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SECRET

31 March 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: DD/P Meeting with Messrs. Barnes, Stanulis, Hunt, and Droller on 31 March 1961.

1. This meeting was called because the DD/P and Mr. Barnes were somewhat perturbed about the quality and tone of the Draft of the Cuban White Paper. A copy of this draft had been sent to Mr. Schlesinger of the White House who had also expressed his disappointment in the draft.

2. The DD/P made the point that the Cuban White Paper should have the most powerful appeal that can be devised. He went on to say that we are primarily interested in getting rid of a Communist regime in Cuba and that it is really up to the Cubans to choose the progressive, liberal, forward-looking government they want. "I am worried," the DD/P remarked, that in an indirect way the Cubans were writing for the American market; that is to say that they might still be under the impression that the look which prevailed under the old administration was still favored by some U.S. elements. Everything possible should be done to convince Miro and members of the Revolutionary Council of the contrary. In this connection, Messrs. Bissell and Barnes wondered out loud whether [redacted] would not be handicapped by his own personal convictions in making a convincing case when presenting the current American viewpoint.

3. The sum total of the remarks of Messrs. Stanulis, Hunt, and Droller were:

a. The draft should not be looked upon as a really strict indication of the opinions of the Revolutionary Council. The Revolutionary Council had been faced with tight deadlines and they have been presented with many additional problems including their trip to Guatemala, their relations to the military, etc. Also, we said, it should be remembered that Miro did not care for Ray and that the only reason he was keeping up negotiations with Ray was that he believed the State Department (Bonsal and Berle) were in favor of this. Mr. Stanulis pointed out that the [redacted] assignment was a bit delicate in view of the letters long and faithful service with the VII Division.

4. At the end of the meeting Mr. Stanulis asked the DD/P whether a decision on the Mosquera affair had been reached. Mr. Bissell said that this activity should be terminated. Chief, WED and many others intimately concerned with this matter agreed that this would be the wisest course to take. He himself felt that on balance this operation would be counter-productive.

GERARD DROLLER
C/WH/PA

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