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FROM: DAVIES, ALBERT C.
TO: MEMO FOR THE RECORD
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ANTI-CASTRO
WITHHELD
LEONARDO PLAN
GEORGE VOLSKY
SZULC, TAD

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with AMCAPE-1, 6 February 1963

1. The undersigned met with AMCAPE-1 at his residence Tuesday evening, 6 February 1963.

2. The main purpose of the contact was to discuss an anti-Castro plan to "split the regime" surfaced by AMCAPE-1 to the PBRUMEN Coordinating Committee thru Mr. Hurwitch of State (ODACID) (see Attachment A). I advised AMCAPE-1 that I had read the plan and we were interested in fully exploring its possibilities. AMCAPE-1 stated that he discussed the plan Monday evening with Messrs. Cottrell and Hurwitch and felt sure that we would get the plan for comment although he did not expect such fast action. His first thought was to bring the plan to GPIDEAL as he has had a standing invitation for direct contact on PBRUMEN matters with GPIDEAL since November 1961 to contact either GPIDEAL, GFOCUS, or Mr. McGeorge Bundy. He decided against this approach and that the normal channel to the Coordinating Group would be more proper. Initially, AMCAPE-1 was reluctant to reveal who originated the LEONARDO PLAN but did say that Dr. Nestor Moreno wrote a good portion of it. We stated that in order to decide on a course of action we would need more detail. It was pointed out that the plan was not clear as to who would crew the ships, run communications, conduct necessary training, and that it would be most desirable to talk to those responsible for the plan. AMCAPE-1 agreed and stated he was going to "level" with me although he realized that revealing his contact would compromise his source of information. He said he would rely on our discretion to safeguard his source and treat it as secret and, in his judgment, the importance of the LEONARDO PLAN warranted such disclosure. He then contacted his source by telephone in my presence.
3. AMCAPE-1 identified the person he was calling as "George" and said that he had taken his plan up with his friends here in Washington, and that it was AMCAPE-1’s suggestion that "George" and whoever he thought he should bring along should come up to Washington for consultation. He asked if a trip this weekend would be convenient and "George" apparently agreed. When questioned as to who else "George" should bring along, he said that outside of Dr. MORENO the other 3 closely involved would be out of their element dealing with Washington representatives. AMCAPE-1 then revealed that "George", nicknamed "Chico", was, in fact, George VOLSKY, a friend of his for the past 3 years. He stated that he considered VOLSKY one of the most informed exiles on Cuban internal affairs and that he was, in fact, his contact for most of his important information emanating from inside Cuba. He referred to him as to "our man in Havana" even though he is residing in Miami, Florida. AMCAPE-1 related a short biographical sketch of VOLSKY. George VOLSKY (apparently true name) is a 36-year-old male, born in Poland. He was in the Polish air force, was captured by the Russians and interned in a Russian prison camp. Later, he joined the Royal Air Force and, while in England, met a Cuban girl who is the daughter of the RON ROVERO (phonetic) family whom he subsequently married, went to Cuba where he acquired Cuban citizenship. His wife's family set up VOLSKY in a sign business (neon signs, Coca-Cola sign painting contracts and the like) in which he prospered. By the nature of his business, he traveled extensively throughout the provinces of Cuba and made many friends. Like others, VOLSKY became disillusioned with the Castro regime when they intervened both his wife's family and his own business enterprises, and he spent the latter part of 1959 and most of 1960 actively supporting the "underground" activities. AMCAPE-1, of his own knowledge, knew of instances of VOLSKY transporting explosives and hand and shoulder weapons in VOLSKY's private car. During the May 1961 G-2 roundup, VOLSKY was imprisoned in Cabana prison and when a quantity of these prisoners were released, VOLSKY luckily was able to leave Cuba with his wife by virtue of having a valid United States visa in his passport. AMCAPE-1, through Paul BETHEL, then USIA field station chief in Miami, procured a job for VOLSKY as a contract employee of USIA in their Miami office. VOLSKY has kept his internal Cuban contacts and passes on the information to AMCAPE-1. VOLSKY’s sister-in-law is and has been a lifelong friend of Juanita CASTRO and furnishes, what AMCAPE-1 considers vital information, by means of this friendship to VOLSKY. AMCAPE-1.
revealed that Major PINIENO (red beard) No. 2 man in the
Ministry of the Interior was in contact with VOLSKY when
he, PINIENO, telephoned to Miami during the October crisis
and stated, in effect, that "Fidel CASTRO was mad as he
felt the Russians had sold off the Cubans down the river."
Continuing on with VOLSKY, AMCAPE-1 stated that VOLSKY is
masterminding the LEONARDO PLAN and is mainly assisted by
Dr. MORENO. Dr. MORENO was once a 26th of July Movement
Member and was also part of Faure Chomen's Second Front of
the Escambrey Group. AMCAPE-1 stated flatly that the
LEONARDO PLAN was not sponsored by any one group. It owed
no allegiance nor did it want contact with Miro CARDONA
and the CRC, and that it did not want to deal with KUBARKers
in Florida area.

4. AMCAPE-1 said that he would explain to VOLSKY and
Dr. MORENO that the operational professionalism needed in
support of their plan would, of necessity, be furnished by
KUBARK. He did not anticipate any difficulty in this
regard. It was then agreed that KUBARK representatives
would meet with AMCAPE and the two LEONARDO PLANers this
coming weekend here in Washington to further explore the
feasibility of their plan.

5. AMCAPE-1 returned to the subject of Juanita CASTRO
and stated that she was presently in Mexico but would return
to Havana this coming Saturday. He said, of his own
knowledge, he knew that Juanita CASTRO had been sympathetic
to anti-regime forces and had lent discreet help to them
mainly by keeping her eyes and ears open. He related an
incident which occurred about June of 1960 when two ODENY
agents (accredited as attaches to the U. S. Embassy) named
PRETTYMAN and SWEET were picked up by the G-2. AMCAPE-1's
first knowledge of this came from Juanita CASTRO directly
to AMCAPE-1 and stated as a warning that if any of his
friends were engaged in anti-government activities, he should
warn them.

6. AMCAPE-1 asked if I had seen last Sunday's
(3 February) "New York Times" article under his by-line
about Castro's island fort. I stated that I had not received
it as yet so he let me read his only copy. I complimented
him on his article and he stated it was very helpful that
he was able to check out with us most of the salient points.
7. ANCAPE-1 is of the firm belief that the concept envisaged by the LEONARDO PLAN is the one sure way of splitting the regime and that the time is NOW. He stated he is at a loss to understand why there is not a huge psychological warfare effort presently being conducted against PBRUMEN. He further feels that it is self-evident that the Castro regime is engaged in such an effort against the United States as evidenced by some of the planted misinformation emanating from PBRUMEN.

8. The meeting lasted approximately 2 hours and ended at 1940 hours.

ALBERT C. DAVIES

Attachment: As stated
OPERATION "LEONARDO"

1. OBJECTIVES:

To establish contact with elements within the Government, Rebel Army and Militia, in order to penalize into action their present anti-communist feeling and induce those who maintain a passive attitude but who are potentially susceptible to turn against the Regime, to act now. The future plan of action and the size and development of the present operation would be determined after first contacts are made and information thus gathered, is evaluated. However, "Leonardo" should be considered as merely a first step towards coordination of anti-Castro elements within the Cuban Government, for producing an internal upheaval.

It is the opinion of people with contacts in Cuba, that the moment to act is now, because the conditions for action are ripening steadily. Reliable information from the Island points out to the gradual internal softening of the Castro Regime, to tensions existing among its members, and to the effect President Kennedy's words had in the highest governmental Cuban circles who are said to have acknowledged with sympathy his phrase that "I am confident that all over the island of Cuba, in the Government itself, in the Army, in the Militias, there are many who ... have viewed with dismay the destruction of freedom faith and who are determined to restore that
freedom so that Cuban people may once more govern themselves. This phrase is the leit-motif of "Leonardo".

2: MODUS OPERANDI:

LEONARDO I: Two men, Enrique Cayado Rivera, 24, and Antonio Garcia Perez, 29, would disembark near Punta Jijira, between Boca de Jaruco and Santa Cruz del Norte. At this very place (Punta Jijira) a small farm, property of Antonio Garcia Perez is located, where his father and a local laborer are living. Garcia father's car is always on the premises and would be used to take the two men to Havana. Enrique Cayado's family is in Havana and one of his friends, Elsa Maria Negrin, secretary of Jose Rebellon, leader of University Students Federation (FEU), can be counted to serve also as his cover and guide. In order to determine the present attitude of military and civilian officials who have possibilities to organize or speed up the internal upheaval, the following contacts would be used: (A) Dr. Jorge Vals; (B) Comandante Jose Duarte; (C) Miss Juanita Castro Ruz.

Jorge Vals and Jose Duarte have widespread contacts within the Government and it is known that Juanita Castro, Fidel Castro's sister, is also helping the underground. She is currently in Mexico.

Enrique Cayado and Antonio Garcia would return to the U. S. after two or three weeks, with messages, opinions and suggestions from their contacts in Cuba.

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LEONARDO II: Three disembarkation points are planned for this operation: a) the outer keys off Santa Clara Bay (Matanzas province), b) keys off Caibarien, c) keys off Corralillo area (Las Villas province). Santa Clara Bay keys are thought most advisable as they are inhabited by fishermen and charcoal workers only and military patrols visit them very infrequently, because of extremely difficult living conditions there. Two men employed in this mission: Dr. Nestor Moreno 4I, and Miguel Diaz y Sangu 23, would use one of the fishermen (who are known to be willing to work against Castro and had worked with them before), to go to the mainland and proceed to Cardenas with the message to arrange a meeting with Comandante Ramon Guin or a person he designates. The round trip to Cardenas might take two or three days. If conditions are favorable and a meeting can be arranged at once, the two men would go inland. However, if the rendezvous with Cuban contacts cannot take place immediately, they would have to return to Key Sal or any other base and go back on the date or dates previously fixed by the message. Through Comandante Guin, who works in INRA and travels around the country, and through anti-Castro army and civilian elements already active in Cardenas and Marti, the following army officers would be contacted initially: Comandante Guerra, Comandante Parra, Comandante Jose Pinares, Capitan Manuel Avila, Capitan Lawton. From there on the contacts would be enlarged.
The above mentioned officers were approached before Pig's Bay and agreed to participate in Rebel Army uprising in Las Villas province as a part of internal-external anti-Castro plan. After Play Giron, which upset that plan, they remained in the Government and are said to be disposed to do it again.

3. – EQUIPMENT:

A 25 or 27 speed boat which can navigate in shallow waters and can cruise at 40 knots. Identification documents, Cuban money and small amount of arms. Data about Cuban sea patrols in Havana and Matanzas provinces, equipment for communications, once contacts are established.

4. – GENERAL OBSERVATIONS:

It is considered that although the majority of officials whom the participants of the missions plan to talk to have no political ambitions and will act against Castro for purely ideological reasons, minimum of assurances and promises have to be offered. It is also a consensus of opinion, that once initial steps are successfully accomplished, an additional number of persons should be used for the development of "Leonardo", working always in operational coordination. Each of them are known to have friends within the Cuban Government and their personal and representative
The intervention could help swaying many men of the Regime who would trust more the seriousness of the enterprise. The following men are suggested for participation in the next stages of "Leonardo":

(1) Dr. Raul Chibas, ex-Rebel Army Major.

(2) Raul Farandelis, ex-Rebel Army Captain, Hubert Matos group.

(3) Aldo Vera, ex-Rebel Army Major. ASSASSINATED

(4) Enrique Barroso Dorta, ex-Rebel Army Lieutenant.

(5) Julio Cesar Alonso, ex-Cuban Navy Captain.

(6) Mario Fontela, ex-CTC leader, has contacts with Rebel Army and agrarian leaders in the provinces.

(7) Reinaldo Cruz (Simon), ex-Cuban Air Force capt.

(8) Francisco Ilias, ex-Militia Captain.

(9) Dr. Antonio de la Carrera, ex-secretary of former president Manuel Urrutia.

(10) Humberto Armada, ex-captain Cuban Army and Air Force.

(11) Antonio Perez, ex-Cuban Marine officer.

(12) Alvaro Romero, ex-Rebel Army captain.

(13) Pablo Campos, ex-Rebel Army captain.

(14) Gutierrez Menoyo, ex-Rebel Army Major.

(15) Berta Ferrer, ex-member of anti-Batista underground, knows a large number of Rebel Army officers having been in Sierra Maestra.

(16) Jose Lopez Castillo, ex-Rebel Army captain.

(17) Alberto Padilla, ex-INRA functionary.

(18) Dr. Hiram Sanchez, ex-Rebel Army captain.

(19) Dr. Manuel Marinas, a negro anti-Batista leader, has great prestige among Havana former underground.

An additional list can be furnished upon request.
All of the above are former members of 26 of July Mov., Students' Directorate (DRE) and II Escambray Front, and have friends in Havana and in the provinces.

The details of this operation have been discussed only with Dr. Nestor Moreno and Enrique Cayado.

Miami, February 3, 1963

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