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DISPATCH	CLASSIFICATION SECRET//NOFORN	DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NO. [] 2492
	TO Chief, SR INFO EE, COS/G	HEADQUARTERS FILE NO. 74-6-324/3 F.F. #2358
FROM Chief, ¹⁵⁻⁸⁷ Munich Base	DATE 22 May 1959	RE: "43-3" - (CHECK "X" ONE)
SUBJECT REDWOOD AERONAUT OPERATIONS Implication of Aline MOSBY in the [] Operation	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> MARKED FOR INDEXING <input type="checkbox"/> NO INDEXING REQUIRED	<input type="checkbox"/> INDEXING CAN BE JUDGED BY QUALIFIED HQ. DESK ONLY
ACTION REQUIRED See Para. 4 below.		

REFERENCE(S)

1. It has just come to [] attention that MOSEY wrote to [] from Moscow. The letter, however, was mailed from London. It is not known how the letter got to London for mailing, but we assume that it was handcarried from Moscow to London and mailed from there. The letter was shown to [] the Munich Base Case Officer in contact with [] and the gist of it is as follows:

Aline MOSBY, UPI staffer, Moscow, on 6 March 1959 (in English) indicates that she arrived in Moscow, is working very hard, finds Moscow drab, the housing abominable. Says during her first week while dining at the National someone named Sam sat with her party who asked her "if I knew []" (he had seen me at another hotel talking to UP people) and if I had met you! Frightening. I said I had met both of you and let it go at that. Saw him again but avoided same. My apartment phone is tapped, etc....As the Russians open our mail, you can write me as follows: Aline Mosby c/o American Embassy (m) Helsinki, Finland. It will be taken by diplomatic pouch to Moscow, but don't sign your name if you don't want. Much rush, Love, A." Adds in a margin note: "He (Sam) asked nothing further about you. He has small, narrow eyes, receding hairline, says he's neurotic and unhappy."

Quoted also are two entries in the "MEMORANDUM TO THE FILE" in the [] case:

[] showed [] Aline MOSBY's letter. [] in keeping with [] plans to write MOSBY advising her to ask her recently met acquaintance Sam PAVLOV, whether or not he would like to make contact with [] or [] through her. [] thinks Sam is a "good guy" even though he might have been impressed into the service of the NGB as []'s father guessed.

Supplemental Information: 16 March 1959

In the evening of this date, [] in a telephone conversation with [] reported the latest [] information known to him. Of greatest interest was the Aline MOSBY letter about Sam PAVLOV. Having been personally involved in [] interest in PAVLOV, [] made a weekend trip to Frankfurt to see his old handler, [] and to discuss the matter. [] advised [] to keep in touch with [] With regard to []'s initial reply to Mosby, [] cautioned against manifesting any aggressiveness from the [] side. He recommended that instead of sending a note to Sam PAVLOV immediately, MOSBY should first ask Sam if he'd like her to bear a message from Sam to [] or []

2. Taking into consideration []'s mentality, personality and makeup, we fear that he may request that MOSBY contact several of his friends in Moscow, especially since both [] and MOSBY may feel that they have a secure channel of mail communication. We fear that it will not take the Soviet Security organs long to determine that MOSBY is communicating with the West, bypassing censorship. We also fear that [] will attempt to []

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have MOSBY perform certain "tasks", which will jeopardize her position in Moscow.

3. How will this affect the A operation? We are afraid that MOSEY will be suspected of participating in some sort of clandestine activities and that she was rather close to A in Brussels for an extended period of time; that her continuous efforts to recontact A will most likely not go unnoticed; and that A may become suspected of having clandestine relationships with MOSBY, causing him to come under surveillance. Even if the MVD determines that this relationship is purely social, A will still have a black mark on his record and possibly be prevented from ever going to the West again. Even if the results of MOSBY's activities in Moscow are not as drastic as outlined above, we fear that A will feel that the AIS has failed to protect him and the operation, and he therefore might break contact with us.

4. We would appreciate headquarter's comments and views on the above.

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