
**DRAFTS of “Brief Overviews” for
Final Report, Chapter 6, As Indicated
August 5, 1998**

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A 2. Military records. [Brief Overview] Members of the public have long wondered whether the Marine Corps conducted a post-assassination investigation of Lee Harvey Oswald, circa late 1963 and early 1964, and produced a written report that has not yet been seen. Similarly, many have wondered whether ONI conducted a post-defection, “damage control assessment” investigation of Lee Harvey Oswald, circa 1959 or 1960. (Some evidence exists for both, based on human recollection.¹) Some have wondered whether Oswald was an “authentic” defector, or part of a false defector program run by an agency of the U.S. government, or a false defector sent on a mission to the USSR for one particular purpose, and then used for different purposes by some members of the intelligence community following his return to the United States.²

B. Records on Cuba. [Brief Overview] It was first publicly alleged by journalists in 1967, and then publicly revealed during the Senate’s Church Committee hearings during the mid-1970s, that the U.S. government had sponsored assassination attempts at various times against Fidel Castro. Castro, of course, presumably knew about many of these attempts long

¹In Volume 11 of the HSCA report, a section was written that attempted to deal with allegations of a possible military investigation of Oswald by the Marine Corps following the assassination; also, some former USMC associates of Oswald have told researchers that they recall civilian investigators asking questions about Oswald following his defection in late 1959 or early 1960.

²Author Anthony Summers writes in his book *Conspiracy* that former CIA official Victor Marchetti told him in a 1978 interview that ONI ran a “fake” defector program, run out of Nag’s Head, South Carolina, in which three dozen, maybe forty, young men were trained to appear to be disenchanting, disillusioned youths who had rejected the West and wanted to see what communism was about—hence their defection, to see how the USSR and Eastern Bloc treated defectors, and to study USSR and KGB methods of recruitment, and “doubling.”

before the U.S. public, and many historians and researchers have wondered whether he retaliated by assassinating President Kennedy. The Review Board sought to find records that would illuminate a slightly different but related area of interest, namely, the degree of U.S. sponsorship of potential uprisings and military coups within Cuba, and possible U.S. plans to invade Cuba with overt military force; i.e, the armed forces of the United States. If found and opened, the Board felt that such records would be of interest not only to mainstream historians, but also to many who feel there was a conspiracy to kill President Kennedy--for example, evidence of serious, or imminent, contingency plans to invade Cuba with U.S. military forces during the Kennedy administration, if found, could provide either a motive for retaliation by Castro, or a motive for domestic malcontents who may have been extremely displeased that such plans were not being carried out by the administration. It was clear that all sides interested in Cuba policy following Castro's rise to power, or in the Kennedy administration's foreign policy, would be very interested in any records the Review Board could find that would illuminate U.S. government policy deliberations on Cuba. Furthermore, accused assassin Lee Harvey Oswald's connection with the Fair Play for Cuba Committee makes a search for any records on U.S. Cuba policy relevant to the assassination. The degree to which U.S. policy toward Cuba following President Kennedy's assassination may (or may not) have changed was another reason for searching for such records, for any such records would surely enhance the historical understanding, or context, of the assassination.

C. Records on Vietnam. [Brief Overview] The debate among historians continues over whether President Kennedy would have escalated U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War had he lived, or whether he would have lessened involvement and even withdrawn. The Review Board, therefore, sought to locate any records that would illuminate this debate, and similarly illuminate any differences in Vietnam policy (if any) between the Kennedy administration's mid-and late 1963 policy, and the Johnson administration's 1964 policy in Vietnam. Much of the interest here, as in the case of the Review Board's search for Cuba records, is in enhancing the historical understanding, or context, of the assassination. Individual citizens who study the documents found will determine for themselves whether they are

directly relevant to the assassination, or not.

D. 4. U.S. Military and Department of Defense. [Brief Overview]

Attempts were made to find records of the following Senior Agency Officials: Secretary of Defense McNamara (because of his direct and daily involvement in Cuba and Vietnam policy), and Rear Admiral Rufus Taylor, Director of Naval Intelligence (because of an affidavit--uncovered during the Review Board's work with the Navy--he provided to Defense Secretary McNamara dated September 21, 1964, certifying under oath that Lee Harvey Oswald was never utilized as an agent or informant for the Office of Naval Intelligence). The Review Board located about 40 records from the files of Defense Secretary McNamara (record series "195") considered relevant to Cuba or Vietnam policy; ONI could not locate any files of Rear Admiral Rufus Taylor.

F. Defectors. [Brief Overview] Because the Warren Commission and HSCA were interested in studying whether Lee Harvey Oswald was treated by the Soviets the same as other defectors to the Soviet Union, both upon his entry into and his exit from that country, and because many assassination researchers are equally interested in studying whether the U.S. government treated Oswald the same upon his return to the United States as other returning U.S. defectors, this topic is of interest to virtually everyone who studies the assassination of President Kennedy.

J.1. Staff examinations of versions of the Zapruder film designated as "in-camera" original, and first-generation copies.

An ARRB staff member was asked by the Head of Research and Analysis to examine the Zapruder films at NARA designated as the original and two Secret Service copies (believed to be first-generation copies), and record observations made about the characteristics of these films. The purpose was twofold: to record observations that could be used later by others who could not obtain physical access to these films, and also to determine whether there was merit in proceeding with examinations by Kodak. Two memos produced as a result were written by staff member Doug Horne, and are dated August 2, 1996, and April 9, 1997, respectively.

Subsequently, what apparently is the third first-generation copy made on 11/22/63 was located in the possession of the LMH Co., during the ARRB staff's inspection of the LMH Co. inventory in the company of Jamie Silverberg. A third memo recording the circumstances of the discovery of this item, also written by Doug Horne, is dated April 15, 1997.

O. 4. Army. The Review Board's two primary concerns with Army records were: (1) to open the counterintelligence files at the Investigative Records Repository (IRR) at Fort Meade; and (2) to determine whether Army intelligence units had any regular protection responsibilities for the President as part and parcel of their normal duties circa 1963. The Review Board's first Military Records Team Leader, Mr. Tim Wray (a retired Army Colonel and history instructor at West Point), instituted a series of interviews with individuals who had been in Texas military intelligence units in 1962 and 1963, and wrote a memo titled "Army Intelligence in Dallas," dated February 21, 1997, addressing the second question above. The details of INSCOM's counterintelligence collection at IRR is discussed below.

O.5. White House Communications Agency (WHCA).

WHCA was, and is, responsible for maintaining both secure (encrypted) and unsecure (open) telephone, radio, and telex communication between the President and the government of the United States. Most of the personnel that constitute this elite agency are U.S. military communications specialists, many, in 1963, from the Army Signal Corps. On November 22, 1963, WHCA was responsible for communications to and from Air Force One and Two, the White House Situation Room, the mobile White House, and with the Secret Service in the motorcade.

R. Medical Evidence. [Brief Overview] In the minds of many, the medical evidence in the assassination of President Kennedy, in concert with the ballistics evidence and film recordings of the events in Dealey Plaza, is the most important documentation in the case, as indeed it would be in any homicide. Since there were arguably more apparent discrepancies and ambiguities in the medical evidence of President Kennedy's assassination than in the film or ballistics areas, and since Congressman Stokes, former Chair of the House Select Committee on Assassinations, had encouraged the

Review Board to look into any perceived irregularities or ambiguities in the medical evidence, the Review Board focused on this area much more than film or ballistics evidence. Published below in its entirety is the Staff Medical Report released with the Review Board's medical documents on July 31, 1998.

R. 2. Additional autopsy records. Numerous leads were received from members of the public quite knowledgeable of the assassination's medical issues, regarding possible sources of additional autopsy records beyond those already produced by the Navy and the U.S. Secret Service. Some of the results of the Review Board's attempts to pursue these leads are provided below.

R. e. Gary Aguilar. Dr. Gary Aguilar of San Francisco was kind enough to provide an audiotape of his 1994 telephonic interviews with Dr. James J. Humes and Dr. "J" Thornton Boswell, the two Navy prosecutors at President Kennedy's autopsy. He also provided suggested lines of questioning to the Review Board staff prior to its depositions of the Bethesda prosecutors.

R. f. David Mantik. Dr. David Mantik of Rancho Mirage, CA provided extensive information to the Review Board staff regarding his study of the President Kennedy's cranial x-rays. In addition, he also provided proposed questions in advance of depositions of the Bethesda prosecutors.

R. g. Kathleen Cunningham. LPN Kathleen Cunningham provided extensive research leads into HSCA and Warren Commission testimony prior to the Review Board's depositions of the Bethesda prosecutors.

R. h. Randy Robertson. Dr. Randy Robertson provided detailed information to the Review Board about both his analysis of President Kennedy's cranial x-rays, and about research leads in Warren Commission and HSCA testimony.

R. i. David Lifton. At the request of the Review Board General

Counsel, Mr. Lifton provided audiotapes, videotapes, and transcripts of his previous interviews of John Stringer, Floyd Riebe, Jerrol Custer, Edward Reed, and James Sibert that materially assisted the staff in preparing for depositions of these Bethesda autopsy participants.

R. j. Gerald Posner. In an exchange of letters with the Review Board's General Counsel, Mr. Posner was asked if he would donate to the JFK Collection his notes and tape recordings (if there were extant tape recordings) of interviews he claims to have conducted with Drs. Humes and Boswell, the 2 Navy prosecutors, while researching his book *Case Closed*. [Mr. Posner, while under oath before the Legislation and National Security Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations on November 17, 1993, had stated that both Navy autopsy prosecutors--Drs. Humes and Boswell--had reversed their original Warren Commission opinions on the location of the entry wound in President Kennedy's cranium while before the HSCA forensic pathology panel, from a "low" entry wound to one 4 inches higher, and had verified that reversal to him during his interviews of them. When asked by another witness, Mr. James Lesar, whether he would donate his notes of those interviews to the JFK Collection at the National Archives, and whether he had any audiotapes of those interviews, Mr. Posner responded--see pages 112-113 of subject hearing--"I would be happy, Mr. Chairman, to ask Drs. Humes and Boswell if they would agree for their notes to be released to the National Archives."] Mr. Posner declined the Review Board's first attempt to get him to donate his notes of these interviews to the ARRB for placement in the JFK Collection, and never responded to the Review Board's second letter.
