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19 October 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT : Meeting in Mr. Coerr's office, 1100-1230, 13 Oct 61

PARTICIPANTS: Messrs. Coerr, Wollam, Hurwitch, [redacted]
Colonel Johnson

1. Colonel Johnson gave a full account of his two meetings with Dr. MIRO in Miami on 5 and 6 October, following in detail the Memoranda for the Record prepared by Colonel Johnson of these meetings. He also outlined the items Paula had given [redacted] as the budget for 1961 on the basis of their receiving \$100,000 for that month. That outline, it was remarked, appears to be largely the same as the old FRD budget. All present felt that this budget appeared to be well-padded and largely for salaries. It was remarked by Colonel Johnson that there seemed to be a very good possibility that some of those on the salary list may also be receiving support from HEW. Colonel Johnson remarked that he would be seeing Dr. MIRO on Monday, 16 October, at which time he expects to clarify some of the budget matters and also to get from CIA's Miami station some more details from Mr. Paula.

2. Mr. Coerr raised the question of what was the cover to be used by Colonel Johnson in his contacts with Dr. MIRO. Colonel Johnson said that the cover question had not yet been resolved, that it was questionable how long any cover would hold up, particularly with the press, that the cover of public relations consultant, the cover of a research man or teacher in Miami, and various other possibilities were under consideration. Mr. Coerr commented that the astute press representatives might soon learn the identity of the CIA representative with MIRO, particularly if opposition leaders like PRIO, who, he remarked, already seems to know, should become angry and report in the press what they know. Mr. Hurwitch stated that MIRO had told him that PRIO, or a representative of PRIO, had said to MIRO, "I understand that you have a Colonel Johnson as your representative with the U. S. Government." MIRO also declared to Mr. Hurwitch that only he, MIRO, and his secretary, ARAGON, had reason to know of Colonel Johnson's role. There was some speculation on how PRIO had learned of the matter.

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3. Mr. [] said that there was need to clarify just who Colonel Johnson represented to Dr. MIRO, that MIRO had been told he would have a representative who would have frequent contact with Mr. Goodwin in the White House and Mr. Woodward and others at the Department of State and would also be in contact with the Agency, and that it was accordingly the understanding of the Agency that Colonel Johnson would therefore represent or be the link between Dr. MIRO and the U. S. Government, at least in the Miami area. He remarked that this certainly had some bearing on the cover matter and its security aspects. Mr. Coerr remarked that it seemed Colonel Johnson was simply an overt representative of the Agency. Mr. [] remarked that this was hardly possible and still have any security or deniability. If he was overt, he was automatically a representative of the U. S. Government. Mr. Hurwitsch interposed that he considered Colonel Johnson to be solely the representative of the Agency. He said that Mr. Goodwin had said that he, Goodwin, only wanted to be consulted on the most important issues and that MIRO's normal contact in Washington for policy guidance should be with the Cuban desk in the Department of State. In Miami, Colonel Johnson would then work out with MIRO the Agency support of these policies.

4. Mr. Hurwitsch continued, expressing his view that Colonel Johnson should have the authority from the Agency to discuss and approve Dr. MIRO's operational plans such as tours to Latin America, support of internal groups and the like and, if certain plans were approved by them, to sit down with MIRO, the military advisors and representatives of the internal groups, and work out final details for actually running operations in support of these elements. Mr. [] countered, "It is by no means as simple as that. This is a lot more complicated than just having two or a dozen people sit down in Miami and agree on something. Take, for instance, the simple matter, relatively speaking, of sending to Latin America a person on a speaking tour. Did you know that the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the FBI require all requests for support from them to be sent back here to Washington and then their people in Miami have to be instructed by their Headquarters here in Washington to facilitate such travel, thus, in effect, the final control on travel is up here in Washington and it doesn't even reside in the Agency. Each individual has to be so handled." Mr. Hurwitsch said he thought that this could be worked out so that it could be done entirely locally in Miami. Mr. [] expressed some doubt and said that somehow

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he had the impression that MIRO had little assets but thought that if he could acquire all the facilities of CIA as a government entity placed at his disposal, he could do something. Of course these facilities and the authority of CIA simply could not be turned over to Dr. MIRO.

5. Colonel Johnson said that he felt there was a considerable area in which we could support Dr. MIRO and he referred to the State Department's propaganda plan, "Operacion Grieta," which Dr. MIRO said he had received during his visit to Mr. Hurwitch and Mr. Morales Carrion. Mr. Hurwitch explained that this was in no sense a Department of State plan but rather a suggested draft by Morales Carrion and passed to MIRO as merely an indication of the sort of propaganda operation in Latin America that might be effective.

6. On the subject of propaganda and the activities of the "collateral groups" like the FORD, the DRE, etc. outside the CRC, both Mr. Wollam and Mr. Hurwitch said they believed it would be possible to transfer these groups and their activities in their entirety to Dr. MIRO in accordance with his desires. Mr. [] said he sympathized with MIRO's position but doubted that it would work. Mr. Hurwitch said that if we had some doubts on this matter, he wondered why these doubts had not been brought up by Mr. Bissell in the discussions with Mr. Goodwin. Mr. Hurwitch then claimed he had a Goodwin memo saying the DRE, FORD, and all internal groups must be financed through MIRO. Mr. Hurwitch wondered when this new position had developed in the Agency. Mr. [] stated that the Agency had had long experience during the past two years in dealing with the various Cuban elements both in and outside Cuba, and that these types of problems had existed from the beginning and although they may seem new to Mr. Hurwitch and Mr. Wollam, who had recently come on the desk, they certainly were not new to Mr. Coerr, who readily agreed. Mr. [] pointed out that, in the early stages of 1960, attempts were made to form some sort of coalition of the miscellaneous Cuban groups. Finally the FRD was born and much later the CRC, responsibility for which was then transferred to the White House and the State Department after the invasion. In the first or early stages mentioned, relatively little had come of our attempts to generate meaningful activities through Cuban-controlled channels such as the FRD, that the Agency, to achieve any real degree of success in developing propaganda and other activities against Castro, had to form miscellaneous groups, political and collateral, and then try to

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show them one way or the other under the umbrella of the FRD. He pointed out that the most telling criticism made by the press and by members of the State Department, too, at that time was that we were forcing these various groups through monetary control into joining the FRD. He stated further that this had been discussed in Baltimore last month in detail with Dr. MIRO, who at that time seemed to agree that if Dr. MIRO and the CRC were to succeed in controlling the other groups, both collateral and political, it ideally should be by leadership rather than by exercising financial control.

7. Mr. [] then brought up the question of just how far should we go in support of MIRO and the Council, and how are we going to justify some of these expenses. Considerable discussion followed, at the conclusion of which Mr. [] said he would like to throw out on the table some specific points simply as an indication of some of the problem areas which he felt had been at least touched upon by the discussion and to which in the coming weeks some consideration would have to be given, although certainly this meeting should not try to arrive at any definitive answers:

a. It should be clarified whether or not, in fact, some of those persons listed as receiving salaries from the FRD are also receiving economic aid from the HEW.

b. It should be noted that Dr. MIRO's request to engage in activities are sometimes very unrealistic. For example, at one point Dr. MIRO wanted to take over the Swan Island operation and wanted to put up a \$2,000,000 radio station at Key West to beam propaganda to Cuba and also to jam Cuban broadcasts.

c. The proposal to have round table discussions including Dr. MIRO, his military commission, and representatives of the internal groups to decide on sabotage and commando-type raids is rather unrealistic for a variety of reasons, including security factors and the question of whether or not this would be acceptable to any or all of the internal groups.

d. Dr. MIRO has apparently the idea that he can use his million dollars for whatever he desires with little or no advance approval, and above this figure he may ask for unlimited funds for operations. This area certainly needs clearing up.

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e. Dr. MIRO has requested that the Agency turn over to him the funds, the control of the bank accounts, and the entire mechanism for making the "dependent payments." This is a rather key item related to past history. Mr. [] stated it was his personal opinion that this should not under any circumstances be turned over to the CRC to administer independently.

f. Relative to MIRO's request for aid to the Escambray resistance group, Mr. [] stated that he had discussed this matter very thoroughly with Dr. MIRO, and it appeared from that conversation that MIRO had had only one indirect contact with this group. Dr. MIRO had merely a piece of paper signed by RAMIREZ and several others allegedly in the Escambray, stating that there were some 30 of them in desperate straits and in need of support and that, if weapons were given to them, they could muster 100. Dr. MIRO was at that point not even sure how the paper had got to him and had no means whatsoever of communicating with RAMIREZ. He proposed the use of a boat to get the supplies to the North coast of Cuba, but had no idea how to get them from the North coast to the Escambray. As an alternative, he suggested an air drop by a plane from Florida.

g. With regard to the financial aid that MIRO had spoken to both Mr. Hurwitch and Colonel Johnson about, i. e., the \$70,000 monthly to be sent into Cuba via the [] Mr. [] pointed out that the [] when contacted by an Agency representative, stated that he, for the time being, did not want his Embassy utilized further in this type of transaction, that of the \$70,000 given MIRO, apparently only \$40,000 was sent into the [] and, of this, a large portion went for the needs of persons in asylum in the Embassy rather than for support of Cuban internal resistance elements outside the Embassy. In at least one instance, the Agency, through separate channels, had, in fact, arranged to send funds to the principal internal group which was supposed to have received-- but didn't-- a portion of the \$40,000. Certainly we could not give further support to this activity without a good deal of clarification of exactly how future funds were to be sent in by Dr. MIRO.

8. Mr. Hurwitch then said that, with regard to Dr. MIRO's proposal for the Council to establish itself on Cuban soil via a commando operation and then get U. S. military support, this had been brought up

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repeatedly with Mr. Goodwin, and Dr. MIRO had been told flatly not to count on a U. S. military operation against Cuba. Mr. Hurwitch said that MIRC now seems to be making the same proposal again through Colonel Johnson, and that he should be discouraged from making any plans for such an operation.

9. Mr. Hurwitch said that he believed something could be done for the three Cuban residents of the U. S. who had fought at Playa Giron, but who now couldn't get aid through the Refugee Council or Social Security. He offered to take care of any such matters with HEW. Accordingly, the names and data were left with Mr. Wollam for Mr. Hurwitch's use. Mr. Hurwitch added that Mr. Wise at the Refugee Center in Miami might be a good contact if CIA wanted to handle these matters itself in Miami.

[Redacted]

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Attn: Col Johnson
Mr. Ellis

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