

March 28, 1995 *Investigation of the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy, Appendix to Hearings Before the U.S. House: Select Committee on Assassinations of the U.S. House of Representatives, 95th Congress, Second Session, VOLUME XI, March 1979*

Secret Service Performance

Cast of Characters:

1. Junior Counsel on the Warren Commission in charge of topic "Presidential Protection" is Samuel A. Stern
2. Liason for Warren Commission with the Secret Service is Inspector Thomas Kelley.
3. Presidential advance man: Jerry Bruno (received formal notice of Texas trip from Kenneth O'Donnell on October 21, 1963). HSCA summary continues: On September 26, 1963 Dallas Morning News carried a story stating that JFK would be in Texas on November 21 and 22, 1963. (JZ: on what day did Oswald get on the bus for Mexico?)
4. Walter Jenkins: LBJ's right-hand man
5. Gerald Behn: special agent in charge (SAIC) of the White House detail of the Secret Service
6. Forrest Sorrels: SAIC of the Dallas field office (drove the entire route on Nov. 18 with Lawson). Rode in the lead car of the motorcade
7. Bob Stuart: Special Agent of the Dallas office
8. Winston G. Lawson: special agent from White House detail (did not identify who selected the turn on Elm Street). Lawson says only the Main St. route had been chosen by Nov. 14. Said Sorrels obligation to watch windows was greater than his. Lawson was riding in the lead car in front of the limosine; Lawson maintained radio contact with Chief of Police Jesse Curry about schedule and motorcade speed.
9. Jack Puterbaugh: advance man serving Democratic Committee and the White House
10. Bill Moyers: Department Director of the Peace Corps. Moyers coordinated the President's visit to Texas from Austin. Ordered the bubbletop off the limosine because it was not raining.
11. Elizabeth Harris: Moyers' Dallas representative; and associate of Moyers' in the Peace Corps. (Moyers insisted that the motorcade route be printed in the newspapers). Again, following orders from Moyers, Harris approached Sorrels about the bubbletop and together they had special agents remove it (526)
12. Robert Strauss, associate of Connally's
13. Sam Bloom: Dallas advertising man in charge of publicity for Connally
Moyers said he was aware of security implications of printing route and had discussed this with Secret Service agent in Dallas. (520)
14. George Lumpkin: assistant police chief in Dallas in 1963; consulted by Secret Service about motorcade aspect of security planning. Lumpkin said Industrial Blvd had winos and broken pavement; there would have been no crowds, and JFK wanted exposure
15. Roy Kellerman: special agent in charge of the Texas trip (523). Rode in the right front seat of the Presidential limosine. (529) Said there were motorcycles on each side of the rear wheel of the

limo.WCR does not press Kellerman on this point.

16. Floyd Boring, Assistant Chief of SS White House detail
17. John Joe Howlett, local SS agent in Dallas, working with Sorrels
18. Robert I. Bouck, SAIC of PRS
19. James Rowley, overall Chief of the Secret Service
20. Jesse Curry: Dallas Chief of Police
21. Perdue W. Lawrence: Dallas Police Department Captain: in charge of traffic control as of Nov. 19. On Nov. 20, he discussed motorcycle escorts with Lunday and Batchelor. No SS present at this meeting, where all decided to use 18 cycles, some to be alongside the limo.
22. R.H. Lunday: Deputy Chief, Dallas Police Dept. Lawrence's supervisor. Lunday: Head of the Traffic Division
23. Charles Batchelor, Assistant Chief, Dallas Police Dept. Lunday's supervisor.
24. Stevenson, Deputy Chief DPD
25. Fisher, Deputy Chief, DPD
26. Souter, Captain, DPD
27. King, Captain, DPD
28. Sawyer, Inspector, DPD
29. David Grant, SS agent
30. Marion L. Baker: Motorcycle officer riding to the right rear of the limo.Says SS did change original DPD plan for motorcycles escort. Says his sergeant told him not to ride directly next to JFK but to fall behind the limo. Baker received this instruction 5 or 10 minutes before the motorcade left Love Field. His sergeant also told Baker to fall in beyond the press car. Baker was on Houston St. at the first shot.
31. Billy Joe Martin: DPD motorcycle officer assigned to ride to left and rear. Says JFK told him not to stay in close formation immediately to the rear of the limo.Says he was 5 feet to the left and 6-8 feet to the rear of the left bumper. Hargis was on his right as they turned onto Elm Street
32. Bobby W. Hargis: DPD motorcycle officer assigned to ride to the left and rear of the limo. Says he was right next to Mrs. Kennedy at the first shot.
33. Clyde A. Haygood: DPD Motorcycle officer assigned to the right rear of the limo. Offered no explanation for riding several cars behind the limo. He was on Main Street at the time of the shooting.
34. Fritz: Captain (Chief of DPD Homicide)

Topic: Politics and Presidential Protection: The Motorcade
Staff Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations U. S. House of Representatives,
Ninety-Fifth Congress, Second Session, March, 1979

begins on p. 505

p. 508: JZ: some discrepancy on Main Street: the summary states that if motorcade had been traveling from west to east (an option if the women's building rather than the Trade Mart had been chosen), there would not have been a slowing down because the car would proceed directly east on Main Street. Summary also states that Mrs. Kennedy would have been on JFK's left thereby blocking the view of the two gunmen.

1. Laura has book by Robert Blakey: says taking Main Street would entail driving through an unattractive neighborhood, so the route to Trade Mart had to take Elm Street. Despite maps, Elm and Main Street do not merge. Main Street route west of Dealey Plaza would have meant the route would go through a bad area.(Note: p. 521: SAIC Forrest Sorrels says he chose the Main-Houston-Elm route as the most direct route to the Trade Mart)

On another topic: TCU decided not to award JFK an honorary degree. Decision not to award was November 1, 1963.

On Secret Service Methods: p. 517: reference to Secret Service standard operating procedure: (issue: special agent from WH detail advances the president's trip by traveling to the proposed site of visit.

Dallas Times Herald published motorcade route on Wednesday, Nov. 20, 1963 in the afternoon. Dallas Morning News published route on Thursday morning.

According to Eizabeth Harris, SA Lawson and Curry were working on getting a fix on the known troublemakers(521)

Lawson recalled that the route was published on Nov. 19, 1963.

.(522) Shortcomings in the way Samuel Stern questioned Sorrels; not enough information on logistics of choosing the motorcade route and logistics. Stern asked why expressway was approached from Elm Street instead of Main Street at western end of Dealey Plaza

Sorrels: 1. Size and cumbersomeness of the motorcade

2. Raised divider separated Main Street lane from Elm Street lane at the foot of the ramp up to the expressway

BOTH OF THESE POINTS KEPT SORRELS FROM DIRECTING THE ROUTE ON MAIN STRET

STERN DID NOT MAKE IT CLEAR IN HIS QUESTIONS THAT IT WAS POSSIBLE TO GET TO THE TRADE MART WITHOUT ENTERING THE ELM STREET RAMP.

Motorcade could have taken Main Street to Industrial Blvd to the Trade Mart

Start on p. 522: The Protective Research Section

HSCA reviewed the functions of the PRS: meant to function both as repository of information about threats to the security of protectees AND as a provider of such information to agents in all types of assignments. It acquired and made available information received from its own agents and from other sources (JZ: what other sources?)

Process:

In 1963, Info from any outside source to local SS office "was relayed by the local office of PRS headquarters in Washington". (JZ: this is a quotation; should "of" be to?)

(523)HSCA criticizes WC: leaves out description of how threat information was processed and analyzed by PRS and of how its results of analysis were communicated to local field offices. Lawson's testimony suggested that Washington, D.C. office would normally send info. about Presidential trips within that city; PRS seldom provided advance agents with threat information before their departure. (JZ: This bit seems quite careless; how does PRS convey its information? And to whom? On a timely basis?)

Kellerman traveling with JFK so he was not involved in active investigation in Dallas concerning evidence of threats

SS SOP (523): SS procedure required an inquiry to be made of the PRS about one week before a trip was assigned. So Kellerman says he received assignment on Nov. 17 and by custom a check with PRS was made on Nov. 10, 1963 (JZ: the way this is worded is confusing: if Kellerman was given the assignment on Nov 17, how could he check with PRS on Nov. 10?) Kellerman did not know who made the check: either Behn, Boring, or an unnamed agent. Kellerman said he received no information , AND HE CONSIDERED THIS 'UNUSUAL.'" (523)

Contrast Kellerman with Lawson, who knew his role in the Dallas trip no later than Nov. 8, nine days before Kellerman. Kellerman was Lawson's superior. Kellerman had overall responsibility for the trip.

Nov. 8: Lawson checked with PRS at Executive Office Building, learned that there were no active subjects in Dallas area, and "that no JFK file existed." (523). Lawson was in contact with Sorrels and John Joe Howlett in Dallas by Nov. 13. Discussing PRS investigations of local anti-JFK suspects

Kellerman knew nothing of local right-wing individuals and extremist groups

Kellerman said he did not know of an investigation of a threat submitted to the SS by the FBI circa Nov. 21, 22. Kellerman said that it was strange (his word) that there was no information about local suspects in Dallas and nothing had been given to him. This despite the A. Stevenson incident in October 1963.in Dallas.

See SS final report for the Nov. 21 trip to Houston: this report mentions 2 active suspects who had made threats. Kellerman was not questioned about Houston.

Kellerman is important because he had access to JFK and could have relayed information about threats directly, was sealed off from the information he needed.

On Nov. 21, FBI was interested in KKK suspect. Dallas field office FBI James Hosty informed the local SS of a handbill accusing JFK of being a traitor(524). Dallas police could not track the handbill, and neither could the SS.

Lawson says the responsibility for any investigation is not his but Sorrels' or PRS

SS SOP: would not require Lawson to receive information only from the local office. He could get info. From Washington PRS as well.

SS SOP: for White House detail: advance agents and field office SAIC were to become familiar with the entire threat profile before contacting local police. (524)

Lawson White House detail agent: said his job was limited to shift work and advances: he was not encouraged to engage in investigations of threats at the local level

Lawson on SS SOP: On PRS: When Prs received information about a threat from local agent or White House detail agent making an advance, the subject was given a file number. "In the old days,' files consisted of a folder containing 3 by 5 cards and PRS had the job of coordinating what were called 'collateral' investigations in the same or an adjacent district." (524) Lawson did not receive information from other regions.

Gerald Behn said PRS was the focus of protective operations; any threats were relayed directly to PRS from local office before being referred to Chief of White House detail.

The SAIC of the White House detail received field reports only from White House detail advance agents

Behn did not recall if Prs sent info to Lawson about Oct 1963 heckling of A. Stevenson, nor could Behn recall any information distributed on Edwin Walker: no one in PRS passed it on. Behn did not warn about these two.

© Physical Protection Along the Motorcade Route

SS defined the role of the Dallas Police

In addition to PRS functions Police also did the following:

Arrangements for traffic control

Follow up for each policeman after motorcade passed him

Assigning officers to all over and under passes

SS did not give DPD a checklist regarding crowd observation. This was not procedure for SS

Officers were placed on top of buildings at Love Field landing site (525), but there was no check of offices in buildings in the area.

(526)SS SOP: criteria for checking buildings along a motorcade route:

- 1) Presidential inaugurations
- 2) Visits by a king or president from a foreign country
- 3) when motorcade route has been known for years

Guideline may have been violated by Sorrels and Lawson regarding a familiar motorcade route.

Sorrels said same route had been used by FDR in 1936.

SS SOP: Lawson says SS knows to watch all windows; he did not give a specific instruction to do so.

(527) SS agent says JFK wants motorcycles behind him so they can move up, but not alongside the limo. Quotations from testimony offer discrepancies about whether SS input caused reduction in number of motorcycles or in their position, while the numbers stayed the same. DPD Lawrence suggests that SS wanted the number reduced: that 4 near the limo was too many.

(528) Lawson said JFK did not want motorcycles alongside the limo because they were loud and interfered with conversations in the car.. Lawson did not recall any changes at the SS -DPD coordinating meetings of Nov. 21. Lawson stated that motorcycles behind the limo could move up alongside if the crowd pushed forward too far. (529) This point was lost because the motorcycle policemen had been instructed to fall so far back, even behind the press car. They offered no protection at all.

(529) The deployment of motorcycles in Dallas by the SS was surprisingly even "uniquely" insecure. (Quotation) Report on Houston visit lists several more plus more cycles to police the intersections. Nothing on motorcycles in Ft. Worth report.

(529) Lawson also refused to insert a DPD squad car with homicide dets. Behind the VP's car.. This did not nec.depart from SOP : only in New York was a homicide car a part of motorcades.

Lawson specified the number of cars in the motorcade and their order. At a meeting on Nov. 14, 1963 with Sorrels and Curry, Curry understood that Capt. Fritz would be in a car behind the VP. Sorrels said nothing had been done on that at a meeting Nov. 21.. Lawson said car full of SS agents follows the VP, they want a police car in the rear of the motorcade.

Lawson rejected any responsibility for any discussion of the homicide car: either its inclusion or exclusion.

Leads:

1. Secret Service Final Survey Report (Presidential visit of Nov. 21, 1963 to Houston, Texas), Mar. 19, 1978, HSCA, p. 7(JFK document No. 014979).
2. Secret Service Final Survey Report (Presidential visit of Nov. 22, 1963, to Ft. Worth, Texas), Mar. 19, 1978, HSCA, p. 3 (JFK document no. 014980).
3. Winston G. Lawson, special Secret Service agent from White House detail: On PRS procedues, Lawson commented on files consisting of a folder containing 3 by 5 cards of each threat. Each threat subject had a file number. Prs had the job of coordinating collateral investigations in the same or an adjacent district. (524)

NOTES ON TESTIMONY BY INSPECTOR THOMAS J. KELLEY, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR OF PROTECTIVE OPERATIONS IN WASHINGTON, D.C. INHOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE VOLUME NO. 3, 323-356

(325) Kelley: not conducting a criminal conspiracy investigation but to find out what had happened and what the role of the SecretService had been. With Forrest Sorrels, Kelley sat in on the second interrogation of Oswald.. Kelley conducted four interviews with Oswald. Kelley wanted to know if Oswald was the assassin; whether he had accomplices; whether there were problems that Secret Service might be facing with the assassination of other people. Kelley says too many people were in on the interrogation controlled by Capt. Fritz of the Dallas police.

(326) Kelley asked Oswald if he killed President Kennedy. If he had not done it, say so. Oswald said the Kelley that he would talk to him later on. SS had personal interviews with Marine Oswald to gather infoirmation on Lee's background.. "There was a great deal of information coming to us in the Dallas office at that time from the other agencies who had information on Oswald. The FBI had information on him....The Dallas police had some information on him and the State Department had some information on himin connection with his trips to Russia. The military was supplying information to our headquarters and it was being provided to me at Dallas."

(327) Kelley: Secret Service had nothing in its files about Oswald before the assassination. The SS prepared a series of documents on Oswald background. Kelley did not ask field offices to conduct investigations of suspects who might have had a connection with Oswald.. PRS was coordinating information coming from other agencies and sending it to Kelley in Dallas. SS conducted investigation into source of the rifle in Chicago.

On SS agents out drinking the night before: Kelley: they were not in violation of any SS rules warranting any action- only poor judgment. The inquiry indicated this night out had no bearing on performance the following day in Dallas.

(328) None of the agents were in delection of duty. Kelley never talked with driver of the limo. Kelley says the general instructions are to drive safely and to get President away from dangerous situations. Driver had no formal training in evasive driving. The special agent in charge of the White House detail had been removed and demotted. That agen was not at Dallas. He had selected agents agents and had made arrangements for the trip.

(329) Kelley: this agent's performance was normal. In response to counsel's question about what field offices were turning up, Kelley says there were reports of Oswald being sighted in various cities especially New Orleans. Counsel brings up FPCC and Kelley says this came out of New Orleans. One of the SS agents had interviewed Marina Oswald shortly after the assassination. She said she was a strong Castro supporter.. Kelley said that before the assassination, SS had investigations going on concerning groups that had threatened the President. Kelley says this in response to counsel's question about SS awareness of Cuban organizations. (JZ: note that SS is not necessarily put onto the Cuba track by the FBI, but SS had previously investigated Cubans before the assassination. Are FBI Cuban groups/individuals different from SS targets of investigation preassassination?) Kelley had not made any specific requests about Cuban groups.

(330) Counsel mentions report of agent in Chicago regarding specific threat by Cubans there.. Kelley was aware of this investigation when he was in Dallas but filed no report on it.. Miami reports on Cuban activity connected to Chicago activity. Miami interesting to SS because of Kennedy's visits to Florida., preassassination. In Miama investigation the name Quentin Pina Machado was mentioned, and Kelley said this came up in information on pro and anti Castro groups. Counsel refers to an exhibit? JFKF-419, a report saying that if there is any international conspiracy involving Castro that Machado would be involved with carrying out Fidel's orders. Kelley says SS did not make special investigation of this point. Says both FBI and CIA were investigating this. SS was exchanging info. With these two agencies regarding Machado and Cuban radicals. In Miami area.

(331) counsel asks Kelley if he knew of any other possible conspiracies. Kelley responds that there were white rightist groups, John Birch Society, and KKK Several other people reviewed all the reports including Sorrels and the head of the PRS. SS does not gather intelligence but only evaluates intelligence. So according to Kelley the SS is dependent on other agencies to supply information.. Kelley says that probably two or three days after he arrived in Dallas, he received instructions about FBI taking over the investigation of a conspiracy. Kelley arrived in Dallas on the evening of Nov. 22. Kelley says FBI takes over on the 24th or 25th.

(332) Counsel asks Kelley if he made a point of alerting the FBI to specific areas the SS had been focusing on, i.e. Cubans in Miami and Chicago. Kelley says no he did not draw attention of the FBI to

this. Jim Malley was Kelle's counterpart from the FBI in the Dallas office.. Kelley had no plan to determine whether there was a conspiracy.. PRS would looked into connections between Chicago Cubans and Dallas.. Bob Bouck is head of PRS. This line of questioning stops here. Counsel asks aboutliason with FBI. SS was supplying info to FBI on Marina, they had not seen this before SS gave it to them. Kelley says he personally talked with Malley. People were approaching SS off the streets. (333) Agent Patterson had talked with an FBI agent regarding some top secret info on Oswald that could only be exchanged at the Washingotn level.. This agent said (the FBI) agent had had contact with Marina ten days before the assassination. Agent James P. Hosty. Kelley never learned wht the top secret information was.. Kelley thought it was about Oswald having visited Russia. Kelley never discussed this with Malley.. Kelley learned independently that Hosty was Oswald's "control agent." Kelley never heard about the Hosty note until he read about it in the press a year before the 1979 hearings.. FBI gave Kelley info about Oswald. That Oswald had contact with Carlos Bringuir a member of Cuban groups DRE. In this connection Kelley was asked if SS developed anything about a plot. Kelley says nothing was developed.

(334)Counsel asks Kelley if he knew that Castro had given a speech on September 7, 1963 indicating that he knew of CIA plots to kill Castro.. Kelley knew this and knew that Castro intended to respond in kind. Kelley only learned of this after he returned to Washington from Dallas..

Next Kelley's responsibilities vis a vis the Warren Commission: to assist the WC to furnish information SS had in connection with the assassination. Who determined what was supplied to the WC. Kelley : says Rankin requested what he wanted."I would make the determination as to what information I thought the Commission would want from it.. " If WC heard of something that SS might have from some other source, they would ask for it. If SS had it they would give it to the WC. If not, they would say so.. SS had documents describing what they had done in Dallas, all information that had come into Dallas office while Kelley was there. All reports and statements made by the people which were involved.. And SS gave more to WC in response to requests.. Kelley made no additional suggestions to the WC about other areas to investigate.

(335) Kelley discussed conspiracies with staff of WC, stemming from threats that SS had preassassination.. Kelley discussed with staff info from field offices, presumably from Chicago and New Orleans.. SS supplied them with all the reports that we thought were pertinent to the assassination! (I.e. not all of their eports.)

Next: questions on motorcade and securing buildings.. SS supplied WC with SS procures. Kelley investigated and determined what things on the motorcade route should be examined.. Kelley says empty warehouses or partially occupied warehouses were targets to examine by SS. End of this questioning. Counsel goes on to ask about Joseph Milteer Kelley explains this was part of investigation of members of KKK and white rightists. One of whom had made a threat against JFK. Threat was from Miami and mentioned rifle fired from high building.(336) SS response to this threat was to communicate with the FBI which was continuing to keep track of these organizations. SS had received other threats similar to this one throughout the year. Counsel says this threat was specific: Nov. 18, 1963 and it would be an attempt to assassinate JFK with a rifle from a high building.. Counsel asks if SS made an effort to check the buildings Kelley responds,"What ever effort was made was a request by the advance man with the Dallas police to see what they could do about a route

survey." SS resources were extremely limited, depended on local police. "I don't know specifically what the Dallas police were asked to do or what they did on the survey route." Kelley says there was an advance report suggesting that the Dallas Police do certain things (JZ: where is this report?). Counsel asks Kelley if he reviewed the Performance of the advance agents with consideration of the Milteer threat. Whether or not the advance agents knew about ? Kelley this try of threat would go from SS PRS to White House detail. Kelley says WH detail received this information but Kelley says he does not know what they did with it. So this points the finger at Behn, Lawson, and Kellerman. Kelley does not know personally whether these WH detail men were aware of this particular threat.. Next Counsel asks about series of reports designated Cuban Plot to Assassinate the President files identified as JFK-F414 through JFK-F418, investigation lasting from November 1962 to August 1963. Kelley has reviewed these reports Summary by Kelley: Cuban activity in the Miami area. Resulted from interception (Kelley does not say who intercepted these letters) to an address in Miami. Letters contained threats to JFK. SS asked for info from FBI, what did FBI know about the people involved. Letters were mailed from Havana Cuba. Investigation established that the person who mailed the letters was authentic. Kelley thought that the letters were sent to be intercepted. Had SS made connection between earlier and later mentions of Quentin Pino Machado. Kelley says no connection between this investigation in Miami and the assassination in Dallas. Kelley says WC staff followed up SS leads in Miami. Next Ford from Tennessee questions Kelley: on performance of agents in Dealey Plaza responding to gunfire. Kelley says he thought about it. Agents told Kelley they did not realize they were under fire until they saw that JFK was so badly wounded.. Kelley: agents were trained to look at the crowd. Ford: what training did the agents receive?. Kelley: training in how to handle a crowd and how to attempt to keep themselves between danger and the President's body, recognition of gunfire. Mr. Ford then says that Mr. Maurice Martineau, the special agent in charge of the Chicago field office testified that before the assassination the field offices did not call on other Federal agencies for assistance.. Ford wants to know why SS did not ask other agencies for assistance on these threats. Kelley says that SS called on local police. There was restriction on SS calling on FBI for physical protection. SS could ask any government agency for intelligence. SS could get bodies if it thought necessary to do so.

(339) Kelley says SS did not have enough resources nor the kinds of people and training they needed to perform protective function. SS Chicago office determined whether Alex Hidell had purchased a rifle from Klein's Sporting Goods Store. FBI agents had preceded them on that point. In the beginning, the FBI and the SS were investigating jointly. Kelley: "The rifle had been identified as having been used, the alcohol and tobacco people had identified it as having been purchased in Chicago by Oswald using his alias of Hidell. SS got that info and Kelley asked SS agent in Chicago to verify it. FBI did the same thing. (JZ: implies that neither agency trusted the ATF to come up with accurate information). Ford: did Kelley recommend to WC that they should focus on conspiracies which SS at one time was concerned about?. Kelley : we were looking at entire range of possibilities. Ford: there were significant questions about Oswald's connections with Castro's government and the Cuban groups in the US. Kelley was aware of Oswald's trip to Mexico after the assassination. Also aware of Oswald's activities in Dallas with the FPCC. No indication of connection between Oswald and radical groups among the Cubans except FPCC

(340) Ford asks Kelley why he did not review all SS files and supply more to the WC. Kelley: SS supplied everything that was pertinent, anything they asked for, and anything that we, in our opinion, thought would be interesting to them. SS held nothing back.. Ford asks Kelley if he thought FBI focused on Oswald and ignored conspiracy investigations. Much of the info about the Cubans was coming from the FBI. SS and FBI in Miami were exchanging info and at hdqrs regarding plots. PRS reviewed assassination investigation done by field offices. Considered plots that came to PRS attention directly or through the agency or through the CIA..

(341) Kelley had decided what files should be given to the Warren Com.. SS group made no recommendations to the WC regarding their work on conspiracies. The head of PRS said he had no knowledge of Castro's direct to JFK. Kelley: SS did not consider investigating pro-Castro supporters. SS only looked at threats made against the President. FBI dealt with domestic security. After the ass. All PRS files were reviewed. They were looking for info that would lead them to Oswald. FBI took over the investigation after Dec. 9. SS did not turn over their intelligence files to the FBI. Kelley: info on the Cuban conspiracies and Cuban groups was the same info that the FBI had. SS got info from FBI not the other way around. Bureau had not thought SS was concerned with this info. (JZ: this is rather confusing, no sign of SS threats in FBI records I've seen)

(342) SS did not go through Cuban files for purpose of investigation of pro-Cuban groups. SS did look through them for connection to Oswald. Even though Marina made statement about Castro and even though SS learned about Castro's statement, SS did not investigate. SS only looks at direct threats because of lack of resources.. Machado was known to the SS before the assassination. As someone who associated with someone who had threatened JFK. SS did not supply file on Machado with to WC Kelley says WC did receive file on Machado "That report had a file number on it reflecting that there was a great deal more information in the Secret Service files on this particular situation." (JZ: make a note of this system of file numbering). Kelley refers to this group of papers as F-415. Kelley can not be sure if F 415 ever got to the WC. But SS can say that report on Machado containing the same file number as this information did go to WC so WC had access to this information.. Kelley says the WC did investigate Cubans in Miami.

(343) Kelley says SS did not give WC JFK F-415 through F-418 but did give WC information concerning these plots in Secret Service Report No. 206 that was sent to the WC, and this is in the commission file mentioning Quentin Machado, containing the file number under which these reports are filed.. In 1963, these docs were considered by the SS to be secret. They were not given to the WC, not because they were considered secret since other secret documents had been given to the WC. So why were these documents not given to WC. Kelley did not think Cuban plot was a concern to the WC. Miami info. Had nothing to do with Oswald.. WC was looking at Oswald connection to pro-Castro groups. WC had same info from FBI and CIA. WC people may have come to SS to review this info since they had a referenced file, knowing that SS had info on these plots. But SS did not transmit these files to WC.. So SS gave WC a file number; did this indicate to WC what the file number referred to?. SS sent WC Memorandum 206 would have told WC what file numbers referred to. (JZ: consider photocopying this page 342-343)

(344) Ford says a member of FPCC is alleged to be part of a plot to Kill JFK. Anything in SS files about this group?. Kelley says not in this report which is only about Machado. This report is 2 pages.

Kelley was aware that Oswald was part of FPCC after the ass..

Stokes asks if performance of agents was evaluated. Kelley: activity of the night before had no bearing on their performance or on the assassination. On Zapruder film, shows that agents could not have come up to the limo in time.

(345) Stokes: notes quick reaction of Gov Connally. Kelley says no quick reaction by Kellerman. In VP car Youngblood reacts immediately. Agents react when Motorcade moves out after the hit..

Kellerman said let's get out after the third shot. On issue of agents the night before, Kelley defends them saying they went to get something to eat.. Investigation of that incident was done by another inspector. Stokes says it was 2 AM before they left..(346) Kelley says it did not affect their performance.. Stokes asks if SS checked higher buildings. Kelley: says SS had to rely on local authorities for route survey. SS asks local police what buildings are not occupied.. Police might put people in buildings; then police ask for cooperation of people in buildings to alert them to strangers. No review in occupied buildings. Kelley in 1963, not enough agents to put in buildings. Mr. Devine: finds out that Kelley started with SS in July 1942. Kelley was an inspector at the time of the ass.. Notes that ass. Of Pres is now a Federal crime.

(347) Kelley says that relations with FBI were satisfactory. Devine asks about decision to publish the motorcade route. Kelley it is done by President's staff. Can SS veto this? Kelley says SS can make suggestions one way or the other. If motorcade is political it will be published.. In 1963, says Kelley, SS had no right to veto or not publish motorcade.. Now SS operates by persuasion.

(348) SS lacked funds for enough people

(349) Kelley describes especially dangerous situations for Pres. That SS cannot fully protect. Talks about loners: can not always know who they are in advance.; should Pres be required to use bubbletop car? Kelley he probably would not want it.. SS followed recs of the WC regarding exchange of information among agencies

(350) amount of info from FBI has been cut down recently because of new boundaries FOIA and Privacy Act Kelley does not think it nec. For SS to have its own motorcycles or crowd control people; can rely on local police for that

(351) Kelley does not know who decided whether to use the bubbletop. Bubbletop is a deterrent. McKinney wants to know why SS men were not standing at the rear of the car holding grips. Kelley says JFK did not want them there. (JZ: note that McKinney refers to briefing books supplied to members of the current committee) evidence that Kelley was present during Capt Fritz's interviews with Oswald. Why were these not taped? Kelley: Dallas police did not have a tape recorder. Kelley did not have one with him. Kelley did not feel he had a right to insist on the use of a tape recorder. Kelley was a guest of the Dallas police and Captain Fritz was handling it. Kelley did not know until later that the interview was not recorded.

(352) Kelley on Oswald's comments: Said he was a Communist but not a Marxist. Kelley wanted to know if Oswald was the assassin. Oswald said he would talk to Kelley later. Mr. Edgar asks Kelley if he was the first SS agent to talk with Oswald. Kelley said Kelley was the first. And that Oswald had not encountered any other SS agents outside the Texas Book Depository. Kelley says, "We did not have any agents there." Edgar refers to his briefing book which says that SS was put in charge of protection for Marina. Kelley selected the people and supervised this part. Kelley had several

discussions with Marina through a Russian speaking SS agent Gopadze. Marina was afraid of being attacked by the government without being specific

(353) was there ever a meeting where all investigative agencies met together to pursue a specific plan. Kelley says no. Kelley says he talked with Malley about what was coming into SS from the streets or field offices.. FBI took over the invest. And everyone understood that. On contingency plans: Kelley says the only plan is to get out of danger.. Procedure: agents to surround the Pres. If in a vehicle; vehicle moved out. In 1963, there had been no practice in getting out of situations; not so sophisticated about handling emergencies.. Kelley blames all this on lack of resources and never on his own casual planning.

(354) Kelley: in 1963, agents did have instructions on where to stand if the car stops and where to go when the car is moving. In 1963, agents had no particular training in identifying different types of gunshots. They were trained in the use of firearms.. Mr. Sawyer surprised that no policeman was stationed at the grassy knoll area. (Before this comment, I should add that Kelley was extremely defensive about the slow reaction time of the agents in the motorcade and refused to tolerate any more questions about the 7 or 8 seconds during which Connally reacted but the agents just sat.

(355) Kelley's comment about the grassy knoll. First there were several dangerous areas like that along the parade route. There were some police in the area. "There was nobody on the grassy knoll. There were some police in the area of Dealey Plaza as it went into the underpass." Kelley: SS did not fail in its pre-ass investigation. SS had no info on Oswald; other agencies had info on him.. Can not predict when a loner will become an assassin. Cannot totally protect the Pres.

(356) Kelley complains that SS is receiving much less info from FBI.(JZ: is this not an ironic ending? Kelley wants more clandestine info from FBI, an activity Congress told them to stop it, i.e. clandestine spying. All the clandestine spying had not prevented sharing of info from SS to FBI no connection between Oswald and the Cubans.)

TESTIMONY OF THOMAS KELLEY VOL III

pp. 323-329 organizational chart of Secret Service (Nov. 1963); circumstances of Kelley's interrogation of Oswald; Secret Service had no prior information on Oswald; agents drinking the night before the assassination did not violate any rules; driver of President's limousine had no formal training in evasive driving

pp. 329-337 threats received by Secret Service prior to the assassination involved Chicago Cubans, Cubans in Miami, and white right-wing groups; Secret Service evaluates intelligence gathered by other agencies; Secret Service in charge of interrogating Marina Oswald; Secret Service decided there was no plot to kill the President; Secret Service policy on supplying information to Warren Commission; Secret Service made no connection between Milteer threat, Cuban threat, and Oswald

pp. 337-350 performance of agents at the moment of the assassination; FBI did not focus on Cuban conspiracy developed by Secret Service; according to Kelley, Secret Service did not hold anything back from the Warren Commission regarding Cuban threats; Secret Service policy on building checks along a motorcade route; Secret Service lacked resources for adequate protection;

dangers of loners and nuts

pp. 350-356 President Kennedy did not want agents riding the back of the limosine; bubbletop not placed on the limosine in Dallas; lack of tape recording from Oswald interviews in Dallas Police station; Oswald claimed to be a Communist but not a Marxist; no Secret Service agents at the School Book Depository; Zapruder film showing reactions of agents; because of FOIA and Privacy Act Secret Service does not receive as much information from the FBI as it used to.

Thomas Kelley's remarks describe the performance of the Secret Service before, during, and after the assassination of President Kennedy. Pre-assassination activity in 1963 consisted of two major areas: Evaluating specific threats to the President and preparing an advance report for a route survey to be conducted by the Dallas Police Department. According to Kelley, President Kennedy's frequent visits to Florida created a special interest in threats coming from the Cuban community in Miami as well as possible conspiracies among white right-wing groups. Although the Secret Service was aware of specific threats from Joseph Milteer and the possibility of an attempt on the President from Machado, the Secret Service did not necessarily disseminate this information throughout the White House detail. Kelley gives the impression that the Secret Service is a passive agency: it receives but does not generate intelligence; Kelley was, as he put it, a guest in the Dallas Police Dept, and therefore not in a position to insist on a tape recording of Oswald's remarks. The Secret Service did not point the FBI in the direction of following up on the Cuban leads it had after the FBI took over the investigation. The Secret Service lacked resources and had to rely not only on the local police department but also people who worked in buildings along a parade route to alert the Service to suspicious activity. In Kelley's view, the Secret Service could not be blamed for the assassination. The fact that agents scheduled to protect the President were drinking the night before did not affect events in Dealey Plaza. Finally, the Secret Service can not protect the President from loners who suddenly decide to become assassins. Given the passivity of the Secret Service, its failure to disseminate information it had obtained on specific threats, and its refusal to take responsibility for any failure in protecting the President, it is ironic that Kelley would conclude his remarks before the HSCA by bemoaning the negative implications of the FOIA. Implying that the FBI should continue to supply the Service with information on subversive groups when that very information had remained hidden from its own agents in charge of the President's protection