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2. What covert offensive actions should be considered?

DISCUSSION

The answer to this question is generally covered in the answer to Question 1. Additional actions which might be considered would be an increase in attention given to potential North Vietnamese intelligence sources living abroad. Defection and/or recruitment in place of North Vietnamese officials, particularly in Europe, has been pursued as an objective by CIA for some time. No significant results from operations in this field have been obtained. It is probably worthwhile at this time to review the priority of this task, however, and raise the question again with CIA Stations wherever North Vietnamese officials are present. Psychological Warfare activities directed against North Vietnam, including both "white" and "grey" broadcasting is also being conducted by CIA in conjunction with Psychological Warfare Directorate of the Vietnamese Army. There are insufficient means, however, of judging the impact of these broadcasts. Requirements for reporting on these broadcasts should be levied on liaison sources which have official representatives in North Vietnam and agent teams placed in North Vietnam should eventually be required to report on the effectiveness of the broadcasting activity.

RECOMMENDATIONS

No additional policy authorizations or support are necessary at this time.