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APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1994
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
B. Views of Intelligence Personnel

1. Statement by DERYABIN

a. Introduction

Former KGB officer Peter Sergeyevich DERYABIN has followed closely the entire course of CIA’s investigation of NOSENKO and his information. He took part in the interrogations of NOSENKO in April 1964, January-February 1965, and October 1966 as an observer and consultant, and he personally questioned NOSENKO during July and August 1965 concerning certain aspects of his personal past and early KGB career. On the basis of his direct, personal knowledge of conditions within the Soviet Union and of KGB organization and procedures prior to his defection in February 1954, supplemented by continuing study of later information from a variety of sources, DERYABIN is of the opinion that much of what NOSENKO has said about himself and the KGB is purposefully false or distorted. Although DERYABIN has been able to offer authoritative comment on many aspects of NOSENKO’s story, the following section of this paper is limited to his remarks concerning NOSENKO’s entry into the KGB (then MGB) and his Communist Party affiliation, both of which fall into the period when DERYABIN was active as a KGB (then MGB) staff officer. DERYABIN personally interrogated NOSENKO on those topics in the summer of 1965. Since DERYABIN was a personnel officer of the KGB (then MGB and MVD) in Moscow, with long experience in Communist Party activities, at the time NOSENKO claims to have entered the American Department of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, he is particularly qualified to comment on these aspects of NOSENKO’s story.

DERYABIN, as a Soviet Army officer, was graduated in 1945 from the higher counterintelligence school of Smersh (counterintelligence with the Soviet Armed Forces). Following this he worked in Naval Smersh in Moscow and in March 1947 began to work in the MGB as a case officer in the Central Personnel Directorate. Shortly afterwards, when his superior was appointed Deputy Chief of the Chief Guards Directorate for Personnel, DERYABIN transferred with him to the Guards Directorate. He served as a Guards Directorate personnel officer until May 1952, rising through the ranks from case officer to the position of Chief of Section. One of his responsibilities was the approval of personnel for service in various units of the Guards Directorate, and he was also in charge of supervising personnel and security matters concerning one of the Directorate’s surveillance sub-sections.

After requesting a change from personnel to operational duties, DERYABIN was transferred in May 1952 to the Austro-German Department of the MGB Foreign Intelligence Directorate. Until December 1952 he served as the Deputy Chief of a sub-section in the Counterintelligence Sektor (desk) of the Austro-German Department. He was then appointed Deputy Chief of the Intelligence Sektor of the same department, a position he held until March 1953. From March until September 1953, DERYABIN was the Deputy Chief of the section in MGB Headquarters which was responsible for the security of Soviets stationed in Austria and Germany. In September 1953 he was transferred to Vienna, where he became Deputy Chief of the section in the MVD Legal Residency responsible for the security of Soviets in Austria. He defected to American authorities on 15 February 1954.
DERYABIN joined the Komsomol in 1937 and became a member until 1940, when he became a candidate member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union; he became a full Party member in August 1941. During his Party career he held a number of responsible posts. Before the war, when DERYABIN was a teacher in Altay Kray, he was the secretary of a local Komsomol unit and simultaneously served as a member of the Komsomol Plenum in the rayon where he lived. From October 1940 until November 1941 he was Secretary of the Komsomol Committee of the 107th Engineer Battalion of the Red Army and from June 1945 until April 1946 held the same position in the Komsomol Committee of the Naval Smersh. This was the unit which had particular responsibility for counterintelligence work within the Naval GRU, which NOSENKO said he joined in 1951. In the MGB DERYABIN was a member of the Party Committee of the Personnel Section of the Guards Directorate and, after his transfer, was elected Secretary of the Party Bureau of the Austro-German Department of the Foreign Intelligence Directorate. He held this post from January 1953 until his transfer to Austria in September 1953.

b. DERYABIN’s Comments

The following statements by DERYABIN are based on his questioning of NOSENKO between 26 July and 13 August 1963. The questions asked and the statements attributed to NOSENKO (referred to as Subject) were during this period. Although the Soviet State Security Service did not become known as the KGB until March 1954, this term is used for convenience sake, except where the specific organization of the MGB or MVD is under discussion. DERYABIN’s comments follow:

"NOSENKO’s Acceptance into State Security"

"Taking NOSENKO’s own statements at face value, it is highly improbable that a person such as he has described himself to be would be acceptable for a position as a staff officer in State Security. The following factors are important in this regard:

a. It was the policy of State Security to avoid hiring the children of high government officials.

b. Until STALIN’s death in March 1953, KOBULOV, the man who supposedly helped NOSENKO gain entrance into the service, had no influence inside the MGB apparatus. From about 1948 until 9 or 10 March 1953, KOBULOV had no office inside the MGB or the MVD buildings. I know personally that in these years KOBULOV worked in Germany as Deputy Chief of the GUSIMZ (Chief Directorate of Soviet Properties Abroad)** which was once directly under the Council of Ministers and later under the Ministry of Foreign Trade. The office was located on Chkalova Street, near the Kurskii Railroad Station (three blocks from my former apartment).

* See also Part V.B.

** WISMUT A.G. in Germany was subordinate to GUSIMZ; for a further discussion of KOBULOV’s role in helping NOSENKO join the KGB, see Part V.B.
c. It was physically impossible at the time for NOSENKO to be recommended for and accepted into State Security, as he has told us, all in one month, March 1953. (If one accepts his earlier version that he had his talk with KOBULOV in January or February, his account is similarly impossible because KOBULOV was not then in State Security.) It would normally have taken a much longer time, but in addition to this it was a period of reorganization and the personnel staff was not actively conducting their work at that time, and permanent staff officers were not sure that they would retain their positions.

d. In March 1953 NOSENKO was already twenty-five and a half years old and only a member of the Komsomol. He had no recommendation for Party membership and could not become a member for a full year because of his transfer from one service (GRU) to another. It is impossible that State Security would accept him knowing in advance that on his birthday he would be twenty-six years old and without either Komsomol or Party membership. Even for the son of a Minister, the Secretary of the Komsomol Committee of the KGB would have to talk with the Personnel Office and would not give a recommendation for his acceptance, especially for the Internal Counterintelligence (Second Chief) Directorate. In the case of a son of a Minister and one who is recommended by KOBULOV, the secretary would request from NOSENKO a recommendation for Party membership from the members of the Communist Party where NOSENKO used to work, in this case the GRU. In this way the secretary of the Komsomol would be sure himself that NOSENKO would become a candidate member of the Communist Party during the next year.

"However, even accepting that despite these obstacles and contradictions the KGB would have accepted him, one must also remember (according to NOSENKO's own statements) that NOSENKO's file contained the following negative points.* They are serious factors and certain of them alone would be enough to cause the rejection; the totality makes it difficult to believe that at a time of crisis in the State Security organs anyone would take the responsibility of accepting him:

a. Subject was already married and divorced before entry into State Security.

b. He had been married to General TELEGIN's daughter and TELEGIN had been arrested by State Security and was in jail the day that Subject entered State Security.

c. NOSENKO said that there was a file on NOSENKO's father in which compromising material was collected on Subject's family. NOSENKO agreed that one piece of information that would have been in this file was the fact that his maternal grandfather died in a Soviet prison while under sentence as a counter-revolutionary.

d. The social status background in the life of Subject's mother was nobility.

* See also Part IV.B.
e. The shooting incident in Leningrad during World War II and his desertion from the Naval School in Baku would have played a very negative role in any consideration of his acceptance into State Security.

f. Subject never completed high school in the normal fashion.

g. Subject was a poor student at the Institute of International Relations.

h. It should be added that the KGB would definitely know that NOSEENKO was involved in an automobile accident in 1947 and was interrogated by the Militia (traffic court), found guilty, and fined. This would definitely play a negative role in NOSEENKO's admission to the KGB.

i. NOSEENKO would never be allowed to enter the KGB having just recovered from tuberculosis. In fact, there was a rule at that time that no person who ever had tuberculosis (even twenty years earlier) would be permitted to work in the KGB.

"In addition, after acceptance, the fact that KOBULOV was a personal friend of Subject's father, as he has told us, would have been noted in the file and would have played a negative role in permitting Subject to continue to work in State Security after KOBULOV's arrest in June 1953.

"I asked Subject how he answered some of the questions in the anketa (entry questionnaire), particularly the questions on his former wife, her relatives, and on his mother's ancestry." I then asked Subject how it was, taking into account his mother's aristocratic ancestry, the fact that her father died in jail, the Trotskyite allegations against Subject's father, the fact that Subject's former father-in-law (TELGIN) was still in jail, and the fact that Subject was present when TELGIN's apartment was searched--that he had been accepted into the KGB, particularly in 1953 during the confusion and changes after the death of STALIN. Subject admitted that the question was logical, and said that he could only assume that the influence of KOBULOV and the important and influential position of his own father outweighed these negative factors. He also cited his GRU experience in this connection.

"I then asked Subject how he had reported his second marriage to the KGB. He replied that before the marriage he had mentioned

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* NOSEENKO first mentioned having had tuberculosis during the June 1962 meetings, when he described it as a minor case but said he was under out-patient treatment until 1958. He next mentioned his illness in 1966, describing how he sometimes coughed up a "glass of blood" at a time. Although DERYABIN's questioning covered this part of NOSEENKO's life in detail, there was no mention of tuberculosis in July and August 1963. DERYABIN's comment is based on the 1966 information but is included here for purposes of context.

**The anketa and DERYABIN's questioning on this subject are discussed further below.
it briefly to ORBATENSKO, and that he had unofficially run a name check on his prospective bride (which was ‘clean’), and that after the marriage he had filled out another form in which he included all the required data on his wife and her relatives. After considerable prompting, Subject said that he had indicated that she and her parents had been in France, but that he had concealed the fact that her grandmother had been in German-occupied territory during the war. (He admitted that the KGB would have learned this in a routine check, however.) I then reviewed for Subject the negative security factors mentioned above, adding the arrest of KOBULOV, the fact that his new wife and her parents had been abroad, the fact that her grandmother was in German-occupied territory, the fact that Subject was now over-age for the Komsomol but not yet a Party member or candidate, and the fact that Subject received a 15-day sentence for misuse of cover documents and incurring venereal disease, and asked if he didn’t think that his personnel file had been reviewed in 1954, and if so, what grounds there could have been for retaining him in the KGB. Subject said that he thought that his file probably was reviewed but that again the influence of his father had saved him. Subject added that another important factor was probably his language qualification and particularly his higher education. I pointed out to Subject that if his second wife and her parents had been abroad it was impossible that her name check could have been negative. He admitted it was illogical, but insisted that this was so.

"NOSENKO’s Knowledge of KGB 1953-54"

"Entry Date into KGB: NOSENKO was reminded that he had previously given varying dates for his entry on duty in the KGB. He replied that he did not remember the exact date, but he was sure that it was in the middle of March 1953 - perhaps 13 or 15 March (15 March 1953 was a Sunday). He would give no explanation for why he previously claimed to have entered the KGB in 1952.* In fact it would be very unusual for a KGB officer to forget his exact entry-on-duty date to the very day because it is used to compute length of service and must be entered on various forms from time to time.

"Numerical Designation of the Intelligence and Counterintelligence Directorates in 1953: Asked to describe what directorates existed in the KGB while BERIA was Minister (March-June 1953), NOSENKO named the First Chief Directorate (FCD) and the Second Chief Directorate (SCD) which he said were the intelligence and counterintelligence directorates respectively. Asked if he were sure, NOSENKO said he was positive, and that the only change that took place was that later, under KRUGLOV, for a few months only, the FCD became the SCD, and vice versa. NOSENKO stuck to this even when told he was wrong; he did not say he did not know or did not remember, perhaps realizing that he could not claim not to remember what directorate he served in. (Actually, the change in numerical designations was instituted by BERIA right after STALIN’s death in March 1953 and persisted until the KGB was reorganized in March 1954. Thus, NOSENKO does not know what the correct designation of his own directorate was at the time that he allegedly entered on duty with Soviet State Security and for the entire first year of his alleged service there.

* NOSENKO on other occasions has given various reasons why he told CIA that he joined the KGB in 1952. See Part V.B.
"KGB Leadership, 1953-54: Asked to name the Chiefs of the directorates and separate departments of the KGB under BERIYA and KURGOV, NOSENKO named nine out of 10. He was unable to name the Chief of the Intelligence Directorate, saying that he remembered only SACHAROVSKIY (PANYUSHIN was chief until 1955). Asked to name KURGOV's deputies, NOSENKO named only ROMASHKOV and SEROV, and was ignorant of such prominent deputies as LUNEV and SHATANIN. Told that a Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU was one of KURGOV's deputies at this time (SHATANIN), NOSENKO flatly denied that this was possible."

"Organization of KGB: NOSENKO did not know when the KGB was organized (March 1954). He said that it was in early 1955 or late 1954. Told that he was a year off and asked to think it over, NOSENKO insisted that he was right."

"Processing Procedures for Employment with KGB: NOSENKO's story about how he was processed for employment with the KGB in 1953 is inconsistent with the procedures used at that time. He does not know many of the things that he should know about entrance procedures; he is wrong about many of the things that he claims to remember. The disparities are so great that they cannot be explained (as NOSENKO attempts to do) by the claim that KOROL'OV's recommendation resulted in a simplified entrance procedure for NOSENKO."

"The most important document filled out by prospective employees of Soviet State Security is a detailed personal history questionnaire, called in Russian Anketa splëtnogo naslædeniya gotrynika KGB. This exhaustive questionnaire is 16 pages long, and filling it out is an experience that one is not likely to forget. A background investigation is run on the basis of this questionnaire, which itself becomes a permanent and prominent feature of the employee's personnel file. NOSENKO remembers filling out a questionnaire, but does not know its designation. He asserts that it was only 4-6 pages long. He asserts that he filled it out at home, and submitted it in two copies shortly before entering on duty. Actually, this questionnaire was required in one copy only, and was never permitted to be taken home since it was a classified document (even when not filled in)."

"NOSENKO insists that he did not have to take a medical examination prior to entering the KGB. This is not possible. Such an examination was a routine and mandatory part of the processing. I cannot think of any instance in which it would be waived."

* DERYABIN's views are based on NOSENKO's statements in August 1965. In his original biographical statement (1962), NOSENKO said that no anketa was required. He implied as much in his most recent statement in April 1966, after being questioned by DERYABIN. This statement is given in Part V.E.

**See remarks above concerning NOSENKO's alleged treatment for tuberculosis from 1952 to 1958.
"ROSENKO's description of the secrecy agreement that he signed when entering on duty with the KGB is completely unlike the agreement that was in use at that time for staff employees. It may be significant that ROSENKO's description of the secrecy agreement he recalls signing resembles the secrecy agreements that were taken from agents.

"ROSENKO insists that he did not fill out any other forms, questionnaires, or papers when entering the KGB. Actually, there were a number of other routine forms that had to be filled out by applicants and new employees.

"Location of ROZHENKO's Office: ROSENKO says that all his entry processing was handled by a personnel officer named ROZHENKO and his staff. He asserts that ROZHENKO's office, which ROZHENKO visited several times in early 1953, was located on the 5th floor, 8th entry, Building No. 12, Izerzhinsky Street. In fact, neither ROZHENKO nor any officers or units of the Personnel Department were located in the 8th entry. They were all (including ROZHENKO) located on the 6th and 7th floors of the 7th entry of Building No. 12."

"Rank Pay: Asked about his salary when he first started to work in the KGB, ROSENKO said he got a basic salary of 1700 rubles as a case officer, 500 rubles for his rank of lieutenant, plus secrecy, language, and longevity pay. He insisted that this was correct, even when told that KGB officers were no longer being paid for rank in March 1953, and said that although he remembered that there was one year—1954—when they were not paid for rank, he was sure that when he first entered on duty he received this pay. Salary for rank was taken away from State Security officers in September 1952 and was not restored until April 1954.

"Promotion to Senior Lieutenant: In giving the chronology of his promotion to various military ranks, ROSENKO claimed to have been promoted to senior lieutenant in April 1953, shortly after joining the KGB. Told that this was impossible, and that no one in the KGB was promoted at this time, ROSENKO replied that he couldn't say about anyone else but he was sure that he had received his promotion at that time. In fact, this is impossible: all promotions in the KGB were frozen from the time BERIYA took over as minister (March 1953) until late 1953.

"Visitor's Pass Procedures: In talking about his first visit to the KGB to process for employment, ROSENKO was unable to recall the procedures employed by the KGB Pass Office in issuing visitor's passes. Specifically, he maintained that the name of the interviewer was not indicated on the pass. In fact, the name of the interviewer did appear on the pass and the interviewer had full responsibility for the visitor while he was on KGB premises. While it is understandable that ROSENKO might have forgotten the details involved if he had only visited there a few times more than ten years ago, if he worked at KGB Headquarters for over ten years as a staff officer and particularly as a supervisor he would have frequent occasion to admit visitors, and thus should know visitor's pass procedures quite well.

"ROSENKO has since said that he spoke to no personnel officers prior to acceptance by the KGB or afterwards, thereby indicating that his statements to DERYABIN were untrue. See Part V.B.

**TOP SECRET**
"Unescorted Entry into KGB Building with Visitor's Pass: In describing his first day at work, NOSENKO said that he went from the Pass Office, where he obtained a visitor's pass, to the 4th entry of the building No. 2, where his pass was checked by the guards, and then went unescorted to KOBULOV's office on the third floor. Challenged on this point, he said he was sure that it was possible to enter without an escort. In fact, it was absolutely impossible to go through any entry of Building No. 2 without escort if you did not have a properly stamped KGB (MGB) identity document (see below).

"KGB Identity Documents: NOSENKO was asked to describe the KGB identity document that he received when he first entered the KGB. He was then asked if there was anything unusual in connection with this document at that time. He replied that he knew of nothing unusual. He was then reminded that after STALIN's death and again after BERIYA's arrest it was necessary to have special stamps placed in the identity documents to validate them. Without the right stamp it was impossible to enter the KGB building. NOSENKO was ignorant of this and was unable to recall anything about it despite a number of hints and leading questions. Actually, during the period of upheaval following STALIN's death and again after BERIYA's arrest, all KGB identity documents were temporarily withdrawn in order to have special validation stamps placed in them, and it was literally impossible to get in the KGB buildings if one did not have the right stamp. This was the subject of numerous anecdotes at the time and is hard to believe that an officer who served in the KGB at the time could have forgotten it completely.

"Gastromom: Asked to describe the sign in front of the KGB Club, NOSENKO said that he did not remember any sign (there was one in 1953) but mentioned that there was a Gastronom (food store) next to the KGB Club. Asked when the Gastronom was opened, he said firmly that it was already there when he started to work in the KGB. In fact, this Gastronom was definitely not there as of 1954. It was opened sometime between 1955 and 1957, as Moscow directories show. The KGB Club is in entry No. 1 of Building No. 12, Dzerzhinskiy Square, and NOSENKO would have had to pass it every day he went to work.

"Chief Directorate of Militia: Asked where the Chief Directorate of Militia of the USSR was located in 1953-54, NOSENKO replied that he did not know, and knew only that later it was located on Ulitsa Ogareva. Actually, in 1953-54 it was located next to the main KGB building at Dzerzhinskiy No. 2. A staff officer in the counterintelligence directorate would have frequent occasion to deal with the Chief Directorate of Militia.

"K.I. (Committee of Information): Asked where the Intelligence Directorate of the MGB was located in 1953, NOSENKO replied that it was scattered between Dzerzhinskiy No. 2, the Agricultural Exhibition, the K.I. building, and Kiselniy Pereulok. This is a confused and incorrect answer. Asked for clarification, NOSENKO said that he had never visited either the K.I. or the First Chief Directorate building at the Agricultural Exhibition. Thus, NOSENKO seems to be unaware that the K.I. has not existed since 1951, and that the K.I. building and the building at the Agricultural Exhibition were one and the same place.
"NOSEKO's Claim to Have Been a Komsomol Secretary in the Second Chief Directorate, KGB

"NOSEKO claimed to have become a member of the Komsomol Organization (K/O) of the KGB when he entered on duty in March 1953, to have been elected as Secretary of Komsomol Organization of the Second Chief Directorate in the fall of 1953, and to have served in that capacity until the fall of 1954, when he was removed because he used operational-alias documents in obtaining treatment for a venereal disease he had incurred. He claims to have been excluded from the Komsomol, without prejudice, when he attained his 27th birthday in October 1954.

"Asked to describe how he transferred from the Komsomol Organization of the Naval Intelligence post in the Baltic to the Komsomol Organization of the KGB, NOSEKO gave an entirely incorrect description of this procedure. Both as regards deregistration from the K/O in the Baltic, and registration with the K/O in the KGB, he stated that he was issued a new Komsomol registration card by the KGB K/O, without reference to the previous K/O in the Baltic; this is impossible.

"NOSEKO gave an incorrect account of how a K/O secretary is elected, stating that he was elected at a meeting of the K/O. In fact, the K/O meeting can only select the K/O committee, which will convene separately to elect the secretary.

"NOSEKO could not describe the duties of a K/O secretary in a specific manner.

"NOSEKO did not know who was the secretary of the overall KGB K/O. The secretary of the SCD K/O would be directly subordinate to him and would deal with him frequently.

"NOSEKO was unable to describe his dealings with the KGB K/O or the identities or responsibilities of the people with whom he dealt there.

"NOSEKO insisted that in 1953-54, the maximum age for a Komsomol member was 27. In actual fact, the maximum age was 26 (it was raised later). This point is important, both because NOSEKO should know exactly if he had served as a K/O secretary, and also because it refutes his story that he was excluded from the Komsomol for over-age in 1954.

"NOSEKO maintained that all the members of his K/O paid dues in the amount of 2 percent of their monthly salaries. This is incorrect, as monthly Komsomol dues were calculated on a sliding scale determined by wage group; at that time, Komsomol members earning up to 500 rubles monthly paid 0.5 percent; those earning 500 to 1500 rubles paid 1 percent, and those earning over 1500 rubles paid 1.5 percent. The K/O secretary collects the dues, and must know the right amount.

"NOSEKO did not know whether or not a Komsomol Congress took place while he was K/O secretary, saying that they took place every year. In actual fact, the 12th Komsomol Congress which convened in March 1954 was the first since 1948; at this 12th Congress a number of changes were made in the Komsomol Rules (Ustav). As secretary of a K/O NOSEKO would have been involved
in a good deal of preparatory work for this Congress, which was a big event in the life of every Komitet worker at the time, and could not be forgotten."

Although Demyabin's direct knowledge of the KGB ended in 1954, his detailed information of KGB procedures has been updated by his more recent examination of reports from other sources. With regard to what Noseenko has said about KGB procedures, Demyabin stated: "Asked to describe how he conducted name checks on a Soviet citizen and on a new arrival to the American Embassy in 1953-54, Noseenko gave a superficial description of how such checks were done. However, he resisted every attempt to get him to describe the process in detail, and he made several blunders which show that he never actually ran such a check himself. For example, he did not know where the records of all Soviet citizens who have been tried are kept, and he attempted to improvise an answer (completely wrong) that they would check with the Militia about this. Noseenko correctly said that Archives were located on Kirov Street, but he was completely unable to stretch his limited knowledge to provide a description of how these various repositories were actually checked. Noseenko was also asked to describe in detail how he ran such a check on a Soviet citizen in the 1956-59 period. Here again he was in difficulty and refused even to try. He did not even know the everyday term Spets-proverka, which means a check for clearance.

"It was particularly interesting that he did not feel able to dispute my challenges of his information, even though he undoubtedly knows that I do not have first-hand knowledge of procedures in this period. I even tested this on one occasion by asking Noseenko the difference between the 1st Spets Otdel (Special Department - KGU cards and files) and the Operativno-Uchetnii Otdel (Operational Reports Department - the functional name for the 1st Special Department). He answered that the 1st Special Department holds the files on Soviet criminal cases, while the Operational Reports Department is for political and espionage cases. It seems he invented this answer on the spot. In addition, it is wrong that political and security cards are separate from criminal ones in the 1st Special Department. They were in my time and must still be combined in one card file."

"Noseenko states that he knows nothing about the files of the First Chief Directorate. It is unbelievable that in ten years of service in the Second Chief Directorate Noseenko never saw a First Chief Directorate file; how else would he be able to check information on foreigners, especially on American Embassy personnel? The first stage in such a check is an inquiry to the First Chief Directorate and a check of any files they may have on the subject. According to his own account, Noseenko should have been doing this type of thing the whole of his ten years of service, without regard to whether he was assigned to the American Department or the Tourist Department."