

DRAFT MEMORANDUM

Revised

January 22, 1996

To: Jeremy Gunn
cc: Dennis Quinn

From: Doug Horne

Subject: Proposed Interview Questions for Robert McNamara

In response to our meeting of January 4, 1995 the following are proposed questions for the Review Board's possible Robert McNamara interview:

AUTOPSY:

-While at Bethesda, did you communicate any orders or desires from the 17th floor suite to the morgue regarding conduct of the autopsy?

-If so, were any restrictions placed on the autopsy?

-If so, what were the nature of the restrictions?

-If so, what were the motivations for those restrictions?

-While at Bethesda, did you witness any others place restrictions on the autopsy?

-If so, who gave those directions?

-If so, what were those restrictions or desires?

-If so, are you aware of the motivations for those restrictions or desires?

-Are you acquainted with a Dr. Robert Livingston?

-If so, did you know him in 1963? In what capacity?

-Can you give us any indication as to his character/judgment?

-Has he ever discussed the JFK autopsy with you? In what regard? Did he ever mention calling Dr. Humes prior to the start of the autopsy?

REINTERMENT:

-The official MDW log of the JFK 1967 Reinterment indicates that you arrived at Arlington National Cemetery with Robert Kennedy. Did he have in his possession a small wooden box about one foot square? Did he have any container of any kind with him upon arrival at Arlington?

-Can you identify the wooden box sitting on the ground in the Cecil Stoughton

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reinterment photos?

-Do you have any knowledge of what happened to the missing Deed of Gift materials (i.e., President Kennedy's brain, paraffin blocks of tissue and tissue slides)?

DEFCON:

-Did you issue any orders changing DEFCON following the assassination? (McNamara claims in his book that he placed the military on alert after the assassination, but does not specify what changes in DEFCON took place, or how the decision was made, or whether he made it himself in advance of any changes to alert status, or approved it after-the-fact.)

-Are you aware of others (i.e., Assistant Defense Secretaries or high-ranking Senior Officers) changing DEFCON in the immediate aftermath of the assassination?

-Are you aware of any changes to DEFCON which occurred immediately before the assassination?

-Did you discuss DEFCON changes (in any context) with President Johnson in the immediate aftermath of the assassination?

-Did President Johnson order any changes to DEFCON during the 7-10 days following the assassination?

-Did President Johnson express to you any concern about the possibility of nuclear war with the USSR as a result of the assassination, or about increased risk of war with the USSR or Cuba as a result of the assassination?

CUBA:

-Did you perceive a change in Cuba policy in the immediate aftermath of President Kennedy's assassination?

-If so, how soon did you notice evidence of a policy shift?

-If so, what was the nature of the policy shift? Was it documented?

-If so, who directed or lobbied for the changes? (The President, NSC civilian advisors, or members of the Joint Chiefs?)

VIETNAM:

-Did you perceive a change in Vietnam policy in the immediate aftermath of President Kennedy's assassination?

-If so, what were the changes?

-If so, how soon after the assassination were these changes implemented?

-If so, who directed or lobbied for the changes? (The President, NSC civilian advisors,

or members of the Joint Chiefs?)

-If so, were the changes documented?

-Did you have any input to prior to drafting, or review subsequent to its drafting, and/or suggest any changes to, McGeorge Bundy's November 21, 1963 draft of NSAM 273? (The draft NSAM was sent by McGeorge Bundy to his brother, Deputy Asst. SECDEF William Bundy--DOD representative on Southeast Asia Task force--on November 21, 1963 for review, suggesting that William Bundy check with Robert McNamara regarding its contents prior to President Kennedy's scheduled meeting with recalled South Vietnam Ambassador Lodge on Sunday, November 24th.)

-Did you have knowledge of the process by which changes were made in the November 21, 1963 draft prior to signature of the smooth document on November 26, 1963? (McGeorge Bundy has told Professor John Newman that he considers changes that were made to the November 21st draft to be escalatory, and Newman agrees.)

-To what extent was the McNamara-Taylor Report of October 2, 1963 written "in-country" by you, General Taylor and your staff while in South Vietnam, and to what extent was it written/reviewed "back-channel" in Washington? (Supposedly, General Krulak never actually departed on the trip and he and the Joint Staff assisted in its drafting, and in its chop with the White House--via Robert Kennedy--and in electronic transmission of large segments of it back to the "in-country" team so that upon arrival in Washington, the report would reflect the President's wishes; i.e., no recommendation for a coup against Diem, but a planned, phased withdrawal plan for U.S. troops.)

-Is it true that the plan to withdraw 1000 men from South Vietnam in 1963 was removed from the McNamara-Taylor report prior to its submission to the President on October 2, 1963, but that it was reinserted in the text at the President's insistence after he met with you and General Taylor on that date? (William Sullivan of DOS claims he insisted on the removal of this passage before the team left Vietnam, and that under his threat of submitting a minority report, McNamara and Taylor agreed to its removal; Newman claims that the passage on the 1000-man 1963 withdrawal is absent from the draft of the McNamara-Taylor report as it existed during the Honolulu stop enroute Washington, and that it was reinserted on October 2, 1963 after the President so directed following a meeting with McNamara and Taylor.)

-Did President Kennedy ever confide in you his definite intention to pull U.S. forces out of Vietnam? (On May 6, 1963 at the Eighth SECDEF conference in Honolulu, McNamara directed that the military accelerate withdrawal planning in general, and draw up concrete plans to withdraw 1000 U.S. troops by the end of 1963. By this time, Kennedy had received quite negative reports on the war effort in Vietnam from Senator Mansfield, Roger Hilsman of State and NSC staff member Michael Forrestal. Some historians have speculated that although JFK confided no withdrawal intentions to Dean Rusk, that he almost certainly did so to McNamara, as evidenced by McNamara's first mention of withdrawal planning to the Joint Chiefs in April, 1962--and by his direct orders to the JCS to bring

home 1000 men by year's end in May of 1963. In his new book, McNamara says he is sure that President Kennedy would have withdrawn from Vietnam, but is vague about why he feels so sure about JFK's intentions.)

ASSASSINATION PLOTS/PLANNING:

-Were you ever privy to discussions involving assassination (or possible assassination, to include contingency planning) of any foreign leaders? If so, which foreign leaders?

-Did you ever propose, formally or informally, that any foreign leader(s) be assassinated, or that consideration be given to assassination of any foreign leaders? If so, which foreign leaders or officials were considered for assassination, and to whom did you propose it and in what setting and context? (Reference reported August 10, 1962 conversation with CIA director McCone.)

-Did you ever discuss assassination of foreign leaders or officials with President Kennedy, Robert Kennedy, or Lyndon Johnson? If so, when, and which leaders were considered as targets?