

MEMORANDUM

March 19, 1998

To: Carol Keeley
Chief, Historical and Executive Review Unit

From: Laura Denk

Subject: Standards for FCI Review in “Segregated Collection”

I enjoyed talking to you, LuAnn Wilkins, and Carl Valentine yesterday to discuss the standards for FCI review in the HSCA Subject files (the FBI’s “segregated collection.”) I am enclosing a revised draft of the standards that we discussed. As I mentioned to you yesterday, I anticipate that Jeremy Gunn will be able to review the standards tomorrow or Monday, and I hope to be able to finalize them next week.

Please give me a call if you have any additional thoughts or comments about the draft standards. Thanks, as always, for your help.

STANDARDS for FCI REVIEW in FBI's "SEGREGATED COLLECTION"

From the Review Board's "Guidelines for Review of the Segregated Collection:"

It is presumed that the FBI will, at least partially, carry over its post-appeal standards for disclosing FCI activities targeting Communist-bloc nations. To the extent that the HSCA subjects reflect "FCI" activities against other nations that have not been addressed by the Review Board in the "core" files, the FBI will be allowed to redact direct discussion of such activities, unless the information in the proposed redaction meaningfully contributes to the understanding of the assassination.

Counterintelligence Against Communist Bloc

- (1) General Rule: release all information
- (2) Specific Issues
 - (a) **classified symbol numbers for technical sources (ELSUR)**
 - (i) postpone entire symbol number until 2017
 - (ii) substitute language "source symbol number"
 - (b) **information about technical sources**
 - (i) release general information regarding techs on "hostile" embassies
 - (ii) release information received from techs on "hostile" embassies, including transcripts
 - (iii) may refer to Engineering Section any specific, technical information regarding installation, equipment, location, transmittal, routing of ELSUR
 - (c) **human sources in foreign counterintelligence (assets)**
 - (i) may be appropriate to postpone
 - (ii) evaluate on case by case basis as w/other informants, but allow FBI more room to postpone
 - (d) **other classified file numbers**
 - (i) release UNLESS FBI provides particularly good evidence for protecting (burden on FBI)
 - (e) **information that reveals an investigative interest**
 - (i) release information that reveals only an investigative interest in "hostile"

foreign establishments or personnel, without revealing a specific “source or method”

- (A) example: case captions: release FCI-R, FCI-Cuba, FCI-Czechoslovakia, FCI-Poland, etc. . .
- (B) example -- checking of the Diplomatic List or other publicly available sources

(f) **misc.**

- (i) almost everything on Solo
- (ii) code names Sam Survey, Viaduct, Tumbleweed

Counterintelligence Against Other Countries

- (1) General Rule: the FBI may redact direct discussion of FCI activities against countries not previously considered by the Review Board, but only if the information in the proposed redaction does not meaningfully contribute to the understanding of the assassination.
 - (a) all postponed material in records that are closely related to the assassination will be submitted to the Review Board
 - (b) the following standards apply ONLY to material that does not meaningfully contribute to the understanding of the assassination
- (2) Specific Issues
 - (a) **classified symbol numbers for technical sources (ELSUR)**
 - (i) postpone entire symbol number until 2017
 - (ii) substitute language “source symbol number”
 - (b) **information about technical sources**
 - (i) release as much information as possible (paying particular attention to releasing the substance of a document), but protect the country that is the target of the FBI’s surveillance UNLESS the tech. is of heightened public interest
 - (ii) again, may refer to Engineering Section any specific, technical information regarding installation, equipment, location, transmittal, routing of ELSUR
 - (c) **human sources in foreign counterintelligence (assets)**
 - (i) may be appropriate to postpone
 - (ii) evaluate on case by case basis as with domestic informants, but allow FBI more room to postpone; Carl will fill out “FCI Postponement Evidence Form” if it is a difficult issue
 - (d) **other classified file numbers**
 - (i) protect UNLESS the subject of the file is of heightened public interest
 - (e) **information that reveals an investigative interest**
 - (i) AS A GENERAL RULE, protect information that reveals only an investigative interest in foreign establishments or personnel UNLESS the country or person at issue is of heightened public interest