

NR_key_name: EFDA45BF660A37A0052565740052E38F

SendTo: Jeremy Gunn;Eileen

CopyTo:

DisplayBlindCopyTo:

BlindCopyTo:

From: CN=Tom Samoluk/O=ARRB

DisplayFromDomain:

DisplayDate: 12/21/1997

DisplayDate_Time: 10:34:19 AM

ComposedDate: 12/21/1997

ComposedDate_Time: 10:05:22 AM

Subject: Lifton Posting on JFK Newsgroup on Internet Regarding Our Vietnam Document Release
I took the message below from Lifton off of the internet. I was curious if anybody had contact with Lifton on the Vietnam document release (he wrongly says "released last week"). Also, did Newman ever come in and review the documents? Please advise. Thanks. Tom P.S. Also, a second Lifton posting on the Cuba document release. Subject: Newly Released Vietnam (withdrawal) Docs From: David Lifton <dflifton@earthlink.net> Date: Sat, Dec 20, 1997 09:10 EST Message-id: <349BD1DF.653E@earthlink.net> JUST RELEASED VIETNAM DOCUMENTS; anyone interested? SYNOPSIS: JCS documents released last week; including record of 8th SecDef Conference of 5/6/63. Available for \$25. The ARRB has just released previously classified documents from the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning Vietnam---and in particular, the long sought after records of the "8th Sec Def Conference" of May 6, 1963 held in Hawaii. (Sec Def McNamara would periodically go out to Hawaii to meet with the top military brass at CINPAC headquarters at Camp Smith, Hawaii. Hence, the term "Sec Def Conference"). The record of the 8th Sec Def conference on Vietnam of 6 May 63 drives the nail into the coffin for those fantasists who are still laboring under the illusion that JFK had any intention of doing anything but withdrawing from that conflict---albeit a withdrawal bundled in the political rhetoric of "we won" or "we turned it over to the Vietnamese" etc. The documents show that John Newman (JFK and Vietnam) was correct---that JFK had ordered McNamara to pull out, and McNamara was complying with his boss's orders. The record of the meeting(s) consist of a detailed record of the "discussions and the decisions reached at the conference on 6 May 1963." The military apparently had one plan for withdrawal, and McNamara told them that wasn't fast enough; that they must "draw up training plans. . . that will permit us to start an earlier withdrawal of U.S. personnel than proposed under the plan presented" (i.e., by the military brass). At the very least, McNamara demanded a plan to have 1,000 men out by December 1963, but the whole tone of the document is "the sooner the better". McNamara's whole tone so alarmed the military that "General Harkin emphasized that he did not want to gather up 1,000 U.S. personnel and have them depart with bands playing, flags flying, etc. This would have a bad effect on the Vietnamese, to be pulling out just when it appears they are winning." (Why yes, of course General Harkin!) McNamara kept pushing for a complete takeover of functions by the Vietnamese. Army Chief Earl Wheeler was still pushing for overt operations against the north but the record notes "It was the General's opinion that proposals for overt action invited a negative Presidential decision." Get that: "a negative Presidential decision." The withdrawal of 1,000 US troops by December 1963 was considered "a matter of urgency"; and when McNamara first saw the military's plan, he reportedly said "that the phase-out appears to slow." And: "He made particular point of the desirability of speeding up training of helicopter pilots so

Body: Record

recstat: Record

DeliveryPriority: N

DeliveryReport: B

ReturnReceipt:

Categories: