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Subject: Format for Chapter 4

DURING OUR CONVERSATION late last week in which I asked if you were still intending to include NSA sections in Chapter 4 of the final report, I told you that I would send you an example of the format that we are using to write the Board's "common law" in Chapter 4. Since you hadn't mentioned it since we first talked about it with Jeremy in March and since you told me that it wouldn't take you very long to complete your part, I figured that you weren't in a huge rush to get it. But I understand that you said in the meeting on Friday that you expected to receive the example from me before I left on Thursday. To the extent that I hindered the work that you would have completed between Thursday evening and the final report meeting on Friday afternoon, I apologize for the delay. Given that you are familiar with CIA issues, I am sending you an example of a CIA issue under section 6(1). If you write a similar rule and commentary for each NSA issue and e-mail it to me, I will number it appropriately and integrate it into the draft of Chapter 4. I told Jeremy that I would complete my section by May 29.

4. CIA Crypts

a. Review Board Guidelines. The Review Board generally released crypts and digraphs within the JFK Collection and in related records. Specifically, the Review Board releases all crypts that denote parts of the US Government. LI crypts (denoting Mexico City) and AM crypts, especially those in the core files, are generally releasable under JFK Act standards. For all other crypts, the Review Board usually protects the digraph and releases the remainder of the crypt. The Review Board established several exceptions to the above guidelines and, where such exceptions applied, required the CIA to present specific evidence of its need to protect.

b. Commentary. Early phases of the Review Board's consideration of crypts highlighted the cultural differences between the CIA and the Review Board. The CIA considered crypts to be operational methods that required protection despite the fact that CIA had years ago replaced most of the crypts at issue. The Review Board, on the other hand, considered crypts to be a code that obscures an identity or an operation discussed in a document, which could presumptively be released without compromising the identity or the operation. Negotiations between the CIA and the Review Board established a middle ground in which the CIA yielded to the release of most crypts and digraphs in the JFK context and the Review Board acknowledged that some sensitive crypts required protection. Early in the review process the CIA argued for the protection of all crypts, even those such as ODENVY -- the crypt that denotes the FBI -- which were no longer in use and which the CIA had inadvertently released in other records. The Board quickly rejected such postponements and required the CIA to identify each crypt for the Review Board. CIA complained that the research involved in identifying crypts for the Review Board was cumbersome, but it did proceed to identify crypts for the Board. In the first meetings in which the Review Board considered crypts, it tabled its

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