AGENCY: CIA
RECORD NUMBER: 104-10268-10013
RECORD SERIES: JFK
AGENCY FILE NUMBER: 80T01357A

ORIGINATOR: CIA

TITLE: HELMS HEARING DUPLICATE - VOLUME II, COPY 10 OF HELMS HEARING.

DATE: 01/01/0000
PAGES: 157

SUBJECTS:
- DUPLICATE
- VOL II, COPY 10
- UNIT INDEX
- HELMS HEARING

DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER - TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION: Not Marked
RESTRICTIONS: 1B
CURRENT STATUS: Withhold
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 05/13/1998

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

1. Memorandum for Winston m. SCOTT, dated 13 October 1966; Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD.

2. Note, undated, regarding contacts of ALFEROV.

3. Memorandum for Assistant Deputy Director, Plans, dated 23 November 1963; Contact of Lee OSWALD with a member of Soviet KGB Assassination Department. [FOIA 34-538]

4. Memorandum for J. Lee RANKIN, dated 25 November 1964; Subject: June COBB. [TX-1962; FOIA No. 928-927]

5. Memorandum for Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security Department of State, dated 16 September 1969; Subject: Charles William THOMAS. [FOIA No. 1135-992]

6. CSCI 3/779,814, dated 30 January 1964; Subject: Jack L. RUBY - Lee Harvey OSWALD.

7. PARJ-1731 (IN 73050), 4 December 1963 [FOIA No. 298-697]

8. Note to Richard HELMS, dated 23 March 1964, regarding briefing at Allen DULLES' home on 4 March 1964. [FOIA 618-793]


10. CSCI-3/779,135 to FBI, dated 16 December 1963; Subject: Peter DERYABIN's Comments on the Kennedy Assassination. [FOIA No. 413-76A]

11. Memorandum for J. Lee RANKIN, dated 5 June 1964; Subject: Allegations Regarding Intelligence Training School in Minsk, USSR. [FOIA No. 726-314 XAAX-17620]

12. Memorandum for J. Lee RANKIN, dated 31 March 1964; Subject: Reports on Activities and Travel of Lee Harvey OSWALD and Marina Nikolevna OSWALD. [FOIA No. 627-821]

13. DIR-92725, 6 January 1964 [FOIA No. 456-771]


15. Note from HELMS to RANKIN, dated 6 March 1964

16. Memorandum for Chief, CJRRA, dated 20 February 1964; Subject: Documents Available in OSWALD's 201 File. [FOIA No. 563-810]

17. Memorandum for J. Lee RANKIN, dated 23 July 1964; Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD. [DDP 4-3769]


19. DIR 85246, 26 November 1963 [FOIA No. 113-48]

20. MEXI-7045 (IN 67281), 24 November 1963 [FOIA No. 78-559]

22. Memorandum for DC/OPS, dated 23 May 1975; Subject: Review of Selected Items in the Lee Harvey OSWALD File Regarding CIA Identification of CASTRO Cuban Involvement in the CASTRO Cuban Assassination.

23. Memorandum for J. Lee RANKIN, dated 15 May 1964; Subject: Role of the Cuban Intelligence Service in Processing Visa Application, Section of that Service to the Assassination of President Kennedy. [XAAZ-36307 - FOIA No. 697-294]

24. Note dated 10 April 1964 listing material from P-8593 shown to Warren Commission. [FOIA No. 653-828]

25. Brief for Presentation to President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy, 14 May 1964. [XAAZ-27212 - FOIA No. 695-302A]


28. Memorandum to Chief, CI/R&A, dated 19 June 1964; Subject: Lee Harvey OSWALD [XAAZ-27166 - FOIA No. 739-319]

29. Memorandum for Deputy Director for Plans, dated 11 May 1964; Subject: AMMUG/1 Information on Lee Harvey OSWALD. [XAAZ-27213 - FOIA Np. 687-295]

30. Blind Memorandum, dated 5 May 1964; Subject: Debriefing of AMMUG/1 - OSWALD Case.

31. Chronology of RGR Meetings with Members of the Warren Commission [XAAZ-27161]

32. Memorandum for the Record, dated 1 April 1975; Subject: Conversation with David W. BELIN, 1 April 1975.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event/Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 April 75</td>
<td>Memo for Record, R. Rocca</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Jan 64</td>
<td>DIR 392725</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 Nov 63</td>
<td>IN 67281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 May 64</td>
<td>Debriefing AMM 98/1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 May 64</td>
<td>FOIA 687-285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 Nov 64</td>
<td>FOIA 739-819</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 April 75</td>
<td>Letter from Belin to Knocks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 May 75</td>
<td>FOIA 689-298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 May 64</td>
<td>FOIA 695-302A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 April 64</td>
<td>FOIA 653-828</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 May 64</td>
<td>FOIA 697-294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 Feb 64</td>
<td>FOIA 559-243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 Nov 63</td>
<td>DIR 85573</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 April 64</td>
<td>Coleman-Sawson name</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 April 64</td>
<td>Coleman-Sawson name</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 June 64</td>
<td>Helen, name to Rankin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Jan 64</td>
<td>FOIA 509-803</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 Nov 64</td>
<td>FOIA 78-559</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 Nov 63</td>
<td>FOIA 113-48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 Nov 63</td>
<td>FOIA 187-622</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 Feb 64</td>
<td>FOIA 663-810</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 March 64</td>
<td>FOIA 590-252</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Jan 64</td>
<td>FOIA 486-771</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 March 64</td>
<td>FOIA 627-831</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Jan 63</td>
<td>FOIA 726-714</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Dec 63</td>
<td>CSC 823-764</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 Jan 64</td>
<td>FOIA 482-193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 Mar 64</td>
<td>FOIA 618-793</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Dec 63</td>
<td>FOIA 298-677</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 Jan 64</td>
<td>FOIA 777-884</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Jan 63</td>
<td>FOIA 313-292</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
25 Nov 64, 925-927
23 Nov 63, BP 636
13 Oct 64, memo from N. Ferris to W. Scott
Office of Security
Summary Report of
114 paragraphs of Gilber to Alvarez

Ugarte.

I will be retired by 026 through 05

GCC1875
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation with David W. Belin, 1 April 1975

Q: What was the line of reporting in CIA during the period I served as working level point-of-contact with the Warren Commission Staff?

A: It was a multiple levelled thing: (a) from the Commission and AHD personally via Mccone to Dick Helms; (b) from Helms to the two or three components primarily concerned (SE, then SB, Dave Murphy; LA, then WH; and CI). In practice the substantive SB input worked up by one of its research components headed by Lee Wigren--Minsk photo for example, et al--passed via CI. CI had own defector input. In addition, an sensitive matter of concern to the investigation, Dick Helms and Murphy also dealt directly with the Commission.

Q: Did you hear: ?? [two crypts, one sounded by "Jackenet"?]. I had not. Belin recalled that Castro had made a speech in which he had charged assassination intent by emigres and had promised retribution in kind if there was official support.

Q: Had any thought been given to the assumption that an anti-Castro assassination plot might have been underway, and fact it was known to Helms and to Castro? [Mr. Belin said he now knew that Helms was, in fact, aware of something underway regarding Castro. He had no evidence to show that I (RGR) had been informed about it.] Would that change any of the thinking re Oswald's Mexican trip and contacts?

A: Yes, I said, though I intended to give more potential importance to Oswald's KGB contacts and related that I and others--though recognizing the wisdom of the Warren Commission's handling--had felt there had been a lot to the Soviet aspect that should have been pursued.

   a. Fact that his two Soviet consular contacts in Mexico City had been identified as KGB and at least one (both?) had been traced organizationally to the 13th Department (assassinations).

SECRET EYES ONLY
SUBJECT: Conversation with David W. BELLIN, 7 April 1975

b. Our defector information strongly insists that all Western military defectors—like Oswald—were screened by the 13th Department.

c. Thinness of file turned over by Soviets in view of b.

I acknowledged in retrospect that Cuban hypothesis was worth reconsidering, though it would appear that period of solid inter-service (KGB-UCI) relations began later (i.e. after 1967-68, Venceremos, etc.).

Q: Why did Oswald's lies include a denial to Dallas police that he had made the Mexican trip unless there was something important to hide about it? All his other lies concerned key factual elements of his cover story. Why also did Marina deny she knew anything about the Mexican trip in her first story to the FBI—which she later rectified before the Warren Commission? Mr. Bellin noted that he had left the hypothesis of Castro/Cuban involvement open in his book. He added that it would have been important to have known the facts about the anti-Castro plot at the time of the Warren Commission investigation. He felt the least he would have done would have been to have insisted on the polygraphing of Marina Oswald regarding her knowledge of Oswald's Mexican trip.

Raymond G. Rocca
Counter Intelligence Operations

SECRET EYES ONLY
Chronology of RGR Meetings with Members of the Warren Commission

14 January 1964  RANKIN, WILLINS
12 March 1964  RANKIN
27 March 1964  WILLINS ET AL (LIEBLER)
26 May 1964  "LIEBLAND" re DeMohrenschild
28 August 1964*  "Commission" (Stimson)
12 October 1964  "Commission" (Stimson, Goldberg)

*Believe Mr. Rocca was at the Commission at least one other day
(probably Saturday, the 29th) reviewing proofs.

---

Page 5 of 212
COPY NO.
Subject: General

Specific: OSWALD CASE

The source does not have direct knowledge of Lee Harvey Oswald or his activities except for his association with Cuban Intelligence Officers assigned to the Dirección General de Inteligencia, of which the source himself was a staff officer. The information appears below was furnished by the source and is keyed to questions submitted by KGB.

1. Prior to October 1961, OSWALD visited the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City on two or three occasions. Before, during, and after these visits, OSWALD was in contact with the Dirección General de Inteligencia (DGI), specifically with Luisa CALDERON, Manuel VEGA Perez and Rosendo RODRIGUEZ Lopez.

VEGA, whose Cuban intelligence pseudonym is MARCOS, is the current Cuban IS chief in Mexico. He recently had a tour of duty in Havana, prior to which he held the same post as Osval's Cuban IS chief in Mexico.

RODRIGUEZ is a Cuban IS staff officer in Mexico. He has three Cuban intelligence pseudonyms, Eliantio, Castaño, and Jose Antonio.

The precise relationship of Luisa CALDERON to the DGI is not clear. She spent about six months in Mexico from which she returned to Cuba early in 1961.

CURRENT: WH/SA/CI has the following references concerning Luisa CALDERON Carrilero: She was assigned to the commercial office of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City, and she arrived in Mexico on 26 January 1963 and on 11 December 1963 made a reservation to return to Cuba on Cubana Airlines "REX" 737, 13 December 1963 IN-3035, HS-0153. She left Mexico City for Havana on 15 December 1963 using passport E-6377 "REX" 7423, 17 December 1963, IN-52692. Another reference "REX" 20058, 25 March 1963, said that her date of arrival in Mexico was 19 January 1963 and that she had replaced Rosario VAREZ, a Mexican secretary in the commercial office. Other references apparently concerning the subject are "REX" 6623 and "REX" 3025 IN-56591 dated 25 January 1963 which do not appear to add anything of interest to that given above.

2. The source does not know whether or not the Cuban Services used OSWALD in any agent capacity or other manner.

3. A. When news of the assassination of President Kennedy reached the DGI, it caused much concern concerning the fact OSWALD had been in the Cuban
Embassy in Mexico. In addition, orders were issued for all headquarters and
field officers of the DII to sort and package all documents according to whether
they were "Top Secret," "Secret," "Confidential," and "Important." The material once
packaged was to be held pending further instructions. In addition, all travel by DII officers and all DII
passports were suspended temporarily.

3. When the news that OSWALD was the assassin reached the DII, there
was no immediate comment but, when Fidel CASTRO spoke on television to deny
Cuban involvement, there was considerable comment concerning OSWALD's visit to
the Cuban Embassy in Mexico. At this time VADA, who has been mentioned previously,
was in Cuba and contacted a group of DII staff officers that OSWALD had come
to the Cuban Embassy in Mexico to request a visa but had been refused. VADA
did not give any details and the subject was not pursued.

4. It is not known whether information on OSWALD's visit to the Cuban
Consulate in Mexico in September 1963 was relayed to any Cuban services.

5. It is not known if the Cuban intelligence services had contact with
the New Orleans' Fair Play for Cuba Committee.

6. The only Molina who is recalled as "The Hook," the Cuban who was con-
victed in New York City for the murder of a young girl during a clash between
two Cuban groups. The DII staff officer who had been in the United Nations in
New York, CASTELLO, had traveled to Cuba with "The Hook" and with another Cuban
newspaperman. Upon arrival in Cuba, he tried to obtain employment for both
individuals. The names Pedro Charles and Peter have no known significance.

7. The reaction of Soviet officials in contact with the Cuban intelli-
gence services is not known.

8. Nothing is known about Soviet proposals following the news of President
Kennedy's assassination.

9. The only fabrication known is the special matter by Fidel CASTRO pre-
viously mentioned.

10. Nothing is known about Jack RUBENSTEIN aka Jack RUM.

11. The name Gilberto LEONE is not familiar but, if he visited DII head-
quarters, a photograph of him possibly could be identified.

12. OSWALD's photo was seen in the newspapers but nothing is known about
him other than what appeared in the press.

2
Proposed Questions on Oswald Case

1. Was Lee Harvey OSWALD known to the Cuban intelligence services before 23 November 1963? If so, which service?

2. Were the Cuban services using OSWALD in any agent capacity, or in any other manner, before 23 November 1963?

3. What was the reaction of the Cuban intelligence services to news of President Kennedy's assassination? To the news that OSWALD was the assassin?

4. Was information on OSWALD's visit to the Cuban Consulate in Mexico City in September 1953, relayed to any Cuban service? If so, what action was taken?

5. Was there any contact between the Cuban intelligence services and the New Orleans' Fair Play For Cuba Committee?

6. Has subject ever heard of Mario del ROSARIO Molina, or Pedro Charles known also as "Peter"?

7. How did the Soviet officials in contact with the Cuban intelligence services react to news of the assassination?

8. Did the Soviets propose any type of action or investigation to the Cuban intelligence services following the news of President Kennedy's assassination?

9. Was any provocative material deliberately fabricated by the Cuban services or others and sent to the United States to confuse the investigation of the OSWALD case?

10. Was Jack MARGURIT aka Jack RUBY known to the Cuban intelligence services? If so, in what way?

11. Does subject know a Calberto LOPEZ who entered Mexico on November 23, 1963 at Nuevo Laredo, Texas and four days later proceeded to Havana by special plane? He was 23 years old and carried a U.S. passport. He also had a Mexican tourist permit. Develop all information you can on this individual.

12. Attached is a photograph of OSWALD, and a letter from Havana which is self-explanatory for guidance of the case officer. Under no circumstances should the contents of the letter be made known to the subject. This information came from the Secret Service and FBI.
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT: AMMUG/1 Information on Lee Harvey OSWALD

1. This memorandum is for information and for action. The proposed lines of action are indicated in paragraph 4.

2. AMMUG/1, the Cuban Intelligence Service defector, has produced information of interest to the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy. CI Staff learned of AMMUG/1 on 30 April. A questionnaire was submitted by the Staff on 1 May (Attachment A). Mr. Swenson, who is handling the AMMUG/1 debriefing, provided a reply on 5 May (Attachment B). It was clear from Mr. Swenson's summary that AMMUG/1 had information bearing on the OSWALD relationship with the Cuban Embassy and Cuban intelligence personnel in Mexico City, albeit his knowledge was not that of a direct participant in matters affecting OSWALD. A follow-up questionnaire was submitted to AMMUG/1 on 6 May (Attachment C). Mr. Swenson's reply was dated 8 May (Attachment D). Attention is directed particularly to the content of paragraph two of Attachment D.

3. We have the problem of reconciling the operational exploitation of AMMUG/1 and satisfying the responsibilities we have undertaken with Mr. Rankin. AMMUG/1 is such an operational gold mine that Mr. Swenson wants, at a maximum, two months to work fully. It is palpable, however, that we must furnish to the Commission the substance of AMMUG/1's...
information on OSWALD before that. On the previous record of our association with the Commission, particularly with Mr. Rankin, it seems possible for the Agency to work out an arrangement with Mr. Rankin personally that would take care of their needs and ours after a frank discussion of the equities.

4. It is recommended that the DDP in person or via a designee, preferably the former, discuss the AMMUG/1 situation on a very restricted basis with Mr. Rankin at his earliest convenience either at the Agency or at the Commission headquarters. Until this takes place, it is not desirable to put anything in writing.

Raymond G. Rocca
Chief, CI Research and Analysis

Attachments

cc: C/CI
C/WH/6 (without att)
C/WH/SA/CI (without att)
Proposed Questions on Oswald Case

REFERENCE: Debriefing of ABUC-1, dated 5 May 1964

The source says that prior to October 1963, Oswald visited the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City on two or three occasions. It is public knowledge he was in Mexico during the period 9-26-63 to 10-3-63.

A) When did source learn of these visits - before or after the assassination? Please describe in detail the circumstances under which source learned this information and identities of the persons involved.

B) Did these visits take place during the aforementioned period or is the source referring to previous visits. If the latter, try to get more specific details regarding these trips and the origin of the source's information.

2. The source states that before, during, and after these visits, Oswald was in contact with the DGI, specifically Luis CALDERON, Ismael VISTA FERES and Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez. This would appear to mean that one or more contacts were made after Oswald returned to the United States i.e., between 10-3-63 and 11-22-63.

A) What does source mean by contact?

B) Can he break down these contacts by the specific individual named, place and type of contact, and date of occurrence?

C) Did Oswald know or have reason to suspect the intelligence connections of these persons?

D) What was the purpose of these contacts?
1. If Oswald did not know the intelligence affiliations of these individuals, what prompted, if any, were employed in contacting him?

2. Did source ever see any documentary material on any of these contacts, or any correspondence initiated by or addressed to Oswald?

3. Did the DGI ever employ physical surveillance, technical devices or camera equipment to cover these contacts?

4. The source says he does not know whether the Cuban services used Oswald in any agent capacity or otherwise. This obviously makes it more important to check out what the source meant in question one.

5. Did the DGI ever initiate an investigation of Oswald?

6. What was the reason for passing files at DGI headquarters and field offices after news of the assassination was received?

7. Source was asked whether any provocative material was deliberately fabricated by the Cubans (Question 7) to confuse the investigation of Oswald. The reply attributed to him was, "the only fabrication known in the special matter by Fidel CASTRO previously mentioned." Please clarify.
MEMORANDUM FOR:  Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff  
Attention: Mr. Roca

SUBJECT General:  Debriefing of AMMUG-1  
Specific:  The Oswald Case

REFERENCE:  Blind Memorandum dated 05 May 1964

1. Reference is made to a telephone conversation yesterday with Chief, CI Staff concerning this matter.

2. Because I am not aware of the information already available to the Commission investigating the Oswald Case or furnished by the Agency, my debriefing of the Source has been based on the questions prepared by the CI Staff and on what the Source answers have suggested. I shall be glad to pursue any other topics suggested by CI Staff.

3. The following information in addition to that in the reference might be of interest:

   a. Luisa Calderon, since she returned to Cuba, has been paid a regular salary by the DGI even though she has not performed any services. Her home is in the Vedado section where the rents are high.

   b. Source has known Calderon for several years. Before going to Mexico, she worked in the Ministry of exterior commerce in the department which was known as the Empresa Transimport. Her title was Secretary General of the Communist Youth in the department named in the previous sentence.

   c. Luisa Calderon was transferred directly from her position in the Ministry of exterior commerce to a post in Mexico, a matter of surprise to the Source.

   d. Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez (DGI pseudo MORCOS), shortly before he left Cuba for Mexico on or about 16 April 1964, saw Calderon.
4. As explained to CI Staff any publicity which would reveal the identity of the Source, his defection to KUBARK, or the extent of his knowledge of DCI activities might prejudice the operational use of the Source himself and of information which he has provided. Accordingly, it might be appropriate to point out to the Commission (as agreed by DC/WH/SA) that KUBARK hopes, by using the Source, to obtain access to DCI personnel including those mentioned in paragraph 3 above.

Harold F. Swenson
Chief, WH/SA/CI
6 May 1964

Proposed Questions on Oswald Case

REFERENCE: Debriefing of ASUG-1, dated 5 May 1964

1. The source says that prior to October 1963, Oswald visited the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City on two or three occasions. It is public knowledge he was in Mexico during the period 9-26-63 to 10-3-63.

   A) When did source learn of these visits - before or after the assassination? Please describe in detail the circumstances under which source learned this information and identities of the persons involved.

   B) Did these visits take place during the aforementioned period or is the source referring to previous visits. If the latter, try to get more specific details regarding these trips and the origin of the source's information.

2. The source states that before, during, and after these visits Oswald was in contact with the DGI, specifically Luisa CALDERON, Manuel VEGA Perez and Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez. This would appear to mean that one or more contacts were made after Oswald returned to the United States i.e., between 10-3-63 and 11-22-63.

   A) What does source mean by contact?

   B) Can he break down these contacts by the specific individual named, place and type of contact, and date of occurrence?

   C) Did Oswald know or have reason to suspect the Intelligence connections of these persons?

   D) What was the purpose of these contacts?
E) If Oswald did not know the intelligence affiliations of those individuals, what pretext, if any, were employed in contacting him?

F) Did source ever see any documentary material on any of these contacts, or any correspondence initiated by or addressed to Oswald?

G) Did the DGI ever employ physical surveillences, technical devices or camera equipment to cover these contacts.

H) The source says he does not know whether the Cuban services used Oswald in any agent capacity or otherwise. This obviously makes it more important to check out what the source meant in question one.

3. Did the DGI ever initiate an investigation of Oswald?

4. What was the reason for packaging files at DGI headquarters and field offices after news of the assassination was received?

5. Source was asked whether any provocative material was deliberately fabricated by the Cubans (Question 9) to confuse the investigation of Oswald. The reply attributed to him was, "the only fabrication known is the special matter by Fidel CASTRO previously mentioned." Please clarify.
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff
Attention: Mr. Rocca

SUBJECT General: Debriefing of AMMUG-1
Specific: The Oswald Case

REFERENCE: A. Blind Memorandum dated 05 May 1964
            B. Blind Memorandum dated 07 May 1964
            C. Conversations between CI Staff and
               C/WH/SA/CI

1. When the Oswald Case first was discussed with the Source the specific questions prepared by CI Staff were posed. The answers given by the Source were reported in Reference A. That memorandum which I dictated to a CI Staff stenographer appears accurate except for sentence 2 which should have said that the only possible "fabrication" known by Source was the specific denial by Fidel CASTRO, on a television program, of any Cuban knowledge of Oswald.

2. On 07 and 08 May 1964 I further discussed the Oswald Case with the Source in order to clarify exactly what he knew and what he had heard. In the light of the explanation given by him, I believe that a clearer understanding of what he knows can be reached if I record his knowledge without using the question and answer format. Accordingly, in the following paragraphs I shall report all the information given by the Source paraphrasing his explanations and comments.

"I have no personal knowledge of Lee Harvey OSWALD or his activities and I do not know that OSWALD was an agent of the Direcccion General de Inteligencia (DGI) or any other directorate or department of the Cuban Government.

I first heard of OSWALD after the assassination of President Kennedy when news media carried the name of OSWALD. Personnel in the DGI first commented about the case, so far as I can recall, one day after lunch when a group of officers, of whom I was one, were chatting. The officers present were about ten including Roberto SANTIESTEBAI, Norberto HERNANDEZ de Curbelo, Andres ARMONA, Pedro FARINAS Diaz and
Manuel VEGA Perez. Manuel VEGA Perez previously had been assigned to Mexico in the Cuban Consulate where he was the principal intelligence officer of the DGI. VEGA mentioned that OSWALD had gone to the Cuban Consulate two or three times in connection with a visa application during the time that VEGA was in Mexico. I gathered, although I do not know that VEGA made any specific statement to this effect, that VEGA personally had seen OSWALD. I well could have reached this conclusion because normally VEGA and his assistant in Mexico for the DGI, Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez, would see persons applying for a visa to go to Cuba. This is because DGI officers are charged with expediting the granting of visas of agents of the DGI. Such agents on appearing at the Consulate use a special phrase to indicate their relationship with the DGI. (I do not know the particular phrase used in every case. I do know that agents from El Salvador in requesting visas always made mention of the name "Mauricio".) The DGI officers at a Consulate interview visa applicants to find out if they are agents. If the visa applicant does not use one of the indicated phrases, the DGI officers instead of granting the visa immediately, tell the applicant to return in a few days. The officer then notifies Habana and requests authority for the visa. I cannot recall if VEGA even made the statement that he had requested permission to issue a visa to OSWALD, but I feel sure that he would have done so because VEGA had said that OSWALD had returned several times and this would be the usual procedure.

I believe that Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez also would have seen OSWALD because he worked with VEGA and also would have screened visa applicants.

I thought that Luisa CALDERON might have had contact with OSWALD because I learned about 17 March 1964, shortly before I made a trip to Mexico, that she had been involved with an American in Mexico. The information to which I refer was told to me by a DGI case officer named Norberto HERNANDEZ de Curbelo. (I remember the conversation with HERNANDEZ...
because he gave me $40.00 to buy some shoes and other items during my trip to Mexico. I had commented to HERNANDEZ that it seemed strange that Luisa CALDERON was receiving a salary from the DGI although she apparently did not do any work for the Service. HERNANDEZ told me that here was a peculiar case and that he himself believed that she had been recruited in Mexico by the Central Intelligence Agency although Manuel PINEIRO, the Head of the DGI, did not agree. As I recall, HERNANDEZ had investigated Luisa CALDERON. This was because, during the time she was in Mexico, the DGI had intercepted a letter to her by an American who signed his name as OWER (phonetic) or something similar. As you know, the pronunciation of Anglo-Saxon names is difficult in Spanish so I am not sure of how the name mentioned by HERNANDEZ should be spelled. It could have been “Howard” or something different. As I understood the matter, the letter from the American was a love letter but indicated that there was a clandestine-professional relationship between the writer and Luisa CALDERON. I also understood from HERNANDEZ that after the interception of the letter she had been followed and seen in the company of an American. I do not know if this could have been OSWALD. I, myself, considered the case of Luisa CALDERON unusual because I had known her before she went to Mexico when she worked in the Ministry of Exterior Commerce in the Empresa Transimport Department where she was Secretary General of Communist Youth. She was transferred directly from that position to a post in Mexico which seemed strange.

The only other person about whom you asked me in connection with this, whom I recall, is Sylvia DURAN and I know very little about her. What happened was that I was in the Cuban Embassy in Mexico on 23 March, 1964 about 1:30 in the afternoon preparing to return to Havana the same day. I was talking to some other Cubans including Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez and fmu BUENAVENTURA of the Cuban Embassy; a courier named "Enio", a courier named "Tato"; and one other Cuban whom I cannot recall. We saw a pretty girl standing at the end of the reception room and someone asked who she was, and one of the group said it was Sylvia DURAN.
I recall that after the news of the assassination of President Kennedy reached the DGI, orders were issued for all offices of the DGI at Headquarters and in the field, to sort and package all documents according to whether they were "muy secreto" (very secret), "secreto" (secret), or "importante" (important). The material, once packaged, was to be held pending further instructions. All travel by DGI officers and all DGI pouches were suspended temporarily. In addition, I recall that DGI Headquarters personnel were instructed either to remain in the DGI Headquarters offices or to keep the DGI aware of their whereabouts so that they could be reached immediately. I do not know the reason for these measures but I believe it logical that they were issued because of the possibility that the United States might take some type of action against Cuba and the DGI offices. As nearly as I can recall, we were able to unpack DGI files and use them normally about the 3rd of December 1963."

3. In brief, the Source does not claim to have any significant information concerning the assassination of President Kennedy or about the activities of OSWALD. If the paraphrased comments of the Source are considered to need further clarification, I suggest that Mr. Rocca, who is most familiar with the details of the OSWALD Case, talk to the Source. This can be arranged at any time. Meanwhile, I shall have a question asked in a forthcoming LCFLUTTER to determine whether or not the Source seems to have concealed any information on this matter.

Harold F. Swenson
Chief, WH/SA/CI
I think you will be particularly interested in paragraph 3 of Mr. Dooley's memo of record, attached. Art went over to wind up loose end we had with regard to the AMMUG information we had previously furnished.

Rock

BY HAND

Document Number: 739-319
for FOIA Review on: JUN 1976
SAME AS:
1193-953
201-289.248

CCG1855
SOURCE EVALUATION:

The Source is believed to be very reliable. We have established through independent evidence and cross-checking that the major part of the intelligence information furnished by him is unquestionably true. For example, we knew independent of this Source that Manuel VEGA Perez and Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez were Cuban intelligence officers in Mexico.
1. On 15 May 1964, we provided the President's Commission with a summary of our debriefing of Cuban defector AMUG 1 who had no personal knowledge of Oswald and no information linking him to the Cuban intelligence services in any manner. As a follow-up, Mr. Howard P. Willens of the Commission asked if he could see the questions used in the interrogation.

2. On 18 June, I took the questions and source’s responses to the Commission and showed them to Mr. Willens. He studied them and returned the questions to us with the observation that they were very thorough and fully satisfied his requirements. He said that he saw no need to pursue this further. The questions and answers exhibited to Mr. Willens are attached. At no time during our contacts with the Commission did we disclose the source’s identity or cryptonyms.

3. Mr. Willens indicated that the Commission was winding up its investigation. He was highly complimentary of CIA, referring to the agency personnel he encountered here and in Mexico as “real professionals.” Mr. Willens asked that I convey his best regards to you.
Proposed Questions on Oswald Case

REFERENCE: Debriefing of Cuban Source dated 3 May 1964

1. The source says that prior to October 1963, Oswald visited the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City on two or three occasions. It is public knowledge he was in Mexico during the period 9-26-63 to 10-3-63.

   A) When did source learn of these visits - before or after the assassination? Please describe in detail the circumstances under which source learned this information and identities of the persons involved.

   B) Did these visits take place during the aforementioned period or is the source referring to previous visits. If the latter, try to get more specific details regarding these trips and the origin of the getter's information.

2. The source states that before, during, and after these visits Oswald was in contact with the DFI, specifically Luis Callejo, Manuel Vega Perez and Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez. This would appear to mean that one or more contacts were made after Oswald returned to the United States i.e., between 10-3-63 and 11-22-63.

   A) What does source mean by contact?

   B) Can he break down these contacts by the specific individual involved, place and type of contact, and date of occurrence?

   C) Did Oswald know or have reason to suspect the intelligence connections of these persons?

   D) What was the purpose of these contacts?

   E) If Oswald did not know the intelligence affiliations of these individuals, what pretext, if any, were employed in contacting him?

   F) Did source ever see any documentary material or any of these contacts, or any correspondences initiated by or addressed to Oswald?
G) Did the DGI ever employ physical surveillances, technical devices or camera equipment to cover those contacts?

H) The source says he does not know whether the Cuban services used Oswald in any agent capacity or otherwise. This obviously makes it more important to check out what the source meant in question 5.

3. Did the DGI ever initiate an investigation of Oswald?

4. What was the reason for packaging files at DGI headquarters and field offices after news of the assassination was received?

5. Source was asked whether any provocative material was deliberately fabricated by the Cubans (Question 9) to confuse the investigation of Oswald. The reply attributed to him was, "the only fabrication known is the special matter by Fidel CASTRO previously mentioned." Please clarify.

Addendum 18 June with reference to 45;

The only possible fabrication known by source was the specific denial by Fidel CASTRO on a TV program of any Cuban knowledge of Oswald.
5 May 1964

Subject - General: Debriefing of Cuban Source
Specific: OSWALD Case

The source does not have direct knowledge of Lee Harvey OSWALD or his activities but was able to provide items of interest based on Cuban intelligence officers assigned to the Direccion General De Inteligencia. The information appearing below was furnished by the source and is keyed to questions submitted.

1. Prior to October 1963, OSWALD visited the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City on two or three occasions. Before, during and after these visits, OSWALD was in contact with the Direccion General De Inteligencia (DGI), specifically with Luisa CALDERON, Manuel VEGA Perez and Rogelio RODRIGUEZ Lopez.

VEGA whose Cuban intelligence pseudonym is MARCOS is the current Cuban IS chief in Mexico. He recently has had a tour of duty in Habana, prior to which he held the same post as now as Cuban IS chief in Mexico.

RODRIGUEZ is a Cuban IS staff officer in Mexico. He has three Cuban intelligence pseudonyms, Eduardo, Casimiro and Jose Antonio.

The precise relationship of Luisa CALDERON to the DGI is not clear. She spent about six months in Mexico from which she returned to Cuba early in 1964.

2. The source does not know whether or not the Cuban Services used OSWALD in any agent capacity or other manner.

3. A. When news of the assassination of President Kennedy reached the DGI, it caused much comment concerning the fact OSWALD had been in the Cuban Embassy in Mexico. In addition, orders were issued for all headquarters and field officers of the DGI to sort and package all documents according to whether they...
were "Muy secreto" (very secret), "secreto" (secret), and "importante" (important). The material once packaged was to be held pending further instructions. In addition, all travel by DGI officers and all DGI pouches were suspended temporarily.

B. When the news that OSWALD was the assassin reached DGI, there was no immediate comment but, when Fidel CASTRO spoke on television to deny Cuban involvement, there was considerable comment concerning OSWALD's visit to the Cuban Embassy in Mexico. At this time VEGA, who has been mentioned previously, was in Cuba and commented to a group of DGI staff officers that OSWALD had come to the Cuban Embassy in Mexico to request a visa but had been refused. VEGA did not give any details and the subject was not pursued.

4. It is not known whether information on OSWALD's visit to the Cuban Consulate in Mexico in September 1963 was relayed to any Cuban service.

5. It is not known if the Cuban intelligence services had contact with the New Orleans' Fair Play for Cuba Committee.

6. The only Molina who is recalled is "The Hook", the Cuban who was convicted in New York City for the murder of a young girl during a clash between two Cuban groups. The DGI staff officer who had been in the United Nations in New York, SANTIESTABAN traveled to Cuba with "The Hook" and with another Cuban named ORHUELA and upon arrival in Cuba tried to obtain employment for both individuals. The names Pedro Charles and Peter have no known significance.

7. The reaction of Soviet officials in contact with the Cuban intelligence services is not known.

8. Nothing is known about Soviet proposals following the news of President Kennedy's assassination.

9. The only fabrication known is the special matter by Fidel CASTRO previously mentioned.

10. Nothing is known about Jack RUBENSTEIN aka Jack RUBY.

11. The name Gilberto LOPEZ is not familiar but, if he visited DGI headquarters, a photograph of him possibly could be identified.

12. OSWALD's photo was seen in the newspapers but nothing is known about him other than what appeared in the press.
Proposed Questions on Oswald Case

1. Was Lee Harvey OSWALD known to the Cuban intelligence services before 23 November, 1963? If so, which service?

2. Were the Cuban services using OSWALD in any agent capacity, or in any other manner, before 23 November 1963?

3. What was the reaction of the Cuban intelligence services to news of President Kennedy's assassination? To the news that OSWALD was the assassin?

4. Was information on OSWALD's visit to the Cuban Consulate in Mexico City in September 1963, relayed to any Cuban service? If so, what action was taken?

5. Was there any contact between the Cuban intelligence services and the New Orleans' Fair Play for Cuba Committee?

6. Has subject ever heard of Mario del ROSARIO Molina, or Pedro Charles known also as "Peter"?

7. How did the Soviet officials in contact with the Cuban intelligence services react to news of the assassination?

8. Did the Soviets propose any type of action or investigation to the Cuban intelligence services following the news of President Kennedy's assassination?

9. Was any provocative material deliberately fabricated by the Cuban services or others and sent to the United States to confuse the investigation of the OSWALD case?

10. Was Jack RUBENSTEIN aka Jack RUBY known to the Cuban intelligence services? If so, in what way?

11. Does subject know a Gilberto LOPEZ who entered Mexico on November 23, 1963 at Nuevo Laredo, Texas and four days later proceeded to Havana by special plane. He was 23 years old and carried a U.S. passport. He also had a Mexican tourist permit. Develop all information you can on this individual.
12. Attached is a photograph of OSWALD, and a letter from Havana which is self-explanatory for guidance of the case officer. Under no circumstances should the contents of the letter be made known to the subject. This information came from the Secret Service and FBI.
Mr. E. Henry Knoche
Assistant to the Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Knoche:

As you know, there have been allegations that the CIA was involved in a plan to assassinate Fidel Castro. For the purposes of this letter, we will assume that these allegations are correct, and based upon this assumption I would like to know the answers to the following questions:

1. Did anyone with the CIA tell any member of the Warren Commission or any lawyer serving on the Warren Commission staff that such plans had been underway? If the answer is yes, we would like to know what person or persons with the Agency delivered said information, to whom it was delivered, when it was delivered, what specifically was told or said, what documents there are to support the answers to the foregoing questions, and what response, if any, was received from the Warren Commission. If the Commission was not told about this, why was it not told and who made the decision not to deliver such information to the Warren Commission?

2. There is evidence that Castro, prior to November 22, 1963, knew about the existence of such plans and the possible involvement of the U.S. Government. Did the CIA at any time prior to the completion of the Warren Commission investigation have any documents or other information indicating that Castro may have known about such plans? If the answer is yes, would you please furnish up with copies of all such documents and details of any such information.

3. Several months prior to the assassination of President Kennedy there is evidence of a public speech by Castro that was printed by the Associated Press whereby Castro alluded...
to possible assassination attempts on his life and possible retaliation. Would you please advise us if there is any evidence that the Associated Press report may have appeared in any newspapers in the United States, including specifically any newspapers in Dallas or New Orleans. Would you also advise us if you have any other information of public statements of any Cuban leader prior to November 22, 1963 indicating any awareness of possible assassination plots on the lives of Cuban leaders.

4. Would you please advise us if there is any information in CIA records to indicate that at any time prior to November 22, 1963 any foreign government or any foreign group was considering a possible assassination of any American leader. If so, would you please advise us of all details and also advise us who in the United States Government outside the CIA was advised of these plans or possibilities.

5. Prior to his death Lyndon Johnson supposedly stated that he believed that although there was no doubt that Oswald killed Kennedy and Tippett, nevertheless Oswald might have been a part of a conspiracy in retaliation to possible United States assassination attempts in Cuba. Would you please advise us of any information in Agency files showing whether or not there was any communication to President Johnson of any possible plans involving the attempted assassinations of any Cuban leader and if the answer is yes, also give us all details involving this matter.

Sincerely yours,

David W. Belin
Executive Director
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Rocca

Subject: Memo Regarding Agency's Position in Dealing with Hoover Commission

1. The DDP called me this afternoon, 12 May, to state that the Director has received a telephone call from RANKIN regarding the Commission's desire to interview him at 1030 AM, Thursday. Mr. HOOVER is scheduled to appear at 9:00 on that morning.

2. The DDP wishes to have from you a short but comprehensive memorandum which highlights the basic issues or positions entered into by the Agency in its dealings with the Commission. For example, RANKIN indicated that the Commission would wish to hear the Director's views as to how improvements might be made in protecting the President's life. Further, they will probably ask questions regarding the possibilities that a conspiracy existed. Such general questioning certainly necessitates that the DCI be made aware of the positions taken during previous interviews. I raised with Mr. HELMS the nature of the recent information which you are processing which originated with the sensitive WH source. I informed him that in your view this would raise a number of new factors with the Commission, that it should not go to the Commission prior to the Director's appearance unless we have first had some preliminary reaction or made sure that the Director is fully aware of its implications since it could well serve as the basis for detailed questioning. The DDP stated that he would review this carefully and made a decision as to the question of timing.

3. Given the schedule, you will appreciate that the DDP will need a paper covering the above points as soon as possible.
Brief for Presentation to
President's Commission on the Assassination
of President Kennedy

14 May 1964

Document Number 695-302 A
for FOIA Review on JUN 1975

CS COPY
SECRET

201-289248
6301867

REPRODUCTION
PROHIBITED

PAGE 34 of 212

REPRODUCTION
PROHIBITED
Summary Outline

This brief is concerned with five topics which, it is anticipated, will arise in the course of the Director's appearance before the President's Commission. These are:

a. Formal and unqualified negation by the DCI of any contact or association, direct or indirect, between the Central Intelligence Agency and Lee Harvey Oswald. This should be accompanied by the tabling of an affidavit signed by the Director and notarized. (TAB A)

b. A formal assurance by the Director that all information in the possession of the Agency regarding Oswald's activities and associations outside of the United States has been made available to the Commission through its staff, with which there has been close and frequent contacts since the inception of the Commission's activities. (TAB B)

c. An interim pronouncement by the DCI on the problem of conspiratorial responsibility for Oswald's
activity. It is suggested that the DCI take the position that at this time there is no conclusive evidence of conspiratorial sponsorship of Oswald; that all Agency information bearing on this problem has been furnished to the Commission for evaluation and consideration in the framework of its total knowledge of the facts. The Agency, at the present time, is lacking any knowledge of recent information or documentation furnished by the Soviet Government to the Commission with respect to Oswald's activity in the Soviet Union. (TAB C)

d. The DCI's suggestions for improving policy and organization with respect to the personal security of the President. Certain steps relating strictly to the Agency's jurisdiction have already been suggested by memorandum. It is proposed that the Director now make specific suggestions involving legislation which would treat information bearing on the personal security of the President and, advisedly, other Federal officials directly related to national security affairs in a manner similar to what currently exists by statute for special
nuclear material or weapons introduced to the United States or manufactured therein (The Atomic Weapons Awards Act of 15 July 1955). (TAB D)
e. Oswald's activity in Mexico and his possible relationship to the Cuban Intelligence Service.

Substantive information of grave concern to the security of sources and methods have been developed on both of these topics. The information and, in certain instances, knowledge with respect to acquisition has been made available on a highly restricted basis to Mr. Rankin and to certain elements of his staff. It is recommended that the DCI not respond on the record to queries on these topics. He should suggest that all such "technical questions" be worked out in detail through the channels and procedures that have functioned very well -- we believe -- between the Commission and particular CIA components. (TAB E)
Formal Disclaimer of any Relationship with Lee Harvey Oswald

There have been rumors and allegations which began immediately after the assassination which branded Oswald as a U.S. Government agent. In many instances, CIA has been named as his sponsor. The authorship, geographical dispersion throughout the world, the identity of themes and the timing lend strong support to the conclusion that these charges are elements of a world-wide, Soviet-sponsored propaganda and misinformation program.

As DCI, Mr. McCone welcomes this appearance before the Commission to make a categorical and unqualified denial of these unprincipled distortions of the historical and personal responsibilities for what was a dastardly and heinous act. In witness of this, the DCI submits to the Commission an affidavit which formalizes this statement. The affidavit is attached.

It is recommended that the DCI state concurrently with this action that he desires to draw the Commission's attention to the fact that the irresponsible charges that have been made, sponsored
and replayed by Soviet bloc and Communist individuals and organs since the assassination of the President, recall the methods and the purposes of the broader campaign against American intelligence and security components which has built up momentum over the past six years. We have traced the sponsorship of that campaign directly to individuals and components within the Soviet police state apparatus. Their unscrupulous treatment of the Oswald case was neither new as a method nor a surprise as an occurrence.

If the DCI is challenged by anyone on the Commission about the substance or implication of his affidavit, it is recommended that response be along the following lines:

CIA is a democratic institution. The DCI has incorporated in his affidavit the results of detailed and painstaking examination. If any qualification is raised with respect to the affidavit, he willingly undertakes the extraordinary step of releasing any individual in CIA to appear before the Commission and to testify with respect to any knowledge bearing on the Commission's task.
APPELAVIT OF JOHN A. MCCONE

STATE OF VIRGINIA;

COUNTY OF FAIRFAX;

JOHN A. MCCONE, being duly sworn, deposes and says that he is the Director of Central Intelligence, and that based on his personal knowledge of the affairs of the Central Intelligence Agency and on detailed inquiries he caused to be made by the officers within the Central Intelligence Agency who would have knowledge about any relationship Lee Harvey Oswald may have had with that Agency, he certifies that:

Lee Harvey Oswald was not an agent, employee, or informant of the Central Intelligence Agency;

the Agency never contacted him, interviewed him, talked with him, or received or solicited any reports or information from him, or communicated with him, directly or indirectly, in any other manner;

the Agency never furnished him any funds or money, or compensated him, directly or indirectly, in any fashion; and

Lee Harvey Oswald was never associated or connected, directly or indirectly, in any way whatsoever with the Agency.

(L.S.)

JOHN A. MCCONE

Subscribed and sworn to this day of 1964, before me, a Notary Public in and for the State of Virginia, by the said JOHN A. MCCONE, who is personally known to me and he duly acknowledged to me the execution of the foregoing instrument.

Notary Public

My commission expires

(Seal)

PAGE 41 of 212
TAB B

Dissemination of Information to the Commission

The DCI should make the general statement that CIA has supplied all the information in its possession regarding the activities, affiliations and associations of Oswald. Copies of the reports and access to original data, in specific instances, has been given to Commission representatives in accordance with the DCI's expressed instruction from the inception that the Agency place itself completely at the Commission's disposition.

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED
The Problem of Conspiracy

The DCI should note that from the start he had given specific indications to Agency personnel working on the Commission's problems that all information bearing on Oswald's possible relationships with foreign sponsors be made available to the Commission. The DCI may state that he is gratified that his instructions have been carried out diligently and promptly. Among the items of information provided the Commission have been studies on the organization and functions of components of the Soviet police state which are known to include individuals and units charged with the performance of what is euphemistically referred to as "executive action" -- but is, in fact, charged with assassination and sabotage.

The DCI should state that no firm evidence has thus far developed abroad linking known Soviet, Soviet bloc or Cuban intelligence and assassination personnel or organizations with the act committed by Lee Harvey Oswald in Dallas on 22 November 1963.
It is recommended that the DCI handle any questions from the Commission with respect to the apparently favorable treatment afforded Oswald in the USSR, the withdrawal of his wife, his possible contact there with Soviet State Security (the KGB), and related questions which would tend to establish Oswald's associational link with Soviet intelligence as "technical questions" and, therefore, beyond the scope of present testimony. It is suggested that he rest on the fact that the Commission has taken up these points item-by-item with the technical levels of the Agency and that the ultimate findings and evaluation can only be determined by the Commission.
Suggestions for Improving Policy and Organization Regarding Presidential Security

Mr. Rankin raised this question directly by letter. In its response, the Agency confined itself to elements relating to its statutory mission. Specifically, it was suggested that:

a. The Secret Service, or Treasury, record with the Office of Central Reference a formal requirement for information relating to Presidential security.

b. It was suggested that, if the Secret Service intended to expand its intelligence coverage of possible threats to the President's security, our experience showed that it would need a specialized organizational component to handle that task within the Secret Service itself.

c. The CIA reply also noted that the Agency was in direct touch with the Secret Service regarding the possible utilization by that agency of our experience in machine data processing. On the public record, it is suggested that the DCI not repeat this detail.
In his presentation to the Commission after referring to these earlier suggestions, the DCI should state that he desires to take the opportunity to offer a suggestion which he has not tabled heretofore.

The Commission's major problem has been the assessment of personal motive and the relationship of an individual act to possible conspiratorial guidance. Because conspiracy is the core of the problem, the DCI should point out the possibility of legislative action which might be an assistance in preventing recurrence of the national calamity it is investigating. There is an analogy at close hand between the problem of developing in advance information relating to Presidential security and the problem faced by the country a few years ago regarding the clandestine introduction or manufacture in the U.S. of special nuclear material or atomic weapons. The remedy devised at that time was embodied in the Atomic Weapons Reward Act of 15 July 1955 (29 Stat 365, PL.165, 84th Congress). In essence, the Act established a substantial reward ($500,000) for information bearing on the Act provided by any person, and in certain instances privileged treatment for such persons -- for example, asylum if they were
foreigners, was assured. Finally, a Reward Board was created to administer the purposes of the Act.

1) The DCI should suggest that the Commission consider a recommendation for original legislative action designed to induce individuals to furnish information bearing on Presidential security by offering a substantial reward and preferential treatment. The DCI should assure the Commission that he is convinced that the substantial award, the special treatment, and the publicity which would attend the implementing legislation in this matter could represent a significant inducement even to staff officers and personnel of secret associations and state security organs abroad whose functions include assassination and sabotage. It is these individuals who would be privy to plans of executive action. The reward would constitute additional inducement for such individuals to take the risk of making important disclosures.

The suggestion does not rest on the material elements of reward and special treatment. The DCI can assure the Commission that we are aware that personnel in police state apparatuses charged with the assassination and sabotage functions have repeatedly expressed and, in many cases, acted upon their repugnance for
such work and for the system which calls upon them to do it.

There are specific cases in the past ten years which document this assertion. Trusted personnel charged with assassination missions have abandoned the mission even without the assurance or the inducement which the DCI is here proposing.

In making this suggestion, the DCI may go one step further in advising the Commission to suggest that the Commission examine the advisability of legislation making it a Federal offense to conspire and to kill the Chief Executive. 3) The DCI could also indicate that the Commission might desire to suggest that any legislation along these lines should be enlarged to include conspiracy to kill any Federal official in the President's personal circle of official associates directly concerned with national security affairs. (The Agency's Legal Counsel states that draft bills have been considered on the Hill.)
ATOMIC WEAPONS REWARDS ACT


"It is enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as the "Atomic Weapons Rewards Act of 1955".

"Sec. 2. Any person who furnishes original information to the United States—

(a) leading to the finding or other acquisition by the United States of any special nuclear material or atomic weapon which has been introduced into the United States, or which has been manufactured or acquired therein contrary to the laws of the United States, or

(b) with respect to an attempted introduction into the United States or an attempted manufacture or acquisition therein of any special nuclear material or atomic weapon, contrary to the laws of the United States, shall be rewarded by the payment of an amount not to exceed $200,000.

"Sec. 3. An Awards Board consisting of the Secretary of the Treasury (who shall be the Chairman), the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the Director of Central Intelligence, and of one member of the Atomic Energy Commission designated by that Commission, shall determine whether any person furnishing information to the United States is entitled to any award and the amount thereof to be paid pursuant to section 2. In determining whether any person furnishing information to the United States is entitled to an award and the amount of such award, the Board shall take into consideration—

(a) whether or not the information is of the type specified in section 2, and

(b) whether the person furnishing the information was an officer or employee of the United States and, if so, whether the furnishing of such information was in the line of duty of that person.

"Any reward of $50,000 or more shall be approved by the President.

"Sec. 4. If the information leading to an award under this Act is furnished by an alien, the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, and the Director of Central Intelligence, acting jointly, may determine that the entry of such alien into the United States is in the public interest and, in that event, such alien and the members of his immediate family may receive immigrant visas and may be admitted to the United States for permanent residence, notwithstanding the requirements of the Immigration and Nationality Act.

"Sec. 5. The Board established under this Act is authorized to hold such hearings and make, promulgate, issue, rescind, and amend such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act.

"Sec. 6. Any awards granted under section 3 of this Act shall be certified by the Awards Board and, together with the approval of the President in those cases where such approval is required, transmitted to the Director of Central Intelligence for payment out of funds appropriated or available for the administration of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended.

"Sec. 7. As used in this Act—

(a) The term 'atomic energy' means all forms of energy released in the course of nuclear fission or nuclear transformation.

(b) The term 'atomic weapon' means any device utilizing atomic energy, exclusive of the means for transporting or propelling the device (where such means is a separable and divisible part of the device), the principal purpose of which is for use as, or for development of, a weapon, a weapon prototype, or a weapon test device.

(c) The term 'special nuclear material' means plutonium, or uranium enriched in the isotope 235, or any other nuclear material which is found to be special nuclear material pursuant to the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1944.

"(d) The term 'United States' when used in a geographical sense includes Puerto Rico, all Territories and possessions of the United States and the Canal Zone; except in section 4, the term 'United States' when so used shall have the meaning given to it in the Immigration and Nationality Act."
Mexican and Cuban Phases of Oswald's Activity

Extensive information has been made available to the Commission by CIA on the working level regarding Oswald's activity in Mexico City in September and October 1963. The Commission Staff has been in detailed communication and conversation with the Agency working levels both in headquarters and in Mexico City. Within the past week, significant information has been developed by CIA regarding the relationship with Oswald of certain Cuban intelligence personnel in Mexico City and the reaction in Havana within the Cuban Intelligence Service to the news of the assassination of President Kennedy. The Commission Staff is in the course of being briefed on the Cuban aspect.

It is suggested that the DCI handle any question on the Mexican and Cuban phases of Oswald's activity as "technical questions" which members of the Commission can develop from or through their own staff with the appropriate component of the Agency. This would be entirely consistent with the DCI's overall assurance that he has instructed his personnel to place their information completely at the Commission's disposal.
10 April 1964

SECRET

MATERIAL FROM P-8593 PASSED TO WARREN COMMISSION:

1. English translations of calls made by OWALD to Russian Embassy:
   27 Sep 63 (1037); 27 Sep 63 (1626); 27 Sep 63 (1605); 28 Sep 63 (1151);
   1 Oct 63 (1031); 1 Oct 63 (2); 3 Oct 63 (3).

2. English translation of conversation between President Dorticos in
   Havana and Cuban Amb Joaquin Hernandez Armas in Mexico on 26 Nov 63.

3. English translation of conversation between Cuban Amb to Mexico and
   President Dorticos in Havana on 26 Nov 63.

Document Number 653-828
for FOIA Review on JUN 1976

File: P-8593

RECORD COPY

10 APR. 64

PAGE 55 of 212
COPY NO.
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. J. Lee Rankin
General Counsel
President's Commission on the
Assassination of President Kennedy

SUBJECT: Role of the Cuban Intelligence Service
in Processing Visa Applicants; Reaction
of that Service to the Assassination of
President Kennedy

1. Within the very recent period, this Agency has established
contact with a well-placed individual who has been in close and
prolonged contact with ranking officers of the Cuban Direcció
General de Inteligencia (Directorate General of Intelligence – DGI).
His knowledge of DGI activities, techniques and personalities is
direct and profound. This Agency has queried him in detail on
possible contacts between Lee Harvey Oswald and the DGI prior
to the assassination of President Kennedy. A report on the infor-
ination thus obtained is attached to this memorandum.

2. This source is highly sensitive and of great, immediate
operational significance to this Agency. The national counterintelli-
gence interest abroad requires, therefore, that access to the attached
report, as knowledge of the existence of this source be restricted,
for the present at least, to yourself and a minimum number of your
staff.

Document Number: 267-2944

Downgraded to 
by authority of

267-2944

Page 56 of 212

COPY NO. 55216 DocId:32373017 Page 59
3. An appropriate sensitivity indicator has been affixed to this memorandum and the attached report.

4. A copy of this memorandum with its attachment has been forwarded to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

(Signed) Richard B. Helm
Deputy Director for Plans

Attachment

Distribution:
Orig. & 2 - Addresses
2 - DDP
2 - C/CI/R&A
1 - C/WH/3
1 - CL/R&A/201
1 - C/CI

Originated By: CI/R&A/Halligh

13 May 1964
SUBJECT: Lee Harvey OSWALD

The source has no personal knowledge of Lee Harvey OSWALD or his activities and does not know whether OSWALD was an agent of the Dirección General de Inteligencia (DGI) or any other directorate or department of the Cuban government.

He first heard of OSWALD during the assassination of President Kennedy when news media used OSWALD's name. DGI personnel first mentioned the case in his presence one day after lunch, when a group of officers were chatting. Among them was Manuel Vega Perez who previously had been assigned to the Cuban Consulate in Mexico City, where he was the principal DGI officer. Vega mentioned that OSWALD had gone to the Cuban Consulate two or three times in connection with a visa application during the time that Vega was in Mexico.

Whether OSWALD had any contact with Vega on those occasions is not known to the source. However, DGI officers stationed in consulates customarily interview visa applicants to determine if they are DGI agents. If applicants are identified as agents, their travel is expedited. Otherwise, they are usually told to come back in a few days. During the interim applicants' names are submitted to Havana for further checking and instructions. According to the source, OSWALD may have been interviewed by Vega or his assistant, Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez, but this is strictly conjecture on his part. The source does not know Silvia Duran or anything pertinent about her except that she was present in the Cuban Embassy in Mexico in March 1964.

After the news of the assassination of President Kennedy reached the DGI, orders were issued for all DGI components in the country to sort and package all documents according to whether they were "muy secreto" (very secret), "secreto" (secret), or
"Important" (important). The material, once consolidated, was to be held pending further instructions. All travel by DGI officers was suspended temporarily. In addition, DGI Headquarters' personnel were instructed to remain in their offices or to keep the DGI aware of their whereabouts so that they could be reached immediately.

The source does not know the reason for these measures but believes it logical that they were issued because of the possibility that the United States might have taken some type of action against Cuba and the DGI itself. As nearly as he recalls, the DGI files were restored to regular use about 3 December 1963.
23 May 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: DC/OPS

SUBJECT: Review of Selected Items in the
Lee Harvey OSWALD File Regarding
Allegations of the CASTRO Cuban
Involvement in the
John F. KENNEDY Assassination

1. The attached review and summary was written at
the express request of Mr. David W. Belin as a follow-
up to Question 3 of his letter to the Agency of
15 April 1975.

2. The results - as I have already told him - add
nuance, not evidence, to what the Warren Commission and
its staff had laid before them in 1964 on this subject.
The results of the review are stipulated in paragraph 8
of the Attachment. There seemed to be no reason to
attach copies of the case reports from the file to this
summary. These can be made available promptly, however,
on request. This summary does not deal with press,
magazine and books that dealt with the subject during
the period after the assassination.

3. My recommendation is to do with this paper as
we did with the earlier one requested by Mr. Belin on
the unidentified man: let him read the entire summary
and then decide how much of it, if any, is pertinent.
to his and the Commission's needs and then decide how much will go into the classified record.

/s/
Raymond G. Rosca

Attachment
SUBJECT: Review of Selected Items in the Lee Harvey OSWALD File Regarding Allegations of CASTRO Cuban Involvement in the John F. KENNEDY Assassination

REFERENCE: Letter by David W. Belin to Mr. E. Henry Knoche, 15 April 1975, paragraph 3 (Regarding Public Statement by CASTRO, etc.), attached

BACKGROUND

1. On Saturday evening, 7 September 1963, Fidel CASTRO appeared at a Brazilian Embassy reception in Havana; even more unusual, CASTRO submitted to an informal interview by the Associated Press correspondent, Daniel HARKER.

2. HARKER's interview reached New York on Sunday, 8 September, and was in print throughout the country on Monday, 9 September. There can be no question from the facts surrounding the CASTRO appearance, which had not been expected, and his agreement to the interview, that this event represented a more-than-ordinary attempt to get a message on the record in the United States.
3. CASTRO's statements to HARKER covered a range of topics but dealt principally with American political leadership, in particular President KENNEDY, whom he excoriated in extraordinarily provocative fashion ("... KENNEDY is a cretin..." ... the BATISTA of his times ... the most opportunistic American President of all time ...").

4. The interview also contained an uncomplimentary reference to Senator GOLDWATER and Cuban delay in signing the limited nuclear test ban. There were differences in the replay by United States newspapers like the New York Times and Washington papers, with a result that CASTRO's "message" was significantly modulated.

5. In New Orleans, where Lee Harvey OSWALD resided until the middle of September 1963, the HARKER story appeared in the principal morning paper, the Times-Picayune, on Monday, 9 September, page 7, under a three-column headline: "CASTRO Blasts Raids on Cuba. Says U.S. Leaders Imperiled by Aid to Rebels." The story followed under the HARKER by-line:

"Havana (AP) - Prime Minister Fidel Castro said Saturday night: 'U.S. leaders would be in danger if they helped in any attempt to do away with leaders of Cuba.'"
"Bitterly denouncing what he called recent U.S. prompted raids on Cuban territory, Castro said: 'We are prepared to fight them and answer in kind. U.S. leaders should think that if they are aiding terrorist plans to eliminate Cuban leaders, they themselves will not be safe.'

"... World affairs ... seemed to be entering a more peaceful climate a few days ago, but now this trend has changed with attacks.

"'The U.S. is always ready to negotiate and make promises which later it will not honor. This has happened to promises made during the October crisis. They have been broken as can be seen with new attacks.

"'But I warn this is leading to a very dangerous situation that could lead to a worse crisis than October's ...'"

6. The New York Times, in its coverage on 9 September, used a UPI wire service report which omitted any reference to the warning and threat which gave the interview its real significance. The Washington Post did an abbreviated rewrite (9 September, page A-7) which, similarly, omitted any reference to the main thrust of CASTRO's remarks.
The Evening Star of Washington, D. C., printed the HARKER story nearly in its entirety in the second section of the paper (9 September 1963, page B-4) and reworded the content of the HARKER interview, placing the emphasis on the political aspects - in particular, highlighting the GOLDWATER elements and burying CASTRO's warning to the United States leadership in the middle of the piece.

7. There is no evidence in the files on the KENNEDY assassination that this CASTRO interview was considered in following up leads or in dealings with the Warren Commission and its staff although Mexico Station specifically directed Headquarters attention to the AP story very shortly after the Dallas killing. More important, the interview appears to have been forgotten in the contemporary political consideration of relations with CASTRO's Cuba. There is no evidence in the Agency records, either, that the Warren Commission staff itself pursued the implication of the CASTRO interview in dealing with the conspiracy hypothesis. There is no evidence in the files that anything along these lines was stated by any other Cuban leader before the assassination.

8. The purpose of this review, undertaken at Mr. Belin's request, is to reconsider Lee Harvey OSWALD's activity on the assumption that as an avid newspaper reader - which we know from testimony of Marina OSWALD and others - he read the CASTRO warning and threat as reported above. The results
of the review, admittedly heavily using the 20—20 quality of hindsight, may be stipulated in summary:

a. There is no increment of credible evidence, applying this phrase strictly, of Soviet and/or Cuban political, intelligence or security service involvement in the assassination to what was developed and considered by the Warren Commission and its staff. The Commission's finding that Lee Harvey OSWALD was the killer of President KENNEDY and Officer TIPPIT and did them in alone and of his own determination stands.

b. "Credible evidence" that would upset or significantly modify this judgement did (and does) not exist in Washington. But such evidence could exist in Moscow and/or Havana, whose voluntary inputs to the Warren Commission were minimal in quantity and quality, designed to cover up any admissions of knowledge of, or connection with, OSWALD which might be related directly or indirectly with the assassination. Therefore, the belief that there was Soviet and/or Cuban (KGB and/or DGI) connection with OSWALD will persist and
grow until there has been a full disclosure by these governments of all elements of OSWALD's handling and stay in the Soviet Union and his contacts in Mexico City. The Warren Commission report should have left a wider "window" for this contingency. That, indeed, was the opinion at the working level, particularly in the counterintelligence component in the CIA in 1964. As was indicated by Mr. Helms in his testimony before the Warren Commission, CIA would continue to regard this aspect of the OSWALD case as still open.  

c. In the absence of additional or new elements of "credible" evidence, there are "nuances" in the record that emerge as noteworthy, in the light of other conclusions. These are reviewed and summarized below, item-by-item.

d. CASTRO's warning and threat of 7 September 1963 — if OSWALD did indeed read

1 Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. KENNEDY. Hearings Before the President's Commission on the Assassination of President KENNEDY (Washington, 1964), hereafter cited as Hearings, Vol. V., pp. 120 — 129. See especially p. 124. "Mr. Helms: 'Yes. I would assume the case could never be closed.'"
it in New Orleans, must be considered of
great significance in the light of the
pathological evolution of OSWALD's passive/
aggressive makeup after his attempt to kill
General WALKER early in April 1963 and his
identification with Fidel CASTRO and the
Cuban revolution which is directly trace-
able as far back as his Marine Corps
service in El Toro, California. CASTRO's
warning and threat, given to AP corres-
pondent HARKER, irrespective of whether
there was any formal mandate, or even
security service contact with OSWALD
by the Cubans or the Russians - was an act
of singular irresponsibility and under no
circumstances was excusable as retorsion
for what the Cuban emigres were doing during
the summer of 1963.

CUBAN CONTACT WITH LEE HARVEY OSWALD, SANTA ANA, CALIFORNIA,
EARLY 1959 (?)

9. The testimony of Nelson DELGADO contains an assertion
of germinal significance to any review of the background of
Lee Harvey OSWALD's feeling toward and relations with
CASTRO's Cuba. DELGADO was probably the closest peer group
SECRET

member to OSWALD during his specialist training period at El Torro Marine Corps Base December 1958 - September 1959. The Warren Commission Report takes note of this:

"OSWALD told DELGADO that he was in touch with Cuban diplomatic officials in this country, which DELGADO at first took to be 'one of his lies, but later believed." 2

10. Actually DELGADO's testimony says a lot more of possible operational significance than is reflected by the language of the report, and its implications do not appear to have been run down or developed by investigation. Thus, the record of the beginning of OSWALD's relationship with the Cubans starts with a question mark.

11. The period was one of transition in U.S. - Cuban relations after CASTRO's takeover. OSWALD, and DELGADO at the outset, were CASTRO supporters, OSWALD being particularly keen about how to get to the island. DELGADO testified:

"... I didn't know what to tell him, so I told him the best thing that I know was to

get in touch with a Cuban Embassy, you know. But at that time that I told him this — we were on friendly terms with Cuba, you know, so this wasn't no subversion or malintent, you know. I didn't know what to answer him. I told him to see them.

"After a while he told me he was in contact with them ...

"... I seen this envelope in his footlocker, wall-locker, and it was addressed to him, and they had an official seal on it, and as far as I could recollect that was mail from Los Angeles, and he was telling me there was a Cuban Consul. And just after he started receiving these letters — you see, he would never go out, but stay near the post all the time ...

"... he had one visitor after he started receiving letters he had one visitor. It was a man, because I got the call from the MP guard shack, and they gave me a call that OSWALD had a visitor at the front gate. This man had to be a civilian, otherwise they would have let him in. So I had to find somebody to relieve OSWALD, who was on guard, to go down
there to visit with this fellow, and they spent about an hour and a half, two hours, talking. I guess, and he came back. I don't know who the man was or what they talked about, but he looked nonchalant about the whole thing when he came back. He never mentioned who he was, nothing.

"Mr. LIEBELER: How long did he talk to him, do you remember?

"Mr. DELGADO : About an hour and half, two hours ...

"Mr. LIEBELER: You never asked OSWALD who this fellow was that he talked to?

"Mr. DELGADO : No. No .

"Mr. LIEBELER: Did you connect this visit that OSWALD had at that time with the Cuban Consulate?

"Mr. DELGADO : I did; because I thought it funny for him to be receiving a caller at such a late date - time. Also, up to this time he hardly ever received mail; in fact he seldom received mail from home because I made it a policy, I used to pick up the mail for our unit and distribute it to the guys in there, and very seldom did I ever see one for him. But every so often, after he started to get in contact with
these Cuban people, started getting letter pamphlets and newspapers ...

... and he also started receiving letters, you know, and no books, maybe pamphlets, you know, little-like church, things we get from church, you know, but it wasn't a church.

"Mr. LIEBELER: Were they written in Spanish, any of them, do you know?"

"Mr. DELGADO: Not that I can recall, no.

"Mr. LIEBELER: Did you have any reason to believe that these things came to OSWALD from the Cuban Consulate?

"Mr. DELGADO: Well, I took it for granted that they did after I seen the envelope, you know ... something like a Mexican eagle, with a big, impressive seal, you know. They had different colors on it, red and white; almost looked like our colors, you know. But I can't recall the seal. I just knew it was in Latin, United, something like that. I couldn't understand. It was Latin.

"Mr. LIEBELER: You don't know for sure whether it was from the Cuban Consulate?"
SECRET

"Mr. DELGADO: No. But he had told me prior, just before I found that envelope in his wall locker, that he was receiving mail from them, and one time he offered to show it to me, but I wasn't much interested because at the time we had work to do, and I never did ask to see that paper again, you know.

"Mr. LIEBELER: Did he tell you what his correspondence with the Cuban Consulate was about?

"Mr. DELGADO: No, he didn't.

"Mr. LIEBELER: Did he ever indicate to you that it had to do with the conversations that you had about going over to Cuba?

"Mr. DELGADO: No. The only thing he told me was that right after he had this conversation with the Cuban people was that he was going to - once he got out of the service - he was going to Switzerland... "

12. OSWALD'S application to Albert Schweitzer College, Churwalden, Switzerland, was dated 19 March 1959, and he was presumably to report there on 20 April 1960. Destined for discharge from the Marines on 7 December 1959, OSWALD


SECRET

CCC1947
accelerated his exit on grounds of family hardship in early September 1959. On 27 September 1959 he was issued a U.S. passport valid for travel — among other places to Cuba and the USSR. He entered the Soviet Union from Finland on 15 October 1959.

13. DELGADO's testimony has the cast of credibility. Granting that, it is of basic importance to focus attention on the male visitor who contacted OSWALT at El Toro Camp and talked with him for between one and a half to two hours. The event was unique in DELGADO's recollections, and actually there is nothing like it — on the record — in everything else we know about OSWALT's activity in the United States before or after his return to the United States. The record reflects no identification of the El Toro contact. DELGADO's presumption is that he was from the Cuban Consulate in Los Angeles. Assuming that, the questions are: Who was it, and was there reporting from Los Angeles to Washington and Havana that could, in effect, represent the opening of a Cuban file on OSWALT?

"PREDICTION" OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S DEmise BY COMMunist PARTY CELL LEADER MORSE BENitez ZABOLA, 1962

14. Guatemala Station forwarded to Headquarters on 9 January 1964 a duplicate copy of a raw report by a U.S./Cuban diplomatic and consular relations were severed on 3 January 1961.
penetration dated 5 January 1962 describing events at the yearly Communist Party cell meeting. The cell leader, Morse BENITEZ Zabola, said that the Communist Party in Guatemala should form a single new party; "We need not preoccupy ourselves over the politics of President KENNEDY because we know, according to prognostications, that he will die within the present year, 1962."

15. This report apparently had been discounted when it was received and was not forwarded until the Station re-reviewed all of its material after the assassination. The file reflects no follow-up or formal dissemination of the report.

ENIGMATIC THREATS BY CUBAN THIRD SECRETARY IN THE HAGUE, 7 NOVEMBER 1963

16. A sensitive liaison source, reporting after the KENNEDY assassination, indicated that at the Soviet reception on 7 November 1963, the Cuban Third Secretary, Ricardo L. SANTOS Pesa, discussed the recent refugee raids on Cuba and their implications with a host-country diplomat, concluding with the admonition: "... Just wait and you will see what we can do. It will happen soon." Asked to be more specific what would happen soon, SANTOS replied: "Just wait, just wait."

17. These data were passed to the Warren Commission by memorandum, 31 March 1964. SANTOS was reported to have
a history of medical instability and was summarily recalled from The Hague reportedly for reasons related to that fact in April 1966.

INTERCEPTED CONVERSATION OF CUBAN EMBASSY EMPLOYEE, LUISA CALDERON, AFTERNOON OF 22 NOVEMBER 1963

18. At 1730 Mexico City time, about five hours after the KENNEDY assassination, a Cuban Embassy employee named "Luisa" received a telephone call in Spanish from an unidentified male outside.

19. The caller asked her if she had heard the latest news. "Luisa" jokingly replied: "Yes, of course, I knew it almost before KENNEDY ... Imagine, one, two, three and now, that makes three [she laughs], what barbarians! ..."

20. Both speakers agreed on the seriousness of the assassination. "Luisa" also stated that the party at Silvia DURÁN's had been called off so it would not appear that they were celebrating the death of KENNEDY, nor would they have the party coincide with the burial. Finally she said she planned to move that night into the house of a doctor (a woman friend).

21. Latin hyperbole? Boastful *ex post facto* suggestion of foreknowledge? This is the only item in the intercept coverage of the Cubans and Soviets after the assassination that contains the suggestion of foreknowledge or expectation.
22. The tenuous, enigmatic character of the conversation is sharply highlighted by the following facts:
   a. "Luisa" was probably identical with Luisa CALDERON, a cadre worker of the Cuban Directorate General of Intelligence (DGI). She returned to Cuba in 1964 and was reported to be working in DGI Headquarters.
   b. The DGI element in Mexico City in the fall of 1963 was headed by Alfredo MIRABEL Diaz who had arrived on 2 September 1963, formally as the replacement of the Consul Eusebio AZCUE (departed 19 November 1963). The deputy DGI chief (and as of June 1964, MIRABEL's successor) was Manuel Engenio VEGA Perez.
   c. The "Silvia DURAN" named in Luisa's conversation was the receptionist, a Mexican national, who dealt with OSWALD during his known visits on 27 and 28 September to the Cuban installation, in connection with a Cuban visa application for stay and/or transit. Silvia DURAN is the sole live witness on the record regarding OSWALD's activity in Mexico City. Her testimony, however, in its entirety was taken and presented, solely, by the Mexican Governmental authorities. A direct
confrontation with her was requested by the Warren Commission staff but rejected by the Mexican authorities. It is from Silvia Duran's statements that it was learned that Oswald became engaged in a personal altercation on 27 September with Eusebio Azcue.

d. Manuel Engenio Vega Perez, alias Marcos, and his DGI assistant, Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez, were positively identified in February 1964 by two independent sources as engaged in the active development and facilitation of the training of Nicaraguan agents for the purpose of assassinating General Anastasio Somoza. Vega, it is established, was on post in Mexico City during Oswald's stay there 27 September - 2 October 1963. He left Mexico City on 3 November 1963 for Havana. It was reliably reported about Vega that all individuals going to Cuba, legally or illegally, had to pass through him first. He took the biographical data and sent it to Cuba for name checking, a procedure which normally took fifteen days.\(^5\)

\(^5\) For example, Vega would have handled the details of the visa action and facilitation of the trip to Cuba via Mexico City from 28 December 1962 - 21 January 1963.
23. There is no evidence in the OSWALD case file that Silvia DURAN was subjected to a systematic elicitative interrogation that would have related her dealings with OSWALD, known or confirmed by intercept, with the data held on the Cuban DGI, its personalities and methods, in Mexico City. Was it normal for a case like OSWALD's, considering the fuss he allegedly made with AZCUE, for the applications to be handled solely by a local employee and a lame duck like AZCUE whose slot had been taken by the DGI chief? Whatever the answer to these questions, they were not asked at the time. And there remains the more fundamental question: accepting the DURAN story on its face, could it have happened without the knowledge and participation of the DGI personnel above cited? This seems unlikely especially because VEGA is later cited by a Cuban DGI defector as having stated he was aware OSWALD made several visits to the Cuban Consulate. It is clear CASTRO's overseas intelligence and security service could have more in its files than was surfaced in the DURAN

was taken by Vincent Theodore LEE, the organizer of the Fair Play Committee for Cuba, with which OSWALD established relations from Dallas during the period 19 April - 2 November 1963. There is an overlap between LEE's and VEGA's travels to Havana during that period: VEGA departed Mexico City on 6 January for Havana and returned on 13 February 1963.
statements. Coming back to the beginning: "Luisa" — Luisa CALDERON — as a member of the DGI unit in Mexico City — could very well have known something that would make what she said to her unidentified caller less a matter of boastful self-indulgence than was assumed at the time.

SILVIA DURAN, SUBSTANTIAL AMPLIFICATION OF ADMISSION OF ALLEGED PERSONAL RELATIONS WITH LEE HARVEY OSWALD, 1967

24. The defects viewed in hindsight of the Silvia DURAN testimony already have been suggested above. (In that context of criticism it would also be relevant to reconsider the implications of the two intercepted telephone conversations on 26 November 1963 between the Cuban President, DORTICOS, and his Ambassador to Mexico, Joaquim Hernandez ARMAS, because the thrust of the conversation dealt with the question whether Silvia DURAN had been asked about [or been offered?] money payments by her Mexican interrogators.)

25. As of September 1964 Silvia DURAN gave up her Cuban Embassy job. In the spring of 1967 Silvia DURAN was reported by a reliable and sensitive source to have cut all relations with Cubans. Her account, in 1967, of how she had been taken into custody and had been interrogated after the assassination repeated what was already known. She added, under circumstances that did not permit the source to challenge or elicit corroborative details, that
she had gone out with OSWALD during his stay in Mexico City and claimed she had sexual relations with him.

ALLEGATIONS OF CONSPIRATORIAL CONTACT BETWEEN OSWALD AND CUBAN GOVERNMENT AGENTS WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO ALLEGATIONS OF (A) ELENA GARRO DE PRAZ AND (B) OSCAR CONTEREMAS

26. As the Warren Commission reported, "Literally dozens of allegations of a conspiratorial contact between OSWALD and agents of the Cuban Government have been investigated ...." Among these cases, which consumed hundreds of CIA man-hours in Headquarters and abroad - and similarly the FBI in the United States - was the Nicaraguan walkin in Mexico City, 26 November 1963, Gilberto ALVARADO Ugarte.

27. The ALVARADO case is taken up in detail by the Warren Commission under the cryptograph "D." ALVARADO claimed that he had seen an American, whom he identified as OSWALD, receive money some time in mid-September 1963 in a meeting in a patio of the Cuban Consulate in

6 See Report, p. 305 ff. Some of the others were the cases of Ylarico ROJAS Villenueve in Cozumel and Guadaloupe, the allegations of Enrique Ruedolo GONGORA in New York City, the claims of Robert Edward GALLANT, Santa Clara Prison Farm, California, and the allegations of Ray DOBKIN's.

7 See Report, pp. 307 - 308.
Mexico City. Alvarado's story was ultimately broken by the use of the polygraph, on which Alvarado showed evidences of deception, and by bringing Alvarado's former Nicaraguan security service control into the case.

28. The Alvarado story is a particularly acute representation of the difficulties that beset the evaluation of observed evidence: certain elements of the story persist despite the impeachment of its major premises. Alvarado, whose account did not become public until the release of the Warren Report in October 1964, talked consistently of the presence in the Cuban Consulate transaction of a Negro with red-dyed hair.

29. Elena Garro de Paz is a mercurial, articulate and socially prominent Mexican writer, married, but separated from a high-ranking Mexican foreign service official. She is also the cousin of Horacio Duran, the husband of Silvia Duran, cited above. There is a strong personal antipathy between the two women descending from Elena Garro's trenchant anti-Communism.

30. From October 1964 until his retirement in the fall of 1966, a U.S. Embassy officer, Charles Thomas, persistently kept up a stream of reports and memoranda reflecting Garro's account of what had actually gone on between Oswald, the Cubans and in particular Silvia Duran in September 1963, including a repeated reference to a Negro with red-dyed hair.
31. The first reference to the GARRO story was noted in a Mexico Station Memorandum of Record dated 12 October 1964:

"Elena GARRO [said] that she and her daughter were invited to a party at the Cuban Embassy during the period she now finds out that OSWALD was here in Mexico prior to the assassination. She was invited by a Mexican secretary in the Cuban Embassy whose husband is a cousin of the GARRO family [Horacio DURAN]. At the party she saw three Gringos, not drinking, not mixing and more or less just standing around together like three bumps on a log. They were so obviously out of place that she asked someone in the Cuban Embassy about them and was told that 'they were just passing through.' She claims that on the way these three Gringos stood out she took a good look at them as did her daughter. When the assassination occurred and OSWALD's picture was spread into the newspapers, both Elena and her daughter immediately said that he was one of the three Gringos 'without a doubt' at the party.'

32. GARRO repeated her story to Mr. Charles William THOMAS, an Embassy political officer on 10 December 1965:
SECRET

In September 1963, after her return from abroad, she went to a party accompanied by her daughter, at the home of Ruben DURAN [emphasis added]. Ruben is one of the two brothers of Horacio DURAN, who married her cousin. She met OSWALD and two other young Americans. At the party she was discouraged from talking with him. Other guests were the Cuban Consul AZCUE, General Clark FLORES, Silvia DURAN, who she later learned was OSWALD's mistress while he was here, Emilio CARBALLIDO and a Latin American Negro man with red hair [emphasis added]. In November 1963 when the identity of the assassin became known, she and her daughter went to the Cuban Embassy and shouted "assassins" and other insults at the staff there. Shortly afterward, she and her daughter were visited by a friend, Manuel CARVILLO [or CALVILLO], then an official in the Secretariat of the consumers and were told he had orders to escort them to a small and obscure hotel in the center of town. They were kept there for eight days under pretext that they were a stranger. When she told CARVILLO she wanted to go to the American Embassy and explain what she knew of OSWALD, she was told that the American Embassy was full of Communist spies.

33. On 25 December 1965 and 9 January 1966 in further interviews with THOMAS, GARRO and her daughter elaborated and 8 These particulars were not confirmed by independent observers at the time.

SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED
in certain particulars significantly modified her earlier account. She also acknowledged that she and her daughter had been interviewed by Embassy officers to whom she claimed they did not give a very complete story because the Embassy officers did not appear to give much credence to anything they said.

34. It developed that GARRO and daughter had been interviewed by the Legal Attache on 17 and 24 November 1964. Her information had been similar to what she claimed in her account to THOMAS but had not been substantiated by inquiries. The FBI representative therefore considered the matter closed and reaffirmed his disengagement from the matter to the CIA Chief of Station on 27 December 1964 and to the Ambassador on 25 February 1965.

35. The Embassy Political Officer, however, persisted in his interviews and reporting. In a memorandum of conversation, 13 July 1966, GARRO identified the place to which she had been taken by CALVILLO as the Hotel Vermont. (This detail checked out affirmatively. GARRO was at the Hotel 23 – 24, 25 – 27 and 28 – 30 November 1963.) In another, on 7 February 1967, GARRO's continuing misgivings with the Cubans are set out. And finally, when THOMAS's retirement from U.S. Government service, the Department of State, at his request, 28 August 1969, disseminated to CIA and FBI a compilation of his reporting of the Elena GARRO interviews.
36. There the matter rests. GARRO's chronology of the events she described as having occurred in the Mexican capital in September 1963 never coincided with the confirmed data of OSWALD's presence there. Her story, however, had two points consonant with allegations by others regarding OSWALD:

a. ALVARADO's allegations regarding the Negro with the red-dyed hair [this detail could, however, have been gleaned from the Warren Commission's published account of the "D" case] and

b. Silvia DURAN's later claim of intimate personal contacts with OSWALD.

37. Beginning in March and amplified in May 1967, the American Consul, Benjamin J. RUYLE, in Tampico developed a contact with a local Mexican journalist, Oscar CONTRERAS Larrique, who claimed to have encountered OSWALD with other pro-CASTRO students at the University of Mexico campus in September 1963.

38. In June 1969 CONTRERAS was interviewed by a CIA officer:

He studied law at the University of Mexico for three years, approximately 1960 - 1964. He belonged to a clandestine pro-CASTRO revolutionary group at the University. Regarding the OSWALD
case he was extremely cautious and although he was not able or willing to give dates and names, he said OSWALD visited the University of Mexico campus shortly after the Cuban Embassy refused him a visa to visit Cuba. OSWALD made inquiries regarding pro-Cuban revolutionary groups at the University and was directed to CONTRERAS and his friend. OSWALD met CONTRERAS and four other persons as they came out of a round-table discussion held in the faculty of Philosophy. OSWALD told the group it was urgent that he visit Cuba and the Cuban Embassy had denied him a visa. He requested aid from CONTRERAS' group. CONTRERAS and others mistrusted OSWALD because they felt he was a CIA provocation. The group allowed OSWALD to accompany them the rest of the day, that night and part of the next day. OSWALD was very introverted and appeared to be slightly crazy. OSWALD made no mention of an assassination plot but kept bringing up the point he had to travel to Cuba immediately.

39. At this point, with FBI knowledge, the matter was turned over to the Mexican authorities who determined that CONTRERAS was indeed at the University of Mexico but only
for the years 1959 - 1960 and that he had been publicly associated in protest activity for the Student Revolutionary Bloc (BER) in January 1961. However, the group ceased functioning as such in the middle of 1962, and Oscar CONTRERAS was never one of its leaders. No further work is reflected in the files on the CONTRERAS allegations. Apart from the uns sustained claims made by CONTRERAS about his own presence at the University, there is an additional element that undermines the credibility of his account: OSWALD's Spanish, which was barely adequate to get him meals near the hotel, seems hardly likely to have permitted him to carry on for an extended period with a University student group.
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. J. Lee Rankin

SUBJECT: Information Developed by CIA on the Activity of Lee Harvey OSWALD in Mexico City, 28 September - 3 October 1963

as Transmitted to Warren Commission

1. I am enclosing a presentation of the information developed by CIA on or about Lee Harvey OSWALD in Mexico City. We have included in this paper only hard, substantive information. Any judgments that are made represent professional evaluations by individuals who have worked over the years as specialists in their fields. Speculation, rumor, and vague detail not directly related to OSWALD's activity have not been included.

2. Pursuant to our discussion on 14 January 1964, I have given the enclosure an appropriate classification. The compromise of this material in its present form would lead directly to the destruction of current sources and methods of this Agency in Mexico and elsewhere.

Document Number 509-803

(signed)

Richard Helms
Deputy Director for Plans

Enclosure

Orig & 1 - Addresses w/att
1 - DDP w/att
1 - WH/3 (Mr. Whitten) w/att
1 - SR/CI w/att
L - Chief CI/R&A w/att

CI/RGRocca.de/ 31 January 1964

1 ATT.

CS COPY

201-289-245

31 Jan 64

CC/CC/CC/7

PAGE 134 of 212
COPY NO.
Information Developed by CIA on the Activity of Lee Harvey OSWALD in Mexico City  
23 September - 3 October 1963

I. OSWALD's Activity in Mexico City

1. On 9 October the CIA Station in Mexico City received the following information from a reliable and proven source:

An American named Lee OSWALD had contacted the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City on Tuesday, 1 October 1963. He had spoken in halting Russian to the Soviet Embassy guard, Ivan Ivanovich OBYEDKOV, to whom he said he had visited the Embassy two days earlier, Saturday, 23 September. He asked whether there had been a reply to a telegram that the Consul with whom he had spoken, but whose name he could not recall, had promised to send to Washington. OBYEDKOV had attempted to establish the identity of the Consul with whom OSWALD had talked: if it had been a dark person, then it had probably been KOSTIKOV. OBYEDKOV,
after a check with Soviet Consular personnel, assured

OSWALD the telegram had been sent to Washington but

no answer had been received.

The information was forwarded by cable to CIA Headquarters

the same day it was received.

2. A file check in Washington which is routine in these

matters revealed the possibility of an identity between the Lee

OSWALD who had spoken with OBYEDKOV, and presumably

with KOSTIKOV, and the defector returned, Lee Harvey OSWALD.*

3. On 10 October 1963 CIA Headquarters disseminated by

cable the report in substantially the form and in the detail

indicated above, in paragraph 1, to the Federal agencies whose

jurisdictional interests had been established by a review of

OSWALD's file: the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Depart-


* The CIA file on Lee Harvey OSWALD was opened on 9 December

1960 to accommodate biographic information developed by CIA in

response to an inquiry from the Department of State on a list of

American defectors in Soviet Bloc countries. OSWALD was

among the names in the list. The Department of State inquiry

was dated 25 October 1960. An interim reply was given by CIA

on 3 November 1960; a final reply, on 21 November 1960. Until

early October 1963 the contents of the OSWALD file held by CIA

consisted entirely of press materials and disseminations

received from the Department of State, the Federal Bureau of

Investigation, and the Navy Department.
ment of State, the Navy Department, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service. A comment was included in the report noting the likelihood that the subject, Lee OSWALD, was probably identical with the former Marine who had defected to the Soviet Union in 1959. (The report disseminated by CIA in Washington on 10 October also included a physical description of an individual who was believed to have been the OSWALD who had contacted the Soviets in Mexico City. It was subsequently established by investigation that the description did not pertain to OSWALD.)

4. On the same day, 10 October 1963, CIA Headquarters sent a lengthy cable summary to the Mexico City Station of the background information held in the Headquarters' file on OSWALD. An instruction was included for the Mexico City Station to pass the substance of its 9 October report to the local representatives of the same Federal departments and agencies that had been given the information in Washington. This instruction was immediately carried out. In this manner the information on OSWALD's contact with the Soviets on 1 October was passed to Mexico City to the Embassy, the FBI representative, the Naval Attaché, and to the office of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. There were no requests from recipients of the report for further information or for follow-up investigation.
5. After the assassination of President Kennedy and the arrest of Lee Harvey Oswald, an intensive review of all available sources was undertaken in Mexico City to determine the purpose of Oswald's visit. It was learned that Oswald had also visited the Cuban Consulate in Mexico City and had talked there with a clerk, a Mexican national, named Silvia Duran. After the assassination and the publicity about Lee Oswald, Silvia Duran had told a number of relatives and friends that she had talked to Oswald about a Cuban visa. Silvia Duran and her husband, Horacio Duran Navarro, were detained and questioned by the Mexican police from 23 to 25 November 1963.

6. After giving some of the details of her own personal background - she is an admitted leftist sympathizer and had formerly worked for the Mexican-Cuban Institute of Cultural Relations - Silvia Duran said that when she first heard of the death of President Kennedy she was depressed and thought the assassin must have been a maniac. When she learned that he was associated with the "Fair Play for Cuba Committee" she did not believe it.

7. She talked about the case to her husband and when she heard the name of Lee Oswald mentioned, she recognized it as
the man who had come to the Consulate about two months before to get a visa to transit Cuba on his way to the USSR. She realized that he had said he was married to a Russian and that he had belonged to the "Fair Play for Cuba" group. She checked her file on him in the Consular archives and from the descriptive data, she was sure it was the same man. He was short, blond, poorly dressed and his face got red when he talked. He was denied a Cuban transit visa because he did not yet have a Soviet visa, and he was told to get the Soviet visa first, but it was noted that this would take about four months. She had asked the Cuban Consul himself, Eusebio AZCUE, to talk to OSWALD and they had an argument when AZCUE urged OSWALD to leave Mexico instead of waiting there. The Consul had phoned the Soviet Consulate and talked to the person handling OSWALD's case, who had said it would take about four months to hear from Moscow about the Soviet visa. The same afternoon, OSWALD had come back again and she had told him the same thing. She gave OSWALD a slip of paper with her name and telephone number on it in case he ever got his Soviet visa. He did not call back, she said.

8. Silvia DURAN's husband, Horacio DURAN Navarro, gave essentially the same story, as he had previously heard it from his wife after the assassination. He had never had any personal contact with OSWALD.
9. Silvia DURAN was reinterrogated by the Mexican police from 27 to 29 November but she did not change or add materially to her story about OSWALD.

10. It is known that the Cuban Ambassador in Mexico, Joaquin HERNANDEZ Armad, reported on the detention and interrogation of Silvia DURAN by the Mexican authorities. The Cuban Government sent the Mexican Government a stiff note of protest, which the Mexicans rejected.

11. We are reliably informed that on 26 November, the day after DURAN's release, Cuban President DORTIGOS queried HERNANDEZ about his report. HERNANDEZ confirmed that there had been an altercation between OSWALD and Consul AZCUE. DORTIGOS made a persistent but unsuccessful effort to determine from HERNANDEZ whether the Mexican authorities had questioned Mrs. DURAN about money, or thought that the Cubans had paid OSWALD money.

12. The CIA follow-up investigation produced the following confirmed results which have a bearing on Mrs. DURAN's account:

a. 27 September. In mid-afternoon, Silvia DURAN informed the Soviet Embassy that a male American citizen had requested a visa to transit Cuba on his way to the
Soviet Union. She desired to know who the American had talked with at the Soviet Consulate. Also, she indicated that the Cuban Consulate could grant him the visa and arrange immigration details if the concurrence of a Soviet visa were assured.

By 27 September, pursuant to her inquiry, Silvia DURAN received a confirmation from the Soviet Embassy that the American had been to the USSR installation. He had shown them a letter from the Soviet Consulate in Washington indicating that he had been long awaiting a visa for himself and his wife to go to the USSR. No answer had come from Washington; however, the waiting period was sometimes four or five months. The American also had a letter attesting that he was a member of a pro-Cuban organization but he had claimed that the Cubans would not give him a visa unless he had already received a Russian visa.

Although the American was still at the Cuban Consulate, Silvia DURAN repeated that she could not give him a transit visa unless a Soviet visa was forthcoming, notwithstanding the American's wish to go to Cuba to wait.
there for his Soviet visa. According to DURAN, the
American knew no one in Cuba and she intended to
appropriately annotate the American's card. The Soviet
official echoed her statement that the American was not
known.

c. 28 September. Silvia DURAN was again visited
at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City by the American
seeking a Cuban transit visa. Mrs. DURAN contacted
at least two members of the Soviet Embassy and facilitated
a direct conversation between one of the Soviets and the
American. **Conversing in poor Russian**, the American
stated that he already had been to the Soviet Consulate
and had left an address. The Soviet official replied that
he was aware of that. The American suggested that he
had not known his address then, and he had gone to the
Cuban Embassy to ask for the address, because they had
it. The American then acceded to the Soviet official's
invitation to come by and give the address.

d. 1 October. In mid-morning an unidentified
individual, speaking broken Russian, contacted the Soviet
Military Attaché in Mexico City. He said he had been to
the Embassy the previous Saturday (26 September) and
had talked with a Consul who had said they would send a
telegram to Washington, had there been a reply? He
was referred to the Consulate for the information.

These additional materials were promptly disseminated in
Washington by the CIA to the White House, the Department of
State, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

e. 1 October. See paragraph 1 above for Lee
OSWALD's contact with the Soviet Consulate.

II. Valery Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV

13. It is believed that the Soviet official with whom
OSWALD dealt in Mexico City was Consular Attaché Valery
Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV, born in Moscow, 17 March 1933.
A photograph of KOSTIKOV is attached. In his letter of
9 November to the Soviet Consulate in Washington, OSWALD
wrote about his "meetings with Comrade KOSTIN (sic) of the
Soviet Union in Mexico City, Mexico." There is no official
of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City with a name resembling
"KOSTIN", other than Consul KOSTIKOV.

14. KOSTIKOV is the senior officer of five Soviet
Consular representatives who deal with visas and related
SECRET 240408Z
IMMEDIATE DIR CITE MEXI 7845

provided below sufficiently definitive summary of local contacts ivan gavrilovich alferev (unless otherwise stated, info from lienvoy). 18, 19, 23 nov 60 contacts with enriqueta gonzalez of com re extension of courtesy permit for self remain in mexi.
10, 11 nov 60 with fnu varela re delivery of subj's furniture.
3' nov 60 and 7 mar 61 with juan sedillo re insurance subj car.
8 nov 60 sergio duran of national city bank of new york re pickup of money. 14, 15 nov Humberto Gonzalez re picking up new car.
25-28 nov subj treated at sanatorio reforma (usually used by sovs) by well known leftist dr. carlos noble noyo who used frequently by sovs. 23 dec with third sec cuban cultural attaché teresa proenza re arranging press conference for rolando cusela president of cuban feu. 18 feb and 20 mar 61 with dentist dr. leslie valery for appointment fix son's teeth. valery frequently used by sovs. 1 mar arranges meeting with ignacio acoyta lagunes, prominent pro connie aide of gen Lazaro Cardenas. 26 mar FNU female manjarrez (phonetic whom monitor believes be an eminent)

D: 260-5-41

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED
LETTER CLEMENIA BASSO TO INTERVIEW HERE. 14 JCT INVITES:

SUBJ CALLS JOHN RITTO (SEE MEXI 4747), 14 JUNE CALLS WELL KNOW.

- CLOSER FREQUENT CONTACTS.

- NEW YORK CITY.

- TOKYO.

- JUAN GARCIA AND RUTH FERGUS (C.C.GA).

- JUNE 6.

- JULY 6.

- MEXICO CITY.

- PRESIDENTS.

- COORDINATING.

- VISIT.

- CHILE.

- ECUADOR.

- PERU.

- COLOMBIA.

- PANAMA.

- COSTA RICA.

- HONDURAS.

- EL SALVADOR.

- GUATEMALA.

- BANGLADESH.

- THAILAND.

- VIETNAM.

- NORTHERN VIETNAM.

- SOUTH VIETNAM.

- CAMBODIA.

- LAOS.

- VIETNAM.

- BANGLADESH.

- THAILAND.

- VIETNAM.

- NORTHERN VIETNAM.

- SOUTH VIETNAM.

- CAMBODIA.

- LAOS.

- VIETNAM.

- BANGLADESH.

- THAILAND.

- VIETNAM.

- NORTHERN VIETNAM.

- SOUTH VIETNAM.

- CAMBODIA.

- LAOS.

- VIETNAM.

- BANGLADESH.

- THAILAND.

- VIETNAM.

- NORTHERN VIETNAM.

- SOUTH VIETNAM.

- CAMBODIA.

- LAOS.

- VIETNAM.

- BANGLADESH.

- THAILAND.

- VIETNAM.

- NORTHERN VIETNAM.

- SOUTH VIETNAM.

- CAMBODIA.

- LAOS.

- VIETNAM.

- BANGLADESH.

- THAILAND.

- VIETNAM.

- NORTHERN VIETNAM.

- SOUTH VIETNAM.

- CAMBODIA.

- LAOS.

- VIETNAM.

- BANGLADESH.

- THAILAND.

- VIETNAM.

- NORTHERN VIETNAM.

- SOUTH VIETNAM.

- CAMBODIA.

- LAOS.

- VIETNAM.

- BANGLADESH.

- THAILAND.

- VIETNAM.

- NORTHERN VIETNAM.

- SOUTH VIETNAM.

- CAMBODIA.

- LAOS.

- VIETNAM.

- BANGLADESH.

- THAILAND.

- VIETNAM.

- NORTHERN VIETNAM.

- SOUTH VIETNAM.

- CAMBODIA.

- LAOS.

- VIETNAM.

- BANGLADESH.

- THAILAND.

- VIETNAM.

- NORTHERN VIETNAM.

- SOUTH VIETNAM.

- CAMBODIA.

- LAOS.

- VIETNAM.

- BANGLADESH.

- THAILAND.

- VIETNAM.

- NORTHERN VIETNAM.

- SOUTH VIETNAM.

- CAMBODIA.

- LAOS.

- VIETNAM.
14 OCT INVITES JAVIER SANTOS LORENTO OF NOVELADAS TO SAFE HOUSE.
30 OCT UNSUCCESSFULLY TRIES CONTACT CLEMETINA BASSOLS. 14 NOV
TRIES CONTACT RICARDO POERY GERVANTES. 14 AND 15 NOV ARRANGES MEETING
VIRGINIA GOMEZ NIEZO, LEFTIST AND PARAMOUR OF POERY.

SECRET

C/S COMMENT: REQUESTED INFO RE TRAVEL VALERIY VLADIMIROVICH KOSTIKOV.

261-289248
REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

TO:  THE WHITE HOUSE ATT: NICHOLAS BUNDDY
DEPARTMENT OF STATE ATT: MR. U. ALEXIS JOHNSON
FROM: FBI
SUBJECT: SECRET

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISCLOSURE

SUBJECT: LEE H. OSWALD

ON 26 SEPTEMBER, MR. JOSE CALLEJO, AGUERE OF MEXICO, TOLD THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION TO HECTOR MIRAS, UNITED STATES INFORMATION OFFICER IN MEXICO CITY:

MARTA RODRIGUEZ DE LOPEZ, SAID A SON IN LAW OF HERMASTO RODRIGUEZ, WHO LIVES IN NEW ORLEANS WAS WELL ACQUAINTED WITH LEE OSWALD. SON IN LAW IS A CIVIL RIB LIVES AS 212 JEFFERSON PARKER, NEW ORLEANS, TEL: 5-9858. ARNESTO RODRIGUEZ RUNS A SPANISH LANGUAGE SCHOOL AND IS AMY CASTRO. ACCORDING TO MARTA RODRIGUEZ DE LOPEZ HER SON IN LAW HAS A TAPED CONVERSATION WITH OSWALD.

DOCUMENT NUMBER 113-48

FOR FOIA REVIEW ON APR 1976

END OF MESSAGE

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW
CONDUCTED ON 24 MAY 1979

C/S COMMENT: 

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.
TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. H. J. Papich

FROM: Deputy Director (Plana)

SUBJECT: Lee B. OSMOND/Soviet Activities in Mexico City,
13 - 24 November 1963. To include V. V. KOSTIKOV and I. G. ALFIERI

1. Forwarded as Attachment A is a resume of the observed
activities of Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV and Ivan Gavri-
lovich ALFIERI as reported by a reliable source in Mexico City.
Attention was given to KOSTIKOV because of the indication
that he is in a consular interview with OSMDAL on 23 September
1963 (see CSCL-3/778, 891, 25 November 1963). ALFIERI trav-
elled with KOSTIKOV to Northern Mexico during the early part
of September 1963. Source reported that during the period
under review the observed activities of KOSTIKOV and ALFIERI
appeared to be normal, as did the activities of the entire
Soviet Embassy complement.

2. Forwarded as Attachment B is a resume of telephone
calls placed to and from the Soviet Embassy on the afternoon
of 22 November. Analysis of calls made the morning of
22 November and the morning and afternoon of 23 November re-
vealed no pertinent information.

3. Technical surveillances of the homes of several known
and suspected Soviet intelligence officers produced no pertinent
information.

4. Forwarded as Attachment C is a list identifying the
Soviets whose names appear in Attachments A and B.

5. Because of the extreme sensitivity of the enclosed
information, we urge that the source data and the information
be given the most secure handling possible. This information
is for background use only and may not be disseminated without
permission from this Agency.

Record Copy
Document Number 187-622

SECRET

No Foreign Dissem

Reproduction
Prohibited

Page 148 of 212
Copy No.
18 November

0857 - Alferiev enters Embassy alone (Departure not noted)
1526 - Kostikov enters alone
1629 - Kostikov departs alone
1656 - Kostikov enters alone
1711 - Kostikov departs alone
1759 - Kostikov enters alone

19 November

1210 - Alferiev enters Embassy alone
1312 - Alferiev departs with Garaschev
1352 - Alferiev and Garaschev return
1415 - Kostikov departs alone
1533 - Alferiev enters alone (prior departure not noted)
1653 - Kostikov enters alone

20 November

No coverage

21 November

0852 - Alferiev enters Embassy with wife

NO FOREIGN DISSEM
22 November

0916 - Kostikov enters alone
0917 - Alferiev departs alone
0949 - Alferiev enters alone
1153 - Kostikov departs with Shubin
1206 - Alferiev departs alone
1240 - Kostikov enters with Shubin
1310 - Kostikov departs in car driven by KGB chauffeur Kalinin
1341 - Kostikov enters with Kalinin
1353 - Alferiev enters alone
1427 - Kostikov departs alone
1630 - Kostikov enters alone

1353 - Alferiev enters Embassy alone
0904 - Kostikov enters alone
1005 - Kostikov has discussion with Shubin
1016 - Kostikov departs with Shubin
1028 - Kostikov enters with Shubin
1030 - Kostikov departs with wife and Shubin
1250 - Kostikov, wife and Shubin return
1302-1312 - Kostikov speaks in garden with Kazantsev
1336 - Kostikov departs with Shubin, Shpakevich, Turygin, driven by Kalinin
1402 - All above return
1402 - Kostikov talking in garden with Alferiev, Andreyev, and Turygin
1432 - Kostikov departs in car with family
1432 - Alferiev departs alone
1436 - Alferiev enters alone
1503 - Alferiev departs alone
1517 - Alferiev enters alone
1539 - Kostikov enters alone

23 November

1130 - Kostikov speaks with Kazantsev and Shubin
1133 - Kostikov departs with Kazantsev and Shubin
1200 - Alferiev enters alone
1240 - Kostikov, Kazantsev and Shubin enter
1410 - Kostikov plays volleyball with Yatskov, Shubin, Kazantsev, Porkhunov, and Strepunov
1425 - Kostikov speaks to Shubin and Slavnov
1430 - Kostikov departs with Shubin and Romanchenko
1440 - Alferiev departs alone

24 November

1100 - Alferiev enters Embassy alone
1207 - Kostikov enters with wife and Shubin
1326 - Alferiev departs with Shengalev
1410 - Alferiev enters with Shengalev
1449 - Alferiev, Kostikov, Kazantsev and 2 unidentified Soviet visitors depart (A's car)
Am 22 November coverage of Soviet Embassy normal.

At 22 November coverage follows:

1230 - Cuban Consul Alfredo Mirabal Diaz asks to speak with Yatskov. Latter apparently unavailable and Kostikov comes on line with following conversation ensuing familiar form "wh-

KOS: Forgive me for arriving late.

MIR: Did you recover the suitcase?

KOS: Yes

MIR: Then it was arriving on the other trip.

KOS: Yes

MIR: I called to tell you the following, that regarding that matter that we had talked about, to see if we would spend Sunday in Chapultepec Park because my wife is preparing some food to eat there.

KOS: I'm sorry but I've just made plans for another trip and I'm leaving this very day. So please forgive me for not being able to go with you.

MIR: I'd like to talk to Pavel Yatskov.

KOS: Wait a minute, he'll come now.

MIR: If he's busy I'll call him later, but I'll be available for the next half hour at telephone No. 11-28-47.

KOS: O. K.

1334 - Reporter requests statement. Unidentified Soviet male refuses.

1323 - Female implies to Bukharenko that the Soviet Ambassador has said to make no statement.

1445 - Yugoslav Ambassador Slavko calls and speaks with Soviet Ambassador Bazarov in Russian. Talk briefly about assassination telling each other what they know, which
appears to be only what they got from the radio.

1530 - Unidentified woman advises Soviets of assassination.

1644 - Unidentified reporter asks for Kazantsev, advised that Kazantsev not in, will be back Monday, 0900-1400.

1645 - Unidentified male asks for Kukharevko, told he isn't in.

1652 - Unidentified female reporter told Soviet Embassy not working today, Saturday or Sunday.

1715 - Reporter calls for statement. None given.

- Kazantsev calls his residence, personal call.

1744 - Reporter told to call back Monday.

1750 - Unidentified male asks for Leonov. Not in.

1755 - Above calls again

- Reporter told call back Monday.
ATTACHMENT C TO CSCI-3/773,881

1. Ivan Gavrilovich ALFEMOV - Pravda Correspondent
2. Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIEV - Attache Consular Office
3. Aleksey Ivanovich GEMASHEV - Consul
4. Vitaliy Borisovich SERYGIN - Attache
5. Yuriy Dmitriyevich KULININ - Chauffeur
6. Boris Alekseyevich KAZANTSEV - Counselor
7. Vladmir Ivanovich SHPADEVICH - Third Secretary
8. Vladmir Ivanovich ANDREEV - First Secretary
9. Vladmir Vasilyevich TURGIN - Third Secretary
10. Pavel Antonovich YATSEV - Attache
11. Vladimir POKHENOVI - Code Clerk
12. Gennadiy SVOGANOVI - Radio Operator
13. Nikolay Petrovich SLAYNOVI - Code Clerk
14. Vladmir ROMANCEVSKO - Second Secretary
15. Lev Fedorovich SHENGALEV - Employee, Commercial Office
16. Oleg Maksimovich NECHTIPORENO - Vice Consul
17. Sergey Semyonovich KUZHARENO - Second Secretary; Soviet Information Bulletin
18. Nikolay Sergeyevich LEONOV - Third Secretary
Ad
22 November coverage of Soviet embassy normal.

No
22 November coverage followed

1250 - Cuban Consul Alfredo Darnhol Wiaz asks to speak with Yatskov. Letter apparently unavailable and Kostov comes on line with following conversation ensuing familiar form "tu"

KOS: Forgive me for arriving late.

MIR: Did you recover the suitcase?

KOS: Yes

MIR: Then it was arriving on the other trip.

KOS: Yes

MIR: I called to tell you the following, that regarding that matter that we had talked about, to see if we would spend Sunday in Chapultepec Park because my wife is preparing some food to eat there.

KOS: I'm sorry but I've just made plans for another trip and I'm leaving this very day. So please forgive me for not being able to go with you.

MIR: I'd like to talk to Pavel Yatskov.

KOS: Wait a minute, he'll come now.

MIR: If he's busy I'll call him later, but I'll be available for the next half hour at telephone No. 11-28-47.

KOS: O.K.

1334 - Reporter requests statement. Unidentified Soviet male refuses.

1333 - Female implies to Bukharenko that the Soviet Ambassador has said to make no statement.

1445 - Yugoslav Ambassador Vlahov calls and speaks with Soviet Ambassador Lazarov in Russian. Talk briefly about assassination telling each other what they know, which
appears to be only what they got from the radio.

1550 - Unidentified woman advises Soviets of assassination.

1644 - Unidentified reporter asks for Kazantsev, advised that Kazantsev not in, will be back Monday, 0930-1400.

1645 - Unidentified male asks for Kukharenko, told he isn't in.

1652 - Unidentified female reporter told Soviet Embassy not working today, Saturday or Sunday.

1716 - Reporter calls for statement. None given.

- Kazantsev calls his residence, personal call.

1744 - Reporter told to call back Monday.

1750 - Unidentified male asks for Leonov. Not in.

1755 - Above calls again

- Reporter told call back Monday.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name and Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Ivan Gavrilovich ALFREY = Pravda Correspondent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV = Attaché Consular Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Aleksey Ivanovich GARANIN = Consul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Vitaliy Borisovich SHURIN = Attaché</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Yury Dmitriyevich BALININ = Chauffeur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Boris Alekseyevich KAZANTSEV = Counselor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Vladimir Ivanovich SHAPAKHIN = Third Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Vladimir Ivanovich ANDREYEV = First Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Vladimir Vasilyevich TCHUGIN = Third Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Pavel Antonovich YATSHENKO = Attaché</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Vladimir FORSHUNOV = Code Clerk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Gennady STEGANOY = Radio Operator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Nikolay Petrovich SLAVNOV = Code Clerk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>Vladimir ROMANOVICH = Second Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>Lev Fedorovich SHEVTSOV = Employee, Commercial Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>Oleg Maximovich KRECHTCHENKO = Vice Consul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td>Sergey Sergeyevich KUZNETZOV = Second Secretary; Soviet Information Bulletin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.</td>
<td>Nikolay Sergeyevich LESNOV = Third Secretary</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
MEMORANDUM FOR:  Mrs. J. Lee Rankin  
General Counsel  
President's Commission on the  
Assassination of President Kennedy.

SUBJECT:  Lee Harvey Oswald

1. Mr. James W. Liebeler of your staff phoned me last Friday and requested that CIA furnish the Commission with an affidavit respecting the origin and circumstances of a photograph of an unknown individual which was furnished by this Agency to the Federal Bureau of Investigation on November 22, 1963.

2. I am forwarding an affidavit with this memorandum which I trust will satisfy your needs. Because of the extreme sensitivity of the source involved, I have refrained from adding further details.

3. The Central Intelligence Agency recommends that this photograph not be reproduced in the Commission's report, because it would jeopardize a most confidential and productive operation. In addition, it could be embarrassing to the individual involved who as far as this Agency is aware, had no connection with Lee Harvey Oswald or the assassination of President Kennedy.

4. In view of the above, a sensitivity indicator has been affixed to this communication.

Richard Helms  
Deputy Director for Plans

Attachment - a/s
Distribution:

Orig & 1 - Address
2 - DDP
1 - CI/R&A/Oswald 201
1 - CI/R&A/Dooley
1 - WH/Whitton

CI/R&A/Dooley pm 22 July 1964
20 February 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, CI/R&A

SUBJECT: Documents Available in OSWALD's 201 File

1. A machine listing of documents officially recorded as being in OSWALD's 201 file was requested and is attached. The actual machine work of this type was begun in 1963, but a few items of previous dates were also recorded.

2. A comparison of the documents physically available in the 201 file and those recorded as being in the 201 file has shown that 37 documents which should be in the 201 file are not available in it. This total is made up of:

   - 2 dispatches
   - 7 memoranda from the FBI
   - 1 CSCI
   - 2 State Department documents
   - 25 cables.

3. Machine inquiries for the location of these documents have not been made.
Mr. J. Lee Rankin

Would you please be good enough to telephone me on Monday, 2 March, by which time I assume you will have had an opportunity to glance at this material.

(Signed) Richard Helms

Attachment

6 March 1964
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. J. Lee Rankin

SUBJECT: Information in CIA's Possession Regarding Lee Harvey OSWALD Prior to November 22, 1963 as Transmitted to Warren Commission

1. This refers to your letter of February 12, 1964 addressed to the Director of Central Intelligence which has been passed to me for reply.

2. Paragraph three of your letter requested the Agency to supply the Commission with a report on information in the Agency's possession regarding Lee Harvey OSWALD prior to November 22, 1963. The request was predicated upon the footnote on page two of CIA's report to the Commission dated 31 January 1964, entitled: "Information Developed by CIA on the Activity of Lee Harvey OSWALD in Mexico City, 28 September - 3 October 1963".

3. There is attached an exact reproduction of the Agency's official dossier on Lee Harvey OSWALD beginning with the opening sheet dated 9 December 1960. The entire dossier carries the security classification of Secret and consists of thirty documents arranged in chronological order. On the basis of clearances from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of State, the Department of Navy, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service, who were queried by us after the receipt of your letter, we are able to make available exact copies of all materials in the file up to early October 1963. These include:

Document Number: 590-252

Page: 164 of 212

Copy No.: 261-259248

6 Mar 64
a. Seven documents received from the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

b. Ten documents received from the Department of State.

c. Two documents received from the Department of Navy.

d. One document (a name check request) from the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

e. Four newspaper clippings.

f. Five internal CIA notes.

g. CIA report dated 31 January 1964 to the Commission which covers all substantive developments affecting CIA in the matter of Lee Harvey Oswald from 9 October to 22 November 1963. The report indicated the disseminations of information developed by CIA that were made to other Federal agencies during that period. This item, as was pointed out at the time, is particularly sensitive and bears appropriate sensitivity indicators.

4. You will note that almost all of the documents carry markings required for CIA's internal records processing. A few of the papers contained the names of our employees or identifications of specific organizational components. We have taken the liberty of blocking out these items as they do not bear on the substance of the Commission's request.

Richard Helms
Deputy Director for Plans

Attachment

Original & 2 - Addresses: 1 - C/GI/SG
1 - DDP Subject: 1 - C/GI/R&A
1 - DDP Chron.: 1 - C/WH/3
1 - C/GI 1 - 201-289248

CHRGOccardc/7468/4 March 1964 (Inventory of documents contained in file attached for all but Addresses) 201-289248

2012038
Inventory of Documents Contained in OSWALD Dossier Forwarded to the Commission

1. State Telegram No. 1306, October 31, 1959 (Confidential) ✓
2. Newspaper Article from the Washington Post, November 1, 1959
3. CIA/LSN Internal Note dated 2 November 1959 (oral FBI name check request) and NR reply dated 4 November 1959 (Confidential)
4. Foreign Service Despatch 234, November 2, 1959 (Confidential)
5. State Telegram 1358, November 9, 1959 (Confidential)
6. State Telegram 1448, November 9, 1959 (Confidential) ✓
7. Newspaper Clipping from Washington Post, November 16, 1959
8. Newspaper Clipping from Evening Star, November 26, 1959
9. DBF 49478, 25 May 1960 (Confidential)
10. Internal CIA Biographic Profile dated circa May 1960 (Confidential)
11. Letter from the Department of State (Cumming) to DDP (Bissell) dated October 25, 1960 (DD/P 0-5679 - Secret)
12. DDP Response to State, dated 21 November 1960 (DD/P 0-6003 - Secret)
13. Internal CIA Request for Opening of 201 file, 9 December 1960 (Secret)
14. State Memorandum of Conversation dated January 26, 1961 (OUO)
15. State Instruction A-273, April 13, 1961 (OUO)
16. Foreign Service Despatch 806, May 26, 1961 (OUO)
17. Foreign Service Despatch 29, July 11, 1961 (OUO)
18. DFB 2181, July 13, 1961 (Confidential)

ATT: XAAZ - 22575 CS COPY 201-297248
19. Internal CIA Memo for the Record, 28 September 1961 (Secret)

20. Foreign Service Despatch 317, October 12, 1961 (OUO)

21. INS Name Check Request, December 5, 1961

22. Navy Message 20197/RB/3, 3 March 1962 (Confidential)

23. DNA 1624, 26 April 1962


25. DBA 20883, September 7, 1962 (Confidential)

26. DBA 51407, 10 September 1963

27. DBA 52355, 24 September 1963

28. DBA 55715 (number unclear), November 7, 1963

29. DBA 55777, November 8, 1963

30. CIA Summary Report on Activities of CSWALD in Mexico City, dated 31 January 1964
TO: BERLIN FRANKFURT  
FROM: DIRECTOR  
CONF: C/III 4  
INFO: DCl, D/DCl, DDP, ADDP, C/C1, C/C1/SI, VR  

RE: BRLN-5267 (IN 90848)*  
IN VIEW REGGAB CONNECTION MARINA OSWALD HEADQUARTERS  
DOES NOT DESIRE LONG-RANGE OPS INVOLVEMENT SUGGESTED PARAGRAPH 3 REF.

C/S COMMENT: *Reggab has number complex financial, documents and personal problems which leading him consider return to Moscow for further study in cinematographic institute. Believe he would definitely return if encouraged by us and that he susceptible to recruitment as KUBARK agent during Moscow sojourn and possibly as long range asset in Morroco.
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. J. Lee Rankin

SUBJECT: Reports on Activities and Travel of Lee Harvey OSWALD and Marina Nikolevna OSWALD as Transmitted to Warren Commission

1. Reference is made to the second paragraph of your memorandum dated 12 February 1964, and the second paragraph of your memorandum of 16 March 1964, relative to disseminations of information made by CIA to the Secret Service.

2. Immediately after the assassination of President Kennedy CIA undertook to assemble through its stations in Europe all available data, including information in the files of other governments and intelligence services, on the travels and activities of Lee Harvey OSWALD and Marina Nikolevna OSWALD. This information, as it was collected, was made available to the White House, the Department of State and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Copies of these messages were also sent to the Secret Service.

3. Attached to this memorandum are exact copies of two teletyped messages relative to the travels and activities of the OSWALDS (Attachments A and B). Paragraphs g and h of Attachment C are paraphrased. In Attachment C, OUT Teletype No. 85715, are found references to two other teletyped messages (OUT No. 85182 and OUT No. 85665) which describe one Richard Thomas GIBSON, a negro journalist...
now residing in Switzerland who has been active in the Fair
Play for Cuba Committee. Paraphrases of No. 35132 and
No. 35665 are included as Attachments D and E. Access to
original texts of paraphrased items will be provided when
members of your staff visit Langley. The information on
which paragraphs g and h of Attachment C are based was
received at CIA Headquarters on 27 November and dissemi-
nated on 28 November.

4. This memorandum and the attachments contain
very sensitive information which has a direct bearing on
sources and methods. An appropriate sensitivity indicator
has therefore been affixed.

Richard Helms
Deputy Director for Plans

Attachments-

as stated

Distribution:
Original & 2 - Addressee w/atts
1 - DDP Chrono w/atts
1 - DDP subject w/atts
1 - Mr. Rocca w/atts
1 - C/CISIG w/atts
1 - C/WH/3 w/atts
1 - 201-

CI/R&A/TRHall/6664/26 March 1964
Teletype message, OUT No. 96702, dated 4 December 1963, filed at 1411 hours, to the White House, the Department of State and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with copy to the Secret Service.

SUBJECT: Lee Harvey OSWALD

Records of the foreigners records office of the German Federal Republic in Cologne, Germany, show that Marina Nikolayevna Posakova OSWALD crossed West Germany from East Germany to Holland on 3 June 1962. She traveled by rail, crossing into West Germany at Helmstedt on 3 June and entering Holland by rail at the Bentheim crossing point. She had a West German visa 694/62 issued at the West Germany Embassy in Moscow. She listed her final destination as U.S.A. Comment: This confirms information from the U.S. Embassy in Moscow to the effect that the OSWALD family traveled from Moscow to Rotterdam by rail around 3 June 1962. Helmstedt and Bentheim are on the main rail route from Russia to Rotterdam. While Lee OSWALD himself and their infant daughter are not recorded in German records this is probably because little attention is paid to U.S. citizens and to infants in keeping travel records.

ATT 1 4

XAAZ-2201

63 6371

31-Mar-1974

291-259245

CGO244

PAGE 171 of 212
COPY NO.
Teletype message, OUI No. 87520, dated 6 December 1963, filed at 1829 hours, to the White House, the Department of State and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with copy to the Secret Service.

SUBJECT: Lee Harvey OSWALD

Reference is made to our OUT telegram No. 36732 of 6 December 1963 which gave information on the travel of Marina OSWALD (and presumably also Lee Harvey OSWALD and their daughter) across West Germany on their return from the Soviet Union. Information now available from Dutch authorities seems to confirm this. On 3 June 1962 one M. OSWALD, listed as a male Russian citizen, entered The Netherlands by train at the Oldenzaal border point.

Comment: It is believed that the listing of this person as a male instead of female was just an error of the border officials. Note that Oldenzaal is opposite Bentheim, the German border point where Marina OSWALD left Germany.
Teletype message No. 85715, dated 29 November 1963, filed at 13:40 hours, to the White House, the Department of State and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with copy to the Secret Service.

SUBJECT: Travel of Lee Harvey OSWALD

1. The following information has been gathered from reliable sources regarding the travel of Lee Harvey OSWALD and his wife:

   a. 9 October 1959: According to official British travel records OSWALD arrived in Southampton this date claiming on his landing card that he had no fixed address but planned to remain in the United Kingdom one week for vacation before going on to "some school" in Switzerland. (Headquarters comment: Probably referring to the Albert Schweitzer College in Switzerland with which he is known to have been in correspondence.)

   b. 10 October 1959: According to the same official British travel records OSWALD left London this date by air for Helsinki.
c. October 1959: Stockholm newspaper, DAGA

Nyhoter, of 25 November 1963 states Lee OSWALD passed through Sweden during October 1959. Article also adds that OSWALD was unsuccessful in obtaining visa to the USSR in Helsinki which resulted in his returning to Stockholm. Two days after he arrived in Stockholm OSWALD traveled directly to Moscow. Concluding sentence of article states "This indicates that the Russian Embassy (Stockholm) gave him a visa." According to a reliable source there was no record that there was any request for a USSR visa processed through normal channels for OSWALD at any time during 1959, and source indicated it was difficult to explain how OSWALD might have received his visa in two days without going through normal channels. The only conclusion which can be drawn is that OSWALD must have received his visa directly from the Soviet Embassy in Stockholm which occasionally is done in special cases, but the source had no evidence to confirm this assumption.
d. 10 to 15 October 1959: According to a very reliable but extremely sensitive source OSWALD stayed at the Torii Hotel in Helsinki from 10 to 11 October and then moved to the Klaus Kurki Hotel where he stayed until 15 October, apparently waiting for a visa to be issued him by the Soviet Consulate in Helsinki. He traveled to the USSR by train, crossing at Vainikkala on 15 October.

e. 13 May 1962: According to a Dutch official source, the Dutch Charge in Moscow issued a transit visa to OSWALD's wife on 13 May 1962. Their records reveal his wife was born on 17 July 1941 instead of 19 July 1941 and in Severodvinsk instead of Minsk. There is no record of her having actually transited The Netherlands.

f. 1962: Official British records do not reflect that OSWALD returned to the United States from the USSR through the United Kingdom. However, if he were merely transiting, it would not have been necessary for him to fill out a landing card, and therefore there would be no record of his travel in the official traffic index.
g. 1963: According to an extremely sensitive and reliable source, on 23 November Maria SNETHLAGE, head of the "Workgroup Informatics Cuba" (Workgroup Information Cuba), told an employee of the Cuban Embassy in The Hague that she was sure she had met "that Mr. LEE is Havana, who did the murder". She described him as a man of violence and entirely full of hate and indicated that it was possible that this man had been misled by a group. She said she had written to 'GIBSON' about the bad impression she had had of this LEE. (Headquarters comment: Please refer to our teletype Nos. 85152 and 85565 for additional information on GIBSON.) Later, SNETHLAGE told Castro Cubans in The Hague that "Mr. LEE of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee" had been slandered and that it was another person named Lee CSWALD who had done it. SNETHLAGE seemed to be glad to have heard this "correct" version. (Headquarters comment: Mr. LEE may be identical with Vincent Theodore LEE who replaced Richard GIBSON as Head of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee.)
h. According to reliable information, SNEHLAGE was in Cuba in January 1963, and according to an official Dutch source, she again traveled to Cuba for the May Day celebrations in 1963.
Teletype No. 05132, dated 22 November 1963, filed at 1932 hours, to the White House, the Department of State and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with copy to the Secret Service, (paraphrase)

SUBJECT: Lee Harvey OSWALD

1. In conversation with a close friend in Bern, Switzerland, on 23 November 1963, Richard Thomas GIBSON remarked that OSWALD is "one of us". OSWALD and GIBSON had corresponded two years previously, and OSWALD had joined the Committee. (Comment: Reference is presumably to the Fair Play for Cuba Committee.) GIBSON added that he had destroyed all his letters from OSWALD. OSWALD is crazy. GIBSON then remarked that he is happy that he was not in New York. He felt sorry for "LEE" in New York and for "TIBOR".

2. The information given above was supplied by an extremely sensitive source who is usually reliable.

3. According to other information that was available, Richard Thomas GIBSON, born 13 May 1931 in Los Angeles, California, is a negro journalist who has been active in the
Fair Play for Cuba Committee since 1960. He has resided since April 1963 at Lausanne, Switzerland. In this latter country Gibson has participated in the publication of La Revolution Africaine.
Teletype message, OUT No. 35665, 23 November 1963, filed at 1826 hours, to the White House, the Department of State and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with copy to the Secret Service. (paraphrased)

1. Our station in The Hague has reported that on
23 November 1963, a local Castrolite named Maria SNEHLAGE told Third Secretary Ricardo SANTOS of the Cuban Embassy in The Hague that she knew the "Mr. LEE" (sic) who murdered President Kennedy. She described "LEE" as a man full of hate and violence, and speculated that he had been 'misused by a group'. She said she had written to GIBSON (undoubtedly Richard GIBSON, U.S. citizen of Lausanne, Switzerland, born 13 May 1935, a Castro sympathizer, who had visited The Netherlands recently and had been in contact both with the Soviet Ambassador and the Cuban Embassy).

2. Later that same day Maria SNEHLAGE told Secretary SANTOS that "Mr. LEE of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee" had been slandered. The assassin had been another person, Lee OSWALD. SNEHLAGE is reported to have been in Cuba in January and again in May 1963.

ATT. 5 P: XAAZ-22601 63 COPY 201-287248
3. According to Dutch authorities on 7 November 1963, in talking about attacks by Cuban refugees against the Cuban mainland, SANTOS had replied "just wait and you will see what we can do. It will happen soon." Asked to be more precise, SANTOS had replied "just wait, just wait." SANTOS is reported to have a pro-Castro brother in the U.S.A.

4. A very sensitive source reports that after his conversations with SNETHLAGE, SANTOS was very angry because she had contacted him.
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. J. Lee Rankin
General Counsel
President's Commission on the
Assassination of President Kennedy

SUBJECT: Allegations Regarding Intelligence Training
School in Minsk, USSR as transmitted to
Warren Commission

1. Allegations of the existence of a Soviet intelligence and/or
sabotage training school in Minsk, USSR, have come to the
attention of the Agency from press reviews. Also, there has
been an informal inquiry from a member of the Commission,
Mr. Dulles, very recently on this detail. I take this opportunity
to furnish to the Commission the information which the Agency
has on this topic.

2. A careful review of CIA files has produced no hard
information regarding Soviet intelligence or sabotage training in
Minsk since 1947. One item of information supplied by a Soviet
disector in 1949 reported the existence, as of 1947, of an intelligence
training school in Minsk. No additional details, however, were
available regarding its curriculum or location in Minsk. Information
developed from our sources since 1949 has not mentioned, confirmed,
or corroborated the continued existence of the installation.

3. Another reference in CIA files to training in Minsk relates
to the existence of a sabotage school which functioned in Minsk until
the German attack on the Soviet Union in 1941, after which the school
was moved to Leningrad.
4. These two items of information are the only ones in the possession of this Agency relating to intelligence and sabotage training in Minsk. They are furnished to the Commission in order to complete its records. Because of the sensitive sources involved, it has been necessary to affix a sensitivity indicator to this memorandum.

Richard Helms
Deputy Director for Plans

Distribution:

Original & 1 - Addressed
2 - DDP
1 - SR/CI/R
1 - C/CI/51G
1 - C/CI/R8
1 - CI/R&I/3/Hall
1 - CI/R&I/201

Originated by: CI/R&I/3/Hall (5664, 4 June 1964)
16 December 1963

To: Deputy Director (FBI)

From: [Redacted]

Subject: The Kennedy Assassination

1. Attached for your personal use are the written comments of the Joint FBI-High Court of Inquiry on some aspects of the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. As you know, the Joint Investigation Committee's findings have been made public, and it is now appropriate to consider the evidence in the light of the latest developments.

   The evidence suggests that Lee Harvey Oswald was involved in the assassination of President Kennedy. The evidence also indicates that there may have been others involved in the conspiracy.

2. We have decided to pass on this evidence without waiting for further confirmation. The President and his advisors should be informed of the findings as soon as possible.

Distribution: [Redacted]
TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Popich

FROM: Deputy Director (Plumey)

SUBJECT: Poter BERTABIN’s Comments on the Kennedy Assassination

1. Attached for your perusal are the written comments of KGB defector Peter BERTABIN on some aspects of the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. As you know, BERTABIN defected from the KGB about 25 years ago, and his personal knowledge is not up to date, but he has stayed in touch with Soviet intelligence developments to the best of his ability. His comments on how Lee OSWALD and his wife must have been handled by Soviet intelligence authorities while they were inside the Soviet Union are particularly interesting and his suggestions for questioning of Mrs. Marina OSWALD are equally provocative.

2. We have decided to pass on his views without editing, and this Agency does not specifically endorse his conclusions or recommendations.

CXXI-3/779,135
Enclosures: Per paragraph 1

C/VI/3/J.M.Written:cty

12 December 1963

Distribution:

Orig. & 1 - Addressee
1 - RI
1 - CT/LIA
1 - CT/BIA
1 - CT/SCG
2 - C/VII/3
1 - VI/R

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW
CONDUCTED ON 25 MAY 1976

IMPF CT BV22422

Document Number 413-76A
for FOIA Review on MAY 1976

16 Dec 63
SUBJECT: Peter DEBERRY's Comments on President Kennedy's Assassination

1. We should understand that my comments which follow are not based solely on the thesis that OSWALD was specifically dispatched to murder our President. The very real possibility also exists that OSWALD was sent here on another mission by the KGB and subsequently accomplished the deed on his own initiative. However, such a possibility does not make the KGB less culpable as the seeds for OSWALD's act must have been planted while he was training in the USSR for his other mission. We might first consider the question uppermost in the minds of most Americans, "What did the USSR have to gain by killing the President?" I believe we can make a good case as to the precise gains accruing to the USSR and most specifically accruing to BERNSTEIN. The assassination of President Kennedy would accomplish the following for BERNSTEIN personally:

   a. Western pressure behind the leadership of the USA would automatically ease up. Witness President Johnson's immediate conciliatory tone towards the USSR after the murder. We might mention that the USA was the chief proponent for not extending long range credits to the USSR. Extension of long range credits is vital to the USSR at this juncture.

   b. This leads us into the most pressing problem within the USSR. The West persistently underestimates the extent of the Soviet internal situation. It was my prediction that as a result of the mismanagement of the 1963 harvest and the CHICOM arguments that BERNSTEIN would resign during the upcoming December plenums of the Communist Party of the USSR. Our President's death thus effectively diverts the Soviets' attention from their internal problems. It directly affects BERNSTEIN's longevity.

   c. In the Cuban situation any USA or Cuban expatriate actions against Cuba will not be tainted by the fact that these are vengeful acts against Cuba because of OSWALD's "Fair Play for Cuba" associations. Obviously the Soviets properly interpret our situation in that President JOHNSON will restrain any planned interventions in Cuba for a long time.

   d. A more conciliatoryAmerica will strengthen BERNSTEIN'S hand in his running battle with the CHICOMS. He will thus have another reason to say his form of peaceful coexistence is superior to that of the CHICOMs.
e. Conceivably any of President KENNEDY's planned actions to get even more firm with the Soviets during the pre-
election year are thus sabotaged by the President's murder.

f. The Soviets obviously understood that the death of President KENNEDY would result in the emergence of DEGAULLE as a strong Western leader. DEGAULLE of course says 'what's good for France is not necessarily bad for the USSR.'

g. The death of President KENNEDY removes a popular rallying point for our allies. Furthermore, and more pertinent, his death removes a symbol for Soviet intellectuals who have repeatedly made inviolate comparisons between their own intellectual despair and the flowering of the arts under the KENNEDY's. The problem of the intellectuals in the USSR should not be interpreted as the least of KENNEDY's internal problems. We must recall that beginning with 1956, intellectuals have provided the impetus for revolution in the USSR and they comprise one of the three balls KENNEDY must constantly juggle—the department of war, the cortex and the cortex.

h. If the USSR has any ambitions aside in manipulating U. S. public opinion their murder of President KENNEDY would serve to exasperate the present differences between the radical left and right in America. In fact the USSR propaganda machine began to say the murder was committed by the radical right as soon as the deed was done and before OSWALD was captured.

i. Finally, the death of President KENNEDY, whether a planned operation or not, will serve the most obvious purpose of providing proof of the power and existence of the KGB. This application of sheer terror could be interpreted as a warning to Russia's own citizens, as the Soviet intelligence services have suffered severe reverses recently with REMERSON, GORKHEN'S defection, their ignominious expulsion from the Congo, etc. I have long predicted that the USSR would take some drastic action to halt the rapid erosion of their security.

2. Can we briefly view the OSWALD operation as a mounted KGB operation to kill the President? What are the essential ingredients?

a. The KGB had spent three years to assess OSWALD in the USSR...Logren will depurate the value that the KGB attaches to such on the spot assessment. They may also say that OSWALD was a not-inappropriately would not be entrusted with such an operation by the KGB. However, the KGB properly knows that historically poor assassins have been pathological miscreants.
b. In such an operation the KGB could not use a Soviet citizen, though the very real possibility exists that OSWALD was assisted by a Soviet illegal of the KGB 13th Department. Sticking to essentials—it was a good plan that did succeed.

c. OSWALD did escape from the book building.

d. He did get to a theater which could have been his point of contact with his illegal case officer. Certainly we knew the KGB's penchant for using theaters for meeting places.

e. After his arrest, which was only due to his unfortunate encounter with Policeman TUPPEN, OSWALD did remain silent. How like the behavior of Col. AKHY was his behavior in this regard.

3. Also the very real possibility exists that the KGB intended to eliminate OSWALD after he did the job. His posting in the theater was probably for just such a liquidation or removal from the scene. In RUBY's part in the operation we must recognize the possibility that HUNY was also a KGB hatched man. Looking at the bare essentials of his part in the operation we see the following:

a. RUBY had access to the police station. Departs may be personally knew most policemen.

b. He successfully assisted OSWALD.

c. RUBY remains silent and his cover is holding up.

d. He has a good legend of temporary insanity.

e. He has a reasonable chance to escape the death sentence.

4. The undersigned might be better qualified to comment on the OSWALD aspects of this case if we knew the following about his activities prior to his departure to the USSR: (a., b., and c. below offer three possible answers to the question, "Why did he go to Moscow?"

a. First, OSWALD was a self-made Marxist or Communist who decided to go on his own; that is, he made this decision by himself and prompted by no one. He possibly was looking for a better life without knowing that the Soviet Union really is.

b. Second, after OSWALD's discharge as an "undesirable" from the Marines, he found himself in a difficult and unpleasant situation: if it possible that in this situation he was noticed by a spotter or recruiter for the Illegals or some other department and was considered as a possible candidate for use or
recruitment: The full information about OSMALL was sent to Moscow, and on Moscow's order an investigation of OSMALL was made and there followed a decision to "invite" him to Moscow. Using the word "invite," the underwater man in mind that some agents or recruiters through conversations with OSMALL, but without actually suggesting the trip itself, inspired OSMALL to travel to the USSR. Had in this case, it is possible that someone gave him some financial assistance and some advice on how to do this.

a. Third, OSMALL went to Moscow, or was sent to Moscow, by some pro-Soviet, pro-Communist, pro-Chinese organization(s), having in mind that he would stay in the Soviet Union for a few years, learning more about the Soviet Union and receiving instructions for future operations, activities, etc.

5. Knowing for sure that the Soviets never give a visa without making an investigation of the person making the application, we have to make our own investigation of the following questions:

a. When did OSMALL first begin to express his wish to go to the Soviet Union?

b. To whom did he talk, whose did he contact at this early time, and how much time elapsed between these talks and contacts and his application?

c. How, when and through whom did OSMALL get his Soviet visa?

d. How long did it take for him to get the visa?

e. Who personally gave the visa to OSMALL? We must know if the person at the embassy who actually gave OSMALL the visa was a KGB employee.

f. When and how did OSMALL travel to the USSR (air, sea; through which countries; in which countries, if any, did he make stops; how long were such stops)?

6. Together with the above, it is very important to know of OSMALL's circumstances before his trip to the USSR. The man in advance that he was going and who knew that he had gone: mother, brother, relatives, friends, neighbors, girl friends, boy friends, old buddies, etc. To whom did OSMALL say goodbye before he left for the USSR: personally or by telephone, by mail? Did he ever ask anyone any questions on traveling to the USSR? Where?
7. ONSLADT in Moscow. When ONSLADT arrived in Moscow, he was under observation, investigation and complete control by the KGB. In this particular case, under the Second Chief Directorate (CI). Being under the control of the KGB, at the same time he was under heavy investigation directed at answering the question of why this stupid American had come to the USSR (it doesn't make any difference whether they knew in advance about ONSLADT or not; anyway, they would conduct such an investigation). Every possible bit of information was taken from ONSLADT about the USA, especially about his service in the Marine Corps, etc. At the same time, ONSLADT was under constant observation and study for possible future use by the Soviet Intelligence and CI services.

8. It should be noted here that any foreigner, especially an American, who visits the USSR for business or prolonged stay always is examined by the Soviet State Security as a possible candidate for future use (special training and recruitment) within the USA or other countries (but against the USA). After a good study and investigation which continues about six months in Moscow, under normal financial support and minimal contact from the KGB, the KGB makes the conclusions: that ONSLADT is clear and is who he claimed to be and that he might possibly be used or useful for Soviet Intelligence or CI Service. NOTE: the underlined believes that during KGB (ONSADT'S) first few months in Moscow, additional inquiry and investigation of ONSLADT was going on through the Soviet Embassy in Washington and through Soviet agents networks in the USA and possibly through pro-Soviet and pro-Communist organizations within the USA.

9. After being a few weeks or months in Moscow, ONSLADT expressed a wish to stay forever in the Soviet Union and to be a Soviet citizen. Then the KGB said to him: "If you really want to be a Soviet citizen and serve the Communist cause, you must return American Imperialism and American citizenship." Therefore, somewhere in this period, ONSLADT went to the U.S. Embassy and renounced his U.S. citizenship. After this act, State Security decided to give ONSLADT some kind of job in accordance with his knowledge and capabilities, at the same time continuing to study him as a potential agent.

10. Because to make a good agent takes a long time and because ONSLADT was impatient—and because he had not yet been given Soviet citizenship— the KGB decided not to make him a good agent, but to make him a useful person and decided to use him in a more or less open way.

11. When ONSLADT showed signs of dissatisfaction about the Soviet way of life (it is usual for Americans)—and by this time ONSLADT had already met his girl friend (the KGB probably helped
his to find her—to make him happy and to make sure that he would not leave the Soviet Union—the KGB at the same time continued to train him, probably in the way of an old-fashioned infiltrator, telling him that he would be a good fighter against imperialism and against American millionaires, such as ROCKEFELLER, KENNEDY and others. And somewhere here, while in this kind of training, a low level KGB officer of State Security told him that to have a better life in the U.S. you have to fight very hard to bury capitalism; as our Nikolai Sergeyevich says, together with capitalism you have to bury all the millionaires, including your first beat and block-sucker, KENNEDY (NOTE: this is not a tall story; it is the way in which State Security operates with the stupid Fascists and with naive followers of the Communist movement). If on a high level within the KGB it was decided that there is nothing good in OSWALD and that he is just a naive American and that he could not be relied upon fully, but that nonetheless he could be used because he is for our cause and is against capitalism in general, then the following would have been suggested—after OSWALD already had asked permission to return to the USA. OSWALD was told to be a good fighter against capitalism and to secure your Soviet citizenship, you must show yourselves a good soldier for the Communist cause inside the USA. Then, we give you permission because we believe you are a strong Fascist to return to the USA and to do something for our common cause, such as to help any American pro-Soviet organizations or, for instance, become a member of a Pro Cuba Committee or in case of crisis to do something outstanding—that will be noticeable everywhere—that will prove that you are a real Communist. Then, somewhere here, if he was already a Soviet agent or not, the girl showed up, or she was taken before, but by this time she was pregnant and OSWALD decided to go to the USA. Then he was told. After this talk, OSWALD started—there is your fueron? She is my wife, we have a child, and I would like to go. If he did make any noise, they decided to let him and his go; or if he already was a trained agent, then without any kind of noise on his part, but with some difficulties, permission was granted for her to go with him.

12. Looking at the wife of OSWALD we should here in mind that she was and still is an agent or at least a low-level informer of the FBI. If she was before she met OSWALD, she became so after the second day she met him. This is the regulation in State Security on how to handle foreigners—it makes no difference whether they are Communists or not.

13. Investigation of OSWALD’s wife should be undertaken as soon as possible, with special attention being paid the questions to follow.
a. First, who is she? Her education, profession, age, family background, Party affiliation (Komsomol membership). If she was a member of the Komsomol, then the Komsomol organization will take any steps possible against her traveling to the U.S. Also, she must be expelled from the Komsomol, and then she automatically would be considered a member of the Imperialist Coup. Then, if she was a member of the Komsomol and this action did not take place, it was because of KGB interference against such action. The same action would relate to any of her relatives—father, mother, brothers... if they were members of the CPSU or Komsomol.

b. To which offices was she invited before and after their marriage? If she was invited to see official Soviet offices, and if these offices asked her not to marry a foreigner and not to go with him, then probably she was not a member of the Komsomol and she did it on her own volition; but if she answered that no one invited her to such offices, then the whole job was done by the KGB—smoothly and quietly, with no talk going around about it.

c. Who helped her and how many times to write papers for the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs to say that she had married an American citizen and would like to go with him to the USA? If it was done a few times and with great difficulties, then probably it was done only with a little help from the KGB. If, however, the papers were prepared only once and permission was granted after only a few months, with no mention of special days by the KGB... (According to the American newspapers, her application for permission to come to the U.S. was processed very easily and quickly.)

d. When and where did they register their marriage? Who were the witnesses to that marriage? How many relatives and friends (of wife) were present at the wedding and celebration? What kind of gifts did they receive at the time of marriage and after? Where did they live up residence after marriage? Were they given an apartment, or a room? And in what neighborhood?

e. Where did her husband, OSS, live? In what factory? What is his hours of work? How long did he spend in Moscow before he went to Kinerk? Who chose Kinerk—did he or did someone else?

f. Who were her husband's friends? From what circles? Workers? Intellectuals?

g. How many times did she and her husband—while they lived together—invited to the police stations or any other Soviet government offices, together or separately? (Note: There is no other office than the KGB which would make such an invitation. It makes no difference if they were agents or not.)
h. How smart (intelligent) is she? Does she really speak no English? Is her English better than she shows or better than it should be after being here only two years? Or worse?

i. What does she say about life in the Soviet Union?

j. Did her husband have a gun while he was in the Soviet Union? If so, how does she know about it? When did he get it? Did he have special permission to carry a gun? Did he bring this gun with him across the border? For your information, nobody carries a gun in the USSR without the KGB eventually learning of it. Least of all an American.

k. Who gave financial help to them before they left the Soviet Union? (Note: For a regular worker in the Soviet Union, it is impossible to save enough money to buy a ticket and make any kind of preparations to go abroad.)

l. Who gave instructions to Oswald to ask for financial assistance at the American Embassy upon his return to the USA?

m. Was their first child born in Russia—baptized in the USSR? If so, in what church? Whose idea was it? Did they baptize their second child, born in the U.S.?

n. If Oswald never had a permanent job here in the USA, then who was going to finance his next trip to the USSR? How much did his wife know about his plan to return to the USSR via Cuba?

1. The investigation of the wife should be made step by step, keeping in mind and never forgetting that Oswald as well as she herself were under constant observation and with constant contacts with organs of the KGB. Without such observation and contacts with organs of the KGB, no foreigners can live within the Soviet Union.

15. In any investigation of this case we should not lose the initiative. In view of the extraordinary circumstances surrounding this case, the FBI, through the Department of State, could logically enough request that the USSR provide all available info on Oswald's story in the USSR and the purpose of his visit to the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. A friendly gesture can be expected to honor such a request. We might learn a great deal from the Soviet reply.
1. Below is a summary of the matters discussed in our meeting with Messrs. Angleton and Rocca on the evening of 15 January 1964. In turn, Mr. Angleton was reporting to us the substance of his meeting with Mr. Allen Dulles, Mr. J. Lee Rankin, trial counsel, Mr. Wollins of the Justice Department, Mr. Helms and Mr. Rocca, which took place on the afternoon of 14 January 1964.

2. Mr. Angleton said that Mr. Dulles, apparently provoked by press accusations that the Warren Commission has been dilatory, asked CIA for suggestions of questions or requests to be included in a letter to the Soviet Government. To this end, the Warren Commission and to be transmitted through the Department of State, would seek additional evidence which is presumably available in Soviet files which could assist the Commission’s deliberations. Mr. Dulles did not have a detailed idea of what he wanted to ask the Soviets for but did say that the questions should be "not too technical." Although Mr. Angleton thought that the letter should be written only after the CIA report and comments have been completed, in order to make the letter as effective as possible, Mr. Dulles felt it should go now, be phrased in generalities and allow the Soviets more flexibility in their handling of the matter than would a more pointed letter based on our concrete findings. Mr. Dulles asked CIA only for the questions and not for a draft letter. Mr. Murphy suggested that we ask only for certain records rather than put specific questions to the Soviets. Mr. Murphy suggested that these might include Soviet hospital records connected with Lee Oswald’s attempted suicide, city visa and registration records for Moscow and Minsk, factory personnel records from Oswald’s place of employment, etc. Also Oswald’s diary noted that his case had passed through two commissions in the USSR; we might ask for the records of these commissions as well. Mr. Angleton said that in transmitting our suggestions to Mr. Dulles we can include any introductory paragraphs or explanatory comments that we
felt necessary to explain to Mr. Dulles the direction of our thinking about these proposals.

(Note: I instructed Mr. Wigren to prepare a draft of suggested queries, using the assistance of DERZABIN and to have this ready, if possible, by the close of business today.)

3. Rankin stated that the Commission wants to account in detail, minute by minute and hour by hour, for Oswald’s time outside the United States. Mr. Bagley suggested that the narrative chronology of Oswald’s stay in the Soviet Union be converted to a chronology tabulation which would permit us more simply to insert added details and dates as we learned of them in other documentation which we can expect to receive shortly. This was agreed.

(Note: I instructed Mr. Wigren to begin recasting the narrative immediately into this form.)

4. Mr. Rankin said that the Commission has a waist-high stack of documents and reports received from the FBI and Secret Service, plus the CIA has not yet received. These include Secret Service interviews with Marina Oswald, letters from Lee Oswald in the USSR and other material. He promised to send this material to Mr. Helms shortly.

(Note: We will pass appropriate parts of this material to DERZABIN for further analysis along the lines of his earlier work on documents already in our possession.)

5. Messrs. Angleton, Murphy and Rocca considered DERZABIN’s initial analysis of Marina Oswald’s documents, and the questions to which it gave rise, to be a worthwhile and important contribution. CIA would be unable to make any serious analysis of even hypothesis until some of DERZABIN’s questions had been answered. Mr. Rocca suggested that DERZABIN’s paper be recast into more of a questionnaire form and Mr. Bagley agreed, pointing out that DERZABIN’s comment and speculation could be put off to the side as explanatory comment on each question, as appropriate. Mr. Angleton and Mr. Murphy thought that it would be desirable to send this paper to the Warren Commission in advance of other CIA reports with a memorandum informing the Commission that we would need answers to this interim questionnaire in order to reconstruct a detailed chronology of Oswald’s time in the USSR and to comment on his activity there. The Commission would be asked to procure the information from Marina through any Agency it might choose.
(Note: I instructed Mr. Wigen to prepare the DERYABIN paper in this format urgently.)

6. Mr. Angleton reported that he had asked the Commission representatives certain questions pertaining to our use of defectors in analysing the Oswald papers:

a. Was the Commission formally requesting us to have defectors analyse the material?

Mr. Wellins thought that the answer to this question is yes. However, Mr. Angleton asked for a formal request from the Commission to this effect. The FBI has stated that its reports are not to be passed to the Commission, which may cause some complications.

b. Would the Commission be prepared to assume the burden of responsibility if such a defector should disagree with the Commission's opinions or come up with a radically different hypothesis or interpretation?

The persons present said that the Commission would.

c. If a defector who had contributed to the analysis of the documents should be unwilling to appear personally and formally before the Commission, would the Commission exercise its subpoena powers against him?

Mr. Rankin thought that if there was a risk involved for the defector, the Commission would not do so. However, Rankin promised to get a formal answer from the Commission on this point.

d. Will the classification we put on our correspondence to the Commission be honored?

The answer was that in principle our classification would be honored. However, Mr. Rankin warned those present that CIA should not hope to evade criticism or responsibility through classification of its material.
6. Mr. Angleton reported that Mr. Richard Davis is representing the interests of the Department of State in this inquiry. Mr. Thompson had ruled himself out because he was Ambassador to the Soviet Union at the time of the events in question.

7. One matter which had been brought to light by the Oswald case was the need for a mechanism in the United States Government to record and assimilate our knowledge of the Soviet handling of American defectors to the USSR. The Bureau is apparently in some danger of criticism for its failure to keep an eye on Oswald after his return. Similarly, CIA has not systematically collected nor compiled information on Soviet defector handling. Berlin Base had kept a list of American defectors at one time, but these individuals have not been debriefed on their return to the West.

8. The Commission representatives at the 14 January 1964 meeting estimated that the Warren Commission would need from three to six months to complete its task.

9. Mr. Bagley raised the question of the desirability of having DERYABIN participate personally, representing the FBI as an interpreter perhaps, in a debriefing of Marina. Nesara. Angleton and Murphy were convinced that CIA must avoid direct involvement with this investigation. Although it is less efficient as a method, we will content ourselves with putting written questions to Marina to be answered by whatever Agency the Commission may choose to use.

Tennent R. Bagley
Chief, SR/CI

201-289249
ROCCA note to HELMS on
Talk with Dullés on 21 March,
Dick:

Had a briefing at Allen Dulles' house on Saturday afternoon. (We were assembled to discuss his taping session with Denver, Halen, MacInnes, Donovan, and Hansenne-Baldwin in New York tonight. None of the others were present.)

A.W.D. showed me a letter he had received from Rankin recently expressing the desire to reach a modus vivendi in order to allay the story of CIA's possible sponsorship of Oswald's activity. The point of the communication to A.W.D. was to suggest that he serve as a file reviewer for the Commission. The letter outlined alternative possibilities in this matter (affidavit from the DGI, etc.).

In my presence, A.W.D. wrote the answer:

a. Declining the invitation to serve as file reviewer for good and sufficient reasons.

b. Stating his willingness to provide a statement or testimony to the Commission with respect to his knowledge of Oswald during his tenure as DGI. He noted in the tail-off of the letter that as far as he could remember he had never had any knowledge at any time prior to the date of the assassination.

23 March 64

Rock

23 March 64