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**Subject:** From an insider's perspective  
 For Eddington's comments re declassification vs. sources and methods are valuable. Please read the following excerpt, and his comments. Eddington is in a good position to comment on this, having just come from the CIA himself.----- Forwarded message -----Date: Mon, 28 Jul 1997 10:43:24 -0400 (EDT)From:Eddington@aol.comTo: gwvm@structured.netCc: Gulf-Chat@structured.netSubject: House Intelligence committee & GULFLINKThe following is extracted from "Committee Report - House Rpt. 105-135 Part 1- INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1998," section on declassification:"Finally, the Committee will focus in detail on the GULFLINK case. The recent GULFLINK damage assessment report concluded that the declassification process associated with Gulf War intelligence documents resulted in serious damage to intelligence sources and methods. Those working on declassifying Gulf War intelligence documents were directed to declassify an enormous amount of documents in a relatively short amount of time. Furthermore, the Department of Defense directed those declassifying these documents to err on the side of declassification and post documents on the GULFLINK Internet site unless instructed otherwise on a case-by-case basis, by officials at the highest levels of the Department of Defense. Clearly, the reported damage done to intelligence sources and methods in the case of GULFLINK are directly due to these declassification criteria. The Committee will closely examine the declassification processes and requirements used in the GULFLINK project to ensure that such mistakes are not made in future declassification projects."The assertion that sources and methods were compromised in the GulfLINK case is pure garbage. The "damage assessment" referenced in the House report was prepared by CIA...the same agency that attempted to reclassify data pertaining to the locations of CBW munitions in the KTO. Moreover, the U.S. government shared significant (and similar) intelligence data with the Iraq government during the 1980's, ostensibly to help Saddam stave off defeat at the hands of the Ayatollah Khomeini's hordes. Apparently, it's OK to share intelligence with dictators who do our bidding but not OK to share it without our own citizens who fought a war against this same dictator we helped arm. This is another example of the hypocritical approach that the Congressional committees of jurisdiction (Intel, National Security, etc.) have taken on Gulf War-related issues. These committees and their staffs have been co-opted by the CIA and the Pentagon in a major way. When my attorney and I briefed both the House Intelligence Committee and the House National Security Committee in December 1996, we got a decidedly frosty reception. Most of the staff members of those committees are either former intelligence officers, or retired or reserve members of the armed forces (pay grades of LTC or above in every case). You cannot have effective oversight of CIA and the Pentagon when former CIA and

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