

## Memorandum

TO: Jeremy Gunn  
FROM: Eric Scheinkopf  
DATE: March 29, 1995  
RE: Items of interest in Allen Dulles biography, Gentleman Spy  
FILE NUMBER: 4.0.2 Dulles

The following items were found during my reading of Allen Dulles' biography. I believe them to be of interest in suggesting possible lines of inquiry for the A&R staff to pursue.

On pages 495-6, there is a discussion of a March 17, 1960 meeting convened by President Eisenhower of 13 top advisors, including Allen Dulles, on a comprehensive action program against the Castro regime. This was not a full NSC meeting as Peter Grose, the book's author, says that Eisenhower did not like to talk about covert intelligence operations with the full NSC. While there is no available record of anything being said about assassination to the President at this time, there is a line and a half deletion in what Allen Dulles said during the meeting. According to Mr. Grose, even if the deleted line had not mentioned even a suggestion of "radical" or "executive" actions, Mr. Dulles' language was many times so "circumspect" that if one was not familiar with his means of communication one would not understand what he really meant.

On pages 500-506 the CIA's efforts to assassinate Patrice Lumumba are discussed. The CIA officer who brought the poison to the Congo to kill Lumumba was Sidney Gottlieb who is identified in the Church Report under the pseudonym Joseph Schneider.

On page 535, there is a discussion about the internal investigation Allen Dulles asked the CIA's IG at the time, Lyman Kirkpatrick, to make about CIA's handling of the Bay of Pigs operation. Some in CIA believe that Kirkpatrick's bitterness at not moving higher in the agency influenced his judgment in producing the report which was even more critical of CIA personnel than the inquiry JFK asked Maxwell Taylor to conduct. The discussion of the Kirkpatrick report ends by noting that despite retired officers lawsuits, the CIA still refused to release it to the public 33 years later.

On page 542, Grose notes that Senator Richard Russell "had been privy, probably beyond any other member of the Senate, Johnson included, to the most secret of Allen's CIA operations." This man was one person to whom Dulles would confide in as a means of securing congressional authorization for actions CIA wanted to undertake. Grose speculates that if anyone on the Hill knew about efforts to kill Castro, Russell would. Russell's papers, I believe, merit an examination by the ARRB.

On page 544, Grose says that while on the Warren Commission, Dulles "systematically" acted to keep the Commission from pursuing lines of inquiry that might expose CIA operations even if these operations had no relation to the murders in Dallas. In addition, Dulles "pressed," even before any evidence was reviewed, for a final verdict that Oswald was a "crazed lone gunman" and not part of any national or international conspiracy. Dulles wanted the panel to confine its work to reviewing the investigation already being done by the FBI.

On page 546, Grose recounts remarks Dulles made to other members of the Commission that the President of the U.S. was the only person to whom a true intelligence professional could reveal all information he had and only if

asked. As Grose puts it in paraphrasing Dulles, "a responsible spymaster would confide in no one else."

On page 547, Grose discusses Dulles' role of liaison between the Commission and the CIA. On March 20, 1964 he met with a representative of the clandestine services and said he would not have any difficulty in assuring the Warren Commission that up to the time he left the CIA in November 1961 "as far as [I] could remember [I] had never had any knowledge of Oswald at any time prior to the date of the assassination." However, as Grose points out there is no reason why the DCI would bother knowing the names of agents within a network and Oswald returned to the US after Dulles was dismissed as DCI. Another fact of interest is that the names of the members of Helms DDP staff who met with Dulles were deleted when the records of his talks with them were declassified in 1993.

On pages 560-561 Grose notes that when Dulles agreed to be interviewed for an oral history for the JFK library, he mixed up names, places and times to such a degree that the transcript was kept locked up long after the others were made available to scholars and the public.

FILE NAME (dulles.wpd)