JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

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RECORD NUMBER : 104-10534-10084
RECORD SERIES : JFK
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : NOSENKO RECORDS

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

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FROM : MILER.
TO :
TITLE : HANDWRITTEN NOTES ON MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
FORMS: ANATOLE RE NOSENKO
DATE : 05/14/69
PAGES : 51
SUBJECTS : NOSENKO
ANATOLE
NBR

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CLASSIFICATION : SECRET
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RELEVANT (NBR). NOTES ARE DATED 15, 16 AND 17 JAN AND 14
MAY 1969.

CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENT

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED
ANATOLE REY NOSZUKO

c1c1 was given a copy of the following for delivery to Anatole today:

A. Memo for Director Security

"Amendment Topics for Anatole Noszuko"

(A copy of the draft was given to c1c1 on which I annotated final was dated 22 April.)

B. A carbon of the Memo for the Record dated 4 April 69, Subject: Anatole ReNoszuko with atts A B C.

G. W. ScottWieler
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT

ANATOLE RE Solie Moskino Paper

DATE

16 JANUARY '59

FILE NUMBER

A Question if he stated in re

his Dec '60 talk with Kosostev

that it was a military

code clerk which was

recruited — most likely

he stated important

recruitment code clerk

may be military —

(Circle self in Solie paper — this

procedure DA-574 - info from

FB1 wire transcript (?) Kosostev

in Dec '60)

OFFICE AND TITLE

V. a. eld.

SIGNATURE

CLASSIFICATION
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: 60-61 Nosenko's position

(Annul 1 to Reviewing Staff Nosenko paper)

2. Points of "misinformation"
from Nosenko

1. He was not in American Section, 60-61, and he could not be Deputy Chief (W says he was)

2. There were no recruitments of American personnel during this period.

If N is established as in American Section then point 2, i.e. Nosenko's claim, follows. This is not the case.

Dec. 60-Jan 61 - in office
V. Petrov's Section. Petrov told
personnel he could not find
make reports Amendment - look for it

OFFICE AND TITLE

SECRET

DATE: 16 January 61

FILE NUMBER

SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

(2) 60-61 NSEC.120

If Petrov was responsible for
Inquiring why would he make
" wikid " report in this Section?
A overlooked their ask for

A sank the in sure that before his
defection IV would have no
problems learning about
recruitment and operations,
tributary announced
successes - rewards
followed in few days - this
knowledge, Police A knows as
that IV would know - he
would analyze who doing
what and piece together
with announcements -

Rewards to extra and

targets.
Memorandum for the Record

Subject: Nasekile trip to Cuba - Nov-Dec 60

Avalle says only photographs will substantiate Nasekile's visit to Nikolaev, i.e., Nikolaev did travel there.

Amsterdam - RR to Berlin, alone as traveler or as member of travel control, etc.

Request for sworn documentation to substantiate actually was Nasekile.

Office and Title: 4th Sr. Ruler

Signature: [Signature]

Date: 15 January 61

File Number: 1401

Classified: SECRET

GROUP I: EXCELLENCE OF AUTOMATIC REPORTING

Confidentiality: SECRET

DocId: 32404750 Page 6
Memorandum for the Record

Subject: Visceral Attitude to Surfacing

Date: 15 January '69

Office and Title: Signature: G. S. Miller

annotate suggests consideration about asking N if he would agree to have true information published under his name, such as political information, of Guiteros from what he has provided. This to be tested, see N's reaction, suggest this and see what he would say about writing article about Guiteros. See stage see what might be done.

I have asked and been told by N that N feared for his safety with respect to surfacing or living openly.
Klipper: Britanco relations.

Create says pursue tasks together as hunting or fishing — something of affection about line described to understand his game it seems not right.

Did not understand point!
Aneiro categorically states it would have been impossible for N to transfer any notes or papers with him when transferring to another department.

Check out safe and material constant. A says if he had been told N kept notes in his apartment A would say “madness” but believes N cannot accept transfer notes with N.

A questions No 2 notes dealing with military targeting. How would he have?

A says flatly military unit under Kovshur, Possibly Petrov in section (sub) separate from Kovshur.

Gioqi Zukor. Second motion SSA agrees (Zhukov) Chekpanov papers show Chief Section used to check "C paper" re Kovshur status.
SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

DATE
15 January 69

SUBJECT
CHEREPANOV WRITE-UP from British
Caption: Aleksandr Nikolayevich Cherepanov - 5 pages only

Solo read, copy to him today.
TA read.
Avalone
Kovshuk - in U.S. - demotion.

Anatole says. That Kovshuk got in trouble while he was in the USS on a mission. He was recalled and detainted. He was a SCF officer not FCD. He was only in US 10 months.

Anatole does not accept Kosenko's explanation of reason for Kovshuk's demotion.

Anatole says, referring to Solie, he does not believe Kosenko's version. In US was girls. Solie said it indicated was involved girls in US.

However, Anatole says recall just because of girls abducting his information but did indicate should investigate. Relates to cases he studying.

W. S. [Signature] 7-69

1954
Memorandum for the record

Date: 15 Jan 69

Subject: Tamara Mamedova

Statement: The KGB suggested that she be investigated further. She might be a KGB operative or traveler and active while in the US. Was in Washington.

On the basis of her previous behavior and responses, she was considered a confirmed case. She had not mentioned anything new. The file was updated to reflect this.

Office and Title: [Redacted]

Signature: [Redacted]
SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

DATE
15 January '69

SUBJECT
Kosoloh-Churchov - Gulu

FILE NUMBER

Avadis called N-C-C closest
friend, N would know all C & G
92 agents and vice versa.
Points: N could identify versus
by audience would know C's agents.
A also commented that Gulu in
Switzerland would have been targeted vs.
Americans not concerned with
frustrations Swiss police.
A in answer to TA question
said he knew for fact that N-C-G
closest friends - professional, social-
talk about women, etc., and he
had been present when N & C
talking about operations using
language, i.e., doubletalk, so to.
A did not know what they
really talking about but indicating
to A they will train up operational.
Avakos returned to join them to see  
no substantiation for evidence that N
was actually involved and working  
against Americans – in two years
he should have been in “10 cases as
participate – Muilems – would not
tolerate “planning” as part of experienced
Guerrillas. Even as he conceded by A
that N was “deputy” he would be
directly involved – in contact. A note
Kovshish – higher rank,
Kopyovcov did not know language.
Koslovov and K should have
worked and participated together.
Kovshish and Kushionov active –
no cover,
Unbelievable he could stay 2 yrs
without involvement and direct control.
The response to Sekis into 10. N
approached to Kuykor at airport which
Sekis noted Kushionov could not confirm,
A tip not confirmed – cover.
A very positive weak point in N's story is American Section duty — we can substantiate — no confirmation — not unusual — a reconstruction on actual role at time.

U.S. Miller
Memorandum for the Record

Subject: V. Nosenko

Antonov emphasized point that Nosenko should have directly participated in an approach to American Embassy personnel to have no social contact with Americans during the period Jan 60 - Dec 61 when he was in Dept I, Section I. Another point No's good language, experience, etc., according to his knowledge, means that it should have followed American Section of policy and been directly
involved. In reply to the question, Sollo said only direct confrontation N had with American was in hallway when it pitched bool. Solle said it had attended a Cove 7/4th July celebration at AMEM 2, Muscati.
No doubt, not even 10% doubt, that Brecke is not a provocateur(s).

A statement Brecke reiterated
to J. Angleton, B. Dole, and S. Miller.

Angleton's concern is to point out the contradictions, major areas, necessary to protect our security.
ANATOLE RE NOSENKO

ANATOLE read thru several volumes of
transcripts of Solo interviews with
Nosenko, the Cheka papers, including
the Russian and Solo's paper at
Moscow zona files. He recorded for
his comments.

[note: illegible handwriting]

Paperwork - Cheka papers -

[notes illegible]

Did not get file to review but

A man here to Bagley double again

Newspaper account made it clear

A source that was discussed with

Bagley 1963, went to MI6

1964, rec'd file from embassy as it
was 64 ANALYSIS PROPOSED

Analysis audited to 60-61 KB

Service Background - no clear

analyis of whole case, but letters

information, etc.

A position was lead to have acc

[notes illegible]

[signature]
Warmed to the position. At this could not do research completely. Lastly, recommendations on interrogators to check out to story and must be (A) would review materials and analyse - see what do.

Mr. Solie did good job - did what SB failed to do, find many gaps - abundant info - publish important aspect of background - after analysis thinks many things to discuss and N can be really assessed as bona fide or provocateur in a decision.

Our state conclusion: 8-9 vals of info Solie elicited from (good) for

Conclusion -

Final val conclusion - analysis of evidence - mistake made -

Analysis & Conclusion not supported by previous vals of N's information.
Memorandum for the Record

Subject: Nثار נאשף תייר רכיב דקרת קר

Use to adress timing and meaning account for what happened before Dov Evdoshenky Case - whatever is.

Wait in agents -

Paper genuine agent in CRU -

As to no esp agents - military personnel after paper arrest within the esp.

Another case walk-in - meet

Analyze Dov Evdoshenky light Paper.

Parallel up-dated info. look at Dov Evdoshenky from Paper.

1. Naosher background against what went before - different Pniki Zym key to Dov Evdoshenky was missile info which took more than usual to prepare.

Pakis up to Roshel school 59 - gave them basis similar to Naosher what before.

Balitzy come Dec 61 - inform KGB

Structure - major reorganization, new tasks, personnel, operations, agents - some Fed + some SCD - C info indicated

Long assignments preparation AMIB Moscow

Signature:

Office and Title:

1954

Classified

GROUP 1

EXEMPT FROM THE EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 11,850
6 months ago to Gibraltar - described
contacts old in General. Talked here wase
into KG2, structure, personnel, operations -
Speaks impressively fine. - Some cite
personally - Hard and (A) your question
been filled because he gave fairly -
cooperation not criteria to assess
defector. If defector respects himself
we may not cooperate and two
The more cooperative the more suspect
because we had to tell story - do mission
Free response does not impress A -
If popo gave vast info then Pankowsky
had green light - parallel to Goli clock
If KG2 knows that Goli clock made SO
no available to CIA. They never get
Green light - difference in details

2nd cue assessment - background -
PERSONAL - pre - service, bio = character = ops/professional/bio
not speak about bankrisht - speak as mentioned
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

I B) 4th KG - not important dwell on this
the incident - 4am of minuto - an group against
Amnesty by SB concluded with P etc.

important to see if any connection to penetration
of CIA - we explained to hoiste interrogation
question in deliberate but was Washington
SB and radio waves or calculated -

Part-deux - If CIA accepted decision
(when I had made) Part 1 some minor
see if decision results after getting down to

II Personal character - different opinions
rather not discuss - two sides - can be
important but not major - information on
7's bragging - boasting - boasting not
that yellow key - exaggerated - if
assides been fine then important but
still questioning then back differently
open question -

III Service in KG - determine
details of service accurate or given to CB
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT

If we do not accord to sources and years of different time factors a significantly lacking with duplication than we cannot say do has done his analysis that predictions, salaries, etc., acceptable on basis of speculation. Examines N into E other evidence - cannot discard evidence if contrary what he says.

Date: 1 April 1960 - Jan 62 (61)

Importance in considers last I. A says.

pit of G - important up.

Not true according to G - G

Mention for fact N did not save I.

G told Bailey 63 - among list he saw N's name - G did not pinpoint N, but said list wrong because G knew N not in American Section.

Based on fact - not theory eventual.

many people thought this Still valid - stick fact.

Bracco

OFFICE AND TITLE

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION

GROUP

(40)

5216 DocId:32404750 Page 24
A. Intention to give evidence. Can I say in this

sentiment to give authoritative grounds

about 59 - is ambivalent in this

period.

B. Evidence against N

Here A speculate - maybe G tested
to see if he knew that N dealt with II.
See first reaction - check about

personalization. G did not seem as they

might have expected. Only said used
canada. police Telecom - did not exclude
disinformation.

What is false about background

is that he worked in II and he held

position Deputy - false as fact -

59 position abdicated. In 60 was there

and no N.

G-AZNA V was Deputy II

in 59 - when Deputy abolished

he became second class officer. - if

There were detectives reed do

G-AZNA V survive in II net never was
Assessment of info to judge sincerity -
two types: Operations and political (policy, concern, 
assess in grt). 1959 Sheopkin - conf - etc.
He has provided list info KGB personnel,
agents & operations = what significance
845 KGB officers (Sov 1 rank -
probably 2000) 2000 + 300 agents
250 current FDC & SCB officers

(Take off - Zaulkin - Mikhail
Political write. Brussels - connectin Solitroj
not Yuri - looking now elsewhere?)

Accrue all info - repeat identity KGB
Perrkovsky did this.
Golitsyn did even less.
Substantiate when this means.

How many known CIA or others sources
subtract this from N's figures -
state minor, retired, teachers -
evaluate info thru. Staying with
system (what he gave) info about each.
How does he characterize them - categorize them - just names meaning to do.

TAKHCHANOVA travelling - suspicious, how G's info fits into what G told personnel necessary reduce N info vs what G's identification

Analysis - how explain confirm other sources?

Analysis of what X, 300 agents mean - maybe some superficial lacking significance of agents - 100 3rd countries - some cases leads against agents in tourist field? of value.

G says only 5% tourists cooperate per KGB policy - how many real agents did he identify?

- Johnson defense ministry practice

Analyze overall - then each particular case

Vassall - analyze in depth

Operations - value & significance

Visit to em' Embassy - Soviets mistake

Americans

[Handwritten notes and initials]
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT

In record analysis later that he satisfied Politburo -

Importance, his info allegedly Soviet intel reorganized in '62

Suslov + VAKRUNSHEV lead to recruitment - what significance, analyze.

Solie questions if alınce S + V

Feel of it nos volunteered - (check this)

Important re CIA penetration in SB

Solie hazards guest Nos did not volunteer makeup.

Coincide Strange example same time,

as deflection V gives evidence lines to drink
Vakrunshev's actions supported incident.

Nos' statement.

Value of his political info -

only one, with mentioned (by Socie)

O SWALD -
If genuine defector would have immediate wife abroad it 69 possibly 1959 meeting.

Shelypin apparently alerting head reports did not know only relevant was work
task KGB.

Rumanov — sick in ’59 for
contact with Americans.

tried to give secret report of Shelypin.

Order report everyone read — SCD
 didn’t explain how Rumanov offered

who agent who exposed

Soviet officers.

Judgments errors, inconsistencies — omissions

conclusions info

63-64

One fact kept from SR was info

the May 59: Shelypin to see if
defector would disclose — important

Moirin — Khrushchov dissuaded act 4

As explained

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION

GROUP I

IMMEDIATE ACTION REQUIRED

RECLASSIFICATION

NW 53216 DocId:32404750 Page 29
Tourist in ... C14 - FBI

3rd country - efficiency - very strange
results from ex tourist suggest at first.

6/4 - Analysis - evidence not sufficiently
defined but needs special attention.
First mistake made interview was by one
mean - under experienced - specialist -
special escort - irregular. 1 man.

Second dissemination question - can be no
broad dissemination - mistake to send
allDOB info to FBI 3rd country -
before giving all this work should be

no question missed - only individual cases

and question of efficiency of polygraph
in general.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Major points when read from of info -

1. Info re SCD agents in America Embassy 53-64 -
   Andrei - identified in Smith report codes -
   Howard -
   NS signed thru 3x2 intervals -
   Annual report Depts - Delegator - Rewards -
   SCD work open. FCD taken for talked -
   Sharonov, Guk, Koussevite

2. Factual basis disagreement re success -
   RS Andrei - Biggest An Dept SCD Russia 54-55-56
   Case completed. No details - new info -
   Success explains promotion Capt. Kurtenakov Edensen -
   Not Andrei - (Dismissed)
   Kurtenakov - GEBRENKA
   VGB college tech as VGB Agent. 1st time named theoretical
   Discussion about definition of agent related to principle defined -

OFFICE AND TITLE:  

SECRET  

GROUP 1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY  

CLASSIFICATION

1-57 1955

NW 53216 DocId:32404750 Page 31
3. C not able make research re CIA in real
re. recruiter 54-56 - areas both a) Stalag
of nummber 37 - our objecirs points this way
helping all agents b) recruited mid-high
level c) someone CIA Their period or else
derive with big production.

4. Indication some diversion Arniex
by 57 - may be same as no - which was
reactivated by Kringle in who.

leaving aside ANDBY -

mentioned to (Kouzhuk) slept with agent in D.C
+ drinking - woman agent in State or acquire from elsewhere -

Veneral (venereal) disease

(Vernikova) actress by Kouzhuk. Inge

Lapunov (?)

(Review, surveillance reports - found)
doesn't exclude or reject Audricy could be

coincidence date Kringle & Videzne.

return Videzne.
(check tape. A told us Langell were known in advance to be to build one agent when told who etc)

ZHUKOV was military field
60 DEG ZHUKOV said in 1ST DECEMBER

5,5854 important recruitment
analyzing Popov case
areas Berlin Paris Bern (Switzerland) and Zens
no CIA

read Cheprenov papers
BOWDEN
WINTERS 2
Langelle 1 sequence
paroled 3

Popov not compromised Winters latter
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Break in tape telephone call

A. Planning to recruit them to leave - every CIA man.

needed revenge for Pappi - more secrecy those in their favor! - (This needs
I push against S3-S4 Comprehensive theory)

Kotov from Vienna - went

returned to Berlin in 58

High office penetration CIA not solved

Surveillance (as) of Dangelle. Significant paper G9 read.

for A's info

6. Significant penetrate 60-61 while

more controversial - C vs NAS - comparison -

Crucial question - do you accept what NCS says

deputy position, etc. requires careful

way to resolve continuity/counter-intelligence

Investigate no conclusion

OFFICE AND TITLE

SECRET

SIGNATURE
Kosolapov trip to Helsinki -
controversy - fixed opposite date
wants, etc. - imploded
independent info not favoring NOS -
(sources- check - significance Sofia?)

N. mission not to place NOS in status but
to continue & unwind after defection.
He influences investigation -

Completely inaccurate he worked

Dep't I / Section

Absolute statement he was not

and No Deputy - a fact -

TAPE IV = o -

9. Code C, his case

need to be reexamined

NOS June 62 2 pieces

Belitsky

Walev
Vassall info given by Golitguyi in April 62—

Through from Golitguyi so that Vassall case would be solved irrespective of NDB and USA—

Shame to cut—

(JA—when came Geneva, 1st time he warned not to go out with British girl because of penetration BIS—doubted to cut above security of Britis basis & leads)

Cannot accept 6 months for them. Socio says no 6 only 3

Another basis can you discover importantly when contact made—

JA—contact at point of departure from Geneva—only few meetings—
A - and Belitskii Case which
announced our Z team (Mayfile) because code (cover) manual
our partner - alias - also
he claimed was KGB officer
who handling from
Deep D - did information -

ZENKIN - after Brussels lecture
KGB college '59 - A's analysis
B case confirmed this what Z said.

new info in Nos (Serie) paper -

Belitskii case could have led to Blake

LAVINIA - Golienewski - A concluded
KGB - UB of - whose info led to Blake -
pur together into Belitskii never known KGB -
evidence, KGB supporting reliability
of Golienewski -
Raece questions why Golemushki started
any way - possible implication to
MI-5 - why motivation - why
giving away Blake.
Relatey supports to A query Golemushki
introduced by calculation.

JA - What I lack to see (1)@.
members MI-5 believe Blake fits
type agent who ideologically
would be give away - no
recruitment, no splitting -
gave away teams, sites, etc.
Supposed bar view when in
prison - escape changed MI-5
Dick Ellis controller for
Blake in Korea - DE German
agent admits - to OSS liaison
in NYC - DE cutties Philly.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

JA - Point our ascend - detailed assessment by Brits - delegate from - BAD - in stating - no conclusion. Belief that same to be correct.
This lead to SE - Started Brits who turned down then switched to CIA.

What exact info Belief gave substance re Blake - lead to Blake - something known only to small group - (scientist - traveller -)

NOS info NOT COMMUNICABLE.
Claimed he was position 00-61.

Johnson - Case - Paris
重要 partner in give-away
Pouches
FCD would not need help from SCID to open pouches - Think Strange
Could be MI6 agent.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT

HORRIBLE -

John Dorance Smith - Secret announcement

Interesting took place fall 67 - KGB

worried - if not informed about Moscow -

Mike (audio) case -

Question when NOS sent Steve Sous

June 62 - when details - 64?

ST - Stilberg, info wishes to Dept May 62

Said he intended to inspect.

Question how NOS could get detailed plan

he had - Explan. would know not

Lower level -

PETROV

Way he info obtained therefore basis given away by NOS

Important into NOS revealed -

Stated - "new Politician Task of KGB"

Budinov - "... " SED

SA - our first direct 1st time when defected

Could be NOS re sheeps in paper vital

Matterial Security

OFFICE AND TITLE

SIGNATURE

P.O.W. 2-67 1954

SECRIT}

CLASSIFIED

GROUP 1

EXHIBIT FILED AND CHIEF OF STAFF

CLASSIFIED

GROUP 1

EXHIBIT FILED AND CHIEF OF STAFF
Saw VA Khlebnikov Jan 12 1954 Paris
V & Kovshov accompanied Nixon
no mention Dinehov.

Kovshov - Andrey Case -

Possible again Galik 53-54 in U.S.
left to Andrey's personal case
40%

Genu by Sale:

Yarli Gulya + Discussed close friends
closer than Golitzyn + Gulya
And Andrey - two secrets
Andrey a good friend
Sold and Gulya talked about Nosesov - yes
Some -

Churinov recommended Nosiey
from American deep into from top
down - Nos two - what asks when.
went to Kobelski.
LYALIN -

51 Technical Information - Deputy 2nd CD

electronic equipment recruitment - code clerks
letter re aid research from Source
Backgrounds in Moscow - Poland 57-57

BAGRICHEV may have been case officer
from US to London.

Pavelovskiy investigation -
unexplained? if incarcerated knows Par -

Supported Viaadur
Maurice de Joan -

Dinosaurs - Valerinhor

SASHA as usual - did not report
Kopievkin - special status under Gladurto
No known Kirov - important - no details
56-57 - 60 A friend's situation was -
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT

SASHA -- Mikhalcheyev

Pictures Travel Germany Kwidii-Moscaio

SASHA (oplen) film sending pictures from Europe upset A.

Victor Koslow-- Mara

Article about penetration CIA of KGB-- whose ads - reason how came about

Y

Mamedova Tammara-- analysis for reporting--

overlap similarities DOS & info

Preinfrawd--

will code man allegedy
See with Comrie please.

Ceramic - probable omission.

May 10 - starting.

Morone (months) [Note: Barred]

If approved, single at a close

Kushins, do 30. [Note: 2 bars]

2 cases cannot be connected.

info in 1954 -

no recruitment

60% recruitment ends will appear.

1954 Monday - with our.

1

[Signature]
Taylor approached later outside—no explanation—

Dweller—most crucial point—see himself with others—!

Wolfe—Garbler

TAPE 3

Garbler

K Horbally (Horbally)

Papov case indication that KGB learned he warned CIA to undue control. Clean up—penetration CIA—

Koulishk arrival—connected

Langelet—examined—

Recruited ex-CIA man Moscow—

Langelet. Koulishk would work
Trip to Konshin sleeping

Willing may be enough...

Will not analyze Chepérov-

povor

this (mis)information-majority

itself

also support Moscow

ground work for new operations

Chepérov head of Section-

Harmstone paper cited head of

section Zhukov in 58 — aug-

washed against diplomats —

inconsistent — against

military — clean. Go Moscow

Analysis information convincing

missing

information fits Counter

intelligence
On evidence we doubt provocateur - want.

60-61 crucial clues now to give him status access to leads.

Reinvestigation suggestions to come later.

CIA - code man 60-61

Plunkovskiy case -

CIA coupley 55 to

Plunkovskiy

JA - may not want comment

Oswald - nothing to state

First paragraph - I had heard nothing before assassination

French leads - we

Have just an earred
De Jean. French lack. Don't work up yet.

Viaduct - British results along lines French -

Motivation - not examined.

Barroom - case figured, promised to come to our attention.

Coordinating Committee
FCD + SCD - not exactly.

Coordinating Section within FCD - not 2 Directorate.

Mainly coordinating intelligence and work against American intelligence.

Not for purpose of coordinating FCD + SCD influential.

But -
main time came up was with Bureau
FBI de Sashal

French dealt by
De Jean - 

by Viardot - 

in interrogation - (concluded)
De Jean I said be approached
& gave some info to Gribanov
(Cheval said per A -
(?) Gribanov (Gribanov)

Giving away of De Jean -

DST says no recruits
agreed to be an agent

(Canadian) Rock Bottom - Canadian Ltd.
Nos needs for Althing Ltd.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

DATE: 16 January 69

FILE NUMBER

SUBJECT: 60-61 Mosuiko's position

(Assist Reviewer's Office notes from Mosuiko)

2. Points of "misinformation" from Mosuiko

1. He was not in American Section, 60-61, and he could
   move to Deputy Chief - (W says he saw)

2. There were no reinforcements
   of Am Emb personnel
during this period.

If N is established as an
American Section then point
2 i.e. Mosuiko's claim follows
but this is not the case.

Dec 60 - Jan 61 - in office
V. Petren's Section. Petren told
personnel he needed "just find
similar reports from other books".

OFFICE AND TITLE

V. Pelipa

SIGNATURE

V. Pelipa - Okiria
If Petrov was responsible for

"skilled" raids in this Section?

A overlooked him as for

reports.

A says he is sure that before his

defection N would have no

problems learning about

recruitments and operations.

Aubanov announced

successes - rewards

followed in few days - this

mentioned Petrov. A three or

four N would knew - he

could analyze. Who doing

what and piece together

with announcements -

rewards to cases and

targets.
A very mobile man, SKVORTSOV could pose as French Jesuit priest. A says he knows S does not know enough French to write enough cover - too many questions. Stoppsberg identification? Question in all records. Some noted Stoffers and Motche identification and that Skvortsov used English and French to America. Hand with Finish party. A says cover would break easily. In Vienna, Skvortsov did not meet French A could be wrong. Maybe Skvortsov started learning in Germany after 55.
JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY: CIA
RECORD NUMBER: 104-10534-10084
RECORD SERIES: JFK
AGENCY FILE NUMBER: NOSENKO RECORDS

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

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ANATOLE
NBR

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[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED
Anatole de Noszuko

ecl was given a copy of the following for delivery to Anatole today:

A. Memo for Director Security

"Solicitation Topics for Our Noszuko"

(A copy of the draft was given to ecl, on which I annotated. Final was dated 22 April.)

B. A carbon of the Memo for the Record dated 7 April 69, Sebjeen: Anatole de Noszuko with atts A B C.

G. Scott Miller
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT
ANATOLE RE Solie NOSENVRO PAPER

DATE 16 JANUARY '69

FILE NUMBER

A Questions if he stated in re
his Dec 60 talk with Kost稀缺el
that it was a military
code clerk which was
recruited — more likely
the stated important
recruitment code clerk

may be military —

( Check ref in Solie paper — this
probabe VA-54 — info from
FBI note transcript (?) Kost稀缺el
in Dec 60.

OFFICE AND TITLE

+ e/c

SIGNATURE

CLASSIFICATION

GROUP I
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
RECLASSIFICATION

NW 53216 DocId:32404750 Page 55
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: 60-61 Nosseko's position

Avato reviewing SEE Nosseko paper

2 points of "misinformation"
from Nosseko

1. He was not in American
   Section, 60-61, and he could
   not be Deputy Chief — (N says he was)

2. There were no reconnaissance
   of ArmEAB personnel
during that period.

If N is established as in
American Section then point
2, i.e., Nosseko's claim, follows
but this is not the case.

Dec. 60-Jan 61 — in offices

V. Petrov's Section, Petya told
presence he could not find
nuide reports and sent look for

Office and Title

Signature

SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: 60-61 NIOSEKRO

If Petrov not responsible for
 Szekely, why would he make
"secret" report in this section?
A overlooked them ask for
reports.

A says he is sure that before his
defection N would have no
problem learning about
recruitments and operations.
Stribanov announced
successes — rewards
followed in few days — this
information. Politburo talks is
that N would know — he
could analyze who doing
work and piece together
with announcements to
rewards to cats and
targets.

OFFICE AND TITLE

SECRET

FILE NUMBER

SIGNATURE

SECRET

NW 53216 DocId:32404750 Page 57
Nashiko trip to Cuba: Nov Dec 60

Audace says only photographs will substantiate Nashiko's visit.

Nashiko, as Nikolaev, did travel there.

Amsterdam - RR to Berlin -

name alone as traveler on

manifests, travel control, etc.

and substantiation.

Requests have been shown

documentation to substantiate

actually was Nashiko.
Memos suggest consideration about asking N if he would agree to have true information published under his name, such as political caps, sketch of Gitaruso from what he has provided. This to be tested, see B's reaction—suggest this and see what he would say about writing article about Gitaruso—see stage see what might be done.

(11)

Solicits opinion if he would agree.

A had asked and been told by Solio that N feared for his safety with respect to surfacing or living openly.
Klipper - Guatemalan relations -

Georlys says pulls two together not hunting or fishing -
Something he explains about Lin -

Did not understand power!
Anatoli categorically states it would have been impossible for N to transfer any notes or papers with him when transferring to another department, check out safes and materials constant. A case is he had been told N kept notes in his apartment A would say "madness" but believable. He cannot accept transfer notes with N.

A question N notes dealing with military targeting. How would he have.
A says flatly military units under Kovshulke. Possible Petrov in section (sub) separate from Kovshulke.

Gioqgi Zhukov: Lermontov 55A agrees (Zhukov) Chekmanski papers show chief section used to check "C papers" re Kovalke status.
CHEREPAHOV WRITE-UP FROM BRITISH

(Caption: Aleksei Nikolayevich Cherepanov - 5 pages only)

Solid read. Copy to him today.

TA read.

Available
Kovshuk - in H.S. - detention.

Austole says that Kovshuk got in trouble while he was in the US on a mission. He was recalled and demoted. He was a SCD officer, not FCD. He was only in US 10 months.

Austole does not accept Moskho's explanation of reason for Kovshuk's detention.

Austole says, referring to Sotic, he does not know why he'd profiled in US was girls. Sotic said it indicated was involved girls in U.S.

However, Austole says recall just because of girls, according this information, but did indicate needed investigation. Relates to cases he studying.

[Signature: U. F. Miller]
Anatole, noting in transcript N's Statement Subject and nor KGB suggest this be investigated. He is of opinion she might be KGB. Solie noted she traveled and active while in US was in Washington.

A case he thinks she fits into case he studying-developing but in response to mild question heed case said he had not previously mentioned but will when ready. A confirmed most case previously mentioned when miles said he thought might be case to be reviewed.
Avantco says N-C-G closest of friends, would know all C-C agents and vice versa.
Points: N could identify Vasil by address, would know C's agents.
A also commented that Cilk in Swiss would have been targeted vs. Americans not concerned with penetrations Swiss police.
In answer to JA question said he knew for fact that N-C-G closest friends - professional, social - talk about women, etc., and he had been present when N+C talking about operations using language, i.e., doubletalk, so he, A, did not know what they really talking about but indicating to A. They manipulate or operations.
Anatole returned to point that he saw no substantiating or evidence that N was actually involved and working against Americans—in two years he should have been in "10 cases" as participant. Khrushchov would not tolerate "planning" as part of experience investigation. Even as a consoler, by A they N was "deputy" he would be directly involved—in contact. Another Kovalchik higher rank.

Khrushchov did not know language, Kostyakov and N showed able worked and participated together.

Kovalchik and Churabov active—no cover.

Unbelievable he could stay two years without involvement and direct contact.

In response to Stalin wrote no N arranged for Kovalchik at airport, which Stalin noted Kovelchik could not confirm.

A snap not confirmation—cover.
A very positive weak point in N's story is American Section duty — no confirmation — a reconstruction not actual role at time.
ANATOLE emphasized point that

Nosenko should have directly participated

in approach to American Embassy

personnel or been in social contact

with Americans during the period

Jan 60 - Dec 61 when he in

Dept I Section I. A matter point N's

good language, experience, etc.,

according to A's knowledge, means

that N should have followed America

Section of his policy and been directly
involved. In reply to a
question Solie said only direct
confrontation N had with
American was in hallway
where [redacted] had not identified N.
Solie said N had attended
a Cone 7/4th July celebration
at AMEMB, Moscow.
No doubt, not even 1% doubt, that Nosukko is not a provocateur(s).

A statement Anstole reiterated to J. Aukston, B. Solie and S. Miler.

Anstole's concern is to point out the contradictions, major areas, necessary to protect our security.
ANATOLE RE NOSENKO

Anatole read thru several volumes of
transcripts of Solie interviews with
Nosenko, the chernoboi papers, including
the Russian and Solie's paper re
Nosenko thru files. He recorded the
his comments:

Boston, - chernoboi papers -
met Bagley, palme and denn 62 divvateate
Didn't get file to review but
I made clear to Bagley double agency
Newspaper account made it clear to
a south source as discussed with
Bagley 1963, went to NYC, 1964 we'd file for murder 64
Quo 64 - analyst provocateur;
Analysis limited to 60-61 KS17
service background - no clear
analysis of whole case. but notes
ruminations, etc
A position was had to have acc
in to he would accept give but
want to hostile rhetoric - puzzles
Warned N re position - at time could not do research completely - later agreement re interrogation to direct entire story add heat to (A) would review material and analyze - see what do.

Mr. Solie did good job - did what SB failed to do. fills many gaps - abundant info - publicly important aspects of background. After analysis looks many things to discuss and N can be really assessed.

As bona fide or provocateur or a mission.

Our State conclusion: 8-9 vols of info.

Still elicited train (good) for conclusion.

Final vol conclusion - analysis of evidence - matches evade - analysis & conclusions not supported by previous vols of N's information.
Nosekto type caliber defectors from USA need to address timing and warning
account for what happened before Penkovsky Case - relevant to walk-in - agents -
Popov genuine agent in GULag - to RC ops. agents - military - personnel
after Popov arrest within 75 days
another GULag walk-in - need
analyze Nosekto light Popov.
parallel - up-date info. look at Polevskiy
from Popov

1. Nosekto background against what went before - difference Penk 2 yrs.
key to Nosekto was missile info which took more than year to prepare
Pens up to Rocket school 54 gave him basic similar to Nosekto when before

Golizyn came Dec 61 - info to KGB
structure - major reorganization new tasks, personal, operations, agents - some
FCD + some SCD - C into indicated

done recruitment preparation AM114B Moscow

Office and title
Signature
6 months after Golitsyn - Moscow

contacts CIA in Chicago. Early here vast
info KGB, structure, personnel, operations -
Speaks impressively truly - first cite
Penshchik - field and your question
bone tired because he gave freely -
Cooperation not criteria to assess
Defector - if defector respects himself
he may not cooperate any time

The more cooperative the more suspect
because he had to tell story - do mission
Your response does not impress A -
If KGB gave vast info then Penkovich
had green light - parallel to Golitsyn
If KGB knows that Golitsyn made SC
info available to CIA then Nobuko gets
green light - difference in detail.

\^ 2nd role assessment - background -
Personal - pre-service bio - character - ops/professional/bio
Not speak about Penkovich - speak as Nobuko

OFFICE AND TITLE

SIGNATURE
I Bio pro KGB - not important now dwell on main
the accused - six of minutes - no question against
An analyze why SB concluded not N, etc.
important see if any connection to penetration
of CIA, most especially of hostile interrogation
resistance or deliberate bad acts, warned too
SB can make sustain or calculated
Park don't matter if CIA accepted decision
(while it had made) that N should remain
see if decision results not getting disipato.

II Personal character - different officers
rather not dissent - this side - can be
important not just major - informance of
N as bragging - boasting - boasting not
that reduce key - exaggerated - if
decides this file then important but
it still questioned then looks disparity
open question - 0

III Service in KGB - determination
details of service accurate as given to CIA
If he is not accurate in source and years of certain than factual & significantly lacking facts heationally then we cannot say as was done by analysis then promote, salary etc. acceptable on basis of speculation. Spannke N input vs other evidence cannot discount evidence if contrary what he says.

Dec 1941 1 section Dec 60 - Jan 62 (61 A says)

Impotence in coincides last 2 yrs of G - important now.

Not true according to G's - G known for fact N did not save I/G tells Bagley 62 - among list be saw no specific name - G did not point N but said list wrong because G knew N not in American Section.

Based on fact - not theory eventually when people figures this will fail valid - stocks fail.

Crucial
A. Importance to his mission and in this event, to give authoritative grounds for
speak about ops - as ambient in this period.

B. Evidence against N

Here A speculate - maybe if tested to see if he knew facts they do not in T I. See first reaction - check about penetration - G did not react as they thought here appeared. Only said wanted
overseas control - did not exclude disinformation.

What is false about background is that he worked in T I. And he held position Deputy - false as fact - 59 positions abolished. In 60 was there and no N.

C. YAZNOV was Deputy T I in 59 - when deputy abolished she became senior aide office. - if there were deputies would be C. YAZNOV or someone in T I had newcomer.

OFFICE AND TITLE

SIGNATURE
Assessment of info to judge sincerity -
two types: operational and political (policyersion, KGB in grt) 1959 Shkilev - conf - etc.
He has provided US/UK info KGB personnel, agents & operations - what significance?
875 KGB officers (SOE list - just today 2000) 2000 + 300 agents
250 current FCO & SOC officers

(tape off - Zeckin - Mikhail
See note photo, Brussels - connection Politsiya,
not Yuri = lecture 1953 exclusive)

Assessment of info - repeat identities KGB
Parkovskiy died this.
Golitsyn died even less -
Substitute - what this means -
How many known CIA or other sources
Subtract this from N's figures -
Set minus retirees - teachers -
evaluate of value remaining -
extent (what he gave) into chart code each
How does he characterize them -
Agregate them - just names - nothing to do.

TARCHIANOV travelling - sensible
Haul IVs into fits into what G told personnel
Necessary reduce IVs vs what G's identification
Not analysis - as in paper - explain where ever
Known - how explain confirm other sources?

Analysis of where 300 agents mean
May be very superficial - lacking significance of
agents - 100 3rd countries - some cases leads into agents
agents in tourist field - ? of value.

It says over 5% tourists cooperate per KGB policy
how many real agents did he identify?

- Johnson defense ministry papers
Analyze overall - then even particular cases
Vassall - analyze in depth

Operations - value & significance
Three in Embassy - Soviet influence
means American
For record analysis later that he identified Belitsky --

Important, his info allegedly Soviet intel reorganized in '62

Suslov & Vakhrushev, lends to recruitment - what significance - analyze.

Some questions in name S + V fell of the NOS volunteered. (Check this)

All records - CIA penetration in SB

Sovie requests guest - NOS did not volunteer names.

Coincide Strange, except same time.

As deflection V gives evidence likes to drink.

Vakhrushev's actions supported validity.

NOS' statement.

Value of his political info -

Only one point mentioned (by Solzhenitsyn)

O. Wald
If genuine defector would have communicated space about KGB policies - May '59 meeting -
Shelepkin app'x - orally oral report.
did not come - only relevant was next task KGB -

RUMANTSEV - start in '59 for contact with Americans -
tried to give report re Shelepkin -
order report everyone read - SCD
didn't explain how Rumantsev opposite
who agent who opposed -

Soviet media

Judgement - errors, inconsistencies, omissions

63-64

One fact report from SR was into
re May '59 - Shelepkin to see if
defector would disclose - important

Meine - Khrushchev assessment act '64

Explain
Tourist info disordered C44 - FBI
3rd country efficiency - very marginal
results from ex-turistic investigations

67 - Analysis - evidence NOS not significant
defective but serv special interest
1st - mistake made interviuew NOS by one
man - wider experience - specialist
special assessment - impossible

2nd - Dissemination question - can be no
broad dissemination - mistake to send
all NOS info to FBI +3rd country
- before giving all this work showed to
no question valid - only individual cases

3rd - question of efficiency of polygraph
in general
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Major points when read tales of info -

1. Info re SCD agents in American Embassy
   53-64 - 
   Andrey - identified as Smith repair cokes -
   Howard -
   NOS showed same 5x2 y not more.
   Annual reports Depts - Directorates - rewards.
   SCD now open - ECD taken to talk -

   Chusanov, Guk, Koushka

2. Factual basis disagreement no success.
   VS AMERIK - Biggest And Dept SCD Sources 54-55-
   case completed - no details - new info.
   Success explains promotion Col Korlebekov Colcord
   not Andrey - (dismissed)
   KGB college teach to KGB Afghani. 1st true Afghan theoretical
   discussion about definition of agent - worked to give right answer.

OFFICE AND TITLE

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION

DATE

FILE NUMBER

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET
3. Get able make research re who in rel -
recruited 54-56 - areas devoted to: 1) Stalingrad
op Summer 55 - our officers - points this way
helps inside all aspects 2) recruited July-high
level 3) Someone CIA That period - on case
alone, with big production

4. Indication some concentration Am Enab-
ley 57 - may be some de naive - which was
reactivated by Kovshik in Wash.
leaving aside ANDREY -
mentioned he (Kovshik) slept with agent in DC,
+ drinking - woman agent in state or agent sell you Moscow -

Venereal (venereal) disease

(LVVAZOVA) actresses w/ Kovshik - Inge
LAPOPOU (P)

(Reviews of surveillance reports - females-
does n't exclude or reject Andrey - could be

Coincidence date Kovshik + fallable
return Moscow.
check tape A told us Langelle went known in advance to handle one agent when told - who etc

ZHUKOV was military_field
60 Dec Zhukov still in 1st phase

5.58-59 - important recruitment assigning Popov case.
areas Berlin Paris Bern (Swiss) Montreal
re CIA

read cherepashov papers

BOWDEN WINTERS 2
Langelle 1 subsequence

Pullack 3

Popov not compromised Winters letter.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Break in tape telephone call

Laugelle NOS said

A strange to recruit him to leave - every CIA man

needed revenge for Pappo - move against those in their hands - (This needs
ppers against 53-54 compartment theory)

Kotov from Vienna - went

returned to Berlin in 58

High level penetration CIA not solved

Surveillance of Laugelle, significant

paper to read

per A's info

6. Significant sentencing 50-61 which

now controversial - C vs NOS comparison -

Crucial question - do you accept what NOS says

deploy position etc. requires reanalysis

Way to resolve controversy /conflict: scenario

Investigate no penetration

OFFICE AND TITLE

SIGNATURE

SECRET

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT

FILE NUMBER

1. Kosolapov trip to Helsinki – controversy – direct opposite cases – names, etc. supported

independent info and favoring NOS - (double-check – significance Sofia?)

8. Mission not to place NOS in status but to confirm & mislead after defection. He influence of investigation –

Completely inaccurate he worked Rep 111 Section

Absolute statement he was not

and NQI deputy – a fake –

TAPE II = ☐

9. Code Checks case need to be reexamined

NOS June 63 2 pieces

Belitskiy

Varshel'
Vassal info given by Golitsyn on April 62 -
Enough from Golitsyn so that Vassal case would be solved irrespective of NDS and UKE -
known to CT -

(IA - when came Geneva 1st time,
he wanted me to go out with British girl because of penetration BIS - doubts to CT about security of Brits
basing leads)

Cannot accept 6 months too short
Sovie says nov 6 only 3 Month
buts can you discount importantly when contact made

IA - contact at point of departure
from Geneva - only few meetings
JA - and Belitschik case which announced our '2 men were free' because code (cover) names our person - alias - also / another man was KGB officer who handling from Department D - did the formation.

ZENKIN - after Brussels lecture KGB college '59 - A's analysis B case confirmed this what I said.

New info in NOS (Sovi) paper - 8

Belitschik and could have led to Blake

LAVINIA - Golienowshi - A concluded KGB - UB or - whose info led to Blake - put together with Belitschik most known KGB - evidence, KGB supporting reliability of Golienowshi.
Rises questions why Gneuwski started using asd - possible duplications to MI-5 - why motivations - why giving away Blake.

Relates support to a theory Gneuwski introduced by calculation.

JA - what I had to say earlier members MI-5 believe Blake fits type agent who ideologically could be given away - no recruitment, no spotting - gave away turns, aides, etc. Supposed buy view when in prison - escape changed MI-5 Dick Ellis controller for Blake in Korea - DE German agent admitted - no OSS liaison in NYC - DE controller Philly -
JA - Point: our record - detailed assessment by Brit in derogatory 
provocation - Phipps at Park -
long statement on - ops - conclusive 
Bolts saw to make contact
This call to SR - started Brits
who turned down then switched
101.

Whatever info Bolts gave
Substance re Blake or lead to
Blake - Something known only to
Swede group (Scientist Traveler)

NOS info not commensurate
Claims he was position 60-61

Johnson Case - Paris -
() Importanter or Give-away
Pouches

FCD would not need help from SCD to
open pouches - This strange -
Could he be Gill agent
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

HOWARD case

John Diseae Smith - Secret announcement

Interesting took place face 67 - KG6

worried if not informed about Noses

Mike (audio) call

Question when NOS gave Solie say
June 62 - when details - 64

Ja - Gorbatschov info miners to Dept May 62

Gave enough to impact

Question how NOS could get detailed plan

He had - Gorbtschov would know more

Lower level

Petrov

Major info adjusted therefore basis given away by NOS

Important into NOS situation

Seiden - "New Political Task in KGB"

Budapest - "SED"

Ja - one first move 1st thing when defected

Would be NOS & Stakhanov paper vital

NATIONAL SECURITY

OFFICE AND TITLE

SIGNATURE

SECRET

GROUP 1

CLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFICATION

NW 53216 DocId:32404750 Page 92
Saw VA.Kushchenov Jan 18 1964 Paris
V & Kovshuk accompanied Nixon -
no mention Director -

Kovshuk - Andrei Case -

Possible again Gub 53 - 54 in U.S.
Left to Andrei's previous case

Query by Secru -
Facts Gub & Rosenberg closer friends
Closer than Kotelny & Gub
Add Churamov - his secrets -
Andrei good friend
Said did Gub talk about Rosenberg - yes
Some -

Churamov recommended NO, i.e.
from American dept. not from top down - NO's hardly what ask when
went to Kobets -
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT

LYALIN -

59 Technical & Directorates -
Deputy 2nd CD

Electronic equipment recruitment - aide clerk,
letter re aid research from Service,
Backgrounds in Moscow - Poland 57-59

BAGRICHEV may have been case officer
from US to London

Perekhodkin investigation -
Verkhovdenk? If procurator knows Peu

Supported Viaduc
Maurice De Jean

Dinosaur - Vakhrushev

SASHA as pers - did not report
Kopekina - special status under Gribenko
He seemed knows - important - no details
56-59 - COA does not know where K was
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SASHA — Nikolayev

Pictures. Travel Germany, Kurdia, Moskva.

SASHA (opera) full funding, pictures from Europe, upset. A.

V. Litvinov.

Article about penetration CIA of KGB —
whose asked — reason how came about
thing — self by Moskva —

Mamedova, Tavara.

analysis FBI reporting —

overlap. Simonovka, DOS & UN Info.

Preisland —

use case was alleged.
SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT

[Handwritten text]

Fare with opinion please

[Handwritten text]

Non-reason - possible reason
may be - 

[Handwritten text]

Morone (morone)

[Handwritten text]

I appeal. Some log of case

[Handwritten text]

Kosnica 400, Dec 76

[Handwritten text]

2 cases cannot be connected

[Handwritten text]

[Handwritten text]

May in 1959

[Handwritten text]

no recruitment

[Handwritten text]

no recruitment plus cost append

[Handwritten text]

1 15 minutes - make out

[Handwritten text]
Taylor approached later outside -

Nos explanation -

Dweller -
most crucial point - see himself

not others -

Morel - Gorbler

Tape 3

Gorbler

Horbally (Horbal)

Popov case indication that KGB
learned he warned CIA the under
cover. Clean up - penetration CIA-

Kovshuk arrival-connected
Langells - examine -

Recruited CIA man Moscow

Before Langells Kovshuk would work

in Wash.
Trip to Katyn: sleeping through may be adv "up";
Will not analyze Chepanov papers - dis (mis)information major by itself.
Also support Moskalenko - ground work for new operations.
Chepanov heads of Section.

Hamstone paper - cited head of Section Zhukov in 58 - aug.
Worked against diplomats - inconsistent - against military - clean. Go to Moskalenko.

Analysis info not convincing.

Action: information fits counterintelligence.
On evidence we doubt provocateur sent.

60-61 crucial chosen to give him status, access to leads.

Reinvestigation suggested to come later.

CIA - code man 60-61
Pershing's case - CIA complex 55 - to Pakistan

JA - may not want comment.

Oswald - nothing to state.
First polygraph I had heard nothing before assassination.

French leads - we have not pursued.
Pe Jean - French leaders
don't want 157 N -

Viaduct - British results
along lines French -

Motivation - not examined

Bargaining - easiest figured
prominently to come to our
attention

Coordinating Committee
FCD + SCD - not exactly

Coordinating section within
FCD - not 2 Directorates
mainly coordinating intelligence
and work against American
intelligence -

Not for purpose of coordinating
FCD + SCD influential

but -
Main time came up was with Burrow,
Pat de Sasha

French leads -
De Jean - partly confirmed
by Viaduct - Mosheko be
in interrogation - (congruential)

De Jean said he approached
and gave some info to Gritnurov
Chapel said per A -

-> Curburov (Gritnurov)

Giving away of De Jean -

DST says mo recruiting
agreed sho an agent

(Canadian) Rockbottom - Canadian Club -
Nos leads fit Politypi leads -
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT

60-61 Voseuko’s position

(Ancelote Reviewing Some Voseuko papers)

2 points of “misinformation” from Voseuko

1. He was not in American Section, 60-61, and he could not be Deputy Chief. (W says he is)

2. There were no recruitment of Army EMB personnel during that period.

If W is established as in American Section then point 2 i.e. Voseuko’s claim follows. But this is not the case.

Dec. 60-Jan. 61 - in offices
V. Petrov’s Section, Petkbo told personnel he could not find

snike reports contact book for it.

OFFICE AND TITLE

V. E. 61 - E. 1954

SIGNATURE
If Petrov were responsible for
similarly, why would he make
"smirk" reports in this section?
A overlyath him ask for
reports.

A says he is sure that before his
defection N would have no
problem learning about
recruitments and operations,
Sverdlov something
successes - rewards
followed in few days - this,
As shown, Policy A means is
That N would know - he
could analyze who doing
what and piece together
with announcements -
rewards to cases and
targets.
A main concern that SKVORTSOV could pose as French by nature. He says he knows it does not know another French - few words - and
succeeded cover - too risky. Questions - Stroberg identification - question in an unusual sort noted Stroberg and Morse identification and I
then SKVORTSOV used English and went to America. Hound with
Finnish party. He says cover would break easily.

In Vienna SKVORTSOV did not speak French. A could be zone,
may be SKVORTSOV started heading in January after 55.