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[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED
I sent a copy of this (draft copy) to Helms at DCI's request. DCI said on the intercom to Helms something to the effect that this should be held very closely. Helms is also preparing a memo on this meeting.

Jerry
11/12
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting on Policy Relating to Cuba - 10:30 a.m. - 12 Nov 63

IN ATTENDANCE: The President, Secty. McNamara, Secty. Rusk, Secty. Gilpatric, Attorney General, Secty. Vance, General Taylor, Mr. Bundy, Secty. Johnson, Mr. McConA, Mr. Helms, Mr. FitzGerald, Mr. Shackley

McCone opened the meeting with a brief resume of conditions in Cuba along these lines:

1. Cuba still belongs to Castro though his grip is weakening.

2. The military remain essentially loyal to Castro with some evidences of disension and dissidents which are being exploited by CIA.

3. The internal security forces and apparatus are effective and show evidence of increasing efficiency.

4. The economy is bad and is deteriorating, causing increasing hardships to the civilian population. This is due to economic sanctions and Flora.

5. The Soviets are continuing a gradual withdrawal. No organized Soviet units appear in Cuba although they apparently provide principal manning for the SAMS. There are recent evidences of considerable rotation with between 1,000 and 2,000 new arrivals, but in balance there is a decrease.

6. Training of Cubans continues on all Soviet equipment including the SAMS. It is not clear whether the SAMS will be turned over to full Cuban control; however it is clear the Cubans will supply the majority of the operating personnel.

7. The only equipment which has been withdrawn has been the advanced C-band radar for the SAMS and certain communication equipment. No military equipment has been withdrawn. There have been some recent new arrivals of military equipment, particularly between 25 and 50 tanks.
McCone then stated that the program which had been followed for the last several months, having been approved about the first of June, was integrated and interdependent one part on the other and therefore should be considered as a comprehensive program and not a number of independent actions.

FitzGerald then made a presentation.

With respect to sabotage, McCone stated that no one event will particularly affect the economy. However a continuous program will have its effects on the economy and it will encourage internal sabotage by dissident people within Cuba. There have been 109 events since April which were probably internally-inspired sabotage.

The President then raised the question of the sabotage program; whether it was worthwhile and whether it would accomplish our purpose.

Secretary Rusk then spoke at considerable length, the thrust of his remarks being opposed to sabotage. He stated we should concentrate on obtaining information as to what Castro is doing with respect to other countries, particularly sending arms to Latin American countries. Rusk said we must replace Castro; we must accomplish a reduction in Soviet troops, however sabotage might result in an increase in troops. Rusk had no problem with infiltration of black teams; furthermore internal sabotage gave him no problem and the more of this, the better. In addition he strongly supported our economic efforts. However he opposed the hit-and-run sabotage tactics as being unproductive, complicating our relationships with the Soviets and also with our friends and indicated a connection between our sabotage activities and the autobahn problem.

McCone observed that infiltration was difficult, internal sabotage was extremely difficult to stimulate but that external hit-and-run sabotage had the effect of automatically stimulating internal sabotage.

McNamara could see no connection between the Cuban operations and the Berlin autobahn incidents. He saw many advantages to going ahead which he advocated but ordered a careful watch.

The President asked questions concerning the immediate operations, and the next one on the schedule was approved.

FitzGerald explained the independent operations of the Artine group. McCone emphasized that to a very considerable extent these are uncontrollable and forecast that once Artine was in business, we might expect some events to take place which were not exactly to our liking.

JAM/mfb    (cc to Mr. Helms in draft)
No one event will affect learning
entire program must go forward

Pros - quantum vs sabotage program

Retreat - what about Berlin reading arms to etal. in
Canada - must replace Canada - need modern Sec
hepcas - infection in problem - sabotage cause
my problem - arms.

Salem - Economic effort good - Het & Ben bad with
Sous - our friends - can we work
with Auto Bahn -
THE WHITE HOUSE

McCone must do this.
McCone -- no communication with
Pakew -- Auditors going
ahead -- but watch carefully

McCone -- Consult Continue

Continue
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of the Meeting to Review The Cuban Program

PRESENT: The President
Secretary of State Rusk
Secretary of Defense McNamara
Attorney General Kennedy
Director of Central Intelligence McConie
Mr. Roswell Gilpatric
Mr. Cyrus Vance
Mr. McGeorge Bundy
General Maxwell Taylor
Mr. U. Alexis Johnson
Mr. Richard Helms
Mr. Desmond FitzGerald
Mr. Bruce B. Cheever
Mr. Theodore Shackley
Mr. Paul Eckel

The meeting convened in the Cabinet Room of the White House at 1040 on 12 November 1963.

1. The Director of Central Intelligence opened the meeting with a brief resume of conditions in Cuba. He highlighted the following points:

   a. Cuba still belongs to Castro though his grip is weakening.

   b. The military remain essentially loyal to Castro with some evidences of dissension and dissidents which are being exploited by CIA.

   c. The internal security forces and apparatus are effective and show evidence of increasing efficiency.
d. The economy is bad and is deteriorating, causing increasing hardships to the civilian population. This is due to mismanagement, economic sanctions, and Flora.

e. The Soviets are continuing a gradual withdrawal. No organized Soviet units appear in Cuba although they apparently provide principal manning for the SAMs. There are recent evidences of considerable rotation with between 1,000 and 2,000 new arrivals, but in balance there is a decrease.

f. Training of Cubans continues on all Soviet equipment including the SAMs. It is not clear whether the SAMs will be turned over to full Cuban control; however, it is clear the Cubans will supply the majority of the operating personnel.

g. The only equipment which has been withdrawn has been the advanced C-band radar for the SAMs and certain communication equipment. No military equipment has been withdrawn. There have been some recent new arrivals of military equipment, particularly between 25 and 50 tanks.

2. Mr. McConne then stated that the program which had been followed for the last several months, having been approved about the first of June, was integrated and interdependent one part on the other and therefore should be considered as a comprehensive program and not a number of independent actions.

3. Mr. FitzGerald presented a status report of the six-point integrated program against Cuba. Following is a summary of his presentation.

a. Covert collection of intelligence for U.S. strategic requirements as well as for operational requirements.

This element of the program is progressing satisfactorily. At the present time we have 74 singleton agents reporting directly to us. In addition there are 79 identified sub-agents who are part of organized nets. All of these agents and sub-agents legally reside in Cuba. There is one Black (illegal) team successfully operating in the
Pinar del Rio area. It has 55 sub-agents in its net. The geographical distribution of agents throughout Cuba has continued to improve. In addition to the above resident agents, we have 19 successful penetrations of Cuban official installations abroad. The Cuban counterintelligence efforts have intensified during the past months. Our losses have increased. This is particularly true with regard to the Black teams. The Cuban control system and ration system make the team's continued existence more and more precarious. We have had to withdraw some teams and we have lost others. In view of this experience we expect to reduce the number of "Black-team" infiltration operations, but to continue to press forward with all other types of intelligence operations.

b. Propaganda actions to stimulate low-risk simple sabotage and other forms of active and passive resistance.

The program includes both mailing and radio operations. Approximately 30,000 - 40,000 pieces of propaganda are mailed into Cuba every month. There are 32 hours daily of radio programs using seven different radio stations. Radio America on Swan Island broadcasts 13 hours daily. Separate radio programs are keyed to all significant target groups within Cuba, i.e., students, teachers, labor, military leaders, etc. We believe the propaganda effort aimed to stimulate simple sabotage has, when combined with the other parts of the integrated over-all program, stimulated sabotage and resistance. We have intelligence reports citing 109 instances of sabotage since 1 April 1963. These include such things as derailing locomotives, destroying high-tension poles, burning trucks and factories. Many have been similar to ideas included in our broadcasts and mailing. There appears to have been a slight upturn in instances of sabotage in recent weeks.

c. Economic denial actions on an increased basis.

This is a Government-wide program, one which has probably had a greater impact on Cuba than any of the others. A great deal has been learned regarding Cuban sources of supply. Some we have successfully closed down. The Cuban
merchant fleet is so badly managed that we are almost better off by leaving it alone. The big gaps in the success of the program are in Canada, Great Britain, and possibly Spain. Recently Canada has refused to cooperate. This is considered most serious. The economic denial program should be strengthened wherever possible.

d. Exploitation and stimulation of disaffection in the Cuban military and power centers.

On this key part of the over-all program slow but encouraging progress is being made. Jointly with DIA we have just completed detailed biographic studies of 150 key military personnel. Further analysis of these indicate 45 are of particular interest to us and will warrant further close attention. We currently are in direct contact with three "Heroes of the Revolution" who are either in Cuba or who will soon return there. One basic problem is that individual military figures will talk with us but will not conspire with their fellow officers for fear of compromise. This must ultimately be overcome. The leaders with whom we are in touch have emphasized the need to be reassured that, should they overthrow Castro, they will not be considered in the same light as Castro himself by the U.S. In summary, we have made some progress but we have a long way to go before the ultimate goal can be attained. The effort must be continued and where possible expanded.

e. General sabotage and harassment.

Since the approval of the program four successful externally mounted sabotage operations have been mounted (Santa Lucia – Casilda – La Isabela – Cayo Guin). Three additional were ready to go, but at the last minute were recalled. A chart was shown identifying the proposed targets through January 1964. This included the Matanzas Electric Plant and the Santiago de Cuba Refinery. It was pointed out that with but few exceptions the economic results of any single sabotage operation were only significant for the cumulative economic effect plus the psychological effect in stimulating internal sabotage and resistance. Mention was again made of the
109 internal sabotage acts previously cited. The favorable impact of the successful external raids on the Cuban people was noted. This has an important bearing on the ultimate willingness of key military personnel to participate in a conspiracy and of other persons to engage in simple sabotage. It was explained that the sabotage teams utilized on the raids were trained in the Miami area, in Agency facilities in Virginia, plus a remote section of Eglin Air Force Base. The use of Nicaragua-based aircraft for strikes against key targets such as the refinery at Santiago de Cuba was discussed but no definitive decision was reached although Higher Authority questioned the efficacy of such raids. The continuation of the sabotage and general harassment was specifically recommended.

f. Support of autonomous anti-Castro groups to supplement and assist in the execution of the above courses of action.

Substantial progress is being made in this part of the program. Manuel Atime and the MRR are being supported. He is developing bases in Costa Rica and in Nicaragua. He has his ships; his first groups of men are ready to start training. We have had to "prime the pump" and will have to give him a shipment of arms and ammunition. This will be done in a way in which even Atime will not know that it comes from the United States. Atime expects to mount his first operations in December.

Support to the extent of $25,000 per month is being provided Manolo Ray; however, he has not progressed to the extent that Atime has. At present his major problem is to develop a foreign base of operations.

We may recommend support of one or more additional autonomous groups.

The activation of these groups will relieve some of the pressure on our operations which we believe will be most beneficial.

4. Throughout the presentation, a limited number of clarifying questions were asked and answered. At the conclusion H.A. asked what decisions were necessary at this time. The consensus was that the over-all program
should continue but there was some divergency of opinion regarding the sabotage program. H.A. raised the question of the sabotage program; whether it was worthwhile and whether it would accomplish our purpose. Mr. McConie stated that no one event will particularly affect the economy. However, a continuous program will have its effects on the economy and it will encourage internal sabotage by dissident people within Cuba. The previously mentioned 109 sabotage acts were again mentioned.

5. Secretary Rusk then spoke at considerable length. He stated the infiltration of Black teams for intelligence purposes gave him no problems. He strongly supported the Economic Denial Program. Internal sabotage should be continued, "the more of this, the better." He opposed hit-and-run sabotage raids stating that he considered them to be unproductive in addition to complicating our foreign relations. Specifically, he stated that such raids could result in the Soviet failure to remove their troops from Cuba and could directly relate to Soviet harassment of Autobahn traffic. He said if we could mount sabotage raids as retaliation for specific identifiable Cuban acts in the Western Hemisphere, he could go along with this. In this connection, he stated we should concentrate on securing information on what Castro was planning on doing in or against other countries, particularly those in the Western Hemisphere. Mr. McConie observed that infiltration was difficult, internal sabotage was extremely difficult to stimulate but that external hit-and-run sabotage had the effect of automatically stimulating internal sabotage.

6. Secretary McNamara stated he could see no real connection between Berlin Autobahn incidents and Cuban operations. He saw many advantages in going ahead with the program but agreed with the necessity of keeping a careful watch on it. He said that he does not believe that the program will result in the fall of Castro but that it serves to maintain pressures on him which would improve chances of either a change in regime or a change in Castro himself.

7. The Attorney General commented that he believed the program had produced a worthwhile impact on Cuba during the past five months and that it was useful in the United States as an indication that something was being done.
8. Mr. McGeorge Bundy commented that the proposed sabotage operations could be controlled but that when the autonomous groups started operations this might cause some problems due to the acknowledged lack of tight control. Mr. McConé emphasized that to a very considerable extent these are uncontrollable and forecast that once Atime was in business, we might expect some events to take place which were not exactly to our liking.

9. There was a brief general discussion of the need to expand naval and/or air coverage of shipping in the Caribbean area to identify possible Cuban arms shipments.

10. H.A. then specifically approved the sabotage operations against Nazabal wharf and Canete sawmill scheduled for the weekend of 15 November. In addition State was directed to do something about Canada, Great Britain, and Spain with respect to implementing the Economic Denial Program.

11. The meeting ended at approximately 1115.

[Signature]
Bruce B. Cheever
Deputy Chief
Special Affairs Staff
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

4 November 1963

SUBJECT: Meeting Saturday Morning - 9:15, 2 November 1963 - Executive Committee, attended by all members except the Vice President.

The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the developments in South Vietnam as reported in the night cables. McGeorge distributed the morning wrap-up which summarized all cables received up to about 7:00 a.m.

There was a general discussion on instructing Lodge to urge the junta to get going with the formation of a government but the President urged that we not quarter back the operation from here although we should give Lodge our views. Concern was expressed that there might be a temptation to work out an amnesty with the Viet Cong. This possibility was to be reflected to Lodge.

McNamara advocated the announcing of recognition and resumption of the CIP and resumption of the Special Forces. Ball expressed some concern over hasty action and thought we should seek improvements in control. It was the consensus of the meeting that Lodge should be given contingency authority but that no actual action should be taken prior to Monday and that recognition should be withheld until Monday or Tuesday.

It was decided that we would use our influence to bring about a detente between South Vietnam and Sihanouk in Cambodia and also the Embassy in Thailand should keep in close touch with Sarit.

General Taylor and Secretary Ball raised the question of the urgency of prosecuting the war. Taylor reported that Harkins has no real trouble with the military regime although in the last few days he has not been in close touch and was not in circuit on the coup plans. Taylor was to communicate with Harkins urging immediate concentration on the war effort.

The President was very emphatic that care must be exercised in the type of political leadership installed at various levels by the military group. He warned against installation of ultra-liberals or quasi-Communists and giving them a free hand in the affairs of South Viet Nam.
Instructions were given to Hilsman to draft a series of
cables and drafting committees were organized which include CIA
representation.

At 4:30 in the afternoon a second meeting was held,
Memorandum prepared by Colby. At the meeting several communi-
cations to Lodge were approved. Others were held over for further
consideration.

At various times during the day discussions were held
with the President concerning his suggestion that Colby go to South
Vietnam at once. This was agreed and Colby arranged to leave on
Sunday. It was understood that he would meet with McNamara, Rusk,
and Bundy separately to get their views and receive their instructions.
At 6:00 Colby and I met with the President. The President expressed
the desire that Colby go to Vietnam as a Presidential representative
and a representative of all departments and not confine himself to
a role of CIA representative. This was an indication of his great
confidence in Colby. The President repeated briefly his comments
at the meeting, expressed concern that delays in organizing a
government properly identified as civilian would place the U.S. in
the position of supporting a military coup which would be undesirable
because of our Latin American policies. Also the President was
extremely concerned over the reported assassination of Diem and Nhu.
29 October 1963

Notes on Meeting - about 3:30 on 29 October - Situation Room:

In Attendance: Secretary McNamara, Gen. Taylor, McGeorge Bundy, William Bundy, Mr. Mccone, Mr. Helms, Mr. Colby

1. Draft cable -- keep Lodge in place until Saturday.

2. Taylor expressed view that coup, if either successful or unsuccessful, would have disastrous results.

3. McGeorge Bundy insisted we cannot reconsider our position with respect to support of a coup but can merely ask Embassy for further assessment.

McCones raised question of why not reconsider our support position, stating it was extremely disturbing to him, that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs had responsibility for military operations, and for military advice to the President; expressed dissatisfaction that it can not be reconsidered.

It was decided to send out a cable and get an appraisal of the prospects of the success of the coup.

Notes on Meeting at 4:00 - Cabinet Room - re South Viet Nam

In Attendance: The President, The Vice President, Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, Attorney General, Gen. Taylor, McGeorge Bundy, Gen. Krulak, Gov. Harriman, William Bundy, Mr. Forrestal, Alexis Johnson, Mendental, Mccone, Helms, Colby

Colby briefed on the attitude of the forces, using charts indicating the disposition of forces, stating that about an equal number of key units were in support of the coup as were in support of the Government, and units totalling about 18,000 personnel were neutral. Colby also briefed on the two coup groups, the Generals and the Can Lao group, and indicated very modest interchange between the two.
The President raised the question of the 1960 coup attempt. Colby stated that our principal effort was to get the two sides negotiating and to stop the fighting. The President expressed concern over prospect of protracted fighting - thought we should have an evaluation from the Embassy.

Rusk spoke, stated we must assume that Diem and Nhu are informed about the talks. Diem's talk with Lodge indicates Diem was informed about coup talks. Rusk questioned whether we should be silent and permit a coup to go forward and involve civil war. We should raise the question with the coup leaders as to whether the coup could be carried off without civil war. Lodge should pass this word on to Don; should indicate we are not now convinced of the outcome, therefore should demand their plans before indicating support. The President indicated Lodge should stay on his schedule, that if his departure was delayed and a coup would take place, it would be apparent that we were informed. After discussion it was decided that Lodge could leave on Saturday on military aircraft and this was agreed to. Agreed that a cable be sent to Lodge and Harkins asking for a detailed assessment of all questions relating to the coup and also outlining command arrangements after Lodge's departure.

The Attorney General took a very positive position, questioning the communication that was proposed and indicating grave doubts of the wisdom of our proceeding with a program which seemed to spell defeat because of failure of a coup or political confusion following a coup, if successful. He thought the consequences of failure in South Vietnam would be the loss of Southeast Asia to the communists. NOTE: He in effect was repeating my statement to him at lunch last week. General Taylor repeated his views which were to the effect that a successful coup was no guarantee of success.

I repeated what I had said on 25 October at my meeting with the President, McNamara, Bundy, AG, and Taylor. A coup if attempted might result in some form of civil war in which the Viet Cong would win by sitting on the sidelines or, if successful, would result in an extended period of political confusion during which time the war might be adversely affected and possibly lost and furthermore a period of political unrest would probably result in a second or perhaps a third coup.

JAM/mfb
(Helms or Colby to prepare full notes of the above meetings)
THE WHITE HOUSE

Men - Mr. C, Taylor, Thacher, W. Thacher, Helen, Callery

1) Cables - Keep cables on plane
2) Taylor - Secretary of Compt
3) Thacher - Cannot recommend
4) McCarth - Why mail
5) Send back cables to get approval
THE WHITE HOUSE

Calling - Briefing of all aspects of forces - Some conclusions as

News - Very much about 60s

Comm. groups - Several and can see

Question - At 10 a.m. camp at

Rusk - Senate - Deep N.Y. area

altruistic - Judge for real, real

Rusk in brief - Small area as
closed - Should we - Concur

Briefing of Council was -

Not concerned with issue -

Judge should pass this word to

Birn - Judge's story on what while

News media, dep., several - Hesitate

in change -
29 October 1963

MEMORANDUM

1. Diem-Lodge discussions produced no movement in the direction of political action to satisfy our wishes. Also Diem insinuations indicate his knowledge of U.S. officials familiar with coup planning.

2. Knowledge of Generals' coup planning by at least two civilians outside of government would indicate sufficient talking in Saigon so that at least some of the plans are known to Diem and Nhu.

3. The security measures are an improvement.

4. Analysis of SVN forces in Saigon area indicate three groups: neutral, pro-government, which is probably the largest and pro-coup which is smaller but still a larger force than in August.

5. Discussion to assess prospects of a coup. Quite probable that action will be postponed from time to time for favorable developments. On the other hand a coup attempt could be made momentarily.

6. If successful political difficulties will follow and confusion will exist for a protracted period.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

SUBJECT: Meeting with the President, McNamara, Attorney General, Bundy, myself concerning South Viet Nam

1. The President stated the purpose of the meeting was to consider (1) recent actions in South Viet Nam with respect to coup planning and qualifications of the individuals reporting, and (2) our policy in South Viet Nam as he wished to be assured there was unanimity within the government prior to the return of Ambassador Lodge.

2. With respect to the first item I stated that I felt we were handling a very delicate situation in a non-professional manner and that the reports indicated it in such statements as paragraph 3 of SAIG 1956.

"Gen. Don stated that Gen. Harkins had reiterated the fact that he had misunderstood a presidential directive, that Ambassador Lodge was aware of and controlling Conein's contacts with Don, and that Conein was the proper person with whom to speak."

This placed us in a position that if General Don was being "managed" by Diem and Nhu there was absolutely no plausible denial of U. S. officials participating in coup plotting at the levels of the President, General Harkins and Ambassador Lodge.

Secretary McNamara supported this position and went much further, stating that Conein's wires were inaccurate, not checked or verified as evidenced by General Harkins' denials of statements attributed to him. Furthermore, the whole coup business was being handled in an amateurish way by inexperienced people from Lodge on down.

I stated that we were dissatisfied and pointed out that this morning's cable (Lodge to Bundy) stated that "CAS has been punctilious
in carrying out my instructions. I have personally approved each meeting between General Don and Conein who has carried out my orders in each instance explicitly. " On this basis CIA has no control over this situation and therefore could assume little responsibility.

After an extended exchange in which all expressed concern over the existing situation, the President asked that CIA come up with (a) a plan for installation of a chief of station and reorganization of the station, and (b) plan for further conduct of monitoring coup plotting in a way that would be non-attributable and therefore deniable. These plans should be available prior to Ambassador Lodge's return.

3. The President then said that he felt that I was not in agreement with policy and asked my views on the course of action we are pursuing. I stated as follows:

   a. I was dissatisfied with the present actions of the Ambassador, General Harkins and the Station because if General Don was being "managed" by Nhu then we would be seriously embarrassed.

   b. There is a possibility, however, that General Don has a coup in the making and will pull it off.

   c. If so we in CIA felt we could expect an interregnum and a period of political confusion because CIA does not feel that the Generals involved in the coup plotting are capable of providing immediate, dynamic leadership to the country.

   d. We forecast that this political confusion would then end up, quite possibly, in another coup at some undetermined future time and after that some form of political order would probably evolve.

   However, I pointed out that the effect of all this on the war effort was difficult to determine, and indeed it was possible that the war might be lost during the interregnum and period of political confusion.

   e. I said that in CIA's opinion there were civilians fully capable of running South Viet Nam, however, it is not clear to us how these men, some of whom are in South Viet Nam and others outside of the country in exile or on political assignments could be injected into the government and exercise effective control.
f. I then said that in examining the Diem-Nhu actions in the last 60 days it is to be noted that they have taken constructive military moves as recommended by McNamara and Taylor; have taken a few relatively unimportant political steps; but have apparently "dug in" on the really important political issues. These however have not so much as been discussed with them because of the policy of "correct, cool attitude."

g. At this point I noted that the policy of "correct coolness" had foreclosed either overt or covert contact with Diem and Nhu and hence had shut off all intelligence concerning their thinking and plans. Although some contacts at the lower level of foreign minister had continued, they were non-productive. Furthermore, we observed Diem and Nhu had instituted their own policy of "correct, cool attitude" and apparently had warned many of their subordinates, both civilian and military, to be extremely careful in their contacts with the American mission.

4. I stated that we were at a crossroads. We either have to work with Diem and Nhu or we have to take aggressive steps to remove them and it was not clear that the succeeding government would be much better. However, it was clear that the resulting political confusion would be damaging.

I then said that I felt we should work with Diem and Nhu as the most desirable alternative. We should keep in contact with them and this differed from present policy. We should exercise persuasion, influence and pressure to get them to institute some political reforms. This, I felt, was in the best interest of winning the war.

I said that there was some hope that Lodge might get started on this course during this coming weekend when he would be with Diem. I didn't think he should sit stony faced waiting for Diem to talk to him but rather he should talk to Diem and get the issues out on the table and recommended he be so instructed.

5. The President ordered Bundy to cable Lodge expressing our concern over the situation described above and also urging free and open talks with Diem over the coming weekend.

6. The President also asked that (1) CIA develop a plan as outlined above promptly and (2) arrange for Dave Smith to return with Lodge.

JAM:mcm
19 July 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with the President - 12:15 p.m. - 19 July 1963

1. McConne reviewed the memorandum of 19 July, outlining the answers to the four questions posed by the President on July 18 - copy attached.

2. Dr. Wheelon and Dr. Chamberlain reviewed the status of Soviet nuclear technology and weapons development versus U.S. developments and the effects of nuclear explosions on hardened missile sites, on cities when exploded at relatively low altitude and on cities when exploded at about 20 miles in the air, indicating the extent of the damage from blast and thermo effect.

3. Dr. Wheelon discussed status of Soviet satellite photography, the manner in which we intercepted the photography and were able to reproduce it, examples of which were displayed.

4. Dr. McMillan and Capt. Sands reviewed recent GAMBIT photography -- comparisons between G and M photography.

JAM/mfb

SECRET EYES ONLY
Find out:

1. When the French will be testing.

2. How much it would cost them to test?

3. What significance would be the progress they expect from the testing.

4. If we give them assistance to make the testing unnecessary
   a) how much money would that save them
   b) how much time would that save them.
1. French Field Questions
2. Effects Chamberlain
3. Sound Photography Whelan
MEMORANDUM

The French have detonated 8 nuclear devices at the Sahara

test site since February 13, 1960 -- 4 were atmospheric and the

last 4 underground. All were plutonium devices or weapons. Date

and yields are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Designation</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Cond.</th>
<th>Yield</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FR-1</td>
<td>13 Feb 1960</td>
<td>Atmos.</td>
<td>60 KT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR-2</td>
<td>1 Apr 1960</td>
<td>Atmos.</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR-3</td>
<td>27 Dec 1960</td>
<td>Atmos.</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR-4</td>
<td>25 Apr 1961</td>
<td>Atmos.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR-5</td>
<td>7 Nov 1961</td>
<td>Under.</td>
<td>Low yield</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR-6</td>
<td>1 May 1962</td>
<td>Under.</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR-7</td>
<td>18 Mar 1963</td>
<td>Under.</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR-8</td>
<td>30 Mar 1963</td>
<td>Under.</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The French are preparing a nuclear test site in Tuamotu

Archipelago in the South Pacific, using Tahiti as a staging base.

Preparatory work involves substantial construction of harbors,

airport runways, communications, depot facilities and

instrumentation. Reports indicate the French plan to have the
I. WHEN WILL THE FRENCH BE TESTING?

The French can test plutonium fission devices or weapons underground in the Sahara at almost any time, or in the atmosphere in the South Pacific late this year or any time through 1964. Some of the tests scheduled this Spring in the Sahara were cancelled for unknown reasons, but we know of no reason why the French might not resume.

An all-out testing program in the South Pacific of thermonuclear devices will not take place prior to 1966. Dr. Seaborg was told that the French will not attempt to make an all-plutonium thermonuclear device. Therefore their TN development is controlled by initial Pierrelatte gaseous diffusion plant which is several years away.
II. How much would it cost them to test underground plutonium fission devices?

Underground plutonium devices—

They can be tested in the Sahara, up to 50-100 KT relatively inexpensively using existing test facilities. A fair guess would be $10-15 million per test.

Plutonium fission devices or weapons could be tested by air drop in the South Pacific, using minimum facilities (and getting minimum diagnostic data) for about the same figure per test. It is impossible to estimate the cost of "minimum facilities" and it might be as low as a few million dollars. Such tests would be categorized as proof tests of the MIRAGE IV weapons system.

Preparations for permanent facilities for a South Pacific testing facility involving the development of harbors, construction of roads, water reservoirs, bridges, logistic support facilities, etc., will be very expensive, probably costing on the order of $200 million.

III. Of what significance would be the progress they can expect from testing?

We believe the French have developed a 50 KT plutonium bomb of reasonable weight. We feel they are anxious to conduct a proof test of the MIRAGE IV nuclear weapon delivery system.

By further testing, they could increase the yield of this weapon to 100 KT at acceptable weights.

Their next advance will be in the thermonuclear field which we believe to be three to four years off. We would expect their initial thermonuclear devices to yield about 500 KT at acceptable weights.

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IV. If we give them assistance to make the testing unnecessary: (a) how much money would they save?

The French would be saved the facility cost in the South Pacific, estimated at $200 million, plus the cost of each test conducted in the Sahara or in the Pacific which would be in the order of $10-15 million per test for the plutonium fission weapons and a considerably higher figure for the thermonuclear weapons.

(b) How much time would that save them?

The time saved is dependent upon the degree of our assistance. If we gave them complete designs plus the fabricated nuclear and non-nuclear components, the French would be saved several years. If, on the other hand, we gave them only general information, several years would be involved in assimilating this information, translating it into acceptable designs for manufacturing, and then the French would be concerned about the dependability of the finished article. A vast saving would accrue to the French if we sold them U-235. This would eliminate the necessity of completing the Pierrelatte plant which is estimated to cost the French between $1 billion and $1.2 billion and is several years away from completion. Furthermore, such an arrangement would release to the French economy 6-700,000 KW of cheap hydroelectric power in the Rhone Valley.