name?

S The right name -- that is, whether he gave her genuine name.

M Well, there is such a person.

S Yes. But what I want to read there and to be sure that it was name and was same as person whom I meant. And the second point, if, for example, we knew that it was leakage from here or from FBI, then we can make this conclusion about at least who had access to it, in CIA and in FBI. My idea, therefore, is to give me results of investigation of FAURER, CARMEN in CIA and FBI. And the list of people who had
access to that piece of information or the investigation. Because if that would coincide with my studies which I made, then it might be some clue. But maybe it's not so. And also about BROCHES, he says that was recruited in 1960. The case was always very interesting -- I think it would be -- and also to find all materials about that case.

A Of course, the French know that case, too, very well.

S And from French side, too. Because he might be important from French side.

By the way, who is the source that NOSENKO has three wives?

M This one is a man named Eugene EMILIANOV, EMILIANOV. He is an interpreter, a Swiss citizen, in Geneva.

S In Geneva -- are you sure that it's EMILIANOV, not anybody else?

M I'm pretty sure it is, yes. Yes, this man gave it to another girl.

He said that he was a rotter, that he had two or three wives.

A Why do you ask that question?

S What?

A Why are you so interested in that question?

S That's -- my opinion was if -- I was interested to know who the source is.

R You mean it wasn't NOSENKO, himself?

A Is it true that he had three wives, or not?