

-The President publicly read a letter to the Vice President in regard to his committee on Space. (Note: this is almost surely the famous April 20, 1961 Memorandum for the Vice President, signed by President Kennedy, which asks for a report at the earliest possible moment that would identify a specific endeavor in which the U.S. could beat the Soviets in space achievement (*i.e.*, promise “dramatic results in which we could win”); landing a man on the moon is one of the options JFK offers as a possibility for study.)

Feb-August 1962: 202-10002-10104 JCS

This voluminous 197-page “Northwoods” Case File (#3360, established Feb 7, 1962) contains several JCS documents and papers related to JCS recommendations to the Secretary of Defense that the United States should adopt a national policy of early military intervention in Cuba, and should invade Cuba as soon as possible, and provides a wide variety of pretexts that could be used to justify that overt military intervention. Highlights follow:

-The various papers and studies appear to have been stimulated by taskings from the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose (Brigadier General E. G. Lansdale, USAF);

-Unlike their rather lukewarm and highly qualified support for the CIA’s Bay of Pigs plan (see Feb 3, 1961 document cited above), the Joint Chiefs appear to be truly enthusiastic, and of one mind, in regard to their repeated recommendations to SECDEF and Lansdale throughout Feb-August 1962 to unilaterally invade Cuba with U.S. forces.

-**JCS 1969/303, dated February 7, 1962** and approved by the JCS on Feb 8, 1961, and titled “Position of Department of Defense, Cuba Project,” warns that:

-the Soviets could establish
land, sea and air bases in Cuba;

-the Soviets could provide
Castro with missiles with nuclear warheads, or furnish the missiles and
maintain joint control of the nuclear warheads.

The Chiefs conclude that the communist regime in Cuba is incompatible
with the minimum security requirements of the Western Hemisphere, and state
the DOD is prepared to overtly support any popular movement in Cuba to
install a govt acceptable to the U.S., and believe this would not precipitate
general war if certain conditions are met. They offer up as the mode of
potential military intervention either OPLAN 314-61 (simultaneous
amphibious and airborne assault within 18 days of the execution order), or
OPLAN 316-61 (designed for a faster commitment of U.S. forces, via an
airborne assault within 5 days of execute order, but projecting forces into
Cuba more gradually than OPLAN 314-61).

-JCS 1969/321, dated March 12, 1962, approved by the JCS on March 13,
1962, in response to a Lansdale tasking, states that "...inasmuch as the
ultimate objective is overt military intervention, it is recommended that
primary responsibility for developing military and para-military aspects of the
plan for both overt and covert military operations be assigned the Joint Chiefs
of Staff." Furthermore, the "Annex to Appendix to Enclosure A" is titled
"Pretexts to Justify U.S. Military Intervention in Cuba," and among several
ideas, proposes the following options:

-blowing up a U.S. ship in
Guantanamo Bay and blaming it on Cuba;

- painting a U. S. F-86 fighter jet like a Cuban MIG and having it simulate attacks on a civilian airliner in flight;

- blowing up a full-sized, but unmanned "drone" civilian chartered airliner over Cuba with an installed bomb and blaming it on an attack by a Cuban MIG;

- creating an incident which will convincingly make it appear as if Cuban MIGs have destroyed a USAF aircraft over international waters with an unprovoked attack, by dumping F-101 parts 15-20 miles from the Cuban coast following a simulated dogfight in the air by U.S. planes broadcasting scripted radio chatter.

-Lyman Lemnitzer Memo for SECDEF dated March 13, 1962, titled "Justification for U.S. Military Intervention in Cuba," recommends that the "proposed memo" [JCS 1969/321, discussed immediately above] "be forwarded" [to Lansdale] "as a preliminary submission suitable for planning purposes," and that the JCS be given the primary responsibility within the U.S. government for justifying the desired, and expected, U.S. military intervention in Cuba.

-JCS 1969/335, dated April 9, 1962 and approved by the JCS on April 10, 1961, recommends to SECDEF that:

- If 100 or more Bay of Pigs prisoners are executed by Cuban government, that this be used as justification for U.S. invasion;

- That if used, OPLAN 314-61, which would allow a full-scale invasion following 18 days' prep time,

is more prudent than using OPLAN 316, which would allow a more rapid invasion with lesser forces;

-That general war can be avoided if the U.S. stresses the humanitarian nature of its assistance (that is, the invasion).

-Lyman Lemnitzer Memo for SECDEF dated April 10, 1962 (JCSM-272-62), titled "Cuba," states:

-JCS believe that U.S. can undertake military intervention in Cuba without risk of general war;

-JCS recommend that U.S. adopt a national policy of early military intervention in Cuba, and that it be undertaken as soon as possible.

Oct 17, 1962: 198-10004-10015

Col. Boucher, USA

Memo for Brig. Gen. Edward G. Lansdale, USAF, Subj: Cuban Operations, reports that a businessman, Jordan James Pfunter, with ties to anti-Castro group Alpha-66's "highest echelon," has relayed the desire of the group for U. S. Army funds, equipment and arms, for the purpose of launching raids against Cuba and inserting agents into Cuba. In return, Pfunter said the group would provide the Army with intelligence information and captured Soviet equipment and ordnance. Marginalia on the document, apparently written by General Lansdale, reads "overtaken by events--Mr. Gilpatric said no--EL" (Note: this memo is written after the commencement of the Cuban Missile Crisis EXCOM meetings, and presumably the Missile Crisis may have influenced Roswell Gilpatric's refusal to grant permission to the request relayed by Pfunter.)

July 17, 1962: 202-10002-10005

Chairman, JCS Memo for the Special Group (Counterinsurgency) that **forwards a report explaining the current internal organization of the Joint Staff and the Armed Services for counterinsurgency matters.** Includes organizational charts and **biographies of key players, including General Krulak, USMC, the Special Assistant to the Director, Joint Staff and the Joint Chiefs of Staff for Counterinsurge**

ncy and
Special
Activities
(SACSA).

Undated: 202-10002-10008

Col. Hawkins Talking paper prepared for the JCS by Col. J. Hawkins, USMC titled: **“National Level Cuba Planning Relationships.”** This document is a primer that explains, in both words and through use of organizational diagrams, who in the U. S. Government is involved in Cuba planning, and how.

Jan 14, 1963: 202-10002-10114

Army Chief of Staff Memo to Secretary, JCS forwards State Department memo from **Sterling Cottrell on the subject of future U.S. policy toward Cuba to the JCS for review and comment in accordance with NSAM 213.** Highlights include:

- ultimate objective is overthrow of Castro regime and its replacement with one compatible with objectives of the U.S.;
- recommends isolating, undermining, and discrediting Castro regime through the exercise of all feasible diplomatic, economic, psychological and covert actions;
- U. S. Should be prepared to respond with up to the full range of military

forces to a request for open military support (material, advisors, training, and special forces support) from any anti-Castro group in Cuba which demonstrates an ability to survive and threaten the present regime;

- invasion by the U.S. should not be undertaken in the absence of aggression that threatens the peace and security of the Hemisphere--however, this does not preclude appropriate U.S. retaliation for isolated hostile acts by Castro or Soviet forces;

-whenever possible, U. S. Actions against Cuba should be multilateral;

(Comment: annex of proposed actions against Cuba proposed by State does not include premeditated invasion or unilateral military intervention.)

Jan 22, 1963: 198-10004-10017

William Brubeck

Memo to NSC Executive Committee (EXCOM) forwarding **5 papers on Cuba policy for consideration at an EXCOM meeting on Jan 24, 1963.**

Highlights are:

-divorce Cuba from Soviet regime;

-replace Castro government with a regime compatible with U.S. goals;

-be prepared to meet military contingencies that may arise;

-ensure offensive weapons not reintroduced into Cuba and ensure Cuba does not take aggressive action against other Caribbean states;

-Bay of Pigs Brigade should be disbanded as a military unit;

-President Kennedy's no-invasion pledge of November 20, 1962 is reiterated

**for study by
EXCOM
members as a
starting point
for group**

discussions of
future policy
toward Cuba.

Jan 24, 1963: 202-10002-10037

W.Y.S.

Memo for General Taylor from W. Y. S. dated Jan 24, 1963 titled "Future Policy Toward Cuba," with ASD/ISA memo of the same title from CAPT Elmo Zumwalt to Joseph Califano, dated Jan 15, 1963, attached.

Such memos are the beginning of a year-long attempt by key players in the government to develop a consensus, post-Missile Crisis national policy toward Cuba. In the Jan 15, 1963 Zumwalt memo, highlights include the following comments:

-Zumwalt recommends the U.S. "*create conditions* in which we could respond to incipient rebellion instead of limiting ourselves merely to be in a position to capitalize on the breaks;"

-Zumwalt recommends "our future policy paper spell out our willingness *to make the breaks* for ourselves..."

-Zumwalt says "we should *seek to create conditions in which we could respond*, and be in a position to respond with open military support...up to the full range of military forces;"

-Zumwalt writes "if the Presidential decision is to be ready for the breaks but not to make them, then the present Cottrell version of future policy is considered to be an acceptable method of maintaining pressure."

In an attached route slip, "W.J.S." writes to General Goodpaster: "ISA wants to seek out any opportunities of a rapprochement with Cuba and at the same time undermine it. This will be a very difficult policy line to walk."

- March 1, 1963: 198-10004-10020 **Multiple**
- This is a multi-document set. **In a document apparently from March 1962, among other harassing psychological warfare actions considered against Cuba appear the following:**
- "Operation COVER-UP: The objective is to convince the Communist government of Cuba that Naval Forces ostensibly assigned to the Mercury project is (sic) merely a cover. It should not be revealed as to what the cover is (sic)--this should be left to conjecture. This could tie in with Operation Dirty Trick;"
 - "Operation DIRTY TRICK: The object is to provide irrefutable proof that, should the Mercury manned orbital flight fail, the fault lies with the Communists et al (sic) Cuba."
 - "Operation BINGO: The objective is to create an incident which has the appearance of an attack on U. S. facilities (GMO) in Cuba, thus providing the excuse for use of U.S. military might to overthrow the current government of Cuba," (followed by a detailed scenario which includes Presidential orders to invade, based upon false pretexts).
- March 11, 1963: 198-10004-10016 **ASD/ISA**
- Fragment of a paper drafted by Elmo Zumwalt, titled: "General Pressures to Create a Contingency."** Highlights read:
- "...there must be careful coordination and phasing of our future actions and demeanor. There must be a plan capable of getting us from where we are now to where we want to go, by gradually increasing pressures until the objective is achieved."
 - "An invasion force should be kept in readiness for use, if required to save the resistance...;"

-“If Castro has initiated a suitable war-like act...pressures should be escalated to the maximum immediately rather than gradually.”

April 17, 1963: 198-10004-10012 Paul Nitze

Memo from ASD/ISA for the Chairman, JCS, Subject: Contingency Planning for Cuba. Nitze requests a JCS response, by May 20, to (a) contingencies that might flow from a *spontaneous revolt* in Cuba, and (2) contingencies in response to *a revolt that is incited by the U.S.*, or in response to *a contrived incident which will provide an opportunity to overthrow Castro.*

April 22, 1963: 202-10002-10007 JCS

JCS 2304/184, dated April 22, 1963, considers what course the U.S. military should follow in the event of a spontaneous revolt in Cuba. A cover sheet makes clear that its provisions were approved at a May 6, 1963 meeting of the Joint Chiefs, and states that **JCS 2304/184 was forwarded to SECDEF via a Chairman, JCS letter dated May 10, 1963 (JCSM-358-63).** Summarizing the contents of the attached JCS study, **paragraph 9 of Maxwell Taylor’s letter reads “...the Joint Chiefs of Staff have concluded that the United States should be prepared to support any spontaneous revolt in Cuba showing a reasonable promise of success.”** The most revealing highlight of the study is this passage on page 17 (para 21): **“It might prove desirable, under some circumstances, to apply the full force and power envisioned in CINCLANT OPLANS 312 and 316.”** Other, amplifying highlights include these basic U.S. capabilities, starting from a normal deployment posture:

- can execute air strikes in
- 12-72 hours;
- can deploy unconven-

tional warfare assets to staging areas within 8 days ready for infiltration into Cuba;

- can reinstitute a quarantine in 72 hours;
- can undertake a full-scale invasion of Cuba in 18 days.

May 1, 1963: 202-10002-10018

JCS

JCS 2304/189 states that it is written in response to a request from the Chairman, JCS to provide comment and recommendation concerning the requirements for and the desirability of fomenting a revolt in Cuba, giving consideration to the advantage of engineering an incident as an alternate cause for invasion. Highlights of this document follow:

- “The United States should intervene militarily in Cuba and could (a) engineer provocative incidents ostensibly perpetrated by the Castro regime, or (b) foment a revolt in Cuba;”
- “Engineered provocations would provide greater advantages in control, timing, simplicity, and security than would a fomented revolt;”
- “The United States should initiate a coordinated program to create a pretext for overt U.S. military intervention in Cuba,” ...and should “at a propitious time, launch appropriate military action to remove the Castro government.”
- “The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that military intervention will be required in order to achieve our national objectives...it could be accomplished without serious risk of general war...or of military action by Soviet forces outside Cuba;”
- “The engineering of provocative incidents could progress from minor to

major, increase in number, occur in different locations and pose a rising threat to the security of the United States and Latin America;”

-“Fomenting a genuine, widespread and effective revolt in Cuba would require a difficult, long term and carefully coordinated effort;”

-“The United States should initiate a coordinated program to create a pretext for overt U.S. military intervention in Cuba;”

-In Enclosure B, a Memorandum for the Secretary of the Army (in his capacity as Executive Agent of the Department of Defense for Cuba Policy), an Appendix discusses possible pretexts in detail (recommending many of the same pretexts found in the “Northwoods” Case File discussed above) and repeats the JCS preference for engineered pretexts as a *casus belli* over the difficult prospects involved in fomenting a widespread revolt . The concept, in summary, is that “U. S. manufactured provocations could be evolved as the prelude to the execution of OPLANs 312 and 316.”

A CINCLANT timetable is discussed (with summarized excerpts provided below) which would have a U.S.-engineered Cuban invasion occurring before the 1964 Presidential election:

-execute CINCLANT OPLAN 380-63 about Jan 15, 1964, and in doing so, commence UW, establish guerilla bases, and accelerate subversive activities;

-goal is to establish a Free Cuban Government (FCG) by July 15, 1964 (no matter how precarious) which asks for U.S. assistance;

-mobilize U.S. forces for conventional operations about July 15, 1964 following the FCG request;

-execute OPLAN 312 (air strike) on July 26, 1964;

-execute OPLAN 316 (invasion) about August 3, 1964;

-a Cuban government compatible with the aims of the OAS and friendly to the U.S. should be established by Oct 1, 1964.

-Last page of the document is dated October 4, 1963 and reads **“JCS 2304/189 is withdrawn from consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in light of JCS 2304/194-1-9123/3100 (29 May)”**

May 6, 1963: 202-10002-10079

Col. Pollock
(Joint Staff J-5)

**Briefing Sheet for the Chairman,
JCS on a report to be considered at the JCS Meeting on May 6, 1963 (JCS 2304/189).** [The document this briefing sheet summarizes is discussed above.]

The document begins by saying “...the Chairman, JCS, requested, inter alia, that a separate study be undertaken of the requirements for and desirability of fomenting a revolt in Cuba, giving consideration to the advantage of engineering an incident as an alternate cause for invasion.”

Highlights follow:

-“An effective spontaneous revolt in Cuba is not considered likely at this time;”

-“There appears to be little likelihood that the Castro communist regime will risk a direct provocation that could be used as a pretext for U.S. intervention;”

-“The engineering of a major incident or series of incidents as a sole cause for invasion is not advisable at this time. However, plans for fabricated provocations either alone or in conjunction with a contrived revolt, should be developed by appropriate governmental agencies;”

-“A small and well managed revolt would be the best course of action to adopt if the United States should decide to contrive a pretext for U.S. military actions in Cuba.”

-Discusses a draft memo for SECDEF which recommends that he "Seek a national policy decision to undertake a carefully coordinated, flexibly phased effort to contrive a revolution in Cuba in order to supplant the Castro communist regime," and that he "Arrange for the DOD (JCS) to participate in all planning for this effort, and, at an appropriate time in the execution thereof, to assume responsibility for the operations."

June 8, 1963: 198-10004-10007

Lt Col Patchell Memorandum for Mr. Califano, Subject: Comments on Fourth Draft of State-Defense Paper on U.S. Assistance to Revolt in Cuba. The author offers the following comments to Mr. Califano:

-“Paper is not a contingency plan--it is a “sexy scenario” written in a discussional vein;”

-“To the casual reader, the paper appears to be a scenario for the overthrow of the Cuban government. In fact it is a discussion of U.S. response to an initiative which may never mature;”

“...it is obvious that this paper is going to end up as an outright confrontation between JCS and State (with ISA siding with State)--I would not want to give it the blessing of Mr. Vance’s nod of approval.” A revealing highlight from the attached draft paper follows:

-“the JCS point out that “the best U.S. military response to the revolt would be the orderly implementation of CINCLANT OPLANS 312-316.’ Under the present circumstances, however, 18 days are required to put U.S. armed forces in the requisite state of readiness fully to implement these plans--probably far too late to be of any help in most situations envisaged in this paper.”

June 22, 1963: 202-10002-10014	SACSA	<p>Memorandum for Chairman, JCS from Major General V. Krulak, Subject: "Proposed Covert Policy and Integrated Program of Action Toward Cuba." Highlights follow:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> -the memo forwards a CIA memo proposing a program of hit-and-run raids against Cuba; -the memo requests that at the next meeting of the Standing Group, Maxwell Taylor request CIA provide to the DOD a summary of CIA requirements for military support of its approved sabotage raid program. <p>In the forwarded CIA program memo, one quote reads: "This program is based on the assumption that current U.S. policy does not contemplate outright military intervention in Cuba or a provocation which can be used as a pretext for an invasion of Cuba by United States military forces." Its author goes on to state "the ultimate objective of this policy would be to encourage dissident elements in the military and other power centers of the regime to bring about the eventual liquidation of the Castro/Communist entourage and the elimination of the Soviet presence in Cuba."</p>
July 19, 1963: 198-10004-10005	A. M. Haig	<p>Although the RIF lists the document as a 7/19/63 memo from Alexander Haig to CAPT Zumwalt, that memo only provides basic approval for the substantial memo written by Wolfe and Zumwalt on July 16, 1963 which summarizes a DOD study on the adequacy of U. S. policy toward Cuba. In this memo, the authors lay out 4 different foreign policy tracks on Cuba which might be followed by the U.S. government.</p>
Sep 26, 1963: 198-10004-10001	State/DOD	<p>An undated Memo for the Chairman, JCS from Cyrus Vance forwards a</p>

joint State-Defense Paper titled: “Draft State-Defense Contingency Plan for a Coup in Cuba,” and asks for JCS comments by October 21, 1963. The Vance letter states that different contingency plans are required for each of these four variants of revolt: a military coup; a military revolt which does not neutralize the top leadership; an insurgency movement; and a mass uprising. *The letter forwards to Maxwell Taylor a joint State-DOD plan for the military coup variant only.* The letter states that draft plans for other types of revolt will follow. The concept is introduced of inserting a special CIA, DOD and State team into Cuba upon the onset of a military coup, to evaluate its likelihood of success, and follow with recommendations to the President regarding level of U.S. support required.

Sep 30, 1963: 198-10004-10009

Paul Nitze

Memo from Paul Nitze to Secretary of the Army Vance forwards a draft “State-Defense Contingency Plan for a Coup in Cuba,” along with a cover memo for Secretary Vance to sign in forwarding that draft to the Chairman, JCS. Attached to the Nitze letter is a **memo for Mr. Vance from A. M. Haig**, also dated September 30, 1963, which originally forwarded the Nitze memo, the draft memo from Vance to Maxwell Taylor, and the Draft Contingency Plan. Haig’s memo to Vance indicates **the product forwarded is the 13th draft of a U. S. Plan of action in the event of a military coup in Cuba.** The text of the Nitze and Haig memos make clear that they were forwarding the documents discussed above, namely Record Number 198-10004-10001.

October 21, 1963: 198-10004-10004

Chairman, JCS Memo for SECDEF from Chairman, JCS providing comments on Draft

State-Defense Contingency Plan for a Coup in Cuba as requested by a memo from the Secretary of the Army dated October 1, 1963 (see above two entries). In this memo, which General Taylor and the Chiefs send directly to Secretary of Defense McNamara (instead of to Cyrus Vance, the Secretary's Executive Agent for Cuban Affairs, and the person who asked for a JCS response by October 21), General Taylor makes the following comments:

- The Chiefs reaffirm their view that a coup is unlikely to occur at this time in Cuba;
- The Chiefs express serious reservations with regard to the probable effectiveness of the insertion of the "special team;"
- The Chiefs state that the U. S. would have a moral obligation to intervene (militarily) in Cuba irrespective of the report of the "special team;"
- The Chiefs support the view in the draft paper that the U.S. would commence to position forces to implement OPLANS 312 and 316 as soon as the decision is made to introduce the "special team" into Cuba, noting that this provision would reduce reaction time required for overt military support after a Presidential decision is made to intervene;
- Conclusion: while holding reservations, the Chiefs conclude the 13th draft of the Contingency Plan is "militarily feasible."

(Note: A bold line is scratched diagonally across the front page of the two-page memo--could this mean that it was not sent to McNamara, even though date stamped? See Record Number 202-10002-10116, dated Dec 4, 1963, below).

- Nov 23, 1963: 202-10002-10084 **JCS DCOS-OPS** Memo from Major General Unger to Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff the day after President Kennedy's assassination provides **a list of briefing items for President Johnson**, as follows:
- JCS Emergency Action Procedures (EAP) and Continuity of Operations of the Organization of Joint Chiefs of Staff (COOP-OJCS);
 - Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP);
 - Access to Berlin;
 - U. S. Contingency Plans for Operations in Cuba* and Rules of Engagement for U. S. Forces in the Cuban Area.
- Dec 4, 1963: 202-10002-10116 **JCS** **JCS 2304/205-2, Draft State-Defense Plan for a Coup in Cuba.** This document circulates two documents for information:
- Memo for SECDEF from Cyrus Vance, Subj: "A Contingency Plan for a Coup in Cuba," dated 30 November 1963, which states the JCS find the Contingency Plan militarily feasible, and requests formal DOD approval of the plan from McNamara so that detailed planning within the government can commence;
 - Memo for U.Alexis Johnson (State) from Cyrus Vance, Subj: "A Contingency Plan for a Coup in Cuba," dated 30 November 1963, which states the JCS consider the plan militarily feasible, and requests that Johnson obtain the formal approval of Secretary of State Dean Rusk and DCI John McCone. **The Vance memo to SECDEF summarizes the Chiefs' principal criticisms expressed in the Taylor letter to SECDEF of October 21, 1963.**
- The existing version of the Contingency Plan is appended to the memo from Vance to Johnson in JCS 2304/205-2, for reading purposes of those on the

distribution list.

Dec 11, 1963: 198-10004-10011

Army

This **memo** from Colonel Albro, Director of Foreign Intelligence (ACSI-CX), to Mr. Joseph Califano, **Subj: Training of Cuban Refugees in Nicaragua**, forwards 4 separate documents related to the subject matter, as follows:

- DA Form 586, dated Nov 1, 1963;
- Memo for the Record (Army), undated, about events of November 19, 1963;
- Memo from Brigadier General Charles Denholm, Acting ACOS for Intelligence (Army), to Mr. Joseph Califano, dated Nov 19, 1963;
- Undated Memo for the Record written by Dorothe K. Matlack, Chief, Exploitation Section.

The basic memo of December 11, 1963 contains the following information:

-Various anti-Castro

Cuban leaders were reported by the press in Nicaragua to be visiting Nicaragua in July and August, 1963;

-Following investigation at the request of the CIA, Army intelligence in Nicaragua reported, in response to a query, that there was "no indication" that retired Army Chief of Mission (for Nicaragua) Colonel Thomas McPhail--visiting Nicaragua at the time--was in any way involved in the training of Cuban refugees in Nicaragua;

-An Army intelligence report of Nov 1, 1963 (attached) indicated that **anti-Castro leader Manuel Artime had been personally attempting to get former members of the Bay of Pigs Brigade, who were now members of the Cuban Inductee Program (i.e., in the U. S. Army), to resign from the U. S. Army and go with him to a**

revolutionary training camp in Nicaragua;

-Para 5 states: "Mr. Robert

Kennedy did confer on 17 Nov 63 with Manuel ARTIME Buesa, Roberto SAN ROMAN aka Roberto Perez SAN ROMAN, Jose SAN ROMAN aka Jose Perez SAN ROMAN, and Enrique Jose RUIZ William Alfert. They were scheduled to meet with Mr. Robert Kennedy on either 21 or 22 November 1963."

Dec 19, 1963: 202-10002-10010

Earle Wheeler Memorandum for the Record about Meeting with the President on Cuba, 1100 hrs, 19 Dec 1963. The memorandum is selectively quoted as follows:

-LBJ was most interested in pursuing economic denial actions against Cuba;

-Desmond Fitzgerald of the CIA stated in response to questioning that "exploitation of Cuban military disaffection is a long term undertaking.

While there are disaffected Cuban military men in important posts, they have not, to date, made any contacts with each other nor formed any sort of group;"

-“During the discussion on sabotage and harrassment, the President expressed his reluctance to undertake high risk actions at this time for two reasons:”

-attempts to work with

OAS against Cuba might be jeopardized;

-Soviets are watching

closely, and high risk violent actions might influence unfavorably the success of our efforts to achieve further reductions in Soviet military personnel in Cuba.

Dec 26, 1963: 202-1098-10086

Maxwell Taylor

Memo for General Clifton forwards an agenda (submitted at the President's

request) for the JCS meeting with the President scheduled for Dec 30, 1963.

The agenda items appear to be administrative issues (*i.e.*, budetary and procurement matters), rather than policy discussions or military contingency discussions.

Jan 31, 1964: 202-10002-10117

JCS

Memo to SECDEF from JCS, Subj: A Contingency Plan for a Coup in Cuba, which forwards a memo of the same date from JCS to CINCLANT directing him to **develop a separate contingency plan to support a coup in Cuba within the context of conditions in an attached proposal developed jointly by State, DOD, and CIA.** Highlights of the proposal are:

- ideal scenario is for coup leaders, with prior knowledge and concurrence of CIA, to establish a provisional government and request U.S. assistance;
- if U.S. had prior knowledge of coup, up to 48 hours would be required to insert a joint (CIA, State, and DOD) "special team" into Cuba to evaluate situation and make recommendation as to U.S. action;
- U.S. intervention would be based on either a pre-arranged call for help from the Provisional government, or an unexpected call for help from insurrectionists after a coup had started without U.S. concurrence;
- coup should appear to have some chance of success to merit U.S. support;
- "U.S. does not contemplate either a premeditated full scale invasion of Cuba (except in the case of Soviet intervention or the reintroduction of offensive weapons) or the contrivance of a provocation which could be used as a pretext for such action;"*
- if Soviet military forces take any action to quell a coup, the U.S. would

immediately implement OPLANs 312 (air strike) and 316 (full scale invasion);

- U.S. forces would begin moving logistically into position to enforce a blockade, and to implement OPLANs 312 and 316 upon insertion of the “special team” to evaluate the coup in Cuba;
- upon agreement of the President, instruct the coup leaders to declare a provisional govt, and request U.S. and OAS assistance to provide justification for a blockade;
- blockade designed to discourage Soviet action inside Cuba, and immobilize Cuban Navy and Air Force;
- U. S. will selectively implement portions or all of OPLANs 312 and 316 as required to ensure success of the coup.*

-A copy of Cyrus R. Vance’s Dec 30, 1963 letter to the Chairman, JCS is enclosed at the end of the document; this letter forwards the final, approved version of “A Contingency Plan for a Coup in Cuba” (developed jointly by representatives of State and Defense, in coordination with the CIA, and approved by the Secretaries of State and Defense, and by the DCI) to the Chairman, JCS, and states that the plan “...has been revised to reflect generally the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.” This document forwarded by the Vance letter of December 30, 1963 is the same document discussed above. It appears to be the final, consensus product of the U.S. government regarding what to do about the “Cuba problem” in the post-Missile Crisis environment, and its contents reveal that **the unilateral, overt military intervention (air strikes followed by invasion) recommended as a national policy by the Chiefs in the spring of 1962 [per the Northwoods document], and again recommended by the Chiefs in May of 1963 [per JCS 2304/189],**

has been soundly rejected by the other members of the ICCCA.