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TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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SECRET (When Filled In)	CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
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COUNTRY	SOUTH VIETNAM NORTH VIETNAM	REPORT NO.	TDCS DB-3/656,927
SUBJECT	MEETING BETWEEN POLISH INTERNATIONAL CONTROL COMMISSION DELEGATE AND NGO DINH NHU	DATE DISTR.	27 SEPTEMBER 1963
DATE OF INFO.	2 AND 23 SEPTEMBER 1963	PRECEDENCE	ROUTINE
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	VIETNAM, SAIGON (23 SEPTEMBER 1963)	REFERENCES	IN 28400
APPRAISAL	SEE BELOW	FIELD REPORT NO.	FVS 9711

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE [REDACTED]

APPRAISAL: IN VIEW OF THE WIDELY DIVERGENT ACCOUNTS OF THE NHU/MANELI MEETING, MANELI'S STATEMENTS CONCERNING WHAT TRANSPIRED AT THE MEETING CANNOT BE ACCURATELY JUDGED. HOWEVER, IT IS QUITE POSSIBLE THAT MANELI DID OFFER TO SERVE AS AN INTERMEDIARY BETWEEN NHU AND THE DRV. MANELI'S STATEMENTS CONCERNING DRV ATTITUDES TOWARD NEUTRALIZATION AND THE WAR IN SOUTH VIETNAM AS WELL AS HIS JUDGEMENT CONCERNING PHAM VAN DONG MAY BE ACCURATE. PLEASE NOTE THE FIELD COMMENT IN PARAGRAPH 6.

1. (SUMMARY: ON 23 SEPTEMBER 1963 THE CHIEF OF THE POLISH DELEGATION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL COMMISSION (ICC) IN SAIGON, DR. M. MANELI, SAID THAT DURING HIS MEETING WITH NGO DINH NHU ON 2 SEPTEMBER NHU HAD DONE MOST OF THE TALKING. MANELI ASKED NHU FOR HIS VIEWS ON DE GAULLE'S STATEMENT ON VIETNAM TO WHICH NHU REPLIED THAT DE GAULLE WAS TRYING TO RETURN TO THE OBJECTIVES OF THE 1954 AGREEMENT. MANELI ALSO ASKED IF THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN) HAD CONSIDERED DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (DRV) PROPOSALS

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FOR A CEASE-FIRE AND FOR TRADE RELATIONS. NHU REPLIED NEGATIVELY ON BOTH COUNTS. SUBSEQUENTLY MANELI DENIED THAT NHU HAD EVER HINTED THAT MANELI SHOULD BE AN INTERMEDIARY BETWEEN THE GVN AND THE DRV. MANELI SAID THAT THE DRV COULD NEVER ACCEPT NEUTRALIZATION BECAUSE OF INTERNAL DRV CONDITIONS, THAT HIS DRV CONTACTS DID NOT BELIEVE THE VIET CONG WOULD WIN THE WAR IN SOUTH VIETNAM, AND THAT DRV PRIME MINISTER PHAM VAN DONG WAS THE ACTUAL LEADER OF NORTH VIETNAM.)

2. ON 23 SEPTEMBER 1963, MANELI SAID THAT HE HAD NOT SOUGHT A MEETING WITH NHU AND WAS RELUCTANT TO ACCEPT NHU'S INVITATION TO MEET ON 2 SEPTEMBER. MANELI FURTHER EMPHASIZED THAT HE HAD HAD NO CHANCE TO CONSULT WITH HIS GOVERNMENT BEFORE THE MEETING.

3. MANELI SAID THAT NHU TALKED ABOUT THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE STRATEGIC HAMLET PROGRAM, MILITARY PROGRESS IN SOUTH VIETNAM, AND HIS REASONS FOR BEING ANTI-COMMUNIST. MANELI SAID THAT NHU DID MOST OF THE TALKING WHILE MANELI CONFINED HIS CONVERSATION TO SUBJECTS OF INTEREST TO THE ICC. MANELI'S QUESTIONS AND NHU'S ANSWERS FOLLOW:

A. MANELI ASKED NHU FOR HIS VIEWS ON DE GAULLE'S STATEMENT ON VIETNAM. NHU SAID THAT HE HAD NOT SEEN THE OFFICIAL TEXT BUT WAS FAMILIAR WITH THE PRESS ACCOUNT. HE SAID THAT DE GAULLE WAS SIMPLY CALLING FOR A RETURN TO THE ORIGINAL CONCEPT OR OBJECTIVES OF THE GENEVA ACCORD OF 1954 AND WAS STRESSING THE PROVISIONAL

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NATURE OF THE PRESENT UNNATURAL DIVISION OF VIETNAM.

B. MANELI ASKED IF THE GVN HAD CONSIDERED THE DRV SUGGESTION THAT A CEASE-FIRE BE CONCLUDED. NHU REPLIED THAT A CEASE-FIRE WAS NOT POSSIBLE AT THIS TIME.

C. MANELI ASKED IF THE GVN HAD CONSIDERED HO CHI MINH'S PROPOSAL THAT TRADE RELATIONS BE ESTABLISHED BETWEEN THE GVN AND THE DRV WITHOUT REFERENCE TO POLITICAL DIFFERENCES. NHU REPLIED THAT THIS WAS ABSOLUTELY OUT OF THE QUESTION.

4. MANELI DEPLORED THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE COLUMN BY JOSEPH ALSOP WHICH ALLEGED THAT NHU HAD EXTENDED "EXTRAORDINARY COURTESIES" TO MANELI AND THAT THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT WAS INVOLVED IN FOSTERING NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE GVN AND THE DRV. MANELI DENIED THAT NHU HAD EVEN HINTED THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO USE MANELI AS A CHANNEL OF COMMUNICATIONS TO THE DRV.

5. PASSING TO OTHER MATTERS, MANELI SAID THAT THE DRV COULD NEVER ACCEPT NEUTRALIZATION BECAUSE OF INTERNAL STRESSES AND IDEOLOGICAL CONDITIONS THERE. IN REPLY TO A QUESTION WHETHER HIS DRV CONTACTS REALLY BELIEVED THAT THEY WOULD WIN THE WAR IN SOUTH VIETNAM, MANELI PONDERED FOR A LONG TIME AND THEN SAID, "I DO NOT THINK SO." MANELI ALSO SAID THAT PRIME MINISTER PHAM VAN DONG HELD REAL POWER IN THE DRV AS HO CHI MINH WAS "GETTING QUITE OLD."

6. (FIELD COMMENT:) (B) TALKED TO NHU ON

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6 SEPTEMBER AND OBTAINED A CONSIDERABLY DIFFERENT VERSION OF WHAT TRANSPIRED BOTH BEFORE AND DURING THE NHU/MANELI MEETING; NHU SAID THAT MANELI HAD MADE SEVERAL EFFORTS TO SEE HIM BUT THAT HE HAD REFUSED UNTIL ITALIAN AMBASSADOR D'ORLANDI AND THE INDIAN ICC COMMISSIONER GOBURDHUN PERSUADED NHU TO CONSULT WITH MANELI. ACCORDING TO NHU, MANELI URGED NHU TO ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE DRV; HE SAID THAT PHAM VAN DONG HAD AUTHORIZED HIM TO ACT AS THE INTERMEDIARY FOR SUCH NEGOTIATIONS. NHU REPLIED TO MANELI, THAT, WHILE DE GUALLE'S STATEMENT WAS INTERESTING, ONLY COMBATANTS IN THE WAR HAD THE RIGHT TO SPEAK AND ACT, THAT THE GVN WAS ALLIED WITH THE UNITED STATES AND IT WOULD BE AN "IMMORAL ACT" TO EXPLORE MATTERS WITH THE DRV WITHOUT AMERICAN KNOWLEDGE, AND THAT COMMERCIAL RELATIONS WITH THE DRV WOULD ENTAIL INEVITABLE POLITICAL REPERCUSSIONS AND LEAD TO A WEAKENING OF MORALE OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES. NHU COMMENTED THAT HE HAD NO "SECRET CHANNEL" TO THE DRV BUT COULD COMMUNICATE WITH THE DRV AT ANY TIME THROUGH GOBURDHUN OR MANELI. ACCORDING TO NHU, MANELI SAID THAT THE GVN WOULD SOON HAVE FOUR ENEMIES AGAINST IT, PRESUMABLY INCLUDING THE U.S. NHU SAID THAT HE REPLIED THAT THE GVN WAS ACCUSTOMED TO HAVING MANY ENEMIES AND WOULD PREFER TO DIE FIGHTING RATHER THAN LIVE ON ITS KNEES

7. FIELD DISSEM: STATE (AMBASSADOR LODGE) USMACV (GENERAL HARKINS) CINPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF

END OF MESSAGE

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