HELMS HEARING DUPLICATE - VOLUME II, COPY 7 OF HELMS HEARING.

DATE: 01/01/0000
PAGES: 157

SUBJECTS:
DUPLICATE
VOL II, COPY 7
UNIT INDEX
HELMS HEARING

DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION: Not Marked
RESTRICTIONS: 1B
CURRENT STATUS: Withhold
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 05/13/1998

COMMENTS: JFK4: F10: 1998.05.13.17:52:05:436031: DUPLICATE OF VOL II, COPY 1 OF HELMS HEARING IN JFK3, F2 WHERE DOCUMENTS WERE INDIVIDUALLY PROCESSED. THIS COPY WAS UNIT INDEXED.
1. Memorandum for Winston m. SCOTT, dated 13 October 1966; Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD.

2. Note, undated, regarding contacts of ALFREREV.

3. Memorandum for Assistant Deputy Director, Plans, dated 23 November 1963; Subj ect of Lee OSWALD with a member of Soviet KGB Assassination Department. [FOIA 34-538]


5. Memorandum for Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security Department of State, dated 16 September 1969; Subject: Charles William THOMAS. [FOIA No. 1133-992]

6. CSCI 3/779,814, dated 30 January 1964; Subject: Jack L. RUBY - Lee Harvey OSWALD.

7. PARI-1731 (IN 73050), 4 December 1963 [FOIA No. 298-697]  
8. Note to Richard HELMS, dated 23 March 1964, regarding briefing at Allen DULLES' home on 4 March 1964. [FOIA 618-793]


10. CSCI-3/779,135 to FBI, dated 16 December 1963; Subject: Peter DERYABIN's Comments on the Kennedy Assassination. [FOIA No. 415-76A]

11. Memorandum for J. Lee RANKIN, dated 5 June 1964; Subject: Allegations Regarding Intelligence Training School in Minsk, USSR. [FOIA No. 726-314 XAAZ-17620]

12. Memorandum for J. Lee RANKIN, dated 31 March 1964; Subject: Reports on Activities and Travel of Lee Harvey OSWALD and Marina Nikolevna OSWALD. [FOIA No. 627-821]

13. DIR-92725, 6 January 1964 [FOIA No. 456-771]


15. Note from HELMS, dated 6 March 1964

16. Memorandum for Chief, CI/KAA, dated 20 February 1964; Subject: Documents Available in OSWALD's 201 File. [FOIA No. 563-810]

17. Memorandum for J. Lee RANKIN, dated 23 July 1964; Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD. [DDP 4-3769]


19. DIR 85246, 26 November 1963 [FOIA No. 113-48]

20. MEXI-7045 (IN 67281), 24 November 1963 [FOIA No. 78-559]

22. Memorandum for DC/OPS, dated 23 May 1975; Subject: Review of Selected Items in the Lee Harvey OSWALD File Regarding Intelligence Service's Role in processing Visa and Intelligence Service in Connection with Kennedy Assassination.

23. Memorandum for J. Lee RANKIN, dated 15 May 1964; Subject: Role of the Intelligence Service in Processing Visa Application; Relation of that Service to the Assassination of President Kennedy. [XAZ-36307 - FOIA No. 697-294]

24. Note dated 10 April 1964 listing material from P-8593 shown to Warren Commission. [FOIA No. 653-828]

25. Brief for Presentation to President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy, 14 May 1964. [XAAZ-23122 - FOIA No. 695-302A]


28. Memorandum to Chief, CI/R&A, dated 19 June 1964; Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD. [XAAZ-27166 - FOIA No. 739-319]

29. Memorandum for Deputy Director for Plans, dated 11 May 1964; Subject: AMMUG/1 Information on Lee Harvey OSWALD. [XAAZ-27213 - FOIA No. 687-295]

30. Blind Memorandum, dated 5 May 1964; Subject: Debriefing of AMMUG/1 - OSWALD Case.

31. Chronology of RGR Meetings with Members of the Warren Commission [XAAZ-27161]

32. Memorandum for the Record, dated 1 April 1975; Subject: Conversation with David W. BELIN, 1 April 1975.
Rocca Deposition

1. 1 April 74, memo for Record, R. Rocca
2. Chron q Rocca meetings w/ Warren Connor
3. 6 Jan 74, DIR 92725
4. 24 Nov 69, FoIA 67281
5. 5 May 64, debriefing, ARMY 06/11
6. 11 May 64, FoIA 687-295
7. 19 June 64, FoIA 739-319
8. 15 Apr 75, letter from Balin to Knocks
9. 23 May 75, Rocca name on letter file
10. 12 May 64, FoIA 689-298
11. 14 May 64, FoIA 695-302A
12. 10 April 64, FoIA 653-828
13. 15 May 64, FoIA 697-294
14. 21 Feb 64, FoIA 559-243
15. 2 Dec 63, DIR 85373
16. 1 April 64, Coleman-Scawson memo (DS)
17. 15 April 64, Coleman-Scawson memo (DS)
18. 1 June 64, Helen mem to Rankin
19. 31 Jan 64, FoIA 509-803
20. 27 Nov 64, FoIA 778-557
21. 26 Nov 63, FoIA 113-478
22. 27 Nov 63, FoIA 187-622
23. 20 Feb 64, FoIA 563-810
24. 6 March 67, FoIA 590-252
25. 16 March 67, FoIA 456-771
26. 31 March 67, FoIA 627-821
27. 5 January 67, FoIA 726-314
28. 16 Dec 63, CSCI-3/77A-235
29. 16 Jan 67, FoIA 482-193
30. 23 March 64, FoIA 618-793
31. 4 Dec 63, FoIA 298-697
32. 30 January 67, CSCI-3/779-884
33. 19 December 64, FoIA 1133-972
25 Nov 64, 925-927
23 Nov 63, 84-88

Office of Security
Summary Report
114th paragraph of 5115r to Atwater

Ugarte

Will be retrieved by OZ5 through OZ

GSC1875
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation with David W. BELIN, 1 April 1975

Q: What was the line of reporting in CIA during the period I served as working level point-of-contact with the Warren Commission Staff?

A: It was a multiple leveled thing: (a) from the Commission and AWD personally via McConi to Dick Helms; (b) from Helms to the two or three components primarily concerned--SE, then SB, Dave Murphy; LA, then WH, and CI. In practice, the substantive SB input worked up by one of its research components headed by Lee Wigen--Minsk photo for example, was passed via CI. CI had own defector input. In addition, on sensitive matters of concern to the investigation, Dick Helms and Murphy also dealt directly with the Commission.

Q: Did you hear: ?? [two crypts, one sounded by "Jackenet" ?]. I had not. Belin recalled that Castro had made a speech in which he had charged assassination intent by emigres and had promised retribution in kind if there was official support.

Q: Had any thought been given to the assumption that an anti-Castro assassination plot might have been underway, and fact it was known to Helms and to Castro? [Mr. Belin said he now knew that Helms was, in fact, aware of something underway regarding Castro. He had no evidence to show that I (ABB) had been informed about it.] Would that change any of the thinking of Oswald's Mexican trip and contacts?

A: Yes, I said, though I intended to give more potential importance to Oswald's KGB contacts and regretted that I and others--though recognizing the wisdom of the Warren Commission's handling--had felt there had been neglect of the Soviet aspect that should have been pursued:

a. Fact that his two Soviet consular contacts in Mexico City had been identified as KGB and at least one (both?) had been traced organizationally to the 13th Department (assassinations).
SUBJECT: Conversation with David W. Belin, 1 April 1975

b. Our defector information strongly insists that all Western military defectors—like Oswald—were screened by the 13th Department.

c. Thinness of file turned over by Soviets in view of b.

I acknowledged in retrospect that Cuban hypothesis was worth reconsidering, though it would appear that period of solid-inter-service (KGB-US) relations began later (i.e. after 1967-68, Venecremos, etc.).

Q: Why did Oswald's lies include a denial to Dallas police that he had made the Mexican trip unless there was something important to hide about it? All his other lies concerned key factual elements of his cover story. Why also did Marina deny she knew anything about the Mexican trip in her first story to the FBI—which she later rectified before the Warren Commission? Mr. Belin noted that he had left the hypothesis of Castro/Cuban involvement open in his book. He added that it would have been important to have known the facts about the anti-Castro plot at the time of the Warren Commission investigation. He felt the least he would have done would have been to have insisted on the polygraphing of Marina Oswald regarding her knowledge of Oswald's Mexican trip.

Raymond G. Rocca
Counter Intelligence Operations

SECRET EYES ONLY
Believe Mr. Rocca was at the Commission at least one other day.

(probably Saturday, the 29th, according to notes.

14 January 1964
26 May 1964
12 August 1964
27 March 1964
12 March 1964
26 March 1964
12 October 1964

"Commission"

"Commission"

"Commission"

*RANKIN, WILLINS

*RANKIN, WILLINS

Chronology of RGR meetings with members of the

RANKIN, WILLINS

[Handwritten notes and crosses out information]
Subject: General: Confidential
Specific: OSSAL C1-1

The source does not have direct knowledge of the Harvey Oswal or his activities but was able to provide items of interest based on contacts of Cuban intelligence officers assigned to the direction general de inteligencia, of which the source himself was a staff officer. The information appearing below was furnished by the source and is keyed to questions submitted by KUBEK.

1. Prior to October 1963, Oswal visited the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City on two or three occasions. Before, during and after these visits, Oswal was in contact with the Direccion General de Inteligencia (DGII), specifically with Luis Calderon, Manuel Vega Perez and Roberto Rodriguez Lopez.

VEGA whose Cuban intelligence pseudonym is Marcel is the current Cuban IS chief in Mexico. He recently had a tour of duty in Havana, prior to which he held the same post as Oswal, as Cuban IS chief in Mexico.

RODRIQUEZ is a Cuban IS staff officer in Mexico. He has three Cuban intelligence pseudonyms, Eduardo, Casado and Jose Antonio.

The precise relationship of Luis Calderon to the DGII is not clear. He spent about six months in Mexico from which he returned to Cuba early in 1963.

COMMENT: WH/CA/II has the following references concerning Luisa Calderon Carralero. She was assigned to the commercial office of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City, and she had arrived in Mexico on 16 January 1963 and on 11 December 1963 made a reservation to return to Cuba on Cubana Airlines "MMX II 33, 13 December 1963 10-3631, 15-0135." She left Mexico City for Havana on 15 December 1963 using passport E/63/7 "MMX II 7U45, 17 December 1963, E/22592. Another reference "WH/CA/II 25 March 1963," said that her date of arrival in Mexico was 19 January 1963 and that she had replaced Rosario Vazquez, a Mexican secretary in the commercial office. Other references apparently concerning her subject are INM-6943 and INM-3205 IN-56572 dated 25 January 1963 which do not appear to add anything of interest to that given above.

2. The source does not know whether or not the Cuban Services used Oswal in any agent capacity or other manner.

3. A. When news of the assassination of President Kennedy reached the DGII, it caused much consternation concerning the fact Oswal had been in the Cuban
Embassy in Mexico. In addition, orders were issued for all headquarters and
field officers of the DII to sort and package all documents according to whether
they were "Top Secret," "Very Secret," "Secret," "Unclassified," and "Top Secret"
(important). The materials were then to be held pending further instructions. In addition, all travel by DII officials and all DII pouches were
suspended temporarily.

3. When the news that OSWALD was the assassin reached the DII, there
was no immediate comment but, when Fidel CASTRO spoke on television to deny
Cuban involvement, there was considerable comment concerning OSWALD's visit to
the Cuban Embassy in Mexico. At this time VADA, who has been mentioned previously,
was in Cuba and commented to a group of DII staff officers that OSWALD had come
to the Cuban Embassy in Mexico to request a visa but had been refused. VADA did
not give any details and the subject was not pursued.

4. It is not known whether information on OSWALD's visit to the Cuban
Consulate in Mexico in September 1963 was relayed to any Cuban service.

5. It is not known if the Cuban intelligence services had contact with
the New Orleans' Fair Play for Cuba Committee.

6. The only Holina who is recalled is "The Hook", the Cuban who was
convicted in New York City for the murder of a young girl during a clash between
two Cuban groups. The DII staff officer who had been in the United Nations in
New York, SANTERNAUS traveled to Cuba with "The Hook" and with another Cuban
named CRUZEAUX and upon arrival in Cuba tried to obtain employment for both
individuals. The names Pedro Charlos and Peter have no known significance.

7. The reaction of Soviet officials in contact with the Cuban intelligence
services is not known.

8. Nothing is known about Soviet proposals following the news of President
Kennedy's assassination.

9. The only fabrication known is the special matter by Fidel CASTRO pre-
viously mentioned.

10. Nothing is known about Jack RUBENSTEIN aka Jack RUIY.

11. The name Gilberto LOPEZ is not familiar but, if he visited DII head-
quarters, a photograph of him possibly could be identified.

12. OSWALD's photo was seen in the newspapers but nothing is known about
him other than what appeared in the press.
Proposed Questions on Oswald Case

1. Was Lee Harvey OSWALD known to the Cuban intelligence services before 23 November 1963? If so which service?

2. Were the Cuban services using OSWALD in any agent capacity, or in any other manner, before 23 November 1963?

3. What was the reaction of the Cuban intelligence services to news of President Kennedy's assassination? To the news that OSWALD was the assassin?

4. Was information on OSWALD's visit to the Cuban Consulate in Mexico City in September 1963, relayed to any Cuban service? If so, what action was taken?

5. Was there any contact between the Cuban intelligence services and the New Orleans' Fair Play For Cuba Committee?

6. Was subject ever heard of Mario del ROSARIO Molina, or Pedro Charles known also as "Peter"?

7. How did the Soviet officials in contact with the Cuban intelligence services react to news of the assassination?

8. Did the Soviets propose any type of action or investigation to the Cuban intelligence services following the news of President Kennedy's assassination?

9. Was any provocative material deliberately fabricated by the Cuban services or others sent to the United States to confuse the investigation of the OSWALD case?

10. Was Jack KIRCHSTEIN aka Jack RUBY known to the Cuban intelligence services? If so, in what way?

11. Does subject know a Gilberto LÓPEZ who entered Mexico on November 23, 1963 at Nuevo Laredo, Texas and four days later proceeded to Havana by special plane? He was 23 years old and carried a U.S. passport. He also had a Mexican tourist permit. Develop all information you can on this individual.

12. Attached is a photograph of OSWALD, and a letter from Havana which is self-explanatory for guidance of the case officer. Under no circumstances should the contents of the letter be made known to the subject. This information came from the Secret Service and FBI.
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**Document Number 687-295**

**For FOIA Review on JUN 1976**
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT: AMMUG/1 Information on Lee Harvey OSAWALD

1. This memorandum is for information and for action. The proposed lines of action are indicated in paragraph 4.

2. AMMUG/1, the Cuban Intelligence Service defector, has produced information of interest to the President’s Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy. CI Staff learned of AMMUG/1 on 30 April. A questionnaire was submitted by the Staff on 1 May (Attachment A). Mr. Swenson, who is handling the AMMUG/1 debriefing, provided a reply on 5 May (Attachment B). It was clear from Mr. Swenson’s summary that AMMUG/1 had information bearing on the OSAWALD relationship with the Cuban Embassy and Cuban intelligence personnel in Mexico City, albeit his knowledge was not that of a direct participant in matters affecting OSAWALD. A follow-up questionnaire was submitted to AMMUG/1 on 6 May (Attachment C). Mr. Swenson’s reply was dated 8 May (Attachment D). Attention is directed particularly to the content of paragraph two of Attachment D.

3. We have the problem of reconciling the operational exploitation of AMMUG/1 and satisfying the responsibilities we have undertaken with Mr. Rankin. AMMUG/1 is such an operational gold mine that Mr. Swenson wants, at a maximum, two months to work fully. It is palpable, however, that we must furnish to the Commission the substance of AMMUG/1’s
information on OSWALD before that. On the previous record of our association with the Commission, particularly with Mr. Rankin, it seems possible for the Agency to work out an arrangement with Mr. Rankin personally that would take care of their needs and ours after a frank discussion of the equities.

4. It is recommended that the DDP in person or via a designee, preferably the former, discuss the AMMUG/1 situation on a very restricted basis with Mr. Rankin at his earliest convenience either at the Agency or at the Commission headquarters. Until this takes place, it is not desirable to put anything in writing.

Raymond G. Rocca
Chief, CI Research and Analysis

Attachments

cc: C/CI
    C/WH/6 (without att)
    C/WH/SA/CI (without att)
Proposed Questions on Oswald Case

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SECRET EYES ONLY

6 May 1964

1. The source says that prior to October 1962, Oswald visited the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City on two or three occasions. It is public knowledge he was in Mexico during the period 9-25-62 to 10-3-62.

A) When did source learn of these visits - before or after the assassination? Please describe in detail the circumstances under which source learned this information and identities of the persons involved.

B) Did these visits take place during the aforementioned period or is the source referring to previous visits. If the latter, try to get more specific details regarding these trips and the origin of the source's information.

2. The source states that before, during, and after these visits Oswald was in contact with the DGI specifically Luisa CALDERON, Manuel VEGA Perez and Regina BORDAOZU Lopez. This would appear to mean that one or more contacts were made after Oswald returned to the United States i.e., between 10-3-62 and 11-22-63.

A) What does source mean by contact?

B) Can the break down these contacts by the specific individual named, place and type of contact, and date of occurrence?

C) Did Oswald have or have reason to suspect the intelligence connections of these persons?

D) What was the purpose of these contacts?
3) Did CCU direct the intelligence affiliations of those individuals who were attending the events, if any, they were employed in? 

7) Did source ever pass any documentary material or any of those contacts, or any correspondence initiated by or referred to Oswald? 

9) Did the DGI ever employ physical surveillance, technical devices or camera equipment to cover those contacts? 

11) The source says he does not know whether the Cuban services used Oswald in any agent capacity or otherwise. Thus, this obviously makes it more important to check out what the source meant in question 9. 

A. Did the DGI ever initiate an investigation of Oswald? 

B. What was the reason for posting files at DGI headquarters and field offices after news of the assassination was received? 

C. Source was asked whether any provocative material was deliberately fabricated by the Cubans (Question 7) to confuse the investigation of Oswald. The reply attributed to him was, "The only fabrication known in the special matter by Fidel CASTRO previously mentioned." Please clarify.
MEMORANDUM FOR:  Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff  
Attention:  Mr. Roca  

SUBJECT  General: Debrieting of AMMUG-1  
Specific:  The Oswald Case  

REFERENCE  :  Blind Memorandum dated 05 May 1964  

1. Reference is made to a telephone conversation yesterday with Chief, CI Staff concerning this matter.

2. Because I am not aware of the information already available to the Commission investigating the Oswald Case or furnished by the Agency, my debriefing of the Source has been based on the questions prepared by the CI Staff and on what the Source answers have suggested. I shall be glad to pursue any other topics suggested by CI Staff.

3. The following information in addition to that in the reference might be of interest:

a. Luisa CALDERON, since she returned to Cuba, has been paid a regular salary by the DGI even though she has not performed any services. Her home is in the Vedado section where the rents are high.

b. Source has known CALDERON for several years. Before going to Mexico, she worked in the Ministry of Exterior Commerce in the department which was known as the #Empresa Transimport#. Her title was Secretary General of the Communist Youth in the department named in the previous sentence.

c. Luisa CALDERON was transferred directly from her position in the Ministry of Exterior Commerce to a post in México, a matter of surprise to the Source.

d. Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez (DGI pseudo MORCOS), shortly before he left Cuba for Mexico on or about 16 April 1964, saw CALDERON.
4. As explained to CI Staff any publicity which would reveal the identity of the Source, his defection to KUBARK, or the extent of his knowledge of DGI activities might prejudice the operational use of the Source himself and of information which he has provided. Accordingly, it might be appropriate to point out to the Commission (as agreed by DC/WH/SA) that KUBARK hopes, by using the Source, to obtain access to DGI personnel including those mentioned in paragraph 3 above.

Harold F. Swenson  
Chief, WH/SA/CI
6 May 1964

Proposed Questions on Oswald Case

REFERENCE: Debrieffing of AMUG-1, dated 5 May 1964

1. “The source says that prior to October 1963, Oswald visited the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City on two or three occasions. It is public knowledge he was in Mexico during the period 9-26-63 to 10-3-63.

   A) When did source learn of these visits - before or after the assassination? Please describe in detail the circumstances under which source learned this information and identities of the persons involved.

   B) Did these visits take place during the aforementioned period or is the source referring to previous visits. If the latter, try to get more specific details regarding these trips and the origin of the source’s information.

2. The source states that before, during, and after these visits Oswald was in contact with the DGI, specifically Luisa CALDERON, Manuel VEGA Perez and Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez. This would appear to mean that one or more contacts were made after Oswald returned to the United States i.e., between 10-3-63 and 11-22-63.

   A) What does source mean by contact?

   B) Can he break down these contacts by the specific individual named, place and type of contact, and date of occurrence?

   C) Did Oswald know or have reason to suspect the intelligence connections of these persons?

   D) What was the purpose of these contacts?
E) If Oswald did not know the intelligence affiliations of these individuals, what pretext, if any, were employed in contacting him?

F) Did source ever see any documentary material on any of these contacts, or any correspondence initiated by or addressed to Oswald?

G) Did the DGI ever employ physical surveillances, technical devices or camera equipment to cover these contacts.

H) The source says he does not know whether the Cuban services used Oswald in any agent capacity or otherwise. This obviously makes it more important to check out what the source meant in question one.

3. Did the DGI ever initiate an investigation of Oswald?

4. What was the reason for packaging files at DGI headquarters and field offices after news of the assassination was received?

5. Source was asked whether any provocative material was deliberately fabricated by the Cubans (Question 7) to confuse the investigation of Oswald. The reply attributed to him was, "the only fabrication known is the special matter by Fidel CASTRO previously mentioned." Please clarify.
08 May 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff
Attention: Mr. Roca

SUBJECT
General: Debriefing of AMMUG-1
Specific: The Oswald Case

REFERENCE: A. Blind Memorandum dated 05 May 1964
B. Blind Memorandum dated 07 May 1964
C. Conversations between CI Staff and C/WH/SA/CI

1. When the Oswald Case first was discussed with the Source the specific questions prepared by CI Staff were posed. The answers given by the Source were reported in Reference A. That memorandum which I dictated to a CI Staff stenographer appears accurate except for sentence 99 which should have said that the only possible "fabrication" known by Source was the specific denial by Fidel CASTRO, on a television program, of any Cuban knowledge of Oswald.

2. On 07 and 08 May 1964 I further discussed the Oswald Case with the Source in order to clarify exactly what he knew and what he had heard. In the light of the explanation given by him, I believe that a clearer understanding of what he knows can be reached if I record his knowledge without using the question and answer format. Accordingly, in the following paragraphs I shall report all the information given by the Source paraphrasing his explanations and comments.

"I have no personal knowledge of Lee Harvey OSWALD or his activities and I do not know that OSWALD was an agent of the Dirección General de Inteligencia (DGI) or any other directorate or department of the Cuban Government.

I first heard of OSWALD after the assassination of President Kennedy when news media carried the name of OSWALD. Personnel in the DGI first commented about the case, so far as I can recall, one day after lunch when a group of officers, of whom I was one, were chatting. The officers present were about ten including Roberto SANTISTEBAN, Norberto HERNANDEZ de Curbelo, Andres ARMONA, Pedro FARINAS Diaz and

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CCU1851
Manuel VEGA Perez. Manuel VEGA Perez previously had been assigned to Mexico in the Cuban Consulate where he was the principal intelligence officer of the DGI. VEGA mentioned that OSWALD had gone to the Cuban Consulate two or three times in connection with a visa application during the time that VEGA was in Mexico. I gathered, although I do not know that VEGA made any specific statement to this effect, that VEGA personally had seen OSWALD. I well could have reached this conclusion because normally VEGA and his assistant in Mexico for the DGI, Rogello RODRIGUEZ Lopez, would see persons applying for a visa to go to Cuba. This is because DGI officers are charged with expediting the granting of visas of agents of the DGI. Such agents, on appearing at the Consulate, use a special phrase to indicate their relationship with the DGI. (I do not know the particular phrase used in every case. I do know that agents from El Salvador in requesting visas always made mention of the name "Mauricio")

The DGI officers at a Consulate interview visa applicants to find out if they are agents. If the visa applicant does not use one of the indicated phrases, the DGI officer, instead of granting the visa immediately, tell the applicant to return in a few days. The officer then notifies Habana and requests authority for the visa. I cannot recall if VEGA ever made the statement that he had requested permission to issue a visa to OSWALD, but I feel sure that he would have done so because VEGA had said that OSWALD had returned several times and this would be the usual procedure.

I believe that Rogello RODRIGUEZ Lopez also would have seen OSWALD because he worked with VEGA and also would have screened visa applicants.

I thought that Luisa CALDERON might have had contact with OSWALD because I learned about 17 March 1964, shortly before I made a trip to Mexico, that she had been involved with an American in Mexico. The information to which I refer was told to me by a DGI case officer named Norberto HERNANDEZ de Curbelo. (I remember the conversation with HERNANDEZ.
because he gave me $40.00 to buy some shoes and
other items during my trip to Mexico.) I had
commented to HERNANDEZ that it seemed strange
that Luisa CALDERON was receiving a salary from
the DGI although she apparently did not do any work
for the Service. HERNANDEZ told me that hers was
a peculiar case and that he himself believed that she
had been recruited in Mexico by the Central Intelligence
Agency although Manuel PINEIRO, the Head of the DGI,
did not agree. As I recall, HERNANDEZ had investigated
Luisa CALDERON. This was because, during the time
she was in Mexico, the DGI had intercepted a letter to
her by an American who signed his name as OWER (phonetic)
or something similar. As you know, the pronunciation
of Anglo-Saxon names is difficult in Spanish so I am not
sure of how the name mentioned by HERNANDEZ should be
spelled. It could have been "Howard" or something different.
As I understood the matter, the letter from the American
was a love letter but indicated that there was a clandestine-
professional relationship between the writer and Luisa
CALDERON. I also understood from HERNANDEZ that
after the interception of the letter she had been followed
and seen in the company of an American. I do not know if
this could have been OSWALD. I, myself, considered the
case of Luisa CALDERON unusual because I had known her
before she went to Mexico when she worked in the Ministry
of Exterior Commerce in the Empresa Transimport Department
where she was Secretary General of Communist Youth. She
was transferred directly from that position to a post in Mexico
which seemed strange.

The only other person about whom you asked me in connection
with this, whom I recall, is Sylvia DURAN and I know very
little about her. What happened was that I was in the Cuban
Embassy in Mexico on 25 March 1964 about 1230 in the afternoon
preparing to return to Havana the same day. I was talking to
some other Cubans including Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez and
Juan BUENAVENTURA of the Cuban Embassy; a courier named
"Enlo", a courier named "Felo"; and one other Cuban whom I
cannot recall. We saw a pretty girl standing at the end of
the reception room, and someone asked who she was, and one
of the group said it was Sylvia DURAN.
I recall that, after the news of the assassination of President Kennedy reached the DGI, orders were issued for all offices of the DGI at Headquarters and in the field, to sort and package all documents according to whether they were "muy secreto" (very secret), "secreto" (secret), or "importante" (important). The material, once packaged, was to be held pending further instructions. All travel by DGI officers and all DGI pouches were suspended temporarily. In addition, I recall that DGI Headquarters personnel were instructed either to remain in the DGI Headquarters offices or to keep the DGI aware of their whereabouts so that they could be reached immediately. I do not know the reason for these measures but I believe it logical that they were issued because of the possibility that the United States might take some type of action against Cuba and the DGI offices. As nearly as I can recall, we were able to unpackage DGI files and use them normally about the 3rd of December 1963."

3. In brief, the Source does not claim to have any significant information concerning the assassination of President Kennedy or about the activities of OSWALD. If the paragphrased comments of the Source are considered to need further clarification, I suggest that Mr. Rocca, who is most familiar with the details of the OSWALD Case, talk to the Source. This can be arranged at any time. Meanwhile, I shall have a question asked in a forthcoming LCFLUTTER to determine whether or not the Source seems to have concealed any information on this matter.

Harold F. Swenson
Chief, WH/SA/CI
I think you will be particularly interested in paragraph 3 of Mr. Dooley's memo of record, attached. Art went over to wind up loose end we had with regard to the AMMUG information we had previously furnished.

Rock

BY HAND

Document Number 739-319

for FOIA Review on JUN 1978

SAME AS 1193-953

201-289248

Commission
SOURCE EVALUATION:

The Source is believed to be very reliable. We have established through independent evidence and cross-checking that the major part of the intelligence information furnished by him is unquestionably true. For example, we knew independently of this Source that Manuel Vega Perez and Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez were Cuban intelligence officers in Mexico.

SECRET
TO: Chief, CI/NSA
Mr. Raymond P. Rourke

FROM: CI/NSA/S. Dooley

SUBJ: Mr. Harvey Oswald
(201-286-2248)

19 June 1964

1. On 15 May 1964, we provided the President's Commission with a summary of our debriefing of Cuban defector MEX-1 who had no personal knowledge of Oswald and no information linking him to the Cuban intelligence services in any manner. As a follow-up, Mr. Howard P. Williams of the Commission asked if he could see the questions used in the interrogation.

2. On 18 June, I took the questions and source's responses to the Commission and showed them to Mr. Williams. He studied them and returned the questions to me with the observation that they were very thorough and fully satisfied his requirements. He said that he saw no need to pursue this angle any further. The questions and answers exhibited to Mr. Williams are attached. At no time during our contacts with the Commission did we disclose the source's identity or cryptonyms.

3. Mr. Williams indicated that the Commission was winding up its investigation. He was highly complimentary of CI, referring to the agency personnel he encountered here and in Mexico as "real professionals." Mr. Williams asked that I convey his best regards to you.
Proposed Questions on Oswald Case

REFERENCE: Debriefer of Cuban source dated 7 May 1964

1. The source says that prior to October 1963, Oswald visited the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City on two or three occasions. It is public knowledge he was in Mexico during the period 9-25-63 to 10-3-63.

   A) When did source learn of these visits - before or after the assassination? Please describe in detail the circumstances under which source learned this information and identities of the persons involved.

   B) Did these visits take place during the aforementioned period or is the source referring to previous visits? If the latter, try to get more specific details regarding these trips and the origins of the source's information.

2. The source states that before, during, and after these visits Oswald was in contact with the DII, specifically Luis CALDERON, Manuel VEGA Perez and Rogello RODRIGUEZ Lopez. This would appear to mean that one or more contacts were made after Oswald returned to the United States i.e., between 10-3-63 and 11-22-63.

   A) What does source mean by contact?

   B) Can he break down these contacts by the specific individual named, place and type of contact, and date of occurrence?

   C) Did Oswald know or have reason to suspect the intelligence connections of these persons?

   D) What was the purpose of these contacts?

   E) If Oswald did not know the intelligence affiliations of these individuals, what protests, if any, were employed in contacting him?

   F) Did source ever see any documentary material on any of these contacts, or any correspondence initiated by or addressed to Oswald?
G) Did the DGI ever employ physical surveillances, technical devices or camera equipment to cover these contacts?

H) The source says he does not know whether the Cuban services used Oswald in any agent capacity or otherwise. This obviously makes it more important to check out what the source meant in question one.

3. Did the DGI ever initiate an investigation of Oswald?

4. What was the reason for packaging files at DGI headquarters and field offices after news of the assassination was received?

5. Source was asked whether any provocative material was deliberately fabricated by the Cubans (Question 9) to confuse the investigation of Oswald. The reply attributed to him was, "the only fabrication known is the special matter by Fidel CASTRO previously mentioned." Please clarify.

Addendum 12 June with reference to 35;

The only possible fabrication known by source was the specific denial by Fidel CASTRO on a TV program of any Cuban knowledge of Oswald.
5 May 1964

Subject - General: Debriefing of Cuban Source
Specific: OSWALD Case

The source does not have direct knowledge of Lee Harvey OSWALD or his activities but was able to provide items of interest based on Cuban intelligence officers assigned to the Direccional General De Inteligencia. The information appearing below was furnished by the source and is keyed to questions submitted.

1. Prior to October 1963, OSWALD visited the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City on two or three occasions. Before, during, and after these visits, OSWALD was in contact with the Direccional General De Inteligencia (DGI), specifically with Luisa CALDERON, Manuel VEGA Perez and Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez.

VEGA whose Cuban intelligence pseudonym is MARCOS is the current Cuban IS chief in Mexico. He recently has had a tour of duty in Habana, prior to which he held the same post as now as Cuban IS chief in Mexico.

RODRIGUEZ is a Cuban IS staff officer in Mexico. He has three Cuban intelligence pseudonyms, Eduardo, Casimiro and Jose Antonio.

The precise relationship of Luisa CALDERON to the DGI is not clear. She spent about six months in Mexico from which she returned to Cuba early in 1964.

2. The source does not know whether or not the Cuban Services used OSWALD in any agent capacity or other manner.

3. A. When news of the assassination of President Kennedy reached the DGI, it caused much comment concerning the fact OSWALD had been in the Cuban Embassy in Mexico. In addition, orders were issued for all headquarters and field officers of the DGI to sort and package all documents according to whether they...
were "Muy secreto" (very secret), "secreto" (secret), and "importante" (important). The material once packaged was to be held pending further instructions. In addition, all travel by DGI officers and all DGI poodles were suspended temporarily.

B. When the news that OSWALD was the assassin reached the DGI, there was no immediate comment but, when Fidel CASTRO spoke on television to deny Cuban involvement, there was considerable comment concerning OSWALD's visit to the Cuban Embassy in Mexico. At this time VEGA, who has been mentioned previously, was in Cuba and commented to a group of DGI staff officers that OSWALD had come to the Cuban Embassy in Mexico to request a visa but had been refused. VEGA did not give any details and the subject was not pursued.

4. It is not known whether information on OSWALD's visit to the Cuban Consulate in Mexico in September 1963 was relayed to any Cuban service.

5. It is not known if the Cuban intelligence services had contact with the New Orleans' Fair Play for Cuba Committee.

6. The only Molina who is recalled is "The Hook", the Cuban who was convicted in New York City for the murder of a young girl during a clash between two Cuban groups. The DGI staff officer who had been in the United Nations in New York, SANTIELSTAN traveled to Cuba with "The Hook" and with another Cuban named ORIHUELA and upon arrival in Cuba tried to obtain employment for both individuals. The names Pedro Charles and Peter have no known significance.

7. The reaction of Soviet officials in contact with the Cuban intelligence services is not known.

8. Nothing is known about Soviet proposals following the news of President Kennedy's assassination.

9. The only fabrication known is the special matter by Fidel CASTRO previously mentioned.

10. Nothing is known about Jack RUBENSTEIN aka Jack RUBY.

11. The name Gilberto LOPEZ is not familiar but, if he visited DGI headquarters, a photograph of him possibly could be identified.

12. OSWALD's photo was seen in the newspapers but nothing is known about him other than what appeared in the press.
Proposed Questions on Oswald Case

1. Was Lee Harvey OSWALD known to the Cuban intelligence services before 23 November 1963? If so, which service?

2. Were the Cuban services using OSWALD in any agent capacity, or in any other manner, before 23 November 1963?

3. What was the reaction of the Cuban intelligence services to news of President Kennedy's assassination? To the news that OSWALD was the assassin?

4. Was information on OSWALD's visit to the Cuban Consulate in Mexico City in September 1963, relayed to any Cuban service? If so, what action was taken?

5. Was there any contact between the Cuban intelligence services and the New Orleans' Fair Play for Cuba Committee?

6. Has subject ever heard of Mario del ROSARIO Molina, or Pedro Charles known also as "Peter"?

7. How did the Soviet officials in contact with the Cuban intelligence services react to news of the assassination?

8. Did the Soviets propose any type of action or investigation to the Cuban intelligence services following the news of President Kennedy's assassination?

9. Was any provocative material deliberately fabricated by the Cuban services or others and sent to the United States to confuse the investigation of the OSWALD case?

10. Was Jack RUBENSTEIN aka Jack RUBY known to the Cuban intelligence services? If so, in what way?

11. Does subject know a Gilberto LOPEZ who entered Mexico on November 23, 1963 at Nuevo Laredo, Texas and four days later proceeded to Havana by special plane. He was 23 years old and carried a U.S. passport. He also had a Mexican tourist permit. Develop all information you can on this individual.
12. Attached is a photograph of OSWALD, and a letter from Havana which is self-explanatory for guidance of the case officer. Under no circumstances should the contents of the letter be made known to the subject. This information came from the Secret Service and FBI.
Mr. E. Henry Knoche  
Assistant to the Director  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Knoche:

As you know, there have been allegations that the CIA was involved in a plan to assassinate Fidel Castro. For the purposes of this letter, we will assume that these allegations are correct, and based upon this assumption I would like to know the answers to the following questions:

1. Did anyone with the CIA tell any member of the Warren Commission or any lawyer serving on the Warren Commission staff that such plans had been underway? If the answer is yes, we would like to know what person or persons with the Agency delivered said information, to whom it was delivered, when it was delivered, what specifically was told or said, what documents there are to support the answers to the foregoing questions, and what response, if any, was received from the Warren Commission. If the Commission was not told about this, why was it not told and who made the decision not to deliver such information to the Warren Commission?

2. There is evidence that Castro, prior to November 22, 1963, knew about the existence of such plans and the possible involvement of the U.S. Government. Did the CIA at any time prior to the completion of the Warren Commission investigation have any documents or other information indicating that Castro may have known about such plans? If the answer is yes, would you please furnish us with copies of all such documents and details of any such information.

3. Several months prior to the assassination of President Kennedy there is evidence of a public speech by Castro that was carried by the Associated Press whereby Castro alluded...
to possible assassination attempts on his life and possible retaliation. Would you please advise us if there is any evidence that this Associated Press report may have appeared in any newspapers in the United States, including specifically any newspapers in Dallas or New Orleans. Would you also advise us if you have any other information of public statements of any Cuban leader prior to November 22, 1963 indicating any awareness of possible assassination plots on the lives of Cuban leaders.

4. Would you please advise us if there is any information in CIA records to indicate that at any time prior to November 22, 1963 any foreign government or any foreign group was considering a possible assassination of any American leader. If so, would you please advise us of all details and also advise us who in the United States Government outside the CIA was advised of these plans or possibilities.

5. Prior to his death Lyndon Johnson supposedly stated that he believed that although there was no doubt that Oswald killed Kennedy and Tippitt, nevertheless Oswald might have been a part of a conspiracy in retaliation to possible United States assassination attempts in Cuba. Would you please advise us of any information in Agency files showing whether or not there was any communication to President Johnson of any possible plans involving the attempted assassinations of any Cuban leader and if the answer is yes, also give us all details involving this matter.

Sincerely yours,

David W. Belin
Executive Director
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Rocca

1. Internal Memo Regarding Agency's Position in Dealing
with Warren Commission

The DDP called me this afternoon, 12 May, to state that the Director has received a telephone call from RANKIN regarding the Commission's desire to interview him at 1030 AM, Thursday. Mr. HOOVER is scheduled to appear at 9:00 on that morning.

2. The DDP wishes to have from you a short but comprehensive memorandum which highlights the basic issues or positions entered into by the Agency in its dealings with the Commission. For example, RANKIN indicated that the Commission would wish to hear the Director's views as to how improvements might be made in protecting the President's life. Further, they will probably ask questions regarding the possibilities that a conspiracy existed. Such general questioning certainly necessitates that the DCI be made aware of the positions taken during previous interviews. I raised with Mr. HELMS the nature of the recent information which you are processing which originated with the sensitive WH source. I informed him that in your view this would raise a number of new factors with the Commission, that it should not go to the Commission prior to the Director's appearance unless we have first had some preliminary reaction or made sure that the Director is fully aware of its implications since it could well serve as the basis for detailed questioning. The DDP stated that he would review this carefully and made a decision as to the question of timing.

3. Given the schedule, you will appreciate that the DDP will need a paper covering the above points as soon as possible.
Brief for Presentation to
President's Commission on the Assassination
of President Kennedy

14 May 1964

Document Number 695-302A
for FOIA Review on JUN 1976

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201-287248

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COPY NO.
Summary Outline

This brief is concerned with five topics which, it is anticipated, will arise in the course of the Director's appearance before the President's Commission. These are:

a. Formal and unequivocal negation by the DCI of any contact or association, direct or indirect, between the Central Intelligence Agency and Lee Harvey Oswald. This should be accompanied by the tabling of an affidavit signed by the Director and notarized. (TAB A)

b. A formal assurance by the Director that all information in the possession of the Agency regarding Oswald's activities and associations outside of the United States has been made available to the Commission through its staff, with which there has been close and frequent contacts since the inception of the Commission's activities. (TAB B)

c. An interim pronouncement by the DCI on the problem of conspiratorial responsibility for Oswald's
activity. It is suggested that the DCI take the position that at this time there is no conclusive evidence of conspiratorial sponsorship of Oswald; that all Agency information bearing on this problem has been furnished to the Commission for evaluation and consideration in the framework of its total knowledge of the facts. The Agency, at the present time, is lacking any knowledge of recent information or documentation furnished by the Soviet Government to the Commission with respect to Oswald's activity in the Soviet Union. (TAB C)

d. The DCI's suggestions for improving policy and organization with respect to the personal security of the President. Certain steps relating strictly to the Agency's jurisdiction have already been suggested by memorandum. It is proposed that the Director now make specific suggestions involving legislation which would treat information bearing on the personal security of the President and, advisedly, other Federal officials directly related to national security affairs in a manner similar to what currently exists by statute for special
nuclear material or weapons introduced to the United States or manufactured therein. (The Atomic Weapons Awards Act of 15 July 1955). (TAB D)
e. Oswald's activity in Mexico and his possible relationship to the Cuban Intelligence Service.

Substantive information of grave concern to the security of sources and methods have been developed on both of these topics. The information and, in certain instances, knowledge with respect to acquisition has been made available on a highly restricted basis to Mr. Rankin and to certain elements of his staff. It is recommended that the DCI not respond on the record to queries on these topics. He should suggest that all such "technical questions" be worked out in detail through the channels and procedures that have functioned very well -- we believe -- between the Commission and particular CIA components. (TAB E)
Formal disclaimer of any relationship with Lee Harvey Oswald

There have been rumors and allegations which began immediately after the assassination which branded Oswald as a U.S. Government agent. In many instances, CIA has been named as his sponsor. The authorship, geographical dispersion throughout the world, the identity of themes and the timing lend strong support to the conclusion that these charges are elements of a world-wide, Soviet-sponsored propaganda and misinformation program.

As DCI, Mr. McCone welcomes this appearance before the Commission to make a categorical and unqualified denial of these unprincipled distortions of the historical and personal responsibilities for what was a dastardly and heinous act. In witness of this, the DCI submits to the Commission an affidavit which formalizes this statement. The affidavit is attached.

It is recommended that the DCI state concurrently with this action that he desires to draw the Commission's attention to the fact that the irresponsible charges that have been made, sponsored
and replayed by Soviet bloc and Communist individuals and organs since the assassination of the President, recall the methods and the purposes of the broader campaign against American intelligence and security components which has built up momentum over the past six years. We have traced the sponsorship of that campaign directly to individuals and components within the Soviet police state apparatus. Their unscrupulous treatment of the Oswald case was neither new as a method nor a surprise as an occurrence.

If the DCI is challenged by anyone on the Commission about the substance or implication of his affidavit, it is recommended that response be along the following lines:

CIA is a democratic institution. The DCI has incorporated in his affidavit the results of detailed and painstaking examination. If any qualification is raised with respect to the affidavit, he willingly undertakes the extraordinary step of releasing any individual in CIA to appear before the Commission and to testify with respect to any knowledge bearing on the Commission's task.
APPELAVIT OF JOHN A. MCCONE

STATE OF VIRGINIA

COUNTY OF FAIRFAX

JOHN A. MCCONE, being duly sworn, deposes and says that he is the Director of Central Intelligence, and that based on his personal knowledge of the affairs of the Central Intelligence Agency and on detailed inquiries he caused to be made by the officers within the Central Intelligence Agency who would have knowledge about any relationship Lee Harvey Oswald may have had with that Agency, he certifies that:

Lee Harvey Oswald was not an agent, employee, or informant of the Central Intelligence Agency;

the Agency never contacted him, interviewed him, talked with him, or received or solicited any reports or information from him, or communicated with him, directly or indirectly, in any other manner;

the Agency never furnished him any funds or money, or compensated him, directly or indirectly, in any fashion; and

Lee Harvey Oswald was never associated or connected, directly or indirectly, in any way whatsoever with the Agency.

__________________________
JOHN A. MCCONE

Subscribed and sworn to this __________ day of __________, 1964, before me, a Notary Public in and for the State of Virginia, by the said JOHN A. MCCONE, who is personally known to me and he duly acknowledged to me the execution of the foregoing instrument.

__________________________
Notary Public

My commission expires __________

(Seal)

PAGE 41 of 212
Dissemination of Information to the Commission

The DCI should make the general statement that CIA has supplied all the information in its possession regarding the activities, affiliations and associations of Oswald. Copies of the reports and access to original data, in specific instances, has been given to Commission representatives in accordance with the DCI's expressed instruction from the inception that the Agency place itself completely at the Commission's disposition.
The Problem of Conspiracy

The DCI should note that from the start he had given specific indications to Agency personnel working on the Commission's problems that all information bearing on Oswald's possible relationships with foreign sponsors be made available to the Commission. The DCI may state that he is gratified that his instructions have been carried out diligently and promptly. Among the items of information provided the Commission have been studies on the organization and functions of components of the Soviet police state which are known to include individuals and units charged with the performance of what is euphemistically referred to as "executive action" --- but is, in fact, charged with assassination and sabotage.

The DCI should state that no firm evidence has thus far developed abroad linking known Soviet, Soviet bloc or Cuban intelligence and assassination personnel or organizations with the act committed by Lee Harvey Oswald in Dallas on 22 November 1963.
It is recommended that the DC take any questions from the Commission with respect to the apparently favorable treatment afforded Oswald in the USSR, the withdrawal of his wife, his possible contact there with Soviet State Security (the KGB), and related questions which would tend to establish Oswald's associational link with Soviet intelligence as "technical questions" and, therefore, beyond the scope of present testimony. It is suggested that he rest on the fact that the Commission has taken up these points item-by-item with the technical levels of the Agency and that the ultimate findings and evaluation can only be determined by the Commission.
Suggestions for Improving Policy and Organization Regarding Presidential Security

Mr. Rankin raised this question directly by letter. In its response, the Agency confined itself to elements relating to its statutory mission. Specifically, it was suggested that:

a. The Secret Service, or Treasury, record with the Office of Central Reference a formal requirement for information relating to Presidential security.

b. It was suggested that, if the Secret Service intended to expand its intelligence coverage of possible threats to the President's security, our experience showed that it would need a specialized organizational component to handle that task within the Secret Service itself.

c. The CIA reply also noted that the Agency was in direct touch with the Secret Service regarding the possible utilization by that agency of our experience in machine data processing. On the public record, it is suggested that the DCI not repeat this detail.
In his presentation to the Commission after referring to these earlier suggestions, the DCI should state that he desires to take the opportunity to offer a suggestion which he has not tabled heretofore.

The Commission's major problem has been the assessment of personal motive and the relationship of an individual act to possible conspiratorial guidance. Because conspiracy is the core of the problem, the DCI should point out the possibility of legislative action which might be an assistance in preventing recurrence of the national calamity it is investigating. There is an analogy at close hand between the problem of developing in advance information relating to Presidential security and the problem faced by the country a few years ago regarding the clandestine introduction or manufacture in the U.S. of special nuclear material or atomic weapons. The remedy devised at that time was embodied in the Atomic Weapons Reward Act of 15 July 1955 (29 Stat 365, PL 165, 84th Congress). In essence, the Act established a substantial reward ($500,000) for information bearing on the Act provided by any person, and in certain instances privileged treatment for such persons -- for example, asylum if they were
foreigners, was assured. Finally, a Reward Board was created to administer the purposes of the Act.

1) The DCI should suggest that the Commission consider a recommendation for original legislative action designed to induce individuals to furnish information bearing on Presidential security by offering a substantial reward and preferential treatment. The DCI should assure the Commission that he is convinced that the substantial award, the special treatment, and the publicity which would attend the implementing legislation in this matter could represent a significant inducement even to staff officers and personnel of secret associations and state security organs abroad whose functions include assassination and sabotage. It is these individuals who would be privy to plans of executive action. The reward would constitute additional inducement for such individuals to take the risk of making important disclosures.

The suggestion does not rest on the material elements of reward and special treatment. The DCI can assure the Commission that we are aware that personnel in police state apparatuses charged with the assassination and sabotage functions have repeatedly expressed and, in many cases, acted upon their repugnance for
such work and for the system which calls upon them to do it.

There are specific cases in the past ten years which document this assertion. Trusted personnel charged with assassination missions have abandoned the mission even without the assurance or the inducement which the DCI is here proposing.

In making this suggestion, the DCI may go one step further in advising the Commission to suggest that the Commission examine the advisability of legislation making it a Federal offense to conspire and to kill the Chief Executive. The DCI could also indicate that the Commission might desire to suggest that any legislation along these lines should be enlarged to include conspiracy to kill any Federal official in the President's personal circle of official associates directly concerned with national security affairs. (The Agency's Legal Counsel states that draft bills have been considered on the Hill.)
Atomic Weapons Rewards Act


"Do it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress Assembled, That the Act may be cited as the 'Atomic Weapons Rewards Act of 1955'.

"Sec. 2. Any person who furnishes original information to the United States—

(a) leading to the disabling or other acquisition by the United States of any special nuclear material or atomic weapon which has been introduced into the United States, or which has been manufactured or acquired therein contrary to the laws of the United States, or

(b) with respect to an attempted introduction into the United States or an attempted manufacture or acquisition therein of any special nuclear material or atomic weapon, contrary to the laws of the United States, shall be rewarded by the payment of an amount not to exceed $200,000.

"Sec. 3. An Awards Board consisting of the Secretary of the Treasury (who shall be the Chairman), the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the Director of Central Intelligence, and one member of the Atomic Energy Commission designated by that Commission, shall determine whether any person furnishing information to the United States is entitled to any award and the amount thereof to be paid pursuant to section 2. In determining whether any person furnishing information to the United States is entitled to an award and the amount of such award, the Board shall take into consideration—

(a) whether or not the information is of the type specified in section 2, and

(b) whether the person furnishing the information was an officer or employee of the United States and, if so, whether the furnishing of such information was in line of duty of that person.

"Any award of $200,000 or more shall be approved by the President.

"Sec. 4. If the information leading to an award under section 3 is furnished by an alien, the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, and the Director of Central Intelligence, acting jointly, may determine that the entry of such alien into the United States is in the public interest and, in that event, such alien and the members of his immediate family may receive immigrant visas and shall be admitted to the United States for permanent residence notwithstanding the requirements of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

"Sec. 5. The Board established under section 3 is authorized to hold such hearings and make such promulgations, issue, rescind, and amend such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act.

"Sec. 6. Any awards granted under section 3 of this Act shall be certified by the Awards Board and, together with the approval of the President in those cases where such approval is required, transmitted to the Director of Central Intelligence for payment out of funds appropriated or available for the administration of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended.

"Sec. 7. As used in this Act—

(a) The term 'atomic energy' means all forms of energy released in the course of nuclear fission or nuclear transformation.

(b) The term 'atomic weapon' means any device utilizing atomic energy, exclusive of the means for transporting or propelling the device (where such means is a separable and divisible part of the device), the principal purpose of which is for use as, or for development of, a weapon, a weapon prototype, or a weapon test device.

(c) The term 'special nuclear material' means plutonium, or uranium enriched in the isotope 233 or in the isotope 235, or any other material which is found to be special nuclear material pursuant to the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.

(d) The term 'United States,' when used in a geographical sense, includes Puerto Rico, all territories and possessions of the United States and the Canal Zone; except that in section 4, the term 'United States' when so used shall have the meaning given to it in the Immigration and Nationality Act."
### Mexican and Cuban Phases of Oswald's Activity

Extensive information has been made available to the Commission by CIA on the working level regarding Oswald's activity in Mexico City in September and October 1963. The Commission Staff has been in detailed communication and conversation with the Agency working levels both in headquarters and in Mexico City. Within the past week, significant information has been developed by CIA regarding the relationship with Oswald of certain Cuban intelligence personnel in Mexico City and the reaction in Havana within the Cuban Intelligence Service to the news of the assassination of President Kennedy. The Commission Staff is in the course of being briefed on the Cuban aspect.

It is suggested that the DCI handle any question on the Mexican and Cuban phases of Oswald's activity as "technical questions" which members of the Commission can develop from or through their own staff with the appropriate component of the Agency. This would be entirely consistent with the DCI's overall assurance that he has instructed his personnel to place their information completely at the Commission's disposition.
MATERIAL FROM P-8593 PASSED TO WARREN COMMISSION:

1. English translations of calls made by OSWALD to Russian Embassy:
   27 Sep 63 (1037); 27 Sep 63 (1626); 27 Sep 63 (1605); 28 Sep 63 (1151);
   1 Oct 63 (1031); 1 Oct 63 (2); 3 Oct 63 (3).

2. English translation of conversation between President Dorticos in

3. English translation of conversation between Cuban Am to Mexico and
   President Dorticos in Havana on 26 Nov 63.

Document Number 653-828
for FOIA Review on JUN 1976

File: P-8593

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201-289248
10 APR. 64

PAGE 55 of 212
COPY NO.
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. J. Lee Kaada  
General Counsel  
President's Commission on the  
Assassination of President Kennedy

SUBJECT: Role of the Cuban Intelligence Service in Processing Visa Applicants; Relation of that Service to the Assassination of President Kennedy

1. Within the very recent period, this Agency has established contact with a well-placed individual who has been in close and prolonged contact with ranking officers of the Cuban Dirección General de Inteligencia (Directorate General of Intelligence - DGI). His knowledge of DGI activities, techniques, and personalities is direct and profound. This Agency has queried him in detail on possible contacts between Lee Harvey Oswald and the DGI prior to the assassination of President Kennedy. A report on the information thus obtained is attached to this memorandum.

2. This source is highly sensitive and of great, immediate operational significance to this Agency. The national counterintelligence interest abroad requires, therefore, that access to the attached report, as knowledge of the existence of this source be restricted, for the present at least, to yourself and a minimum number of your staff.

Document Number: 077-2948

For FOIA Review on: JUN 1975

Downgraded to: SECRET
by authority of: JUN 1975

[Signature]
3. An appropriate sensitivity indicator has been affixed to this memorandum and the attached report.

4. A copy of this memorandum with its attachment has been forwarded to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

(Signed) Richard Heims
Deputy Director for Plans

Attachment

Distribution:
Orig. & 2 - Addresses
2 - DDP
2 - C/CI/R&A
1 - C/WH/3
1 - C/R&A/201
1 - C/CI

Originated By: C/DR/R/Halligh 13 May 1964
SUBJECT: Lee Harvey OSWALD

The source has no personal knowledge of Lee Harvey OSWALD or his activities and does not know whether OSWALD was an agent of the Dirección General de Inteligencia (DGI) or any other directorate or department of the Cuban government.

He first heard of OSWALD after the assassination of President Kennedy when news media carried OSWALD's name. DGI personnel first commented about the case in his presence one day after lunch, when a group of officers were chatting. Among them was Manuel VEGA Perez who previously had been assigned to the Cuban Consulate in Mexico City, where he was the principal DGI officer. VEGA mentioned that OSWALD had gone to the Cuban Consulate two or three times in connection with a visa application during the time that VEGA was in Mexico.

Whether OSWALD had any contact with VEGA on those occasions is not known to the source. However DGI officers stationed in consulates customarily interview visa applicants to determine if they are DGI agents. If applicants are identified as agents, their travel is expedited. Otherwise, they are usually told to come back in a few days. During the interim applicants' names are submitted to Havana for further checking and instructions. According to the source, OSWALD may have been interviewed by VEGA or his assistant, Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez, but this is strictly conjecture on his part. The source does not know Silvia DURAN or anything pertinent about her except that she was present in the Cuban Embassy in Mexico in March 1964.

After the news of the assassination of President Kennedy reached the DGI, orders were issued for all DGI components in the country to sort and package all documents according to whether they were "muy secreto" (very secret); "secreto" (secret); or
"Important" (important). The material, once consolidated, was to be held pending further instructions. All travel by DCI officers was suspended temporarily. In addition, DCI Headquarters personnel were instructed to remain in their offices or to keep the DCI away of their whereabouts so that they could be reached immediately. The source does not know the reason for these measures but believes it logical that they were taken because of the possibility that the United States might have taken some type of action against Cuba and the DCI itself. As nearly as he recalls, the DCI files were restored to regular use about 3 December 1963.

Downgraded to by authority of date
SECRET 21 OCTOBER 1975

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COPY NO. 1
MEMORANDUM FOR: DC/OPS

SUBJECT: Review of Selected Items in the Lee Harvey OSWALD File Regarding Allegations of the CASTRO Cuban Involvement in the John F. KENNEDY Assassination

1. The attached review and summary was written at the express request of Mr. David W. Belin as a follow-up to Question 3 of his letter to the Agency of 15 April 1975.

2. The results - as I have already told him - add nuance, not evidence, to what the Warren Commission and its staff had laid before them in 1964 on this subject. The results of the review are stipulated in paragraph 8 of the Attachment. There seemed to be no reason to attach copies of the case reports from the file to this summary. These can be made available promptly, however, on request. This summary does not deal with press, magazine and books that dealt with the subject during the period after the assassination.

3. My recommendation is to do with this paper as we did with the earlier one requested by Mr. Belin on the unidentified man: let him read the entire summary and then decide how much of it, if any, is pertinent

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to his and the Commission's needs and then decide how much will go into the classified record.

Raymond G. Rocca

Attachment
SUBJECT: Review of Selected Items in the Lee Harvey OSWALD File Regarding Allegations of CASTRO Cuban Involvement in the John F. KENNEDY Assassination

REFERENCE: Letter by David W. Belin to Mr. E. Henry Knaake, 15 April 1975, paragraph 3 (Regarding Public Statement by CASTRO, etc.), attached

BACKGROUND

1. On Saturday evening, 7 September 1963, Fidel CASTRO appeared at a Brazilian Embassy reception in Havana; even more unusual, CASTRO submitted to an informal interview by the Associated Press correspondent, Daniel HARKER.

2. HARKER’s interview reached New York on Sunday, 8 September, and was in print throughout the country on Monday, 9 September. There can be no question from the facts surrounding the CASTRO appearance, which had not been expected, and his agreement to the interview, that this event represented a more-than-ordinary attempt to get a message on the record in the United States.
3. CASTRO's statements to HARKER covered a range of topics but dealt principally with American political leadership, in particular President KENNEDY, whom he exorciated in extraordinarily provocative fashion ("... KENNEDY is a cretin..."... the BATISTA of his times... the most opportunistic American President of all time...").

4. The interview also contained an uncomplimentary reference to Senator GOLDWATER and Cuban delay in signing the limited nuclear test ban. There were differences in the replay by United States newspapers like the New York Times and Washington papers, with a result that CASTRO's "message" was significantly modulated.

5. In New Orleans, where Lee Harvey OSWALD resided until the middle of September 1963, the HARKER story appeared in the principal morning paper, the Times-Picayune, on Monday, 9 September, page 7, under a three-column headline: "CASTRO Blasts Raids on Cuba. Says U.S. Leaders Imperiled by Aid to Rebels." The story followed under the HARKER by-line:

"Havana (AP) - Prime Minister Fidel Castro said Saturday night: 'U.S. leaders would be in danger if they helped in any attempt to do away with leaders of Cuba.'"
"Bitterly denouncing what he called recent U.S. prompted raids on Cuban territory, Castro said: "We are prepared to fight them and answer in kind. U.S. leaders should think that if they are aiding terrorist plans to eliminate Cuban leaders, they themselves will not be safe."

"... World affairs ... seemed to be entering a more peaceful climate a few days ago, but now this trend has changed with attacks.

"'The U.S. is always ready to negotiate and make promises which later it will not honor. This has happened to promises made during the October crisis. They have been broken as can be seen with new attacks.

"'But I warn this is leading to a very dangerous situation that could lead to a worse crisis than October's ...'"

6. The New York Times, in its coverage on 9 September, used a UPI wire service report which omitted any reference to the warning and threat which gave the interview its real significance. The Washington Post did an abbreviated rewrite (9 September, page A-7) which, similarly, omitted any reference to the main thrust of CASTRO's remarks.
The Evening Star of Washington, D. C., printed the HARKER story nearly in its entirety in the second section of the paper (9 September 1963, page B-4) and reworded the content of the HARKER interview, placing the emphasis on the political aspects - in particular, highlighting the GOLDFATER elements and burying CASTRO's warning to the United States leadership in the middle of the piece.

7. There is no evidence in the files on the KENNEDY assassination that this CASTRO interview was considered in following up leads or in dealings with the Warren Commission and its staff although Mexico Station specifically directed Headquarters attention to the AP story very shortly after the Dallas killing. More important, the interview appears to have been forgotten in the contemporary political consideration of relations with CASTRO's Cuba. There is no evidence in the Agency records, either, that the Warren Commission staff itself pursued the implication of the CASTRO interview in dealing with the conspiracy hypothesis. There is no evidence in the files that anything along these lines was stated by any other Cuban leader before the assassination.

8. The purpose of this review, undertaken at Mr. Belin's request, is to reconsider Lee Harvey OSWALD's activity on the assumption that as an avid newspaper reader - which we know from testimony of Marina OSWALD and others - he read the CASTRO warning and threat as reported above. The results
of the review, admittedly heavily using the 20–20 quality
of hindsight, may be stipulated in summary:

a. There is no increment of credible
evidence, applying this phrase strictly, of
Soviet and/or Cuban political, intelligence
or security service involvement in the as-
sassination to what was developed and con-
sidered by the Warren Commission and its
staff. The Commission's finding that
Lee Harvey OSWALD was the killer of
President KENNEDY and Officer TIPPIE and did
them in alone and of his own determination
stands.

b. "Credible evidence" that would
upset or significantly modify this judgement
did (and does) not exist in Washington. But
such evidence could exist in Moscow and/or
Havana, whose voluntary inputs to the Warren
Commission were minimal in quantity and
quality, designed to cover up any admissions
of knowledge of, or connection with, OSWALD
which might be related directly or indirectly
with the assassination. Therefore, the belief
that there was Soviet and/or Cuban (KGB and/or
DGI) connection with OSWALD will persist and
grow until there has been a full disclosure by these governments of all elements of OSWALD's handling and stay in the Soviet Union and his contacts in Mexico City. The Warren Commission report should have left a wider "window" for this contingency. That, indeed, was the opinion at the working level, particularly in the counterintelligence component in the CIA in 1964. As was indicated by Mr. Helms in his testimony before the Warren Commission, CIA would continue to regard this aspect of the OSWALD case as still open.¹

C. In the absence of additional or new elements of "credible" evidence, there are "nuances" in the record that emerge as noteworthy, in the light of other conclusions. These are reviewed and summarized below, item-by-item.

d. CASTRO's warning and threat of 7 September 1963 — if OSWALD did indeed read

¹Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. KENNEDY. Hearings Before the President's Commission on the Assassination of President KENNEDY (Washington, 1964), hereafter cited as Hearings, Vol. V., pp. 120 - 129. See especially p. 124 — "Mr. Helms: 'Yes. I would assume the case could never be closed.'"
it in New Orleans must be considered of great significance in the light of the pathological evolution of OSWALD's passive/aggressive makeup after his attempt to kill General WALKER early in April 1963 and his identification with Fidel CASTRO and the Cuban revolution which is directly traceable as far back as his Marine Corps service in El Toro, California. CASTRO's warning and threat, given to AP correspondent HARKER, irrespective of whether there was any formal mandate, or even security service contact with OSWALD by the Cubans or the Russians - was an act of singular irresponsibility and under no circumstances was excusable as rétorsion for what the Cuban emigres were doing during the summer of 1963.

CUBAN CONTACT WITH LEE HARVEY OSWALD, SANTA ANA, CALIFORNIA, EARLY 1959 (?)

9. The testimony of Nelson DELGADO contains an assertion of germinal significance to any review of the background of Lee Harvey OSWALD's feeling toward and relations with CASTRO's Cuba. DELGADO was probably the closest peer group
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member to OSWALD during his specialist training period at El Toro Marine Corps Base December 1958 - September 1959. The Warren Commission Report takes note of this:

"OSWALD told DELGADO that he was in touch with Cuban diplomatic officials in this country, which DELGADO at first took to be 'one of his lies, but later believed.'"  

10. Actually DELGADO's testimony says a lot more of possible operational significance than is reflected by the language of the report, and its implications do not appear to have been run down or developed by investigation. Thus, the record of the beginning of OSWALD's relationship with the Cubans starts with a question mark.

11. The period was one of transition in U.S. - Cuban relations after CASTRO's takeover. OSWALD, and DELGADO at the outset, were CASTRO supporters, OSWALD being particularly keen about how to get to the island. DELGADO testified:

"... I didn't know what to tell him, so I told him the best thing that I know was to

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can touch with a Cuban Embassy, you know. But at that time that I told him this - we were on friendly terms with Cuba, you know, so this wasn't no subversion or malintent, you know. I didn't know what to answer him. I told him to see them.

"After a while he told me he was in contact with them ...

"... I seen this envelope in his foot-locker, wall-locker, and it was addressed to him, and they had an official seal on it, and as far as I could recollect that was mail from Los Angeles, and he was telling me there was a Cuban Consul. And just after he started receiving these letters - you see, he would never go out, but stay near the post all the time ...

"... he had one visitor after he started receiving letters he had one visitor. It was a man, because I got the call from the MP guard shack, and they gave me a call that OSWALD had a visitor at the front gate. This man had to be a civilian, otherwise they would have let him in. So I had to find somebody to relieve OSWALD, who was on guard, to go down...
there to visit with this fellow, and they spent about an hour and a half, two hours, talking, I guess, and he came back. I don't know who the man was or what they talked about, but he looked nonchalant about the whole thing when he came back. He never mentioned who he was, nothing.

"Mr. LIEBELER: How long did he talk to him, do you remember?"

"Mr. DELGADO: About an hour and half, two hours ..."

"Mr. LIEBELER: You never asked OSWALD who this fellow was that he talked to?"

"Mr. DELGADO: No, No ..."

"Mr. LIEBELER: Did you connect this visit that OSWALD had at that time with the Cuban Consulate?"

"Mr. DELGADO: I did; because I thought it funny for him to be receiving a caller at such a late date - time. Also, up to this time he hardly ever received mail; in fact he seldom received mail from home because I made it a policy, I used to pick up the mail for our unit and distribute it to the guys in there, and very seldom did I ever see one for him. But every so often, after he started to get in contact with
these Cuban people. He started getting letter pamphlets and newspapers ...

"... and he also started receiving letters, you know, and no books, maybe pamphlets, you know, little like church, things we get from church, you know, but it wasn't a church.

"Mr. LIEBELER: Were they written in Spanish, any of them, do you know?

"Mr. DELGADO: Not that I can recall, no.

"Mr. LIEBELER: Did you have any reason to believe that these things came to OSWALD from the Cuban Consulate?

"Mr. DELGADO: Well, I took it for granted that they did after I seen the envelope, you know ... something like a Mexican eagle, with a big, impressive seal, you know. They had different colors on it, red and white; almost looked like our colors, you know. But I can't recall the seal. I just knew it was in Latin, United, something like that. I couldn't understand. It was Latin.

"Mr. LIEBELER: You don't know for sure whether it was from the Cuban Consulate?
"Mr. DELGADO: No. But he had told me prior, just before I found that envelope in his wall locker, that he was receiving mail from them, and one time he offered to show it to me, but I wasn't much interested because at the time we had work to do, and I never did ask to see that paper again, you know.

"Mr. LIEBELLER: Did he tell you what his correspondence with the Cuban Consulate was about?

"Mr. DELGADO: No, he didn't.

"Mr. LIEBELLER: Did he ever indicate to you that it had to do with the conversations that you had about going over to Cuba?

"Mr. DELGADO: No. The only thing he told me was that right after he had this conversation with the Cuban people was that he was going to - once he got out of the service - he was going to Switzerland ..."  

12. OSWALD's application to Albert Schweizer College, Churwelden, Switzerland, was dated 19 March 1959, and he was presumably to report there on 20 April 1960. Destined for discharge from the Marines on 7 December 1959, OSWALD

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accelerated his exit on grounds of family hardship in early September 1959. On 27 September 1959 he was issued a U.S. passport valid for travel—among other places to Cuba and the USSR. He entered the Soviet Union from Finland on 25 October 1959.

13. DELGADO's testimony has the cast of credibility. Granting that, it is of basic importance to focus attention on the male visitor who contacted OSWALD at El Toro Camp and talked with him for between one and a half to two hours. The event was unique in DELGADO's recollections, and actually there is nothing like it—on the record—in everything else we know about OSWALD's activity in the United States before or after his return to the United States. The record reflects no identification of the El Toro contact. DELGADO's presumption is that he was from the Cuban Consulate in Los Angeles. Assuming that, the questions are: Who was it, and was there reporting from Los Angeles to Washington and Havana that could, in effect, represent the opening of a Cuban file on OSWALD?

"PREDICTION" OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S DEMISE BY COMMUNIST PARTY CELL LEADER MORSE BENITEZ ZABOLA, 1962

14. Guatemala Station forwarded to Headquarters on 9 January 1964 a duplicate copy of a raw report by a

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U.S./Cuban diplomatic and consular relations were severed on 3 January 1961.

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penetration dated 5 January 1962 describing events at the yearly Communist Party cell meeting. The cell leader, Morse BENITEZ Zabala, said that the Communist Party in Guatemala should form a single new party; "We need not preoccupy ourselves over the politics of President KENNEDY because we know, according to prognostications, that he will die within the present year, 1962."

15. This report apparently had been discounted when it was received and was not forwarded until the Station re-reviewed all of its material after the assassination. The file reflects no follow-up or formal dissemination of the report.

ENIGMATIC THREATS BY CUBAN THIRD SECRETARY IN THE HAGUE, 7 NOVEMBER 1963

16. A sensitive liaison source, reporting after the KENNEDY assassination, indicated that at the Soviet reception on 7 November 1963, the Cuban Third Secretary, Ricardo L. SANTOS Pesa, discussed the recent refugee raids on Cuba and their implications with a host-country diplomat, concluding with the admonition: "... Just wait and you will see what we can do. It will happen soon." Asked to be more specific what would happen soon, SANTOS replied: "Just wait, just wait."

17. These data were passed to the Warren Commission by memorandum, 31 March 1964. SANTOS was reported to have
a history of medical instability and was summarily recalled from The Hague reportedly for reasons related to that fact in April 1966.

INTERCEPTED CONVERSATION OF CUBAN EMBASSY EMPLOYEE, LUISA CALDERON, AFTERNOON OF 22 NOVEMBER 1963

18. At 17:30 Mexico City time, about five hours after the KENNEDY assassination, a Cuban Embassy employee named "Luisa" received a telephone call in Spanish from an unidentified male outside.

19. The caller asked her if she had heard the latest news. "Luisa" jokingly replied: "Yes, of course, I knew it almost before KENNEDY ... Imagine, one, two, three and now, that makes three [she laughs], what barbarians! ..."

20. Both speakers agreed on the seriousness of the assassination. "Luisa" also stated that the party at Silvia DURAN's had been called off so it would not appear that they were celebrating the death of KENNEDY, nor would they have the party coincide with the burial. Finally she said she planned to move that night into the house of a doctor (a woman's friend).

21. Latin hyperbole? Boastful ex post facto suggestion of foreknowledge? This is the only item in the intercept coverage of the Cubans and Soviets after the assassination that contains the suggestion of foreknowledge or expectation.
22. The tenuous, enigmatic character of the conversation is sharply highlighted by the following facts:

a. "Luisa" was probably identical with Luisa CALDERON, a cadre worker of the Cuban Directorate General of Intelligence (DGI). She returned to Cuba in 1964 and was reported to be working in DGI Headquarters.

b. The DGI element in Mexico City in the fall of 1963 was headed by Alfredo MIRABEL Díaz who had arrived on 2 September 1963, formally as the replacement of the Consul Eusebio AZCUE (departed 19 November 1963). The deputy DGI chief (and as of June 1964, MIRABEL's successor) was Manuel Engenio VEGA Perez.

c. The "Silvia DURAN" named in Luisa's conversation was the receptionist, a Mexican national, who dealt with OSWALD during his known visits on 27 and 28 September to the Cuban installation in connection with a Cuban visa application for stay and/or transit. Silvia DURAN is the sole live witness on the record regarding OSWALD's activity in Mexico City. Her testimony, however, in its entirety was taken and presented, solely, by the Mexican Governmental authorities. A direct
confrontation with her was requested by the Warren Commission staff but rejected by the Mexican authorities. It is from Silvia Durán's statements that it was learned that Oswald became engaged in a personal altercation on 27 September with Eusebio Azcue.

d. Manuel Engenio Vega Perez, alias Marcos, and his DGI assistant, Rogelis Rodríguez Lopez, were positively identified in February 1964 by two independent sources as engaged in the active development and facilitation of the training of Nicaraguan agents for the purpose of assassinating General Anastasio Somoza. Vega, it is established, was on post in Mexico City during Oswald's stay there 27 September - 2 October 1963. He left Mexico City on 3 November 1963 for Havana. It was reliably reported about Vega that all individuals going to Cuba, legally or illegally, had to pass through him first. He took the biographical data and sent it to Cuba for name checking, a procedure which normally took fifteen days. 5

5 For example, Vega would have handled the details of the visa action and facilitation of the trip to Cuba via Mexico City from 28 December 1962 - 21 January 1963 that
23. There is no evidence in the OSWALD case file that Silvia DURAN was subjected to a systematic elicitive interrogation that would have related her dealings with OSWALD, known or confirmed by intercept, with the data held on the Cuban DGI, its personalities and methods, in Mexico City. Was it normal for a case like OSWALD's, considering the fuss he allegedly made with AZCUE, for the applications to be handled solely by a local employee and a lame duck like AZCUE whose slot had been taken by the DGI chief? Whatever the answer to these questions, they were not asked at the time. And there remains the more fundamental question: accepting the DURAN story on its face, could it have happened without the knowledge and participation of the DGI personnel above cited? This seems unlikely especially because VEGA is later cited by a Cuban DGI defector as having stated he was aware OSWALD made several visits to the Cuban Consulate. It is clear CASTRO's overseas intelligence and security service could have more in its files than was surfaced in the DURAN

was taken by Vincent Theodore LEE, the organizer of the Fair Play Committee for Cuba, with which OSWALD established relations from Dallas during the period 19 April - 2 November 1963. There is an overlap between LEE's and VEGA's travels to Havana during that period: VEGA departed Mexico City on 6 January for Havana and returned on 13 February 1963.
statements. Coming back to the beginning: "Luisa" - Luisa CALDERON - as a member of the DGI unit in Mexico City - could very well have known something that would make what she said to her unidentified caller less a matter of boastful self-indulgence than was assumed at the time.

SILVIA DURAN, SUBSTANTIAL AMPLIFICATION OF ADMISSION OF ALLEGED PERSONAL RELATIONS WITH LEE HARVEY OSWALD, 1967

24. The defects viewed in hindsight of the Silvia DURAN testimony already have been suggested above. (In that context of criticism it would also be relevant to reconsider the implications of the two intercepted telephone conversations on 26 November 1963 between the Cuban President, DORTICOS, and his Ambassador to Mexico, Joaquim Hernandez ARMAS, because the thrust of the conversation dealt with the question whether Silvia DURAN had been asked about [or been offered?] money payments by her Mexican interrogators.)

25. As of September 1964 Silvia DURAN gave up her Cuban Embassy job. In the spring of 1967 Silvia DURAN was reported by a reliable and sensitive source to have cut all relations with Cubans. Her account, in 1967, of how she had been taken into custody and had been interrogated after the assassination repeated what was already known. She added, under circumstances that did not permit the source to challenge or elicit corroborative detail, that
she had gone out with OSWALD during his stay in Mexico City and claimed she had sexual relations with him.

ALLEGATIONS OF CONSPIRATORIAL CONTACT BETWEEN OSWALD AND CUBAN GOVERNMENT AGENTS WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO ALLEGATIONS OF (A) ELENA GARRO DE PRAZ AND (B) OSCAR CONTRERAS.

26. As the Warren Commission reported, "Literally dozens of allegations of a conspiratorial contact between OSWALD and agents of the Cuban Government have been investigated ..." Among these cases, which consumed hundreds of CIA man-hours in Headquarters and abroad and similarly the FBI in the United States was the Nicaraguan walkin in Mexico City, 26 November 1963, Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarde.

27. The ALVARADO case is taken up in detail by the Warren Commission under the cryptograph "D." ALVARADO claimed that he had seen an American, whom he identified as OSWALD, receive money some time in mid-September 1963 in a meeting in a patio of the Cuban Consulate in

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6 See Report, p. 305 ff. Some of the others were the cases of Yiarico ROJAS Villeneuve in Cozumel and Guadaloupe, the allegations of Enrique Ruedol GONGORA in New York City, the claims of Robert Edward GALLANT, Santa Clara Prison Farm, California, and the allegations of Ray DOBKIIN's.

7 See Report, pp. 307 – 308.
Mexico city. ALVARADO's story was ultimately broken by the use of the polygraph, on which ALVARADO showed evidences of deception, and by bringing ALVARADO's former Nicaraguan security service control into the case.

28. The ALVARADO story is a particularly acute representation of the difficulties that beset the evaluation of observed evidence: certain elements of the story persist despite the impeachment of its major premises. ALVARADO, whose account did not become public until the release of the Warren Report in October 1964, talked consistently of the presence in the Cuban Consulate transaction of a Negro with red-dyed hair.

29. Elena GARRO de Paz is a mercurial, articulate and socially prominent Mexican writer, married, but separated from a high-ranking Mexican foreign service official. She is also the cousin of Horacio DURAN, the husband of Silvia DURAN, cited above. There is a strong personal antipathy between the two women descending from Elena GARRO's trenchant anti-Communism.

30. From October 1964 until his retirement in the fall of 1969, a U.S. Embassy officer, Charles THOMAS, persistently kept up a stream of reports and memoranda reflecting GARRO's account of what had actually gone on between OSWALD, the Cubans and— in particular Silvia DURAN in September 1963, including a repeated reference to a Negro with red-dyed hair.
31. The first reference to the GARRO story was noted in a Mexico Station Memorandum of Record dated 12 October 1964:

"Elena GARRO [said] that she and her daughter were invited to a party at the Cuban Embassy during the period she now finds out that OSWALD was here in Mexico prior to the assassination. She was invited by a Mexican secretary in the Cuban Embassy whose husband is a cousin of the GARRO family [Horacio DURAN]. At the party she saw three Gringos, not drinking, not mixing and more or less just standing around together like three bumps on a log. They were so obviously out of place that she asked someone in the Cuban Embassy about them and was told that 'they were just passing through.' She claims that on the way these three Gringos stood out she took a good look at them as did her daughter. When the assassination occurred and OSWALD's picture was spread into the newspapers, both Elena and her daughter immediately said that he was one of the three Gringos 'without a doubt' at the party."

32. GARRO repeated her story to Mr. Charles William THOMAS, an Embassy political officer on 10 December 1965.
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In September 1963 after her return from abroad, she went to a party, accompanied by her daughter, at the home of Ruben DURAN [emphasis added]. Ruben is one of the two brothers of Horacio DURAN, who married her cousin. She met OSWALD and two other young Americans. At the party she was discouraged from talking with him. Other guests were the Cuban Consul ARCUÉ, General Clark FLORES, Silvia DURAN, who she later learned was OSWALD's mistress while he was here, Emilio CARBALLIDO and a Latin American Negro man with red hair [emphasis added]. In November 1963 when the identity of the assassin became known, she and her daughter went to the Cuban Embassy and shouted "assassins" and other insults at the staff there. Shortly afterward, she and her daughter were visited by a friend, Manuel CARVILLO [or CARVILLE], then an official in the Secretariat of the Gobernación and were told he had orders to escort them to a small and obscure hotel in the center of town. They were kept there for eight days under pretext that they were of danger. When she told CARVILLO she wanted to go to the American Embassy and explain what she knew of OSWALD, she was told that the American Embassy was full of Communist spies.

33. On 25 December 1965 and 9 January 1966 in further interviews with THOMAS, GARRO and her daughter elaborated and

These particulars were not confirmed by independent observers at the time.
in certain particulars significantly modified her earlier account. She also acknowledged that she and her daughter had been interviewed by Embassy officers to whom she claimed they did not give a very complete story because the Embassy officers did not appear to give much credence to anything they said.

34. It developed that GARRO and daughter had been interviewed by the Legal Attache on 17 and 24 November 1964. Her information had been similar to what she claimed in her account to THOMAS but had not been substantiated by inquiries. The FBI representative therefore considered the matter closed and reaffirmed his disengagement from the matter to the CIA Chief of Station on 27 December 1964 and to the Ambassador on 25 February 1965.

35. The Embassy Political Officer, however, persisted in his interviews and reporting. In a memorandum of conversation, 13 July 1966, GARRO identified the place to which she had been taken by CALVILLO as the Hotel Vermont. (This detail checked out affirmatively. GARRO was at the Hotel 23 - 24, 25 - 27 and 28 - 30 November 1963.) In another, on 7 February 1967, GARRO's continuing displeasures with the Cubans are set out. And finally, upon THOMAS's retirement from U.S. Government service, the Department of State, at his request, 28 August 1969, disseminated to CIA and FBI a compilation of his reporting of the Elena GARRO interviews.
In September 1963, never having occurred in the Mexican capital events she described as having occurred in the Mexican capital.

In the case of OSMAN's presence there, her story, however, had two points congruent with allegations by others regarding OSMAN: a. Adamuno's allegations regarding the Negro with the red-dyed hair (this detail could,Secret

In June 1969, Compreras was interviewed by a CIA officer:

Oscar COMPRERAS Arrighi, who claimed to have encountered OSMAN with other pro-Castro students at the University of Mexico campus in September 1963.

37. Beginning in March and amplified in May 1967, the Warren Commission's published account of the case was:

b. Silvia DURAN's later claim of the

Intimate personal contacts with OSMAN, however, have been gleaned from the

governmental revolutionary group at the University, according to the OSMA.

36. The war's verdict rests...
case he was extremely cautious and although he
was not able or willing to give dates and
names, he said OSWALD visited the University
of Mexico campus shortly after the Cuban
Embassy refused him a visa to visit Cuba.
Oswald made inquiries regarding pro-Cuban
revolutionary groups at the University and
was directed to CONTRERAS and his friend.
Oswald met CONTRERAS and four other persons
as they came out of a round-table discussion
held in the faculty of Philosophy. OSWALD
told the group it was urgent that he visit
Cuba and the Cuban Embassy had denied him a
visa. He requested aid from CONTRERAS' group.
CONTRERAS and others mistrusted OSWALD because
they felt he was a CIA provocation. The group
allowed OSWALD to accompany them the rest of the
day, that night and part of the next day. OSWALD
was very introverted and appeared to be slightly
crazy. OSWALD made no mention of an assassination
plot but kept bringing up the point he had to
travel to Cuba immediately.
39. At this point, with FBI knowledge, the matter was
turned over to the Mexican authorities who determined that
CONTRERAS was indeed at the University of Mexico but only

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for the years 1959 - 1960 and that he had been publicly 
associated in protest activity for the Student Revolutionary 
Bloc (BER) in January 1961. However, the group ceased 
functioning as such in the middle of 1962, and 
Oscar CONTRERAS was never one of its leaders. No further 
work is reflected in the files on the CONTRERAS allegations. 
Apart from the unsustained claims made by CONTRERAS about 
his own presence at the University, there is an additional 
element that undermines the credibility of his account: 
OSWALD's Spanish, which was barely adequate to get him meals 
near the hotel, seems hardly likely to have permitted him to 
carry on for an extended period with a University student 
group.
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. J. Lee Parckin

SUBJECT: Information Developed by CIA on the Activity of Lee Harvey Oswald in Mexico City, 28 September - 3 October 1963 as Transmitted to Warren Commission

1. I am enclosing a presentation of the information developed by CIA on or about Lee Harvey Oswald in Mexico City. We have included in this paper only hard, substantive information. Any judgments that are made represent professional evaluations by individuals who have worked over the years as specialists in their fields. Speculation, rumor, and vague detail not directly related to Oswald's activity have not been included.

2. Pursuant to our discussion on 14 January 1964, I have given the enclosure an appropriate classification. The compromise of this material in its present form would lead directly to the destruction of current sources and methods of this Agency in Mexico and elsewhere.

Document Number: 509-803

Richard Halms
Deputy Director for Plans

Enclosure

Orig & 1 - Addressed w/att
1 - DDP w/att
1 - WH/3 (Mr. Whitten) w/att
1 - SR/CI w/att
1 - Chief, CI/R&I w/att

CI/RGOccardo/ 31 January 1964

CS COPY

201-287-245

31 Jan 64

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PAGE 134 of 212
COPY NO. 1
31 January 1964

Information Developed by CIA on the Activity of
Lee Harvey OSWALD in Mexico City
23 September - 3 October 1963

I. OSWALD's Activity in Mexico City

1. On 9 October, the CIA station in Mexico City received
the following information from a reliable and proven source:

An American named Lee OSWALD had contacted
the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City on Tuesday, 1 October
1963. He had spoken in halting Russian to the Soviet
Embassy guard, Ivan Ivanovich OBYEDKOV, to whom
he said he had visited the Embassy two days earlier,
Saturday, 23 September. He asked whether there had
been a reply to a telegram that the Consul with whom he
had spoken, but whose name he could not recall, had
promised to send to Washington. OBYEDKOV had
attempted to establish the identity of the Consul with
whom OSWALD had talked; if it had been a dark person,
then it had probably been KOSTIKOV, OBYEDKOV,
after a check with Soviet Consular personnel, assured
OSWALD the telegram had been sent to Washington but
no answer had been received.
The information was forwarded by cable to CIA Headquarters
the same day it was received.

2. A file check in Washington, which is routine in these
matters revealed the possibility of an identity between the Lee
OSWALD who had spoken with OBYEDKOV, and presumably
with KOSTIKOV, and the defector returnee, Lee Harvey OSWALD."

3. On 10 October 1963 CIA Headquarters disseminated by
cable the report in substantially the form and in the detail
indicated above, in paragraph 1, to the Federal agencies whose
jurisdictional interests had been established by a review of
OSWALD's file: the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Depart-

* The CIA file on Lee Harvey OSWALD was opened on 9 December
1960 to accommodate biographic information developed by CIA in
response to an inquiry from the Department of State on a list of
American defectors in Soviet Bloc countries; OSWALD's was
among the names in the list. The Department of State Inquiry
was dated 25 October 1960. An interim reply was given by CIA
on 3 November 1960; a final reply, on 21 November 1960. Until
early October 1963 the contents of the OSWALD file held by CIA
consisted entirely of press materials and disseminations
received from the Department of State, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, and the Navy Department.
ment of State, the Navy Department, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service. A comment was included in the report noting the likelihood that the subject, Lee OSWALD, was probably identical with the former Marine who had defected to the Soviet Union in 1959. (The report disseminated by CIA in Washington on 10 October also included a physical description of an individual who was believed to have been the OSWALD who had contacted the Soviets in Mexico City. It was subsequently established by investigation that the description did not pertain to OSWALD.)

4. On the same day, 10 October 1963, CIA Headquarters sent a lengthy cable summary to the Mexico City Station of the background information held in the Headquarters file on OSWALD. An instruction was included for the Mexico City Station to pass the substance of its 9 October report to the local representatives of the same Federal departments and agencies that had been given the information in Washington. This instruction was immediately carried out. In this manner the information on OSWALD's contact with the Soviets on 1 October was passed in Mexico City to the Embassy, the FBI representative, the Naval Attaché, and to the office of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. There were no requests from recipients of the report for further information or for follow-up investigation.
5. After the assassination of President Kennedy and the arrest of Lee Harvey Oswald, an intensive review of all available sources was undertaken in Mexico City to determine the purpose of Oswald's visit. It was learned that Oswald had also visited the Cuban Consulate in Mexico City and had talked there with a clerk, a Mexican national, named Silvia Duran. After the assassination and the publicity about Lee Oswald, Silvia Duran had told a number of relatives and friends that she had talked to Oswald about a Cuban visa. Silvia Duran and her husband, Horacio Duran Navarro, were detained and questioned by the Mexican police from 23 to 25 November 1963.

6. After giving some of the details of her own personal background - she is an admitted leftist sympathizer and had formerly worked for the Mexican-Cuban Institute of Cultural Relations - Silvia Duran said that when she first heard of the death of President Kennedy she had been depressed and thought the assassin must have been a maniac. When she learned that he was associated with the "Fair Play for Cuba Committee" she did not believe it.

7. She talked about the case to her husband and when she heard the name of Lee Oswald mentioned, she recognized it as
the man who had come to the Consulate about two months before
to get a visa to transit Cuba on his way to the USSR. She
realized that he had said he was married to a Russian and that
he had belonged to the "Fair Play for Cuba" group. She checked
her file on him in the Consular archives and from the descriptive
data, she was sure it was the same man. He was short, blond,
poorly dressed and his face got red when he talked. He was
declared a Cuban transit visa because he did not yet have a Soviet
visa, and he was told to get the Soviet visa first, but it was noted
that this would take about four months. She had asked the Cuban
Consul himself, Ensobio AZCUE, to talk to OSWALD and they
had an argument when AZCUE urged OSWALD to leave Mexico
instead of waiting there. The Consul had phoned the Soviet Con-
sulate and talked to the person handling OSWALD's case, who
had said it would take about four months to hear from Moscow
about the Soviet visa. The same afternoon, OSWALD had come
back again and she had told him the same thing. She gave
OSWALD a slip of paper with his name and telephone number on
it in case he ever got his Soviet visa. He did not call back, she said.

8. Silvia DURAN's husband, Horacio DURAN Navarro, gave
essentially the same story, as he had previously heard it from
his wife after the assassination. He had never had any personal
contact with OSWALD.
9. Silvia DURAN was reinterrogated by the Mexican police from 27 to 29 November but she did not change or add materially to her story about OSWALD.

10. It is known that the Cuban Ambassador in Mexico, Joaquin HERNANDEZ Armas, reported on the detention and interrogation of Silvia DURAN by the Mexican authorities. The Cuban Government sent the Mexican Government a stiff note of protest, which the Mexicans rejected.

11. We are reliably informed that on 26 November, the day after DURAN's release, Cuban President DORTICOS queried HERNANDEZ about his report. HERNANDEZ confirmed that there had been an altercation between OSWALD and Consul AZCUNA. DORTICOS made a persistent but unsuccessful effort to determine from HERNANDEZ whether the Mexican authorities had questioned Mrs. DURAN about money, or thought that the Cubans had paid OSWALD money.

12. The CIA follow-up investigation produced the following confirmed results which have a bearing on Mrs. DURAN's account:

a. 27 September. In mid-afternoon, Silvia DURAN informed the Soviet Embassy that a male American citizen had requested a visa to transit Cuba on his way to the
Soviet Union. She desired to know who the American had talked with at the Soviet Consulate. Also, she indicated that the Cuban Consulate could grant him the visa and arrange immigration details if the concession of a Soviet visa were assured.

By 27 September, Pursuant to her inquiry, Silvia DURAN received a confirmation from the Soviet Embassy that the American had been to the USSR installation. He had shown them a letter from the Soviet Consulate in Washington indicating that he had been long awaiting a visa for himself and his wife to go to the USSR. No answer had come from Washington; however, the waiting period was sometimes four or five months. The American also had a letter attesting that he was a member of a pro-Cuban organization but he had claimed that the Cubans would not give him a visa unless he had already received a Russian visa.

Although the American was still at the Cuban Consulate, Silvia DURAN repeated that she could not give him a transit visa unless a Soviet visa was forthcoming, notwithstanding the American's wish to go to Cuba to wait.
there for his Soviet visa. According to DURAN, the American knew no one in Cuba and she intended to appropriately annotate the American's card. The Soviet official echoed her statement that the American was not known.

c. 28 September. Silvia DURAN was again visited at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City by the American seeking a Cuban transit visa. Mrs. DURAN contacted at least two members of the Soviet Embassy and facilitated a direct conversation between one of the Soviets and the American. Conversing in poor Russian, the American stated that he already had been to the Soviet Consulate and had left an address. The Soviet official replied that he was aware of that. The American suggested that he had not known his address then, and he had gone to the Cuban Embassy to ask for the address, because they had it. The American then acceded to the Soviet official's invitation to come by and give them the address.

d. 1 October. In mid-morning an unidentified individual, speaking broken Russian, contacted the Soviet Military Attaché in Mexico City. He said he had been to
the Embassy the previous Saturday (28 September) and had talked with a Consul who had said they would send a telegram to Washington; had there been a reply? He was referred to the Consulate for the information.

These additional materials were promptly disseminated in Washington by the CIA to the White House, the Department of State, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

4. 1 October. See paragraph 1 above for Lee Oswald's contact with the Soviet Consulate.

II. Valery Vladimirovich Kostikov

15. It is believed that the Soviet official with whom Oswald dealt in Mexico City was Consular Attaché Valery Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV, born in Moscow, 17 March 1933.

A photograph of KOSTIKOV is attached. In his letter of 9 November to the Soviet Consulate in Washington, Oswald wrote about his "meetings with Comrade KOSTIN (sic) of the Soviet Union in Mexico City, Mexico." There is no official of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City with a name resembling "KOSTIN", other than Consul KOSTIKOV.

14. KOSTIKOV is the senior officer of five Soviet Consular representatives who deal with visas and related
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TALKS FAMILIARLY WITH SUBJ AND INVITES HIM TO PRESS CONFERENCE – LECTURE AT HOTEL REFORMA WHERE A CUBAN TO SPEAK. 3 MAY WITH GUADALUPE PEREZ MACIA OF GOBERNACION RE OBTAINING (UNDETERMINED) VISA. 6 JUNE AND 6 JULY WITH OSCAR SANTAELEO, FORD SALESMAN. 7 JUNE WITH JUAN GARCIA AND FNU PEREZ GROZCO, DODGE SALESMEN. 2 AUG CALLS ROGER OR ROBERT KATZ OF "FRANCE PRESSE" TO INVITE TO SOUVENIR PRESS CONFERENCE. 13 MAY AND 16 JUNE 1962 CALLS EDUARDO JARDON OF PRENSA LATINA TO GET TOGETHER. 14 JUNE ASKS SPEAK WITH DR. GUILLERMO MONTALO ISLAS, PROMINENT MEXICAN PRO COMISSE LEADER WELL KNOWN HOS. 22 JUNE HE AND TASS REP ANATOLY PAVLENKO INVITED TO LUNCHEON BY MEXICAN PRESIDENT'S PRESS SEC HUMBERTO ROMERO. 25 SEP IS INVITED TO LUNCHEON WITH DR. IGNACIO CHAVEZ, RECTOR AT UNAM. 3 DEC ACCEPTS INVITE ATTEND BUFFET FOR PRESS ON BEHALF CARL J. RICDAIL, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT. 23 JAN 65 HORACIO CHANCALINI OF UNITED NATIONS POSTPONES HIS APPOINTMENT WITH SUBJ. 19 FEB FNU SABINO CABRERA OF INSURANCE FIRM RE PAYMENTS. 8 MAR INVITES CANADIAN NEWSPAPERMAN JOHN ALIUS TO STAG DINNER. 30 APR REQUESTS APPOINTMENT WITH RICARDO POEY CERVANTES, PROMINENT LEFTIST JOURNALIST IN CLOSE FREQUENT CONTACT SOUVS. 15 AND 17 MAY TALKS VIA NEW YORK TIMES REP PAUL KENNEDY WHO INVITED SUBJ DINNER 26 MAY. 18 MAY DIRECTOR OF VOZ DE MEXICO AND PCM CENTRAL COMMITTEE KANUEL TERRAZAS GUERRERO, ASKS SUBJ FOR SOV FINANCIAL SUBSIDY. 23 MAY SUBJ CALLS JOHN RETTIE (SEE MEXI 4743). 14 JUNE CALLS WELL KNOWN LEFTIST CLEMENTINA BASOLES TO INTERVIEW HER. 14 OCT INVITES ENRIQUE LOUBET OF EXCELSIOR TO SOUVENIR RECEPTION BEHALF COSXONALIT.
14 OCT INVITES JAVIER SANTOS LORENZ OF NOVEDADES TO SANCHEZ MEETING.

30 OCT UNSUCCESSFULLY TRIES CONTACT CLEMENCIA BASSOLS. 14 Nov

TRIES CONTACT RICARDO POEY CERVANTES. 14 AND 15 NOV ARRANGED MEET

VIRGINIA GOMEZ-NIEGO, LEFTISE AND PARANOUR OF POEY.

SECRET

C/S COMMENT: * REQUESTED INFO RE TRAVEL VALERIY VLADIMIROVICH KOSTIKOV.

201-289-248

6002613
SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

SUBJECT: LEE H. OSWALD

ON 26 NOVEMBER 1963 JOSE RODRIGUEZ ACQUIRING OF MEXICO TOLD THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION TO FEDERAL BUREAU, UNITED STATES INFORMATION/OFFICER IN MEXICO CITY:

MARTA RODRIGUEZ DE LOPEZ, SAD A SON IN LAW OF HER FATHER RODRIGUEZ, WHO LIVES IN NEW ORLEANS WAS WELL ACQUAINTED WITH LEE OSWALD. SON IN LAW IS A CUBAN WHO LIVES AS 212 JEFFERSON PARISH, NEW ORLEANS, TEL: VERONA 5-3652. ARDESTO RODRIGUEZ RUNS A SPANISH LANGUAGE SCHOOL AND IS AUNT CAINO. ACCORDING TO MARTA RODRIGUEZ DE LOPEZ HER SON IN LAW HAS A TAPE CONVERSATION WITH OSWALD.

Document Number II-48

for FOIA Review on APR 1976

END OF MESSAGE

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW
CONDUCTED ON 24 MAY 1975
E. IMPOT CL By O2/24/75

C/S COMMENT: * DISSEMINATION APPLICABLE TO IBRB GCPFLOOR CABLES.

C/3 7200-5-41

GS. 26 NOV 63

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE Issuing OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.
TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. E. J. Papich

FROM: Deputy Director (Plana)

SUBJECT: Lee H. OSWALD/Soviet Activities in Mexico City,
13 - 24 November 1963, to include V. V. KOSTIKOV and V. S. ALFREY

1. Forwarded as attachment A is a resume of the observed activities of Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV and Ivan Karlovich ALFREY as reported by a reliable source in Mexico City. Attention was given to KOSTIKOV because of the indication that he was the consultant interviewed OSWALD on 23 September 1963 (see CSCI-3/778, 886, 25 November 1963). ALFREY travelled with KOSTIKOV to Northern Mexico during the early part of September 1963. Source reported that during the period under review the observed activities of KOSTIKOV and ALFREY appeared to be normal, as did the activities of the entire Soviet Embassy complement.

2. Forwarded as attachment B is a resume of telephone calls placed to and from the Soviet Embassy on the afternoon of 22 November. Analysis of calls made the morning of 22 November and the morning and afternoon of 23 November revealed no pertinent information.

3. Technical surveillance of the homes of several known and suspected Soviet intelligence officers produced no pertinent information.

4. Forwarded as attachment C is a list identifying the Soviets whose names appear in attachments A and B.

5. Because of the extreme sensitivity of the enclosed information, we urge that the source data and the information be given the most secure handling possible. This information is for background use only and may not be disseminated without permission from this Agency.

CSCI-3/778, 881

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WH/3/Mexico/Terry Ward:ard

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27 November 1963

BASICS:
MEXI-7030 (IN-67262)
MEXI-7033 (IN-67253)
MEXI-7036 (IN-67237)
MEXI-7034 (IN-67231)
MEXI-7032 (IN-67198)

NO PROJECT

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

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PAGE 149 of 212
COPY NO.
18 November

0857 - Alferiev enters Embassy alone (Departure not noted)
1556 - Kostikov enters alone
1629 - Kostikov departs alone
1656 - Kostikov enters alone
1711 - Kostikov departs alone
1759 - Kostikov enters alone

19 November

1210 - Alferiev enters Embassy alone
1312 - Alferiev departs with Carmaschev
1352 - Alferiev and Carmaschev return
1415 - Kostikov departs alone
1533 - Alferiev enters alone (Prior departure not noted)
1653 - Kostikov enters alone

20 November

No coverage

21 November

0852 - Alferiev enters Embassy with wife
0916 - Kostikov enters alone
0917 - Alferiev departs alone
0949 - Alferiev enters alone
1133 - Kostikov departs with Shubin
1206 - Alferiev departs alone
1240 - Kostikov enters with Shubin
1310 - Kostikov departs in car driven by KGB chauffeur Kalinin
1341 - Kostikov enters with Kalinin
1353 - Alferiev enters alone
1427 - Kostikov departs alone
1630 - Kostikov enters alone

22 November

0853 - Alferiev enters Embassy alone
0904 - Kostikov enters alone
1005 - Kostikov has discussion with Shubin
1016 - Kostikov departs with Shubin
1028 - Kostikov enters with Shubin
1030 - Kostikov departs with wife and Shubin
1250 - Kostikov, wife and Shubin return
1302-1312 - Kostikov speaks in garden with Kazantsev
1336 - Kostikov departs with Shubin, Shpakewich, Turygin,
driven by Kalinin
1402 - All above return
1402 - Kostikov talking in garden with Alferiev, Andreyev, and Turygin
1402 - Kostikov departs in car with family
1402 - Alferiev departs alone
1402 - Alferiev enters alone
1503 - Alferiev departs alone
1517 - Alferiev enters alone
1330 - Kostikov enters alone

23 November

1130 - Kostikov speaks with Kazantsev and Shubin
1123 - Kostikov departs with Kazantsev and Shubin
1150 - Alferiev enters alone
1240 - Kostikov, Kazantsev and Shubin enter
1410 - Kostikov plays volleyball with Yatskov, Shubin, Kazantsev, Burakmov, and Striganov
1425 - Kostikov speaks to Shubin and Slavnoy
1430 - Kostikov departs with Shubin and Romanenko
1440 - Alferiev departs alone

24 November

1100 - Alferiev enters Embassy alone
1207 - Kostikov enters with wife and Shubin

NO FOREIGN DISSEN
1326 - Alferiev departs with Shengaley
1410 - Alferiev enters with Shengaley
1440 - Alferiev, Koestikov, Kazantsev and 2 unidentified Soviet visitors depart (A's car)
Am 22 November coverage of Soviet Embassy normal.

At 22 November coverage follows:

1250 - Cuban Consul Alfredo Miranda Diaz asks to speak with Yatskov. Latter apparently unavailable and Kostikov comes on line with following conversation ensuing familiar form "eh?

KOS: Forgive me for arriving late.

MIR: Did you recover the suitcase?

KOS: Yes

MIR: Then it was arriving on the other trip.

KOS: Yes

MIR: I called to tell you the following, that regarding that matter that we had talked about, to see if we would spend Sunday in Chapultepec Park because my wife is preparing some food to eat there.

KOS: I'm sorry but I've just made plans for another trip and I'm leaving this very day. So please forgive me for not being able to go with you.

MIR: I'd like to talk to Pavel Yatskov.

KOS: Wait a minute, he'll come now.

MIR: If he's busy I'll call him later, but I'll be available for the next half hour at telephone No. 11-28-47.

KOS: O.K.

1334 - Reporter requests statement. Unidentified Soviet male refuses.

1333 - Female implies to Rukharenko that the Soviet Ambassador has said to make no statement.

1445 - Yugoslav Ambassador Vlahov calls and speaks with Soviet Ambassador Bazarov in Russian. Talk briefly about assassination telling each other what they know, which
appears to be only what they got from the radio.

1520 - Unidentified woman advises Soviets of assassination.

1644 - Unidentified reporter asks for Kazantsev, advised that Kazantsev not in, will be back Monday, 0930-1400.

1645 - Unidentified male asks for Kukharevko, told he isn't in.

1652 - Unidentified female reporter told Soviet Embassy not working today, Saturday or Sunday.

1718 - Reporter calls for statement. None given.
   - Kazantsev calls his residence, personal call.

1744 - Reporter told to call back Monday.

1750 - Unidentified male asks for Leosov. Not in.

1755 - above calls again
   - Reporter told call back Monday.
ATTACHMENT C TO CSCI-3/773,831

1. Ivan Gavrilovich ALFENOV - Pravda Correspondent
2. Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV - Attache Consular Office
3. Aleksey Ivanovich GARKASHIN - Consul
4. Vitaliy Borisovich SEUBIN - Attache
5. Yuriy Dmitriyevich KALININ - Chauffeur
6. Boris Alekseyevich KAZANTSEV - Counselor
7. Vladimir Ivanovich SHEPALEVICH - Third Secretary
8. Vladimir Ivanovich ANDREYEV - First Secretary
9. Vladimir Vasiliyevich TURGENIN - Third Secretary
10. Pavel Antonovich YATEKOV - Attache
11. Vladimir POREHNOV - Code Clerk
12. Commadiy STROGANOV - Radio Operator
13. Nikolay Petrovich SLAVNOV - Code Clerk
14. Vladimir ROMANEVICH - Second Secretary
15. Lev Fedorovich SHERKALEV - Employee, Commercial Office
16. Oleg Maksimovich NEMCHIKORENO - Vice Consul
17. Sergey Senyovitch KUBARENO - Second Secretary; Soviet Information Bulletin
18. Nikolay Sergeevich LEBNOV - Third Secretary
22 November coverage of Soviet Embassy normal.

22 November coverage follows:

1230 - Cuban Consul Alfredo Miranda asks to speak with Yatskov. Latter apparently unavailable and Miranda proceeds on line with following conversation ending familiar form "tu"

KOS: Forgive me for arriving late.

MIR: Did you recover the suitcase?

KOS: Yes

MIR: Then it was arriving on the other trip.

KOS: Yes

MIR: I called to tell you the following, that regarding that matter that we had talked about, to see if we would spend Sunday in Chapultepec Park because my wife is preparing some food to eat there.

KOS: I'm sorry but I've just made plans for another trip and I'm leaving this very day. So please forgive me for not being able to go with you.

MIR: I'd like to talk to Pavel Yatskov.

KOS: Wait a minute, he'll come now.

MIR: If he's busy I'll call him later, but I'll be available for the next half hour at telephone No. 11-28-47.

KOS: O.K.

1334 - Reporter requests statement. Unidentified Soviet male refuses.

1338 - Female implies to Huskarenko that the Soviet Ambassador has said to make no statement.

1445 - Yugoslav Ambassador Vlahov calls and speaks with Soviet Ambassador Barazov in Russian. Talk briefly about assassination telling each other what they know, which
appears to be only what they got from the radio.

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1716 - Reporter calls for statement. None given.

- Kazantsev calls his residence, personal call.

1744 - Reporter told to call back Monday.

1730 - Unidentified male asks for Leonov. Not in.

1755 - above calls again

- Reporter told call back Monday.

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SECRET

NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

SECRET

NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

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6002031

PAGE 158 OF 212
COPY 30.
ATTACHMENT C TO CSCI-3/773,881

1. Ivan Gavrilovich ALFREZEV - Pravda Correspondent
2. Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV - Attache Consular Office
3. Aleksandr Ivanovich GARMASHOV - Consul
4. Vitaliy Borisovich SHUREV - Attache
5. Yuriy Dmitriyevich BALYIN - Chauffeur
6. Boris Aleksandrovich KAZANTSEV - Counselor
7. Vladimir Ivanovich SEPAKOVICH - Third Secretary
8. Vladimir Ivanovich ANDRASEV - First Secretary
9. Vladimir Vasileyvich TURTGIN - Third Secretary
10. Pavel Antonovich YATSUK - Attache
11. Vladimir PORTUNOV - Code Clerk
12. Gennadiy STROGANOV - Radio Operator
13. Nikolay Petrovich SLAVEV - Code Clerk
14. Vladimir ROMANCHENKO - Second Secretary
15. Lev Fedorovich SHERBAKOV - Employee, Commercial Office
16. Oleg Maksimovich KHOLOPOV - Vice Consul
17. Sergey Semyonovich KHRUBAREV - Second Secretary; Soviet Information Bulletin
18. Nikolay Sergeyevich LECHOV - Third Secretary

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

PAGE 159 OF 212
COPY NO.
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. J. Lee Rankin
General Counsel
President's Commission on the
Assassination of President Kennedy.

SUBJECT: Lee Harvey Oswald

1. Mr. James W. Liebeler of your staff phoned me last Friday and requested that CIA furnish the Commission with an affidavit respecting the origin and circumstances of a photograph of an unknown individual which was furnished by this Agency to the Federal Bureau of Investigation on November 22, 1963.

2. I am forwarding an affidavit with this memorandum which I trust will satisfy your needs. Because of the extreme sensitivity of the source involved, I have refrained from adding further details.

3. The Central Intelligence Agency recommends that this photograph not be reproduced in the Commission's report, because it would jeopardize a most confidential and productive operation. In addition, it could be embarrassing to the individual involved who as far as this Agency is aware, had no connection with Lee Harvey Oswald or the assassination of President Kennedy.

4. In view of the above, a sensitivity indicator has been affixed to this communication.

Richard Helms
Deputy Director for Plans

Attachment - a/s
20 February 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CI/R&A

SUBJECT: Documents Available in OSWALD's 201 File

1. A machine listing of documents officially recorded as being in OSWALD's 201 file was requested and is attached. The actual machine work of this type was begun in 1963, but a few items of previous dates were also recorded.

2. A comparison of the documents physically available in the 201 file and those recorded as being in the 201 file has shown that 37 documents which should be in the 201 file are not available in it. This total is made up of:

   - 2 dispatches
   - 7 memoranda from the FBI
   - 1 CSCI
   - 2 State Department documents
   - 25 cables.

3. Machine inquiries for the location of these documents have not been made.
Mr. J. Lee Rankin

Would you please be good enough to telephone me on Monday, 9 March, by which time I assume you will have had an opportunity to glance at this material.

Richard Holms

Attachment

6 March 1964
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. J. Lee Rankin

SUBJECT: Information in CIA's Possession Regarding Lee Harvey OSWALD Prior to November 22, 1963 as Transmitted to Warren Commission

1. This refers to your letter of February 12, 1964 addressed to the Director of Central Intelligence which has been passed to me for reply.

2. Paragraph three of your letter requested the Agency to supply the Commission with a report on information in the Agency's possession regarding Lee Harvey OSWALD prior to November 22, 1963. The request was predicated upon the footnote on page two of CIA's report to the Commission dated 31 January 1964, entitled: "Information Developed by CIA on the Activity of Lee Harvey OSWALD in Mexico City, 28 September - 3 October 1963".

3. There is attached an exact reproduction of the Agency's official dossier on Lee Harvey OSWALD beginning with the opening sheet dated 9 December 1960. The entire dossier carries the security classification of Secret and consists of thirty documents arranged in chronological order. On the basis of clearances from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of State, the Department of Navy, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service, who were queried by us after the receipt of your letter, we are able to make available exact copies of all materials in the file up to early October 1963. These include:

590-252

Document Number

for FOIA Review on JUN 1976

ATT.

261-287248 6 Mar 64

CCG2C37 PAGE 164 of 212
a. Seven documents received from the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

b. Ten documents received from the Department of State.

c. Two documents received from the Department of Navy.

d. One document (a name check request) from the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

e. Four newspaper clippings.

f. Five internal CIA notes.

g. CIA report dated 31 January 1964 to the Commission which covers all substantive developments affecting CIA in the matter of Lee Harvey Oswald from 9 October to 22 November 1963. The report indicated the disseminations of information developed by CIA that were made to other Federal agencies during that period. This item, as was pointed out at the time, is particularly sensitive and bears appropriate sensitivity indicators.

4. You will note that almost all of the documents carry markings required for CIA's internal records processing. A few of the papers contained the names of our employees or identifications of specific organizational components. We have taken the liberty of blocking out these items as they do not bear on the substance of the Commission's request.

Richard Helms
Deputy Director for Plans

Attachment

Original & 2 = Addresses  1 = C/CI/SEG
1 = DDP Subject  1 = C/CI/R&A
1 = DDP Chrono  1 = G/WH/3
1 = C/CI  1 = 201-289248

C/O RG70 7468/4 March 1964 (Inventory of documents contained in file attached for all but addresses)  201-289248
Inventory of Documents Contained in OSWALD Dossier Forwarded to the Commission

1. State Telegram No. 1304, October 31, 1959 (Confidential)
2. Newspaper Article from the Washington Post, November 1, 1959
3. CI/LSN Internal Note dated 2 November 1959 (oral FBI name check request) and NR reply dated 4 November 1959 (Confidential)
4. Foreign Service Dispatch 234, November 2, 1959 (Confidential)
5. State Telegram 1358, November 9, 1959 (Confidential)
6. State Telegram 1448, November 9, 1959 (Confidential)
7. Newspaper Clipping from Washington Post, November 16, 1959
8. Newspaper Clipping from Evening Star, November 26, 1959
9. DBF 49478, 25 May 1960 (Confidential)
10. Internal CIA Biographic Profile dated circa May 1960 (Confidential)
11. Letter from the Department of State (Gunning) to DDP (Bissell) dated October 25, 1960 (DD/P 0-5679 - Secret)
12. DDP Response to State, dated 21 November 1960 (DD/P 0-6003 - Secret)
13. Internal CIA Request for Opening of 201 file, 9 December 1960 (Secret)
14. State Memorandum of Conversation dated January 26, 1961 (OUO)
15. State Instruction A-273, April 13, 1961 (OUO)
16. Foreign Service Dispatch 806, May 26, 1961 (OUO)
17. Foreign Service Dispatch 29, July 11, 1961 (OUO)
18. DBF 22181, July 13, 1961 (Confidential)

ATT: XAZZ-22595 CS COPY
19. Internal CIA Memo for the Record, 28 September 1961 (Secret)
20. Foreign Service Despatch 317, October 12, 1961 (OUO)
21. HLNS Name Check Request, December 5, 1961
22. Navy Message 20197/RB/3, 3 March 1962 (Confidential)
23. DNA 1624, 26 April 1962
25. DBA 20883, September 7, 1962 (Confidential)
26. DBA 51407, 10 September 1963
27. DBA 52355, 24 September 1963
28. DBA 55715 (number unclear), November 7, 1963
29. DBA 55777, November 8, 1963
30. CIA Summary Report on Activities of OSSALD in Mexico City, dated 31 January 1964
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TO: BERLIN FRANKFURT
FROM: DIRECTOR
CONF: C/WH 4
INFO: DCI, D/DCI, DDP, ADDP, C/C1, C/C1/51, VR

TO: BRLN INFO FRAN

RE: BRLN 5267 (IN 90848) *

IN VIEW REGGAB CONNECTION MARINA OSWALD HEADQUARTERS
DOES NOT DESIRE LONG-RANGE OPS INVOLVEMENT SUGGESTED PARAGRAPH

3 REF.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *Reggab has number complex financial, documents and personal problems which leading him consider return to Moscow for further study in cinematographic institute. Believe he would definitely return if encouraged by us and that he susceptible to recruitment as KUBARK agent during Moscow sojourn and possibly as long range asset in Morocco.

RECORDS OFFICER STAMP
The following action is authorised: DE SENSITIVE

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW
CONDUCTED ON: 25 MAY 1976
E. IMPORER CL BY 06.23.77

Document Number: 456-771
CS COPY

For FOIA Review on: MAY 1976

D-200-5-41

CC: EE1, President

ADD: ADDP

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. J. Lee Rankin

SUBJECT: Reports on Activities and Travel of Lee Harvey OSWALD and Marina Nikoleva OSWALD as Transmitted to Warren Commission

1. Reference is made to the second paragraph of your memorandum dated 12 February 1964, and the second paragraph of your memorandum of 16 March 1964, relative to disseminations of information made by CIA to the Secret Service.

2. Immediately after the assassination of President Kennedy CIA undertook to assemble through its stations in Europe all available data, including information in the files of other governments and intelligence services, on the travels and activities of Lee Harvey OSWALD and Marina Nikoleva OSWALD. This information, as it was collected, was made available to the White House, the Department of State and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Copies of these messages were also sent to the Secret Service.

3. Attached to this memorandum are exact copies of two teletyped messages relative to the travels and activities of the OSWALDS (Attachments A and B). Paragraphs g and h of Attachment C are paraphrased. In Attachment C, OUT Teletype No. 85715, are found references to two other teletyped messages (OUT No. 85182 and OUT No. 85665) which describe one Richard Thomas GIBSON, a negro journalist...
now residing in Switzerland who has been active in the Fair Play for Cuba Committee. Paraphrases of No. 35132 and No. 85665 are included as Attachments D and E. Access to original texts of paraphrased items will be provided when members of your staff visit Langley. The information on which paragraphs g and h of Attachment G are based was received at CIA Headquarters on 27 November and disseminated on 28 November.

4. This memorandum and the attachments contain very sensitive information which has a direct bearing on sources and methods. An appropriate sensitivity indicator has therefore been affixed.

Richard Helms
Deputy Director for Plans

Attachments - as stated

Distribution:

Original & 2 - Addressee w/atts
1 - DDP Chrono w/atts
1 - DDP subject w/atts
1 - Mr. Rocca w/atts
1 - C/CI/SIG w/atts
1 - C/WH/3 w/atts
1 - 201-

CI/R&A/TRHall/4664/26 March 1964

69 8571

201-297248

-2-

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED
Teletype message, OTU No. 36702, dated 4 December 1963, filed at 14:11 hours, to the White House, the Department of State and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with copy to the Secret Service.

SUBJECT: Lee Harvey OSWALD

Records of the foreigners records office of the German Federal Republic in Cologne, Germany, show that Marina Nikolayevna Puzakova OSWALD crossed West Germany from East Germany to Holland on 3 June 1962. She traveled by rail, crossing into West Germany at Helmstedt on 3 June and entering Holland by rail at the Bentheim crossing point. She had a West German visa 694/62 issued at the West Germany Embassy in Moscow. She listed her final destination as U.S.A. Comment: This confirms information from the U.S. Embassy in Moscow to the effect that the OSWALD family traveled from Moscow to Rotterdam by rail around 3 June 1962. Helmstedt and Bentheim are on the main rail route from Russia to Rotterdam. While Lee OSWALD himself and their infant daughter are not recorded in German records this is probably because little attention is paid to U.S. citizens and to infants in keeping travel records.

ATT. 4: XAAZ-2260
Teletype message, 4780, dated 6 December 1963, filed at 1829 hours, to the White House, the Department of State and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with copy to the Secret Service.

SUBJECT: Lee Harvey OSWALD

Reference is made to our COT telegram No. 45732 of 4 December 1963 which gave information on the travel of Marina OSWALD (and presumably also Lee Harvey OSWALD and their daughter) across West Germany on their return from the Soviet Union. Information now available from Dutch authorities seems to confirm this. On 3 June 1962 one M. OSWALD, listed as a male Russian citizen, entered The Netherlands by train at the Oidsmaal border point.

Comment: It is believed that the listing of this person as a male instead of female was just an error of the border officials. Note that Oidsmaal is opposite Bentheim, the German border point where Marina OSWALD left Germany.
Teletype message No. 85715, dated 29 November 1963, filed at 1340 hours, to the White House, the Department of State and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with copy to the Secret Service.

SUBJECT: Travel of Lee Harvey OSWALD.

I. The following information has been gathered from reliable sources regarding the travel of Lee Harvey OSWALD and his wife:

   a. 9 October 1959: According to official British travel records OSWALD arrived in Southampton this date claiming on his landing card that he had no fixed address but planned to remain in the United Kingdom one week for vacation before going on to "some school" in Switzerland. (Headquarters comment: Probably referring to the Albert Schweitzer College in Switzerland with which he is known to have been in correspondence.)

   b. 10 October 1959: According to the same official British travel records OSWALD left London this date by air for Helsinki.
c. October 1959: Stockholm newspaper, Dagomir

Nystater, of 25 November 1963 states Lee OSWALD passed through Sweden during October 1959. Article also adds that OSWALD was unsuccessful in obtaining visa to the USSR in Helsinki which resulted in his returning to Stockholm. Two days after he arrived in Stockholm OSWALD traveled directly to Moscow.

Concluding sentence of article states: "This indicates that the Russian Embassy (Stockholm) gave him a visa."

According to a reliable source there was no record that there was any request for a USSR visa processed through normal channels for OSWALD at any time during 1959, and source indicated it was difficult to explain how OSWALD might have received his visa in two days without going through normal channels. The only conclusion which can be drawn is that OSWALD must have received his visa directly from the Soviet Embassy in Stockholm which occasionally is done in special cases, but the source had no evidence to confirm this assumption.
d. 10 to 15 October 1959: According to a very reliable but extremely sensitive source OSWALD stayed at the Torni Hotel in Helsinki from 10 to 11 October and then moved to the Klaas Kurki Hotel where he stayed until 15 October, apparently waiting for a visa to be issued him by the Soviet Consulate in Helsinki. He traveled to the USSR by train, crossing at Vainikkala on 15 October.

e. 19 May 1962: According to a Dutch official source, the Dutch Charge in Moscow issued a transit visa to OSWALD’s wife on 13 May 1962. Their records reveal his wife was born on 17 July 1941 instead of 19 July 1941 and in Severodvinsk instead of Minsk. There is no record of her having actually transited the Netherlands.

f. 1962: Official British records do not reflect that OSWALD returned to the United States from the USSR through the United Kingdom. However, if he were merely transiting, it would not have been necessary for him to fill out a landing card, and therefore there would be no record of his travel in the official traffic index.
g. 1963: According to an extremely sensitive and reliable source, on 23 November Maria SNETHLAGE, head of the "Working Group Informatic Cuba" (Working Group Information Cuba), told an employee of the Cuban Embassy in The Hague that she was sure she had met 'that Mr. LEE is Havana, who did the murder'. She described him as a man of violence and entirely full of hate and indicated that it was possible that this man had been misled by a group. She said she had written to 'GIBSON' about the bad impression she had had of this LEE. (Headquarters comment: Please refer to our teletype Nos. 85132 and 85665 for additional information on GIBSON.) Later, SNETHLAGE told Castro Cubans in The Hague that "Mr. LEE of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee" had been slandered and that it was another person named Lee CSMALD who had done it. SNETHLAGE seemed to be glad to have heard this 'correct' version. (Headquarters comment: Mr. LEE may be identical with Vincent Theodore LEE who replaced Richard GIBSON as Head of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee.)
b. According to reliable information, SNETHLAGE was in Cuba in January 1963, and according to an official Dutch source, she again traveled to Cuba for the May Day celebrations in 1963.
Teltype No. 35132, dated 22 November 1963, filed at 1732 hours, to the White House, the Department of State and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with copy to the Secret Service. (paraphrase)

SUBJECT: Lee Harvey OSWALD

1. In conversation with a close friend in Bern, Switzerland, on 23 November 1963, Richard Thomas GIBSON remarked that OSWALD is "one of us." OSWALD and GIBSON had corresponded two years previously, and OSWALD had joined the Committee. (Comment: Reference is presumably to the Fair Play for Cuba Committee.) GIBSON added that he had destroyed all his letters from OSWALD. OSWALD is crazy. GIBSON then remarked that he is happy that he was not in New York. He felt sorry for "LEE" in New York and for "TIBOR." 

2. The information given above was supplied by an extremely sensitive source who is usually reliable.

3. According to other information that was available, Richard Thomas GIBSON, born 13 May 1931 in Los Angeles, California, is a negro journalist who has been active in the...
Fair Play for Cuba Committee since 1960. He has resided since April 1963 at Lausanne, Switzerland. In this latter country GIBSON has participated in the publication of *La Revolution Africaine*. 
Teletype message, CUT No. 35665, 29 November 1963, filed at 1826 hours, to the White House, the Department of State and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with copy to the Secret Service. (paraphrased)

1. Our station in The Hague has reported that on 23 November 1963, a local Castrolite named Maria SNETHLAGE told Third Secretary Ricardo SANTOS of the Cuban Embassy in The Hague that she knew the "Mr. LEE" (sic) who murdered President Kennedy. She described "LEE" as a man full of hate and violence, and speculated that he had been "misused by a group". She said she had written to GIBSON (undoubtedly Richard GIBSON, U.S. citizen of Lausanne, Switzerland, born 13 May 1935, a Castro sympathizer, who had visited The Netherlands recently and had been in contact both with the Soviet Ambassador and the Cuban Embassy).

2. Later that same day Maria SNETHLAGE told Secretary SANTOS that "Mr. LEE of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee" had been slandered. The assassin had been another person, Lee OSWALD. SNETHLAGE is reported to have been in Cuba in January and again in May 1963.
3. According to Dutch authorities on 7 November 1963, in talking about attacks by Cuban refugees against the Cuban mainland, SANTOS had replied 'just wait and you will see what we can do. It will happen soon.' Asked to be more precise, SANTOS had replied 'just wait, just wait'. SANTOS is reported to have a pro-Castro brother in the U.S.A.

4. A very sensitive source reports that after his conversations with SNETHLAGE, SANTOS was very angry because she had contacted him.
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. J. Lee Rankin  
General Counsel  
President's Commission on the  
Assassination of President Kennedy

SUBJECT: Allegations Regarding Intelligence Training  
School in Minsk, USSR as Transmitted To  
Wurman Commission

1. Allegations of the existence of a Soviet intelligence and/or  
sabotage training school in Minsk, USSR, have come to the  
attention of the Agency from press reports. Also, there has  
been an informal inquiry from a member of the Commission,  
sir, Bullock, very recently on this detail. I seize this opportunity  
to furnish to the Commission the information which the Agency  
has on this topic.

2. A careful review of CIA files has produced no hard  
information regarding Soviet intelligence or sabotage training in  
Minsk since 1947. One item of information supplied by a Soviet  
defector in 1949 reported the existence, as of 1947, of an intelligence  
training school in Minsk. No additional details, however, were  
available regarding its curriculum or location in Minsk. Information  
developed from our sources since 1949 has not mentioned, confirmed,  
or corroborated the continued existence of the installation.

3. Another reference in CIA files to training in Minsk relates  
to the existence of a sabotage school which functioned in Minsk until  
the German attack on the Soviet Union in 1941, after which the school  
was moved to Leningrad.
4. These two items of information are the only ones in the possession of this Agency relating to intelligence and sabotage training in Minsk. They are furnished to the Commission in order to complete its records. Because of the sensitive sources involved, it has been necessary to attach a sensitivity indicator to this memorandum.

Richard Helms
Deputy Director for Plans

Distribution:

Original & 1 - Addresses
2 - DDP
1 - SR/CI/R
1 - CI/CI/SIG
1 - CI/CI/RA
1 - CI/RHA/T/31
1 - CI/RHA/201

Originated by: CI/RHA/T/31 (5664, 4 June 1964)
16 December 1963

Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. J. W. Boys

cc:

Diplomatic Missions to the Kennedy Administration

1. Attached for your personal use are the written comments of Mrs.
   Weimer. These comments are on some aspects of the assassination
   of President John F. Kennedy. As you know, Mrs. Weimer detected
   from the CIA about two years ago, and he personal knowledge is not
   up to date, but he has worked in which with Soviet intelligence
   developments on the basis of his ability. Her comments on how
   Mrs. Weimer and his wife must have been handled by Soviet intelli-
   gence authorities while they were inside the Soviet Union are
   particularly interesting. Her suggestions for the questioning
   of Mrs. Weimer OS7 are equally provocative.

2. As you have decided to pass on his views without editing,
   and this agency does not specifically endorse his associations
   or recommendations.

\[\text{Enclosures: For paragraphs 2.}\]

C/3/3/J.R. Whittier
12 December 1963

Distribution:

Orig. 1 - Addresses
1 - H1
1 - C/WI
1 - C/WI
1 - C/WIR
2 - C/4/3
1 - W/2

[C/3/3/J.R. Whittier]
TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. G. J. Popich

FROM: Deputy Director (Nicos)

SUBJECT: Peter BERTABIN’s Comments on the Kennedy Assassination

1. Attached for your personal are the written comments of KBG
Defector Peter BERTABIN on some aspects of the assassination of
President John F. Kennedy. As you know, BERTABIN defected from
the KGB about ten years ago, and his personal knowledge is not
up to date, but he has stayed in touch with Soviet intelligence
developments to the best of his ability. His comments on how
Lee GOWALD and his wife must have been handled by Soviet intelli-
gence authorities while they were inside the Soviet Union are
particularly interesting and his suggestions for questioning
of Mrs. Marina GOWALD are equally provocative.

2. We have decided to pass on his views without editing,
and this Agency does not specifically endorse his conclusions
or recommendations.

CC: 3/779, 135
Enclosures: Per paragraph 1

C/WH/3/J.Hitten:my

12 December 1963

Distribution: BASIC:
None

NO PROJECT
SUBJECT: Peter Rostin's Comments on President Kennedy's Assassination

1. We should understand that my comments which follow are not based solely on the thesis that OSNAD was specifically dispatched to murder our President. The very real possibility also exists that OSNAD was sent here on another mission by the FSB and subsequently conspired with the deed to his own initiative. However, much a possibility does not make the FSB less culpable as the seeds for OSNAD's act must have been planted while he was being trained in the USSR for his other mission. We might first examine the question uppermost in the minds of most Americans, "What did the USSR have to gain by killing the President?" I believe we can make a good case as to the precise gains accruing to the USSR and most specifically accruing to Hirenberg. The assassination of President Kennedy would accomplish the following for Hirenberg personally:

a. Western pressure behind the leadership of the USA would automatically cease up. Witness President Johnson's immediate conciliatory telegram to KHRENBERG, after the murder. We might mention that the USA was the chief proponent for not extending long range credits to the USSR. Extension of long range credits is vital to the USSR at this juncture.

b. This leads us into the next pressing problem within the USSR. The West persistently underestimates the extent of the Soviet internal situation. It was my prediction that as a result of the mismanagement of the 1965 harvest and the CHICOS argues that President Kennedy's resignation during the upcoming December plenum of the Communist Party of the USSR. Our President's death thus effectively diverts the Soviets' attention from their internal problems. It directly affects KHRENBERG's longevity.

c. In the Cuban situation any USA or Cuban expatriate actions against Cuba will not be tainted by the fact that these are treasonable acts against Cuba because of OSNAD's 'Fair Play for Cuba' associations. Obviously the Soviets properly interpret our situation in that President KHRENBERG will restrain any planned interventions in Cuba for a long time.

d. A more amenable America will strengthen KHRENBERG's hand in his running battle with the CHICOS. He will thus have another reason to say his form of peaceful coexistence is superior to that of the CHICOS'.

[Signature]
e. Conceivably any of President KENNEDY's planned actions to get even more firm with the Soviets during the pre-election year are thus sabotaged by the President's murder.

f. The Soviets obviously understood that the death of President KENNEDY would result in the emergence of DEGULLE as a strong Western leader. DEGULLE of course says 'what's good for France is not necessarily bad for the USSR.'

g. The death of President KENNEDY removes a popular rallying point for our allies. Furthermore, and more pertinent, his death removes a symbol for Soviet intellectuals who have inevitably made invidious comparisons between their own intellectual degener and the flowering of the arts under the KENNEDYs. The problem of the intellectuals in the USSR should not be interpreted as the loss of KENNEDY's internal problem. We must recall that beginning with TOLSTOY, intellectuals have provided the impetus for revolution in the USSR and they comprise one of the three balls KENNEDY must constantly juggle—the intellectuals, the Party and the military.

h. If the USSR has any ambitions aise in manipulating U. S. public opinion their murder of President KENNEDY would serve to exacerbate the present differences between the radical left and right in America. In fact the USSR propaganda machine began to say the murder was committed by the radical right as soon as the deed was done and before OSWALD was captured.

i. Finally the death of President KENNEDY, whether a planned operation or not, will serve the most obvious purpose of providing proof of the power and effectiveness of the KGB. This application of sheer terror could be interpreted as a warning to Russia's own citizens, as the Soviet intelligence services have suffered some very real reverses recently with PERLOWSKI, GORBUNOV's defection, their ignominious expulsion from the Congo, etc. I have long predicted that the USSR would take some drastic action to make the rapid creation of their security.

2. Can we briefly view the OSWALD operation as a mounted KGB operation to kill the President? What are the essential ingredients?

a. The KGB had some three years to prepare OSWALD in the USSR. Layman will depreciate the value that the KGB attaches to such on the spot assessment. They may also say that OSWALD was a nut and properly would not be entrusted with such an operation by the KGB. However, the KGB properly knows that historically such assassins have been reliable PURELY ASSIGNED TYPES.
b. In such an operation the KGB could not use a Soviet citizen though the very real possibility exists that OSWALD was identified by a Soviet Illegal of the KGB 13th Department. Sticking to essentials—it was a good plan that did succeed.

c. OSWALD did escape from the back building.

d. He did get to a theater which could have been his point of contact with his illegal case officer. Certainly we knew the KGB's penchant for using theaters for meeting places.

e. After his arrest, which was only due to his unfortunate encounter with Policeman THERP, OSWALD did remain silent. Now like the behavior of Col. AKALAN his behavior in this regard.

3. Also the very real possibility exists that the KGB intended to liquidate OSWALD after he did the job. His presence in the theater was probably for just such a detection or removal from the scene. As RUBY's part in the operation we must recognize the possibility that RUBY was also a KGB hatchet man. Looking at the bare essentials of his part in the operation we see the following:

a. RUBY had access to the police station. Reports say he personally knew most policemen.

b. He successfully silenced OSWALD.

c. RUBY remains silent and his cover is holding up.

d. He has a good record of temporary insanity.

e. He has a reasonable chance to escape the death sentence.

4. The undersigned might be better qualified to comment on the OSWALD aspects of this case if we knew the following about his activities prior to his departure to the USSR: (a., b., and c. below offer three possible answers to the question, "Why did he go to Moscow?"

a. First, OSWALD was a self-made Marxist or Comminist who decided to go on his own; that is, he made this decision by himself and prompted by no one. He possibly was looking for a better life without knowing that the Soviet Union really is...

b. Second, after OSWALD's discharge as an "undesirable" from the Marines, he found himself in a difficult and unpleasant situation: Is it possible that in this situation he was noticed by a spottor or recruiter for the illegals or some other department and was considered as a possible candidate for use or...
recruitment? The full information about Oswald was sent to Moscow, and on Moscow's order an investigation of Oswald was made and there followed a decision to 'invite' him to Moscow. Using the word 'invite', the purpose was to train that case-agent or recruiter through conversations with Oswald, but without actually suggesting the trip itself. In this case, it is possible that someone gave him some financial assistance and some advice on how to do this.

c. Third, Oswald went to Moscow, or was sent to Moscow, by some pro-Soviet, pro-Communist, pro-Chinese organization(s), having in mind that he would stay in the Soviet Union for a few years, learning more about the Soviet Union and receiving instructions for future operations, activities, etc.

5. Knowing for sure that the Soviets never give a visa without making an investigation of the person making the application, we have to make our own investigation of the following questions:

a. When did Oswald first begin to express his wish to go to the Soviet Union?

b. To whom did he talk, whom did he contact at this early time, and how much time elapsed between these talks and contacts and his application?

c. How, when and through whom did Oswald get his Soviet visa?

d. How long did it take for him to get the visa?

e. Who personally gave the visa to Oswald? We must know if the person at the embassy who talked to Oswald was a high official.

f. When and how did Oswald travel to the USSR (air, sea; through which countries; in which countries, if any, did he make stops; how long were such stops)?

6. Together with the above, it is very important to know of Oswald's circumstances before his trip to the USSR. Who knew in advance that he was going and who knew that he had gone: mother, brother, relatives, friends, neighbors, girl friends, boy friends, old buddies, etc? To whom did Oswald say goodbye before he left for the USSR: personally or by telephone, by mail? Did he ever ask anyone any questions on traveling to the USSR? When?
him to find her—to make him happy and to make sure that he would not leave the Soviet Union)—the KGB at the same time continued to train him, probably in the way of an old-fashioned Marxist, telling him that he would be a good fighter against imperialists and against American millionaires, such as ROCKEFELLER, KENNEDY and others. And somewhere here, while in this kind of training, a low level KGB officer of State Security told him that to have a better life in the U.S. you have to fight very hard to bury capitalism, as our Blanka Sorgayevich says; together with capitalism, you have to bury all the millionaires, including your first-born and block-sucker, KENNEDY. (Note: this is not a tall story; it is the way in which State Security operates with the stupid Marxists and with naive followers of the Communist movement). If on a high level within the KGB it was decided that there is nothing good in OSWALD and that he is just a naive American and that he could not be relied upon fully, but that nonetheless he could be used because he is for our cause and is against capitalism in general, then the following would have been suggested—a letter OSWALD already had asked permission to return to the USA. OSWALD was told to be a good fighter against capitalism and to secure your Soviet citizenship, you must show yourself as a good fighter for the Communist cause inside the USA. Then, we give you permission because we believe you are a strong Marxist to return to the USA and to do something for our cause there, such as to help any American pro-Soviet organizations or, for instance, become a member of a Free Cuba Committee or in case of crisis to do something outstanding—that will be noticeable everywhere—that will prove that you are a real Communist. Then, somewhere here, if he was already a Soviet agent or not, the girl showed up, or she was there before, but by this time she was already decided to go to the USA. Then he was told. After this talk, OSWALD started—then your fresnel. She is my wife, we have a child, and I would like to go. If he did make a big noise, they decided to let him and her go; or if he already was a trained agent, then without any kind of noise on his part, but with some difficulties, permission was granted for her to go with him.

12. Looking at the wife of OSWALD, we should have in mind that she was and still is an agent or at least a local-level informer of the KGB. If she were not before she met OSWALD, she became so after the second day she met him. This is the regulation in State Security on how to handle foreigners—it makes no difference whether they are Communists or not.

13. Investigation of OSWALD's wife should be undertaken as soon as possible, with special attention being paid to the questions to follow:
a. First, who is she? Her education, profession, age, family background, Party affiliation (Komsomol membership). If she was a member of the Komsomol, then the Komsomol organization will take any steps possible against her traveling to the U. S. Also, she must be expelled from the Komsomol, and then she automatically would be considered a member of the Imperialist Camp. Then, if she was a member of the Komsomol and this action did not take place, it was because of KGB interference against such action. The same action would relate to any of her relatives—father, mother, brothers...if they were members of the CPSU or Komsomol.

b. To which offices was she invited before and after their marriage? If she was invited to some official Soviet offices, and if these offices asked her not to carry a foreigner and not to go with him, then probably she was not a member of the Komsomol and she did it on her own will; but if she answers that no one invited her to such offices, then the whole job was done by the KGB—smoothly and quietly, with no talk going around about it.

c. She helped her and how many times to write papers for the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs to say that she had married an American citizen and would like to go with him to the USA? If it was done a few times and with great difficulties, then probably it was done only with a little help from the KGB. If, however, the papers were prepared only once and permission was granted after only a few months' wait, then everything was done by the KGB. (According to the American newspapers, her application for permission to come to the U. S. was processed very easily and quickly.)

d. When and where did they register their marriage? Who were the witnesses to that marriage? How many relatives and friends (of both) were present at the wedding and celebration? What kind of gifts did they receive at the time of marriage and from whom? Where did they take up residence after marriage? Were they given an apartment, or a room? And in that neighborhood?

e. Where did her husband, OSNAD, work? In what factory? What was his hours of work? How long did he spend in Moscow before he went to Mexico? Who chose Mexico—did he or did someone else?

f. Who were her husband's friends? From what circles? Workers? Intellectuals?

g. How many times were she and her husband—while they lived together—invited to the police stations or any other Soviet government offices, together or separately? (Note: There is no other office than the KGB which would make such an invitation. It makes no difference if they were agents or not.)
h. How smart (intelligent) is she? Does she really speak no English? Is her English better than she shows or better than it should be after being here only two years? Or worse?

i. What does she say about life in the Soviet Union?

j. Did her husband have a gun while he was in the Soviet Union? If so, how does she know about it? When did he get it? Did he have special permission to carry a gun? Did he bring this gun with him across the border? For your information, nobody carries a gun in the USSR without the KGB eventually learning of it. Least of all an American.

k. Did she give financial help to them before they left the Soviet Union? (Note: For a regular worker in the Soviet Union, it is impossible to save enough money to buy a ticket and make any kind of preparations to go abroad.)

l. Did she give instructions to OSWALD to ask for financial assistance at the American Embassy upon his return to the USA?

m. Was their first child born in Russia—baptized in the USSR? If so, in what church? Whose idea was it? Did they begin their second child, born in the U.S.? I.

n. Did OSWALD never had a permanent job here in the USA, then she was going to finance his next trip to the USSR? How much did his wife know about his plan to return to the USSR via Cuba?

1. The investigation of the wife should be made step by step, keeping in mind and never forgetting that OSWALD as well as she herself were under constant observation and with constant contacts with organs of the KGB. Without such observation and contacts with organs of the KGB, no foreigners can live within the Soviet Union.

15. In any investigation of this case we should not lose the initiative. In view of the extraordinary circumstances surrounding this case, the FBI, through the Department of State, could logically enough request that the USSR provide all available info on OSWALD's story in the USSR and the purpose of his visit to the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. A friendly attitude can be expected to honor such a request. We might learn a great deal from the Soviet reply.
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

TO: Chief, SR

SUBJECT: CIA Work in Support of the Warren Commission

1. Below is a summary of the matters discussed in our meeting with Messrs. Angleton and Rocca on the evening of 15 January 1964. In turn, Mr. Angleton was reporting to us the substance of his meeting with Mr. Allen Dulles, Mr. J. L. Reams, Chief Counsel, Mr. W. R. Hunt of the Justice Department, Mr. Helms and Mr. Rocca, which took place on the afternoon of 16 January 1964.

2. Mr. Angleton said that Mr. Dulles, apparently provoked by press accusations that the Warren Commission has been dilatory, asked CIA for suggestions of questions or requests to be included in a letter to the Soviet Government. This letter, from the Warren Commission and to be transmitted through the Department of State, would ask additional evidence which is presumably available in Soviet files which could assist the Commission's deliberations. Mr. Dulles did not have a detailed idea of what he wanted to ask the Soviets for but did say that the questions should be "not too technical." Although Mr. Angleton thought that the letter should be written only after the CIA report and comments have been completed, in order to make the letter as effective as possible, Mr. Dulles felt it should go now, be phrased in generalities and allow the Soviets more flexibility in their handling of the matter than would a more pointed letter based on our concrete findings. Mr. Dulles asked CIA only for the questions and not for a draft letter. Mr. Murphy suggested that we ask only for certain records rather than put specific questions to the Soviets. Mr. Murphy suggested that these might include Soviet hospital records connected with Lee Oswald's attempted suicide, city visa and registration records for Moscow and Minsk, factory personnel records from Oswald's place of employment, etc. Also, Oswald's diary noted that his case had passed through two commissions in the USSR; we might ask for the records of these commissions as well. Mr. Angleton said that in transmitting our suggestions to Mr. Dulles we can include any introductory paragraphs or explanatory comments that we
felt necessary to explain to Mr. Dulles the direction of our thinking about these proposals.

(Note: I instructed Mr. Wigren to prepare a draft of suggested queries, using the assistance of BERYABIN and to have this ready, if possible, by the close of business today.)

3. Rankin stated that the Commission wants to account in detail, minute by minute and hour by hour, for Oswald's time outside the United States. Mr. Bagley suggested that the narrative chronology of Oswald's stay in the Soviet Union be converted to a chronology tabulation which would permit us more simply to insert added details and dates as we learned of them in other documentation which we can expect to receive shortly. This was agreed.

(Note: I instructed Mr. Wigren to begin recasting the narrative immediately into this form.)

4. Mr. Rankin said that the Commission has a waist-high stack of documents and reports received from the FBI and Secret Service which CIA has not yet received. These include Secret Service interviews with Marina Oswald, letters from Lee Oswald in the USSR and other material. He promised to send this material to Mr. Helms shortly.

(Note: We will pass appropriate parts of this material to BERYABIN for further analysis along the lines of his earlier work on documents already in our possession.)

5. Messrs. Angleton, Murphy and Rocca considered BERYABIN's initial analysis of Marina Oswald's documents, and the questions to which it gave rise, to be a worthwhile and important contribution. CIA would be unable to make any serious analysis of even hypothesis until some of BERYABIN's questions had been answered. Mr. Rocca suggested that BERYABIN's paper be recast into more of a questionnaire form and Mr. Bagley agreed, pointing out that BERYABIN's comment and speculation could be put off to the side as explanatory comment on each question, as appropriate. Mr. Angleton and Mr. Murphy thought that it would be desirable to send this paper to the Warren Commission in advance of other CIA reports with a memorandum informing the Commission that we would need answers to this interim questionnaire in order to reconstruct a detailed chronology of Oswald's time in the USSR and to comment on his activity there. The Commission would be asked to procure the information from Marina through any Agency it might choose.
(Note: I instructed Mr. Wigren to prepare the DERRYBIN paper in this format urgently.)

6. Mr. Angleton reported that he had asked the Commission representatives certain questions pertaining to our use of defectors in analyzing the Oswald papers:

a. Was the Commission formally requesting us to have defectors analyze the material?

Mr. Wellins thought that the answer to this question is yes. However, Mr. Angleton asked for a formal request from the Commission to this effect. The FBI has stated that its reports are not to be passed to ASLADLE, which may cause some complications.

b. Would the Commission be prepared to assume the burden of responsibility if such a defector should disagree with the Commission's opinions or come up with a radically different hypothesis or interpretation?

The persons present said that the Commission would.

c. If a defector who had contributed to the analysis of the documents should be unwilling to appear personally and formally before the Commission, would the Commission exercise its subpoena powers against him?

Mr. Rankin thought that if there was a risk involved for the defector, the Commission would not do so. However, Rankin promised to get a formal answer from the Commission on this point.

d. Will the classification we put on our correspondence to the Commission be honored?

The answer was that in principle our classification would be honored. However, Mr. Rankin warned those present that CIA should not hope to evade criticism or responsibility through classification of its material.
6. Mr. Angleton reported that Mr. Richard Davis is representing the interests of the Department of State in this inquiry. Mr. Thompson had ruled himself out because he was Ambassador to the Soviet Union at the time of the events in question.

7. One matter which had been brought to light by the Oswald case was the need for a mechanism in the United States Government to record and assimilate our knowledge of the Soviet handling of American defectors to the USSR. The Bureau is apparently in some danger of criticism for its failure to keep an eye on Oswald after his return. Similarly, CIA has not systematically collected nor compiled information on Soviet defector handling. Berlin Base had kept a list of American defectors at one time, but these individuals have not been debriefed on their return to the West.

8. The Commission representatives at the 14 January 1964 meeting estimated that the Warren Commission would need from three to six months to complete its task.

9. Mr. Bagley raised the question of the desirability of having DERAYABIN participate personally, representing the FBI as an interpreter perhaps, in a debriefing of Marina. Mosara. Angleton and Murphy were convinced that CIA must avoid direct involvement with this investigation. Although it is less efficient as a method, we will content ourselves with putting written questions to Marina to be answered by whatever Agency the Commission may choose to use.

Tennent H. Bagley
Chief, SR/CI
ROCCA NOTE TO HELMS ON
TALK WITH DULLES ON 21 MARCH.

23 March 1964

Dick:

Had a briefing at Allen Dulles' house on Saturday afternoon. (We were assembled to discuss his taping session with Deryabin, Helen MacInnes, Donevan and Hanson-Baldwin in New York tonight. None of the others were present.)

AWD showed me a letter he had received from Rankin recently expressing the desire to reach a modus vivendi in order to allay the story of CIA's possible sponsorship of Oswald's activity. The point of the communication to AWD was to suggest that he serve as a file reviewer for the Commission. The letter outlined alternative possibilities in this matter (affidavit from the DCI, etc.).

In my presence, AWD wrote the answer:

a. Declining the invitation to serve as file reviewer for good and sufficient reasons.

b. Stating his willingness to provide a statement or testimony to the Commission with respect to his knowledge of Oswald during his tenure as DCI. He noted in the tail-off of the letter that as far as he could remember he had never had any knowledge at any time prior to the date of the assassination. 201289248

Rock

23 Mar 64