

MEMORANDUM

(Updated version as of February 21, 1997)

To: Jeremy Gunn
cc: David Marwell; Chris Barger; Doug Horne; Brian Rosen; Joan Zimmerman
From: Tim Wray
Subject: Army Intelligence in Dallas

Here's some of what we've learned so far about Army intelligence in Dallas.

1. General Background: U.S. Armies and Intelligence Corps Groups.

In the Army's 1963 organizational scheme, the 48 contiguous states were divided into six military regions, each of which was controlled by a "numbered army" headquarters. (These are also called the "U.S. armies" or the "continental U.S. armies," and today are generally abbreviated with the acronym "CONUSA's.") The six CONUSA's collectively came under the authority of Continental Army Command (CONARC) headquartered at Fort Monroe, Virginia.

The states of Texas, Louisiana, Arkansas, Oklahoma and New Mexico fell under 4th Army, which had its headquarters at Fort Sam Houston in San Antonio, Texas. Fourth Army, like the other CONUSA's, was a peacetime, administrative headquarters that supervised those units and activities in its assigned area that were not immediately deployable for combat. For example, while 4th Army supervised reserve and training units throughout its realm, it generally had no authority over the 2d Armored Division—a high-readiness combat unit stationed at Fort Hood, Texas. (Combat-ready units like the 2d Armored Division, regardless of their geographical location, ultimately belonged to U.S. Strike Command headquartered at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida.) The Army uses essentially the same system today, though the headquarters titles are different.

Each CONUSA had a military intelligence group directly assigned to it. These intelligence groups were not designed for combat: their organization was tailored to peacetime duties rather than a wartime role, they had no combat vehicles or other military equipment, and members of the unit were ordinarily issued no helmets, gas masks or other items of individual equipment such as would be given to soldiers in a combat-deployable unit. Each military intelligence group was, in effect, a "household" unit of its parent CONUSA, responsible for peacetime intelligence gathering and counterintelligence within its assigned geographic area. In actual practice, most of the effort

expended by these domestic military intelligence groups went into pedestrian security matters: on average, 70-85% of their man-hours were spent on conducting routine background investigations on individuals who had applied for security clearances and in making physical security inspections of defense plants.

Except for administrative personnel (typists, supply clerks, etc.), most of the people assigned to these units had attended standard intelligence training courses, and many possessed advanced individual qualifications in such technical intelligence/ counterintelligence skills such as photography, defense against electronic eavesdropping, or interrogation techniques. We have been unable to locate any evidence that members of these organizations, either individually or as a unit, ever received any training in protecting senior military or civilian officials. Former members of such units thus far interviewed by us deny they ever received such training.

Regardless of their individual specialties or qualifications, most of the intelligence personnel assigned to the CONUSA intelligence groups wound up doing security interviews and background checks because that was what the work required. They ordinarily performed these duties in civilian clothes, drove around in government-owned sedans instead of military vehicles, and carried a billfold-type credential identifying them as "special agent." (In a military context, the chief purpose of the "special agent" designation is to conceal the agent's military rank. This allows, for example, an agent who is actually a junior enlisted person to interview a senior officer without being intimidated by ordinary protocols of rank and deference. While this practice is also used by military police criminal investigators, it should be emphasized that Army *intelligence* "special agents" are distinct from such *criminal investigation* "special agents" in that they have no training in law enforcement, no authority to conduct criminal investigations or make arrests, and as a rule do not carry weapons.)

In addition to their ordinary security duties, during the 1950's and 1960's the CONUSA intelligence groups also carried on domestic surveillance of "radical" or "subversive" groups and activities. This surveillance covered organizations from all parts of the political spectrum, from communists to George Lincoln Rockwell's American Nazi Party, and public demonstrations from civil rights marches to Ku Klux Klan rallies. Though the whole issue of domestic surveillance by military intelligence agencies later caused a big uproar in the early 1970's, until the Vietnam War protests got going in earnest in the late 60's this was a fairly minor activity in terms of military intelligence resources and manpower. In fact, the few surviving records from the early 60's suggest that much of the domestic "intelligence" garnered by the CONUSA intelligence groups in that era came from TV and newspaper reports, or from secondhand information passed along by various law enforcement agencies, rather than actual surveillance by military intelligence personnel. (Most Army domestic intelligence records were destroyed in accordance with Department of Defense Directive 5200.20 dated March 1, 1971. This destruction was ordered following criticism that domestic surveillance of non-DOD affiliated U.S. citizens was an inappropriate, and possibly unlawful, use of military assets. This

destruction was not limited to the Army, nor even to intelligence records: *all* DOD records which fell into proscribed categories were supposed to have been destroyed.)

2. 112th Intelligence Corps Group.

The 112th Intelligence Corps Group (written as the 112th INTC Group) was directly subordinate to 4th Army, and in fact its headquarters was virtually side-by-side with 4th Army's headquarters at Fort Sam Houston. This unit originally came into being in 1946 as the 112th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment with an initial strength of 16 officers, 6 warrant officers and 26 enlisted men. During its early years at Fort Sam Houston it was fully integrated into 4th Army's G2 (Intelligence) section: the 112th's headquarters were in the G2 offices, and personnel from the 112th constituted the Security Branch within G2. The detachment was given its own separate office space outside 4th Army G2 in 1949 and enlarged to a counterintelligence group in 1957. It was renamed the 112th Intelligence Corps Group in 1961, though it went by the cover name "4th U.S. Army Operations Group" until July, 1962. Its official mission was "to contribute to the operations of 4th U.S. Army through the detection of treason, sedition, subversive activity, and espionage and sabotage within or directed against the 4th U.S. Army and the area of its jurisdiction."

In 1963 the 112th INTC Group had approximately 300 military personnel and 25 civilians assigned to it. In addition to the Group headquarters, these people manned seven regional offices: Region I (also at Fort Sam Houston), Region II (Dallas), Region III (El Paso), Region IV (Houston), Region V (New Orleans), Region VI (Little Rock), and Region VII (Oklahoma City). These regional offices frequently had smaller (often temporary) "resident" sub-offices in outlying areas. For example, the Dallas Regional Office at one time or another supervised offices in Abilene, Amarillo, Texarkana, and Tyler, while the New Orleans Regional Office had residents in Baton Rouge, Lake Charles, Leesville, and Shreveport. Most resident offices were manned by only one or two people.

The 112th was inactivated (disbanded) on June 30, 1974, and all its personnel and equipment transferred to other units.

3. 316th INTC Detachment.

The 112th INTC Group's personnel total given above does not include members of the smaller 316th INTC Detachment, which had an authorized strength of 38 in 1963. The 316th INTC Detachment was transferred from Fort Jackson, South Carolina to Fort Sam Houston and attached to the 112th INTC Group in December, 1962. In Army parlance, "attached" means that the superior unit "owns" the subordinate attached unit: it has full command authority over it, is responsible for its welfare and support, and in nearly every way treats it as an integral part of the parent unit—except that the attached unit retains its separate paper identity and keeps separate unit records, thereby allowing it to

be “detached” at some future time and reassigned elsewhere with a minimum of fuss.

While it thus had an identity distinct from that of the 112th, the initial December, 1962, transfer of the 316th INTC Detachment to Fort Sam Houston and its attachment to the 112th INTC Group was essentially a paper transaction, as no people or equipment moved with it. Rather, on the date its transfer became effective nothing happened except that some of the troops from the 112th’s Region I office were reassigned on paper to the new 316th INTC Detachment, and the 112th’s Region I commander was temporarily made the commander of the 316th INTC Detachment as an additional duty. While this may seem silly on the surface, the beneficial effect of this transfer and attachment was that it boosted the total number of “authorized” military intelligence personnel spaces at Fort Sam Houston, eventually easing the workload there as new replacements arrived to fill the vacancies.

In general, the 316th’s day-to-day mission was augment the 112th’s Region I office and to shoulder part of its workload. Taken together with its separate organizational identity, this explains why 316th actions are reported in Region I’s section in the 112th INTC Group’s unit history, even though personnel from the 316th are not listed on the roster of individuals assigned to the 112th appended to that unit history. Other records reveal that officers were freely shifted back and forth between the 112th INTC Group and the 316th INTC Detachment, further confirming that (except when the 316th was temporarily detached to participate in some exercise—see below) the two units largely operated as a single functional entity. A notable example of this is Colonel Rudolph M. Reich, who commanded the 316th at the time of President Kennedy’s assassination. Before taking command of the 316th in May, 1963, Reich had spent two years as a staff officer in the 112th, serving first as the Group intelligence officer and then as its operations officer.

Unlike the 112th INTC Group, the 316th INTC Detachment was organized for combat duties and so periodically went to participate in field training exercises away from Fort Sam Houston. Two notable instances of this were Exercise Swift Strike III in July, 1963, and Exercise Desert Strike in California in May, 1964. When the 316th went off on these exercises, it went as a separate, intact subunit without the rest of the 112th INTC Group.

4. Domestic Surveillance and Liaison with Law Enforcement Agencies.

Like the intelligence groups of the other CONUSA’s, the 112th INTC Group engaged in domestic surveillance in the early 1960’s. Region V (Louisiana) appears to have been the most active, especially with respect to civil rights clashes and demonstrations. Due to their limited manpower resources and broad geographic responsibilities, the intelligence groups had to rely heavily on newspaper accounts and information forwarded from various law enforcement agencies to keep their

files up to date. Thus, for example, the 112th INTC Group's unit history for 1962-3 notes that Region II (Dallas) carried out "activities in the field of CONUS intelligence includ[ing] coverage of anti-Castro activities, minor racial problems and Right Wing groups through public media and close liaison with other agencies." (This gathering-in of data on political "subversives" via newspaper clippings and information forwarded by local law enforcement officials is presumably how Lee Harvey Oswald's actions in New Orleans led to the creation of a personnel dossier on him by the 112th INTC Group.)

We have so far located several documents in the microfilm files from the Pentagon Telecommunications Center that document the extent of the cooperation between the intelligence groups and various law enforcement agencies. Most are 1963 "spot report" messages of actual or impending civil rights disturbances sent to the Army's Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence in Washington by the CONUSA G2's. These spot reports, which are rendered in a standard format, include an entry showing the source of the information, making it easy to get a sense of the frequency and the extent of such collaboration. (Unfortunately, in general only large, noteworthy incidents merited such formal spot reports to Washington. It appears that no spot report was prepared on Oswald's pre-assassination activities.)

Though spot report messages from 4th Army G2 document a regular, close working relationship between the 112th INTC Group and local, state and federal law enforcement agencies (including the Dallas police department and, especially, the FBI), they record no collaboration at all between military intelligence and the Secret Service. Our interviews with Rudolf M. Reich and Edward J. Coyle pointed to the same conclusion. While both of these former intelligence officers confirmed that liaison with local law enforcement agencies, as well as other federal agencies like the FBI, the Navy's Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) and the Air Force's Office of Special Investigations (OSI), was both routine and extensive—Coyle had such a close relationship with Dallas FBI agent James Hosty that Coyle warmly referred to him in our initial phone interview as "Jimmy"—neither recalled any contact whatsoever with the Secret Service. Reich, who before becoming the commander of the 316th INTC Detachment in July, 1963, had been the 112th INTC Group's operations officer, said in his ARRB interview that while he commonly worked with other organizations, he has no recollection of ever having worked with the Secret Service.

5. Assassination Issues.

a. Colonel Robert E. Jones' HSCA Testimony. Colonel Robert E. Jones appeared before the HSCA on April 20, 1978, and in sworn testimony told the panel that he had been operations officer of the 112th INTC Group at the time of the assassination. He also said the Group had been involved in presidential security activities on November 22, 1963, and that it had had "between eight and twelve" plainclothes agents in Dealey Plaza—a remarkable assertion in light of the fact that no such military presence had previously been noted by the Secret Service, the FBI or the Warren

Commission. Jones so impressed the Committee with his bearing and demeanor that Representative Dodd gushed at the close of his testimony that “you have been an extremely responsive witness, extremely helpful. . . . I wish that all of the witnesses we had were as competent, concise, detailed and as willing as you have been.” The Committee’s final report found Jones’ testimony to be “credible.”

Unfortunately, on closer examination Jones appears to have been something less than a credible witness. His testimony contains many patent inaccuracies and misrepresentations, beginning with what his job in the 112th actually was.

Jones testified that he had been “operations officer for the 112 MI Group and. . . served as the operations officer from June, 1963 until 1 January 1965.” However, the 112th’s unit history for 1962-3 says that then-Lieutenant Colonel Robert E. Jones became the Group S2 (intelligence officer) in August, 1963, and that the Group S3 (operations officer) at the time of the assassination was actually Lieutenant Colonel Stanley W. Greer. We confirmed this by examining Jones’ and Greer’s official military records at the Military Personnel Records Center in St. Louis. According to his personnel record, Jones never served as the 112th INTC Group’s operations officer (though he did move up to become the Group executive officer in 1964.)

It appears that Jones’ misrepresentation of his duties with the 112th was not an isolated “slip of the tongue,” since at other points during his testimony he remarked that “upon my assignment to 112, I was appointed the operations officer for the entire group,” and that “I directed the operations for [the]seven regions.” Nor was this an inadvertent failure of memory: two weeks before his sworn testimony, Jones told HSCA staffer Harold Leap during a preparatory interview that he had actually been the 112th INTC Group’s “chief of intelligence,” not its operations officer.

Whether Jones was the operations officer (S3) or intelligence officer (S2) is significant because it bears directly on the extent to which Jones knew what he was talking about. The S3 would have been the person responsible for overseeing the 112th’s plans, operations and training, and would be much more knowledgeable of the 112th’s day-to-day activities than the S2. Most importantly, the S3 would be the person at the 112th’s San Antonio headquarters most likely to have any knowledge, for example, of whether members of the Dallas Regional Office had been asked to assist the Secret Service with presidential security. On the other hand, the principal function of the Group S2 was to read and file the intelligence reports, background investigations, and other material submitted by the regional offices and to prepare summary reports for higher headquarters; in that capacity (which appears to have been his actual position), Jones might not have had much real knowledge about what went on in Dallas aside from whatever he might have gleaned from reports rendered after the fact.¹

¹As a retired Army officer, I can say from personal experience that it is axiomatic that the S3 is ordinarily the best-informed officer in any unit about what that unit is doing, commonly knowing

A careful reading of Jones's HSCA testimony reveals that, in fact, throughout he attributed his recollections almost entirely to written reports rather than first-hand knowledge, a vantage more consistent with the duties of the unit's intelligence officer.

It would appear, then, that Colonel Jones may have consciously misstated his duty position in his sworn testimony to the HSCA. Whether he misled the HSCA in order to inflate his credentials and importance, or whether there was some other, more benign reason cannot now be known. For our purposes, however, the significance of this misrepresentation is that it not only undermines Jones' stature as a "competent," "concise," and "credible" witness, but it strongly suggests that some or all of his authoritative-sounding pronouncements to the Committee—and especially those where he asserts no firsthand knowledge—may have been little more than the imaginative guesswork of a self-important blowhard. At the very least, one should approach Jones' overall testimony with a healthy amount of skepticism.²

With that in mind, it should be noted that Jones' remarkable assertion that there were "between eight and twelve" plainclothes intelligence agents from the 112th INTC Group in Dealey Plaza at the time of the assassination does not square with other information we have so far collected.

Both members of the 112th's Dallas regional office that we have interviewed so far (James W. Powell and Edward J. Coyle) deny emphatically that there were *any* Army intelligence agents on duty in Dealey Plaza when the assassination occurred. Both of these men were eyewitnesses to other events in and around Dealey Plaza on November 22, 1963, and so their firsthand knowledge would seem on its face to be more credible than anything Colonel Jones might have heard second- or thirdhand in San Antonio. The 112th's unit history for 1962-3 says nothing about it providing security for the President in Dallas or anywhere else. (It mentions the assassination only to note that the Dallas

more about the day-to-day nuts and bolts than even the unit commander himself. The S2, on the other hand, is often almost laughably clueless about what's going on, as his duties have less connection to current operations than almost anyone else in the unit. A typical anecdote is the one about the S2 who dashes out of his office on VJ Day to breathlessly tell his commander that, after years of careful analysis and study, he has positively confirmed that it was the Japanese who bombed Pearl Harbor.

²This perception is strengthened by other patent mistakes or falsehoods in his testimony. For example, Jones asserted that James W. Powell was an officer (a captain) on duty in Dealey Plaza at the time of the assassination. Powell was actually a Sergeant (E-5), a fact confirmed both by Powell himself and by our examination of Powell's VA and military records. According to Powell, he was not on duty at the time of the assassination, but rather had asked for the day off in order to see the presidential visit.

Regional commander told the members of his office that “although personnel of Region II had no official role to play in the investigation [which presumably was still ongoing at the time the report was prepared at the end of 1963], they would support any reasonable request within the Region’s capability.”)

When interviewed by the ARRB, Powell (who was a Sergeant E-5 at the time of the assassination) does not remember anyone ever asking or even suggesting that the 112th play a security role during the presidential visit. Coyle, who was both more senior in rank than Powell (Warrant Officer WO1) and more routinely involved in liaison activities with various law enforcement agencies, also confirmed this.

Coyle recollected that Lieutenant Colonel Roy Pate, commander of the 112th’s Dallas Regional Office, attended monthly meetings with the heads of the various local law enforcement and military intelligence agencies within the Dallas community, and that upon his return from such meetings would commonly assemble the office’s personnel to pass on to them any important information he had picked up. Coyle recalled that, prior to the assassination, Pate (Coyle was not absolutely certain that it was Pate on this occasion, though he thought so) came back from such a meeting and advised them that security measures for the upcoming presidential visit had been discussed, but that the Secret Service and the Dallas Police Department said that they had everything under control and needed no additional help from other agencies. Coyle thought that Pate expressed some surprise at this, but thought there was nothing unusual or sinister about it.

Colonel Jones also told Leap in the preparatory interview on April 4, 1978, that the 112th routinely helped the Secret Service. According to Leap’s notes, Jones stated “we normally assist the SS [Secret Service] upon request for protection of the President.” We’ve been looking through available Secret Service trip surveys [after action reports] to ascertain the extent to which military personnel were ever used to provide presidential security. Though the Secret Service made extensive use of local law enforcement agencies wherever the President went, it appears that military personnel regularly provided security only when Air Force One was landing at a military base or when the President was visiting a base or installation. In such cases, military personnel were included in Secret Service security arrangements while he was on military property. In an ARRB interview, the former director of protective research for the Secret Service, Robert Bouck, stated that the only time he recalled military personnel being used for presidential security was in World War II. Likewise, Colonel Rudolph Reich (who had been the 112th’s operations officer before assuming command of the 316th INTC Detachment) told us that he could remember no occasion where the 112th had ever assisted the Secret Service or otherwise provided similar security.

While none of this conclusively answers the question of whether the 112th INTC Group’s Dallas Regional Office had assigned on-duty agents to Dealey Plaza, it appears for now that the weight of

evidence is against Colonel Jones.³ We have identified other former members of the Region II office and will attempt to contact them for further clarification of this issue.

b. Fletcher Prouty's Written Allegations. We conducted a lengthy interview of Colonel (USAF, Ret.) L. Fletcher Prouty on September 24, 1996. Among other purposes, an important goal of this interview was to ask Prouty about three specific allegations he made in his book *JFK: The CIA, Vietnam and the Plot to Assassinate John F. Kennedy*. These allegations were of particular significance to us because Prouty claimed they were based on his own firsthand knowledge. The topic-by-topic results of our interview with Prouty regarding these particular allegations are summarized below.

Allegation 1: The existence of specially trained military intelligence “presidential protection units.”

Background. Prouty had written that, while stationed at the Pentagon in the early 1960's, he “worked with military presidential protection units.” (He did not specify what these units were, but other passages make it clear he was talking about Army intelligence units, including the 112th INTC

³Jones' testimony also appears to fail the “Does this make sense?” test, especially with respect to the number of agents he claimed were in Dealey Plaza. The 112th's Dallas Regional Office had only 30 military personnel assigned to it. Some of these—for example, the agents who ran the resident sub-offices—were presumably not even in Dallas on November 22, 1963. Still others—Powell, Coyle, Lieutenant Steven Weiss and, significantly, the Region II commander, Lieutenant Colonel Pate—were, according to either Powell or Coyle, neither in Dealey Plaza nor engaged in any kind of security duties. This leaves perhaps 20-24 military personnel. Even if Jones is correct about the Dallas Office having been asked to provide assistance to the Secret Service, it doesn't make sense that something between one-third and one-half of all the remaining personnel assigned to the unit—though not the commander himself—would have been concentrated in one place (Dealey Plaza) instead of more generally dispersed. Jones' numbers just don't work out. Furthermore, his whole story runs contrary to ordinary military practice, according to which Colonel Pate would personally have been on the scene supervising an enterprise of such magnitude and importance. When one notes the other discrepancies in Jones's testimony, the most obvious explanation is that Jones was speculating rather than speaking from firm personal knowledge when he said the 112th INTC Group had 8-12 agents in Dealey Plaza. Further support for this can be found in Jones' testimony itself: the only agent he was able to place in the Dealey area, either by a description of his actions or by name, was Powell. He had no direct knowledge of any others, Jones conceded, because these “would have been debriefed by the Regional Commander” and only reports forwarded to Jones in San Antonio. Elsewhere in his testimony, Jones acknowledged a specific recollection of only one such report, presumably Powell's.

Group and the 316th INTC Detachment.) He had further written that such units were “specially trained in protection” duties.

Interview results: To our inquiries about “specially trained” military intelligence “presidential protection units,” Prouty conceded he had little concrete information about any such units. Such knowledge as he had, he said, came from a visit he once made to Fort Myer, Virginia, apparently in the late 1950's. During that visit, he heard about an Army training course at Fort Holabird, Maryland, that may have involved individual protective skill training; Prouty, however, was fairly certain that this course was not intended for entire units. To our questions about particular “presidential protection *units*”, he replied that “these units existed at Fort Myers [sic] for some job the Army would have, and among them is assistance of the Secret Service, and they called the course ‘Presidential Protection.’” In response to other questions, Prouty readily acknowledged that the comments he’d heard at Fort Myer about a “presidential protection unit” did not necessarily refer to intelligence units, and in fact might actually have been in reference to the Army’s ceremonial unit [3d U.S. Infantry Regiment, “The Old Guard”] stationed at Fort Myer, members of which provide the honor guards at state functions and perform other ceremonial duties such as guarding Arlington Cemetery’s Tomb of the Unknowns. On balance, in his ARRB interview Prouty seemed to be much less knowledgeable about any such units than he suggested in his various writings, leaving us with virtually nothing to follow up on.

Allegation 2: Prouty’s post-assassination phone call to an Army intelligence officer.

Background. In *JFK: The CIA, Vietnam and the Plot to Assassinate John F. Kennedy* (pp. 293-5), Prouty had written that some time after the assassination “I called a member of that army [intelligence] unit” who told Prouty that the commander of the “316th Field Detachment of the 112th Military Intelligence Group at Fort Sam Houston in the Fourth Army Area” [a unit that here Prouty alleged was “specially trained in protection”] was mysteriously told to “stand down” and not provide any assistance to the Secret Service in Dallas. Prouty’s interlocutor allegedly told him that this happened when his commander “had offered the services of his unit for protection duties for the entire trip through Texas”; however, when the Secret Service “point-blank and categorically” refused this offer “there were hot words between the agencies.” Prouty’s source also alleged that this unit “had records on Lee Harvey Oswald before November 22” and “knew Dallas was dangerous.” Based on this conversation, Prouty concluded in his book that the refusal to let 112th/316th intelligence agents provide additional security coverage was part of a larger conspiratorial pattern orchestrated “from a very high level.”⁴ Prouty has subsequently claimed in other published works and public fora to still

⁴This incident is also portrayed in Oliver Stone’s film *JFK*. Stone and Prouty have both publicly acknowledged that the film’s “Mr. X” character (played by Donald Sutherland) is based on Fletcher Prouty.

have the original notes he jotted down during that telephone conversation.

Interview Results. One of the most remarkable aspects of our entire interview with Fletcher Prouty was the way he completely revised the particulars of this purported phone call and downplayed its significance.

(1) Before I could even finish my first question to Prouty about this phone call, he interrupted me to say, "It didn't work that way. He contacted me." Expanding on this explanation, Prouty said that he received an unsolicited phone call out of the blue sometime in 1964 or 1965. Prouty was already retired from the Air Force at that time. Prouty did not know how this person knew of him, nor why this person chose to call him.

(2) Prouty said that he did not personally know the person who called him with this information, and could not recall his name. Prouty confirmed that this person claimed to have been "the number two man, as I understand it, to Colonel Reich, who was the commander of the military unit down there in Houston [sic]. . ." I showed Prouty a roster of the personnel who had been assigned to the 316th INTC Detachment in late 1963, but he was unable to identify any individual name on that list as the person who called him.

(3) I also gave Prouty a roster of all the personnel assigned to the 112th INTC Group's San Antonio headquarters, as well as a list of those assigned to the Region I office. He was similarly unable to identify any name on these lists as the person who called him.

(4) Prouty is convinced that military intelligence units such as the 112th INTC Group *routinely* and *automatically* provided support to the Secret Service, though throughout our interview he was never able to give any specific basis for that belief. In describing the phone call from this person claiming to be Reich's second in command, Prouty said at one point that the chief significance of the phone call was, to him, that "it was the first time it had ever occurred to me that the rote, the advance orders hadn't taken effect [for Army intelligence agents to provide additional security in Dallas]."

(5) When we persisted in our questioning, Prouty tried to move the discussion on to other areas, finally saying, "The fact this guy called me is almost an irrelevant issue." Later, during informal conversation while exiting the ARRB building after the taped interview was concluded, Prouty said to me, "You know, that phone call has troubled me for a long time. I'm not sure that guy was even authentic. He didn't really sound like somebody who was in the business."

(6) Prouty denied that he any longer has any notes from the telephone conversation in question.

[Note: We have determined that Colonel Reich's second-in-command in the 316th INTC Detachment was Major Jose Cabaza. We have a date of birth and SSN on Cabaza, but thus far have been unable to locate him. If he is still living, he would now be 80 years old.]

The commander of the 316th INTC Group in November, 1963, Colonel (US Army, Ret.) Rudolph M. Reich, emphatically denies both the particulars and the general substance of Prouty's allegation. In a taped telephonic interview with us on July 24, 1996, Reich said that his unit was not "specially trained" in presidential protection; to the best of his recollection, neither the 316th nor the 112th ever undertook any such missions; he himself never volunteered to have his unit assist during President Kennedy's visit; nor did he engage in any conversation of the sort described in Prouty's book in which such an offer to the Secret Service was turned down. (Reich claimed that "the only Secret Service man I ever saw was about two years ago right here in Orlando by accident.") Of Prouty's allegation in general, Reich remarked, "That guy has been smoking something. . . ."

Our telephonic interview was apparently not the first time that Reich has tried to challenge Prouty's allegations. He told us that when he first saw Prouty's claims in print in the introduction to Mark Lane's book *Plausible Denial*, he was so incensed that he wrote a letter of the Chief of Staff, Army Intelligence Support Command, denouncing the story and asking for legal advice on whether he could take some sort of legal action against Prouty. Reich has provided the ARRB both a copy of his original letter (plus enclosures) and the INSCOM reply.

While Reich's telephone interview with us clearly conveyed the relevant information, a slower, more patient in-person interview with him would be particularly helpful because of his somewhat jumbled syntax and tendency to speak in incomplete sentences. (Reich was born in Vienna, Austria, and speaks with a strong Austrian accent.) Furthermore, because of his strong negative feelings about Fletcher Prouty, he tended to get excited when the conversation turned to Prouty's allegations and, while the tenor of his feelings is clear on the audiotape, when reduced to paper his statements take on a somewhat disjointed quality.

Allegation 3: Flagrant failure by the Secret Service to take routine precautions.

Background. Prouty had written that, during President Kennedy's trip to Dallas, "many things which ought to have been done, as matters of standard security procedure, were not done" by the Secret Service in contravention of "the Secret Service's own guidelines." These failures included such things as not welding shut sewer covers, not ensuring all windows were closed, and not providing adequate surveillance personnel along the motorcade route. Prouty concluded that these omissions "provide strong evidence of the work of the conspirators. Someone, on the inside, was able to call off these normal precautions." Because these passages suggested firsthand familiarity

with Secret Service methods and procedures, we asked him several questions about this during our interview.

Interview Results. Prouty acknowledged during his interview with the ARRB that such personal knowledge as he has of Secret Service methodology comes almost entirely from an incident in 1955 when he piloted an aircraft to Mexico City carrying equipment for the Secret Service advance team prior to a trip there by President Eisenhower. Prouty declined to characterize how much of what he had written was based on his limited exposure to the Secret Service and how much was conjecture. He finally told us, “See, we’re overdoing this. I went to Mexico City once, so I’d know the business. I have no idea how they [the Secret Service] run their business. . . . I only went to Mexico City with the senior man of that [advance party] group, and stayed there a few days with him. But I went there for logistics purposes, not to learn all about the system. And I can’t extrapolate that into a nationwide system, because I never had any Secret Service [training].”

c. Sergeant James K. Powell and the Book Depository. During his taped interview with me, Powell was emphatic that, to the best of his knowledge, he was the only member of the 112th in the vicinity of Dealey Plaza when President Kennedy was shot. And, he says, he was there only because he’d asked for the day off in order to see the motorcade. Other facts seem to substantiate this: he photographed the President’s arrival at Love Field, and later hurried downtown where he watched (and photographed) the motorcade from a vantage point approximately one block from Dealey Plaza. (Powell’s celebrated photo of the upper floors of the School Book Depository was taken after he heard the shots, ran to Dealey Plaza to see what was going on, and observed several people on the street pointing up at the TSBD.) Powell’s subsequent phone call to the 112th INTC Group’s Region II office from inside the TSBD was apparently the first information the 112th had of the shooting; and, when he was later detained inside the TSBD, he had to again call the Regional office to get someone to come down and verify his identity in order to be released. At a minimum, these actions indicate that Powell himself was not “stationed” in Dealey Plaza, and further suggest that the 112th was not wired-in to what was going on in Dealey either before or after the shooting.

Powell’s story also dovetails with a previously-unreported story told to us by Coyle in his interviews. Coyle recounted that he had just returned to the Region II offices in the Rio Grande building after his meeting with Hosty and Ellsworth (and after seeing the presidential motorcade pass by on the corner of Main and Rio Grande), and was getting ready to go to lunch when the first of two phone calls came in from “one of our agents [who] was inside the School Book Depository.” Coyle said he and another member of the unit, Lieutenant Steven Weiss, hurried down to the TSBD after the phone calls. Coyle added that, standing in front of the Depository, they “could see our guy in the building, [but] I could not get in to get him. I could not get him out” because of the police cordon. (In his own interview with me, Powell said he was in the ground floor stairwell near the door and was

prevented from leaving by the police.) Powell was later released when Coyle and Weiss solicited the assistance of Jack Revill, a police official they knew from their liaison activities, who was the head of the Dallas Police intelligence section and who was at the scene outside the TSBD.⁵

d. Coyle, Hosty and Ellsworth. FBI agent James Hosty has written that he met with Coyle at the office of ATF agent Jack Ellsworth just before the assassination on November 22, 1963. Hosty remembers that he, Coyle and Ellsworth all remarked over the fact that neither the FBI, the ATF, nor the 112th INTC Group was assisting the Secret Service with presidential security, and recalls Coyle as saying, "You know, it's a damn shame, but by federal law the Army can't provide any assistance to the Secret Service."

I conducted two interviews with Coyle, an initial telephonic interview on July 29, 1996, and a longer, more substantial in-person interview on October 25, 1996. Both were taped. In both interviews, Coyle recalled the Hosty-Ellsworth meeting in substantial detail. Though he claimed not to have read Hosty's book, Coyle's recollections track Hosty's very closely (though he has no recollection of having made the statement attributed to him by Hosty). Like Hosty, Coyle remembers that the purpose of the meeting was to sort out a problem related to an investigation of stolen Army weapons from Fort Hood.

Coyle's recollection of that investigation was that he had been called to do a local agency check [a background records check with local law enforcement offices] on some individual whose name he could not recall. Though he did not know it at the time, Coyle later found out that this person was involved in some kind of illegal arms transfers. According to Coyle, "this individual was a member of a group who contacted a captain who worked in an armory down at Fort Hood, Texas. And they requested that he obtain certain weapons for them. And what they were going to do with them, I have no idea. We surmised that they were going to be used for something else." [In response to a question interjected at this point, Coyle clarified that the Army suspected the ultimate recipients might be Cuban emigres.] Continuing his story, Coyle said that the Fort Hood captain had contacted Army intelligence, and that they had decided to allow this transaction to go forward "to gain as much information about this guy from Dallas that wanted to buy these weapons and what he was going to do with them." Coyle, who was not privy to these purposes, was therefore tasked to do the agency check. He received a negative response from the FBI despite the fact the FBI apparently also had this same individual under some sort of investigation. "Shortly after that, about a week later or so,

⁵Powell did not recall that it was Coyle and Weiss who got him out. He thought that the person who got him out of the TSBD was Master Sergeant Wilson Page. Page, who formerly had been assigned to the Dallas office, had however been transferred to Japan before the assassination. Page is now deceased, but both his widow and his military records confirm his transfer prior to the assassination.)

this guy, our prime suspect, was arrested for selling illegal arms to an ATF agent. So, in essence, what had happened was this. ATF busted this guy. We didn't want him busted, the FBI didn't want him busted. We wanted to find out what he was going to do with these various weapons that he was trying to buy up. But once ATF arrested him, that just blew the other operation apart. . . ."

The result, according to Coyle, was the November 22 meeting with Hosty and Ellsworth. "When the arrest by ATF blew up, blew this clandestine operation that was going on, I got angry. I was really mad. I was mad at my headquarters for not telling me what was going on. I was mad at the FBI because they didn't tell me what was going on. And I was mad at ATF because they screwed everything up. So I decided that I would take it upon myself to have a meeting of our three agencies. And my sole purpose in asking that, for them to get together, was to find out what we could do to prevent any screwups in the future." While he thought he remembered the name of George Nonte, Coyle did not remember (nor even recognize when prompted) the names Lawrence Reginald Miller, Donnell Darius Whitter, or John Thomas Masen.

In their book *Oswald Talked*, Ray and Mary LaFontaine assert that Coyle was "the army's liaison for presidential protection" on November 22, 1963, citing Colonel Jones' testimony to the HSCA. A careful review of Jones' HSCA transcript shows that the LaFontaine citation is apparently mistaken: Jones, in describing Coyle's regular duties, said they involved "contacts and liaisons" with various agencies in the Dallas area, but said nothing about Coyle being responsible for presidential security or liaison with the Secret Service. Coyle himself denies that he had any responsibility for presidential security during the Kennedy visit, and said he does not recall having any contact with the Secret Service then or at any other time.⁶

e. 4th Army's Message about Oswald. In his HSCA testimony and various interviews with the HSCA staff, Colonel Jones gave a fairly thorough explanation of how the message concerning Lee Harvey Oswald sent by 4th Army to higher headquarters was composed. What both Jones and the HSCA have misstated, however, is when the message was sent and to whom it was addressed, since they describe the assassination night message as having been sent from 4th Army to Strike Command. This would have been peculiar since Strike Command was not 4th Army's superior headquarters.

⁶The LaFontaines' assertion that Coyle was responsible for presidential security also fails the "Does this make sense?" test. Coyle was a brand-new warrant officer, recently promoted from Staff Sergeant, and relatively new to the Dallas office. (Until becoming a warrant officer he had run the resident office in Abilene.) He is therefore an unlikely candidate for such an important responsibility, especially in light of the fact that, in US Army usage, warrant officers are technicians and not normally assigned leadership responsibilities. Furthermore, if Coyle was responsible for presidential security, what was he doing at a meeting with Hosty and Ellsworth when the visit was underway?

It appears the initial message transmitted by 4th Army on the night of November 22, 1963, was actually sent to CONARC. The message examined by the HSCA (a copy of which we located in the microfilm records of the Pentagon Telecommunications Center) appears to be a *retransmission* of this original message, a retransmission going from CGUSCONARC (Commanding General, US Continental Army Command) to US Strike Command at MacDill Air Force Base. This retransmission did not go out until November 26, 1963, at 2202Z (10:02 PM Greenwich Mean Time).

The mistaken description of this message by Jones and the HSCA appears to me to have no real significance aside from the fact that their incorrect characterization has now become imbedded in assassination literature.

6. Miscellaneous Tidbits.

While it has no apparent connection to the assassination, in late 1963 a few members of the 112th INTC Group apparently were detailed to do polygraph tests and interviews of some Cubans who were former members of the 2506th Brigade trained for the Bay of Pigs. These individuals had been commissioned in the U.S. armed forces under the "Cuban Volunteer Inductee Training Program" and were receiving English language training at Lackland Air Force Base, Texas.

Also anecdotal: in 1956 or 1957, more than a dozen members of the 112th were sent to Little Rock when President Eisenhower sent in federal troops to assure the integration of its public schools. While there, these individuals came under the command of Major General Edwin Walker.

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