

## MEMORANDUM

To: Review Board  
From: Jeremy Gunn and A&R Staff  
Date: May 3, 2017  
Re: Possible Questions to Pose to CIA During Mexico City Briefing

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***Overarching question: what issues does the Agency really care about?*** The Agency's policy has been, for years, to keep classified all of the information we are discussing today. Nevertheless, we are now operating under a new statute that presumes disclosure. It is thus important for the Agency to make very clear what the *real* issues are as opposed to its general policy position.

### I. Location of CIA stations

1. There is no secret that CIA has stations all over the world. Some prominent CIA officials have themselves disclosed their service at certain stations. What significant harm would result from acknowledging in official documents (some of which are more than thirty years old) that which is already well known?
2. Are there particular stations where there might be heightened sensitivity about their existence? If so, which stations are they and why is there a heightened sensitivity?
3. If we assume that the name of a particular station will be postponed, what substitute language might be possible? For example, might the Board describe a particular redaction as: "Name of CIA station redacted" or "CIA presence"?

### II. Surveillance Methods

1. The CIA has acknowledged that it has transcripts of telephone conversations from Mexico City. Given that this is acknowledged publicly, what need is there to protect information regarding what some might see as the obvious *technical* means by which the conversations came to be recorded?
2. To the extent that some information relating to sensitive surveillance should be protected, what substitute language could be used to describe the surveillance without revealing important sensitive information?

3. Why are commonly known surveillance methods still being protected?

### III. Numbers and Crypts that reveal internal operating procedures

During CIA's early years -- including the 1960s -- the Agency employed a crypt system using a digraph (two letters, *e.g.*, JM, KU, AM, etc.) that identified a country, project, agent, or entity, followed by a word taken randomly from the dictionary (*e.g.*, AMLASH, JMWAVE, etc.).

1. Does the Agency employ the same digraph system today that it employed in the 1960s? Given that this crypt system is very well known, does the Agency have any objection to releasing the digraphs that are contained in its assassination records? What harm would result from releasing all of the digraphs?
2. What need is there in the 1990s to protect a crypt for an operation from the 1960s?
3. For each crypt: when was the last time the crypt was used?
4. *File numbers.* Why do the file numbers in those documents we are examining need to be postponed? Why are they sensitive? Could part of the file number be released?
5. *Slug lines.* Why is it that a crypt that is released in a document is not released in the slug line? What additional information is contained in the fact that the crypt is in the slug line?
6. *Crypts for agents.* Given that the purpose of crypts is to *disguise* information, why cannot at least the disguise be revealed? After all, the crypts are not identifying individuals. What substitute language might be used?
7. Of those agents whose crypts are at issue, which individuals might still be in danger?

### IV. Names of CIA officers

1. Which officers' names are in greatest need of protection? Does any identified officer now live in a foreign country? Would any be at risk? Are former officers genuinely at risk? How dangerous is it *in the 1990s* -- as opposed to the 1970s and 80s for present and former CIA officers.

2. *Protecting State Cover for CIA officers.* It is well known and undisputed that CIA officers typically operate under State cover. Given that this arrangement is well known and undisputed, what additional reason could there be for protecting a State cover in the specific 30-year-old cases we are reviewing here?

## V. Pseudonyms

1. When the true name of the officer is a matter of public record (*e.g.*, David Atlee Phillips, Richard Helms, Anne Goodpasture), what are the specific reasons for protecting the pseudonyms?

2. Why protect pseudonyms at all? Pseudonyms are not the same as releasing the true name.

3. When (or if) there is a good reason for protecting the pseudonym (*see* question 1) in cases where the true name is known, could the true name be used in substitute language?

## VI. General description of source

1. What substitute language might be used to describe sensitive liaison issues? How could the public be informed generally without disclosing still-sensitive issues?

## VII. Crypts for US government entities

See issue III above.

1. Many of the crypts for US government entities have been disclosed in the popular press. Why cannot they now be released in documents?

2. Is there any reason that the identity of the US government entity cannot be provided in substitute language?