MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Historical Review Group

FROM: Thomas A. Twetten
Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT: Release of JFK Assassination Records--Differences

REFERENCE: Your Memorandum dated 1 June 1993, Subject: Release of JFK Assassination Records--Perception Problem

1. After consulting with key people on the DO team who are reviewing the JFK records for release, I have learned that there are some misunderstandings as well as some honest differences of opinion which are reflected in your Referenced memo.

2. First, to clear up some points: it was agreed early on, in July 1992, that old organizational designators, phone and room numbers would be released. It is entirely possible that this agreement is not applied uniformly among all the reviewers. Or that some of the later documents in the 1970's have more recent data in them. However, I am in agreement that old office designations above the branch chief level and old phone and room numbers can be released.

3. I also agree that well-known methods such as telephone taps and surveillance need not be protected per se. I understand much is being released about such activities in Mexico City in the 1963 time period. There are times, however, when such activity involves liaison equities, and caution would have to be used to protect liaison's involvement or awareness. Liaison sensitivity in this regard is universal and never ceasing.
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4. Document and file numbers are problematical. I understand an early agreement was reached to release Mexico City and Headquarters numbers, 201 numbers of key players in the JFK story, as well as old intelligence and DCD reports numbers. Other cable and dispatch numbers betray station location by their configuration and abbreviations; indiscriminate release of 201 numbers would be indicative of our operational or counter-intelligence interests in the persons involved. All of these details need to be protected.

5. As for inactive cryptonyms, I can only give partial approval for their release. Where the crypt has been blown or publically exposed in Congressional hearings, there is no problem. But many inactive crypts still are using a valid diagraph and while crypts were designed to protect the real secrets, they themselves are secrets which must be held. Many of them interrelate to other projects or activities in a given location. Inactivity by itself is not enough reason to release cryptonyms.

6. Source descriptions on disseminated reports, while often general or sterile, frequently are descriptive enough for the knowledgeable reader to determine the identity; so purely benign descriptions such as "untested" or "usually reliable" may be released, others may not. A disseminated report is still classified and often the customer is given an accurate, if vague description in order to establish the credibility of the information. We cannot share such source-identifying information with the general public.

7. Pseudonyms of former employees cannot be released. Like cryptonyms, they were designed to protect a secret and have become secrets themselves. Pseudonyms follow employees through their careers. If overseas, the number of different names allows the researcher to determine the size of a station.

8. Lastly, we are all concerned with the credibility problem--not only for the Agency but also for this project. One will be able to point critics to the vast amount of information being released that ordinarily would not be--Mexico City Station activities including photo ops, phone taps and surveillance capabilities; considerable file information on Cuban emigres;
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contacts such as Tad Szulc and counterintelligence concerns re
Zbignew Brzezinski to cite just a few examples. I understand
numerous staff names are being released which also is not our
normal practice.

9. While there will always be those who say we have not
released enough, we must concern ourselves with those who will
think we have released too much--agents, prospects, liaison
services and employees. Accordingly, I must insist on continuing
to protect that which I consider to be essential to the success
of ongoing and future operational activity.

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DO/IRO: K. Stricker x44440 (7 June 93)

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